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Sourcing and Framing Analysis of Source Messages in the Coverage of Armed Conflicts by American and British Foreign Reporters

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SOURCING AND FRAMING ANALYSIS OF SOURCE MESSAGES IN THE COVERAGE OF ARMED CONFLICTS BY AMERICAN AND BRITISH FOREIGN REPORTERS

A Dissertation

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Louisiana State University and
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation contributes to closing several gaps in mass communication scholarship as well as indicates new avenues for further research in the area of sourcing and framing. This study explored whether reliance on official sources in foreign reporting of international crises is as heavy as the hypothesis predicts, and, by studying messages delivered by official sources in this coverage, revealed how those messages were framed. The results showed that officials were dominant sources of information in all the three media outlets studied. The results also supported the argument that the same indexing mechanisms are at force in foreign reporting and apply not only to American officials or American media but foreign officials and other media markets as well. In all the media outlets under scrutiny messages delivered by American officials appeared most frequently. The analysis of the message frames revealed a sharp division based on which official source delivered them. Russian and Crimean officials named the same causes, provided same evaluations and suggested same remedies. On the other side were Western and Ukrainian official sources who named opposite causes, provided opposite evaluations and suggested different remedies to those voiced out by Russian and Crimean officials.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

This dissertation contributes to closing several gaps in mass communication scholarship as well as indicates new avenues for further research in the area of sourcing and framing. This study explores whether reliance on official sources in foreign reporting of international crises is as heavy as several existing theories predict, and, by studying messages delivered by official sources in this coverage, reveals how those messages are framed. By doing so, this study adds knowledge in several areas. The first one is sourcing.

Even with the competition from newly emerged ‘civil journalists’ and media platforms enhanced by the rapid development of new technologies, the news media represent a major source of information about the outside world for their audiences (Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston, 2007; Hamilton, 2009). Following established norms and routines, the practice that results in a product of certain expected form and quality, the media construct the reality for their consumers (Tuchman, 1978). Out of numerous norms and routines, this study focuses on sourcing.

As Hamilton and Lawrence (2010) put it, “sourcing is a bedrock routine of American journalism” (p. 683) and “sourcing practices are prime elements in the construction of narratives and frames in the news” (p. 684). On any given day, doing their job “journalists make subjective choices all of the time as to whom they interview or what documents they quote” (Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010, p. 683). So what are those choices? Is there anything generally common about them? Existing scholarship suggests that there is; that influenced by the environment they work in (overall political and social system, corporate employers, newsroom demands and routines, and individual traits) (Bennett, et al., 2007; Entman, 2004; Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014), reporters largely ‘index’ their coverage to (rely
on) official sources not only for information about the news but often the news itself (Bennett, et al., 2007).

The scholarship in this area, however, is mostly American centered even if it concerns foreign crises. The events under scrutiny were the ones in which the United States was either directly involved or had immediate foreign policy interests. According to Hamilton and Lawrence (2010) “we know less about the sourcing of foreign news in non-war contexts, or in contexts of foreign conflicts in which the United States is not directly involved” (p. 685) and “we are unaware of any studies that … specifically examine the sourcing of news filed by US reporters abroad” (p. 686). What’s more, there is practically no scholarship that studies sourcing in non-American news media.

This study addresses both of the issues. First of all, it looks at a recent, still ongoing and yet unexplored crisis, the events that took place in Ukraine. This crisis did attract great attention from the international community and did generate active response and participation in its resolution from both Europe and the United States. There was even involvement that took the form of sanctions against Russia for its military interference in the affairs of an independent state and financial aid provided to the new government of Ukraine. Neither Europe nor the United States, however, were involved as parties to the crisis or participated in it militarily. Second, to broaden the study of sourcing to non-American news media, I explored the coverage of this crisis by a British newspaper. Language barrier, however, prevented me from including the news media with international reach from other countries.

Another gap that this study aims to fill is how official sources frame their messages in the coverage of foreign crises. Dependence of the news media on official sources (Bennett, 1990), provides these sources with an opportunity to convey their messages through the news coverage
and frame them to try to construct the reality for the audiences they target and achieve desired ends (Entman, 2004). This issue is especially relevant when the constructed reality falls beyond the audiences’ immediate experiences; that is, in foreign affairs reporting. Reliance of the audiences on the media for knowing not only what is happening, but why and how the events are developing is much higher since the level of knowledge about the covered region and/or topic is generally low (Hamilton, 2009). This is especially true if the topic of the coverage is a foreign conflict. Since official sources dominate the coverage, what they are saying, what they are emphasizing and how they are presenting the reality to the public, therefore, becomes very important.

According to Hayes and Guardino (2013), “numerous studies … [failed] to independently operationalize elite discourse, instead analyzing only news coverage itself. Therefore, many researchers are unable to describe what government officials are saying about a foreign policy issue…” (p. 57). What they meant was that current scholarship does not cover the debate that is going on among the officials beyond the media coverage. “This kind of research does not allow for a full examination of indexing because it fails to consider the actors and messages that characterize elite discussion that occurs outside of media venues” (Hayes & Guardino, 2013, p. 57). Even though this study does not address this specific issue, by studying the messages by official sources that do get into the media coverage, it does provide partial insight into the elite discourse, at least the part of it that was selected for reporting. So, even though partly, I will be able to answer the question as to “what government officials are saying about a foreign policy issue” (Hayes & Guardino, 2013, p. 57) as well as how they are saying what they are saying and what they select and emphasize as important while they are saying it.
What’s more, again breaking the barriers of American-centrism in existing theories on sourcing, this study includes an analysis of messages by foreign official sources. Existing scholarship suggests that one of the existing theories, indexing works as applied to foreign officials as well as American, both in the coverage of events with the United States being a major participant and, naturally, in those where United States is not directly involved. Foreign officials find their way into the coverage just the same as the Americans do (Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010; Hayes & Guardino, 2013). In their discussion of the coverage of the war in Iraq, Hayes and Guardino (2013) argue that “when non-U.S. voices are viewed as important to the development or the resolution of a foreign policy debate – that is, when journalists perceive foreign actors or institutions as possessing power to affect events – these voices will receive significant media attention” (p. 5). On the other hand, in their comparative study of The New York Times coverage of the 1931 Japanese military operation in Manchuria and 1994-1995 Russian invasion of Chechnya (both absent the United States involvement), Hamilton and Lawrence (2010) found that the mean number of paragraphs with attributions to Japanese and Russian as well as Chinese and Chechen officials was greater than the mean number of paragraphs with attribution to United States or other country officials. “Therefore, not only the concept of ‘official debate,’ but the larger theoretical framework of power indexing in news coverage should be extended for potential application to actors and actions outside the confines of the United States” (Hayes & Guardino, 2013, p. 26).

To address the issues discussed above, I opted to analyze the coverage of the crisis in Ukraine by three media outlets based on their long-established tradition of foreign reporting and worldwide reputation. These media outlets are The New York Times, its British counterpart, The Guardian and the Associated Press. The newspapers were selected because their content was
much more readily available and easily accessible as opposed to the broadcasters (although future studies can cover those as well). The Associated Press served as sort of a point for comparison since its services are widely used by both papers and its format is the closest to pure news reports.

With all this in mind, in this study, I ask and answer the following research questions:

RQ1: What sources were dominant in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ2: What official sources were dominant in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ3: What are the differences (if any) between the American and British newspapers and the Associated Press in terms of use of official sources in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ4: What frames appeared in the messages by official sources in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ5: What are the differences in frames (if any) between the American and British newspapers and the Associated Press?

Frist, I provide a review of relevant literature that covers theoretical framework of this study, then, I discuss the history and state of foreign reporting to provide a context in which the coverage of the crisis in Ukraine took place. I also introduce in some detail the crisis under scrutiny as well as the background of the media outlets I analyze. Following is the discussion of the research method applied in this study, its results and discussion of implications, limitations and future research.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a review of literature to introduce the theoretical framework of this study and lay the basis for answering the research questions above. The first three research questions for this study focus on sourcing.

2.1 Sourcing

As long ago as in the infancy of journalism as a profession, those who aspired to report the news were trained to rely on solid sources for information and perspective on the events. Yet in 1894, the rule of thumb for a reporter, his/her “mission” was “to reproduce facts and the opinions of others, not to express his own” (as quoted in Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010, p. 684). Coming from the premise that a reporter has to stay detached from what is reported, not take sides or include his/her own opinion (Berkowitz, 2009; Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010), newsgathering became a process of putting a picture of an event together through the accounts of sources, documentary as well as human (Berkowitz, 2009; Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010). “Essentially, journalism’s paradigm follows a science-like model, where reporters gather authoritative data and then present it without explicitly taking a side in the discourse… [Sources] become the providers of this data, so that reporters become beholden to them for the raw materials of news” (Berkowitz, 2009, p. 103). To this day, textbooks teach future journalists that “most of the major facts in a news story should be attributed to some source” (Stovall, 2012, p. 62). This study focuses on human sources.

Newsmaking is a business, sustainability of which depends on the product being trusted by and popular among the audiences. It is also a profession, and though not licensed, has its norms, standards, values and responsibilities. “News is a product with organizational expectations, and … reporters must develop strategies and procedures to help ensure they will
produce their product on time and in a form that their peers will judge as ‘good’” (Berkowitz, 2009, p. 103). Therefore, “news stories need sources the way human beings need oxygen” (Cozma, Hamilton & Lawrence, 2012, p. 85). Being far from mere information carriers, sources make the news legitimate, add credibility and authority (Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010; Stovall, 2012), help to avoid bias and protect from legal problems (Tiffen, Jones, Rowe, Aalberg, Coen, Curran, Hayashi, Iyengar, Mazzoleni, Papathanassopoulos, Rojas, & Soroka, 2013; Tuchman, 1972), as well as facilitate reporters’ productivity in finding news and meeting deadlines on their day-to-day job (Berkowitz, 2009; Cook, 1998; Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010; Tiffen, et al., 2013). “News organizations can only be viable and meet their necessary goals of frequent and reliable production if they establish regular channels of news gathering… News is, then, a parasitic institution; its product is the deeds and words of others” (Tiffen, et al., 2013, pp. 1-2).

The ‘parasitism’ of the news institutions expresses itself in an interdependent, symbiotic, and “delicately negotiated” (Berkowitz, 2009, p. 103) relationship between reporters and their sources in which each side relies on the other for reasons of self-interest (Berkowitz, 2009; Cook, 1998; Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010; Reich, 2006), something that Reich (2006) called a “‘reciprocal’ model of reporter-source relations” (p. 498). For we should not forget that not only journalists need sources to successfully conduct their business, but that “news sources usually have a vested interest in journalists’ reports, linking news content to public opinion, and ultimately, their own success” (Berkowitz, 2009, p. 103). In these relations, some sources have higher power, stakes as well as importance for reporters than others; those are officials.

There is an extensive scholarship on this topic in mass communication and political communication literature (Bennett, 1990; Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2007; Berkowitz, 1997; Cook, 1998; Cozma, Hamilton & Lawrence, 2012; Dimaggio, 2009; Entman, 2004;
Ericson, Baranek, & Chan, 1989; Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Sigal, 1973). Cook (1998), assigned the news media a “central political force in government” calling it a “political institution” (p. 3). He saw the news media as serving an active (although basically involuntary) role in the American system of government by proving fast and efficient channels of communication between and within the three branches: legislative, executive and judiciary, as well as facilitating and affecting public opinion (Cook, 1998). The news media, in turn, he insisted, have their own vision of what are their responsibilities and how they should approach them (Cook, 1998). “American journalists are faced with an impossible task of gathering all the most important and interesting news under the unremitting pressure of the deadline and with declining resources to do so. Moreover, journalists are conscientiously committed to high standards of impartiality and to excluding their own personal values from the newsmaking process” (Cook, 1998, p. 5).

Journalists adapted to the demanding environment and came up with their own ways of dealing with it and getting what they need. They are aware that officials still need them to tell “their side of the story” (Sigal, 1973) even despite the fact that in today’s environment officials can communicate directly to the public bypassing the media altogether. Even so, the news media have a loud voice and are omnipresent for they use the same technologies. “Reporters learn how to find sources that can readily be scheduled and who will provide the kinds of information they seek in a concise and manageable way. Once the scheduling … and interviews has taken place, reporters can then shift to a new work mode, interpreting the information they have received, privileging some sources’ information over others, and crafting a news story” (Berkowitz, 2009, p. 104).
The “important and interesting” (Cook,, 1998, p. 5) aspect that has to be present for information and/or event to be newsworthy, and the news, as neutral as it should be, to also be of a high quality, however, takes journalists back to officials (Cook, 1998). “Important news is most often certified as such by persons ‘in a position to know’ based on their official position within government. Thus, powerful officials are best positioned to create news events, certify issues as newsworthy, and make news on their own terms” (Cook, 1998, p. 5). Dimaggio (2009) agrees: “Though the corporate media remain formally independent from government, informally, media outlets are dominated by official sources. Reporters overwhelmingly rely upon government voices in constructing news stories” (p. 14). Berkowitz (2009) and Bennett, et al. (2007) argue the same. According to Bennett, et al. (2007), in politics, what drives a story is not so much truth or importance of the events, but rather “whether it is driven by dominant officials within institutional decision-making arenas... The advantage generally goes to those officials with the greatest perceived power to affect the issues or events at hand, the greatest capacity to use the levers of office to advance their news narratives on a regular basis, and the best communication operations to spin their narratives well” (Bennett, et al., 2007, p. 29).

Scholars agree that officials do not shy away from taking the maximum advantage possible from their position of power in order to satisfy their own agendas and achieve their own goals. According to Paletz and Entman (1981) and Entman (2004), officials “peddle their messages to the press in hopes of gaining political leverage” (Entman, 2004, p. 4). Berkowitz (2009) argues that if a source is in a position of high power, like an official would be, he/she can impede reporters’ job of meaningful information gathering. They, for instance, can ‘flood’ the media with information on more ‘convenient’ events and/or issues (Sigal, 1973), the idea being
that “that best way to keep the press from peering into dark corners is to shine a light elsewhere” (Sigal, 1973, p. 54).

Sources with power have both the capacity and the resources to “not only be able to speak to an issue on the news agenda, but to be able to influence the shape of an issue that gain a place on the agenda and then form the initial discussion about that issue” (Berkowitz, 2009, pp. 105-106). Even more so, some official sources may be so able as to prevent some information on an issue or issue itself from being on the news agenda and the subject of public discussion (Berkowitz, 2009). All these correspond to the efforts of official sources to frame information that is covered by the news media (Berkowitz, 2009; Berkowitz, 1997; Entman, 2004; Paletz & Entman, 1981).

I will talk in depth about the concept of framing, its place in the mass communication scholarship and its application in this study in the following section of the literature review. For now, I will provide a brief explanation of it as applied to the news meanings. According to Berkowitz (2009), “issues can be discussed in specific ways, with specific boundaries applied to which meanings are included in the discussion and which are beyond its scope” (p. 106). Official sources are important and necessary as well as capable of shaping the discussion of issues and “construction of news reality in that they are empowered to shape and frame discourse; moreover, a preponderance of one type of source can result in news coverage focused along narrow ideological lines” (Berkowitz, 1997, p. 486).

Entman (2004), Bennett (1990) and Bennett, et al. (2007) suggested theoretical models that explain how these processes work in practice. Bennett put forward an indexing hypothesis based on the discussed above premise that “it is by now well established that the mass media in the United States look to government officials as the source of most of the daily news they
report” (Bennett, 1990, p. 103). In his hypothesis, Bennett’s argued that the American mainstream media adapt or “calibrate”/“index” (Bennett et al., 2007, p. 49) their content to what those in power are saying. Such calibration makes the media almost passively transmit the events they cover through what Bennett calls “principles of power and process” (Bennett, et al., 2007, p. 29) (also discussed above) rather than fulfill their widely known responsibility: serve as watchdogs (Althaus, Edy, Entman, & Phalen, 1996; Bennett, et al., 2007). “The mainstream news generally stays within the sphere of official consensus and conflict displayed in the public statements of the key government officials who manage the policy areas and decision-making processes that make the news” (Bennett, et al., 2007, p. 49). It is through this process that the news media evaluate and decide “what gets into the news, what prominence it receives, how long it gets covered, and who gets the voice in the stories” (Bennett, et al., 2007, p. 49). Bennett, at al. (2007) describe this ‘decision making’ in insightful detail:

Shifting periods of elite consensus in the policy-making process become punctuation points in news coverage as political forces line up for or against particular initiatives. The press monitors these power formations, and reports them in insider terms of strength of support or opposition for the leading initiative or the contending initiatives… Indexing the news to points of institutional decision conflict sets the broad terms of press narratives, within which various news sources are sorted primarily in terms of their ability to affect the political process and to spin the media most aggressively and effectively… Resulting stories focus on who won and who lost a vote, a court case, a struggle over the budget, or a decision to go to war. And those stories generally stick to the language and political limits set by the officials involved, especially with regard to fundamental decisions about foreign policy and war (pp. 49-50). As a result, we get the news that is dominated by official voices especially if officials have something to lobby (Bennett, 1990). And if and when they do, “the prominence of various perspectives in the news does not have so much to do with whether they are supported by available facts, but whether they have powerful champions” (Bennett, et al., 2007, p. 50). And more powerful these champions are, the louder they can speak. In their book, “When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina,” Bennett, et al. (2007) studied
among others the example of the Bush administration’s publicity build up to the war in Iraq. By
the authors’ account, thanks to the aggressive, well organized and massively executed spin and
management of messages backed up by loud criticism of any information contrary to the
administration’s version as being unpatriotic and biased, the news media were almost uniformly
filled with ‘we-need-to-go-to-war-because-Iraq-has-weapons-of-mass-destruction-and-
connections-to-Al-Qaeda’ rhetoric. So successful was this spin and so aggressive the
management that all the evidence (abundant and reliable) pointing to the falsity of the above
argument, and all the credible voices outside and inside the government criticizing this policy
either did not make it into the coverage or were drowned because the government itself failed to
muster a strong enough opposition and activate its own “inquiry mechanisms” (Bennett, at al., p.
14).

Existing scholarship supports the postulates of the indexing hypothesis (Cozma,
Hamilton & Lawrence, 2012; Entman, 2004; Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010; Hayes & Guardino,
2013). The number of attributions to official sources in a number of studies on this topic
consistently exceeded the number of attributions to unofficial sources. The impact of officials’
messages over messages delivered by others, however, should not only be evaluated in terms of
dominance but also in terms of frames deployed in the messages. Entman’s (2004) theoretical
model, while mirroring the Bennett’s, takes this aspect into consideration as well.

Entman (2004) agrees with the explanations suggested by the indexing hypothesis adding
to it the influence of frames officials assign to their messages as well as the fact that the media
are not that passive in playing the official tune but rather active party trying their best to do their
job according to the established standards. The news is not under “iron grip of hegemonic elite
control, nor does it always provide a straightforward index of elite discussion” (Entman, 2004, p.
Entman (2004) came up with a cascade model that “attempts to illuminate the increasingly complicated process of framing foreign affairs, explaining how and why some views activate and spread from the president to other elite, to the media, and to the public” (p. 147). The model involves several levels through which messages “cascade” (Entman, 2004, p. 9) down and up and are framed depending on how much power each level has. At the top is the country’s Administration and Defense, lower level is represented by Congress members and its staff. Together with Congress members are ex-officials, experts and foreign leaders. It is, however, important to note that even though ex-officials and experts may have the same power in terms of ability to frame their messages and in their credibility in public’s eye as officials, they do not have a power vested upon them by their office, hence, no policy-making power. Therefore, while being elite, they will not be considered as official sources. The next level on the model is represented by the media (individual journalists and news organizations), then the news itself (news frames) and then, the public:

Ideas cascade downward from the administration’s first public expressions about an event. Activation of thoughts and feelings in the minds of journalists and leaders almost immediately spawns conversations that spread ideas between participants. Journalists canvass their networks of legitimate and customary sources … to learn how they are connecting ideas and feelings: are sources saying the same things in unison, are they arguing with each other, are they quiet on particular matters? During this time, too, reporters and editors talk to each other, compare impressions, and monitor competitors’ coverage. The more often journalists hear similar thoughts expressed by their sources and by other news outlets, the more likely their own thoughts will run along those lines, with the result that the news they produce will feature words and visuals that confirm the same framing. If ideas expressed are more varied, framing may be less one-sided (p. 9).1

According to Entman (2004), when an event or an issue is in full consonance or dissonance with the existing political culture, meaning the majority of the elite is united in their position on the event/issue, official frames tend to dominate the coverage. “Ambiguous guidance from the political culture is the key to opening space for dissent from the White House’s

1 Italics added.
framing” and “journalists’ motivations push them toward including opposition to the White House in their coverage” (p. 148).

In sum, both indexing and cascading model suggest and explain general dominance of official sources over and in the news coverage of events and issues, especially those, where the political stakes are high or which concern foreign policy decisions. Cascading model does add some nuance by including the framing in the equation, breaking down the process into ‘cascades’ and explaining processes that take place at each level. Both theories, however, focus on American political elite. Both theories are American-centric. Literature that would study these mechanisms and processes in different environments, and media and political markets is practically absent. Whatever scholarship is available is sporadic, out of context and has not yet led to development of unified theories. While the news media at least in developed countries are going global (one of the signs, for instance, being British media changing the domain extensions from .co.uk to .com), we do not know much about the practices and processes that are at work there and what they result in. Are the same or similar factors affecting relations between sources and reporters? What form do those relations take and in what kind of phenomena they turn into? What kind of media product comes out of it? While I cannot possibly answer these questions here, I at least can ask them and reveal some information that will be helpful in setting agenda for and conducting future research. Also, only Entman’s model mentions foreign officials but does not deliberate much on their role and place in the news coverage. Are they part of the journalist-source relationship discussed in this chapter? In fact, they are. Mostly in foreign reporting, which actually is the focus of this study. This dissertation addresses the existing gaps in scholarship discussed above and takes indexing hypothesis and cascading model to a different level. For now, it builds upon these two theories. Future research in this area, however, if yields
consistent results, will contribute to new theory building in sourcing. What is this new level? This study takes sourcing beyond American media by analyzing a British newspaper and beyond American official sources by studying framing of the messages by foreign officials. But why should we care about foreign officials?

Hayes and Guardino (2013) show that in today’s global and interdependent world voices of foreign officials become more and more important, relevant, influential and noticeable in the U.S. foreign policy process and to public opinion. According to them, “not only the concept of ‘official debate,’ but the larger theoretical framework of power indexing in news coverage should be extended for potential application to actors and actions outside the confines of the United States” (Hayes & Guardino, 2013, p. 26). This is exactly what this study will do. It also addresses another existing gap in scholarship. Hamilton and Lawrence (2010) said: “we are unaware of any studies that … specifically examine the sourcing of news filed by US reporters abroad” (p. 686) in foreign reporting. So, it is important to study the journalist-source relationships in this particular domain. In this work, however, I go even further than that; I look not only at American foreign reporting practices and products but, to expand the existing knowledge (questions I asked above), at British foreign reporting practices as well. This particular choice is based on the knowledge of language and availability of the content for analysis. Though these aspects are limiting, my work lays ground for further research in this area in other countries and other languages.

Going back to reporter-source relationships, to fill the knowledge gaps discussed above, we should put it in the context of foreign officials and foreign reporting. Existing scholarship suggests that in foreign reporting even by American media and especially when the United Stated is not directly involved in the events, the variety of participating officials is much broader
(Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010; Hayes & Guardino, 2013). Not only the White House, the Pentagon and the Congress become influential actors trying to push certain messages through, but foreign officials as well (Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010; Hayes & Guardino, 2013). According to Hayes & Guardino (2013), “when non-U.S. voices are viewed as important to the development or the resolution of a foreign policy debate – that is, when journalists perceive foreign actors or institutions as possessing power to affect events – these voices will receive significant media attention” (p. 5). The results of a comparative study by Hamilton and Lawrence (2010) of *The New York Times’* coverage of 1994-1995 war in Chechnya and the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria provide support to this argument. According to the content analysis of the above coverage, the mean number of paragraphs with attributions to Japanese, Russian, Chinese and Chechen official sources exceeded the mean number of paragraphs with attributions to the American or other country officials.

The findings above clearly demonstrate and support one more thing. The same processes explained by both theoretical models may be at work in foreign reporting as well. Certain peculiarities pertinent specifically to foreign reporting, however, warrant it a more detailed general review that comes in the next chapter. I started this discussion with the premise that reporters rely on sources to help them construct the reality of events and issues. This is especially relevant when the constructed reality falls beyond the audiences’ immediate experiences; that is, in foreign affairs reporting. Reliance of the audiences on the media for knowing not only what is happening, but why and how the events are developing in this case is much higher since the level of knowledge about the covered region and/or topic is generally low (Hamilton, 2009).

Based on the above discussion, the study will answer the following research questions:

RQ1: What sources were dominant in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?
RQ2: What official sources were dominant in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ3: What are the differences (if any) between the American and British newspapers and the Associated Press in terms of use of official sources in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

As I already mentioned, however, official sources not just dominate the coverage, but also frame their rhetoric to sway public opinion and achieve certain policy goals (Entman, 2004). Studying frames of messages delivered by official sources, therefore, becomes crucial to mass communication research especially in the context of an international geopolitical crisis where the stakes are usually rather high. According to Hayes and Guardino (2013), there is no scholarship that explores what debate is going on among the political elite per se. All of the research, they say, focuses on studying news content (Hayes & Guardino, 2013). “Therefore, many researchers are unable to describe what government officials are saying about a foreign policy issue” (p. 57). Even though the researchers meant the elite discourse beyond the media coverage, and this study does not address this particular domain, it, nevertheless, sets to study the messages by official sources that did get into the media. By doing so, this work at least partly fills the gap that Hayes and Giardino (2013) argue exists in the field. This goal is achieved by answering the remaining research questions:

RQ4: What frames appeared in the messages by official sources in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ5: What are the differences in frames (if any) between the American and British newspapers and the Associated Press?

Before moving on to answering these questions, however, it is necessary to discuss the concept of frame and framing analysis.
2.2 Framing

The concept of framing came to the field of mass communication from cognitive psychology (Benford & Snow, 2000). “It ties into schema theory, the idea that the synapses of our brains do not purely save and store facts. Instead, our brains link related ideas in associative patterns; ideas fitting patterns more easily find room than those with no existing ‘hook’ to hold them” (Harmon & Muenchen, 2009, p. 13). An anthropologist, Gregory Bateson (1955, 1972) who studied the link between human communication and behavior was the one to introduce the term ‘frame’ to explore “social interaction [and] the interpretation by actors of the behavior of other social actors” (Denzin & Keller, 1980, p. 52).

In his efforts to improve methods of psychotherapy for schizophrenic patients, Bateson (1955) theorized about these individuals’ psychological ability to perceive, process and correctly interpret signals (that are supposed to convey certain messages) embedded in certain actions. By scrutinizing the reading of signals used in communicating meaning during a play, Bateson focused on the ability of humans to ‘know’='/understand’ what is really going on. Schizophrenic patients are unable to make the distinctions between reality and fantasy, and whether the action carries a meaning of what a signal usually denotes. These connections between the actions and signals in communication were at the center of psychotherapy for those patients.

Bateson then suggested looking at the interpretations that psychiatrists use in treating patients in terms of frames; “it will be necessary to examine the nature of the frame in which these interpretations are offered” (p. 44). A frame, he insisted, is a psychological concept. The analogies he used to define this concept though were that of a physical picture frame and a mathematical set of categories that share common traits. Then “the first step in defining a
psychological frame might be to say that it is (or delimits) a class or set of messages” (Bateson, 1955, p. 46).

According to Bateson (1955), frames facilitate perception of meaning by giving individuals a point of reference, providing a focus everything beyond which should not be paid attention to. “Psychological frames are exclusive, i.e., by including certain messages (or meaningful actions) within a frame, certain other messages are excluded… The frame around a picture, if we consider this frame as a message intended to order or organize the perception of the viewer, says ‘Attend to what is within and do not attend to what is outside’” (p. 46). What’s more, frames can not only direct attention but also the way of evaluating the messages within it. They sort of “tell” (p. 47) individuals to not think about what is beyond them in the same manner as about what is within. “Either … the frame is involved in the evaluation of the messages which it contains, or the frame merely assists the mind in understanding the contained messages by reminding the thinker that these messages are mutually relevant and the messages outside the frame may be ignored” (p. 47).

Decades later, sociologist Erving Goffman (1974) borrowed Bateson’s concept of the frame and applied it in his explorations of the construction of meaning. Goffman defined frames as means that people use to “organize what they see in everyday life” (p. 248) and understand the world and events around. Goffman (1974) suggests that each individual views/perceives and interprets reality differently and while some of the perceptions and interpretations may be common, there are nuances of those that vary from individual to individual based on certain traits. “It is plain that retrospective characterization of the ‘same’ event or social occasion may differ very widely, that an individual’s role in an undertaking can provide him with a distinctive
evaluative assessment of what sort of an instance of the type the particular undertaking was” (Goffman, 1974, p. 9). The question Goffman is trying to answer is, why is that the case?

He answers this question in terms of “frameworks of understanding”/”frames of reference” (p. 10) that help individuals “make sense out of events” (p. 10). To explain what he means by frames, Goffman turns to Bateson (1955) stating that “I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify. That is my definition of frame. My phrase ‘frame analysis’ is a slogan to refer to the examination in these terms of organization of experience” (pp. 10-11).

Goffman (1974) suggests that people do not see and cannot comprehend the reality as it is (if it’s even possible to do so). Instead, they apply certain filters that help them make the vastness of the reality more manageable, close, relevant, and thus, understandable and interpretable. Those filters are people’s mental schemata or primary frameworks that differ from individual to individual based on their natural, cultural, professional and social backgrounds (Goffman, 1974). “Each primary framework allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (Goffman, 1974, p. 21). People, Goffman says, are most likely not aware of such a process in their brains as they handle information but they apply this process in every event nonetheless (Goffman, 1974).

Goffman distinguished two types of primary frameworks, natural and social (1974). Natural frameworks are those that occur ‘naturally’ and cannot be controlled or altered but yet influence our interpretation of the reality, such as, for instance, a kind of weather that affects how we interpret the reality outside. Social frameworks are those that “provide background
understanding for events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being” (Goffman, 1974, p. 22). An example of such a framework can be “newscast reporting of the weather” (p. 23). According to Goffman (1974), a person serving as an “agency” influencing social frameworks “is anything but implacable; it can be coaxed, flattered, affronted, and threatened. What is does can be described as ‘guided doings’” (p. 22). Such doings have consequences. They “subject the doer to ‘standards,’ to social appraisal of his action based on its honesty, efficiency, economy, safety, elegance, tactfulness, good taste, and so forth… Motive and intent are involved and their imputation helps select which of the various social frameworks of understanding is to be applied” (Goffman, 1974, p. 22).

At its core, the concept of a frame, as applied by Bateson (1955), identified a process that helps individuals understand the meaning of actions by providing a focus on signals. As applied by Goffman, it represented elements that facilitate organization of reality by individuals that help them answer the question “what is it that’s going on here?” (Goffman, 1974, p. 8). “We tend to perceive events in terms of primary frameworks, and the type of framework we employ provides a way of describing the event to which it is applied” (Goffman, 1974, p. 24).

Since the main purpose of developing the concept of frame was to explain how individuals perceive, understand and interpret reality, it should come as no surprise that framing theory eventually found its place in mass communication research. When people do not have direct contact with events and occurrences, the mass media present those events for them, thus, affecting their perception and understanding of it. To explain how these processes work, mass communication scholars applied the already exiting concept of framing.

In mass communication, the concept of a frame, or framing, generally came to mean selecting and emphasizing certain information. Because of its ‘foreign’ origins, however, the
conceptual definitions of frame and framing, although widespread, are inconsistent (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). The issue is that framing in its original areas of scholarship is discussed as the process an individual applies to perceive and understand reality. Due to its role as an intermediary between the real world (events and occurrences) and the people (audiences) and that as a constructor of this reality for them, the mass media introduce additional levels where the construction of meaning, and thus, framing occurs. Scheufele (1999) called these levels “input, process” and “outcome” (p. 104).

These additional levels contributed to discrepancies in the conceptualization of frames and framing within mass communication theory and research (Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999). Entman (1993) called framing a “fractured paradigm” (p. 51). For instance, Gitlin (1980) defined frames as “devices that facilitate how journalists organize enormous amounts of information and package them effectively for their audiences” (Borah, 2011, p. 248), and as “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 6). McLeod, Kosicki, Pan and Allen (1987) conceptualized frames as mental tools that “operate as non-hierarchical categories that serve as forms of major headings into which any future news content can be filed” (p. 10). Gamson and Modigliani (1989) spoke about a frame as “a central organizing idea … for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue” (p. 3). According to Pan and Kosicki (1993), a frame is “a cognitive device used in information encoding, interpreting, and retrieving; it is communicable; and it is related to journalistic professional routines and conventions” (p. 57). Rhee (1997) identified frames as “a combination of the textual features operating at the initial level of news interpretation where the textual features set limits on the use of knowledge” (p. 28). Iyengar and Simon (1993), in turn, focused on “the use of story lines, symbols, and
stereotypes in media presentations” (p. 369). Entman (1993) offered yet another perspective on framing when he wrote that, “frames … define problems–determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes–identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments–evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies–offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects” (p. 52).

Scholars applied the concept of framing across various levels and areas within mass communication research to explore media frames (construction of messages/reality by the media) as well as peoples’ perception and interpretation of frames (media effects) without any apparent conceptual system to guide and locate this scholarship (Borah, 2011; Scheufele, 1999). Some scholars have argued that the concept of framing does not possess enough explanatory power to afford it its own niche in mass communication, arguing instead that framing is part of agenda-setting and priming (McCombs, Shaw & Weaver, 1997; Weaver, 2007). There is, however, a general agreement about the purpose of framing, which is the emphasis on certain characteristics of an issue or issues “while excluding other elements, which might lead individuals to interpret issues differently” (Borah, 2011, p. 248).

The product of framing processes are interpretive frames, which function like picture frames, to focus attention by bracketing and punctuating what in our sensual field is relevant and irrelevant, what is “in-frame” and “out-of-frame.” They also function as articulation mechanisms by linking together the highlighted elements of the event or setting such that one set of meanings rather than another is conveyed. And they sometimes perform a transformative function by reconstituting the way in which some objects of attention are understood as relating to each other… (Snow & Vliegenthart, 2007, p. 387).

The need to bring framing ‘in order’ obviously became more and more apparent (Borah, 2011; Entman, 1993; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Scheufele, 1999). And while some insisted that it should be left alone (D’Angelo, 2002) because “theoretical and paradigmatic diversity has led to
a comprehensive view of the framing process, not fragmented findings in isolated research agendas” (p. 871), others suggested that consistency would help rather than disturb the framing scholarship (Borah, 2011; Entman, 1993; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Scheufele, 1999).

Entman (1993) was among the first to call for a unified approach to framing theory and research. He insisted that “despite its omnipresence across the social sciences and humanities, nowhere is there a general statement of framing theory that shows exactly how frames become embedded within and make themselves manifest in a text, or how framing influences thinking” (p. 51). Others agreed. According to Borah (2011), “the lack of clear conceptualizations and operationalizations has led framing research to be used synonymously with research approaches that are distinctly different. In addition, different approaches and theoretical positions often disagree on key points” (Borah, 2011, pp. 246-247). Hertog and McLeod (2001) called the debate about framing research “both a blessing and a curse” (p. 139). “A blessing in that it allows for some of the most creative analysis of media in current scholarship. It is a curse in that findings, methodological insights and theoretical conclusions don’t ‘add up.’ The cumulative learning that is supposed to accompany normal science is not possible” (p. 140). What’s more, the lack of a unified, rigid approach allowed scholars to come to the conclusions they were looking to find and disregard evidence that did not support their hypotheses (Hertog & McLeod, 2001). Scheufele (1999) noted yet another issue resulting from the inconsistency in the framing scholarship. He argued that in some instances vague and various conceptualizations led to framing being absorbed into and pushed out by other, “closely related concepts” (p. 104) such as agenda setting and priming. “Therefore, additional research demonstrating framing effects for particular media or in specific content areas is of limited use to the filed” (Scheufele, 1999, p. 104).
Borah (2011) contributed to the systematization of framing scholarship in mass communication by reviewing all literature that had emerged throughout ten years of research and discussion in this area. For that, she identified framing’s two roots of origin, sociological and psychological, and sorted the scholarship within those two categories (Borah, 2011). According to Borah, research based on the sociological approach studied frames that occur in the communication process and “tend[ed] to focus on the ‘words, images, phrases, and presentation styles’ that are used to construct news stories and the processes that shape this construction” (p. 247). Research that had origins in psychology, was “involved in the formation of the audience frame. There is much research that demonstrates how news framing influences information processing and the subsequent decision-making process” (Borah, 2011, p. 248). The approach of sorting the scholarship along the sociological/psychological origins, however, failed to consider that Goffman, who brought the frame concept to sociology, borrowed Bateson’s definition of it from psychology to study the frames in people’s minds and not news frames.

In his paper, “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects,” Scheufele (1999) also embarked on addressing the “terminological and conceptual inconsistencies” in framing scholarship in mass communication (pp. 103-104). He, applied a social constructivism approach. He looked at media and individual frames as not separate processes but two processes that take place in one realm, the “social construction of reality” (Scheufele, 1999, p. 104). “Mass media actively set the frames of reference that readers or viewers use to interpret and discuss public events… At the same time, people’s information processing and interpretation are influenced by preexisting meaning structures or schemas” (Scheufele, 1999, p. 105). Scheufele separated framing concepts into media frames and individual frames, and suggested that all farming research should be placed on various levels of analysis within one “metatheoretical model” (Scheufele, 1999, p.
“This interactive model of construction of reality,” he insisted, “has important implications for conceptualizing framing as a theory of media effects. An analysis of the roles that audiences and mass media play in this constructivist approach requires research on various levels of analysis… [B]etween-level and within-level analyses” (Scheufele, 1999, p. 106). According to him, such a model also addressed the gap in scholarship that would explain phenomena occurring when these two levels interact (Scheufele, 1999).

Scheufele (1999) also suggested to categorize framing scholarship in yet another dimension, according to frames studied as dependent or as independent variables. “Studies of frames as dependent variables have examined the role of various factors in influencing the creation or modification of frames… Studies in which frames serve as independent variables typically are more interested in the effects of framing” (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107). Accordingly, research could focus on media or individual frames as dependent variables or on media or individual frames as independent variables.

As a result, Scheufele (1999) came up with a “typology of framing” (p. 108) that structurally classified framing scholarship “with respect to the way in which it has conceptualized frames and the relationships between frames and other variables” (p. 108) and yet allowed for within- and between-level associations. It provided a shared basis, a “tool for theory building by providing a common set of conceptual definitions and theoretical statements about between-level and within-level relationships” (pp. 108-109). Scheufele (1999) offered six general research questions, each falling within a certain quadrant of the typology (media frames as dependent variable, individual frames as dependent variable, media frames as independent variable or individual frames as independent variable) and thus providing general direction of
research and establishing criteria for assessment, “how well previous studies have answered
questions pertinent to each cell” (p. 108). According to Scheufele (1999):

With respect to media frames as dependent variable, we should ask:
…What factors influence the way journalists or other societal groups frame certain
issues?
…How do these processes work, and, as a result, what are the frames that journalists use?
With respect to media frames as independent variable, we should ask:
…What kinds of media frames influence the audience’s perception of certain issues, and
how does this process work?
With respect to individual frames as dependent variable, we should ask:
…Which factors influence the establishment of individual frames of reference, or are
individual frames simply replications of media frames?
…How can the audience member play an active role in constructing meaning or resisting
media frames?
With respect to individual frames as independent variable, we should ask:
…How do individual frames influence individual perception of issues (p. 108)?

Scheufele’s (1999) typology helps to consolidate previously scattered framing research.
Despite various existing definitions of a frame and framing (for example, Pan & Kosicki, 2001;
Reese, 2001; Scheff, 2005; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Tankard, Jr., 2001; Wicks, 2005),
each research piece would add to a common jigsaw puzzle, creating a full theoretical picture and
a “common understanding of the concept of framing” (Entman, 1993, p. 56). This dissertation
applies Scheufele’s approach to framing in that it uses media frames as a dependent variable to
explore how official sources frame their messages (RQ4 and RQ5).

For the framing part of this study, I use Entman’s (1993; 2004) definition of frames and
framing. According to Entman (1993; 2004), “the verb ‘to frame’ (or ‘framing’) refers to the
process of selecting and highlighting some aspects of a perceived reality, and enhancing the
salience of an interpretation and evaluation of that reality” (Entman, 2004, p. 26). “To frame is to
select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text,
in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Entman suggests to
identify focus of framing in media coverage by looking at the events, issues and actors central to the subject of the coverage that will allow to create a three dimensional (full) frame of this coverage.

According to Entman (2004), media and/or sources they refer to can, to the exclusion of other alternative interpretations, facilitate certain interpretation of events through frequent and consistent repetition of specific terms/phrases thus “conveying an unambiguous and emotionally compelling frame” (p. 1). “The words and images that make up the frame can be distinguished from the rest of the news by their capacity to stimulate support or opposition to the sides in a political conflict” (Entman, 2004, p. 6). How strong or weak can such stimulus be, is defined by cultural resonance and magnitude of frames (Entman, 2004). Frames that use terms/phrases/images that are culturally resonant, “highly salient in the culture, which is to say noticeable, understandable, memorable, and emotionally charged” (p. 6), will have great stimulating power and thus are used by media and/or their sources when there is a need to achieve certain ends or agendas (Entman, 2004). By the same token, magnitude depends on how prominent and frequently repeated frames are (Entman, 2004). “The more resonance and magnitude, the more likely the framing is to evoke similar thoughts and feelings in large portions of the audience” (Entman, 2004, p. 6), the goal that officials are usually trying to meet through the media (Entman, 2004). Frames can have both high resonance and high magnitude, but some do not require a lot of magnitude to be strong and effective if they are highly resonant, like, say, 9/11 images (Entman, 2004).

Entman’s approach to frames and framing does not just imply identifying simple frame categories (such as, for instance, conflict frame v. peace frame; Entman calls them styles of writing or scripts (2004)), but allows for a multidimensional nuanced examination of frames as
complex as framing is by its nature, but at the same time, clear and easy to analyze and interpret, which is exactly what this dissertation is seeking to achieve. This dissertation seeks to answer the following five research questions, based on the literature reviewed:

RQ1: What sources were dominant in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ2: What official sources were dominant in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ3: What are the differences (if any) between the American and British newspapers and the Associated Press in terms of use of official sources in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ4: What frames appeared in the messages by official sources in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ5: What are the differences in frames (if any) between the American and British newspapers and the Associated Press?

Before I get to the analysis part of it and get to answer the research questions, there are several other components of this study that require closer review. Those are foreign reporting, the crisis under scrutiny, and the media under scrutiny, which are discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 3. THE CONTEXT

3.1 Foreign Reporting

Foreign reporting fulfills the same role for public as the rest of the news media, that of a constructor of reality that “circulate[s] and shape[s] knowledge” (Tuchman, G., 1978, p. 2). The task of foreign reporting is, however, grander and its role of being “a [major] window on the world” (Tuchman, G., 1978, p. 1) is greater. According to Hannerz, “most people do not have personal experiences of very much of [the world]. Rather than having been everywhere and seen, heard, smelled, tasted, and touched everything, people – including those aspiring to be informed citizens of the world – depend on the representations provided by various agencies of information brokerage, and the news media have a central place here” (Hannerz, 2004, p. 23).

Foreign correspondents serve as sort of an international information hub, “engaged in reporting, representing, interpreting – generally, managing meaning across distances” (Hannerz, 2002, p. 58).

Even in today’s world, where rapidly evolving technology allows every individual who owns at least a smart phone to become a foreign reporter, and the only thing he needs is to be at the right place at the right time and willing to share information, traditional news media in general, and foreign reporting (especially foreign reporting) in particular still can remain the major sources of knowledge if not information about the world beyond our borders (Livingston, 2007; Schiller, 2010). “In the view of some, journalism is defined by an editorial process that is lacking in amateur information gathering, and even in live-broadcast television: News professionals exercise judgment concerning the importance or relevance of events and processes. Journalism is something more than an unfiltered flow of raw information” (Livingston, 2007, p. 60). When audiences are unable to construct the event context for themselves due to the lack of
direct experience, the news media and foreign reporting in particular should be able to do it for them while not letting them drown in the flood of information pouring through the multitude of platforms (Livingston, 2007). This is exactly what foreign reporting has been striving to accomplish (Hachten, 1999; Hamilton, 2009).

Everything points at foreign reporting being a “special genre of news” (Hachten, 1999, p. 9) especially in today’s global and interdependent environment (Perlmutter & Hamilton, 2007). It, however, is facing challenges and experiencing influences that go beyond the factors covered by the hierarchy of influences model (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014) and discussed in the literature review. According to Hamilton, “all the problems of journalism are magnified in foreign news-gathering. For owners of media, this is the most expensive reporting. For editors, it is the most difficult to second-guess, because they have little intimate knowledge of what is happening. For journalists, it is the most demanding” (Hamilton, 2009, p. 9). These challenges and factors, their possible implications, and crucial role foreign reporting plays in the construction of reality, therefore, are important for the context of this study and merit an in-depth review in this section.

There is a common sentiment in the scholarship that the golden days of foreign reporting are over (Hachten, 1999; Hamilton, 2009; Perlmutter & Hamilton, 2007), and that this is relevant beyond the American media market (Willmott, 2010). Foreign reporting has come a long way from being the one getting the lion’s share of space and the most read, independent, expert, in-depth, elite, influential, educational, even romanticized to facing major transformations and decline in both volume and quality (Hachten, 1999; Hamilton, 2009; Lewis, 2010; Perlmutter & Hamilton, 2007; Utley, 1997; Willmott, 2010).

There was a time when foreign news was one of the most convenient and lucrative for newspaper publishers, and was popular among audiences (Hamilton, 2009). It was convenient
because news from abroad was less likely to be and to be viewed as unfavorable to local
government or the public. In colonial times, it was a rather serious issue. Even after prior
restraint was abolished by the First Amendment, sedition and defamation remained powerful
deterrents for publishers who “did not want to forfeit government positions, lose government
printing contracts, or drive away readers” (Hamilton, 2009, p. 12). This, however, was not the
major factor in foreign news’ popularity. According to Hamilton (2009), “foreign news was
newsier than local news” (p. 12). Colonial life back then did not provide too much to write about.
Abroad, on the other hand, though foreign already, was still largely influential and relevant.
Business, economy, politics, society, personal ties, all warranted a place on the pages since what
was going on there “shaped life in the Americas” (Hamilton, 2009, p. 13). In the days before
paid correspondents were sent and settled in foreign bureaus, foreign news had also been cheap,
supplied by those who were willing to write and/or share information (Hamilton, 2009). Foreign
news helped to fill the space and sell papers (Hamilton, 2009).

The tradition continued after the independence. Political and social changes, proliferation
of the press, changes in business models, and growth in influence did change the goals and ways
foreign news was gathered and published, but did not diminish its importance (Hamilton, 2009).
Foreign newsgathering practice changed as well. Newspapers started to “enlist correspondents to
secure firsthand information about events in Europe and elsewhere… With the role of reporter,
domestic or foreign, still ill-defined, these early foreign correspondents were part-timers with
other jobs” (Hamilton, 2009, p. 38). Foreign reporting, however, remained in demand.
Intercontinental business affairs, social and political events, and steady supply of wars,
facilitated constant and continuous evolution of foreign correspondent and his growth in
importance and influence.
Fast forward about a century, and the profile of a foreign correspondent (in the “classic” sense) had been pretty much molded. An independent travelling professional, stationed (sometimes for decades) abroad, expert in the affairs and the region(s) he covered. Yemma (2007) described this correspondent as “the prince of the profession. Independent and resourceful, they roam the world, pursuing conflicts and famines, coups and earthquakes” (p. 110). Their life “is rarely boring” (p. 110). “He or she mines a vein of material largely unknown to readers back home… Free from the mundane aspects of journalism, far from meddling bosses, a foreign correspondent is as independent as a journalist can be” (Yemma, 2007, p. 111).

Last century’s means of communication, though advanced for their times, made staying in touch with the home office highly dependent on the availability and working order of infrastructure at the location of coverage (Hamilton, 2009; Yemma, 2007). This made foreign correspondent an autonomous unit with the high level of news related decision-making power and expertise. “A foreign correspondent had to be a self-starter and a sparkling writer. Little wonder that a successful foreign correspondent often developed an air of assurance that bordered on arrogance. Editors indulged – and readers expected – a foreign correspondent’s authoritative and unchallenged accounts of faraway people and events” (Yemma, 2007, p. 111).

Foreign reporting seized to be cheap. But in the media favorable economic conditions combined with high level of reputability, each self-respected media organization that could afford it had at least several foreign correspondents stationed abroad in foreign bureaus (Hamilton, 2009). The birth of radio and, later, television, added to the cost, complicated logistics, but, also allowed the foreign news to pour right into people’s living rooms through their radio speakers and TV screens (Hamilton, 2009).
The evolution of foreign reporting did not stop there. “The changing economic structures of the news business, including forms of ownership and business management; the advent of new technologies; the rise of professional norms; interaction with government, which at times makes the news and at times feeds off it; war and peace and other developments abroad; the public’s current interests and predilections” (Hamilton, 2009, p. 458), all these factors altered foreign reporting and its functions and forced it to adjust.

Foreign reporting today is the least attractive to the audiences (their interest is at best episodic, when there is something major going on or the events are relevant to home), has the smallest contribution (if any) to bringing in advertising money, but is requiring the most investment to maintain itself (Hamilton, 2009). People’s interests has shifted to local news or national and international news that are relevant locally. Advertisers that closely monitor and tailor their money to audience preferences, therefore, largely bypass foreign coverage. Even with technological advances that make travel and communication progressively faster and cheaper, the amount of money necessary to station one permanent foreign correspondent somewhere may reach six figures a year (Hamilton, 2009). There is no way a today’s media corporation can and will choose to maintain its foreign reporting on the same level as before. There is a growing trend among media organizations of either closing their foreign services completely or drastically reducing their presence abroad, both in terms of number of bureaus and number of people, and switching to either getting their foreign coverage from others (e.g. wires or other papers), merging their coverage efforts or widening the reach of whatever hubs they have kept (Hamilton, 2009; Lewis, 2010; Moore, 2010). They have also been reducing the amount of foreign coverage and time and space devoted to it (Hachten, 1999; Hamilton, 2009).
Over the past 25 years, the amount of foreign reporting in the American newspapers the organization selected for its study dropped by 53 percent (Kumar, 2011). Furthermore, “the percentage of staff-produced foreign stories in the eight papers also fell sharply, from 15 percent in 1985 to 4 percent in 2010. When newspapers printed foreign news in 1985, they were more likely to go longer, with stories more than 400 words long outnumbering shorter pieces nearly two to one. And although this year's foreign stories were still more likely to be longer, the ratio narrowed” (Kumar, 2011). Since 1998, 20 newspapers closed down their foreign bureaus (Kumar, 2011), and the number of full time and freelance foreign reporters employed by 10 newspapers and one chain in 2011 was 234 as compared to 307 full-time correspondents (excluding freelancers) in 2003 (Kumar, 2011).

Reports suggest that the same tendencies are true for the British press. Over 30 years, the overall amount of foreign news decreased by 39 percent (Moore, 2010). Their share as compared to other news stories also dropped from 20 to 11 percent (Moore, 2010). Thirty years ago, about 33 percent of stories published on the first ten pages of the papers were foreign news, by 2009 this number fell to 15 percent (Moore, 2010). The number of foreign reporters in British media has also been declining. “The number of foreign reporters has declined for nearly all UK newspapers in the past 30 years. Even for the few exceptions, such as the Guardian and Observer’s 18 and the Times’ 24 staff foreign correspondents, foreign reporters have decreased as a proportion of total reporters” (Willmott, 2010, p. 1). The only media organization in Britain that can boast high numbers of foreign correspondents, according to Moore (2010), was the BBC.

Recent technological advancements, while tremendously easing travel and communication, and accelerating the speed of newsgathering and news publishing, added to the
economic issues by increasing competition (Hamilton, 2009; Perlmutter & Hamilton, 2007).

Nowadays, any person with a smartphone equipped with a camera and connected to the Internet can become a foreign reporter providing he/she has a desire to collect and share information and happens to be at the right place at the right time. Bloggers have been emerging as a force that is now taken seriously not only by broad public, but by professional journalists as well. The practice of blogging spread and settled in the profession itself (Tramell & Perlmutter, 2007).

“The weblogs or bloggers that now worry EDS are evidence that the monopoly [on foreign reporting] no longer exists. The audience is fragmented and active. Everyone can be a foreign correspondent” (Hamilton, 2009, p. 478). Citizen foreign correspondents are right there, they don’t need to travel, they don’t need an office, they don’t need a paycheck, they do not require insurance, they don’t need to research what is happening, they can just turn on their cameras and report.

The infamous editorial independence and decision making power foreign reporters have been traditionally enjoying is also a matter of the past thanks to advances in technology that allow to easily and instantly connect and stay in touch with home (Yemma, 2007). According to Yemma (2007), “rapid changes in technology are ending the era of the freewheeling, independent foreign correspondent” (p. 114). He, however, sees a positive side in it arguing that closer oversight increased overall accountability by “enabling vital journalistic safeguards involving truth and accuracy to be extended to foreign reporting” (p. 115).

With all the rapid and ongoing changes, foreign reporting still remained the major source of information about the word outside. It did adapt, adjust and transform. “…The adverse environment for old models of news-gathering spawned not just a new model, but new models, plural. … New species of foreign news-gathering and news distribution emerged. … The overall
result was a broader, more variegated class of foreign correspondents that, though still imperfect, ensured a continued foreign news flow and formed basis for improvement” (Hamilton, 2009, p. 465). Hamilton (2009) meant various types of foreign correspondents that emerged as a result of the constant evolution in foreign reporting. They are correspondents who compliment and sometimes substitute for a traditional foreign correspondent, work with him/her, team up at all levels of the news production process and are well suited to various environments. These types of correspondents are foreigners who cover their countries for the media abroad, parachute journalists who are dispatched when and where needed as events occur, local reporters who stay home but cover foreign stories with local angle, and others (Hamilton, 2009). Despite adjustments and evolution, however, the discussed above circumstances add to the usual array of factors that predispose reporters’ reliance on official sources and make foreign reporting just as prone if not more susceptible to their influence as local reporting.

The era of around the clock news streaming both on traditional and new platforms has challenged foreign reporters in their news gathering, processing, analyzing and producing high quality content (Hachten, 1999; Hamilton, 2009). According to Seib (2007) and Hachten (1999), foreign reporting had to comply with the public’s general preferences in the news formats and forms of its delivery to attract and retain attention. In the heat of competition, being first to break or update a story, however, may jeopardize adherence to basic journalistic values. Foreign reporters end up “providing premature and incomplete reports to feed the presumed public appetite for constant real-time coverage” and “giving precedence to live reports at the expense of background stories that are essential in providing the depth and context that solid coverage of wars and other international news events requires” (Seib, 2007, p. 152). In such an environment, especially during foreign crises or armed conflicts, sources become even more important than
ever as suppliers of information and explanation if not newsmaking. It is, therefore, easier for reporters to become susceptible to the news management tactics of the government officials foreign as well as American and to open wider gates to their voices. For “politicians and government leaders in every nation from north to south attempt to manage or manipulate the news so that it favors their causes, their programs, and their image” (Hachten, 1999, pp. 127-128).

This study examines one of the instances of modern American and British foreign reporting in crisis situations by looking at one of the recent and yet unexplored crises, that of the turmoil in Ukraine that started in November 2013 and remains unresolved to this day. I focus on one particular period, from February 27 to March 16, 2014, when Ukraine’s autonomous region of Crimea was effectively taken over by Russian and Russian-backed forces that resulted in its ultimate de facto secession.

3.2 The Crisis

The current crisis in Ukraine started at the end of 2013. The country’s then president, Viktor Yanukovych, known for his close ties with Russia, pro-Russian policies and corruption, was preparing for signing a trade association agreement with the European Union. The agreement was supposed to help the country’s integration with Europe and revive its trade (Yuhas, April 13, 2014). Another option on the table was a $15 billion loan from Russia and a potential commitment to the integration with the Eurasian Union, an economic arrangement that would bring together Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014).

By November 2013, before the period when the president made his final decision, Ukraine’s economy was in a dire state. According to The Word Bank 2013 data, “Ukraine is in
recession because of weak external demand and delays in policy adjustment” (The World Bank, April 2, 2103) with a projected scarce economic growth throughout the year and urgent need for structural reforms (The World Bank, April 2, 2103). Poor economic conditions were complemented by widespread corruption spearheaded by the president and his family who had allegedly pocketed billions of dollars (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014).

Faced with the choice and under pressure from Russia, Yanukovych opted for Eurasia and away from Europe. He abandoned plans for the trade association agreement with the European Union and took the money from Russia (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014). He even received the first $3 billion installment before the consequences of this decision cost him his office. Outraged by the president’s conduct, people and some oppositional political groups gathered on the central square (Maidan) of the country’s capitol, Kiev (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014). Their numbers gradually grew as the government turned a blind eye to their grievances. People did not leave Maidan for three months, going into the first month of 2014 (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014).

The demands of the crowd also evolved with time. Initial discontent with the decision turned into demands to eliminate corruption and restore the economy, which, later on, were replaced by demands for the president’s resignation and dissolution of the government. These demands were fueled by the authorities’ violent response to peaceful protests in the form of riot police (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014). Refusing to leave the square until their demands were met, people, mobilized by the number of opposition groups and parties that put aside their disagreements and united in their dissatisfaction with the government, fought back with whatever they could use as weapons and means of protection (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014).
The clashes claimed the lives of over 100 people. Kiev’s central square and surrounding streets turned into a battlefield with barricades and burning tires. Ultimately, with the control over the situation slipping through his hands, and possibility of being removed from office by force growing dangerously real, Yanukovych and his family fled the country under the Russia’s protective umbrella (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014). By February 27, 2014, the starting day of the period under analysis in this study, the president had already left the country, and the new interim government led by the leaders of the opposition parties was being established (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014).

The turmoil, however, did not end there. The new authorities, who haven’t had a chance to ‘catch their breath,’ had to face a new challenge, Russia’s rage (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014). Unhappy with the loss of influence over Ukraine in the form of Yanukovych’s government and the potential drift of the country back toward closer ties with the European Union and, potentially, NATO, Russia, while denying any involvement, intervened in Crimea, a Black Sea peninsula within Ukraine’s territory (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014).

Crimea, an autonomous region within Ukraine’s borders, had ‘changed hands’ several times in two centuries. Belonging to Russia since 1783, the territory was transferred to Ukraine by the Soviet Secretary General, Nikita Khrushchev in 1954. Back then, this transfer, which took place within the geopolitical context of the Soviet Union, did not yield significant implications (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union that left the former Soviet republics within their concurrent borders, however, Crimea presented a potential point of conflict. Its population was largely of Russian origin and mostly
Russian-speaking with close ties to Russia. Its marina also still housed the Russian military fleet (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014).

For the time being, the issue was resolved peacefully with the region maintaining its autonomous status within Ukraine, and Russian military fleet remaining where it was under the lease agreement between the two countries (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014). The status quo lasted until February 2014 when, immediately following Yanukovych’s escape, masked armed men in unidentified uniforms took over the Crimean parliament building, a move that coincided in time with surprise military exercises of Russian armed forces in the immediate proximity with the Ukrainian border (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014).

In the following days, armed forces, which claimed to be local self-defense that did not recognize the new central government and set to protect the local population from ‘radical forces,’ effectively took control over the peninsula blocking both the Ukraine’s military bases and its military fleet and pressuring the personnel into either defection or surrender (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014). Despite official denials, numerous reports, including eyewitnesses, identified the men as Russian (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014). Citing a growing threat and necessity to protect the Russian-speaking population from ‘fascists’ in Kiev as well as calls for protection and integration from the Crimean people, Russia supported the establishment of a local pro-Russian government and swiftly planned and executed on March 16, 2014 referendum that sealed the newly formed parliament’s decision to separate from Ukraine and join Russia in an overwhelming 97 percent vote (PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014).
Ukraine’s interim government joined by the international community denounced the referendum, refused to recognized its results, and formally dissolved the Crimean government. The move, however, did not have any effect on the events on the ground. The unrest together with the growing number of Russian troops spread through the largely Russian-speaking eastern parts of the country ultimately forcing Ukraine to respond militarily in April 2014 (BBC, November 13, 2014; PBS Newshour, March 7, 2014; Yuhas, April 13, 2014). The armed conflict resulted in the effective pro-Russian takeover of major cities in Ukraine’s eastern regions, Donetsk, Lugansk, and Kharkiv. Widespread political and economic sanctions against Russia were paused by the ceasefire agreement brokered by the international community and signed by Ukraine and pro-Russian de facto authorities in Minsk (BBC, November 13, 2014). Today, peace remains shaky, Ukraine’s east remains resolute in its separatism, and Russia’s army remains close to the conflict zone (BBC, November 13, 2014).

This study, however, does not cover the whole crisis. Having a time span of close to two years and being extensively covered by the world media for almost the whole period of time, it is impossible to grasp in its entirety. Obvious logical stages in the development of the crisis, however, offer a time frames for manageable research. The content analysis covers the period from February 27, 2014 (immediately after the escape of president Yanukovych, when the new interim government in Kiev was established and the events in Crimea started) to March 16, 2014 (the day of the Crimean referendum that concluded the region’s secession from Ukraine).

As I already mentioned, all stages of the crisis were extensively covered by international media including American and British (the focus of this study). For this study, I selected three media outlets: two newspapers, one American (The New York Times), one British (The Guardian), and a wire service (Associated Press).
3.3 The Media

For this study, I selected two newspapers, American *The New York Times* and British *The Guardian*. I also selected a wire service, the Associated Press. Although originated in the United States, the Associated Press provides news services to both papers and in this study fills the picture by representing the significant part of their content that is not gathered and produced by staff writers or freelancers. The Associated Press also serves as a point of reference against both newspapers in terms of newswriting style. While *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* stories a lot of times take the form of a mix of news and analysis with several reporters contributing from multiple locations, the Associated Press story format is the closest to the news style in its traditional sense. All the three media outlets were selected for their size, reach, established reputation and long, deep-rooted tradition and continuous commitment to quality foreign reporting. In the following section, I will provide a brief background for each media outlet starting with the Associated Press.

The Associated Press was established 1846 as a not-for-profit news cooperative jointly owned and funded by a group of American newspapers that wanted to come up with a solution to speedy delivery of the news that newspapers could afford (AP, 2015). The model proved a success and the organization grew and expanded with geometrical progression. Its services gradually started to include photographs, audio, video, graphics, and multimedia (AP, 2015) and be distributed worldwide. In 2005, the Associated Press went digital and currently claims to be one of the quickest “to adapt to new technologies” (AP, 2015). “Today, AP news moves in digital bits that travel nearly as quickly as the news itself unfolds, to every platform available, from newspapers to tablets” (AP, 2015). The organization prides itself for being committed to highest standards of the profession that facilitate objective and accurate reporting (AP, 2015).
According to the organization’s own data, it employs journalists in 280 locations in 100 countries with bureaus all around the globe, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe (AP, 2015). Its ownership remains American, however, and includes 1,500 newspapers that are its members as well as customers.


Its British counterpart, *The Guardian*, is also a daily national paper founded in 1821 (The Guardian, 2015). It is a part of the Guardian Media Group that is owned by the Scott Trust, a limited liability company that does not have stakeholders and operates the profits by reinvesting
them back into the paper (Guardian Media Group, 2015). It positions itself as a “unique media organisation” and according to the Group, “Guardian writers are free to present the truth as they see it, without interference by shareholders, a proprietor or a political party. As a result the Guardian is a byword for serious, trusted, independent journalism” (Guardian Media Group, 2015), the notion supported by experts in the field (The Economist, 2012). The paper’s global reach is mostly ensured through its online presence and “digital-first” strategy and open access to the content on the web (Guardian Media Group, 2015). By October 2014, the paper’s daily print circulation dropped from 300,000 plus to 180,000 (Greenslade, October 10, 2014, The Guardian). Its commitment to the quality foreign reporting, however, is still maintained. According to the 2010 Media Standards Trust report, The Guardian kept 18 foreign bureaus around the world (Willmott, 2010).
CHAPTER 4. METHODS

To study frames I need to study media messages, and the method for studying media messages is content analysis (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005). “Content analysis is a formal system for doing something that we all do informally rather frequently, drawing conclusions from observations of content” (Stempel III, 1981, p. 119). Due to the evasive and fluid nature of the frame concept (as discussed in the literature review), as well as lack of consistency in contextual definitions and importance of nuances for identifying and categorizing frames, content analysis of frames has mostly been conducted using qualitative approach (Riffe, et al., 2005). This approach, while allowing to capture the framing nuances and provide in-depth analysis placed in a context, is a source of one major problem: lack of replicability. Qualitative content analysis, especially analysis of media frames, is prone to subjective influences from a researcher. Besides, there can probably be as many interpretations of frames as there are people who embark on studying them (Riffe, et al., 2005).

In striving for replicability, however, do not scholars sacrifice depth for consistency? Do not they simplify a complex concept into simple categories defined by numeric codes? (Riffe, et al., 2005). Is it possible to conduct framing analysis and preserve both advantages as best as it can be done? Scholarship suggests that there are methodological approaches that address the existing issues at least partially (Matthes and Kohring, 2008). Such an approach is a study of frames through cluster analysis of certain frame elements, which is arguably the most comprehensive empirical method existing in framing research thus far with measurements of media frames that comply with reliability and validity standards (Matthes and Kohring, 2008).

Matthes and Kohring (2008) argued that since a frame is such an abstract and thus, difficult variable to identify and code in a content analysis, it is very hard to preserve objectivity
and avoid the subjective influence of a researcher. According to them, studies that apply various qualitative approaches, such as hermeneutic (“interpretative account of media texts linking up frames with broader cultural elements” (p. 259)), linguistic (“frames … identified by analyzing the selection, placement, and structure of specific words and sentences in a text” (p. 260)), manual holistic (“frames … generated by a qualitative analysis of some news texts and then … coded as holistic variables in a manual content analysis” (p. 260)), computer-assisted (“frame-mapping”” where frames are identified through “finding particular words that occur together in some texts and do not tend to occur together in other texts” (p. 261)), and deductive (where frames are theoretically deduced from the existing literature and then coded), all lack reliability and validity (Matthes and Kohring, 2008). “It is often not clear which elements should be present in an article or news story to signify the existence of a frame… In order to measure a frame in a valid and reliable way, it is therefore important to identify the single elements of a frame” (Matthes and Kohring, 2008, p. 263). According to them, unlike other approaches, this is exactly what the method they propose allows for.

This study, however, does not go through with the cluster analysis per se since what I am analyzing are not stories but messages that do not necessarily contain all the frame elements Matthes and Kohring (2008) are talking about. Even though Matthes and Kohring (2008) argue that their method can be applied to any unit of analysis, I have not come across a study that would analyze source messages let alone a study that would analyze source messages applying cluster analysis. I, therefore, did not have a ‘template’ that would guide me and indicate whether such an approach can generate meaningful clusters. For this reason, this work being the first such endeavor, I took a more cautious and less ambitious approach. I opted to replicate the method suggested by Matthes and Kohring (2008) only to the point where qualitatively derived frame
elements are supposed to be turned into numeric categories after being grouped into manageable variables. This way, I could 1) estimate whether such analysis of messages can result in a sufficient number of frame elements to potentially generate meaningful clusters; 2) if yes, prepare the data for cluster analysis that I plan to conduct in future; and 3) produce as consistent as it is possible to achieve qualitatively analysis of frames that follows an already established method. With this in mind, I moved on to actual process.

4.1 Analysis

The analysis for this study consisted of two stages, qualitative content analysis and quantitative descriptive statistics. Before running their cluster analysis that “systematically group[s] together [frame elements] in a specific way” (p. 258), Matthes and Kohring (2008) identified those frame elements qualitatively, based on Entman’s (1993; 2004) model. According to Entman (2004), “frames in the news are typically a part of the reporting process for three different classes of objects: political events, issues, and actors (who may be individual leaders, groups, or nations). Often the same set of news stories simultaneously frame more than one object, providing framing information not just about an event, say, but also about a related issue or actor” (p. 23). Entman (2004) looked at each “object” through four different dimensions, problem definition, cause identification, moral evaluation and remedy suggestion. For instance, in his analysis of the September 11 coverage, Entman identified act of war and attack on U.S. civilians as a problem as framed by the coverage when talking about the event (the attacks), al-Qaeda and Taliban as the cause, when talking about the actor and need to destroy al-Qaeda as a remedy, when talking about the issue (war) (Entman, 2004). In their totality, these analyses constituted a “fully developed frame” (Entman, 2004, p. 25) for a specific topic.

Matthes and Kohring (2008) followed the same principle. “We understand a frame as a certain pattern in a given text that is composed of several elements. These elements are not
words but previously defined components or devices of frames. Rather than directly coding the whole frame, we suggest splitting up the frame into its separate elements, which can quite easily be coded in a content analysis” (p. 263). Matthes and Kohring (2008) successfully tested this argument in a study of frames in the coverage of biotechnology by *The New York Times* using Entman’s (1993) operational definition of frames that is presented above and that I discussed in the literature review: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). So, Matthes and Kohring (2008) content analyzed the texts under study and generated problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations and treatment recommendations pertaining to biotechnology. They treated these categories as frame elements that consisted of a number of variables (Matthes and Kohring, 2008). This approach, they argued, eliminated possible researcher bias as early as the data collection stage. “Conceived this way, frames are neither identified beforehand not directly coded with a single variable” (Matthes and Kohring, 2008, p. 264). Based on their success, my study replicated Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) methodology up to this point with the adjustments to the unit of analysis and relevant specifics of the generated data.

4.2 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis in my study, as it was not mentioned before, is a message delivered by a source that was included in the coverage of the events. The message could be a direct quote of what a source said, a paraphrase of his/her words or a combination of the two. When reporters used what appeared as source messages as part of the description/explanation of what was going on, they were not considered as source messages. For example, in the paragraph: “As the Russians consolidated their hold on Crimea and the US administration conceded the peninsula
was under complete Russian control, there were contradictory reports of an ultimatum to remaining Ukrainian forces to surrender their weapons by early on Tuesday” (Traynor, Walker, Lewis, Pilkington, & Watt, March 4, 2014, The Guardian), neither the U.S. administration’s concessions, nor the reports of the ultimatum were counted as messages. For the rest of the content, textual keys indicated what should be counted as source messages. While it was fairly straightforward when direct citations were involved (quotation marks), in case of paraphrased messages and combinations, such key words/phrases as “insisted (that),” “added (that),” “said (that),” “admitted (that),” “reported (that),” “told (that),” “emphasized (that),” “warned (that),” “claimed (that),” “announced (that),” “confirmed (that),” “argued (that),” “according to” guided the identification, especially when those ‘introductory’ messages were followed by a quote. Various terms, and slogans and chants that reporters quoted throughout the coverage as part of their descriptions of demonstrations and public rallies, such as, for instance, “Russia! Russia!” or “contact group” were not counted as messages since they carried more of a descriptive load than intended to carry frames.

I counted the source messages based on story paragraphs. If a paragraph contained separate messages delivered by one, two, or more sources, the number of messages was as many as the attributed sources. When a paragraph contained messages by one and the same source that differed contextually, I counted them separately. If a source’s message was distributed over several paragraphs, the number of messages was as many as there were paragraphs. The logic behind such coding was that as a rule, in a news story, each paragraph carries a distinct contextual idea and reporters distribute messages throughout paragraphs relative to the paragraphs’ content. Therefore, messages, even when attributed to one and the same source, in different paragraphs would carry different ideas, and so, they were counted separately. For
instance, two messages were counted in the quote by one and the same source distributed throughout two paragraphs:

“Obviously Putin has won the Crimea through brute force. But if you measure this in years - which you really have to in a struggle like this - then the advantage doesn’t go to Putin,” [message one] Burns, also a former US ambassador to Nato, told the Guardian.

“We shouldn’t accept what he’s done, and we should continue to argue against it, but understanding the Russians and knowing what Putin is like, the chances are high Putin will never leave Crimea” [message two] (Lewis, Ackerman, & Roberts, March 3, 2014, The Guardian).

Such a breakdown also ‘shortened’ the messages that, to the maximum possible extent, allowed that all the four frame variables for each single message would not contain too many components. Such approach made the content that fell under each variable more consistent, mutually exclusive and manageable for the following quantitative coding. For instance, in the two-paragraph quote:

Kerry said on Wednesday that a Russian intervention would be a “grave mistake”.

“For a country that has spoken out so frequently … against foreign intervention in Libya, in Syria, and elsewhere, it would be important for them to heed those warnings as they think about options in the sovereign nation of Ukraine,” he said (Salem, Walker, & Harding, February 28, 2014, The Guardian).

When counted as two messages instead of one (despite being delivered by one source, Kerry), it allowed for two moral evaluations (that both are part of these messages but relating to different things), that of Russia’s military intervention being a ‘grave mistake’ and that of Ukraine being a ‘sovereign nation’ to be separated instead of being clumped into one under the “Moral Evaluation” frame variable.

Sometimes ‘introductory’ paraphrases and following quotes that complemented and reinstated what was said in a paraphrase conveyed the same idea but appeared in different paragraphs. In such cases, the logic behind counting them as two separate messages was the
reinstatement. The intention was to account for the fact that one and the same idea was repeated twice like in the following excerpt:

Waving a Ukrainian flag alongside several other local clergy, Maxim Gorinov, 37, a pastor at a local evangelical church, said he wanted Donetsk to stay in Ukraine [message one].

“I am Russian, my family speaks Russian, but I am against separatism. We don't want Russian troops here to separate us by force,” [message two] he said (Salem, March 4, 2014, The Guardian).

4.3 Content

Type of content: the sample contains only news stories under the bylines of either staff reporters or freelancers, or staff and agencies. I included only news and not analysis. Even though news analysis also contributes to the construction of reality and allows for a reporter to take a ‘step back’ and provide a more in-depth picture of an event in an objective way by including alternate sources, disparities in the amount of analytical content in the three media outlets under scrutiny forced me to exclude it. Among the analyzed media organizations, The Guardian had much more analytical pieces written by staff or freelance reporters that were not labeled as opinion. The New York Times had more columns, editorials and opinion stories, while the Associated Press predominantly had news. Therefore, for the sake of consistency, analytical pieces were excluded from the sample. I used a Boston Globe’s definition of a news analysis as a guide in identifying the stories for exclusion: “News Analysis is an essay with a central theme that goes beyond facts and statements attributable to sources. It provides interpretations that add to a reader’s understanding of a subject. A news analysis does not report the news. It discusses the news in a style more literary than a news story” (Boston Globe, 2015). It would be interesting, however, to conduct the same study with the inclusion of news analysis to possibly show the differences in the approaches to coverage by various news media and check whether by
having more analytical stories, the dominance of official sources is challenged. This aspect can be addressed by future research. For now, it is beyond the scope of this study.

Going back to the selection of the content for analysis, in addition to analytical pieces, news stories connected to the events in Ukraine but not about the events in Ukraine (such as a piece on a group of Russian bikers who settled in Crimea to assist in the takeover, or a story on the leaked document in Britain that outlined what position the country should take in regards with the proposed sanctions against Russia based on the premise of suffering the least possible harm to the economy, or the piece about the split along the party lines on the lack of toughness in the U.S. policy toward Russia) were also excluded from the sample. News stories on the Olympic Games in Sochi that talked about the events in Ukraine (especially Paralympics), however, were included since representatives from some countries decided not to attend them as part of the ‘consequences’ Russia had to face due to its actions in Crimea, and athletes from Ukraine explicitly expressed protest against Russia’s involvement in the events that were taking place in their country. Because of that, the news on the Games were very closely intertwined contextually with the news on the events in Ukraine.

The content for the analysis was retrieved online. I obtained *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* stories through the papers’ online archives by using “Ukraine” as the key word during the search. Since the Associated Press seized its online archive service, I turned to LexisNexis Academic for the material. I used the same key word to obtain the relevant content there. In total, the search generated 153 news stories, with the Associated Press, *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* accounting for 30, 76 and 47 stories, respectively.
4.4 Sample

The study sample represented a census of all messages attributed to sources that were included in all the news stories about the events in Ukraine published by the three media organizations under study, *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* and the Associated Press, between February 27, 2014 and March 16, 2014, the period when the active phase of the events in Crimea unfolded. The major focus of the analysis was on the messages delivered by official sources, but to be able to provide descriptive statistics and establish whether officials were dominant sources of information, I coded messages by all types of sources in the sample. In total, the coding generated 2,458 messages with the Associated Press accounting for 500 messages, *The Guardian* accounting for 1,272 messages and *The New York Times* accounting for 686 messages.

4.5 Variables

Based on Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) and Entman’s (2004) approaches, the variables in my study were the problems, causes, moral evaluations and remedies that constituted frame elements in the messages delivered by sources in the coverage of crisis in Ukraine. In addition, I included variables for the news medium (*The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, the Associated Press), story word count, message word count, message type (quote, paraphrase, combination), type of source (official v. unofficial), type of official source (Ukrainian, Russian, American, Crimean, British, Other), and messages with no frames.

4.6 Content Analysis

**Frame elements**: As Matthes and Kohring (2008) did, I identified and collected initial data, the frame elements, through qualitative content analysis. Besides being coded for the news medium it appeared in, the word count, the type of message it was, the type of source that
delivered it, and the type of official source that delivered it if it was delivered by an official
source, each message was coded for the four frame elements: problem definition, causal
attribution, moral evaluation and possible treatment/remedy. Those elements were written down
as they appeared in the messages. As I mentioned before, being short, as compared to full text of
a story, and usually targeted, not all messages contained all four elements. To avoid having so
many missing elements as to render the future quantitative analysis impossible, those elements
that were missing from a message were coded as “not present.”

Since there was no uniform way sources talked about problems, causes, remedies and
evaluated events and issues, I wrote down each of them based on the definitions provided in the
code book. Generally speaking, problems were defined as a central issue that can be identified in
a message, which this particular message is addressing and around which the rest of the message
content is built. The central issue was identified not only by looking at a message alone but in the
context of the text it was inserted in. For instance, in the following excerpt:

The International Monetary Fund will answer Ukraine's call for financial help “at this
critical moment in its history,” fund chief Christine Lagarde said Thursday.

In the IMF's first official statement on Ukraine since the country's political crisis
intensified last week, Lagarde said a fact-finding team will go to Kiev in the coming days
to assess the financial needs.

“We are ready to respond,” she said (Baetz, February 27, 2014, Associated Press),

There are three messages by one and the same source: that the IMF will answer Ukraine’s call
for help, that a fact-finding team will go to Kiev, and that IMF is ready to respond. From what
issue the messages are addressing and the surrounding context, it is clear that the problem here is
financial crisis that Ukraine was facing at that time.

The same approach was used in identifying the causes, evaluations and remedies (if
present) in each message. Definitions for each can be found in the code book. In general, causes
were identified by looking to which phenomenon/event, individual(s), country or countries, organization(s) or institution(s) a source assigned the responsibility for the problem in his/her message. For instance, in the following piece:

Russia ordered 150,000 troops to test their combat readiness Wednesday in a show of force that prompted a blunt warning from the United States that any military intervention in Ukraine would be a “grave mistake” (Ritter & Isachenkov, February 27, 2014, Associated Press),

Based on the surrounding context, the United States warning was caused by Russia’s show of military might. The cause element for this message, therefore, was written down as such.

Identification of moral evaluation element was based on the assessments, if any, sources gave to phenomenon(a)/event(s), individual(s), country or countries, organization(s), institution(s) or respective action(s) addressed by a particular message. Some of them were explicit, like in the above example (military intervention was evaluated as a “grave mistake”), some of them, on the other hand, were not so easy to spot. For instance, the following message does not provide an overt evaluation:

The maneuvers will involve some 150,000 troops, 880 tanks, 90 aircraft and 80 navy ships, and are intended to “check the troops” readiness for action in crisis situations that threaten the nation's military security, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in remarks carried by Russian news agencies (Ritter & Isachenkov, February 27, 2014, Associated Press).

The assessment, however, can be deduced from the message through a careful examination. The crisis, as implied by Shoigu, was a threat to Russia’s military security. The moral evaluation element for the issue of political and security crisis, therefore, was written down as “threatening Russia’s military security.” The instructions on deducing the evaluation frame element are included in the code book. The last, treatment element, was identified based on the suggestions, if any, put forward by sources in their messages as solutions to the problems they talked about. Again, the code book contains a detailed definition for this frame element. It
should be said that this particular element, if present, was relatively easy to identify in almost all messages. For example, in:

“Any kind of military intervention that would violate the sovereign territorial integrity of Ukraine would be a huge, a grave mistake,” Kerry told reporters in Washington. “The territorial integrity of Ukraine needs to be respected” (Ritter & Isachenkov, February 27, 2014, Associated Press),

The treatment proposed by Kerry in this particular case was respect to Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

**Other variables:** As to the rest of the variables, the media outlets were coded 1, 2 and 3 for *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* and the Associated Press, respectively; message and story word counts were written down as number of words either indicated by the outlet itself (Associated Press) or generated by using the Word’s word count tool; message type was identified based on whether it was a direct quote, a paraphrase or a combination of the two (see the code book for the definitions); type of source was identified as official or unofficial (official being those who were public officials with the policy and decision making power and ability to influence the course of events, and unofficial being all the rest); and type of official source identified based on the country of origin (Ukrainian, Russian, American, British (in case of *The Guardian*), Crimean and Other, the ones who are from other countries). Detailed definition for official and unofficial sources can be found in the code book.

I included one extra category for the type of official source variable, British, when analyzing the content from *The Guardian*, since the natural expectation was that of British officials being dominant in the coverage by a British newspaper just like American officials are dominant in the coverage by American news media (Bennett, et al., 2007). To check whether this expectation was right, I added British category to this variable so that I could generate descriptive statistics for it. Since adding another category made the coding for *The Guardian* not
uniform with the coding for the rest two media outlets, I coded each of them on a separate code
sheet.

The last variable in my analysis was that of No Frame. I included it to account for the fact
that not all messages carried frame elements. Some just conveyed information without providing
causal attribution, moral evaluation or remedy suggestion, or all four frame elements. I coded
this variable 1 if a message did not contain any of the four frame elements or only problem
definition could be identified. The message had to carry at least two frame elements to be
considered having a frame. This decision was purely arbitrary based on the logic that even if a
coder could identify the problem definition frame element but not the rest, it could have been
deduced from the surrounding context as well as from a message itself. Therefore, when a
message only had problem definition frame element, it was considered as carrying no frame. If a
message carried at least one more frame element in addition to the problem definition, the No
Frame variable was coded as missing, “.”.

4.7 Grouping

Following Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) approach, I also identified variables
constituting each frame element. Since there was no codebooks created previously for me to rely
on, I manually wrote down all content coded for each frame element and grouped it into as many
variables as could be created making sure that the content assigned to each of them was mutually
exclusive. For instance, on the problem definition frame element, the message content was boiled
down to four major problems: political/security crisis, financial crisis, military intervention and
separatist movements/territorial integrity. All the problem definitions that did not fit into any of
those, were grouped into a separate variable, “other”. Subsequently, using the same principle, the
causal attribution frame element content was grouped into nine major causes (actors as well as
phenomena): Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, West, economy, other and one more, “not present,” for those messages that did not contain a causal attribution frame element. Similarly, moral evaluation frame element was summarized into 13 variables: negative evaluation of the situation in Ukraine; negative evaluation of Russia and its actions (ranging from counterproductive to illegal); positive evaluation of Russia and its actions; negative evaluation of Ukraine, its new government and their actions; positive evaluation of Ukraine, its new government and their actions; negative evaluation of Crimea and its actions; positive evaluation of Crimea and its actions; negative evaluation of the West and its actions; positive evaluation of the West and its actions; negative evaluation of Ukraine’s old government and its actions; positive evaluation of Ukraine’s old government and its actions; other; and not present. Remedy/treatment frame element, in turn, generated eight variables: provide financial aid, engage in state building, respect and preserve [Ukraine’s] sovereignty and territorial integrity, protect ethnic Russians, keep peace and stability, enforce sanctions, other, and not present. Table 1 illustrates the distribution of variables according to the frame elements:

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Element</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem definition</td>
<td>Financial crisis</td>
<td>Financial difficulties faced by Ukraine after the government takeover; international financial aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relations and interactions between countries in the context of the crisis and their economic and geopolitical cooperation; concurrent general critical situation in Ukraine; crisis negotiations; conflicting positions on crisis resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political/security crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame Element</td>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military intervention</td>
<td>Russia’s actions in and military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>support to Crimea and assistance</td>
<td>in the local government and Ukrainian military bases takeover.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separatism/territorial integrity</td>
<td>Secession of Crimea from Ukraine</td>
<td>and annexation of Crimea by Russia; referendum; separatism; issue of Ukraine’s territorial integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Problem definitions that do not</td>
<td>fit in any of the above categories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal attribution (actors and their</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actions, or events responsible for</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russia, Putin, Kremlin, Moscow, associated forces, their actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the problem)</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>New government, associated forces, their actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>Pro-Russian authorities in Crimea, their actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
<td>U.S., EU, Britain, NATO, associated forces, their actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Financial crisis, its causes and consequences, and financial aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Causal attributions that do not fit in any of the above categories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not present</td>
<td>Developments in Ukraine</td>
<td>Causal attribution not present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia’s actions (negative)</td>
<td>Gruesome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia’s actions (positive)</td>
<td>Rightful and legal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine and new government (positive)</td>
<td>Striving for democracy and freedom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine and new government (negative)</td>
<td>Illegal, radical and threatening.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame Element</td>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea (positive)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Autonomous, having a right to choose, belonging to Russia;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>events: self-defense and fight against extremism from Kiev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea (negative)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Part of Ukraine, strategic;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>events: separatist and illegal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West (negative)</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S., EU, Britain, NATO destabilizing, interfering with Russia’s sphere of interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West (positive)</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S., EU, Britain, NATO supportive, promoting democracy and territorial integrity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanukovych (negative)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Corrupt and criminal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanukovych (positive)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimate president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moral evaluations that do not fit in any of the above categories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not present</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moral evaluation not present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment/Remedy</td>
<td>Financial aid</td>
<td>Provide financial aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State building</td>
<td>Engage in state building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sovereignty and territorial</td>
<td>Respect and preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>integrity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia’s interests</td>
<td>Protect Russia’s interests and ethnic Russians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>Keep peace and stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>Enforce sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Treatments/remedies that do not fit into any of the above categories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not present</td>
<td>Treatment/remedy not present.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above steps completed the qualitative analysis of frames that the messages delivered by official sources carried in the coverage of crisis in Ukraine. As I mentioned before, this is where I stopped in following Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) methodology that allowed me, first
and foremost, to answer my research questions, and then see whether I could generate enough frame elements for future cluster analysis (by the initial estimates, there are, so, I do plan to conduct cluster analysis in future as the next step in developing this line of research), and be consistent and avoid bias. My findings are discussed in the next chapter together with descriptive statistics and each frame variable presented in the context of a relevant frame element.
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS

This research set to answer the following questions:

RQ1: What sources were dominant in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?
RQ2: What official sources were dominant in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?
RQ3: What are the differences (if any) between the American and British newspapers and the Associated Press in terms of use of official sources in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?
RQ4: What frames appeared in the messages by official sources in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?
RQ5: What are the differences in frames (if any) between the American and British newspapers and the Associated Press?

The qualitative content analysis with the quantitative descriptive component yielded results that answer these questions.

5.1 Official Sources

RQ1: What sources were dominant in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine? The results support the premise of indexing hypothesis and, as intended, contribute to the scholarship in this area. Officials were dominant sources of information in all the three media outlets under scrutiny. The results also support the argument that the same indexing mechanisms are at force in foreign reporting and apply not only to American but foreign officials as well.

Out of 500 messages that were attributed to sources in the coverage of crisis in Ukraine by the Associated Press from February 27 to March 16 of 2014, 387 (77.4%) were delivered by official sources, while 113 (22.6%) were delivered by unofficial sources. Please, see Table 2:
Table 2
Messages by type of source (official v. unofficial) in the coverage of the events in Ukraine by the Associated Press

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Categories</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official Source</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>77.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unofficial Source</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>22.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same tendency could be observed in the other two media outlets. The New York Times coverage included 513 (74.8%) out of total of 686 messages attributed to official sources and only about a quarter, 173 (25.2%), messages attributed to unofficial sources. In The Guardian that had the most voluminous coverage of the events, official sources delivered 955 (75.1%) out of 1,272 messages, whereas the share of messages delivered by unofficial sources was much smaller, 317 (24.9%). Please, see Tables 3 and 4:

Table 3
Messages by type of source (official v. unofficial) in the coverage of the events in Ukraine by The New York Times

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Categories</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official Source</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>74.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unofficial Source</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>25.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>686</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4
Messages by type of source (official v. unofficial) in the coverage of the events in Ukraine by The Guardian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Categories</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official Source</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>75.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unofficial Source</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>24.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>1272</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As I already mentioned above, these numbers show that what is true for the American media, turns out to be true for the British newspaper as well. All three media outlets relied
heavily on official sources in their stories. Also, as can be seen from the results, despite the
differences in total number of stories and messages among the media outlets under scrutiny, the
proportions of messages delivered by official versus unofficial sources in each of them was
roughly the same, about three to one with the Associated Press tilting slightly more heavily than
the others in favor of officials. The consistency with which official sources outnumbered
unofficial sources in such a proportion in the media outlets of different origins, sizes, missions,
and business models, points to the necessity of further research into why this is the case. Existing
theories (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014) provide explanation of what factors influence the way
reporters cover their stories. With the outcomes in this case being so similar, it will be interesting
to look at whether, and if yes, which theoretical factors and how impact the reporters’ sourcing
choices. In the environment of general globalization, are we moving toward a uniform approach
despite all the differences? Is this uniformity consistent throughout media formats and
throughout the media in other countries? Does it only apply to sourcing?

RQ2: What official sources were dominant in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine? It was
interesting to discover that even in The Guardian, the officials who delivered the majority of
messages in the coverage of Ukrainian crisis were American. Out of 955 messages attributed to
official sources, 281 (29.4%) were delivered by American officials. Second in the majority came
Russian officials with 190 (19.9%) messages, then Ukrainian with 166 (17.4%) messages, and
only after that, British with 124 (13%) messages. Crimean de facto authorities did not get a large
share of messages in the coverage, only 44 (4.6%), while other sources (and those included EU
officials as well as NATO, UN and Council of Europe officials and officials from countries other
than EU) were attributed 150 messages in total (15.7%). Table 5 illustrates these results:
Table 5
Messages by type of official source in the coverage of the events in Ukraine by *The Guardian* as the share of the total number of messages by official sources and the total number of messages by both official and unofficial sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Categories</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>17.40</td>
<td>13.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>19.90</td>
<td>14.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>29.40</td>
<td>22.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>9.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimean</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>11.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Observations

|               | 955 | 1272   |

That a British newspaper included more messages by American official sources than by British or even European officials in general is a very important discovery. It possibly points at whom the media view as a major geopolitical power even in the crisis that is geographically and economically much more proximate to Europe than the United States. In the coverage, the United States, not Europe was described as an active initiator of steps toward peaceful resolution of the crisis; the United States, not Europe was described as the first to put forward the idea of economic and political sanctions and the first to start enforcing them; the United States, not Europe to most frequently be in direct contact with Russia regarding the situation on the ground and ways to settle without involving military. It looks like the distribution of power in international community beyond the media coverage found its reflection within it. Such an interesting finding warrants further inquiry into whether this really is the case.

I should also add a little reminder here about the fact that on the coding stage, the Type of Official Source variable for *The Guardian* had one category that the rest of the media outlets under scrutiny did not have (the reasons are explained in the Methods chapter), and that category was ‘British official.’ For the Associated Press and *The New York Times*, British officials were
coded as ‘Other’ together with the EU, NATO, UN, Council of Europe, and other countries’ officials. Again, rather interestingly, in *The Guardian*, British officials lagged behind all three types, American, Russian and Ukrainian officials in the number of message included in the coverage. In the stories, Britain was positioned politically between the United States and the European Union. It was presented as a country that takes its own stand in foreign affairs policy not necessarily siding with either of the two players on everything. Britain would support European Union’s reluctance to impose sanctions against Russia at the same time following the Unites States in active search for the peaceful solution through the direct contacts with Russia.

Geopolitically, however, Britain is a much smaller power that the United States or the European Union, and that the number of messages by British officials is smaller than that of other official sources in the coverage even by the British paper is possibly indicative of that.

Going back to the media outlets, for the American media, the predominance of American official sources over official sources from other countries was not unusual. The results largely supported the postulates of indexing hypothesis and cascading model but added evidence that even in the crisis where the United States is not directly involved as a party, American media rely on American officials more so than on the officials from the countries responsible for the crisis to begin with. In *The New York Times*, messages delivered by American officials were in majority, but the difference in numbers was not as large as in the paper’s British counterpart. American official sources were responsible for 151 (29.4%) of the messages with Russian officials following closely with 137 (26.7%) messages. Ninety nine messages (19.3%) were attributed to Ukrainian officials, 102 (19.9%) to other official sources, and 24 (4.7%) – to Crimean. Again, in total, official sources delivered 513 messages. For details, please see Table 6:
Table 6
Messages by type of official source in the coverage of the events in Ukraine by *The New York Times* as the share of the total number of messages by official sources and the total number of messages by both official and unofficial sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Categories</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>19.30</td>
<td>14.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>26.70</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>29.40</td>
<td>22.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimean</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>19.90</td>
<td>14.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Observations</strong></td>
<td><strong>513</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the Associated Press’ 387 messages attributed to official sources, 128 (33.1%) were to American officials, 99 (25.6%) – to Ukrainian, 71 (18.3%) – to Russian, 78 (20.2%) – to other, and 11 (2.8%) – to Crimean officials. Please, see Table 7:

Table 7
Messages by type of official source in the coverage of the events in Ukraine by the Associated Press as the share of the total number of messages by official sources and the total number of messages by both official and unofficial sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Categories</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>25.60</td>
<td>19.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>18.30</td>
<td>14.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>33.10</td>
<td>25.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimean</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>20.20</td>
<td>15.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Observations</strong></td>
<td><strong>387</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RQ3: What are the differences (if any) between the American and British newspapers and the Associated Press in terms of use of official sources in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine? Due to the specifics of descriptive analysis, the meaningful comparison between the analyzed media outlets could only be done in terms of shares. All of them included approximately the same share of American sources (about 30%) with the Associated Press, again, scoring slightly more. As I
mentioned before, such a result is not unusual for the American media even if they cover a foreign conflict where the United States is not directly involved. It is rather interesting, however, that a British newspaper would follow the same trend. Deliberation as to why that might be the case, what may be the implications of this and areas for future research will follow in the Discussion chapter.

In terms of the share of messages by Russian official sources, *The New York Times* was the most generous with having attributed to them slightly over a quarter of all the messages by official sources. Thus, the paper gave approximately the same weight to American and Russian officials. *The Guardian* and the Associated Press were about equal in allocating about 20% of the official source messages to the messages by Russian official sources. Ukrainian officials accounted for about 17 to 20 percent of the messages in all the three media outlets. This reveals another interesting fact worthy of discussion in the next chapter. That of American and Russian official sources being attributed to more frequently than their Ukrainian counterparts even though the events unfolded in Ukraine. Crimean officials did not get much attention in either of the media outlets under scrutiny. *The Guardian* and *The New York Times*, however, accounted for about the double of the share as compared to the Associated Press. Such a result, given the fact that the time period under scrutiny was when Crimea effectively separated from Ukraine, again, warrants further discussion.

5.2 Frames

RQ4: What frames appeared in the messages by official sources in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine? Out of 955 messages delivered by official sources in the coverage of the crisis in Ukraine by *The Guardian*, 845 (about 90%) carried at least two frame elements identified by Entman (2004): problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation and treatment/remedy.
suggestion. In *The New York Times*’ coverage, 401 messages (out of 513), about 80%, delivered by official sources carried at least two of those frame elements, while the Associated Press coverage contained 337 messages delivered by official sources that carried at least two frame elements. Those comprised 87% of the total 387 messages delivered by official sources. For details, please refer to the Tables 8, 9 and 10, respectively:

Table 8:  
Messages with and without frames by official sources in the coverage of the events in Ukraine by *The Guardian*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Categories</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Messages with frames</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>88.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messages without frames</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>11.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>955</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9:  
Messages with and without frames by official sources in the coverage of the events in Ukraine by *The New York Times*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Categories</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Messages with frames</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>78.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messages without frames</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>21.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>513</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10:  
Messages with and without frames by official sources in the coverage of the events in Ukraine by the Associated Press

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Categories</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Messages with frames</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>87.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messages without frames</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>387</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Problem definition: In the coverage by all the three media outlets, four major problem definitions could be identified, and they were consistent through each of the two papers and the Associated Press. Those problem definition frame elements were: political/security crisis,
(Russia’s) military intervention in Crimea and possibility of military intervention farther into the eastern parts of Ukraine, financial crisis that Ukraine was facing after it had ousted its president, and separatism movements/territorial integrity of the country.

Within the political/security crisis frame element, sources predominantly discussed the concurrent situation in Ukraine, relations and interactions between the countries in the context of the crisis (not only Russia and Ukraine, but all that were involved in the process of resolution) and their geopolitical cooperation, Ukraine’s political transition, the events that led to it, and the alleged threats to the lives and wellbeing of Russian-speaking population in Ukraine. The differences in how these frame element was presented depending on what official source delivered a message were rather obvious. Russian officials presented the crisis as coming as a result of the illegal overthrow of the central government in Ukraine that posed imminent threat to the country’s Russian-speaking population. A clear example of such messages is the statement by the Russia’s foreign ministry that “Moscow would defend the rights of its compatriots and react without compromise to any violation of those rights. It expressed concern about ‘large-scale human rights violations’, attacks and vandalism in the former Soviet republic” (Salem, Walker, & Harding, February 27, 2014, The Guardian).

Ukraine, on the other hand, mainly focused on the problems that it had to face as a result of political transition and a looming prospect of Russia’s involvement in the country’s internal affairs. This was reflected in such messages as, for instance, Ukraine’s Rada (parliament) member’s comment on the appointments in the new interim government of the country. “More seasoned public officials acknowledged that some of the choices were unorthodox, but said that the protest leaders had earned the right to a strong voice in the new government. ‘First of all, we should give the benefit of the doubt,’ said Hryhoriy Nemyria, a Parliament member and former
deputy prime minister. ‘Also, we’re in extraordinary circumstances,’ he said. ‘Business as usual is not something we can expect’” (Herszenhorn, February 27, 2014, The New York Times).

The gist of the political/security crisis as implied by the western officials, however, was not only the Ukraine’s internal political transitions, but also the absence of direct dialogue between Russia and Ukraine and Russia’s lack of cooperation with international community in their efforts to defuse the situation. Claims such as that of the United States State Department official “that it was Russia's refusal to discuss the American proposals that was hurting prospects for a negotiated solution - in particular, the idea of direct talks between Russian officials and those of the new Ukrainian government” (Heintz & Danilova, March 11, 2014, the Associated Press) were common throughout the coverage.

The messages that contained (Russia’s) military intervention frame element of the problem definition variable revolved mainly around the allegations of Russia’s military involvement on the territory of Ukraine and Russia’s military support to and cooperation with the local forces in Crimea in their overtake of the control over the peninsula. Ukraine’s view of the problem was that of Russia militarily presence, facilitation and active participation in the seizure of government buildings in Crimea as well as blockade and military pressure on Ukrainian military bases located on the peninsula. Not so much in the Associated Press coverage, but present in the coverage by The Guardian and The New York Times, this particular problem definition also involved potential spread of Russian military intervention to the eastern parts of Ukraine. For instance, the statement by the Ukraine's foreign minister “that his country was practically in a state of war with Russia, whose forces have effectively taken control over the Crimean Peninsula in what has become Europe's greatest geopolitical crisis since the end of the
Cold War” provides a clear example of how Ukrainian official sources framed the problem (Heintz & Danilova, March 11, 2014, the Associated Press).

Similar to the Ukrainian officials’ were the sentiments related to this frame element of western official sources. Widespread were messages like the one made by the United States State Secretary, John Kerry that “a Russian intervention would be a ‘grave mistake’” (Lewis, February 28, 2014, The Guardian) and NATO’s statement objecting the intervention as a “breach of international law” (Gordon, March 2, 2014, The New York Times). Russia, on the other hand, first presented this problem in light of Crimean self-defense efforts against chaos in Kiev, and later, after having finally come close to admitting military presence in Ukraine, as a measure caused by the security concerns over the Russian-speaking population’s wellbeing. Messages by Russian officials would carry statements that “its intervention is only to protect its citizens and interests from chaos and disorder after the still-unexplained departure from Kiev of the Kremlin-backed president, Mr. Yanukovych” (Erlanger, March 2, 2014, The New York Times).

Financial crisis appeared to be the least frequently named problem by the official sources in the coverage of Ukraine’s crisis. The discussion in this case revolved around the financial difficulties faced by Ukraine after the government takeover and international financial aid. It mainly came from the Ukrainian and western officials, however. Russia did not seem to be making notice of this problem and this frame element did not appear in the Russian officials’ messages.

Separatist movements/territorial integrity frame element of the problem definition variable referred to the secession of Crimea from Ukraine and annexation of Crimea by Russia. Related were messages on the Crimean referendum and issue of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Ukraine and the West, again, sided together on the way they framed this problem. “The U.S.
outline … called on Russia to pull back from Crimea, both in military force and in influence, to halt the local government there from holding a March 16 vote on whether it should separate from Ukraine” (Heintz & Danilova, March 11, 2014, the Associated Press). As to the Ukrainian government, it “branded the referendum decision by Crimea's parliament as unconstitutional” (Salem, Walker, & Harding, February 28, 2014, The Guardian). To Russia, however, the problem was not in the separation of Crimea from Ukraine that was “based on the norms of international law and aim to ensure the legal interests of the population of the peninsula,” according to Putin (Heintz & Danilova, March 11, 2014, the Associated Press), but in that Ukraine and the West were trying to prevent it from happening. “Only the people who live in a certain territory have the right to decide their own future,” stated Putin (Myers, Barry, & Cowell, March 4, 2014, The New York Times). On this, Russia had an ally in the form of Crimean de facto officials who delivered similar frames: “The question is simple … Let the people choose” (Herszenhorn, March 6, 2014, The New York Times).

Causal attribution: Here, as well, several main frame elements could be identified. Almost all specific causes named by the official sources in their messages could be grouped into several general categories: Russia, Ukraine, old government, Crimea, West and economy. Among the causes that were grouped under Russia cause were Russia’s zero-sum game approach, violation of sovereign state’s territorial integrity, pro-Russian forces, foreign forces, men in unmarked uniforms, attackers, armed men, gunmen, military exercises, military movements, Russian troops, criminals, Russian activists, pro-Russian activists/protesters, Russia’s actions, government buildings takeover in Crimea, Crimea’s takeover, Russia’s military buildup, invasion, Moscow, Putin, Lavrov, no dialogue (because of Russia), Russia’s refusal to discuss American proposals, Russia’s financial aid withdrawal, foreign interference (by Russia),...
use of force (by Russia), Kremlin, Russian troops, Russian military forces, legal violations by Russia, escalation (by Russia), East-West polarity, Russia-West polarity, and other similar statements.

Russia as a cause either of the political/security crisis, military intervention or separatist movements was named by Ukrainian and Western official sources. They delivered messages like “Russia should not lose a game of chess for the very ephemeral pleasure of taking a piece from the board. The pleasure is very ephemeral indeed” (Lederer & Spielmann, March 13, 2014, Associated Press), “Merkel said Russia risks ‘massive’ political and economic consequences, if it does not enter into ‘negotiations that achieve results’ over the situation in Ukraine” (Eckel & Isachenkov, March 13, 2014, Associated Press), “‘here in the streets today I didn’t see anybody who feels threatened, except for the potential of an invasion by Russia.’ [Kerry] expressed hope that Mr. Putin ‘would step back and listen carefully that we would like to see this de-escalated’” (Gordon, March 4, 2014, The New York Times), ‘I am appealing to the military leadership of the Russian Black Sea fleet. Any military movements, the more so if they are with weapons, beyond the boundaries of this territory [the base] will be seen by us as military aggression’” (Salem, Walker, & Harding, February 28, 2014, The Guardian).

Russian and Crimean officials, on the other hand, pointed fingers for the same problems at Ukraine (implying the new government) and the West that backed it up and provided support. Among the causes named by Russian and Crimean official sources were absence of legitimate government, forceful overthrow of legitimate government (coup), Ukrainian military forces, Ukraine, Ukraine’s new government, forces that overtook Ukraine, activists from Kiev, the treatment of ethnic Russians by forces that overtook Ukraine, lack of control, lack of order, resulting violence, Right Sector fighters, and other related issues and actors. According to Russian and Crimean officials, “the recent developments in Crimea … confirmed the desire of
Kiev's politicians to destabilise the situation on the peninsula” (Beaumont, March 1, 2014, The Guardian), “the world shouldn't blame [Russia] for … Ukraine's ‘internal crisis’” (Eckel & Isachenkov, March 13, 2014, Associated Press), Russia “reserves the right to ‘use all means’ to protect Russian speakers in Ukraine from violent nationalists” (Eckel & Isachenkov, March 13, 2014, Associated Press), “the lawlessness … ‘now rules in eastern regions of Ukraine as a result of the actions of fighters of the so-called 'Right Sector,' with the full connivance’ of Ukraine's new authorities’” (Heintz & Danilova, March 11, 2014, the Associated Press), “it's foremost Ukraine's internal crisis, … but, regrettably, we have been drawn into these events" (Eckel & Isachenkov, March 13, 2014, Associated Press), and “‘the self-defense forces in Crimea should [not] be any less professional … [than] people who were operating in Kiev – they were very well trained at special camps in Poland and Lithuania, they were trained by special structures’” (Myers, Barry, & Cowell, March 4, 2014, The New York Times).

As to the West, the causes identified here were desire of Ukraine to have closer ties with EU and NATO, reciprocal support of these institutions, United States’ actions and proposals, Western interference, lack of common view, sanctions. For instance, in one of his statements, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin said that “the United States government had interfered in Ukraine ‘from across the pond in America as if they were sitting in a laboratory and running experiments on rats, without any understanding of the consequences’” (Myers, Barry, & Cowell, March 4, 2014, The New York Times). In another statement, Russia’s foreign minister Lavrov announced that “proposals made by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry are ‘not suitable’ because they take ‘the situation created by the coup as a starting point’” (Heintz & Danilova, March 11, 2014, the Associated Press).
When Crimea was named to be at fault in the messages (a lot of times in conjunction with Russia), the accusations mostly came from Ukrainian officials with some western contributions and concerned pro-Russian authorities that took control over the peninsula, the referendum, close ties to Russia and Crimea’s military forces. According to Ukrainian official sources, “‘under the stage direction of the Russian Federation, a circus performance is underway: the so-called referendum… Also taking part in the performance are 21,000 Russian troops, who with their guns are trying to prove the legality of the referendum’” (Dahlburg & Eckel, March 16, 2014, Associated Press). Some statements were even harsher: “separatist ‘ringleaders’… had compromised [Ukraine’s] independence ‘under the cover of Russian troops. ‘We will find all of them – if it takes one year, two years – and bring them to justice. The ground will burn beneath their feet’” (Harding & Walker, March 16, 2014, The Guardian). Western officials mainly focused on illegality of the actions of Crimean self-proclaimed authorities and the referendum. A statement from the White House read: “President Obama emphasised that the Crimean ‘referendum’, which violates the Ukrainian constitution and occurred under duress of Russian military intervention, would never be recognised by the United States and the international community” (Swaine & Yuhas, March 16, 2014, The Guardian).

Attribution to the old Ukrainian government and its president as a cause came from the Ukraine’s new authorities and appeared in The Guardian and The New York Times, not so much in the Associated Press coverage. Officials named the old government and the president as the causes for the grave economic situation Ukraine was facing at the time. “‘The money in Yanukovych's personal accounts and in the accounts of his family would be enough to cover many current needs of Ukraine.’ If the new government [does] sign the EU association
agreement that Yanukovych faltered over, it would be easier to investigate offshore havens and return the stolen money” (Walker & Grytsenko, February 27, 2014, The Guardian).

Moral evaluation: Among the major frame elements that could be identified under the moral evaluation variable were evaluations of the situation in Ukraine as gruesome, positive evaluations of Russia and its actions, negative evaluations of Russia and its actions, positive evaluations of the new Ukrainian government, negative evaluations of the new Ukrainian government, positive and negative evaluations of Crimea and its actions, positive and negative evaluations of the old government and the ousted president, positive and negative evaluations of the West and its actions.

Among evaluations of the situation in Ukraine that mostly related to the political/security and financial crisis as well as, in some instances, Russia’s military intervention, were such assessments of it as critical moment in Ukraine’s history, very dangerous situation, extraordinary situation, representing risk to lives and threatening (of Russian-speaker population), urgent, baring serious negative signs and high risks, difficult times, delicate times, tense, deteriorating, escalated, grave, destabilizing, disaster, financial collapse, default, dire, sharpest international crisis in Europe since the end of the Cold War, greatest geopolitical crisis since the end of the Cold War, unstable, big mess, uncertain, very painful, uneasy problem, great catastrophe for Ukraine, and other.

Here too, patterns were quite obvious. Russian officials evaluated the situation as grave seeing it as a threat to Russian citizens and Russian-speaking population in Ukraine: “In his address to parliament, Putin said the ‘extraordinary situation in Ukraine’ was putting at risk the lives of Russian citizens and military personnel stationed at the Crimean naval base that Moscow has maintained since the Soviet collapse” (Sullivan & Isachenkov, March 1, 2014, Associated
“Mr. Lavrov said, in comments that were not part of his prepared speech, that it was necessary to keep Russian troops in Ukraine ‘until the normalization of the political situation’” (Cumming-Bruce, March 3, 2014, *The New York Times*). Western official sources provided the same evaluations of the situation but in a different context. They framed it as the consequence of Russia’s actions on the territory of a sovereign state and emphasized its gravity to stress the necessity of de-escalation and peaceful resolution of the crisis. “The British foreign secretary, William Hague … voiced concern at reports of new Russian troop movements into Crimea in an interview on Monday with BBC Radio 4, saying, ‘This is a very tense situation and dangerous situation that Russia’s intervention has now produced’” (Cumming-Bruce, March 3, 2014, *The New York Times*). “Calling the situation in Ukraine ‘as dangerous as it is destabilizing,’ U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power told the council, ‘It is time for the Russian military intervention in Ukraine to end’” (Anna, March 2, 2014, Associated Press).

Moral evaluations by Ukrainian officials were focused more on negative framing of Russia’s actions in Crimea and, later, eastern Ukraine. Western official sources joined them on this as well. Among assessments used to frame Russia’s conduct were: grave mistake, very dangerous game, military intervention, violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, isolationism, profound interference, unjustified, ungrounded, unreasonable, incredible aggression, takeover, threatening escalation and international security, threatening European security and stability, dangerous, unacceptable, alarming, provoking, illegal, military invasion and occupation, annexation, crime against the government of Ukraine, violation of the principles and values of G-7 and G-8, violation of international law, impermissible, zero-sum game, fomenting unrest, closing any available space for diplomacy, hurting prospects for negotiated solution, not responsive, not willing to engage in proposals, ruining friendship with Ukraine,
deceitful, violent, not trustworthy, supporting secession, waging backdoor annexation of Crimea, cynical, intimidating, deliberate and destructive, anti-American, and others.

According to Ukrainian and Western officials, “Russia today is trying to rewrite the borders of Europe after world war two, that is what’s going on. If we allow this to happen, next will be somebody else” (Roberts & Traynor, March 6, 2014, The Guardian). “US secretary of state, John Kerry, warned that Russia could be expelled from the G8 and face economic sanctions, unless President Vladimir Putin halts his ‘incredible act of aggression’ and withdraws forces from Ukraine” (Walker & Traynor, March 2, 2014, The Guardian). “Mr. Obama accused Russia on Saturday of a ‘breach of international law’ and condemned the country’s military intervention, calling it a ‘clear violation’ of Ukrainian sovereignty” (Smale & Erlanger, March 1, 2014, The New York Times). Similar sentiments came from the Ukraine’s interior minister (and other officials) who said that he “can only describe [Russia’s actions] as a military invasion and occupation” (Bennett & Ritter, March 1, 2014, Associated Press).

Russian officials responded with negative frames of the Ukraine’s new government and the West and portrayals of Russia’s and Crimea’s actions as rightful and forced by the threatening circumstances. Among negative evaluations of Ukrainian side were: threatening to Russia’s military security, radical nationalists, armed and dangerous radicals who illegally and forcefully overthrew the old government, intimidating and terrorizing, armed extremists, ultranationalists, fascists, dangerous, lawless, losing control, unable to provide security, unprincipled clowns, oppressive. Events preceding Yanukovych’s demise were labeled as unconstitutional and bandit coup and an illegal rebellion. The West, in turn, was described as destabilizing and interfering with the Russia’s sphere of interests as well as putting forward unacceptable proposals. “Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Moscow sees no sense in
talking with Ukraine's new authorities because, in his view, they kowtow to radical nationalists. ‘The so-called interim government isn't independent. It depends, to our great regret, on radical nationalists who have seized power with arms,’ he said at a news conference. He said that nationalist groups use "intimidation and terror" to control Ukraine” (Bennett & Karmanau, March 8, 2014, Associated Press). According to Russian ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin, new government in Kiev was “‘a government of victors,’ stuffed with extremists, who came to power on the shoulders of violent protesters and Westerners who had interfered. He called Sunday’s scheduled referendum in Crimea an exercise in ‘self-determination’” (Sengupta, March 13, 2014, The New York Times). Russian officials framed Western countries as applying double standards (reminding of Kosovo and Iraq) and threatening sanctions against the country that is trying to protect its ‘compatriots’ from imminent danger.

Russian official sources self-evaluated their country’s actions as a response to threat and risk to Russia’s military security and geopolitical interests, lives, health and legal interests of ethnic Russians, Russian citizens and compatriots, response to unrelenting violence that is legal, protective, adequate, and rightful. Russia positioned itself as forthcoming, open to reasonable solutions, not wanting war, involuntarily drawn into the crisis, not intending to invade any regions, and not the one to blame for the mess. “The Russian president told his US counterpart that Moscow had the right to protect its interests and those of Russian speakers not only in Crimea but also in east Ukraine” (Walker & Traynor, March 2, 2014, The Guardian). In its coverage, The New York Times included large portions of a statement issued by the Kremlin in response to the accusations from the United States:

Early Friday, the Kremlin released a statement describing the phone call. “In the course of the discussion there emerged differences in approaches and assessments of the causes which brought about the current crisis and the resulting state of affairs,” the statement
said. “Vladimir Putin, for his part, noted that this had occurred as a result of an anticonstitutional coup which does not have a national mandate. It went on to say that the current Ukrainian leadership has imposed “absolutely illegitimate decisions” on the eastern and southeastern regions of the country. “Russia cannot ignore appeals connected to this, calls for help, and acts appropriately, in accordance with international law,” the statement said. Mr. Putin, the statement said, appreciated the importance of the Russian-American relationship to global security, and added that bilateral ties “should not be sacrificed for individual — albeit rather important — international problems.” (Herszenhorn, Gordon, & Rubin, March 6, 2014, *The New York Times*).

Evaluations and self-evaluations of Crimea’s events and actions of its de-facto government also split along the West-Ukraine, Russia-Crimea lines. On the one side, Crimea was framed as an integral part of Ukraine; its takeover assessed as well-organized illegitimate operation conducted by Russian or Russian-backed extremists, separatist, specially ordered Russian servicemen armed to the teeth and backed by armed forces from another country; the March 16 referendum labeled as illegal, unconstitutional, unauthorized, invalid and illegitimate, rebellion, violation of international law where voters casted ballots under the barrel of a gun, a vote with a foregone conclusion, a clown show, a circus directed and stage-managed at gunpoint by Moscow, cynical power play and land grab by Russia, legality of which was being proved by weapons. “‘The decision to hold a referendum in Crimea is illegal and not compatible with the Ukrainian constitution,’ said Merkel” (Roberts & Traynor, March 6, 2014, *The Guardian*).

“Ukraine’s acting president, Oleksandr V. Turchynov, scoffed at a planned referendum under the watch of foreign troops. ‘This will be a farce,’ he said in a televised address. ‘This will be false. This will be a crime against the state’” (Herszenhorn, Gordon, & Rubin, March 6, 2014, *The New York Times*).

On the other hand, Russian and Crimean officials pained a different picture. Crimea was evaluated as autonomous, having a right to choose, belonging to Russia, and what was going on there (including referendum) as a self-defense and fight against extremism and illegal
government from Kiev. Crimean “deputy prime minister of the region, Rustam Temirgaliev, said that … as of Thursday, the only legal troops on Crimean soil were the Russian army.

‘Any troops of a third country will be treated as illegal band formations, with all the consequences that entails,’ he said” (Walker & Traynor, March 6, 2014, The Guardian). Russia’s president Vladimir Putin, in turn, said “that Moscow has no intention of annexing Crimea, but that its people have the right to determine the region's status in a referendum” (Bennett & Karmanau, March 8, 2014, Associated Press). Russian ambassador to the United Nations went even further saying “that the concept of a referendum isn't new, pointing to a vote set for November on whether Catalonia should be independent from Spain, a vote upcoming in Scotland in September on independence from Britain, and a March 2013 vote in the Falkland Islands to remain part of Britain. ‘Why should the people of Crimea be an exception?,’ Churkin asked” (Lederer & Spielmann, March 13, 2014, Associated Press).

Remedy/Treatment: Official sources suggested various remedies to the crisis that could be grouped into the following solutions: provide Ukraine with financial aid, for Ukraine to engage in state building, respect and preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, protect ethnic Russians, keep peace and stability, and enforce sanctions. All of them except from protecting ethnic Russians came from Western and Ukrainian officials. Although part of the remedies suggested by Western and Ukrainian officials did also involve addressing whatever concerns Russian-speaking population living in Ukraine could have. Unlike Russian official sources, however, theirs involved granting Crimea more autonomy and introducing international monitors to ensure that human right violations would not take place. Russian and Crimean officials, on their part, saw achieving the same end through different means. Those were military intervention/maneuvers/exercises, integration of Crimea and Ukraine’s east, sending in troops,
proceeding with the referendum, secession to Russia, and annexation. Initially, Russian sources
denied considering integration of Crimea into Russia, but as the referendum date approached,
those frames appeared in their messages as a response to the calls for help coming from the
Crimean Russians and their salvation from the radicals that took control of Kiev. “The Russian
ambassador, Vitaly I. Churkin, preceded his no vote [on the United Nations Security Council
resolution] by saying that Russia would respect the results of Sunday’s referendum, but he did
not say anything about exactly what it would do afterward. Mr. Churkin described the
referendum as an ‘extraordinary measure,’ expressing the Crimean people’s right to self-
determination, made necessary by what he said was an ‘illegal coup carried out by radicals’
in Ukraine. He was referring to the ouster of President Viktor F. Yanukovych, a Russian ally, in
February, which precipitated the current crisis” (Sengupta, March 15, 2014, The New York
Times). “The Russian president Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday that Russia was ‘not
considering’ annexing Crimea, but on Thursday, Sergei Mironov, a Russian MP, said the Duma,
Russia’s parliament, could consider the issue as early as next week. The Duma has already begun
work on a bill that would make it easier for Russia to join new territories, clearly penned with
one eye on Crimea events” (Walker, March 6, 2014, The Guardian).

Western and Ukrainian officials, meanwhile, were focused on peaceful resolution through
keeping calm, and engaging in diplomatic negotiation and direct dialogue between Russia and
Ukraine. “In his brief speech, Yatsenyuk accused Russia of violating the U.N. Charter and
several treaties and urged Moscow to pull back its troops in the Crimean Peninsula to barracks
and to start real negotiations to tackle the conflict” (Lederer & Spielmann, March 13, 2014,
Associated Press). “The G7 nations called on Russia to address human rights concerns through
direct negotiations with Ukraine or by entrusting international monitors. Their statement, also
endorsed by the presidents of the European Council and European commission, added: ‘We also call on all parties concerned to behave with the greatest extent of self-restraint and responsibility, and to decrease the tensions’” (Lewis, Ackerman, & Swaine, March 3, 2014, The Guardian). As the events progressed, however, with Russia proceeding with taking control over and annexation of Crimea, remedy frame elements coming from Western official sources started to include political and economic sanctions, and isolation if Russia would not change its course of action. German Chancellor Angela Merkel “said the European Union and other Western nations would soon freeze bank accounts of Russians and implement travel restrictions, if Moscow refuses to enter ‘negotiations that achieve results’” (Eckel & Isachenkov, March 13, 2014, Associated Press).

Among all these remedies suggested by Western and Ukrainian officials in their messages, was one more that was steadily and constantly repeated, that of respect and protection of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. “Emphasizing that ‘the territorial integrity of Ukraine cannot be called into question,’ Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany appealed forcefully to Russia on Thursday to abandon what she called the politics of the 19th and 20th centuries, and to find a peaceful negotiated solution to a crisis ‘in the heart of Europe’” (Smale, March 13, 2014, The New York Times). “The United States circulated a draft resolution which would reaffirm the Security Council's commitment ‘to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders’” (Lederer & Spielmann, March 13, 2014, Associated Press). “The British prime minister, David Cameron, spoke to Putin on Friday and reinforced the message that Moscow should respect Ukraine's territorial integrity… A No 10 spokesman said: ‘The prime minister emphasised that all countries should respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. President Putin
agreed, stressing that Russian military exercises in the area had been planned before the current situation in Ukraine” (Lewis, Traynor, & Harding, February 28, 2014, *The Guardian*).

RQ5: What are the differences in frames (if any) between the American and British newspapers and the Associated Press? In general, no great differences could be identified between the frames found in the messages by official sources reported by *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* and the Associated Press. The style of the coverage, however, differed. The Associated Press news stories being reported more according to the news writing style, concise, more down to the point, and even drier. The messages by sources both official and unofficial throughout the stories were more condensed even though the share of the total message word count in the Associated Press and *The Guardian* was about the same, approximately 45% of the total story word count. The messages with frames by official sources in the Associated Press coverage constituted 36.63% of the total story word count. In *The Guardian* coverage, this share was a little smaller, 30.61%. *The New York Times’* share of messages was smaller than that in the Associated Press and *The Guardian*, 33.07%, and only 21.13% of the total story word count in *The New York Times* was occupied by the messages with frames delivered by official sources.

Please, see Table 11 for details:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Outlet</th>
<th>N of Stories</th>
<th>N of Messages</th>
<th>Total Story Word Count</th>
<th>Message Word Count</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1,272</td>
<td>65,822</td>
<td>20,149</td>
<td>30.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated press</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>25,668</td>
<td>7,862</td>
<td>36.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11
Descriptive statistics for the number of stories, number of messages, story word count and official source messages with frames word count across the three media outlets.
These numbers indicated a greater reporter’s presence and less of the sources’ and thus, their frames’ presence in the paper’s stories. This fact, however, does not necessarily mean that the possible impact of the frames in the officials’ messages is weak. Future research should address this issue as discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation asked and answered the following research questions:

RQ1: What sources were dominant in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ2: What official sources were dominant in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ3: What are the differences (if any) between the American and British newspapers and the Associated Press in terms of use of official sources in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ4: What frames appeared in the messages by official sources in reporting on the crisis in Ukraine?

RQ5: What are the differences in frames (if any) between the American and British newspapers and the Associated Press?

By doing so, it helped to fill several gaps in mass communication research related to the area of sourcing and framing.

First, it expanded the scholarship on sourcing by demonstrating that indexing hypothesis applies not only in the contexts it was originally developed in and was set to explain, but also in foreign domain, namely in the reporting of crises that do not involve United States directly, the area where there is a general lack of knowledge according to Hamilton and Lawrence (2010).

This dissertation also revealed that just as Hayes and Guardino (2013) argued, American officials were not the only dominant official sources in the coverage of this foreign policy issue. Foreign official voices were also present, and it can be said that these findings indicate that both phenomena, that of journalists indexing their reporting to the rhetoric of those who have a policy making power and that those who have power and desire to shape policies try to use the media to deliver their version of and spin on the events in question, work beyond American media market
as well as they do within it. The result of the content analysis in this study also showed that indexing works not only in the American media. To say the least, it does in a British newspaper, and that newspaper being *The Guardian*, a reputable outlet with the established professional standards and policies at work as well as long tradition of foreign reporting, we may hypothesize that the same can be true for any other British newspaper of the same or similar rank. This hypothesis, however, needs proper investigation and empirical support.

All the above revelations open doors to further research. One of the ways to expand knowledge about sourcing in reporting on foreign crises absent direct involvement of the United States would be to content analyze the coverage of other conflicts, such as the one in Syria, or the one in Gaza. Both, however, and that includes Ukraine as well, have various levels of geopolitical interest for the United States, Russia and Europe and it would be interesting to see and compare how sourcing and indexing worked there. Namely, it would be interesting to study the official sources belonging to which of the parties involved (directly or indirectly) dominate the coverage.

This subject warrants further scrutiny because, unlike Hamilton and Lawrence’s (2010) study that showed that Russian and Chechen as well as Japanese and Chinese officials were attributed more than American or any other country officials (war in Chechnya and invasion of Manchuria, respectively), this study revealed that despite the crisis being of and taking place in Ukraine, messages delivered by American officials were the ones that reporters included most frequently in their coverage. Interestingly enough, this was true not only for *The New York Times* and the Associated Press, but for *The Guardian* as well. As I already mentioned, the fact that a British newspaper had more messages by American officials than by British or even European official sources may indicate the media’s views on which country is the major geopolitical power
regardless the geography of the crisis and the parties involved so long as this major power has a foreign policy interest in the region. Another interesting discovery, that in the coverage by The Guardian, messages by British officials appeared in relative minority to American, Russian and Ukrainian official sources, may be reflective of the same as well as that Russian official sources trailed Americans in the frequency of their messages followed by Ukrainian and other sources and even coming third in the Associated Press coverage. Crimean de facto officials were the least represented even though the peninsula was the source of the events and the cornerstone of contention in the period under scrutiny.

All these findings support the underlying logic of indexing and cascading models but take these theories to a different level. The results can very well indicate that not only do media calibrate their coverage to officials as those who have a vested interest in influencing and power to shape policy, but they also calibrate their coverage to those officials who have higher interest in influencing and greater power to shape that policy. Another, simpler, explanation may be that indexing reveals who the real parties to a conflict and thus, decision makers and policy shapers are since Crimean authorities basically acted as auxiliary force behind Russian intervention. In any case, further exploration into this issue will generate additional knowledge that will ultimately contribute to the scholarship on sourcing.

Another possible area for future research concerns the second set of the research questions asked in this study that focus on framing and could be based on Entman’s (2004) theoretical framework that explains effectiveness of messages delivered by official sources. Entman (2004) argues that it should be measured based on the magnitude (frequency) and resonance (high cultural salience) of specific frames in the messages. This type of research would explore the effects of media frames, but to accomplish it using Entman’s theoretical
explanation and approach, among other measurements, one needs first, to identify specific frames that repeatedly appear in the messages by officials sources as well as what type of official sources those individuals are (e.g. American, Russian, etc.) and second, code and calculate the frequency of those messages according to the type of official source. This study provides initial data for such an analysis. Studying magnitude and resonance of message frames can also reveal their power, namely whether more means more powerful, influential and effective.

By studying the frames of the messages delivered by official sources, this study contributed to closing yet another gap in mass communication scholarship. According to Hayes and Guardino (2013), there is no research that would focus on exploring elite discourse, what officials are discussing, not what media is writing. Even though Hayes and Guardino (2013) meant that scholarship should study officials’ rhetoric that does not necessarily get into the news, this work partly addresses this issue by focusing on the messages delivered by official sources that did get in the media coverage. It reveals the part of the elite debate that was selected by reporters to construct the reality on the ground. Further research may address Hayes and Guardino’s (2013) concerns in full, and since the data on messages that became part of the coverage is already available, it will also be possible to compare the two pools.

The analysis of the frames itself revealed sharp division of how the events, actors and actions were framed based on what official source delivered them. Russian and Crimean officials named the same causes, provided same evaluations and suggested same remedies. On the other side were Western and Ukrainian official sources who named opposite causes, provided opposite evaluations and suggested different remedies to those voiced out by Russian and Crimean officials. Russia and Ukraine basically pointed fingers blaming each other for provoking one and the same turmoil. Crimean officials repeated after Russian sources. West mostly focused on
Russia as the driving force behind the military intervention and Crimean secession, and preservation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and peaceful resolution of the crisis. Interesting was how Russia and Ukraine would use same terms, such as illegal and illegitimate, to describe each other’s actions. Same tendency could be observed when they assigned causal attributions to issues they named as problems: issues – the same, causes - each other. It will be interesting to study whether same sharp distinction in frames based on what official delivered a message exists in other crises as well where stakes for the parties involved are as high as in Ukraine. Can there be a trend?

Such a detailed and insightful evaluation of frames was possible through application of Entman’s (2004) approach to frame analysis that implied looking at frame elements such as problem definitions, causal attributions, moral evaluations and treatment/remedy suggestions. This analysis, however, is qualitative in nature, and that brings us to the study’s limitations.

Scholarship suggests that qualitative content analysis, while allowing for in-depth evaluation of media messages without taking them out of context, does have major disadvantages: high level of subjectivity and lack of replicability (Riffe, et al., 2005). Even though Entman’s approach does allow for certain level of consistency, it still does not fully address the issue. Quantitative content analysis, on the other hand, does take care of reliability and validity problems, but this happens on the expense of depth and context (Riffe, et al., 2005). Scholarship offers an alternative in the form of mixed methods approach to frame analysis, namely, cluster analysis (Matthes & Kohring, 2008). The authors conducted qualitative content analysis to identify Entman’s (2004) frame elements, then grouped them into manageable variables that could be quantified and statistically combined into meaningful clusters – frames (Matthes & Kohring, 2008).
This study followed Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) approach up to the point where the variables was supposed to be quantified. It did not, however, fully replicate Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) method due to the exploratory nature of the analysis here and, therefore, remains qualitative. To address this limitation, another study should follow that would go through with cluster analysis of frame elements that were identified in the messages delivered by official sources in the coverage of crisis in Ukraine. If this future research succeeds in coming up with meaningful clusters, it can be replicated in other frame analysis research and produce results that will contribute to creating consistency in scholarship in the area that is widely recognized and criticized among mass communication scholars for the lack of it.

Other limitations of this study are, as I mentioned above, 1) its narrow focus on one crisis as well as exclusively on 2) news in 3) print media and one wire service that represent 4) only two countries. To address these limitations, future research should, again, as I already mentioned above, expand its scope by including other crises, other content formats (e.g., news and analysis and/or opinion), other media (e.g. broadcast, online), and other countries. What’s more, due to the increase in participation and importance of civil journalism, the research should also expand beyond professional reporting. It should be noted, however, that focusing on messages rather than stories generates large samples that create large datasets when transformed for cluster analysis. This turns data collection into a very time consuming and elaborate process that has to be broken into manageable portions that would represent clearly identified segments of research.

Despite limitations, this study succeeded in providing valuable insight into sourcing and framing of messages delivered by official sources in the coverage of foreign crisis by American and British news media. It contributed to filling the existing gaps in relevant mass communication scholarship and opened doors for a wide variety of future research in this areas.
It not only provided answers to the above research questions, but also generated new ones as well as identified potential problems and outlined the avenues for possible solutions.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX: CODE BOOK

This study examines the frames of the messages delivered by official sources in the coverage of the crisis in Ukraine.

**Unit of Analysis:**

The unit of analysis is a source message included in the coverage of the events.

Various terms, and slogans and chants that reporters quoted throughout the coverage as part of their descriptions of demonstrations and public rallies, such as, for instance, “Russia! Russia!” or “contact group” were not counted as individual messages since they carried more of a descriptive load than intended to carry frames.

**Variables for Coding:**

Story: Identify and code the story number in order of appearance.

Medium:

1 – *The New York Times*
2 – *The Guardian*
3 – Associated Press

Date: Identify and write down the date of publication in the following format:

mm/dd/year

e.g.: 02/27/2014 stands for February 27, 2014

Message: Identify and code the message number in order of appearance.

Message Type: Identify and code the type of attribution to a source:

1 – Quote

2 – Paraphrase: attribution that is not a quote (not separated by the quotation marks) but a paraphrase of the source’s words. For example: “The police reported earlier in the day that at least nine people, including two police officers, had been killed, but then raised this to 14.”
When identifying a paraphrase of a message, use the following key words/phrases as a guide, especially when paraphrases are followed by quotes: “insisted (that),” “added (that),” “said (that),” “admitted (that),” “reported (that),” “told (that),” “emphasized (that),” “warned (that),” “claimed (that),” “announced (that),” “confirmed (that),” “argued (that),” “according to.”

3 – Combination (a mix of quoted and paraphrased words by a source. For example:

“The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that if the violence continued, the United States, working with the European Union, would impose sanctions against Ukrainian officials ‘in a much broader and deeper way’”).

Source: Identify and code the type of source:

1 – Official
A source serving as a public official who has at least some degree of policymaking power. Those are Russian, Ukrainian, American or other country/international organization officials, including, presidents, secretary of state, ministers, parliament members/senators/congressmen/governors, high-ranked military and state security officials (at least in the rank of general or commander), UN, NATO, EU or Council of Europe officials. When a country or official institutions, such as administration, ministries, offices, the White House, the Kremlin, etc. or their spokesmen are identified as a source, it should also be coded as official (Hayes & Guardino, 2013).

0 – Unofficial
Regardless of their citizenship “non-official citizens, including grass-roots and activist sources belonging to organized groups,” protesters, medics, independent experts, former officials no longer serving in the office, IMF representatives, celebrities (e.g. athletes), low-rank military personnel (lower than general in rank), “witnesses, people on the street, and other civilians not affiliated with any groups” (Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010, p. 687; Hayes & Guardino, 2013).

Pseudo-sources should also be coded as unofficial. A source is categorized as pseudo when the
source of a reference “is unclear, for example, “It is rumored...,” “it was hinted that...,” “the
Ukrainian people believe...,” “authorities are said to...,” “reports say” as opposed to attribution
that is more specific, such as “an official said today” or “as reported by members of the staff of
the premier” (Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010, p. 688).

Official Source: Identify and code the type of official source when the coded source is official:

1 – Ukrainian (Interim President and interim government of Ukraine, ministers (including prime-
minister and deputy ministers), parliament members; press secretaries, websites of and
documents issued by the president’s apparatus, ministries, parliament; all the above inferred by
such identification as Kiev, Rada, etc.; city mayors and regional governors, their deputies, press
secretaries, websites of their institutions and documents issued by them; high-ranked Ukrainian
military, such as commanders and generals; ambassadors and embassies, their spokespeople,
websites and issued documents. All need to be on active duty (not former and not up for
appointment) at the moment of coverage to be considered as officials. If at some point in the
coverage an individual is attributed as serving in office and later on, as not, he/she needs to be
coded as official source in the former case and as unofficial in the latter. Same applies to the
reverse situation. For this particular period of coverage, the ousted president Yanukovych should
be coded as unofficial source).

2 – Russian (President and government of Russia, ministers (including prime-minister and
deputy ministers), parliament members; press secretaries, websites of and documents issued by
the president’s apparatus, ministries, parliament; all the above inferred by such identification as
Moscow, Kremlin, Duma etc.; city mayors and regional governors, their deputies, press
secretaries, websites of their institutions and documents issued by them; high-ranked Russian
military, such as commanders and generals; ambassadors and embassies, their spokespeople,
websites and issued documents. All need to be on active duty (not former and not up for appointment) at the moment of coverage to be considered as officials. If at some point in the coverage an individual is attributed as serving in office and later on, as not, he/she needs to be coded as official source in the former case and as unofficial in the latter. Same applies to the reverse situation).

3 – American (President, his administration and government, Vice President, State Secretary, members of Congress, department heads, their deputies; press secretaries, websites of and documents issued by the President’s administration, State and other Departments, Congress; all the above inferred by such identification as Washington, White House, Pentagon etc.; governors, their deputies, press secretaries, websites of their institutions and documents issued by them; high-ranked American military; ambassadors and embassies, their spokespeople, websites and issued documents. All need to be on active duty (not former and not up for appointment) at the moment of coverage to be considered as officials. If at some point in the coverage an individual is attributed as serving in office and later on, as not, he/she needs to be coded as official source in the former case and as unofficial in the latter. Same applies to the reverse situation).

From this point on, the categories for the type of official source variable differ based on the media outlet:

For The New York Times and the Associated Press, continue with:

4 – Crimean (Crimea’s de-facto authorities including interim government, ministers, deputy ministers, parliament members; press secretaries, websites of and documents issued by the ministries, parliament; high-ranked local military, such as commanders and generals).

5 – Other (Official sources that do not fit in any of the above categories: Public officials from all other countries, UN, NATO, European Commission officials).
For *The Guardian*, continue with:

4 – British (Prime Minister, his deputies, department heads, their deputies; press secretaries, websites of and documents issued by the government; Royal Family, their spokespeople; all the above inferred by such identification as Downing Street, No. 10, etc.; government press secretaries, government websites and documents issued by the government; high-ranked British military; ambassadors and embassies, their spokespeople, websites and issued documents. All need to be on active duty (not former and not up for appointment) at the moment of coverage to be considered as officials. If at some point in the coverage an individual is attributed as serving in office and later on, as not, he/she needs to be coded as official source in the former case and as unofficial in the latter. Same applies to the reverse situation).

5 - Crimean (Crimea’s de-facto authorities including interim government, ministers, deputy ministers, parliament members; press secretaries, websites of and documents issued by the ministries, parliament; high-ranked local military, such as commanders and generals).

6 – Other (Official sources that do not fit in any of the above categories: Public officials from all other countries, UN, NATO, Council of Europe, European parliament/European Commission, EU officials, ambassadors and embassies).

If the type of source variable is unofficial, code the type of official source variable as missing, “.”

**Frame Elements:**

Frame elements are components that, taken together, constitute a frame (Matthes and Kohring, 2008). Based on Entman’s (2004) frame analysis model, Matthes and Kohring (2008) identified four frame elements (content analyzed here as variables): problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation and treatment/remedy suggestion.
Problem Definition:

A problem, a central issue that a source overtly or covertly identifies or addresses in his/her message and around which the rest of the message content is built. For instance, in the following excerpt:

“He International Monetary Fund will answer Ukraine's call for financial help ‘at this critical moment in its history,” fund chief Christine Lagarde said Thursday.
“In the IMF’s first official statement on Ukraine since the country's political crisis intensified last week, Lagarde said a fact-finding team will go to Kiev in the coming days to assess the financial needs.
“We are ready to respond,” she said (Baetz, February 27, 2014, Associated Press),

There are three messages by one source: that the IMF will answer Ukraine’s call for help, that a fact-finding team will go to Kiev, and that IMF is ready to respond. From what issue the messages are addressing and the surrounding context, the problem here is the financial crisis that Ukraine was facing at that time.

If the central issue is not clear from the message itself, it can be identified by looking not only at a message alone, but at the context of the surrounding text. Sometimes, a message may address two or more issues (problem definitions). In this case, the central issue will be the one that is relevant to the main point the source is making. Usually, it either is the one identified (overtly or covertly; or deduced from the surrounding context) at the beginning of the message, or the one that the biggest part of the message addresses. For instance:

“We are concerned as we watch this situation that the Russians have badly miscalculated,” one senior official said. “There is a fierce and proud tradition in Ukraine of defending their sovereignty and territorial integrity. So far Ukraine has showed, and Ukrainians individually have showed, marked restraint … but the longer this situation goes on, the more delicate it becomes” (Lewis, Ackerman, & Swaine, March 3, 2014, The Guardian).

Here, two problems are identified since the source is talking about Russian military involvement in Crimea (based on the second part of the message and the surrounding context) and Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The major focus, however, is on Russia’s military involvement. The
surrounding story text is focused on it, the overall point the source it making is about the military involvement, the message starts with it, and most of the message talks about it – how Ukrainians showed remarkable restraint in the face of Russian military presence and managed not to open fire and ignite an armed confrontation despite being provoked. The situation the source is referring to is the military standoff that occurred as a result of Russian military personnel blockading Ukrainian military bases in Crimea.

Problem definitions in the coverage under scrutiny fall into four major categories:

1 – Political/security crisis: referring to the relations and interactions between countries in the context of the crisis and their economic and geopolitical cooperation; concurrent general critical situation in Ukraine and Crimea; crisis negotiations; conflicting positions on the crisis resolution; Ukraine’s political transition; messages related to Russia’s justifications for their actions usually involving referrals to threats to the lives and wellbeing of Russian-speaking population.

2 – Military intervention: Russia’s actions in and military support to Crimea and assistance in the local government and Ukrainian military bases takeover; messages related to Russia’s explanations on the identity of the troops operating in Crimea.

3 – Financial crisis: financial difficulties faced by Ukraine after the government takeover; international financial aid.

4 – Separatist movements/territorial integrity: secession of Crimea from Ukraine and annexation of Crimea by Russia; referendum; separatism; issue of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

Identify and write down one and only one of the above problem definitions pertaining to each message. In case a problem definition does not fall into any of the above categories, write it down (as it is stated in the message) as an individual problem definition. Such problem
definitions will either form a separate category or categories, or will be united into one, “other” category.

Causal Attribution:

Identify causes by looking at to which phenomenon/event, individual(s), country or countries, organization(s) or institution(s) a source assigned the responsibility for the problem in his/her message. For instance, in the following piece:

Russia ordered 150,000 troops to test their combat readiness Wednesday in a show of force that prompted a blunt warning from the United States that any military intervention in Ukraine would be a “grave mistake” (Ritter & Isachenkov, February 27, 2014, Associated Press).

Based on the surrounding context, the United States warning was caused by Russia’s show of military might. The cause element for this message, therefore, should be written down as such - Russia.

Sometimes a message contains two causal attributions depending on how many problem definitions are present. In such cases, apply the same principle as above and based on the central problem definition of the message, write down the causal attribution for that issue. If causal attribution is not overtly indicated but is implied or stated in the surrounding context, write it down as it is implied.

There are cases when neither a message contains causal attribution, nor the surrounding context offers one. In such cases, write down “not present” in place of this variable.

Moral Evaluation:

This frame element variable stands for the opinions on, views about, positions on, and assessments of phenomenon(a)/event(s), circumstances, individual(s), country or countries, organization(s), institution(s) or respective action(s) addressed by a source in a message. Those can be evaluations of the situation in Ukraine in general (“critical moment in history,” “very
dangerous situation,” “extraordinary situation,” “risk to lives,” “urgent,” “high risks,” “difficult times,” “delicate times,” “tense atmosphere,” “deteriorating,” “grave,” etc.), evaluations of the countries, their rulers, representative and governments, their actions or roles (“autonomous,” “integral part of Ukraine,” “military invasion and occupation,” “annexation,” “crime against the government of Ukraine,” “incredible act of aggression,” “adequate,” “rightful,” “response to unrelenting violence,” “not political,” “radical nationalists,” “radicals,” “armed and dangerous,” etc.), or events (“illegal,” violating international law,” etc.). These moral evaluations should be written down as they appear in the messages including the subject they are intended to evaluate.

Some of the moral evaluations are explicit, like in the above example (military intervention was evaluated as a “grave mistake;” should be written down: “military intervention – grave mistake”), some of them, on the other hand, are not. For instance, the following message does not provide an overt evaluation although it does contain one:

The maneuvers will involve some 150,000 troops, 880 tanks, 90 aircraft and 80 navy ships, and are intended to “check the troops” readiness for action in crisis situations that threaten the nation's military security, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in remarks carried by Russian news agencies (Ritter & Isachenkov, February 27, 2014, Associated Press).

In such cases, you should deduce the assessment in a message through a careful examination of the message itself as well as surrounding context. In the example above, Shoigu talks about military exercises intended, according to him, to check their readiness in crisis situations. The crisis on hand, on the background of which those exercises were taking place, was that of military confrontations ongoing in Crimea. Shoigu, while speaking generally, evaluates crises the exercises intended to be ready for as those that threaten the nation’s (Russia’s) military security. Therefore, the message does offer a moral evaluation, that of crisis being a threat to Russia’s military security. Therefore, the moral evaluation element for the issue of political and security crisis here should be written down as “threatening Russia’s military security.”
If a message contains several evaluations, write them all down including the subject they evaluate. There are cases when messages do not contain moral evaluation, neither overt nor covert. In such cases, write down “not present” in place of this variable.

Treatment/remedy:
In some cases, messages contain suggestions for the resolution of the stated problem. For instance:

“Washington and Europe need to win the argument with Russia as well, not just take the moral high ground, and therefore they should be coming up with counter proposals for Crimean autonomy,” De Waal told the Guardian (Roberts, March 12, 2014, The Guardian).

Here, the source suggests a remedy, for the West to come up with counter proposals. The treatment/remedy frame element variable, therefore, should be written down as such - come up with counter proposals.

If a message contains several treatment/remedies, write them all down including the subject they are meant to fix. There are cases when messages contain no treatment/remedy suggestion(s). In such cases, write down “not present” in place of this variable.

For a message to have a frame, it has to contain at least one frame element in addition to problem definition. If the only frame element that can be identified in a message is problem definition, this message should be regarded as carrying no frame. Sometimes a message delivered by a source does not contain even a problem definition but merely provides information (such as number of military personnel that entered Crimea). Such messages should also be regarded as carrying no frame. In such cases, all frame element variables should be coded as missing, “.”
No frame:

When a message does not carry a frame, this variable should be coded as “1” while in all the other instances is should be coded as missing, “.”

References


VITA

Ellada Gamreklidze is a native of the republic of Georgia where she received her bachelor’s degree in journalism at the Georgian Technical University in 2001. Seeking further higher education, she applied to the United States State Department funded Muskie fellowship program for the students from the former Soviet Union, which took her to the University of Missouri School of Journalism. There, she had the first opportunity to transform her interest in the role of the media in political communication into a research that took form of her master’s project. She graduated with the Master of Arts degree in 2004 and went back to Georgia where for almost seven years she worked for a number of US and EU-funded media development projects. She also started her teaching career working as an instructor at two journalism schools. As her professional experience grew together with the interest in teaching and research, Ellada decided to return to school and receive a PhD in mass communication and public affairs at the Louisiana State University, Manship School of Mass Communication. She will be graduating in August 2015 and plans to begin her career in academia after that.