1960

Attitudes, Attitude Change and Group Conformity in the Psychopathic Personality.

Patricia Kaye Morgan

Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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ATTITUDES, ATTITUDE CHANGE AND GROUP CONFORMITY

IN THE PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Psychology

by

Patricia Kaye Morgan
B.A., Ohio State University, 1952
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1956
August, 1960
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**TABLE I** Severity of Sentence Given by Each Subject
Before and After Group Discussion (1 = Mild, 10 = Severe) 

**TABLE II** Analysis of Variance Showing the Original "Sentences" Immediately Following the Trial for Experimental and Control Ss

**TABLE III** Repeated Measurements Analysis of Variance for Pd and non-Pd Ss Before and After Group Discussion
ABSTRACT

The purpose of the present study was to investigate the attitudes, attitude change and group conformity behavior of persons diagnosed as psychopathic, as compared with those diagnosed as non-psychopathic, personality. Thirty psychopathic and thirty non-psychopathic prisoners at Angola State Penitentiary served as Experimental and Control Groups, respectively in a mock courtroom experimental situation in which a case of euthanasia was enacted. Prisoners were assigned to the Experimental Group based upon case history, psychiatric diagnosis and scores on the Pd Scale of the MMPI of 80 or above, assigned to the Control Group with scores of 70 or below on the Pd Scale of the MMPI. The subjects, in groups of ten each, serving as jury members, voted on the sentence, which had been previously judged and ranked and in terms of severity, held group discussion, then voted again.

The results while not statistically significant showed a tendency in the predicted direction for the Experimental Subjects to differ in their judgments from Control Subjects and, for the judgments of Experimental Subjects to be more lenient, to change less after group discussion and to change less in the direction of the group decision than the Control
Subjects. The failure to show a statistically significant difference between the two groups was attributed to the criterion MMPI Pd Scores not being extreme enough within the limits of 80 or above and 70 or below. Other factors which were mentioned as having possibly contributed to the lack of significance were:

(1) Time in prison was not controlled.
(2) Range of scores was limited, decreasing variability.
(3) The group standard was not controlled by the examiner. Suggestions were made for correcting these weaknesses in any further studies in this area.

For the two groups in which the Pd scores were most extreme the predicted differences occurred and it was also found that the Experimental Subjects became more severe after group discussion whereas the Control Subjects became more lenient. This result was discussed in terms of its ramifications for group psychotherapy with psychopathic persons. The conclusion was reached that despite the failure to obtain statistically significant differences, the method of utilizing a mock courtroom with the subjects as active participants has merit for investigating the largely unexplored area of the group conformity behavior of the psychopathic personality.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study was to attempt to determine reactions of subjects with so-called psychopathic personalities to a situation of social significance with moral implications and their degree of attitude change and conformity to a group decision as compared with non-psychopathic subjects.

Recent work in social psychology such as that of Sherif (1935, 1936, 1937); Berenda (1950); Bovard (1951); Festinger (1950); Schacter (1951) and Schonbar (1945) has indicated that there are individual differences in the degree to which persons will conform to a group standard. The suggestion has emerged out of this research that there may be personality differences between those who conform and those who do not.

In the prototypical Asch experiment there are eight to sixteen subjects only one of whom is naive; the rest conspire with the examiner to produce the crucial conflict situation. In earlier perceptual studies of judgment of the length of a line subjects announce their judgments publicly and the naive subject is placed so that he is always one of the last to respond. On critical trials the hired majority give a prearranged false answer. To agree is to yield; to give the correct response is to be independent. Hardy (1957) extended the work of Asch and others from perceptual to attitudinal
judgments and from public conformity to attitude change as well. Hardy's experiment is a type of social situation in which a small group of men meet informally and state their opinions on a given topic, expressing unity of opinion. The question with which this type of experiment is concerned is "what will the person do whose position on the issue has hitherto been at variance with the others?" Conformity is defined as the avowal of a belief or attitude at variance with one's prior position, which avowal tends to correspond to the position approved by the group in which the avowal occurs. The private response is considered a measure of attitude change. It was upon this latter type of design, somewhat modified, that the present study was based. As in Hardy's study there was a pretest--experimental manipulation--posttest. In Hardy's study, however, during the experimental manipulation there were, as in Asch experiments, a hired majority who were free to express in their own words, their divergent opinions. The essential difference in the present study was that no confederates were used. The subjects themselves were free to arrive at their own group decision which was then considered the "group standard." This modification was felt to be consistent with the attempt throughout to create a realistic life situation.

The major goal of this study was to attempt to explore the social behavior of the psychopathic personality in terms of attitudes, attitude change and conformity rather than to
contribute to the growing body of knowledge related to group
conformity in its technical theoretical sense. Because of
the emphasis given to the lack of conformity among psycho-
pathic persons this social psychological method appeared
particularly adaptable to a clinical psychological problem.

Research in the area of group conformity provides nu-
umerous examples of differences in personality among ready-
yielders and reluctant conformers. Barron (1953) found
yielders characterized themselves as obliging, optimistic,
efficient, determined, patient and kind, while independents
see themselves as original, emotional and artistic. Yielders
also tended to be group-oriented and practical minded; inde-
pendents placed higher values on close interpersonal relations
and the individual as opposed to the group. Crutchfield
(1955) found an independent could be classed as an effective
leader, ascendant in his relations with others, persuasive,
efficient, active, expressive, unaffected, self-reliant,
seeking aesthetic and sensuous expressions, and as one who
is turned to for advice and reassurance. A person high in
conformity on the other hand is suggestible, conforming,
submissive, compliant, has a narrow range of interests, over-
controls his impulses, is unable to make decisions easily,
becomes disorganized under stress, and lacks insight into his
own behavior. In a study relating two aspects of conformity,
acquiescence and conventionality, Beloff (1958) correlated
conformity with three personality characteristics:
ascendance-submission, neuroticism, and authoritarianism, and concluded that those high on conformity were low on ascendance and neuroticism and high on authoritarianism; independents were high on neuroticism and ascendance, low on authoritarianism. Moeller and Applezweig (1957) found that persons valuing individual achievement and self-approval are less conforming, while those who value social approval highly will be more conforming. Krebs (1958) and Tuddenham (1959) also found that a high need for individual achievement goes with less conformity. Tuddenham (1959) found introspective, more intelligent and generally competent persons to be less conformant, as did Crutchfield (1955) and Nakamura (1958), and leaders to be less conforming or persuasive than non-leaders, as did Crutchfield (1955) and Kelley and Volkart (1952). Less conformity was found for persons more self-esteeming, self-assured, nonsubmissive, aggressive, impulsive, self-confident, non-self-devaluing, nondepressed and nondependent (Thorndike, 1938; Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953; Hochbaum, 1954; Mouton, Blake and Olmstead, 1956; Schroder and Hunt, 1958; Janis, et al., 1959; Tuddenham, 1959; Jakubczak and Walters, 1959). Barron (1955) found an orientation toward creativity associated with less conformity. Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1953) showed that persons who in their past experience have been successfully inventive or innovative will be less conforming as will social isolates. Barron (1953), Hoffman (1953), Hochbaum (1954) and Beloff
(1958) found that conventional persons are more conforming, Mouton, Blake and Olmstead (1956) and Helson, Blake and Mouton (1958) found that submissive persons are more conforming and Bell (1955) and Janis, et al. (1959) found other-directed persons to be more conformant. White (1957) concluded that those tolerant of non-conformity in others are less conforming.

In summary, according to the authors previously mentioned, we would expect non-conformists to be original, emotional, artistic and individualistic (Barron); ascendant, persuasive, efficient, active, unaffected, self-reliant, aesthetic and sensuous (Crutchfield); neurotic and non-authoritarian (Beloff); intelligent and generally competent (Nakamura and Tuddenham); self-esteeming, self-assured, self-confident, aggressive, impulsive, nondepressed, nondependent (Thorndike; Hovland, Janis and Kelley; Hochbaum; Mouton, Blake and Olmstead; Schroder and Hunt; Helson, Blake and Mouton; Janis, et al.; Tuddenham; Jakubczak and Walters); valuing individual achievement and self-approval (Krebs; Tuddenham; Moeller and Applezweig); introspective (Tuddenham); inventive and socially an isolate (Hovland, Janis and Kelley) and tolerant of non-conformity in others (White).

How well does this describe the psychopathic person? In regard to those descriptions related to self-concept we should expect the psychopath to be self-esteeming, self-assured, self-reliant, self-confident, self-approving and
and valuing individual achievement because of his marked egocentricity (Curran and Mallinson, 1944), pathological egocentricity (Cleckley, 1955) and narcissism (Richards, 1946). Morgan and Lovell (1949) in describing the anti-social behavior of the psychopath say: . . . "this philosophy of living is highly individualistic, not conforming to anything normally expected of those who live in a given culture and are modified by the experiences they have with other human beings in it." (p. 576). Regarding his emotionality we find the psychopath is described as demonstrating "lack of appropriate emotional response" (Curran and Mallinson, 1944) or "general poverty in major affective reactions--an incapacity for love" (Cleckley, 1955), "does not seem to understand and sympathize with the feelings and attitudes of other people . . . his emotions do not seem to have developed along the usually expected lines" (Morgan and Lovell, 1949). That he is aggressive, active and ascendant there appears to be little doubt. Wooley (1942) feels that the psychopath's "many acts of aggressiveness are probably due to the fact that no adequate provision for the future has been made previously." Of his sensuousness and impulsivity, we have the word of Cleckley (1955) that the psychopath's sex life is impersonal, trivial and poorly integrated, of Curran and Mallinson (1944) that he is characterized by maladjustment and perversion in the sexual sphere, and Richards (1946) says: "In the psychopathic personality freedom of expression
is paramount. Possessed of the adult's sexual drive, the psychopath sees no reason for restraining it. In the process of enjoying himself--having a good time--sex and alcohol are incidentals." Regarding intellectual traits most authors agree that the psychopath's intelligence is within the average to superior range (Curran and Mallinson, 1944, Cleckley, 1955, Richards, 1946). His originality and inventiveness are considered minimal according to Lindner (1944) as he lacks depth and is content with a very superficial knowledge. With regard to neuroticism, the psychopath is not considered neurotic or psychotic (Richards, 1946); shows an absence of "nervousness" or other psychoneurotic symptoms (Cleckley, 1955), although Lindner (1944) considers the psychopath in his own way to be mentally ill.

When it comes to his social behavior we have numerous authors' views which would tend to support the view that the psychopath socially is a non-conformist (Cason, 1948; Cleckley, 1955; Curran and Mallinson, 1944; Maughs, 1941; Meyer, 1912; Pennington, 1954, Richards, 1946). Cleckley describes this as "inadequately motivated antisocial behavior" and "unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations; failure to follow any life plan." Preu (1944) defines psychopathic persons as "individuals who have manifested considerable difficulty in social adjustment over a period of many years or throughout life." White (1948) defines them as "those who have developed in such a way that
parental and social standards have never been introjected. Curran and Mallinson (1944) speak of his inability to pursue socially acceptable goals and his defective relationship with the community.

Authors have not commented upon, to the writer's knowledge, the other personality traits characteristic of nonconformists, i.e., the artistical, efficient, unaffected, dependent or introspective qualities in reference to the psychopathic personality. Additional characteristics which are generally used to describe the psychopath and not included in the literature on nonconformity are: (1) almost total lack of insight in regard to the self; (2) defective judgment as evidenced by marked imbalance between ego and social goals; (3) verbal rather than emotional acceptance of social percepts; (4) strong migratory tendencies; (5) quick ability for rationalization (Curran and Mallinson, 1944); (6) superficial charm; (7) untruthfulness and insincerity; (8) fantastic and uninviting behavior while drinking; (9) self-destructive but suicide rarely carried out (Cleckley, 1955); (10) deficient superego (Greenacre, 1955).

It appears from this, that whereas a person who is nonconforming is not necessarily psychopathic, there is sufficient evidence to support the contention that the psychopath would be considered as one type of person showing nonconforming behavior.
If one assumes that the psychopath differs behaviorally from non-psychopaths in his social behavior as previously-cited, then it seems likely that he will demonstrate non-conforming behavior in an experimental social situation if called upon to give an opinion about others' antisocial acts. The first hypothesis is concerned with demonstrating that the opinions or attitudes of a psychopathic person in a social situation will differ from those of non-psychopathic subjects:

**Hypothesis I.** Persons with the diagnosis of psychopathic personality, when making judgments in a social situation about antisocial acts, will differ in these judgments from non-psychopathic persons.

Many authors have commented upon the poorly developed conscience in the psychopath (Pennington, 1954) (Greenacre, 1955). If the psychopath is assumed to be deficient in conscience with regard to his own behavior and it is characteristic of nonconformists to be tolerant of nonconformity in others (White, 1948) then it might be expected that he would be more lenient in his judgments of others' antisocial acts.

**Hypothesis II.** Persons diagnosed as psychopathic personality, when making judgments in a social situation about antisocial acts, will tend to be more lenient than non-psychopathic subjects.

Since the psychopath is also conceived of as not introjecting societal demands (Lindner, 1942-43; Lindner, 1943;
Linder, 1944; Miller and Dollard, 1941), it might be predicted that his behavior would conform less to a group standard than normal subjects. Hypothesis III was concerned with this prediction.

**Hypothesis III.** Persons diagnosed as psychopathic personality will be less likely than non-psychopathic subjects to change their original opinions in favor of their group's decisions.

Because of his unresponsiveness to treatment of himself by others (Cleckley, 1955) and his failure to introject social standards (White, 1948) we would expect that the psychopath would fail to demonstrate attitude change after exposure to a group having divergent opinions. The fourth hypothesis thus states:

**Hypothesis IV.** Persons diagnosed as psychopathic personality will be less likely than non-psychopathic subjects to change their original opinions after group discussion.
CHAPTER II

PROCEDURE

Subjects

Subjects for this study were thirty inmates of Angola State Penitentiary diagnosed as psychopathic personality who were matched for age, sex and education with thirty non-psychopathic prisoners. Criteria for inclusion in the psychopathic group consisted of the following:

(1) An extended history of antisocial behavior as evidenced by repeated incarcerations or offenses against the law.

(2) A score of 80 or above on the Pd scale of the MMPI.

(3) Where available, a psychiatric diagnosis of psychopathic or sociopathic personality.

In selecting cases to qualify for the psychopathic group, the first step was to require an MMPI Pd score of 80 or above. The records of such prisoners were then examined to satisfy the criteria of history and of psychiatric diagnosis if available. The non-psychopathic group was selected from prisoners whose MMPI Pd scores were 70 or less. The psychopathic Ss comprised the Experimental Group; non-psychopathic Ss the Control Group.

11
Method

The experimental situation consisted of a mock courtroom in which subjects, in groups of ten each, served as jurors. The case enacted was one of euthanasia, specifically chosen because no clear-cut laws regarding a decision in such cases exists and because decisions in such cases appear to depend heavily upon the moral feelings of the jurors. Advantages of this procedure were conceived of as:

(1) The individuals were not able to make a judgment in terms of existing right and wrong answers.

(2) Differences of "own" judgment and judgment after group discussion could be readily compared.

(3) Results could be easily quantified.

(4) The situation should be interesting and realistic enough to absorb the subjects to the degree that they could become ego-involved in their decisions.

The Minnesota Multi-Phasic Inventory (MMPI) was administered to all subjects prior to the experiment. Subjects were included in the "non-psychopathic" group who obtained a score of 70 or below on the Pd Scale of this test; subjects were included in the "psychopathic" group who obtained a score of 80 or above on this test.

For the experiment proper subjects were seated far enough apart that they were not able to see the other subjects' decisions. The "courtroom" was set up in the prison recreation toom while a small adjoining room served as a "jury room."
The "cast" consisted of undergraduate students at Louisiana State University. To heighten the effect of realism appropriate costumes, props and "Exhibits" were used. Each subject was equipped with his own individual, lettered, "ballot" box with a correspondingly lettered index card, a pencil and a list of possible sentences (Appendix B).

The subjects were instructed by the Examiner as follows before the enactment of the case.

Examiner: "We are doing some research in the Psychology Department at L.S.U. on "mercy killing." More specifically, we are interested in public opinions regarding the sentences in such a case and we want your opinions. In order to make the situation more interesting to you and in order that you may participate more freely we are going to dramatize an actual court case. You will act as the jury. Each of you has been given a small white card upon which to write your vote and a list of possible sentences. When the evidence has been presented, choose the sentence which you think the defendant should be given. Write the number of the sentence, e.g., 1 (a), 2 (b), etc. on the white card and drop it in the slit of the box in front of you. In considering these sentences assume that parole is not possible, that the defendant will have to serve the complete sentence you give him. You may take as long as you wish to decide but it is very important that during the trial or after, before you vote, that you do not confer with other
"jury members" about the trial or your decision or their decision. Remember we want your opinion."

The case contained in Appendix A was then enacted. Votes were cast then the "jury members" were instructed as follows by the "Judge":

"You will now be allowed to retire into the Jury Room and discuss the case for the next 30 minutes. You will elect one of your group as Jury Foreman, discuss the case with each other and reach some decision as a group as to the sentence the group feels the defendant should have. The Jury Foreman will report the decision which the group has agreed upon when you return to the courtroom. Your discussion will be recorded to be kept for future reference. Mr. Distefano will now take you to the Jury Room."

The subjects discussed the case for thirty minutes and their discussions were recorded. They were then returned to the courtroom and "court" readjourned. The following procedure was then carried out for each group of subjects:

Judge: "The court will please come to order. (Pause). Has the jury reached a verdict?"

Jury Foreman: "Yes, your Honor, we have."

Judge: "Will you please tell the court the nature of that decision?"

Jury Foreman: (Gives verdict)

Judge: (Repeats decision of group given by Jury Foreman, one of the 10 possible sentences contained in Appendix
B).

For each of the 10 sentences the judge had prepared a statement of his final commitment of the case, based upon that particular jury's decision which constituted his final remarks and the conclusion of the "trial," for example, "It is the decision of this court that the defendant is innocent of any crime and should not be punished." (For complete text see Appendix C). The Examiner then read the final instructions to the jury as follows:

Examiner: "Now that you have heard the evidence and had the opportunity to discuss the case with others we would like to have you vote again. Remember that others may have mentioned things which you had not thought of in just that way and you may wish to change your vote. This is perfectly legitimate. If you are convinced that you would like to change your vote by all means do so. If you are still convinced of your original idea do not change your vote. When you are satisfied that you have made up your mind you will again vote as you did before, in your own box, without letting other members see how you voted."

Following the collection of the final votes from each jury member, the jury was dismissed, concluding the experimental session.
CHAPTER III

RESULTS

The possible "sentences" (see Appendix B) were ranked by fifteen judges according to the "degree of severity" of the sentence. The final rankings were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Death penalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Life imprisonment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Imprisonment - 20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Imprisonment - 15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Imprisonment - 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Imprisonment - 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Imprisonment at hard labor - 3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Imprisonment at hard labor - 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Imprisonment - 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free (no prison sentence)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A coefficient of concordance of .994 was obtained for these rankings which comprised the "scores" upon which further analysis of the data was based.

Subjects were matched for race, education and age. Means for the two groups are shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experimental</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age (years)</td>
<td>29.96</td>
<td>29.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Education (years)</td>
<td>10.75</td>
<td>10.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean I.Q.</td>
<td>100.03</td>
<td>103.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The subjects' ages ranged from 18 to 47 years, with a Mean Age for the group of 29.87, Mean I.Q. of 101.73 and Mean Education level of 10.73 years. The Mean MMPI Pd Score for the Experimental Group was 85.14. For the Control Group the Mean MMPI Pd Score was 63.64.

Table I presents the ranks of the sentences given by each subject before and after the group discussions arranged according to Experimental and Control group. Means and Medians appear below the table. Hypothesis I states that: Persons with the diagnosis of psychopathic personality when making judgments in a social situation about antisocial acts will differ in these judgments from non-psychopathic subjects. To test this hypothesis, the original votes (in terms of ranks) for the Control Subjects immediately following the trial were compared with the original votes of the Experimental Subjects. The results using the Analysis of Variance for Matched Groups are shown in Table II. The obtained value of F based upon the Mean Square Between Groups was 1.15 which does not meet significance for 1 and 29 degrees of freedom. The value of F based upon the Mean Square between pairs was .749 which is also not significant. These results are interpreted as indicating that there is no significant difference originally between Pd and non-Pd Ss when making judgments in a social situation about antisocial acts.

Hypothesis II states that: Persons diagnosed as psychopathic personality when making a judgment about antisocial
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experimental Subjects</th>
<th>Control Subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Group I</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>After</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_1$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_2$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_3$</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_4$</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_5$</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_6$</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_7$</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>$S_8$</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_9$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_{10}$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Min.</strong></td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Group Decision: 2 3 1 1 2 2
TABLE II

ANALYSIS OF VariANCE SHOWING THE ORIGINAL "SENTENCES"
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE TRIAL FOR
EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL Ss

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>1.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Pairs</td>
<td>113.35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>.749*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>151.49</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>270.85</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
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N = 60

*Not significant
acts will tend to be more lenient than non-psychopathic subjects. In Table I it is seen that the means for the experimental groups are lower (less severe) than those for the control groups. However, the difference while in the predicted direction yielded a t of 1.08, which shows lack of statistical significance. The differences for votes following discussion also in the predicted direction, yielded a t of 1.20 which is also not significant. This result would seem to indicate that there is no significant difference between Pd and non-Pd Ss in the matter of leniency. As a further test of this result, to determine the possibility of a trend in this direction, the ranks for experimental and Control Ss were correlated with their Pd scores on the MMPI. A correlation of -.184 was obtained which is in the expected direction, i.e., the higher the Pd score the more lenient the decision.

Hypothesis III states that: Persons diagnosed as psychopathic personalities will be less likely than normals to change their original opinions in favor of their group's decision. To test this hypothesis the groups' decision and the subjects' final judgments were used to compute the rank order correlations. For the three Experimental groups the correlations were .98, .83 and .55 indicating relatively little change as the result of participating as a juror in discussion and hearing the group's verdict. The correlations for the Control groups were: .33, .76 and .90.
This result is interpreted as indicating that there was little difference between the groups as far as modifying their judgments in favor of the groups' decision, however, the Experimental group does demonstrate less willingness to change. It is interesting to note that most of the subjects in both groups did not change their vote after group discussion. Twenty Ss in the Experimental group and twenty-five Ss in the Control group did not change. However, those in the Experimental group who changed were as likely to change in a direction away from the group decision as towards it while those in the Control group who changed did so without exception in a direction toward the group decision.

Hypothesis IV states that: Persons diagnosed as psychopathic personality will be less likely than non-psychopathic persons to change their original opinions after group discussion. To test this hypothesis the Analysis of Variance for repeated measurements on the same subjects was computed. The data for computing the analysis were the scores before and after group discussion for Experimental and Control subjects. Table III shows the results of the Analysis of Variance. The value of F for the mean square based upon the variation between Ss in the same group when tested for significance against the mean square between methods was 1.47 which does not meet significance for 1 and 58 degrees of freedom. It is inferred from this that there is no statistically significant difference between the decisions of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
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<td>10.21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.21</td>
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<td>Between Ss in same group</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>1.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total within subjects</td>
<td>67.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>479.79</td>
<td>119</td>
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</table>

Between methods: A, B
Between trials: I, II
Interaction: trials x methods
Total between cells
Between Ss in same group
Interaction: pooled Ss x trials
Total within cells
Total

*not significant
psychopathic and non-psychopathic subjects. The value of $F$ based upon the mean square for trials tested for significance against the pooled interaction error term was 2.71 which does not meet significance for 1 and 58 degrees of freedom. From this it may be inferred that there is no significant difference between the groups before and after group discussion, that group discussion does not have a differential effect upon those diagnosed as psychopathic personality as compared with those diagnosed as non-psychopathic personality in this situation. The value of $F$ for the trials x methods interaction was .005 which is also not significant.
CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

If one compares individual groups by inspection it is interesting to note that for Groups I and IV, in which the Pd scores were most extreme that:

(1) Group I (Pd Ss) became more severe after group discussion.

(2) Group IV (non-Pd Ss) became more lenient after group discussion.

(3) Group IV (non-Pd Ss) changed more after group discussion.

(4) Group I subjects' group decision was to let the defendant go free; Group IV Ss gave the defendant a one year prison term.

Also in comparing Groups II and V and Groups III and VI, Experimental subjects were more lenient in their original decisions than Control subjects. This trend toward verification of the hypotheses suggests that when the Pd scores are extreme enough to show significant differences between the groups, the differences suggested by the hypotheses do result.

The results, if they had been statistically significant, would have indicated that persons classified as psychopathic
on the basis of their MMPI Pd scores and presumably showing such personality characteristics as aggressiveness, impulsivity, egocentricity, narcissism, average to superior intelligence, antisocial behavior, individualism and shallow emotionality have a tendency to judge others' antisocial acts in the direction of greater leniency, tend to conform less to their own group's standard and to show less attitude change as a result of participating in group discussion and hearing the group decision publicly announced than does the person classified as non-psychopathic.

This study would tend to support White's (1957) finding that nonconformists are more accepting of nonconformity in others. It also tends to lend support to the literature describing nonconformists as ascendant, persuasive, aggressive, impulsive, intelligent, individualistic, self-esteeming, self-assured, self-confident and self-approving.

With regard to the lack of statistical significance several factors appear likely to have contributed to the failure to show significant differences between the groups in this study.

1. Contamination and insufficiency of the criterion. Despite their Pd scores there may have been severely psychopathic subjects in the Control groups. Whereas, the Pd scale of the MMPI is considered highly reliable (Hathaway and McKinley,
1951) it may not be sufficiently valid and reliable within the rather narrow range of 80 and above and 70 and below. Many of the subjects in the present study who were in the Experimental Group had scores of exactly 80 or slightly above, while many of the subjects in the Control group were also on the borderline of just below 70. This criterion was as recommended by Hathaway (1951), i.e., scores of 80 or above are considered as having a severe degree of the trait in question, but actually a person having a t score of over 50 is also considered as having the trait in question to some degree. A given subject therefore who was untruthful (as psychopaths are known to be) may have had a score of below 70 and had been assigned to the non-Pd group when actually he should have been assigned to the Pd group. This is felt to be a serious weakness of the experiment and a repeat study would recommend the following:

(a) To avoid this happening in a repeat study, if the Pd scale is used as a criterion, more extreme scores should be used as cutoff points, which would lessen the chances of psychopathic persons being assigned to non-psychopathic groups.

(b) Other criteria should be added, e.g., detailed
case history data, other psychological test results and possibly clinical interviews. The more data which are available the less the likelihood of errors in assigning cases to the two groups. Personality traits which the psychopath is presumed to have; e.g., defective judgment, lack of insight in regard to the self, migratory tendencies, insincerity, untruthfulness, self-destructiveness, deficient superego, superficial charm, verbal rather than emotional acceptance of social percepts and bizarre behavior while drinking, usually found clinically in psychopathic persons, might have been elicited more definitively by interview technique. While an attempt was made in the present study to utilize case history data the prison records were very sketchy.

2. Time in prison was not controlled in the present study. Evidence from Maher and Hulin (1959) suggests that attitudes towards the law became increasingly negative or hostile as imprisonment is prolonged. Such an effect operating in this study might have been a factor in producing more leniency toward the "prisoner."

3. Range of scores was limited, decreasing variability. This might be corrected by using a more controversial
issue than euthanasia for the trial, or by using a more refined scale. A twenty-point scale, for instance could easily have been designed using one, two, three, etc. years in prison, rather than multiples of five which were used in this study. Numbers also should be eliminated before the choices since there is evidence to suggest that people show a preference for certain numbers over others, irrespective of content (Berg and Rapaport, 1954), and (Ross and Kohl, 1948).

4. The group standard was not controlled by the examiner. Repeating the study with the use of confederates would not only insure that the amount of opposition opinion was the same for all groups but also that there was considerable distance between individual opinions and the group standard which was not always the case in the present study. In Group I, for example, the amount of opposition opinion was only one scale point's different from the S's opinion. Inasmuch as the psychopath is so defined by his deviation from normally expected standards, comparing him with other psychopathic persons may reduce his apparent deviation. In this instance, the effect could be to militate against significance based upon comparison of degrees of deviation.
Of particular interest was the finding that psychopathic subjects became more severe after group discussion while non-psychopathic subjects became more lenient in Groups I and IV. The $t$ of 2.13 was significant at the .05 level. Assuming that the results obtained for Groups I and IV are valid, the implications are that association with a group for non-psychopathic subjects seem to weaken the superego while its effect upon the psychopath is to make him more severe or at least less tolerant of others' antisocial behavior. The crucial issue, in this case is, of course, whether the psychopath identifies with the defendant or is merely projecting more hostility onto the defendant. In the former case we would expect beneficial results from group psychotherapy in the latter instance the group would only serve as a vehicle for the psychopath to enable him to project more hostility onto others than he already does without himself benefitting from the experience. Certainly this aspect of the study seems to warrant further investigation.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In an attempt to study attitudes, attitude change and the conformity behavior of psychopathic vs. non-psychopathic subjects a mock courtroom experimental situation was devised which provided for measures of individual and group decisions before and after group discussion. Subjects for the study were 60 prisoners at Angola State Penitentiary, assigned to the Experimental Group based upon case history, psychiatric diagnosis and scores on the Pd Scale of the MMPI of 80 or above, assigned to the Control Group with scores on the Pd Scale of 70 or below. The trial enacted was a case of euthanasia. Prisoners, in groups of 10 each, served as jury members, voted on the sentence which had been previously judged and ranked in terms of severity, held group discussion, then voted again.

The results showed that psychopathic subjects so diagnosed when making judgments in a social situation about antisocial acts do not differ significantly in these judgments from non-psychopathic prisoners. The psychopathic subjects in this study also were not significantly more lenient in their judgments than non-psychopathic subjects,
although based upon the correlation between their scores on
the MMPI and their sentences there is a trend in this di-
rection, i.e., the higher the Pd score, the more lenient
the sentence. There was also found to be no significant
difference between the two groups after group discussion.
In both groups there was a tendency to retain their original
votes despite group pressure and not to change in a direction
toward the group decision. However, those in the Experimen-
tal Group who did change were as likely to change in a
direction away from the group decision as towards it while
those in the Control Group who changed did so without ex-
ception in a direction towards the group decision.

Because of the trend toward verification of the hy-
potheses it was felt that the criterion for inclusion in
the two groups, dependent so largely upon the Pd Scores of
the MMPI, was not extreme enough to meet significance. The
criterion for inclusion in the Experimental Group was a
score of 80 or above as recommended by Hathaway. For in-
clusion in the Control Group a cutoff point of 70 or below
was used. Thus, on many of the subjects there was a scant
ten point difference on their MMPI scores which relies per-
haps too heavily upon the validity of the MMPI as a criter-
ion. Other factors which were mentioned as having possibly
contributed to the lack of significance were:

(1) Time in prison was not controlled.
(2) Range of scores was limited, decreasing variability.
(3) The group standard was not controlled by the examiner.

Suggestions were made for correcting these weaknesses in any further studies in this area.

In conclusion, despite the essentially negative results of this study there were some interesting trends, such as the finding that psychopathic subjects apparently become more severe after group discussion, while non-psychopathic subjects become more lenient in their judgments of others' antisocial acts. This was discussed in terms of its implications for the value of group psychotherapy in treatment of the psychopath. While the failure to show significant differences between the two groups is disheartening, the method seems to have achieved its goal of inducing the inaccessible psychopathic subjects to participate, if the enthusiastic tape recorded group discussions are any indication. In one such group a psychopathic subject actually retained his opinion despite the opposition and considerable group pressure from nine other members of the group.

Further research utilizing this method might shed some valuable light on the antisocial behavior of those individuals who, since Kraepelin have been relegated to the "wastebasket category" and towards any growing understanding of whom this study seems only to provide a challenge in the form of provocative hints and stimulating questions.
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APPENDIX
Case of the State Versus Roberts

Examiner: Following the death of the defendant's wife he was arrested on a charge of murdering her. A complaint was made in due form, on June 14, 1948, a warrant issued thereon, and the defendant was apprehended and brought before the justice on June 25th, where he waived a preliminary examination. Subsequently, on July 12th, he was taken before the circuit court, in pursuance of his own request, and arraigned. After the information was read to him, he was interrogated by the court as to whether he understood the charge and whether he understood it to be murder. He replied that he did. He indicated that he would like to have counsel, whereupon the court appointed Mr. Dusenberry, at his request. The following is an enactment of the defendant and his counsel in court.

Judge: The court will please come to order. (Nods to Mr. McClintock, counsel for the prosecution to proceed)

Mr. McClintock: Gentlemen of the jury, the state will attempt to prove that the defendant Frank Roberts is guilty of murder. You must remember that the man accused is not bound to prove his innocence... it is the obligation of the state, my obligation... too, to prove his guilt.

Mr. Dusenberry: Your honor, would you instruct the jury that what the counselor just said is a matter of law. It has nothing to do with his own particular magnanimity.

Mr. McClintock: (courteously) Certainly, it is a matter of law. In many respects this is both an unusual case and a very interesting one. The defendant is accused of murder. The fact that he is so charged is the reason he is here, but it does not necessarily mean that he committed a murder. The state of Kentucky will attempt to prove that he did kill his wife, Kathy Roberts.. who was an invalid. We will attempt to prove the accused had a motive and the opportunity. Undoubtedly each of you has heard the expression... "mercy killing." There are those who would have you believe that it is completely justifiable to commit murder... as long as it is done in the name of mercy. A rose... gentlemen... by any other name would smell as sweet. Are we then to advocate putting all the world's sufferers out of their misery... in the name of mercy? Such a
recommendation is against all Christian principles, against every moral code by which we live and . . . incidentally, against the law. Such a recommendation must surely fill every decent law-abiding citizen with horror.

Mr. Dusenberry: Objection. This is a matter of argument and is theoretical to the point that it can neither be proved or disproved.

Mr. McClintock: If it please, your honor, I feel this matter of mercy killing is of the utmost importance to the jury and must be completely understood. I'm sure the counselor is planning to refer to it himself.

Judge: Gentlemen, in matters of evidence I will instruct the jury myself.

Mr. McClintock: You will be asked to believe that the defendant was justified in killing his wife since her case was hopeless . . . incurable. When these arguments are introduced into this case, please ask yourselves how it is within the realm of human knowledge to know that a case is really hopeless or incurable. Tomorrow, next week, a year from now, the cure may come. Gentlemen, in short, you will be asked to condone wholesale slaughter should you vote to acquit the defendant. As for the argument that Kathy Roberts wanted to die . . . gentlemen . . . in a civilized society we do not kill everyone who wants to die . . . we protect such people against themselves. Now, with these points in mind, let us return to the night of May 23rd, 1948. It is the contention of the state that on that date sometime preceding midnight, the defendant killed his wife, Kathy Roberts. Kathy Roberts was an invalid. Evidence will be introduced to show that the defendant mixed a quantity of Paris Green in a cup, that he placed this cup at the bedside of his wife, with full knowledge that she intended drinking from it, and that she did, indeed, drink from this cup, thereby causing her death. This evidence will be presented to you. You will appraise it, weigh it, consider it. After you have seen the evidence with your own eyes, if you believe beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty . . . it is then your duty, your obligation . . . to return to this court your verdict attesting it. Thank you.

Mr. Dusenberry: Usually this is the time when the defense states what it hopes to prove . . . even while I again remind you that neither the indictment of the defendant nor the prosecutor's statement are proof. You are going to be presented with evidence which will attempt to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Frank Roberts is responsible for the
death of his wife, Kathy Roberts. You will note that I use the words "responsible for the death of" rather than murder. I do so advisedly since even if the prosecution proves that Frank Roberts is responsible for the death of his wife, extenuating circumstances may still make the crime . . . if there is one . . . committed by Frank Roberts considerably less than murder. And, gentlemen, there are extenuating circumstances in this case. The defense will admit that Frank Roberts is guilty of the responsibility for the death of Kathy Roberts. It does not admit that Frank Roberts is guilty of murder. The defense will attempt to prove that on the night of May 23rd, 1948 Frank Roberts administered a lethal dose of Paris Green to his wife, Kathy Roberts, that he did so at her request, that she had desired to commit suicide for the past year. It is the contention of the defense that suicide is no crime and that therefore one who provides the means whereby one commits suicide is guilty of no crime. The real issue in this case is a moral one. My respected colleague, Mr. McClintock, has mentioned "mercy killing." Perhaps killing is not ever justified, not even taking one's own life, but we are not here today to settle a philosophical argument. We are dealing with a human life and fate. As we attempt to show the suffering endured by the late Kathy Roberts and by her husband who watched her suffer helplessly in the throes of an incurable disease . . .

Mr. McClintock: Objection. That is a conclusion.

Judge: Objection sustained. The jury will overlook the word 'incurable' as applied to Kathy Roberts' condition.

Mr. Dusenberry: As his wife begged him to kill her. Gentlemen, put yourselves in his place. Ask yourselves if you could resist the pleas of a loved person under such circumstances. There is very little more I want to add now, except to remind you that my client has pleaded guilty. He is at the mercy of the court to decide. I ask of you, beg of you to keep your sense of appraisal, maintain your feelings of skepticism and keep your minds open until both sides have been heard.

M. McClintock: I would like to call Dr. Lambert as the first witness for the prosecution.

Clerk: Raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. Lambert: I do.
Clerk: The witness will now take the stand.

Mr. McClintock: Would you please tell the court your name and occupation?

Dr. Lambert: I am Owen Lambert, coroner of Isabella County, Kentucky.

Mr. McClintock: You presided over the inquest upon the body of Kathy Roberts?

Dr. Lambert: I presided at the inquest upon the body of Kathy Roberts. The body over which I held the inquest was her body. I knew her as the wife of Frank Roberts. I was the surgeon who opened up the body, and I examined her stomach, and her intestinal organs.

Mr. McClintock: In what condition was the stomach, as you found it?

Dr. Lambert: The stomach was greatly dilated with gas and partly with fluid in the amount of 8 ounces, otherwise it was in a good state of preservation.

Mr. McClintock: Did there seem to be any other substance in it when you took it out of the body?

Dr. Lambert: There was a greenish substance in the stomach and some in the esophagus.

Mr. McClintock: What did you do with the stomach?

Dr. Lambert: I tied it at both ends, before removing it, so as not to spill the contents, placed it in a glass container, and personally took it, with the other organs, to the state board of health at Lansing.

Mr. McClintock: Have you had any return from the analysis of that stomach, as made there?

Dr. Lambert: I have.

Mr. McClintock: What did that show?

Dr. Lambert: The stomach showed on analysis at Lansing 84 hundredths of an ounce of Paris Green.

Mr. McClintock: At the time you held the post mortem, did you examine the other organs in the body, i.e., the heart and lungs and things of that sort?
Dr. Lambert: I did.

Mr. McClintock: Did you find any trace of any organic trouble inside there, other than in the stomach?

Dr. Lambert: I did not.

Mr. McClintock: From the condition of the body, as you found it, and the amount of Paris Green so found in the stomach, would you say as to what was the cause of death?

Dr. Lambert: Aceto-arsenical poisoning.

Mr. McClintock: Aceto-arsenical poisoning.

Dr. Lambert: That's correct.

Mr. McClintock: I offer Exhibit A in evidence. (Jar containing stomach) Thank you, Dr. Lambert. That will be all. Mr. Dusenberry do you wish to examine?

Mr. Dusenberry: Yes. Doctor, did you identify the body as that of Kathy Roberts wife of John Roberts?

Dr. Lambert: I did.

Mr. Dusenberry: You identified it as being the wife of the defendant here?

Dr. Lambert: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: Doctor, did you talk with the defendant about this matter?

Dr. Lambert: No, I have not. This is the first time I have seen him since her death.

Mr. Dusenberry: Did you ever treat him?

Dr. Lambert: I treated Mr. Roberts' wife. I sent her to Ann Arbor.

Mr. Dusenberry: You had reference to a time you had sent Mrs. Roberts as a patient?

Dr. Lambert: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: When was that, Doctor?
Dr. Lambert: I could not say just when . . . about 3 or 4 months before her death. I saw her at her home where they lived. She was a bed patient or practically so at that time. She was in bed, and I believe she said she was unable to do any kind of work. Whether she could get up and around or not I don't know.

Mr. McClintock: Objection. Your honor, this is opinion.

Mr. Dusenberry: Your honor, I am merely trying to clarify the condition of Mrs. Roberts' health.

Judge: Objection sustained. Restate your question.

Mr. Dusenberry: In what condition was Mrs. Roberts' health at the time you examined her?

Dr. Lambert: Her body was considerably wasted. She showed evidence of a long-drawn out sickness. She showed symptoms of a multiple sclerosis.

Mr. Dusenberry: What is that?

Dr. Lambert: It is a disease of the central nervous system, affecting both the brain and cord. The causes of these patches in the brain and cord is unknown. This condition I found with the patient. She had the outward signs of multiple sclerosis, the rapid pulse, hesitating singsong speech, and from these signs you diagnose multiple sclerosis.

Mr. Dusenberry: Was she practically helpless?

Dr. Lambert: I should say practically. Just how specifically I could not say.

Mr. Dusenberry: Basing your answer upon your observation at that time, did you consider her a hopeless patient; or did you consider she might possibly recover?

Dr. Lambert: I considered her case as incurable.

Mr. Dusenberry: Did you advise that she go to the hospital?

Dr. Lambert: I don't know whether I did or not, or whether that was suggested by someone else. That might have been suggested by someone else. But I consented to send her.
Mr. Dusenberry: Did you send her to the hospital?

Dr. Lambert: I believe I made the motion that she be sent at the county's expense. It at least had my sanction.

Dr. Dusenberry: I want to have the record shown, in justice to my client. He says that he paid the expense to the hospital himself and that it wasn't at the county's expense.

Judge: I think I said I would accept his plea; I think I will accept his plea anyway.

Mr. McClintock: I would like to call Mr. Anderson to the stand.

Clerk: Raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

Mr. Anderson: I do.

Mr. McClintock: State your name and occupation.

Mr. Anderson: I am Charles Anderson, a pharmacist for the Rexall Drugstore at 1201 Main Street, Paducah, Kentucky.

Mr. McClintock: Will you please tell the court what happened on the afternoon of May 23rd, 1948?

Mr. Anderson: It was a rainy Monday afternoon and we didn't have many customers which is how I come to remember Mr. Roberts.

Mr. McClintock: You mean the defendant here?

Mr. Anderson: Yes, that's right. That's him. He came into the store about 2:00 and asked me for some Paris Green. Said he was troubled by rats out at this place lately.

Mr. McClintock: So you sold him the Paris Green?

Mr. Anderson: Yes, sir, I did.

Mr. McClintock: How long have you known the defendant, Mr. Roberts?

Mr. Anderson: Oh about 5 years now he's been dealin' at our drugstore.
Mr. McClintock: So that you are definitely sure it was Mr. Roberts who bought the Paris Green from you on the afternoon of May 23rd, 1948?

Mr. Anderson: Yes, sir, I am sure. I have a copy of the sales slip for the transaction.

Mr. McClintock: I submit the sales slip in evidence. Thank you, Mr. Anderson. That will be all. Mr. Dusenberry, do you wish to examine the witness?

Mr. Dusenberry: Yes. Mr. Anderson, do you have many calls for Paris Green?

Mr. Anderson: Well...yes...not too many, you understand. But it's not too uncommon for someone to buy it for rat poison.

Mr. Dusenberry: Thank you. That will be all.

Mr. McClintock: I would like to call Alva Badon to the stand.

Clerk: Raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. Badon: I do.

Mr. McClintock: Please state your name and occupation.

Mrs. Badon: I am Mrs. Alva Badon. I am employed as a housekeeper. I was employed by Mrs. Roberts, to look after things while she was sick.

Mr. McClintock: You were employed by Mrs. Roberts?

Mrs. Badon: Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. McClintock: Please tell the court in your own words what happened on the afternoon of May 23rd, 1948.

Mrs. Badon: I was just finishin' the cleanin' when Mr. Roberts came in from the drugstore. He had a package with him. He opened it in the kitchen. It was some sort of greenish stuff, a powder. He said it was for the rats. As long as I been workin' there, I ain't never seen no rats in that house. It seemed sorta suspicious to me.
Mr. Dusenberry: Objection. That is an opinion.

Judge: Sustained. The witness will please confine herself to the facts.

Mr. McClintock: What happened next, Mrs. Badon?

Mrs. Badon: Well, sir, before I left I went to Mrs. Roberts' room to see if she wanted anything. I noticed there was a cup on her bedside table with some green stuff in it. I didn't connect the two things up then, just thought it was some of her medicine. But when all this come out about her bein' murdered by Mr. Roberts . . .

Mr. Dusenberry: Objection!

Judge: Sustained. The witness will confine herself to the facts.

Mrs. Badon: Well . . . ! Anyway, I thought it was my duty to tell somebody about it.

Mr. McClintock: You were quite right, Mrs. Badon. Was there something else you wished to tell the court?

Mrs. Badon: Yes, sir, there was. The day before all this happened, on the 22nd, Mrs. Roberts had been feelin' poorly and I asked Mr. Roberts how she was, poor thing, Mr. Roberts said, "The way she is she'd be better off dead." Them was his exact words, "The way she is she'd be better off dead." Fairly sent chills up my spine thinkin' about it later when I connected them things up.

Mr. McClintock: Thank you, that will be all. Mr. Dusenberry, do you wish to examine?

Mr. Dusenberry: No questions.

Mr. McClintock: Then I would like to call Mr. Beecher to the stand.

Clerk: Raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Beecher: I do.

Mr. McClintock: Tell the court your name and occupation.
Mr. Beecher: I am Leroy Beecher. I am an attorney at law. I drew up the last will and testament of the deceased, Kathy Roberts.

Mr. McClintock: Would you please tell the court the contents of that will?

Mr. Beecher: Yes, sir. I have it right here. The deceased, Kathy Roberts, left the house and her worldly possessions to her husband, Frank Roberts.

Mr. McClintock: Please tell the court of what these possessions consisted.

Mr. Beecher: She owned the house which was worth about $10,000 and she had a bank account in the amount of $973.56 and she owned furniture in the house worth about maybe a thousand dollars. She also owned some real estate worth about $5,000. In all about $17,000.

Mr. McClintock: I submit in evidence a photostatic copy of the last will and testament of Kathy Roberts, deceased. Thank you, Mr. Beecher, that will be all. Mr. Dusenberry, do you wish to examine?

Mr. Dusenberry: Yes. Mr. Beecher, you said that the property of Mrs. Roberts was worth about $17,000, is that right?

Mr. Beecher: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: Not a great deal of money, is it? Hardly worth committing murder for. Especially since Mr. Roberts had access to the furniture and house with Mrs. Roberts alive. That would leave his gain then only the real estate, $5,000, and a bank account of about a thousand dollars. His real gain then would amount to about $6,000, isn't that right, Mr. Beecher?

Mr. Beecher: Yes . . . I guess so . . . I hadn't thought of it in just that way.

Mr. Dusenberry: In just what way had you thought of it, Mr. Beecher?

Mr. Beecher: Well . . . just that if he needed a motive he had one.

Mr. Dusenberry: Thank you, Mr. Beecher. No more questions.
Mr. McClintock: The prosecution rests its case.

Mr. Dusenberry: I would like to call the defendant to the stand.

Clerk: Raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Roberts: I do.

Judge: You have had an attorney appointed. Are you present with that attorney, and are you ready to plead now?

Mr. Roberts: Yes sir.

Judge: Do you wish to plead to the information?

Mr. Roberts: Yes sir.

Judge: What is your plea?

Mr. Roberts: Guilty.

Judge: Guilty, as charged?

Mr. Roberts: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: On May 23rd, 1948 Mr. Roberts, I understand you told me you had mixed a quantity of Paris Green in a cup?

Mr. Roberts: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: Is that right?

Mr. Roberts: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: You did that?

Mr. Roberts: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: And that subsequently she did take that?

Mr. Roberts: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: And a few hours after that she died. Is that right?
Mr. Roberts: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: Had she ever tried to commit suicide before?

Mr. Roberts: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: When was that?

Mr. Roberts: Last summer.

Mr. Dusenberry: What means did she try to use?

Mr. Roberts: Carbolic acid.

Mr. Dusenberry: So that by her previous actions you knew that she was desirous of dying?

Mr. Roberts: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: I believe you said your wife was sent to the hospital at Ann Arbor?

Mr. Roberts: I took her myself. She was there 30 days I think. I did not stay there at Ann Arbor while she was there. I took her myself, and made three trips down to see her while she was there and I brought her back myself. I paid the expenses incident to her going to the hospital and staying there 30 days. It wasn't paid by the county. I paid it out of my own pocket.

Mr. Dusenberry: Thank you, that will be all. Mr. McClintock, do you wish to examine?

Mr. McClintock: No questions.

Mr. Dusenberry: Then I would like to call the next witness Mrs. Irma Summers to the stand.

Clerk: Raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. Summers: I do.

Mr. Dusenberry: Mrs. Summers, I believe you told me you were a friend of the deceased, Kathy Roberts, is that right?

Mrs. Summers: Yes, sir. We were very close friends.
Mr. Dusenberry: You were aware then of her previous suicide attempt last summer?

Mrs. Summers: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: You cared for her when she was recuperating after she had swallowed carbolic acid, is that right?

Mrs. Summers: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: You visited with her almost every day during the last few months before her death?

Mrs. Summers: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: Did she mention suicide frequently?

Mrs. Summers: Yes, sir. She certainly did. That seemed to be the only thing she had on her mind was to die. She was in terrible pain. She cried a lot and asked God to take her out of her misery. She was so helpless and it seemed to worry her a lot. One time she said if she could do it herself she would but she was scarcely able to move.

Mr. Dusenberry: Were those her exact words?

Mrs. Summers: As nearly as I can remember she said, "If I could walk as far as the kitchen I would take the carbolic acid again and this time I would take enough." She was always saying things like that so I can't be sure those were her exact words but that's what she meant all right.

Mr. Dusenberry: Thank you, that will be all. Mr. McClintock, do you wish to examine?

Mr. McClintock: Yes, Mrs. Summers, you said you couldn't be sure those were Mrs. Roberts exact words, is that right?

Mrs. Summers: Yes, sir.

Mr. McClintock: Mrs. Summers, what did you and your husband discuss at breakfast yesterday morning?

Mrs. Summers: Why, . . . why I don't remember . . . I believe it was . . . oh yes we discussed the new neighbors who just moved in across the street.

Mr. McClintock: What were some of the things your husband said?
Mrs. Summers: Why . . . I don't know he said something about the woman having a mean look and he wouldn't like to have them visit us.

Mr. McClintock: Were those his exact words Mrs. Summers?

Mrs. Summers: Well . . . I can't be sure . . . I . . .

Mr. McClintock: Exactly! You can't be sure. You can't be sure of the exact words of what your husband said yesterday morning at breakfast yet you expect us to believe you can remember the exact words of a friend some months back. Isn't it possible Mrs. Summers, that after all this time the words of Mrs. Roberts may have been just a little distorted?

Mrs. Summers: Well . . . as I said I can't be sure . . . but I'm sure that's what she meant.

Mr. McClintock: That will be all, Mrs. Summers.

Mr. Dusenberry: I would like to call Dr. Marvin Saunders to the stand.

Clerk: Raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. Saunders: I do.

Mr. Dusenberry: Dr. Saunders you are a qualified neurologist, is that correct?

Dr. Saunders: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: Would you clarify briefly for the court the nature of the profession of a neurologist?

Dr. Saunders: A neurologist is a medical doctor who specializes in diseases of the nervous system.

Mr. Dusenberry: Is multiple sclerosis such a disease, Doctor?

Dr. Saunders: Yes, it certainly is.

Mr. Dusenberry: Is the cause of multiple sclerosis known?

Dr. Saunders: No, it is not.
Mr. Dusenberry: Is it curable?

Dr. Saunders: In our present state of knowledge, no.

Mr. Dusenberry: Then multiple sclerosis is not curable at the present time? Dr. Saunders, in your opinion as an expert witness what is the outcome of this disease?

Dr. Saunders: After a course of increasing debility, it is fatal.

Mr. Dusenberry: Does Mr. McClintock wish to examine?

Mr. McClintock: No.

Mr. Dusenberry: Then, I should like to call Dr. Erwin Walshe to the stand.

Clerk: Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. Walshe: I do.

Mr. Dusenberry: You are Dr. Erwin Walshe, a psychiatrist?

Dr. Walshe: Yes, sir.

Mr. Dusenberry: In your profession, Doctor, do you ever have occasion to work with patients having the disease multiple sclerosis?

Dr. Walshe: Yes, occasionally I do.

Mr. Dusenberry: In what capacity, Doctor?

Dr. Walshe: For mental symptoms accompanying the disease.

Mr. Dusenberry: Then multiple sclerosis results in mental symptoms?

Dr. Walshe: Yes, mental and emotional symptoms.

Mr. Dusenberry: Would you clarify briefly for the court the nature of these symptoms?

Dr. Walshe: Well they vary from case to case depending of course on the premorbid personality but there is inevitably mental confusion as the disease progresses and invades the cortex.
Mr. Dusenberry: Dr. Walshe, suicide is a frequent result of mental confusion, is it not?

Dr. Walshe: I couldn't say how frequently.

Mr. Dusenberry: Let me rephrase my question Doctor, if a person attempts suicide would you say he is mentally confused?

Dr. Walshe: Certainly he is not behaving in a rational manner.

Mr. Dusenberry: Then it seems likely that in a state of mental confusion resulting from multiple sclerosis suicide is likely.

Dr. Walshe: Well, it is certainly possible.

Mr. Dusenberry: Thank you, Doctor. The defense rests.

Judge: Mr. McClintock, will now summarize the case for the prosecution.

Mr. McClintock: Gentlemen of the jury you have heard evidence in this court which can lead you to only one conclusion--Frank Roberts is guilty of the cold-blooded murder of his wife Kathy Roberts. You have heard the testimony of the coroner that Kathy Roberts died of aceto-arsenical poisoning. You have heard a reliable witness testify that the poison which killed Kathy Roberts was purchased by the defendant several days prior to her death. You have heard the testimony of the housekeeper that Frank Roberts was heard to say his wife would be better off dead. You have heard the testimony of Mr. Beecher whereby you learn that Frank Roberts profited considerably from the death of his wife. But if these witnesses have not convinced you, you have the confession of the defendant himself. That murder was committed there is not the slightest doubt. But you have heard on the other hand the attempt by the defense to make a mockery of justice. The defense asks you to believe that Frank Roberts was so torn by sympathy, pity and compassion for his ailing wife that he killed her. You have been led by the defense through a maze of expert witnesses who by technical jargon and fancy terms have attempted to confuse the entire issue. The state maintains that Frank Roberts grew tired of caring for a helpless invalid wife, saw a chance to profit from her death and took that chance. Gentlemen, if this heinous cold-blooded murderer is allowed to go free, you must hold yourselves responsible for a terrible miscarriage of justice. There is only one possible verdict--to find Frank Roberts
guilty of murder! That verdict is your duty. (pause)

Thank you.

Judge: Mr. Dusenberry, will now summarize for the defense.

Mr. Dusenberry: Your honor, gentlemen of the jury, as we have stated previously the defense has made no attempt to deny that Frank Roberts was responsible for the death of his wife, Kathy. For that reason we are in agreement with the prosecution that the defendant is pleading for mercy, pleading for his life. This, then is not the real issue. The issue once more appears to resolve itself into one of motivation. Did Frank Roberts grow tired of caring for his invalid wife as the prosecution would have you believe? Why then did he pay her medical expenses at Ann Arbor? Did he run the risk of life imprisonment or death in the electric chair for a pitiful small inheritance when he knew she had but a short time to live before she would die of natural causes? Or, did he watch her slowly becoming more confused, in greater pain begging him with her eyes and her lips and her own desire to give her some respite from an even more horrible future. Picture it in your minds. Ask yourselves if this were my wife whom I loved, could I bear to see her suffer. If I knew that if she could lift herself from her bed to do it she would kill herself. Which is humane, which is right, which is justice? To watch a person suffer un­bearable pain and condemn them to continue their suffering or to give them the means whereby their own will and desire they end that suffering. Mercy killing is not cold-blooded murder. Remember that you are now in the position of de­ciding the fate of Frank Roberts as he had to decide the fate of his wife. Examine your hearts and minds as he ex­amined his. Show the same mercy he has shown. Set this man free, for if Frank Roberts is guilty of any crime it is that he is not unmerciful.

Judge: Court is adjourned.
APPENDIX B

1. One who at the request of a person places poison within her reach, whereby she commits suicide is guilty of murder in the first degree, whether suicide is a crime or not.

I believe the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree. I would recommend the death penalty.

2. One who at the request of a person places poison within her reach, whereby she commits suicide is guilty of murder in the first degree, whether suicide is a crime or not.

I believe the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree. I would recommend life imprisonment.

3. One who contributes to another person's committing suicide is guilty of murder which is not premeditated, or, murder in the second degree.

I believe the defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree. I would recommend a prison term of

(a) ______ 10 years
(b) ______ 15 years
(c) ______ 20 years

4. Every person deliberately assisting another in the commission of self-murder shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.

I believe the defendant is guilty of manslaughter and should receive a sentence of

(a) ______ 2 years at hard labor
(b) ______ 3 years at hard labor

5. The defendant is an accessory before the fact to the crime of self-murder and as such he is charged with willful murder. However, the jury may recommend in view of extenuating circumstances that he not receive the maximum penalty but that he be punished by a prison sentence.

I believe the defendant is guilty of willful murder, but would recommend a prison term of
(a) _____ 1 year
(b) _____ 5 years

6. So far as the law is concerned, the suicide is innocent; therefore the party who furnishes the means to the suicide must also be innocent of violating the law.

I believe the defendant is innocent of any crime and should not be punished.
Sentences of the Court

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Judge's Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>It is the decision of this court that the defendant, Frank Roberts is guilty of murder in the first degree. In accordance with the laws of this state he will be taken from the court to the State Penitentiary at Lexington where he will be executed on the night of August 22, 1950.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>It is the decision of this court that the defendant, Frank Roberts is guilty of murder in the first degree. He is to be confined in the State Penitentiary at Lexington for the remainder of his life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>It is the decision of this court that the defendant, Frank Roberts is guilty of murder which is not premeditated or murder in</td>
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</table>
the second degree. He is to be confined in the State Penitentiary at Lexington for a period of not less than 10 years.

3 (b)  7  It is the decision of this court that the defendant, Frank Roberts is guilty of murder which is not premeditated or murder in the second degree. He is to be confined in the State Penitentiary at Lexington for a period of not less than 15 years.

3 (c)  8  It is the decision of this court that the defendant, Frank Roberts is guilty of murder which is not premeditated or murder in the second degree. He is to be confined in the State Penitentiary at Lexington for a period of not less than 20 years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Decision</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Judge's Commitment</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 (a)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>It is the decision of this court that the defendant, Frank Roberts is guilty of manslaughter. He will serve a term in the State Penitentiary at Lexington for 2 years at hard labor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (b)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>It is the decision of this court that the defendant, Frank Roberts is guilty of manslaughter. He will serve a term in the State Penitentiary at Lexington for 3 years at hard labor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (a)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>It is the decision of this court that the defendant, Frank Roberts is guilty of willful murder. However, in view of the extenuating circumstances in this case the jury has entered a plea for mercy. Therefore, he will be confined for not less than 1 year in the State Penitentiary at Lexington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Decision</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Judge's Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 (b)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>It is the decision of this court that the defendant, Frank Roberts is guilty of willful murder. However, in view of the extenuating circumstances in this case the jury has entered a plea for mercy. Therefore, he will be confined for not less than 5 years in the State Penitentiary at Lexington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>It is the decision of this court that the defendant, Frank Roberts is innocent of any crime and should not be punished.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VITA

Patricia Kaye Morgan

**Born:** February 6, 1927, Lake Butler, Florida

**Education:**
- Lincoln High School, Canton Ohio, June, 1944
- B.A., Ohio State University, June, 1952
- M.A., Louisiana State University, June, 1956
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**Positions held:**

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L.S.U. Chapter Treasurer (1955-1956)
L.S.U. Chapter Vice President (1956-1957)
Louisiana Psychological Association

Papers Presented at Professional Meetings:


Publications:


EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate: Patricia Kaye Morgan

Major Field: Psychology

Title of Thesis: Attitude Change and Group Conformity in the Psychopathic Personality

Approved:

[Signature]
Major Professor and Chairman

[Signature]
Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signature]
J. Berg

[Signature]
J. Valenstic

[Signature]
J. T. French

[Signature]
Charles Watten

Date of Examination:

25 July 1960