Master of Arts (MA)
Philosophy and Religious Studies
I defend Martin Heidegger’s philosophy from Lee Braver’s contention that it espouses or entails anti-realism, and instead contend that it strongly supports a robust realism. Realism is, in essence, the metaphysical position which states that human beings are aware—or are capable of being aware—of entities that exist independently of us. The counter-position, anti-realism, sometimes equated with idealism, holds that this is not the case. Braver breaks down these simplistic definitions into several more technical propositions, or “matrices,” and attempts to show how Heidegger rejects the realism matrices in favor of their anti-realist counterparts. I will likewise examine the matrices, arguing that Heidegger rejects all but one of them, but that, contrary to the tradition, none of these are essential components of a realist position. Furthermore, I argue that in rejecting these matrices, Heidegger is able to construct a philosophical theory that embraces the most important matrix, and therefore the essence of realism itself, in a novel way.
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Bounds, Graham Charles, "The return to the world: precís of a defense of Heideggerian realism" (2012). LSU Master's Theses. 3987.