2003

Regimes, institutions and foreign policy change

David Baker Huxsoll

Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation

https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/2377

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
REGIMES, INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by

David B. Huxsoll
B.S., West Virginia University, 1991
M.A., West Virginia University, 1993
May 2003
I wish to acknowledge the assistance and support of my entire dissertation
committee; Dr. Erik Gartzke, for his valued assistance in the use of his data; and the
leadership of the 22nd Air Refueling Wing, McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, for
permitting the extended leave necessary to complete this work.

This dissertation is dedicated to my entire family, especially my wife, Julie, and
children, Caroline and Samuel, in whose future this work is invested.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................. ii

ABSTRACT .............................................................. vi

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 1

CHAPTER 2. COMPARATIVE FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE .................. 4
  The Development of Comparative Foreign Policy: Antecedents .......... 5
  The Development of Comparative Foreign Policy ............................. 6
  Comparative Foreign Policy Approaches ..................................... 9
  Comparative Foreign Policy Methods and Events Data .................. 10
  Re-Evaluation ......................................................................... 11
  The Question of Foreign Policy Change .................................... 15
  Why Study Foreign Policy Change? .......................................... 16
  Foreign Policy Change: A ‘Neglected Phenomenon’ ....................... 18
  The Development of Foreign Policy Change ................................. 20
  The Dissertation: Contributions to the Study of Foreign Policy Change..... 30

CHAPTER 3. REGIME TYPE AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE .......... 35
  Introduction ................................................................................. 35
  Approaches to Foreign Policy Change ........................................... 36
  Regimes ..................................................................................... 37
  Democratic Regimes and Non-Democratic Regimes ....................... 38
  Regime Effects in the Literature .................................................. 39
  Structural Constraints in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes 43
  Political Constraints in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes 47
  The Nature of Opposition in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes 53
  Audience Costs in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes 60
  ‘Two-Level Games’ and Prospects for Foreign Policy Change .......... 62
  The Nature of Legitimacy in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes 65
  The Nature of the Public in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes 70
  The Nature of Organized Interests in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes 74
  Summary ................................................................................. 78
CHAPTER 4. INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE ............80
Below the Regime Surface ..........................................................80
Presidential and Parliamentary Systems ......................................81
Contextual Approaches ..............................................................92
Presidentialism and Divided Government ....................................94
Presidentialism and Multipartism ..............................................98
Parliamentary Democracy: Single-Party Governments and Coalition Governments ...........................................101
Coalition Governments and the Number of Parties in Parliament ....106
Non-Democracies and Military Governments ............................108
Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries .........................111
Leadership Change and Foreign Policy Change .........................113

CHAPTER 5. METHODS AND ANALYSIS .................................116
Data: The Dependent Variables .................................................116
Events Data .............................................................................116
United Nations Voting ...............................................................120
United Nations General Assembly Affinity Scores .......................122
Important Votes in the United Nations General Assembly ..........125
Independent Variable: Democracy/Non-Democracy ....................127
Independent Variable: Presidential/Parliamentary Democracy .......130
Independent Variable: Divided Government ...............................131
Independent Variable: Multi-Party Systems ................................131
Independent Variable: Coalition Government ............................132
Independent Variable: Military Government ..............................132
Independent Variable: Less Developed Countries .......................133
Independent Variable: Leadership Change .................................135
Description of Data .................................................................135
Control Variables .................................................................136
Control Variable: National Capabilities ....................................136
Control Variable: Coups d’Etat ...............................................137
Control Variable: Wealth .........................................................138
Control Variable: Alliance ......................................................138
Control Variable: U.S. Economic Assistance ............................139
Control Variables: Polity and Polity Differences .........................140
Control Variable: Cold War .....................................................141
Methodology ............................................................................142
Hypothesis 1: Democracy and Non-Democracy .......................145
Hypothesis 2: Presidential and Parliamentary Democracies ...........153
Hypothesis 3: Presidentialism and Divided Government ...............156
Hypothesis 4: Presidentialism and Multipartism .........................158
Hypothesis 5: Coalition Government .......................................160
Hypothesis 6: Effective Number of Parties and Coalition Parliamentary Government .............................................163
ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the effects that different political regime types and institutional arrangements have on the amount of foreign policy change occurring a state. Scholars in International Relations studying the democratic peace have identified a relationship between characteristics of democracy and non-democracy and the behavior of states. Scholars in Comparative Politics have noted that certain institutions more easily facilitate policy change. This dissertation synthesizes these perspectives and develops and tests a number of hypotheses relating regime type, institutional arrangement, and party system to the amount of foreign policy change a state undertakes. Employing a pooled, cross-sectional time series design, the findings show that democracies are more stable in their foreign policies than are non-democracies, and that states with different political institutions and party systems differ with regard to the amount of foreign policy change they undertake.
Beginning in the 1980s, scholars of foreign policy began to examine what was called "a neglected phenomenon" in foreign policy – the study of foreign policy change. Real-world events and attempts to improve the development of theory led scholars to address questions of when, why and how states restructure and reorient their foreign policies. The study of foreign policy change is an important endeavor. Significant foreign policy changes can be disruptive to the international system, with ramifications felt throughout the world. The study of foreign policy change also provides unique opportunities to examine the dynamics of the foreign policy decision-making process and those factors that influence and constrain it.

The bulk of scholarly work in the area of foreign policy change has consisted largely of theoretical frameworks, single case studies, or studies of particular groups of countries. Notably lacking are major empirical studies that cast explanatory variables across time and space, providing results that can be generalized across multiple cases. The purpose of this dissertation is to test empirically a series of variables that have previously been largely ignored in the study of foreign policy change and to do so in a way that produces generalizable results.

Specifically, this dissertation will test the effects that different regime types and institutional arrangements have on the amount of foreign policy change a state will undertake. While the concept of regime has received extensive treatment in recent years throughout the international relations literature, it has yet to be applied in any meaningful way to a study of foreign policy change. Scholars have explored the
various factors that contribute to regime change (Gasiorowski, 1995) as well as the effects that regimes changes have on the international environment (Maoz, 1996). The concept of regime is central to ongoing debates on the democratic peace. During the Clinton years, the pursuit, support and sustainment of democracy became enshrined in U.S. foreign policy with the goal of reducing the threat of hostilities between nations throughout the world (see Lake, 1993). Despite all these activities, when studying the factors that might influence foreign policy change, the significant role that regime settings may play has received little attention. This dissertation will apply regime setting as an explanatory variable and examine how regime types influence foreign policy change.

Another set of explanatory variables for this dissertation will be developed by incorporating ideas found in the comparative politics literature regarding institutions and the different outcomes they produce. This topic was pursued with renewed interest as the "third wave" of democratization swept the world in the 1970s and 1980s (Huntington, 1991). The international relations literature, however, has been slow to keep pace. Only very recently have scholars begun to look below the level of the two major regime types to examine the influence that the myriad of institutional arrangements available might have on conflict behavior and foreign policy. This dissertation will develop a number of hypotheses about the role institutional arrangements and party systems have on foreign policy change.

The next chapter of this dissertation provides an overview of the development of comparative foreign policy and the study of foreign policy change. It will also specify where this dissertation fits in the foreign policy change literature, as well as
how it will contribute to the field and foster a better understanding of foreign policy change.

The third chapter will develop the hypothesis regarding regimes and foreign policy change. With insights from the literature, the chapter will explain how different regime types can create both constraints and incentives for foreign policy change, and will specify how the different regimes might differently impact a decisionmaker’s ability and willingness to undertake foreign policy change.

The fourth chapter develops the remaining hypotheses in this dissertation with theoretical explanations regarding the ways in which different institutional arrangements create incentives and disincentives for foreign policy change. Specifically, this chapter will address presidential and parliamentary systems, the different party systems found therein, the makeup of governments, as well as differences in certain types of non-democratic regimes and the influence that underdevelopment might have on a state's foreign policy stability.

The fifth chapter will operationalize each of the variables and methodologically test each of the hypotheses using a pooled, cross-sectional time series design. The sixth chapter will provide a discussion of the findings and conclusions.
CHAPTER 2
COMPARATIVE FOREIGN POLICY AND
THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

The purpose of this dissertation is to develop and test a series of hypotheses related to how regimes and institutions – which guide state-society relations, political arrangements and decisionmaking in states – constrain and influence a policymaker's ability to undertake foreign policy change by comparing and contrasting democracies, non-democracies and host of other institutional arrangements and how they impact foreign policy change. The questions raised in this dissertation fall within a subfield of international relations known as "comparative foreign policy" or "foreign policy analysis." Developed in the 1960s, comparative foreign policy arose as a reaction against more "traditional" methods of study, and sought to develop theories of foreign policy at multiple levels of analysis and explanation. Within the subfield, this dissertation addresses questions of foreign policy change, which emerged as a topic of inquiry in the 1980s. Scholars addressing foreign policy change are specifically interested in cases where states change their foreign policies from a previous position — how it occurs, when it occurs and what factors serve to influence it. This chapter provides an overview of the development of comparative foreign policy and foreign policy change as a research question. It also identifies areas where this dissertation will build upon and improve upon other works, incorporate important explanatory variables into the debate, and contribute significantly to a better understanding of foreign policy change.
The Development of Comparative Foreign Policy: Antecedents

Although the study, evaluation and analysis of foreign policy is as old as the study of politics itself, a coherent and focused effort to study foreign policy comparatively is relatively new, developed by a fairly small number of scholars working in the 1960s. Commonly identified as “the comparative study of foreign policy,” “comparative foreign policy” or “foreign policy analysis,” the approach emerged as a challenge to the prevailing methodological practices and theoretical assumptions of the day. Methodologically, these scholars were challenging a “traditionalist” approach to the study of international relations and foreign policy, which was skeptical of efforts to predict or apply probability analysis to human affairs. Instead, traditionalists applied “judgment, intuition and insight in arriving at their conclusions” after subjectively examining and interpreting the evidence. Traditionalists saw no need to quantify their findings and instead focused on single events or problems that they used to understand “the subtlety of detail” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990: 29).

Theoretically, scholars of comparative foreign policy came to challenge many of the assumptions central to the realist paradigm (see Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 1973). Realists argue that the international system is characterized by a “struggle for power,” where states pursue power as a means to ensure their safety and survival. Since all states operate in the same anarchical international system, realists argue that all states will pursue their foreign policies in essentially the same way – with national security as the paramount goal. Realists assume that decisionmakers, as rational actors, consciously follow a goal-oriented process by which they evaluate all available
information about an international event before choosing the best alternative that will maximize their goals.

Realists characterize states as unitary actors – “billiard balls” that all collide and interact with each other in exactly the same way. Foreign policy decisions are made in a “black box,” in that sources of foreign policy decisions are seen as external. Other factors, such as economics, political systems, size, and individual leadership characteristics are not regarded as an important influence. Though the tenets of realism can be traced back more than two thousand years, the theory’s emphasis on self-reliance, military might, the balance of power, and the pursuit of the national interest gained a strong following among scholars and practitioners following World War II. While the comparative study of foreign policy and the realist paradigm are not necessarily mutually exclusive, comparative foreign policy, almost by definition, challenged some key assumptions of realism—primarily, that foreign policy decisions are made by rational actors behaving in the national security interests of the state, that states are unitary actors, and that the emphasis on power accumulation is a primary foreign policy goal.

**The Development of Comparative Foreign Policy**

Surveys of comparative foreign policy generally identify the work of Richard Snyder and his associates as being the first major effort to theorize about foreign policy in a scientific matter (see Hermann and Peacock, 1987; Gerner, 1995; Hudson and Vore, 1995). Contrary to the assumptions of realism, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin held that sources of foreign policy could be found in individual decisionmakers and the context in which they operated:
We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis, yet we have discarded the state as a metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizing decisionmaking as a central focus we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society. Decisionmakers are viewed as operating in a dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decisionmakers (Snyder, et. al., 1954: 53).

Central to their approach was a decisionmaker’s “definition of the situation,” which results from a number of factors, including the competence of actors in the decision-making unit, the flow of communication among members, their individual motivations, personal attributes, values, and perceptions. While the Snyder framework did not lead to any real substantive scholarly works, it was an important contribution in that it challenged political scientists to begin looking at the decision-making process itself to explain foreign policy. Comparative foreign policy, however, did not gain momentum as a distinct discipline until more than a decade later.

The individual generally credited with launching the field of comparative foreign policy is James N. Rosenau. Though he was not the first to advocate a scientific or comparative approach to the study of foreign policy, his work in the mid to late 1960s was the first “self-conscious appeal” to develop coherent, comprehensive generalizations on which to build testable hypotheses. He decried the lack of general theory in the area of foreign policy. While great strides had been made in “inventoried determinants of external behavior,” the field had “not even begun to take shape as a theoretical enterprise” (Rosenau, 1980:119):

To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To uncover processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain
circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or indicate the conditions under which one predominates the other. (ibid.: 118).

Ronsenau charged that work in the field was largely non-theoretical, non-comparable, and non-cumulative, consisting of an abundance of frameworks; studies into the behavior of a specific country at a specific time; or “partial,” non-comparable, non-cumulative theories that focused exclusively on single sources of foreign policy behavior. In response, Rosenau aggressively championed the building of general theory in foreign policy through the development of “if-then hypotheses” that would enable scholars to determine under what conditions different sources of foreign policy influence the process. This, he hoped, would lead to cumulative, comparable research that would advance the study of foreign policy beyond that of simple diplomatic histories – and into a true science of foreign policy.

Rosenau laid the groundwork for this theory building through his "pre-theory" of foreign policy. This framework sought to provide direction for the comparative study of foreign policy by grouping all possible foreign policy source variables into one of five manageable variable clusters, and assessing the "relative potencies" of each of the variable clusters according to the conditions under which each would most likely contribute to foreign policy behavior.

Through this, and other subsequent pieces (particularly his 1968 “fad, fantasy, or field” article), Rosenau made the case that launched the comparative study of foreign policy as a distinct field of inquiry. Rosenau sought to make the study of foreign policy into a true science and more methodologically rigorous by analyzing
the phenomenon “in terms of independent, intervening, and dependent variables that are operational and manipulable” (Rosenau, 1975: 109).

**Comparative Foreign Policy Approaches**

The scholars who responded to this call for a more scientific study of foreign policy are frequently referred to as the “first generation” of comparative foreign policy scholars. They shared a commitment to the study of foreign policy that contained two central features that helped establish and shape their early research agendas — a commitment to the study of foreign policy phenomenon “as the object of inquiry,” and a commitment to the use of comparative methods (Hermann and Peacock, 1987).

For first generation scholars, “foreign policy behavior” was itself the primary object of inquiry. Early attempts to code and quantify foreign policy behavior, such as the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project, sought to shift the focus from foreign policy as a goal-seeking policy – and toward the more limited but observable concept of foreign policy behavior, defined as “discrete purposeful action that results from the political level decision of an individual or group of individuals” (Hermann, 1978:34). Behaviors were characterized as the “observable artifacts” of a political decision, with a specific location in time and space and with a defined beginning and end. By focusing on behaviors rather than the decisions themselves, researchers were free to conceptualize and explore foreign policy in new ways. Foreign policy truly became a “variable” in that researchers could assemble, operationalize and organize it in different ways. Foreign policy could assume different values, as both a dependent and independent variable (Hermann 1978).
Comparative Foreign Policy Methods and Events Data

The shared commitment to the use of comparative methods entailed three related aspects: a commitment to multi-nation comparisons (as opposed to simple case studies); a commitment to a comparative methodology (systematic comparison of similar variables); and the use of scientific methods (Hermann and Peacock: 1987). Scholars looked at variables that were assumed to exist to a greater or lesser degree in every political system and made comparisons about the degree to which relationships and variables influenced outcomes. These commitments combined with a focus on foreign policy behavior helped fuel the growth of events data collection and application in research. Events data refer to discrete foreign policy acts that can be coded comprehensively. To foreign policy scholars, events became analogous to “the vote” for behavioralist scholars of American politics, allowing them to “classify the entire range of national foreign policy actions in order to allow reliable comparisons between nations” (Hermann, 1975: 145) across time and space. A number of extensive data sets were developed beginning in the 1970s with significant funding from the United States government. Many are still widely used today to address specific foreign policy questions – as is the case in this dissertation.

Early events data collection projects included Rudolph J. Rummel’s (1976) *Dimensionality of Nations (DON)*, which tabulated domestic and conflict variables used to examine the relationship between domestic conflict and foreign conflict behavior. Charles McClelland’s (1971) *World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS)* captured hostile or cooperative action directed by one country toward another. The *Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON)* project at Ohio State
University collected data on different policy positions of states to examine the relationships between state attributes and types of foreign policy. Singer and Small’s (1972) *Correlates of War (COW)* data set was event-specific, consisting of data complied on the frequency, severity and intensity of international wars back to 1816. This data set remains in widespread use today by scholars studying issues related to the democratic peace.

Edward Azar’s *Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB)* (Azar and Sloan, 1975) classifies foreign policy events according to conflict and cooperation on a 15-point weighted scale. This data set has been used as a measure to conceptualize foreign policy change, and it will be employed as one of the dependent variables in this dissertation. The ease and availability of events data helped fuel the growth of comparative foreign policy research and theory building. McGowan and Shapiro’s (1973) survey of the field found that comparative foreign policy publications in 1972 were more than double that of five years earlier and more than 14 times that of ten years earlier.

**Re-Evaluation**

These developments fueled a great deal of optimism on the part of many comparative foreign policy practitioners. Rosenau noted less than 10 years after his “pretheories” article:

> Descriptions have been supplemented by analyses, implicit assumptions have given way to explicit propositions, unrelated examples have been replaced by recurring patterns, and noncomparable case studies have been complemented by careful replications (Rosenau, 1975: 31).
In fact, by 1975, Rosenau declared that the field had already reached the status of a Kuhnian “normal science,” in that there was a methodological and philosophical consensus among practitioners to such a degree that their research merely “elaborated and refined” that of one another. Events data and the comparative method formed the basis for the consensus, and what remained was merely “mopping up operations” (Rosenau, 1975; 1976; McGowan, 1976).

At the same time, however, a sizable group of scholars were expressing dissatisfaction with the direction of the field, disappointment with its inability to achieve its grandiose goals, and doubts about its viability as a separate field altogether. Sources of this dissatisfaction were rooted in the ways most comparative foreign policy scholars conceptualized their inquiry – as “neopositivist inductionism,” and as a Kuhnian normal science (Hudson and Vore, 1995).

While few scholars held a strict interpretation of neopositivism, one aspect of it that was reflected in the philosophies of many of them was that of a “building block”—that empirical findings would build one upon another until enough findings “could be fitted together into a general or grand theory that would explain the multiple sources of, variations in, and implications of foreign policy” (Neack, Hey and Haney, 1995:4). While early comparative foreign policy literature did lead to some well-established generalizations about foreign policy behavior, none of them, using a model of cumulation, had been integrated into broader theory. In terms of a “normal science,” while many aspects of comparative foreign policy were “Kuhnian” in terms of methodological commitments, the field lacked the Kuhnian notion of a set of shared theoretical commitments.
The period of critical evaluation for comparative foreign policy began in the mid 1970s and continued into the mid 1980s, beginning at conferences hosted by the Inter-University Comparative Foreign Policy (ICFP) project. The project was established to assess contributions to the growth of cumulative science, and many at the conference did express generally optimistic views of the field’s progress and future (Powell, Andrus, Purkitt and Knight, 1976; Kegley and Skinner, 1976). Others, however, were more critical, charging that the field never exhibited any “uniform, sustained, selective cumulation” (Ashley, 1976:155), and that it was being weakened by its division from international studies, which discouraged the synthesis of national and systemic variables and cross-level theorizing (Munton, 1976).

Scholars came to realize that “to evolve further, comparative foreign policy needed to jettison (1) the aim of a unified theory and (2) the methodological straightjacket imposed by the requirements of aggregate empirical analysis” (Hudson and Vore, 1995:221); and find ways to address issues that had long been ignored. At a 1985 conference on New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, comparative foreign policy scholars met to reach a consensus on the new direction the field should take. What emerged was a renewed commitment to continue comparative analysis, but without the constraints of being wedded to a single model or quantitative methodology. Instead, the scholars agreed to establish and pursue a more diverse approach that incorporates different levels of analysis, perspectives and approaches. This approach has come to characterize what has been called the second generation of comparative foreign policy, commonly identified as “foreign policy analysis” (Neack, Hey and Haney, 1995).
The second generation of comparative foreign policy is distinguished from the first not only in terms of a second generation of scholars in the field, but also a second generation of scholarship. Second generation scholarship builds on the work of the previous generation, but incorporates more diverse approaches to the topic. These approaches include: the employment of a wide variety of methodologies with diverse quantitative and qualitative techniques; drawing on numerous theoretical perspectives from across the social sciences, especially comparativists and area specialists; rejecting simple connections and associations, and considering multi-causal explanations at multiple levels of analysis; rejecting the need for a “paradigmatic core” and central methodology; and an attempt to link research to substantive concerns of foreign policy (Neack, Hey and Haney, 1995; Hudson and Vore, 1995).

The dividing line between first- and second-generation scholarship and scholars is not solid. In fact, the field itself today is not so narrowly defined. Foreign policy analysis reflects a wide area of scholarship with a common dedication to understanding foreign policy through a wide array of approaches and perspectives. Foreign policy analysis today is seen to be making progress as a “bridging field” linking international relations theory, comparative politics and the foreign policy making community (Hudson and Vore, 1995: 228). Country and area experts are now taking a more active role in refining and testing theories developed by foreign policy analysts, and can provide valuable insight into the characteristics of leaders, bureaucratic politics, the role of legislative bodies and the influence of pressure groups. This dissertation, for example, builds heavily on the contributions of comparativists studying the role of institutions to develop hypotheses about how
different regimes, political systems and institutional arrangements place different constraints on, and create different incentives for, decisionmakers to undertake foreign policy changes.

Current approaches to foreign policy analysis also provide hope that research may bridge the gap between academia and practitioners of foreign policy. As Alexander George notes:

Practitioners find it difficult to make use of academic approaches such as structural realists theory and game theory, which assume that all state actors are alike and can be expected to behave in the same way in given situations, and which rest on the simple, uncomplicated assumption that states can be regarded as rational unitary actors. On the contrary, practitioners believe they need to work with actor-specific models that grasp the different internal structures and behavioral patterns of each state and leader with which they must deal (George, 1993:9).

The Question of Foreign Policy Change

Current trends in foreign policy analysis – with its emphasis on diverse methodological techniques, broad theoretical perspectives, integrating approaches, multiple levels of analysis and multi-causal explanations, and desire to be more “policy relevant” is reflected in today’s approaches to the question of foreign policy change.

State’s foreign policies are forever changing to some degree, and as long as scholars have been studying foreign policy outcomes, change has been an element. The study of change itself as a distinct subject of inquiry, however, is relatively new, emerging in the 1970s amidst the re-evaluations ongoing in comparative foreign policy. In fact, Rosenau himself first surfaced the issue, suggesting that one area in which comparative foreign policy research might prove fruitful is “if the concept of
change were fashioned into an operational dependent variable” (Rosenau, 1976b: 371).

Rosenau believed that developing a concept of change into an operational dependent variable would further develop comparative foreign policy as a field and would spark the “innovative theorizing” that was lacking in the field. Focusing on those points where old patterns were broken and new ones developed would focus attention on genuine “puzzles,” and by exploring these questions, scholars would be forced to become more creative in their theory building. Rosenau also believed that it would force scholars to build longitudinal variable into their models – something he believed necessary for good theory building.

**Why Study Foreign Policy Change?**

There are a number of important reasons to study foreign policy change. First, foreign policy changes are often not only surprising, but disruptive. Events such as Sadat’s dismissal of the Soviets and rapprochement with the West and the rising assertiveness in the foreign policies of a number of Third World countries were in part what triggered an interest in foreign policy change among scholars. Any foreign policy change, particularly significant changes, can have a profound effect on the regional and international system. “Relations between nations are established and progress based on what is understood to be patterned behavior. When those patterns are broken, interrupted, or reversed, the effects can be felt throughout the system, generating greater conflict and uncertainty between states most affected by major changes in the status quo” (Volgy and Schwartz, 1994: 24). This can be especially true when foreign policy change conflicts with important interests of a dominant
power, exacerbating international tensions and often resulting in “coercive, punitive and violent responses” (Holsti, 1982). Even more mild changes and shifts have profound effects, especially among great powers where, “the question of change and stability in foreign policy is vital for peace and security” (Goldmann, 1988: vx).

Second, the study of foreign policy change can contribute to a broader understanding of foreign policy and international relations by fostering a richer theoretical focus on foreign policy studies. By focusing study on foreign policy change itself, scholars offer an important contribution by focusing squarely on what Hermann (1978) called “that which is to be explained” – the dependent variable of foreign policy. Unlike many other works in foreign policy analysis that seek to develop theories based on particular sources of foreign policy, here, foreign policy itself is the center of analysis (Hagan and Rosati, 1994).

Third, because the study of foreign policy change is "less abstract theoretically and substantively more meaningful," than other foreign policy approaches, the study of change can further develop foreign policy analysis by generating empirical studies at the macro, middle-range and micro levels of specificity (Hagan and Rosati, 1994). Fourth, the study of foreign policy change offers opportunities to incorporate multiple perspectives, thereby synthesizing and integrating approaches to a much greater degree than other studies in foreign policy analysis. A common approach, for example, is to model the policy-making process as an intervening variable acted upon by a myriad of other domestic and international phenomenon, blurring the traditional distinction between internal and external sources of foreign policy (ibid.).
Fifth, foreign policy change can provide important insights into core issues between the field of international relations and foreign policy analysis – specifically, the structural approach of neorealism. This perspective (see Waltz, 1979) emphasizes how prevailing global structures constrain foreign policy options for decisionmakers, seeing foreign policy change as more “evolutionary.” Thus, neorealists would argue, change would only occur when there are changes in the global structure and rational government actors adapt their foreign policies in response to those new realities. The study of foreign policy change challenges this notion and may provide a synthesis of these two previously antagonistic perspectives.

David Skidmore’s (1994) work in this area is one example. He explains a state’s ability to adjust its foreign policy to changes in the international environment as a function of international and domestic constraints. He posits that realist theory best explains policy change in states that have modest power abroad but are institutionally strong at home; while an institutional approach, looking more at domestic factors, best explains foreign policy change in states that are strong at abroad, but weak at home.

**Foreign Policy Change: A ‘Neglected Phenomenon’**

Despite compelling reasons for the study of foreign policy change, it remained, for many years in the words of K.J. Holsti, “a neglected phenomenon” in the study of foreign policy:

An aspect of foreign policy that has received little attention in the theoretical literature...(is) foreign policy change. A review of current writings reveals that the sources of foreign policy...have received more attention than actually policies...and even where policy is reviewed, rather static pictures emerge; continuity of the major powers’ foreign policy orientation seems to be the norm (Holsti, 1982: ix).
Similarly, Rosenau observed:

In our search for recurring patterns – for constancies in the external behavior of nations – we tend to treat breaks in patterns as exceptions, as nuances which complicate our tasks. Yet it is precisely the point at which a trend veers off sharply in a new direction that the interaction of key variables is most fully exposed. Patterns do not change except when the value of one or more variables is altered or when…processes that are normally independent become intertwined…changed behavior provides an especially useful occasion for observing the interplay of the factors that shape foreign policy (1976b: 371-372).

A number of reasons have been given for this neglect. First, foreign policy analysis is a young field, and “the development of any science naturally proceeds from analyzing order to analyzing change (Rosati, et. al., 1994: 5).” As Gilpin observed, “until the statics of a field of inquiry are sufficiently well developed and one has a good grasp of repetitive processes and recurrent phenomena, it is difficult if not impossible to proceed to the study of dynamics (Gilpin, 1981:4).” A second reason was the rise of behavioralism and the search for “middle range theories.” This resulted in “a proliferation of research into more narrow questions and microphenomena, analysis not conducive to the broader study of foreign policy change” (Rosati, et. al., 1994: 6)

A third explanation was western bias. Gilpin observed that the dominance of American scholarship since World War II led to a field that was “parochial and ethnocentric,” focusing primarily on the western state system of the postwar era. In the study of foreign policy, this led to a preoccupation with explaining Cold War policies of the great powers (Gilpin, 1984). Holsti (1982) charges that this narrow
focus contributed to the inattention given to foreign policy changes that were occurring elsewhere in the world.

Another reason identified for the inattention to foreign policy change was the general “conservative bias” of western academic scholarship. Gilpin observed “social scientists have a preference for stability or at least a preference for orderly change” (Gilpin, 1984: 6). Rosati states that because the comparative study foreign policy was developed at the height of the Cold War, there was a natural emphasis on the role of government decisionmaking in U.S. foreign policy – at a time when the “high” politics of national security was dominant, and a true consensus existed among decisionmakers and the public.

The Development of Foreign Policy Change

The study of foreign policy change remains today a relatively young field. It was not until the 1980s that change, as a concept and subject of study, began to receive attention. The publication of several frameworks throughout the decade helped shape the way scholars began to conceptualize foreign policy change, its sources, and processes. While these frameworks did not receive widespread application in the literature, they did provide important insights into how scholars should think about change.

In Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World. K.J. Holsti pursues a specific type of foreign policy change – restructuring – “the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations” (Holsti, 1982:ix). This differs from “normal foreign policy change, which is usually slow, incremental and typified by low linkages between [geographic and functional]
sectors.” (ibid.: 2). Instead, restructuring “usually takes place more quickly, expresses an intent for fundamental change, is non-incremental and usually involves the conscious linking of different sectors.” Reorientation, according to his definition, refers to the intention of foreign policy decision makers to restructure their state’s foreign policy.

Holsti distinguishes reorientation and restructuring on the basis of significant changes in: (1) the levels of external involvement, (2) policies regarding types and sources of external penetration, (3) the direction of the external involvement, and (4) military or diplomatic commitments. Based on these characteristics, he develops four ideal types of foreign policy: isolation, dependence, self-reliance and non-alignment/diversification.

Using these four types of foreign policy, Holsti establishes 12 possible ideal types of foreign policy restructuring, as states move from one of the four foreign policy types to another. Holsti and the authors in his volume use case studies of an eclectic group of states, examining a variety of external, domestic, historical, cultural variables, as well as the policy-making process to try to explain why foreign policy restructuring occurs. In his conclusion, Holsti states that he is unable to explain why some states will undergo foreign policy restructuring while other states, facing a similar set of circumstances, do not. However, he does note that:

certain conditions, particularly dependence, vulnerability, perceptions of weakness and massive and external penetration, predispose some governments to restructure their foreign policies and that sometimes the major residues of dependence and independence are seen as threats which, in turn, compel governments to build moats and create more ‘distance’ between themselves and their mentors (Holsti, 1989: 199).
Non-military threats, such as perceived economic and cultural threats, were found to play a large role in foreign policy restructuring. Fears of economic control by a more powerful neighbor and fear of a “foreigner” also were found to play a role. Holsti also concludes that foreign policy reorientation will often occur without subsequent foreign policy restructuring, as the leaders express a goal of significantly altering their policies but find the costs and realities associated with it difficult to overcome.

Holsti’s work is significant because it represents the first major application of a systematic study of foreign policy change. It also offers important insight into how the perceptions of leaders in developing states might lead them to undertake foreign policy change. Elements of this notion will be introduced into the dissertation, to distinguish differences in the extent to which developed and less developed states change their foreign policies.

Kjell Goldmann’s (1988) *Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: The Problems and Possibilities of Détente* specifically addresses the “tension” in international politics whereby states face pressures to change policies from the past (through changing conditions in the environment, learning, and domestic political changes that produce new leaders with new ideas), yet there remains a strong tendency to stick to the policies of the past. The “unresolved issue in foreign policy theory,” he states, is to establish “what factors determine whether, when, and to what extent pressure for change in a policy will in fact produce change” (Goldmann, 1988: 3). Goldmann specifically looks at how “stabilizers” intervene with sources of foreign policy change and the decision-making process. “A source of policy change is an
event tending to start a process of policy change. A stabilizer is a variable affecting the likelihood that such an event will set a process of change in motion and/or the extent to which a process of change will be completed and produce a change in policy” (ibid.: 4).

Stabilizers determine whether or not inputs from sources of foreign policy change actually set a process of policy change in motion. Stabilizers reduce the sensitivity by blocking foreign policy change, reducing the scope of change, or delaying change. Goldmann lays out an inventory of thirteen international, cognitive, political and administrative stabilizers that affect the sensitivity of decisionmakers to their environment, the availability of alternatives and the costs of change.

While Goldmann readily admits there are limitations to testing all of the variables outlined in his sketch, he offers them as a basis on which others can build theory. Goldmann’s assumption that “in the absence of stabilizers, policies are highly sensitive” (ibid.: 16) to sources of foreign policy change is a theme of this dissertation.

In Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy, Charles Hermann proposes a scheme for “interpreting decisions in which a government decides to change policy direction” (Hermann, 1990: 3). Specifically, his interest is in those cases that mark a major reversal or redirection in policy. He identifies four graduated levels of foreign policy change: adjustment changes (changes in the level and scope of recipients); program changes (qualitative changes in the methods and means); problem/goal changes (where the initial problem or goal is replaced or forfeited, purposes replaced); and international orientation changes (the redirection of a country’s entire orientation toward world affairs, a simultaneous shift
in all international roles and activities). The escalation of American involvement in Vietnam, followed by its extrication, is provided as an example illustrating all four levels of graduate change. Hermann also outlines four agents of major foreign policy change – *leader driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring* and *external shock*.

Leader driven change “results from the determined efforts of an authoritarian policymaker…who imposes his own vision of the basic redirection necessary in foreign policy” (ibid.:11). This Hermann says, requires the leader to have the conviction, power and energy necessary to compel the change. Under bureaucratic advocacy, a group or organization within government that has access to top officials becomes the agent of change. Hermann suggests that individuals in the middle levels of government often have the knowledge to recognize when a policy is not working, as well as the expertise to overcome resistance. Under domestic restructuring, the agent of change comes from outside the government structure and is defined as “the politically relevant segment of the society whose support the regime needs to govern” (Hermann, 1990: 12). Change can come from shifting elite demographics, shifting worldviews, or both. External shocks are the result of dramatic international events that have an immediate impact and cannot be ignored.

The essence of Hermann’s model is the decision-making process as an intervening variable between these agents of foreign policy change and the four graduated levels of change. To effect change, agents must act on the decision-making process, which can either facilitate or obstruct change at any stage of the decision-making process. Of the major frameworks outlined here, Hermann’s is the only one to
receive any real application in the literature. Bengt Sundelius (1994) applies Hermann's model to the case of Sweden when it broke its longstanding no-alliance, neutrality doctrine and joined the European Community in 1990. He finds that this policy move constituted what Hermann called a policy/goal change, which constitutes a policy restructuring. Sundelius identifies domestic restructuring and external shock as the two change agents that acted upon the decision-making process leading to the change.

Other recent new works have sought to build upon these frameworks to develop new models of foreign policy change. Gustavsson (1998; 1999) incorporates elements of Hermann's model in his three-stage process of foreign policy change. Domestic and international sources of change are mediated by decision makers who in turn act upon the decision-making process to bring about one of the four types of policy change identified by Hermann. Individual decision makers must perceive sources of change that trigger alterations in their beliefs for them to impact foreign policy change. Like Sundelius, he applies his model to the Swedish decision to join the European Community. He posits that the end of the Cold War and a deep recession (external shocks) caused Sweden's prime minister, an advocate of EC membership, to seize the opportunity. Acting as a "policy entrepreneur," the prime minister framed the debate in terms of an economic, rather than political issue, and successfully overcame internal resistance within the cabinet to effect the change.

Kleistra and Mayer (2001) incorporate elements of both Goldmann's and Hermann's models into a model of foreign policy and organizational change. They identify 11 indicators for change that can act as "carriers" and "barriers" for change,
based on Hermann's agents of change and Goldmann's stabilizers. They identify periods of change and stability in Dutch Foreign policy toward their former colony of Suriname. Comparing and contrasting Dutch responses to two different military coups in the early 1980s, they account for these changes in terms of whether the indicators for change (such as a normative regulation, political support, decision making mandate and response repertory) acted as carriers or barriers. Kleistra and Mayer's study is significant in its inclusion of indicators for change as true variables, which, depending upon the value they take, can either induce or inhibit foreign policy change. Although the authors claim their model was established to explain the Dutch case, the foreign policy change aspects of it hold out the prospect for application to other cases as well.

Most recently, Charles Hermann, along with Robert Billings (2001), sought to readdress elements of the Hermann framework and apply it to a model of sequential decisionmaking – when decision makers engage in a series of decisions about the same issue or problem across a period of time. The authors introduce control theory into their model, to assess when decisionmakers will decide to change their foreign policies in response to information that a previous policy is not working, and when leaders will instead decide to “stay the course.” According to control theory, hierarchical “control loops” are used to explain more complex behavior. In terms of policy, higher-level goals are addressed by success in achieving lower-level sub-goals, strategies or objectives. The authors illustrate this with the case of North Korea and the United States’ goal of preventing that country from developing nuclear weapons. To achieve that goal, several descending sub-goals must also be achieved – an agreement to open the country to inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA); an agreement by North Korea to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whose signatories agree to IAEA inspections; and an agreement on the part of China to pressure North Korea to join the NPT. Each sub-goal must be achieved in order for the primary goal to be achieved. When feedback indicates that one of these sub-goals is not being met, the policy will be reconsidered in light of readdressing the sub-goals or in developing an entirely new approach to the problem. The course of action taken is dependent upon how those involved in the decision-making process believe different actions will address the problem and the reasons they assign for failure of the sub-goal.

Another set of recent scholarship that addresses foreign policy change is the literature on foreign policy substitution. The notion of foreign policy substitutability, developed by Most and Starr (1984), suggests that countries may respond differently to the same conditions by employing different foreign policy tools at their disposal. Morgan and Palmer (2000) challenge a standard notion of substitutability – that as resources assigned to a given policy increase, resources assigned to other policies must decrease. They posit that changing resources devoted to a policy comes as a result of a change in the efficiency of the policy, or from a change in resources available to the states. Regan (2000) examines the conditions under which the United States substituted its intervention strategies in the internal conflicts of other countries. He argues that this is a function of domestic political risks and capabilities. Leaders will decide to substitute policies (military, diplomatic or "mixed") when the political risk of maintaining the status quo is high. Clark (2001) examines foreign policy substitution in the context of political strategies and the diversionary use of force. He
finds that leaders facing economic and domestic political problems prefer to pursue private good policies, such as aggressive economic and trade policies, as opposed to military conflict.

Two smaller-scale studies of foreign policy change are relevant to this dissertation and are worth addressing. Thomas Volgy and John Schwartz (1990) examine foreign policy restructuring in three western European states, highlighting the ways in which democratic leaders overcome the "webs of restraint" to bring about foreign policy change. The imperative to survive and remain in office is such that democratic leaders will tend to avoid changes in the status quo that risk failure, and will instead favor incrementalism and modest departures from the status quo – even if they desire foreign policy change. Despite this fact, the authors note that democratic leaders do at times undertake significant foreign policy change and propose a relationship between risk taking and size of electoral margins.

Volgy and Schwartz suggest that leaders with slim electoral margins are more likely to undertake foreign policy restructuring than are leaders with moderate or large electoral margins. Risks associated with restructuring could erode the support that leaders with larger margins already have. However, if restructuring is successful, leaders with slim margins may broaden their coalition. They also propose that fundamental changes in foreign policy are just as likely when elections result in elite continuity as when they result in an elite turnover. The authors find some support for these propositions. Elite turnover did not significantly predict changes in foreign policy in any of the cases they studied. They also found a tendency for restructurings to occur following a narrow margin of victory – although narrow margins alone did
not guarantee major changes in policy. The findings also indicated where restructurings followed narrow electoral margins, leaders enjoyed a solid government majority in their respective parliaments.

This study offers some important insights into theories that will be tested in this dissertation. Their findings highlight the importance of constraints and the political calculus that democratic leaders must evaluate if they are to risk changes in the status quo that could undermine their status or survival. They also demonstrate that significant foreign policy change can occur absent changes in political leadership. By examining cases where leaders enjoyed a parliamentary majority, they also demonstrate that political and institutional realities in different democratic settings can create opportunities and incentives for political leaders to take greater risks and undertake changes from the status quo. This study suffers from a small number of cases limited to Western Europe; and although it develops no theories about the constraints and incentives that non-democratic leaders might face in undertaking foreign policy change, it is significant for this dissertation because it highlights the fact that the political and institutional setting can shape how leaders perceive risks associated with foreign policy change and their willingness to undertake it.

Park, Ko, and Kim's (1994) comparison of the foreign policies of South Korea and Taiwan under periods of non-democracy and democracy provide another study of foreign policy change relevant to this dissertation. They examine how the regime transition fundamentally changed each country's ideology, state-society relationship, political structure and political interest; which in turn fundamentally changed how each state defined its foreign policy goals as well as changed the foreign policy
making process, leading to foreign policy change – specifically a policy of "Nordpolitik" toward North Korea and China. This analysis presents several themes that will be developed in this dissertation – particularly the notion that issues related to legitimacy and ideology can dominate non-democratic governments and fundamentally shape how they define their foreign policy goals and how they use their foreign policies in ways that can be "inconsistent" (ibid.: 170). By illustrating how state autonomy was reduced and regime accountability was increased after the transition to democratic rule, this study makes a fundamental distinction between regime types and how the characteristics of each shape foreign policy decisionmaking.

The Dissertation: Contributions to the Study of Foreign Policy Change

If one criticism can be leveled against the study of foreign policy change, it is that there has been very little in the way of building on the established frameworks to develop a better understanding of why, when and how foreign policy change occurs. As one critic recently noted, “the study of foreign policy change...has so far been dominated by conceptual rather than empirical contributions...The very sophistication and elaboration of the analytical schemes put forward by authors appeared to militate against their usage in empirical research. Book-length case studies, let alone comparative analyses, of foreign policy change using these models are practically non-existent” (t'Hart, 1998: 441). Almost two decades after Holsti's appeal for its more systematic study, the field is still described by its scholars as "small but growing," with "relatively few empirical studies" (Gustavsson, 1999). Yet, as described above, it remains for many reasons an important field of inquiry. As a result, the study of
foreign policy change will likely prove more fruitful by addressing more answerable but equally relevant questions at a lower level of sophistication.

The crux of my argument in this dissertation is that arrangements central to different types of regimes and institutional arrangements create constraints and incentives on decisionmakers to undertake foreign policy change. This is an area that has received little attention in the foreign policy change literature; and, as will be seen later, much of the theory supporting contentions of this dissertation are borrowed from other fields of study within international relations and comparative politics.

Even Goldmann’s rather extensive cataloging of foreign policy stabilizers failed to grasp directly how the nature of state-society relations and institutional arrangements between decisionmakers and government bodies might serve as a constraint on foreign policy change. This can be attributed to the fact that many of these works are conceptualized in the context of a process underway once a foreign policy “problem” or issue has been identified and decisions have been made that action must be taken, rather than at a more macro level that asks how different structures and institutions might shape the way decisionmakers approach the issue of foreign policy change generally. Thus Goldmann’s concept of “institutionalization” addresses not the institutionalization of political structures, but the institutionalization of the policy; and “support” addresses, not the levels or sources of support for those making foreign policy decisions, but levels of support for the policy itself. While some of the works outlined above touch on these elements, the field of foreign policy change has yet to address sufficiently issues related to how different types of regimes and institutional arrangements might promote or mitigate foreign policy change.
This dissertation represents a serious contribution to the field of foreign policy change in both its theoretical and methodological application. In evaluating foreign policy change in the context of different regime types, this dissertation applies to the study an important question being widely addressed in other areas of the literature. Theories of the democratic peace have spawned a vast array of literature on war proneness, collaboration, cooperation, alliance duration and conflict resolution as they relate to regimes. However, regime effects have yet to be applied to a study of foreign policy change in any widespread empirical study that can generate measurable results. Additionally, unlike other studies, this dissertation delves "below the regime surface" to develop and test hypotheses about a myriad of political and institutional arrangements, and how they relate to foreign policy change.

Another significant aspect of this dissertation is that it accepts a much broader definition of what constitutes foreign policy change, allowing foreign policy changes to be captured generally – that is, capturing both major foreign policy restructuring endeavors as well as other, more incremental, non-realigning types of foreign policy change. Holsti (1982) originally conceptualized a very specific type of foreign policy change – "a dramatic, wholesale alteration of the nation's pattern of extra relations across different sectors." In reality, changes of this degree and scope are relatively rare, and concentrating on these cases alone as the dependent variable is severely limiting. Examining change only in its most extreme form also prohibits an evaluation of both change and continuity – dynamics that are occurring simultaneously throughout the world. As (Rosenau, 1976b: 372) notes, "Change cannot be discerned and assessed unless it is analyzed in the context of previously constant or continuous
behavior. There are no discontinuities without continuities to highlight them." A broader definition permits this dissertation to model and measure both changes and continuities in foreign policy, highlighting the ways in which causal factors both compel and constrain decisionmakers to undertake foreign policy change. A more general understanding of change as a continuum from stability, to incremental change, to the more dramatic realignments, allows us to capture ways in which causal variables may more subtly influence the decision making process. Although these more mild forms of change may not be as visible or impacting, they are still important because together they have a cumulative effect on a state's overall international orientation.

This dissertation will also provide findings that are measurable and can be generalized, a fundamental shortcoming of most work in this area. Applying a pooled, cross-sectional time series design provides results that can be validated against each of the hypotheses. By definition, change is something that is temporally relevant. Change can only be understood in the context of time, and it is only after a period of time that change can be determined. This approach is also beneficial because it promises to capture less visible cases of foreign policy change in states that may otherwise be ignored or overlooked; it will also capture more subtle foreign policy changes that may be occurring at different times and in different cases.

In short, this dissertation promises to be a significant contribution to the study of foreign policy change by synthesizing contributions from elsewhere in the literature and incorporating important causal factors into the debate, while producing results that are measurable and generalizable. The next chapters will develop a set of hypotheses
about regimes, political and institutional factors, and how they may pressure or constrain a decisionmaker's ability, willingness and desire to undertake foreign policy change.
CHAPTER 3
REGIME TYPE AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

Introduction

All foreign policy decisionmakers are to some degree shaped by their environment. The legal, constitutional and political settings in which they make decisions largely shape policy outcomes, as leaders must navigate their way through a web of institutional roadblocks and political opposition that generates constraints and incentives in the conduct of foreign policymaking. Regimes fundamentally define the essence of state-society relations, sources of legitimacy for their leaders and boundaries for their conduct in office. That said, it would seem that foreign policymaking in different regimes should differ fundamentally. Suggestions from the literature, however, are mixed. In international relations, a vast literature has developed around the “democratic peace,” that purports to show that democracies are less likely to go to war with one another than with other regime types. This literature has expanded to demonstrate other relationships according to regime type, to include levels of cooperative behavior, conflict resolution and alliance duration. Many studying foreign policy decisionmaking, however, have tended to downplay the differences in regimes, instead stressing the similarities in the ways constraints can affect all decision-making units, regardless of regime type.

In this dissertation, I examine the effects of regime type on foreign policy change and propose that different constraints and incentives for foreign policy change are discernible by regime type. In so doing, I ask a number of important questions. Are non-democracies more likely to change their foreign policies than democracies?
What sorts of institutional arrangements are more likely to shape foreign policymaking in ways that constrain or encourage foreign policy change? Are distinctions at the regime level most important, or rather, are they the specific institutional arrangements below the regime level that have the greatest influence? When it comes to the factors impacting foreign policy change, are the differences within each regime type as important as the differences between each regime type? These are some of the questions that will be outlined, addressed and empirically tested in this study.

This chapter will provide a brief outline of the major regime types and how they are currently treated in the literature. It will then compare and contrast the regimes on a number of relevant characteristics and explain how those characteristics may constrain or create incentives for foreign policy change in each regime.

**Approaches to Foreign Policy Change**

Approaches to the study of foreign policy change can be condensed into one of three broad areas of explanation. Approaches stressing *changes in the global structure or a state’s international position* explain foreign policy change in terms of the constraints imposed on states by the structure of the international system. This more traditional view, which is prominent in neorealism, complex interdependence, and dependency theory, looks to sources outside the state and its decision-making process. According to this logic, foreign policy change is likely to occur when there are changes in the international structure that fundamentally alter a state’s position in the international system. A second area stresses the role of *domestic political realignments*, explaining shifts in policy in terms of shifts in power and the relative position of those vying for power. As new individuals are brought into the process of
foreign policymaking, they bring with them different sets of beliefs, interests, and definitions of the national interest. A third area concentrates on the policy-making process itself. This explanation looks at how dynamics within the government and the political process shape the implementation of policy initiatives developed by a country's central leadership. These processes include the roles played by bureaucratic organizations, political opposition, and government structures, which may reinforce policy continuity and rigidity, or stimulate foreign policy change.

It is this latter approach that the dissertation will take to explain foreign policy change, specifically addressing how different regimes types (democracies and non-democracies) and a number of other political and institutional arrangements within each regime type shape the context of decision-making process itself.

**Regimes**

Do the differences between political regime types impact the foreign policy decision-making process in such a way as to influence a decisionmaker’s ability, willingness, or desire to undertake foreign policy change? There are compelling reasons to believe this is the case, not only because regime effects have been found to exist in other areas of international relations literature, but also because the study of regimes goes to the very crux of the relationship between state and society, the government and the governed, with implications for the leadership’s interests, ideology, autonomy, sources of legitimacy and opposition, and accountability – all which directly impact the state’s ability undertake foreign policy change.

Before turning to an examination of regime effects on foreign policy, it is first important to define the regime concept as applied in this dissertation as well as outline
definitions of the two major regime types treated in the literature. Regimes have been
defined as the set of rules, practices, and norms that shape how governments are
constituted and regulated (Hauss, 1994; Dominguez, 1987). Regime characteristics
include: the openness of the state's political institutions; the competitiveness of its
selection process for new leaders; the amount of citizen involvement in the political
process that is permitted or tolerated; the extent of legal and institutionalized
constraints imposed upon those in positions of power; and existence of, and protection
of, individual rights. Regimes throughout the world are generally characterized, to a
greater or lesser degree, as being either democratic (open and competitive) or
autocratic (non-democratic – closed and restricted).

**Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes**

The word *democracy* comes from the Greek words demos, meaning “people”
and kratos, meaning “rule.” Thus, democracy can be understood most simply as, “rule
by the people.” Numerous definitions of democracy have been offered over the years,
stressing the roles played by the public, procedural rules, protection of individual
rights, representation and accountability of elected leaders.¹ Robert Dahl (1998)
identifies six necessary items for a democratic society to exist. These include: elected
officials; free, fair and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of
information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship. The definition of
democracy for purposes of this dissertation tracks closely with Dahl’s concept that
democratic systems are understood to exist in countries where: leaders are chosen
through a open, competitive electoral process; institutionalized procedures are in place
regarding the transfer of power; leaders face legal and institutionalized constraints on their powers; citizens may freely organize for the purpose of political participation and expression; and basic protections of individual rights are secured.

Definitions of non-democracies are not nearly as well developed. Non-democracies can most easily be conceived of in terms opposite of democracy – that is, where there are no open, competitive elections; there are no institutionalized procedures to transfer power; there is an absence of legal or institutionalized constraints on leaders; there are limits on an individual’s ability to participate politically; and individual rights are not secured.

**Regime Effects in the Literature**

While comprehensive empirical analyses of regime effects on foreign policy change are not to be found, the same cannot be said when applied to other areas of the international relations literature. A vast body of literature has developed around the "democratic peace" or "war-proneness" of democratic regimes, and a variety of findings have emerged. These include: that democracies initiate war as frequently as non-democracies (Small and Singer, 1976; Chan, 1984); that democracies are less likely to engage in hostilities with other democracies than they are with non-democracies (Doyle, 1986; Maoz and Russett, 1993); that democracies show greater restraint in their foreign policies than do non-democracies, and will seek to settle disputes by other means short of war (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Mousseau, 1998); that conflicts between non-democracies are more likely to escalate into war than are

---

conflicts between democracies (Maoz and Russett, 1993); that democracies are more amenable to collaborate in military disputes than are non-democracies (Mousseau, 1997); and that immature democracies are prone to militarized disputes (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; 2002).

Others have found that democracies tend to ally with other democracies (Siverson and Emmons, 1991); non-democracies tend to ally with other autocracies (Werner and Lemke, 1997); and that alliances between democracies are less averse to failure than are alliances between democracies and non-democracies (Gaubatz, 1996; Reed, 1997). Studies measuring the overall level of cooperation and conflict between democratic and non-democratic dyads have shown that jointly democratic dyads engage in comparatively higher levels of cooperation than will jointly autocratic dyads; that jointly autocratic dyads will engage in higher levels of cooperation than “mixed” dyads of autocratic and democratic regimes (Leeds, 1999); and that democracies demonstrate cooperative behavior regardless of the institutional characteristics of the dyadic partner (Leeds and Davis, 1999).

Despite this vast array of work (of which this is only a fraction), regime effects have yet to be widely applied to a study of foreign policy change. On the surface this is somewhat surprising. It would appear that the same characteristics of regimes that influence alliances and militarized disputes would also apply at a lower level of abstraction and capture the day-to-day activities of foreign policy decisionmaking – defined as "how leaders, groups, and coalitions of actors can affect the way foreign policy problems are framed, the options that are selected, the choices

---

2 In one of the literature’s most comprehensive treatments of non-democracies, however, Juan Linz
that are made, and what gets implemented" (M. Hermann, 2001:1) – and how it influences foreign policy change. This inattention can be explained in part by those areas emphasized by major approaches to the study of international relations and foreign policy.³

First, as outlined earlier, those who ascribe to realist and neorealist explanations of international relations tend to discount the role played by domestic political regimes in foreign policy change (see Waltz, 1979). The neorealist theory of international relations is based on the proposition that in an anarchic “self-help” system, all units perform essentially the same function. Since all state’s goals are the same (survival), they face the same incentives to change or maintain their foreign policies. From this perspective, foreign policy change is something that occurs as states seek to increase their security by making adjustments in response to changes in the distribution of capabilities within the international system. Domestic considerations, including a country’s regime type, are considered largely irrelevant.

A second school focusing on the dynamics of the foreign policy decision-making process highlights the constraints inherent in democracies and non-democracies, downplaying differences between them and stressing the way constraints function in both democracies and non-democracies. These themes predominate the

³Traditional approaches have suggested that regime effects do exist, but in the opposite direction predicted in this dissertation – that democracies are more prone to change. This logic suggests that in democratic systems, public opinion and citizen involvement influence the policy process to such an extent that it is difficult for democratic leaders to commit to a course of action, making foreign policy relatively unstable and inconsistent. In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides (431 B.C.) noted that, following an oligarchical coup d’état, members of a new government in Athens felt that a Spartan king might be more open to make peace “now that he had them to deal with instead of the inconstant commons” (Thucydides, 431 B.C.: Ch 25). Similarly, Tocqueville observed in American foreign policy-making a “propensity that induces democracies to obey impulse rather than prudence, and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary passion” (Tocqueville, 1835).
current literature on decision units, which argues that decision-making dynamics can be quite similar across, and quite varied within, both regime types. For example, both Saddam Hussein and Lyndon Johnson have been characterized as predominant leaders, in that they had the ability to stifle opposition and dissent and make decisions alone if necessary. Foreign policy decisionmaking in both the British cabinet and in the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party have been described as being carried out by a single group. A coalition of autonomous actors has described foreign policymaking in Iran as well as many democratic states, where relevant actors are separate individuals, groups or representatives of institutions which can act in concert with one another, but cannot force compliance on the others (see Hagan, 1987, 1994b, 2001; M. M. Hermann at. al., 2001; Hermann, 2001b; M. Hermann, Hermann and Hagan, 1987; M. Hermann and Hermann, 1989). Tsebelis (2002) takes a similar view of democracy and non-democracy and its capacity for policy change, charging that regime effects are cast at too high a level of abstraction for any meaningful differences to be found in terms of policy change.

While accepting the notion that significant constraints do exist in both major regime types, it is the contention of this dissertation that there are fundamental differences in the level and nature of those constraints, which impact the decision-making process in fundamentally different ways. As will be argued below, this suggests different prospects for foreign policy change and stability in democracies and non-democracies.
Structural Constraints in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and Prospects for Foreign Policy Change

I argue that the structures of democratic institutions make them more conducive to foreign policy stability and that the structures of non-democratic systems make them more conducive to foreign policy change. These structural characteristics include legal and constitutional restrictions related to the conduct of government, government bodies and players involved in the decision-making process, and the institutionalized procedures for foreign policy decisionmaking.\(^4\)

Almost by definition, it can be said that democratic leaders face heavier structural constraints than do their autocratic counterparts. The very nature of democracies provides an organized and institutionalized mechanism for diffusing decision-making authority, mobilizing opposition and holding decision makers accountable. Whether those mechanisms take the form of votes in the legislature, votes of confidence, negotiations with government coalition partners, constitutional checks on executive authority, party politics or elections – each has the power to authoritatively constrain foreign policy decisionmaking.

In democracies, there are formal constitutional limits on the power and authority of the executive’s conduct of foreign policy. For example, in the United States, only Congress may make declarations of war. Treaties require approval of the Senate, as do the appointment of ambassadors. Other democratic governments face similar restrictions and while these formal powers may be limited, they are significant

in that they are legally constituted and binding. In contrast, non-democracies are characterized by the absence of any enforced, legally binding restrictions on the leader’s ability to make foreign policy.

In addition to formal restrictions on what a democratic leader may do in the realm of foreign policy, he or she must also contend with formal, legally instituted bodies within government that can block, stall or kill executive initiatives, or at the very least, bargain in such a way that the executive must settle for a compromise significantly different from his preferred course of action. While democracies, as will be outlined later, vary significantly from one type to the next, all are to some degree characterized by decentralized power and shared decisionmaking. This power may be shared with legislative bodies, cabinet ministers, coalition partners or bureaucratic institutions.

Policy initiatives may require the support of a majority or supermajority in a legislature, a majority of government coalition partners, or the concurrence of government ministers. Even if there is concurrence among elected leaders for a course of action, bureaucratic institutions may limit the options available to decision makers for consideration or negatively impact the implementations of foreign policy decisions. Allison (1969) demonstrates how the standard operating procedures of bureaucracies, and the intense competition among actors within them, make bureaucratic institutions resistant to change.

Fragmentation has been used as a concept to define a leader’s ability to dominate his or her immediate political environment (Hagan, 1987). At one extreme are highly fragmented regimes, where no dominant party or group is able to assert
leadership. Instead a coalition of autonomous actors governs who can easily block policy initiatives by threatening to withdrawal from the ruling group, causing it to collapse. At the other extreme are cases of highly cohesive leadership, where a single individual is able to dominate the decision-making process, other political groups, bureaucracy and government institutions. While the framework was originally intended for application to both democratic and non-democratic regimes, I posit that the concept, particularly if stripped of its "situational" political context, is useful for understanding the differences between them.

Since no democratic leader can completely dominate his environment, all democracies are to some degree fragmented. While serious divisions may exist in non-democratic entities (as was the case in China during the Cultural Revolution and in Iran during the early years of the Ayatollah Khomeini), a critical difference is that these divisions are "situational" in that they have no legal or constitutional standing – rather they are of a more political nature. A non-democratic leader in a moderately fragmented ruling group may be able to consolidate his power by eliminating or repressing opposition. Democratic leaders do not have this option, as fragmentation, in the form of pluralism, is itself enshrined in the constitution or inherent in the democratic norms of that society. A democratic president cannot eliminate an opposition legislature without ceasing to be a democratic president. Further, while clearly there are degrees of fragmentation and cohesiveness, democracies will fall more on the fragmented side of a continuum than would non-democracies; and under no circumstances would a democratic leader ever be able to exercise full authority over the formulation, implementation and execution of foreign policy. Divisions of
power, checks and balances, and requirements for majority votes dictate that democracies will always be fragmented to some degree.

This concept is important to the study of foreign policy change because policy change requires the commitment of resources as well as the support of (or at least concurrence or indifference of) relevant actors with the authority to oppose such actions. As a consequence, I expect policymaking in democratic regimes to be characterized to a much greater degree than non-democratic regimes by bargaining and compromise. Democratic leaders build support for the policy's adoption and implementation through negotiation. New initiatives may be blocked or voted down altogether. If passed, they may no longer reflect the preferences of leadership, but instead the process of accommodation with government partners. Non-democracies with fewer constraints would be expected to have more of a free hand in the formulation, implementations and execution of foreign policy. Consequently, foreign policy change in democracies should be more incremental, less confrontational and less dramatic than in more cohesive non-democracies, where power is more concentrated, and the stabilizing and moderating influences of fragmentation exist to a much lesser degree.

The idea that democratic regimes face greater constraints in the conduct of foreign policy is not new. In 1531 Italian political philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli observed in *Discourses on Livy*:

> taking everything into account...there will be found greater stability in the Republics than in Princes: For even if the Republics had the same spirit and the same wants as Princes, their movements being slower will always make them take longer to form resolutions than Princes, and because of this they will be less prompt in breaking their
faith…Alliances are broken for usefulness. In this, Republics are more careful in the observance of accords than Princes. And it is possible to cite examples where a minimum of usefulness has caused a Prince to break his faith, and where a great usefulness has not caused faith to be broken by a Republic…people make fewer errors than Princes, and because of this, they can be trusted more than Princes (Machiavelli, 1675: Ch. 59).

Countless quantitative studies on the democratic peace, alliance behavior, and use of force have similarly identified executive constraints as a significant explanatory variable in state’s international behavior (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 1999; Leeds and Davis, 1999; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Weitsman and Shambaugh, 2002).

**Political Constraints in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and Prospects for Foreign Policy Change**

Constraints and incentives for foreign policy change deriving from political considerations presume that political leaders wish to remain in power and maintain or increase their level of support. To remain in power and remain effective, leaders must rely on the support of those groups to whom they are accountable, that is – those groups that can remove the executive from power. Democratic executives may be removed from power in a number of ways — through elections, the withdrawal of support from a majority in parliament, desertion of a coalition partner, a lost vote of confidence, or impeachment. This means that democratic leaders must maintain a sufficient level of support for themselves or their party among the electorate and/or a majority within the ruling government or the parliament.

A leader’s foreign policies, their success and failure, can figure prominently in the judgments of an electorate, party or parliament. Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to
seek reelection in 1968 following a worsening situation in Vietnam is one example. Nincic (1992) studied incumbent approval ratings and found that a president's handling of foreign policy was an important factor in his overall rating, with a shift in foreign policy approval of two percent inducing a change in the overall approval rating of one percent (for a further examination of how voters use foreign policy to evaluate presidents, see Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 1989; Smith, 1998).

What does this mean for the conduct of foreign policy – in particular, the prospects for foreign policy change? There is some debate in the literature regarding how a democrat’s tenure vulnerability and the electoral process might translate into foreign policy behavior and how that vulnerability creates incentives for democratic leaders to pursue certain policies.

Some argue that democratic leaders may use foreign policy to mobilize public support through military action abroad. Although there is some quantitative evidence for a "rally around the flag effect" showing an initial upsurge in support for the president, those effects have been found to be weak and relatively short-lived (James and Oneal, 1991). Public support for the president following the use of force is more likely when the United States is involved in a serious crisis (Lian and Oneal, 1993); and the longer the military action continues without a clear victory, the sooner that support dissipates. This makes military action abroad for political purposes a somewhat risky proposition. Central to concepts developed in this dissertation, this suggests that democratic leaders are not likely to undertake a significant change in their state’s foreign policy toward another country through the use of foreign policy for strictly political purposes.
To the contrary, other evidence suggests that democratic leaders, aware of this, will undertake military action when it is "politically safest" to do so – usually early in their terms of office (Auerswald, 1999). In fact, the popularity and support of a democratic leader may well be a predetermining factor in a decision to use force abroad (Ostrom and Job, 1986). American leaders have frequently cited the necessity of public support for military engagement abroad, particularly when Americans are being killed (Mueller, 2000).

Political concerns may also foment foreign policy change in democracies through the politicization of foreign policy during elections. New administrations are bound to coincide with some degree of foreign policy change, as new individuals enter the decision-making process bringing with them different beliefs, goals, perceptions and worldviews. Some, however, have argued that these differences are beyond what could be explained by normal differences between administrations, and that American presidential candidates have staked out hard-line positions on national security issues in an attempt to draw distinctions between themselves and the other candidate, and to avoid the label of being “soft” on hot button issues. Once in office, these new leaders are then bound by campaign promises to follow through on their stated positions. John F. Kennedy’s declaration of a “missile gap” between the United States and the Soviet Union during the closely contested 1960 presidential election is one oft-cited example of this dynamic (Nincic, 1992). This view would suggest that democratic elections produce greater instability in foreign policy, as new administrations, bound by promises of the campaign, move foreign policy in a different direction from that of their predecessor.
I argue, however, that there are some critical weaknesses to this argument. To the extent that candidates may be tempted to draw distinctions between themselves and other candidates, they will nonetheless avoid staking positions that are too costly or too out of step from the mainstream, at the risk of being criticized by their opponents. Additionally, even though candidates may stake out strong positions in a campaign, once in office, international realities often dictate a different course of action. During the 1992 elections Bill Clinton promised that if elected, he would lift the United Nations-imposed arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. Once in office, however, as the war escalated further, he continued the Bush policy of no direct involvement. Outside of some criticism from his political opponents, Clinton faced no undo pressure to stick to the promises made during the campaign. This can be attributed to the fact that key support groups did not deem the issue of sufficient significance, and the fact that American presidents have four years to overcome any fallout that might generate from broken promises.  

I posit here that instead of creating incentives for foreign policy change, the political process of democratic regimes creates strong incentives for foreign policy stability. A political leader wishing to remain in office, be re-elected, ensure success for his party and maintain his political capital will want to, above all else, avoid embarking on activities that could potentially undermine his success and perceived effectiveness on the job. This should make democratic leaders more risk-averse to foreign policy behaviors that could result in failure.

---

5 To the extent that this dynamic might exist in democratic polities, it is much more likely to occur in presidential systems. Unlike parliamentary systems, where the executive is accountable to parliament
Weitsman and Shambaugh (2002) address the issue of risk-taking and regime type. They define risk-averse policies as those having a high probability of success, yet low potential yields – that is, they are “safe bets,” where the positive benefits of pursuing it may be minimal, but the probability of the policy failing is low. Risk-accepting policies, on the other hand, have a low probability of success; but promise much more favorable results if the policy in fact succeeds. Measuring risk preferences in terms of states’ alliance commitments, they find that democratic states – with their concomitant electoral accountability, constraints on the chief executive, and institutionalization and regulation of political participation – are more risk-averse than non-democracies.

Foreign policy change is an inherently risky behavior for a number of reasons – especially for democratic politicians. New foreign policy initiatives may involve a significant investment of national resources and national pride. Policy changes often require a commitment of economic and human resources, which for many countries is very limited (Volgy and Schwartz, 1991, 1994). Military resources are also limited, and policies of military intervention have an obvious human cost as well. Any decision to enter into a trade agreement or establish diplomatic relations with another state or intervene militarily in a conflict involves trade offs. Resources that are committed to pursuing a particular policy may preclude or diminish the ability of decisionmakers to commit those resources to other important areas. Therefore, when significant or controversial policy initiatives fail, leaders can expect to be judged harshly by the accountability groups on which they must depend for political survival.
Any departure from the status quo involves "unknowns" which can lead to unintended consequences and policy failure. States or important sectors within states may not derive all the expected benefits promised from a policy, maintenance of the new policy may become too costly, or it may require a greater commitment of resources than anticipated. Military defeat or quagmire is also costly not only in terms of material and human loss, but also national pride. For a risk-averse politician, except in cases of severe crisis or national emergency, the safest policy should be to simply continue the current policy, where relevant groups are already aware of its costs, benefits and consequences – "better the devil you know." Additionally, even if a new policy initiative promises success, a leader must ensure that he or she does not alienate significant portions of “accountability groups” who may be adversely affected by the new policy. To secure support for passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, for example, U.S. President Bill Clinton had to overcome opposition from his own party's leadership as well as the traditional Democratic Party constituency of organized labor, who feared that the agreement would send manufacturing jobs south to Mexico (Wink, et. al., 1996).

I suggest that democratic leaders, sensitive to their environment and wishing to remain in power, face strong incentives to avoid the risks and controversies associated with pursuing significant changes in foreign policy. Leaders will not wish to alienate groups upon which they rely for political support by undertaking changes that could intentionally or unintentionally adversely affect their interests or well being. They also will not wish to face the political consequences associated with policy failure that and must stake out positions they believe will mobilize the greatest number of voters.
might come from a significant change in the status quo. Policy failures adversely affect the evaluation of leaders and provide political fodder for the opposition. As a result, I would expect democracies to demonstrate relatively stable foreign policies marked by more incremental change.

The Nature of Opposition in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and Prospects for Foreign Policy Change

A key feature that distinguishes democracies from non-democracies is the existence of open and fair elections. Regardless of the institutional arrangements within different democracies, all hold elections of some sort, providing a regularized means of removing leaders from office and a ready avenue for opposition to challenge the current leadership. Democratic elections serve to reinforce tendencies of foreign policy stability in two ways. First, by providing citizens an opportunity to remove a leader from office, reward him or her with additional time in office, or select an entirely different leader, elections make democratic leaders accountable. Second, they provide citizens an opportunity to inform political leaders of their preferences on a wide array of issues, including foreign policy, by rewarding those candidates whose preferences most closely match their own. Since voters are free to express their views, leaders do not have to guess what policies are most appealing or acceptable to the electorate, and in fact, can claim a mandate from them. The existence of elections is a powerful source of stability because it means that democratic leaders are in a constant state of vulnerability – they are held accountable for their actions on a regularized basis through an institutionalized, recognized and binding process. At the least, elections may stabilize policies by delaying unpopular changes in foreign policy –
reflected in John F. Kennedy’s attributed statement to advisers that he would be unwilling to remove troops from Vietnam until after the 1964 elections (Nincic, 1992).

Unlike democracies, non-democracies do not have such regularized mechanisms for removing a leader from office, and opposition in non-democratic regimes does not have an established avenue for challenging leadership or its having interests considered. This is not to suggest that opposition does not play a role in non-democratic regimes or that opposition interests do not have the capacity to influence policy. Studies of foreign policy decisionmaking in the Soviet Union following the death of Stalin have stressed the significant constraints leaders faced, where no individual, even the secretary general of the Communist Party, could dominate the process. Soviet leaders, like leaders in democracies, had to secure a voting majority for all major decisions, and some have even suggested that they in fact had fewer prerogatives in decisionmaking than their American counterparts (Valenta, 1978, 1979). Differences within the Politburo, ruling juntas, or royal families all serve to limit the options available to autocratic rulers. Additionally, leadership turnover can occur in many non-democratic settings. Internal opposition forced Khrushchev from power in 1964, and military governments in Latin America established regularized turnover of its political leadership.

What I suggest is that leaders in non-democratic regimes will be relatively less sensitive to the political environment than will democratic leaders, and that opposition, while serving as a constraint on a leader’s freedom to act, can also influence foreign policy in a very different way – that creates incentives for foreign policy change.
The lack of institutionalized mechanisms (such as votes in the legislature or national elections) for channeling demands and making preferences known to leadership has several consequences important for foreign policy change. First, as outlined earlier, since opposition concurrence is not required for government decisions to take force, non-democratic leaders do not have to accommodate other views, and they can simply ignore demands or repress the opposition. Since opposition from outside the government is regarded as illegitimate, its aims are viewed with particular hostility by the central leadership. In democracies, virtually every decision has political consequences. Leaders must be concerned not only about their policies being implemented but also the political consequences of those decisions and whether they will adversely affect a leader’s future in office. In non-democracies, government proposals typically do not face formal votes, and leaders do not have to consider how their decisions will impact their future in the next election.

Second, without such mechanisms, or a free press or freedom of speech, non-democratic leaders are often unable to gauge what opposition demands might be, the level of support among the people for the central leadership, or their ideas for the direction of the country. Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi’s genuine surprise as he witnessed widespread demonstrations in opposition to his rule shortly before his downfall and the Soviet Union’s inability to control or accommodate demands once citizens were able to express them under glasnost reflect this tendency. Thus, unaware of consequences of their decisions to a much greater degree than democratic leaders, non-democratic leaders should feel less encumbered in the decisions that they make and are less likely to recognize a need to accommodate those demands.
Third, without mechanisms to channel opposition or accommodate its demands, opposition may take a much more extreme anti-system flavor. Without an “escape valve” to have demands and frustrations heard, opposition may move from the mere political – where moderates within the opposition press demands on moderates in the government – to the systemic, as opposition leaders feel they have no other option than to challenge the legitimacy of the regime itself. When opposition reaches this stage, threats to the regime are perceived by its leaders not only as threats to their tenure, but quite possibly their group’s integrity, their personal status, freedom or life. At this stage, rather than ignoring demands of relevant actors, non-democratic leaders may be tempted to co-opt them by politicizing foreign policy for purposes of regime maintenance. This may be done by appealing to patriotic and nationalist symbols and themes to generate support for the regime and justify its “right to rule.” This may take the form of challenges to former colonial power or hegemon or staking out positions and making statements in international bodies. This process, however, can take on a life of its own and lead to the use of foreign policy in its most extreme form – military action. Opponents may “outbid” one another by advancing bold proposals to defend the national interest; nationalist leaders may find themselves trapped by the “blowback” of nationalist rhetoric and forced to take actions abroad; or nationalist coalitions may form around issues through a process of “logrolling” (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002).

In what has become known as the "diversionary theory of war," or "scapegoating" (see Rosecrance 1963; Levy, 1989), leaders try to divert attention from problems at home, isolate opponents, and consolidate political support by taking
military action abroad. One of the most often cited recent examples is Argentina’s 1982 invasion and seizure of the Falklands Islands.

The military junta in Argentina, under the leadership of General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri, was facing internal and external political opposition, worsening economic problems and growing pressure from international and domestic human rights organization over the government’s repressive policies and questions over the status of the "disappeared." Internally, there were growing divisions between hardliners and softliners within the military over its mission, the future of military rule and its impact on the institutional interests of the military. Externally, demonstrations against the government were growing. Even among those within the regime who did not favor continued military rule, there was a growing sense that the situation was one they could no longer control. Argentina’s military rulers believed recovery of the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands, a “national symbol” shared by almost every segment of society, would boost support for the military by demonstrating that it could act on behalf of Argentine sovereignty. The occupation did initially bolster support for the regime. Appealing to the Argentine image of "lost greatness," the "territorial integrity symbolized family, the group and national integrity" (Femenia, 1992: 12). Through proclamations coming from Argentina's central leadership alluding to "missing relatives," "healing old wounds" and "reconciliation," they sought to fashion the military action in terms that would unify the country and help its citizens forget some of the very problems that the military junta created (Levy and Vakili, 1990; Femenia, 1992). Ultimately British victory in June 1982 sealed the fate of Argentina's military government. The government did not believe that the British would respond militarily
to retake the islands. Nonetheless, this risky strategy demonstrates the extent to which non-democratic leaders will go to maintain their hold on power (or at least regain control of the process of transition to civilian rule).

A democratic leader in a similar situation would not have faced the same incentives to take high-risk military action for strictly political purposes. Recent evidence suggests that democratic leaders facing domestic problems at home prefer instead to pursue policies aimed at reallocating private, rather than public, goods to a “core constituency,”—seeking to address the specific nature of their domestic problems (Clark, 2000). Since the benefits of military disputes approximate a public good policy for democracies (such as a widespread increase in patriotism, for example) (Bueno de Mesquita, et. al. 1999), democratic leaders should avoid foreign policy adventurism and look for other more mild policy tools to boost their popularity or resolve domestic problems (Clark, 2000). Miller’s (1999) examination of scapegoating in democratic and non-democratic regimes found no relationship between changing economic growth rates, levels of protest and rebellion at home, and dispute escalation. Autocratic leaders, however, were found to be more prone to diversionary behavior, with economic growth rates negatively correlated with dispute escalation.

The political consequences of possible policy failure are in a sense greater for democrats because they still have stake in a political future, even if they lose electorally. Non-democratic leaders, however, would be willing to accept higher risk “all-or-nothing” strategies for political purposes because the stakes are higher for them. It is rare that a “defeated” autocrat is able to reenter the political arena at a later
date. Thus there is a distinct temporal difference between “loss” in a democracy and “loss” in a non-democracy. Applying tenets of Przeworski’s explanation of why political forces comply with the rules set forth in democratic institutions provides some insight into the motivations of democratic and non-democratic leaders and their conduct of foreign policy. He notes that elections produce winners and losers, yet:

Democratic institutions render an intertemporal character to political conflicts. They offer a long time horizon to political actors; they allow them to think about the future rather than being concerned exclusively with present outcomes... (they) offer to the relevant political forces a prospect of eventually advancing their interests that is sufficient to incite them to comply with immediately unfavorable outcomes. Political forces comply with present defeat because they believe that the institutional framework that organizes the democratic competition will permit them to the advance their interests in the future" (Przeworski, 1991: 19).

For democrats, defeat or removal from office is not a final statement, but a temporary outcome. Candidates, parties, and ideas can endure long after elections are over; and losers do not forfeit their right to run again, shape their party's agenda, or otherwise shape the policy agenda. Since there is a persistent role for politics, parties, and elections, the timeframe of political actors in a democratic society is unlimited (see Linz, 1999). Therefore, political actors wishing to remain relevant face strong incentives to avoid pursuing policies that are considered extreme, controversial, or could easily be discredited or result in policy failure. Non-democratic leaders, however, must focus to a much greater degree on present outcomes, regime maintenance, controlling opponents and assuring acquiescence, support or compliance from those upon whom they rely for support. I suggest that differences in the nature of opposition as well as the temporal aspects of democracies and non-democracies will
cause each regime to treat the uncertainties of foreign policy change differently – with
democracies being far more cautious.

**Audience Costs in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and Prospects for
Foreign Policy Change**

Not only are there fewer incentives for democratic leaders to undertake foreign
policy change, in particular situations, there are strong incentives *not* to change
foreign policy. "Audience costs" constrain leaders from changing foreign policy since
they may face domestic political penalties for backing down from previously stated
policies or breaking foreign policy commitments important to the domestic audience.
Particularly in cases of crisis, domestic audiences will punish or criticize leaders more
for *escalating* confrontation and *then backing down*, than for *choosing not to escalate*
the in the first place (Fearon 1994). Crises, in a very public way, "engage the national
honor," and expose leaders to criticism from opposition groups for subjecting their
country to "diplomatic humiliation." Fearon notes that opposition groups “frequently
condition their activities on the international successes and failures of the leaders in
power" (ibid.: 581).

Therefore, states that bear the greatest audience costs should be the ones least
likely to back down in a crisis. While leaders in both democratic and non-democratic
regimes face audience costs, these constraints are especially important in democracies,
where domestic audiences (such as rival ministers, opposition politicians, legislative
committees, and the mass public) are more organized and institutionalized and have a
greater opportunity to make leaders pay a penalty for changing course:

In democracies, foreign policy is made by an agent on
behalf of the principals (voters) who have the power to
sanction the agent electorally or through the workings of
public opinion. By contrast, in authoritarian states the principals often conduct foreign policy themselves (ibid.: 581).

The significant role that audience costs play in democratic foreign policy stability may not be limited to the extreme cases of confrontation and conflict. Fearon hypothesizes that other foreign policy actions create audience costs as well, and suggests that democratic states "should be less inclined to bluff or try ‘limited probes’ in foreign policy" (ibid.: 578). Additionally, in democracies, foreign policy commitments often represent a sizable political investment to build the required domestic coalition needed to support the action.

An administration that justifies the use of costly sanctions by going to great lengths to persuade reluctant legislators and economic actors that vital interests are at stake will face high domestic costs if it then backs down from threatening counter-sanctions. Having committed itself to a particular policy, such reneging would call into question its initial arguments and damage its reputation (Martin, 1993: 414).

Alastair Smith (1998) suggests that since autocratic rulers and lame-duck presidents cannot be punished at the ballot box, they face no real audience costs, and may pursue policy on the basis of international conditions alone. While I concur with Smith’s sentiments on non-democratic leaders, I argue that, while lame-duck presidents may not face the prospect of electoral defeat, it does not mean they do not face audience costs or that audience costs are not important to them. Favorable political capital is something important to all democratic leaders – whether or not they are facing election. The successful conduct of foreign policy has the power of increasing a democratic leader’s prestige and popularity, which he can then use to
influence other areas of the policy agenda, assist in the electoral fortunes of other
members of his party, and ensure his place in history.

Audience costs are seen as an important way that states may signal their
intentions and commitments. For example, George Bush’s 1990 declaration that the
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait "will not stand" was seen as credible because it put
American honor and prestige at stake. George W. Bush's statement that “either you
are with us, or you are with the terrorists” similarly lent credibility to the U.S.
commitment to a war on terrorism. On the other hand, it is more difficult to gauge the
credibility of, or take seriously, Saddam Hussein's frequent threats and
pronouncements, since he faces no significant audience cost for not following through
on those threats. Suggestions from this literature indicate that democracies would be
less likely to undertake foreign policy change than would non-democracies.

‘Two-Level Games’ and Prospects for Foreign Policy Change

Related to issues of political constraints on the conduct of foreign policy, the
literature on two-level games suggests that major foreign policy changes in the form of
international agreements are more difficult for democracies to undertake. This is
related to the “transparency” of its decision-making process (Cowhey, 1993) and the
way foreign policy commitments are made. Schelling (1966) posits that states may
communicate their intentions and commitment to other actors by maneuvering into a
position where they would face a cost were they to back down or not follow through
on a committed course of action. Domestic political costs are one such mechanism,
and linkages between foreign policy in the domestic audience make it much more
difficult to divert from a committed course of action in states where leaders would
face a political cost for doing so. Robert Putnam (1988) suggests that the requirement for democratic leaders to garner domestic political support places additional constraints on their ability to make new international agreements. He models international negotiations as a “two-level game:”

At the national level domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments (ibid.: 434).

The ability to reach agreements is largely a function of the distribution of power, preferences, possible coalitions among domestic constituents, and the nature of domestic political institutions. Institutional requirements for ratification are an effective constraint on leaders’ abilities to reach agreements. In states where there are few or no domestic institutional barriers to reaching an agreement, leaders have greater autonomy and face fewer constraints in committing to a specific course of action. States with greater domestic constraints, however, may place leaders into immovable negotiating positions, provoking stalemate or breakdown (Schelling, 1960). Putnam posits such states "should make fewer international agreements and drive harder bargains in those that they do make" (Putnam, 1988: 443). While the logic of two-level games is not limited to democracy, it is suggestive that it will play a much larger role in democracies than in non-democracies, where there is an absence of organized, legally recognized and institutionalized constituent opposition. Putnam stresses the primacy of domestic political considerations since there are “fixed costs” associated with domestic coalition building.
Any political entrepreneur has a fixed investment in a particular pattern of policy positions in a particular supporting coalition. If a proposed international deal threatens that investment, or ratification would require him to construct a different coalition, the chief negotiator will be reluctant to endorse it, even if (judged abstractly) it could be ratified (ibid.: 458).

Anderson (1981) suggests that leaders have a built-in bias toward consistency and "reliability" in foreign policymaking – a bias that is further reinforced in democratic systems. He notes that the uncertainty associated with international politics places a premium on consistency in foreign policy. This is because governments use the behavior of other governments to develop expectations about the future, and sustaining expectations about future behavior requires pursuing courses of action consistent with expectations.

As Kissinger (1969) argued concerning U.S. policy in Vietnam:

Stability depends upon confidence in American promises. Unilateral withdrawal or a settlement that unintentionally amounts to the same thing, could therefore lead to the erosion of restraints and to even more dangerous international situation (ibid.: 219).

Domestically, there is a bias toward consistency as well, and undermining what is seen as a desirable precedent requires justification to the domestic audience. However:

If a government is willing to bear the political costs of implausible justification, or in the case of autocratic systems, is relatively isolated from the associated domestic costs, the constraint will be minimal. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for example, occurred under what many in the West considered a flimsy justification (Anderson, 1981: 743).
Thus leaders, especially democratic leaders, and their foreign policy decisions have a way of committing and binding future leaders and the latitude they have in foreign policy decisions.

The logic of two-level games, illustrating the interaction of the international and domestic negotiations necessary for foreign policy change, suggests that democracies should be less likely to undertake significant changes in foreign policy than non-democracies. The difficulty policymakers have in meeting both domestic and international imperatives are a significant constraint on forging new international agreements. Non-democracies, however, with fewer domestic constraints, should more easily negotiate international agreements, since autocratic leaders may place much greater weight on the international ramifications, as opposed to the domestic ramifications, of their decisions.

The Nature of Legitimacy in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and Prospects for Foreign Policy Change

Another fundamental difference between democracies and non-democracies with prospects for foreign policy change concerns the sources of legitimacy upon which the regimes and their central leadership is based. Legitimacy has been defined as "the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed" (Hurd, 1999: 381). It has a subjective quality, based on an individual's perception "that the actions of the entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate" (Suchman, 1995: 574). For an individual citizen, legitimacy is an internalized belief conferred upon a ruling body or regime in its "right to rule." For national leaders this is an important source of control and stability, and it ensures compliance on the part of the people. Legitimacy is less costly and politically less risky than the other mechanism for
maintaining compliance – coercion. Robert Dahl observed that higher levels of legitimacy require lower levels of the use of force, while conversely, as legitimacy decreases, higher levels of coercion and force are necessary to maintain control and compliance.

For democracies, legitimacy is much easier to come by because it comes in two forms – ruler legitimacy and regime legitimacy. Democratic ruler legitimacy is based on the leader’s ability to perform duties and meet the expectations of those supporting him or her. The legitimacy of a democratic regime is based on rules and procedures – the ability of voters to select their leaders through open and fair elections, compete for elective office, express political opinions freely, and so on. A democratic leader may lose ruler legitimacy while maintaining regime legitimacy. In fact, when a leader is voted out of office and a peaceful transition of power occurs, the legitimacy of the regime is itself reaffirmed (Huntington 1991). A democratic leader’s loss of ruler legitimacy does not mean an end to any role he might play in the future. Since the legitimacy of the regime in which he is operating continues, he and his party may work within the system to regain power at a later date.

Democratic regime legitimacy (rules and procedures) serves as a constraint on the conduct of foreign policy. Opposing views may be expressed, elections may remove leaders, and executive powers are limited. Opponents to the government or its policies may organize and voice their opinion without fear of retribution. Since political power in democracies is limited and rests abstractly with the office, rather than being unlimited and resting with specific individuals, a domestic legal environment binds leaders and what they may do. Scholars have suggested that these
norms associated with democratic legitimacy shape the conduct of foreign beyond the domestic legal constraints imposed upon them. Gaubatz (1996) suggests that the role of law, "juridical nature of liberal democracy," and "reputation of a state for reliability" have a significant rhetorical appeal in democracies. Stanley Hoffmann (1989) observed the restraining effects of liberalism, "the essence of Western political regimes and Western international law." He states that the "civilizing and refining of power through international law and legal institutions" act as "blinders...to a more effective approach" and that "diplomatic correctness...limits what a non-totalitarian power can achieve" (ibid.: 47-49).

In non-democratic regimes there is no distinction between ruler legitimacy and regime legitimacy. Thus non-democratic leaders must build and maintain their own legitimacy if they wish to remain in power. The "legitimization problem" to some extent will be a perpetual challenge for non-democratic leaders as they seek to justify their rule through other sources (Huntington, 1991). For some non-democratic regimes, particularly those that seize control from democracies, leaders will often base their legitimacy on "their capacity to guarantee order, restore faith in the economy, or eliminate a 'subversive' threat" (Share and Mainwaring, 1986: 188). Once these governments solve the "problems" that brought them to power, however, those sources of legitimacy will dissipate; and groups in society that initially supported them may begin to question their continued purpose (see O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1989). Faced with this decline, non-democratic leaders are eventually driven to look to other areas, such as the government's "substantive accomplishments" and "performance" as the principal sources for legitimacy. When a country suffers economic hardship or does
Robert Snyder’s (1999) recent study of the breakdown in U.S. relations with the revolutionary states of Cuba, Iran and Nicaragua reveals that domestic political imperatives in these countries, and not U.S. attitudes toward the revolutionary states are what caused the breakdown. In each case, the United States became the target of foreign policies aimed primarily at justifying the revolution, isolating opponents in the bourgeoisie and consolidating their power. In each case, the countries fundamentally reoriented their foreign policies into an anti-U.S. posture, despite initial receptiveness on the part of the United States to the new regimes and their leadership. A similar dynamic was identified in Ethiopia’s realignment with the Soviet Union and Sadat’s realignment with the United States (David, 1991). Legitimization was also a central feature of Argentina’s occupation of the Falklands Islands, outlined above.

Dawisha (1990) identifies the drive for legitimacy at home as a central tenet of the foreign policies of many Arab states, where power is often concentrated in the hands of a single individual or very small group. As urbanization and education have increased in these states, traditional values and attitudes have been questioned and can no longer be relied upon to underpin regime stability. As a result, Arab leaders have demonstrated a willingness to pursue very risky and adventurist foreign policies aimed at consolidating support at home. For example, Syria’s confrontation with Israel following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 reestablished Assad’s credibility as leader of “the only country that dared to confront Israel militarily,” following ethnic violence that seriously undermined his position as leader (ibid.).
Legitimacy was also a driving force in the foreign policy of Egypt under Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Through his refusal to join the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact, active participation in the nonaligned movement, arms deals with the Soviets, formal recognition of the People’s Republic of China, and confrontation over nationalization of the Suez Canal, Nasser enhanced his anti-Western credentials in a way that not only brought him immense support at home, but also throughout the Arab world (Dekmejian 1971). His success in using foreign policy as a legitimizing tool became a model emulated by many other leaders of non-democratic states.

Foreign policy legitimization is not limited to the small developing states. Whiting (1983) notes that a tone of "assertive nationalism" pervaded a wide range of foreign policy pronouncements following the Communist Party's Twelfth Party Congress in 1982. Consistent with the notion of declining legitimacy over time, he attributed the shift in China’s more aggressive tone to the new leadership’s need for “ideological unity and legitimacy after the dilution and reduction of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought as the primary appeal to loyalty and national cohesion” (ibid.: 328).

I suggest that the fundamental differences in sources of legitimacy in democracies and non-democracies will impact their propensity to undertake foreign policy change in fundamentally different ways. The rules and procedures associated with democratic legitimacy will foster greater foreign policy stability, while the search to continuously build and maintain legitimacy in non-democracies will drive them to use foreign policy in ways that foster more foreign policy change.
The Nature of the Public in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and Prospects for Foreign Policy Change

Another central feature that differentiates democracies from non-democracies is the nature of opposition that comes from outside the central leadership. External opposition can and does exist in many non-democracies. Whether in the guise of the church, trade unions or other organizations, individual citizens have found ways to express their opinion and disapproval of policies and the conduct of the regime itself. A key consideration that differentiates regime types, however, is the fact that non-democracies have the capacity to suppress public opinion, popular movements and limit or eliminate popular participation (or conversely, mobilize them toward their own ends). Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) illustrate this by contrasting the Greek response to the Cyprus crises of 1967 and 1974. In 1967, a Greek Army general associated with enosis (the union of Greece and Cyprus) was involved in an attack on Turks in Cyprus and the Turkish government responded by preparing for war; however, a negotiated settlement with the help of the United States averted the crisis. Greece’s military junta, which had come to power just months earlier, could not overcome strong opposition to war from the public and "the high domestic constraint more typical of a democracy operated in this case against the Greek colonels in the early days of their leadership." Seven years later, however, when the Greek military government was "more skilled at suppressing the views of political opponents," the government effectively ignored popular opinion, even more opposed to enosis by force than was the case in 1967, and lead a risky military coup in Cyprus, installing a puppet leader sympathetic to the Greek government (ibid.: 162).
If democratic decisionmakers have less autonomy from the public and relations between demands and decisions are relatively strong (Purcell, 1973), will that mean more or less foreign policy change? Does public opinion matter? Is it consistent? How responsive are decisionmakers to public opinion on foreign policy issues? For Kant and most liberals, public opinion was believed to be inherently peaceful and would discourage democratic leaders from going to war. Since public support would have to be mobilized to support a war, preferences for peace among the public would serve as a major restraint on policymakers. Others have noted, however, that a hawkish public can also pressure political elites into adopting hard-line policies that lead to war, as in the case of the United States in the Spanish-American War (Levy, 1988).

A major concern among traditional realists following World War II was a "disruption from below" – where popular pressures would force democratic governments to respond in ways that "drive foreign policy off the path of cool reason and calculated reflection" (Nincic, 1992: 5). Hans Morgenthau feared that democratic states subject to the whims of public opinion would be ineffective in dealing with the realities of political realism (Morgenthau, 1973). The “Almond-Lippmann consensus” (O. Holsti 1992) that developed concerning the public and foreign policy was based on two concerns – that the public was ill-informed and knew very little about the intricacies of complex foreign policy issues facing the nation and that public opinion was extremely fickle and volatile (see Almond, 1950, 1956). Rather than a force for foreign policy stability, this logic suggested that an inconsistent public would force an inconsistent foreign policy.
Research generally does support the contention that the public is ill-informed on most foreign policy issues. Just ten years after the end of the Vietnam War, less than two-thirds of the public knew that the United States supported South Vietnam in the conflict (Clymer, 1985); and a famous Harris poll taken at the height of U.S. efforts to support the Contras in Nicaragua showed that 56 percent believed the Contras were enemies of the United States. In terms of volatility, early research focusing on public opinion seemed to confirm concerns that public preferences are “moody” and “malleable” and that opinions were not linked to a larger ideological structure or understanding that would provide those beliefs context, structure or coherence (Converse, 1964).

More recent research indicates that although public opinion may be volatile, the beliefs underlying them are, in fact, structured and coherent. In other words, foreign policy beliefs are not horizontally constrained (where beliefs within one issue area are systematically related to opinions and beliefs in other issue areas). Instead, they are organized by vertical constraints, where specific opinions on foreign policy issues are rooted in a deeper set of ideological beliefs. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) developed a hierarchical model rooted schema theory to explain the relationship between general and specific foreign policy attitudes (vertical constraints). According to schema theory, people are "cognitive misers," and have a limited ability to deal with complex information. Therefore, they take "short cuts" to simplify the process by relying on a more general understanding to interpret, gather, and process new and more specific information. More abstract ideas and beliefs constrain the more specific ones – from core values to postures to foreign policy issues (public opinion).
Wittkopf’s (1990, 1994, 1996) examinations of Americans attitudes about foreign policy after Vietnam show that individuals’ beliefs about foreign policy remain relatively stable and consistent over time, in spite of changing attitudes on specific foreign policy issues. This has been shown to exist not only in the United States, but in other countries as well. A recent study found that public beliefs concerning foreign policy issues in Sweden are also very structured, in ways not unlike that of the United States (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999). Other studies have found evidence that public opinion itself is relatively stable when analyzed in the context of changing world events (Page and Shapiro, 1988). This was also found in a non-American setting, where public opinion and attitudes stabilize over time at the aggregate level following significant changes in the international environment (Isernia et. al., 2002).

If opinions and beliefs are more stable than many originally conceived, the question remains to what extent does public opinion influence the foreign policy decision-making process; and whether beliefs can be aggregated in any meaningful way that could influence the decision making process (see Riker, 1982). Some argue that public opinion plays a role because decisionmakers perceive that it is important (Hoffmann, 1989). Monroe’s (1998) study of public opinion and U.S. policy decisions found that of all issue areas, foreign policy preferences were the most consistent with government policy; and that the growing gap between public preferences and policy present in most policy areas was not evident in the case of foreign policy. Nincic (1992) suggests that Presidents Carter and Reagan adjusted their policies with the Soviet Union to a more moderate approach in response to public opinion that rejected policies seen as too accommodating or too confrontational.
Others suggest that public opinion plays a role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy, in that democratic leaders must mobilize support for their policies by shaping their appeals in terms of wider themes that appeal to core beliefs about foreign policy (see Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Wittkopf, 1996); and that public opinion establishes for decisionmakers a “range of policies” that can be popularly sustained (Russett, 1990). Elite interviews with foreign policy decisionmakers have also indicated a very direct role for public opinion in that public reaction to policies are considered at the earlier stages of formulation; and when public opinion conflicts with policy, decisionmakers will seek to educate the public and build support for the policy rather than change the policy (Powlick, 1991).

On balance, current research on the role of the democratic public in foreign policymaking suggests that to the extent that public opinion does influence foreign policy, it is a source for policy stability rather than change. While the public may be ill informed on major foreign policy issues, the foreign policy beliefs that help inform those opinions are ordered, structured and coherent. Thus, changes in foreign policies in democratic societies are not likely to be in response to changes in public opinion. If anything, according to current literature, they are an attempt to bring policies more in line with public opinion, avoid the extremes and remain more consistent with the beliefs of citizens and policies of the past.

The Nature of Organized Interests in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes and Prospects for Foreign Policy Change

One way individual opinions and preferences may be expressed and used to influence policy in democracies is through organized group demands. An analyst of decisionmaking in an authoritarian regime contrasts the process in both regimes:
Limited pluralism may be expected to produce an erratic relation between the authoritarian leader’s decisions and expressed group demands. Many decisions will involve issues that were never raised, while issues that are raised frequently may be ignored because groups lack sufficient resources and capabilities to support their demands. Interest groups in authoritarian regimes may also be expected to play a predominantly reactive (rather than initiating) role in the decision-making process, expressing support for the leader’s decisions or seeking to modify them in their behalf. In a democratic regime characterized by relatively unlimited pluralism, the relation between group demands and the leader’s decisions may be expected to be strong; groups will play a predominantly initiating role in the decision-making process and should be able to support their demands with substantial pressure. The low subject mobilization of authoritarian regimes will reduce the number of demands made upon the authoritarian leader, provide him with substantial decision-making autonomy, and reinforce the erratic relation between group demands and the authoritarian leader’s decisions. In a democratic regime characterized by moderate "participant" mobilization, the number of demands emanating from the policy will be greater. The autonomy of the decisionmakers will be more limited, and the relatively strong relation between the demands and decisions will be reinforced (Purcell, 1973: 37-38).

While group demands may be repressed or controlled in non-democracies, they play a prevalent role in many democracies. Interest groups are able to pool resources and political clout to articulate policies to the elected members, educate and inform them on the benefits and consequences of political decisions, mobilize votes – as well as educate their membership, the American public and the media, on issues of interest to them. The United States has been called an "interest group society" (Berry, 1984) due to the pervasiveness of interest groups and lobbyists and the role they play in attempting to influence the legislative agenda. Special interest groups may play an especially large role in countries such as the United States, where there is weak party
discipline and individual legislators are more open to other influences and ideas. Democracies, especially democracies such as the United States, present these interest groups with multiple channels of influence, where they compete and coalesce with other groups for influence over policies. Groups vary in size and scope, representing special interests, a particular ideology or issue (such as peace or nuclear disarmament), military defense or trade policy. Others are ethnic in nature and geared toward U.S. policies with specific nations or regions. Historically, one of the most influential of these ethnic interest groups in the United States has been the pro-Israel American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). With close ties to Israeli governments as well as allies in Congress, this organization has been an integral part of U.S. policymaking toward Israel for many years (see Hadar, 1996). The Cuban American National Foundation is another ethnic group that exercised significant influence in the 1980s (Haney and Vanderbrush, 1999).

Addressing the issue of foreign policy change, critics of special interest groups charge that their influence forces decisionmakers into responding to pressures from what is a relatively narrow segment of society. If this is indeed the case, one might expect a relative lack of continuity in foreign policy in democratic states, as policies successively respond to an ever-increasing number of narrow interests groups. Others, however, suggest that except under rare circumstances, interest groups do not have a great influence on foreign policy. AIPAC’s influence is often seen as an “exception to the rule” that interest groups do not exercise great influence on foreign policy, with its unified organization, money, lobbying skills, cohesive constituency and issue salience to lawmakers being key to its success (Haney and Vanderbrush,
As interest groups are formed around issues and those groups begin to exercise influence, opposition is prompted to organize and push policy in the opposite direction, creating cross-pressures on decisionmakers. Additionally, groups often will seek inaction and maintenance of the status quo. "Such efforts are generally more successful than efforts to bring about policy change. For this reason interest groups are generally regarded as agents for policy stability" (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1991: 273).

Another way organized interests further stabilize foreign policy is that sub-national actors adjust their behavior to receive the greatest benefits from the current policy. Interests organize and take an active role in the political process to ensure that those policies and benefits continue. Rogowski’s (1989) study of trade expansion and decline shows how domestic political cleavages are formed around those industries reaping the greatest benefits from international trade conditions and how those interests use their economic clout to further strengthen their political position. Charles Lipson (1982) illustrates how a free trade agreement fosters the development of, and increases the political power of, those firms benefiting from free trade. These interests become an important part of the “domestic supporting coalition,” making foreign policy changes that impact their interests less desirable for democratic decisionmakers to undertake if they wish to maintain the political support of these groups. Further, these interests need not be especially large or widespread to have an important impact on the policy-making process. Putnam (1988) observes that political participation rates vary significantly across groups and issues; when costs and benefits of a policy or agreement are relatively concentrated, those constituents whose interests are most
affected will exert special pressures on the policy-making process to act on their behalf. Thus foreign policy commitments themselves can perform an important feedback mechanism – developing and strengthening the political power of those interests that benefit the most from a policy, who in turn pressure leaders dependent upon their political support to maintain the status quo. The role of interest groups, therefore, is another reason to expect greater foreign policy stability in democracies than non-democracies.

Summary

As I have outlined in this chapter, there are compelling reasons to believe that differences between democracies and non-democracies will have a significant impact on their foreign policies. The institutional and structural constraints on democratic leaders are greater than those on non-democratic ones. Democratic leaders must contend with an instituted and legally binding decision-making framework that can authoritatively limit the availability of foreign policy options. The nature of political competition in democracies makes them more averse to risky foreign policy strategies and more likely to pursue policies that accommodate the interests of relevant political actors than is the case in non-democratic systems. Instead, non-democratic states may exhibit strong incentives to use foreign policy toward strictly political ends. The nature of democratic legitimacy further constrains the steps decisionmakers may take and affects the timeframe in which they view their political future. The legitimacy of non-democracies, however, is tied very closely to the performance of government and shapes a focus of immediacy on domestic support for the regime and its leadership. In democracies, the public has a much stronger impact on the decision-making process.
Organized interests and the democratic public can effectively punish leaders for significantly departing from policies favorable to the people. Non-democratic leaders are much more isolated from societal pressures and can repress popular movements, control media and more easily shape public opinion.

I argue that these fundamental differences should make it more difficult for democracies to undertake foreign policy change and place fewer incentives in the hands of democratic leaders to undertake foreign policy change. Non-democracies, on the other hand, have fewer impediments to undertake foreign policy change, and more incentives to do so. Thus, the first hypothesis of this dissertation:

H1: Democratic states demonstrate a greater degree of stability in their foreign policies than do non-democratic states.

In developing this hypothesis, concepts of democracy and non-democracy were necessarily generalized. In the following chapter I will take a look at factors "beneath the regime surface," examining ways the variety of institutional and structural arrangements within each regime type influence foreign policy stability and continuity, and I will develop specific hypotheses regarding these factors. While these factors have been largely ignored in empirical studies of regime effects on international relations and foreign policy, compelling reasons exist to believe that just as democracies and non-democracies place different constraints and incentives on decisionmakers, so too do the myriad of differences within them.
CHAPTER 4  
INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

Below the Regime Surface

In the previous chapter I outlined some of the differences between major regimes types, argued that those differences create incentives and constraints for foreign policy change, and developed the hypothesis that democracies will exhibit more stable foreign policies than will non-democracies. For a fuller understanding of how domestic constraints influence foreign policy stability, it is necessary to look below the regime surface. Within the democracy/non-democracy dichotomy there is great variation in terms of institutional arrangements, political dynamics and the types of actors involved, each creating opportunities and constraints for foreign policy change. Drawing upon literature developed largely in the area of comparative politics, this chapter will produce specific hypotheses related to how these differences impact a state's foreign policy stability.

The notion that institutional arrangements in different types of democracies produce different outcomes is not new. It was the central debate among framers of the United States Constitution, who wished to design a system that would constrain the powers of government by dividing its functions and creating a system of checks and balances. The recent focus on institutions and their outcomes has been spurred largely by the "third wave" of democratization that swept the globe throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s. These new democracies faced fundamental choices about how their new regimes would be organized, how individuals would be elected and power
dispersed.\(^1\) Neo-institutionalists argue that these choices have profound consequences in terms of the representation, efficiency and responsiveness of governments, and, perhaps most importantly, prospects for democratic consolidation and regime stability.

While the study of institutions has been central to debates within comparative politics for more than a decade, they have until very recently received little attention in the international relations and foreign policy literature. Auerswald (1999) examines the domestic institutional context in which executives make a decision to use force. He posits that executives become less adventurous in foreign policy as they become accountable to more domestic groups. Examining the U.S., British and French responses to the Suez Crisis and the war in Bosnia, he finds that presidents are more likely to use force than single-party parliamentary governments, which are also more likely to use force than coalition governments. Prins and Sprecher (1999) examined the differences in Western parliamentary democracies. They find that coalition governments are more prone to reciprocate disputes and speculate that single-party governments are more sensitive to the electoral risks associated with escalation. This dissertation will expand upon the notion that important differences exist between regimes aside from the standard democracy/non-democracy dichotomy and apply those differences specifically to the study of foreign policy change.

**Presidential and Parliamentary Systems**

Presidential and parliamentary systems constitute, in a broad sense, the two major ways of organizing democratic government. The systems differ fundamentally

---

\(^1\) One of the most fundamental choices facing these new democracies was whether their system would be presidential or parliamentary. Of the new democracies that have emerged since the 1980s, all of Latin America and Asia have opted for pure presidentialism; and of the 25 countries that constitute Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union only three have chosen pure parliamentarism – Hungary,
in terms of *executive selection, separation of survival* and *separation of powers.*

Executives in presidential systems are popularly elected; whereas parliamentary executives are selected based on the allocation of legislative seats, usually the leader of the party winning the greatest share of seats. Regarding separation of survival, in presidential systems, the terms of the executive and the legislature are both fixed and the survival of one is not dependent on the other. In parliamentary systems, the terms of the executive and the legislature are concurrent, and the executive is accountable to, and depends upon the confidence of, the lower chamber of the legislature. In presidential systems there is a formal separation of powers. Executive power rests outside the legislature with the president and his cabinet. In parliamentary systems these functions are fused, and the parliament is the forum for both lawmaking and executive power (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Samuels and Eaton, 2002).

A state’s ability to change its policies is a function of a number of factors. One of these is the number of “veto players” in the system, defined as the person, political party, or faction that can act alone to exercise a “veto” on a policy or issue (or must agree for the policy to change) (see Tsebelis, 1995, 2002). As the effective number of vetoes increases, so do the transaction costs (through negotiations with different actors, etc.) that must be overcome to change a policy. Greater costs make policy change more difficult to undertake, and lower costs, in terms of fewer veto players, make policy change less difficult to undertake (Cox and McCubbins, 2001). A greater number of veto players, therefore, create a self-enforcing mechanism for policy change.

---

Czech Republic and Slovakia. Almost all other opted for some for a hybrid presidential/parliamentarism.
stability, “guarding against the possibility of ever-changing, unpredictable policies” (Haggard, et. al., 2001: 321).

I suggest that several other attributes of presidential systems make them more stable in their foreign policy. One such attribute is separation of powers. Executive and legislative powers are divested into two separate institutional bodies – the presidency and the legislature. The framers of the U.S. Constitution (upon which virtually all presidential systems today are modeled), sought to construct a system that would avoid a "tyranny of the majority" by making compromise the norm and rapid, drastic policy changes more difficult to achieve. Decisionmaking and the lawmaking process are formally and legally shared between an individual and an often disparate body of individual legislators who have the capability to effectively constrain the executive’s policy agenda.

Members of the legislature are equipped with mechanisms to effectively block, delay and "water down" a president's proposals. In this fragmented decision-making process, presidents are compelled to seek compromise if they wish to avoid deadlock. Linz (1994), a critic of presidentialism, observes:

the political process therefore becomes broken into discontinuous, rigidly determined periods without the possibility of continuous readjustment as political, social, in economic events might require... (unlike) the much greater flexibility of that process in parliamentary systems (ibid.: 8-9).

The constraining effects of separation of powers are further exacerbated in cases where legislative bodies are bicameral. Effective bicameralism exists in a much greater degree in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems (Samuels and Eaton, 2002).
Separation of powers does not exist in parliamentary systems, where instead there is an “association of powers.” Legislative and executive functions are fused. The prime minister and his or her cabinet are almost always selected directly from parliament itself, and while in power, members of the government may retain their seats in parliament. If a party wins a majority of the seats in parliament, there is true “party government,” and government may pass its programs virtually intact, without much of the requisite bargaining and compromise found in presidential systems. This lack of a separation of powers is a significant difference that makes parliamentary systems generally less constrained than presidential democracies. While political and policy differences may exist within parliamentary government, prime ministers do not have to face opposition in an entirely separate body. The separation of powers creates an additional institutional veto player for presidential systems that makes new policies more difficult to undertake and old policies more difficult to break. Therefore, presidential systems should demonstrate more stable foreign policies than parliamentary democracies.

Another factor that should make presidential systems more prone to foreign policy stability concerns the constraints raised by separation of purpose, which refers to “the degree to which the executive and legislators have similar preferences and political incentives in response to, and are accountable to the same groups, pressures, and demands” (Samuels and Eaton, 2002: 7). Executives and legislators with a high separation of purpose are less likely to come to an agreement on policies and solutions since they must respond to different actors with different interests and preferences. Separation of purpose is not only more likely to occur in presidential systems, but its
impact is greater. This is largely a function of presidentialism’s system of separate elections and the separate origin of executives and legislators. Presidents and legislators stand for election in separate contests, often at different times. Each has a different origin in that presidents are not selected from legislatures. This means that each has a different constituency and different incentives to respond to different actors, pressures, and demands.

A president wishing to appeal to a majority of voters will more likely represent the political center, while principles of representation in the legislature produce individuals with more parochial preferences, interests and allegiances. Therefore, presidents and legislators, pursuing policies consistent with their own preferences, or acting rationally on behalf of their constituents’ interests, will likely be at odds on many issues. Separation of purpose is not tied to party identity and can easily occur even when a majority in the legislature is of the same party as the president. The fact that executives are directly elected in separate elections, however, allows voters to "split their votes," giving executive control to one party and legislative control to another. When this happens, separation of purpose is even more likely.

Separation of purpose tends to be much lower in parliamentary systems. Since there are no direct or separate elections for the prime minister, elections for members of parliament take on a more national scope, with voters casting votes for parliament based upon which party’s leader they would like to form a government (Linz, 1994). “Legislators in parliamentary systems ban together in parties that seek to present a relatively coherent face to the electorate in the form of a party label that is identified with a basket of policy positions. They are encouraged to do so because the only way
that legislators or their voters can influence the makeup of the executive branch is through their choice of party in legislative races” (Shugart and Haggard, 2001: 83).

Thus parliamentary elections tend to be more party-focused and legislative elections in presidential systems more candidate-focused. Elected members of parliament will tend to have a more nationally focused mandate from their constituents, who will reward them for adherence to the party line. The prime minister and a majority of those in parliament will have more similar preferences; and will have similar incentives to be responsive and accountable to the same groups, pressures and demands. A lower separation of purpose suggests that parliamentary executives will face fewer legislative constraints in policymaking than will presidents.

Separation of survival is a key factor that differentiates presidentialism from parliamentarism, with ramifications for the conduct of foreign policy. In presidential systems the fate of the executive is not tied in to the legislature. In parliamentary systems the government is responsible to the parliament and will remain in office only as long as it retains the support of a majority in parliament. If it loses that support, either parties in parliament must form a new government or hold new elections. This has a profound affect on the allegiance of members of the majority or government coalition party to the head of government. Self-interested parliamentarians would not want to risk their party losing power and face new elections by withdrawing support for the government over particular policies or legislation. Therefore cabinet ministers and rank-and-file legislators have “little incentive or ability to stray from the preference of their own party…(which are) powerfully shaped by national issues (Shugart and Haggard, 2001: 84). This “mutual
dependence” maximizes incentives for maintaining single-party or coalition majorities while minimizing the opportunities for legislative impasse (Stepan and Skach, 1994).

One way of assuring allegiance on important legislation is by tying it to a vote of confidence, whereby its defeat would cause the government to resign and new elections be held. Linz observes:

in parliamentary systems governments can demand from parties (either their own if they have a majority or those in the coalition) support in votes of confidence, threatening them otherwise with resignation in the case of lack of support and ultimately with dissolution of the legislature. The role of each party and even of each deputy would be clear to the voters, who are unlikely to sanction destructive actions by parties. The party that failed to support its prime minister would have to pay a price (Linz, 1994: 64).

Arend Lijphart (1994) contrasts this with presidential systems:

[in parliamentary systems], on every important vote, legislators must cast their votes not only on the merits of the particular issue but also on keeping the cabinet in office: the fact that most legislators do not want to upset the cabinet too frequently gives the cabinet very strong leverage over the process of legislation. In presidential systems, the legislature can deal with bills on their merits without the fear of causing a cabinet crisis—and hence without being “blackmailed” by the executive into accepting its proposals (ibid.: 96).

Separation of survival contributes to the weak party systems that are generally found in presidential systems. Presidents cannot (and need not) rely on a majority of support from the legislature, even if his or her party holds a majority of the seats, since legislators in presidential systems have incentives to focus on the local and special interests that support them. To enact their programs, presidents must therefore continually build and maintain coalitions within the legislature, and bargain and compromise on their agendas. Since parliamentary legislators have strong personal
incentives to support the national policies of their party to a much greater degree than do legislators in presidential systems, parliamentary executives should face fewer constraints in their ability to enact policies, including foreign policy change.

The separate origin and survival of the executive and legislature in presidential systems also makes them more open to the influence of interest groups, since organized interests will always have at least two points of entry to exert their influence (Vogel, 1993). Additionally, weak party systems ensure that individual legislators will not lose their jobs or face being disciplined by their party for allowing these groups to influence their policy decisions. “The greater number of access point suggests that demand side pressures may have relatively greater success at influencing the policy process in presidential systems, thereby increasing the cost of moving policy from the status quo " (Samuels and Eaton, 2002: 36). On the other hand, "unity of survival in parliamentary systems limits how responsive legislators can be to lobbies” (ibid.). The constraining effects of interest group participation on foreign policy change would appear to be greater in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems.

The literature on the ways institutional characteristics may contribute to democratic breakdown also offers insight into the foreign policy stability of presidential and parliamentary systems. One of the most influential pieces in the past decade is Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela’s *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (1994). In addition to the fact that presidents and members of the legislature are elected to separate, fixed terms, Linz finds another drawback of presidentialism – its "dual democratic legitimacy.” Dual democratic legitimacy arises from the fact that
both the popularly elected president and the elected legislature can rightfully claim
democratic legitimacy. Presidents will claim a strong mandate that they represent all
of the people (even though often that may not be the case); and legislators, often
representing different political, and parochial interests, also lay claim to that
legitimacy. The result is often a veto or stalemate on legislation, which presidential
systems have no way of resolving. Dual legitimacy thus provides one other prospect
for constraints in presidential systems.

Of interest to the study, it must be noted that there are aspects of
presidentialism that suggest presidents will have significant freedom to act in foreign
policy. Chief executives in almost every presidential system have some
constitutionally granted lawmaking authority. While there is great variation across
presidential systems, these powers include the ability to make diplomatic and
administrative appointments, act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and veto
legislation. In some countries these powers can be quite significant. Shugart and
Haggard (2001) observe, however, that the strongest presidential powers exist in
countries that are prone to high separation of purpose. They hypothesize that
presidents in these societies are granted extraordinary powers in order to compensate
for the "indecision, deadlock, and particularism" that would otherwise prevail. They
caution that strong presidential powers cannot offset the constraining effects that a
high separation of purpose has on policy decisiveness; and that presidential powers are
used as a source of policy change only under limited circumstances, when there is
explicit delegation to the president on the part of the legislature, or in crisis settings
when legislatures are willing to grant greater leeway. Other “reactive” powers, such
as the veto, can only reinforce policy stability. Others positing that presidents are less
restrained in foreign policymaking than parliamentary governments stress the fact that
premiers and their cabinets are dependent upon the legislature for support, which
serves as a significant constraint on their freedom to act (Maoz and Russett, 1993).
Auerswald’s conclusion that parliaments are more subject to the meddling effects of
the legislature supports this contention. However, for the reasons outlined above I
suggest, that on balance, presidents will be more constrained in their foreign policy
conduct than will parliamentary executives.

An early study comparing foreign policymaking in presidential and
parliamentary systems is Kenneth Waltz’s *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*
(1967). Waltz compares the foreign policy decision-making processes in the United
States and Great Britain and concludes that the American presidential system is more
effective; however, his observations suggest mixed ramifications for foreign policy
stability. On the one hand he states that a source for long-term stability and
commitment for presidential systems is the fact that Congress, an independent
legislature with varied interests, must approve many executive actions. On the other
hand, he concludes that prime ministers are actually more constrained in their decision
making than are presidents. He argues that party discipline in parliamentary systems
is actually a source of weakness, since executives must depend on the support of
members of their party to remain in power. This leads to a situation where party
cohesion takes precedence, and prime ministers bargain, make concessions and avoid
controversial issues, lest they risk losing their needed majority support. The result is
“massive continuity, painfully slow adjustment, response to crisis only when they have
almost hopelessly deepened" (Waltz, 1967: 3-4). This conclusion, however, ignores the fact that individual members of parliament are likewise dependent upon supporting their party to stay in power and that it is in their best political self-interest to do so. Particularly in the British system, prime ministers have a means to ensure party discipline, and Charles Hermann (1968) notes that the British House of Commons has not voted a majority out of office since 1895.

Stephen D. Krasner has characterized the United States as a "weak state" in his analysis of foreign policymaking in the American presidential system, where the central characteristics are the fragmentation and dispersion of power and authority. He observes the important effects of separation of purpose and notes that cleavages between Congress and the president have often been greater than those between political parties. The fragmentation of power within Congress itself, through its committee system, creates further "decision making nodes" where policies can be blocked. He characterizes policy change in these states in terms of a "punctuated equilibrium," where significant changes only come in response to crisis situations (Krasner, 1976; 1984). "Once policies had been adopted, they are pursued until a new crisis demonstrates that they are no longer feasible" (Krasner, 1976: 341; see also Hoffman, 1989).

Cowhey (1993) concludes that the U.S. presidential system, when compared to that of Japan's parliament, makes it easier for America to maintain its policy commitments. He explains America’s success in developing multilateral institutions, such as GATT and NATO, in terms of the U.S. separation of powers, which enables each branch a veto over policy; and the nature of its electoral system, which
encourages parochial interests in Congress. In Japan's parliamentary system of
democracy, political power is concentrated, which makes it easier to undertake major
policy initiatives. In the absence of "built-in checks on reversals of policy promises...
it is easier both to initiate and to reverse major foreign policy promises" (ibid.: 315).

To summarize, presidential democratic systems differ fundamentally from
parliamentary democracies. The separation of powers, separation of purpose, and
separation of survival inherent in presidential systems contribute to a weaker party
system, different constituencies and allegiances for policymakers, and a greater
openness to multiple influences on policy decisions. Collectively these aspects create
more veto players and generally more constraints on the policy-making process in
presidential systems. Or, as stated in the second hypothesis:

H2: States with presidential democracies demonstrate a greater degree of
stability in their foreign policies than do states with parliamentary
democracies.

Contextual Approaches

The presidential-parliamentary dichotomy, however, is by no means the only
institutional distinction in the democratic settings. Within presidential and
parliamentary systems are a myriad of other arrangements that can impact the stability
of a state's foreign policy. Scholars in the past decade have begun to challenge long-
held assumptions about the superiority of parliamentary systems (see Epstein, 1967).
Some lines of argument have trumpeted the merits of presidentialism over
parliamentarism, including a higher degree of accountability to voters, the
identifiability of winners in elections, and the mutual checks on powers of the
executive and the legislature (Sugart and Carey, 1992). Others have argued that the presidential-parliamentary distinction is cast at too high a level of abstraction and that the differences within each system are so great that the dichotomy has no real explanatory value (Haggard and McCubbins, 2001; Shugart and Haggard, 2001; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Haggard, McCubbins and Shugart, 2001; Cheibub and Limongi, 2002; for an alternate view that key distinctions do exist between the systems see Samuels and Eaton 2002).

A proponent of this latter view, which has been called the "contextual view," is George Tsebelis. His concept of veto players provides a framework for analyzing constraints on policymaking that can be applied across and throughout presidential and parliamentary settings. As outlined briefly earlier, the veto player concept stems from the idea of checks and balances present under the U.S. Constitution, and is defined as "an individual or collective actor whose agreement by majority rule for collective actors is required for a change in policy" (Tsebelis, 1995: 301). Institutional veto players refer to institutional bodies such as the presidency or legislature. Partisan veto players take the form of members of the government coalition or a legislature. Policy stability in any system is a function of three characteristics of its veto players – their number, their congruence (the differences in the political positions of the veto players) and their cohesion (the similarity of policy positions of those that comprise each veto players). The potential for policy change decreases as the number of veto players increases and the congruence and cohesion of veto players decreases. This concept will be addressed further throughout the chapter as hypotheses are developed about
how different types of presidential and parliamentary systems are more or less prone to foreign policy change.

**Presidentialism and Divided Government**

One aspect unique to presidential systems that may influence foreign policy stability is the possibility of *divided government*. Divided government occurs when a different party from that of the president controls the legislative branch. These situations occur in presidential systems as a consequence of separate elections for the executive and legislators and the separation of survival present in such systems. When the fortunes of legislative candidates are not tied to that of the executive, and elections are held separately, the tone and tenor of those races become very different. Legislators seeking election in (often) smaller and geographically separate districts appeal to a narrower set of more parochial interests. Presidential candidates, on the other hand, must appeal to the broader electorate and represent interests of a more national focus. Since voters may focus on issues of interest to their districts when voting at the legislative level, and issues of national interest when voting at the presidential level, it is often the case that separate parties control each of these bodies.

Divided government has important consequences for the conduct of foreign policy and foreign policy change in a number of ways. First, divided government increases the number of veto players already present in the system, making the agreement necessary for policy change more difficult to achieve. While the number of *institutional* veto players is specified in a state’s constitution, the number of *partisan* veto players can vary from election to the election. According to Tsebelis (1995, 2002), divided government will add an additional veto player to the policy-making
process because parties generally have different policy positions. As Shugart and Haggard observe, "Under divided government, a wider range of interests must necessarily be accommodated for policy to be enacted. As a result, the potential for stalemate increases" (2001: 82).

Second, the separation of powers and purpose, already forces for policy stability, are reinforced with partisan concerns that dominate divided government. Incentives already facing legislators to respond to local interests in their district as opposed to the president's program and any "mandate" he might have nationally, are coupled with the fact that divided government provides parties with electoral incentives that discourage support for presidential initiatives:

When party control of Congress and the presidency is divided, partisan considerations dominate these institutions’ relations. Opposition politicians will sometimes find electoral advantage in frustrating the other side, even when doing so prevents them from satisfying their own policy goals... The conflict and impasse a divided government frequently inspires are not born of frustration from failing in a sincere search for mutually acceptable policies; rather they are more calculated and designed to yield advantage in the next election (Kernell, 1991: 96-97).

Studies have shown that partisan loyalties are an important feature in congressional support for a president's foreign policy (Wittkopf and McCormick 1998, 1999).

Additionally, majority control of a legislative body may, as in the case of United States, afford the opposing party considerable tools to influence the policy agenda, such as through control of committees. Strong partisanship combined with legislative mechanisms to control a policy agenda provides powerful impediments to foreign policy change.
It should be noted that this contention runs somewhat contrary to the traditional notion that American presidents have a relatively free hand in the conduct of foreign policy. In cases of deadlock, presidents may break the impasse by veto, appealing directly to the American people; “going public” with foreign policy commitments; or making wider use of executive agreements (Cox and Kernell, 1991, 1991B). Wildavsky (1966) developed his “two presidencies thesis” based on the notion that presidents have greater success in dealing with Congress on foreign and defense matters than on domestic policies, and that Congress is less likely to intervene on foreign policy issues. Statistical analysis, however, has called this claim into question (Bond and Fleisher, 1990; Nincic, 1992).

In cases of divided government in the United States, Congress has shown a willingness to block the foreign policy initiatives of presidents. Sundquist (1982) observed that the Democrat Congress confronting Gerald Ford refused to acknowledge agreements Nixon made with South Vietnam and rejected aid packages to the country, blocked a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, sided with Greece in the dispute over Cyprus, and blocked his attempts to intervene in Angola. Clark’s (2001) study of foreign policy substitution found that American presidents are more likely to substitute trade action for military action in cases of divided government, which has a restraining effect on more aggressive policies. Regan’s (2000) study of policy substitution explains decisions to intervene in internal conflicts in terms of a political calculus and finds that presidents are less likely to undertake policy changes when there is divided government and they may face stronger political opposition to the new policy.
Most recently, the constraining effects that divided government can have on a
president’s ability to conduct foreign policy were reflected in the words of Senator
Tom Daschle. Less than 12 hours after his party lost control of the Senate in the 2002
elections, giving President Bush a Republican majority in both houses of Congress, he
observed that with the Republican majority:

I think it means that the president has an opportunity here
to enact and proceed with the plan (on Iraq) as he has
articulated it…It is too early to tell what will happen on
Iraq, but you will probably see a far more hawkish position
and confrontational tone to their approach.

Without the constraints imposed by divided government, the majority leader conceded
that the president would have a much easier time undertaking foreign policy change in
the form of a more aggressive stance toward Iraq.

I posit that for a number of reasons, divided government in presidential
systems will make foreign policy change less likely than would occur in cases of
unified government. Divided government reinforces the constraints already present
through the institutional separation of powers and the separation of purpose. Divided
government creates an additional veto player with interests, goals and agendas
frequently different from that of the president, as well as partisan incentives to resist
the policy agenda of the president. For significant foreign policy change to occur in a
divided presidential system, not only must a president often formulate a policy that
will be accepted by an entirely separate and independent branch of government; he
must do so with a body that is largely ideologically opposed to him that has political
incentives to derail the effort. This will be tested in the third hypothesis of this
dissertation:
H3: Presidential democracies with divided government demonstrate a greater degree of stability in their foreign policies than do presidential democracies with unified government.

Presidentialism and Multipartism

Another variation among presidential systems that I propose will impact foreign policy stability is the existence of a multi-party system. Multipartism should make changes in foreign policy more difficult than in two-party systems. In these instances presidents must not only contend with an institutional separation of powers, they will likely find it more difficult to build coalitions in the legislature without any sort of working majority. Additionally, the greater the number of parties, the more likely they are ideologically diverse, further making the agreement necessary for policy change to occur more difficult.

Whether any system (presidential or parliamentary) functions as a two-party or multi-party system is largely a function of electoral formulas. Single member district plurality formulas tend to produce two-party systems, while proportional representation tends to lead to the formation of multiple viable parties (Duverger, 1986). The two-party/multi-party distinction is important in that it informs the degree to which members of the legislature are likely to agree on a common set of goals or objectives, and the extent to which they may be able to work together to achieve them (cohesion). It also informs the degree to which the legislature will effectively work with the president (congruence) (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002).

In a single member district plurality "first past the post" electoral system, a candidate has an incentive to appeal to the widest group of voters as possible, since

---

Quotes appeared in the Nov. 6, 2002 Argus Leader and Reuters news service reports
staking out extreme positions or appealing to very narrow interests will be punished at the ballot box. Interests, ideology, and policy positions will tend to converge around two major competing parties, which are less ideological, more cohesive with one another and more representative of the political middle. Examples of the United States and United Kingdom illustrate that two-party systems will typically produce a center-left party (Democratic, Labour) and a center-right party (Republican, Conservative). Other electoral systems, such as proportional representation or those that allow multiple members to be elected from the same district, permit a more eclectic mix of ideas and interests. It is possible for multiple parties to win enough votes that they are awarded seats in the legislature. Multi-party systems permit a much wider range of interests to be represented and the ideological space between the parties is much greater.

Another important consequence is that two-party systems tend to be one-dimensional party systems. Since two parties cannot absorb multiple issue dimensions, the main parties usually differ only in regard to socio-economic issues. The number of issue dimensions in multi-party systems varies with the number of parties. In addition to socioeconomic issues, other dimensions may include religious, cultural and ethnic, urban and rural, pro-system and anti-system, materialist and post-materialist, and foreign policy (Lijphart, 1999). The correlation between numbers of parties and number of issue dimensions is closely related. When there is an increase in the number of issue dimensions, there will likewise be an increase in the number of parties (Taagepera and Grofman, 1985; Lijphart, 1999).
These constraints on policymaking should be especially prominent in presidential settings. The combination of presidentialism and multipartism, and the deadlock and immobilization associated with it, has been attributed to the breakdown of democratic government in Latin America (Mainwaring, 1993). Multi-party systems make it rare for the president’s party to have a majority in the legislature, and presidents must continuously build new legislative coalitions to pass important policies. In multi-party systems a president is more likely to have fewer representatives of his own party in the legislature, making this coalition building even more difficult. Greater ideological space between the parties also makes this coalition building more difficult. The separation of survival and purpose makes agreements that are made with party leaders in the legislature less binding, since they face fewer incentives to support the executive or follow a party line.

Duverger (1964) also expressed concerns over the stability of multi-party presidential democracies, albeit with different implications for foreign policy stability. Unlike two-party systems where “parties are big enough to dwarf the president,” his concern was that in “weak and ineffectual” multi-party systems presidents would come to dominate the policy process. However impotent multi-party legislatures may be in presidential systems, this contention must be tempered with those outlined above. When legislative support is required for major policy actions, and legislatures have the power to block presidential initiatives, I posit that even a fractionalized body without a majority or organized opposition can still effectively stalemate presidential initiatives.

In summary, multi-party systems exacerbate constraints on foreign policy decisionmaking already present in democratic presidential systems under separation of
powers. The greater number of parties representing a much wider ideological spectrum, inherent in multi-party systems, makes forming stable majorities and coalition building more difficult. Not only must chief executives in such systems contend with constraints emanating from a lack of congruence between bodies, but also problems of cohesion within the legislature itself. I suggest this will make impasse and stalemate more likely and foreign policy change less likely:

**H4: Multi-party presidential democracies demonstrate a greater degree of stability in their foreign policies than do two-party presidential democracies.**

Parliamentary Democracy: Single-Party Governments and Coalition Governments

As with presidential democracies, there is great variation among parliamentary systems, with implications for a state's capacity to undertake foreign policy change. Considered here are cases of single-party government, where a single party, usually winning an outright majority of seats, is able to form a government on its own, and coalition governments, where usually no party wins an outright majority and a government must be formed from more than one party.

In Arend Lijphart’s (1984, 1999) classic analysis of modern democratic systems, he outlines two models of democracy. Although his analysis is not limited to parliamentary systems, I find it useful here in identifying some of the key differences between single-party and coalition governments and how they impact the decision-making process. The Westminster Model describes majoritarianism (of which single-party party governments are one element), where power is concentrated in the hands of a bare majority. The Consensus Model (of which coalition governments are one
element), on the other hand, seeks to maximize majorities, and "its rules and
institutions aim at broad participation in government and broad agreement on policies
that the government should pursue" (Lijphart, 1999: 2). Single-party and coalition
systems differ fundamentally in the concentration of executive power, executive-
legislative relationships and party systems. This makes foreign policy change more
likely in single-party government systems.

In single-party governments executive power is concentrated in one-party and
bare majority cabinets. Typically the party winning the majority of seats forms the
government and the cabinet. The minority is completely excluded from power and
relegated to strictly an opposition role. In coalition systems, power is shared with
several parties, with a greater representation and variety of interests participating in
the decision-making process. In single-party government systems the cabinet
(executive) tends to dominate parliament since that party holds a majority of seats. As
Lijphart describes the situation in the United Kingdom:

In theory, because the House of Commons can vote a
cabinet out of office, it "controls" the cabinet. In reality,
the relationship is reversed. Because the cabinet is
composed of the leaders of a cohesive majority in the
House of Commons, it is normally backed by the majority
in the House of Commons, and it can confidently count on
staying in office and getting its legislative proposals
approved. The cabinet is clearly dominant vis-à-vis the
parliament (Lijphart, 1999: 11-12).

Under systems of coalition government there is greater parity in the executive-
legislative balance of power. Because no single party within the government enjoys a
majority and can completely rely on the support and confidence of parliament, the
broad, often uncohesive coalitions that form cabinets require a more "give-and-take"
relationship with the parties and legislators in parliament. Additionally, single-party
governments tend to exist in two-party systems, while coalition governments are
common in multi-party systems.

Each of these factors is very much interrelated. Two-party systems permit the
formation of majorities; majorities permit the formation of single-party government;
which in turn permits the emergence of a cohesive government able to dominate
parliament and rely on the confidence of the majority in parliament. Likewise, multi-
party systems reduce the likelihood of the formation of outright single-party
majorities; creating the necessity of coalition government; which in turn produces a
government that is less cohesive and must more carefully cultivate and maintain the
confidence of a majority in parliament. Additionally, as outlined above, the greater
number of parties associated with coalition governments means that there will likely
be greater ideological diversity in these systems, as well as more policy dimensions.

The essence of executive dominance in single-party governments means that
they will face far fewer constraints in foreign policy decisionmaking than will
coalition governments. Single-party parliamentary majority governments represent
the most cohesive and the least fractionalized of all democracies. Internal cohesion is
high because members of the same party hold all cabinet portfolios. The cabinets can
dominate parliament unfettered by concerns that the government will fall due to a loss
of confidence. The decision-making process in coalition governments is far more
constrained. Since the government's existence typically depends upon the support of
all coalition parties, prime ministers have strong incentives to distribute cabinet
portfolios proportionally to the weight of each party (Samuels and Eaton, 2002).
Since different parties hold cabinet portfolios, internal cohesion within the cabinet is much lower. In some cases key ministerial posts such as prime minister, defense minister, and foreign minister may be held by members of different parties. Even small parties that are members of a coalition may wield significant influence. In Germany, the Free Democrat Party and (more recently) the Green Party, though seldom winning more than 10 percent of the vote nationally, have consistently been a part of German coalition governments. Their reward for facilitating the formation of a government has been a top cabinet post, usually foreign minister. Controlling this post has permitted the German government’s junior partner to effectively block foreign policy initiatives favored by the senior partner. These include prevention of German participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative and postponement of the modernization of short-range nuclear forces in 1989 (see Kaarbo, 1996).

As a result, coalition government ministers must take a much more accommodating stance in policymaking, accounting for and accepting a much broader range of interests. Governments cannot rely on the confidence of just one party, and the withdrawal of a coalition member, even a rather junior member, may cause the government to collapse and new elections to be held. Disputes over foreign policy issues can lead to coalition crises putting at stake the very question of who governs (ibid.). Relations between the executive and the rest of parliament are also less stable than in single-party government situations. Therefore, leaders of coalition governments will be more averse to risky policy pursuits than single-party government executives, since members of the legislature will be especially sensitive to the success and failure of the executive (see Auerswald, 1999).
In terms of veto players, all else being equal, a single-party government has only one – the majority party that forms the government. In coalition governments, however, that number is as high as the number of parties in the coalition, since desertion of a coalition partner threatens the collapse of government (Tsebelis, 1995). The greater number of veto players places more barriers in the way of the decision-making process, making change more difficult. Tsebelis observes that in the United Kingdom, common complaints concern frequent policy reversals, while in coalition governments such as Italy, with many parties (and many veto players) complaints tend to revolve around policy immobilism (ibid., 1995).

An illustration of coalition constraints in the conduct of foreign policy can be found in the Dutch government’s decisions regarding NATO’s planned deployment of nuclear weapons in Western Europe and the early 1980s. Coalition governments at the time managed only very small collective majorities in parliament, with the defection of just one or two parliamentarians threatening to bring down the entire government. The result was deadlock and a “minimalist” foreign policy that precluded a single, coherent course of action and delayed a final decision through three different governments (see Hagan et al., 2001; Van Staden, 1985).

C.S. Ahn (1997) contrasts foreign policymaking in Japan under the period of LDP dominance, with the advent of coalition politics in the 1990s. After decades of single-party government, Japan’s foreign policy-making apparatus was confronted with conflict and dissention for the first time. Under LDP rule, the prime minister was largely able to circumvent formal and legal limitations on executive power due to the fact that he was not only chief executive but also party leader. Under coalition
government, conflicts emerged for the first time between the prime minister and ministry of defense; and the Diet itself began to abandon its role as a “rubber stamp” on LDP policy initiatives.

For reasons outlined above, I posit that coalition parliamentary governments are less likely to undertake foreign policy change than are single-party governments. In single-party governments, power is concentrated into a single cohesive ruling body that can effectively dominate the parliament. Since ministers can confidently rely on the support of a majority of parliament, they are far less constrained in their decisionmaking than are multi-party coalition governments, where there is a greater diversity of interests present within government and the parliament, greater parity in executive-parliamentary relations, and less cohesion within the government itself. Consequently, foreign policy decisionmaking in coalition governments should be more incremental, reflecting the accommodation and bargaining necessary in holding together a more diverse and less ideologically cohesive ruling body. Thus, the fifth hypothesis of this dissertation:

**H5: Parliamentary democracies with coalition governments demonstrate a greater degree of stability in their foreign policies than do parliamentary democracies with single-party governments.**

**Coalition Governments and the Number of Parties in Parliament**

Another important consideration for coalition governments is support within parliament. In majority single-party governments, the cabinet may take majority support in parliament largely for granted, since its defeat would mean new elections and possible minority status for majority parliamentarians. This "in or out" dynamic
ensures loyalty and cohesion. The situation is very different in coalition governments. Since there is relative parity in executive-legislative powers in these cases (Lijphart, 1999), support for the government from within the parliament is much more important. This becomes more difficult with a greater number of parties. With a greater number of parties, the greater the likelihood that they will represent a wider ideological spectrum and bring to the table a greater number of issue dimensions. Contending with a greater number of parties, governments must ensure that their policies are acceptable to a much wider range of interests than in systems where there are fewer parties represented.

A greater number of parties also mean that the size of the predominant party in the coalition will be smaller. The existence of a "predominant" or "senior" party in a coalition has been identified as an important factor in overcoming the decision-making constraints associated with coalitions (Hagan, 1993). Hanrieder and Auton (1980) compare foreign policymaking in Germany under 1966-1969 Grand Coalition between the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats to later periods when one of the larger parties shared power with the smaller Free Democrats. They found that agreement was much easier to attain when a large party dominated.¹

As a result, I would expect that in coalition governments where there are a greater number of parties represented in parliament, states will undertake fewer bold foreign policy initiatives that could risk failure, or offend or adversely affect members of the legislature upon whom the government relies for support. Through a policy process characterized more by accommodation and bargaining, policy outcomes will

¹ This view contradicts that of Tsebelis, who stresses the number rather than size of coalition parties as an important constraint on policy change.
be more “watered down,” incremental and status quo. As reflected in the sixth hypothesis of this dissertation:

**H6: In parliamentary democracies with coalition governments, the greater the effective number of parties seated in the parliament, the more stable a state’s foreign policy.**

**Non-Democracies and Military Governments**

The first hypothesis of this dissertation posits that fewer constraints on non-democratic leaders, combined with unique incentives to utilize the state’s foreign policy for political purposes and regime maintenance, would make non-democracies undertake more changes in foreign policy than democracies. One possible exception may be those cases where the military takes an active role in the political leadership of a non-democratic regime. The reasons for this are related to the circumstances under which military governments come to power, the preferences and ideology of military leadership, and the formulas they use for maintaining power and governing.

Military governments typically come to power following a perceived crisis. While some military governments remain in power for long periods of time, typically their stated purpose is temporary – to restore order and national unity. The interest of military regimes then, is not to remake society, but solve “the problem” that brought them to power and restore political stability. Thus military rulers do not see their role as remaking society, but a restoration of order and maintenance of their institutional integrity. Often military governments come to power in response to a “knock on the barracks door,” and leaders of military juntas frequently show no interest in remaining in power indefinitely. In fact, differences within the military leadership over its
continued role in politics are often an important step in the process of transition to

Military governance has been characterized as "decisionmaking without
politics.” Rather than seeking to mobilize sectors for popular support, military
governments, particularly bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, instead seek to
depoliticize the process and relegate policy decision to those of technical, rather than
political, concerns (Collier, 1979; O’Donnell, 1980). Rejecting any pretense of
responding to the will of the people or organized groups, military governments have
been characterized as having transferred the technical and rational process of military
decisionmaking to national governance:

Politics as a regulated conflict, competition and
compromise is transformed into the apolitical politics of
consensus, acquiescence and government by fiat

Formulas for legitimization open to many civilian non-democratic leaders who
might encourage a politicized foreign policy prove difficult for the military, where the
“military mind” and its associated managerial qualities, traditional values, and
command-obey structure are not easily transplanted into politics (Danopoulos, 1983).
Max Weber (1947) identified three principles for attaining and maintaining
legitimacy: charismatic rule, where a leader appeals to the masses based the force of
his personality; an appeal to traditional beliefs and practices; and legal-rational
legitimacy, based on an adherence to democratic ideals and principles. The latter is
not an option for non-democratic leaders. Charismatic rule does not fit with the
military principles of order and hierarchy or its bureaucratic structure (Nordlinger,
An appeal to traditional beliefs and practices in fact may be more likely to promote foreign policy stability.

While military governments may have preferences that would indicate a stable foreign policy, they are also the ones directly controlling one of foreign policy’s key instruments – the use of force. Without military support or acquiescence, any foreign policy change would be difficult to achieve. Additionally, whenever the military is part of the government, a potential source of government opposition (the military itself) is in effect co-opted.

The stability of the foreign policies of military governments is illustrated in Park, Ko and Kim’s study of the foreign policies of Taiwan and Korea during both their democratic and non-democratic periods. They characterize the politics of these countries between the late 1960s and late 1980s as bureaucratic-authoritarian. Utilizing the military as a power base, these governments exhibited a “depoliticization of social issues in exchange for technical rationality” and the use of "security, stability, and economic growth" as a legitimizing ideology. The commitment to national security as an ideology constrained the flexibility of these governments, whose foreign policies were “highly inflexible and dogmatic.” It was not until after democratization, and its concomitant change in value systems and political ideologies, that a policy of Nordpolitik – rapprochement with North Korea and the People’s Republic of China – became a viable policy option (Park, Ko and Kim, 1994).

Military governments are a unique form of non-democracy whose characteristics suggest fundamental differences in the conduct of foreign policy when compared to other forms of non-democratic government. The circumstances that
bring them to power, their goals, preferences, and ideologies suggest that non-
democratic military governments will foster greater foreign policy stability than will
non-military non-democratic governments (see also Perlmutter, 1977; Collier, 1979;
O’Donnell, 1980):

**H7: Non-democratic governments in which the military is a member will
engage in a more stable foreign policy than will non-democratic
governments where the military is not a member.**

**Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries**

Another set of factors that will be considered is not regime or institution
related, but nonetheless should significantly impact a state’s foreign policy stability.
The first of these concern a state’s level of development.

Leaders of less developed countries are confronted with a daunting task. They
must simultaneously address acute political and economic problems, while having few
resources with which to do so. In many of these states there is a notable lack of
political institutionalization, and organized competition for control of the reins of
government and the policy agenda is frequently viewed as a threat to the regime itself
(see Good, 1962; Dawisha, 1990). In a system where leaders perceive themselves to
be vulnerable, foreign policy becomes an important legitimizing tool:

Political debates often raise fundamental questions over the
legitimacy of basic political arrangements and even the
existence of the national political order itself (as a
result)...the leadership’s domestic political needs are a
powerful factor behind foreign policy...(the) management
of volatile and polarized opposition does not usually take
the form of bargaining and compromise... (Rather), foreign
policy issues are to be manipulated to legitimate the current
regime’s hold on power (Hagan, 1993: 56-57).
With few economic resources available, foreign policy becomes an attractive and less costly way of legitimization, and can be used to isolate domestic opponents, divert attention from certain difficult and intractable issues, and establish nationalist credentials (Weinstein, 1972, 1976). In his seminal study of small state foreign policy behavior, East (1973) showed that states with limited economic and military resources are not confined to low levels of participation in world affairs, low levels of conflict behavior, or a reticence to use force. Instead, they have been shown to take part in high-risk behavior, to exhibit high levels of overall participation in world affairs, and to become involved in conflict. Likewise, K.J. Holsti suggests that smaller, less developed states may be more prone to restructure their foreign policies as they seek to “assert autonomy, to control transnational processes, to destroy the residue of colonialism, and to escape from the embrace of a hegemon” (Holsti, 1982:ix-x).

Steven David describes a situation where leaders in developing countries, facing both internal and domestic threats, must “omnibalance” demands and threats coming from both arenas, and they “will sometimes protect themselves at the expense of the interests of the state” (David, 1991: 236).

In what he calls the “dilemma of dependence,” Franklin Weinstein (1972, 1976) outlines how foreign policy is “used” when a developing state is torn between pursuing two mutually exclusive foreign policies – one of “independence” and one of “development.” States seek to avoid the domination and influence associated with dependence on a major power, yet at the same time, due to conditions of poverty and economic development, there exists a recognized need to attract foreign aid and investment. Using elite interviews with key foreign policy decisionmakers in
Indonesia, Weinstein finds that while Indonesia’s foreign policy changed after
Sukarno seized power from Suharto, elite attitudes and beliefs regarding
“independence” and “development” did not. However, as Sukarno eliminated
domestic opposition, it became politically safer to pursue the policy of development,
even though it may have been less politically popular (Weinstein, 1972,1976). The
Indonesia case illustrates how, depending upon the perceived vulnerabilities of the
government or regime, foreign policy decisionmakers may be “pushed” into pursuing
a particular policy, or at other times have the political latitude to “pull” the country
with them toward pursuing another more prudent, but perhaps less popular, policy.

Developed countries with more established institutions do not face these
constraints to the extent that less developed states do. In addition, developed states are
likely more “satisfied” with their pattern of foreign relations, and the costs of changing
them would be much higher (K.J. Holsti, 1982). The constraints and incentives for
foreign policy change that especially affect less developed states is the basis of the
eighth hypothesis:

**H8: The more developed states will engage in a more stable foreign policy
than will the less developed states.**

**Leadership Change and Foreign Policy Change**

Another factor that will be considered (and controlled for), concerns periods
when there is a change in the leadership of a state. Empirical studies have shown that
changes in leadership (even relatively minor changes) usually coincide with a change
in foreign policy (see Moon, 1985; Hagan, 1989). Leadership changes bring to the
decision-making process new actors with a different set of beliefs, ideas, preferences
and goals. The most striking cases are those of a true revolution, such as in Iran. Although this country throughout its history has been ruled by a non-democratic regime, the revolution of 1979 that overthrew Muhammad Reza Shah and eventually installed the Ayatollah Kohmeini produced drastic changes in Iran’s foreign policy, even though its regime type did not change. While it is necessary to control for these effects, there still may be a relationship between leadership change, regime type and foreign policy.

I posit that there are theoretical reasons to believe that when there is a change in leadership under a non-democratic regime, there will be more dramatic changes in foreign policy than is the case when democratic states change leaders. In democracies there are open channels through which opposition can compete and vie for political power. Because leaders must rely on public support to get elected and remain in office, alternative views on major issues must at least be considered, and policy output is usually the result of bargain and compromise. When a new leader comes into office, he too faces these same institutional constraints. Policy will be a more watered down version of what the leader wants, rather than a true reflection of his preferences; and because there is an outlet for opposition, actors have an opportunity to influence the agenda. This is not the case in authoritarian regimes, where the ideological space between the “in” and “out” groups is far greater. With no “release valve” to channel opposition, the political situation becomes polarized. Rather than being centered on narrow issues of policy, opposition is frequently “anti-system.” Repression further polarizes the opposition.
This notion was explored by East, Salmore and Charles Hermann (1978), who stated that leader-autonomous decision-making groups will more frequently select foreign behaviors involving change from the government’s previous position than will delegative groups and assemblies, who tend to select policies involving less change. Gaubatz (1996) makes a similar assertion in his study of democracy and alliance commitments, suggesting that, since democratic leadership changes are regularized as well as being a regular, the policy differences between them will be far less substantial than in non-democratic states, which lack an effective means for leadership transition.

Democracies accommodate opposition while non-democracies tend to ignore, resist or repress it. The mitigating influence of democratic institutions and the opportunities they present for opposition to make their views known and heard should mean that when opposition does come to power, their foreign policies will not differ as significantly from that of their predecessors when compared to leadership changes in non-democratic regimes. Therefore, the ninth hypothesis of this dissertation:

**H9: Changes of leadership in democratic states will produce less dramatic changes in foreign policy than will leadership changes in non-democratic states.**

This chapter outlined some of the key differences within the major regime types and developed hypotheses about how those differences impact foreign policy change. Differences in institutional arrangements, party systems and players in government all create different constraints and incentives for change. The following chapter will empirically test each of these hypotheses.
CHAPTER 5
METHODS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter will model and test each of the hypotheses developed in the foregoing chapters. I will first identify the data used and operationalize each of the dependent, independent and control variables. I will then explain the models used and employ a pooled, cross-sectional time series analysis to test the hypotheses.

Data: The Dependent Variables

The dependent variable in this dissertation is *foreign policy change*, which is operationalized three different ways. One uses events data and measures foreign policy change in terms of changes in conflictual and cooperative foreign policy behavior. Two other schemes employ measures of foreign policy in terms of votes cast in the United Nations General Assembly. One of these schemes measures foreign policy change in terms of changes in the patterns of voting similarity between states on all United Nations roll call votes. The other measure captures change in terms of changes in voting coincidence with the United States on salient votes deemed important to the United States.

Events Data

The Conflict and Peace Databank, or COPDAB is a longitudinal events data set that records international events and interactions for countries in terms of their level of cooperation and conflict. Data used in this dissertation cover the years 1953 to 1978, the last year for which these data were collected. COPDAB specifies international interactions as "occurrences between nation-states that are distinct enough from the constant flow of ‘transactions,’ (e.g., trade, mail flow) to stand out
against this background as ‘reportable,’ or ‘newsworthy’” (Azar, 1993: 6). Data are coded from reports in 99 different newspapers, magazines, annual reports, chronologies and historical accounts from throughout the world. Regional experts assisted in the coding procedures. Relevant information includes: date; actor who initiated the event; target to whom the event was directed; the activity initiated; the type of issue involved (political, military, economic, etc.); and a scale value based on the degree of cooperation or conflict involved in the event. International events are coded on a 15-point weighted scale, with a score of 1 being the most cooperative action and a score of 15 being the most conflictual.

The data set assigns each point on the scale a weighted intensity value. Scale point number 8 is designated the "neutral point.” and assigned an intensity value of 1. Scale point number 15, the highest level of conflict, is deemed to be 102 times more conflictual. Scale point number 1, the most cooperative action, is judged 92 times more cooperative than scale point number 8. This scale is outlined in Table 5.1. A more detailed explanation is found in Appendix A (Azar, 1993).

For this dissertation, COPDAB data will be employed as used in Leeds and Davis’ (1999) study of domestic political structures and alliance behavior. An average annual cooperation/conflict score (what Leeds and Davis call “net interactions”) sent by each state in the data set toward all other countries in its Politically Relevant International Environment (PRIE) will establish an annual measure of each state's foreign policy in terms of cooperation and conflict.
Leeds and Davis sum the annual weighted values on the cooperation and conflict scales for each state; they then divide that figure by the total number of events for that year, which provides an annual level of cooperation and an annual level of conflict score for each state toward another for each year. They calculate an annual net score by subtracting the average level of conflict score from the average level of cooperation score. “This variable thus captures the flow of interaction between states, with positive values indicating a generally cooperative relationship and negative values indicating a more conflictual relationship...Net interactions captures more than either conflict or cooperation…(and) is our closest measure of the general tenor of a state contact toward a dyadic partner” (Leeds and Davis, 1999:12).

The concept of a Politically Relevant International Environment was first developed by Maoz and Russett (1993). Building on a procedure developed by Weede (1983), the concept of a PRIE is to focus analysis on those areas where international interactions between states are most likely to occur. Most international dyads are
considered irrelevant since the states comprising them are too far apart and too weak militarily or too weak economically for any meaningful interactions to occur. Measuring Cyprus’ interactions toward Costa Rica, for example, would tell us very little about Cyprus’ foreign policy-making process. A state's PRIE, on the other hand, “represents the set of political units whose structure, behavior, and policies have a direct impact on the focal state's political and strategic calculus” (Maoz, 1996:138).

Each state's PRIE is defined in terms of contiguity and geopolitical status. Maoz defines contiguity in terms of land connection and/or short water distance between two states (less than 150 miles). In terms of geopolitical status, the United States, United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and China are considered "major powers" and included in every state’s Politically Relevant International Environment (ibid.).¹ For example, Malaysia’s PRIE, in addition to the major powers, includes Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. Haiti’s PRIE, in addition to the major powers, includes Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica.

Using the COPDAB scores, Leed and Davis calculate average annual cooperation/conflict score for each state toward all states its PRIE. This provides an annual measure of a state's foreign policy, in terms of cooperation and conflict, toward each politically relevant state. From this I calculate the dependent variable for foreign policy change by lagging the average scores for all states in the PRIE from the previous year, and using the absolute value of the difference. Changes in these COPDAB scores are illustrated dramatically in the case of Cambodia following the 1970 coup, which brought in a pro-Western government that became more heavily

¹ Since 1991, PRIEs include Russia and Germany as well (Maoz, 1996).
involved in the Vietnam War. With annual foreign policy change scores ranging from 1 to 4 for five consecutive years, this country score jumped to more than 16.

The value of using COPDAB data in this study is that it measures the dependent variable through a broad range of state interactions – from diplomatic exchanges, visits, and agreements to official statements and full-scale war. One disadvantage is that data are not available beyond 1978. In this dissertation, COPDAB data are used for the 25-year period from 1953 to 1978. An ongoing project, the Global Events Data System at the University of Maryland, which was to have updated the COPDAB data to real-time, was canceled in late 2001 due to funding-related issues.\(^2\)

**United Nations Voting**

Another set of measures of the dependent variable uses votes cast in the United Nations General Assembly. For decades votes cast in the U.N. General Assembly have been conceptualized in the literature as a measure of foreign policy (Alker, 1964). Studies involving U.N. voting have typically taken the form of tests of the bargaining model, which tracks U.S. aid and trade with compliance with the U.S. in United Nations voting (Wittkopf, 1973; Richardson, 1976; Richardson and Kegley, 1980; Moon, 1983); or a measure foreign policy change by comparing a country’s U.N. voting agreement using a major power, such as the United States or the Soviet Union, as a baseline (Vengroff, 1976; Moon, 1985; Hagan, 1989).

---

\(^2\) This drawback unfortunately plagues most events data sets. Studies of the democratic peace, for example, typically end in 1992, the last year for which Correlates of War data is available.
The use of U.N. votes presents a number of advantages. Moon (1985) observes that it "is perfect for the needs of cross sectional and longitudinal studies," in that it is reliable, it is comparable across cases, and it is available for a substantial period of time. Of all possible measures, it is the single foreign policy behavior in which virtually all countries in the world equally participate and can be measured on an equal basis. Moon also notes that votes in the United Nations General Assembly are regarded as an important expression of foreign policy in much of the world and that for many countries it provides one of the few opportunities to express their foreign policy on a wide range of issues. "Where alternative measures exist, they are highly correlated with U.N. voting but do not capture position taking on global issues" (ibid.: 299fn). Further credence in U.N. voting as a measure of a state's foreign policy can be found in the fact that the United States has deemed it important enough to be a major consideration in its dispensation of foreign aid (see below).

Despite this, questions have been raised regarding the utility of using U.N. votes as an accurate measure of foreign policy. First, U.N. voting is seen as a relatively cost-free enterprise. Votes do not require a significant commitment of resources and typically do not carry with them the visibility of other foreign policy undertakings. These votes therefore do not carry the same significance as other foreign policy actions. Additionally, there has been a trend in recent years toward consensus voting in the United Nations, which leaves less variance for analysis and could skew results.

Despite these criticisms, I believe U.N. votes are a useful tool for measuring foreign policy change in this dissertation. This measure permits an analysis of those
more subtle expressions of foreign policy that do not require major resource allocations. In capturing these aspects of foreign policy behavior, I may find that the constraints hypothesized to impact foreign policy change and stability have a different influence on different aspects of foreign policy. This may include what can be seen as “declarative” foreign policy – the wishes, intentions and preferences of a state's foreign policy orientation. As Holsti (1982) observed, states may declare changes in foreign policy or their intentions to undertake changes without fundamentally altering their relations with other states. Another benefit of this measure also allows analysis across time and space for more recent years, since the collection of the events data typically lags the present by several years. The use of United Nations General Assembly votes as an indicator of a state's foreign policy position has received renewed interest in recent years. Signorino and Ritter (1999) suggested that U.N. voting might represent a more accurate reflection of a state's foreign policy positions than do its alliance commitments. Gartzke and Jo’s (2002) subsequent development of the United Nations General Assembly Affinity of Nations Index is receiving widespread attention throughout the field, and has been used in a number of empirical studies to capture the similarity of a state’s foreign policy positions (Oneal and Russett, 1999; Gartzke, 2000; Mansfield and Snyder, 2002).

**United Nations General Assembly Affinity Scores**

This study employs scores of U.N. voting measured two different ways – one using S scores for voting affinity on all roll call votes cast in the United Nations General Assembly and another measuring a percent-agreement with the United States on General Assembly votes deemed "important" to the United States by the U.S. State
Department. Data on S scores for all roll call votes cast in the U.N. General Assembly from 1950 to 1994 come from Gartzke and Jo’s (2002) Affinity of Nations Index, which measures the similarity in voting among pairs of states. Signorino and Ritter (1999) developed the S score as a measure of foreign policy similarity for those types of foreign policy cases where a disagreement can be registered from an agreement. This spatial measure of foreign policy similarity is based on the conception that "the closer two states are in the policy space – i.e., the closer their revealed policy positions – the more ‘similar’ their revealed policy positions. The further apart two states are in the policy space, the more dissimilar their revealed policy positions” (ibid.: 126).

The S indicator is calculated as: \( S = 1 - 2 \times \frac{d}{d_{max}} \), where \( d \) is the sum of the metric distances between dyad members (in this case in terms of votes) in a given year and \( d_{max} \) is the largest possible metric distance of those votes (Gartzke and Jo, 2002). The S indicator provides scores in a range from -1 to +1. A score of +1 indicates that the two states policy positions are identical. A score of -1 indicates that the two states are as far apart as possible in the policy space, and a 0 indicates that the distance between the two states is half the maximum that it could be (Signorino and Ritter, 1999). An examination of Iran’s affinity scores with the United States over the years provides a good illustration of these differences. Throughout the 1950s, 60s and 70s, Iran’s affinity scores were with rare exceptions always positive — indicating that the policy distances between the two states were less than half the maximum that they could be. This trend continued up through 1978, when Iran’s U.N. affinity score with the United States was .2377. The following year, after the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power, the affinity score changed to -.2451, indicating the two countries were more
than half the maximum distance in policy positions. The difference in scores in this one-year period was .4828.

The Affinity of Nations data were compiled from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR dataset #5512) and official United Nations sources (Gartzke and Jo, 2002). This ICPSR data contained a number of coding errors that the authors noted and corrected. Using the raw data, S scores are calculated based on United Nations votes on three dimensions – "yes" for approval and “no” for disapproval, as well as an intermediate dimension covering those cases where a state "abstained," was "non-participating (present but not voting)" or "absent (country cast no vote and there is no evidence of non-participation).” Since no votes were recorded in 1964, the authors interpolated data for these missing values by using the interpolate procedure in the STATA statistics data analysis program.

The Affinity of Nations Index contains annual dyadic S scores for all states in the United Nations. To capture the similarity of U.N. voting positions among states likely to interact in the international system, I calculate an average annual S score for each state with all other states in its Politically Relevant International Environment. The politically relevant dyads are obtained using Bennett and Stam’s (2000) Expected Utility Generation (EUGene) program. EUGene is a software program that can be used to create dyadic data based on a number of different criteria. PRIE dyads where selected using the same criteria specified above, with Russia and Germany included in all PRIEs from 1991 onward, as outlined by Maoz (1996). These S scores provide an average yearly measure of foreign policy in terms of affinity for each state with all
other states in its PRIE. For use as a dependent variable, foreign policy change was calculated from the absolute value of the difference in the lagged annual score from the previous year.

**Important Votes in the United Nations General Assembly**

A third measure of the dependent variable also uses U.N. General Assembly roll call votes but refines the process by focusing strictly on those votes deemed "important" by the United States. Using the U.S. as a baseline for these votes, a percent-agreement score was calculated for each state in the study.

Beginning in 1982, pursuant to Public Law 101-167, the United States State Department began tracking votes cast in the United Nations General Assembly on “all such votes on issues which directly affected important United States interests and on which the United States lobbied extensively” (United States Department of State, 1990: 93). This move was prompted by concerns in the Reagan administration and among members of Congress regarding the erosion of support for American initiatives in the United Nations. States were beginning to assert themselves to a much greater degree than in the past and were casting votes contrary to the United States — including states that were recipients of large amounts of U.S. foreign assistance. Lawmakers later sought to link foreign aid to recipients’ voting compliance with U.S. positions on these important votes (Kegley and Hook, 1991).

Under Public Laws 101-167 and 101-246, annual reports record the votes of all U.N. members on several resolutions deemed important to the United States. These

---

2 Subsequent studies analyzing successful links between foreign aid and compliance on important votes have yielded mixed results. Kegley and Hook (1991) found no statistical evidence of any relationship,
votes, which typically number from 12 to 15 annually, cover such issues as human rights, the U.S. embargo of Cuba, the Middle East peace process, and weapons of mass destruction. These data are recorded in annual editions of *Voting Practices in the United Nations*. Based upon the availability of these publications, I collected data on these important votes back to 1985. The data in this dissertation are recorded up through 1997, the last year for which data on the independent and control variables are available. Votes are recorded as identical or opposite to the United States position, or as an abstention or absence. Annual coincidence rates are recorded by calculating a percent agreement with the U.S. position for those votes coded as identical or opposite. This method has been shown to produce results nearly identical to other measures that treat abstentions and absences as opposite votes (Wang, 1999). As with procedures for measures of the dependent variables above, an absolute value of the difference score is calculated to measure foreign policy change.

The cases best illustrating changes in this variable are those of the former Soviet Bloc countries that, prior to 1990, consistently voted with the United States less than 50 percent of the time on these important votes. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, these states have fairly consistently voted with the United States greater than fifty percent of the time.

The use of important votes offers a number of advantages. By focusing on those votes deemed critical to a major power, this scheme offers a more refined measure of foreign policy by eliminating positions taken on “unimportant” or non-

---

while Wang (1999) found that foreign aid programs successfully induced foreign policy compliance on important U.N. resolutions.
controversial issues. These more high-profile United Nations issues would be expected to have greater attention from domestic actors. Including a measure of important votes also allays the bias inherent in including all roll call votes, since recent years have demonstrated a significant trend toward consensus votes in the General Assembly. During the past decade, of the 300 to 400 resolutions adopted each year, typically 75 to 77 percent are adopted by consensus – a significant increase from the 60 to 65 percent rate 20 years earlier. Additionally, since I am employing the U.S. as a baseline, using important votes makes it easier to control for the fact that there has been declining support for the U.S. position over the years. Wang (1999) notes that the average coincidence rate among 65 developing countries for all U.N. resolutions from 1984 to 1993 was 19 percent, while the coincidence rate for important votes during the same period was 55 percent. Because these data run through the year 1997, it also permits an analysis of both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. A disadvantage of this measure is that it does not provide as large a timeframe for analysis as do other measures of the dependent variable.

**Independent Variable: Democracy/Non-Democracy**

The independent variable for democracy/non democracy is operationalized as each state’s annual Polity score, based on a 21-point scale from most non-democratic to most democratic, as recorded in the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). Since the 1970's, the Polity data sets have been widely used in cross-national, longitudinal studies involving authority characteristics of modern politics – most frequently to assess the degree of democracy and autocracy in the political systems of
modern states (K. Gleditsch, 2002). The data set includes all independent states in the
global system with a total population greater than 500,000.

The concept of democracy, as operationalized in the Polity data, contains three
interdependent elements: the presence of institutions and procedures for citizens to
express preferences regarding alternative policies and leaders, the existence of
institutionalized constraints on executive power, and a guarantee of civil liberties to all
citizens. "Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of
checks and balances, freedom of the press, and the like, are treated as a means to, or
manifestations of, these institutional structures" (Jaggers and Gurr 1995: 471.).

The indicators used to create the scale are constructed based on values
assigned to five different components of democracy and autocracy, providing a rich
measurement that captures multiple characteristics of regime type. These indicators
include:3

1. Competitiveness of Participation: the extent to which alternative preferences for
policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena.

2. Regulation of Participation: the extent to which there are binding rules on when,
whether, and how political preferences are expressed.

3. Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: the extent to which there is a process of
advancement that provides political players an equal opportunity to obtain the position
of chief executive; for example, whether executives are elected or selected.

---

3 A more detailed explanation of the component variables, along with assigned values may be found in Appendix B.
4. Openness of Executive Recruitment: the extent that the position of chief executive is theoretically open to members of the politically active population; for example, whether the executive is hereditary or open to selection by other means.

5. Executive Constraints (Decision Rules): the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive.

Scores on these components are used to construct separate 10-point autocracy and democracy scales, ranging from 0 to 10. The 21-point scale is calculated in Polity by subtracting each state’s total autocracy score from its total democracy score, providing a single summary measure ranging from –10 (most non-democratic) to +10 (most democratic). For purposes of illustration and ease of interpretation, I converted this scale to a 1 to 21 scale of whole numbers and report the relative frequencies in Appendix D. The three figures correspond to the years covered by each of the three dependent variables. The reader will observe the paucity of cases in the middle range on the scale. The 11 points in the middle of the scale account for only about 20 percent of the cases in each time period, and several points correspond to less than one percent of all cases. The bimodal nature of the scale makes its use as single scale variable impractical. For analysis in this dissertation, the scale is collapsed to define non-democracies, democracies, and those states in between with mixed authority characteristics.

Within the political science literature, there are different notions as to what Polity score should mark the threshold of democracy and non-democracy. Scores for democracy have been assigned at a range from +3 and higher (N. Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997), +6 and higher (McLaughlin et. al., 1998; Mousseau 1998; Leeds and Davis 1995, 1999).
1999), and +7 and higher (Enterline 1998; Reiter and Stam 1998; Mansfield and Snyder, 2002). Non-democracies have been associated with Polity scores of -6 and lower (Leeds 1999) and -7 and lower (Enterline, 1998; Reiter and Stam, 1998; Mansfield and Snyder, 2002).

For this dissertation I code states with Polity scores of +6 and higher (+17 and higher on the adjusted scale) as democracies and states with Polity scores of –6 and lower (5 and lower on the adjusted scale) as non-democracies. This places each regime type at the midway points between high democracy/high non-democracy and completely mixed systems. States falling between the two regime thresholds are coded as and are “mixed systems.” Using this criterion, I created several variables for the independent variable. First, three separate dummy variables for each of the three regime types outlined above are coded 0 or 1, accordingly. Second, a three-point regime scale identifies non-democracies as 1, mixed systems as 2, and democracies as 3. A third measure is a two-point scale, with non-democracies coded 1, democracies coded 2, and mixed systems on the middle of the scale as missing data.

**Independent Variable: Presidential/Parliamentary Democracy**

The independent variable for presidential democracy-parliamentary democracy is operationalized using data from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS). CNTS contains comprehensive longitudinal political, economic and social variables and indicators for every state in the international system. The CNTS project was developed and is maintained by Arthur S. Banks, former senior editor of the *Political Handbook of the World*. I create dummy variables for presidential and parliamentary democracy from the CNTS variable Effective Executive (Type). This
variable identifies "the individual who exercises primary influence in the shaping of
most major decisions affecting the nation's internal and external affairs," as a
monarch, president, premier, military or other (Banks, 1999). I code those states
identified as parliamentary (premier) or presidential with a 0 or 1 accordingly.

**Independent Variable: Divided Government**

Data for presidential systems with divided government come from Witold
Henisz' (2000) Political Constraint Index Dataset, developed at the University of
Pennsylvania. This data set contains an annual variable identifying cases where the
party controlling the lower house of the legislature is aligned with that of the
executive. To operationalize divided government in the dissertation, I convert this
variable to indicate cases where the lower house and executive are not aligned
(divided government). The divided government variable is assigned a value of 1
when the executive and legislature are not aligned and a 0 when they are aligned.

**Independent Variable: Multi-Party Systems**

The independent variable for multi-party systems is operationalized using a
calculation that identifies the effective number of parties in a system. This method
avoids the bias found in a simple count of the total number of parties, especially in
those systems where several small and politically insignificant parties coexist with
two or three other larger, more substantial parties (as is the case in the United
Kingdom). Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) measure of effective number of parties is
an indicator that counts the number of parties in a system after weighting them by
size.
This measure is constructed as: \( N_p = \frac{1}{\sum p_i^2} \), where \( N_p \) is the number of parties and \( p_i \) is the proportion of seats held by the \( i \)-th party. This data comes from the CNTS data set, which includes annual measures of Rae’s (1968) party fractionalization index:

\[
F = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{m} (t_i)^2
\]

where \( t_i \) = the proportion of members associated with the \( i \)th party in the lower house of the legislature. Using a formula \( P = \frac{1}{1 - F} \) identified by Lawrence and Hayes (2002), I converted these figures to a measure for effective number of parties. While there is little substantive difference between the two measures, I chose to use the effective number of parties indicator in this dissertation since the figure is designed to approximate actual numbers of parties and is more widely accepted in the literature.

**Independent Variable: Coalition Government**

The independent variable for coalition government is developed from a CNTS variable that divides the size of the legislature by the number of seats held by the largest legislative party. Using this scale, I establish a dummy variable (1 or 0) for coalition government. Parliamentary systems are coded as coalition if they score above a 2.0 on the scale, indicating that the largest party does not hold a majority of seats. Only under extraordinary circumstances would a party winning an outright majority form a coalition government.

**Independent Variable: Military Government**

The independent variable for military government is developed from the CNTS variable Type of Regime. This variable codes states as civilian, military-civilian,
military, and “other.” From this, I construct separate dummy variables corresponding
to the extent of military involvement in government.

Military-Civilian Rule (coded 1 or 0): Describes cases where an outward
civilian government is effectively controlled by a military elite. Civilians hold only
those posts (up to and including that of head of state) for which the military deems
their services necessary for the successful conduct of government operations. The
majority of Latin American military governments fall under this category, as did
Greece from 1967 to 1974.

Direct Military Rule (coded 1 or 0): Direct rule by the military, usually (but not
necessarily) following a military coup. The governing structure may vary from
utilization of the military chain of command under conditions of martial law to the
institution of an ad hoc administrative hierarchy with at least an upper echelon staffed
by military personnel. About one-fourth of the cases of military rule in the
dissertation's dataset fall into this category. Argentina's experiences under military
rule in the 1970s and early 1980s are one example.

**Independent Variable: Less Developed Countries**

Conceptualizing an independent variable for less-developed countries is not an
easy task. In fact, frequently scholarly articles will examine cases related to the "Third
World" without ever defining or operationalizing what constitutes this group of
nations. The term “Third World” is used to describe the less developed nations of
Asia, Africa and Latin America. These states tend to be characterized as poor and
economically dependent on the export of primary products to the developed world.
They are also frequently associated with having higher rates of illiteracy, population
growth and political instability. Typically included among Third World states are all those of Asia, with the exception of Israel and Japan, all of Africa (with the possible exception of South Africa), and all of the Americas with the exception of Canada and the United States.

Most standards for characterizing a country as Third World are subjective in nature. There are no widely accepted standards or criteria in the literature for classification. One possible method is to utilize the World Bank's country classification indicators. However, these data are not available longitudinally. This dissertation characterizes states as "less developed" based upon their membership in the Group of 77. The Group of 77 (G-77) was established in 1964 by 77 developing countries that were signatories of the "Joint Declaration of the 77 Countries" issued at the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The G-77, which now numbers 133 countries, characterizes itself as "the largest third-world coalition in the United Nations." Its stated goals are to articulate and promote collective economic interests, enhance joint negotiating capabilities on major international issues in the United Nations system, and promote economic and technical cooperation among developing countries. G-77 membership tracks quite closely with what conventional wisdom dictates as "the Third World," with the possible exceptions of Mexico, South Korea and four of the five former Soviet Central Asian republics, who are non-members. Member states that may not traditionally be thought of as "developing" or "Third World" include Cyprus and the Eastern European states of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Romania.
For this variable, member states are coded as 1 for all years in the study; non-member states are coded as a 0 for all years.

While admittedly not a perfect measure, this is at least non-subjective and reflects the states' self-identification with development issues. Membership in the G-77, as with most conventional concepts of what constitutes the Third World, include an eclectic mix of nations – from extremely poor and underdeveloped states such as Haiti, Sierra Leone, Comoros and Bangladesh – to oil-rich nations such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – to newly industrializing countries such as Malaysia and Singapore.

**Independent Variable: Leadership Change**

I adapt the independent variable for leadership change from the CNTS variable Changes in Effective Executive. This variable identifies the number of times in a year that effective control of executive power changes hands. Changes are coded if the new executive is independent of his or her predecessor. For this dissertation, if a change in the effective executive occurs in a given year, I assign that variable a value of 1. If no changes in the effective executive occur, I coded that variable as 0. This variable is used as both a control variable in tests of each of the hypotheses and as an independent variable in an interaction model comparing the effects on leadership change in foreign policy change in democracies and non-democracies.

**Description of Data**

A further description of the dependent and independent variables is illustrated in Appendices C, D and E. Appendix C contains descriptions of the mean, minimum and maximum values for each dependent and independent variable according to the
years included in each dependent variable. Appendix D contains histograms for the non-dichotomous dependent and independent variables. Appendix E contains correlation tables for each of the independent variables. Since the time periods covered by each of the dependent variables differs significantly (1954-1978 for the COPDAB data, 1951-1992 for the U.N. Affinity Data, and 1986-1997 for the Important U.N. Votes), there are variations in the independent variable depending upon the dependent variable being used to test the hypothesis.

Control Variables

This dissertation includes several variables to control for other factors that might influence foreign policy change or stability. These variables include a state's capabilities, national attributes, political factors, international alliances, aid allocations as well as other considerations that arise when adapting the hypotheses to a methodological model.

Control Variable: National Capabilities

One important consideration is a state's capacity to undertake foreign policy change. States throughout the world differ significantly in national resources that can be utilized to effect foreign policy changes. National resource levels also reflect a state’s position in the international system. This dissertation employs the Composite National Capabilities Index (CINC), developed by Singer, et. al. (1972) as part of the Correlates of War project, as a control variable for capabilities. In a given year, this index represents a state's share (percentage) of global capabilities in six areas: iron and steel production, urban population, total population, total military expenditures, total military personnel and total amount of energy production. Each state's
proportion of total system capabilities in each area is calculated, and an average is
taken across all areas for that state where data is not missing. Data are available for all
years in this study up through 1992. Inclusion of this control variable limits the
analysis up to the year 1992.

**Control Variable: Coups d’ Etat**

Another factor that must be controlled are cases when changes in leadership
come through violence or extra-constitutional means. Moon (1985) demonstrates that
revolutionary changes in government produce significant changes in foreign policy.
Hagan (1989) continues this logic and found that more extreme changes in leadership
produce more dramatic changes in foreign policy, while more mild changes yield less
significant changes.

The variable already included in this dissertation for leadership change
accounts for the effect those new individuals entering the decision-making apparatus
have on foreign policy change. However, it is necessary to differentiate "typical"
leadership changes from those that are more extreme and would likely result in more
abrupt policy changes. A control variable for coups is adapted from the CNTS
variable Number of Coups d' Etat. This variable captures the number of successful
extra-constitutional or forced changes in the top government elite and/or its effective
control of the nation's power structure that occur in a given year. If a successful coup
occurred, I assign that state's coup variable a value of 1; if no coups occurred, the
variable is coded 0.
Control Variable: Wealth

As discussed in the foregoing chapters, scholars suggest that wealthier states are less likely to undertake significant foreign policy change, since they are more likely "satisfied" with their prevailing situation and undertaking significant changes would be relatively more costly. A control variable for wealth is operationalized based on a state’s per capita Gross Domestic Product relative to the United States (U.S. = 100) for each year. Higher levels indicate higher levels of wealth. Data for this variable come from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (PWT 6.1) data set (Heston, Summer and Aten, 2002). One problem with the PWT data sets is that they do not contain these data for most communist states. To include these cases in the dissertation, I followed the prescription used by Leeds and Davis (1999). In order to combine their data with that of the more updated data set, I code all states with a GDP relative to the United States that was 30 percent or higher as “wealthy” and assign them a value of 1 for the given year. All other states are coded as 0. Leeds and Davis (1999), using an earlier version of PWT, sought to resolve the problem by adding data missing for the communist states that they collected from various other sources. I supplement the per capita GDP data from PWT 6.1 that I converted to categorical data with the categorical data from the Leeds and Davis data set for those cases.

Control Variable: Alliance

An alliance variable is included in the dissertation to control for the similarity of formal alliances between states. Walt (1987) explains alliance formation in terms of: a response to threat; ideological, political and cultural solidarity; and a means of garnering more foreign military and economic assistance. Each of these can be
expected to reinforce policy stability. Since alliances reflect common perceived threats, interests, goals or orientations, states with similar alliance patterns should be less likely to undertake actions that would change the relationship they have with important partners.

Control variables for alliance are constructed from EUGene based on S scores for regional alliance similarity from the Correlates of War data set, updated by Dan Reiter through 1992. Alliances are ranked as 1 (defense pact), 2 (neutrality pact), 3 (entente) and 4 (no alliance). All states in the international system are included, even if they do not engage in any alliance behavior. Signorino and Ritter’s S correlation (1999), evaluates the rank order correlation for two states’ alliance portfolios and takes into account both the presence and absence of an alliance in the correlation calculation, accounting for the fact that states may have identical alliances with some states as well as no alliances with identical sets of other states. Possible S scores range from -1 (totally opposite alliance agreements) to +1 (complete agreement in alliances) (Bennett and Stam, 2001). For the model using important U.N. votes, I use a control variable for alliance similarity with the U.S. For the other models I use the average alliance S score for each state with all other states in its PRIE – the same sets of states captured in the dependent variables. Like the national capabilities control, use of this variable limits analysis up to the year 1992.

Control Variable: U.S. Economic Assistance

For the model using important U.N. votes, an alternate measure is necessary to control for states that have closer relations with the United States. I include a U.S. aid control variable as a surrogate for alliance, since alliance data are not available beyond
1992, and data for the dependent variable, independent variable, and other control variable are available up through 1997. This variable is the total annual economic assistance loans and grants provided to each country in millions of current U.S. dollars. These data come from the United States Agency for International Development. One drawback of using this measure is that the industrialized countries of Western Europe have close relations with the United States but do not receive U.S. aid.

**Control Variables: Polity and Polity Differences**

Another set of variables control for polity-related effects that may exist between states and may influence their foreign policies. First, I created a control variable to capture the level of non-democracy/democracy of the states receiving the change in foreign policy action. There are reasons to believe that the recipient state’s level of democracy/non-democracy may influence the stability of foreign policy directed toward it. Aside from findings in the vast democratic peace literature, studies have shown that democracies and non-democracies are treated differently and that democracies will more often be the recipients of conflictual behavior than cooperative behavior from non-democracies (Leeds and Davis, 1999). I construct a control variable Regime (target) by calculating the average Polity score for each state’s PRIE in each year to control for the overall Polity of the states receiving the foreign policy action.

Another polity-related variable controls for the difference in levels of non-democracy/democracy between interacting states. States of a more similar regime type may be expected to behave differently toward one another. States with similar
regime types are likely to have more similar interests, less to disagree over, and perhaps fewer occasions for foreign policy change. On the other hand, states of a similar regime type may have less to fear from one another and in the context of a cooperative relationship be willing to change policies. I constructed the control variable Regime (dif) from the difference in the Polity score for each state and the average Polity score for its PRIE.

A third control seeks to address changes that might be happening in the environment receiving the foreign policy action. Cases will occur when a state may change its foreign policy in response to significant changes occurring in its PRIE, not necessarily any internal dynamic. Especially in the case of the Affinity model, changes from one year to the next raise the issue of “who moved?” One type of change that can occur in a PRIE that might induce foreign policy response is a change in the regime makeup of the states. A state that has dealt primarily with non-democracies could be expected to change its foreign policy if each of those states suddenly became democracies. To control for this effect, I create a control variable Regime Change (target), calculated as the absolute value of the difference in a state’s PRIE’s average Polity score from the previous year.

**Control Variable: Cold War**

Using important U.N. votes as the dependent variable permits examination of a more recent timeframe, and an analysis of the impact of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. A Cold War dummy variable will be used in an interaction model. The Cold War period is coded 1 for the years 1986 to 1990, and 0 for 1991 to 1997.
Methodology

In this dissertation I employ a pooled, cross-sectional time series design to test each of the hypotheses. These designs enable comparisons across a number of units (in this case states) over a period of time (years) by combining time series for multiple cross sections of data. Pooling data gathered across time and space presents a number of advantages. It helps overcome the "small N" problem often associated with studies involving too many explanatory variables and too few cases. These designs are also beneficial when examining variables whose "variability" may appear at different times and in different cases and for cases where variability may be negligible across time or space but can be captured in time and space (Stimson, 1986). Ultimately, pooled, cross-sectional time series designs permit the capture of variation not only through time or space, but also variation of these dimensions simultaneously (Podesta, 2002).

Pooled, cross-sectional time series present a number of problems, however, since “the disturbance term is likely to consist of time series related disturbances, cross section disturbances, and a combination of both” (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991: 223-224). These designs often violate the standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumptions regarding the error term. The OLS method dictates that the "best fit" for a regression line is the one where the sum of squared deviations of the points from the line are a minimum. OLS regression estimates are the standard way social scientists link causes and effects, but for OLS to be optimal “it is necessary that all the errors have the same variance (homoskedasticity), and that all of the errors are independent of each other” (Podesta, 2002: 9). Meeting these assumptions is a problem for pooled, cross-sectional time series designs for a number of reasons.
Error terms tend not to be independent from one time period to the next. Autocorrelation may occur if errors for a country in a given year are correlated with errors in subsequent years. National traits, such as population, largely carry over from one time period the next and cannot be characterized as "independent." Errors may also be correlated across cases. Interdependence increases the opportunity for disturbances from one country to the next (Podesta, 2002). Events in Canada, for example, will likely influence events in its largest trading partner, the United States. Errors also tend to be heteroskedastic. The variance on certain variables may differ substantially from one country to the next. Military expenditures, for example, are likely more volatile in large countries than in very small countries with limited public expenditures. Heteroskedasticity may also impact the dependent variable if the scale of activity (such as foreign policy initiatives or United Nations votes) differs between countries (Hicks, 1994; Podesta, 2002).

Errors may also be generated reflecting cross sectional and temporal effects. This stems from the assumption of homogeneity in the level of the dependent variable across units. "If we assume the units are homogenous in level and they are not…then the least squares estimator will be a compromise unlikely to be a good predictor of any of the units, and the apparent levels of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation will be substantially inflated " (Stimson, 1986: 919).

The method used here is a generalized estimating equation (GEE) model employed using the STATA data analysis program. GEE models control for heteroskedasticity and the non-independence of observations through a population-averaged approach to estimating correlated data. This procedure “fix(es) the average
values of the independent variables across the panel to the average value of the dependent variable for a given year – essentially turning panel data into cross-sectional data” (Bennett and Stam, 2000b: 665). These models "in fact, model…the average response over the sub-population that shares a common value of X" (Diggle, Liang and Zeger, 1994: 131). Zorn (2001) states that this method is most valuable for making comparisons across groups or sub-populations.

Hu, et. al. (1998) observe:

The GEE approach is more desirable when the objective is to make inferences about group differences . . If we want to estimate the average treatment effect, regardless of individual change over time, then the population-averaged parameter is of more interest (ibid.: 701).

In the context of political science, Zorn observers that the GEE approach is ideal for assessing such things as the propensity of democracies and non-democracies to engage in interstate conflict.

Using this model, variables associated with greater degrees of foreign policy change should yield coefficients that are positive. Variables associated with greater foreign policy stability should produce coefficients that are negative. I will conduct one-tailed tests of significance on the independent variables and two-tailed tests on the control variables.

In calculating foreign policy change for the dependent variables, the first year for each state in the study had to be dropped. With this, periods of analysis for models using the COPDAB data cover 1954 to 1978. The models using U.N. Affinity scores include the years 1951 to 1992; and the models using important U.N. votes cover 1986 to 1997, depending upon the years available for the control variables used.
Hypothesis 1: Democracy and Non-Democracy

The reader will recall that the first hypothesis of this dissertation is that states with democratic regimes demonstrate greater stability (less foreign policy change) than do states with non-democratic regimes. Thus the null hypothesis is that estimates for the coefficient for democracy will be zero or greater, and the alternative hypothesis is that estimates will be less than zero. Likewise, for non-democratic systems, the null hypothesis is that the estimate for non-democracy will be zero or less than zero. The alternate hypothesis is that the estimate will be greater than zero.

I first test this hypothesis using the COPDAB measure of foreign policy change as dependent variable, which covers the years 1954 to 1978. The first column in Table 5.2 displays the results for the model including a non-democracy and democracy independent variable. The estimated coefficient for the independent variable for non-democracy reveals that non-democracy has a positive effect on foreign policy change, significant at the .01 level. A one-unit change in the non-democracy variable, in this case from the intermediate category of “mixed systems,” is associated with a 17 percent increase in the annual mean change in the COPDAB score (see summary statistics in Appendix C).

The lack of statistical significance in the estimate for democracy suggests that there is no significant difference in the amount of foreign policy change occurring in democracies and “mixed systems.” The mixed systems, however, are a relatively small percentage of states, and the significant finding in the predicted direction for the non-democracy variable confirms the hypotheses that there are differences in the stability of foreign policy between non-democracies and other systems. This finding
Table 5.2 Regime Effects on Foreign Policy Change: 
Five Models Using COPDAB Dependent Variable, 1954-1978

Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Non-Dem/Dem</th>
<th>Non-Dem</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>Regime (3-Point Scale)</th>
<th>Regime (2-Point Scale)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+)</td>
<td>.675***</td>
<td>.637***</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.301)</td>
<td>(.229)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem (-)</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-.444***</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.355)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.268)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (-)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-.340***</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3-Point)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.136)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (-)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-.820***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2-Point)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.298)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability (+/-)</td>
<td>-17.712****</td>
<td>-17.729****</td>
<td>-18.297****</td>
<td>-17.945****</td>
<td>-17.493****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.980)</td>
<td>(3.978)</td>
<td>(3.928)</td>
<td>(3.962)</td>
<td>(4.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth (-)</td>
<td>.520**</td>
<td>.538**</td>
<td>.550***</td>
<td>.598***</td>
<td>.687**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.267)</td>
<td>(.250)</td>
<td>(.265)</td>
<td>(.259)</td>
<td>(.298)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup (+)</td>
<td>.673</td>
<td>.668</td>
<td>.714</td>
<td>.665*</td>
<td>.740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.430)</td>
<td>(.429)</td>
<td>(.430)</td>
<td>(.430)</td>
<td>(.525)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change (+)</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td>.262</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>.260</td>
<td>.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.222)</td>
<td>(.222)</td>
<td>(.222)</td>
<td>(.222)</td>
<td>(.258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-)</td>
<td>.105**</td>
<td>.105**</td>
<td>.075*</td>
<td>.096*</td>
<td>.125***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Target)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.046)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-)</td>
<td>-.081**</td>
<td>-.077**</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>-.086*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dif)</td>
<td>(.040)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+)</td>
<td>.238*</td>
<td>.237*</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>.228</td>
<td>.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change (Target)</td>
<td>(.145)</td>
<td>(.144)</td>
<td>(.145)</td>
<td>(.144)</td>
<td>(.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (-)</td>
<td>-.538</td>
<td>-.523</td>
<td>-.420</td>
<td>-.446</td>
<td>-.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.410)</td>
<td>(.402)</td>
<td>(.404)</td>
<td>(.402)</td>
<td>(.483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (+/-)</td>
<td>3.250****</td>
<td>3.256****</td>
<td>3.711****</td>
<td>4.081****</td>
<td>3.650****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.267)</td>
<td>(6.262)</td>
<td>(5.888)</td>
<td>(5.777)</td>
<td>(6.577)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01, **** p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
is robust across all models of the independent variables, outlined in columns 2-5 of Table 5.2.

The second column shows that non-democracies, compared with all other systems, undertake more foreign policy change. The third column shows an opposite relationship for democracies, which undertake less foreign policy change than other states. Comparing this coefficient with that of democracy in column one shows that while significant differences may not exist between democracies and mixed systems, significant differences can be found when democracies are compared to mixed systems and non-democracies together. The fourth and fifth columns show the relationship between regime type and foreign policy change on two- and three-point scales from non-democracy to democracy. The negative coefficients, both significant at the .01 level, indicate that a change from a less democratic to a more democratic system is associated with less foreign policy change.

Among the control variables, both capabilities and wealth produce significant coefficients in the model. The estimate for national capabilities indicates that greater national capabilities are associated with less change as measured by the dependent variable. Greater wealth, however, is associated with more change. Also significant are the estimates controlling for the levels of democracy in the states receiving the foreign policy action. The estimated coefficient for the average Polity score of the PRIE, Polity (target), is positive and significant, indicating that the more democratic the state’s PRIE, the more foreign policy change a state would undertake toward it. The estimate of the coefficient for the difference in regime type between a state and its PRIE, measured as the absolute value of the difference in Polity scores, is negative
and significant, indicating that the more dissimilar the regime types of interacting states, the less foreign policy change they will undertake.

The second model tests this hypothesis in a model using U.N. Affinity scores, which capture voting similarity between a state and other states in its PRIE. As with the model using COPDAB data, the findings in this model support the hypothesis of this dissertation that democracies undertake less foreign policy change than non-democracies. While the estimates for both variables in the first column of Table 5.3 indicate a statistically significant and negative direction, the coefficients show that democracies undertake less change in U.N. voting patterns than do non-democracies, which undertake less changes than mixed systems. A one-unit change in the independent variable to democracy is associated with a 30 percent decrease in the annual mean change in the Affinity score for all states. The remaining columns in Table 5.3 show that this finding is robust across all measures of the independent variable, whether as separate indicators of regime type or as a scale.

As in the COPDAB model, the control variable for national capabilities is significant. However, unlike the model using the events data as the dependent variable, the estimate here is positive, indicating that states with more national capabilities undertake more changes in voting similarity with states in their relevant environments. The estimate for the variable controlling alliance similarity is also significant, and as expected, indicates that states with more similar alliance patterns are less likely to change patterns of voting similarity. All three of the regime-related controls were also significant. As was the case in the COPDAB model, estimate for regime type of the recipient states is positive and negative, and the estimate for the
Table 5.3 Regime Effects on Foreign Policy Change: Five Models Using U.N. Affinity Dependent Variable, 1951-1992

Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Non-Dem/Dem</th>
<th>Non-Dem</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>Regime (3-Point Scale)</th>
<th>Regime (2-Point Scale)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Dem (+)</td>
<td>-.005***</td>
<td>.004*</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem (-)</td>
<td>-.0170****</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-.014****</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (-) (3-Point)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-.006****</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (-) (2-Point)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-.010****</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability (+/-)</td>
<td>.190****</td>
<td>.184****</td>
<td>.193****</td>
<td>.191****</td>
<td>.196****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth (-)</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>- .003</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup (+)</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change (+)</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Target)</td>
<td>.004****</td>
<td>.003****</td>
<td>.004****</td>
<td>.004****</td>
<td>.003****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Dif)</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>-.001*</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>-.001**</td>
<td>-.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+) Change (Target)</td>
<td>.012****</td>
<td>.012****</td>
<td>.012****</td>
<td>.012****</td>
<td>.013****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (-)</td>
<td>-.039****</td>
<td>-.044****</td>
<td>-.041****</td>
<td>-.044****</td>
<td>-.037****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (+/-)</td>
<td>.032****</td>
<td>.031****</td>
<td>.028****</td>
<td>.039****</td>
<td>.032****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4,125</td>
<td>4,125</td>
<td>4,125</td>
<td>4,125</td>
<td>4,125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables.
“regime distance” between the states and their PRIEs is positive and significant. Another significant estimate is for the variable controlling regime changes in a state’s PRIE. The positive coefficient shows that greater changes in the average Polity score of a PRIE is associated with more changes in a state’s United Nations voting patterns.

The third model of foreign policy change measures change in terms of voting coincidence with the United States on important votes in the U.N. General Assembly and covers the years 1986 to 1997. This model also produced an estimate for the independent variable that supports the hypothesis. As the first column in Table 5.4 indicates, the coefficient for democracy is negative and significant, and the coefficient for non-democracy is positive and significant. A one-unit change from a mixed system to a democracy is associated with an 18 percent decrease in the annual mean change in the voting coincidence of all states. A one-unit change to non-democracy is associated with a 22 percent increase in the annual mean change in the voting coincidence of all states. Statistically significant findings on the three-point regime scale also support the hypothesis that democracy is associated with less foreign policy change.

Statistically significant estimates were produced for the control variables for wealth, executive changes and U.S. aid. Contrary to the findings in the COPDAB model, the estimate for the wealth control variable in this model reveals that greater wealth is associated with less foreign policy change. As expected, changes in executive leadership are associated with more foreign policy change. The estimate for the control variable for U.S. aid, used here as a surrogate for alliance, shows a small
Table 5.4 Regime Effects on Foreign Policy Change: Four Models Using Important Votes Dependent Variable, 1986-1992

Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Non-Dem/Dem</th>
<th>Regime (3-Point Scale)</th>
<th>Regime (2-Point Scale)</th>
<th>Regime (3-Point Scale) With Cold War Interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Dem (+)</td>
<td>.029**</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.016)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem (-)</td>
<td>-.024*</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (-) (3-Point)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-.027**</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-.025*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (-) (2-Point)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.055)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War X Regime</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>.042****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth (-)</td>
<td>-.019***</td>
<td>-.019**</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>-.029****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup (+)</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change (+)</td>
<td>.017*</td>
<td>.017*</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.017*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Dif)</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S Aid (-)</td>
<td>-.000*</td>
<td>-.000*</td>
<td>-.000*</td>
<td>-.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (+/-)</td>
<td>.147****</td>
<td>.203****</td>
<td>.110*</td>
<td>.160****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
but negative association between aid and less foreign policy changes on U.N. votes deemed important by the United States.

The fourth column displays the results of an interaction model testing the difference in the effect of regime type on foreign policy change during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. The coefficient for the regime type variable (three-point scale) represents the effect of regime type on changes in voting coincidence during the post-Cold War period (i.e., when Cold War=0, 1991-1997). The negative coefficient of -.025 indicates that during the post-Cold War period, greater democracy is associated with less foreign policy change. The coefficient for the interaction variable represents the difference in regime effects during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. This coefficient is positive (.042) and significant, indicating that during the Cold War, democracies undertook more change than during the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, the total effect of regime type is .017 (i.e., -.025 + .042). This suggests that the non-democracies and democracies behaved fundamentally differently during each period, at least as measured here. Democracies undertook more changes in voting coincide with the United States than non-democracies during the Cold War period, and undertook fewer changes than non-democracies during the post-Cold War period.

These findings support the primary hypothesis of this dissertation that democracies engage in relatively more stable foreign policies than do non-democracies. All three models produced statistically significant results in the predicted direction across numerous measurement schemes. A further discussion of these findings and the control variables is included in Chapter 6.
Hypothesis 2: Presidential and Parliamentary Democracies

In Chapter 4 I posited that presidential democracies would demonstrate greater stability (less change) in their foreign policies than would parliamentary democracies. The null hypothesis is that estimates will be zero or greater, and the alternative hypothesis is that estimates will be less than zero. Test for this hypothesis are conducted only on those states identified as democracies (17 or higher on the Polity scale).

Results are outlined in Table 5.5. Since each model employs a different measure of foreign policy change, covers different periods of time, and includes different cross sections, the reader is cautioned in making comparisons between coefficients produced by these models. The model using the COPDAB dependent variable does not produce a statistically significant estimate for the independent variable or for any of the control variables. Results from the model using Affinity data, however, support the hypothesis. A statistically significant estimate for the presidential democracy variable indicates that a one-unit change from parliamentary to presidential democracy leads to a decrease in foreign policy change of .02 on the Affinity scale. This amounts to 35 percent of the annual mean change in Affinity scores for all states. Statistically significant estimates for control variables in this model include those for capabilities (positive; the more capabilities, the more change), regime type difference (negative; the more dissimilar the regime type of the actor and target, the less change), regime change in the PRIE (positive; the greater the magnitude of regime change in a PRIE, the most change directed toward it), and alliance (negative; the more similar the alliance patterns between states, the less
Table 5.5 Presidential vs. Parliamentary Democracy:  
Effects on Foreign Policy Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President (-)</td>
<td>-191 (.630)</td>
<td>-.020**** (.006)</td>
<td>.019 (.12)</td>
<td>.002 (.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (+/-)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>.094**** (.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X President</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>.059** (.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability (+/-)</td>
<td>-10.345 (7.169)</td>
<td>.253*** (.081)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth (-)</td>
<td>.152 (.565)</td>
<td>.006 (.006)</td>
<td>-.026** (.12)</td>
<td>-.022* (.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup (+)</td>
<td>-1.277 (.565)</td>
<td>-.030 (.006)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change (+)</td>
<td>.394 (.319)</td>
<td>.002 (.003)</td>
<td>.015 (.11)</td>
<td>.018* (.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Target)</td>
<td>.327 (.221)</td>
<td>-.001 (.002)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Dif)</td>
<td>.028 (.205)</td>
<td>-.006*** (.002)</td>
<td>-.006 (.04)</td>
<td>.001 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+) Change (Target)</td>
<td>.734 (.311)</td>
<td>.007*** (.002)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (-)</td>
<td>-1.601 (1.173)</td>
<td>-.047**** (.011)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Aid (-)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-.000* (.000)</td>
<td>-.000*** (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (+/-)</td>
<td>.134 (4.142)</td>
<td>.125*** (.040)</td>
<td>.124**** (.012)</td>
<td>.081**** (.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
foreign policy change between them). These estimates are consistent with those produced in the model testing the first hypothesis.

The important votes model does not produce a statistically significant estimate in the hypothesized direction. The model produces a statistically significant estimate for the wealth control variable, which indicates that greater wealth results in less change in voting coincidence with the United States. The U.S. aid estimate is also significant and in the predicted direction, but the small size of the coefficient demonstrates little substantive impact.

The positive and significant coefficient for the Cold War interaction variable in the fourth column shows that presidential democracies undertook more changes in voting coincidence with the United States during the Cold War than after the Cold War. However, because the coefficient for the presidential variable is not significant, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the effect of presidential democracy on foreign policy change during the Cold War period. The Cold War variable is positive and significant, indicating a positive relationship between Cold War and foreign policy change.

These results indicate that differences exist in the stability of the foreign policies of presidential democracies and parliamentary democracies, depending upon the foreign policy behavior being measured. The different timeframes analyzed in each model also may affect these differences, as will be discussed later in Chapter 6.
Hypothesis 3: Presidentialism and Divided Government

The third hypothesis of this dissertation is that presidential systems under divided government demonstrate greater foreign policy stability than in democracies where the president and a majority of the legislature come from the same party. Testing this hypothesis confines this part of the study only to presidential democracies. Since divided government is expected to be associated with less foreign policy change, the alternative hypothesis is that estimates for the divided government coefficient will be negative. The null hypothesis is that estimates will be zero or greater.

As Table 5.6 indicates, none of the three models produces a statistically significant estimate in the direction hypothesized, indicating that presidents facing opposition in the legislature undertake no less change than presidents with unified government. Among the control variables, the COPDAB model produces statistically significant and positive estimates for the regime type of the recipient states, indicating that states undertake more foreign policy change when the recipient state is more democratic; and regime changes in the PRIE, which indicates that when recipient states change their regime type, foreign policy directed at them also changes. In the Affinity model, significant control variables include those for wealth (positive), difference in regime type between the actor and recipient states (negative) and alliance (negative). The single statistically significant estimate in the important votes model, controlling for alliance, indicated little substantive impact.

As was the case in the second hypothesis, a lack of statistical significance for the divided government variable prohibits an estimation of the effect of divided government on foreign policy change during the Cold War. However, a statistically
### Table 5.6 Divided Government in a Presidential Democracy: Effects on Foreign Policy Change

*Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Div. Govt. (-)</td>
<td>.226 (.447)</td>
<td>.016 (.005)</td>
<td>.005 (.014)</td>
<td>-.005 (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (+/-)</td>
<td>.123**** (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (+/-) X Div. Govt.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.122**** (.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability (+/-)</td>
<td>-3.183 (2.73)</td>
<td>.068 (.106)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth (-)</td>
<td>.072 (.474)</td>
<td>.024**** (.009)</td>
<td>.011 (.020)</td>
<td>.007 (.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup (+)</td>
<td>-.236 (2.65)</td>
<td>-.029 (.033)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change (+)</td>
<td>-.666 (.508)</td>
<td>.001 (.005)</td>
<td>.024 (.020)</td>
<td>.014 (.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Target)</td>
<td>.717**** (.221)</td>
<td>-.005 (.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Dif)</td>
<td>.008 (.126)</td>
<td>-.009**** (.003)</td>
<td>-.004 (.005)</td>
<td>.004 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) Change (Target)</td>
<td>1.867**** (.539)</td>
<td>.002 (.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (-)</td>
<td>1.866 (.539)</td>
<td>-.073**** (.022)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Aid (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.000** (.000)</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (+/-)</td>
<td>-5.481 (3.732)</td>
<td>.175**** (.052)</td>
<td>.000**** (.000)</td>
<td>.074**** (.014)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ N = 146 \quad 416 \quad 294 \quad 294 \]

* \( p < .10 \), ** \( p < .05 \), *** \( p < .01 \), **** \( p < .001 \). Values are based on a one-tailed test for the independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
significant and positive coefficient for the interaction variable shows that divided presidential systems undertook more foreign policy change during the Cold War period than after the Cold War period. This is consistent with the fact that the Cold War variable is positive and significant.

The lack of significant findings in any of the models merits a re-evaluation of the contention that divided government constrains presidents in their foreign policymaking. Further examination may reveal ways in which presidents may overcome these constraints and the types of foreign policies that may be more sensitive to legislative constraints.

**Hypothesis 4: Presidentialism and Multipartism**

I next test the hypothesis that multipartism in a presidential democracy is associated with greater foreign policy stability and less foreign policy change. It is expected that a greater number of parties will place greater constraints on a president’s ability to undertake foreign policy change. The subpopulation in this model includes all presidential democracies. Since multipartism is expected to be associated with less foreign policy change, the null hypothesis is that estimates for the variable effective number of parties will be zero or greater. The alternative hypothesis is that estimates will be less than zero. As outlined in Table 5.7, the COPDAB and U.N. Affinity models do not produce significant estimates for the independent variable for effective number of parties.

The significant estimates for the control variables in the COPDAB model were consistent with those produced in the earlier models. In the Affinity model, the estimate for wealth showed that states with greater wealth undertake more foreign
### Table 5.7 Presidential Democracy and Multipartism: Effects on Foreign Policy Change

*Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective (-)</td>
<td>-.063</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.004**</td>
<td>-.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Parties</td>
<td>(.263)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (+/-)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>.099****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (+/-)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>.018**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X ENP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability (+/-)</td>
<td>-2.41</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.96)</td>
<td>(.111)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth (-)</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.027****</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.472)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup (+)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change (+)</td>
<td>-.414</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.531)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-)</td>
<td>.682****</td>
<td>-.005*</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Target)</td>
<td>(.205)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-)</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>-.009***</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dif)</td>
<td>(.118)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+)</td>
<td>1.816****</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change (Target)</td>
<td>(.544)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (-)</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>-.090****</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.21)</td>
<td>(.025)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Aid (-)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (+/-)</td>
<td>-4.251</td>
<td>.176****</td>
<td>.137****</td>
<td>.073****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.688)</td>
<td>(.053)</td>
<td>(.137)</td>
<td>(.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
policy change. The control variable for regime type of states receiving the foreign policy action, or in this case, those states with which U.N. voting patterns are measured, is negative and significant. This indicates that states undertake fewer changes in voting patterns with democratic states than non-democratic states. Another statistically significant control in this model indicated that, consistent with the other models, the further apart states are in terms of regime type, the less foreign policy change occurs.

The important U.N. votes model did produce a statistically significant estimate in the predicted direction. An increase of one party in a presidential system leads to a .004 decrease in foreign policy change, which accounts for about three percent of the annual mean change in voting coincidence of all states (see Appendix C). No other significant estimates were produced in this model.

The fourth column of Table 5.7 displays results from the Cold War interaction model. The interaction variable indicates that the multipartism in presidential systems was associated with more foreign policy change than in the post-Cold War period. However, since the coefficient for the effective number of parties is not statistically significant, no conclusions can be drawn about the effect that presidentialism and multipartism had on foreign policy change during the period of the Cold War. The Cold War variable is positive and significant, indicating a positive relationship between Cold War and foreign policy change.

**Hypothesis 5: Coalition Government**

For the fifth hypothesis I explore whether coalition governments in parliamentary systems demonstrate greater stability in foreign policy than states
governed by single-party governments. For this model estimates were obtained for the subpopulation of states comprising parliamentary democracies. Since coalition governments are expected to be more constrained in their decisionmaking and undertake less foreign policy change, the alternative hypothesis is that estimates for the coalition variable will be less than zero. The null hypothesis is that estimates will be zero or greater.

As Table 5.8 indicates, the U.N. Affinity model is the only one of the three to produce a statistically significant estimate for the independent variable. The coefficient -.007, significant at the .10 level, indicates that a one-unit change in the value assigned to coalition (0 or 1) is associated with a decrease in foreign policy change, expressed in terms of U.N. voting similarities, accounting for about 12 percent of the annual mean change in Affinity scores of all states.

The COPDAB model produced a significant and negative estimated coefficient for the capabilities control variable. The executive change control was positively associated with foreign policy change, as expected. The estimate for wealth was negative and significant in the important votes model, which indicates that wealth is associated with less foreign policy change.

The control variable for Cold War indicates a positive association between the Cold War and greater changes in voting coincidence with the United States. This indicates that a one-unit change in the Cold War dummy variable (from non-Cold War to Cold War) is associated with an increase in the amount of foreign change equal to about 65 percent of the annual mean change of all states.
**Table 5.8 Coalition Parliamentary Democracy: Effects on Foreign Policy Change**

*Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition (-)</td>
<td>.100 (.440)</td>
<td>-0.007* (.005)</td>
<td>-0.009 (.014)</td>
<td>-0.001 (.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (+/-)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability (+/-)</td>
<td>-31.794* (18.879)</td>
<td>.558 (.216)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (+/-) X Coalition</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth (-)</td>
<td>.516 (.844)</td>
<td>-.010 (.009)</td>
<td>-.054** (.021)</td>
<td>-.053** (.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup (+)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change (+)</td>
<td>.868** (.390)</td>
<td>.002 (.004)</td>
<td>.010 (.017)</td>
<td>.017 (.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Target)</td>
<td>.214 (.351)</td>
<td>-.005 (.004)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Dif)</td>
<td>.039 (.339)</td>
<td>-.002 (.004)</td>
<td>-.013 (.014)</td>
<td>-.007 (.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+) Change (Target)</td>
<td>.504 (.380)</td>
<td>.009 (.003)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Aid (-)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-0.000* (.000)</td>
<td>-0.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (-)</td>
<td>-1.50 (-1.573)</td>
<td>-.052 (.015)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (+/-)</td>
<td>1.253 (6.603)</td>
<td>.032 (.072)</td>
<td>.167**** (.023)</td>
<td>.114**** (.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
Hypothesis 6: Effective Number of Parties and Coalition Parliamentary Government

I next test the hypothesis that the greater the effective number of parties in a coalition government, the less foreign policy change occurs. These models look exclusively at parliamentary democracies with coalition governments. Since a greater number of parties are expected to generate more constraints on the decision-making process and be associated with less foreign policy change, the alternative hypothesis is that estimates will be less than zero. The null hypothesis is that estimates will be zero or greater.

The COPDAB model produces a significant estimate for the independent variable in the direction predicted in the hypothesis. As Table 5.9 indicates, a one-unit change in the effective number of parties in a coalition parliamentary government is associated with a .725 decrease in foreign policy change, approximately 20 percent of the annual mean change of all states. Significant estimates for the control variables for capabilities and alliance are both negative.

The important U.N. votes model also produces an estimate for the effective number of parties in the predicted direction, significant at the .01 level. This indicates that a one-unit change in the effective number of parties is associated with a seven percent decrease in voting coincidence, about five percent of the annual mean change of all states. Other significant estimates for variables in this model include wealth (negative) and regime difference (negative). The Affinity model produces significant estimates for the control variable measuring regime changes in the PRIE (positive) and alliance (negative).
Table 5.9 Coalition Parliamentary Democracy and Number of Parties: Effects on Foreign Policy Change

Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective (-)</td>
<td>-.725****</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.007*</td>
<td>-.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Parties</td>
<td>(.285)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (+/-)</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>.125***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X ENP</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability (+/-)</td>
<td>-59.377* (34.794)</td>
<td>.357 (.268)</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth (-)</td>
<td>1.297 (1.470)</td>
<td>.008 (.014)</td>
<td>-.093*** (.033)</td>
<td>-.081** (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup (+)</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change (+)</td>
<td>.671 (.498)</td>
<td>-.002 (.005)</td>
<td>.020 (.020)</td>
<td>.019 (.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Target)</td>
<td>.209 (.642)</td>
<td>-.005 (.006)</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Dif)</td>
<td>.045 (.661)</td>
<td>-.009 (.006)</td>
<td>-.042** (.019)</td>
<td>-.024 (.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Change (+/-) (Target)</td>
<td>.706 (.561)</td>
<td>.011*** (.004)</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Aid (-)</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (-)</td>
<td>-6.251*** (2.630)</td>
<td>-.041** (.020)</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (+/-)</td>
<td>5.619 (12.510)</td>
<td>.206 (.126)</td>
<td>.227**** (.050)</td>
<td>.152*** (.052)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
As is the case with the hypothesis above, the Cold War control variable indicates a positive relationship between the Cold War and foreign policy change. However, no significant results are found in the coefficients of interaction variable.

**Hypothesis 7: Military Government**

The next set of models test the hypothesis that greater military involvement in non-democratic governments is associated with less foreign policy change. Thus these models look exclusively at the subpopulation of non-democratic states. The reader will recall that I created two dummy variables – one indicating cases where civilians and military rule together and one for cases where the military rules alone. Since greater military involvement in government is expected to be associated with less foreign policy change, the alternative hypothesis is that estimates for the coefficients of both variables will be less than zero, but that the relationship will be stronger for cases where there is complete military rule. The null hypothesis is that estimates will be zero or greater.

Because too few cases are available for analysis in the important U.N. votes model, the hypothesis is tested using the COPDAB and Affinity models. As Table 5.10 reveals, estimates for the independent variables in the Affinity model support the hypothesis of this dissertation. While the estimates indicate that both types of government are associated with less foreign policy change, when compared to civilian non-democratic governments, the coefficient for complete military rule indicates that there will be even less foreign policy change when there is greater military involvement. Among the control variables, estimates for capabilities (positive), wealth (negative), regime type of PRIE (positive), regime change in the PRIE
Table 5.10 Military Role in Non-Democratic Government:
Effects on Foreign Policy Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COPDAB U.N. Affinity U.N. Important U.N. Import (CW Inter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil-Civilian (-) .613 (.291) -.004* (.003) Too few cases for analysis – Only 40 cases of complete military rule since 1986.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military (-) .887 (.494) -.009** (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability (+/-) -21.800**** (4.700) .202*** (.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth (-) .697* (.362) -.009** (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup (+) .997 (.647) -.003 (.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change (+) -.253 (.472) .007 (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) .011 (.123) .002* (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Target) .030 (.106) -.001 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Dif) .0357 (.191) .017**** (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) Change (Target) (.191) (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Aid (-) -------- --------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (-) -.503 (.483) -.034**** (.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (+/-) 4.216 (.811) .038**** (.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 1,281 1,941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
and alliance (negative) were all significant as well. The only significant estimates produced by the COPDAB models were for capabilities (negative) and wealth (positive).

**Hypothesis 8: Development and Foreign Policy Change**

In testing the hypothesis that more developed states engage in more stable foreign policies than do less developed states, I include all states in the population, and code them as either less developed or developed. The variable used to operationalize less developed countries is Group of 77 membership. Because G-77 membership is closely associated with a country’s wealth, the control variable for wealth was dropped from this analysis. Since G-77 members are expected to undertake more foreign policy change, estimates for the independent variable should be positive and significant. The null hypothesis is that estimates will be zero or less.

As Table 5.11 indicates, both models employing U.N. voting as the dependent variable produce significant estimates for the independent variable in the predicted direction. The one-unit change in the independent variable was associated with a .006 increase in the Affinity score and a .024 increase in the voting coincidence measure, or 11 percent, and 18 percent of the annual mean change of all states, respectively.

The control variable for capabilities produces coefficient estimates that are negative for the COPDAB model and positive for the Affinity model. The estimate for the control variable for regime change in the PRIE is also significant and positive in both models. The estimate for alliance similarity is significant and negative for the COPDAB model. The estimate for regime type of the PRIE is positive in the Affinity model, indicating that more changes in voting similarity occur when the makeup of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less Dev. (+)</td>
<td>-.157</td>
<td>.006***</td>
<td>.024****</td>
<td>.027***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.292)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (+/-)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>.082****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (+/-) X Less Dev.</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability (+/-)</td>
<td>-17.056****</td>
<td>.197****</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.319)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup (+)</td>
<td>.520</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.401)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change (+)</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.022**</td>
<td>.019*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.213)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Target)</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.004****</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Dif)</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+) Change (Target)</td>
<td>.232*</td>
<td>.011****</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.137)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Aid (-)</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>-.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (-)</td>
<td>-.868***</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.411)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (+/-)</td>
<td>4.252****</td>
<td>.018****</td>
<td>.099****</td>
<td>.075****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.709)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.077)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,627</td>
<td>4,574</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables and variables in the interaction model; (+/-) indicates expected direction.
PRIE is more democratic. The single significant estimate for control variables in the important U.N. votes model is for executive change, which is positive, as expected.

The Cold War interaction model did not produce a statistically significant estimate for the interaction variable. However, consistent with all other models in this dissertation, the Cold War is positively associated with changes in voting coincidence with the United States.

**Hypothesis 9: Executive Change**

The final set of models test the hypothesis that changes in executive leadership are associated with greater foreign policy changes in non-democracies than in democracies. Since the effects of changes in the executive are expected to be a function of regime type, interaction models are run using each of the dependent variables. For the variable Democracy, democracies are coded as 1 and non-democracies are coded as zero. Mixed systems are coded as missing data.

As the data in Table 5.12 indicate, no significant coefficients are produced for the interaction variable. Contrary to the hypothesis of the dissertation, this indicates that there is no significant difference in the effect of changes in the executive leadership in democracies and non-democracies.

This chapter specified how each of the variables were operationalized and tested according to the hypotheses developed in this dissertation. Results indicate significant support for a number of these hypotheses. The following chapter will analyze and discuss these results, their relevance, and their contribution to the literature. I will also suggest further directions this line of research may take.
Table 5.12 Executive Change in Democracies and Non-Democracies: Effects on Foreign Policy Change

Coefficients reported for each variable with standard errors in parenthesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change (+)</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.464)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (-)</td>
<td>-.891***</td>
<td>-.011****</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.308)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change (-)</td>
<td>.519</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Democracy</td>
<td>(.550)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability (+/-)</td>
<td>-17.416****</td>
<td>.241****</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.062</td>
<td>(.066)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth (-)</td>
<td>.697**</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.297)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup (+)</td>
<td>1.020*</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.603)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Target)</td>
<td>.126**</td>
<td>.003****</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.053)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+/-) (Dif)</td>
<td>-.085*</td>
<td>-.001****</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.046)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (+) Change (Target)</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>.012****</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.164)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Aid (-)</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (+/-)</td>
<td>-.328</td>
<td>-.038****</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.482)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (+/-)</td>
<td>3.657****</td>
<td>.030****</td>
<td>.110*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.655)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,999</td>
<td>3,359</td>
<td>1,028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001. Values are based on a one-tailed test for the independent variable, and two-tailed tests for the control variables.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine effects that regime settings, institutional arrangements, party systems and other factors have on a state's foreign policy stability. The study of foreign policy change is an important endeavor, but lacking in this field have been studies that look at foreign policy change empirically across time and space, permitting conclusions that can be generalized regarding causal factors and their influence. In this dissertation I have sought to address this concern and developed a number of testable hypotheses examining how regime settings and institutional arrangements create constraints and incentives that influence a decision-maker’s ability and willingness to undertake foreign policy change. Some factors, such as regime type, have received significant treatment in the international relations literature but scant treatment as an explanatory variable for foreign policy change – at least in any broad empirical studies. Other factors such as democratic institutional arrangements have received extensive treatment in the area of comparative politics throughout the past decade, but until very recently they have been largely ignored by those studying international relations and foreign policy. This dissertation sought to fuse and synthesize perspectives from a number of areas of political science to explain the conduct of foreign policy and significantly enhance our understanding of some of the factors that encourage or inhibit foreign policy change.

Examining the effects of regime type on foreign policy change is important. While regime effects receive extensive treatment in the literature as they relate to the politics of war and peace, alliance behavior and conflict resolution, they have not
received significant treatment in a more general sense, looking at the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy. Discovering differences between the major regime types and their propensity for foreign policy change is a significant contribution to a better understanding of those factors that shape foreign policy-making. Some scholars charge that the democracy/non-democracy dichotomy is cast at too high a level of abstraction to produce any meaningful differences in the conduct of foreign policy. Results to the contrary merit a re-examination of this contention.

Another significant aspect of this dissertation is that it delved "below the regime surface," incorporating insights from the comparative politics literature and applying them to the study of foreign policy. The third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991) fostered a renewed interest in the "new institutionalism" (Lane and Ersson, 2000) among scholars in comparative politics who recognized that "institutions matter" and can have a profound effect on a state's ability to consolidate a new regime, represent adequately and efficiently the interests of citizens, and to effectively develop and implement public policies.

Another important contribution of this dissertation is that it provided empirical and generalizable results across a broad area of space, covering different periods of time and multiple aspects of foreign policy change. Broad-based empirical studies of foreign policy change are seriously lacking in the field (t’Hart, 1998), and this dissertation provided an important step in beginning to identify those causal factors that can be generalized beyond specific countries or regions.
Findings

Examining the effects of regime types on foreign policy change, I posit that democracies demonstrate greater stability in foreign policy than do non-democracies. Democracies face greater constraints, which come in the form of: (1) legal and structural constraints on what a decision maker may do; (2) political constraints which preclude executives from making decisions that could adversely affect their position or the position of their party; (3) the interests of the public which a democratic leader must consider; and (4) the procedural and juridical nature of the democratic regime’s legitimacy. Non-democratic leaders on the other hand face fewer constraints, can more effectively repress demands, and exercise a freer hand in the conduct of foreign policy. Additionally, I identify ways non-democratic leaders may face unique incentives to undertake foreign policy change.

The hypothesis was tested using three different measures of foreign policy change. The empirical analysis confirms the hypothesis that democracies are more stable in their foreign policies than non-democracies, undertaking fewer foreign policy changes. Results from each of the models demonstrate that more democratic states undertake less foreign policy change. This proves true for the COPDAB events data model, which measures the foreign policy actions of states toward all states in its Politically Relevant International Environment on a weighted severity scale, as well as both models using United Nations votes. Findings are robust not only across different measure of the dependent variable but also across numerous models of the independent variable as well.
These findings demonstrate a significant difference between regime types when it comes to foreign policy change. While constraints and incentives can function equally in both democracies and non-democracies, the results of these tests show that important differences can be found. These findings suggest that contentions that regime differences are cast at too high level of abstraction to have any meaningful impact on foreign policy change merit re-evaluation.

A significant regime effect found in the control variables throughout the dissertation concerns the regime type of the recipient states and the polity distance between them. The results in the COPDAB model indicate that states undertake more foreign policy change as the average level of democracy of the state receiving the foreign policy action increases; or, in the case of Affinity scores, as the average level of democracy increases for those states with which U.N. voting similarity is measured. This may be explained in the way democracies are viewed by other states. If democracies face greater constraints at home, can more credibly commit to a course of action, and tend to engage in more cooperative behavior and avoid conflict, other states may feel more compelled to change their foreign policies toward them than toward non-democracies – since changing policies toward non-democracies could invite a more immediate and negative response.

Results across each of the models also indicates that the greater the difference in regime type between a state and those states receiving the foreign policy action (or those states with which voting similarity was measured), the less states undertake foreign policy change. This finding suggests that the more dissimilar the regimes of states, the less foreign policy change will occur between them. On the surface this
finding is somewhat surprising, since dissimilar states would be expected to have
dissimilar interests. One explanation may be related to the fact that states of similar
regime type have been found to engage in more cooperative and less conflictual
behavior (Leeds, 1999). In the context of a cooperative relationship, a state may feel
free to change its foreign policy toward a state of a similar regime type without fear of
possible negative consequences.

The estimate for the control variable for regime changes in the PRIE was
significant and positive in the Affinity model. This indicates that more foreign policy
changes occur when there are greater changes in the regime type of those states
receiving the foreign policy action. Regime changes can fundamentally affect the
approaches states take in their foreign policies, as new leaders, with different goals,
incentives and constraints take new and different approaches to foreign policy. The
purpose of including this variable is to capture those effects where states must adjust
to new realities abroad as a consequence of domestic changes in other states.
Whenever significant, the estimate for this variable was consistently positive
throughout the models in this dissertation.

Two other sets of controls that are consistently in the same direction
throughout the models in the dissertation are those controlling alliance and executive
changes. The two measures used to control for alliances (alliance or U.S. aid,
depending upon the model) consistently demonstrate that states undertake fewer policy
changes with those states with which they share similar alliances. Similar interests
and goals create fewer issues for disagreement and fewer occasions for foreign policy
change. Changes in executive leadership are also associated with foreign policy change.

Two control variables that produce estimates in the opposite direction, depending upon the model, are capabilities and wealth. Capabilities are negatively associated with change in the COPDAB model, while wealth is positively associated. In the Affinity model, estimates indicate a positive association between capabilities and foreign policy change. In the important U.N. votes model, the coefficient for wealth is consistently negative, indicating that wealthy states undertake fewer changes in their voting coincidence with the United States. These findings are fairly consistent throughout the models in the dissertation — greater capabilities mean less foreign policy change, and wealth means more foreign policy change in the COPDAB events data model, while the opposite is found in the model using U.N. votes. Reasons for this are not readily apparent, though the two variables are fairly collinear (.215). East (1973), however, demonstrates that “small states,” with fewer resources and capabilities, nonetheless act forcefully in the international system. Also, states with greater capabilities are likely to have larger foreign policy bureaucracies to process information and implement policy. States lacking these filtering mechanisms may change policies more abruptly.

Additionally, states with greater resources may be more satisfied with their situation and position in the international system and may be less willing to undertake policies that could alter that status – particularly if the change in policy requires major commitments of those resources. In forums such as the United Nations, however, states’ resource commitments are not tied to the decisions they make. Votes instead
reflect preferences and positions. In this setting, states may see their votes as an opportunity freely express their views on a range of issues that they otherwise would not address in their foreign policies.

I expected wealth to be negatively associated with foreign policy change. This is not the case in the COPDAB model. This may be explained by the fact that although wealthy states may be more satisfied with their position, as a consequence of greater wealth they have more interactions with their neighbors and the major powers and thus more opportunities to change their foreign policies. The changing policies and positions of the oil-producing states in the Middle East is one example that may reflect this phenomenon.

The control variable for Cold War is incorporated into an interaction with the regime variable for the important U.N. votes model. Results show that the Cold War was positively associated with changes in this foreign policy measure, and that while more democratic states undertake fewer foreign policy changes than non-democratic states, that relationship was reversed during the Cold War. While regime type is the only independent variable in this dissertation to show any statistical significance in the interaction models, all of the interaction models for Cold War show that the Cold War was associated with greater foreign policy change. This finding runs counter to all conventional wisdom concerning the constraints imposed by the international system during the Cold War.

Before drawing any conclusions, however, the reader is cautioned to recall that this finding is generated in a model measuring foreign policy change specifically in terms of percent-agreement with the United States on United Nations role call votes it
deems important. The timeframes for the other data available does not permit comparisons between a Cold War and post-Cold War period. The COPDAB ends in the year 1978 and the Affinity data ends in 1992, which would permit changes during the Cold War period to be observed for only one year out of the 41 years covered.

I suggest that this finding is not related to the nature of the Cold War system but rather to other factors related specifically to the dependent variable. Were these findings concerning the Cold War robust, regime effects in the COPDAB and Affinity models, which for the most part cover the Cold War period exclusively, would have generated coefficients in the opposite direction that they did. Other factors, including U.S. activities during this same time period must also be considered as explanations. The 1986 to 1990 time period identified as the Cold War coincided with reductions in U.S. aid allocations in a direct attempt to tie aid to foreign policy behavior (Kegley and Hook, 1991). States receiving reduced U.S. aid may have felt compelled to vote against resolutions promoted by the United States in greater frequency in retaliation for aid cuts; or, hoping to see aid restored, they may have begun to vote more in favor of U.S. positions, which could account for the greater changes during this period.

Issues associated with democratization that continued throughout the early 1990s also cannot be dismissed as a possible explanation. Further examination may discover that the “new” democracies demonstrate greater consistency in their voting coincidence with the United States than do the “old” democracies. If this is the case, the changing makeup of democratic states in the world since 1990 may account for the difference. The time period also roughly coincides with a change in U.S. administrations and a greater willingness to work with international bodies. The United States and its allies
waged the Gulf War under the auspices of the United Nations; and under the Clinton administration, the United States took a much more active role in multilateral efforts aimed at such activities as family planning and reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions. This greater willingness to work within multilateral institutions could be reflected in the fact that overall, less change occurred after 1990.

Testing the hypothesis that presidential systems have more foreign policies than parliamentary systems, the Affinity model produces results in the predicted direction, indicating that presidential systems undertake fewer changes in voting patterns with other states in their PRIE than do parliamentary systems. In developing the hypothesis, the case was made that presidents face greater constraints on their decisionmaking than do parliamentary executives. This is related to the separation of powers, separation of purpose and separation of survival present in presidential systems that I predicted would inhibit the chief executive's ability to undertake foreign policy change.

The fact that no other models provided significant results should discourage any sweeping claims that can be made about the presidential-parliamentary dichotomy. Further examination is required regarding how the constraints in these systems impact the decision-making process. As mentioned earlier, Maoz and Russett (1993) posit that a parliamentary government’s reliance on the support of the legislature would make it more constrained than presidential systems. This, and other cross cutting influences, may account for the mixed results here.

A question that should be addressed, however, is why significant results are found in one type of foreign policy measure (United Nations votes) and not in the
other (events data). One possible explanation is related to the fact that of the three measures of foreign policy change, the U.N. Affinity scores, which include all annual votes cast in the General Assembly, are arguably the least substantive of all the measures. On the other hand, the COPDAB data, which measure aspects of cooperation and conflict behavior, capture aspects of foreign policy that have more significant consequences for states. In these cases where more important international issues are at stake, presidential and parliamentary systems may behave more similarly, regardless of the differences that may exist between them, as the realist paradigm would predict.

Contrary to my expectations regarding presidentialism and divided government, no significant findings show that when presidential systems experience divided government they undertake less foreign policy change. There are a number of possible explanations for this. First, the assumptions developed in the hypothesis may have overlooked the significant bargaining power presidents have with members of the legislature, and the ability of presidents to establish coalitions of support for policies with members of the opposing party (in fact, the weak party systems often associated with presidential systems should make this task easier). Other factors not included in the model such as presidential popularity, which allow a president to overcome some of these constraints, may also account for a lack of findings consistent with the hypothesis.

While there no significant findings to suggest that divided government is associated with less foreign policy change, the fact that the coefficients produced by the other estimates are positive merit further investigation. This may reveal that
presidents will, when confronted with a divided government, seek ways to circumvent the legislative process by exercising other executive powers in foreign policy making, something he may be reluctant to do with members of his own party—thereby creating a situation where unified government encourages greater foreign policy stability and divided government greater foreign policy change. If divided government places legislative constraints on a president’s ability to exercise a free hand in the conduct of foreign policy, he may look for other ways to express policy preferences that avoid significant legislative meddling. Certain types of foreign policy behavior may be more amenable to this.

Results from the model using important U.N. votes do support the dissertation’s hypothesis that a greater number of legislative parties will inhibit foreign policy change in presidential democracies. The model shows that the greater the effective number of legislative parties in a presidential system the less foreign policy change occurs. When there are fewer parties in the legislature it is easier for the president to take the necessary steps to undertake foreign policy change.

Testing the hypothesis that coalition governments undertake less foreign policy change than do single-party governments produces a significant result in the direction predicted when using the model with important U.N. votes. Higher profile votes, especially those with a possible consequence of lost economic assistance are more likely than other U.N. votes to have the attention of domestic actors. This may account for why differences could be found in the important vote model but not in the Affinity model. Results from the COPDAB events data model, however, suggest that, coalition governments are no more or no less likely to change foreign policy than are
single party governments. This may be because single-party governments, in fact, face
greater constraints in foreign policy-making than was posited here, or because
coalition governments can as effectively undertake foreign policy change as single-
party governments. Another possible explanation for the lack of significant findings
may stem from the fact that single-party governments are more identifiable to the
voters. If policies go bad or could upset a significant portion of the population, single-
party governments may be reluctant to undertake foreign policy change even though
they have the means to do so. Thus coalition governments undertake a level of foreign
policy change reflected by their level of domestic constraints, and single-party
governments undertake no greater changes because they are more risk averse.

The dissertation also tests the impact that the number of legislative parties in a
parliamentary system with a coalition government has on foreign policy change. A
greater number of parties should make the agreement necessary for major foreign
policy change more difficult to achieve. Findings in the COPDAB and important U.N.
votes models confirm this hypothesis. A greater number of parties in parliament
makes it more difficult for the executive, who already must contend with different
interests within his or her own government, to exercise effectively and authoritatively
a free hand in the conduct of foreign policy. Because the government must rely on the
support of the legislature, it must take care to avoid taking policy positions
objectionable to a majority of parliament. With more parties come more interests and
policy dimensions that must be accommodated, which will tend to inhibit foreign
policy change in coalition governments.
Turning from democratic regimes, I propose that a military role in the governance of non-democratic regimes has a stabilizing effect on foreign policy. This notion is based on the ideology and interests of most military regimes, how they view their role in government, as well as the absence of legitimizing strategies for military leaders in non-democracies that might otherwise provide incentives for foreign policy change. The hypothesis predicts that in non-democratic governments where the military is a member, there will be less foreign policy change than in non-democratic governments where military is not a member. A lack of cases where there is direct military rule during the 1986-1997 time period precluded analysis using the important U.N. votes model.

The U.N. Affinity produced significant estimates for each of the military government variables. Greater military involvement is associated with less foreign policy change. Both levels of military involvement are associated with greater foreign policy stability than civilian rule. The lack of significant findings in the COPDAB model suggests that in terms of cooperation and conflict during this time period, military governments were no more stable in their foreign policies than are their civilian counterparts.

This is another area that merits further investigation. Military governments, in fact, should be quite able to undertake foreign policy change if they wish. They are by nature highly cohesive actors, with an organized and clearly defined hierarchical structure. Cohesive actors face far fewer internal constraints on the decision making process that could inhibit foreign policy. Another factor is that the military itself exercises control over a significant tool of foreign policy. Military governments
wishing to employ the military for a foreign policy action do not face the same barriers as their non-democratic civilian counterparts in needing to convince a reluctant military establishment to cooperate with the government's foreign policy aims. Also, in non-democratic states where the military in not a political player, the military is nonetheless often seen as a potential player. Their presence as an actor outside the political system may have a constraining effect on a civilian autocrat’s ability and willingness to undertake foreign policy change that could conflict with the interests of the military.

In examining cases of the Third World, I hypothesize that features associated with lower levels of political and economic development make these states especially prone to strategies that use foreign policy to promote state building, development, and legitimacy. Significant results are found in the predicted direction in both of the models using U.N. voting. The model using COPDAB data as the dependent variable does not yield significant findings for the independent variable. Statistically significant estimates for control variables in this model that do explain change indicate that with increasing capabilities and more similar alliance patterns with recipient states, there is less foreign policy change.

Because these states are in a relatively weak position within the international system, they may be unwilling to take on the consequences or risks associated with significantly altering the substantive aspects of their policies in their relevant international environment, as would be captured in the model using COPDAB data. The fact that significant results are found in both of the U.N. votes model, however, reflects the fact that these states conduct foreign policy in the United Nations
fundamentally differently than in their direct interactions with other states. The United Nations presents these states with a relatively cost-free forum to use foreign policy, expressed in terms of U.N. votes, in the manner hypothesized. The less developed states may use United Nations votes to assert their interests and independence and thwart the interests of the major powers. This may be done for purposes of domestic consumption without regard to the consequences invited by becoming more or less conflictual with states in their relevant environments.

A factor that merits consideration is the fact that, as a United Nations affiliated organization, the G-77’s activities are focused toward activities in the United Nations, which may account for some of this change. However, examinations of the model using wealth as the independent variable instead of G-77 membership produce nearly identical results, with wealth associated with less foreign policy change.

The final hypothesis examines how executive changes in non-democracies and democracies might differently impact foreign policy change. I predict that the mediating aspects of organized, regularized and institutionalized political competition in democracies will lead to fewer significant changes in foreign policy when new leaders come to power. In non-democracies, however, where political competition cannot effectively be channeled or managed, the expectation is that when changes in the executive do happen, they will coincide with much more significant changes in foreign policy. Interaction models for executive change do not produce significant estimates for the interaction in any of the models, suggesting, somewhat surprisingly, that there is no significant difference in the level of foreign policy change between executive changes in non-democracies and democracies.
Among the control variables not already discussed above, the variable for national capabilities is consistently significant across most of the models. In the COPDAB and important U.N. votes models, the estimate is negative, indicating that greater capabilities mean less foreign policy change. In the Affinity model, the estimate for capabilities is consistently positive and is associated with greater changes in the similarity of voting patterns. Here again, the different direction of the estimates is reflected in the measurement used for the dependent variable. If capabilities reflect a state’s position in the system, it may be unwilling or unable to undertake the more significant foreign policy changes reflected in the COPDAB and important votes models. The General Assembly votes not subject to heavy U.S. lobbying, however, may more accurately display these state’s preferences, which they are more constrained from doing in other foreign policy areas – accounting for the greater levels of change. The control variable for wealth is also significant across a large number of the models. As is the case with capabilities, the direction of estimates varies depending upon the measure of foreign policy used. The COPDAB produces positive coefficients for this variable, while the important U.N. votes models produces negative estimates. The Affinity models produce both positive and negative estimates. Significant findings for the alliance control show that with greater alliance similarity between states there is less foreign policy change.

Somewhat surprisingly, the estimates for the control variables for leadership change and coup produce few statistically significant estimates, with the coup variable dropped from the model several times due to collinearity. In cases where the variables were significant, however, they were in the direction as predicted, indicating that
executive changes coincide with greater foreign policy change. The different controls for regime effects – capturing the regime type of the target, the distance between regime types, and regime changes in the PRIE were consistent in their direction across all cases. Significant estimates showed that the more democratic the recipient states, the more foreign policy change occurred, and the greater the regime distance between states, the less foreign policy change occurred. Possible reasons for this are outlined above.

**The Dissertation in Perspective**

The statistical analysis supports the general contentions of this dissertation – that the regime setting and institutional arrangements have an impact on the amount of foreign policy change a state will undertake. Of the tests on the 9 hypotheses, seven yielded significant findings from which to draw conclusions. The hypotheses are summarized below, indicating which of models produced statistically significant findings to support them:

**H1: Democratic states demonstrate a greater degree of stability in their foreign policies than do non-democratic states.**
- COPDAB
- Affinity
- Important Votes

**H2: States with presidential democracies demonstrate a greater degree of stability in their foreign policies than do states with parliamentary democracies.**
- Affinity

**H3: Presidential democracies with divided government demonstrate a greater degree of stability in their foreign policies than do presidential democracies with unified government.**
- None
H4: Multi-party presidential democracies demonstrate a greater degree of stability in their foreign policies than do two-party presidential democracies.
  - Important Votes

H5: Parliamentary democracies with coalition governments demonstrate a greater degree of stability in their foreign policies than do parliamentary democracies with single-party governments.
  - Important Votes

H6: In parliamentary democracies with coalition governments, the greater the effective number of parties seated in the parliament, the more stable a state’s foreign policy.
  - COPDAB
  - Important Votes

H7: Non-democratic governments in which the military is a member will engage in a more stable foreign policy than will non-democratic governments where the military is not a member.
  - Affinity

H8: The more developed states will engage in a more stable foreign policy than will the less developed states.
  - Affinity
  - Important Votes

H9: Changes of leadership in democratic states will produce less dramatic changes in foreign policy than will leadership changes in non-democratic states.
  - None

As this indicates, the results are not entirely robust. Only the results for the first hypothesis produce significant estimates using all of the models in this dissertation. This is not altogether surprising, considering that these measures cover different time periods and vastly different aspects of foreign policy behavior. The COPDAB measurement covers the Cold War period and includes a wide array of foreign policy actions, from the diplomatic to military. The important U.N. votes model covers the decade straddling the end of the Cold War and measures foreign policy in terms of votes cast on issues important to the United States in the United
Nations. The Affinity model covers the longest period and includes all annual votes cast in the United Nations, measuring foreign policy change in terms of changes in voting similarities with a state’s relevant environment.

Of the three different models, those employing the COPDAB measure offer the most compelling evidence for the hypotheses they support. Because this measure captures substantive actions that have real consequences for a state’s foreign policy, findings discerning differences in the amount of foreign policy change between states with different regime types and institutional arrangements provide compelling evidence in support of the hypotheses. In a number of the hypotheses, significant results were found using the U.N. voting measurements only. This may be a function of the fact that U.N. voting, particularly as measured in Affinity, is a relatively cost-free expression of foreign policy. When foreign policy changes involve more significant risks and consequences, external considerations may override domestic constraints and incentives facing decision-makers. The forum of U.N. however, provides a forum where those constraints and incentives may play a more active role. On the other hand, as was suggested in the discussion of divided government, the U.N. may also provide a forum for leaders to “play politics” and express foreign policy preferences that would be constrained in other venues. Both of these dynamics may be in place, which merit future investigation.

The measure using important U. N. votes produces significant findings for almost all of the independent variables tested. These votes are subject to heavy lobbying and arm-twisting on the part of the United States. However, even when controlling for alliance similarity with the United States and economic aid, the models
show significant estimates for the independent variables. This suggests that those factors driving the hypothesized differences in levels of foreign policy change are sufficient to overcome these barriers. It also may reflect the ineffectiveness of U.S. lobbying and bargaining efforts in the United Nations.

This dissertation is a significant contribution to the study of foreign policy change. It builds on a number of recent works in different parts of the political science literature and develops and tests hypotheses on important causal factors of foreign policy change. Explanations of the democratic peace by authors such as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Morgan and Schwebach (1992) and Morgan and Campbell (1991) have shown how institutional constraints on democratic executives promote accountability and competition, reducing the likelihood that democracies will go to war with one another. Gaubatz (1996) demonstrates how aspects of democracy made them less resistant to change and their alliances more durable. Leeds (1999) demonstrates how these characteristics make democracies’ commitments more credible and cooperation more likely. Recent works in the democratic peace by scholars such as Prins and Sprecher (1999) and Auerswald (1999) have expanded the concept of regime to examine how different institutional constraints within democracies affect a state’s likelihood to take military action or escalate disputes. In the area of comparative politics, institutionalists such as Tsebelis (1995, 2002), Cheibub and Limongi (2002), and Stephan Haggard, et. al. (2001) have looked at ways domestic institutional arrangements facilitate or inhibit policy change. Aspects of each of these approaches were incorporated into this dissertation to study how regimes and institutions specifically affect foreign policy change.
This dissertation applies these important concepts developed elsewhere in the literature to a field of inquiry where they have thus far received little attention. For scholars of the democratic peace, this dissertation offers insight into how regime characteristics might impact foreign policy more generally, below the levels of war and peace. These findings are also insightful for scholars of comparative politics. Arguably, foreign policy should be much less sensitive to institutional and political constraints and other types of public policy. The fact that institutional arrangements were found to have an influence on foreign policy change further enhances the argument of those comparativists who claim that "institutions matter" and can have a profound influence on the policy process.

Implications for Future Research

This dissertation is an important step in applying the concepts of regimes institutions to the study of foreign policy change, and the concepts developed here provide directions for future study. Greater insight into role of institutions and foreign policy change may be found by distinguishing between different types of foreign policy change. Different types of policies demand the use of different foreign policy instruments, each of which may generate different constraints and incentives for foreign policy change. Differentiating between economic policies and security policies may show that executives may be more or less sensitive to the constraints and risks associated with foreign policy change, depending upon the nature of the policy. Legislatures in presidential systems, for example, are likely more sensitive to changes in economic policies that could impact their constituents. Differentiating policy types may demonstrate that institutional constraints are greater concerning economic
policies than, for example, security policies. This dynamic, if it exists, may account for a lack of significant findings in a number of the models. The COPDAB data provides an outlet to explore these differences, where policy types are identified according to security, economic, cultural, etc. The data also provides an opportunity to capture directional change in foreign policy – toward more cooperation or conflict. Future study, for example, may uncover a difference in the direction that non-democracies and democracies change their foreign policies.

This dissertation determined that constraints and incentives for foreign policy change are discernible by regime type, as well as institutional arrangement. Future studies should refine those specific aspects that constrain and/or create incentives for foreign policy change. This would require taking apart and analyzing the myriad of characteristics inherent in each of the institutions to determine those specific aspects that inhibit or encourage foreign policy change. For example, is it the leader’s risk adversity or the institutional constraints that inhibit change in a given system? Another direction for future study is to examine other institutional factors that might have an influence on foreign policy change. These may include bicameralism versus unicameralism, federalism, the division of cabinet portfolios in coalition governments, as well as corporatist arrangements and other aspects of citizen representation.

Foreign policy change remains an important subject of inquiry, and recent scholarship in this area suggests a renewed interest in studying those factors that may impel states to depart from status quo foreign policies. By demonstrating the influence of regimes and institutions on foreign policy change, this dissertation adds important new elements to the study. Foreign policies will continue to change as long as states
continue to conduct foreign policies. The quest to explain those changes will also continue. As this dissertation shows, the centuries-old debate over regimes and foreign policy behavior is as relevant today as ever before.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/Polity.html


MACHIAVELLI, NICCOLO (1675) “Which Alliances or Leagues Can be Trusted, Whether Made with a Republic or those made with a Prince.” In Discourses on Livy. Translated by HARRY NEVILLE. Online text: http://www.constitution.org/mac/disclivy.txt.


1. *Voluntary unification into one nation*: two states join into a single, legally binding government.

2. *Major strategic alliance (regional or international)*: fighting a war jointly; establishing or joining a joint military command or alliance; conducting joint military maneuvers; or establishing economic common market.

3. *Military, economic or strategic support*: selling nuclear power plants or materials; providing air, naval, or land facilities for bases; providing military assistance; granting military aid; joint programs and plans to initiate and pursue disarmament; or sharing highly advanced technology.

4. *Non-military, economic, technological or industrial agreement*: making economic loans or grants; agreeing to economic pacts or trade agreements; giving industrial, cultural, or educational assistance; establishing common transportation or communication networks; selling industrial-technological surplus supplies; providing technical expertise; ceasing economic restrictions; repaying debts or providing disaster relief.

5. *Cultural or scientific agreement or support (non-strategic)*: starting diplomatic relations; recognizing a government; visit by a head of state; opening borders; establishing technological or scientific communications; proposing or offering economic or military aid; conducting or enacting friendship agreements; or conducting cultural and academic agreements or exchanges.

6. *Official verbal support of goals, values, or regime*: official support of a policy; raising legation to an embassy; reaffirming friendship; asking for help against third party;
apologizing for unfavorable actions or statements; allowing entry of press correspondents; thanking for aid; or resuming broken diplomatic or other relations.

7. **Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressions—mild verbal support**: meeting of high officials; visit by lower officials for talks; conferring on problems of mutual interest; proposing talks; issuing joint communiqués; announcing cease-fires; exchanging prisoners of war; appointing ambassadors; non-governmental exchanges; requesting support for a policy.

8. **Neutral or non-significant acts**: rhetorical policy statements; non-consequential news items; non-governmental visitors; indifference statements; compensating for nationalized enterprises or private property; or “no comment” statements.

9. **Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction**: low-key objections to policies or behavior; communicating dissatisfaction through a third party; failing to reach an agreement; refusing a protest note; denying accusations; objecting to an explanation of goals, position, etc.; or requesting change in policy.

10. **Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction**: warning retaliation for acts; making threatening demands and accusations; condemning strongly specific actions or policies; denouncing leaders, a system, or ideology; postponing heads of state visits; refusing participation in meetings or summits; leveling strong propaganda attacks; denying support; blocking or vetoing policy or proposals in the United Nations or other international bodies.

11. **Diplomatic-economic hostile actions**: increasing troop mobilization; boycotts; hindering movement on land, waterways, or in the air; closing borders and blocking free communication; imposing economic sanctions; embargoing goods; refusing mutual trade
rights; manipulating trade or currency to cause economic problems; halting aid; granting sanctuary to opposition leaders; mobilizing hostile demonstrations against a target country; refusing to support foreign military allies; recalling an ambassador for emergency consultations regarding a target country; refusing visas to other nationals or restricting movement in the country; expelling or arresting nationals or press; spying on foreign government officials; terminating major agreements.

12. Political-military hostile actions: inciting or supporting riots, rebellions or guerilla activities against the target country; limited and sporadic terrorist actions; kidnapping or torturing foreign citizens or prisoners of war; providing sanctuary to terrorists; attacking diplomats or embassies; breaking diplomatic relations; expelling military advisors; or nationalizing companies without compensation.

13. Small scale military acts: limited air, sea, or border skirmishes; border police acts; annexing territory already occupied; seizing material of a target country; imposing blockades; assassinating leaders of a target country; or material support of subversive activities against target country.

14. Limited war acts: intermittent shelling or clashes; sporadic bombing of military or industrial areas; small-scale interception or sinking of ships; mining of territorial waters.

15. Extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic costs: full-scale air, naval, or land battles; invasion of territory; occupation of territory; massive bombing of civilian areas; capturing of soldiers in battle; large scale bombing of military installations; or the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.
APPENDIX B
POLITY DATA DESCRIPTION

Variable descriptions are adapted from Gurr (1997) and Marshall and Jaggers (2000b)

1. Competitiveness of Participation: Refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena.

a.) Suppressed Competition (coded 0 for Democracy, 2 for Autocracy): No significant oppositional activity outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party, and the regime's institutional structure is matched by its demonstrated ability to suppress oppositional competition.

b.) Restricted (coded 0 for Democracy, 1 for Autocracy): Some organized political competition occurs outside government, but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the male adult population) from participation.

c.) Factional Competition (coded 1 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): Polities with “factional” or “factional/restricted” patterns of competition. This differs from "Restricted" in that the restrictions are not "persisting in nature," and do not include large categories of people, groups, or types of peaceful political competition.

d.) Transitional Competition (coded 2 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): Any transitional elements from Restricted, or Fractional patterns to fully Competitive patterns, or vice versa.

e.) Competitive Competition (coded 3 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political
influence at the national level. Competition rarely causes widespread violence or disruption. Very small parties or political groups may be restricted.

2. Regulation of Participation: The extent to which there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed.
   a.) Restricted (coded 0 for Democracy, 2 for Autocracy): Some organized political participation is permitted, but significant groups, issues and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process.
   b.) Factional/Restricted (coded 0 for Democracy, 1 for Autocracy): Polities which oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and restriction -- when one group secures power it restricts its opponents' political activities until it is in turn displaced.

3. Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: "The extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates (Gurr, 1974:1483)."
   a.) Selection (coded 0 for Democracy, 2 for Autocracy): Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both. Examples include rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; and cases where there are repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties.
   b.) Dual/Transitional (coded 1 for Democracy, 0 to Autocracy): Dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election.
Also used to describe transitional arrangements between Selection and competitive Election.

c.) Election (coded 2 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): Chief executives are chosen in or through competitive elections (may be popular or by an elected assembly) matching two or more major parties or candidates.

4. Openness of Executive Recruitment: Recruitment of the chief executive is "open" to the extent that all the politically-active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process.

   a.) Closed (coded 0 for Democracy, 1 for Autocracy): Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, which have executive powers by right of decent.

   b.) Dual Executive--Designation (coded 0 for Democracy, 1 for Autocracy): Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister.

   c.) Dual Executive--Election (coded 1 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister.

   d.) Open (coded 1 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election.

5. Executive Constraints (Decision Rules): Eckstein and Gurr (1975) define decision rules in the following manner:

   Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that supers and subs be able to recognize when decision-processes have been concluded, especially “properly” concluded. An indispensable
ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken (ibid.: 121).

This variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives (whether individuals or collectives), which may be imposed by any number of different "accountability groups."

a.) Unlimited Authority of Chief Executive (coded 0 for Democracy, 3 for Autocracy): There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions. Examples include: cases where constitutional restrictions are ignored, or the constitution is frequently revised or suspended; there is no legislative assembly, or it is called and dismissed at the executive's will; the executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can remove them at will; the legislature cannot initiate legislation, veto or suspend acts of the executive; rule by decree is repeatedly used.

b.) Intermediate Category (code 0 for Democracy, 2 for Autocracy): A transition period between Unlimited Authority and Slight to Moderate Limitations, where power within an autocratic regime is either contracting or expanding.

c.) Slight to Moderate Limitations on Executive Authority (coded 0 for Democracy, 1 for Autocracy): There are real, but limited constraints on the executive. Examples include: cases where the legislature can initiate some categories of legislation and delays or blocks implementation of executive acts and decrees; the ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive; the legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive; the
executive fails to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term; there is an independent judiciary; situations in which there is civilian leadership, but policy decisions reflect the demands of the military.

d.) Intermediate Category (coded 1 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): A transition period between the concepts Slight to Moderate Limitations and Substantial Limitations, where limited constraints on an autocratic regime emerge, or there is a weakening of horizontal accountability in a democratic system.

e.) Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority (coded 2 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them. Examples include: a legislature, ruling party or council that often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action; a council or legislature that sometimes refuses funds to the executive; the accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts; the legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.

f.) Intermediate Category (coded 3 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy): A transition period between Substantial Limitations and Executive Parity or Subordination, where there is a weakening of executive authority vis-à-vis the legislature and/or the judiciary, or a strengthening of executive authority vis-à-vis these branches of government. This category includes cases where the legislature grants the executive temporary emergency powers in times of a national crisis.
g.) Executive Parity or Subordination (coded 4 for Democracy, 0 for Autocracy):
Accountability groups have effective authority equal to, or greater than the executive in most areas of activity.
Examples include: a legislature, ruling party, or council that initiates most important legislation; and cases where the executive is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems). Most consolidated democracies are coded here (Marshall and Jaggers 2000b).
The Polity dataset constructs separate democracy and autocracy scores for every state, as of Dec. 31 of each year.
APPENDIX C
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Table C.1 Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COPDAB (1954-1978)</td>
<td>2,815</td>
<td>4.043</td>
<td>3.669</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29.944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity (1951-1992)</td>
<td>4,762</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.489*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important Votes (1986-1997)</td>
<td>1,608</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For a more accurate representation of this data, a single outlier of 0.839 is eliminated from this summary.

Table C.2 Summary Statistics for Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs.*</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (1954-1978)**</td>
<td>2,346</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (1951-1992)</td>
<td>4,168</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (1986-1997)</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Dem. (1954-1978)</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Dem. (1951-1992)</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Dem. (1986-1997)</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres. Dem. Divided (1954-1978)</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres. Dem. Divided (1951-1992)</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>0.664</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres. Dem. Divided (1986-1997)</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP in Pres. Dem. (1954-1978)</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>2.525</td>
<td>0.9631</td>
<td>1.212</td>
<td>5.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP in Pres. Dem. (1986-1997)***</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>3.751</td>
<td>3.581</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>34.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Parl. Dem. (1954-1978)</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Parl. Dem. (1951-1992)</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Parl. Dem. (1986-1997)</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>0.664</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-Civilian Rule (1954-1978)</td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-Civilian Rule (1951-1992)</td>
<td>2,546</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-Civilian Rule (1986-1997)</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Rule (1954-1978)</td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Rule (1951-1992)</td>
<td>2,546</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Rule (1986-1997)</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Developed (1954-1978)</td>
<td>4,090</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Developed (1951-1992)</td>
<td>6,858</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Developed (1986-1997)</td>
<td>1,954</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Change (1954-1978)</td>
<td>2,963</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Change (1951-1992)</td>
<td>5,208</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Change (1986-1997)</td>
<td>1,818</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* The number of observations does not precisely meet the N in each of the models due to some missing control variables.

** Democracy variable is coded 1 for democracy (17-21 on Polity scale) and 0 for non-democracy (1-5 on Polity scale). Interim cases (6 –16) are coded as missing data here.

***The CNTS data set codes all self-identified parties as separate parties. Several conglomerate parties in countries of the former Soviet Union Eastern Europe won seats in the early to mid 1990s, which accounts for few cases of unusually high multipartism.
APPENDIX D
HISTOGRAMS FOR DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Figure D.1 Relative Frequency Distribution
COPDAB Dependent Variable, 1954-1978

Figure D.2 Relative Frequency Distribution
U.N. Affinity Dependent Variable, 1951-1992

Single outlier of 0.839 is eliminated from this histogram for more accurate representation.
Figure D.3 Relative Frequency Distribution
Important U.N. Votes Dependent Variable, 1986-1997

Figure D.4 Relative Frequency Distribution
Regime Type Independent Variable (21-Point Scale), 1954-1978
Figure D.5 Relative Frequency Distribution
Regime Type Independent Variable (21-Point Scale), 1951-1992

Figure D.6 Relative Frequency Distribution
Regime Type Independent Variable (21-Point Scale), 1986-1997
Figure D.7 Relative Frequency Distribution
Effective Number of Parties in Presidential Democracy Indep. Var., 1954-1978

Figure D.8 Relative Frequency Distribution
Effective Number of Parties in Presidential Democracy Indep. Var., 1951-1992
Figure D.9 Relative Frequency Distribution

Figure D.10 Relative Frequency Distribution
Figure D.11 Relative Frequency Distribution

Figure D.12 Relative Frequency Distribution
APPENDIX E
CORRELATION MATRICES FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Table E.1
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables Corresponding to Democratic Systems (Democracies Only), 1954-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Div.</th>
<th>Exec.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pres.</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div. Govt.</td>
<td>.468</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>-.187</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dev.</td>
<td>-.194</td>
<td>-.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>-.074</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table E.2
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables Corresponding to Democratic Systems (Democracies Only), 1951-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Div.</th>
<th>Exec.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pres.</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div. Govt.</td>
<td>.401</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>-.122</td>
<td>.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dev.</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>-.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change</td>
<td>-.045</td>
<td>-.018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table E.3
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables Corresponding to Democratic Systems (Democracies Only), 1986-1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Div.</th>
<th>Exec.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pres.</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div. Govt.</td>
<td>.331</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>-.060</td>
<td>.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dev.</td>
<td>.510</td>
<td>-.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec Change</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>.050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table E.4
**Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables**
**Corresponding to Non-Democratic Systems**
**(Non-Democracies Only), 1954-1978**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military-Civ.</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dev.</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Change</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table E.5
**Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables**
**Corresponding to Non-Democratic Systems**
**(Non-Democracies Only), 1951-1992**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military-Civ.</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dev.</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Change</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table E.6
**Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables**
**Corresponding to Non-Democratic Systems**
**(Non-Democracies Only), 1986-1997**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military-Civ.</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dev.</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Change</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table E.7
**Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables**
**Corresponding to Democratic and Non-Democratic Systems**
**(Both Systems Included), 1954-1978**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Dem.</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Less Dev.</th>
<th>Exec. Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Dem.</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.674</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dev.</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>-0.444</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Change</td>
<td>-0.229</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table E.8
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Corresponding to Democratic and Non-Democratic Systems
(Both Systems Included), 1951-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Dem.</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Less Dev.</th>
<th>Exec. Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Dem. Democracy</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-0.696</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dev.</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>-0.454</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Change</td>
<td>-0.219</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table E.9
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Corresponding to Democratic and Non-Democratic Systems
(Both Systems Included), 1986-1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Dem.</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Less Dev.</th>
<th>Exec. Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Dem. Democracy</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-0.659</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Dev.</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>-0.416</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Change</td>
<td>-0.167</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VITA

David B. Huxsoll was born in Washington, D.C., and grew up in Malaysia and Maryland. He graduated Suma Cum Laude from West Virginia University in 1991 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in journalism. In 1993 he earned his Master of Arts Degree in political science from West Virginia University. He is a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, currently serving at McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas.