Degree

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Accounting

Document Type

Dissertation

Abstract

The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act (DF) created asset size thresholds associated with considerable costs. Avoidance of these thresholds has changed the distribution of banks and created a discontinuity around $10 billion in total assets. The thresholds create incentives for managers below the thresholds to stifle asset growth. This study examines loan sales and securitizations, marketable securities, and the allowance for loan losses account as methods of slowing growth, and also tests for unintended consequences of suboptimal asset shifting on risk, regulatory ratings, and earnings quality. Results demonstrate that post DF, slow growing private financial institutions (FIs) just below the threshold increase the asset held-to-maturity securities, while public FIs show loan increases. Public FI just below the threshold post-DF have higher credit quality and liquidity risk, and lower accruals quality, and their private counterparts have lower credit quality and lower liquidity risk. This study contributes to the literature on the earnings quality, regulatory ratings, ownership structure, and methods of slow growth for financial institutions.


Date

8-3-2018

Committee Chair

Hollie, Dana

Available for download on Friday, August 01, 2025

Included in

Accounting Commons

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