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Rhetoric, Prudence, and the "Morrill Act" of 1862.

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UMI
RHETORIC, PRUDENCE, AND THE "MORRILL ACT" OF 1862

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Speech Communication

by
Jason B. Munsell
B.A., University of Arkansas, 1993
M.A., University of Arkansas, 1995
May 2000
I dedicate this dissertation to my parents: Dr. Jay B. Munsell, Chair, Department of Teacher Education at Northeastern State University in Tahlequah, Oklahoma; and Barbara L. Munsell, Assistant Manager, Northeastern State University Bookstore. This dissertation isn't the greatest thing in the world, but at least I did my best.
First, Dr. Ken Zagacki, my advisor, worked very diligently on my behalf. His comments and suggestions always forced me to think about "prudence" from a more complex perspective. I'm also appreciative of my other committee members: Dr. Andrew King, Dr. William E. Davis, Dr. Michael Bowman, and Dr. David Kurpius. They each supplied me with invaluable insight. The dissertation is much richer because of them. Additionally, I'm obliged to the staff of Louisiana State's Hill Memorial Library for digging up the full text of the "Yale Report."

I'm also want to share my gratitude to the rest of my family, my friends, and my colleagues. Though my sister, Amy, isn't cool enough to get a dedication, she deserves at least a mention. Her stubborn independence has always been inspiring. It would be impossible to mention all my friends here, but I particularly treasure the direct and indirect contribution of Mindy Fenske. Bits and pieces of her wisdom seem tattooed to my dissertation. Finally, I thank all my colleagues in the Speech Communication Department. Little talks here and there have certainly aided me during this project.
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ABSTRACT

The Morrill Act was the political telos of numerous rhetorical messages calling for pedagogical changes in higher education. This study examines the role of prudence in four of them. The method is a mode of textual criticism that attempts to capture the bifurcated sense of rhetorical invention: The immediate rhetorical situation, and the cultural grammar that constrains the rhetor performatively. The author illustrates how the relevant rhetorical strategies/gestures within each text and the text's textual context pointed to a certain conception of prudence.

Historically, the author argues that the struggles between different notions of prudence impacted political, pedagogical action. Theoretically, the author reflects on the nature of prudence in relation to the rhetorical canons, agent, purpose, and audience. The study contributes to a broader understanding of how prudence emerges in rhetorical action.
CHAPTER ONE
A RHETORICAL INQUIRY INTO
THE CALL FOR PRACTICAL HIGHER EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

During the nineteenth century, the lack of widespread "practical" higher education motivated many of those concerned with this issue to rise up and plea for industrial and agricultural pedagogy. In 1850, for instance, President Francis Wayland of Brown reported that American higher education failed to offer applicable courses of instruction that the populace needed and desired. In 1851 Jonathan Baldwin Turner, speaking to an agricultural convention in Granville, Illinois, argued for a college of agriculture and industry. In 1857 Justin Smith Morrill, a Vermont Representative, proposed a bill in Congress to donate public land to states and territories for the purpose of establishing agricultural and mechanical colleges. Speaking on behalf of the Agricultural College Bill, Morrill proclaimed, "There has been no measure for years which has received so much attention in the various parts of the country as the one now under consideration" (Congressional Globe, 1858, p. 1692). Morrill's bill passed through Congress in 1858, but President Buchanan vetoed it. After revisions, amendments, and a presidential election, President Lincoln signed the bill into law on July 2, 1862.

There is no question that the consequences of this original Land Grant College Act, or "Morrill Act" as we often call it, were monumental. It apportioned to each
state thirty thousand acres per senator and representative
it had in Congress under the 1860 census. The law required
states to sell the land and reap interest from the receipts
for the purpose of endowing, supporting, and maintaining a
college of agriculture, though not excluding scientific,
classical, and military studies. Thus, it generated
unprecedented diversity in the curriculum, brought higher
education to the working classes, and placed classical
academics and vocational instruction under the same roof.
Perhaps most importantly, it also gave the general public a
new lust for learning by democratizing higher education and
making the practical learned.

The Morrill Act was the political telos of numerous
rhetorical messages calling for pedagogical changes in
higher education. By rhetoric, I mean the communicative art
that seeks to induce an audience to feel, reason, and
perceive in a certain way. Rhetoric, in the Aristotelian
sense, is finding, in the contingent world, the
opportunities for persuasion. More specifically, the
persuasive efforts resulting in the Morrill Act, working
alone and together, demonstrate the important role of
prudence in the invention of public argument. Prudence is a
difficult word to define. One function of this dissertation
project is for me to come to terms with what prudence means
and how it works. At this juncture, let me define prudence
as practical and appropriate orchestration of persuasive
possibilities, and practical, appropriate political conduct
in light of situational limitations. While rhetoric is the art of strategic inducement toward a certain way of feeling, reasoning, and perceiving, prudence is an implicit—often explicit—underlying manner of appropriate and practical discursive practice and political conduct. We should particularly note, too, that prudence relies on rhetorical performance for its existence.

Performance is thus another important word I will use throughout my dissertation. There are many different perspectives on what performance means. For instance, Pollock (1998) suggests that

performance is primarily something done rather than something seen. It is less the product of theatrical invention or the object of spectatorship than the process by which meanings, selves, and other effects are produced (p. 20).

Pollock turns to speech act theory to make the point. A "performative" speech act "does" something. This kind of speech act is "action in the form of representation" (p. 20). Take, for instance, the idea that the short phrases such as "I do" and "I now pronounce you..." in a marriage ceremony actually generate meaning; the words make the marriage so. In brief, this is one way to look at performance.

However, the above description of performance is one I do not aspire to. There are hints here and there that the scholars I depend on for understanding prudence mean performance in that "doing" way. Nevertheless, those scholars do not fully articulate what they themselves mean
by performance. Thus, I cannot assume that they in fact adhere to the sophisticated slant on performance as depicted above. By performance I simply mean a stylized repetition of some tradition of rhetorical action through gesture, figures of speech, and the like.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS, ARGUMENTS, AND STUDY RATIONALE

My dissertation seeks to analyze specific rhetorical efforts that I suggest were vital to the eventual passing of the Morrill Act. I will examine one text that promoted the traditional, literary college, the Yale Report of 1828, but then focus on several texts that advanced the general notions of the Morrill Act. I will analyze a report by Francis Wayland, a speech by Jonathan Baldwin Turner, and two of Morrill's speeches in Congress on behalf of the measure. I seek to understand the role of prudence in each text.

I have many questions that I will address. We can group them into three general questions: 1) Primarily, given the rhetors I examine, what sense of prudence did they each offer and how did they symbolically actualize or achieve that notion of prudence? Along the same lines, was such an idea of prudence linked to any communal tradition(s) of prudential thinking? 2) Considering the idea of textual context, what vision of the past, present, and future did each rhetor project, and what sense of prudence did that develop? 3) What was the effect of the implicit view of
prudence within each text—did it help or hinder the rhetorician's persuasive efforts?

Historically, I argue that the changes occurring within nineteenth century American higher education were generally a struggle between diverging conceptions of prudence in rhetorical action. Specifically, I suggest that Morrill supplied a confused notion of prudence that helped frame the way his contemporaries received his "act," and it touches us today in higher education as we struggle with curricular fragmentation and an unsteady mission. I also contend that prudence helps orchestrate rhetorical invention. A sense of prudence is, in part, a wrestling with strategic calculation and display. A sense of prudence also helps govern the tie between rhetorical form and persuasive content. What is more, a sense of prudence guides the aesthetics of politics. I also argue that prudence is both situational and cultural. Thus, to study prudence says something about the complicated relationship between a rhetorical text and its immediate rhetorical situation, and between the persuasive text and its broader cultural context. Further, a discursive text might have two ideas of prudence in tension. Further, I argue that prudence changes as communal notions of ethos change, and that there is always a representation of prudence within rhetorical action. Finally, however, I also suggest that prudence is, echoing Wilson (1998), open to different interpretations.
Additionally, I assume that the process of creating rhetorical discourse is a social process of grappling with and organizing a multiplicity of communal, rhetorical conventions alive only in rhetorical discourse. Certain communal, rhetorical traditions, like standards of prudential thought, depend on specific ideational patterns, argumentative arrangement, stylistic devices, word choices, and rhetorical organization. I suggest that a rhetor must always use some tradition of prudential thinking, even if the particularized sense of prudence is somewhat novel. It is impossible, I believe, to invent an entirely new way of prudential thinking. In persuasive texts, rhetors also encode their prudential outlook through certain implicit and/or explicit conceptualities, or visions, of temporal reality. Rhetoric about educational policy almost always depicts some temporal vision and depends on it. Finally, the sense of prudence alive in rhetorical discourse is a pivotal test of the rhetoric's successfulness. Successful rhetors are those who best help their audience(s) along to a certain way of prudential seeing.

My study is important for several reasons. Historically, the study of prudence gives us an illustration of how different modes of prudence facilitated and or inhibited certain ways of thinking about nineteenth century pedagogical policies. This study gives us a rhetorical insight into the institutional structure of nineteenth century American colleges and universities, and their
contemporary off-springs. Hariman (1997) thinks that the study of historic public address "can identify and resolve problems of historical interpretation that are themselves the result of depending on an insufficient understanding of the role of public talk in the political culture of the period" (p. 165). Interests and ideas of a political and pedagogical culture work within communicative practices and contexts.

Theoretically, and as I mentioned, this study helps us better grasp the role of prudence in rhetorical invention. Thus, it also forces us to grapple with important issues surrounding the persuasive process. We must look at the canons. We must look at the relationships between delivery and invention. We must struggle with the relationship between rhetorical form or organization and argumentative content. We must turn to the relationship between style and political action. Again, prudence is, at base, an underlying discernment of practical, appropriate rhetorical response or invention that helps shape appropriate judgment and action. Because prudence lives within rhetorical efforts, it is a valuable concept when attempting to better understand the project of rhetorical invention and the other basic rhetorical canons in a practical, variable world.

Additionally, the study of prudence helps us understand the complicated relationship between a rhetorical text and its immediate rhetorical situation, and between the persuasive text and its broader cultural context. Jasinski
(1997), in an effort to recover the bifurcated mode of rhetorical contextualization described in 1925 by Wichelns, suggests that both an immediate exigency (Bitzer, 1968) of a rhetorical situation, and a broader, public, cultural sense of context influence a rhetor and his or her agency. Jasinski (1997) says that "the text is positioned as an outgrowth of context; context does not simply surround or contain the text but permeates or saturates the text as the result of an organic process of emergence and development" (p. 200). The study of prudence helps develop this dialectic because it necessitates a struggle with both the immediate situation, and the broader, rhetorical traditions emerging out of the larger context. The study of prudence appreciates the instrumental approach to rhetorical invention, but also the deeper comprehension of the "birth" of a rhetorical text from a widened, cultural source.

Further, the study of prudence helps us better realize the nature of the rhetorical agent and rhetorical purpose in persuasive discourse. The ethos of a rhetor often helps convey an idea of prudence, and communal norms of selfness often sanction a rhetorical ethos. Further, in the traditional, neo-Aristotelian approach to rhetorical practice and interpretation, a rhetor comes to a situation, establishes an ethos and purpose, and invents the persuasive message. This is not the entire story, however. Jasinski (1997) thinks that the "individual authorial agency is decentered in the act of textual production as intentions
are 'refracted' through the spectrum of languages and voices that the author seeks to organize" (p. 215). Thus, the study of prudence recounts how a persuasive author invents him or herself rhetorically, but also how an author might be prudentially purposive and strategic simply by imitating a broader, cultural grammar. My point is that communal norms of prudence might also help establish the rhetor's discursive purpose.

Finally, I think the study of prudence might illustrate the important role of the audience as powerful decoders of prudential, or not so prudential messages. We might say, in light of Hall's (1980) description of dominant, negotiated, and oppositional readings, that prudence is a site of interpretive struggle. Again, repeating Wilson (1998), prudence is a contested space of legitimacy rhetors try to fix or stabilize in their discourse.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Because of the nature of my study as a theoretical and historical exploration of rhetorical discourse, I think it is essential to establish a narrative tying together the important historical moments that helped impel my research texts to life. I also think it is indispensable to describe a historical account of the transformations in rhetorical theory and discourse during the nineteenth century. The changes emanating from and through the nineteenth century rhetorical/communication culture are themselves affected by persuasive efforts and rhetorical training.
Historical Narrative

During the colonial period and early American independence, American higher education was for the elite. It was for boys from refined families. Education was classical and literary. Students would learn things like Greek and Latin. Also, though colonies and states normally donated land for colleges, the federal government, once established, had no federal policy of higher education:

Obviously, in a period in which the traditions of the state rights and the practices of frontier individualism were so determining, there was lacking sufficient sentiment of centralization and socialization to make possible federal initiative in educational policy involving the fixing of standards (Ross, 1942, p. 8).

Everything was up to individual states and institutions. Some colleges and universities began providing scientific courses during the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth. For instance, Princeton started using a chemical apparatus and telescope during the tenure of President William Smith in 1815. However, it is important to understand that the general public saw scientists as charlatans. Scientists were too mysterious. Ross (1942) states, "In the popular view, as reflected in fictional and sensational news portrayals, there was much mystery, not to say magic, connected with the scientist and his laboratory" (p. 10). The liberal or classic educators staved off any major educational innovation, especially in scientific application to agriculture; though there were some novel teachings here and there.
The teaching of the classical curriculum held strong during the early nineteenth century. Instead of promoting new practical and vocational courses based in scientific advancement, English model colleges required courses in "Evidences of Christianity" and "Moral Philosophy." While most colleges kept with their literary traditions and perpetuated the innate purity of the Christian soul, students rebelled. They rebelled not only because of the religious rigidity of most colleges, but the lack of curricular innovation and innovative teaching.

Progressive voices were gaining volume. Jefferson's experiment at the University of Virginia, which opened in 1824, was a notable progressive move. Rudolph (1965) explains that "at the University of Virginia every student was a free agent" (p. 126). Yet, Butts (1939) says that the only choice a student really had was which school or schools to enter, and the order and time that student might take specific courses (pp. 95-96). Moreover, lack of funding halted Jefferson's plan of opening a school of agriculture. Even still, the Virginia experiment represented the most comprehensive democratic ideal of American higher education framed through the philosophical and political conceptions of freedom, individuality, and practicality (p. 96).

Other unique institutions opened as well. The founding of the Rensselaer Institute in Troy, New York, was a significant moment in the rise of technical and practical education. Also started in 1824, the purpose of the
institute was to qualify teachers to teach the sons of farmers and mechanics the application of experimental chemistry, philosophy, and natural history to agriculture and manufacturing. It helped the progressive educators move forward. The idea of fitting a higher education to the wants of the many was in the wind. Even Harvard toyed with an elective system.

In 1828, the conservative old school reacted against practical curricular reform in higher education when James L. Kingsley, a Yale professor of classics, and Yale's President, Jeremiah Day, gave Yale their famous Report on a Course of Liberal Education, known today as the "Yale Report." It was, as it is now, an important defense of classical, literary education and the learning of ancient languages. However, despite its conservative edge and literary trench, Yale supplied instruction in scientific application starting in 1847. Also in 1847, Harvard opened its Lawrence Scientific School. The ball of science practicality was rolling.

As the classical curriculum still ruled the colleges of the nation, the industrial revolution and its momentum increased, forever changing the national mind-set. Ross (1942) thinks that the industrial revolution also had a profound impact on higher education:

In its broadest scope and truest aim, this movement to apply the findings of the new sciences and the technique and organization of the new education to the changing business and social order marked the most socialized phase of the educational awakening (p. 15).
Utilitarian, pragmatic voices invoked visions of individual wealth and advancement, especially in Francis Wayland. Francis Wayland's 1850 report to Brown University's corporation is one of the most famous attempts to re-make higher education to fit with the dominating progressive American scene of commercial individualism. Though the "ordinary" farmer and mechanic still shrugged at the notion of science, it was clear that the old-line, classical curriculum was out-dated because, for one reason, enrollments were decreasing markedly. According to Wayland (1850), American colleges, like Brown, were somewhat empty because they did not offer courses the populace desired. However, the plight for the farmer and mechanic seemed to be the plight of the middle class educator, not the true farmer. Ross puts this idea succinctly when he says that "The typical farmer...was governed by established tradition which...reconciled him to a fatalistic acceptance of the inscrutable and unmodifiable manifestations of nature" (p. 18). Farmers wanted farms, not degrees, and not necessarily scientific innovation. Even so, Wayland's report represented the changes in pedagogy that had occurred, and were continuing to occur, in the country's colleges and new German-styled universities.

The most influential regional drive for agricultural education came in Illinois. The Illinois movement, spearheaded by Jonathan Baldwin Turner, had more impact on the Morrill Act than any other state or regional movement.
In 1851, Turner provided a plan for an industrial college that assumed a society split into two major factions, the working class and the professional class. For the working class, he longed for an institution that joined a modified technological education with the exhibitional nature of agricultural societies. In a way, this Illinois movement had British roots. Agricultural displays were very popular in medieval England, and animal breeding and food experimentation had occupied eighteenth century minds. Also, the movement to improve agriculture, again, was not so much a yeoman farmer enterprise, but an upper class longing. Even still, Ross says that Turner earned a special place in the history of the land-grant movement because of his rhetorical display. As Ross (1942) states, Turner's appeal was, in part, "due to its vigorous restatement of the traditional national philosophy of popular opportunity and its rhetorical onslaught on the aim and content of an obsolescent classicism" (p. 38). Turner continued to speak to agricultural conventions and urged others to make the case for practical education.

Courses of instruction in technical practicality increased throughout the 1850's and new state colleges with agricultural leanings continued to emerge. The Farmer's High School [now Penn State] opened in 1854. The Michigan Agricultural College started in 1857. Progressive educators laid the cornerstone for the People's College of New York in
1858. However, the People's College, like so many early educational experiments, failed.

There were also several arguments for national agricultural education. They usually followed along common lines. They "combined appeals to precedent—land grants for education, asylums, and public works, proposals for a board of agriculture, and a national university—with the alleged needs of the nation for industrial leadership" (Ross, 1942, p. 39). These assertions, however, always provoked strong opposition. Some argued that a national program for agricultural and industrial education broke the limits of the federal government's role. Others argued the process was not expedient. At the 1857 convention for the United States Agricultural Society, B. P. Moore "did not think any gentleman acquainted with the practical workings of Congress would believe for a moment that there was the slightest chance of obtaining such an immense donation for such vague purposes" (cited in Ross, p. 43-44). By the end of the 1850's, the movement was at a point of uncertainty.

Many private and state funds provided technical, practical education, but there was still a lack of standards in subject matter, methods of teaching, and resources. Any drive forward would have to come from a centralized, federal level. Ross (1942) explains that

Educational exigency had to wait upon political expedience, but by the late fifties, in spite of all past constitutional and social traditions and prejudices and present sectional division involving them, sufficient sentiment had been created to make
federal aid to industrial education an 'available' issue, provided it was strategically presented (p. 45). Turner left the job to a New Englander, Justin Smith Morrill.

Morrill, like Turner, did not care for the domination of classical education. From Vermont, Morrill was a self-taught intellectual and retired businessman with close ties to the working class. He introduced a resolution on the matter first in 1856, but it was tabled and lost. He introduced a bill in late 1857. In the bill he coordinated the leading technical pedagogical plans of the day. In the simplest terms, he desired to promote practical education in service of industrial classes. The bill, however, proposed to do many things. It charted out a popular way to dispose of plentiful public lands. It promised soil rejuvenation. It articulated a way to refine the "ordinary" people. It recognized the need to help states less blessed with fertile land. It illustrated that America could better compete with the agriculturists of Europe. Morrill, a Republican, also hoped that the passing of the act would help along his party's platform in the eye of the yeoman agrarian.

The arguments against the measure were boisterous. A Virginia Representative howled that the measure was "an unconstitutional robbing of the Treasury for the purpose of bribing the States" (cited in Rudolph, 1962, p. 250). Others did not see the need for empowering the industrial classes of the North or the white Southern farmer through education; elitism was still in the air. Moreover, there
still existed hostility toward higher education. As mentioned, the bill, with some amendments, passed through Congress, but President Buchanan vetoed it. Morrill and his allies in Congress made specific changes for war-time considerations and re-submitted the measure in the Senate. It passed in 1862 and Lincoln signed it into law.

The journals and newspapers of the time did not receive the measure as major news. Eventually, Northern states generated varying forms of Land Grant colleges. After the war, the Southern states were soon to follow. Pennsylvania, Michigan, Maryland, and Iowa converted existing agricultural institutions into land grant "A & M's." Rhode Island, Connecticut, Kentucky, Delaware, Indiana and New York gained control of private institutions and made them the Land Grant universities. Minnesota, Georgia, Missouri, Wisconsin, and North Carolina changed existing public colleges into state Land Grants. Places like Arkansas, Texas, and Kansas formed brand new institutions.

Louisiana, too, embraced the national legislation. Ross (1942) says that "in Louisiana, where educational status had always been curiously confused and unsettled, popular sentiment favored the union of the land grant foundation with the old military seminary to provide a real state university" (p. 82).

Subsequent land granting legislation increased federal aid. The second Morrill Act, in 1890, stipulated that federal aid be used with an eye to racial equality. This
measure helped form several of the traditionally African American institutions.

The Land Grant institutions did not have immediate success. Regardless, the institutions evolved and became the mainstays of American higher education. Today every state has at least one Land Grant university. The policy remains one of the most profound legislative acts to affect American higher education.

The above narrative is only partial because a detailed examination of the history of practical or vocational education is not the project of this dissertation. Thus, we can see practical, vocational, and scientific pedagogy appearing here and there and scattered throughout early American history. What is essential to note, however, is, again, that the call for practical education came from voices of power, not true, uneducated, raw farmers. The great agrarian revolts did not occur until the late nineteenth century.

Nineteenth Century Rhetoric

Interwoven within the above historical narrative is a dynamic history of rhetorical theory and practice. Thus, my narrative account sets the stage for my analysis, but I must also unveil the transformations of rhetorical theory and discursive practice during the nineteenth century because my texts for analysis encompass those changes.

Cmiel (1990) focuses on style and analyzes nineteenth century voices rarely touched by scholarly lenses.
Moreover, his project on style gives us a broad perspective of the changing fabric of nineteenth century rhetorical culture. In his book about the struggle over popular speech in nineteenth century America, Cmiel is particularly interested in the tie between language and the self, social authority, and an assumed audience.

According to Cmiel (1990), through a literary education, early colleges indoctrinated young gentlemen into a so-called refined style of speech and life. Eloquent language was a smaller part of an overarching "cultured" sense of self. The use of elaborated codes placed this high culture style above vernaculars. Yet, educated elites could not always convey their messages to the masses. Thus, according to Cmiel, as the nineteenth century was dawning, a dilemma that expanded throughout the nineteenth century and onward emerged: America's elites wanted a refined, educated, and civilized public, but also their own unique political and communicative power. They desired democratic republicanism, but wanted to keep their perch. What emerged, Cmiel asserts, was a "middling" style, as Cmiel calls it, that used both refined and vulgar speech.

Cmiel says that the middling style mixed the literary eloquent with the uneducated raw, or the high culture with low culture. Often, to sway the public, literary educated rhetoricians had to escape the chains of refined speech. Henry Ward Beecher, for instance, used a middling style. Daniel Webster and Lincoln used this hybrid style. The
distinctive features that characterized the middling style included intrusive informality, calculated bluntness, jargon and euphemism. Cmiel (1990) states, "The arrival of middling styles led to a war over the soul of American life" (p. 66). The struggle over what type of language style to use translated to a struggle over a sense of selfness and citizenry.

We could also call Ralph Waldo Emerson's rhetoric an example of what Cmiel calls middling rhetoric. Antczak (1985) considers Emerson a democratic educator. However, to educate the democratic masses, Emerson had to talk in a plain tongue. Emerson said that the

Masses are rude, lame, unmade, pernicious in their demands, and need not to be flattered, but schooled. I wish not to concede anything to them, but to tame, drill, divide, and break them up and draw individuals out of them (cited in Antczak, p. 92).

His middling style invited the masses to identify with his democratic, rhetorical persona. Thus, Emerson also invited his audiences to imitate sort of anti-institutional, democratic character through his middling style.

Cmiel (1990) also states that "from the 1820s and 1830s through the end of the century, there was continual sniping between those favoring a more refined decorum and those committed to the new idioms" (p. 66). Though the "war over the soul of American life" persisted, the use of the middling style was the norm in this era, and used in journals and newspapers. At the same time, asserts Cmiel, mid-nineteenth century romanticism offered a Saxon
eloquence, or a humble style. Both the common touch and the unadorned style were in vogue. Nevertheless, in the years after the Civil War, conservative, literary types desired to revive the old, neo-classical style. These conservatives wanted to re-draw the lines between the few and the many.

As the century progressed, linguistic differences between critics and scholars ignited furious feuds. While the critics wanted to return to the old style, the scholars began focusing on grammar, expertise, and science. Academically trained scholars wanted to assert themselves, but through a scientific mode of thinking and talking, not a literary one. This struggle continued as rhetoricians and philologists butted heads in the late nineteenth century. The rhetoricians explained that one needed some flare for effective rhetorical display, while the philologists thought style was mere fashion. The philologists wanted an empirical understanding of the way language worked.

The tension between the high style and popular style remained, but in the mean time, the academic, technical expertise style invaded dictionaries and bibles. Language was both jargon filled and informal. In the late nineteenth century into the early twentieth, colloquial informality became even more accepted while the language of the expert flourished. According to Cmiel (1990), as the century closed the refined person was now an expert. Technical talk replaced aesthetics.
In an effort to supply the "big picture," Cmiel (1990) argues that, first, cultures actively encourage one style over another at given times. Second, late twentieth century public discourse has its roots in the effort to accommodate a more educated, assertive populace, but at the same time create authority for the educated. Third, after the rise of mass democracy, the debates over the "raw" and "refined" resulted in no wrong style, and by the turn of the twentieth century, technical, plain, and colloquial styles were all alternatives to traditional rhetorical theory and practice. Fourth, middling rhetoric was and is polysemic. Those best able to capture populace expectation in their rhetorical efforts often won political authority. Thus, it should also be noted that Cmiel's insight echoes Cicero and Quintilian. The grand style, middle style, and plain style were still resources for the nineteenth century rhetorician.

Cmiel's project is important to my work not only because it offers a compelling description of the changes occurring within the rhetorical culture of the nineteenth century, but also because prudence is, in part, a mode of style. The type of style a rhetor uses often points to the implicit idea of prudence the rhetor is advocating. This prudence, moreover, also entails a sense of selfness and of audience expectation.

For instance, I will suggest that the Yale Report of 1828 is an example of a refined style. While this style was suitable for an academic audience in the early nineteenth
century, it had little stylistic appeal for the mass populace. Wayland used more of a middling style that allowed him to speak to the populace. Turner used, for the most part, a middling style and a humble style that aided his efforts with his rural audience. Morrill, too, illustrated the use of a middling, but one fitted for his Congressional situation. In short, then, a prudential outlook encompasses a certain style of discursive practice.

Clark and Halloran (1993) bolster Cmiel's view of how rhetoric developed through the nineteenth century. In their analysis of the oratorical culture in nineteenth century America, they argue,

Both the theory of rhetoric taught in the schools and the practice of public discourse sustained outside them were transformed...from those of the neoclassical oratorical culture into those of the professional culture we see characterizing both colleges and communities by its [19th Century] end (pp. 5-6).

During the first few decades of the nineteenth century, the mainstay of the neo-classical rhetorical culture helped create a communitarian ethos. Echoing the perspectives of Cicero and Quintillion, early nineteenth century classicists called for public moral consensus through rhetoric. John Witherspoon's "complete orator was not motivated by the ideal of striving for individual advancement that would become central to middle-class culture in the nineteenth century" (p. 7). Thus, the first change of rhetorical theory and practice during the nineteenth century was from the orator having a central cultural role of expressing and
building moral consensus to the orator building up his or her own identity.

America's unique possession of land helped transfer moral authority from the neo-classical "polis" to the individual. Individualism became concrete in the form of private property which warranted individual claims of natural rights and political independence. This liberal individualism invaded rhetorical theory and practice. For instance, the rhetoric of Ralph Waldo Emerson, again, moved religion from communitarian institutionalism to private, individual processes. The public arena became a place to promote one's own personality. With Andrew Jackson's 1828 ascension to the presidency, the "common man" individual was winning the day. As Clark and Halloran (1993) put it,

More than any preceding president, Jackson was innocent of a classical education, and his victory over the one-time Harvard chair-holder [John Quincy] Adams can be taken as a figure of the declining importance of oratorical public discourse and of the collectivist assumptions about moral authority on which it was based (p. 13).

When distinct academic disciplines and departments emerged in the college setting, the expert became the valued individual. The expert was the hero. Clark and Halloran (1993) state, "Expertise, whether specifically scientific or not, came to be understood in the new professional sense as a privately held commodity and was for many in the new [middle] class the means of advancement" (p. 20). With the expert professional came a neglect of classical rhetorical invention and an investment in oneself as an economic
commodity. The professional ethos, argue Clark and Halloran, called for a morally neutral discourse. The public forum was a place where persuasion became a "dubious function of exciting the passions" (p. 32). Moreover, professional culture, assert Clark and Halloran, constrained public debate. It structured fragmented sub-publics. Thus, at the close of the nineteenth century, "the dominant aspects of American culture in general and the theory and practice of its public discourse in particular had been transformed by the emergence of the practical and seemingly apolitical ideals of professionalism" (p. 25).

While Clark and Halloran's work does not explicitly discuss prudence, nor focus on educational discourse, it is important to my study because norms of prudence emerge out of a rhetorical culture. I will illustrate, for instance, that the authors of the Yale Report tied their idea of prudence with a neo-classical, communitarianism, but Wayland's prudence emerged out of individual longings. Thus, my study of prudence helps illustrate the changing tide of rhetorical culture in the nineteenth century from the vantage point of educational policy discourse.

Clark and Halloran's edited work is also important to my study because of one specific essay within it. Clark examines the oratorical poetic of Timothy Dwight, Yale's president during the late eighteenth century. Clark (1993) suggests that Dwight used the language of poetic sentiment, but his rhetoric was also "traditionally
oratorical in its commitment to engage those it addresses in the project of shaping and sustaining a common moral and political culture" (p. 58). I will argue that the authors of the Yale report extended Dwight's rhetorical mission.

Considering the rhetorical theory promoted in the college and university classrooms of the nineteenth century, Johnson (1991) suggests that the rhetorical educators located rhetorical theory and pedagogy not only in the classical conceptions of the art, but also eighteenth-century discourse theory. More specifically, three things influenced nineteenth century rhetorical education: classical foundations, like Aristotle and his canons, belletristic interests in rhetorical beauty, and epistemological approaches linking science with rhetorical theory. Thus, the most immediate characteristic of nineteenth century rhetorical education was that it was synthetic. This synthesis was a "New Rhetoric," as Johnson calls it. Throughout the century, then, rhetorical educators worked off this "New Rhetoric" and mixed

...a philosophical approach to rhetoric that examined the nature and aims of rhetoric in terms of the processes of the "mental faculties"; the view that the study of rhetoric applies to all major forms of communication, oral and written; and aesthetic/ethical commitment to the critical study of rhetorical theory and the development of taste; and a neoclassical approach to rhetoric as the art of adapting discourse to purpose, audience, and occasion (pp. 19-20).

While early nineteenth century rhetorical educators most often focused on public speaking as the most crucial practice of rhetoric, educators expanded the discipline to
prose composition and critical analysis. The study and practice of rhetoric also broadened toward the pedagogical ideal of the eighteenth century belles-lettres tradition of eloquence and nonverbal display. Even though many have argued that this move illustrated a decline in the status of rhetoric, Johnson thinks that the liberal arts curriculum during the century supported the pedagogical, philosophical, and theoretical interests of rhetoric as a discipline. Her point is that rhetorical education served an important cultural function. Johnson states, "Rhetorical education played a crucial role in bolstering the idealism of nineteenth century liberal education, an enterprise that was committed to the development of an intellectually progressive and cultural enlightened society" (p. 16).

Johnson's work is important to mine because many of the rhetors I examine were classically trained rhetors. The authors of the Yale Report, for instance, both took courses in rhetoric from Timothy Dwight. Wayland learned the classics at Union College. Turner went to school at Yale, but wanted to shed himself of the classical persona to promote practical curricular change. Thus, it should also be interesting to see how the academic appreciation for rhetorical education worked out in a more functional setting. Further, Morrill did not have higher education at all. Thus, it will be informative to see how his rhetoric matched up with the synthesized pedagogical processes Johnson attests were part of the rhetorical fabric of
nineteenth century culture. In short, there is often a link between prudence and the type of education one has had.

The above studies illustrate the struggles and transformations that characterized the rhetorical culture of the nineteenth century. This rhetorical culture was an offshoot of the oratorical tradition of instruction and reflected public, political, and institutional needs. In short, we can see that in the nineteenth century the new professional style and ethos eclipsed the Ciceronian. Cmiel (1990) states, "The nineteenth-century debate over language was a fight over what kind of personality was needed to sustain a healthy democracy" (p. 14). He goes on to say that "the boisterous rhetoric of the nineteenth century...reflected the increased assertiveness of the popular audience" (p. 16).

PREVIEW

As I mentioned, in my dissertation I will investigate several texts that strongly influenced the educational scene during the road to the Morrill Act. The second chapter contains a literature review that focuses on my theoretical grounding, and I will also articulate my methodological perspective. In Chapter Three I will analyze the text that best represents the rhetoric against practical education. This text, the 1828 Yale Report, was a source of great pride and power for the "classical" camp. Crane (1963) states, "...Yale faculty issued an uncompromising defense of the prescribed curriculum and the residential college, which
remained the chief reliance of educational conservatives until after the Civil War" (p. 83). In Chapter Four I will analyze one of Francis Wayland's major rhetorical works, his Report to the Corporation of Brown University (1850). In Chapter Five I will investigate Jonathan Baldwin Turner's Plan for an Industrial University, for the State of Illinois (1851). Writing of Turner's rhetoric, Crane (1963) says the piece was "written in homespun style, an assault on the learned professions...coupled with proposals for institutional development that forecast the vocational emphasis of many twentieth century universities" (p. 172). I will center on Morrill's congressional speeches in Chapter Six. In the closing chapter I will discuss my results and the implications of my study.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHOD

INTRODUCTION

Many present day scholars return to historical oratory to better understand the nature of rhetoric and its impact on historical change and institutional structures. To locate the link between prudence and historical discourse is a current trend in contemporary humanist literature and aids that project. Prudence is an ancient concept. Aristotle and Cicero discussed it. Many contemporary works on the concept have taken a historical approach. For instance, Pocock (1975), Kahn (1985), and Garver (1987) each historicize prudence in their own way. Hariman (1991) focuses on the link between prudence and performance to insist that rhetors practice prudence in and through rhetoric. Many rhetorical critics locate the concept as a take-off point for their analyses. Most recently, Wilson (1998) uses the idea of prudence to examine the Congressional debate over civil rights in the late nineteenth century Reconstruction period. It is my hope to continue the conversation about prudence and its relationship to rhetorical discourse. In this chapter I begin with my literature review. I touch on the theoretical link between prudence and rhetoric, and on recent examples of rhetorical criticism employing the concept of prudence. After my literature review, I will offer an explanation of my methodology.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Phronesis

If prudence has a theoretical heritage, it begins in the classic notion of phronesis. While some scholars, like Ross (1980), translate "phronesis" as practical wisdom, others, like Welldon (1987), translate it to prudence. Hariman (1991) supports this translation, as do the other scholars I depend on in my literature review. Thus, I use Welldon's translation for my review of Aristotle's theoretical sense of prudence, though we should note that prudence and practical wisdom are primarily, at least theoretically, the same thing.

Aristotle spent a good portion of Book Six in his Nicomachean Ethics pointing out his take on the theoretical meaning of prudence. For Aristotle, prudence was one of many ways to arrive at truth. The others were art, science, wisdom, and intuitive reason. In a moment of immense clarity, Aristotle said that "We may ascertain the nature of prudence by considering who are the people whom we call prudent" (p. 191). To Aristotle, prudence was the ability to deliberate effectively and expediently on one's own behalf. Another way of putting it is that if one deliberated successfully in light of situational constraints, then that person was automatically prudent.

To further account for the theoretical idea of prudence, Aristotle compared it to other ideas from his
theoretical corpus. Prudence was not an art, neither was it a science:

--not a science, because the sphere of action is variable and not an art, because all art is productive and action is generally different from production. It remains therefore that prudence should be a true rational and practical state of mind in the field of human good and evil; for while the end of production is different from the production itself, it is not so with action, as right action is itself an end (Aristotle, 192, Welldon's emphasis).

What is most significant in the quote is that prudence was an end in itself. Also, prudence was a type of virtue or excellence. It was part of the rational soul; the part dealing with the variable. Thus, it was a practical virtue.

Additionally, prudence was like political wisdom, but not exactly. One could have political wisdom, but not necessarily embody practical wisdom. In Welldon's (1987) translation, Aristotle said that "A person who understands and studies his own interests is generally looked upon as prudent, while politicians are looked upon as busybodies" (p.198). Prudence was also different from intelligence because intelligence made distinctions between things, while prudence issued commands through effective deliberation. General wisdom, too, was a bit different from prudence because prudence regarded happiness. Prudence was also different from cleverness, but could not exist without it. Aristotle thought that people often applied the term prudence to the same people considered as having good judgment, intelligence, intuitive reason, cleverness, and all the other modes of coming to truth. Thus, there was an
assumption that prudence could encompass these other notions, though it was still different.

Most importantly, prudence assumed a morality and a wisdom. Aristotle said that "It is clear from what has been said that goodness in the proper sense is impossible without prudence, and prudence without moral virtue" (p. 210). Prudence gave birth to wisdom. Aristotle revealed that "prudence is not the mistress of wisdom or of the better part of the soul...For prudence does not employ wisdom, but aims at producing it; nor does it rule wisdom, but rules in wisdom's interest" (p. 211, Welldon's emphasis). Even still, Aristotle thought wisdom was superior to prudence. Aristotle stated, "It would seem paradoxical that prudence, although inferior to wisdom should enjoy a higher authority" (p. 206). Its higher authority sprang from the fact that humans lived in a contingent political world.

Aristotle's notion of prudence is important to my study primarily because he suggested that prudence is practical, occurs in deliberation, assumes moral virtue, wisdom, and encompasses other concepts such as political virtue. Kahn (1985) thinks that Aristotle devised his dialectic syllogism based on common opinion and consensus and that the syllogism's authority sprang from a practical epistemology guided by a sense of prudence. This is to say that the syllogism found authority in the decernment of a truth in a contingent sphere in which "what all believe to be true is actually true" (p. 32). Theoretically, then, even though
prudence was practical and situational, it was also communal. It was a social construct.

Cicero also examined prudence. The standard of judgment that empowered Cicero’s orator was goodness. Moreover, one of Cicero’s central rhetorical concepts was decorum. Generally, decorum, from a rhetorical perspective, means adhering to discursive obligations. Goodness, or morality, and decorum could not conflict, according to Cicero (Kahn, 1985). In the Orator, Cicero wrote that an “orator must have an eye to propriety [decorum], not only in thought but in language...The universal rule, in oratory as in life, is to consider propriety” (cited in Kahn, p. 34). Kahn argues that Cicero thought that political decorum and prudence were one in the same.

Articulating Cicero’s view, Kahn (1985) states, "And while he first opposes prudence to theoretical wisdom as Aristotle does, he goes beyond Aristotle when he argues for the superiority of prudence on the grounds that it is concerned with action rather than contemplation" (p. 35). From this perspective, prudence shaped moral or ethical choice in the realm of the contingent. In a human society, prudence was more powerful than contemplation. Cicero stated in De officiis,

And then, the foremost of all virtues is wisdom--what the Greeks call sophia; for by prudence, which they call phronesis, we understand something else, namely, the practical knowledge of things to be sought for and of things to be avoided...And service [a function of prudence] is better than mere theoretical knowledge, for the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective, were no practical
results to follow. Such results, moreover, are best seen in the safeguarding of human interests. It is essential, then, to human society: and it should, therefore, be ranked above theoretical knowledge (cited in Kahn, p. 35).

Therefore, Cicero insisted that the prudent person and the ideal, persuasive orator were synonymous.

Cicero's view of prudence is important to my study because, even while Aristotle discussed it, Cicero made more concrete the idea that prudence was the epitome of a good person speaking persuasively in the realm of the contingent. The prudent person performed well in life, but his or her sense of decorum led to appropriate modes of persuasiveness in rhetorical and political arenas. The link between political virtue and prudence is significant because contemporary scholars appreciate the idea that prudence is both a mode of discursive practice and political conduct. This is a key point to remember.

Pocock (1975) studies what he thinks are enduring traditions of prudential thought. Pocock's work is important to my study not only because he flushes out prudential conventions, but also because Jasinski (1995) uses Pocock's assertions to argue that in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries an "immanent conceptual struggle" existed between two norms of prudence, prudential audacity and prudential accommodation. To Pocock, the Renaissance handed down these two norms of prudence. Francesco Guicciardini, in his Dialogo del Reggimento di Firenze, insisted that a governor be prudent; and to
Guicciardini that meant waiting on an event and adapting to it. However, according to Pocock, Machiavelli thought that the prince should be assertive. Pocock suggests that this pluralistic, yet stable view of prudence became a resource for rhetorical invention during future controversies.

In her own study of the history of phronesis, or prudence, Kahn (1985) links up rhetoric, prudence, and skepticism in the Renaissance. Throughout the work she focuses on the rhetorical theories of Renaissance humanists, Quatrrocento thinkers, Erasmus, Montaigne, and Hobbes, among others. Though I have depended greatly on her historical review, a detailed description of her work and specific arguments are not relevant to my study. What is relevant is that she illustrates how close textual study of historical texts gives rise to divergent conceptualizations of prudence. She thinks that prudence is much like rhetoric in that its ambivalent moral status is variable. One can condemn rhetoric as immoral, like Plato. One can subordinate rhetoric to moral judgment and thus justify rhetoric as the moral use of rhetoric, like Cicero and Quintilian. One can also argue that rhetoric has no constraints. Rhetors can use their persuasive art for good or evil. Prudence is similar. One can identify it with theoretical wisdom if one believes absolute Platonic ideals govern prudence. One can identify it as an understanding of good and evil—"what to seek and what to avoid" (p. 42). One can identify prudence with the faculty of practical
reason governed in every case by decorum—"of the best means to achieve the end at hand" (p. 42). Thus, her work chronicles the variability of prudence throughout the Renaissance.

Garver (1987) calls prudence a "perennial problem" (p. 6). He thinks that the problem with prudence is "the problem of practical reason" (p. 7). More specifically, Garver thinks that prudence "is the meaning of autonomy, integrity, and character in a faculty whose primary strength is responsiveness to circumstances..." (p. 7). In the simplest terms, Garver posits a pivotal question for the prudent rhetor: "How can an orator base his [or her] presentation on what his [or her] audience already believes, yet persuade them to do what he [or she] wants, not what they already want?" (p. 7, his emphasis). Thus, his theoretical view of prudence is familiar to us.

What is more important is that Garver, like Kahn, historizes prudence. He says that there are different histories of prudence. Some can review paradigmatic prudent acts. Garver does not do this. Instead, Garver's history is a history of texts. He explores the changing role of ethics and politics when he compares and contrasts Aristotle's work with Machiavelli's. Garver (1987) insists that "the sort of imitation required in the acquisition of prudence, and the sort of uses of history available in the practice of prudence, are fundamental dimensions in prudence's career..." (p. 164-165). Prudence has an
external history because its heroes change. These external
and contingent factors, says Garver, gives rise to an
internal history of practical reasoning; the tactics and
resources also change. Most significantly, Garver says that

The permanently defeasible and essentially contested
nature of any history of prudence, and the way that
history of prudence must be a history of the embodiment
of practical intelligence in specific roles and
characters, appear most critically in the way shifts in
practical autonomy are connected to the changing
relations between ethics and politics (p. 166).

I suggest that the changing nature of prudence occurs not
just in a huge sweep of time, but is always contingent in
line with differing perspectives of ethics and politics.

Hariman (1991) offers the most compelling contemporary
theoretical explanation of prudence and its relationship to
rhetorical discourse. He says that

Phronesis, or prudence, designates the capacity for
effective political response to contingent events. It
arises in deliberation, requires implicit understanding
of the possible, the probable, and the appropriate
within a specific community, and is not reducible to
categorical imperatives, deontologies, or universal
laws (p. 26).

Moreover, Hariman insists that "when we say that someone is
prudent, we often are accounting for how well he or she has
mastered the nuances of a particular art [rhetoric] in order
to perform a script capable of motivating advantageous
responses from an audience" (p. 27). Hariman thinks that
prudence as a form of reasoning emphasizes the significance
of situation, social knowledge, and enthymemes.

We should particularly note that Hariman thinks that
prudence is performative. Prudential thinking encompasses
the nuances of a particular political culture, and a prudent agent weighs strategic calculation with questions of performative aesthetics or dramatic force. Prudence is not an explicit plan one can break off or separate from the performance of rhetoric. Prudence lives in and through stylistic and argumentative performance of a persuasive effort. In essence, this is what Hariman means by the performative nature of prudence.

Further, prudence holds the seeds for successful rhetorical and political action. Hariman (1991) says that "...successful action must be more than the rules specifying its reproduction, and this difference is fully articulated only in performance" (p. 28). More specifically, Hariman explains,

To claim that some decision is prudent requires that one specify an action: it is prudent because it leads to something desired actually happening, and the account of why it is prudent has to include description of each of the elements of action, including (in the Aristotelian schema) the desire impelling thought, the calculation of means and of ends, and the continuing value of the state of character being realized (p. 28).

The prudent rhetor often explicates the process of action he or she advocates, but also imitates that action through rhetorical performance. Thus, not only must rhetorical discourse, to be prudent, specify action, but also motivate action by "activating awareness of and standards for the aesthetic dimension of political conduct" (p. 28). When a rhetor enacts prudence through rhetorical performance, this itself is an advocacy of a particular political action.
Hariman also acknowledges that prudence is rule governed, but not from a strict rational perspective. Different from mathematical algorithms or trial by error heuristics, prudential rules for argument building, aesthetic force, and action verge on the unruly. Hariman (1991) puts it this way: "...[P]rudential rules are rules for designing, predicting, and evaluating an event whose value will emerge during its successful enactment as a performance" (p. 30). Prudent discourse emerges out of a dynamic inventional process, but that brand of prudence comes to life only within the performance of rhetorical discourse. During the performance of rhetorical discourse one can become aware of the negotiation that involves coming to terms with the available argumentative and aesthetic dimensions and possibilities within a contingent, performative culture. The rhetorical construction of prudence is itself an interpretation of the available means of persuasion a performative culture allows.

There are several other important ideas that Hariman highlights. First, he illustrates the reciprocal relationship between the concepts of prudence and decorum. Again, where decorum accounts for situational obligation, prudence accounts for the sense of how one comes to terms with such obligations. In viewing prudence as a performative term, Hariman (1991) says one can take stock of the "alternation between obligatory enactment and reflection upon one's conventions of display" (p. 33). The view that
prudence is a performative sensibility also stresses the relationship between morality and gesture. Symbolic gesture itself, not motive or consequence, accounts for morality. In short, a performative conception of prudence stresses that political decision making is less a process of rational calculation, but of "improvisation upon conventions of display." (p. 35).

Hariman's conceptualization of prudence is, in part, the basis for my understanding of it, and that is why his brief essay is so important to my work. Again, to him, a prudent rhetor must understand the possible, probable, and appropriate within a specific rhetorical and political community, and this sense of prudence comes to life through rhetorical symbolism. Prudence symbolically might also come to life through specific policy action requests, through illustrations of why such requests are taking place, through a plan of how it will work, and through indicating the moral value such an action will evoke. Still, these policy requests are not always cut and dry. Recall that a significant point I am trying to make is that rhetorical gesture often develops political policy requests implicitly.

Hariman also thinks that prudence is rule governed, but not necessarily rationally. Prudential rules help a rhetor design his or her rhetoric, predict what will happen with it, and help an audience evaluate it, but the rules for these processes will only show up in rhetorical discourse. Rational generalizations do not ground the rules. In fact,
these rules are not rules at all, but rather unstable

cultural guidelines for appropriate rhetorical performance

one gleans from other acts of rhetoric.

We can see from the above discussion that prudence is a

very tricky and complex theoretical concept; this is

probably why only a hand-full of scholars have dared to

study it. As we glance back through the review we can see

that prudence occurs in successful deliberation, but that it

is more of a virtue than anything else. We cannot learn

prudence from a book; prudence is as prudence does.

Moreover, to Cicero, prudence encompassed ideas of wisdom

and eloquence in as much as it called for rhetorical

decorum. However, we also learn that prudence can be

traditional and communal, though always variable. It is

communal to the extent that it is learned through communal

participation and observation of prudent discourse and acts,

but also that prudence is a stylized repetition of

rhetorical strategies. Hence, prudence is a discursive

practice and political action. Prudence is traditional and

situational. The interpretation of prudence is up for

grabs, but it is also an illustration of strategic

intention. And when I say, "Up for grabs, " I do not mean

that prudence is totally polysemic. A particular act of

rhetorical discourse still limits the ways we can read that

act.
Prudence and Rhetorical Criticism

As mentioned, Jasinski (1995) used the idea of prudence to understand and critique Henry Clay's oratory. Jasinski argues that the Congressional struggle over slavery in the mid-nineteenth century was actually a battle between two different perspectives on what was prudent, given the complex situation. The views of prudence at odds were, as mentioned, "prudential accommodation" and "prudential audacity." Prudential accommodation impelled Clay and other Congressmen to reason that compromise was the most prudent way to act. Clay performed this prudence through his techniques and strategies. For instance, Clay valorized the ontological status of accommodation, created an association between the Union and constitutional compromise, and deferred the slavery issue through metonymic logic that substituted the problem of disunion for slavery. Importantly, Jasinski, like Hariman, argues that prudence is a product of rhetorical performance, but that producing a certain view of prudence (accommodation in this instance) can limit the possibilities of effectively negotiating a crisis. In this dispute over slavery, Jasinski argues that the situation called for prudential audacity and that Clay's misreading of the constitutional framers' prudence contributed to his promotion of accommodation. As Jasinski puts it, "It may also be the case that history is open and contingent. If that is the case, then a tradition of prudential accommodation based on deferral, restraint, and
blind imitation probably contributed to the [the Civil War]" (p. 473).

Jasinski's research is important to my dissertation in two ways. First, Jasinski says that acute controversies illicit standard norms of prudence. "A political culture's dominant form (or forms) of prudence will most likely be enacted or performed in an effort to resolve a particularly acute controversy" (1995, p. 456). I suggest that the educational debates during the nineteenth century accentuated an acute controversy. As industrialization and commercialism became dominant modes of cultural discourse, as regions conflicted and war eventually waged, and as literary canons controlled the educational scene, something or someone had to render American higher education relevant. Second, Jasinski's work displays important characteristics of nineteenth century political rhetoric. In the process of promoting any sort of federal action, he says that a nineteenth century rhetor "was obliged to engage in constitutional hermeneutics: they needed to subvert rival constructions of the Constitution and federal power...while affirming that the government possessed the power to do what was proposed" (p. 462). The Morrill Act is an example of this interplay.

However, though Jasinski's rhetorical critique offers valuable insight for the student of rhetoric and prudence, I think he misses something. Echoing Wilson's (1998) sentiment, Jasinski treats prudence as too stable. In other
words, he takes the performative traditions for granted. Jasinski implies that all prudential outlooks are either accommodating or audacious. But rhetoric is an innovative art and rhetoricians are egocentric. A rhetor would not call his or her rhetoric imprudent. There is a multiplicity of prudential resources even as there are prudential norms.

Another recent rhetorical critique using prudence is Levasseur's re-examination of Edmund Burke's rhetorical art. Critiquing Burke's private correspondence, Levasseur depicts the struggle between prudential and heroic functions of rhetoric in attempt to account for Burke's ironic place in the history of rhetorical discourse; scholars view him as a rhetorical genius, yet many of his persuasive efforts were not successful. To Levasseur (1997), Edmund Burke's rhetorical discourse "is an apt illustration of the frequent tension that exists between rhetoric's prudential and existential functions...[and how] the collision of these two functions can generate discourse which is at war with itself" (p. 334). Levasseur equates prudence with the good and practical. Heroic rhetoric corresponds to an existential function. Through rhetorical discourse rhetors constitute their "very beings" (p. 336). Levasseur argues that while Burke's rhetoric was both prudential and heroic, the heroic function usually won out: "Burke was rather successful at elevating his personal standing with discourse which failed to meet its explicit persuasive goal" (p. 345).
Thus, Burke is a mainstay rhetorical hero, yet he often did not move his immediate audiences.

Levasseur's project is important to my research in one important way. Levasseur emphasizes the important and complex role of prudence in the process of rhetorical invention. To him, prudence is both good and practical, and in "rhetorical practice, this tradeoff between principles and pragmatism translates into a dialectical tension between adaptation and constancy" (1997, p. 335). How can a rhetor use the expected norms, yet innovate for the sake of unique immediate concerns? The rhetor's view of what is prudent helps flush out this inventional process.

However, even as Levasseur points out the complex nature of prudence, I still think that he makes it out to be too simple. I agree with Wilson (1998) when he states, "I do not dispute Levasseur's reading per se, but I do question his dichotomy that implies a settled and widely accepted notion of what is prudent" (p. 133). Levasseur does not express an appreciation for the dynamic and multiplicitic, yet normative nature of prudence as a performative tradition of political expression. It might have been prudent to be heroic.

Browne (1997) thinks that Daniel Webster's fictional speech within a speech during his eulogy to Thomas Jefferson and John Adams was a sign of Webster's prudence. During the speech, Webster offered a sort of "sub-speech" he attributed to Adams, but which Webster composed. Browne says that
Webster wanted to transmit cultural knowledge through prudential display.

Browne uses Lyotard's understanding of how narrative tradition helps generate cultural knowledge. Lyotard offers pragmatic rules that help generate a social bond through cultural narrative. These rules include "know-how," "knowing how to speak," and "knowing how to listen" (p. 41). Know-how is a symbolic standard of action and a celebration of quick, practical wisdom in a specific community. To Browne, "Know-how is thus displayed as a quality of character as much as of mind, and it is evident in the actor's successful negotiation between principle and expediency. It is a sign of prudence" (p. 41). Browne thinks that Webster illustrated "knowing how to speak" through celebrating the orator-as-hero and attributing rhetorical eloquence to character and oratorical authority. Eloquence and authority merge when eloquence "gives to great action its fitting expression" (p. 41). Considering the last criterion, Browne thinks that Webster suggested that listening properly meant to study and learn from the past:

"As Webster commemorates Adams he in effect celebrates himself, at least as an exemplar of republic competence, and teaches others that in listening well the good citizen learns to remember" (p. 42).

I do not specifically use Lyotard's scheme in my dissertation. Nevertheless, Browne's essay is essential to mine because it appreciates the communal nature of prudence.
The essay also suggests that prudence emerges out of rhetorical action.

Leff (1997) also employs the idea of prudence when he suggests that Jane Addams appropriated Lincoln as a prudential hero in order to help diffuse the Pullman strike of 1894. Leff's project is to locate uses of Lincoln as an important symbol of national identity in rhetoric after his assassination. Leff argues that the symbolic Lincoln became a resource for rhetorical invention, "but a pliable resource that could be constructed and adapted to fit a variety of political purposes and ideological agendas" (p. 135). Pullman thought Lincoln's own explicit values were a fixed code. However, Addams altered Lincoln's values for the moment at hand. She did not reproduce Lincoln, but imitated his authority in new forms. Though Leff does not explicitly make the point, to be prudential means appropriating or imitating past rhetorical gestures in new forms for present circumstances. That is why his work is important to mine.

Wilson (1998) argues that prudence is not a stable, unchanging concept or practice, but a contested space:

Not only does it demand a balance between the ideal good and the practically possible, political rhetoric remakes prudence so that it coincides with the speaker's position...Prudence, then, is a coveted space of legitimacy that [political rhetors] attempt to occupy by discursively controlling its meaning" (p. 133).

Focusing on the civil rights debate between 1874-1875, Wilson argues that the battle over civil rights during Reconstruction was a competition between different meanings.
of prudence. By performing different images of the past and present within their texts, the rhetors implied different forms of prudence. These different perspectives, Wilson charges, contributed to different views about desegregation. Wilson explains that the differing textual contexts "implied divergent norms for political judgment and discursive practice...Each side articulated a different vision of the then and the now, and these expressions led to opposing ideas about the wisdom of desegregation" (p. 137). In short, the Southern Democrats saw racism as a personal error that individual maturation could remedy. On the other hand, the Republicans saw it as a systemic cultural problem. Thus, these contrasting visions of prudential action led to the separate but equal doctrine, the doctrine that established "equal" public accommodations for African Americans, but maintained segregation.

Wilson's essay is important to my dissertation not only because he emphasizes prudence as implicit and dynamic, but also because he links prudence with social change. Wilson (1998) concludes that

Social change...has links to the variability of prudence. Because rhetoric refashions prudence in every moment of practice, a progressive articulation may rework the norms that inform the practice. From this perspective, political judgment theory becomes a useful perspective to illumine the evolution of a rhetorical culture and community" (p. 132).

Though Scott and Smith (1969) imply that principles such as prudence can impede confrontation and change, Wilson says that, "In every communicative act, prudence may be a
conservative or progressive influence on the norms that guide its articulation" (p. 145).

Moreover, I think Wilson is pretty much on the mark when he says that "sharp boundaries between prudent and imprudent rhetoric...underrate the dynamic elements that make the concept an important window into rhetorical theory and practice" (1998, p. 133). I agree that critics must interpret the dynamic workings of rhetorical discourse and that prudence is indeed re-fashioned through rhetorical practice. Because prudence is at the heart of rhetorical invention, the prudential process a rhetor advocates is the window into understanding the artistic process of invention. What Wilson misses, however, is the idea that prudential conventions are often communal. This, I think, is a flaw in his research. Again, we need to appreciate prudence as communal and thus as a rhetorical resource, but prudence is also up for grabs from an interpretive perspective.

METHOD

I will use a textual methodology to uncover the implicit views of prudence alive in the rhetoric I will investigate. While I agree with the foundational premises of textual criticism, my research is more in line with Jasinski's (1997) stand on the interpretive practice. In the effort of making the method clear, let us take a look at this brand of rhetorical analysis from a historical perspective.
Textual Criticism

Textual criticism received a great deal of interest in the late 1980's and early 1990's and continues to offer the critic a valuable tool for getting inside rhetorical discourse. Leff (1986), in his encomium to G. P. Mohrmann, illustrates the basic nature of textual criticism. As he puts it, textual criticism is generally

The close reading and rereading of the text, the analysis of the historical and biographical circumstances that generate and frame its composition, the recognition of basic conceptions that establish the co-ordinates of the text, and an appreciation of the way these conceptions interact within the text and help determine its temporal movement (p. 380).

The methodological process seeks to flush out the relationship between the textual, internal rendition of the external situation and the historical circumstances. To Leff, "The central task of textual criticism is to understand how rhetorical action affect[s] this negotiation, how the construction of a symbolic event invites a reconstruction of the events to which it refers" (p. 385, his emphasis).

In many cases this method was, and still is, problematically stabilized into a search for the text's context. Concerning this notion of "textual context," Lucas (1988) states that, "Based on the understanding that rhetorical discourses are temporal phenomena, it holds that a text creates its own internal context as it unfolds in time and is processed by a listener or reader" (p. 249). A text creates the context. It creates and contains various
circumstances, temporality, characters, and norms of action. The method, then, seeks to better understand the temporal flow of rhetorical characteristics within the text and how this progressive flow interacts with the audience to suggest a way of seeing. Lucas goes on to say that

The benefit of close textual analysis is that it allows the critic, in essence, to "slow down" the action within the text so as to keep its evolving internal context in sharp focus and to allow more precise explication of its rhetorical artistry" (p. 249).

The methodological vantage point described above holds an important assumption: rhetorical oratory is time-bound. In a sense, immediate concerns and audiences imprison rhetoric. Yet, though a rhetorical text must adhere to the history outside the text, it also holds an internal history. Rhetoric develops in time through discursive progression. Leff (1986) contends that

Every rhetorical text is a particular construction that unfolds in time as it is written or spoken and as it is processed by a listener or reader. The rhetorical text, then, is a historical development occurring within a broader context of historical developments. However circumscribed by extrinsic events, the text retains an internal history of its own (pp. 384-385).

As mentioned, in his monograph on the contested space of prudence, Wilson (1998) uses Lucas' and Leff's notion of "textual context" to interpret prudence. Taking this view of textual criticism and the idea of "textual context," Wilson reconstructs the way the texts of the civil rights debate during Reconstruction advanced a specific past, present, and future. As his rational for this method, Wilson (1998) argues, "Prudence requires an apprehension of
circumstances and an anticipation of potential futures" (p. 134). Wilson continues, "To appreciate the prudence articulated by the Democrats and conservative Republicans who opposed desegregation, it is necessary to recover the reality that their discourse created--that is, their rhetoric's textual context" (p. 134).

However, Jasinski (1997) thinks that "rethinking the relationship between context and text may help stimulate thicker interpretive practice" (p. 205). Jasinski's problem with the textual context process is the assumption of a stable context. Jasinski criticizes Lucas when he contends that Lucas's "version of particularism contributes to a set of interlocked assumptions that constitute the instrumental tradition" (p. 210). As Jasinski has it, this instrumental condition includes:

A mode of contextualization that assumes situational stability, a sense of agency that assumes that intentions are unambiguous, fully present, and capable of directing textual production, and a sense of the text that assumes its coherence and its ability to represent authorial intention fully and without significant distortion (p. 210).

The goal, then, should not be to stabilize the particular, but illustrate the multiplicity in the particular.

The way he seems to do this methodologically is to uncover performative traditions embedded in rhetorical discourse. This process is not only a good way to answer my first question, but I also think it is an addition to our theoretical understanding of prudence. We theoretically understand prudence better, or at least differently, when we
accept it as a type of performative tradition. Jasinski (1997) says, "Performative traditions are a promising context in that they constitute the conditions of discursive possibility or, in the neo-Aristotelian idiom, the available means of persuasion" (p. 212).

To Jasinski, there are four things that help define and label a performative tradition. First, "a performative tradition is embodied in a linguistic idiom or language" (p. 213). Certain types of terms and specific words ground certain traditions. Rhetors use these terms and words to give meaning to or describe the tradition. For instance, Jasinski says that civic republicanism is embodied in terms of value, like virtue, and opprobrium, like corruption. Second, "a performative tradition is enacted through particular speaking voices" (p. 213). It would be difficult for a wealthy suburbanite to enact the performative norms of inner city poverty. Third, "a performative tradition is marked by various figurative and argumentative patterns and structure" (p. 213). Jasinski says that the locus of the existent marks the performative tradition of accommodationist prudence. Last, "a performative tradition is perpetuated by a range of textual practices and organized into generic forms that are structured through generic conventions" (p. 214). As Bercovitch (1978) observed, Puritanism uses the jeremiad. In other words, certain traditions rely on certain genres of speech. Hence, according to Jasinski (1997), we can say that prudence is a
resource for rhetorical invention because it is a performative tradition that occurs within a language context. And a "language context is most appropriately understood as an ongoing process of creating and diffusing multiple idioms or modes of speaking" (p. 210). Prudence is itself a layered mode of speaking.

More specifically, prudence is a performative tradition because certain words and phrases—idioms—essentially embody certain modes of prudence. Also, specific voices enact certain traditions of prudence. Certain traditions of prudence rely on marked figurative and argumentative structure. Prudence, because it concerns the process of appropriate political judgment, is most usually dependent on epideictic genres, though most genres are never pure.

However, I do not see prudence as just one of many performative traditions. Because of the nature of prudence, I argue that prudence is a master performative tradition. Even while there are different modes of prudence—like accommodationist prudence or audacious prudence—in whatever shape or form prudence takes it orchestrates the process of rhetorical invention. Prudence, as such a performative tradition, is the process of interplay between a rhetor's textual interpretation of the available means of persuasion and the contextual limitations on those available means of persuasion.

Therefore, while I agree with Wilson's (1998) stance that prudence is not an "a priori reflection of cultural
expectations" (p. 133), his sense of the stability of an internal textual context which then implies a perspective of prudence troubles me. Wilson argues that it is the text's rendition of a past, present, and future, what he calls a "vision," that implies divergent norms of political judgment and discursive practice. This procedure seems not to appreciate the fluid nature of the text, its inside context, and its outside context. Wilson's method is good, but it needs help. Wilson's method allows me to answer my second question, but not my first. The cultural norms of political judgment and discursive practice embedded in performative tradition help craft the way rhetors see certain situations. In the inventional process, the multiplicity of resources is not unending. Innovation cannot stray too far from tradition. In short, prudence as an orchestrating performative tradition is implicit within the rhetorical elements in a text that, then, help construct an internal temporality.

Hence, my method is a sort of play between a neo-classical, intentionalist approach, and one, as Jasinski (1997) recommends, that de-centers the rhetorical agent to focus on the text/context relationship apart from intentionality. And this seems to be a useful way to go. Hariman (1997) thinks that a combination of neo-classical thought, and post-structural analysis invigorates the study of public oratory.
Neo-classical approaches to oratory focus on an individual speech and a specific situation, and how this speech supplies an argument for a tangible political policy or defines some aspect of civic culture. Poststructuralists, on the other hand, get away from all this and desire to analyze the social structure and a broader process of discursive creation and reception. Generally, poststructuralists emphasize the fragmentation of discursive practice, the limited role of individual rhetors, and the dispensability of particular texts.

Hariman (1997) thinks a middle of the road approach might look to the relationship between prudence and decorum; decorum, again, being situational obligations. However, single versions of prudence or decorum are short-lived. Cultural pluralism disallows it. Thus, Hariman thinks that to study oratory one must give an "eye to its imitation" (p. 173).

The middle ground is focusing on the imitation of persuasive artistry for specific, situational expectations. More specifically, Hariman (1997) says that "Instead of attention to the striking turn of phrase, the critical interest should be in the strategic value of particular persuasive designs that become widely available for use in a myriad of situations" (p. 175). And how particular persuasive designs are themselves imitations of past rhetorical art. I want to understand how certain senses of prudence, implicit within the texts I analyze, are
themselves imitations of communal norms of prudential thinking.

Another way of saying all this is that the middle ground method is really an attempt to capture both grounds. Thus my study of prudence looks something like Watson's (1997) recent study. In her study of the Sentiments of the 1833 American Anti-Slavery Society, Watson finds a middle ground between viewing a text as a symbolic whole and as an intertextual phenomenon. She argues that the Declaration of Independence was a textual influence on later American Declarations. She also argues that "historically rhetors have been the interpreters of texts to their own strategic ends" (p. 92). Even iconic texts are in the process of intertextual play. However, I also think that my study looks something like Henry's (1997) investigation of William Lloyd Garrison's 1833 Declaration of Sentiments through close textual analysis. He concludes that the Declaration is an outgrowth of Garrison's personal history and immediate anti-slavery persuasive goals. The Declaration is, in other words, instrumental rhetoric. It is purposeful discourse, shaped with intent by the rhetor, to persuade a specific audience, in response to immediate situational concerns.

I view rhetorical texts as wholes. I think we ought to focus on specific texts that rhetors intended as responses to specific situations. However, those texts are also intertextual to the extent that, in line with Leff (1997), they appropriate past prudential voices in certain ways.
Specific Application

I organize each chapter, and each analysis, using a set methodological process in attempts to understand the prudence implicit in each discourse and how that prudence impacts persuasive art. In each of the following chapters I will offer, first, a general introduction that attempts to capture the key exigencies the rhetors faced. Next, I will supply a general textual description; a summary. This is important because it will illustrate the basic pedagogical policy each rhetor advocated. We must assume that each rhetor thought that his policy was prudent.

After that, I will take Jasinski's (1997) advice and try to recover a representation of prudence as a performative tradition. Again, this will help me answer my first question. I will focus in on the important figurative and argumentative aspects of a text; these figurative images and argumentative patterns that gave life to prudential traditions and possible innovations. This process will be a sort of back and forth interplay between the artistic elements of the text and the aesthetic traditions of discourse available to the rhetor. In other words, in light of Jasinski's description of performative traditions, I will attempt to illustrate the tradition or innovation within the text. During this effort I will often use words like "actualize" or "enact" because a notion of prudence is alive within discursive symbolism. During this effort I will also
use various "sub-methods" to help me account for persuasive art. I will describe those methods when I get to them.

Next, I will show how the text's artistry and the view of prudence it offers generated a vision of the past, present, and future within the text; its textual context. I will illustrate how the performative tradition(s) of prudence worked within the text and orchestrates the multiplistic nature of rhetorical invention within a temporal framework; the framework of the rhetoric and the reality it created for immediate rhetorical purposes. Simply put, this method will illustrate how the marker's of the text's prudence played out within a temporal framework and helped (re)negotiate the historical context; it helps me answer my second question.

Finally, I will underscore the implicit prudence within each text, but evaluate the limitation or aid its prudential outlook afforded given the texts' historical, cultural context. This will be an attempt to fold the text back into its historical grounding, both discursively and politically, to figure out its rhetorical consequence. While I will, to some extent, discuss the rhetoric's successfulness or unsuccessfulness, I certainly understand that such labels are difficult to make.

Further, in this final section I will also attempt to grapple with Hall's (1980) idea of encoding and decoding and the different types of "readings" an audience or specific receivers might develop. From my understanding, all Hall
means by encoding is the meaning an author embeds in a message, and decoding is what an audience gets out of that message. However, an author might intend one thing, but an audience member decodes it another way all together. Moreover, the term "reading" is complex because it connotes a sophisticated process of not just decoding, but organizing meaning from a message to fit one's individualized scheme of reality. In my dissertation I will not attempt to offer a "cultural study." I do not necessarily consider myself a structuralist, or poststructuralist, or ethnographer, or semiotician. And I am obviously not studying media culture. Yet, Hall's project is useful to anyone studying communication.

His project is useful mainly because of his ideas of dominant or preferred, negotiated, and oppositional readings. By a dominant or preferred meaning, Hall (1980) means communication that is perfectly transmitted, "or as close as we are likely to come..." (p. 136)--a rhetor intends a certain message, and the "reader" gets that same message. A negotiated meaning is a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements. Finally, an oppositional reading is one that decodes "the message in a globally contrary way" (p. 138, his emphasis). I should note that most readings are negotiated. Very rarely do we completely accommodate to the speaker's message and very rarely do we receive a completely different intention. In sum, these ideas will help me consider the impact of the rhetor's prudence and
persuasive art. I will not use his ideas as a method, but as a simple guide to direct my thinking about possible interpretations of prudence in rhetorical action.

I think through all of these methodological layers of analysis I can best see how struggles over prudential discursive practice impacts historical political and pedagogical action. Again, the first critical exercise attempts to capture prudence as a performative tradition. It illustrates how the text's symbolic gestures were imitative and/or innovative. The textual context is more instrumental. It more closely looks at how the norm of prudence in the text helps construct an internal reality, but also how that norm of prudence impacted political consideration. The last step goes back to figure out the historical impact of that sense of prudence implicit in the text performatively and temporally.
CHAPTER THREE
THE "YALE REPORT" OF 1828

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores a pivotal report authored by Yale's president, Jeremiah Day, and ancient language professor, James L. Kingsley, and the report's impact on the academic battle waged during the early nineteenth century. Again, this battle concerned the unsteady function of American higher education in an increasingly industrialized, commercial society. On one side stood the reformers or progressives, who wanted an American system of higher education fitted for the perceived practical realities of an industrialized era: choice in the curriculum and practical education for the masses. On the other side, classicist conservatives wished to preserve the literary tradition. As I mentioned, the conservatives seemed to be winning the debate in the early nineteenth century. The conservatives thought that a classical education was the ideal form of pedagogy no matter what societal changes were occurring outside the college (Butts, 1939, p. 116).

I mentioned in Chapter One that Harvard, early on, experimented with progressive pedagogy. George Tickner, Harvard's president during the early nineteenth century, supplied a voice of reform. The changes he desired included opening up Harvard to students not seeking degrees, developing departmental systems, and allowing some choice of curriculum for students. He helped bring an elective
principle to Harvard. Though Harvard's progressivism declined under future conservative college presidents, Tickner's ideas provoked Yale's faculty and administrators to ponder such progressive changes at their institution.

Thus, in light of Harvard's move to make ancient languages and the classics elective, some at Yale proposed a similar change. The trustees of Yale asked Day and Kingsley to comment. I suggest that they had to meet a couple of key exigencies. Obviously, they had to quiet the shouting down of classical education as impractical. They had to illustrate that the ancient languages mattered. Also, Yale was the stronghold of orthodox Congregationalism and was a model for many denominational colleges springing up in the West. Thus, they had to tie together orthodox religious ideals with a classical education. Originally published for the public in 1829 in the American Journal of Science and the Arts, what Day and Kingsley came up with is today considered one of the most powerful defenses of classic, literary education: "Yale explicitly and forcefully formulated, in opposition to Harvard's position, the doctrine that a liberal education can be attained only by following a strictly prescribed college curriculum based upon considerations of mental discipline" (Butts, 1939, p. 119).

In the first section of this chapter, I will give a brief summary of the report. Second, I will analyze the emergence of prudence in the text. Third, I will analyze
the text's textual context. Finally, I will evaluate the report and the sense of prudence implicit within it. I will suggest that Day and Kingsley's conception of prudence both hindered and helped their rhetorical effort.

SUMMARY

The authors arranged the report in two major sections. Day authored the first section and Kingsley the second. The over-riding policy action they advocated, in both sections, was continuing the tradition of literary education at Yale. They desired to beat back the tide of modern languages. In the report, Day dealt mostly with what he called the "object" of collegiate education, while Kingsley focused on the particular struggle between ancient and modern languages.

Day (1829) understood a college's mission as laying a foundation for future studies, not to finish a student's education. Day grounded this foundation in vigor, balance, authority, and, by necessity, suitable buildings. Moreover, part of that foundation was a balanced approach to instruction. Day wanted study in science balanced out by study in literature. A balanced mechanism for instruction gave symmetry to the foundation Day was building. However, though Day desired educational balance, students in his scheme marched the same steps. This devotion to a thorough education differentiated the literary education from the professional. To Day, one attained practical information with little mental effort. A student acquired a literary
education, on the other hand, only from seemingly endless mental drudgery. To Day, any other type of education was superficial. Further, those schools in the United States desiring to copy practical European institutions without caution ran the risk of diminishing the thoroughness of a literary education. Finally, Day linked a thorough, classical education with an elevated character. The practical arts, like farming, should begin not in practical measures, but in foundational classics to help build an elevated character. If American institutions were to ignore the classical foundation, they would be disavowing the country's destiny of greatness in all spheres of public culture, and the nation would crumble.

Kingsley (1829) supported Day's ideas by comparing a liberal education to the foundational elements of mathematics in understanding the workings of the physical world and the ancient perfection of Greek architecture. He wrote that a person educated in the literary classics could assert themselves over the artisans. Furthermore, Kingsley claimed that ancient languages were more practical than modern ones because the world was partly literary and those who desired to participate in it needed to realize the value of ancient literature. Also, ancient languages were simply the foundation of many professional studies. To substitute modern languages for ancient languages resulted in a superficial education. Additionally, Kingsley argued that the public did not really demand modern languages. Those who
desired it sought out every new fad. Finally, to Kingsley, a literary education led to public notoriety.

PRUDENCE IN THE TEXT

The policy Day and Kingsley advocated was to perpetuate the pedagogical status quo at Yale. They apparently thought this was prudent pedagogical action. Day and Kingsley enacted this idea, or invented it symbolically, through, first, specific metaphorical concepts. The authors offered structural, light and dark, and nature metaphors and so encouraged a certain way of seeing classical and practical education. Second, Day and Kingsley also constructed a sense of prudence by making classical education a vehicle for moral development both for the individual and, consequently, society. Rhetorically, they did this specifically by employing the sacred/secular metaphors of "taste" and "genius," metaphors used by Yale's former president Timothy Dwight. Thus, while the Yale Report is a secular, educational epideictic, I also contend that the authors engaged a performative homiletic tradition framed by the ideas of Dwight.

Metaphor

Ivie (1989) says that "In the most important uses of metaphor, as a source of rhetorical invention, a term (or 'vehicle') from one domain of meaning acts upon a subject (or 'tenor') from another domain" (p. 199). As the vehicle and tenor interact, the number of ways one can see or read a rhetorical text becomes limited. The interaction of vehicle
and tenor directs one's attention to a certain place. Burke (1968) calls this idea "terministic incentive" (p. 45). For Burke, metaphors incite a reader to see the text from a certain perspective.

As I mentioned, there were three clusters of vehicles Day and Kingsley used to create a particular vision of classical and practical education. The first was a STRUCTURE cluster consisting of such terms as "foundation," "solid," "balance," "finish," "superstructure," "furniture," "pillar," and "superficial." Though one might consider "solid" a dark-light metaphor, the authors used it as a positive metaphoric descriptor of a structure; no one wants a building that is not "solid." Likewise, no one wants a building that is "superficially" constructed. Moreover, the term "balance" metaphorically reinforced the idea of a "solid" structure, something that will not "fall."

Additionally, the term "finish" supported Day's assertions because Day did not think Yale ought to be in the business of "finishing" any sort of structure. These images, or vehicles, helped Day and Kingsley describe classical education, the tenor, and its premises. Consequently, they also gave practical education a pretty bad rap.

There are several examples of the "foundation" metaphor in association with the "balance" metaphor. For instance, Day (1829) asserted that the object of a literary college like Yale was "to LAY THE FOUNDATION of a SUPERIOR EDUCATION..." (p. 300, his emphasis). Classical education
maintained this "object" through strict toil of all mental faculties. Day stated, "A costly edifice ought not to be left to rest upon a single pillar" (p. 301). Thus, Day also thought that "in the course of instruction in this college, it has been an object to maintain such a proportion between the different branches of literature and science, as to form in the student a proper balance of character" (p. 301, his emphasis).

The "foundation" metaphor ruled the pages of the report. The other STRUCTURE metaphors seemed also to congregate around the term "foundation." Using constant repetition, Day declared that a literary education "is far from embracing everything which the student will ever have occasion to learn. The object is not to finish his education; but to lay the foundation, and to advance as far in rearing the superstructure..." (p. 308, his emphasis). And again, "Our object is not to teach that which is peculiar to any one of the professions; but to lay the foundation which is common to them all" (p. 308). Speaking of students, Day asserted, "They should not be sent, as we think, with an expectation of finishing their education at the college; but with a view of laying a thorough foundation in the principles of science, preparatory to the study of the practical arts" (p. 310, his emphasis).

Further, Yale offered "...solid attainments" (Day and Kingsley, 1829, p. 321). The country needed classical education, because "there is perhaps no nation whose
interests would be more deeply affected, by a substitution of superficial for solid learning" (p. 322).

A general DARK-LIGHT cluster supported the STRUCTURE cluster and revealed further how Day and Kingsley enacted their prudence textually. The DARK-LIGHT cluster included such images as "elevated," "high," "thorough," "down," "low," "partial" and "blind." Day and Kingsley almost always associated the term "solid" with an "elevated" or "enlightened" way of seeing. Moreover, I consider "thorough" this type of vehicle because it indicated a clarity in seeing. Throughout the report, Day and Kingsley associated practical education with the dark and classical education with the light.

We see this when Day explained that people of "mere practical detail are wanted, in considerable numbers...but the higher stations require enlightened and comprehensive views" (1829, p. 311). Recall that Day and Kingsley wanted all literary students to follow the same steps. Why? "To this we answer, that our prescribed course contains those subjects only which ought to be understood, as we think, by every one who aims at a thorough education." (p. 312, my emphasis).

Day (1829) argued against progressives who desired to copy the expanded German form of education in the United States through metaphor. Day claimed that American universities might learn a few things from European institutions, but "not by blindly adopting all their
measures without discrimination" (p. 316). Thus, Tickner and Harvard could not see.

Moreover, Day thought that the sentiment that Latin and Greek ought to be optional would reverse intellectual progress. Day asked,

> When in almost all our schools, and academies, and professional seminaries, the standard of education has been enlarged and elevated, is this a time for the college to lower its standard? Shall we fall back, and abandon the ground which, for thirty years past, we have been striving so hard to gain? (1829, p. 318, his emphasis).

Though Harvard had made ancient languages elective, "it is to be hoped that, at no very distant period, they will be able to come up to this elevated ground, and leave the business of second-rate education to the inferior seminaries" (p. 321).

Day (1829) offered his conclusive remarks by explicitly declaring that a literary institution holds an "elevated character" (p. 320). Those educated in the literary, classical tradition "must take their position on a summit which towers above the height of surrounding ranges of hills" (p. 322).

Kingsley (1829) thought that when one knew Greek and Roman writers, in the Greek and Roman tongues, one could take "relish of what is elevated..." (p. 329). It worked the mental faculties and brought the intellect to its "highest maturity" (p. 330). To stay its liberal course, Yale had much to expect, "but by deserting the high-road which it has so long traveled, and wandering in the lanes
and bye-paths, it should trifle with its prosperity, and put at hazard the very means of its support and existence" (p. 337).

A final cluster, a NATURE cluster, referred to naturally occurring objects and bound the positive structure images and the light images with the beauty of nature. These images helped Day and Kingsley construct a tie between classical education and the perceived splendor of a poetic nature. The authors associated the "highest" of natural beauty with classical education. While a practical education was like a poplar, "slender, frail, and blighted," a classical education was "more of the stately elm; striking deep its roots, lifting its head slowly to the skies, spreading wide its grateful shade, and growing more and more venerable with the years" (1829, p. 322). Day asked, "When even our mountains, and rivers, and lakes, are upon a scale which seems to denote, that we are destined to be a great and mighty nation, shall our literature be feeble, and scanty, and superficial?" (p. 324). He thought that classical education ranked up there with mountains, rivers, and lakes.

While these metaphorical images do not necessarily force a reader to accept the necessity of certain pedagogical perspectives, they do limit one's ability to see classical and practical education any which way. Again, the basic pedagogical policy the rhetors advocated was in keeping with the educational status quo at Yale. Thus, to
enact this prudential policy, Day and Kingsley helped the report's readers see classical education as a good, "solid," and lasting structure, more "elevated" than other types of education, and very near the beauty of nature. The authors bound classical education with "solid" structures, but did not "finish" the details. Classical education did not deal in "ornaments," as Day put it, but in building the foundation for future studies. However, that foundation was much more "elevated" than the "low-ness" of "mere" practical education, or professional education minus the foundational elements of a specific practice. To study the ancients was to study the "beautifully displayed," the "warmth, animation, and intellectual illumination of the living, active and intelligent being..." (Day & Kingsley, 1829, p. 346). The various subjects of classical education were the best possible examples of solid and lasting human work. This use of metaphor, then, was the prudential argumentative and figurative enactment of the policy Day and Kingsley desired upheld.

"Taste" and "Genius"

By themselves, the metaphors Day and Kingsley employed give us a good demonstration of how they went about constructing a sense of prudence rhetorically. Another way prudence took shape was through the terms of "taste" and "genius." When we accept "taste" and "genius" as metaphorical appeals or perspectives as well, we can
interpret the Yale Report as an extension of a tradition of prudence passed down from Timothy Dwight.

Timothy Dwight, president of Yale during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, thought that "public happiness results from individual citizenship that enacts a regenerate sort of virtue that must come of God's grace" (Clark, 1993, p. 57). According to Dwight, Yale was "the fountain from which flow the laws of the state [Connecticut] and its whole jurisprudence, the rules which form its happy society, and the doctrines and precepts which are inculcated in its churches" (cited in Clark, p. 58). Clark suggests that Dwight expressed his idea of prudence through the metaphors of "taste" and "genius." To understand how Day and Kingsley's representation of prudence worked out textually, we must investigate Dwight's notion of prudence.

In Clark's view, Dwight meant the metaphor "taste" to refer to the process of correct judgment, and intended the metaphor of "genius" to refer to the action of this so-called correct judgment (Clark, 1987, p. 156). More specifically, by taste, Dwight signified both an aesthetic, secular taste that, once acquired, led to moral virtue; but also a sacred taste that was a "refined sensibility enabled by spiritual regeneration" (Clark, 1993, p. 65). In 1812 Dwight offered angels as the model for what he saw as prudent. As cited in Clark, Dwight explained that angels

...admit nothing but truth [because they are] possessed...of the most noble and refined taste. Their relish is as regularly conformed to truth as their intellect. Nothing little can engross their
attention: nothing debased can give them pleasure (cited in Clark, p. 67, Clark's emphasis).

By genius, Dwight indicated a genius consisting of two functions: a logical function sifting through truth and error and a rhetorical function in eloquence making impressions upon others. Teaching both theology and rhetoric at Yale, Dwight professed a public discourse theory that was both secular and sacred. This discourse theory assumed the "motivating force of the language of sentiment..." and it was "traditionally oratorical in its commitment to engage those it addresses in the project of shaping and sustaining a common moral and political culture" (p. 58).

Dwight blurred rhetoric and poetic and in so doing "did the homiletic work of appealing to sentiments that would nurture the regenerative virtue that he believed functions as a powerful public bond" (p. 59). Both theology and rhetoric inculcated taste and genius in Dwight's type of society. Dwight had a religious and political vision of a "godly government" (Clark, 1987, p. 149). This was Dwight's prudential endpoint. It is apparent that Day and Kingsley take these metaphorical terms--taste and genius--and Dwight's perspective of what they meant, as models for prudential action and discursive practice.

Considering the term "taste," the authors often used it either in promoting so-called correct taste in relation to a classical education, or poor taste in a desire not to study the classics. For instance, Kingsley (1829) illustrated
that "Familiarity with the Greek and Roman writers is especially adapted to form the taste, and to discipline the mind, both in thought and diction, to the relish of what is elevated, chaste, and simple" (p. 329). Kingsley argued that through the study of ancient literature a student gleaned proper, superior taste. This was "proved by the only proper evidence, the voice of men of letters in every country where the classics have been studied, and where a correct taste has prevailed" (p. 330). To Kingsley, Yale laid "the foundation of a correct taste..." (p. 330). When engaged in classical study, "every faculty of the mind is employed; not only the memory, judgment, and reasoning power, but the taste and fancy are occupied and improved" (p. 330). Day and Kingsley illustrated that through the study of language, at its classical root, the student could "hardly fail to improve his taste and to enlarge his capacity to think, and to communicate thought" (p. 347).

Again, the term "taste," understood metaphorically, submitted both a sacred and secular appeal while it also framed the Yale Report's construction and imitation of prudential tradition. While I suggest that Day and Kingsley perpetuated Dwight's notions of "taste" and "genius," it is also important to understand that Dwight depended upon conventions of prudential thought as well. Hence, Day and Kingsley not only imitate Dwight, but Dwight's models too.

For his secular understanding of taste, Dwight depended on the understanding of the term drawn from the moral
philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment. From this secular stance, taste was the refined moral sentiment and a pre-requisite to public virtue. Dwight connected the aesthetic poetic and the moral by asserting moral virtue to be the endpoint of their merger. Day and Kingsley, too, seem to have meant secular virtue as the endpoint of classical education. To them, classical education did not merely offer the means for future employment, but it generated the proper character to enact morality and thus public virtue. For Day and Kingsley, I argue, their rhetoric inescapably tied their sense of secular morality to their conceptualization of prudence.

The secular notion of taste leading to moral virtue blurred into the sacred notion as depicted by Jonathan Edwards, Dwight's maternal grandfather. Both Dwight and Edwards embraced regeneration by grace in sentiment before reason. "And both use the refinement of sensory taste," Clark (1993) argues, "as a metaphor to describe the felt effect of grace, relying on the term relish to describe the heightened ability to perceive the good that was, for both, a primary consequence of regeneration" (p. 65, his emphasis). Perception of God's grace and beauty led to affection for that grace, or sacred taste, which, then, led to godly, virtuous actions. Therefore, for Dwight, part of prudence began in the ability to perceive and relish in moral and spiritual beauty. I contend that this was the so-called regenerative virtue and the meaning for sacred taste.
to which the language in Day and Kingsley's report aspired as well. One could best enact and explore both morality and the grace of God through classical education.

As I mentioned, "taste" is performed through a kind of "genius." To Day (1829), part of Yale's purpose was "rousing and guiding the powers of genius" (p. 301). Moreover, "The sublime efforts of genius consist in the creations of the imagination, the discoveries of the intellect, the conquests by which the dominions of science are extended" (p. 302). Kingsley thought genius resided, partly, in the works of ancient Greeks. Kingsley wrote that, "...the original works of Grecian genius are the models by which artists, even at the present time, direct their labors; the standards by which in great measure, their merits are determined..." (p. 329). Furthermore, Kingsley asked: "...[I]n order to understand the true spirit and genius of English literature,—which is of the greatest practical use, the literature of France, or the literature of Greece and Rome?" (p. 332). Kingsley thought it was Greece and Rome. In the closing arguments, Day and Kingsley suggested that

...we [Americans] are the people, the genius of whose government and institutions more especially and imperiously than any other, demands that the field of classical learning be industriously and thoroughly explored and cultivated, and its riches productions gathered (p. 345).

In an essay written in 1787, under the title of An Essay on American Genius, Dwight proposed, with Hugh Blair, that genius, nationalistic poetry for instance, would pave
the way for a refined, tasteful American citizenry. Clark (1987) suggests that "Dwight presented his notion of American genius as the core of his politicized doctrine of taste" (p. 158). Clearly, Day and Kingsley continued this tradition. Clark also explains that Dwight's Yale lectures somewhat re-defined genius into a general faculty of effort. As Clark notes, "This redefinition transports Blair's esthetic notion of genius as the native ability to create beauty directly into Dwight's political realm of moral action and public discourse" (p. 160). Dwight's project filtered truth and error and generated the idea of a "city upon a hill" inhabited by regenerative souls (p. 161). For Day and Kingsley, it took classical education to foster taste, but also to enact it by storing past works of genius within the mind, building upon and imitating them, and performing eloquence in the community. Classical education fostered this sense of prudence.

In sum, Dwight's secular and sacred sense of taste and genius was the foundation of Dwight's prudential outlook. It, too, had a heritage and took shape in his teaching style at Yale, but also emerged in the discourse of his students, Day and Kingsley. The students, like Dwight, linked taste with grace and the language of animated feeling or sentiment. They showed genius as a mode of distributing the impression of taste to the community. Clark (1993) thinks that

This act of impression was central to his [Dwight's] instruction at Yale...instruction in public discourse
[both in theology and rhetoric] that addressed first the taste, in both the sacred and the secular senses of that term, from which he believed would spring the sort of citizenship upon which his vision of community depended (p. 75).

Dwight hand-picked Day to take his place as Yale's president. It is evident that Day, a mathematician, and Kingsley, a professor of ancient languages, inherited Dwight's notion of prudential action and discursive practice.

Hence, from Jasinski's (1997) point of view, we might say that Day and Kingsley represented a specific prudential outlook that was also a performative tradition anchoring and organizing the process of rhetorical invention. It existed in and through the language of feeling and sentiment and used specifically the terms "taste" and "genius". It was best spoken through classicists radiating Dwight's sacred and secular notions of taste and genius. It depended on metaphorical thinking as its figurative and argumentative framework. Intellectual, conservative homiletic tradition perpetuated this thinking. Another way of putting it is that Day and Kingsley's rhetoric was an imitation of previous rhetoric, but their prudence also lived on through future rhetoric. For instance, while Austin Phelps, schooled at Yale's theological seminary, preached a much more rational stance compared to Dwight, a conventional view of prudence remained, not necessarily pure, but alive. Speaking of Austin Phelps, Professor of Sacred Oratory in Andover Theological Seminary from 1848-1879, Hirst (1993)
explains that Phelps thought that "from the fountain of regenerated individual character would spring the right, unforced, and lasting response to every kind of social ill" (p. 78-79).

THE REPORT'S TEXTUAL CONTEXT

The authors' weaved their idea of prudence with metaphors. The metaphors revealed a standard way of viewing classical and practical education, and the regenerative vision of Dwight extrapolated from the metaphors of "taste" and "genius". Furthermore, Day and Kingsley's depiction of temporal reality is telling not only because the report's rhetoric created it, but it highlighted their prudential outlook by illustrating what they saw to be appropriate action, rhetorical response, and judgment in temporal action.

Undoubtedly, the symbolic prudence, as analyzed above, was a layered configuration of both sacred and secular arguments. The report advocated both the intellectual path to individual and societal moral attainment, but also a feeling-centered, more sacred notion of the same process. In attempts to prudentially create a symbolic reality--a rhetorical vision of the past, present, and future--the classical became sacred and evangelical.

Day and Kingsley supply a fairly specific view of how they saw the wide sweep of past, present, and future. To them, the past, antiquity, was an era of beauty and perfection. The present was a struggle between the beauty of
past treasures and the "business" or "practical" character of their contemporary America. The future, if students studied the past, would be bright. If Yale ignored the past, or made ancient languages optional, the future would be dismal.

To Day (1829), the past held "sublime discoveries" (p. 311). Kingsley thought along the same lines, but made a more profound statement. He said that a classical, literary education "is obviously distinct from a professional, education...The former is antecedent in time; the later rests upon the former as its most appropriate foundation" (p. 324). The works of the ancients, of "genius," are "models" for artists. Ancient art supplied the "best guides, the surest interpreters of nature itself" (p. 328). To Kingsley, "Time, which brings to light so many defects, and suggests so many improvements in most of the discoveries of men, has added its sanction to the perfection..." (p. 330). Speaking directly to the question of the practicality of ancient languages, Kingsley announced that "to begin with the modern languages in a course of education, is to reverse the order of nature" (p. 333). Moreover, "to suppose the modern languages more practical than the ancient...is an obvious fallacy" (p. 333). To study ancient languages was foundationally important and had always been so because "the learned world long ago settled this matter, and subsequent events and experience have confirmed their decision" (p. 344).
Not only did the study of ancient languages help illustrate perfection in art and linguistic practice, but also in character. Day and Kingsley (1829) illustrated that...

to appreciate justly the character of the ancients, the thorough study and accurate knowledge of their classics, in the language of the originals, are indispensable; as the simplicity, energy, and striking peculiarities of these pristine exemplars of freedom which are forcibly and beautifully displayed...(p. 345).

When a student read the ancient literature in the ancient language then...

...such study carries the young pupil back to the earliest era in the history of mental efforts, and lays open to him the most simply and original operations of the mind and acquaints him with its brilliant and unrivaled productions (p. 346).

Even further, a classical education revealed "splendid results of mental labors" and "seized [sic] the refined treasures of antiquity" (p. 347). To study Greek was to study "perfection" of "almost mathematical precision" (p. 347).

What is most important to the authors was that ancient insight revealed truth:

The ancient languages having been made the organ of communicating revealed religion to man....In a matter of such deep concern, what teacher will be disposed to forego any available means of ascertaining the truth? As by biblical criticism, controversies involving eternal interests are often determined, faithfulness to the souls of men imposes an imperative obligation to read and know the Scriptures in their original simplicity and purity (Day and Kingsley, 1829, p. 348-349).

Thus, for the student desiring to study the "Divine," the bible, in its antique linguistic form, offered the "oracles of truth" (P. 349). For Day and Kingsley, the Christian God
"communicated to man in the ancient languages" (p. 349). Not only did the authors perfect the past, but made it sacred, and so too its languages.

To Day and Kingsley, the present was a struggle between the beauty of antiquity and a call for practical education within a "business" culture. Day (1829) thought that the public were "undoubtedly right, in demanding that there should be appropriate courses of education, accessible to all classes of youth," but Day argued that this was not Yale's job (p. 318). In light of the "business" character of Day's era, as he depicted it, the argument that colleges should adopt "to the spirit and wants of the age" was wrong. Day thought that the argument that Yale and other classical colleges will "soon be deserted, unless they are better suited [sic] to the business character of the nation" was ill-conceived (p. 300). He asked, "Do the public insist, that every college shall become a high-school, gymnasium, lyceum, agricultural seminaries, &c" (p. 318)? Day did not think so because this would, in part, de-value college education: "What will induce parents in various and distant parts of the country" Day inquired, "to send us their sons, when they have academies enough in their own neighborhood?" (p. 320). The only way to maintain Yale's place in the "business character" of the nation was to offer an "elevated rank" of education.

Moreover, in this "business character" the "field of enterprise is so wide" that even a person of "a very limited
stock of knowledge" could "push himself forward into notice and employment" or even to "office and popular applause" (Day and Kingsley, 1829, p. 321-322). In this type of atmosphere, America needed a college like Yale in order to supply "high literary excellence, and professional distinction" (p. 322). Classical education gave a student sacredness, and the ability to influence others toward godliness.

Further, Yale was indeed changing. While critics charged that Yale started up in the days of "monkish ignorance," Day (1829) responded that "nothing is more common, than to hear those who revisit the college, after a few years absence, express their surprise at the changes which have been made..." (p. 299). "We believe," Day asserted, "that changes may, from time to time be made with advantage, to meet the varying demands of the community" (p. 299). Yale inevitably changed with time, but it was hasty to change everything. To Day, any institution ought to "still firmly adhere to some of its original features, it is from a higher principle, [rather] than a blind opposition to salutary reform" (p. 299). Again using a key metaphor, Day believed in a cautious and gradual change.

In the Yale Report, the future had two possibilities. As mentioned above, Yale could adhere to antiquity and prosper, or "blindly" change and "fall" into "blight." To Day (1829), if Yale adopted a practical or vocational European approach then parents would not send their children...
to college. In Germany, for instance, there was no "parental" philosophy that helped guide and discipline the student. Day asked, "Would parents in this country consent to send their sons, at the age of sixteen, to an institution in which there should not be even an attempt at discipline, farther than to preserve order in the lecture room?" (p. 316). Raising the standards of admission was a good idea, but to allow students complete freedom of curriculum "shall only expose" Yale to "inevitable failure and ridicule" (p. 317).

Moreover, Day and Kingsley illustrated that some French schools neglected the ancient languages and "that example, neither by its literary or moral results, can demand our imitation" (p. 345). If Yale made the study of ancient languages and option, then not only would its education sink in value, but also lead to a further perpetuation of commercialism. Day and Kingsley did not want to surrender to the business climate of the day: "The standard of scholarship would not only be lowered here, but we should become directly accessory to the depression of the present literary character of our country" (p. 345).

Also, and as I mentioned, if Yale acquiesced to the call for mass practical education without foundational classical education, then the public would lose confidence in the institution. Certainly, a new class of student might walk the halls of Yale college, but "if we should not immediately suffer in point of number, yet we shall exchange
the best portion of our students, for others of inferior aims and attainments" (Day and Kingsley, 1829, p. 320, Day and Kingsley's emphasis). If all educational institutions in America offered the same "object," then the "rivalry becomes a mere scramble for numbers, a dexterous arrangement of measures in beating up for recruits, the stand attainment will sink lower and lower, till the colleges are brought to a level with common academies" (p. 321).

However, even while Day called for a "high intellectual culture" he understood that the business class would earn most of the financial prosperity in the country:

Is it not desirable that they should be men of superior education, of large and liberal views, of those solid and elegant attainments, which will raise them to a higher distinction, than the mere possession of property; which will not allow them to hoard their treasures, or waste them in senseless extravagance; which will enable them to adorn society by their learning, to move in the more intelligent circles with dignity, and to make such an application of their wealth, as will be most honorable to themselves, and most beneficial to their country? (p. 323-324)

Hence, clearly Day and Kingsley thought that Yale and its graduates out to regenerate the commercial go-getters in the business climate or culture pervading Day and Kingsley's era. Yale needed to spiritually re-awaken the commercial culture.

The distinct textual context articulates a certain vision of the past, present, and future, and this expression leads to an over-arching idea about the practical wisdom of classical education. The temporal vision of the Yale Report is thus telling in three ways. First, it located the wisdom
of classical education in the perfected language of God. Only through perpetuating the perfection of the past could one glean godly revelation. Second, because "business" tainted the present, it was only through a thorough, classical education that secular/sacred moral taste and genius emerged. One could not generate a language of sentiment without deep knowledge of the classics and Dwight's society needed this type of language in order to exist. Therefore, third, this textual context illustrated the prudence of Dwight's political vision and the metaphoric resources Day and Kingsley used to spur it along.

Clark (1987) illustrates that Dwight used the metaphor of "family" as a model for a happy political community. Those who lead, Dwight thought, "should nurture the citizens as a virtuous parent nurtures his children" (p. 152). Moreover, societal leaders lead "on the basis of the same divine sanction and divine guidance that authorizes people to govern their own children" (p. 152). As quoted in Clark, Dwight, in 1791, said that these "virtuous rulers" were "...elevated to the first earthly distinction, entrusted with the first means of usefulness, and separated from the rest of men by peculiar insights of deity..." (p. 152). These insights took the form of both revelation from God, but also knowledge of God's language. Dwight thought that "the voice of god...entitled [leaders] to an unrivaled homage, and secured from opposition, disgrace [sic], and
unrivaled irreverence as common parent to the great family of the state" (p. 152).

Day and Kingsley surely thought the same way. To Day, "When removed from under the roof of their parents, and exposed to the untried scenes of temptation, it is necessary that some faithful and affectionate guardian take them by the hand, and guide their steps" (1829, p. 303). The "parents" in the college were not only responsible for disciplining the students, but also for illustrating the vision of the type of leadership that would enact Dwight's plan. Day stated,

This consideration determines the kind of government which ought to be maintained in our colleges. As it is a substitute for the regulations of a family, it should approach as near to the character of parental control as the circumstances of the case will admit (p. 303).

Undoubtedly, Day and Kingsley meant this type of government to also be the model for their country. Classically trained people would lead this country by acclaiming the past as perfect, and transforming the present "business" society back to a literary one. Yale would produce students who could spiritually re-awaken the culture because those students would become the secular/sacred parents of a godly society.

CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

In light of Harvard's move to make classical studies and ancient languages elective, Day and Kingsley revealed that prudent pedagogical policy was maintaining the pedagogical status quo; ancient languages stayed where they
were. To do this, Day and Kingsley defended classical education and asserted its importance over practical education through metaphor. They recovered the language of sentiment and feeling, and also borrowed the prudential conventions of Timothy Dwight by using the key terms of "taste" and "genius." This recovery fused a sacred/secular meaning for classical education itself. Also, the author's rhetorical re-enactment of an oratorical poetic within a perceived business culture illustrated the primary wisdom of maintaining the status quo. It would further develop Dwight's vision of a godly government.

Placed within the context of nineteenth century rhetorical culture, Day and Kingsley's sense of prudence had both successful consequences, and not so successful ones. I evaluate it as successful because it perpetuated the role of the classically trained rhetor in an oratorical society. Again, during the first part of the nineteenth century, the stronghold of the neoclassical tradition helped create a communitarian ethos helped along by classical, literary pedagogy. The Yale Report and the view of prudence it advanced gave solace and fuel to the classically educated. These types thought that the educated orator had a central cultural role of expressing and building moral consensus. The notion of prudence that the Yale Report adhered to certainly helped Day and Kingsley advance their sense to many denominational schools in the West. For the most part, the report staved off any major pedagogical change in
conservative, literary colleges for many years. The report and its model of prudence helped to prolong "neoclassical elitism" (Clark, 1993).

To Clark (1993), Dwight's doctrine was "developed in the eighteenth century, influential in the nineteenth, and perhaps still with us residually...worked explicitly against a democratic transformation of public discourse..." (p. 76). The model of prudence Day and Kingsley supplied helped the conservative, classical cause in the eyes of those already perpetuating classical elitism. However, it only alienated the industrial and agricultural yeoman. It made practical education illegitimate. It did not bring the working classes into the fold, nor could it. Those who disagreed with Day and Kingsley's standard of prudence, both politically and discursively, were, in fact, imprudent. Granted, during this early period farmers and industrialist thought classical education was nonsense and that science was too "magical" to learn. Regardless, the Yale Report certainly did not make classical education attractive to the yeoman agrarian and industrialist. If anything, it created a larger chasm between those desiring practical education and those clinging to the conservative way.

From Hall's (1980) perspective we might note that those academic, classical audiences read the report in a preferred manner. To them, communitarianism fit in with how they saw the culture. It made sense to them. It sounded like good news. For even those desiring practical education, we might
say that Day and Kingsley offered some solace. A negotiated reading might have been one that scoffed at Day and Kingsley's arrogant argument that classical education was superior to other forms, yet applauded the idea that practical, vocational education had a place. Even the Morrill Act, once passed, gave legitimacy to classical pedagogy even as it advanced vocational education. However, we might also say that some readers might have received the report as one not having the entire national interest in mind, but a class interest instead. Prudence, thus, is up for grabs. To some, perhaps, the policy Day and Kingsley advocated, and the report itself, were prudent. To others, they certainly were not.

Again, according to Cmiel (1990), while a classical, literary education indoctrinated young gentleman into a refined style of speech and lifestyle, the classically educated elites had trouble conveying their message to the common people. Therefore, while I suggest that the tradition of prudence Day and Kingsley prolonged helped them in the eyes of other conservative classicists, their primary audience, it may have hindered them when it came to persuading anyone else outside that class. The Yale Report slowed down pedagogical progressivism in certain spheres. However, those spheres were populated, for the most part, by easily swayed, already cheering, classically trained audiences salivating at the ringing sounds of Latin and Greek. But practicality would soon have its day. It got a
good shot in the arm when Francis Wayland reported the status of American higher education to Brown's overseeing corporation in 1850.
CHAPTER FOUR
FRANCIS WAYLAND AND HIS 1850 "REPORT TO THE CORPORATION OF BROWN"

INTRODUCTION

Francis Wayland was born March 11, 1796, in New York City and died in 1865. His parents were both English immigrants. Strong religious teaching occupied his early childhood. On Sundays, before dinner, Wayland's parents taught him a new hymn; before tea, his parents taught him portions of the Catechism; after tea, his father read scriptures and explained their meaning; after that the family sang hymns and prayed.

His strong Christian, Baptist upbringing seemed to prepare him for his years at the Dutchess County Academy, and then at Union College. He graduated from Union on July 28, 1813 at the age of seventeen. He then studied medicine, but decided to return to his Christian roots. He began study at the Theological Seminary at Andover in the autumn of 1816. In 1817 he became a tutor at Union College teaching the classical courses. In 1821 he entered his pastorate at Boston's First Baptist Church. He was ordained pastor on August, 21, and stayed in that post for five years.

He decided to leave Boston and return to Union College to teach in 1826. Although he was popular in Boston, Wayland himself condemned his sermons because he thought they were lacking in the "simple and homely address essential to true popular effect, and [they were]
constructed too much on lines of an ambitious, intellectual display" (Murry, 1891, pp. 55-56). Wayland hardly got his feet wet back at Union when Brown declared a vacancy.

Wayland was president of Brown University from 1827 to 1855. Although educational scholars dub Wayland a progressive, early in his career he embraced a conservative educational philosophy (Butts, 1939). Between 1827 and 1840, Wayland did not challenge the status quo. His radical call for reform did not come until after a trip to Great Britain. It was not that he wanted America's colleges to mirror English ones. Wayland did not think too highly of Oxford and Cambridge because these were places of "fruitless discussions" (p. 143). However, Wayland perceived a cultural chasm between England and America. To Wayland, the English college was near perfection for monastic and literary needs, but America needed a newly styled system of higher education.

His voice of educational reform took flight in several speeches, articles and pamphlets. His most important works include his *Thoughts on the Present Collegiate System in the United States*, published in 1842, and his 1850 report to the corporation of Brown. He was conservative in his stance in 1842, desiring to increase requirements for the bachelor's degree, and he did not advocate the elective system. What was clearly radical in his earlier work was that he thought Brown should supply an education for people desiring knowledge and skill in the practical arenas such as
mercantilism and agriculture. Butts (1939) contends that Wayland's 1842 pamphlet unveiled a "complete" statement of the problems Wayland saw with early nineteenth century American college education. Wayland's 1842 effort proclaimed that America's students needed a narrower focus. Though he did not explicitly support an elective system, Wayland thought colleges assisted only ignorance by promoting the ideal that students should learn all subjects:

Wayland pointed out, as others had done, that the amount of knowledge and number of courses had doubled or trebled since the colleges were first established and yet that the amount of time allowed for finishing the course had remained exactly the same; thus it had become impossible for young men to acquire all of this knowledge in such a manner as to insure proper mental discipline (Butts, 1939, p. 145).

Wayland's other ideas for reform included raising requirements for admission in order to instill in students an appreciation for thorough knowledge, but also to engender a "university" system through advancing all the important branches of knowledge. The classical course would lead to the B.A. and the practical would lead to the B.S. or B. Litt. Wayland wanted to retain the classically prescribed college curriculum, but also wanted to expand the system and open Brown's gates to everyone. Wayland thought that offering scientific knowledge and modes of scientific application to the arts, like farming, would increase the wealth of the country by way of the individual and, at the same time, enlighten the masses.

"His theories were the most advanced in terms of democracy since the days of Jefferson" (Butts, 1939, p. 146).
146), but his recommendations did not take hold. He could not make the changes he wanted at Brown because of so many dissenting voices in the faculty. At the same time, enrollment had decreased almost twenty-five percent from 1835 to 1849, and the college's income was plunging. In 1849 Wayland tried to resign, but the Brown corporation would not let him. Instead, Wayland designed a new proposal for reform. In light of the situation, Wayland had to contend with several general contingencies, as implied above. First, he had to negotiate his radical ideas with the conservative scene of mid-nineteenth century American higher education; especially at Brown. He also had to re-make Brown into an enticing place to earn an education. Finally, he had to deal with the glum state of Brown's income. What Wayland came up with was pretty much in line with his 1842 treatise, but much more radical.

In the first section of this chapter I will describe and summarize the report. Second, I will interpret the view of prudence Wayland advocated discursively. In the third section I will examine the report's textual context and how Wayland further developed his prudential outlook temporally. Finally, I will evaluate the historical consequence of Wayland's view of prudence, suggesting that it hindered his efforts at Brown, but helped his public rhetorical effort.

SUMMARY

Wayland's report is a broad treatise of seventy-six pages, organized categorically, and within each category,
organized chronologically. Wayland discussed education in Great Britain, the progress of education in the United States, the condition of Brown University, how to make it more useful, and finally the value of collegiate degrees.

Wayland claimed in the first two sections that the nation's educational founders misunderstood the nation's unique educational needs; copying English traditions stifled American higher education. Thus, classical education created elitism, but practical education uplifted the practical longings of practical people. Wayland (1850) did not want a student "profoundly versed in mathematics or classics, and ignorant of all earthly things else..." (p. 37).

Within his third section, his history of Brown, Wayland declared that he would alter Brown's system in several ways. For instance, Wayland suggested abandoning the four-year fixed term of a college education. Wayland also proposed to determine time allotted for particular courses of instruction by the nature of the courses themselves. Additionally, he wanted to allow every student to choose a particular course of study and never interrupt it until finished. Wayland also suggested that Brown should continually revise the curriculum according to communal desire. He urged Brown to allow students to attend any particular course they wished to attend, allow for non-degree seeking students, and award non-degree seekers with
certification for every course pursued. To Wayland, these changes would help Brown fend for itself financially.

Wayland also wrote about the relationship between the corporation and the instructors. He argued that the corporation should furnish the instructor only with the necessary apparatus, lecture room, and library. Payment depended largely on individual academic and pedagogical talent in Wayland's scheme.

Moreover, talent and intellect were the true signature of an academic degree. Wayland (1850) believed that the degree in arts had become a social "knighthood" signifying no real "attainment" of knowledge. The degree had lost academic value. It was merely a social distinction. Wayland wanted to change this, not only to bring more students from the working classes of society to college, but also to usurp the aristocratic label of the college degree.

PRUDENCE IN THE TEXT

Wayland's claim was that Brown ought to democratize its education in order to uplift the practical classes of society. Consequently, this was what Wayland suggested was prudent pedagogical policy. The rhetorical sentiments of individuality, self-reliance, and commercial autonomy enacted Wayland's sense of prudence. A mode of rhetorical identification also helped bring his notion of prudence to life. Both Wayland's political ideals and his discursive practice were popular and conventional. Wayland used and
perpetuated a representation of prudence consonant with the perceived egalitarianism in the age of Andrew Jackson.

Individualism

As the nineteenth century marched on, "the rhetoric that emerged both within and outside the academy in America expressed...increasing individualism" (Clark and Halloran, 1993, p. 13). Antczak (1985) explains that the watershed moment of Andrew Jackson's election marked the era and called for a "rhetoric of identification." Echoing Antczak's perspective, Clark and Halloran (1993) explain that "Jackson defeated Adams by presenting himself to the voters as a representative personality, using rhetoric that addressed its audience not as citizens who must judge but as spectators observing a version of themselves" (p. 14). Wayland exemplified this discursive practice and it brought to life his sense of prudence. In short, sentiments of individualism were more persuasive then classical argumentation.

The desire for practical training was, in Wayland's (1850) view, "Individualized in the bosom of every citizen" (p. 13). Wayland's prose constructed a lush view of individuality in which "every man is desirous for himself and especially for his children, of that knowledge which is most essential to success in the field which is placed before him" (p. 13). Moreover, Wayland thought that "it is one thing to aid the struggles of genius oppressed by adversity," but it is "another to provide such inducements
to education, that young men shall be enticed into the learned professions, who would be more useful and successful in other departments of life" (p. 35). Every individual had his or her own unique calling. Wayland went on to say that any funds or scholarships given to entice students to enter Brown should "not paralyze the sentiment of honest, manly independence, without which genius itself is contemptible" (p. 35). A college or university ought not make a preacher out of a farmer, or vice versa.

Along the same lines, Wayland (1850) proposed that Brown must supply "courses of instruction, not for the benefit of one class, but for the benefit of all classes...Is there not reason to believe that, if such an education were furnished, they would cheerfully avail themselves of it?" (pp. 50-51). It was obvious to Wayland that individuals would snatch up opportunities for self progress. Also, Wayland justified his idea of prudence through that argument that "every man...has an equal right to the benefits of education, every man has a special right to that kind of education which will be of greatest value to him in the prosecution of useful industry" (pp. 56-57). Therefore, imparting only classical studies was, consequently, unjustified and imprudent.

Wayland (1850) also suggested that the corporation should support professors, but that Brown's corporation members could not "pretend any longer to hold themselves responsible for the support of every professor;
nor...pretend to oversee him in the discharge of his duty" (p. 62). Wayland thought that the professors should look to independent student fees for what the corporation could not give. In this way, "like every other man, the instructor will be brought directly in contact with the public, and his remuneration will be made to depend distinctly upon his industry and skill in his profession" (p. 62). This discursive strategy recognized the ideal of self-reliance. I suggest this rhetorical gesture was a key symbolic enactment of Wayland's prudential outlook.

Continuing his sentiments of individuality and self-reliance, Wayland (1850) argued that the college degrees were "mere privileges by courtesy" (p. 66). Wayland insisted that the A.B. should signify the possession of a specific amount of knowledge, and the A.M. a bit more. Wayland believed that if Brown reduced the number of studies an individual student took up, it would increase the value of the degree program. The student would have options and could take electives that substituted for other courses. Of significance, Wayland admitted that this kind of policy might greatly effect the classics, but "if by placing Latin and Greek upon their own merits, they are unable to retain their present place in the education of civilized and Christianized man, then let them give place to something better" (p. 74).

We can see that Wayland's treatment of academic degrees was a representative anecdote of his discursive treatment of
individualism and self-reliance, and thus his sense of prudence. When the college degree was an individual program of study, aiding the student in an individual, practical quest, the degree obtained its merit. His talk about degrees and his policy solution to the problem indicated his idea of prudent policy and how he enacted it rhetorically through the gesture of curricular natural selection.

In short, Wayland supposed several stances on individualism and self-reliance. My point is that these stances were themselves discursive sentiments that articulated his implicit view of prudence. At the heart of it, he thought that every person longed for personal attainment, but he also thought that each individual was unique and had a special, individual calling. Not every person attained, or should attain, high intellectualism. As long as each individual was self-reliant and there was equal opportunity to seek out autonomy, Wayland was content. That would be prudent policy.

Additionally, this prudential perspective, and the inventional framework that constructed it, was consistent with Wayland's (1835) thoughts in his Elements of Moral Science. In that work, Wayland argued that "every human being, is a distinct and separately accountable individual" (p. 202). While each person was unique, equality reigned: "[A]ll men are placed under circumstances of perfect equality. Each separate individual, is created with precisely the same right to use the advantages with which
God has endowed him, as every other individual" (p. 202, his emphasis). In this moral philosophy we also see the seeds of Wayland's primary ideal of prudence. This ideal, as manifested in his report and his text on moral philosophy, emerged out of the democratization of his era.

Wayland's report is a Jacksonian appeal. Antczak (1985) says that during the early period of the nineteenth century, with the aid of Jackson's election, a democratic audience emerged. A characteristic of this democratic audience was, in part, "outsideness:" a willingness to butt-heads. As Antczak puts it, "Americans saw themselves as potential 'heroes against the odds'; increasingly confident in their can-do attitudes, they were willing and even eager to 'enter the scramble' and get ahead" (p. 49). This perception developed, Antczak contends, through the personality and exaggerated triumphs of Jackson. What is more, an aversion to authority existed and also an anti-intellectualism. Antczak, speaking of Jackson, says that he "was the key representative figure of American politics in the nineteenth century because with him, identification with a democratic character became the most effective mode of persuasion of the popular audience..." (p. 49).

Hence, I argue that Wayland developed these attitudes as dimensions of prudential conduct and discursive practice. I also suggest that Wayland might have seen himself as a sort of Jacksonian educator. Though a Baptist Whig, he apparently considered himself the outsider in an arena
dominated by conservative, classical thought. He was trying to beat the odds in consideration for the mass populace. Crane (1962) says that Wayland's earlier critiques of classical education "struck a popular and potentially destructive note in the age of Jackson" (p. 107). The destructive note was that he still wanted to retain and improve the traditional classical course. However, in 1850, he thought the traditional courses should stand on their own merits. His democratic appeal illustrated that he seemingly longed to be the public's educational hero, and the classicist's villain.

**Commercial Autonomy**

A consistent economic voice further established Wayland's gestures of individualism and self-reliance. Through his mode of rhetorical identification, he established a sort of commercial personality for the democratic, autonomous agent. Again, Antczak (1985) reveals that in the age of Jackson the "rhetoric of personal identification" beat out the "rhetoric of issues" (p. 43). To Antczak, "[T]he practice of Jacksonian politics, a rhetoric of personality led to reshaping the substance of politics..." (p. 43). The substance centered around "strictly personal considerations" (p. 43). While Wayland was not on the same political playing field as Jackson, I contend that he, too, engaged in a type of rhetoric of personality. Though it does not recant any triumphant measures, Wayland's report granted only a specific

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characterization for the moral individual: He or She was economically viable. At the get-go, Wayland argued that "Every man among us is the architect of his own fortune" (p. 13).

Two of Wayland's key ideas were that education was an article, and that universities ought to be economically independent. Discussing the history of American colleges, Wayland (1850) said that "the demand for the article produced in the colleges was falling off, not from the want of wealth, or intelligence, or enterprise in the community; but really because a smaller number of the community desired it" (p. 22). Wayland thought that to fix things meant offering newly styled and practical course work. This would allow colleges/universities to stray away from communal financial support. Wayland's point was that asking a community for money was not economically self-reliant. Harvard tried this system of communal charity, but Wayland did not think it worked out. Wayland offered extended statistics to argue that Harvard found it difficult to fund itself even as the community helped it along. Therefore, there was a profound problem with the system. Primarily, the problem rested in college and university administrators not being prudent enough to re-work pedagogy to become economically autonomous as institutions.

Wayland (1850) continued this thought when he discussed some proposals for agricultural and industrial schools. He argued that if traditional colleges did not provide for
practical training, the populace would attend the new, practical institutions: "If the prestige of colleges should be thus destroyed, and it be found that as good an education as they furnish, can be obtained in any of those other schools, the number of their students will be seriously diminished" (p. 60, his emphasis). Brown had to change or it would become obsolete in the educational market-place. If Brown would make the changes Wayland thought prudent, only then could it "reap all the benefit arising from the diffusion and progress of knowledge" (p. 61). Brown, like the individual, should be self-reliant--especially, like Jackson in New Orleans, in the face of adversity.

Furthermore, Wayland's (1850) "history of the institution" (p. 41) was an economic narrative. He discussed the number of students, the salaries of teachers and administrators, he even supplied a table. He considered the income of the institution, the aid given to students, the money donated to the institution, the property assets of the institution, and the financial strategies the corporation followed to insure the college's success. Wayland also recounted administrative deeds, but with an economic slant. He reported at length on how donors offered specific amounts for such things as the library and means for scientific progress. These were all commercial appeals that helped shape his prudential point of view.

Wayland concluded his treatise with several economic observations, also appeals shaping his conception of
prudence. First, Brown could not exist much longer without increased funding. Second, given the impractical mode of education, even funding additions would not increase the number of students unless a major provision created "gratuitous" tuition. Third, "gratuitous" tuition would only steal students from other colleges; it would not increase the number of educated citizens in society or bring education to the working classes. Fourth, the same amount of money needed to sustain the college would, if they would fix things the way Wayland wanted, add to the number of students and "confer inestimable advantages on every class of society" (1850, p. 75). While one might argue that Wayland was simply reporting the obvious economic state of things, I suggest his economic observations highlighted his form of practical reasoning. His economic way of seeing and talking bolstered what he considered prudential pedagogical policy. He was declaring his thesis that

...our colleges are not filled because we do not furnish the education desired by the people...Our customers, therefore, come from the smallest class of society...We have produced an article for which the demand is diminishing...Is it not time to inquire whether we cannot furnish an article for which the demand will be, at least, somewhat more remunerative?" (p. 34).

Thus, Wayland regarded students as customers seeking an article. His supply and demand way of thinking borrowed from a tradition of prudence founded in the commercialism of the mid-nineteenth century. He enacted a notion of prudence through the language of commercialism that revealed the importance of economic self-reliance. Wayland thought that
Brown had to adapt or become impoverished. The school had to re-invigorate the value of its education so customers could consume a product of value and, through the process of consumption, become more independent.

Crane (1962) says that "his [Wayland's] policies were based on principles of educational finance..." (p. 68). Crane also reveals that Wayland's "individualistic moral code, qualified faith in democracy and progress, and laissez-faire economics, which he associated with the laws of the universe, provided the basis for his educational policies" (p. 69). I have suggested that the discursive practice of talking in an economic tone helped establish Wayland's sense of prudence. It illustrated the type of democratic personality he advocated. Put simply, the ideal democratic personality, the prudent democrat, was economically viable. Additionally, the economically viable person was also moral:

Wayland's investigations in political economy strengthened his convention that a benevolent providence governed human affairs and that social institutions must meet the test of utility...Thus the laws of political economy paralleled and reinforced those of moral philosophy" (Crane, p. 74).

As Wayland himself put it,

Reasoning from unquestionable facts in the history of man, they [wealthy people] have incontrovertibly proved that the precepts of Jesus Christ, in all their simplicity, point out the only rules of conduct, in obedience to which, either nations or individuals can become either rich or happy (cited in Crane, p. 74).

Thus, Christian rules apparently supported Wayland's prudential framework. These rules took formal structure in
both his moral philosophy and political economy texts. In 1837, Wayland announced that "the principles of political economy are so closely analogous to those of Moral Philosophy, that almost every question in one, may be argued on grounds belonging to the other" (p. vi).

To summarize, Wayland's idea of prudential pedagogical policy was to democratize higher education. In light of Jasinski's (1997) ideas, we might say that Wayland enacted this sense of prudence through appeals to Jacksonian individualism and the language of commercialism. The conventions of mid-nineteenth century democratic individualism, Wayland's personal understanding of moral philosophy and political economy founded in Baptist, Christian belief all produced Wayland's conceptualization of prudence. Because he thought that the rules of moral philosophy and political economy were manifestations of the laws of God, he used this conventional mid-nineteenth century conviction in order to invent his rhetoric. Through his prudential way of thinking Wayland sought to fashion a specific kind of democratic identification. He offered his own commercial/Christian, political/moral personality to the public as a rhetorical illustration of the ideal democratic citizen. Furthermore, Brown was a symbolic representation of the democratic individual. To make Brown profitable was to make it an example of prudent democratic and moral action.
I have suggested that Wayland emphasized what he saw as the ideal democratic citizen. In this, Wayland was a rhetorical popularizer. I also suggest that Wayland unveiled an ideal of democratic citizenry for the audience to model. Like other rhetorical popularizers, his "invitation was not to some specific and shareable commitment but to the acceptance of individual moral responsibility generally" (Clark and Halloran, 1993, p. 14). Rhetors often conveyed this "responsibility" through story. While Wayland offered specific educational proposals to advance his prudential stance, he also conveyed an ideal democratic character in narrative action.

Crane (1962) thinks that Wayland believed that "simple piety...was more effective than learning" (p. 71). Moreover, Wayland "paid little attention to the historical development of human institutions. If educators obeyed moral laws, their schools would probably prosper; in any case, their consciences would be clear" (p. 69). While I am not as cynical as Crane, I do think that Wayland perhaps meant his historical narratives to frame the role of American college education and the specific role of the practical classes within the unfolding of American history.

Therefore, his narrative history further dramatized the plight of the practical classes, illustrated the specific character of college as an economic article to be consumed on the road of individual progress, but, most importantly,
promoted what he thought was the ideal, prudent person in action. His textual context was a fiction that helped him develop his prudential view in temporal flow. The rhetorical appeals that established his prudential outlook also generated his textual context.

When Hart (1997) discusses the rhetorical narrative, he urges critics to look for specific things. For one, the critic ought to decide if a narrative springs from a master story. Second, one should decide what proposition a narrative is revealing. Third, one should decide what propositions the narrative masks. Simply put, Wayland's fiction was the story of mythical frontierism, pragmatism and the self-made American. It submitted the proposition that a college/university education ought to be a utility for the individual on the way to economic well-being. However, the story hid the proposition that a college/university ought to function more classically, producing a sense of communitarianism. More specifically, it hid the competing view of prudence articulated in the Yale Report. Through his individualistic and commercial appeals, Wayland generated a seemingly historic narrative that implicitly refuted the Yale Report by masking the perceived importance of classical education with the face of individual, commercial merit.

Wayland painted the past as a time of warranted misunderstanding and error; early American educators simply did not understand the progressive nature of the American
experiment. Wayland illustrated the present in his repeated comments about the "progress" of the nation, and in his rendering of Brown as an educational embarrassment. His vision of the future took form in his arguments about what might happen if the corporation would not, or would, heed his proposals. For instance, if the corporation conceded to Wayland's policy requests it would result in financial compensation to Brown.

Wayland spent most of his rhetorical effort recounting the past. For instance, in the first major section of the report, he weaved a narrative about the traditional style of education in Great Britain. To Wayland (1850), it was "natural" for early American educators to desire to copy English literary colleges. However, Wayland argued that because the United States was unlike Great Britain in many regards, the fit between literary education and American democratic idealism and pragmatism was unnatural. In the first place, "they were ecclesiastical and monastic institutions" (p. 6). Further, Wayland argued that British universities were not universities at all, but rather "a collection of colleges" (p. 7). The single college, the prototype for the colonial colleges, was a "distinct society" (p. 9). The object was to educate youthful, future ministers in a family environment: "master, fellows, tutors, and students, all sitting at the same table" (p. 9). Wayland made the traditional English college out to be an educational utopia for future clergy. Moreover, "if a
system of this kind were to be adopted, we do not perceive in what manner the present organization of a college in an English university could be improved" (p. 9).

However, Wayland suggested that historic American colleges unwittingly fouled things up. Mistakes took shape in, first, an adoption of "the unchangeable period of four years, and confined the course of education almost exclusively to Greek, Latin and Mathematics..." (1850, p. 9). Also, early American colleges assumed the role of superintendence over the student, but did not arrange their buildings appropriately or require all officers to live on campus. Third, "We [American educators] gave to the college the power of conferring all degrees in the several faculties..." (p. 10). Wayland insisted, "Hence, in this country, a college and a university mean the same thing; in England their meaning is very dissimilar. The result of our departures from the original idea has been in every respect unfortunate" (p. 10). Finally, Wayland maintained that the American experimentation was in some ways successful. "We certainly have then no reason to be ashamed of the colleges founded in our early history" (p. 11).

Yet, Wayland emphasized throughout the first section that the nation's educational founders misunderstood the nation's educational needs; copying English traditions stifled American higher education. The early colleges wanted to use the clergy model for every student. Early educators did not quite see the unique democratic sense of
Americanism. America had a unique democratic characteristic, much different from that of England, and Wayland thought this should force educators to re-model American higher education.

Within the second section of the report, Wayland (1850) became even more of an embellishing historian, still focused on the past, but closer to home. With the "dawn" of the nineteenth century new sciences held the "progress of civilization" (p. 12). Literacy increased, the Revolution quickened intellectualism, and the "spirit of self-reliance had gained strength by the result of that [the Revolution] contest" (p. 12). To Wayland, the nation's wealth and its ability to produce was unending, but the country needed scientific application. Given this historical rendition, Wayland argued, "That such a people could be satisfied with the teaching of Greek, Latin, and the element of Mathematics, was plainly impossible" (p. 12). Practical needs awaited. "What could Virgil and Horace and Homer and Demosthenes, with a little mathematics and natural philosophy, do towards developing the untold resources of this continent?" (p. 12-13). With frontier leanings, Wayland became an opponent to classical education; he became the "outsider."

Wayland (1850) suggested that instead of changing the curriculum, turn of the century educators held to unwarranted assumptions that "our colleges were designed exclusively for professional [clergy, law, medicine] men;
that they must teach all that professional men might wish to know; and that all this must be taught in four years..." (p. 14). Wayland narrated all the various branches of learning offered in New England at the turn of the century and, using his statistical mode of support, he added all the weeks of four years, divided it by twenty courses of study, and concluded that "in this manner all continuity of thought is interrupted, and literary enthusiasm rendered almost impossible" (p. 15). However, to the turn of the century educators, "The greater the number of studies prescribed in the curriculum, the more generous is believed to be the education imparted" (p. 15). Wayland thought this was absurd.

Still focusing on the past, but alluding to the present, Wayland (1850) contended that the result of turn of the century educational system was not all that impressive. Again using his statistical examples, he made it obvious that given a fixed amount of time, an increase of subjects resulted in a decrease in learning: "the student never carrying forward his knowledge to its results, but being ever fagging at elements, looses all enthusiasm in the pursuit of science" (p. 17). Colleges during the early part of the nineteenth century simply taught too much. Not only did this impact the student, but also the teacher. The teacher could "not mark out such a course as he would wish to teach, but must teach as much as he can, in the fragment of time allotted to him" (p. 19).
In his historical narrative, Wayland discussed the early history of American higher education from an even more economic way of seeing. Through several paragraphs, Wayland argued that the option of teaching more in the same fixed time was partly a function of the institution's economic framework. In the early history of American education the institutions supported themselves. Most usually, at least before communal support, institutions depended on fees, but fees were failing because of the movement of civilization. The early system was correct, thought Wayland, but did not move quick enough. Offering a glimpse of his view of American progress, Wayland (1850) insisted, "It is manifest to the most casual observer, that the movement of civilization is precisely in the line of the useful arts" (p. 21). Given this seemingly natural movement, colleges, especially in New England, had difficulty supporting themselves: "The fact is, they were originally schools for merely the learned professions, and the proportion of those whole desired a professional education was growing less" (p. 22).

Thus, what resulted was a system of charity in order to create a "gratuitous" tuition. However, to Wayland (1850) there was "danger, under such a system, that colleges may be tempted to render education cheap instead of striving to render it valuable" (p. 31). This system of looking for financial support in the community in order to supply very cheap education failed, according to Wayland. It did not
work because the practice did not idealize the American
democratic experiment of individuality and commercial self-
reliance that saturated the culture outside of academe.

When Wayland elaborated on his present-day Brown he
praised the university, but, in light of its charity system
and lack of innovative courses, also said that in many ways
it was not the type of institution it ought to be. "The
number of students, for several years, has not increased,
but has diminished. Hence the condition of the institution
has become embarrassed" (1850, p. 47). Wayland continued
the point by reporting that not only might Brown exhaust its
funds if the failing system persisted, but also that the
institution would lose prestige if it did not alter its
educational philosophy. Given these problems, Wayland
suggested that two options of "relief" were open to the
college. The first was to continue what it was doing and
adjust the branches of learning available, but stay the
literary framework and fixed time. However, this would "do
nothing, or very little either to reduce the cost of tuition
or render it gratuitous. It would not, therefore, increase
the number of students" (p. 49). The second option would be
to meet the needs of the public.

As he continued developing his historical narrative,
Wayland (1850) illustrated that one of the reasons for
making education more practical and democratic was its
expedience (p. 57). I suggest this expediency supported and
developed Wayland's sense of prudence in temporal movement.
Again, to Wayland, American civilization was naturally advancing toward the useful arts. Past minds did not appreciate the practical arts, but the birth of practical industry called for practical knowledge. He revealed, "The time then would seem to have arrived, when our institutions of learning are called upon to place themselves in harmony with the advanced and rapidly advancing condition of society" (p. 59). Brown had to make the change or it would "suffer injury from one of the most hopeful indications of the progress of civilization" (p. 61). Again, Brown could not be economically self-reliant without the change.

I already mentioned the changes Wayland wanted to make at Brown and the general policy he advocated and thus apparently thought prudent. As he proposed his changes, he revealed one a glimpse of how he saw the possible future. He said, "The object of the change would be to adapt the institution to the wants, not of a class, but of the whole community" (1850, p. 53). This would relieve Brown's embarrassment by allowing the college to fend for itself:

[N]o other way can this result be arrived at, than by extending its advantages to every class of the community, and thus increasing the number of its pupils. The more it can do for itself, the less need...[for] friends...(p. 54).

Wayland, therefore, saw past educational systems as blunders to be re-worked. Wayland flooded the present with progressivism outside the academy, but stagnation within. The future, if the committee accepted Wayland's proposals, would help perpetuate Wayland's notion of prudence and thus
help sustain commercial individualism. Through a narrative voice, he weaved a tale aligned to the popular American mythos of the time. Antczak (1985) says that democratic urges often got help from frontier notions. He explains that "people of the time found the notion of the possibility for advancement increasingly credible, so much so that their belief eventually generalized to the characteristically American 'myth of the self-made man' and 'the doctrine of self-improvement'" (p. 26). Materialism amounted to an idealism; and, the "moral habits of self-determination" helped average citizens think in political terms. Wayland's narrative emphasized a prudential stance marked by moral, commercial individualism and a democratic mythos.

CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

In sum, Wayland's view of prudent policy was that Brown ought to extend the curriculum and allow the working classes to attend the institution. I suggest that the languages of individuality, self-reliance, and economic materialism were the linguistic idioms that actualized Wayland's sense of prudence. These idioms were traditions Wayland adhered to for dramatic effect. He used these idioms for the purpose of uplifting the practical classes of society—or individual citizens within those classes—in accordance with what he identified as universal laws.

Further, Wayland also made himself out to be the Jacksonian outsider through his often anti-classical sentiments and the recanting of his own moral causes. Not
unlike his political contemporaries, Wayland's was a rhetoric of identification. This was his argumentative structure. "The speaker had to be a sort of representative figure," says Antczak (1985), "—representative in the sense of being one with, one of the democratic audience, of course; but representative too of the discipline he wanted to popularize" (p. 9, his emphasis). In this case, Wayland wanted to popularize not rhetoric, but college education, and a mode of prudential conduct and discursive practice.

Though the work he crafted was a formalized report to Brown's corporation, it was, as Crane contends, an appeal to the public. To be sure, future pragmatist perpetuated his prudential outlook of democratic, commercial individualism, and his inventional framework. Noting the democratic idealism within the 1850 report, Crane (1962) states, "It was used by critics of the classics and became a weapon for politicians demanding radical changes in existing institutions that they might serve the 'practical' needs of laborers and farmers" (p. 67).

Considering the textual context, we can see that Wayland constructed a narrative in order to tap into popular mythos. To Antczak, the average citizen longed for education in order to live up to the ideal of materialism and self-determination. Wayland re-worked higher education as a utility to this end. This was his proposition. No longer was a college education about the sanctity of classical thought. Wayland's prudential outlook was that
Brown must democratize higher education in light of the story he narrated. Wayland's was the age of commercial individualism, and he gave terms of action to his audience through his rhetorical narrative.

Wayland seemed to have acquired much of the financial support he needed to inaugurate his new system before he published the report. Though the New England Baptists did not give funding, after Brown published the report the public rallied to Wayland's economic needs, and the corporation conceded. The Fall semester of 1850 saw Wayland's new scheme in action. There was a wide choice of courses, though the traditional classics remained. Brown promised a master's degree to students desiring to learn and complete their studies in the classics. The Bachelor of Arts offered elective options and only required one ancient language. The only course required of all students was Wayland's own in moral philosophy. According to Crane (1962), it was the only course required "since it treated of God's laws for human conduct, it was more important than purely intellectual studies" (p. 117). Wayland appointed two new professors in "practical" education. Brown welcomed non-degree seekers, especially their payments. What is of most importance, however, is that

Wayland's reforms involved not simply the introduction of elective studies, but, more significantly, the provision of a pattern of alternative degrees and educational opportunities for students who were not seeking any degree at all. Here, in a repudiation of the traditional curriculum which appears almost chaotic, was the ultimate expression of
the president's utilitarianism and educational democracy (Crane, p.118).

Typical of an administrator, Wayland was happy to see Brown's classrooms very full. The increase in number was dramatic. However, the major increase was in the demand for a classical education and the new master's degree. While Wayland thought it was his educational proposals that were ringing in the profits, Crane asserts that it was a new tide in American prosperity.

Even still, Brown was a successful institution for a while, but such controversies as dormitory supervision forced Wayland to oust professors and replace them with trusted alumni. Faculty morale grew low, especially in regards to Wayland's fee system of compensation. Wayland resigned in 1855. Brown elected Wayland a Fellow of the University, but he broke all ties with Brown in 1857 because the new president, Barnes Sears, for all intents and purposes dismantled Wayland's radical system. He did so, says Crane (1962), in order to gain respect with his colleagues around the country "who had viewed Brown's 'new system' primarily as an attack on the ancient languages" (p. 120).

Historically, Wayland and his 1850 report have many fans. For instance, Crane (1962) reveals that the democratic leanings and emphasis on a practical curriculum forecasted two of the major features of American colleges after the Civil War. William Green Roelker (1943) acclaimed
Wayland as the pioneer of the elective system. Butts (1939) ranks Wayland with Jefferson.

However, many educators responded to Wayland's rhetoric and his prudential way of thinking with harshness. Crane (1962), though giving Wayland some credit, explains that Wayland's progressive ideas "rudely interrupted the natural development of Brown University, though they were accompanied by a major addition to its funds" (p. 66). Harvard historian Samuel Eliot Morison (1936) thought that Wayland's philosophy did more "mischief" than any other reform notion in the history of American education. Bronson (1914) says that Wayland struggled between the objective of mass education and the objective of a sound Brown treasury. Wriston (1945) thinks that Wayland's report was "vitiated by a fatal confusion" (p. 30). More specifically,

It was framed with a view not only to educational reform but also to financial support. No program can have promotion as one of its essential elements and be educationally successful. It is not possible to make money by emphasis on 'high intellectual culture,' practical philosophy, or Christian ethics (cited in Crane, 1962, p. 68).

Wayland's contemporaries at Brown, like Sears, shared many of the above critical sentiments. Wayland's critics commented on the danger of placing the principles of supply and demand upon pedagogical culture.

Nevertheless, I contend that Wayland's prudential outlook and the way he enacted it through his rhetoric helped his persuasive effort. Wayland's prudential thought promoted the commercially viable, self-reliant individual as
the epitome of ideal Christian morality and as a model of the ideal democratic personality. I suggest that this aided his quest to democratize higher education in America not only because it helped perpetuate his own moral and economic codes, but also an American mythos he obviously embraced. It helped because he borrowed his prudence from an immensely popular public sentiment. While for the most part the faculty of Brown were ashamed by the report, as were others in the higher education scene, the general public, especially those in Rhode Island, seem to have rallied to Wayland's side (Crane, 1962).

Hence, we can say from Hall's (1980) perspective that perhaps the general public, or those advocating democratic notions, read the meaning that Wayland actually intended; this idea that democratic individualism was synonymous with commercial self-reliance and morality. However, we can say, too, that perhaps a negotiated reading led some in the culture to think in terms of democratic pedagogy, but also retort the supply and demand way of thinking. However, others might have read it not as a slogan for and from the democratic masses, but rather an attack on ancient languages. And I do not think that is really what Wayland intended. He was saying that classical courses, courses he had taught at Union College, simply needed to compete with more vocational studies. He wanted all the types of courses under the same roof to give students choice.
In short, I suggest that his prudential way of thinking hindered his efforts within the educational scene. His changes at Brown were short-lived, and scholars savoring the sacredness of classical education have consistently berated his appeals. Maybe Wayland wanted to antagonize conservative educators. If so, this clash gives credence to the successfulness of his effort for the future. While he made little lasting headway in his immediate arena, he became a martyr for his cause. Progressive voices still herald him as an educational savior and imitate his sense of prudence. Even J.B. Turner, though he did not discuss Wayland's proposal, certainly enlisted similar notions of American democratic individualism in his speech to a rural crowed in Illinois.
CHAPTER FIVE

JONATHAN BALDWIN TURNER AND HIS 1851
"PLAN FOR AN INDUSTRIAL UNIVERSITY"

INTRODUCTION

Jonathan Baldwin Turner was born on a farm in Massachusetts, December 7, 1805, and died on January 10, 1899. His father was an Army captain, and his grandfather a lieutenant. Turner was of English, French, and Norman origin. Turner was a strong, vigorous youth—a farm boy type. But he was smart as well. The practical knowledge he picked up here and there he taught to others. He also worked for neighbors when he was not needed at home.

Turner's family wanted him to stay home and not venture off to school like his older brother. When Turner was twenty-one his father gave him a deed to all the Turner property. However, Turner's brother, Asa, persuaded his father to allow Jonathan to enter Yale, as Asa himself had done. At Yale, Turner was appointed as an instructor of a gymnasium school connected with Yale, but Turner also took preparatory courses in order to enter Yale. When he finished his preparatory work, Turner entered the Classical Department at Yale. He took prizes in English composition and Greek. After the summer vacation of 1832, Turner returned to Yale, but things would soon change his educational process.

In 1833 Jeremiah Day personally suggested to Jonathan Turner that he journey to Illinois to teach at Illinois College in Jacksonville. Although Turner had not yet
graduated from Yale, Day promised to award him the degree if he went west before his graduation. Henry (1961) explains that "Turner's enlistment in Illinois education and the reasons for it had the quality of a volunteer for missionary duty" (p. vii). Turner was not the first Yale student or graduate to venture that way. The Presbyterians helped establish Illinois College and wanted Yale graduates to help develop the religious frontier through education. The number of Yale graduates in Illinois led to the formation of the "Yale Band," a group of seven. Included in the seven was Turner's older brother, Asa. These seven had organized, in 1829, "The Illinois Association" to promote learning and religion in the rural area through preaching and establishing a seminary of learning.

Turner, however, was unorthodox and did not strictly adhere to conservative doctrines. Turner dabbled in religion, politics, and education and was sort of a roaming "evangelist of ideas" (Henry, 1961, p. viii), but his unconventional stances brought him criticism. For instance, conservatives rebuked him when he attacked the views of his Presbyterian roots. Early on, he spoke against slavery before it was popular to do so. In the educational arena, he voiced the need for practical education for the working classes and the impracticality of a classical education for the yeoman agrarian and industrialist. He was so boisterous that he became the "center of public turmoil" in Illinois (p. viii). According to Henry, "Like Horace Mann, he used
every occasion he could find—teachers' meetings, sermons, county fairs—to awaken the people to a greater interest in their schools and in how to advance their welfare" (p. ix). Edmund James, president of Illinois College, called him "A prophet of democracy in the western country" (cited in Henry, p. ix). Even so, in 1848, the Presbyterians forced Turner to abandon his post at Illinois College. Turner, then, returned to the love of his youth, agriculture. Instead of going back to his Massachusetts homestead, however, he remained in Illinois.

While he was advancing agricultural products like the Osage Orange, which made it possible to fence the prairie, Turner also lectured both in and out of Illinois on the social and practical advancement of the "working class." He became associated with the movement for the creation of an industrial university in Illinois, and through the 1850's was the principal lobbyist for the Illinois Industrial League. He gave several speeches very similar in nature. One speech Turner delivered to a convention in Granville, November 18, 1851, best captured his prudential outlook, his view of reality, and what he saw as the plight of the laboring classes.

When he taught, Turner was a teacher in the humanities, specializing in rhetoric, Latin, and Greek. According to Henry (1961), Turner most usually offered "purple passages" and a "grand manner" of speaking characteristic of early nineteenth century oratory (p. xi). This is true, but
perhaps he needed to maneuver around his classical training for this speech. I suggest that Turner faced two general exigencies. First, he had to promote a pedagogical plan that brought the rural crowd into the fold; he had to convince them that it was prudent for a farmer to have a college or university education. Second, in light of his classical training, he had to identify with his rural audience.

In the first section of this chapter, I will describe Turner's speech. Second, I will interpret the notion of prudence he developed rhetorically. In the third section I will examine the speech's textual context in order to more fully understand the sense of prudence Turner advanced through textual time. Finally, I will explain how Turner's prudential outlook aided his persuasive effort.

SUMMARY

Turner's speech was about the proposition to devise an Industrial University in the state of Illinois. Turner's arguments for a new university took shape through several different sections. He first discussed what he interpreted as the "want" of the industrial classes and how they could themselves supply it. Then he moved to offer his arguments for practical education by contrasting practical education with a classical education. Finally, he spoke of funding and administering the would-be industrial college.

As Turner began his speech, he established what he saw as a natural relationship between the professional class and
the industrial class. This class division was necessary, but the industrial class had, heretofore, received the short end of the stick in regard to education. The professional classes had their specific schools, curriculums, textbooks, teachers, but civilized society had not yet afforded the working classes with a unique and appropriate educational system. Turner believed the working classes desired their own educational niche.

To Turner, existing institutions could not offer such an education. There needed to be parallel educational schemes that correlated to the opposite destinies of the two classes. Through a new education system, Turner wanted to supply the working classes with a different, practical pedagogical process that might bring them higher social standing.

As Turner continued his speech, he insisted that progressive efforts should not focus on primary education. Education, like water, flowed downhill. Moreover, he argued that a National Institute of Science should exist to help coordinate industrial universities in each class with other schools like lyceums and high schools. Turner wanted a federal eye on the ball.

Turner's plan also focused on specific, practical principles. For instance, he urged that any industrial university must have several appropriate buildings. He also thought that instruction should cover the "anatomy and physiology, the nature" (1851, p. 73) of almost every living
animal, bird, insect and plant under the sun. Turner suggested that the university should instruct students on the nature of soils, on the nature of manufacturing, on the "political, financial, domestic, and manual economy...to all industrial processes..." (p. 73). Even further, the model industrial university would to teach law, the theory and art of government, the laws of vicinage, health, trade, commerce, ethics, and accounting. In short, Turner desired the institution to teach

...all those studies and sciences, of whatever sort, which tend to throw light upon any art or employment which any student may desire to master, or upon any duty he may be called to perform, or which may tend to secure his moral, civil, social, and industrial perfections as a man (p. 73)

Apparently, Turner wanted nothing left out.

He suggested, too, that professors ought to hold annual experiments. In order to accomplish these experiments, the institution required plentiful resources like appropriate grounds and collections of vegetation. Turner insisted that there should also be a number of buildings to secure a successful experimentation process and a shed to keep tools in. When the experiments started producing results the state would create a patent office to register inventions. Additionally, any industrial education would have an industrial library with practical literature. Students would come from any class and stay at the institution for any length of time they were willing to pay for, either in money or necessary work on the grounds. Even more, Turner
envisioned an annual fair during which students showcased their efforts and professors lectured.

Turner then moved to ideas about how to handle the administration and funding of his hypothetical, practical institution. He thought a fund already existing for the purpose of creating a college would do the trick. Illinois designed the fund to give a college to the "people." And the administration of such a college would be in the hands of the "people." He wanted the Governor to nominate a board of five to look after the funds. The Senate would confirm the nominations. If any members of the board were "sinister" the people could impeach them.

PRUDENCE IN THE TEXT

I suggest that Turner's prudential sense of appropriate pedagogical policy was that the yeoman agrarians ought to have their own educational scheme. We can recall that Jasinski (1997) thinks a performative tradition exists in and through certain linguistic idioms, particular speaking voices, figurative and argumentative patterns, and future generic conventions. The idea of prudence that emerged in Turner's discourse primarily existed in and through the language of myth. Turner became a representative hero of that myth not only because he bought into the mythic cause, but because he shed his classical identity. The myth took shape in the metonymic structure of his argument and the anti-intellectualism Turner professed. This tradition, more or less, was perpetuated by other rhetors, especially in the
late nineteenth century during the agrarian revolts, to enliven agrarian ideals through the story.

Metonymy

The essence of metonymy is that it reduces substantive reality to a word or phrase. Hart (1997) says that metonymy refers to "using the name of one thing as the name for something else to which it has a logical relationship" (p. 151). This stylistic device functions to generate a new association among ideas. Similarly, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) say that metonymy provides a spotlight on the intellectual focus of a rhetorical effort. It calls attention to a single feature. The example Hart (1997) uses is the phrase, "Saddam Hussein marched into Kuwait" (p. 151), which reduces the Iraqi military to a single villain. This reduction, however, can be dangerous. Burke (1950) thinks that a metonymic reduction does not capture the essence or substance of reality. Leff (1989) thinks that this stylistic device does not consider "the motives and interests that inform the substance of human behavior..." (p. 120). To Leff, this type of logic reduces "all human action to naturalistic correlations, to mere processes..." (p. 120). Echoing Burke and Leff, Madsen (1993) states, "A mytonymic construction of an event would be a misrepresentation or deflection of the essence of the event" (p. 210).

Turner's speech reduced social reality to what he called a non-antagonistical relationship between the so-
called professional class and the working class. While this mytonymic structure of social reality maybe mis-represented the existing substance of Turner's external reality, this social organization gave potentiality to the prudential action he advocated. We can see the logic advancing throughout his speech as he compared and contrasted the destinies of the two classes of people.

In the introduction of his "plan," Turner (1851) proposed his metonymic view of reality:

All civilized society is, necessarily, divided into two distinct cooperative, not antagonistic, classes; a small class, whose proper business it is to teach the true principle of religion, law, medicine, science, art, and literature; and a much larger class, who are engaged in some form of labor in agriculture, commerce, and the arts (p. 69).

He called one class the "professional" class and the other the "industrial" class. Society needed very few people in the professional class, but Turner implied that a seducing professional siren often snatched up individuals not suited for that class. While Turner concluded that the professionals were unique, he also seemed heartened by the number and preponderance of workers.

To Turner, it was problematic for a "worker" to become a "professional." The life of each class was the antithesis to the other. From Turner's perspective, if fate had one picked for farming, it would be ridiculous to combat that destiny. A "farmer at birth" had to embrace the practical life and long for a practical education, not a classical one. "How absurd would it seem," Turner (1851) mused, "to
set a clergyman to plowing and studying the depredations of blights, insects, the growing of crops, etc., in order to give him habits of thought and mental discipline for the pulpit..." (p. 81). A person destined for a practical art would learn "all that God has made, and all that human art has done" (p. 81).

Like Wayland, Turner believed that the existing pedagogical system needed to radically change, but Turner was much more revolutionary than Wayland. The professional classes had their liberal education. They had enough literature to "well-nigh sink a whole navy of ships" (1851, p. 70). The industrial class, however, had no schools, university, professors, or apparatus. As Turner revealed, "In other words, society has become, long since, wise enough to know that its teachers need to be educated; but it has not yet become wise enough to know that its workers need education just as much" (p. 70, his emphasis).

True, teachers offered rudiments of a practical education in the early schooling years, but that education was not nearly enough for Turner. While the classicists, like Wayland, had invited the industrialists to higher education, Turner thought that the process "set by some of our older professional institutions [was to] keep the rising and blazing thought of the industrial masses from burning too furiously" (1851, p. 70). Turner insisted, "They [professionalists] have hauled a canoe alongside of their huge professional steamships and invited all the farmers and
mechanics of the State to jump on board and sail with them..." (p. 70). Turner admitted that the professionals might have had their hearts in the right place, but they did not know how to "save," as Turner put it, the workers. The workers needed to "save" themselves.

Therefore, Turner (1851) wanted to generate a totally new scheme of industrial education. His idea was that no existing institution could supply effective practical pedagogy. Those colleges could not escape their professional, literary design. "Their whole spirit or aim is literary and intellectual—not practical and industrial; to make men of books and ready speech—not men of work, and industrial, silent thought" (p. 71). Again, one should not attempt to tempt fate:

But the very best classical scholars are often the very worst practical reasoners; and that they should be made workers is contrary to the nature of things, the fixed laws of God. The whole interest, business, and destiny for life of the two classes run in opposite lines; and that the same course of study should be equally well adapted to both is as utterly impossible as that the same pursuits and habits should equally concern and benefit both classes (pp. 71-72).

Thus, the working class needed its own "system of liberal education...adapted to their own pursuits; to create for them an industrial literature, adapted to their professional institutes" (p. 72, his emphasis). Why? Turner thought this should "elevate them, their pursuits, and their posterity to that relative position in human society for which God designed them" (p. 72).
The metonymic logic that marks Turner's prudential outlook was similar to the prudential thinking of John C. Calhoun. This suggests that this basic prudential perspective already existed discursively in the rhetorical and political culture of the day. Calhoun also argued that civilized society must, necessarily, divide itself between a working and professional class. To Hofstadter (1970), Calhoun wanted division of labor adapted to the needs of the particular geographical sections of the United States. Calhoun thought the North had wage labor, the West the farmer, and the South, slavery. To Calhoun, all were correct divisions. Turner was talking only of the western farmer and mechanic. My point is that Turner used a marker of societal organization perhaps most popularly promoted by Calhoun. Calhoun, and other rhetors, established it in the oratorical culture of the day. Unlike Calhoun, however, Turner wanted to upset the roles.

Hence, Turner's idea of prudence depended on this metonymic way of structuring society, but from a particular slant. Turner seemingly believed in a natural aristocracy much like Thomas Jefferson did. Marmor (1988) insists that Jefferson thought an American aristocracy would spring from "more distant and humble counties of the nation" (p. 6). They would not be aristocratic in birth, but in humble hard-work and self-reliance. Jefferson thought that the best suited to lead were the simple people. Jefferson expected that the members of this natural aristocracy would "emerge
from the farm houses of yeoman America, not the Federalist drawing rooms of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston" (Marmor, p. 15). Calhoun was born into this idea and perpetuated it, but, as Hofstader (1970) observes, he too rigidly perceived the dichotomy. Calhoun's contemporary, Turner, did not.

Thus, not only did Turner's logic generate a natural dichotomy in line with the tradition popularized by Calhoun, but hearkened back to the Jeffersonian ideal of a new, natural aristocracy tempered by simplicity and agrarian values. According to Turner (1851), the workers would rise up and form their own aristocracy. Americans had to produce a nobility with the leisure and means for agricultural experimentation. For Turner, this nobility would come "from our own ranks, to aid and serve, not to domineer over and control us" (p. 77). There was no rise to such a level without the hierarchy Turner built through his metonymic logic. There was no natural aristocracy without a non-aristocracy. Turner's notion of prudence depended on this metonymic structure.

In short, Turner established a way of thinking and acting prudently using a metonymic logic that reduced reality to a struggle between two natural classes of people. In this, Turner resonated the popular sentiments of Calhoun, one of the most prolific rhetoricians of Turner's era. I contend that Turner used that tradition, but stepped back to adhere to the Jeffersonian ideal of a natural aristocracy.
This yeoman aristocracy was also dependent upon the metonymic logic on which Turner relied.

**Anti-Intellectualism**

Hart (1997) says that rhetoric often reduces evil to a scapegoat, "a person, group, or idea treated as the incarnation of evil" (p. 270). A rhetor can scapegoat something else. Burke calls this victimage. A rhetor might scapegoat him or herself. Burke calls this mortification. "In either case," Hart asserts, "rhetoric cleanses the soul of sin and provides new 'attitudes' for use in daily decision-making" (p. 271). When looking for processes of scapegoating, Hart suggests one ought to consider how strong or overt the scapegoating is, where the scapegoat resides, if the scapegoat resides in another person or group, and why that person or group is being victimized. As mentioned, I suggest that the language of anti-intellectualism was another aspect of Turner's prudential representation. He used anti-intellectual sentiments to overtly scapegoat the professional class and classical education, and his own background.

Turner revealed, in part, his anti-intellectual sentiment when he asserted that classical education did not necessarily have all there was to say about mental and moral discipline. With a sarcastic tone, Turner (1851) admitted that he trembled "at the thought of being arraigned before the tribunal of all the monks and ecclesiastics of the Old World, and no small number of their progeny in the New" (p. 140).
79) for advancing practical education. Sure, classicists should become fine writers and talkers and, therefore, learn the dead and living languages, but "it has become quite doubtful whether, even in their case, such a course is most beneficial..." (p. 79). While mental discipline did arrive for these literary types through daily course of study, it only hindered their teaching effort. Turner thought that a "classical teacher who has no original, spontaneous power of thought, and knows nothing but Latin and Greek, however perfectly, is enough to stultify a whole generation of boys and make them all pedantic fools like himself" (p. 80).

Turner (1851) also believed that there was just too much talk and too many "purple passages." "This chronic diarrhoea of exhortation, while the social atmosphere of the age tends to engender, tends far less to public health than many suppose" (p. 80). Turner promoted an idea of mental and moral discipline--a conceptualization of prudence--that came from daily practice of simple farming. To Turner, "The history of the Quakers shows that more sound sense, a purer morality, and more elevated practical piety can exist, and does exist, entirely without it [classical education], than is commonly found with it" (p. 80). Thus, the practice of "sophistical cant" and "verbose declamation" had too much power over "obvious facts" (p. 81).

There was no way for a classicist to teach a person suited for a life in agriculture:

It may do for the man of books to plunge at once amid the catacombs of buried nations and languages, to soar
away to Greece and Rome, or Nova Zembla, Kamchatka, and the fixed stars, before he knows how to plant his own beans, or harness his own horse, or can tell whether the functions of his own body are performed by a heart, stomach, and lungs, or with a gizzard or gills (Turner, 1851, p. 80).

Common people had to rise and generate a new pedagogical process, "unless, indeed, the pedantic professional trifles of one man in a thousand are of more consequence than the daily vital interests of all the rest of mankind" (p. 82).

According to Burke, hierarchy helps generate obedience and communication, but one cannot obey everything since humans are imperfect. Thus, this imperfection feeds guilt, or pollution, into human language systems. When individuals recognize guilt, both victimage and mortification occur. The catharsis or purification comes through victimage and/or mortification, and leads to a state of stasis, or redemption. The rhetor is a new self. Thus, on one level, by evoking sentiments of anti-intellectualism Turner was renewing himself by wringing himself away from his own educational background that he perceived as out of date. He was building, through his rhetoric, an agrarian character for himself and this discursive gesture encompassed his notion of prudence. Also, still working within his metonymic logic, Turner used his own elite style to make fun of it and treated classical studies, and the class that promoted it, as the incarnation of societal evil. This also helped develop the sense of prudential action he advocated.

Additionally, Turner's anti-intellectualism associated him with the same feeling popular in the oratorical culture
of his day. I classify his anti-intellectual sentiment as a characteristic of what Cmiel (1990) calls a middling style of rhetorical discourse. We can recall that this middling style mixed the literary eloquent with the uneducated raw. Because literary education was so powerful in the early part of the nineteenth century, rhetoricians, to sway the common populace, had to escape the chains of refined speech, as I mentioned. Again, Cmiel identifies several basic characteristics of this effort, including intrusive informality, calculated bluntness, jargon and euphemism. Cmiel thinks that the invention of this middling style provoked a "war over the soul of American life" (p. 66). There existed a battle between the refined style and the raw. Turner's speech was a microcosm of this war. Along with his refined speech spawning from his classical training, he used calculated bluntness and euphemism, and at points great informality, to, again, scapegoat his own educational background, literary studies, and the class that employed it.

During the same period, mid-nineteenth century romanticism helped offer a Saxon eloquence, or a humble style of speech. In several cases, Turner (1851) disclaimed his plan. For instance, when presenting his points he said, "[A]nd let them pass for whatever the true friends of the cause may think them worth" (p. 71). When he described his plan of administration, he revealed, in his humble style, that if someone had a better idea then he would "cheerfully
accord with it" (p. 84). Turner used an often adorned style to promote an unadorned, simple attitude and new, simple, unadorned hierarchy. This was a representation of appropriate political action and discursive practice.

**Myth**

Myths are "the substance of culture" (Hart, 1997, p. 242). A culture's dominant myths hold "...a society's collectivity of persistent values, handed down from generation to generation, that help to make the world understandable, support the social order, and educate the society's young" (Rushing & Frentz, 1978, p. 67). Robertson (1980) says, "Myths are self-justifying. Because they often carry social ideals, the people who use them and participate in them assume that the ideals justify the past out of which these ideals came" (p. 19). A myth can rationalize decision making. A myth can hold the seeds of prudence, but Burke (1947) sees a difference between political ideology and myth. Myth drifts to the side of image, but ideology drifts to the side of ideas, though image and ideology obviously bleed into one another. Burke sees myth as a non-political first principle of the political; it is pre-political. As Braden (1983) puts it, "[M]yth provides an effective means of establishing identification or consubstantiality. When the speaker activates the myth, listeners develop feelings of kinship or oneness with him" (p. 74). When a speaker activates a myth through speech, that invigorates the pre-political narrative, the society that embraces it, and the
individuals that participate in that society and story. One of the most important markers of Turner's conception of prudence was his activation, dependence and perpetuation of mythic agrarianism. With it, he helped energize a specific audience identity.

This agrarian myth was a story of the yeoman farmer and his sacred tie to land. Hofstadter (1955) describes part of the myth: "Because he [the yeoman farmer] lived in close communion with beneficent nature, his life was believed to have a wholesomeness and integrity impossible for the depraved populations of cities" (p.24-25). Burkholder (1989) describes several themes of the myth often used in nineteenth century populist rhetoric. Four of the themes are important for my purposes here. First, small landowners were archetypal citizens. As Burkholder puts it, "Self-sufficient and economically independent, yeomen farmers were the foundation of democratic society" (p. 294). Second, agriculture was uniquely important to society and called for governmental protection. Third, America was the "garden of the world" and "[f]orces outside the garden, in other countries and in the American east, were suspect and probably evil" (p. 294). Finally, nature was beneficent and honest labor reaped its bounty.

There were several instances that indicate that the yeoman agrarian was the ideal citizen to Turner, but this was perhaps best illustrated when he discussed what kind of
student ought to attend, and who should control his propositional university. Turner (1851) said that

A man of real skill is amazed at the slovenly ignorance and waste he everywhere discovers on all parts of their premises, and still more to hear them boast of their ignorance of all 'book farming,' and maintain that 'their children can do as well as they have done'; and it certainly would be a great pity if they could not (p. 78).

Turner wanted to tap into the mythical possibilities of the situation, but also wanted to refute the often unfriendly response some farmers gave to scientific agricultural education. Turner wanted students amazed at the ignorance and waste and wanting to change that tide. "The man whose highest conception of earthly bliss is a log hut in an uninclosed yard," Turner announced, "where pigs of two species are allowed equal rights, unless the four-legged tribe chance to get the upper hand, will be found no patron of industrial universities" (p. 78). Turner would cast a certain type of yeoman in his mythic drama.

He also thought that another class of untaught farmers was not right for his school. These were the farmers schooled in management of capital and labor, not in the actual labor. As Turner (1851) put it, "[D]eprive them of these [their management skills], and confine them to the varied culture of a small farm, and they would starve in five years, where a true farmer would amass a small fortune" (p. 78). It was the self-reliant, independent farmer Turner praised.
Turner (1851) also suggested that these true farmers were democratic exemplars, as he desired to place control of the university in their hands. When he pondered the question of administration of the would-be institution he said that

...without hesitation and without fear, that this whole interest should, from the first, be placed directly in the hands of the people, and the whole people, without any mediators or advisers, legislative or ecclesiastical, save only their own appointed agents, and their own jurors and courts of justice, to which, of course, all alike must submit (p. 82).

Turner meant the agrarian yeoman when he used the term "people." If a board member did to take into constant consideration the "interest of properly and worthily educating all the sons of her [the state's] soil," then the people would "set on such a man, if the miscreant wretch lives, for all future time, a mark as much blacker than the mark set on Cain as midnight is darker than noonday" (p. 83).

Another mythic theme Turner articulated was that, in light of the above illustrations, government would have a direct hand in the protection and progression of the agrarian ideal:

The fund given to this State by the general government, expressly for this purpose, is amply sufficient, without a dollar from any other source; and it is a mean if not an illegal perversion of this fund to use it for any other purpose. It was given to the people, the whole people, of this State—not for a class, a party, or sect, or conglomeration of sects...(Turner, 1851, p. 82).

This idea of using educational funding for the "people," or for yeoman farmers and industrialists, was very important to
Turner because governmental funding and endless promotion of professional and classical education was the "inevitable result of trying to crowd all liberal practical education into one narrow sphere of life" (p. 79). If government would fund an agricultural and industrial university these yeoman heroes would not be as they were "starving scavengers," but "honored members" of the mythic yeoman class.

Turner also said that Illinois lost financial resources because of farming ignorance; thus he again tied agriculture to government. Using an economic argument woven within his mythic proclamation, Turner suggested that "in a few years the entire cost of the whole institution would be annually saved to the State in the above interests alone, aside from all its other benefits..." (p. 75).

Turner also illustrated the theme of the garden and the theme of honest labor. He weaved a lush tale of his school as an agrarian utopia managed through diligent labor. Smith (1950) says that the "image of this vast and constantly growing agricultural society in the interior of the continent became one of the dominant symbols of the nineteenth-century" (p. 123). Turner tapped into this symbolism. It is my conjecture that while part of his plan included necessary "garden speak," he embellished the symbol, especially the associated "labor" symbol, for rhetorical purposes. Even if he did not mean to, the symbolism still existed. "The master symbol of the garden,"
Smith explains, "embraced a cluster of metaphors expressing fecundity, growth, increase, and blissful labor in the earth, all centering about the heroic figure of the idealized frontier farmer armed with that supreme agrarian weapon, the sacred plow" (p. 123).

Turner went back and forth between his recanting of labor and the fruits it brought. For instance, early in his plan he illustrated the importance of annual experiments. Turner (1851) revealed specific examples for each department, but his point was that every professor labor not only to expand existing practical knowledge, but also because the "most natural and effectual mental discipline possible for any man arises from setting him to earnest and constant thought about things he daily does, sees, and handles...to make them thinking laborers...(p. 80, his emphasis).

As for those needing "at this late hour" to write the textbooks, professors would "...be men of the most eminent, practical ability in their several departments...or all the peculiar benefits of the system would be lost" (Turner, 1850,p. 76). Professors would not only preach, but practice what they did. In Turner's program, the professors would give lectures in the colder months of the year so that they, and their students, could labor during the warmer months.

The students would come from any class and stay at the institution for any length of time they were willing to pay for, either in money or labor. Moreover, "[a]mong those who
labor, medals and testimonials of merit should be given to those who perform their tasks with the most promptitude, energy, care, and skill" (Turner, 1851, p. 76). In the process of reward, Turner would "let the law of nature, instead of the law of rakes and dandies, be regarded, and the true impression ever made on the mind of all around, that work alone is honorable, and indolence certain disgrace, if not ruin" (p. 76, his emphasis).

Turner used lush symbolism when he revealed the garden resources required for the labor of the university. There was, for instance, a direct cluster between labor and the garden. On his institution, Turner (1851) would have "a botanical and common garden...orchards and fruit-yards...lawns and promenades, in which the beautiful art of landscape-gardening could be appropriately applied and illustrated..." (p. 75). Furthermore, Turner desired to maintain "...all varieties of pasture, meadow, and tillage needful for the successful prosecution of the needful annual experiments" (p. 75). On these symbolic grounds, Turner wanted samples of "every variety of domestic animal, and of every tree, plant, and vegetable that can minister to the health, wealth, or taste and comfort of the people..." (p. 75).

The myth of the garden and the farmer as its archetypal hero was a mainstay as a performative tradition. Walt Whitman called the West and its farmers "the real genuine America" (cited in Smith, 1950, p. 124). Ben
Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, and many other popular writers of that day, helped this notion along. Franklin theorized a society based in the agrarian mythos. In the late 1780's Franklin declared agriculture as the business of America (Smith, p. 125). Likewise, Jefferson contended, "Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever He had a chosen people, whose breasts He has made His peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue" (cited in Edwards, 1976, p. 23). Smith (1950) says of Jefferson, "He saw the cultivator of the earth, the husbandman who tilled his own acres, as the rock upon which the American republic must stand" (p. 128). Jefferson used his agrarian ideal for political endeavors like the Northwest Ordinance that opened the trans-Allegheny and eventually admitted new Western states, he arranged a plan for the country to give out public lands to individual owners, and he achieved the Louisiana Purchase, not to mention his educational experiment at the University of Virginia.

The discursive assertions and political actions of Jefferson were also simply part of a rich fabric of ideas and attitudes living within the rhetorical culture of his era. Eisinger (1947) finds several themes of agrarianism in the late eighteenth century by pursuing the writings of the time:

[A]griculture is the only source of real wealth; that every man has a natural right to land; that labor expended in cultivating the earth confers a valid title to it; that the ownership of land, by making the farmer
independent, gives him social status and dignity, while constant contact with nature in the course of his labors makes him virtuous and happy; that America offers a unique example of society embodying these traits; and, as a general inference from all the propositions, that government should be dedicated to the interests of the freehold farmer (cited in Smith, 1950, p. 126).

Thus, early on in American history the farmer was a republican symbol. This symbolism continued throughout the early part of the nineteenth century along with westward settlement.

However, by 1830, Smith (1950) contends, there were two conflicting views of agrarianism. Smith says that "each of these new agrarianisms found expression in imaginative and symbolic terms: that of the South in a pastoral literature of the plantation, that of the Northwest in the myth of the garden of the world with the idealized Western yeoman as its focal point" (p. 133). Turner continued the tradition of Jefferson. Calhoun took the Southern perspective. While for Calhoun the laboring class were the slaves, for Turner they were the heroic yeoman farmers. During the middle part of the century, as Smith puts it, the mythic agrarian yeoman was the "darling of poets and social theorists....[the yeoman symbol] is one of the most tangible things we mean when we speak of the development of democratic ideas in the United States" (p. 135). Turner assimilated the myth in his speech. It became a resource for his prudential point of view both as a mode of political action and discursive possibility.
TURNER'S TEXTUAL CONTEXT

As mentioned above, myth is a story, a narrative, and therefore a type of narrative strategy. Not only does the myth, once activated by a rhetor, provide identification and a heightened sense of community (Hart, 1997), but the form of the myth gives direction to human action. Many "identity myths" plot out the narrative course of the myth's hero. According to Rushing (1989a), "In a truly transcendent myth, although the hero may be from a particular culture and thus appear in a time and space-bound guise, his or her message will be universal" (p. 35). Specifically, the hero usually has an extraordinary, but modest birth, proves early superhuman strength, rises to distinction and authority, and gains great victories over forces of evil. In essence, Turner asked his audience members to rise up and become heroic; and he did it through the mythic context he weaved. Like the textual context of Wayland's report, Turner also fictionalized a figurative sentiment popular in the culture of his day in order to further develop the educational policy he thought was prudent. The use of metonymy, anti-intellectualism, and myth helped generate the narrative he weaved.

Turner recounted a past controlled by "pedantic fools." "Ancient worthies," generated only confusion by focusing not on the simple facts in front of them, but on abstract theories. As Turner (1851) put it,

I think the exclusive and extravagant claims set up for ancient lore, as a means of disciplining the reasoning
powers, simply ridiculous when examined in the light of those ancient worthies who produced that literature...If it produces infallible practical reasoners, we have a great many thousand infallible antagonistic truths, and ten thousand conflicting paths of right, interest, duty, and salvation (p. 80).

He continued to scapegoat the classicists by aligning them with these so-called "ancient worthies." He called classical education an "evasive discipline" which had given power to "sophistical cant" and "stereotyped nonsense," instead of the "obvious facts" (p. 80). To Turner "verbose declamation" would hold sway over the educational schemes of the country until "any man will just be at the trouble to open his eyes and his ears" to sense the garden of the world. Even so, this ancient invention and diffusion of confusion continued as the classically trained mind perpetuated the ideals of the ancients.

Thus, Turner saw the present as dominated by a caste system controlled by the professional classicists, and he saw his time as ripe for a heroic class rebellion. If the industrial classes would rise up, then an implicit American caste system would fall. This was a foundational goal of his scapegoating strategy and why he put the agrarian audience in narrative action. Still relying on his metonymic logic, Turner (1851) argued that America's elite educationalists, though not aristocratic in the European sense, had nevertheless helped develop a "caste education, legislation, and literature" (p. 78). The caste participants would only desire to perfect the hierarchy unless a competing discourse upset the perfection:
If any one class provide for their own liberal education in the State, as they should do, while another class neglect his, it is as inevitable as the law of gravitation that they should form a ruling caste or class by themselves, and wield their power more or less for their own exclusive interests, and the interests of their friends (p. 78).

The country's leaders had neglected industrial and agricultural education. This left the working classes in the dark "while the professions have been studied till trifles and fooleries have been magnified into matters of immense importance, and tornadoes of windy words and barrels of innocent ink shed over them in vain" (p. 79).

Most of Turner's speech was about the future. It was a plan of what could be. It was a deliberating proposal in the language of a ceremonial celebration of the mythic agrarians and their future utopia close in the distance. The idea for the future Turner created was that his plan, or one like it, would come to fruition. As such, Turner was a prophetic voice singing a truism for the future. For instance, Turner closed his remarks by illustrating the crux of the historical moment and the eventuality of the proposition:

Others may feel a little alarm when, for the first time in the history of the world, they see the millions throwing themselves aloof from all political and ecclesiastical control, and attempting to devise a system of liberal education for themselves; but, on mature reflection, we trust they will approve the plan—or, if they are too old to change, their children will (1851, p. 85).

This plan, like a farmer's life, was fated. It was the fixed law of God that the people would design this
university. To not adhere to the plan, or the general jest of it, would be to kill the drama he has depicted.

Rushing (1986) sees myth as an unfolding drama. If that is so, than Burke's dramatistic pentad is useful in understanding the motivation of the myth. Burke (1969) insists, "...any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of answer to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he [or she] did it (agency), and why (purpose)" (p. xv). Thus, this perspective affords us a crisp way of looking at Turner's vision of the future. From this perspective, Turner's story was that the agrarian farmer and industrialist (agent), living within a caste-system controlled by classically learned professionals (scene) would re-do the American caste-system (act), with the aid of practical education (agency), in order to promote an educational order aloof from political and ecclesiastical control (purpose).

The ratios are interesting too. Foss (1989) suggests, "A ratio is a pairing of two of the elements in a pentad in order to discover the relationship between them and the effect that each has on the other" (p. 339). Some terms, if emphasized, will shadow others. The agent dominated Turner's symbolic story. The agent, when in conjunction with the other elements of Burke's scheme, and in light of Turner's metonymic logic, scapegoating, and mythic sentiments, became the central figure of his effort. Turner centered on the
character of the yeoman agrarian and industrialist. Further, the disposition of the yeoman, laden with symbolism of purity, simplicity, honorable labor, and fate, made the pedagogical plan he advanced pure, simple, honorable, and fated--both the yeoman agrarian and his pedagogical institution would illustrate an ideal conceptualization of prudence. The character of the yeoman would rise despite the scene.

Smith (1950) asserts, "The Western yeoman had become a symbol which could be made to bear an almost unlimited charge of meaning, [and] it had strong overtones of patriotism..." (p. 135). While Turner perpetuated the traditional ideals of the agrarian cause, he also continued a notion of beating the odds. He rendered the yeoman agrarian as a type of Jacksonian individualist. Again, this type of individualism flowed within the linguistic wave of mid-nineteenth century oratorical culture. Turner's prudential framework helped him generate the mythic context that potentially incited the audience to act it out.

CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

In sum, I have argued that Turner's prudential claim about action was that the yeoman agrarians should invent their own educational scheme. Turner discursively defined and refined this claim through aesthetics of metonymy, anti-intellectualism, and, of course, the agrarian myth and the symbolic reservoir of the yeoman agrarian. The metonymic logic afforded him the opportunity to perpetuate a perceived
political chasm between the working class and the professional class. This lent credence to the agrarian myth and the narrative he told. I suggest that Turner used anti-intellectual sentiments to make himself out to be a representative hero of the agrarian myth. He enacted his own verbal mortification and he poked fun at his own training in order to become a voice for the agrarian. The language and themes of the agrarian myth grew out of a long symbolic lineage, and the democratic republicanism and Jacksonian individualism of Turner’s era.

In the process of generating a symbolic reality, I have suggested that Turner was asking his audience to live out the agrarian myth he told, and take it to its telos. He wanted his audience to live out a popular and sacred fable that, at that time, represented the process of democracy. And though the myth was mainly a fable for the voices of power, the mass populace, too, seemed to have enjoyed the story.

Turner’s notion of prudence was itself an imitation of past conceptualization of prudence, but this mythic tradition, though worse for wear, still exists today. However, especially in the mid-nineteenth century, this type of prudential thinking found declamation in the continued move for federal support for agricultural and mechanical education.

There has been much deliberation as to Turner’s role in the congressional bill passed in 1862. For the most part,
historians have given Morrill credit as the sole author of Land Grant Act. Many Land Grant universities have even heroically memorialized Morrill by having campus buildings named after him. The real question is what role did the sense of prudence and the rhetoric of Turner play in Morrill's invention processes. Did he imitate them at all? While Morrill offered his own slant on the myth, he also perpetuated Turner's idea of prudence. Turner's prudential thought and his speech were important stepping-stones toward the ultimate goal of federal support for agricultural and industrial colleges. Thus, I suggest that Turner's sense of prudence certainly added his persuasive art. Even though he inhibited a fusion of vocational, practical education with classical education, his audacity brought success in so much that Morrill, and others, apparently interpreted his policy and rhetoric as prudent.

Morrill submitted an initial resolution on the topic of agricultural colleges during the first session of the thirty-fourth Congress, February 28, 1856, but Mr. Keitt of South Carolina rejected it. Even so, and all the while, Turner had been trying to enact his plan. The United States Agricultural Society met in Washington in 1856 and again in 1857 to address Turner's ideas. Morrill was the Vermont delegate to both meetings. Though the records indicate that Morrill did not make any statements, True (1929) argues that...

...it seems probable that Mr. Morrill knew about Turner's proposition even if he took no part in discussing it. Something must have happened which led Mr. Morrill to bring forward a bill differing
materially in its purpose from that indicated in his resolution..." (p. 98).

After Keitt rejected his first resolution, Morrill went back to the drawing board. What he came up with closely resembled what Turner desired. Morrill's bill emanated out of Turner's basic plan. Granted, Morrill's proposal was not an exact duplicate of Turner's plan. Nevertheless, the wording of the speeches which Morrill delivered to promote his proposals had a rhetorical and prudential lineage illustrated through Turner's message. "Morrill's measure," True admits, "was in fact the culmination of the long movement for agricultural and technical schools...and it is altogether likely that Morrill derived the ideas incorporated in the bill from various sources connected with that movement" (p. 99).

Again, it would appear that Turner's prudential framework aided his rhetorical effort. He reduced reality to a canonical mythic struggle between the heroic, thinking yeoman, who could do little wrong, and the classical elite, who could do little right. He celebrated the audience's story while invigorating the agrarian and industrial community and his own mythic, agrarian character. Through his rhetoric he revealed himself as a prophet of the cause calling his troops in for the hierarchical upset. Moreover, and as Darsey (1997) notes, "The prophetic life as presented by the prophet and his disciples becomes it own rhetoric..." (p. 34). Ironically perhaps, Turner wanted his audience to follow him in being a deeply educated and thinking anti-
intellectual. In final analysis, then, while Wayland could not escape his academic status, Turner could and did, and recanted his own mythic struggle within his inventive choices in order to invite the populace to rise to their perceived agrarian distinction.

From Hall's (1980) viewpoint, we might speculate that to enact Turner's story would have been itself a preferred reading. However, the negotiated reading might not have enacted the story as Turner would have, but fused the courses of study Turner discussed. That is, a negotiated reading might have put the vocational with the classical. An oppositional reading, I think, would see the plan and Turner's rhetoric not as prudential longings for "the people," but rather imprudent discursive practice and political ideology that certainly placed a certain sect of people over another.

Turner's mission in Illinois would not come to fruition until 1871. He was present for the laying of the cornerstone of the new University Hall at the Illinois Industrial University. Though Henry (1961) explains that the plan for this institution did not always exactly look like Turner's idea, "Jonathan Baldwin Turner is not only a forebear of the land-grant movement but also of the University of Illinois" (p. x).
CHAPTER SIX
JUSTIN SMITH MORRILL AND THE PASSAGE OF THE LAND GRANT COLLEGE ACT

INTRODUCTION

Justin Smith Morrill was born April 14, 1810, and died on December 28, 1898. He lived the ordinary life of a country boy from Strafford, Vermont, picking up fragments of education from the district school. He spent two years at Thetford Academy, but Morrill's school education ended at the age of fourteen.

He was then hired to work as a clerk in a Strafford store. He spent two years under that contract, and then worked for four years as a clerk in a Portland, Maine store. Mercantilism seemed to be his calling. After the end of those four years, a native of Strafford made Morrill a partner. Morrill worked as a manager for fifteen years, then retired with a modest fortune, bought a tract of land, made it into a farm, built a house, married, and settled in for the long haul.

However, in 1854, the Congressional representative from the Strafford district declined re-election and many people thought Morrill would make a fine candidate. He was elected by a majority of fifty-nine votes. He spent the rest of his years as a representative, then as a senator. In his Congressional life, he is best known for the Tariff Law of 1861, measures for constructing public buildings, and the Land Grant Act.
Morrill introduced the first land grant bill in the House of Representative on December 14, 1857. Though Morrill desired that the Speaker of the House send the bill to the Committee on Agriculture--Morrill was a member--it went to the Committee on Public Lands. This committee had the bill for four months and then Representative Cobb of Alabama, the chair, reported that it was a no-go on April 15, 1858. True (1929) argues that the argument against the bill was that it was unconstitutional.

On April 20, a pending motion to postpone consideration of the bill allowed Morrill an opportunity to speak on the matter. He took this opportunity to offer a substitute bill. This substitute omitted the original reference to Territories and offered a slight change in the way to price the land that the federal government might grant. On April 22, Morrill called for the previous question and the Speaker accepted it, requiring a vote on the bill. The House agreed to Morrill's substitute as an amendment and passed it by a vote of 105 to 100. The Speaker referred Morrill's bill to the committee on Public Lands in the Senate, chaired by Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio, a fellow republican, and it passed in February of 1859.

There was much lobbying during the process and True (1929) states that "Turner and his associates in Illinois and elsewhere were active by correspondence" (p. 103). Nevertheless, President Buchanan vetoed the bill. As True puts it, "The greatest hope that President Buchanan would
sign the bill lay in his vote in Congress in 1827 in favor of a bill to grant public lands for a deaf and dumb asylum in Kentucky" (p. 103). However, many Congressmen thought that vote was an error and, apparently, Buchanan did too. Although Morrill urged his troops on, the final vote had 105 for Morrill's bill and 94 against. The veto stood.

While disappointed, those in favor of Morrill's bill worked behind the scenes in order to promote it despite Buchanan's stand. For instance, the United States Agricultural Society debated the issues at its meeting in January of 1860, but, as True (1929) explains, a verbal attack by one of its members on Buchanan prevented any hope of the president changing his mind and offering support to a new bill. For another, the Illinois agricultural and horticultural societies called a joint meeting on June 27, 1860, in order to generate a resolution to promote Morrill's bill. Turner chaired the committee that drafted the resolution.

What is more, True (1929) reveals that Turner might have personally asked Lincoln, before his presidential nomination, to support the cause. Legend has it that Lincoln stated, "If I am elected I will sign your bill for State universities" (p. 104). Apparently, Stephen A. Douglas, also a possible candidate at the time, likewise unveiled to Turner that he would sign the bill. Thus, if Morrill introduced it again, after the election of 1860, the
bill most likely would not have too much trouble getting through the system.

After Lincoln's election, Morrill again introduced his bill on December 16, 1861, but it did not work out. Morrill decided not to offer a substitute bill this time because Senator Wade introduced a very similar bill in the Senate. True (1929) argues that Wade and Morrill were in cahoots. In the Senate, the bill went to the Committee on Public Lands chaired by Senator Harlan of Iowa, a proponent of the measure. The debate in the Senate centered on the measure's constitutionality, the amount of land granted and where, and the pricing of the land. After two amendments, it passed on May 16, 1862. The amendments focused on the amount of land that Congress would locate in individual states, and the number of acres they might allot to individual people. The final vote, with the amendments in place, stood at 32 to 7. Morrill delivered an important speech on the matter on June 6, 1862. The House called up the Senate bill on June 17 and passed it by a vote of 90 to 25. Lincoln signed the bill on July 2.

While the political maneuverings certainly clear up the constitutional and economic issues that were at the crux of the Congressional debate, Morrill's two most lengthy speeches on the measure, the one in 1858, and the one in 1862 before the calling up of the Senate bill, brought to bare the most significant rhetorical strategies on which Morrill depended. What is more important for my purposes,
these speeches also reveal much about Morrill's representation of prudence.

While the need for each speech grew out of particular situations, taken together, I suggest Morrill had to meet several challenges. For one, he had to negotiate the constitutionality of the bills. Also, he had to secure an attitude that all this was economically viable and productive for the country. Additionally, Morrill was speaking, both times, during a vacillating historical period. When he presented his first speech, the political stage was one of biting compromise, conflict between antislavery and proslavery groups, weak presidential leadership from James Buchanan, and constant constitutional battles over the role of the federal government. During his second oration, the country was, of course, at Civil War. Economically, both before and during the war, the industrial revolution replaced communal agrarianism with commercial individualism. Linguistically, changes in demographics continued to promote diverse styles of discourse.

In short, Morrill invented his speeches while Congress was coming to terms with that bloody conflict, the role of science and technology in American culture, the mode of agrarian and industrial life and its impact on the character of the nation, appropriate educational and intellectual policies in a commercial, democratic society, and the province of federal institutions.
In this chapter I analyze both addresses because they are very similar in their prudential stances and thus form a more coherent illustration of Morrill's over-arching sense of prudence. In the first section of this chapter, I will describe Morrill's speeches. Second, I will interpret the outlook of prudence he developed symbolically. Third, I will examine Morrill's textual context. Finally, I will offer the implications of Morrill's prudential way of thinking and how it, in a way, rendered the process of implementing the Morrill Act somewhat confusing.

SUMMARY

Morrill organized his first speech categorically. He began by establishing the importance of his bill to the nation and the preponderance of thought and debate upon the measure. He pointed out, as Turner did, that agricultural education had not received its fair share of federal aid. He implored the House to make a change because America, as an agricultural nation, was slipping. He argued that the propriety and happiness of a populated country depended upon the division of land into small, manageable parcels and upon the education of those who would own and till the soil. The following was the climax in this introductory part:

If it be true that the common mode of cultivating the soil in all parts of our country is so defective as to make the soil poorer year by year it is a most deplorable fact, and a fact of national concern. If we are steadily impairing the natural productiveness of the soil, it is a national waste, compensated only by private robbery (Morrill, 1858, Congressional Globe, p. 1692).
With this, he turned to discuss what he called a "national waste."

Morrill moved to a discussion of the "facts" of waste. As he had it, "These facts...establish, conclusively, that in all parts of our country important elements in the soil have been exhausted..." (1858, p. 1692); and his list of facts was exhaustive. He used statistical examples of agricultural loses, citing specific numbers from agricultural journals, and including a table to take them all in. His point was that the quality of the soil and the financial rewards potentially reaped were decreasing, and Congress could combat this depreciation through the federal act of establishing agricultural and mechanical universities. Along with the talk of "waste" Morrill also discussed the progress of science and the lack of scientific output for agriculturists.

Like Turner, Morrill (1858) discussed the class of yeoman agrarians and mechanics, the rise of practical education, and the ineffectiveness of classical education for the working classes. When agricultural and mechanical universities existed with federal aid, then the "spurious dogmas will be touched lightly with the spear of Ithuriel, and no longer squat around the ears of weary plowmen" (p. 1694). The graduates of these new universities "would know how to sustain American institutions with American vigor" (p. 1694). The heroic yeoman agrarian dwelled apart from the professionals. Morrill saw yeoman agrarians and
mechanics as having a unique role and place in American society.

Morrill turned to a very extensive declamation on European agriculture and how America's productivity stacked up against it. He discussed agricultural progressivism in Prussia, Saxony, Belgium, France, England, Scotland, Russia, Spain, Italy, and Bohemia, all in the effort to make American's federal support of agriculture look pretty awful. Though he realized some European nations had committed agricultural errors, Morrill (1858) explained, "Thus, we behold the suffrages of all the wiser civilized nations in favor of the measure contemplated by the bill under consideration...If other nations advance, though we but pause, we are distanced" (p. 1695).

Morrill then focused on the importance of land-granting and rebuked the argument that the federal government had no constitutional authority to grant such land or to require the states to use it for the sole purpose of creating agricultural and mechanical universities. Morrill (1858) argued that everyone, if not directly, would indirectly reap the benefits of this land grant. Thus, "if the measure shall in any degree increase the future profits of cultivators, the value of all land, wherever it may be, whether held in small or large quantities, will be augmented" (p. 1695, his emphasis). He also read from the constitution in order to support the constitutionality of his proposed law. His own sense of prudence, in part,
seemed to emerge explicitly when he placed his measure under the auspicious argument of "prudent proprietorship." As he put it, "As a prudent proprietor, may we not do that which will not only tend to raise the value of all land, whether owned by individuals or by Government, but make agricultural labor more profitable and more desirable as a pursuit in life?" (p. 1696). Additionally, he talked about previous land grants and used past voices, like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, to further establish federal land precedents.

Morrill ended his first speech by praising the enduring legacy of Congress to give land for the general benefit of the country and all of its inhabitants, but especially its agrarians and mechanics. Using repetition, he announced what the measure would do if passed. Morrill (1858) stated that it would do something "to enable the farmer to raise two blades of grass instead of one; Something for every owner of land; Something for all who desire to own land..." (p. 1696) and the like. Toward the very end of the speech Morrill supplied a succinct summary of his arguments:

The persuasive argument of precedents; the example of our worthiest rivals in Europe; the rejuvenation of worn-out lands, which bring forth taxes only; the petitions of farmers everywhere, yearning for 'a more excellent way;' philanthropy, supported by our own highest interests--all these considerations impel us for once to do something for agriculture worthy of its national importance (p. 1697).

With that, Morrill revealed how much land the Land Office had to dispose of and submitted his substitute bill.
Morrill's second speech was very similar. It also advanced categorically and he returned to the topics and arguments used in the first speech. In the beginning section he argued that the new educational institutions would perpetuate republicanism. As Morrill (1862) put it, "Just in itself, benevolent in its scope, demanded by the wisest economy, it will add new securities to the perpetuity of republican institutions" (Congressional Globe, p. 256). He then discussed what happened to the first bill, and using a sort of compliance gaining strategy of debt, Morrill announced that he would soon resign from the House and would like a favor in return.

Morrill also revealed in his introduction that he thought that several issues ought to be put upon the table because of the Civil War, but not this one. "Instead of being postponed, it is a measure that should have been initiated at least a quarter of a century ago..." (p. 256). This was so not only because it would have earlier befitted the farmer and the agriculturist, but also because teaching military tactics had become part of this second bill. Morrill talked about the military dimensions of the new bill and what the bill, as a whole, proposed:

This bill proposes to establish at least one college in every State upon a sure and perpetual foundation, accessible to all, but especially to the sons of toil, where all the needful science for the practical avocations of life shall be taught, where neither the higher graces of classical studies nor that of military drill...will not be entirely ignored, and where agriculture, the foundation of all present and future prosperity, may look for troops of earnest friends, studying its familiar and recondite economies, and at
last elevating it to that higher level where it may fearlessly invoke comparison with the most advanced standards of the world (p. 256).

Morrill then moved to a more specific discussion of land.

Morrill discussed the steadily decreasing value of public lands and how the legislature had, heretofore, granted public lands. From his vantage point, the legislature had not been too wise in the process. He (1862) suggested that "grants for railroads and military bounties have been made which such loose abundance as to destroy the gifts and more than satisfy all demands..." (p. 257).

Morrill continued to elaborate on the amount of land the government had and had not granted and why, and then moved to a discussion of the "facts" depicting the depletion of the nation's soil. He referred to his April 20, 1858, speech and recanted his facts and numbers.

After recalling factual and statistical information from his first speech, he again compared American agriculture to European agriculture in order to illustrate that the United States had, in large part, taken an agricultural back seat to the rest of the civilized world. Morrill (1862) said that America was "in the rear of Europe, and that will never be satisfactory" (p. 258). Then, he discussed practical education and how it would propel America to lead the world instead of follow.

Within the closing portion of his speech Morrill (1862) discussed the westward expansion and the call for educated expansioneers, the possible professors of the would-be
practical institutions—those of practical value—and the value of science. He also discussed practical education in Europe and highlighted what his measure might do for the United States. Apart from repairing the commercial loses, such a measure would "nurse patriotism" and the institutions would "secure permanent usefulness and enduring honor to the whole country" (p. 259).

PRUDENCE IN THE TEXT

It is my conjecture that the basic notion of prudence in the text, as far as specific political conduct goes, grows out of Morrill's advocacy of federally aided, agricultural and mechanical universities; and, these universities would make the land more fertile and empower the agrarian way of life. This is fairly easy to see if one considers how Morrill invoked "prudent proprietorship." Symbolically, I suggest that Morrill's rhetoric actualized his sense of prudence through the aesthetics of the agrarian myth: using synecdoche and filiopiety in the process. The synecdoche Morrill used personified the United States and its republican institutions through the symbol of the mythical agrarian. He also engaged in filiopiety, or the use of past voices, like Washington and Jefferson, which also helped enact his view of prudence and secured the patriotic tone of the myth. He therefore grounded his idea of prudence in American heritage. What is more, Morrill also enacted prudence through commercial talk. Morrill's prudential perspective existed in and through the language
of both the agrarian myth and commercialism; these were both performative conventions that Morrill apparently roused in his inventional scheme. He upheld the idea of an agrarian sacred thriftiness, but also wanted the agrarian to be a commercial success. Two competing traditions of prudence commanded Morrill's rhetorical choices.

**The Agrarian Myth, Synecdoche, and Filiopiety**

In the previous chapter I argued that the agrarian myth was a rhetorical marker of Turner's sense of prudence. In so doing, Turner perpetuated certain themes of the agrarian myth. I contend that Morrill, too, depended on and borrowed the mythic tradition to enact his prudential outlook. The agrarian myth was, foundationally, the romantic notion of the powerful, political, ruling classes (Hofstadter, 1955). Hofstadter reveals that the mythic story denoting sacred agrarian values was a patchwork of themes living through the speeches, writings, poems, songs, etc., of early American culture. I discussed some of the themes and the strong tradition of the myth in the previous chapter, but Hofstadter explains the myth more thoroughly and the following quote might serve as a reminder:

> Its hero was the yeoman farmer, its central conception the notion that he is the ideal man and the ideal citizen. Unstinted praise of the special virtues of the farmer and the special values of rural life was coupled with the assertion that agriculture, as a calling uniquely productive and uniquely important to society, had a special right to the concern and protection of government. The yeoman, who owned a small farm and worked it with the aid of his family, was the incarnation of the simple, honest, independent, healthy, happy human being. Because he lived in close communion with beneficent nature, his life was believed
to have a wholesomeness and integrity impossible for the depraved populations of cities. His well-being was not merely physical, it was moral; it was not merely personal, it was the central source of civic virtue; it was not merely secular but religious, for God had made the land and called man to cultivate it (p. 24-25).

There were several instances in Morrill's two speeches that helped perpetuate many of these themes and thus activated the prudential values inherent within them. Clearly, Morrill appreciated the existence of the myth, and he assumed that his audience was very familiar with it. In so doing, his mythic dialogue acted as an enthymeme. As we learned from Aristotle and Hariman (1991), prudence more than often takes shape through enthymemes.

For instance, and as I mentioned above, early on in his first speech Morrill argued that "prosperity and happiness" of a populated nation depended "1. Upon the division of the land into small parcels. 2. Upon the education of the proprietors of the soil" (1858, p. 1692). To promote agricultural education Morrill highlighted the importance of the modest, self-sufficient farm. Morrill was not talking about the large plantations, but the small homesteads. He was not talking about the classically educated dandy merely managing a farm, but the "robust ranks" of sacred yeoman agrarians (p. 1694). Speaking of this mythic profession, he said that

No other pursuit in life obtains this universal tribute, that, whatever may be the present idol of devotion, all classes and rank of men hope to reach that estate first bestowed upon Adam, and become proprietors of the soil as their ultimate earthly paradise (p. 1694).
Continuing his praise of the agrarian and his myth, Morrill explained, "Many of the purest embellishments of literature have been drawn from the field of the husbandman. Gems, not only of poesy and song, but of painting and sculpture, of philosophy and eloquence, thus have their origin" (p. 1694). Thus, he explicitly noted the myth's existence and its performative configurations in order to activate its appeal.

Sustaining his sentiment, Morrill more fully characterized what he saw as the mythic agrarian. To Morrill (1858), the agrarians were "frugal...Thrift is their cardinal virtue. They do not produce, vend, nor consume luxuries. They hasten slowly, and go untouched of all epidemical speculations" (p. 1694). However, Morrill thought that the possibility of wealth attracted the farmers to the city. Thus, if Congress passed this agricultural college bill perhaps it would curb the desire to leave the farm for the city. The passage of his bill would, in part, "induce the farmer's sons and daughters to settle and cluster around the old homesteads;" it would "prevent the dispersion of our population;" and it would "concentrate it [the population] around the best lands of our country--places hallowed by church spires, and mellowed by all the influences of time--where the consumer will be placed at the door of the producer;" and it would also "increase the loveliness of the land" (p. 1696-1697).

These passages indicate that Morrill, like Turner, was certainly imitating traditions of rhetorical performance
available within the performative culture of the era. Specifically, Hofstadter (1955) points out that a significant problem was the abandonment of the farm for the city. "For all the rhetoric of the pastoral tradition," Hofstadter concedes, "nothing could keep the boys on the farm, and nothing could conceal from the farm population itself that continuous restless movement not merely to farms farther west but to urban areas, East and West" (p. 32).

Part of Morrill's goal was a last stand to combat this run away from the homestead. In this, Morrill aligned himself with the folklore propagated by farm journals of his times. Hofstadter recants what he calls a "typical bit" of this folklore: "The great busy West has inducements, And has the business mart, But wealth is not made in a day, boys, Don't be in a hurry to start!" (p. 32, his emphasis). And again, "Better stay on the farm a while longer, Though profits come in rather slow; Remember you've nothing to risk, boys--Don't be in a hurry to go" (p. 33, his emphasis). Morrill's conception of prudence emerged out of this popular sentiment and rhetorical resource.

Additionally, at times, Morrill, like Turner, compared the agrarian "career" to others. Morrill (1862) explained that

The business of agriculture is something thought to be uninviting by those in other walks of life, and they shun any investigations of the great truths which underlie and surround it, as much as they would shun instruction in the craft of a tinker, lest they should some day be called upon to mend their neighbors' pot (p. 257).
Turner implied it, but Morrill made more concrete the claim that many in America shunned agrarianism as an occupation, even as the myth was popular. Hofstadter (1955) explains that the agrarian myth, alive within the formats revealed above, told farmers that they were "innocent pastoral victims of a conspiracy hatched in the distance" (p. 35). Morrill seemed to have believed it was prudent to not only remind his listeners of the values the myth enshrined, but also to offer them an opportunity to help the so-called victims of political and educational neglect.

While Morrill made these mythic assertions he used a synecdoche and this helped illumine his prudential stance. In Chapter Five I explained metonymy, but synecdoche is different. Hart (1997) says that synecdoche is "a kind of rhetorical shorthand that provides a more interesting view of commonly understood objects or ideas" (p. 151, his emphasis). He offers an example: "Wherever wood [a ship] can swim, there I am sure to find this flag of England [the British fleet]" (p. 151). The "wood" stands in for a ship, and the "flag of England" stands in for the whole British fleet. At the most elementary level, and as Burke (1950, 1969) declares, a synecdoche refers to a part of something the captures the whole of something, or a whole of something that captures a part. Madsen (1993) argues that synecdoche is synonymous with representation. I contend that Morrill's view of prudence, in part, emerged out of synecdochical logic. He used synecdoche so that the mythic yeoman
agrarian and his mythic values stood in, or represented, America, its institutions, and the character its citizens ought to be enacting.

We witness synecdoche operating in the beginning of Morrill's first speech when he personified the country as a man. Alerting his audience to the justness of his measure, Morrill (1858) argued that the bill was "just politically, just to all the States, and just, above, all, to the manhood of our country" (p. 1692). Not only did Morrill personify the country, but asserted that the lack of effective husbandry certainly questioned this "manhood":

> It is our province, as a nation and as individuals, to do well whatever we undertake. The genius and skill of our artists and artisans have been universally commended. Our navel architecture is a subject of national pride. Our engineers are doomed to no merely local fame. Our agricultural implements are beyond the reach of competition. Yet, while we may be in advance of the civilized world in many of the useful arts, it is a humiliating fact that we are far in the rear of the best husbandry in Europe... (p. 1693).

Morrill was not merely cataloguing America's successes, but pointing to the supreme importance of the yeoman agrarian as a significant American symbol. This pointing out was important to Morrill's persuasive effort because it acted as a prudential framework for Morrill's action claims. If the yeoman agrarian could not improve the soil and thus extend the agrarian way of life, and the myth, then the country would plummet. Perhaps he regarded it as prudent to link the country with the plight of the yeoman agrarian in order to accent the national importance of this plight.
In his second speech Morrill (1862) proposed:

Should no effort be made to arrest the deterioration and spoliation of the soil in America, while all Europe is wisely striving to teach her agriculturists the best means of hoarding up capital in the lands on that side of the Atlantic, it is easy to see that we are doomed to be dwarfed in national importance, and not many years can pass away before our ships will be laden with grain not on their outward but homeward voyage. Then, with cheap bread no longer peculiar to America, our free institutions may be thought too dear by those of whom even empires are not worthy—the men with hearts, hands, and brains—vainly looking to our shores for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (p. 258).

Importantly, the phrase above was a further elaboration of the synecdoche. Whatever the condition was of the yeoman agrarian, so too the condition of the country. The yeoman agrarian was the epitome of freedom, thrift and self-reliance, and Morrill wanted to make that representative association with the United States, the country's institutions, and citizens. In another way, because of the representation, the heroic agrarian was the representative anecdote of Morrill's speech, his efforts on the bill's behalf, and the prudent action he was advocating for the Congress.

Finally, Morrill also engaged in a type of filiopiety. **Webster's Dictionary** (1988) defines filiopiety as "an often excessive veneration of ancestors or tradition" (p. 462). Jasinski (1995) attests that the rhetorical practice was common in mid-nineteenth century oratory (p. 459). For instance, Morrill (1858) asserted his implicit sense of prudence when he associated past and present political actors with the pastoral tradition:
Washington, Calhoun, Clay, and Webster, are more secure of love and homage as farmers than even as men of highest public renown; and Mount Vernon, Fort Hill, Ashland, and Marshfield, the Meccas of America, prove the ideal truth of the worlds of Pliny, that "the earth took delight in being tilled by the hands of men crowned with laurels and decorated with triumphant honor" (p. 1694).

He also evoked the words of Washington and described how Washington brought before Congress the subject of agriculture in his first inaugural address. In the quote, Washington discussed the primary importance of agriculture to the nation's welfare and that federal policies ought to aid in the "cultivation of the soil" (p. 1694). Morrill exclaimed that in Washington's voice was the "germ" of the agricultural college project. Hence, we can say the same thing about Morrill's idea of prudence. "It cannot be doubted that donations of land for agricultural colleges would have received the approval of Washington" (p. 1694).

Maintaining the filiopiety, Morrill turned to Jefferson in order to argue for the creation of public educational institutions. Morrill called forth Jefferson's prudential thought in order to help him combat the constitutional arguments against the bill, and thus, again, imply his own sense of prudential political conduct. Morrill discussed how Jefferson promoted public institutions for the dispersion of scientific advancement. Morrill (1858) submitted "that here the whole question of constitutional power is covered, as well as a powerful argument suggested, by Jefferson" (p. 1696). Morrill also mentioned, in passing, Madison, Monroe, Adams, and Jackson. He declared
that "there can be no question that General Jackson and the
men who cooperated with him would have approved of grants of
land to all the States for the benefit of agricultural
colleges" (p. 1696). Apparently, Morrill thought the
political stances of these men were prudent. The founders
were prudent in as much as they desired to generate public
policy supporting the yeoman agrarian. Thus, Morrill's
filiopiety, a sense of prudent discursive practice, mirrored
prudentional political action.

**Commercialism**

The language of commercialism also marked Morrill's
conceptualization of prudence. This type of talk not only
pointed to the commercial reality of the era, but it also
empowered the agrarian myth. This commercialization denied
the agrarian myth he was telling.

After a long recitation of the loses of stock, sheep,
crops, tabacco, etc., Morrill (1858) contended that the
amount of money wasted was significant. For instance, the
loss in Massachusetts was a million dollars on cereal grain
(p. 1693). There were loses in New York, in Alabama, in
Georgia, etc. In an important paragraph Morrill highlighted
the country's agricultural, commercial slump:

My time will not permit a greater accumulation of
evidence on this point, although I have a cloud of
witnesses in reserve, nor is pointing out the nakedness
of land an agreeable duty. That leading fact, however,
of a wide-spread deterioration of the soil, stands out
too boldly to be denied...It follows, just in
proportion, that capital is disappearing, and that
labor receives a diminishing reward...(p. 1693).
Morrill continued his commercial talk in the second speech. He implied that he agreed with the passage of the Homestead Act—he seemingly thought that act was prudent—and argued that the amount of public land still available ought to be distributed using the same prudential outlook, increasing the value of the land. Morrill (1862) stated that "these land colleges come in to aid in the plan of improving, not only the new lands, but also the old, and thereby extending the basis of taxation and revenue" (p. 257).

He extended his statistical information on the hog crop, flax and hemp; a drastic loss here, a drastic loss there. The reparation, of course, began in Morrill's agricultural and mechanical universities. My point is that Morrill's rhetorical effort revealed that he wanted to help the farmer reach a respectable commercial status and assist the country along to commercial success. This was also prudential reasoning for Morrill.

Morrill's commercial talk pointed to a recognition and appreciation of the commercial reality of the mid-nineteenth century. As Hofstadter (1955) explains it, from 1815 to 1860 the self-reliant yeoman agrarian disappeared from the world outside myth. "The cash crop converted the yeoman into a small entrepreneur, and the development of horse-drawn machinery made obsolete the simple old agrarian symbol of the plow" (p. 38). The rhetoric of yeoman thrift made way for the want of profit. For instance, the call in the
1860's *Prairie Farmer* was for division of labor to increase profits. Along with the myth came the "rage for business." Along with the rhetoric of the sacred yeoman came an "entrepreneurial zeal probably without precedent in history" (p. 40). Moreover, Hofstadter exclaims that the "agrarian sentiment sanctified labor in the soil and the simple life, but the prevailing Calvinist atmosphere of rural life implied that virtue was rewarded, after all, with success and material goods" (p. 40). In short, the oratorical culture of the day valorized the myth, but the entrepreneurial spirit goaded the farmer to embark on a journey not toward sacred self-sufficiency and thrift, but toward material social standing and, consequently, widespread debt.

Morrill's commercial talk also pointed to the fiction of the agrarian myth, and this fiction made the myth much stronger. The recognition of entrepreneurial zeal was also an implicit denial of the agrarian myth, even as Morrill indicated the myth's sacred aura. Hofstadter (1955) says, "Oddly enough, the agrarian myth came to be believed more widely and tenaciously as it become more fictional" (p. 30). The agrarian myth was a reflective appeal. As Braden (1983) says of any myth in a rhetorical context, it draws "upon imagination, it strives to illicit what is pleasant, soothing, and satisfying, and gains acceptance and strength through repetition" (p. 75). By pointing out the myth Morrill energized its mythic charm, and he enlivened the
memory of the myth in the minds of the hearers. However, intentional or not, his commercial talk made the myth more nostalgic. Stated simply: Morrill's sense of prudence, as immersed in his rhetorical text, spawns out of the agrarian myth, but also in its denial.

We should note, too, that it seems somewhat unusual that Morrill would promote the mythic, somewhat innocent, thrifty character of the yeoman agrarian, but also desire the agrarian to become much more commercialized. Morrill's rhetoric was a paradox. However, this contradiction points to the inherent irony of Morrill's rhetoric and the myth he embraced; and this irony is inherent in Morrill's performative culture. Burke (1993) says that irony is that "type of vacillation which comes of realizing that the traits which one is best equipped to develop are not the traits best making for one's adaptation to his environment" (p. 156). The mythic agrarian could never survive in the commercial culture of the mid-nineteenth century. The irony in the text re-fashioned the heroic agrarian into a business person without tainting the persuasive identification the myth provided. Considering this cultural irony, Hofstadter (1955) explains that

The triumph of commercial agriculture not only rendered obsolete the objective conditions that had given to the agrarian myth so much of its original force, but also showed that the ideal implicit in the myth was contesting the ground with another, even stronger ideal--the notion of opportunity, of career, of the self-made man" (pp. 39-40).
Morrill also recognized the problem with land value. True, Morrill wanted to curb the hit and run style of farming through his universities and the education it might afford, but he ironically wanted to keep the old with the new; he desired the "thrift" of the yeoman along with the spirit of profit.

Hence, in light of Jasinski's (1997) perspective, we can see that for Morrill a sense of prudence as a performative tradition emerged out of the language of the agrarian myth, but also out of commercial talk. He tried to awaken agrarian voices, and in a way perhaps he tried to offer his own voice as a mythic one through symbolism. However, Morrill, a stereotypical self-made person, applauded a profession he never had. He projected an agrarian voice he could not legitimately call his own. We might also say that synecdoche and filiopiety framed Morrill's rhetoric argumentatively and figuratively. And the irony and confusion that resulted through his agrarian/commercial representation of prudence still exists today as we grapple with mythic stories that make our lives meaningful, but also commercial realities that make our lives financially profitable.

MORRILL'S TEXTUAL CONTEXT

Morrill generated a past, present, and future infused with a temporal irony. He longed to return to the innocence, purity, and sacredness of the mythic past, but also desired to progress toward the commercial future. His
prudential sense, tied to the language of myth and commercialism, commanded a temporal confusion that pointed to the fluid nature of the text's context, and the historic circumstance that framed it.

The past became sacred and the agrarian myth a story of origin. There were several passages that pointed to this sacredness. For one, Morrill (1858) said that agriculture was the "the most useful of the earliest arts" (p. 1693). He continued this thought by illustrating that

All history shows the tenacity with which habits acquired in the cultivation of land cling to a people from generation to generation. In all ages farmers have been stable, conservative, and reverent to antiquity. The same plow as described three thousand years ago at "Athens, the eye of Greece, mother of arts, And eloquence" is still in use among the modern Greeks. The habitant of Canada as much believes to-day in the propriety of placing the yoke on to the horns of the ox, in order to secure the entire strength of the animal, as he did in the days when he owed allegiance to the Grand Monarch. The old Roman plow, sometimes drawn, in the days of Nero, "by a wretched ass on the one side, and an old woman on the other," still retains its place in Italy, and in parts of Spain and the south of France. If we turn to the descendants of the Puritans, we shall find some of these yet kill their pork and plant their corn in "the old of the moon." In all ages, and in all countries, the habits, as well as the virtues of agriculturists, remain fixed (pp. 1694-1895, his emphasis).

Even as Morrill noted that it was difficult for agriculturists to improve things, he associated the profession with Adam in order to declare the sanctity of the steadfastness (p. 1694). Thus, we can see Morrill's idea of prudence developing through the temporal nod of the agrarian, and through the process of taking his listeners through this temporal journey. His rhetoric transformed
"immediate exigencies into recurring and symbolic ones" (Hoban, 1980, p. 279). Morrill called for a participation with the myth through a temporal disjoiner. The instances in Morrill's speech that recalled the sacred past of the agrarian become thresholds through which timelessness afforded mythic participation.

In contrast to Morrill's mythic view of the past, Morrill's view of the present and future were very progressive. Morrill (1858) saw the present as a contingency of agricultural errors, and thought that "the great, irreversible law of American agriculture appears in the constant and increasing diminution of agricultural products, without any advance in prices" (p. 1693). Morrill (1862) also declared, "By our mode, the earliest crops are seldom sequentially equaled, and the last are apt to be the worst" (p. 258). Again, from Morrill's perspective, America was leaning toward doomsday.

Only commercial inclinations, private enterprise, and science could seemingly remedy the woeful condition. Morrill (1858) said that "the only thing we constantly dwell upon with complacency is, that we surpass the stock from which we sprang, and that we present our land better than we found it. But this is not beautiful unless true!" (p. 1693). Morrill (1862) thought that "the true system of farming would seem to be to make the land more fertile than it is in its natural state, and every succeeding crop better than the last," (p. 258). Science and technology were
saviors. "Merely practical men have looked at science as though it were a goddess in the clouds, to be worshipped only by fanatics and afar off, when it is really a handmaid, beautiful, and busy everywhere at saving labor and capital" (p. 259).

Interestingly, when considering the present and future, Morrill adhered to an Euramerican perspective of temporality. Many rhetorical scholars refer to this progressive view of reality as "time's arrow." Lake (1991) explains that this metaphor assumes an irreversibility of events and a linear march of time. Rushing (1989b) reveals that, when buying into this "time's arrow" metaphor, past and present mistakes are "transitional moments" during which the future already remedies those errors. Thus, Morrill's consistent praise of science became, itself, a prudential solution to present and past agricultural problems. Morrill provided a litany of agricultural short-comings and blunders, and the corresponding inevitable future doom. Evidently, he did so in order to assert that science and agricultural technology were the only effective antecedents to successful, commercial agrarian culture. Morrill further developed his prudential viewpoint by asserting that science would assist agrarians in their efforts to progress to a commercially successful future.

Therefore, Morrill's textual context was temporally ironic. He praised the past and offered a threshold of timelessness that allowed his listeners to reverse time in
order to appreciate and participate in the agrarian myth. At the same time, he denied that regression to assert an irreversible march of agricultural error only halted by techno-science distributed, of course, through his agricultural colleges.

**CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION**

Morrill's understanding of prudential political conduct was, at the most basic level, that Congress ought to pass the agricultural college bill. In so doing, Congress would prolong the agrarian myth while most other societal indicators pointed to its demise. A sense of prudential discursive practice emerged out of the language of myth, synecdoche and filiopiety. Prudential discursive practice also emerged out of commercial talk. The commercial talk not only recognized the commercial ideology of the day, but also fictionalized the myth. However, the myth's fiction, while it made the myth more nostalgic, pointed to an irony in Morrill's implicit prudential outlook and the inventional framework that helped enact it symbolically. Morrill's rhetoric existed in and through the language of both sacred myth and progressive commercialism.

Further, as Morrill and the performative traditions he imitated helped develop a certain perspective on prudence, they also helped create a temporal confusion. While his regression beckoned nostalgic participation and sacred recognition, his progressive stance rejected this ebb. In
short, contradictory traditions of prudence branded Morrill's performative choices.

It is my conjecture that Morrill's rhetorical discourse, and the enactment of prudence that brought it about symbolically framed the act and the perceptual response to it. While the bill eventually passed, the rhetoric and prudential perspective that Morrill advocated did not readily help the process, nor did it lead to a coherent vision of what the measure might do, even if Morrill wanted the states to decide how to appropriately spend the money themselves.

I am not by any stretch of the imagination claiming that the Morrill Land Grant Act was and is a failure. I suppose one could even say that Morrill's ambiguous prudence gave the states an appropriate degree of freedom to do what they wanted. However, Lucas (1996) points out that, "In fact, for several decades their careers as institutions of higher learning were both precarious and uncertain" (p. 62). Even more, the agricultural papers of Morrill's day did not seem to offer too much enthusiasm for the measure. Ross (1942) explains that the "original law, while offering the possibility of strengthening existing projects in industrial education and of founding new ones, in itself assured nothing" (p. 66). It did not, I suggest, because the way Morrill talked about the measure allowed too much room for divergent views. Additionally, Ross says there was a doubt that the states would even accept it. Morrill's rhetoric,
and his sense of prudence, revealed that "there was no effective provision for federal direction and control of state policy" (p. 68).

In this, Morrill's rhetoric and the policy were kin to the Homestead Act. They were both policy actions extending from the republican's 1860 platform. As Rudolph (1962) explains, "In conjunction with the Homestead Act of the same year, this [Morrill Act] parcel of legislation gave political recognition to the yeoman farmer on the eve of his displacement as the characteristic American" (p. 250). Smith (1950) calls the Homestead Act the "agrarian utopia in politics" (p. 165). In more detail, Smith contends that

...between 1856 and 1860 the homestead principle with its utopian blueprint for developing the trans-Mississippi region become official Republican doctrine...It was a bid for votes that could not be attracted to the antislavery cause. The platform of 1860...showed that the Republicans meant to capture the myth of the garden and the symbol of the hardy yeoman, and thus to command the imaginations of Northwestern farmers (p. 168).

However, this free-simple empire was not to be. While the measure passed in 1862, it was not awfully successful (Hofstadter, 1955). The framers of the Homestead Act and the free-simple empire acted upon ideals spawning from the agrarian myth, but these ideals or assumptions, says Hofstadter, "were out of date even before the act was passed" (p. 57).

Hofstadter (1955) thinks these framers trusted in nature as abundant, the nonspeculative ideal of the yeoman, the easy process of passing land to settlers without cost,
and the native strength of the farmer to be self-sufficient. However, these assumptions did not match up with the Industrial Revolution well established by 1862, nor did it mesh with the communications revolution that was on the horizon. It was "incongruous even with the natural character of the plains, with their winds, sandstorms, droughts, and grasshoppers" (p. 57). Hofstadter asserts that the farmer was caught up in the "toil of cash-crop commercial farming" (p. 57). Basically, the farmer was not self-sufficient at all, but depended on the exchange value of his products measured through supply and demand. The myth did not secure the agrarian's livelihood. The agrarian found hope only within a "commercial position, which in turn, was dependent upon the vicissitudes of the world market" (p. 58).

These same assumptions affected Morrill's discourse. In practice, he articulated a commercialism; in ideology, he promoted an agrarian ideal. His prudential scheme was wrought with irony. While some might call his irony strategic, I do not think so, at least in his immediate situation. The bill passed, but it never really did what Morrill wanted it to.

Hofstadter (1955), in his explication of the populist and progressive movements of the nineteenth century, contends that the American farmer had a dual character. Populist rhetoric derived from a "soft" side of the farmer's existence and used traditional agrarian ideology. Yet, most

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farm organizations since the populist decline in the late nineteenth century talked in terms of a "hard" side. "Agricultural improvements, business methods, and pressure politics" (p. 47) defined this hard side. Morrill advocated both sides and therefore produced a kind of agrarian schizophrenia, or split in agrarian identity. The act he advocated, once enacted, failed to halt the tide of agrarian discontent. It did not provoke the children of farming families to cluster around the old homestead. They still went to the city. Morrill's act, and the conception of prudence that brought it about, seemingly institutionalized this agrarian schizophrenia.

Thus, Rudolph (1962) says that "the land-grant college movement owed something both to those forces that were destroying the agrarian orientation of American society and to those sentiments that would seek to perpetuate the past as an agrarian myth" (p. 251). One could say that Morrill's legislation was essentially a "romantic effort...to remain philosophically agrarian..." (p. 251) while, at the same time, surrendering to the culture of profit. Thus, Morrill's irony alerts us to another implication of his rhetoric.

Burke (1993) sees an often uneasy relationship between what he calls the "Self," the individual agent, and the "Non-Self," social institutions and the like. There is often, thinks Burke, a "maladjustment" between the Self and Non-Self if the agent does not fit in with the scene. This
rift might be "righted through the surrender of Self" to the Non-Self. However, Burke argues that some writers, Marx for instance, insisted "that we must change the Non-Self, or must change the social institutions to fit our needs, rather than changing our needs to fit the social institutions..." (p. 156). This relationship between Self and Non-Self often leads to irony. Burke elaborates on his notion of irony when he calls it a "recognition of the fact that people surrender only because they have to, along with the recognition of the fact that one does not propose to accept such ready forms of integration for himself" (p. 156). This is also what I mean by saying that Morrill's prudence was ironic. Morrill's idea of prudence accommodated to the commercial zeal of the day, while still projecting a bit of agrarian audacity. His irony potentially allowed his audience to associate with the agrarian myth and disassociate from commercialism; acting out a fervor for profit all the while.

Moreover, from Hall's (1980) point of view, we might say that the preferred reading was in putting the two strains of prudence together. However, because they seemed incongruous, a negotiated reading perhaps tended to provoke a dialectic between the two. An oppositional reading, perhaps, would read either one prudence or the other; or resist the whole measure as a political ploy for the republican agenda. In any case, Morrill's rhetoric did not have the influence he perhaps desired. However, the public
institutions that resulted certainly changed the landscape of American higher education.

While the state institutions, once established, did certainly improve agricultural production, it also displaced the yeoman agrarian. However, perhaps that is not the stuff to dwell on endlessly in my rhetorical way. The Land Grant colleges broadened the idea of public higher education. For the most part, they gave students of all classes and interests options. One could go to school to be a farmer, but end up a writer. One could go to school to be an artist, but end up an engineer. Ross (1942) puts this idea nicely when he says that

Whatever the name, the real test of all the land-grant institutions was their ability and disposition to fulfill their peculiar mission in the new era, and it was in ministering to the technical, social, and political needs of the nation come of age that they attained measurably to the vision of the true prophets of the industrial movement in becoming real people's colleges--with all their limitations a distinct native product and the fullest expression of democracy in higher education (p. 182).
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

REVIEW OF STUDY

The Morrill Act apportioned to each state thirty thousand acres per each senator and representative they had in Congress under the 1860 census. The law obligated states to sell the land and use the interest from the receipts to endow, support, and maintain a college of agriculture, though not excluding scientific, classical, and military studies. The result of the law, though we are still debating its value, brought about new vocational curricula, extended higher education to the working classes, put classical academics and vocational instruction under the same roof, and most significantly, it democratized higher education and thus carved out an intellectual and learned niche for the practical, working citizenry.

The law did not come about without rhetorical effort both for and against the general, democratic notions of the measure. The persuasive messages critical to the ultimate passing of Morrill Act, working alone and together, demonstrate the important role of prudence in the invention of public argument. Thus, I have sought to understand the role of prudence in the texts I have analyzed and I have indicated that prudence gives us both historical and theoretical insight. I will come along to those insights shortly.
I consider my project a continuation of the ongoing historical interpretation of nineteenth century American higher education. Even more so, I consider my research an addition to the discussion about nineteenth century rhetorical discourse. I also regard this study as a contribution to the theoretical understanding of prudence. Thus, I reviewed prudence from a theoretical perspective. I also reviewed several works of rhetorical criticism in my literature review, each embarking from particular understandings of theoretical prudence. In so doing, my point was to illustrate that critics have either thought of prudence as too stable, or too polysemic. My conception of prudence appreciates the play of prudence between stability and polysemic. I see prudence as a dynamic performative tradition, but also a unique sense of situational appropriateness in performance.

Analytically, I appreciate both the instrumental mode of critical analysis, but also the far-reaching, textual play of multiplistic modes of prudential symbolism. My basic method has been textual criticism. More specifically, a hybrid of traditional instrumentalist, or intentionalist interpretative practice, and an interpretative practice that focuses on performative traditions in textual action. In my application, I first used Jasinski's (1997) understanding of performative traditions, then, like Wilson (1998), I focused on each text's textual context and how prudence emerged out of that. In short, Jasinski (1997) thinks that by
decentering the hub of critical activity away from purpose and agent to the text/context relationship, a critic can better focus on the orchestration of cultural performative traditions in textual action. I also recognize the idea that deviating away from the assumptions of instrumental practice invigorates rhetorical scholarship. It was my hope that these two schemes of interpretation—Jasinski’s and Wilson’s—would reveal interesting results when put together. Working in tandem, they recover a contextual dialectic between the text and its immediate rhetorical situation, and between the text and its broader cultural grammar.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

I had several questions that I addressed: 1) Given the rhetors I examine, what sense of prudence did they each offer and how did they symbolically actualize or achieve that notion of prudence? Along the same lines, was such an idea of prudence linked to any communal tradition(s) of prudential thinking? 2) Considering the idea of textual context, what vision of the past, present, and future did each rhetor project, and what sense of prudence did that develop? 3) What was the effect of the implicit view of prudence within each text—did it help or hinder the rhetorician’s persuasive efforts?

To answer my first question, Day and Kingsley suggested that it was appropriate to hold tight to traditional classical and literary pedagogy. Metaphor tellingly
developed this prudential idea. The authors supplied structural, light and dark, and nature metaphors to encourage a certain way of seeing classical education, and practical education. The sacred/secular metaphors of "taste" and "genius" also cultivated a notion of prudence. These were metaphors with a long symbolic lineage, and used by Yale's former president Timothy Dwight. Thus, while the Yale Report was a secular, educational epideictic, the authors engaged a homiletic tradition. This helped to project a sense that classical education was both secular and sacred, and that Yale graduates would go on to establish Dwight's vision of a godly society through poetic and refined discursive practice.

Wayland asserted that Brown ought to democratize its education in order to uplift the practical classes of society. He actualized his idea of prudence through the discursive sentiments of individuality, self-reliance, and commercialism; and his rhetoric of identification. His prudential ideals were conventional. Wayland supplied a tradition of prudence that perpetuated a political imagination consonant with the perceived egalitarianism in the age of Jackson. Moreover, his idea of prudence emerged out of his own design of moral philosophy and political economy, both tied to Jacksonian democracy. In light of his discourse on individuality and self-reliance, Wayland consequently made himself out to be a kind Jacksonian outsider, fighting the good fight, on behalf of working
people he really could not relate to. Wayland volunteered himself, both politically and discursively, as a shining example of individualism for his democratic audience. He also shaped a sense of prudent conduct for the Brown corporation.

Turner's basic claim was that the yeoman agrarians ought rise up and invent their own educational scheme. He achieved his representation of prudence symbolically through the aesthetics of, first, metonymy in as much as Turner generated a seemingly natural, antithetical relationship between the professional class and the working class. Second, Turner activated his prudence through anti-intellectualism. Finally, Turner's prudence primarily existed in and through the language of myth. These rhetorical appeals were also traditions living within the oratorical culture of Turner's day. Turner perpetuated ideas of societal structure propelled by Calhoun, but Turner wanted to re-do the hierarchy. Turner enlisted the Jeffersonian ideal of a natural aristocracy. Further, Turner performed a middling style of discourse that resounded an anti-intellectual sentiment, and a humble style that was in vogue. His use of the agrarian myth had a long symbolic lineage.

Morrill's idea of prudence resembled Turner's. The basic notion of practical political conduct Morrill advanced was the founding of federally aided, agricultural and mechanical universities. I suggest that this general
conceptualization of prudent conduct issued from the agrarian myth's symbolism. However, different from Turner, Morrill's created his slant on the myth using synecdoche and filiopiety.

However, Morrill also enacted prudence through the language of commercialism. Morrill's commercial talk pointed to a recognition of the commercial zeal of his day, but it also, intentionally or not, pointed to the fiction of the myth. It generated nostalgia. It also indicated the irony implicit in the agrarian myth, and in the culture Morrill lived in and through.

I have already pointed to the strength of the agrarian myth at that time. Filiopiety, as Jasinski (1997) argued, was also a very popular sentiment. Commercialism, too, was immensely strong during Morrill's era. The rage for business and entrepreneurial zeal was commonplace. In brief, a conception of prudence linked to the agrarian myth, and discursive strategies that activated it, were conventional. Also, a sense of prudence linked to commercialism, and the commercial talk that brought it about, was traditional. In short, Morrill's vision of prudence was actually two competing visions put together. The irony that resulted indicated an ironic tension in the broader, oratorical culture.

In the effort of answering my second general question, I contend that Day and Kingsley constructed the past, antiquity, as an era of beauty and perfection; ancient
language was God's language. The present was a struggle between the beauty of past treasures and the "business" or "practical" character of their contemporary America. The future, if students studied past treasures, would be bright. Yale and its students would deny a brilliant future if they ignored the past. This vision perpetuated Dwight's political ideal and promoted the post-Puritan notion of a "godly government."

Much different from Day and Kingsley, Wayland created a temporal narrative that painted the past as a time of warranted mis-understanding and error. Wayland illustrated what he saw as the present through repeated comments about the "progress" of the nation, and in his rendering of Brown as an educational embarrassment. His future took form in his arguments about what might happen if the corporation heeded his proposals. If the corporation conceded to Wayland's policy requests it would result in money for Brown and uplift the middling and lower classes that, then, would help enact Wayland's prudential way of thinking. Wayland's historical narration framed the role of American college education and the specific role of the practical classes within the unfolding of American history. Wayland seemingly accepted that average American citizens longed to live up to a cultural ideal of materialism and self-determination; they longed to live out the myth of the self-made American.

Turner narrated a heroic myth as his understanding of reality. He unveiled the past as controlled by classicist
fools. While places like Yale praised the ancients as worthy, these ancients really only produced confusion. They thought too much and talked too much. Thus, Turner saw the present as a caste system controlled by these classically educated fools perpetuating the trifles and confusions of ancient, pedantic ideals. Turner's proposal for the future, then, was to re-work the caste system. His future, like his myth, was a story. We can see that Turner's story was basically that the agrarian farmer and industrialist, living within a caste-system controlled by classically learned, professional dolts, needed to re-do the American caste-system, with the aid of practical education, in order to promote an educational order aloof from political and ecclesiastical control.

Morrill's past was sacred and the agrarian myth a story of origin. This illustration of the past as mythic and sacred indicated, also, Morrill's sense of prudence. Mythic time partly developed this representation of prudence. As the agrarians looked to the mythic past, so too did Morrill's symbolic overture ask his audience to do the same. Different from his mythic view of the past, Morrill's view of the present and the future were very progressive. He saw the present as a vast file of agricultural and political errors that both devalued land and the labor of it. Regardless, he also saw the present as an era of scientific progress--this would be the future remedy to the agrarian's woes. Morrill adhered to an Euramerican perspective of
temporality in this regard. He bought into "time's arrow." In short, Morrill's textual context was temporally ironic. He praised the past and offered a threshold of timelessness that allowed his listeners to appreciate and participate in the agrarian myth. However, he denied that regression because his view of the present and future asserted the necessity of progression and that techno-science was the remedy for the excessive march of agricultural blunders and lost profits. Thus, the overall effect of his textual context and the sense of prudence it helped project was irony and confusion.

Finally, to answer the third general question, placed within the broad context of nineteenth century rhetorical culture, Day and Kingsley's idea of prudence was both successful and not so successful. Again, I realize the label, "successful", is problematic. Nevertheless, when we consider the different readings Hall (1980) suggests are available to any audience member it makes more sense. What I mean is that a preferred reading, if such a reading emerges, illustrates a sense of success. Hence, Day and Kingsley were successful because their rhetoric captured and perpetuated the privileged role of the classically educated person in an oratorical, evangelical society. Significantly, the sense of prudence that the Yale Report clung to and developed also helped Day and Kingsley advance their sense of prudence to many denominational schools in the West and, for the most part, staved off any major
philosophical change for conservative colleges for many years. Yet, they also alienated practical education and made it difficult to believe that there was any other road to thorough education or godliness other than classical education. Thus, their representation of prudence was also unsuccessful because oppositional readings existed as well.

Like Day and Kingsley, Wayland was both successful and unsuccessful. I suggest that Wayland's prudential outlook and the way he enacted it through his rhetoric helped a broad, cultural persuasive effort. Wayland's sense of prudence aided his persuasive pursuit to democratize higher education in America because he borrowed it from an immensely popular public sentiment. While for the most part the faculty of Brown dismissed the report, as did many conservatives in the higher education scene, the general public seem to have accepted Wayland's idea of prudence.

Turner's enactment of prudence and rhetoric was important and, in a sense, successful because Morrill imitated it. While Morrill offered his own slant on the agrarian myth in his own speeches, it is my conjecture that Turner's idea of prudence still lived within Morrill's efforts. More specifically, Morrill, like Turner, promoted the symbolism of labor and the garden to afford the agrarian, in part, a mode of prudent conduct.

Morrill's rhetorical discourse is problematic because, while the bill did pass, the rhetoric and prudential perspective that Morrill implied did not readily help the
process, nor did it lead to a coherent vision of what the measure might do. In practice, Morrill praised the zeal for commercialism; in ideology, he promoted an agrarian ideal. Morrill advocated two sides of agrarian identity: the traditional, mythic side, and the commercial, business side. He therefore produced a kind of agrarian schizophrenia. The act he advocated failed to block the tide of agrarian discontent. It did not halt the desire to leave the farm for the city. Morrill's act, and the notion of prudence that brought it about, seemingly institutionalized this agrarian schizophrenia. It contributed to the decline of a myth it tried to perpetuate.

IMPLICATIONS

It now comes time in my project to theorize about my findings. In order to do that I want to first consider my project from historical/pedagogical vantage point. Second, I will speculate about the role of prudence by thinking about it in relation to several of the basic rhetorical canons and other important rhetorical concepts like the rhetorical agent, purpose, and audience.

We can see from a historical perspective how certain representations of prudence inhibited or facilitated certain ways of thinking about pedagogy. In fact, I suggest that the changes occurring within nineteenth century American higher education were generally a struggle between diverging conceptions of prudence in rhetorical action. The Morrill
Act emerged out of a contest between divergent expressions of prudence.

For instance, the Yale Report and its representation of prudence helped facilitate neoclassical elitism, yet alienated classical pedagogy from mainstream democratic ideals. It inhibited a sense of legitimacy for practical, vocational pedagogical plans. However, Wayland's rhetoric and the style of prudence attached to it antagonized conservative educators and this idea illustrates the persuasiveness of his prudential outlook outside of the scene. Wayland's enactment of prudence facilitated future educational progressives through its discursive resource, but it inhibited his immediate task. He made little lasting progress at Brown. Thus, we can speculate that inside the pedagogical scene, the idea that literary education was sacred still persisted. The change could not come from within.

Turner's embodiment of prudence facilitated his progressive ideas because he wanted to invent a totally new pedagogical system. He legitimized practical, vocation education, but his notion of prudence inhibited the fusion between vocational and classical studies; a fusion we are still having trouble with.

However, Morrill's understanding of prudence, tied to both Wayland's and Turner's, legitimized every and any pedagogical adventure. As I mentioned earlier, the debate about the historical and pedagogical value of the Morrill

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Act is ongoing. Ross (1942) reveals that the measure often invites "superlative encomiums of the measure as the 'greatest act in the history of higher education'" (p. 67). Lucas (1996) disagrees when he reveals what he sees as the present-day outcome of Morrill's law. He says that today "one comes to the university to learn how to become a sanitation engineer, an information specialist, a financial analyst, a health-service coordinator...and so on ad nauseam..." (p. 67). I insist that the way Morrill talked about his measure helped lead to this contemporary state of things. The Morrill Act opened the wedge that led to excessive vocationalism. Morrill's speeches were significant moments of irony that illustrated a notion of pedagogical accommodation to cultural, commercial longings, while also romanticizing about the non-commercial. In short, Morrill, through his irony, surely made the implementation of his political practice difficult, but his way of pluralizing the agrarian character also facilitated a schizophrenia in higher education itself.

What I mean is that Morrill's rhetoric authorized plural voices within the walls of American higher education. I would not dare say that plurality is a bad thing. However, it does confuse things. Look at most every administrative justification for any contemporary college/university course. Within those justifications are usually voices of communitarianism, individualism with a technical slant, and populism. The voices mix together in a
contemporary pedagogical stew; they are all part of the
recipe and the product cannot exist without them. Burke
(1969) says that

True irony, humble irony, is based upon a sense of
fundamental kinship with the enemy, as one needs him
[her], is indebted to him [her], is not merely outside
him [her] as an observer but contains him [her] within,
being consubstantial with him (p. 514, his emphasis).

And these voices do not come and go, but exist always,
rising in intensity at certain historical moments, and then
fading, but to rise again.

This study also gives us several indications of how
rhetoric and prudence work together theoretically. One way
prudence and rhetoric interact is through the process of
invention. Rhetorical invention is the process of coming to
terms with the most persuasive strategies given the
opportunities and limitations of a situation at hand and the
communal, linguistic resources available to the rhetor.
Traditionally, the product of rhetorical invention is a
rhetorical performance: persuasive discourse in action. I
have argued that prudence orchestrates the process of
invention.

Hariman's (1991) idea of prudence as performance serves
me well here. Again, he thinks that prudence is a
performative virtue that rests in one's ability to master
the nuances of rhetorical art, and perform a rhetorical
script dramatically in order to move an audience. Prudence
is not an explicit plan one can break off or separate from
the performance of rhetoric. Prudence lives only in and
through the creative endeavor of rhetorical discourse. Prudence lives in and through the stylistic and argumentative forces of a persuasive effort. Therefore, invention also lives only within rhetorical action. The rules for creative practice exist within the practice; or, at least, resources for invention are most readily found through observation of persuasive art. Hariman says that "prudence becomes a master code for successful performance within a community, and the use of prudence as a norm becomes a mean for maintaining the community's traditional alignment of its social practices" (p. 29). The point, I think, is that invention is not a scientific process. Even though we have our text books and our hand books, invention as a creative, innovative endeavor springs from immersion in a rhetorical community.

This does not mean that rhetoric cannot be subversive, but that the potentiality for rhetorical success is guided from communal norms of prudent thinking, even while there are many different norms of implicit prudence. For instance, the potentiality for Wayland's rhetorical success lived within the communal norms of Jacksonian individualism and commercialism. These were cultural discourses Wayland's persuasive effort originated from and contributed to.

This study also says something about the relationship between prudence and rhetorical organization or form. To Burke (1931, 1968), rhetorical or artistic form leads an audience from one part of the performance to the next. The
rhetor generates situational variables in a sort of plot moving forward to some end. The audience, then, begins to expect some happening and becomes aroused and persuaded through that expectation. Swartz (1996) says that "in experiencing an expectation, [an audience member] grows to identify with either the persuader or the ends of the communication" (p. 315). Echoing Burke, Swartz also says that form helps define conditions of aesthetic or normative values within a culture. My point is that prudence often grows out of form. A sense of prudence promotes a certain expectation of outcome, in discourse and in political action, that ignites that notion of prudence to constantly be rediscovered in the process of invention.

We see in my study that prudence often emerged out of mythic form. When a speaker energized the agrarian myth through speech, the mythic sentiments invigorated a pre-political narrative, the society that embraced the mythic symbols, and the individuals that perceived that they participated in that society and story. The best example of this was Turner's speech. His textual context was a mythic story. Again, his story was that the agrarian and working industrialist, living within a caste-system controlled by the classically learned, needed to re-make the American caste-system, with the aid of vocational education, in order to promote an educational order detached from political and ecclesiastical control. This was a hero's plot. Turner used it as an inventional resource and contributed to its
persuasiveness. To live out the expectation would certainly be, at least in Turner's mind, prudent.

Additionally, my study forces us to consider the relationship between prudence, style and politics. Hariman (1992) links politics with style:

Style becomes an analytical category for understanding a social reality; in order to understand the social reality of politics, we can consider how political action involves acting according to a particular political style. From this perspective, political events are produced within a social setting through conventions of artistic composition depending upon aesthetic reactions for persuasive effect (p. 151, his emphasis).

The understanding of a certain political style depends on an understanding of decorum within that political scene. Again, decorum and prudence are similar. Where decorum accounts for situational obligation, prudence accounts for the representation of how one comes to terms with those obligations. A notion of decorum assumes a certain style, and a representation of prudence enacts that style. Thus, we can speculate that prudence is, in part, a type of style.

To Hariman (1992), the courtly style of political action and power took shape through explicit norms of decorum, like the performance of hierarchy, self-conscious ceremonies, and the like. Day and Kingsley supplied an embodiment of prudence that was somewhat courtly. The authors used refined speech to promote a refined type of pedagogy. They performed hierarchy through their metaphors and used conventions of address developed socially through Dwight's discourses. Wayland's style was different, it was
a bit more "middling," as Cmiel (1990) might say. Turner's style was middling. Morrill's style was too. However, both Turner and Morrill gave slight impressions of a technical style. Turner's style was particularly interesting because he performed what I have called an anti-intellectualism in order to shed himself of his classical roots. Morrill tried to adhere to this style, but had to adhere to the decorum of Congress. It might be that pedagogical change must discursively take shape through a subversion of stylistic norms in light of its conservative scene. Turner was cruel to be kind. His rhetoric was prudent for his particular occasion, but certainly some might perceive it as imprudent within the expanded scene of mid-nineteenth century American higher education. Thus, I suppose we can say that a sense of imprudence is often strategic stylistically, though one runs the risk of alienating particular audiences in that process. Wayland exhibited this idea as well.

This study of prudence also pursues a richer understanding of the complicated relationship between a rhetorical text and its immediate rhetorical situation, and between the persuasive text and its broader cultural context. As mentioned earlier, Jasinski (1997) recovers Wicheln's (1925) bifurcated sense of rhetorical context. On the one hand, there is an impression that audience and occasion bind rhetoric through certain "exigencies" and situational "constraints" (Bitzer, 1968). This first sense of context "functions as a prison cell that contains
advocate and text" (Jasinski, 1997, p. 199). However, there is another, broader view of context. This widened, cultural sense of context saturates the text "as the result of an organic process of emergence and development" (p. 200). There is, then, a specific rhetorical situation, but also a cultural context through which a text is not necessarily inhibited by the hyper-particular, but the wave of intellectual, institutional, political, religious, and economic forces that take shape through linguistic effort. This linguistic context lives in and through textual performance. Jasinski's point is that there is intentionality in a text, but also contextual manifestations of a broader cultural grammar embedded in that text, but not necessarily out of authorial purpose.

Hence, culture and situation bifurcate prudence. We can get an idea of a hyper-particularized sense prudence, but also a cultural, traditional conceptualization of prudence manifested in the rhetoric's broader symbolism. Thus, while traditionalists see prudence as particularized, we might speculate that there are two sets of prudence: "situational prudence" and "cultural prudence". My point is that a rhetor might have a specific idea of prudence in mind for the situation, but a reader might pick up another, perhaps an opposed sense of prudence within that discourse.

I agree with Wilson (1998) that the textual context is certainly not the same as the rhetorical situation, but I also think that the temporal movement within the text
illustrates how the rhetor or rhetors see the practical wisdom of a particularized political or pedagogical policy. Yet, the performance of prudence, though it is a coveted and contested space, depends on a traditional, cultural idea of prudence. A cultural representation of prudence necessarily resides within the text, even as a rhetor might subvert it for a particularized rhetorical goal.

We can also theorize that, in light of Morrill, some modes of prudence within rhetoric might be more open than others. Again, Morrill used synecdoche, filiopiety, and the agrarian myth as rhetorical resources for persuasive ends. Implied within those symbolic gestures was an idea of prudence. However, at the same time, Morrill supplied a conception of prudence linked to the commercialism of his day. This confused things. It generated an irony. I realize that irony can be strategic, but we can speculate that if there are two competing understandings or styles of prudence within a text, then it is doubtful if the rhetor can be overly successful because the interpretation is too open. That is to say that even while interpretations of prudence are always open, some rhetorical discourses open themselves up more than others.

We can also better speculate about the role of the rhetorical agent from a theoretical/historical perspective. Again, during the first few decades of the nineteenth century, the mainstay of the neo-classical rhetorical culture helped create a communitarian ethos. Day and
Kingsley's rhetoric exemplified this. Nevertheless, the process of building moral consensus through rhetoric gave way to the orator building up his or her own identity. Wayland illustrated this, so did Turner. The public arena became a place to promote an individualized personality. My dissertation thus illustrates the relationship between authorial ideas of prudence and communal conceptions of prudence. We can see in my texts a move away from a refined style of speech and communal ethos, toward an individualistic ethos through a search for pedagogical autonomy. Again, this change also illustrated the variability of prudence. In short, ethos is tied to prudence, and both are tied to communal notions of selfness.

When can also speculate about the role of prudence on the nature of rhetorical purpose. I suggest that embedded in any rhetorical message is a "prudential purpose," and in line with Jasinski (1997), it does not necessarily have to be intentional. We can, in a way, remove the agent to highlight a prudential purpose, apart from a specific, policy outcome, in order to interpret a perception of prudential conduct and appropriate discursive conduct that the rhetoric implies and/or explicates. An audience member might interpret an idea of prudence the author has not intended from a cultural, traditional standpoint. Therefore, a cultural sense of prudence seems to be more polysemic than a situational sense of prudence, but it is never fully so.
Hence, we can say there is also a strong relationship between prudence and an audience. Again, prudence is pretty much up for grabs. It is, as Wilson (1998) charges, a contested space. Audiences, or specific audience members, can read prudence from a preferred reading, a negotiated, or even an oppositional. But even as rhetors try to "fix" prudence within the discourse, there are always communal notions of prudences that audience members can cling to despite the rhetoric they have received. Hence, I think this idea is a bit different, and an elaboration on Wilson's thinking.

THE PROBLEM WITH PRUDENCE

The real problem with prudence is that it is a concept that does not allow itself to be put on a specific shelf, in a particular file, in a unique scheme. Prudence is as prudence does. Because of the nature of the dissertation as a learning process, I want here to offer my own thoughts, my final conclusions about the nature of prudence and its impact on rhetoric and nineteenth-century American higher education. To do so, I will ask several important questions, but try, in my humble way, to answer them.

First, is understanding prudence from an academic stance important? My answer is, of course, yes. I outlined why I think my study is important in my first chapter, but I missed something. If we comb through any contemporary newspaper we can find "prudence" all over the place. It is even in our popular media. A character on the popular
television series, "Saturday Night Live," made the word famous when he constantly mimicked former president George Bush in the late 1980's and early 90's. The famous line: "It wouldn't be prudent." It seems that, in its contemporary usage, to be imprudent means to be unaccountable, not informed, and the like. Much like the contemporary use of the word "rhetoric," the term "prudence" or "imprudent" is apparently another mindless "catch word" in a political environment over-populated with such "catch words." Rhetorical scholars need to re-introduce a more sophisticated way of thinking about words and discourse to the general political process.

Next, does prudence exist before discourse? My answer is yes and no. I do not think that an idea of prudence exists without a mode of prudence already articulated, if only implicitly, in a rhetorical community. However, an audience cannot deem a discourse prudent until it exists. The process, if it is a process, is cyclical and interactive.

Third, is prudence just an interpretation done by an audience? Where is prudence? This question echoes the previous question, and it is a difficult one to answer. I think that prudence is both a strategic endeavor, but also up for grabs by an audience. A rhetor wants to be prudent; even if being imprudent is prudent. Often times doing what is not appropriate is appropriate and strategic. Thus, a rhetor always attempts to be prudent, but the rhetor's
prudence has a double life. It is prudent, in some way, to the speaker, but an audience must also scrutinize that prudence.

Another question: Are speakers conscious of prudence? I would never be so arrogant as to explicitly state that I can delve into the mind of a speaker. However, I would speculate, in line with by previous paragraph, that a rhetor attempts to be prudent. The rhetor might not call it "prudence," but nonetheless, I would suggest there is always an urge in a speaker to do something that will result in rhetorical success. However, I do not think that, for example, Day and Kingsley thought to themselves, "Gee, it would be prudent to use Dwight's discursive elements of 'taste' and 'genius' here."

Is there a difference between prudent discourse and prudent action and behavior? My answer is yes. Throughout my dissertation I have attempted to illustrate that discursive practice and political action are closely aligned. One must talk the talk to walk the walk. However, I do think that one can have a prudent action in mind, but be imprudent in discursive practice, or vice versa.

Another thing that I must ask myself to consider is the relationship between "common sense" and prudence. Are they the same thing? Perhaps. There is a sense that prudence is not a "book smart" concept, but a "street smart" process. However, both "common sense" and "prudence" are communal to
the extent that they depend on popular opinion or resolve to give them life.

Also: What is the role of rhetorical imitation in all this? As "common sense" has it, imitation is the best form of flattery. Thus, imitation illustrates a reception of discursive practice and/or political action as prudent. I doubt a rhetor would imitate something he or she found imprudent.

Finally, what is the role of prudence and rhetoric on historical and contemporary higher education? This is an important question. I have argued that the struggle over nineteenth century higher education was struggle between norms or prudence. I think struggles of prudence are foundational to cultural change and new discursive practices. What emerged in Morrill's rhetoric were plural voices of prudence. This opened a wedge. We have now many voices of pedagogical prudence. We have a synthetic, almost pastiche mode of higher education. However, in line with Burke, this is all processive. Again, periods of history do not come and go, but shine, and do not shine so brightly. Burke (1969) thinks that what rises inevitably falls, but comes back later. This is his "over-all ironic formula" (p. 517). The voices we have in contemporary American higher education are in dialectic. We can, even now in the first year of 2000, see that the more well-rounded, thoroughly educated graduates are the types employers prize. Perhaps Day and Kingsley's communitarianism is once again intense.
FUTURE RESEARCH

More research on rhetoric, prudence, and nineteenth century higher education must take place to better equip ourselves to think about the Morrill Act and its historical and contemporary consequences from a rhetorical perspective. Further, we also need to improve our understanding of prudence and rhetoric theoretically. I suggest three specific modes of future research.

First, I would suggest that rhetorical scholars focus on other texts that provide information about the prudence of both classical and practical education during this early period of American higher education. For instance, a scholar could study specific educational plans from the agricultural presses. These plans might include the ones from the People's College, the State Agricultural College in New York, the Michigan Agricultural College, the Farmer's High School in Pennsylvania, to mention just a few. Apart from specific pedagogical plans, one might study the prudence of classical and practical education by analyzing the ongoing debates in the journals of that era. One could analyze the debates in, for instance, the Rural New Yorker, The Country Gentleman, the American Agriculturist, or the New England Farmer, again, to mention just a few.

Second, one could study the specific state plans for utilizing the money reaped from the land grant after the Civil War. Ross (1942) bolsters the point I made about Morrill's prudential conflict when he says that "The
possibilities of this plan of national aid [the Morrill Act] were only to be manifested in the course of time as the states utilized it in accord with their particular conditions and needs" (p. 67). The state debates, therefore, on how to manage the process would be very interesting to analyze.

Third, in accordance with Lucas (1996), I propose that contemporary pedagogical perspectives about curriculum have roots in some of the basic ideas of the Land Grant movement, and specifically in Morrill's ironic sense of prudence. It would be interesting to analyze contemporary persuasive messages that call for certain pedagogical policies and compare them to historical ones.

Apart from these three ideas, trying out the implications I have supplied from a theoretical and methodological stance would improve the way we theorize about prudence, rhetoric, and interpret both historic and contemporary pedagogical schemes.

Understanding the role of prudence in rhetorical discourse, no matter the method, is important. Certainly, it is significant in the understanding of political and cultural change, but also understanding pedagogical change. The focus on prudence, rhetoric and persuasive pedagogical messages will help us more fully understand how we talk about pedagogy, how we enact that pedagogy, and how we transform pedagogical perspectives.
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VITA

Jason Brian Munsell was born on July 27, 1971, at 3:10 in the morning. Though his folks lived in Tahlequah, Oklahoma, at the time, the author gasped his first breathe in nearby Muskogee because of the perceived condition of Tahlequah's various health care facilities.

Jason graduated from Tahlequah High School in 1989. He was co-Valedictorian of his class of two-hundred and seventy or so. He then ventured to Fayetteville to attend school at the University of Arkansas. He majored in Communication and graduated with his bachelor of arts degree in May of 1993. Jason began his master's program the following fall. Staying in Fayetteville, the author's first graduate school experience solidified his burgeoning love of the ideal of higher education and the endeavor and art of effective college teaching. He graduated with his master's degree in May, 1995.

Jason then taught at Rogers State University in Claremore, Oklahoma, and Tulsa Community College. In the Fall of 1996, the author moved to Baton Rouge to begin his doctorate program in Speech Communication at Louisiana State University. His emphasis was in rhetoric and public address, and he minored in educational leadership, research, and counseling. He earned the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in May, 2000.
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