Reformers in the Marketplace of Ideas: Student Activism and American Democracy in Cold War Los Angeles.

Kurt Edward Kemper
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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REFORMERS IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS:  
STUDENT ACTIVISM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY  
IN COLD WAR LOS ANGELES

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the  
Louisiana State University and  
Agricultural and Mechanical College  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of History

by

Kurt Edward Kemper  
B.S. University of South Dakota, 1991  
M.A. George Mason University, 1995  
August 2000
We must be in the library, but we must also be in Watts. We must be in the laboratory, but we must also be on the moon. We will be in the lecture rooms, but we will also be in the operating rooms.

Without apology, indeed with undisturbed and I hope growing commitment, we will serve the world of pure scholarship and the world of man and his problems, and both with distinction.

This we will do within the ancient University tradition of the free marketplace of ideas where all matters are open for discussion and analysis, without fear of retribution, and where dissent is as necessary as agreement for the vitality and integrity of the dialogue.

- Chancellor Franklin D. Murphy¹

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Primary thanks for this dissertation must go to my doctoral committee which offered me constant support, guidance, and feedback: Stan Hilton, Leonard Moore, and Gaines Foster. I owe my greatest debt to my advisor, friend, and fellow college football fan, Chuck Shindo, who offered me every sort of assistance.

Much of my research took place on the campus of UCLA and many thanks are due the staffs of Special Collections, Young Research Library; University Archives, particularly Dennis Bitterlich, Powell Library; the Chicano Studies Research Center Library; the Asian American Studies Center Library; and the Offices of the Daily Bruin and the Associated Students of the UCLA. In addition, the off-campus University Religious Conference allowed me access to their records. The Southern California Library for Social Studies and Research provided invaluable material on Los Angeles and reform efforts both off- and on-campus. I received long distance support from Harry Miller at the Wisconsin State Historical Society and David Kessler and Jenny Mulowney at the Bancroft Library, University of California. Thanks also to the interlibrary loan department at Middleton Library, LSU.

My sister and grandmother provided me with the money to make my first research trip for what eventually became this dissertation and my mother allowed me to live rent-free in Los Angeles while I completed my research. I also received some financial assistance from the LSU Graduate School Travel Funds and an unofficial "Xerox grant" from University Archives, UCLA. My most profuse and seemingly inadequate thanks is due my wife, Robin, who simply deserves more credit than she will ever know.
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Contemporary opinion and much scholarship frequently interprets student activists from the 1960s and 1970s as radical critics of both American society and foreign policy, seeking revolutionary changes in both and caring little of the consequences to the existing order. In fact, conservative forces and values based on democratic capitalism drove student activism of the period. Students' core values of equality of opportunity, equality of and before the law, and faith in the democratic process motivated their activism not just towards civil rights and the war in Vietnam, but also towards issues of student funding and institutions, indicating that self-interest served as one of those values as well. Only when these core values were offended did students engage in activism. Whereas the denial of equal opportunity to blacks in the South and Chicanos in the West easily offended those values and appealed to students' sense of democratic capitalism, the War in Vietnam did not. Specific issues of the war, such as the draft, offended students' sense of self-interest, motivating them to forcefully oppose the war. The war itself, however, did not succeed in bringing large-scale activism even though much of the student body felt America's involvement in Vietnam a mistake, illustrating the difference between being opposed to the war and opposing the war.

The evolution of minority student activism and their successful development of ethnic studies centers illustrated both the extent and limitations of reform during this period. Minority students grasped the relationship between empowerment and education, demanding greater access to the university and its institutions through developmental admissions programs and ethnic studies. While the white-majority student body embraced some of those
reforms as seeking to address inequality, when they perceived those demands as limiting their own sense of equality and self-interest, they relied on the same values to oppose later reforms as they had to endorse earlier reforms.
INTRODUCTION

In 1952, Martin McReynolds entered UCLA and found the student body dominated by the Greek system, under the thumb of a reactionary Dean of Students, and only moderately influenced by a small, though vibrant group of liberal, reform-minded fellow students. This group, many with ties to the organized left, clustered around the student newspaper, the Daily Bruin, and proceeded to use it as a mouthpiece against injustice, from the Greeks, from the Dean, and from society in general. Looking back on his days as part of that group at UCLA, McReynolds offered a candid portrait of himself:

I entered UCLA with a fairly typical WASP middle-class set of values, weighted a little more heavily than average on the side of straight-laced morality -- politically naive, believing in Freedom and Democracy in a fuzzy sort of way, sympathetic to the Working Class, which I knew nothing about . . . Against racial discrimination and prejudices but raised in an almost lily-white environment . . . I was drawn to the mainstream, a rabid football fan in typical college fashion, continued to live at home and remained a non-smoker and teetotaller on what I thought were my own values but really represented by close ties with my parents.¹

McReynolds' recollections of himself reflect a set of values easily found at UCLA before, during, and after his years there. These values of equality of opportunity, equality of and before the law, and a faith in the democratic process have formed, and continue to form, the bedrock of democratic capitalism in the United States. Students at UCLA believed that the values of democratic capitalism applied to all, including themselves, making self-interest one of those values as well. When issues such as discrimination and limitations on free speech and association offended students' values, they struggled to oppose such offenses and, befitting their core values, did so using the democratic process of speech, assembly, petition,¹

and boycott. These values and students' responses to their offense, appear as a common thread, linking student generation to student generation. Though McReynolds' claim as a non-smoker and teetotaler would have seemed anathema to a later generation of student activists freely experimenting with drugs and alcohol, they would have readily identified with his upbringing and understood how and why he opposed the things he did. The values and traits of students at UCLA from the 1940s through the 1970s have far more in common than in opposition. It is these values transmitted from generation to generation that say far more about student activism and America.

Popular perceptions of student activism from the 1960s remain centered on the notion of activists' altruistic motivations in their battles against what much of society now easily recognizes as evil, Southern segregation and American involvement in Vietnam. Working against such perceptions potentially places critical examinations of sixties activists and their motivations in alignment with either the neo-Confederate bigot or the Cold War hawk, both of whom have moved into the historicized past. Another factor shaping historical perceptions of the period is that so many participants remained in academia or other forms of public life and have published substantially on the subject, including Terry Anderson, Tom Bates, Todd Gitlin, Richard Flacks, and James Miller, to name only a handful. While most of these works

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have a scholarly edge to, or at least offer provocative insight of, the people, issues, and events of the period, their works remain couched in the social or political philosophy that lead the authors to activism in the first place. In addition, much of the "participant generation" of scholars came from the ranks of student leaders, making them part of a student elite, largely ignoring the "rank-and-file" activists. The inability or unwillingness of most current interpretations to consider the role and motivations of non-white students within the context of their white counterparts remains an additional deficit in contemporary scholarship. A fourth factor affecting current scholarly examinations of sixties activism remains the near obsession with dramatic events of the period, such as the Free Speech Movement at the University of California, the Third World strike at San Francisco State College, and the murders at Kent State University. These events remain so ingrained in either memory or scholarship because they were unique. Almost no other campus witnessed such massive


Miller's *Democracy is in the Streets* is one of the best, while Gitlin's *The Whole World is Watching* is one of the worst, with Anderson, Bates, and Flacks somewhere in between.

Gitlin and Flacks were both officers in Students for a Democratic Society, while Miller put together a platform to be debated at that group's final convention in 1969: Gomez-Quinones and Munoz were both leading members of United Mexican American Students and leading figures in Chicano student activism at UCLA. In the preface to the second printing of *Democracy is in the Streets*, Miller candidly admits if he "were to start over again,... I would want to emphasize more forcefully how unrepresentative most of the characters in my story really are," Miller, *Democracy is in the Streets*, p. 5.


At the time of this dissertation, there were no less than eight books that dealt with the Free Speech Movement in whole or in substantial part and at least five each on the 1968 Columbia strike and Kent State.

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physical opposition to the University (and such administrative bungling) as happened at Berkeley, no other student strike lasted even half as long as the one at San Francisco, and only a handful of students lost their lives in activist confrontations during the period in the confrontationally dramatic fashion as at Kent State. A final factor limiting existing interpretations of the period and the participants is the absence of much historical perspective. Most works begin with the assumption that no student activity occurred before 1964, or, most charitably, 1960, and that campus and administrative patterns prior to the outbreak of large-scale student activism do not add anything to the story. In short, existing interpretations of sixties student activism remain dominated by white participant elites offering atypical events as representative of the period.

One illustration of UCLA's representative nature is that it has previously existed below the radar of sixties scholars because, for the most part, it did not witness large-scale disruptions. With few notable exceptions, UCLA avoided the dramatic confrontations that previously characterized the period because its student body generally rejected radical attempts to engineer situations which might inflame a more aggressive response. Also, from 1960 until well past the end of the period under review here, UCLA enjoyed a progressive administration which viewed students as fully interested partners in the university enterprise, cautiously granted rights and privileges, shrewdly undercut radical demands for greater

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concessions, and always sought the answer to the question, "what is right and what is just?"

As a public university, UCLA attracted a relatively diverse student body, both economically and, within the context of the state of California, geographically, although up until the late 1960s, it had only a handful of minority students, which allowed reform-minded students to practice activism in a bit of a vacuum. As UCLA's minority admissions increased and minority students took part in activism themselves, creating the integrated, multi-cultural university many white students agitated for, the campus witnessed tensions between rhetoric and reality.

UCLA's status as a public institution also guaranteed that student debates frequently found both larger proponents and opponents off campus, making it difficult to separate student issues from non-student issues. This also guaranteed that the university was not beyond public and or political pressure, illustrating the paradox of the public university serving as both beneficiary and critic of the state. Additionally, most students who came to UCLA in this period acknowledged the benefit of public education to the nation and grasped that part of that mission included the struggle to reconcile democratic ideals with everyday practices.

The school also resided in the midst of a growing, well-endowed urban metropolis that represented America's post-World War II economic growth and optimism. The economic growth that Los Angeles enjoyed and the lack of institutionalized public-facility Jim Crow

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8 Oral interview with Dr. Charles E. Young, August 3 and 11, 1999, Los Angeles, CA.

laws facing the city's minority populations offer a striking venue in which to consider activists' willingness to seek change abroad without noticing equally discriminatory, though perhaps less visible instances, at home. Such a paradox allowed Westerners to criticize Southerners for their behavior, fully aware of the historical context of race relations in the South, while ignoring the equally complex history of race relations in the West and the continuing struggle for equality in that region.

Student activism at UCLA, and elsewhere, took place not out of a radical desire for revolution, but squarely within the American historical tradition of reform. Students' obsession with maintaining their activism within the context of the democratic process, and contemptuous dismissal of those who did not, serves as a primary illustration of that fact. Students had no desire for revolution because America already provided the framework for the kind of materialist society they desired. Their activism merely sought to "fine-tune" out of that society the abominations of racism, inequality, and war, abominations which affected their abilities to prosper. Students' reform efforts embraced both democracy and capitalism, seeing both as the bedrock of American society. As such their efforts at change came in support of the established system, not in spite of it. In this context, students of the period are aligned with grass-roots reformist efforts, including abolitionism and temperance reform, and even quasi-government reforms like progressivism.

This is the story of the liberal-moderate majority of American collegians from the 1940s through the 1970s. While UCLA contained an active and vibrant radical community throughout this period, it never succeeded in winning over the traditional, conservative student body. For this reason, this is not a story of student radicalism. Scholars have already
told that story. Neither is this an intellectual interpretation of the period, examining with
great detail the writings and speeches of either leaders or followers. The stress here is on
activism; an overwhelming majority of students at UCLA during thus study agreed with the
goals of the Civil Rights movement and opposed American intervention in Vietnam, but only
under certain conditions did they engage in direct action to illustrate those feelings.

Instead, this is a social history of essentially a social movement, about students' efforts
to ensure the availability of the tenets of democratic capitalism to all, most notably
themselves. It is about their efforts to oppose restrictions or abrogations of democratic
capitalism that might inhibit their ability to assume the place in materialist society they felt
higher education provided. While issues such as civil rights and the war in Vietnam
precipitated activism during this period, both on- and off-campus, the underlying issue
remained the meaning of America. Students' participation in these struggles and many others
during the period illustrated their interest in that debate as well. As such, mainstream student
activism stood squarely in the camp of providing for a materialist, egalitarian America that
hopefully provided for all but certainly provided for them. This is a story about college's
middling sort, those who favored reform but picked and chose their activism based not on the
cause of the moment but the cause that resonated with the values they brought with them to
campus and the values that provided the America they wanted to find when they left campus.
CHAPTER ONE
THE CITY THE WAR MADE:
WORLD WAR II LOS ANGELES AND ITS UNIVERSITY

On the night of February 25, 1942, the shrill wail of air raid sirens sounded above the city of Los Angeles. Civil Defense workers, convinced this was the Japanese attack that Angelenos had awaited ever since the bombing of Pearl Harbor, flocked to the city's gun emplacements as anti-aircraft fire soon filled the sky. When day broke, residents discovered that in fact no Japanese planes had flown overhead, the Imperial Navy was not anchored in Santa Monica Bay and the only shells fired on the city came from their own anti-aircraft guns. The so-called "Battle of Los Angeles" was as close as the combat of World War II came to the city.1 The changes wrought by the war, however, were more dramatic, though far less tragic. The effects of wartime migration and economic growth transformed the city into the dominant metropolis of the West; established it as the capital of the aerospace industry so crucial to the coming Cold War; and brought about a population increase that not only established the white middle class as the city's dominant social, political, and economic force, but also dramatically expanded the black, Chicano, and Asian populations in Los Angeles. Los Angeles' post-war affluence, fueled by defense industry spending, remained a largely white phenomenon, however, as the city's non-white population not only failed to make similar gains, but in many respects slipped backwards.

Los Angeles' population explosion actually began before the United States' entry in the war, as the city's industry moved to a war footing as early as June 1938 when Great

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Britain and France began placing orders for bombers and fighter planes with the city's nascent aircraft industry. By the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, at least a portion Los Angeles' industrial capacity operated at full capacity, with companies like Douglass Aircraft soon running three shifts to meet the demand. Los Angeles County's population in 1940, already expanded by over half a million residents from that of 1930, stood at 2,785,643, but jumped to 4,151,687 in the war decade to meet defense employment needs. As impressive as wartime Los Angeles' population growth appears, the city never fully satisfied the insatiable demand for workers. The War Manpower Commission twice named Los Angeles the Number One Critical Labor Shortage Area during the war years.

The growth of Los Angeles' population did not end with the war; quite the contrary, it continued to grow apace until the 1990s. But the war migrants brought a change to the

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1  Ibid., pp 4-6.
2  The term "Los Angeles," like "the West," means many things to many people. Besides being a city and county, it is also a regional concept. The use of county, rather than city, census statistics is crucial because much of the war-time industry occurred outside the city of Los Angeles, but still in the county of Los Angeles, in the numerous municipalities surrounding the city. For example, Northrup aircraft in El Segundo and Douglass Aircraft in Santa Monica were crucial players in the wartime boom. To add to the confusion, close proximity and friendly relationships between municipalities allowed for shared services, such that someone living in Los Angeles could send their children to school in Culver City and work in Santa Monica.

Even more important is the location of large minority populations outside the city limits, particularly unincorporated East Los Angeles, where most of the region's Chicano population resided. Here again was an example of shared services where the children of county residents used the city's school system.

Throughout this dissertation, the term "Los Angeles" will mean the region of the Los Angeles Basin, encompassing the city and its outlying municipalities. When "Los Angeles" is used otherwise, city or county is specified.


city's balance of power previously dominated by the downtown business interests, lead by the Chandler family and their *Los Angeles Times*.\(^6\) The new migrants forced the city's physical growth away from downtown, particularly towards the Westside, where a majority of the region's liberal Jewish population resided. The shifting of commercial trade away from downtown, begun with the completion of the Miracle Mile shopping district before the war, accelerated in the late 1940s and 1950s with both residential and commercial growth fueled by the savings and loan industry based on the Westside. During the first nine months of 1945, the city issued a total of 21,916 building permits, most for the Westside. This does not even count separate Westside municipalities such as Santa Monica, Culver City, and El Segundo.\(^7\)

These separate Westside communities, as well as those within the city, exploded after the war as the home of the region's new middle class, a middle class created in part by the defense and aerospace industries and by merchant retail services demanded by the expanding population. Middle class thrift fueled the Westside savings and loan industry, which enjoyed a savings deposit base that grew 21 percent a year through the 1950s.\(^8\) The region's new middle class came from the ranks of Depression-era migrants, such as "Okies" and "Arkies," who left either agricultural work or unemployment for the wartime industrial economy, and soldiers who passed through southern California on their way to theaters of war, settling there.

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\(^7\) *Verge, Paradise Transformed*, pp. 145-6.

\(^8\) *Davis, City of Quartz*, p. 124.
afterwards. After the war, they took advantage of federal contracts, government loans, and the G.I. Bill to find prosperity amidst the sunshine. They understood that American values of democracy and capitalism, the basis of which came from equality of opportunity, equality of and before the law, and a faith in the democratic system which many of them had so recently fought for, buttressed their ascension into the middle class.

The building of the Westside, however, did not represent a reversal of the city's power and authority, but merely an end to the monopoly enjoyed by the old downtown elite. The building demand and the need for retail services created a new class of kingmakers on the Westside, particularly in the savings and loan and entertainment industries. This new Westside power elite, created, in essence, by the area's middle class, now shared power with the downtown Old Guard. As historian Mike Davis has written, "although other American cities may have had plural elites or competing cliques, none could claim a situation so dichotomous, on so many levels, as the separate upper-class universes of downtown and the Westside."9

This dual power elite resisted any liberal activism or dissent that might erode their elite position. The Los Angeles Times, long a supporter of the open shop, consistently ran editorials critical of anything that smacked of leftism. When Fletcher Bowron won the city's mayoralty in the late 1940s and promptly instituted a low-rent public housing program, the Times wailed about "creeping socialism."10 In one of the last Old Guard victories, Norris Poulson defeated Bowron in 1953, immediately ending the housing programs and evicting

9  Ibid., p. 125.
10  Ibid., p. 122.
12,000 low-income Chicano residents in Chavez Ravine so the city could build Dodger Stadium. Both downtown and Westside elites engaged in rabid post-war anti-Communist rhetoric, assuming any leftist successes would come at their expense, while the region's new middle class wished to protect their recently achieved affluence as well. As the Cold War funneled billions of federal dollars into Los Angeles, the region's new middle class had practical as well as ideological motivations for accepting the Communist threat at face value and warily questioning those who did not. Organizations such as the Civil Rights Congress, which provided an interracial forum to fight racism and which enjoyed broad support from celebrities as diverse as Lena Horne and Frank Sinatra, faced harsh anti-Communist rhetoric from institutions such as the Times. Appearing on Attorney General Tom Clark's 1946 list of "subversive organizations," the CRC soon withered away as conservatives viewed its attempts at racial equality as part of a Communist plot. Historian Gerald Horne argues that the vitriol and vehemence of this anti-Communism successfully repressed leftist organizations, particularly those that espoused anything resembling civil rights, by characterizing any plea for liberal reform as Communist.

The establishment of Los Angeles as the industrial capital of the West came as a direct outgrowth of federal government spending. The two largest wartime industries, shipbuilding

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and aircraft production, garnered $3.5 billion in government contracts during the war years and accounted for 318,000 jobs. All told, Los Angeles received a total of $11 billion in government contracts between 1939 and 1945 and stood as the second leading defense producer in the nation and near the top in the value of their manufactured products. By the mid-1950s, 55% of all manufacturing employment in Los Angeles came courtesy of government aircraft/aerospace contracts. In addition, the establishment of military bases in and around Los Angeles, the government think tank RAND Corporation and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at California Technical Institute, and the aircraft industry's expansion into aerospace guaranteed that federal dollars would fund Los Angeles' growth throughout the Cold War.14

The explosion of the region's middle class, however, remained predominantly a white phenomenon. As defense contractors either refused to hire blacks or did so only for menial positions, whites dominated Los Angeles' initial war-time population surge. As Lawrence de Graaf has argued, 1942 stands as the real watershed date for black World War II migration, when the Federal Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) began stipulating non-discriminatory hiring practices for federal contracts.15 While Los Angeles County's black population increased 33% in the decade before the war, that accounted for only 75,209 residents in all of Los Angeles County. After the institution of the FEPC mandates and the

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14 Verge, Paradise Transformed, pp. 142-43, 146; also see Lotchin, Fortress California, pp. 65, 206-259.

opening of defense jobs to blacks, however, the population skyrocketed by almost 200% to 224,881.  

As the region's black population increased, the use of restrictive real estate covenants by landlords, realtors, and banks forced blacks into the central and southern part of the city. The war-time housing shortage felt all across the region made this forced ghettoization even more acute. As new migrants came in, more established blacks had nowhere to go because of the housing covenants, leading to overcrowding in sections like Watts. Black ghettos such as Watts had a higher ratio of residents per square mile than other sections of the city and the quality of that housing was far worse. By 1965, a commission determined that 22.5% of all housing in Watts was deteriorating or dilapidated. Addressing the wartime myth that blacks in Los Angeles "had it better" than elsewhere, Sally Jane Sandoval acknowledges that blacks enjoyed higher wages and greater percentage of home ownership, but they paid more for it, found it of lesser quality, and found it only in specific ghettos, created with no small assistance from the California Real Estate Association.

In addition, blacks in the city faced a tremendously oppressive police department. Los Angeles Police Department Chief William H. Parker's rabid anti-communism convinced him that only a fifth column movement in marginalized communities, such as Watts, would provide a foothold in the city for Communism. Accordingly, he ordered heavy surveillance

of these communities by an "arrest conscious" police department.\(^\text{19}\) Officers rigged traffic signals so as to increase violations, allowing the LAPD to question, search, and usually arrest hundreds of blacks weekly. Parker placed heavy emphasis on the number of arrests to justify the importance of the Department as the defenders of the Thin Blue Line. These artificially inflated statistics allowed Parker to obtain federal grant money to purchase high tech innovations such as helicopters and listening devices.\(^\text{20}\) The LAPD exemplified this attitude in the Chicano community as well, using outlandish arrest statistics to imply a near epidemic of juvenile delinquency there. The use of these statistics meant that while the city would build the modern LAPD, the city's non-white population would pay for it.

While FEPC mandates helped blacks secure defense industry jobs and allowed for an increased standard of living, the region's increasing Mexican-American population did not enjoy similar good fortune. As late as 1944, Mexican-Americans were still vastly under-represented in the primary defense industries, accounting for less than 3\% of the work force at six of the region's largest plants.\(^\text{21}\) This under-representation in the defense industry stood in stark contrast to their growing population. Historian Rodolfo Acuna asserts that some


\(^{20}\) Taylor, "Black Radicalism." Taylor cites the main intersection in Watts of 103rd Street and Central Avenue as a frequent target of LAPD officers who would sit in wait for potential violators before pulling them over.

315,000 Chicanos lived in Los Angeles during the war decade, increasing to over 600,000 by 1960, while the state's Chicano population tripled from 1940 to 1960.\textsuperscript{22}

The increase in Chicano population came not from defense industry jobs as in the case of the region's black population, but rather in agriculture. As defense industry jobs lured white migrant farm workers to the city and with the internment of the immigrant and native-born Japanese, California lost a sizable portion of its agricultural labor force. This, in addition to the general manpower shortages felt throughout the nation on account of the war, left California's wealthy growers and landowners shorthanded. The federal government's cozy relationship with California's agricultural elite compounded this need. Farm subsidies and government reclamation and irrigation projects allowed California's Central and Imperial Valleys to become some of the most profitable and fertile farmland in the nation. To help supply labor for California, as well as other regions, the government arranged with Mexico for the importation of \textit{braceros}, contract farm laborers at set wages. Although the government intended the \textit{braceros} to return to Mexico after each growing season, many remained in the United States.\textsuperscript{23} The majority of the region's population increase in the post-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item Acuna, \textit{Occupied America}, p. 261 & 284. Population statistics concerning Mexican-Americans are hard to ascertain because at the time, the federal census counted them as "white."
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\end{footnotesize}
war period, however, came from internal migration, with 60% of all Chicano movement within the United States ending in California.  

Chicanos, like blacks, found housing in poor quality and high demand. Their barrio existed in the unincorporated East Los Angeles area and due to urban growth and their lack of a political voice, frequently fell victim to the bulldozer, as in the case of Dodger Stadium and the Golden State Freeway, which ran through the Boyle Heights section of the city. They also suffered from social discrimination and law enforcement harassment. A Los Angeles County ordinance restricted Chicanos and blacks from swimming in county pools except on Wednesdays, after which they were drained. Living in East Los Angeles, Chicanos faced harassment from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department as well as the Los Angeles Police Department. Incidents indicative of law enforcement contempt for the Chicano population included the 1942 Sleepy Lagoon Murder Case, in which LAPD and County Sheriffs rounded up an entire Chicano gang, charging them with murder on no physical evidence, and the notorious "Bloody Christmas" incident, in which Central Division officers beat three Chicano suspects already in custody on Christmas Eve, 1951 in retribution for an officer injured in a fight with Chicanos earlier in the evening.

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24 Acuna, Occupied America, p 264.

25 Acuna, Community Under Siege, pp. 21-121.

26 Acuna, Occupied America, p. 265.

Both law enforcement harassment and public opinion against Chicanos coalesced in the 1943 Zoot Suit Riots. Before and during World War II, Los Angeles youth, overwhelmingly Chicano, took to wearing the pegged trousers and wide-shouldered, long coats that made up the Zoot Suit. The outlandish, attention-grabbing attire of the Zoot Suit offended many Americans seeking unity and conformity as part of the war effort. As such, many whites who viewed the overwhelming number of Chicano youth "Zooters" in Los Angeles as juvenile delinquents, perceived the Zoot Suit a symbol of rebellion and anti-patriotism.28 The perception of Chicano juvenile delinquency lay largely at the feet of the two conservative Los Angeles daily papers, the Chandler-owned Los Angeles Times and the Hearst-owned Los Angeles Herald-Express, which frequently ran front page stories about the threat of "pachuco gangs," noting each police round-up with the same satisfaction they recounted enemy war dead.29

The accumulated racial tension mixed with the highly charged atmosphere of the war exploded in the first week of June 1943. Uniformed military personnel "cruised" Chicano neighborhoods "with rocks, sticks, clubs, and palm saps" looking for Zoot Suiters. The soldiers and sailors targeted the clothing as much as the individual, as most confrontations included not only a physical beating, but the ritualistic stripping of the Zoot Suit from Chicano youth. Los Angeles Police and Sheriffs' Departments allowed the beatings to occur for


several days with almost no intervention, only taking action after civilians began joining in on
the side of the servicemen and the cheering of spectators gave the beatings all the atmosphere
of a lynch mob. In response, the L.A. City Council passed an ordinance prohibiting the
wearing of the Zoot Suit.\textsuperscript{30}

Chicanos also faced the anti-Communist rhetoric of the period when attempting to
organize reform efforts. Like blacks, their attempts at civil rights activism, particularly their
affiliation with the Civil Rights Congress and the League of United Latin American Citizens,
brought charges of Communist influence from groups like the FBI.\textsuperscript{31} Councilman Edward
Roybal, the only elected Chicano official in all Los Angeles County, suffered constant red-
baiting for his association with Bowron and various civil rights organizations.\textsuperscript{32} For the
region's Chicanos, the war meant increased population, but also a rise in ghettoization, a
general exclusion from industry with opportunities primarily limited to agricultural labor, and
the cloaking of LAPD and Sheriff's Department brutality behind charges of hoodlum-ism and
potential Communist subversion.

The war affected no single group to the degree it affected the region's Japanese and
Japanese-American population. Forcibly evacuated and interned at gunpoint by the federal
government, the Japanese and Japanese-Americans comprised the bulk of the county's Asian
population, accounting for over 69\% in 1940.\textsuperscript{33} The politics of internment illustrate the

\textsuperscript{30} Scott, "The Mexican-American in Los Angeles," pp. 239, 243-44.
\textsuperscript{31} Acuna, \textit{Occupied America}, pp. 259-260.
\textsuperscript{32} Acuna, \textit{Community Under Siege}, pp. 33-34.
\textsuperscript{33} 1940 Census, Volume II, part 1, p. 567.
extreme feelings with which Anglo Westerners, particularly Angelenos, viewed the region's non-white population. Although both the Department of Justice and the Army felt "mass evacuation . . . unnecessary," Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 largely under pressure from and on the request of local authorities, both civil and military.\textsuperscript{34} Joining in, and perhaps stirring up, this public request for internment, the \textit{Times} printed dozens of articles, most lacking even a shred of truth, alleging the Japanese threat to Los Angeles. The most notorious, and least truthful, was the allegation that Japanese truck farmers had planted their tomato plants in the shape of a giant arrow pointing potential Japanese bombers to a nearby air base. Throughout the West, the government "relocated" over 107,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans.\textsuperscript{35}

Upon their release and subsequent re-incorporation into Los Angeles' social, economic and political life, the Japanese and Japanese-Americans, particularly the Nisei (second) and Sansei (third) generations, struggled to re-establish themselves. Most lost everything over the course of internment requiring them to start all over in 1945, rebuilding savings accounts, businesses, homes and lives. The larger white population viewed their successes, motivated by more personal issues of pride and self-comfort, as prime examples of middle class values such as hard work, thrift, and assimilation, thus making Japanese, and Asians in general, a

\begin{footnotes}

\item[35] Daniels, \textit{Prisoners Without Trial}, p. 29, 72.
\end{footnotes}
"model minority," a label that would haunt later generations. Unlike other minority groups, the Japanese-American population in Los Angeles actually decreased during the war decade due to re-emigration to Japan and dissemination throughout the interior to avoid internment and post-war discrimination in the West. It would be another decade before their population growth rate reached its pre-war status.

In contrast, Chinese-Americans actually benefited from the war, in part because they were not Japanese, but also because of China's role as an ally in the fight against Imperial Japan. White Angelenos jingoistically withheld racial condemnation and persecution of local Chinese out of allegiance to the war effort. The county's Chinese-American population nearly doubled in the 1940s, but still remained comparatively small. Their population increase came mainly from immigration. As an act of goodwill towards China, the U.S. in 1943 repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act, though still retaining heavy limitations on Chinese immigration, and in 1946 allowed Chinese wives of American citizens to emigrate. This, along with internal migration, accounted for Los Angeles County's Chinese-American population increase from 5,330 before the war to 9,187 by 1950. While the region's Asian population remained small compared to other minorities in the decades following the war, they achieved success beyond their numbers in home ownership, middle-class jobs and sending their children


37 United States Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population: 1960, Volume I Characteristics of the Population, Part 6, California, p. 196. The Japanese and Japanese-American population before the war was 36,866 and by 1950 had rebounded to 38,998.

38 Kitano and Daniels, Asian Americans, pp. 39-43.

39 1950 Census, volume II, part 5, California, p. 179.
to school, thus solidifying the "model minority" label. However, Asians in Los Angeles experienced more subtle forms of discrimination in finding upper end employment and housing.40

The economic and industrial gains made by Los Angeles after World War II elevated the city into the upper echelon of urban metropolises. The white middle class and working class enjoyed unbridled success, but the region's non-white population remained an underclass with few opportunities for change. Ghettoization, either legally or through real estate practices, job discrimination, and the white middle class' empowerment of the LAPD to "maintain order," all provided a cycle of oppression that proved all but impossible to break. While each of these minority communities would eventually erupt in protest, some more violently than others, many liberal whites viewed their oppression as troubling. Grasping that their own social and economic advancement came from traditional values of equality of opportunity, equality of and before the law, and faith in the democratic process, liberal whites understood that the denial of these opportunities had dire consequences for the future of

40 John Modell, *The Economics and Politics of Racial Accommodation: The Japanese of Los Angeles 1900-1942*, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1977). Much of the history of the Japanese-American experience after internment still needs to be written. For a cultural analysis of both before and after the war, see Harry H. L. Kitano, *Japanese Americans: The Evolution of a Subculture*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969). Modell does identify patterns that carry though the internment period, notably the pattern of the Japanese-American community in Los Angeles to seek acceptance and integration through accommodation of white bigotry; in essence adopting a similar behavior to what Booker T. Washington advocated for Southern blacks in the Atlanta Compromise. By accepting the nature of white's feelings toward the Japanese and Japanese-Americans, the latter set about to change those feelings through middle class values of thrift, hard work, home and business ownership, etc. However, in accommodating white animosity while achieving relative financial progress, the Japanese-American community entrenched the "model minority" stereotype. Their hesitancy to protest the subtle discrimination aimed at them by whites, when viewed in conjunction with their absence from police blotters and welfare roles, only added to this "model minority" label. When later generations refused to be as accommodating, they rose up against not only discrimination but also against the model minority stereotype that sought to preclude their activism.
America. Their children, too, found offensive the denial of tenets they believed inherent in a democracy, grasping that such limitations on opportunity might someday limit their own opportunity.

Before Los Angeles' mid-century climb to dominance, the region remained a poor sibling to the San Francisco Bay area in almost every category. While the boosters of the Southland declared Los Angeles "one of the world's great cities in the making" in the years after the turn of the century, Bay area residents and power brokers scoffed at such hubris. The continued refusal of the Board of Regents of the University of California to consider opening a branch of the University in Los Angeles remained a constant bone of contention in the Southland, leaving the region's intellectual youth the option of travelling the then considerable distance to Berkeley or paying the expensive tuition of the more local, but private, University of Southern California.

Pressure from Los Angeles' growing business and real estate community, as well as that of Edward Dickson, the only Regent from southern California, eventually won from the Regents first a summer session in Los Angeles in 1917, and then a two year program on the campus of the former Los Angeles State Normal School, officially known as the Southern Branch of the University of California in 1919. The Regents assumed that students would then transfer to the main campus in Berkeley for their upper-division course work. Hoping only to appease the growing political and financial influence of the Southland, the Regents sought to concede as little as possible; however, to some of the University's alumni, even this...

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41 Davis, City of Quartz, p. 113.
was too much. Berkeley alumnae Charles S. Wheeler vehemently opposed those "who would seize the sacred scroll, . . . tear it in two, and . . . leave one-half here in our midst and would set the other half at some center convenient to the real estate market south of the Tehachapi."

The hesitancy of the University and the Regents, and the outright hostility of many alumni, engendered a fiercely paternalist rivalry towards the Southern Branch. The Berkeley campus institutionalized this paternalism in its organization of the new campus. The new campus' charter required that the chief campus officer, a provost, defer to the University president on all matters, regardless of how local, leaving the provost with no ultimate authority. While this caused obvious administrative conflict, the new students also perceived their second-class status within the University system when the school's first provost, Dr. Ernest Carroll Moore told them, "you must do twenty-five percent better than Berkeley in order to be recognized at all."

With the Southern Branch's creation, the students immediately set out to establish their own institutions. They created the Cub Californian, a weekly paper which did not hesitate to criticize campus leaders, the administration, or their favorite target, the Los Angeles Electric Railway. They also organized intercollegiate athletics and student

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government. Students sought to establish a little independence from Berkeley by insisting on publicly referring to themselves as either the "University of California at Los Angeles" or the "Los Angeles Branch of the University of California," which brought a quick and stern rebuke from Berkeley. A letter from then-comptroller Robert Gordon Sproul all but demanded the student store pay to reprint their stationery because the header included the latter appellation. Although it would be forty years before students would successfully exploit the tensions between the main and branch campuses for their own ends, the episode is emblematic of the extent to which Berkeley went to keep track of the fledgling campus in Los Angeles.

Claiming these new institutions as their own, the students closely guarded them and opposed attempts to curtail them. In April 1925, the boxing coach held out black student Leon Whitaker from a match with Stanford because of a gentlemen's agreement initiated at

44 The Southern Branch took over the campus of the Los Angeles State Normal School, so institutions like the paper had predecessors, while student government had to be reformed under University by-laws, including a new student constitution. For the paper's attack on the street car monopoly, see the Cub Californian, September 29, 1919; the paper ominously referred to those forming the new student government as the "Council of Twelve," beginning a perpetual atmosphere of friction between the two institutions, see George Garrigues, "'The Loud Bark and Curious Eyes': A History of the UCLA Daily Bruin, 1919-1955," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970; for the birth of student government see William C. Ackerman, My Fifty Year Love-in with UCLA (Los Angeles: Fashion Press, 1969) p. 27; and Johnson, "Student Self-government."

45 Letter from Robert Gordon Sproul to Ernest Carroll Moore, August 19, 1919, folder #2, Box #1, Records of the Chancellor's Office, Subject Files of Ernest Carroll Moore, 1917-1936 (ECM), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles; also see Garrigues, "Loud Bark and Curious Eyes," p. 21.

46 The extent to which the University sought to run the affairs of the Southern Branch only increased with time, culminating with the university presidency of Robert Gordon Sproul, affiliated with the University since before the Southern Branch's inception and serving as president from 1945 to 1958. Sproul saw his reputation and the University's as one, seeking to maintain total control over all aspects of the University. The most obvious manifestation of this was Sproul's active suppression of a 1948 report which advocated greater autonomy for the other campuses in the UC system. See Eugene C. Lee, The Origins of the Chancellorship: The Buried Report of 1948, (Berkeley: Center for the Studies in Higher Education and Institute of Governmental Studies, 1995).
Stanford's request. Students at UCLA responded with outrage; not only had Stanford encroached upon one of their institutions, but in doing so had offended the students' ideals of equality and justice embodied in the ideology of public education. Various student groups, including the Forum Debating Society, circulated petitions demanding the university make clear its position on such blatant discrimination, declaring that the university "has sacrificed its democratic principles." The students felt such protest necessary, "being firmly convinced that such action is contrary to the true principle of democratic education." The Forum Debating Society's petition alone garnered 254 signatures. Provost Ernest Carroll Moore responded to the students' demands, declaring that the University "knows no color line" and in the future would "enter all its athletes in competitions without any reference whatsoever to color, showing no partiality at all but leaving to its antagonist either to accept its practice or default." Moore referred to the matter as a "keen regret to us all."

The University did not always uphold this official position, however. In an earlier incident in March, 1925, Whitaker wrote Moore a letter expressing dismay that some professors used in class expressions such as "nigger," "darky," and "pickaninny."

These words are probably not of such importance in themselves, but inasmuch as the average Negro student comes in contact everyday with sufficient discriminations,

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47 Historically, both the students and the administration viewed UCLA's athletic department as a part of student's extracurricular activities, therefore it was run by the student body until 1960. This arrangement prompted legendary basketball coach John Wooden to note that it "made the student body president my boss," John R. Wooden with Jack Tobin, They Call Me Coach (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1988), p. 77.

48 Petition from The Forum Debating Society, undated, folder #10, Box #18, ECM; also see Garrigues, "Loud Bark and Curious Eyes," p. 22.

49 Letter from Ernest Carroll Moore to The Debating Society, May 6, 1925, folder #10, Box #18, ECM.
embarrassments, and insults to cause the average white student, if placed under like circumstances, to either be constantly in jail for assault and battery or to commit suicide in sheer desperation and hopelessness, it is easily seen that there is no humor in these words for the Negro student; but rather there is only bitterness and humiliation.30

Moore, a diligent correspondent, never replied. The two Whitaker incidents illustrate the degree to which many students felt the university had an obligation to respect the ideals of fairness and equality and their own responsibility as students in holding the University to those ideals.

Throughout its early years, the student paper, which by 1929 was known as the Bruin,51 identified itself as the liberal voice on campus. In both its news coverage and editorials, the paper consistently opposed discrimination, arguing that the stamping out of such ignorance was a primary responsibility of higher education. In November, 1920, the paper editorialized that prejudice was the enemy of progress and education, stating that "college students who claim to be leaders in all progressive thought, and democratic ways of living, should be the first to oppose a mental attitude which retards progress. . . . Discrimination . . . is not in accord with the spirit of a large and liberal-minded institution."52 Not only was discrimination anathema to a liberal education, the paper felt education played the pivotal role in fighting discrimination. When a football game between Washington and

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30 Letter Leon Whitaker to Ernest Carroll Moore, March 12, 1925, folder #10, Box #18, ECM.

31 The masthead of the student paper underwent numerous changes due to publication schedules and the school's status relative to Berkeley. It was originally known as the Cub Californian, then became the Grizzly, then the California Bruin, and finally the Daily Bruin, although to this day, the 'Daily' is dropped whenever the publication schedule is not daily. See Garrigues, "Loud Bark and Curious Eyes."

Jefferson College and Washington and Lee College included a gentlemen's agreement precluding W&J from using its black players, the paper wrote:

It is a sorry state of affairs when our institutions of learning, the backbone of the country, will not only refrain from breaking down this race hatred, but will even go so far . . . as to sanction its existence. How superficial, how ridiculous, all their high-flown lecture hall theories of brotherly love appear when viewed in the light of actual circumstance!53

The paper returned to this theme in 1927 when criticizing the efforts of white students in Gary, Indiana, to keep fourteen black students from attending school with them, "are they going to be accepted or are we always going to regard them as boot-blacks and elevator operators? . . . Let us, as educated university students and Christians, show a little more practically the beliefs we profess as Christians."54 However, mere intolerance of discrimination was not enough. The Bruin felt that the university should actively work against discrimination and seek its abolition. "We honestly believe a university fails in its purpose if a student can attend classes for four years, receive his [degree], and emerge a fully confirmed bigot."55 During the war, the paper consistently defended the rights and loyalties of Japanese-Americans, many of whom were classmates and campus leaders. The Daily Bruin was the state's only daily paper to oppose internment.56

53 "Intolerance Still." Daily Bruin, October 12, 1923, p. 4.


56 Garrigues, "Loud Bark and Curious Eyes," p. 89. The paper's editorial stand on racial issues, particularly their opposition to internment, did not go unnoticed. In January 1945, the Associated College Press awarded the paper its highest All-American ranking, specifically noting editor Gloria Farquar's writings on race and discrimination. The ACP singled out the editorial "Color Blind," (November 21, 1944, p. 4) opposing continued internment of the Japanese, arguing that any questions of loyalty should have been answered by that group's sacrifices in the European theater of the war. The ACP noted that such editorials "should have a wider readership. They pack real editorial punch," "Bruin Wins
Student activism in the pre-Cold War period existed within sharp limitations set and rigidly maintained by the administration. Dating to the University's founding, Regulation 17 forbid any "partisan political or religious activity" from occurring on any campus of the University of California. Robert Gordon Sproul, now President of the UC, and Moore rigidly enforced Regulation, or Rule, 17 and successfully squashed almost every effort towards campus free speech and association. When students circulated a poll in May 1933 based on the Oxford Pledge asking students to what degree, if at all, they would support American belligerency in a coming war, Moore demanded the petitions confiscated, saying, "I hold it clearly out of order for anyone to propose to students of a state university the question whether they shall or shall not support the United States at this or any other time."37

Although Sproul and Moore cloaked their actions in the rhetoric of keeping the University free of controversial issues, they operated with partisan intent themselves. In fact, both men had an abiding fear of radicalism, socialism, and even left-leaning Democrats. Their fear of the Left fueled the repression of student activities. Moore had a firm anti-radical record on campus; he unilaterally dissolved the Liberal Club in 1926 and suspended a student for "communistic tendencies," stating that "the University of California cannot allow the Third


37 "Student Peace Committee," 1933 folder, Box #1, Student Activism Collection (SAC), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles. The Oxford Pledge originated on the campus of Oxford University, stating, "I will not fight for king or country in any war." The Pledge spread to American campuses as the embraced the peace movement in the 1930s, see Ralph S. Brax, The First Student Movement: Student Activism in the United States During the 1930s, (Port Washington, NY: Kenikat Press, 1981) and Robert Cohen, When the Old Left Was Young: Student Radicals and America's First Mass Student Movement, 1929-1941, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
International of Moscow to establish a cell of agitation on the grounds of the University.\textsuperscript{58}

Moore's paranoia of the Left led him to gross excesses, including seeking intelligence information on student radicals from the Los Angeles Police Department, welcoming a secretive LAPD presence on campus, and requesting LAPD surveillance, harassment, and arrest of at least one student activist.\textsuperscript{59}

In the fall of 1934, students demanded an on-campus open forum in which they could address political issues. Their demand for a political voice came as part of the ongoing antimilitarism of the 1930s, but also was specific to Upton Sinclair's candidacy in the upcoming California gubernatorial election with the Socialist EPIC (End Poverty In California) program.

Moore immediately refused, citing Rule 17 and ordered four students, including the student body president, to cease their public agitation for such a forum. When they refused, he suspended them for ignoring his gag order and a fifth student for her communist attempts to "destroy UCLA."\textsuperscript{60} In fact, none of the students had violated any university rules and were targeted by Moore simply because of their visibility in their opposition to him. The suspensions prompted a peaceful protest rally the next day, attended by 3,000 students, which Moore attempted to disband using the LAPD. Moore then made a radio address suggesting

\textsuperscript{58} Garrigues, "Loud Bark and Curious Eyes," p. 34.

\textsuperscript{59} Cohen, \textit{When the Old Left was Young}, pp. 118-129. Cohen's research uncovered information showing FBI involvement on scores of campuses prior to World War II. The Berkeley campus was one of those targeted, although Cohen turned up no specific information on UCLA. However, at least as early as 1936, the UCLA administration began tracking students they labeled as "subversive," noting names and addresses, suspected affiliations, types of material they distributed and where on campus they did so. The detailed nature of such intelligence reports suggests even greater involvement than the local LAPD, see Confidential Memo, File #105, Box #24, Records of the Chancellor's Office, Administrative Files, 1936-59 (CO), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.

\textsuperscript{60} Cohen, \textit{When the Old Left Was Young}, pp. 118-129; also see Brax, \textit{The First Student Movement}, pp. 38-40.
vigilantism on the part of conservative students, urging them to "clean house" of the radicals and "purge the Communists," specifically calling on the fraternity and sorority members for this task. The Greeks responded to his red-baiting by forming the UCLA Americans, which included a midnight initiation ceremony that had all the trappings of a Klan rally. Their first order of business was to form a "vigilance committee" and vowed to use force to "rid the UCLA campus of Communistic and radical activities."

Students immediately rejected Moore's claims of anarchism and Communist infiltration, clearly viewing the issue as one of free speech and assembly. They openly questioned Moore's skirting of the free speech issue and urged the student body not to split into "org vs. non-org," the labels used for students who were or were not members of the Greek system. After a student strike in support of the "UCLA 5" brought disruption to campus, Sproul came down from Berkeley to personally oversee the situation. Sproul's interest in minimalizing bad publicity for the University led him to immediately reinstate the original four and to reinstate the fifth by December after being threatened with litigation from the students' parents. Privately, Sproul fumed that Moore had botched the situation and brought "serious injury to the University." Publicly, however, he supported Moore's questionable use of Rule 17 and used his announcement of the reinstatements to condemn the open forum and the entire concept of free speech on campus. The incident severely damaged

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62 "UCLA Americans," 1934 folder, Box #1, SAC.

63 "What's it all about???," 1934 folder, Box #1, SAC; for the students' demands, see "General Reinstatement Committee Demands," 1934 folder, Box #1, SAC.

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Sprout's confidence in Moore, and Moore exacerbated the situation when he made the offhand comment to a reporter that UCLA was "a hotbed of Communism."64 Sproul, already unhappy with the bad publicity to the University, and hence himself, decided that Moore had to go. Within two years, Sproul forced Moore into retirement.65

The entire incident, particularly Moore's comment about "a hotbed of Communism," gave UCLA the reputation as "the Little Red Schoolhouse." Moore's phrase would be recycled for years in the Los Angeles papers, particularly the ultra-conservative Los Angeles Times. The reputation became a self-fulfilling prophecy as moderates and liberals dominated campus institutions while conservatives distanced themselves from UCLA.66 Rather than discourage liberal reform and student activism, Moore's and Sproul's actions had in fact bolstered these efforts.

The administration's willingness to see red in student activism however, did not stop with Moore's dismissal. In fact, it illustrated a pattern for more than twenty years. In December 1940, several students questioned the drama department's production of Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, in particular, its stereotypical treatment of blacks. Numerous letters to the editor of the Daily Bruin argued that the era called for a more positive image of blacks. One letter writer suggested inviting someone like Langston Hughes

64 Hamilton and Jackson, UCLA on the Move," pp. 77-79.
65 Cohen, When the Old Left Was Young, pp. 118-129; Brax, The First Student Movement, pp. 38-40; for the contention that the incident cost Moore his job, see Hamilton and Jackson, UCLA on the Move, pp. 77-79.
or Ralph Bunche to speak on "modern Negro culture." For the few black students on campus, the issue lay not in whether the play presented negative stereotypes of blacks, but rather too many people still viewed the fictional portrayal of the happy darky as historically accurate. Recreating it on stage might only reinforce a perceived reality, rather than express an artistic interpretation. While this argument and the compromise seemed imminently sensible to the student body, the administration took a different view. Dean of Undergraduates Earl J. Miller, replacing Moore as the resident paranoid anti-Communist, kept Sproul appraised of the situation and labeled the entire incident a ploy by the leftist American Student Union. Miller argued that the ASU had made "use of a few of our colored students to try and create an issue and start some trouble.”

By World War II, UCLA was a fully accredited four year institution offering a full undergraduate and graduate catalog. However, the campus still played the role of Cal's younger brother, most importantly in the lack of autonomy enjoyed by the UCLA administration and the willingness of the University president to involve himself in local affairs large and small, as witnessed by the incidents surrounding both the "UCLA 5" and the production of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. The students, having established their own campus

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68 In 1940, there were only 91 black students at UCLA, out of a total population of 8439, "UCLA Office of the Registrar, Statistics, October 1944 - August 1950."

69 "Grins and Growls," *Daily Bruin*, December 5, 1940, p. 4; "Grins and Growls," ibid., December 9, 1940, p. 4. Also see Ackerman, *Love-in*, pp. 152-53 for the administration's take on the issue.

70 Letter from Earl J. Miller to Robert Gordon Sproul, December 12, 1940, File 40-2, Box #90, CO.

71 "Cal" refers to the Berkeley campus, whereas "Berkeley" refers to the UC and its administration.
institutions, sought to use them as a platform for a liberal consciousness and limited reform. They did so based on their beliefs of fairness and the ideals of public education. Chafing under what they perceived as overly strict in loco parentis regulations that stemmed in part from the meddling of Berkeley, the students were willing, in limited proportion, to oppose the administration's violation of these ideals. The tools available to the administration, however, including suspension and expulsion, and in Moore's case, LAPD harassment, trumped any student efforts to bring prolonged activism and liberal reform to campus.

Most important, the perceived shadow of Communism at UCLA loomed for a generation. As the nation moved into a post-war period increasingly concerned with anything even resembling leftist activity, UCLA's pre-war reputation carried over all too easily. As Los Angeles' population increased and the campus' minority enrollment grew, the struggle for liberal reform over such issues as discrimination in university living and social groups and the continuing struggle for free speech and association provided conservatives both within and without the university the opportunity to level the "hotbed of Communism" charge. This proved to be the single defining factor in the development Cold War student activism.
CHAPTER TWO

THE SCOURGE OF ANTI-COMMUNISM:
COLD WAR CAMPUS REFORM, WORLD WAR II - 1960

The strident anti-communism evident in UCLA's administration before the war reached epic proportions after the war, never more so than in 1955-56. Within the span of sixteen months, the administration unilaterally altered the editorial makeup of the student newspaper, amended the student constitution, and increased the administration's voice in the Student Executive Council, eviscerating any notions of student sovereignty within their own institutions. As anti-communism made its "long march" through America's universities, student activists' efforts towards liberal reform fell under the jackboot of fear, ignorance, and paranoia. The harder students pushed for reform, the more vociferous was the charge of communist influence in their activities. Conservatives generally opposed student reform efforts amidst the apocalyptic rhetoric of anti-communism, justifying any excesses within the larger context of the bi-polar ideological struggle between East and West. Without control of their own institutions and even the most basic constitutional rights, the administration doomed to failure student reform efforts.

The United States' prosecution of a war against fascism and tyranny while maintaining segregated armed forces and domestic racial concentration camps served as one of the fundamental paradoxes of World War II. Readily apparent at the time, both blacks and liberal whites hoped to exploit this paradox for the purposes of reform. The Pittsburgh Courier, a leading black newspaper, called for a "Double V Campaign" against fascism abroad and Jim Crow at home, while the interracial Committee (later Congress) On Racial Equality formed
to directly and actively confront segregation through non-violent means. Of particular value was the government's own rhetoric of "fighting a war for democracy" and Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, rhetoric that reformers readily employed to demand justice and equality at home as well as victory abroad.¹

Students at UCLA also perceived this paradox and they fused its absurdities onto the paradox of discriminatory behavior in a public institution, which many students identified before the war. At first, UCLA's students clumsily noted the paradox without making the connection to more localized issues. As early as August 1942, the campus publication *Haldaner* excoriated recent lynchings in Texas, stating it was the "best news for Hitler on America's fighting home front this month," and argued that such actions were "a disgrace to the nation, and [a] blow against national unity and the war effort." The article finished by stating, "all discrimination negates the aims of the war and jeopardizes victory."² As German defeat grew more likely, particularly after the Normandy landings, students increased their criticisms of discrimination. In May 1944, the *Daily Bruin* urged students not to tell racially oppressive jokes, arguing, "we have seen how close the snicker at a 'Sambo' joke is to the Master-race propaganda of the enemy."³ Still later that year, the editor demanded an end to


² *The Haldaner*, August 31, 1942, 1942 folder #1, Box #3, Student Activism Collection, 1927 - present (SAC), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.

segregation in the armed forces, noting it as the only instance of Jim Crow at the federal level.4

By 1944, students began noting discrimination closer to home. When William Ratcliffe donated blood at an on-campus American Red Cross Victory Drive in August, the Red Cross official separated and labeled his pint "Negro blood." A letter to the editor condemned this practice, suggesting the importance of the university and education in halting such thinking, "does this sound . . . familiar? It should: It has been suggested . . . as a remedy for the racial and political doctrines of the young post-war Germany."5 In using the rhetoric of the war effort to oppose discrimination at home, students grasped that failure to successfully fight discrimination had larger consequences for the meaning of the war. After many West Coast chapters of the American Legion excluded returning Nisei veterans, a Bruin editorial noted, "the war may be over on the European front, but the war against racial and religious prejudice is just beginning on the American front. If it isn't, we might just as well forget any expectations we have from the victory in World War II."6

The relationship between the sacrifices of the war and the end of discrimination had special meaning in the West, particularly in Los Angeles, due to the dramatic wartime increase in population, especially of non-whites, and the substantial rise in material wealth through federal contracts. Liberals hoped that Los Angeles' liminal status could allow for accommodation and compromise, creating a model for an urban, multi-racial capitalist


5 "False Barriers," Daily Bruin, August 9, 1944, p. 4; and "The Racial Myth," ibid., August 14, 1944, p. 4.

society. In effect, liberals saw post-war Los Angeles as a potential industrial "City Upon the
Hill." Student William J. Stout wrote that while much of the country seemed beset by racial
tension, "we in the West are being offered an opportunity the nature of which has never been
seen in any other section of the country." While the East remained "bound by custom and
fear," Stout continued, the great wartime influx, notably blacks, allowed the West an
opportunity to establish a more racially tolerant society, "we in the West are at a crossroads.
What steps we take will determine to a great extent our place in the nation for some years to
come. The nation's minorities look to the West, and for us there is but one course morally and
sensibly correct. We must not make a mistake." As UCLA students discovered in 1944,
however, that crossroads had perhaps already been passed.

During World War II, UCLA housed the Navy's V-12 training program, in essence
creating a federal installation on campus. Navy regulations specified weekly haircuts for all
sailors; however, Westwood barbers refused to cut blacks' hair, forcing both black students
and military personnel to travel to Santa Monica for such services. When two black sailors
faced disciplinary action for falling in after the assigned time due to the length of travel
because of the time to travel from Santa Monica, the Daily Bruin howled at such injustice.
Devoting three of the editorial page's five columns to the incident, the paper printed letters
representing both sides of the issue. Two days later, the paper felt compelled to note that the

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7 "Opportunity Knocks," Daily Bruin, July 12, 1944, p. 4.
episode brought such "voluminous" response that they reprinted some of the fifteen letters they received opposing discrimination, noting only one letter in support.8

Two weeks later, the Bruin devoted all five columns of the editorial page to the V-12 episode, noting that "such practices are grist for the propaganda mills of our fascist enemies." By making the connection between such discriminatory behavior and the war effort, students viewed discrimination as unpatriotic, "Americanism means democracy. Democracy demands equality."9 Supporting the struggle for equality meant affirming such nebulous terms as Americanism and democracy which, they had been told, provided the basis for America's involvement in the first place. By equating the demand for equality with Americanism, they did so with patriotism as well. With such principles at stake, students' previous efforts at reform seemed unequal to the task. They would have to go beyond mere letter-writing and petitioning. One student argued that they could only "defeat this undemocratic activity by giving their support and patronage to the barbers and the shops which do not practice discrimination."10 By exerting their consumer influence, the letter continued, students could "break down one of the bars to equality for the Negro population in Westwood and UCLA."11 Writing in the same issue, one student was even more direct, noting the "dependance" of

8 "The Issue: Segregation," Daily Bruin, August 21, 1944, p. 4; and "Assimilation, Not Segregation," ibid., August 23, 1944, p. 4. This episode also highlighted an interesting trend. Students in this period who supported liberal reform almost always signed their full name to their letters, while those who supported segregation and discrimination invariably did not, perhaps in deference to the popularity of liberal views on campus.


10 "Our Town . . . .," Daily Bruin, September 15, 1944, p. 4.

Westwood business upon UCLA students, arguing that "were we really to settle down and attack this problem," students could "force" the discriminatory barbers into line.\(^{12}\)

No longer content with mere letter-writing, students under the leadership of the leftist American Youth for Democracy (the successor to the American Student Union), but also including such groups as the Quaker Club, the University Religious Conference, and the \textit{Bruin}, circulated petitions stating that "the undersigned are not in favor of patronizing a barber shop which excludes Negro students."\(^{13}\) With letters continuing to roll in on the episode, the \textit{Bruin} editor, under the headline, "The Motion is Seconded," reprinted a letter from Xenia Chasman, "its really too bad that colored boys are considered Americans so long as they can shed blood for their country, and 'Negro' (with all the stigma attached) when it comes to getting a haircut." Chasman stated she would be "among the first to patronize, and ask my friends to patronize" the barbershops which were "sufficiently American to stand up for the rights of their fellow citizens."\(^{14}\)

Student representative Myron Land introduced a petition from the students containing more than 500 signatures demanding the Student Executive Council (SEC) take a definitive stand on the issue. However, the SEC opted instead for a fact-finding committee to report back later.\(^{15}\) Rather than offer a resolution demanding censure or at least criticism of the

\(^{12}\) "Our Town . . .," \textit{Daily Bruin}, September 15, 1944, p. 4.

\(^{13}\) Letter from Earl J. Miller to Robert Gordon Sproul, dated September 23, 1944, folder #105, Box #185, Records of the Chancellor's Office, Administrative Files, 1936-59 (CO), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.

\(^{14}\) "The Motion is Seconded," \textit{Daily Bruin}, September 18, 1944, p. 4.

\(^{15}\) "Council Takes Action," \textit{Daily Bruin}, September 22, 1944, p. 3. Since none of the petitions have survived in the historical record, it is unclear if the petition presented to the SEC for its action was the
barbershops' discriminatory practices, the committee returned a report that all but sided with the Westwood merchants. It offered no concrete recommendations or plan of action; and instead stated that as taxpayers, the opinions of the merchants contained validity, too. The report argued that it was not the students' place to force their values on the merchants and concluded by suggesting "getting to know" those who are discriminated against and "seeking the aid of all established agencies who are legitimately concerned with the problem." It expressly rejected the proposed direct action.16

Students at the time had no idea the role the administration played in bringing the issue to its denouement. Dean of Students Earl Miller viewed the entire episode in strictly ideological tones, singling out the AYD's role while ignoring involvement of the other campus groups, suggesting they had in fact fallen under the influence of the AYD, and belittling the students' actions by referring to the "so-called discrimination" and "so-called petitions." Cutting short his vacation to personally attend the initial SEC meeting on the matter, Miller "persuade[d] the Student Council to refrain from taking any action," after which, with no legal authority whatsoever, he told student leaders that no more petitions would be circulated on the matter and forbid the Bruin from commenting on the issue any further. Still unwilling to let the issue rest at that, Miller met with the fact-finding committee to highlight the AYD's leftist past, commenting smugly in a letter to University President Robert Gordon Sproul that, "that committee, I am sure, will not recommend any action on the part of the Student Council same as that circulated by the AYD, et al.

16 "Discrimination," Daily Bruin, October 6, 1944, p. 3.
which will be objectionable."\textsuperscript{17} Miller closed the issue by suggesting to Sproul that the University revoke the students' right of petition to avoid such "agitation" in the future.\textsuperscript{18} Sproul felt intrigued enough by the suggestion to consult the university's lawyer about the issue, but demurred upon legal advice.\textsuperscript{19} Miller was not the only member of the administration to keep Sproul informed on the issue. In a memo to Sproul from Charles H. Titus marked "CONFIDENTIAL," Titus wrote that Bill Ackerman, general manager of the Associated Students, was "working on the \textit{Bruin} leadership and hopes that they will turn their attention to constructive problems." However, the larger issue, according to Titus, was "either taking over the \textit{Bruin} as a laboratory for a Department of Journalism or abolishing the student paper."\textsuperscript{20} Faced with this administrative behind-the-scenes maneuvering as well as the censorship of the paper and the right of petition and the co-opting of the SEC committee, the students' efforts at direct action fell apart. Witnessing their swift defeat and aware that they lacked a dramatic tradition of off-campus activism, student activists realized that fighting discrimination would have to occur in a strictly student venue.

The student defeat over the barbershop issue did not quell students' concerns over discrimination. On the contrary, they began to see discrimination everywhere. On the

\textsuperscript{17} Letter from Earl J. Miller to Robert Gordon Sproul, dated September 23, 1944, folder #105, Box #185, CO.

\textsuperscript{18} Letter from Earl J. Miller to Robert Gordon Sproul dated October 10, 1944, folder #105, Box #185, CO.

\textsuperscript{19} Letter from Robert Gordon Sproul to Dean [Earl] Miller, October 19, 1944, folder #105, Box #185, CO. Also see William C. Ackerman, \textit{My Fifty Year Love-in at UCLA}, (Los Angeles: Fashion Press, 1968), p. 61, for the administration's brief version of the event.

\textsuperscript{20} Letter from Charles H. Titus to Robert Gordon Sproul, dated September 19, 1944, folder #105, Box #185, CO. For a discussion of the \textit{Bruin}'s role in the issue and the administration's attempts to co-opt the paper, see Garrigues, "Loud Bark and Curious Eyes."
occasion of the annual East-West Shrine all-star football game, played on the West Coast, the
Bruin noted that the game continued in to refuse to invite black players, specifically
mentioning the most notable snub in 1939 when the game refused to invite any of UCLA's
great all-black backfield consisting of Jackie Robinson, Kenny Washington, and Woody
Strode.\textsuperscript{21} Also during this period, the Bruin ran a weekly feature called "Commuter Listings,"
which advertised rides for off-campus students. In November, 1945, one student ran a listing
offering a ride, but specified "Gentiles only." Letters to the editor soon followed, demanding
that the paper strike such bigotry from university listings, arguing that such attitudes clearly
violated the democratic ideals upon which a public university stood.\textsuperscript{22} The paper soon
complied, forbidding such discriminatory listings. Similarly, a student questioned why the
university, which did not take race into account for admissions, requested that information
on applications. "Since UCLA is a state University, operated by the taxpayers of this state,
regardless of their race, it is our duty as students to see to it that a university we support and
attend does not propagate Hitlerian ideologies." By 1947, the university quietly discontinued
that practice as well.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} "Negro Stars left off East, West Rosters," \textit{Daily Bruin}, December 28, 1945, p. 4. The magnitude
of the Shriners's snub is best viewed in the accomplishments of the players involved. While Robinson's
post-UCLA career is well-known, Washington and Strode became the first black players to play in the
National Football League. Strode contends that the all-black backfield was college football's first.
Unfortunately, the Shrine game was not Washington's only exposure to Jim Crow in athletics. He was
also left off the First Team All-America selections in 1939, despite leading the nation in total offense and
playing 580 out of a possible 600 minutes for the Bruins that year. The omission was so egregious that
the Hearst reporter Davis J. Walsh argued that any All-American selections should begin with
Washington and that the ten others were superfluous anyway, see Woody Strode and Sam Young, \textit{Goal

\textsuperscript{22} "The Narrow Mind," \textit{Daily Bruin}, November 9, 1945, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{23} "Prejudice?," \textit{Daily Bruin}, March 9, 1945, p. 4. While this was a victory for the students, it was
a defeat for historians. From 1927 through 1947, a complete listing exists of Asian and black students,
However, no struggle proved as long, as complex, and as difficult as that of discrimination in university sponsored groups. The students collectively made up the Associated Students of the University of California, Los Angeles (ASUCLA), which sponsored all extracurricular clubs, professional societies, social fraternities and sororities, off-campus living groups, and athletics, and was headed by the SEC. The only form of coercion the ASUCLA enjoyed over these groups was that of "recognition." A recognized group enjoyed voting privileges in the ASUCLA, could fundraise at the annual Mardi Gras carnival, have access to university facilities such as meeting space and the *Daily Bruin*, and participate in such functions as Homecoming and Spring Sing. According to the association's historian, the ASUCLA traditionally practiced a policy of denying recognition to groups that practiced racial or religious discrimination, in accordance with the general University of California policy of non-discrimination.24 This did not apply to several groups, however. Social fraternities and sororities were automatically exempted because they were not university organizations, but rather local chapters of national organizations. The ASUCLA similarly exempted honorary professional Greek letter organizations, although they were delineated from the social Greek letter groups by making a distinction between social and scholarly organizations. Up until 1959, only one dormitory, Mira Hershey Hall, existed at UCLA. All other students who wished to live in the immediate neighborhood who did not live at the Greek houses lived in private dorms. These too, were exempted on the grounds including their names, providing detailed minority enrollment figures. However, this record disappears until 1968, when the Department of Education begins mandating such statistics.

that as private residences, they did not fall under the purview of the university, designated by
the ASUCLA as "living groups." Because of the numerous distinctions within the ASUCLA,
students had to attack discrimination in these groups separately. It would be 23 years before
the students could claim final victory.

All attempts at reform of these student groups had to come through the ASUCLA and
its political arm, the SEC. From 1919 through 1965, UCLA elected only three non-Greeks,
referred to on campus as non-orgs, as student body president. In addition, because of the
party-like organization and coercion of the Greek houses, they operated as a bloc vote,
making it almost impossible to defeat a Greek candidate in a campus-wide election before the
late 1960s.25 As such, the Greeks dominated campus politics. Their almost universal and
unified opposition to liberal reform made them the campus' ancien regime. An obvious feud
developed between the Greeks and the Bruin, since the latter not only served as a constant
critic of the former, but also served as the leading proponent for liberal reform. When the
Greeks met for their annual "Greek Meet" in 1946, the discussion centered around the paper
and its "obvious" Communist infiltration. The Greeks criticized the over-emphasis on
international events and issues not relating to campus happenings, suggesting fewer serious,
more humorous features.26 Liberal students, particularly non-orgs, flush with the rhetoric of

25 The Greek houses successfully marshalled votes by allowing candidates from their house to speak
at their weekly meetings, or if no candidate ran from a certain house, that house would allow other Greek
candidates to speak during the dinner hour. Greek houses also coerced members into voting by either
withholding dinner the night of the election for members who did not vote or simply fining members for
not voting.

equality and justice from the war and unaware of the administration's opposition to reform, attempted to move against the ancien regime in May 1944.

During and after the war, an ASUCLA subcommittee, the Council for Student Unity (CSU) served essentially as the campus committee for civil rights. In mid-1944, they issued a report noting the blatant racial and religious discrimination in many campus organizations. The CSU offered a proposal to the SEC which called for the refusal of recognition for all groups that practiced discrimination. However, the SEC, lead by the Greeks, by far the most discriminatory groups on campus, easily defeated the proposal. Instead, the SEC passed a resolution asking the living accommodations committee to "investigate charges of discrimination in living groups with a view to removing University recognition for living groups which follow the practice of not admitting students because of their race or religion."

The language of the second resolution is indicative of the Greeks' control of student politics. By specifying "living" groups, they excluded themselves due to the ASUCLA's classification of the Greeks as "social" groups. More importantly, the investigative committee recommended that non-recognition would serve no purpose at that time.27

Turned away in their direct assault on all campus discrimination and defeated in attacking the living groups, student activists turned to the one group that discriminated but was not directly represented in the SEC, professional honorary societies. In March, 1945, Jerry Pacht wrote an article in the Bruin entitled "Must There be Hate?" in which he coalesced the themes of patriotism, the war rhetoric, and the public education ideology to attack these groups.

While you read this . . . some of your brothers are spilling their blood on the East bank of the Rhine. They are there because they believe that Fascism and all its frills must be wiped out. . . . We, you and I, are standing by, quietly, passively, apathetically, while one of these frills flourishes here on our campus. Not down in the Village. Not over on sorority row. Not in the deep South, but here on the campus of the state University.

The letter mentioned three Greek letter professional societies, citing from their charters explicit racial and religious exclusionary clauses and argued the intolerance of such behavior at a state university, "democracy cannot pander to racist dogma and manage to survive." Pacht called on the SEC to either oversee revision of the groups' charters or revoke campus recognition. The Bruin editorial staff jumped on Pacht's suggestion to endorse non-recognition. The paper also made an effort to disassociate this issue from discrimination by other groups so as to avoid another Greek circling of the wagons, arguing in effect that discrimination in the honoraries was worse because they based their membership on scholarship. By limiting membership, they inherently limited the breadth of professional inquiry, thereby decreasing their own prestige. The paper, however, did see the incident as a "jumping off point" for future battles, arguing that "the beginning of the end of these clauses and practices might as well begin on this campus now that the students are aware of the problem. It is time for UCLA to step to the front as a leader of universities." While the editorial dealt only with discrimination in the honoraries, its reference to "the beginning of the end" had larger, more subtle implications.

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28 "Must There Be Hate?," Daily Bruin, March 19, 1945, p. 4.
29 "Required Reading," Daily Bruin, March 26, 1945, p. 4.
The SEC once again sent the issue to committee, which returned a report asking the "ASUCLA to call upon the students of the universities throughout the nation and upon all honorary and professional organizations to join them in order to eliminate all constitutional barriers based on race and religion." The report listed all 27 honorary societies on campus and each of their policies regarding discrimination, but stopped short of recommending disassociation.\(^3\) The defeat of this most recent effort to affect liberal reform on campus convinced students that the SEC could not, or would not, take decisive action on its own. Students interested in ending campus discrimination would have to get involved. In November 1945, students formed the Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) with the avowed purpose of ending campus discrimination in all its forms. At its first meeting, more than 70 students attended seeking membership.\(^3\) Speaking to the group, Dr. Clyde Johnson, Associate Dean of Undergraduates, placed UCLA "among the top fifteen or twenty universities in the country" regarding the lack of discrimination. Johnson singled out the University Religious Conference, the YWCA, and the International House as "something unique" in furthering cultural relations among students and reducing discrimination. Johnson also pointed out the relatively high standards at UCLA regarding anti-discrimination.\(^3\)

However, it is telling to note that the three organizations Johnson listed were all off-campus groups lacking recognition, and all caused the university some chagrin at one time or another exactly because of their commitment to anti-discrimination. In lauding these groups' efforts

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\(^3\) "Thank you and you," *Daily Bruin*, November 14, 1945, p. 4.

\(^3\) "Johnson Commends Lack of Racial Discrimination," *Daily Bruin*, November 29, 1945, p. 3.
towards achieving UCLA's "relatively high standards," Johnson unwittingly highlighted the lack of the university's own groups working towards such ends.

Within the academic year, the ADC succeeded in forcing the SEC's hand. In May 1946, Alpha Kappa Psi, a national business fraternity, applied for recognition with discriminatory clauses in their constitution. The SEC denied recognition. While the SEC felt justified in denying recognition to new groups, it hesitated to take action against established organizations, a distinction which the Bruin criticized, "where moral guidance has failed, moral pressure should be applied. It is time for a coherent statement of a new policy under which discriminatory honorary and professional societies are denied recognition."33 Even this victory, however appeared short-lived. One week later, the SEC reversed itself on the issue, stating it had no legal basis to deny recognition (which was untrue), resolving instead to "pursue an educational program designed to eliminate restrictive constitutional clauses under a resolution condemning, as poor policy and against the inclination of the ASCULA, racial and religious discrimination on the part of any campus group."34 The reliance on a legal argument and a compromise resolution that offered nothing concrete sounded eerily familiar to the barbershop episode two years before.

Both the administration and the SEC moved toward some reform on the issue by the following fall, however. Rather than place an outright ban on discriminatory honoraries, the SEC declared that all existing honoraries whose charters contained discriminatory clauses had


two years either to strike them or face non-recognition. By 1948, only two, Alpha Kappa Psi and Alpha Chi Sigma, persisted, and both applied for extensions on the grounds that their national organizations had not met in national conference during the two-year period. The Bruin, hoping once again to separate the honoraries from social and living groups, argued the inapplicability of applying a ruling against professional groups to either the living or social groups, "the reasons behind discrimination in social groups have a different, and far more complex basis." In a page one, above the fold story, the Bruin triumphantly announced the SEC's unanimous revocation of recognition for the two groups. When the music sorority, Mu Phi Epsilon, refused membership to Phyllis Holloway on account of her race in 1952, four members resigned in protest and the SEC withdrew recognition at its next meeting without discussion. The battle over discrimination in the honoraries had been won.

The issue of living and social groups proved much thornier, however, as both involved off-campus, non-university authority. The university originally resided downtown on Vermont Avenue, but moved to its present Westwood location in 1929. The Janss Development Corporation facilitated this move by selling the acreage to local municipalities at a steep discount, which in turn donated it to the state for the purpose of housing the university. The Janss brothers retained all the acreage surrounding the university parcel and intended to more than offset the discounted sale by establishing the commercial district of Westwood Village to the south and the high-end residential sections to the north and east of

campus, now known as Westwood Hills, Holmby Hills and Bel-Air. These residential lots all came with restrictive covenants attached to the deeds prohibiting the sale, rental or lease "to any person not of the white or Caucasian race nor shall the same ever be occupied by any such person, except as the servant or employee [of the owner]." Some deeds in Westwood also excluded Jews. The university successfully won from the Janss brothers a concessionary clause that exempted rentals to UCLA students, though in some areas, the restrictions ensured that most property owners who would agree to such restrictions in the original sale were unlikely to rent to non-whites, as well as Jews. These restrictions also precluded the purchase of homes by groups for the exclusive use of non-whites such as ethnic or racial fraternities and sororities. The end result was that UCLA's non-white students had limited access to nearby housing, and most had to travel from communities such as Culver City or Santa Monica, or ones even farther from campus.

Compounding the problem, UCLA operated only one dormitory until 1959, Mira Hershey Hall, whose policy stated, "there shall be no racial discrimination in choosing

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39 From the Official Records of Los Angeles County, found in Buildings and Landscaping, 1927-1928, folder, Box #26, Records of the Chancellor's Office, Subject Files of Ernest Carroll Moore, 1917-36 (ECM), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles. See notation dated 3/16/28 attached to deed for marginal comments of Regent Edward A. Dickson on the compromise over rentals.

residents.41 Anecdotal evidence abounds however, that de facto segregation existed there as well. When Mabel Ota, a Japanese-American, attempted to check in at Mira Hershey after being told she had secured a room in the late 1930s, the white desk clerk informed her that the dorm was full. Blacks had similar experiences at Mira Hershey as the dorm remained all-white at least into the early 1950s.42 Students responded to these problems by founding their own housing and social groups. Japanese-American women formed Chi Alpha Delta in 1938, the nation's first Asian-American sorority; Robinson Hall, founded in 1944, and Stevens House, founded in 1948, served as multi-racial, interfaith co-operative housing for men and women, respectively, with the first group of residents at Stevens' House consisting of three Asians, three blacks, and six whites, most of whom were Jewish; and the Helen Mathewson Club, founded in 1923 on the Vermont Avenue campus for women working their way through school, welcomed all backgrounds and ethnicities in their Westwood home.43 These groups enjoyed only mixed results in their efforts, however, as the University "regretted that it could do nothing" to help the Chis get around the restrictive covenants in Westwood and

41 "Proposed Policy for Student Housing Association," dated June 24, 1946, from Clarence A. Dykstra, folder #170, Box #227, CO.

42 Lim, "Girls Just Wanna Have Fun," pp. 33-34. Yearbook photos suggest that Mira Hershey Hall was not integrated until 1951 when Diane Fertig and Betty Gee gave Hershey its first black and Asian residents, see Southern Campus 1951, pp. 434-435. While Hershey managed to provide lodging for at least a handful of Asian residents throughout this period, no black students appeared after 1953 until 1957 when Odessa Williams re-integrated Hershey, see Southern Campus 1957, pp. 460-461.

Stevens House initially had to be owned by the University Religious Conference, then rented to members so as to get around the covenants.44

Students enjoyed only two other options with regards to off-campus housing, private dorms or the Greek system. This latter option was hardly an option at all for some students, however. The cost was prohibitive, especially for women, with the initial selection process, known as Rush, requiring a separate, frequently new, dress for each of Rush's five evenings. More importantly, almost every house at UCLA, and nationwide for that matter, maintained restrictive membership clauses which excluded non-whites, and in many instances, non-Protestants as well. Greek discrimination proved so entrenched that when Beta Sigma Tau colonized at UCLA in the fall of 1949 across class and racial lines, the Daily Bruin termed it "violently unorthodox."45 Even within the Greek community, members acknowledged the discriminatory practices. One fraternity man wrote in 1946 that his house's discriminatory clauses stood in opposition to both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, "for this, they may gently be called unprincipled and un-American." He went on to note, however, that this behavior also "violated" the sacrifices and achievement of World War II,

If Jews, negroes and gentiles could fight together and die together, sometimes in each others arms, why shouldn't they enter the houses along Hilgard and Gayley together? We have come to UCLA supposedly to gain a liberal education, that is, free ourselves from ignorance, prejudice and bad habits. . . . But how can we if we uphold


45 "Inter-Racial House May Join Greeks," Daily Bruin, October 12, 1949, p. 3.
the injustice of the fraternal and sororal [sic] scheme of discrimination and segregation?46

The bulk of off-campus housing, especially for women, fell to private home-owners. These private home-owners accepted the dual responsibility of providing housing and upholding the prevailing moral ethos with regards to young women living away from their parents. This included strict curfews, "parlor rules" (regulating physical contact with gentlemen callers), and generally "observing the moral and social codes usually required of women students attending a university," while "providing an atmosphere of refinement and good taste."47 The strictness of these regulations as well as the double standard for men and women, especially curfew, is evidenced by a December 1946 reminder in the Bruin. After UCLA accepted its first Rose Bowl bid, the Dean of Women reminded ladies that regular curfew hours would be in effect and lockouts enforced should they attempt to stand in line all night for Rose Bowl tickets. The Dean suggested men should acquire the tickets, vaguely noting the impropriety of that sort of behavior by females.48 This sense of proprietary guardianship of women included a concern for interracial or interfaith living arrangements. More than one housemother commented that "parental objections were mainly responsible" for restrictive clauses in off-campus dorms. For some, they were merely the personal views of the proprietor/housemother. Bannister Hall's housemother stated bluntly "that minority groups should be segregated" and that Bannister's policy would remain unchanged even if the


47 Memorandum from Paul C. Hannum to Dean Jesse Rhulman, dated June 23, 1949, with report attached, folder #170, Box #240, CO.

Supreme Court ruled restrictive clauses unconstitutional. The most notorious, however, was Neva McCoy, owner and housemother of Neva Hall and late of Alabama, who vowed that "over my dead body would any colored girls come in."

After a survey by the off-campus Coordinating Council to End Discrimination (CCED) noted the number of these discriminatory off-campus dorms, Harriette Goodman argued that it was "a sad commentary on American democracy" when "Negro, Mexican, Japanese, and other minority students cannot obtain housing. . . ." Goodman urged the ASUCLA to ensure "liberty and justice" for all students by acting against such practices, "we can only guarantee equality by demanding the complete elimination of restrictive covenants in their legal and extra-legal form. And such elimination must be enforced to be worth anything." Another student wrote to the paper objecting to the discrimination at Mira Hershey, asking, "why not start at home to eliminate racial and religious prejudices?" After the AYD wrote a series of articles in the Bruins about the CCED survey, the university did investigate the discriminatory situation in off-campus dorms and issued their findings in a June 1949 report by Associate Dean of Students Jesse Rhulman. The report concluded that "private individuals owning and operating their own homes have a perfect legal right to

49 "The Housing Story," Daily Bruin, December 12, 1947, p. 3.

50 "Memories of a Haven Live on at UCLA," Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1994, Section B, page 1; McCoy made such contentions freely and often, including to the author's mother in the early 1950s.


52 "Pitch In," Daily Bruin, December 4, 1947, p. 2. The University never publicly admitted nor responded to allegations of discrimination at Mira Hershey.

choose for residence any applicant they wish." Rhulman contended that as such, the university did not have the "right to dictate to them as to who shall live in their homes." Rhulman's argument ignored the rights of the students and the university's responsibility to them. Few, if any, students suggested that the university had the right to dictate to homeowners who could live in their homes. Rather, students contended that the university had an obligation to refuse the recognition, which came in the form of a list maintained by the University of available housing, which so many interpreted as tacit approval of the discriminatory practices. Perhaps the most telling part of Rhulman's report was her criticism not of the homeowners, but of the students who raised the issue in the first place, charging that they "served only to antagonize the householders concerned and . . . did not serve the best interests of the minority groups." Further, she claimed "it is possible that an attempt has been made to create a situation for which no problem has existed." Although she did not mention the AYD by name or engage in the explicit red-baiting that accompanied correspondence from other members of the administration, Rhulman clearly implied that the AYD only latched on to the issue for exploitive purposes.

The successor to the pre-war American Student Union, the American Youth for Democracy faced constant criticism for both its leftist past and present. The AYD never succeeded in gaining recognition, of which the administration made sure, usually making the argument that its existence violated Rule 17 as a partisan political organization, even though the group claimed no affiliation with any political or ideological organization. The AYD also

54 Memorandum from Paul Hannum to Dean Jesse Rhulman dated June 23, 1949, with report attached, folder #170, Box #240, CO.
fought a running battle in the war of public opinion, constantly hoping to shift the focus of any debate from the organization's leftist background to the issue at hand. When the AYD chose to make the housing survey an issue, this battle began anew.

Immediately after the AYD aligned itself with the CCED survey, student Paul Garrett wrote to the Bruin, completely ignoring the issue of racial discrimination and instead harping on ideology. "It is much easier to find faults in an active system of government than in a theoretical system of government," Garrett wrote, suggesting that the AYD "put more emphasis on improving our present form of government rather than destroying faith in it."55 The AYD attempted to bring the discussion back to the issue at hand, while noting the interrelationship between excluding students on account of race and on account of political ideology. "Just as the principle is not, do you want racial minorities to live near the campus, but rather do you believe they should have the right to live here, so the question is not, do you agree with the AYD on all points, but rather do you think they should have the right to be recognized?"56 Conservatives in the SEC did not hesitate in treating the AYD with contempt, no more so than in April 1948 when the SEC rejected the students' nomination of Jerry O'Connor as UCLA's delegate to the National Student Association "solely upon the basis of [his] membership in the American Youth for Democracy."57 Indeed, some twenty years later,  

57 "AYD Makes a Statement," Daily Bruin, April 21, 1948, p. 4. The greatest of ironies regarding the NSA is that while conservatives at UCLA and elsewhere charged that the group was obviously a communist front, and that is in part why O'Connor was rejected, it was actually a front for the Central Intelligence Agency, a fact revealed by the leftist magazine, Ramparts in 1967. See William Chafe, Never Stop Running: Allard Lowenstein and the Struggle to Save American Liberalism, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 86-110.
the then-student body president, Bob Jaffie, still reveled in keeping the AYD unrecognized by noting "we were successful . . . in thwarting their efforts to get a toehold on the campus."58

Jaffie's use of the "toehold" metaphor is indicative of how the administration and conservative students viewed the AYD's efforts for liberal reform, arguing that the group merely sought the smallest justification for creating an issue upon which they would obviously build a mass communist insurgency. Dean of Students Milton E. Hahn, Earl Miller's successor, treated all attempts at reform as a communist conspiracy when he stated that "there has been constant pressure for years to get questionable organizations into the University family so that they can damage UCLA from the inside." Hahn described the actions and goals of these groups in such apocalyptic terms as "constant attack" and "chaos."59 When the SEC finally moved against the discriminatory honoraries in 1948, student Bob Lambert implied that the SEC should not be moving against those groups, but rather the CCED and the AYD, which "should be closely scrutinized as to its actions and membership." Lambert argued that these group's real agenda included "student antagonism," not "unity," and that "a study to determine the mutual membership affiliations of the 'coordinators' and [the AYD] should prove quite interesting." He concluded that the time had come "to neutralize the antagonistic and coercive tactics used by the 'coordinators.'"60

Unable to shake the criticism, the AYD frequently went on the attack to point out the hypocrisy of not only their persecution, but also the unwillingness to affect liberal reform

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58 Ackerman, *Love-in*, p. 63.


while cloaked in patriotic rhetoric. The group contended that "the constant red-baiting" came not only to fight Communism, but also to oppose the issues that the AYD fought for, "red smearing is a very handy weapon, for how else could those 100 per cent Americans dare to talk against racial equality, freedom of expression, low-cost housing, peace?" These leftist groups knew exactly where to lay the blame for the vehement on-campus red-baiting, charging that the administration had stymied the CSU's anti-discriminatory efforts "every step of the way" and that that group's failures lay at the feet of the administration, "every attempt will be made to split the student body over the time-worn 'red' issue, the sooner we learn that allowing ourselves to be taken in will result in diverting us and preventing the cooperation necessary to win this fight, the better."62

The Bruin made light of the growing campus obsession with communism when it suggested in an editorial cartoon that the issue consumed even the more mundane tasks, such as picking a chair for the annual Tropicana dance (see illustration 2.1). This perceived threat of communism, first visible before the war and clearly evident in Earl Miller's actions and correspondence during the barbershop protests, served as the blanket antidote to student


activism throughout this period. Both the barbershop and housing survey incidents indicate that the administration, as well as others, felt that leftist involvement automatically meant no real problem existed, other than the existence of the leftist groups in the first place. After investigations revealed that UCLA alumna Iva Toguri served as the Japanese propagandist "Tokyo Rose" during World War II, one critical student wrote anonymously to the Bruin suggesting she join the editorial staff to "lend an air of authenticity to the Bruin's pro-goose step, pro-collectivist, pro-absolute-government-ownership-of-souls slant."63 After several students joined in a picket line during the 1945 strike at Warner Brothers Studios, the Regents of the University called for the dismissal of faculty and students who identified themselves as affiliated with the University when engaged in such activity. The Regents called for a special investigation into "un-American activity" on campus, and the state un-American Activities Committee obliged.64 No allegation seemed as far-fetched, or as hard to dispel as the one made by senior Robert S. Jordan, who complained of the difficulty in getting a job in Los Angeles with a UCLA degree. Jordan wrote that many Los Angeles businesses would not hire UCLA graduates at all while some would do so only after "intensive investigation"


64 "Regents consider disloyalty," Daily Bruin, December 17, 1945, p. 1. The California State Senate Committee for Un-American Activities held hearings at UCLA three times in this period, the first in 1945, during which time they subpoenaed the student body president, Gene Lee, the second in 1953 and the last in 1956, see Garrigues, "Loud Bark and Curious Eyes," pp. 106-119 and Ackerman, Love-in, p. 64. Also, in 1952, a representative from each UC campus served as a point of contact for the Committee to "report of any suspected subversive activities on University campuses," see "Sold Down the River," Daily Bruin, March 31, 1952, p. 4.
showing that they lacked the Communist influence that their UCLA credential supposedly implied.65

The media continued to play a role in the public's perception of Communist influence at UCLA. Never one to pass up a red-baiting opportunity, the *Los Angeles Times* continued propagating the "Little Red Schoolhouse Myth" when it ran an eight column headline alleging that UCLA was "one of Communism's prime post-war education targets." The article alleged a vast, nationwide conspiracy in which students trained at New York University journeyed west for infiltration at UCLA.66 By far the most famous incident, however came with the *Saturday Evening Post's* 1950 cover story, "U.C.L.A.'s Red Cell: A Case History of Campus Communism." As with all of the allegations regarding UCLA at this time, the article offered no substantive proof of Communist influence other than one *Daily Bruin* staffer, Helen Edelman, who in fact edited the social page, and instead rehashed old allegations dating back to the 1930s and the "UCLA 5" episode.67

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65 "Indictment of Irresponsibility," *Daily Bruin*, September 28, 1950, p. 2. The myth of hiring difficulties first appeared in the late 1930s, after the "UCLA 5" incident, and continued on into the 1950s. In a 1955 *Daily Bruin* poll which asked whether current students would recommend UCLA to incoming freshmen, the response was overwhelmingly positive and no mention was made of UCLA's Communist reputation negatively affecting job hunting, see ibid., May 19, 1955. The Chancellor's Office also received letters throughout this period from concerned citizens and alumni to the effect that UCLA's "red" reputation was costing the institution students. This allegation is even more unfounded than the one about hiring graduates, as the undergraduate population increased steadily every year throughout this period, with the exception of the war years, and the school's reputation as a first tier research institution dates to this time.


Aware that their leftist background turned away many students, groups like the Labor Youth League and the AYD moved away from their traditional class rhetoric and embraced issues such as racial discrimination. The AYD organized a campaign against discrimination in the city's Bimini Baths and played a key role in opposing the revival of the Southern California Ku Klux Klan.\textsuperscript{6}\textsuperscript{4} These groups also sought to appeal to UCLA students' more traditional college activities while still offering their ideological message. The Students for Wallace newsletter offered UCLA football and basketball scores as well as general discussion of Bruin games.\textsuperscript{6}\textsuperscript{9} The Labor Youth League distributed programs for UCLA's football game with Santa Clara in October 1949 featuring political messages between the two team rosters, while the opposite page offered the starting lineups with the question, "Which Team Are You For? The team of Big Business that has broken every rule of fair play, whose tactics are not running the single wing or T-formation, but the tactic of running roughshod over the rights of American people?"\textsuperscript{7}\textsuperscript{0}

Students seeking liberal reform at UCLA succeeded in bringing the issue to the forefront of campus politics and enjoyed limited success in forcing non-recognition of discriminatory honorary societies. They bogged down, however, when they faced heavy-handed administrative action and external red-baiting that accompanied their activities when brought into alliance with leftist groups like the AYD. While this red-baiting did not deter those committed to reform, it did effect moderates, mostly white and affluent, unsure of the

\textsuperscript{6}\textsuperscript{4} "American Youth for Democracy, 1940s," Box #3, Organizational Files, Box #3, Southern California Library for Social Studies and Research, Los Angeles.  
\textsuperscript{6}\textsuperscript{9} "Student Reports," 1947 folder, Box #5, SAC.  
\textsuperscript{7}\textsuperscript{0} "UCLA vs. Santa Clara," 1949 folder #1, Box #6, "1949, SAC."
extent of leftist involvement and unwilling to completely repudiate the *ancien régime*. In the 1947-48 campus-wide elections, six candidates, out of several dozen, referenced some commitment to non-discrimination in their election platforms, whereas none had done so in the past. Only one, however, succeeded in winning election and the Greeks captured every elective office that year.71

Campus liberal politics received a shot in the arm though, in 1949, when students elected Sherrill Luke, UCLA's first black student body president. That year, all four candidates for president expressly condemned discrimination and nine of the twelve candidates for Representative at Large opposed it in their platforms.72 In previous years, only liberal and leftist candidates addressed discrimination within the venue of campus politics. Luke's candidacy and subsequent election however, forced others to deal with the issue. As a black student, his natural concern for such issues placed him above the usual anti-leftist rhetoric, allowing white moderates to oppose campus discrimination and avoid criticism from the moderate right. In addition, Luke's visibility as a black man and his willingness to address these issues forced other candidates to the left, in hopes of avoiding a virtual referendum on campus discrimination. It is significant in examining both the growth of anti-discriminatory feeling and the beginnings, albeit slight, of the erosion of the *ancien régime*, that many conservative student politicos tacitly acknowledged they could not win such a referendum.

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If Luke's administration sought to attack discrimination, he did not need to look too far for a problem. The 1949 Homecoming parade, featuring the theme "Southern Comfort," included several floats with offensive racial stereotypes, most notably the "southern mammy," all entered by Greek houses. Campus conservatives, particularly the Greeks, seemed incredulous that someone could take offense at something so "harmless as 'southern hospitality.'" The Phi Gamma Deltas went so far as to defend the image of the "nigger mammy," and argued "to use the Southern mammy personifies many of the fine qualities of the Negro race." Both the Young Progressives, a leftist group, and the CSU offered sharp criticism in both the pages of the Bruin and SEC meetings. One letter to the editor harkened back to the war rhetoric by comparing such harmful imagery to the Nazi stereotype of the inassimilable, money-grubbing Jew. The CSU requested that the SEC allow them to sit on future float committees to act as an arbiter of good taste; the SEC, however defeated that motion, passing instead a resolution officially apologizing for the floats, calling them "unconscious but ill-advised." While the issue passed without any further controversy, it is indicative of the ancien regime's inability, or unwillingness, to see a changing social order. In addition, the

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73 "Charges are Made and Answered," Daily Bruin, November 8, 1949, p. 2; and "Those Debatable Floats," ibid., November 15, 1949, p. 4.


SEC took a significant step in apologizing on behalf of the entire student body over a social issue, marking a willingness, and establishing a precedent, to expand their authority.

The winter and spring quarters in 1950 brought renewed activism over the issue of discrimination. The student council at the University of Michigan vowed that it would cease campus recognition of discriminatory living groups, a policy many university councils, including UCLA's, subsequently designated as the "Michigan Plan." Debate over the Michigan Plan centered around whether the SEC had the authority to revoke recognition from groups that had not broken university rules. Unable to decide the question and fearful of losing the momentum the Michigan Plan provided, student activists compromised. The SEC passed the Michigan Plan, but amended it such that it denied recognition only to future discriminatory groups, ignoring those already recognized. In seeking passage, Luke gave up his gavel to address the council, the only time he did so during his tenure, asking, "how can a person say he is opposed to discrimination, and then in the same breath say he is opposed to such a slight change as the Michigan Plan? That to me is hypocritical." The five dissenting votes all came from the Greek community. The Pan-Hellenic Council, campus governing body of sororities, opposed the Michigan Plan, among other reasons, because they "could not assume that the plan would not be made retroactive." The only abstention came from Dean of Students Milton Hahn, who had made a point of showing up to the meeting only to publicly abstain, a chilling reminder of the administration's unwillingness to embrace even the most basic elements of activist reform.77

77 "Michigan Plan Passes Council," Daily Bruin, May 26, 1950, p. 1. The Bruin reported Luke's quote differently in different issues. In the March 2 issue, they quoted him as saying, "How can a person say he is opposed to discrimination, and talk of special privileges and special rights? That to me is
Seizing upon the visibility of Luke's administration in fighting discrimination and the momentum of efforts such as the Michigan Plan, students formed a coalition of on- and off-campus groups to fight discrimination, the Council for Campus Equality. The CCE operated much like the on-campus CSU, but as an off-campus organization, avoided "the red tape of ... ASUCLA organizations." The group enjoyed immediate support from religious organizations such as Hillel, political groups such as the Young Democrats, Young Progressives, and the Labor Youth League, and ethnic and racial organizations such as the Nisei Bruin Club and the NAACP. The Bruin, however, noted with concern the apparent recalcitrance of conservative groups to take part, stating that without such balance, "there is a danger that the CCE will fall under the label of 'left-wing' or 'Red Front;'" in that event, "the fault would lie with those groups that wouldn't help when they had the chance."78 When expediency forced student activists to concede defeat on the issue of revocation, they chose to attack the off-campus living groups in another way. While the privilege of recognition existed at the discretion of the ASUCLA, the university maintained a list of approved housing which parents and students could consult when seeking living arrangements. Up to that point, the University's criteria dealt only with "sanitary conditions or evidence of immoral surroundings," according to Dean Hahn.79 Student activists now attempted to force the university to strike discriminatory dorms from the listings while ignoring, for the moment, the question of recognition. Brought before the SEC by the CCE, the motion asked that the

hypocritical."


university drop from its list of approved housing any living groups that discriminated. The CCE motion existed on the basis of the recent court case *Shelley v. Kraemer* and the Fourteenth Amendment, which precluded the state from "discriminating against its citizens." The SEC initially demurred, passing the issue to the CSU for a committee report, but eventually passed the resolution unanimously, calling on the University's Living Accommodations Committee to drop from the listing any off-campus housing engaged in discrimination. In the wake of this success, the CSU also called for a removal of discriminatory job listings in the university-maintained Bureau of Occupations, known as the BurOc, long a target of the CSU. Chairman Bob Zakon argued, "since jobs and housing are basic needs of all students, especially minority students, the university can live up to the democratic principles on which it was founded only by removing discrimination" in the BurOc and living groups.

The struggle against Jim Crow discrimination at UCLA occurred in an overwhelmingly white environment. While figures do not exist giving minority enrollments

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80 "Open Doors and Recognition," *Daily Bruin*, March 29, 1950, p. 5. The sophisticated legal argument used by the students came courtesy of local NAACP lawyer Loren Miller, active in almost all of Los Angeles' important civil rights battles and particularly present on UCLA's campus throughout this period.

81 "SEC Tables Housing Resolution," *Daily Bruin*, March 30, 1950, p. 1; and "SEC Passes CSU Proposal," ibid., April 6, 1950, p. 1. The Living Accommodations Committee themselves deferred on the issue to President Robert Gordon Sproul, who wrote, "The University policy has been to suggest that there be no discrimination with regard to race, color or creed in the selection of student tenants . . . The policy shall continue *ex post facto* in force so far as present accommodations are concerned. However, no new listing . . . will be accepted if there is to be discrimination with regards to race, creed or color in the selection of residents." See memo from Robert Gordon Sproul to Living Accommodations Committee, dated October 24, 1950, folder #31, Box #243, CO. Student activists proceeded to ridicule the so-called "*ex post facto* ruling" by arguing that it stood logic on its head. See "Stand on Your Head," 1950 folder, Box #6, SAC.

after 1947, in that year, only 157 black students attended UCLA, out of a general student population of 11,202. Because so much of campus activism in this period consisted of letter writing, petitioning, and electoral pressure on the SEC, it is unclear what percentage of black students took part in campus activism. It is clear however, that white liberals recognized that the journey toward a fluid, interracial campus and society had to account for the black experience. During World War II and immediately after, the *Daily Bruin* ran a weekly column entitled "The Minority Report," which discussed issues pertaining to blacks, Jews, and Asians. While the overwhelming majority of the features dealt with some aspect of discrimination, they also discussed music, art and history. One white student noted in 1949 that a positive step towards racial harmony "would be to offer a course on Negro history," however, the student also noted that no black faculty taught at UCLA nor did anyone qualified to teach such a course. Beginning in 1950, UCLA celebrated "Negro History Week" to partially address that need, but still lacked any minority faculty.

When the Council for Campus Equality formed that year, it identified a "5-Point Program," one of which was "employment of faculty members from minority groups." The CCE's program went on to note that "in many University courses which should discuss the contributions of minority groups in American history, such facts have been minimized to the point of seeming insignificant, whereas in reality minority groups have played important and

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84 The Minority Report first appeared in late 1943, was most active in 1944 and apparently ceased to run by early 1946. For a sample, see May 5, 1944.
86 "Let's Celebrate Negro History Week," 1950 folder, Box #6, SAC.
influential parts in US history." The report offered the example of the black contribution to Reconstruction and closed by arguing that such oversight could be alleviated by "instituting special courses dealing with these subjects, to be included in the required curricula, and to have a treatment of such subjects included in courses being offered at present." These allowances that blacks and other minorities were somehow excluded not only from existing campus institutions but the existing curricula as well, marked an important realization for this generation of student activists. Few white liberals would have disagreed with historian Kenneth Stampp's oft-quoted phrase that "negroes are, after all, only white men with black skins," and as such felt that making available existing campus institutions were sufficient to achieve an equalitarian society. Only later would minorities deem these existing institutions insufficient and call for their own.

True liberal reform in this period remained a distant activity for many student activists. The relatively limited number of minority students on campus and the even smaller number of opportunities for integrated activities meant that white liberals did not witness on a regular basis the types of discrimination so many of them opposed, thereby limiting the lengths to which they actively sought change. When student Elliot Rose wrote a letter to the Bruin in 1948 stating that discrimination was a fact of life and people should be able to choose with

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whom they wished to live and socialize, four solid days of letters and editorials ensued, rebuking him at every turn. 89 One student tellingly responded,

those who have answered Mr. Rose should either put forward some workable solutions to our race problem or forget that we have any such animal. So far they have offered us nothing but their own selfish views . . .

Those who make up the majority group should learn to practice what they preach. How many live up to their flowery idealism? 90

In 1949, the CSU pointed out this paradox when it noted "there has never been a consistent effort on campus for the rights of minority students. The student body has left the job to off-campus groups who themselves have not conducted a consistent campaign against racial discrimination." The CSU called on students to make a direct contribution to ending discrimination by making a "special attempt to integrate minority students into their groups. A need for these special attempts is necessary due to discriminatory conditions which minority students meet both on and off campus." 91

The problem of encouraging minority students to take part in overwhelmingly white-dominated campus institutions required white students to make minorities feel welcome. Student Eugene Blank clarified this by stating, "this does not mean that an attitude of condescending patronage or 'bending over backwards' should be assumed by people active in student affairs, but rather a realization that a special problem exists in this regard which

89 "Grins and Growls," Daily Bruin, March 3, 1948, p. 5. The response to the Rose letter proved so voluminous that the editor finally cut off debate after more than a week and at least thirty five published letters to the editor, see ibid., March 8, 1948.

90 "Accentuate the Positive," Daily Bruin, March 5, 1948, p. 6.

requires special and extra effort." A member of the CCED similarly placed the onus for reform upon individuals, not groups, by arguing, "those liberal students who live in houses with restricted admittance policies have responsibilities" to work directly for an end to such practices.

With this in mind, it is not surprising that large scale student activism still lacked any direct action on issues, distant or local. Leftist groups such as the AYD, the Young Progressives, and the Student Communist Club attempted in March 1948 to bring before the students the case of Rosa Lee Ingram. A Georgia jury had sentenced Ms. Ingram and her two teenage sons to the electric chair after killing a white man in self-defense. Referring to the earlier death of a puppy by the Beta Theta Pi fraternity, one student noted that while the puppy's death caused great consternation on campus, the situation in Georgia appeared without comment, "how many of you who became incensed over the puppy incident will take the time and a stamp to write to the governor of Georgia, the President of the United States and the attorney general demanding that justice and not 'white supremacy' reign in Georgia and the South?" When UCLA celebrated Bill of Rights Week in 1950, one student noted the absence of any student protest over the new restricted housing development in nearby Lakewood or the continued restrictions in Westwood, charging students to "do something

94 "Southern 'Justice,'" and "'Legal' Murder!," 1948 folder #1, Box #5, SAC.
95 "Civil Liberties, Southern Style," Daily Bruin, March 26, 1948, p. 4.
every day of the year whenever the Bill of Rights is denied to any group of people." At an on-campus CSU-sponsored forum on discrimination in March 1949, student speakers offered various courses of action, including more inter-racial housing, minority hiring, and an end to discriminatory listings in the BurOc. Students made no mention, however, of picketing or boycotting Westwood businesses that discriminated, or personally lobbying the administration for an end to BurOc discrimination, or any other type of direct action. Commenting on this hesitance, student Cy Skolnick noted that terms such as "democracy," "discrimination," and "prejudice" required vigilance, "We must act," Skolnick wrote, "as long as we practice verbiage, it shows that we do not believe strongly enough. Talking means very little to people who have been oppressed for centuries. It is easy to talk. Thinking and believing must lead to action." 

The momentum brought to campus activism by Sherrill Luke and his administration marked one of the high points during this period for liberal reform. Students succeeded in banning discriminatory listings from the BurOc before Luke's term expired and the following term made race and religion optional pieces of information on the all-campus social register. Student activists forced upon the campus an open discussion of race and discrimination, successfully identifying their cause with patriotism, the sacrifices of the war, and concepts of justice and democracy. However, the issue of living group recognition proved beyond their

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98 "We Must Act," Daily Bruin, April 8, 1949, p. 2.
grasp and discrimination in the Greek system not even up for serious discussion. The passing of Luke's administration brought a lull in liberal reform in the area of anti-discrimination activism. It is not coincidental that this occurred just as the rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy and his tactics made many Americans even more wary of any agitation for reform. For moderate students uncommitted to either liberal reform or the status quo, the 1950s brought unparalleled campus apathy. In the spring of 1953, a campus referendum on a new student constitution brought only 1,228 students to the polls, on a campus of just under 13,400.100

For student activists, the period witnessed a shift from fighting discrimination to fighting for free speech. This shift did not mark a change in tactics or emphasis. Rather it marked a struggle for the right of activism at all. Students at all branches of the University of California faced the restrictions of the University's original 1886 charge from the legislature directing the University to remain independent of sectarian and political influence. For the most part, administrative authority at UCLA indiscriminately utilized this restriction on free speech and association before the 1930s. Provost Ernest Carroll Moore frequently censored campus publications and refused to allow campus speakers who had even the slightest taint of religion or politics.101 However, as students devoted themselves to the pre-war peace movement under the direction of leftist organizations, Moore and UC President Robert Gordon Sproul increasingly used restrictions of free speech and association against the left.


101 Moore's favorite target for censure was the campus humor magazine Hells Bells, which he derided by stating, "all campus humor magazines, except the Harvard Lampoon, are a disgrace to the colleges they represent, see Garrigues, "Loud bark and Curious Eyes," p. 36. Moore also refused to allow most clergy to speak on campus, even if their presentation had nothing to do with religion. This refusal to allow most speakers on campus made the off-campus University Religious Conference the unofficial speakers bureau.
When leftist groups increasingly took the lead in post-war student activism, the administration used Rule 17 as a club with which to suppress their efforts. The extent to which the University sought to impose Rule 17 knew no limits. Political speakers frequently spoke from the back of trucks parked on Hilgard Avenue, technically not on University property, but backed up such that students who gathered to hear the speech stood on University property. When presidential candidate Henry Wallace spoke from a truck in April 1948, the University brought disciplinary action against more than a dozen students who were identified by administration officials gathered to observe the event. The sanction of off-campus activity decreased even more when the University asked the city to begin enforcing an anti-leafletting restriction at the intersection of Le Conte Avenue and Westwood Boulevard, just off-campus. In the past, student groups as varied as the Young Republicans and the Student Communist Club used this intersection to hand out leaflets to carloads of students stopped at the traffic light before entering campus; however, when a group called the Committee for More Democratic Student Government, which explicitly called for a removal of free speech restrictions, attempted to continue this tradition, Los Angeles Police arrested them at the behest of the University. As the leftist clamor for greater access to speech and association increased, the administration only heightened its oppressive behavior. On the other side of campus from the Le Conte and Westwood intersection stood the campus bus stop, also on city property, and also a traditional spot for student leafletting. In early 1948, university police arrested two students, Shifra Meyerowitz and Libby Yashon, for

103 "Accused Students plead 'not guilty,'" Daily Bruin, April 7, 1947, p. 7.
distributing Young Progressive literature at the bus stop and the University suspended them. Only after the girls obtained legal counsel did the school reinstate them. In an effort to curtail future bus stop activity, however, Dean Jesse Rhulman concurred with the University's lawyer by "suggest[ing] that no public announcement should be made of a change of policy regarding the handbill distribution and that the two cases be dismissed with a stern warning."\(^\text{104}\)

After Sproul issued new directives in 1946 reiterating the traditional restrictions on speech and association, students at UCLA quickly questioned the sagacity of such restrictions in a democracy. One column in the *Bruin* argued, "if you believe that the fool and the fascist ought to be allowed freedom of expression because that is the best way to discover them, rather than suppress the fool and the fascist and to let them succeed in secret, then you must also see to it that the truth has its chance to be heard."\(^\text{105}\) Students quickly grasped the limitations that Rule 17 placed on not just their rights of speech and association, but on their education as well. "Hardly a day passes that men and women whose opinions and beliefs could be a welcome supplement to the lessons learned in the classroom do not visit Los Angeles. Rule 17 makes it difficult to bring such speakers to our campus."\(^\text{106}\) The absurd lengths to which the administration went to enforce Rule 17 included its forcing a group called "Uclans for Eisenhower" to change their name and directed them to change the location of one of their meetings which had been called at a sorority house because in listing the

\(^{104}\) Letter from Jesse Rhulman to Clarence A. Dykstra, dated February 13, 1948; and letter from Richard L. Rykoff to Jessie Rhulman, dated January 21, 1948, emphasis in the original, both found in Regulation 17 folder #2, Box #128, Records of the Office of the Chancellor, Administrative Files of Franklin D. Murphy, 1935-1971 (FDM), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.


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meeting location in the newspaper, they referred to the sorority house by name, rather than merely its street address, implying the use of a university facility.107

As with other issues, the fight for free speech quickly embroiled leftist groups, particularly the American Youth for Democracy. After the SEC again refused the AYD's bid for recognition in 1947, the AYD argued that Rule 17 (which both the SEC and the administration had at various times used to deny recognition to the AYD) stood "as the chief obstacle to democracy on our campus. . . . Regulation 17 hangs about the neck of the whole student body."108 The Bruin agreed when it ran an editorial entitled the "... the Illimitable Freedom," arguing that the restriction of free speech provided for by Rule 17 defeated "the very purpose of the University," a university "devoted to the forging of citizens and the probing of truth." The subjective nature of Rule 17 proved particularly offensive, "it gives to the head of the University broad-and, we believe, dangerous-power to determine who may speak on University facilities." The editorial continued by noting the absurdity of an institution devoted to free inquiry suppressing such basic rights as speech and association, demanding that only by testing democracy in the free marketplace of ideas can practitioners demonstrate its soundness. The Bruin echoed the words of Thomas Jefferson that "this institution will be based on the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not

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107 "GOP Group Asked to Change Name," Daily Bruin, October 10, 1952, p. 1. Uclan was a non-trademarked athletic nickname which emanated from the local press and was rarely, if ever used by the administration or the athletic department.

afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is free
to combat it."\(^{109}\)

The argument over Rule 17 as a general restriction on free speech and association
almost got lost in the argument over whether Communism should be freely discussed. After
the University forbid from speaking on campus both Dr. Ralph Spitzer, fired from Oregon
State for defending the right of free speech for Communists, and British socialist Harold J.
Laski, one student argued, "exposure to a real life Communist will contaminate neither more
nor less than exposure to his ideas, which are still taught in the classroom."\(^{110}\) The restrictions
of Rule 17 clearly offended students' perceptions of America. One student noted that Laski
"has been denied what every school child knows is the primary privilege of democracy" while
the Bruin editorial board made the comparison to Nazi Germany by noting, "it is our opinion
that one would not have to search too far before one found persons who recommend Jews
and Catholics for the blacklist," which proved a short leap to "the pogroms of Hitlernian
Germany."\(^{111}\)

Student activists' attempts to oppose the restrictions imposed by Rule 17 followed
previous patterns visible during the fight against discrimination. Students petitioned the
provost when he denied permission for Spitzer to speak, both student petitions and an SEC
resolution opposed the University's loyalty oath for professors, and telegrams to President


\(^{110}\) "Hold the Line," *Daily Bruin*, March 25, 1949, p. 5; and "Approximately and Inch," ibid.,
September 21, 1949, p. 4.

Sproul asked for his intervention in certain instances. All of these actions, however were predicated upon the notion of an administration responsive to the students' wishes and needs. In fact, as the party responsible for such restrictions, the administration had no intention of complying with the students' wishes and the more students voiced protest over the issue, the more the administration felt the restrictions necessary. In a letter obtained by the Daily Bruin from Dean Hahn to President Sproul in March 1950, Hahn noted his desire to find some way "whereby important issues (taken up by the SEC) can be previewed in order that student government, the Academic Senate and the administration can avoid reversals of action." In other words, Hahn hoped to regulate what came up for discussion in front of the SEC so as to avoid having to override that body when their actions angered the administration.

The pervasiveness of the administration's anti-communism increased in this period with the naming of Raymond Allen as UCLA's new chancellor in 1951, largely on the merit of his hard-line stand of firing supposed Communist sympathizers on the faculty while heading the University of Washington. Allen joined Milton Hahn, whose anti-communism "bridged on paranoia," according to Assistant Dean Byron Atkinson. Hahn's paranoia included his 1955 refusal of Russian student editors to visit the camps, using quotation marks in his correspondence around the words "student editors," suggesting that they were not really...

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students, but obviously communist infiltrators. The extent to which the administration sought to suppress activism and viewed the relationship between it and leftist activity knew no bounds. Dean Hahn kept secret intelligence files on student activists which included aliases, occupations, and even information about their parents. Mentioning this information, as well as a much larger general file on students in a letter to President Sproul, Hahn replayed the tired theme of Communist infiltration on campus, but noted that such intelligence allowed Hahn to stay one step ahead of them. While Hahn failed in his attempt to limit the activity under the purview of the SEC, he did succeed in limiting the information at their disposal upon which to take any action. After an on-campus poll revealed a preponderant majority of UCLA students engaged in some form of cheating at one time or another, severely embarrassing the University's growing academic reputation, the Regents established a committee to approve all future polls and surveys conducted on campus, something the student Stan Kegel compared with George Orwell's novel 1984. The same week, Hahn also banned from the student store the sale of the publication Anvil, put out by the New York Student Federation Against War, which, he alleged, maintained "socialist" ties.

This rigorous anti-communist oppression took its toll on student activists. Groups like the AYD, the Labor Youth League, and the Young Progressives failed to attract new

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115 Ackerman, Love-in, p. 140; for Hahn's remarks on the Russian student editors, see letter from Milton E. Hahn to Robert B. Allen dated March 23, 1955, Daily Bruin Policy, 1955 folder, Box #294, CO.

116 Letter from Milton Hahn to Robert Gordon Sproul, dated August 24, 1951, folder #228, Box #250, CO.


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members. As older students graduated, these organizations withered away and died, with the AYD disappearing by 1955. In addition, liberal groups which gained the support of these leftist organizations suffered by association, "in accepting Communists in their ranks as coworkers, the liberal groups are allowing themselves to be duped, and their effectiveness to be destroyed."  

Simultaneously, the ancien regime reasserted its hegemony over student politics and the SEC in the 1950s. A Bruin editorial noted the timidity of the SEC when it wrote, "there seems to be a general feeling nowadays that controversial issues should be avoided. This amounts to fear of censure, a terror of becoming another victim of the popular witch hunts."  

Censorship became a reality in March 1952 when the SEC voted to ban from sale in the student store all literature from Communist groups. 

After the SEC noted in October 1953 its powerlessness to question President Sproul's authority and his implementation of Rule 17, the Bruin regretted this public announcement of the council's "impotence." The paper argued that power came not from political authority but from action, "students can actually be very forceful - if and when they stand up and speak up for their rights." Sproul could not stand against public opinion, the Bruin argued, he would have to bend to the will of the majority. "Students can be very effective if they only realize it and if their student legislators stop shrugging their shoulders and start exercising some of their potential power." 

Regardless of the veracity of the paper's contention of

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Sproul's having to bend to public opinion (a dubious claim at best), most students in the early and mid-1950s were unwilling to publicly fight the established order. That same month, Shelly Lowenkopf, a Bruin staffer, asked 203 randomly selected UCLA students on campus to read and sign a document, affirming their belief in what they were signing; only twenty signed. The untitled document was the Declaration of Independence. Fifty four students recognized the document but still refused to sign, while one, offering a commentary on the fear and paranoia of the period, noted that the signatures were attached to the document on a separate sheet, "how do I know that you won't cut off one of the sheets that has my signature on it and attach it to something subversive?" The SEC too, retreated as it hesitated to consider off-campus issues. After two homes, one whose new owner was black and the other owned by a white man but who announced his intention to sell to a black family, were bombed in the West Adams section of Los Angeles in March 1952, the council attempted to pass a resolution condemning the actions. The SEC spent more time debating whether they had the authority to pass such a resolution than the actual resolution itself. Even one of the Bruin editors criticized discussion by the SEC on the matter, claiming it was not "anything which would affect student opinion." Similarly, when students clamored for the SEC to endorse the Federal Employment Practices Commission the following year, the ASUCLA president ruled any such discussion out of order, arguing, "I consider such matters as Fair Employment Practice Commission beyond the area of competence of . . . ASUCLA


at this time.126 At McCarthyism's hightide, only the *Daily Bruin* remained as a vocal advocate for liberal reform.

As the administration, particularly Milton Hahn, grew increasingly convinced of the paper's Communist bent, the relationship between the two took on the trappings of a blood feud. Hahn's open contempt for the *Bruin* was apparent when he announced a meeting would be held to clarify certain nuances of Rule 17, but then refused to allow *Bruin* reporters to cover the meeting.127 After several letters and articles in the paper questioned the administration's authority and one openly attacked McCarthyism as the "technique of the Big Lie," numerous alumni and citizens sent angry letters to both the administration and the state Un-American Activities Committee, prompting the administration to begin a clippings file of leftist articles and letters appearing in the paper.128 After running the plan by Chancellor Allen, Hahn announced on December 7, a fitting day as far as the paper was concerned, that henceforth, student leadership of the paper no longer emanated through institutional nomination and acceptance by the SEC, but rather, all editors would stand for general election, and only the editor-in-chief was required to have so much as one semester's worth of experience on the paper.129 The paper's historian noted the *Bruin* was "forced to sink ever


129 For a fuller, more complete narrative of this episode see Garrigues, "Loud Bark and Curious Eyes," pp. 198-199; as well as Garrigues, "The Great Conspiracy Against the UCLA Daily Bruin," pp. 217-230. Indicative of the unfounded nature of Hahn's claims is the fact that in 1954, the last year before the new editorial procedures were installed, the National Collegiate Press Association awarded the *Bruin*, "All-American" status as one of the top ten college dailies in the nation, specifically citing its "good balance," *Daily Bruin*, May 1, 1957.
deeper into the mire of student politics.\footnote{130} Hahn shortly amended this plan such that student editors had to receive the unanimous approval of the outgoing editor, the ASUCLA president, and Hahn himself, thereby giving Hahn veto power in selecting the editor for the student newspaper.\footnote{131} Moreover, the new, conservative, administration-approved editorial board refused to print letters from leftist groups and refused to meet Peter Allen, editor of the \textit{Young Socialist} when challenged to a debate.\footnote{132}

Hahn's actions proved so heavy-handed and so thinly veiled that they sparked one of the few public demonstrations of the entire period. Unaware that he had secretly signed off on the plan, over 3000 students signed a petition to Sproul demanding he rescind Hahn's actions and the editors held a mock funeral for the paper. A cortege of some 300 students paraded through campus with a coffin symbolizing the "corpse" of the \textit{Daily Bruin}. The protest proved to no avail as Sproul refused to overturn Hahn's actions, contending the issue was a "local matter."\footnote{133} The anger and bitterness felt by the paper and some of the students came out when editor Martin McReynolds wrote to Sproul of the incident, "students and faculty members who felt that you would defend a free student press on the basis of some of your past statements now know that they must rely on themselves and stand up for their own

\footnote{130} Garrigues, "The Great Conspiracy Against the UCLA Daily Bruin," p. 228.

\footnote{131} Garrigues, "Loud Bark and Curious Eyes," pp. 208-209. When Hahn testified before the Burns Committee, the state's Un-American Activities Committee, in 1956, he stated that "the key to the complete control of the University [is] the control of the \textit{Daily Bruin}," something he and Chancellor Allen both claimed they had, bragging to the Committee that the paper was "completely free" of Communist influence, see \textit{Daily Bruin}, December 11, 1956.

\footnote{132} untitled flyer, 1957 folder, Box #6, SAC.

\footnote{133} Garrigues, "The Great Conspiracy Against the UCLA Daily Bruin," p. 228.

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privileges." Given the tone of the times, the letter served as a stunning rebuke of an authority figure.

Much of the *Bruin* staff resigned in protest, five of whom, including McReynolds, formed their own underground paper, *The Observer*, which served as the unofficial student activist newsletter, covering issues such as discrimination, restrictions on free speech and association, and the university's responsibility to the students. While the new editorial election procedures resolved the conflict between the paper and the administration, Hahn showed the issue to be a personal vendetta when he continued to harass this breakaway group. After forbidding *The Observer's* distribution on campus, he ordered William Waldman, captain of the UC Police Department to investigate the five students, in particular their sources of funding, and made a point of collecting all the issues, filing them under "Subversive Activities."\(^{135}\)

Amidst the clamor over the censorship of the *Daily Bruin*, students again pushed for some resolution of campus discrimination in both the Greek system and the living groups. The *Bruin* noted with approval the abolition of restrictive clauses by two national Jewish fraternities, Sigma Alpha Mu and Zeta Beta Tau and in 1953 students asked the Student Legislative Council (previously the SEC, renamed that year) to consider the Rutgers Plan, which called for a gradual, seven year elimination of the Greeks' discriminatory clauses.\(^{136}\)

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\(^{134}\) Letter from Martin McReynolds to President Robert Gordon Sproul, dated April 9, 1955, folder #246-DB, Box #294, CO.


Many students recognized that the question of these clauses originated with the national organizations, meaning a forced elimination at the local level would either require disassociation from the national organization or their abolition from campus. Moreover, Dean Hahn, a staunch supporter of the Greek system and a former Greek himself, viewed efforts against the Greeks throughout this period as part of the larger Communist conspiracy he saw everywhere. Hahn argued that these efforts actually came from "subversive" groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, the Labor Youth League, and the Civil Rights Congress. Coming at the height of McCarthyism, many students and administrators agreed with Barry Goldwater when they considered a university without a Greek system, "where fraternities are not allowed, Communism flourishes." The SLC defeated the Rutgers Plan.

The Council for Student Unity refused however, to drop the issue. If local and national political climates kept them from attacking the Greeks, they could still attack the living groups. In April 1954, the CSU issued a report on all nine on- and off-campus living groups, declaring that "discrimination in housing . . . is undesirable at UCLA and we intend

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137 Letter from Milton E. Hahn to Chancellor Raymond B. Allen, dated August 4, 1955, folder #247-Fraternities and Sororities, Box #294, CO. The administration collected literature from the Civil Rights Congress and filed it under "Subversive Activities," see Loyalty Oath and Subversive Activities folder, Box #234, CO. For an examination of how these groups suffered under such unfounded red-baiting, see Gerald Horne, Communist Front?: The Civil Rights Congress, 1946-1956, (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1988), particularly his chapter on the group's activities in the West, pp. 310-353.

138 Lawrence Wright, In the New World: Growing Up with America From the Sixties to the Eighties, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 84. Conservative observers of the time saw any threat to traditional undergraduate institutions as communist inspired, including national journalist Bill Stern, who noted that schools without a strong commitment to college football were "hotbeds of communism." Stern noted that schools like Harvard, New York University, and the University of Chicago, "that have played down football are the very same universities where communism has run rampant." Stern made no comment on UCLA's "red" reputation in light of their winning the 1955 national championship. "Lack of Football Cited as Reason for Communism," Daily Bruin, November 7, 1958, p. 1.
to... do all in our power to bring about its relief." The efforts of CSU proved successful, as the SLC voted to rescind recognition from any living group still found to maintain discriminatory practices as of December 2, 1954, effective February 1, 1955, the first day of the winter quarter. On the second of December, only Neva Hall maintained the hard line and refused to abolish its discriminatory policies. Recalcitrant to the end, housemother Neva McCoy declared, "no one can tell me what to." On the question of renting to blacks, McCoy argued that her neighbors "would not stand for it," referring to blacks as "outsiders."

The question of Neva Hall and the living groups however, did not go quietly. Neva, and all living groups, belonged to Dorm Council, itself a recognized, voting ASUCLA organization. Upon the SLC's action, Dorm Council did not expel Neva, providing for the paradox of an unrecognized organization maintaining full membership in a recognized organization. The question languished for over two months, in large part because the new conservative Bruin refused to cover the issue. It also forced living groups opposed to discrimination to face the question of withdrawing from Dorm Council in protest, but also lose their privileges in the process, something considered by both Stevens House and Rudy

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The SLC in the end voted to disassociate Dorm Council, something Hahn's underling, Assistant Dean Byron Atkinson, opposed as "unfair."143

Many students noted the hypocrisy of the SLC's ability to rule on the living groups but not on the Greeks. After lauding the SLC for removing Neva, Martin McReynolds, editor of the *Bruin*, wrote: "now if the same sincerity, earnestness and energy can be turned to the problem of discrimination in fraternities and sororities, the Student Legislative Council may come up with another constructive step in the fight against bigotry."144 McReynolds continued to harp on this theme for the remainder of his tenure with the *Bruin* and later in the pages of *The Observer*.145 Still lacking the administration's support, students proved unable to dislodge such an entrenched institution as the Greek system. They did succeed in passing a resolution "officially condemning and opposing" racial and religious discrimination, calling for the Greeks to make every effort to work within their national organizations to abolish such restrictions. Tellingly, the administrative representative even voted against that

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142 Minutes of Stevens House, May 9, 1955, Student Council Minutes, 1949-1955 folder, Box #1, SH. The eventual disassociation of Dorm Council by the SLC meant that neither Stevens nor Rudy had to face the issue.


144 "SLC's Stand," *Daily Bruin*, October 18, 1954, p. 4.

resolution. In protest, both governing bodies of the Greek system, the PanHellenic and Interfraternity Councils, announced their withdrawal from the ASUCLA.

After the SLC continued to consider such liberal issues as working to remove discrimination in Westwood Village through the so-called "Fair Bruin" policy, Hahn, perhaps fearful it would eventually succeed in striking at the Greek system, moved against that organization as well. In May 1956, he announced a change in the ASUCLA Constitution and makeup of the SLC, reducing the number of votes student groups enjoyed while increasing the administration's voice on the council. The SLC formally rejected the attempt at changing the constitution and refused to call for the next year's campus elections in protest.

The General Manager of the ASUCLA technically held student body elections, but only after

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146 "SLC Pass Anti-Discrimination Resolution," The Observer, May 18, 1955, p. 1. The administration's protection of the Greek system seemingly knew no bounds, including involving itself in state-wide politics. In 1957, the California State Legislature considered a bill prohibiting discrimination in any publicly affiliated organizations, including recognized fraternities and sororities. Dr. Clyde S. Johnson, while on the University of California payroll as the Assistant Dean of Undergraduates, also served as an advisor to one of the bill's staunchest opponents, the Interfraternity Alumni Association of Southern California. Johnson recommended that the University "gently oppose" the bill, a feeling seconded by Byron Atkinson, Associate Dean of Students, letter from Byron Atkinson to Chancellor Raymond B. Allen, dated April 24, 1957, folder #247, Box #325, CO. In a separate legal summary of the issue directed to the Chancellor, counsel Robert Wellman argued that even if the bill should pass, the University could put off the inevitable by adopting a "cooling off period," giving the groups five years to remove the discriminatory clauses. While Wellman granted that some houses would not fall in line, he highlighted the importance the administration placed on the Greeks by noting the cooling off period would "allow for continuity and provide an adjustment period for the more recalcitrant," letter from Robert Wellman to Dr. Raymond Allen, dated June 13, 1957, folder #247, Box #325, CO.

147 "PanHel Announces Withdrawal Intent," Daily Bruin, February 9, 1956, p. 1; and "Withdrawal Move Considered by IFC," ibid., February 10, 1956, p. 1. This action caused the local NAACP to label the Greeks "secessionists." Both groups would eventually rejoin the ASUCLA only to threaten withdrawal again the 1960s in similar protest.

148 "DB Begins Series of Interviews on Student Discrimination Policies," Daily Bruin, December 29, 1954, p. 1. The "Fair Bruin" program called for businesses in Westwood Village to agree to non-discriminatory hiring practices, minimum wages and fair working conditions, in exchange for the right to display Fair Bruin symbol in their shopfront windows. The SLC would then ask students to not patronize shops that not support the Fair Bruin policy.
being annually requested to do by the SLC. When the SLC refused to call for elections, Hahn ignored the students, called his own elections, and billed the ASUCLA for them. In protest, the SLC called for a referendum on the issue, asking students to vote in the referendum but ignore Hahn's rogue election.  

Although slightly more students voted in the rogue election than in the referendum, the more than 3600 students who did vote rejected Hahn's actions by almost a two to one margin in the highest voter turnout since 1949.

The electoral response to Hahn's oppression indicated a pattern of student activism at UCLA evident for the next twenty years. While many students remained apathetic and easily swayed by anti-communist rhetoric, they took offense at Hahn's disregard for the student press and electoral process. Hahn's extra-legal suspension of basic constitutional rights offended students values of faith in the democratic process and the rule of law. These circumstances allowed for large-scale student activism, such as the *Bruin* "funeral" and the separate referendum, which previous conditions did not.

Not content with limiting existing institutions, Hahn also worked against new organizations seeking to agitate for reform. Dating at least as far back as October 1949, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) sought to establish a campus chapter at UCLA; the successes of Sherrill Luke's administration however precluded the need for another organization on campus seeking racial reform. As the activist fervor in the mid-1950s waned, however, the NAACP saw a need to establish a 

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campus chapter and initiated what it thought would be a routine campaign to gain recognition in 1954. Milton Hahn, however had other ideas. Hahn swiftly rejected the campus NAACP's application on the grounds that the group duplicated the functions of existing campus organizations and that its control by a national organization did "not fit well into the . . . operational structure of the University." Hahn argued he merely followed procedure by stating, "the Regents would have to change policy" for the NAACP to gain recognition. The fact that the Berkeley campus, home of the Regents, had granted recognition to the NAACP in 1953 highlighted Hahn's duplicitousness, as did his reliance on the "national organization" argument, which should have ruled out all the fraternities and sororities as well. The group duly attacked Hahn for this hypocrisy when it asked Hahn "why your administration has shown such favoritism for the greek letter organizations, who have publicly declared that they are both required and willing to submit to the general authority and jurisdiction of their national organizations "[as a justification for maintaining discriminatory clauses]. The answer, of course, lay in Milton Hahn's perceptions of the Greek system as upholding everything American while he equated the NAACP with the AYD, the ACLU, and the Civil Rights Congress, all "subversive" and destructive to UCLA, and hence, the very fabric of the republic. Willard Johnson, president of the campus NAACP group and UCLA's second black student body president in 1956-57 summed up the administration's thinking in

the late 1950s as "overly suspicious of students concerned about race relations, restrictive clauses, the independent authority of student government, and student concern with broader social and political issues."\textsuperscript{156}

The extreme anti-communism of the 1950s waned as the decade drew to a close, and none too soon from the standpoint of students at UCLA. Both students and administrators opposed liberal reform in the name of anti-communism, successfully oppressing leftist student activists. The administration, however, went beyond merely opposing liberal reform. Lead by Dean Milton Hahn and supported by President Robert Gordon Sproul, the University abused its authority by running roughshod over students and their institutions. Just as the federal government violated principles of American democracy at home and abroad in the name of anti-Communism, the UCLA administration saw the local fight as no less apocalyptic, creating gross violations of civil liberties, common decency, and good sense. Student activists surveyed their landscape under Milton Hahn and found the hour late and the night dark.

The lesson proved a sobering one for student activists. The extreme red-baiting of the period limited their successes and forced them to choose their allies as well as their enemies. By keeping the activist community divided, the anti-communism of the period severely limited reform. It also illustrated that only an offense of students' core democratic capitalist values would bring large scale activism. Student activists did achieve limited successes, however, using traditional democratic institutions such as the right of petition, free

\footnote{\textsuperscript{156} Ackerman, \textit{Love-In}, pp. 87-88. The fact that the administration made no discernible attempt to limit the activities of the student Council for Mexican-American Education, whose prime function served to increase Mexican-American student enrollment but pointedly lacked an activist agenda, indicates that the administration tolerated groups with community ties and ethnic organization, so long as they did not make any attempt to threaten the status quo, see "Council for Mexican-American Education," 1954 folder, Box #6, SAC.}

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speech and press, and representative government. When the administration either curtailed or ignored those institutions, however, they were left with nothing. The administration aptly demonstrated throughout this period that it held all the cards and did not hesitate to use them.

If student activists at UCLA were to achieve any larger success, they would need issues and methods that could rise above the traditional red-baiting of the 1950s. More importantly, they needed an administration willing to allow them the exercise of at least the most basic rights in a democracy, free speech and association and a free press. By 1960, they got both.
CHAPTER THREE

"THE FREE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS:"
THE STRUGGLE FOR FREE SPEECH AND CIVIL RIGHTS

When the Regents of the University of California chose Franklin D. Murphy, a physician-turned-educator from the University of Kansas, as UCLA's next Chancellor in the spring of 1960, they unwittingly provided the students with their strongest ally in their struggle for free speech and association. Murphy's oft-repeated phrase describing the university as a "free marketplace of ideas" inherently included, indeed encouraged, the students' ability to vigorously question the status quo, thereby delegitimizing anti-communist rhetoric as a limiting factor to student activism. Student concerns over rights of free speech and association coalesced with their growing concern over civil rights, both in the South and in Los Angeles, an endeavor that enjoyed the full support of Murphy who felt student civil rights work served as the triumphal monument to his notions of the university as an intellectual free marketplace. Student activism, however, occurred only within the proscribed context of students' core values of equality of opportunity, equality of and before the law, faith in the democratic capitalist system, and their post-collegiate concerns for achieving the materialist comfort of their parents. Only when issues of free speech and association and the Civil Rights movement offended these values did large scale student activism at UCLA take place. While events in the South and in Los Angeles may have offended students' morals, morality alone did not succeed in substantially swelling the activist ranks.

Franklin Murphy brought to Los Angeles a skillful administrative tact and a no-nonsense belief that UCLA belonged in the most elite tier of America's universities, public or
private, as well as an unbounded faith in progress, education, and democracy, tenets that served as the hallmark of America's mid-century liberalism, though Murphy himself was no Kennedy liberal. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles, he put the students on notice that previous administrations' expectations of their quiescence were a thing of the past. In using his hallmark phrase to describe the university, he stated, "Our society must demand that the University be a marketplace of ideas, not a trade school." Murphy argued that in accordance with things like a free press and free economic system, "our Universities must also be free to evaluate the ideas of this society. But there cannot be two kinds of freedom in this country. It is the manifest destiny of education to test the status quo." The idealism of Democratic liberalism inspired by its most notable proponent, John Kennedy, as well as Murphy's rhetoric of a free marketplace of ideas had immediate effects on students. After Kennedy challenged students at the University of Michigan in 1960 to work abroad for peace and freedom, hundreds responded by establishing "Americans Committed to World Responsibility." Similarly after a Kennedy appearance at UCLA, students established the position of Peace Corps Coordinator to aid students in participating in that endeavor. Signalling both a departure from past administrative repression and an indicator of Murphy's own sense of

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liberal progress, the new chancellor allowed for recognition of the campus NAACP chapter in his very first week of classes. After the NAACP discovered examples of discrimination in Westwood businesses, the Student Legislative Council asked Murphy to form a Chancellor's Advisory Committee on Discrimination. Murphy responded with such a body by stating "segregation is immoral, and all University activities dealing with discrimination will be geared towards this end."

Murphy's demand for a free marketplace of ideas as a potential threat to the status quo sounded interesting to the students at UCLA, but rhetoric alone could not shake off the lethargy imposed by anti-communism's intellectual reign of terror. For starters, both UCLA's students and its new Chancellor still had to answer to Berkeley. Clark W. Kerr succeeded Robert Gordon Sproul as President of the University of California in 1958 and had no intention of surrendering any of Berkeley's long-standing hegemony over the UC's other campuses. Murphy quickly grasped the nature of the relationship with Berkeley when he told a reporter a month after assuming the chancellorship, "What once was a colonial empire is becoming a commonwealth of institutions." Tension between Kerr and Murphy erupted almost immediately over the subject of the Chancellor's prerogative on his own campus. Tradition held that the UC president travelled to every UC campus for commencement, at which the individual Chancellor presided, but stepped aside at the last moment so that Sproul,

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and now Kerr, actually conferred the degrees. Murphy argued that as chief campus administrator, the responsibility and privilege of conferment lay with him. Murphy refused to budge and Kerr grew wary of Murphy's intentions. Hoping not to yield a precedent, Kerr's office called Murphy in April or May of each year to inform him that "scheduling conflicts" precluded the President's presence at commencement and would Murphy fill in for him. This charade continued until 1965 and is indicative of both Kerr's pettiness and Murphy's insistence on winning a measure of independence for UCLA.

While the commencement battle proved of little concern to the students, Murphy's belief that the University serve as a "free marketplace of ideas" brought him into conflict with Kerr over the issue of free speech, something of interest to the students. Sproul forbid students and faculty from involving themselves in "partisan political or religious activity," a controversial policy known as Rule 17 which the administration inconsistently applied, generally to the detriment of campus reformers. Rule 17 prohibited political or religious speakers from appearing on campus and forbid student organizations from having any religious or political affiliation. Kerr, however, sought to ease these restrictions and by 1961, abolished Rule 17 altogether, claiming he "liberalized" restrictions on free speech, although replacing them with other restrictions. The new regulations, dubbed the Kerr Directives, allowed for almost any speaker to appear on campus, provided they received prior approval from the chancellor. The Kerr Directives also stipulated that "recognized" campus

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8 For the commencement episode, as well as many others between Kerr and Murphy, see the latter's oral history, Franklin D. Murphy, "My UCLA Chancellorship: An Utterly Candid View," UCLA Oral History Project (OHP), Department of Special Collections, Young Research Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.
organizations could not comment on "off-campus issues," but that un-recognized groups could do so and enjoy the use of University facilities so long as they did not affiliate with any partisan political or religious organization.\footnote{9} In essence, the Directives liberalized restrictions on speakers appearing on campus, but maintained the old policy of prohibiting student comment on anything of substance. As Kerr told a group of Cal alumni, "the name of the University cannot be used as a good housekeeping seal of approval."\footnote{10} Students at UCLA immediately saw through Kerr's rhetoric and criticized both the meaning and intent of the Directives. The \textit{Bruin} lampooned Kerr's rhetoric by linking him with 19th Century arch-conservative Clemens von Metternich (see illustration 3.1), while other students questioned exactly what defined an "off-campus issue," arguing that "the officials of the University of California still believe that civil liberties must be violated to keep the University free from politics."\footnote{11}


Simultaneous to the Kerr Directives, and perhaps due in part to them, students at UCLA witnessed an increased politicization on campus. After students at Cal vociferously protested the intended execution of convicted rapist Caryl Chessman by the state of California, students at UCLA formed the group Endcap, opposing capital punishment and wearing black armbands to protest Chessman's execution, as well as any future executions.\textsuperscript{12} In addition, UCLA students formed Platform, the campus' first political party, hoping to maintain some continuity "from year to year" among student politicos.\textsuperscript{13} Irrespective of its name, the organization maintained no specific platform other than a commitment to student activism. As such, it opposed the Kerr Directives' continued restrictions on student activity and criticized student government for overly concerning itself with "homecomings and junior proms . . . [and] thousands of howling football fans."\textsuperscript{14} The \textit{Daily Bruin} too, shaking off the repression of Milton Hahn's reign, criticized both the Directives and student government by demanding "that student government be more than a vacuum cleaner," that concerned itself with issues of "student activities."\textsuperscript{15} The final component to UCLA's increased politicization came from outside speakers. One of the motivating factors for the formation of Platform came from members of SLATE, Cal's own political party, who spoke on campus numerous times during 1959 and 1960, urging students to organize and oppose the Kerr Directives. As the


\textsuperscript{14} "Spirit or Apathy," \textit{Daily Bruin}, December 17, 1959, p. 4.

sit-in movement swept over the South and other regions of the country, veterans of that protest also spoke on campus, the first effort to bring the direct action phase of the Civil Rights movement to UCLA. One civil rights worker compared the type of repression he faced with that of the students by noting, "you've made good in the South when you've been arrested; in the North when you are subpoenaed by the Un-American Activities Committee."

In conjunction with Platform and the American Civil Liberties Union, UCLA student Joel Peck brought suit against Clark Kerr, alleging that the Kerr Directives' ban on distribution of literature served as a limitation of free speech, forcing Kerr to strike the restriction from the Directives. Kerr then issued a final modification in August of 1961, removing the "recognition" category from student organizations, thereby prohibiting any student group from affiliating in name or nature with any off-campus partisan political or religious organization. Interestingly, the increasing number of off-campus speakers now allowed under the Kerr Directives helped bring about rising criticism of the Directives as increased student awareness of the world beyond the ivy-covered walls blurred the distinction between "on-campus" and "off-campus" issues. At UCLA, the intersection of civil rights, free speech, and the students' role in the university brought forth a tidal wave of activism in the fall of 1961.


18 Otten, University Authority, p. 178.
The modern Civil Rights movement came slowly to UCLA, just as it had to Los Angeles in general. Without public facility Jim Crow laws to attack, reformers found white middle class Angelenos less receptive to claims of racial discrimination in a land supposedly bathed in sunshine and economic growth with an apparent heritage of equal racial opportunity. Even more so at UCLA, where the notable successes of alumni such as 1950 Nobel Peace Prize winner Ralph Bunche, and athletes Kenny Washington and Woody Strode, who desegregated the National Football League in 1946, Jackie Robinson, the first player to integrate Major League Baseball in 1947, Don Barksdale, one of the first blacks to play in the National Basketball Association in the early 1950s, and Rafer Johnson, 1960 Olympic Gold Medal winner and world record-holder in the decathlon, created the myth that UCLA was a "racial paradise" where equality reigned and Jim Crow dare not rear his head. After massive violence accompanied James Meredit's integration of the University of Mississippi, the Bruin ran an open letter to the students at 'Ole Miss, suggesting they look West to UCLA for a lesson in interracial education, specifically mentioning Bunche, Robinson, and Johnson.19

The reality proved quite different and reformers faced an uphill battle. Events such as the lynching in Mississippi of thirteen year old Emmett Till brought a few Bruin protestors to the Olympic Auditorium for a city-wide demonstration, but such activity, both on and off campus, proved underattended and discouraged by conservative forces.20 During the fight to achieve university recognition by UCLA's NAACP chapter, Willard Johnson noted that opposition to reform groups demonstrated "a fear of examining ourselves, the campus

community, lest we find something disagreeable." The likelihood of that remained strong as the chapter continued to criticize employment discrimination in Westwood while taking part in a city-wide FEPC "mobilization."22

When Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference initiated its series of direct action campaigns based on Christian love and non-violence, which appealed so well to many Northern whites, the response in Los Angeles was muted. The city's chapter of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) concentrated its activities in the central city where most blacks lived, ignoring the affluent, lily-white Westwood, but also limiting both the scope of their activities and the base from which to draw members.23 This abandoning of the Westside also meant ignoring UCLA, where no campus activity existed and no external organizing attempt was made. As Milton Hahn continued to reject the appeals of the campus NAACP, the L.A. chapter of CORE lapsed into inactivity amidst internal bickering and personality conflicts.24 The desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, and the bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, gained almost no attention on campus, in part because the administration still refused recognition to the campus NAACP chapter. Meeting off-campus, the group took part in a National Deliverance Day Prayer

21 *NAACP Newsletter*, December 1955, p. 1; "Our Fight for Recognition," 1955 folder, Box #6, Student Activism Collection (SAC), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.

22 UCLA Chapter, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Activity Report, Spring Semester, 1958, 1958-59 folder, Box #18, Records of the NAACP - National Office, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.


Meeting to protest the "mass arrest" of the leaders of the Montgomery bus boycott, but the participation appears limited at best, in part because the Daily Bruin offered no coverage. In addition, the SLC remained cowed by the presence of Milton Hahn, either in person or in memory. When Raymond Allen announced he would not continue as UCLA's Chancellor, and with Milton Hahn's administrative excesses proving to be a liability, Hahn was unceremoniously replaced by his assistant, Byron Atkinson, in 1959, but his shadow lingered. UCLA students remained cowed for two years after Hahn's departure.

Even the sit-in movement, begun by students at North Carolina A&T University in February 1960, garnered little interest on campus until responses to it turned violent. After white demonstrators in Nashville attacked the students, the SLC unanimously passed a resolution condemning the violence, declaring "segregation...morally reprehensible and a violation of constitutional rights." A group of students from UCLA formed the Southern California Boycott Committee (SCBC), with students from Santa Monica City College and USC, staging sympathy pickets with CORE at area Woolworth's and Kress's, the target of the sit-ins in the South. The picketers exhorted local patrons, "don't back Southern segregation with your money." While the pickets included only a handful of UCLA students, their

25 NAACP Newsletter, March 26, 1956, "Attend UCLA Prayer Meeting!," 1955 folder, Box #6, SAC.

26 "Will our Dean of Students Return?," Daily Bruin, October 28, 1959, p. 1. Although Hahn's dismissal took place before Franklin Murphy's arrival, it is highly doubtful Murphy would have tolerated Hahn's anti-communist hysteria or gross violations of civil liberties.


28 untitled, undated flyer, file #11, "CORE, boycotts, flyers, etc." Box #12, Civil Rights Movement in the United States Collection (CRM), Department of Special Collections, Young Research Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.
activities remained largely outside the organizational realm of CORE. The city's CORE chapter continued to lack strong direction and new blood because it continued to ignore the new direction the movement took after Greensboro. As an organizer wrote of the chapter, "LA CORE has made no effort to recruit college students," leaving the field to "impromptu groups" such as the SCBC.

The notable lack of enthusiasm at UCLA for the sit-in movement, which attracted student support at universities both North and South, did not pass without notice. Student Robert Farrell argued that students "prostituted" their ideals by offering "no comment at all. . . Where is your concern, your idealism? It is conspicuous because of its absence." Also absent was a realization that problems in the South and West remained fundamentally different, as pointed out by student Amy Marie Jones, who asked why picketers at Woolworth's demonstrated at the lunch counter where blacks could be served when no one demonstrated against the fact that no blacks owned homes in Westwood, would be served at the famous Brown Derby Restaurant, or held any elective office in Los Angeles. "You need not look to Georgia for an example of racial inequality but rather focus your attention on the issues here. . . . Does the West have no problems that you . . . can attack or perhaps solve?"

In the fall of 1961, student activists at UCLA found an answer to that question.

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30 Letter from Joann Love Allen to National Office, undated, reel #18, Series 5:15, CORE.


In the spring, James Farmer, National Director of CORE, spoke on campus to a sparse audience, explaining CORE's vision for non-violent protest and their upcoming attempt to test federal laws protecting interstate bus travel. Although UCLA did not have an official CORE chapter, national CORE efforts were "channeled though the campus NAACP," which functioned "somewhat like a CORE chapter." Some students decided at that moment to participate in the Freedom Rides; still others took part after the initial rides met heavy violence in Alabama and Mississippi; in all, at least eighteen UCLA students participated. When those students returned to campus in the fall, they brought with them their bruises and scars, their testimony, and the movement itself. Like evangelicals, they bore witness on campus to the brutality of Southern segregation and in the process provided a tangible, flesh and blood example of both what was at stake in the Civil Rights movement and the cost of that movement. Steve McNichols, arrested in Houston, was the first of the Riders to tell his story on campus. He detailed not only his rough treatment from law enforcement but also the beating he received from other inmates while in custody at the direction of the Harris County Sheriff. Others followed, including Robert Singleton, president of the campus NAACP chapter and organizer of the UCLA Freedom Riders. Singleton graphically illustrated

33 Oral Interview with Robert Singleton, January 8, 1997, Los Angeles, CA.

34 "Report on Los Angeles CORE," by Evert M. Makinen, September 7, 1961, Reel #18, Series 5:15, CORE.

35 The exact number of Riders from UCLA is unclear because they did so in different places at different times. CORE bail records note at least 16 students from UCLA and two others were known to have participated which did not show up in CORE bail records, see "Freedom Riders Cases on Appeal," undated, roll #3, Series 1:38, CORE.

Southern contempt for civil rights workers and their cause, describing his misdemeanor arrest in Jackson, Mississippi for which local officials placed him on Parchman Prison's death row.37 The importance of the Freedom Rides increased for UCLA students when one of the Riders, Al Barouh, died in a plane crash returning to Los Angeles in August. An intensely popular student leader, Barouh's death weighed heavily on those who knew him, offering increased attention to both the efforts of the Riders and their sacrifices and a "catalyst" for the movement at UCLA.38

The Daily Bruin traditionally served the role of advocate for liberal reform and during the fall quarter the paper only enhanced that reputation by keeping students abreast of civil rights battles on other campuses, including the peaceful integration of Georgia Tech, the demand by students at the University of Texas for integrated athletics, and the efforts of students at the University of Minnesota to desegregate campus housing.39 In addition to the paper's efforts to politicize the campus, the number of off-campus speakers also increased in this period. Previously, commentators from both Cal and UCLA commented that one of the primary differences between the political attitudes of the two campuses was the high number of off-campus speakers at Cal, while UCLA remained relatively provincial.40 That changed


38 Oral interview with James Stiven, January 5, 1997, Los Angeles, CA; Singleton interview. Stiven was the ASUCLA president for the 1961-62 school year. Both Stiven and Singleton used the word "catalyst" when describing the effect of Barouh's death, a notion further agreed upon by Stiven's wife Katie Murphy Stiven, the ASUCLA Secretary during the time.


40 Murphy, pp. 129-131, OHP; Byron H. Atkinson, "Expanding Student Services," pp. 193-194, OHP.
during this period with appearances by activists like Farmer and Major Johns, a student suspended from Southern University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for his part in the sit-in movement, members of SLATE, and numerous activist speakers from Cal.41

When students returned to campus for the fall quarter to hear of the Freedom Riders' accomplishments, they also found the final modifications to the Kerr Directives, what the Bruin termed "an explosive policy statement."42 The Directives' forbearance of student government and other campus organizations from commenting on off-campus issues appeared even more restrictive in the wake of the Freedom Riders' sacrifices. The explicit disavowal of off-campus political groups such as the Young Democrats and Young Republicans had obvious connotations for the students' burgeoning civil rights efforts when that ban also included groups like CORE and the NAACP, as evidenced by a Daily Bruin cartoon linking all of these groups (Illustration 3.2). What bothered the students most was the undefined nature of "off-campus." To many students, condemning the violence in the South should fall under their "on campus"

41 "Wake Up, America," Daily Bruin, May 13, 1960, p. 2; Singleton interview.

purview when that violence was directed at fellow students. The *Bruin* challenged students to speak out on all issues that involved the "student in his role as a student," even if it meant "stepping upon the feet of the Kerr Directives."\(^{43}\) The Riders embraced this challenge when they sent an open letter to the campus thanking those who signed petitions to President Kennedy and his Attorney General after the Riders' arrest that summer. They signed the letter "UCLA Freedom Riders," openly violating the Kerr Directives by using the University name in conjunction with their off-campus activities.\(^{44}\)

In their struggle against the Kerr Directives, the students also found an ally in their new Chancellor. Described by his chief assistant as a "moderate conservative in most every respect, but not with regards to free speech," Murphy believed in the marketplace of ideas, not as "just a catchphrase," but as "a very real thing." The Chancellor's "free speech liberalism" aligned itself with mainstream liberalism during the Cold War in arguing that "the best way to defeat a bad argument is to let it show itself in the marketplace." Murphy felt the best way to ensure the continuance of democracy and Cold War victory was not by sheltering students from ideas, but exposing them in the marketplace, hence exposing these ideas to be the frauds so many Cold Warriors like Murphy believed them to be.\(^{45}\) This "free speech liberalism" flew in the face of the Kerr Directives and the attempts of avowed liberal Clark Kerr to keep the University above the political fray, exposing a deep ideological chasm

\(^{43}\) "Can't We Hope?," *Daily Bruin*, September 20, 1960, p. 4.


\(^{45}\) Oral Interview with Dr. Charles E. Young, August 3 and 11, 1999, Los Angeles, CA. From 1960 to 1968, Young served as Assistant to the Chancellor and later Vice Chancellor before succeeding Murphy as Chancellor in 1968.
between Kerr and Murphy. Attempting to ensure the University's freedom to engage in important academic research and inquiry, Kerr hoped to insulate the University from politics and controversy by precluding any student and faculty activity which might anger the legislature or political pressure groups. Murphy felt that such restrictions on student and faculty behavior abrogated the University's very responsibility to the society of which it is a part.

Murphy made it clear to both students and other members of the administration that he had no intention of combing the campus to seek every violation of University policy as had Milton Hahn. While Murphy publicly backed the Directives and correctly lauded the liberalization of campus speakers, he allowed campus civil rights groups such CORE and the NAACP to use the name "Bruin CORE" or "Bruin NAACP," rather than the less associative "Westwood," when the Directives explicitly prohibited "UCLA," and he made no apparent attempt to punish the Freedom Riders for their use in print of "UCLA Freedom Riders." As Young later termed it, "we pushed the envelope as far as it could be pushed. . . . We found inventive ways to allow things to happen that others might not have found, but found ways to do it within the letter of the law. There were ways to get around some of those issues."
The disagreement between Kerr and Murphy over the issue of free speech added more tension between the two over UCLA's independence and chancellorial autonomy. It also served as a benefit to student activists.\textsuperscript{49}

In addition to his support of free speech, Murphy also aided student civil rights advocates. As part of the Chancellor's Advisory Committee on Discrimination, student groups such as the Bruin NAACP and Bruin CORE checked employment and housing listings in the Bureau of Occupations and Housing (BurOc). As a way to root out discrimination in the BurOc, if black students were told a job or apartment were no longer available, white students inquired about the same listing shortly thereafter. If the job or apartment were offered them, these students reported this to Murphy's office, who had the offending listing struck from the BurOc. The students found this method so successful, they institutionalized the "test team" process by forming the ASUCLA President's Committee on Discrimination, which made such checks a regular occurrence.\textsuperscript{50}

The nexus of the struggle for free speech and civil rights brought increased attention to both and heightened students' awareness of injustice everywhere. Nand Hart-Nibbrig urged students not to ignore the efforts of the Freedom Riders, claiming, "the moral impetus has been provided by our Freedom Riders. Now let us all get on the bus."\textsuperscript{51} Students

\textsuperscript{49} For another example of how student activists used friction between branch and main campus to their advantage, see William H. Exum, \textit{Paradoxes of Protest: Black Student Activism on White Campuses}, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985) and his discussion of civil rights issues at New York University's University College.

\textsuperscript{50} Singleton interview; letter from Scott Van Leuven, Director, to Fellow Students, May 1, 1964, Social Action - Housing and Prop. 14 folder, Box #2, CRM.

watched with growing alarm the treatment CORE workers continued to receive in McComb, Mississippi in their desegregation and voter registration efforts. In response, UCLA students sent a petition to the Attorney General urging prompt action in the wake of 113 student arrests in McComb while simultaneously sending a resolution of solidarity to the jailed students, praising their "efforts to secure freedom and dignity for all Americans." 52 An editorial in the Bruin by Louis Weschler urged students who could not ride or sit in to at least provide money or support, arguing that it was no longer just the activists' responsibility to end segregation, but "all our responsibility to help continue the fight against racial discrimination." 53 Weschler's comments illustrated that the student activist community understood that injustice anywhere against anyone meant injustice everywhere against everyone. The fight for black equality abroad illustrated the students' own inequality at home with regards to free speech. In addition, the Freedom Riders highlighted areas of discrimination not just in the South, but in the West as well. When CORE began demonstrations against Don Wilson, a developer who restricted home sales to whites only, a flyer reminded students, "remember . . . it is just as important for a Negro to be free to buy a house HERE, as it is for a Negro to be able to attend a university in Mississippi!!" 54

Student activists at UCLA, who, for two generations, made the connection between education and liberal reform, did not fail to note the amount of activity now centered around and against college students. After the President at Jackson State College in Mississippi


54 "To All Who Oppose Racial Injustice," 1962 folder, Box #6, SAC.

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unilaterally disbanded student government after that body spoke out against segregation, 700 students walked out of classes in Jackson in protest. In urging support for the Jackson State students as well as those in McComb, Steve Weiner made the connection rather succinctly, "if we are students who believe in education for freedom, we shall not fail them." 55 Clearly, activists at UCLA felt that not only did they have the right to work for justice and equality, but as students at a public university, they had the moral and social obligation to do so. Students felt the Kerr Directives' restrictions on their behavior towards this end not only made them unfair, but morally unjust and indefensible. Danny Rifkin, the Bruin's "Cub" Editorial Editor, noted that successfully challenging the Directives required an expansion of the activist community on campus and suggested "a formalized protest of the Directives on the part of UCLA students." 56 While no protests aimed specifically at the Directives occurred, two issues arose that allowed the students the opportunity to register their discontent with the Directives and simultaneously expand the activist community.

By the middle of October, UCLA's football team unexpectedly found itself in the hunt for the Athletic Association of Western Universities (AAWU) conference championship and the accompanying Rose Bowl bid. Because of a lapse in the agreement between the AAWU and the Big Ten Conference that provided that the respective champions play each other in the Rose Bowl, the AAWU's Rose Bowl opponent for that year remained undetermined. 57


57 For the briefest of descriptions of the agreement between the two conferences and the Rose Bowl, and the agreement's lapse, see Herb Michelson and Dave Newhouse, Rose Bowl Football Since 1902, (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1977); also see John D. McCollum, Pac-10 Football: The Rose Bowl Conference, (Seattle: Writing Works, 1982).
When the University of Alabama surfaced as a likely opponent, students at UCLA formed the ad hoc Negro College Students of Southern California (NCSSC) and called for a boycott of the Rose Bowl if Alabama were invited. The group's Executive Committee specifically mentioned that its supporters included members of the football team, implying that a boycott would affect the game itself, not just attendance.58

The NCSSC's announcement soon gained attention beyond campus and in the media. Pat Hull wrote from Colorado College that news of the proposed boycott had spread to the Rockies and that support on campus ran high.59 The Los Angeles Sentinel, the city's black newspaper, screamed "Don't Bring Dixiecrats to Rose Bowl," and sports editor L.I. Brockenbury indicated how offensive to Los Angeles' black community the consideration of Alabama was when he wryly commented, "if they're going to recommend Alabama, they might as well go all the way and invite 'Ole Miss."60 Nothing, however, attracted attention to the students' action like the biting, Pulitzer Prize-winning wit of Jim Murray of the Los Angeles Times, who noted "The Uclans' student announcement . . . under no circumstances would they be willing to waive the Emancipation Proclamation even for a single New Years afternoon."61 Murray continued the attack the next day by commenting he had no intentions of finding social injustice when he reported on Alabama, only that of covering a football


game, "but the cross-currents of our time are such that the two are interrelated." Murray's comments made clear that many outside UCLA also viewed the whole episode within the context of the Civil Rights movement.

The *Bruin* made its position clear with an editorial cartoon opposing the invitation of the Crimson Tide, featuring the UCLA mascot dressed in Civil War attire, illustrating the South's longstanding opposition to racial equality (see illustration 3.3). It is unclear how much support the proposed boycott enjoyed from the football team, but starting halfback Kermit Alexander certainly intended to abide by any boycott and it is likely he would have been joined by starters Almose Thompson and quarterback Bobby Smith. How many others, white or black, might have participated is open to conjecture. Already suffering heavy criticism for both its handling

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63 Henrik van Leuven, *Touchdown, UCLA!: The Complete History of Bruin Football*, (Tomball, TX: Strode Publishers, 1982). Alexander's position that he would not play in the game is found in van Leuven's personal interview notes, which he generously provided the author. The likelihood that the athletic department or administration would have acceded to any such boycott appears limited. The Bruins' appearance in the Rose Bowl netted the athletic department $134,415, covering almost a third of the debt left over from when the students controlled athletics, see "Report on Examination of Statement of distributive share of football game with the University of Minnesota played at the Rose Bowl on January 1, 1962," FDM, Box #27, "f. 14 Rose Bowl 1961-1966." In addition, the sheer magnitude of the Rose Bowl, known as "The Grandaddy of Them All," and the fact that UCLA had never won a Rose Bowl at this point, seriously dampens any speculation that the students could have successfully pulled off a boycott. Former business manager and eventual assistant athletic director Robert Fischer said of the issue, "I
of the Autherine Lucy episode and negative publicity concerning the football team, the University of Alabama chose not to engender more controversy and withdrew from consideration for the Rose Bowl.64

No sooner had the Rose Bowl controversy passed, however, when a similar situation confronted the basketball team. The Houston chapter of the NAACP sent Robert Singleton a telegram informing him of the segregated seating at the Houston Coliseum, site of an upcoming basketball tournament featuring UCLA, and announcing their intentions to picket the Jim Crow arrangements. Singleton, overwhelmed with his own campus activism and his ongoing legal battles due to the Freedom Rides, passed the telegram off to Walt Hazzard, starting guard on the team.65 While the SLC unanimously opposed sending the team to Houston, Hazard apparently addressed the team on the issue; a day later the University of Houston announced the removal of Jim Crow seating arrangements at the Houston Coliseum.

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64 For problems facing the University of Alabama during the Autherine Lucy episode, see E. Culpepper Clark, The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation's Last Stand at the University of Alabama, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); for charges of excessive on- and off-field violence on the part of the football team, see "A Bear at 'Bama," Time, November 17, 1961 and "The Bear and Alabama Come Out on Top," Sports Illustrated, December 25, 1961. Alabama head coach Paul "Bear" Bryant claims the invitation was in fact offered but then rescinded, which he blamed entirely on Murray's columns in the Times, "He wrote about segregation and the Alabama Ku Klux Klan and every unrelated scandalous thing he could think of, and we didn't get the invitation," Paul W. Bryant and John Underwood, Bear: The Hard Times and Good Life of Alabama's Coach Bryant, (Boston: Bantam Books, 1975) pp. 201, 317. Defending his columns Murray could not resist another shot, writing, "I took the trouble to point out they'd have to take pot luck at the drinking fountain with the rest of us, the water was integrated, that the buses were very careless in their seating and let just ANYBODY sit in the front . . ." "Living Color," Los Angeles Times, November 29, 1961, part IV, p. 1.

65 Singleton, interview; also see "NAACP May Walk on UCLA Games in Houston," Daily Bruin, December 8, 1961, p. 14.
Although Houston integrated the seating, the city's Jim Crow facilities forced the Bruins to stay in campus dorms as no hotel would lodge the integrated team. In response to both the football and basketball issues, the SLC passed a resolution asking the Chancellor to issue a policy prohibiting UCLA's participation in any sporting event that included segregated facilities or teams, followed by telegrams to President Kerr and California Governor Edmund Brown asking for similar policies for the entire University of California. In fact, the University already maintained such a policy for regular season match-ups only, but had not made it public. The student demands however, persuaded the university to do so.

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66 "Council Backs Pull Out of Houston Tilts," Daily Bruin, December 14, 1961, p. 1 and "Houston Game On - Johns," ibid., December 15, 1961, p. 3; Singleton, interview. It is Singleton's contention that Hazard's address to the team displeased Head Coach John Wooden, who nonetheless spoke to Athletic Director Wilbur Johns about the issue. Wooden's own views on the rank injustice of discrimination are well established and any displeasure he might have had towards Hazard may have been based in Hazard not speaking with him first.

67 "Reports Conflict About Negro Cager Treatment," Daily Bruin, January 3, 1962, p. 1. Staying in dorms or hotels hours from game sites was a mainstay of Wooden teams when faced with Jim Crow facilities. Ironically, the problem most often arose not in the South but in the West when UCLA played schools in Utah on account of the racial assumptions then part of the Mormon religion. Wooden refused to ever split the team and the "us-against-them" togetherness it fostered went a long way in maintaining team cohesiveness between black and white players during the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s.

68 "SLC Asks Chancellor For Athletic Segregation Policy," Daily Bruin January 4, 1962, p. 1; "Wires Sent Brown, Kerr On Athletics Segregation," ibid., January 5, 1962, p. 1. Discussion concerning an anti-discriminatory policy in athletics began at least as early as April 1960, and the President made the policy official five months later, see letter from Thomas J. Cunningham, Vice President and General Counsel to Chancellor Glenn T. Seaborg and Vice Chancellor William G. Young, April 1, 1960; and letter from Clark Kerr to Chancellor Glenn T. Seaborg and Chancellor Franklin D. Murphy, September 7, 1960, both found in folder #246-S Intercollegiate Athletic Advisory Council 1960, Box #123, FDM. It is unclear why Kerr felt it necessary not to make public such a policy. After the basketball incident, Murphy sent AD Wilbur Johns a letter assuring him that his actions were "beyond criticism," but wanted to take the opportunity to "restate . . . the policies by which we have been operating . . ." suggesting that Johns was either negligent in scheduling the Houston tournament in the first place or was unaware of the policy, the latter being highly unlikely considering his position as Athletic Director. The letter is also indicative of the relationship between Murphy and student activists in that Murphy sent copies of the Johns letter to both Stiven and Singleton, letter from Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor to Wilbur Johns, Director of Athletics, January 24, 1962, Department of Intercollegiate Athletics, 1962-64 folder, Box #27, FDM.
though not admitting that such a policy previously existed, duping the students into believing it was "almost directly attributed to a recommendation made by SLC."\(^{69}\)

Simultaneous to the issues surrounding discrimination in athletics, the UCLA students arrested during the Freedom Rides faced the issue of posting bond money for their trials in late spring and early summer of 1962. A group calling itself the Student Leadership Assembly vowed to raise $12,000 for that purpose, though not offering any specific methods by which to do so.\(^{70}\) Two weeks later, the group addressed a letter to the student body requesting individual donations for the Riders, noting the fifteen Riders needed $1000 each. Two history department faculty members, John and LaRee Caughey, arranged for a Westwood bank to accept the donations and hold them in trust, earning interest, until such time as the Riders needed the funds.\(^{71}\) Student activists, however, had no intention of letting public subscriptions solve the problem and circulated petitions requesting $5,000 from the student incidental fund as a loan to the Riders, to be repaid upon completion of the judicial process. James Stiven, ASUCLA President, lent credence to the issue by stating, "if it is proven a substantial percentage of the student body desires to use its funds for the benefit of the Freedom Riders, the money should be used for that purpose."\(^{72}\)


\(^{70}\) "SLA Committees Set Action on Riders, Faculty Content," \textit{Daily Bruin}, October 26, 1961, p. 2.


After the pro-loan petition gained a fair amount of attention and signatures, including that of Senator Eugene McCarthy, on campus that fall as yet another political speaker, students opposed to the loan began circulating their own petition. Once either or both petitions received signatures from 10 percent of the student body, the SLC was obligated to vote on the issue or bring it before the general student body in the form of a referendum.

An editorial in the *Bruin* commented on what was at stake when it noted that the SLC could not consider the moral implications of the decision, but rather only if the 10% figure had been reached. Such constrictions, however, did not bind the petition's signers; for them, the moral question was "the imminently important issue. . . For the petition is far more than a businessman's request for a loan; it is an expression of support for equality before the law and for the efficient enforcement of the law - the supreme law." The author left without saying that "the supreme law" ranked hierarchically above the Kerr Directives.

Alan Bock clarified the true implications of the issue when he noted that the Riders enjoyed the financial and legal support of CORE and the NAACP, leaving them other recourse should the SLC deny the loan; conversely, $5,000 out of the Student General Fund of $200,000 did not constitute a "substantial drain" on student coffers. "It appears that the money is intended primarily as a symbol of endorsement for the Freedom Riders from UCLA," a gesture Bock supported. Quite simply, student activists wanted to make the loan

to include the wider campus in the Civil Rights movement, to test the Kerr Directives, and to bring a sense of activism to a still relatively dormant campus. The Dean of Students ruled that making the loan would not, in and of itself, constitute an endorsement, so long as SLC did not also pass any resolution of praise or support. Students, however, noted the contradiction and argued that not only was the money intended to be a vote of support, but that the ASUCLA had taken stands on off-campus matters just that semester on issues such as housing and job discrimination in Westwood.

Kerr continued to argue that the Directives were a liberalization of Sproul's Rule 17, which was correct, while the students continued to argue that the "off-campus" restrictions limited campus activism, which was also correct. At issue were the modifications Kerr announced in August while students were away on summer break. While the first Kerr Directives distinguished between recognized and unrecognized campus organizations, allowing for unrecognized, i.e. political, organizations use of University facilities and virtually no limitation on speech so long as they did not officially identify with the University, the second Directives abolished the distinction, forbidding any affiliation with off-campus political or religious organizations and prohibiting any comment on off-campus issues. After a Bruin editorial criticized the second Directives as "an ideological filter tip to screen out harsh dissenting ideas," Chancellor Murphy wrote back, arguing of their liberality compared with Rule 17. The Editor, Harry Shearer, replied to Murphy in print, sharply informing the

77 "Our Turn to Help," Daily Bruin, December 6, 1961, p. 4.
79 "The Speech and Reality," Daily Bruin, November 6, 1961, p. 4; letter from Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor, to Harry Shearer, Editor, November 17, 1961, folder #246 - BV Student Government, Kerr

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Chancellor that prior to Murphy's arrival "Kerr developed a liberal set of rules that completely revamped Rule 17. Sir, you skirt the issue. It is the President's former policies that we aim to achieve again." Unwilling to negotiate with the students, Kerr offered them "a Hobson's choice for which [they] have not asked," namely, repealing the Kerr Directives and reinstating Rule 17. The *Bruin* lashed out at this tactic by agreeing that Kerr's "original directives were a liberalization of previous policy; it is when he extends that appellation to the recent revisions and then offers the students a political shell game" with which they took issue.  

By the students' own admission, the Kerr Directive restrictions lay at the heart of the Freedom Riders bail controversy. When the pro-loan petition achieved the requisite 10 percent figure, the SLC immediately voted to put the issue up for referendum. Regardless of the administration's ruling that the loan would not constitute an endorsement or a violation of the Kerr Directives, parties on both sides explicitly placed the issue in those terms. Steve Weiner, arguing for the loan, disabused the students of any notion they might have had that the decision was purely administrative by referring to the vote not as a decision on the loan, but as a "referendum on the Freedom Rides" themselves. A front page editorial in the *Bruin* urging students to vote for the loan stated, "Implicit in any vote is a moral judgement" about

Directives, 1958-64, Box #122, FDM.

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the disparity "between the country's ideals and their implementation," while an editorial cartoon lampooned the dueling petitions, but gave the moral high ground to those in favor of granting the loan by placing a member of the Ku Klux Klan in the anti-loan camp (see illustration 3.4). The Freedom Rider loan episode is illustrative of the Civil Rights movement at UCLA in that it was an attempt to reconcile what is with what ought to be.

Students at UCLA approved the loan with 60 percent approval; however, only 3,532 students voted on a campus of 18,000. The small voter turnout played a significant role when the administrative Board of Control refused to grant the loan, as was their prerogative as the final arbiter of ASUCLA finances. Platform immediately filed an appeal to Chancellor Murphy, arguing, "there's much more at stake than the loan for the freedom riders. The Board of Control evidently does not give primary consideration to the wishes of the very people who support ASUCLA." The Bruin

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85 "Measure Given 60% Support; 3532 Vote," Daily Bruin, February 16, 1962, p. 1; campus enrollment figures can be found in University of California Statistical Survey, Students and Faculty, 1961-1961, p. 6.

editorial board commented that the BOC's decision illustrated "that student government, as it is tolerated here, is little more than a pleasant sham." In response, an ad hoc committee from the law school, with the support of Platform, held a demonstration to protest the decision, featuring "several hundred students," where speakers called for a curtailment of the BOC's authority, claiming "the Board has shamelessly used its power to save a cause that lost in the ballot box." Following the successful rally, Platform called for a sit-in the next day at the Administration Building to demand a resolution of the appeal and an explanation from Murphy and spent the night calling the 3000 students who signed the pro-loan petition urging their attendance. Only 200 students showed up for the demonstration to hear Murphy personally support the efforts of the Freedom Riders but reject their final appeal.

The Freedom Rider loan episode marked the high tide of identity based student activism at UCLA, while illustrating that the now substantial cadre of student activists on campus could not mobilize overwhelming student support when circumstances required. Even more so, the episode marked a shift in the nature of student activism with regards to working with the administration. Student-specific issues such as discrimination in athletics, free speech and association on campus, and the financial support of students engaged in those

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89 "Sit-Out Demonstration Set to Ask FDM Loan Views," Daily Bruin, March 16, 1962, p. 1; "FDM Rejects Appeal," ibid., March 19, 1962, p. 1. The original appeal was filed while Murphy was away and his surrogate, Vice Chancellor Foster Sherwood heard and denied the appeal; however, it is indicative of the esteem student activists held for Murphy that they hoped he might overturn the decision upon his return to campus, see "Chancellor's Office Denies Appeal Hearing to Riders," ibid., March 12, 1962, p. 1. Although he rejected the appeal, according to Singleton, Murphy personally intervened in the financial aid office to ensure that all of the student Riders received additional student aid, even those then at the limit, Singleton interview.
activities brought activism to campus in ways less personal issues could not. The politicization of campus continued with the SLC approving a free speech "Hyde Park" area on campus and Platform devoting itself to opposing the Kerr Directives and the complete repudiation of discrimination in both the South and at home. These student-specific issues made the reform efforts truly "student" activism in that students responded to their primary identity in opposing or supporting such issues. As the social movements of the 1960s broadened their scope off campus, students at UCLA never again enjoyed such identity based activism. In addition, while student activists again found their voice in the Bruin and the SLC and could win support for a clearly reformist referendum, even marshalling hundreds of students for a protest, far too many at UCLA were unwilling to make the jump from supporting activism to being an activist. The Freedom Rider loan provides the single best example, with the number of supporters diminishing with each level of activism, from more than 3000 signatories on the initial petition to 200 demonstrators outside the Chancellor's office.

Finally, the activist community at UCLA now viewed the administrative machinery as ambivalent at best, harmful and restrictive at worst. While some students, exhibiting an optimistic mentality, argued that the second Kerr Directives were better than Rule 17 and that the BOC provided tremendous benefit to the ASUCLA, student activists began to articulate the first cries for student power at UCLA. Activists argued that the issue over the BOC had


nothing to do with long-term fiscal oversight and everything to do with administrative
contempt for students' abilities to handle their own affairs. Similarly, Kerr's efforts to limit
their political activity and what they perceived as his duplicitous rhetoric offended their
burgeoning sense of activist responsibility. If identity based student activism taught students
how and where to see injustice, it also taught them to demand authority over their own
institutions.

The loan controversy also had long term ramifications for the Civil Rights movement
on campus. The Freedom Rides illustrated the terms under which the movement came to
campus at all and under what circumstances large numbers of students would take part.
Southern brutality towards the Riders, with the complicity of local law enforcement,
demonstrated not simply the rank unfairness of the Jim Crow system, but its extra-legal status,
thereby repudiating students' traditional democratic capitalist values of working within the
system and equality of and before the law. The Freedom Rides were not a demonstration for
rights yet unwon, but rather an exercise of rights already established under the federal court
system. Students at UCLA, taking advantage of California's free public education and hoping
to achieve a materialist lifestyle after college, understood the value of working within the
democratic capitalist system. The treatment of the Riders offended students' beliefs in the
sanctity of law and its attendant protection of individual liberty and private property; as such
their activism sought to protect their rights as much as those of blacks in the South or West,
making these values in fact, conservative. More importantly, the participation of UCLA
students in the Rides and their subsequent violent treatment offered a far more personal
consequence to the struggle for civil rights to UCLA's relatively ambiguous student body.
While the sit-in movement of 1960 also witnessed violence against college students, only the presence of UCLA students allowed the activist eruption of 1961-62. Finally, the injustice of the Freedom Rides in the South helped illustrate injustice at home as well. Opposition to the Kerr Directives increased during the fall term as the Freedom Rider issue grew apace and the concern over UCLA’s athletic teams might never have arisen were it not for the attention brought by the Freedom Rides.

Student activists at UCLA, however, could not maintain the activist fervor of 1961-62. The large numbers of students who participated in the protests and demonstrations of 1961-62 did so out of emotional response to things like the Freedom Rides and the Kerr Directives, emotions which appealed to their materialist sense of self-interest. Because only the activist cadre remained morally and ideologically committed, when the confrontations over athletics and the loan referendum passed, the emotional attachment that the majority of students brought to the period passed as well. To do otherwise would have required deep-seated uncertainty over the efficacy of institutions such as the federal government and the university. Most of UCLA’s students could not repudiate a system with which they so strongly identified, both currently and in the future.

In addition, far too many students continued to see UCLA, and the West in general, as lacking serious racial inequalities. When a student wrote a letter to the editor noting the lack of discrimination at UCLA, Letitia Levinson wrote back noting not only the obvious example of the Greek system, but the fact that currently only two blacks served on any of the numerous student governing bodies, none had ever been elected Homecoming Queen or
named Song Girls, while the Bruin Belles included only three blacks out of 80 students. And finally, the refusal of the BOC to grant the Freedom Rider loan convinced the uncommitted masses that the university establishment did not value their input and proved too monolithic to be swayed when the stakes really mattered. The memory of the Freedom Rider loan episode lingered well into the decade as one letter to the paper noted, "memories of the Freedom Rider debacle still leave a bad taste," as institutions such as student government offered no authority with issues like the Kerr Directives and the loan. An editorial commented that the dates of the loan referendum and the BOC rejection remained as the outstanding events in UCLA's recent past, comparing the BOC's action to that of a high school principal, noting the obvious "change in students' attitude since that time." As late as 1965, students still bitterly commented on the episode, contrasting the active participation of students at schools like Jackson State with UCLA students' inability to secure the loan "from its own funds."

As other battles in the Civil Rights movement occurred, the activist cadre at UCLA unsuccessfully attempted to energize the campus again. During the Meredith crisis in 1962, Platform publicly condemned the violence and Clement Cottingham, Jr. wrote of "the noticeable apathy on this campus" in response to the violence at 'Ole Miss. Similarly, during


95 The Marxist-Humanist, April 9, 1965, p. 2, 1965 folder, Box #7, SAC.


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the 1963 demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama, John Sprungman wrote a caustic editorial directed at apathetic students, "curse the South, will you? Curse the South and then go home and curse the landlord who let those awful wetbacks rent the apartment next door. . . It's not safe to walk Main Street after dark? Damn those Negroes. Who are you to curse the South?"

Efforts to use events closer to home to inspire students to identify with the Civil Rights movement witnessed similar struggles. During the spring and summer of 1963, Platform joined CORE picketers at restricted housing developments in Torrance and Dominguez Hills with no mainstream support from the campus. The Daily Bruin did not cover the picketing at all nor made any editorial reference, even though the action proved to be one of L.A. CORE's most successful, receiving joint cooperation with the NAACP, including hundreds of arrests and one demonstration that drew over a thousand people. By its own acknowledgement, "CORE, primarily because of the sit-in, is now recognized as the most potent force in this area in combatting housing discrimination." The group, however, "failed to capitalize fully on our opportunities during and since the Freedom Rides, primarily because our organizational skills have not kept pace with our growth." Much of that failure came in L.A. CORE's continued unwillingness to embrace students. Upwards of fifty UCLA CORE members staged a demonstration at the offices of the Los Angeles Board of Education.


99 Los Angeles CORE Annual Report (June 1, 1961 - June 1, 1962), folder #41, Carton #3, Social Protest Collection (SPC), Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
in November 1963 to protest discrimination in the city's public schools. President Scott Van Leuven was arrested and roughly one hundred other students joined the UCLA group the following week to stage an all night sit-in at the Board.100 By March 1964, L.A. CORE finally recognized the student contribution to the movement and made the Student Committee a regular standing committee.101

Outside of CORE however, the efforts of the students and CORE in general earned criticism on campus. The *Bruin*, and many students, were cool to Van Leuven's actions at the Board of Education demonstrations and another CORE project aimed at Lucky's Supermarkets. Unique to the West Coast, CORE developed the "shop-in" technique, which involved individuals filling shopping carts and then abandoning them in the check-out line, requiring the market to spend hours restocking, as a way to force Lucky's into hiring blacks. After the shop-ins, the paper editorialized that "CORE's recent actions . . . are to be viewed with alarm." Such militant "needless recklessness" not only alienated potential allies, the *Bruin* argued, but offended the political sensibilities of potential moderate off-campus supporters, hindering other efforts such as the Rumford Fair Housing initiative, which sought to outlaw restrictive housing development, sales and rentals.102 Taking a page from the shop-ins, UCLA CORE began picketing the Bank of America for both its hiring policies in the United States and its investments in South Africa. The demonstrations included a "coin-in,"


in which students sought to exchange a $10 or $20 bill for pennies, and a "cash-in," in which demonstrators took advantage of federal banking legislation allowing for almost anything to serve as a legal check so long as it contained a valid account number, by attempting to cash checks written on an old washtub, a door, and even the backs of picket signs. Both were designed to maximize the inconvenience to the bank and force it to reconsider its hiring and investment policies.103

This period also witnessed politically conservative students at UCLA vocalize their opposition to liberal student activism. In 1961, the Daily Bruin published an editorial critical of conservative students for their lack of participation in campus political affairs and their contentment with murmuring that "liberal whites write too many letters to the editor."104 Conservative students at UCLA began publishing Gargoyle Weekly in late 1963, a weekly broadsheet devoted to supporting Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential candidacy and attacking the efforts of campus reformers. Both articles and letters in "the Garg" illustrated the attitudes of the new conservative activists as harshly critical of the liberal activists and their tactics, though not necessarily offering a conservative activist alternative. A satirical spoof in one issue of the Garg criticized the CORE sit-ins at the Board of Education suggesting their primary need was deodorant.105 Similarly, a leaflet advertising the Bruin Young Republicans told students to "Join the only club . . . that does not discriminate against fraternities . . . and clean-shaven men." The leaflet also returned to the old red-baiting tactics

103 "Report of Bruin CORE's action against the Bank of America," from Bruce Hartford, dated July 30, 1964, reel #18, Series 5:15, CORE.


105 Gargoyle Weekly, vol. 4, no. 2, Misc. folder, Box #16, SAC.
by proclaiming "Better Think Than Pink," and criticized the civil rights activists' tactics by urging students to "join the only club which exhorts you to stand up and be counted rather than sit in and be carried off to jail."¹⁰⁶

Even the efforts of Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in Birmingham did not bring much outcry from students at UCLA until the bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in October 1963 resulted in the deaths of four young girls. Three hundred fifty students attended a memorial rally at UCLA's Hyde Park for the Birmingham victims and heard Reverend Donald Hartsock of the University Religious Conference (URC) tell them that Birmingham demanded each student "speak up clearly" and personally contribute to the Civil Rights movement. Robert Singleton, now in graduate school, bluntly told those assembled that the time for criticizing activism was past; students must either take part or "get the hell out of the way and stop telling us, who are trying to do something, that we are wrong."¹⁰⁷ Hartsock's and Singleton's exhortations aside, many at UCLA who might have wanted to take part in the movement lacked either the courage or the means to confront Southern segregation directly, thus muting the activist response since the 1961-62 period. Issues such as the Rose Bowl boycott and the Freedom Rider loan represented rare appearances in the West of Southern Jim Crowism. Without such appearances, however, uncommitted students found few tangible issues that could be passively dealt with in the West. By early 1964, however, an available option presented itself to those students. When counties in Mississippi began denying poverty relief to blacks who

¹⁰⁶ "Coming, Coming, Coming," 1965 folder, Box #7, SAC.

had attempted to vote or agitate for civil rights, a national student group sponsored a "Fast for Freedom" for February 26, calling on students to forgo food on that day and forward the money to Mississippi. The Bruin understood the importance of such a vicarious form of activism by noting, "here is a chance for participation for those who feel a need and desire to be on the front lines of the time[']s most significant issue. The opportunity to make a personal and immediate sacrifice for a cause is here."\(^{108}\) Not willing to limit students' participation to the single-day fast, UCLA Hillel Council organized a food drive for 22,000 affected blacks in the Mississippi Delta and helped collect and ship 20 tons of food from the Los Angeles area.\(^{109}\) In addition, under the auspices of the URC, students canvassing voting booths for NBC's Election Night coverage in 1964 donated their pay to the Food for Freedom project.\(^{110}\)

Students' hesitancy to embrace more militant tactics and their penchant for criticizing those who did was most evident during the fall 1964 Free Speech Movement (FSM) demonstrations at Cal. After student activists, mostly from the Civil Rights movement, ignored restrictions over on-campus political discussion and fundraising and faced both civil and academic punishment, thousands of Cal students staged a massive sit-in. The administration, using heavy-handed tactics throughout, at first refused to negotiate with the students, who quickly gained the sympathy of both the teaching assistants and the faculty, forcing the administration's hand. Months of negotiations and an all-night sit-in, featuring the largest mass arrest in California history, resulted in concessions to the students effectively

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nullifying the Kerr Directives. The period between the events of 1961-62 and the Cal FSM of 1964 witnessed little agitation at UCLA over free speech and the Kerr Directives. Murphy's willingness to allow tremendous lateral movement on the part of the students and the establishment of Hyde Park in 1962 minimized protest at UCLA. The activist cadre, however, lead by Platform, who continually petitioned Kerr to revise his Directives, maintained misgivings. Robert Friedman parodied the restrictions surrounding Hyde Park, for example, by referring to it as "Hydeovitch Plaza," implying that the limitations on registration, advertising and sound amplification in a "free" speech area were akin to Communist doublespeak. Similarly, an editorial cartoon suggested administrative contempt for the students' free speech concerns, referring to them as "a game," and including police surveillance (see illustration 3.5). Nothing at UCLA, however, came close to or prepared students for what happened at Cal.

The Daily Bruin kept students aware of the demonstrations at Cal throughout the fall of 1964, but no solidarity movement immediately sprang forward at UCLA. In fact, many students were appalled at the occurrences at Cal. The Bruin criticized the FSM for both its militancy and uncompromising nature, and its effects beyond the Berkeley campus, "we

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111 Perhaps the single most-written about event pertaining to student activism during this period, the Free Speech Movement has been the subject of numerous works. For a full description of the issues and events of the FSM at Cal, some of the better ones are Rorabaugh, Berkeley at War, which places the FSM and the University within the context of Berkeley and state politics; David Lance Goines, The Free Speech Movement: Coming of Age in the 1960s, (Berkeley: Ten Speed Press, 1993), from one of the original FSM defendants, the most recent, and one of the best, participant memoirs; and Max Heirich, The Beginning: Berkeley 1964, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), one of the earliest scholarly examinations of the FSM.

112 "Platform Petition," Daily Bruin, November 18, 1863, p. 4.

mourn not only the tragedy of what the Berkeleyites are doing to themselves, but what they are doing to the entire student community as well." "Study in Contrast," Daily Bruin, November 13, 1964, p. 4; also see "Berkeley, Plus 7," ibid., October 10, 1964, p. 4, in which the paper claimed that "at UCLA, we've been lucky" to have avoided such confrontations.

The paper charged in another editorial, "the FSM has also been guilty of egoism and a near total disregard for the rights and interests of others." "Discourse on Method," Daily Bruin, December 1, 1964, p. 4.

In late November, the FSM's most notable proponent, Mario Savio, hoping to expand the Movement, came to UCLA in an effort to explain the motives and goals of the FSM and show how the administration's restrictions hindered UCLA students' activities as well. "Free Speech Movement," 1964 folder, Box #6, SAC.

The following week, a UCLA FSM chapter met to hold an "educational meeting," attended by 450 students, of whom only 100 signed a pledge to support a UCLA FSM. "FSM Moves To Commence UCLA Actions," Daily Bruin, December 1, 1964, p. 4.

Interestingly, students both opposed to and in favor of the FSM agreed on the UCLA administration's role in the controversy. A Bruin editorial noted that between students and the administration lay "an area of mediation, ... Although it makes bad copy, the
administration of UCLA has been almost too cooperative to students' whims and ideas. Chancellor Franklin Murphy has always pledged that he will listen to talk, but not shouts. Indeed, the willingness of Murphy to protect the free marketplace of ideas, and students' knowledge of his wishes, may have been the single greatest factor which kept the UCLA campus from the direct confrontations witnessed at Cal. When students from both Cal and UCLA gathered at the Regents meeting at UCLA in mid-December, Murphy commented on the assembled demonstrators, "as long as its peaceful and doesn't interfere with the normal conduct of the University, why not?" Jim Berland, Chairman of the UCLA FSM agreed wholeheartedly with the paper, but argued that it missed the entire point of the Movement:

> Whether or not the University Administration is composed of good people makes little difference because as long as we have to depend on their being good people we are in a dangerous situation.

> The issue of advocacy is, in fact, as important as is student participation and decision making, but it has not affected us as deeply as it has at Berkeley because the administration has not chosen to discipline students who have been arrested for civil rights activity.

After several FSM rallies at Hyde Park in early December, which never garnered more than 500 students, some students, wary of the stringent rhetoric of the UCLA FSM, formed the Responsible Free Speech Movement (RFSM) and promptly stole the moderate underpinnings of the UCLA FSM. After the podium refused the floor to a member of the

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119 Letter from Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor, to Robert Michaels, President, ASUCLA, August 8, 1966, BV-110 University Rules and Regulations Regarding Student Activities, etc. 1966 folder, Box #79, FDM.


audience at an FSM meeting, the RFSM called for a walkout, which included roughly 400 students of the 500 gathered. Robert Shapiro, one of the RFSM's founders, originally admitted that the group's founding was a "joke," but after the denial of free speech at a meeting devoted to free speech, the RFSM quickly gained more legitimate support.\textsuperscript{122} If the FSM had any hope of marshalling the kind of student unity and support enjoyed at Berkeley, the RFSM split destroyed that hope. Even without the FSM/RFSM split, the students still lacked a solid issue with which to posit the administration as the oppressor and gain wider support. Throughout December and January, the FSM's own literature continued to harp on the occurrences and victories at Cal because they had so little to write about at UCLA.\textsuperscript{123} When CORE set up a fundraising table on campus in violation of the new regulations won at Cal concerning free speech, no uproar occurred when the administration declared those tables in violation of the rules.\textsuperscript{124}

A \textit{Daily Bruin} poll taken at the height of the Free Speech Movement offers insight into the nature of student activism at UCLA. When asked if they approved of the confrontational behavior of activists at Cal, two thirds of the respondents at UCLA said no.

\textsuperscript{122} "RFSM Boycotts Meeting of Independent Activists," \textit{Daily Bruin}, December 7, 1964, p. 1. Shapiro and other leaders of the RFSM also belonged to a campus spirit group called the Kelps, which turned the college prank into an art form and reveled in unleashing it upon anyone they felt took themselves too seriously, hence the RFSM begun as "a joke." Their most notorious stunt involved the 1965 Air Force-UCLA football game at which the cadets intended to entertain the crowd with a half-time falcon show. Just as the cadets released the falcons, the Kelps, dressed in World War I leather flying helmets, ran screaming out of the aisles of the student section slinging dead chickens over their heads, upstaging the cadets and distracting the falcons.

\textsuperscript{123} "UCLA Free Speech Movement Newsletter, December 9, 1964," and "UCLA Free Speech Movement Newsletter, January 4, 1965," both found in 1964 folder, Box #6, SAC.

When asked questions about specific incidents, however, student opinion proved much less decisive. Close to half opposed Governor Brown's use of police in clearing Sproul Hall and the subsequent arrest of over 800 Cal students. More than 60 percent opposed the University's ability to discipline students for off-campus activity, and close to half supported the use of direct action protest after the failure of arbitration or appeal to the administration. The last point shows how vastly uninformed the UCLA student body was over the issues in Berkeley. Students at Cal had appealed to the administration before engaging in direct action and the biggest demonstrations occurred in the wake of Kerr's duplicity and heavy-handedness towards both the students and the local administration at Cal. Students at UCLA seemed to declare a pox on both houses by condemning the original actions of the students but equally condemning the law enforcement repression and Kerr's seemingly personal vendetta by bringing University sanctions against those guilty of civil violations. Lacking a substantial amount of radical activist activity and enjoying Murphy's attempt to establish a free marketplace of ideas, students at UCLA found few, if any, instances of administrative repression. Hence, they had little sympathy for the Cal students. Finally, the lifelong rivalry with Berkeley caused many students at UCLA to inherently diminish the efforts of the Cal students, making it difficult to see the Cal students' struggles as their own. The subsequent victory of the Free Speech Movement and the excesses of both the police and Kerr, however, did mark a change in student opinion at UCLA. When ASUCLA President Jeff Donfeld addressed the UCLA Academic Senate after the

125 "DB Poll Shows Bruins Opposed to FSM Actions," Daily Bruin, December 15, 1964, p. 1. The poll received 1082 respondents, evenly distributed amongst all classes of undergraduates and graduates.
controversy, he informed the faculty "that students no longer believe that administrative rules and regulations are invincible and beyond change."\textsuperscript{126}

While the success of the Free Speech Movement largely settled the two-decades old question of speech and association at UCLA, the more basic issue of student power remained. Students made some progress by obtaining the right to offer student evaluations of faculty and their classes in 1964 and the SLC in 1965 unanimously supported the right of students to regularly attend and address the faculty senate.\textsuperscript{127} The question of student finances, however, remained the one issue most likely to rouse the student body as a whole and the one battle they had the most difficulty in winning. Memories still lingered over the Freedom Rider loan episode and students resented any reminder of their impotence. Unknowingly, Franklin Murphy tapped that resentment and suffered perhaps his only public defeat as Chancellor at UCLA.

An overwhelming supporter of intercollegiate athletics, Murphy felt strongly that UCLA's ascension to the upper tier of American universities required every aspect of the university, including athletics, to enjoy superior resources and facilities. The lack of an on-campus football stadium particularly rankled Murphy, especially considering that UCLA played its home games at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, literally across the street from

\textsuperscript{126} "Report of the Student Welfare Committee, Fall Semester, 1964-65," March 16, 1965, Student Affairs (1954-70), Box #39, Records of the Academic Senate, Executive Office Administrative Files, 1949-70 (ASEO), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles. According to Donfeld, another possible difference between the two campuses and subsequent response to the FSM lay with the faculty. Donfeld felt many students at Cal participated in the FSM demonstrations to vent their growing frustrations with the faculty and the apparent decline in the quality of teaching and faculty access, issues not quite so acute at UCLA.

its archrival, USC. Murphy suggested in 1965 the expenditure of more than six million dollars from the Student Activities Fund for the building of an on-campus football stadium. Students, some of whom felt a stadium unnecessary, others simply resenting someone having responsibility over their money, rose in revolt.128

The Bruin ran countless letters to the editor opposed to the stadium and the issue emerged as a litmus test for campus elections. No issue since the Freedom Rider loan garnered this much attention for so long. Students held a rally at Hyde Park to oppose the stadium and close to 600 students attended, far outpacing any demonstration during the FSM, at which Joel Siegel told students, "its simply a case of students asking to be consulted about the spending of their money."129 Siegel and others opposed to the stadium, dubbed the "Moneybowl," illustrated the convergence of college activism and college humor by staging a protest touch football game in Murphy's office, stating, "he wants football on campus, we'll give him football on campus."130 Students felt so strongly about the issue that the SLC ordered a referendum on the stadium and the Daily Bruin ran the only front page, above-the-fold, bannered editorial of the period urging students to vote no on the stadium as a demonstration to Murphy that not only did they oppose the stadium but they opposed his or anyone else's presumption to speak for their finances.131 The students narrowly opposed the

128 Student opposition to the football stadium was not the first time students opposed new building on campus. The previous year, some students also opposed the building of the Sunset Canyon Recreation Center, but it never achieved the wide-spread resentment that the football stadium engendered, see "Statement on the Proposed Recreation Center," February 13, 1963, 1963 folder, Box #6, SAC.


stadium in the referendum, 2701 to 2267, and the semester-long tirades in the *Bruin* and at Hyde Park forced Murphy to drastically scale back his intentions, instead approving the building of a track stadium at a fraction of the cost. Tellingly, more students voted on the stadium issue than the other referendum item that day, the Vietnam War, an indicator of the role self-interest played in motivating student activism at UCLA.\(^2\) While the students could not wrest total control of ASUCLA finances from administrative oversight, they forced the administration to consult with and consider student opinion. To this day, UCLA still does not have an on-campus football stadium, and Franklin Murphy always considered it one of his greatest disappointments.

While issues of student speech and power waxed and waned at UCLA, the Civil Rights movement remained an issue most students vaguely supported but generally ignored. The continued inability of students to see racial injustice at home remained a critical factor in arousing student activism. When the California Real Estate Association sponsored Proposition 14 in 1964, which would overturn the Rumford Fair Housing Bill prohibiting racial restrictions in renting, leasing or selling residential property, several student groups, including Bruin CORE and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), initiated a voter registration drive in an attempt to defeat Proposition 14, referring to it as "the segregation Amendment" and calling it the "most important Civil Rights fight in the history of California."\(^3\) The SLC passed a resolution asking students of voting age to oppose Proposition 14, noting that restricted housing covenants continued to be a problem for


\(^3\) "Vote no on 14," 1964 folder, Box #6, SAC.
students around Westwood. A group calling itself the California Youth for Fair Housing challenged students at UCLA to rise to the occasion, pointing out that students from all over the country were engaged in the fight against racial injustice by working in Mississippi on the Freedom Summer Project, in Virginia, and in urban ghettos, "those staying home shouldn't miss out." Students responded by forming the ad hoc Student Coordinating Committee for Voter Registration, which, along with other liberal reform groups, eventually registered over 2000 new voters for the 1964 election. Over 100 students took part and although California voters approved Proposition 14, the major campus success, according to Ellen Estrin of SDS, "was the involvement of so many students who heretofore had only spoken, not acted, their commitment."

Students' efforts during the Proposition 14 campaign marked a willingness to involve themselves in the fight for civil rights so long as they could make a local, personal connection to the struggle. As violence in the South increased however, that connection became less essential in rousing students' indignation. The murders of student workers James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman in June 1964 during the Mississippi Freedom Summer Project and continued harassment and beatings of civil rights workers throughout the South served as a clear message that the segregationists' steadfastness in opposing change

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135 "California Youth for Fair Housing," California, Social Action - Housing and Proposition 14 folder, Box #2, CRM.

136 "Segregation Amendment," 1964 folder, Box #6, SAC.

137 SDS Bulletin, May 1964, roll #6, Series 2A, #68, Papers of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.
must be met with an equal commitment to justice. When Alabama state troopers savagely beat demonstrators at the Pettus Bridge in Selma on national television, many students outside the activist cadre finally had had enough. Under the leadership of well-known campus activists such as Jim Berland, over a thousand students attended a rally in Hyde Park, where Berland told the crowd, "the beatings in Selma should shake us out of our apathy."\textsuperscript{138} The Daily Bruin editorialized that doing nothing at this point was no worse than the German citizens who sold out the Jews by also doing nothing, "if we are to pass judgement at Nuremberg on a nation that turned its head from the injustices and atrocities, we can do no less at Selma and the injustices being committed there, against our own countrymen."\textsuperscript{139}

Student repugnance over the events in Selma marked another peak in campus activism at UCLA. Where past rallies and student protest generally included statements of condemnation and little else, activism in the wake of Selma included more concrete efforts at change. The SLC, called into emergency session to address the events in Selma, unanimously condemned the violence and formed a committee "to study avenues of further action by SLC and ASUCLA for the best use of our resources to aid in the struggle for constitutional rights in Selma, Alabama."\textsuperscript{140} The Hyde Park rally, which dozens of students helped organize by writing copy, mimeographing leaflets, and arranging for speakers and sound equipment, and which many professors supported by cancelling classes for that time, netted $700 to aid the demonstrators in Selma; the following week, SLC allotted $500 to the


\textsuperscript{139} "Selma-USA?" \textit{Daily Bruin}, March 9, 1965, p. 4.

Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) for further demonstrations in Selma.¹⁴¹ A group of students addressed this change in a letter to the *Bruin*, saying the marchers in Selma, "like the three martyrs of last summer, are marching into the American consciousness; they are also marching into the UCLA students' consciousness." The letter noted that since "the excitement and disappointment of the Freedom Rider loan," students at UCLA retreated into apathy and disinterest, and the authors hoped that events in Selma would be enough to shake the legacy of the loan debacle.¹⁴²

The importance of the 1964 murders and the Selma beatings was not merely repugnance of the sheer brutality, although that clearly had visceral benefits, but the absolute disregard for the law. Students' beliefs in the sanctity of the democratic process precluded their acceptance of the violent denial of the franchise to American citizens. As one *Bruin* columnist wrote, "the greater issue at stake [was] the integrity of the law." While the murders of Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner demonstrated a savage brutality present in the fight for justice, events in Selma "revealed a danger immeasurably more sinister" because they involved the force of the state itself;

when the government itself embarks on a calculated, methodical suppression of a segment of society, perverting the law to the point of being a tool to facilitate that suppression . . . it is not lawlessness, it is tyranny . . . no one can be indifferent to disenfranchisement and violent suppression perpetrated not in defiance of law and government, but with its zealous assistance.¹⁴³

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¹⁴² "Will This Go On, UCLA?," *Daily Bruin*, March 10, 1965, p. 4.

As many students grasped their opposition to America's growing military commitment in Vietnam, they understood the next time the state turned its resources against dissent, it could be against them. Opposition to events in Selma reinforced their democratic capitalist beliefs in the sanctity of law and the democratic process because to do otherwise put their own rights and interests at stake.

While the activist ferment of Spring 1965 did not require a local, personal connection to arouse large-scale student participation, the outgrowth of that ferment took form in exactly that context. As large-scale activism awoke at UCLA, students discovered that poverty and injustice surrounded them. Dating back to 1935, UCLA students operated Unicamp, a summer camp for underprivileged children from Los Angeles. Originally, Unicamp catered to physically and mentally handicapped children, although by the mid-1960s students also insisted on including socially underprivileged kids as well.144 Students also operated the UCLA Tutorial Project, begun in 1963, to work in Venice and Watts tutoring underprivileged students at risk of dropping out of elementary, junior or senior high school. By 1965, the project worked in conjunction with the Western Student Movement (WSM), a local outgrowth of SDS whose objective was to include "the entire community in the process of education and community development." The WSM and the tutorial project also sought to mentor potential college students from economically depressed areas who either lacked encouragement to attend college or entered college ill prepared. By 1967, over 550 UCLA

144 "The UCLA Unicamp Story," Unicamp file, Vertical Subject Files, University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.
students participated in the Tutorial project. During the Proposition 14 campaign, the Student Coordinating Committee for Voter Registration also sponsored a tutorial program called Education in Watts, urging students to "take a few hours off from studying to do something meaningful and important."

In addition to the on-campus and around town efforts that students engaged in, others went farther afield as well. In 1963, UCLA students formed Amigos, a service organization devoted to bringing poverty relief to the ghettos of Tijuana, Mexico, known as "colonias." Amigos usually spent spring break or Thanksgiving in one of the colonias building schools, orphanages, or other public use facilities and in 1965, as other students went south to work for civil rights, the group also planned a summer project building a workshop and orphanage. The 1965 summer project spawned an intensive three year relationship with the Colonia Durango which included building a new school for the deaf and illustrated that Amigos represented perhaps the most idealistic of the new activist groups at UCLA. As one member put it, "you won't save the world; you won't go gloriously forth to feed the hungry, clothe the naked and bring general joy and sunshine to the suffering . . . But you will get a chance to work with other people, to learn something of all that they know and are as

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146 "Segregation Amendment," 1964 folder, Box #6, SAC.

individual human beings instead of objects. Perhaps you will find out a little about yourself."\textsuperscript{148}

Closer to home, UCLA students finally realized they had their own version of the Mississippi Delta in the farm communities of the Central Valley. Historically in California, individual landowners controlled vast acreages, aided in part by federal reclamation projects, requiring cheap migrant labor to provide the rich agricultural profits that the Valley's white communities relied upon. The white growers paid the overwhelmingly Latino migrant farm workers poverty wages, some as low as a dollar an hour, and less for women and children. Headquartered in the Valley town of Delano and lead by Cesar Chavez, the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC) struck against the growers in 1965 and immediately gained student sympathy.\textsuperscript{149} After noting that disenfranchisement took other forms in the Central Valley than in Mississippi, Mike Davis, UCLA alumnae and SDS organizer, noted "otherwise, the Valley is Mississippi: poverty, alienation, feeling of hopelessness, mechanization, police brutality, little organization . . ."\textsuperscript{150} During the summer of 1965, the UCLA Tutorial Project sponsored a Migratory Worker Summer Project to tutor children of migrant workers who enjoyed no schooling at all, many of whom did not even

\textsuperscript{148} "UCLA Amigos in TJ: do machos have more fun?," \textit{Daily Bruin}, February 23, 1967, pp. 6-7.


\textsuperscript{150} Letter from Mike Davis to Clark Kissinger, December 21, 1964, roll #11, series 2B, #31, SDS.
speak English. The project included at least 25 UCLA students and benefited from a $12,500 grant from the federal government.\textsuperscript{151}

At summer's end, the tutors and SDS organizers returned to campus just as the Freedom Riders did four years previous to relay their experiences. SDS's first on-campus rally occurred in October at Hyde Park, which explained the situation in the Valley and UFWOC's efforts, seeking donations of money and food for the workers from the more than 200 in attendance.\textsuperscript{152} The group referred to Delano and the Valley as "The Other California," declaring, "it is a struggle to determine if farm labor has the right of organization for a decent, human life. For nearly all people there is a thing more important than money. It is a thing called dignity." Student activists attempted to establish the farmworkers' moderate, democratic legitimacy, by stating their desire to "get involved in politics, in voter registration, not just contract negotiation."\textsuperscript{153} SDS, with support from SNCC, also took the lead among white student groups to picket retail stores such as Safeway that continued selling non-union grapes and lettuce.\textsuperscript{154} As the strike wore on and the growers exhibited the same tactics as white officials in the South, the Bruin called on students to support the strike by boycotting Schenley industries, the single largest landholder in Delano. To aid the students in their boycott, the paper printed a listing of Schenley's entire product line of wines, liquors and liqueurs. Jack Saunders wrote, "its about time that Governor Brown and the other state


\textsuperscript{152} "Grape Strikers' motives explained," \textit{Daily Bruin}, October 7, 1965, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{153} "UCLA Student Committee to Aid Farm Workers;" and "The Other California," 1965 folder, Box #7, SAC.

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{SDS Bulletin}, December 7, 1965, roll #21, series 3, #17, SDS.
officials who so loudly applaud this country's efforts to bring 'the American way of life' to Viet Nam do something to bring it to Delano."155

The success of SNCC's Freedom Summer Project in 1964 persuaded Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to attempt a similar project for the summer of 1965. King spoke at UCLA in the spring, announcing the project, Summer Community Organization and Political Education (SCOPE), and endeared himself to the students by refusing an invitation from Chancellor Murphy and Governor Brown to a formal luncheon. Stating, "I'm a clergyman first," King instead attended the "paper-plate, cafeteria style lunch" in the basement of the University Religious Conference.156 The relatively large number of black students at Western schools like UCLA caused both the SCLC and SNCC to view the region as fertile ground for recruiting, especially SNCC, which by 1965 emphasized greater leadership roles for blacks.157 It is unclear how many blacks participated at UCLA, but from the beginning, UCLA SCOPE harped not on the violence or injustice of segregation, but on the theme that had aroused so many students after Selma, the issue of voting rights. A recruiting flyer stated, "in more than one hundred counties of the black-belt South, Negroes make up more than 50% of the population but less than 10% of the voting


156 Siegel, "Sixties Scrapbook," p. 41. The URC played an important role in the campus struggle for civil rights, serving as liaison between students who participated in direct action and the university and faculty, arranging for lighter course loads during peak periods of activism, independent study, and Incompletes for students who got arrested or delayed coursework to complete activist work, Donald Hartsock, "UCLA Ombudsman," p. 89, OHP.

157 "Report on Recruiting, Screening and Training Volunteers for the South," SNCC West Coast Regional Conference, November 1964, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee folder, Box #23, Organizational Files.
population." Similarly appealing to students only recently committed to the struggle in the South, the flyer stated, "we are not going South to break laws. We are not going south to organize marches or participate in sit-ins or Freedom Rides. . . . In all probability, nothing [illegal] will happen." What the recruiting flyer did not mention was the workshop on non-violent tactics offered by SNCC, which also included how to react and protect yourself while being beaten.

Between eighteen and twenty UCLA students took part in the project and before their departure for Macon, Georgia, the group raised $2500 for its travel and living expenses, while a support group on campus continued fundraising throughout the summer. The Bruin recognized that such activism did not come along every day at UCLA, noting that substantial civil rights activity had been limited to two events: the Freedom Rider loan and the Selma sympathy rally; however, the paper challenged students to support the group going South by continuing to organize on campus or at least give money. Students responded by supporting the L.A. Friends of SNCC and their efforts to institute a Freedom School in Los Angeles. Friends of SNCC contended that for many black students in Los Angeles, high school served only to "mold young people to fit into society, to advance the system. The idea of challenge to the existing structure is thwarted early." SNCC put the issue in context for

158 "Bruin SCOPE Fact Sheet," 1965 folder, Box #7, SAC.


160 Letter from Roger Daniels, Assistant Professor to Vice Chancellor Charles E. Young, June 11, 1965, folder #230 - Speakers on Campus, Box #114, FDM; "What is Bruin SCOPE?," 1965 folder, Box #7, SAC. The Daniels letter claims that 20 students took part, but the SCOPE flyer lists 18 students, while the Bruin claimed the number went as high as 35.

students unable to see injustice at home without the prism of the South to illuminate it, "in the end, there is perhaps little difference between the high schools in Mississippi and those in L.A."162

By summer's end, UCLA SCOPE registered over 4,000 new voters in Macon and although in an election just after their departure, the first black candidate to run for public office was narrowly defeated, it marked the highest voter turnout ever for that office.163 Before their return to Los Angeles, the UCLA group went to Atlanta to be honored for registering the most voters of any of the SCOPE contingents at King's Ebeneezer Baptist Church. During the meeting, Joel Siegel, a white Westside Jew, joined in on guitar with the Albany Freedom Singers and was singled out from the pulpit by the Reverend Ralph Abernathy, "I've been in the movement my entire life, but I've never seen a white boy lead freedom songs."164

When students returned to campus in 1965, they found that Los Angeles had indeed become Selma with the Watts Uprising in August of that year. After white Los Angeles Police officers detained and arrested a black resident, a crowd gathered, prompting the officers to make an overt display of force, escalating the situation. Bystanders began throwing rocks and within two hours, rage caused by years of high unemployment, substandard living conditions, and police brutality erupted into six days of urban warfare.


costing 34 lives. Watts dramatized for students and Los Angeles' liberal white community the sheer destitution, poverty, hopelessness, and discontent faced by the city's blacks.\footnote{For a thorough discussion of the circumstances leading up to and a detailed narrative of the Uprising, as well as a persuasive argument as to why it was truly an uprising and not a riot, see Gerald Horne, \textit{The Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s}, (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1995).} It also directly highlighted the level of law enforcement brutality they faced on a daily basis from a police department which Roy Wilkins of the NAACP labeled as "next worse to Birmingham's."\footnote{"Police Brutality," Chronology of Movement Activity and Related Events - North folder, Box #5, CRM.} The \textit{Daily Bruin} noted the irony of the SCOPE workers going to Georgia to fight injustice only to come home and find it in Los Angeles, "while 18 UCLA students were working for justice in Macon, Georgia . . . [Los Angeles] was having a riot that made the Selma march look like an Easter parade." The editorial continued by noting the inequities of the law in Los Angeles, inequities which allowed some of the people now in Watts to be moved out of their homes so a cigar-smoking millionaire could build a baseball stadium in Chavez Ravine. And then a repeal of the fair housing law helped to keep them there. The laws allow them to be exploited in stores, out of decent jobs and away from security in their home. . . . In a society where the law allows people to be oppressed to such a degree, The Law will mean nothing but trouble and will never command respect.\footnote{"Law in Watts," \textit{Daily Bruin}, September 20, 1965, p. 4.}

For students whose own sense of activism grew out of respect for the fairness of the democratic capitalist system and the law, Watts represented the ultimate failure. Students at UCLA responded immediately with a canned food drive for the residents of Watts but also understood that a larger problem existed.\footnote{"Food for Watts," 1965 folder, Box #5, SAC; also see "UCLA undertakes Watts 'food drive,'" \textit{Daily Bruin}, August 19, 1965, p. 1.} Students understood that the exclusion of blacks
from Los Angeles' post-war prosperity helped bring about the uprising. With comparatively limited income, an inability to enjoy unlimited home ownership, and facing a total lack of respect for both persons and property from law enforcement, many blacks in Los Angeles could not identify with the tenets of private property and individual liberty that served as the tangible reminders of democratic capitalism. As one student noted succinctly, "perhaps making the goodies of America available to residents of the ghetto would help alleviate the condition which lead to riots."\(^{169}\) For students concerned with the struggle for black equality and the future of an interracial America, the question of how to distribute "the goodies of America" without diminishing the nature of America, and perhaps most importantly, their role in it, lay at the heart of the issue. When Floyd McKissick, national director of CORE spoke on campus about black power and the death of the Civil Rights movement, he put the issue rather bluntly to the overwhelmingly white audience, "most of you have never lived in a capitalistic society without capital."\(^{170}\)

Just as in 1961-62 when the ferment of the Freedom Rides, the Rose Bowl boycott and the Kerr Directives crested and then crashed like a wave, the activist fervor of 1964-65 similarly passed. The earlier wave crashed over the BOC's rejection of the loan, while the latter wave crashed over Watts. The small but increasing number of non-white students at UCLA indicated that removing discrimination in things like the Greek system or the BurOc no longer contained meaning in a society where blacks were shot in the street. Liberal and moderate whites increasingly directed their attentions to the war in Vietnam and more


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localized civil rights struggles like the grape workers strike. A handful of students continued to work within the context of the national Civil Rights movement by sponsoring tutorial projects in Grenada, Mississippi through the URC, but most activists recognized that the direct action phase of the Civil Rights movement passed into eclipse.171

Achieving the promises of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution stood as the primary goal of the direct action phase of the Civil Rights movement. Activists hoped to achieve that goal through an interracial coalition based on Christian love and an assumption that existing institutions could sufficiently embrace an interracial America. The failure of legislative victories such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 illustrated that existing institutions were in fact part of the problem. In response to that realization, blacks turned to the concept of Black Power, a notion soon embraced by other minorities, based on the assumption that minorities would have to create and control their own institutions in order to achieve equality. The turn to Black Power at UCLA marked a repudiation of a half century of student activism based on interracial participation, but lead by the white student majority and using existing institutions such as the student newspaper and government and the university itself.172

Symbolically, nothing illustrated this transformation like the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., in April 1968. King's death brought an emotional reaction from the

171 "The Bruin-Grenada Project," URC - UCLA Programs/Events 1932-72 folder, URC Programs - Historical, URC. The Bruin-Grenada Project began during Christmas 1966 and lasted at least through the summer of 1968, featuring various student exchanges, with some Grenada students coming to Los Angeles or UCLA students travelling to Mississippi to offer tutoring services.

students, who spontaneously moved to cancel all classes that Friday and hold a vigil at Janss Steps. Chancellor Murphy acknowledged that such short notice did not allow him to do so officially, but hoped "that faculty will look with sympathy on the initiative of the students to pay personal tribute to Dr. King." Murphy did officially call off classes on Monday for a formal memorial in Royce Hall, but the Friday vigil at Janss Steps clearly belonged to the students. Between five and seven thousand students attended, including Chancellor Murphy who eschewed the podium, choosing instead to sit, in jacket and tie, with the students, on the ground. As his deputy Charles E. Young later recalled, "Martin Luther King was one of Franklin's heroes." Hundreds of students then marched south through Westwood Village, urging merchants to close their businesses on Monday for one hour in King's memory; more than half complied. For stores that refused, students stood peacefully outside holding signs reading "by not closing, this store has failed to respect Dr. Martin Luther King." Curiously absent from the Friday vigil, however, were almost all black students. At 10:30 in the morning, while white students were meeting with Murphy to ask for a cancellation of classes, approximately 50 members of the Black Student Union marched through campus to Ackerman Union, where they promptly burned several American flags and then left campus.

King's death not only symbolized the passing of the direct action phase of the movement but also ushered in a change in tactics and goals on the part of student activists.


174 "University closes for King memorial," and "Student sorrow over King;s death shown at marches, silent vigil," *Daily Bruin*, April 8, 1968, p. 1; Young, interview.


The *Daily Bruin* placed King's death in context for the still predominantly white student body by noting that the struggle for an interracial America had largely failed up to that point, creating instead a white and black America, separate and unequal. "We must not claim to 'understand' the black man's problems for we don't. Possessed with the basic good intentions of liberals, most of us cannot translate these intentions into action until we break through the psychological wall built by vastly differing life experiences which separate black from white."

In this separate America, the *Bruin* argued, students should accept that the struggle for justice now must occur separately, "... the presence of whites within the ranks of the black power movement is antithetical to its very essence. Our efforts should be directed where they will do the most good: among our own people, white America."\(^\text{177}\)

The struggle for black power at UCLA, however, suffered from one notable problem: a limited black presence to exercise that power. Blacks, and other minorities, numbered only in the hundreds on a campus of almost thirty thousand. As the concept of black power took hold of campus civil rights organizations, some found themselves at a crossroads. Bob Niemann, leader of UCLA Friends of SNCC, proclaimed "it is no longer a good idea to remain a totally white group which the UCLA group has been." Niemann admitted, however, that the sticking point remained "whether he can find any Negro leadership on campus to help with the organization."\(^\text{178}\) Indeed, the *Bruin* editorial after King's death addressed to a third person "we" did not have to explicate that "we" meant whites. The small but growing number of non-white students at UCLA who accepted the notion of black power surely looked

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around campus and noticed a power vacuum. The late 1960s and early 1970s for these student activists witnessed a way to fill that vacuum. Residents of Watts showed liberal and moderate whites at UCLA and elsewhere in the city, the state, and the nation that the current implementation of the democratic capitalist system contained serious flaws. While Watts put politicians and public figures on notice that change needed to occur in their respective venues, students acknowledged that their venue, education, also must be held accountable for Watts. For more than forty years students at UCLA made the connection between education and progress, and the responsibility of the public university to use education to lead that progress. Activist students at UCLA now faced a situation of "put up or shut up," and the ensuing debate finally determined if the students were to be viewed as fully vested shareholders in the university.

Wide spread student activism at UCLA always required a local or personal connection to attract less ideologically committed students. The dramatic increase in student activity in late 1964 and 1965 witnessed a heavy emphasis on community related activism as a natural outgrowth of that need. The response to such activism prompted the Daily Bruin to editorialize that students should receive academic credit for such community service projects. "The benefit to the University by exposing its students to pragmatic exercise of skills has implications - all of them positive - which should make the University take the lead in providing credit."\(^{179}\) If the very essence of civil disobedience includes a willingness to accept the consequences, then the corollary must also be to engage in such activity without the expectation of profit. The Bruin's suggestion of class credit for student activism clearly

\(^{179}\) "Field-study credit proposal," Daily Bruin, November 4, 1966, p. 4.
identified that many students at UCLA took part in campus activism not in opposition to the established system of democratic capitalism, but in support of that system, and not solely for altruistic purposes. Indeed, students at UCLA took part in the fight for civil rights as a way to ensure that their expectations of equality before the law and the efficacy of the democratic process were shared and available to all, including themselves.

In commenting on the success of the Civil Rights movement, one student cited "the nature of its opponent" as the "prime reason" for that success. Southern racists' embrace of violence made them easy to oppose, and "in the north, its symbol became the discriminatory store or apartment house owner," no less easy to oppose as both stood "outside the considered American value system." The activities of bigots north and south "could be scorned as unfair, undemocratic and unconstitutional." The Civil Rights movement gained the greatest attention, and the greatest response, at UCLA when occurrences in the South, and closer to home, violated these democratic capitalist values. Control of their own financial affairs and political behavior in 1961-62 and gross violations of respect for the law in 1964-65 brought forth a stream of activity because students felt that such injustice affected them and either threatened or diminished the democratic materialist society, both from whence they came before college and hoped to achieve after college. As other issues arose, such as the war in Vietnam, successful student activism would have to rely on a similar offense to the students' sense of democratic capitalist propriety.

CHAPTER FOUR

PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM:
THE CAMPUS ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

When the Los Angeles Police Department swarmed over the UCLA campus in the late afternoon of May 5, 1970, they inadvertently provided the campus anti-war movement with one of its few rallying points. As police truncheons rose and fell in furious rhythm upon the heads and bodies of UCLA's students, the campus anti-war movement finally succeeded in exacting the fascist response that proved so successful in expanding the movement nationwide. Radical activists no longer needed rhetoric to connect violence in the Mississippi Delta to the Ia Drang Valley to Watts to UCLA. As one student said while fleeing similar police excesses on another campus, "we're all niggers now." The actions of the LAPD, however, came too late to substantially alter the nature of anti-war protest at UCLA. Patterns by which UCLA students opposed the war in Vietnam carried over from those established during the struggle for civil rights, requiring a tangible offense to their core values of faith in the democratic process, equality of opportunity, and equality before the law. Students' basic beliefs in institutions such as the government and the university and the efficacy of democratic capitalism prohibited large numbers of them from actively opposing the war in its early years because to do so would have required a repudiation of those beliefs.


2 For the effects of administrative repression and police violence against students as a radicalizing force during the events surrounding the Third World Liberation Front Strike at the University of California, see Rorabaugh, Berkeley at War, pp. 85, 154; for the Dow Day demonstrations in October 1967 at the University of Wisconsin, see Tom Bates, Rads: The 1970 Bombing of the Army Math Research Center at the University of Wisconsin and its Aftermath (New York: Harper Collins, 1992) pp. 81-92.
and institutions. Specific issues, such as the killings at Kent State and the brutality of the LAPD, however, did violate their democratic capitalist beliefs and successfully brought large-scale activism, though as these issues receded into the background, so too did large scale anti-war student activism.

Beginning in 1964, students supporting U.S. policy in Southeast Asia quickly answered articles and letters to the editor appearing in the *Daily Bruin* from students questioning U.S. policy and the debate polarized over familiar tones of anti-communism. One student dubiously argued that the actions of the Viet Cong (VC) clearly fit within the context of geopolitics by noting that their true motivation lay in "fighting to move Vietnam from the Capitalist Bloc to the Communist Bloc." Still another student parroted Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara by stating "we cannot permit the people of South Viet-Nam to adopt communism because that would threaten our sphere of influence." Even when student activists attempted to link the war to other forms of injustice, notably the Civil Rights movement, they could not escape the scourge of anti-communism. One student labeled the efforts of civil rights activists to oppose the war, "a mistake," arguing that fighting communism stood above all other issues and that letting the Communists take Vietnam would have far greater consequences than the human, emotional, and financial cost of the war.

Just as the defense of U.S. policy centered around the issue of anti-communism, so too did the criticism of anti-war activists. The first anti-war rally at UCLA occurred in

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February 1965, sponsored by the leftist W.E.B. Du Bois Club, and although non-leftist groups such as the pacifist Council for a Sane Nuclear Policy aligned themselves with the campus peace movement, the majority of campus peace organization and criticism fell to groups like the Du Bois Club. Under the leadership of the Du Bois Club, student activists from various groups, including the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) joined with the faculty University Committee on Vietnam to form the "united front" Vietnam Day Committee (VDC). The UCLA VDC quickly "became the mainspring of campus political life," organizing a major rally to coincide with the national VDC's International Days of Protest for October 14 and 15, 1965. The leftist orientation of the VDC quickly garnered opponents from both within and without the campus. In November 1965, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach placed the Du Bois Club on his office's list of Subversive Organizations, prompting numerous students to argue that the entire anti-war movement was "communist inspired." As late as 1968, a multi-page feature in the Bruin on

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6 "Viet Nam Forum Draws 200," Daily Bruin, February 26, 1965, p. 1; the Southern California chapter of SANE took out a full page ad in the Bruin on April 5, 1965, urging students to educate and organize against the war.

7 Ilene Richards, Chairman, UCLA Du Bois Club, "UCLA Committee Report," from "Peace, Jobs and Freedom," report from the 1966 Annual Conference of Los Angeles Du Bois Clubs, W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs folder, Box #8, Organizational Files, Southern California Library for Social Studies and Research, Los Angeles; "Rally to End the War in Vietnam," 1965 folder, Box #7, Student Activism Collection (SAC), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.


9 "Du Bois Club Decrees FBI 'Red' Charge," Daily Bruin, November 16, 1964, p. 4; "The Vietniks," ibid., December 8, 1965, p. 4. One student went so far as to suggest that the country so obviously opposed the Communist-inspired peace movement that the movement's true motives were to condition the country to further support the war, thus drawing them into the unwinnable "land war in Asia," prophesied by General Douglas MacArthur.

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the anti-war movement included an article noting the problem of liberals allying with radicals "if liberals are defined . . . [as accepting] existing political and economic systems . . . and radicals . . . as those seeking fundamental changes in the political, social, and economic systems." The author concluded that "condoning or co-operating with the anti-democratic elements of the radical Left is morally insupportable."10

By the fall of 1965, campuses across the country, beginning with the University of Michigan, built the anti-war movement by holding teach-ins, designed to present in a scholarly manner both sides of the war, offering political, historical, economic, and cultural contexts. The success of the teach-in movement nationwide lay not only in its attempt at objectivity, some more successful than others, but in the use of pre-existing activist networks from the Civil Rights movement that offered the teach-in instant legitimacy. Although the VDC served as a workable alliance of leftist activist groups at UCLA, it did not succeed in creating a broad-based antiwar movement on campus. Accordingly, UCLA's first teach-in on the war in November 1965 occurred at the direction of the faculty University Committee on Vietnam. Roughly 7,000 attended, while outside in Hyde Park, proponents of the war held a "teach-out," which never included more than 200 individuals. At the teach-out, Bruin Young Republicans asked students to not "let our soldiers in Vietnam lose contact with home," by donating magazines and periodicals to be sent to Southeast Asia.11 While the teach-out amounted to nothing more than a platform for Cold War rhetoric, the teach-in, with heavy

10 "Martyrs . . . or madmen?," Daily Bruin, April 2, 1968, pp. 5-7.

11 "Don't let our soldiers in Vietnam lose contact with home," Vietnam Day Committee Teach-in folder, Box #25, Organizational Files.
faculty input, "sought to present all the views of the current crisis in as balanced a fashion as possible by the best spokesmen" obtainable. The teach-in succeeded in providing that balance, as one observer commented on the "intellectual discussion without any of the elements of a circus which have accompanied all other programs of this kind." 

Campus anti-war organization enjoyed little success in the year following the Gulf of Tonkin incident. After the fall 1965 teach-in, UCLA students overwhelmingly rejected all three anti-war proposals in a campus-wide referendum, supporting U.S. military commitment in Vietnam by 57 per cent. The five positions on the referendum included immediate withdrawal (553 votes), a bombing restriction (763 votes), outright cease-fire (690 votes), maintain present policy (2164 votes) and escalation (498 votes). The fact that more voters weighed in on the other issue on the referendum that day, an on-campus football stadium, serves as an indicator of students' initial lack of concern for the war. The Bruin criticized students' reflexive support of the war by referring to the U.S. as "a society . . . hypnotized by cries for patriotism, America the Great and democracy." Agreeing, one student noted that supporting the military was only natural amidst the apocalyptic rhetoric of the Cold War, "the
American people are exhibiting an unthinking, conditioned response to a war situation: Americans are fighting, they are therefore on the right side and we must cheer them on." Conversely, those opposed to the war obviously lacked patriotism, becoming "a fiend in the public's eye."16 The most aggressive critics of the war explicitly noted the connection between the war in Vietnam and Cold War hysteria by arguing, "in 1966, we reap the fruit of a 20-year heritage of incessant Cold War propaganda," witnessing American defense of "the most ruthless, corrupt elements in South Vietnam in the name of anti-communism," while an editorial cartoon illustrated the vast ideological differences between hawks and doves (see illustration 4.1).17 Los Angeles' economic stake in both the war in Vietnam specifically and the Cold War in general provided an unspoken corollary to much of the Cold War-based support in the city.

Critics of the anti-war demonstrators illustrated further limitations to the movement. After Philosophy Professor Donald Kalish invited faculty and students to join him in a silent vigil every Wednesday afternoon on Bruin Walk from 12:00 to 1:00 in non-violent protest,

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one student commented, "it's a waste of time. If they want something, they should write their Congressman, which won't do anything anyway." A more caustic critic noted,

Doesn't it ever strike any of the Bearded Elite that their picketing and teach-ins and think-ins every Wednesday are rather futile? . . . What the hell are they accomplishing? Do they honestly think that their protests, even if expanded to include the entire student population of the country, are going to force an immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Viet Nam? . . . Nothing is being accomplished.

A third student clarified the issue, noting the general apathy on campus towards the war as an indicator of the students' feelings on their chances of success. Students could not embrace the issue of the war because they doubted the anti-war movement's ability to succeed. A Daily Bruin article discussing the absence of a viable campus left posited three keys to building such a movement at UCLA, one of which stressed the importance of the potential for success in attracting student workers. By November, the Kalish peace vigil already suffered a decline in attendance.

As seen with issues of civil rights, the vast majority of students at UCLA only vaguely committed to activism responded only to specific issues and events which offended their traditional democratic capitalist values of equality of opportunity, equality before the law, and faith in the democratic system. In sharp contrast with the Civil Rights movement, the war in Vietnam failed to consistently offend those values. Acknowledging this, activist leaders both

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on and off campus attempted to make the connection between civil rights and Vietnam in hopes of increasing anti-war sentiment. One student flyer entitled "Alabama-Mississippi Viet Nam: The Game is the Same," noted the rhetorical similarity between states in the South which claimed "Northern agitators are stirring up all this trouble in Alabama and Mississippi" and South Vietnam which claimed "Northern infiltrators are stirring up all this trouble in South Viet Nam." After the violence in Selma, Alabama, and President Johnson's "We Shall Overcome" speech embracing the efforts of the Selma campaign, community organizer Ruth Ehrlich noted that the war in Vietnam forced Johnson's hand. Arguing that the lack of freedom in the South undercut America's foreign policy of fighting for freedom abroad, Ehrlich stated that "the most important lesson" from Selma was the connection between civil rights and the anti-war movement, "every effort should be made to draw the two issues closer together, since the civil rights issue, having already achieved wider and wider public acceptance, can help win the American people to more articulation on the war and peace issues as well." Campus activist Larry Gerber argued that the Civil Rights movement should naturally lend itself to the anti-war movement as the former served as "a critique of American society and is not duty bound to restrict itself to only one manifestation of that society's problems." For Gerber and other activists, the Civil Rights movement represented "a desire for a new America which is not compatible with present U.S. policy in Viet Nam." The problem, however, lay in making pragmatic connections between the two to attract the largely

23 "Alabama-Mississippi Viet Nam: The Game is the Same," 1965 folder, Box #7, SAC.

24 Letter to Women Strike for Peace and LA Peace Exchange from Ruth Ehrlich, March 16, 1965, Peace Exchange #1 folder, Box #18, Organizational Files.

uncommitted student body. One student noted this problem when he argued that "the success of the civil rights movement stemmed from one prime reason - the nature of the opponent." The base hatred and ignorance of the white South, particularly its law enforcement, "put them outside the considered American value system. Their activities could be scorned as unfair, undemocratic, and unconstitutional." The same could not be said of the anti-war movement. Their opponent was no less than the President of the United States, Lyndon Johnson, who was pointedly "not outside the American value system." 26

While the Civil Rights movement at UCLA roughly coincided with a relatively weak movement throughout the city, the same could not be said for city-wide anti-war activism. Los Angeles enjoyed a vigorous and well-publicized anti-war movement, which benefited in no small part from reactions by its police department. In the spring of 1966, fifty Los Angeles-based anti-war groups organized the Peace Action Council (PAC) as a "loose confederation" to serve as a clearing house for anti-war activism. The PAC staged a silent vigil on July 4, 1966, at the American Legion's fireworks display as the first test of their ability to marshall anti-war forces, a test it passed by gathering more than 5000 participants. When President Johnson announced he would hold a black-tie fundraiser at the Century Plaza Hotel in June 1967, the PAC mobilized a massive display of anti-war sentiment for the President's benefit. Roughly fifteen to twenty thousand people attended a rally at Cheviot Hills Park before marching on the hotel on June 23. As the peaceful march stalled in front of the Century Plaza, however, hundreds of LAPD officers, without provocation, charged into the crowd. More than simply defending the hotel containing the president, the LAPD chased

demonstrators for blocks, only to beat and then release them. Although the police made few arrests, hundreds were injured; by giving chase, they guaranteed a disproportionate number of the injured came from the ranks of women, children, and elderly demonstrators. A police officer informed a health care worker, "they had it coming." One participant, self-described as "a white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant female . . . dressed in a conservative manner," commented on the police actions, "now I know what it must be like to be Negro in Watts. The LAPD taught me that."27

The brutality of the LAPD galvanized the anti-war movement in Los Angeles. Veterans of the Century City Peace March formed the June 23 Movement as a way of publicizing the defense trials for the fifty arrestees from that march, but also to highlight the brutality of the war and its consequences at home.28 In October of that year, anti-war activists sponsored a demonstration at the city's Federal Building, located in Westwood, which attracted thousands. Although the demonstration was well-ordered and otherwise uneventful, one episode made nationwide news. Florence Beaumont, a Los Angeles housewife, imitating Buddhist monks in Vietnam, doused herself in gasoline and immolated herself on the steps of the Federal Building.29 While the suicide shocked Los Angeles, it caused barely a ripple on campus. An editorial in the Daily Bruin addressed Beaumont's self-immolation, "Florence, with my own sense of apathy for this whole damn peace movement, I say you were a fool -


28 "June 23 Movement," June 23rd Demonstration and Movement (Action Council) 1967-70 folder, Box #11, Organizational Files.

you shouldn't have done it. Nobody will really hear your spirit, see your cause, advance towards peace in your place."

Although direct ties between Beaumont's self-immolation and a rise in female anti-war activity are difficult to make, her death came at time when women in Los Angeles took a particularly active role in the anti-war movement within traditionally proscribed female venues. In the fall of 1969, a group of mostly female anti-war activists in Los Angeles formed the Christmas Buying Boycott for Peace organization, dedicated to curtailing holiday spending as a powerful economic message against the war, "tell it to the warmakers in the language they seem to understand: the thundering silence of cash registers!" The group urged consumers to demonstrate their opposition to the war by purchasing used toys, making home made gifts or recycling certain items, "money talks. Why shouldn't ours talk for peace?" Out of the Christmas Buying Boycott came a more permanent anti-war organization, Another Mother for Peace, whose leadership included the wives of entertainment industry celebrities and many celebrities themselves such as actresses Donna Reed and Barbara Bain, but whose membership came overwhelmingly from middle class housewives. The organization's ideology came from the moral authority they possessed as mothers. As life-long pacifist and former Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin put it, "if we

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30 "Eulogy to a suicide," Daily Bruin, October 18, 1967, p. 4.

31 "For whom the bell tolls . . .," Christmas Buying Boycott for Peace folder, Box #5, Organizational Files.

32 Letter from Ann Rush, et al., unaddressed, undated, Christmas Buying Boycott for Peace folder, Box #5, Organizational Files.

33 untitled flyer, Another Mother for Peace, 1960s and 1970s folder, Box #2, Organizational Files.
had 10,000 women willing to go to prison . . . that would end [the war]. You cannot have wars without the women. . . . We've had 10,000 women sit back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. To me, that is worse than the old Hebrew sacrifices." All the group's mailings came addressed to Mrs. Smith, the every-mother, and their signature slogan, soon adopted by the peace movement nationwide, embraced women's responsibility as caretaker and nurturer, "War is not healthy for children and other living things." 

The mainstream anti-war activity throughout Los Angeles did not, however, have any subsequent spill-over on campus at UCLA. Activism in Los Angeles did not begat activism in Westwood. Students continued to require a tangible, local offense to their beliefs in the democratic capitalist system or a direct threat to their status within that system. Two issues arose during this period that did offend those values, but neither had anything to do with the war. In November 1966, UCLA's football team finished the season with a stunning upset victory over crosstown rival USC and a 9-1 record. Based on a technicality, however, USC, not UCLA, received the conference's invitation to play in the Rose Bowl. When the news reached Westwood, the students, using tactics learned from the Civil Rights and anti-war movements, went to the streets. Thousands marched through the Village, "shouting obscenities and starting bonfires." Roughly 2000 students climbed up onto the 10-lane San Diego Freeway, the main north-south artery through West Los Angeles, blocking traffic with

34 Untitled, undated, incorrectly annotated newspaper article found in ibid. Rankin was the only member of Congress to vote against U.S. entry into both World Wars and the only member to vote against U.S. entry into World War II.

35 Untitled flyer, Another Mother for Peace folder, Box #1, Organizational Files.
a sit-in and wreaking havoc for seven hours, resulting in thirty arrests. As the rivalry's historians wrote, "Vietnam? For one afternoon, USC-UCLA was even bigger."36

Offending students' sense of self-interest even more, Ronald Reagan, after assuming the office of California's governor in January 1967, felt it unnecessary for the state to continue offering free tuition to resident students, inadvertently unifying UCLA's students like never before. Groups as disparate as the Greeks, the Kelps, the Graduate Student Association, and the SLC held a rally in Meyerhoff Park37 to oppose Reagan's tuition plan.38 Shortly thereafter, the Regents fired the students' old nemesis Clark Kerr. Their arbitrary behavior and the direct involvement of Reagan in the firing, as well as the proposed tuition charge, however, prompted the largest demonstration of the period when 8000 students poured into Pauley Pavilion, presenting Murphy with a set of demands for the Regents, calling for no tuition, no budget cuts for the UC, statewide student representation and a student voice in the selection of the next President. Students flatly rebuked Reagan by stating, "the University . . . is not an elevator to the White House," while the Bruin offered a pair of editorial cartoons illustrating their contempt for Reagan's actions (see illustrations 4.2 and 4.3).39 Murphy accepted the demands and agreed to endorse them, expressing his sympathy and "deep

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37 The students renamed Hyde Park "Meyerhoff Park" in the spring of 1966 in memory of Professor Hans Meyerhoff, killed in an automobile accident in late November 1965 on the eve of UCLA's first teach-in. Besides being a staunch advocate of free speech and an opponent of the war, Meyerhoff frequently held his political science courses at the park as both a way to enjoy the day but also as a tangible reminder of the struggle for free speech.


satisfaction" with the students' efforts.40 Students formed the California Federation of
Students (CFS), canvassing surrounding neighborhoods to discuss the tuition and
budget situation and receiving financial support from dorm and co-op residents who
agreed to forsake dessert for a week and turn over the savings to CFS.41 After Reagan cut
the UC's budget by 30%, students held a rally at Meyerhoff Park while a letter to the Bruin attempted to link the problem students did seem concerned about with the one they did not,

It seems ridiculous to quibble over a mere $50 million slash when we happily strafe
trees, cows and occasionally people to the tune of $463 million . . . almost twice what
the Regents requested; also note that the projected income from the tuition would barely cover our firebombing bill. Governor Reagan's budget cuts, while anti-
intellectual, economically unjustifiable, punitive, etc., are only a symptom of the disease: war. The basic solutions are to be found in Washington and Hanoi, not Sacramento.42

40 "Murphy will endorse four student resolutions," Daily Bruin, January 25, 1967, p. 1. The overt political maneuverings of Reagan in the Kerr episode and the acquiescence of the Regents prompted an Emergency Committee on University Autonomy at UCLA, whose final report, marked CONFIDENTIAL, stressed the UC "should provide students with a voice in its government" as something due them "on democratic grounds, and the failure to do so would constitute an invitation to rebellion," arguing that denying students such representation "would be both wrong and folly." "At the Crossroads: The Government of the University of California, A Report by the Emergency Committee on University Autonomy, UCLA," folder # 101 - University Wide - 1965-69, Box #79, FDM.


While the war itself failed to offend the base values of many students in the 1960s, specific issues relevant to the war, and closer to the individual, did have some resonance, creating a punctuated equilibrium of activism. Activists hoped to appeal to male students' sense of self interest by making the draft a rallying point to oppose the war. Jim Berland noted that students must begin to face the fact that they are receiving the benefits of one of the most clear cases of class legislation. . . . We students have a deeper responsibility to examine the war in Viet Nam, because we are sending the unemployed and ghetto youth to a war which by our lack of opposition we condone.

A more base appeal to male students' interests appeared in the Daily Bruin in the winter of 1966 when the paper noted that increased draft calls meant more than half of the campus had their draft status reclassified to I-A, meaning fit and ready for military service, not the least of whom was the starting quarterback on the football team, eventual Heisman Trophy winner Gary Beban.

As the draft issue increasingly made male students uncomfortable about the war, SDS and the VDC held a rally in 1967 demanding an end to the University's complicity with the

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draft process by discontinuing its practice of releasing academic records to the Selective Service System. The rally called for a referendum on the issue, which caused the Office of the Registrar to announce that the following quarter, student registration packets would contain a consent card allowing students to control the release of their academic records for purposes of the Selective Service System. In addition, numerous on-campus efforts at draft resistance occurred beginning in 1968. In April, the Resistance, a nationwide draft resistance organization founded in Berkeley, sponsored an anti-draft rally at Meyerhoff Park attended by over 1500 people, including ten students burning their draft cards and pledging non-compliance with the process. Indicative of the consequences of their actions, one student hesitated after taking the pledge, returned to the microphone and said, "my name is Dennis Gitell for the benefit of the FBI agents here." That fall, the Resistance sponsored another anti-draft rally at Meyerhoff with an increasingly militant tone. Flyers for the rally included "A Word to Seniors: The Selective Service has something special to say to you: 'Tough shit, baby. We'll be seeing you soon.'" Other flyers suggested that opposing the draft was "A Vote for Life," and the most dramatic gesture of the fall rally came when Arthur Zack chained himself to the Office of Special Services on the day of his proposed induction to oppose the draft. For the remainder of the war, male students at UCLA, like those around the country,

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47 "A Word to Seniors," folder 245 - Activism 1965-1969, Box #118, FDM.

48 "A Vote for Life," and letter from Arthur C. Zack to Brothers and Sisters, undated, both found in 1968 folder, Box #7, SAC.
continued to stage dramatic acts in defiance of the draft process, including Tom Connolly, who sought sanctuary in the lounge of Dykstra Hall, his dormitory, and Richard Williams, a Western Shoshone Indian who refused induction under the 1863 Ruby Valley Treaty, affirming Western Shoshone sovereignty and citizenship. Williams illustrated the connection between civil rights and the war by asking, "why should I go to some foreign country to fight a war when they are trying to do the same thing there that the government has already done to the American Indian here?"49

On-campus underground publications offered draft dodging advice to students, ranging from the pragmatic, suggesting conscientious objection or civil disobedience, to the hilarious, by suggesting potential draftees arrive for their physical drunk and high or "undesirable . . . go for a couple of weeks without a shower. Really look dirty. Stink. Long hair helps."50 The issue of the draft did have tangible concerns for male students, so much so that many faculty members began giving passing grades to male students in jeopardy of failing in an effort to keep their student deferment.51 By 1969, the law school opened the Draft Counseling Center, initially counseling approximately 200 students a week but quickly having to more than double their hours to keep up with the demand.52 Evidence strongly suggests

49 "Draft News," Peace House, 1968-69 folder, Box #18, and "Williams refuses induction," Association on American Indian Affairs folder, Box #4, Organizational Files.

50 "The ABC's of Draft Dodging," UCLA Vets for Peace folder, Box #52, SAVF.

51 Franklin P. Rolfe, "Undergraduate Education at UCLA," pp. 127-128, UCLA Oral History Project (OHP) Department of Special Collections, Young Research Library, UCLA, Los Angeles; also see Donald Hartsock, "UCLA Ombudsman," OHP.

52 Community Participation Center, "Proposal for Support Funds," Summer 1969, folder 245 - Activism 1965-69, Box #118, FDM.
that the draft played a heavy role in the anti-war attitudes of males, attitudes that grew stronger as they grew closer to graduation and the loss of their II-S deferment.\textsuperscript{33} The administration too, aided students in their attempts to avoid the draft. Thomas M. Grant, Associate Dean of Students, wrote a letter to the Bruin urging freshman not to apply for a II-S deferment since most were not old enough to be assigned a draft number yet, while applying for a deferment meant an automatic assignation.\textsuperscript{34}

While the draft and the deferment system brought about activism that the war itself did not, committed anti-war activists failed to make university complicity in the war, namely on-campus recruiting and ROTC, a similar issue with which to increase campus anti-war activism. In October 1966, a small group of students at UCLA gathered outside the Student and Alumni Placement Center (formally the BurOc) to protest the on-campus recruiting efforts of Dow Chemical, makers of napalm. Shouting "Dow Means Death!" and carrying signs reading "Making Money Burning Babies," the participants of the VDC-sponsored rally, which included only a dozen or so students, failed to halt the placement interviews or raise much resentment on campus.\textsuperscript{35} Both the demonstrators and Dow, however, returned in the winter and the demonstrators escalated their protests. In February 1967, roughly 50 people entered the placement center and staged a sit-in while Dow conducted interviews. Jerry Palmer, a spokesman for the VDC, stated, "we feel that since the nature of the Dow Chemical

\textsuperscript{33} C.E. Tygart, "Religiosity and University Student Anti-Vietnam War Attitudes: A Negative or Curvilinear Relationship?,” \textit{Sociological Analysis}, vol. 32 (2) 1971, pp. 120-129. Tygart's sociological study occurred at UCLA in the spring of 1966 using 1006 randomly selected male students.

\textsuperscript{34} "Frosh urged against II-S," \textit{Daily Bruin}, October 19, 1970, p. 4.

Co. is [to] manufacture a product for killing people, they should not [be] allowed to recruit on campus." Vice-Chancellor Charles E. Young achieved a peaceful resolution with the demonstrators when he arranged for them to move outside the placement center in a location "so as to have the most effect on persons arriving for interviews with Dow."  

Young's resolution to the situation fit firmly within the context of Chancellor Franklin D. Murphy's "free marketplace of ideas." Indeed, in 1966 after UCLA's second teach-in, Murphy wrote to Professor Kalish noting the "sincerity, integrity, and objectivity that you and your colleagues have brought to this matter . . . it reflects credit on the notion of a University serving as an honest, free market place of ideas."  

Young's resolution of the Dow sit-in, however, also cut both ways in the marketplace by noting, "the University has an obligation to allow students who are interested in taking a job with the Dow Co. to get an interview."  

So long as students' protests remained within the context of non-violent civil disobedience, Murphy and Young lauded their efforts at bringing vitality to the idea of the free marketplace of ideas. At Murphy's behest, Young "did everything . . . to see to it that [Dow recruiters] engaged in a dialogue, that there was an opportunity [for students] to question [the recruiters]."  

When student activists escalated their tactics, however, the administration quickly disabused them of the notion that the free marketplace would serve as a blanket defense of liberal activity.


57 Letter from Chancellor Franklin D. Murphy to Professor Donald Kalish, Department of Philosophy, October 19, 1966, folder 245 - Activism, 1965-69, Box #118, FDM.


59 Oral interview with Dr. Charles E. Young, August 3 and 11, 1999, Los Angeles, CA.
When demonstrators refused to abandon another sit-in inside the placement center two days later, Young called the police. Six students still refused to leave peacefully and were escorted out of the building into custody. While the original sit-in and demonstration included only fifteen to twenty students, the arrests quickly increased student participation. Roughly fifty students immediately surrounded the squad car in which police detained the demonstrators, and one jumped atop the vehicle to address bystanders as well as prohibit it from moving. An obvious imitation of Mario Savio during the Free Speech Movement at Cal, the action enjoyed similar success as the police eventually released the students.\(^{60}\) The campus paper opposed the demonstrations, referring to them as "a silly confrontation," which completely devalued "the righteousness of the protestors' stand," and the SLC defeated a motion to call a referendum on Dow recruiting.\(^ {61}\) While the numbers involved remained small, it is indicative of the effects of law enforcement at such demonstrations that the number of students involved more than doubled the moment police began making arrests.

The February-March demonstrations against Dow however, proved only a precursor to much larger, more violent demonstrations in November. When Dow recruiters returned to campus in the fall, SDS initiated three days of demonstrations, highlighted by a sit-in that turned violent when police attempted to arrest 25 students. Attempting to get back inside the placement center, protestors broke windows and doors and burned Murphy in effigy with napalm for his refusal, protestors incorrectly alleged, to hold a campus referendum on the


Dow question. Hoping to personalize the effects of napalm, student Richard Carter doused his arm in the jellied gasoline and ignited it, urging students to smell human flesh as it was consumed by the Dow product, experiencing what the Vietnamese dealt with on a daily basis.62 Dow recruiters returned the following week to meet further picketing at the placement center; however, university police quickly moved against the protestors, confiscating illegal sound equipment and dragging away students who physically blocked the entrance. The police actions prompted 250-300 student activists to further escalate the demonstrations by occupying the administration building in yet another sit-in. After an anonymous source called the LAPD on campus, Young persuaded them to wait in the basement of the building while he addressed the students. The students agreed to abandon the sit-in in exchange for Young's promise to meet with them the next morning and his dismissal of the LAPD, whom students heard were amassing in the basement for an assault.63

The Dow demonstrations failed to mobilize substantial portions of the campus community to physically oppose the war. While a few hundred participated in the sit-in, the demonstrators turned off easily that many who opposed the increasingly militant tactics of the devoted anti-war groups on campus. Two weeks after the demonstrations, nearly 10,000 students turned out for a campus referendum, with 7798 (80%) opposed to barring companies

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63 "Students stage Administration Bldg. sit-in," Daily Bruin, November 15, 1967, p. 1; Andrew Hamilton, "Report on the Events of Tuesday, November 14, 1967," folder 245 - Disturbances 1965-69, Box 118, FDM. Hamilton's report offers a summary of faculty and administrative activities, as well as such detailed information as "4:30 - Protestors sent out for Chicken-De-Light and soft drinks."
such as Dow from on-campus recruiting and more than half (5298 to 4275) opposing immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. The Dow demonstrations also shook Murphy, illustrating that he was dealing with a new generation of student activists less devoted to his free marketplace of ideas than previous students. After the first week of demonstrations in November, Murphy issued a memo to the entire faculty asserting his unwillingness to accept any disruptions of "normal campus operations . . . , Mob rule and violence have no place in an intellectual community committed to law and freedom." More candidly, Murphy noted the increased militance of the Dow demonstrators, "I am puzzled by these people. They could . . . be more civil."

The Dow demonstrations also served as the coming out party for the campus chapter of Students for a Democratic Society. The brief history of SDS at UCLA is indicative of student activism there during this period. The campus civil rights movement, particularly the CORE chapter, provided the earliest members of SDS at UCLA. The generally proscribed

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64 "Placement center policy approved as 10,000 go to polls here," Daily Bruin, December 1, 1967, p. 2.

65 Memo from Chancellor Franklin D. Murphy to All Members of the Faculty, November 9, 1967, University Committee on Vietnam, 1967 folder, Box #3, MHC.

66 Freedland, "How Now, Dow?," p. 12. Murphy's criticism of student radicals came not only for their tactics, but their shortness of vision as well. Commenting on activists in general, he noted that "much of what they are asking is right and is long overdue. I think students long ago should have been brought more seriously and substantially into the conversation having to with curricular construction, management of the courses, . . . On the other hand, I do not go along with the so-called student power group, who simply want us turn the University over to them. Students are here today and gone tomorrow, and they sometimes don't look to the future. We need to keep the final decision-making process in the hands of the faculty and the administration . . .," William C. Ackerman, My Fifty Year Love-in with UCLA, (Los Angeles: Fashion Press, 1969), p. 212.

tone of the Civil Rights movement at UCLA, as well as the presence of groups such as CORE and the NAACP, however, did not provide very fertile ground for SDS. While the organization prospered elsewhere in southern California, even at junior colleges, with no less than 16 chapters in the region and interest spreading to area high schools as well, organizers remained puzzled over its struggles at UCLA.68 Students started a provisional chapter in December 1965, but it remained merely an extension of the VDC. One organizer noted, "the chapter never really got off the ground," with the presence of "numerous special committees for other things (students' rights, the grape strike, etc.) [competing for students' interests]. . . What there is of SDS works closely with existing groups on various things, but has no real following of its own."69

With the majority of UCLA's students offering a tepid response to the war and its related issues and anti-communism limiting the effectiveness of organizations such the Du Bois Club, no effective organization existed to offer a radical critique of the war or American society. As SDS's regional organizer described the UCLA campus, "radicals/activists abound, but seem to have no where to turn to."70 In response, SDS organized the radical minority at UCLA. Regional organizers saw recruiting efforts by groups like Dow and the CIA as prime motivational targets on campus, "anti-war protest directed within the university might

68 Letter from Margaret Thorpe to George Brothers, July 2, 1965, Series 2A #68, roll #6, SDS.

69 UCLA's provisional status found in "List of California Chapters," the reference to the VDC found in a letter from Nancy [last name unknown] to Mark [last name unknown], National Office, October 18, 1966; for the chapter's initial struggle see Chapter Summary filed with the National Office, all found in Series 3 #22, roll #21, SDS.

70 Letter from Mike Davis to Bob [last name unknown], January 28, 1966, Series 2B #31, roll #11, SDS.
provoke an explosive recognition of the un-freedom of the campus itself. Intensive recruiting by the armed forces and the possibility of extension of the draft to the campus will likely be key issues..."71

The Dow crisis provided SDS with what they hoped would be the provocative episode by which they could militarize the campus and expand the anti-war movement. The organization felt it occupied the moral high ground during the placement center demonstrations, claiming SDS sincerely desired dialog with Dow, but claimed "a confidential Dow memo... obtained by our counter-intelligence group" prohibited such activity by recruiters, and their challenge to Dow for a debate in Meyerhoff Park proved they did not seek to deny the right of free speech. Finally, SDS felt that all other options had been pursued, including the earlier peaceful demonstrations, the demand for a referendum, and direct appeals to the administration. The latter point proved crucial for SDS as it could issue its final appeal in dire terms without responsibility, "the legal channels have been exhausted and Murphy will have forced the issue."72 Unlike administrators on other campuses, Murphy and Young did not play into the radicals' hands by unleashing violent police oppression upon the demonstrators. Indeed, Young's patience in dealing with the demonstrators and his willingness to meet with them proved to the majority of the students that the administration

71 Letter from SDS Regional Office to Friend, August 16, 1965, Series 2B #31, roll #11, SDS.

72 "Dow Crisis!," Students for a Democratic Society folder, Box #156, Underground, Alternative & Extremist Literature Collection, Department of Special Collections, Young Research Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.
remained committed to the free marketplace of ideas. While the Dow crisis identified SDS as the leading radical activist group on campus, that very status relegated it to the fringe.

Though the placement center demonstrations failed to force change in university policy or dramatically increase the number of students engaged in anti-war activity, they demonstrated the increased militance of the radical activists and the attendant negative publicity to the University. When student activists turned on another form of university complicity, ROTC, the administration apparently felt compelled to offer a concession. In mid-April 1968, Brian Weiss, Editor-in-Chief of the Daily Bruin and writing for the entire Editorial Board, penned a letter to Murphy, appealing to his concerns about another radical confrontation. Weiss called Murphy's attention to the fact that ROTC cadets took part in the campus-wide commencement, in full military dress at which they received their commissions, a privilege afforded no other extra-degree program on campus. "It's somewhat unusual for us to reveal our editorial intentions before the fact, but . . . if ROTC participation in graduation ceremonies cannot be eliminated, we will editorially encourage a boycott of ALL official university ceremonies . . . beginning with the upcoming inauguration of [new UC] President [Charles] Hitch." The following week, Murphy notified the directors of the ROTC program in a letter marked PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, that commissioning

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73 Many observers claimed Young's accessibility and willingness to meet with demonstrators on any occasion played a significant role limiting violent campus response to the war. According to Vice Chancellor Rosemary Park, after Young became Chancellor, students always knew they could reach the top and he would meet with them, sometimes all night, sharing coffee, cigarettes, and, though not well-publicized, his opposition to the war. Rosemary Park, "Liberal Arts in the Modern University," p. 193, OHP. Radical activists who came into contact with Young before he became Chancellor knew what the rest of the campus quietly learned after he assumed that position in 1968: the new Chancellor was a dove.

74 Letter from Brian Weiss, Editor-in-Chief, to Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor, April 18, 1968, Commencement, 1965-70 folder, Box #111, FDM.
and military dress would no longer be a part of commencement. Wary, perhaps, of criticism for the decision, Murphy informed the directors that "there will be no public announcement by my office of this change." 75

Murphy's concerns of negative publicity came not only from off-campus bastions of Los Angeles conservatism such as the Los Angeles Times, but also from a vocal and growing conservative student activist element. Parroting their liberal counterparts, conservative student activists at UCLA organized and held rallies, teach-ins, etc. using similarly toned rhetoric and tactics. The Thomas Jefferson Club emerged as the strongest of these conservative groups, describing itself as a foreign affairs club devoted to democracy, opposed to totalitarianism and unequivocally supportive of U.S. policy in Vietnam. 76 The Jefferson Club and other groups such as the Young Americans for Freedom, however, illustrated their conservative nature by never initiating any activist program or agenda of their own. Rather, conservative activism at UCLA always came in response to the actions of liberal activists. As such, issues pertaining to Vietnam dominated conservative activists, seemingly demanding a conservative response to every liberal attack. In 1967, the Jefferson Club circulated photographs of alleged VC atrocities and terrorism in response to similar SDS attacks on the

75 Letter from Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor, to Captain Robert R. Dupzyk, Lieutenant Colonel Donald G. Moore, and Major Sidney A. Sosnow, April 25, 1968, Commencement, 1965-70 folder, Box #111, FDM. Although Murphy never mentioned the letter from Weiss in his correspondence to the ROTC directors, no other correspondence exists to suggest that Murphy weighed any other factors in excluding the ROTC from commencement.

76 "Thomas Jefferson Club," 1967 folder, Box #7, SAC.
tactics of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and frequently decried VC violations of the Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{77}

Conservative activist groups also provided a locus for organized anti-communism. After UCLA's first teach-in in October 1965, the Victory in Vietnam Association (VIVA) sent a telegram to Assemblyman Jesse Unruh and State Senator Hugh Burns demanding they investigate the UCLA teach-in and the International Days of Protest, charging that "actual communist propaganda, printed in Peking," was handed out.\textsuperscript{78} In April 1968, the YAF sponsored a "Sympathy Week" for Czechs and Poles suffering under Soviet militarism, consisting of a rally and vigil at Meyerhoff Park.\textsuperscript{79} That same month, VIVA circulated petitions on campus for a referendum asking Ho Chi Minh to hold free, secret-ballot elections in Vietnam. The proposed wording of the referendum, however, illustrated both VIVA's lack of concern for an impartial referendum and the group's inability to deviate from standard anti-communist rhetoric. "Yes, I believe in democracy and free elections for North Vietnam," or "No, I do not believe in democracy and free elections except for Americans" were the only choices.\textsuperscript{80} The final component of conservative student activism in this period was a universal contempt for liberal activists. This contempt, however, seldom took shape in the form of criticism of liberals' message or their methods, but merely their existence as liberals and their

\textsuperscript{77} "VC Atrocities," 1968 folder, Box #7, SAC; "POWs treated poorly," \textit{Daily Bruin}, April 16, 1968, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{78} Telegram from William Longstreth, Chairman UCLA VIVA, to Assemblyman Jesse Unruh and State Senator Hugh Burns, November 15, 1965, folder 245 - Activism, 1965-69, Box #118, FDM.


\textsuperscript{80} "Vietnam Victory member urges elections in North," \textit{Daily Bruin}, April 22, 1968, p. 7.
appearance. A group calling itself the Genuine American Youth announced a Decency Rally on campus in April 1970 to occur during the appearance of radical leader Jerry Rubin. A flyer for the Decency Rally called on all "who believe in clean living and unaltered minds" to attend, "wear a shirt or a tie and bring a flag. Show the rest of the long haired radicals what it is to be proud."81

Conservative activists were emboldened by both off-campus attitudes as well as on-campus radical transgressions. In early 1967 and again in 1968, an organization called California Poll discovered that "large majorities" of Californians not only lacked sympathy for student activists, but favored punitive sanctions as well. Most surveyed called for the suspension of student demonstrators, offering strong support for the loss of demonstrators' student deferments.82 That summer, Governor Reagan argued that student activists were "not harbingers of tomorrow, they are throwbacks to a darker age, a dismal time of Hitlerian holocausts, savagery and inquisitions."83 As student protest against the war intensified, the tone of Reagan's rhetoric escalated with dire portents. Just three weeks prior to the shootings of four students at Kent State University by Ohio National Guardsmen, Reagan responded to a question about student activists by saying, "if it takes a bloodbath, let's get it over with. No more appeasement."84 This unwillingness to appease student demands found tremendous support in Los Angeles' working class communities. The area's working class felt they owed

81 "Decency Rally," 1970 folder #3, Box #9, SAC.
82 "Campus Protests Irritate Public," Santa Monica Evening Outlook, February 27, 1968, p. 2.

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their success to traditional mores and values, such as respect for authority and institutions, and viewed students' use of foul language, countercultural dress and confrontational methods disrespectful of authority. In addition, working class optimism was based on the justness and openness of the American system which provided for a supposedly fluid, classless society. The city's working class viewed radical student criticism of the university and demands to shut down the campuses as doubly offensive in that they offended an established institution in the university, and held so casually their opportunity of higher education, an opportunity many in the working class did not enjoy.85

Nothing legitimated conservative activism, however, like the excesses of the left. In May 1968, the Jefferson Club sponsored a State Department photographic exhibit on Vietnam that highlighted atrocities by the VC. Members of SDS, including leader Mike Balter, stormed into the exhibit and tore down the photographs in an incident caught by a Daily Bruin photographer and printed on the front page of the paper the following day. The incident lead to the suspension from campus of SDS, an act the group publicly disavowed by renaming itself the Robin Hood Slate and defiantly proclaiming, "we will meet; we will hold rallies and demonstrations and we will continue to fight this administration every time it acts to perpetuate racism and imperialism."86 Perhaps more importantly, the photo exhibit incident cost SDS what little mainstream support it enjoyed. Students universally criticized the group's actions at the photo exhibit as a gross violation of free speech and their rhetoric

86 Aardvark, September 25, 1968, Series 3 #33, roll #21, SDS.
against the administration rang hollow, as most activists acknowledged the tremendous latitude afforded them by the administration. As SDS railed against a racist, fascist, imperialist America ripe for revolution, the group inherently alienated both the surrounding communities in Los Angeles and the overwhelming majority of the student body at UCLA, who firmly believed in the efficacy of the democratic capitalist system.

While both radical and conservative campus activism at UCLA failed to gain substantial adherents to either end of the spectrum, events beyond campus conspired to bolster the anti-war effort. In April, 1969, four radical campus groups banded together to form the Coalition, ostensibly to protest the suspension of SDS leader Mike Balter and perceived administrative repression. Its radical basis, however, and demands which only a limited number of students identified with, seemed to offer a short life for the Coalition, with the Bruin pronouncing its "death" within a month. Simultaneous to the Coalition movement at UCLA, students at Cal attempted to turn a vacant piece of University land off campus into a community park known as People's Park. When the Regents ordered the land retaken by force, confrontation ensued both on and off-campus between students and various law enforcement agencies. Shortly thereafter, the Regents held their rotating monthly meeting at UCLA and students, most from the supposedly "dead" Coalition, attempted to confront the Regents about the People's Park episode and their overwhelming presence on the boards of directors of corporations whose interests lay counter to student activism, such as war

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87 For examples of letters regarding SDS's actions, see Daily Bruin, May 28, 1968, p. 4.
89 For a full discussion of the People's Park episode, see Rorabaugh, Berkeley at War, pp. 145-166.

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profiteers Dow Chemical and numerous aircraft manufacturers and companies with racist policies such as the Bank of America. The crowd swelled to over 1500 as the Regents refused to allow students to address them. The presence of Reagan, an ex-officio Regent, meant heightened security, which only added to the tension. After security ejected a handful of students who snuck into the faculty center trying to address the Regents, the students surrounded the single-story moderately constructed building and attempted to literally push it over. Chancellor Young, inside the meeting, later described the experience as “frightening” and Vice Chancellor Charles Hobson called in the LAPD and the California Highway Patrol. Although minimal violence ensued, an increasing number of students perceived the Regents' unwillingness to allow the students to address them as indicative of the administration's contempt for student participation in the education process and the administration's view that students were not full shareholders in that process.90

The weeks following the Regents' meeting again witnessed a decline in the Coalition's presence on campus until circumstance again intervened one month later. The continuing confrontations over People's Park in Berkeley erupted in tragic violence on May 15 when police officers opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, shooting close to 100, and killing one, James Rector, while Reagan ordered helicopters to make strafing runs over the campus to drop tear gas. The incident marked the first time in the United States an arm of government

90 “Coalition confronts Regents, LA police disperse crowd,” Daily Bruin, May 19, 1969, p. 1; "May 16: Regents vs. the UCLA Community," Activism 1969-72 folder, Box #2, Records of the Office of Public Information, Administrative Files of Chandler Harris, University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles; Young interview. Former Regent and eventual Nixon aide H.R. Haldeman commented on the irony of the incident that Berkeley always received the reputation for radicalism, but it was on the UCLA campus where the Regents first feared for their safety; H.R. Haldeman, "Oral History interview with H.R. Haldeman," OHP, pp. 245-250.
unleashed helicopters against its own citizens. Students at UCLA, and elsewhere, were stunned at the violence and the overwhelming display of force by the state. An editorial cartoon in the Bruin suggested America had come full circle from protecting democracy in World War II to embracing fascism 20 years later (see illustration 4.4). After a memorial service on campus for Rector, 1200-1500 students marched on the administration building and staged a sit-in under the direction of the Coalition. Acknowledging its increased, and more moderate, support, the group passed a resolution demanding no vandalism or violence take place during the sit-in. Young, in only his eighth month as Chancellor, continued to allow constructive student activism by refusing Reagan's demand that he use force to clear the building. Young canceled classes so that students could "discuss the issues related to the situation at Berkeley" and drastically scaled back his formal inauguration as Chancellor, eliminating all music, speeches, and honorary degrees, instead using the ceremony "as an act of solemn dedication to the deep issues which confront us."91 Lauding the peaceful manner in which the students comported themselves, Young pledged "to assist you in every

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conceivable way," while deploring the "armed force [in Berkeley] which is so repugnant and antithetical to the goals of an academic community."92

Students throughout the UC system declared a two-day strike, the first day of which gathered at least 3000 students to a strike rally and even included the support of the President of the Interfraternity Council. The strike enjoyed moderate support, with most estimates settling around 30%, but clearly far more were deeply disturbed over the excessive use of force in Berkeley.93 One professor declared the episode "the most dramatic and deeply felt that I have witnessed at UCLA," and the Los Angeles Times cautioned readers that to dismiss the disruptions as merely "wild-eyed, bushy-haired radicals intent on anarchy" would be "a serious miscalculation."94 The People's Park episode demonstrated to many moderate students the utter contempt with which many in the university administration and society held them. With regards to their opposition to the war in Vietnam, the open firing on, and use of helicopters against, unarmed civilians indicated to many students that the war was a sickness now pervading the United States, a sickness that had spread to their institutions.

Nationally, too, anti-war opinion escalated. The stunning 1968 Tet Offensive, staged by the North Vietnamese Army and the VC, helped convince a large portion of the country that U.S. policy in Vietnam contained serious flaws. Richard Nixon's subsequent election on the basis of a plan for peace and his failure to act on that election pledge caused more and

92 "Come to the Administration Building . . . NOW," 1969 #2 folder, Box #8, SAC.

93 "Strike meets response from campus," Daily Bruin, May 27, 1969, p. 1; "Presidents of Student Body and Interfraternity Council Support Strike," 1969 #1 folder, Box #8, SAC.

more Americans to conclude that America's decision to "stand in Vietnam" had been a mistake. Nowhere was this transition more apparent than at UCLA. In October, over one third of the student body turned out for a campus referendum, supporting an immediate troop withdrawal with 67% of the vote, a shocking turnaround considering just two years before, in the wake of the Dow crisis, 55% of students opposed immediate withdrawal. Adding credence to the referendum results, over 3500 students marched the next day from Royce Hall on campus down Westwood Boulevard to join in the National Moratorium at the Federal Building, a demonstration that drew over 15,000 from across the city. Perhaps the most symbolic evidence of the shift of anti-war opinion on campus that fall occurred at the UCLA-Washington football game. The halftime card stunts put on by the student section included a peace sign quickly rolling to a white dove. The increased expression of anti-war sentiment did not, however, signify a wholesale embrace of the activist mentality. While an increasing number of students opposed the war, their demonstration of that opposition continued to exist within the limitations of their core values of democratic capitalism and self-interest.

On April 30, President Nixon ordered U.S. troops across the Vietnamese border into Cambodia, outraging anti-war activists who argued that Nixon's actions actually expanded the war at a time when he pledged to end it. While the Cambodian invasion caused an eruption of demonstrations on many campuses, UCLA was not one of them. In fact, both the campus community and the Daily Bruin all but ignored the invasion and subsequent protests,

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offering only editorial cartoons lampooning Nixon. Nixon's expansion of the war greatly upset those with committed anti-war sentiment, but a massive, spontaneous demonstration seemed beyond the means of UCLA's only recently expanded activist community. When Ohio National Guardsmen killed four unarmed students, Allison Krause, Jeff Miller, Sandy Scheuer, and William Schroeder at Kent State University on May 4, however, students at UCLA found an issue more tangible than the war to protest. The following day, UCLA joined close to a thousand other campuses to protest the invasion and what Chancellor Charles E. Young called "the unspeakable violence" of Kent State in "the most disastrous day in the history of American higher education."

The Daily Bruin called for a strike across the academic community to protest not only the Cambodian invasion but the Kent State murders as well. The strike, however, should not be a cessation of work, according to the paper, but "a day of work within the community, of 'bringing the war home.'" Activists called for a noon rally on May 5 at Meyerhoff Park which roughly 4000 students attended. In a quirk of fate, the monthly meeting of the Chancellors occurred the same day, placing Young off campus and Vice Chancellor David Saxon as his surrogate. Saxon, warned by observers of the student administrative building, Kerchoff Hall, that the students were unsettled, cancelled plans to be off campus that morning.

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and hastily prepared remarks for the growing rally. Attempting to share the students' outrage over the killings, Saxon announced that the following day would be a day of mourning at UCLA, an all-campus convocation at Pauley Pavilion was set for May 7 and on May 8 the Academic Senate planned to meet in emergency session. Saxon was unprepared however, for the vehemence and anger of the students. He found their remarks "inflammatory," and was disquieted by their need for "direct action."100

Some students called for a march on the Men's Gym, home of ROTC, and a group of roughly 75 then left Meyerhoff for the Men's Gym, where they found locked doors and Lt. Bill Collins of the UCLA Police (UCPD). Collins, in plain clothes, noting the students' tone earlier in the day and now seeing them marching towards the gym, ordered the LAPD notified and placed on tactical alert. The students rushed the gym, breaking doors and windows to get in, literally overrunning Collins. The demonstrators beat him on the back of the head and at that moment, one of them took his loaded sidearm. They continued to beat and kick him until cooler heads prevailed and students helped him up. He suffered a mild concussion and four broken ribs, and his weapon stolen. Although roughly 3000 students were in the area looking on, one witness placed the number of active participants at no more than thirty. The arrival of additional UCPD officers kept the demonstrators from doing more than destroying the entrance areas to the gym; they never got to the ROTC offices.101

100 Violence at UCLA, p. 9-10. The seething anger on campus that day was not unique to UCLA. One student at the University of Iowa described his participation in violent demonstrations as "nothing but anger, sheer fucking anger," Dr. Robert C. Hildebrand, America in the 1960s and 70s, University of South Dakota.

101 Violence at UCLA, pp. 12-17.
After hearing about the disturbances on campus, Chancellor Young telephoned Saxon from Berkeley to inquire about the severity of the situation at UCLA. Saxon also received a phone call from the LAPD, who "understood there was turbulence at UCLA and that they stood ready to move in and restore peace." Vice Chancellor James Hobson declined the offer. The violence on campus, however, had spread to the Aerospace ROTC program in the Social Welfare Building, broken windows in Haines Hall, fires in Ackerman Union, and rumors of an assault on Kinsey Hall, home of the Thailand Project, a State Department program involved in counter-insurgency research in Southeast Asia and long a target of anti-war activists.\textsuperscript{102} Young called Saxon again to inform him that upon conferring with UC President Charles Hitch, Saxon should feel authorized to declare a state of emergency if he felt the situation warranted such action; Saxon promptly issued such a declaration. Unbeknownst to Saxon, the student violence had spent itself by 2:00 pm, the point at which he made his decision. The state of emergency, however, cleared the way for the LAPD to enter campus and clear out any remaining demonstrators surrounding the Men's Gym.\textsuperscript{103}

In the half hour between 2:35 pm and 3:05 pm, Saxon, a UCPD officer, and an LAPD officer made three separate public address announcements to students to disperse from around the Men's Gym. Within thirty five minutes, the LAPD successfully cleared the area around the Men's Gym with only a handful of arrests and a reasonable use of force, scattering

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., pp. 17-18. A faculty Senate report on War-Related activity in the University noted the Thailand Project "is to a large extent an instrument of U.S. policy in Thailand, the thrust of current U.S. policy in Thailand is counter-insurgency," see The Nature of the University's Involvement in War-Related Activities, War-Related Activity, Report of the Committee folder, Box #46, Records of the Academic Senate, Executive Office Administrative Files 1949-78 (ASEO), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.

\textsuperscript{103} Violence at UCLA, pp. 18-19.
the thousands of onlookers and demonstrators. What followed, however, was a miscommunication of tragic proportions. Administrators at UCLA, beginning with David Saxon, assumed that the LAPD would clear and secure the area around the Men's Gym and then retire or at most, maintain a ready position. The LAPD, however, felt that having been called on campus, they would deal with the situation as they saw fit and define its conclusion on their own terms. As such, they broke off into small groups to hunt for students, some as far away as three quarters of a mile. Observer and campus ombudsman Donald Hartsock referred to it as "warfare" and "pursuit."

Bands of LAPD officers began roaming the campus, beating any students, faculty and administrators they came across. The actions of the LAPD illustrated a total lack of discipline and utter contempt for student activism; the declaration of a state emergency allowed them to demonstrate both. As the LAPD swept through the upper campus shortly after 4:00 pm, some four hours after the initial demonstrations began, many of the people they ran across were coming from classes or work and had nothing to do with the earlier demonstrations. Most victims were chased down from behind, beaten and then released or ignored. Attempting to leave campus after working in the University Research Library (URL), researcher John M. Thomas suddenly found himself being chased by a police officer. The officer caught Thomas, beat him several times, then simply ran off. Professor Peter Ladefoged, a member of the Chancellor's Task Force on the Causes and Implications of

104 Ibid., pp. 20-23.

105 Hartsock, OHP, pp. 336-38; David Saxon, "University of California President," pp. 137-39, OHP; and Young interview. Records of the LAPD concerning the matter remain unavailable.
Violence, stood observing the activities of the police in the Architecture Plaza when they
turned their truncheons on him, beating him viciously all over the body with as many as fifty
blows. After knocking him into the gutter and handcuffing him, they proceeded to beat him
again. After working in the URL all afternoon, student Jerald Stanoff attempted to leave the
library but found a rush of students coming at him attempting to hide in the URL from
pursuing police. Stanoff leisurely turned to go back inside and reached the door just as the
police did, many whom appeared befuddled by the "in" and "out" turnstiles. Stanoff
attempted to point out the "in" turnstiles to the officers, one of whom turned and shoved him
into a display case, began beating him, and broke his arm, calling him a "goddamed fucking
Commie Jew bastard." Outside the library, officers with their weapons drawn chased a group
of unarmed students towards Bunche Hall. One officer stopped and fired a round into the
side of Bunche, above the students' heads, apparently as a warning shot. With the murders
at Kent State obviously fresh on their minds and the LAPD's behavior indicating open season
on students, the students kept running, fearing for their lives.106 Graduate student Marilyn E.
Ravic, observing the gunfire, noted, "in light of what happened on the Kent State campus,
[and] the impressive show of force exhibited by the LAPD on our own campus, it became
apparent to me for the first time yesterday [May 5, 1970] that such a tragedy could occur
with frightening ease and rapidity."107


107 Letter from Marilyn E. Ravicz to Chancellor Charles E. Young, May 6, 1970, folder 245.38
Student - Campus Disruptions 1970, Box #120, FDM.
By far the most disturbing of the incidents on that afternoon occurred at Campbell Hall, home of the University's ethnic studies centers. Along with the beating of Jerald Stanoff in the URL, Campbell was the only other building the LAPD entered where no protest activity had occurred. Also, Campbell was one of the farthest buildings from the original demonstrations earlier in the day. As the longstanding tensions between the city's minority communities and the LAPD found voice in the years after the Watts Uprising, the LAPD found itself under constant, justifiable, criticism from those communities as well as from some whites.\textsuperscript{108} As police entered Campbell Hall on May 5, they found an opportunity to exact a measure of revenge. Events earlier in the day illustrated the departmental disrespect for minorities, including the arrest of Richard A. Joseph, a graduate student leaving an afternoon seminar. Three officers blocked his path and began beating him. After placing Joseph in handcuffs, they then broke one his fingers and taunted him, asking, "can't take a little pain, nigger?" and "I bet your mother doesn't know who your father is." Similarly, while attempting to enter Campbell Hall, Webster Moore was caught up in a rush of students fleeing police. Police began clubbing Moore about the face and head, opening up such a gash that blood filled his right eye. After arresting him, one officer threatened to kill him before suggesting to the other, "let's use him as an example and march him around the campus." In

piecing the evidence together afterwards, observers and commentators realized that in fact, the LAPD had "targeted" Campbell Hall.109

The police entered Campbell without provocation and began chasing students down the hallways, "invading" offices and classrooms, and beating anyone in sight. As one student noted at the time, the LAPD was "kicking ass." After urging students to go home, Ernest G. Guiterrez, an administrator of one of the ethnic studies programs, went inside Campbell to use the phone. While standing in the hall, an officer ran by, struck him in the face several times, knocking him down, then beat him some more, before running off. The most serious incident occurred when Arch Henry White, a Native American student, attempted to fight back when an officer beat him on Campbell Hall's second floor. After the officer struck him several times with his baton, White attempted to flee but the officer pursued, slipping and dropping his truncheon. The officer contended that White grabbed the night stick and was about to strike him when he drew his revolver and fired. White slightly knocked the revolver askew and the bullet only grazed his face. Observers who came upon the scene moments after the shot however, found White lying in a pool of blood with the officer standing over him with his weapon drawn. More arrests occurred in and around Campbell Hall than any other area on May 5, yet of the nine buildings that suffered any damage on May 5, Campbell Hall suffered the least. In fact, no demonstrations or activity occurred at all at Campbell Hall until the LAPD arrived, suggesting the police caused most, if not all of the damage.

109 Violence at UCLA, pp. 30-31, 32-33, 38-39; letter from Department of Special Education Programs to Chancellor Charles E. Young, May 14, 1970, University Unrest, 1969-70 folder, Box #4, Records of the Center for African American Studies, Administrative Subject Files 1969 - , University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles, which referred to the "arbitrary, wanton, and willful disregard" for minorities by the police, who engaged in a "frenzied orgy of beating, kicking, and cursing innocent" minority students.
Campuswide, of the incidents needing medical attention at the University Medical Center, 65% of the students were treated for head injuries. Of the 81 arrests, eleven were faculty, staff, or administrators.\footnote{Violence at UCLA, pp. 39, 40-41, 43-44.}

Demonstrations erupted on almost every campus in the state that day, though UCLA witnessed by far the most violent. Largely in response to the activity at UCLA, Governor Reagan closed the entire statewide college and university system for the remainder of the week in hopes of allowing for a cooling-off period. When Charles Young returned to UCLA at 6:00 that evening, he found the campus shell-shocked, the students in fear for their lives, and Saxon shaken by the behavior of the police. That evening, Young and many others gathered in the Chancellor's residence to discuss recent events. Feeling overwhelmed with frustration and anger, Young called a friend, the Secretary of Education, in hopes of getting someone at the federal level to understand the local situation, "you've got to do something. Somebody's got to stop this." The Secretary told Young, "don't talk to me. You've got to get to the President, and [White House aide] Bob Haldeman is the person you gotta talk to." Young then contacted Haldeman, a UCLA alumnae, who told Young, "it's nothing." Attempting to illustrate the severity of discontent and unrest on area campuses in terms that a UCLA alum could understand, Young referenced the school's traditionally conservative rival, which had also witnessed demonstrations and unrest, "Bob, USC is closed down. This
is serious business, you've got to do something about this." Recalling the incident years later, Young sadly noted Haldeman's reply, "he just laughed at me."\footnote{Young interview. Haldeman's hubris and arrogance on the matter aligned with responses from other Nixon Administration officials, including Vice-President Spiro Agnew, who referred to demonstrators in October 1969 as "an impudent corps of effete snobs," and referred to the Kent State killings as "predictable;" FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover commented that Allison Krause "was nothing more than a whore;" and President Richard Nixon referred to demonstrators as "bums," callously commenting after the killings, "when dissent turns to violence, tragedy is inevitable," Wells, \textit{War Within}, pp. 382-83, 423-24.}

While the Cambodian invasion garnered almost no attention on campus, the murders at Kent State and the actions of the LAPD radicalized the campus, albeit temporarily, as never before. The actions of the LAPD demonstrated that Kent State could easily happen in Westwood and, perhaps more importantly, that the war represented an abrogation of basic rights such as speech, assembly, and even life. In one of the few sympathetic commentaries on the campus violence nationwide, a KABC radio editorial in Los Angeles asked the meaning of the largest youth protest in the nation's history, "this explosive outpouring of shock, anger, and frustration?" Primarily, it meant a reaction "to an unpopular war," but the students also expressed "their views on apathy, on injustice, on unresponsive institutions, . . . on the abandonment of ideals upon which this country was founded."\footnote{Transcript of KABC Radio Editorial, broadcast on May 9, 1970, in Los Angeles, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1970 folder, Box #1, MHC.} Like hundreds of other campuses who came to similar conclusions, students at UCLA went on strike.

The strike gained immediate credence when ASUCLA President Keith Schiller issued a press release on ASUCLA letterhead "calling for an immediate student-faculty-administration strike." Schiller urged student strikers to work towards peaceful, constructive solutions in the areas of uniting and informing the student body and disseminating peace.
information into the community, "if you attend classes, you are avoiding the issues. If you assist in destruction, you are violating the only positive approach we have." A final point illustrated the broad base of support for a strike: Strike Central had been granted office space in Kerchoff Hall, the student administrative building containing offices for everything from the Daily Bruin and the ASUCLA to the Black Student Union and Intramurals.\(^{113}\)

At least 28 departments voted to support the strike with most arguing their scholarly resources would be better used at that moment for dealing with the tragedy and seeking an end to the war.\(^{114}\) The Anthropology Department agreed to the strike, but demanded that the University stay open "so that its resources, our knowledge and skills, our manpower and facilities, can be put to the services of these ends," while the English Department held weekly student-faculty meetings to discuss the strike and the political crises, with all but eight professors agreeing to modify their syllabus to accommodate striking students.\(^{115}\) The Zoology Department unanimously requested permission from the University to issue pass/fail grades for all students who requested them and also asked the Office of the Registrar to

\(^{113}\) Press release from Keith Schiller, Undergraduate Student Body President, May 6, 1970, Intramural Relations - Student Disruptions - May 5-6, 1970 folder #2 Box #24, Records of the Chancellor's Office, Administrative Files of Charles E. Young, 1967-97 (CEY), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.

\(^{114}\) An incomplete list of striking departments in May 1970 includes: Anthropology, Art History, Botany, Business, Dance, Design, Education, Engineering, English, ESL, Film and Television, French, History, Immunology, Law, Linguistics, Mathematics, Medical Microbiology, Meteorology, Music, Philosophy, Physics, Pictorial Arts, Political Science, Psychology, Sociology, Theater Arts, and Zoology, see strike flyers, "1970 #1," Box #9, SAC; strike flyers, folder 245.38 Students - Campus Disruptions - Individuals, 1970, Box #119, FDM; and strike flyers, English Undergraduate Association, 1970 folder, Box #1, MHC.

\(^{115}\) Department of Anthropology strike notice, Peace Commencement Fund - Correspondence, 1970 folder and Department of English flyers, English Undergraduate Association, 1970 folder, Box #1, MHC.
redefine "Incomplete" so as not to imply an "F." In response, Dr. Franklin P. Rolfe, Dean of the College of Letters and Science announced policies "taken to protect the academic records of students whose consciences lead them to interrupt their studies during the quarter," including virtually open "drop" and withdrawal policies, the changing of "Incomplete" so as not to imply "F," and the waiving of scholarship requirements for students whose strike activity might affect their grades. Library employees voted 170-11 in favor of "active" support of the strike, while 76 agreed to strike for a day, with loss of pay, to "search for understanding and peace." Only limited support for the strike, however, came from the hard sciences. When the English Department issued a call to all professors and teaching assistants to compile a listing of meaningful poems, quotes and paragraphs "on the subject of War, Peace, Repression, Freedom, Racism and Brotherhood," the notice asked respondents to "give special attention to ideas which will have an impact on students in the sciences." Perhaps the most moving and original contribution to the strike came from the Music Department, which played Handel's Messiah, conducted by Zubin Mehta, director of the Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra, on Royce Quad in support of non-violent protest. The department printed hundreds of copies of the "Hallelujah Chorus" so students could join in, but were woefully unprepared for the response when at least 5000 packed the area between

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116 Department of Zoology strike flyer, folder 245.38 - Students - Campus Disruptions - Individuals, 1970, Box #119, FDM.

117 Dean Rolfe announcement, 1970, folder #2, Box #9, SAC.

118 "Library Newsletter," May 15, 1970, Library Staff Association, 1970 folder, Box #1, MHC.

119 Letter to All Professors and Teaching Assistants, unsigned, May 22, 1970, English Undergraduate Association, 1970 folder, Box #1, MHC.
Powell Library and Royce, Kinsey, and Haines Halls to sing for peace, most with tears in their eyes.\textsuperscript{120}

Just as quickly as the strike began, however, it fractured between moderates and liberals on one end and radicals on the other. The former found themselves overcome with frustration and contempt after the Cambodian invasion and the Kent State murders while the latter hoped the strike signalled a willingness of the student masses to make fundamental changes in American society. A letter to the paper declared, "Its about time we all get off our cans and took the reigns of student protest out of the hands of the radicals and put them in the responsible hands of other students who are more concerned about how to realistically change things and gain public support."\textsuperscript{121} Moderates and liberals on campus still believed in the efficacy of the democratic process and as such, continued to petition the surrounding neighborhoods and write letters to public officials. Two days after the LAPD riot on campus, all thirteen members of UCLA's 1970 national championship basketball team signed a letter to President Nixon expressing their "grave concern and disapproval over the President's policy" in Vietnam, supporting "the meaningful and peaceful demonstrations held throughout this country." Establishing their moderate credentials, the team "deplore[d] the tactics and violence of both students and law enforcement agencies that are suppressing the intentions of those who are truly concerned with peace on earth." The players rebuked Nixon for his "bums" comment, declaring that they and other peaceful demonstrators "are concerned with


the well being of America and its democracy." Nixon's hasty dismissals of their concerns and protest implied "something seriously wrong" with that democratic process.\footnote{Letter from UCLA 1970 NCAA Basketball Champions [13 names], to President Richard Nixon, c/o H.R. Haldeman, May 7, 1970, English Undergraduate Association, 1970 folder, Box #1, MHC. The inclusion of such traditional college activities as athletics signified the breadth of support for the strike. The letter also hopefully held out special appeal to Nixon, an acknowledged sports fan, who during the October 1969 National Moratorium, admitted that rather than paying attention to the demonstrations, he would spend the day watching college football on television.} Similarly, in a letter to residents of the neighborhoods surrounding UCLA, students and staff appealed to their sense of propriety by emphatically declaring that the strike did not seek to close down the University, "we are not destroying buildings and setting fires." The letter urged residents to "DO SOMETHING. Make your voice heard. USE the democratic process."\footnote{Letter from Concerned Staff Members at UCLA to Concerned Citizen, undated, Peace Commencement Fund - Correspondence, 1970 folder, Box #1, MHC.}

The moderates and liberals, however, did not control Strike Central. The visceral reaction immediately following Kent State and the LAPD riot allowed the radicals to push a far more aggressive agenda, reflected in the strike's three demands: immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Southeast Asia; the freeing of "political prisoners," particularly Black Panther leader Bobby Seale and Chicano nationalist leader Reis Tijerina; and the cessation of war-related research and ROTC at UCLA. The radical student contingent argued that the war and student repression were merely symptoms of a much larger problem, America's inherent racism and profit-consciousness. The radicals felt that alone, the UCLA strike could not be successful, but allied "in solidarity with our brothers and sisters on strike around the nation, we have tremendous strength. And our strength increases as the students and workers
around the world join us." This misplaced optimism was apparent in the short-lived radical student newspaper *Contempt*, whose very name illustrated their rejection of the democratic process, the motto of which was "we can be sure of two things in this REVOLUTION: One, we're gonna get our asses kicked; two, we're gonna WIN!" Finally, the radicals argued on firmer ground that Kent State was only the beginning of rightist repression, circulating a flyer on campus quoting a survivor of a Nazi concentration camp,

> I did nothing when they came for the communists, I was not a communist.  
> I did nothing when they came for the trade unionists, I was not a trade unionist.  
> I did nothing when they came for the students, I was not a student.  
> I did nothing when they came for the Jews, I was not a Jew.  
> And when they came for me, I looked for help but they had all been taken.

The flyer called for the freeing of all political prisoners and ended by declaring, "when law becomes tyranny, Revolution becomes order."

More than a week into the strike, the students held a referendum on the demands, with the results illustrating the already dissipating radical sympathy from the first week of May. Almost 70% voted to continue the strike beyond the first week with 77% calling for an immediate withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Beyond the first strike demand however, support diminished rapidly; only 58% supported the abolition of ROTC and students defeated the issue calling for the release of Seale and Tijerina with 64% disapproving. Indicative of the more practical concerns of most students voting in the referendum, the call for an on-campus

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124 "On Strike!," folder 245.38 - Campus Disruptions, 1970, Box #120, FDM.
125 *Contempt*, May 1970, found in 1970 folder #1, Box #9, SAC.
126 "Why Strike?!," 1970 folder #2, Box #9, SAC.
child care center passed with the greatest margin of victory, by 85%. In addition, a student-faculty survey on the strike demands found that only 29% favored the abolition of ROTC from campus. In an editorial on the strike, the Daily Bruin urged students to stay the course, to "stop business as usual until the war is over, . . . to take their case out of the colleges and universities and . . . to the streets and communities." The paper noted that such activity required sacrifice from students "to suspend their education for two months or longer with the uncertainty that such an act" entailed. "However, it is an opportunity for liberal and moderate students . . . to show that they are willing to risk upsetting their comfortable lives . . . ." Everyday the war continued, more American and Asian lives were lost, "we believe that the sacrifice which students are being asked to make becomes insignificant in comparison."

Shortly after the violence of May, a student wrote to the Bruin arguing that "only rational planning will smash the war machine," and students could bring the war to an end "if every young man would refuse induction and every taxpayer would withhold that part of his income tax which is financing the war." The problem, she noted however, was that most students were not willing to risk "jail and bankruptcy and confiscation of assets and financial disaster." As May turned into June and the end of the quarter approached, support for the strike slipped as more students attended classes and hurriedly made up coursework to receive

128 Perspective on the Student-Faculty Survey Project, by Steven A. Lippman and Ira Weiss, May 13, 1970, folder 245.38 - Students - Campus Disruptions - Individual Disruptions, 1970, Box #119, FDM.
full academic credit. Observers of UCLA's student body and the strike should not have been surprised. At the height of the strike, only a week after the initial violence, a student-faculty survey asked students the "greatest sacrifice" they were willing to make in support of the strike; 69% responded they would not give up class credit for the quarter.\textsuperscript{131} Fearful of losing the momentum provided by the Ohio National Guard and the LAPD, radicals hoped to drive the annual Naval ROTC review off campus. After political pressure forced a reversal of an initial decision to cancel the parade, radicals bombed the ROTC building on campus two days before the review.\textsuperscript{132} Almost all, however, dismissed the bombing, which incurred no casualties, as nihilistic violence. A more pragmatic appeal came in conjunction with the upcoming commencement. After the entire graduating class at Yale University forsook academic attire, donating the rental money to peace efforts, students began the Peace Commencement Fund (PCF), asking graduates to forsake caps and gowns and contribute the rental fee to peace candidates in the fall elections. The PCF at UCLA gained credence when the University Committee on Public Ceremonies endorsed the PCF's activities, a letter which the PCF promptly copied and sent to every graduating senior in hopes of enlisting their

\textsuperscript{131} Perspective on the Student-Faculty Survey Project, by Steven A. Lippman and Ira Weiss, May 13, 1970, folder 245.38 Students - Campus Disruptions - Individual Disruptions, 1970, Box #119, FDM.

\textsuperscript{132} The initial decision to cancel the parade came while Young was off-campus. The decision caused such a controversy that Young rescinded it, after "it became clear the Governor was going to get involved," Young interview; letter from Elwin V. Svenson, Assistant Chancellor, to Mrs. Louise Krenz, July 16, 1970, folder 245.38 Students - ROTC disruptions, 1970, Box #120, FDM; for the ROTC's version of the events, see Lawrence M. Kryske, "NROTC at UCLA: The Colors Still Fly," \textit{U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings}, December 1971, pp. 19-25.

Although the bombing was never solved, a group called The Red Sun Tribe took credit for the act, along with other bombings in Los Angeles, including the bombing of the Hall of Justice, letter from The Red Sun Tribe to \textit{Los Angeles Free Press}, September 11, 1970, reprinted in \textit{Los Angeles Free Press}, September 11, 1970.
Although only approximately 300 students, out of a graduating class of 7700, refused to wear academic attire, hundreds, perhaps thousands more made dramatic peace gestures. Countless students wore peace signs on their gowns and mortarboards and many raised the peace sign or the power salute when receiving their diploma. When the Philosophy grads were asked to stand, they raised a sign reading "Peace Now." 

With the end of the quarter and summer vacation, the mainstream anti-war movement at UCLA all but died. Fears that the campuses would explode again in the fall proved unfounded on a nationwide basis as well as locally. On an immediate level, without direct links between students' own rights and civil liberties and the war, large-scale activism at UCLA continued to suffer. On the first anniversary of the Kent State killings and the LAPD riot, one student noted "UCLA students were pissed last May not because of the injustice of Cambodia but instead because the oppression that comes down against [minorities] was actually coming down on their own type - white college students. The May 5 riot was an angry response to Kent State, not the Cambodian invasion." The failure of the student strike came "because no more white college students were shot . . . . As soon as it became apparent that white college students were no longer going to be killed, most people lost their political fervor and went back to class while the war went on." Sociologist and UCLA faculty member Ralph Turner essentially argued the same point when he examined the nature of

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133 Letter from Waldo Phelps, Chairman, Committee on Public Ceremonies, to Jeff Sellwood, Peace Commencement Fund, May 19, 1970, Peace Commencement Fund - Correspondence 1970 folder, Box #1, MHC.


activism in the term following the Kent State spring. Turner found that "personal frustration" served as the primary motivating factor in student activism at UCLA and that a return to "earlier patterns of disruption" were only as far away as "a rise in [students'] personal frustration." \(^{136}\)

On a more symbolic level, however, the Kent State killings served as a watershed event for student activism at UCLA. The physical repression in Ohio as well as on their own campus, and the overwhelming national response that Krause, Miller, Scheuer, and Schroeder deserved their fate, indicated to students at UCLA the high stakes of aggressive activist behavior. Although anti-war sentiment at UCLA reached an all-time high, with the emotion of the spring gone, student anti-war activism waned, highlighting the difference between being opposed to the war and opposing the war. On the anniversary of the Kent State killings, the ASUCLA president joined presidents from other UC campuses in agreeing "to declare their full support for a university-wide moratorium . . . to allow students to express their feelings about the war in Vietnam." \(^{137}\) Students expressed their feelings on the war by ignoring it. Although a referendum on the war showed a staggering 82% opposed, only 3673 students bothered to participate, and a referendum the following year did not even mention the war. \(^{138}\) In discussing the general apathy and disgust at UCLA, one letter noted, "at this May 5,


\(^{137}\) Letter from Associated Student Body Presidents, April 12, 1971, Student Association's - General 1968-81 folder, Box #137, CEY.

students are asking 'what's the point.'"139 The second anniversary found many of the same attitudes when student Mary MacGregor said, "everybody's given up their idealism because they think it is pointless."140 In the opening editorial in the fall of 1970, the editor of the Daily Bruin noted that students received from college what they put into it, but in the end, they all wanted the same things, "four years of C's and B's; marriage to a girl from a good house; the furnished apartment; a couple of kids; that ranch house far out in the valley; good fortune in business; a new house up on the hills; and finally, success: your children enroll at UCLA." The question, according to the editor, lay in what students did at UCLA to make that happen. Participating in the anti-war movement, of which most had given hope of its, and their, success, only threatened their achievement of the materialist ideal.141

The dearth of activism after the Kent State spring did not go unnoticed. In January 1972, the Bruin condemned "the lack of commitment to the cause of peace among a supposedly enlightened student body of 28,000."142 Three months latter the paper asked, "where has all the student activism gone?"143 Vice Chancellor Norman Miller claimed in the spring of 1972, "students are as active as they have ever been. The difference is that they are now interested in ecological problems, consumerism, and other public interest issues."144

140 "Radicals Leave Campus," Santa Monica Evening Outlook, April 5, 1972, part one, p. 2.
141 "Four Years of Being," Daily Bruin, September 29, 1970, p. 32.
143 "Reminders," Daily Bruin, April 17, 1972, p. 4.
144 "UCLA Activism Takes New Direction," Santa Monica Evening Outlook, April 4, 1972, part one, p. 1.
Indeed, the nascent environmental movement appealed much easier to students' sense of self-interest and their stake in mainstream middle class society. After a letter to the campus paper inquired of the lack of activism in response to Nixon's bombing of Cambodia in April 1973, one student wrote back that "it was paying homage to the shrine of the Grade Point Average, saving Santa Monica Pier and writing letters to the Daily Bruin."\(^{145}\)

Committed campus anti-war activists, however, hoped the visceral passions of May 1970 could be renewed in May 1972 when Nixon announced an increased bombing campaign in North Vietnam and the mining of Haiphong Harbor. Three days of rallies, marches, and demonstrations attracted as many 2000 students, the highlight of which came when just under a thousand students, including basketball player Bill Walton, barricaded themselves in Murphy Hall with furniture and overturned maintenance vehicles which began leaking gasoline. With employees trapped inside and the very real threat of fire, Young regretfully called the LAPD. Working with far more restraint and professionalism this time, the LAPD made 52 arrests, including Walton, who extended his middle finger towards Young as he was being loaded into the paddy wagon.\(^{146}\) Without personal affronts such as the Kent State murders and the excesses of the LAPD, the events of May 1972 did not call forth wide-scale activism on campus. Walton's involvement, as well as his self-described "socialist" views, which included


\(^{146}\) "Students here march against Vietnam war," and "Meyerhoff to Wilshire — UCLA version of march," Daily Bruin, May 10, 1972, pp. 1-2; "Protests remain peaceful as students march, strike," ibid., May 11, 1972, p. 1; "LA Police sweep campus, arrest 52 demonstrators," ibid., May 12, 1972, p. 1. For an appeal to strike, see "Expand the Strike!!!," Intramural Relations - Student Disruptions and Discipline - May 10-11, 1972 folder #1, Box #45, CEY. When asked 29 years later if the LAPD riot of May 1970 made him wary of ever calling them on campus again, Young said yes without hesitation, Young interview.
a newspaper interview in which he referred to U.S. foreign policy as imperial, and stated, "Vietnam is the first place to stand up to the empire and say, 'Fuck you,'" helped revive old allegations of communist infiltration on campus.\textsuperscript{147} Athletic Director J.D. Morgan, convinced that student activism was entirely communist inspired, feared that Walton's high profile had made him a target for recruitment. Walton's arrest only confirmed Morgan's suspicions that the Communists had gotten to Walton.\textsuperscript{148} The \textit{Bruin} offered an indication of the lack of fervor accompanying the 1972 demonstrations and Walton's well-publicized involvement by merely noting its non-effect on UCLA's championship basketball program (see illustration 4.5).


\textsuperscript{147} "Most Valued basketball player talks about his anti-war arrest," \textit{Los Angeles Free Press}, November 24, 1972, part one, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{148} "The Right Man at the Right Time: J.D. Morgan," pp. 540-41 OHP.
Off-campus, the reaction was even worse, indicating that conservative anger and
disgust towards demonstrators was not limited to Ohio. Letters from Los Angeles residents
to Chancellor Young suggested the "use of a fire hose on the kids," while another demanded
the students lined up for a "spraying with a machine gun," offering to personally man one of
the guns, while still others singled out Walton's presence as particularly shameful as a
scholarship athlete.149 The most strident attack came from E.R. Ray of Riverside, who
enclosed a photograph of bearded students participating in a peaceful candlelight vigil, noting
that "they very much resemble a bunch of dirty, filthy, disgustingly repulsive shepherders that
had just been on an extensive sex orgy." Ray called such students "a disgrace to the human
race and all decent people everywhere," postscripting, "I regret such people even live."150

The announcement of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 was duly noted in the pages
of the Daily Bruin, but no exaltations of joy, relief or smugness accompanied it. By 1973,
most students at UCLA just wanted the war to go away. The war offended many of them
morally, but morality alone never proved a successful incentive to large scale student activism
at UCLA. In the end, campus organizers had to hope for issues that offended students' sense
of self-interest, like the draft, or incidents that offended students' appreciation of civil liberties
and equality before the law, like the Kent State murders and the LAPD riot of May 1970.
The war never threatened the democratic capitalist society students so desperately hoped to
achieve the way issues of the Civil Rights movement did. As UCLA's non-white population

149 The first two letters, both unsigned, are found in Intramural relations - Student Disruptions and
Discipline - May 10-11, 1972 folder #1, Box #45, CEY; the Walton letters are found in folder #2.

150 Letter to Chancellor's Office, UCLA, from E.R. Ray, May 15, 1972, Intramural relations -
Student Disruptions and Discipline - May 10-11, 1972 folder #1, Box #45, CEY.
increased dramatically towards the end of the 1960s, however, even those issues had limitations on appealing to students' sense of equality.
Students at UCLA traditionally responded to calls for reform when those issues appealed to their sense of equality of opportunity, equality of and before the law, and faith in the democratic process, which embody democratic capitalism. Throughout the history of the school, students successfully attacked discrimination in the University in the form of the Greek system, student housing, and student clubs because those issues appealed to students' core values based on democratic capitalism. The school's low minority enrollment similarly illustrated that the University itself did not provide equal opportunity and white student activists embraced special admissions and employment programs and an expanded curriculum to account for the minority experience. UCLA's minority enrollment increase due to special admissions programs and ethnic studies centers occurred just as the militance of both rhetoric and behavior increased amongst non-white activists. Using this increased militance, minority activists demanded expanded concessions from both the administration and the larger student body. Many white students, however, did not often view such demands as emanating from unequal opportunity, but rather from minorities' sense of oppression. Thus, they perceived minority student activism as no longer seeking equal opportunity but rather providing for a special interest. The notion of special interest inherently offended their democratic capitalist values.

As UCLA students intensified their anti-discrimination activism after World War II, they acknowledged the mere symbolism of such activity due to limited minority enrollment,
and that with the exception of intercollegiate athletics, most student institutions remained overwhelmingly white. Minority enrollment figures are unavailable until 1968, but all estimates place the combined number of Chicano and black students at only a couple of hundred and Asian enrollments only slightly higher throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. The student body, however, was not the only predominantly white body on campus, as the faculty, too, suffered from limited racial diversity, including no blacks as late as 1950. Just as Chancellor Franklin D. Murphy aided and encouraged student efforts to achieve free speech and greater involvement in civil rights, his presence bore similar fruit in the efforts to expand UCLA’s minority presence, both in the faculty and the student body.

The vitality of the University as a free marketplace of ideas, as Murphy envisioned it, depended on the assumption that all enjoyed equal access to the marketplace, thus his support for students’ rights of speech and association. Just as students’ exclusion from the marketplace threatened its vitality, so too did the exclusion of minorities, limiting not only the success of the university, but of democracy as well. In November 1963, Murphy issued a memo to all University employees stressing the "time honored and unequivocal policy" of non-discriminatory hiring practices at UCLA, in which he explained the significance of such practices for both the University and the republic,

The University is unique among society's institutions in its singular dedication to truth and justice. As such it cannot be less than a visible and dynamic model of what can be achieved for those among us who are seeking the dignity and security of opportunity which others of us are able to take for granted.

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In short, the University must stand as an example to the community, indeed
to the nation and the world, as a true and working democracy completely free from
the unjust discrimination that results from even the most subtle prejudicial attitudes.¹

When the Regents suggested that the University of California campuses seek out talented
students from historically black colleges for teaching assistantships in May 1964, Murphy
proudly announced that UCLA already engaged in such recruitment efforts.² Just as the
administration under Murphy, and later Charles E. Young, preempted moderate student
demands for free speech and association by serving as an ally in that struggle, they served the
same role in the efforts to diversify the university.

The administration embraced similar efforts to increase minority enrollment at UCLA.
As early as June 1963, UC officials recognized "that the UC is not attracting nearly enough
students from the large minority groups such as Negro and Mexican-American and that the
University has an obligation in this regard."³ In response to that recognition, faculty at UCLA
began a program the following spring which brought promising students from Jordan High
School, one of the most segregated and academically poorest performing schools in the vast
Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), to UCLA each Saturday for a semester. The
program served two equally important functions: first, students in the UCLA Tutorial Project
provided the Jordan students with academic tutoring; second, students and faculty exposed

¹ Memo from Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor, to All University Employees, November 21, 1963,
FEPC 1963-70 folder, Box #42, Records of the Chancellor’s Office, Administrative Subject Files of
Franklin D. Murphy, 1935-71 (FDM), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.

² Minutes of the Council of Chief Campus Officers, May 20, 1964, FEPC 1963-70 folder, Box #42,
FDM.

³ Minutes of the Council of Chief Campus Officers, June 1963, Relations with Schools 1960-69
folder, Box #40, FDM.

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the Jordan High students to a college campus and the idea that as a public university, UCLA could be their school as well. The program operated under the valid assumption that the city's public school system did not provide equality of opportunity as it pertained to schools with heavy minority enrollment and in economically poor areas. As one UCLA administrator for the project put it bluntly, "chemistry at Jordan High bears no resemblance whatsoever to chemistry at Beverly Hills High."

The viability and success of the Jordan program lead UCLA in the fall of 1964 to expand and formalize it into the Educational Opportunities Program for Disadvantaged Students (EOP), the goal of which "will be to encourage the higher education of capable disadvantaged students, including members of minority groups." Chancellor Murphy put the issue in terms of the free marketplace by describing EOP's "main function" as recruiting "students who, because of circumstances beyond their control, have not realized their potential — the salvage of talents that otherwise might be irretrievably lost." EOP sought to identify "talented and disadvantaged" area high school students who might otherwise lack the opportunity to attend college by providing them financial aid, tutorial services, and job placement help. The administration admitted these students under a UC-wide caveat allowing

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5 Letter from Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor, to Acting Assistant University Dean William F. Shepard, November 30, 1965, folder #143 - Special Educational Programs, 1968-69, Box #92, FDM.

6 Memorandum from Byron Atkinson, Dean of Students, UCLA to School Counselors, fall 1964, FEPC 1963-70 folder, Box #42, FDM.

7 Letter from Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor, to Kenneth Washington, November 7, 1966, folder #143 - Special Educational Programs, 1968-69, Box #92, FDM.
for the admission of two percent of the entire student body on the basis of factors other than grades, known as the "two percent rule." The basis of the EOP existed in the school's sense of responsibility "in making higher educational opportunities available to students of promise who, because of disadvantaged economic and social backgrounds, would not otherwise be able to assume their rightful place in society."*

With the exception of student participation in the Tutorial Project, early efforts at increasing minority employment and enrollment occurred entirely at the administrative level. That changed however, with the Watts Uprising of August 1965. Watts showed UCLA's overwhelmingly white student body that the city's non-white population lacked numerous avenues of equal opportunity, including, housing, jobs, and education. After Watts, and in no small part due to students' developing, though belated, racial consciousness from their Civil Rights activities, students suddenly took notice of administrative diversity efforts. Part of the EOP, known as Upward Bound, served as a college preparatory program for disadvantaged students "who possess the necessary potential to succeed in college [but otherwise] would not consider higher education as an alternative for future success."9 In 1966, the administration offered only limited admissions to Upward Bound participants, citing poor academic performance as the reason, though poor academic performance was one of the criterion which qualified them for the program in the first place. An editorial in the Daily Bruin cried foul, "People with special talents (athletes, musicians, and others) are admitted

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8 Memorandum from Byron Atkinson, Dean of Students, UCLA to School Counselors, fall 1964, FEPC 1963-70 folder, Box #42, FDM.

to UCLA, though they don't qualify on grades, through the two-percent rule. These students are special too; their need for quality education is special." The editorial urged the administration to admit all the Upward Bound participants as a first step towards "counteract[ing] the damage that has already been done" by unequal educational opportunities.10

Inner-city uprisings in Newark, Detroit and other cities continued in successive summers after Watts, illustrating that America suffered grave economic and social disparities amongst non-whites. In response, UC President Charles Hitch presented a special address and report to the Regents in May 1968 entitled, "What We Must Do: The University and the Urban Crisis." Recognizing "the need for a concerted effort by the University community to become viably involved in the present urban crisis, as a means for ameliorating the tenacious malaise that grips our nation," Hitch called for a long-term re-evaluation of the University's role in research, public service, and education and in the short term, demanded an additional one million dollars for programs like the EOP, as well as increased minority faculty recruitment efforts.11

At UCLA, that re-evaluation could not occur without minority student input. In the fall of 1968, the first year such figures are available, UCLA's total undergraduate minority population equaled 2,562, only 9% of the total enrollment of 28,997, while minorities accounted for almost 25% of Los Angeles' population by that time. Specific enrollment


11 Special Report of the President, "What We Must Do: The University and the Urban Crisis," May 17, 1968, folder #251 - Urban Crisis Universitywide, 1968-70, Box #251, FDM.

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figures for the fall are unavailable but later figures suggest that less than 700 blacks were enrolled and Asian-Americans accounted for almost half of all minority enrollment during this period.\textsuperscript{12} Because of the poor public secondary education available to most non-whites in Los Angeles at the time and the absence of large-scale development programs for minority applicants, minority students at UCLA came from successful working and middle class backgrounds and proved highly competitive in UCLA's rigorous academic environment. For the black students on campus, their academic success, merged with a race-based social consciousness, created what Chancellor Charles E. Young called, "a group of the finest [black] students UCLA ever had."\textsuperscript{13} This generation of black students, intellectually reared during the "long hot summers of violence," intuitively grasped the paradigm put forth by historian William L. Van Deburg, "If knowledge is power, then institutions of higher learning were academic jousting fields upon which key societal power relationships were decided. For the student protesters, greater control over their learning environment was vitally essential to the larger struggle for self-definition and power."\textsuperscript{14}

In an effort to achieve self-definition and power, black students at UCLA formed the Black Student Union in spring 1967. The BSU at UCLA, as at many other campuses, grew out of the political activism and promotion of black cultural expression espoused by Malcolm X. Black students in predominantly white universities identified with Malcolm's assertion of

\textsuperscript{12} "Enrollment and Support of Minority Graduate Students, UCLA, Fall 1968," folder #254 - Special Educational Programs 1968-69, Box #125, FDM; "American Cultures Project announced," \textit{Daily Bruin}, January 20, 1969, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{13} Oral interview with Dr. Charles E. Young, August 3 and 11, 1999, Los Angeles, CA.

blacks as a "colonized" people in a predominantly white country and argued that terms such as "college system" and "student financial aid" could easily be substituted for "plantation" and "tenant farming." They correctly perceived organization as the primary means by which to achieve power. In December 1968, the president of the BSU addressed the black student body, arguing, "We must no longer exist as disorganized individuals, but as a collective, functional entity... we must realize that there can be no such thing as individualism, for we are all black; and we all catch hell because of that fact." They rejected the liberal assumptions that had characterized the Civil Rights Movement that equality before the law accompanied with integration would create a harmonious bi-racial society. James Roberson, an ex-SNCC field worker, enrolled at UCLA out of the belief that blacks would have to seize control of the institutions affecting them and education remained the surest step to achieve that end. Roberson viewed the black struggle for justice in America "as heading away from the pre-1966 ideals of SNCC to the more positive, de facto acquisition of power." To that end, black youth in Southern California, including Roberson, took part in Operation Bootstrap, a program borne out of the Watts Uprising, which adapted the chant, "Burn! Baby, Burn!" into "Learn! Baby, Learn!", and stressed the need for job training and education. In March 1968, the group hosted a five part lecture series on Black Power and the following

15 Ibid., p. 71.
16 "BSU President Speaks," Nommo, December 4, 1968, p. 4.
17 "Black militant here to prepare for revolution," Daily Bruin, November 1, 1968, p. 4.
year, Hal Griffin, a graduate of Bootstrap and a BSU member, earned a Rhodes Scholarship, the first black at UCLA so honored.18

In the winter of 1967, the BSU held a retreat outside of Los Angeles to discuss ways in which to achieve power within the university structure. At the students' invitation, then-Vice Chancellor Young attended, indicating not only Young's respect for their contribution to changes within the University that he, too, envisioned, but the group's willingness to deal even-handedly with the existing power structure. As Young later recalled the goals of the conference, "they were trying to get recognition for the concerns they had," while also seeking "an appropriate University response for those concerns." Young learned from that conference that the BSU desired, and indeed had already begun to formulate, a black studies curricula at UCLA, but of "a different character than popped up elsewhere, not departmental curricular, but research based centers."19 As Van Deburg wrote, "if the black student unions were the chief coordinators of Black Power protests, the academic programs for which they so vigorously campaigned were to be the movement's more formal link to the established university power structure."20

The first fruit of that conference came in the spring quarter of 1968, when UCLA offered "The Black Man in a Changing American Context," an accredited course through the Committee for the Study of Education in Society (CSES), with significant curricular

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19 Young interview.

20 Van Deburg, New Day in Babylon, p. 73.
contributions from BSU leadership, in particular Virgil Roberts and Skip Johnson. The class proved immensely popular with both black and white students, so much so that Dickson Hall, containing the largest lecture hall on campus, seating over 500, hosted the class, with most lectures standing room only.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, mainstream campus institutions lauded the motivations behind the class, including a \textit{Daily Bruin} editorial which referred to the course as a "tremendous achievement" and criticized the administration for not offering more courses of this nature and more support to the BSU.\textsuperscript{22}

Other efforts by BSU leadership to deal with curricular issues included text and monograph adoption. For years, UCLA's black students criticized textbooks and monographs with openly racist content and interpretation; as far back as 1949, students opposed the use of historian U.B. Phillips' groundbreaking but now notorious \textit{American Negro Slavery}, comparing Phillips with racist Mississippi Senator Theodore Bilbo by referring to the scholar as nothing more than "Bilbo-with-a-PhD."\textsuperscript{23} By the late 1960s, students opposed the use of a psychology textbook that suggested connections between race and intelligence and historian John Hicks' textbook \textit{Rise of the American Nation} which, among other things, referred to Ku Klux Klan activity during Reconstruction as merely "frightening Negroes . . . [by] stopping now and then at a house to issue their warning."\textsuperscript{24}

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\textsuperscript{21} Virgil P. Roberts, "UCLA Center for African American Studies," pp. 31-32, UCLA Oral History Program (OHP), Department of Special Collections, Young Research Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.

\textsuperscript{22} "Encouragement," \textit{Daily Bruin}, March 29, 1968, p. 4.


\textsuperscript{24} "Stop racist textbooks," Vietnam War Protest folder, Los Angeles Subject Vertical Files, Southern California Library for Social Studies and Research, Los Angeles.
\end{flushright}
Chicano students at UCLA also organized at this time and around similar issues as the school's black students. They too, found themselves underrepresented at UCLA, with one historian estimating that perhaps only sixty Chicano students enrolled for the 1966-67 school term. That small core of students, however, provided the critical mass for Chicano student organization in southern California. With the help of the L.A. City Human Relations Office, area Chicano students organized a conference in May 1967 to discuss issues of racism, the tutoring of Chicano high school students, community organization, and support of the continuing struggles of the United Farm Workers. Lead by the UCLA contingent, a "mandate" for campus organization evolved as the "principal result" of the conference. By the fall of 1967, chapters of the United Mexican-American Students (UMAS) organized at almost every public college and university in southern California.25

Like initial BSU rhetoric of Black Power achieved through essentially conservative means, UMAS placed heavy initial emphasis on self-help and community development, particularly through education, as a means to seize the reigns of institutions affecting their lives.26 Also like black students in the mid-1960s, those who made it to college did so without the aid of developmental programs or special admissions and succeeded in a competitive academic environment, making them a privileged minority within a minority. While the Chicano barrios did not erupt in violence as did black ghettos, they suffered similar plights of unemployment, poor living conditions, and oppression at the hands of the LAPD.


and L.A. County Sheriffs. Their academic success and cognizance of ethnic community oppression gave Chicano students of this early generation a sense of responsibility to the larger community. Just as white-dominated campus institutions such as the Daily Bruin embraced the course on blacks in America, these institutions perceived their own responsibility to help provide equality of opportunity when the ASUCLA cosponsored with UMAS a symposium on Mexican-Americans in February 1968. The symposium examined the Mexican-American's role and treatment in both society and education and featured speakers from academia and the community.

When California Governor Ronald Reagan again prodded the Regents to impose a tuition charge on students in 1968, UMAS argued that such a financial requirement would have dire effects on the already limited enrollment of minorities, many of whom came from working class backgrounds. In January, UMAS held two days of demonstrations on campus to remind Reagan and the Regents "of their responsibility to secure the traditional principle of free educational opportunity in our state." Portending serious consequences for abrogating that responsibility, UMAS claimed, "the denial of education may be the drop that overflows the cup of patience." That overflow came in March 1968 when thousands of Chicano high

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29 "The United Mexican-American Students Protest Fee Increase: A Direct Injustice to our Community," 1968 folder, Box #7, Student Activism Collection (SAC), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles; Rosen, "The Development of the Chicano Movement," pp. 162, 175; Gomez-Quinones, *Mexican Students Por La Raza*, p. 27.
school students, with leadership from area UMAS chapters, including UCLA, walked out of four LAUSD high schools in East L.A. to protest inferior facilities and resources, racist and apathetic teachers, and an indifferent board of education.30

Known as the East L.A. Blowouts, the strike opposed what Chicanos viewed as the "meaning and purpose of education in American society," which "alienated" Chicanos from their native language and "deculturized and dehumanized [them] so as to be able to function in a white middle-class Protestant" world.31 One Chicano columnist suggested the importance of the Blowouts by arguing that "all time should be dated" from them "because of the unique and significant place [they] will have in the history of our revolution."32 Seeking to capitalize on the momentum and publicity generated by the Blowouts and hoping to attract sympathy from the majority white student body at UCLA, UMAS leaders involved in the Blowouts held a symposium in May to make clear the methods and goals of the Blowouts, which again included participants from across the academic and community spectrum.33

The constructive nature by which UMAS and the BSU sought to affect change within the university won them the power role they sought. In June 1968, now-Chancellor Young called together a Steering Committee of faculty, students, and administrators, which included

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31 "Blowouts Illustrate Purpose of Education," Chicano Student News, March 15, 1968, p. 7. This paper soon changed its name to the Chicano Student Movement.


UMAS and BSU leadership, to answer President Hitch's charge of responding to the Urban Crisis. The Committee's response included two programs that bore the heavy stamp of minority student input, the High Potential Program, which sought to attract minority students, and an Institute of American Cultures, which consisted of several components, including the Centers for the Study of Afro-American History and Culture and Study of Mexican-American Culture. Though both the High Potential Program and the ethnic studies centers would eventually cause tremendous controversy and spark a tragic gun battle on campus, they established the precedent for valuable minority student input on programs relating to their involvement in the education process.

Begun in the fall of 1968, the High Potential Program, known as Hi-Pot, was remarkably similar to the EOP, recruiting "students who have high qualities of intelligence and who demonstrate the potential to benefit higher education," though they lacked traditional academic success. Administrators, beginning with Chancellor Young, envisioned Hi-Pot as a short term program to encourage minority admissions before more long-range planning could effect that change. As Young later put it, "we felt we needed to do a little pump-priming." Immediately, a "major concern" arose over how to admit these "culturally different and economically disadvantaged students" who lacked a traditional academic performance record. In looking at other factors for admission, administrators made the

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34 "Addendum to the Call for the Special Meeting of the Los Angeles Division of the Academic Senate, November 25, 1968, Re: Report on UCLA's Response to the Urban Crisis," folder #252 - Faculty Development Program UCLA 1968-79, Box #124, FDM.


36 Young interview.

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comparison with foreign exchange students who scored poorly on American standardized tests like the Scholastic Aptitude Test, but gained admission through other means. "In other words, special skills, insights and experiences must be brought to bear upon" Hi-Pot admissions. Such justifications inadvertently reinforced BSU rhetoric of blacks as a colonized people.

In Hi-Pot's first term, the program admitted 100 minority students and 275 the following quarter, which had a dramatic effect on overall minority enrollment. By the winter quarter of 1969, minority student enrollment increased from 2562 to 3268, an increase far in excess of the 375 Hi-Pot admissions, suggesting that UCLA's commitment to programs such as Hi-Pot, EOP, and Upward Bound, as well as the success of ethnic student organizations, convinced area minorities that attending UCLA presented itself as an attainable goal. This remained an issue, however, for several more years considering that in 1972, the Student Legislative Council (SLC) allocated over $1100 to UMAS's successor MEChA to operate tours of UCLA for Chicano barrio youth. Student Mario Flores argued, "for most of us here, UCLA is something taken for granted that we can come to any time. But for kids in the barrios, it is like another world. We have to show them its accessible and that they can come here if they want to."

The relative ease of Hi-Pot's creation by minority student activists and administrators stood in contrast to the ethnic studies centers, in large part because so many held differing

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37 Letter from Raymond Orbach, Chair, Faculty Advisory Committee to Vice Chancellor David Saxon, July 30, 1969, folder #254 - General Special Education Programs 1970, Box #125, FDM.

38 "American Cultures Project announced," Daily Bruin, January 20, 1969, p. 1; Young interview.

views on what should be the goals and objectives of the centers. Like Hi-Pot, the Institute of American Cultures, the umbrella agency which would oversee the study centers, created four components, one each for black, Chicano, Asian-American, and Native American studies. The Steering Committee created all four simultaneously in large part due to the impressive influence of the UMAS and BSU contingents, particularly the latter, even though no forceful organized Asian-American student group existed on campus nor pushed for such a program, and only 32 Native American students were enrolled in early 1969. Said Young later, "we ended up creating the other centers before there was really a demand for them." 

Because of the strength of their leadership and planning involved in the "Black Man in America" course, the black students quickly developed a proposal for a black studies center which immediately identified a difference in what the University sought and what the students sought. While some administrators contended that the black students "retreated from the idea of an academically oriented study center," and embraced the notion of an "action base" from which community development and political activism would occur, it is unlikely they abandoned the former but demanded that it accompany the latter. Black students, indeed all minority student activists at UCLA during this period, perceived the immediate value of ethnic studies centers as a connection to their larger oppressed minority community. BSU leader Virgil Roberts envisioned the center as a bridge between the resource [the black community] and the researcher [the University] so that something valuable could be said by

40 Young interview.

41 Letter from Paul Proehl to Chancellor Charles E. Young, October 2, 1968, folder #255 - Ethnic Programs and Centers 1968-70, Box #127, FDM.
the researcher about the resource. As part of that community relationship, the black studies center ordered its books not through the Ackerman Union bookstore on campus but through the Aquarian Bookstore in South Central Los Angeles, providing not only an economic benefit to the community, but establishing a legitimacy within the community by illustrating that the studies center included their interests as well. Meetings between the administration and students over the studies centers frequently included community members as well, who attended at the behest of the students and to the chagrin of the administration. Vice Chancellor Paul Proehl bluntly told Chancellor Young, "I think we would be making a great mistake if we did not try to separate from the Center . . . the political and community thrust into the University." Six months later, the Chair of the Committee on Education Policy expressed the same reservations to Young, suggesting that "certain safeguards and controls must be instituted at the very outset to prevent these Centers from developing into propaganda outlets for the communities represented."

Part of the ongoing struggle over the community role in the black studies center included the selection of its director, an issue which not only split the administration from the community but split the students from each other. According to Chancellor Young, "the issue was whether we were going to have an academically qualified person or whether it was going}

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42 Roberts, "UCLA Center," pp. 66-70, OHP.

43 Alfred Ligon, "All the Lights the Light," pp. 47-48, OHP.

44 Letter from Paul O. Proehl to Chancellor Charles E. Young, October 2, 1968, folder #255 - Ethnic Programs and Centers 1968-70, Box #127, FDM.

45 Letter from Colin Young, Chairman Committee on Education Policy, to Chancellor Charles E. Young, April 29, 1969, folder #253 - Urban Research at UCLA 1967-70, Box #124, FDM.
to be someone from the street." Complicating matters further, competing interests within Los Angeles' ghetto community viewed control of UCLA's black studies center as a power tool with which to achieve their own agenda. The chief antagonist was a group known as US, sometimes referred to as United Slaves, lead by UCLA alumnae Maulana Ron Karenga (formerly Ron Everett). Karenga based US on the tenets of cultural nationalism, stressing ancestral ties to Africa, wearing tribal dress, and speaking Swahili. The organization assumed a cult of personality based around Karenga, with many of his followers shaving their heads like him, quoting from the group's basic primer, "The Quotable Karenga," and joining the group's elite bodyguard unit, the Simbas, or Young Lions, not unlike the Nation of Islam's Fruit of Islam. Karenga's ability to exert control over some of Los Angeles' street gangs and his ties to community centers in South Central L.A. allowed him tremendous discretionary authority over federal anti-poverty funds flowing into the region, making him, in essence, a kingmaker. His attempts to exert control over the directorship selection of UCLA's black studies center fell under those auspices.

Karenga and US found opposition both in Los Angeles' ghetto communities and at UCLA over the center directorship from the Black Panther Party (BPP). Founded in the San Francisco Bay Area, the Panthers stressed black community development, featuring free hot breakfast programs and schools which highlighted the black experience in America. The Panthers rejected the non-violent approach of the earlier Civil Rights movement, forming

\[46\] Young interview.


armed community patrols not only to maintain order in their ghetto communities, but more importantly, to surveil the tactics and behavior of white racist police officers in the ghettos. The Panthers found no vested interest in whether the director came from academia or the streets, but opposed Karenga's attempt to assert hegemony because it offended the Panthers' basic ideology of self-determination, espoused in their oft-quoted slogan, "All Power to the People!" The Panthers denied they sought control over the UCLA center, stating they "would not trade one block of Central Avenue for the whole city of Westwood, because the Black Panther Party is based on the masses of black people and gets its strength from the same."49 Members of both US and the Panthers were enrolled at UCLA under Hi-Pot, which added to the tension as organizational ideology found its way to campus. Karenga apparently attempted to strong arm the students into endorsing his nominee by sending the Simbas onto campus armed with M-16 assault rifles concealed under long black coats, a threat the Panthers met in kind when many of them brought weapons to campus as well, also concealed under long black coats. The two groups provided an almost comical image warily eyeing each other on campus in winter clothing during one of Los Angeles' typically balmy fall days.50

With apparent Karenga influence, the community advisory board strongly supported Charles Thomas, a psychologist and education director of the Watts Health Center, for the directorship. The BSU leadership strongly opposed Thomas because he lacked strong


academic credentials. Thomas' nomination shocked Virgil Roberts, who stated, "We wanted to have a really heavy brother come in who could deal with UCLA," referring to Thomas as "an intellectual pygmy" who would be "eaten alive" in UCLA's supercharged intellectual environment. The Panthers' willingness to offer armed resistance to Karenga's tactics emboldened the students, particularly the rank and file of the BSU, to openly oppose both Thomas and Karenga himself. On January 15, 1969, the BSU declared that they would not recognize Thomas as director if appointed and resolved that "any person appointed as director of the Black Studies Center . . . must have the approval of the Black Students' Union," and declared that "the Black Students' Union will develop a criteria by which those candidates will be chosen."\(^{51}\) At one confrontational BSU meeting, one female student addressed US members by rebuking Thomas' nomination and saying of Karenga, "he should take his little bald head and get off the campus!"\(^{52}\) The growing friction between US and the Panthers created what the *Daily Bruin* called "an oppressive aura of tension," among black students.\(^{53}\)

The confrontation reached a tragic climax on January 17, 1969 when, after another heated meeting to discuss the directorship, two Hi-Pot students and US members shot and killed John Huggins and Alprentice "Bunchy" Carter, also both Hi-Pot students and high ranking L.A. Panthers, in Campbell Hall. It remains unclear the exact motives in the murders or Karenga's role in them, but the tragic meeting featured "unanimity amongst the students in support of the application of sound academic criteria in the selection of a Director [and]

\(^{51}\) Letter from Black Students' Union of UCLA to Chancellor Charles E. Young, January 15, 1969, Afro-American Cultural Program 1968-60 folder, Box #127, FDM.


that the BSU had clearly made a commitment to educational values . . . " What is clear is the role played by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's infamous COINTELPRO, active in the 1960s and 1970s against all manner of leftist activity in the United States. Through COINTELPRO, the FBI attempted to "promote violence" between the Panthers and US, according to Director J. Edgar Hoover, "in order to fully capitalize upon BPP and US differences as well as to exploit all avenues of creating further dissension within the ranks of the BPP." Put more simply, the FBI hoped US and the Panthers would kill each other off, and after the Campbell Hall killings, local FBI officials felt justified in taking "credit." Both before and after the killings, the FBI sent cartoons to Panther and US members caricaturizing each other, hoping to inflame more violence (see illustrations 5.1 and 5.2).

Illustration 5.1 found in Churchill and Vander Wall, Agents of Repression.

54 Minutes of the Chancellor's Cabinet Meeting, January 20, 1969, Campus Administration - Chancellor's Cabinet Meetings 1969 #1 folder, Box #32, Records of the Office of the Chancellor, Administrative Files of Charles E. Young, 1967-1997 (CEY), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.

There is also evidence to suggest the FBI infiltrated the BSU at UCLA, in addition to the existing FBI informant, Bill Divale, placed in the highest levels of the leftist Du Bois Club and Students for a Democratic Society.36

The Carter-Huggins murders set the entire campus on edge, particularly the leadership of the BSU. Administrative concern for their safety grew so palpable that Chancellor Young "hid the students for the next several days. We had them hidden around so that nobody could get to them. We were afraid they were going to be killed as well."37 Black students on campus refused to be interviewed in the Daily Bruin and Mary Jane Hewitt, director of Hi-Pot, brushed off a reporter, stating, "I think it would be foolish to be nosing around at a time like this."38 Questions immediately arose about the sagacity of the very basis of Hi-Pot and recruiting and attracting such students "from the street."39 Chancellor Young answered those concerns in a press conference after the murders. "The tragic events . . . have in no way diminished our resolve to offer broader educational opportunities on this campus. We are determined to go forward with what we

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37 Young interview.


39 Letter from Thomas J. Scully, Campus Advocate, to Chancellor Charles E. Young, January 29, 1969, folder #3, Box #401, FDM.
have started in the conviction that it is necessary, that it is right and that it is just.\textsuperscript{60} The \textit{Daily Bruin} placed the issue within the context that so many whites student activists at UCLA responded to by declaring the continuation of Hi-Pot an "absolute necessity if minority youth, many of them the products of inferior secondary schools, are to be given the opportunity to obtain a higher education." The paper argued that without Hi-Pot, "only a very small percentage of minority students would be eligible for admittance to the University. The eligible students, by and large from bourgeois middle class black and brown families, would hardly represent a cross section of their respective communities."\textsuperscript{61}

The Campbell Hall killings offered a sanctity and urgency to Hi-Pot and the emerging black studies center. In the BSU's first meeting after the murders, they issued an open letter to the black student body calling for all "to bend their energies now toward building our institutions, such as the Afro-American Studies Center, in the image that John Huggins and Alprentice Carter died for." Out of Carter's and Huggins' deaths, the students should "send forth a black Phoenix from the ashes."\textsuperscript{62} Though the administration compromised on the nature of the centers by providing a "two-fold program" containing both a research-based study center and an "urban-centered action program," they found themselves unprepared for perhaps the students' most adamant demand, a centralized building where all Special Education Programs (SEP), the umbrella program for Upward Bound, EOP, Hi-Pot, and the

\textsuperscript{60} Undated draft remarks, BSU, etc., 1968-71 folder, Box #2, Records of the Public Information Office, Administrative Files of Chandler Harris, University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.

\textsuperscript{61} "Progress, not tension, must follow campus deaths," \textit{Daily Bruin}, January 22, 1969, p. 4.

studies centers, activity took place. Administrative proposals did not "take account of the felt need of the blacks for something in the way of a physical center, a locus for their activity."°

That "felt need" intensified dramatically after the Campbell Hall killings.

The relatively quick creation of programs such as Hi-Pot and the emerging studies centers forced the administration to house them on a temporary basis in Campbell Hall, vacated by the recently abolished Department of Home Economics, though with the understanding that upon renovation, the space in Campbell had been promised to other departments. The murders offered a sanctity to Campbell Hall that black students, and indeed all minorities, refused to repudiate. In the recently founded black student newspaper Nommo, a front page article declared that "Campbell Hall is a symbol of self-determination and identity. Let it be remembered that for a people who have been deprived of symbols of their identity and their self-determination, he who scoffs at the idea of symbolism is in a way courting with a sleeping lion."64 Such apocalyptic rhetoric was not limited to the students, as Robert Singleton, the newly named Director of the Afro-American Studies Center, warned Chancellor Young "of the possible holocaust that the Campbell Hall controversy might touch off on this campus."65

Beyond the symbolic attachment to Campbell Hall on account of the murders, all minority students appreciated the sense of ownership that accompanied the sole presence of

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° Letter from Paul O. Proehl to Chancellor Charles E. Young, October 2, 1968, folder #255 - Ethnic Programs and Centers 1968-70, Box #127, FDM.


65 Memorandum from Robert Singleton, Director of Afro-American Studies Center to Chancellor Charles E. Young, June 26, 1969, folder #255 - Ethnic Programs and Centers 1968-70, Box #127, FDM.
the ethnic studies centers in Campbell. An editorial in Nommo argued that the importance of Campbell lay in its ability to achieve a critical mass of activism and organization borne out of the minority students' shared oppression. "The Chancellor is discussing programmatic space whereas the BSU is talking political space. Campbell Hall currently contains the most vital and productive political space on campus. . . . as a locus for political action, it is exciting in a way hard for outsiders to comprehend."66 Chicano students, too, appreciated the symbolism of Campbell Hall, as the building provided the locus for campus organization to support the United Farmworkers efforts in the grape strike, and offered them a haven where students felt welcome and inspired to succeed. "The atmosphere of the University's cold, heartless, often hostile surroundings is not present in Campbell Hall. These things help each program to succeed. This kind of atmosphere could not be achieved in the administration's alternative of Royce Hall."67 When the administration temporarily acquiesced to the maintenance of the studies centers in Campbell, Gidra, the Asian-American student newspaper declared, "Campbell Hall is free. Liberated by the united efforts of the Third World students."68

The fight over Campbell Hall illustrated a larger problem that few, if any, from the white majority student body grasped. Student institutions such as the Daily Bruin and the SLC remained dominated by whites. Minority students felt so strongly about keeping all the minority-based programs together in Campbell because the building represented the one place


67 "The Grape Strike," La Gente, February 16, 1971, p. 2; untitled, undated statement on the disposition of Campbell Hall, Chicanos at UCLA folder, Box #1, Dorra Anne Weber Papers, Chicano Studies Library, Murphy Hall, UCLA, Los Angeles.

on campus where minority students were not in the minority, where they enjoyed a sense of belonging. Part of this struggle included the formation of minority-based student groups and the launching of ethnic student newspapers. Students turned to UMAS or the BSU and read *La Gente* or *Nommo* because they did not feel the SLC or the *Daily Bruin* spoke for them. When traditional student institutions did attempt to include the minority student body, they did so in terms of traditional liberalism, which offended the increasingly militant ideology of most minority students, as when the BSU declared UCLA's celebration of Negro History Week as "initiated, planned, programmed, and directed by and for white people under the aegis of Black folk. . . . It does not accurately portray the true history of Black people in this racist country."69 Perhaps most importantly, the ethnic student groups and papers served a function not met by the older, white-dominated student institutions: service to the specific ethnic community.

When UMAS delivered their proposal for the development of the Mexican American Studies Center, they stated their "primary goal" as increased Chicano student enrollment and the "development of curricular, research, and public service programs more relevant to the Mexican-American student and community."70 The UMAS proposal explicitly viewed UCLA as an instrument of the Chicano community by declaring that "UCLA through UMAS and the Mexican American community work together to help resolve community problems and


70  Letter to UCLA's United Mexican-American Students from Chancellor Charles E. Young, April 7, 1969, folder #254.5 UMAS/MEChA 1970, Box #125, FDM.
interests as defined by the Mexican American community.\textsuperscript{71} Gilbert D. Garcia, the Center's Administrative Coordinator, agreed by noting that "the center was created out of the need of the community - the barrio. It came out of a need to sensitize the Anglo Community of Westwood and UCLA that they must service the community, not just the Westside."\textsuperscript{72} Part of that sensitization process included changing the Center's name to the Chicano Studies Center because of the assimilationist overtones implied by the term Mexican-American, instead embracing the term favored by many nationalists and militants.\textsuperscript{73}

The ongoing farmworkers strike served as perhaps the most visible community struggle that the Chicano Studies Center sought to aid. In embracing the farmworkers struggle as their own, UMAS, and its successor MEChA (Movimiento Estudiantle Chicano de Aztlan),\textsuperscript{74} reaffirmed not only their ethnic identification with the workers, but also their own working class background, something which previously had been a source of ridicule and shame.\textsuperscript{75} Initially, student activist hoped to support the grape strike and boycott by forcing the University to cease its purchase of grapes. President Hitch, however, ruled that not purchasing grapes "as a policy decision" would involve the University in the labor dispute.

\textsuperscript{71} Joint News Media Release from Chancellor Charles Young, UCLA and Luis Arroyo, Chairman, United Mexican American Students, UCLA, April 7, 1969, folder #254.5 UMAS/MEChA 1970, Box #125, FDM; also see Munoz, \textit{Youth, Identity, Power}, pp. 132-133.


\textsuperscript{73} "Chicano Studies Center name," Chicano Studies Center folder, Box #28, ASEO.

\textsuperscript{74} The English translation is Chicano Student Movement of Aztlan, although the acronym itself has militant, incendiary meanings as well, translated as "match."

which its status as a public institution precluded. Hitch did offer a clue to students as to how
to effect such a policy however, "the furnishing of specific food products may be discontinued
if . . . there is not sufficient demand" for them.76 In other words, if UCLA students stopped
buying grapes in the cafeteria, the school would be "forced" into not offering them. UMAS
leaders immediately understood Hitch's loophole and the following week held a rally in
Meyerhoff Park to implore white students to abide by the boycott, implicitly appealing to
UCLA's historically liberal-minded yet indifferent white student body by declaring, "this is the
cause of you who go home to the suburbs and wonder what you can do to help us. You can
boycott the grapes."77

The Daily Bruin declared Hitch's rationale for not directly ceasing grape orders as
"completely untenable," arguing that in buying grapes, the University sided with the growers
by financially supporting them and their activities. "The University is inherently an agent of
social change, and must take some responsibility for insuring that the change it helps foster
does not yield injustice and abuse for some members of the total society it is committed to
serve." The grapeworkers strike continued to serve as the one issue that resonated with
UCLA's white-dominated student body because it offended their democratic capitalist values.
"It is crucial . . . that when specific issues raise questions of basic social justice, the University
recognizes its responsibility to speak and act."78 White students' responded to UMAS calls
to support the boycott such that by the end of October 1968, Jack Knopf, food services

76 Memorandum from Charles J. Hitch to Chancellors, October 11, 1968, Directives - President's,
 July - December 1968 folder, Box #3, FDM.


administrator, announced that lack of student demand forced him to cancel future orders for table grapes. Both the Bruin, through editorials, and the SLC, by officially endorsing the secondary boycott against Safeway stores which sold the grapes, continued to call for support of the farmworkers, while Chicano student activists continued to appeal to students' sense of democratic fair play by declaring that "farm workers are not asking for charity or for welfare, they are trying to help themselves."

Asian-American students lacked such an overt display of oppression with which white students could identify, or at least sympathize. Indeed, "one of the major objectives" of the newly created Asian-American Studies Center was to address the myth of Asian-Americans as the "model minority." One student author placed the issue in glaring perspective by declaring, "the Asian Americans' current position in America is not viewed as a social problem," on account of their achievement of "middle class incomes while presenting no real threat . . . to the white majority." These assimilated, middle class Asian-Americans faced a serious identity crisis, "fully committed to a system that subordinates them on the basis of non-whiteness, Asian Americans still try to gain complete acceptance by denying their yellowness. They have become white in every respect but color." Scholar and then-UCLA Professor Harry Kitano argued that most Asians-Americans "do not think in terms of what they want for themselves, but what the white majority wants," and stated that Asian-American


80 "Safeway," Daily Bruin, October 20, 1971, p. 5; "Safeway boycott continues," ibid., January 5, 1972, p. 2; "You Can Help Farm Workers," 1972 folder, Box #12, SAC.

acceptance of the American value system came from a "tremendous desire to please." As such, Asian-American student activists faced the two-fold task of convincing the white majority of their oppression, but also raising the consciousness of many Asian-Americans to their own oppression. To achieve that end, a small group of Japanese-American students formed the group Sansei Concern in the summer of 1968 and planned a September conference, "Are You Yellow?" aimed at identifying a minority consciousness. The success of the conference lead student leaders to broaden the scope of the group to include all Asian-Americans and renamed it Oriental Concern. Following the example of black students and the BSU, this core of student leadership served on the studies centers Steering Committee, developed and won approval for the CSES class "The Oriental in America," and launched the Asian-American student newspaper *Gidra*, both in 1969. Large-scale Asian American activism developed late in this period, at least with respect to black and Chicano activism, because so many accepted the success implied in the "model minority" stereotype and because Asian-Americans lacked a unifying force of oppression to rally against. Differences in national identity served as an additional barrier to achieving Asian American unity. Potential activists found a common form of oppression, however, in late 1968 at San Francisco State College. As minority, or "Third World," students felt themselves increasingly excluded from mainstream avenues of advancement and success, particularly higher education, these students struck at San Francisco State in 1968.

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in the longest student strike in American history. The Third World Strike at San Francisco State marked "the first campus uprising involving Asian Americans as a collective force," and was violently suppressed by law enforcement and the campus administration. The strike did much, however, to politicize and heighten a sense of ethnic identity for Asian American students throughout the West, "through their participation, a generation of Asian American student activists reclaimed a heritage of struggle."  

The "model minority" stereotype directly affected administrative perceptions of the need for an Asian-American component in both the Institute of American Cultures and Hi-Pot. After reviewing initial proposals for the studies centers, one administrator, speaking for the Committee on Budget and Interdepartmental Relations, commented, "the Asiatic studies draft proposal... while inoffensive, seems to us less justifiable than the others. We do not believe that the Asiatics can be as easily classified into an ethnic unit as can the Mexican-Americans or the Blacks." Two months later, the same administrator again brought the issue before Young, noting the Committee's concerns,

It seemed to us that the Asian-Americans in Los Angeles constitute less of an ethnic entity than do the blacks or the browns. Moreover, the Asian-Americans generally

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84 Glenn Omatsu, "The 'Four Prisons' and the Movements of Liberation: Asian American Activism from the 1960s to the 1990s," in Karin Aguilar-San Juan, ed., The State of Asian America: Activism and Resistance in the 1990s, (Boston: South End Press, 1994), pp. 24-25. Also see Karen Nora Umemoto, "Asian American Students in the San Francisco State College Strike, 1964-68," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1989; and Karen Umemoto, "'On Strike!' San Francisco State College Strike, 1968-69: The Role of Asian American Students," Amerasia Journal, vol. 15, no. 1, 1989, pp. 3-41. In her master's thesis, Umemoto contends that other campuses in California moved to create ethnic studies centers for fear that failing to do would result in similar strikes and violence. That does not appear to be the case at UCLA, as any mention of the San Francisco Strike is wholly absent from both administrative and student discourse found in the historical record and Chancellor Young formed the Steering Committee from which these centers developed before the San Francisco strike began.

85 Letter from E.R. Hardwick, Chair, to Chancellor Charles E. Young, April 16, 1969, folder #253 - Urban Research at UCLA 1967-70, Box #124, FDM.
seem to have integrated themselves to a greater extent than have other minorities. For these reasons, we believed, and still believe, that an Asian-American Center, while formally necessary, may not need to become as large an operation as other minority centers.66

The perception of Asian-Americans as the successful minority gained further credence when an Academic Senate report on minority faculty identified that the overwhelming number of Asian-American faculty at UCLA came from the professional schools of Engineering, Dentistry, and Medicine.77 These factors and concerns, in addition to the fact that Asian American enrollment far out-paced other minorities, contributed to Hi-Pot providing for no Asian American enrollment in 1968 and only 25 in 1969, one fourth of black and Chicano Hi-Pot admissions.88

This attempt at consciousness raising witnessed a spate of Asian-American student groups, including Allied Orientals, the Asian Radical Movement, the Asian-American Student Alliance, and Asian-Americans for Peace.89 Though these groups sometimes held different goals and tactics, they operated under the shared concern "over the position of the Orientals

66 Letter from E.R. Hardwick to Chancellor Charles E. Young, June 16, 1969, folder #255 - Asian American Studies Center 1969-70, Box #127, FDM.


88 "Chicano Proposal," 1970 #2 folder, Box #9, SAC.


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in exclusion from various opportunities in minority programs: 'If we do not unite, there will be no one else to look for out for us - we will be on the bottom of the totem pole.'

The issue of uniting these various groups proved more difficult for Asian-American students because unlike their black and Chicano counterparts, they could not identify with a common background of oppression and lacked a common ancestral heritage. The presence of students from Japan, China, Korea, the Philippines, and soon, Vietnam, provided tremendous cultural and historical variety. Indeed, the initial proposal for the Asian-American Studies Center specifically highlighted the folly of identifying a singular Asian-American community. In an effort to solidify an Asian-American identity, student activists attacked Asian-Americans unwilling to explicitly accept their ethnicity as their primary identity. One letter to the *Daily Bruin* attacked Asian-American students who identified with white-dominated student organizations, "the problem is the moderates" who were "too status-quoish . . . But worst of all, they associate themselves with the white establishment." Letters published in *Gidra* were even more critical, denouncing Asian-American women who altered their appearance by bleaching their hair or taping their eyes to enhance roundness in an attempt to "look white," arguing that in so doing, they were no better than prostitutes, degrading not only themselves but their Asian heritage as well, "You will always be inferior if you strive to become that which you can never be." Another column directly criticized the Asian-

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91 Proposal for an Asian-American Studies Center, May 1969, Asian-American Studies Center folder, Box #27, ASEO.


American middle class for accepting their half-way oppression: not fully white, but not as degraded as blacks, by evoking the image of plantation slavery in referring to them as "house niggers." 94

The creation of the ethnic studies centers and Hi-Pot addressed the primary concern of most non-white students at UCLA: increasing minority enrollment and providing them with their own institutions. From their standpoint, these programs achieved success. The administration, however, saw things from a different perspective, in no small part because they saw these programs as a way to integrate minority students into the larger university, not insulate them. In addition, members of the administration never fully grasped the extent to which the minority students in these programs felt excluded from the larger society and the University. In August 1970, Seneca Turner, Acting Coordinator of the black Hi-Pot component, sent letters, on University letterhead, to all their students, to inform them whether their performance allowed them unqualified admission to UCLA. The "failure" letter informed students why they would not be recommended for admission and wished them well, but bluntly rebuked them to "stop jiving and start taking care of business." 95 The promotion letter was even more blunt. Though the letter informed students of their success, it added, "but before we part I would like to take a few moments to talk about us all because brothers and sisters do not separate without getting certain things of their chests." The letter informed

94 "Still a minority," Gidra, May 1969, p. 3.

95 Letter from Seneca Turner, Acting Coordinator High Potential Program to [addressee deleted for privacy], June 25, 1970, UCLA High Potential Program 1970-72, Box #6, Center for Afro-American Studies, Administrative Subject Files (CAAS), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.
the students that their continued success depended upon their ability to accept the social circumstances from whence they came:

Remember the brother in the community who sits and waits in front of the liquor store until it opens so that he can buy his early morning short dog; the little Black children who are kept out of school because they lack shoes or proper clothing to wear, and those who go to school merely to learn about George Washington, Patrick Henry, Abe Lincoln and other white gangsters. Remember the brother in the community who has to have six reds or two caps of smack before he can get out of bed. Remember the sister who sells here beautiful black body to soft, pink, moist hands holding dollar bills, in order to make ends meet. Remember the roaches that hurry across the floor when the light is switched on in thousands of Black peoples' kitchens. Remember the over ripe fruit and tainted meat that thousands of our people buy daily from the neighborhood market because they can get credit. Remember the white racist police patrolling our community rousting whomever they choose.96

When Vice Chancellor David Saxon learned of the letter, he sent letters of disclaimer to all the recipients and demanded Turner's dismissal.97 The tone of Saxon's letter and his dismissal of Turner outraged the black students, who sharply rebuked Saxon, "this letter was not meant for a white person such as yourself, for it was written by Black people to Black people. And only Black people could understand and appreciate its contents and the eloquent manner in which it was written. This letter exemplifies the totality of the Black experience, which Black people live everyday of their lives." The students illustrated their contempt for Saxon and his inability to perceive from their vantage point not only the importance of Hi-Pot to minorities but the vast divide that separated whites and non-whites in America. "For your future reference, we therefore suggest that you should be able to interpret what you read before you

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96 Letter from Seneca Turner [and three others] to [addressee deleted for privacy], June 25, 1970, UCLA High Potential 1970-72, Box #6, CAAS.

97 Letter from David S. Saxon, Vice Chancellor to Winston Doby. August 6, 1970, UCLA High Potential 1970-72 folder, Box #6, CAAS.
attempt to write on a subject for which you may have no understanding. Your letter was insulting and degrading, and shows a lack of understanding on your part, towards the people that you are supposed to be representing."

In addition, many administrators maintained serious reservations as to Hi-Pot's validity and efficacy. As early as October 1969, Raymond Orbach, Chairman of the Faculty Advisory Committee, informed Vice Chancellor David Saxon in a letter marked STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, that "in gross terms, we believe that in so far as High Potential is concerned, SEP has failed." The Committee "found that students have become progressively more remote . . . [and] a bureaucracy and rigidity within SEP which effectively eliminates the very goals" established for the program. Orbach bluntly laid Hi-Pot's failures at the feet of the administration, citing lack of "Administrative control" and stating, "the lack of clear leadership and responsibility exhibited by this Administration is a scandal in itself." Orbach darkly warned that "failing severe action, SEP will grow into a hydra-headed monster fully capable of devouring us all."99

One week later, Orbach wrote to Saxon again, stating that his previous letter "probably understated the problem," citing three unnamed members of the SEP administration "who are essentially worthless to the educational experience of the student." Orbach highlighted the power students enjoyed with such programs by noting that the three could not be fired "because of the trouble that would be caused with both the student organizations .

98 Letter from Black High Potential Students to Vice Chancellor David Saxon, October 1, 1970, High Potential Program 1970-71 #10 folder. Box #200, CEY.

99 Letter from Raymond Orbach, Chairman Faculty Advisory Committee to Vice Chancellor David Saxon, October 22, 1969, folder #254 - General SEP 1970, Box #125, FDM.
and the community. This is what develops from a complete lack of control over this program by the administration." According to Orbach, fears of vocal student criticism amounted to the administration "paying hush money to keep peace in the program."\(^{100}\)

Another indicator of minority student power occurred when Henry L. N. Anderson resigned as Upward Bound Director after he concluded that "the performance of the responsibilities of the Director cannot be judged independently of campus politics," while he maintained "strong misgivings" about student demands within the program.\(^{101}\) Concern over SEP programs existed as well within the highest levels of the University administration. Dean of Students Byron Atkinson claimed that EOP maintained a terrible retention rate and did not hesitate to state his concerns to Young, causing a rift between the two.\(^{102}\) Assistant Vice Chancellor Rosemary Park felt Hi-Pot's failure lay in its attempt to bring community activists on campus with an already full schedule of community activism, leaving them no time for an equally full academic schedule.\(^{103}\)

In an effort to gather data on Hi-Pot students' proficiency levels, the administration hoped to administer a "diagnostic test" in hopes of determining "the specific English and

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\(^{100}\) Letter from Raymond Orbach, Chairman Faculty Advisory Committee to Vice Chancellor David Saxon, October 27, 1969, folder #254 - General SEP 1970, Box #125, FDM.

\(^{101}\) Letter from Henry L. N. Anderson to May Jane Hewitt, Director, SEP, June 10, 1969, Project Upward Bound folder, Vertical Subject Files, Office of the Director, University Religious Conference, Los Angeles.

\(^{102}\) Byron Atkinson, "Expanding Student Services at UCLA," pp. 150-57, OHP.

\(^{103}\) Rosemary Park, "Liberal Arts in the Modern University," pp. 161-2, OHP. This point is substantiated in Valle's examination of student activism at Arizona State, see Valle, "MEChA," p. 107.
mathematical needs of High Potential Program students.\textsuperscript{104} The students however, refused to take the test based on two factors that illustrate the wide disparity in how students and administrators viewed the program. The students argued that without assurances to the contrary, they could not be certain that the results would not be used against Hi-Pot at some point in the future, and that such a standardized test could not possibly account for "the varied cultural backgrounds involved in High Potential."\textsuperscript{105} From the students' perspective, the diagnostic test served only to provide a means by which a predominantly white, i.e. racist, administration could at some time in the future eject the minority presence from campus. In addition, students viewed the use of standardized testing as yet another feeble attempt to account for the minority experience using a "white" measuring stick, in essence, expecting minorities to conform to existing institutions, rather than developing institutions to account for the varied minority experience.

The rapid expansion of Hi-Pot and the absence of direct administrative oversight in SEP came in large measure because of minority student pressure. Chancellor Young conceded that such expansion doomed the program, "we moved a little too quickly on it and moved without the design which would have enabled a better ongoing analysis." In addition, Young felt "a hesitancy to try to single it out, spotlight it too much," for fear that such attention, along with the program's experimental nature, might restrict its successes. As such, the administration reached a conclusion that Hi-Pot needed to be reigned in. "It was a

\textsuperscript{104} Letter from Winston Doby, Coordinator, to Staff and Students, High Potential Program, December 2, 1970, High Potential Program - Evaluation 1971 #9 folder, Box #200, CEY.

\textsuperscript{105} Letter from Students - Asian American Students to Winston Doby, December 4, 1970, High Potential Program - Evaluation 1971 #9 folder, Box #200 CEY. Letters from each of the other Hi-Pot components using the same arguments are also found in this file.
conclusion, without as much evidence as we would have liked, that the program had to be changed, cut back, modified in order to be successful." As it was originally conceived and developed, High Potential ceased to exist after June 30, 1971.\textsuperscript{106}

The failure and curtailment of Hi-Pot occurred simultaneously with a change in UCLA's minority student body. The increasingly militant tone of discourse sweeping the country, particularly with regards to non-whites, found its way to campus as minority students refused to accept existing institutions that did not account for them and refused to tolerate members of their own community whom they deemed as accommodationist. More militant students grew dissatisfied with the studies centers because of their concentration upon research, such that many students either ignored or condemned them. Almost immediately upon its founding, administrators and staff in the Asian American Studies Center grew dismayed at the poor student response. Student Alan Nishio, the Center's Community Project Coordinator, expressed his "overall feeling of dissatisfaction," with the Center because he did not "see ethnic studies making any impact on the University or on Asian American students." Nishio admitted that one of the reasons for the Center's irrelevancy lay in the fact that many students did not come into the Center.\textsuperscript{107} The Chicano Studies Center, too, encountered problems in attracting students. One student noted, "The Center does not relate to Chicano students or to its community. Instead it has created a bureaucracy."\textsuperscript{108}

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\textsuperscript{106} Young interview, "UCLA Ends Program for High-Risk Students," \textit{Los Angeles Times}, May 3, 1971, part I p. 3.

\textsuperscript{107} "Asian studies here 'buys off' militants; others apathetic," \textit{Daily Bruin}, February 12, 1970, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{108} "Chicano Studies Center 'does not relate to Chicano Students or its community,'" \textit{La Gente}, February 27, 1973, p. 8.
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dissatisfaction with the direction of the Center erupted during this period, resulting in the replacement of the director, Rodolfo Alvarez, with former student activist, now an academic, Juan Gomez-Quinones, who himself would eventually be ousted for the same reasons.\textsuperscript{109} Morgan Wooten, chairman of the Black Student Union, leveled similar criticism at the Center for Afro-American Studies, expressing his unhappiness with the center because "it's totally research oriented. By that fact alone it makes undergraduates somewhat detached from the center." Speaking for the larger black student body, Wooten said, "I think the general attitude among Black students on campus is that they are not satisfied with the center."\textsuperscript{110} Their continued stress on academia in the centers lead the BSU to expel Virgil Roberts and three others, all of whom played integral roles in the development of the studies centers and programs such as Hi-Pot, for "selling out to the white folks."\textsuperscript{111} If the development of such institutions were part of a revolution, as many minority students contended, than the revolution had begun to consume its children.

Most examples of minority student activism during this period occurred outside the realm of issues embraced by the larger white majority student body, particularly after the shift of the Civil Rights movement from liberal integration to Black Power. Writing exactly one week before Martin Luther King's assassination, one student declared, "Although the Civil Rights movement is concerned with re-establishing rights denied [to blacks] while guaranteed to whites, the blacks have shown the whites that no matter how long it takes, the goals for

\textsuperscript{109} Munoz, \textit{Youth, Identity, Power}, pp. 159.

\textsuperscript{110} "Afro-American Studies Center," \textit{Daily Bruin}, October 27, 1972, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{111} Roberts, "UCLA Center," pp. 41-42.

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self-respect and the freedom for self-determination have been set and no longer will they be put aside. 112 Minority students aligned with whites during the May 1970 anti-war strike, but mostly as a way to further their own agendas. Both the BSU and the Asian Strike Committee issued demands separate from those of Strike Central which only tangentially referenced the war, but centered on issues of funding for minority programs, minority enrollment and minority faculty. 113 Indeed, in responding to concerned parents after the strike, Chancellor Young noted that "neither the black nor Chicano students have played any role in the recent difficulties. They believe their problems are different and unique and have remained almost totally aloof from any activity related to the Viet Nam War." 114

Because minority students viewed their problems as separate and unique, they remained aloof from white student organizations as well. After SDS attempted to align themselves with the 1971 Chicano Moratorium, MEChA rebuked SDS as "parasites," stating, "No one outside the Chicano movement should be setting policy for us. It is up to Chicanos to find their own destiny and it is not up to other organizations to tell us how to move." 115 Indeed, because minority students perceived many of their problems existed off the campus rather than on, they were wary of the larger student movement because of its inherent


113 "The Black Students in Conjunction with the General Striking Body of UCLA," PCF Correspondence 1970 folder, Box #1, Moratorium History Committee, Records Pertaining to Campus Unrest 1966-71 (MHC), University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles; and "UCLA on Strike!!!," folder #245.38 - Students - Campus Disruption 1970, Box #120, FDM.

114 Letter from Chancellor Charles E. Young to unknown parents, June 16, 1970, folder #235.55 Students - Campus Disruptions 1970, Box #120, FDM.

limitations as campus-based. "A student movement which concerns itself with bringing about changes within the University is engaging in an act which can have all the appearances of being quite important, while being, in essence, quite unimportant. The University is a temporary society for which most who live within its confines, and as such any radical activity aimed at it is of limited value."116

The struggles over minority-based academic programs did not preclude minority student activism on other campus issues. On the contrary, struggles over the academic programs only bolstered minorities' abilities to see and fight their exclusion from traditional student institutions. The creation of minority student papers not only addressed the large-scale absence of minorities from the staff of the *Daily Bruin*, but allowed minority students to address issues specific to their respective communities. One letter critical of the paper wrote, "when the sociological and educational problems of minorities are at an end, and when there is no longer any discrimination among people, then we can all relax. And when the *Bruin* can really recognize minority problems and integrate the *Bruin* editorial staff, we will no longer need minority papers."117 Throughout 1970 and 1971, *Gidra*, working to identify for Asian Americans events of their oppression, ran features on the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the internment of the Japanese during World War II, and the American colonial presence in Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. Seeking to highlight Chicano cultural distinction, *La Gente* in 1970 featured articles on Chicano poetry and other cultural events, as well as news from East L.A., completely irrespective of the campus. Similarly, *Nommo* ran

116 "From the Other Side of the Track," *Nommo*, May 9, 1969, p. 4.


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articles about the effects of narcotics, the criminal justice system, and welfare on the black community. In addition, every issue featured a section of black poetry and the arts. These papers and the cultural events they advocated found at least a measure of legitimacy within larger student institutions when the ASCULA began advertising in Nommo and celebrated the Cinco de Mayo holiday with an exhibition and sale of Chicano and Mexican art, literature and crafts.

Other attempts at addressing inequality in existing student institutions did not prove as seamless. In varying degrees, many white students at UCLA grew uncomfortable with the expansion of minority student activism into realms other than strictly under the purview of minority student institutions. The bastion of racial conservatism on campus remained the school's Greek system. Student pressure finally forced the University to address the question of discriminatory clauses in fraternities and sororities in 1959 when President Clark Kerr ordered such clauses stricken from all UC campus organizations upon penalty of the loss or recognition. The houses, however, had until 1964 to comply. Illustrating their intractability on the issue, ten sororities and two fraternities at UCLA lost University recognition in 1964 when they refused to do so. In an effort to forestall such action, two houses, Pi Beta Phi sorority and Acacia fraternity brought suit against the University which the University vigorously fought in the courts. Not until March 1966 did Acacia drop the last

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118 For examples from the three papers see Gidra, April 1970, p. 3; La Gente, February 16, 1971, p. 4; Nommo March 9, 1971, p. 1.

119 Nommo, December 7, 1970, p. 7; and Daily Bruin, May 2, 1970, "FIND P.#.


of the suits surrounding discriminatory membership restrictions. This did not change student activists' perceptions of the Greek system, however. The campus humor magazine Satyr ran a serial cartoon entitled "Fratman," which used "a gift from a Southern friend," two leashed, snarling dogs, to oppose those who would change Fratman's pledging policies. In the end, a black student is pledged, but for "wash'n 'n clean'n 'n and polish'n shoes." Indeed, the Greek system appeared unchastened by both the administrative mandate and the changing social order. In the 1968 student yearbook, Southern Campus, the Lambda Chi Alpha fraternity entry featured blatantly anti-semitic themes, including the implication that property values had declined since the Jewish fraternity Zeta Beta Tau moved in next door, referring to ZBT as Zion Banking & Trust, and featuring the Lambda Chi president in a Nazi uniform under the caption, "Ve vill haf vays o f dealink wit Zebes [ZBT's]."

By far the most serious incident occurred in May 1968 when the Phi Kappa Psi fraternity threw a Viva Zapata party, which included a replica of the Mexican tri-color flag hung from the front of the house, but with an extended middle finger replacing the eagle in the flag's center. Also hung from the house was a notification to prospective entrants that this was "closed party," listing almost every possible group, including "boys," "girls," and "whites," but also including "No Negros, no Japs, no dogs, no Clits, no Zapatas." The party outraged UMAS, who demanded the administration revoke Phi Psi's charter. The Daily Bruin, March 10, 1966, p. 1.

Satyr, December 1963, found in Box #4, Records of the ASUCLA, Publications 1920-87, University Archives, Powell Library, UCLA, Los Angeles.


Bruin agreed with UMAS by similarly calling for Phi Psi's charter, editorializing on "the fact that racism is firmly ingrained in the fraternity-sorority system." 126 After the administration suspended Phi Psi for a year, the Greeks held a protest rally on campus and the Interfraternity Council threatened to dissociate, a move supported by the Panhellenic Council. 127 Student activist criticism of the Greeks during this period moved beyond its usual calls for an end to antiquated traditions and mentalities to complete abolition of a system hopelessly mired in outmoded ideals, "if they have something to contribute, let them prove it. If not, perhaps they should fade into the antiquated past." 128

Negative perceptions of the Greek system had a very real impact on membership, which declined by almost 50% from 1966 to 1969, the number of students choosing to pledge dropped even more, with as many as seven houses closing during that period. 129 Under the auspices of the Associate Dean of Students, the Student Activities Office undertook a study to examine the relevance of the Greek system, asking if "the nature of the fraternity is such that it merits the special privileges from the University which has not been extended to any other group." 130 One year later, the fraternity advisor informed the Dean of Students, "it is imperative that the University give additional support to the fraternities if they are to


129 Letter from Steven L. Davis, Fraternity Advisor to Byron H. Atkinson, June 3, 1970, folder #245.9 - Student Activities, Box #120, FDM.

131 Using constant pressure for almost a quarter of century, student activists finally broke the back of the Greek system. Never again would the Greeks dominate campus life or student institutions, while Greek membership became a liability rather than an asset in campus elections.

Acknowledging that other student institutions still appeared closed to minorities, these students also attacked athletic support groups. While black athletes played a prominent role in UCLA's athletic programs, students on the sidelines remained overwhelmingly white. After no black students were selected as song girls in 1968, the BSU lodged a protest, prompting athletic officials to name the highest black vote-getter to the squad, something the BSU denounced as tokenism.132 The following year, black males landed six of the seven yell leader positions, but again black females were left off the song girl squad.133 In 1972, after the song girls again did not include a single black female, five black women who tried out but did not make the squad charged discrimination. Though the girls could provide no specific evidence of discrimination, the fact that sororities dominated the song girls for years and in 1972, six of the seven were Greek, with four coming from the same house as the captain, Kappa Alpha Theta, gave the strong appearance of impropriety. The athletic department's Stadium Executive Committee approved of a second group of cheerleaders, made up of those who felt

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131 Letter from Steven L. Davis, Fraternity Advisor to Byron H. Atkinson, June 3, 1970, folder #245.9 - Student Activities, Box #120, FDM.


discriminated against, creating one squad of all white song girls and one squad of all black cheerleaders.\textsuperscript{134}

Many white students viewed the creation of ethnic studies and Hi-Pot with ambivalence or satisfaction when the University addressed a measure of inequality. The song girls/cheerleaders controversy, however, proved entirely beyond that scope. The reaction of the majority white student body was overwhelmingly negative. The \textit{Daily Bruin} conceded that the "sorority domination" in the song girls needed to end, however, the creation of racially separate squads "was ill-advised. Such obvious segregation can only lead to more problems."\textsuperscript{135} When the cheerleaders performed at one game, members of the Sigma Chi fraternity stood and turned their backs. Letters to the \textit{Daily Bruin} editor proved just as harsh, with one student bluntly charging, "It seems to me that the girls were permitted to do so in order to avoid a major conflict with the black students of UCLA. Perhaps it was easier to give in to the demands of the black girls than to refuse, but such action is not at all fair to the rest of the girls who were eliminated." Equally unjust was the expenditure of student funds to pay for the cheerleaders, money "which rightly belongs to the entire student body. As a member of ASUCLA, I do not like such appropriations of student funds."\textsuperscript{136} The \textit{Bruin} placed the issue in its sharpest context by editorializing, "no one yet has faced the reality of the situation: divergent lifestyles may be a complex and sensitive issue in today's world, but

\textsuperscript{134} "Administration intercedes in spirit group dispute," \textit{Daily Bruin}, September 27, 1972, p. 1; and "Cheers," ibid., September 28, 1972, p. 4.


effectiveness, and not race, should be the criterion for the existence of a spirit support group.\(^{137}\)

The cheerleaders issue illustrated the limits both to which many white students were willing to tolerate minority claims of inequality and minority students' refusal to patiently wait for equality. The apparent dominance of the sorority system, already a pariah on campus to reformers, might have attracted much sympathy to claims by black students that the process contained rank inequality. The creation of separate squads, however, not only offended liberals' sense of integration, but the granting of privileges based not on inequality but the perception of inequality rankled many students. White students grasped that previous claims, though many justified, of black inequality preconditioned the Stadium Executive Committee to accept charges of discrimination, leading to the formation of the cheerleaders, a course of action that could not have occurred if the offended students had been white. Finally, the use of student monies for such an endeavor offended students' sense of self interest under the assumption that student money was used to pay for something from which not every student was able to benefit.

Conversely, by the 1970s, minority students indicated an increasing lack of patience for white liberals to slowly discover every form of discrimination and the process required to root it out. Had the BSU chosen to make sorority domination the issue and demand change from that perspective, they could foresee a very predictable process. Existing student institutions such as the Bruin and the SLC would discuss the issue over a length of time, with the SLC possibly sending the issue to a committee, further drawing out the process, while the

\(^{137}\) "Spirit groups," Daily Bruin, October 4, 1972, p. 11.
Stadium Executive Committee, an administrative body, would further discuss the issue. At the earliest, these groups might reach a resolution in time for the following year's selection process, with no guarantees that that resolution would be satisfactory to the BSU. In addition, the very reliance on institutions such as the *Bruin* and the SLC ran counter to the notion of Black Power. Quite simply, minority students felt they had waited long enough.

The struggle over the song girls/cheerleaders also indicates the nature of UCLA's limited feminist movement. The fact that so many students, male and female, white and black, found the issue compelling indicates that the institution of cheerleading, based on beauty and popularity, still represented the proper outlet for most female undergraduates. In fact, before the passage of Title IX federal legislation mandating equal opportunity for women in intercollegiate athletics, cheerleading remained the only such avenue for women at UCLA as even the band did not admit women until the fall of 1972.139 The absence of much a feminist movement serves as another example of the limits to which much of the larger student body accepted claims of inequality and oppression. When Rosemary Park accepted an administrative position at UCLA in 1967 after working at the University of Connecticut and Vassar College, she was stunned at the socially conservative nature of UCLA's female students. She felt they "belonged to a prior generation," so unconcerned and uninterested were they in serious intellectualism and issues directly affecting them.139 Indeed, when the *Daily Bruin* ran a feature on the campus Women's Liberation Front, which had been at UCLA for three years, many women on campus, both students and faculty, did not even know the

138 "Women to be allowed in all-male band here," *Daily Bruin*, May 9, 1972, p. 1.

139 Park, "Liberal Arts," p. 132, OHP.
Though militant groups such as the WLF, the Union for Women's International Liberation and the Women's Caucus existed on campus and called for things such as free and unlimited access to abortion and birth control, a female Hi-Pot component, and the destruction of the nuclear family, they found almost no constituency amongst a student body lacking even a limited feminist perspective and predisposed to reject radicalism.¹⁴¹

One issue that did resonate with UCLA's larger student body was the creation of a child care center on campus precisely because it appealed to students' sense of equality of opportunity. Victoria Fromkin put it in exactly those terms when she addressed the Academic Senate on the issue, "there are many women who are unable to participate in the life of the university as students or employees because of inadequate child care facilities. Not to provide such facilities leads to great hardships for many families and is tantamount to discrimination against women."¹⁴² Child care advocates planned a "baby-in" on campus for May 6, 1970, to demonstrate the need for a child care center, but the planned rally was cancelled amidst the tragedy and violence of the Kent State murders and the LAPD riot. Rescheduled for the fall, the event succeeded in convincing traditional student institutions of the need for on-campus child care. Keith Schiller, SLC president, addressed a letter to Chancellor Young on the issue announcing SLC's support for a center and declared that an "overall consensus" had


¹⁴¹ "Sex discrimination attacked," Daily Bruin, May 13, 1969, p. 2; "Statements and Demands from the Women's Caucus," 1970 #3 folder, Box #9, SAC.

¹⁴² Minutes of the Town Meeting of the L.A. Division of the Academic Senate, May 12, 1970, Agendas and Reports 1970-76 & '78 folder, Box #3, AMR.
developed "understanding that women cannot attend the university if they have to stay at home to baby-sit and that we should promote constructive efforts to remedy this problem."\(^{143}\)

Student support for such programs did not imply blanket support for any larger agenda however. Just as student activism regarding the Vietnam War remained largely uncommitted until provoked by specific offenses to students' core values, issues of minorities and women followed similar patterns, though in the opposite direction. Most remained ambivalent about feminist and minority activism until such activism offended core values, causing a backlash against such activism. After various women's groups on campus sponsored Women's Week in April 1973, a week-long symposium focusing on women's changing role in society, the *Bruin* ran a satirical column entitled "Special Interest Week," lampooning the attention women and minorities received and the resources committed to them. The article called for UCLA not to stop with just these "oppressed" groups, "but to quickly move on to another," suggesting short people as first on the list, and each group should of course get their own student newspaper, "and the best part of all this free publicity is that its being paid for out of student body funds."\(^{144}\) The efforts of minorities and women to establish "the politics of identity" based on their oppression succeeded only in offending the larger student body when that body perceived activism by those groups as not addressing inequality of opportunity but seeking privileges and resources unavailable to those outside the circle of oppression.

\(^{143}\) Letter from Keith Schiller to Chancellor Charles E. Young, December 3, 1970, Student Association's Child Care Center 1970-71 folder, Box #154, CEY.

The question of admissions quotas for minorities and women illustrates the point. Students generally supported special enrollment programs like EOP and Hi-Pot, because those programs sought to address unequal education and social background that minorities labored under. Programs like EOP and Hi-Pot hoped to level the playing field so minority students could then compete equally within the university. Many students viewed admissions quotas as entirely different however. They argued that racial quotas did not inherently address inequality, but merely sought to increase enrollment from some oppressed group. And, perhaps most importantly, unlike EOP and Hi-Pot admissions, racial quotas for non-whites meant less admission slots for whites, simultaneously offending their belief in equality of opportunity for all as well as their inherent self-interest. One student argued, "the sense of outrage against minority admissions arises in great part because certain individuals have recently been using social credentials as a vehicle for personal advancement at the expense of others who possess other, equally valid, personal credentials and are competing for the same space." Students at UCLA traditionally opposed examples of inequality of opportunity, but never so much as when they found inequality aimed at them. Students at UCLA did not completely reject claims of unequal opportunity by minorities and women. Indeed, the Bruin continued to provide editorial support of EOP and Hi-Pot, while the SLC continued to fund minority programs on campus, such as in October 1971 when they gave the BSU $2550 for a Black Culture Week and a campaign against sickle cell anemia. A


December 1972 student referendum found more than two thirds of the students felt minority enrollment should more closely approximate the state's population, while 79% felt the state should continue to fund EOP as a means of achieving that enrollment. The referendum pointedly did not include any reference to admissions quotas.  

By minority students' own admission, the ethnic studies centers found themselves part of the bureaucracy by 1973, thereby removing much of the impetus for student direct action. The previous five years, however, illustrated the success of minority student activism in creating their own campus institutions when existing institutions continued to exclude them or failed to account for the minority experience. Additionally such activism forced the administration to acknowledge the responsibility of the University, as a public institution, to account for all of its constituents and respect student input towards that end. The victory of minority student activists on this latter point represented a victory for all students as the University finally and firmly recognized students as constituent shareholders. Henceforth, any future large-scale curricular, financial, or administrative discussions affecting students would include the students. The failure of the white-majority student body to recognize their own gain in the efforts of their minority student colleagues points up the conservative nature of student activism throughout this period.

In addition, minority student activism highlighted the limits to which the white-majority student body supported, or at least accepted, such activism. So long as minority student demands remained within the context of seeking what white students defined as

147 "UC Student Lobby Poll shows students favor education fee abolition," Daily Bruin, March 31, 1972, p. 1.

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equality of opportunity, they found at least tacit support in the pages of the *Daily Bruin* and the minutes of the SLC. When whites perceived minority student activism as seeking concessions based merely on their oppressed status, however, they rejected such claims as appealing to a special interest, inherently offending their democratic capitalist values. Finally, white support for minority student activism came to a screeching halt the moment that whites perceived such demands might inhibit their own equality of opportunity. The creation of student institutions or the funding of activities which explicitly excluded them brought cries of discrimination and a reversal of everything their activism sought to achieve, illustrating the role self-interest played in both their activism and their values.
CONCLUSION

By the fall of 1973, most students at UCLA found other issues towards which to direct their activist behavior. Many women on campus finally embraced the feminist agenda while a growing environmental concern sprouted into a full-fledged "movement" with national activities such as Earth Day and local organizations primarily concerned with the Pacific Ocean. These issues found student support for the same reasons others had in earlier periods: they appealed to their democratic capitalist values of equal opportunity and their sense of self-interest. As such, the fall of 1973 did not witness an end to student activism, nor even a retrenchment. If anything, it marked a sense of victory for most student activists. Having in their minds successfully confronted the issues of student inequality, racism, and war that offended their core values, students could direct their attentions elsewhere because those issues no longer required their combative presence.

Dating to the University's founding in 1919, liberal-minded students at UCLA easily identified inequality and injustice and easily establishing a pattern by which they opposed it. Reared within the shared culture of democratic capitalism, students embraced core values of equality of opportunity, equality of and before the law, and a respect for the democratic process. Initial attempts at activism centered on the inequality UCLA's few non-white students faced in venues such as housing and athletics. Against that backdrop however, students also struggled against the paternalist notions of the University which severely limited their own rights of free speech, assembly, and association. The scourge of anti-communism illustrated to students the hypocrisy of limiting their rights in the name of a struggle against tyranny. More importantly, for students whose willingness to seek reform came strictly within
the context of the democratic process, the denial of such basic freedoms as speech and assembly entirely precluded their activism, illustrating their need to address those issues before substantively addressing any others.

Once students won such basic rights, they used them to oppose forms of inequality on campus such as the Greek system and discriminatory housing and job listings. These issues appealed to student activists because the denial of such basic elements as housing and employment clearly illustrated an inequality faced by non-white students. Students at UCLA did not immediately embrace the Civil Rights movement, however, in large part because the West lacked the institutionalized Jim Crow laws blacks faced in the South. When a handful of UCLA students suffered under that system in the Freedom Rides, students embraced the Freedom Riders' struggle precisely because they now achieved a local connection to distant oppression. In addition, the Freedom Rides illustrated a continued willingness of the South to defy federal law by refusing to accommodate integrated travel, thereby also offending students' beliefs in the sanctity and equality of the law.

The difficulty activists faced in achieving Civil Rights reform in the West also offers an illustrative window into examining the extent to which reformers off campus, as well as on, went to support the movement. The myth of the West as a "racial paradise," based on blacks' higher wages, greater home-ownership, and access to solid working class jobs allowed many Westerners to ignore the more subtle, though no less insidious, forms of discrimination in the West, such as ghettoization, rank law enforcement harassment, and poorer living and working conditions when compared to whites. On campus too, the notable successes of alumni such as Ralph Bunche, Jackie Robinson, and Arthur Ashe allowed many white
students to accept at face value the notion that students of all races enjoyed equal opportunity and success at UCLA. Finally, the difficulty in achieving large-scale Civil Rights support in the West illustrates the relationship between racism and capitalism. Early reformers at UCLA, acknowledging the great social and demographic upheaval wrought by World War II, hoped that the West's liminal status would allow the region to embrace its growing white and non-white population equally as the post-war economic opportunity provided not merely a redistribution of existing wealth, but the creation of new wealth to satisfy all. Put more simply, economic and social opportunity for non-whites need not come at the expense of middle and upper class whites. The fact that the opposite occurred illustrates the tenuousness with which many middle and upper class whites perceived their material social status. It is no accident that racism in the West grew more pronounced and institutionalized as the war years receded, simultaneous to the material wealth and success that capitalism provided the region.

Students at UCLA accepted at least the general goals of the Civil Rights movement because it worked within the democratic process and hoped to achieve equality of opportunity for all Americans. The war in Vietnam, however, did not achieve the same connection to students' core values. As such, while many students may have doubted the efficacy of American policy in Vietnam, the war did not call forth large scale activism, illustrating the difference between being opposed to the war and opposing the war. Specific issues relating to the war did offend students' core values, particularly their sense of self-interest. Many male students' opposition to the war increased as they grew closer to losing their college deferments. Nothing, however, increased anti-war activism like the murders at Kent State.
University and the subsequent police riot of the LAPD at UCLA, seemingly violating every value that students held dear, including students' abilities to exercise the democratic process in the form of lawful assembly and speech, expectations of equal treatment before the law, and students' safety and inherent self-interest.

The lasting monument to student activism of this period remains the ethnic studies centers. Firmly entrenched in the University bureaucracy by 1973, the centers found themselves competing for funding, faculty positions, and research recognition like any other department on campus. The success of their dual mission to serve as a research component and attracter of minority students from the community is readily apparent. The pre-eminent scholarly journals for the fields of Chicano studies and Asian American studies, Aztlan and Amerasia Journal, are edited by their respective departments at UCLA, while these departments, along with the Center for Afro-American Studies, produce graduate students to feed the demand for greater diversity in the republic's universities. In addition, by 1999, UCLA's minority student enrollment exceeded 50%, the overwhelming majority coming through the regular admissions process, paralleling the overall population of Los Angeles. Finally, student activism returned to an earlier pattern of whites and non-whites working together on a student-specific issue when a multi-racial coalition of thousands of students staged dramatic demonstrations, including the building of a shanty-town on campus, in 1985-86 demanding the UC's divesture from South Africa.

Student activism of the period had other, more subtle effects as well. Liberal reformers broke forever the power of the Greeks and their control of student politics and campus organizations. As other student groups, particularly the minority student
organizations, rallied large numbers of students to their causes, the Greeks no longer enjoyed a monopoly on the ability to marshal party-like voting discipline. The old order did not disappear entirely however, as evidenced by a 1987 Tequila Sunrise party by the Beta Theta Pi fraternity featuring derisive racial stereotypes. When MEChA showed up to demonstrate, the Betas stood on their balcony and threw tortillas as the Chicano demonstrators. In addition, appearing at roughly the same time as the shanty-town demonstrations, the Beta's behavior further illustrated the tendency of racial and social conservatives to respond to liberal activism with a demonstration of their own.

On a much larger scale, student activism at UCLA in this period, when examined within the context of the tremendous ferment of reform in the 1960s and 1970s, illustrates the limited extent to which Americans are willing to push for change. Though a vocal, radical minority called for revolution, and some, like Weatherman, even half-heartedly attempted it, they never came close to achieving any kind of following. One reason remains that the expansion of democratic capitalism has offered most Americans far more to lose than to gain by aligning with radical reform efforts. But the darker reason is that as much as Americans would like to think of themselves as a vigilant, activist people within the republican tradition, they are not. The irony is that the expansion of democratic capitalism has made it harder, not easier, for reform efforts to succeed as the decreasing number of Americans left out of democratic capitalism's successes are that much easier to ignore. In general, activism makes most Americans, particularly the white middle class, uncomfortable because it inherently calls for change, change which might threaten the materialist comfort which democratic capitalism has provided so many of them. When Americans do embrace activist reform, they do so not
merely on the causes alone, but also on the methods. They embrace such reform only when it clearly identifies a violation of democratic capitalist ideals and when such reform seeks to address those offenses within the context of the democratic process. The willingness to use the machinery of the existing system to change the existing system is inherently conservative.

This inherently conservative behavior camouflaged as dramatic, some might even perceive it as radical, reform to serve democratic capitalist self-interest enjoys other precedents in American history. Nineteenth century anti-slavery advocates opposed the peculiar institution not because radical abolitionists convinced them of slavery's evil, but because many white northerners agreed with the so-called "Slave Power Conspiracy" that alleged not only a pervasive influence of slave holders at every level of the federal government, but that the institution of slavery won special status for the South and the ideology of unfree labor, thereby denigrating the North and free labor. White Northerners who embraced the Republican platform of anti-slavery did so not because of the effects of slavery on Southern blacks but because of its effects on Northern whites. With the institution of slavery abolished by the Civil War, the support for a radical Reconstruction from Northern whites whose opposition to slavery came from personal, not moral, reasons quickly faded. As taxes rose in the North to pay for a reordering of Southern society and American race relations, the widespread anti-slavery fervor present in the North before the war disappeared.

Temperance reformers, too, engaged in a furious social campaign motivated from issues of self-interest. Like radical abolitionists and the more moderate anti-slavery advocates, the fight for temperance witnessed varying support. The older, and more morally grounded, Women's Christian Temperance Union opposed alcohol because of its effects on
women, children, and the family, but enjoyed little wide-spread success. The onset of industrialization and the rise in immigration brought forth new concerns over alcohol as nativist whites perceived that alcohol served as a primary impediment to immigrant working class assimilation and production. As such, groups like the Anti-Saloon League advocated prohibition of alcohol in more capitalist terms of worker efficiency and corporate profit. The flaunting of the 18th Amendment by the white middle class who enjoyed the financial means to procure bootleg liquor illustrated their belief that prohibition was intended for the working class only.

American reform efforts have traditionally begun with agitation by radical elements but have enjoyed success only when embraced by more moderate citizens and their attendant sense of restraint. The success of these reform movements lay in their unwillingness to substantially alter the existing system of democratic capitalism. Not coincidentally, none fully and successfully addressed America's inequality, either. Activist reform of the 1960s and 1970s achieved some of the most far reaching social change in American history. The unwillingness of reformers of the period to consider more radical reforms places them firmly within the context of the American reform tradition and its pattern of stopping short of complete success.
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VITA

Kurt Edward Kemper was born in Los Angeles, California, in 1970. He received his bachelor of science degree from the University of South Dakota in 1992, where he graduated with University Scholar honors. He earned his master of arts degree from George Mason University in 1995 before completing the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Louisiana State University in 2000.
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: Kurt Edward Kemper

Major Field: History

Title of Dissertation: Reformers in the Marketplace of Ideas: Student Activism and American Democracy in Cold War Los Angeles

Approved:

[Signature]
Major Professor and Chairman

[Signature]
Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signature]
James M. Foster

[Signature]
Leonard Moore

[Signature]
Lucy E. Wilcox

[Signature]
[Signature]

Date of Examination: May 15, 2000