Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 1812-1952; An Ecological Analysis of Voting Behavior.

Perry H. Howard
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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POLITICAL TENDENCIES IN LOUISIANA, 1812-1952;
AN ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF VOTING BEHAVIOR

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Sociology

by

Perry Holbrook Howard
A.B., Harvard College, 1950
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1951
June, 1954
MANUSCRIPT THESSES

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DEDICATION

To My Wife
Katie Parker Howard
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author has become indebted to a number of persons in writing this dissertation. He particularly wishes to express appreciation to his major professor, Dr. Rudolf Heberle, for invaluable guidance and assistance in every phase of this study and to recall fondly nearly five years of association. To Doctors Homer Hitt, Vernon Parenton, Alvin Bertrand, Paul Price, Eric Voegelin, and Robert Harris the author is indebted for orientation in the fields of sociology and government.

The study was carried out under the auspices of the Institute of Population Research in the Department of Sociology at Louisiana State University.

Gratitude is expressed to Miss Louise Kemp, Director of Division of Research and Statistics of the Louisiana Department of Institutions, for the opportunity of making special statistical computations; Mr. Joseph R. Nelson, Office of Secretary of State, for making available unpublished ward returns of the 1952 presidential election in Louisiana. Finally the author wishes to give special thanks to his typist, Mrs. Augusta Bradsher.
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ABSTRACT

The objectives of this study are first, to discover the factors influencing voting behavior in Louisiana during the period of 1812 to 1952 and in particular to analyze influences inherent of the processes of social differentiation and stratification; second, to inquire whether political tendencies present in certain "crucial" elections represent deep-seated interests and social cleavages; third, to characterize persistent "climates" of political opinion through demonstration of the relation between regional and class factors in voting behavior; fourth, to ascertain whether regularities in deviations from basic tendencies correlate with stability of geographic patterns of voting behavior; fifth, to search for continuity of basic political tendencies in situations of change.

The method used is the ecological analysis and comparison of election returns and sociological factors. A series of map diagrams are presented showing the geographical distribution of the vote in gubernatorial and presidential elections. In some cases findings were tested by correlation methods.

The results show that analysis of Louisiana politics
through political ecology can be extremely useful. Whereas class factors were always important, basic cleavages appear more striking when social groupings are studied in geographical distribution. Groups of influence — sugar and cotton planters of south and north Louisiana, in alliance with commercial interests — were opposed by groups of number — farmers of hill parishes and bayou country and city laborers. Despite Whig or Democrat labels, Louisiana politics before the Civil War was dedicated to the furtherance of a planter aristocracy. In political struggles of Reconstruction this basic pattern of voting cleavage remained, only now former slaves voted in number. White farmer joined Bourbon planter and merchant in successful assertion of "White Supremacy" through the Democratic Party. Solidarity displayed in the vote of the hill farmers on this issue was carried over to more basic economic problems, but the Bourbon "climate" of opinion disallowed deviation. After the Populist movement was frustrated, Negro and poor white alike were disenfranchised in 1898 and Louisiana commenced the Twentieth Century with minority representation and with an economically deprived lower class. One-party politics was in reality a dominating "group" politics, upset only by the advent of Longism which brought a balance to political forces. Leading tendencies and persistent opinion were found in the distribution of voting support of pro and anti Long factions, which in recent
years have paralleled Democratic and Republican party expressions. By 1952 influences of industrialization and urbanization had created a new base for social stratification, and with Negroes voting again, Louisiana politics was more representative of all elements of society. Two-party politics existed in fact if not in name.

The significance of this study lies in systematic analysis of election returns for over one hundred years. It has discovered political tendencies of long duration and has presented an evaluation of factors motivating Louisiana political behavior. Such a study contributes to the empirical foundations from which generalizations may be drawn in the field of political sociology.
CHAPTER I

POLITICAL ECOLOGY; METHODOLOGY AND CERTAIN PROBLEMS

If sociology be regarded as the study of social action, then most certainly political action is an important field of investigation for the sociologist. And as in the general field, it is essential that a methodology be developed, that the scholar wed conceptual schemes with research tools. For political sociology, the techniques of political ecology have been devised.

One of the main concerns of political sociology is the study of the interrelationships between political tendencies, movements, and parties, and social classes.\(^1\) The location of political attitudes affords the opportunity for answering the question of who votes for what and why. Since the utilization of quantitative methods is desirable, it has been found fruitful to focus attention upon analysis of election returns. We proceed on the assumption that in our political system an analysis of the geographical distribution of support for a party or candidate enables us to find out what classes and categories of voters make up that support.

\(^1\)R. Heberle, Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1951).
It has also been suggested that such analysis leads to a more complete understanding of the fundamental processes of social integration or disintegration.²

The political ecologist attempts to explain the political behavior of the people in a given area through inquiry into the factors which may influence voting. By correlating significant indices of social characteristics with election returns, we can ascertain the actual interests and predispositions which are present in an area as well as the cleavages which are reflected in the voting.

The method of political ecology consists primarily in the comparison of election returns in small areas and in correlating the differences between voting behavior in these areas to differences in the social stratification. The geographic characteristics of an area are influential in the development of a particular economy which in turn determines the objective class structure, and ultimately, political tendencies.³ The assumption is that people are influenced in their political attitudes by their "life chances" in Max Weber's sense, or more precisely: by their interpretation of the conditions and interests of their own social class.

The continental scholar most influential in the development of the theory and techniques of political ecology, or

³Heberle, Social Movements, pp. 312-214.
what he calls the *géographie de l'opinion politique*, is André Siegfried. His interest in the subject came from his observations of the astounding consistencies in political opinion in areas of France, despite the well-known instability of political parties. He was moved to seek the geographic and social factors which contribute to this apparently underlying stability. More recently, Rudolf Heberle has made a comprehensive study of a region in Germany applying the techniques developed by Siegfried with the addition of more refined statistical methods.

In this country, the foremost exponents of quantitative and regional studies of a more or less ecological nature have been: A. N. Holcombe, Stuart Rice, George Lundberg, Harold Gosnell, V. O. Key, Jr., and Samuel Lubell. In general the work of these men has emphasized the regional (geographic), or the statistical approach, or a combination of

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both. The work of Lubell suggests what may be accomplished from a skillful interpretation of voting statistics coupled with a general knowledge of the characteristics of various areas and groupings.

A veritable "school" of political ecology has been developed in France since the end of the last World War; most of these have been the students of, or have been influenced by, Siegfried. A series of studies have been published by the National Foundation of Political Sciences which are ecological in nature and are described by the term sociologie électorale. These scholars do not pretend that the increasing number of monographs on the electoral sociology of different regions of France makes possible at this time the statement of general laws concerning the determination of political opinions by specific factors; their knowledge is as yet too fragmentary. It is possible, however, to engage in certain comparisons, surely the way to generalizations, and to make some reflections on the nature of the existence between given social and political phenomena.

The term sociologie électorale has likewise been adopted by the Norwegian political scientist, Sten S. Nilson, who has published the first comprehensive treatise on the

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The value of this work lies in bringing together both European and American findings and the drawing of comparisons between the various studies. Nilson provides a thorough review of the literature concerned with application of quantitative methods to political behavior. He suggests that a comparative political ecology may be developed.

In the attempt to abstract general "principles" of political ecology, some amount of discussion has centered about the charge that the "ecologist" may be guilty of being a geographic determinist. Such is not the case, for as Heberle has pointed out, the implications of a schema such as found in Siegfried's Ardeche study are not that geographic (or even geological) conditions determine the political behavior of the people of an area, but that geographic or geologic zones tend to correspond to politically relevant zones. Heberle goes on to say that "...in this he is quite justified, because it is perfectly amazing to see these correspondences even in regions where the geological structure is as inconspicuous -- for the layman, at least -- as in Louisiana." The point is that the physical landscape is there to be used, and that the way in which men utilize a particular natural

8 S. Nilson, Histoire et Sciences Politiques (Bergen, 1950).


environment depends in large measure on their system of values.\textsuperscript{11}

Louisiana appears particularly amenable to an application of the techniques of political ecology for two reasons. In the first place, although Louisiana has been a "one-party state," at least since 1900, the Democratic party contains quite well-defined factions representing the interests of various elements of the population. Secondly, the state may be divided into definable sub-regions on the basis of socio-economic, cultural, geographic, and even geologic indices.\textsuperscript{12} Much has been written concerning Louisiana politics, but we gain from this literature little understanding of the ecological conditions of political life. Louisiana politics become intelligible by analysis of the social forces behind the factions and by the demonstration of the tendencies which the factions represent.

The present study has been undertaken to meet certain problems encountered in an earlier attempt at determining the political ecology of Louisiana.\textsuperscript{12} (The examination of voting behavior in "crucial" elections in Louisiana (Secession in 1861, Populism in 1896, Socialism in 1912, and the vote for Huey Long in 1928) suggested that the events of the past most

\textsuperscript{11}W. Firey, Land Use in Central Boston (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947).

certainly influenced the present. Yet, the need had been felt to check generalizations made for different periods in regard to the possible continuity of basic behavioral tendencies and the influence of cumulative experiences.

A growing body of empirically derived data established through ecological analysis of political behavior has made it practical, if not necessary, to re-examine the generalizations being made concerning Louisiana politics.\(^{13}\) (Investigations, quite legitimately, focused upon certain problems (such as support of the Long faction) and specific periods (such as the 1890's when Populism appeared in Louisiana) with the intention of bringing understanding to political processes, the careers of politicians, and the voting behavior of classes within the electorate.

Analysis utilizing the methodology of political ecology has shown that a "one-party" state is amenable to quantitative study. Factions within, as well as deviations from, the Democratic Party stemmed from definite elements within the social structure of Louisiana society. Evidence suggested that within the rural population two divergent

groups, planters and farmers, displayed a long-time continuity of social and political antagonism. The phenomenon of Longism was believed to have emerged from this traditional cleavage. Within the urban areas of the state there appeared to be the beginnings of another political cleavage. The older commercial layer of the city populations allied themselves with the planter class. Now, an increasing urban-industrialization was producing a growing differential between middle and working classes. Evidence was found of a correspondence of factional cleavages to nationwide (party) cleavages. The apparent consistency in the continuity of geographic distribution of the support of various parties and factions indicated that the voting behavior of sub-regions of the state manifested the crystallization of antagonistic tendencies in the social relationships of divergent groups.

The contention that similarities in voting tendencies, found for specific "crucial" elections, of necessity demonstrated the existence of a continuity of basic influences might be seriously challenged. The investigator did not show what voting behavior may have been manifested in the periods between the key elections. Furthermore, the very choice of "crucial" elections might be biased by value judgment or a superficial interpretation of historical events. The present study therefore proposes to examine Louisiana politics in historical depth. The theme may be stated thus: the search for basic political tendencies in situations of change.
This study will begin with an investigation of the interrelationships of ecological factors and social values of the people of Louisiana before the Civil War. (The attempt will be made to demonstrate how Louisiana colonial experience influenced the early days of statehood and the development of Louisiana political parties.) After showing how the instrument of government was established in 1812 and manned through electoral choice, the success or failure of Whig and Democratic party will be traced. Finally, with the discovery of the leading political tendencies of the period, an evaluation will be made concerning the influences which led to the tragedy of Secession.

Chapter III will provide a fresh view of the period of Reconstruction, tracing political developments from 1864 through 1900. The focus of attention will be placed upon the voter support of the various factions and parties which engaged in the political struggle for power during these decades. Of special concern will be the attempt to discover the presence of social cleavages and experiences which may provide evidence of continuity in basic political tendencies.

In the fourth chapter, the problem is one of putting the phenomenon of Longism in proper perspective, to ascertain whether the political maneuvering in the years before 1900 which gave rise to "one-party politics" guaranteed the potential rise of a leader such as Huey Long. Emphasis will highlight social conditions rather than the influence of
personality and individual activities.

Chapter V provides an analysis of the most recent elections in Louisiana. Here the purpose is to discover how much of the experiences and tendencies of the past are still influential in Louisiana political life and will channel the voting behavior of the future. At the same time changes and the appearance of new factors will be noted.

Finally, Chapter VI will present a brief evaluation of the entire study, citing what generalizations appear feasible concerning Louisiana politics.
CHAPTER II

LOUISIANA EXPERIENCES REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

-Of forms of government in which one rules, we call that which regards the common interests, kingship or royalty; that in which more than one, but not many, rule, aristocracy; and it is so called either because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens. But when the citizens at large administer the state for the common interest, the government is called ... a constitution.

Aristotle

A. Colonial Experience and the Framing of the Constitution of 1812. (In the only early "ecological" study of Louisiana politics, Greer asserted that the social and industrial activities of Louisiana were influenced by two factors, topographical and geographical conditions, and the nature and diversity of the population.) If one can find interests requiring different policies, then he has found potent elements in the determination of political choices.

Louisiana was obviously a land of economic and, hence, political differences. In simple terms of agricultural production -- which became Louisiana's economic lifeblood --

there was cotton, a natural staple, and sugar, an artificial one. Here was an assertion of simple economic necessity leading to political organization. Norton has written that "sugar could not be produced in Louisiana without the active protection of the central government, and the realization that this was an inexorable fact made the sugar growers almost without exception National Republicans, and later Whigs."

That, up until 1824, no political party per se was organized does not invalidate the thesis. It must always be remembered that Louisiana emerged a United State in one day. Her citizens had had no past experience with political representation, and the subsequent development of political parties and factions within the state speaks well of her successful adaptation to republican government. When it became necessary to organize politically in order to seek and gain the support and well being of her interests, developed in colonial status under French and Spanish dominion, Louisiana emerged as a copy in miniature of national political processes.

It is against a background of colonial experience that the subsequent political processes of Louisiana, the state, must be viewed. When Louisiana entered the Union, her constitutional framers met peculiar difficulties in establishing the instrument of a democratic form of government among a

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people devoid of past political experience of such a nature. Louisiana's early political development differed from that of other American states. Her colonial experience was gained under French, rather than English, influences. For a short period France had ceded Louisiana to Spain. The colonists had resented the Spanish transfer, and Spain's rule left little influence. As a Royal Colony, the laws governing Louisiana emanated directly from France. Her laws were Louisiana law; particularly, the Custom of Paris became the local law of the colony. Present day civil law doctrine of the state, in large part, stems from the experiences under this arrangement. Under France and Spain, then, the Louisiana colonists were politically passive. They did not participate in civil administration to any extent, and apparently they were satisfied with the generally kind paternalism of their rulers.

Although extending for only sixty-seven years, French rule left the lasting mark, influencing the institutions and the attitudes of the people.) Later Anglo-Saxon infusion "has

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3M. Evans, A Study in the State Government in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1931). Mr. Evans divided Louisiana political history before 1812 into three main periods with the following divisions:

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<td>Royal Colony</td>
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<td>1712-1731</td>
<td>Charter Colony</td>
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<td>1731-1769</td>
<td>Royal Colony</td>
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<td>Under Spain</td>
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<td>1769-1803</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Territory of U. S.</td>
<td>1803-1812</td>
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</table>
never been powerful enough to displace, but only to modify, the basic Latin institutions." \(^4\) Under the Enabling Act of 1811, the United States Congress allowed the Territory of Louisiana to call a convention and frame a constitution, that she might become one of the United States. How different an occasion than the convention which had met on an earlier date at Philadelphia!

Usually, a constitution has a gradual development, the product of the progression or retrogression of the community. \(^5\) The majority of the original thirteen American colonies had experienced Anglo-Saxon influences. The colonists revolted against oppression under the prevalent political system, not against its common law traditions. In the framing of the American Constitution there was little which was new in it, if there was much which was debatable. \(^6\) In Louisiana the people had no such continuity of experience which might be articulated in an instrument of government. The differences in the social structure and in the cumulative experience between Louisiana and the thirteen original states are apparent when their constitutions are compared. Not only was the political experience vastly different, there was also a

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 12.


unity of interests among the politically active which had been lacking in the other colonies.

The royal French colonists had dreams of aristocracy. The major problem of Louisiana was to frame a constitution acceptable to the American Congress, being republican enough to satisfy the temper of the time. This becomes clear when the office of the governor in the new state of Louisiana is examined below. One student of Louisiana government has aptly summarized the differences alluded to above in these words:

"Louisiana, too, had her symbol of external control, but in comparing the formation of her first Constitution to that of the revolutionary state constitutions, the differences remain more significant than the similarities. Of fundamental importance was the lack of a revolutionary struggle; no Louisianan's blood had been shed in their effort to rid themselves of external control. In addition, there was not the same internal conflict that had expressed itself in the lively struggle between the yeoman class of farmers and the large planters and financial interests in the older states."

Louisiana was an aristocratic society with strong French sympathies and, hence, the constitution which was framed expressed the will of this dominant element of the society just as all ensuing constitutions were to express the influence of some other dominant portion of the citizenry.

The prevailing attitude of this early elite was reflected in the pages of the Louisiana Gazette when it "...urged the convention to adopt a short aristocratic constitution based

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upon a propertied electorate, and which provided for a governor not elected by suffrage."\textsuperscript{8} The membership of the convention was composed of seventeen men of American descent and twenty-six of Creole ancestry. Among this elite group were three future governors, five future United States Senators, one future Congressman, and a future minister to France.\textsuperscript{9} This was to be a convention which would take care of its own.

Casting about for models of a constitution suitable to their needs, the framers decided upon the Kentucky Constitution of 1797. It had been written by a similarly conservative convention with anti-democratic leanings. In most cases the Louisiana convention used the exact language of this instrument. The Kentucky Constitution, in turn, had been patterned after the Federal document. (But the Louisiana Constitution emerged ultra-conservative and ultra-aristocratic.)

In studying the origins of this first of Louisiana's constitutions, Uzee concluded that the explanation most warrantable "...was that the members of the convention chose the Kentucky Constitution as a model because it was the last southern constitution to be adopted before 1812, and that they believed it contained the provisions which most nearly


\textsuperscript{9}Ibid., p. 15.
coincided with their needs."\(^{10}\)

The Constitution of 1812 was far from being in accord with the spirit of the American Union. "...It had been so formulated as to satisfy the alien prejudices in favor of hereditary government existing in the State during its early years."\(^{11}\) The preamble heralds the aristocratic attitude of the convention. It began, "We the representatives of the people" and ended with, "do mutually agree with each other to form ourselves into a free and independent State."\(^{12}\)

Finally, emphasis must be placed upon the provisions made concerning the powers of the executive in the first Louisiana Constitution, since the present study shall focus upon analysis of the electoral support of Louisiana governors. The framers of the Constitution of 1812 adopted a strong executive, an action at variance with the practice of the earlier states, who had reason to reject a strong governmental head. In Louisiana the power of the executive began with strength, reflecting the experiences of the past and the pervasive unity of the early plantation aristocracy. Moreover, a record of the appointive power of the governor likewise points up the extent to which the people wished to

\(^{10}\)Ibid., p. 31.

\(^{11}\)Evans, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 33.

\(^{12}\)Evans, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 28; italicized by Evans.
delegate authority to the executive. The document diminished the absolute appointive power of the governor only to senatorial approval, and the elite would provide the membership of the General Assembly. The governor was to be elected by the Assembly from the two highest on the list of candidates voted upon by the people. The voter only indicated his preference. The executive was required to be a citizen of the United States, a resident of Louisiana six years, and to own taxable property valued at $5,000. Aristocratic, indeed!

B. Utilizing the Machinery of Government: The Genealogy of Louisiana Political Parties. The first few gubernatorial elections were in the nature of skirmishes between local factions, although cutting across this was the struggle for power between French and American. The Florida parishes, then four in number, were joined to Louisiana in the Act of Statehood in April, 1812, although these parishes, settled by American stock of American experience and Democratic in politics, had not been represented at the Constitutional convention. The native Louisianan outlook was strange to the Americans who migrated in ever increasing number to New Orleans, the Florida parishes, and to north Louisiana. It is perhaps understandable, in terms of ethnocentrism, why the

issue in these early elections was carried by old Creole settlers against American newcomers. "The Frenchman," in turn, "...was looked upon as a Frenchman by the English citizen or settler, though he might have been of the same political party."\textsuperscript{14}

The cleavage was not apparent, perhaps, in the first gubernatorial election, when the old Territorial Governor, Claiborne, was chosen by the assembly over Jacques Villere. Probably there was more unity of opinion concerning the performance of this man whom everybody knew, even if there might have been some honest differences of opinion regarding certain of his actions while working for the national government. As his term of office drew to a close, "...it was evident he had done a difficult job amazingly well.... He had succeeded in winning the admiration of the people and had headed them in the direction of successful representative government."\textsuperscript{15}

In 1816, despite the attempts at keeping nativity out of politics, the French-speaking elite had nominated an illustrious son, Villere, while the Americans had backed Joshua Lewis. Villere received 2,314 votes to 2,145 for Lewis; the Florida parishes, predominantly American, gave

\textsuperscript{14} Greer, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 338.

Lewis 740 votes and Villere 18 votes. It had been feared that Villere would show partisanship in his appointments, but such was not the case. The Frenchman demonstrated his capacity to rule and his aristocratic sense of responsibility in making a sincere effort to heal the breach between Creole and American.

Thomas Robertson, candidate of the American faction, polled the highest vote in a field of four in 1820. The next highest vote was cast for the Creole, Peter Derbigny. Louisiana had had her first taste of representative government and had found able candidates were not wanting. By 1824 the people were becoming more vitally interested with national issues, finding that there could be a rewarding relationship of local with national concerns. Continuance of the Creole-American split would remain an influence on Louisiana politics, but there were other interests about which to focus the political struggle.

Louisiana became a meeting ground of national tendencies in the 1820's. A clarity of interests and party support might be observed resulting from that emerging structure, the plantation economy. Ultimately, the interests of sugar and cotton country might be the same; but since the cotton planter was a more recent arrival on the Louisiana scene, he had brought with him a political preference for the

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16 Ibid., p. 127.
Democratic party. Up until the early thirties the great national parties were the National Federalists and the Jeffersonian Democrats. The program of the former found sympathetic support from "native" Louisianans, the sugar planters and the attendant commercial interests of the city. The simple process of migration was bringing to Louisiana ever increasing numbers of backwoods Democrats, from the same stream as the cotton planters, but arrived too late and not so fortunate.

Though in the following decade the party labels changed, the two basically different views of the ends of government remained. The Whigs of Adams and Clay lined up against the Jacksonian Democrats. The Whig program envisaged the state as the originator of ambitious programs of internal improvements whereas the Jacksonians wanted the state kept simple and frugal. The middle class Whiggery of Clay represented the influence of the maturing settlement, while Jacksonianism was of the frontier -- coonskin individualism with its simple agrarian laissez faire.17

The South was the heir to the Democratic Party. But behind the label it was a party divided against itself; unfortunately, in retrospect, the Democrats became split on principle. Failure to look behind the label of the party of

traditional choice was costly. Since the Democrats of the South also were the party of numbers, when the time came to stand up and be counted, Secession was inevitable. The intellectual leaders of the two streams of thought were Jefferson and Calhoun. "The contrast in their philosophies -- the rejection by the latter of equalitarian idealism, and the substitution of economic realism -- mark the diverse tendencies which in the end disrupted the South." ¹⁸

Jackson was of Jeffersonian bent, whereas Jefferson Davis was of the Calhounian school of thought; Henry Clay may be depicted as having wavered in between. Louisiana, in the three decades from 1830 to the Secession, embraced the two great parties, Whig and Democratic. Possibly in the good of both, or at least the portions which were not ideologically in contradiction, the local interests and demands of the politically articulate people of the state found satisfaction. When crisis came, however, it would be necessary to look behind party labels and determine what ends were being furthered.

The immediate impression was that the Democrats were the party of poverty and numbers. On the other hand, the Whigs appeared to represent property and talents. Emerson was supposed to have remarked that the Democrats had the best principles and the Whigs the best men. In Louisiana, as the

¹⁸ Parrington, op. cit., II, 4.
cotton planter found prosperity, he might drop his previous Democratic affiliation. The Whigs had good men and they also attracted propertied reinforcements. They found strong support in the South.

In the South, the Whigs were the party of gentility and property, owning over two-thirds of all the slaves. Sugar planters in Louisiana, who wanted protection against Cuba; big cotton planters, who regretted the U.S. Bank, and who, in state politics resisted the repudiating tendencies of their poorer fellows... all went Whig. 19

It would not be difficult to imagine, then, how the alignment of support for the principles and parties worked out in Louisiana. All the diverse elements working to produce the national situation appeared to have been present.

In the early days of statehood the political struggle had been between the old Creole elite and the American newcomers. The gubernatorial election of 1824, however, brought a broader cleavage, support for Republican or Democratic party. To be sure, there was superficial similarity between the old and new alignments. The sugar planters, mostly of French lineage, tended to become Whigs, finding agreement between their interests and the Adams-Clay political philosophy of the "American System." And the newcomer Americans, bringing their Democratic heritage with them, supported the Democratic party of Louisiana. There was room enough within these two parties for the intrusion of interests other than

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nativity. These alignments initiated the political experiences which were to mold traditional support and climates of opinion in the history of Louisiana politics.

C. The Parallel of Louisiana and National Politics, and Jacksonianism Triumphant. In the election year of 1824 the people of Louisiana embraced the two great national parties. At least, the representatives of the "people" in the General Assembly manifested a tendency toward party politics as they cast the five electoral votes allotted to Louisiana. The Congressional delegation had had opportunity to report favorably to their constituents concerning the advantages of supporting one national party or the other. The Assembly was split with three electoral votes going to Jackson and two for Adams. Democrat and Whig emerged in Louisiana politics.

The results of the gubernatorial election, however, showed that despite this tendency to adopt labels or support a party interest, the old vestiges of the French-American cleavage remained. Once again the campaign was a struggle of personalities, where provincial prejudices served as issues.20 Of the five competing candidates, Henry Johnson was the strongest, as he had succeeded W. C. C. Claiborne in the Senate in 1818. With Washington experience, Johnson was more likely to spell out the issues behind the emerging party

labels. The two other candidates with any considerable chance to succeed were of Creole lineage. Bernard Marigny came from the illustrious family of the De Mandeville. It was claimed that he had played politics and ran to split the Creole vote. Jacques Villere had served with distinction, previously, as Governor.

For the first time, in 1824, the Journal of the Louisiana Senate published parish returns in the vote for governor. Henry Johnson had received 2,847, or 42.4 per cent of the popular vote. He gained pluralities in fourteen of the twenty-five parishes which published returns. In fact, however, the combined vote for the two Creole candidates would have produced 52 per cent of the total vote; Marigny gained pluralities in four French parishes and Villere in eight of them. The support of the latter was more general, as his strength ranged from Plaquemines to the southeast, on up the Mississippi to Pointe Coupee and Avoyelles, and up the Red River in Natchitoches. Pockets of French sentiment were spread throughout Louisiana.

Quartile distribution of the Johnson vote indicated that his strongest support came from the Florida parishes where American sentiment was firmly established. (See Figure 1.) It would take further elections before the French-American cleavage would cease to dominate gubernatorial campaigns. Yet even so, in several parishes where settlers were of predominant American stock, there was indication
Gubernatorial Election 1824
Vote for Henry Johnson
By Parishes

- 1st quarter: 00.0% - 24.6%
- 2nd quarter: 28.0% - 41.5%
- 3rd quarter: 43.4% - 71.9%
- 4th quarter: 80.8% - 92.4%

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1825

Figure 1
that the vote in 1824 revealed more than native prejudices. Concordia and Ouachita, for example, although on the list of majority Johnson parishes, registered a sizable opposition to his candidacy. The lack of relatively complete solidarity here might bespeak divergent economic and social interests.

Preparations for the 1828 campaigns commenced as early as two years ahead of time. Louisiana politicians were learning the value of uniting national and local control of the offices of government. Both National Republicans and Democrats sought to gain all the state offices, the national congressional and senatorial seats, as well as the support of the presidential electors. The Republicans supported Pierre Derbigny and Philemon Thomas, and the Democrats Bernard Marigny and Thomas Butler. Derbigny won with 44.1 per cent of the vote cast in his favor. The combined Democratic vote was only 39.6 per cent. In this election Derbigny gained pluralities in fourteen parishes, including most of south Louisiana as well as the parishes of Natchitoches, Concordia, and Rapides.

The quartile distribution of Derbigny support, in Figure 2, however, indicated his greatest backing came from the French sugar country. The support for Derbigny in Concordia Parish, which was also plantation (cotton) country, although not sufficient to place it in the top Republican quartile, was nevertheless relatively strong, again. The same may be said of Rapides. In other words, the intrusion of economic
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1626
PIERRE DERBIGNY
BY PARISHES

1st quarter: 00.3% - 18.8%
2nd quarter: 23.7% - 43.0%
3rd quarter: 44.8% - 65.4%
4th quarter: 71.3% - 89.0%

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1828
interests, rather than nativity, was seen; the predominant plantation parishes of cotton country were comprised of populations with no general consensus of opinion. The weakest Republican support was found in the Florida parishes, where the planter opinion was more entrenched and where it had been traditionally Democratic.

The results of the 1828 presidential vote in Louisiana may be considered a forecast of things to come. An element of demographic processes worked to the detriment of the conservative groups of the state who were championing the Republican cause. It was not the sheer addition of numbers to the electorate which gave a hint of inevitability, for with a property provision in granting the suffrage, the process of economic selection would do its work. The vast majority of migrants to Louisiana came from areas where the climate of political opinion had produced a traditional Democratic leaning. North Louisiana was the predominant seat of Democratic support, for it was here, and in southwest Louisiana, that the migrants settled. The politically articulate were predominantly Democratic, but evidence has already been given showing that as an area became less "frontier," elements of economic self-interest might blunt the traditional Democratic sentiment. This is seen when new parishes were established, which would register a high Democratic vote while the vote of the older "core" area remained more conservative in tendency.
It was not as if the Republicans were unaware of the great popularity of the "Hero of New Orleans." Experience with the ever more popular "democratic" form of government indicated the importance of mass appeal. Louisiana Republicans put up a vigorous opposition, but Jackson gained the vote of the electorate, though his margin was not as high as might be expected; he was given 53.0 per cent of the popular vote. A student of the period explained Jackson's support:

Jackson's endorsement came from the City of New Orleans, and from the 'interior.' His personal popularity will largely explain his victory in the city. The 'interior' cotton farmer had no need or desire for the application of the protective principle. No West Indian latifundia challenged their staple.

Quartile distribution of the Jackson vote clearly demonstrated his "interior" popularity. (See Figure 3.) The Floridas and north Louisiana emerge as the seat of Democratic support. The National Republicans carried only twelve parishes, mostly the predominant sugar producers. Southwest Louisiana, at that time all St. Landry parish, appeared to be Republican country, and yet this was an area, recipient of a steady migration of farmers. The answer to the seeming paradox must lie in the fact that the "core" of the parish, centered about Opelousas, had an electorate which outnumbered that of the hinterland. And there was a sizable conservative element centered in the more settled portions of St. Landry.

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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1828

VOTE FOR ANDREW JACKSON
BY PARISHES

1st quarter: 10.3% - 29.0%
2nd quarter: 39.5% - 52.9%
3rd quarter: 53.0% - 63.5%
4th quarter: 69.6% - 84.7%


Figure 3
The fact that New Orleans voted Jackson by only 52.9 per cent demonstrates the split of the electorate there between American and European migrant labor and the great commercial interests and old French.

Although the Louisiana Jacksonians triumphed in the presidential campaign, they were not yet strong enough to challenge in state politics. For in 1831 the Republicans again captured the governorship, this time with André Roman, who represented the elite of the Creole element. Again each party entered two candidates, the Republicans Roman and Arnaud Beauvais, the Democrats entering W. S. Hamilton and David Randall. As was the case in the previous gubernatorial election, the combined Democratic vote would not have been enough to ensure victory. Roman received 43.6 per cent of the vote, whereas the combined Democratic vote would have amounted to but 38.4 per cent.

The highest Republican support came from the sugar country, as Figure 4 indicates. The Floridas and northeast Louisiana were strongly Democratic. Even so, there was enough Republican sentiment in West Feliciana and Concordia, for example, to register close to a quarter of the vote for Roman. Of special note is the behavior of Assumption Parish. The voters were evenly divided in their presidential choices in 1828, as was the Ascension electorate. In subsequent elections, the support for one party or the other took ups and downs. Assumption was in the heart of the French country, of
Gubernatorial Election 1831
Vote for André Roman
By Parishes

- 1st quarter: 5.2% - 27.4%
- 2nd quarter: 28.5% - 42.4%
- 3rd quarter: 41.6% - 52.1%
- 4th quarter: 62.4% - 90.4%

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1831

Figure 4
course, but the politically articulate population had been influenced by several waves of Anglo-Saxon settlement and the establishment of the plantation economy. There was the objective foundation, at least, for differences of opinion which might show up in the voting statistics.

The victory of the Republicans in the gubernatorial election of the preceding year was no indication of victory in 1832. Nationally, Jackson was in the political saddle, and Louisianans flocked to his support in even greater numbers than in the previous election. (See Figure 5.) The pattern of distribution of the Jackson vote was quite similar to that of his first success; the striking difference was in the proportion favoring him. New Orleans gave six per cent more of its vote to the Democrat than in 1828. Whereas both Ascension and Assumption parishes had compiled tie votes in 1828, in this election the former gave 87.3 per cent, while the latter gave him only 15.4 per cent of its vote. Ascension had company, though, for neighboring Iberville, St. James and St. Charles along the river, also registered majorities for Jackson. This was in contrast to the heavy Republican support deeper in the sugar country.

While the great popular hero won elections with ease in Louisiana, his party had not yet been able to translate

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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1832
VOTE FOR ANDREW JACKSON
BY PARISHES

1st quarter: 15.4% - 47.0%
2nd quarter: 56.9% - 65.9%
3rd quarter: 67.1% - 79.8%
4th quarter: 83.2% - 100%


Figure 5
this national success to the state scene. For the Democrats did not succeed in winning the governorship until 1842; after this election they won each contest up to Secession. No doubt, the pattern of Jacksonian victory was a forecast of coming events.

Meanwhile, in 1834, another of Louisiana's most noted sons was nominated as candidate of the newly formed Whig party of Henry Clay. The Whigs had retained the nationalistic program of the old Republican party and were organized to give opposition to the leveling tendencies of the Jacksonians. Quite naturally many Louisiana people joined forces. The Whigs were to elect Edward Douglas White in 1834 and Andre Homan for his second term of office in 1838.

White's victory over the Democratic candidate, John B. Dawson, was complete. He received nearly 60 per cent of the vote cast. The election was conducted so as to arouse class consciousness, and both parties used demagogy to win. Each sought the French vote and the New Orleans Irish vote. Since such was the case, it might be useful to present a summary of the qualifications of the two candidates:

Edward D. White was proclaimed as an uncompromising Whig, a fast friend of protective tariff, a jealous advocate of internal improvements, a warm and substantial friend of the United States Bank, and a firm and consistent exponent of the American system.

John B. Dawson was zealously supported by the Democrats, who represented him as a firm and pure public

\[23\text{Norton, Readings, p. 109; McGinty, op. cit., p. 137.}\]
man, a friend of the people, a supporter of the Union of the states, and an advocate of low tariff, and an unflinching enemy of the United States Bank.  

The Whigs were more successful in their campaign efforts. Even the "Hero of New Orleans" had not been able to command the support given to White in that city. And it was obvious that Dawson could pose as no Jackson. Within the parishes, there was some indication of the old pattern of split between French-American. (See Figure 6.) Dawson took pluralities in the Floridas and in north Louisiana. Returns of more than 80 per cent were registered in White's favor in seven of the sugar parishes. All of the sugar country gave majorities for White, who, after all, was the Whig representative of the south Louisiana aristocracy. The contrast in support given the Whig in Catahoula and Concordia is striking, with the latter once again listed in the ranks of the conservatives. Catahoula, bordering the hills, had more of the farmer class whose subsistence agriculture need not bring a shift in sentiment away from the traditions of the Democracy.

Political reversals on the national scene apparently have always brought repercussions back home. The panic of 1837 and ensuing depression placed a stigma on the Democratic administration. The local effect was immediate. The panic had caused fifteen New Orleans banks to suspend specie payment, paralyzing business and spreading consternation among planters and commercial people alike. Such a consequence

GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1834
VOTE FOR EDWARD WHITE
BY PARISHES

- 1st quarter: 8.9% - 29.3%
- 2nd quarter: 38.6% - 61.6%
- 3rd quarter: 56.2% - 74.8%
- 4th quarter: 82.4% - 96.8%

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1834

Figure 6
might not have guaranteed a Whig victory, but coupled with the reputation of the Whig candidate, ex-Governor Roman, this circumstance brought success.

Even so, Roman won with only 52.3 per cent of the vote in his favor. The support of the candidates in this election, as seen in Figure 7, demonstrated that in a crisis situation the voter might leave his traditional tendencies and give support where it might do him the most good. Both Roman and Prieur cut into sugar and cotton country. The Floridas were split in their support of Roman, and his strongest support was seated outside the sugar country. Both Catahoula and Concordia supported the Whig. Newly established Caldwell showed no such predisposition. On the other hand, Caddo Parish reported its first returns in this election, also, and was listed in the Whig ranks. Caddo was Red River plantation country, while the farmer might be found in greater number in Caldwell. This was to be the high water mark of Whiggery in Louisiana. In this election, the margin of victory was narrow, and with population steadily increasing every year, the success of the Whig party was doubtful. In 1842 the Democratic party captured the governorship with Alexandre Mouton, state legislator from Lafayette Parish, who received 60 per cent of the popular vote and became Louisiana's first Democratic governor. The Whigs had suffered from the same malady which had given victory in 1838. Unsound banking policies, enacted over Roman's protests, had sunk the Whig party.
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1838
VOTE FOR ANDRE' ROMAN
BY PARISHES

1st quarter: 21.0% - 35.6%
2nd quarter: 41.9% - 49.9%
3rd quarter: 51.0% - 64.4%
4th quarter: 65.6% - 96.5%

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1838

Figure 7
In the long run, population growth would work against the Whigs. The strongest support for that party came from the sugar country, which in the two decades from 1820 to 1840 counted a white population increase of between 40 and 50 per cent. At the same time, predominantly Democratic north Louisiana marked a population increase which was more than double. The number of slaves in south Louisiana increased by over 140 per cent. The percentage increase in north Louisiana was much greater; cotton country was more recently developed, and the number of slaves increased from a base of practically none. Not all of north Louisiana was devoted to the plantation economy, by any means.

There were relatively few slaves but many farmers in the hill parishes. The differential between white farmer and planter may be viewed in comparing Concordia, which had a sizable voting element partial to Whiggery, with Catahoula Parish, strong in support of the Democratic Party. With more than twice as many white people, Catahoula counted nearly five times fewer slaves. Concordia recorded an increase in slaves of over 300 per cent from 1820 to 1840. The incidence of slavery marked the plantation economy, which in turn tended to be an index of conservative political tendencies. There were more farmers than planters in north Louisiana as a whole, though.

At this point it might be wise to pause and summarize the success and achievements of the Republican-Whigs. In
view of the general excellence of the qualification of Louisi-
ana's early governors, it might be regretful that the Whigs
could win no more. Of course they were not voiceless, for
Whigs were in strong representation in the Louisiana Assembly
throughout the forties and most of the fifties. The two
strongest economic elements of the state followed Whig ten-
dencies. These, "the merchants and the sugar planters, were
the aristocrats of Louisiana. They had a community of inter-
est which was satisfied by the Whig platform; and as elec-
tions approached, they expressed themselves as preferring a
party nominee who was a 'gentleman.' This usually meant that
they preferred the nomination of a wealthy sugar planter."25
Little wonder the Whigs could get nowhere with the rural
Democrats, the raw frontiersmen with their strong sense of
individualism.

Governor Roman had represented this elite community.
He was a sugar planter from St. James, on the west side. Of
his qualifications there is no argument. He was a wise and
progressive leader. He worked for the improvement of public
education; Roman established a model penal system, a well
organized militia; he worked for the multiplication of com-
munications and the encouragement of science and agriculture.
Crossing party lines where principle mattered, Roman had en-
dorsed Jackson's stand against the Nullification Ordinance

25 Norton, Readings, p. 113.
of South Carolina. The Whig tempered conservatism with political responsibility.

Quotations from Roman's inaugural address in 1831 and his farewell address of 1843 will catch a bit of the Whig flavor:

The gratitude which I feel for the extreme kindness conferred on me by a majority of the votes of my fellow citizens, is increased still more from the idea that it is not due to party spirit that I am indebted for my election. That illiberality which some would wish to substitute for patriotism and which consists in inquiring not whether a candidate is capable and honest, but whether he belongs to such a party, such a section of the state, or to such a population has not generally exerted against me.

The country has changed; the wide career offered to our agriculture and commercial industry is not closed; no convulsions of nature have destroyed the fertility of our soil, or turned away from our capital the stream of the Mississippi. We are now aware of our real situation; we enjoy the advantages of self-government, and our destinies are in our own hands. Louisiana must yet be prosperous and happy if the means which we still retain, are administered with that prudence and economy which should have always observed.

The Whigs were gone from the seat of government, but not forgotten. Many of their numbers were yet to make contributions to the well-being of the state.

Louisiana had been a Whig state, but in the 1840's the winds of Jacksonian doctrine became strong. It was as if the democratic sentiments of the ever increasing migrant groups incubated until Democratic number could make them felt. But


before making an analysis of the political fortunes of Louisiana in the period from 1846 to Secession, it is necessary to investigate the move for, and the outcome of, the Constitutional Convention of 1845. The desire to drive aristocracy and privilege from government was said to have served as the animus of the entire Jacksonian movement. By 1845 the Democrats were numerous enough in Louisiana to make their desires felt. As early as 1842, and again in 1843, the people of Louisiana evinced strong approval to hold a constitutional convention. In the former year the electorate voted nearly three to one "for." Eight parishes voted against the proposal; these were sugar parishes clustered near Orleans, which was also "against." Nearly every parish of north Louisiana had registered approval by over 90 per cent. The actual enabling act passed the legislature March 18, 1844, and the convention was held the following year.

It may seem strange in retrospect from the present, after Louisianans almost doubled the mortality rate which Jefferson had prescribed for constitutions -- ten in 110 years -- that the first constitution was to last for over thirty years. However, the social grouping which had written Louisiana's first organic law was satisfied with the results; for them there was no real need to make a change. The multiplication of Louisiana's electorate through migration from the southeastern states and the growing success of the Democrats at the polls upset the old order. "The populace.... felt that they were living in the nineteenth century under a
seventeenth century government."\textsuperscript{28} The main "aristocratic" provisions which were objectionable were the property and religious qualifications for holding office, the limitation on suffrage, the great appointive power of the governor, and the inequality of senatorial representation.

The great significance of the convention was the fact that the membership brought two distinct philosophies of government. The existence of a two-party system in the state, and the fact that one of these, the Democratic party, was a rising party with leveling tendencies established clear issues leading to meaningful argument. The great issues were concerned with the proper function of government and the position of the governor. "Should the government represent the simple public needs and desires of the entire population, or should it establish a restrictive order under the auspices of those gentlemen of principle and property who best know the needs of the unthinking masses?"\textsuperscript{29} Obviously the Constitution of 1812 had given answer in far different terms than was desired at this time.

That both sides would be represented was guaranteed when the results of the election of delegates were made known. The convention was composed of thirty-nine Whigs and thirty-eight Democrats. One Whig editor exulted:

\textsuperscript{28} Prothro, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{29} Prothro, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 153.
Thank providence our Constitution will be safe from the agrarian and leveling view of the radicals; of the numbers elected to the Convention 48 are conservatives, enough to satisfy us that none but changes absolutely necessary will be made in the Constitution — that the Judiciary will not be elective by the people -- thus securing to us one of the greatest boons we were struggling for. 

Yet, the constitution written in 1845 was a liberal doctrine compared with that of 1812. And it was prefaced by words far different than those embodied in the Preamble of 1812. Gentleman rule was still maintained, but a concession had been made by the aristocrats. Now the people were doing things for themselves. The Constitution of 1845 began, "We the people of Louisiana, do ordain and establish."

Of course, none went away from the convention completely satisfied. There had been opposing views and compromise had been achieved; for such a social process to work, every one must give up some point or interest. Some Whigs were dissatisfied because the new instrument was too Democratic. The convention president, Joseph Walker, and the Democratic "radicals" signed, but purely as compromise; the instrument was not democratic enough for them.

One of the controversial issues had centered about the suffrage. The Whigs feared to let the bars down completely. As finally written, suffrage was granted to all white males twenty-one years of age or over and who had been citizens of

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30 Norton, Readings, p. 122.
the United States for two years and of the state two years preceding an election. The governor was no longer required to have a property qualification, but he must be thirty-five years of age and a resident of Louisiana for at least fifteen years. The office of Lt.-Governor was established. The legislators were no longer restricted to property qualifications, and some offices formerly appointive were made elective. The conservatives successfully maintained the judicial bulwark, for judges were still to be appointed by the governor, with the consent of the Senate. A lasting accomplishment of the convention was the creation of the Office of State Superintendent of Public Education. In fine the influence of Jacksonian Democracy had been felt; Anglo-Saxon traditions, reworked through American experience, became a part of the political heritage of Louisiana.

D. The Downfall of the Whigs and Impending Secession.

The downfall of the Whigs, in the elections which were to follow, may be explained by the simple phrase: too many Jacksonians. "Whig power in Louisiana was enervated by the liberalization of the state's constitution."31 The Whigs never succeeded in electing a governor again. Election analysis then must focus upon the successes of the Democratic tickets and the various elements which made up the voting

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31 Norton, A History of the Whig Party; see also, E. Asseff, Legislative Apportionment in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Bureau of Government Research, Louisiana State University, 1950).
support. Until 1860, the gubernatorial elections were close; the Democratic support ranged from only 51 to 54 per cent of the total vote. A close election might indicate a clear cleavage within the electorate and an intense interest in the resolution of pressing issues. It would be important to know how many of Louisiana's people had the suffrage, also.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION AND THE VOTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830-1860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>White Males, 20 Years Old and Above</th>
<th>1830</th>
<th>1840</th>
<th>1850</th>
<th>1860</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Vote Cast Nearest Election Year</td>
<td>25,886</td>
<td>50,110</td>
<td>80,450</td>
<td>98,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Per Cent of Population Group</td>
<td>8,318</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>36,119</td>
<td>41,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: U.S. Census, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth; Louisiana Senate Journals.*

The table printed above presents only an approximation of the relation between population of voting age and the number of people actually voting, but it does allow several important generalizations. In the first place, it belies the assumption that if Louisiana had government by gentlemen, then the "people" were politically voiceless. It has been
shown that Louisiana did enjoy gentleman rule; this fact re-enforces the classic proposition that political power follows from economic domination. Louisiana's wealth came from the plantation economy and for this reason, perhaps, it was the planter and merchant, the articulate upper classes, which dominated the government.

Less than half the population of voting age practiced suffrage in the four decades prior to the Civil War. Undoubtedly the majority of votes cast were upper class ballots. Yet, how many people bother to vote even if they have the privilege? In the presidential election of 1952, certainly an intensely heated election in Louisiana, only 40 per cent of the people of voting age voted. This percentage is little different than those in the decades under discussion. The backwoods farmers of north Louisiana and the "interior" population of south Louisiana, les petits habitants du bayou, probably outnumbered the planter-merchant groups. But it is an open question whether the problem of suffrage was major. These groups migrated to Louisiana, established homes and farms and self-sufficiency. Would they not seek economic security first? It might take time to develop the level of articulation enjoyed by the elite, and to participate in political affairs. Politics would become important when the farmer found he might have to fight someone else's war!

The figures do show the increase of able bodied voters, though, and indicate that a good many of the migrants must
have utilized the suffrage. Between 1830 and 1840 the popula-

tion of voting age almost doubled, while the number of
votes cast had increased by 150 per cent. It is significant
that this increase came before the liberalization of the suf-
frage requirements, too. In the next decade voting popula-
tion increased 60 per cent, and the number of votes cast had
increased by 80 per cent. Obviously the number of voters
had increased steadily in Louisiana.

Whether planters or farmers, the majority of the in-
creased voter population must have been Democrats. But with
the support in elections breaking even, there must have been
a subtle change in the combinations of groups supporting the
Whigs and Democrats. A new alignment of interests was in the
process of developing. Through emulation of the Whig aristo-
crats, or through identity of interests, portions of the
cotton planter class had left the Democratic party.

In the first election after the adoption of the new
constitution, the Democratic party, in 1846, successfully
supported the candidacy of Isaac Johnson, who received 54
per cent of the total vote of 23,354. The Democrats gained
a majority of two in the senate, whereas the Whigs, behind
De Buys, held a majority of three in the house. Johnson was
a member of the West Feliciana aristocracy; his leadership
of the state administration left little to choose from, so
far as accomplishments were concerned, between the new Demo-
crats and the old Whigs. However, the issue of slavery was
in emergence, an issue which the Democrats would face in a different manner than the Whigs.

The Wilmot Proviso was advanced nationally, in meeting the problem of the annexation of Texas. The storm of protest raised by southern politicians was indicative of the determination of a dominant element of the Democratic party to struggle for their views on slavery. This was sectionalism, and it remained to be seen whether the traditional parallel of Louisiana with national interests would be spread. As a spokesman of Louisiana Democrats, Governor Johnson answered in these words:

Noninterference of congress with the slavery question is the surest means of preserving the Union, and that doctrine should be insisted on with an unflinching resolution never to surrender it. To any proposition, therefore, to compromise that doctrine, the South, with the bitter and humiliating experience before her, will turn a deaf ear. Submission to incipient oppression prepares men for the yoke, and compromises on this question are nothing else than anti-slavery victories. The repeated, galling, and unprovoked aggressions of anti-slavery leave no room to anticipate a cessation of hostilities, and the South had been sufficiently warned that, if it is wise to hope for the best, it is equally prudent to prepare for the worst. It is far better to be lawless than to live under lawless rule.32

Despite these words, which suggest that then as now the use of the social process of compromise was little less than appeasement and almost treason, Johnson was not a strict party man; he appointed some Whigs to office, and tried to steer a middle course on the slavery question.

What areas of the state had given voting support to a Democrat of such ideas and actions? Although gaining but a slim majority of about 2,000 votes, yet Johnson had pluralities in thirty of the forty-three parishes which voted, indicative of the wide spread of his appeal. The highest Democratic vote was seated in the "interior" parishes of north and southwest Louisiana. (See Figure 8.) Likewise, the Floridas were strong in support of Johnson, the native son. The formerly named areas, where the Democratic farmer resided, show the effects of the lowered suffrage qualifications. This was the first election in which nearly all the parishes of the hills and the prairies registered support in the highest quartile of the Democratic percentages.

The sugar parishes remained the seat of the Whig support. However, parishes from cotton country likewise emerged with Whig leanings. Wherever there was a sizable layer of planter classes within the northern parishes, a rather even split of the vote occurred. In this election, in fact, both Union and Morehouse were on the list of parishes lowest in support of the Democratic candidate, and Madison and Concordia had given majorities to the Whigs, also. A very definite tendency toward Whiggery had emerged in the four "front" parishes of the Mississippi delta. Here the large scale planters preempted the levee lands and in back, along the secondary levees, more small planters were found. The election returns indicate that a difference in political opinion likewise
Gubernatorial Election 1846
Vote for Isaac Johnson
By Parishes

1st quarter: 21.4% - 47.0%
2nd quarter: 47.4% - 52.5%
3rd quarter: 54.2% - 61.7%
4th quarter: 63.0% - 77.2%

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1846

Figure 8
occurred. The significance in the distribution of the Democratic vote in this election, then, was twofold; it marked the cluster of strong Democratic tendency in the hills and the emergence of a Whig leaning among portions of the planter groups of cotton country.

Two years later, in 1848, the Whigs became enthusiastic concerning their chances in the gubernatorial campaign of 1850. The Whig candidate for president, Louisiana's General Taylor, was successful, and had carried Louisiana. Whigs should have known from past experience, however, that Louisianans were strong in their support of military heroes at the polls -- "old soldiers never die." Just as the Whigs remained in office despite the election of Jackson, so the Democrats in 1850 won despite the Taylor popularity.

The Democrats eked out victory in the race for governor in 1850. Joseph Walker, native of New Orleans, and president of the Constitutional Convention of 1845, had won with 51.4 per cent of the vote, a slim majority of just over a thousand votes over the Whig, Plauche. The campaign had followed national issues, among which was the problem of the Wilmot Proviso; the Democrats had opposed, and the Whigs had favored it. In his inaugural address Governor Walker gave much attention to the problem of slavery. These are his words:

Situated as we are, I think we owe it to ourselves, to our sister States of the South, and to our northern brethren, to declare that if, unhappily, the anti-slavery agitation, which has so long been allowed to insult our feeling should be carried to the point of aggression upon our rights; if the equality between all
the members of the Confederacy, established and guaranteed by the constitution, should be destroyed or trenched upon by the action of the general government, then we are prepared to make common cause with our neighbors of the slave-holding States, and pronounce the Union at an end. I shall look upon the dissolution of the Union as the greatest calamity that could befall us; but that, great as this calamity would be, I am certain there is no one of our citizens who would be willing for a moment, to weigh it in the balance against the dishonor of submission.33

Walker had been among the group of "radical" Democrats at the constitutional convention who had felt that the instrument had not gone far enough toward democracy. It could be assumed that the people, newly tasting of more democracy, would have given Walker great support at the polls. That such was not the case was the resultant of the continuation of a tendency noted in analysis of the preceding election. The geographical distribution of the highest quarter of support for Walker indicates that the supposed backing of the "people" was indeed apparent. (See Figure 9.) There was a cluster of Walker strength in the newer parishes created in northwest Louisiana. Indeed, the bulk of Democratic support came from the same "interior" parishes which had voted Democratic in 1846. However, the increased solidarity of the cotton and sugar plantation parishes in support of Whiggery was such that the total Democratic vote was evened.

The people had tasted of the joys of democracy, and it became apparent that they wanted an instrument that was absolutely democratic; the appointing power of the governor

33 Ibid., p. 73.
Gubernatorial Election 1850
Vote for Joseph Walker
By Parishes

1st quarter: 17.6% - 40.3%
2nd quarter: 43.8% - 54.3%
3rd quarter: 54.8% - 61.1%
4th quarter: 61.7% - 73.5%

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1850

Figure 9
was still too great. Governor Walker now opposed the calling of another convention; but the people demanded it, and a peculiar document resulted; it was both more radical and more conservative than the instrument of seven years previous. The Whigs were quick to perceive their opportunity in this movement and campaigned vigorously in the election for delegates. Their strategy showed they could not afford to be as openly anti-democracy "...with the same honest vindictiveness that had been used earlier. Jacksonianism had so popularized the word 'democracy' that those later Whigs shifted their strategy."\textsuperscript{34} Vernon Farrington observed concerning the national scene that "...instead of proclaiming democracy the mother of all mischiefs, they \textit{the later Whigs} welcomed it as an effective aid in vote getting."\textsuperscript{35} That such an approach was successful is borne out by the fact that of the membership of the convention the Whigs outnumbered the Democrats by 85 to 45. The \textit{Baton Rouge Gazette} hid its enthusiasm when the Whigs filled two-thirds of the seats in saying:

The Whigs have an awful responsibility resting upon them, and it behooves every Whig to work with diligence and to present to the people a constitution wise in its construction, liberal in its provisions and worthy of the great state of Louisiana and of the Whig party. We now have it in our power to place Louisiana beyond the reach of Locofocoism and to retain its government in our hands for years to come.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34}Prothro, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 62.

\textsuperscript{35}Parrington, \textit{op. cit.}, II, 152.

\textsuperscript{36}Prothro, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 62.
Diverse elements pushed through the 1852 convention, and its work reflects the demands of different groups. It met the demands of the people for a more democratic structure; every office became elective, including the judiciary, and terms of office were shortened. The Whigs did work with diligence, however, and in the changes made concerning representation saw to the perpetuation of their control of government. Representation was to be based upon total population rather than upon qualified voters. This meant that the planter interest would control the legislature, as their slaves would count in their favor. The Democrats had argued with some justification that "...one Whig master and his 1,000 slaves possessed representation in the General Assembly equal to 1,001 free, white Democrats."\(^{37}\) The Democrats were also in objection to the more liberal provision granted corporations and commercial interests generally. Yet, the Constitution was endorsed by the voters of the state, the feeling being that despite some objections this new instrument was more satisfactory than the one it superceded.

Under stipulations of the new Constitution, the citizens of Louisiana should vote for governor in 1852. The Democrats chose as their candidate Paul O. Hebert, resident of Iberville Parish and of Acadian lineage. Again as in the last election, the Democratic margin was very slim, this time a majority of less than 2,000 votes. His main support

came from the hill farmers of the interior parishes, and from
the Floridas. (See Figure 10.) Once more the cotton and
sugar planters showed their like-mindedness in joint support
of the Whig candidate, Bourdelon. Over half of Hebert's
slight lead might have been secured in New Orleans, where he
obtained 56.4 per cent, representing a majority of some 1,200
votes. Elements of city and country were lined up behind the
Democratic party; of course the same could be said for the
Whigs, save that the elements were of far different composi-
tion.

Louisiana supported the Democrat, Franklin Pierce,
in the 1852 presidential campaign. But the Louisiana Demo-
crats had not put up a united front. The impending dissolu-
tion of the National Whig Party and the consequential
weakening of the Louisiana Whigs presented the Democrats with
a secure situation in which to conduct a factional quarrel.
Events would prove the folly, however, of the meeting of the
slavery crisis in a one-party situation.

Factions were divided under the lead of two dominant
personalities. John Slidell was demonstrating his finesse
at the game of political arithmetic, becoming boss of Louisi-
a politics through combination of the unified support of
New Orleans Irish and the Jacksonian farmer of the "inter-
ior." Pierre Soule provided leadership of the opposing fac-
tion from his post as United States Senator. The personal
ambitions of these two men for political power became
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1852
VOTE FOR PAUL HEBERT
BY PARISHES

- 1st quarter: 17.3% - 45.5%
- 2nd quarter: 46.4% - 53.7%
- 3rd quarter: 53.8% - 60.0%
- 4th quarter: 60.3% - 78.2%

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1852

Figure 10
entangled with the issues of slavery and the possible gain that might follow from supporting one of the opposing streams of thought within the Democratic party. Each leader became a political Hamlet.

During the decade of the 1850's both Slidell and Soule shifted positions. At the beginning of the decade the national affiliations of the two men were in contradiction with their local stands. Slidell's supporters favored Buchanan and the radical wing of the national party, but Slidell was a Unionist. Soule's local support was sympathetic to Douglas and the conservative wing, while Soule himself was a sectionalist. While the situation in the national Democratic party remained unchanged, in 1860 Slidell had turned sectionalist and Soule was an ardent Unionist. It was written, "unto thine own self be true." These two men had been more concerned with alignment with a winning team than with the political resolution of a very serious problem. It was too late in 1860.

In the gubernatorial election of 1856, the American Party had appeared in Louisiana. It was unique in this section of the country, for nationally it had repudiated the Catholics. The bulk of the membership of the old-line Whig party found haven in the ranks of the American Party. They had believed the Democrats were voting the New Orleans Irish and other foreign born against them. Apparently, the anti-

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38 Greer, op. cit., XII, 381, and XIII, 462.
democratic tendency of the old Whig combined with the anti-foreign sentiment, overruling the solidarity of Catholicism. Still, although forwarded by the sugar parish Whigs, the Know Nothing candidate, Charles Derbigny, found strong support in cotton country, also. Perhaps the American Party had been supported because there was no other alternative than vote Democratic.

The Democratic candidate, Robert G. Wickliffe, was another of the West Feliciana elite. He had conducted himself so well in the legislature that he was boomed as a gubernatorial possibility. Wickliffe was a Douglas supporter and influenced the state nominating convention to endorse the Douglas Kansas-Nebraska Act as just legislation. The Louisiana Democrats then pledged cooperation with the northern Democrats so long as this branch accepted the ruling of Congress on slavery as set forth in the Act.39

The American Party was strong in New Orleans, and when the 1856 vote was counted, the city had given a very slight majority to Derbigny. The most significant result was the loss of support in many of the old-time Whig parishes of the sugar country. (See Figure 11.) Still, continued solidarity of cotton and sugar voters is to be noted. Wickliffe had

Gubernatorial Election 1856

Vote for Robert Wickliffe by Parishes

1st quarter: 27.5% - 49.1%
2nd quarter: 49.3% - 54.3%
3rd quarter: 55.2% - 61.1%
4th quarter: 61.9% - 93.1%

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1856

Figure 11
gained the support of the Democratic hill farmers again, and his appeal had apparently made some inroads on voting support in the Mississippi delta area. The Democrats had lost some ground in the Florida parishes, and Wickliffe had just barely won in his home parish of West Feliciana. Obviously the electorate was in favor of Democratic rule, but apparently, the issues of this campaign gave no directive as to alternatives. The planters in both north and south Louisiana demonstrated their anti-Democratic Party tendency, but that was about all.

The national Know Nothing Party ceased to function in 1857, but the New Orleans organization still showed some life. They controlled the city and did not want to surrender that control. Likewise, the large settled foreign population and the constant immigration of more foreigners was a factor working for them. The Know Nothings could continue to say they were the bulwark against Democratic manipulation of these groups. However, 1858 marked the climax of party activity. Speaking in 1859, Pierre Soulé summed up the political situation in Louisiana:

Partyisms are entombed in the past. The American Party, the Whig Party, exist no more as national or even state parties, though we may at times still see their shadows flit around our municipal halls and elective precincts. Their scattered fragments are in process of assimilation with the two factions into which the Democratic Party is divided.

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The gubernatorial election of 1860 became a struggle for control of the Democratic Party. Soulé faced Slidell for the showdown. The firmly entrenched support of "King John" prevailed in the nomination of Thomas O. Moore. In final desperation, Soulé organized an opposition party which was a coalition of "purifiers," or anti-Slidell Democrats, and the remnants of the Know Nothing party. Thomas J. Wells received the nomination of this group. The campaign issue boiled down to "for or against Slidell." The resulting victory for Slidell could have been forecast from the beginning. The electoral balance of two decades had been destroyed as Moore received a convincing 62.0 per cent of the votes cast. Soulé's candidate retained majorities in only two parishes, Orleans and Terrebonne, although the Jefferson vote was a toss-up.

The distribution of Moore's highest voting percentages is scattered in parishes throughout the state; however it is clear that the greatest anti-Slidell sentiment was seated in plantation parishes. (See Figure 12.) With the statewide support of Moore so strong, an interpretation of the voting percentages favoring the Slidell faction must remain in relative terms. This election had been a battle of factions and it was obvious which one had the greater support. Slidell sentiment was widespread, although most generally found concentrated in hill parishes or prairie. This vote was a Democratic one. In the previous election, for example, the four
Gubernatorial Election 1860
Vote for Thomas Moore
By Parishes

1st quarter: 40.5% - 58.4%
2nd quarter: 59.3% - 64.3%
3rd quarter: 66.9% - 74.4%
4th quarter: 74.7% - 95.4%

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1860
hill parishes of Bienville, Jackson, Caldwell, and Winn had registered votes in the highest quarter support for the Democratic candidate, Wickliffe, who had been a Douglas man. In 1860, the same four parishes recorded votes of over 70 per cent for Moore, who with Slidell's backing was in the other camp. The hill farmer voted Democratic out of tradition and did not look behind the party label.

The same could not be said for those parishes where planter groups were dominant; opinions appeared to be divided, since the electorate might have known more of what the factions stood for. Sugar parishes along the river marked a continuation of a trend toward Democratic support observed as early as 1850. Parishes of the upper Mississippi appeared on the list of Slidell supporters, although here Madison and Concordia, Know Nothing in 1856, were weaker in support of Moore's candidacy. Factional support in 1860 was divided, but no clear pattern emerged indicative of a clarity of issues.

E. An Evaluation of Political Tendencies, 1846-1860, and the Tragedy of Secession. It has been fashionable, following Roger Shugg,41 to make a socio-economic interpretation of the issues which led Louisiana to Secession. His thesis maintained that the planters were a dominant minority, who,

imposing their will, led the state out of the Union in order to protect their interests. A cleavage was found between the planter of the delta-lands and the farmer of the hills. Without doubt, such a cleavage did emerge in Louisiana politics. But the proposition to be maintained here is that this planter-farmer antagonism was a much later development which emerged from the actual factors which brought Secession and its aftermath.

Shugg's collection of detail and analysis of existing social classes was a masterful work. However, he wanted to go farther than the data allowed in the matter of describing actual class struggle, in this period. Exaggeration, though, is forgivable. If there was no manifest class struggle, Louisiana was the setting for a lively political struggle in which members of farmer, worker, and planter groups could engage. (In the 1850's there certainly was a growing sentiment of class consciousness in Louisiana society. The upper class was exploiting the lower white classes. This solidarity was reflected in the vote for parties. The Irish, for example, voted Democratic because the party took care of their interests. Success and failure in the political side of society marked the way to Secession.)

In the preceding analysis, it has already been suggested that the establishment of a traditional Democratic vote and a subtle shifting of party labels and alignments guaranteed, when the issue became crucial, that Secession
was inevitable. (To be sure, analysis of voting support demonstrates that the settlers of the "interior" parishes, the farmers of the hills and prairies, brought with them and practiced the ways of Jacksonian Democracy.) On the other hand, it had been shown that the planters of both the sugar and cotton country tended to line up behind different labels. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a spelling out of these political tendencies and their consequences.

Louisiana had become the land of the planters; and by 1850 Louisiana had come of age. Most of the fertile lands of the state were devoted to the plantation economy. Early French and Spanish masters had followed the practice of giving large grants of land along rivers and bayous; hence, large-scale land-owning became an integral part of Louisiana's development as an agricultural state. With the introduction of the two staples, sugar and cotton, in the nineteenth century, the great estates already in existence became even more profitable. Slaves constituted the laboring base of this economy, and their importation into Louisiana in ever increasing number before 1860 meant that the vested interests of the planter became more and more lucrative. The problem is to ascertain through what political channels these interests were protected and forwarded.

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At the same time, American immigration into Louisiana was continuing apace. The planter having preempted the more desirable land, the farmer pioneered the piney woods and the empty prairies, developing a subsistence agriculture. Undeniably, there was a striking contrast between the ways of life of farmer and planter as between two social worlds, but the farmer was not voiceless. (An electorate emerged from both groups; and it was discovered that the farmer was a die-hard Democrat. He made a fine pioneer because embraced within his political philosophy was a vital individualism; the farmer in coonskin was the first "rugged individual." )

New Orleans was the "New York" of the South. Thousands of immigrants came to the city, many from foreign shores. By 1860 there were over 81,000 foreign-born in the city. Of these there were 28,207 of Irish nativity, 26,614 people of German lineage, and over 14,000 from France. The Irish, as a general rule, became manual workers here as elsewhere; although they would work indiscriminantly with the Negroes, the Irish were given the privilege of the franchise. In the New Orleans of 1860 the whites outnumbered the Negroes three to one, an indication of the importance of the white labor vote which could be mustered. Planter unity was a phenomenon of the country, where Negro outnumbered white. The City of New Orleans regularly contributed over one-fifth of the total state vote, and hence the immigrant vote was one to be

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43 Greer, op. cit., p. 387.
reckoned with.

There were, then, in the prosperous Louisiana of the eighteen-forties and fifties, several population elements of political consequence. Political parties were dependent upon the alignments of portions of these elements. An understanding of Louisiana politics circa the decade of the 1850's requires an analysis of certain political tendencies. (The planter element was certainly the dominant minority -- together with the closely allied commercial interests, this element was master of the economic resources.)

Traditionally, however, the historian has separated this block of voters into cotton and sugar planters. There is evidence presented above which indicated that it is more realistic to isolate "planter" interests and identify them with the Louisiana Whig tendency. There was a general raprochement between sugar and cotton planters in the decade before the war. (The immigrants were the groups of number. The farmer of the hills and prairies was numerically more powerful than the planters of the delta; likewise, the laborer of the city occurred in greater number than the businessman and professional, the city cousins of the rural elite.) Determination of which way these groups voted will explain the complex of events which led to the great Secession.

In order to discover the political tendencies of the Louisiana electorate during the fifteen year period which preceded the Civil War, a map has been compiled which registers
POLITICAL TENDENCIES 1846 - 1860
AVERAGE QUARTILE DISTRIBUTION OF
DEMOCRATIC VOTE BY PARISHES

- 1st quarter: 1.00 - 1.74
- 2nd quarter: 1.75 - 2.49
- 3rd quarter: 2.50 - 3.24
- 4th quarter: 3.25 - 4.00

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1846 to 1860

Figure 13
the average incidence of each parish in a quartile computation of the gubernatorial elections held within the period. (See Figure 13.) The quartiles are represented by numbers 1 - 4, from low support to high. There were five such elections, each won by the Democrats; usually they had also gained control of the General Assembly. With the aid of the map it will be possible to ascertain the regularity of party support within different areas of the state, and to make a judgment concerning the groups of citizens involved.

The most striking observation which can be made is the general geographical distribution of the predominant Democratic tendency. It is seated within the "interior" where, with increasing populations, numerous new parishes had been created. The Jacksonian frontiersmen had preempted the land of these parishes. Investigation will show that the core group of parishes of the north Louisiana hills had registered strong Democratic majorities in election after election. Lafayette Parish, on the fringe of the southwestern prairies, and Calcasieu Parish both show strong Democratic leanings. These, also, were predominantly "farmer" areas. One would expect to find the Florida parishes preeminently among the strong supporters of the Democracy; yet this was not wholly the case. It may be recalled that these parishes had been settled by Americans, also, but at an earlier time than north Louisiana. The Americans here had developed a plantation economy which paralleled the way of
life of the Creole planters to the south of them. The political tendencies of these parishes were influenced by more complex factors than had been felt by the American farmers of the northern hills. (Plaquemines Parish sticks out like a Democratic thumb; close to New Orleans, its electorate was subjected to political machinations even in those early days. John Slidell assured the Louisiana electoral vote for Polk in 1840 by floating a voting contingent down the river from New Orleans to the Plaquemines parish seat, where a sizable majority was registered for the Democrats.)

The sugar planters had found repose within the ranks of the National Whigs. (The party was to die nationally, engulfed by the issues of slavery and the force of the Abolitionist movement. It could no longer hope to sustain the alliance between north and south. Whiggish sympathies were not to die out in Louisiana, however; even without party, the sugar planters and commercial alliances could not wholeheartedly support the Democratic cause. The distribution of Whig tendency, then, would be seated within the sugar country.) Within the deep delta, more slavish than the parishes to the north, the support for anti-Democratic candidates remained firm. Likewise, among the parishes of the old German and Acadian "coasts," along the River above New Orleans, the Whig tendency continued to the bitter end. These parishes had gained less population from immigration, and the planter unity prevailed. The most significant political expression within
the period under analysis, however, is to be found within the cotton country of the upper Mississippi delta, and as far north as Caddo on the Red River. Concordia, for example, was one of the original Louisiana parishes, and had emerged as a supporter of Whiggery in the 'forties and 'fifties. Although cotton was King in the southern Democracy, yet in Louisiana, at least, the cotton planters did not give the undying Democratic support which was evident elsewhere. In the eight cotton parishes, where slaves greatly outnumbered whites, half of them registered Whig tendencies after 1846. These were the four Mississippi delta parishes; in three of them, Concordia, Madison, and Tensas, the whites were outnumbered by ten to one, and in Carroll the ratio was three to one. Cotton was king and dependent upon slave labor. Yet prosperity was too great to risk all without first searching for a party of moderation. These were conservatives, and the Whig party had been the home of conservatism as well as aristocracy, in Louisiana.

The conclusion to be drawn is that Louisiana had come of age in the 'fifties, and a very definite cleavage between conservative planter and Democratic farmer was the dominant political tendency. With the breakdown of the Whig party organization and the division of the Democratic party into Slidell and Soule factions, large groups of Louisiana voters were left politically voiceless when the issue of Secession became crucial. It was too late in 1861; the conservative
sympathy for Union, compromise, and moderation had been rendered helpless in the political struggle for control of the Democratic party.

With a failure of party in 1860, the forces of Slidell captured the state for the Democracy. The farmer groups supported the "real" Democrats, out of tradition; victory was guaranteed. Factional strife among the Democrats and lack of party organization among the old-time Whigs merged in the presidential election of 1860 in such manner that a golden chance was missed to register a stand for moderation. The combined votes for the conservative Bell ticket and the compromising Douglas ticket would have been enough to have won the electoral vote of the state. As it was, the Breckinridge forces won; moderation was overwhelmed.

In the call for Secession which followed the next year, the electorate lined up, for or against, in the election of membership for the convention. Now, it was farmer and sugar planter who joined forces -- neither desired to resort to bloodshed in the protection of vested interests; but there were not enough hill Democrats, or planter Whigs, to halt the now inevitable move for disunion.

Inexorable circumstance had done its work. Party strife and failure, and cumulative political experience brought the great tragedy of Secession. And in Louisiana the tragic was touched with irony, for, how curious that it had been Josiah
Quincy of Massachusetts who had protested Louisiana's admission to the Union in 1811, and the Abolitionists of Massachusetts who vehemently protested her secession in 1861.
CHAPTER III
A NEW LOOK AT RECONSTRUCTION

— I certainly think that it is better to be impetuous than cautious, for fortune is a woman, and it is necessary.... to conquer her by force.—

Machiavelli

A. Picking Up the Pieces: 1864-1868. A failure of parties destroyed the opportunity to master fortune in the events which led to Secession. If it were correct that the war had been begun by and conducted for a slave-holding minority, then the probability was certain by 1864 that the dominated majority of 1861 could become the master of its own fate. For Federal forces controlled the Louisiana parishes surrounding New Orleans and vicinity; the Confederate troops stood in force beyond the Mississippi and up the Red River in north Louisiana. The people were to be allowed to pick up the pieces of Statehood and begin afresh the political struggle for power. A new Constitution was to be drawn and state offices filled. Within the Federal lines were the old conservative Whigs, who at the end had stood firm for the Union, and remnants of the Democracy in the persons of farmer and laborer. That farmer and laborer had built up an accumulation of grievances was to become manifest in the constitutional
instrument written in 1864.

Unionist sentiment, in 1863, was divided on the issue of the constitution.¹ One group favored Negro suffrage and held that the old constitution had been destroyed by the Secession. On the other hand, a more conservative group felt that only mulattoes should be given the vote, and they protested that the state government had been suspended, and that it should be revived. In January of 1864, General Banks ordered an election be held for state offices, and further, that in April delegates should be elected for a constitutional convention. The moderates nominated Michael Hahn for governor and James Madison Wells for lieutenant-governor. The radicals gave opposition with the nomination of B. F. Flanders. Upon becoming elected to the governor's chair, Hahn reiterated the views of the conservatives concerning Louisiana's constitutional status; in March, President Lincoln transferred to him the powers which had previously been exercised by the military governor. The governor allowed the call for a constitutional convention, issued by Banks, to stand.

The move for the Constitution of 1864, and the later one of 1868, may be viewed as a manifestation of a social revolution in which white labor and the newly-freed black

successively gained ascendancy. It has been suggested that the Constitution of 1864 must have been written by Louisianans whose memory of the problems of the state were fresh. They recalled the machinations whereby in 1852 the conservative Whigs had gained unequal strength in representation at the General Assembly. Perhaps this was one reason why no Negro suffrage was put forth at this time. "It was said that any grant of the suffrage itself to the Negro might well serve to re-establish the control of those on whom the Negro must depend for his livelihood." 

This constitution, rather, was to be a vehicle whereby the grievances of farmer and laborer would be redressed. The suffrage was extended to all white males of twenty-one years of age or over who could meet the one-year residence requirement. The constitution established representation on the basis of qualified voters, with no restrictions placed upon New Orleans. It revived the 1845 restriction on banks and corporations. A progressive income tax was inaugurated. Minimum wage and maximum hours for laborers in public work were established. There should be public schools for white as well as for black. Finally, slavery was abolished. This

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2R. W. Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1939), pp. 196-197. The year 1879, then, may be viewed as the inevitable counterrevolution.

was the first Louisiana constitution which had mentioned slavery. The constitution was ratified on July 23, with a vote of less than the ten per cent desired by Lincoln.

Louisiana, it appeared, was off to a good start in re-establishing her Statehood. Governor Hahn gave up his post in 1865 to serve as United States Senator; Wells succeeded to the post of governor, and although many felt that the recently adopted constitution was invalid, Governor Wells called for an election for state offices that year in accord with the provisions of the new instrument of government. Wells was nominated for the office of governor by the Democrats, and another group, appreciative of the merits of Louisiana's wartime governor, Henry W. Allen, nominated him for the position. This was little more than gesture, for Wells was elected by a large majority. Wells had been candidate for governor in unsuccessful opposition to Moore in 1860; he had been a Union sympathizer. Wells had by proclamation given full legal status to the Confederate parishes which had held out until the end of the war. His attitude was instructive:

Whatever may have been the cause of the outbreak and however bitter may have been the feelings engendered in the hearts of some, it is better that all such matters be buried out of sight forever. It is not the past, but the present and future, we have to deal with. You must go to work to organize civil government in your respective parishes."

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A contemporary sums up the feeling toward Wells in a letter written to ex-Governor Moore, exiled in Cuba:

Governor Wells bears.... the same happy relation to Louisiana that President Johnson bears to the whole South. Their instincts, if not of the States Rights school are yet for justice to the South and they are and will show themselves to be true to their instincts.... Governor Wells from a combination of circumstances.... [is] the most fortunate selection which could be made to carry out the true policy -- the President's policy -- the patriot's policy -- a reconstruction of the Union on the basis of the perfect equality of the states.5

A study of the distribution of the election returns in favor of Governor Wells might be instructive, revealing some indication of the appeal of his actions. Figure 14 shows that in fourteen parishes Wells had received 95 per cent of the vote or better; and there was a consistency in the distribution. It might be supposed that this electorate was anxious to have the affairs of government in order once more. Along the entire length of the Mississippi, the parish vote was overwhelmingly for Wells. These were plantation areas; the cotton parishes of this group had moved for Secession, whereas the sugar parishes had been in the ranks of the Cooperationists in 1860. Now they were in accord once more. The bulk of the remaining voting interests had followed, as there were only five parishes which had not given a majority vote for Wells.

Gubernatorial Election 1865

Vote for James Wells

By Parishes

- 1st quarter: 7.8% - 60.0%
- 2nd quarter: 61.0% - 79.0%
- 3rd quarter: 80.0% - 94.0%
- 4th quarter: 95.0% Above

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1865

Figure 14
The nature of the support given Wells in the election of 1865 seemed to assure that Louisiana would be able to realize a good reconstruction. However, there were other elements of the populace seeking political fortune from different premises than those of Governor Wells. The name Warmoth first made its appearance on the Louisiana scene; he was claimed by the Radical Republicans to be the delegate to Congress for the Territory of Louisiana. At the same time, political fortunes on the national scene bode ill for Louisiana. In 1866-67, the Republicans carried congressional elections by such majorities that they became determined to carry radical reconstruction into effect. When Louisiana rejected the 14th Amendment along with other southern states, the die was cast in the National Congress. The First Reconstruction Act of 1867 was passed, and Louisiana once more fell under military rule.

Wells had apparently been a man of moderation and sympathy for the problems of his state; he was also the only governor who served during Radical Reconstruction who had been a native Louisianan. After his election in 1865, however, he experienced trouble with the Democratic legislature. Although he had shrewdly enlisted the support of the numerically strong and influential ex-Confederates in furtherance of his own political fortunes, the old dominant groups had
ambitions of their own. Wells had pressed for the ratification of the 14th Amendment, but of course this did not fit into the plans of the conservative Democrats. But this was no time for the ex-Confederates to assert themselves with the expectancy that the social and political orders would fall back into the old slots. The Negro problem must be solved, but not through legislative actions bound to raise the anger of the Northern Radicals. No new black code, no matter how mild, could stand for long. Radical Republicans were organizing in New Orleans, and of course they too would have ambitions and plans of how best to attain them.

B. Politicians of Fortune: The Carpetbaggers, 1866-1876. The rapprochement of ex-Confederates with Unionists with such views as Wells entertained might have indicated that in a few years the former would be in a position of dominance and security, once more. However, this was not to be; in 1866 Wells joined forces with the radicals and reversed his stand on Negro suffrage. His remarks at this time stand as revealing testimony of the impending struggle for power between radical and conservative. He said, "...only by giving all Negroes the right to vote could the large Democratic or conservative majority possessed by the ex-Confederates in


7Shugg, op. cit., p. 212.
Louisiana be overcome." There could be no doubt now but what, with the renewal of Federal supervision, the lot of the white conservative would be dire.

General Sheridan instituted a registration of voters under provisions of the Reconstruction Act. Delegates for the constitutional convention were chosen and an equal number of whites and Negroes convened in 1868. The Constitution of 1868 was the first in Louisiana containing a Bill of Rights; a phrase from the Declaration of Independence was utilized. The social revolution inaugurated in 1864 had been continued. The Negroes were granted suffrage, and the political fortune hunters who were filling New Orleans established the residence requirements in such manner that they could proceed to act with the full privilege of citizenship; restrictions were placed upon unrepentant ex-Confederates. This meant that with the aid of the native scalawags, Republican domination would be guaranteed, providing the Negro vote could be influenced. It was possible to outnumber, or at least to outmaneuver, the Democrats.

The Constitution of 1868 was adopted by the eligible voters, and in the election for state offices Henry Clay Warmoth was elected governor. His lieutenant-governor was Oscar J. Dunn, a Negro. During the ensuing administration, Louisiana was to witness an unprecedented struggle for

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8Lowry, op. cit., p. 119.
political power. Democrat and Republican alike sought to use means, legal or otherwise, to ensure success for their side in the quest for state offices. The Negro had become an important political factor and "...Republican politicians organized the Negro vote, massed it, and carried it to the polls." Without education and with no previous political experience, the Negro was easily swayed; since the Negro population of the state was slightly larger than the white, the inference is obvious: the Negro vote would dominate any election. It was to combat this advantage that Democrats organized such secret societies as the Knights of the White Camelia, in order to intimidate the Negro and to secure white supremacy.

Prior to the gubernatorial election of 1872, then, the Louisiana Democrats became radicals. Finding peaceful means to gain the upper hand would fail, they utilized their "white man's association." Warmoth had charged the former governing group with disgraceful acts of intimidation as early as the presidential election of 1868. Reconstruction was in full swing in 1871; but as occurs in any power struggle of such open admission as this, coalitions were transitory. The Republicans commenced to quarrel among themselves, and two factions emerged, each with a candidate for governor. One faction consisted of the governor, Warmoth, and his supporters; the other faction consisted of the "customhouse crowd," which handled patronage and was close to the Radicals.

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of the National Congress. The former group nominated John McEnery for governor, while the candidate of Packard and the customhouse group was William Pitt Kellogg.

In this quarrel the Democrats thought they saw an opportunity, and they fused with the Warmoth faction in opposition to Kellogg. When the returns came in, victory was claimed by McEnery, but the rival "returning board" of the Kellogg group counted victory for their faction. Two rival governments were set up; but the customhouse group gained official recognition from the Federal government, and the count of their Returning Board was established.

It is a political paradox worth noting\(^\text{10}\) that the Democrats, who had heaped so much scorn upon Warmoth earlier, should now have gone down in defeat with him. For, given the alignment of support they were able to muster, the move of the Democrats for fusion had seemed a wise one. The returns which had been made official gave Kellogg a majority of over 17,000 votes; the New Orleans compilation was allowed to stand with a 6,000 majority for McEnery. The Republicans piled up their count, apparently, in the parishes with large Negro registration, where it could be safely assumed they were strong.

In defeat, the distribution of the fusion support for McEnery demonstrates the part the Democrats had played.

\[^{10}\text{Norton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 196.}\]
(See Figure 15.) The parishes of the northern hills and of the southwestern prairies, and the Floridas, registered anew their Democratic tendencies. The vote from West Feliciana Parish, one of the richest plantation districts in ante-bellum days, was pro-Republican, but the Florida parishes to the east, where the Negro was less numerous, tended to support the Democratic cause. Already in emergence is to be found the "fracture line" of subsequent Louisiana politics. The parishes along the length of the Red and the Mississippi rivers show a unity of electoral support, in 1872, of course, held together by the vote of the Negro. Here the pattern that is going to be typical in the future appears for the first time -- but "in reverse," so to speak.

This was a struggle to the political death. Governor Kellogg showed no disposition toward moderation; his rule was absolute. Louisiana became an armed camp in 1873 as a result of the "Colfax riot" which had resulted in the death of a number of Negroes. Federal authorities had a necessary excuse for keeping troops in the state. The Negro had found a place in Louisiana politics, but his position was an uncomfortable one. Salvation of the state lay in overthrowing the rule of the Negro, the Democratic majority of the white people of Louisiana believed. It might be true that the Negro became the scapegoat in the development of this critical situation in the state. "It is... impossible to trace White political issues and cleavages without reference to the Negro
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1872
VOTE FOR JOHN McENERY
BY PARISHES

1st quarter: 0.0% - 26.2%
2nd quarter: 26.6% - 41.6%
3rd quarter: 42.9% - 56.9%
4th quarter: 59.3% - 94.7%

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1872

Figure 15
as the common enemy, the red herring across all political trails.\textsuperscript{11}

The point of view has merit, but it has generally been utilized incorrectly. In 1865, during the constitutional debate, it was seen that neither the Democrats nor the Conservative Unionists had been for Negro suffrage; but since such a fact as Negro suffrage was to become a political reality, most certainly the conservative Democrats would have developed sentiment one way or another concerning it. Negro suffrage was a stern reality, and the block of Negro votes became enormously important. It was a support worth struggling for if political fortune was the goal.

The first inclination was to attempt to discredit the Negro at the polls; the planter would insure that his former slave would look ridiculous as a citizen. The events which actually followed lend credence to the remarks of P. B. S. Pinchback, Louisiana's only Negro governor:

Democrats in many portions of the state instigated and thrust forward the most ignorant colored men that could be found for election to the Constitutional Convention with the view of making that Constitution a farce; and in order to make success certain, they put no competing candidate in the field.... The illiterate men returned home successful statesmen and from that day to this nearly every man in Louisiana has felt himself every inch a statesman and from this policy has arisen in a great degree the ignorance that has found its way into the public offices of our state.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11}P. Lewinson, Race, Class, and Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 4.

\textsuperscript{12}A. S. Grosz, The Political Career of P. B. S. Pinchback (unpublished master's thesis, Louisiana State University, 1943); Pinchback before House of Representatives, June 8, 1874.
There were other ways of attempting to meet the problem of manipulation of the Negro vote. After the defeat of 1872, in the local elections which preceded the next gubernatorial election, the Democrats prepared for drastic action. The Shreveport Times published this warning:

The carpetbaggers' careers are ended; we are determined to tolerate them no longer; and if they care for their infamous necks, they had better stop their work right now and look out for a safer field for rascality.13

Federal control made it impossible to overthrow Negro rule in a legal manner, so it was decided to circumvent Negro domination by subterfuge or extralegal action.

In 1876, the Democrats overcame the carpetbaggers; and since there was an increase in the total vote of over 30,000, it is not feasible to believe that they won by suppressing the Negro vote, though they might have stuffed ballot boxes. In fact, the Democrats went all out to woo and win the Negro to their cause. The cumulative results of carpetbag misrule likewise weighed heavily against the Republicans. Particularly, the exploitation of the state coffers by these political adventurers, and the fact that the Negro had gained little by these financial maneuvers, weakened Republican chances. It became evident early in the campaign that the Negro vote would again play the deciding factor, and the Picayune keynoted the policy of the Democrats:

13Norton, op. cit., p. 196.
We must convince the Blacks that we are in earnest in our expression of good will, and they, for their part, must evince a disposition to meet us half way. As ours is the superior race, at least by culture and experience, it becomes us to take the initiative. Let us endeavor to persuade the colored people that an alliance of the two races is necessary to the preservation of their common safety.  

This policy must have borne fruit, as the Democratic candidate, Francis T. Nicholls, from Lafourche Parish, polled a clear majority over the Republican candidate, Packard.  

An inspection of the distribution of the Nicholls vote will indicate, however, that if the Negro had voted Democratic in some numbers, the resultant was a general spread of the total vote; for it is clear from the compiled map that the parishes predominantly Negro were still foremost in the Republican count. (See Figure 16.) Future events were to prove that the Democratic party control remained with the old planter elite. They won their victory, however, with the strong support of the farmer's vote. The bulk of the highest quartile of the Nicholls' parish vote was distributed in the hills and prairies. The ancient Democratic prejudice remained a factor to be reckoned with.

And what of the old Whig country? All of the parishes of the sugar country were predominantly Negro; together with New Orleans they were the seats of Republican strength. Coupled with remaining Negro strength in Red River and

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GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1876
VOTE FOR FRANCIS NICHOLLS
BY PARISHES

Source: Report of Secretary of State. Louisiana, 1886-88

Figure 16
Mississippi delta parishes, the Republicans were formidable. Still, white Democrats had achieved a signal victory, but there was no pronounced political change, in the results of this election, either way. One student of the period summarized:

The change of political control did not bring forth any outstanding modification of political principles nor any great improvement in public morals. With the exception of Governor Nicholls and a few others, the new public servants were not especially concerned with improving the lot of the masses.15

Governor Nicholls had promised not to be counted out by a carpetbag Returning Board should he be elected; he would beat the Republicans at their own game. After a year of Republican opposition, in 1877 President Hayes recognized the Nicholls government, and Federal troops were withdrawn from Louisiana. Packard surrendered the State House to the White League; "Reconstruction" was over. This event did not signal the establishment of white supremacy, however, for there were still many parishes where Negroes were entrenched in local office. Likewise, one of the institutions of Reconstruction, the Louisiana Lottery Company, remained a force of political influence. It had donated funds to the administration in 1877 and, with great strength in the legislature, was seeking to perpetuate its influence by an extension of its charter, first established in 1868.

Nicholls began his opposition which was to culminate successfully in 1892; he vetoed the legislative enactment. The Lottery Company gained relief from the Federal courts, however, and in 1879 joined its influence with the legislature in a move for a constitutional convention. This was the inevitable counterrevolution of the movements of 1864 and 1868. It was not surprising that the Constitution of 1879 should have imposed strong restrictions upon the legislature and granted the executive powers rivaling 1812.

As it appeared on paper, this constitution was not a reactionary instrument; there had been no move to disenfranchise the Negro at this time. Of course such an action was prohibited by fear of the action of the Federal government. No, it was the attitude of the new ruling group which was reactionary, as the events of subsequent decades were to show. The actions of 1879 mark the emergence of the "lilywhites," for the Democratic party, under the direction of the conservatives, became the "...institutionalized incarnation of the will to White Supremacy."\(^{16}\)

It was the planter-merchant elite which re-emerged triumphant. White support for the new Democracy might have appeared solidary, but the ability to use the hindsight of the present day suggests that the dominant group in the Democratic party would make the moves to protect its position

whenever the time and the event should present itself. Any rebel would have to oppose the established hierarchy of the one political party to achieve redress of a grievance. In the end, the Yankee failed in his mission to Reconstruct the South and especially the southern attitudes. Cash reminds us:

So far from having reconstructed the Southern mind.... in its essential character, it was the Yankee's fate to have strengthened it almost beyond reckoning, and to have made it one of the most solidly established, one of the least reconstructible ever developed.17

C. The Emergence of the Lilywhites. The experience of Reconstruction took on proportions of a first class traumatic episode within the ideological structure of Louisiana's governing elite; a political bill of goods was fashioned which depicted carpetbag political adventurer and Negro supporter as the bogeymen. Catharsis lay in action designed to perpetuate forever the assurance of political supremacy.

( Drawing from the experience of the past, elements of both Whig and Jacksonian philosophy were accepted as dogma.) The planter groups, which had shown a tendency toward political alliance, before the issue of Secession arose, were to continue the spirit of Whiggery; and the farmer groups, whose Democratic tradition was utilized by elements of the former groups before the War, were to continue to be susceptible to the appeals of Jacksonian Democracy.

However, the struggle for power was to become more

17Ibid., p. 107.
naked, and groups of cotton planters, using the machinery of the Democratic party to their own ends, were to fail to practice the political responsibility which had gone hand in hand with the political authority of the old sugar country Whig. In revamping the economic losses brought by the War, the sons of planters became "rugged individualists" and managed, through continued alliance with city commercial interests and the establishment of an avaricious credit system, to maintain the dominance of large-scale agriculture. It has been concluded that "...the end result was that the dogma of an individualistic democracy became the accepted political theory of a state permeated with the spirit of Whiggery."\(^\text{18}\)

It has been said that Reconstruction ended with the withdrawal of Federal troops in 1877. (A recent evaluation of the period, however, indicates that more realistic, if unpopular, justification lies in closing the period with the Democratic success in the elections of 1878.\(^\text{19}\) In this year white supremacy was established through Democratic fraud, violence and intimidation against the Negro. A contemporary had written:

The election of 1878 marked the final overthrow of the Republican party in Louisiana. In 1876 we had elected Nicholls governor on a state ticket, but it took 1878 to finish the work. So complete was the overthrow of the Radical-Republican-Negro party... at that

\(^{18}\)Prothro, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 154.

election, that from that time to this, it has never been able to elect a constable, even in the parish.\footnote{20}

The Democrats were taking no chances and fanned the flame of white solidarity;\footnote{21} reigns of terror had been established in several parishes in an attempt to intimidate the Negro. These disclosures are revealing, as they indicate the extent to which Reconstruction experience became a rationalization justifying actions as severe as had been practiced earlier by the former rulers; and this after 1876, when the whites had attempted to persuade the Negro that a vote for the Democrats was more in line with his interest.

Singletary has revealed the duplicity of the whites' action. Their first reaction had been non-recognition of the facts of 1878, but the Democrats were actually too proud of their achievements to remain discreetly quiet. The claim was prevalent that the Negroes had voluntarily voted the Democratic ticket, but the facts of actual violence robbed this argument of support.\footnote{20, quoted from letter of Newton C. Blanchard to John R. Ficklin, Feb. 9, 1903.} A favorite theme of Democratic rationalization was that the actions were not the resultant of prejudice against the Negro as Negro, but against the Negro as a political leader. \footnote{21, Ibid., p. 66 ff.} "From a moral viewpoint, the negro was, on the average, a good citizen; the negro politician vile. From a political viewpoint, both were..."
bad.\textsuperscript{22} (Therefore, whether "accidentally" or "incidentally," the Negro in 1878 became the object of white terror based primarily on political grounds. The inescapable conclusion is that in 1878 the Republican party was not given a free ballot in a fair election.)

(The emergence of the reality of White Supremacy, through the use of such desperate measures, marked the mood of the time.) The important question to answer in this connection is who gave electoral support to the standard bearers of this movement. (A planter-merchant elite reestablished itself in the political saddle, but it could stay there only through gaining support of the farmer groups and a portion of the Negro group, or through intimidation of either or both.)

The thesis that race prejudice, \textit{per se}, united the whites after the War in the ascendancy of the Democratic party must be re-examined.\textsuperscript{23} It has been supposed that the presence of the slave before the War had given the poor and white, farmer and laborer, a privileged position on the social ladder. There was someone lower to be looked down upon; hence, the farmer did not turn justifiable rage against the wealthy planter who had dominated him politically. Race prejudice filled the void of class hatred. (The Jacksonians of the 'forties could effectively escape the fear of the

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{23}Shugg's popular contention.
Negro, whereas the farmer-Democrat of the 'seventies and 'eighties could not afford to ignore him.

But is it absolutely necessary to hold that the Jacksonian hill-farmer should have been concerned about the race problem unless his way of life were threatened? Then he would quite naturally protest the necessity of fighting someone else's war. After all, the Negro was conspicuous by his absence in the areas of settlement predominantly farmer. Moreover, as Cash has pointed out, the farmer of the south was not directly exploited by the plantation system, either; the farmer could act as a relatively free agent within society. Could not the old Jacksonian think for himself and vote his traditional beliefs? We shall never know, for aside from the evidence of his vote there is no record. The hill-farmer as the south Louisiana Cajun had no press through which to articulate his opinions, for such mediums of communication were established and dominated by the self-styled aristocracy of planter-merchants.

The events of the 1880's would more likely substantiate the thesis concerning incipient class struggle and the fanning of the flame of racial prejudice. Economic exploitation of the farmer would become more apparent through the development of the crop lien system. The white family farmer became dependent on the cotton merchant through indebtedness, and the merchants and planters controlled the (new)

\[2^k\text{Cash, op. cit., p. 39.}\]
Democratic party. Here lay the foundation for group struggle culminating in the political explosion of the 1890's. With fears of economic insecurity, the farmer might admit to the compulsion of using the Negro as the political whipping boy, just as in another age the fear of the communist threat was to lead good-hearted men to condone the slander of the Liberal.

D. Solidarity in the Hills: 1879-1892. If the dominating elements of the Democratic party were prepared to fight to make the state safe for white democracy, then they must turn to the hills for support. Without the threat of the Negro vote, experience had shown the natural majority of the Democratic party support in the state. The quest for political supremacy was more arduous now and required the dogma of solidarity. An investigation of the distribution of the Democratic support by parishes, in the period of a little more than a decade in the 'eighties, will reveal the pattern of success of the lilywhites. An election by election discussion will be followed by a summary and evaluation of the tendencies which are revealed.

In 1879, following the successful ratification of the new constitution, the Democrats elected Louis A. Wiltz governor of Louisiana. Of the total vote cast, 63.5 per cent was in favor of Wiltz; his majority of over thirty-one thousand was a large increase over the rather close majority of some eight thousand which Nicholls had received in 1876.
Significantly, there was a sharp decrease in the number of Negro votes, assuming that the Negro vote was a Republican vote. Since the total white vote was smaller, also, in 1879, the indication is that some thirty thousand fewer Negroes had gone to the polls; and there were more Negroes registered than white voters. Suggestion of intimidation once again appears when an inspection is made of the distribution of voting support.

Although the support for the Republicans remained seated in the sugar country of the southern delta, in the election under discussion, the continuation of the political "fracture line" up the Red River and along the upper Mississippi delta appears disrupted. The parishes involved were composed of populations of Negroes outnumbering the whites. Since the voter registration figures favor the Negroes, also, only one conclusion is feasible.

Ten parishes registered a Democratic vote of more than 98 per cent. This was solidarity; or it might just as realistically have been the effect of intimidation or machine pressure. Most of these parishes had consistently given Democratic majorities, but never such proportions as these. Likewise, the predominant group in each was the farmer. These were the hill parishes where the Negro had never resided in great number; at least this was the situation in most of the ten parishes under consideration. In the two decades since 1860 the Negro had actually migrated in large number into the
parishes bordering Arkansas. Winn and Sabine had shown decreases in Negro population.

The incidence of this high voting percentage, however, would not assume such significant proportions were it not for the fact that it occurred in a clustering of parishes. (See Figure 17.) Stretching from Franklin and Richland, on Macon Ridge, to Sabine and Vernon, on the Texas border, the group is broken only by the parishes through which the Red River flows, and of course the planter was the dominant element here. Almost all of the parishes fringing this Democratic core area had also produced relatively high votes for the same party.

The factor which counts heavily in favor of interpreting this phenomenon as a demonstration of Democratic manipulation is the diversity of the composition of the population in some of the parishes. Desoto, to the west, and Ouachita, Richland, and Franklin on the eastern fringe, were parishes where planter interests were great and where the Negro population outnumbered the white; and in the case of Ouachita, there was also the commercial town of Monroe to take into consideration. Ouachita gained around 8,000 in Negro population from 1800 to 1880. In the core parishes of the hills, the Democratic tendency was already strong; it had not been so readily visible in the parishes of the fringe.

This pattern of voter solidarity again appeared in
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1879
VOTE FOR LOUIS WILTZ
BY PARISHES

- Below 50.0%
- 50.0% - 59.9%
- 60.0% - 96.8%
- 98.0% and Above

Source: Report of Secretary of State, Louisiana, 1886-88
Once more the seat of Republican opposition is found in the sugar country, with some vestiges of Republican tendency showing in Grant and East Carroll. However, this time, there were twelve parishes with a vote favoring the Democratic candidate, McEnery, by more than 98 per cent. West Carroll and Tensas joined the block of solid Democratic parishes, and these had compiled votes of over 80 per cent for the Democratic candidate the previous election. The former, another Macon Ridge parish, was predominantly an area of farmers, although the Negro population outnumbered the white, in the population count of this decade. But East Carroll, on the Mississippi, was planter dominated in contrast to a large farmer class in West Carroll. In the former the Negroes outnumbered the whites by ten to one; the proportion was nearly equal in West Carroll. Tensas was a parish of planters which had, of course, registered high Republican votes in the years of Negro support of the carpetbaggers.

The results of the gubernatorial election of 1888 show a slightly different distribution of voting support. (See Figure 19.) There was not only the appearance of gaps in the block of sugar parishes which favored the Republican party, there also appeared to be a shift in the distribution of parishes with strong Democratic leanings. Seven of the parishes which had given over 98 per cent of support to the Democrats continued to do so; and two new parishes, Morehouse and
Gubernatorial Election 1884
Vote for John McEnery
By Parishes

- Below 50.0%
- 50.0% - 66.0%
- 74.8% - 97.8%
- 98.0% and Above

Source: Report of Secretary of State, Louisiana, 1886-88

Figure 18
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1888
VOTE FOR FRANCIS NICHOLLS
BY PARISHES

- Below 50.0%
- 50.0% - 71.4%
- 73.1% - 97.7%
- 98.0% and Above

Source: Report of Secretary of State, Louisiana, 1886-88
Figure 19
Madison, were added to the list. However, West Carroll and Richland, registered less support in this election. Likewise, Winn Parish, in the heart of the hills, no longer approached one hundred per cent solidarity in its voting tabulations. Cameron and East Feliciana round out the group of parishes which approached perfect unity. The lure of Democratic solidarity was fading, or the accomplishments of Democratic administrations, perhaps, was not all to be desired.

The most significant aspect of these political tendencies which were expressed in the 1880's lies in the emergence of the events of the next decade. This will be discussed below in the following section. However, this phenomenon of Democratic solidarity also must be viewed in light of the actions of the time. The Democrats had regained control of state politics in the "seventies, and although the Republicans remained a determined, if out-voted opposition, they continued to put up a ticket for each gubernatorial election." To win elections, the Democrats had to somehow counter the numerical strength of the Negro vote.

Unless some other alternative is brought forward, the thesis must stand that the emergence of the Bourbon Lilywhites was a political paradox. Their support would have to come from plantation-Negro areas of cotton country and from farmer areas; but these groups had nothing to gain from acceptance

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of such political bedfellows. Did the planter-merchant group which dominated the Democracy sell the farmer the idea that the Negro in politics was bad for him, or did they control the vote in both Negro and farmer areas?

The necessity for white solidarity had been forwarded by the dominant minority. The theory of the "self-fulfilling prophecy" states that as people define the social situation so it shall become through their consequent actions. The grand old Democratic party was threatened by the vote of the Negro, so he must become a scapegoat. Racial hatred might have been an exaggeration of the Bourbon, but the solidarity of the farmer was a reality.

The most striking Democratic success at the polls in this period occurred in those parishes where a unified front was least needed. Solidarity would mean little in the ten parishes with a support of over 98 per cent for the Democratic candidate of 1879, for example. For the combined vote of these parishes would have been but a third of the majority of the total Democratic vote for governor. Moreover, the combined white registration outnumbered the Negro registration almost two to one. What the Democrats wanted, then, must have been control of the local parish political machinery, to augment their state-wide control; and no logic could deny that the predominant farmers groups of these parishes would

prefer white to Negro control in the political offices on
the local level.

As the voting results of the decade have shown, there
was little trouble in gaining solidarity. In this endeavor
the Democrats were eminently successful, if the statistics
have any meaning. It would be far easier to control a par­
ish where the predominant political tendency had always been
Democratic, and where the Negro vote was small. The politi­
cians were intent upon spreading the techniques of success
as widely as possible; and in the end it would prove easier
to deal with the Negro populations than with the whites of
certain parishes, at least. Whereas in the political strug­
gle the party could draw upon a traditional vote in the farm
areas and forward the ideology of racial solidarity, events
were to prove that in the accompanying economic sphere the
patent lack of a union of interests in this alignment worked
against the Bourbon.

Competent research has amply demonstrated the fact
that by the end of the 1880's the plantation system had not
only survived in Louisiana, but had also become established
as the predominant agricultural system.\(^\text{27}\) The political con­
sequence of this is the fact that the agrarian base of the
old Jacksonian Democracy, Louisiana style, was destroyed;

\(^\text{27}\)Shugg, op. cit.; also W. E. Highsmith, Louisiana
During Reconstruction (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Loui­
siana State University, 1953). Highsmith had special Census
data which Shugg had not used.
gone was the self-sufficiency of the frontier farmer, gone, in fact, the frontier. The pre-Civil War pattern of large land-holdings still prevailed in the delta lowlands, and although the farmers of the hills still worked their small plots, they devoted their efforts to raising cotton. Many farmers enjoyed a prosperity rivaling the planter; but the results of one-crop farming were insidious. As more and more Louisianans devoted their lands to cotton, the crop lien became established. In bad years indebtedness increased, farms were lost through forfeiture, and farmers were forced into tenancy. An economic situation was established whereby the farmer class might find itself building up new and real resentments toward the planter-merchant elite which could manage to ride out the failure of a bad crop.

The difference in the incidence of Negro participation in elections was striking to the south, in the sugar country. Here was seated the continued support of Republicanism in Louisiana during the 1880's.\(^28\) The party had survived, after 1877, due to the fact that it controlled the Federal patronage in the state during much of the period from 1877 to 1900. Funds were available with which to maintain party organization and a sizable following. However, this factor alone cannot explain away the large Negro vote in the sugar country which brought to the Republicans the label of the "Black" party.

\(^{28}\)Uzee, op. cit.
To be sure, the predominant Negro registration would guarantee a Republican majority in most sugar parishes, but the question could be asked as to why the Negro could vote here while his participation in elections was discouraged in cotton country. In the first place, the sugar plantation, although it had been devastated by the events of the War years, had remained the stable economic unit of the area. Large land-holdings were maintained and sharecropping was far less prevalent. Yet, the primary conclusion concerning lack of widespread Negro intimidation in south Louisiana must be a sociological one. There was a cultural tradition manifest in the French background and the presence of the Catholic Church. The more "tolerant" mood in regard to Negro voting in sugar country also happened to coincide with the planters' Republican leanings, which were of an economic basis.

E. The Populist-Republican Fusion: 1892-1900. Reconstruction, as generally viewed, had ended by 1880, but political reconstruction was not over, for the ascendancy of the Bourbon-Democrat was not fully assured; and the assertion of the Dogma of White Supremacy not fully accepted. The Populist Party appeared on the Louisiana scene in the election of 1892 and made its strongest inroads in that part of the area of Democratic solidarity which had been manifest in the eighties. The success of the Populists was to set up a severe challenge to the continued supremacy of the Bourbons; to maintain their economic security there was nothing more
rewarding than political success.

The Democrats had somehow established a solid front against the opposition of the Black Republicans; but now the farmer groups, upon whom the Democrats had depended so heavily, became Populists, in head-on conflict with the party of their formerly intense preference. The Democrat had shown the farmer of the 1880's that in unity there was strength; how well the farmer had learned his lesson would be demonstrated in the political battles of the 1890's. It could be held that the Bourbons no longer needed the support of the farmer; but the actions of the Democrats in the decade of the nineties in Louisiana were to dispel this notion.

Why did the farmer of the hills lose faith and disavow the established Democratic solidarity? The answer to that question can be stated in socio-economic terms. The movement for Populist-Republican fusion became one in which elements of farmer groups became class conscious and joined others who sought economic redress through political action. Self-sufficiency for the farmer had vanished with the passing of the frontier, and the heavy concentration upon the one cash crop of cotton, served to place him in an untenable situation. He was under the mercy of the merchants of the country towns; with a crop failure the farmer must find credit to fill his needs or lose farm and go down into tenancy. The conclusion is valid that "... the plantation system not only survived, with modifications of labor and finance, but extended to the
upland farms to make trouble for the future." This pattern was not peculiar to Louisiana, but was a familiar one throughout the south.

The historian of Populism, John Hicks, placed the movement in the common perspective of the south and the nation when he wrote:

The Populist Party was almost exclusively a farmers' affair. Its roots lay in the acute agricultural distress that overtook both the New West and the New South toward the end of the eighties. Impressed with the occasional effectiveness of labor unions and eager to win comparable victories for agriculture, the farmers of both sections began to band themselves together into farm orders of various names and natures.

Two great branches, the Northern and the Southern Alliances, met with great success in their forays into local and statewide politics. So much so, that in 1892 a movement was initiated to merge the two into a national People's Party. This was accomplished despite much southern reluctance in making a move for a third party which might upset the newly won White Supremacy. There could be found little reluctance amongst the Louisiana Populists when they went into political battle in the gubernatorial election of 1892.

In 1892 the Lottery issue split the parties with the results that four candidates were entered in the race for

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29 Shugg, op. cit., p. 273; Highsmith, op. cit., Ch. X "Problems of Money and Lands."

30 J. D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1931).

governor. The Democrats split between the factions headed by Murphy J. Foster and ex-Governor McEnery. Fearing that solidarity would be breached, the Democrats called for a state-wide vote to solve the issue of candidacy. This move was the forerunner of the party primary in Louisiana. McEnery was the candidate of the Lottery Company, although he denied the claim. When Foster became the choice of the Democrats, McEnery decided to run anyway. Foster had fought the Lottery in the legislature. He was a gentleman from St. Mary, and in the fight against the Lottery he had gained many friends. It has been said that he had "... led the forces of morality to victory over the graft and corruption that permeated the state government." If it were true that the Democratic dogma required absolutes, then they had found the man for the job, a man versed in the imagery of persuasion. Concerning the Lottery he had asked "... the mothers of this land when they kneel with their little ones at prayer to teach them to pray: Lead us not into this temptation, deliver us from this evil and save us from this polluting monster." 


The Republicans were split, also, over the Lottery question, with the Warmoth Faction opposing, while the Kellogg faction championed it. The former group nominated John E. Breaux, and the latter nominated Albert H. Leonard. The newly organized People's Party nominated R. L. Tannehill. The Lottery issue was robbed of significance prior to the election when the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the anti-lottery postal law.\textsuperscript{35}

Something was wrong with the old Democratic unity, when the "real" candidate of the party, Foster, was given but 44.5 per cent of the total vote cast. Even without the defection of McEnery, the Democratic party would have polled some six per cent less votes than in the previous gubernatorial election. In this situation, the Republicans might well become enthusiastic about chances in the next elections. Even though the Lottery question had lost force, yet the candidates had lined up more or less on that basis. Hence it is interesting to find the quite sharp split in the vote between north and south Louisiana. Perhaps the issue of the Lottery had a religious or cultural connotation. At any rate, the distribution of highest parish support for the candidacy of Foster clustered along the Arkansas Border in north Louisiana, although he was at home in south Louisiana. Here, in

\textsuperscript{35}\textup{Uzee, op. cit.}
south Louisiana, the only overwhelming Foster support was found in St. Mary and neighboring Acadia and St. Martin. The Floridas were likewise safe for the Democracy.

Support for the candidacies of McEnery and the Republican hopefuls was seated in south Louisiana almost exclusively, save for the Republican support of Leonard in Tensas. (See Figure 20.) Leonard, from Caddo, received pluralities in seven parishes strung along the Mississippi from Pointe Coupee to St. Charles. In this election, at least, the color line was not apparent in the political support within the area. The emergence of this situation made the possibilities of new alignments in the quest for political supremacy more certain.

The highly significant result of this election of 1892 was the emergence of support for the People's Party; but the significance lies not so much in the support, but in its location. (See Figure 21.) The break of the near-perfect solidarity in behalf of the Democrats which had existed in the hills in the eighties was the more striking in its suddenness. Yet, the beginning of the shift of the unified support to the parishes of the Arkansas border was seen in 1888. Five parishes, in 1892, registered pluralities in favor of the People's Party, and this when there were four other choices. Each of these parishes was comprised of a farmer population, where the whites outnumbered the Negroes. Moreover, there were seven other parishes with a sizable
Gubernatorial Election 1892
Vote for Murphy Foster
By Parishes

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1892

Figure 20
Gubernatorial Election 1892
Pluralities for Losing Candidates

- Tannehill (People's Party)
- McEnery (Sugar Planters)
- Leonard (Kellogg Republicans)

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1892

Figure 21
Populist vote clustered adjacent to the core group; and in these parishes there were also goodly numbers of white farmers. In fact, the whole group of parishes with these Populist leanings comprise the bulk of what are popularly known as the "hill parishes" of Louisiana.

From the hills of north Louisiana, then, to the piney woods of Washington Parish, the farmer had sought a voice to protest his concern at the condition of things. The economic ailments confronting him evidently could not be cured by the party of his traditional choice. Conscious of himself as part of a specific grouping within Louisiana society, the action of the farmer indicated he no longer was willing to put up a solid political front along with the planter, in behalf of the quest for White Supremacy; the Populist farmer became class conscious.

The untenable situation in which the farmer found himself, as the eighties became history and he faced the nineties, was one of crisis. Once before, the farmer had faced crisis, in 1861, at which time he had voiced his protest, in vain, in opposition to the impending Secession. The farmer had remained a Democrat after the war and through the struggles of reconstruction. Now, the pleasure of solidarity was not enough, since it had brought no great benefits to the vast majority of the Louisiana farmer groups.

In the decade of the 1890's chances looked as good for the Republicans as for the Democrats. The bulk of
carpetbagger-scalawag influence had been softened and the opportunity for fusion with the "people" of the white race had been found. The election of 1896 found the Democrats facing a three-headed opposition comprised of the union of Republicans, disgruntled sugar growers, and the People's Party. The sugar interest were hurt by the Tariff of 1894, and these planters, many ex-Democrats, joined forces with the opposition. Considering the cluster of anti-Foster support in the sugar country in the previous election, it is not surprising that a community of interests could be established. The Democrats ran Foster for a second term as governor in opposition to the Fusion.

The Negro vote again became a factor of great importance, and the Democrats made much of the distasteful political bedfellows embraced by the Fusion, and particularly the Populist element. It is not known whether the Fusion candidate, J. N. Pharr of the People's Party, spoke for the membership of his party or not, but his words concerning the Negro in 1896 were far different from the views of the Democrats:

I was reared with the Negro and worked side by side with him for twenty odd years. I may say for all my life, I never have found him other than a good laborer and as honest as most other men. If he has cut a bad figure in politics, we are to blame for it.36

For good or bad, the Negro still had a vote in 1896, and this worried the Democrats. Foster had fought for the

36Romero, op. cit., p. 76.
unity of his party all his political career, and the election of 1896 was to be his toughest battle. He had believed that only with the Democrats in power could the commonwealth prosper, and of course this meant the Negro vote must somehow be managed; this meant White Supremacy. The main issue of the election of 1896 for the Bourbon Democrats was the problem of Negro suffrage.

Not only did the intrusion of the problem of Negro suffrage irk the Fusion, which stood to gain by the Negro vote, also, the Populists had become antagonistic to Foster as a result of the governor's action while in office his first term. The Louisiana Populist had claimed that "...the first thing Foster did after he was counted into office was to take the farmers by the nape of their necks and the slack of their trousers and dump them outside the party lines."37 If the farmer wanted to try his luck with the People's Party, then the Democrats could do without him; and the election results proved the Democrats to be correct.

When the voting returns were counted, it was revealed that the Democrats had won with 56.2 per cent of the total vote. Foster claimed 116,216 votes to Pharr's 90,138. Fraud was claimed, and with some justification, since Foster's largest majorities came from parishes where the Negro

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37 Romero, op. cit., p. 64.
registration was heaviest.\textsuperscript{38} The Fusionists were sure the Democrats had stuffed the ballot boxes and insured victory. No one will ever know; but after an investigation of the circumstances, each may draw his own conclusion.

The distribution of the parish support of Foster shows the marked pattern of the fracture line in Louisiana politics. (See Figure 22.) It shows the Foster support in the parishes of the Bourbon Democrats, where to this day the large proportion of Louisiana's Negro population resides. Very significant was the strong voice of the farmer manifested in the "People's" vote of West Carroll. The farmer was anti-Democratic party wherever he predominated a parish in 1896.

The motto of the Democrats in 1896 was apparently "if you can't beat 'em, keep 'em away from the polls." The support of the Fusion, as registered in the count which was made official, was seated in those parishes where the Negro was not predominant. (See Figure 23.) In general, the parishes which had shown Populist tendencies in 1892 were the ones where the Fusion of 1896 was successful. The people had found their voice, but in so doing they had discovered their common enemy, the Bourbon Democrats. The people would not be heard again until the advent of Huey Long.

GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1896
VOTE FOR MURPHY FOSTER
BY PARISHES

* * * Above State Average, 56.2%
* * 90.0% and Above

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1896
Figure 22
Gubernatorial Election 1896
Majorities for John Pharr
By Parishes

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1896

Figure 23
F. The Disenfranchisement of Negroes and Whites: 1898-1900. The reconstruction, which was to shape the course of Louisiana politics in the twentieth century, was completed in 1898. The Bourbon Democrats had successfully met the challenge of the Populist-Republican fusion; now the destiny of Louisiana was in safe hands. Yet some further safeguard must be devised to assure that no rebel farmer class nor Negro voters should again have the opportunity of upsetting the status quo. Once more a call was made for the convening of a body to write a new constitution, since the general feeling was that the instrument of 1879 had served its purpose and changed conditions made necessary a new one. However, the real reason for the convention was to consider the problem of suffrage. It interpreted its mandate from the "people" to be, to disenfranchise as many Negroes and as few whites as possible, without violating the Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

Several of the constitutional provisions brought forth reflected the general temper of the age. Legislative provisions, for example, increased the power to control corporations, a Populist idea. The legislature could no longer enact either local or special legislation. The governor was made ineligible to succeed himself. Yet, the constitutional provisions extended the practice of putting detailed restrictions on legislation; and this despite the fact that Negro dominance would be gone. The Constitution of 1898 was
still under the shadow of Reconstruction.

The main problem was to construct provisions concerning the suffrage which would accomplish that which the Democrats were under compulsion to achieve, and at the same time to meet the limits of legality as the United States Supreme Court might interpret them. The scheme devised was to provide for several alternative suffrage requirements; if the Negro could not be refused the vote under one provision, then he could be banned under another. Certain educational and property qualifications were required of all voters, except any whose fathers or grandfathers had been legal voters in 1867. This meant that four classes of men would be allowed to vote: literates, tax-paying property owners, sons of property owners, and men who had voted in 1867 or their descendants. This action assured the successful completion of the struggle for reconstruction.

Foster had been influential in leading the move to change the constitution. An investigation of his message concerning the 1898 constitution reveals, perhaps, the dominant attitude which prevailed within the membership of his party:

The white supremacy for which we have so long struggled at the cost of so much precious blood and treasure, is now crystallized into the Constitution as a fundamental part and parcel of that organic instrument, and that, too, by no subterfuge or other evasions. With this great principle thus firmly imbedded in the

39Constitution of 1898, Article 197.
Constitution, and honestly enforced, there need be no longer any fear as to the honesty and purity of our future elections. The results of this principle of suffrage will be investigated below; suffice it to say, the immediate results were to disenfranchise more than the estimated twenty to thirty thousand whites which the "grandfather clause" provision had proposed to maintain on the registration books. Overt subterfuge, most likely, genuinely was not desired. The remarks of a member of the convention are instructive of the objective consequence of the actions of 1898:

By the irony of fate, as it were, this ultra conservative convention was called upon as its first chief duty to do the most radical thing known to legislation; to falsify the accepted teaching of history and roll back the wheels of political revolution without bloodshed; to take away the ballot from almost, if not quite, a majority of the voters of the state.

The registration statistics, before and after 1898, and the results of the gubernatorial election of 1900, provide an eloquent finale to the struggle for Bourbon supremacy. The voter turn-out in 1896 had been extremely great, indicative of the issues at stake in the election. The more than two hundred thousand votes cast was a new high; and 70.1 per cent of the registered voters had gone to the polls and cast ballots. In the election of 1900, not only was the total

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40 Louisiana Senate Journal, 1898, pp. 33-35.
vote considerably smaller than in the previous election, due to the great disenfranchisement, but also, the participation of the electors fell off. In 1900, only 53 per cent of the registered voters actually went to the polls. Quite obviously the Democrats had not only managed to keep many from voting; they had also discouraged interest in the utilization of the suffrage.

The registration of voters reached its highest peak in 1897, the year following the attempt at Fusion. At that time there was still expectation that the vote of the people held a promise of victory. The total registration reached 294,432, of which some 44 per cent were Negroes. However, this strong numerical position in which the people found themselves was to be of no avail. For, in the registration which preceded the gubernatorial election of 1900, the total count was but 130,757 qualified, registered voters. The decrease in Negro registration was over 95 per cent; the suffrage clauses had done their expected work. However, far more significant is the fact that the percentage decrease in the number of white registered voters was 23.5. Almost 40,000 less white people had registered in 1900 than in 1897. Moreover, a glance at the distribution of the greatest percentage losses among the parishes will indicate that it was the poor, illiterate, but certainly not necessarily ignorant farmers who had lost the suffrage.
As if it had been calculated, the parishes which showed the greatest drop in white registration were by and large the same which had supported the Fusion. (See Figure 24.) At any rate, such a distribution is a strong reinforcement to the proposition that the People's movement was a farmers' movement. And the impact of disenfranchisement hit north Louisiana and the south alike. In some parishes white registration actually increased; most of these were planter dominated. In the enforcing of the new suffrage provisions, no breach of honesty need be made, for so long as the registrar of voters could pass on minimum qualifications, there was no need for Bourbon support to suffer. In the northwest and southeast parishes an increase in white population had occurred, blunting the general decrease in voters. The move of whites into East and West Carroll was a forerunner of the large migration into the Macon Ridge parishes of Richland and Franklin which would occur after 1910. An overall gain was likewise registered in Vernon and Washington parishes, where increased lumber operations had already brought an influx in the white population in these areas. Still, the statewide distribution of losses in white registration was a commentary of the indignity imposed on the farmer groups.

The Democratic state convention nominated the incumbent state auditor, William W. Heard, for governor in 1900. He was the preference of Governor Foster to carry on the Democratic duties of the state. The Regular Republicans nominated
PER CENT LOSS OR GAIN OF
WHITE REGISTRATION
1897 - 1900

Above State Average
Loss, 23.5%

Parishes With Gain

Source: Report of Secretary of State, Louisiana, 1897 and 1900

Figure 24
Eugene S. Reems, while the Lilywhite Republicans and the Populists joined in the support of the candidacy of Donelson Caffery. Although the campaign was spirited, the result was never in doubt. Heard became governor with the support of 78.3 per cent of the total vote cast. In examining the parish distribution of the 1900 vote, the pattern of final domination is discovered. The situation found in 1872 had been reversed.

The Bourbon Democrat and his urban allies emerged as the dominant minority, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in Louisiana. Solidarity of support was again established, but this time in the parishes where it should have been. (See Figure 25.) The parish vote was over 90 per cent in favor of the Democrats in the plantation areas of the cotton country, up the Mississippi, down the Red River, across the Felicianas. Also clustered about New Orleans, there was another seat of support. Most of these were the parishes where the Negro registration had outnumbered the whites, previously, and where the plantation remained a potent force in the economy. These were the home parishes of the Bourbon Democrat, the conservative, unreconstructed southern gentleman. For them ideology had become fact.

Despite the overwhelming victory of the Democrats at the polls, and despite the decreased white registration, the white Republican-Populist fusion carried pluralities for Caffery in Cameron, Ascension, and St. James; and impressive
Gubernatorial Election 1900
Vote for William Heard
By Parishes

- Above State Average, 78.3%
- 90.0% and Above

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1900

Figure 25
support was given in many other of the parishes which had demonstrated the Populist tendencies before. The traditionally Whig-Republican sugar bowl supported a sizable Republican vote in backing Caffery on the Republican ticket. The distribution of Caffery support on the Populist ticket brings into sharp relief the block of "hill" parishes where yet the farmer's voice was heard.

In general outline, the pattern of support for the People's Party and its Republican allies has remained a significant one in the history of subsequent Louisiana politics. (See Figure 26.) The "people" had been frustrated in their attempts at gaining the political upper hand in the struggles of the decade just finished. But a precedent had been established which would bear observing in the future. The protest of the farmer in the decade of the 1890's had been effectively frustrated by the dominant elite within the Democratic party. In his ascendency, the Bourbon forced the farmer to re-define the situation the elite had structured for him. Participation in elections after 1900 was far from what it had been in the grand struggles of the eighties and nineties. It was after 1908 before white voter registration figures again reached the count of 1897. So far as total vote for gubernatorial candidates was concerned, there was no appreciable rise in the count until 1924, when there were over 95,000 more votes than in 1920. In the election of 1924, Huey P. Long had thrown his hat into the Louisiana political ring.
Gubernatorial Election 1900
VOTE FOR FUSION CANDIDATE
DONELSON CAFFERY BY PARISHES

Above State Average, 18.0%

- People's
- Republican
- Republican Plurality

Source: Journal of Senate, State of Louisiana, 1900

Figure 26
CHAPTER IV

ONE-PARTY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF LONGISM

-A wise Prince should devise means whereby his subjects may at all times, whether favorable or adverse, feel the need of the State and of him and then they will be faithful to him.-

Machiavelli

A. Machine Politics. With opposition effectively eliminated, the Democratic Party had a clear field in Louisiana politics. The sole problem became one of maintaining control of the party machinery. The Bourbons were not at a loss in knowing what to do. There were allies to be had in the city. For, New Orleans had regularly polled about twenty per cent of the total statewide vote. For purposes of representation in the state legislature, the City of New Orleans was divided into districts (wards), each of which sent a representative to the legislature. Utilizing the ward as a unit, the city could be organized into an effective political machine. With the ability to deliver the city vote, the selection of a gubernatorial candidate with a reasonable degree of strength outside the city would be tantamount to victory. Organized in 1897, the New Orleans Choctaw Club, the Ring, or the "Old Regulars" as they were known to their
friends, developed a machine along these lines and began to play an influential part in state politics.¹ Experience was to demonstrate that intra-party factional struggles could be just as bitter as the previous struggles between parties had been.

The gubernatorial election of 1904 was a very one-sided contest. The Republican candidate, W. J. Behan, received but ten per cent of the total vote. The count of the votes polled in this election revealed a drop of more than twenty thousand below the total vote for 1900. What little Republican support remaining in Louisiana was seated in the sugar country. The Republican support reached as high as 41 per cent in Ascension Parish, and in total there were fourteen parishes which had registered a Republican vote higher than the state average of 10 per cent. Three of the previously strong Populist parishes, Natchitoches, Winn, and Catahoula, registered vestiges of the former protest; these were not yet willing to let Democratic ascendancy be complete.

In the Democratic primary which had preceded the election, the total vote was some 12,000 more than the Democratic total in the general election of 1900. Part of this gain came from south Louisiana Democrats who had voted for Caffery then, now back in the Democratic camp. The distribution of the support for the winner of the primary, Newton Blanchard,

demonstrated the pattern of the new one-party tendency when a candidate had the endorsement of the Choctaws. (See Figure 27.) The prediction of Blanchard's victory might have lain in the fact that he registered 71 per cent of the New Orleans vote. Part of the highest parish percentages favoring the machine candidate clustered in the Mississippi delta and in the sugar country. Reynolds suggested that the surprising support of the ring candidate in the hill parishes was due to the successful campaign appeals of Martin Behrman, Choctaw leader, who ran for State Auditor on the Blanchard ticket. The election of 1904 demonstrated the assurance that Louisiana had become a one-party state.

The Old Regular Democratic organization supported Lt.-Governor J. Y. Sanders in 1908. He had been a law partner of former Governor Foster, and in the primary was opposed by Mr. Wilkinson, a friend of Governor Blanchard and his choice as successor. But the line of gubernatorial descent was evident in this period. The politicians made the choices, and their alliance with the Bourbons was a leading tendency. Sanders received 56.3 per cent of the state-wide vote, but the machine produced a near 10,000 majority in New Orleans with which to offset any close margins in the country parishes. The distribution of support in this election approached the classic pattern; Bourbons from the Mississippi delta parishes

\^{2}Ibid., p. 99.
Gubernatorial Primary 1904

Vote for Newton Blanchard

By Parishes

Above State Average, 58.0%

Source: Report of Secretary of State, Louisiana, 1905

Figure 27
and from sugar country aligned with the cluster of support about New Orleans. (See Figure 28.) The appearance of parishes from western Louisiana within the ranks of the Democrats of this decade gives reason to pause. These parishes, Vernon and Sabine in particular, were predominantly composed of a farm population, and yet after the experience of the previous decade they turn up in the Democratic column, with stronger than average majorities!

A study of population increases within Louisiana from 1890 to 1910, however, will demonstrate that the group of parishes under discussion falls into a class which ranked among parishes with a rapid population increase in these decades. Extensive lumbering operations were carried on during this period, bringing in their wake large numbers of farmers and laborers. The population of Sabine, for example, doubled in the period from 1890 to 1910, and that of Vernon had tripled. In 1910, the racial composition of the two parishes was 79.0 and 78.6 per cent white, respectively. Vernon had shown a thirty-three per cent increase in voter registration in the period from 1897 to 1900. This is more understandable against the fact that the population was increasing so rapidly. But this does not mean that the poor and white farmer might not have lost his right to vote. Maybe only the

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Gubernatorial Primary 1908
Vote for J. Y. Sanders
By Parishes

Above State Average, 56.3%

Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns
Louisiana, 1908

Figure 28
upper classes and the more fortunate farmers and workers voted.

It is likewise understandable why a decade or so later a parish like Vernon, enjoying such a boom in this period, should show a decided change in political tendencies. For the lumber combines came, cut and moved on to fresher forests, leaving a devastated cut-over area, where farmer and lumber worker became hard pressed to eke out a bare existence.\(^4\)

The machinery being perfected by Bourbon and city Democrats was not to remain unopposed. It would seem inevitable that sooner or later some one or some groups within the electorate would become dissatisfied with the political arrangements. The cry of "corruption and inefficiency in government" could be raised even in those halcyon days, and there was strong possibility that the cry would be heard among the rural electorate. At the same time that opposition was being consolidated, there had emerged a problem which would serve as another source of dissatisfaction and of the desire for "reform." The Constitution of 1898 had failed, as would the subsequent one, to fit the processes of government to the temper of the time. Louisiana was faced with industrial growth which would reshape her society. New groups and new problems emerged requiring satisfactions and solutions. The governor was head of an administration largely beyond his control. It is well taken that "the two governing bodies had become the

constitutional convention and the indifferent electorate which voted on the flood of amendments which came in the twentieth century."^5

B. "Good Government" Opposition. The name of John Parker emerged in Louisiana politics in the gubernatorial election of 1912. Two years before, Parker had been instrumental in organizing the Good Government League, whose leader he became. The League was established in an effort to work for a more efficient local government in New Orleans. The move was parallel with action on the national scene, where at the turn of the century a new rationale of public administration came under the impetus of reform movements. In 1910, for example, Taft had established the "Commission on Economy and Efficiency in Government;" the business men got behind it, and apparently old attitudes hang on, for the slogan, even then, was "let's make government more business-like." Parker meant business, and in 1912 the League put forward the candidacy of Judge Luther Hall for governor.

As the League candidate, Hall was in opposition to the New Orleans machine, which had put forth John T. Michel as their candidate. He was Secretary of State and an Old


Regular of long standing. The race took on a new form when Dr. James B. Aswell resigned the presidency of the State Normal School at Natchitoches and announced his candidacy as an independent. Aswell had been elected State Superintendent of Education during the administration of Governor Blanchard, and he had established a reputation for having guided the progress which had been made in education. The rural people had reason to appreciate what a lack of educational advantages could mean. At Natchitoches, Aswell had worked for improvement of rural schools in the hill parishes. In this election he had gained stature through refusal to place himself in the hands of the Good Government League and withdraw from the race.

The race lay between Michel and Hall, although the entry of Aswell was to demonstrate the support that could be had for an appeal in the hill parishes. Hall won the primary election with 43.2 per cent of the total vote. The machine candidate, Michel, gained but 37.4 per cent of the votes cast. Even without the candidacy of Aswell, who received 19.4 per cent of the vote, it is doubtful that the machine could have won; for the strength of both Hall and Aswell was found in the rural parishes. The machine did, however, maintain its strength in the city, for again New Orleans gave the ring

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candidate a plurality of almost 10,000 over the opposition. The appeals of reform had spread too widely to enable the machine to swing the election of 1912.

The Old Regular, Michel, was able to gain pluralities, outside New Orleans, in but eleven parishes. The distribution was instructive, indicating that the Bourbon-machine alignment could still register the old pattern, despite the strong opposition. In the rural areas, Michel won pluralities in plantation country. Caddo Parish does not disturb the pattern, for along the Red River were many large plantations and the Bourbon predisposition of Shreveport would become stronger with the passing years.

The distribution of the parish support for the Good Government candidate was widespread. (See Figure 29.) Nearly all of south Louisiana voted Hall in a block, and he also won pluralities in the parishes of the Arkansas border. The parishes of the hills, however, gave their plurality support to the candidacy of Aswell. It is not surprising that here, in the parishes which had produced so recently the strong Populist tendency, the electorate would have been enthusiastic for the one candidate who had been a genuine independent. At any rate, the cluster of parishes which gave Aswell his pluralities was the heart of the country of the People's Party. Even Washington Parish, in the extreme eastern edge of the Floridas, once again manifested the political tendency of similar farm parishes.
Gubernatorial Primary 1912
Pluralities for Candidates by Parishes

Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns, Louisiana, 1912

Figure 29
The appearance of lumber corporations in the hills and prairies of central and southwest Louisiana after the turn of the century brought not only an increased population of farmers and workers and momentary economic gain, but also the organisation of the lumber worker by Socialist groups. When Eugene Debs spoke in Winnfield in 1908, the local Socialist party was well organized and elected half the officials of Winn Parish. This parish had only a decade before taken the lead in the Populist movement. The struggle for economic betterment through the use of the ballot was not completed. In 1912 Winn Parish gave almost 36 per cent of its vote to the presidential candidate for the Socialists, Debs. Two more parishes, Vernon and West Carroll, voted more than 30 per cent for Debs, and Caldwell, Grant, and LaSalle each supported the Socialists with more than 20 per cent of the total votes cast. Where the lumbering industry was important, the Debs vote was high.

The phenomenon of such a radical vote in Louisiana would not be so important except that the very people manifesting this tendency had come from or resided in the parishes of Populist protest and were of or related to the farmer class. For as the lumber operators worked the Louisiana hills, the farmer had grasped the opportunity to augment his meager subsistence by engaging in lumbering. The work

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8 McWhiney, op. cit.
did not appreciably increase the level of living of the hill people, for there was a plentiful supply of labor among the farmers willing to work at almost any wage. The farmer had experienced the "corporation."

Enamoured with the pure principles of Progressivism, John M. Parker decided to run himself in 1916. He was opposed, of course, by the Old Regulars, whose candidate was Ruffin G. Pleasant. In 1912 Parker had become an active Progressive, endorsing Roosevelt in the fight for national Republican leadership; he resigned his position as chairman of the Good Government League, as it was a faction of the Democratic Party. In so doing he voiced his determination to be found fighting, still, for good government in Louisiana. Parker said he had become a Progressive out of respect for Theodore Roosevelt: "I am for Roosevelt because I believe he is one of the most active and progressive men in the United States, and does things." Parker would need to do things and to become quite active himself, if he desired to win the governorship from the control of the still active New Orleans Ring. Parker announced his candidacy in Crowley, during the fall of 1915. He advocated a limited constitutional convention and a protective tariff on sugar and rice. This stand should have had sympathetic appeal among old-time Republican groups in Louisiana.

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9Phillips, op. cit., p. 11.
An interesting anecdote coming from the campaign revealed the forthrightness of Parker.\textsuperscript{10} The New Orleans Protestant Ministers' Association asked three questions of the candidates, concerning the enforcement of gambling and Sunday laws. With a straight face, Pleasant had answered that he would enforce the laws under question, and of course all other laws within his jurisdiction. Parker had answered, however, in no such virtuous terms. Where there were regulations on gambling, these would suffice, if followed. Besides, it was a matter for the people to decide, whether they wanted to gamble or not. Anyway, the enforcement of such laws generally was left to local authorities.

There had been mixed feelings concerning the candidacy of John M. Parker. No one wished to doubt the personal qualifications of the man, but it was felt that inasmuch as the Democratic candidate, Pleasant, had been duly nominated by the party primary, it was a bit unfair for Parker to merely nominate himself. To clear this feeling, the Progressives held a nominating convention in which Parker was overwhelmingly endorsed. Nevertheless, it was felt that Parker and his ticket were foredoomed to failure. To beat the combined efforts of the established Democratic party and the New Orleans Ring would be singularly difficult. Even if Parker should win, however, his power of performance would be

\textsuperscript{10}Phillips, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 13.
negligible in the face of a probable hostile legislature. As good men as Parker had tried in that unequal struggle and failed. The editorial opinion of the *Alexandria Democrat* adequately summarized the situation:

We are willing to admit that the conditions in Louisiana are bad politically, and there is much room for improvement, but considering the fact which everyone knows that Parker is a man of splendid character, great personal integrity, rugged honesty and extraordinary business ability, in the event of his election, which nobody for a moment thinks probable, what would he be able to accomplish? He would be absolutely powerless as has been the present governor whom Mr. Parker assisted largely in elevating to the executive chair, and whose honesty of purpose and sincere desire to put into execution plans for the upbuilding and advancement of the State and all its people have never been questioned by any except his political enemies.\(^{11}\)

The reformers might be able to capture the governorship, but without some friendly support in the legislature, no great reforms would be forthcoming. The platforms and appeal of the Good Government faction of the Democratic Party, and the earnestness of the Progressive movement might find a widespread support among an electorate still dominated by the Bourbons. However, the Democrats had found the necessity for organization in the struggle for power, and control of local parish affairs, and particularly control of the legislature, was in their hands.

In 1916, however, the Old Regulars and their country allies emerged triumphant, anyhow. Pleasant received more than sixty per cent of the vote cast, piling up a majority

over Parker of about 32,000 votes. New Orleans voters gave Pleasant a majority of 10,000, which was apparently what had come to be the usual safe lead the King produced. Nevertheless, Parker had gained majorities in sixteen of the state's sixty-four parishes. The distribution of these majorities indicated the impression that Parker had made upon voters within the sugar country and among parishes of rice production. (See Figure 30.) The majority parishes, taken along with those in which the percentage vote was above the Parker state average of 37.3 per cent, describe a pattern outlining quite precisely the borders of French south Louisiana.

A number of factors could account for this phenomenon. South Louisianaans, slightly less adverse to the sins of gambling, may have supported Parker on that count. His stand on the tariff may have been widely accepted; and finally, the Progressive label of 1916 was akin to Republicanism, whose seat of support had ever been in the south of the state. Parker received his weakest support in the parishes of north Louisiana, along the Mississippi, and along the Arkansas and Texas borders, as if there had been an anti-gambling judgment among hill farmers. Too, this was Democratic country. There was one exception, West Carroll on Macon Ridge, which had supported Aswell in 1912, now continuing to show its independence in support of Parker.
Gubernatorial Primary 1916

Vote for John Parker

By Parishes

Above State Average, 37.3%

38.7% - 49.3%

51.9% - 68.7%

Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns
Louisiana, 1916

Figure 30
C. Parkerism: A Respectable Failure. Failure by John M. Parker in firmly establishing his political position may have been part of the success of Huey P. Long. Although not a "man of the people," nevertheless the rather "progressive" program of Parker was somewhat different from that of other state politicians up to this time. At any rate, the present section, in outlining the activities of Governor Parker, will highlight the political philosophy and program of Parkerism. Another gubernatorial aspirant was to likewise draw from Parker's experience as mid-century reached Louisiana, although most likely Robert Kennon was unaware of the parallel. Parker had demonstrated there was some truth to the idea that if a candidate kept right on running for office, sooner or later he would be elected. In 1948 as in 1916, the defeated candidate learned the value of organization.

In 1952 as in 1920, one of the primary concerns of the campaign was the pledge for governmental reforms. In both years, the chief issue was "anti" — anti-Long and anti-Ring. Finally, in elections where the rural vote was going to be close, the value of organization in New Orleans was recognized. Kennon, as Parker before him, managed to capture a sizable vote in the city to insure victory. In 1920, John M. Parker was recognized by the Old Regulars as the man to beat, and the resulting campaign between Stubbs and Parker was bitter.

It appears that time may corrupt, in terms of
political longevity. Past mistakes, the actions of opponents, and perhaps even some corruption, had made the Ring machine the target of cries of corruption. Moreover, the experience of success had given hopes of more, and even established patterns for the future. After all, Mayor Behrman, the leader of the Choctaws, had recalled that in twenty years of political struggle there was plenty of time to make many enemies. He philosophized that "most people remember what you did to them rather than what you did for them." The theme of corruption in government had a long and notable record of usefulness.

Parker realized full well that if he were to defeat the machine he would have to gain a sizable vote in New Orleans. To this end he established the Orleans Democratic Association with which he hoped to cut deeply in Ring support. With the provision of enough votes to insure victory in the gubernatorial primary, it was Parker's intention to use the appointive powers which would be at his disposal to take patronage away from the Old Regulars and defeat Behrman in his race for the mayorship with a candidate of his own choosing. Parker proved successful, in 1920, on both counts.

In the game of politics, it is axiomatic that to defeat organization, it must be opposed with better organization. There was a danger that Governor Parker might have

12Reynolds, op. cit., p. 216.
created a machine not different from the one he was set to defeat. The claim has been made that Parker failed in his attempt at defeating the Choctaws and putting them out of political business due to his realization of this fact; he was reluctant to use the tactics of the Ring to defeat the Ring.\textsuperscript{13} The old Ring, defeated by Parker in 1920, promptly made a comeback. The organization Parker had established, in order to defeat the Ring, had been composed of many disgruntled members of the Old Regulars; and there are always the opportunists who sense that a change of horses might be advantageous. The elements which made up the organization of the Orleans Democratic Association were too discordant, and composed as it was of reformers and disgruntled Old Regulars, it could not hope to become the permanent opposition to the Choctaw Club, which had been Parker's aim.

However, in Louisiana politics it was necessary to organize, and to make organization relatively permanent, for with the advent of Democratic supremacy only the strong and the politically wise could hope to wrest control from the Bourbons. For their successful domination they had worked long and hard. If it were impossible to beat them without joining them, and copying their methods, then join them and beat them at their own game. This was part of Huey Long's success.

Who supported Parker in his successful overthrow of

\textsuperscript{13}Phillips, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 156.
the Ring in 1920? First of all there was the organized sup-
port in New Orleans, where old members of the Choctaws had 
formed the Orleans Democratic Association in Parker's behalf. 
The city vote favoring the candidacy of Parker constituted 
45 per cent of the total city vote. The consistent spread 
of some 10,000 votes in favor of machine-backed candidates 
had been narrowed to 5,000. If worker groups were in support 
of the Choctaw machine, it appears likely that Parker's gain 
had come from the support of the more privileged groups of 
the city.

Parker received his largest country vote in the Third 
Congressional District, which embraced the heart of the sugar 
bowl. (See Figure 31.) His most impressive gains over the 
1916 Parker support came from north Louisiana, however, there 
being fingers of support pushed up the delta and up the Red 
River country. It is likely that planter groups of both 
north and south were in favor of Parker's candidacy. But 
Parker gained likewise in the hills, from Vernon Parish across 
to Franklin. The Ring candidate, Col. Stubbs of Monroe, 
gained far less support than had the machine candidate of the 
previous election in the hills. Farmer groups must have 
voted for Parker since Huey Long had stumped for Parker in 
1920, believing he favored the sort of economic reforms Long 
had been proposing as Public Service Commissioner. It is ap-
parent from the election returns that Parker's support had 
been widespread. The success of the program for which he had
Gubernatorial Primary 1920

Vote for John Parker

By Parishes

1st quarter: 17.5% - 50.1%
2nd quarter: 51.5% - 58.3%
3rd quarter: 58.9% - 65.7%
4th quarter: 66.3% - 84.9%

Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns Louisiana, 1920

Figure 31
campaigned so vigorously lay in the hands of the new legislature which Parker hoped to influence.

Ask some old-timers about John M. Parker, and they will assert he was the best governor Louisiana ever had; in turn they will scoff at the name of Long. Yet, if the measure of success be political longevity, Long managed to perpetuate his position, while Governor Parker failed in his endorsement of a successor in 1924. However, the measure of success might just as well be the resultant of the establishment of a constructive program of governmental reforms. Ascending to the governorship in 1920, after the completion of World War I, Parker was to meet with a prevalent mood of sympathy among the electorate in behalf of the principle of reform. The social and economic changes wrought in Louisiana, as elsewhere in America, as a consequence of the first World War meant that whoever became governor must be prepared to solve many practical problems. Moreover, natural reaction of puritan morality which gripped the country after 1913 provided a fertile ground in which to emplant a sweeping reform against the corruptions of machine politics. The political independence of Governor Parker likewise tended to demonstrate to the voters that the man was more important than the party.

During the campaign the Parker forces never allowed attention to be diverted from the main issue -- that of Ring rule. Their platform has been summed up:\(^{14}\)

\(^{14}\)Phillips, op. cit., p. 34.
1. The ring rules New Orleans and rules it badly.

2. If the ring elects a governor, the ring will rule the State and rule it badly.

Ergo, defeat the Ring. This much of the Parker platform was successful, for the time being at least. Upon the first meeting of the legislature after Governor Parker took office, a series of proposals were forwarded at regular intervals to the representatives which rivaled in scope and detail those of the Republican President of the United States in his directives to the Eighty-third Congress. The ten points may be summarized thus:15

1. Financial program
   a. severance tax of 2 per cent
   b. inventory of state property
   c. construction work

2. Good roads

3. Labor legislation

4. Oil and gas laws (including ways and means of regulation)

5. Political program, including constitutional convention

6. "Blue Sky" law to protect investors

7. Legislation for New Orleans

8. Changes in executive department, including administration of state charitable institutions

9. Cost of living aid by encouragement of agriculture and invitation for business to come to Louisiana


Important portions, at least, of all the ten points were enacted into law by the regular session of 1920. Parker has been called the "Gravel Roads" governor because of the steps taken under his administration to create a workable highway system in Louisiana.\textsuperscript{16} He negotiated a so-called "gentlemen's agreement" concerning the proposed severance tax, and proceeded to the building of a greater agricultural and mechanical college on a large tract of land just south of Baton Rouge. Still more of his program became effective after the Constitution of 1921 was ratified. Yet for all this efficient and forward-looking administration, Parker was unable to perpetuate his influence. In 1924 the Ring made a comeback and aided in the election of Henry L. Fuqua.

Any governor in the early twenties would have had to do much of what Parker did, anyway. There were pressing problems concerning which policy had to be formulated; and there did not appear to be anything amiss in the particular steps which Parker had taken. Reform makes a popular appeal, but Parker would have had to make good on his reform of the New Orleans Ring if his administration were to be called a success. In that he had failed, and the Parker program was not carried for another four years.

Why was Parkerism a respectable failure? First of all, because there was nothing wrong with the program of the

governor. In fact, the spectacular success of Huey Long four years after Parker left office might serve to demonstrate that he should have given more of the same. Where Parker had built gravel roads, Long built concrete roads; and they were good roads, even if "...a few miles were paved in every parish to let the people see the superiority of concrete over gravel." The programs of the two governors paralleled in many respects, but the popular support of the two leaders was singularly different. Long's appeal was more broadly to the masses, whereas Parker, half a Republican anyway, had not sufficiently disassociated himself, in the people's eyes, from the dominant economic groups of the new Louisiana.

Moreover, Parker never seemed to realize that more than the New Orleans machine could be politically evil or corrupt. "The corruptor of politics in the form of privileged business he did not see, or seeing, was unwilling to break its strangle hold. His reforms failed because they were not in reality carried out and because they did not remove the economic causes of machine control." The failure of Parkerism to perpetuate itself rests essentially upon the factor of electoral appeal. For the people of the hills, who were to give Long such strong support, had some pretty definite ideas about the reforms necessary in Louisiana society. The

17 Ibid., p. 252.
18 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 233.
generation which had felt the exhilaration of the movement of
the People's Party, and the sting of disenfranchisement, had
not yet died off. Reform has become fashionable in Louisiana,
but only after the masses had been afforded the opportunity
to make a mess in choices of leaders. A clean-up campaign
whose purpose was to perpetuate the domination of the Bourbon,
or his big business cousin, lacked broad popular appeal.
Like the Whigs of the last century, the program of Parker,
no matter how good, must fail. It failed because it was not
conceived of and for the "people."

D. Longism: An Appraisal. The nice arithmetic of
one-party politics had been finally worked out by the conserva-
tives; and it provided easy calculations, too, for the Negro
had been effectively blocked from political activity since
1898. The struggle for political control was narrowed to
participation by members of factional alignments, all of which
were representative of some dominant groups in Louisiana so-
ciety. The only numerically dominant group which had been
left out of political calculations was the "people," the have-
nots, farmers and laborers. Political monopoly had been added
to economic monopoly.

In this political situation, two possible combinations
for political success were available.19 The country could be
united solidly against the city, or, as was more likely, the

19Reynolds, op. cit., p. 198.
city could be organized and victory achieved with some segments of the country vote. The Choctaws, as well as the "reformers" in opposition to the machine, utilized the latter combination. Planter and rural town elite combined with city cousin. It was the old story of the dominant minority which maintained its political ascendancy. Machine candidates or reform candidates, it made little positive difference which won, none of them manifestly represented the interests of the "people" of Louisiana.

The "chance" that consensus might be found among farmer and laborer, as a group, was great, for there had been opportunity for significant societal tendencies to have been established. Such an analysis might not be able to produce objective, quantitative demonstration of the presence of a class struggle in Louisiana, however. Yet, the results of elections of a "crisis" nature have indicated the presence of a latent consensus which might lead to group action. The peculiar institution of "gentleman rule" in Louisiana politics could generate an opposition among the masses, the numerical majority. Events might force a dormant consciousness of group solidarity into action against the status quo. So long as the avenue of political expression remained free, the farmer, as a group, voiced his opposition. Protest had been registered concerning the actions leading to Secession. A reaction of political solidarity occurred among the farmers
of the hills in the 1880's. The farmer found voice to protest his frustrations in the Populist movement, during the economically depressed 1890's, and even flirted with Socialism in the 1910's.

Historically, then, so long as the procedures of democracy remained in force, the frustrations of the "have-nots" might find release through the utilization of the suffrage. The people might make known desires and interests through the ballot, and while this channel of expression was opened, the effects of privation and frustration were blunted, and the probability of latent consensus becoming manifest was that much slighter. "Misery loves company," the old adage goes; but so long as lip-service was paid to the cult of democracy, the opposition of serious group action was averted.

However, the actions of the dominant minority in taking away the ballot from the Negro, and in so doing from the poor and white, might well have spelled its political doom. Democracy in Louisiana had become perverted. A plutocracy struggled amongst itself for the plums of political victory. With the traditional channels of expression closed, group frustration might lead to group action. With the right combination, the dominant minority could yet be overthrown. The "people" needed merely to be drawn out. The farmer of the hills would most certainly respond to the political appeals of one of his own.
The advent of Longism in Louisiana, then, was the culmination of long-time tendencies. There had always been the possibility of a "people's" party gaining ascendancy in Louisiana; up until Huey Long appeared, all actual attempts had been frustrated by the dominating elite. The evidence that Longism was a political phenomenon explainable in terms of the support of social groupings lies in analysis of voting behavior. Definite political tendencies emerge and have, since 1924, remained relatively constant. Attention has all too often been focused upon the organizational apparatus of Long machines, upon the personal appeal and ability of Huey Long, or upon the corruptions of Longism; far more important is the sociological basis of Longism.

The social situation existing by the turn of the century made it certain that it was only a matter of time before the people would have been heard. Huey Long's appearance upon the political scene in the 1920's was merely a happy circumstance -- despite our personal predilections. Huey Long upset the nice arithmetic established by the Bourbons, came to power with the vote of the "people," and established a political algebra of his own.

Huey talked the language of the people; whether he was aware of his choice of analogy or not, Long's famed "Evangeline Oak" speech hit home with the "rednecks" and "cajuns" of hill or bayou.
... It is here under this oak where Evangeline waited for her lover Gabriel, who never came. This oak is an immortal spot, made so by Longfellow's poem, but Evangeline is not the only one who has waited here in disappointment.

Where are the schools that you have waited for your children to have, that have never come? Where are the roads and highways that you send your money to build, that are no nearer now than ever before? Where are the institutions to care for the sick and disabled? Evangeline wept bitter tears in her disappointment, but it lasted only one lifetime. Your tears in this country, around this oak, have lasted for generations. Give me the chance to dry the eyes of those who still weep here!20

The people had waited a long time for someone to do something for them. With Longism, there emerged a pattern of appeal, support, and political program which has set the opposing pattern of all subsequent attempts at reform within the state.

The election of 1924 indicated the pattern of voting support which was to emerge in producing Longism in Louisiana. (See Figure 32.) Against the machine's candidate, Fuqua, and the candidate who was Governor Parker's personal choice, Huey Long gained more than fifty per cent of the vote in twenty-one parishes. Except for three, these parishes clustered in north Louisiana; St. Helena, Livingston, and Washington, in the Floridas, were also areas where the farmer was predominant. The significance of the pattern was that it cut across the "country" quite broadly. While still limited to north Louisiana hill parishes and some cut-over areas of the Florida parishes, Longism had a class appeal. While his

FIRST GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY 1924
VOTE FOR HUEY LONG
BY PARISHES

Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns
Louisiana, 1924

Figure 32
opponents had fought the election on the Klan issue with its religious overtones, Huey Long spread his name and record among the "people." Were Long to extend his country support into French Louisiana in a subsequent election, next time he would win.

There was a next time, and Huey Long did win. In 1928, the area of support was extended to include most of the country vote aside from the areas of planter domination in both north and south Louisiana. In fact, the opposition managed to gain pluralities in but seventeen of Louisiana's sixty-four parishes. Only the country parishes of the upper Mississippi delta and the plantation parishes of the Felicitanas, with neighboring Pointe Coupee and St. Landry, withstood the challenge of the "rural demagogue." (See Figure 33.) Urban parishes, among them Caddo, Ouachita, and East Baton Rouge, and a cluster about New Orleans, showed anti-Long predispositions.

The fact that St. Landry appeared in the Bourbon pattern was not a contradiction. Although popularly thought of as a "farmer" parish, actually St. Landry has characteristics similar to planter dominated parishes. The proportion of Negroes residing in the parish is close to 50 per cent, and there is an old layer of planter-commercial influence in this, one of the original Louisiana parishes. The pattern of a high degree of farm tenancy here also gives St. Landry further similarity with planter areas. In 1930 two out of
Gubernatorial Primary 1928

Pluralities for Anti-Long Candidates by Parishes

Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns
Louisiana, 1928

Figure 33
three white farm operators were tenants. Parishes with such factors have usually recorded a conservative vote, through domination by its elite groups or through indifference on the part of the poor and white.

To say that Huey Long failed to carry the cities obscured the influence of some of the "factors" which influence Louisiana voting behavior. There are social groupings in the urban areas whose economic and political sympathies were part of the old Bourbon complex. Anti-Long opposition has consistently shown in the upper limits of the socio-economic layers of the city populations. Yet a clear differential in urban voting behavior exists, reflecting the tendency among the workers to support candidates with programs closer to their interests than Bourbon ideologies. As Long established his machine and organized support in New Orleans and other cities, Long support in working class districts became clearly visible.

In 1928 the victory of Huey Long was complete, supported as he was by the great solidarity of the farmer groups in both north and south Louisiana. The rise of Huey Long was therefore no political accident. Long, as well as other

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southern politicians of the period, had his origin among lower class whites but gained his support from a wider appeal. His rise to power, likewise, was a result not so much of an uprising of poorer whites as of a rising tide of opposition to intolerable economic and social conditions.\textsuperscript{23}

It is more than a coincidence that Winn Parish, the boyhood home of Huey Long, should have been the center of Populist and Socialist support, and a later stronghold of Longism. With the rise of Huey Long the political balance in Louisiana tipped in favor of the farmer class. If extension of appeal and organization has reached other groupings, such as urban workers, and gained their support, the core of the strength of Longism remained among the farmers. Moderately strong coefficients of correlation have been computed between the parish support of Huey Long in 1928, and the support of Socialism and Populism previously. Rank-order coefficients of correlation of $0.621$ and $0.400$ have been computed between the parish support of Long in 1928 and of Populism in 1896 and Socialism in 1912, respectively.\textsuperscript{24} Statistically these coefficients may not be "highly significant," but they indicate a continuity in the geographical pattern of a political tendency which found expression in these elections.

The state had suffered an arrested socio-economic

\textsuperscript{23}Heberle and Bertrand, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 344.

\textsuperscript{24}Howard, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 133 ff.
development which had flavored the political climate, establishing the potentiality of political group action among farmers and workers. For it was the farmer-lumber worker element which contributed to the continuity of support in these elections. In Populism and the appeal of Huey Long the "people" of the uplands and the French lowlands believed they had found deliverance from the domination of the Bourbon classes. One portion of the population enjoyed the fruits of a way of life guaranteed by their political domination. By 1928 Louisiana was found to be neither inherently solid one-party nor completely right wing. The latent possibility of opposition to the Bourbon Democrat, which had been dormant for more than a quarter century, had become manifest. Huey Long's election ended single-class political domination in Louisiana.

As if to demonstrate that other factors were being felt, the results of the 1928 presidential election in Louisiana did not follow the general pattern which V. O. Key has found for the South as a whole. To be sure, the sixteen parishes with a Negro population outnumbering the white gave Alfred Smith a majority in maintaining the solid front of the Bourbon. But Smith polled a majority in every parish! And there were parishes with fewer Negroes which gave Smith an even greater majority over Herbert Hoover. The lowest

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Democratic support was found in parishes where the farmer predominated. The significant aspect of the Louisiana Smith vote was that the parishes of south, Catholic Louisiana contributed the greatest majorities. Hence it seems more realistic to say that the issue was religious rather than racial. The results of this election showed there were cracks in the Bourbon solid front.

Huey Long was a master politician; significant was the way in which he entered the political arena in the first place, as Railroad Commissioner in 1918, and later Public Service Commissioner as the agency changed names. His political ideology, if Long had one, was in the tradition of Populism as it had been experienced in his native hills. Intentionally or otherwise, Huey Long made corporate domination his constant target. Once having scored victories for the "people" he demonstrated his political acumen by his controversial activities which kept his name constantly on the lips of Louisianans. Long had successfully opposed vested corporate interests and could run on his record.

Long became governor of Louisiana in 1928 on an "anti" platform; but it was not the old anti-Ring, anti-corruption and inefficiency in government platform which made him so popular and gave Long his support with the people. The hill

folk from whose ranks Huey himself emerged might not be aware of the theoretical and legal subtleties behind the exploitation by corporate interests. But a politically frustrated and economically destitute farmer-worker class could understand what the championing of Huey Long was all about when he demanded protection of the "people's" rights and the establishment of public utility rates and tax relief designed to put more money in their pockets. Long chose his opponents carefully in his political fights against the domination of vested interests. Just say that Huey was fighting the Bourbons and absentee corporate interests, and the farmer of the hills knew what Long was doing.

The ideology of "share our wealth" was perhaps illogical and economically unworkable. But the simple program of $30 per month Old Age Pension for citizens over sixty years of age, the limitation of poverty and working hours, a balanced agricultural production which prevented price-lowering surpluses, and the taxation program which would reduce big fortunes was something the lower classes in Louisiana and elsewhere could readily appreciate. The appeal was disarming, since Long buttressed his talks with liberal quotations from the Bible and from great leaders of all times.27 Huey Long had a record of stepping on the toes of vested interests, and there was no reason for the people to believe he

27 H. P. Long, Share Our Wealth (Washington, D.C., 1935?).
would not successfully make "every man a king" if he were elected governor.

Lack of legislative support might stand in the way of Huey Long carrying out his program. However, Long had observed the traditional maneuvers used to assure success. If the legislator votes right, he receives the plums of patronage at the governor's disposal, with which the legislator must satisfy the constituents back home. Long got his program through and penalized the opposition. He likewise faced the problem of gaining control of the decentralized boards and commissions. Again he was successful. His enemies and the intellectual articulates were severely critical of Long's methods, but Carleton Beals, one of those who deplored Long's "dictatorship," justified his actions in this situation:

Not Huey, but the political system, was to be blamed. Theoretically the various boards had previously been taken out of politics. But as a single party and a single machine had dominated Louisiana for decades, all governmental agencies were an integral part of the corrupt system. Non-politicalizing the board in effect had merely permitted Ring henchmen to enjoy perfect immunity, creating foci of permanent political power. Though not subject to the spoils system of each governor, the boards were all part of a complicated powerful regime of a vicious political clique tied up with large corporations and the underworld. Huey had to do exactly what he did, or else be another meek corporation and underworld puppet like his predecessors. Whether his purposes were genuine, whether the reforms he espoused were worthy and important are separate questions entirely.28

Huey Long ensured the establishment of his program for the state, and no Louisiana governor since 1928 has felt it expedient or wise to throw out the general pattern of governmental functions of Longism. He made a public record to which his partisans pointed with pride.\textsuperscript{29} Property assessments were reduced by some 20 per cent. Huey Long distributed free school books in the amount of 600,000. At free night schools 175,000 illiterates over twenty-one years of age had learned to read and write. Long established L. S. U. as an institution with an A-1 rating; enrollment was increased from 1,500 to 5,000. The Long highway program was responsible for 2,500 miles of new paved roads, 6,000 miles of new gravel roads, and numerous new bridges. He built the $5,000,000 State Capitol, the $150,000 executive mansion, and the State University's School of Medicine in New Orleans. The charity hospital program had been increased to care for some 1,800 patients per day, and mental hospitals generally improved. Regardless of the cost and who was to pay, Huey Long established a record of achievement which was tangible and durable.

The politics of Louisiana have been called bifactional,\textsuperscript{30} since the rise of Longism.\textsuperscript{30} It is true that since 1900 only the Democratic party has been preeminently effective at the polls. The Democrats managed this, however, with the suppression

\textsuperscript{29}Time Magazine, October 3, 1932.

of legitimate portions of the electorate. Taking the long view, the era of "one-party" politics was transitory. For the tradition and economics of two-party politics have been present in long standing. Recent politics could just as readily be viewed as the on-going struggle between the haves and the have-nots.

Longism had become one brand of party in this historical process; and the haves, since 1948, manifest a strong desire to revolt against the party they had made supreme. By 1952 it had become apparent that the Long faction inclined to follow the "real" Democratic party in platform and outlook. The main Long tendency built up over a twenty-year period has shown a remarkable consistency, and in the last two extremely important presidential elections in Louisiana, the coalition which had been strong in support of Longism has likewise stood firm for the Democratic party. Emergent elements in the social structure had created the possibility of Longism, and in consequence it was discovered that national and statewide political behavior paralleled one another again.

Longism, as the New Deal, brought more people to the polls than had ever voted previously; in Louisiana, the increased turnout was immediately apparent. In 1924 there were nearly 100,000 more votes counted than in 1920, and four

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years later the total vote of 1920 had been doubled. At the same time, during the census decade of 1920–30, the population of the state increased by only 16.9 per cent. The appeal of Huey Long brought out the electorate to the polls, and the Long faction got the larger part of this increase in ballots. Long, as Franklin D. Roosevelt nationally, was doing something for the "people," and regardless of how much it was costing, and who was going to pay, the people registered their satisfaction upon election day. By the election of 1936, not only had the tradition of Longism become established, the people had registered their strongest approval. Governor Leche had been given over two-thirds of the record total vote of over one-half million; the same year, President Roosevelt gained the electoral votes of every state but Maine and Vermont.

Then came the crash, when, it was thought, the house that Huey built had come tumbling down. Yet the lower classes had not forgotten what Longism had done for them. In the hotly disputed election of 1940, the "reform" faction barely managed to secure victory. The social stratification of Louisiana about 1940 was not such that a candidate more "conservative" in outlook had a clear opportunity of breaking the domination of Longism. The middle class elements so crucial in the influence of the outcome of the elections of the next decade were still in emergence. The traditional farmer-planter cleavage remained in the agricultural economy,
and of course the class of number, composed of farmer groups, had manifested their strong predisposition to support the candidates of Longism.

Prevalence of a plantation economy establishes social relationships similar to those present where big business prevails. Both planter and businessman held such economic influence that a sizable opposition to Longism might be mustered within the electorate. Yet the growing industrial capacity of Louisiana was bringing not only class elements whose political tendencies augmented the old Bourbon complex and at the same time created a new power base, but also an increasing labor force which might naturally manifest a political support more sympathetic to Longism. Labor organization had not made appreciable inroads on Louisiana; even so, a large potential block vote was present. Farmer and laborer apparently voted for Earl Long in such number that Longism was almost perpetuated. He received a vote of over a quarter of a million, representing 4.8 per cent of the total.

Many groups, despite the cost to their tax pocketbooks, had registered satisfaction concerning the increased state services which Longism had provided. No "reform" group could take this away and still hope to be supported at the polls. In 1940, Sam Jones could only attempt to clean up corruption and administer the bureaucracy more efficiently.32 Sam Jones,

32R. H. Weaver, Administrative Reorganization in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Bureau of Government Research, Louisiana State University, 1951), Ch. IV, p. 34 ff.
a lawyer from Lake Charles, had defeated the forces of Longism, and although his campaign bespoke the urgency of "cleaning up the mess in Baton Rouge," at the same time it was apparent to the politically observant that Jones was also the representative of the new big business groups.

The old Bourbon dominant minority had been forced to use extreme measures in their ascendancy after 1896 through the vehicle of the great disenfranchisement; this was an error which must be recognized. Just because the "people" tired of the old order had found a champion who would establish something new was no indication that they were correct in their action. The corruptions of Longism would never have occurred if "liberals" like Sam Jones had been around in 1928; the wrongs of the past would have been rectified to the greater glory of the Bourbon-corporate interests. But let Sam Jones explain in his own words, taken from his first legislative message on May 20, 1940:

I occupy a unique position in Louisiana political life. I am a liberal who has consistently opposed the out-going regime because of its tendency towards dictatorship; because of unconstitutional and undemocratic methods used, and because of the many flagrant vices evident in the system used by it. To me these were paramount issues because the methods used were destructive of democracy itself. But, I believe in benefits and services on a safe and sane basis. I have had the audacity to say that the regime which commenced in 1928 came about as a result of the faults, defects, and omissions of the administrations which preceded it.

The principal reason for the revolutionary changes of 1928 was that the great masses of the people were being forgotten. In opening my campaign on September 21, 1939, I said:
I am not unmindful of the causes and effects in the political world, and of the affairs of the state. The present regime, at its inception, was ushered in because of the sins and faults and defects of a pre-existing group. Many thousands of Louisianians were ready for a change which would dig up by the roots the power then entrenched and give it to the people — the benefits to which they were justly entitled. Among these were many thousands as honest, sincere, and conscientious as can be found in the state of Louisiana. Among these was my own father, who hated, with holy fervor, all that smacked of corrupt politics.  

The administration of Sam Jones did show some degree of responsibility for the needs of the "people," through the establishment of Civil Service and of "blue ribbon" boards.  

But as election time came in 1944, the actions of the faction which Jones represented revealed more clearly the nature of its outlook. A candidate must be found to fill the position of governor until Jones could be eligible to run again in 1948. "Jimmie" Davis appeared to be a safe choice. Strumming his guitar, he need not make a stand on any political issue. Davis was, as the farmer would say in northeast Louisiana where Jimmie was raised, "a good ole country boy." It did not seem to matter that quite obviously oil money was backing Davis, and apparently was found in large quantity in the Jones faction.  

In 1948, the Long faction made a decided comeback, with Earl Long running for governor, supported and aided by his nephew Russell, Huey's son and heir to the political magic

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33 Louisiana Senate Journal, 1940.
of the name Long. Karl was thought to be a politician close to the lower classes -- at least he posed as a "man of the people." Three other candidates had entered the race, although it was widely believed that in the "run-off" the struggle would be between Long and Sam Jones, his erstwhile opponent. "Jimmie" Morrison, congressman from the Florida parishes, was running again for the third straight time. Robert Kennon was a "dark horse." Politically unknown at this date, the Webster Parish judge posed as a veterans' candidate and appealed to anti-Long people who opposed "High Hat" Sam Jones' close connection with big business. 

Jones had the advantage of being the administration candidate, but the fact that he had, by and large, the support of industrial interests counted against him with the broad layers of the lower classes. The welfare program proposed by Huey's brother Earl was quite ambitious; but if it had been fostered with hopes of political perpetuation, the aspiration was blunted after Long's victory by quarrels within the Long faction itself. Earl's endorsement at the polls had been strong, for he beat Jones with 65 per cent of the vote cast and gained majorities in all but two parishes.

The results of the first primary had forecast clearly who the ultimate winner would be. Long gained heavy support in almost all of the hill parishes of north Louisiana, and in

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34 Heberle and Bertrand, op. cit., p. 349.
eight of the south Louisiana French parishes. His strongest opposition was seated in the urban parishes, such as East Baton Rouge, Calcasieu, Orleans, and Caddo. Likewise certain of the Mississippi delta parishes showed considerable opposition to Earl Long. Yet here, analysis on the ward level has shown that increased populations in "backwater" settlements during the thirties had swelled the farmer vote and that the Long candidate got many of them.35 Jones, weak in his home parish of Calcasieu, found his main backing in the urban areas about New Orleans and Baton Rouge. Kennon's support was generally seated about Shreveport, Monroe, and the hill parishes near his native Webster. However, Kennon did show surprisingly strong gains in Lake Charles and Baton Rouge and in the southern portions of the sugar country; this was perhaps a forecast of things to come. Morrison scored heavily in his native Florida parishes, as he had consistently done. With Long's strong initial support, and the decided shift of Morrison's support in his favor, Long had no trouble in the second "run-off" primary.

The main tendencies which constitute the Long faction, placed in geographical setting, provide the opportunity for isolating certain elements of the electorate. It is then possible to check further the expressions of these same elements in regard to political issues of the national scene.

35 Howard, op. cit., p. 130.
One crucial issue which the Louisiana electorate faced was the Dixiecrat revolt of 1948. The action of the "haves" and the "have-nots," the Longs and the anti-Longs, is quite instructive of the emerging political situation of the "new" Louisiana. For, although Longism and the New Deal had done much for Louisiana, yet they had done little for the political aspirations of the Bourbons. Rule of the "people" was by no means assured. There was little labor organization in 1948, very few Negroes had been given the privilege of registering for suffrage, and party control was still oligarchic.

At first glance, the distribution of pro-Long sentiment among the parishes for the two decade period, 1928-48, suggests a pattern similar to the old Whig-Jacksonian cleavage. (See Figure 34.) At least the strongest Long support is found in the northern hills where the Jacksonian farmer had made his political choice in favor of the Democracy; and the area where the faction was least popular falls generally in south Louisiana. However, the composition of the electorate in Louisiana parishes had changed over the years, and it is the parishes retaining a predominant farmer population which manifest this political tendency. In general terms, the fundamental farmer-planter cleavage with roots in the preceding century still exists, modified in time by identification of farm group and labor groups with Longism and of planter and industrial interests within opposing factions.
LONG TENDENCIES FOR SELECTED ELECTIONS - 1928, 1940 SECOND PRIMARY, 1948 FIRST PRIMARY SUPPORT ABOVE STATE AVERAGE BY PARISHES

None
One
Two
All Three

Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns Louisiana, 1928, 1940, 1948

Figure 34
There have been eighteen parishes which have consistently supported Long candidates. These have been pro-Long from the beginning, have withstood the storm of the scandals of 1940, and found favor with Earl Long again in 1948. The majority of these parishes cut across north Louisiana, of course, and contain farmers and workers of low income groups residing in the rural towns. The three parishes along Macon Ridge in the northeast corner of the state stick out as Long territory; these parishes, West Carroll, Richland, and Franklin, among the largest cotton producers of the state, are largely given over to the family farm, where both white and colored are farmers. Both St. Bernard and Plaquemines have registered Long sentiment, but in both of these parishes there has been evidence of bossism.

Special attention must be given to the situation in the Florida parishes, for some of them have voter groups who have supported Longism. The political career of favorite son Congressman Morrison has required support for his candidacy in many gubernatorial primaries. Personal appeal has ruled the first primary, but in the "run-offs" the farmers and laborers of the Floridas have voted for the Long faction. An example of the vote in Tangipahoa is typical of electoral behavior. In 1948, Morrison and Kennon were eliminated in the first primary, leaving Earl Long and Jones in the run-off. Even though Morrison pledged his support to Jones, his change to the candidate of big business failed to change the
political tendencies of his constituents.

Calculations reveal that combination of the Long and Morrison percentages of the first primary will total remarkably close to the Long percentage of the second primary. This holds for the parish total as well as for ward totals. The entire parish vote for Earl Long and Morrison in the first primary was 9,979; in the second primary, Long received 9,550. The fact that the same holds true for the vote of the more conservative candidates reinforces the proposition that in the Florida parishes the farmer and laborer will vote in support of Longism. It is only where plantation influence in the hills of the Felicianas or influences in Baton Rouge prevail that the Long following is diminished.

Of course there are farmers in south Louisiana, scattered throughout the sugar country. The initial appeal of Longism found favor in nearly all of the sugar parishes. Yet, it was here that the first conservatism in Louisiana politics was seated, and the old Whig tendency has not died out. There has been a steady drift toward Longism in the eastern section of the sugar country, whereas the western portion has crystallized a conservative opposition. In general, the parishes to the east of the Atchafalaya basin have manifested the development of a different social situation than exists in the parishes on the western edge.

In searching for a clue which would explain this differential, the primary influence would seem to be the greater
industrial development in the parishes along the Mississippi between Baton Rouge and New Orleans. Oil and sugar refineries, and sawmills located in the area have produced a situation in the small towns where the majority of the resident labor force are workers. The plantation economy remains a force, but the other influence may be said to be more telling, if for no other reason than the greater proportions of Negro registration occurring in these parishes; to date, the registration of Negroes has been primarily an urban phenomenon. A cluster of six parishes strung along the Mississippi River have revealed a recent tendency to Longism. These are Iberville, Ascension, Assumption, St. James, St. John, and St. Charles. The combined Negro registration in these parishes for 1952 was over 10 per cent of the state total.

The alignment of Negro and white laborer comprises an element of the electorate in majority strength within these parishes, as the election results have indicated.

The numerical strength of anti-Long support has been drawn from the urban parishes of Louisiana. Of course, these parishes are the seats of the new industrialism which has changed the Louisiana society. The cities had likewise been the home bases of the older commercial interests tied to the rural conservatives. Election returns from the urban-industrial

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parishes have been consistently below the state average of the candidates of Longism. Yet the Long forces could expect to poll some one-third of the vote in these parishes due to the fact that by and large the laborer has found in Longism a platform more amenable to his interests. The events of the elections of 1952, to be discussed in the next chapter, will indicate that the growing tendency is that the vote in the city will break even, with the conservative elements, perhaps, prevailing.

The problem must now be solved concerning what happens to tendencies toward Longism when transferred from the arena of state politics to that of national politics. The issues of 1948 are chosen because they are tied to the attempt of the conservatives to regain political ascendancy. As Key has pointed out, the black belt was the seat of Dixiecrat agitations. The shadow of the Negro's presence remained to haunt the conscience of the Bourbon Democrat. The Negro was no longer a threat to political dominance, so long as he knew his place; events on the national scene, however, rubbed the Bourbon prejudice the wrong way. The threat of "Trumanism" set the Bourbons to mending political fences. The political climate in Louisiana, however, had been modified by Longism, and the Democratic party, of all things, tended toward the parallel of the national organization. There was nothing

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37 Key, op. cit.
left but for the conservatives to bolt the party. A generation or two before, the presence of the Negro had guaranteed the successful domination of Louisiana by a minority group. In 1948, the presence of the Negro served as an index depicting which areas of the state were most susceptible to the appeal of States' Rights.

The Lilywhite, the Bourbon Democrat, had established white supremacy by intimidating, and eventually, disenfranchising the Negro. Bourbon political prejudice would show most strongly in those areas where the Negro's presence had meant Republican politics. This minority group, though economically strong, would need political allies. The farmer of the hills, Democrat by tradition, was the most obvious ally. Yet, the Bourbon had most assuredly alienated the farmer's affections, in the events of the turn of the century; and the emergence of Longism had assured the former ruling class that other groups than farmer and labor must identify with their political and social philosophy if they were to attain once more the absolute certainty of domination which had once been the glory of the Bourbon's past.

In which parishes was the support for the Dixiecrats greatest? Without referring to the election results, it would be possible to ascertain the parishes with populations comprised of high proportions of Negroes, and spot these for the Dixiecrats. In the top sixteen States' Rights parishes, only three showed percentages of Negroes lower than the state
TABLE II

HIGHEST AND LOWEST QUARTILES OF DIXIECRAT VOTE IN 1948 AND PER CENT NEGRO, 1950, BY SELECTED PARISHES*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest Quarter Dixiecrat</th>
<th>Per Cent Negro</th>
<th>Lowest Quarter Dixiecrat</th>
<th>Per Cent Negro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>Ouachita</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tensas</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>Caldwell</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordia</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>Beauregard</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoyelles</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>Allen</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangeline</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>Calcasieu</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Landry</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>Jeff. Davis</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pte. Coupée</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>Cameron</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Feliciana</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>Iberia</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Martin</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>Terrebonne</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Bernard</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>Iberville</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaquemines</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>W. Baton Rouge</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeSoto</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>E. Baton Rouge</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red River</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>Livingston</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bienville</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>St. James</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claiborne</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>St. John</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>Orleans</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

average of 35.9 per cent Negro. Seven Dixiecrat parishes were predominantly Negro, and in two, the per cent Negro was between 49 and 50 per cent. At the same time, inspection of the lowest quarter of Dixiecrat parishes will indicate that in only two were the whites outnumbered. It is instructive to note that in these two parishes, West Baton Rouge and St. James, the Negro had been allowed to register for the vote, in 1952.

The Dixiecrats polled 49.8 per cent of the total presidential vote in 1948 and the impression would be gained that the revolt had wide appeal, as nearly every parish of north Louisiana registered strong support. Yet, in the light of the discussion preceding, to hold this position would seem unreasonable. The contention may be made that the Dixiecrat vote was double-pronged; half of the "revolt" was a protest on the part of the farmer against the Truman administration. In 1944 a vote of from a quarter to a third of a parish total was registered in favor of the Republican candidate in north Louisiana among many normally Democratic parishes. It is maintained that this was a protest vote against administration policies, in an area with a tradition of protest. For where did this portion of the vote go in 1948?

Taking those parishes which registered a vote for the Republican candidate above the state average of 19 per cent in 1944, it should be possible to trace the direction this tendency took in the 1948 presidential election. Of these
TABLE III
CONTINUITY OF POLITICAL TENDENCIES IN GROUPS OF PARISHES
PARISH PERCENTAGE ABOVE STATE AVERAGE*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1944 Republican</th>
<th>1948 States' Rights</th>
<th>1948 Truman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Webster</td>
<td>Webster</td>
<td>Webster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winn</td>
<td>Winn</td>
<td>Winn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabine</td>
<td>Sabine</td>
<td>Sabine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vernon</td>
<td>Vernon</td>
<td>Vernon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morehouse</td>
<td>Morehouse</td>
<td>Morehouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Carroll</td>
<td>W. Carroll</td>
<td>W. Carroll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richland</td>
<td>Richland</td>
<td>Richland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catahoula</td>
<td>Catahoula</td>
<td>Catahoula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red River</td>
<td>Red River</td>
<td>Beaufort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natchitoches</td>
<td>Natchitoches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaSalle</td>
<td>LaSalle</td>
<td>Calcasieu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Carroll</td>
<td>E. Carroll</td>
<td>Caldwell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Feliciana</td>
<td>E. Feliciana</td>
<td>Franklin</td>
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<td>Tangipahoa</td>
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<td>Beaufort</td>
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<td>Calcasieu</td>
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<td>Union</td>
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<td>Iberia</td>
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<td>DeSoto</td>
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<td>W. Feliciana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jeff. Davis</td>
<td>Jeff. Davis</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

thirty-three parishes, nearly all showed up in the Dixiecrat column, but with one striking difference. In some the Dixiecrat percentage was extremely high, while in more the States' Rights and the Truman percentages were above the state averages. It is this differential which belies the unity of the 1944 Republican vote. While for the electorate of some parishes it was a protest vote against the national Democratic party, in others the 1944 vote was a protest not against party but against policy. In one group of parishes the political climate was such that the revolt was to carry over into the 1952 elections, while the rest were to remain devoted to Longism and the Democratic party.

There were ten parishes of the 1944 group which registered percentages favoring the Dixiecrats in 1948 with about two-thirds of the vote. Here, the leading tendency was apparent as the geographical distribution of these parishes would reveal. They fringed the heart of the Louisiana hills, but in none was the traditional farmer vote a dominating tendency. They were planter parishes or those among which the farmer class was generally more prosperous. To anticipate and clinch the contention that these parishes belonged to the conservatives, it will be found that in all ten of these parishes the 1952 Republican percentages were above the state average.

On the other side of the political center, there were ten parishes of the 1944 group which registered Dixiecrat
proportions above fifty per cent. The support could be no more, for the Truman candidacy was also favored by around one-third of the electorate. The geographic distribution of these parishes stretches from Macon Ridge, across the hills, to the parishes of the Texas border. Within this area was seated the old-time traditional farmer vote, a political tendency favoring the Democratic party and Longism. In 1952 every one of these parishes registered majorities for the candidate of the Democratic party. There very definitely has been delineated here a cleavage and a continuity of basic political tendencies.

There were, in between the extremes, four parishes of the 1944 group which failed to register Dixiecrat percentages above the state average, while the votes for Truman reached proportions of from 10 to 15 per cent above the state average of 31.2 for his party. One of these is Calcasieu, which of course contained a sizable worker class vote. On the other hand, Beauregard, Caldwell, and Franklin are areas where the tradition of the farmer was predominant.

The remaining three parishes of the group which in 1944 registered Republican percentages above the state average, Union, Ouachita, and Iberia, had little in common except the 1944 vote and the near equal split in the 1952 vote between Republican and Democrat. Iberia belonged to the group of parishes of the southern part of the state traditionally Whig-Republican. Ouachita is one of the urban-industrial
centers of the state whose class stratification is scrambled, with an older planter-commercial layer, farmer groups, a considerable laboring group, and a middle class of some proportion. In Union there is apparently a Republican tendency of a number evenly matched against the opposing tendency toward the Democratic party.

The north Louisiana parishes which did not fit the extremes in voting behavior of the 1948 election tend to traditional position in support of the Democratic party and of the Long faction. The farmer had learned that a protest might bring results, but he also recognized from whence came his political bread and butter.

The general pattern, then, in the continuity of protest since 1944 is the cleavage in the geographical distribution of the tendency in north Louisiana. The fact that the cleavage follows quite generally the outlines of Long country would suggest that the differential follows the line between the "haves" and the "have-nots," and that it is the "haves" which have revolted, this time. For of the group of ten parishes highlighting the political trend on each extreme, the control factor, the support of Longism, is clearly apparent only in the group tending Democratic. In each group the exceptions do not upset the rule. Using the three key Long elections as an index, in the Democratic group the average support for Longism is 2.5 times, whereas in the Dixiecrat-Republican group, the average support is only 1.5, with three
parishes, Caddo, Madison, and West Feliciana "anti" all three times.

The conservative-liberal cleavage discovered in north Louisiana is carried over in south Louisiana. It might be expected that in the sugar country, the home of Louisiana conservatism, a consensus of political opinion still existed. However, this area was no less immune to the influences which shaped present day Louisiana society. Here, too one may look for differentials in political outlook as expressed in the ballot. Yet, the outlet for conservatism might be expected in a different direction than in north Louisiana, since the tradition of Whig-Republicanism had remained influential. The conservatism of the sugar country contained more of an enlightened self-interest than the ideological concern of the north Louisiana Bourbon.

The year 1920 was one peculiarly sensitive for Republican opinion in Louisiana. The Progressive-Republican, Parker, had been elected governor with staunch backing from south Louisiana, and in the presidential election Harding had been favored in fourteen parishes, with a Republican vote of nearly 75 per cent having been recorded in Iberia. (See Figure 35.) Ten of these parishes were in sugar country. In 1920 only the "solid South" carried for the Democrats in the electoral college. The Democratic candidate had stood on the Wilson record, and the war-weary electorate defeated him. There was no alternative candidate, for as one journalist
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1920
REPUBLICAN SUPPORT IN
SELECTED PARISHES

Source: Report of Secretary of State, Louisiana, 1920
observed, Harding had been elected "by disgust." In the background, releasing the old Whig concern for self-interest in sugar country was the subtle question of tariff. Not long after gaining office, the Republicans repudiated Democratic concern for trade with exhausted Europe and in 1922 established tariff rates higher than ever before in our history. There had been good reason for the sugar interests to exhum and reassert old tendencies.

In 1948, after another "Democratic War," the sugar country once again registered strong Republican sympathies. The tendency had been nurtured over the years, although by this time the numerical support was not what it once had been. Every one of the ten sugar parishes which had registered Republican majorities in 1920 had, in 1948, recorded Republican percentages above the state average of 17.5 per cent. (See Figure 36.) Still, there was no consensus of political opinion within the sugar country, and the remaining proportions of the vote were divided between Dixiecrat and Truman sentiments.

Iberia showed the leading tendency for the cluster of sugar parishes west of the great Atchafalaya drainage basin. Here the Republican candidate received a plurality, the

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1948
PLURALITIES IN SELECTED PARISHES

- Truman
- Thurmond
- Dewey

Source: Report of Secretary of State, Louisiana, 1948

Figure 36
returns being 47 per cent in favor of Dewey. The parishes grouped on either side of Iberia registered Republican percentages above the state average, but in these the pluralities were gained by the Dixiecrats. Perhaps there was a feeling among the conservatives that a States' Rights vote would do more in 1948, but at any rate, the fact remains that in these parishes almost three-quarters of the electorate had cast conservative ballots. Oil was more prevalent here. The differential is clearly apparent between these Dixiecrat-Republican parishes and those to the east of the Atchafalaya. The Republican candidate received the traditional proportions, but the balance of the vote in Iberville, St. James, and St. John was decidedly liberal and pluralities were recorded for the Truman candidacy.

Within the sugar country, as in cotton country, there is indication of a political cleavage, in the southern part of the state aided by the changing attitude toward Negro suffrage. Yet, this is not so surprising when it is recalled that in some of these parishes the old Whig tradition had been strong, and that here the tradition of Negro voting had been nurtured longest.

If the sugar parishes along the Mississippi between Baton Rouge and New Orleans have shown a definite Democratic tendency, they have also been more sympathetic to the appeal of Longism. The two tendencies seem to go together.
Lafayette, Iberia, and St. Mary registered Long support in 1928, but have been conspicuous by their absence in the Long columns since that time; and although some parishes in the eastern side of sugar country have been slow in accepting the appeals of Longism, they have steadily demonstrated a drift in that direction. Actually, the breakthrough was to occur in the elections of 1952. The parishes of the middle ground, such as St. Martin, Assumption, Lafourche, and Terrebonne, have recorded rather strong support for Longism, although in the latter two parishes the climate of opinion became more conservative. The voting records provide ample evidence that if an economic unit, the sugar country is no longer unified on political opinion. Yet, it is to be suggested that the cleavage existent here does not reflect quite the same ideological background that can be found in north Louisiana. After all, the home of conservatism in Louisiana is in south Louisiana; the Bourbon ideology was fostered under more trying circumstances and hence carried perhaps a bit more compulsion and a little less feeling for responsibility.

Finally, it is necessary to devote a few lines to the tendencies of labor groupings in Louisiana.\(^40\) Baton Rouge is representative of the recent urban-industrial developments within the state; quite obviously the development had brought

an increased population among which were elements with an effect on voting behavior. At the same time these processes brought, on the higher socio-economic layers, a population with a "conservative" vote, there has been a growing worker class with tendencies to vote "progressive." As expressed in the vote, the former groups have backed anti-Long candidates and in presidential elections Republican candidates or the "defection" within the Democratic party. The worker class, in Baton Rouge at least, has not been strong in support of Longism, but will tend to support a Long candidate when clearly there is no other choice on the basis of fundamental economic issues; and in presidential elections the workers, although not organized with definite ties with national unions, will parallel the national tendency of supporting the Democratic party. The phenomenon of voting behavior in Baton Rouge will be pursued further in the next chapter.

Investigation has proceeded to the point which warrants, in summation, a discussion of generalizations which may be entertained concerning the significance of one-party politics and the rise of Longism. To do so will establish the relationship which exists between the events of the past and the situation in which the elections of 1952 were carried out. One conclusion is foremost, that Louisiana politics may be understood, but only against the background of the historical circumstances which helped make the present what it is. Class support has been hidden behind party or factional
labels poorly understood, and further, the labels themselves may be shifted. Yet, basic tendencies of political expression may remain consistent.

Political behavior may not always appear reasonable. In Louisiana politics, significance lies not in the electorate's rational choices of Long or anti-Long candidates but in the tendencies behind the unceasing struggle for power. Opposing parties or factions are representative of differing philosophies of government, with traditional backgrounds in Louisiana political experience. Yet the social situation had changed and political outlook must be adjusted in some manner to the present reality. In 1952 talk arose concerning the possibility of two-party politics in Louisiana. Had not there always been present at least the necessary ingredients for party politics, if not the actual opposition of genuine political parties?

The electorate which voted for the Democratic candidates, after 1900, scarcely had an alternative choice. Those who were able to vote were also fortunate that their situation was such they met the suffrage requirements. Such people might be expected to have an interest in the party struggle. As industrial plants became more prevalent, as the economic situation bettered, the level of living was raised, and educational opportunities were afforded, then, the voice of the people was heard again. An aspiration for a share of the realizable potential in Louisiana's economy, coupled with
the pent-up frustration of the masses would produce a consensus among the very group which if united represented a majority of Louisiana's electorate.

Moreover, the history of Louisiana's political experience might well stress the strong role of the executive in the state government. The legislature, throughout most of the state's history, has been secondary to the governor; it was expected of the governor to do things when elected. On the local level, especially in south Louisiana, the politicians, lawyers, sheriffs, and the priests acted as the spokesmen for the people, who, speaking French, were inarticulate of their interests and needs. Against such a background, is it so surprising that a Huey Long could rise to political power, and acting the role of the strong man, perpetuate his political program? The Whig philosophy that the people should be ruled merged with the Jacksonian belief that the people should rule. In Longism the people had everything to gain.

Yet, if traditionally, the role of the executive was a major one in Louisiana government, the dogmas, if not the spirit, of Jacksonian Democracy were perpetuated. The expanding functions of government were scattered among numerous holders of fragments of the executive power at the very time that rising industrialism made demands of a stronger or more

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41 Prothro, op. cit., p. 99.
centralized executive. Once this had happened, who could gather again the pieces of executive authority except the strong man? Government by bureaucracy became the accepted pattern, and the electorate decided whether direction would be through their representative, the governor, or through the action of boards. Opinion was split on this decision.

Implicit in the political philosophy of the Louisiana conservative, if his dogma may be so dignified, was the feeling for states' rights and vested interests. In the first state constitution, "property" was the basic concern of governmental activity. The old Whig had protected his interests in voting for internal improvements, the banks, and for high tariff. Yet at the same time the Whig governed with responsibility, for theirs was an articulate major premise. The cotton planters likewise could find sympathy for the Whig concern for vested interests; but the Calhounian doctrines of states' rights, which in the end the cotton planter embraced in justifying the Secession, was a doctrine of another shading. Embodied in the dogmas of the Democratic party which became the dominating party in Louisiana politics, it remained an inarticulate major premise.

The dogmas of the Democratic party were mixed, however, and although the dominating elite could be guided by the concerns of states' rights and vested interests, the people,

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following the traditions of the Jacksonian past, would nurture a more liberal outlook. For the Calhounian doctrine "reserved liberty exclusively to the ruling class, rejected the egalitarian doctrines of the Declaration of Independence, denied generally the doctrine of natural rights in its traditional context, and converted the principle of states' rights into an instrumentality primarily for the protection of property rights." 

If on the national scene the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian liberalism, and the economic and social legislation requested by the Populists, had become part of the program of the Democratic party culminating in the New Deal, then in Louisiana a similar spirit might prevail in the Democratic factional program of Longism. The electoral support of farmer and laborer given to Long candidates would suggest this conclusion. Objectively viewed, the actions of the opposing conservative faction, since its ascendancy in 1900, and particularly since 1948, suggest an attitude of cynicism. Yet subjectively the spokesmen and principal actors in the Bourbon camp most likely are motivated by genuine attitudes of concern. The most recent anti-Long governor of Louisiana, for example, has worked day and night for the cause of states' rights and yet often describes himself as a Jeffersonian Democrat.

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43 Ibid., p. 459.
44 Morning Advocate, Baton Rouge, Nov. 22, 1953.
He might more accurately be labeled a Calhounian.

The rise of Longism in Louisiana was made possible by the rather severe domination of the populace by one party controlled by a dominant minority. The people, frustrated beyond endurance, found their champion in Huey Long, and quite conscious of their position in society and aware of what should be done about it, supported and established the reign of Longism. As on the national scene, most of the latent class conflict of the thirties was averted through political action in Louisiana, and a generation of small farmers and portions of the working class learned to favor Longism. Its program was satisfactory for the period for which it was meant, but by 1950 the records of the United States Census showed that economic and demographic influences had transformed Louisiana society.
CHAPTER V

THE ELECTIONS OF 1952 AND THE FUTURE OF LOUISIANA POLITICS

"We were told for a half century that if the people in the South even thought of voting Republican, grandfather would turn over in his grave. Well, no noise was heard from the cemeteries.... last November."

Gov. James F. Byrnes

A. Demography and Politics. The good governor of South Carolina, in speaking of Republicanism in the South of 1952, forgot to make clear that those were representatives of the very politically dominant minority of which he is a member who had exhorted Democratic solidarity. This is no anachronism, either, for the governor meant what he said. It appeared "safe," in 1952, for the conservatives of the South to give strong electoral support in behalf of the Republican candidate. More than being safe, however, it can be demonstrated that this move was but an inevitable consequence of the demographic factors which influenced the establishment of, and reflect the existence of, the "New South." Paradoxical events transpired in the Louisiana portion of this new South, events which could not be clearly understood through sole use of old formulae. The demographic indices of social structure in Louisiana will be employed to show
that Louisiana politics, after 1952, will never be quite the same as traditionally conceived.

Demographic characteristics, such as the composition of the population, have of course always influenced politics. The old antagonism between Creole and American, the gradual outnumbering of Whigs by Jacksonians, and the importance of the Negro vote during Reconstruction, all these and more have worked their effects upon Louisiana politics. If, in the past, migration peopled the state with a farmer class, it was also to work in transforming the social structure of the mid-twentieth century. The small farmer groups of the hills and "cut-over" parishes developed a class solidarity and became the backbone of support of Longism. The industrial labor force present in the Louisiana of 1952 might become supporters of a politics of another sort. The tabulation of the Federal Census of 1950 indicated that Louisiana was no longer to be characterized as rural, but had become predominantly urban. There is also an accompanying industrial growth which will remake the structure of the formerly agricultural society.

The former traditions, the political symbols of the past, must somehow be adapted to changed conditions. In the 1950's there were new sources of power and of electoral support. There would be combinations established and tried in the ceaseless struggle to man the machinery of government. The Louisiana of 1950 reflected demographic characteristics
more similar to national trends than to her own past. The demographic tendencies or trends hinted at were observable by 1940 and have been evaluated elsewhere.\(^1\) In the next decade, more of the same is discernable and leading features of the trend to industrial urbanity will be presently discussed. The population growth and distribution in Louisiana shows an increase of people in the cities. The urban centers have become the key to political success if for no other reason than the sheer number of voters who reside there. Industrialization has afforded a host of job opportunities, and since manufacturing plants have been concentrated in but seven of Louisiana's sixty-four parishes, the resulting voting labor force is not only concentrated but also tends to outnumber other groups within the electorate. The trend to industrial urbanity developed in Louisiana a situation parallel to national experience, the shift in the class structure.

It was a generation ago that Professor Holcombe observed that the old geographic sectionalism in American

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politics was giving way or being modified by a rising urbanity.\textsuperscript{2} There was sectionalism in Louisiana politics, but class cleavage, also, as the rise of Longism demonstrated; now this would be changed. As C. Wright Mills has shown, of the three broad strata comprising present day society, it has been the "middle class" which has grown steadily in proportion to the whole.\textsuperscript{3} It could be assumed, in the case of Louisiana, with industrial urbanity a rather sudden event, that the very population aggregating in the cities would be quite middle class in the new sense. Of course the industrial labor force would be comprised of a large share of working class people, but nonetheless the proportion of people falling into the middle income brackets would be appreciable.

As the industrial base of Louisiana increased within the last decade, its influence was felt in the social class structure. For the nation, Mills has shown how the decline in the older, independent sectors of the middle class was accompanied by the numerical rise of the newer groups of salaried employees.\textsuperscript{4} This trend is striking for Louisiana, even when using but two census compilations for comparisons. The

\begin{footnotes}
\item[4] Ibid., p. 65.
\end{footnotes}
The proportion of self-employed had dropped from 27.7 to 19.2 per cent since 1940, whereas there was an accompanying rise in the proportion of private wage and salaried workers from 58.9 to 67.9 per cent. Moreover, the gain within the major occupational groups of professionals, managers and officials, clerical, and sales people, generally falling into the salaried middle class, was proportionately 8.4 per cent more in 1950 than in the previous count.

A word of caution must be given, however, in the interpretation of these percentages. For the newer industrial base has been placed over the older agricultural base of Louisiana economy. Yet, even agriculture has not remained unaffected by recent changes. The farmer was considered a part of the older middle classes, but his place, numerically, in the new order has dwindled. Part of the decrease in self-employed persons and the increase in wage and salaried employees may be a direct consequence of the proportionately fewer farmers in the Louisiana labor force. In 1940 farmers made up 18.3 per cent of the total labor force, but by 1950 this group comprised only 10.3 per cent of the total. At the same time, farm laborers also made up less of the labor force; the proportion was 13.6 per cent in 1940 and only 6.6 per cent a decade later.

The rural sociologist will point out that much of this decrease in the number of farmers is a direct consequence of
the mechanization of agriculture. It is true that owner-operated farms are increasing, while sharecroppers and laborers are on the wane. At the same time we are told that the number of farms is decreasing. There are fewer farms and those that remain are increasing in size. This has meant a decrease in the rural population, and this helps explain the facts concerning composition of the Louisiana labor force. With no work in the country, even more people have migrated to the urban areas. The mechanization of agriculture takes a sectional differentiation. Least mechanized, generally speaking, are the parishes included in the north and central Louisiana hill and cut-over areas. Along with mechanization there has been an increase in the total value of farm products; this has meant generally a higher level of living. Hence even as the industrial-urban trend has helped change the class structure of Louisiana society, so also mechanization has affected the composition of the farmer class within the system of stratification.

The population, elements of which will fill the economic class positions described above, was characterized as predominantly urban in 1950, for the first time in Louisiana's census history. The urban population made up 54.3 per cent of the total. The population as a whole had increased 13.5 per cent

5A. L. Bertrand, Agricultural Mechanization and Social Change in Rural Louisiana, Louisiana State University Experiment Station Bulletin, No. 458 (1951).
over 1940, but spectacular gains were made in the urban-industrial parishes. The census computations indicate, for example, that almost two-thirds of the population increase in the state was accounted for by Orleans, East Baton Rouge, and Jefferson parishes. East Baton Rouge continued its rapid expansion with an increase of 79.0 per cent, while in Jefferson Parish the population had increased by 106 per cent. Such is obvious, for when driving to New Orleans from the northwest, it is difficult to discern when one leaves Jefferson and enters Orleans Parish. Jefferson is rapidly becoming industrialized and portions of the parish have become the residential suburbs for New Orleans. With Jefferson as the latest addition to the group of urban-industrial parishes, there are now seven whose population represents 47.2 per cent of the Louisiana total.6

The residents of these seven parishes make up an important segment of the Louisiana electorate. Nearly half the people of the state live there, making up 48.1 per cent of the total registered voters in 1952. At the same time it is revealing of the urbanward migration of Louisiana Negroes that in 1950 over two-fifths of the state total resided in these seven urban-industrial parishes. And in 1952, the colored voters there represented 62.9 per cent of the total who had registered in such large number. The colored

6Jefferson, Orleans, East Baton Rouge, Calcasieu, Rapides, Caddo, and Ouachita.
residents made up close to a third of the population in most of these parishes.

Even though the Negro was also becoming urbanized, there were still fourteen parishes, in 1950, where the white population was outnumbered by the colored. These parishes follow down the Mississippi, border part of the Floridas, and cluster about the northwest corner of the state. In general pattern, the rural Negro population follows the seats of the former plantation economy still, after all these years. W. J. Cash had called the Negro the "Proto-Dorian bond of the Democratic party," and with his heavy voting registration in the urban parishes it is instructive that little or no Negro registration was allowed in the rural parishes where in 1952 the conservative vote was so high. The Negro had generally found a new freedom but it would be slow in spreading back from the urban centers into the rural hinterland.

As a substitute for the lack of a better index of the relative incidence of "capital" and "labor" within the parishes, a ratio has been computed showing the proportion of wage and salary workers to those self-employed in each parish. (See Figure 37.) As expected, the large worker ratio occurs clustered about the urban centers. The areas where agriculture is primary stand out with low ratios. In the hills

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RATIO OF PRIVATE WAGE AND
SALARY WORKERS TO SELF-EMPLOYED
1950 BY PARISHES

1st quarter: .112 - .238
2nd quarter: .248 - .395
3rd quarter: .449 - .666
4th quarter: .680 - 2.486

Source: Seventeenth Census of the United States, 1950
Figure 37
between Rapides and Ouachita, the agricultural pattern is broken due to the relatively high worker ratios resulting from the presence of lumber industries which draw from farmer groups for a labor force. Southwest from Rapides, until Calcasieu is reached, there is likewise a cluster similar in characteristics to the hill parishes. The distribution of high ratios within the sugar bowl probably reveals the association of labor with the processing end of the sugar industry. There are also scattered lumber, seafood, oil, and chemical industries in the small towns and cities of south Louisiana.

The more concentrated distribution of high worker ratios in south Louisiana results from the greater density of population in that area of the state where the older layer of agriculture, industry, and commerce had flourished. Yet the parishes close or adjacent to the Mississippi River, such as Assumption, St. James, St. John, and St. Charles have in each considerably smaller populations than Iberia and St. Mary parishes farther west, beyond the Atchafalaya basin. (See Table IV.) In the former areas, any substantial increase in the number of industrial establishments would be felt in the composition of the labor force. Moreover, in this area there are no large cities or towns. Iberia, St. Mary, Terrebonne and Lafourche, on the other hand, contain in each a city with more than 7,000 population. Here additions to the labor force in the categories of wage and salary
TABLE IV

DIFFERENTIALS IN SELECTED RATIO OF COMPOSITION OF LABOR FORCE
IN CERTAIN SUGAR PARISHES AND POPULATION OF LARGEST
CITY OR TOWN ABOVE 2,499 IN 1950*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>Ratios of Managers, Officials, and Proprietors** to Craftsmen, Operatives and Kindred Workers</th>
<th>Population of Largest City or Town Above 2,499</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. John</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Charles</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascension</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>4,150</td>
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<td>Iberville</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>5,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Mary</td>
<td>.302</td>
<td>9,759</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iberia</td>
<td>.244</td>
<td>16,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrebonne</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>11,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafourche</td>
<td>.246</td>
<td>7,733</td>
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</table>


**Farmers Excluded.
workers would be counterbalanced by other elements of the population already present. However, in the eastern parishes worker groups would tend to outnumber the older layers of planter and commercial groups and associated classes. While in Iberia and St. Mary parishes from 10 to 15 per cent of the population was engaged in manufacturing in 1950, in St. James and St. John the proportions were from 22 to 36 per cent. Likewise, the ratios in the accompanying table clearly reveal the relatively greater importance of worker groups in the parishes along the Mississippi. Moreover, as has been shown above, there are many more Negroes in these parishes who have gained the suffrage. All these factors work to produce a voting potential different in kind from that which exists in the western parishes of the sugar country.

The politician must make different appeals and seek different combinations of electoral support in this new Louisiana. Cleavages of classes and interests cut across the former alignments. It would no longer be possible to unite country against New Orleans, or the latter with a portion of the former. The increase of population in urban centers has created a new middle class whose favor at the polls must be won. Likewise, the class structure of the rural parishes has shifted. The farmers of today are generally more secure, better educated, and more prosperous than previously. If the class position of the rural or urban dweller had been altered and generally improved, so the subtle process of
identification might work in the direction of alliance with the older status groups of prestige and power. Surely the predispositions of the old Bourbon Democrat might remain in force, reenforced through the aspirations of social mobility among the members of the new emergent middle class.

With the establishment of television stations in Louisiana cities, a virtual revolution might take place on the farm. The values and attitudes standard for the urbanite would find their way to alter the rural mind. In recognition of the potentials of this phenomenon a farmer recently told the writer that in the next elections the candidate who most efficiently utilized the channels of television could be the governor of Louisiana. On the national scene elections cost more and more money because of the expenses involved in using the mass media of communication. This trend must surely be felt quite soon in Louisiana politics.

B. The Rise of the "Independent": The Gubernatorial Primaries. Of the nine gubernatorial candidates in the Democratic primary of 1952, only five were given serious consideration, although Dudley LeBlanc counted himself in the running, also. The results of the election indicated that Louisiana politics could still be understood in terms of the Long and anti-Long cleavage. Yet the campaign brought out

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clearly the fact that more than the old political battle with
the former symbols was involved. 9

In the first place, every leading candidate considered
himself an independent. Even Judge Spaht denied that he was
Charley McCarthy to Earl Long's Edgar Bergen; he was dedi­
cated to the program of Longism but pledged himself to admin­
ister it with efficiency and humaneness. McLemore held that
the "Long-Long" team of Spaht and Boggs was a plot of
Governor Earl Long and Senator Russell Long to perpetuate
Longism. However, each leading contender set himself to the
task of explaining to the electorate what was new and differ­
ent about his program and why he was the "independent" candi­
date best suited for the position of governor. The very
actions of the candidates themselves, then, in 1952 indicate
that the politicians of the new Louisiana were on uncertain
ground and had to feel their way, to play safe and be indepen­
dent. The problem was one of who should be appealed to, to
attempt to be all things to all groups of voters.

The leading political philosophies and slogans which
were present on the national scene were voiced by the inde­
dependents during the campaign, adapted of course for home con­
sumption. A brief analysis of the platforms of the leading
candidates will make it possible to ascertain the ways in
which the politicians reached what they thought to be important

9 New Orleans Item. This paper ran weekly columns
printing views and reports of the candidates.
segments of electoral support. At the same time it will be possible to isolate some of the reasons why groups of voters had supported one candidate rather than another. The election was to be a meeting ground between the old and the new.

Although the "reform" administrations of 1940 and 1944 had left much of the bureaucracy of Longism intact, the administration of Earl Long proved to be four years of high taxes and heavy spending. "Welfare statism" was given its greatest boost in Louisiana at the same time the national trend was to take a rather drastic turn away from the dangers of "creeping socialism." The observant politician might detect that the new middle class was among those most receptive of this idea. In the spring of 1948 the Long administration increased the tax collections by 63 per cent. The welfare state would cost money, and in the first year of Long's administration the tax take was slightly more than $200 million. The other side of the tax coin was spending. Whereas the state total of the last year of Davis' administration amounted to $170 million, spending rose to $336 million during the 1951-52 fiscal year. Long attempted several power grabs, and in so doing alienated the respect of his nephew Russell. Earl was of the old school of Longism, but Russell seems cut of a different cloth. The truth may lie in the remarks of a

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10 *New Orleans Item*, May 11, 1952: Mr. Edward Stagg summarized the "Long Regime."
columnist who pointed to Russell's good standing in the Senate and of the cynical summation of a wag who felt that "education is the ruin of a demagogue." At any rate, the Earl Long administration was going out of office, but "benefits" seemed to be here to stay. The independents of 1952 would be expected to take some stand on these matters.

This study has focused upon the presence of groups and groupings within Louisiana, of factors which influence the development of "climates of political opinion" manifested in voting behavior. In 1952, with such a large number of "independent" candidates with an eye on the governorship, it might be difficult to untangle elements of support unless the various appeals of the candidates are known. Pronouncements of "political philosophies" during a campaign are not to be taken too seriously, but on the other hand they are about the only source of ideological factors available. Nevertheless, whether the quintessence of the politicians' "ideology" can be distilled from campaign speeches and circulars, there is no doubt that the intention of the candidate is to touch sympathetic tendencies of the voter and draw them out in his favor. It is with this word of qualification that the following analysis of the gubernatorial election of 1952 is made.

Dudley J. LeBlanc's appearance in the 1952 gubernatorial race certainly fitted the temper of the year. Although an

11New Orleans Item, July 25, 1952; Doris Fleeson, syndicated columnist.
early supporter of the program of Longism, LeBlanc had become a successful manufacturer of Hadacol. His approach would be that of the business man's. His idea was to sell Louisiana to the manufacturing world by offering inducements more attractive than those of neighboring states. LeBlanc pledged a business man's government and summed up his platform in these words:

Political and economic opportunists like political termites are boring into the very foundation of our financial structure of government for their own selfish aggrandizement. It is time to call a halt to all this. It is time to elect a businessman to run the biggest business of them all, the government of the state of Louisiana.\(^{12}\)

Dudley said he was the man for the job and that if elected he would get new industry to offset the unemployment that was resulting from the agricultural mechanization in the state.

The campaign platform of Bill Dodd, the estranged lieutenant-governor of the Long administration, seemed generally to accept the program of Longism. He would fight the power grab, and having had governmental experience, his election would insure a smooth transfer of office. He had cooperated fully with the undertaking designed to help the people and had openly fought the attempted grabs of Earl Long. Dodd remarked that he had "... always been independent, yet.... tried to cooperate with.... friends to carry out the programs

\(^{12}\) *New Orleans Item*, Oct. 28, 1951, p. 20.
designed to help the general welfare of our state."\(^{13}\) Dodd felt that taxes could be reduced even under the type of administration the people were now enduring. Dodd had many friends in the state, especially among labor unions. Yet in his campaign reports the impression was gained that he often talked to convince himself that he was the man to beat.

The candidate who proved to have the most conspicuous class appeal was James McLemore. The election results showed that his support was definitely drawn from plantation areas. A businessman, McLemore was an avowed independent, by his own admission the only "real" independent in the field. His campaign headquarters initiated a "Citizens' Revolt" akin to the "Crusade" which was called later the same year. Toward the end McLemore declared the other so-called independents were worried over the swing to McLemore, and the count of the vote indicated that there definitely had been a swing. McLemore appealed widely among the prestige and power groups and the new middle class, too. His line was that the revolt against the "Trumanism-Socialism" debacle in Washington and the political machine was red hot. Taxes must be reduced and state spending lowered. However, McLemore was careful to state that he was not against welfare. Every needy citizen would get assistance — the political padding would go, and the state would save money. McLemore was also the heir

\(^{13}\)Ibid., Sept. 16, 1951, p. 24.
apparent to the 1948 Dixiecrat movement, for he was openly states' rights. McLemore could sum up his position in this manner:

From this point forward we must have a governor who has integrity, who is a fearless fighter, who is an experienced administrator who knows, from experience, the problems of both business and agriculture. We must have a governor who firmly believes in states' rights and is willing and able to fight a stern campaign to win back those wrested from us, and to defend those the federal government is steadily encroaching upon.14

In the new Louisiana the feeling that it was "time for a change" was widespread. It was discernible in the opposition candidates were voicing to the Truman machine or the Long machine. The attempt to lump the candidacy of Hale Boggs within the endorsement of the Long machine is an example of the tendency. The campaigning of Boggs with the aid of Russell Long was an impressive combination of political talent, for both were highly regarded in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, respectively. The senator's charge that his Uncle Earl had "mansionitis" was sincere on his part. The break within the Long faction was definite. Even the conservative Shreveport Times denounced the talk of a double entry and openly endorsed Hale Boggs for governor.

Boggs recognized the traditional power of the governor in Louisiana when he asked that the legislature be utilized for more than a rubber stamp. "In Louisiana," Boggs declared, "the Legislature has too often been the political football

14Ibid., Nov. 11, 1951, p. 8.
of the executive branch. In this state, the governor has exercised great powers over legislation -- powers too potent, weakening that branch, destroying its integrity, debilitating its character. Such a hold is the first step toward complete dictatorship. In this, Boggs too revealed his opposition to Earl Long, but neither would he throw out all aspects of Longism along with the present administration. His platform called for an improved old age pension program; a cost of living raise for school teachers; the modernization and improvement of all public institutions; rebuilt, widened highways; flood control and drainage; and the attraction of commerce and industry to Louisiana. Under his program it would be "Louisiana First."

Carlos Spaht was the choice of Earl Long to succeed to the governorship; Spaht was chosen only after Long had tried other persuasions in vain, however. The Long candidate would stand on the Long program, of course. Spaht pointed out that most of the opposition said they would retain all benefits of the present state administration and at the same time promise multiple tax reductions. This was said to be a good trick if it could be done. Briefly, Spaht pledged the following:

To carry out the constructive and humanitarian program of the present state administration.

15Ibid., Nov. 11, 1951, p. 8.
16Ibid., Sept. 16, 1951, p. 24.
Not to increase and wherever possible to decrease taxes and operating expenses.

To maintain the old-age pension and welfare programs.

Continue to expand and improve state roads.

Preserve and advance wherever possible hospital, dental, and health programs.

Better conditions at Angola and other state institutions through employment of outstanding doctors, penologists and administrators.

Protect communities and observe home rule.

Safeguard oil, gas and timber, and other natural resources.

Maintain and improve educational program.

Establishment of a Governor's Advisory Council.

Constitutional civil service.

The Spaht platform pledges were so similar to those of Kennon that it is difficult to decide whether the Long forces did the copying, feeling that camouflage was needed, or whether Kennon copied Spaht. At any rate, it was clear that no independent could start completely from scratch.

Robert Kennon claimed throughout the campaign that his was the first announced platform and that the other candidates had borrowed from it as they found that Kennon was gaining such favor with the people. Whatever the case, the judge from Minden had a twelve-point platform which included these pledges:17

Continuance of $50-a-month old-age assistance.

Businesslike administration of affairs of highway commission through establishment of a board.

Repeal two cents additional gasoline tax enacted in 1948.

Improvement of public health.

Removal of state institutions from political control by creating boards.

Prison reform.

A modern parole system.

Preserve home rule.

Constitutional civil service.

Voting machines made available in every voting precinct.

Bring new industry to Louisiana.

Encourage agriculture and make an effective team of farmer, businessman, and banker.

Were there common elements which tied the platforms of these candidates together? And were there essential differences between the platforms of the 1952 gubernatorial candidates?

Taking the two candidates who entered the "run-off," Kennon and Spaht: their platforms had much in common. If it were true that Spaht ran on the Long program, then what was Kennon doing with a similar program? Kennon might well have considered himself the heir to the "reform" administrations of 1940 and 1944, for his platform, like those, could not be radically different from that of the administration in office. No wholesale removal of any Long endorsed practice was suggested. Welfare aid was to be continued, the institutions were to be furthered, Angola was to be improved,
Louisiana highways were a key problem, and home rule was to be preserved. The difference was that Kennon was going to continue services and at the same time cut taxes. Being an independent with no previous record in government, Kennon could more easily make his promises sound legitimate. Kennon was clearly in line with the traditions of "reform" in his endorsement of government by boards, and in his backing of civil service.

The essential difference between the programs of Spaht and Kennon appeared to be that Kennon presented his platform with the promise of a businesslike administration. Louisiana was experiencing an unprecedented prosperity, and who but the businessmen had made this possible? Spaht was dedicated to the task of carrying on the program of Longism. But this smacked of corruption and machine politics. This sort of government would parallel "Trumanism" on the national scene. Against this Kennon proffered an administration whose virtue would be self-righteousness and whose watchword would be efficiency. Maybe the Kennon program was not so different from past reforms, after all. Yet Robert Kennon made his strongest appeals in the urban areas of the state, and did not make the effort that other candidates did in the rural areas of the state. Kennon, it appeared, was up on his political know-how. The people of Louisiana had come to accept the good of Longism as an inevitable function of modern government. No one dared take it away. Kennon, then, gave the
impression that he was a man of the people, the people of the 1950's; he posed as the middle class's Huey Long.

Whether Earl Long and his political henchmen, or Spaht and his personal friends, composed the Long platform of 1952, it was written in such a way as to meet the challenges of the opposition. It too would be carried out constructively, and with the humanitarian touch traditional of Longism. Lest there be any danger at all of any more power grabs, Spaht endorsed the establishment of an advisory council in order to make the new Long administration the most incorruptible and productive.

The program endorsed by Congressman Boggs read more like something the national Democratic party might back on the local level. Perhaps this is why McLemore labeled Boggs the Truman candidate. Yet the congressional record of Mr. Boggs indicated that he was quite middle-of-the-road concerning domestic policies. The impression gained from studying the platform of Boggs was that here was a candidate willing to carry on the gains of the past twenty years, and to do so with the efficiency and understanding of an administrator aware that functions of government work to the people's good.

The "independent," McLemore, was not the independent representative of the good of Longism or of anti-Longism. His candidacy, consciously or not, represented the assertion of the older Bourbon Democratic faction, adapting its continuing revolt to the situation of 1952. Truman had beat out
the Dixiecrats, and now they had ample ammunition to hurl at
the Democratic party. McLemore, as suggested above, picked
up a groundswell of support as the campaign drew to a close.
He was not supposed to have a real chance, and yet he ended
up fourth and ran ahead of Bill Dodd.

Pick up any copy of Reader's Digest and there may be
found journalistically undigested slogans and slurs opposing
the Democratic status quo. Free enterprise and "rugged"
individualism were proposed as the traditional American answer
to the evils of "creeping socialism" and "mink coat" corruption. Therein may be found the essence of McLemore's plat­
form and appeal. It was conservative, with a touch of
nostalgic reaction. The political climate was such that a
platform like that one, if clearly perceived, would find
broad favor within the electorate among all groups involved
in the insecurity of the "status panic" or disposed to lean
to the political right of center. Since more than fourteen
papers, including the Times-Picayune, endorsed McLemore, it
is not surprising that the "citizens' revolt" should have ended with a sizable following. It was a select following,
too, composed of the leading economic and status groups of
city and country.

Longism had been the champion of the small people, the
farmer, the worker, and the small businessman, whose tradi­
tional support was firmly seated. In 1952, the die-hards,
the farmers of the hills, remained loyal to the tradition;
but even here the area of support had shrunk. The clearcut differential of farmer class opposed to planter and business interests was blurred. Take Macon Ridge, for example. The cotton farmers of the parishes located here, many of whom had come from the hills, supported Spaht in the first primary but endorsed Kennon in the "run-off" with between 52 and 58 per cent of the total vote. The farmer class itself was divided. Good times had brought the farmer security and a newly found status, and he looked further up the class ladder for his identification. A natural social-psychological process had worked its influence.

Spaht's support had come primarily from the country. LeBlanc and Dodd turned out to be "favorite son" candidates and failed to gain much support outside their home territories. The crucial battle of the 1952 elections was fought in the urban parishes. Kennon proved the candidate with the best organization, and his city vote made the difference. He had claimed that with thirty thousand New Orleans votes in the first primary victory would be his; more than thirty-three thousand Kennon votes were counted. In the second primary, the urban appeal of Kennon was overwhelming, for in the seven urban-industrial parishes the electorate had favored his candidacy with 65.2 per cent of the parish totals. Moreover, the contribution of these seven parishes to the total state vote

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18 Heberle, Hillery, and Lovrich, op. cit., figures 1 and 2.
of Kennon was 49.8, almost one-half of the entire Kennon support. Spaht, on the other hand, gained but 42.2 per cent of his second primary support in the urban areas.

Recently an attempt was made to identify the six leading candidates of the gubernatorial elections in terms of traditional Long and anti-Long support. Computations of rank-order coefficients of correlation indicated that whereas the combined "anti-Long" group of Kennon, McLemore, and LeBlanc was given support from similar geographic areas and social strata, the combined "Long" group of Spaht, Dodd, and Boggs was given no such unity of support. The conclusion was drawn that Kennon not only picked up McLemore and LeBlanc support in the second primary, he also gained some support from first primary Long candidates. It may be contended that the reason for this was the blurring of the traditional Long-anti-Long struggle. Political differences were expressed in other terms.

Compilations of election results by wards have been made available since the Heberle, Hillery, and Lovrich study was published. They have been utilized in the present study for two reasons. In the first place, it was felt that a study of the relationships of voting support by wards might cancel out regional variations and more clearly indicate rural-urban and socio-economic differences. Secondly, since the number

of wards is so much greater than the sixty-four parishes, it would be possible to use a more refined correlation formula. Computed on the basis of returns in the 532 wards, Pearsonian product-moment coefficients of correlation for grouped data between the support of the candidates have been established.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcccccc}
\hline
                  & McLemore & Kennon First & LeBlanc First & Boggs & Dodd & Spaht First \\
\hline
Kennon Second     & .443     & .319         & .106          & .039  & -.136 & -.748       \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Product-Moment Coefficients of Correlation between Kennon Second Primary Support and That of Leading Candidates in the First Primary, by Wards*}
\end{table}

\*Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns, Louisiana, 1952.

Only one of these coefficients approaches the range of very much significance, yet they are of relative importance in the comparison of electoral support of the candidates. It was discovered that correlations on the ward level, in this election at least, do not differ much from those computed on the parish level. The primary reason is a resultant of the clustering of support on a regional basis. Each candidate tended to pull his highest vote percentages in different parts of the state. The favorite son effect was felt.

Furthermore, the large number of candidates also was a factor of importance in this connection. The vote was split into fragments of support. These correlations are still valuable, however, in documenting the types and shifts of support found in 1952.

It will be noted that Kennon's second primary support was in closer relationship with that of McLemore than with his own first primary support. That Kennon's support was not stable is significant. Whereas his highest first primary support had been noticeable in the Florida parishes, in the second primary, the followers of McLemore in the north Louisiana and Bourbon Democrat areas were more highly enthusiastic for the candidacy of Judge Kennon. Kennon did maintain a good deal of his own first primary support, and it will be asserted that this came from the urban areas of the state. Where a ward registered a high first primary vote for McLemore, it tended to Kennon in the second primary in equal proportions. There was a political relationship between the appeals and support of Kennon and McLemore.

Weak but positive coefficients correlate the support of LeBlanc and Boggs in the direction of the "right" side of the political ledger. Whereas the second primary shift of Boggs' support was noticeable as was that of the relationship of Kennon support with LeBlanc, yet the almost complete lack of correlation would indicate that Boggs, as Kennon, was gaining strong support in urban areas. The Boggs candidacy
found greater favor in the middle class than did that of other "Long" candidates.

The Dodd support correlated negatively with Kennon support, clearly indicative that he was more a candidate of Longism. In fact, the Dodd strength was clustered west of Rapides within the "cut-over" parishes. It was here that a goodly portion of traditional Long support was seated and where Spaht maintained majorities in the second primary. Spaht tended to run second to Dodd in this area in the first primary.

The fact that the relation between Kennon second primary support and Spaht first primary support did not produce a completely negative coefficient of correlation deserves mention. On the extremes the differential was clear. Where Kennon was given strong support, Spaht was weak, and vice versa. In wards where Kennon obtained from 40 to 60 per cent of the vote in the second primary, Spaht received between 20 and 50 per cent of the vote in the first primary. It would appear plausible that in such wards the contraction of traditional Long support was felt, but not to the extent that Kennon's gain was too detrimental to the chances of Spaht.

For farmers in rural areas and workers in the cities, the appeal of Longism was not so attractive as formerly. Once again the evidence points to the conclusion that in 1952 the election was conducted in view of gaining a somewhat different combination of electoral support than formerly.
Likewise, the electorate itself was interpreting self interest from other premises than in the past. The independents were independently representing recognizable tendencies and trends which had begun to dominate the Louisiana political scene.

The most significant phenomenon in 1952 was the increased Negro participation in the political battle. Registered in large numbers in the urban areas, the Negro became once more an important factor in political success. Since the Negro, as a class group, tended to support Longism, his appearance may be a crucial one in the attempt to perpetuate that political program. For as the contraction of the area traditionally "Long country" occurred in the rural parishes, the addition of new support from the Negro would be useful. The new factor of the Negro in politics becomes another of the indices which point up the city as a key to future Louisiana politics.

The hypothesis that the urban areas of the state have become an important key to the understanding of Louisiana voting behavior must be further substantiated. It is necessary to identify the "factors" within the social structure which influence the political tendencies present in the cities. One previous study of urban voting behavior has been published

21 Heberle, Hillery, and Lovrich, op. cit.
using Baton Rouge as a crucial case. It will prove useful to summarize the findings presented there and to project the analysis to voting behavior in the 1952 elections.

Census tracts have not been established as yet in Baton Rouge, so it is not possible to make computations of socio-economic characteristics of a statistical nature. However, the city does lend itself to a delineation of social "ecological" areas. It is "common knowledge" that within the city "natural areas," in the terminology of urban ecologists, exist, setting apart sections of the city on a residential basis as predominantly "worker" or "business-professional" areas. The ecological pattern of Baton Rouge residence is quite clear and affords the opportunity to draw conclusions concerning the voting behavior of various class elements of the population, within the bounds of the political units, the precincts.

In the 1948 elections it was found that Earl Long was an "also ran" in the first primary, due to the fact that Baton Rouge had developed an antipathy towards Longism through the earlier episodes of Huey Long's fight with Standard Oil. Baton Rouge business would have been hurt as much as Standard Oil had Huey's threatened action driven the company from the city. Jimmie Morrison had polled strong support in "worker" precincts, while Robert Kennon and Sam Jones had found

support in the "business" precincts. In fact, Kennon was a strong second choice in both "worker" and "business" precincts — a forecast of 1952, perhaps. In the second primary, the "worker" precincts shifted to support of Long, whereas Jones gained large majorities in the areas of business class predominance. It was believed that in the showdown, the workers preferred Long as the minor evil in preference to the businessman's candidate, Jones. The same basic tendencies of class support were found to hold in the presidential election of that year, when Truman carried the "worker" precincts and Thurmond and Dewey shared the support of the "business" precincts.

Workers at the Standard Oil refinery and part of those at the Ethyl plant are organized in a form of company union with no statewide or national affiliation. Although workers might be expected to share the general outlook of their employers, yet they live in separate residential areas clearly identified as the home of the working man, with commercial enterprises catering to their needs. An older layer of commercial and professional classes resides in or near the old "core" city by the Mississippi River and downtown, though of course numbers of these groups have moved into the more recently developed residential subdivisions, also. In these latter-named areas, however, there are found many persons associated with business and industry who come from the Midwest and Atlantic Coast regions, with a traditional Republican vote.
Likewise, University personnel are mixed with these groups in the newer residential areas.

The analysis of the results of the 1952 elections may be approached in two ways. The situation can be investigated as was done above through checking the support given to the various candidates. On the other hand, the situation can be approached from the social classes, that is, to ascertain how white labor or the businessmen voted as groups. Here both approaches will be utilized. (See Tables VI and VII.)

The Negro had little or no voice in the election of 1948, but now it will be necessary to isolate this element of voters in making a class analysis of voting behavior. The precincts have been lumped into three general categories, based upon the predominance of some residential grouping. Not all Negroes are workers, but the majority who live in distinctly Negro areas are wage earners; and of course there are even Negroes who live in predominantly white precincts. Analysis will proceed with the investigation of the tendencies of the "Negro worker class," the "white worker class," and the "business-professional-white-collar class." It must be remembered at all times that these categories are not mutually exclusive.

In the first 1952 primary, the Negro group of precincts clearly showed a preference for "Long" candidates; Kennon and McLemore together were the choice of only 16.7 per cent of the Negro voters. At the other end of the social pyramid,
TABLE VI
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTING PERCENTAGES IN ECOLOGICAL AREAS OF BATON ROUGE, BY CANDIDATES, 1952*

FIRST PRIMARY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS AREA</th>
<th>SPAHT</th>
<th>ROGGS</th>
<th>DODD</th>
<th>KENNON</th>
<th>McLemore</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro Worker</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Worker</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business-Professional-White Collar</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
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</table>

SECOND PRIMARY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS AREA</th>
<th>SPAHT</th>
<th>KENNON</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro Worker</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>White Worker</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business-Professional-White Collar</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>100</td>
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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS AREA</th>
<th>DEMOCRATIC</th>
<th>REPUBLICAN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro Worker</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Worker</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business-Professional-White Collar</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns, Louisiana, 1952.
TABLE VII

DISTRIBUTION OF VOTING PERCENTAGES FOR CANDIDATES BY ECOLOGICAL AREAS OF BATON ROUGE, 1952*

FIRST PRIMARY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS AREA</th>
<th>SPAHT</th>
<th>BOGGS</th>
<th>DODD</th>
<th>KENNON</th>
<th>MCLEMORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro Worker</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Worker</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business-Professional-White Collar</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>72.8</td>
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<td>TOTALS</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SECOND PRIMARY:

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<tr>
<th>CLASS AREA</th>
<th>SPAHT</th>
<th>KENNON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro Worker</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<td>White Worker</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>45.5</td>
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<td>Business-Professional-White Collar</td>
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<td>49.9</td>
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<td>TOTALS</td>
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</table>

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:

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<th>CLASS AREA</th>
<th>DEMOCRATIC</th>
<th>REPUBLICAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Negro Worker</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Worker</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business-Professional-White Collar</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns, Louisiana, 1952.
the business-professional group showed a much greater proportion of support for these two candidates. Even so, the three "Long" candidates shared 47.2 per cent of the choices of this block of voters. Here it may be contended that the lower ranges of the group, the white collar class, tended to show a more decided tendency toward the "Long" candidates. The white worker group gave its heaviest support to the candidacy of Kennon, 51.9 per cent, with the other candidates splitting the remaining votes between them.

What choices were made between the candidacy of Spaht and Kennon in the "run-off" election? In the second primary, as in 1948, it might be expected that the vote would be drawn on basic issues and interests, within each of the class groupings. The Negro group demonstrated again its predominant preference for the Long candidate, although Kennon was given more support by this group in the second primary than the combined Kennon-McLemore vote of the first. The fact that the groupings are not mutually exclusive might be raised in explanation of this slight shift. Many people within the business group who had supported "Long" candidates in the first primary must surely have given Kennon their votes in the second primary, for he was the choice of 66.3 per cent of the group. Whereas the Kennon percentage was raised by over 20 per cent in the second primary, Spaht's percentage changed from 21.2 per cent to 33.7 per cent. The most surprising class support was given to Kennon in the white worker group.
The second primary choice of nearly 75 per cent of this group, there can be no doubt that Kennon had made a strong impression on the workers. Yet it was pointed out that in 1948 only in the second primary did the Long candidate gain worker votes in any number. But Kennon did not have the same identification with big business as the public had made for Jones. Moreover, Kennon was known to have made personal visits to Standard Oil for campaign purposes, and company feeling had been pointed in his direction.

Approached from another standpoint, it is possible to indicate the proportionate amount of support each candidate had gained from the three groups in the overall number of votes cast for him. Table VII shows that McLemore was most certainly gaining his greatest support from the business-professional elements. Both Boggs and Kennon emerge as candidates with business and worker but little Negro support. Dodd's following approximated more closely the proportions of Spaht support, marking him as more the "Long" type of candidate. In the second primary Spaht appeared to draw support from each class grouping in nearly equal proportion. Of course Spaht had a surprisingly large proportion of his followers among business-professional people because he has many social connections in these areas. Still, he obtained only about one-fifth of the vote cast in these precincts in the first primary. One striking conclusion which might be made is that the Negro support tended to act as an index of the old Long, anti-Long identification of the candidates.
Without wanting to anticipate the following section devoted to analysis of the 1952 presidential election, it is nevertheless instructive to show at this time the rather clear class support given presidential candidates, and the similarities with the support of the state Democratic factions. The class group preferences clearly indicate the worker and Negro bias for the Democratic candidate. Likewise, the similarity of support for both national Democratic candidate and Long candidate is revealed, even if the worker class finds a greater sympathy for the national party than for Longism. On the other hand, the business-professional classes tend to be much more willing to vote for the national Republican party and for candidates a bit to the right of Longism.

The present discussion, then, amply emphasizes the fact that the ballot in present-day Louisiana is a vehicle of class expression. Undoubtedly it always was, but it is hoped that the shifting support of different social classes has been demonstrated. In 1952 it was apparent that the support of the more conservative candidates rested further down from the top of the class pyramid than previously had been the case.

C. Louisiana Republicanism in Modern Garb. Louisiana was to help choose a president a few months after the excitement of the gubernatorial elections had subsided. The student of voting behavior would be afforded an excellent opportunity to check the consistency of political tendencies. It appeared
that Governor Kennon felt he could gauge political opinion, also, for as the presidential campaign approached, he stepped closer to the political right.

Part of the support of the conservative candidate in the second primary had come from initial backers of LeBlanc and McLemore. This added a decidedly more upper class atmosphere to the Kennon camp. Added support for Kennon had come from the conservative western sugar country and the rice country of the prairies which had backed local son LeBlanc. Likewise, Kennon gained the support of the Mississippi delta plantation parishes and the conservative northwestern parishes about Caddo. These had been outspokenly in support of McLemore in the first primary. Moreover, it was within the parishes which fell in the highest quartile of second primary Kennon support that the strongest Dixiecrat sentiment had been found in 1948.

Recalling the "revolt of the haves" which brought the Dixiecrat defection from the Democratic camp, it is not surprising that Governor Kennon should have joined the movement in 1952. In the second primary he had found great favor from the very groups who had endorsed and supported the Dixiecrats. Maybe the decisive win over the Long forces led Kennon to believe that he could shake off any disguise of liberal tinge. At any rate, the National Democratic Convention was to become the stage upon which "real" Democratic support and hidden Republican sympathies would be presented.
Longism was not dead, as Russell Long joined the ranks of the young liberal Southern Democrats and spoke out in favor of the common man. Kennon, by his actions, joined the ranks of anti-Long and cloaked himself in the old Bourbon Democrat mantle. In such alignments, of course, the "people" would outnumber the dominating minority, but as traditionally the Bourbons were adept at manipulations. Action at the convention revealed the continuing power struggle as the Bourbons jockeyed to recapture or to hold their favorable position in the state party organizations.

If Kennon had thought he could take party and support along with him in the "safe" shift from liberal to conservative banners, he made his calculations without reference to the emerging leader of Longism, young Russell. The election results definitely showed the strength of the new middle class with its prevailing conservative climate of opinion in 1952. Likewise, however, the count showed that the traditional Long support of farmer and portions of laborer groups could combine with a solid Negro vote to outnumber the party bolters.

Governor Kennon had won the fight against the loyalty oath pledge which was to have made it mandatory that convention delegates accept the choice of a candidate made at Chicago, and the Louisiana delegation was seated. "It was a matter of principle," Kennon said. The conservatives of Louisiana had always stood on principle -- white supremacy and disenfranchisement had likewise been a matter of principle
among the members of the old dominant minority. The action of Senator Long made it certain that the Democratic party, *per se*, would be in the presidential race backing the choice of candidate made at the Chicago convention. Long had said he would make his stand against the "walkout" of the Louisiana delegation "no matter what it cost me personally." Politically, it was a smart move, putting Long assuredly on the side of the "people" back home and labeling him one of the "symbols of the new South." He could be hurt politically on neither count.

So the campaign settled in Louisiana between the "real" Democrats and the "Democrats for Eisenhower." The Stevenson ticket ran practically unaided by the official party organization; the Eisenhower backers had money and used it liberally. But the Democrats had the endorsement of most liberals who had ever been associated with Longism and whose political names were respected by the Louisiana electorate. That the coming election would result in a vote cast on class lines was clearly evident as one inspected the difference in financial backing and in the choice of local party headquarters throughout the state. The sub-deb might be found at an Ike rally, whereas a newsboy or industrial laborer would choose a meeting of "Volunteers for Stevenson." And of course

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intellectuals rallied in large number to Democratic meetings.

In reviewing the election results, giving the Democratic candidate 53 per cent of the statewide vote, it is plain that predominant farmer parishes strongly supported the candidacy of Stevenson; these same parishes formed the core of the support for Longism. (See Figure 38.) Yet, the crucial point was found to be within the cities of Louisiana. The support for the two presidential candidates tended to "break even" in urban areas, and the urban Negro vote, in the end, proved to be the deciding factor in giving the Democrats a bare majority.

Over 100,000 Negroes had registered prior to the November presidential election, and all indications point to a unified Negro vote, and with a high participation. Where predominantly Negro precincts can be spotted, the Democratic support is found to be overwhelming. A "colored box" in Merryville, Beauregard Parish, near the Texas border, contained 116 ballots favoring Stevenson and two for Eisenhower. This overwhelming differential could be found wherever the Negro voters predominated a precinct. Two such precincts in Baton Rouge registered votes of more than 90 per cent in favor of the Democrats. In the urban areas, then, the Negro was again a crucial factor in Louisiana politics; only, time and circumstance had worked a reversal in the direction of his support.

The ballot count on the ward level allows analysis to proceed in finding significant areas of support for the two presidential candidates as well as layers in the social
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1952
VOTE FOR ADLAI STEVENSON
BY PARISHES

- 1st quarter: 7.1% - 49.9%
- 2nd quarter: 50.0% - 54.8%
- 3rd quarter: 55.4% - 60.5%
- 4th quarter: 61.6% - 76.6%

Source: Report of Secretary of State, Louisiana, 1952
class structure of the electorate. It can be shown that the vote in the seven urban-industrial parishes broke even, with the Democratic candidate favored by only 50.9 per cent. Since nearly half the state vote was cast in these urban parishes, it might be feasible to begin the ward analysis by investigating the distribution of the vote in the wards in which are found urban places -- cities and towns with 2,500 or more population. (See Table VIII.) Seventy-two such cities and towns have been utilized, containing eighty-five wards. New Orleans makes up seventeen wards of the total. Here the vote was evenly split, with the Democratic candidate barely in the lead. On the other hand, the total Republican vote, in the sixteen wards containing the other cities with a population of 10,000 or more, was 52.1 per cent.

In the larger cities of Louisiana, there was a regional difference in the support given the Republican candidate. Cities located in the parishes listed in the Republican column recorded a high Eisenhower vote. Where the parish went Democratic, as in Calcasieu, Rapides, and East Baton Rouge, the city vote of Lake Charles, Alexandria, and Baton Rouge, respectively, was higher in support of the Republican party than the parish average. At the other extreme, as in northwest Louisiana, where factors of oil, planter or commercial interests were more influential, Shreveport in Caddo Parish and nearby Bossier City in Bossier Parish voted Republican by over 60 per cent. In each case, the city per cent of
TABLE VIII

THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE OF WARDS CONTAINING URBAN PLACES*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WARDS</th>
<th>REPUBLICAN VOTE</th>
<th>DEMOCRATIC VOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>85,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>89,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Places over 10,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>87,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>79,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Places 2,500-9,999</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>49,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Rural Wards</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>84,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>97,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE TOTAL</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>306,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>325,027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Republican votes was some points above the parish average. The same holds true for cities in south Louisiana where the parish vote was Republican. Opelousas in St. Landry, the city of Lafayette, Morgan City in St. Mary, and Houma in Terrebonne all registered a Republican vote in such number as to influence the parish total in favor of the Republican candidate.

It was the strong conservative tendency in the cities which put the percentages for the larger Louisiana cities in the Republican column. Labor groups were numerous, but so
were the older layers of commercial groups and the newer residents representing industrial interests, business men, professionals, and white collar personnel. Even so, regional differences, which will be discussed below, played a heavier influence on urban "climates of opinion." Otherwise, the situation may have been closer to that of the smaller cities, where total ward counts gave the Democratic candidate 53.6 per cent of the vote. It was thought perhaps the larger in this group of cities or towns may have been more inclined to the Republican than the Democratic candidate, but when ranked according to size of population there was no telling difference. There was still somewhat of a tendency for these urban wards to register a higher Republican vote than the surrounding rural wards, but the lack of a numerous middle and upper class population and the presence of more small business men and laborers with close ties to the farmers of the hinterland all worked as factors strengthening the Democratic support.

The Democratic percentage for the remaining 450 rural wards was the same as for the wards containing small urban places. There was consistently more Democratic support away from the larger urban places, indicative perhaps of the presence of the political tendency of the farmer class. These factors of urban and rural influences upon the voting behavior in the 1952 presidential election can be brought into sharper relief through a delineation of the voter support.
by wards.

As was true for the voting in the gubernatorial elections, if the presidential candidate gained a parish majority, the wards of that parish tended to be uniformly Republican or Democratic. A glance at Figure 39 indicates the broad clusterings of the ward support for the Democratic party, encompassing in many instances complete parishes. In the heart of the hills cutting diagonally across north Louisiana, down the southwest corner of the state, through the eastern Florida parishes, and along the Mississippi River to the south, the ward distribution of Democratic support spreads almost unbroken. Only the influence of country towns, pockets of plantation domination, and urban-industrial centers disturb the general pattern. The second and third quartiles of Eisenhower support were purposely cut on either side of 50 per cent so that the break of the vote with the incidence of these influences might be emphasized.

The wards in parishes where the predominant element has been the small farmer class and where seats of Populist and Long support were located continued in 1952 to show the long-time Democratic prejudice. In the parishes of central and southwestern Louisiana and in the eastern Floridas, the farmer classes evidently did not believe that by 1952 it was "time for a change." An ancient "climate of opinion" had remained unchanged.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1952 VOTE FOR EISENHOWER BY WARDS

(PER CENT)

- 44.9 AND UNDER
- 45.0 - 49.9
- 50.0 - 54.9
- 55.0 AND OVER

SOURCE: UNPUBLISHED ELECTION RETURNS
OFFICE SECRETARY OF STATE

FIGURE 39
The cleavage between farmer and planter in rural areas, however, has likewise represented an influential traditional tendency. If the voters in the strictly "farmer" parishes had swelled the Democratic support, it is also essential to learn what happened in the wards of the parishes with vestiges of planter domination. In the parishes of the northwest corner of the state, along the Red River, up the Mississippi delta, and through the Ouachita River valley in Morehouse and Ouachita parishes, planter activity remains in force. Here there are observed pockets of high Republican percentages, reflecting the political sympathies of the planter class. Plantation wards the entire length of the Red River in the parishes of Caddo and Bossier, and extending into Red River Parish, all registered Eisenhower votes of 56 per cent or above. Likewise, in the tier of delta parishes a string of wards can be found with high Republican support recorded. The same is true in the area between Monroe and Bastrop along the Ouachita River.

In striking contrast, in the wards removed from the Mississippi River the low Republican percentages are indicative of the presence of farmers in the "backwater" settlements and along the length of Macon Ridge, in West Carroll, Richland, and Franklin parishes. In this delta area it is only where the plantation dominates the agricultural economy that the Republican tendency was strong. But the planter element in the cleavage between it and farmer groups is reenforced.
by the presence of associates in the country towns. After all, the planter is somewhat of a business man, a capitalist in his agricultural operations, and the identification of his interests with the commercial elite of the country towns has been of long standing.

There seem to be several blocks of voters taking sides in the farmer-planter cleavage. Town laborers may tend to vote as the farmers do, whereas the merchants, the lawyers, and other "business class" people in the country towns tend to vote with the planters. With planter support, the factor of the country town seems to be more telling in the river bottom areas than in the hill parishes. In these small, non-industrial towns the planter-merchant groups tend to be more influential, the "working class" consisting largely of Negroes or being split by the "color line" -- and these planter-merchant groups tend to determine the election results. This is demonstrated by the Republican vote in the towns along Macon Ridge. Oak Grove in East Carroll Parish, Delhi in Richland, and Winnsboro in Franklin all registered a more decided tendency to support Eisenhower than did the wards of the surrounding countryside. Even down in Avoyelles Parish, the ward containing the planter-merchant town of Bunkie follows the pattern.

A revealing situation has emerged in Tensas Parish, deserving of mention. There are two adjacent wards in which are located the towns of St. Joseph and Waterproof. In the
former, the Republican tendency was strong, while in the latter the reverse was true. In St. Joseph the planter-merchant influence is deep-rooted, and with the young people tending to move away as they attain adulthood the remaining population manifests the traditional conservative prejudice. On the other hand, Waterproof's population consists of oil workers from the nearby fields of operation and here the traditional tendency is altered. Moreover, a similar pattern exists in Concordia, where the parish seat of Vidalia voted Democratic while surrounding wards in one of which is the old town of Ferriday recorded Republican sympathies. Across the river from Natchez, Mississippi, Vidalia has become a boom town, a residential suburb of the neighboring city. Many worker families have settled here and apparently in such number that a Democratic majority was assured.

Northwest Louisiana manifested a solidarity in voting Republican which was intense, broken only by defection of Webster Parish. Previously McLemore and Kennon, the native son, had scored heavy support in this area, as had the Dixiecrat candidate in 1948. Undoubtedly the dominance of Shreveport in the area together with the presence of planter groups as well as white farmer groups with relatively high levels of living are deciding factors. Shreveport, an old commercial city and the oil capital for northwest Louisiana and adjacent counties of East Texas, is a wealthy city. It is more "western" in outlook than other Louisiana cities; that
is, it is more like Dallas, Texas. Nearby DeSoto Parish has
developed quite a dairying industry in recent years. Such
farming is capitalistic and provides a reinforcement for the
older layer of cotton planter domination. Webster Parish has
proportionately more people in the worker groups than sur­
rounding parishes. Here a Federal ammunition plant at Minden
and a paper mill at Springhill support a labor force which
apparently still found favor for the Democratic party.

The contrast of Republican West Feliciana, together
with adjacent wards of Pointe Coupee Parish, with urban East
Baton Rouge is marked. The traditional conservatism of the
plantation past had been carried forward. The traditional
Republican tendency farther south in sugar country appeared
diminished, if the whole of south Louisiana is viewed. Yet
there were numerous pockets of Republican support which in­
dicated that the traditional influences still existed. This
was particularly true of the line of parishes from St. Landry
south to the Gulf in Terrebonne. Within the string of wards
in this area there exist small town after small town. Here
the same sorts of factors which influenced voting in north
Louisiana have been present. There are likewise cities of
some size like Lafayette, New Iberia, and Morgan City, all of
which registered an exceptionally high urban Republican vote.
In the back country on either side of this "conservative line"
the support of the Democratic candidate was more decided.

Parenthetically, together with the plantation and urban
factors within the Republican areas of northwest and south Louisiana, there was also present the subtle factor of the "tideland" oil issue. One could pass through sugar country along the old Spanish Trail between New Orleans and Lafayette, for example, and view huge billboards advertising the presidential campaign in terms of awful determination of the Democratic administration in Washington to take the tidelands away from the people of Louisiana. This appeal probably worked; it also indicated the amount of money the Republicans had at their disposal in attempting to win the Louisiana presidential vote.

On the ward level, it is apparent that the Florida parishes still showed the old Democratic leaning. Of course wards within the Felicianas, where the plantation economy was present, registered Republican majorities. Likewise, the ward in which the parish seat of St. Helena is located supported Eisenhower. The rural towns of Kentwood and Tangipahoa in ward one of Tangipahoa Parish were listed in the Republican column. To the south the ward with urban Hammond and Ponchatoula and the wards of the "gold coast" along Lake Pontchartrain were also counted in favor of the Republican candidate. The majority of Jimmie Morrison's Sixth Congressional District, however, followed his lead in support of the Democratic party.

Having extended the discussion of presidential voting tendencies to an analysis on the ward level, it is now possible to take one step further in the isolation of leading tendencies
through a presentation of a correlation table showing the
toelationships between Republican support and that of certain
other elections. Previously, analysis of the relationships
between the support of various gubernatorial aspirants had
pointed up the similarities and differences resulting from
the identification with regional and socio-economic groups.
Now, with an understanding of these tendencies, any correla-
tions existing between presidential support and gubernatorial
support can be more concisely revealed. Besides the presenta-
tion of coefficients of correlation based on ward data, some
rank-order computations have been made of parish support for
a series of elections in which the emergent revolt of the
"haves" was a significant factor.

The tables here presented give clear indication that
for 1952, at least, the relationship between voting in state
and national elections was a close one. This is particularly
true for what may be called the more conservative groups of
voters. The **general** leading tendencies of groups within the
electorate show stability in expression of voter choices.
Moreover, the continuity of the Bourbon Democratic sentiment
is more clearly tied with the so-called revolt of the "haves"
from 1948 on. Very obviously some unified group within the
electorate shows a persistency revealing of a consciousness
of identity or aspiration among its members.

Once again the distributive pattern of McLemore sup-
port provides the key to homogeneous relationships. The
coefficient of correlation between McLemore and Eisenhower support is relatively high because they were backed by the same portions of the electorate. With the exception of the relationship with the Kennon second primary vote, itself swelled by the votes of McLemore supporters, there is a general blurring of correlation of the support of gubernatorial candidates and the Republican candidate. The political ambivalence of the middle class is reflected in the hesitation to give wholesale support for one candidate or another. The members of the groupings supporting McLemore, ranging toward the upper class limits, had no such difficulty shifting political allegiance.

The Kennon supporters of the second primary have better qualifications to emulate the political expressions of the elite groups. It consisted of McLemore followers and similar voters bent on leaning away from the center toward the political right. For there is virtually no correlation between the Eisenhower support and that for Kennon's first primary backing. Kennon's after-election climb onto the Eisenhower bandwagon must have seemed a pleasing gesture among the groups of "haves" and those who would find identity with the upper class. There is safety in numbers, and the old Bourbons were well aware of the exigencies of political combinations.

Where the Republican support was high, corresponding support for Longism tended to be low. Comparisons with Long
### TABLE IX

**PRODUCT-MOMENT COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN THE VOTE FOR EISENHOWER AND LEADING GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATES, BY WARD, 1952***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kennon Second</th>
<th>LeBlanc (First)</th>
<th>Kennon First</th>
<th>Boggs</th>
<th>Dodd</th>
<th>Spaht First</th>
<th>Spaht Second</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>.532</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>-.288</td>
<td>-.317</td>
<td>-.470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns, Louisiana, 1952; unpublished election returns, Office of Secretary of State.

### TABLE X

**RANK-ORDER COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN THE VOTE FOR EISENHOWER AND SELECTED CANDIDATES OR ELECTIONS, BY PARISH***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kennon Second</th>
<th>McLemore</th>
<th>Kennon First</th>
<th>Dixiecrat 1948</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>.614</td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns, Louisiana, 1952; Report of Secretary of State, 1948; unpublished election returns, Office of Secretary of State.
support, however, resulted in no strong negative coefficients. One of the major conclusions which must be forwarded, then, is that there was a blurring of traditional lines of cleavage, in the elections of 1952.

Rank-order computations did show on the parish level, what has been suggested from ward level analysis, the line of affinity of out-and-out Eisenhower support with the Kennon and McLemore backing and with the Dixiecrat defection of 1948. This traditional tendency, the unity of support for the dominant minority, remained strong. Is it only coincidental that some of the highest Republican support in Louisiana was found within rural areas where the Negro tended to outnumber the whites? V. O. Key's thesis, if valid, would require a strong Democratic majority in these wards. But Key wrote before 1952, and it became clear during the campaign that the Dixiecrats of 1948 would find it expedient to make the jump into the Republican party. This was not a vote to ensure a solid Democratic party in Louisiana, it was a revolt aimed at gaining complete ascendancy once more through a new political vehicle.

Members of this privileged group in 1952 extended the warm hand of welcome to all those who felt they could meet the qualifications. The most striking event of the presidential election, then, was the subtle hint that perhaps

political control might be enhanced and perpetuated if the Bourbon should don the cloak of the modern Republicans. Articulated in terms of a "crusade," Republicanism in modern garb was fitting vehicle to be used by the unreconstructed elite.

But members of the very groups against whom the Bourbon erected the bulwark of "white supremacy" and one-party rule voted in large enough number to thwart aspirations of Republican victory. The Negro tenant or farmer in Bourbon country appeared a mute reminder of the plantation past; his city cousins helped turn the Republican tide of 1952 by making a shift from his previous voting tendencies!

D. The Future of Louisiana Politics. 26 If it be correct that Louisiana experiences in the recent elections found counterparts in national politics, then the phenomena described by Samuel Lubell as requiring a new theory of political parties must have been present and influential in the molding of Louisiana politics. 27 Changes in the social structure have produced within the American party system a break with the traditions and continuity of the past. The former political ideologies and party labels may remain, but it does not necessarily follow that today's politicians are the heirs of


27 Ibid., p. 204 ff.
earlier political movements. It is important, then, to investigate the presence of different groups who may find it convenient to speak in terms of the same ideological concepts and to isolate the specific voting elements with whom the appeals and slogans find favor.

The pattern of national political party struggle has been one of alternations between one party or another, of the success of a dominant majority party so long as it has managed to hold together the support of groupings of the electorate. In this process each new majority party brings with it an opposition of its own and succeeds through the *timeliness* of its appeal. Therefore, if the theory is valid, "the key to the political warfare of any particular period will be found in the conflict among the clashing elements in the majority party."28 A *resume* of the 1952 elections may substantiate the thesis of Mr. Lubell, and will most certainly provide an understanding of the leading trends of present-day Louisiana and possible pathways to the future.

The espousal of "independence" by the gubernatorial candidates in 1952 was indicative that the politician was feeling his way to new alignments of voter elements drawn from the Louisiana society which now manifested such change in the direction of industrial urbanity. Just as on the national scene there was doubt that the old Roosevelt-Truman

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coalition of voter elements would "stick" and guarantee another Democratic victory, so in Louisiana it appeared that new appeals must be made. Of course, the success of the Dixiecrat revolt of 1948 must have convinced the anti-Longs, or the conservative candidates, that there were appreciably strong groups of voters ready to make their political choices in other than Long--anti-Long terms.

In the gubernatorial primaries the issues were cast in a liberal-conservative language, although all candidates were Democrats. In the late summer as the presidential campaign became intense, however, the emergence of a two-party situation was noted, even though the choice was said to be for the "real" Democrats or the "Democrats for Eisenhower." The latter was a contradiction in terms, but was a safe slogan for the Bourbons to muster behind; then, if the Republican candidate should lose, the one-party struggle could be commenced again. The "haves" wanted their cake and to eat it too.

To win these contests it would be necessary to get out the electoral slide-rule and make some calculations in political arithmetic. What were the groupings in the new Louisiana, and what were their desires? Farmer groups remained a numerically important element of the electorate. In general it was found that this group continued to be influenced by traditional Democratic tendencies and the support of Longism. However, the presence of previous consensus of opinion among the farmers was missing. There was a "defection"
in the farmer vote inasmuch as many who had found prosperity under Democratic and Long administrations were now naturally inclined to make identification with groups and classes who manifested a more conservative leaning. Since they had "never had it so good," farmers might want to conserve their gains with an "independent" administration on the state level and a Republican one in Washington.

Members of planter groups might still think of themselves as part of the Louisiana elite, and their political tendencies in 1952 would remain conservative. But whereas the traditional Republicanism of the south Louisiana sugar planters would insure their participation in the independent and Eisenhower causes, the logic for the support of the Bourbon cotton planters started from a different premise. The Bourbon was seeking a safe bet in backing the conservative candidates. States' rights was the dogma which had replaced White Supremacy, though in either case the end result was the quest for political domination.

Yet the key to the elections of 1952 lay in aligning the support of elements of the new "urban frontier." It was the votes of labor and the middle classes which swung the vote conservative or liberal. The re-emergence of the Negro in Louisiana politics was also an urban phenomenon, and although his number was relatively small, it represented a block vote large enough to influence the outcome of the elections. The Negro, as generally the worker, had made the
observation that it was the Democratic party nationally which had furthered his interests. The middle classes showed no such certainty of where support should be placed, although again this paralleled national experience, and in 1952 the mood of the middle class appeared to be a conservative one.

The year 1952 takes on meaning in retrospect -- two-party politics was an objective fact even if in the elections of that year the people had subjectively denied it. In the new Louisiana the values and symbols of past politics are in the process of adjustment to present-day realities. There are new groupings with interests demanding attention. Louisiana has once more become a copy of American society -- middle class, urban, industrial, with an acceptance of welfare-ism, and faced with the fact of emerging Negro freedom.

Yet the traditional tendencies have hung on. Both farmer whites and city colored have found Longism and the national Democratic party can do something for them. But perhaps the Republican party can provide solution for the problems of the present day and become a force in the state. The memory of past tendencies may remain an influence, but in the emergent situation of the present will be found the basis for the future of Louisiana politics.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

This study has analyzed factors influencing voting behavior in Louisiana. More than that, using assumptions and methodology of political ecology as a research tool, emphasis has focused upon historical experiences, interests, and social values which have influenced political choices. Analysis of the geographic distribution of voting support in a great number of elections has revealed the presence of subregions within the state where existed different "political climates" of great persistence.

In the characterization of persistent climates of opinion it has been necessary to demonstrate the relation between "regional" and "class" factors in voting behavior. Processes of social differentiation have worked to produce a number of groups within Louisiana society, each of which has sought to perpetuate its interests through the expression of the ballot; in fact a striking aspect of political tendencies in Louisiana has been the actions of social groupings in various areas of the state which have at different times utilized the ballot to further particular interests and interpretations of the ends of society. Political attitudes
were expressive of cumulative experiences, of developed ways of life found in certain social strata.

Voting behavior has revealed the antagonisms as well as the accommodations which different groups have experienced. Since groups making up the social strata of Louisiana society have tended to predominate certain regions of the state, analysis through political ecology has been extremely useful. A very striking differential might be expected between south French-Catholic and north Anglo-Saxon-Protestant Louisiana, an opposition in cultural backgrounds. There has been found antagonism, yes; but in south Louisiana assimilation has likewise been active, producing a blending of Anglo-American and German elements to French-Spanish society and culture. This is revealed most notably in the area of religion.

The reader might object, in fact, that this study has in a one-sided way emphasized class differentials as influencing voting behavior to the neglect of religious factors. But religion has been found to play a rather secondary role in Louisiana politics. With the minor exception of 1928, when south Louisiana voted heavily Democratic in favor of the Catholic, Alfred Smith, in the presidential election, the analysis of voting behavior points more certainly in the direction of socio-economic influences. Political choices have been made by social groupings in favor of very definite economic interests, factors emergent from ecological processes.

From the beginning, Louisiana society had concern for
and dedication to the continuance of aristocracy. The planter aristocracy, whether based on sugar in south Louisiana or on cotton in north Louisiana, had vested interests to protect. And in alliance with men of commerce, the planters maintained "gentleman rule." There was found a circulation of the political elite, only the circulation was generally within and between the same dominating social groupings of certain regions of the state. Here was a replica of Western European society of the nineteenth century. The latter-day Louisiana model might be watered down with the reception of the nouveau-riche by the class of old wealth, but the predisposition to play the role of the aristocrat has remained.

Yet, any aristocracy is by definition limited in membership. It would derive from those areas of the state where plantation economy was employed in the utilization of natural resources. But since Louisiana had embraced an Anglo-Saxon type of representative government, the "people" of the society -- and this meant specifically the farmer class and later the worker class -- potentially at least would enjoy a numerical superiority. And the ecology of Louisiana was such that it is quite simple to demonstrate the political tendencies of these societal groups when and where they practiced suffrage.

In the two decades before 1860, planters of sugar and cotton country, whether originally Whig or Democrat, tended to find the ends of aristocracy more nearly achievable within Whiggery. However, the persistent migration of Democratic
farmers and laborers into north and southwest Louisiana and into New Orleans upset the basis for the planter domination. The traditional appeal of Jacksonian Democracy was more timely and received the die-hard support of those farmers and laborers who enjoyed suffrage -- and these were considerable despite their manifest lack of party control. The Democratic party became dominant through the main factor of numbers and because the Whig political philosophy found in general no place for the "people."

The sugar planters and the cotton planters of the Mississippi delta country might find rapprochement within the ranks of Whiggery. Planters within the Florida parishes and upper class elements of New Orleans might gain political ascendency through the Democratic party with the aid of the vote of the farmer and the worker. But the farmer from the hills was voting Democratic from Jacksonian preference, whereas the dominating members of the party had other interests to forward. Moreover, the Whig party became disorganized in the fifties and former members found but short-lived respite in the ranks of the American party.

The issues of slavery, then, must be resolved within the dominant Democratic party. But factional strife was such that the problems and possible answers were never met nor solved. Secession became inevitable as the traditional political processes became ineffective. The possibility of resolution or compromise was lost in the directionless drift to
At the end of the Civil War, the Republican party was to become dominant. With the manipulations of political adventurers, whose success rested upon the vote of the Negro, the Bourbons in emergence could point to a clearly untenable situation and gain the support of the "people," the white farmers and laborers. Since domination shifted to the Bourbons through their erection of the dogma of white supremacy as the raison d'être of the Democratic party, the numerical potential of the Negro at the polls must be destroyed. Whereas a voice of moderation might have been established in the years between 1864 and 1866, when the Louisiana Unionists attempted to reconstruct the Democratic party and forward the rebuilding of the war-ravaged state, the ex-Confederates gave short notice that the new should rest upon their interpretation of the old. The struggle for power became naked.

Again, as a generation previously, political processes became ineffective. The Bourbon-Lilywhites maneuvered to diminish the Negro strength at the polls while at the same time they encouraged the white farmers of the hills to support the Cause. And either through intimidation or the fact that the dominant minority controlled the economic as well as the political life of the state, the poor and white displayed a remarkable solidarity in support of the Democratic party in the decade of the 1880's. However, just as the farmer facing the crisis of Secession indicated that he concurred in a
situation over which he had no control, so now the threat of economic ruin in the 1890's became more important than the maintenance of white supremacy.

The farmers in north Louisiana in the parishes clustered about the central hills found a vehicle for protest, this time. The platform of the People's party was timely and in fusion with the Republican party enough voting strength could be mustered to gain political power and avert financial disaster. It was now clear that the issue was one of party representation. The farmer had supported the Democratic party from tradition, without looking behind the label, and events proved that the suffrage of the "people" had been a privilege of little value. In Populism, farmer groups in Louisiana, whether in the hills of north Louisiana or in the Florida parishes, in the prairies of southwest Louisiana, or along the bayous of south Louisiana, could gain political footing equal to that of the self-styled aristocrats.

The Populist "bubble" was burst, however, in bitterly fought elections when the Bourbons barely gained majority support over the Fusion. The great two-party tradition of this country had found ideological support in the opposing philosophies of Hamilton and Jefferson, but while there might be differences of opinion, there was likewise consensus that they should be resolved through resort to the suffrage, in compliance with established rules of procedure. The Bourbons put aside the rules in gaining political ascendancy. And
their action was the more striking because it was within the bounds of legality. The Constitution of 1896 disenfranchised the Negro all right, but also many thousand white farmers and workers, whose vote a decade or so before had aided the Bourbon overthrow of the Republican party born of Reconstruction. In so doing, the great movement of the "people" was averted. The poor and white were expendable in the Bourbon scheme of things; social problems would be resolved through political action if, when, and how the Democratic minority party decided.

After 1900 Louisiana was aptly labeled a "one-party state." The Bourbon had created a situation where only one party could possibly function without overthrowing the dominant minority. Moreover, the Bourbon split with the past, for he did not display the same sense of political responsibility which had been the Whigs', nor the feeling for the interests of the common man which had characterized the Jacksonian. In such a situation machine politics could flourish. And even the "reforms" such as proposed by Governor Parker did not strike at the root of the matter, for the one party remained dominant. Yet the opposition created by the actions of the Democratic elite was potentially explosive and numerically strong. For slightly more than one hundred years a favored few had enjoyed the fruits of Louisiana society in unequal proportions.

An analysis of the geographic distribution of voting
tendencies over a period of more than a hundred years reveals a continuity of ecological influences. Farmer groups in the bloc of parishes which gave near one hundred per cent support to the Bourbons in the 1880's suffered economic reversals and deprivations never righted; here was motivation for a persistent solidarity. The Democratic party was compelled to gain ascendancy over the "Black" Republicans. Perhaps more emphasis than has previously been made should be pointed at the extreme differential between farmer-laborers and planter-commercial-industrial interests, between the "have nots" and the "haves."

Redress was finally achieved by socially and economically deprived groups of Louisiana citizens within the one-party state with the advent of Huey Long. The assurance of the emergence of a movement such as Longism was found in the backing of farmer and labor groups which the Bourbons had subordinated. And precedents for strong-armed political methods were not lacking either. Longism, whatever else may be said of it, fulfilled the movement of the frustrated Populists, held back for a quarter of a century. The momentum of the success of Long candidates with the lower classes was so great that until 1952, at least, elections in Louisiana were the scene of struggles between Long and "reform" factions, neither willing to set a new pattern of action radically different from traditions of the past. The solid core of Long support remains in the regions of the state where the farmer
predominates and in urban areas where laborers are numerous.

As was true of the success of the "New Deal" on the national level, Longism brought unprecedented numbers to the polls and nearly all groups within society found a vehicle of political expression whereby societal needs might be voiced. By 1952 it was apparent that two-party politics was a fact, in voting behavior if not in name. Louisiana society had been transformed under the impact of industrialization, and politicians must attempt to gain the support of members of social strata whose preferences were untested or unknown. This phenomenon gave rise to the appearance of "independent" candidates.

Analysis of the 1952 gubernatorial elections, however, demonstrated that whereas the electorate displayed political attitudes and was composed of elements similar to those of the national scene, yet the tendencies and traditions of the past were still influential. Although a numerically increasing middle class had emerged in Louisiana, whose political preference tended to the right of center, the farmer and the worker showed continued adherence to the Long faction on the local level and preference for the Democratic party on the national scene. Upper class groups of planters and business men continued to vote anti-Long and anti-Democratic, looking for a safe shift to more conservative associations. The Negro had once more become an important factor in Louisiana politics; Negro registration was another manifestation of the
urbanization of the state.

The result of the presidential election of 1952 made it clear that citizens from all levels of the social strata were making their political weight felt. The nearly fifty per cent split of the electorate and the identification of the support of Republicans and Democrats indicated that objectively a two-party system in Louisiana is quite possible and probable. Factions within the state Democratic party, though popularly identified by their leaders actually represent deep-seated cleavage over interests and issues. The traditional solidarity of the Democratic one-party system is breaking down as their socio-economic interests tend to draw the dominant minorities into the Republican fold. The struggle for power continues, and at the present time it appears that the Louisiana experience with representative government, because of or in spite of the influence of the past, will be more genuinely democratic than ever before.

This study has adequately demonstrated, it is believed, that voting tendencies which may be discovered in the analysis of crucial elections are rooted in persistent attitudes and traditions of different groups of citizens whose political choices further their interests. The methodology of political ecology enables the investigator to ascertain the multiplicity of factors influential in voting behavior and through careful selection to highlight the determinants of Louisiana politics. The ideas and institutions, and cumulative experiences of
Louisiana citizens have been discussed and the continuity of leading political tendencies placed in historical perspective.

The significance of this study for political sociology is fourfold. In the first place, it has been demonstrated that the methodology of political ecology is eminently satisfactory for the investigation of the sociology of political life. Secondly, it has shown that whether analysis is made of selected "crucial" elections or in historical depth, factors of tradition as well as elements of change influence political choices. Thirdly, this study has demonstrated the importance of placing emphasis on the process of social differentiation, on the groups and groupings within a society which support parties or movements. Finally, the importance of social classes and the correspondence of differentials in social strata and in voting behavior, even under a one-party regime, have been emphasized. The struggle for political power is real, and the political sociologist through ecological analysis gains an insight into this important social process.
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