John Ford's Moral Perspective: a Reading of "The Broken Heart" and "'Tis Pity She's a Whore."

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JOHN FORD'S MORAL PERSPECTIVE: A READING OF

THE BROKEN HEART AND 'TIS PITY

SHE'S A WHORE

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of English

by

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ABSTRACT

Remembering to be cautious in the moral outlook one assigns to Ford, we suggest in this study that Ford's moral perspective involves a clearly defined code of ethical behavior, a code rooted in Christian beliefs yet modeled in significant respects on a similar code discernible in Sophocles' Oedipus the King. The Christian foundation for the ethical system appears in Ford's early religious poem, Christ's Bloody Sweat; the influence of classical Greek and Roman thinkers on the formulation of Ford's ethical precepts becomes evident in Ford's early prose pamphlet, The Golden Meane, and continues in a later, similar prose pamphlet, A Line of Life, which also indicates Ford's fusion of Christian and classical moral attitudes. This combination of Christian and classical ethical ideas coalesces into a unified system most clearly stated and dramatized in The Broken Heart; Ford's statement of his ethical system in this play echoes in important parallels, both moral and dramatic, a related ethical attitude perceptible in Sophocles' Oedipus the King. Ford's continuing preoccupation with this same moral approach to human behavior also dominates in his development of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, though here Ford's presentation focuses primarily on the pervasive ill effects resulting from man's contemptuous distortion of the code's moral intent.

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In Christ's Bloody Sweat Ford establishes the need for a guide for human conduct by emphasizing in Christian terms the uncertain nature of human existence; then he provides a system of right conduct: achieving self-reformation by following reason's moderating guide and contritely foregoing sinfulness and thereafter becoming a soldier in Christ despite pain and deprivation. An essential element in thus becoming spiritually worthy is dependent upon human pity for Christ's suffering: man's reciprocal pity for Christ's manifestation of compassion becomes an expression of religious reverence. In both The Golden Meane and A Line of Life Ford follows the same basic pattern although his approach here is secular rather than religious, though no less certain and didactic. The emphasis on pity becomes in the first work a reiterated emphasis on nobility and wisdom and in the second a largeness of spirit which incorporates both religious reverence and human compassion.

The assumptions and emphases in these early works become central to Ford's dramatic vision in The Broken Heart. Ford, continuing his didactic approach, develops a world of uncertainty, deceit and adversity, offers through Tecnicus an ethical standard based on religious reverence and human compassion, dramatizes the ill-effects resulting from abuse of this standard, especially through the characters Ithocles and Orgilus, and provides through Nearchus the spiritual hope inherent in following the code. In each step of this development Ford reflects striking parallels with Sophocles'
dramatization of the Oedipus story.

In 'Tis Pity She's a Whore the pattern established in The Broken Heart reappears, but here the commonly accepted code is distorted into a tool for human manipulation, thus becoming a basis for seeming virtue and honor based on a perversion of reverence. Here Ford creates an atmosphere of moral confusion; however, that confusion is not his own but rather that of the world of his play. Ford seems to view Giovanni and Annabella with a great sadness because in their world each seems the only viable alternative for the other and because their love eventually brings them both to the same degenerate level of the others; Giovanni does not regain a worthy level, but Annabella does—through repentance. Ford makes clear, primarily through Annabella, that another way of the world, another code of behavior, is possible, and he seems both sad and angry that such a viable way is ignored or travestied.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In recent years John Ford's dramas have received increasing attention, much of which focuses on whether or not his dramas reveal a moral perspective and, if so, the exact nature of that moral perspective. This study continues that exploration in the belief that Ford did indeed reveal a definite moral concern, one which began as conventional orthodox Christianity in his early religious poem, Christ's Bloody Sweat, blended with neo-Stoicism in his early moral prose pamphlets, The Golden Meane and A Line of Life, and developed in his drama, notably in The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, into an essentially Christian honor code that reveals striking parallels to a similar code perceptible in Sophocles' Oedipus the King. Ford's moral seriousness manifests itself in a didactic insistence both in his early works and in his later plays, and his moral earnestness continues even when threatened by what seems to be frustrated confusion.

Beginning with the nineteenth century, Ford's critics evidence deep division in their judgments of his moral attitude. On the one hand, many critics condemn, with faint praise or outrightly, Ford's moral ambiguity, at the least, or his moral anarchy, at the most. Primarily, these
critics object to his choice of indecently sensational subject matter, such as incest in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, which they believe he dramatizes, as Felix E. Schelling complains, in a "wonderful and dangerous way." ¹ William Hazlitt, Hartley Coleridge, William Gifford, George Saintsbury, James Russell Lowell, Adolphus W. Ward, W. A. Neilson, C. F. Tucker-Brooke, Muriel C. Bradbrook, Thomas B. Tomlinson and others generally follow this line of criticism though with differing degrees of indignation. ²


man, in an article influential in subsequent twentieth-century Fordian criticism, synthesizes previous negative appraisals of Ford when he names Ford "an apostle of passion," "a decadent romanticist," and "a romantic rationalist in morals."³ For critics such as Sherman and those who share the basics of his appraisal, Ford must be approached with a wary readiness to detect and condemn any hint of dubious morality which, as Adolphus W. Ward suggests, reflects "something unsound" in Ford's nature.⁴

On the other hand, critics such as Charles Lamb, Havelock Ellis, and Algernon C. Swinburne find Ford not morally reprehensible but morally praiseworthy for seeking, despite difficulties, to portray such problems as incest or, as Havelock Ellis puts it in his comparison of Ford with Stendhal and Flaubert, "the naked soul."⁵ Many modern critics have expanded this view, placing less emphasis on Ford's moral rectitude than on his analytical abilities, though often noting that Ford uses a conventional moral attitude as a dramatic background against which he silhouettes

³ S. P. Sherman, ed. 'Tis Pity She's a Whore and The Broken Heart by John Ford (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1915), xxiii-liv.


his character studies. Una Ellis-Fermor, for example, in her discussion of Ford in *The Jacobean Drama*, acknowledges instances of "actual moral obliquity," but essentially dismisses them by emphasizing that in his plays Ford explores untried territory, "abnormal conditions of mind or unusual experiences and relations," in which he "cannot fall back upon a tried convention or upon deductions from recorded experience" but in which he nevertheless manifests "a grave and unaltering faith in the ultimate prevalence of underlying virtue in the universe of the mind."6 A similar emphasis on Ford's analytical ability occurs in H. J. Oliver's *The Problem of John Ford* when Oliver stresses that Ford's "strength lay in analysis and inquiry." Oliver notes that Ford does not "inquire into the causes of social good and evil," maintaining, however, that "it cannot be a handicap to a dramatist that he is interested in people as individuals, even if he is not attracted by all of them."7 A further discussion of Ford's concern with character develops in M. Joan Sargeaunt's *John Ford* when she disagrees with S. P. Sherman's moral indictment of Ford and upholds the view that "Ford was interested in any situation that revealed character, normal as well as abnormal, and charac-


ters conventionally moral or immoral."  

Other critics who do not so emphatically stress Ford's powers as an analyst do, however, note the strong moral strain in his work. Robert Davril, for instance, in *Le Drame de John Ford,* suggests the value of stoical suffering as an ethical norm in Ford's plays. Clifford Leech in *John Ford and the Drama of his Time* recognizes a tension between pagan ethics and Christian ethics but sees therein a definite moral concern; although believing that Ford's plays do not satisfy on every level of consciousness, he maintains that patient perseverance beyond the surface of Ford's tragedies will reveal "a kind of experience . . . where events tumble haphazardly from life's sleeve, but where uniform principles of being and virtue are strenuously affirmed." Cyrus Hoy also recognizes a moral norm in Ford's plays, especially in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, which has received the strongest criticism. Noting a kind of moral reversal in the character of Giovanni, Hoy explains that this moral confusion "must be seen in the context of a world where a conventional concept of justice prevails," a concept which Hoy believes Ford provides.

Charles O. McDonald in his discussion of The Broken Heart finds "an underlying concept of morality" which he sees epitomized in Calantha: "Calantha's actions are certainly meant to set those of all the other characters in a firm moral perspective, to indicate clearly their lesser nobility of action and of soul."  

Such interest in both negative and positive assessments of Ford's moral concerns has recently generated frequent re-evaluations of Ford's moral position. Generally, these later studies of Ford have sought to explain more carefully what attitudes Ford expressed in his plays by understanding the context out of which he wrote. Four such studies of particular significance in this present study are those of Robert Ornstein, R. J. Kaufmann, Irving Ribner, and Mark Stavig.

Robert Ornstein in The Moral Vision of Jacobean Tragedy views Ford's tragedies as dealing with ethical problems or situations which appeal to an aristocratic rather than a popular audience: "he projects the aristocratic values of his age into a storied or aesthetically distanced past." Ornstein sees 'Tis Pity She's a Whore and The Broken Heart as tragedies of "spiritual disintegration," in the first of which Ford "imperfectly executes the moral design" but in the second of which he completes the moral

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design, especially in the character of Penthea "who, ex-
pressing in the beauty of her own life the correspondence
of poetic vision and moral knowledge, reaffirms the essen-
tial humanity of ethical ideals." Ornstein maintains that
although Ford "did not always possess the tact required for
the investigation of the darker ways of passion," he made
judgments "based on a clearly defined set of values." In
fact, Ornstein asserts that Ford wrote "with a far greater
ethical assurance than did his predecessors" in that, lack-
ing "pervading skepticism," he probed "beneath the surface
of conventional morality" and investigated "the rare indi-
vidual instance that proves the moral 'rule.'" Thus, ac-
cording to Ornstein, "Because he was concerned with the in-
dividual rather than the typical Ford does not offer uni-
versal truths." Ornstein concludes that Ford wrote with a
deep "sense of the communion between the individual and so-
ciety" and thereby conveyed a knowledge "that circumstances
'condition' acts and give them their moral nature" while at
the same time manifesting "an ethical judgment that is in-
dividual, flexible, and humane, not rigid, dogmatic, and
absolute." 13

Similar to Ornstein's emphasis on circumstances as
determining the moral nature of deeds is R. J. Kaufmann's
interest in the force of situations as determinants of be-

13 Robert Ornstein, The Moral Vision of Jacobean
Tragedy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960),
pp. 200-21.
behavior in Ford's drama. In his essay, "Ford's Tragic Perspective," which emphasizes 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, Kaufmann develops the thesis that Ford deals not with problems but with situations: "irreducible situations in which the qualities of the participants necessarily harden into tragic contours through their relations with each other." Kaufmann perceives one "core situation" in Ford, "one of misalliance, of natures subtly mismatched and progressively at odds with themselves and with received sanctions." As Ford seeks to portray the character forcing his actions into congruence with such distorted situations, Ford becomes a "student of the arbitrary," an existentialist exploring the painful results of an individual mistaking his identity:

It is the most special quality of the Fordean hero that he calls himself to a role that his residual nature (conscience and shaping habits) will not permit him to fulfill. The protagonist misidentifies himself through a too arbitrary choice, disregards too much in himself, and tragedy results. It is this troubled contest between overt resolve and inner need, between what we demand and what we are free to accept, that makes for the tension of tragic experience.

Here Kaufmann speaks primarily of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore; in a later essay, however, he deals solely with The Broken Heart but continues the focus on the forcing of an individual into too rigid a pattern. In his essay, "Ford's 'Waste Land": The Broken Heart," the former situation of misalliance...
ance which fatally distorts character becomes the study of the "governing image of forestalled growth," an image which expresses the individual's inability to conform to a rigid theory of social moral obligation. Kaufmann reaches the conclusion that The Broken Heart is a "tragedy of manners" in which Ford endeavors to "raise maxims of social prudence to the level of commanding moral obligations." The Broken Heart, then, "subscribes to a philosophy of manners, endorses a theory of obedience, and subsides finally into a condition of social entropy in which none of the major characters has an iota of latitude in the face of his vision of duty." Thus, in both of these provocative essays, Kaufmann reflects Ford's preoccupation with the need for a viable moral code.

Irving Ribner in Jacobean Tragedy: The Quest for Moral Order also explores the moral position evident in Ford's plays, noting that it "is more subtle than his critics usually have been willing to allow." Ribner disagrees specifically with Ornstein's conclusion that Ford portrayed "the rare individual instance that proves the moral 'rule.'" Although Ribner, unlike Kaufmann, makes no case for Ford's existentialism nor one for his theory of moral obligation, like Kaufmann he does maintain that Ford creates predicaments which test the ethical gymnastics of his characters. In fact, Ribner argues that the main prob-

lem with Ford's ethical concern in his tragedies is that he does not satisfactorily resolve the ethical predicaments into which he works his characters:

What sets Ford apart from his contemporaries is not a disregard for moral issues, but an inability to lead his audience to a full resolution of the moral problems which he poses. His tragedies of paradox, products of a sceptical age which can no longer accept without question the doctrine of a human law reflecting the will of God in a perfectly reasonable and harmonious universe, such as Richard Hooker had expressed it in some half century before. We cannot find in Ford's tragedies the kind of moral certainty we may find in Shakespeare, and it is this fact which reveals John Ford as among the most pessimistic tragedians of his age. He draws for us the tragic plight of humanity aware always of evil but unable to find good, forced to live in a world where moral certainty seems impossible, and able to escape destruction only by blind conformity to principles which oppose man's reason and his most basic human feelings. The tragedy of Ford's heroes and heroines is their inability to find a satisfactory alternative to sin. They can only die with courage and dignity.

Thus, according to Ribner, Ford's dramas deal with moral paradoxes which portray human tragedy as "man's inability to escape moral uncertainty" in a world which offers hope only in a "blind acceptance of the moral order which runs counter to his highest human attribute, his searching rational spirit." Such dramatic portrayals are "a perfect expression of the Caroline scepticism," a scepticism which is "the product of a search for moral order which can only resolve itself in paradox, and never in the kind of certainty attained by those Elizabethan forebears whom Ford so assiduously imitated and in whose company he longed in vain.
to be."¹⁶ Ribner, then, views Ford as consumed with the realization of a need for moral order but incapable of credibly filling that need for his characters.

In contrast to Ornstein’s view of Ford’s situational ethics, Kaufmann’s view of his existentialism, and Ribner’s perception of his insoluble moral paradoxes born of Caroline scepticism, Mark Stavig develops his idea that Ford’s work manifests a stable ethical standard which provides the basis for resolution of human dilemmas in Ford’s tragedies. Stavig maintains that all of Ford’s earlier work as well as the plays lead to the development of traditional Renaissance Christian neo-Stoicism:

Ford is perhaps best seen as a Christian neo-Stoic who conceives of true honor as combining noble thought with heroic action. Man should dedicate his life to carrying out the highest ideals of his Christian society. True honor requires that selfish desires to achieve superficial worldly success and happiness be sacrificed for the deeper spiritual wisdom that comes from following virtue and truth. With the security of this inner wisdom, man can then confidently act in the world because no matter what happens his nobility is secure. If honor is not based upon virtue, however, it is an empty pretense that may fool some men but can never deceive God or the individual himself. He will remain troubled and dissatisfied until he achieves the wisdom that comes from a proper attitude toward the things of this world.

Stavig emphasizes that Ford’s ethical standard does not admit an easy resolution to life’s difficulties: " Implicit in his choice of themes is his recognition that living a virtuous life is difficult because of the temptations that

face man. Ford does not pick situations in which a character is faced with a clear moral choice and brings about his own destruction by choosing wrongly. Instead he picks protagonists who represent the highest ideals of their society and places them in perilous situations not entirely of their own making." For instance, Ford sympathizes with his separated, initially virtuous lovers whose plights are complicated by situations beyond their control, but the dramatist "does not excuse or romanticize his lovers." Rather, Ford portrays these lovers as "products of a society in which an absolute, idealized morality is applied to human beings no matter what their situation, but Ford believes in those standards." Thus, though Ford portrays the serious difficulty in adhering to his high ethical codes "in a society whose institutions have been corrupted by human weaknesses, he does not question the moral order." Such difficulty requires the character's increased effort of ethical control. Stavig maintains that "It is a measure of Ford's Christian neo-Stoicism that his highest praise is reserved for those who recognize their plight honestly and overcome it through humility, restraint, and common sense.\(^\text{17}\)

Thus, Ornstein, Kaufmann, Ribner, and Stavig separately probe into Ford's plays seeking to determine Ford's moral position. Each acknowledges a genuine moral concern in Ford's work, though each understands that moral concern

\(^{17}\text{Mark Stavig, John Ford and the Moral Order (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), pp. 188-91.}\)
in a different way. This present study continues the previous efforts in the hope of contributing to a clarification of Ford's moral views as they are expressed in *The Broken Heart* and *'Tis Pity She's a Whore*. It does not, however, take a position similar to that of either Ornstein or Kaufmann; while recognizing the great value of Ornstein's and Kaufmann's studies, it does not attempt to explain either Ford's situational ethics or his existentialism. On the other hand, it follows Ribner's lead in the belief that Ford does search for moral order; however, unlike Ribner, it suggests that Ford is not stymied by moral paradoxes. Rather, like Stavig, this study suggests that Ford offers a definite and essentially Christian moral code; however, it diverges most clearly from Stavig's "broad humanistic approach stressing rational common sense and simple faith" by offering the possibility of a more systematic and well-defined moral code, the essential points of which bear a provocative resemblance to ethical precepts which can be traced in Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*.

Several early critics have noted an affinity between Ford and the classical Greek dramatists. For example, in *Chambers's Cyclopedia of English Literature*, Edmund Gosse comments that Ford, "in his finest plays, and pre-eminently in *The Broken Heart*, reminds us less of the more glowing characteristics of the English school than of other

18 Stavig, p. 187.
dramatic literatures—that of Greece in the past, that of France in the immediate future." Gosse's emphasis is on Ford's "severity, we might almost say that rigidity, of his dramatic form." Later critics, such as Emile Legouis and Louis Cazamian in A History of English Literature, relate Ford to the classical Greek drama. Though bemoaning the "amoral" paganism manifested in his treatment of love, they express their admiration for him as "a true poet who wrote carefully, harmoniously, and restrainedly, and whose nature inclined him to a dramatic form more classical than that affected by his predecessors." Legouis and Cazamian extend their comparison beyond dramatic form to include the occurrence of fate in Ford's works: "Ford, by the belief in fatality which dominates his work, joins hands with the Greeks, not by an effect of mere artistry but in virtue of a special temperament. The impression he makes is as deep as it is painful. His plays move in a heavy, still, and thundery atmosphere. Their lack of even the lightest breath of lively and wholesome air is disquieting." Una Ellis-Fermor also suggests a basis for comparing Ford with the classical Greek dramatists, specifically Sophocles. She notes that the two dramatists share a "distinctive quality" which she describes as a "coldness and restraint," "a

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20 Legouis and Cazamian, pp. 506, 509.
grave chill dignity in which the emotions seem to be recollected rather than felt. Thus, the association of Ford's drama with that of Sophocles is neither new nor unusual.

Other reasons for comparing the two dramatists emerge when Ford's Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore are examined in the light of Sophocles' Oedipus. Such an examination reveals striking similarities in the attitude toward man's moral and ethical relationship with his world and himself found both in Sophocles' Oedipus the King and in Ford's Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. The intention in this present study is not, of course, to assert that Ford attempted to apply pure Sophoclean ideas or ideals in his plays; however, the purpose is to provide insight into Ford's moral perspective by exploring in detail the resemblances between ethical attitudes found in Sophocles' Oedipus and Ford's two tragedies.

Both Sophocles and Ford portray man as occupying a precarious position in an uncertain world by stressing that the superior vision and wisdom of the inscrutable gods contrast sharply with the limited vision and knowledge of man, that man is constantly subject to his passions which overwhelm reason, and that he is subject to the treacherous passions of other men. While situating man thus unstably, both dramatists suggest at the same time an ethical code to guide man in striving for a sense of equilibrium in his un-

21 Ellis-Fermor, p. 229.
certain situation, a code which consists basically of mani-
ifesting piety and reverence toward the gods, treating other
human beings justly and compassionately, and maintaining
both rational self-control and dignified humility. Further,
in both the plays under discussion, Ford uses a pattern of
sight-blindness, ignorance-knowledge imagery to emphasize
his code, an imagery pattern similar to that found in
Sophocles' Oedipus.

Insofar as this emphasis on man's relationship with
his world and with an ethical code is concerned, both Soph-
ocles and Ford exhibit the characteristic concerns common
to serious tragedians. Irving Ribner states this shared
concern of tragic dramatists in reminding us of his intent
in Patterns in Shakespearian Tragedy:

In Patterns in Shakespearian Tragedy is suggested
that to be truly great tragedy must spring from the
artist's moral concern, his need to come to terms
with the fact of evil in the world, and out of his
exploration of disaster to arrive at some comprehen-
sive vision of the relation of human suffering to
human joy. I suggested also that the great ages of
tragedy have been those in which an established sys-
tem of values was being challenged by a new scepti-
cism, and that Shakespeare was able to effect his
tragic reconciliation by affirming in poetic terms
the validity of his age's Christian humanism. His
tragedies lead to a sense of order, justice and
divine purpose in the universe.22

Ribner believes, however, that tragedians of the
early seventeenth century, including Ford, found "it diffi-
cult to accept without question the view of man's position
in the universe which gives to Shakespeare's greatest trag-

22 Ribner, Jacobean Tragedy, p. xi.
Perhaps, instead of speaking of Ford's moral perspective in terms of his un-Shakespearian imitations, it might be informatively approached by discussing his similarities with Sophoclean moral attitudes.

Furthermore, additional clarification of Ford's system of values evolves from a study of the notable likenesses Ford shares with Sophocles in dramatizing the human dilemma and the necessary code. To dramatize the uncertainty of man's human condition and the validity of the code, both Sophocles and Ford depict the disastrous fate of individuals who fail to recognize, accept, and understand the human dilemma and to follow the ethical code; in each ill-fated case, the individual allows his passions, usually pride, to triumph over his reason despite the warnings and guidance of more enlightened or more reasonable associates, and, as the character's reason becomes increasingly blinded by passions, he presume to vie with the gods and disregards the rights of other men. Fated to fail in his presumption because of inexorable divine law as well as civic law, if justly administered, the offending character comes to a terrible end in punishment for his failings; however, in each case, neither dramatist condemns the fallen hero as a vil-

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23 Ribner, p. 1.

lain; rather, each maintains an attitude of human concern, sympathy and understanding, acknowledging human failings while suggesting a possible means of dealing with them.

Thus, this study concerns itself with John Ford's attempts to formulate and apply in his major tragedies, The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, a definite and systematic ethical standard; as a means of reaching a deeper understanding of Ford's moral perspective, the study presents and pursues the ethical and dramatic parallels evident in a comparison of Sophocles' Oedipus the King and Ford's Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. The presentation begins with an investigation into the reasons for noting parallels with Sophocles' Oedipus the King rather than Seneca's version of the same play. Then, having established the pertinent significant differences between Sophocles' and Seneca's dramas of Oedipus and, thereby, substantial external reasons for pursuing internal parallels between Ford's and Sophocles' plays, this study next examines Ford's early works, Christ's Bloody Sweat, The Golden Meane, and A Line of Life, in which are found important attitudes and concepts which serve as a prelude to his later fully developed ethical standard. Next, both the fully stated moral code and the parallels with Sophocles are thoroughly explored in the discussion of The Broken Heart. The last chapter of investigation focuses on 'Tis Pity She's a Whore in which the theory is still clearly active although Ford seems to emphasize the intensity of frustration which counters his ethical attitude in a decadent society.
CHAPTER 2
FORD'S RELATIONSHIP TO SENECA AND SOPHOCLES

Despite the notice of such critics as Ellis-Fermor that Ford's drama shares a certain affinity with that of Sophocles, one might well question exactly the justification for pursuing the study of more specific evidence of parallels with Sophocles' Oedipus the King, contending, on the contrary, that a claim for parallels with the Senecan Oedipus would be much more reasonable. To note that Orgilus in Ford's The Broken Heart, the play most closely echoing Sophocles, invokes the name of Oedipus in emphasizing his inability to fathom the riddle of that play's oracle would most probably meet with the response that Ford might equally as well have had in mind Seneca's Oedipus instead of Sophocles'. Such a response would have much justification because it is useless to deny that Ford felt the traditional influence of Senecan drama. In order to explain the reasons for turning to Sophocles' play, it is necessary to clarify the reasons for turning away from Seneca's play. These reasons can best be delineated by discussing the following topics: one, the extent of Senecan influence in Ford; two, whether or not Ford might have some access to Sophocles' play; and, three, the fundamental differences in Seneca's and Sophocles' presentation of the Oedipus story.
Coming as he did at the end of the great Elizabethan dramatic tradition which had borrowed freely and re-created uniquely the Senecan heritage, John Ford did undoubtedly stand as a recipient of the impressive Senecan legacy. In exploring Seneca's influence on Elizabethan dramatists, F. L. Lucas determines that Senecan evidence in Ford is too diffuse to be pinpointed:

It would be possible to follow the Senecan trail further into the flowery meads of Beaumont and Fletcher, the dignity of Massinger or the quieter gloom of Ford. But it grows too faint and derivative until at last it fails altogether in the first twilight of the English state, and the mutterings of the coming war.

Lucas does not pursue the reappearance in Ford of some of Seneca's "most quoted lines," but he acknowledges that although such echoes are "perhaps the most striking evidence of pervasive imitation," still that influence might be "at first or second or third hand."¹

J. W. Cunliffe, also discussing Senecan effects in Ford, is more precise, noticing more than a hint of Seneca in the fact that Ford "abounds in his own kind of tragic horrors" and that he is "not altogether free from a crude sensationalism." Though Cunliffe does not say so specifically, he most probably refers to the horror and sensational effect Ford creates with such devices as the chair with its engine by which Orgilus assures the death of his victim in The Broken Heart and such effects as that created by the

incestuous love theme in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore which culminates with the brother appearing on stage with his lover-sister's heart skewered on his sword. But Cunliffe points out that if Ford so borrowed from Seneca he adopted Senecan effects in a less garish way than did some of his contemporaries:

... the atmosphere of his tragedies does not overpower us with the smell of blood, as in the case of Webster and Tourneur; there is often a fresher, purer air of quiet thought and natural passion. Ford makes little use of the supernatural... Ford's genius was of too refined a character to seek the strong and coarse effects which were achieved by some of his contemporaries and predecessors.

Even when Cunliffe finds Ford "guilty of rhetorical exaggeration," such as Orgilus' speech after having vengefully trapped in the execution chair the man held accountable for his personal pain, Cunliffe finds that, given the plot situation at that moment, such "extravagance is pardonable."²

This same critic also sees a similarity between the Roman and English dramatists' introspectively reflective tendencies, but here again Cunliffe stresses that, in Ford, the difference is clearer than the likeness: "In Ford the reflective tendency is strongly marked, but his manner is all his own. He had a marvellous gift for expressing deep and yet simple thought, far removed from Seneca's artificial and strained dialectic, which was probably its far-back ancestor."³

³ Cunliffe, p. 114.
Even in discussing "the points in which Ford drew nearest to Seneca and in which he owes most to him," that is in Ford's fatalism and Ford's portrayal of a calm acceptance of death, Cunliffe makes a telling qualification. He adds parenthetically the important limitation of Ford's direct debt to Seneca when he questions, "[I]f indeed he [Ford] owes anything at all" to Seneca.\(^4\) Cunliffe, therefore, recognizes, as does Lucas, that Ford is far removed from direct Senecan influence. Though Ford is a recipient of the generally familiar and commonplace aspects of Senecan tragedy in the English Renaissance, Ford writes sufficiently far enough away in time from the full burst of Seneca's Renaissance prestige to write a drama which, while often but not precisely derivative, still bears Ford's own stamp.

Although Cunliffe hesitates decidedly concerning whether Ford "owes anything at all" to Seneca in his fatalism and his portrayal of a character's calm acceptance of death, the presence in both Seneca and Ford of fatalism and serenity in the face of death necessitates some discussion since such occurrences suggest, at least on the surface, that the two authors share Stoic concepts. Certainly Ford was familiar with Seneca as the Stoic philosopher, for in A Line of Life, Ford's carefully documented early moral pamphlet giving a guide for the virtuous man, he footnotes two references to Seneca's Epistles;\(^5\) further, Stoic, or


\(^5\) John Ford, A Line of Life in The Works of John
Neo-Stoic, precepts recur in Ford's prose and drama.

Greek Stoicism began as a philosophy which provided an essentially ethical aim and doctrine which satisfied the more practical needs of the cultured layman of post-Aristotelian Greece when philosophy had "tended to degenerate into sceptical indifference or arid formalism." Offering guidance for man by showing him how "to live wisely and attain peace from the turbulent world without and the storms of passion within," the philosophy set up the wise man as the ideal. W. G. DeBurgh in The Legacy of the Ancient World describes the nature of the Stoic philosophic life:

... it consists in following virtue, in obedience to an authoritative law of nature or reason; the sage, by subjugating emotion, and by detachment from the restless world of circumstance, disciplines his soul to self-sufficiency and inward independence. ... The Stoic was a moral aristocrat, somewhat prone to pride himself on his ascetic fortitude, to despise his weaker brethren. ... On a lower plane, Stoicism degenerated into puritanic formalism and casuistical compromises with the world that squared ill with its lofty professions. ... Stoicism exercised a continuing influence on civilization primarily because of its positive emphasis on human will: "The Stoic taught that, impotent as man seemed to be in the face of hostile circumstance, of slavery, torture, disease, and death, in reality he was absolute master of his will, and that on this mastery of will alone depended all the value and good of life." Whether or not will could be considered good depended upon "the inner character" of an in-

individual's "volition" because "the will is good when it wills the good." The Stoic considered the existing circumstances and cosmos as good since "The order of the universe, the truth of all its happenings, the nature (physis) which is its creative energy, is perfect, is law, reason, God." Reason in man corresponds to the rational principle of the universe, and to be free the individual accepts whatever befalls him as a portion of the ultimate reason, good, of the universe since the rational law which governs the universe is the function of a divine plan. Thus, the saintly Stoic sage, "by strength of inward self-determination . . . , conquers passion and wins tranquillity of soul. . . . " Thus when Stoic philosophy exhorts one to follow nature or reason, or virtue, or God, it simply repeats in alternate ways the same idea.®

The Stoic philosophy exerted its influence in Roman civilization in a modified form basically because it proved accommodatingly adaptable to the Roman sense of duty and service to the state and because the Romans were more interested in practical ends than in theoretical speculations of their own. By the time of Nero, Stoicism had "combined with sturdy Roman conservatism" and incorporated "the Aristotelian mean as a cardinal doctrine" so that it was acceptable enough to be "the orthodox creed of Rome." Seneca was such a Roman Stoic. In his essays Seneca expounded the

tenets of Roman Stoicism, and a Stoic tone generally prevails in his tragedies; however, the Stoicism of his plays is not altogether orthodox. The difference lies in his attitude toward Fate; in the essays Seneca the philosopher maintains the orthodox faith in the benevolence of Fate, but in the plays belief in the good design of Fate often falters into the question of fickle fortune. Mendell in *Our Seneca* explains that Seneca

as a poet, speaking to a wider public than any philosophic coterie . . . , allows himself the luxury of some of the more popular beliefs, especially the belief in Fortuna. He feels free to use much that is NOT Stoic, as a Christian poet, even with a predominantly religious tone, might often express an entirely un-Christian attitude toward Fate. Seneca the philosopher believed in pre-destination; the poet Seneca saw constantly in the world the caprice of Fortune.

This point should be remembered when we reach our discussion of the place and sometimes confused meaning of fate in Ford. Ford is Christian, but he sometimes seems to express an attitude toward Fate that appears un-Christian.

Stoicism, and especially the Roman Stoicism of Seneca, continued its adaptability in the medieval Christian era and the medieval drama. Seneca's formulation of Stoicism proved capable of a Christian synthesis amenable to the Church and its associated dramatic tradition; Charlton explains:

> . . . the beginnings of popular drama as the handmaid of the mediaeval church threw preponderant em-

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phasis on the moral and didactic features of tragedy. Seneca would be not only better provided in bulk with this commodity than any other ancient tragedian, but would preach a sermon remarkably to medieval taste; his favourite themes, the shortness of life, the fickleness of fortune, 'fragilitas humanarum rerum,' are so close to the medieval feeling that all flesh is grass, his supernatural figures relentlessly purs­uing the victim to his fate are so forcible an il­lustration of the hell-fire doom of sinners, that St. Jerome himself stood sponsor for the Christian efficacy of Seneca's doctrine.

The synthesis of Stoicism and Christianity maintained its authority in a more general ethical way as well as in a more specific dramatic way in the Renaissance. The Renais­sance saw a merging of diverse ethical trends, including Platonism and Aristotelianism as well as Christianity and Stoicism. Within this diversity, however, the Renaissance maintained an aristocratic ethic of gentility, an ethic which found various expressions but one which, for instance, as Herschel Baker recalls in The Image of Man, usually de­scribed a king as "a good ruler and a good man because his kingly virtues of wisdom, courage, and magnificence are matched by 'those which stirre affection,' truth, meekness, courtesy, mercy, and liberality." All these virtues "sup­port" the "master virtue of piety," and piety for many is elevated into "a sort of Neo-Stoical resignation." That is: "Ostensible disaster is only the mercy of God, Who demands reverence and not curiosity." By thus joining Christian and Stoic ethics with Platonism and Aristotelianism in a

delicately balanced conciliation, the Renaissance provided itself with an ethical statement "suitable both for the ills amenable to the exercise of man's native reason and for the ills amenable only to the ministrations of a benevolent God."

Thus the Renaissance allowed considerable leeway in human activity without exceeding ethical bounds. Such a synthesis composed Christian humanism, the polarities of which are suggested by Herschel Baker in *The Image of Man*:

This kind of bifurcated ethics employed the sovereignty of reason for disturbances in the order of nature, and the grace of God for spiritual afflictions. It was as humanistic as the Renaissance, heir to fifteen centuries of Christianity, dared to be, and until the rise of the new science it maintained a kind of precarious preeminence. It not only preserved intact the glory of God; it also affirmed the possibility and desirability of man's controlling the complex functions of his organism through his innate capacity for reason. By ringing the various changes upon it man could make his proper obeisance to God and still satisfy his secular craving for individualism, subjectivism, and personal dignity. . . . In an age productive of men whose lust for fame and conviction of excellence demanded an ethical prop, Cicero's equation of morality with rational decorum and gentility was extremely congenial. . . . In this notion of rational self-discipline the Renaissance found its ambiguous but generally satisfactory reconciliation of human and divine spheres of influence.

Thus, as Robert Hoopes says in *Right Reason in the English Renaissance*, "The tradition of Christian humanism . . . draws freely both upon pre-Christian and Christian thought for its full expression."

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Later in the Renaissance the Neo-Stoic philosophy proved a satisfactory means of imposing order on the chaotic problems beginning to result from the earlier emphasis on human worldliness; Baker notes that "In the late Renaissance, on the eve of the victory of the new science, Stoicism was revived that certain men might believe they could rely on the constancy of their own indomitable souls in a world characterized by aggression, compromise, and disorder."¹¹ Thus, Stoicism merged more decidedly with Christian humanism in the effort to maintain the humanistic synthesis of reason and faith. The long history of compatibility between Stoicism and Christianity reveals early the Christian acceptance of the Stoic Seneca. Baker in Wars of Truth records that "As early as the fourth century there appeared a fabricated correspondence between St. Paul and Seneca, so congenial were their values thought to be," and he adds that this "facile assimilation of Christian providence and Stoic law was a commonplace from Boethius through the seventeenth century."¹²

Thus, the Stoicism of Seneca, as well as that of Cicero, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and others, was incorporated into Christian humanism as a moral discipline which proved congenial to the Renaissance ethical needs. But in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, as

¹¹ Baker, Image of Man, p. 301.

Baker points out, Renaissance Neo-Stoicism assumed dominance for some:

... [W]hat was an urbane and flattering commonplace for most moral philosophers became for the Neo-Stoic a burning conviction of pre-eminence that elevated him above Church, above state, even above human nature. Of all the neo-pagan cults of the Renaissance, Neo-Stoicism provided the most chest-thumping rationalization of individualism; for an age productive of individuals who were perhaps more intense than virtuous, Neo-Stoicism provided a rhetorically splendid justification of a common attitude.

Therefore, Neo-Stoicism could under the cloak of Christian humanism sanction a fierce individualism which allowed great liberty of action without conscience if one used the argument of Stoic determinism under the guise of God-directed Providence. Though the Neo-Stoic might not be able to "conceive of freedom without law," nevertheless the law which he recognized was "the law which no man could break," the law of "that providence or destiny which determined the course of all things in nature," or natural law. In such a case, the laws of society and morality had no significance. Furthermore, such a mercilessly assertive individualism denies the ethical human virtues of Christianity, for the Stoical emphasis demands complete control of the passions so that, callously misconstrued, all human feeling evaporates. Baker states this point well:

No one . . . can argue seriously that humanitarianism was a flourishing sentiment in the sixteenth century; none the less, the virtues—passions, said the Stoic contemptuously—of pity and love were gen-

erally accounted to be integral parts of the Christian ethic. But the Stoic moralist had no choice; if complete self-realization through submitting to nature meant the eradication of all passion, then even the passions sanctioned by religion must go. . . . As for the Christian virtues, pity constituted a subversion of reason just as much as lust or anger. . . . Excessive grief over the misfortunes of one's country or of one's friends is ignoble, and based on opinion rather than reason.

Baker believes, moreover, that despite attacks in the sixteenth century on "this pose of unchristian and inhuman passivity," still in the seventeenth century, notably in Jacobean drama, "the humanistic ethics of balance, moderation and rational harmony gave way . . . to a mechanistic Stoic philosophy and an ethics that threw grave doubts on man's capacity for harmonizing the elements of his nature." 14

Seneca, then, as Stoic moralist and Stoic tragedian, maintained a clearly discernible influence on the moral tradition and the dramatic tradition of the Renaissance, including John Ford's prose and plays. The very titles of Ford's two early prose pamphlets, The Golden Meane (1613) and Linea Vitae: A Line of Life (1620), suggest the moral tone of the works, and their contents reveal a strong general Stoical influence. In the first, The Golden Meane, Ford uses his moral treatise to teach the man aspiring to virtue how to face adversity by identifying virtue with moderation. For instance, Ford warns against allowing adversity to overwhelm one so that a man lets exaggerated and irrational feelings, the result of a false judgment or opinion, deter

him from consciously willing the good: "Most men subject to those unhappinesses, like things floating on the water do not goe, but are carried; not the counsell of providence directs the steps of Discretion, but they are wholly rather carried by the violent streame of Opinion and Conceit, precisely termed Humour." One should, instead, be guided by the just proportion of reason to avoid "violence in judgment and wilfulness in error." Thus in Stoic fashion, the happy man is the virtuous man guided by reason toward the highest purpose: "Wisdom, Temperance, Valour, Justice, are the substance and hereditary possessions of a perfectly happie man, and these riches cannot be forfeited, except by a decay of Vertue, they cannot be seized except the owner cast them off, they cannot suffer contempt so long as they be nourished in a Noble mind."  

Thus speaks Ford in The Golden Meane; in A Line of Life a similarly predominant Stoic tone combines with the Christian point of view. Ford again stresses the importance of Stoic strength of will, or resolution, by which "are exemplified the perfections of the mind, consisting in the whole furniture of an enriched soul" and to which "are referred the noblest actions, which are the external arguments and proofs of the treasure within." Ford distinguishes between the private man, the public man, and the good man, showing how each should pursue goodness and virtue by fol-

ollowing reason resolutely and thereby gaining "the truest honor, a deserved fame, which is one, if worthy, of the best and highest rewards of virtue." Thus, the most virtuous man should bear Fortune's slings and arrows equably and thereby maintain his virtuous nobility:

A good man is the man that even the greatest or lowest should both be, and resolve to be; and this much may be confidently averred, that men of eminent commands are not in general more feared in the tide of their greatness than beloved in the ebb of that greatness, if they bear it with moderation. . . . Always there is a rule in observation, positive and memorable, that an interposition or eclipse of eminence must not so make a man undervalue his own desert, but that a noble resolution should still uphold its own worth in deserving well, if we aim and intend to repute and use honours but as instrumental causes of virtuous effects in actions.

Despite such Stoic sentiments, however, Ford is not unequivocally Stoic in A Line of Life. He combines his Stoicism with Christian humanism. In defining the line of life of which he writes, he says that in following determinedly the line of reason man uses as guide "the most certain and infallible rule which we, as we are men, and more than men, Christians, and more than Christians, the image of our Maker, must take our level by."16 Thus, in these moral prose pamphlets, The Golden Meane and A Line of Life, Ford definitely reflects the influence of Stoic thought, but a Stoicism integrated with the expected Renaissance Christian humanism. The Stoic precepts expressed in these works come from Seneca, but they come equally, as his documentation in

A Line of Life reveals, from Cicero, Aristotle, Plutarch, Pliny, Diogenes, Horace, and St. Augustine.

Ford also reveals the effect of Stoic thought in his dramas, although not so thoroughly and with such all-embracing welcome as some critics would maintain. An important statement with regard to Senecan and stoical influence in Ford's drama occurs in Hardin Craig's influential article, "A Shackling of Accidents: A Study of Elizabethan Tragedy." Though Craig concerns himself primarily with Shakespeare, he includes Ford in the assertion that many Elizabethan dramatists were fundamentally affected by Seneca in their conceptions of tragedy. Craig's essay is so important in this context that it deserves considerable review.

In recognizing Seneca as "the preceptor of the tragic writers of the Renaissance," Craig develops the thesis that Seneca's influence extends beyond supplying various dramatic techniques to providing the Renaissance tragic writer with a stoical concept of tragedy which differs significantly from the Greek and Christian concepts of tragedy generally accepted in the Renaissance. Craig distinguishes the Christian, the Aristotelian, and the Stoical ideas of tragedy. As Craig explains in the Christian tragic concept, tragic fate is the "result of guilt and is a function of

character and conscience"; that is, "man is the responsible child of God. His joys are God's gift and his misery is God's punishment. Man's character and his conduct are the sources of weal or woe, though his disasters need not be purely punitive, for whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth." This typically Christian concept of tragedy usually ends in death, "a symbol of the final and the terrible," since the Elizabethans "in their philosophy and their morals . . . set a greater value upon death than did the ancients." The classical Greek concept of tragedy did not, of course, share the Christian world view, and thus the two concepts differ considerably; however, the two perceptions of the tragic do have one significant idea in common: man's trials and tribulations relate to the divine. As in the Christian view man's disaster relates to God's will, in the classical Greek view "human calamity is an irresistible and sometimes inexplicable manifestation of divine order. There is nothing to be done about it. Calamity must be accepted as the will of the gods delivered through the agency of fate." However, unlike the Christian view, the Greek concept provided no specific penance as a means of overcoming disaster-provoking sinfulness and "no pattern" for acceptance of disaster: "Man sustained calamity as best he could according to the strength or weakness of his humanity. If man was sufficiently strong in his fortitude, his endurance might become so heroic as to offset the evils of his lot." Nevertheless, though no set pattern for triumph existed for the Greeks,
man's lot need not be inevitably sad as contrasted with the
Christian man's lot which almost inevitably ended in death:

With Aeschylus and Sophocles and Aristotle and
wherever and as long as the mighty influence of
Aristotle prevailed, man was believed to have some
chance for happiness. He had some chance to escape
disaster, not always and in all circumstances to be
sure; but the fact remains that human life was a
possible enterprise normally and for most men. Man
could live the life of reason. This Aristotelian
document belongs to the Ethics rather than to the
Poetics. According to it man might come out a vic-
tor in the struggle.

In contrast to these Christian and Greek concepts
of tragedy, Craig offers a third, a Stoical tragic view in-
troduced by Seneca. A distinctive difference between this
tragic view and the previous two is the omission of divine
influence in man's disaster; Stoic tragedy is "philosophic
instead of religious." Here the disaster man encounters is
in no way connected with God or the gods; further, no remedy
to catastrophe or chance for happiness exists:

With Seneca the very nature of things was disas-
trous, and calamity was irresistible and inescap-
able. There was nothing left for man but to en-
dure, and in endurance lay his only hope. He
could by learning to be indifferent both to life
and death rob fate of its triumph, become a victor
in attitude in his ability to resist or meet cou-
rageously. There is also a positive way of saying
this. If man did acquire this self-dependence, if
he became the master of himself, he became also
the master of his fate.

Such a tragic view, says Craig, is "a fatalistic theory of
tragedy remotely derived from Aristotle and a stoical
theory implicit in some of the tragedies of Seneca."19

19 Ibid., 11-13.
Craig associates Ford with this latter, stoical view of tragedy rather than with the Christian or Aristotelian view. Craig acknowledges the fact that Renaissance dramatists did not consciously differentiate among the three views, "never thought the matter through," though "in practice Shakespeare and some others gave preference to the . . . Christian ideal." Still, he maintains that Shakespeare and other Renaissance dramatists were affected, often deeply, by the Aristotelian and Stoical views, and he includes Ford among those dramatists most deeply influenced, especially by Senecan tragedy:

If this is true of Shakespeare, it is even more true of his contemporaries; for Marston, Chapman, Jonson, Webster, and Ford are much more archaic than is Shakespeare. Senecan conceptions are often more fundamental to them than to Shakespeare. Since Seneca carries with him the Aeschylean idea [the idea of fate], what these closer followers of Seneca often give us is the spectacle of sheer fate, opposed or unopposed by stoical resistance.

Marston, Chapman, Jonson, and Webster do not here concern us; but Ford does. Though Ford may well be more archaic, that is, less original, more derivative, and therefore less progressive, his dramas do not seem to give "the spectacle of sheer fate, opposed or unopposed by stoical resistance." But we will delay our discussion of Ford in this context until after we review Craig's clarification of his meaning of stoical tragedy.

Craig continues his argument by explaining the dis-
tinction he perceives between Aristotelian tragedy and Seneca tragedy. To clarify his distinction, he begins by com­paring the differences between the two with the differences between what would be tragedy in the world-views of Hegel and Schopenhauer. Essentially, Hegelian tragedy would in­volve conflict between two moral rights, a moral conflict in which one side violates the other to achieve its ends; this inevitable violation would necessitate destruction of the violator in order to re-establish a unity of moral order. Such a conflict pursuing ultimately a regained moral unity would rest on the premise that happiness is possible: "... the longing, the unrest, the strife, the will to unity which is Hegel's absolute presupposes a world in which something can be done, such as [in] Aristotle's world. ... ." 21

Schopenhauer, on the other hand, if portraying his philosophy on stage, would present the conflict between will and an opposing world. In this world the will "is everywhere present as the basic ingredient of the universe, the soul of the soul, the essence of reality," and, since the will constantly seeks to be something other than what it is, unity, harmony, and happiness are impossible. Such an "exaltation of will," Craig maintains "aligns Schopen­hauer with the stoics" and implies "Schopenhauer's doctrine of the totally evil nature of all things." 22

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By making this distinction between Hegel's and Schopenhauer's world views, Craig explains his dissatisfaction with the Aristotelian analysis of tragedy when applied to certain Elizabethan tragedies and tragic heroes that do not fit the Aristotelian pattern. He finds answer to his discontent in the belief that actually two types of tragedy exist under the single definition of Aristotelian tragedy. The first kind of tragedy, like the Hegelian, is "the tragedy of character and conduct, which is also the tragedy of event." Such a type of tragedy corresponds with the following:

... those tragedies in which we behold a man or group of men making a (typically brave) struggle against an evil fate; behold them caught in the toils of an unpropitious destiny, like Oedipus, Agamemnon, Philoctetes, Ajax, or Hecuba; or see them as victims of divine justice following in the wake of their sins, like Faustus, Othello, Macbeth, Vittoria Corambona, or Beatrice Joanna.

A second kind of tragedy he recognizes as being heretofore unsatisfactorily included in the definition of Aristotelian tragedy. This second type, much like that of Schopenhauer's world view, might be called the stoic tragedy of self, an introspective tragedy which focuses not on event or flaws in character but on "man struggling for mastery of himself, struggling in order to achieve indifference to disaster and death, struggling ultimately in order to achieve a philosophic calm." Such a tragedy is at bottom, according to Craig, stoical because it assumes that "calam-
ity, shame and death" are "the inevitables of human life" and it focuses not on the avoidance of these evils but on "the triumph over them." To illustrate the distinction between the two types of tragedy, a distinction evident in emphasis rather than in event, Craig cites the Oedipus of Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* and *Oedipus at Colonnus*. In *Oedipus Rex* stoic self-mastery has not developed into a principle, whereas in *Oedipus at Colonnus* successful stoic self-mastery "is so marked as to become an artistic principle." In such plays as the latter Oedipus play, "it would seem as if here the dramatist has come close to, if he has not actually achieved a different type of tragedy."

Craig does not seek to apply this distinctive second type of tragedy to the hero-villains found in some Elizabethan drama nor to the titans of tragedy, such as Chapman's Bussy d'Ambois, who are "neither merely a villain-hero nor an Aristotelian protagonist." Rather, he seeks to apply the second definition to those dramas in which characters begin in conflict with a pervasively evil world. The final result of the conflict of these latter characters is not a resolution of the conflict but the attainment of a stoically philosophic and triumphant ascendance over both the evil and the conflict, an ascendance by which the character has achieved a self-acceptance which is at ease with suffering and, especially, death. Craig gives Shakespeare's

24 Ibid., p. 16.
Hamlet as a case in point because Craig views Hamlet as "an inquiry about the validity of human existence, the fundamental query of Stoicism on foot." For Craig, Hamlet's following statement to Horatio constitutes the center of the development of the Hamlet character:

I defy the augury which says that there is a special significance in the fall of a sparrow. I tell you that death, which has so long threatened me and caused me dread, has at last lost its terrors for me. It will come, and I have at last arrived at a state of mind in which I do not concern myself any longer about when it comes. "If it be now, 'tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will come; readiness is all."

Craig maintains that this speech "marks the end of a long struggle," a struggle by which Hamlet has gained his final goal through suffering. This goal, ultimate self-mastery, "is the end and aim of stoicism." Hamlet has thus achieved "a spiritual triumph in the face of death," the ideal of Stoic will.  

Craig's argument deserves so much attention in this context because he has included Ford in the list of those Elizabethan dramatists deeply influenced in their plays by Senecan stoicism, thus suggesting that Ford's dramas represent the stoical type of tragedy just defined. Without doubt stoical tenets appear in Ford; but their appearance does not constitute proof that Ford writes a stoical type of tragedy. For instance, reference to fate does occur in Ford's plays, but it is capitalized only in The Broken

25 Ibid., pp. 16-18.
Heart, the play which with its Spartan setting is most purposefully classical. Further, Ford frequently uses the terms fate, the fates, fortune, destiny, and providence without clearly differentiating what he means by each. N. W. Bawcutt in his introduction to 'Tis Pity She's a Whore seems justified in his assessment of Ford's unintentionally ambiguous use of the term fate: "Ford does not seem to have worked out a consistent and coherent theory of the relationship between fate and change, and of the extent to which they are controlled by divine purposes, but his works do not give the impression that he saw man as the plaything of random and inexplicable forces." 26

Yet there are strong indications in each of the two plays under consideration that Ford clearly was interested in divine intervention or control of human affairs; fate in his plays more often seems the instrument of the gods or God. Those characters who defy the gods or God and attempt to take fate into their own hands, or, as Craig put it, those who express "exaltation of the will," receive the most severe punishment. For instance, in The Broken Heart both Ithocles and Orgilus ignore the truth in the oracle brought by Tecnicus, the god Apollo's priest. Ithocles ignores the oracle, saying, "My burthen lyes within me." And Orgilus sneers, "It shall not puzzle me;/ Tis dotage of a

26 N. W. Bawcutt, ed., 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, by John Ford, Regents Renaissance Drama Series (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), xvii.
withered braine." In 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, Giovanni's attitude toward fate changes according to what he desires for himself until he believes himself triumphant in securing Annabella's love; then, having abjured religion, he declares himself "regent" of the fates. Each of these characters not only experiences disaster himself but causes pain, death, and chaos for others. A passage from Ford's A Line of Life applies here:

As, then, the fabric of the globe of earth would of necessity run to the confusion out of which it was first refined, if there were not a great and watchful providence to measure it in the just balance of preserving and sustaining; so consequently, without question, the frame of our human composition must preposterously sink under its burthen, if war and prudent direction, as well in manners as in deeds, restrain it not from the dissolution and wreck the proclivity of corrupted nature doth hourly slide into.

In both The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, the problems created by the usurpers are finally solved, or purged, at great price; order and justice are regained in The Broken Heart, and Ford holds the hope of such order and justice in the next world in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. Craig says of the stoic tragedy that "calamity, shame and death" are "the inevitables of human life." Thus the world of stoical tragedy is pervasively evil, the cause of which being simply the nature of things, an evil nature which must be philosophically accepted. The worlds of The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore are rife with evil, but

27 A Line of Life, p. 392.
Ford's point seems to be that such evil is not inevitable but the result of failing to live by an ethically valid code, the one he develops or implies in each work. Thus, the plays do not seem to assume "calamity, shame and death" as "inevitables" in the world; there is an alternative to human disaster, and Ford seems to offer this alternative in his code.

Further, the protagonists in these plays do not illustrate, as does Craig's example of Hamlet, "man struggling for mastery of himself, struggling in order to achieve indifference to disaster and death, struggling in order to achieve a philosophic calm." Although Ford exhibits great interest in psychological states, as his frequent references to Burtonian psychology suggest, the characters themselves do not express an introspectively reflective concern with either their own or others' psychological states. The usual device for introspection and philosophic reflection is the soliloquy, and, as H. J. Oliver in The Problem of John Ford points out, "Ford uses soliloquy very rarely indeed, particularly for a psychological dramatist."28 Despite the fact that such characters as Ithocles, Orgilus, and Giovanna face death with a certain degree of final calm and acceptance, they have not previously agonized through their experiences in the same way as does Hamlet and thereby "triumphed" over death by achieving a hard-won "philosophic calm."

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in *The Broken Heart* exceeds the other characters in calmly facing, and even controlling, her death; but again, she does not achieve such calm through philosophic inquiry; she is not, as Craig calls Hamlet, "an inquiry about the validity of human existence, the fundamental query of Stoicism on foot." Rather, her calm seems to be the result of her adherence to an aristocratic code which demands providing a worthy example. Annabella in *Tis Pity She's a Whore* exceeds all the rest in accepting both herself and her death; but her acceptance comes not from the kind of stoical resignation of which Craig speaks but from her reconciliation with God. Hers is not simply a "philosophic calm" but a religious, a Christian calm.

An equally important point in refuting the claim that Ford's drama is essentially stoical revolves around what the achievement of stoical calm in face of death demanded. The Stoic ideal required severely controlled aloofness from passion of any kind because passion was equated with evil. The following is a helpful summary of the Stoic attitude:

... [E]vil conduct is the result of wrong judgment, or false opinion: the Stoics sometimes regard evil as the cause, sometimes as the effect of the passions or immoderate impulses. There are four such passions: pleasure, desire, grief, and fear. ... All these passions and their many variations are diseases of the soul which it is our business, not merely to moderate, but to eradicate, since they are irrational, exaggerated feelings—the result of false opinion. Apathy or freedom from passion is, accordingly, the Stoic ideal.

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29 Frank Thilly and Ledger Wood, *A History of Phil-
When such a Stoical ideal of impassiveness becomes elevated in an extreme form to a life principle, religious feelings have no place. Herschel Baker's discussion of the contemptuous Stoic attitude toward even pity and love, "integral parts of the Christian ethic," deserves brief repetition: "But the Stoic moralist had no choice; if complete self-realization through submitting to nature meant the eradication of all passion, then even the passions sanctioned by religion must go... As for the Christian virtues, pity constituted a subversion of reason just as much as lust or anger." This extreme expression of the Stoical ideal does not dominate in any of Ford's works. True, Ford advocates moderation and control, as the very title The Golden Meane suggests; but contrary to the Stoic rejection of Christian love, Ford develops as a major theme in his works the necessity of religious love, both divine and human. In Christ's Bloody Sweat, an early religious poem, Ford presents his concept of Christian piety and Christian pity, and this idea becomes a significant aspect of his overall ethical attitude.

Ford does not treat religion, God, or God's representatives lightly; in fact, a strong religious current runs throughout each of his works even to the extent of being didactic. In this respect, Ford differs considerably

Baker, Image of Man, p. 302.
from Seneca who borrowed the Greek gods and presented them almost as a dramatic convention rather than as a central part of his dramatic development of any world view. Here we recall Hardin Craig's distinction between Stoic and Aristotelian tragedy mentioned earlier: that Stoic tragedy was "philosophic" while Greek tragedy was "religious." Perhaps this distinction explains Charlton's observation that "the note of rigid fatalism and the atmosphere of overhanging doom are much more prominent in Seneca than the Greeks."

As an illustrative comparison of this observation, Charlton cites Seneca's Oedipus and Sophocles' Oedipus Rex. C. M. Bowra explains that Sophocles' tragedy is of the religious Greek type: the "background of Sophoclean tragedy" is "a mood of unquestioning awe and respect" for the gods. Sophocles does not offer "any ultimate explanation of the gods," but their inscrutable presence constitutes a necessary element in his tragic vision: "For him the tragic issue comes from some breach in the divine order of the world. Whether a play ends unhappily or happily, the conflict which it presents arises because someone has gone too far and upset the balance of life." In this religious concern, Ford shares an affinity with Sophocles that he does not share with Seneca.

31 Charlton, The Senecan Tradition in Renaissance Tragedy, p. xxv.

Ford, then, knew Seneca's tragedies and derived through Elizabethan dramatic tradition much of the prevailing Senecan influence; further, Ford reveals considerably the effect of Stoicism as introduced to the Renaissance through various classical authors, including Seneca, and as merged typically in the Renaissance with various other philosophies which together became Christian humanism. But Ford was not a slavish imitator of Senecan tragedy and he did not advocate extreme stoical doctrines or ideals in his prose, poetry or drama. In fact, the emphasis on moderation and Christian love in his works might be considered a warning against fanatical adherence to Stoicism. Therefore, we cannot accept Ford as either a Senecan playwright or as a Senecan philosopher.

The next point to consider is whether or not Ford had direct acquaintance with Sophocles' drama. The point can be approached in two ways, in terms of physical availability and intellectual accessibility.

Sophoclean drama was not as readily available as Senecan. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Senecan plays were available both in Latin and in translation. The first printed edition of Seneca's tragedies, notes H. B. Charlton, "appeared before 1485, perhaps six years before," and numerous editions followed; by 1500, "Seneca had gone through twelve complete editions and three of one or two separate plays." Charlton concludes, "Thus by 1518 Seneca was easily accessible to all with no more learning than an
ability to learn Latin." As for translations, J. W. Cunliffe explains, "The translation of Seneca's 'Tenne Tragedies' appeared as a whole in 1518, but all plays composing the volume had been published with the exception of the fragmentary Thebais." Although these translations proved greatly helpful, Cunliffe continues, the Latin texts of Seneca's plays were often preferred to the translations: "The learned dramatists of the Inns of Court and the popular playwrights of a later date who borrowed from Seneca seem to have gone to the Latin text, and their version is often more accurate, as well as more elegant, than the rendering of the professed translators."^34

There were fewer editions of Sophoclean drama. Whereas the first edition of Seneca "appeared before 1484," Sophocles' extant plays "were first issued in 1502" in Venice, Italy; furthermore, there were far fewer editions of Sophocles' plays than of Seneca's. For instance, before 1541 there were "only five full Greek texts and four editions of one or two single plays"; also, before 1542, only two plays, Ajax Flagellifer and Antigone, were published in Latin translation. A burst of interest in "the study of Greek tragedy" occurred, according to Charlton, in the years 1540 to 1560; during this time, there appeared with notably competent editing, five complete editions of Sophocles in Greek (1544, 1547, 1550, 1553, 1555) and four com-

^33 Charlton, pp. xxxi-xxxii.  ^34 Cunliffe, pp. 3-7.
plete Latin editions (1543, 1544-57, 1558, and another 1558). Each of these editions is from a Continental press, although Charlton does not specify which press issued which edition except to note that only one Greek edition was issued by a French press while two Latin editions were issued by the French press and two by the Italian. Edward Harwood includes in his list of Various Editions of the Greek and Roman Classics subsequent Greek editions issued by Continental presses: Paris, 1568; Heidelberg, 1597; Geneva, 1603; and Ingolstadt, 1608. The English press did not issue any complete editions before 1641 and only two editions of single plays, Watson's Antigone [1581] and Thomas Evans' Oedipus: Three Cantoes, 1615. In comparison of editions of Seneca and Sophocles, then, the Greek dramatist is no match for the Roman.

On the other hand, in focusing on whether or not Sophocles' drama would have been available to Ford, one cannot ignore the Renaissance interest in Sophoclean drama shown by the issued editions. The fact of an Italian edition of all of Sophocles' plays as early as 1502 and the continuing interest through the century resulting in Evans' translations.

35 Charlton, xxxi-xxxv and lviii.


English version of Oedipus in 1615 serves as support for the possibility that Ford might well have read one of the editions. The fact that all major editions of Sophocles' plays were issued by Continental presses does not necessarily preclude their availability to Ford; Ben Jonson, for instance, possessed at least two editions of Aristophanes: "Both were printed in Geneva, in 1607 and 1614 respectively; and both feature the Greek text, with a Latin translation." Further, the fact that Ford's contemporary Thomas Evans had sufficient interest in Sophocles to render his English translation of Oedipus suggests that during Ford's life interest in Sophocles was high and the availability of his work was not such as to deter the serious student.

With regard to the intellectual accessibility of Seneca and Sophocles, the Seneca again has a considerable edge. Cunliffe explains that Seneca was more easily understood by the Elizabethans:

> Even if Greek tragedy had stood within as easy reach of the Elizabethans as Seneca, it may be doubted whether they would have been able to assimilate it; its perfectness would not make it easier to imitate, and it was far removed from modern ideas in spirit as in form. The whole Greek tragedy is thoroughly Athenian in spirit, its conceptions are all of the ancient Greek world, and its form, its very conventions were vitally affected by the circumstances that had given it birth and assisted in its development. Seneca is nearer to the moderns in spirit than in time. In his case the local conditions which moulded Greek trag-

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Some critics believe that because Seneca was more easily understood by the Elizabethans, it is through him, rather than through the Greek dramatists themselves, that the Elizabethan dramatists learned what F. L. Lucas calls "something of the grace, the greatness, and the sadness of the Greek, something of that divine fire still quickening the Roman clay."\(^\text{40}\) Clarence Mendell explains that it is because Senecan drama is inferior to that of the Greeks that the Renaissance found Senecan tragedy more acceptable:

Seneca may be bad. For certain ages and tastes he was good. What matters it? He exerted a great disciplinary influence on a drama in swaddling clothes and the infant had a most phenomenal development. One thing the critics forget who vituperate the Senecan drama. It was the reproduction in another medium of a drama which they with their habit of evaluation would have to admit was good. The vitality of Greek tragedy was not lost even in the process of evaporation which was necessary to preserve it for two thousand years. Sophocles, presented directly to sixteenth century England, would have in all probability been passed by. But the evaporated product was acceptable and Seneca by means of his own mediocrity, which was understandable and human, gave to the predecessors of Shakespeare as much as they could absorb of a far greater drama than either he or they could comprehend.

In general, then, Seneca was more easily understood than Sophocles during John Ford's lifetime, and, if Ford read Sophocles, he would probably have done so "through Senecan spectacles," as Charlton claims was the usual case with Renaissance perception of Greek playwrights. Never-

\(^\text{39}\) Cunliffe, p. 15. \(^\text{40}\) Lucas, p. 132.

\(^\text{41}\) Mendell, pp. 199-200.
theless, though Ford's perception of Sophocles would most likely have been distorted, there is a good possibility that he would have been able to read the Greek tragedies without a Latin or an English translation. As T. W. Baldwin in *William Shakespere's Small Latine and Lesse Greeke* says, "[B]y Shakespeare's day practically all grammar schools on regular foundations, as was that at Stratford, would at least hope to teach some Greek," and the "conventional first author" was the Greek New Testament; if a school boy progressed beyond the New Testament, then Sophocles would have been one of the probable authors included for study. 42 Thus, as a school boy, Ford was probably at least introduced to learning Greek. If Ford was the same "'John Ford Devon gen.'" who enrolled at Oxford University on March 26, 1601 at the age of sixteen, as M. Joan Sargeaunt offers as a possibility, 43 then Ford would not only have continued his Greek 44 study but he would have been introduced to drama, for, as Frederick S. Boas states, university drama "formed part of the Renaissance scheme of education, as a pedagogical instrument for the teaching of clas-


sics and rhetoric." Ford's education, if not in studying Greek but in exposure to drama, would have continued when he became a member of the Middle Temple on Nov. 16, 1602.

Ivor Brown in *Shakespeare in His Time* explains that the Inns of Court were "a third English university" and that "Inns of Court men were much given to appearing in masques and to acting plays themselves and to attending plays given by the professional actors." Thus, Ford would probably have had a foundation in the Greek language and the opportunity at the university to acquaint himself with Sophocles' work as well as with drama in general; the interest in drama would probably have continued at the Inns of Court. The possibility exists that Ford might have known Sophocles' work. If, as is possibly the case, Ford's interest in Sophocles was sparked by his boyhood Greek training, fueled by his University association with further Greek study and an introduction to drama, and refueled by his introduction to active non-academic concern with drama in the Inns of Court, then Ford would have been able to find an available edition of Sophocles to pursue his continuing interest.

The next point to consider is the fundamental differences in Sophocles' and Seneca's dramatic versions of

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45 Frederick S. Boas, *University Drama in the Tudor Age* (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1914), p. V.
46 Sargeaunt, p. 2.
the Oedipus story. The purpose in discussing these differences and in noting that Ford's attitude and dramatic approach in *The Broken Heart* and *'Tis Pity She's a Whore* are often generally much closer to Sophocles' than to Seneca's is to lay further foundation for pursuing the study of parallels between Sophocles and Ford. The intention of this paper here is to explain why there is good reason to explore in detail the parallels with Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*.

A comparison of the Senecan and Sophoclean versions of Oedipus can be effectively achieved by relating Seneca's version to H. B. Charlton's list of typically Senecan dramatic characteristics so attractive to the Renaissance; the following is a summary of the Senecan bequest:

He provided the most tragic motive, revenge exacted on the closest consanguinity. He provided the most tragic theme, the inevitability of Fate's decrees. He provided the most tragic appeal, horror piling itself on horror. He provided the most tragic machinery, ghosts, supernatural forces, and foreboding dreams; the most tragic incidents, murder inflicted in the most cruel and most bloodthirsty way. He provided the most tragic characters, superhuman villains dominated with one abnormal consuming passion. He provided the most tragic sentiment, morbid introspective self-pity and self-reliance. He provided the superlative tragic style, whether for the utterance of passion, picture, or sentence. Above all, he warranted the use of all these elements extravagantly and without restraint. And beyond these principal qualities, he established a preference for an atmosphere of Ovidian romance and splendour, laden with the wonders of the Orient or the not less wonderful glamour of contemporary Italy, to weave round stories of thrilling sexual passion engendering horrible crime. He gave example of dramatic technique and even of devices of stagecraft for enhancing the marvel of it all; and furnished an unmatchable model of the fence of words.
in stichomythic dialogue and of their sparkle in crystallized proverb.

The focus in this discussion will be on the following: the tragic motive of revenge; the tragic theme of the inevitability of Fate's decrees; the tragic appeal of incremental horror; and the tragic machinery of ghosts, supernatural forces, and foreboding dreams. Each of these Senecan characteristics occurs in his Oedipus, and each serves as a basis for discerning the fundamental differences between his and Sophocles' tragedy of Oedipus. Despite the fact that Seneca derives the basic plot outline and general development of his play from Sophocles and therefore shares the surface similarities of the sexual theme of incest and the frightening elements of Oedipus' realization of his situation, subsequent blindness, and Jocasta's suicide, nevertheless the differences in the two tragedies are fundamental.

Seneca and Sophocles do not use the motive of revenge in the same way. The tragic motive of revenge appears in Seneca's Oedipus as both divine vengeance and human vengeance. Seneca presents the expected divine demand for revenge for Oedipus' sins of patricide and incest, but he emphasizes another aspect of divine revenge, that of divine vengeance against the sinner who tries to avoid his Fate as the result of fear, in the Stoic doctrine one of the evils which tempts man into irrational acts, such as

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48 Charlton, pp. clxix-clxx.
attempting to "outwit destiny," acts which inevitably bring disaster. Seneca especially emphasizes this aspect of fear in Oedipus' Prologue which recounts the dire prophecy and reiterates several times Oedipus' obsessive fear of that prophecy. Later, as fear prompts Oedipus to accuse Creon of treason, Creon gives an appropriately Stoic warning: "Who fears/ Vain terrors earns the real" (273), and "Whoso wields with tyranny/ The scepter fears even the fearful dreads/ Returns against its author" (274). Oedipus' fear leads him into irrational, tyrannical acts which evoke divine vengeance as much as do his patricide and incest. In addition to the divine vengeance, Seneca introduces a strong element of personal revenge through the ghost of Laius, Oedipus' father; the ghost promises revenge against his son:

'Tis thou, 'tis thou, The bloody scepter in thine hand, 'tis thou That I, thy father unavenged, pursue, Thou and thy city bringing in my train The Fury, fit attendant o'er thy couch. Her far resounding blows follow me Where I shall o'erthrow this house accursed and so With impious war obliterate its gods. (272).

With this promise of the ghost, Seneca combines family blood revenge with divine vengeance in developing the tragic motive of revenge.

Sophocles' Oedipus shares with Seneca's only the

49 Seneca, Oedipus in Our Seneca, Clarence W. Mendell, ed. (New Haven, Conn., 1968), p. 255. All future references to this source will be indicated in the text by page number.
initial theme of revenge in that Oedipus and Thebes vengefully search for Laius' murderer at the behest of the gods. But Sophocles does not place inordinate emphasis on Oedipus' fear as a basis for disaster as does Seneca; rather, the Greek dramatist places stress on Oedipus' moral pollution, or, as Tiresias says to him, "the sin of your existence." Further, the theme of personal revenge receives none of the importance in Sophocles' play that it does in Seneca's, for Sophocles does not use the device of the ghost. Revenge remains in the hands of the gods and becomes divine retribution.

Thus, Sophocles does not treat revenge as a matter for man to decide. John Ford seems to take this same attitude toward revenge in The Broken Heart when he has Tecnicus warn the vengeful Orgilus: "He then failes/ In honour, who for lucre or Revenge/ Commits thefts, murthers, Treasons and Adulteries/ Whose sov'raignty is best preserv'd by Justice." Also in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore Ford does not treat revenge as an acceptable means of settling debts of personal honor; in each case of revenge, that of Grimaldi, Hippolyta, Vasques, Soranzo, and Giovanni, the avenger appears as one who in his vengeful attempts acts in an extreme

50 Sophocles, Oedipus the King in World Masterpieces, I, rev., eds. Maynard Mack, et. al. (New York, 1965), pp. 326, 1396. All future references to this source will be indicated in the text by line number.

51 John Ford, The Broken Heart in Jacobean Drama: An Anthology, II, Richard C. Harrier, ed. (New York, 1968), III,1.40-44. All future references to this source will be indicated in the text by act, scene and line numbers.
and morally unworthy manner. In this play the character who forsakes his revenge, Richardetto, does so because he makes the correct decision that justice is out of his own hands and in the hands of God: "I need not now--my heart persuades me so--/ To further his [Soranzo's] confusion; there is One/ Above begins to work. . . ."52 In both plays Ford takes the position that to maintain both honor and moral order man must follow law and leave retribution to the justice of the gods or God.

Turning to the second point of comparison of Seneca's and Sophocles' Oedipus, the tragic theme of the inevitability of Fate's decrees, we find that the two plays differ strikingly. Seneca pursues this theme with strong insistence, but Sophocles incorporates the theme with his reverential attitude toward the gods. In Seneca the role of Fate persists from the Prologue in which Oedipus says, "Now, now for me the Fates prepare some blow" (253), to the end of the play, receiving the most comprehensive statement in the chorus' final expression of Fate's inexorable control of events:

By Fate we are compelled--yield ye to Fate:
No anxious thought
Can change the fabric wrought
Upon the loom of Fate;
All that befalls this race of mortal man,
All that we do began
Within the clouded past.

52 John Ford, 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, Regents Renaissance Drama Series, ed. N. W. Bawcutt (Lincoln, Neb., 1966), IV.II.7-9. All future references to this source will be indicated in text by act, scene and line numbers.
For Lachesis with hand that may not stay
Without regret
Preserves the pattern set.
As all things move by Fate's predestined way,
So earth's first revolution fixed the last.
Not god himself may turn
From its appointed course
Aught that by precept stern
Must hold to the order of its ancient source.
Many in futile hate
Have wrecked their lives—or soon or late
Seeking to outwit destiny have met their fate.

(282-83).

Such a statement reflects the general Stoic attitude in the play. Life is determined by Fate and human beings must use their "freedom of will" to acquiesce with Fate's decrees, as Oedipus did not since he allowed the passion of fear to rule him, as he says: "When fearsome terror rules thee thou must dread/ Even what thou still believest impossible: I fear all things nor trust me to myself" (253). When man thus allows passion to rule his life, then his life is "wrecked." Man cannot escape Fate; furthermore, "not god himself may turn" the fated course of events. Fate is above god.

In Sophocles the theme cannot be expressed quite so starkly as "the inevitability of Fate's decrees," for Fate is not so much a prime mover in itself as it is the will of the gods. In Sophocles' Oedipus the chorus speaks of the man denounced by Apollo's oracle as a victim of fate: "the terrible Fates, unflagging, relentless,/ Follow the track of their prey" (453-54); however, here Fate is the instrument of the gods rather than a force above god. Whereas in Seneca's play "not god himself may turn" the course of fate, in Sophocles' drama fate is associated with "those great laws
whose dwelling is in heaven," laws "unslumbering, unfailing, unforgetting,/ Filled with a godhead that is ever young" (829, 833-34). The conflict here is not between man and omnipotent Fate but between man and the gods' laws. As C. M. Bowra in *Sophoclean Tragedy* explains, "... [T]he play shows how human life is at the mercy of the gods." Fate is the will of the gods, and "When the gods make a decision, it cannot be cancelled or withdrawn." Although Oedipus "is not legally or morally guilty of murder or of incest since he acted in ignorance," he has nevertheless violated divine law and must suffer the consequences. Bowra explains that the gods have chosen to make an example of Oedipus to prove the lesson "that men must be modest in prosperity and remember that at any moment the gods may destroy it" and to warn man "not so much against pride as against any confidence or sense of security."53 Thus, the chorus, after learning Oedipus' true situation, lamentingly acknowledges the precariousness of man's lot as manifested by Oedipus' situation:

Men are of little worth. Their brief lives last
A single day.
They cannot hold elusive pleasure fast;
It melts away.
All laurels wither; all illusions fade;
Hopes have been phantoms, shade on air-built shade,
Since time began.
Your fate, O King, your fate makes manifest
Life's wretchedness. We can call no one blessed,
No, not one man.

(LL30-1139)

Consequently, while Fate rules supreme in Seneca's *Oedipus*, the gods rule supreme in Sophocles' *Oedipus*.

As for Ford, we have already discussed the fact that Ford does not reveal a rigid concept of fate because he uses the term with unintentional ambiguity. Further, we have also noted that Ford most often indicates that fate, or fortune, or whatever term he uses in any given instance, is the instrument of the gods and that Ford dramatizes the unfortunate consequences deriving from human attempts to scorn the gods and to assume their control of fate.

Further evidence of Seneca's and Sophocles' differing attitudes toward Fate and the gods evolves from their contrasting portrayal of the gods' prophet Tiresias. Both authors present Tiresias as seer for the god Apollo, the seer summoned for guidance in discovering Laius' murderer; but the authors differ in their attribution of power to the prophet and in their concept of the dramatic function of the character. The result is that, in Seneca's play, the role of the gods is further diminished, whereas, in Sophocles' play, the role of the gods receives greater emphasis.

Seneca diminishes the power of Tiresias as prophet when the character suggests that his divine powers are limited, "Great share of truth lies hidden from the blind," and that they are further attenuated by old age: "If still within my veins the blood ran hot/ With lusty vigor, I should welcome god/ Himself with lusty vigor" (261). In contrast to this portrayal of Tiresias' tentative ability,
Sophocles emphasizes the power of Tiresias' truth. Tiresias asserts the certainty of his truth, especially in the face of Oedipus' taunting disbelief: "My strength is the living truth" (335). In concluding the argument with Oedipus over the truth of Tiresias' prophecy, the seer declares that "if you find/ That I have been mistaken, you can say/ That I have lost my skill in prophecy" (444-46). Tiresias' prophesy regarding Oedipus is, of course, true; his power is undiminished.

An even more important difference in the portrayal of Tiresias is the authors' concepts of his dramatic function. In Seneca's play, Tiresias enters and immediately requires an animal sacrifice, the reading of which fails to reveal the name of Laius' murderer and necessitates the summoning of the dead for more specific information; Tiresias retires for this latter ritual and is never seen again. There is never a significant exchange between Oedipus and Tiresias; after the sacrifice, Tiresias warns that Oedipus will "be angry at the signs," but he retires without suggesting the meaning of the sacrifice or why Oedipus will be angry. As a character, Tiresias is presented in a fragmented and unfocused manner; however, those supernatural occurrences associated with his appearance receive considerable emphasis. Seneca gives a lengthy description of both the animal sacrifice and the evocation of the dead, neither of which is described by Tiresias: the first is described by Manto, whose presence as Tiresias' guide seems to be
solely for the purpose of this sensational description; and the second is described after the fact by Creon who returns from the experience to report to Oedipus. Judging from the fact that the two rituals receive more attention through detailed, lurid description than does Tiresias as moral spokesman, it seems that Seneca uses Tiresias only as a means to justify the introduction of these sensational elements, neither of which appears in Sophocles' play. Tiresias, then, is not integral to the plot and the meaning of Seneca's play.

Sophocles, on the other hand, makes the blind prophet central to the plot, the characterization, the imagery, and the meaning of his play. Through Tiresias, Sophocles confronts Oedipus directly with his own guilt, and through Oedipus' angry and contemptuous reaction to Tiresias' accusation, Sophocles dramatizes Oedipus' unyielding, hubristic character and his mockery of the god's representative. Throughout the confrontation between the King and the seer, Sophocles intensifies the play's complex paradox imagery of light-darkness, sight-blindness, knowledge-ignorance, an imagery which reinforces Sophocles' emphasis on the difference between the gods and man. In anger, Oedipus contemptuously scorns Tiresias for living in darkness, "in endless night" (335), and mocks the efficacy of Tiresias' prophecy: "Truth can save anyone excepting you,/ You with no eyes, no hearing, and no brains" (351-52). Tiresias spiritedly counters: "... [Y]ou have eyesight/
And cannot see the sin of your existence" (395-96). Following this episode which focuses on Oedipus' guilt, his rejection of the god's prophet, both stressed through imagery which ironically conveys Oedipus' limitations and Tiresias' ability, the chorus speaks of the profound discrepancy between gods and man, thus giving broader application of the meaning of the difference between Oedipus and Tiresias: "From Zeus's eyes and Apollo's no human secret is hidden;/ But man has no test for truth, no measure his wit can devise" (472-73). The remainder of the play develops Oedipus' hubris, the truth Tiresias speaks, and ends with Oedipus joining Tiresias in physical blindness and achieving a degree of spiritual knowledge. Thus, in Sophocles' hands, Tiresias is an integral part of the play, necessary to plot, characterization, imagery, and moral intent; Tiresias is not, as in the Senecan play, merely a mechanical device to introduce meretricious sensationalism. The overall effect in Sophocles' play is an emphasis on the supremacy of the gods.

Once again Ford tends to be more in tune with Sophocles than with Seneca. In both The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore Ford introduces a character whose function is very similar to that of Tiresias. In The Broken Heart, Ford provides Tecnicus, also a prophet of Apollo like Tiresias, who is important to the play's plot as spiritual advisor to the state, important to characterization as the god's representative contemptuously dismissed.
by Orgilus and Ithocles in their increasing sense of self-sufficiency, and important to the play's moral intent as the one character who gives the clearest statement of the play's moral code. In 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, Ford provides in Friar Bonaventura a character much like Tecnicus, and thus like Tiresias, in being a religious man who is important to the play's plot and to the characterization of Giovanni as an irreligiously independent character who rejects God; but, unlike Tecnicus and Tiresias, Friar Bonaventura is confused and tainted by the immorality of the play's world in his statement of the play's moral view. Still, neither of Ford's religious representatives is simply a mechanical device for the introduction of sensationalism, but each is integral to the whole of his respective play and, especially in the case of Tecnicus, to the moral intent of the play. Further, in each play Ford develops a pattern of sight-blindness imagery reminiscent of the paradox imagery in Sophocles' play and developed for a similar purpose of emphasizing the profound discrepancy between divine and human. As with Sophocles' play, the overall intent is to emphasize the supremacy of the divine.

54 Sight imagery was common in Renaissance and Jacobean drama, but not always used in exactly the same way. For instance see Robert B. Heilman's discussion of similar patterns of sight imagery in Sophocles' Oedipus and Shakespeare's King Lear (This Great Stage: Image and Structure in King Lear (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963), pp. 20-23). Also see Edward Engelberg's article on Middleton's use of sight imagery ("Tragic Blindness in The Changeling and Women Beware Women," MLQ, XXIII (March, 1962), 20-28).
Another important illustration of Seneca's and Sophocles' differing attitudes toward Fate and the gods occurs in the two authors' use of the chorus. Seneca's chorus is not an integral part of the action or thought in his plays; Clarence Mendell's general comment on Seneca's chorus applies to the chorus in Seneca's Oedipus:

. . . [T]he odes in the Senecan plays have not a natural and necessary function but are used almost exclusively to mark divisions between acts. They are not either choral or truly lyric in quality but use lyric meters and would probably have been designated as such if a Roman critic had tried to classify them. They develop the themes of current popular wisdom, dressing it up with a considerable amount of learning. They are rather an accessory to the play than an integral part of it.

In two important instances, Seneca's chorus in Oedipus expresses what Mendell calls "current popular wisdom." The first is that passage previously quoted in which the chorus makes its significant statement about inexorable Fate. The second instance occurs after Oedipus' acceptance of the terrible truth of his fate, and here Seneca most closely reflects the ethics expressed in Sophocles' Oedipus:

If Fate were mine to guide
As I should choose,
Only to Zephyr's breeze
My sails I'd loose,
Lest 'neath the sterner gale
The sheets should fail.

Ever may gentle airs
That mildly float
Nor threaten ill, conduct
My unfearing boat.
From life's safe middle way
I would not stray.

\[55\] Mendell, p. 149.
Fearing the Cretan king,
In mad career
Seeking a starry course,
With new found arts
Striving to emulate
Birds of the air,
Trusting too much to wings
Fashioned by craft,
Icarus to the sea
Gave his lost name.

Daedalus warily,
Finding his way
Through the more lowly clouds
Midway to heaven,
Like an old hawk his brook,
Watched for his son
Till from the sea he saw
Hands stretched for help:
All that betrays excess
Stands insecure.

In seeking the "safe middle way" because "All that betrays excess/ Stands insecure" and in using the Icarus image to express excess and the Daedulus image to express moderation, Seneca's chorus most closely resembles Sophocles' chorus in its prayer on excessive pride and the image of the tyrant. But, despite these similarities, the differences in ethical context must be stressed. Although each of Seneca's choruses does not contribute to the development of a unified ethical view, this particular chorus must be viewed in relation to the final chorus. The above chorus begins with the revealing condition, "If Fate were mine to guide," and the long final chorus on Fate begins, "By Fate we are compelled—yield ye to Fate," and expresses in its entirety the world view of Stoicism. This Senecan stoical context differs considerably from the Sophoclean context of reverence toward the gods, the community, and human life. In Seneca, the philosophic con-
text prevails; in Sophocles, the religious.

The Sophoclean chorus serves consistently throughout the play as a character whose function is to reflect the emotions created by the situations before them and to express the orthodox ethical beliefs. In this capacity, the chorus sometimes takes part in the dialogue and at all times evidences intense concern with the play's situation and outcome. An example of the Sophoclean chorus' involvement in the play action occurs when the chorus intervenes as moderator between quarrelling Oedipus and Tiresias, saying, "Sir it appears to us that both of you/ Have spoken in anger. Anger serves no purpose. Rather we should consider in what way/ We best can carry out the god's command" (386-89). Another instance which illustrates the Sophoclean chorus function, this time as both an emotionally involved character and as a spokesman for traditional religious belief, occurs when the gods' terrible prophecy is called in doubt and Jocasta soothes Oedipus' agitation with the poor advice, "I would not waste my time/ In giving any thought to prophecy" (821-22). Reflecting the confusion raised by such doubt, the chorus prays for guidance and assurance:

May piety and reverence mark my actions;  
May every thought be pure through all my days.  
May those great laws whose dwelling is in heaven  
Approve my conduct with their crown of praise:  
Offspring of skies that overarch Olympus,  
Laws from the loins of no mere mortal sprung,  
Unslumbering, unfailing, unforgetting,  
Filled with a godhead that is ever young.  

(827-34)
I cannot go in full faith as of old,
To sacred Delphi or Olympian vale,
Unless men see that what has been foretold
Has come to pass, that omens never fail.
All-ruling Zeus, if thou art King indeed,
Put forth thy majesty, make good thy work,
Faith in these fading oracles restore!
To priest and prophet men pay little heed;
Hymns to Apollo are no longer heard;
And all religion soon will be no more.

(853-63)

At this point also the chorus voices the conventional ethical attitude toward the Greek sin of pride which tempts man to blasphemous tyranny over both gods and men:

Pride breeds the tyrant. Insolent presumption,
Big with delusive wealth and false renown,
Once it has mounted to the highest rampart
Is headlong hurled in utter ruin down.
But pour out all thy blessings, Lord Apollo,
Thou who alone has made and kept us great,
On all whose sole ambition is unselfish,
Who spend themselves in service to the state.

Let that man be accursed who is proud,
In act unscrupulous, in thinking base,
Whose knees in reverence have never bowed,
In whose hard heart justice can find no place,
Whose hands profane life's holiest mysteries,
How can he hope to shield himself for long
From the gods' arrows that will pierce him through?
If evil triumphs in such ways as these,
Why should we seek, in choric dance and song,
To give the gods the praise that is their due?

(835-52)

Thus, the Sophoclean chorus as character reflects intense emotional involvement with the action of the play and, in its groping for spiritual direction, expresses the basic ethical tenets against which the actions and words of the play's other characters are silhouetted.

Although Ford has no chorus in the Greek mode, his two plays do include characters who serve a function simi-
lar to that of the Greek chorus. Tecnicus in *The Broken Heart* and Friar Bonaventura in *'Tis Pity She's a Whore* function as types of chorus figures in that each expresses moral beliefs which serve as a background for the action of each play. Further, each character is emotionally involved with the action taking place in the play. Here again Ford echoes Sophocles rather than Seneca.

The third and fourth points of typically Senecan characteristics listed by Charlton are the tragic appeal of incremental horror and the tragic machinery of ghosts, supernatural forces, and foreboding dreams; because these two characteristics are intricately entwined in Seneca's play, they will be considered together. Significantly, neither of these characteristics occurs in Sophocles' *Oedipus*.

In Seneca's *Oedipus*, the tone of horror begins with Oedipus' prologue in which he describes both his hated Fate and the terrible Theban plague; the same tone continues with the chorus' repetitiously hyperbolic description of the awful effects of the plague: "Black death spreads her greedy claws/ And stretches o'er earth her wings,/ While the aged ferryman plies/ His barque with a wearied arm. . . ." (257). The tone of horror increases with evidence of supernatural forces causing the ugly manifestations of the animal sacrifice in which "no natural law controls" the womb of the sacrificed heifer:

An embryo calf
Within the unwedded womb, nor holds its place
Therein but fills its mother's body, groans.
And weakly moves its legs that stiffly shake;
The livid blood besmears the sinews black,
The empty body rears itself and strikes
With budding horn the sacrificing slaves.   (264)

Horror intensifies with Tiresias' ritual calling of Laius' ghost from the dead, a long passage stressing the dread task of calling forth the horrors of Hell and describing the terrible, unearthy manifestations thus loosed. Creon, in reporting the sight, repeatedly emphasizes his profound terror, saying, "the blood within/ My veins stood frozen" (270) and "terror seizes me to speak" (271). Seneca spares no opportunity to augment the atmosphere of fearful horror, but the horror of these supernatural manifestations bears no relationship to any religious context. As Clarence Mendell explains, horror in Seneca relates to the fact that Seneca's plays were intended for rhetorical rather than dramatic presentation; thus, Seneca is interested in the "effect of horror" and sets "an example of rhetorical horror but not of 'stage horrors.'" 56 Further, Seneca's use of the supernatural and of ghosts represents means of attaining this "effect of horror." "The supernatural in Seneca," Mendell declares, "is one of the tools of [Seneca's] trade," having little relationship to religion. 57

In sharp contrast to Seneca's use of horror and the supernatural as a means of emphasizing that horror in Oedipus, Sophocles makes no use of the "tragic machinery" of ghosts or supernatural forces such as those in Seneca's

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56 Mendell, p. 93. 57 Mendell, p. 151.
play. Horror exists in Sophocles' *Oedipus*, of course, but the horror in Sophocles' play builds naturally with the development of Oedipus' character, his situation, and his realization of the true nature of that situation.

Like Sophocles, Ford makes no use of ghosts, supernatural forces, or foreboding dreams; he has, however, been accused of presenting instances of horror for their own sake, instances such as the ingenious chair for Ithocles' death in *The Broken Heart* and, most notably, the scene of the heart on the sword in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. In commenting on these devices of shock in Ford's drama, Clifford Leech gives an insightful explanation for their existence:

> The Jacobean writers had indeed cultivated the horrible and the shocking, needing to jolt an audience accustomed to tragedy, to prevent them from merely recognizing in disaster an old dramatic acquaintance. But there is something 'operatic,' something in the Fletcherian mode, in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. Though when he wrote it he was around forty years of age, Ford shows something of mere desire to make our flesh creep. That needs to be said, but the criticism does not dispose of the play. The blemish is almost inevitable when a dramatist is working in circumstances of special difficulty, is aware that his audience is hardly to be made to share his view of things. This is indeed frequent in drama, from the Electra of Euripides to the plays of Mr. Sartre and the films of Mr. Luis Bunuel.

The accusation of horror in Ford's plays does not dispose of either *The Broken Heart* or 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. In each play Ford's ethical concerns far outweigh the isolated instances of stage horror.

In summary, therefore, one of the most striking dif-

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58 *John Ford and the Drama of his Time*, pp. 49-50.
ferences between the Oedipus of Seneca and that of Sopho-
cles is that religious feeling or intent is not present in
Seneca; both are present in Sophocles' drama. As we have
seen, "there is little enough of religious feeling" in Sen-
eca's plays. When the gods appear in his plays, they do
so, as Mendell reminds us, "as casual symbols or even as
realities of another age still intruding," and, though they
are thus "bound to occur constantly," they do not occur
"religiously." The gods do not control the world of Sene-
can drama; rather, "it is Fortuna, the fickle Fate that
casts down the mighty and strikes always without warning." 59
In contrast, the gods are central to Sophocles' Oedipus; as
C. M. Bowra explains, "The play depicts a conflict between
two worlds, the world of gods and the world of a man," a
conflict between "divine truth and human illusion." Ac-
cording to Bowra, this conflict is resolved in Oedipus through
the protagonist's realization and acceptance of the difference
in the two worlds:

As Oedipus comes to see the truth and to punish him-
self for his past actions, he makes his peace with
the gods. He does what is right, accepts his posi-
tion, knows the truth. Through resignation and suf-
fering the rightful harmony of things is restored.
By divine standards Oedipus at the end of the play
is a better man than at the beginning. His humilia-
tion is a lesson to others and to him. Democritus'
words, 'the foolish learn modesty in misfortune,'
may be applied to Oedipus, who has indeed been
foolish in his mistakes and illusions and has been
taught modesty through suffering. The lesson which
the gods convey through his fall is all the more im-
pressive because he is the great king and the great

59 Mendell, p. 151.
man that he is. In the eyes of the gods what matters is that he should know who and what he really is. To secure this end his power and his glory must be sacrificed. In his acceptance of his fall, his readiness to take part in it, Oedipus shows a greatness nobler than when he read the riddle of the Sphinx and became king of Thebes.  

In noting the ethical and religious differences in Seneca's and Sophocles' Oedipus we see a close relationship not between Seneca and Ford but between Sophocles and Ford. H. B. Charlton reminds the reader that the sixteenth century proclaimed, "as Aristotle said, and indeed mainly because Aristotle said, that Oedipus is the best Greek play," and Charlton explains this general Renaissance approbation by saying that "it was best to them because its story was nearly as rich as Seneca's in startling incidents."  

It seems, however, that for Ford this statement might not altogether apply.

Ford differs from Seneca in not having a prevailing emphasis on human and divine revenge, in not insisting on Fate's control of events, in not presenting horror for horror's sake, and, most important of all, in not failing to have a religious and ethical context for his plays' development. Moreover, in just these instances which reveal Ford's departure from Senecan practice, Ford reveals an affinity with Sophoclean presentation. However, although Ford's plays reflect important similarities with Sophocles'  

60 Sophoclean Tragedy, pp. 199-200.  
61 Ibid., 210-11.
Oedipus, Ford nevertheless does not produce tragedy of the Sophoclean type nor an imitation of classical Greek tragedy.

Ford's tragedies, The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, do not fit Craig's analysis of Aristotelian tragedy. For instance, in Ford "human calamity" does not stem from "an irresistible and sometimes inexplicable manifestation of divine order." Rather, human disaster seems more directly related to man's denial of his responsibility to God and God's laws. Further, unlike the classical Greek tragedy, Ford's protagonists do not survive or transcend disaster by virtue of their human strength of fortitude or endurance; certainly Giovanni in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore acts with little of either, and neither survives nor transcends. Calantha in The Broken Heart, on the other hand, does seem to transcend with the dignity the disaster around her just before succumbing as victim in her turn; yet her fortitude and endurance do not develop progressively through The Broken Heart so that the audience experiences that purgation of pity and fear of which Aristotle speaks. The one character in the two plays who seems to transcend disaster before becoming its victim is Annabella in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore; she dies with the hope of Heaven in her heart as the result of her repentance. It is not the life of reason alone, as Craig maintains is the case in Greek tragedy, which saves Annabella, but her final reconciliation

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with her religion. Thus, there is hope for happiness in this world and in the next, and that hope lies in man's repentance and religious faith. At the end of Ford's plays we do not find ourselves saying, as W. H. Auden suggests we react at the end of Greek tragedy, "What a pity it had to be this way"; we come closer to saying, as Auden would say at the end of a Christian tragedy, "What a pity it had to be this way when it might have been otherwise."64

Having thus reacted, we must raise the question of whether Ford's plays can be tragic if they are fundamentally Christian, for, as Richard B. Sewall in The Vision of Tragedy has said, "In point of doctrine, Christianity reverses the tragic view and makes tragedy impossible."65 Nevertheless, Sewall defends the use of the term "Christian tragedy" because he views it as useful in indicating "the new dimensions and tensions introduced into human life by Christianity and which perforce entered into the Elizabethan tragic synthesis. Tragedy puts to the test all the formulations of a culture and comes out committed to none."66 In naming Marlowe's Faustus the "first 'Christian tragedy,'" Sewall points out that the play's concluding note of "typical morality-play"
piety as spoken by the Chorus does not answer all the questions raised by the play:

If, in Faustus, he [Marlowe] brings the play to a pious conclusion, the 'truth' of the play goes far beyond the Chorus' final piety, just as the meaning of Oedipus transcends by far the choric summing up of that play. The voice of the Chorus is not the only voice in Faustus. For one thing, no figure of the old moralities talks so much or takes us so deep into his own being as does Faustus—or does so much so boldly. Faustus in thought and action, brooding, philosophizing, disputing, conjuring, defying God and risking all with a flourish, does not suggest so much the lay figure of the moralities, Everyman, as, (in one of his phases) Adam the knowledge-seeker and (in others) the defiant hero of the Greek tradition—a Prometheus or Tamburlaine.

In revealing Faustus to us so completely, Sewall believes, Marlowe "introduced the modern tragic theme of the divided soul ... torn between the desire to exploit its new mastery and freedom and (on the other hand) the claims of the old teachings, which to defy meant guilt and a growing sense of alienation." Faustus' tragedy lies in his conscious realization of this division, for "Even as he boasts that his soul is his own, to dispose of as he will, he hears the fearful echoes thundering in his ears." Marlowe's Faustus, then, exemplifies the possibilities of Christian tragedy and the tragic effect Ford might have achieved in attempting a similar tragic Christian drama.

In an interesting article, "'Ignorance in Knowledge': Marlowe's Faustus and Ford's Giovanni," Cyrus Hoy compares Marlowe's Faustus and Ford's Giovanni of 'Tis Pity.
She's a Whore as tragic Christian figures in a way pointed by Sewall's analysis of Faustus as a type of Christian tragedy. Both of these characters, says Hoy, "are persuaded to their several presumptions by a fatal intellectual pride; and, however different the implications of their respective fates might be, the careers of both have this in common: both provide spectacular examples of the catastrophe attendant upon the misuse of the divinely given powers of reason."69 Also, the conclusion of both dramas "is nothing if not a graphic demonstration that the wages of sin is death."70 In making this comparison, however, Hoy finds it necessary to qualify Ford's achievement in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore:

'Tis Pity She's a Whore is, notoriously, one of the most powerful of Elizabethan plays, but I doubt that even its warmest admirers would term it 'grand.' By so much as it fails of grandeur, it fails in the achievement of the highest tragedy; but I think the difference between the tragic effect of Faustus and that of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore is one of degree and not of kind.

Thus, though 'Tis Pity She's a Whore may be termed a Christian tragedy, it cannot claim a place with the "highest tragedy."

Perhaps John Ford did not possess that talent necessary to formulate completely or to express effectively the kind of vision the highest tragedy demands. In discussing the demands of tragedy on authors, Sewall suggests why some

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70 Hoy, 154. 71 Hoy, 146.
would-be tragedians fail the mark:

Tragedy, traditionally the most exalted of the forms, has exerted on artists of many generations, not only Greek and Elizabethan, a compelling influence. Its effect on the individual talent has sometimes been noble and often disastrous. It requires an independent, radical vision whose lack is as fatal as the lack of a sense of ultimate harmony is in comedy. Sophocles and Euripides, though building on Aeschylus' original insights and to this extent acting in imitation of him, used the form he had established to express their own individual and radical visions. The Elizabethans, whose nervous and independent force worked creatively on whatever form they chose, expanded and improvised to suit their own expressive needs. Since then, as writers not so vitally equipped have attempted to write tragedy, the sense of strain and artificiality is frequent.

No doubt Ford was "not so vitally equipped" as Sophocles or Shakespeare, for a quality of "strain and artificiality" does occur in Ford's tragedies.

Such critics as David L. Frost in The School of Shakespeare and Arthur C. Kirsch in Jacobean Dramatic Perspectives explain this artificial quality in Ford as the result of Ford's failure to integrate dramatic method and dramatic content. Frost claims that Ford borrows ideas from Shakespeare without entertaining them, that Ford does "not think on moral issues" because he is interested in ideas only as "they are useful dramatically," and that Ford does not take "any consistent view of [his] characters or of [his] character's actions." Like Frost, Kirsch per-

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72 Sewall, p. 2.

ceives in Ford's plays, especially in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, a "disjunction" between each play's moral understanding and the movement of its "theatrical effects," a "disjunction" Kirsch explains as resulting from Ford's elaborate imitation of Beaumont and Fletcher, especially Fletcherian tragi-comedy. "Ford's plays," Kirsch maintains, "are theatrical to their core, and there seems no reason to make more pretentious claims for them than most critics are prepared to make for the plays of Fletcher." Finally, according to Kirsch, this "disjunction" between form and content born of Fletcherian imitation causes Ford's dramas to suffer from a preciosity that precludes their being a unified whole. 74

Perhaps it is a recognition of a similar kind of disunity or strain in Ford's work that leads Irving Ribner to his judgment that "What sets Ford apart from his contemporaries is not a disregard for moral issues, but an inability to lead his audience to a full resolution of the moral problems which he poses." Ribner assesses Ford as "among the most pessimistic tragedians of his age," saying that Ford

draws for us the tragic plight of humanity aware always of evil but unable to find good, forced to live in a world where moral certainty seems impossible, and able to escape destruction only by blind conformity to principles which oppose man's reason and his most human feelings. The tragedy of Ford's heroes and heroines is in their inability to find a satisfactory alternative to sin. They can only die

with courage and dignity. 75

David L. Frost would agree with Ribner's assessment of Ford's pessimism; in fact, Frost views this pessimism as the element which most clearly justifies his evaluation of Ford as "anti-Shakespearean." Shakespearean tragedy, says Frost, conveys a moral interpretation of disaster, an interpretation which suggests that "in some way the catastrophe was the result, albeit disproportionate, of faults in the protagonists and their society." Frost further explains that Shakespearean tragedy is based on the understanding that the native state of the world, the only condition in which it can successfully move, is one of moral order. Evil is a dislocation; justice, mutual responsibility, natural affections are norms which, though frequently departed from, are yet necessary to society for its proper functioning. The great individual cannot act ill without corrupting the whole, for he is inextricably bound up with his fellows; but the world is fundamentally hostile to corruption and will uproot it, though the innocent dependents must also suffer. Thus the catastrophe becomes tolerable by being not entirely pointless; Shakespearean tragedy is in essence optimistic.

Frost asserts that, in contrast to Shakespeare, Ford, as well as Webster, is more pessimistic, for he creates in his dramas a "prevailing mood" of doubt. Speaking of both John Webster and John Ford, Frost says:

Both dramatists are at their most powerful when giving way to this sense of doubt and dismay. A fear of impermanence and fluidity of things, a picture of life as a short term of terrifying and unanswered questions, closed by death: this can be

paralleled in Shakespeare, but it is not the dominant theme in his plays. No doubt the 'mists' in which Webster's characters perish are a result of sin; but both Webster and Ford are oppressed by the hopeless complication and ambiguity of moral issues, while Shakespeare seems unbewildered. 77

Admittedly, Ford does not attain the tragic achievement of Sophocles and Shakespeare, both of whose influences appear in his plays, but to attribute to Ford such dark pessimism as do Ribner and Frost seems a grave overstatement. Ford does attempt tragedy, and, as Joseph Wood Krutch in The Modern Temper maintains, "tragedy is essentially an expression, not of despair but of the triumph over despair and of confidence in the value of human life." Whether successful or not, John Ford attempts participation in the illusion, Krutch's "Tragic Fallacy," "that something outside his [man's] own being some 'spirit not himself'--be it God, Nature, or that still vaguer thing called a Moral Order--joins him in the emphasis which he places upon this or that and confirms him in his feeling that his passions and his opinions are important." 78

Unlike Seneca, Ford does not treat the gods casually or as a means simply to achieve dramatic effect. Like Sophocles, the relationship between human and divine is basic both to the content and to the intention of his plays. Whatever affinity for the ideas and method Ford

77 Frost, p. 131.

might have discovered in Sophocles' Oedipus, the English playwright integrates them into his own seventeenth-century version of Christian tragedy. Even his ostensibly classical Broken Heart can be read as essentially Christian in meaning. Whether or not Ford is successful in conveying his Christian intent is not here the question. Rather, the question is whether, in grappling for coherent meaning in a chaotic seventeenth-century world, Ford discovered and portrayed a system of ethical behavior rooted finally in a Christian world view. Acutely mindful of M. Joan Sargeaunt's warning "to be cautious in the moral outlook one assigns to Ford," this study proposes that helpful insight into Ford's moral vision can be gained by studying the parallels between his two major tragedies and Sophocles' Oedipus. Ford's version of Christian tragedy seems to derive from the fact that, in viewing his immediate world and recognizing that all was not well there, Ford felt compelled to show that Christianity offered the possibility of moral order. It is as if Ford looked at the chaotic world around him and lamented, to paraphrase Auden, "What a pity it is this way when it might be otherwise." His early poetry, Christ's Bloody Sweat, and his early moral prose, The Golden Meane and A Line of Life, reveal his intense awareness of the need for moral order, his emphasis on the primary role of Christianity in achieving this moral order, and his acceptance of the self-

appointed task to teach, as he perceives it, the way to realizing this moral order.
Before a discussion of the parallels between Sophocles' *Oedipus the King* and Ford's *The Broken Heart* and *'Tis Pity She's a Whore*, a study of three of Ford's early works, *Christ's Bloody Sweat* (1613), *The Golden Meane* (1613), and *A Line of Life* (1620), is important in establishing attitudes and ideas which remain basic in Ford's later works. Each of these three early works shares a number of common characteristics in content: each is didactic; each admits the adversities and temptations of life and teaches with a sense of certitude a way for man to lead a virtuous life; each emphasizes reason and resolution as counter measures against human frailty and the allurements of the world and, thus, as necessary means of attaining and adhering to the virtuous life. Further, in *Christ's Bloody Sweat* Ford establishes an essential reciprocity between the meanings of piety and pity, and the bond linking the meanings of these two concepts in the Christian context of *Christ's Bloody Sweat* becomes significant in Ford's definition of the most admirably virtuous person in *A Line of Life*. Together, these three early works provide a combination of Christian and neo-Stoic ideas central to Ford's moral views in *The*
Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore.

Christ's Bloody Sweat is a religious poem only recently attributed to Ford and accepted as one of his youthful efforts. Though hardly an auspicious poetic effort, the poem does contain ideas fundamental to Ford's later development of his ethical code; thus, it deserves full consideration. This poem differs from the other two early works under consideration in that it is the one work concerned most specifically with a wholly Christian subject. In dedicating this work to William, Earle of Pembroke, Ford describes the poem as a "little labour, which containes but a Summarie of the Sonne of Gods sorrowes." Following the dedicatory epistle, Ford offers an explanatory note which indicates that the poem has two purposes, the first general, and the second specifically personal: first, to clear verse of the charge of "herald of wantonesse," and, two, to testify what Ford himself desires to be:

I confesse, I have, touching my particular, beeene long carried with the doubts of folly, youth, and opinion, and as long miscaried in the darknesse of unhappinesse, both in invention and action. This was not the path that led to a contented rest, or a respected name. In regards wherof, I have heere set forth the witnesse that may testifie what I desire to bee. Not that many should know it, but that many should take comfort by it. . . .

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1 M. Joan Sargeaunt, "Writings Ascribed to John Ford by Joseph Hunter in Chorus Vatum," Review of English Studies, 10 (1934), 165-76.

2 John Ford, Christ's Bloody Sweat Or the Son of God in His Agony (London, 1613), dedication (unnumbered page). Future references to this work will be indicated in the text by page number.

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The poem proper begins with the claim that the poet's memories of Christ's suffering and sacrifice inspired him to write:

Such thoughts as those, whiles in a ravish't spirit,
Faire meditations Summoned to appear,
Before the Arke, and mercie seat of merrit,
A sacred flame mixt with an holy feare,
As if Gods voyce had spoke, seem'd to invite,
My heart to prompt, my ready hand to write. (2)

The voice suggests that the poet choose Christ's "bloudy Sweate" as a theme and promises to be the poet's spiritual guide in writing, admonishing him to "Remember first the sorrowes thou hast past,/ The shame thou hast escap't, what thou hast felt . . . ,/ For by thine owne, thou mayst conceave of mine" (4). Ford, of course, obeys "the Heavenly voice" (4).

The poet begins his appointed task by reviewing Christ's life and emphasizing Christ's faultless virtue. To stress the selflessness of Christ's final agony, Ford uses two comparisons. In one the poet compares Christ to the Phoenix who dies that "many may rise," and in the other he compares Christ to a pelican:

This was that Pellican indeed, retyr'd
Into the desert of a troubled breast,
Who for to pay the ransom long desir'd,
Consum'd himselfe to give his people rest:
A Pellican indeed, that with her blood
Pulls out her heart, to give her Chickens food. (10)

This comparison seems to find echo through ironic reversal in the last scene of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore.

Having made clear that the bloody sweat of Christ's agony and death was "a streame of soft compassion" for the
purpose of washing "a severall sin from severall men," Ford
gives a long list of types of sinners for whom Christ suf­fered: Princes who strive "to protect alone/ Religious
name, not for religious love" (11): those in command who
wasted "Their greatnesse in ambition and debate," using
force unjustly (11); scribes who used their learning to
abuse "unlearn'd soules" (11); lawyers "whose tongue was
bought" (12); soldiers who toiled "in the heat/ Of cruelty,
not measuring the right" (12); "Schollers" who boasted of
their wit and knowledge though being "both needy and yet
proud" and who used their art to enhance "unlawfull love"
and to support "upstart sects"; flatterers; alchemists;
greedy sea merchants; "Hard Landlords"; "Unconscionable
usurers" and, finally, women, "... Saintes to behold, in
view/ Chast Matrons, but (O frailtyes curst) in triall/
More vaine than vanitie, and more untrue/ Then falsehood"
(11-15). At the close of this list Ford repeats the promise
of Christ's bloody sweat which offers "to all in heart con­trite and broken,/ The benefit of life and living food"
(17).

Next, Ford gives a second list in which he explains
how various types of sinners would improve if they would
denounce their sins and accept Christ's compassion. Two
examples from this list will suggest its entirety:

This did the lov-sicke musicke-straining wanton,
Who leades his life in sonnetting some Ay-mes
Ponder, he'd cease and then there would be scant one
En-amourd on so many lisping Shees:
But changing better notes, they would take pittie
On their owne soules, and sing a sweeter dittie.
This did the mockers of th'elect and holy,
Whom God hath set on earth to do his will,
Regard they could not be so curst in folly,
As to persever in their mischiefe still
Despising Preachers, and nickenaming those
With malice, whom the holy ghost chose. (18)

Ford ends this second list with the sad acknowledgment that such change from sinfulness "is so strange,/ So hard to thinke, so difficult to doe,/ As tis almost impossible to change,/ From bad to good though God in mercy woo/ Mortality, to tast of mercies treasure,/ Yet O, tis hard to leave the baites of pleasure" (19). Nevertheless, the poet reminds the reader that Christ's bloody sweat is like the "comfortable Jordan" and the "Bethesda cold" and will wash away the disease of sin just as a sinner's tears of contrition will enable the sinner to see both "with eyes of body, and with eyes of mind:/ So must we wash, our blindness is so great,/ In the fresh fountain of his bloody sweat" (19). This emphasis on human blindness and the need for spiritual sight receives later development through repetitive sight imagery in both The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore.

Since Christ's bloody sweat offers so much, the poet calls upon his reader to become Christ's soldier, conquering first the enemies within himself, "For greater enemies incampe about,/ Mans owne weake heart, then any are without" (21).

Turn then thy weapons on thy selfe, O man,
And fight against those enemies within thee,
Beat downe thy proper strength, sincerely sean [sic]
The horror of those foes that aime to win thee:
Put plates of righteousness upon thy brest,
And have thy feet shod with the Gospels rest.

Gird on thy loines with veritic, and take
Salvations helmet to secure thy head,
Beare up the shield of faith and hourily shake
The spirits sword and on thy watchfull bed
Keepe centinell when all thy powers retreat
Then come and bath thee in his bloody sweat.  (22)

Here Ford indicates the need for self-reformation and the
subsequent vigilance necessary to maintain the righteous
way because of both internal human temptations and external
evil enticements. In thus becoming a soldier, however, man
must expect no worldly reward:

For he who follows Christ must not respect
Promotion, money, glory, ease, delight;
But poverty, reproofs, and selfe-neglect
Disgrace, tears, hunger, cold, thirst, scorn, despight,
Friends, father, mother, brethren, children, wife,
Must be forgone, yea lands and goods and life. (25)

Unless man does choose to follow Christ, the day of
judgment will show how each "did disdaine/ His love." As
proof, Ford gives a description of Hell with specifics of
unrelieved agonies:

Here the wantons for a downy bed,
Be rackt on pallets of stil-burning steele:
Here shall the glutton, that hath dayly fed,
On choice of daintie diet, hourly feede
Worse meat than toads, and beyond time be drencht
In flames of fire, that never salbe quencht.

Each moment shall the killer, be tormented
With stabies that shall not so procure his death;
The drunkard that would never be contented
With drinking up whole flagons at a breath,
Shalbe deni'd (as he with thirst is stung)
A drop of water for to coole his tongue.

The money-hoarding Miser in his throat
Shall swallow moten lead: the spruce perfum'd
Shall smell most lathsome brimstone: he who wrote
Soule-killing rimes, shall living be consum'd
By such a gnawing worms, that never dies,
And heare in stead of musicke hellish cries.

No sin that is not washt in true repentance,
Shall scape in every sin and sinner shall have sentence,
To be without all end with horrors vexed.
And that not for a day, a month, a score
Of yeares, or terme, or time, but evermore. (26-27)

M. Joan Sargeaunt points out that this passage of the tortures parallels strikingly a similar passage in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore when the Friar uses the tortures to persuade Annabella to repentance.3

Thus shall the unrepentant suffer, but Ford reassures those who do repent, those in whose eyes Christ's "Bloody Sweate won pitie" (28). For these latter, Christ offers "life eternall, for [their] due reward" (28). Judgment Day will tell the tale: "Justice pronounceth, as is justly fitted:/ Sin shewed no pittie, sinne must not be pittied" (29). Thus the poet urges man to "Fly to the safety of [Christ's] Bloody Sweat" (29).

The poet describes the nature of man in order to emphasize that such a limited and mortal creature needs the mercy of Christ:

What is a man but dust made up in forme?
Fraile, weake, corrupted: Keeping time in motion,
A ship at sea, ore-turned with every storme:
Eats, sleeps, dies, unsetled in devotion:
In health unbridled, his yeares a span,
A fading bloom, and such a thing, is man.

Mans beautie but a frame made up in snow,
Immext with waxe, which melts with every Sun,
Even so experience teacheth men to know,

3 Sargeaunt, "Writings Ascribed to John Ford . . . ," 168-69.
How soon this work of frailty is undone:
A winters frost, or summers parching heat,
Doth soon this pictures ornament defeat.
... ...

Man as a cunning fire-work in his power,
Dares God and heaven, and kicks against the Lord,
Till all his force be spent, then in an hower
Abates, decates, falls of his owne accord:
Being indeed as nothing, in despair
Of doing ill, fumes into smoke and aire. (34-35)

This picture of man includes many of the aspects which recur in both The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, especially the idea of man as one who "Dares God and Heaven, and kicks against the Lord." Orgilus and Ithocles in The Broken Heart and Giovanni in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore fall into this category.

The poet takes special note of those who "smooth the front of sin" and "strive forsooth to make a God of love" (37), declaring emphatically:

Love is no god, as some of wicked times
(Led with the dreaming dotage of their folly)
Have set him forth in their lascivious rimes,
Bewitch'd with errors, and conceits unholy:
It is a raging blood affections blind,
Which boiles both in the body and the mind. (37)

Ford contrasts this lustful love with the lawful, honest, temperate, and chaste married love which receives Christ's blessing: "Such find the pastures of their soules and hearts,/ Refreshed by the soft distilling dew,/ Of Christ's deare bloody sweate. ... ." (37).

All men, including those sick with the disease of lustful love, will come before the gate of Heaven and be questioned by the angels who guard the gate and control en-
trance there. Yet not all comers who ask in their sickness for "Christ our physion" to heal them will be welcomed unless they have "bath'd" their sins in Christ's bloody sweat. Here Ford re-emphasizes the efficacy of tears, an emphasis which appears later both in The Broken Heart and, especially, in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore:

Never was tear from any heart let fall,  
In true repentance, but the Lord of grace,  
Hath seen and bottled up, and kept it all  
For such as must his saving health embrace:
  This is a rule in text for certaine given,  
  An eye still drie doth seldom come to heaven.

He who gush out tears as were a flood,  
Of christall sorrows, and a zealze unfained,  
Doth purge his faults in Christ his sweat of blood,  
And with his faults shall never more be stained,  
Stars in their brightnes shal not shine so glorious,  
Nor all the kings on earth be so victorious. (39)

The poet stresses once again God's forgiving love for those who love God enough to repent, saying that if a sinner will but give his heart to God then God through Christ "will sweat in blood, to pawn the mine [God's own]" (40).

To illustrate God's love for man and the repeated attempts to win man from sinfulness, the poet presents an extended metaphor of the soul as a woman being wooed by Christ, her lover:

Goe then Remembrance, tell that Queene of Reason (Fayre bride to Christ) the Soule her lover comes,  
Deckt in his wedding robes, and courts the season  
With choyce of pleasures, and with many sinnes  
Of sure deserts, invites this wandring Queene,  
To be as true as he to her hath beene. (42)

At first the soul responds to Christ's suit and pledges her virginal love, refusing to succumb to a second lover,
"youthfull lust." This second lover applies to "Old sin" for advice and winning arguments, and "Old Sin" provides the persuasive carpe diem theme: "Faire daughter listen, time will come when thou/ Shalt change thy hue, and be as I am now" (43). Sin's argument wins, and youthful lust prevails with the soul; yet Christ still entreats the soul: "Redeeme the poore remainder of thy daies,/ Deaden the life of thy lascivious lust,/ Take pittie on thyselfe . . . ,/ Be trew to my desires, when sin assaults,/ And Ile forget thy wrongs, forgive thy faults" (46). The poet finds such merciful forgiveness incredible: "The God that should have punisht, doth intreat:/ Hee in whose power it is to scourge the sinner,/ With words of mildnesse doth assay to win her" (46). The soul repentantly turns to Christ, won by his merciful love:

Heare I disclaime the follies of my will,
Heare I returne the sinnes by frailties gave mee:
Heare I forsake my heart-inveighing ill,
Heare fly I to his oulie [sic] blood did save me:
    Mercie, O mercie, I commend as even
    My whordomes to the dust, my soule to heaven. (48)

"Christ is appeas'd" (48), says the poet, emphasizing that it is the soul's repentance and not her presumption that has deserved the grace of mercy. Any soul that looks upon the suffering of Christ must be brought to pity for Christ's suffering and thereby to repentance for his sins in payment for this suffering. This metaphor of the soul as a woman being wooed by Christ becomes particularly significant in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore with regard to Annabella and her
final repentance.

The poem ends with the poet's own repentant pleas that his sins not be remembered in "the day of grace" but rather that his poetic offering be accepted as having adequately fulfilled the task God originally set for him:

Heere, Saviour of the world, worke that I may
Begin to live anew, and in this theame
Of thy sad bloodie sweat, learne out the way
Of life indeed, and wake mee from the dreame
Wherein my Soule long slept, and felt the terrour,
Of double two Apprentiships to errour.

And now my God, if I discharged have,
This imposition of thine heavenly taske,
Some token of thy being pleas'd I crave,
Some certaine knowledge of thy will I aske:
For Heaven, and Angels with my soule record,
I no way have traduc'd the written word. (62)

In answer, the poet hears a voice say reassuringly, "rest thee," and promise to "teach thee how thou shalt attaine the place,/ Where quiet soules doe end their happie race" (63). In this prayer and its answer Ford affirms his faith in the religious belief maintained throughout the poem: that if man heartily and sincerely repents of his sins and resolutely hearkens unto a new life then Christ's forgiving love, as manifested in his bloody sweat, can cleanse man of his sinfulness.

Christ's bloody sweat, then, becomes a metaphor for Christ's love, for his compassionate pity for a sinful but repentant man. Christ, in his dying agony for man, showed a love for man, a tenderness of feeling and a respect for the pure of heart; in so doing, Christ manifested a powerful reverence for the best in man. Important in developing
this metaphor is the recurring use of the word pity in the contexts of Christ's compassion, of man's reciprocal compassion, and of man's willful, selfish sinfulness, as well as in the context of God's justice: Christ's pity for man allowed him to suffer for man's redemption; man's pity for Christ in his agony allows man to repent of his sins; man's failure or refusal to pity Christ's suffering and to repent brings not God's mercy but God's justice: "Sin shewed no pittie, sinne must not be pitied" (29). This emphasis on pity in several contexts looks forward to The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore and two major points of Ford's ethical code: religious reverence and human compassion.

Furthermore, the recurrence of pity in the different situations in Christ's Bloody Sweat becomes increasingly significant both in this work and later in relation to Ford's ethical code when we learn that in the seventeenth century pity and piety had reciprocal meanings. In a prefatory note to pity, the Oxford English Dictionary explains that "the sense of Latin pietas, 'piety,' was in late Latin extended so as to include 'compassion, pity'"; in Middle English "both pite and piete are found first in the sense 'compassion,'" and "subsequently both are found in the sense of 'piety.'" The Dictionary's prefatory note concludes with the observation that "the differentiation of forms and senses was scarcely completed by 1600." Therefore, if the forms and senses of pity and piety were used interchangeably as late as 1600 and possibly later, then it

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is not unlikely that Ford in 1613 was consciously using pity in both the sense of piety and of pity when he wrote Christ's Bloody Sweat.

Each of the contexts of pity in Ford's religious poem falls within both of the Dictionary's groups of definitions. The first group centers on "A feeling or emotion of tenderness aroused by the suffering, distress, or misfortune of another and prompting a desire for its relief," and the second centers on "To feel pity for; to compassionate, commiserate, be sorry for." These meanings of pity stress genuine concern that implies a kind of love. It would be such a sense of genuine loving concern that Ford intends in Christ's pity for man when he says that Christ "did in his troubled spirit/ Into a streame of soft compassion melt/ His lcye [sic] bloud, that frailty might inherit/ The sun of conform, by the griefes he felt" (11). Further, it would be in a similar sense of loving concern that Ford means man's response of tears in foregoing his sinfulness in reciprocal pity for Christ's suffering: "My Bloody Sweate won pitie in your eyes,/ And you poore soules did love me in my griefes..." (28). Such a reciprocal pity from man begets a higher pity, or love, from God: "Where the soule is prest/ With sence of knowinge shee hath done amisse,/ Asking for grace," the soul's "case is pittied, she forgiven is" (48). On the other hand, man's failure to show such concern excludes him from God's forgiving love: "Sin shewed no pittie, sinne must not be pittied" (29).
God made his merciful love for man manifest through Christ's suffering and death, but unless man accepts God's mercy then he warrants God's justice: "That God is mercifull 'tis true, so must/ Our bouldnes eke remember hee is just" (48).

Those who do express through tears genuine pity for Christ's suffering and consequently repent of their sins are also expressing "religious love" (11), or piety. The Oxford English Dictionary records one usage of piety as "Habitual reverence and obedience to God (or the gods); devotion to religious duties and observances." God's merciful pity, his love, for man excites in the receptive soul a corresponding pity, or love, which, when acted upon in continued obedience to God, becomes piety. If man acts out of genuine concern or pity for Christ's suffering and heartily and contritely repents of his sins and tries to lead a new life, then man reveals a religious love, or piety. Religious love, then, springs from heartfelt pity which develops into piety. This early emphasis on the overlapping meanings of piety and pity as expressions of divine and human love provides important groundwork for the first two tenets in Ford's later ethical code and the basis for the other points of right conduct.

It is in this context of religious love that Ford's injunction against making a god of lustful love and his support of married love are particularly significant. Ford specifically warns those who would perversely ignore Christ's love while attempting "to make a God of love":

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Love is not god, as some of wicked times
(Led with the dreaming dotage of their folly)
Have set hem foorth in their lascivious rimes,
Bewitch'd with errors, and conceits unholy:
It is a raging blood affections blind,
Which boiles both in the body and the mind. (37)

Such a willful distortion of religious love equates love
and lust, an uncontrolled passion which clouds reason, and
thereby ignores a portion of the previously given definition of piety, "devotion to religious duties and observances."

This concern with the error of lustful love continues to be evident later in the plays, especially when Ithocles in The Broken Heart and Giovanni in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore insist upon making love their god.

Further, making a god of lustful love not only negates the religious meaning of piety but also negates the second meaning, or human meaning, of piety: "Faithfulness to the duties naturally owed to parents and relatives, superiors, etc.," that is, respectful human love. That Ford intended this second definition of piety to be a corollary to the first is indicated when he speaks of a reverence for the married state, a kind of love clearly in contrast to the "disease" of lustful love:

But such whose lawfull thoughts, and honest heat,
Doth temperately move with chast desires,
To choose an equall partner, and beget
Like comforts by alike inkindled fires:
Such find no doubt in union made so even,
Sweet fruits of succors, and on earth a heaven. (37)

The chaste love of the married couple represents not only a respect for the religious observance of marriage vows but also a respect for human love and the marriage partner.
This emphasis on respect for human obligations in love also becomes evident later in Ford's plays, especially in the case of Penthea in *The Broken Heart*: Penthea tries to remain true to two marriage vows while at the same time proving her familial love for her brother and acting as his envoy to Calantha.

Ford also indicates that reason is an important element in religious piety and human piety. In his metaphor of the soul as a woman pursued by Christ as lover, Ford makes clear that man has in his reason a handmaiden to guide him to successful observance of both religious and human piety: "Goe then Remembrance, tell that Queene of Reason/ (Fayre bride to Christ) the Soule her lover comes,/ Deckt in his wedding robes. . . ." (42). Thus, reason is a key to achieving the virtuous life, for in resolving to follow "that Queene of Reason," man can achieve self-reformation, overcoming his human weaknesses by "fight[ing] against those enemies within. . . ." (22). *Christ's Bloody Sweat*, therefore, teaches the conventionally orthodox way of being saved from sinfulness; here, however, the emphasis is on the merciful compassion, or pity, of Christ toward the sincerely repentant sinner. The way to the virtuous life, or piety, is to forego sinfulness, love God, and love man through God.

Whether or not Ford himself "has undergone a religious conversion," as Miss Sargeaunt believes,⁴ or whether

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⁴ Sargeaunt, "Writings Ascribed to John Ford . . . ," 166.
Ford is simply following convention in beginning his poem with "a lamentation for one's private life and writing and for secular writing in general," as Mark Stavig suggests, does not seem pertinent to this study. What matters are the ideas and emphases that the reader finds in the poem. Since we know so little of Ford's life, we cannot know of his personal spiritual tribulations. In any event, a biographical interpretation of the poem is beside the point. What we find in the poem is a didactic certitude that there is a means of achieving a virtuous, a good life; and here that means is a Christian one which stresses both pity and piety.

Some critics have tried to determine more specifically exactly what version of orthodox Christianity Ford intends in Christ's Bloody Sweat. M. Joan Sargeaunt and Clifford Leech, for instance, suggest that Ford's religious attitude is Calvinistic, and of the passages they use as proof the following is the most significant:

Yet neither did the Death or Bloodie Sweat Of Christ, extend to soules ordain'd to Hell: But to the chosen, and elect, beget A double life, although the Scriptures tell How this meeke Lambe of God did chiefly come To call the last sheepe, and the strayers home. (57)

Based on passages such as this Miss Sargeaunt determines that Ford's attitude in the poem is Calvinistic:

The extreme emphasis on personal salvation and on

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one particular aspect of the atonement—the saving virtue of Christ's blood—suggests a 'revivalist' type of religion. In the one verse that expresses any very definite doctrinal view the author is revealed as a Calvinist assured of the salvation of the faithful and repentant through the blood of Christ, but believing at the same time that there were some to whom God's grace did not extend, souls predestined to everlasting damnation. . . .

Clifford Leech, too, notes Calvinistic indications in the poem, but does not depend on these indications for a final decision: "We shall find religious feeling evident in The Witch of Edmonton, The Lover's Melancholy and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, but we shall not find it expressed in the simple and rather savage Calvinistic terms of Christ's Bloody Sweat." Mark Stavig rejects the strict Calvinist reading of the poem, saying that we must "resist the temptation to read the poem as proof of narrowly religious attitudes." Stavig's view seems to be the most reasonable. The poetic stanza quoted above contains reason to be hesitant in determining Ford as a Calvinist. Although this passage does refer to the "chosen" and "elect" as well as to "soules ordain'd to Hell," nevertheless, the reader cannot overlook the equivocation included in the same verse, the significant qualification which says that the Bible tells a different story from that which emphasizes the

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6 Sargeaunt, "Writings Ascribed to John Ford...", 167.


8 Stavig, p. 22.
elect and the damned: ". . . although the Scriptures tell/
How this meeke Lambe of God did chiefly come to call the
last sheepe, and the strayers home" (57). Such a qualifi-
cation in a key verse of support for Calvinism makes the
Calvinist evidence inconclusive at best. Further, Ford's
emphasis throughout the poem on pity and piety, as dis-
cussed earlier, suggests that salvation is a possibility
for all who follow their reason and seek God's mercy.

In contrast to the Christian religious viewpoint of
Christ's Bloody Sweat, The Golden Meane has a secular though
equally didactic viewpoint. A moral prose pamphlet, The
Golden Meane identifies virtue with moderation, and here
Ford teaches with a certainty equal to that of Christ's
Bloody Sweat. He opens this moral work with a preface
which sets forth his purpose to the reader: "I have heere
cast into a small Volume a large summe of Love. . . . Heere
you may view and read Vertue personated in moderation; here
you may know and prove Moderation to be the life of Ver-
tue. . . ."

The main body of The Golden Meane begins with a de-
scription of man which recalls a similar description of the
human state in Christ's Bloody Sweat, a description which
emphasizes man's transience and his frailty: "Men, as they
are all the sons of their Mothers, are all the subjects of
misery; borne to live few days in many dangers whose glory

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9 John Ford, The Golden Meane (London, 1613), preface. All future references will be indicated by page number.
(if they were Monarches of their owne desires) may be well compared to their shadowes in the Sunne; for, as the bodies shadow is at morning before us, in a goodly lustre; at Noone, or in the full, besides us, in a violent heat; at Night or in the wane, behinde us, in a neglected pitty" (1-2). Ford continues by distinguishing between those who do and do not face adversity and change gracefully:

If men could as well frame their mindes to their change of fortunes, as their change of misfortunes doth corrupt their mindes, greatnesse would as truely welcome calamitie, as the base doe rejoyce in being great. Heereunto not the outward actions of the body, but the inward temper of the minde must be framed, since the first are but hand-maidens to the latter. Even as one lying in the bed of visitation and death, doth not therefore die because hee is sicke, but because he lives (for the depravation of life is death, not sicknesses) so the minde of man divided by the consumption and disease of humor, being touched with affliction, is not therefore miserable because it suffers misery, but because it hath once tasted (and bin lifted up to) happi-ness. (3-4)

In this context one thinks of angry Orgilus in The Broken Heart, one who could not frame his mind to the change of his fortunes. Ford explains that in order to follow steadfastly the recommended moderate way man must expect possible adversity and arm himself against it: "The Golden Meane, so aunciently commended, is onely there perfectly observed, where true Wisdome and true Nobilitie are the special ornaments of a prepared mind. . . . " (4-5). Ford warns that fear is the first problem against which man must prepare himself: "In sorrowes or adversities nothing is so fearefull as feare itself; which passion of weaknesse is so below the
heart of virtue, that a minde trained up in the exercises of honour, cannot as much as let fall one looke to behold it" (6-7). Fear never touches those of virtuous mind, for they prepare themselves for adversity; those of virtuous mind accept the fact that, in "being Men," they are subject to "the miseries of men that befall them" and thus recognize that the "temporal blessings" of wealth, honor and power are subject to adverse change. Ford refers to ancient examples of individuals who experienced changed fortunes: Pompey lost his wealth, Sejanus his honor, Ptolemy his kingdoms; then Ford gives contemporary examples: Wolsey lost his wealth, Robert, Earle of Essex his honor, and "Many of the Henries" were "kings of much power and small fortune" (12-17).

Not only must the virtuous be prepared to face a change of fortunes with "Judgement and Content," but they must also be prepared for death in the same way, for death is not a possibility but an inevitable. The "foundation to the erecting of the Master-piece of the Golden Meane" is the preparation for death: "Nothing is left therefore to a man borne to live, but a stayed and a sure resolution to be armed to die. In which hee is to care, not where hee shall die, or in what manner, or in what estate, but that hee must die, and in what minde, and in what memorable virtues" (39).

Recognizing the difficulty of preparing for adversity with virtue and honor, of building "this excellent
frame of the *Golden Meane*, on the plot of a prepared resolu-
tion* (54), Ford offers a guide for such preparation, 
focusing on six major miseries which most probably will 
confront the seeker after virtue. His list, directed to 
men of "Honour and Nobilitie" (57) and thus suggesting that 
he writes for an aristocratic rather than a general audi-
ence, includes the following miseries which most probably 
will confront the seeker after virtue: first, disfavor of 
his prince; second, neglect of his country; third, forfeiture 
of his estate; fourth, banishment from his friends; fifth, 
imprisonment of his person; and, finally, death.

Under the first type of misery, falling into dis-
favor with his prince, Ford includes a discussion of the 
causes of such disfavor, touching in particular on one 
cause which recalls *Christ's Bloody Sweat* and later becomes 
important in *The Broken Heart* and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. 
That cause is self-unworthiness of the mind which includes 
ambition, discontent, covetousness, and pride. The types 
of self-unworthiness recall several of the types of sins 
listed in *Christ's Bloody Sweat* and prepare for Ithocles' 
ambition and Orgilus' discontent in *The Broken Heart* as 
well as Giovanni's wilfull pride in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. 
The cure for these kinds of unworthiness is the same as 
that for sinfulness: self-reformation. "A remedie against 
self-unworthinesse," says Ford, "must be found in a self-
reformation; which being sincerely performed, the follies 
of the past times belong not to the reformed" (70). The
content here sounds much like Ford's advice in Christ's Bloody Sweat for man to become Christ's soldier by first conquering the evils within himself. In The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore Ford seems to dramatize the pervasive destruction resulting from failure to attempt "self-reformation."

Ford also suggests attitudes found in his early religious poem when he discusses the final cause of misery, Death, which he calls not a misery at all but "the onely remedie and securest ease against misery" (160). Ford maintains that "The end of all sorrowes is Death, if the partie to die be truly reconciled to his God and to his conscience" (163). Here Ford clearly strikes a Christian note, suggesting that death offers a promise other than simply a cessation of misery. Ford concludes his list of miseries with the idea that by keeping "truce" with passions and by preparing "Courage with resolution," then misery is no misery at all.

Thus, the prepared mind steadfastly adhering to the golden mean will prevail: "Wisdom, Temperance, Valour, Justice, are the substance and hereditary possessions of a perfectly happie man, and these riches cannot be forfeited, except by a decay of Vertue, they cannot be seized except the owner cast them off, they cannot suffer contempt so long as they be nourished in a Noble mind" (115). Ford concludes:

In a word, everie action, and the minde of every
one that hath a minde to act, is limited within the precincts of those two humane blessings, to wit, Wisdome and Noblenesse. Wisdome insures the minde, and Noblenesse commends the actions: insomuch as every one who can act wisely and deliberate Nobly, squaring his resolution in resolved steadinesse to both fortunes, may of merit be inrolled amongst the memorable; and be remembered by the desertful to be truly wise because Noble: to be perfectly Noble be­cause Wise. (182-83)

In this work Ford repetitively asserts the value of moderation as the answer to life's uncertainties. He draws on the "aunciently commended" (5) golden mean of classical Greece as the basis for his definition of virtue. The righteous man must have faith in his resolution and, when he observes slackness in his resolution, he must find "rem­edie against self-unworthinesse" in "a self-reformation."

In general, Ford asserts that man can deal with the misfortunes of life if he builds his house of virtuous moderation upon the rock of noble and wise reason; reason provides man with a sense of proportion which aids man in avoiding "violence in judgement and wilfulness in error." This emphasis on moderation and disciplined reason becomes cen­tral to major points of the ethical code developed in The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, those points which require control of the passions in order to maintain dignified humility.

In contrast to the numerous pity-piety references in Christ's Bloody Sweat, no reference to the pity-piety relationship appears in The Golden Meane, perhaps because the relationship was developed previously in a religious
rather than a secular context. The only notable reference to pity occurs when Ford is discussing envy as a cause of disfavor from the noble subject's Prince: "It is better to be envied than pittied, pitty proceeding out of a cold charitee towards the miserable; envie out of a corruption of qualitie against the virtuous" (78-79). Perhaps this passage can be best understood by again referring to The Oxford English Dictionary. We find that pity, in its second meaning of "To feel pity for; to compassionate, commiserate, be sorry for," can sometimes be used to imply "slight contempt for a person on account of some intellectual or moral inferiority attributed to him." Given the context of the present passage, envy as a cause of disfavor from the noble subject's prince, it is likely that Ford was using pity here in the sense of contemptuous condescension; thus, as Clifford Leech suggests, Ford indicates here "the patrician touch in a rejection of pity."\(^{10}\) It is better for the noble man "by tempering his disgrace with sufferance, increase the honor of his merit," and thereby envy of him, than to be pittied with contempt. In contrast with this reference to pity, it is possible that Ford comes closer to the spirit of the pity-piety reciprocity when he emphasizes Nobility and Wisdom, saying, for instance, that it is better to "be remembered by the desertful to be truly Wise because Noble: to be perfectly Noble because Wise" (183).

\(^{10}\) Leech, p. 24.
In *The Golden Meane*, then, as in *Christ's Bloody Sweat*, Ford teaches and teaches the way to a virtuous life; this time, however, his emphasis is not a Christian one, but a more stoical one which emphasizes reason without associating reason with Christ as Ford does in *Christ's Bloody Sweat*. Once more man learns that he must firmly resolve to attain the virtuous life, just as he has to resolve to be heartily sorry for his sins in the religious poem. Actually, the two works are not so very far apart in their ideas, both emphasizing similar commands though in different contexts, one Christian, the other classical. Both offer the certitude of a right way through the perilous paths of life, and in this certainty of a mode of right conduct lies the basis for Ford's offering an ethical code in *The Broken Heart* and *'Tis Pity She's a Whore*.

The third pertinent work, *A Line of Life*, closely resembles *The Golden Meane* in both form and content. This moral prose pamphlet, like the first, clearly proposes a guide through life. In its preface Ford warns against interpreting his work too specifically:

*It is an easy vanity, in these days of liberty, to be a conceited interpreter, but a difficult commendation to be a serious author; for whatsoever is at all times honestly intended, oftentimes is too largely construed. General collections meet—not seldom—with particular applications, and those so dangerous, that it is more safe, more wise, to profess a free silence than a necessary industry. Here in this—scarce an—handful of discourse, is deciphered, not what any personally is, but what any personally may be; to the intent that by the view of others' wounds we might provide plasters and cures for our own, if occasion impose...*
Justifying the need for such general applications, Ford maintains that the possession of or lack of reason is the quality which differentiates men: "It is true that all men are not born in one the same or the like purity of quality or condition; for in some custom is so become another nature, that reason is not the mistress, but the servant, not the directress, but the foil to their passions" (383).

Ford concludes his preface by asserting the salutary virtues of following the golden mean, and, in so doing, acknowledges his authorship of the earlier work of that name.

Ford begins the body of his discussion with a distinction between living and living well:

The difference between these two is, life, desired for the only benefit of living, fears to die; for such men that so live, when they die, both die finally and die all. But a good life aims at another mark; for such men as endeavour to live well, live with an expectation of death; and they, when they die, die to live, and live for ever. In this respect hath death--being the parting of a precious guest from a ruinous inn, the soul from the body--been by the ancients styled a haven of safety, a finishing of pilgrimages, a resting from travail, a passage to glory. (387)

This attitude toward living in the knowledge of death recalls both the Christian attitude found in "Christ's Bloody Sweat" and the more stoical attitude expressed in The Golden Meane. This easy combination of the two world views con-

tinues throughout the pamphlet.

Ford's guide to living well consists of three inter-related parts: action, perseverance, and sufferance. Action he calls "the crown of vertue"; perseverance "the crown of action"; and sufferance "the crown of perseverance" (388). This tripartite guide Ford compares to a "Line of Life":

... for whosoever shall level and square his whole course by this just proportion, shall, as by a line, be led not only to unwind himself from out the labyrinth and maze of this natural and troublesome race of frailty, but to fly up in the middle path, the via lactea of immortality, in his name on earth, to the throne of life, and perfection in his whole man, and to an immortality that cannot be changed. (389)

The man who endeavors to live well must be guided by the Christian "Line of Life" which "is the most certain and infallible rule which we, as we are men, and more than men, Christians, and more than Christians, the image of our Maker, must take our level by" (390).

Before one can attempt to learn the line of life, he must have one necessary attribute: resolution.

Whatsoever, therefore, in those brief ensuing collections is inserted to pattern and personate an excellent man, must be concluded and understood, for method's sake, in this one only attribute, resolution; for by it are exemplified the perfections of the mind, consisting in the whole furniture of an enriched soul; and to it are referred the noblest actions, which are the external arguments and proofs of the treasure within. (390)

Ford organizes his subsequent discussion of resolution into three parts, speaking of resolution as exercised by a man, a public man, and a good man. Resolution in a man"concerns
a man's own particular person for the carriage of himself in his proper duty"; resolution in the public man "concerns a man's employment in affairs for his country, prince, and commonwealth"; and resolution in the good man "concerns a man's voluntary traffic in civil causes, without the imposition of authority, only urged on to perform the offices of a friend, as a private statist to several ends, all tending to goodness and virtue. . . ." (391). In each of the three areas of performance, men will find sufficient opportunity "for ennobling themselves with public honours, or gaining them the truest honour, a deserved fame, which is one, if worthy, of the best and highest rewards of virtue," a comment which reminds one of Tecnicus' speech defining honor in The Broken Heart.

Before a man can be either a "public deserving man" or a "civil good man," he must first "discharge his own duty to himself" (393). The man aiming to guide his conduct by the line of life must, like Christ's soldier in Christ's Bloody Sweat, defeat the enemies within himself, a difficult task: "What infinite enticers hath a man, as he is a mere man, to withdraw him from an erected heart!" (395). Further, a man has "a world of precedents, of partners, of helpers" who will "persuade and draw him on to the full measure of an unworthy life" (395). Thus, a man must be ever watchful: ".. . [L]et no man be too confident of his own merit; the best do err. Let no man rely too much on his own judgment; the wisest are deceived. Yet let every
man so conceive of himself that he may endeavour to be such a one as distrust shall not make him careless, or confidence secure" (397). Ford's concern here with misleading deceit receives further stress later in *The Broken Heart* and *'Tis Pity She's a Whore* through sight imagery which suggests in those plays the numerous ways by which man perpetrates and falls victim to deceit.

Ford cites as ancient examples of men who were "commanders of their own infirmities" the Theban Epipaminondas, the Athenian Pocion, the Romans Brutus and Cato. As a contemporary example he names "John, the last and youngest Harington," who "attained even in his youth not only gravity in his behaviour, to wisdom in his understanding, to ripeness in his carriage, to discretion in his discourse, but to perfection in his action; a man well deserving even the testimony of a religious learned divine" (398).

Even more difficult than being a worthy and admirable man is being an esteemed public man: "Great is the task, the labour painful, the discharge full of danger, and the dangers full of envy. . . ." (399). Ford explains that he does not presume to teach "any positive rules what a right statesman should be," for that would be "to read a lecture of soldiery to Hannibal" (400). Rather, Ford intends to suggest the good use of what statesmen know: "The sum of these brief collections is intended to recreate the mind; not to inform knowledge in practice, but to conform practice to knowledge" (400).
Ford distinguishes two types of public men, the one who advances through special favor of the prince and he who advances as the result of the degree and the execution of his abilities, both of whom are subject to powerful enemies. These enemies are of two kinds: "The first are poisoners of virtue, the betrayers of goodness, the blood-suckers of innocency; the latter, the close deathsmen of merit, the plotters against honesty, and the executioners of honours: they are, in two words, discovered blandientes et savientes, flatterers and privy murderers" (401). Public men such as the English Robert, Earl of Essex, the French Charles, Duke of Byron, and the Dutch Sir John Vanolden Barneveldt represent Ford's contemporary examples of failures to contend successfully with either flattery, envy, or both. Those who do rise above these enemies "cannot choose in his own lifetime but build a monument, to which the triumph and trophies of his memory shall give a longer life than the perpetuity of stone, marble, or brass can preserve" (408). In The Broken Heart Ithocles seems to be an example of a public man unable to deal honorably with flattery; in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, Vasques answers to the description of flatterer and privy murderer.

Last is the good man, the third branch of resolution, a man who "doth--beside the care he hath of himself in particular--attend all his drifts and actions to be a servant for others, for the good of others, as if it were his own" (409). This man loves virtue for itself; he
"never flatters folly in greatness, but rather pities and
in pity strives to redress the greatness of folly" (410).
But even this man must be alert, for "flattery procures
friends, truth hatred" (410). Ford calls the good man a
"private statesman" and explains: "His endeavours are pub­
lic, the use public, the profit public, the commendation
public; but the person private, the resolution private, the
end private, and the reward peculiar" (411). Ford uses as
example of a resolute man the beleaguered Socrates, but
maintains that the good man of whom he speaks, the Chris­
tian good man, exceeds even Socrates: "The good man here
personated--inspired with a far richer and diviner knowledge
than humanity--cannot but as much exceed Socrates in those
virtues of resolution as Socrates did his adversaries in
modesty and moderation" (413). Though not specifically
stated, Ford's good man seems to be the one who practices
both pity and piety in their highest senses. Ford's para­
gon of virtue in A Line of Life experiences and expresses a
pity which is both a manifestation of his Christian spirit
and an expression of his love of man. Such a manifestation
of pity is compatible with that suggested in Christ's Bloody
Sweat. It is important that pity is one of the distinguish­
ing characteristics of Ford's good man, for it indicates
that pity has become an essential part of his ethical view.
With his closing example of the good man, Ford makes an
elaborate compliment to his sovereign, "James, the king of
Great Britain presently here reigning over us. . . ." (414).
James, says Ford, inferior on earth only to God whose vice-regent he is, is "not only a good king, but a good man, and teacheth by his example others securely and readily to run by his Line of Life to the immortality of a virtuous name" (416).

Ford concludes this pamphlet with a section entitled "The Corollary" in which he sums up the previous discussions with emphasis on the idea that all men should be and resolve to be like the good man. His final word echoes the general thrust of The Golden Meane when he says that misfortunes, borne with moderation and resolution, become the proof of virtue:

Always there is a rule in observation, positive and memorable, that an interposition or eclipse of eminence must not so make a man undervalue his own desert, but that a noble resolution should still uphold its own worth in deserving well, if we aim and intend to repute and use honours but as instrumental causes of virtuous effects in actions. (419)

In this work we have an obvious combination of Christian and stoical attitudes. Ford combines the two attitudes without hesitation or apology, differentiating only, as in the case of Socrates, to show the superiority of the Christian man. The focuses of the two earlier works, one Christian, the other classical, Ford blends into a unified whole.

The common characteristics of Christ's Bloody Sweat and The Golden Meane appear also in A Line of Life: a didactic approach proclaiming a guide to a virtuous life through resolute exercise of reason. Each work also bases its guide to virtue on similar assumptions. First, the
image of man emphasizes man's susceptibility to error, to passion, and to inevitable change, thus creating the necessity for an ethical guide and man's firm resolution to follow that guide. Second, the image of man includes the possibility of man's changing for the better by improving self-unworthiness through self-reformation. Third, in each work the ethical guide offered requires of man a very strict self-control, a self-control which at times nearly seems humanly impossible. Fourth, each ethical guide, at least those offered in *Christ's Bloody Sweat* and *A Line of Life*, involves a largeness of spirit which includes both religious reverence and human love or respect, that is, both piety and pity. Each of these assumptions influences the world view which appears in *The Broken Heart* and *'Tis Pity She's a Whore.*
CHAPTER 4

THE BROKEN HEART

The clearest evidence of Sophoclean parallels in John Ford's drama occurs in The Broken Heart. In the prologue and the epilogue of The Broken Heart Ford implies an identity with the Greek concept of the poet as a moral teacher; then in the play proper, the play's development reveals striking central parallels with Sophocles' development of Oedipus the King. Ford creates a precarious human situation in much the same way as does Sophocles in Oedipus; both emphasize the superiority of the gods and the limitations of man; furthermore, both make similar use of sight imagery to dramatize this discrepancy. At the same time that Ford presents this painful human dilemma he offers the guidance of an honor code which shares major points in common with a comparable code discernible in Sophocles. Each code stresses the requirements of reverence for the gods; compassionate respect for man; the essential need for moderation in human action; and an equal need for dignified humility. As a means of stressing the necessity for following such a code, both Ford and Sophocles portray the disastrous results when an individual attempts to ignore or defy the code. Finally, each playwright suggests the viability of his code by leaving the world of his play in the hands of man.
of one who has consistently respected each element of the code. Irving Ribner has said that Ford is "among the most obvious of writers in his moral concern,"¹ and here in *The Broken Heart* Ford clearly and explicitly presents a moral view which attempts to reckon with the human dilemma.

In the prologue and the epilogue of *The Broken Heart*, John Ford's attitude toward his audience and toward the purpose of his work reflects the Renaissance understanding of the Greek concept of the poet. Clifford Leech provides a helpful description of the Caroline audience, a description necessary to understanding Ford's attitude toward that audience. Leech stresses the audience's desire for witty and titillating escape entertainment:

The audience had not the post-War and post-Interregnum characteristics of the restoration theatre-public; it was a society that delighted in a new-won gentility, that played a little clumsily with its new toys. Masques and plays were for these people a way of escape from the unpleasantness of political circumstance and a means of cultivating the graces. The popular theatre which they patronised was not, of course, capable of the splendours of Whitehall, but still it could spin a charming story to its two-hours' length. Some of the dramatists, like Shirley, might move towards the attitude of calm appraisal that marks the Restoration, and some, like Massinger, might feel more kinship with a robust, earlier age, but the keynote of years was inattentiveness. The spectators could thrill to a new horror or to a new love endangered, but their minds strayed from an idea. Ford is a master-poet in spite of his time, though his lesser qualities are Caroline through and through; the playwright closest to the age is Davenant, who could offer noisy rant, competent satire, or dilute

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Ford's characteristic audience, then, was "sick" to the extent that it was "most pleased" by "spectacle, romance, the easy wit of slander or ribaldry" and to the extent that it required a manner of presentation "efficient, untroublesome to the jaded guest."

Leech bases this assessment of the Caroline audience primarily on the prologues and epilogues from plays of the period. "These direct addresses," explains Leech, "necessarily take their tone from the spectators even more obviously than the plays themselves; they are intimate where the earlier prologues and epilogues were impersonal and aloof, and time and again they offer us detailed descriptions of, and comments on, the persons addressed." In The Broken Heart, Ford clearly shows his awareness of his audience, their demands and expectations as well as his own response to their requirements. In the prologue to this play, Ford sets limits to what the audience can expect from his play and suggests his intention for their response. First, Ford disavows any pandering to a taste for scurrilous attacks or lewd bawdry:

The Title lends no expectation here
Of apish laughter, or of some lame Jeere
At place or persons; no pretended clause
Of jests fit for a brothell Courts applause

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3 Leech, p. 164.
From vulgar admiration: such low songs,
Tun'd to unchast eares, suit not modest tongues.

(3-8)

Here, recognizing the kind of play which "most pleased" the "jaded guest" in his audience, Ford purposefully sets his play in contrast to such expectations. More importantly, in subsequent lines of the prologue, Ford indicates his intention of providing a prevailing moral tone and purpose in the play:

The Virgine Sisters then deserv'd fresh bayes
When Innocence and Sweetnesse crown'd their layes:
Then vices gasp'd for breath, whose whole Commerce
Was whip'd to Exile by unblushing verse.
This law we keepe in our Presentment now,
Not to take freedome more then we allow;
What may be here thought a fiction, when Times youth
Wanted some riper yeares, was knowne A Truth:
In which, if words have cloath'd the subject right,
You may pertake a Pitty with Delight. (9-18)

Thus, Ford sets forth the purpose of his play in a fashion strongly reminiscent of Sir Philip Sidney's definition of poesy and its purpose found in "An Apology for Poetry."

Sidney defines poesy as "an art of imitation, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth--to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture; with this end, to teach and delight." The similarity between Ford's hope that his audi-


ence will "pertake a Pitty with Delight" and Sidney's statement that poesy should "teach and delight" suggests that Ford consciously intended a didactic purpose for The Broken Heart.

Further, a stronger emphasis on Ford's didactic purpose develops when we remember the overlapping seventeenth century meanings of pity and piety in connection with Ford's effective blending of these terms in Christ's Bloody Sweat. If we understand "pitty" in the prologue as connoting the comprehensive meaning of religious and familial piety as well as the meaning of human compassion, then Ford's prologue suggests that he seeks to achieve an even higher didactic purpose, teaching both piety and human understanding with enjoyment through the poetic vehicle of his play. Such a high moral purpose again recalls Sidney's "An Apology for Poetry," this time the passage in which he describes "right Poets" as those whose work is creative imitation in the sense of the Greek meaning of poet as maker. These "right Poets," says Sidney, "... most properly do imitate to teach and delight, and to imitate borrow nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be; but range, only reined with learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be, and should be." Such poets, according to Sidney,

\[ \ldots \] are waited on in the excellentest languages and best understandings, with the fore-described name of Poets; for these indeed do merely make to imitate, and imitate both to delight and teach, and delight to move men to take that goodness in hand,
which without delight they would fly as from a stranger, and teach, to make them know that goodness whereunto they are moved: which being the noblest scope to which ever any learning was directed, yet want there not idle tongues to bark at them.

Ford's conscious identity with the moral purpose of art suggests that he might well look to a Greek poet, a fellow "maker," as an influence.

In the epilogue to The Broken Heart, Ford follows up the didactic moral purpose introduced in the prologue by revealing his awareness of both the potential and the limitation of his audience in responding to his play:

Where Noble Judgements, and cleare eyes are fix'd
To grace Endeavour, there sits Truth not mix'd
With Ignorance: those censures may command
Beliefe, which talke not, till they understand.
Let some say This was flat; some Here the Scene
Fell from its height; Another that the Meane
Was ill observed in such growing passion
As it transcended either state or fashion:
Some few may cry, 'twas pretty well or so,
But,—and there shrugge in silence; yet we know
Our writers ayme, was in the whole addrest
Well to deserve of All, but please the Best. (1-12)

Here, as Clifford Leech so aptly states, Ford "cunningly differentiates between the shallow commentators and the genuine understanders." As the epilogue suggests, Ford has aimed his play at the "genuine understanders," and furthermore asserts a degree of independence from his audience in aiming "to deserve of All, but please the Best." Ford seems aware that his art will not be well received by all

6 Sidney, pp. 52-53.
7 Leech, Shakespeare's Tragedies, p. 168.
because, in the atmosphere created by the audience which Leech describes, "the more searching study was eschewed for the light relief of a vicarious existence," while "the easy thrill or laugh was trebly welcome." Ford perceptively acknowledges the levels of his audience and aims for the highest level.

Thus, the prologue and epilogue to The Broken Heart tend to support Una Ellis-Fermor when she says:

... superficially, Ford's plays show all the signs of a late and decadent art in their use of sensational episode and setting. But as one approaches him more closely it becomes clearer that these groupings and situations are, like the utterly incongruous comic sub-plots of his plays, concessions to the needs of the theatre rather than a spontaneous expression of his thought. They have, in fact, no valid part in the main business of his plays which is, as with the greatest of his predecessors, the illumination of character and thought by aid of event.

Ford intended his audience to learn both piety and compassion with delight by viewing his play; alert to his audience's interest, Ford reflects a concern with love and with an honor code, but he uses neither as an escape from provocative thought.

Most of Ford's critics have commented upon the related subjects of love and marriage in The Broken Heart but with varying interpretations. S. P. Sherman, for instance, views this play as "a plea for the rights of the individual

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8 Leech, p. 178.

against the tyranny of the matrimonial bond." In a similar vein, G. F. Sensabaugh relates _The Broken Heart_ to "the tenets and ethics of court Platonism," saying: "With court dramatists, Ford made love his religion, exalted individual whim, and worshiped a morality 'higher' than law and convention; and, since the cult shaped court drama while Ford wrote most seriously, it seems probable that he found his romantic theory of love in Henrietta Maria's Platonic coterie." In contrast to Sherman and Sensabaugh, other critics, such as Glenn H. Blayney and Brian Morris, see the play as a protest against the practice of enforced marriage, and others, such as Moody E. Prior and Fredson Bowers, see it as a study of unfulfilled or frustrated love. Robert Ornstein, however, does not see this play as revealing any interest in "the immediate problem of enforced marriage," but as evidencing Ford's interest in "the ethical problems that arise when the reality of marriage

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travesties the ideal."\(^\text{14}\) Enlarging on this idea, R. J. Kaufmann considers the travesty of marriage in The Broken Heart as one ravaging effect of destructive ambition.\(^\text{15}\) M. Joan Sargeaunt concludes from the total import of the play that Ford followed the "currently accepted idea that love is the only sound basis for marriage, and that marriage is the only sound basis for love."\(^\text{16}\)

As with love and marriage in The Broken Heart, critics recognize the existence of a code of behavior in the play but differ in their explanations of its meaning and function. Both Clifford Leech and Robert Ornstein agree that it is essentially an "aristocratic code," with Ornstein adding that the play is the "aesthetic expression" of "aristocratic values."\(^\text{17}\) Ellis-Fermor analyzes the code into the three related parts of "continence, courage and chivalry."\(^\text{18}\) Others find the code too inflexible to be realistic; for instance, Brian Morris calls it "a sparse collocation of iron principles."\(^\text{19}\) Still others, such as


\(^{19}\) Brian Morris, ed. The Broken Heart, p. xix.
Arthur C. Kirsch, consider it a "characteristically Fletcherian" code which creates conflicting demands between love and duty;\(^\text{20}\) Irving Ribner, though not insisting on the total Fletcherian likeness, does see the code as "an absolute social code" which makes "conflicting demands."\(^\text{21}\) Kaufmann, too, places the emphasis on the social aspects of the code, calling it a "code of renunciation" based primarily on "maxims of social prudence" which Ford raises "to the level of commanding moral obligations."\(^\text{22}\) Martin L. Wine views the code as nothing more than a "code of noble gestures."\(^\text{23}\)

Certainly The Broken Heart does involve the subject of love and marriage and the expression of a code of behavior. Orgilus and Penthea's broken contract, Penthea and Bassanes' unfortunate alliance, Ithocles and Calantha's marriage contract solemnized in death, and Prophilus and Euphranea's worthy union attest to the prevalence of love and marriage in the play's action; Tecnicus' definition of honor in exactly the middle of the play suggests by its location, not to mention its content, its central importance in the play. Both topics seem best understood when viewed


21 Ribner, Jacobean Tragedy, pp. 156-57.

22 Kaufmann, "Ford's 'Waste Land,'" 184.

in conjunction. Charles O. McDonald recognizes the inter­
relationship of the two subjects when he says that in The
Broken Heart "though Ford adopts the subject-matter of the
'new sensibility'--love--he is even more strenuously op­
posed to any notion of 'unbridled individualism' than in
Love's Sacrifice, and, as in that play, he orders his char­
acter studies in a strict relationship to an underlying con­
cept of morality more rhetorical and 'Stoic' . . . than
'Platonic' . . . , particularly insisting upon the necessity
of restraining passion by reason."

24 The importance of
love is intricately involved with the code of behavior de­
veloped in The Broken Heart, finding expression in religious
reverence and human compassion, the first two tenets of
Ford's honor code. Ford's code gains meaning by a compari­
son with moral ideas implicit in a similar code discernible
in Sophocles' Oedipus.

Both Sophocles and Ford portray man as precariously
situated in his universe, caught between his woeful inferi­
ority to the gods in vision and wisdom and his own weakness
as represented by the passions which, by contradicting rea­
sonable attempts to establish a sense of balance, cease­
lessly threaten his relationship with the gods and with
other men who are equally subject to passion. As a means
to survive such an uncertain existence, both playwrights

24 Charles O. McDonald, "The Design of John Ford's
The Broken Heart: A Study in the Development of Caroline
Sensibility," SP, 59 (1962), 145.
suggest through dramatic presentation a code which calls, first, for piously revering the gods; second, for recognizing all men justly and compassionately; third, for determinedly following reason as opposed to the passions in an effort to fulfill the first two requirements; and, fourth, for shunning especially presumptive pride while striving to maintain a dignified humility lest the individual and his world be destroyed. In establishing the nature of the dangerously awkward position man occupies in this world, Sophocles, and Ford like him, stresses the discrepancy between the gods' omniscience and man's meager powers, often using sight imagery to suggest this discrepancy.

In Sophocles' Oedipus the King, the chorus expresses the vast difference between divine and human, with the resulting human uncertainty, when it laments, "From Zeus's eyes and Apollo's no human secret is hidden;/ But man has no test for truth, no measure his wit can devise" (472-73). Sophocles emphasizes the truth of this lament through the sight and blindness, light and darkness, wisdom and ignorance images and paradoxes associated with the man, Oedipus, especially as he is contrasted with Tiresias, the blind prophet of the all-seeing god, Apollo. Tiresias, though physically blind, has "the clearest vision/ Next to our Lord Apollo" (270-71) and can see the wretchedness of

25 Sophocles, Oedipus the King in World Masterpieces, I, rev., eds. Maynard Mack, et. al. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1965), p. 317. Future citations from this work will be indicated within the text by line number.
Oedipus' situation: that the Theban king has killed his father and married his own mother by whom he has sired offspring. Oedipus, on the other hand, though physically capable of sight, cannot, as Tiresias warns him, "see the sin of [his] existence" (395-96), the truth of his situation. Only when Oedipus is blind does he see himself as he is. Further, although Oedipus proposes in searching for his father Laius' murderer to "start fresh and again make clear/Things that are dark" (133-34), he succeeds only in plunging himself into darkness by bringing the truth to light, for the truth shows him his unbearable sin and causes him to blind himself. Despite the fact that Oedipus has earlier possessed the knowledge, the insight, to solve the riddle of the Sphinx, he, unlike Tiresias who "alone/Is godlike in knowledge of the truth" (284-85), has remained ignorant of the truth of events in which he is directly involved.

Hence, man as Sophocles portrays him is a poor creature, gifted though he may be, in contrast with the gods who govern existence. The chorus, after learning the truth about both old and new kings, Oedipus and his father Laius, clearly delineates the precarious position of man in this world:

Men are of little worth. Their brief lives last
A single day.
They cannot hold elusive pleasure fast;
It melts away.
All laurels wither; all illusions fade;
Hopes have been phantoms, shade on airbuilt shade,
Since time began.
Your fate, O King, your fate makes manifest
Life's wretchedness. We can call no one blessed,
No, not one man. (1130-39)

Therefore, through the contrast between Tiresias and Oedipus in both vision and knowledge, Sophocles portrays man as a strictly limited being as compared to the gods who omnisciently govern his existence. For man, no certainties, no absolutes, no sureties exist, and the chorus views man's unstable situation in terms of "Life's wretchedness." In the dramatic world of this play, the gods and their priests are all-seeing and all-knowing, but, as Oedipus' position makes painfully evident, man exists in ever-present uncertainty, never fully seeing or knowing his world or even himself.

In The Broken Heart Ford creates a similarly uncertain world for his characters, and his primary basis for this equivocal human situation, like that of Sophocles, derives from the inequality between the gods and man. The scholar, philosopher and prophet, Tencicus, serves as The Broken Heart's counterpart to Oedipus' Tiresias as the gods' representative, and he is a main focus for developing the discrepancy between divine and human powers; however, Ford does not limit himself to Tencicus alone, for he persistently develops the theme of discrepancy through several other characters as well. Still, Tencicus remains the primary focus; for instance, when Orgilus, posing as a scholar, seeks entry into Tencicus' study, Tencicus, prophet of Apollo like Tiresias, warns Orgilus that he cannot deceive
the gods through disguise, for "this change/ Of habit and
disguise in outward view/ Hides not the secrets of thy soul
within thee/ From their quicke-piercing eyes, which dive at
all times/ Downe to thy thoughts" (I.iii.3-6). This prophet
of Apollo serves as reminder of the vision and power of the
gods as contrasted with man's feeble subterfuges, such as
those practised by Orgilus. Orgilus himself is aware,
though he chooses to ignore, the great difference between
god and man: "Mortality/ Creeps on the dung of earth and
cannot reach/ The riddles which are purpos'd by the gods"
(I.iii.178-79). Other characters, too, acknowledge the
gods' omniscience. Euphranea, for example, does so when
she calls for the gods' mercy in behalf of her brother,
Orgilus; she says, "Heaven/ Does looke into the secrets of
all hearts:/ Gods, you have mercy with 'ee, else--" (I.i.
113-15). Prophilus, also, suggests the discrepancy between
man's vision and that of the gods when he observes, "Stares
fall but in the grossenesse of our sight" (II.iii.156).

Ford elaborates the imagery of man's limited sight,
as does Sophocles in Oedipus, to stress the profound dif­
ference between divine and human vision. Although the gods'
vision cannot be deceived, as Tecnicus cautioned Orgilus,
man's restricted vision, like that of Oedipus, certainly
can be deluded; characters in The Broken Heart both fear
and practice deception. Because Bassanes wrongly suspects
Penthea of deceit on the basis that "No woman but can fall,
and doth, or would" (II,i.40), he proposes to "have that
window next the street dam'd up" because it "courts a Gazers
glances" (II.i.1-3). Orgilus disguises himself so that,
"Thus metamorphiz'd" (I.iii.33), he can spy on both Euphranea
and Penthea; moreover, being successful in this metamorpho-
sis, he calls on Mercury to "inspire" him with further "swift
deceits" (I.iii.177). Later, he pretends friendship and af-
fection for Ithocles, calling him "Most right, my most good
Lord, my most great Lord,/ My gracious Princely Lord, --I
might add--royal" (IV.iii.103-104), while plotting this
man's death. For his part, Ithocles, who publicly declares
he serves Sparta as "a debt of service" to the state (I.ii.77),
reveals privately that ambition actually consumes his pri-
vate thoughts. Crotolon expresses distrust of "the painted
meat of smooth perswasion" (II.ii.22). And Penthea, in her
madness, explains that she has been living as in a dream
because she has felt spiritually dead: "... ['T]is a fine
deceit/ To passe away in a dreame: indeed, I've slept/ With
mine eyes open a great while" (IV.ii.73-74). Calantha, too,
resorts to pretense when continuing to dance despite news
of her father's, her friend's, and her lover's deaths: "O
my Lords,/ I but deceiv'd your eyes with Anticke gesture/
When one newes straight came hudling on another/ Of death,
and death, and death,--still I danced forward" (V.iii.67-70).
Only Nearchus can most truthfully say that "My tongue and
heart are twins" (III.iii.64); but even he understands the
power of deceit, for he intends to practice deception for
the unselfish purpose of furthering Ithocles' suit to Calan-
tha by pretending "To be jealous/ In publike of what privately I'le further" (II.i.210-11). In fact, Armestes' warning to Ithocles regarding Orgilus' seeming good nature could be issued to the whole court: "Our eyes can never pierce into the thoughts/ For they are lodg'd too inward" (IV.i.17-18).

Therefore, through such repetitive emphasis Ford creates a world in which appearances do not accurately reflect reality; man's perception and judgment are limited. As a result, each of Ford's characters to some degree is limited to as well as desirous of that of which the "senses waking are partakers.--A reall, visible, material happiness" (IV.i.49-50); likewise, Sophocles' Oedipus desires an equally definitive solution to his city's and his own problems. Such a distinct absolute, even if limited, would be a welcome relief; however, as Penthea realizes, such apparent absolutes are only illusions:

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Glories
Of humane greatness are but pleasing dreams,
And shadowes soone decaying: on the state
Of my mortality, my youth hath acted
Some scenes of vanity, drawne out at length
By varied pleasure, sweetned in the mixture,
But tragicall in issue; Beauty, pompe,
With every sensuality our giddinesse
Doth frame an Idoll, are unconstant friends
When any troubled passion makes assault
On the unguarded Castle of the mind. (III.v.13-23).
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Ford places man in a confusing and changing world in which he is bounded, yet driven, by his own limitations.26

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26 Such emphasis on deceit and illusion are common in Jacobean drama. As Cyrus Hoy notes, "In no major body of tragic drama have deceptions, disguises, the manipulation of appearances loomed so large as in that of Shake-
Thus, in Ford's *Broken Heart*, as in Sophocles' *Oedipus*, the gods are superior to man in sight and wisdom, while man is insecurely lodged within his limitations. The song Calantha prepares as her dirge, reflecting in its content a view similar to Penthea's, echoes the view and much of the spirit of the Sophoclean chorus which bewailed "Life's wretchedness" because life is characterized by "elusive pleasure," withering laurels, fading illusions, and phantom hopes:

Glories, pleasures, poms, delights, and ease,  
Can but please  
The outward senses, when the mind  
Is not untroubled, or by peace refin'd.  
Crowns may flourish and decay,  
Beauties shine, but fade away.  
Youth may revell, yet it must  
Lye downe in a bed of dust:  
Earthly honors flow and wast,  
Time alone doth change and last.  
(V.iii.81-90)

This song suggests the illusoriness of much of man's existence, especially those things which he holds falsely in too high esteem. The misfortunes surrounding Calantha have made her aware, as Oedipus' misfortunes have made the chorus aware, that no guarantee exists for human happiness. This point of view clearly reflects a passage in *A Line of Life*:

"All glory, whether it consist of profits or preferments, is without, and therefore makes nothing to the essence of Shakespeare and his Jacobean contemporaries." Hoy explains the reason for such emphasis as being the fact that for these writers "the problem of what is real and what is not had become a problem," the problem at the base of the "crisis of the Renaissance." (Cyrus Hoy, "Jacobean Tragedy and the Mannerist style," *Shakespeare Survey*, 26 (1973), 58).
true happiness; but the feeling of a resolved constancy is within, and ever keeps a feast in a man's soundest content."27

In both Oedipus and The Broken Heart, not only must man live poised thus unsurely in relation to the gods while limited by his own inadequacies, but he must also contend with the conflicts within his own nature, striving to achieve an equilibrium between the dictates of his reason and the impulses of his passions. Through Oedipus, Sophocles illustrates the power of the passions over reason. Oedipus allows passionate anger, born of pride, to control him when he insults Tiresias because of the seer's frightening prophecy and when he accuses Creon of plotting treachery. Later, Oedipus again succumbs to passion, this time arrogant certainty of self, when he believes the oracles are false and he is free of their predictions: "Why should anyone/ Give heed to oracles from the Pythian shrine . . . ?" (914-15). Hence, Creon assesses Oedipus' character accurately when he observes, "Natures like yours/ Inflict their heaviest torments on themselves" (638-39). Creon recognizes that the king's intense sense of pride will in some way delude him; consequently, he warns Oedipus, "If you imagine that a blind self-will/ Is strength of character, you are mistaken" (515-16). Because Oedipus pursues his willfulness and asserts himself over Creon's reasonableness, Tiresias' warning, and the gods' prophecy, he finally ends in bring-

ing the "heaviest torments" on himself. Through the combination of man's unbalanced relationship with the gods and his own passionate nature, Sophocles creates a painfully precipitous world for man.

Ford also portrays man as being at the mercy of his own passions and those of others in The Broken Heart. Rather than focusing on a single character, as does Sophocles, Ford presents a variety of characters who are victims of their passions, usually passions rooted in pride: Ithocles of his ambitious pride; Orgilus of his anger and pride of honor; Bassanes of his husbandly pride; and Penthea of her virtuous pride. Ithocles' problem is consuming ambition: "Ambition! 'tis of vipers breed, it knowes/ A passage through the wombe that gave it motion" (II.ii.1-2). Rather than attempt control of his passion, however, he looks for "Meanes, speedy meanes, and certain!" as a "cure" for his "strong Feavers" (II.ii.13-15). Orgilus suffers from a different passion, anger, which stems from his thwarted love for Penthea and which grows apace as the result of his desire for vengeance to assuage his injured honor. Gradually, anger becomes for him a general "Infection of the mind" (III.iv.44) and controls him wholly. Bassanes suffers from jealousy born of his sensitive husbandly pride; because he will not trust Penthea's fidelity, he succumbs to jealousy, allowing it to befuddle his wits: "Swarmes of confusion huddle in my thoughts/ In rare distemper. Beauty! O it is/ An unmatcht blessing or a horrid
curse" (II. i. 65-67). Finally, his jealousy tempts him into bursting in on Penthea's private conversation with Ithocles and into accusing Ithocles of "frank[ing] his lust/ In Swine-security of bestial incest" (III. ii. 149-50). However, rather than be voiced "the contempt of manhood" (III. ii. 204) because of this jealousy, he seeks to control his passion. Unlike either her brother, her former betrothed, or her husband, Penthea falls victim to her virtuous pride, allowing the deep frustration of her "troubled passion" to make an "assault/ On the unguarded castle of [her] mind" (III. v. 22-23) so that she commits suicide. In each case the character succumbs to that against which Tecnicus warns Orgilus, as Creon similarly warned Oedipus: "Be well advis'd; let not a resolution/ Of giddy rashnesse choake the breath of reason" (III. i. 1-2). But in every instance, the character cannot control his "giddy rashnesse" so that, in yielding to his passion, each character creates circumstances which cause not only himself but others to suffer: Ithocles' early ambition initiates the conflict among Orgilus, Penthea, and Bassanes, thus provoking the equally passionate responses which lead, directly and indirectly, to the related chain of deaths, those of Penthea, Ithocles, Orgilus, and Calantha. Eventually, with Calantha's death, the chain of events affects the whole court and the state.

Ford warns against just such passions and their disastrous effects in Christ's Bloody Sweat, The Golden Meane, and A Line of Life. In Christ's Bloody Sweat Ford
admonishes against the lustful passion of love, calling it a "raging blood affections blind." In The Golden Meane Ford defines "self-unworthiness" of the mind in terms of various passions: "Ambition," or "Mother of Disloyal Plots and Practices"; "Discontent," or "Nurse of Conspiracies"; "Covetousness"; and "Vaineuglorie or Pride." In A Line of Life Ford distinguishes between those men for whom reason is the guide and those in whom "reason is not the mistress, but the servant, not the directress, but the foil to their passions." In this same work he explains that a man must resolve first "to know, feel, and moderate affections, which like traitors and disturbers of the peace, rise up to alter and quite change the laws of reason, by working in the feeble, and oftentimes the sounder parts, an innovation of folly." 

Often in The Broken Heart Ford speaks of the passions, which work "in the feeble, and oftentimes the sounder parts," in terms of disease imagery. Thus, Bassanes speaks of his jealousy as a "distemper" of the mind; Ithocles calls his ambition "strong Feavers"; Orgilus' discontent develops into an "Infection of the mind"; Penthea's madness

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30 A Line of Life, p. 383.
31 A Line of Life, p. 393.
bears witness to the infection of passion. To speak thus of passion as a disease suggests Robert Burton's *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. Critics have explored the relationship between Ford's portrayal of the various types of uncontrolable passion to Burton's detailed study, some finding such a close correspondence between the two that it appears Ford documented his cases of passion according to the type of melancholy they represent. S. Blaine Ewing's study, *Burtonian Melancholy in the Plays of John Ford*, maintains that "Ten of Ford's plays," including *The Broken Heart*, "are directly concerned with the theme of Burtonian melancholy." For instance, Ewing names Bassanes "the chief melancholic" representative in *The Broken Heart* because of that character's jealousy, and he rates Ithocles next in importance as a melancholic because of ambition. Ewing's study contains valuable information, but he reaches a rather narrow conclusion in saying that in Ford's "great plays," including the play presently under discussion, "melancholy is the very principle of tragedy itself. It is the character's tragic flaw, which imbues all his wickedness and violence in the colours of martyrdom." Another exploration of the relationship between Ford's plays and Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* is that of G. F. Sensabaugh. This critic, in contrast to Ewing, sees in Burton's influence evidence that

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Ford "wholeheartedly embraced scientific thought in his day." In other words, Sensabaugh believes that Burton's influence contributes to a belief in "scientific determinism" which Sensabaugh attributes to Ford. "John Ford's heroes and heroines," says Sensabaugh, "are embodiments of definite melancholy diseases. Few characters of sound body and mind appear in Ford's plays; few scenes lend themselves to normal relations such as abound in the best plays of Shakespeare." Sensabaugh maintains that in Ford's plays "if custom and law hindered the application of appropriate cures" for the melancholic, then tragedy resulted because of the consequent conflict between "scientific necessity and the demands of traditional law." Hence, although Sensabaugh's conclusion regarding the effect of Burton's Anatomy on Ford's plays is quite different from Ewing's conclusion, nevertheless each reaches an equally restrictive conclusion.

In contrast to both Ewing and Sensabaugh, Robert Stavig suggests that Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy did not exert such an overwhelming influence on Ford's drama. Stavig points out that Burton "was writing a compendium of the learning of his day" and, therefore, included many commonplaces of his time; further, Stavig em-

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34 Sensabaugh, pp. 34-35.
35 Sensabaugh, p. 46.
36 Sensabaugh, p. 35.
phasizes that Burton maintained a constant religious concern throughout his work. Thus, to overemphasize the "scientific method" of Burton and his medical and psychological contemporaries in writing is to come to a "deterministic explanation of their psychology" which overlooks the fact that for them "Medical psychology was still the handmaiden of Christian ethics."

Stavig's position seems more justifiable than that of either Ewing or Sensabaugh. The correspondences between Burtonian melancholy and melancholic characters in Ford's plays exist; however, these correspondences, though interesting and informative, need not require concentration to the exclusion of more important concerns. In fact, such correspondences should be viewed in conjunction with larger issues. One purpose of this present study is to show that Ford does not, as Ewing suggests, imbue "all his wickedness and violence in the colours of martyrdom," nor does he, as Sensabaugh insists, sacrifice the requirement of traditional law to the demands of scientific necessity. In Ford, aberrations in human behavior should be seen in the context of a recommended code of behavior.

In Sophocles' and Ford's dramatic worlds, man requires some code of conduct in order to stabilize his existence in the perilously unpredictable life situation in


38 Ewing, p. 113.
which he is inferior to the gods and, at the same time, subject to dangerous passions of his own and of others. Both playwrights provide such a code. In Oedipus one can read a code motivated basically by reverence for the gods in the light of their superior powers and a concomitant justice and compassion for man in view of his painful situation. We receive the fundamental elements of the code in Sophocles' dramatic world from the chorus, which, says Herbert Grierson, is an "authoritative utterance in a Greek tragedy." The fullest statement from the Theban chorus occurs after the development of Oedipus' pride of place in his rejection of Tiresias and his accusations against both Creon and the chorus; the anxious chorus after this dangerously erratic behavior cries for a belief in the oracles and promulgates the tenets of the code which such belief presupposes:

May piety and reverence mark my actions;
May every thought be pure through all my days.
May those great laws whose dwelling is in heaven
Approve my conduct with their crown of praise:
Offspring of skies that overarch Olympus,
Laws from the loins of no mere mortal sprung,
Unslumbering, unfailing, unforgetting,
Filled with a godhead that is ever young.
Pride breeds the tyrant. Insolent presumption,
Big with delusive wealth and false renown,
Once it has mounted to highest rampart
Is headlong hurled in utter ruin down.
But pour out all thy blessings, Lord Apollo,
Thou who alone has made and kept us great,
On all whose sole ambition is unselfish,
Who spend themselves in service to the state.

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Let that man be accursed who is proud,
In act unscrupulous, in thinking base,
Whose knees in reverence have never bowed,
In whose hard heart justice can find no place,
Whose hands profane life's holiest mysteries,
How can he hope to shield himself for long
From the gods' arrows that will pierce him through?
If evil triumphs in such ways as these,
Why should we seek, in choric dance and song,
To give the gods the praise that is their due?

I cannot go in full faith as of old
To sacred Delphi or Olympian vale,
Unless men see that what has been foretold
Has come to pass, that omens never fail.
All-ruling Zeus, if thou art King indeed,
Put forth thy majesty, make good thy word,
Faith in these fading oracles restore!
To priest and prophet men pay little heed;
Hymns to Apollo are no longer heard;
And all religion soon will be no more. (827-62)

The essential code of human conduct implied in this intensely troubled prayer to the gods can be read to consist of four main points: One, reverence for the gods; two, compassionate respect and justice for men; three, the necessity of vigilantly controlling selfish passions; fourth, a specific warning against unjustified pride, pride that "breeds the tyrant." The chorus first stresses the piety of reverence for the gods: "May piety and reverence mark my actions." Such reverence necessarily includes following divine laws: "May those great laws whose dwelling is in heaven/ Approve my conduct with their crown of praise."

Next, the chorus makes clear that this reverence for the gods and their laws, which are "Filled with a godhead that is ever young," is incomplete without an equal piety for life. Only those are reverent "whose sole ambition is unselfish,/ Who spend themselves in service to the state."
That man is last "in whose hard heart justice can find no place,/ Whose hands profane life's holiest mysteries."

Here plainly the justice is directed at man; reverence for the gods is empty without a like regard for "life's holiest mysteries." Since points one and two are so closely related they will be discussed together. Points three and four will be discussed separately in order later.

Sophocles emphasizes the importance of these two aspects of the code by dramatizing Oedipus' successes and failures in following them. At the beginning of Oedipus, the king manifests reverence for both the gods and the Theban citizens; he has sent Creon to inquire of the Pythian oracle of Apollo how to dispel the plague, and he empathizes as a fellow sufferer with the Theban citizens, telling them: "Each of you suffers for himself alone,/ But my heart feels the heaviness of my sorrow, and the sorrow of all the others" (64-66). Yet, with his anger at Tiresias comes an explosive disintegration of piety as Oedipus insults Tiresias as a prophet of Apollo and as a man, calling him a "scheming mountebank," a "fraud," and a "trickster" (368). He persists in his impiety by accusing his kinsman, Creon, of being master of a plot to overthrow him as King. Oedipus' impiety reaches a further peak when the Corinthian messenger allays his growing fears of culpability by telling him of the death of Polybus, the King of Corinth and the man whom Oedipus believes to be his father; at the news of his supposed-father's death, Oedipus exclaims that the oracles,
"as they stand, at least . . . , have been swept away like rubbish,/ They are with Polybus in Hades, dead" (922-24). Oedipus, therefore, initially recognizes the importance of proper reverence for the gods and compassionate respect for man, but as pressures build he allows himself to ignore this necessary veneration and pity, first denouncing Tiresias and turning on his kinsman and then arrogantly scoffing at the gods' oracles. Oedipus fails to abide by the first two demands of the code.

In *The Broken Heart* Ford develops a code similar to that in *Oedipus*. Tecnicus in this play serves as spiritual guide in much the same way as does Tiresias in *Oedipus*; moreover, he serves as a kind of chorus figure in that it is he who sets out the code of conduct which offers man a means of some security in this precarious world. Acting in both these capacities, Tecnicus, in attempting to forestall any dishonorable acts on the part of the willful Orgilus, offers a definition of "reall Honour" as an ethical code for action:

Honour consists not in a bare opinion  
By doing any act that feeds content,  
Brave in appearance, 'cause we think it brave:  
Such honour comes by accident, not nature,  
Proceeding from the vices of our passion,  
Which makes our reason drunke. But reall Honour  
Is the reward of vertue, and acquired  
By Justice or by valour, which for Bases  
Hath Justice to uphold it. He then failes  
In Honour, who for lucre or Revenge  
Commits thefts, murtherers, Treasons and Adulteries,  
With such like, by intrenching on just Lawes,  
Whose sov'raignty is best preserv'd by Justice.  
Thus, as you see how honour must be grounded  
On knowledge, not opinion—for opinion  

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Relyes on probability and Accident,
But knowledge on Necessity and Truth--
I leave thee to the fit consideration
Of what becomes the grace of reall Honour,
Wishing successe to all thy vertuous meanings.  

(III.i.32-51)

Clearly recognizable in Tecnicus' catechism of honor are four points roughly similar to those found in the Sophoclean chorus' prayer. First, honor depends upon justice or complying with the gods' laws; second, honorable actions depend upon treating other men with respect and compassion rather than acting selfishly in order to satisfy destructive desire; third, honor demands that one control his passions within the confines of the law; and fourth, this honor code warns specifically against "opinion" which comes from "the vices of our passion,/ Which makes our reason drunke." Essentially Tecnicus' honor code corresponds to the four major aspects of the chorus' code in Oedipus.

Basic to Tecnicus' definition of honor and his attendant list of dishonorable motives and actions is the underlying assumption that man must act with piety, obeying the laws of God and man. Tecnicus does not speak here in his role as Apollo's prophet; rather he speaks as a spiritual teacher reiterating those maxims of good conduct generally known. Still, his position as religious leader and as "Artist," as the Dramatis Personae names him, lends special weight and authority to his code; clearly the code is first based on religious principle: "reall Honour/ Is
the reward of vertue." Second, "reall Honour" must respect the rights of other men. He "failes" in honor who acts out of the greed of "Lucre" or the anger of "Revenge," both of which motives are essentially selfish; further, he also neglects honor who commits acts which demean, diminish, or destroy other human beings: "Thefts, murthers, Treasons and Adulteries, with such like. . . ." These ill-conceived ideas of honor can be a vice, a moral deficiency rather than a moral virtue because, if relentlessly pursued, they exclude the proper attitude toward the gods and man. Honor here is the same as Ford defines it in A Line of Life when he says, "truest honour, a deserved fame, which is one, if worthy, of the best highest rewards of virtue." In his introduction to The Broken Heart, Brian Morris emphasizes the central position such a definition of honor holds in the lives of this play's characters:

Honour, for Tecnicus, and for the moral fabric of this play is a virtue rooted in society, a reward given for knowledge exercised in the preservation of justice and truth. It is not an isolated, personal quality, still less an accidental valour, but a pattern of behaviour lived out in the presence of others. By this ideal the subsequent actions of the characters are to be judged. . . . Honour, in Ford's presentation of it, is no mere scutcheon; it is a quality of life, an ideal lived out in public action and service, which moulds the inward man.

40 An interesting point here is that Apollo, for whom Tecnicus is priest, was sometimes in the Renaissance associated with Christ. See Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 245, 268.

41 A Line of Life, p. 391.

42 Brian Morris, ed. The Broken Heart, pp. xviii-xix.
These first two points of the ideal honor code gain more significance when viewed as implicitly incorporating the reciprocal meanings of piety and pity. Remembering this play's prologue with its inferred reference to the reciprocal meanings of piety and pity and the earlier occurrence of similar reciprocity in *Christ's Bloody Sweat*, Ford seems to be purposefully suggesting these same concepts in his code of honor which calls for reverence for the gods and man. Tecnicus, the voice of piety, calls for an honor which respects the commands of virtue as associated with the laws of god and men; he offers specific examples of dishonorable acts, each of which transgresses against other human beings and, therefore, rejects pity. Piety here would include, first, religious reverence of the gods and all that they represent. Further, it would also include familial reverence or a sense of dutiful respect to parents and other family members. Pity here would imply a sense of merciful compassion and justice with respect for all men. But pity does not include obsessive self-pity. Thus, in his code of conduct in *The Broken Heart*, Ford carefully intertwines the interrelated meanings of piety and pity. Ford stresses the necessity for such an emphasis on these two concepts in his honor code by dramatizing the failure to live up to the code. In so doing, Ford follows much the

43 The definition for piety is reverence for God, or regard for religious observations, and dutiful respect or regard for parents or others.

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same pattern as does Sophocles in depicting the importance of the Greek code; however, Ford differs from Sophocles by dramatizing his idea through the fortunes of several characters rather than just one.

Orgilus is one character who fails in reverence and compassion. Despite Tecnicus' good counsel in setting forth the proper course of honor, Orgilus does not heed the advice, intentionally defying the recommended piety and gradually placing himself above the gods and man. In his initial appearance, Orgilus presents a sympathetic figure, a young man suffering from the unjust deprivation of his pre-contracted love, Penthea, because of her brother Ithocles' pride and revenge (I.i.29-46); further, he seems a compassionate lover, one who feels more his beloved's pain than his own: he says, for instance, "... [H]e savord not humanity/ Whose sorrow melts not into more than pitty/ In hearing but her [Penthea's] name" (I.i.54-56). As a result of this first impression, we appreciate Orgilus' stated intention to leave Sparta rather than provoke Penthea's husband, Bassanes, into further jealousy by staying nearby. We even approve Orgilus' solicitous concern about his sister Euphranea's possible marriage choice, though some confusion surrounds his reason for having her wait for his approval since their father yet lives (I.i.92-95).

Orgilus' next appearance, however, contrasts so sharply with his first that it demands a reconsideration of both his virtue and his compassion. First, disguised as a scholar, Or-
gilus misleads Tecnicus as to the disguise's purpose in order to gain entrance into the protection of the scholar's private study; next, he eavesdrops suspiciously on his sister's very proper conversation with Prophilus, and ends the scene with the cry, "Inspire me, Mercury, with swift deceits" (I.iii.177). In his third appearance, the still-disguised Orgilus reveals his true identity both to Penthea and to the audience. Penthea recognizes him as her unreconciled love, and the audience recognizes him as having not so much pity for Penthea but pity for himself, especially when he complains to her: "If thou soft bosome be not turn'd to marble,/ Thou't pity our calamities; my Interest/ Confirmes me thou art mine still" (II.iii.62-64). With Penthea's regretful but adamant rejection of his advances Orgilus vows to "teare my vaile of politicke French off,/ And stand up like a man resolv'd to doe" (II.iii.124-25). Henceforth, Orgilus' public actions cannot be trusted.

Orgilus returns to court, but his first discussion alone with his father indicates his mood, for he grumbles about being asked to respond positively to Ithocles' show of friendship. He growls that Ithocles' "scorne/ Of my untoward fortunes is reclaim'd/ Unto a Courtship, almost to a fawning:/ I'le kisse his foot, since you will have it so" (III.iv.27-30). His father, Crotolon, rebukes him for "the Wolfe of hatred snarling in [his] breast" (III.iv.33), noting in his son an "Infection of the mind, which . . . /

Threatens the desolation of our family" (III.iv.43-45).
Orgilus promises to play the part of friendship to Ithocles (III.iv.92-96). The weakness of this vow as well as the extent of his earlier disdain for Tecnicus soon become evident.

Orgilus reveals the degree to which he is willing to extend his religious impiety when he scorns the cryptic parting warning against revenge which Tecnicus addresses especially to him. He sneeringly dismisses the prophet's words as "dotage of a withered brain" (IV.i.154). At this point he mocks Tecnicus, claiming, "Darke sentences are for Apollo's Priests:/ I am not Oedipus" (IV.i.140-41). Despite this disclaimer, Orgilus fails to perceive the irony in the fact that he is imitating the Greek king by insulting Apollo's representative as a prophet and as a man. Orgilus thus reaches a peak of impiety in scorning the gods in the manner of Oedipus. This sacrilege, furthermore, leaves him open to yet another. Hearing Penthea's mad ravings and feeling pain for her, Orgilus listens as to a Pythian oracle: "If this be madnesse, madnesse is an Oracle" (IV.ii.133). Certainly Orgilus does love Penthea and feels a deep compassion for her suffering; but, as noted earlier, his love for Penthea struggles often unsuccessfully with his own self-pity, his hatred of Ithocles, and his lust for revenge. Thus selfishly preoccupied, he rejects the gods and their oracles, choosing for himself a god consistent with his own "opinion."

Having chosen Penthea's madness as his "oracle," as his justification for pursuing his revenge, he is alert to
Ithocles' slightest vulnerability. Thus, when Orgilus per-
ceives the growing affection between his enemy and Calantha,
he thrills at the possibilities: "Apparent,/ The youth is
up on tiptoe, yet may tumble" (IV.iii.92-93). Finally, Or-
gilus names himself Ithocles' judge, jury, and executioner,
basely causing his enemy to "tumble" into the trap of the
"engine." Maliciously taunting the trapped Ithocles, Orgi-
lus' own self-pity surfaces again, for his last emphasis is
on his own suffering: "Penthea's grones, and tortures,/ Her
agonies, her miseries, afflictions,/ Ne'er toucht upon your
thought; as for my injuries,/ Alas! they were beneath your
royall pitty" (IV.iv.34-37). Orgilus' genuine concern for
Penthea is overwhelmed by his own selfish need to avenge
Ithocles' insult on his honor; so obsessed is he by the be-
trayal of his honor that, as Tecnicus has warned him, he al-
lows passion, "opinion," to render him incapable of acting
honorably. In the process, he follows Oedipus' pattern of
degenerating in both piety and pity.

Ithocles' progress parallels that of Orgilus in sig-
nificant respects. Both gradually become dominated by their
particular passions so that they transgress the requirements
of piety and pity. As with the gradual revelation of Orgi-
lus' character, Ithocles' character also unfolds by degrees.
Before Ithocles ever appears, other characters prepare for
him, though in contradictory terms. Orgilus, for instance,
accuses Ithocles of forcing Penthea, after their father's
death, to marry Bassanes out of pride in new-found power

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and out of lingering revenge of "former discontents" with Orgilus' family. However, in contrast to Orgilus' preparation for Ithocles, Prophilus, Ithocles' friend-in-arms, prepares for Ithocles' victorious appearance at court in the most glowing terms, assuring Calantha that military success has not spoiled the hero:

He, in this Firmament of Honour, stands
Like a Starre fixt, not mov'd with any thunder
Of popular applause, or sudden lightning
Of self-opinion: he hath served his Country
And thinks 'twas but his duty. (I.ii.43-47).

When this "miracle of a man" (I.ii.48), as the court generally acclaims him, actually appears, he seems to embody the soul of honorable Spartan manhood. Ithocles speaks humbly, even blushingly, of his achievements: "What nothings have I done, compar'd with the honours/ Heaped on the issue of a willing minde" (I.ii.71-72); he names his acts but a grateful "debt of Service" to his country, and he speaks of his success in the name of the "many hands" which helped him. He appears impeccably the proper and honorable hero, even denouncing the seductively persuasive power of such praise as he receives: "Whom heaven/ Is pleas'd to stile victorious, there, to such,/ Applause runs madding, like drunken priests/ Voycing the Leader-on a Demi-god" (I.ii.79-83).

This speech serves as transition to Ithocles' next appearance when he enters alone, revealing that his private self has heard the "madding" applause more than his public self has admitted; apparently upon reflection, the accolade "Demi-god" seems not undesirable: "Ambition! 'tis of
vipers breed, it knawes/ A passage through the wombe that gave it motion" (II.ii.1-2). Moreover, he consciously abjures the teachings of "Morality appli'd/ To timely practice" (II.ii.8-9) in continuing to pursue his ambitious desires. Like Orgilus, Ithocles reveals himself to be consumed with his particular passion, waiting only for some opportunity to assert himself. Orgilus finds his justification in Penthea's madness; Ithocles finds his in Calantha's return of his love. Consequently, Ithocles allows himself to be swept into a passionate heresy, exulting, "There is more divinity/ In beauty then in Majesty" (IV.i.95-96). Ithocles thus professes allegiance not to the majesty of the gods or even to the majesty of the king but to "Divine Calantha!" (IV.i.148). Nearchus takes note of this turn, saying, "This odde youths pride turns hereticke in loyalty" (IV.i.97). Hence, gradually Ithocles' ambitious hopes delude him into the impiety of failing to revere the gods, preferring reverence for something which he believes justifies his basic ambitious impulses.

Ithocles' failure in religious piety corresponds to a failure in pity. He failed to show compassion for Penthea and Orgilus in their mutual love when he broke the bonds of their pre-contract to bestow Penthea on Bassanes; the play's central conflict derives from this cruel action which Ithocles admits was partly occasioned by selfishly motivated "flattery of greatness" (II.ii.46). Even his much acclaimed military victories lose their luster as "a debt
of service to the state" because they seem prompted by the same ambitious motive he admits as all-consuming in his soliloquy on "Ambition!" Further, his sanction of Prophilus and Euphranea's marriage as well as his displays of friendship toward Orgilus appear directly related to his politically shrewd desire to heal the breach with Crotolon's family. More damningly, his professed love for Calantha is tainted with ambitious hopes of realizing power, for she is the king's daughter and, though above Ithocles in station, yet the "Meanes, speedy meanes, and certain!" (II.ii.15) to his own advancement.

To note the taint on Ithocles' feelings and actions is not to deny altogether his concern for others; rather such notice underscores the fact that his compassionate interest in others are no match for his own selfish concerns. Mark Stavig pinpoints the problem of Ithocles' ambiguity when he says that "There is no reason to believe that Ithocles' later pleas to Penthea for forgiveness are insincere, but it would be naive to think that that is all he wants." 44 Ithocles is so mesmerized by the power accruing to honor that he succumbs to his ambitions, allowing the virtue of honorable action to become the vice of apparent honor which masks the sacrifice of both pity and piety.

Thus, considering Orgilus' and Ithocles' breaches in the reverence of the gods and men, one must acknowledge

44 Stavig, p. 152.
their serious and far-reaching limitations and find it difficult to agree with Irving Ribner that in *The Broken Heart* "All of the characters are exemplary in their virtue, and they are caught in the consequences of an act belonging to their past irrevocable and beyond human control." In Ribner's discussion of Ithocles in particular, he maintains that this character's "tragedy . . . is that of man's inability to atone for sin" because this character is "the prisoner of his own past" who "must suffer the consequences of a course of action which once set in motion cannot be averted; there is no room in Ford's world for divine forgiveness or reconciliation." In contrast to this assertion, it is important to note that Ithocles, as well as Orgilus, persists in his impiety. Only in the act of death does Ithocles attempt to reassert virtuous honor by forgiving Orgilus' murdering hand acknowledging to the dead Penthea seated by his side that his own death is "The earnest of [my] wrongs to thy forc'd faith" (IV.ii.67-69). Given the code of conduct with its emphasis on religious reverence and human compassion, Ithocles and Orgilus cannot be substantially exonerated.

Although Orgilus and Ithocles represent the clearest examples of offenders against the honor code requirements of piety and pity, they are not the only ones in this play. Bassanes, Penthea, and Calantha to a lesser extent also fail in some way to be consistent in both code requirements.

Bassanes, for example, though not impious in reverence toward the gods, is an example of gross impiety in his relationships with his wife and, subsequently, with his brother-in-law, Ithocles. Bassanes' initial appearance affirms Orgilus' description of this husband's love as a "kinde of Monster-Love, which Love/ Is nurse unto a feare so strong and servile,/ As brands all dotage with a Jealousie" (I.i. 60-63). When Bassanes first speaks we realize that he has virtually made a prisoner of his wife, Penthea, fearing for anyone to see her because "there's a lust/ Committed by the eye, that sweats and travels,/ Plots, wakes, contrives, till the deformed bear whelpe/ Adultery be lick'd into the act,/ The very act. . . ." (II.i.3-6). Such lewdly suspicious talk becomes, upon the appearance of Penthea, a lyric praise of beauty: "Shee comes, she comes: So shoots the morning forth,/ Spangled with pearles of transparent dew;/ The way to povery is to be rich,/ As I am wealthy, but for her/ In all contents a Bankrupt" (II.i.68-72). This praise, in view of his suspicions, is a parody of Platonic adulation; here it loses any real content and becomes a meaningless gesture in words. A similar occurrence of such absurd juxtaposition of speech styles is evident in the contrast between his addresses to Penthea and his aside remarks to himself. In the presence of members of the court, Bassanes extols for Calantha's benefit the joys of marriage as "heaven on earth,/ Life's paradise, great Princesse, the soules quiet,/ Sinewes of concord, earthly immortality,/ Eternity
of pleasures; no restorative's/ Like to a constant woman"
(II.ii.86-90). But privately in the same breath he rumbles
the ugly attitude which contradicts his public speech:
"But where is she?/ 'Twould puzzle all the gods but to cre­
ate/ Such a new monster" (II.ii.90-92). Still, he immedi­
ately returns to his public pose: "I can speake by proofe,/ For I rest in Elizium, 'tis my happinesse" (II.ii.92-93).

Again, when Bassanes bursts in upon Penthea's pri­
ivate conversation with Ithocles, the husband swings between
vulgar accusations and Platonic praise. For example, he
accuses Ithocles of being a brother "that franks his lust/
In Swine-security of bestial incest" (III.ii.149-50); but his
tone alters radically when he replies to Penthea's pleas of
innocence:

Light of beauty!
Deale not ungently with a desperate wound!
No breach of reason dares make warre with her
Whose lookes are sovereignty, whose breath is balme.
O that I could preserve thee in fruition
As in devotion! (III.ii.160-66)

Bassanes disgraces himself in this confrontation, and his
actions here outwardly reveal the previously inner conflict
between his fierce private jealousy and flatteringly ideal­
istic public pose.

Chastened after his above encounter with Ithocles,
Bassanes considers reform. His first concern seems to be a
compassionate regret for mistrusting Penthea and for ac­
cussing Ithocles: "Let him want truth who credits not her
vowes./ Much wrong I did her, but to her brother infinite"
(III.ii.202-203). With his next words, however, he immedi­
ately suggests that his concern is actually more for his own public image: "Rumor will voyce me the contempt of manhood,/ Should I run on thus. Some way I must try/ To out-doe Art, and cry a' Jealousie" (III.i.204-206). Yet he at least recognizes that he has failed in familial piety, for he tells his servants, "... [I]n your charities appease the gods,/ Whom I with my distractions have offended" (IV.ii.4-5). He promises in the best vein of Christ's Bloody Sweat, The Golden Meane, and A Line of Life to "study reformation" of his former behaviour, admitting his fault:

This speech appears on the surface to be totally laudable, encompassing as it does emphasis on man's need to exercise reason, Bassanes' recognition of his own neglect in this respect, his justified praise of Penthea, Bassanes' realization of his impiety in distrusting his wife's marriage vows, and his solemn promise to practice the ultimate degree
of humility and patience. When called upon to act upon these pledges in the presence of Penthea's madness, Bassanes first ignores the reality of her insanity, asking her to "forget" his previous "cruelty of frenzy" (IV.ii.64-66). Then he reacts as if her madness is a test of his new-sworn "composure." Despite his supposed suffering, "Sweats hot as sulphur/ Boyle through my pores! Affliction hath in store/ No torture like to this" (IV.ii.95-97), his focus remains entirely on himself when he says, "Ere I'le speake a word/ I will looke on and burst" (IV.ii.107-108) and "Keepe in vexation,/ And breake not into clamour" (IV.ii.120-24). He exits with the promise to find a cure for Penthea's intent to starve herself: "... [T]here is a mastery/ In Art to fatten and keepe smooth the outside;/ Yes, and to comfort up the vitall spirits/ Without the helpe of food, --fumes or perfumes,/ Perfumes or fumes: let her alone, I'le search out/ The tricks on 't" (IV.ii.162-67). Even these attempts at maintaining rational composure recall his earlier posturing, for they are unrealistic, impossible. R. J. Kaufmann suggests that Bassanes' stated intention not to show disquiet at Penthea's madness is such an extreme of "Stoic moderation" that in this instance it becomes "moral blindness." His pose of absolute control argues his former emphasis on his public image. He seems so preoccupied with the fear of being voiced by rumor "the contempt of manhood" (III.ii.204) that he cannot respond to

47 Kaufmann, "Ford's 'Wasteland,'" 183.
Penthea's situation with either reason or grief.

After Penthea's death, Bassanes proclaims in front of the whole court his constancy of controlled emotion:

Make me the pattern of digesting evils,
Who can out-live my mighty ones, not shrinking
At such a pressure as would sink a soule
Into what's most of death, the worst of horrors:
But I have seal'd a covenant with sadnesse,
And enter'd into bonds without condition
To stand these tempests calmely; marke me, Nobles,
I doe not shed a teare, not for Penthea!
Excellent misery. (V.ii.58-66)

Here again the emphasis falls on his pride in his public image: "[M]arke me, Nobles." Further, as Kaufmann suggests, "In this histrionic ceremony of renunciation, Bassanes chooses to annul large areas of normal human sensivity in order to render himself less vulnerable to the encroachments of remorseful passion." The oxymoron of his final words might be reversed to read, "Miserable excellence."

Finally, Bassanes dispenses with his public image and the previous change of character from madly jealous to insensitively Stoic, a change which Robert Stavig has justifiably labeled "sentimental, shallow, and immature." The bereaved husband foregoes any pose when Calantha includes him in asking advice about her future marriage; he admits his "reason is so clouded/ With the thicke darke
ness of my infinite woes/ That I forecast nor dangers, hopes, or safety . . . ," and he concludes, "[W]hat can you looke for/ From an old foolish, peevish, doting man/ But

48 Kaufmann, 183. 49 Kaufmann, 183.
crasinesse of age?" (V.iii.22-24; 35-37). In discussing this speech, Charles O. McDonald says that "it is one which shows him [Bassanes] unable to keep up his pretensions to being rational, calm and composed. . . ."\(^{50}\) McDonald also maintains that Bassanes' "notes are changed to tragic somewhat at the expense of character-consistency, but only in the nick of time to save him as a character and to rescue the total structure of the play from the embarrassment that would result if he were to preserve the calm to which not even Calantha can fully lay claim."\(^{51}\) Bassanes has been characterized by extremes, swinging, as Robert Stavig says, "from absurd jealousy to a posturing, sentimental stoicism,"\(^{52}\) but his change in this speech recognizing his limitations and foregoing his former public pose suggests that, possibly, he has learned something of himself, at least enough to forego his posturing for the moment.

Bassanes is impious to the extent that he does not exhibit reverence for the sanctity of marriage when he isolates Penthea because of his unfounded jealousy; this familial impiety, however, does not reach as far as that of Orgilus and Ithocles, that is, as far as blasphemying the gods with contempt for their powers. Bassanes does blaspheme Ithocles by accusing his brother-in-law of incest, but this exhibition reveals lack of respect for others

\(^{50}\) Charles O. McDonald, "The Design of John Ford's The Broken Heart," 157.

\(^{51}\) McDonald, 157. \(^{52}\) Stavig, p. 146.
rather than religious impiety. Bassanes' lack of reverence for marriage and respect for others derives from his preoccupation with his own public image, his misconception of personal honor. His jealousy revolves around the fear of being called a cuckold by others; his resolve to reform, though it nominally takes Penthea's feelings into account, seems basically motivated by fear of a tarnished public image; his final grief he bears with pride in his stoic control, a control for which he publicly asks praise from his court audience. Selfishness controls him until his final remarkable and finally unconvincing humility in Act V.  

Penthea's case is a difficult one, for, when compared with Orgilus, Ithocles, and Bassanes, she certainly seems more the victim of others' selfish pitilessness than the author of impiety. Though laboring under even more trying circumstances than Orgilus because her betrayed betrothal to him has been compounded by the subsequent forced marriage to the insanely jealous Bassanes, Penthea attempts to reconcile the paradoxical demands made of her. Beset on the one side by the wild suspicions of Bassanes and on the other by the pleas of the unreconciled Orgilus, Penthea at-

53 In a 1962 production of The Broken Heart at the Chichester Theater directed by Sir Laurence Olivier, Olivier played Bassanes and rendered him sympathetic. One reviewer says, "Sir Laurence makes the poor fool at once absurd, helpless, waspish and appealing; attention must be paid to this man—and is" (Roger Gellert, "Lacedaemonic," New Statesman, Friday, July 20, 1962, p. 90). Another reviewer comments of this same production that Olivier's Bassanes "is raised to almost excessive authority" (Anonymous review of The Broken Heart, The London Times, Tues., July 10, 1962, p. 13).
tempts the difficult task of treading the virtuous middle path of sustaining honor in her marriage to Bassanes now that the honor of her contract with the still-loved Orgilus has been breached; thus, she cries in anguish, "Honour,/ How much we fight with weaknesse to preserve thee" (II.iii. 130-31). As Orgilus, Ithocles, and Bassanes do not, Pen-thea attempts the middle path advised by Ford in A Line of Life: "Action, perseverance in action, sufferance in perseverence, are the three golden links that furnish-up the richest chain wherewith a good man can be adorned." Pen-thea puts her virtue into action by being a faithful wife, crowns her action with perseverance by refusing Orgilus' advances, and pathetically tries to endure patiently both Bassanes' jealousy and Orgilus', as well as her own, unhappiness.

Unlike Bassanes with his concern about his public image, Penthea refuses her husband's offer of "ravishing lustre/ Of Jewels above value," preferring that her appearance suit the "inward fashion" of her mind:

I need
No braveries nor cost of Art to draw
The whitenesse of my name into offence;
Let such (if any such there are) who covet
A curiosity of admiration
By laying out their plenty to full view,
Appeare in gawdy outsides; my attires
Shall suit the inward fashion of my minde. . . .

(II.i.92-99)

In addition to thus abjuring "opinion," she also tries to be the dutiful wife, refusing to play the role of command-

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54 A Line of Life, p. 388.
ing "Mistresse" (II.i.107-109). Also, she acts upon her duty and faithfulness to her husband when Orgilus accosts her in the garden. Though she freely admits her continuing love for Orgilus, she insists that Orgilus "forget" the "demands" of their previous, now-betrayed bond of love because their earlier contract is now "buried in an everlasting silence" (II.iii.69). Seeking to save Orgilus' "merit" and herself from pitying her own "ruine," she believes she can best show her love by setting him completely free: "How, Orgilus, by promise I was thine,/ The heavens doe witnesse; they can witnesse too/ A rape done on my truth: how I doe love thee:/ Yet, Orgilus, and yet, must best appeares/ In tendering thy freedom... (II.iii.77-81,82,89). When Orgilus scorns this decision, insisting, "Come, sweet th'art mine," Penthea threatens to turn her "affection into vengeance" and dismisses her lover harshly: "Goe thou, fit onely for disguise and walkes,/ To hide thy shame" (II.i.109-110;117-18). Penthea acts out of her desire to salvage what honor she can in a difficult situation; forced into betrayal of her former contract, she seeks to preserve the sanctity of her present marriage as well as the honor of Orgilus. Her dismissal of Orgilus, which seems so pitiless to him, is the only way she can protect both; yet she takes no pleasure in spurning Orgilus thus, feeling rather a deep sense of tenderness for him: "I fear I was too rough: alas, poore Gentleman,/ 'A look'd not like the ruines of youth/ But like the ruines of those ruines" (II.iii.128-30). Thus,
Penthea strives for piety in protecting her marriage while expressing deep human concern for her unhappy lover. 

Penthea's patient endurance is not, however, limitless; the strain of her supreme efforts shows, for she laments: "In vaine we labour in this course of life/ To piece our journey out at length, or crave/ Respite of breath; our home is in the grave" (II.iii.146-48). Robert Ornstein remarks the difference between Penthea and Orgilus: "The misery that makes her compassionate and generous makes him selfish and self-pitying." 55 Penthea, in fact, makes the conscious effort not to "pitty mine owne ruine" (II.iii. 89); Orgilus' refusal to listen to her evidences his selfishness, as Ornstein observes:

. . . Penthea recognizes the true nature of the alternatives that face her. If she flees with Orgilus it must be outside society and law, without hope of the joyous fulfillment of marriage. If she refuses, Orgilus may yet find happiness and she will preserve intact the citadel of her mind. Her thoughts are pure even though her body is defiled; the shame of her 'adultery' rests upon Ithocles. Thus while Orgilus' claim to Penthea is in the abstract just, he demonstrates his unworthiness of her by pressing it.

In her relationship with her brother, Penthea reveals herself to be ultimately more concerned for someone other than herself, but not before she makes Ithocles fully aware of his injustice to their father, herself, Orgilus, and even Bassanes. Penthea reminds him that much unhappiness resulted because of his failure in his familial duty to his father's final command, because he "forfeit[ed] the last

will of the dead,/ From whom [he] had [his] being" (III.ii. 41-42). Because he has thus failed in observance of a son's duties to his father's will and forced his sister into unhappiness with Bassanes, she names him an "unnatural brother" and calls for the ghosts of their parents to charge him with familial impiety: "The ashes of our parents will assume/ Some dreadful figure, and appear to charge/ Thy bloody gilt, that hast betray'd their name/ To infamy, in this reproachful match" (III.ii.76-80).

But Penthea's harshness is still susceptible to her basic love for her brother. Although she wishes that Ithocles know the torture of cherishing someone "With desires infinite, but hopes impossible" (III.ii.49), such mercilessness disappears when Ithocles touches the cords of her kinship and love with his plea for "pitty" (III.ii.87). In healing the breach between brother and sister, Penthea does so in the name of the pious duties of family members: "We are reconcil'd:/ Alas, Sir, Being children, but two branches/ Of one stocke, 'tis not fit we should divide" (III.ii.111-13). M. Joan Sargeaunt observes in Penthea's treatment of Ithocles much the same generosity that Ornstein noted in Penthea's treatment of Orgilus:

In her behaviour towards her brother she shows something beyond endurance and loving forbearance: a quality that is only described by the word charity in its original meaning. But there is no softness in Penthea's nature. . . . Her magnanimity rests on her forgivingness, to forget would only argue lack of humanity. 57

57 Sargeaunt, John Ford, p. 74.
Not only does the sister seal again the family solidarity, but she also keeps her promise to broach her brother's suit of love to Calantha.

Penthea does so in the compelling terms of a final bequest with Calantha as "Executrix":

Vouchsafe then to be my Executrix,  
And take that trouble on 'ee, to dispose  
Such Legacies as I bequeath impartially:  
I have not much to give, the paines are easie;  
Heaven will reward your piety, and thanke it  
When I am dead; for sure I must not live. . . .

(III.v.36-41)

Penthea has only three things to bequeath, her youth, her good reputation, and, third, her love; however, since she cannot with integrity leave her own love to anyone, to Calantha she does "bequeath in holiest rites of love/ Mine onely brother Ithocles" (III.ii.52-62, 77-78). To emphasize her sincerity, she speaks in religious terms, and, in so doing, absolves her brother of the ambition of which she is unaware: "Impute not, heaven-blest Lady, to ambition,/ A faith as humbly perfect as the prayers/ Of a devoted suppliant can endow it:/ Looke on him, Princesse, with an eye of pitty. . . ." (III.v.79-82). Thus, Penthea pleas for Ithocles out of the bonds of sisterhood: "I am a sister, though to me this brother/ Hath beene, you know, unkinde:  
0 most unkinde!" (III.v.106). Thus, not only does she strive to honor the piety of her marriage vows, but also the familial bonds of sisterhood.  

58 R. J. Kaufmann views Penthea's "intermediation" in Ithocles' behalf as "not a charitable act." See his "Ford's 'Wasteland,'" 174.
Despite her virtuous perseverance in actions, Penthea does have a limit to her endurance; her "troubled passion makes assault/ On the unguarded Castle of [her] mind" (III.v.22-23). Penthea's madness is, as Ithocles laments, "a killing sight" (IV.ii.60), for she pathetically presents the depth and force of her suffering caused by "those Tyrants,/ A cruel brother, and a desperate dotage!" (IV.ii.144-45). This suffering has driven her to extremes, willful suicide by starvation. Both Armostes and Ithocles realize the impiety in her refusal to live; Armostes says, "Be not so wilfull,/ Sweet Niece, to work thine owne destruction," and Ithocles begs his sister not to become "A murthresse to thy self" because then "Nature/ Will call her daughter monster" (IV.ii.154-59). However, having pursued virtue to the limits of her endurance, Penthea commits the final impiety against life by taking her own. Thus, she, too, finally succumbs to the power of passion, as Charles O. McDonald explains:

Penthea's role in the drama is that of a person 'more sinn'd against than sinning,' but she, too, gives way to passion, for though she rejects Orgilus' proposals of an illicit laison with him and remains nominally faithful to her unloved husband, who seems hateful to us for his unfounded jealousy of her, she, nonetheless, deliberately seeks out suicide, the most passionate sin of self-destruction, through starvation. She claims in a lament that this is 'just,' but we are clearly meant, according to the code of the play, to feel the opposite—whether we do or not. . . .

Despite the fact that Penthea evokes our deep sympathy,
nevertheless she proves finally incapable of fulfilling the demands of piety.

Irving Ribner understands Penthea's suffering and death differently, seeing both as resulting from the moral paradoxes in the play: "The fate of Penthea serves as a dramatic symbol of human values. Those absolutes which men most revere, love, friendship, honour, may be the very sources of hatred, death, and desecration." This young woman is indeed the victim of abuses of human ideals. She struggles to hold to her values, and she is one of the few, including Calanatha and Nearchus, who does not use a virtuous exterior to mask a selfish motive. However, this innocent girl suffers because others abuse the ideals of the code and, therefore, her. Finally, she abuses herself. Her suffering and death result not because these ideals which "men most revere" are not viable, but because they are misused selfishly.

Robert Ornstein considers Penthea as the play's representative of the ethical ideal: "... [T]hough Tecnicus is the official 'philosopher' of The Broken Heart, it is Penthea who, expressing in the beauty of her own life the correspondence of poetic vision and moral knowledge, reaffirms the essential humanity of ethical ideals." As compared with Orgilus, Ithocles and Bassanes, Penthea manifests a genuine and consistent piety, both godly and familial; further, she reveals a capacity for compassion far exceeding that of either her lover, her brother, or her husband. Nev-

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60 Ribner, p. 158.  61 Ornstein, p. 216.
Nevertheless, Penthea is unable to maintain that "inward temper of the minde" of which Ford speaks in *The Golden Meane*: "If men could as well frame their mindes to their change of fortunes, as their change of misfortunes doth corrupt their mindes, greatnesse would as truely welcome calamitie, as the base doe rejoice in being great. Heereunto not the outward actions of the body, but the inward temper of the minde must be framed, since the first are but handmaidens to the latter."\(^{62}\) Penthea's "inward temper of the mind" is not strong enough to endure the "assault" of her "troubled passion." Thus Penthea, despite her efforts, is unable to maintain the "Golden Means" prescribed by Ford: "The minde of a Wise and Noble man is such, that what or how many gusts and tides of adversity assault him they may at all times rather arme, then at any time oppresse him, since his resolution cannot overflow the rudenesse of passion; for that his excellent and refyned temperature will ever retaine the salt of judgment and moderation; the one producing a *Wise*, the other a *Noble man.*"\(^{63}\)

Mark Stavig rightfully designates Penthea as the character "who has best embodied the rational approach needed for overcoming misery. In her reaction to the problems caused by earlier tragedy she has been easily the most mature in trying to find constructive solutions." However, though she struggles "valiantly," "the combination of a

\(^{63}\) *The Golden Meane*, p. 6.
tyrannous brother, a jealous husband, and a doting former love is too much for her to bear, and her reason is destroyed." Stavig finds her death "pathetic but noble," but maintains that "Ford makes clear that the responsibility of her breakdown is not hers. Burton [in The Anatomy of Melancholy] follows what was probably a widely accepted view when he states that a person who commits suicide while mad or melancholy will be saved if he was a good Christian before going mad. Although the Christian context is absent, this description would seem to fit Penthea exactly. We should admire Penthea's courage, pity her tragic plight, and excuse her irrationality." We should also remember and admire the degree of Penthea's piety and her compassion; if we do regret, and we must, her final impiety, it must be seen in the context of previous evidence of her dutifulness and love.

Calantha, like Penthea, observes the dual reverence implicit in Tecnicus' code of honor. Further, she must exercise the code in a further dimension than Penthea because she is the king's daughter and owes a special duty to the state. In her first appearance the princess manifests her awareness of the demands of her position. With her first words she inquires of Prophilus how his friend, Ithocles, bears himself under the circumstances of the praise and applause pursuant to military success (I.ii.32-33), thus indicating her cognizance of the potential for false honor,

64 Stavig, pp. 157-58.
that honor which Tecnicus has warned "Comes by accident, not Nature, Proceeding from the vices of our passion, Which makes our reason drunke" (III.i.35-37). Calantha's consciousness of such false honor implies her corresponding knowledge of "reall Honour." Thus, she approves when Prophilus assures her that Ithocles conducts himself with "moderation, Calmesse of nature, measure, bounds and limits/ Of thankfulness and joy" (I.ii.35-37). Satisfied with Ithocles' deportment, Calantha expresses her approbation by crowning the successful young general with a garland, "Deserv'd, not purchas'd" (I.ii.68). The king, in turn, commends his daughter's propriety and wisdom: "Shee is in all our daughter" (I.ii.69). Being a dutiful princess and thus sensible of her obligations to Sparta, she agrees with Ithocles' assertion that a man owes "out of gratitude for life,/ A debt of Service, in what kinde soever/ Safety or Counsaile of the Common-wealth/ Requires for payment" (I.ii.76-79). No doubt she also approves of Ithocles' having said it himself. Calantha again manifests her awareness of her station and its attendant duties when she meets Nearchus, a relative invited to court from Argos as an acknowledged and approved suitor for her hand in marriage. Knowing her father's desire, she answers most circumspectly to Nearchus' greeting of praise: "Princely Sir,/ So well you know how to professe observance,/ That you instruct your hearers to become/ Practitioners in duty, of which number/ I'le study to be chiefe" (III.iii.21-25).
Another aspect of Calantha's character emerges in her private conversation with Penthea. Here we see not only her sense of duty in her position as a princess but also her sense of compassion and understanding as a friend. Calantha welcomes Penthea graciously, granting her friend's request for a private audience: "Being alone, Penthea, you have granted/ The opportunity you sought, and might/ At all times have commanded" (III.v.5-7). She is understanding of Penthea's unhappiness, though believing there is yet no cause "so great/ As to distrust a remedy" (III.v.30-31). But upon being asked to be Penthea's "Executrix," she is touched to weeping by Penthea's sadness, saying, "Thou turn'st me too much woman" (III.v.43). This response shows the Princess' alertness to the necessity for not allowing passion to control her; thus, she is shocked by Penthea's suit for Ithocles because it touches her own affections so closely: "Shall I answer here/ Or lend my eare too grossely" (III.v.84-85). To protect herself from revealing her feelings, and perhaps to check them for herself, she quickly establishes a formal distance between herself and Penthea: "Your checks lyes in my silence" (III.v.107). Not only does her curt formality mask her pleased surprise with Penthea's news of Ithocles' love, but it also serves as a cover for her compassion for Penthea's plight, as her parting aside evidences: "Ithocles? Wrong'd Lady!" (III.v.110).

Unaware of Ithocles' private ambitions, Calantha responds to him as a marriage choice. Yet, even here, she
remains true to her duty as well as to her genuine affection for Penthea's brother. For instance, when first advised by Penthea of "how strong a power" Calantha's "absolute authority holds over" Ithocles' "life and end," the princess reminds her friend that "still I have a father" (III.v.101-104). Further, when she later asks her father for permission to wed Ithocles, she does so only after her father has expressed his grateful debt to the military leader with the words, "Mine owne Ithocles,/ I have done little for thee yet" (IV.iii.73-74). As a consequence, her request meets with instant approval, for the king replies, "Still th'art my daughter,/ Still grow'st upon my heart" (IV.iii.81-82). Calantha and her father judge Ithocles by his military success and subsequently admirable public demeanor; so judged, he appears a suitor worthy of King Amyclas' consenting praise: "Calantha, take thine owne; in noble actions/ Thou'lt find him firme and absolute. --I would not/ Have parted with thee Ithocles, to any/ But to a mistresse who is all what I am" (IV.iii.83-86). The royal family finds Ithocles, as Charles O. McDonald says, "the most rational and honorable [man] at court" because the successful young general "never overtly indulges in behavior that would disabuse" them of their favorable estimation.65 Thus, Calantha fulfills her duty to Amyclas as both a princess and as a daughter, choosing a man apparently worthy of her station and commended by her father.

65 McDonald, 151.
The fullest view of Calantha and her pious sense of duty comes in the closing scenes of the play during the "bridal sports" ordered by her father, despite his "late indisposition," in celebration of Prophilus and Euphranea's marriage (IV.iii). While dancing, Calantha learns successively of the deaths of Amyclas, Penthea, and Ithocles, but she dances still, causing incredulous, "Thunder-strokes" remark of her continence. As Charles O. McDonald observes, Calantha persists in the festivities because they were her father's order, a fact of which she reminds the court.66 Having once acknowledged the deaths of her father, her friend, and her newly betrothed, Calantha's first thought is of her duty as a new queen, for, immediately turning to the self-confessed murderer, Orgilus, she begins "our reigne/ With a first act of Justice" (V.ii.66-67). Both Armostes and Bassanes note the unusual, even unnatural, repression of feeling in their new Queen, Armostes noting that "'Tis strange, these Tragedies should never touch on/ Her female pitty" and Bassanes remarking that "She has a masculine spirit" (V.ii.94-95). Calantha herself recognizes the difference between the masculine and feminine spirit when she asks counsel of the court in choosing a mate: "A woman has enough to govern wisely/ Her owne demeanours, passions, and divisions./ A Nation warlike and inur'd to practice/ Of policy and labour cannot brooke/ A feminate authority. . . ." (V.iii.8-12). Having thus ad-

66 McDonald, 151.
mitted her own weakness as a queen and as a woman, she ful-
fills her duty as a sovereign by ordering her kingdom,
first choosing Nearchus as king to "retaine the royalty/ Of
Sparta in her owne bounds" (V.iii.42-43). Then she con-
fesses the depth and toil of her sorrow in her losses when
she weds herself to the deceased Ithocles:

... ['T]was my fathers last bequest:
Thus I new marry him whose wife I am;
Death shall not separate us. O my Lords,
I but deceiv'd your eyes with Anticke gesture,
When one newes straight came hudling on another
Of death, and death, and death, --still I danc'd forward;
But it strooke home, and here, and in an instant.
Be such meere women, who with shreiks and outcries
Can vow a present end to all their sorrowes,
Yet live to vow new pleasures, and out-live them.
They are the silent griefes which cut the hart-strings;
Let me dye smiling. (V.iii.65-76)

Thus, as Irving Ribner says, "Calantha dies with a studied
calm and dignity, performing all the necessary duties of
life before she goes." Calantha does indeed fulfill her
duties as royalty, as daughter, as friend, and as lover.
And such fulfillment was not easy; despite her admitted
weaknesses as a woman in governing "Wisely/ Her owne de-
meanours, passions and divisions" (V.iii.8-9), she never-
theless conducts herself responsibly and nobly, thereby re-
vealing the force of her powerful self-control. To the ex-
tent she acts with such nobility, she stands as a lesson in
contrast to Ithocles and Orgilus who abdicated their re-
sponsibilities to all except themselves.

Yet, even Calantha, like Penthea, finally allows

the excess of her passion to make her "reason drunke" (III. i.37). Calantha and Penthea are alike insofar as they both strive to obey the pious and personal demands of the honor code; further, both women are similar in that each finally capitulates in her own way under the strain created by others and by her own strong feelings. Calantha's "sense of responsibility to the state" as Spartan queen requires, as Robert Stavig points out, that she try "to act a role that is beyond her capabilities" as a "meere" (V.iii.72) woman. As with Penthea, her death is much influenced by the circumstances outside herself. She bears no blame for, but must bear the final burden of Ithocles' original selfish impiety as well as his and others' subsequent failures in piety and pity. The matrix created by Ithocles, Or-gilus and Bassanes finally redounds upon her.

However, the reasons for her death do not all lie outside herself. Like Penthea, Calantha, too, endures a passion ultimately beyond her control. Mark Stavig views her as alternating between extremes, between "stoic mastery of self and grief as superior to mourning for a time and then resuming a normal life." Charles O. McDonald agrees in part, seeing Calantha's sorrow as "passionate grief" which "forces itself into the open, overpowering her heart and reason." Certainly, in terms of the code which requires moderation of passion in order to remain satisfac-

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68 Stavig, p. 165. 69 Stavig, p. 164.
70 McDonald, 155.
torily pious and just, Calantha is, ultimately, overcome by passion. Considering the requirements of her position, the effects of others' faults and her own final powerful emotion, it seems dubious that, as Irving Ribner says, "Calantha's tragedy is utterly without human cause or reason." However, Charles O. McDonald aptly comments that "... it is impossible to condemn her wholly, as we might Ithocles or Orgilus, or even partially, as we might Penthea..."

Calantha's explanation of her "silent griefes," says McDonald,

... preserves her dignity and raises her stature above that of the merely pathetic Penthea to that of a tragic heroine who has seen the revelation--and even the enaction--of all strength in her own final weakness. Calantha's actions are certainly meant to set those of all the other characters in a firm moral perspective, to indicate clearly their lesser nobility of action and soul.

Closer to Calantha in dutiful reverence and human understanding, though not in dramatic impact, is Nearchus, her Argosian suitor to whom she awards the rule of Sparta. Contrasting sharply with the fractured piety and pity of Orgilus, Ithocles and Bassanes, Nearchus' pious propriety makes him a worthy inheritor of the kingdom. From his first appearance, this cousin from Argos proves his stature. King Amyclas welcomes him as next in title to the throne and as a prospect for his daughter, though this father vows "Not to inforce affection by our will" (III.iii.10-11). Nearchus' response styles him a proper gentleman, a respect-

71 Ribner, p. 161. 72 McDonald, 154-55.
ful suitor, and an understanding person:

You speake the nature of a right just father:
I come not hither roughly to demand
My Cozens thraldome, but to free mine owne:
Report of great Calantha's beauty, vertue,
Sweetnesse, and singular perfections, courted
All eares to credit what I finde was publish'd
By constant truth; from which, if any service
Of my desert can purchase faire construction,
This Lady must command it. (III.iii.13-21)

Nearchus recognizes the justice in the king's consideration of his daughter's wishes and comes himself as a servant to her wishes without intention "roughly to demand" her "thrall-dome." The young man's quality is tested in his next appearance because Calantha refuses him her ring to wear as a sign of her favor and, instead, tosses it to Ithocles who, in his proud joy, insults Nearchus' friend while gloating over the prize. Nearchus expresses his anger by reminding Ithocles of his inferior station, scolding, "Sirrah! low Mushrooms never rivall Cedars" (IV.i.98). However, rather than harboring this anger or allowing it to oversway him, Nearchus later returns to Ithocles with his own explanation for the incident, an explanation which requires no apology from Ithocles; Nearchus excuses the "late disorder" as a "custom" of soldierly "roughnesse" which Ithocles has "not yet shook off . . . in houres of leisure" (IV.ii.181-85). Further, the rejected lover issues an invitation to Ithocles from Calantha, saying that any apology the young general might wish to give can be given to her. Nearchus' insulted friend is incredulous that the Argosian prince can "brooke to be so rival'd, / Considering th' inequality of
the persons," but Nearchus explains that he perceives Ithocles to be "Lord ascendant" in Calantha's affections. To interfere forcefully would have the unhappy results of tyranny; as Orgilus and Penthea's sad example illustrates, "affections injur'd/ By tyrannie, or rigour of compulsion,/ Like Tempest-threatened Trees unfirmely rooted,/ Neer spring to timely growth" (IV.ii.196-208). This attitude on Nearchus' part sets him in direct contrast to Ithocles, the tyrant in Penthea's forced marriage. Moreover, Nearchus chooses graciously to promote Ithocles' suit rather than his own by pretending "To be jealous/ In publike of what privately I'le further;/ And though they shall not know, yet they shall finde it" (IV.ii.210-12). Thus Nearchus reveals his respect for love and his compassion for others; he does not allow his own selfishness to control his actions as have Orgilus and Ithocles. R. J. Kaufmann cites Nearchus' refusal to thwart Ithocles in pursuing Calantha as manifestation of "wisdom" in "sharp contrast to Ithocles' folly."

In the last act when Calantha names Nearchus Sparta's sovereign, he vows, as pious duty demands, that Calantha's "last will/ Shall never be digrest from" (V.iii.102-103). Further, his final words, and the last words of the play proper, acknowledge the mystery and power of the gods'

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Kaufmann, p. 173. This critic sees Nearchus' refusal in conjunction with "images dealing with the cessation or abortion of organic growth caused by disease or failure at the roots."
vision and wisdom: "The Counsels of the gods are never knowne,/ Till men can call th' effects of them their owne" (V.iii.105-106). Thus Nearchus comes closest to manifesting the kind of "reall honour" which Tecnicus advised. In his recognition of the superiority of the gods, Nearchus reveals piety equal to the pity he has shown for Ithocles' suit for Calantha. Although Ford provides only a few appearances for Nearchus, in those select scenes the playwright clearly delineates Nearchus' admirable character.

In The Broken Heart, Nearchus comes closest to living up to the ideal of a "good man" which Ford sets forth in A Line of Life:

A good man is the last branch of resolution; and by him is meant . . . such a man as doth—beside the care he hath of himself in particular—attend all his drifts and actions to be a servant for others, for the good of others, as if it were his own. . . . This man not only lives, but lives well, remembering always the old adage, that God is the rewarder of adverbs, not of nouns. His intents are without the hypocrisy of applause, his deeds without the mercenary expectations of reward; the issue of both is, all his works are crowned in themselves, and yet crown not him, for that he loves virtue for itself. This man never flatters folly in greatness, but rather pities, and in pity strives to redress the greatness of folly.

Nearchus as Ford's "good man" in The Broken Heart seems to possess those qualities which Ellis-Fermor says Ford attributes to his "ideal figures." These "ideal figures" exhibit not only continence and courage but chivalry: "The innate nobility which is part generosity and part humility and almost inseparable from generation of simultaneous

74 A Line of Life, p. 410.
responsibility (the quality, whether in crofter or nobleman, whose freedom is perfect service), is for Ford the summit of human development. . . ." 75

Nearchus maintains an enviable reverence for both the gods and man because, as in the case of Ithocles' insult, he manages to control his passion, allowing his actions to be guided by reason. In both Oedipus and The Broken Heart the twofold reverence advised is possible only as man follows reason and eschews the prideful promptings of passion. Such moderation and control of the passions constitute the third requirement of the four-point code of behavior found in Sophocles' and Ford's plays.

In Oedipus Sophocles dramatizes the necessity for exerting reasoned restraint through the chorus which both exemplifies and counsels self-control while warning against excess. For instance, the chorus intervenes in the growing quarrel between Oedipus and Tiresias, saying, "Anger serves no purpose" (387). Also, it refuses to judge Oedipus after Tiresias' prophecy lays the blame for the Theban plague on the king's shoulders, reasoning, "Though Oedipus stands accused, until he is proven guilty/ We cannot blacken his name" (476-77). Further, the chorus restrains Oedipus from acting on his groundless suspicions of Creon's treachery, advising, "Do not act in haste, convicting him out of hand," for "Hasty decisions always lead to danger" (617;585). Moreover, and most important, when the truth of the oracles

75 Ellis-Fermor, p. 238.

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seems doubtful because appearances indicate they might have been proved false, the chorus prays for guidance, "May piety and reverence mark my actions," remembering the danger of blind conceit: "Pride breeds the tyrant. Insolent presumption,/ Big with delusive wealth and false renown,/ Once it has mounted to the highest rampart/ Is headlong hurled in utter ruin down" (827;835-38). Therefore, the chorus preaches the Greek gospel of restraint and clear-headedness, the Greek ideal of sophrosyne, while warning against the dreadful folly and intoxication of willful and uncontrolled human pride.

In The Broken Heart Ford stresses a similar kind of reasoned self-restraint as the third point in his honor code. Recalling Tecnicus' talk with Orgilus about "reall Honour," the speech in which the prophet sets forth the basics of the code which should guide the play's characters, Tecnicus stresses the contrast between "reall Honour" and that false honor which Orgilus might create out of his wrath. The scholar advises his sceptical pupil not to follow the passion and appetite of "Opinion," Knowing of Orgilus' unfortunately betrayed marriage to Penthea and the probable anger resulting therefrom, Tiresias warns emphatically that "Honour consists not in bare opinion." Ford's audience would recognize anger as the first cause of revenge.


77 Bowers, Elizabethan Revenge Tragedy, p. 20.
Men with unhappinesses such as Orgilus' would be like those Ford describes in *The Golden Meane*, those who, "like things floating on the water, doe not goe, but are carried; not the counsell of providence directs the steps to goe by the staffe of Discretion, but they are wholly rather carried by the violent streame of Opinion and Conceit, precisely termed Humour."" Orgilus himself seems to know the reality of this assertion, for at one point he comments, "In point of honour/ Discretion knowes no bounds" (IV.i.105). As Tiresias warns, such misconceptions of honor proceed "from the vices of our passion,/ Which make our reason drunke." A lack of the proportion taught by reason leads man, as Ford maintains in *The Golden Meane*, into "Violence in judgement and wilfulness in error," extremes which draw men and "their best knowledges quite contrarie waies" and which result in men forsaking the laws of both gods and men."

"Reall Honour," by contrast, is based on reason unmarred by the "vices of passion" and thus is "the reward of vertue" and "acquired/ By Justice or by valour, which for Bases/ Hath Justice to uphold it." In this passage from Tecnicus' speech on honor Ford echoes a similar idea from *The Golden Meane*: "Wisdome, Temperance, Valour, Justice, are the substance and hereditary possessions of a perfectly happie man, and these riches cannot be forfeited, except by a decay of Vertue, they cannot be seized except the owner cast them

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off, they cannot suffer contempt so long as they be nourished in a Noble minde.\textsuperscript{80} Honor, then, results from virtuously following the law, both the laws of the gods and those of men, and, in so doing, abjuring passionate extremes while determinedly practicing moderation.

Thus, in The Broken Heart Ford stresses the reason inherent in the concept of "reall Honour," the third point in his honor code. It is a reasoned self-restraint similar to that in Sophocles' Oedipus and voiced by characters who perform the same moderating function as Sophocles' chorus. Both Tecnicus and Armostes fulfill this role. First, Tecnicus serves the dual role of being the god Apollo's representative, as does Tiresias in Oedipus, and the voice of orthodox morality, as does the Theban chorus in Sophocles' play; perhaps Tecnicus gains a didactic authority which the Sophoclean chorus cannot equally share because he speaks from his position as teacher, scholar and seer. In such case, Tiresias would not be only a reminder in recalling the wisdom of moderation, but also an authoritative instructor making an affirmative restatement of the value of such wisdom. Tecnicus performs his moderating function primarily in relation to Orgilus, whom he warns,

\begin{quote}
Tempt not the Stars, young man; thou canst not play
With the severity of Fate: this change
Of habit and disguise in outward view
Hides not the secrets of thy soule within thee
From their quicke-piercing eyes, which dive at all time
Downe to thy thoughts: in thy aspect I note
A consequence of danger. \hfill (I.iii.1-7)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{80} The Golden Meane, p. 115.
Noting Orgilus' demeanor, Tecnicus counsels specifically against excess: "Neglects in young men of delights and life/ Run often to extremeties; they care not/ For harms to others, who contemne their owne" (I.iii.16-18). Here Tecnicus cautions Orgilus against being oblivious to others, against forgetting the rights of others. We are reminded of the passage in Christ's Bloody Sweat which foretells that such heedlessness reaps its own reward: "Justice pronounceth, as it justly fitted;/ Sin shewed no pittie, sinne must not be pittied." Thus, Tecnicus' final warning to this young man advises him to let his plans be guided by his respect for others: "Let craft with curtesie a while conferre,/ Revenge proves its owne Executioner" (IV.i.138-39). If Orgilus follows the dictates of his passionate anger and its resultant desire for revenge, such an extreme will exact its own and equal payment: "Sin shewed no pittie, sin must not be pittied."

Tecnicus is not alone in this role as moral advisor of moderation. Ford achieves even further emphasis on the necessity for reasoned control and broadens the base of specific application by having Armostes serve as a second chorus figure in relation to Ithocles as Tecnicus serves in relation to Orgilus. Armostes, labelled by the Dramatis Personae "Appeasor," acts in a more political capacity as counselor of State than does Tecnicus. This counselor reiterates a similar message of restraint in trying to ease

81 Christ's Bloody Sweat, p. 29.
Ithocles' straining ambitions. For instance, suspecting Ithocles' dangerous intent as Tecninicus has doubted Orgilus, Armostes warns the young general against the extreme to which overly ambitious hopes can lead him: "Containe yourself, my Lord: Ixion amying/ To embrace Juno, bosom'd but a cloud,/ And begat Centaures: 'tis an useful morall;/ Ambition hatch'd in clouds of meere opinion/ Proves but in birth a prodigie" (IV.i.69-73). When Ithocles replies that he must show his gratitude to fate by taking advantage of his opportunities, then Armostes repeats the need for control: "He deserves small trust/ Who is not privy Counsellor to himself" (IV.i.77-78). Remembering Ithocles' recent military victories as well as Calantha's favor, this passage echoes the meaning of a passage from A Line of Life: "There is no safety, no security, no comfort, no content in greatness, unless it be most constantly armed in the defensive armour of self-worthy resolution." Armostes suspects that Ithocles' "defensive armour of self-worthy resolution" is being overwhelmed by ambitious desires so that the heretofore successful young man no longer is in touch with his own virtuous interests. Again, when Ithocles, presuming on his ambitious hopes of Calantha's preferment, insults Nearchus, a royal superior, Armostes admonishes his young friend for allowing emotion to overcome his reason and propriety: "Quiet/ These vaine unruly passions, which will render ye/ Into a madness" (IV.i.114-16). Ithocles is

82 A Line of Life, p. 405.

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forfeiting the wisdom and nobility which, Ford tells us in
*The Golden Meane*, "are the special ornaments of a prepared
mind," and thus he is losing the "salt of judgement and
moderation."83 Thus, both Armostes and Tecnicus, one as
political counselor and the other as spiritual advisor, re-
iterate the necessity for rational self-control; moreover,
they both serve as types of chorus figures similar to the
chorus of Theban citizens in Sophocles' *Oedipus* in estab-
lishing the moral norms of the play.

Charles O. McDonald states the conflict between
reason and passion in *The Broken Heart* in sets of triads,
which he calls "antilogies."

83 The Golden Meane, pp. 4-5. 84 McDonald, 147.
of the gods and other men, and, therefore, to "content," or fulfillment of selfish desires.

Thus Ford, like Sophocles, counsels moderation, the third part of their four-point codes. The fourth point in each code is a corollary of the third and might be called the dignified strength of humility. As both Sophocles and Ford are intent upon dramatizing, when man resigns reason and thereby loses his reverence for both the gods and man, his passions delude him into believing himself superior to his peers and equal to the gods. So it is that the Greek chorus proclaims against the tyranny of pride:

Pride breeds the tyrant. Insolent presumption,
Big with delusive wealth and false renown
Once it has mounted to the highest rampart
Is headlong hurled in utter ruin down.
But pour out all thy blessings, Lord Apollo,
Thou who alone has made and kept us great,
On all whose sole ambition is unselfish,
Who spend themselves in service to the state.

Let that man be accursed who is proud,
In act unscrupulous, in thinking base,
Whose knees in reverence have never bowed,
In whose hard heart justice can find no place,
Whose hands profane life's holiest mysteries. . . .

(835-47)

The Chorus here voices a commonplace in Greek moral thought. The historian W. G. DeBurgh explains that "The Greek knew full well his weakness and the evil passions that were ever on the watch to lure him to assert his individuality beyond the bounds prescribed by reason and law." Therefore, "When tyranny made its appearance, it was regarded as the crowning manifestation of hubris in the public life of city-
Oedipus' sense of self-worth becomes immediately apparent when he appears before the plague-ridden Theban citizens, proclaiming himself "Oedipus, renowned in the sight of all" (78). At this early point, his eminence seems fully warranted and certainly unthreatened, and his pride is unconsciously masked in the cloak of benevolence as he projects admirable self-control in his promise to save the city from plague as he had once saved it from the Sphinx. However, Tiresias threatens the king's seemingly secure position and power with his ominous prophecy: "Today will see your birth and your destruction" (421). This threat unmasks Oedipus' capacity for tyrannical pride and unleashes his "insolent presumption" (835), that against which the chorus has specifically warned. Oedipus strikes out in "fear and blind suspicion" (645), accusing both Tiresias and Creon of complicity in a treacherous plot to depose him. Oedipus' fury subsides when he learns that his supposed father in Corinth, Polybus, is dead and that, therefore, the oracles must be false and he, himself, free of the oracle's curse; so assured, Oedipus rashly assumes that he has transcended the religious laws and that he is "The child of Fortune, giver of all good" (1036). Thus, Oedipus ascends to the peak of hubris, first insulting the god's representative, then accusing his own kinsman, and, finally, presuming to transcend the laws of the gods.

85 The Legacy of the Ancient World, pp. 117-18.
His new ascendancy, of course, is short-lived. Oedipus soon learns that he is guilty of patricide and incest. Convinced of his culpability, Oedipus gouges out his eyes, calling forth terrified questions from the chorus: "What madness has come upon you?" (1276). Oedipus can answer only: "It was Apollo, my friends, who brought me low;/ Apollo who crushed me beneath this unbearable burden;/ But it was my hand, mine, that struck the blow" (1277-79). The demon, then, is Oedipus himself, his own willful pride which he has allowed to overrule his reason and become his god. No matter what the provocation, Oedipus himself is guilty; he has failed to heed Creon's insight, choosing mistakenly to believe that "blind selfwill/ Is strength of character" (516-17). Despite his proven knowledge and his faith in human wisdom he has remained ignorant of divine wisdom; thus, Tiresias' words, uttered when he is summoned, continue to gain impact: "How dreadful a thing, how dreadful a thing is wisdom,/ When to be wise is useless!" (302-303). When Oedipus doubted the gods' oracles, he presumed to place himself and his knowledge above the gods and their wisdom. Through the rise and fall of Oedipus, Sophocles dramatizes the heights to which pride can delude one, including rising above the gods, and the depths to which this passion eventually plunges one. In this play Sophocles never realizes the strength of dignified humility.

In The Broken Heart Ford significantly bodies forth a similar usurpation of divine position. Ford has no char-
acter exhort specifically against the sin of pride as does Sophocles with the chorus in *Oedipus*. However, in each of Tecnicus' and Armestes' attempts to counsel moderation is an implicit appeal for the individual to remember his place. Thus Tecnicus warns Orgilus: "Tempt not the Stars, young man; Thou canst not play/ With the severity of Fate" (I.iii. 1-2); and Armestes advises Ithocles: "Containe yourself, my Lord: Ixion amying/ To embrace June, bosom'd but a cloud,/ And begat Centaures" (IV.i.69-70). Also, recalling the pervasive sight imagery in the play with its emphasis upon the gods' omniscience and man's limitations, the emphasis is always upon man recognizing his inferior position. Thus, Ford clearly infers an admonition against forfeiting dignified humility for presumptive pride. More importantly, he dramatizes two cases of such forfeiture in Orgilus and Ithocles.

We have already noted Orgilus' gradual degeneration in piety and pity, his decreasing respect for the gods and fellow human beings and his correspondingly increasing self-pity and selfishness. At the same time that his reverence for the gods and respect for man diminishes, his sense of pride gradually asserts itself; in fact, his angry, self-pitying preoccupation with his loss and with his slighted personal honor develops into self-justifying pride. Finally, his passionate anger dominates so completely that he believes himself omnipotent.

From the beginning Orgilus' public expressions of
humility serve only as a cover for his angry discontent. His plan to leave Sparta in the best interests of Bassanes, Penthea and himself is really a cover for his intention to apply to Tecnicus for entrance into the scholar's study. When he does make his request, he does so with humility, maintaining that he will profit from the moderating influence of the teacher's learning: "... [I]f my fortune/ Run such a crooked by-way as to wrest/ My steps to ruine, yet thy learned precepts/ Shall calle me backe, and set my footings streight;/ I will not court the world" (I.iii.11-15). When alone, however, Orgilus voices his real intentions: "Thus metamorphiz'd,/ I may without suspition hearken after/ Pentheas usage and Euphranea's faith" (I.iii.33-35). Thus, Orgilus has very little interest or faith in Tecnicus' "learned precepts" and will indeed, in his own way, "court the world." Having once proved the success of his disguise with Euphranea and Prophilus, the young man uses it as a means of approaching Penthea and arrogantly claims his beloved: "I would possesse my wife, the equity/ Of every reason bids me" (I.iii.71-71). When Penthea effectively rejects his assertive claims, Orgilus, hurt and angry, leaves with vague but violent intentions to "stand up like a man resolv'd to doe" (II.iii.125). Thus, when Orgilus later leaves Tecnicus' protection, his stated explanation, the state's request for his presence at court, is reasonable but unacceptable, given his earlier behavior; rather, Tecnicus' suspicions come closer to the truth:
I am jealous:
For if the borrowed shape so late put on
Inferr'd a consequence, we must conclude
Some violent designe of sudden nature
Hath shooke that shadow off, to flye upon
A new-hatch'd execution: Orgilus,
Take heed thou hast not (under our integrity)
Shrowded unlawfull plots: our mortal eyes
Pierce not the secrets of your heart, the gods
Are onely privie to them. (III.i.3-12)

Since Orgilus has already indicated that he does act on
"some violent designe of sudden nature," he seems a good
example of those whom Ford describes in The Golden Meane as
being "carried by the violent streame of Opinion and Con­
ceit. . . ." 86 Because Orgilus seems to be about to "cast
... off" the "riches" of "Wisdom, Temperance, Valour,
Justice," as Ford puts it in the same Golden Meane, 87 Tec­
nicus at this point appropriately reminds his young friend
of the meaning of honor. Orgilus receives the scholar's
teaching with seeming humility: "The gods increase thy
wisdom, reverend Oracle,/ And in thy precepts make me ever
thrifty" (III.i.52-52). Despite this pious intention to
observe Tecnicus' wisdom carefully, we know that Orgilus is
returning to court with the kind of discontent Ford must
have been referring to in an earlier work when he called it
"Nurse of Conspiracies." 88

Orgilus privately holds little genuine regard for
Tecnicus as a "reverend Oracle"; as we have shown earlier

86 The Golden Meane, p. 48.
87 The Golden Meane, p. 48.
88 The Golden Meane, p. 66.
he publicly proves the extent of his contempt for Tecnicus and his function when in front of the entire court he flaunts his disdain for Tecnicus' parting prophecy: "Darke sentences are for Apollo's priests; I am not Oedipus" (IV.i. 140-41). In so doing, Orgilus here sets himself outside or above the application of the gods' oracle. Surely Ford's intention in having Orgilus allude to Oedipus cannot be facile or chance, for Orgilus continues to follow the order of Oedipus' ascending pride in contemptuously dismissing the oracle, pointedly insulting the prophet, and looking for some self-justifying guide for action. Oedipus found his justification in believing himself "the child of Fortune"; Orgilus finds his in choosing Penthea's madness as a divine command.

Penthea's madness torments Orgilus because it unifies all his conflicting emotions: his pain for Penthea's suffering; his self-pity for his own suffering; his anger at both Bassanes and Ithocles; his selfish need to avenge his injured pride. When Penthea in her ramblings points at Ithocles, Orgilus reacts as if he has had a revelation: "She has tutor'd me: Some powerful inspiration checks my lazinesse:/ Now let me kisse your hand, griev'd beauty" (V.ii.124-26). The young man who would not be "tutor'd" by Tecnicus judges the tutoring of Penthea's madness as explicit justification for seeking the revenge which has rancored in his heart for so long and against which Tecnicus' oracle has specifically warned him. Thus, Orgilus defies
the gods, as does Oedipus; in their stead, he places as his
guide a madness, the random gesture of which agrees with
his own inner desire for revenge. Penthea's madness serves
as an excuse for asserting his own will. As he has said
earlier in another context, "In point of honour/ Discretion
knowes no bounds" (IV.i.105-106).

Not until he has murdered Ithocles and, in payment,
is bleeding himself to death does he realize the meaning of
Tecnicus' warning and recognize Tecnicus as the god's
prophet: "Oh Tecnicus, inspir'd with Phoebus fire,/ I call
to mind thy Augury, 'twas perfect:/ Revenge proves its owne
Executioner" (V.ii.145-47). Orgilus finally achieves a de­
gree of self-knowledge in recognizing the appropriateness
of Tecnicus' oracle and in placing the prophet in his right­
ful position; but, as R. J. Kaufmann points out, Orgilus'
new understanding is limited:

When confronted with Tecnicus' riddles, Orgilus had
protested, 'I am not Oedipus' (IV.i.141). But
ironically he, like Oedipus, finds his true enemy
lies within. Although Orgilus implies a symbolic
or subconscious awareness of this fact in choosing
to die by letting his own blood, the source of his
passion, there is no larger recognition. Publicly
he is still convinced of the justice of his revenge,
and, characteristically, he treats his death as a
legal penalty rather than as a resolution of incom­
patible tensions.

In the first act of The Broken Heart Crotolon twits
his son about his reasons for planning to go to Athens. He
asks, for instance, whether or not Orgilus intends to "be­
come/ An Areopagite, and judge in causes/ Touching the

89 Kaufmann, 181.
Common-wealth" (I.i.7-9). The father believes his youthful son "Cannot prognosticate/ So grave an honour" (I.i.10-11).

Ironically, Orgilus' final actions do touch the commonwealth, that of Sparta, because of his vengeful obsession. Mark Stavig comments that "From the very start revenge is associated with death and disorder: the feud begun by Crotolon and Thrasus and continued in turn by Ithocles and finally Orgilus has brought tragedy both to the individual and to the state." \(^90\)

Clifford Leech speaks of revenge in association with "the persistence of a Christian ethical scheme."

Leech explains:

Revenge had always been condemned by the Church and it was manifestly, too, an offence against the social order, a usurpation of authority's privilege. But . . . it gave to a man a sense of being sufficient to himself, as he assumed the right to 'be his own carver of destiny and cut his way'; it was in tune with the Renascence pride of life, delight in individuality. Moreover, the Senecan drama gave a powerful precedent for revenge as tragic motive and endowed with classic authority.\(^{91}\)

Leech continues, saying that, even though Jacobean tragedies thus often "demand our sympathy for revengers," nevertheless there is always some indication that revenge is wrong. Leech says that sometimes this indication is only a "hint" and other times it is "a manifest demonstration"; however, he emphasizes that "Even the dramatists farthest from orthodoxy" reveal an awareness of "the sinking in the

\(^90\) Stavig, p. 162.

\(^91\) Leech, John Ford and the Drama of His Time, p. 44. See also Bowers, Elizabethan Revenge Tragedy, pp. 3-22."
scale of being that revenge entails." Ford shows his character scorning conventional morality as represented by Tecnicus and placing himself into a category above ordinary ethical norms; but as the character places himself higher and reaches more surely for revenge he actually is falling below the ethical norm and reaching more certainly for his own destruction. Mark Stavig suggests that Orgilus' death represents a symbolic purging of Sparta's evil; if such is the case, Orgilus himself does not seem to regard his act as a symbolic purgation for Sparta, for, as R. J. Kaufmann has noted, Orgilus does not seem to intend his act as even the purging of his own "incompatible tensions."

Ithocles follows a similar pattern of ascendance of self, but for different reasons. He allows pride to lead him to usurpation of the gods through his ambitious desires. As with Orgilus, we have already followed Ithocles' degeneration in piety and pity, his rejection of morality for more expedient measures to satisfy his ambitious longings. Unlike Orgilus, Ithocles does not begin with an angry self-pity that transforms itself into omnipotence; rather, Ithocles begins on the upswing. The death of his father has given the young Spartan power early; his military victories have given him success and royal commendation. Whereas Orgilus' selfishness derives from self-pitying anger, Ithocles' selfishness derives from greediness. He longs for the fulfillment of "A reall, visible, materiall happinesse"

92 Leech, John Ford, p. 45. 93 Stavig, p. 161.
With Calantha's return of his love, all else is swept beyond his ken, for his goal is in sight.

Ithocles' taste of success only feeds his ambitious desires, as his soliloquy on ambition clearly reveals:

Ambition! 'tis of vipers breed, it knowes  
A passage through the womb that gave it motion.  
Ambition! like a sealed Dove, mounts upward,  
Higher and higher still, to perch on clouds,  
But tumbles headlong down with heavier ruine.  
So squibs and crackers fly into the air,  
Then only breaking with a noise, they vanish  
In stench and smoke. . . .  

(II.ii.1-8)

Ithocles' words here seem to parody Sophocles' chorus' image of pride: "Pride breeds the tyrant. Insolent presumption,/ Big with delusive wealth and false renown,/ Once it has mounted to the highest rampart/ Is hurled in utter ruin down" (835-38). However, although Ithocles recognizes the dangers of ambition, he embraces them while dismissing the moderating "counsell" of "Morality" (II.ii.8,14).

Ithocles moves from a contemptuous dismissal of morality to a similar disregard for the prophet's message: "When youth is ripe, and Age from time doth part,/ The loselesse trunke shall wed the Broken Heart" (IV.i.133-34). Ithocles chooses to ignore the oracle as worthless: "Leave to the powers/ Above us the effects of their decrees;/ My burthen lyes within me. Servile feares/ Prevent no great effects" (IV.i.145-48). Thus arrogantly dismissing the oracle, he looks within himself for guidance, and, having so recently received proof of Calantha's favor, he turns his worship to her: "Divine Calantha!" (IV.i.94-95). In Christ's Bloody Sweat Ford speaks particularly of those

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worshipers who strive with "their foolish wits with pride to prove" and "forsooth to make a God of Love." Ford asserts, "Love is no god...." For Ithocles, however, Calantha represents not only beauty and love; she also represents through her position as the king's daughter the "cure" for his "sickness" of the mind: the attainment of his ambitious desires. Thus, actually, Ithocles makes his own personal ambition his god.

The pattern of imagery associated with Ithocles emphasizes this character's exaggerated sense of self. Donald K. Anderson helpfully provides a concise summary of the pertinent "rising and falling" images associated with Ithocles:

Time and again Ithocles is described in terms of rising and falling, the former usually presumptuous and the latter usually precipitous. Thus, soliloquizing on his ambition, he likens it to a sealed dove that mounts to clouds only to tumble "headlong down" (II.ii.3-5) and to fireworks that "fly into the air" only to "vanish/ In stench and smoke" (II. ii.6-8). Armostes compares him to Ixion, who, "aiming/ To embrace Juno, bosom'd but a cloud/ And begat centaurs" (IV.i.69-71); Orgilus compares him to Phaeton (IV.iv.26), who drove the sun-chariot until blasted from the heavens by Zeus; and Bassanes likens him to both Ixion and Phaeton (III.ii.130-31). Prince Nearchus cites his "colossic greatness" (IV. i.94), warns him that "low mushrooms never rival cedars" (IV.i.98), and refers to him as "lord ascendant" (V.ii.200), while Orgilus, in an aside, says, "The youth is up on tiptoe, yet may stumble" (IV. iii.92). The cumulative effect of these descriptions is to make Ithocles an upstart and to prefigure his sudden downfall.

94 Christ's Bloody Sweat, p. 37.

95 Donald K. Anderson, Jr., ed., The Broken Heart, Regents Renaissance Drama (Lincoln, Neb.: University of
Ithocles does suffer, but his suffering in large part derives from his own weaknesses. To see him as a helpless sufferer is to ignore the persistence of his ambition and his willingness to use others for his own ends.

Mark Stavig suggests that Ford tries to give a balanced view of Ithocles, portraying both positive and negative qualities:

In his early prose and poetry, Ford returned again and again to the theme of the great man who under the pressure of flattery, pride, and ambition is unable to retain his sense of moral values. Ithocles is no small-minded Machiavellian; rather he seems to be Ford's dramatic version of his earlier account of greatness with insufficient goodness. Ithocles is conceived in the mold of Essex, Bryon, and Barnevelt—great men with heroic ideals that we can admire but with personal weaknesses that we must lament. If we are to understand Ithocles, we must give full weight to both elements in his nature and avoid making him either a study in villainous ambition or a portrait of a valiant hero ruined by a mistake he cannot rectify.

Considering Ithocles' private admission of the power of his ambition, Stavig concludes that "There is little change in Ithocles' private character in the course of the play" and that Ithocles should therefore "not be interpreted as a study of the tragic inefficacy of repentance."\(^{96}\)

Both Ithocles and Orgilus are presumptives in The Broken Heart. Like Ithocles, Orgilus performs his own version of the Phaeton myth when he usurps the place of the gods and places himself as the sole arbiter of justice in

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\(^{96}\) Stavig, p. 151. \(^{97}\) Stavig, p. 156.
the play. Charles O. McDonald makes a significant point when he observes that "the famous scene of the diabolic chair" appropriately ends the developments initiated by Orgilus and Ithocles when they fail to follow Tecnicus' guide to honor and, instead, adopt courses of action through which they enact their own definitions of honor. In this death scene each character "puts his finger on the weakness of the other." McDonald explains:

Orgilus taunts the materialistic Ithocles for his ambition which 'dreamt of kingdoms' and 'the delicacies of a youngling Princesse,' while ignoring the cries of his sister for justice and pity (IV.iv. 30-38); Ithocles, in turn, reveals Orgilus' weakness, his cowardice in his strategem, both implicitly and explicitly—implicitly by facing up to death with courage, and explicitly by taunting Orgilus for losing honor and bravery in undertaking a base course of revenge (IV.iv.39-51). Finally, Orgilus, in confessing Ithocles' murder before his own death, ties all the threads together. . . .

Through his portrayal of Orgilus and Ithocles, then, Ford dramatizes the devastating results of man's "insolent presumption." In the ascendancy and final dominance of a prideful sense of self each character follows the essential pattern Sophocles portrays in Oedipus. In attempting to displace the gods each character blinds himself to his own human condition and to the possibility of achieving the strength of a dignified humility in the face of that condition. By choosing rebelliously to ignore or defy the moderating dictates of reason, the offending characters destroy the order inherent in following the laws of piety and

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98 McDonald, p. 149.
pity and the good sense of reason.

Neither playwright, however, portrays his offender or offenders as unrelieved villains; each character possesses admirable human qualities but allows himself to be overwhelmed with the negative aspects of his character. The attitude of sadness and regret Ford has expressed in A Line of Life:

What infinite enticers hath a man, as he is a mere man, to withdraw him from an erected heart! As the temptation of a reputed beauty, the invitement of presented honor, the bewitching of an enforced wealth, the lethargy and disease of an infectious court-grace; yet all and every one of these—with what other appendances soever belonging unto them—are, if not wisely make use of, but glorious snares, dangerous baits, golden poisons, dreaming destructions, snares to entrap the mightiness of constancy, baits to deceive the constancy of manhood, poisons to corrupt the manhood of resolution, destruction to quite cast away the resolution of a just desert.

Yet, despite the sadness in both Oedipus and The Broken Heart, the total effect in neither is altogether pessimistic. Both dramatists provide a final hope with the restoration of order in the hands of a character capable of honorable actions. Sophocles provides this character in Creon who has maintained a sense of rational balance throughout the play, even when sorely tested by Oedipus' insulting and unjust accusation of treachery. Upon indirectly hearing of the accusation, Creon, though angry and hurt, asks first whether Oedipus spoke with full control of his emotions:

"Were his eyes clear and steady? Was his mind/ Unclouded,

99 A Line of Life, p. 395.

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when he brought the charge against me?" (495-96). Confronting Oedipus later, Creon argues his case reasonably, urging Oedipus to base his charges on fact:

. . . [B]ase your verdict upon something more
Than mere suspicion. Great injustice comes
From random judgments that bad men are good
And good men bad. To throw away a friend
Is, in effect, to throw away your life,
The prize you treasure most. (575-80).

After the chorus' support of Creon, Oedipus relents somewhat, but insists, "I shall hate him [Creon] always, no matter where he is" (636). In response, Creon warns that the King's own character is Oedipus' worst enemy: "You go beyond all bounds when you are angry,/ And are sullen when you yield. Natures like yours/ Inflict their heaviest torments on themselves" (637-39).

Events finally prove Creon's innocence and Oedipus' guilt, but Creon expresses no gloating triumph. He does not "mock" Oedipus or "reproach" the former king for "any evil-doing" (1359-60); rather, he asks that the now-blind Oedipus be led inside his home, saying, "Piety demands/ That only kinsmen share a kinsman's woe" (1367-68). Further, he postpones taking any action against Oedipus until the gods reveal to him his "duty" (1377). Not only does Creon act thus on pious duty, but he also acts out of human kindness in having Oedipus' children brought to the blind father because, as he says, "I knew how much/ You used to love them, how you love them still" (1412-13). But Creon cannot honor Oedipus' request for either banishment or the continuing company of his children; the new king must remind
his predecessor, "You must be patient. Nothing can restore/
Your old dominion. You are King no more" (1457-58). Thus,
in this play, despite the tragedy of Oedipus' suffering,
Sophocles provides in Creon a worthy successor to the
throne and a sense of restored order and hope for the
future.

In The Broken Heart Ford provides a character com­
parable to Creon in Oedipus. We have already discussed how
Ford portrays Nearchus' qualities of piety, pity and reason­
able control; not only does Nearchus exhibit these commend­
able virtues in his attitude toward the gods and toward his
fellows, but he also is the one designated by the oracle as
the future regenerative force for Sparta. King Amyclas' oracle, given to Tecnicus for interpretation, reads:

The plot in which the Vine takes root
Begins to dry from head to foot,
The stocke soon withering, want of sap
Doth cause to quailing the budding grape:
But from the neighboring Elme, a dew
Shall drop and feed the Plot anew. (IV.iii.11-16)

In his interpretation of this oracle, Tecnicus identifies
the "plot" as "Sparta," the "dry'd Vine" as King Amyclas,
the "quailing grape" as the king's daughter, Calantha; but
the prophet refuses to identify the "thing/ Of most im­
portance," that is, the "neere Prince, the Elme" (IV.iii.
19-22). This mystery clears when Calantha names Nearchus
as the new ruler of Sparta; Nearchus is a "neere Prince"
both in being from nearby Argos and in being a cousin to the
Spartan royal family. This "neighboring Elme" is a worthy
successor to the throne, one whom Ford portrays as having

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the potential to "feed" the plot of Sparta "anew."

Furthermore, in choosing the elm to represent Ne­archus in the oracle, Ford seems to be emphasizing the strength of this "neere Prince." It should be noted here that Ford is drawing on a commonplace tradition which asso­ciates the elm with the vine as the vine's strong support. As a literary tradition, this association exists at least from Ovid to Milton. The elm as a support for the vine ap­pears repeatedly in the literary convention of lists of trees, each tree of which is characterized by a word or phrase. In tracing the source of such annotated tree lists, Robert Kilburn Root discovers that the "ultimate source is a passage in Ovid (Met. X. 86-108). . . ."100 In English literature, Chaucer follows this tradition in The Parlia­ment of Fowls; here the elm bears the annotation of "piler elm," which F. N. Robinson explains "doubtless refers to the tree's support of the vine. . . ." Robinson also notes that Spenser follows the same tradition in the tree list in The Fairy Queen, Book I, Canto I; Spenser here lists the "vine-prop Elme."101 Other English authors use the vine/elm association figuratively. Shakespeare, for instance, uses the vine/elm alliance as a metaphor for the marriage rela­tionship in Comedy of Errors: "Thou art an elm, my husband;


I a vine,/ Whose weakness, married to thy stronger state,/ Makes me with thy strength communicate" (II.ii.170-72). Milton also uses the traditional association of the elm and vine as a marriage metaphor in *Paradise Lost*, Book V; here Adam and Eve in tending their garden "... led the Vine/ To wed her Elm; she spous'd about him twines/ Her marriageable arms, and with her brings/ Her dow'r th' adopted Clusters, to adorn/ His barren leaves. ..." Ford must have had in mind this traditional linking of the elm and the vine when specifying the elm as the "neighboring" tree which would revitalize Sparta after the old vine "Begins to dry from head to foot" and after the "budding grape" begins to "Quaile" for "want of sap" (IV.iii.11-16). The strength of the elm, Nearchus, will serve as the support, the new chief, for the new vine of Sparta; the two will be wedded together so that Sparta will flourish.

Thus, Ford suggests that the elm in the oracle will serve as the strength of a husband for the vine of Sparta; moreover, he states in the oracle that the elm tree will nourish Sparta, for "from the Neighboring Elme, a dew/ Shall drop and feed the Plot [of Sparta] anew" (IV.iii.15-16). This combination of the marriage metaphor and the life-giving image of dew suggests significant parallels

102 See also Shakespeare’s *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, IV.i.49.

with a passage in *Christ's Bloody Sweat*. Two stanzas are relevant here; the first describes the joys of virtuous, lawful love in marriage and the second expresses Christ's blessings on such marriage:

But such whose lawfull thoughts, and honest heat,
Doth temperately move with chast desires,
To choose an equall partner, and beget
Like comforts by alike inkindled fires:
Such find no doubt in union made so even,
Sweet fruits of succors, and on earth a heaven.

Such find the pastures of their soules and hearts,
Refreshed by the soft distilling dew,
Of Christs deare bloody sweate, which still imparts
Plenty of life and joyes so surely trew,
As like a barren ground they drinke the pleasure,
Of that inestimable showre of treasure.

In *The Broken Heart* the oracle implies a marriage between the elm and the vine; in the first stanza above Ford describes the proper kind of love as married love. In both the play's oracle and the poem's second stanza above, a "dew" falls to enliven and sustain the marriage: in the oracle "a dew/ Shall drop and feed the Plot anew" (IV.iii. 15-16), and the above stanza "the soft distilling dew,/ Of Christs deare bloody sweate . . . imparts/ Plenty of life and joyes" to the "pastures" of married couples' "soules and hearts." Without attempting here to give the oracle, the elm, or Nearchus a Christian interpretation, it does

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104 *Christ's Bloody Sweat*, p. 37. The parallels of this passage also suggest that this work is of John Ford's authorship.

105 The Christian implications of the oracle are intriguing, however. The vine, for instance, is a "Religious symbol of the church as an organic unity centered in Christ" (Donald T. Kaufmann, *Dictionary of Religious Terms*,

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seem clear that Nearchus promises new life for Sparta by reviving and sustaining its now-barren ground. Further, the parallels between the oracle and the above passages from Christ's Bloody Sweat imply that Nearchus' life-giving gift will be spiritual as well as physical; he will feed

[Westwood, N. J.: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1967], p. 426). The Biblical reference establishing this interpretation of the vine reads: "I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman. Every branch in me that beareth not fruit he taketh away: and every branch that beareth fruit, he purgeth it, that it may bring forth more fruit. Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken to you. Abide in me and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; nor more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the vine, ye are the branches. He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit: for without me ye can do nothing. . . . Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; so shall ye be my disciples. As the Father hath loved me, so have I loved you: continue ye in my love" (John 15:1-9).

If the vine of Ford's oracle were read as Christian allegory or emblem in the context of the above Biblical passage, it would seem to suggest that the vine, representing the Spartan king and, thus, Sparta, represents also the Christian church or the Christian religion which has dried up, thus causing the grape to "quaile" or die since the vine can be fruitful only as this vine, the Church, abides in Christ. (See also Child and Colles, Christian Symbols: Ancient and Modern [London: G. Bell and Sons, 1971], pp. 206-207; Rosemond Tuve, A Reading of George Herbert [Chicago: University Press, 1952], p. 112).

The elm tree is named as a Christian symbol of strength and dignity (see again Kaufmann's Dictionary of Religious Terms, p. 168; see also Gertrude Jobes, Dictionary of Mythology, Folklore and Symbols [New York: The Scarecrow Press, 1962], p. 506). Another source states: "The elm alludes to the dignity of life. Its all-encompassing growth and the spreading of its great branches in every direction symbolize the strength which is derived by the devout from their faith in the Scriptures" (George Ferguson, Signs and Symbols in Christian Art [Oxford: University Press, 1966], p. 30). If the elm in Ford's oracle is read allegorically in this Christian context, then the elm, or Nearchus, represents the life and revitalizing force of the word of God which will give strength to the desiccated vine of Sparta, or the church. (It is of interest here that the only reference to the elm in the Bible occurs in a
the heart and soul of Sparta. The nature of his spiritual
gift can be seen in Tecnicus' honor code: humble and tem­
perate love for man and for the gods.

Both Donald K. Anderson, Jr. and R. J. Kaufmann fo­
cus on the spiritual aridity in The Broken Heart. Anderson
associates the play's heart imagery with restraint or depri­
vation in love and its banquet imagery with the resulting
frustration; "... because the much desired banquet is
never tasted, the heart is ground to dust, burned, or bro-
ken." Although Anderson thus focuses on the spiritual
depivation of love in the play, he does not take note of
the promised banquet in the oracle, the "dew" from "the
neighboring Elme" which "Shall drop and feed the Plot anew"
(IV.iii.15-16).

R. J. Kaufmann incorporates Anderson's study of the
heart and banquet imagery into his own study of the "gov-
erning image of forestalled growth" in The Broken Heart.
Kaufmann develops the idea that, first, "life and growth
cannot continue to exist where the means of sustenance, the
fertilizing energies, are cut off or diverted from their
normal course" and that, second, "failure to control or
convert the energies thus deprived of their normal function
results in their release for destructive purposes, in desic-
cation and desolation." He concludes that the "atmosphere"
of the play "is controlled by images of truncation, frus-
tration, and desiccation which reach their culmination in
the powerfully realized death scenes in the last acts." Then Kaufmann traces the images, showing how they follow a
movement "away from the source of life." However, Kauf-
mann gives scant attention to the reverse, the play's final

106 Donald K. Anderson, Jr., "The Heart and the
Banquet: Imagery in Ford's 'Tis Pity She's a Whore and The
Broken Heart," SEL, 2 (1962), 209.
107 Kaufmann, 169. 108 Kaufmann, 171.

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emphasis on a movement from death to life. The critic does comment on the "casket" which contains the oracle for Sparta, saying, "It is this final box, the casket, and this only which will bring health and safety to the diseased state." Yet he stops short of exploring the emphasis that Ford places on Nearchus as the bringer of new life, an emphasis Ford clearly intended by having the casket contain the oracle with its promise of Nearchus' leadership.

Perhaps the need for a new moral order in the world of The Broken Heart suggests Ford's purpose in selecting Sparta as his setting. Some critics consider Ford's Sparta not a classical Greek setting but one in imitation of the Sparta in Sidney's Arcadia; others view the setting in relation to the overall atmosphere of restraint and frustration in the play. These latter critics generally note that the setting evokes the principles of the historical Sparta. R. J. Kaufmann explains that

the ideal Spartan exemplified traits very close to the Stoic cardinal virtues of courage, justice, moral insight, and self-control or temperance. Its hero-lawgiver, Lycurgus . . . , decreed that no laws should be recorded; they were rather instilled as the substance of a Spartan education and were effectively internalized by means of public censure

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109 Kaufmann, 175.


and derision.\textsuperscript{112}

"These basic assumptions of the historical Sparta," continues Kaufmann, "are vitally relevant to Ford's Sparta."\textsuperscript{113}

Perhaps Ford intentionally evokes the principles of ancient Sparta to show that, as these principles are abused in his play, they have become a travesty of a viable moral code. The abuse of the moral code, by those such as Ithocles and Orgilus, creates impossible situations for and makes unnatural demands of those who still attempt to live by the code, such as Penthea and Calantha. One person's transgression of the moral order through selfish pride and self-indulgent excess forces another into excessively repressive responses in order to deal with the effects of the original transgression. Since excess of any kind is socially unacceptable, the eventual result is a spiritual chaos masked by the public appearance of piety and propriety. Tecnicus apparently realizes that the moral state of Sparta has passed beyond the limits of his influence, for he sadly leaves Sparta after delivering his interpretation of the oracle of Sparta's future. The moral code which he represents is no longer regarded with complete reverence, as Orgilus' and Ithocles' attitudes and actions evidence. Instead, as we have seen, the Spartans both rely on and fear the deceit made possible by their human physical and spiritual limitations; it seems that the Sparta of The Broken Heart is a world of "opinion" rather than a world of knowl-

\textsuperscript{112} Kaufmann, 177. \textsuperscript{113} Kaufmann, 178.
In his honor speech, Tecnicus warns that actions based upon "bare Opinion" actually are prompted by "passion/Which makes our reason drunke" (III.i.36-37). Bassanes suggests the error of such judgments when he looks outside of Sparta, to Athens, for aid in curing Penthea's madness: "Athens, to Athens, I have sent, the Nursery/Of Greece for learning, and the Fount of knowledge; for here in Sparta there's not left among us/One wise man to direct,—we're all turn'd madcaps" (V.i.1-4). R. J. Kaufmann summarizes this idea: "There is need for the 'learning' and 'knowledge' of the 'nursery of Greece,' for the 'herbs' of Apollo, for the 'dew of the neighboring elm' to compensate for the 'opinion' which has infected the roots of Sparta, so as to check the age and disease which have left it languishing and withered and therefore incapable of supporting growth from its own stock. . . ." The moral world of Ford's Sparta has become a travesty of the ideal; thus, Sparta needs an infusion of a new knowledge, a new moral spirit. This new moral spirit will come from Nearchus who, as the elm of the oracle, will provide both the "dew" which will "feed the Plot anew" as well as the strength of moral authority. Though Calantha rejected the "strength" of the "love" which Nearchus offered (IV.ii.196-99), Sparta is now in need


115 Kaufmann, 177.
of the "strength" of his "love."

Therefore, in *The Broken Heart* Ford sets forth a moral code, a code of honor, and teaches its efficacy by dramatizing the pervasive ill effects resulting from failure to follow it. In developing the elements of his code he seems to draw upon a similar code perceptible in Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*; both systems of human behavior emphasize the necessity for maintaining dignified humility through moderate behavior, especially a reasonable control of the temptress passions, in order to achieve a consistently just and compassionate respect for man and a reverence for the gods. Further, in dramatizing the failure to respect the moral system set forth, Ford's offending characters follow the same pattern of arrogant ascendance and consequent fall as does Sophocles' *Oedipus*. Like the Greek dramatist, Ford does not, however, end his play on a final note of pessimism; both Sophocles and Ford offer hope through the potential for re-established order provided by worthy successors.

Because Ford does end *The Broken Heart* with an emphasis on the revitalizing potential of Nearchus, the moral corruption and destruction recorded in the play's world reveal a powerful and sad waste. Ford makes his audience aware of such needless waste through the deaths of Penthea, Ithocles, Orgilus, and Calantha, each of whom in some way possessed fine potential but destroyed this potential, succumbing finally to the spreading infection of spiritual sterility. Through Nearchus as spiritual hope, Ford seems
to be saying, again to paraphrase Auden, "What a pity it was this way when it might have been otherwise."

Whether or not Ford is dramatically convincing in conveying his proposed code of moral order in *The Broken Heart* is another matter. The sensational deaths of Penthea, Ithocles, Orgilus, and Calantha may well overwhelm the intended effect of Nearchus' symbolic presence, thus giving us reason to lament with Irving Ribner that Ford was unable "to lead his audience to a full resolution of the moral problems which he poses."\(^{116}\) As we have noted earlier, in chapter two, perhaps Ford did not possess that talent necessary to express effectively the kind of vision the highest tragedy demands, primarily because of a quality of strain and artificiality that would have interfered with leading his audience to a full realization of the moral resolution he proposes. Nevertheless, whether or not Ford is dramatically effective, the vision is there; he seems intent upon dramatizing the need for moral order, the need for both piety and pity in their highest senses. There exists in *The Broken Heart* a moral certainty already clearly visible in *Christ's Bloody Sweat*, *The Golden Meane*, and *A Line of Life*. Because of this evidence of moral certainty in *The Broken Heart*, it is difficult to accept fully Irving Ribner's judgment that John Ford is "among the most pessimistic tragedians of his age."\(^{117}\)

\(^{116}\) Ribner, p. 155. \(^{117}\) Ribner, p. 155.
'TIS PITY SHE'S A WHORE

'Tis Pity She's a Whore is a far different play from The Broken Heart. One difference, Robert Ornstein suggests, is that 'Tis Pity She's a Whore "lacks the concern with aristocratic codes of behavior" found in other Ford plays, particularly The Broken Heart.¹ Such a judgment appears justified when one compares evidence of the code of conduct in The Broken Heart with the apparent lack of similar evidence in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. As we have seen, in The Broken Heart the code of behavior was clearly presented through the voice of a reliable spokesman, dramatized by means of several characters who succeeded or failed wholly or in part to live up to the code, and finally affirmed by one who remains at the end of the play as a representative of successful adherence to the code. Such is not the case in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. Here no character serves as a completely reliable spokesman for the code, no array of characters offers clear-cut dramatization of those who attempt but fail partially or entirely to live up to the code, and no affirmative representative ultimately remains to emphasize the code's validity. Nevertheless,

evidence of the code does occur in *'Tis Pity She's a Whore*, the approach to its presentation is, however, more subtle and complex than in *The Broken Heart*. In *The Broken Heart*, Ford seems intent upon establishing the code and asserting its viability; in *'Tis Pity She's a Whore*, on the other hand, he seems more concerned with hypocritical abuse of the code. In the world of *'Tis Pity She's a Whore*, the existence of the code seems to be so well understood and accepted as a commonplace that it serves as a tool for devious manipulation; it exists, but is consciously dishonored, even travestied. Cognizance of the code serves as a basis not for virtuous and honorable actions based on reverence for God and man, but as a basis for seeming virtue and honor based on a perversion of reverence.

Although *'Tis Pity She's a Whore* differs from *The Broken Heart* in the way Ford presents the code of behavior, it does not differ from *The Broken Heart* in the basic characteristics Ford creates in the play's world. As in the previous play, Ford creates in this one a very unstable human world, one which is, first, marked by a profound discrepancy between the divine and the human, a discrepancy emphasized here, as in *The Broken Heart*, by sight imagery that conveys human limitations, and one which is marked by the treacherous weakness of the human passions that often blind man to his own limitations while at the same time making him susceptible to the passions of others. The need for the code in *'Tis Pity She's a Whore* remains at least as pressing as it is in *The
Broken Heart.

The fact of the discrepancy between the divine and the human becomes immediately apparent in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore in the opening argument between Friar Bonaventura and Giovanni. From the nature of this argument Ford makes clear the basic Christian assumption that man is a fallen creature in relation to a supreme deity. In the argument Giovanni grasps for some logic that will justify or sanctify his incestuous love for his sister, Annabella; the Friar counters with the fact of God's omnipotence in determining such matters, saying:

Dispute no more in this, for know, young man,
These are no school-points; nice philosophy
May tolerate unlikely arguments,
But Heaven admits no jest: wits that presum'd
On wit too much, by striving how to prove
There was no God, with foolish grounds of art,
Discover'd first the nearest way to hell,
And fill'd the world with devilish atheism.
Such questions, youth, are fond; for better 'tis
To bless the sun than reason why it shines,
Yet He thou talk'st of is above the sun.

In thus warning Giovanni that God is beyond human understanding and that all man's skeptical questioning does not change the power, mystery, or knowledge of God who "is above the sun," the Friar is, as Irving Ribner points out, "affirming] the inscrutability of divine law." The Friar's words,

2 John Ford, 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, Regents Renaissance Drama Series, ed. N. W. Bawcutt (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), I.i.1-11. All future references to this source will be indicated within the text by act, scene and line.

then, echo in content both the chorus in Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*, "From Zeus's eyes and Apollo's no human secret is hidden;/ But man has no test for truth, no measure his wit can devise,"⁴ and Tecnicus in *The Broken Heart* when the seer warns the erring Orgilus that he cannot deceive the gods through disguise: "... this change/ Of habit and disguise in outward view/ Hides not the secrets of thy soule within thee/ From [Fate's] quicke-piercing eyes, which dive at all times/ Downe to thy thoughts."⁵ The Friar, like the Sophoclean chorus and Ford's Tecnicus, stresses the fact that man cannot use fallacious human logic to circumvent God and his laws; to do so in the way that Giovanni has done is to leave "the schools/ Of knowledge to converse with lust and death. . . ." (I.i.57-58). The Friar begs Giovanni to desist from his pursuit of Annabella's love and to acknowledge in repentance before Heaven his human failings:

Cry to thy heart, wash every word thou utter'st
In tears, and (if't be possible) of blood:
Beg Heaven to cleanse the leprosy of lust
That rots thy soul, acknowledge what thou art,
A wretch, a worm, a nothing: weep sigh, pray
Three times a day, and three times every night.
(I.i.72-77)

The Friar offers this ritual as a means for Giovanni to confess his own sin as well as to recognize God's omnipotence,

⁴ Sophocles, *Oedipus the King* in *World Masterpieces*, I, rev., eds. Maynard Mack et al. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1965), ll. 472-73. All future references to this source will be indicated within the text by line.

⁵ John Ford, *The Broken Heart* in *Jacobean Drama: An Anthology*, II, ed. Richard C. Harrier (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1963), I.iii.4-7. All future references to this source will be indicated by act, scene and line.
and in so doing he reiterates a theme from Ford's *Christ's Bloody Sweat*: "No sin that is not washt in true repentance, / Shall scape in every sense to be perplexed. . . ."\(^6\) Irving Ribner finds that such a requirement shows that "The Friar's religion involves a debasement of man, a denial of his intellectual capacity. . . ."\(^7\) Such a command does involve an extreme humiliation of self, but it must be seen in the context of the inevitable and profound difference between God and man; further, it should also be remembered that, in seriously proposing and defending incest, Giovanni has debased himself extremely in God's eyes; Giovanni's extreme sin requires an extreme penance. The denial of man's "intellectual capacity" implicit in the ritual reflects the same difference between the omniscient divine and the limited human found in both Sophocles' *Oedipus* and Ford's *The Broken Heart* as well as *Christ's Bloody Sweat*; in each case man is bounded by his limitations, whereas God is not.

The fact that Giovanni persists in his blasphemy, achieves success in his pursuit of Annabella, and subsequently boasts of the glory of their incestuous love causes the Friar once again to counsel against putting ultimate faith in human knowledge as opposed to divine:

0 ignorance in knowledge! Long ago, 
How often have I warn'd thee this before? 
Indeed, if we were sure there were no deity,

\(^7\) Ribner, p. 165.
Nor Heaven nor hell, then to be led alone
By nature's light, as were philosophers
Of elder times, might instance some defense.
But 'tis not so; then, madman, thou wilt find
That nature is in Heaven's positions blind.

(II.v.27-34)

Giovanni has ignored the fact of God's omniscience while preferring to follow the guidance of his own passionate will. Thus, here the Friar echoes Tiresias in Sophocles' Oedipus, for in that Greek play Tiresias has lamented Oedipus' misdirected intelligence: "How dreadful a thing, how dreadful a thing is wisdom,/ When to be wise is useless" (302-303). Further, Bonaventura is repeating essentially the same ideas as Tecnicus when that religious man warns Orgilus against confusing "bare opinion" with "knowledge" (I.iii.4-7). Moreover, the Friar here implies what Ford suggests in Christ's Bloody Sweat: that the soul is the "Queene of Reason" and that, for the soul to be saved and reason to be used correctly, the soul must be wedded to Christ. 8

Irving Ribner considers the Friar's above response "no rational answer" to Giovanni's problem but rather only a blind assertion "that religion must prevail in spite of human reason"; thus, Ribner suggests that the Friar's religion is inadequate to the task of answering Giovanni's search for a rational response. 9 Robert Ornstein, however, explains the Friar's response differently:

The late Renaissance acknowledgment of the natural-

8 Christ's Bloody Sweat, p. 42. 9 Ribner, p. 167.
ness of sexual desire makes comprehensible the Friar's 'retreat' to a fideistic position. In his speeches, as in The Atheist's Tragedy, there is a partial acceptance of a naturalistic view of man and the universe. If there were no power superior to nature and no goal in life higher than that of satisfying natural impulses, the Friar concedes, the naturalist's position would be in some respects defensible. But like Tourneur (and like the moral philosophers of the late Renaissance) the Friar insists that a wholly naturalistic view of the universe is incomplete, that nature in 'Heavens position' (i.e., as law-giver) is blind.

Thus, Ornstein concludes, "The significance of the Friar's answer to Giovanni, then, is not its apparent surrender to libertine sophistry but its calm, assured dismissal of 'ignorance in knowledge.'"10 Mark Stavig makes a similar observation in a Christian context:

In his simple refutation of Giovanni's involved arguments the friar states that Giovanni is forgetting or ignoring that in the Christian scheme the order of nature and the order of grace are fused. Certainly man should reason (and we should remember that it was the friar who taught Giovanni his philosophy), but man's reason, according to the friar, is misguided unless it is directed by God.11

If the Friar's response is viewed in context with Tiresias' and Tecnicus' similar attitudes, as well as in the Christ's Bloody Sweat context of human reason ruled by the Christ-wed soul, then it would not seem to be an inadequate answer to Giovanni's questioning. As Tiresias, Tecnicus, and Friar Bonaventura recognize, Oedipus, Orgilus, and Giovanni suffer from "ignorance in knowledge" because each character

10 Ornstein, p. 207.

chooses to ignore the profound difference between himself with his humanly limited powers of reason and knowledge and the divine's omnipotence and omniscience.

Not only does the Friar emphasize this discrepancy between human and divine, but Giovanni also seems to recognize the discrepancy, although he struggles to deny it. The fact that he applies to the Friar at all suggests that he knows the blasphemous nature of his desire. Further, the arguments he presents as justification of his position are obviously faulty, for instance his wish: "O that it were not in religion sin/ To make our love a god and worship it!" (I.ii.145). Even just before he murders Annabella, Giovanni is still aware of his sin, though again he seeks for some means of amelioration:

. . . if ever after-times should hear Of our fast-knit affections, though perhaps The laws of conscience and of civil use May justly blame us, yet when they but know Our loves, that love will wipe away that rigor Which would in other incests be abhorr'd. (V.v.68-73)

As H. J. Oliver comments, Giovanni's awareness is clear here: "What Giovanni says, of course, is not that love is a justification but that it is an alleviation, an alleviation of a sin which can justly be condemned. . . . Giovanni may struggle against the inevitable—. . . . but the premise from which he starts is that it is a sin." Giovanni's acknowledgment of the sin of his love is tantamount to a recognition of the discrepancy between human and divine. He tries to sup-

plant the Christian religion with a religion of incestuous love, thus recognizing the need for some kind of divine sanction. In the end, as Oliver suggests, he holds to the hope that their love will somehow justify itself. In any case, Giovanni does realize the great difference between human and divine, though he struggles to ignore it.

Moreover, once again in this play as in The Broken Heart Ford develops both the fact and the significance of this discrepancy between man and God through a pattern of sight imagery. We remember that in The Broken Heart Ford stresses man's limitations through sight imagery which always suggests the gods' omniscience; in the present play he develops a similar pattern of sight imagery, one which suggests that man makes erroneous judgments based on unreliable appearances whereas God sees into the heart of the matter. Ford develops the sight imagery in two different but related patterns. The first pattern involves Giovanni's attempt to have exclusive faith in his own reason and the Friar's warning against such exclusiveness; the second involves the validity of the Neoplatonic argument that a beautiful appearance accurately reflects an equally beautiful soul.

In the first pattern the sight imagery revolves around sight and blindness, light and darkness, reason and ultimate knowledge in a way similar to that found in Sophocles' Oedipus. To recall Oedipus' error briefly, Oedipus chooses to believe that his rational ability to solve rid-
dies enables him to see clearly and makes him great so that, therefore, he need not depend on the gods or their representa-tive, the blind Tiresias; Oedipus fails to realize that though he has physical sight and human reason he nevertheless is not omniscient. In 'Tis Pity She's a Whore Giovanni reaches a similarly rigid faith in the powers of his own reason to solve the riddle of his dilemma. At first, he toys with various possibilities of rationalizing his incestuous love; for instance, one of his early arguments is the following:

Shall a peevish sound,
A customary form from man to man,
Of brother and of sister, be a bar
'Twixt my perpetual happiness and me?
Say that we had one father, say one womb
(Curse to my joys) gave both us life and birth;
Are we not therefore each to other bound
So much the more by nature, by the links
Of blood, of reason--nay, if you will have't,
Even of religion--to be ever one,
One soul, one flesh, one love, one heart, one all?

(I.i.24-34)

Later in his suit to Annabella he claims that he has "Reason'd against the reasons of my love" without success (I.ii.221); the earlier rationalizations have prevailed. Once the relationship with Annabella is consummated, the new lover manages to twist reason so that it seems to verify his judgment, moving from beauty to virtue to reason to love as a culmination and justification for all: "... [W]here the body's furniture is beauty,/ The mind's must needs be virtue; which allowed,/ Virtue itself is reason but refin'd,/ And love the quintessence of that" (II.v.18-21). At this point Giovanni may be arguing in a playfully exuberant mood.
so that his argument, as Robert Ornstein says, "is high-spirited casuistry for casuistry's sake, an egotistic display of shallow wit." Nevertheless, Giovanni does finally convince himself that his reason is right; by the time that he has enjoyed his sister unhampered even after her marriage and found "every kiss/ As sweet and as delicious as the first/ I reap'd, when yet the privilege of youth/ Entitled her a virgin" (V.ii.8-11), he is so assured of the rightness of his original judgment that he can dismiss the Friar's earlier warnings of hell as "nought else/ But slavish and fond superstitious fear. . . ." (V.iii.19-20). Now Giovanni has reached a point of certainty in his own reason that allows him to dismiss the validity of any higher reasoning and thus to reject contemptuously, as had Oedipus, religion and its representative. He blinds himself to all but his own judgment.

Friar Bonaventura, like Tiresias, recognizes such fallacious reasoning as not only a mental distortion but also as a spiritual blindness. The Friar counters Giovanni's argument that beauty equals virtue equals reason equals love with the warning that such distorted logic is not seeing truly. In being led solely by "nature's light," says the Friar, man forgets "That nature is in Heaven's positions blind" (II.v.30-34). Man mistakenly thinks he sees all, and when man persists in ignoring the superior vision of God then he cuts himself off from the light of heaven and thereby

13 Ornstein, p. 205.
blinds himself paradoxically with the very nature's light
in which he had put his ultimate faith of seeing and know-
ing. Later, when Giovanni scorns the Friar's earlier warn-
ings as "slavish and fond superstitious fear," Bonaventura
recognizes the extent of his young friend's blindness and
knows the fatal result of that blindness: "Thy blindness
slays thee" (V.iii.21). The Friar knows that Giovanni has
misread the security of his situation, for the priest holds
in his hand the letter from Annabella warning her brother
to beware Soranzo's pretended friendship and to seek re-
pentance for himself; further, the Friar also recognizes
Giovanni's spiritual blindness in making his own reason
everything. Upon delivering the letter the Friar says,
"Unrip the seals and see;/ The blood's yet seething hot, that
will anon/ Be frozen harder than congeal'd coral" (V.iii.
24-26). Bonaventura means in one sense that Giovanni should
open his eyes to the meaning of the contents of the letter,
contents that should disabuse the young man of his arrogant
certainty; but the Friar must also mean in another sense
that, having read and understood the full import of the
letter, Giovanni should unrip the seals of his spiritual
blindness and see not only the condition of his soul but
also the destiny to which the young lover's blindness is
leading him. Unfortunately, Giovanni refuses to accept
either meaning of the letter; thus, with unconsciously ironic
appropriateness, he boasts of murdering Annabella: "The
glory of my deed/ Darken'd the midday sun, made noon as
night" (V.vi.23-24). Giovanni chooses to see only in the light of his own reason; thus, he blinds himself to moral or spiritual knowledge and eventually brings darkness to both Annabella and himself as well as to his father.

The second pattern of sight imagery relates to the first through Giovanni's early argument that the physical beauty reflects spiritual virtue and sanctifies love. Giovanni considers Annabella physical perfection; he says to her, "If you would see a beauty more exact/ Than art can counterfeit or nature frame,/ Look in your glass and there behold your own" (I.ii.199-201). Using this beauty as his basis, Giovanni boastfully justifies in Neoplatonic terms having brought his love for Annabella to fruition:

What I have done, I'll prove both fit and good.  
It is a principle, which you have taught 
When I was yet your scholar, that the frame 
And composition of the mind doth follow 
The frame and composition of the body; 
So where the body's furniture is beauty, 
The mind's must needs be virtue; which allowed, 
Virtue itself is reason but refin'd, 
And love the quintessence of that. This proves 
My sister's beauty being rarely fair 
Is rarely virtuous; chiefly in her love, 
And chiefly in that love, her love to me. 
If hers to me, then so is mine to her; 
Since in like causes are effects alike. (II.v.13-26)

Giovanni builds his whole argument on the Neoplatonic assumption succinctly summarized by Herschel Baker in The Image of Man:

Through the great Platonic doctrine of spirit as the creative principle working on matter, the Neoplatonists explained the beauty and order of the universe as a result of love. It was that love that first caused God to share his perfection with lower forms of creation and it is love, inspired by
beauty, that causes man to seek to return again to the perfection of God.14

Giovanni may be being purposefully witty and specious in his argument in the beginning, but his Neoplatonic explanation is the one to which he clings throughout the play, and through this explanation, though he twists it to his advantage, he is able to sanctify, at least for himself, his incestuous love. Also, Annabella is caught by her brother's physical beauty; to her he is the "blessed shape/ Of some celestial creature" (I.ii.126-27). Moreover, she uses Giovanni's beauty as justification for her love just as Giovanni has used hers; she taunts Soranzo with Giovanni's superior physical qualities, saying, "This noble creature was in every part/ So angel-like, so glorious, that a woman/ Who had not been but human, as was I,/ Would have kneel'd to him, and have begg'd for love" (IV.iii.36-39).

Ford discusses this idea of physical beauty as a reflection of spiritual beauty in his earlier works. In *Honor Triumphant* (1606), one of Ford's earliest works, a topical and humorous work written on the occasion of a visit by the King of Denmark to England, Ford proposes a positive defense of the assertion that "Fair lady was never false," saying: "The temperature of the mind follows the temperature of the body; which axiom--says that sage prince of philosophers, Aristotle--is evermore infallible." In continuing his defense of the truth of the fair lady, he elaborates:

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"For, if the temperature of mind follow the temperature of the body,—text it is,—then, without controversy, as the outward shape is more singular, so the inward virtues must be more exquisite. Nature is but the handmaid to heaven: beauty is the rarest workmanship of nature's power." He says further that "foulest enormities harbour in foulest forms," whereas the "firmest virtues are shrouded in the fairest complexions." Yet, Ford cannot continue this line of defense without making a telling qualification; immediately after his defense, he makes an apology for it:

I confess—and blush that occasion should be ministered of confession that many there are whose bewitching looks draw youth into folly, and age into dotage rather madness: too many there are whose smooth counterfeit, in the indiscretion of virility, may pass for beauty, when the counterfeiters are so mutable as they are neither ever their own or ever certain any ones.  

These "smooth counterfeiters" reverse the axiom, for "In them the temperature of the body follows the temperature of the mind, not the temperature of the mind the temperature of the body. . . . [T]he error of their enchanting amiable-ness bewitcheth their adherents, who, being ensnared in the nets of their lasciviousness, esteem that prime beauty which they themselves deliciously enjoy." Even when Ford undertakes to verify the validity of the statement that the outer

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16 *Honour Triumphant*, p. 364.


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body reflects the inner mind he finds it necessary to introduce qualifications which refute his entire original premise. In *Honour Triumphant* all his argument is done humorously, but it is interesting that even in humor he suggests the falsity of the basic assumption.

This same assumption receives a more solemnly straightforward refutation in Ford's serious early work, *A Line of Life*. In this work he argues that outer beauty does not prove inner beauty and that outer beauty requires a greater striving to make the inner person worthy of the outer appearance. In this regard he makes use of Socrates' device of "mirrors or looking-glasses" to make his point:

"When thou viewest thyself in a mirror," said the wise man, "surveyest thy complexion, thy proportion, if thy face be more fair, lovely, and sweeter than others, thy body straighter, thy lineaments perfecter, consider how much more thou art bound by that to match those blessings of nature with the accomplishment of more noble qualities than others of a coarser mould. If on the other side, thou perceive thy face deformed, thy body crooked, thy outward constitution unsightly or misshapen, by so much the more hast thou reason to live a good life, that thereby concord of virtuous conditions may supply defects of nature, and make thee more beautiful inwardly to the eye of judgment than outwardly thou coulest have been to the eyes of popular delight." 18

Here physical appearance may well attract or repel "the eyes of popular delight," but the important appeal is to the "eye of judgment" which looks beyond the physical appearance into the condition of the soul.

With regard to Giovanni, it seems that despite his

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Neoplatonic protestations he may have lost his ability to use the "eye of judgment" and may have depended instead upon "the eyes of popular delight." Lu Emily Pearson in Elizabethan Love Conventions clarifies an important distinction between Platonism and Petrarchism in the Renaissance:

Platonism . . . carefully differentiated between the attraction of woman and of sex; it was concerned with the soul. To the Platonists, the union of the lover and the beloved was simply a union of souls, and that union could triumph over both time and space. Petrarchism, on the other hand, had come to center its attention upon the mistress, and frequently upon her physical charms alone. Many Elizabethan sonneteers, either through misunderstanding of the Platonic teaching interwoven with Petrarchism, or through the Renaissance use of Petrarchism as an excuse for lust, or through a combination of smatterings from both, had followed the path of other Petrarchists of Italy and France and spent their poetic energy on portrayal of the delights of lust under the guise of praising physical beauty.

Giovanni may well have confused Petrarchism with Neoplatonism in a similar way; one is led to suspect the possibility when he rhapsodizes to Friar Bonaventura over Annabella's physical beauty after having just enjoyed her sexually for the first time:

View well her face, and in this little round
You may observe a world of variety:
For color, lips; for sweet perfumes, her breath;
For jewels, eyes; for threads of purest gold,
Hair; for delicious choice of flowers, cheeks;
Wonder in every portion of that throne:
Hear her but speak, and you will swear the spheres
Make music to the citizens in Heaven.
But, father, what is else for pleasure fram'd,
Lest I offend your ears, shall go unnam'd.

(II.vi.49-58)

Giovanni is happily exultant here, and he seems particularly

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concerned with Annabella’s physical charms. Robert Ornstein notes that: “Sweetness and affectation hover in these lines; the worn Petrarchan conceits take on fresh beauty and meaning. Here is love of the flesh that touches the spiritual, an ardor that is unsullied by the courtly sensual wit of Suckling and Carew.” But Ornstein fails to comment on the final two lines of the passage, the lines in which Giovanni taunts the Friar with Annabella’s specifically sexual charms. Perhaps Giovanni is only teasing here, but his final emphasis is on sexual appeal; further, the Petrarchan conceits are indeed worn, and it is possible that, like the Petrarchists whom Pearson described, Giovanni is really portraying “the delights of lust under the guise of praising physical beauty.” Giovanni seems to be viewing Annabella not with the "eye of judgment" but with "the eyes of popular delight."

Annabella, too, as we have said, was first entranced with Giovanni’s physical beauty. And in enjoying each other they both have depended on the eye of delight to guide them; however, Annabella, unlike her brother, fortunately does come to see with the "eye of judgment." Annabella eventually makes a distinction between the two ways of seeing when she recognizes and repents the enormity of her sinful relationship with Giovanni. In her moment of private confession she admits that, to a great extent, she has acted out of lust: "My conscience now stands up against my lust/ With depositions character’d in guilt,/ And tells me I am lost: now I confess/ Beauty that clothes the outside of
the face/ Is cursed if it be not cloth'd with grace" (V.i. 9-13). As she recognizes her sin, she pinpoints the flaw in Giovanni's earlier argument that "where the body's furni

ture is beauty,/ The mind's must needs be virtue" (II.v. 18-19). Annabella is here admitting her realization that her inner lust betrayed her outer beauty and that she has come to see clearly because of her repentance. This recognition concomitant with repentance echoes a passage from Ford's earlier work, Christ's Bloody Sweat, in which he says that "no sin that is not washt in true repentance,/ Shall escape in every sence to be perplexed. . . ."\(^\text{20}\) In this earlier work Ford speaks of the sinner washing away the disease of sin from his eyes so that he may see with "eyes of body, and with eyes of mind." The sinner must wash his eyes "In the fresh fountain of his [Christ's] bloody sweat" because sinful man's "blindness is so great."\(^\text{21}\) Through repentance, then, Annabella's blindness falls away and she sees herself with the "eyes of mind," or the "eye of judgment."

Giovanni, failing to repent with Annabella, persists in his blindness, refusing to admit his lust and insisting on the purity of their love, this even in the act of murdering his sister. Giovanni does not find grace through repentance, but rather, asks only "this grace,/ Freely to view my Annabella's face" (V.vi.107-08). One is

\(^{20}\) Christ's Bloody Sweat, p. 27.

\(^{21}\) Christ's Bloody Sweat, p. 19.
reminded of the familiar Renaissance convention of Blind Cupid, usually associated with lustful love, and of Seeing Cupid, associated with a more exalted, spiritual love.

Erwin Panofsky explains that "the Renaissance spokesmen of Neoplatonic theories refuted the belief that Love was blind as emphatically as the mediaeval champions of poetic Love, and used the figure of Blind Cupid, if at all, as a contrast to set off their own exalted conception." Panofsky continues:

Thus the bandage of blindfold Cupid, despite its indiscriminate use in Renaissance art, tends to retain its specific significance wherever a lower, purely sensual and profane form of love was deliberately contrasted with a higher, more spiritual and sacred one, whether marital, or 'Platonic,' or Christian. What in the Middle Ages had been an alternative between 'poetic Love' and 'mythographical Cupid' now came to be a rivalry between 'Amor sacro' and 'Amor profano.'

Despite Giovanni's Neoplatonic protestations, then, we have good reason to believe that his love has been the result of "Blind Cupid," or lustful love. Giovanni himself never achieves this recognition, for, as the Friar tells him, "Thy blindness slays thee" (V.iii.21). Annabella, on the other hand, achieves through her Christian repentance a sense of "conscience" which finally stands up against her "lust."

The two patterns of sight imagery in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, that involving Giovanni's attempt to have faith in only his own reason and that involving the validity of the Neoplatonic argument that a beautiful appearance accurately

reflects spiritual virtue, are related in that both involve some kind of moral or spiritual blindness which denies the omniscience of God and the omnipotence of his laws. Giovanni's pride in his reason blinds him to the fact of his human limitations as contrasted with God's all-powerfulness. Both Giovanni and Annabella's misapprehension of Neoplatonic ideas provides the justification for their blind pursuit of desire for each other; they ignore the basic Neoplatonic idea that love inspired by beauty should lead to an understanding of the perfection of God. In the case of each pattern of sight imagery, the emphasis lies on the profound difference between man and God; man's visual inadequacies as compared with the omniscience of God become a metaphor for man's spiritual inadequacies without the grace of God's guidance.

The patterns of sight imagery in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore reflect, as does sight imagery in The Broken Heart, the basic difference between the divine and human; furthermore, it suggests man's tendency toward self-delusion and his inability to differentiate accurately between appearance and reality. Thus man is capable of as well as susceptible to deceit; in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, too, instances of deceit are pervasive, even to a greater extent than in The Broken Heart, so pervasive that they create a denser atmosphere of intrigue than that found in the first play. Many such instances occur in the sub-plots of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. Richardetto has been duped into going on a
journey so that his wife, Hippolyta, can pursue her adulterous affair with Soranzo; Richardetto returns in the disguise of a physician to establish his wife’s infidelity and seek revenge on Soranzo. In his vengeful efforts, he provides Grimaldi with poison to kill Soranzo in ambush. Hippolyta, having deceived her husband, is now receiving similar treatment from Soranzo, who renounces the promises of love and marriage he once made to her. In anger she turns to Vasques to join her in a plot against Soranzo, but Vasques also deceives Putana into divulging the identity of Annabella’s lover. Bergetto attempts to deceive his uncle by secretly marrying Philotis rather than his uncle’s choice for him, Annabella.

In addition to this background matrix of treachery and deceit in the sub-plots, significant instances of deceit occur in the main plot. For example, Giovanni claims to Annabella that he has "ask'd counsel of the holy church,/ Who tells me I may love you. . . ." (I.i.237-238). Further, both Giovanni and Annabella are parties to deceiving Soranzo in Annabella’s marriage to him; the deceit continues in the brother’s and sister’s uninterrupted relationship after the marriage. The Friar, too, is party to deceiving Soranzo since he is privy to Giovanni and Annabella’s relationship, and, if Giovanni has advised him as the brother presumably has, possibly to Annabella’s pregnancy as well, at the same time that he strongly counsels Annabella to marry Soranzo.

This tangle of deceit in *'Tis Pity She's a Whore* is
closely connected with the effects of human passions. The deceptions seem to spring from some impulse of passion, usually lust or the injured pride of revenge resulting from love, that overwhells the dictates of reason and then dominates a character's actions. Man is limited not only in contrast to God and in the validity of his own perceptions but also in the make-up of his own nature; he is subject within himself to the gusts of his own passion which often drive him to deceive others and to be the victim of the passionate ploys of his fellows. The interrelatedness of love, revenge and deceit is evident in Hippolyta and Soranzo's love affair, which serves as the source of deceiving the cuckolded husband, causing Richardetto to leave town and subsequently to return vengefully. The ragged termination of this same affair leads to Hippolyta's attempt to avenge herself against Soranzo and, subsequently, to Vasques' success in avenging his master against Hippolyta's plot. The complex of love, revenge and deceit also initiates Soranzo's and Grimaldi's rivalry over the hand of Annabella and prompts Grimaldi's attempted ambush on Soranzo's life and the mistaken murder of Bergetto. The most important connection of love, revenge, and deceit occurs, of course, in the love of Giovanni and Annabella. Because their love must remain clandestine, Annabella marries Soranzo, thus eventually provoking his revenge against both Annabella and Giovanni. Further, Annabella's final full repentant realization of her plight and her resulting attempt to end the
affair causes Giovanni's awful revenge against Annabella, Soranzo's death and his own. Thus, N. W. Bawcutt is justified in observing that

The play's treatment of love in general makes it difficult to see Ford as an apostle of free love. All the love-affairs in the play end in disaster, including the comparatively innocent one between Bergetto and Philotis, and it would even be possible to read the play as a series of warnings against the destructive effects of passion. . . . All this suggests that human love is not by any means the supreme value in the moral world of the play.

Critics have further noted the relationship of the power of passion and the presence of revenge in the play. Donald K. Anderson, Jr., says, for instance, "'Tis Pity She's a Whore is a tale of blood as well as of lust; the violent action of this revenge play augments the shock and outrage of its incest." Anderson sees further a fusion of lust and revenge in the heart-on-the-sword scene: "In brilliant fashion, the playwright fuses his two themes of lust and revenge into an unforgettable love-death that is emblematized by Annabella's heart." Mark Stavig also comments on the connection between lust and revenge: "Lust was the initial cause of the tragedies, and pride, expressed in a compelling desire to assert greatness of spirit, is a strong motivating force behind the revenges of Hippolyta,

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23 N. W. Bawcutt, ed., 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, by John Ford, Regents Renaissance Drama Series (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), xv-xvi.


25 Anderson, pp. 103-104.
Soranzo, and Giovanni."26 Fredson T. Bowers, too, emphasizes the importance of revenge in the play, saying that in constructing 'Tis Pity She's a Whore Ford creates a story "which is not in itself a revenge plot but is set against a background of revenges to which it is eventually linked."27 Thus, as Keith Sturgess says, "Revenge dominates the subplots and informs the catastrophe; but the play can hardly be considered about revenge. . . ."28 In the context of this present study, recognition of the prevalence of lust and revenge stresses the degree to which characters in the play are subject to the destructive effects of passions, both their own and those of others.

Both love, or lustful love, and revenge contribute significantly to the pattern of deceit and resulting disaster in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore and thereby intensify the uncertainty of human existence in the play. Ford's warning reminder in A Line of Life is particularly applicable in the world of this play:

. . . [I]t may somewhat too truly be said, though not by way of discouragement, yet of caveat, what by the proclivity and proneness of our frailty is warrantable, --let no man be too confident of his own merit; the best do err. Let no man rely too much on his own judgment; the wisest are deceived. Yet let every man so conceive of himself that he may

26 Stavig, p. 114.


endeavour to be such a one as distrust shall not make him careless, or confidence secure."

Thus the Sophoclean chorus' lament in Oedipus over "Life's wretchedness" and Calantha's dirge regarding the illusoriness of much of man's existence in The Broken Heart applies in the Christian context of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore; Richardetto accurately observes in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore that "All human worldly courses are uneven;/ No life is blessed but the way to Heaven" (IV.ii.20-21). In 'Tis Pity She's a Whore as in The Broken Heart Ford has created a painfully unpredictable human world, one in which man must acknowledge his subordination to the deity as well as his fallible human reason and perception, an acknowledgment necessitated by and yet complicated by his own confusing passions and those of others.

Having created in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore a world in so many respects like that created in The Broken Heart, Ford might reasonably be expected to reiterate his former emphasis on the necessity for some code of conduct to serve as a guide so that man might ascertain a means by which to establish a proper relationship with the gods and with other men. Clearly, in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore there is still the need for reverential piety toward God and family; there is the need for compassionate respect for other human beings; there is need for the moderation and control of the passions; and there are the disastrous results of uncontrolled pride

29 A Line of Life, p. 397.

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which suggest the need for dignified humility. But Ford
does not straightforwardly set forth the code of conduct
here as he does in The Broken Heart. Whereas in The Broken
Heart Tecnicus gave full and cogent statement of the code
of conduct which was clearly supported by other characters,
such as Nearchus, in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore the code sur­
faces in a much more muted, and even transmuted, way. Ford
offers no single character as a code spokesman; rather all
the aspects of the code seem to be assumed by the play's
characters though not necessarily as ideals for which to
strive. For instance, with regard to the first two aspects
of the code, reverential piety toward God and man, Ford fo­
cuses attention on them through the perversion of both and
the partial fulfillment of both.

Characters in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore frequently ex­
press piety or pity, but more often than not they intend
something other than the expected meaning or they purpose­
fully act contrary to their pious or compassionate profes­
sions. Vasques is one of the clearest examples of this kind
of hypocritical perversion. Vasques depends on the pervers­
ion of the virtues of compassion and pity to gain his ends,
all of which he sanctifies in the name of reverential duty
to his master, Soranzo. Vasques makes no pretense of paying
reverence to God, but seems to make Soranzo his personal
demigod; yet the servant serves the master in a curious way,
for, at the same time that he pays homage to his master, he
is also molding and directing Soranzo to follow courses de-
When Vasques first appears he is fighting with Grimaldi, playing his master's part in correcting this Roman gentleman's tongue for having somehow defamed his master in the contest for Annabella's hand in marriage. Annabella's father, Florio, intervenes, explaining that such quarrel over mere words is unnecessary since Soranzo knows that he is favored over Grimaldi; but Vasques presumes to leap to his master's defense: "yet the villainy of words, Signor Florio, may be such as would make any unspleen'd dove choleric. Blame not my lord in this" (I.ii.56-58). This incident suggests the accuracy of one character's observation of Vasques, that he is "ever forward/ In seconding contentions" (I.ii.27-28). Apparently Vasques interprets duty to his master in the most extreme terms, extending protection beyond his station.

Again Vasques leaps to his master's defense when the angry Hippolyta storms into Soranzo's lodgings seeking satisfaction for her injured honor and pride. This scene abounds with comic undertones, for the woman who claims that Soranzo "hath made my youth/ A scorn to men and angels" (II.ii.28-29) is, in fact, an adulteress who has sent her husband on a journey to provide her with more time with her lover. Soranzo's self-righteous response, however, makes him no more admirable than his former lady; he scorns both the lady and his previous vows: "I care not; let her know her monstrous life./ Ere I'll be servile to so black a sin, I'll be accurs'd."
Woman come here no more: Learn to repent and die, for by my honor/ I hate thee and thy lust; you have been too foul" (II.i.95-99). Recognizing the potential danger of this woman so scorned, Vasques steps in to rescue his master, accurately observing that Soranzo has "scurvily play'd" his part in this affair and realizing that some preventive measures against Hippolyta's fury must be taken. Proving himself the master of well-played parts, Vasques professes compassion for Hippolyta's plight: "Visit him in some milder temper. O if you could but master a little your female spleen, how might you win him!" (II.i.123-24). Being also the master of carefully plotted deceit, he pretends to join league with her schemes to avenge herself against Soranzo, promising willing compliance: "Then here I call our good genii for witnesses, whatsoever your designs are, or against whomsoever, I will not only be a special actor therein, but never disclose it till it be effected" (II.i.153-56). However, privately, he reveals his pretense: "Work you that way, old mole? Then I have the wind of you" (II.i.140-41). By pretending compassionate agreement with Hippolyta, Vasques puts himself in a position to protect his master and upstage Hippolyta when she puts her play into action and appears unexpectedly at the feast honoring Soranzo and Anna-bella's wedding. Vasques makes sure that it is she who drinks from the poisoned cup rather than his master and, having effectively assured Hippolyta's death, he self-righteously mounts a pedestal of virtue: "Foolish woman,
thou art now like a firebrand that hath kindled others and burnt thyself; . . . thy vain hope hath deceived thee, thou art but dead; if thou hast any grace, pray" (IV.i.72-75). Through pretended compassionate regard, Vasques traps Hippolyta and then assumes for himself superior moral virtue. He believes he has served his master well.

Vasques' manipulation of both Soranzo and Hippolyta prepares for the similar part he plays with regard to Soranzo and Annabella when the fact of the new wife's too-old pregnancy is known. Once again his master takes an extreme position, raging that "such a damned whore/ Deserves no pity" (IV.iii.85-86); once again Vasques intervenes to accomplish more effectively his master's revenge. As he had for Hippolyta, Vasques intercedes for Annabella, pretending compassion but intending more certain expedition. Within Annabella's hearing, he reminds Soranzo of husbandly duty, counseling:

Now the gods forfend! Would you be her executioner, and kill her in your rage too? O, 'twere most unmanlike. She is your wife: what faults hath been done by her before she married you, were not against you; alas, poor lady, what hath she committed which any lady in Italy in the like case would not? Sir, you must be ruled by your reason and not by your fury, that were unhuman and beastly. (IV.iii.80-86)

While thus advising Soranzo aloud for Annabella to hear, Vasques privately whispers assurances to Soranzo that he will find out the desired information: "Sir, in any case smother your revenge; leave the scenting-out your wrongs to me; be rul'd, as you respect your honor, or you mar all" (IV.iii.99-101). Thus, he calls his master back to a show
of reason and forgiveness. But, always aware of Annabella's presence, he openly reminds his master piously: "'Tis as manlike to bear extremities as godlike to forgive" (IV.iii.105-106). Vasques is successful, for, thus directed, Soranzo acts his part so well that he brings the remorseful Annabella literally to her knees. Having thus recovered control of this aspect of his play by using pity and compassion for the sake of duplicity, Vasques can now proceed to the business of "scenting out" the desired information.

He does so by approaching Putana with the same pretense of pity and concern that he has twice used previously. By playing upon Putana's love and duty to her mistress he persuades the servant that by revealing the name of her mistress' lover she will relieve Annabella's "present discomforts, pacify my lord, and gain [her]self everlasting love and preferment" (IV.iii.201-203). Having succeeded in gaining Giovanni's name, Vasques rises once again to the throne of judgment as he has previously done with Hippolyta: "Come sirs, take me this old damnable hag, gag her instantly, and put out her eyes" (IV.iii.224-25). Next he turns the eye of his self-righteous judgment on Annabella: "Her own brother! O horrible! To what a height of liberty in damnation hath the devil train'd our age, her brother!" (IV.iii.234-35). Unaware of the ironic applicability to himself and his master of the remark, "To what a height of liberty in damnation hath the devil train'd our age . . . ," Vasques hastens to Soranzo to prepare the next act of his play, to "tutor" his
master "better in his points of vengeance" (IV.iii.237).

Succeeding, with the help of banditti, in killing Giovanni, Vasques justifies this and all previous actions in the name of duty to and compassionate regard for his "ever dearest lord and master," piously explaining, "What I have done was duty, and I repent nothing but that the loss of my life had not ransom'd his" (V.vi.94-95;120-22). He maintains that he has been led to do his deeds not by an "incarnate fiend," as the Cardinal first suggests, but by "Honesty, and pity of my master's wrongs" (V.vi.16). If one can believe Vasques while knowing his proven talent for manipulating the words of proper duty and compassion to his own, and his master's, advantage, then his reasons are laudable. Certainly the Cardinal gives full credence to the servant's claims of honorable duty, for he sentences Vasques only to banishment from Italy, nothing more. Since Vasques is by birth a Spaniard rather than an Italian, this sentence scarcely seems harsh; and Vasques' reaction to the sentence indicates that rather than being deeply concerned he is, rather, triumphant: "'Tis well; this conquest is mine, and I rejoice that a Spaniard outwent an Italian in revenge" (V. vi.146-47). Once again it seems that Vasques has used the virtues of duty and compassion to gain his own ends; in his mouth duty and pity become a mockery of human decency.

Ford's reference in A Line of Life to the pious color of corruption applies particularly well to Vasques:

The excellency of goodness is apparent mainly in
this one point, that even those who least practise
it in outward appearance cunningly labour to make
it the mark whereto all their actions, how foul so­
ever in the issue, level at. It was truly observed
by a grave author, that there was never any public
mischief attempted in a state by even atheists or
very incarnate devils, but religion was their coulour
to effect it; at least a show of some false zeal in
as false worship for there must be an intention of
virtue in the worst actions, otherwise they could
never have passage by any public approbation; inso­
much that hypocrisy is reputed the surest and safest
ground of policy.

Vasques makes duty to Soranzo the compelling force in his
life; interestingly, however, in exercising his duty as he
conceives it, Vasques attempts to control his master as well
as others and, in so doing, makes himself something of a god
with divine judgment.

As Irving Ribner clearly explains, Vasques is anti­
thetical to the Elizabethan ideal of the servant:

In the idea of a harmonious cosmological order which
Elizabethans carried over from the Middle Ages, the
ture servant had an honoured place. In his loyalty
to his master he reflected his master's loyalty to
his king and his king's loyalty to God. A chain of
trust and obedience extended from highest to lowest,
cemented by the love of God for man which was re­
lected in the king's concern for the welfare of his
people and the master's care of his servant, who re­
paid him with true service, loyalty and devotion.
Upon this system Ford's Vasques is an ironic reflec­
tion. Of his absolute loyalty to Soranzo there is
never any question, but this very loyalty is a de­
structive force in the social order. It fosters the
plot of Hippolita and her consequent death, as it
is to destroy Giovanni and Annabella and even Soranzo
himself. This carnage is the fruit of his loyalty,
and in it Vasques exults. . . . There is no place
for remorse in the system he represents. . . .

Except for above analysis by Ribner, little attention has
been paid to Vasques, but he is important in the world of

30 A Line of Life, p. 394.  31 Ribner, p. 170.
'Tis Pity She's a Whore. In fact, Irving Wardle, in his review of the 1972 National Theatre production of this play, suggests that on stage "Vasques alone is too big for the surrounding play. . . ." The reviewer of yet another recent production of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, that of the Yale School of Drama in 1967, indicates the power of Vasques when he compares the character with Iago, calling Vasques the "quintessential Elizabethan underling with that cool, matter-of-fact, Iagoish villainy." In two ways Vasques seems to serve as an index of the depths to which the society of this play has fallen. First, his hypocritical manipulation of others reflects a basic disrespect for the one person to whom he avows loyalty. Second, society's judgment of him, as represented by the Cardinal's sentence, indicates that the world of the play is as incapable of pious and compassionately just judgment as he is.

Giovanni, too, turns the accepted meanings of piety and pity inside out. In the beginning he at least has some idea that he is twisting the meanings of reverence toward God and family and respect for humanity. For instance, in seeking for reasons to justify his incestuous passion for Annabella, Giovanni first attempts to rationalize making beauty a god: "Must I not praise/ That beauty which, if fram'd anew, the gods,/ Would make a god of, if they had it


33 (anon. rev. of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore), Newsweek, October 30, 1967, p. 92.
there,/ And kneel to it, as I do kneel to them?" (I.i.20-23).

But then he turns to a perversion of familial piety as a basis for loving Annabella as more than a sister:

Say that we had one father, say one womb
(Curse to my joys) gave both us life and birth;
Are we not therefore each to other bound
So much the more by nature, by the links
Of blood, of reason—say, if you will have't,
Even of religion—to be ever one,
One soul one flesh, one love, one heart, one all?

(I.i.28-34)

Giovanni seeks to make the duty and love of one family member for another his justification for having Annabella as his lover. The fact that he turns so quickly from the conscious rationalization of making beauty a god to making a sister a lover suggests that he, unlike Vasques, realizes that what he proposes is sin; at this point he has not yet succeeded in convincing himself of the pious rightness of his desire. Thus, at least in the beginning, he clearly recognizes the two basics of Ford's code of behavior, reverence for God and for the family, and he uses this knowledge as points necessary to refute or transform in order to make his desire and purpose acceptable.

Unable to do either, Giovanni interprets his failure to exorcise his love for Annabella, or his desire for her, as reason to pursue her, though still aware of the blasphemy in doing so:

O that it were not in religion sin
To make our love a god and worship it!
I have even wearied Heaven with prayers, dried up
The spring of my continual tears, even starv'd
My veins with daily fasts: what wit or art
Could counsel, I have practic'd; but alas,
I find all these but dreams and old men's tales
To fright unsteady youth; I'm still the same.
Or I must speak, or burst; 'tis not, I know,
My lust, but 'tis my fate that leads me on.

(I.ii.145-54)

Keith Sturgess observes in this passage "a certain amount of contradiction" in that Giovanni "at one moment accepts guilt, at another extenuation, and at another disbelieves in the whole system of sin and punishment. . . ." But, Sturgess notes, such equivocation is for Giovanni "perfectly in character."34

Despite Giovanni's excuse, "... 'tis not, I know,/My lust, but 'tis my fate that leads me on," Giovanni persists in his blasphemy and does indeed make his "love a god and worship it," for he makes Annabella with her beauty his religion. Consequently, having found Annabella a willing lover, he tries to use his own version of Neoplatonic logic to justify his love: "My sister's beauty being rarely fair/Is rarely virtuous; chiefly in her love,/And chiefly in that love, her love to me./If hers to me, then so is mine to her;/Since in like causes are effects alike" (II.v.22-26). Even here, as we have previously seen the logic of his argument is obviously flawed, for though he equates Annabella's beauty with her virtue and her virtue with their love yet he allows the lustful aspects of their love to dominate his thinking, a fact he indicates when he catalogues for the Friar Annabella's physical beauty while leaving unnamed, intentionally and teasingly, Annabella's sexual ap-

34 Sturgess, p. 358.
peal lest that "offend" the Friar. Giovanni manages to merge the lustful desire of his love with his idealistic perception of it, making Annabella's love his "Heaven, and her divine" (II.v.36). By persisting in his idealistic delusion he can glory in their love, even when that love has been enjoyed after his sister's marriage to Soranzo:

Busy opinion is an idle fool,  
That as a school-rod keeps a child in awe,  
Frights the unexperienc'd temper of the mind:  
So did it me; who, ere my precious sister  
Was married, thought all taste of love would die  
In such a contract; but I find no change  
Of pleasure in this formal law of sports.  
She is still one to me, and every kiss  
As sweet and as delicious as the first  
I reap'd, when yet the privilege of youth  
Entitled her a virgin. 0 the glory  
Of two united hearts like hers and mine!  
Let poring book-men dream of other worlds,  
My world, and all of happiness, is here,  
And I'd not change it for the best to come:  
A life of pleasure is Elysium.  
(V.iii.1-26)

Here Giovanni's attitude echoes much the same attitude found in Ithocles' speech on ambition in The Broken Heart. Just as Ithocles dismisses morality as "forme of books and schoole-tradition" which "physicks not the sicknesse of a mind/ Broken with griefes" and, rather turns to "meanes, speedy meanes, and certaine" to effect the "cure" of his ambitious desire (II.ii.8-15), Giovanni also dismisses morality as "Busy opinion" which is used "as a school-rod" to keep "a child in awe" and to fright "the experienc'd temper of the mind."

Further, both Ithocles and Giovanni, having suc-
cessfully achieved their desire, reject the spirit and turn to the tangible pleasures of the present as the height of happiness: Ithocles, having received indication that Calantha prefers him, exults, "[G]ive me felicity/ Of which my senses waking are partakers, --/ A reall, visible, materiall happinesse. . . ." (IV.i.48-50); Giovanni, glorying in the success of his love of Annabella even after her marriage, says, "My world, and all of happiness, is here,/ And I'd not change it for the best to come:/ A life of pleasure is Elysium" (V. iii.14-16). As Mark Stavig comments, "Giovanni's perverted love . . . has twisted his reasoning on religion as well. Instead of worshiping God, he has substituted an earthly 'idol,' his sister. Giovanni has learned his lessons on Platonic love imperfectly; instead of proceeding from the admiration of earthly beauty to the worship of God, Giovanni inverts this natural order and even suggests that the gods would bow down to Annabella if they had the chance."36

In addition to Giovanni's blasphemous twist of religion as a means of justifying his love for his sister, Giovanni also finally finds it necessary to twist the meaning of that love in order to maintain his selfishly idealistic version of his love for his sister. In his tyrannically selfish desire to possess her completely he first desires that she not marry, that is, of course, before her marriage

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36 Stavig, p. 98.
to Soranzo becomes a necessary expedient, and later takes her life when he believes she has been a "faithless sister" (V.iv.9). Thus, Giovanni first perverts his whole world view by persisting in his delusion of his own version of Neoplatonic love; then, second, he destroys Annabella to keep that version pure. As Annabella dies, though she forgives her brother, she is yet accurate in calling him "Brother unkind, unkind!" (V.v.93). He is both cruel and unnatural as a brother.

Thus, Giovanni, like Vasques, serves as an example of perverted piety and pity; but they are not alone. To a greater or lesser degree, they are joined by the representatives of religion in the play, the Cardinal and the Friar. The Cardinal, according to religious hierarchy supposedly the most likely to manifest Christian piety and pity, stands particularly suspect of perversion of reverence to God and compassionate justice for man. One might expect the Cardinal because of his position to be the one who is "noble" and who, therefore, "no doubt/ Will give a true justice" (III.ex. 20-21). In contrast to expectation, however, the Cardinal's first example of justice is the protection he gives Grimaldi after that character's confessed murder of Bergetto:

You citizens of Parma, if you seek
For justice, know, as nuncio from the pope,
For this offense I here receive Grimaldi
Into his holiness' protection.
He is no common man, but nobly born
Of princes' blood, though you, Sir Florio,
Thought him too mean a husband for your daughter.
If more you seek for, you must go to Rome,
For he shall thither; learn more wit, for shame.
Here the religious leader acts not out of pious duty but out of pride, having somehow been offended that Florio has considered Grimaldi "too mean a husband" for Annabella. As a kind of revenge he offers Grimaldi protection and grants him his freedom. As Irving Ribner notes, this "exoneration of Grimaldi" represents "the corruption of divine law."

Such arbitrary justice, denying as it does respect for both religious principle and civil law, brings forth outraged and disbelieving cries from Donado and Florio. Donado understandably queries, "Is this a churchman's voice? Dwells justice here?" (III.ex.61). And Florio exclaims: "Justice is fled to Heaven and comes no nearer.... Come, come, Donado, there's no help in this,/ When Cardinals think murder's not amiss./ Great men may do their wills, we must obey;/ But Heaven will judge them for't another day" (III.ex. 62, 65-68). Florio thus correctly recognizes both the Cardinal's perversion of religious duty and the churchman's earthly power to prevail in his judicial vagaries.

In the final scene of the play the Cardinal once again proves himself a curious representative of religious piety. For instance, he makes a strange distinction between Annabella's servant and Soranzo's servant: Putana he sentences "to be burnt to ashes" (V.vi.136); Vasques he banishes from Italy, a sentence which, as we have already noted, seems only token punishment. In addition to this arbitrary treatment of Putana and Vasques, the Cardinal reveals
another questionable aspect of his morality when, in an act of thinly veiled cupidity, he commands that the "gold and jewels" from the dead on stage be seized to be put "to the Pope's proper use" (V.vi.151). Thus, as he had in protecting Grimaldi, the Cardinal again exhibits his own kind of insolent power by using the privileges of his position to make a mockery of pious duty. Keith Sturgess considers the confiscation of the goods and Grimaldi's protection as "a symptom of the corruption of the establishment in the play." 37 But yet another instance of his corrupted sense of piety and pity occurs in his contemptuous final judgment of Annabella: "Of one so young, so rich in nature's store,/ Who could not say, 'tis pity she's a whore" (V.vi.159-61). Ignoring any possibility of spiritual salvation, the Cardinal apparently does not feel even sincere human compassion for Annabella; dispassionately, he damns her. As Clifford Leech notes, Ford's characterization of the Cardinal prevents our joining in sympathy with that churchman's judgment of her. 38 This same characterization also clearly prevents the audience from accepting the Cardinal as the worthy moral spokesman for the play despite his high position in the Church. Rather than being a laudable example of moral virtue, the Cardinal proves himself capable of debasing religious authority and human compassion.

37 Sturgess, p. 374.

The Cardinal seems to fall into that category of ill-chosen leaders described by Ford in *A Line of Life*: "The best law-makers amongst the ancients were so curious in their choice of men in office in the commonwealth, that precisely and preemptorially they reputed that state plagued, whipped, tormented, wounded, yea wounded to death, where the subordinate governors were not as well unblemished in their lives and actions as in their names and reputation." The Cardinal represents corruption of his religious office; further, it is possible that Ford intended him to represent corruption of the Church as well. An interesting point is that the Cardinal remains nameless; he is designated only as a "nuncio to the Pope." Thus, in his anonymity and in his relation to the Pope, the Cardinal could represent the corruption of the Church and of religion as currently practiced in the world of the play.

In addition to the Cardinal, Friar Bonaventura, too, proves to be less than the expected moral leader though he does not seem to be as morally culpable as the Cardinal. The Friar evidences a capacity for religious concern and human compassion. For instance, whereas the Cardinal protects Grimaldi out of what seems to be his own hurt pride rather than out of a sense of compassion or justice for the guilty, the Friar responds to Giovanni and Annabella's situation out of genuine concern for them and for their souls, even though he does so at the expense of proving

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39 *A Line of Life*, p. 400.
himself, as Robert Ornstein says, "a somewhat muddled moralist." 40

The Friar's initial response to Giovanni's confession of incestuous love for Annabella is a cry for his young friend's repentance, a cry which he consistently re­ iteratorates both to Giovanni and to Annabella throughout the play; he says, "Repentance, son, and sorrow for this sin:/ For thou hast mov'd a Majesty above/ With thy unranged blasphemy" (I.i.43-45). Cyrus Hoy compares the Friar's response with that of the Good Angel in Marlowe's Faustus, saying that, given the situation, both the Friar and the Good Angel "... can only look on from the sidelines and enjoin repentance." 41 This religiously acceptable plea for repentance does not, however, remain untainted by worldly practical considerations, for the Friar suggests that Giovanni choose another lover rather than Annabella: "Look through the world,/ And thou shalt see a thousand faces shine/ More glorious than this idol thou ador'st:/ Leave her, and take thy choice, 'tis much less sin,/ Though in such games as those they lose that win" (I.i.59-63). Mark Stavig maintains that this advice reflects the Friar's practical distinction between venial and mortal sins and that the Friar suggests the practical solution of a lesser

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40 Ornstein, p. 208.

over a greater sin. Robert Ornstein also views the Friar's advice in terms of lesser and greater sins but considers this kind of counsel evidence of the Friar's "legalistic" mind: "His literalistic mind views morality wholly in terms of crime and punishment; he regards sin with the mentality of a criminal lawyer." Thus, Ornstein continues, the Friar advocates that, repentance failing, Giovanni should "commit the smallest possible crime and incur the lightest punishment." 43

Certainly the Friar's first response is that of the good religious guide-repentance; however, his next suggestion is a moral expedient born of a worldly knowledge learned in an environment characterized, as we have already seen, by deceit, treachery and moral corruption. The Friar seems to recognize his own moral equivocation when he says that in the game of choosing another lover "they lose that win." Despite his good intentions, then, the Friar's advice here evidences the moral corruption of the play.

The Friar himself, however, is neither completely callous nor totally corrupt. He does not turn his efforts to choosing another lover for his young friend; rather, he expends his efforts in prayer for Giovanni: "I day and night have wak'd my aged eyes,/ Above my strength, to weep on thy behalf" (II.v.7-8). And when he learns of Giovanni's accomplished sin, he is distraught: "Peace! Thou hast told a tale, whose every word/ Threatens eternal slaughter to the soul" (II.v.1-2). Further, upon hearing Giovanni's jubilant

42 Stavig, p. 100. 43 Ornstein, p. 209.
sophistical rationalizations in proud proclamation of his consummated love, the Friar recognizes his young friend's profound moral distortion, "O ignorance in knowledge!" (II. v.27), and searches still for some alternative: a marriage for Annabella; absolution, at least, for Annabella; repentance for them both: "Why, leave her yet; The throne of mercy is above your trespass,/ Yet time is left you both--" (II.v.64-66). The Friar still offers and clings to the hope of repentance for both brother and sister.

The Friar's concern for repentance continues in his approach to Annabella, though he manifests this concern in a harsh and frenetic manner. By the time the Friar reaches Annabella, he presumably has been informed by Giovanni of Annabella's pregnancy and, further, has received word from Florio, still unaware of his daughter's actual predicament, that Annabella should be convinced to accept Soranzo as husband. Thus, when we next see the Friar, he is frantically exhorting Annabella to repentance: "... These tears may do you good; weep faster yet,/ While I do read a lecture" (III.vi.5-6). We remember from Ford's Christ's Bloody Sweat the efficacy of tears in achieving God's grace, but here the scene seems a pitiful parody of real repentance. The Friar verbally whips Annabella into fuller tears so that her repentance will come the faster, and he, not losing a minute, intones a lecture replete with horrible images of hell's punishment, a lecture calculated to beat the clock so that Annabella will repent and be reconciled to marriage.
Ay, you are wretched, miserably wretched, 
Almost condemn'd alive. There is a place—
List, daughter—in a black and hollow vault, 
Where day is never seen; there shines no sun, 
But flaming horror of consuming fires,
A lightless sulphur, chok'd with smoky fogs
Of an infected darkness; in this place
Dwell many thousand thousand sundry sorts
Of never-dying deaths; there damned souls
Roar without pity; there are gluttons fed
With toads and adders; there is burning oil
Pour'd down the drunkard's throat; the userer
Is forc'd to sup whole draughts of molten gold;
There is the murderer forever stabb'd,
Yet can he never die; there lies the wanton
On racks of burning steel, whiles in his soul
He feels the torment of his raging lust.

There stands these wretched things
Who have dream'd out whole years in lawless sheets
And secret incests, cursing one another:
Then you will wish each kiss your brother gave
Had been a dagger's point; then you shall hear
How he will cry, "O would my wicked sister
Had first been damn'd, when she did yield to lust!"

(III.vi.7-30)

The Friar ends his grim lecture with the breathless query,
"... [H]ow is't with you?" (III.vi.32). Irving Wardle,
in his review of the 1972 National Theatre production, sug­
gests that this scene, along with the opening argument be­
tween Giovanni and the Friar, becomes "a withering blast of
Catholic doctrine." Whether or not the scene is anti-
Catholic, it is certainly the most "withering blast" of the
Friar in the play. Further, Bonaventura does nothing to

M. Joan Sargeaunt notes the many parallels be­
tween lines 13-23 in this passage to a similar description
of "the tortures of the damned" in Christ's Bloody Sweat in
her article "Writings Ascribed to John Ford by Joseph
Hunter in Chorus Vatum," Review of English Studies, 10
(1934), 166-67.

Wardle, p. 13.
improve his religious image when, satisfied with Annabella's slightest hint of repentance, he advises her, first, to save her honor and, next, how to redeem her soul: "'Tis thus agreed,/ First, for your honor's safety, that you marry/ The Lord Soranzo; next, to save your soul,/ Leave off this life, and henceforth live to him" (III.vi.35-38). As Robert Ornstein remarks, "The Friar's idea of precedence is disturbing and his conception of heavenly grace is ironic, for the deceitful marriage which he advises is neither effective nor a moral solution. Nevertheless his legalistic mind is working here at full pressure."46 The effect of the frenzied quality of the scene together with the Friar's placing honor before salvation is to suggest the moral confusion of Bonaventura, and that confusion is not portrayed sympathetically. Once again, as in the earlier scene with Giovanni, the Friar proves himself the advocate of moral expedience, for here, too, though repentance is his aim, he reacts under pressure as one too worldly wise to be sure of his moral sense. In this scene the Friar reaches the lowest depths as both a religious adviser and a compassionate human.

Nevertheless, despite the Friar's morally questionable methods of solving moral dilemmas and assuring salvation, we cannot dismiss his genuine and continuing concern, his pity and compassion, for both Annabella and Giovanni. For instance, when he overhears Annabella's private confession of repentance, a confession rendered fully from a

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46 Ornstein, p. 209.
troubled soul, the Friar is deeply moved: "Here's music to the soul!" (V.i.30). He describes himself as "Glad in my soul that I have liv'd to hear/ This free confession 'twixt your peace and you" (V.i.41-42). Thus, with glad haste he bears to Giovanni both the sister's letter of warning regarding Soranzo's pretended friendship and her pleas that her brother repent as she has done; further, Bonaventura adds his own plea to that of Annabella's. When, despite all, Giovanni remains willfully unrepentant, the Friar faces his own uselessness and determines to leave Parma: "Well, young man, since no prayer/ Can make thee safe, I leave thee to despair" (V.iv.69-70). The Friar's departure is not so much the result of his weakness, as H. J. Oliver suggests, as it is the only recourse, given Giovanni's intransigence. When Giovanni's will to sin renders the Friar's counsel pointless, the Friar must be content in knowing of Annabella's repentance. Thus, as N. W. Bawcutt says of the Friar, "He came to Parma because of his affection for Giovanni, and it seems hard to blame him for going away when he realizes that Giovanni completely disregards his advice."  

47 Oliver, p. 89.

48 Bawcutt, p. xxi. Kenneth H. Requa suggests that the Friar's initial decision to leave his teaching post and follow Giovanni indicates in the Friar "a pride parallel to Giovanni's," a pride which blinds the Friar into "mis-plac[ing] his hopes in Giovanni." The initial decision to come away from Bononia is the Friar's first "blunder" and the decision to flee Parma is his "culminating blunder" and further culpable because it is "rooted in despair." "Giovanni as Tragic Hero in Ford's 'Tis Pity She's a Whore," Papers on Language and Literature, 7 (Winter, 1971), 23-24.
Throughout the play the Friar manifests his deep concern for the brother and sister, always seeking ways to save them from themselves. To the extent Bonaventura shows this concern he is like the "good man" Ford describes in A Line of Life. The good man, says Ford, attends "all his drifts and actions to be a servant for others, for the good of others, as if it were his own... His intents are without the hypocrisy of applause, his deeds without the mercenary expectations of reward; the issue of both is, all his works are crowned in themselves, and yet crown not him, for that he loves virtue for itself. This man never flatters folly in greatness, but rather pities and in pity strives to redress the greatness of folly."49 The Friar does act selflessly and manifests a deep sense of compassion for both his young friends. Unfortunately, however, Bonaventura's piety does not equal his pity; we can hardly say of him, as Ford does of the good man, that "he loves virtue for itself." The Friar proves himself too much a creature of the secular world to be a worthy spiritual guide. We must agree with H. J. Oliver that the evidence of the play prevents us from viewing the Friar as "morally admirable" while, on the other hand, it proves that in Bonaventura "the moral order has an unworthy representative."50 In agreeing with Oliver, it seems difficult to go as far as Robert Ornstein who views the Friar as "insensitive to claims of morality."51

49 A Line of Life, pp. 409-10. 50 Oliver, p. 88. 51 Ornstein, p. 209.
But, the Friar is touched by the corruption of the play and is, as Cyrus Hoy says, an "ambiguous" figure. Consequently, the Friar's moral position is sometimes confused and confusing. Irving Ribner regards "the Friar's confused religious position as part of Ford's deliberate purpose, his means of showing religion's inadequacy." The Friar does fail in unequivocal piety, as we have seen; yet, he does maintain a sense of compassionate pity. Perhaps the Friar is one of Ford's means of dramatizing the inadequacy, not of religion per se, but of religion as practiced in the world of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. The Friar is one of several, including Vasques, Giovanni, and the Cardinal, who reveal varying degrees of perverting or distorting both piety and pity. The character of repentance seen in Annabella, however, would seem to refute the idea that Ford finds religion altogether inadequate.

Annabella ultimately manifests deeper religious piety and human compassion than does any other character in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, for she comes to understand the meaning and requirements of both. Ford portrays Annabella's growth into understanding. Having succumbed to the desired temptation of Giovanni's love, Annabella's first attempt to repent fails to have the ring of sincerity, sounding more desperately fearful than genuinely contrite. She is a young, unmarried girl, pregnant by her own brother, as well as tormented by the Friar's gruesome picture of hell-fire

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52 Hoy, p. 154.  53 Ribner, p. 164.
and damnation; thus, when she cries, "Mercy, O mercy!" and "Is there no way left to redeem my miseries?" (III.vi.24,33), the fact of full consciousness of sin cannot be clearly extricated from profound confusion. When the Friar offers her the solution of a repentant marriage to Soranzo, she musters only an "Ay me!" (III.vi.39), hardly wholehearted acquiescence; even when the Friar pushes her to leave the "baits of sin" and be content with his solution, she gives the minimum agreement: "I am." (III.vi.39). The depth and sincerity of this decision are questionable, especially when we later see her taunting Soranzo with her pregnancy and the unparalleled beauty of her unnamed lover. Here, as Mark Stavig points out, "[H]er rebellious behaviour parallels Giovanni's in insolence and moral confusion." Stavig cites particularly the songs Annabella sings to Soranzo, both of which are both taunting and blasphemous in the present context. In the first, "Che morte piu dolce che morire per amore" ("What sweeter death than to die for love"), says Stavig, Annabella inverts the kind of love intended in the song, implying death for love of the "earthly Venus" rather than the "celestial Venus." In the second song, "Morendo in gratia Dei, morirei senza dolore" (Dying in the grace of God, I should die without sorrow), she inverts the meaning of grace, implying "not the grace of God but the grace of Giovanni."

At this point, not only do we doubt Annabella's re-

54 Stavig, pp. 112-13.
igious sincerity but also her human compassion, for in addition to negating her earlier repentance she also denies Soranzo any pity, thus justifying here Stavig's equation of Annabella with Giovanni as persons who treat "other human beings as means of achieving lustful ends." Furthermore, it would seem reasonable here to agree with T. S. Eliot in his judgment of Annabella as a "moral defective." Even if we consider the circumstances of the marriage, Annabella does not fare well in terms of the consistency of her development. Annabella is forced into the marriage; Soranzo deserves no special respect, having heartlessly and expediently dismissed Hippolyta. Knowing of Soranzo's past, Annabella's disrespectful attitude toward him is, if not admirable, at least understandable. She has scorned him since he first approached her. Thus, when he self-righteously acts the deceived husband, she equals his self-righteous pride with her own insolence. Arthur Kirsch agrees that Annabella's "impudence" is "not implausible under the circumstances," but he believes that its intrusion mars Ford's characterization of Annabella as growing in understanding: "At best, her impudence and wit are out of place in this development, and at worst, they actually subvert its continuity."

55 Stavig, p. 112.


the key to Annabella in this scene is her reaction to Soranzo's pretended pain, humility, and virtuous love. Acting on Vasques' advice, Soranzo turns from his mad ranting to pained entreaty:

And wouldst thou use me thus? O, Annabella, Be thou assur'd, whatsoe'er the villain was That thus hath tempted thee to this disgrace, Well he might lust, but never lov'd like me. He doted on the picture that hung out Upon thy cheeks, to please the humorous eye: Not on the part I lov'd, which was thy heart, And, as I thought, thy virtues. (IV.iii.122-29)

Such apparent sincerity touches upon the very self-doubts Annabella later contritely acknowledges and literally brings Annabella to her knees before Soranzo. Possibly the suddenness of Soranzo's change explains the abruptness of Annabella's change. When Soranzo unexpectedly turns from wild accusations to being a deeply hurt husband, Annabella proves incapable of brutal disregard of him. Annabella's change is no more sudden than Soranzo's and, more importantly, Annabella's reversal is motivated by a concern for him rather than, as is Soranzo's change, motivated by the intent to deceive. Arthur Kirsch explains Annabella's reversal as additional evidence that Ford is here using "a Fletcherian situation," one which he finds particularly "disturbing" with regard to Annabella because such "peripetetic behavior cannot be accommodated to any single governing pattern." 58 Perhaps Annabella's abrupt change is related to similar Fletcherian reversals, but it need not be seen as under-

58 Kirsch, p. 125.
mining the continuity of her characterization. Vasques provides cause to doubt Soranzo, but nothing offers reason to doubt that Annabella is serious and sincere. We yet have grounds to believe in Annabella's basic humanity and the continuity of her characterization.

Thus having basis to believe in Annabella's humanity, we are given occasion to accept her capacity for religious consciousness. After being confronted with her own deceit, no matter how deceitfully, by Soranzo, Annabella finally faces squarely the "false joys" of her lustful love for Giovanni and feels the world-weariness of one too early burdened with too much sad knowledge: "My conscience now stands up against my lust/ With depositions character'd in guilt,/ And tells me I am lost. . . ." (V.i.9-11). She characterizes herself as among those "who sleep in lethargies of lust/ Hug their confusion, making Heaven unjust. . . ." (V.i.28-30). Here she seems to recognize that "confusion" typified her first repentance, her marriage to Soranzo, and her subsequent contradictory reactions to her husband, not to mention her relationship with Giovanni. In this private confession between her conscience and herself, more believably than in her previous hurried confession, she "sadly vow[s]/ Repentance, and a leaving of that life/ I long have died in" (V.i.35-37). Annabella seems to have achieved the absolution of that true repentance spoken of in Christ's Bloody Sweat; indeed, belief in the validity of this final repentance receives support because of the many parallels
between her situation and that of the soul allegorized in Ford's *Christ's Bloody Sweat*.

This early work contains an account of Christ's attempts to win completely the soul of erring man. The human soul, personified here as a woman, at first responds to Christ, figured as a suitor, and pledges chaste faithfulness to him but subsequently betrays her promise, taking other lovers. Despite this betrayal, Christ persists in his wooing:

Yet thus that kinde good God will not give over,
But once againe by parley doth attempt,
To court this perjur'd dame' and like a lover
Scorn'd of his Lady from all hope exempt,
Pittyes the shipwracke of her tainted name,
And yet by Mariage would recure her fame,

I know (Quoth Christ) I love thee, els I would not,
Have swimd unto thee in a Sea of Blood:
More testifie my love thou know'st I could not,
Long have I strove to bring thy soule to good:
   And witnesse here this crimson sweat, howe I,
(0 soule of man) doe for thy whoredomes dye.

Christ recounts how often he sued man's soul and called her "From strange imbracements." Then he warns her of the confusion of her present life:

Call but to minde what 'tis to bee a whoore,
A whoore, the worst of creatures, trades her pleasures
With all diseases, lives till she be poore;
Sels all to buy damnation, never measures
   Or shame, or health, but makes her bodies mart
Her soules confusion; such an one thou art.

Thus Christ pleads with her to repent while she can and not to wait until "thou canst not if thou wouldst repent." He continues:

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59 *Christ's Bloody Sweat*, p. 45. 60 Ibid., p. 46.
Redeeme the poore remainder of thy daies,
Deaden the life of thy lascivious lust,
Take pittie on thyselfe, forsake thy waies
Of licorish bondage, hate what is unjust,
Be trew to my desires, when sin assaults,
And Ile forget thy wrongs, forgive thy faults. 61

When the soul does attempt a penitent reformation and cries,
"Mercie, O Mercie, I commend as even/ My whordomes to the
dust, my soule to heaven," then

Christ is appeas'd, and where the soule is prest
With sence of knowinge shee hath done amisse,
Asking grace, shee is with grace redrest,
Her case is pittied, shee forgiven is,
But this so seldom hapneth and so rare,
Scant two such soules amongst a million are. 62

In significant respects, the above allegory parallels Anna­bella's situation. Annabella turns away from Christ in the
strange embrace of incest, repents of her sin but falls into
it again, compounding her error through her marriage to So­ranzo. Finally, she recognizes and is heartily sorry for
her soul's confusion, awakening out of her "lascivious lust." Given the parable in Christ's Bloody Sweat, we have reason
to believe that Annabella's soul, like the erring human
soul, is "pittied, shee forgiven is."

Irving Ribner puts little stock in Annabella's re­pentance: "Annabella is a whore, but her very human attrib­utes led her to be one, and in our pity for her we lament
the moral dilemma in the human condition." 63 To grant Anna­bella redemption through repentance undercuts Ribner's basic
premise regarding not only Annabella but also the whole of
'Tis Pity She's a Whore; to grant Annabella redemption sug­

61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., p. 48. 63 Ribner, p. 173.
gests a solution to the corruption of the play's world, a solution sought by none but Annabella, but a solution that would resolve the moral dilemma of the play. In *Wars of Truth* Herschel Baker reminds us that "in the tradition of Renaissance optimism, which carried over powerfully into the seventeenth century, man's dignity was assured" because, despite the fact that he was "a sinful, fallen creature," he "still retained two inestimable advantages," the gift of reason and "the unmerited gift of grace which made faith possible." Thus, one might claim that Annabella is no more morally defective basically than any human born after the fall.

Not only does Annabella repent, but she desires to take the entire burden of the blame:

O Giovanni, that hast had the spoil
Of thine own virtues and my modest fame,
Would thou hadst been less subject to those stars
That luckless reign'd at my nativity:
O would the scourge due to my black offense
Might pass from thee, that I alone might feel
The torments of an uncontrolled flame!  

(V.i.17-23)

Such selflessness indicates that Annabella possesses a deeper sense of compassion and human concern than any evidenced previously in the play. This same concern dominates her actions and words throughout the remainder of the play. Her next act is to warn Giovanni of Soranzo's treachery and to call him to repent as she has done. When Giovanni scorns her warning and her request, deciding instead to visit her

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in her chamber, Annabella continues to impress on Giovanni the seriousness of the situation:

Brother, dear brother, know what I have been,
And know that now there's but a dining-time
'Twixt us and our confusion: let's not waste
These precious hours in vain and useless speech.
Alas, these gay attires were not put on
But to some end; this sudden solemn feast
Was not ordain'd to riot in expense;
I, that have now been chamber'd here alone,
Barr'd of my guardian, or of any else,
Am not for nothing at an instant freed
To fresh access. Be not deceiv'd, my brother:
This banquet is an harbinger of death
To you and me; resolve yourself it is,
And be prepar'd to welcome it. (V.iv.16-29)

Annabella has awakened from the dream-world of her incestuous love and faces both herself and her situation; vainly she attempts to convince Giovanni to do so as well. Annabella's final words recall her own repentance and, at the same time, convey her sense of compassion toward Giovanni even in the instant of her death: "Forgive him, Heaven—and me my sins; farewell./ Brother unkind, unkind! --Mercy, great Heaven. . . ." (V.v.92-93). Annabella clearly has a capacity for moral responsibility both to her religion and to others that far exceeds that manifested by any other character in the play.

Robert Ornstein finds Annabella an unacceptably ambiguous moral example:

It should be Annabella who positively affirms the humanity of moral law and who weds ethical judgment and poetic insight. Possessing a moral sensitivity which Giovanni lacks, she feels the loathsomeness of their sins while he knows only the torments of jealousy. Unfortunately, however, Annabella plays too ambiguous a role in the moral action to serve as an ethical touchstone. At one moment she seems
to have risen above carnality; at another moment she seems like Giovanni corrupted by incest and adultery. Now she plays the repentant sinner, now the wanton who brazenly boasts of her lover to her husband. Even when she is conscience-stricken, Giovanni fills her mind. Her nobility lies in the generosity of her love for him, not in a victory over desire.

Ornstein correctly notes Annabella's vacillation, but he puts too little store in her final repentance and in her compassion toward, rather than her desire for, Giovanni. Annabella is a picture of the human sinner finally brought to a deep sense of repentance. She is the soul finally wooed successfully by Christ, as was seen possible in Christ's Bloody Sweat; Annabella has commended her "whore-domes to the dust" and her "soule to Heaven." Thus, as the sinful soul in Christ's Bloody Sweat, "Her case is pittied, shee forgiven is. . . ." To ignore the heart of the Christian doctrine of repentance is to miss the dramatic irony of the Cardinal's final pronouncement: "... 'tis pity she's a whore" (V.vi.159-60). The Cardinal sees Annabella only as a whore, failing completely to understand the possibility that she could be anything else; however, the audience, having shared Annabella's private repentance, can view his statement as a manifestation of his own spiritual myopia while understanding that Annabella does not need his contemptuous pity, having already received Christ's redemptive pity. The Cardinal recognizes that Annabella was one

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65 Ornstein, p. 212.

66 Christ's Bloody Sweat, p. 48.
"so rich in nature's store," but he is unable to see that, despite her obvious sin, she is more commendable in both religious depth and human love than he is himself.

In 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, then, Annabella achieves the highest level of religious reverence and human compassion, while other characters, in contrast, represent various degrees of twisting religious duty and human concern into grotesque shapes. The moral tone of the play is deeply ironic, repeatedly revealing a discrepancy between what one would expect and what actually happens. For example, those who might be expected to represent a religious and moral touchstone are, as in the case of the Cardinal, morally corrupt, and, in the case of the Friar, morally suspect. Moreover, the character who piously and persistently mouths loyal devotion to his master as justification for his acts does so in defense of clearly reprehensible deeds, perverting the concept of duty. Giovanni, though he does not play the hypocrite as does Vasques, knowingly flies in the face of accepted religion and blasphemously chooses to create his own religion by sanctifying his incestuous love. Only Annabella struggles out of moral confusion to discover the religious meaning of repentance. Flawed she is; but she seems the only character aware of her flaw and certainly the only one willing to acknowledge that flaw contritely. Though she seems to partake of a distortion of religious values in consummating her incestuous love and in her adultery, she stops short of final hypocrisy and ultimate blasphemy. Thus,
Annabella is the most admirable follower of the first two aspects of the code of behavior, reverence for God and compassion for other humans; others, though apparently aware of these requirements of the code, abuse them to a lesser or greater degree, thus creating in the play an atmosphere of moral ambiguity and confusion.

The moral ambiguity continues in the next aspect of the code, that emphasizing control of the passions as a means of achieving both piety and compassion. The call to self-control and reasoned self-restraint which sounds in The Broken Heart still echoes in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, but, again differently here than in the first play. The Friar's command for Giovanni and Annabella to "Be rul'd" expresses his recognition for their need to exercise self-discipline. The essence of this command is inherent in his advice to Giovanni to "Beg Heaven to cleanse the leprously of lust/That rots thy soul" (I.i.74-75). The Friar reiterates the dictum to "Be rul'd" after Giovanni enjoys Annabella:

The more I hear, I pity thee the more,  
That one so excellent should give those parts 
All to a second death; what I can do  
Is but to pray: and yet I could advise thee, 
Wouldst thou be rul'd. (II.vi.59-63)

Again, when Giovanni insists on accepting Soranzo's birthday invitation, the Friar tries to dissuade him: "Be rul'd, you sha'not go" (V.iii.58). Also with regard to Annabella the Friar advises self-discipline when he pleads with her to abandon her incestuous love for her brother. In each instance, the Friar pleads with the sister and brother to
control their wilfullness which breaks the bonds of reason. Insofar as his dictum attempts to call the two back to reasoned restraint within the bounds of divine and human laws, it is a morally responsible dictum; yet, the reader cannot ignore the fact that at the same time the Friar counsels self-discipline for Annabella he also counsels marriage to Soranzo for the pregnant girl. Once more we are brought back to the fact that the Friar sometimes resorts to that which is morally expedient rather than that which is morally responsible.

Vasques also employs the axiom "Be rul'd" but never in support of divine or human laws. Vasques counsels restraint in efforts to protect Soranzo from the vengeance of others and to guide Soranzo in effecting his own revenge. For example, Vasques soothes the irate Hippolyta with the intent of making her his master's willing though unwitting victim, coaxing her to "master a little [her] female spleen" (II.ii.123-24). And he similarly persuades the raving Soranzo to prevail over Annabella by feigning reasonableness: "... be rul'd, as you respect your honor or you mar all" (IV.iii.99-101). Vasques achieves his own ends by utilizing a mask of sweet reasonableness. It appears that Vasques manipulates the appearance of reason so that he can rule in revenge, all in the service of his master and his own ego.

Therefore, in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore as in The Broken Heart, the Greek chorus advising clear-headed restraint speaks again, but in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore it...
speaks in a morally ambiguous way. Here the wisdom of restraint is evoked in the service of moral corruption as well as in the service of moral good. Friar Bonaventura's plea for reason is essentially well-intentioned, though it sometimes proves adaptable to circumstance. In Vasques the axiom is twisted into the persuasive value of deceitful restraint. This aspect of Ford's code of conduct, like that requiring reverence for God and compassion for man, remains alive in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore but in a curiously distorted way. The fourth aspect of the code, dignified humility, also appears in this play and its need is dramatized here in a way similar to that used in The Broken Heart, that is, through examples of prideful presumptives who scorn dignified humility. Vasques and Giovanni are examples of different types of prideful presumptives.

At the play's conclusion, Vasques imbues his actions with the odor of sanctity by claiming that all of his actions have been done in the name of duty to his master, Soranzo. He justifies all as deeds of loyalty to his "ever dearest lord and master" (V.vi.94-95). But his appeal to selfless loyalty is questionable. Soranzo has not directed Vasques; rather, the reverse is the case. For instance, in the situations with Hippolyta and Annabella, Vasques treats his master almost as a wayward child, manipulating Soranzo in his relationship with each woman in order to achieve the most effective revenge for his lord. In the end when Vasques receives only the sentence of banishment, he exults...
that "this conquest is mine" (V.vi.146-47). Vasques proves himself a master manipulator and triumphs by that skill. By claiming to be his master's man, he conceals the fact that actually he is master of Soranzo. Vasques is not a typical prideful presumptive in the same way as Orgilus and Ithocles in The Broken Heart. He does not deny God and proclaim his own ascendance, for he operates on a much more worldly level. He makes his master his justifying excuse while puppeteering that master.

In comparison with Vasques, Giovanni is an importantly different kind of prideful presumptive. Vasques, out of a perverse concept of self-righteous duty, tries to manipulate those within his immediate purview, but Giovanni usurps the place of God and, ignoring the rights of others in the manner of Orgilus and Ithocles, sees himself as the ruler of destiny. He chooses to make love his god, and in so doing he consciously and obstinately places himself at variance with the religious laws, proclaiming that his wilfull vow to love Annabella will not be thwarted: "It were more ease to stop the ocean/ From floats and ebbs than to dissuade my vows" (I.i.64-65). When he does relent a bit to the Friar's persuasion to pray for repentance, he does so with a significant qualification that later proves to be the loophole through which he achieves his desires; in agreeing to pray as the Friar asks, he says, "All this I'll do, to free me from the rod of vengeance; else I'll swear my fate's my god" (I. i.83-84). Thus, as Cyrus Hoy points out, by so saying,
"Giovanni is prepared, even before he has invoked the aid of heaven, to view his fate as external to self, a necessity imposed from above, if aid is not forthcoming. This being so, he cannot—in his own eyes—be held accountable for what he does."67 By leaving open the possibility that he may be the helpless victim of a force outside his control, Giovanni gives, as Mark Stavig says, "not a legitimate defense but an abdication of his moral responsibility." Such a qualification acts as Giovanni's escape clause, for it is, as Stavig notes, a "rationalizing fatalism" which serves as Giovanni's "excuse through the play."68 Therefore, if prayers and tears do not cure him of his love, then he is but the instrument of fate and is, therefore, destined to love Annabella. From this point on, Giovanni's concept of fate becomes central to his self-concept. He is on his way to becoming like those Neo-Stoics of the early seventeenth century described by Herschel Baker, those who elevated themselves "above Church, above state, even above human nature," using the argument of Stoic determinism or fate as their explanation.69

Giovanni uses the escape clause of fate when his penance inevitably fails; he proclaims that his failure in prayer proves the higher virtue of his love for Annabella and that, thus, it is fate which directs him: "... [T]is not, I know,/ My lust, but 'tis my fate that leads me on"

67 Hoy, p. 148. 68 Stavig, p. 100.
69 Herschel Baker, Image of Man, p. 302.
(I.ii.153-54). By denying lust as his motive while at the same time placing responsibility for his passionate drive on fate, Giovanni actually links the two inextricably; Cyrus Hoy correctly observes that at this point there is no distinction between Giovanni's lust and his fate: "Giovanni's lust is his fate."\(^{70}\) Giovanni's fate lies in his character as a person susceptible to the human weakness of his passion. To acknowledge Giovanni as dominated by his lust is to call into question Irving Ribner's judgment that Giovanni's destructive fate is his "very nature as a sentient and intelligent man." Ribner sees Giovanni as "man in his highest state of excellence, reflected in the beauty of his physical form, man the seeker after truth," man whose "very need to know . . . is his destruction."\(^{71}\) To accept Giovanni as such a paragon of human excellence is to disregard Annabella's final understanding that outer beauty does not necessarily reflect inner beauty. She comes to know that "Beauty that clothes the outside of the face/ Is cursed if it be not cloth'd with grace" (V.i.12-13); Giovanni's beauty is not so clothed, for he has rejected grace and embraced a self-justifying fate.

Having abandoned himself to his own vision of his fate, Giovanni asserts his love to Annabella, claiming that "'tis my destiny/ That you must either love, or I must die" (I.ii.224-25). Further, he explains to Annabella that he has done all that "smooth-cheek'd virtue could advise,/ But

\(^{70}\) Hoy, p. 149. \(^{71}\) Ribner, p. 164.
found all bootless . . ." and that he has "ask'd counsel of the holy church,/ Who tells me I may love you" (I.ii.223-25; 237-38). Irving Ribner is not skeptical of Giovanni's declaration that he has received permission from the church: "Giovanni is not practising a cheap duplicity. He is saying to the audience that although he has followed the ritual of the church it has offered him no help; in the inability of religion to convince him of evil, he finds justification for evil." Mark Stavig, on the other hand, is skeptical: "Giovanni is aware of his sin and seems to realize that the inevitable result will be his destruction; but instead of continuing to struggle he capitulates. Recognizing that he must choose between God and Annabella, he argues illogically that since God has not cured him Christianity has no validity; hence he is free to love Annabella and blame fate for what he seems to realize will be a tragic end." There seems to be reason for skepticism, and an important reason can be found in the flippancy and abandon which characterize Giovanni's opening and succeeding arguments with the Friar. Cyrus Hoy explains what possibly is the nature of this wilful disrespect when he compares the "intellectual profundity of [Marlowe's] Faustus" and the "adolescent cleverness of Giovanni." Giovanni's declaration is but another instance of this "adolescent cleverness" and provides further reason to view him as Hoy does, as "one wilfully courting a fatal destiny rather than seeking--however fitfully and momentarily--

72 Ribner, p. 166. 73 Stavig, p. 101.
So far Giovanni justifies his love by imagining himself the pitiful victim of a relentless fate; however, once assured of Annabella's love, his self-image as related to fate changes: no longer is he victimized, governed by fate; on the contrary, fate is his to command. This change becomes evident when he is satisfied that Annabella will not abide the courtly advances of Soranzo. Annabella tells Soranzo that she does not love him, but evades the question of whom she actually loves by saying enigmatically, "That's as the fates infer" (III.ii.19). Eavesdropping, Giovanni exults, "Of those I'm regent now" (III.ii.20). No longer does fate rule Giovanni; now Giovanni, at least in his own eyes, governs fate. Consequently, as R. J. Kaufmann maintains, "From the moment Giovanni wants more to preserve his rights in his sister than her sense of her own dignity and freedom, he begins to deteriorate morally." Giovanni is following the same pattern previously seen in Ithocles and Orgilus in The Broken Heart and Oedipus in Oedipus: having scorned divine powers, he believes he has ultimate control over his own destiny and that of others, thus presuming a kind of godhead for himself.

This assertion of control over fate reveals the first stage of Giovanni's progress toward the mistaken con-

74 Hoy, p. 153.

fidence in his own omnipotence and it serves as proof of his moral deterioration. Keith Sturgess notes that such confidence leads man into a feeling of "security" which for the Elizabethan was "a culpable lack of anxiety." Later, when Giovanni discovers that Annabella's marriage to Soranzo proves no deterrent to his enjoyment of his sister, Giovanni reaches the peak of his "security" and exults in his control over the situation:

Busy opinion is an idle fool,  
That as a school-rod keeps a child in awe,  
Frights the unexperienc'd temper of the mind:  
So it did me; who, ere my precious sister  
Was married, thought all taste of love would die  
In such a contract; but I find no change  
Of pleasure in this formal law of sports.  
She is still one to me, and every kiss  
As sweet and as delicious as the first  
I reap'd, when yet the privilege of youth  
Entitled her a virgin. O the glory  
Of two united hearts like hers and mine!  
Let poring book-men dream of other worlds,  
My world, and all of happiness, is here,  
And I'd not change it for the best to come:  
A life of pleasure is Elysium. (V.iii.1-16)

With good reason Irving Ribner considers this speech the "height" of Giovanni's "delusion." To have his security in his power challenged here at its peak, as it immediately is by Annabella's warning letter, proves intolerable for Giovanni so that he refuses to face the fact that Soranzo has discovered him and that Annabella has repented. N. W. Bawcutt accurately calls Giovanni's distorted view "megalomania":

It could be said that Giovanni becomes increasingly

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76 Sturgess, p. 364. 77 Ribner, p. 172.
detached from reality as the play proceeds. Anything that stands in the way of his love is discarded or ignored: religion forbids an incestuous love, so he becomes an atheist, and when he is presented with Annabella's letter, which strikes at the root of his moral position, he brushes it aside by arguing that it is forged. The temporary success of his love induces in him a kind of euphoria in which he believes that, far from being driven by fate, he is in fact the controller of fate. This megalomania persists into the last scene of the play.

Giovanni's "megalomania" is full tide at the point when he confronts his sister with the angry sadness of a god who must chastise his own:

What danger's half so great as thy revolt?
Thou art a faithless sister, else thou know'st Malice, or any treachery beside,
Would stoop to my bent brows; why I hold fate Clasp'd in my fist, and could command the course Of time's eternal motion, hadst thou been
One thought more steady than an ebbing sea.
And what? You'll now be honest, that's resol'd?

(V.iv.7-15)

He comes to her with "Death, and a swift repining wrath" in his look and a deep sadness in his heart that he must satisfy the requirements of the "jealous Destinies" (V.v.62). Here Giovanni equivocates, for he has previously proclaimed himself regent of these same fates or destinies which he now implies direct him; once again Giovanni follows his passion, this time anger at being thwarted, looking sidelong for a justification which absolves him of responsibility for evil.

By murdering Annabella, Giovanni asserts final control over her, thereby making her more securely his own and at the same time re-establishing for the moment his own om-

78 Bawcutt, p. xx.

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nipotence. Momentarily, he can boast that he is invincible, proclaiming to the assembled company at the feast that he will outlive the murders of both Annabella and Soranzo, "For in my fists I bear the twists of life" (V.vi.72). The "twists of life" in his hand are in Annabella's heart which he bears upon his sword; the heart in his hand is for him proof of his omnipotence. R. J. Kaufmann observes:

In the final murder we can see very clearly that Giovanni is no longer with his sister. He acts unilaterally. He no longer possesses the love to share even his plans for a Liebestod with her. His selfishness has grown perfect, his love become an abstract and self-oriented thing. He is true only to the negative sanction of their 'marriage' vow. . . . We watch the monomaniacal workings of his mind as he does betray her to 'mirth and hate' and, having killed all but the gorgeous verbal residue of their love, he kills her.

Kenneth A. Requa traces Giovanni's final arrogance back to his initial choice of Annabella because this choice "reflects, mirrorlike, Giovanni's egotism." Noting how the brother stresses his identity with and control over his sister, Requa concludes that "By the end of the drama what is clear is not [Giovanni's] great love for Annabella, but his unbridled egotism, for the incestuous love signals self-love." 80

This scene with Giovanni bearing the "twists of fate" on his sword is very powerful dramatically, evoking from the theater audience a gasp of disbelief or, as is the

79 Kaufmann, pp. 369-70.

80 Requa, "Giovanni as Tragic Hero in Ford's 'Tis Pity She's a Whore," pp. 19-20.
actual case for Giovanni's audience onstage, a shocked and stupefied silence. Several critics suggest that Ford's intent in this scene exceeds the portrayal of Giovanni's final act of presumption; they propose that the scene is emblematic in intent. Brian Morris states that this scene "functions on the stage almost like an emblem in a book" and that heart on the sword is "the perfect, final, visual image for what has been going on privately, secretly. . . ." Donald K. Anderson, Jr. views this scene as the emblem of Ford's fusion of the "two themes of lust and revenge into an unforgettable love-death." Keith Sturgess leaves the question of the emblematic nature of the heart on the sword open, saying, "Giovanni's entry with a heart upon his dagger can be seen as ridiculous melodrama or profound symbol, decadent sensationalism or economic summary of themes and images." Emblematical interpretations of the scene must remain tentative.

81 Morris, p. xxiii.
82 Anderson, John Ford, pp. 103-104.
83 Sturgess, p. 373. A recent critic, Jeanne Addison Roberts, suggests that both "the tone and the technique" of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore "support metaphorical and symbolic interpretation." Citing the lack of precise and complex character development, Roberts suggests that "a 'meaningful' reading [of the characters] may depend on seeing the characters as symbolic rather than realistic" ("John Ford's Passionate Abstractions," Southern Humanities Review, 7 (Summer, 1973), 324.).
84 Two possible related interpretations focus on Giovanni first and then Annabella, both readings depending on an ironical turn of religious symbolism. For instance, Gertrude Jobes records that the "Sword pointing to naked
Giovanni's arrogant assurance and triumph are short-lived; when he is set upon by the banditti, he is incredulous at the fact of his own weakness: "Feeble arms,/ Have you so soon lost strength? (V.vi.83-84). He proves fatally mortal after all; yet, even in his own death, he achieves no self-knowledge or moral reconciliation, for he is arrogant to the end, desiring as his mercy only "this grace,/ Freely to view my Annabella's face" (V.vi.107-108). Cyrus Hoy, continuing his comparison of Giovanni with Faustus, summarizes Giovanni's situation at the end:

For Giovanni, like Faustus, no repentance is possible, nor, unlike Faustus, does he ever give sign of wishing it. . . . Ford has sought to show—with what success is open to question—a transformation in the character of Giovanni as the play moves to its catastrophe. If Giovanni has begun by seeing himself as 'lost,' doomed to death by fate, led to his destruction, not by his lust, but by a cruel destiny for which he cannot be held accountable, he comes, once he has committed himself to the course which an over-mastering fate seems to demand, to see himself as the lord of fate, the very arbiter of destiny.

Robert Ornstein focuses on the same kind of degeneration:

"Tormented by jealousy and coarsened by stealth, Giovanni's love changes from breathless adoration to insane possessive-

heart" is a symbol of "Divine justice, which overcomes all sinners" (Dictionary of Mythology, Folklore and Symbols [New York, The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1962], II, 1520). In such a case the emblem might read that Giovanni, usurper of the divine, believes that he has indeed wrought justice for both Annabella and Soranzo while proving himself omnipotent. In another instance, Jobes records that the "Heart pierced with an arrow" symbolizes "Contrition, devotion, love, repentance" (I.737). The pierced heart could refer to Annabella's state of grace, not at the hands of Giovanni but because of her earlier repentance.

85 Hoy, pp. 150-51.
ness. In the final throes of despairing egoism he comes to believe that Annabella’s life literally belongs to him. When their relationship is discovered, he murders her as part of his ‘revenge’ on Soranzo.” Thus, as T. S. Eliot says of Giovanni, the brother develops into a “monster of egotism.”

Once again with Giovanni as with Orgilus and Ithocles in The Broken Heart, Ford dramatizes in ‘Tis Pity She’s a Whore the devastating results of man’s “insolent presumption.” In choosing to ignore or defy the moderating dictates of reason, the offending characters destroy the order inherent in the laws of piety and pity. Cyrus Hoy’s assessment of Giovanni is pertinent here:

In selecting as a protagonist an intellectual who is at bottom a sensualist, Ford, like Marlowe before him, has made the more vivid, and so the more disturbing, the tragedy implicit in man’s enslavement to passion. We are confronted, in both plays [Dr. Faustus and ‘Tis Pity She’s a Whore] with the disturbing spectacle of the divinely given powers of reason being employed to justify allegiance to the world and the flesh and, consequently, to the devil. Reason becomes the defense of passion, and, this being so, knowledge turns to ignorance as evil is hailed the highest good, hell is viewed in the light of heaven, and death is sought in the name of life. Right is confounded with wrong, and sin assumes the name of virtue.

Several critics perceive a tension between a kind of heroism in Giovanni and his degeneration. Irving Ribner, for instance, speaking of both brother and sister, says, “... [T]heir tragedy is an heroic opposition of their own

86 Ornstein, p. 211.  87 Eliot, p. 198.
88 Hoy, p. 154.
humanity to a world which they cannot accept. The price of such opposition must be sin and death, but such self-destruction is not without its heroic quality.®® Clifford Leech comments that "Ford, it is evident, sees the love of Giovanni and Annabella as an impulse that drives them to doom. Nevertheless, he sees Giovanni's growing arrogance as at once inevitable, splendid, and culpable." Leech offers an explanation for these apparently contradictory attitudes toward Giovanni, the tragic hero and the arrogant sinner:

To an early seventeenth-century tragic writer it is not surprising that a man's conduct should simultaneously present these different facets, and in Ford the opposition of pagan and Christian impulses is stronger than in most. Joined to his admiration for the adventurous Giovanni is the stern piety that had earlier shown itself in Christ's Bloody Sweat.®®

In Christ's Bloody Sweat there is one passage on presumption which clearly seems applicable to Giovanni:

Presumption leads the readie path to hell,  
For whilst wee looke on mercie we forget  
The equalenes of Justice, and compell  
Our soules to runne into a greater debt,  
That God is mercifull 'tis true, so must  
Our bouldnes eke remember hee is juste.

Viewing Giovanni in the context of this passage, Cyrus Hoy seems accurate when he says that Giovanni "has outraged heaven for too long, he has persistently refused its offered grace, and he has become hardened in his sinful courses; he

®® Ribner, p. 171.

®® Leech, John Ford and the Drama of His Time, p. 56.

®® Christ's Bloody Sweat, p. 48.
is thus, inevitably, in the eyes of the pious, one marked for a terrible fate that heaven will not long withhold.\(^{92}\)

To observe that Ford's stern piety prevails with Giovanni is not, however, adequate in terms of the whole play. If this play presented only the plot of the incestuous love with Annabella's final repentance and Giovanni's transformation into a prideful presumptive who experiences the disaster inherent in his presumption, then Cyrus Hoy's conclusion that *Tis Pity She's a Whore provides a clear framework of justice for its world would be readily acceptable. In reaching his decision Hoy limits his focus only to the love of Annabella and Giovanni, and based on this narrow focus concludes that *"Tis Pity She's a Whore, like Faustus, is nothing if not a graphic demonstration that the wages of sin is death."\(^{93}\) In this conclusion Hoy makes the valid point that with regard to Giovanni the character's rise and fall do demonstrate that sin brings destruction. However, to limit the discussion in such a way and yet apply the conclusion to the play as a whole oversimplifies the moral framework of the play because it ignores the fact that we do not see others in the play receive their just deserts, notably the Cardinal and Vasques, both of whom we have discussed earlier. Further, there are in the subplots other instances of distorted justice and perverted ideals which do not fall within Hoy's framework.

As two examples of the corruption of the expected

\(^{92}\) Hoy, p. 153.  \(^{93}\) Hoy, pp. 146-54.
ideals Ribner cites Grimaldi and Soranzo. Of Grimaldi, Ribner says:

He is never mentioned without some reference to his high connections and his noble blood, but his nobility can only express itself in the sordid plot of Richardetto, and his sole accomplishment is to stab a pathetic fool. Yet Grimaldi's is the kind of honour which the world respects and which merits special protection of Cardinal and Pope.

This indictment of Grimaldi also stands as an indictment of the Cardinal, who protects Grimaldi the confessed murderer; further, it is an implied indictment of the Pope whom the Cardinal represents. Certainly honor and the piety which should be its virtuous base prove corrupt here. Another example of the corruption of ideals is Soranzo, who fares no better morally. Ribner says of Soranzo that this character's "moral position is that of the very world which condemns Giovanni and Annabella, for there is no secret of Soranzo's past relation to Hippolyta, and he is accepted by all as the image of nobility most fit to be Annabella's husband." 94 Florio, Annabella's father, is no representative of a higher order, for it is he who promotes the marriage between his daughter and Soranzo (III.iv), while knowing Soranzo's character. The virtues of piety and pity with these men do not reach to an admirable level. Third, there is the sub-plot involving Bergetto, a sub-plot which serves by contrast to emphasize the degeneration of traditional ideals. As Irving Ribner says, "The pathos of Bergetto's death makes more poignant the injustice of the Car-

94 Ribner, p. 169.
dinal, and the simple fidelity of Poggio mourning over the body of his master throws the brutal fidelity of Vasques into clearer light." T. S. Eliot suggests that Ford comes close to achieving the intended relevant comic effect with Bergetto. Juliet McMaster offers a pertinent reason for Ford's success here, the fact that Bergetto is a "ridiculously unconventional lover." McMaster explains that "one reason for the failure of Ford's comic attempts is that he evidently feels more contempt than sympathy for his comic characters. Just as he cannot smile at his main characters, so he cannot see any potential for pathos in his buffoons. Bergetto is the only one of them who really does fall in love, and he is perhaps the one who comes nearest to being funny." A buffoon undoubtedly Bergetto is, but he does express the capacity for a level of innocent and genuine human emotion foreign to such characters as Soranzo, Vasques, Grimaldi or the Cardinal. By contrast, Bergetto serves to underscore Ribner's judgment that "Ford takes special pains to depict the society which condemns the incestuous lovers, with its code of honour and its standards of nobility, as sordid and self-destructive."

95 Ribner, p. 165.
98 Ribner, p. 169.
To be fair to the play, then, one must consider its entirety without limiting a discussion to only the story of the incestuous lovers; in this broader view, the disparity between Hoy's framework of justice and the actual events of the play becomes evident. Further, this broader view first leaves the impression that Ford does not follow through with his code of behavior.

Of the two plays, The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, this drama fits less neatly into the overall pattern which Ford seems to have gathered from Sophocles' Oedipus, a pattern which involves the code of conduct centered in reverence for God and compassionate justice for man achieved by reasoned self-discipline and dignified humility. One reason for the difference in the two plays may be Ford's change of religious context in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, a change which also informs the seemingly disparate application of justice. In The Broken Heart, Ford uses the framework of the Greek gods for his religious context and, in so doing, achieves a similarity with the religious context of Sophocles' Oedipus; in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, however, Ford provides a Christian religious context. The nature of the difference in these two approaches becomes evident in a comparison of the attitudes toward death in the plays. The attitude in the first play is much like that in Oedipus. In Oedipus the final lines of the chorus suggest that death is a relief because it terminates the vicissitudes of life: "Look to the end of mortal life. In vain/
We say man is happy, till he goes/ Beyond life's final bor-
der, free from pain." Similarly, in The Broken Heart Calan-
tha's dirge echoes this idea of death as a cessation of sor-
row: "Sorrowes mingled with contents, prepare Rest for
care" (V.iii.90-91). In 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, however,
the Christian concepts of repentance, salvation and damna-
tion change the image of man in life and in death. In the
Christian context man is still a poor creature, limited in
contrast with the divine; however, the Christian world miti-
gates the hopeless inferiority of man by offering the grace
of redemption: the Christian can make his reconciliation
with his God. With this grace of redemption comes the ever-
lasting glory of Heaven. Without such salvation, man can
expect only Hell, as the Friar so graphically describes to
Annabella, a Hell which is an intensification rather than a
cessation of pain and suffering. Herein lies the major dif-
fERENCE between The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore.
In both Oedipus and The Broken Heart, one finds the sugges-
tion that death ends all and that, thus, the laws of god and
man prevail in this life or not at all. In 'Tis Pity She's
a Whore, on the other hand, death does not end all; there-
fore, the laws of God and man may be strategically avoided
or cynically perverted in this life, but in the next life
divine justice will prevail despite man's delusions of cir-
cumvention. From this standpoint, Florio's despairing cry
holds yet some hope: "Justice is fled to Heaven and comes
no nearer" (III.iv.62).
Furthermore, the distinction in religious contexts of the two plays also explains what seems to be an intolerable disparity of justice in 'Tis Pity. Though the Cardinal and Vasques, for instance, seem to triumph in the play, not despite their corruption but because of it, the hopeful possibility of the play is that they ultimately will get their just reward; on the other hand, Annabella, who is so casually and contemptuously damned by the Cardinal, has the play's best hope of Heaven because of her final repentance.

This change of religious contexts also contributes to an intensification of deceit and corruption in the play. In this Christian context man is allowed to continue unrestrained since neither conscience, civic law, nor divine justice is necessarily operative in this world; when man forgets God, then he creates a hopelessly confused and corrupt maze for himself. Moral corruption characterizes the climate of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore; deceit and delusion issue from and often engulf man. Moreover, confusion prevails in the play. Brian Morris has observed that the word "confusion" recurs significantly in Acts IV and V, as if the corruption in the play culminates in a pervasive confusion in the final two acts. In each repetition of "confusion," the word suggests not only mental disorientation and personal or social disorder but also moral turmoil and both physical and spiritual death.

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The word first occurs in Act IV at Soranzo and Annabella's wedding banquet when Giovanni finds his sister's marriage intolerable: "O torture! Were the marriage yet undone,/ Ere I'd endure this sight, to see my love/ Clipp'd by another, I would dare confusion,/ And stand the horror of ten thousand deaths" (IV.i.16-18). As Giovanni later clarifies, he is here emotionally confounded over losing Annabella as his lover, so much so that he is willing to risk physical death rather than have his sister embraced by another. What he fails to acknowledge is that, in pursuing the incestuous relationship, he has already incurred moral confusion and the spiritual "horror of ten thousand deaths."

"Confusion" occurs again in this same scene. Vasques reveals to the wedding company Hippolyta's plan "to poison my lord, while she might laugh at his confusion on his marriage day" (IV.i.79-81). Here, too, confusion occurs in the context of death: Hippolyta intends Soranzo's humiliation in death but finds both humiliation and death herself. Confusion becomes acute in this scene because in Soranzo and Annabella's marriage and in the presence of both Giovanni and Hippolyta this scene unites the various degrees of moral and spiritual confusion of the four people. When staged, the marriage feast must be dramatically effective, juxtaposing as it does Soranzo and Hippolyta's sordid affair, Giovanni and Annabella's incestuous relationship, and both Soranzo's and Annabella's hypocrisy in the marriage celebration.100

100 Perhaps Roland Joffe, director of the 1972

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final touch to the effect is provided by the Friar, who has personal and regrettable reason to doubt the sanctity of the union: "... that marriage seldom's good,/ Where the bride-banquet so begins in blood" (IV.i.110-11). Later, Richardetto hints of the inevitable disintegration of this parody of a marriage when he abates his plans for revenge against Soranzo, having heard rumor of marital discontent and knowing he now has no need "To further [Soranzo's] confusion" (IV.ii.7-8).

We see the predicted upheaval in the marriage in the ugly confrontation between Soranzo and Annabella. Fortunately, Annabella realizes the moral and spiritual basis for that confusion and accepts the burden of her role in it. In her subsequent private speech of repentance, she recalls the Friar's earlier warning that in loving Giovanni she "trod the path to death" (V.i.27). Now she confesses why she did not heed him: "But they who sleep in lethargies of lust/ Hug their confusion, making Heaven unjust,/ And so did I" (V.i.27-30). Annabella's lust distorted her thinking so that she clung to her delusion that the incestuous love was virtuous and not corrupt; moreover, in persisting in the lustful and incestuous relationship, Annabella now sees that

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National Theatre production, tips the scales too far in favor of Giovanni and Annabella's relationship when in this scene, says reviewer Benedict Nightingale, Joffe "gratuitously inserts a mime about Mary Magdalene where the text demands only 'music and dance,' presumably because he is trying to accentuate the idea that only those without sin should throw stones, even at incestuous fornicators." ("Tender Taboo" (rev.), New Statesman (August 11, 1972), 204).
she was daring both loss of life and loss of moral sense. Here is a clear example of what Herschel Baker generalizes as a truth of Jacobean drama, that "the cognate themes of sex and death intwine themselves into the recurrent symbol of lust as man's death in life." Morally confused, Annabella has courted damnation while existing in a living death.

In sharp contrast to Annabella, Giovanni refuses to accept the disintegration of his supposedly secure world as well as his part in that breakdown: "Discovered?/ The devil we are; which way is't possible?/ Are we grown traitors to our delights?/ Confusion take such dotage. . . ." (V.iii. 36-39). Giovanni curses as imbecile any hint that something could interfere with their continued pleasures and his own sense of self-sufficient security. The painful irony is, of course, that he is indeed discovered, both by Soranzo and by God, and will soon be brought to death and damnation. The final appearance of the word comes at the critical moment of Giovanni's last visit with Annabella. Suspecting catastrophe, Annabella again warns her brother: "Brother, dear brother, know what I have been,/ And know that now there's but a dining-time/ 'Twixt us and our confusion" (V.v.16-18). Here Annabella means confusion in the sense of their physical death and spiritual damnation. The combination of these instances of "confusion" and the crucial contexts in which they occur suggests a labyrinth of emotional, moral and spiritual turmoil and destruction. Given in the

last two acts this increasing focus on confusion, especially moral and spiritual confusion, it is difficult to accept Arthur Kirsch's judgment that "There is no moral confusion, as such, in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore --that issue has always been a red herring." 102

For Ford's audience this atmosphere of confusion and moral corruption was intensified by the setting of the play. John L. Lievsay says that the Elizabethan attitude toward Italy was contradictory; for the Elizabethan, the name Italy "represented the very acme of beauty and culture, of license and corruption. With such a range of potential pleasure and disgust, it is small wonder that the Elizabethans found themselves divided in their opinions of the fascinating peninsula. Laudation and bitter attack stand side by side in the records they have left us." 103 Roger Ascham in The Scholemaster, for instance, laments what he believes is the change in Italy past and Italy in the Elizabethan present:

. . . [T]yme was, whan Italie and Rome, have bene, to the great good of us that now live, the best breeders and bringers up, of the worthiest men, not onelie for wise speakinge, but also for well doing, in all Civill affaires, that ever was in the worlde. But now, that time is gone, and though the place remayne, yet the olde and present maners do differ as farre, as blacke and white, as vertue and vice. Vertue once made that contrie Mistres over all the worlde. Vice now maketh that contrie slave to

102 Kirsch, p. 125.
This attitude toward Italy apparently does not abate with the turn of the century; in fact, the antipathy seems to intensify. Lu Emily Pearson explains that "at the end of Elizabeth's reign, a strong reaction was setting in against Italy and all things Italian." Consequently, Ford's audience would probably have associated the Italian setting of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore with the social and moral evils of decadence; they would have expected in this setting the kind of confusion they find in the play.

Perhaps here exists a possible connection between the emblematic intent of the heart-on-the-sword scene and the play's setting, as well as between the settings of The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. Gertrude Jobes states that two general symbolic meanings for both a "broken heart" and a "bleeding" heart are "Disappointment in love" and "disillusionment." Possibly in both The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, Ford uses the broken heart of his title and the "bleeding" heart on Giovanni's dagger to suggest not only the painfully ill-fated loves of his characters but also the disillusionment occasioned by the spiritual corruption in the worlds of both plays. We have already discussed how the Sparta of The Broken Heart needs spiritual regeneration and how, emblematically, Ford offers

this revitalizing possibility through Nearchus. Again in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, Ford portrays a world that has become spiritually deficient, even perverted. Once more the choice of setting emphasizes this moral disorder.

Interpretative critical comment on the moral confusion in the play ranges from existential readings, such as those of G. F. Sensabaugh and R. J. Kaufmann, to the firmly orthodox Christian view of Mark Stavig, and finally to the interpretation of lesser or greater unresolved moral tension as seen by Clifford Leech and Irving Ribner. Because Ford sees no divine order, says Sensabaugh, he portrays a confusion which reflects the absurdity in human existence, an absurdity born of "the discontinuity of human experience" to be endured with "stoic acceptance." 107 R. J. Kaufmann believes that Giovanni is "a martyr to the tragic limitations of the Stoic vision," that is, martyr to the Stoic injunction "to live well" in a situation in which "a community standard of intelligible virtue is lacking." 108

Both Sensabaugh and Kaufmann focus on the lack of a functioning moral norm, the resulting irrational appearance of events, and the human defense of a stoic posture. Neither considers the possibility of a Christian code which is perverted and therefore not functioning; nor do they consider that the perversion of this code results in the ir-

108 R. J. Kaufmann, 357-68.
rationally absurd; nor do they consider that Giovanni, the character who takes the stoic stance of extreme individualism and thereby believes he achieves what Herschel Baker has called "a bumptious state of self-sufficiency," is the character who most flagrantly violates the two basic tenets of Ford's Christian code, the piety of Christian reverence and the pity of human compassion.

Mark Stavig, on the other hand, views the "moral chaos" of the last scenes as finally symbolized by the Cardinal who is "a kind of symbol of the society's venality" because he, like the society, lets "corruption and hypocrisy go unchallenged." In contrast to the Cardinal, Stavig sees the Friar as "the symbol of true religion." Agreement with Stavig's judgment of the Cardinal is not difficult, but such is not the case with his complete confidence in the morality of the Friar. The Friar is not thoroughly desppicable morally as is the Cardinal, but he cannot be regarded as the play's Christian moral touchstone as Tecnicus is the moral norm of The Broken Heart because the Friar has shown serious moral equivocations resulting from being touched by the brush of the corrupt world in which he lives.

Clifford Leech observes a strong Christian influence in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore but sees that influence unsuccessfully contending with an equally strong pagan influence so that moral confusion develops from the resulting "intel-

110 Stavig, p. 120.
lectual tension." If there is such an "intellectual tension" in Ford, the prevailing attitude in the play seems to be Christian, an attitude based on a Christianized code ultimately derived from the Greek tragedian Sophocles.

Ribner, as we have stated earlier, believes that Ford is unable to use Christianity convincingly enough "to lead his audience to a full resolution of the moral problems he poses," problems hinging on the paradox of a rationally unacceptable Christian religion in a corrupt society. Ribner concludes that "In man's inability to escape moral uncertainty lies his tragedy." Thus, Ribner finds the total import of the play to be far more pessimistic than a belief in the code of conduct would necessarily find it.

In this play Ford does create an atmosphere of moral confusion; however, that confusion is not his own but rather that of the world of his play. He does suggest that man cannot live by human reason alone; he suggests that human reason must be informed by reverent piety and human compassion. Further, it is this very reverence and pity which save Annabella finally from being the whore the corrupt Cardinal names her. Ford seems to view Giovanni and Annabella with a great sadness, not because their incestuous love does not survive, but because in their world each seems the only viable alternative for the other and because their

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111 Leech, *John Ford and the Drama of his Time*, p. 43.

112 Ribner, pp. 173-74.
love eventually brings them both to the same degenerate level of the others; Giovanni does not regain a worthy level, but Annabella does—through repentance. Ford's sadness also seems tinged with anger; since he makes clear, primarily through Annabella, that another way of the world, another code of behavior, is possible, he seems both sad and angry that such a viable way is ignored or travestied.

Thus, in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore there is the possibility of hope, the possibility of the restoration of order through Christian repentance and a return to a code of virtuous behavior; in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore hope remains only a possibility. Never in this play do we have the purging of evil and the restoration of good; we are left only with the hope, and that hope seems directed didactically toward the audience. Except for Annabella, the world of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore seems effectively lost; the prevailing hope seems to be some kind of object lesson through Annabella for the audience to heed. Such a tentative resolution contrasts sharply with the end of The Broken Heart; there we have Nearchus as the firm representative of hope, a hope that is not only a possibility but a promise of a new moral order. The play ends with the representative of the code of behavior taking the reigns of government. Through Nearchus Ford affirmatively asserts a promise; in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, however, he makes no such promise: he offers only the possibility.
CONCLUSION

Remembering M. Joan Sargeaunt's admonition "to be cautious in the moral outlook one assigns to Ford,"¹ we suggest in this study that Ford's moral perspective involves a clearly defined code of ethical behavior, a code rooted in Christian beliefs yet modeled in significant respects on a similar code discernible in Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*. The Christian foundation for the ethical system appears in Ford's early religious poem, *Christ's Bloody Sweat*; the influence of classical Greek and Roman thinkers on the formulation of Ford's ethical precepts becomes evident in Ford's early prose pamphlet, *The Golden Meane*, and continues in a later, similar prose pamphlet, *A Line of Life*, which also indicates Ford's fusion of Christian and classical moral attitudes. This combination of Christian and classical ethical ideas coalesces into a unified system most clearly stated and dramatized in *The Broken Heart*; Ford's statement of his ethical system in this play echoes in important parallels, both moral and dramatic, a related ethical attitude perceptible in Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*. Ford's continuing preoccupation with this same moral approach to human behavior also dominates in his development of 'Tis

Pity She's a Whore, though here Ford's presentation focuses primarily on the pervasive ill effects resulting from man's contemptuous distortion of the code's moral intent.

In Christ's Bloody Sweat Ford establishes the need for a guide for human conduct by emphasizing in Christian terms the uncertain nature of human existence: human transience, human vulnerability to temptation and sin, man's resulting need for constant vigilance against both indulging in and being victimized by his own sinfulness and that of others, the ever-present threat of hell as a just reward for those who are not sufficiently watchful. Having thus provided foundation for needing a system of right conduct, Ford provides a Christian approach to appropriate human deportment: achieving self-reformation by following reason's moderating guide and contritely foregoing sinfulness, thereafter becoming a soldier in Christ despite pain and deprivation. As stated in Christ's Bloody Sweat, the essential element in thus becoming spiritually worthy is pity, Christ's pity for man causing Christ to sacrifice his life for human redemption and man's consequent pity for Christ's suffering resulting in man's desire for full salvation. Here Ford plays upon the reciprocal meanings of pity and piety, making man's reciprocal pity for Christ's manifestation of compassion an expression of religious reverence.

In The Golden Meane Ford repeats the basic reason of unstable human existence necessitating a moral guide, this time emphasizing human transience and frailty through
man's susceptibility to changes in fortune. Ford's approach to proper conduct in this secular moral pamphlet stresses the means by which to prepare for and to deal most gracefully and effectively with adversity. That means is to overcome moral unworthiness through self-reformation by steadfast adherence to the virtue of moderation founded upon the nobility and wisdom of reason. Though the thrust of this moral tract is classical and secular rather than Christian, as evidenced by the frequent references to classical Greek and Roman moral philosophers for support and illustration, Ford nevertheless incorporates many of the same moral essentials found in *Christ's Bloody Sweat*: the need for self-reformation and the possibility for human change through reason and moderation. Ford does not emphasize in this work the reciprocal meanings of pity and piety as he does in *Christ's Bloody Sweat*, probably because this latter work is not specifically religious in intent. He does, however, suggest a Christian attitude by indicating that death offers a promise greater than an end to misery; further, the reiterated emphasis on nobility and wisdom might well be understood as secular equivalents for the Christian connotations of piety and pity.

In *A Line of Life* Ford once again follows the same basic pattern established in *Christ's Bloody Sweat* and *The Golden Meane*. Awareness of death and of human deceits and difficulties requires man's resolution to follow the virtuous direction of a "Line of Life." The guide provided here
unhesitatingly combines the Christian and classical approaches of the previous two works; the "Line of Life" is a middle way somewhat like the golden mean and is further "the most certain and infallible rule which we, as we are men, and more than men, Christians, and more than Christians, the image of our Maker, must take our level by." Once possessed of the resolution to follow this moral guide, man in his three possible capacities as a private person, a public servant, or as a "private statesman" can persevere in acting with modesty and moderation even while tolerating nobly pain and distress. In Ford's description of the most admirable type of man, the "good man" or "private statesman," Ford seems to spotlight the kind of pity which he stresses in Christ's Bloody Sweat, for the "good man" practices both pity and piety in their highest senses.

Thus, these three early Ford efforts share similar attitudes and ideas. First, each work shares an attitude of moral earnestness as well as a didactic certitude that a definite pattern of behavior exists as a means for man to achieve the virtuous life. Second, each work emphasizes similar uncertainty of human life and the fact of human weakness as reasons requiring an ethical guide; each asserts the belief that man can counter human frailty through a steadfast resolution to reform himself with moderation and

3 Ibid., p. 411.
reason as his moral touchstones; each suggests that a genuinely moral code of behavior necessitates a largeness of spirit which incorporates both religious reverence and human compassion.

The assumptions and emphases evident in Christ's Bloody Sweat, The Golden Meane, and A Line of Life become central to Ford's dramatic vision in The Broken Heart. Judging by this play's prologue, in which Ford expresses his hope that his audience "may pertake a Pitty with Delight," and its epilogue, which reinforces this intention, Ford's purpose in The Broken Heart remains as didactic as it has been in his early works. Further, Ford very carefully develops a world of human uncertainty, deceit and adversity, a world which clearly requires the guidance of an ethical code. Moreover, Ford sets forth this ethical standard in a definitive way, primarily through the prophet-teacher Tecnicus, while at the same time dramatizing, especially through Ithocles and Orgilus, the pervasive ill effects ensuing from a failure or refusal to exercise self-control and to adhere resolutely to the moral precepts. Most important, Ford suggests here as in Christ's Bloody Sweat, The Golden Meane, and A Line of Life, that moral virtue must have as its motivating force both religious reverence and human compassion; in The Broken Heart this belief is most affirmatively presented, though perhaps without the desired dramatic effec-

tiveness, through Nearchus, who represents the spiritual hope of the play; Nearchus brings to the spiritually sterile world of the play's Sparta the "strength" of his "love." 5

It is in The Broken Heart that Ford reflects most clearly and specifically the influence of Sophocles' Oedipus the King. First, as the prologue and epilogue indicate, Ford intends his play to serve a didactic moral purpose in the manner of the Greek concept of the poet as moral teacher. Further, in dramatizing his moral lesson, Ford chooses a method strongly reminiscent of that used by Sophocles in Oedipus the King. Ford, like Sophocles, creates a precarious human world, one characterized particularly by the discrepancy born of the gods' omnipotence and man's limitations; in addition, Ford seems to imitate Sophocles in choosing a pattern of sight and blindness imagery to stress divine omniscience and human shortsightedness. Moreover, adding to this human uncertainty, Ford, like Sophocles, portrays man as caught in the tension created by the conflicting dictates of his reason and the impulses of his passions, and Ford uses an Apollonian seer, much like Sophocles' Tiresias, to dramatize both man's human inferiority and his internal tension. More importantly, as a moral line through this confusing life, Ford provides through Tecnicus a system of ethical rules requiring that one revere the gods, respect man, follow reason, and cultivate dignified humility instead of presumptive pride. Significantly, these aspects of

5 The Broken Heart, IV.ii.196-99.
Ford's code of behavior can be clearly distinguished in the Sophoclean chorus' anguished restatement of their religious beliefs when these beliefs are threatened by Oedipus' presumption. As a means of dramatizing the meaningfulness of his moral system, Ford portrays the disaster resulting from the failure of individuals, such as Ithocles and Orgilus, to live by the code. These individuals follow a similar pattern of error, the same pattern which Sophocles' Oedipus traces as he grows in presumption: first, each character scorns the gods, then decreases in his sense of justice while becoming possessed by his passions rather than his reason and, finally, ascends to an illusion of human omnipotence. When the illusion inevitably proves false, as it does both in The Broken Heart and Oedipus the King, Ford, like Sophocles, closes his play with a representative of a new moral order; in The Broken Heart Nearchus serves a function similar to that of Creon in Oedipus. Thus, in the background for the code, the statement of the code, and the dramatization of man's need for the code and of the painful results when man denies the code in The Broken Heart, Ford evidences the strong influence of Sophocles' Oedipus.

Many of these same elements that indicate Sophoclean impact in The Broken Heart appear in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore; once again Ford presents a shaky human world characterized by the same divine-human discrepancy and the same reason-versus-passion conflict. As before, he dramatizes the discrepancy and the conflict by a pattern of sight-blindness.
imagery. Further, Ford suggests the basics of an ethical code which is, despite the change from a classical Greek to a contemporary Christian Italian setting, essentially the same as that in The Broken Heart. Once more, this time through Giovanni, Ford illustrates the rise and fall of the Oedipus-like presumptive who begins by flaunting the gods or religion, progresses through human disrespect because of the dominance of his passions over his reason to a final point at which he believes he has transcended the divine and thus become omnipotent himself. Thus far, Ford repeats the Sophoclean type of pattern found in The Broken Heart.

'Tis Pity She's a Whore is, however, more inclusive in focus than is The Broken Heart. In the present play Ford is not only concerned with portraying the disaster resulting from one individual's slow moral deterioration; rather, he is equally concerned with conveying the pervasive corruption resulting from a society's retention of the form of the ethical standard while simultaneously divesting that standard of any meaningful content. Ford's focus here is not so much on Giovanni as it is on the whole world of the play as represented by the various social levels from the servant Vasques to the Church's highest representative in the play, the Cardinal. In The Broken Heart Ford suggests the spiritual sterility of that play's world, a sterility stemming primarily from Ithocles' initial selfish act of giving his formerly betrothed sister to another, more socially prestigious suitor; in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, how-
ever, Ford portrays a whole society in which moral subversion is the norm although ethical pretense survives, a society in which corruption feeds upon corruption: clearly Giovanni and Annabella are initially superior to their surroundings, but each descends to the level of these degenerate surroundings. Here Ford is much more strongly condemnatory of the whole society than he is in The Broken Heart. Yet, despite Ford's more all-inclusive critical presentation, this play does provide affirmation of Ford's belief that divine and human love should form the basis of moral conduct; that affirmation comes through Annabella. At the end of the play she remains, as the result of her final repentance, the only character who achieves a level of moral distinction, for she alone evidences both religious reverence and human love.

In terms of this study's focus on Ford's moral perspective, the primary difference between The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore is one of degree and not of kind. Both plays attempt to teach a particular moral view, one based on the ethical code consisting of religious reverence and human respect, moderation and dignified humility. The difference seems to lie in the attitude of Ford the moral teacher at the end of each lesson. At the end of The Broken Heart, Calantha's powerfully realized death ritual recalls the play's preceding deaths and evokes a profound sadness over the sense of needless loss. But the final note of the play is struck by Nearchus, primarily through
his actualization of the play's symbolic oracle; Ford clearly intends Nearchus' promise of spiritual renewal to counter with hope the deepening sadness of the play. In 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, on the other hand, the effect is far different. First, although Giovanni's death dominates the final scene of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore as Calantha's does that of Broken Heart, each death produces contrasting effects: Giovanni's death does not produce a sadness similar to that created by Calantha's death. Giovanni's sacrificial murder of his worthy sister to satisfy his unbounded ego overshadows his own death; the fact and nature of Annabella's death produces onstage, and surely in the viewing audience, a shocked and outraged speechlessness. Compared with the enormity of her awful murder, Giovanni's death is insignificant—and pitiful in that insignificance. Moreover, in further contrast to the end of The Broken Heart, the final note of the play is sounded not by a symbol of moral hope but, ironically, by an individual who, by his church position, should be a moral spokesman but who, actually, has proved himself to be contemptibly corrupt; his condescendingly casual dismissal of Annabella as, regrettably, a whore Ford surely intended to produce outraged indignation in the audience. Contrary to the Cardinal's judgment, Annabella has proved herself capable of sincere religious reverence and human compassion and, therefore, deserves not only respect but admiration; thus her presence in the play provides at least the moral hope of Christian repentance. Conse-
quently, her absence in the final scene speaks more elo-
quently than the presence of all the rest, for her absence
provides mute comment on the final and continuing moral
corruption of the world she has left. Ford the moral
teacher closes the lesson of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore with
an angry warning to hearken to Annabella's religious example
of repentance.

At this point a return to a comparison of Sophocles
and Ford might serve as a means of understanding Ford's
final moral position. The emphasis here will be on a major
contrast between Sophocles' and Ford's moral perspectives,
a contrast which might possibly have been purposeful on
Ford's part but which was more likely at least partially a
result of the seventeenth-century lenses through which Ford
viewed Sophocles and partially a result of the force of
Ford's own beliefs.

We remember that in _Oedipus the King_, Sophocles
puts into the mouth of the chorus the observation that "From
Zeus's eyes and Apollo's no human secret is hidden;/ But man
has no test for truth, no measure his wit can devise."⁶ Implicit in this statement lies the basis for Sophocles' agony
over the human condition, an agony clearly evident in his
portrayal of Oedipus, a man who became obsessed with leading
a virtuous life despite the pronouncements of the gods but
who even because of his own attempts followed the very pat-
tern prophesied by the gods. In his play, Sophocles painfually explores the discrepancy between the gods' knowledge and power and that of man. Sophocles' portrayal of Oedipus reveals the dramatist's profound agitation over the fact that man, both despite his efforts and because of his efforts, has "no test for truth, no measure his wit can devise" to plumb the demands and the meaning of divine knowledge and power; man is caught in the dilemma of the discrepancy between the gods who rule and man who must follow the unarticulated divine rules. Though in Sophocles' drama the gods always prevail, man must nevertheless make his effort, wrong-headed, misdirected, inadequate though it may be, to fathom the divine rules. Sophocles utters through his chorus a code of behavior which is man's nearest hope of approximating the gods' requirements; but Sophocles seems always aware that this code is only a supposed approximation, that man can never be sure as long as he acts as a man. As Hardin Craig explains in his article, "A Shackling of Accidents," classical Greek tragedy viewed "human calamity" as "an irresistible and sometimes inexplicable manifestation of divine order. There is nothing to be done about it. Calamity must be accepted as the will of the gods delivered through the agency of fate." For the classical Greek tragedian, there was no special code which offered man a certain means of averting calamity; man had to depend upon his own strength of character and the hope of living the life of reason, and, by so doing, says Craig, "man might
come out a victor in the struggle." 7 C. M. Bowra in Landmarks in Greek Literature expresses basically the same idea when speaking specifically about Sophocles; he states that "one of the chief characteristics of Sophoclean tragedy is that it emphasizes the gap between human and divine judgments, and from this draws much of its mystery and strength. [Sophocles] writes throughout in the conviction that the laws of the gods are not the same as the laws of men, and what may seem right enough to men may be utterly wrong for the gods." Bowra explains that Sophocles' attitude toward the gods was "a mood of unquestioning awe and respect," for it was "not for men to criticize [the gods], or even to hope to understand them." 8

In contrast to Sophocles, Ford does not seem to reveal the same kind of agony over the human condition or the same attitude toward the divine. Ford, like Sophocles, recognizes the discrepancy between human and divine; further, he, like Sophocles, seems earnestly concerned that man recognize this discrepancy and, consequently, follow a prescribed code of behavior. Nevertheless, in contrast to Sophocles, Ford does not seem uneasy about the effectiveness of his code; Ford does not, as Sophocles tentatively does through his chorus, offer his recommended pattern of behavior as the possibility of a hope that man can reconcile


his human ways with divine requirements. On the contrary, Ford seems to assert his code as the one way of achieving the necessary reconciliation. In fact, Ford seems to speak with the authority of the strict Christian who believes that he is repeating commandments. Whereas Sophocles evidences distress over recognition that man's painful predicament is born of the fact that man cannot be absolutely certain the proposed code is precisely the right answer, Ford evidences distress over the recognition that man too often obstinately refuses to follow the incontestably efficacious code. Both Sophocles and Ford reveal sympathy for their characters, but the sympathy of each springs from different sources. Sophocles' sympathy for Oedipus seems to come from Sophocles' belief that Oedipus, being man, cannot transcend his human limitations and bridge the gap between divine and human. On the other hand, Ford's sympathy for Penthea, Calantha, Orgilus and Ithocles, Friar Bonaventura, and Giovanni proceeds from his recognition that the way of the code is exactingly difficult and these characters do not fully comply; he reserves the most sympathy for Annabella who does recognize the exacting requirements of the code, complies with them, and who, therefore, transcends her human limitations by contritely acknowledging them and by committing herself to the demands of the code. The overall contrast between the two dramatists' presentations seems to stem from the difference in a classical Greek and in a seventeenth-century Christian point of view. In his plays Ford speaks with a surer sense
of unquestionable authority as a result of the Christian doctrines of repentance and salvation. The final moral confusion in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore seems to be Ford's angry acknowledgment that the world in general, at least as that world is represented in 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, persists in ignoring the Christian obvious.

At the end of both The Broken Heart and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore Ford seems to be saying, as W. H. Auden would say at the end of a Christian tragedy, "What a pity it had to be this way when it might have been otherwise." The difference in this final comment at the end of each play would be in Ford's tone; at the end of The Broken Heart his tone is regretfully sad, yet hopeful; but at the end of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore his tone is angry and even anxious. Neither the sadness of the first nor the anger of the second proceeds from Ford's doubt regarding the moral strength of his code; both result from his concern over whether or not the lesson of his plays will be heard and his moral precepts heeded by his audience.

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