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Shaping the Subject in "La Chanson De Roland" and in Hermann Broch's "Der Tod Des Virgil"

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**SHAPING THE SUBJECT IN
LA CHANSON DE ROLAND AND IN
HERMANN BROCH'S *DER TOD DES VIRGIL***

A Dissertation

**Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

In

The Department of French and Italian

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores two texts, each of a different era, language and culture, to discover what they may each tell us about the role played by writing in the construction of subjectivity. Accordingly, the first part of the dissertation departs from custom in treating the *Chanson de Roland* less as a repository of accumulated oral performance than as a document of singular textual integrity. Militating against the premise of textual unity is the uncontested fact that the *Roland* is clearly divided into two distinct narrative panels. This reading, however, reveals the manner in which the writer of the *Roland* integrates the text's two narrative panels by positioning 'history' against 'fiction,' and 'word' against 'deed' in order to effect a unified and unifying literary work. The argument of the first part of the dissertation concludes with the observation, rooted in the text, that the narrative divide mirrors a divide within the subject and the integration of narrative effects a reintegration of the split subject into a newly created subject of fiction.

Hermann Broch's *Tod des Vergil* brings to writing not the integration of 'history' and 'fiction,' but the integration of fiction with the most intimate sort of personal experience, namely, the experience of an encounter with death. Part

two of the dissertation examines how Broch, in attempting to 'realize' through fiction a prior encounter with death, creates within the text of the *TDV* a reflection of his own subjectivity. Broch's writing reveals to the reader that death is indeed realized (inscribed) in fiction, and that death is the mirror that does not merely reflect subjectivity, as does the verisimilitude of representation, but creates the subject through the fictionalization of personal experience. This reading examines closely the *TDV* for what it reveals to us about the complex and inextricable relation between fiction and subjectivity.

AN INTRODUCTION

The texts brought under close critical scrutiny over the pages of this dissertation are of vastly different times and cultures. *The Song of Roland*¹ (hereafter referred to as the *Roland*) was set down on parchment sometime between the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth centuries C.E. This work appears at the incipient stages of what was to become and continue to be a great and flourishing culture and, as such, plays no small role in shaping the succession of political entities that eventually come to define themselves as the French nation state. The composition of Hermann Broch's *The Death of Virgil*² (hereafter referred to as *T.D.V.*) on the other hand, was begun in a jail cell in the middle —which is to say the nadir— of twentieth century Europe. It was written not at the beginning but at what appeared to be, at least in the eyes of its author, the end of another long flourishing culture with its corresponding social and political orders.

In terms of their public reception the contrast between these two works could hardly have been greater. The *Roland* remains the rare example, alongside such like monuments as the *Aeneid*, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, of the literary work that embraces and is embraced by a culture and its peoples as

its social, political and cultural representation. *T.D.V.*, by striking contrast, is in many respects the orphan of its age; it is an obscure work not likely ever to enjoy anything more than a very limited readership. Its author is a Jew writing in German while in detention under Nazi guard in an Austrian prison cell. Broch had been placed in a corner of terrible isolation at the time this work was begun. And yet, as if in spite of this, Broch's literary works, the *T.D.V.* being the foremost among them, were intensely concerned with the shaping of the social, political and cultural spheres of the German speaking world. Some months after his release from prison and escape from Nazi Austria Broch was able to write his publisher, Daniel Brody: *"Ich glaube mit Recht sagen zu dürfen, daß der Vergil ein Werk ist, welches unbedingt der deutschen Sprache erhalten werden muß, u. z. umsomehr als es von einem Juden stammt.....das Buch ist Kulturtat....."* ('I believe I should be able to say that without question the *Virgil* is a work that must help preserve the German language; all the more so since it is written by a Jew.....the book (referring to *T.D.V.*) is 'culture-deed').³

Though the case for the *T.D.V.* remains to be made, there is little doubt among scholars of all stripes that the *Roland* is indeed *Kulturtat*. Little is known regarding the public reception of the *Roland* during and immediately following the period in which it was written. There is evidence to indicate that there was, in fact, an extended period during which the narration developed through oral performance. Tradition has it that parts of the story were sung by Norman warriors prior to the Battle of Hastings. Whether fact or apocrypha

the tradition is 'true' at least in the sense that it underscores the importance of this work in the cultural, social and political spheres of its time. The date at which the written text was produced has been determined to fall within a fairly limited scope of years. Scholars generally agree that this occurred sometime between the last quarter of the tenth and the first quarter of the eleventh centuries; some, however, notably Hans Erich Keller, move the date forward to as late as 1150, C.E.⁴ Over time all trace of the manuscripts that replicate what is now identified as the *Roland* disappear from public purview until, in 1837, what has come to be known as the Oxford manuscript is rediscovered and published by Francisque Michel.⁵ The scholarly debate in which I situate my reading of the *Roland* dates from this time.

Roland

The initial critical scholarship dating from the mid-nineteenth century and steeped in the positivist ideology so prevalent at the time holds considerable sway even to the present.⁶ Among the scholars and critics of that period it is indubitably Gaston Paris whose work and whose critical point of view continue to exert the greatest influence. Briefly stated, the scholarly premise upon which the work of Paris and that of his fellow positivists rests is that the true 'historical' account of the events that occurred at Roncevaux lie buried in bits and pieces within the text. The task of the scholar/critic, according to this methodology, is to dislodge from the manuscript those 'bits of history' from which to accurately reconstruct the events as they occurred. In order to 'attain history' the critic has to navigate the long oral tradition that

putatively flowed from the 'actual' event to its record as fiction. Hans Aarsleff gives a résumé of the methodology followed by Paris and others:

The battle of Roncevaux is dated 778, but *The Song of Roland* is some three hundred years younger. Since the facts of history could not possibly have been preserved so long in the absence of written records, the oral tradition was once more invoked to close the gap. Among the slightly different solutions, the best known was that of Gaston Paris, which Bédier made the chief object of his critique. Paris argued that short poems — "*Chants lyrico-épiques*" or historical ballads— had been composed by witnesses at the time of or soon after the events and preserved orally until they flowed into the later epics.⁷

A principal aim of this scholarship was the unearthing of true 'historical' events; no matter how greatly the text may be revered, it is evident that this tradition places fiction, and so writing, in a secondary or inferior position *vis-à-vis* the evidence of historical fact.

The 'historical fact,' such as it is employed by the positivist critical tradition, is decidedly oral; inevitably, the critic traces the path leading from one 'witness' and then another, each leading in greater proximity to the original event. The originary event may be the actual battle as it occurred or, in other permutations of this same line of critical thought, origin might be re-defined as the primal song from which all subsequent oral performances and, eventually, from which the *Ur-Text* itself would ultimately be derived. Among others Jean Rychner, inspired by the work of Milman Parry,⁸ held to the view that epic was essentially an oral tradition of which the written text is only a reasonably accurate transcription. Here the scholar faces the challenge of reclaiming the words of the bard. One effect of such a theoretical point of view is the critical bias toward an understanding of the written text as a lengthy suture of bits and pieces of 'song' left over from long oral tradition. In

addition to the valuation of speech over text is the always concurrent bias in favor of 'history' over 'fiction'.....the succession of bards, unlike fiction, would inevitably lead back to an originary witness.

Analogous to the attempt to 'reconstruct' from existent manuscripts a hypothetical oral tradition upon which, it is assumed, the surviving texts are based is the attempt to reconstruct the *Ur-text* working from the same set of existent manuscripts. The methods used in the scholarly pursuit of the *Ur-text* borrow substantially from the editorial principles developed by the positivist-influenced nineteenth century scholar Karl Lachmann.⁹ Lachmann's method supposed that the same textual errors would not occur in manuscripts that were independently produced; if the same set of textual accidents occurred in two or more manuscripts then one of these manuscripts would necessarily be originary and the others mere transcriptions. The scholar could then compare and discard until attaining the manuscript from which all others were supposedly derived. But of course there are no *Ur-texts* to be found and so, pursuant of the methodology based on sound positivist principles, one had to make do with a reconstructed text that would be based on bits and pieces of isolated textual fragments that would be deemed 'authentic.'

Though versions of this method of textual 'recovery' are still widely practiced even today a revolutionary alternative was introduced almost a century ago with Joseph Bédier's edition of the *Roland* (1913). His approach was disarmingly simply, as Aarsleff explains:

He based his text on a single manuscript of the seven he had because he found that it was on the whole, in purely pragmatic terms, the simplest, most reasonable, and most coherent, with good French

grammar and consistent spelling, or in short the manuscript "one is the least inclined to correct." He did not presume to know or be able to divine what the original would have been like.¹⁰

There is more to Bédier's method, to be sure, than mere practicality or the scholar's modesty when confronted with the mysteries of manuscript production. Bédier's method points to a new definition of 'history;' at least in so far as history is to be recovered from the text. Though the point is nowhere made explicit in Bédier we are able to easily deduce the following regarding the virtues of each of these two competing methods of editorial practice. The effort to establish something as near as possible to the originary text is essentially an effort to approximate to the nearest degree possible the original historic event, whether that event be understood as the primal text or the actual historic 'occurrences;' in the case of the *Roland*, the actual battle at Roncevaux upon which this text is based. In the ideal, the perfectly reconstructed text would always lead us back to the eye-witness, someone who was there, who saw and who recorded the events as they transpired. This methodology succumbs to the seductions of the text that lays claim to its own authenticity by an internal appeal to the eye-witness of its 'author.' The *Song of Alexis* claims for itself to have been taken literally out of the hands of the saint whose life is its subject; the *Roland* tells its reader that the account is written by St. Giles who was present on the field as battle was being waged. History, as it is recovered in the reconstruction of the primal text, is reassuringly 'factual;' the 'history' of Bédier's text, to the contrary, remains unapologetically fiction.¹¹

By choosing to publish, with only the few necessary emendations the 'best' of the available manuscripts (the Oxford) as his edition of the *Roland* Bédier tacitly concedes that the 'event' of which he is in search as editor is essentially a textual one. Dispensing with the essentially positivist notion that the text is a collection of indicators from which some exterior truth might be deduced, the reader of Bédier's edition is led to conclude that the historical truth of which scholars have been ardently in search is embedded in the text's own fiction. In other words, rather than pursuing the original event that has been subsequently recounted by the text, whether 'original event' is to be understood as the actual battle at Roncevaux or some first oral performance of which the manuscripts are mere transcriptions, Bédier premises his editorial work upon the assumption that the historical event is, in all simplicity, nothing other than the creation of the text itself. The *Roland* has been 'authored' and as such creates its own 'history' all the while encouraging the reader in the notion that it is nothing more than the record of those events which are presented at the hand of its supposed actual eye-witness –the ruseful St. Giles.

For the purposes of this dissertation the differences between these two critical approaches can be summed up in this way: the presumption of an attainable *Ur-text* ultimately carries with it the assumption that the narrative's historical subject is described by the text. By gathering details from the various available manuscripts the subject of the narration can be described to an ever greater degree of accuracy. If, on the other hand, one accepts the idea of a 'best' manuscript, then emphasis is thereby placed not on the

superiority of prior evidence but on the integrity of the fiction; the 'best' manuscript presents the authored fiction in a form that has the fewest grammatical errors and that renders the narration in a clear and coherent fashion. The further implication would be that the subject of the narrative's historical subject is one created by the fiction itself. Rather than go in search of 'Roland' in sources from which the manuscript is thought to be derived, the reader of Bédier's edition finds that Roland is embedded in the fiction, is a creation of the text; no need to go searching elsewhere for him.

The theoretical basis of Bédier's editorial method implies that the 'subject' of the *Roland* is not to be found in a lost manuscript or in an imperfectly recorded historical event but in the fiction itself; the 'best' manuscript would then give the best account of the sought after 'textual' event. Bédier's brilliant contribution to the scholarship of the *Roland* goes largely unappreciated, in my estimation, so long as scholarly debate continues to center on the quest for the reconstructed *Ur-text* or toward marking out a hypothetical trail backward in time from manuscript, to oral performance, to 'actual' eye-witness of the events at Roncevaux. It has only been within the recent past that some few medievalists have begun to turn attention to an examination of the events within the fiction of the *Roland* recognizing in them points of great historical interest. Among those whose work demonstrates an understanding of the full implications of Bédier's contribution are Albert Girard in his article from 1969 "L'Axe Roland-Ganelon: Valeurs en conflit dans *la Chanson de Roland*," Eugene Vance in his article from 1979 "Roland and Charlemagne: The Remembering Voices and the Crypt," and Bernard

Cerquiglini in his article from 1981 “*Roland à Roncevaux, ou la trahison des clercs.*” All approach the *Roland* with an interest in the historical forces that are generated out of, rather than represented by, the fiction of the text.

Through the work of these and other like-minded scholars, the argument for a reading of the *Roland* as a fiction of great historical consequence has been gathering. Peter Haidu brings these arguments together with his own highly original contribution in a work that has proved to be of cardinal importance to Rolandean scholarship: his book, from 1993, entitled *The Subject of Violence*. Haidu makes the case for the *Roland* as the fiction from the late tenth to early eleventh century that purposefully prepares the way for the transition of France from feudal society to modern nation state. The supporting argument of this work is as clear as it is thorough: the *Roland* is of greatest historical significance not to the era of which it pretends to report but to the era in which it was written. The text is a powerful ideological engine that effectively creates a new *épistémè*, a structure of state that is no longer feudal but monarchical.

I have chosen Bédier’s *Roland* as the working edition for this study for reasons that should now be obvious. I have mentioned only a scant few names of scholars whose contributions represent the recent tradition in which my own work situates itself. No one single contribution is so important to this effort as that of Peter Haidu. The chapter of this dissertation treating of the *Roland* begins with Haidu’s thesis concerning the central role this text plays in the transition that France undergoes at the turn of the eleventh century moving from a prior feudal structure to modern nation state. My particular

interests have to do with the role of the *Roland* in the creation of a new mode of subjectivity, one that is fashioned in accordance with the precepts of the modern (centralized) state.

The first of the four sections in this chapter, that entitled “M-Munjoie,” examines the manner in which the *Roland* creates among the French a strong political center focused on the emblem immediately associated with the emperor Charlemagne. This reading follows the rapid transformation within the fiction of the *Roland* of a political and social order in which power and authority is dispersed, into an order in which power and authority are concentrated in the person of the emperor. The progress in the centralization of power and authority within this text parallels the progress of the materialization of the emperor’s war cry ‘Munjoie’ into a banner of the same appellation.

The segment “Outlaws” demonstrates how the introduction of a new *épistémè* into the old feudal structure of state is intentional and comes into being by way of authorial ruse. Here the ‘conversion’ of the French to a new mode of subjectivity is traced in its progress over the course of the narrative of the *Roland*. By the end of the *Roland* the French are seen to have unwittingly abrogated the old order of law in favor of the new. Their forfeiture of the old law is total and irrevocable. They are led to a betrayal of their most closely held social and political convictions by a sovereign/author (Charlemagne/Tuoldus) who calculates with precision the transgressions that will lead to an irrevocable commitment to the new social and political order.

"Honur e Dreiture," the third of four segments, looks at the ideological transformation that occurs at the center of the text, in exactly the space where the text's two semi-autonomous narratives join together. The *Roland* does indeed bring together two narratives which seem apart from one another. Although other critics have argued that the *Roland's* two narrative units were originally independent of one another or that the second narrative is a later addition appended to the 'original' text based on oral tradition, I demonstrate how the narrative 'gap' is integral to the workings of the larger text. The break in narrative allows for a negative textual space in which the feudal concept of *honur* is translated into the concept of divine right (*dreiture*), a fundamental concept in the creation of the structure of monarchy.

The *Roland* chapter concludes with the segment *"Veire Pate(R)ne"*. Drawing from observations made in the chapter's previous three segments, and, in particular, upon the discussion of the bi-partite construction of the text, I examine how the exchange of power and authority from feudal state to monarchy is analogized in the exchange of authority from Roland to Charlemagne. Critical to understanding the nature of the transition from one social, political and cultural order to another is the understanding of how the change comes about through a translation of the old into the new. Roland is a reduction of the old order to a single 'letter' planted in the heart of the new state. Roland has been appropriated to the new social and political order and in the process of appropriation he has been transformed. In the process of seeing to it that Roland becomes 'monumentalized', Charlemagne rewrites the 'prescription' for his former vassal's subjectivity, and he does so by rewriting

the narrative created by Roland's very deed while on the field of battle at Roncevaux.

Virgil

The critical tradition supporting the work of Hermann Broch and of his last literary effort, the *T.D.V.*, in particular, is fragmentary and limited in its ability to make this very ambitious, if not to say arduous, literary project comprehensible to a wider audience. When one considers the nature of the work and the circumstances under which it was written none of this should come as a surprise. Though incidents in the life of the author, specifically, his detention at Alt Aussee and the imminent threat of death experienced there, play a critical role in the genesis of the *T.D.V.* we must turn not to the biographies¹² but to the correspondence to attain a grasp of the play between death and the subject that is very much a part of this work.

There is no question but that *T.D.V.* draws to an unusual degree from the life experience of its author. When in a letter to his publicist, Dr. Kurt Wolf (late 1943),¹³ Broch declares that "The phenomenon of death stands at the center of this Life-book" (*Das Phänomen des Todes steht also im Mittelpunkt dieses Lebensbuches.....*), he may just as well have added that this same 'death' remained at the center of his own life. In a missive of later date addressed to Hermann Weigend (Feb. 12, 1946),¹⁴ Broch reveals this about his *T.D.V.*: "It was not merely the death of Virgil, it was one's own death imagined" (*Es war nicht mehr das Sterben des Vergil, es wurde die Imagination des eigenen Sterbens*) Finally, in a letter to Aldoux Huxley dated

May 10, 1945,¹⁵ Broch states that ".....the reader must be brought to this [experience of death] through exactly the same process, that I have worked through....." ('.....*vielmehr mußte der Leser dazu gebracht werden, genau den gleichen Prozeß, den ich durchgemacht habe.....*'). From this we conclude that it is Broch's intent to share with the reader his own experience with death. Biographical material cannot explain meaning but it can, in this case, illuminate greatly the operations of death and the central role death plays in this highly esoteric last novel.

Recourse to the correspondence as a source of illumination acquires further justification in that the *T.D.V.* records a particularly intimate relation between subject and text. This novel is, in a manner of speaking, one lengthy journal entry recording the author's own experience in the encounter with death, one he attempts to share with the reader only after the fact. The author's 'shared' death has both its private and its public aspects. Broch was not merely near death at Alt Aussee, rather he was very nearly consumed by the forces of social and political disintegration swirling about Europe at mid-twentieth century. Broch did not wish to merely record a death, rather he chose to write himself into death by means of this manuscript, effectively begun during the two or so weeks of his imprisonment. Broch does not offer the reader the mere experience, inevitable to be sure, with death; rather he offers the reader a dying into the social and political chaos that inhabits the text. The Virgil of *T.D.V.* is a subject in the process of being consumed by his own writing; there the reader sees Virgil dying into his own text, offering himself in immolation to his own work (cf.: p. 268). Hence his choice of Virgil,

whose fictionalized death becomes the vehicle to carry the reader through the labyrinth of this experience.

The criticism that has thus far come into print concerning *T.D.V.* has, to my knowledge, been mostly silent on the three point relation, 'death-subject-text,' that I believe critical to an understanding of this novel. The biographies bring to light little of relevance to the topic; it is, after all, out of the general purview of biographies to examine issues of intense critical speculation. There have been critics to address issues that, in one manner or another, do touch on questions of subjectivity in the text. Broch's sometime interest in Jungian psychoanalysis has led one writer,¹⁶ a renowned disciple of Jung, to apply that methodology to an understanding of the *T.D.V.* Another critic¹⁷ attempts to place Broch in a tradition of mysticism, though to my reading, *T.D.V.* seems to fit even less well into that classification. The constructed subject of Broch's *T.D.V.* exasperates any such attempt at understanding by means of prior systems of thought.

Yet, because of the permeating influence of models of subjectivity based on Broch's reading in the literature of phenomenology, certain critics, such as Manfred Durzak¹⁸ and Erich Kahler,¹⁹ well grounded in this philosophical area, have done much to advance an understanding of brochean subjectivity as it is rendered in *T.D.V.* Maurice Blanchot, to my knowledge, is the only writer who approaches *T.D.V.* with a critical interest in the interrelation between death, text and the subject; thus his work, in particular the article on Broch that forms a chapter of his *Livre à Venir*, serves as a recurrent point of reference in this study of Broch's last novel.

The first of the three segments of this chapter, *Ich-Verlußt* (*Dissolution of the 'I'*), begins with an examination of Broch's Virgil, whose subjectivity, in the first pages of *T.D.V.*, is seen undergoing radical disintegration. From radical disintegration of subjectivity, Broch then suddenly shifts to the primal moment of subject identification, the moment of naming at birth. Broch first establishes the 'name' as the portal through which the subject enter into language. This segment follows the progression, as it unfolds with precision and in exacting detail, in which subject identity is constructed within the framework of the name. Three stages are presented: 1) the name given at birth is an as yet empty vessel; 2) the name 'Virgil' attains rank in an 'unending series of names-of-fathers;' 3) Virgil's name/identity breaks with the unending series of names-of-fathers' (*die undendliche Reihe der Väter*, p. 178).

The segment entitled *Schicksal* (Fate) examines Virgil as a figure of ongoing subjective inter-reflection. Broch's 'subject' is not a thing but a function with three points of reference: self, self as other, and an unquantifiable 'real' immanent to the field of language —represented as death and the text— into which these aspects of subjectivity can be glimpsed in reflection. We conclude with a consideration of the phenomenon of 'World-doubling' (*Weltverdopplung*), a term employed by Broch to indicate that the subject is written twice into language, as 'self' and as other. 'World-doubling' in *T.D.V.* also implies a representation of the world as a state of constant exchange in which 'truth' is translated into the 'real' and the 'real' into 'truth.'

The chapter ends with the segment 'Rome', which tests one of *T.D.V.*'s implied premises, namely, that the radical restructuring of a given social, political, cultural order begins with the reconfiguration of a particular individual subjectivity. We look at ways in which the 'real' is predicated upon subjective cognition. Next, from the newly reconfigured subject, 'Virgil,' comes the hope of a rejuvenation of a social order having become moribund. Next we examine the scene in which the emblem of Augustus' validity, the purple toga, is metaphorically shown to be without color and desiccated. It is the language of Virgil's text that will 're-ink' the cloth of Augustus' authority. The chapter ends with a look at the power of the 'word' to recreate the failing social and political order of Augustan Rome.

PART I
ROLAND

M-MUNJOIE

As is typically the case with epic, the *Chanson de Roland* (hereafter referred to as *Roland*) begins in the middle of things. The opening scene informs the reader that after seven hard years the conflict between Saracens and Franks, one way or the other, is about to end. Not long thereafter the text enters into the feast of carnage that will leave the best *chevaliers* of both camps dead on the field of battle at Roncevaux. Subsequent to the slaughter, the Emperor Charles finally arrives after the fact, not having yet drawn his sword in combat. Charles returns as if merely to take care of unfinished business. He then proceeds to reclaim the loss of honor, to defeat the remaining Saracens and to take Spain back into the confines of the Christian world. Charles' return is decidedly anticlimactic.

This second half of the *Roland*, beginning with the emperor's return, has often struck the reader as supererogatory, a surplus of narrative extending beyond the story's main event, namely, the death of Roland at Roncevaux. Significantly, the narrative expansion that begins with *laisse* CLXXXVIII maintains the illusion with which the text begins, that of always

being in the middle of things. It also perpetuates the story's chief fiction, namely, that the *Roland* presents merely an episode within an historical continuum that stretches forward uninterrupted from the beginnings of the Christian world. If that world is fragmented, the text informs us, it is synchronically so in terms of the ever-present opposition between Saracen and Frank, Christian and Pagan. With the eradication of that other, the Pagan/Saracen, all can be made well, can be made whole again; at least for the moment. A closer examination of the text, however, reveals another split, one that runs like a fault line through the center of the Frankish camp and which threatens the political stability of Charles' realm. In the following essay I will trace out this internal divide, particularly in relation to the individual subject, where the reader encounters a widening gap between the significance of name and body, between substance and sign.

Though Charlemagne is not physically present at the battle of Roncevaux, neither is he altogether absent. Inadvertently or otherwise, Roland, Roland's boon companion Oliver, and the text's chief cleric, the archbishop Turpin, reconstruct a presence for Charlemagne in the vocalization of a unifying sign that is the war cry *Monjoie*.¹ *Monjoie* is the name of the *oriflame*, the banner that the emperor will carry forward into battle. Over the course of the text this sign of Charles undergoes numerous transformations in both name and in substance. In particular, after the battle at Roncevaux, through certain semantic and ritualistic manipulations, this vocal sign *Monjoie* will attain a materiality that Charles, as we shall see, somehow lacks.

Our initial narrative approach to Charlemagne comes via the agency of Blancandrin, the Saracens' chief negotiator. He arrives at the camp of the Franks to offer terms of a costly peace. This is the picture we are given upon his encounter, which is the reader's first encounter, with the emperor:

Blanche ad la barbe e tut flurit le chef,
Gent ad le cors e le cuntenant fier:
S'est kil demandet, ne l'estoet enseinger. (ll. 117 - 119)²

(His beard is **white** and his head **hoary**,
His body is **noble**, his countenance **fierce**;
If anyone seeks him, there is no need to point him out.)

The text describes his body in terms more general than particular –noble (*gent*), fierce (*fier*)— placing into question the nature of Charles' own subjective identity. Employing the adjectives *blanche* (white) and *flurit* (flowery), the description makes use of a rhetorical semiology which throughout the narrative connotes virility and rejuvenescence as well as wisdom and old age.³ In later descriptions, not of Charles but of his Saracen counterpart the emir Baligant, the adjectives *blanc* and *flurit* will appear again to signal a renewed vitality:

Tant par ert blancs cume flur en estet... (l. 3162)

(It was as white as a flower in summer...)

Blanche ad la barbe ensement cume flur... (l. 3173)

(His beard was white just like a flower...)

"Blanche ad la barbe cume flur en avrill." (l. 3503)

('His beard is white as a flower in April.')

Charlemagne, at the point at which we first encounter him, stands unmarked, 'un-inked' –*Blanche...et tut flurit* (white...and in bloom); Charlemagne will

generate his own text with its own meaning not through deed in battle, as does Roland, but through a control over the signs and the language of the subsequent text.

Finally, there remains this to be said about the use of the adjective *blanc*: throughout the text it serves as attribute to two primary categories of things, namely, cloth (in this I include hair and beard taking into account a commonplace of rhetorical equivalencies [see Curtius, in particular the example of Góngora des Vizekönigs von Neapel p. 111 - ff.])⁴ and armaments; the blank page of the unwritten geste and the swords of Charlemagne and Roland, those burnished instruments by which narrative will be inscribed on the field of battle. One notable exception must be made for a whiteness that pertains to neither cloth nor armaments, the twice mentioned '*blanc sarcou*,' the white sarcophagus –literally, the eater of flesh– that which consumes flesh, consumes one narrative that is to be replaced by another; but more on this later.

If at lines 1350 and 1378 the cry *Monjoie* continues to evoke Charles as referent, at l. 1260 a new alignment develops between the emperor's sign and those engaged in combat. To the Saracen boast that the Franks will die in place, Turpin, the archbishop/cleric who will die fighting at Roland's side, responds, rather incongruously, swearing that the Franks will, in fact, not flee:

"Culvert paien, vos i avez mentit!
Carles, me sire, nus est guarant tuz dis;
Nostre Franceis n'unt talent de fuir.
Voz cumpaignuns feruns trestuz restifs.
Nuveles vos di : mort vos estoet susfrir.
Ferez, Franceis! Nul de vus ne s'ublitt!
Cist premer colp est nostre, Deu mercit!"
"Munjoie" escriet por le camp retenir.

(ll. 1253 - 60)

(‘Vile pagan, you have told a lie!
Charles, my lord, will always guard us well
Our French have no desire to flee.
All your companions will be laid to rest by us,
I have news for you: you must suffer death.
Strike, Frenchmen, let no one of you forget his duty.
This first blow is ours, thank God’
He shouts ‘Monjoie!’ to hold the field.)

In remarkable contrast to the passage at line 1179 –We must not forget Charles’ battle-cry’ (*L’enseigne Carle n’i devum ublier.....*)– Turpin here states plainly that the coming strikes will be for none other than those present in body on the field of battle, that their deeds here will perpetuate no memory other than their own. Charlemagne’s failure to meet the most fundamental obligation due his vassals, to protect them from impending death, undermines his position of authority among the Franks at Roncevaux and places in jeopardy the inclusion of his name in the commemoration at Roncevaux. Turpin revives the spirits of the warring Franks and in the process anchors them to the field of battle through a re-appropriation of the sign, *Monjoie*, as their own. Charles’ ‘presence’ seems waning at this point and the repeated insistence that the Franks will stand firm does not answer so much to the Saracen taunts as it does to a growing awareness of the fading resolve among the Franks. Turpin’s harangue also reveals a split in logic, one that seems cynical at the core; in urging the Franks not to ‘forget themselves’; he reminds them that they have already been forgotten by Charles.

At a later moment in the text, Turpin reappears to decide the notorious dispute between Oliver and Roland over whether or not to call Charles to their aid against the overwhelming numbers of advancing Saracens. Oliver urges a

call to reinforcements; Roland, citing the 'pride of the *geste*,' determines to do otherwise. In fact, it would already be too late. Charles' return will not rescue anyone, and this the *chevalier* at Roncevaux, thanks to Turpin's instruction, now well know. Plainly, Turpin's wish is to save not the lives, but the remembrance of those who have fallen, and remembrance, as we shall soon witness, is subject to easy appropriation. Turpin initiates an ending to the events at Roncevaux by counseling Roland to blow the *olifant*, summoning Charles not as savior, but as subsequent witness to events that will already have transpired.⁵

"Nostre Franceis i descendrunt a pied,
 Truverunt nos e morz e detrenchez,
 Leverunt nos en bieres sur sumers,
 Si nus plurrunt de doel e de pitet,
 Enfuerunt nos en aîtres de musters;
 N'en mangerunt ne lu ne porc ne chen."
 Respunt Rollant: "Sire, mult dites bien."

(ll. 1746 – 51)

('Our Frenchmen will dismount here;
 They will find us dead and hacked to pieces
 They will raise us on to pack-horses in coffins.
 They will shed tears of sorrow and pity for us
 They will bury us in a church's hallowed ground.
 No wolf or pig or dog will devour us.'
 Roland responds: 'Sir, you say well.')

The profane and the divine intertwine in this substitution of the promise of paradise (l. 1479) for glory and pomp in burial; throughout the *Roland*, this warrior cleric is a curious blend of the sacred and the profane. One quickly remembers, however, that the subtle Turpin addresses here only Roland and Oliver, who will indeed be served in burial with the most elaborate ritual performance; the brutal fact remains that all others --those excluded from this dialogue will also be excluded from any particular remembrance-- will be placed in a shallow grave on the plains just outside Saragossa. The reader

might well imagine that they will indeed suffer dogs and swine and wolves digging at their bodies through a thin covering of soil (cf.: l. 1751 'No wolf or pig or dog will devour us'...(“*N'en mangerunt ne lu ne porc ne chen*”). All but Roland, Oliver and Turpin will suffer a fate amazingly similar to that of Tervagant and Mohammed, the Saracen idols who, the text tells us, meet their end in corporal desecration --‘They seize Tervagant’s carbuncle / And fling Mohammed into a ditch / Where pigs and dogs bite and trample on him’(*E Turvagan tolent sun escarbuncle, / enz en un fossét butent / E porc e chen le mordent e defulent*, ll. 2590 - 91).

When Charles does finally return to Roncevaux it is with the host under his command shouting *Monjoie!*, a sign rejuvenated by the immediately preceding ‘commemoration’ at Roncevaux, a sign soon to be made once again interchangeable with the very name of Charlemagne. Naimes, who is as sincere as he is narrow and literalist in his interpretation of Frankish law and custom, replaces Turpin as the one chiefly responsible for negotiating a new relation between the *chevalier* and ‘their’ sign:

Respont dux Neimes: “Baron i fait la peine!
Bataille i ad, par le men escientre.
Cil l’at traît ki vos en roevet feindre,
Adubez vos, si criez vostre enseigne,
Si sucurez vostre maisnee gent
Asez oez que Rollant se dementet!” (ll. 1790 - 95)

(Duke Naimes replies: ‘A true vassal is pouring out his suffering!
There is a battle, so help me.
The one who begs you to pretend you have heard nothing has betrayed him.
Arm yourself, shout out your battle cry,
And ride to the aid of your noble household.
You can hear clearly Roland signaling his distress!’)

Verse 1793, which associates the cry of *Monjoie* with the covering of protective armaments, anticipates the materialization of the sign *Monjoie* as

the sword (2508) and the cloth (3094), instruments of inscription, which we shall momentarily take under examination. The word *feindre* of the preceding line plays a key role in our understanding of this line. In its Latin derivative *figere* –to form an image, a simulacrum, a fiction of the real– Naimes might well be pointing an accusing finger at the one who has seduced the Franks into confusing truth as representation with the presentation of the body in battle. The exemplary instance of the body as self-revelatory fiction comes at the moment when the fiction of Roland's exploits and the presence of his body in battle merge at verses 1638–40: 'He encountered Roland in his path; / Without ever having seen him, he recognized him in truth / By his fierce look and his noble body, / His gaze and his whole countenance'. (*Enmi sa veie ad encuntret Rollant; / Enceis ne l' vit, si l' cunut veirement / Al fier visage e al cors qu'il out gent / E al reguart e al contement...*). In this reading Naimes instructs the chevaliers to rid themselves of their corporal identity and in its place to assume a unifying identity under the wraps of the newly reconfigured war cry *Monjoie*; it is a first step into the eventual materialization of the sign.

Monjoie's rejuvenescence, its return to potency promises to the Franks who are left under Charlemagne's command a protection that it failed to afford the *chevalier* left at Roncevaux; hence, the materialization of *Monjoie* marks a definitive split within the Frankish camp. The sign *Monjoie* metaphorically cuts the world of the Franks in two, dividing those who will receive its protection, the subjects of a newly constituted order under Charles, and those for whom its protection was forfeit: the fallen at Roncevaux. Prescient of the death and

dismemberment that will be part of the process by which Charles' sign (*l'enseigne Carlun*) will reconstitute itself, Roland is the one who initiates the circulation of 'sign and remembrance' between the Saracen and the Frank camps:

Puis escrient l'enseigne paenisme.
Ço dist Rollant: "C'i recevrums martyrie..." (ll. 1921 - 22)

...
Quant en cest camp verdrat Carles, mi sire,
De Sarrazins verrat tel discipline,
Cuntre un des noz en truverat morz .XV.,
Ne lesserat que nos ne beneïsse.' (ll. 1928 - 31)

(Then they shout out the pagan battle cry.
Thus says Roland: 'Here we will receive martyrdom...'

...
'When Charles, my lord, comes to this battlefield,
He will see such a slaughter of the Saracens
That for every one of ours he will find fifteen of theirs dead.
He shall not fail to bless us.)

In antiphonal response to the Saracen war cry Roland attaches Christian martyrdom to a pagan sign; that the 'pagan sign' (*l'enseigne paënisme*) remains unnamed up to this moment in the narrative facilitates the operation of a graft; Roland inscribes Christian martyrdom onto an unmarked sign that emanates not from Charles, but from the pagan host. The renewal of Charles' sign does not occur without a troubling exchange taking place. Anticipating Charles' blessing of the dead, Roland mingles Saracen and Frank in the *post-mortem* landscape of this scene –in a ratio of 15 to 1– glossing over the annihilation of his own men, as though it were merely incidental to the slaughter of the Saracens. The absurdity of his logic stares out at the reader. Where in the annals of Christian martyrdom do the martyred wreak destruction fifteen-fold upon their persecutors? One plausible solution to this apparent paradox would be if Saracens and Franks had somehow both fallen

victim to the same cause, if both were martyrs to a new order established under Charlemagne and signed by the name *Monjoie*.

Toward the close of this same episode, Roland further elaborates the interconnectedness of the two camps, Saracen and Frank:

Ki lui veïst Sarrazins desmembrer,
Un mort sur altre geter,
De bon vassal li poüst remembrer.
L'enseigne Carle n'i volt mie ublier.
"Munjoie!" escriet e haltement e cler... (ll. 1970 - 74)

(Anyone who had seen him **dismembering** Saracens,
Piling up one corpse upon another,
Would have **remembered** what a good vassal was.
Nor does he want to forget Charles' battle-cry,
He shouts out 'Monjoie!' loud and clear.)

The text presents slaughter and remembrance in a circularity moving from sign (pagan) l. 1921 to martyrdom (Christian) l. 1922 and back again from martyrdom (pagan) l. 1970 to sign (Christian) l. 1974. Whatever the numerical proportions Charles, upon his return to Roncevaux, will find just such an intermingling of Christian and pagan bodies:

Il nen i ad ne veie ne senter,
Ne voide tere, ne alne ne plein pied,
Que il n'i ait o Franceis o païen. (ll. 2399 - 2401)

(There is no road or path there,
No open ground, no yard or foot of land,
Not covered with a Frenchman or a pagan.)

Irrespective of former distinctions of faith, culture and allegiance, the text presents Saracen and Frank as a unified tableau of bodily remains; *desmembrer* becomes *re-membrer*, dismemberment causes remembrance, or the dis-memberment of those left on the field at Roncevaux will be re-membered, reconstituted though in a new configuration under the sign of Charles. What Roland cannot bring himself to articulate, what he attempts to camouflage by

signaling out the destruction of the Saracens, is the fact that the potency, the memorability of *l'enseigne Carlun* depends as much upon the dismemberment of the Franks at Roncevaux as it does upon the that of the Saracens.

The last mention on the field of Roncevaux of either the cry *Monjoie* or its generic *l'enseigne* hales from the forces under Charles' command as he returns from the pass at Cize:

Carles repeiret od sa grant ost, li ber;
De cels de France odum les graisles clers;
Grant est la noise de "Munjoie!" escrier. (ll. 2149 - 51)

(Charles, the brave, is returning with his great army.
We hear the clear bugles of the men of France;
The noise from those who shout 'Monjoie!' is great.)

These verses point not merely to a Saracen recognition of the return/rebirth (*repeirer*) of the Frankish forces under Charlemagne but also the rejuvenescence of the sign *Monjoie* 'The noise of those who shout '*Monjoie!*' is great'...(Grant est la noise de *Monjoie* escrier). This rebirth will be confirmed at the next narrative encounter with the sign of Charles. After the defeat at Roncevaux, the text makes the first mention of an association between Charles' ensign (*Munjoie*) and Charles' sword (*Joyeuse*); it is the narrative's first attempt to offer an explanation of the origins of a newly constituted order under Charles:

Ceinte Joiuse, unches ne fut sa per,
Ki cascun jur muet .XXX. clartez.
Asez savum de la lance parler,
Dunt nostre Sire fut en la cruz nasfret:
Carles en ad la mure, mercit Deu;
En l'oret punt l'ad faite manuvrer.
Pur ceste honur e pur ceste bontet,
Li nume Joiuse l'espee fut dunet.
Baruns franceis nel deivent ublier:
Enseigne en unt de "Munjoie!" crier;
Pur ço nes poet nule gent cuntrester. (ll. 2501 - 11)

[[He] girt about him his sword Joyeuse, which has always been without peer.
And whose (light) changes thirty times a day.
We could say a good deal about the Lance
With which Our Lord was wounded on the Cross;
Charles has its point, thanks be to God,
Which he has had mounted in the golden pommel of his sword.
Through this honor and through this grace,
The name Joyeuse was given to the sword.
French barons must not forget it:
From it they derive their battle cry 'Monjoie.'
For this reason no race on earth can withstand them.)

C[Seinte] Joiuse receives a consecration making it sacred beyond all other instruments of war; although, or perhaps because, up until this point in the narrative, the reader has yet to see it strike a single blow. *Joyeuse*, Charles' battle sword, performs another crucial function in incorporating the history of events at Roncevaux into the larger history of the Christian world. By merit of the contents of its pommel, *Joyeuse* leads the narrative to 'the Zero Hour' (*die Stunde Null*) of the Christian era, which for cleric/scribe would be the beginning of eschatological time. *Joyeuse*, encasing the spearhead that pierced the divine Redeemer hanging from the cross, reaches into the interior of the body of God, and if for no other reason than this, the text finds justification in proclaiming this an instrument of both war and narrative: '...which had no peer' (*unches ne fut sa per*). This last remark --*unches ne fut sa per*-- as well as the description of the luminescent qualities of the sword invites comparison with *Durendal*, Roland's own blade, and we shall see that the two swords here contest priorities as the instruments of historical inscription.

If only in terms of their respective properties of light, there is no question, if one were to grant an implicit trust in the honesty of the text, but that *Joyeuse* is the superior instrument of historical writing. Returning to the

last mention of *Durendal* while still in Roland's possession we find that it, too, is presented in terms of a description of its luminescence:

"E! Durendal, cum es bele, e clere, e blanche!
Cuntre soleill si luises e reflambes!" (ll. 2316 - 17)

('O, Durendal, how fair you are, how clear and white!
How you shimmer and sparkle against the sun.)

Brilliant though it may be, because of stated physical properties --'how clear and white!' ('*e clere e blanche!*')—*Durendal* appears to do no more than to reflect light while there exists at least the suspicion that *Joyeuse* is able to generate light, of its own power --'And whose (light) change thirty times a day'...(*Ki cascun jur muet .XXX. clartez*). This is supported by further evidence in the only other passage within the text to mention the name *Joyeuse*:

Ki pur soleill sa clartet n'en muet... (l. 2990)

(Whose brilliance is not diminished by the sun.)

The light emanating from *Joyeuse* is both lambent and able to rival the light of the sun in its intensity.

Joyeuse's other mark of superiority is that its relic is a unity ('One'), whereas the relics of *Durendal* are multiple, namely, 'a tooth of St. Peter, blood from St. Basile, hair from the head of St. Denis, a portion of the Virgin's vestments.' The many as opposed to the One deflects a sought after mark of hereditary legitimacy, of immediacy and linearity; it is the mark of a diffusion of power and of authority that will in the end coalesce under the sign of Charles. Ultimately, the multiple nature of *Durendal's* reliquary, signaling multiple rather than a unified point of origin, doubles back on the very question of Roland's

own suspected bastardy.⁶ When the Franks are instructed not to forget *Monjoie*, a forgetting is implied in the substitution of one material sign, *Durendal*, in exchange for another, *Joyeuse*. Through the agency of the text, Charlemagne achieves what Roland could not, the supplanting of *Durendal*, Roland's own instrument of inscription, by the even more powerful instrument *Joyeuse*, Charlemagne's own. The metaphorical incorporation of *Joyeuse* into *Monjoie* reestablishes the guarantee of protection that Charlemagne forfeited by his absence from Roncevaux; it also privileges his telling of events in that the history of Roncevaux will be re-inscribed by Charles' own instrument, *Joyeuse*, which, unlike *Durendal*, had, up until mid-narrative, remained unexposed to view, inactive, silent; though always attendant upon this moment of supplanting.

In *laiss * 183 we find an act of exchange that will effectively bind the two halves of the narrative text; it is an exchange of the instruments of inscription; then follows the textualization of the cry *Monjoie*. In preparation for the final encounter with the Saracens the narrative assigns the name *Monjoie* to the the *or eflambe*, the golden cloth taken from the service of St. Peter:

Puis sunt muntez, la bataille demandent;
 "Munjoie!" escrient; od els est Carlemagne.
 Gefreid d'Anjou portet l'orie flambe:
 Seint Piere fut, si aveit num Romaine;
 Mais de Munjoie iloec out pris eschange. (ll. 3091 - 95)

(Then having mounted their horses, they demand battle
 They shout out 'Monjoie!' and Charlemagne is with them.
 Geoffrey of Anjou carries the oriflamme:
 It once belonged to Saint Peter and it bore the name Romaine;
 But from Monjoie it has received a change in name.)

Monjoie now amasses a unity under one sign that is at once military (*Joyeuse*), religious (*Romaine*) and political (Charles' emblem) in form: 'From it they derive their battle cry '*Monjoie*.' / For this reason no race on earth can withstand them'....(*Enseigne en unt de Munjoie crier / Pur ço n'es poet nule gent cuntrester*, ll. 2510-11). In each instance the unity of the Franks under Charles is carried out through a process of exchange: *Durendal* for *Joyeuse*, *Romaine* for *Monjoie*, and the fallen at Roncevaux for the new order of host under Charles. The only time we see Charles' sword drawn it is against his Saracen counterpart, Baligant, and unlike the combat at Roncevaux, we witness not two *chevaliers* measuring one another up, but the cataclysmic coming together of two heretofore separate worlds:

Cil sunt vassal ki les oz ajusterent.
 Lor enseignes n'i unt mie ubliees:
 Li amiralz "Precieuse!" ad crie,
 Carles "Munjoie!", l'enseigne renume.
 L'un conquist l'autre as haltes voiz e as cleres. (ll. 3562 - 66)

(Those who brought the armies together are valiant,
 They have not forgotten their battle-cries:
 The emir cried out 'Precieuse!'
 And Charles his renowned battle-cry 'Monjoie!'
 They recognized each other by their loud, clear voices.)

Only one sign will survive the battle and surely it will be *Monjoie*:

"Munjoie!" escriet pur la reconuissance. (l. 3620)

(He shouts out 'Monjoie!' (that they might recognize him.)

Charlemagne has, as the text tells us, 'Repaired is his and his remembrance'...(*Repairet loi vigur e remembrance*, l. 3614). In context of our discussion, to recover remembrance is to recover vigor. Charles' rejuvenation is at the expense of the forces under Baligant, but also, and indiscriminately, all of those fallen at Roncevaux, Franks and Saracens alike. Whereas at line

119 Charles appears in the narrative as sign without need of interpretation –‘if anyone seeks him, there is no need to point him out...’ (*S’est kel demandet, ne l’estoet enseigner...*)— then ‘un-inked’, one might say, with the blood of direct combat, here we find *Monjoie* replete with the full history of the battle against the Saracens before during and after Roncevaux. The blood of remembrance imbues *Monjoie* and so, too, it imbues the name of Charlemagne.

In conclusion, let us reconstruct an archeology of the sign *Monjoie* such as we find it at the end of the conflict between Saracens and Franks. The *orieflambe*, the war cry ‘textualized’ as Charles’ war banner, swathes *Joyeuse*, having replaced *Durendal* as the sole instrument of historical inscription, which in turn encases the point of the sword reputed to have pierced the body of Christ. These circles within a circle all circumscribe an absent body which, according to the most immediate reading of textual description, would seem to be the unnamed body of Christ:

Asez savum de la lance parler,
Dunt nostre Sire fut en la cruiz nasfret:
Carles en ad la mure, mercit Deu...

(ll. 2503 - 05)

(We could say a good deal about the Lance
With which Our Lord was wounded on the Cross;
Charles has its point, thanks be to God...)

But the profane nature of the text such as we have seen it over the course of this discussion leads us to suspect the possibility of yet another exchange, an exchange of something sacred for something profane; Charles is in need of a material referent for his sign without locus. Remembering that *Monjoie* has covered over the name that is divine in its association with Rome (*Romaine*), it

is more than a little curious that this same name *Romain* should be the very name of the church into which Charles has placed the bodies of the only three among all the fallen at Roncevaux to receive 'proper' burial: Turpin, Oliver and Roland. If one allows for a confluence between *Mojoie* and *Romaine* by virtue of their shared name, then one finds only these three peers named at the center of Charles' sign. They are there, buried at the heart of this church, far from the center and, perhaps one might add, from the active remembrance of Charles' seat of authority at Aix. But just as Christ was said to have had a resurrection and in this way to have disappeared from the grave after death, so, too, the pilgrim might have doubts about the covered remains of these three bodies placed, after all, in that enclosure which consumes all flesh, the *blancs sarcous* into which the bodies of Turpin, Olivier and Roland have been placed. The only physical trace of Roland remains at another place of monumentalization 'Upon the alter of noble Saint Seurin'... (*Desur l'alter seint Sevrin le baron*, line 3685). Here the instrument of Roland's voice *par excellence* rests a silent cipher, like a single, now unintelligible letter that has fallen from the forgotten alphabet of an extinct language. The rhetorical covering written over the surface of Roland's horn, the *olifant*, has fallen into pieces upon the ground during Roland's last kill at Roncevaux. Its letters have been replaced by a pure gold that, cruelly, is meant to at once to fill the horn's cavity and to silence its voice:

Met l'oliphan plein d'or e de manguns:
Li pelerin le veient ki la vunt.

(ll. 3686 - 86)

(He places the oliphant, filled with gold and with mangons,
Pilgrims who visit the place still see it.)

OUTLAWS

On the surface of things, it appears as though conflict within the *Roland* can be determined by an ever extending set of pairings: Roland versus Ganelon; Charlemagne versus Baligant; Saracen versus Frank; Christian versus Pagan, and so forth. But these 'contests' merely reflect a much greater underlying division from which all other difference emanates. The partitioning of the text into two narrative panels of near equal length— one ending with the announcement of the death of Roland (l. 2397), the other beginning with Charlemagne's return (l. 2398)— provides tangible limits to two distinct worlds, and, as we shall see, separate laws govern the make up of their respective social, political and military institutions. The unrelenting course of transition between these two worlds, one, moribund, whose laws have become dysfunctional, and the other which has yet to obtain the validity of its own structuring principles, becomes the source of a violence out of which all struggle within the *Roland* narrative originates.

The movement from one narrative unit to the next, from one world to the other, can be described as a process of translation. From 'honor's ruin,' of which the ultimate expression is the death of Roland and the loss of the

French at Roncevaux, will derive the absolute prerogative of the emperor's right, his *dreiture*. How Charlemagne carries the French, how for that matter, the text carries the reader, from failed honor to *dreiture* will be the focus of this essay. I proceed with an examination of five scenes, each of which demonstrates a significant advance in the transition from the 'old order,' of which Roland is the *exemplum*, to the new. They are the council of Saracens (ll. 10-95); the council of Franks (ll. 96-365); the oratorical dispute between Oliver and Roland over the return of Charlemagne (ll. 1722 - 36 and ll. 1851 - 68); the burial of the Franks, the battle with Baligant and the consequent rejuvenation of the emperor (lines 2845 - 3682); and the conversion of the French to the emperor's *dreiture* during the trial of Ganelon (ll. 3751 - ff.). Through each of these scenes a single paradigm will continue to replicate itself, one that Blancandrin, the subtle Saracen negotiator, establishes during the council of Saracens. There he puts forth a rhetorical construct that makes it possible to displace individual figures of social and political authority, principally Baligant and Charlemagne, with the absolute authority of an abstracted law. In attacking the protective bonds of vassal allegiance (the basis of *honor*) Blancandrin 'frees' men to turn their allegiance to the sovereign state and ultimately to become the subjects of the emperor's, that is to say Charlemagne's, *dreiture*. It begins with the Saracen council and with Blancandrin's ingenious proposal.

There is no word to better describe the situation of the Saracens at the opening of the *Roland* than desperate. After seven years of warfare against the invading Franks they take refuge in their last stronghold, Saragossa,

attending the enemy's final assault. Their protector, the emir Baligant, has been absent despite repeated pleas for a return. Despairing of his aid at this critical moment, the Saracen stand ready to abandon their allegiance to lord and to godhead. It is under these circumstances that Marsile convenes his barons to council and that Blancandrin, described by the text as a good *chevalier* and among the wisest of Saracens, delivers a proposal that aims to reverse their ill fortune.

In place of Baligant and the 'pagan' gods, Blancandrin would pretend to substitute Charlemagne and the 'law of the Christians' as the supreme authority of the realm. In so doing, he appears to carry through on what we later learn has been a threat of long standing. From the first year of combat, Marsile, the embattled Saracen king, sought protection out of Babylon from the emir Baligant. The failure of response and the absence of necessary reinforcements has already led Marsile to consider an accord with Charlemagne, one that would, presumably, have brought about an unencumbered transfer of allegiance from the absent Baligant to the emperor Charlemagne (lines 2413 - 21). Blancandrin's treaty, however, proves further reaching than this. It sees this failure of protection and support as something not individual, but systemic; it recognizes that not merely Baligant, but that the very gods are themselves at fault. Accordingly, his treaty exploits an already existent corruption of the law. Where the word *honur* appears, *shame* is understood; where service to one's lord and protection of one's dependents are promised, betrayal is implied. The following verses disclose the outlines of his proposal:

"En ceste tere ad asez osteiet
 En France, ad Ais, s'en deit ben repairer.
 Vos le sivre a la feste seint Michel,
 Si recevrez la lei de chrestiens,
 Serez ses hom par honur e par ben.
 S'en volt ostages, e vos l'en enveiez,
 U dis u vint, pur lui afiancer.
 Enveius i les filz de noz muillers:
 Par num d'ocire i enveierai le men.
 Asez est melz qu'il i perdent lé chefs
 Que nus perduns l'onur ne la deintet,
 Ne nus seiuns cundreiz a mendeier!"

(ll. 35 - 46)

('[Say that] He has campaigned long enough in this country,
 That he ought to repair to Aix, in France.
 Tell him you will follow him there at the feast of St. Michael,
 That you will receive the law of the Christians,
 Be his man through lands and through goods.
 Send him hostages, if he should demand surety,
 Ten or twenty of them, by way of guarantee.
 Let us send him the sons of our wives:
 Though it means that he will be killed, I will send him my own son.
 Far better that they should loose their heads
 Than that we should loose our honor and our offices,
 Grant that we may never be brought to beggary!')

What is striking about this treaty is that it replicates the error it pretends to correct. At lines 36 - 39, Blancandrin merely proposes a transfer of allegiance from one long absent lord, Baligant, to another; Charlemagne, who resides in far away Aix, will prove just as absent and in that absence just as ineffectual with respect to the Saracen community in Spain.¹ What is more, in lieu of the Saracens who have already perished as a result of Baligant's failure, a failure of their gods and laws to protect them, Blancandrin proposes to set aside his own host of martyrs in the persons of the 'sons of our wives' (ll. 40 - 43). He offers their lives not in witness to an emerging order or to unity between Christian and Saracen under Charlemagne and the 'law of the Christians'... (*la lei de chrestiens*), but as final proof that the existing order has become wholly bankrupt. In this opening scene of the *Roland*, Blancandrin alerts the

reader to the failure of *honur*, to the conditions in which the promise of allegiance between vassal and lord has already lapsed into meaninglessness.

That the treaty put forth by Blancandrin should seem credible, that for practical considerations, for the protection of 'state,' it could possibly effect an *en masse* transfer of allegiance from Baligant to Charlemagne already signals to the reader how slight are the differences of the social and political structures between the realm of the Saracen and the realm of the Frank. The logic of Blancandrin's proposal demonstrates an appreciation of this very powerful truth: as '*bon chevalier*' (—*De vasselage fut asez chevalier*, line 25)—we can see that Blancandrin, and so the Saracens at large, are only one remove from being '*bon chrétien*' as well; the 'law of the Christian' and the 'law of the feudal lord' are spoken of here as one and the same. When first the reader encounters lines 38 and 39, nothing suggests that these verses should be read in any other way than in paratactic relation to one another; in other words, that line 38 and line 39 present two distinct and independent propositions. Line 38 states plainly that the Saracens should convert to the law of the Christians; line 39 that they should swear allegiance to Charlemagne. Notwithstanding, the subsequent text supplies ample evidence to argue in favor of a hypotactic reading of these lines with the result that *honur*—the observance of vassal obligations (cf.: l. 39)—and the adherence to *la loi de chrestiens* (l. 38) are found to represent one and the same thing. Thus, we can infer a certain ethic from these verses when read hypotactically: conversion to 'Christianity' entails an obligation to service in arms. I cite three examples prominent in their support of such a reading.

The first is taken from a passage that we will examine in greater detail later in this paper. Roland, at lines 1854 - 59, eulogizing the French who have lost their lives at Roncevaux, comes as close as a mortal can in granting these 'martyrs' paradise in recompense for their loyal service to lord (Charlemagne) and peer (Roland). In fighting bravely, so goes the logic of Roland's reasoning, the French *chevalier* have earned their heavenly reward and the good *chevalier* is thus granted a 'fief in heaven.' We see this again in a promise made by the archbishop Turpin at the commencement of battle when he exhorts the French: 'Confess your sins, ask God's mercy!... .. / 'You will find your places in the great paradise'.....(*"Clamez vos culpes, si preiez Deu mercit! / / Sieges avrez el greignor pareïs,"* ll. 1132 and 1135). Here too the 'law of the Christians' and the 'law of the chevalier' inter-reflect so as to become scarcely distinguishable one from the other.

In a separate incident Turpin bids farewell to the fallen at Roncevaux even while contemplating the significance of his own approaching death; here the juxtaposition of the sacred and the profane are seen in still greater contrast. Below Turpin addresses a 'prayer' to the lifeless bodies that a diligent Roland has gathered round him:

Après ad dit: "Mare fustes, seignurs!
Tutes voz anmes ait Deus li Glorius!
En pareïs les metet en sentes flurs!
La meie mort me rent si anguissus!
Ja ne verrai le riche empereür."

(ll. 2195 - 99)

(Afterward he said: 'Lords, it was your great misfortune!
May the glorious God have all your souls!
In paradise, may he place them on holy flowers!
My own death causes me such anguish!
I will never again see the powerful emperor!')

Turpin's response admits to a certain reticence of belief; he conceives of death principally, if not exclusively, in terms of an irrecoverable loss. In the utterance 'Lords, it was your great misfortune!' (*'Mare fustes, seignurs!'*), hardly the suitable beginning for a prayer commending to God the souls of the dead, Turpin courts blasphemy. Similarly, faced with his own moment of dying, Turpin all but declares himself a non-believer. In the final moments of life in place of a union with the almighty he is concerned with only the perpetual absence of his protecting lord, the absence of 'the powerful emperor' (*'le riche empereūr'*). As the *'lei de chrestiens'* and the *'lei de chevalier'* seem to collapse into one another Turpin is seen vacillating between two perpetually absent masters, *Deus li Glorius* and Charlemagne; neither will be able to secure either him or the French from the death impending at Roncevaux.

Events in the Saracen camp provide yet a third example of the intertwining of divine and worldly authorities, again with particular regard to their failures. At lines 2580 - 2604, the Saracens are seen cursing their godheads, their idols, casting them into a pit and swearing that Baligant himself is a coward if he does not return to avenge the humiliations suffered at Roncevaux. By these actions, placing blame indiscriminately on Baligant and the gods alike, the Saracens demonstrate a virtual synonymy between the 'law of the Christians' and the 'law of the Chevaliers;' neither has afforded the protection implicitly promised. With this we are now only a small step away from recognizing that the same judgement passed by the Saracens upon Baligant and the 'pagan' gods can now be turned in judgement upon

Charlemagne and the '*lei de crestiens*.' Without distinction of allegiance to whatever lord or whatever law, all will die at Roncevaux. The failure of both laws in both realms, as pointed out by Blancandrin at lines 38 - 39, is seen simply and ultimately as a failure of *honur*.

Blancandrin's proposition takes *honur* into account as the dynamics of a law operating on two intersecting social planes. On the one hand, there exists the obligation between vassal and lord characterized at lines 38 - 39 as that service which the Saracen pretend to offer Charlemagne; on the other hand, there are the obligations of mutual aid among peers —*blatantly violated by the tenor of Blancandrin's proposal at lines 40 - 46*. By the spurious promise of allegiance to Charlemagne at lines 38 - 39 and the abandonment of kin at lines 44 - 46, it is made plain that *honur* is held to be wholly in default. The sense of Blancandrin's proposition within these latter verses, that fathers should purchase lost *honur* with the blood of their sons, demonstrates that the very concept of *honur* has been turned on its head. The obligation to protect one's peers gives way to the decision that will allow for the destruction of one's closest dependents 'the sons of our wives...' ('*es filz de noz muillers*'). And yet this seemingly nonsensical proposition is better understood if we compare lines 44 - 45 with a close variant that crops up a few lines on within the text:

"Asez est melz qu'il i perdent lé chefs
Que nus perduns l'onur ne la deintet..." (ll. 44 - 45)

('Far better that they should loose their heads
Than that we should loose our lands and our offices')

**"Asez est mienz qu'il i perdent les testes
Que nus perduns clere Espaigne, la bele..."**

(ll. 58 - 59)

**('Far better that they should loose their heads
Than that we should loose fair Spain, the beautiful.')**

The very evident syntactical symmetry of these lines, so proximate one another within the text, would seem to suggest a kinship of both form and sense, that the quest for personal *honur* and Blancandrins' 'pursuit of shining 'Espaigne, la bele' might be considered as readily interchangeable goals. In case of point, this is not a defensible reading. Conceptually, *honur* and *deintet* are shown to function within the text in relation to an intricate interdependency of mutual obligations and responsibilities among individual subjects. This stands squarely in opposition to the notion of '*clere Espaigne, la bele,*' or of '*France dulce*' for that matter, as political constructs whose coming into existence necessitates the eradication of the very principles of mutual support that form the underpinnings of feudal social organization. Blancandrin proposes not an equivalency between *honur* and 'state' but an exchange: individual *honur* will be replaced by an all-encompassing law to which the subject will be solely and directly responsible. Blancandrin has foreseen that obligations between vassal and lord and among peers have been reduced to a matter of only secondary importance. He aims to sweep aside the old and weakened order based on feudal ties.² Still, those who engage with him in this, engage in outlawry, in a general repudiation of the standing law, an act that will soon bring about a violence of cataclysmic proportion.

Blancandrin's proposal offers to bring together Saracen and Frank by creating a single position of authority at the pinnacle of their combined worlds (cf.: ll. 38 - 39), a position, for the moment at least, marked only by traces of the variously absent Baligant, Charlemagne and *Deus*. A danger lies in the fact that during the transition to this newly fabricated structure of social and political organization their world remains essentially lawless. As he presents Blancandrin's treaty to the Frankish *chevaliers* for deliberation in council, Charlemagne reiterates the conditions of 'conversion,' while at the same time cautiously raising the specter of an undisclosed anarchy:

"Il me sivat ad Ais, a mun estage,
Si recevrat la nostre lei plus salve;
Chrestiens ert, de mei tendrat ses marches;
Mais jo ne sai quels en est sis curages."
Dient Franceis: "Il nus i cuvent garde!" (ll. 188 – 192)

('He will follow me to Aix, to my residence,
There he will receive our law most salutary;
He will become Christian, from me he will hold his marches as fiefs.
But I do not know what is in his heart.'
Say the French: 'We should be cautious!')

Though a cursory review of the above lines may suggest that the pending conversion to Christianity (line 190) and the promise of fealty to Charlemagne (line 189) might still be considered as separate events, a closer examination reveals that, as with Blancandrin before him, the emperor likewise proffers a fusion of the worldly and the divine. If, as we have seen (ll. 38 - 39), acceptance of *la lei de chrestiens* leads to a service in arms, here acceptance of the emperor's law –*nostre lei*– renders the oath taker 'Christian' –*ert chrestiens*. Thus there appears to be only one law though it goes by several names: *la lei de chrestiens*; *la lei de chevalier*; or, what amounts to the same thing, simply *honor*. Beyond the mere acceptance or refusal of a Saracen

conversion, the council of Franks will be called upon to determine its own willingness to redefine itself according to a new law --*nostre lei plus salve*--; one that will bring together not just two worlds but the multiplicity of feudal communities under the aegis of a single master.

Concluding the treaty's summary with a focus on questions of intent -- *mais jo ne sai quels en est sis curages*-- the emperor prompts vague suspicion among the Franks (l. 192). They reply chorus-like --*Dient Franceis: il nus i cuvent garde!*-- as though struck by some foreboding that reaches far beyond a simple mistrust of Marsile. Taking his cue from their response, Roland instructs the Franks on the nature of their own fears. More threatening than the failure of the Saracens to abide by the terms of their guileful treaty would be for the common discourse among the Franks to lapse into complete meaninglessness. Roland translates this absence of truth from the language of common discourse into a call for unbridled violence:

Il dist al rei: "Ja mar crerez Marsilie!
Set anz ad pleins qu'en Espagne venimes;
Je vos cunquis e Noples e Commibles,
Pris ai Valterne e la tere de Pine
E Balasgued e Tuele e Sezilie:
Li reis Marsilie i fist mult que traître.
De ses paiens enveiat quinze,
Chascuns portout une branche d'olive;
Nuncerent vos cez paroles meïsme.
A voz Franceis un conseil en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie;
Dous de voz cuntes al paien tramesistes,
L'un fut Basan e li altres Basilies;
Les chef en prist es puis desuz Haltilie.
Faites la guer cum vos l'avez enprise,
En Sarraguce menez vostre ost banie,
Metez le sege a tute vostre vie,
Si vengez cels que li fels fist ocire!"

(ll. 196 - 213)

(He said to the king: 'Believe Marsile at your peril!
It has been seven full years since we first came to Spain;
For you I have conquered both Noples and Commibles,
I have captured Valterne and the land of Pine

And Balaguer and Tudela and Sezille:
King Marsile was every bit the traitor.
He sent fifteen of his pagans,
Each bearing an olive branch;
They spoke to you these same words.
You took council of your French,
They counseled you foolishly.
You sent two of your nobles to the pagan,
One was Basan and the other Basilie;
He took their heads on the hill by Haltille.
Make war as you have begun it:
Lead your army you have summoned to Saragossa,
Lay siege there for all your life, if need be,
Avenge those whom the felon has killed!')

Roland rebukes the French, reminding them that Marsile's is a discourse with which they are already familiar (l. 204), one in which they have already made inscription (l. 205). Bad faith on the part of the Saracens conspiring with the imperfect judgement of the French has produced the bankruptcy of language endemic to both camps. From this point onward, in Roland's estimation, the council of *chevaliers* can lead to nothing good. To discover the path from a universal failure of language to universal vengeance in arms, the reader must follow Roland in the inherently cyclical structure of his argument.

Roland's narration, from conquest (ll. 198-200) to negotiations (ll. 201 - 204) to betrayal (ll. 205 - 206) to vengeance (ll. 210 - 213), has the semblance of a reconstruction of events following the logic of a straightforward, uncomplicated chronological order. Likewise, it would appear as though, from the beginning, the motivation for warfare against the Saracens has remained constant and without change or interruption. This illusion of linear chronology serves to obscure two important facts. Firstly, that this passage (ll. 196 - 213) accounts for not one but two cycles of events, one past and one future, that turn on betrayal and vengeance— the past cycle terminating in the deaths of

Basan and Basilie, the future cycle to end in the death of Roland and the French at Roncevaux. Secondly, that from at least as early as the betrayal of Basan and Basilie, a logic different from that of the Franks under Charlemagne has motivated the actions of Roland and those Franks under his own command. From the account given at lines 196 - 213 we can in all reconstruct three possible sequences of events.

If we choose to read lines 197 - 213 as the representation of events in strict linear succession, then it follows that Marsile had been pressured to sue for peace (ll. 201 - 204) only as a direct consequence of Roland's numerous successes in battle (ll. 198 - 200). There are obstacles to an acceptance of this sequence of events. From textual evidence, we determine that Roland's conquests listed at lines 198 - 200, at least in so far as they are motivated by vengeance, do not precede but postdate Marsile's initial betrayal. At line 197 Roland signals to the reader: 'It has been seven full years since we first arrived in Spain.' Hence within the ongoing struggle between Saracens and French the conquests listed at lines 197 - 200 do not culminate in Marsile's first petition for peace, rather, the petition serves as an interruption within the otherwise continuous series of events. That interruption takes on an enduring reality as the French under Roland become infused with an augmented sense of vengeance as a result of the betrayal of Basan and Basilie. If at line 210 Roland urges the French to 'Make war as you have begun it' he concludes the period at line 213 now instructing them to 'avenge those [Basan and Basilie] whom the felon [Marsile] has killed,' as though from the outset the conflict between Saracen and French had its origins in a vengeance justifiable in

terms of Marsile's treachery. In this way Roland revisits the 'beginnings' of conflict between Saracen and French, supplanting, anachronistically, the original drive to impose the 'law of the Christians' upon Saracen Spain with a desire for 'meritorious' vengeance.

The apparent linear chronology of events as they are laid out at lines 197 - 213 gives way under examination to the cyclical narration that can be recounted as follows: At some unspecified moment Marsile sees fit to sue for peace (ll. 201 - 203); the French consider his proposal and acquiesce (ll. 204 - 205); as a result, Charlemagne sends the emissaries Basan and Basilie to the Saracens, who murder them (ll. 207 - 209); only then do Roland and the French seek vengeance against the Saracens as reported at lines 198 - 200. The list of conquests with which Roland begins his oration, assuming that they, too, have been motivated by vengeance (cf.: ll. 210 - 13), stands in last place among events as they actually occur –this premise is anachronous. Hence, the conclusion of this first 'narrative round' (ll. 197 - 200) takes us back to the beginning, to the return of Marsile attempting for a second time to negotiate, treacherously, of course, an end to hostilities. Unlike the circumstances surrounding his prior mission for peace, the process is now encumbered by a contingent, Roland and his Franks, charged with the desire to avenge. Roland, we remember, urges Charlemagne to disband council and to bring vengeance swiftly home to Saragossa. But Charlemagne remains hesitant; unlike Roland and his followers, the forces under the emperor as yet remain 'innocent' of the desire for vengeance. When the Franks under Charlemagne finally do embrace vengeance as a motivation for warfare, it will

not be for the sake of Basan and Basilie, but in remembrance of those who are soon to die at Roncevaux. Thus, Roland displaces the motive of vengeance onto both a reconstructed past –the initial arrival of the Franks in Spain– and a fiction of future events –the coming massacre of the Franks at Roncevaux.³

We might now postulate yet a second ‘future’ narrative cycle, one that proleptically ‘converts’ the Franks under Charlemagne to Roland’s manner of warfare as act-of-vengeance. To paraphrase Roland at line 210, they, too, [Charlemagne and the Franks who return to Roncevaux from *Cize*] must ‘continue the war as they [*Roland and the Franks*] have begun it.’ This proleptic narrative arrangement follows the same order as the chronologically first (*past*) cycle of warfare; only this time in the present and future tense. Marsile’s present messengers are none other than Blancandrin with his current suite of retainers (ll. 201 - 03). For a second time, Charlemagne’s ‘French’ –*vos Franceis*– will consider and ultimately acquiesce to Marsile’s proposal (l. 204 - 05); at Roncevaux, the Franks under Roland will come to stand proxy in slaughter for Basan and Basilie (207 - 09; also, cf.: 3016 - 17). The final conquest of Saragossa will now be led not by Roland, but by Charlemagne and ‘his French’ (*vos Franceis*), who by this time are imbued with the Rolandian spirit of vengeance –here one could say that lines 197 - 200 and 210 - 213 overlap in such a way as to suggest that the chronology of the narrative cycle has attained a certain textual *materiality*). Whereas at the end of the first cycle, the motivation for violence adheres to the names Basan and Basilie, during the second cycle –that in which Charlemagne and his

Franks repurchase 'France dulce' after the loss at Roncevaux-- the spirit of vengeance attaches to the name Roland.

At line 277, Ganelon is the first to rebuff Roland's sermon of vengeance and he does so in a single phrase. Speaking to Charlemagne, Ganelon declares: "He does not care by what death we die" (*'Ne li chalt, sire, de quel mort nus muriuns,'* l. 277). This is the first sally in a defense that, by council's end, will place Ganelon squarely on the side of the law based on vassal ties of mutual obligation, that is to say on the side of a rapidly failing *honur*. Unlike Roland, who operates as something of a free agent at the head of a vast number of vassal dependents, Ganelon sees his allegiance split between two vassalic obligations: duty to clan and duty to the larger feudal community. Chosen as emissary on an almost certainly fatal mission to the Saracens, Ganelon offers his life for the common good on the provision that Charlemagne grant assurances regarding the continued safety of the property and kin left behind in death:

"En Sarraguce sai ben qu'aler m'estoet.
Hom ki la vait repaier ne s'en poet.
Ensurquetut si ai jo vostre soer,
Sin ai un filz, ja plus bels n'en estoet,
Ço est Baldewin," ço dit, "ki ert prozdoem.
A lui lais jo mes honurs e mes fieus.
Guadez le ben, ja nel verrai des oilz."
Carles respunt: "Tro avez tendre coer.
Puis quel comant, aler vus en estoet." (ll. 310-318)

("I know well that I must hasten to Saraguce.
The man who goes there will not return.
To be sure, remember that your sister is my wife,
And that I have a son, there is none more beautiful
Than Baldewin," he said, "he will be a noble vassal.
To him I leave my 'honors' and fiefs.
Care for him well, I will not see him again with these eyes."
Charles responds: "Your heart is too tender.
Since it is commanded, go as you are supposed to."

Staging this scene in the manner he does, Ganelon forces Charlemagne to deliberate publicly concerning an otherwise private matter; everyone present suddenly finds he has a personal interest in the outcome. By this determination, all will recognize either the potency or the *impuissance* of the emperor's power and authority. Should Charlemagne deny Ganelon outright the protection he rightly demands this would be tantamount to announcing to all the Franks present that the very law thought to protect them no longer obtains.⁴

Ganelon's request to Charlemagne comes on the heels of his offering himself up --unto death-- as a paragon of public duty; he gives his life for the sake of his liege lord (ll. 310 - 311). In the probable event of his death, Ganelon petitions Charlemagne to guarantee the security of his son and heir, Baldwin. The emperor's response, or lack thereof, will determine Ganelon's actions from this point onward. Charlemagne demurs in silence to acquiesce to Ganelon's petition. Interpreting this silence --Charlemagne deigns no answer-- as a sign of the emperor's own social/political impotence, Ganelon does not delay in taking upon himself what would otherwise have been the emperor's responsibilities. When his men offer to accompany him to Saragossa, Ganelon has them instead turn back toward Aix to protect Baldwin and, in the case of Ganelon's death, to swear oaths of fealty to his sole remaining heir.

By the end of council we see Ganelon's *honur* in complete antithesis to the perversion of *honor* represented in Blancandrin's proposal at lines 38 - 39 and 44 - 46; Ganelon is both exemplary in service to his lord (Charlemagne)

and loyal in his duty to kin. Vengeance, however, enters like a virus and destroys not only Ganelon, but also the order of law that has been the support and protection of all feudal vassals. 'His name is Baldewin' (l. 314); 'I will never again see him with these eyes' (l. 316); 'You have too tender a heart' (l. 317) –already this passage hints at the future reward of Ganelon's virtues – *Tendre coer* (evisceration); *oilz* -(blinding); Baldewin [*baudöin* - the male member] (dismemberment). The fact that by the end of this council Ganelon comes to be seen as the outlaw and Roland emblematic of virtue in arms is the surest sign that Blancandrin's proposal, the original engine for vengeance at ll. 38 - 39, has taken hold among the Franks.

Dismissing Ganelon, denying him safeguard of honor, property, and kin (ll. 314 - 318), Charlemagne initiates the dissolution of legal obligations between vassal and lord. Yet at the moment of Roland's departure at the head of the rear guard en route to Roncevaux, Charlemagne seems to recant this vicious evolution in polity and offers to Roland the protection he had earlier withheld from Ganelon:

Li empereres apelet ses niés Rollant:
 "Bel sire niés, or savez veirement
 Demi mun host vos lerrai en present.
 Retenez les, ço est vostre salvement."
 Ço dit li quens: "Jo n'en ferai nient." (ll. 783 - 87)

(The emperor calls to his nephew Roland:
 "O gentle sir and nephew, know this truly
 I will now give over to you half my army.
 Accept them, this will be your salvation."
 The count replied: "I will do no such thing.")

In his response, Roland again underscores the already dissolving ties of feudal allegiance; no longer will Charlemagne enjoy the service-in-arms of Roland and the Franks. Much of the ideological struggle among the Franks at

Roncevaux turns on the issue of whether Charlemagne and his 'host' should be called into the fray; whether or not, finally, the French should accept Charlemagne's offer of *salvement*. Oliver, in vain, urges Roland to call for the emperor's return. When his efforts fail to persuade, Oliver reproaches Roland with severity, summarizing many of the same complaints Ganelon has elsewhere raised against Roland. Roland, however, refuses to seek the emperor's return until the moment when it is clear that all is lost. In the larger scheme of things, Roland and the Franks replicate the circumstances under which Basan and Basile die, only this time as victims of a second and infinitely greater round of sacrifice. As such, they are to become the material 'witnesses' to and the motivating factor spurring on the narrative's second round of violence.

When Charlemagne finally returns to Roncevaux, he will return as the avenger. Meanwhile, as the Saracens appear on the horizon with obvious hostile intent, Oliver sees an opportunity to remind Roland of the emperor's prior 'offer of salvation.' Hearing of the coming Saracen onslaught, however, Roland welcomes the news: 'This should be good for our king' (*"Ben devums ce estre pur nostre rei,"* l. 1009). A few lines down, Oliver makes a second attempt and perhaps with the thought that pride stands as an obstacle, Oliver offers Roland this face saving measure:

"Guenes le sout, li fel, li traïtur,
Ki nus jugat devant l'emperereür."

(ll. 1024 - 25)

('Ganelon knew it, the felon traitor,
He condemned us before the Emperor.')

It is not his own fault, so Oliver explains to Roland, if the Franks find themselves in this fatal predicament, but the fault of a treacherous Ganelon. Roland rejects outright the compromising solution of a call for aid and reinforcements. An increasingly insistent Oliver, undeterred by Roland's stubborn refusal of his advice, now resorts to other means of persuasion; to counting (l. 1040), and to underscoring the numerical impossibility of survival without the Emperor's return (l. 1061). To this Roland responds by revealing, albeit obliquely, his true purposes in this affair:

"Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt jugez a mort." (l. 1058)

('I swear to you, all are judged to die.')

"Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt a mort livrez." (l. 1069)

('I swear to you, all will be delivered into death.')

These lines evince erasure of all distinction between Saracens and Franks -- *all* are judged, *all* will die, indiscriminately so, before the conflict has ended. This only corroborates Ganelon's warning of line 227: 'He does not care what manner of death we die'.....(*"Ne li chalt, sire, de quel mort nus murjuns."*) Finally, despite Oliver's seeming incomprehensibility Roland spells out clearly his purposes:

Respunt Rollant: "Mis talenz en est gaigne.
 "Ne placet Damnedeu ne ses angles
 Que ja pur mei perdet sa valur France!
 Melz voeill murir que huntage me venget.
 Pur ben ferir l'emperere plus nos aimet." (ll. 1088 - 91)

(Roland replies: 'Because of it my desire is all the greater.
 'May it not please Our Lord God nor his angels
 That through/for/because of me France should loose her value!
 I would rather die (than) that he should avenge my shame.
 The Emperor loves us all the more when we strike well.')

Roland's wishes will soon come to fruition: from death and shame suffered at Roncevaux arise the avenging deeds of the Emperor.

When finally it is certain that the French will meet their doom then and only then, over Oliver's objections, Roland sounds the *olifant* calling for Charlemagne's return. It thus becomes clear that the harshest terms of Blancandrin's contract, at least with respect to the 'sons of the Franks,' will soon be met. Evoking *honur* as it is defined within the context of Blancandrin's proposal at line 39 Oliver announces that service to the Emperor is now in permanent default: 'Charles the great will have no further aid from us' (*"Karles li magnes, de nos n'avrat aïe,"* l. 1732). Furthermore, Roland's declaration at line 1863 –"Noble French, I see you die *forlthrough/because of me*" (*"Barons franceis, pur mei vos vie murir"*)—resembles the perverse sacrifice prescribed by Blancandrin at lines 42 - 46, namely, that the 'sons of our wives' should be forfeited for the cause. In pendant orations, appropriately situated within the narrative, one to either side of the passage that describes the Emperor's return, Oliver and Roland pronounce upon the meaning of the impending death of the Franks at Roncevaux. Oliver judges their death in terms of the massive loss of vassal allegiance to be suffered by Charlemagne; Roland, on the other hand, views these deaths in terms of an occasion of glorious commemoration. Despite their divergent view points, one thing Roland and Oliver offer in common is the means by which Charlemagne will ultimately translate the violent world of feudal allegiance into a world where there exists an infinitely more stable system of social and political organization.

Oliver's words inadvertently foreshadow the emergence of the 'future' divine justice, one under which Charlemagne will enjoy a flourishing renewal:

Ço dist Rollant: "Por quei me portez ire?"
 E il respont: "Cumpainz, voz le feïstes,
 Kar vasselage par sens nen est folie;
 Mielz valt mesure que ne fait estultie.
 Franceis sunt morz par vostre legerie.
 Jamais Karlon de nus n'avrat servise.
 Sem creïsez, venuz i fust mi sire;
 Ceste bataille oûsum [faite u prise];
 U pris u mort i fust li reis Marsilie.
 Vostre proecce, Rollant, mar la veïmes!
 Karles le Magnes de nos n'avrat aïe.
 N'ert mais tel home dès qu'a Deu juïse.
 Vos i murrez e France en ert hunie.
 Oi nus defalt la leial cumpaignie:
 Einz le vespre mult ert gref la departie."

(ll. 1722 - 36)

(Thus says Roland: "Why are you so angry with me?"
 And he answers: "Friend, you have done it,
 For vassalage by reason is not folly;
 Just measure is better than foolishness.
 The French are dead because of your senselessness.
 Charles will never again have us in service.
 Had you trusted me, my lord would have come by now;
 We would have had this battle and won against the enemy;
 He would have king Marsile either captured or dead.
 Your prowess, Roland, it is our curse!
 Charles-the-great will have no further aid from us.
 Never will there be such a man until God has His justice.
 You will die here and France will be shamed.
 Here we have failed the loyal company:
 He will witness great sorrow before the evening.")

Though he is not mentioned by name, Ganelon's presence haunts this harangue leveled at Roland. Through a series of intra-textual allusions, Oliver has successfully tapped into Ganelon's complaint. The words "*Vos f(orsf)eïstes*" at line 1723 anticipates what will become Ganelon's key defense during his trial: "Roland has forfeited our allegiance in both gold and in chattel".....(*Rollant me forfist en or e en avoir*," l. 3758). But this same accusation of forfeiture has additional resonance in that it carries Roland's name back to an earlier event that marks rupture within the community of Franks, namely, the Emperor's original failure to guarantee protection to the property and heirs of Ganelon (cf.: ll. 310 - 22). There Ganelon declares to

Charlemagne: 'Sir...Roland has done all these things' (*"Sire.....ço ad tut fait Rollant,"* l. 322). Roland's forfeiture reflects the social instability that derives from his condition of being without father, and so to being without claim to his own legitimate inheritance. It is only natural that Ganelon should suspect Roland, his own stepson who is also nephew to the emperor, at the moment when Charlemagne sends Ganelon on that deadly mission to negotiate with the Saracens. What other reasons could the emperor have to refuse assurances concerning the wealth and the safety of his only heir except to favor Roland to the detriment of Baldwin. There is a sense in which this very personal forfeiture, one of birth, causes Roland to become a threat to Ganelon and a general menace among the Franks.⁵

At lines 1724-25, by mention of the words *folie* and *estultie*, Oliver implicates Roland in the same dangers of excess as did Ganelon in an earlier passage. We recall line 228 where Ganelon warns of Roland: 'It is not right that prideful counsel should increase.' (*"cunseill d'orguill n'est dreiz que a plus munt."*) But it is in bringing this résumé of blame to a close that Oliver conjures up the word *legerie*, a word that is, within the *Roland*, consistently associated with violence and reprisals. We compare with the *legerie* of Olivier's oration these earlier verses:

"A vos Franceis un cunseill en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie..."

(ll. 205 - 206)

('You took counsel of your French about this,
They counseled you foolishly.')

We infer from these lines spoken by Roland to Charlemagne that the breakdown in the code of *honor*, particularly as an agreement of mutual

protection, has become systemic. It accuses not just Marsile and the Saracens but, in point of fact, Roland traces the first infraction of the law to the French themselves: they offered Charlemagne suspicious counsel, “Something that smacks of foolishness” (*alques de legerie*) and he accepted. In this way, neither Charlemagne nor the French themselves are innocent of the original act of violence --that of the murder of Basan and Basile-- that has led to the breakdown of social order.

In an even more prominent use of the word *legerie*, Ganelon, announcing at line 300 his defiance of Roland and the French --“I will play my own bit of foolishness” (*Einz i frai un poi de legerie*)-- indicates a serious rift in the social fabric. Technically, Ganelon exculpates himself from the recurrent charge of treason by stating his defiance of Roland plainly and before all. Nonetheless, he, too, unsuspectingly contributes to the rapid erosion of the ties binding peers to peers and vassal to lord by adducing just one more instance --between Roland and himself-- of how the feudal allegiance has begun to lose all value. Ironically, this collapse of feudal order will give rise to a new and, to Ganelon at least, unfamiliar law; one that will, ultimately, allow for the charge of treason to be brought against him. Lastly, the charge made by Oliver against Roland --“The French are dead by your foolishness” (*Franceis sunt mort par vostre legerie*)-- is far more serious than any charge that could legitimately be brought against Ganelon under the dictates of feudal law. Roland has acted furtively⁶ in bringing about the death of the Franks, and murder by ruse is, under feudal law, a more heinous crime, one branding the perpetrator as outlaw. In his accusation of Roland, Oliver then places upon

him a measure of blame surpassing that of all others who might likewise have been culpable of *legerie*.

Having thoroughly fixed blame, Oliver next details the consequences of Roland's 'forfeiture', and it reads like a checklist for the fulfillment of Blancandrin's contractual bargain. The Franks at Roncevaux cease to provide Charles (*Karlun*) with service in arms (cf: ll. 38 - 39), and the 'loyal company' (*la leial cumpainie*), those who stand ready to give their lives in service to their lord, have been abandoned to sacrifice (cf.: ll. 40 - 46). The edifice of the old law, service to one's lord and mutual protection among peers, crumbles. And yet, within the gloom of Oliver's judgement, we spy this unexpected and auspicious prophecy. When, with apparent resignation, Oliver states that 'There won't be another such man [Charlemagne] until the last (God's) judgement'.....(*N'ert mais tel home dès qu'a Deu juïse*), his lament only foretells of the Emperor's coming 'rebirth'. At the trial of Ganelon, God's judgement turns in the Emperor's favor, returning power and authority to Charlemagne so that he might become 'the new man.'

Cryptically, at l. 1733, Oliver has given a preview of what will become perhaps the most significant development of the post-Roncevaux narration: the fact that God's judgement will not only supersede the judgment of men, it will also determine the success or failure of those deeds, Roland's own, that through combat in arms have been productive of the *geste*. Meanwhile, in a subsequent *laisse*, Roland lays the groundwork for the establishment of a new relation between subject and lord, and between subject and law:

Rollant regardet es munz e es lariz;
 De cels de France i veit tanz morz gesir,
 E il les pluret cum chevaler gentill:
 "Seignors barons, de vos ait Deus mercit!
 Tutes voz anmes otreit il pareïs!
 En saintes flurs il les facet gesir!
 Meillors vassals de vos unkes ne vi.
 Si lungement tuz tens m'avez servit,
 A oes Carlon si granz païs cunquis!
 Li empereres tant mare vos nurrit!
 Tere de France, mult estes dulz païs,
 Oi desertet [a tant rubostl exill].
 Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murir:
 Jo ne vos pois tenser ne garantir,
 Ait vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!
 Oliver, frere, vos ne dei jo faillir.
 De doel murra, s'altre ne m'i ocit.
 Sire cumpainz, alum i referir!"

(ll. 1851 - 68)

(Roland looks toward the mountains and hills.
 There he sees lying dead so many of the French,
 And he laments them with the tears of a gentle lord:
 'Noble barons, may God grant you mercy!
 May He grant all your souls paradise!
 May He cause them to lie among holy flowers!
 Better vassals than you I have never seen.
 You have for so long served me at all times,
 Through you Charles has conquered such great countries!
 The emperor has nourished you for nothing!
 Land of France, it is a sweet country,
 You are deserted [by such a terrible exile]
 Noble Frenchmen, for me I see you dying:
 I cannot give you protection;
 May God, who never did lie, should help/have you!
 Oliver, brother, I should not fail you.
 I will die of grief, if another does not kill me.
 My noble companion, let us go and strike again!')

Roland does not dispute the blame; rather, he resigns himself to the center of crisis, though without going so far as to accept the opprobrium implied from Oliver's harangue at lines 1722 - 36. Roland begins his address precisely where Oliver's left off, with the death of the French, with the default of '*la leial cumpaignie*.' Roland's eulogy for the fallen, like that of Turpin (ll. 2195 - 99), shows a strange mixture of the sacred and the profane. Roland allots heavenly fiefs, *-pa(re)ïs-* for the conquest of earthly kingdoms *-païs*. In so doing, he usurps one of the Emperor's greatest sources of power and

authority, the privilege of awarding lands and movable wealth to those of his vassals who are successful in arms. The absurdity of this claim to reward (after all the French are dead) finds its logic in the fact that Roland now has the opportunity to demonstrate that the French die 'for his sake'...(*"pur mei vos vei murir,"* l. 1863). The Emperor will have his own reasons for making similar assertions when, at line 2937, he will effectively contest Roland's claim to the final allegiance of the Franks who die at Roncevaux.

The logic of Roland's claim at line 1863 rests with the fact that Charlemagne, absent from Roncevaux, has failed to protect his *chevalier* from death (ll. 1860 - 67) and, thus, fails to maintain their allegiance. But in this regard, the Emperor is not alone, and at line 1864 we see Roland acknowledge his own failure to defend (*tenser*) or save (*garantir*) the Franks at Roncevaux. This double default, that of Roland and Charlemagne, leads to a peculiar succession of vassal allegiance. We see first (ll. 1860 - 63) an implicit transfer of allegiance from Charlemagne to Roland. Then, because of Roland's own inadequacies (cf: l. 1864), the safety and protection of the Franks, and so their ties of allegiance, devolve from Roland to God the father 'May God, who never lies, help/have you!'—"*Aīt vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!*" The 'loss' of the Franks at Roncevaux will ultimately be compensated through a divine grant permitting Charlemagne to pursue his enemies with vengeance (cf: ll. 2454-56); the ultimate failure of council will be compensated through divine justice during the trial of Ganelon. In the post-Roncevaux world, though Charlemagne will no longer enjoy the aid of his vassal lords —"*Karles li mages, de nos n'avrat aīe.*" (l. 1732)— he will have something greater in the

leveling of divine judgement against his enemies. Furthermore, though Roland might have claimed the *French* as his own— 'Noble French, I see you die for me' ...(*"Barons franceis, pur mei vos vie murir,"* l. 1863)— Charlemagne will be seen to reclaim them through divine favor in the judgement against Ganelon. This passage foretells the transfer of authority from Charlemagne, to Roland, to God, and then to Charlemagne again in what amounts to a pattern of events that, in its circularity, is not unlike that seen in the previously examined lines 197 - 213.

The rejuvenation of the Franks in the post-Roncevaux world is first prefaced by a sudden 'decline' in the emperor's *honor*. The following citations, commented briefly, demonstrate the precipitousness with which this occurs. These passages mix an undercurrent of sexual impotency with an implied loss of military/political power and authority. At lines 2890 - 91 Charlemagne states *honor's* denouement without ambiguity in such a way as to elicit a sympathy between verbal and bodily expression:

"La meie honor est turnet en declin."
Charles se pasmet, ne s'en pout astenir. (ll. 2890 - 91)

('...My *honor* has turned in decline'
Charles faints, he is unable to stand up.)

Soon afterward, the same passage employs the metaphors *—force; baldur; sustienget—* thereby translating 'virtue' into 'sexual virtue':

"Jamais n'ert jurn de tei n'aie dular.
Cum decarrat ma force e ma baldur!
N'en avrai ja ki sustienget m'onur.
Suz ciel ne quid avoir ami un sul;
Se jo ai parenz, n'en i ad nul si proz." (ll. 2901 - 05)

('Never will there be a day when I do not sorrow for you.
How my force and my strength (*baldur*) will fail!
I will no longer have one to sustain my *onur*.'

I will not have a single friend under the heavens;
Though I have kinsmen, I have none of such prowess.')

The loss of Roland becomes a loss of sexual potency. There is a distinct parallel to be drawn with the case of Ganelon (cf. ll. 310-18), which likewise ties the loss of sexual potency —*oilz, coer, Baldewin*— to the collapse of family structure. Ganelon's loss of Baldewin is more than the loss of a family member; it signifies the crumbling of an identity, the destruction of an inheritance sustained in continuity. Likewise, Charlemagne's loss of Roland, his loss of *baldur*, signifies the collapse of an entire social and political order.

The loss of *honor* ends with the loss of the feudal community structured on principles of a close protective interdependence. The scene that charts *honor's* decline is the same in which Charlemagne vents his abundant grief over the death of Roland; it concludes with an odd twist by interring, literally, *honor* in a common grave alongside those Franks fallen at Roncevaux:

Gaillardement tuz les unt encensez;
A grant honor pois les unt enterrez,
Sis unt laissez, qu'en fereient il el? (ll. 2959 - 61)

(With zeal they covered them all in incense;
With great *honor* they have interred them,
They left them, what else could they do?)

From this moment on, we can recognize that *honor* is permanently lost to the Emperor; and yet in spite of this, after having carefully preserved the bodies of Turpin, Oliver and Roland for eventual enshrinement, Charlemagne proceeds to a swift reorganization of the French under his command.

Before battle actually begins, the Saracen admiral Baligant adds this last comment upon the fallen *honor* of Charlemagne, where again metaphor mixes sexual potency, or the loss thereof, with valor in arms:

Dist Baligant: "Oil, car mult est proz.
En plusurs gestes de lui sunt granz honors.
Il n'en at mie de Rollant, sun nevoid:
N'avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus."

(ll. 3180 - 83)

(Baligant says: 'Indeed, he is very noble.
In several *gestes* there is great *honor* concerning him
Now he will not have the aid of Roland, his nephew:
He will have no virtue that he can sustain against us.')

'N'avrat *vertut* ques *tienget* cuntre nus' --For all his insight, seeing with perfect clarity that Roland, and not Charlemagne, sustains *honor* within the *geste*, Baligant remains blind to the emperor's coming resurgence of power. Like Ganelon before him, who at line 1773 has referred to Charlemagne as 'infant,' Baligant vastly underestimates the scope of events at Roncevaux, confusing the cataclysmic fall of a great social and political order with the fall of a merely great man. Without any apparent realization of the profound implications, Baligant puts his finger on the essential by equating the fall of Roland with the fall of the *geste(s)* (ll. 3181-82). In the ensuing battle, defeat comes not to Charlemagne, but to a mode of narrative production; the introduction to this chapter cites Roland's words at lines 1013 - 14 to devise the axiom *from sword-blow to song... (Or guar chascuns que granz colps i empleit/Male cançun de nus chantét ne seit!)*. Beyond Roncevaux, narration can no longer be produced by the force of the individual combatant, sword in hand; rather, it is dictated according to the terms of a new law, supported by the writing of 'witnesses,' who will go on to give even textual support to Charlemagne's call to *dreiture*.

Upon his return to Roncevaux, Charlemagne seeks a renovation of his powers and of his authority in appealing directly to God:

"Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honur,
De France dulce m'unt tolue la flur."

(ll. 2430 - 31)

('Counsel me in both *dreiture* and *honur*,
They have taken from me the flower of sweet France.')

Through the agency of an angel, God grants him neither *dreiture* nor *honor* but the vengeance originally prescribed by Roland; vengeance becomes the instrument by which the losses of Roncevaux are made good:

"La flur de France as perdut, ço set Deus.
Venger te poez de la gent criminel."

(ll. 2455 - 56)

('You have lost the flower of France, this God knows.
You can avenge this criminal race.')

Charlemagne attempts to place blame with the Saracens for the losses at Roncevaux. God's messenger promptly corrects him, however, countering the emperor by stating what God already knows 'You have lost the flower of France, God knows this.' ("*La flur de France as perdut, ço set Deus*"). God holds none other than Charlemagne responsible for the losses suffered at Roncevaux. Charlemagne uses the occasion of the subsequent battle to regain the allegiance of the French, though the terms of that allegiance will be differently defined. Because he is at fault, authority can no longer be reestablished in terms of *honor*, in the person of the emperor, but only through recognition of the newly abstracted law, through a recognition of the approaching validity of a soon-to-appear *dreiture*.

It is therefore no coincidence that the emperor's attack on the pagans should begin with an attack on their laws. Before joining the Saracens in battle Charlemagne addresses his men:

"Veez, païen felun sunt e cuart.
Tute lor leis un dener ne lur valt.

S'il unt grant gent, d'ïço, seignurs, qui calt?
Ki or ne voelt a mei venir s'en alt!"

(ll. 3337 - 40)

('You see, the pagans are outlaws and cowards.
All their laws are not worth small change.
If they are a great race, my lords, what does it matter?
He who doesn't wish to come with me leave at once!')

'Their law' (*lor lei*) is not worth 'small change' (*un denier*) for its power to protect a great host. With these words, the responsibility for the protection of one's dependents shifts from vassal lord to the law itself --*lor leis*. Charlemagne's pronouncement contrasts sharply with Baligant's own assessment of the strength of the Franks whom he deems vulnerable to defeat in battle in consequence of the death of Roland (ll. 3180 - 83). However, ascribing the imminent defeat of the Saracens to the inadequacies of their 'pagan law' leads to damning implications following the defeat of the Franks at Roncevaux. Not the machinations nor the failings of any one person or group of persons is responsible for that slaughter of '*la flur de France*' but the complete dysfunction of a social order based on the guarantee of mutual protection...which is to say *la lei de chrestiens* (cf.: l. 38). The defeat at Roncevaux signals the defeat of a law that no longer obtains, the defeat of *lor leis*, which, one would now suppose, should have guaranteed the safety of the Franks at Roncevaux, but did not.

Immediately following Charlemagne's judgement on the failure of 'pagan law,' the French declare in favor of the law that will sustain them, calling on God's aid (*aïe*) and God's justice (*juïse*):

Dient Franceis: "Icist reis est vassals!
Chevalchez, bers! Nul de nus ne vus falt."

(ll. 3343 - 44)

(The French say: "This king is mighty!
Ride on, nobles! None of us will fail you)

Dient Franceis : "Damnedeus nos aït!
Carles ad dreit, ne li devom faillir."

(ll. 3358-59)

(The French say: "May the Lord God help us!
Charles is in the right, we must not fail him.")

A icest colp cil de France s'escrient:
"Ferez, baron, ne vos targez mie!
Carles ad dreit vers la gent
Deus nus ad mis al plus vrai juïse."

(ll. 3365 - 68)

(With this blow those from France cry out:
Strike, nobles, do no hesitate for an instant!
Charles is in the right against this race.....
God has placed within us the most true judgement.)

They begin with an expression of renewed solidarity: *Nul de nus ne vus falt* (l. 3344); *ne le devom faillir* (l. 3359). Unquestionably they turn to God as the guarantor of their safety and of their success against the enemy. Charlemagne, meanwhile, comes to serve only as the intermediary of that guarantee.

An affinity between these passages and the earlier examined orations of Olivier (ll. 1723 - 36) and of Roland (ll. 1851 - 68) suggest a useful comparison. Where Oliver cites rupture: 'Charles will never again have us in service'...(*Jamais Karlon de nus n'avrat servise*, l. 1727); 'Here we have failed the loyal company'...(*Oi nus defalt la leial cumpaigne*, l. 1735), the French announce the mending of a break 'None of us will fail you'...(*Nul de nus ne vus falt*, l. 3344). Be that as it may, the renewed relations between Charlemagne and the French bear witness to certain changes effected by Roland at lines 1864 - 65. There, we recall, because both Charlemagne and Roland had failed to uphold the basic responsibilities of a lord to his vassals, the French were removed from the protection of mere mortals and placed

directly into 'God's service': 'I was not able to give you protection;/That God, who never lies, should help/have you!'...(*"Jo ne vos pois tenses ne garantir/Ait vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!,"* ll. 1864-65). The French promulgate this fine though highly significant difference as they continue to cite God, and not Charlemagne, as their protector in battle. The French say: 'Lord God help us!/Charles is in the right, we must not fail him.'...(*"Damedeus nus ait/Carles ad dreit...,"* 3358-59). The direct and personal bond between vassal and lord, the signature of feudal relations, is compromised as the French look not to Charlemagne, but to a 'God given' attribute of his person, namely *dreiture*, as their beacon of authority, protection, and strength. Finally, those lines in which the French proclaim the advent of God's justice upon earth –'Charles is in the right against this race...../God has placed within us the most true judgement' (*"Carles ad dreit vers la gent...../Deus nus ad mis al plus vrai juise,"* ll. 3367 - 68)-- lead to a decipherment of the sibylline verse spoken by Oliver at 1733: 'Never again until God's judgement will there be such a man'.....(*N'ert mais tel home dès qu'a Deu juise,* ll. 3367-68). Oliver is proved prophetic in having tied the rejuvenation of the emperor to an ultimate demonstration of God's justice. But there is a further subtlety to Oliver's message: that Roncevaux represents a permanent and irredeemable break with the past --*dès qu'a Deu juise* (until the last judgement..., l. 1733). The French make this manifest as again they attribute their success in arms only indirectly to the Emperor; they proclaim not

Charlemagne's valor but God's justice is the guarantee of their pending success against Baligant.

When for a third time in the narrative covering the battle against Baligant the word *dreit* appears, we find Charlemagne, as opposed to the French, ascribing this attribute to his person:

Li emperere reclimet ses Franceis:
"Seignors barons, jo vos aim, si vos crei.
Tantes batailles avez faites pur mei,
Regnes cunquis e desordenet reis!
Ben le conuis que gueredun vos en dei
E de mun cors, de teres e d'aveir.
Vengez vos fils, voz freres e voz hiers,
Qu'en Rencesvals furent morz l'autre seir!
Ja savez vos cuntre paiens ai dreit."
Respondent Franc: "Sire, vos dites veir." (ll. 3405 - 14)

(The Emperor reclaims his French:
'Noble lords, I care for you, I trust in you.
You have fought so many battles for me,
You have conquered kingdoms and dethroned kings!
I know well what reward I owe you,
Both of my body and my lands and belongings.
Avenge your sons, your brothers and your heirs
Who died last night at Roncevaux!
You know that I am in the right against the pagans.'
The Franks respond: 'Lord, what you say is true.')

Charlemagne's talk of past conquests conjures up memories of the name Roland; we recall that during the council of Franks, Roland began deliberations by reciting a catalogue of those victories he claimed as his own. But Roland has shown himself to have been covetous of something far greater than a simple recognition as the first among peers. During the oratorical dispute with Oliver cited earlier, he declares in lament to the French already fallen:

"Meillors vassals de vos unkes ne vi.
Si lungement tuz tens m'avez servit..." (ll. 1857 - 58)

('Better vassals than you I have never seen.
You have for so long served me at all times.')

And again:

"Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murir..."

(l. 1863)

('Noble Frenchmen, for me I see you dying.')

Only following the death of Roland could Charlemagne have presumed to appropriate to himself such a manner of discourse. It is as though Charlemagne revisits the past glories of the French in an attempt to eliminate the memory of his persistent absence and to further re-ascribe to his own person an authority that had otherwise been attached exclusively to Roland. We discover, however, this difference in their claims: whereas Roland puts forth a list of fabulous conquests over foreign cities and foreign lands -- Ireland, England, Poland, Bulgaria, to name just a few (cf. ll. 198 - 200; ll. 2321 - 32; *passim*)-- Charlemagne remains vague in his summarization of past victories 'You have fought so many battles for me'... ("*Tantes batailles aves faites pur mei*," l. 3407). Unlike Roland, he credits the French themselves for the gains they have made and, more importantly, he points them in the direction of a victory that is ultimately internal to their own realm. When at line 3411 he declares 'Avenge your sons, your brothers, your heirs...' ("*Vengez vos fils, vos freres, vos hiers.*"), he exhorts the French to reclaim a lost inheritance that is nothing other than *France dulce* itself.

As the conflict comes to a close the Saracens will see Baligant's pennant fall and Mohammed's staff --the staff of their law (*lor leis*)-- brought low (ll. 3551 - 52). By contrast the French will be resurrected in what we now recognize as surprisingly familiar terms:

Ço dist li reis: "Seignurs, vengez vos doels,
Si esclargiez voz talents e voz coers,

Kar hoi matin vos vi plurer des oilz."
Respondent Franc: "Sire, ço nus estoet."

(ll. 3627 - 30)

(This said the King: 'My lords, avenge your grief,
Let loose your desires and your hearts,
For this morning I saw your eyes crying.'
The Franks respond: 'Lord, we will do so.')

Hearts (*coers*), eyes (*oilz*).....it appears as though, through a pursuit of vengeance, Charlemagne restores to the French that which he had taken from Ganelon at an earlier departure (cf.: 316 - 38). The list of tender and vulnerable organs (cf.: ll. 314 - 17) is made complete in these last words on the Spanish campaign, words which coincide with the return of the French to Aix:

Muntet li reis e si hume trestuz
E Bramidonie, qu'il meinet en sa prisun;
Mais n'ad talent que li facet se bien nun.
Reparez sunt a joie e a baldur.

(ll. 3679 - 82)

(The King and all his men mount up
And Bramidonie, whom he lead away as his prisoner;
But he had no desire to do her harm, but only good.
His joy and his *baldur* are now repaired.)

Charlemagne's lament during the mourning of Roland and the burial of the dead: 'How my force and my strength (*baldur* [connected etymologically to *baldöin* - the male member) perishes!/I will no longer have one to sustain my *onur*'.....("Cum decarrat ma force e ma baldur! / N'en avrai ja ki sustienget m'onur," ll. 2902 - 23) has now been brought full circle in what might be described as a resurrection of the dead. Charlemagne and the French have been able to resurrect their *baldur* even in the absence of Roland; Ganelon, to the contrary, has no future, no continuation in *Bald-ewin*. Charlemagne and the French have taken to themselves that which Ganelon held most dear, and

in place of *honor* they have aligned themselves under the auspices of the emperor's right, his *dreiture*.

Charlemagne has utterly crushed the Saracens by the end of his Spanish campaign, and yet we find that, in its own right Blancandrin's proposal, lines 38 – ff., has proved hugely successful. This should come as no surprise to our readers, since from the beginning of this essay I have recounted numerous ways in which Blancandrin's proposal is something far more than a mere subterfuge aimed at quickly ridding Spain of the invading Franks. For one, we recall from the initial segment examined in this essay how the shift from the immediate allegiance to the emir Baligant to a pretended allegiance the Charlemagne results in a significant innovation in the structure of interpersonal, political, and social relations. I indicated then that in this new socio-political configuration the subject finds himself not so much obliged to a particular lord as to a figurative authority positioned at the summit of a newly abstracted law. As we have just seen, the post-Roncevaux narration provides evidence of this socio-political realignment as the French turn not to the person of Charlemagne but to *dreiture*, to the divine attribute attached to his name for strength and protection in their final battle against the Saracens. The final passages make clear through demonstration the distinction between the abstracted law to which the French give their ultimate allegiance and Charlemagne who serves as mediator between the French and their *new* law.

The other component of Blancandrin's proposal, remarked upon earlier, regards the non-observance of the obligation to protect even one's closest

dependents. For Blancandrin this meant turning over 'the sons of our wives' (*"les filz de noz muillers,"* l. 42) as hostages to the Franks; for Roland and Charlemagne this meant the abandonment of the French at Roncevaux (see: Roland's admission of the same ll. 1857 - 65). It seems hardly a coincidence that the hostages promised by Marsilie miss their final destination. Somehow at Aix we find that Ganelon and kin appear in their stead. In this we have the surest indicator that Blancandrin's proposal is not merely an expedient and momentary ruse for the Saracens to disembararrass themselves of Charlemagne and the Franks, but a contract for social and political revolution. Before proceeding to an examination of the trial of Ganelon, I wish to cite Blancandrin at the very cruel and violent core of his proposal:

"Asez est mierz qu'il i perdent les testes
Que nus perduns clere Espaigne, la bele..." (ll. 58 - 59)

('Far better that they should loose their heads
Than that we loose fair Spain, the beautiful.')

Already we have allowed for the substitution of Ganelon and kin for the 'sons of the Saracen'; it only remains for us in the above lines to find *France dulce* where the text gives us *clere Espaigne, la bele*.

The gradual recognition by the French during the battle with Baligant of the renewed authority of the emperor (see: ll. 3359; 3367; 3413) leads to a brief interlude, the trial of Ganelon, in which the 'state' hangs suspended between two orders of law. The duration of this interruption is further lengthened by the inefficacy of Charlemagne's command. He opens 'council' addressing the baron Franks in the very discourse newly won during the battle with Baligant:

"Seignors barons," dis Carlemagnes li reis,
"De Guenelun car me juget le dreit!"

(ll. 3750 - 51)

('Noble lords', says Charlemagne the King,
'Judge me the right (*dreit*) against Ganelon!')

Concurrent to the act of claiming judgment against Ganelon, Charlemagne seeks to appropriate what one might have assumed to be the prerogatives of the recently acclaimed *dreiture*. However, what follows will give a clear indication that at the moment of this pronouncement, neither Charlemagne nor the Franks have an adequate understanding of the new law, nor are they able to make effective use of the new law or to operate within its structure.

The trial of Ganelon begins with an absurdity: the Emperor 'commands' in a language unintelligible to his subjects. In their 'deafness' to the very law they help usher in while recognizing the *dreit* of Charlemagne against the Saracens, the Franks revert to the prior law and to those of its institutions with which they are still most familiar. They revert to council and to judging the merits of Ganelon's case according to the law to which Charlemagne now stands firmly opposed. This is the law that was to have vouchsafed the protection of Ganelon's property and kin during his absence among the Saracens, a law that Charlemagne has already purposefully ignored. Now Ganelon turns to the French in a similar cause, asking that they grant him protection where Charlemagne had previously denied it.

Ganelon's second 'cause' is not dissimilar from the first in that he bases his demands on a rigorous interpretation of the rights of vassals and peers according to the tenets of feudal law. The French retreat to council (ll. 3761; and 3779), and when they return, they find in favor of Ganelon. Charlemagne's response, though severe and immediately forthcoming, remains marvelously equivocal:

“Ço dist li reis: “Vos estes mi felun.”

(l. 3814)

(The King said this: ‘You are my felons.’)

This single line, important in that it alone announces the advent of the new law, provides us with three possible variant readings. The most immediate and least ambiguous sense of these words can be summed up in saying that the French have rendered a judgement displeasing to the emperor. But this is a weak reading in that it grossly inflates the value of the word *felun*. After all, in this reading the French have not transgressed the law, they have simply found in favor of Ganelon albeit against the obvious personal wishes of the Emperor. A second possible reading is one in which Charlemagne castigates the Franks not only for defying his wishes, but especially for overturning his prior judgement concerning Ganelon. Where Charlemagne has denied Ganelon and those closest to him protection under the law (cf.: ll. 313 - 318), the Franks in council have reinvested him with those same rights previously denied. This reading is not without merit in so far as it suggests the inability of the French to take cognizance of the very processes of transformation in which, all along, they have been participants. Nonetheless, it falls short in failing to take into account that this line in the text in and of itself marks the culminating point of these very processes of social and political transformation. Only our third interpretation measures this verse as the proper cardinal point, which it is, within the text’s narrative development. Here Charlemagne declares to the French that together and without exception they are all accomplices in transgressing the law.⁷ *Vos estes mi felun* -You and I

are equally felons in having first broken, then abandoned the law through which Ganelon now makes his appeal.

The announcement of general outlawry does not simply spring forth from a propitious narrative juncture, but has been prepared from the first moments of the first Frankish council. There Roland points a blaming finger at both Charlemagne and the French, faulting them for that determination from which stems the spiraling violence of successive conflicts as well as the damaging beyond repair of feudal society's most basic institutions: namely, *cunseill* and *aïe*. We recall Roland's invective as he freshens the memory of Charlemagne and his attendant Franks (*vos Franceis*) to a past replete with shame:

"A voz Franceis un cunseill en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie;
Dous de vos cuntes al païen tramesistes,
L'un fut Basan e li altres Basilie;
Les chefs en prist es puis desuz Haltilie." (II. 205 - 209)

('You consulted your French barons about this,
They gave you some bad advice.
You sent two of your counts to the pagan,
One was Basan and the other Basile;
He cut off their heads in the hills below Haltille.')

From the vantage of narrative hindsight, we recognize in these words the first declaration of a barrier having been crossed, that the twin institutions of *auxilium* (*aïe*) and *consilium* (*conseill*) have become ineffectual at best, and at worst a perversion of their intended offices. Roland is quick to remedy the failures of *auxilium* with another sort of call to arms, namely, vengeance 'Thus avenge those whom the felons have killed. ("Si vengez cels que li fels fist ocire!," l. 213). When at Roncevaux *auxilium* fails for a second time, now on a global scale, Roland relegates to God the care and protection of the French

(cf.: ll. 1860 - 65); appropriately, God fulfills this office with a grant of divine vengeance --*Venger te poez de la gent criminel* (l. 2456). When *consilium* has led to internal harm and disruption within the community we find Oliver naïvely prophesying the coming arrival of divine justice -*N'ert mais tel home dès qu'a Deu jūise* (1733). Now when Charlemagne demands of his French "*De Guenelun car me jugez le dreit!*" this is the first call for that divine judgement and that divine justice won at Roncevaux to be turned against one of their own number.

Momentarily, Charlemagne and the Franks find themselves at an impasse. The Emperor, in the face of this new law that he is unable to implement by command, expresses helplessness:

Quant Carles veit que tuz li sunt faillid,
Mult l'enbrunchit e la chere e le vis,
Al doel qu'il ad si se cleimet caitifs.

(ll. 3815 - 17)

(When Charles sees that all have failed him,
He bends down his head and his face,
And for the grief he feels, he bemoans his miserable lot.)

Frequently within the *Roland* we see the Franks suffer the consequences of the emperor's lapse of command. The earliest and most salient case is that of Ganelon, who at the end of the first Frankish council solicits Charlemagne's guarantee for the safety of his heir and fortune; the Emperor, of course, declines in silence. Now, in the course of their second council, it is the Franks who fall silent. These two incidents mirror one another though with a difference. In the first, Charlemagne threatens Ganelon's existence passively; the failure to act upon his vassal's legitimate request sends a signal that the law has lost its value. During this, the second council, Charlemagne

articulates a life-threatening menace against Ganelon and kin though seemingly in a law which the French as yet find incomprehensible. It will take someone to translate this new law into existence, someone who can comprehend its nature and demonstrate its effects before this 'council' of all the emperor's baron subjects.

Tierry, whose diminutive stature marks him as someone more apt to persuade than to command, arrives at a solution to this impasse between Charlemagne and the French. He proceeds with a subtle, pliant and even deceitful manipulation of language in making a case against Ganelon:

"Que que Rollant a Guenelun forsfesist,
Vostre servise l'en doüst bien guarir.
Guenes est fels d'ïço qu'il le traït;
Vers vos s'en est parjurez e malmis."
(ll. 3827 - 30)

('Though Roland may have forfeited his allegiance to Ganelon
Your service obliged him nonetheless to secure Roland's safety.
Ganelon is the felon for acting treacherously against him;
He has perjured and mishandled himself against you.')

Tierry craftily dismisses Roland's forfeiture against Ganelon as a matter for personal rather than communal concern. But this not only occludes the significant difference in the manner in which each has contributed to the breakdown of vassal ties and so to the dissolution of feudal organization, it also inverts the order of magnitude of their respective blame. Firstly, Ganelon declares openly his defiance of Roland and the French, and so he acts according to the prescriptions of feudal custom, (ll. 322 - 26); Roland, on the other hand, acts in a decidedly more furtive manner, knowingly and willingly leading the French to a death they do not anticipate. In refusing Charlemagne's offer of *salvement* and repeatedly refusing to call for the

Emperor's aid, Roland provokes Oliver's express condemnation: "*Cumpainz, vos forfeistes*" (1723). Thus, it is Ganelon's defiance that takes its aim at the individual Roland, but Roland who, through a significant chain of omissions, forfeits his obligations to the entire feudal community. Line 3828 stands in clear reference to those twenty thousand Franks lost in battle; taking Thierry's words at the letter they are said to die not because of what Ganelon has done but because of what Roland and Charlemagne have failed to do. Thierry flatters neither Charlemagne nor the memory of Roland when he says: "Your service should have been sufficient to save them". In these few lines Thierry pins on Ganelon those charges that would have more aptly been leveled against Charlemagne and Roland.

Thierry is careful to maintain the ambivalence of his accusations; an undercurrent of blame continues to circulate freely among Ganelon, Roland and Charlemagne. In a final jest before joining Ganelon's 'man,' Pinabel, Thierry lets slip just how tenuous are these charges pressed against Ganelon:

"Pur ço le juz jo a pendre e a murir
E sun cors metre.....
Si cume fel ki felonie fist." (ll. 3831 - 3833)

('For this I judge that he should hang and die
And let his body be placed.....
Like a felon who has committed *felonie*.')

Ganelon is condemned to die not because he is a felon but because he is *like* —has the appearance of— a felon who has committed felony. Thierry determines the outcome of conflict not by bodily strength nor even by proof of guilt, but by conjuring blame and, through the skillful manipulation of

language, focusing that blame away from Charlemagne and onto the person of Ganelon.

Tierry sets out to perform the task that Charlemagne has not been able to accomplish either by sword or by express command. The true difficulty of the task is measured less in terms of bodily strength than in terms of subtlety of spirit. To illuminate the point we regress to a moment at the height of battle when the baron Oger dares chastise the emperor:

"Veez païen cum ocient vos humes!
Ja Deu ne placet qu'el chef portez corone,
S'or n'i ferez pur venger vostre hunte!" (ll. 3537 - 39)

('See how the pagans are killing your men!
May it never please God that you should wear the crown on your head
If you do not strike blows to avenge your shame!')

His instructions are exact and precise; Charlemagne is called upon not to reclaim his honor –his honor, as we have seen, having been forever lost– but to avenge an abiding shame. By the blows he strikes, the violence he perpetrates, he is able to exculpate himself from guilt, to transfer shame from his own person onto the bodies of a slaughtered enemy. Thierry has removed all obstacles but one preventing Charlemagne from making the same transfer of shame, finally, onto the bodies of Ganelon and kin. Pinabel stands alone as the last bar separating Charlemagne and the Franks from the new law.

Circumspection marks the Franks' response to Thierry's subtle casuistries:

Respudent Franc: "Or avez vos ben dit." (l. 3837)

(The Franks answered: 'You have spoken well.')

This is fitting. At risk is something far greater than the defense of a single judgment. Thierry has demonstrated the perversion of the discourse (*cunseill*)

that had once kept the balance of vassal relations intact, the discourse to which Ganelon, now as previously (cf.: ll. 310 - ff.), vainly appeals.

Next, as the text informs us, 30 hostages are taken in gage of Charlemagne's '*dreit*' :

Fait cels garder tresque li dreiz en serat. (l. 3849)

(He keeps them well guarded until the *dreiz* is accomplished.)

And the Emperor himself declares that from this trial the *dreit* will be made resplendent:

"E! Deus", dist Charles, "le dreit en esclargiez!" (l. 3891)

('Oh! God', say Charles, 'make known the *dreit*!')

The trial by combat in which Thierry and Pinabel are poised to engage will settle a question of guilt: if Ganelon proves the culprit for the losses at Roncevaux then, by default, Roland and Charlemagne are innocent. But what is this trial if not the final episode in the conflict first plotted by Blancandrin at lines 27 – 60?⁸ These hostages held "...*tresque li dreiz en serat*" are innocents, anti-types to those "...*filz de noz muillers*" (l. 42) promised, though never sent, by Blancandrin. These are the final few upon whom Charlemagne will at last avenge his shame.

As combat begins Pinabel offers Thierry terms reminiscent of those of Blancandrin's proposal:

Dist Pinabel: "Tierri, car te recreiz!
Tes hom serai par amur e par feid,
A tun plaisir te durrai mun aveir,
Mais Guenelun fai accorder al rei!" (ll. 3892 - 95)

(Pinabel said: 'Thierry, concede defeat!
'I will be your man by friendship and by faith,
I will give you my belongings to do with as you please,
But reconcile Ganelon with the king.')

The fatal difference lies in the last line: 'But reconcile Ganelon with the king'—*Mais Guenelun fai accorder al rei*. This is a peace that would take us back to the prior order, one that would continue to value the bond between vassal and lord above the newly created nexus between subject and state. By not only omitting but even contradicting the innovative element of Blancandrin's proposal, Pinabel reveals his innocence of all that has transpired between then and now. The *laisse* continues:

Respont Tierr: "Ja n'en tendrai cunseill.
Tut seie fel, se jo mie l'otrei!
Deus facet hoi entre nus dous le dreit!" (ll. 3896 - 98)

(Tierry responds: 'I will not hold council about this,
I would be a sheer felon, should I agree to that!
Let God himself decide the *dreit* between the two of us!')

Tierry's refusal of Pinabel's vassal submission, striking enough in and of itself, is framed in terms of a rejection of *cunseill* in favor of *dreit*. The demission is radical. At the end of this contest the Franks concede the primacy of the new order by placing the judgment of God, the first principle of *dreiture*, above the judgment of men:

Escrient Franc: "Deus i ad fait vertut!
Asez est dreiz que Guenes seit pendut
E si parent, ki plaidet unt pur lui." (ll. 3931 - 33)

(The Franks shout: 'God has done a thing of great virtue!
It is just that Ganelon should be hanged
Along with kinsmen, who stood pledge for him.')

When Charlemagne asks, *pro forma*, in what manner the hostages are to be disposed of, the Franks answer in chorus, swiftly and as though in response to a familiar litany:

Carles apelet ses cuntres e ses dux:
"Que me loez de cels qu'ai retenuz?"
... ..
Respudent Franc: "Ja mar en vivrat uns!" (ll. 3947 - 48; 3951)

(Charles calls his counts and his dukes:
'Advise, what should I do with those who are guarded?

...
The Franks reply: 'A curse if so much as one should live!')

Formulaic thought it may be, their message is not lacking in potency; they command that not one follower of the old law, *lor leis*, be spared oblivion.⁹ The moment arrives when Charlemagne and the French achieve mutual intelligibility in observing the dictates of the law governing the social order, newly established at the trial of Ganelon.

Where then, finally, is this new *droit* that Charlemagne calls upon God to make resplendent? There can be no other place than Juliane herself of whom the text tells us:

Chrestiene est par veire conoissance. (I. 3987)

(She is Christian by pure knowledge.)

Here is fulfillment of Blancandrin's greatest promise:

"Si recevrez la lei de chrestiens,
Serez ses hom par honor e par ben." (II. 38 - 39)

('Receive the law of the Christians,
And become his man by *honor* and in goods.')

Only this conversion is one taken on by ordeal in the epic scope of the battle at Ronceveaux and the scope of tragedy at the trial of Ganelon, as though the great distance between these two events are telescoped into a single work. Juliane, who knows the law '*par veire conoissance*' departs for Spain as Charlemagne departs for some mythical kingdom outside the confines of *France dulce*. His great anguish bears witness to the terrible separation between the emperor and the law that now dictates not only subject relations, but the order of events. If a new discourse has been created, its makers, the

heroes of Roncevaux, are now but a dim historical memory. The illusion, if ever there was an illusion, that Charlemagne could command in the language, could effect changes that radically alter the order of state, are dispelled. Charlemagne's only power is in knowing when to remain silent and to obey. The *gestes*, the creation of new language, have ceased living with the death of Roland as Baligant astutely recognized:

Dist Baligant: "Oïl, car mult est proz.
En plusurs gestes de lui sunt granz honors.
Il n'en at mie de Rollant, sun nevoid:
N'avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus." (ll. 3180 - 83)

(Baligant said: 'Indeed, because he is most valiant.
In several *gestes* he is given great *honurs*.
He will no longer have the aid of his nephew Roland:
He will not be able to sustain his virtue against us.')

Baligant, of course, is right; though how could he have anticipated a Thierry who, in an unforeseen way, does that which Charlemagne cannot himself do? The power of state no longer lies in the hands of those whose deeds are transformed into *geste*, but in the hands of those, like Thierry, who seem more cleric than soldier, who are more skilled in the manipulation of this new language than in creating the *geste* directly from sword-blows, as did Roland and the Franks at Roncevaux.

HONUR E DREITURE

Ma grant honor t'aveie retenude
Ed anpur tei mais n'en aveies cure
(Euphemien to an absent Alexis)

An ices[t] secle nen ad parfit amor
La vithe est fraile; n'i ad durable honor
Cesta lethece revert a grant tristur.
(Alexis to his virgin bride)

At a pivotal moment, immediately following the death of Roland, while seeking to restore the equilibrium lost to his world and to his state Charles asks that God grant him both *honor e dreiture*:

"E! Deus!", dist Carles, "ja sunt li ja si luinz!
Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honor." (ll. 2429 – 30)

('Oh, God!' said Charles, 'They are already so far removed from us!
Grant me my right and my *honor*...')

Here the word 'honor' proves sufficiently labile that in successive editions of the *Roland* Bédier translates it variously as '*honneur*' (ed. 1922) and as a 'service' rendered by God (ed. 1931: "Accordez-moi mon droit, faites-moi quelque grace"). The beauty of Bédier's successive interpretive offerings is that the reader need not feel compelled to choose between the one and the other, rather, he would do well to combine the two in order to arrive at a fuller

appreciation of the import of this verse. In this instance, 'honor' and 'service' are reciprocal values in that it is through the 'service' rendered of avenging shame that 'honor' is restored.

Here, as elsewhere within the text of the *Roland*, the word '*honur*' is not so much equivocal as it is polyvalent in its acceptation; it typically demands that the reader entertain not one but two or more interpretive meanings at once. In the passage in which Ganelon, confronted with probable death, solicits from Charlemagne security for his son and heir, Baldwin, '*honur*' indicates principally land-holdings:

"En Sarraguce sai ben qu'aler m'estoet,
Hom ki la vait repaier ne s'en poet.
Ensurquetut si a jo vostre soer,
Sin ai un filz, ja plus bels nen estoet,
Ço est Baldewin," ço dit, "ki ert prozdoem.
A lui lais jo mes honurs e mes fieus." (ll. 310 – 15)

('I know well that I must hasten to Saraguce.
The man who goes there will not return.
To be sure, remember that your sister is my wife,
And that I have a son, there is none more beautiful
Than Baldwin,' he said, 'he will be a noble vassal.
To him I leave my 'honors' and fiefs.')

The notion of 'service' is certainly implied here, at least to the extent that particular obligations accrue to Charlemagne as the guarantor of Baldwin's 'inheritance.' But the idea of service to Charles is also diminished in that Ganelon, in legating property directly to Baldwin ('To him I leave *my* lands and *my* fiefs'), effectively supersedes the Emperor's privilege of demanding service in exchange for land. Though the *Roland* continues to 'speak' of '*honurs*' and fiefs it is a matter of historical record that fiefs and '*honurs*' had become all but hereditary by the end of the eleventh century and that the distinction between the two terms was, by that time, all but lost.¹

Let us, for the moment, compare the two passages beginning with those words spoken by Ganelon. The circumstances are such that Ganelon speaks with the acknowledgement of his own almost certain death... (*"Hom ki la vait repaïrer ne s'en poet."*) In preparation for this looming eventuality he states clearly that all his holdings together with all the attendant prestige (*honurs*) are to be passed on to his wife's son; the one whom *he* has sired. If, on the other hand, we ascribe to the legend that indicates Charles as the sire of Roland, through incestuous relations with his sister, Ganelon's wife, then we find in Charles words at lines 2429 – 30 the obverse situation, namely, that Charles is preparing to become inheritor to his own son. As emperor no one, not even Roland, can logically bequeath to Charlemagne 'lands and fiefs,' Roland's gift to Charles, however, is the restoration of service (*honur*) and the establishment of a previously unknown right (*dreiture*).

The word *dreiture* remains largely undefined until the last moments of the text, and it is only there, at the scene of judgement against Ganelon, that the text finally illustrates to the reader something of the meaning of this term so critical to understanding the transformative powers of the *Roland*. The reader might, nonetheless, turn to the dictionary not so much for a set definition of this term as for a indication of its approximate meaning. Under *droit* we find: 1. *Qui suit la ligne droite*; 2. *Qui est du côté droit*; 4. *Vrai, digne de foi, véridique*; 5. *Entier, qui atteint la norme*.² Certainly, all of these definitions serve more or less well. By the end of the *Roland* it is clear that the Emperor's *droit* pretends to a norm (5); makes its claim to veraciousness

(4); is prescriptive of a 'right' way (1). But, perhaps surprisingly, it is the least 'precise' of these rather simple and straightforward definitions, the one which finds its meaning only in reference to its negated opposite, which comes closest to discovering the sense of the Emperor's *dreit*; namely, *Qui est du côté droit*. *Dreiture*, in the final analysis, is the instrument by which 'right' is separated from left, by which those who side with the Emperor continue to exist and those who side with Ganelon undergo total annihilation. The radical break within the historical continuum which is effected by the establishment of the Emperor's *dreit* will be the subject of exploration in the subsequent pages of this chapter.

An Immodest Proposal

The *Roland* opens in the middle of things, among the Saracens army that is 'enemy' to the Franks. It is there that the reader first encounters the noble Blancandrin, chosen as emissary to negotiate peace with the Franks; and it is here that the reader finds him engaged in the process of introducing treachery into the heart of his own camp. In a previous attempt to negotiate peace, a peace presumably initiated by the Franks, king Marsile, the leader of the Saracen forces, had, for the sake of presumed advantage, slaughtered the Frankish emissaries sent by Charles. Now, in a perverse and ironic twist, it is Blancandrin who suggests that Saracens sacrifice their *own* closest kin as a means of maintaining a hold on their possessions (*onur*) and the usufruct (*deintét*) of them:

"Enveius i les filz de noz muillers:
Par num d'ocire i enveierai le men.
Asez est melz qu'il i perdent lé chefs

Que nus perduns l'onur ne la deintet,
Ne nus seiuns cunduiz a mendeier!"

(ll. 42 - 45)

('Let us send to him the sons of our wives:
And though he should be killed, I will send my own son.
Far better that they should loose their heads
Than that we should loose our lands and offices,
That we should be reduced to beggary.')

In a moment of blackest irony, under the pretext of preserving *onur* (land and privilege), Blancandrin threatens to disrupts the chain of patrilineal succession by offering to kill off his own son (l. 43) and patrimony. *Onur's* most fundamental premise, the guarantee of inheritance and the protection of one's young, no longer obtains where the ties that bind father and son, lord and vassal are abrogated for the purpose of calculated advantage.

Though the term *onur* may at first appear to be set in a largely private, familial context, (Let us send to him the sons of our wives // ...That we should (not) be reduced to *beggary*) Blancandrin very deftly relates this seemingly private matter to a concern of state:

"Asez est mierz qu'il i perdent les testes
Que nus perduns clere Espagne, la bele..."

(ll. 58 - 59)

('Far better that they should loose their heads,
Than that we should loose fair Spain. .the beautiful.')

The immediate relation between affairs of state and affairs of 'family' (cf. line 3766 : '*de ses parenz XXX*') is underscored throughout the text, though invariably the text portrays the relation as a source of deep-seated conflict. Much of the violence both within the opposing camps and between them can be traced directly to this same conflict between the private and the public spheres. That the devastation wrought by Blancandrin's terrible bargain of lines 42 – 45 is general and comprehensive to concerns both public and

private is attested by a later passage in which Marsile confesses to loosing both the possession of state and all possibility hereditary succession:

Ço dist Marsilie: "Sire reis, amiralz,
Teres tutes ici.....
E Sarraguce e l'onur qu'i apent.
Mei ai perdut e tute ma gent." (ll. 2831 - 34)

(This Marsilie says: 'My lord king, Emir,
All these lands.....
Both Saragossa and the *onor* that is connected with it;
I myself am lost and the whole of my kin.')

Though Marsile solicits his men for the means of escaping death (*mort*) and shame (*hunte*) ('And save me from death and shame... "*Si me guarisez e de mort e de hunte!*," line 21) Blancandrin's proposal will have precisely the opposite effect.

The reckless murder of Basan and Basile had already disrupted any presumption of good faith in the negotiations between Saracens and Franks. The underlying violence of Blancandrin's proposal demonstrates that this same disruption had become internalized, at least within the Saracen camp. The air of mistrust and suspicion soon arises within the Frankish camp as Roland cautions Charlemagne against the advice of even his own barons:

"A voz Franceis un conseil en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie;
Dous de voz cuntes al paien tramesistes,
L'un fut Basan e li altres Basilies;
Les chefs en prist es puis desuz Haltilie." (ll. 205 - 209)

('You have taken counsel of your French about this,
They offered you foolish advice.
You sent two of your counts to the pagan:

One was Basan and the other Basile;
He took their heads in the hills below Haltille.')

Roland senses that counsel, even that of the French barons, has become a treacherous affair leading to deception and misfortune; thus, he urges

Charlemagne to leave counsel aside and go directly into battle. Ganelon, on the other hand, strongly favors the privileges and obligations of counsel, and with good reason. Ganelon turns to counsel when seeking protection of property and the safeguard of kin (cf.: ll. 310 – ff.); and he will appeal to counsel as a defense against the arbitrary judgement of the Emperor (cf.: 3747 – ff.) Paradoxically, by urging Charlemagne to accept Blancandrin's spurious offer of peace he places into jeopardy the very institution (*concilium*) he would otherwise seek to conserve. In the realm of the Saracens and the Franks, through the 'cooperative' effort of Blancandrin and Ganelon, *concilium*, the safeguard of *honor*, is irreparably broken.

The text clearly indicates to the reader that mistrust among the Franks begins as a 'family' problem. To be sure, Ganelon has every reason to mistrust Roland, who is something of a 'coucou' in the family nest. The son of his wife (Ganelon's wife is Charlemagne's sister) by some unnamed sire, Roland is a potential threat to Ganelon's own first born, Baldewin. Roland becomes all the more menacing in that he has no claim to any legitimate inheritance of his own. A later passage demonstrates how the creation of Roland's inheritance '*ex nihilo*' is parlayed into a cause for deep resentment not only for Ganelon, but for his Saracen counterpart as well:

"Demi Espagne vus durat il en fiet,
L'autre meitet avrat Rollant, sis niés:
Mult orguillos parçuner i avrez!"

(ll. 472 - 74)

('Half of Spain he [Charles] will give you in fief,
The other half will be given to Roland his nephew:
In him you will have a most proud partitioner!')

With these words, Ganelon creates for Marsile a relation to Roland comparable to his own. For Marsile, the implications are clear and his subsequent actions interpret Ganelon's 'message' accordingly; he cannot allow Spain, the inheritance of his own son, '*Jurfaleu le blund*,' to be divided between himself and Roland. Either Marsile destroys Roland in ambush, or Roland and his twelve peers, all insatiable of conquest, will soon ravage his own portion of Spain –heritors, inheritance, *onur* and all. Ganelon could not fail to see the difficulties of his own 'family affair' reflected in the competitive circumstances of Marsile and Roland in Spain.

Volatility within the complex web of family relations is on full display in the scene where Ganelon is chosen as emissary to the Saracens. There Charles declares emphatically (ll. 261 – 262) that none of the twelve peers are eligible for the simple reason, understood, that that their loss would be too great. This having been said, Roland proceeds to nominate Ganelon, his stepfather, for the dangerous if not impossible mission:

"Car m'eslisez un barun de ma marche,
Qu'a Marsiliun me portast mun message."
Ço dist Rollant: "Ço ert Guenes, mis parastre." (ll. 275 - 77)

('Choose for me a baron from my march
Who will carry my message to Marsile.
Roland replied: 'It will be Ganelon, my stepfather.')

Ganelon responds:

Dist a Rollant: "Tut fol, pur quei t'esrages?
Ço set hom ben que jo sui tis parastres,
Si as juget qu'a Marsiliun en alge." (ll. 286 - 88)

(He said to Roland: 'You fool, why this rage?
They know very well that I am your stepfather,
Yet you judge that I should go to Marsile.')

Unlike the conditions of Blancandrin's proposal here it is not fathers offering sons but the son who offers the 'father' in sacrifice. Yet even this reading is complicated by the word *parastre*. Who, the reader may ask, is Roland's father? Why this conspiracy between Roland and Charlemagne to snare Ganelon in a perilous trap? The answer may lie buried in the following line spoken by Ganelon to Roland:

"Tu n'ies mes hom ne jo ne sui tis sire." (l. 297)

('Neither are you my man nor am I your lord/sire.')

Firstly, Ganelon makes clear the absence of obligation between them. But also, by his very choice of words, Ganelon subtly underscores the 'flaw' in their ties of kinship: "*jo ne sui tis sire*" --meaning either 'I am not your vassal lord' or 'I am not your progenitor.' Could it be that the close proximity of *n(')ies* and *sire* also camouflages scandal: "*Tu n(')iestis sire*" ('You are the nephew.....of your sire.' In any case, there is ample further evidence within the text to suggest a 'conspiratorial' link between Roland and Charles against Ganelon.

Personal betrayals notwithstanding, Ganelon still shows himself not only reliant upon, but also skillful in the manipulation of the protocol of the feudal relations. Having accepted the almost certainly deadly mission to negotiate with the Saracens, Ganelon turns to Charlemagne for the expected guarantee of protection for those matters of greatest personal concern:

"En Sarraguce sai ben qu'aler m'estoet.
Hom ki la vait repaier ne s'en poet.
Ensurquetut si ai jo vostre soer,
Sin ai un filz, ja plus bels n'en estoet,
Ço est Baldewin," ço dit, "ki ert prozdoem.
A lui lais jo mes honurs e mes fieus.

Guadez le ben, ja nel verrai des oilz."
Charles respunt: "Tro avez tendre coer.
Puis quel comant, aler vus en estoet."

(ll. 310 - 318)

('I know well that I must go to Saragossa:
The man who goes there does not return.
Indeed, your sister is mine in marriage,
And I have a son, there is none more beautiful:
It's Baldwin,' he said, ' who will be a noble vassal;
To him I leave my fiefs and my honors.
Guard him well, I will never see him again with these eyes.'
Charles responds: 'You have too tender a heart.
Because it is commanded, you must go.')

In this relatively stylized speech Ganelon succeeds at placing 'family' concerns within the context of a highly visible public forum; and his request for 'protection' is not nearly so naïve as it may at first seem. Before acceding to Charles' demands that he go to the Saracen Ganelon seeks public recognition for the personal sacrifice he is about to suffer. In doing so all the French host are witness to the guarantee of protection, or lack thereof, that a liege lord will acknowledge to his vassal subject. Ganelon offers his life in anticipation of a public declaration by Charles that his (Ganelon's) continued 'existence' after death will be assured by virtue of protection for his *honur*, namely, property and Kin: 'It's Baldwin... / To him I leave my fiefs and my honors / Guard him well.'.....('Ço est Baldewin...../A lui lais jo mes honurs e mes fieus./Guadez le ben.....'). But with a show of flagrant indifference Charles declines him protection. Ganelon's fears and suspicions are confirmed; 'tender is his heart' ("Tro avez tendre coer"), vulnerable are his eyes (*oilz*) and the life of his first born.

Half way across the text, in a scene that mirrors the confrontation between Charlemagne and Ganelon at lines 310 – 318, king Marsile speaks to the Emir Baligant of lost *onor*:

Ço dist Marsilie: "Sire reis, amiralz,
Teres tutes ici.....
E Sarraguce e l'onur qu'i apent.
Mei ai perdut e tute ma gent."
E cil respunt: "Tant sui jo plus dolent.
Ne pois a vos tenir lung parlement..."

(ll. 2831 - 36)

This Marsile said: 'My lord king, Emir
All these lands.....
Both Saragossa and the *onor* that is connected with it;
And myself am lost and the whole of my kin.
And he [Baligant] replies: 'I am deeply grieved,
But I am not able to speak with you for long.'

This scene, and Baligant's response in particular, 'I am not able to speak with you for long...' ("*Ne pois a vos tenir lung parlement*"), indicate that a failure of the institution of *concilium* lies at the heart of the breakdown of feudal social order. Roland insinuates as much when warning Charles: 'You have taken counsel of your French about this, // They offered you foolish advice...' ("*A voz Franceis un conseil en presistes, // Loerent vos alques de legerie...*") The significant difference between these two respective scenes is that in the latter, in the confrontation between Marsile and Baligant, *consilium* ends following 'honor's' loss, whereas in the earlier scene the loss of '*honor*' is the result of the dissolution of the office of *consilium*. Ganelon's voice is the first casualty in the ultimate defeat of feudal order.

Before departing, Ganelon turns down the offer of protection even from his closest allies. The danger in going into the Saracen camp remain undisputed, but Ganelon turns his attention to another danger, one that lies deep within the realm:

"En dulce France, seignurs, vus en irez:
De meie part ma muiller saluez
E Pinabel, mun ami e mun per,
E Baldwin, mun filz que vos savez,
E lui aidez e pur seignur tenez."

(ll. 360 - 64)

(To sweet France, my lords, you will go:
Greet my wife for me,
Along with Pinabel my friend and my peer,
And Baldewin my son, as you know,
And aid him and take him as your lord.)

In many respects Roland has been the truest observer of the general state of the institution of *concilium*. Tainted by mistrust, the office of *consilium* will deliver nothing but disaster for those who seek out justice and protection from it. We have already seen how, long into the text, Baligant will dismiss counsel freely and out-of-hand --"I am not able to speak with you for long...".....(*'Ne pois a vos tenir lung parlement'*). These remarks respond directly to Marsile's statement that he has news for Baligant concerning Charlemagne: 'Concerning Charlemagne I should give you good counsel.....' (*"Vers Carlemagne li durrai bon cunseill,"* l. 2750). Baligant does not have the time, does not feel the necessity, to take counsel from one who has lost everything; Charlemagne's dismissal of Ganelon's request speaks to similar circumstances.

From the beginning the text spells out plainly Ganelon's culpability for the global disaster that is to befall the French at Roncevaux.:

Guenes i vint, ki la traïsun fist.
Dès ore cumencet le cunseill que mal prist. (ll. 178 - 79)

(Ganelon, who has committed treason, arrives.
From that point on begins the council begins that went wrong.)

Yet, the reader may question the verity of the following line, spoken in reference to Ganelon at the conclusion of his 'trial':

Ki hume traïst sei ocit e altroi. (l. 3959)

(Who betrays a man kills himself and others too.)

Is Charlemagne not guilty of gross betrayal when, in the probable eventuality of Ganelon's death, he deigns not offer protection for his vassal's proper heir? Or, on a more all-encompassing scale, does Charlemagne not instigate great harm at lines 180 – ff. by privileging the advice of Roland above the counsel of all his barons?

Immediately preceding the convocation of all the barons to decide upon Blancandrin's proposal, and indirectly upon the fate of Ganelon and kin, the text describes the Emperor in repose beneath a pine:

Desuz un pin en est li reis alez,
Ses baruns mandet pur sun conseil finier.
Par cels de France voelt il del tut errer.

...
Li empereres s'en vait desuz un pin,
Sis baruns mandet pur sun conseil fenir... (ll. 165 - 169)

(The King went beneath a pine tree,
He calls his nobles in order to finish council:
He wishes to lead into error (*errer*) those from France.

...
The Emperor goes beneath a pine,
He calls his nobles in order to finish council.)

What could the reader infer from these words: 'He calls his nobles in order to finish counsel...' ("*Ses baruns mandet pur sun conseil fenir...*")? One could begin by observing that this is the council that *finishes* all councils, that reduces the very institution of *concilium* to rubble. The fact that Charlemagne sits by passively during the highly volatile exchanges between Roland and Ganelon hardly results from an *impuissance* of authority or from a failure to recognize the dangers posed by such verbal excess.³ On this count the text informs us: "He wishes to lead into error those from France" (*Par cels de France voelt il del tut errer*). (*errer* -se comporter; s'égarer; se tromper; mener

en erreur.) Charlemagne is seen from the beginning as putting an end to both *concilium* and that part of vassalic *honor* it serves to protect.

Though Charlemagne does not contest the choice of Ganelon for the presumably fatal mission to the Saracen, his response to Ganelon's demand that Roland be relegated to the equally dangerous position as head of the rearguard is altogether different. Charlemagne cries out to Ganelon:

Si li ad dit: "Vos estes vifs diables." (l. 746)

(He said to him: 'You are the living devil.')

And yet, though Charlemagne is keenly aware of the vicious intent of Ganelon's counsel ("*Vos estes vifs diables*."), he does nothing to prevent it from having the intended fatal effect. Charles' betrayal of Ganelon reads very much 'on the surface of things,' the betrayal of Roland and the French at Roncevaux, however, though deftly obscured is no less evident among the many textual 'accidents' all of which point to betrayal.

Vengeance

From the outset of the council of barons (ll. 180 – ff.) Roland is seen to be straddling two worlds, one represented by the old order, the other represented by the new. On the one hand, he plays a critical role in bringing about the destruction of the social order based upon vassal allegiance. This he does, firstly, by proclaiming a profound if unspoken truth. Pointing to the dramatic example of Basan and Basile, Roland effectively accuses the feudal system of vassal allegiance of acquiescing to an endless round of systemic violence. Underscoring the system's fatal flaw, he recommends that Charlemagne dispense forthwith with that institution, *consilium*, which is one

of, if not the pillar of feudal social order. On the other hand, Roland himself slips back into the old pattern of deception and violence, not the least instance of which is his recommendation of Ganelon for the perilous mission to the Saracen. In the interim of change, Roland is content to play at the advantages offered by both worlds.

In a bold move that will define the first step into a new social and political order Roland responds to Blancandrin's proposal for reconciliation between Saracens and Franks with a call for vengeance⁴:

"Faites la guer cum vos l'avez enprise,
En Sarraguce menez vostre ost banie,
Metez le sege a tute vostre vie,
Si vengez cels que li fels fist ocire!"

(ll. 210 - 213)

('Continue to make war as you set out to do:
Lead your summoned men to Saragossa,
Lay siege for all your life,
Avenge those whom the felon had killed!')

In these lines Roland fairly defines 'vengeance' as it operates within the first half (through line 2396) of the text. Vengeance will pursue the Saracens, those ostensibly responsible for the murder of Basan and Basile. But, if the reader were to give a broader interpretation to line 213, 'Avenge those whom the felon had killed!' ("*Si vengez cels que li fels fist ocire!*"), then he would recognize that vengeance does indeed cast a much wider net within the text. The felon, the outlaw, the one who kills by deception and betrayal would include many within the Frankish camp, the most obvious example of whom would be Ganelon. And is it not true that the Emperor wreaks his own brand of vengeance upon Ganelon under the rubric '*juise*' during the 'trial' of the same? And are the French and Roland not the victims of this same

vengeance in repayment for the passive role they played in the betrayal of Basan and Basile? Vengeance, it would seem, unleashes its destructive force without discrimination, through the camps of the Saracens and the Franks alike.

Ganelon, who appears to sense the inherent potential for unleashed violence that harbors in Roland's proposal, speaks prophetically when he declares:

"Ki ço vos lodet que cest plait degetuns,
Ne li chalt, sire, de quel mort nus muriuns.
Cunseill d'orguill n'est dreiz que a plus munt;
Laissun les fols, as sages nus tenuns!" (ll. 226 - 29)

('Anyone who advises that you reject this offer
He does not care, sire, from which death we should die.
Counsel of pride, it is not right that this should increase:
Leave this to fools, and with the wise let us be one!')

These words ring true considering that Roland, the "*Ki ço vos lodet*" of Ganelon's accusation, will do little to circumvent the coming slaughter. But beyond this point of minor prophecy, Ganelon also carefully culls out just those epithets that describe all that is dangerous about the character of Roland.⁵ *Cunseill d'orguill*, echoing the words of advice given by Roland at ll. 205 - 06, is the advice which urges that *no advice* be taken; Roland, as has already been stated, invokes instead an immediate call to arms with vengeance as its motivation (ll. 210 - 13). Additionally, Ganelon places himself on the side of *Les sages*, those who would take counsel, providing the foil that identifies Roland as chief among *les fols*. Between *les sages* and *les fols* it is clear that fate casts its lot with the 'foolish,' those who would launch into immediate warfare.

But Ganelon's words reveal to us, the readers of this text, a quality of character immanent to *'les fols'* that is far more dangerous than mere personal recklessness; namely, they (*les fols*) do not care 'what kind of death we should die...' (*"de quel mort nus muriuns"*). Replacing the second hemistich of line 228 with the post-ceasural *-de quel mort nus muriuns* of line 227 we arrive at the following construct:

.....// de quel mort nus muriuns
 Consill d'orguill //
 (.....// from which death we should die)
 (Counsel of pride //)

The collapse of the institution of council (*cunseill*) brings down with it the social institution upon which all feudal allegiance is premised, the institution of mutual protection and aid which, in old French, goes by the name *aie*, in Latin: *auxilium*. The 'fools' of Ganelon's reproach are more than foolish, they are the agents who will cause ruin to the social and political order upon which Ganelon depends for both protection and advantage.

Ganelon's 'judgement' concerning Roland acquires validity at *laisse* 63, in the scene where Charlemagne offers Roland the opportunity to integrate his forces with those of the other Franks. There, sensing that Roland and his men are vulnerable to attack and devastation, Charlemagne offers sturdy reinforcement:

"Bel sire niés, or savez veirement
 Demi mun host vos lerrai en present.
 Retenez les, ço est vostre salvement."
 Ço dit li quens: "Jo n'en ferai nient.
 Deus me cunfunde, se la geste en desment!
 .XX. milie Francs retendrai ben vaillanz."
 (ll. 784 - 89)

('My dear lord nephew, know this truly,
 I leave to you presently half my men.
 Retain them, it is your salvation!
 Said the count: 'I will do no such thing;
 May God confound me, if I so disgrace the *geste*!
 Twenty thousand very valiant Franks shall I keep.'

Roland refuses reinforcements out of a sense of 'honor,' this he states explicitly at line 788: 'May God confound me, if I so disgrace the *geste*!' ('*Deus me cunfunde, se la geste en desment!*') In this situation, however, Charlemagne would be no less aware than Roland of the blatant affront that this proposition represents to *honor*. Charles' offer of 'salvement,' then, is calculated to misfire, to be summarily refused. Nonetheless, the refusal of Charles' 'sensible' counsel and aid at this critical moment certainly does speak to the accusation that Roland is among *les fols*.

Furthermore, Roland's refusal of Charles' aid has equally to do with his desire to maintain autonomous authority over the *geste*, whether one understand by *geste* the narrative product of Roncevaux, or the Frankish nobles who will author the *geste* in Roland's name. Evidence of this comes only a few lines down as Roland proceeds to gather forces drawing from 'The Franks of France, our land.' (*Francs de France, nostre tere*). He instructs Gautier de l'Hum to be particularly selective in choosing those who are to serve under him in the rearguard at Roncevaux:

Li quens Rollant Gualter de l'Hum apelet:
 "Perez mil Francs de France, nostre tere..." (ll. 803 - 04)

...
 Respunt Gualter: "Pur vos le dei ben faire."
 Od mil Franceis de France, la lur tere,
 Gualter desrenget les destreiz e les tertres.) (ll. 808 - 10)

(The Count Roland calls to Gautier de l'Hum:
 'Take a thousand Franks from France, our land.'

...
 Gautier responds: 'For you I should do it well.'

He takes a thousand *Frenchmen of France, their land,*
Gautier leads through the mountain passes and the elevations.)

It is fitting, and in accord with feudal custom that a lord, going into battle, should gather around him men from 'his own land;' for one, the ties of obligation are more immediate, hence, the opportunities for *something to go wrong* more remote. The text, however, does something most subtly subversive with a switch from one highly overdetermined word to another: Roland asks that a thousand men be chosen from among the Franks of France; Gautier complies with diligence. The text, however, contradicts Roland's express wishes by granting him not a thousand *Fanks* but in their place a thousand *Frenchmen*. Roland has no claim to authority over the larger political body that is to become France, nor does he have authority over its subjects, who will be Frenchmen; Frenchmen are subjects to the Emperor, and not Roland. From this we surmise that the text supplants Roland's *wishes* (the Franks) with the *wishes* of Charlemagne. Though Roland staunchly refuses the Emperor's men (ll. 787 – 88), he gets them anyway; only in far lesser number.

All the same, the reader would be in error to suppose that Roland adheres strictly to the allegiances determined by the complex web of feudal obligations, or, that Charlemagne seeks simply to destroy them. The jealousy with which Roland hews to his own, the Franks of France, only tells half the story. And, it is neither Roland nor Charlemagne but Ganelon, who, in response to Blancandrin's questioning, first reveals to the reader the 'true'

nature of the relationship between Roland and those to whom the text prefers to call the *Franceis de France, la lur tere*⁶:

Dist Blancandrins: "Mult est pesmes Rollant,
Ki tute gent voelt faire recreant
E tutes teres met en chalengement!
Par quele gent quiet il espleiter tant?"
Guenes respunt: "Par la franceise gent.
Il l'aiment tant ne li faldrunt nient..." (ll. 392 - 97)

(Said Blancandrin: "Roland is of the very worst sort,
Who wishes to subdue all peoples
And to place claim on all lands!
With what people does count on to accomplish such exploits?"
Ganelon responds: 'The French people:
They love him so, they will never abandon him.')

Blancandrin begins by noting that Roland is 'of the very worst sort.' Then he says something which must surely have struck a chord with Ganelon; Blancandrin observes that Roland 'wishes to subdue all peoples // And to place claim on all lands!' (...*tute gent voelt faire recreant // E tutes teres met en chalengement!*) Who, to paraphrase Blancandrin, are those who would help him in these exploits? Ganelon has ready answer: 'The French people: // They love him so, they will never abandon him!' (...*la franceise gent. // Il l'aiment tant ne li faldrunt nient.*") From Ganelon's account, it would seem that Roland has already laid claim to 'all peoples...[from] all lands' *within the realm of France*. The question, however, is not 'Is this true...', but, rather, 'In what way is this true of the relation between Roland and the *'Franceis de France'*?' The text itself is hagiographic in its treatment of Roland, and the 'many peoples' under Charlemagne's command are led to 'sanctify' him in that scene (ll. 2962 – 73) just prior to the gathering up of forces for a final battle against Baligant. But Roland's claim to the 'Frenchmen of France' is based solely upon personal prestige, solely upon a concept of *onor* that has more in

common with the 17th century concept of *gloire* than with the complex web of feudal relations which *onor* largely determines. More than any other thing within the text it is Roland's willingness to sacrifice all for the sake of prestige that merits him the epithets *orguillos* (l. 474) and *folie* (l. 1724).

Whereas Roland covets that measure of prestige which effectively demands that all Frenchmen grant him recognition, Charlemagne seeks to bring together the 'Frenchmen of France' in a far more practical, political way. This is shown by the manner in which the Emperor integrates his forces in preparation for the battle against Baligant. At *laisses* 218 - 225, the text shows Charlemagne assimilating his host into units which draw their leader from one region, their fighting men from another. Here 'Ogier the Dane' is assigned to lead 'the brave men of Bavaria,' 'Herman, duke of Thrace' is allotted the "Allemans who come from 'Germany,'" 'Tedbald of Reims' receives under his command the 'Bretons,' 'Hamon and Rembald of Galicia' receive the 'Flemings and the brave lords of Frisia,' and 'Tierry, the duke of Argonne' will lead into battle both the 'Men of Lorraine' and those of 'Burgundy.' Allegiance is created not according to proximity of geography or of blood relation but by the 'word' of the Emperor. Here, for the first time, the reader sees a truly unified picture of the 'Frenchmen of France.'

For Roland, death does not bar the path leading to *onor* and to the production of the *geste* (cf.: l. 788); quite the contrary. Though he is far less forthright about his willingness to sacrifice any and all others to attain this same end, his 'secret' is revealed, obliquely nonetheless, in the following

lines. Here he conceives of death at Roncevaux as a 'totality' from which none will escape:

"Felun païen mar i vindrent as porz:
Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt jugez a mort." (ll. 1057 - 58)

('These felon pagans shall rue the day they came to the pass:
I swear to you, all are judged to die.')

"Felun païen mar i sunt assemblez:
Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt a mort livrez." (ll. 1068 - 69)

('These felon pagans shall rue the day they assembled,
I swear to you, all will be delivered into death.')

Roland holds unequivocally to the point that '*all are judged to die*,' '*all will be delivered into death*' signaling that his own Franks are being prepared to die into the all consuming idea of pure prestige. How different this idea of death-as-totality from the death for which Ganelon prepares at lines 310 – 318. There, Ganelon offers his life on the condition of a continuum: that his *onor* (property, privileges, prestige) be maintained in and through the continued existence of his son and heritor, Baldwin. Death as radical annihilation is a revolutionary concept introduced by Roland under the rubric of 'vengeance' (cf.: ll. 196 – 213); it is a concept which Charlemagne will put into practice during the trial of Ganelon as a means of establishing his *dreit* among the French. Those to whom Roland refers as the *felun païen* in line 1068 will be contrasted with another group of 'felons', those who survive the ordeal of the trial of Ganelon and to whom Charlemagne refers as his own. There, in claiming for himself those French who have acquiesced to judgement against Ganelon, Charlemagne will cry out: 'You are my felons...!' ("*Vos estes mi felun*").

The manner in which the French are led into death by Roland is the topic of a rhetorical exposition in which Oliver harshly criticizes his companion. Oliver explains death in terms of a loss to community, and faults Roland for the act of recklessness that he names *proëcce*:

Ço dist Rollant: "Por quei me portez ire?"
E il respont: "Cumpainz, vos le feïstes,
Kar vasselage par sens nen est folie;
Mielz valt mesure que ne fait estultie.
Franceis sunt morz par vostre legerie.
Jamais Karlon de nus n'avrat servise.
Sem creïsez, venuz I fust mi sire,
Ceste bataille ousum faite u prise,
U pris u mort I fust li reis Marsilie.
Vostre proecce, Rollant, mar la veïmes!
Karles li magnes de nos n'avrat aïe."
(ll. 1722 - 32)

(Roland spoke: 'Why do you bear this anger toward me?'
And Oliver responds: 'Friend, you did it yourself,
For vassalage is through reason and not folly:
Good measure is better than stupidity.
The French are dead because of your senselessness.
Charles will never again have us in his service.
If you had believed me, my lord would have come,
We would have had and won this battle,
And King Marsile would be either captured or killed.
Would that we had never been witness to your prowess, Roland!
Charlemagne will have no help from us.')

Roland's prowess in battle is laudatory, memorable, but also destructive. It flows out of his decision to spurn counsel, and this sets Roland, along with the entire contingency of *la françoise gent*, apart from the remainder of the Franks. A fatal, hence, non-reparable rift is thereby created within the Frankish camp. Roland's prowess demands the acknowledgment of his own personal prestige at the expense of that of all others; hence, it corrodes communal bonds by fostering a notion of Roland as the absolute presence of the 'One.' It is this, Roland's 'auto-deictic' *pro-ëcce* --'behold, here I am!'--, that lies at the bottom of all the coming woes.

The excesses of Roland's *proëcce* are cause for only half the blame leveled against him by Oliver; words like *estultie*, *folie* and *legerie* round out the ledger in this lengthy testament of censure. And yet, here within this passage, it is only on the most superficial level that the words *folie* (folly) and *estultie* (stupidity) bear a meaning similar to that of *legerie*. The reader would be naïve to assume, along with Oliver, that it was only 'folly', 'stupidity' and 'senselessness' that led Roland into the fatal error that was Roncevaux. Roland seems, all along, too aware of the risks (cf.: ll. 787 – 88) too determined to continue in the face of all the direst consequences (*supra*: comments on lines 1057 – 58; 1068 – 69) for the reader to ascribe his 'error' to anything like 'folly,' 'stupidity,' or 'senselessness.' To affirm this hypothesis I simply turn to the three other passages of the *Roland* in which the word *legerie* is employed.

The first is that passage where Roland urges Charlemagne to abandon council and proceed directly into war against the Saracen:

"A voz Franceis un conseil en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie." (ll. 205 – 206)

('You have taken counsel of your French about this,
They offered you foolish advice.')

Here Roland is seemingly content not to impugn the intentions of the French council that sent Basan and Basile to their deaths as emissaries to the Saracen. However, those two remaining passages of the *Roland* which employ the word *legerie* do so by skewing its meaning toward the cynical. Below, Ganelon accepts the role of 'emissary' to which he has been

'nominated' by Roland; but in doing so, he forewarns his stepson of a bit of 'foolishness' that is about to be sent his way:

"En Sarraguce en irai a Marsilie.
Einz I frai un poi de legerie
Que jo n'esclair ceste meie grant ire." (ll. 299 – 301)

('I will go to Marsile in Saragossa.
But I'll do something a bit 'foolish'
Before I clear this great anger of mine.')

By the phrase "something a bit 'foolish'" (*un poi de legerie*) it is eminently clear that Ganelon means to communicate 'something a bit *tricky*.' *Legerie*, within this context, indicates a menace that will arrive only at the unexpected moment. In the fourth, and only other passage within the *Roland* to employ the word *legerie* the term is clearly associated with intentional violence. Marsile chooses the word *legerie* to describe the action whereby he nearly runs Ganelon through with his 'gold-feathered' spear:

"Bel sire Guenes," ço li ad dit Marsilie,
"Jo vos ai fait alques de legerie,
Quant por ferir vus demustrai grant ire." (ll. 512 – 514)

('Dear Sir Ganelon,' thus spoke Marsile,
'I did something a bit foolish to you,
When I vented my great anger and made as if to strike you.')

In a general way, the reader can note that this 'foolishness,' which is *legerie*, always, within the *Roland*, results in a dire outcome, and that it has at least the suspicion of underhandedness about it. Having said this, we can only remark that Roland is in default with regards to his obligations to his liege vassals, and that he has acted surreptitiously by having disclosing nothing to the *franceise gent* with regards to the fact that 'all are judged to die,' 'all will be delivered into death.'

Exill

In the preceding discussion, referring to lines 1731 – 32 in particular, I remarked that ‘Oliver explains death in terms of a loss to community.’ The loss at Roncevaux, however, is of an especially peculiar kind, in that all members of the ‘specific’ warrior community who were allied with Roland through feudal/familial obligation perish in battle. Virtually all the fighting nobles of that particular kinship are annihilated, and so, it is noteworthy about the death of the Franks at Roncevaux that, when shame comes circling home, no one among them is left to seek honor’s restitution through vengeance. It is appropriate, then, that ‘death,’ ‘*honor*,’ ‘shame,’ and ‘vengeance’ should all be defined in a new way, as they will be in the couplet subsequent to lines 1731 – 32. Let us continue our reading from line 1731 and following:

“Vostre proecce, Rollant, mar la veïmes!
Karles li Magnes de nos n'avrat aïe.
N'ert mais tel home dès qu'a Deu juïse.
Vos i murrez e France en ert hunie.
Oï nus defalt la leial cumpaignie:
Einz le vespre mult ert gref la departie.” (ll. 1731 - 36)

(‘Your prowess, Roland, better never to have been witness to it!
Charles the great will no longer have us in his service.
Never more will such a man exist until God’s judgement.
You will die here, and France will be shamed.
Today our loyal (legal) companionship comes to an end
Before dusk, our parting will be most sad.’)

First, let us examine line 1736, specifically the phrase ‘*la leial cumpaignie*’; we might translate ‘*leial*’ as ‘loyal,’ but also as ‘legal,’ ‘*cumpaignie*’ might be translated as ‘companionship,’ but also as ‘community.’ The reader is, then, left with the choice of interpreting line 1736 as a separation through death of one ‘loyal friend’ from another or as the separation through death of one ‘legal community’ from another ‘legal community.’ To shed light on the question we

appeal to the preceding couplet where the reader is again faced with choices in meaning. Who is 'such a man' (*tel home*)? Charlemagne or the man who stood always ready to provide him aid (*aïe*)? When is the 'divine judgement' (*Deu juïse*) to occur? Is this the last judgement of heaven and of earth? Or is it the last judgement of the text, that of the trial of Ganelon? Will there be no other such man as Charlemagne until the time of the last judgement? Or will there never again be such men as those who died at Roncevaux from the time that Ganelon and kin, men 'loyal' to the order determined by the force of *honur*, die in the outcome of a trial that is decided by God's judgement alone?

Of all the verses in this one speech by Oliver none presents more compelling evidence in favor of our reading than that of line 1734. The mechanism whereby *honur*, through an act of retaliation, is repurchased from shame is typically carried out by one member, or members, of a community for another member, or members, of the same community. Here, however, the text speaks of all of 'France' being shamed (*e France en ert hunie*) so that 'vengeance' will be carried out not by members of the community of which Roland was a part, but by members of all communities which now come together to constitute the political entity which will be called 'France.' It is God's judgement (*Deu juïse*), striking final vengeance against Ganelon and kin, which will usher this new political entity into existence. Here is where, in the couplet at ll. 1732 – 33, Oliver makes the sublime connection between *aïe* and *juïse* --*Karles li magnes de nos n'avrat aïe // N'ert mais tel home desqu'a juïse*. With the demise of *auxilium* --*Karles li magnes de nos n'avrat aïe*--

Charles turns to divine judgement –*N'ert mais tel home entrequ'al Deu juise*– as the means by which to continue the new realm.

Death, as Oliver defines it at ll. 1735 - 36, is death in the feudal mode, it is a disruption within the communal continuum –*Oi nus defalt la leial cumpaignie*– a continuum that could always be re-established through a subsequent act of vengeance. Following Roncevaux, however, the cycle is broken and *honur* becomes the casualty when 'worldly' vengeance is replaced with divine judgement. That judgement (*juise*) pertains not just to the Saracen, who, by the end of the epic, have either been 'converted' or swept from the Iberian peninsula, but also to the Franks who, at the trial of Ganelon, either accept Charlemagne's new order or will be eradicated from *France dulce*, from the 'sweet real of France.' One of the tenets of the old, feudal social order was that as one's death was avenged, so was one's *honur* restored; vengeance was, in a sense, a process of 'memorialization.' In the new order under Charlemagne, however, vengeance is replaced with divine judgement (*Deu juise*) and the one who is thereby condemned to die will never be avenged; all memory of him will be eradicated from existence.

In the *Roland* 'death' –*Vos i murrez*– and 'shame' –*e France en ert hunie*– are affinitive aspects of *honur*. To begin with, we remark that Roland understands *honur* strictly in terms of shame averted or shame postponed (cf.: ll. 1091; 1701; 1710; 1927); not once within the text does Roland speak of *honur* other than in reference to its negation 'shame'. Similarly, shame (*hunie*) is again and again redeemed as *honur* through a cycle of deadly

vengeance, so that *honor* is restituted, and shame averted, only when, through vengeance, 'death is paid with death.'

There is a passage within the text where Roland seems to be at work preparing for the demise of *auxilium* (*aie*) and for the advent of divine judgement. Just subsequent to having assigned a place in paradise to the souls of the fallen at Roncevaux, Roland proceeds to interpret their death in terms of a series of transfers of allegiance:

"Meillors vassals de vos unkes ne vi.
Si lungement tuz tens m'avez servit,
A oes Carlon si granz païs cunquis!
Li empereres tant mare vos nurrit!
Tere de France, mult estes dulz païs,
Oi desertet [a tant rubostl exill].
Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murrir.
Je ne vos pois tenses ne garantir;
Ait vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!
Oliver, frere, vos ne dei jo faillir.
De doel murray, s'altre ne m'i ocit.
Sire cumpainz, alum i referir!"

(ll. 1857 - 68)

('Better vassals than you I have never seen:
For so long a time you have constantly served me,
You have conquered such great countries for Charles!
But the Emperor nourished you for naught!
Land of France, you are most sweet,
Today made desolate by a most terrible disaster!
Noble Frenchmen, I see you dying for me,
I cannot protect or save you.
May God, who never did lie, have/help you!
Oliver, brother, I must not fail you,
I will die of grief, if someone does not kill me first.
Companion, sir, let us go and strike blows once more!')

Roland begins by distinguishing between what he considers as rightfully his from that which belongs to Charles. Thus, in the process of 'freeing' his men from service to the Emperor (*auxilium*) Roland claims them exclusively for his own --*Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murrir* (l. 1863). Lines 1860 - 62 center on the etymologically ambivalent *exill* --*exilium* (exile); *excidium* (excision, causing to disappear)-- adding significantly to Oliver's previous definition of

death at lines 1735 - 36. For Roland death is exile, but exile is more...exile is total annihilation. It is in refusing counsel and in choosing to depart from the community that Roland is *forsfiet*. Whereas Roland abandons counsel during the early dispute with Ganelon (cf.: ll. 205 - ff.) at Roncevaux, he likewise abandons *auxilium* by lifting the obligatory ties that bind vassal to lord (cf.: ll. 1863 - 65). Roland seeks to supersede Charlemagne in declaring that the latter has nourished the *chevaliers* to no purpose, that at Roncevaux they die not to Charlemagne's glory but to the glory of Roland exclusively (l. 1863). Next, in conceding a failure to protect and to guarantee the *honur* of those fallen at Roncevaux (l. 1864), Roland makes one last transference of *auxilium*, and of *aïe*, l. 1865. Service (*auxilium*), in this passage, has shifted from Charles to Roland (l. 1860), then from Roland to God (l. 1865). But this covenant between God and the *chevaliers* established by Roland is a covenant between the Divine and dead men. Roland envisions no future for France beyond the apogee of his own glory. At lines 1866 - 68, Roland announces his death not as a departure, but as one being struck down (*ocît*), as one who ceases to exist in absolute terms. Roland's legacy will be one not of existential continuity, but of preserved memory --*Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murir*-- and for the sake of commemoration, Roland seeks total annihilation rather than the reclamation of *honur*. Roland goes into death urging that death be met with death, that one killing blow --*ocît*-- be met with another and another --*alum i referir*.

Upon his return, Charlemagne immediately works to distance himself from those fallen at Roncevaux. In a formally structured *ubi sunt* (laisse 177), elaborating on the same basic procedure used by Roland at laisse 140, Charlemagne proceeds to ask counsel directly from God:

"E! Deus!" dist Carles, "ja sunt il ja si luinz!
Cunsentez [Cunseillez 1922] mei e dreiture e honur;
De France dulce m'unt tolue la flur." (ll. 2429 - 31)

('Oh, God!' said Charles, 'They are already so far removed from us!
Grant me my right and my *honur*;
From me they have taken the flower of France.')

As if in fulfillment of the prophecy implicit in the prosodic connections made in Oliver's speech between *aïe* and *juïse*, an angel of God appears to Charlemagne whereby the 'right' to vengeance supplants the office of counsel:

"La flur de France as perdut, ço set Deus.
Venger te poez de la gent criminel." (ll. 2455 - 56)

('You have lost the flower of France, God knows this;
You are able to wreak vengeance on the criminal race.')

As a consequence to the elimination of *concilium* and *auxilium*, *honur* can only fall into precipitous decline. Charles will accept vengeance and *juïse*, in place of *auxilium* and *cunseill*, as the instruments by which to establish his 'right' (*dreiture*).

As was the case with Roland, Charles, too, sees *honur* in terms of its negativity; yet whereas Roland persistently referenced *honur* as the protection and guarantee against *hunte* (1091; 1701; 1707; 1927; 2337), Charles (ll. 1867 - 68) conceives of *honur* as a settling of the score against the Saracens. He deals them a measure of shame (*hunte*) equal to that suffered by the Franks at Roncevaux; thus begins the emperor's quest for *dreiture*. Whereas

Roland has essentially abandoned *honor* the moment he concedes a failure to provide protection and guarantee for his Franks, Charlemagne forsakes *honor* in a calculation that replaces the obligations of protection with a desire for vengeance.

Returning from the foray against those Saracens who managed to survive Roncevaux, Charlemagne announces *honor's* end:

"La meie honor est turnet en declin." (l. 2890)

('My *honor* has turned in decline.')

The elimination of the last remaining *chevaliers* from Roncevaux marks an absolute end of *honor* for Charles. He reaffirms and elaborates on this assessment in a passage in proximity to the above:

"Cum decarrat ma force e ma baldur!
N'en avrai ja ki sustienget m'onur;
Suz ciel ne quid avoir ami un sul;
Se jo ai parenz, n'en i ad nul si proz." (ll. 2902 - 05)

('How my power and my strength will fall!
I shall have no one to sustain my *honor*;
I don't think I have a sole friend under the heavens;
Though I have kinsmen, none are so courageous as he.')

These lines detail with greatest economy the dissolution of all *honor*, the interdependence of *honor's* two aspects, *auxilium* and *concilium*, have dissolved. Charlemagne's reference to *parenz* is telling in that the material expanse of empire has overcome the prerogatives of the individual authority common to feudal organization. Hence, at *laisse* 208 not individual *chevaliers*, but the anonymous heads of state arrive asking for Roland.

Charles responds to these inquiring heads of state by saying that Roland is dead, that for the moment the empire stands headless, and that the

need for a substitute is pressing. Within his own empire as well there will be revolt, and Charles will again answer:

"Morz est mis niés, ki tant me fist cunquere." (l. 2920)

('My nephew, who conquered so much for me, is dead.')

Internally as well as externally, Charles creates by means of this locution the need for a strongly unifying force in replacement of Roland. With lines 2904 - 05, the text bounds forward to a solution. Charles laments the loss of his sole friend (*ami un sul*, ll. 2909;2916;2933),⁷ Roland, who has extended his powers of *auxilium* to the extent that, in offering protection to the entire realm, he was no longer able to guarantee the protection of the *honor* of his own *chevaliers*. Charles no longer has the likes of such a confederate in arms as was Roland, and so he turns to another sort of subject, one described obliquely in line 2905 as the prototype of Thierry --*Heingre out le cors e graisle e schewid*-- who will rise as the mediator of divine *juise* during the trial of Ganelon.

Auxilium, the force previously used to fend off shame, is replaced by vengeance, the instrument of divine retribution greater than any individual, which is used to crush anyone who stands in defiance of the newly established law. *Honor* is first put to rest in the grave of the three *chevaliers* memorialized by Charlemagne:

A grant honor pois les unt enterrez... (l. 2960)

(They were able to inter them with great honor)

Then again, and with finality, at the burial of Alde:

Lunc un alter belement l'enterrent.
Mult grant honor i ad li reis dune. (ll. 3732 - 33)

(Beside an altar, in noble fashion she was interred;
The King had given her great honor.)

When at line 2430, Charlemagne begs of God: '*Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honur,*' and God responds with a call to vengeance, God's implicit 'counsel' is that Charles should begin the transition whereby *honur* will be replaced by *dreiture* and *aïe* will be replaced by *vengeance*. The text affords a detailed comparison of *dreiture* and *honur* as an alternative opposition.

Whereas the opposition between *honur* and *hunte* is a constant, the opposition between *dreiture* and *honur* is a historic variable that, unlike the first pair, cuts the text diachronically, marking a historical disjunction that defines the dynamics of conflict within the text. This dynamic opposition is illuminated by comparing two passages, one incipient to the conflict at Roncevaux, the other setting in motion the post-Roncevaux confrontation between Saracens and Franks. As already mentioned, Charlemagne begins the movement against the Saracens by consultation not with his *chevaliers*, but with God:

"Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honur." (l. 2430)

('Counsel me in right and in honor.')

Marsile, by contrast, requests the counsel of his barons:

"Cunseillez mei // cume mi saive hume,
Si me guarisez // e de mort e de hunte!" (ll. 20 - 21)

('Counsel me // like wise men
Protect me // from death and from shame!')

Through the use of chiasmus we find in this couplet a truth borne out by the text, namely, that from Blancandrin's counsel, Marsile will visit shame and death upon both camps at Roncevaux:

"Si m' guarisez // cume mi saivë hume,
Cunseillez mei // e de mort e de hunte."

(‘Protect me // like wise men
Counsel me // from death and from shame.’)

Now in placing Charlemagne’s call to counsel in superimposition over that of Marsile’s call to counsel, we find this significant difference, not between Saracen and Frank, but between king and emperor:

Cunseillez mei // e dreiture e honur.

Cunseilez mei // e de mort e de hunte.

(Counsel me // in right and in honor)

(Counsel me // in death and in shame)

A comparison of these reconstructed hemistiches reveals two parallel progressions within the text, one synchronic and the other diachronic. The synchronic, ‘vertical’ axis is brought into definition at the moment of Roland’s death. Up until that moment, the opposition between the term *honur* and the term *hunte* had been a narrative constant. Following Roland’s death, however, the opposition between *honur* and *hunte* lapses and is replaced by the opposition between *mort* and *dreiture*. Hence, the opposition between *honur* and *hunte*, which defines the thematic opposition in the first narrative half of the *Roland*, is exchanged for the opposition between *mort* and *dreiture* which defines the thematic opposition in the second narrative half of the *Roland*. This exchange of oppositional terms *honur/hunte* for *mort/dreiture* occurs just at the moment of Roland’s death and so causes rupture in the narrative linearity of the text. For this reason the axis that is defined at the moment of the exchange between *honur/hunte* :: *mort/dreiture* defines an axis that is ‘vertical’ in that it divides the text into two semi-autonomous narrative segments.


The shift from one of these two oppositional dyads to the other inaugurates a shift from the social and political order circumscribed by the dynamics of the oppositional pair *honor/hunte* to a social and political order that is circumscribed by the oppositional pair *mort/dreiture*. Roland, author of the text's first narrative, is 'exemplary' of the order governed by the opposition *honor/hunte*; Charlemagne, author of the second narrative panel, is exemplary of the order governed by *mort/dreiture*. There is, however, a diachronic, 'horizontal' axis whose progression tends to erase all evidence of narrative rupture coincident with the death of Roland. That axis can be described in this way: though the shift from the pairing of *honor/hunte* to the pairing of *mort/dreiture* points up difference, the translation of the term *honor* into the term *dreiture*, and the translation of the term *hunte* into the term *mort* places a decided emphasis on narrative continuity as the text crosses over into the post-Roncevaux narrative. Hence, whereas it can be said that Roland purchases *honor* by avenging shame (his own for the failure to protect the Franks at Roncevaux [cf.: "*Jo ne vos pois tenses ne garantir*," l. 1864]), Charlemagne purchases *dreiture* at the expense of the lives not just of Ganelon and kin, but especially at the cost of the lives of Roland and of the Franks who die at Roncevaux.

Deu juise

The struggle within the text from the beginning through the battle at Roncevaux is determined by an opposition between *honor* and *hunte*, but not in such simplistic terms. *Honor*, in fact, is the chief concern of Ganelon, and it

is through the exercise of *concilium* that *honur* is preserved. *Hunte*, on the other hand, is the chief concern of Roland, and it is through the skillful exercise of *auxilium* that shame is ward off from the Frankish camp. Death, the complete cessation of existence, is more properly a post- Roncevaux concern, because it is only in the conflict between Charlemagne and Baligant that the possibility of nothingness is confronted. As the reader crosses over the text's central divide marked by the death of Roland, in the place of *concilium* we find *juise* and in place of *honur* we find *dreiture*, for it is the judgement of God rather than the counsel of Charlemagne's barons that will solidify post-Roncevaux power. In place of *auxilium* we find *vengeance* and in place of *hunte* we find *mort*; for whereas Roland's chief concern, at least going into the battle at Roncevaux, was to guard the French and France against shame (1091; 1701; 1707; 1927; 2337), this shifts to a deliberate pursuit of visiting shame upon the enemy, beginning with Roland's instructive oration on death and in particular verses 1867 - 68, with the prosodic point and counterpoint of their respective verb endings (*ocit* -die by sword blow-*referir* the progressive form of *ferir*) suggesting repeated death blows in return.

These double axes which divide the text both 'vertically' and 'horizontally' can be represented in the form of a semiotic square:



This paradigm carries radical implications as to the division between truth and falsehood within the text, a division that is not so simple as the implied 'moral'

division between Saracen and Frank, Christian and Pagan. This divide, which cuts the text into four ontological quadrants, finds representation in a series of verses that thread through the rich tapestry of this text:

Quant ço veit Guenes qu'ore s'en rit Rollant,
Dunc ad tel doel pur poi d'ire ne fent... (ll. 303 - 04)

(When Ganelon sees how Roland is laughing at him,
He was so pained that he nearly split from rage)

Li quens Rollant tint s'espee sanglente.
Ben ad oït que Franceis se Dementent;
Si grant doel ad que par mi quiet fendre... (ll. 1629 - 31)

(Count Roland held his bloody sword.
Well had he heard the French crying out their distress;
He was so sorrowful that he nearly split from grief.)

Si grant doel out que mais ne pout ester. (l. 2219)

(He was so grief stricken that he was no longer able to exist)

"Si grant doel ai que jo ne vuldreie estre!" (l. 2929)

('I am so greatly grieved that I would rather not exist!')

"Si grant dol ai que ne voldreie vivre..." (l. 2936)

('I am so greatly grieved that I no longer wish to live.')

Si grant doel ad sempres quiad murir... (l. 3506)

(He was so sorrowful, that he thought he would die on the spot.)

"Veez païen cum ocient voz humes!
Ja Deu ne placet qu'el chef portez corone,
S'or n'i ferez pur venger vostre hunte!" (ll. 3537 - 39)

('See how the pagans are slaughtering your men!
May it never please God that you should wear a crown on your head
If you do not strike forthwith to avenge your dishonor!')

Ço dist li reis: "Seignurs, vengez voz doels,
Si esclargiez voz talenz e voz coers,
Kar hoi matin vos vi plurer des oilz."
Respondent Franc: "Sire, ço nus estoet!" (ll. 3627 - 30)

(Then said the King: 'Lords, avenge your grief,
Make clear your desires and that which your heart wishes to do,
For this morning I saw your eyes crying.'
The Franks respond: 'Lord, this we should do!')

Morz est de doel, si cum pecchet l'encumbret. (l. 3646)

(He is dead from sorrow, as though encumbered by a great sin.)

The cardinal moment within the text is that of Charles' return framed, as we have seen, by the orations given by Roland (*laisse* 140) and by Charles (*laisse* 178) on death. On the one side of the divide effected by Roland's death we find death defined as non-existence and on the other as non-being. Roland suffers a separation from community, whereas Charlemagne speaks in absolute terms of a 'ceasing to be' (*"jo ne vuldreie estre"*). Let us now examine each of the above passages in context. At ll. 303 - 04 Roland's laugh causes such pain that Ganelon would split –*"pur poi d'ire ne fent."* Indeed, Ganelon perceives that Roland has placed him into a kind of exile (*exilium; excidium*), that his defiant laughter signals to Ganelon and to all present that Ganelon has lost his position of *honur* among the Franks. To qualify this observation, I turn to the passage that makes clear that the selection for this mission to the Saracens and the approval of this selection by Charlemagne come as something disgraceful and particularly odious for Ganelon:

"Par ceste barbe que veez blancheier,
Li duze per mar i serunt jugez!" (ll. 261 - 62)

('By this beard which you see is white,
No one of the twelve peers will be judged to lead this mission!')

Charles has made clear the primary criterion for selecting an emissary to Marsile: the chosen must be someone of secondary rank. Roland's irreverent

laughter sets Ganelon dramatically apart. Here, already Ganeion blames Roland for his coming death:

"Sur mei avez turnet fals jugement." (l. 307)

('You have turned false judgement against me.')

Ganelon recognizes that the election to this mission to the Saracens indicates a purposeful and permanent separation from community.

At lines 1586 - 88 the anguish that overcomes Roland causes him also to 'split.' This separation reflected in the 'split' of Roland is, in a sense, far more serious and richer in implication. Roland responds to a recognition that the French have arrived at the end of their existence:

Dient Franceis: "Mult decehent li nostre!" (l. 1628)

(The French say: 'Many of ours are falling!')

This death as separation marks a critical moment in that the historical cycle has been broken; not the individual, but the entire community loses existence. From this point, logically, death can only be defined in absolute terms as a cessation of being; Roland follows through this transition:

Si grant doel out que mais ne pout ester... (l. 2219)

(He was so grief stricken that he was no longer able to stand.)

Ironically, Turpin never goes so far, never makes this passage into the complete cessation of his own existence. Furthermore, the depiction of his death is tinged with blasphemy:

**"La meie mort me rent si anguissus!
Ja ne verrai le riche empereür." (ll. 2198 - 99)**

**('My death leaves me in such anguish:
I shall never see the rich/mighty Emperor!')**

Among the three *chevaliers* buried at Saint Romain, only Roland has seen death apart from its communal implications as a ceasing altogether of being. In rendering service (*aïe*) to God alone (l. 1865), Roland has interpreted death not merely as a cessation of being, but as the culmination of all existence, of all community, of *la franceise gent* finally and forevermore in his own person.⁸ Charles, however, has other plans.

Before examining ll. 2929 and 2936, I turn to those passages in which the Saracens give pellucid example of death as the alternative to Charlemagne's *dreiture*. Death for the Saracens is seen as a failure to justify their very being. When at verse 3506 the text informs the reader of Baligant's condition (He was so sorrowful, that he would die at once [*Si grant doel ad, sempres quïad murir*]), this is in response to news of the loss of his son Malprimes. For Baligant who has been given *dreiture* over Espagne (*Li amiraill ad Espagne dreit* [l. 2747]) with the loss of his heir there is no continuance for him, and hence for the Saracen, in Spain. Baligant's messenger, Jangleu d'Outremer, spells out the finality of this loss:

E cil respunt: "Morz estes, Baligant!
Ja vostre deu ne vos erent guarant." (ll. 3513 - 14)

(And he responded: 'You are dead, Baligant!
Your gods will not grant you protection.')

This passage acquires meaning as the reader recollects Roland's own description of death, the first to portray death in terms of Being and Nothingness:

"Jo ne vos pois tenses ne garantir,
Aït vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!" (ll. 1864 - 65)

(‘I can not protect or save you.
May God, who never did lie, have/help you!’)

The failure of one’s God to provide help (*aïe*), as in the case of the Saracen Baligant, leads ultimately to an absence of judgement; *juïse* without the authoritative signature of a protecting godhead leads to the eradication of being. Hence the textual assertion that concludes this passage:

Li amiralz alques s’en aperceit
Que il ad tort e Carlemagnes dreit. (ll. 3553 - 54)

(The Emir begins to realize
That he is in the wrong and that Charlemagne is in the right.)

The absence of *dreiture* henceforth equates with a new and absolute cessation of being. Marsile’s death at line 3646 (he is the only Saracen or Frank to die of grief) shows him to be the last remnant of the Saracen community in Spain save Bramimunde; she will be spared by Charles for religious instruction and conversion. The remaining anonymous multitude either embraces Christianity or perishes by the sword, not for defiance of God, but for defiance of Charles (ll. 3666 - 3670).

With the death of Marsile comes the text’s last mention of *hunte* (l. 3643); *honur* finds only one subsequent mention, when Alde is buried with *honur*. A call to vengeance motivates the push to kill the last of the *païens*. At the trial of Ganelon, Charles asks not for vengeance but for his *dreit*:

“De Guenelun car me jugez le dreit!
Il fut en l’ost tresqu’en Espaigne od mei,
Si me tolit .XX. milie de mes Franceis...” (ll. 3751 - 53)

(‘From Ganelon judge for me the right!
He was with me among the warriors all the way to Spain,
And he took from me twenty thousand of my Frenchmen.’)

Ganelon uses the term treason, which Charles is careful to avoid in reference to the Franks⁹:

"Venget m'en sui, mais n'i ad traïsun."

(l. 3778)

('I took vengeance against him, but there is no treason here.')

The text pretends to a separation between the human vengeance meted out against the Saracens and the divine vengeance meted out against Ganelon and his kin, as though the destruction of the latter needed the distance of divine mediation to ensure exculpation. The counsel of the barons who urge that Charlemagne should reconcile differences with Ganelon has been rejected, and Thierry steps in as the agent of divine justice which the text designates as *li dreiz*:

Dist li empereres: "Bons pleges en demant."

.XXX. parenz l'i plevissent leial.

Ço dist li reis: "E jol vos recrerai."

Fait cels garder tresque li dreiz en serat."

(ll. 3846 - 49)

(The Emperor said: 'I will have good pledges.'

Thirty kinsmen offer themselves to him as pledge.

This said the King: 'With this I will place him [Ganelon] in your custody.'

And he placed the hostages under guard until he had his right.)

Just as in the prior conflict between Charlemagne and Baligant, Thierry prevails, though only by the grace of God. Thus, the power of God is demonstrated among men; but also, in this delicate matter of Christians destroying Christians, divine mediation disinculpates those who participate in this mortal judgement. The reader is shown that both Charles and Thierry begin the judgement by ordeal in assigning to God responsibility for its outcome:

"E! Deus," dist Carles, "le dreit en esclargiez!"

(l. 3891)

('Oh, God', said Charles, 'make clear the right!')

"Deus facet hoi entre nus dous le dreit!"

(l. 3898)

('May God establish between us two the right!')

The conflict having been 'miraculously' decided in Thierry's favor allows the Franks to concur with Charles and Thierry that this is indeed the work of God:

Escrient Franc: "Deus i ad fait vertut!
Asez est dreiz que Guenes seit pendut
E si parent, ki plaidet unt pur lui." (ll. 3931 - 34)

(The Franks cry out: 'Through God virtue has prevailed!
It is fitting that Ganelon should be hanged
Together with his kinsmen, who pledged themselves for him.')

The Franks themselves give precision to Charles' demand made at line 3751. Charles' *dreit* prescribes that Ganelon and all his kinsmen should undergo complete destruction. The Franks respond: 'It is wrong that a single one of them should live!' (*Respudent Franc: "Ja mar en vivrat uns!,"* l. 3951). This is a broad extension of God's 'judgement' used to sanction the slaughter of an entire group, whose only fault is that they continue to recognize and abide by the old law. There is something suspicious about this justice, which in the text works progressively toward the profane. At line 1733, Oliver uses the word *juïse* to refer directly to the last judgement; at line 3368 *juïse*, which occurs here for only the second time within the text, refers to a divine grant of authority to wreak destruction upon the enemy. When the text uses the word for a third and final time, it is used to sanction the destruction of Christian by Christian. The last two *laisse* begin with the strangely proprietary use of both *vengeance* and *justise*:

Quant li empereres ad faite sa vengeance... (l. 3975)

(When the Emperor had made his vengeance...)

Quant l'emperere ad faite sa justise... (l. 3988)

(When the Emperor had made his justice...)

Vengeance and justice correspond to and translate the prior institutions of *aïe* and *counseill*. These institutions (*aïe* and *counseill*), which had served to bind the feudal peers one to another, now give way to Charlemagne's own vengeance and justice.

In both title and function, the distinction is made between Marsile *li reis* and Baligant *l'amiralz*, and the distinction is maintained throughout the text. The same cannot be said, however, for Charlemagne, to whom the reader is introduced as both *reis* and *empereres* at once¹⁰:

Charles li reis, nostre emperere magnés... (l. 1)

(Charles the King, our great Emperor...)

As king Charles is wholly ineffectual, hollow, failing completely to guarantee *honor* among his men or to protect them from shame (*hunte*). On the other hand, Charlemagne, the emperor, gains vitality in the pursuit of vengeance and power in the justice granted him by God. Whereas the Saracen king and the Frankish *chevaliers* divert all their energies to the maintenance of a state of homeostasis between *honor* and *hunte*, maintaining the one and averting the other, the emperor distinguishes himself by turning from the external conflict between Saracens and Franks to one that is internal. Ending the ongoing cycle of violence that kept the balance between *honor* and *hunte* always in play Charlemagne instead finds authority and power, even the power of destruction, in the word --'De Guenelun car me jugez le dreit!' In a single occurrence the trial of Ganelon demonstrates before all the *chevaliers* of the realm the power of the word and that *le dreit* belongs solely to the emperor.

Some comfort can be taken at the moment of death with the knowledge that a continuum of one's existence will be maintained. The refusal to pursue that continuum is a choice Charles makes in turning a deaf ear to Ganelon's plea for the guarantee of property and family, just as the latter departs on what promised to be a fatal mission to the Saracens (ll. 310-18). In consequence, the cyclical alternation between living and dying, between *honor* and *hunte* has been replaced by a being that knows no respite. When Charles laments at Roland's death:

"Si grant doel ai que jo ne vuldreie estre!" (l. 2929)

('So great is my sorrow that I do not wish to exist!')

"Si grant dol ai que ne vuldreie vivre..." (l. 2936)

('My sorrow is so great that I do not wish to live!')

Charles expresses a wish for a cessation of being, a wish that will not be granted. For Roland, Oliver and Turpin, death means, among other things, liberation from the never ending struggle to balance *honor* and *hunte*. Charlemagne never attains that respite.¹¹ Though he has put to rest the dynamics of the opposition between *honor* and *hunte*, he has replaced them with a balance between death and his own right *juise*. Charlemagne envelops within his single person the authority to determine both life and death. Though he has silenced the external conflict, he has done so by incorporating it into his own person and at the cost of great and irremediable anguish:

"Deus," dist li reis, "si penuse est ma vie!" (l. 4000)

('God!', cried the King, 'how painful is my life!')

VEIRE PATE(R)NE

Circumcision is of the heart, in the spirit, not the letter...

Romans 2:29

The topics of this chapter's two previous essays have indicated a particular approach, one that privileged reading the *Roland* in the fashion of a linear narrative. In the first of these essays --"M-Monjoie"-- we followed the progress of *Monjoie*, the 'sign' of Charlemagne, from general war cry to material emblem of state. Our inquiry examined scenes from across the length of the text from beginning to end, demonstrating the linear progression that was involved in transforming this war cry into the material sign of Charlemagne's political authority. In the second essay --"Outlaws"-- we discovered in the text's earliest moments a paradigm that would radically alter social and political relations. Our argument went the way of this paradigm's progress as it permuted through successive scenes until, at last, a realization of Blancandrin's grand scheme, the adoption of the paradigm altering social and political reality for Saracen and Frank, is achieved at the conclusion of the *Roland*. Yet these essays were constrained to take notice of the text's central

gap; the break between *laisse* CLXXVI and *laisse* CLXXVII, where two imperfectly connected narrative movements are deftly sewn together. The gap between the text's two principal narratives takes on profound importance as a void at the center of the story, a void across which one social and political order is translated into another. In the chapter's third and final essay we set out to explore this same central gap in terms of both its structural and its substantive aspects.

The compositional arrangement of the arguments of the two prior essays conforms to the supposed linear narrativity of the text they critique; the argument of those essays follows the 'progression' of the narrative from beginning to end. The following essay, however, attempts an examination of the text's material center –the void between *laisse* CLXXVI and *laisse* CLXXVII– and, to the extent to which such considerations can be termed relevant, attempts to provide the reader with another place of beginning and ending for the *Roland*. Initially, we examine two 'prayers', one delivered by Roland and the other by Charlemagne, each treating the theme of resurrection. At the moment of his death, a moment coterminous with the ending of the first and the beginning of the second narration, Roland prepares his own apotheosis, evoking the Biblical examples of resurrection given in the stories of *Daniel* and *Lazarus*. But, as we shall see, Roland encodes his personal resurrection with mundane signs, signs that mark his death as the end of the *geste*. In this way, Charlemagne's prayer, borrowing from Roland's own in both form and in content, seeks a resurrection not only of personal authority and of the strength of his forces, but of a lapsed narrative as well;

Charlemagne resurrects the *geste* in the form of renewed narrative. This leads us to next consider what are ostensibly the text's two modes of narrative production, that of the *geste*, the recounting of 'actual' events, and that of fiction. Roland produces narration with the sword-blow and he chooses Alde, the unblemished virgin who awaits word of his exploits in far off Aix, as the *destinataire* of the *geste*. Charlemagne, somewhat at cross-purposes with Roland, intervenes with what we might call (borrowing the rhymed pair from the 268th *laisse*) an *estrange eschange*; the substitution of one mode of narrative production for another. Outwardly, the *estrange eschange* occurs as Charlemagne proposes to replace the dead Roland with his (living) son Loewis as the groom in a marriage arranged prior to Roncevaux. Be that as it may, the true strange exchange has not to do with altered marriage plans, but with the transformation of the 'historical' *geste* into a fiction, a transformation with significant social and political import. Finally, we return to the center of the text as that place at which the text's two narratives join. It is in the space of this absence, in the operations of the textual hiatus, that Roland and Charlemagne, and so the narratives they produce, stand as figures of competing authority. We shall see how the *geste* and the fiction run like countercurrents from one end of the *Roland* to the other, and how, far from being mutually exclusive, they overlap to create, at the center of the text, a negative presence that functions as both beginning and ending.

Pate(R)ne

From the moment within the narrative that it becomes clear that no Frank will escape the surrounding slaughter at Roncevaux, Roland begins to prepare for 'resurrection' in a style that is as studied as it is methodical. Firstly, he prepares for the resurrection of *li franceis* in the recitation of their eulogy (l. 1854 - ff.), before preparing for his own resurrection in a last act that consists in placing the bodies of the fallen Franks in a symbolically arranged order.¹ Although the term resurrection applies to each of these instances, the intended results of the resurrection of *li franceis* and that of Roland are widely at variance with one another. We can adduce as much by recalling that whereas Roland's mortal remains, along with those of Olivier and Turpin, are deposited at Blaye in the church of Saint Romain, the remains of *li franceis*, as we have already noted, are laid to rest in the fields of Roncevaux at the bottom of a nameless pit (cf.: ll. 2953-61). In a later passage, somewhere well into the second narrative of the *Roland*, Charlemagne plots yet a third resurrection, a resurrection of personal authority, of the order of armed forces, and a resurrection of state drawn up from the ruins of defeat. We shall see in this third act of resurrection how Charlemagne completely subverts those earlier 'acts' of resurrection as they have been carried out by Roland.

Together, the three resurrection passages alluded to above form a loosely articulated whole. Their cohesion, the interlacing of a common theme of resurrection, can be made evident by citing three verses of remarkable similarity, one verse from each of the three passages in question:

"Aït vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!" (l. 1865)

('May God, who never lied, have/help you!')

"Veire Patene, ki unkes ne mentis..." (l. 2384)

('True Father, who never lied.')

"Veire Pateme, hoi cest jor me defend..." (l. 3100)

('True Father, defend me on this day...')

In a purely formal sense these lines provide us with a thematic imbrication. The second hemistich of verse 1865 is repeated with *near* exactitude in the second hemistich of verse 2384; the first hemistich of verse 2384 reappears, again with near exactitude, as the first hemistich of verse 3100; and finally, coming full circle, the second hemistich of verse 3100 re-presents itself as a 'translation' of line 1865, as Charlemagne is able to 'profit' from Roland's having consigned the French to God ('*Aït vos Deus*') by, in turn, soliciting God's help in defending the French that have now become God's own ('*hoi cest jor me defend*'). Stylistic affinities join these three moments of resurrection by the similarities and the slight, though highly significant, variance of their syntagmatic structures. The near perfect circularity of these lines, as the 'tail end' of verse 3100 rejoins the beginning of verse 1865 and so forth, is in itself suggestive of the process of resurrection and cyclical rebirth that will be the focus of inquiry of the opening segment of this essay. We will continue to refer to these three verses as textual signposts that will guide us as we enter into a discussion of strategies of resurrection employed by Roland and Charlemagne and, as will be made clear, as signs of a strategy of resurrection utilized by the text itself.

These three verses bear this further peculiarity, that only here and nowhere else within the *Roland* do their syntagmes '*ki unkes ne ment-is/-it*' and '*Veire Pate(r)ne*' appear. This fact of coincidence, which may at first seem a mere textual accident, lends yet another reason in favor of treating these three lines and the passages of which they are a part as though they were pieces of a single though loosely articulated cohesive structure. In examining and comparing these three passages, it may surprise the reader to discover that the difference of a single letter –as the text moves from '*mentit*' (l. 1865) to '*mentis*' (l. 2384) or from '*Pate()ne*' (l. 2384) to '*Pate(r)ne*' (l. 3100)– signals a shift within the narrative which bears profound political import.

With the words 'May God have/help you, He who never lies...' ("*Ait vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit*") Roland loosens the feudal bond between Charlemagne and the French by consecrating the latter into a direct service to God. In the previous section we have seen how in Roland's oration, beginning with line 1854, the vassal allegiance of the French devolves from Charlemagne (l. 1860), to Roland (l. 1863) and finally to God himself (ll. 1864 - 65). This, as Roland tells it, was all in consequence of the fact that neither he nor Charlemagne have been either willing or able to fulfill the principle obligations of vassal allegiance: [Roland speaks] 'I am neither able to protect nor to defend you'.....("*Jo ne vos pois tenses ne garantir*," l. 1864) –it being understood that the Emperor is and has been no less culpable in this regard. Is Roland admitting failure in these lines? Is he placing the French in the hands of a 'lord' who can meet the obligations to which both he and Charlemagne have proved inadequate, or is he simply liberating himself of a

certain culpability? We can reasonably suspect the disingenuousness of a Roland pretending to this moment of piety and humility, especially where the lament concerns the loss of the French at Roncevaux and he is pretending as though that event were sadly beyond his control.

The irony of Roland's implicit claim to innocence for the slaughter of his men is redoubled by Olivier's assignation of blame just 'moments' prior:

"Franceis sunt morz par vostre legerie.
Jamais Karlou de nus n'avrat servise." (ll. 1726 - 27)

...
"Vostre proecce, Rollant, mar la veïmes!
Karles li Magnes de nos n'avrat aïe." (ll. 1731 - 32)

('The French are dead because of your senselessness.
Charles will never again have us at his service.')

...
'Your prowess, Roland, would that we had never been witness to it!
Charles-the-great will never again have our service.')

Nowhere does Roland, either directly or indirectly, refute Oliver's accusations of blame. To the contrary, from the very first he responds to Oliver by restating his complicity --albeit somewhat cryptically-- in the dismal outcome of events even, as those events are about to unfold. At line 1058, just prior to the joining of the Saracens and the French in battle, Roland states: 'I swear to you, all are judged to die.....' (*"Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt jugez a mort"*); and just a few lines further (l. 1069), he makes the same pronouncement using virtually the same words 'I swear to you, all will be delivered into death'.....(*Je vos plevis, tuz sunt a morz livrez*). If by 'all' (*tuz*) the reader has cause to understand not just Saracen but Saracen and French alike, then the words *Aït vos Deus* of line 1865 become the signal for an act of abandonment. Following the lines of this argument, we find the verbal 'act' whereby Roland abandons all responsibility for the protection of the French at Roncevaux has

occurred in yet an earlier passage,² in *laisse* 63, at the moment in which he out and out refuses the emperor's offer of '*salvement*':

"Demi mun host vos lerrai en present.
Retenez les, ço est vostre salvement."
Ço dit li quens: "Jo n'en ferai nient.
Deus me cunfunde, se la geste en desment!" (l. 785 - 88)

('I will leave you at present with half of my men.
Keep them, it will be your salvation.'
Roland then said: 'I will do no such thing.
May God confound me, if I so betray the *geste*.)

This passage presents evidence that both Roland and the Emperor are to blame for the impending tragedy: Roland for his action in refusing aid where aid is needed, Charlemagne for passively allowing what he recognizes as a disaster-in-the-making to move unimpeded toward its terrible realization. How, then, is the reader to make sense of this '*legerie*' - imprudence, folly, *ruse*- as Oliver calls it? How could Roland and Charlemagne have possibly wished for the demise of the French at Roncevaux?

Roland and Charlemagne each sketches out a response to our query that are both pithy and remarkably similar in form. First we have it from Roland:

"Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murir..." (l. 1863)
('Noble Frenchmen, I see you dying for me.')

Roland describes himself watching the French as they die (*murir pur mei* -- 'for me/because of me.' There is little, if any, evidence coming from the French themselves to suggest that they die *for* Roland; however, we have already seen Oliver make the plain accusation that they die because of what Roland has done --*par vostre legerie* (l. 1726). Roland deftly turns failure to his advantage, as the magnitude of the combined sacrifice of the French

serves only to enhance the glory of his name. Then there is another, not altogether different, logic supporting the idea of the 'willed' sacrifice of the French: that by their deaths the French, and so the *geste* itself, should come to be seen as Roland's *creation* and his *possession*. Already the text has provided us with signals to indicate that Roland and Charlemagne compete for the allegiance of the French: [Roland] 'The emperor has nourished you for naught!'.....(*Li empereres tant mare vos nurrit!*, l. 1860); [Roland] 'Charles will never again have us in his service....' (*Jamais Karlon de nus n'avrat servise....*, l. 1727); there will be yet more such signs of calculated betrayal.³

We might compare the destruction of the Franks at Roncevaux with Roland's attempt to destroy *Durendal*, the sword given him by God. Clearly, Roland is at pains to ensure that *Durendal's* destruction is coincident with the end of his own existence. The comparison becomes all the more valid once we recognize that *Durendal* is the metonymic representation not only of Roland but of the Franks themselves. In his recitation of the catalogue of his conquests, line 2316 ff., Roland attributes powers to *Durendal* that might just as easily have been attributed to the Franks. They, after all, were as much responsible for the successes to which Roland attaches his name as was *Durendal* for not just the divine powers attributed to his sword, but also the sturdy if mundane service of the Franks, served loyally as the instrument of his will. When Roland claims that, by its destruction, he would remove *Durendal* from the hands of the Saracens, there is something not quite right about the circumstances in which this assertion is made. The Saracens, after

all, have fled and will certainly not return before the arrival of a quickly advancing Charlemagne. It is the emperor himself from whom Roland wishes to 'save' *Durendal*, just as Roland has, likewise, 'saved' the Franks from further service to their emperor. Roland fails in the attempt to destroy the sword, *Durendal*, so that it might remain singly his. In a like vein, so will he fail in the attempt to secure the Franks for the glory of his own name, though as he gazes upon the Franks dead and dying on the field of Roncevaux, he states: '*per mei vos vei murir*' (I see you dying for me).

The Emperor's claim to the Franks is of a slightly different nature from that of Roland, as in the scene below Charlemagne laments those who have fallen and whom he is about to bury:

"Si grant dol ai que ne voldreie vivre,
De ma maisnee, ki pur mei est ocise!" (ll. 2936 - 37)

('So great is my anguish, I no longer wish to live,
Because of my household, who have been killed for me!')

Comparing the syntagme taken from Roland's oration ('I see you dying for me.....' [*pur mei vos vei murir*']) with that from Charlemagne's ('who have been killed for me...' [*ki pur mei est ocise*]), we detect a nuanced difference signaled by the choice of verb: *murir* (to die) or *occire* (to kill). The implied difference is one of volition, or the absence thereof, a difference Roland himself will play upon at line 1867:

"De doel murra, s'altre ne m'i ocit." (l. 1867)

('I will die of grief, if another does not kill me first.')

Addressing Oliver Roland declares that with the death of this, his closest companion, he himself will loose the will to live *-de doel murra-* unless, by

chance, some other should kill him (*ocit*) first. We are now in a position to revisit line 1863 and to appreciate that Roland, by the choice of the word *murir*, communicates through insinuation something he dare not speak forthrightly: that the French have 'willingly' given to him their lives. We need not search long or far to find evidence to the contrary: at lines 1515 - ff., Turpin must literally shame the French back into battle once they realize that there is no hope of leaving the field of battle alive and victorious. The Franks meet their end not as a matter of deliberate choice, but as the victims of a 'triple' *legerie* - that of Roland (l. 1726), of Ganelon (l. 300) and, as will be made clear, that of the Emperor himself. In declaring: "I have seen you die for me" (.....'*pur mei vos vei morir*), Roland attempts to claim the Franks for himself, to usurp Charlemagne's position within the feudal hierarchy as 'first among peers'. Although Charlemagne will find a way of turning things to his own advantage, Roland, at least at the conclusion of the first narration, does succeed in 'taking' the lives of the Franks as his own.

Charlemagne's interest in the death of the Franks is related to, although distinguished from, Roland's own interests. As Roland tells it, the Franks willingly die (*murir*) for him; in the Emperor's words, however, these men, whose allegiance has meanwhile fallen to another, are plainly killed (*ocis*). It is not altogether impossible to divine Charlemagne's intent in this matter. When the Emperor presides over the burial of the French, throwing their corpses into the anonymity of a common pit ("*Ad un camer sempres les unt portet*"), he effectively evacuates the body for the sake of retaining the

name. We will see the French of the post-Roncevaux text taking their place in the first ranks of the Emperor's command, as Charlemagne arranges his forces in preparation for the upcoming battle against Baligant (ll. 3026 - ff.) There a new body of men, the French, will be assembled under the rubric of an old and now glorious name, that of Roland.

"Aït (avoir) vos Deus" ('God have you'); with these words Roland gives the French over to death. But, also, we have not neglected to point out that the one who affords to another the guarantee of protection can, by rights, have the other as his man. Certainly this anticipates the new order, the new dispensation, in which the French, preceding the trial of Ganelon, are saved solely by means of a divine intercession (cf: Naimes in combat with Canabeus, l. 3439; Thierry in combat with Pinabel, l. 3923; and Charlemagne in combat with Baligant, l. 3609). As Charlemagne puts it, the law itself will ultimately determine who will survive the final confrontation between 'pagan' and 'Christian':

"Tutes lor leis un dener ne lur valt.
S'il unt grant gent, d'ïço, seignurs, qui calt?" (ll. 3338 - 39)

(All their laws are not worth a penny.
Though they are a great race, what, my lords, does it matter?)

Death or survival in this conflict ceases to be a matter of human effort rather survival is a sign that reflects judgement on the validity of competing laws. The law that fails to protect the Franks at Roncevaux cannot be the same law that will cause Charlemagne to triumph over *all* his enemies. Although Roland might consign the French to God's keeping, Charlemagne, over the course of the second narrative, is certain to resurrect them as his own.

We proceed from the passage in which Roland effects the 'resurrection of the Franks' to that passage in which Roland enacts his own resurrection. There, with an eye for the cynical, we noted that in 'delivering' the French from the ties of human (feudal) obligation and into the protecting hands of God, Roland does little more than to wash his hands in an act of treachery and abandonment. When at lines 2384 - ff. Roland administers his own passage into the nether world, he does so while undercutting still further the system of obligatory ties that characterizes the feudal social organization. We remark the considerable progress in this direction by comparing the last line in his obsequies for the French ('May God, who never lies, have/help you'.....["*Ait vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit...*"]) with the first line of the prayer in which Roland recommends himself directly to God ('True Father, who never lies...' ["*Veire Pate()ne, ki unkes ne mentis...*"]). There is little doubt that Roland refers to the One God of heaven and earth, when at line 1865 he confers on Him the 'future' care of the Franks; the epithet *ki unkes ne mentit* only underscores the fallibility of the previous guarantors (both Roland and Charlemagne) of French safety. The noun phrase *Veire Pate()ne*, by contrast, proves significantly less exact. Whereas at line 1865 Roland distinguishes God (who never lies) from men (who presumably do), at line 2384 Roland makes his appeal to that father among all possible fathers who is *True*. The rejection of Charlemagne as unworthy of his office is now furtively remarked.

Even more disturbing than the veiled accusations against the Emperor are the implications calling into doubt the validity of existing feudal law. We have noted with open parentheses the absence of the 'R' from *Pate()ne*; by

the abstraction of this single letter Roland is removed from the now emasculated name of the father. It is none other than his own name, 'R'(oland), that has been withdrawn.⁴ *Pate()ne*, literally 'an open space', no longer designates the figure of authority, 'father', who either embodies or is positioned as authority within the law; rather, *Pate()ne* indicates an absence of law, a void in the sphere of public authority. *Pate()ne* is an open field, cleared by the evacuation of the Franks, left open by Roland's desire that the *geste* should end with the end of his own existence; a gaping wound in the fabric of a society,⁵ the fabric of a *geste*, that have seemed the direct creation of his own *proëcce*. Whatever may follow, Roland has effectively demonstrated, and to Charlemagne above all others, the far reaching power of his name.

Roland departs from life with telling reference to Biblical figures of resurrection, his is a self appointed apotheosis. He weaves into the final lines of his dying prayer a rebuke against the emperor, evidence of the widening gulf of disagreement rising up between them:

"Veire Patene, ki unkes ne mentis,
 Seint Lazaron de mort resurrexis
 E Daniel des leons guraresis,
 Guaris de mei l'anme de tuz perilz
 Pur les pecchez que en ma vie fis!" (ll. 2384 - 88)

('True father (*Pate()ne*), who never lied,
 Who raised Saint Lazarus from the dead
 And protected Daniel from the lions,
 Keep my soul from all perils
 Due to the sins which in my life I have committed!')

We can summarily conclude that God's judgment has been harsh; unlike Lazarus, Roland will not be returned to the living; unlike Daniel, Roland will not be rescued from death's jaws. Of the two Biblical references, that of Lazarus is, within this context, by far the more problematical (For the moment we

reserve consideration of the reference to Daniel until its reappearance in the prayer of Charlemagne, lines 3100 - ff., the text's third and final 'resurrection passage'). Lazarus brought back to life from death is out of John, 11:1-4. This is the more renowned of the two Biblical stories concerning one named Lazarus, though not necessarily the one most appropriate to Roland's situation at the moment of his death. We have just mentioned the irony implicit in this evocation: there is no one, neither Charlemagne returned to Roncevaux nor God through divine intercession, who will return Roland to the living. We do not dismiss the all too obvious reference to Lazarus as symbol of spiritual resurrection and life everlasting; in fact we insist upon it. Nonetheless, this story of Lazarus from the gospel of John merely serves as a cover for the story taken from Luke; the other Biblical tale involving one named Lazarus.

In the Lazarus of lesser renown, that taken from the parable spoken by Jesus in Luke, 16:19 - 31, we find a more suitable analogue to Roland at the conclusion of the 'first' narration. The text does not fail to imitate the tale related by Luke in having Roland borne into heaven in the arms of angels. Compare:

When the poor man (Lazarus) died, he was carried away by angels
to the bosom of Abraham.

Luke 16:22

Deus tramist sun angle Cherubin
E seint Michel del Peril;
Ensembl' od els sent Gabriel i vint.
L'anme del cunte portent en pareïs.

(ll. 2393 - 96)

(God sent His angel Cherubim
and Saint Michael of the Peril,
And together with him came Gabriel.
They carry the soul of the count (Roland) into heaven)

The importance of this parable from Luke to the recounting of Roland's death at Roncevaux is hardly obscure. A 'rich' man, because of his neglect, is blamed for the death of Lazarus. When he too dies and is then cast into hell he turns to Abraham begging that Lazarus should descend to help alleviate his torments. Abraham responds by noting the unbridgeable distance between them:

"Moreover, between us and you a great chasm is established to prevent any one from crossing who might wish to go from our side to yours or from your side to ours." Luke, 16:26⁶

Nothing comes closer to illustrating the desires implied in so many of Roland's actions, both overt and clandestine, than this tale from Luke. From his refusal of Charlemagne's offer of 'salvement' (l. 784 - ff.) to the invalidation of the name of the father by the extraction of the letter 'R' (*Veire Pate()ne*), Roland has fixed 'a great gulf' between Charlemagne and himself. By this gap marking Roland's death, Roland attempts to create an unbridgeable narrative void that would effectively exclude Charlemagne from the *geste*; Roland's final actions before dying threaten the continuance of narrative. Roland will be disappointed, posthumously, in this avenging wish; not only will Charlemagne find the means to revive and to prolong narrative, he will do so, ironically, by returning Roland to its center.

There exists no better proof of Roland's 'avenging wish' than its remedy attended to by Charlemagne beginning at line 3100. There, Charlemagne undertakes a resurrection that is at once worldly and divine, a hypostatic union that is signaled in the opening words of his prayer: 'True father, protect me on this day'.....(*Veire Pate(R)ne, hoi cest jor me defend*). As Charlemagne

recovers the missing letter 'R' (*Pate(R)ne*), all the potential force and latent violence from the massacre of Roncevaux is again imparted to the name of the father. But we should recall that the revival of the emperor's potency depends upon a mingling of divine and human will; Charlemagne goes on to avenge the losses at Roncevaux only after having been given permission to do so by an angel from God (cf.: ll. 2454 - 56).

Solely by the use of the words he speaks the emperor accomplishes the formidable task of ferrying Roland's presence across the gap separating the first narration of the *Roland* from the second. We also find that Charlemagne is able to 'speak' his new-found potency into existence through a continuation of and an elaboration upon Roland's earlier prayer:

"Veire Paterne, hoi cest jor me defend,
 Ki guaresis Jonas tut veirement
 De la baleine ki en sun cors l'aveit,
 E esparignas le rei de Niniven
 E Daniel del merveillus turment
 Enz en la fosse des leons o fuz enz,
 Les .III. enfanz tut en un fou ardant!
 La tue amurs me seit hoi en present!
 Par ta mercit, se tei plaist, me cunsent
 Que mun nevoid poisse venger Rollant!" (ll. 3100 - 09)

('True father, protect me on this day,
 You who, indeed, kept Jonah from
 the whale that took him into his body,
 And you who spared the King of Nineveh
 And Daniel from the terrible torment
 When he was thrown into the den of lions,
 And the three children burning in a fire so hot!
 May your love be present with me today!
 Through your mercy, if it pleases you, grant
 That I may avenge my nephew Roland!')

Charlemagne chooses the story of Jonah and the King of Nineveh to begin his prayer; it is a variation on the theme of the 'beggar and the rich man' introduced by the parable of Lazarus from Luke. But in this biblical account, Charlemagne seems to turn the tables on Roland; for it is Jonah the

beggar/prophet who rebels against the word of God (1:13) and the 'rich man,' the *king* of Nineveh, who is shown as heedful and repentant:

When the news reached the king of Nineveh, he rose from his throne, laid aside his robe, covered himself with sackcloth, and sat in the ashes. Jonah 3:6

When God saw by their actions how they turned from their evil way, he repented of the evil that he had threatened to do to them; he did not carry it out. Jonah 3:10

Though Jonah's resurrection, being rescued from the belly of the whale, was the more dazzling and hence the more commemorative of the two acts of divine salvation, we should recall that this was only a first step on the road leading to the conversion of the king and of the whole nation of pagans whom Jonah was told to admonish, instructing them the right course of the law. Too apt to be merely accidental, the story proves an informative analogue to the struggle between the emperor and Roland.

"It displeased Jonah exceedingly" that the King of Nineveh and the people under him should go unpunished, though they strayed from the course of the law; so much so that, in willful protest against God's wishes, Jonah asks that his own life be taken (4:1 - 3) rather than he should have to witness the salvation of the pagan Ninevites. Once the law has been abrogated, Jonah insists that Nineveh and its king be brought low. The restoration of city under the new law will call for a humility singularly lacking in Jonah, though found in abundance in the repentant king of Nineveh. In the Biblical story, the king of Nineveh acknowledges his sin with the outward signs of sackcloth and ashes; in the *Roland* the Emperor recognizes his sin, his *peccez*, through an outward sign, namely, circumcision. The loss of a 'palm and more of flesh' is a sign of the Emperor's conversion/submission to the new law:

Prent de la carn grant pleine palme e plus:
Iloec endreit remeint li os tut nut.

(II. 3606 - 07)

(He took a piece of flesh as large as the palm and more:
at this spot the bone of his skull was altogether exposed.)

This occasion of physical marking, of personal humility, contrasts with Roland who dies intact without broken bone, without violation of his body's outer covering.

The story of Jonah and the king of Nineveh concludes with the following verse where God speaks to a chastised Jonah:

And should I not be concerned over Nineveh, the great city, in which there are more than a hundred and twenty thousand persons who cannot distinguish their right hand from their left, not to mention the many cattle? Jonah 4:11

Unable to 'discern between their right hand and their left,' the Ninevites are destined to continue in a narrative of deeds that are both lawful and unlawful. The image of blind imperfection is apt to the resurrection of state under Charlemagne. Not only is the Emperor unable to escape the shame of having failed to protect the Franks at Roncevaux, this shame carries over into the post Roncevaux narration. The work of the right hand and of the left is the work of betrayal and repentance; the continuation of narrative depends upon the integration of these two modes of narration, which is to say, the integration of these two narratives into one text.

The second Biblical story to which Charlemagne alludes is that of Daniel and the *.III. enfanz* who are, in fact, Daniel's brothers Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego. The story of Daniel proves an exceedingly rich quarry for the post-Roncevaux narrative; it introduces a resurrection motif that is announced by Roland and then greatly exploited to Charlemagne's own

advantage. The book of Daniel provides not one, but two, tales generally analogous to that of Jonah and the King of Nineveh. When the three infants (*les .III. enfanz*) undergo trial by fire, they escape unscathed, with the result that Nebuchadnezzar, 'King unto all people, nations, and languages' (4:1), converts to the law of Daniel's God. We might then say that the three infants (*.III. enfanz*) were given over to danger by God for the sake of redeeming the King and his people. Let us examine, for the moment, the differences between death and resurrection in the *Roland* and in this Biblical analogue, the story of the 'three infants' to which Charlemagne alludes. Firstly, though Charlemagne prays that God deliver him from the danger to which he is exposed, in going into battle against Baligant it is not Charlemagne, but the Franks at Roncevaux, who were most in need of miraculous salvation. Furthermore, a puzzling irony arises from the fact that the role of God in the Biblical account, to rescue the three infants from imminent death, is the same role to which we assign Charlemagne in the episode at Roncevaux. However, the difference in outcome is obvious: God carries the infants unharmed through the fire; the Emperor, for whatever reason we might wish to assign, leaves the French to die at Roncevaux.

Similarly, there is the case of Daniel and the lions. Darius, ruler over 'all people, nations and languages', sends Daniel into the den of lions, knowing full well that he would not perish, but would be saved by his God. Darius will use the event of Daniel's salvation to augment his power and to crush those who are in opposition to his rule. I cite extensively from the book of Daniel:

The king was deeply grieved at this news and he made up his mind to save Daniel; he worked till sunset to rescue him. But these men insisted. "Keep in mind, O King," they said, "that under the Mede and Persian law every royal prohibition or decree is irrevocable." So the King ordered Daniel to be brought and cast into the lions' den. To Daniel he said, "May your God, whom you serve so constantly, save you."
Daniel 6:15-17

The King rose very early the next morning and hastened to the lions' den. As he drew near, he cried out to Daniel sorrowfully, "O Daniel, servant of the living God, has the God whom you serve so constantly been able to save you from the lion?" Daniel answered the king: "O King, live forever!"
Daniel 6:20 - 22

The King then ordered the men who had accused Daniel, along with their children and their wives, to be cast into the lions' den. Before they reached the bottom of the den, the lions overpowered them and crushed all their bones.

Then King Darius wrote to the nations and peoples of every language, wherever they dwell on the earth: "All peace to you! I decree that throughout my royal domain the God of Daniel is to be revered and feared:

"For he is the living God, enduring forever;
his kingdom shall not be destroyed,
and his dominion shall be without end.
He is a deliverer and savior,
working signs and wonders in heaven and on earth,
and he delivered Daniel from the lions' power."
Daniel 6:25 - 28

Three things are accomplished for Darius as a result of Daniel's ordeal: 1. The 'law of the Medes and the Persians' is supplanted by the law of Daniel, servant of the living God; 2. Darius achieves unity among 'all people, nations and languages' under the banner of this new law; 3. Darius is able to identify, isolate, and destroy those who prove themselves to be enemies to the new law and so enemies of his rule. Again we note the dissimilarities between Daniel's rescue and the fact that Roland is left to die at Roncevaux.

Those Biblical tales (Lazarus, Jonah, Daniel, *les III enfanz*) become a point of accusation against the emperor; nevertheless, the emperor turns to these tales precisely to justify those otherwise unjust actions against Roland and the Franks at Roncevaux. Charlemagne, like Darius with Daniel, purposely places Roland and the Franks in harm's way 1) for the revival of his

authority (now fully coincident with the authority of the law), 2) for an integration and unification of state, 3) for the destruction of old enemies and the threat of destruction against any new enemies that may arise. Darius recognizes Daniel as the lawgiver; Charlemagne, however, would prefer to obscure any direct link between Roland and the 'justice' (*juise*) he will ultimately attain upon his return to Aix.

Comparing the struggle between Roland and Charlemagne with that between Darius and Daniel, we recognize that the *Roland* provides a more elegant and comparatively more stable solution to internal conflict. Despite Daniel's 'generous' blessings to Darius ('O King, live forever'), the account ends with the Biblical prophet distancing himself from the power of Babylon, as the state is seen splintering into the fragments of smaller semi-autonomous kingdoms. Daniel and his brothers retain for themselves the power of God's law; divine law, however, does not succeed in bringing harmony and endurance to the secular state. The *Roland*, however, successfully melds divine and mundane law and it does so by collapsing one into the other at the point where the text's two narratives meet.

Unlike the account in the book of Daniel, where the reforming law comes to the state from the outside, from the 'stranger' Daniel, the transformational struggle within the *Roland* is internal. Matters are resolved by the subsumption of one law by the other. When Roland and the Franks perish at Roncevaux, this becomes a judgement not on them but on the old law (one based on *auxilium* and *concilium*) that fails to protect them. The Emperor's judgment upon the law of the Saracens might well have been

applied, in retrospect, to the Franks at Roncevaux: 'The whole of their law is not worth a penny...' (*"tute lor leis un denier ne lur valt,"* l. 3338). Though the old (feudal) law can not save Roland's person, his spirit continues in that his name will find a place at the heart of the new law governing the state. In the very last verse of the Emperor's prayer of resurrection, he pleads with God that in the course of battle against the Saracens Roland might be avenged: "That I might avenge my nephew Roland".....(*"Que mun ne vold poisse venger, Rollant!,"* l. 3109). *Venger* has the sense of 'to avenge' but it might also mean 'to repurchase', or 'to redeem'. Above all else, the emperor's mission upon his return is to reclaim the force lost to him at Roncevaux, to recuperate the fallen letter, and to graft it once again onto the momentarily impuissant body of the law of the *Veire Pate(R)ne*.

Exchange estrange

It is necessary to acknowledge one important implication of Charlemagne's re-appropriation and reinsertion of the letter 'R' into '*Veire Pate(R)ne*.' Not only is it the act of a reclaimed potency for both Emperor and *geste*, it is also a dissemination of that potency from the center outward, from the central gap marked by Roland's death to all parts of the narration. In this way not only is Charlemagne able to redeem the French, and so the post-Roncevaux narrative, but also to give cause for a return to the text's first narrative. This journey back through the narrative leads to new insights into the role of the Emperor in the first half of the text. In retrospect, we find that in his apparent passivity, Charlemagne is, to the contrary, calculating and every

bit as 'ambitious' as Roland in his attempts to manipulate the ultimate political and social implications of the *geste*. Roland and the Emperor both strive toward a common destination though with singularly different intent. The separate trajectories of their respective ambitions coincide briefly at the moment where Alde, Roland's betrothed, enters the text. The second part of this essay traces the parallel quests of both Roland and Charlemagne in pursuit of Alde, the feminine '*destinataire*' and the ultimate site of inscription for the *geste*.

It is instructive to compare Roland with Charlemagne as the text first presents them in the opening scene of the Frankish council. The portrait of Roland at lines 196-213 derives from his response to Blancandrin's proposal (ll. 38 - ff.) Earlier we demonstrated how in this passage Roland effectively dismisses all notion of the institution of council (*consilium*, ll. 205 - 09), and that he supplants the life protecting social equilibrium inherent to the institution of vassal aid and protection (*auxilium*) with the urgings of a relentless pursuit of vengeance (ll. 210 - 13). He does not deign to calculate the price of his proposed bargain in terms of its cost in loss of life or in human suffering. Roland, in these lines, augurs a new alignment of the relations between subject and state, one where the authority of an abstracted and all encompassing law is enhanced at the expense of individual protections. From its first moment we detect in Roland's speech at ll. 205 - 213 the outline of a mode of narrative production that soon become recognizably his own. Roland spurns Blancandrin's offer of a negotiated settlement, choosing instead to proceed against the Saracens with the sword-blow by which the *geste* comes

into being; in a manner of speaking, it is a choice to give precedence to the deed over the word.

The Emperor, on the other hand, clearly prefers word over deed, and as such he operates within the first half of the text in the mode of master signifier. The following passage illustrates the considerably greater value of the word, as opposed to the deed, in the text's determination of Charlemagne's 'identity':

Sur palies blancs siedent cil cevaler,
As tables juent pur els esbaneier
E as eschechs li plus saive e li veill,
E escremissent cil bacheler leger.
Desuz un pin, delez un eglenter,
Un faldestoed i unt, fait tut d'or mer.
La siet li reis ki dulce France tient.
Blanche ad la barbe e tut flurit le chef,
Gent ad le cors e le cuntenant fier:
S'est kil demandet, ne l'estoet enseigner. (ll. 110 - 19)

(The chevaliers are seated upon carpets of white silk,
They are playing at table games for their amusement
The most wise and elderly at chess,
The agile youth are at swordplay.
Beneath a pine, beside an eglantine,
There is a throne made of pure gold:
There sits the King who holds sway over sweet France
His beard is white and his hair a flowering mass,
His body well formed his countenance proud:
If anyone comes asking, there is no need to point him out.)

An analysis of this scene produces surprising incongruities. The game of chess serves as a readily apparent metaphor for the placement and manipulation of young warriors on the field of battle; the ground coverings of white silk --*Sur palies blancs*-- are so many squares of an expansive open- air chess board upon which they move and are moved. The agile young men --*cil bacheler leger*-- busily engaged in fencing are pieces in play; the old and wise men --*li plus saive e li veill*-- are the *strategoi* contemplating the positioning of forces and the plan of attack. This image of warfare as an

orderly and contemplative affair will soon be disrupted by the surprise of Roland's rude and wholly unconventional urgings to vengeance (ll. 196 - 213). Roland is about to alter the rules of the game in such a way that they become virtually indecipherable to all except him, of course...and the emperor. The text illustrates this sudden 'incomprehensibility' in the example of Oliver, who will fail to grasp, much less to act, in accordance with the logic motivating Roland's actions at Roncevaux. Or, an even better example might be found in the failed communication between the Emperor and Ganelon, as the latter sets off on his mission to the Saracens; Ganelon's demands, perfectly in accordance with feudal law,⁷ are put forward and subsequently dismissed as though he and the emperor were enmeshed in what had all too gradually become two distinct and mutually incommunicable structures of discourse.

Charlemagne, as we first encounter him, is presented to the reader as an *auto-nymous* (self-naming) sign, one that both defies interpretation and renders it superfluous --*S'est kil demandet, ne l'estoet enseigner*. Like Roland, neither does he have a place *at the board* (cf.: l. 111) among 'the old and the wise.' Here Charlemagne is situated in a discourse apart from that in which his erstwhile 'peers' are busily engaged, the scope of his intellectual imagination ranging far beyond the parameters of those placed before him in this scene. In a later passage, Bramimunde, the Saracen queen who converts to the 'law of the Christians,' makes this observation concerning Charlemagne: 'Under the heavens there isn't a king whom he does not regard as anything more than a child...' ("*Suz ciel n'ad rei qu'il prist a un enfant...*," l. 2739); this holds true in relation to 'kings' that are both external and internal to

the realm of the Franks. Nonetheless, over the course of the first narrative, Charlemagne continues to signify from a position of absence, while Roland maintains an *active* presence, writing the *geste* with blows struck with *Durendal*. At the moment of Roland's death, these positions will reverse themselves: Charlemagne will 'revive' the lapsed narrative by taking charge of his forces against the Saracens; Roland, in turn, replaces Charlemagne as the 'sign' of textual authority with the reassertion of the letter 'R' into the center of *Veire Pate(R)ne*. In the remainder of this brief segment, I want to point out the ways in which this reversal of roles is carried out in the process of an exchange.

Our characterization of Roland has until now been especially dependent upon the manner in which he has 'executed' narrative; I return to these lines, referred to earlier, for their description of the *geste* as an economy of narrative that translates the deed (of warfare) into narrative:

"Or quart chascuns que granz colps i empleit,
Que malvaïse cançon de nus chantet ne seit!
Païen unt tort e chrestiens unt dreit.
Malvaïse essemple n'en serat ja de mei." (ll. 1013 - 16)

"For everyone take good care to strike hardy blows,
That no one will be able to sing an unflattering song about us!
Pagans are in the wrong, Christians in the right.
There will be no bad example from me.")

Remarkably, these lines already hint at the subsumption of all the actions of the Franks at Roncevaux to the sign under the inscription 'R'(oland); remarkable, because until the post-Roncevaux world, until the restitution of authority under the *Veire Pate(R)ne*, there is no sign 'R' under which their actions might be subsumed. When Roland exhorts the Franks to strike hardy

blows 'that no one will be able to sing an unflattering song about us!,' he immediately reminds them that their deeds and their sacrifice will ultimately be reflected back into his own name: 'There will be no bad example from me...' (*"Malvaise essample n'en serat ja de mei..."*) So, in this sense, we can say that an 'exchange' has already been initiated prior to Roland's death; the Franks have given their lives in order that the name Roland might augment in value.

The text demonstrates that the Franks are clearly less interested in this ultimate sacrifice than is Roland. When for a second time they are reminded that the production of 'song' (*geste*, narrative) depends upon the loyal execution of their vassal duties, we see patently that this notion of a pending ultimate sacrifice comes to the Franks as something unexpected and new to their understanding. There is nothing to indicate that Turpin is having anything but a hard time of it, as he coaxes the French to remain steady in the choice between certain death and shameful desertion:

"Seignors barons, n'en alez mespensant!
Pur Deu vos pri que ne seiez fuiant,
Que nuls prozdom malvaisement n'en chant.
Asez est mielz que moerium cumbatant.
Pramis nus est fin prendrum a itant,
Ultre cest jurn ne serum plus vivant;
Mais d'une chose vos soi jo ben guarant:
Seint pareis vos est abandunant;
As Innocent vos en serez seant."

(ll. 1515 - 23)

('Noble lords, don't go thinking wrong thoughts!
For God's sake I pray that you don't go fleeing,
So that no worthy fellow sing anything bad about it.
It is far better that we should die in battle.
Our end is near, we have been promised that,
By the end of this day we shall no longer be alive;
But of one thing you can be certain:
Blessed paradise now stands open before you;
You will be seated there among the innocents.')

Apparently the French do not share in Roland's unadulterated enthusiasm for approaching death (cf.: 1008 - ff.; 1088 - ff.; 1712 and passim). One could argue that intuition serves them well and they stand ready to bolt; as fortune prepares to bring renown to Roland, the Franks will reap only oblivion. Turpin manages to hold them in check not with the promise of glory, which is reserved for Roland, but with the threat of infamy (l. 1517) and the rather weak palliative that though forgotten on earth, they will at least be remembered in heaven. The French will be seated among the innocent. But innocence, in this case, connotes ignorance, an inability to perceive the manipulations that have led, for them at least, to the disasters of Roncevaux. In terms of earthly remembrance, their innocence will not serve them well.

As he lists all conquests from Constantinople to Scotland as his work and the work of the divine instrument *Durendal*, Roland reveals to us the truth of the matter. Significantly, as he calls up these victories one by one, Roland is in the middle of two separate attempts to make the destruction of *Durendal* coincident with the end of his life. Chagrined that he is unable to *take down the sword*, to be, in effect, the author of his own castration, Roland must realize, finally, that deed and word, body and name, signifier and signified do not occupy the same textual space. If they did, no further 'exchange' would be possible, or even necessary. We had earlier determined that both the 'French' and *Durendal* are metonymic representations that join in the name *Roland*; however, as Roland proves unable to make the destruction of *Durendal* coincident with his own death, we now see them as distinct and separable entities. 'Possession' of *Durendal* allows for a position of privilege.

This privilege survives Roncevaux as *Durendal* is transferred back to the 'French', that is to say, the post-Roncevaux French as that 'body' of men reconstituted by the emperor prior to the battle with Baligant (ll. 3015 - 17). But even as Charlemagne reclaims *Durendal* as an instrument by which war is waged, and hence narrative is written, the validity of that narrative will henceforth derive from another source.

An exchange takes place between the emperor and Roland at the event of the latter's death. As Charlemagne becomes engaged in battle following the death of Roland, he effectively continues the narration that had been left off; from that moment onward, Roland assumes within the narrative the position of absent signifier. The transition from first to second narrative effects a reversal in positions, whereby Roland is now the passive, absent signifier, and Charlemagne the agent of an ongoing narrative. With this we are not abandoning our prior observation that Roland's mode of operation is from deed to word, from sword-blow to *geste*, or that Charlemagne operates primarily through the word. To the contrary, Charlemagne's narrative is dependent upon Roland's creation of the *geste*, upon the narrative hammered out by sword-blows; Charlemagne's narration is merely the continuation of what has already been written. If Charlemagne has, in the meanwhile, become an agent in the production of a continuing fiction, the *geste* is both that fiction's source and place of final inscription. The first chosen *destinataire* of the *geste*, the one who waits in anticipation of the 'word' of Roland's exploits is Alde, Roland's designated bride and the sister of Olivier. Well

before the conclusion of the battle at Roncevaux, however, Olivier makes clear that Roland will never live to receive Alde's embrace:

Dist Oliver: "Par ceste meie barbe,
Se puis veeir ma gente sorur Alde,
Ne jerreiez ja mais entre sa brace!"

(ll. 1719 - 21)

('Oliver said: 'By this beard of mine,
If I am able to every see my dear sister Alde,
I swear, you will never lie in her embrace!')

Given the numerous passages in which Roland recognizes the inevitability of death at Roncevaux, this threat would, on the face of it, appear to carry little weight; and yet Oliver's threat is not without pertinence or force. If Roland must relinquish the instrument of inscription, the sword *Durendal*, to Charlemagne, he also forfeits to the Emperor the designated 'receptrice' of the *geste*. The *destinataire* of the narrative created by sword-blows is Alde -- (Albe -white; blanc; virginal)-- and it is her lot to perish upon the news of Roland's death.

Arriving at Aix, the Emperor immediately seeks out Aide who inquires after Roland:

Ço dist al rei: "O est Rollant le catanie,
Ki me jurat cume sa per a prendre?"

(ll. 3709 - 10)

(This she says to the King: 'Where is the captain Roland,
who promised to make me his wife?')

To this the emperor responds:

"Soer, cher' amie, d'hume mort me demandes.
Jo t'en durai mult esforcet exchange:
Ço est Loewis, mierz ne sai a parler;
Il est mes filz e si tendrat mes marches."

(ll. 3713 - 16)

(Sister, dear friend, you ask me for a man who is dead.
I will offer you a very worthy exchange:
Here is Louis, I don't know what else to say;
He is my son and will hold my marches.)

Then Alde again:

Alde respunt: "Cest mot mei est estrange.
Ne place Deu ne ses seinz ne ses angles
Après Rollant que jo vive remaigne!"
Pert la color, chet as piez Carlemagne,
Sempres est morte. Deus ait mercit de l'anme!
Franceis barons en plurent e si la pleignent. (ll. 3717 - 21)

(Alde replies: 'This word seems strange to me.
May it not be pleasing to God, his angels and his saints
That I should remain alive after Roland!'
She loses her color she falls at Charlemagne's feet,
She died on the spot, may God have mercy on her soul!
The brave French barons weep over this and lament her.)

Eschange/estrange - it is this word (*cest mot*) *eschange* that strikes Alde as so foreign, strange, un-interpretable.⁸ Alde finds this word strange, in part, because she anticipates the word of Roland, word of the *geste* for which there can be no true substitute. The proposed exchange of one 'lord' for another, as though they were commodities of near equal value, is alien to feudal sensibilities, though not without precedent within the text. We recall Blancandrin's proposal of an equally facile substitution of one long absent lord, Baligant, for another, Charlemagne (ll. 38 - 39). That exchange, like this one, comes only after a tremendous bloodletting marking not merely the transition from one figure of authority to another, but from one political, social and *narrative* structure to another. In Blancandrin's proposal we saw that the exchange of Baligant for Charlemagne implied a profound alteration in the nature of subject allegiance: from a subjectivity to an individual lord --whether Roland, Charlemagne, Baligant, or Ganelon-- to a subjectivity to an abstracted law (*dreiture*). A definitive exchange occurs as the allegiance of the Franks shifts from the person of Roland to a metonymic representation in the guise of the letter 'R' found at the heart of the name of the father. This exchange

signals a first step in the constitution of state. A second exchange occurs as Charlemagne offers Alde real estate in place of narrative. Louis is recommended to her as the future inheritor of the Emperor's land holdings – "*Il est mes filz e si tendrat mes marches.*" Roland, to the contrary, came recommended as providing a lasting synonymy between his name and the *geste* – "*Que malvaise chançon de nus chantet ne seit.*" (l. 1014); "*Male chançon n'en deit estre cantee.*" (l. 1466).

Charlemagne arrives at Aix to intercept the *Geste* at precisely its intended point of destination. At news of the loss of Roland, the loss of the attended word, Alde looses her color – *pert la color* – thus signaling the effect of erasure. Intercepting the *geste* 'intact', prior to inscription, the Emperor can now direct the *geste* to another awaiting *destinataire*. Charlemagne, in fact, carries out the exchange of Bramimunde for Alde. Bramimunde becomes a receptacle for the new law:

Quant l'emperere ad faite sa justise
E esclargiez est la sue grant ire,
En Bramidonie ad chrestientet mise...

(ll. 3988 - 90)

(When the Emperor had procured his justice
And his great anger dissipated
He has Bramidonie made a Christian.)

Here Alde is exchanged for Bramidonie and the *geste*, created by Roland, is exchanged for the emperor's fiction. The *geste*, then, is no longer simply an historical accounting of the events at Roncevaux, but a new structure of discourse. This most clearly defines the opposition between Roland and Charlemagne in terms of their relation to writing. Roland creates the *geste* by

means of the deed, sword-blow by sword-blow, Charlemagne creates the narrative engine whereby word gives rise to deed.

Li ber Gilie

Charlemagne has intercepted the *geste*, directing it to a new destination, a destination unintended by Roland. And yet Roland is not altogether the loser in the Emperor's exchange of *destinataires*. Charlemagne transforms the name Roland into a symbol of power and authority that goes infinitely beyond anything that might have been commanded by Roland the person. Just as the name Roland has been made an integral part and central element of the new law governing the resurrected state --*Veire Pate(R)ne*--, it will also be made central to the production and diffusion of the narrative now presided over by Charlemagne. We begin by turning to that paradoxical moment within the text where the reader is informed that in this battle (Roncevaux) without survivors, a scribe appears to record the action of the *geste* from the perspective of direct eye-witness:

Ço dist la Geste e cil ki el camp fut:
Li ber Gilie, por qui Deus fait vertuz,
E fist la chartre el mustier de Loûm.
Ki tant ne set ne l'ad prod entendut.

(ll. 2095 - 98)

(Thus says the *geste* and he who was on the field:
The noble Giles, whom God has made virtuous,
He set it down in the charter for the monastery at Laon.
Who does not know this has understood little.)

There is a circular nonsensicality to the proposition that, though Roncevaux left no survivors, we can be assured of the authenticity of the *geste* because it is written from an eye-witness' point of view. Though the text implicitly credits the survival of the *geste*, in other words *its own survival*, to an act of

miraculous intervention, that is to the appearance of a reliable witness *out of nowhere*, it also holds out the prospect of another less preternatural explanation for how the *geste* might have been recorded and preserved.⁸ The developing conundrum explains itself in the pun on the phrase *Li ber Gilie* (the noble 'Gilie') which, however, may also be read as *liber 'gilie'* or 'the cunning or guileful book' cunning in that, among other things, it does not, as it pretends to do, directly witness the events that transpire at Roncevaux.⁹ The writing of the *geste* necessarily entails transcription, a transcription of events as they are both seen and recounted in speech by those who have seen. Designating *Li ber Gilie* as the recording witness of events as they unfold at Roncevaux effectively creates a direct linkage between deed and the written text. This, of course, means that the author of the *geste* passes directly from the sword-bearer to the bearer of the pen.¹⁰

From this passage, the reader can infer that a distinction is being made between two types of narrative: the first, a narrative that is the direct creation of the deed, or of the *granz colps* spoken of by Roland at line 1013, and the second, a narrative that finds its genesis in a prior narrative. This accounts for the writing of *Li ber Gilie*, which amounts to a fictionalizing of the *geste*. The extraordinary power of this authorial *tour de force* lies in the fact that the *Roland* claims for its fiction a validity and a truthfulness that reaches beyond the scope of mere historical narrative.¹¹ The *geste* (histories) is the result of the deed made word, and its greatest claim to truthfulness would come from the fact that a direct witness speaks of events seen. *Li ber Gilie* (fiction), on

the other hand, is derivative, being once removed from the deed and dependent not upon oral accounts, but upon another writing. The text as much as acknowledges the absence of the oral witness *who knows because he has seen* by appealing to God as its author who gives fiction its validity, its virtue –*Li ber Gilie, por qui Deus fait vertuz*.

But the relation between fiction and history, that is to say between *Li ber Gilie* and *la Geste*, is one of interdependence and mutual reinforcement. Fiction reports to an exterior reality by ‘resurrecting’ the name Roland within the charter of the monastery of Laon –*la chartre el muster de Loūm*. For without Roland, without the ‘R’ placed once again at the center of the text, the *cha(R)tre* of the monastery of Laon would be nothing more than the open field, the virginal space, the absolute absence that Roland attempts to impose at the moment of his death. *Li ber Gilie* heals that wound, implants the missing member at the center of the body, redeems the inanity of castration applying the force of the letter ‘R’ to the *cha(R)tre*.

In the first segment of this essay we examined how fiction – Charlemagne’s evocation of Jonah and the king of Nineveh, are Daniel and the .III. *enfan*, –as well as Roland’s evocation of Lazarus and Daniel issues forth from fiction, accordingly, we have considered ‘resurrection’ in terms of a continuance of narrative. For Roland, resurrection emphasizes closure, coinciding with the termination of the *geste*; all deeds having been done, all conquests having been made, Roland turns to Holy Scripture for examples of figures who demonstrate a need to transcend earthly concerns.

Subsequently, Charlemagne also draws from the same or similar Biblical allusions to rewrite Roland's resurrection not as an ending, but as a beginning again. The resurrection theme, then, shows writing (the 'resurrection prayer' of Charlemagne) emanating out of writing (the 'resurrection prayer' of Roland) emanating out of writing (the Biblical sources from which they each draw examples). But even this succession of narrative derived from narrative ultimately arrives at the historical deed; who, at the time that the *Roland* was written, would have questioned the historical existence of Daniel or Jonah, much less the trials they underwent and from which they were rescued through the grace and the will of God? The assumption that these stories are based on historical fact lends validity to these Biblical accounts. One appeals to God to perform again and again the same miracle or a similar miracle of resurrection. Certainly this is the premise upon which the fiction of the *Roland* is fashioned; in the beginning is the deed (Roland's) from which all subsequent narrative derives.

In the second segment, we examined two narrative axes: one leading from Roland to Alde that we termed *geste*, the other leading from Charlemagne to Bramimunde which we can now term the axis of fiction. We concluded with a passage that differentiates, covertly, between *geste* and fiction (*Li ber Gilie*). In the concluding segment, we look to the text for evidence that demonstrates the crossing of these two axes for the intersection of the *geste* and of the fictional narrative.

The writing of the *Roland* ultimately reveals its origin in what the text indicates (obliquely) are 'pagan sources', in what Charlemagne refers to at

verse 3338 as '*lor leis*'. To pursue this topic, we turn our attention for the remainder of this essay to the exploration of the text's two narrative beginnings, the beginning of narrative at the opening of the text and the narrative in recrudescence immediately following the death of Roland. Each of these beginnings, we shall see, is marked by crisis. Significantly, the *Roland* opens not with the council of Franks but the council of the Saracens. Here, in the form of Blancandrin's proposal, is provided a paradigm for the 'work' to be carried out over the course of the text, namely, the sacrifice of *the sons of our wives*, a harsh dictum which proves equally applicable to Frank and Saracen alike, and the transfer of allegiance to the Emperor. Blancandrin's proposal has as its aim to lead the Saracens out of desperate, if not impossible, circumstances. We recall that they 1) have lost all of Spain excepting Saragossa, 2) their forces are so greatly diminished that they can no longer go head to head with the forces under Charlemagne, and 3) their one hope for driving the Franks out of their land, a plea to the emir Baligant for re-enforcements, has gone wholly unanswered. The Saracens have recourse to no other means of 'salvation' than that which can be provided by the workings of their own imaginations. And though, ultimately, the Saracens fail in their attempt to ward off the invading Franks, their imaginations, nonetheless, will prove to be a collective resource of extraordinary power. It is under these uncertain circumstances, during the first council of the Saracens, that Blancandrin responds to Marsile's desperate appeal for help. Marsile's appeal is given as follows:

**"Cunseilez mei cume mi saive hume,
Si me guarisez e de mort e de hunte!"**

(ll. 20 - 21)

**('Counsel me like wise men,
Keep me from death and from shame!')**

Though at first it may seem somewhat unwarranted, a wealth of evidence gleaned from the text will be introduced to justify a rearrangement of these lines through chiasmus. Exchanging the first with the second hemistich of lines 20 - 21 we arrive at these lines:

**Si me gurarisez / cume mi saive hume,
Cunseilez mei / e de mort e de hunte**

**(If you can protect me / like wise men,
Counsel me / in death and in shame)**

This seemingly absurd formulation suddenly becomes less baffling as the reader takes into account that the first narration delivers just that: 'death' and 'shame' in uncertain terms for both Marsile and Baligant. Death and shame will be visited upon the Franks as well, though not with such great severity; for the Saracens, this judgement will be as swift as it is unmitigated.

We have already encountered a vatic Bramimonde, as she senses the coming 'revival' and supreme dominance of the post-Roncevaux Charlemagne ('Under the heavens there is not a king that he does not treat like a child.....' [*"Suz ciel n'ad re qu'il prist a un enfant,"* l. 2739]). It is likewise fitting that she should indicate the moment when Marsile's sibylline 'request' attains its full realization, that is, the demise of both Marsile and Baligant in a peculiar marriage of death and shame. Firstly, she declares of Marsile:

**E Bramidonie vient curant cunter lui,
Si li ad dit: "Dolente, si mare fui!
A itel hunte, sire, mon seignor ai perdut!"
Chet li as piez, li amiralz la reçut;
Sus en la chambre ad doel en sunt venut.**

(ll. 2822 - 24)

(And Bramidonie comes running to him,
She said to him: 'Oh, sorrow, such grief!
Such shame, sir, I have lost my lord!'
She falls at his feet, the Emir caught her
They went up to the room grief-stricken.)

Hunte and perdut (mort) – Marsilie is fallen victim to his own narration. In a subsequent passage Bramimonde –now Bramidonie– delivers a like judgement upon the now fallen Baligant:

A halte voiz s'escrìe: "Aiez nos, Mahum!
E! gentìz reis, ja sunt vencuz noz humes,
Li amiralz ocis a si grant hunte!" (ll. 3641 - 43)

(She cries out in a loud voice: 'Help us, Mohammed!
Ah! gentle King, our men are vanquished,
The Emir has been killed in such great shame!')

There is a circular irony that even goes beyond similarity of content in joining these two passages. At lines 2822-24, Bramidonie announces Marsile's death (*perdut*) and shame (*hunte*) to the arriving Baligant, although at that very instant Marsile is not yet dead, but only dying. He will live long enough, though not a moment longer, to have Bramidonie recount to him the death (*ocis*) and shame (*hunte*) that are to be Baligant's own eventual lot (ll. 3641 - 47). The narrative sleight of hand that goes into having announced to Marsile the death and shame of Baligant and in announcing to Baligant the death and shame of Marsile underscores the degree of thoroughness with which the conditions of the 'request' at lines 20 - 21 have been carried out. Death and shame are end products of the first narration; we will see shame projected well into the second half of the text.

Mention has already been made of the fact that, strictly speaking, death and shame come not only to the Saracens but to the French as well. Death has its own certain finality. Shame, on the other hand, becomes the principle

legacy left to the post-Roncevaux narration, a legacy with which Charlemagne must immediately contend. The emperor does this in a highly paradoxical fashion, remembering that he is destined to first contend primarily with shame, by immediately setting out *honur* and *dreiture* as the goals of the second narration. He does so by the use of phrasing that is a virtual calque of the verse by which Marsile has opened the council of Saracen:

"Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honur,
De France dulce m'unt tolue la flur." (ll. 2430 - 31)

('Counsel me both my right and honor;
They have taken from me the flower of sweet France.')

Whereas Marsile has launched the action of the first narrative in the pursuit of death and shame, Charlemagne launches that of the second in pursuit of *dreiture* and *honur*. Now if we place lines 20 and 2430 one above the other a certain syntactical symmetry plainly emerges:

Cunseillez mei e de ~~mort~~ e de ~~hunte~~

Cunseillez mei e ~~dreiture~~ e ~~honur~~

(Counsel me in death and in shame

Counsel me in my right and in honor)

We have already established (in the previous segment of this chapter) that *honur* and *hunte* are in functional opposition to one another, an opposition that drives the action of the *geste*, so that the pursuit of honor, particularly within the second half of the *Roland* might easily be defined as the repulsion of shame. The *geste* itself is 'situated' on the axis that runs between these two terms; which can be explained in this way: each 'song-generating' sword-blow –the *granz colps* of line 1014– brings honor while repelling at least

potential shame. Yet, when an account of the events at Roncevaux is brought to a close, 'death is on the ledger' and 'shame' carries over into the second narration like a spill of indelible ink.

When Charlemagne conjures up *dreiture* and *honur* as the long-range goals of the second narration, in mirrored antithesis to Marsile's conjuration of *mort* and *hunte* (l. 20/21), the second term, *honur*, proves especially elusive. This is because the emperor himself has been personally shamed by events that have transpired at Roncevaux. Yet in his plea at lines 2430 – 31, the Emperor feigns virtual innocence, his words suggesting that blame fall wholly to the Saracens, and that it would be sufficient to wreak vengeance upon *them* in order to secure the desired *dreiture* and *honur*:

"E! Deus!" dist Carles, "ja sunt il (Saracen) ja si luinz!
Cunsentez [Cunseillez 1921] mei e dreiture e honur,
De France dulce m'unt tolue la flur." (ll. 2429 - 31)

('Oh, God!' said Charles, 'they are indeed so far away!
Counsel me in my right and in honor,
They have taken from me the flower of sweet France.')

It isn't long before Charlemagne receives God's word through the disposition of angels:

"Charle, chevalche, car tei ne falt clartet.
La flur de France as perdut, ço set Deus.
Verger te poez de la gent criminel."
A icel mot est l'emperere muntet. (ll. 2454 - 56)

('Charles, ride, for the light has not left you.
You have lost the flower of France, God knows this.
You may wreak vengeance on that criminal race
At this word the Emperor mounted up.')

This gives the first indication that vengeance must be waged against more than just the Saracens before order and authority will be returned to the realm. In response to Charlemagne's facile accusation of blame against the

Saracens (*De France dulce m'unt tolue la flur*), God speaks to the Emperor, reminding him of the part he has played in the massacre at Roncevaux –*La flur de France as perdut, ço set Deus* (*You have lost the flower of France, God knows this*). Numerous signs appear throughout the remainder of the text that will substantiate this charge against the Emperor.

Charlemagne will not speak out directly concerning his own shame, but speaks instead of a loss of honor:

"La mei honor est turnet en declin." (I. 2890)

('My honor has turned in decline.')

"N'en avrai ja ki sustienget m'onur." (I. 2903)

('I will have no one who can sustain my honor.')

Likewise, Baligant connects the loss of Roland with the diminution of Charlemagne's honor:

Dist Baligant: 'Oïl, car mult est proz.
"En plusurs gestes de lui (Charlemagne) sunt granz honors.
Il n'en at mie de Rollant, sun nevold:
N'avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus." (II. 3180 - 83)

(Baligant said: 'Indeed, for he is most worthy.
'Several *gestes* attribute great honors to him.
But he no longer has his nephew, Roland:
He will not have the strength to hold up against us.')

We have already noted in an earlier segment that the maintenance of honor is contingent upon the presence of Roland, and that his loss has not only the practical effect of weakening the Emperor's strength in arms, but also impinges upon the merit of the *geste*: those reports in several (*plusurs*) *gestes* of Charlemagne's '*honor*' loose validity in the absence of Roland. We find the most overt, if not to say caustic, accusation of blame, however, in the unequivocal words of Ogier, which are all the more potent in that they are

mere paraphrases of that insinuation of blame spoken by God through an angel (cf.: ll. 2454 - 56):

Mult fierement Carlun en araisunet:
"Veez païen cum ocient vos humes!
Ja Deu ne placet qu'el chef portez corone,
S'or n'i ferez par venger vostre hunte!" (ll. 3536 - 39)

(He spoke to Charles most forthrightly:
'You see how the pagans are killing our men!
May it never please God that your head should wear a crown,
If you do not strike to avenge your shame!')

These are very strong words, suggesting that the Emperor has acted in a manner deserving of censure. Oddly, there is nothing we know of the Emperor's conduct in the battle against Baligant that would merit shame (*vostre hunte*). Certainly it does not appear that he has been cowardly or even unenthusiastic, so as to merit this rebuke. His shame must then apply to that earlier event, to Roncevaux, when the Saracens killed his men, while he did nothing to protect them. We recall his own self-reproach from lines 2936 - 37: 'My grief is so great that I do not wish to live / It is my household that is killed for me...' (*"Si grant dol ai que ne voldreie vivre/ De ma maisnee, ki pur mei est ocise!"*) There is no act of vengeance that will allow the Emperor to regain honor following his *shameful* absence at Roncevaux.

Shame is visited upon Charlemagne and the Franks through their principals of authority during three engagements of hand-to-hand combat, scenes that distinctly recall the ritual of circumcision. We list them in order of succession, the first involving a struggle between Naimés and the Saracen Canabeus:

Trenchet (Canabeus) la coife (de Naimés) entresque a la char,
Jus a la tere une piece en abat.

Granz fut li colps, li dux en estonat:
Sempres caïst, se Deus ne li aidast.

(ll. 3436 - 39)

(He cuts through the coif down to the skin,
He knocks a piece of it down to the earth.
The blow was great, the Duke was stunned by it:
He would have fallen had not God come to his aid.)

We note the piece of flesh excised from the scalp and the revival of Naimes through an act of God; Charlemagne submits to a remarkably similar ritual during combat with Baligant:

Prent (Baligant) de la carn grant pleine palme e plus:
Iloec endroit remeint li os tut nūt.
Charles cancelet, por poi qu'il n'est caūt;
Mais deus ne volt qu'il seit mort ne vencut.

(ll. 3606 - 09)

(He took from his flesh a piece the size of your palm and more:
At the spot the bone was fully naked.
Charles wavers, and he almost fell;
But God did not want him either vanquished or dead.)

This is a clear example of the truth of Charlemagne's earlier observation concerning the Saracen:

"Tutes lor leis un dener ne lur valt.
S'il unt grant gent, d'ïço, seignurs, qui calt?"

(ll. 3338 - 39)

('All their laws are not worth a penny.
My lords, even if they have a great army what does it matter?')

Neither the strength nor the prowess of the individual combatant determines the outcome of battle, simply the validity of the law. This applies not only to the Saracens, but also to the contention between Frank and Frank with which the struggle concludes, the internal factious conflict that was determined from the moment the emperor deigned not to safeguard the inheritance and the heritor of Ganelon's legacy (cf.: ll. 310 – ff.).

The final 'circumcision' is that of Thierry who has taken up the sword in defense of Charlemagne's cause; he is the third in succession to have the marks of honor's demise inscribed in the scalp:

Desur le frunt li ad faite descendre.
Em mi le vis
La destre joe en ad tute sanglente,
L'osberc del dos josque par sum le ventre.
Deus le guarit, que mort ne l'acraventet.

(ll. 3919 - 23)

(He brought is down upon his forehead.
in the middle of his face.....
His right cheek is all bloody now,
His hauberk to, from his back to the top of his stomach.
God protected him that he should not succumb to death.)

Shame (*hunte*) is written into the new order side by side with *dreiture*. When Charlemagne demands of his barons, "Judge me my right against Ganelon" (*'De Guenelun car me jugez le dreit'*), shame or full submission of individual volition to the dictates of the law is the price exacted by this exchange, the exchange of the old law for a new dispensation. We can now see that whereas the Emperor sought 'both right and honor' (*e dreiture e honor*) he receives 'both right and shame' (*e dreiture e hunte*) in its stead (a piece of Marsile's legacy --*hunte*-- having been implanted in the second narrative). Conversely, if there is any sense in which it can be said that honor has been reclaimed, it is in having resuscitated, posthumously, the honor of Roland and, at least nominally, of all those who met their death at Roncevaux. Their honor, supreme irony, derives from Roland's rejecting Charlemagne's offer of *salvement* (cf.: ll. 784 - ff.), as blindly they follow after Roland's insatiable hunger for vengeance. Taking Roland's death as the event dividing the text into two narrative panels, we now submit that on the one side of this gap is the narrative marked by death (*mort*) and honor (*honor*), and on the other side a narrative marked by right (*dreiture*) and shame (*hunte*). Now the workings of this inter-reflection of the text, the mirroring into one another of the text's two narrative panels, should be discernible to a greater degree. Finally, we can

say that the text operates on two axes that cross one another just at the moment of Roland's death, at the text's dehiscent center. One of these is the axis of fiction (*dreiture*–(*fingerere*)–*mort*); the other, the axis of the Geste (*honor*–(*gerere*)–*hunte*). We end our study with a brief examination of their overlap, which we lay out in graphic representation.

These axes have already been discussed in a previous segment: 1) *honor–hunte* as the binary opposition that propels the spiral of violence driving the action of the first narrative; and 2) *mort–dreiture* as the polarity that establishes the social order and political stability that becomes the impress of the second narrative. That the *geste* plays out along the axis *honor–hunte* can be inferred from verses 1013 - 14:

"Or quart chascuns que granz colps i empleit,
Que malvaïse cançon de nus chantet ne seit!" (ll. 1013 - 14)

('Now let each see to it that he employ great blows,
So that no taunting song be sung about us!')

('Each one take care to strike great blows,
That no bad song will they know to sing against us!')

Though neither word is mentioned here we can nonetheless deduce from other passages within the text that the opposition *honor–hunte* is critical to our understanding of these verses. We again call to mind the words spoken by Baligant of Charlemagne:

Dist Baligant: 'Oïl, car mult est proz.
En plusurs gestes de lui sunt granz honors.
Il n'en at mie de Rollant sun nevoid:
N'avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus." (ll. 3180 - 83)


(Baligant said: 'Indeed, for he is most worthy.
'Several gestes attribute great honors to him.
But he no longer has the service of his nephew, Roland:
He will not have the strength to hold up against us.')


Honurs equates with *vertut* in these lines, and virtue is at once the ability to prevail in battle and the marks that transport the presence of Roland into the second narrative. Though many *gestes* ascribe *honurs* to Charlemagne, they do so not because of his own qualities, but because of those qualities which, properly speaking, belong to Roland alone. Now that Roland is absent, so, too, is *honor* absent. Needless to say, these words spoken by Baligant could not be more accurate in his assessment. And yet the French under Charlemagne's command will prevail, despite the absence of *honur*, due not to the prowess of particular combatants, but rather because of divine will. But these post-Roncevaux circumstances are found only after the making of the *geste*. In the first narration, the deed (the sword-blow) guarantees honor and wards off shame, and it is in terms of the continuous struggle between *honor* and *hunte* that the creation of the *Geste* is best described –“*Que malvaïse cançun (read geste) de nus chan tet ne seit!*”

The case for the polarity *dreiture–mort* as the axis of fiction can be determined from more general evidence. The first thing to be noted is that by the end of the trial of Ganelon, *dreiture* has been defined in the negative; all those, whether they be Saracen or Frank, who have refused the preeminence of *dreiture*, which is the preeminence of the new law, meet with death. They are the Saracens who refuse conversion at the conclusion of the battle (ll. 3669 - 70) and the clan obstinately supporting Ganelon against the Emperor's call for *dreit* against him (l. 3751). Death is then defined as the wages of those who do not know or recognize *dreiture*. There is ultimately no narration of struggle, at least no ongoing and overt struggle, in the polarity *dreiture–mort*; either one is in conformity with the law or one is eradicated, by 'universal' consent, from the new social and political order. But we can go one


step further in saying that this eradication has already begun at the slaughter of Roncevaux. Yet we find that Roland, dying intact without the puncture of a single wound or the breaking of a single bone, suffers no submission to *dreiture*, to the new law offered him by Charlemagne (l. 786); Roland remains free of the marks of circumcision cut onto the crowns of Naimés, Thierry and Charlemagne. For Roland (ll. 787 - 88), safety in the strength of numbers was repugnant, devoid of *honor* and tantamount a betrayal of the *geste*. 'This says the count: 'I will do no such thing / may God confound me, if I betray the geste!'..... (*Ço dit li quens: 'Jo n'en ferai nient. / Deus me cunfunde, se la geste en desment!'*). Roland refuses the emperor's *salvement* for his own person and for all the Franks under his command. The price of honor is death, and Roland pays the price in full awareness of the choice he has made; that he is less than candid with the Franks, leading them uninformed into oblivion, is a matter already taken up elsewhere in this chapter.

We can now draw out the two axes. Upon one is located the creation of the Geste:






Let us now take briefly into consideration those things that, as Marsile and Charlemagne have indicated, the first and the second narratives seek, namely, *e de mort e de hunte* and *e dreiture e honor*. Death (*mort*), especially now that we have defined death as the absence of *dreiture*, is clearly to the left of the textual gap signaling the absence of Roland, *dreiture* is to the right. This in accordance with the prescriptions set out by Marsile and the Emperor. By contrast, honor, insofar as it has been recuperated by the actions of the second narrative, is a quality that has been returned to Roland and to the first narrative through the actions of the second. In avenging Roland, the Emperor recuperates Roland's honor, though he fall short of repurchasing his own. Honor, as does death, belongs to the first narrative; the Emperor's lot, to the contrary, is continuing *shame*. Thus *honor* and *hunte* switch 'narrative fields' so that *'honor* and *mort* become the hallmark of the first narration, *dreiture* and *hunte* that of the second. Again, we can represent this graphically in fixing the death of Roland at the point of intersection between the axis of the Geste and the axis of fiction:



In addition to representing *mort* by *dreiture* and *hunte* by *honur* this graph draws new 'letters' onto the axes: R = presence, R = absence of Roland; Ch = presence, Ch = absence of the Emperor. By this we wish to recall that in the first narration Roland's 'kinetic' presence contrasts with the emperor's fatal passivity; he is absent from Roncevaux, and absent from his role as executor of the law (in particular, during the frequently noted exchange with Ganelon, ll. 310 - ff.). Likewise, whereas Roland is now 'absent' from the post-Roncevaux text, in other words absent from the second narration, Charlemagne takes on presence as an agent and executor of the (new) law.

One surprising and seemingly contradictory surmise can be drawn from this diagram: fiction and *geste* are no longer divided by the text's open center. Taken separately, the action of the first narration is governed by the axis *honur-hunte*, the second by the axis *dreiture-mort*; but as these two narratives join *hunte* is projected into the second narrative *mort* into the first; the two narratives, that is the "historical" and the "fictive", overlap at every point. This is the work of Charlemagne, who places R(oland), reduced (by his own doing)

to the 'marrow' of the *geste*, back into the center of fiction, to the open, uncultivated fields of the blank page --*Pate(R)ne*. Likewise, we have seen the 'cunning book' fill up the center of the open wound that is the *cha(R)tre* of Laon with the re-found presence of R(oland). Although they are no longer separate, the first and second narratives still remain distinguishable by the presence/absence of Roland/Charlemagne. In the first narrative, Charlemagne, whom we now designate as the author of *fiction*, is present as a noted absence; in the second narrative, Roland, author of the *geste*, is made present as the commemoration of loss. The absence of Roland is dedicated as the gap separating the text's two narratives. This is also the space wherein 'lor leis', that is, the failed law, accuses both Saracen and Frank alike; something 'pagan' disseminates from the center throughout all passages of the text. The third diagram illustrates this in what is recognizably the full elaboration of a semeiotic square:



The first divide, that between first and second narrative is *vertical*, an open field [Pate()*ne*] cleaving the *Roland* into two narratives. The divide itself, this *gap*, is

the scar marks left from the incision where *geste* and fiction cross. So it is that in taking the text as 'two parts joined' we are now able to see how in the first narrative the opposition *honor–hunte* (the axis upon which the *Geste* is produced -*gerere*) is replaced by the non-operative pairing *honor/dreiture* or honor/death. This I have given representation in the initialing letters RCh̄ –the presence of Roland being the guarantor of honor within the *geste* (cf: Baligant at ll. 3181 - 83), the absence of Charlemagne assuring that death will be the order of the day at Ronceveaux (cf.: Roland's refusal of Charlemagne's *salvement* at ll. 783 - 91). Roland is the law (*honor*) of the first narrative; measuring the catastrophic events at Ronceveaux against Charlemagne's observations at lines 3338 - 39, we can now say that Roland's law (*honur*) is none other than *lor leis*, that is, the law from which the second narration attempts to distance itself. Charlemagne is not eclipsed by Roland, and in particular not eclipsed by Roland's *honur*, rather his is the occulted presence of a new and emerging socio-political order, in short, the emergence of a new law. Thus, *lor leis* (*honur*) becomes the mirroring pendant of the 'true law' (*dreiture*) with this difference: whereas *lor leis* (*honur*) depends upon the presence of the man, i.e. the deed, for its validity (*virtut* -cf: again Baligant at lines 381 - 83), the validity of the 'true law' (*dreiture*) is, contrariwise, independent of man's deeds, being determined solely by its consonance with the word of God.

In the second narrative, the polarity *dreiture–mort* is replaced by the pairing *dreiture/honor* that is, by *dreiture/hunte*. This we represent with the initialing letters ChR̄ – the presence of Charlemagne invoking the advent of *dreiture*, the absence of Roland a reminder of the shame that becomes a permanent fixture of the post-Ronceveaux order. Unlike Roland, who *is* honor,

who carves honor out with the sword, Charlemagne is at best a semblance of *dreiture*; he can call for *le dreit* to be judged against Ganelon (cf.: l. 3751), but only the hand of God, using Thierry as its instrument, can execute that order. We now have this understanding of the text's two narratives as they transverse its open center: in the workings of the first narrative (\overline{RCh}), death subtends honor –the absence of Charlemagne serves only to prove the invalidity of *lor leis*; in the workings of the second narrative (\overline{ChR}), shame is the constant undercurrent of *dreiture*. But what does this reveal about the interrelation of the text's two narratives, if not the fact that they interpenetrate one another? The axis of the *geste* is thrust into the second narration as Charlemagne becomes the inheritor of shame, and the axis of 'fiction' projects into the first narrative as death, understood as the absence of *dreiture*, comes, retrospectively, to illuminate the true nature of the events that have unfolded at Roncevaux.

We can now call attention to a second narrational divide, one that bisects the *Roland* laterally. We can see from the third graph (p. 160) that the pair *Honor/Dreiture* defines the upper field which we have named the field of *Chrestientet*; similarly, the field below center, defined by the pair *Dreiture/Honor*, is designated as the field of *lor leis*. To put this in terms perhaps more easily intelligible to the reader, one could argue that there are two currents, hence two distinct approaches that one might take in reading the *Roland*. One reading associates *christientet* strictly with the Franks, *lor leis* strictly with the Saracens; here the Frankish presence is represented by Roland in the first narration and by Charlemagne in the second. In another kind of reading, we place emphasis on the absence of Roland and Charlemagne; this is the dark undercurrent of death and shame which

indicates to us that the difference between *lor leis* and *christientet* (read: *dreiture*) is really a difference internal to the Frankish camp. *Lor leis*, then, is not the law of the Saracens, rather it is a substratum of the text defined by death and shame. There is not a moment within the text where, either in a positive or in a negative representation, *chrestientet* (*dreiture/dreiture*) and *lor leis* (*honor/honor*) are not inextricably intertwined. There is also a single instance at the moment of the death of Roland, at the gap between the text's two narratives, where *lor leis* and *chrestientet* merge. The text's center, we may recall, is the locus where Charlemagne refills the void left by Roland's death -*Pate(R)ne*- where *Li ber Gilie* heals the wound found in the *Cha(R)tre*.

The notion that 'factual' narrative, one that recounts the deed or the *geste*, and 'fictional' narrative, one where word motivates word, might ever exist wholly apart is an illusion, though one necessary to the process of writing. The *geste*, here the first narrative of the *Roland*, refers to something exterior to itself, something from which, putatively, it takes its origin. Looking to the second narrative of the *Roland*, we see that 'fiction,' on the other hand, finds its origin not in the deed --we recall that neither Thierry nor Naimes nor even Charlemagne vanquishes the enemy but only the hand of God-- but in the already written word. The source of the second narrative of the *Chanson de Roland* is the first narrative of the *Chanson de Roland*. There is something paradoxical in the relation between the two. Once the *geste* has been created, there is need of no other, and Roland, in desuetude, can find a well-merited rest in death; this is how the seemingly interminable cycle of violence finally ends. On the contrary, the second narration though it brings the spiral of violence to conclusion calls for an endless repetition, an endless reenactment in similitude of the violence original to the *geste*. Thus, at the conclusion, of

the *Roland*, the emperor is sent out very much against his will, in fact in obedience to the will of Another, to continue in an interminable narrative of battle against the enemy.

Why the anguish? Why do we find Charlemagne crying and pulling at his beard? Because the narration begun with the *geste* will never find its ending; and the glory of conquest will no longer in any way, either directly or indirectly, reflect back upon the *honor* of the Emperor. Charlemagne has vacated his role as the embodiment of authority, he is no longer the law merely the law's chief agent. The law is silent, a hidden text, known only through acts of transgression. The text concludes with the illusion of 'wholeness,' i.e., existence without the presence of shame, shattered. Charlemagne cannot escape the loss: the loss of Roland, the loss of his own position of authority at the center of the text. The endless repetition of unwilled narration is a concession to writing. The writer (author) must write interminably in his futile attempt to cover the gap at the center of the text, to fill in the open space of the *Veire Pate(R)ne*, and to heal the wound of castration that strikes the *Cha(R)tre* at its center.

PART II
VIRGIL

ICH-VERLUBT

L'écrivain appartient à l'oeuvre, mais ce qui lui appartient, c'est
seulement un livre, un amas muet de mots stériles, ce qu'il y a
de plus insignifiant au monde. (Blanchot: *L'espace littéraire*)

The story of the last day in Virgil's life seems perfectly suited to Hermann Broch's near lifelong literary project. The poet Virgil had, after all, lived on the cusp of two ages and his work on a grand scale, the *Aeneid*, is arguably the principal literary pathway through which antiquity attains to the modern age. Broch, in a similar fashion, situates his own writings at what he perceived to be the end of an age. His writings describe the West in decline from the Romantics through the first half of the twentieth century, and they characterize what Broch perceives to be an era of social and political anomie. Some of his works, such as *The Sleepwalkers* (*Die Schlafwandler*), chronicle the decline in detail, attempting to comprehend the mechanisms by which an age unravels toward its end. *The Death of Virgil* (hereafter cited as *T.D.V.*), on the other hand, sets itself apart as the only one of Broch's works that indicates a way out of the chaos by its attempt to supplant an old 'reality' with one newly recreated.

Though Broch had revised and rewritten the basic story repeatedly from Spring 1936 to Spring 1945, we attribute the ultimate shape of the novel published as *The Death of Virgil* to an event that occurred in the life of the author in mid-March, 1938. During the time at which the politics and the military force of Nazi Germany were spreading their way into neighboring Austria, Hermann Broch, under circumstances which remain obscure, was taken into custody in the provincial town of Alt-Aussee. It is not clear that his captors knew of his Jewish identity. Still in all, Broch had every reason to believe that he would probably not escape this imprisonment alive. For a period of two and a half weeks, from the thirteenth to the thirty-first of March, 1938, expecting that these were the last days and hours of his life, Broch wrote obsessively and with a singular concentration upon the story of Virgil's last day. Consistent with these circumstances, he later describes these writings, the basis for what was to become *T.D.V.*, as a "literary will."

How odd, indeed, that Broch, who exercised his talents in such diverse literary forms as the philosophical treatise and the cultural, social and political essay, should choose to write his way toward death through a medium of fiction. The choice, however, reveals a great deal concerning the value Broch places upon fiction as a purveyor of 'truth'¹ and the 'real' (*Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit*), terms that claim an important place in the philosophical thought with which his works are infused. In a letter to Aldous Huxley, dated May 10, 1945, Broch implies that the *T.D.V.* was written as a form of 'witness;' he suggests that the event of death could itself be made present to the reader through the medium of the text:

Für mich galt es, mein Material, mein Erkenntnismaterial dem Leser zu übermitteln. Ich mußte den Leser nachleben lassen, wie man sich der Erkenntnis des Todes durch Zerknirschung und Selbstausslöschung annähert.²

(For me it was important to convey my material, my cognition-material, to the reader. I had to have the reader to live through the experience of how one approaches the knowledge (cognition) of death through a process of contrition and of self-dissolution).

Here Broch finds it necessary that the reader should not simply know something about his, Broch's, experience but that each reader should be 'made to live through' (*nachleben lassen*) a confrontation with death not unlike his own. Extending the 'death experience' to the reader becomes the express purpose for writing *T.D.V.*, and in this light we can say that Broch does 'will' to the reader not just the description of his encounter with death, but death itself; he wills to the reader, through fiction, the immediate experience of death³. Furthermore, death and fiction stand together in a relation of mediated exchange. The death experience and the reading experience translate one into the other through the pages of *T.D.V.* Broch make this clear in the following excerpt taken again from the letter to Huxley:

.....wie man sich der Erkenntnis des Todes durch Zerknirschung und Selbstausslöschung annähert (mag man sie auch als noch Lebender niemals erreichen). Mit bloß rationalen Mitteilungen ist dies nicht zu bewerkstelligen, vielmehr mußte der Leser dazu gebracht werden, genau den gleichen Prozess, den ich durchgemacht habe, nun seinerseits genau so durchzugehen.

(.....how one approaches a knowledge (cognition) of death through a process of contrition and of self-dissolution (may one who is yet alive never reach this experience). This cannot be brought about through purely rational means, rather the reader must be brought to this cognition (of death) through exactly the same process that I myself worked through (*durchgemacht habe*), only the reader must go through it on his/her own).

Broch attempts to realize in fiction the experience of 'death-approaching' so that what happened in *Alt-Aussee*, what *really* happened, might be

experienced again and again, and not just by Broch, but by any reader able to enter into the process of the unfolding fiction of *T.D.V.*

The experience at Alt-Aussee changed in a fundamental way what Broch had earlier intended as a mere sketch of the last hours of Virgil's life. In the text, as it is reshaped following that death experience, Broch conflates the death of an age with the death of the subject, the anguish of a particular individual with the anguish of a world in the maelstrom of political and social chaos. Virgil's death (unless otherwise noted Virgil will hereafter refer to *Broch's* Virgil) and Broch's death and the death of the reader all join in a temporal simultaneity within the pages of this lengthy and stylistically arduous novel.

T.D.V. is offered to the reader as a crucible into which the subject might enter in order that the subject and the age in which he lives should undergo significant transformation. No matter how ambitious or unrealistic the idea, Broch pursues a commonality between *T.D.V.* and Virgil's *Aeneid*. Emulating what had apparently been the transformative effects of the *Aeneid*, Broch wishes that his *T.D.V.* should serve as the portal into a 'real' beyond his then present reality, a 'real' that will likewise be constructed from a work of fiction. Broch sensed that his world was in a state of moral, political and cultural collapse. Through the *T.D.V.*, Broch attempts to allow his reader to fall to an absolute nadir from where the new 'real' of his fiction would well up, supplanting an old, corrupt and fallen state of human existence. The following takes account of the Brochean subject as situated in the cleft between those

two opposing realities: the one emergent, the other in a state of precipitous decline.

A Child's Name

Broch opens the *T.D.V.* with a description of the sea upon which glide the squadron of Roman ships carrying Virgil home to the Italian shore. The Adriatic is a glistening surface, *stahlblau und licht*:(steel-blue and light'), its mirror-like waters reflecting the story of life at the heel of the Italian peninsula. At the approach of Brindisi the once 'death-like loneliness of the [barren] sea' is transformed into a picture of bustling human activity :

.....und jetzt, da die sonnige, dennoch so todesahnende Einsamkeit der See sich ins friedvoll Freudige menschlicher Tätigkeit wandelte, da die Fluten, sanft übergänzt von der Nähe menschlichen Seins und Hausens, sich mitvielerlei Schiffen bevölkerten..... (p. 11)

(.....and now, here the sunny yet death-like loneliness of the sea had transformed itself into the peaceful joy of human activity, here the floods, softly shimmering with the reflection of nearby human existence and of human shelter, the sea teeming with many kinds of ships.....)

Broch describes Brindisi's coastal waters, teeming (*bevölkerten*) with the various sorts of seagoing vessels, as 'softly shimmering in the nearness to human beings and human habitations'. Broch, moreover, further elaborates upon the imagery of the sea as a shimmering reflective surface in calling the water 'mirror-like' (*spiegelglatt*) and capturing in its reflected surface an idyllic picture of Roman life:

.....da war das Wasser beinahe spiegelglatt geworden; perlmuttern war darüber die Muschel des Himmels geöffnet, es wurde Abend, und man roch das Holzfeuer der Herdstätten, so oft die Töne des Lebens, ein Hämmern oder ein Ruf von dort hergeweht und herangetragen wurden. (p. 11)

(.....here the water had become nearly as smooth as a mirror's surface; the arching muscle-shell of the heavens had opened and it was mother-of-pearl, it became evening and there was wood fire smoking in the hearth

place, so often the life-sound a hammer or a call being wafted here, borne here from afar.)

Here is Rome in its Golden Age, much as it is described in Virgil's own *Georgics*. The problem with this picture, as with Virgil's depiction of Roman life in the *Georgics* themselves, is that this representation of the 'Golden Age' is true to an age already removed far into the past, at least as far removed as the now defunct Republic for which it was both example and inspiration. The Rome contemporaneous with Virgil no longer resembles the idyllic past described in the *Georgics*. The significance of this opening passage, then, is two-fold: firstly, it introduces the reader to a Rome which, as a figment of the Virgilian imagination, is untrue to the circumstances of Virgil's later life; secondly, the reader of *T.D.V.* is first introduced to Virgil not as person but as text; that is to say, we first encounter Virgil not addressed in name, but in the form of a fiction that is identifiably his by its style.

The above scene taken from *T.D.V.*'s first page, bears Virgil's signature only in that from the style of the passage we can recognize Virgil within it. As Virgil's 'name' is so recognizably inscribed into the above fictional idyll, so the 'truth' or untruth of the name finds itself implicated in the veracity of the fiction. As the squadron of ships nears shore and Virgil sees at first hand the squalor of the city and the repulsive habits and the nauseating physical appearance of its population (pp. 28 - ff.), the incongruity between the idyll and the actuality of state calls into question the veracity of Virgil's very name. Hence, the fiction portrayed in the above citation bears no resemblance to the

truth of Brindisi as Virgil witnesses it; and the truth of the fiction and the truth of the name appear to Virgil to be sadly and inextricably intertwined.

The idea of the interchangeability of the name-of-the-author for the fiction itself is brought into play throughout that lengthy passage which describes Virgil's movement toward the state palace in Brindisi, the palace that will be Virgil's residence during the final hours of his life. Virgil is carried ashore to find himself at the center of a procession that is about to wind its way through the city's narrow streets. Leading the procession is Lysanias the imaginary boy-companion whom the reader finds carrying the cloak and the manuscript; two highly significant aspects Virgil's material being:

Daß der Knabe mitgekommen war, erwies sich da als unverhoffte Erleichterung; als wäre ihm, und dies war äußerst seltsam, von irgendwoher Kenntnis um die Wichtigkeit des Manuscriptkoffers geworden, achtete er darauf, daß dessen Träger sich stets knapp neben der Sänfte hielten, und während er, immerzu selber daneben und den Mantel über die Schulter geworfen, keinerlei Abdrängung zuließ, blinzelte er manchmal mit helldurchsichtigen Augen belustigt und verehrungsvoll herauf.

(pp. 29 - 30)

(That the boy had come along proved to be an un-hoped for lightening of Virgil's burden, as though from some indeterminate source the boy, and this was exceedingly strange, was apprised about the importance of the manuscript chest, he was attentive to see to it that the manuscript's carrier held it close against the litter and while he is constantly near, the cloak thrown over his shoulder did not allow himself to be driven aside, he now and again winked impishly and reverently upon the manuscript chest with his clear bright eyes.

Appropriate to this passage, Lysanias is the creature of Virgil's imagination who strives to reconcile conflicting aspects of Virgil's being. In later passages (p. 179 *et passim*), he will call Virgil 'name-giver,' implying that all things Roman have been named anew through the writing of the *Aeneid*; and throughout *T.D.V.*, Lysanias will assiduously defend the *Aeneid* against all attempts by Virgil to destroy it. Lysanias carries the manuscript in his hands

and the cloak over his shoulder, protecting them not only from inadvertent loss. The rough handling of the surrounding crowd, but also from Virgil's intent to destroy two outward aspects of his own identity, namely, name and text.

The *T.D.V.* invents an ingenious metaphorical device for bringing name and text under close critical observation. As the procession that has Virgil at its center wends its way upward toward the state palace that is a last 'resting place' for the dying author, a night moth suddenly lights on the handle of the bier upon which he is being carried:

.....ein Nachtfalter verirrte sich auf die Sänftenlehne und blieb daran haften; sachte wollte sich neuerlich Müdigkeit und Schlaf melden, sechs Beine hatte der Falter und sehr viele, wenn nicht gar unbestimmbar viele das Trägersgespann..... (p. 39)

(.....an errant night moth lighted upon the litter handles and remained clinging there, softly sleep and weariness called anew; the moth had six legs and the porters of the litter had a great many if not a countless number of legs.....)

This is the same procession which has Lysanias carrying in his hands the manuscript of the *Aeneid* and, over his shoulder, Virgil's cloak; it is also a procession marching inexorably toward fire.

Fire is the element which lends its name to the subsequent Book of *T.D.V.* (Book II); fire also surrounds the palace toward which Virgil is being borne as though he, along with the moth on the handle of his bier, were being transported to a funerary pyre (p. 39). What is remarkable about this passage is that the night moth so perfectly epitomizes the circumstances of Virgil's physical position within the procession. The six legs of the night moth replicate the legs of the nameless servants bearing the litter upon which he

rests. The texture of the moth's wings recall the textuality of cloak and of manuscript. The image of the moth, which is little other than a soft, shapeless body buried in a magnificent fold of wings, is the very image of Virgil as he lies apart from the enfolding cloak and manuscript carried by Lysanias. As if to hide the 'naked body' beneath the cloth, the reader is given no physical description of Virgil whatsoever; he is present only in name and in 'text;' and the legs that carry him forward remain without identity as though these invisible servants truly were torsoless.

With a recognition that the procession is moving toward fire, there is another significance to which the night moth alludes; like Virgil threatened with the loss of name and text, the night moth, too, is drawn toward a fire that will consume it whole. As Virgil seems to be steadily moving toward some unnamed and unknowable destruction the correlative image of the moth drawn to the flame adds something that immeasurably enriches the significance of this scene. The moth whose body is covered with a fold of wings and from which innumerable legs protrude "a great many when not a countless number" (*sehr viele, wenn nicht unbestimmbar viele*), projects, in this context, the image of the body of state enveloped by the materiality of the text. This is to say, Rome is wrapped in a fiction that, one way or another, depending on whether the manuscript is preserved or consumed by fire, will have significant bearing upon the fate of state. The fiction of the *Aeneid* and so Rome's probable history, as well as its imaginary past, come together at the precarious moment of Virgil's ascent to the palace of Brindisi, which is an

ascent into fire. Here Virgil's text and Virgil's name become synecdochically Rome; and the text, the name, and the state become inextricably one.

As if to emphasize the historico-fictional aspects of the *Aeneid*, Virgil progresses through the streets of Brindisi, moving backward through the chronology of his fiction; it is as though he were realizing in the brief moment of this procession all the events of his own fiction only in reverse order. Brindisi, first glimpsed from the sea (p. 11), conjures up scenes from the *Georgics* and the Golden Age of Rome; Virgil's climb through the steep and narrow passageways of the city distinctly recalls Aeneas' travails during his journey toward *Italia*. More to the point, Virgil's encounter with the shrill and howling voices of the women of Brindisi recalls Aeneas' passage through narrow straits of the Scylla and Charybdis. Here is the scene that describes Virgil's progress as he moves toward the state palace of Brindisi:

.....und wenn auch langsam, man kam trotzdem vorwärts –Stufe um Stufe ging es die Elendsgasse hinan–, nein, nicht diese Behelligungen waren arg, sondern die Weiber waren es, sie waren das Ärgste, sie, diese aus den Fenstern herausgelehnten Weiber, brustzerquetscht auf den Brüstungen, herabbaumelnd schlangengleich ihre nackten Arme mit den züngelnden Händen daran, und waren es auch nur irr keifende Schimpfworte, in die ihr Geschwätz umkippte, sowie sie des Zuges ansichtig wurden, es war zugleich ein keifendes Irresein, groß wie jedes Irresein, übersteigert zur Anklage, übersteigert zur Wahrheit, da es Schimpf war. (p. 40)

(.....and even though slowly they still came forward –one step after the other the procession climbed the misery-streets–, no, these vexations were not so bad, it was the wenches, they were the worst, they were, these wenches leaning overhead from the windows, breasts squashed against the railings, their naked arms swaying like branches, serpent-like, with their hands flickering like signing tongues and though their chatter toppled into mere piping blame-words so soon as the procession was sighted it was nonetheless a carping insanity, great was that insanity which did swell to reproach, which did swell to truth since it was disgrace.)

The women (*Weiber* --wenches) lean downward toward the procession, their breasts quashed against balconies, their arms swinging like branches

(*herabbaumelnd*), that transmogrify into serpents (*schlangengleich*), their hands flickering like serpents' tongues. This aural attack proclaims loudly the anxieties associated with the perceived threat of annihilation. Additionally, the multitude of breasts and swaying arms make claim to Virgil; touching him with their voices, *signing* him with their hands (*züngelnden Händen*). Their words strike hard. Their ravings well up into a cacophony of accusation, and accusation wells up into pitiless truth (*übersteigert zur Wahrheit*). These shrill accusations blame Virgil for the untruth of his text and for the lies of his fiction, and they ultimately make the demand that the texts be destroyed and that Virgil, if only in name, be destroyed along with them.

The voices of the women of Brindisi continue to fly at Virgil as the accusations, however incomprehensible they may be, proceed to attain their effect. They are cries from the 'heart' which tear into the text, which is branded factitious and untrue. The women's voices strip away at the integrity of the author as well as at the falsity of the cloth of his fiction:

—:sinnlos war der Hagel der Schimpfworte, der auf ihn niederprasselte, sinnlos, sinnlos, sinnlos, dennoch berechtigt, dennoch Mahnung, dennoch Wahrheit, dennoch zur Wahrheit übersteigter Irrsinn, und jede Schmähung riß ein Stück Überheblichkeit von seiner Seele, so daß sie nackt wurde, so nackt wie die Säuglinge, so nackt wie die Greise auf ihren Lumpen, nackt vor Finsternis, nackt vor Erinnerungslosigkeit, nackt vor Schuld, eingegangen in die flutende Nacktheit des Ununterscheidbaren— (p. 41)

(—:senseless was the hail of blame-words that drizzled upon him, senseless, senseless, senseless yet justified, yet warning, yet truth, yet insanity welling up into truth, and every shameful insult tore a piece of arrogance from his soul, so that the soul became naked, as naked as a suckling babe, as naked as the grizzled old men laying on their rags, naked with darkness, naked with the absence of memory, naked with guilt, moving into the spreading nakedness of the realm void of all differentiation—)

Though 'nonsense' (*Irrsinn*), the voices are nonetheless 'true,' and they rip at the arrogance of Virgil's soul (*riß ein Stück Überheblichkeit von seiner Seele*).

But Virgil's arrogance is nothing other than an attempt at attaining, through fiction, an alternate reality, a 'real' unlike the one into which he was born. Like the night moth, the texture of whose wings will be consumed in fire, Virgil's own body is to be stripped of its covering, rendering him '.....naked as the newborn, so naked as those who in grizzled old age lie bare on their rags.....' The movement is toward 'truth revealed', one that would lie on the nether side of death, a truth that would be revealed as the cloth of fiction is stripped from the body like flesh from the bone. But this attempt at an immediately perceptible truth comes at the sacrifice of clear memory and at the price of a lapse into an undifferentiated reality: '.....naked before darkness, naked before the loss of all memory, naked before guilt, entered into the spreading nakedness of the undifferentiated--' (*so daß sie nackt wurde, so nackt wie die Säuglinge, so nackt wie die Greise auf ihren Lumpen*).⁴ This is Virgil's first encounter with death within *T.D.V.* and the encounter demands that everything bearing the signature of recognition and of individual identity -- name and text-- be dissolved from his being.

For the moment, Virgil succumbs to the dissolution of identity, to a mode of death that entails a stripping away of name and of text:

.....er aber, entkleidet des Namens, entkleidet seiner Seele, entkleidet jeglichen Liedes, entkleidet der liedhaften Zeitlosigkeit seines Herzens, zurückfalle ins nächtlich Unsagbare und in den Humus des Seins, erniedrigt zu jener bittersten Scham, die der letzte Rest eines erloschenen Gedächtnisses ist--wissende Stimmen der Zeit, ihr Wissen um die Unentrinnbarkeit und um die unentrinnbaren Fänge des Schicksals!

(p. 43)

(.....he, however, stripped of the name, stripped of his soul, stripped of the least song, stripped of the song-filled timelessness of his heart, he falls back into the nightly-ineffable and into the humus of being, brought low to that most bitter shame which is the last remnant of an extinguishing consciousness --:knowing voices of time, their knowledge of the ineluctability and of the inescapable clutches of fate!)

Virgil 'falls back into the ineffable night and into the humus of being.' He is stripped of name (*Namen*), of soul (*Seele*) and of song (*Lied*), the last remnants of memory dissolving (*erloschen*), so that death becomes a dissolution of self, an *Ich-Verlußt*. We have a hint from Broch's letter to Aldoux Huxley dated October 5, 1945, that this is precisely the kind of death from which he has attempted to deliver both himself and his reader through the writing of *T.D.V.*: a death that so completely extinguishes memory, that the memory of dying is itself lost to a hoped for later readership. For Broch relates explicitly to Huxley that while in prison in Alt-Aussee, the writing of *T.D.V.* becomes a manner of remembering death, of relaying the encounter with death to the future reader, so that death can be experienced again and again. Rather than revealing some truth about the death experience, writing enfolds the phenomenon of death within itself, preserving its memory, death's memory, side by side with the memory, in name, of the author.

Especially relevant to Virgil's struggle (—which, we should be reminded, is Broch's struggle—) in the face of death is the notion, expressed in the last words of the above citation, of being snared by fate (—*die unentrinnbaren Fänge des Schicksals!*). Here Broch's Virgil is faced with the choice of either being 'snared by fate,' of being extinguished from existence by fate's dictum, or of escaping the snares of this fate by means of inscribing his name into the text of the *Aeneid*. Elsewhere, this active resistance to becoming fate's captive and victim is expressed in the phrase *Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen* (to take fate upon oneself) (p. 144). This *Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen* refers to the

author's ability, through fiction, to reshape fate by altering the 'real' by which fate itself is determined. A glimpse of this power comes as Virgil returns to his own fiction, reclaiming the role of Anchises and writing into his personal 'fiction' a fiction of the struggles of Rome:

.....und es war Troja, das um ihn brannte, es war der niemals verlöschende
Weltenbrand, doch er, der über den Bränden schwebte, er war Anchises,
blind und sehend in einem, Kind und Greis gleichzeitig kraft unsäglicher
Erinnerung, getragen von den Schultern des Sohnes, er selber Welten-
gegenwart, getragen von des Atlas Schultern, von den Schultern des
Riesen. Und so ging es Schritt für Schritt dem Palaste zu. (p. 50)

(.....and it was Troy burning around him it was the never extinguishing world
conflagration, yet he who floated above the flames, he was Anchises, blind and
seeing in one, simultaneously child and grizzled old man thanks to the
unutterable recollection, borne on the shoulders of his son, he himself
was 'world-presence' borne on the shoulders of Atlas, on the shoulders
of the giant. And so it went one step after the other right up to the
palace.)

Here, in contradistinction to the passage from page 41, *Kind und Greis* do not relinquish but reclaim the cloth of fiction. Here it might be asked, "Who is the child, and who is the wizened old man?" Is Virgil the child of Anchises or is Anchises the child of Virgil? The question, at least, suggests an ongoing circularity between 'text' and 'name', between author and authored whereby *Kind und Greis*, like the 'last' link in a chain, are merely tangent extremities. Virgil's death and his name are already memorialized in the death of Anchises; Broch's death and name are, likewise, memorialized in this fictionalized account of the death of Virgil. One fiction envelops the other so that the names Broch, Virgil, and Anchises become tangent links in a textual chain of self referencing circularity.

Name, death and text exist in a circularity that is relevant to the fundamentally circular relation between father, child and name during the act of name-giving. The name is borrowed and, as Virgil proclaims in the subsequent passage, it covers the nakedness of our being:

"Der Name ist wie ein Kleid, das uns nicht gehört; nackt sind wir unter unserem Namen, nackter noch als das Kind, das der Vater vom Boden aufgehoben hat, um ihm den Namen zu geben. Und je mehr wir den Namen mit Sein erfüllen, desto fremder wird er uns, desto unabhängiger wird er von uns, desto verlassenener werden wir selber. Erborgt ist der Name, den wir tragen, erborgt das Brot, das wir essen, erborgt sind wir selber, nackt hineingehalten ins Fremde, und nur derjenige, der allen erborgten Flitter von sich abgetan hat, der wird des Zieles ansichtig, der wird zum Ziele gerufen, auf daß er sich mit seinem Namen endgültigvereinige". (pp. 59 - 60)

("The name is like a cloth that does not belong to us; naked are we under our names, more naked than the child that the father has lifted from the floor in order to give it the name. And the more we fill the name with being the more foreign it becomes to us, the greater its independence from us, the greater our abandonment. Borrowed is the name we carry, borrowed the bread we eat, we ourselves 'borrowed', held out naked in an alien realm, and only the one who had taken from himself all the borrowed clutter, only he will come into sight of the goal, he is called to the goal so that he might finally come to unite with the name.)

The name is a sort of *Ur-text*, that primal fictive cloth with which our otherwise naked being is draped; and it is a cloth that serves as the ultimate veil of separation between ourselves and death. Here it is said not that we are 'as naked as' but that we are 'more naked than' (*nackter noch*) the child whom the father lifts from the floor to give it its name. Placing the child in his lap the father 'claims' the child and it is the name that carries that claim forward. The name, therefore, is not a covering of the body, not a sign that points to some visible presence, but something that is draped over the uncertainty of something unknown, over the void that continues to exist at the center of our beings. At the same time, the name is the only remnant of the father that we have for certain as our own. That void at the center of our being becomes an ever present death within us, under the wrap of the name, waiting always to be revealed; it is that vast 'nightly ineffable' (*das nächtlich Unsagbare*; p. 43) which, during the course of our lives, we attempt, hopelessly, to fill with being. In giving the child his name, the father tears a piece of the cloth from which

the fiction of his own life has been fabricated, in order that a new fiction might begin, one that will play itself out through the existence of the child.....or, in the case of the author, through the existence of the text. But even the act of continued regeneration will not fill the void covered by the name. The claim to full authorship, authorship of one's own name, is infinitely deferred as the name is handed off from one generation to the next. In *T.D.V.*, Virgil clearly seeks a means whereby he, the author of the *Aeneid*, might become at once author of and authored by the name, a Virgil that might become the 'author' not just of the text but of Anchises as he in turn is authored by him.

Virgil, whom the wenches of Brindisi would render nameless (cf.: pp. 43 - ff.), is himself repeatedly referred to as a giver of names (cf.:*du gabst den Dingen ihre Namen; sie sind in deinem Gedicht* p. 179 et passim). It is Virgil who has given a 'name' —name in the broader sense of a memorialized fiction— to Anchises; and yet Anchises stands to Virgil in a relation of forebear. Such is the circularity of fiction and of the given name, that fathers become the sons of their sons, and so Anchises the 'offspring' of Virgil. This is the fiction to which the women of Brindisi in pages 39 and following object; the fiction from which yet additional fiction is born. It is an affront to the 'truth' (*Wahrheit*) that we hold at the center of our being, that truth which fiction obscures and which the voices of the women promise ever to reveal as they promise, likewise, to reveal the nakedness that is 'more naked than the naked child.'

In Paternal Succession

The issue of Ich-Verlußt (dissolution of self) in T.D.V. touches directly on Virgil's decision to destroy not just the manuscript of the Aeneid, but to destroy all his writings, hence, to destroy his name:

.....oh, es war das Gebot alles Getane zu vernichten, alles, was er je geschrieben und gedichtet hatte, zu verbrennen, oh, alle seine Schriften mußten verbrannt werden..... (p. 166)

(oh, it was the command to obliterate all that had been done, to burn all that he had ever written, had ever put into verse, oh, all his writings had to be burned.....)

Destruction of the writings would disrupt the circularity that places Virgil in the position of being 'father of fathers,' of being author to the narrative that most powerfully relates the story which makes present to Rome its forebears. Augustus' own authority as name-giver is menaced by Virgil's decision to essentially break the circle tying the present to a fictional past, a fiction that otherwise greatly enhances Caesar's own 'authorship' of state. At the close of this section, I will address in greater detail the role that Augustus himself plays, surreptitiously, in the circulation of the name of 'father.' He, too, has a part in granting validity and bringing into the present the name of Rome's fictional forebears.⁵

Virgil seeks out a position within the 'unending succession of fathers' (cf.: p. 178) by revisiting the Anchises of his *Aeneid* (cf: p. 50). He seeks to recover from within his own fiction the prophetic future that is revealed when, at the close of book VI, Aeneas descends into Hades to confer with Anchises. Instead, the 'recovery' fails, Anchises reveals nothing, and Virgil finds that in

place of a glimpse into the future, he is left only gazing ever further into the past:

.....er war Anchises, blind und sehend in einem, Kind und Greis
gleichzeitig kraft unsäglicher Erinnerung, getragen von den Schultern
des Sohnes, er selber Weltengegenwart, getragen von des Atlas Schultern,
von den Schultern des Riesen. (p. 50)

(he was Anchises, blind and seeing in one, simultaneously child and grizzled
old man thanks to the unutterable recollection, borne on the shoulders of his son,
he himself was 'world-presence' borne on the shoulders of Atlas, on the
shoulders of the giant.)

The Age of Giants here mentioned is an *Ur-zeit* belonging, metaphorically speaking, to the reign of Chronos, ante-dating the new order established by a rebellious Zeus, whether we understand 'Zeus' to be Augustus or Virgil himself. It appears that Virgil's foray into the *Aeneid* leads him only further away from the possibility of a newly established order for Augustan Rome. The order of paternal succession into which Augustus and Virgil would find their places shifts into a mode of regress, receding into an 'historical/fictional' distance away from the otherwise inevitable devolution of the name 'father' upon Augustus.

There are many indications within the *T.D.V.* of Virgil's mistrust of Augustan authority, primarily, though not exclusively, in Book III, which represents the imaginary encounter between Virgil and Augustus. The mistrust that Virgil harbors toward Augustus, and so the initial reluctance to yield to Augustus the manuscript, lead Virgil to consider an action, destruction, whereby the *Aeneid* would begin and end only with himself, would bear his 'name' and no one else's. The manner in which Virgil 'visits' Anchises (cited from page 50) suggests a certain exclusivity of proprietorship; the fictional

chronology described in that passage seems to begin with the Age of the Giants and to end with the name Virgil. An oddly incestuous relation is suggested by this passage, in which Virgil is both father and son, Anchises and Aeneas, creator and created. The desire of the author to completely possess his work, to find a place for his own name to the exclusion of any other is a jealous claim, rooted in mistrust, aimed at securing control over and the manipulation of the fictional events recorded. Virgil would guarantee his own complete authority over the text by the act of destroying it. In a sense, Virgil is in accord with the women of Brindisi, who see the 'outer garments' of the text as personal appendages (*Lumpen*, p. 41); *Windeln*, p. 42) that might easily be stripped from the body at the moment of death. Already authorship is framed in terms of an ethical question: does any fiction belong to a single creator? or does the text, like the name given by the father, circulate so as to continue to be reclaimed by others: others within positions of authority, the authors *and* the political forces of succeeding generations?

There are moments within *T.D.V.* where Virgil's reveries on childhood speak, albeit with great ambiguity, to the above question. In the following, Virgil revisits not Anchises but another paternal forebear of his fiction, the here unnamed father of his childhood:

.....und er erinnerte sich des Vaters, der erst mit der Heirat zum richtigen Bauern hatte werden können und dessen einstmaliger Töpferberuf dem Sohn gering gedeucht hatte, obwohl es sehr schön gewesen war den abendlichen Erzählungen von der Arbeit an den bauchigen Weinfässern und edelgeschwungenen Ölkrügen, die der Vater gefertigt hatte, zu lauschen, den Erzählungen von dem lehm-formenden Daumen, von den Spachteln und von der surrenden Drehscheibe, und von der Kunst des Brennens, schönen Erzählungen, unterbrochen von manchen alten Töpferlied. (pp. 37 - 38)

(.....and he remembered his father who at the time of his marriage first had been able to become a genuine farmer and whose earlier potter's trade had little impressed the son, although he, the son, was very pleased to attend the telling of the work stories in the evening, stories of the large-bellied wine urns and of nobly fashioned vessels for holding oil, works that the father had done, he was pleased to listen intently to the stories of the clay-fashioning thumb.....beautiful stories interspersed with many an old potter's song.)

Even this father, like Anchises, is portrayed as author and authored. Virgil's own gifts are the stories which are themselves passed down from anonymous father to anonymous son until arriving at his own, Virgil's, gift. The anonymity of the father allows a place for Virgil to enter into a tradition without time so that the web of fiction that Virgil weaves again into the *Aeneid* is the work of the countless unnamed fathers that precede him. The namelessness of the father works as an act of authorial suppression which allows only Virgil's name to be inscribed into the manuscript of the *Aeneid*. But then even Virgil is in turn threatened with namelessness as it seems that Augustus is only waiting for Virgil's death as an occasion to lay claim to the *Aeneid*.

Each of these threats are alternately alive in the single passage within *T.D.V.* that speaks explicitly of the 'unending line of fathers':

Denn Opfer und Begnadung sind eines, sie folgen nicht aufeinander, sondern gehen auseinander hervor, und nur derjenige ist würdig Vater genannt zu werden, der begnadet ist hinabzusteigen in den Schattenabgrund, damit er, selber zum Opfer gebracht, die Priesterweihe seines opfernden Amtes empfangen, damit er eingegliedert werde in die erhabene unendliche Reihe der Väter, die zu der erhabenen Unzugänglichkeit des Anfangs führt.....unablässig die Kraft unendlichen Neubeginns erhält, den Segen des menschlichen Seins für immer, segenspendend der Ur-Ahn, der Städtegründer jenseits der Erstarrung, der Namensgeber, der das Gesetz gehoben hat, enthoben jeglichem Anfang und jeglichem Ende, enthoben der Geburt, ewig enthoben dem Ablauf. (p. 178)

(For sacrifice and absolution are one, they do not follow one another but, to the contrary, come forth out of one another and only he is worthy to be named father who has the given gift which allows him to climb down into the shadowy abyss in order that he himself, who has made of himself a sacrifice, should receive the priestly consecration of his own sacrificial office, so that he might become 'membered' into the exalted unending line of fathers, the line that leads to the sublime inaccessibility of the beginning.....the indefatigable might

of unending new-beginnings, the blessing from mortal beings for ever, the benefice of the first forebear, of the founders of cities beyond petrification, the name-givers, he who has raised high the law, exempted every beginning and every ending, exempted birth, eternally exempt from the concluding moment.)

The names of both Virgil and Augustus, fathers of state and of fiction, are lurking in this multivalenced passage. Only he who is worthy of the name 'father' has the power, the talent, the gift (*ist begnadet*) to descend into the shadowy abyss (*der Schattenabgrund*) of the past. Antiquity's most prominent examples of figures who had made the descent and returned from the past (death) are Orpheus and Aeneas, who, are like Virgil and Augustus, respectively, are poet and founder of state. But as forebear not only is Aeneas, like Anchises before him, the author of both Augustus and Virgil, he has also, again like Anchises, been authored by them. He is largely the creation of Virgil's fictive imagination, but he is also in some measure Augustus' creation. Anchises' prophecies of conquest and of monument, like all the deeds of Aeneas, serve only to point the way toward the Augustan age. Without Augustus' triumphs and his role in the creation of the Roman state, Aeneas would be rendered an 'inconsequential' figure. Virgil's, and so Aeneas,' ultimate mandate was, after all is said and done, to glorify the reign of Augustus.

The phrase *hinabgesteigen in den Schattengrund* (to climb down into the shadowy abyss) ostensibly refer to the journey into Hades but it could just as well refer to the author –Aeneas/Virgil/Broch– as he recedes from the memory of authorship, as he falls out of authorship and into namelessness. Virgil fears the prospect of relinquishing to Augustus the title of *father of Rome*

and of placing in him all the power and the authority which that title confers. Equally unsettling, perhaps even more so, would be the prospect of leaving behind the name and the text, Virgil's mortal remains, leaving them to be claimed by some as yet unnamed other. Should he not elect to destroy the *Aeneid* at the moment of his death, thereby leaving behind the name and the text, Virgil would in effect bequeath to posterity an enduring, material sign of his own incompleteness, his own inability to complete the circle, to become both father and son of his own life's work. Virgil is inclined to take the text with him, to immolate the name so that he and all his works might go out whole, consumed in full, like the night moth, into death's consuming flame. To destroy the *Aeneid* would be a way of claiming exclusivity for this work in the same way that authors will sometimes claim exclusivity for their letters by requesting that all their correspondence and their private journals be destroyed in a posthumous act. This request is often ignored or denied by the author's executors, and Virgil's request is specifically denied by his old companions Plotius and Lucius (pp. 224 - ff.), who recognize, and rightly so, that Virgil's work no longer belongs to Virgil but to Rome:

[So Lucius]....."Wenn du sterben willst, so ist das deine eigene
Angelegenheit, wir werden dich nicht daran hindern, aber die *Äneis* ist
schon längst nicht mehr deine eigene Angelegenheit; daß schlag dir also
aus dem Kopf....." (p. 225)

(.....if you wish to die that's your own affair and we will not try to hinder you;
but has been a long time since the *Aeneid* was yours to do with as you will;
so get this idea (of destroying the manuscript) out of your head.....)

The otherwise punctilious Lucius states the case with brute clarity: Virgil's person is disposable; the work, however, will remain.

We can, for a moment, revisit the case of Broch and the circumstances surrounding the writing of *T.D.V.* We remember not only the circumstances under which *T.D.V.* was first written, but those under which it was transformed into the most significant and the most intimate work of Broch's writing career. What had been little more than an elaborate sketch of a story concerning the final day in Virgil's life becomes a personal testament to death from the time during which Broch is held prisoner at Alt-Aussee. We have Broch's own testimony regarding the highly personal nature of that writing, and we can speculate that Broch was writing with no prospect of any future reader in mind; yet this is a work written to and for an age. It would seem probable that had Broch's captors executed him, they would have destroyed whatever works they might have happened to find on his person. This evident fact did not deter Broch from inscribing his name furiously and repeatedly into the germ of what was to become *T.D.V.*

Here is a text initially written not for others but for an audience of one. Initially, the purpose of this writing was to embody what is at one and the same time the most intimate and the most elusive experience of one's person, the experience of death. Death, an exquisitely intimate experience, is the thing which in *T.D.V.* is called only *more naked than the child* (p. 59). As the following makes clear it is only after the fact that Broch considers bequeathing the experience of death to his readership:

.....Der *Vergil* ist aus Zufallsanfängen gewachsen; ich bin damit in eine Zeit echter Todesbedrohung (durch die Nazi) geraten, und ich habe ihn daher ausschließlich für mich –teilweise sogar im Gefängnis– gewissermaßen als private Todesvorbereitung, sicherlich also nicht für Publikationszwecke geschrieben..... Für mich galt es, mein Material, mein Erkenntnismaterial dem Leser zu übermitteln. Ich mußte den Leser

nachleben lassen, wie man sich der Erkenntnis des Todes durch Zerknirschung und Selbstauslöschung annähert (mag man sie auch als noch Lebender niemals erreichen). Mit bloß rationalen Mitteilungen ist dies nicht zu bewerkstelligen..... (An A. Huxley. 5.10.45)

(..... The *Virgil* grew out of an accidental occurrence. I had fallen upon a time where I was genuinely threatened by the menace of death (from the Nazis) and, under the circumstances, I had written the *T.D.V.* for myself exclusively –in part, no less, while in prison– and to a certain extent had written it as a personal preparation for death; certainly I had not written it for the purpose of publication..... For me it was critical that I should convey my material, my cognition-material, to the reader (in the same form that circumstances had dictated). I had to allow the reader to live through the way in which one approaches this experience of death, namely, through contrition and the dissolution of self (may no living person ever arrive in such circumstances as these). This (approach to death) could not be brought about through a merely rational medium.....)

And yet it is significant that Broch spends years with this manuscript before finally turning it over for publication. He turns the work over for publication not when he deems it finally complete, but in order that he might find time to devote to other projects. To the end of his life, Broch continues to insist that given just so many additional months or years, he might have made *T.D.V.* a perfect, that is to say, a complete thing⁶ –something that would give complete expression to the name. Broch stubbornly adheres to the notion that truth can be revealed through fiction, as if to insist that somehow name and text could finally be lifted to reveal that state of being described only as *more naked than the child*.

It is interesting to note that Broch senses that there is always something missing from the text and that this elusive something is always just about to be found. In a letter to an anonymous correspondent Broch writes:

.....Ich weiß heute ganz genau, wo das Buch echte Todeserkenntnisse vermittelt, wo es tatsächlich "nackt" ist, aber ich weiß auch, wo die hypnotische Konzentration abgerissen ist, um wieder dem Literarisch-Pathetischen Platz zu machen. (16.8.43)

(..... Today I know precisely where the book (i.e., *T.D.V.*) presents a true knowledge of death, exactly where it is 'naked'; but I also know those places where the hypnotic concentration is broken in order to make room for literary bathos.....)

Broch himself substitutes the word “naked” for the ‘almighty ineffable.’ It is always *‘there’* but where it is supposed to appear, the reader finds only, from Broch’s admittedly disappointed perspective, ‘literary-bathos;’ where one would expect to find truth, that is to say *death*, one finds only fiction. And so somewhere beneath the wrap of the text and the cover of the name is that thing of which Broch, and that thing of which the Virgil of his *T.D.V.*, are hopelessly in search. Turning back to the pages of *T.D.V.*, we discover as close an approximation of what Broch and Virgil are looking for as can be offered. Though they cannot be revealed (rendered ‘naked’), truth, death, and the ‘real’ can at least, however indirectly, be placed at the reader’s disposal through the medium of fiction.

The Augustus who stands before the crowds of Brindisi receiving their (self) adulation (cf.: p. 21) presents to the reader an image of death. In a passage that borders on the obscene for all its resemblance to events coeval to the actual writing of *T.D.V.*, Augustus is shown to present himself to the crowds at Brindisi in the likeness of an idol:

.....da freilich war der Augenblick gekommen, den das dumpf brütende Massentier erwartet hatte, um sein Jubelgeheul ausstoßen zu können, und da brach es los, ohne Pause und ohne Ende, sieghaft, erschütternd, ungezügelt, furchteinflößend, großartig, geduckt, sich selbst anbetend in der Person des Einen.
Dies also war die Masse, für die der Cäsar lebte, für die das Imperium geschaffen worden war..... (p. 21)

(.....clearly the moment had arrived, the one for which the dumb brooding animal masses had been waiting, for the moment when they could let loose a howl of jubilation, and then it erupted, without pause and without end, quaking, victorious, unrestrained, fearsome, sublime, cringing, praying in a mode of self adulation to the ‘Person of the One.’
These, then, were the masses for whom Caesar lived, for whom the Imperium had been created.....)

The idol represents the lawlessness of tyranny, the terrible freedom of absolute self authoring power; the image is one of self reflecting into self. The temptation for Augustus, as it was for Virgil, is to allow oneself to be seduced by the illusion of a 'perfect authority', the illusion of a perfect 'name'. The alternative is to submit to becoming one in 'the unending line of fathers' (p. 178) so that one's voice, the voice of authorship, becomes not one's own, but the voice of a succession of others. Authority so contextualized is as transitory as life itself, is renewed at the cost of a certain degree of self-alienation, and is given its validity by the transforming power of death.

The supreme irony of *T.D.V.* is that it is Augustus, not Virgil, who strives to save the manuscript of the *Aeneid*. The motivation for this seemingly historical fact is not as self evident as it may at first appear. After all, the *Aeneid* was commissioned by Augustus and does flatter his reign as the absolute pinnacle of Roman culture and state. But it also creates a fiction whereby Augustus' Rome becomes situated within ancient tradition going back to the Golden Age. Augustus' reign is thereby placed within the context of an acknowledgeable, 'legitimate' law and custom. The law and custom to which the *Aeneid* alludes were in the process of undergoing profound transformation even as Virgil wrote. Virgil, therefore, stands *self*-accused of playing the role of lawgiver/name-giver to an Augustus flirting with the limits of absolute power.

Plotia

The name is a portal through which every subject enters into language and so, consequently, into the 'real' embodied therein. Thereafter, the name continues to function as a frame which over the course of our lives we fill with being (cf.: p. 59). And yet, as something that is 'given,' the name is and remains forever foreign to us. On page 59 of *T.D.V.*, we find the enigmatic statement: "The more we fill out names with being, the more alien to us it becomes....." (*'Und je mehr wir den Namen mit Sein erfüllen, desto fremder wird er uns.....'*). That aspect of the name, which from the beginning is alien, only becomes more so with the increasing passage of time. We can come no closer to explaining this paradox of the name, that it should remain at once so intimate and so alien, than to say that the name initiates us into language; the name casts us outside ourselves, and causes us to see the image of ourselves reflected back to us from the outside. In the name we recognize the void of something left behind, something to which, however much we try, we are never able to return. Within *T.D.V.*, the figure of Plotia emblemizes that ineffable and never to be attained something left behind.

To the extent to which she is described, Plotia is given to the reader of *T.D.V.* as the outward reflection of something immanent to Virgil. She is not representation itself but, as the following passage indicates, that to which representation alludes, the meaning filled void covered by the name:

Und als sollte diese Unerreichbarkeit sich auch hier widerspiegeln, als müßte allüberall alles zum Bild seines Selbst werden..... (p. 36)

(And as though this inapproachableness should mirror itself again here, as though everything everywhere should become an image of his (*sic*) self.....)

Though in this passage the unattainable refers to memories from Virgil's youth, in other passages within *T.D.V.* that same something-left-behind is identified with a resonance of the voice of the mother. In the following exchange between Virgil and Lysanias, an imaginary figure who appears to accompany Virgil on the last day of his life, the question is asked "For whom are you searching?":

[Vergil] "Wen suchst du?"

[Lysanias] "Dich."

Der Knabe irrte sich. Was wir suchen ist versunken, und wir sollen es nicht suchen, da es mit seiner Unauffindbarkeit uns nur verhöhnt.
"Nein, mein kleiner Führer, du hast mich geführt, doch nicht gesucht."

[V] "Whom are you seeking?"

[L] "You."

The boy was in error. That which we seek is buried deep and we ought not to search for it, because it together with its inattainability only shames us.
"No, my little guide, you have not led me, you have sought me.")

Lysanias answers "You" as though it were Virgil for whom he is searching. Virgil observes that his voice and that of Lysanias appear to be one and the same, both, curiously, of the mantuan dialect. Lysanias' answer carries Virgil's question one step further in that the 'you' of his response indicates not only that it is Virgil that he seeks, it indicates an inter-reflective identification, 'I am You,' Lysanias *is* Virgil. Lysanias makes known that his voice and Virgil's voice are one and the same:

Wiederum lächelte der Knabe: "Es (meine Sprache) ist deine Sprache."

"Die Sprache meiner Mutter."

"Zum Gesang wurde die Sprache in deinem Munde."

(p. 58)

(Again the boy smiled: "It (*my voice*) is your voice."

"The voice of my mother."

"Her speech turned to song in your mouth.")

And just a bit further within the same passage Virgil muses:

".....*meine Mutter war damals gestorben, nur der Klang ihrer Stimme war geblieben*....." (pp. 58 - 59)

(".....my mother died then, only the sound of her voice remains")

The 'remaining voice of the mother' exists as nothing more than a trace within the mantuan 'shared dialect', spoken by Virgil and echoed by Lysanias. The voice of the mother is a third 'unattainable' element floating within the echo of their speech. Plotia personifies that voice inflected into language's double inscription. The mother (as voice) is said in a later passage to be ineluctable - *-die Mutter bleibt unerrufbar* (p. 66), hidden beneath the double inscription of language. Entering through the name into language, we leave behind something that can never again be attained and to which language can no more than indirectly refer, namely, the 'real'; in a similar manner, language conceals a truth that it cannot represent.

Truth is indicated in *T.D.V.* as a sort of *Ur-speech*, one that precedes naming; it is a speech forsaken by the subject from the moment he enters into language. Thus truth is a language from which all other language is set apart. Virgil speaks of this 'speech-outside-of-speech' in a passage where he explores the Brindisi night from out the window of his palace room:

.....ein paar Worte aus dem kehligen Baß des Hinkenden, ein und das andere Mal seine bellende Lache, zuletzt nur noch ein Dämmerfluchen, beinahe fernwehhaft, beinahe zart geworden und eingegangen in die übrigen Geräusche der Nachtferne, eingesponnen und eingeworden mit jedem Ton, mit jedem letzten Tonrest, der sich der Ferne entlöst.....zart auch dies, obwohl es vermutlich zu einem lachenumbrüllten obzönen Matrosensang aus weinstinkender Taverne gehörte, zart und fernwehhaft,

als sei das starr Jenseitige in ihr der Ort, an dem die stumme Sprache des Lachens und die stumme Sprache der Musik, beides Sprache außerhalb der Sprache, unterhalb und oberhalb der Grenze menschlicher Gebundenheit, sich zu neuer Sprache verbündeten.....zur stummen Sprache der Außermenschlich-erstarrtesten Ferne und Verlassenheit, zur Sprache außerhalb jeglicher Muttersprache, zur unerforschlichen Sprache der vollkommenen Unübersetzbarkeit, unverständlich in die Welt eingegangen, unverständlich und unerforschlich die Welt mit ihrer eigenen Ferne durchdringend, notwendig in der Welt vorhanden ohne sie verändert zu haben, und eben darum doppelt unverständlich, unsagbar unverständlich als die notwendige Unwirklichkeit im unverändert Wirklichen!

(pp. 110 -11)

(.....a pair of words from the throaty bass of the cripple, here and there this barking laugh, and finally only a vague cursing, nearly a yearning for something remote, having become almost tender and then disappearing among the other sounds of the nocturnal distance, spun into, having become one with every tone, with every remnant of a tone that dissolves into the distance.....tender also this sound, although probably a sound that (first) belonged to the bellowing laughter of some obscene sailor's song that pouring out of the wine-stinking tavern, tender and yearning for the distant, as though the benumbed other world bound in this place, the place to which the mute language of laughter and the mute language of music, each language outside all language, a language above the border of human language, had joined to form a new speech.....to the mute language of the most benumbed distance and abandonment, unspeakably removed from human kind the voice outside any mother's voice, to the inscrutable speech of complete incommunicability, gone inarticulate into the world, penetrating the world inscrutably and unintelligibly with the sense of its own remoteness, necessarily at hand in the world without having altered the world and precisely for this reason doubly incomprehensible, unspeakably unintelligible as the necessary unreality within the unaltered 'real!')

This disquisition on language begins as Virgil hears a last remnant (*Tonrest*) of a single word spoken by a drunkard, a word dissolving into night. Virgil is able to detect, even in the distant bellowing laugh (*seine bellende Lache*) of a hobbling drunk, a 'tender' (*zart*) sound that he calls *fernwehhaft*. *Fernweh* is in oppositional complementarity to the *Heimweh*, a sort of longing for that which is at once distant (*fern*) and familiar. *Heimweh*, like the 'name given by the father' evokes that which is at once near (*heim*) and strange, that which is at once ours and foreign to us. That which Virgil encounters as *fernwehhaft* is described as 'woven into a tone' (*eingesponnen und eingeworden mit jedem*

Tone) so that it is perceptible yet not to be deciphered, like the irretrievable voice of the mother veiled by language.

The language spoken by the drunk leaves traces that are woven into and become one with the 'whispers of the far night dissolving into the distance.' The speech-sounds receding into the distance resemble Virgil's own moment of dying, as he listens (*lauschen*) for some unattainable truth, a truth that seemingly lies just beyond death's threshold. Penetrating death's veil is Virgil's singular way of attaining truth; it is the search for an immutable 'real' that can only be attained through the experience of death. Virgil observes in an earlier passage:

.....nur wer den Tod auf sich nimmt, vermag den Ring im Irdischen zu
schließen.....nur wer zum Tode hinlauscht, der braucht nicht zu
flüchten..... (p. 78)

(.....only he who takes death upon himself is capable of closing the earthly
cycle.....only he who listens intently to death, only he need not flee.....)

The voice of the mother is finally described as unintelligible and inscrutable (*unverständlich und unerforschlich*), it is the necessary 'unreality' in the unaltered 'real' (*die notwendige Unwirklichkeit im unverändert Wirklichen!*). This difficult passage, taken from page 111, reminds the reader that the name continues to bear that something which on page 59 is referred to merely as *more naked than the child*. That something 'more naked than the child' is a truth which 'weaves itself into and makes itself one with' (...*eingesponnen und eingeworden*... p. 110) fiction. In *T.D.V.*, Plotia is the imaginary guarantor of the truth; ironically, she is also the figure luring Virgil toward a destruction of the *Aeneid*.

Plotia urges Virgil to shed the materiality of language, to destroy the written word in order that only a pure and naked truth should remain. It would be an attempt at death to dissolve one's subjectivity, reducing one's identity to some essential, if inexpressible, 'truth.' Through death Plotia seeks a way of returning Virgil to that aspect of self which language has always kept distant. Language is limited by representation, whereas truth is said to be naked, and without mediation. The mirroring effect of language offers the hope of reflecting truth onto some visible plane, where truth might at least be glimpsed, if not attained. A brief passage from page 164 states this explicitly:

.....von Spiegelung zu Spiegelung, um am Ende aller Enden im Bildlosen sich
zu letzten Nacktheit zu enthüllen..... (p. 164)

(.....from reflection to reflection in order to unveil itself in ultimate nakedness
at the image-less end.....)

Here is a language that strips away language leaving behind only naked truth. The example of the two drunks (pp. 110 - 111), however, indicates that truth lacks a credible contextualizing medium.⁷ The linguistic 'currency' in which their voices circulate is described as an 'obscene sailor's song that flows from the wine-stinking tavern.' Particularly telling is the register of their expression when addressing Caesar: "dancing and singing and fucking and whoring can he, the lord Caesar, but otherwise nothing else" (*'tanzen und singen und huren kann er, der Herr Cäsar, aber sonst kann er nix.....'* p. 108). What is missing is a credible medium into which the voice of the mother, Plotia's 'naked truth,' can be woven.

In the very last moments of the second Book of *T.D.V.*, an 'angel's' voice makes itself known to Virgil and instructs him in an oblique way on the nature of truth in the language of his (Virgil's) own text:

.....dort stand ein Engel vor ihm, fast kein Engel, eher ein Knabe, trotzdem ein Engel.....und seine Stimme war nicht jene, die als verkündende Tat sinnbildhaft das All erfüllt, nein, sie war wohl eher ein ganz fernes Echo des darüber schwebenden sinnbildlichen Urbildes....."Tritt ein zur Schöpfung, die einstmal war und wieder ist; du aber sei Vergil geheißen, deine Zeit ist da!" Dies hatte der Engel gesprochen, furchtbar vor Milde, tröstlich vor Trauer, unerreichbar vor Sehnsucht, so hatte er es aus dem Munde des Engels vernommen, hatte es gehört als Sprache innerhalb der Sprache in all ihrer irdischen Einfachheit, und es hörend, zum Namen gerufen und dem Namen vereint..... (p. 218)

(.....there before him stood an angel who was very nearly not an angel, rather a boy, though nonetheless an angel.....and his voice was not one which as the announcing deed symbolically filled the universe, no, it was much more the entirely distant echo of the symbolic first-image hovering overhead..... "Step into creation which once was and which again is; you are called Virgil, your time is come!" This the angel spoke, fearsome in gentleness, comforting in sadness, unattainable in its yearning, such at least had he understood from the mouth of the angel, had heard the language within language in all her earthly simplicity, and hearing it (was) called to the name and united to the name.....)

The angel is 'more youth than angel' (*eher ein Knabe*) and its voice an 'entirely distant echo.' The voice instructs Virgil to enter into creation (*Tritt ein zur Schöpfung*), his own creation; the truth and reality Virgil seeks are to be found within his own work. Now Virgil attains the unattainable, hears the 'language within language' and as such he is called to and united with the name (.....*zum Namen gerufen und dem Namen vereint*). Now Virgil has achieved that which was first announced on page 60 as the final human destination, to 'unite with the name': *der wird des Zieles ansichtig, der wird zum Ziele gerufen, auf daß er sich mit seinem Namen endgültig vereinige*" (p. 60). To join with one's name has here the meaning of finding 'truth' within the materiality of one's own language, to encounter the voice within one's own

voice. The angel in this passage, a youth (*ein Knabe*), is Lysanias in another manifestation; the angel's voice, a distant echo (*ein ganz ferres Echo*), echoes Virgil's own; the call to creation (*Tritt ein zur Schöpfung*) is a call to infuse the inter-reflective language of the text with the voice of the mother. Though Plotia seeks to unveil truth, to reveal the voice of the mother, this can be done only in the context of the lettered manuscript, in context of the name of the father.

For Plotia, death becomes the final refuge from the name, the escape from the context upon which the subjective relation depends. Plotia attempts to lure Virgil at the moment of his death out of language, out of the chain of interreflecting images and the thereby created meanings that inhabit the text. Within *T.D.V.*, Plotia embodies for Virgil the urge, at the moment of his death, to destroy the *Aeneid*. Virgil's confusion and uncertainty regarding the surety of his of subjective identity is recorded in the following:

War es noch der eigene Leib, den er fühlte? oder war es nur mehr Spiegelbild seines Leibes oder gar nur Spiegelbild seines Fühlens? wo war die Wirklichkeit dieses Seienden.....schwebend zwischen Urbild und Abbild, weder das eine noch das andere berührend, vielmehr Sinnbild beider, schwebend zwischen Erinnertem und Sichtbarem, ihrer beider Spiegel und friedlich eingeworden mit beiden, die äthergleiche Gegenwart, und auf dem Grunde des Spiegels, auf dem Grunde des Friedens, tiefversenkt in Gegenwart und Wirklichkeit..... (p. 272)

(Was this still his body that he felt? or was it rather the reflection of his body or perhaps even only the reflection of his sensibility? where was the reality of his being.....hovering between primal image and representation, touching upon neither the one nor the other, more the symbol of both; hovering between the remembered and the visible, both are mirrors and peaceably reconciled to both, the ether-like present; and on the depth of the mirror, in the depth of the peace, deeply sunk into the present and into the 'real'.....)

Here the body is not undergoing etherialization; to the contrary, Virgil's body is becoming something dense and indecipherable as '*Urbild*' and '*Abbild*,' memory and representation, collapse into death's inalterable present. Plotia

seeks to retrieve from language and to infuse into Virgil's death that something (*Sinnbild*) which arises out of the inter-reflection between memory and representation. It is a way of 'leaving the world with meaning,' a way of extracting one's subjectivity from the vagaries and manipulations that are inherent to the constructions of text.

SCHICKSAL

The *T.D.V.* explores two distinct 'beginnings' that involve its narrative subject Virgil. One of these beginnings describes Virgil as he enters through the 'name' (pp. 59 - 60) into a pre-existing symbolic order of language. A passage taken from page 59 epitomizes the alienation associated with the journey of which naming is merely the first step:*je mehr wir den Namen mit Sein erfüllen, desto fremder wird er uns*.....(.....the more we fill the name with being, the more alien it becomes to us.....). The Name signals its bearer's acceptance of the unaltered continuity of order into which he or she has been born. In the case of Virgil, however, writing in the political and social chaos during and immediately following the collapse of Republican Rome, the value of the name and hence, the symbolic order which the name continued to signify had fallen into desuetude, being without effect and without there being any replacement by way of a new political or social order. Though one might object that a single name could hardly signify so much, surely, the name 'Virgil' could be taken for an exception.

The dissolution of the name is concurrent in *T.D.V.* with the destruction of the text. On page 179 and elsewhere the dissolution of the name is

described as part and parcel of Virgil's intended destruction of the *Aeneid*: 'the name is enclosed in the sacrifice.....nameless is the being, nameless is the place where the mother calls.....*der Name ist im Opfer einbeschloßen.....Namenlos wird das Sein, namenlos wird es, wo die Mutter ruft.....* The 'sacrifice' of name and text indicate a refusal on the part of Virgil to in any way acquiesce to the new order springing into existence during the reign of Augustus. Virgil attempts instead to seek out a state of pre-existence, to escape the name and all it signifies, responding to and then retreating to the place which is called, simply,*wo die Mutter ruft.....*(where the mother calls). Ironically, it is while in pursuit of this first beginning, the beginning that entails birth and subsequent naming, that Virgil encounters that other life event with which things would commence anew, namely. the event of his own death. Death in *T.D.V.* is a return to a place unknown, to a place referred to by the text as the 'unknown familiar' (.....*das ungekannt Wiedererkannte.....* p. 36). When first confronted with death, Virgil, in this novel, attempts to escape it by drawing so completely out of life as to leave no identifying trace behind, no trace of either name or text. Gradually, Virgil discovers the will and the courage not to escape, but to confront death, and in so doing to embrace the destiny that he had heretofore fled. In *T.D.V.*, Vergil's eventual willingness and ability to embrace death causes a reconfiguration of the relation between author and text, a phenomenon that in *T.D.V.* is referred to as *Schicksal*.

Feuer

At the opening of *T.D.V.*, it is fate (*Schicksal*) that is driving Virgil arbitrarily toward his life's ending: 'He had allowed himself to be driven by fate, and fate drove him to the end.....' (*Er hatte sich vom Schicksal treiben lassen, und das Schicksal trieb ihn dem Ende zu*, p. 12). Fate, in this instance, is a purely accidental force over which the author of the *Aeneid* exerts neither control nor influence; it is as though the *Aeneid* itself were some literary entertainment with no prospect of altering the course of Roman culture, politics, or civilization. In light of these circumstances, *T.D.V.* depicts Virgil as being driven not toward death but toward dying:

.....da hatte das Schicksal mit seinen Gewalten sich nochmals seiner bemächtigt.....hatte ihn rückgezwungen zu dem Übel, das sein ganzes Leben überschattet hatte, ja es war als hätte das Schicksal nur noch eine einzige Schlichtheit für ihn übrig – die Schlichtheit des Sterbens. (p. 13)

(.....for fate's mighty force had once more overpowered him.....had forced him back to the evil, the evil that had overshadowed his whole life; yes, it was as though fate had just one lone moment of simplicity left for him –the simplicity of dying.)

Dying (*das Sterben*) as opposed to death (*der Tod*) is a slipping anonymously, if not quietly, out of existence. Death, on the other hand, demands an encounter of sorts, a reckoning *with* and *of* one's life at that moment of supreme personal crisis.

It is with pointed irony that Virgil muses to himself as if unawares.....: Warum hatte ihn das Schicksal gezwungen, hierher zurückzukehren?! Hier war nichts als Tod, nichts als Tod und Abertod! (p. 23)

(Why had destiny forced him to return here?! There was nothing here but death, death, and yet again, death.)

Here fate suddenly reveals itself to be something not wantonly arbitrary, but rather, as something that forces a choosing. Although Virgil references Brindisi where he declaims 'here is nothing but death, death and more death,'

certainly the reader should consider the reference in its more immediate vein; namely, that fate has not in this passage forced a return merely to Brindisi, it has forced a return (*zurückkehren*) to death. In this sense, *zurückkehren* as a 'return' to death would indicate not a place revisited, but a confrontation with something that by definition is unknowable.

While death makes its presence felt not solely at the moment of agony, but can also be evoked by circumstances during various moments of one's life, it is during the moment of dying that the recognition of death's presence becomes most ineluctable. And yet even here, while dying, Virgil would at first more readily elect to slip out of life, taking name and text quietly into the proverbial 'unknown Familiar' (*ungekannt Wiedererkannte*) than to confront and explore death directly. In *T.D.V.*, it is fate (*Schicksal*) that positions Virgil in such a way that the encounter with, or the avoidance of, death becomes a matter of personal struggle, a struggle from which issues much of the narrative drama. The narrative of *T.D.V.* follows something of an autobiographical script in that Broch faced a similar moment while prisoner during Nazi occupied Austria. While in a prison cell anticipating imminent death, Broch recognized and acted upon the unscheduled choice which circumstances had suddenly thrust upon him. Acting upon the belief that death was imminent, Broch chose to write his way into death, rather than to recede voiceless into the silence of oblivion. In so doing, Broch reaffirms the significance of the name and the power of the text; his death was not to be one in which he is swept anonymously out of existence; instead, it was to be an act in which Broch elects to affirm the name boldly.

The prisoner Broch chooses to embrace death by inscribing it into a text,¹ so that death remains as an entombed event, one into which he and a later reading audience could find themselves reflected. By way of contrast, Virgil, at the very beginning of *T.D.V.*, finds his text is without significance largely because the *Aeneid* has failed to assimilate a 'true' experience of death into its narrative. Ironically, the *Aeneid* at first seems distant and irrelevant during the process of his Virgil's own dying. As fate drives Virgil haplessly on to his end, he is able to recognize that the event of death has not in any way been monumentalized within the manuscript of the *Aeneid*:

Er hatte sich vom Schicksal treiben lassen, und das Schicksal trieb ihn
dem Ende zu. (p. 12)

(He had allowed himself to be driven by fate and fate drove him to the end.)

A subsequent passage makes plain, however, that the air of seeming resignation proves only a thin disguise for profound inner conflict:

.....er war zu einem Ruhelosen geworden, den Tod fliehend, den Tod
suchend, das Werk suchend, das Werk fliehend..... (p. 13)

(.....he had become one who was restless, fleeing death, seeking death, seeking
his work and fleeing his work.....)

The twin impulse of the search for, and the flight from, death accompanies a simultaneous search for, and flight from, the text; and death and the text are intertwined early on in *T.D.V.* Flight from death and text promises stony and implacable oblivion, whereas a search for death and text, a search for death *within* the text, indicates a potential for eternal renewal. Fate seems for the moment to have overcome Virgil in this regard:

.....da hatte das Schicksal mit seinen Gewalten sich nochmals seiner
bemächtigt, hatte ihm nochmals die Einfachheit und den Ursprung und
das Innen verwehrt, hatte den Rückweg ihm wieder abgebogen..... (p. 13)

(.....since fate's mighty force had once more overpowered him, had once more barred him from the simplicity and the origin and the inner life, had again once more deflected him from his back reaching journey.....)

So long as Virgil chooses to flee death and the text, he is condemned to an ending that holds no promise of subsequent beginnings.

Virgil first attempts to evade the encounter with death by way of a return to earliest memory; he turns away from death to seek the 'bright eyes and the always nearly-smiling, slightly sun-blushed face of the mother..... (.....er erinnerte sich der hellen Augen in dem immer lachbereiten stets ein wenig sonnverbranntes Gesicht der Mutter..... p. 37). The return to the mother is physically enacted at the beginning of Book II, where Virgil curls himself up '.....his legs drawn up just slightly he had rolled to the side, his head rested on a cushion, his hips pressed into the mattress, his knees resting upon one another.....(.....Die Beine ein wenig hochgezogen, hatte er sich zur Seite gerollt, sein Kopf ruhte auf den Kissen, die Hüfte drückte sich in die Matratze ein, die Knie waren aufeinander geschicktet.....p. 71).² From this physical re-enactment of earliest memory, dying seems a passive state of remembrance and observation, a reclaimed state from which Virgil auscultates the world (p. 71). Soon Virgil is confronted by the substancelessness of the world that he is observing, and remembers, attempting to look out upon the world without recognizing that the world, past and present, is gazing back upon him:

Fast schien es unmöglich, mehr, noch, fast schien es unstatthaft, daß unsere letzterreichbare, wirklichste Wirklichkeit sich darauf beschränkte bloßes Erinnerungsbild zu sein! (p. 72)

(It seemed almost impossible, more than this, it seemed inadmissible that the realest of the 'real', that which lay at our furthest reach should be limited to a simple image out of memory!)

Reality exists in a substance that is not immediately sensible. The 'realest of the Real' is not an image in the mind's eye nor in the eye of memory, rather, the 'real' exists as an encounter of self with self.³ This second self, self as other, is found reflected in memory, in text, or in death. No matter how accurate in detail, the memory (*Erinnerungsbild*) representation without the act of inter-reflection is mere phantasm; a discovery of the 'real' demands something in excess of even perfect representation.

In dying Virgil initially seeks out the 'realest of the Real' (*die wirklichste Wirklichkeit*) either through perfect memory or through the agency of immediate and unobstructed observation. Virgil is soon led to concede that the 'real' is at best something glimpsed only through an experience with death:

.....nur wer den Tod auf sich nimmt, vermag den Ring im Irdischen zu
schließen, nur wer des Todes Auge sucht, dem bricht nicht das eigene,
wenn es ins Nichts schauen soll, nur wer zum Tode hinlauscht, der braucht
nicht zu flüchten, der darf bleiben..... (p. 78)

(.....only the one who takes death upon himself is able to bring the earthly
cycle to its close, only the one who seeks death's eye, that one does not
shatter his own eye when it is necessary to gaze into the void; only the one
who auscultates death has no need to flee, that one may remain.....)

Virgil wishes to attain the elusive 'real', particularly during this moment of dying. The phrase 'death's eye' (*des Todes Auge*) illustrates how death returns the subject's gaze, and that the 'real' exists only in the interplay between observer and observed. The 'real' lies hidded beyond death's veil, behind the veil of the text, and is only glimpsed in the reflection of self peering into self.

As Virgil tells it: 'only he who seeks (out) death's eye..... need not flee, he may remain (*der darf bleiben*).' The phrase 'he may remain' refers to

the reality to which Virgil might attain through the encounter with death. Virgil's position is such that the 'real' to which he attains becomes something immanent to his own subjectivity; as death is written into the text, so the 'real' enters into the name. The phrase '*der darf bleiben*' indicates that the one about whom it is spoken, 'the one who may remain', may do so by having implicated him-/herself into that same 'real.' Reference to a subsequent passage secures this interpretation:

.....wem es verliehen worden ist, die flüchtige Flüchtigkeit der Todesgestalt zu erhaschen, wem es im unablässigen Lauschen und Suchen gelingt den Tod zur Gestalt zu bringen, der hat mit deren Echtheit auch die seiner eigenen Gestalt gefunden, er hat seinen eigenen Tod gestaltet und damit sich selbst zur Gestalt gebracht..... (pp. 80 - 81)

(.....to the one to whom it has been granted that he should capture the fleeting phantom of death's form, to the one who through assiduous listening and searching succeeds in bringing death into form, this same one has by virtue of his own authenticity found his own form, he has given form to his own death and with this given even himself form.....)

By capturing (*erhaschen*) death's 'form', we capture our own form (*seiner eigener Gestalt*), and in the process our own death is 'formed' (*sein eigen Tod gestaltet*). From this passage it becomes clear that the subject realizes itself (*sich selbst zur Gestalt bringen*) through a process of inter reflection and that death is the great mirror into which the subject casts its own reflection.⁴ It is in this sense that, in seeking to imbue the text with the 'real,' Virgil must seek to imbue the text with death, a place from which the subject can find him-/herself reflected in all of his or her possible aspects.

The reader begins to recognize that Virgil's passivity at the beginning of *T.D.V.* is grounded in a failure or an unwillingness to choose; fate will dictate Virgil's 'end' only so long as Virgil fails to act, to choose for himself --'fate drove him to the end' (.....*das Schicksal trieb ihn dem Ende zu*). By the

beginning of the second book, the act of choosing, of taking sides, takes on importance as a central issue:

.....doch die große Linie seines lebens war nicht eigene Wahl nach freiem Willen, sie war ein Müssen gewesen, ein Müssen,befehlend, daß er seine eigene Gestalt in der des Todes suche, um hiedurch der Seele Freiheit zu gewinnen; denn die Freiheit ist ein Müssen der Seele, deren Heil und Unheil stets auf dem Spiele steht, und er hatte sich dem Befehl gefügt, gehorsam seiner Schicksalsaufgabe. (pp. 81 - 82)

(.....yet the great line of his life was not of his own choosing according to a free will, it had been rather a compulsion, a compulsion.....commanding that he seek his own form in that of death in order to thereby win the freedom of his own soul; for freedom is a compulsion of the soul whose redemption of damnation remains always in play and he had heeded the command, obedient to the task assigned him by fate.)

Here the text entertains a pair of contrarities: Freedom arises out of constraint; fate is the construct of individual effort (*Schicksalsaufgabe*). One recognizes that 'free will' is not, in and of itself, something of one's own choosing; it simply *is*, meaning that it exists and is available to us. The exercise of free will is another matter. To gain 'freedom for the soul' (free will), the individual must confront the limit that death places on all human movement and action; he is constrained to seek his/her own form in death, he is compelled to search out reality in the 'unknown familiar' of death's own province. Where the text states that Virgil has 'given himself over to the command' --that he seek out his own form in death and that he be 'obedient to the task set before him by fate'-- it is Virgil finally shaping destiny, rather than the other way around.

For Virgil, the arbitrariness of fate and the arbitrariness of the text are simultaneously overcome; the 'real' attained by the encounter with death is a reality that can be situated within an individual subjectivity, as well as a reality that can be rediscovered within the text:

.....die Schöpfung aus der Stärke des todeserkennenden Wortes..... (p. 81)

(.....creation issuing from the strength of the death-recognizing word.....)

Where the individual is able to discover in death an available reality from which 'form' can be given to one's life, the word (text) imbued with a cognizance of death (*todeserkennendes Wortes*) is one through which reality itself might be reshaped. In the experience with death, as in the experience with the text, there is a hidden 'real' that can be attained, though never revealed. The *Aeneid* is one such text that has profoundly transformed the reality of the world to which it was introduced.⁵ The Virgil of *T.D.V.* harbored serious doubts about the effects which 'his' text would work upon the world and so hesitates to accept the responsibility of authorship. Until the confrontation with Augustus Caesar in Book III convinces him to do otherwise, it is Virgil's intent to go out of the world leaving behind neither name nor written word.

Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen

Virgil's eventual encounter with fate (*Schicksal*) is not something to which the mere circumstance of his dying propels him; rather Virgil purposefully elects fate as oblivion's alternative. It would be easier for Virgil to slip quietly into death, taking all trace of a previous existence with him as he goes. Instead, he chooses a return to the 'unknown Familiar' and a confrontation with what *T.D.V.* refers to as the 'realest of the Real' (*die wirklichste Wirklichkeit*). The 'real', according to *T.D.V.*, is always with us, always available to our discovery, though the act of discovering the 'real' is

seldom exercised. The following locates the 'realest of the Real' at the inchoate stage of our existence:

.....in der Kette der Erinnerung, in die wir geschmiedet sind, die ersten Glieder die gewichtigsten sein sollten, als wären sie, gerade sie, die wirklichste Wirklichkeit. (p. 72)

(.....in the memory chain into which we are forged the first link should be the greatest, as though it, just exactly it were the realest of the 'Real'.....)

This '*wirklichste Wirklichkeit*', this 'first link' in the memory chain, actually precedes memory, suggesting that it, the 'real', were a hidden prerequisite necessary to all existence. To elect one's fate, in the *T.D.V.*, is nothing less than to return to memory's first link, to return to this 'realest of the Real.'⁶

It is telling that, when in search of earliest memory Virgil first inclines toward memory of the song of the father, the father's potter's song (*Töpferlied*) that the father had once sung while laboring as a potter and later, during Virgil's childhood, songs that the father sang as an interlude during long bouts of storytelling:

.....und er erinnerte sich des Vaters, der erst mit der Heirat zum richtigen Bauern hatte werden können und dessen einstmaliger Töpferberuf dem Sohn gering gedeucht hatte, obwohl er sehr schön gewesen war den abendlichen Erzählungen von der Arbeit an den bauchigen weinfässern und edelgeschwungenen Ölrügen, die der Vater verfertigt hatte, zu lauschen, den Erzählungen, von dem lehmformenden Daumen.....schönen Erzählungen, unterbrochen von manchem alten Töpferlied. (pp. 37 - 38)

(.....and he remembered his father who at the time of his marriage first had been able to become a genuine farmer and whose earlier potter's trade had little impressed the son, although he, the son, was very pleased to attend the telling of the work-stories in the evening, stories of the large-bellied wine urns and of nobly fashioned vessels for holding oil, works that the father had done; he was pleased to listen intently to the stories of the clay-fashioning thumb.....beautiful stories interspersed with many an old potter's song.)

Initially, this apparent 'first link' in the chain of memory promises to be the *Urbild* that will grant access to the 'realest of the Real' (*die wirklichste Wirklichkeit*). The text implies a continuum of song from 'father to son to

father to son,' as though the *Aeneid* were an accumulation of song occurring at some point in the heretofore mentioned 'unending line of fathers' (*die unendliche Reihe der Väter*; p. 178). The *Aeneid*, however, is the 'accumulation' of song with the addition of something singularly new; with the advent of the *Aeneid*, all the 'father's' stories, of which it is the 'composite', suddenly undergo a radical alteration of meaning. The change is due to the replacement of one *Urbild* for another; the *Aeneid* begins with a change in what *from the beginning* is real. This new 'element' with regenerative force is the thing which Virgil resists encountering at the time of his dying; it is an element that not only has the power to renew a traumatized post-revolutionary Rome, it also has the potential to reshape the social, cultural and political configuration of Rome. The *Urbild* inscribed by Virgil into the *Aeneid* has the power to redefine the 'real' for Rome.

The chain's first link is nothing so 'tangible' as childhood's earliest memory, nor is it traceable to some yet earlier version of the story (the *Aeneid*) now being told; rather the transformative element within the *Aeneid* appears on the scene as something previously unknown. Here in the passage taken from pages 37 - 38, the *Urbild* of which Virgil is in search appears in the guise of *Maja*, the presence of the unremembered mother (pp. 37 - 38):

.....er spürte sein Blut, er spürte die Erinnerungstiefe seines Körpers.....er
erinnerte sich der hellen Augen in dem immer lachbereiten stets ein wenig
sonnverbrannten Gesicht der Mutter..... (p. 37)

(.....he traced his blood, he traced the memory depths of his body.....he
remembered the bright eyes and the always nearly-smiling, slightly sun burnt
face of the mother.....)

Unlike the memory of the father that is particularized by the representation of the remembered *Töpferlied*, memory of the mother remains general and undefined, by virtue of the absence of particular detail. *Maja* is present in the form of this pair of bright and lucid eyes. The first link in the memory chain is to be discovered hidden behind the eyes of the mother. Her eyes, like 'Death's eye,' defer and withhold the moment of Virgil's return to death. Nonetheless, something behind the eyes of the mother and beyond Death's eye remains present, if unseen. What remains is that element of the 'realest of the Real' which precedes (*Ur-bild*) and gives meaning to all representation. Retrieving that element hidden beyond Death's eye offers Virgil the promise of an integrated text and an integrated existence at the moment of his dying:

.....nur wer den Tod auf sich nimmt, vermag den Ring im Irdischen zu schließen, nur wer des Todes Auge sucht, dem bricht nicht das eigene, wenn es ins Nichts schauen soll, nur wer zum Tode hinlauscht, der braucht nicht zu flüchten, der darf bleiben..... (p. 78)

(.....only the one who takes death upon himself is able to bring the earthly cycle to its close, only the one who seeks Death's eye, that one does not shatter his own eye when it is necessary to gaze into the void; only the one who auscultates death has no need to flee, that one may remain.....)

'Closing the ring' (*der Ring im Irdischen schließen*) amounts to achieving validity for the narrational elements within the *Aeneid* by means of integrating those narrative elements into a larger cultural context. The 'stories' passed on from 'father to son to father to son' that are woven into the text of the *Aeneid* are made valid by re-embracing those elements in the 'world' (*im Irdischen*) from which they spring. By closing the circle with those elements from which it originates, the *Aeneid* is able, ultimately, to alter the 'real' from which it springs.

The above passage states somewhat enigmatically 'only he who takes death upon himself.....only he who auscultates death need not flee, is allowed to remain.' The act of taking death upon oneself (*Tod-auf-sich-nehmen*) occurs not just at the time of one's dying, but at any moment that one is able to ascertain the 'real.' The act of 'Taking-death-upon-oneself,' in the case of Broch's *T.D.V.*, implies an ethics whereby the author (Virgil/Broch) recognizes, and thereby accepts, responsibility for the power of the text to transform the world into which it is written. The dictum *wer zum Tode hinlauscht.....der darf bleiben* indicates that a recognition of the 'real' beyond representation involves one in a subjective relation with the 'real;' text alters subject alters text in such a way that a transformation in the 'real', and hence the world, is being effected by the relation between subject and text and between text and the world it represents.

The formula *Tod-auf-sich-nehmen*, taken from the above passage, is synonymous with the formula *Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen* found on page 144; each implies a relation of inter-reflection between text and the individual subject leading to a creation of the 'real.' The 'real' is not something absolute and apart from the subject, rather the 'real' exists only in the context of an inter-reflective engagement between an individual subject with something outside itself. That relation is defined on pages 113 - 114 in terms of its antithesis:

.....dieses Nichtwissen wurde ihm vom ganzen Rund des Erschaubaren zusammen mit der Schönheit zugestrahlt, zart und dabei fast dämonisch als Verlockung, als die überhebliche Verführung der Bedeutungsgleichheit, dämonisch von der äußersten Grenze her zugeflüstert, zur innersten hindringend ein schimmerndes ozeanisches Flüstern, monddurchströmt ihn durchströmend, gleichgewichtig wie die schwebenden Gezeiten des

Alls, deren flüsternde Gewalt das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare ineinandervertauscht, die Dingvielfalt in die Einheit des Selbst, die Denkviefalt in die Einheit der Welt bindet, beides aber zur Schönheit entwirkt: Wissenlosigkeit ist das Wissen der Schönheit, Erkenntnislosigkeit ist ihr Erkennen, jenes ohne Vorsprung von Denken, dieses ohne Überschuß von Wirklichkeit und in der Erstarrung ihres Gleichgewichtes, erstarrt das flutende Gleichgewicht zwischen Denken und Wirklichkeit..... (pp. 113 -14)

(.....this absence of cognition was radiated to him from the full round of the visible world together with the beautiful, it was a gentle and therefore almost demonic temptation, like the arrogant seduction to an indifference to meaning, the demonic whispered home from the outermost fringes, a whisper of shimmering ocean penetrating to the most internal self, this whispering shot through with moonlight a moonlight continuing to stream in, balanced like the floating tides of the universe whose whispering authority interchanges the visible and the invisible, binding the multiplicity of the thing in the unity of self, binding the multiplicity of thought in the unity of the world, each, however, undone as they are transformed into beauty: the knowledge of beauty is a knowledge without knowledge, its percipience is without perception, this without an origin in thought, this without the surplus of the 'real' and in the lifelessness of its balance, stiff is the floating balance between thinking and the 'real'.....)

Here the text describes a state of beauty (*Schönheit*) in which knowledge of truth (*das Wissen*) and perception of the real (*die Erkenntnis*) are vitiated to the point of being rendered completely ineffectual '.....a knowledge of beauty is a knowledge without knowledge, its percipience is without perception.....' (.....*Wissenlosigkeit ist das Wissen der Schönheit, Erkenntnislosigkeit ist ihr Erkennen*). Here the text takes up the argument that Broch makes with consistency throughout his writing not against beauty *per se*, but against beauty as it is expressed in the notion of 'art for art's sake.' In terms of the Virgil of *T.D.V.* and of his relation to the *Aeneid*, a text devoid of truth and devoid of the 'real' is at best an idle amusement. The greater threat, however, is that unless the text should allow its reader to arrive at some notion of truth and of the 'real', then the text lends itself, as in the case of Augustan Rome, to the manipulation of political forces. Much of the *Aeneid's* narrative, particularly those elements reinforcing the legitimacy of Augustus' political

heritage, could be used to shape the political and cultural reality of Rome according the wishes and aspirations of Augustus and his successors.

In *T.D.V.*, Virgil fears that subsequent to his death the text, perversely, will become an instrument by which Augustus will tighten control over the people and the destiny of Rome. Whereas Virgil fears the nightmare, illustrated on page 21, in which the faceless masses respond in unison to the will of a master –the dumb brooding mass animal.....self adulating in the Person of the One..... (*.....das dempf brütende Massentier.....sich selbst anbetend in der Person des Einen.....*)-- the *Aeneid* is set out as the antidote to such numbing obsequiousness. The text attempts to establish the antidote through the interchange between 'thing' and 'self,' between 'thought' and 'world', binding the multiplicity of the thing with the unity of self,⁷ binding the multiplicity of thought with the unity of the world *die Dingvielfalt in die Einheit der Selbst, die Denkviefalt in die Einheit der Welt bindet.....* *Dingvielfalt* is the incomprehensible manifold nature of the real, the manifold nature of truth that reaches beyond language's capacity to represent. The paradox of a text such as the *Aeneid* is that it enables its reader to encounter the impossible, not perfectly completely, but to the extent that truth can be known and that the 'real' can be perceived. The process whereby this occurs is one through which the reader's subjectivity is defined in relation to the world and the world in relation to the individual subject.

The idea of the subject defined in relation to the 'world' is further explored in this subsequent passage:

und so wußte er auch, daß in solcher Wahrheit die Pflicht allen Künstlertums liegt, die Pflicht zur selbsterkennenden Wahrheitsfindung und Wahrheitsäußerung, dem Künstler zur Aufgabe gesetzt, damit die Seele, gewahr des großen Gleichgewichts zwischen dem Ich und dem All, sich im All wiederfinde, damit sie das, was dem Ich durch die Selbsterkenntnis zugewachsen ist, wiedererkenne als Seins-Zuwachs im All, in der Welt, ja im Menschentum überhaupt..... (p. 133)

(and so he also knew that the duty of all artistry lay in such a truth, the duty to a self enlightening discovery of the truth and of that truth's expression, before the artist is set out the task of rediscovering the great balance between the 'I' and the 'All,' so that the soul might recover herself in the 'All' recognizing that what increases in the 'I' by virtue of self-cognizance also results in an augmentation of the 'All,' an increase for the world, indeed, an increase for mankind overall.....)

T.D.V. posits the soul (*die Seele*) as an observer between the 'I' (*das Ich*) and the 'All' (*das All*) something vastly more general than the ego and from within which 'truth' may be perceived. It is significant that the point of observation is situated not at the locus of the 'I,' rather it is suspended somewhere between the 'I' and that place in which, for all practical considerations, truth is contextualized. There is nothing new in describing the subject, *die Seele* in this case, in terms of a relation, it is the relation between the ego (*das Ich*) and something else that defines individual subjectivity. Because psychoanalytic parlance locates that 'something else' within the realm of the Unconscious, let us equate the Unconscious with what *T.D.V.* refers to as *das All*. In so doing, we move to within a step of understanding what *T.D.V.* offers as the definition for 'truth.' Truth is a point in the Unconscious to which the ego (*das Ich*) connects to form a radically altered subjectivity. The alteration of subjectivity, described here as 'Augmentation of Being' (*Seins-Zuwachs*), effects the introduction of something heretofore unknown. Truth, by this definition, would be an exceedingly rare thing, a phenomenon that alters the nature of the 'real.' *T.D.V.* spells out clearly this result in stating:what increases in the

'I' by virtue of self-cognizance also results in an augmentation of the 'All'.....(*.....was dem Ich durch die Selbsterkenntnis zugewachsen ist, wiedererkenne als Seins-Zuwachs im All.....*).⁸ If the *Aeneid* should be a truth bearing text, then it is one that has the potential to alter the 'real' for both the individual reading subject and the world at large. Though Virgil protests that he wishes to destroy the *Aeneid* because it is an inane text, his real reason for wishing to take the text with him into Death's oblivion is precisely because he fears what it might effect upon the world.

One thing is certain to the Virgil of *T.D.V.*: that should his text be allowed to exist subsequent to his death, an alteration of the 'real' would be effected, a change that would implicate his own person. That change is described as one which would transgress already established frontiers, would redraw the customary boundaries of being:

.....wenn es also auch immer nur sinnbildhafte Erkenntnis bleibt, sie ist gerade infolge solcher Sinnbildhaftigkeit imstande, die unüberschreitbaren innersten und äußersten Grenzen des Seins trotzdem zu neuen Wirklichkeiten auszudehnen, eineswegs bloß zu neuen Formen, nein, zu neuen Inhalten der Wirklichkeit, weil sich eben hierin das tiefste Wirklichkeitsgeheimnis, das Geheimnis der Entsprechung auftut, die gegenseitige Entsprechung von Ich-Wirklichkeit und Welt Wirklichkeit.....

(p. 133)

(.....even if it were to always remain only a symbolic perception, it is by virtue of such a quality of symbolization capable of expanding to new realities the infranchisable inner and outer borders of being, in any case of expanding to new forms, no, even to new content for the 'real' since herein the deepest secret of the 'real', the secret of the correlation came to the surface, the mutual correlation of 'I'-reality and 'world'-reality.....)

Elsewhere in *T.D.V.* it is stated that 'genuine art breaks through boundaries' (*Echte Kunst durchbricht Grenzen* p. 239); in the above passages taken from page 133 the reader is informed that that transgression is accompanied by an 'enlargement of Being' (*Seins-zuwachs*) with the addition of new content to the

'real' (*zu neuen Inhalten der Wirklichkeit...*). Reality's most profound 'secret' (*das tiefste Wirklichkeits-geheimnis*) is the effective correspondence between the 'real' for the individual subject and the 'real' for the world as a whole; a change for the former has the potential for effecting a change in the latter. Though he may pretend otherwise the dilemma for Virgil in *T.D.V.* is not whether he should find the courage to look 'beyond death's eye' but having done so, having discovered some terrible truth that has been inscribed into the text of the *Aeneid* does he now, at the moment of death, have the courage to bequeath this truth to Rome as part of a literary legacy.

Virgil seeks to elude the necessity of claiming responsibility for his text by attempting to derisively declare it merely 'beautiful,' to call it an amusing diversion that does little to effect change in the Rome for which it was written. The most obvious refutation of this pretense lies in the fact that the *Aeneid* clearly establishes for Augustus a right to political legitimacy; the point is not lost on Augustus who in Book III will use every means of persuasion to prevent Virgil from destroying the text critical to the reshaping of political order under his rule. Virgil seems intent on self deception in this passage, in which he all but declares himself incapable of the sort of virtue necessary to creating an effective work of art:

.....denn wer zur Liebe unfähig ist, wer unfähig ist zu ihrer Gemeinschaft,
der muß aus der Brückenlosigkeit seiner Vereinsamung sich in die
Schönheit retten..... (p. 143)

(.....for whoever is incapable of love, whoever is incapable of love's communion
he must turn to beauty to rescue himself from unbridged aloneness.....)

Beauty (*Schönheit*) in this instance, defines the quality of a work that defies subjective interaction; it is a quality that denotes the absence of truth as it was

defined in the above passage taken from page 133. The one who is incapable of love is by definition incapable of establishing the subjective interrelation that has the recognition of truth as its end.

Virgil concludes his musings by assigning to love this somewhat improbable mission:

.....[die] Liebe, obwohl zur Schönheitsschaffung begnadet, nimmermehr auf Schönheit, sondern einzig und allein auf ihre ureigenste Aufgabe gerichtet ist, auf jene menschlichste aller Aufgaben, die allzeit und ausschließlich Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen heißt; oh, dies allein ist Liebe, doch es halten die Toten keinerlei Gemeinschaft untereinander, sie haben einander vergessen— (p. 144)

(.....though graced with the power to create beauty love has never had beauty as its aim, rather singular and alone the primary task to which love aims is that of the most human of all tasks, the eternal and exclusive task that is called taking-fate-upon-oneself; oh, this alone is love, yet the dead have no communion among one another, the dead have forgotten one another—)

Love leads to the taking-fate-upon-oneself (*Shicksal-auf-sich-nehmen*) which we have already seen is analogous to taking death upon oneself (*Tod-auf-sich-nehmen*); either leads to a certain circularity between the individual subject and the 'real' (see: p. 78). When Virgil states that 'the dead have forgotten one another' he speaks with circumspection to imply that the 'truth' of the *Aeneid* will die with him, as though without his presence as guarantor thereof truth itself would vanish from the text. Of course, Virgil is not altogether mistaken in this regard, in that even truth is subject to the grossest sort of distortions and manipulations.

Within the text of *T.D.V.*, a precise moment occurs where Virgil enunciates a desire to 'take fate upon himself.' There Lysanias, Virgil's imaginary boy companion, declares auspiciously:

"Ewig ist der Widerhall deines Gedichtes".

(p. 171)

("Eternal is the echo of your poem".)

To which Virgil counters:

"Nein, ich will den Widerhall meiner Stimme nicht mehr hören; ich erwarte die Stimme, die außerhalb der meinen ist".

(p. 171)

("No, I no longer want to hear the echo of my own voice; I await the voice that is outside my own.")

Lysanias predicts that through the *Aeneid*, Virgil's own voice will continue to speak forever. Virgil, on the other hand, awaits a voice that is 'outside his own' (*die außerhalb der meinen ist*). This personal declaration on the part of Virgil carries forward the general theme of *Sprache außerhalb der Sprache* (cf: p. 167 et passim) developed systematically over the course of Book II. It also points to a duality in language that is shared by both text and subject; though Virgil has authored the *Aeneid* it is not his own voice but that of another that calls to him from the text; the echo (*die Wiederhall*) of which Lysanias speaks is no longer the voice of its creator. We recounted from page 133 the mirroring relationship between subject and world expressed in the phrase 'the corresponding opposition between the 'real' of the 'I' and the 'real' of the world ("...*die gegenseitige Entsprechung von Ich-Wirklichkeit und Welt-Wirklichkeit*"). Subjectivity is the phenomenon that mediates between these two realms so that the voice with which one speaks and the voice which one 'hears' as one speaks are not the same; they have differing points of origin, so that what is spoken by the subject is 'spoken twice, once from a point of origin from within the speaking subject and again from a point of origin somewhere else within the world.' On page 171 it is revealed that

this second voice, this altered echo, has its origins nowhere else in the world but in the context of language; the 'real' is in language and only within language; the 'real' for Virgil is that point within the text of the *Aeneid* from which he hears his own voice calling back to him. This other voice is not precisely 'his own voice' but something vaguely like it, something that *T.D.V.* elsewhere describes as the 'unknown Familiar' (*die ungekannt Wiedererkannte*).

Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit

Virgil's embrace of fate (*Schicksal*) entails a patient waiting and listening, and at the beginning of Book II, the reader finds him preparing in just this manner to scrutinize the silence that promises to release its abundance of hidden truth:

.....nichts war dringlicher als allein zu bleiben, um nochmals und nochmals alles Sein in sich zu versammeln..... (p. 71)

(.....nothing was more pressing that to remain alone and to again and again gather into oneself all being.....)

Although this passage depicts Virgil 'gathering into himself all being' while in pursuit of truth, suggesting an inward scrutiny, other passages show him turning outward toward the realm of the gods. In this later passage, for instance, he speaks of an exterior zone that resists his entry and yet beckons with the familiar if not intimate quality of *Wiedererkanntheit*:

.....die Sterne brannten groß in ihrem großen Wandelgang, tröstlich und stark und ruheflimmernd vor beruhigender Wiedererkanntheit.....als wäre zwischen ihrem Raum und dem der untern Welt mittendurch eine gleichsam hart-undurchdringliche, gerade noch für den Blickdurchlässige, trüb-kristallene Wölbungeinverspannt..... (p. 91)

(.....the stars shone large in their great circuit, comforting and strong and quietly shimmering with reassuring familiarity.....as though between the realm of the stars and the realm of earth below there were interposed

a hard-impenetrable, cloud-troubled crystal firmament through which one could glimpse to the other side.....)

Virgil seeks passage here through the 'hard-impenetrable' barrier between himself and what is designated as 'the already known but forgotten' (*die Wiedererkanntheit*). Comparing these two passages taken from pages 71 and 91 respectively we discover that Virgil's search for truth and his discovery of the 'real' entail an inter-penetration of what is intimate –where all being is gathered into oneself– and of what is foreign –that which exists 'on the other side of the moon'. This zone beyond the firmament, like death itself, yields to Virgil's scrutiny through a process of inter-reflection. Recalling the alluded-to experience of the gaze into 'Death's eye' (p. 78), the break into the 'hard impenetrable' requires that Virgil observe himself observing. Introspection leading to a discovery of truth and the 'real' requires that one turn one's gaze outward for the purpose of scrutinizing what lies within.

The difficulty of the task faced by Virgil in *T.D.V.* is not so 'simple' as to discover and render into words some 'divine' precept called truth; rather Virgil's task is to create a text such that those mirroring aspects of language which might be called 'divine and human', 'true and real', 'self and other' inter-reflect through the medium of its words. In this sense, Virgil strives through the medium of the text to cause the inter-reflection of the fate of man with that of the gods:

-:oh, es ist das Gottesschicksal des Menschen und es ist das menschlich Erschaubare im Schicksal der Götter, es ist ihrer beider unabänderliche Bestimmung, stets aufs neue zum Wege der Wiedergeburt gelenkt zu werden, es ist ihrer beider untülbare Schicksalshoffnung, nochmals den Kreis ausschreiten zu dürfen, damit das Nachher zum Vorher werde und jeder Punkt des Weges alle Vergangenheit und alle Zukunft in sich vereinige.....

(pp. 44 - 45)

(-:oh, it is the divine fate of man and it is what is perceptibly human in the fate of the gods, it was their mutual unalterable destiny to be again and again newly placed upon the path of rebirth, it is their mutual indestructible hope within their fate once again to be able to break through the cycle, so that what is to follow becomes what has already been and that at every point in the cycle all past and all future unite as one.....)

The divine and the human, the true and the real are two aspects of one fate which are never joined, never form a 'complementary whole' but, instead, they circle one another like points on inter-reflecting, though distinctly separate, planes. In the scenario suggested by the above passage human perception (*das menschlich Erschaubare*) effects powerful and consequential changes, enough to transgress the limits circumscribed by a given reality. The claim here is that making truth available to the reader through the text has the effect of reshaping the 'real.'

Virgil describes the relation between truth and reality in terms of an ongoing dynamic between 'the expenditure of being' and death:*denn in unaufhörlichem Wechselspiel mit dem Seinsablauf steht der Tod*..... (p. 78). In this dichotomy, the expenditure of being pertains to human death pertains to the divine. The instance of 'death' broadens the field of play from the particular to the general, from an inward gazing to an outward reflecting subjectivity. Thus, the Virgil of *T.D.V.* does not assert that the text 'reveals' truth, rather that the text provides the outward medium of silence through which truth can be searched:

.....wem es verliehen worden ist, die flüchtige Flüchtigkeit der Todesgestalt zu erhaschen, wem es im unablässigen Lauschen und Suchen gelingt den Tod zur Gestalt zu bringen, der hat mit deren Echtheit auch die seiner eigenen Gestalt gefunden, er hat seinen eigenen Tod gestaltet und damit sich selbst zur Gestalt gebracht..... (pp. 80 - 81)

(.....when it has been granted that one should capture the swift fleetness of death's form, to the one who succeeds through tireless listening and searching in bringing death into form, that one has also found the form of his own death, he has given shape to his own death and therewith realized the form of his own being.....)

Here it is stated that Death's form can be no more than glimpsed (*die flüchtige Flüchtigkeit der Todesgestalt zu erhaschen*), yet this fleeting perception of Death's fleeting form results, according to this passage, in the altered configuration of an individual subjectivity.⁹ The alternance between the passive and the active mode is significant: *wem es im unablässigen Lauschen und Suchen gelingt den Tod zur Gestalt zu bringen, der hat seiner eigenen Gestalt gefunden, er hat seinen eigenen Tod gestaltet.....* To see 'Death's form' is to 'see' the echo of one's own (altered) subjectivity peering from the text; this perception, the perception of self in the reflection of death/text, results from a process of change that can be defined as the working of the 'deed' within the word.

The transformative power of the word, one of *T.D.V.*'s fundamental themes, is formulated in numerous passages as a process by which truth is translated into the 'real' and the 'real' into truth. Broch's Virgil insists that this is not a process whereby word is translated into word, representation into representation; truth and reality in *T.D.V.* are not indistinguishable, not indifferently interchangeable. Virgil specifies that the interchange 'doubles world-form':

.....das Wechselspiel der verdoppelten Weltgestaltung, Wirklichkeit zur Wahrheit umgestaltet, Wahrheit zur Wirklichkeit..... (p. 95)

(.....the exchange of the doubling world-form, the real transformed into truth, truth into the real.....)

This process of exchange between truth and the 'real' indicates the general manner in which one constructs the other. Critical to an understanding of this process, as it is defined in *T.D.V.*, of the exchange between truth and the 'real' is the phrase *verdoppelten Weltgestaltung* (doubled world-form). The phrase obliquely accuses the inanity of the text that is self-enclosed, that bears reference to nothing 'outside' itself, that effects no exchange between the human and the divine, between *Tod* (Death) and *Seinsablauf* (events as they unfold in the course of (human) existence). The inane text does nothing to translate events as they unfold in one's life into a larger cultural, social and political context. The image of the 'masses.....self adulating in the person of the One (cf.: p. 21)' is a caution against the existence which has no larger context in which to observe itself being reflected. The *Aeneid* succeeds as a 'doubler of world-form' to the extent that it reflects the Roman populace (*die Menschengemeinschaft*) not in a mere representation of itself, but in the fiction of the 'unending line of fathers' (p. 178), translating the intimate truth of personal existence into a larger historical 'real.'

Virgil analyses the process of 'world-doubling' in a passage that treats not specifically of truth and the real, but rather of 'Sprachwelt' and 'Dingwelt,' their respective fields of play. The passage is cited at length below:

.....eigentlichster Auftrag der Dichtung wäre, die Namen der Dinge zu heben, ja, selbst wenn es ihr im Aufklang ihrer größten Augenblicke gelungen wäre, einen Blick in das Niemals-Erstarrende der Sprache zu werfen, unter deren Tiefenlicht unberührt und keusch das Wort der Dinge schwebt, die Keuschheit der Namen auf dem Grunde der Dingwelt, sie vermag im Gedicht wohl die Schöpfung im Worte zu verdoppeln, hingegen vermag sie nicht das Verdoppelte wieder zur Einheit zusammenzufassen, sie vermag es nicht, weil die Scheinumkehrung, weil die Ahnung, weil die Schönheit, weil all dies, was sie als Dichtung bestimmt und sie zur Dichtung macht, ausschließlich in der Weltverdopplung statthat, es bleiben Sprachwelt und Dingwelt getrennt, zwiefach die Heimat des Wortes, zwiefach die Heimat des Menschen, zwiefach der Abgrund der Wesenheit, zwiefach aber auch die Keuschheit des Seins und damit verdoppelt zur Unkeuschheit, die gleich einer Wiedergeburt ohne Geburt alle Ahnung wie alle Schönheit durchtränkt und den Keim der Weltzersprengung in sich

trägt, die Ur-Unkeuschheit des Seins, welche von der Mutter gefürchtet wird; unkeusch ist der Mantel der Dichtung..... (pp. 179 -80)

(.....the truest work of poetry would be to evoke the name of things, yes, even if when its greatest moment sounds it were able to cast a glance into perpetually-fluid speech, under whose profound light, untouched and chaste, the word for things lingered, the chasteness of the name on the grounds of the 'thing-world', speech, through the poem, is well able to double creation through words, although poetry is never able to refashion unity from the doubled creation, poetry is not able to do so because the seeming return, because the intuition, because the beauty, because all these things that are determined by poetry and that are thus made into poetry take place exclusively in the doubled world; speech-world and thing-world remain separate, two-fold the sphere of the word, two-fold the home-place of man, two-fold the abyss of being, two-fold the purity of being and being thereby becomes impure, like a rebirth without an initial birth it seeped through all divination and through all beauty and it carries within it the kernel of all world-splintering, namely the primal impurity of being that had been the fear of the mother; impure is the mantel of poetry.....)

The initial concept is one seemingly easy to hold in thought: "the proper task of poetry would be to raise up the name of the thing" (*die Namen der Dingen zu heben*). But then the reader discovers that 'naming' is a process as complex as it is arcane; the sounding of the name gives a view (sic) into 'ever-fluid' (*Niemals-Erstarrende*) language where the word (the name) hovers pure (*keusch*) and untouched. The shift from sound to sight is not accidental and elsewhere Virgil states *Dein Auge ist Deine Stimme*.....(p. 253), meaning that although truth is 'perceived' through the ear, we 'see' truth's form by listening in silence. In poetry, the audible 'klang' of the word should evoke for the 'listener' something true about the nature of the thing to which it refers. These vague precepts give way to something more specific as the passage develops.

In clear, albeit complex, exposition, Virgil claims for the power of poetry the ability to double creation through the word (*die Schöpfung im Worte zu verdoppeln*.....). Continuing, he states that creation, once doubled, has no power to reclaim unity; world-doubling leads to a world irrevocably split into *Sprachwelt* (Languageworld) and *Dingwelt* (Thing-world). This irreconcilable divide emblemizes the original 'fall' that is traditionally associated with the

advent of language, where language effects a separation from the real and a distancing from any immediate contact with truth. And yet this passage affirms the presence of both truth and the real, in that creation is doubled into *Sprachwelt* and *Dingwelt*, into the domain of the intimate and the domain of alienating abstraction.

We conclude with reference to the passage on naming found on page 59, specifically the phrase *nackt sind wir unter unserem Namen, nackter noch als das Kind, das der Vater vom Boden aufgehoben hat, um ihm den Namen zu geben*. There Virgil alludes to the helplessness of the child as its 'true' form is forever altered by 'the gift of the name'. Through the use of the word in poetry (*Dichtung*), Virgil, who finds himself in the role of both father and son, alters the name and, in so doing, alters within himself that intimate interior space which can only be referred to as the thing 'more naked than the child'. The act of creation in language (world-doubling) begins with a recognition of the split subject negotiating between truth and the real; as he alters one (*Sprachwelt*), so the form of the other (*Dingwelt*) is also changed. Lysanias declares to Virgil on page 171: 'Eternal is the echo of your poem' (*Ewig ist der Widerhall deines Gedichtes*). Virgil responds: 'I no longer want to hear the echo of my own voice; I await the voice that is outside my own.' Virgil auscultates the silence, listening for the voice that is 'not his own,' the voice that speaks of a new reality, of a new fate for both himself and for Rome.

ROME

La maîtrise est toujours le fait de l'autre main, celle qui n'écrit pas,
capable d'intervenir au moment où il faut, de saisir le crayon et
de l'écartier. (Blanchot: *L'espace littéraire*)

The reader of *T.D.V.* is invited to witness the otherwise personal encounter between Virgil, the novel's principal protagonist, and imminent death. From the novel's earliest scenes until the point at which Virgil is swept into the confines of Brindisi palace (p. 51), *T.D.V.* represents death as an engine of radical destruction. The experience is necessarily daunting and, so long as Virgil remains incapable of directly confronting death, of looking into 'Death's eye' (cf.: p. 78), death remains the uncompromising barrier, the other side of which promises nothing more than perfect oblivion. With the beginning of the novel's second book, however, Virgil turns toward the experience of death in a mode of searching auscultation:*nichts war dringlicher als allein zu bleiben, um nochmals und nochmals alles Sein in sich zu versammeln, um lauschen zu können; dies war das Dringlichste* --(nothing was more urgent than to remain alone, in order to again and again collect all being into oneself, in order to be able to listen; this was the thing of greatest urgency). This passage marks the onset of Virgil's exploration of death's realm; far from

being the zone of oblivion initially anticipated, Virgil discovers through keen listening and subtle observation a realm rich in those elusive and enticing qualities known as 'truth' and the 'real.'¹

Death proves to be a reflecting mirror offering to Virgil a refracted image of his own subjectivity. Virgil peers into death and death returns the gaze in a phenomenon which the text refers to as 'Death's eye' (*des Todes Auge* p. 78). Through the exploration of death, Virgil discovers an ongoing process which is that of an exchange between 'truth' and the 'real' (*Wirklichkeit zur Wahrheit umgestaltet* - the 'real' transformed into truth p. 95). Situating himself on the axis of this exchange, Virgil discovers a potential to alter the real, an act which *T.D.V.* labels 'taking-fate-upon-oneself' (*Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen* p. 144). The ongoing process of exchange between 'truth' and the 'real' and the indicated potential to alter the 'real' are integrally bound. *Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen* is a phenomenon, mediated through language, whereby in extraordinary instances, the authoring subject is able to alter the real by an alteration of the subject's relation to truth. Certainly the *Aeneid* is one such extraordinary instance; it is a text which irrevocably alters the self-view of its readers, the citizens of Rome and their subsequent cultural legatees. The *Aeneid* establishes for its reader a fictional past from which Rome's very real future emanates.

Yet, the drama of *T.D.V.* derives from Virgil's great struggle to accept the *Aeneid* as anything more than an idle fiction. Virgil's reluctance to acknowledge the tremendous cultural and political import of his work is one of

the supreme ironies of this novel. Virgil protests against the possible public import of the *Aeneid* when stating that it was a work created above all else for and out of personal need: '.....only, I allow myself to maintain that I wrote it (T.D.V.) not for the reader but, to the contrary, first and foremost for myself (.....*allein, ich darf behaupten, daß ich es nicht nur für den Leser, sondern zuerst für mich geschrieben habe*....., p. 292). One of the lessons to be gleaned from T.D.V. is precisely that this work, which would significantly alter the ages, begins within the narrowly restricted confines of personal drama, one in which a particular subjectivity discovers the means of altering its own relation to truth. This third and concluding segment in the chapter on *The Death of Virgil* retraces Virgil's route to the discovery that, through the intermediary of the text, a change in the configuration of a individual subject can, and in the case of the *Aeneid* does, result in a lasting reconfiguration of the real.

Gleichnis, Erkenntnis, Wirklichkeit

There is little doubt that Virgil is stating the ideal --one of which he clearly despairs of achieving-- when on page 74 he declares '*Denn prall von Wirklichkeit sind die Bilder*.....' (For the representations are bursting with the 'real'). The language of poetry (*Dichtung*) does not merely represent reality; rather, it offers to its reader a version of the 'real' open to exploration. Were his poetic ideal to be realized, Virgil's search for the 'real' through an auscultation of death would be not the mere representation of experience, but a repeated contact of the reader with the 'real'. The *Aeneid*'s textual

representations, 'bursting with the 'real' (*prall von Wirklichkeit*), would carry the reader into the context of his or her own fictionalized past and future. The *Aeneid's* fictional representations would alter the reader's memory of the 'historical' past, placing the reader into a newly created context of the 'real'. In *T.D.V.*, Virgil determines to destroy the manuscript of the *Aeneid* and of all his writing (p. 167) for the ostensible reason that these works lack any sense of the real. The unfolding of the story recounted in this novel leads the reader to the near opposite conclusion, namely, that Virgil fears the 'real' that his works threaten to bring into existence.

Consistently, the Virgil of *T.D.V.* speaks of representation in terms not of an object reflected, but in terms of inter-reflecting subjectivities. The following gives an example typical of the sort of 'presentation' of the real within language that Virgil would hope to achieve in his *Aeneid*:

.....da es sich ihm nun, wie unter einer zauberhaft plötzlichen zweiten Beleuchtung, als das Sinnbild seines eigenen Bildes zeigte, bei aller Überferne, so deutlich als wäre es von ihm selber geschaffen, die Versinnbildlichung des Ichs im All, die Versinnbildlichung des Alls im Ich, das ineinanderverschränkte Doppelsinnbild des irdischen Seins...; (p. 114)

(.....because it pointed out to him as though from under a sudden magical second illumination, the symbolic representation of his own representation, surpassing all, as clear as though it were he himself who created the symbolic, it was the symbolization of the 'I' in the 'All,' the symbolization of the 'All' in the 'I,' the shrunken into itself double-symbolic representation of earthly being.....)

Contrary to the notion that symbolic representation (*Versinnbildlichung*) occurs, in any absolute sense, strictly within the confines of the text, Virgil describes the symbolic representation of the real as occurring on an axis limited at one extreme and the other by *das Ich* and *das All*. The reader does not stand at a distance from the 'real' symbolized by the text; rather, the text

situates the reader within the 'real' that it makes present. The text 'echoes' back to Virgil, its reader/author, a voice other than his own (cf. p. 171) from a locus that the passage from page 114 refers to simply as *das All* and elsewhere as *wo die Mutter ruft*. What, then, is *das All*, similar to death in all its aspects, if not a place from which to witness 'the absence of one's own presence.' *Das All* is death's unrestricted range, a place from which the subject is 'echoed' without name. Death, like *das All*, is the place of which it is said, referring to the apothegm from page 179, '.....namenlos wird es, wo die Mutter ruft' (.....nameless is the place [from] where the mother calls). We enter into death, and likewise into the real, without name.

This 'voice of the mother' is Virgil's own altered voice, as it echoes back to him from the text. It is the voice of a second inscription, that which rewrites the 'real', an inscription which, oddly, seems to occur only as an aftermath to the text. Virgil is filled with trepidation by the power of this voice, which is as much his own as it is the voice of another. While discussing with Augustus the fate of the *Aeneid*, whether it is to be kept or destroyed, Virgil indicates that he wrote largely unawares of the often-cited 'second voice':

"Ungeduldig war ich nach Erkenntnis...und darum wollte ich alles aufschreiben.....denn das ist Dichtung: ach, Ungeduld nach Erkenntnis ist sie, dies ist ihr Wunsch, und darüber hinaus vermag sie nicht zu dringen....." (p. 300)

("I was impatient for knowledge (cognition)...and for this reason I wanted to write down everything...for this, alas, is poetry; poetry is a craving for cognition, this is poetry's wish, and poetry is not capable of penetrating beyond that point.....")

This passage gives to the reader an instance in which Virgil confuses the real with a representation of the real. Virgil tells how, in the effort to fill the text with 'meaning' (*Erkenntnis* --the hallmark of verity--), he attempts to write all:

.....[*ich*] *wollte alles aufschreiben*. The irony inherent to this pretended claim is that even if by some superhuman gift Virgil were, as he says, able to write down 'all', 'all' would always be mere representation and never the presentation of the 'real' within language. Virgil's attempt to attain the 'real' by 'writing down everything' (*alles aufgeschrieben*) betrays the notion that the 'real' could somehow be contained within the limits of the text. Whereas the text is representation, the 'real' extends beyond the confines of the text into the greater realm of language.

Because they are the fruit of the second inscription, of the echoing altered voice of the author, the text is not capable of revealing 'truth' and the 'real'; the text can only indicate them to its reader. The truth and the real are rendered by the text through the interchange between *das Ich* and *das All*, through the exchange that occurs between the reading subject and the altered reflection of the reading subject's own voice. Virgil refers to the phenomenon of altered reflection as that of the second 'I' (*das zweite Ich*):

.....wenn mit dem Wunder des zweiten Ichs, das wir durch die Brände tragen, uns die zweite Kindchaft beschieden wird, gewandelt und dem Vater gehörend, Erkenntnis, erkennend und erkannt, Zufall, der zum Wunder geworden ist, da er alle Erkenntnis, alles Geschehen, alles Sein umfaßt hat, Schicksalsüberwindung, noch nicht und doch schon, oh Wunder..... (p. 200)

(.....when with the miracle of the second 'I' which we carry through the flames, and the second childhood is granted us, transformed and belonging to the father, (cognitive) perception, perceiving and perceived, the accident that have become the miracle, since it has embraced all cognition, all that occurs, has embraced all being, it is fate-overcome, not yet and yet at hand, oh, miracle.....)

This 'second I' traverses time and space, travelling from child to father and father to child *und die zweite Kindchaft beschieden wird, gewandelt und dem Vater gehörend* (and the second childhood is granted us, transformed and

belonging to the father.....). That the second 'I' should belong to the father implies that the second inscription has been subsumed by the name, by the word of the text. The sign of the father, as innumerable passages within *T.D.V.* demonstrate (cf.: p. 59 et passim), is that of name-giver; to say that the second 'I' belongs to the father is to say that the 'real' has been *named* by the text. The voice that calls back to us as readers of the text has displacement in space, in the sense that it emanates from the text, and displacement in time, in the sense that it speaks to us from memory, albeit *altered* memory. But this 'second I' also bears the quality of being without locus in either time or space. This 'second I' exists only on the imaginary axis connecting father and son, where father and son are just other designations for the reflecting antipodes at either extreme of the imaginary axis upon which subjectivity is constructed. The significance of these traversing chronological axes, from father to son and from son to father, is that memory, history, and the 'real' within the text are all made present through the sort of intrasubjective activity whereby language is rendered articulate.

The fact of this 'second I' reaffirms the notion of a 'real' that inhabits the realm of language which is not limited to the confines of the text. The following is just one example of the numerous passages within *T.D.V.* that imply or speak directly to an unfolding succession of images that lead to an unfolding succession of 'realities':

.....Wirklichkeit stets nur wieder durch Wirklichkeit versinnbildlicht wird—, Bilder und Aberbilder, Wirklichkeiten und Aberwirklichkeiten, keine wahrhaft wirklich, solange sie alleine steht.....

(p. 74)

(.....the 'real' always symbolized only through the 'real'—, representations and representations of representations, the 'real' and the 'real' reduplicated, none of them truly real so long as they stood alone (without copy).....)

The reader can begin to understand that the production and replication of the real entails something more than the abstract mirroring within language of one representation into another.² Any production of the 'real' implies an introduction of the reading subject into the unending succession of representations mirroring within the text. The reader, listening for (*lauschen*) and osculating the echo of its own altered voice, enters into the realm of the real.

This introjection of the subject into the representations of language (*Wirklichkeit versinnbildlicht* [reality symbolized]) effectuates an action within the word and causes a translation of the word into deed. As its story unfolds, the thematics of 'word as deed' takes on an increasing prominence within *T.D.V.* The following gives a particularly rich instance of the workings of the deed (*Tun*) within the mirroring images of representation as the real is constructed:

.....es wird die Sinnbildkette immer wieder geschlossen, so oft das Unerreichbare sich selber ins Erreichbare verwandelt.....und sie sich zum Kreise schlieÙe, zum Wahrheitskreis, zum ewigen Sinnbildkreis, wahr in jedem seiner Bilder, wahr durch das immerwährende Kreisgleichgewicht, das um die geöffnete Grenze spielt, wahr im ewigen Austausch der göttlichen und der menschlichen Tat, wahr in ihrer beider Sinnbildhaftigkeit und im Sinnbild ihrer gegenseitigen Spiegelung, wahr weil darin die Schöpfung sich für immerdar erneuert, eingegangen in das Gesetz, in das Gesetz der steten Wiedergeburt..... (p. 204)

(.....again and again the symbolic chain is closed, closed as often as the unattainable transposes itself into the attainable.....and the chain closes itself into a circle, to the circle of truth, to the eternal symbolic cycle, true in each of its representations, true by virtue of the perdurable balance of the circle that plays along the open border, true in the eternal exchange between the divine and the human deed, true in both their symbolic quality and in their mutual, mirroring (symbolic) representation, true because creation renews itself repeatedly and forever therein, entering into the law, into the law of eternal rebirth.....)

The passage cited affirms the possibility of attaining the real by the manipulation of symbolic structures (*die Sinnbildkette*); the unreachable (*das Unerreichbare*) comes within the reader's grasp by means of subtle perception (*lauschen*). Truth folding itself into fiction (*wahr in jedem seiner Bilder*), the 'unreachable' (truth) translating itself into the 'reachable' (lettered text), is the consequence of an intra-subjective experience involving reader and text. The passage describes this experience in terms of an interchange between the human and the divine 'deed':truth is the eternal exchange between the divine and the human deed (.....*wahr im ewigen Austausch der göttlichen und der menschlichen Tat*.....).³ The deed here referred to is not the simple act of perception of an observer looking in, but of a change effected within the subject, as it perceives that its own voice reflected back to it from the text has become something different from itself. Not all reading implies the act of discovering the real; not all texts elicit alteration in the reading subject engaged. In point of fact, *T.D.V.* speaks of a text that offers the reading subject a point of entry into the real and the means of effecting change within it:it is true because creation renews itself repeatedly and forever therein, entering into the law, into the law of eternal rebirth..... (*eingegangen in das Gesetz, in das Gesetz der steten Wiedergeburt*.....). That, according the logic put forward by *T.D.V.*, only the rare text allows for the possibility of a reconfiguration of the real (*Wiedergeburt*) can be inferred from Virgil's decision to destroy the *Aeneid* precisely because he judged it was untrue, precisely because, in Virgil's estimation, it failed to do more than offer up

images that were devoid of truth and devoid of the real (cf. p. 22 *et passim* where Virgil laments the inherently false quality of the *Aeneid* and of all of his writing). The law (*das Gesetz*) is the prescription for the ordering of the symbolic structure, for a change (*Wiedergeburt*) in the configuration of the 'real'.

Virgil seeks within his epic an encounter with death, a death which is not merely represented by the text, but which is immanent to it. Shortly after Virgil reveals to Augustus that in the writing of the *Aeneid* he has attempted to write down all (*darum wollte ich alles aufschreiben*, p. 300), he amends this assertion with something that is very nearly the contrary of writing-all-down (*alles aufschreiben*). Below is an exchange begun by Augustus and to which Virgil responds:

[A] "So muß ich dich nochmals fragen, Vergil, zu welchem Ziel du mit deiner Dichtung gestrebt hast, nachdem es die Erkenntnis des Lebens nicht sein sollte".

[V] "Die Erkenntnis des Todes." (p. 301)

([A] "So I must ask you again, Virgil, toward what goal had you striven with your poetry if it was not supposed to have been toward a cognition of life.")

[V] "The cognition of death.")

The word *Erkenntnis* (cognition) carries a particular value in Broch's *T.D.V.* It is a form of knowledge that, while perceptible, remains hidden under the veil of language; it is also the only suitable substitute for the impossible *das All*. Like truth and the real, the reader perceives *Erkenntnis* through the interplay of textual representations; *die Erkenntnis des Todes* and *die Erkenntnis des Lebens* occur within the reader's field of perception as two contrary sorts of 'knowing' that reflect into one another. Virgil is not speaking in mysteries

when he declares that a knowledge of life and a knowledge of death operate in a process of interchange; one illuminates the other. For the Virgil of *T.D.V.*, *die Erkenntnis des Todes*, which either may or may not be found within the text, is that field from which emanate the echo of the reading subject's altered voice.

An examination of *T.D.V.* reveals that 'death' in the *Death of Virgil* is not so much a terminus as it is a reflecting field. Virgil searches (the verb *lauschen* is primarily used to convey the idea of oscultating death) his own *Aeneid* for evidence within it of that same mirroring quality; that is to say, Virgil seeks evidence of the presence of death within his written work. By the presence of death within the work is meant the presence of that quality which causes the reader's own voice to echo back from the pages of the text and to do so in such a way that the reader is changed, we could say 'renamed', by the experience. That echoing voice is denoted on page 218 as *Sprache innerhalb der Sprache* (voice within the voice) and its discovery, the discovery of the "second I" (cf: pp. 200, 241), brings one to a confrontation with the 'unknown familiar' (*das ungekannt Wiedererkannte* p. 36). The encounter with the 'unknown familiar' indeed describes the function of the deed within the word;⁴ the 'deed' is the occurrence within memory (*Wiedererkannte*) of something previously unknown (*ungekannt*). This encounter with the 'unknown familiar' is precisely the encounter with truth, the encounter with something that is 'familiar' and yet 'unknown,' the encounter with one's own voice as it echoes back altered from the text. Truth comes in the guise of the

familiar presenting itself as irrevocable change. One could thus say of the *Aeneid*, or of any other work of art, science, or fiction that, subsequent to its introduction, it alters the real in a permanent way. The truth of the *Aeneid*, a fiction in the guise of a history, can be measured to the degree that the reality of Rome, Rome's inhabitants, and Western culture have been altered by its appearance. As a text, the *Aeneid* remains a bearer of truth to the degree to which it continues to speak to its reader, to the degree to which it continues to impinge upon the 'real.'

That the presence of the real within the text is dependent upon the concurrent presence and workings of the transforming power of death can be inferred from this observation made by Virgil to Augustus:

Nur im Gleichnis ist das Leben zu erfassen, nur im Gleichnis ist das Gleichnis auszudrücken; endlos ist die Gleichniskette, und gleichnislos ist bloß der Tod, zu dem sie sich hinspannt, als wäre er ihr letztes Glied, dennoch schon außerhalb der Kette..... (p. 336)

(Life is to be grasped only in the metaphor, only in the metaphor is 'metaphor' to be expressed; never ending is the chain of metaphor, and plainly death is bereft of the metaphor toward which it stretches, as though it were the (chain's) last link, yet death lay already outside the chain.....)

Virgil describes death as being the last link.....therefore, since the chain is elsewhere described as circular (p. 72), death is the *first* link in the chain of representation, the last link in a chain being likewise the chain's first link. Thus, Virgil declares that only the representation that encompasses the presence of death can be a valid representation of life. Just prior to this declaration of the necessary presence of death in the valid representation of life, Virgil announces to Augustus:

"Oh, Augustus, das Überirdische im Irdischen erkennen und Kraft solchen Erkennens es zu irdischer Gestalt bringen, als geformtes Werk,

als geformtes Wort und eben auch als geformte Tat, dies ist das Wesen des
echtes Sinnbildes....." (p. 334)

("Oh, Augustus, to recognize the divine (present) in the earthly and by virtue
of such recognition to achieve earthly form for the divine, as formed work,
as formed word and even also as formed deed, this is the essence of the true
symbol.....")

Genuine representation (*Sinnbild*) exists when one takes cognizance of that
which is beyond the concrete (*Irdischen*) and, by the force of this cognition
(*Kraft solchen Erkennens*), the divine (*Überirdischen*) is rendered in visible,
tangible form. This tangible form is the form of the 'work', the form of the
'word', the form of the 'deed.' Virgil makes clear the mark of the 'genuine
representation' (*das echte Sinnbild*): it is the text where the 'deed' is wrought
into the lettered word of the text.

Togapurpur

In *T.D.V.*, Virgil gradually awakens to the power of the word to
transform 'truth into the real and the real into truth' (*Wirklichkeit zur Wahrheit
umgestaltet, Wahrheit zur Wirklichkeit* –the 'real' transformed to truth, the true
to the 'real' p. 95); simultaneous to this awakening, Virgil becomes aware of a
profound malfunction in the *épistémè* of his time.⁵ The recognition of this
malfunction is iterated in the middle of Book III, just as Augustus is about the
enter the narrative scene. There the reader finds a variation on the verse
sometimes applied as a brief introduction to the *Aeneid*:

Stille empfing den Geheiligten.....und ferndraußen, dort wo die Faune
getanzt hatten, blies einer von ihnen weiter sein Lied, als würde es ihm
nichts anhaben, daß die Genossen ihn verlassen hatten; freilich, seine
Flöte klang zerbrochen. (p. 284)

(Silence embraced the holy one.....and far in the distance, there where the
Fauns had danced, one of them still blew his song, as though it were nothing
to him that his companions had abandoned him, truly his flute gave forth a
broken sound.)

The original verse emphasizes a harmony between nature and song as though they were one. To the contrary, the disharmony indicated by the verse taken from *T.D.V.* (*seine Flöte klang zerbrochen*) reminds the reader of the perennial disjunction between art and nature. Notation of the disjunction reminds the reader that the 'real' is not 'natural' and that art is something more than accuracy in representation. The *T.D.V.* takes measure of the art of the *Aeneid* in terms of its potential to fix what is profoundly broken with the world it purports to represent.

The novel places Augustus Caesar at the center of a world disharmony, a disharmony of which he is neither the cause nor the solution. The reader's first glimpse of what has been called 'the flute's broken clang' (p. 284) comes early as swarms gather in adulation around Caesar as he enters Brindisi:

.....da freilich war der Augenblick gekommen, den das dumpf brütende
Massentier erwartet hatte, um sein Jubelgeheul ausstoßen zu können.....
sich selbst anbetend in der Person des Einen. (p. 21)

(.....certainly the moment had arrived, the one the dumb brooding mass animal
had awaited in order to be able to belch out its jubilation-howl.....self adulating
in the Person of the One.)

By informing the reader of an absence of 'language' (*das dumpf brütende Massentier*), the text indicates a corresponding absence of the real. The formula 'in adulation of oneself' (*sich selbst anbetend*) denotes a state of perception in which the concrete is mistaken for the real; Augustus becomes the idol of a deluded people who attempt to capture in his image an unaltered representation of themselves. In this passage, Augustus and the people and Rome are perceived as an undifferentiated mass that is 'the person of the One' (*in der Person des Einen*).⁶

The 'person of the One' is an idol to the masses and a barrier to the discovery of the 'real' in Roman social, cultural, and political life. Communal identity is the product of narrative fiction, a fiction that provides a context, the place of the 'real,' into which the subject of state might situate him/herself. As 'idol', Augustus is unable to produce the context of the 'real', instead he is reduced to an ahistorical figure, one that provides security and provisions, but not communal identity. Inevitably, it is the word that binds a people together, and as Augustus becomes cognizant of this fact, he attempts by whatever available means to save the *Aeneid* from Virgil's intent to destroy the work. Lesser characters, as in the three wastrel drunks from the mid-section of Book II, though not immediately aware of the power of the word to create social, cultural and political cohesion, express themselves, nonetheless, in a language that has lost this re-creative power. In the citation below, they express themselves in a language grown sterile, having been reduced to little more than code. One cries out (p. 107 - ff.): "*Heil dem Augustus!.....heil ihm*" (Hail Augustus.....hail him"), and further along he gives the basis for this praise: "*Wein,*" *schrie er, "kriegst dein Wein, Dicker, Wein für alle, Wein aufs Wohl vom Cäsar!"* ("Wine," he cried, "grab your wine, fat one, wine for everyone, wine to toast Caesar with!"). Again, further along in the same passage, he exclaims "*Mehl vom Cäsar, hast es selbst gehört.....Heil ihm!*" ("Flour from Caesar, you heard it yourself.....hail him!") Caesar distributes provisions of wine and grain, and for this the Roman populace remains at least nominally beholden; he does not, however, have it within his power to provide the fictional context in which his subjects might discover and inhabit a

common 'real.' The above passage defines what it means to be Roman in terms of a relationship of mutually required exchange; the distribution of grain and wine wins Augustus a commensurate measure of loyalty. The limited terms of this relationship of 'exchange' affects the tenor of public life in ways made evident by the subsequent passage where, once again, the topic is the form of public largess upon which loyalty to Caesar is based. Below are two characters assessing the import of Caesar's 'generosity':

"Jawohl, morgen wird's ausgeteilt, morgen läßt er's austeiln...kost dich garnix!", da riß ihr die Geduld: "Ein Dreck wird austeiln", –sie kreischte "einen Dreck gibt der Cäsar her...ein Dreck is dein Cäsar, ein Dreck ist er, der Cäsar; tanzen und singen und ficken und huren kann er, der Herr Cäsar, aber sonst kann er nix, und ein Dreck gibt er her!"
 –"Ficken...ficken.....ficken..."

(pp. 107 -08)

("Yes, indeed, it'll be doled out in the morning, in the morning he'll see to it that it's distributed.....cost you not a damned thing!," then her patience gave way: "Garbage will be given out," –she shrieked..... "Caesar gives garbage... and your Caesar *is* garbage, garbage he is, the Caesar; he can dance and sing and fuck and whore, the mighty Caesar, but besides that he can't do a thing, and he hands out garbage!" – "Fuck.....fuck.....fuck.....")

By the estimation of the second character in this crude verbal parry, Caesar's act of public assistance equates to little more than the likes of a sterile copulative grunt. He 'fucks...fucks...fucks' (*ficken...ficken...ficken*), but has nothing more than the barren rhythm of a bankrupt language to show for it. More directly than any other passage in *T.D.V.*, this one accuses Augustus, the 'father of Rome', of ruling over a state without meaning, one in which social, political and cultural intercourse produces nothing new, in which nothing is altered by the general medium of public exchange.

This description of Augustus, shortly after he enters the narrative of *T.D.V.* toward the middle of Book III, emblemizes the arid and unfruitful

nature of public life as it threatens to be, should Rome be denied the rejuvenating powers of the *Aeneid*:

.....[es] wurde zur erkannten Einheit, so daß Mittag und Abend zu einem einzigen Licht-Sein hatten zusammenfließen dürfen, allein nun war nichts mehr hievon vorhanden, und sogar die in der unendlichen Über-Ferne ruhenden Nachthügelketten hatten sich zur leerheit aufgelöst.....stumpfer und stumpfer wurden da die Farben der Blumen, schwarzviolett wurde des Cäsars Togapurpur in diesem Lichte, das trocken war wie angesengtes Papier, äußerst unverwoben war dies alles, geradezu zusammenhanglos und bar jeglicher Gegenseit, unverwoben infolge der strengen Einseitigkeit, die von der schmalen Gestalt dort am Fenster ausging, unverwoben vor Strenge, vor Härte, vor Schärfe, unwirklich schier trotz ihrer sehr handgreiflichen Oberflächenwirkung, und auch das Menschliche, ach, selbst die menschliche Beziehung schien dieser Einseitigkeit einer geheimnisvoll freischwebenden, nichts -überdeckenden Oberfläche verfallen..... (pp. 297 -98)

(.....it became a perceived unity, so that mid-day and evening had been able to flow together into a single light-being, only none of this was any longer at hand, and even that peaceful chain of night-mountains off in the remoteness of the never ending distance had dissolved into emptiness.....
...there the color of the flowers became more and more faded, Caesar's toga-purple became a black-violet color, utterly unraveled was all this, altogether disjointed and without any counter perspective, unraveled following the strict one-sidedness that emanated from that small figure (Caesar) there at the window, unraveled because of the severity, the harshness, the sharpness, sheerly unreal despite the very palpable yet superficial efficacy, and even the humanity, alas, even the ties of human relationships seemed to have fallen subject to the one-sidedness of a secretive, free-floating superficiality that covered nothing at all.....)

This description, which has midday and evening melding into 'one light-one being' (*zu einem einzigen Licht-Sein*), carries overtones of the turning of an age. Likewise, the infinite expanse of 'evening-hills' (*Nachthügelketten*) dissolving into 'emptiness' (*Leerheit*) signals to the reader that an historically critical moment is at hand. The description of Augustus' toga gives a clue as to the ways in which the suspense of the moment might ultimately resolve. 'Inked' with the color of evening (*schwarzviolett*), the toga is simultaneously 'as dry as singed paper' (*das trocken war wie angesengtes Papier*). Next, the passage declares that all of this was 'unraveling to the utmost' (*äußerst unverwoben war dies alles*). *What was unraveling?* These several things: 1)

Augustus' attempt to preserve the manuscript of the *Aeneid*; 2) the political and social cohesion of the Roman state; and 3) by dint of proximity, the very fabric of the toga worn by Augustus in this scene.

The toga, whether the *toga virilis*, *toga picta*, or *toga candida*, is an emblem of status, and the 'purple' toga is the emblem of supreme authority in Rome. Hence, the purple toga unraveling signals the dissipation of Augustus' authority over Rome. The above passage complicates the image of the dissolution of Augustus' authority by indicating decline by means of a 'sign' that is textual. The outward sign of Augustus' power, and the loss thereof, is rendered 'substantive' by identification with Caesar's toga, which is said to be 'as dry as singed paper.' Like the light of this scene, which is a meld of 'midday and evening,' Augustus' toga is at once dry-singed and ink-soaked (*schwarzviolette*). The issue of whether Augustus' authority is either shriveling or rejuvenescent hinges on what becomes of the *Aeneid*, on whether it is burned in accordance with Virgil's wishes or published as both a 'history' of Rome and a directive for Rome's future, as Augustus so desperately would prefer. The purple that signs Augustus' toga with authority is the same black-violet substance with which the *Aeneid* is inked.

In the dialogue that issues from this encounter Augustus and Virgil come to agree that Rome itself is a fiction. Virgil at one point spells out to Augustus that it is 'his' state from which is formed a representation of the Roman spirit:

"Dein Werk, Augustus.....gewiß, ja, es ist Gleichnis.....es ist dein Staat.....er ist Sinnbild des römischen Geistes....."

(p. 308)

(“Your work, Augustus.....certainly, yes, it is a metaphor.....it is your state.....it is a symbolic representation of the roman spirit.....”)

By praising the newly established order of the Roman state as the true representation of the Roman spirit, Virgil moves in the direction of overtly recognizing that the ‘real’ resides in fiction. In discussion with Augustus concerning the merit of the *Aeneid*, Virgil had previously disparaged the *Aeneid* as sheer illusion compared with the ‘real’ and tangible Rome of Augustus’ own making; now Rome itself is conceded by Virgil to be an order of fictional representation (*Gleichnis*).

If Virgil continues to find Augustus’ work, the Roman state, an effective and admirable fiction, what is it that continues to separate the ‘fiction’ of state from the fiction of the text? In fact, Virgil is moving toward the collapse of one into the other, toward a recognition that the ‘real,’ whether of state or of text, is based in an elaboration of the word into fiction. Virgil transcends the barrier between political and textual fiction with this observation:

Dort im raumlosen Raum des Wortes erhob sich die Stadt, und sie war selber nichts als ein Wortgebilde..... (p. 323)

(There in the ‘realmless’ realm of the word the city arose and it (the city) was itself nothing other than a word-image.....)

Though the ‘city’ referred to in this passage is the quasi-fictional Athens which comes down to Virgil through the writing of Plato, it is nonetheless a ‘real’ city that continues to exist both as a geographical location and as a place in the fictional setting of the Platonic dialogues. Yet even here, Virgil disparages the Athens of Plato’s *Republic*, constructed out of the context of fiction and which is ‘nothing but’ a representation in words (*nichts als ein Wortgebilde*).

Given that city (of Rome) and the text (of the *Aeneid*) are two types of fiction each of which represents the body politic (*des römischen Geistes*) Augustus discovers that which connects them to a common 'reality.' Virgil first addresses Augustus in the passage below:

"Rom ist das Gleichnis, Rom ist das Sinnbild, das du geschaffen hast, Cäsar."

"Rom ist die Tat der Ahnen, und die Wirklichkeit, die sie setzten, reicht weit über das bloß Sinnbildhafte hinaus." (p. 333)

("Rome is the metaphor, Rome is the symbol that you have created, Caesar."

"Rome is the deed of the forebears, and the 'real' that they have put into place; it exceeds by a wide margin the simply symbolic.....")

Virgil remarks that Rome is 'representation' (*Gleichnis*), a symbol created by Augustus. Augustus responds by saying that 'Rome is the *deed* of the forebears (*die Tat der Ahnen*);' not his own creation 'made present through representation.' 'The *deed* of the forebears,' Augustus continues, 'puts into place a reality (*die Wirklichkeit die sie setzen*) that exceeds all form of representation.'⁷ The paradox inherent to Augustus' argument that the 'reality of the forebears' exceeds any form of symbolic representation lies in the fact that the 'representation' to which he here refers is that of the physical state of Rome. The tangible works of Caesar Augustus and the physical state of Rome are referred to as symbolic representations (*das bloß Sinnbildhafte*), whereas the 'real' set in place by Rome's forebears is something inherent to Virgil's fiction. The 'deeds' of the forebears are present in the fiction of Virgil's *Aeneid*; the 'reality' 'set into place' by these same 'deeds' are an inscrutable element of that same fiction. The fiction of the *Aeneid* continues to make

present, valid and true the deeds of the forebears from which Rome's reality derives.

The *deeds* of the forebears can be made 'present,' can continue to 'validate' the reality of Rome, precisely because it is a fiction. These *deeds* are deeds of Virgil's own creation, a fact to which Augustus implicitly attests when he states:

"Rom ist die Erkenntnis des Ahnherrn gewesen; Rom war die Erkenntnis des Aeneas, und niemand weiß dies besser als du, Vergil." (p. 338)

("Rome has been the cognition of the forebears; Rome was the cognition of Aeneas, and no-one knows this better than you, Virgil".)

No one knows better than Virgil that 'Rome is the mental construct of Aeneas precisely because Aeneas is the fictional creation of Virgil. The *Aeneid*, then, is not so much a written account of things done in the past as it is a rendering present of deeds drawn from 'historical' memory. Rome is born of a fiction, as Virgil more or less recognizes in this portion of the exchange with Augustus:

Im Gleichnis der Erkenntnis ist Rom gegründet worden; es trägt die Wahrheit in sich, es entfaltet sich zur Wirklichkeit, mehr und mehr.....allein im Wachsen und Werden ist die Wirklichkeit." (p. 338)

(Rome has been founded in the representation (*Gleichnis*) of the cognition: this representation of the cognition bears truth within it, it unfolds into the 'real' more and more.....the 'real' is only increase and becoming.....)

Rome has been founded on the representation of an imaginary concept (*Im Gleichnis der Erkenntnis*), the creator of which is none other than Virgil. Virgil's second voice (*das zweite Ich*) is the *Urahn* who alone makes possible the creation of the Roman state to which Augustus aspires. Virgil's conception, woven into the cloth of the *Aeneid*, is the source of the 'real' sought by Augustus.

The *Aeneid*, which through the fictionalized 'deeds of the forebears' shares with the Roman state a common reality, becomes not the portrait of a people, but a mirror into which Rome is reflected and sees itself reflected:

Der Staat in seiner Doppelwirklichkeit hat nicht nur die Götter zu versinnbildlichen, es genügt nicht, daß er zu der Götter Verherrlichung sich die Akropolis baut, er hat nicht minder dem Volke, das seine zweite Wirklichkeitshälfte ist, das Sinnbild zu setzen, das starke Sinnbild, wie es das Volk sehen will und begreift, das starke Bild, in dem es sich selber wiedererkennt, das Bild seiner Eigenmacht, unter die es sich beugen will und beugen darf, ahnend, daß Macht im Irdischen, wie es das Beispiel des Antonius zeigt, stets dem Verbrecherischen zuneigt, und daß bloß ein Machtträger, der zugleich Sinnbild der ewigwährenden Wirklichkeit ist, solche Gefahr ausschließt. (p. 350)

The state in its double-reality has not only the gods to represent symbolically, it is not enough that he (Pericles) built the Acropolis in order to honor the gods, he had no-less to place into the symbolic representation the people who constitute the other half of the 'real', a powerful symbol that the people will see and understand, a powerful symbol in which the people see themselves mirrored, an image of their own power to which they may and will bow, sensing that earthly power forever inclines toward the criminal as in the example of Antonius, and that only the bearer of might who is at one and the same time a symbol of the everlasting 'real' excludes such a danger.)

The *T.D.V.* here splits the 'double-reality' of state into the divine and the human. The medium of this 'double-reality' is neither textual, as in the *Aeneid*, nor is it some purely abstract notion of state; rather, it is a reality expressed in architectural form. The sublime style and design of the Acropolis reflect back to the citizens of Athens something about themselves which, again, falls into the category of the 'unknown familiar.' The divine is not so alien to the viewer of this state architecture that he or she is unable to recognize some aspect of his or her own subjectivity reflected back. What one sees is the image of oneself *seeing*. 'The human' and 'the divine,' those two positions at the extremes of the axis upon which subjectivity is produced, are, respectively, self and self as other, Roman subjects and their progenitors the *Urahnen*. The median plane defined as the locus where the human and the

divine 'gazes' meet constitutes the 'real' imbedded in the text of the *Aeneid*. The reader is reminded of the already cited passage taken from page 21 of *T.D.V.* which describes the 'dumb brooding beast.....self adulating in the Person of the One;' with the publication and promulgation of the *Aeneid*, Rome would gaze not into self, not into Caesar as idol, but into Caesar as the continuing presence of the forebears.

The passage from page 350 suddenly brings into view the example of Antonius, and the reader's line of vision is caused to shift from architecture to language, from the form of the stone mass to the subtle shape of the letter. Unlike the immediacy of the visually present forms of the Acropolis, Antonius can only be present as memory, can only signify within the context of an articulated past. Antonius is then both a reminder and a warning to Augustus, the speaker of this passage, of what he might become without the benefit of the *Aeneid*. The *Aeneid* contextualizes Augustus within a fictional 'historical' past, and places him into the 'unending line of fathers' (*die unendliche Reihe der Väter* p. 178) of which, ironically, he is the first. This Antonius, the 'bearer of naked might' (*der bloß ein Machträger ist*), again recalls for the reader the image of Augustus where it is said that the people see themselves reflected and adulate themselves through the medium of Augustus' own image (*das dumpf brütende Massentier.....sich selbst anbetend in der Person des Einen* -the dumb brooding mass animal.....self adulating in the Person of the One). The weakness and danger of the idol, of the reflection of oneself as one wishes to see oneself, as opposed to the reflection of oneself as other, as

the 'unknown familiar,' is that it is non-critical representation. This passage states explicitly that Antonius, like the figure of Augustus taken from page 21, is the mere example of the populace of Rome gazing into a representation of self that is delusional: *das starke Sinnbild, wie es das Volk sehen will and begreift, das starke Bild, in dem es sich selber wiedererkennt, das Bild seiner Eigenmacht, unter die es sich beugen will and beugen darf, ahnend, daß Macht im Irdischen, wie es das Beispiel des Antonius zeigt, stets dem Verbrecherische zuneigt.....*(a powerful symbol that the people will see and understand, a powerful symbol in which the people see themselves mirrored, an image of their own power to which they may and will bow, sensing that earthly power forever inclines toward the criminal as in the example of Antonius). Augustus longs for a power and an authority that is placed not in his person, but in fiction of the unending line of fathers, the stabilizing power and authority immanent to the structure of fiction.

Dein Werk ist Rom

In the opening pages of the novel, Virgil imagines himself to be Anchises, carried along upon the shoulders of one designated as 'the son':

.....und es war Troja, das um ihn brannte, es war der niemals verlöschende Weltenbrand, doch er, der über den Bränden schwebte, er war Anchises, blind und sehend in einem, Kind und Greis Gleichzeitig kraft unsäglicher Erinnerung, getragen von den Schultern des Sohnes..... (p. 50)

(.....and it was Troy burning around him, it was the never extinguishing world conflagration, yet he who floated above the flames, he was Anchises, blind and seeing in one, simultaneously child and grizzled old man thanks to the unutterable recollection, borne on the shoulders of his son.....)

Although the reader might expect Virgil to opt for a clear identification with Aeneas, the exemplary hero and model Roman, we instead find here a

somewhat more complex identification. This figure borne over the flames of a burning Troy is at once child and ancient, father and son, Aeneas *and* Anchises, by the grace of the uncanny power of Virgil's memory. This self-designation as both father and son places Virgil in the perversely incestuous position of naming oneself, of begetting oneself of oneself –*Anchises begets Aeneas who begets Anchises*. As creator of the *Aeneid* Virgil is, after all, as much the *Urahn* of Anchises as Anchises is the *Urahn* of Virgil. In a later passage, the imaginary figure of a slave issues this warning to Virgil: “*Wer selber den Namen sich wählet, der lehnt gegen das Schicksal sich auf.....*” (p. 250). This act of self-naming is described as ‘leaning-against-fate’. In the case of the individual, it is certainly a re-writing of oneself, and in the case of the *Aeneid*, for which Lysanias, the imaginary boy-companion, calls Vergil ‘the father who gives all things their names’ (p. 179), it is a re-writing of the ‘real’ for the Roman world.

T.D.V. does not suggest that Virgil has created his epic out of a will to restructure an already functional reality; rather, it makes clear that Virgil, only with great reluctance and apprehension, attempts to reconfigure a reality that has fallen into chaos and lacks significance. (In this way, Virgil's dilemma mirrors Broch's own, since he began writing *T.D.V.* in the political and social chaos of mid-twentieth century Europe). Virgil's project of reconfiguring the real begins with the personal recognition that his own ‘I,’ like the toga of Augustus (cf.: p. 297), is brittle, shrunken and impoverished. In one of the several ‘elegies’ to be included in *T.D.V.*, Virgil makes note of this recognized diminution of ‘self’:

erkenntnisverlustig und verloren in Erkenntnislosigkeit
das ernüchterte Ich,
seine Armut—,

(p. 118)

(destitute of cognition and lost in a cognitionless state
the sobered 'I,'
its poverty--.)

Consistent with the precept that the 'real' is a construct of language is the notion that any alteration in the 'real' would have its most profound reverberations in the individual subject, which is the sole articulator of language. This sense of the diminishing 'I' is given in the example of the three wastrels (cf.: pp. 107 - 108), whose language of expression is impoverished to the point of hardly existing as language, borders on code, and whose crude utterance Virgil characterizes as a disintegration of the social bond:

.....es war die Furchtbarkeit des Sachlichen, das sich nicht mehr an
den Menschen wendet, weder an ihn, der es hier am Fenster gesehen
und vernommen hatte, noch sonst an irgendeinen Menschen, gleichsam
eine Sprache, die nicht mehr Brücke zwischen Menschen ist..... (p. 109)

(.....it was the fearsome of matter-of-factness that no longer concerned
itself with the human, neither with him here at the window who looked on
and comprehended, did not concern itself with any man like a language
that is no longer a bridge between men.....)

The *Aeneid* is to become a new matrix of language in which the already existent ties that bind one subjectivity to another would be re-set; it would become the medium through which to realign the set of social, political and cultural relations from which the 'real' is defined.

For Augustus who stands in relation to Virgil as son to father --through the *Aeneid* Virgil effectively 'names' Augustus into the *unendliche Reihe der Väter* (p. 179)-- and of father to son --Virgil remains the state's, hence, Augustus' most glorious 'client' --the inter-dependence of their two projects of text and state remain inextricable. Augustus spells out the mutuality of their interests clearly and simply:

.....wohlbegründet in meiner Leistung, in der Wirklichkeit Roms und seines Geistes, ohne die niemals die *Aeneis* hätte entstehen können, das ist zu viel für dich..... (p. 367)

(.....well founded in my works, in the reality of Rome and of her spirit without which the *Aeneid* would never have come into existence, that is too much for you.....)

Augustus in his accusation is certainly right in the implication that his own works provide the basis upon which Virgil constructs his epic; he is misleading, however, in suggesting that the reality and the spirit (*Geist*) of Rome emanate from the works of his own hands and not from that of Virgil's text; clearly, the deed springs from the word and not, as Augustus would have it, vice versa. Augustus says as much, contradicting the statement from page 367 in an earlier passage. Here, to the contrary, Virgil would willingly concede that Rome is the work of Augustus:

"Rom ist das Gleichnis, Rom ist das Sinnbild, das du geschaffen hast, Cäsar."

"Rom ist die Tat der Ahnen, und die Wirklichkeit, die sie setzten, reicht weit über das bloß Sinnbildhafte hinaus."

"Und Rom ist auch wieder deine Tat, Augustus, die römische Ordnung im römischen Staat." (p. 333)

("Rome is that metaphor, Rome is that Symbol that you have created, Ceasar."

"Rome is the deed of the forebears and the reality that they put into place reaches far beyond symbolic representation."

"And Rome is also your deed, Augustus, the Roman order in the Roman state.")

It is a peculiarly remarkable exchange, one in which Augustus and Virgil both insist that the other is the father of Rome.⁸ Virgil attributes representation (*Gleichnis*) and symbol (*Sinnbild*) to Augustus, further stating that the order of the Roman state is Augustus' own 'deed' (*Tat*). To the contrary, it is the case, as Augustus clearly states it, that Rome is the 'deed' of the forebears (*Ahnen*)

and Rome's reality is a reality 'set by their deeds' (*die Wirklichkeit, die sie setzten.....*). The *Aeneid* does not record, rather it *creates*, the deeds of the forebears; and within the context of its language, those deeds, the deeds emanating from Virgil's imagination, set the reality and the spirit of Rome as it exists under Augustus. The 'Roman order in the Roman state' which Augustus brings into existence has as its source the 'deeds of its forebears,' deeds which spring into existence by means of Virgil's stylus.

Virgil's imaginary companion Lysanias lays out with the greatest succinctness the paradox of Virgil's position, the fact of being at once father and son, the creator of a reality which in turn creates its creator:

"Du sahest den Anfang, Vergil, bist selber noch nicht der Anfang, du hörtest die Stimme, Vergil, bist selber noch nicht die Stimme, du fühltest das Schöpfungsherz pochen, bist selber noch nicht das Herz, du bist der ewige Führer, der selber das Ziel nicht erreicht; unsterblich wirst du sein, unsterblich als Führer, *noch nicht und doch schon, dein Los an jeder Wende der Zeit.*" (p. 253)

("You saw the beginning, Virgil, you yourself are not yet the beginning, you heard the voice, Virgil, you yourself are not yet the voice, you felt creation's heart beating, you yourself are not yet the heart, you are the eternal guide who never himself reaches the goal; immortal will you be, immortal as guide, *not yet and already at hand, your lot is at the turn of every time.*")

This somewhat cryptic message is *T.D.V.*'s fullest exposition, however oblique, of the meaning of the often-cited phrase *noch nicht und doch schon* (not yet and yet already past). It proclaims the impossibility of situating the subject in an absolute present; it is that unspeakable memory (*die unsägliche Erinnerung*, cf.: p. 50) which constructs the subject in the interstices between child and father (*Kind und Greis*, p. 50), creator and created (*das Erzeugte und das Erzeugende*, cf.: p. 135), divine and human.⁹ Elsewhere in *T.D.V.*,

Virgil decries as 'anti-art' (*die Unkunst*) that which attempts to substitute the thing created for the process of creation:

.....die [Unkunst] das Erzeugte an die Stelle des Erzeugenden setzt, das Spiel an die Stelle der Gemeinschaft, das Erstarre and die Stelle der lebendig fortwirkenden Schöpfung, das Schöne an die Stelle der Erkenntnis..... (p. 135)

(.....denatured art places the created in the place of creating, places the game in lieu of the society, places the lifeless in the place of living, onward forging creation, places beauty in place of cognition.....)

In terms of art, this argues against favoring effect over process, the beauty of the finished object over engagement on the part of the viewer/reader leading to the discovery of otherwise intangible truths.

In the above paragraph, two phrases are brought together that explicate the meaning of one another: *noch nicht und doch schon* and *das Erzeugte an die Stelle des Erzeugenden*. The former speaks to the impossibility of an absolute present, the latter to the (false) illusion of mistaking the concrete for the 'real.' To paraphrase the passage taken from p. 253, *Virgil sees the beginning but is not the beginning, he hears the voice but is not the voice*; Virgil is at once creator (as author of the *Aeneid*) and progeny (as citizen of Rome) of Anchises (compare once again the passage from p. 50); he is at once 'name-giver' and 'named' (cf.: p. 59 - 60). As author, the phrase *noch nicht und doch schon* comes to describe Virgil's place in existence, a place of everlasting process and never-ending incompleteness. In naming all things --*Du, mein Vater, du weißt sie alle, du gabst den Dingen ihre Namen*..... (p. 179)-- Virgil loses his own name, succumbs to the phenomenon of *Ich-Verlust*, relinquishes his own 'present' for a place somewhere between past and future, and becomes a figment of his own

prodigious power of imagination, a figment of his own fiction, a figment of memory of *'die unsägliche Erinnerung.'*

As the novel moves toward resolution --resolution of the conflict between Augustus and Virgil as to whether the *Aeneid* is to perish or remain following Virgil's death, and resolution of the concurrent conflict as to the 'origin in fiction' of state authority-- Virgil's position and that of Augustus move toward a state of uneasy accommodation. Speaking to Virgil, Augustus proclaims:

"Rom ist die Erkenntnis des Ahnherrn gewesen; Rom war die Erkenntnis des Aeneas....." (p. 338)

("Rome has been the cognition of the forebears; Rome was the cognition of Aeneas.....")

To which Virgil responds:

"Die Ahnen haben den Keim der Erkenntnis gelegt, da sie die römische Ordnung schufen....." (p. 338)

("The Forebears have laid the kernel of cognition thereby creating the Roman order.....")

The deeds of the forebears of Rome have created the Roman order, have determined the 'real' for the Roman state. The reader has only to turn back a handful of pages, reading 'forward' toward the beginning of the text of *T.D.V.*, to find Virgil effectively situating the 'deeds' of the forebears within the text of the *Aeneid*. Virgil observes to Augustus the following regarding the nature of writing:

"Oh Augustus, das Überirdische im Irdischen erkennen und kraft solchen Erkennens es zu irdischer Gestalt bringen, als geformtes Werk, als geformtes Wort und eben auch als geformte Tat, dies ist das Wesen des echten Sinnbildes; innen und außen prägt es sein Urbild aus....." (p. 334)

("Oh, Augustus, to recognize the divine (present) in the earthly and by virtue of such recognition to achieve earthly form for the divine, as formed work,

as formed word and even also as formed deed, this is the essence of the true symbol, inward and outward it forms its original image.....")

Das Überirdische im Irdischen is simply the 'deed of the forebears' woven into a cloth of fiction; what is designated as divine is simply the ongoing efficacy of the deed within the word. True representation (*das echte Sinnbild*) is power of the word within the work of fiction to continue the exchange between the true and the real as it is expressed on page 95 of *T.D.V.* This translation of the truth into the real is the deed of the *Urahn*; it is the inherent power of fiction to speak back to the reader in altered voice of the 'second I.'

Though at one point in his disputation with Augustus Virgil insists that the writing of the *Aeneid* was firstly a personal effort —*ich darf behaupten, daß ich es nicht nur für den Leser, sonder zuerst für mich geschrieben habe* —(I allow myself to maintain that I did not write for the reader, but I wrote firstly for myself..... p. 292)— the public implications of this work would always ultimately come to bear. Virgil more than hints at the inevitable public import:

.....dumpf fühlt das Volk, daß eine neue Wahrheit sich vorbereitet, dumpf fühlt das Volk, daß die alten Formen bald sich erweitern werden..... (p. 362)

(.....the populace vaguely senses that a new truth is being prepared, the sense vaguely that the old forms will soon be extended.....)

Virgil writes to reconstruct firstly for himself a 'real' to replace that which had been lost with the collapse of political, social and cultural order; but it is a given that the 'real' acquires validity only insofar as it is a shared 'real'. Explaining to Augustus what that 'real' entails, Virgil does not miss the point that it entails a realignment of the order of the Roman state:

"Denn das Reich der Erkenntnis, zu dem dein Staat erblühen wird, das Reich der wahren Wirklichkeit, wird nicht ein Reich der Volksmassen sein, ja, nicht einmal ein Reich der Völker, sondern ein Reich der Menschengemeinschaft, getragen vom Menschen, der sich im Wissen

befindet, getragen von der menschlichen Einzelseele, von ihrer Würde und von ihrer Freiheit, getragen von ihrer göttlichen Ebenbildhaftigkeit."

(p. 345)

("For the realm of cognition into which your state will bloom, that is the realm of the true 'real', it will not be the realm of the folk masses, yes, not ever the realm of the folk but a realm of human community, community supported by people who are knowing, supported by the unified soul of the people, from their honor and from their freedom, borne from their divine likeness.")

The distinction Virgil makes between *die Volksmassen* and *die Menschengemeinschaft* is not one that differentiates between qualities innate to one group or the other; rather, *Volksmassen* and *Menschengemeinschaft* refer to a distinction in terms of the relation of subject to state. *Die Volksmassen* have already been presented (page 21) as the "dumb, bellowing 'mass-animal' " that 'self-adulates' in the 'Person of the One,' 'the One' being Caesar Augustus as idol. *Die Menschengemeinschaft*, by contradistinction, is a relation to state in which the subject comes not *en masse*, but as a particular member of a larger group (*Menschengemeinschaft*), and for whom the edifice of state offers not a prescriptive representation of subject, but an occasion for encounter with the 'unknown familiar.' The passage states that the subject of the *Massengemeinschaft* discovers that the state (*der Reich*) is, in fact, an 'internal realm' in which knowledge of one's own subjectivity is not prescribed but discovered. Since human subjectivity does not lend itself to *deixis* —except for a symbolic presence through the mediation of the name, there is no absolute presentation of 'self'— the subject experiences at most an illusion of self through an encounter with the 'real' language, in fiction.

The subject of state, like the subject of fiction, is a construct of language, and the construct is a set of relations established between a

fictional past (*das Kind*) and an imagined future (*der Greis*). The position of the subject is well described by the phrase that is often cited as this novel's statement on the relation between the author (Virgil/Broch) and his work: *noch nicht und doch schon* (p. 253). The implied 'non-presence of being,' the asymptotic deferral of subjective presence, applies not only to the author of the *Aeneid* and, likewise, the author of *T.D.V.*, but to the subjects that are to be subsequently constructed by that text.

At the very finish of that contest between Augustus and Virgil that determines the continuing existence of the *Aeneid*, it is stated that the text is, in actuality (*eigentlich*), a coffin:

.....nachgeschickt dem Manuskriptkoffer, der da zur Türe hingetragen wurde und eigentlich ein Sarg war, ein Kindersarg, ein Lebenssarg. (p. 376)

(.....sent after the carrying case for the manuscript that was taken there by the door and was, in fact, a coffin, a child's coffin, a life coffin.)

In what sense, indeed, is the manuscript holder a sarcophagus, a child's sarcophagus *and for whom?* The text of the *Aeneid* 'renames' the subject, destroys the old and replaces with the new. In doing so, the subject is constructed as part of a fictional relation, a 'non-presence' of being that is situated somewhere along the axis that runs from the point of the fictional 'forebear's deed' and the realm of the 'unknown familiar' which is the realm of death. Firstly, the *kindersarg/Lebenssarg* is Virgil's in the sense that this is his death --*Ich bin allein.....niemand ist für mich gestorben*" (I am alone..... no one has died for me; p. 188)-- but it is also a death that he succeeds in making present in fiction. In a letter written to Aldous Huxley, Broch says of his own encounter with death from which the fiction of *T.D.V.* stems:

.....Der *Vergil* ist aus Zufallsanfängen gewachsen; ich bin damit in eine Zeit echter Todesbedrohung (durch die Nazi) geraten, und ich habe ihn daher ausschließlich für mich –teilweise sogar im Gefängnis– gewissermassen als private Todesvorbereitung, sicherlich also nicht für Publikationszwecke geschrieben. Es war ein Versuch, mich imaginativ möglichst an das Todeserlebnis heranzutreiben, und da dies in äußerster psychischer Konzentration vor sich ging, hatte ich das von Ihr diktierete Material, einschließlich der Form und demnach auch der des langen Satzes zu akzeptieren.....Für mich galt es, mein Material, mein Erkenntnismaterial dem Leser zu übermitteln. Ich mußte den Leser nachleben lassen, wie man sich der Erkenntnis des Todes durch Zerknirschung und Selbstauslöschung annähert (mag man sie auch als noch Lebender niemals erreichen). Mit bloß rationalen Mitteilungen ist dies nicht zu bewerkstelligen, vielmehr mußte der Leser dazu gebracht werden, genau so den gleichen Prozeß, den ich durchgemacht habe, nun seinerseits genau so durchzugehen.

(.....The *Vrgil* grew out of an accidental occurrence. I had fallen upon a time where I was genuinely threatened by the menace of death (from the Nazis) and, under the circumstances, I had written the *T.D.V.* for myself exclusively –in part, no less, while in prison– and to a certain extent had written it as a personal preparation for death; certainly I had not written it for the purpose of publication. It was an attempt to propel myself through the agency of my imagination as close to the death experience as possible and because this effort took place only with the greatest mental concentration I had to accept the form and even the lengthy sentences that the material for this story dictated under the given circumstances..... For me it was critical that I should convey my material, my cognition-material to the reader (in the same form that circumstances had dictated). I had to allow the reader to live through the way in which one approaches this experience of death, namely, through contrition and the dissolution of self (may no living person ever arrive in such circumstances as these). This (approach to death) could not be brought about through a merely rational medium, rather the reader must be brought to the experience through exactly the same process that I myself had worked through; the reader would have to work through precisely the same process only on his or her own terms.

CONCLUSION

In both the *Roland* and in the *T.D.V.*, the reader finds that death is the dark generator of writing. The example in the *Roland* is seemingly patent: Roland urges his men to 'strike hardy blows/that no one would know to sing bad songs about us!' (ll. 1013 - 14); and at line 2338 Roland is shown using *Durendal* to 'strike at a dark stone.' In each instance, whether upon the bodies of the Saracens and the Franks or upon the surface of the dark stone, the battle at Roncevaux is monumentalized in an initial blood writing.¹ The writing in blood is then translated into a writing in black ink putatively by St. Giles, the sole remaining witness to the scene of death at Roncevaux. Roland's perfectly preserved body, without a single broken bone or a cut to mar the integrity of his outer mortal remains, serves as a vessel from which flows the dark ink of narrative (cf.: ll. 1763 and 1785); one can almost imagine St. Giles dipping his stylus into the blood-filled mouth, as into a well of ink.

If in the *Roland* narrative flows out of death, narrative in the *T.D.V.* flows into death. Firstly, there are the already recounted circumstances of its genesis; Broch in prison in Alt Aussee using the *T.D.V.* as a vehicle for writing his way into death. Truly remarkable is the fact that Broch continues to

pursue an ever elusive death as the source of validation for his work. His correspondence is filled with promise of soon attaining death, the impossible goal; and of course he never does. The relevant passage in the *T.D.V.* is that in which Virgil crops the hair to prepare for immolation (p. 268); death will be choreographed into a sacred event that will bring validity to his writing. The validity Broch/Virgil seeks is one premised upon the desire to construct the subject. The narrative following the death of Roland and the Franks is one that largely constructs the subjectivity of the post-Roncevaux French as in the example of Thierry.² The narrative of the *Aeneid*, as a text within the text of the *T.D.V.*, is 'untried' in the sense that no construction of any particular subject had yet been determined. Until the *Aeneid* has been put to the public, its only subject is Virgil himself.

At least one can substantiate this view in reference to specific passages within the text, namely, at line 89: 'The fate of Aeneas is his own fate, incomplete' ('.....*das Schicksal der Äneis, sein eigenes Schicksal, unvollendet*'); and at line 139: 'This was the goal of the journey, the now visible goal of the fall, namelessness itself' ('.....*dies war das Ziel der Fahrt, das nun sichtbare Ziel des Absturzes, das Namenlose selber*'). The writing of the text remains intensely personal; the subjectivity reflecting back to its author is its 'author' (as other), creator and created are one; the narcissistic impulse is to integrate with the text completely, to fall into the text as one falls into death. Recalling that as Aeneas' fate and Virgil's fate are one and incomplete, likewise, Virgil's fate and Broch's fate are also one and moving toward a goal at which they will not arrive. Broch observes in a letter to

Huxley dated May 10, 1945: 'I wrote it (i.e., *T.D.V.*) exclusively for myself.....to a certain degree as a private preparation for death, certainly it was not written for the purpose of publication' ('.....*ich habe ihn (T.D.V.) daher ausschließlich für mich.....gewissermaßen als private Todesvorbereitung, sicherlich also nicht für Publicationzwecke geschrieben*). Broch, in fact, is reluctant to surrender the manuscript, and he delays and delays its release. Just as rumor from antiquity onward has it about Virgil, so, too, with Broch there is the assumption that the work remains incomplete and so never quite ready for the public. Even Broch hawks about this notion. But the truth of the matter is this: incompleteness is just a round about way of expressing the author's impossible urge to merge with his own text. The glimmering surface of the text through which Plotia moves with such fluidity (p. 274) will not yield a perfect image of its author Broch/Virgil.

We have come across similar 'authorial' frustrations in the *Roland*, particularly in the first narrative which ends with Roland's death. Roland establishes that sword-blows are for the sake of creating the 'song' (ll. 1013 - 1014) and that at Roncevaux all valorous deeds are done in his own name: 'for me I see you die' (*pur mei vos vei murir*, l. 1863). In this way Roland, like Broch at Alt Aussee, attempts to lay exclusive claim to the narrative 'written' while in progression toward the event of his own death. Roland, it could be argued, is even less naïve than Broch in his desire to possess the text completely. Just at the moment when death is pending and there isn't another Saracen to slay, Roland grabs *Durendal* and attempts to shatter the 'instrument of his writing' (ll. 2338 – ff.). What great sadness he expresses,

that some 'pagan' might pick up the divine instrument *Durendal* to continue the narrative in Christian blood. The narrative beyond Roncevaux is, of course, continued by none other than Charlemagne.

A paradox of the practice of writing is that no matter how intimate the experience, it can never be wholly, to use Broch's word, 'private;' there is always another writer, always another reader already in play. Once committed to the page, Broch's death, no less than Roland's death, becomes an affair for the public domain. In the *Roland*, the example is explicit: the continuation of narrative beyond Roland's death is by the hand of 'another' author. The author of the 'continuation,' however, is also the one to 'transcribe' Roland's *geste*, and, in the process, manages to integrate the two narratives into one text. Roland writes a representation of self; St. Giles places that representation within a public context.³

Roland's inability to shatter *Durendal* is, in practical terms, his inability to terminate the *geste*; completion precludes continuation. Broch's inability to bring his own narrative to an end is, similarly, a recognition of that same mark of incompleteness. It is as though the author wishes to meet himself in the form of two perfectly matched inter-reflecting images; what the author encounters instead is self disguised as 'other'. The 'other', that *'zweite Ich'* to which *T.D.V.* refers, is the product of an un-deliberate second writing. At one passage in the *T.D.V.* it is stated: 'The mother remains beyond our call' ('.....*die Mutter bleibt unerrufbar*'); and in another: 'Nameless is the place from which the mother calls' ('...*namenlos wird es wo die Mutter ruft...*', page

153); and in another: 'He is called to the goal, that he might finally be reunited with the name' ('.....*der wird zum Ziele gerufen, auf daß er sich mit seinem Namen endgültig vereinige*'). Virgil, Broch, Roland are all in search of the 'name,' in search of perfect union of self with that tantalizing 'other self' that remains elusive and in circulation within the text.

Self as 'other' is by definition that aspect of one's subjectivity that is reflected back to us out of the cultural, social and political.....that is to say, out of the public sphere. Roland's attempt to destroy *Durendal* is the attempt to be remembered by one's own unadulterated and so 'private' narrative of self. Interestingly, this is by and large the position supported by those who continue to regard the first narrative of the *Roland* as a kind of *Ur-text*, as a narrative that hews closest to the 'original' story as it had been passed down through oral tradition. In this reading, the second narrative, beginning with Charlemagne's return to Roncevaux, is a later addition that appends itself to a original 'true' story, that of the battle of Roncevaux as it was remembered by eye witness and commemorated through oral tradition. An opposing view, one that receives its first great impetus from Bédier's editorial decision to accept the Oxford manuscript as an integrated text, suggests that one narrative translates into the other, that the Roland of the first and second narratives are one subjectivity twice inscribed; inscribed once as self and again as self as other.

The Roland of the first narrative is a Roland remembered as in the catalogue of feats in battle and conquest of countries listed in *laisse CLXXII* and elsewhere. The Roland of the second narrative, to the contrary, is one

publicly commemorated, his heart veiled in silk in a public ceremony and placed in the white sarcophagus (ll. 1965 - 66). The sarcophagus, literally the eater of flesh, consumes the 'old self' leaving the new, public, commemorated self available, though only through a veil of fiction. The 'public' construct of Roland's subjectivity emanating from the second narrative is, of course, vulnerable to manipulation. That manipulation begins where Charlemagne is able to commemorate Roland in the 'name' of his own cause, as though Roland had died for the sake of attaining Charlemagne's own claim to right (*dreiture*). One has only to consider Thierry, the champion in Charlemagne's cause, to understand that this proposition is as preposterous as it is successful.

Unlike the *Roland*, whose narrative flows out of death (Roland's), the *T.D.V.* writes its way toward death (the author's); in this way it remains intensely 'private.' But writing toward his own demise, the author, Broch/Virgil, is still faced with the same impossibility as was Roland at Roncevaux: there is no way, short of destroying the manuscript, of terminating the narrative absolutely. Broch/Virgil/Roland all seek to have the perfection of the narrative coincide with the moment of their deaths. In terms of their production of subjectivity, one striking difference between the *Roland* and the *T.D.V.* is that the former constructs the subject out of death the latter in movement toward death. The importance of this distinction between these two types of subject construction is that the one (*T.D.V.*) attempts, however in vain, to inscribe the author's subjectivity into the text; Virgil is ever conscious of the need and desire to place his name –and that of Augustus– into the 'sublime and

unending line of Fathers' (*'die erhaben unendliche Reihe der Väter'*, p. 178). In the other text, Roland's efforts to end the *geste* with the complete appropriation of all narrative, to his name only, fails; the true subject of the narration is not Roland himself but rather the 'post-Roncevaux' subject that is not so much inscribed into, as produced by the text.

Roland, Broch, and Virgil all share a similar anxiety regarding the continuation of narrative. Although Virgil and Broch choose, at some point, to 'die with the text,' Roland chooses instead to destroy *Durendal*, the instrument of narrative inscription. Yet, the *Roland* gives the clearest example of how the narrative is transformed subsequent to its creation. Charlemagne returns not only to continue the battle against the Saracens, but also, and especially, to continue the narrative abruptly left off by Roland. The continuation is not merely an extension of narrative, but a rewriting of what Roland has already written. When Roland dies, he dies as a conqueror of nations, but he is commemorated as a force granting validity to a social and political order quite alien to the feudal warrior ideal. Roland is commemorated into an order of social and political organization that is premised upon the recognition of, and absolute obedience to, Charlemagne's monarchical right, his *dreiture*.

Likewise, Virgil fears for the posthumous manuscript. Subsequent to Virgil's death, Augustus will effect those manipulations which render the *Aeneid* subservient to his own political will and ambitions. More than just an instrument of state propaganda, the *Aeneid* will be used to redefine the Roman subject in terms favorable to Augustus' conception of state. In the lengthy chapter, Book III of *T.D.V.*, in which Virgil and Augustus argue over

the survival of the *Aeneid*, Virgil insists repeatedly upon the inefficacy of the text. Virgil laments to Augustus 'I have not reached my goal' (*Ich habe mein Ziel nicht erreicht*, p. 299); and in another passage Virgil attempts to reassure Augustus that Rome is its own creation, independent of any text: 'Rome is the parable, Rome is the symbol that you yourself have created, Caesar' (*Rom ist das Gleichnis, Rom ist das Sinnbild, das du geschaffen hast, Cäsar*, p. 333). Virgil deprecates the text in an attempt to minimize its 'public' value, suggesting that Caesar has created 'parable' and 'symbol' in the building of the city itself.

As the passage on page 297 clearly illustrates, Augustus' need for the text is desperate. There Caesar wears the toga --'that was as dry as singed paper' (*das trocken war wie angesengtes Papier*)-- that is thirsty for Virgil's ink. As the text is transferred from the parchment, that is described as being 'as white and smooth and tender' as Plotia's body (cf.: p. 388), to the toga with which Augustus cloaks himself, there can be little doubt that transcription entails translation. To the extent that we can speak of two aspects of subjectivity immanent to the text, of '*das Ich*' and of '*das zweite Ich*,' both are already in place at the moment of the text's creation. Self as other, the so-called 'second I,' issues from the text at the moment it leaves its author's hands. In the case of the *Roland* and of the *Aeneid*, the alterity of authorial 'self' proceeds to replicate itself in the public to which it is presented; its readers and hearers perceive themselves in the text in ways that were previously unknown to them.

Once the work is released, it becomes the appropriation of the other self. So much is revealed to us in Broch's account of how he attempts to claim the subject even after the manuscript has found its way out into the world. He writes to Huxley on May 10, 1945: '.....rather, the reader must be brought to exactly the same process that I have gone through, and for his part work through it in exactly the same way' ('.....vielmehr mußte der Leser dazu gebracht werden, genau den gleichen Prozeß, den ich durchgemacht habe, nun seinerseits genau so durchzugehen'). This is Broch's *Durendal*, his attempt to end all narration once the pen has been put to rest. Broch would have the reader relive the same death that he has experienced, he would have the reader assume the very 'I' that he himself had inscribed into the text.

Broch's terror at letting go the text seems a tacit acknowledgement of the sentiment Maurice Blanchot expressed when, in *L'espace Littéraire*, he observes:

L'écrivain appartient à l'oeuvre, mais ce qui lui appartient, c'est seulement un livre, un amas muet de mots stériles, ce qu'il y a de plus insignifiant au monde. (p. 16)

(The writer belongs to the work, but that which belongs to him is merely a book, a mute heap of sterile words; that which is the least significant thing in the world.)

The writer, whether Roland or Virgil or Broch, is never able to attain that of which he is in search. Each agonizes in the knowledge that not he, but some other, will find in this 'mute heap of sterile words' the subject that remains hidden from him, hidden within the text.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Joseph Bédier, ed., *La Chanson de Roland* (Paris: Piazza, 1931).
2. Hermann Broch, *Der Tod des Vergil* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976).
3. Paul Lützler, *Materialien zu Hermann Broch "Der Tod des Vergil"* (Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 205 – 06.
4. Hans-Erich Keller, "Saint Sylvester in *La Chanson de Roland*" (Olifant 11: 3 - 4 1986), 189 - 203.
5. Gerald Brault, "'C'est presque la quadrature du cercle': Francisque Michel's Letter Announcing His Discovery of the Oxford Manuscript of the Chanson de Roland (1835)," Olifant 5 (1978) pp. 271 - 75.
6. Hans Aarsleff, "Scholarship and Ideology: Joseph Bédier's Critique of romantic Medievalism," IN *Historical Studies and Literary Criticism*, ed. Jerome J. McGann, Madison: University of Wisconsin Pr., 1985, pp. 93 - 113.
7. Aarsleff. p. 102.
8. Milman Parry, "Studies in the Epic Technique of Oral Verse Making, I: Homer and Homeric Style, II: The Homeric Language as the Language of an Oral Poetry," *Harvard Studies in Classic Philology* 41 (1930).
9. Sebastiano Timpanaro, *Entstehung der Lachmannschen Methode*, Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag, 1971.
10. Aarsleff. p. 106.
11. Bernard Cerquiglini, "Roland à Roncevaux, ou la Trahison des Clercs," *Littérature* 42 (1981) pp. 40 - 56. "Rédigeant ses *Légendes épiques* à

l'approche du premier conflit mondial, Bédier dépeint dans la *C.R.* un des premiers fleurons de notre littérature: l'origine ne peut qu'en être française, savante, et individuelle. De quelques données légendaires, diffusées par les sanctuaires de la route de Compostelle, un poète de génie a fait une oeuvre forte, créant du même coup le genre épique. Le plus remarquable dans la théorie de Joseph Bédier est qu'elle aligne le *Roland* sur la conception moderne de l'oeuvre littéraire. Cette chanson de geste se voit ainsi attribuer un auteur, Turol, lequel participe de cette promotion, et, surtout, l'unicité" (p. 42).

12. Paul Michael Lützler, *Hermann Broch, eine Biographie*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985. The most comprehensive biography to date though others such as Ernestine Schlant's *Hermann Broch*, Boston: Twayne, 1978, and in particular Manfred Durzak's *Hermann Broch, Der Dichter und seine Zeit*, help piece the life together. The biographical detail from outside the correspondence remains, however, of little use in understanding the subjective relation between author and work.

13. Lützler, *Materialien zu Hermann Broch 'Der Tod des Vergil'*, p. 216.

14. Lützler, *Materialien zu Hermann Broch 'Der Tod des Vergil'*, pp. 233 - 239.

15. Lützler, *Materialien zu Hermann Broch 'Der Tod des Vergil'*, p. 221 - 228.

16. Aniela Jaffé, "Hermann Broch: 'Der Tod des Vergil'. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der Individuation," In *Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung*, ed. Manfred Durzak, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 135 - 176.

17. Gundi Wachtler, "Der Archetypus der Großen Mutter in Hermann Brochs Roman *Der Versucher*," In *Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung*, ed. Manfred Durzak, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 231 - 250.

18. Manfred Durzak, *Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis*, Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978.

19. Erich Kahler, "Werttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie bei Hermann Broch," In *Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung*, ed. Manfred Durzak, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 353 - 370.

M - MUNJOIE

1. Peter Haidu, *The Subject of Violence*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. See the passage page 87 beginning "The Franks shout out Charles' sign....."

2. *La Chanson de Roland*, ed. Joseph Bédier, Paris: L'édition D'art H. Piazza, 1927. (All translations are my own).

3. Douglas D. R. Owen, "Beards in the *Chanson de Roland*," *Forum for Modern Language Studies* 24: 2 (1988) pp. 175 - 179.

4. Ernst Robert Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und Lateinisches Mittelalter*, Bern und München: Franke Verlag, 1948.

5. David Hult, "'Ci falt la geste': Scribal Closure in the Oxford Roland," *Modern Language Notes* 97:4 (1982) pp. 890 - 905. Hult remarks upon the textual implications of Turpin's reference to a 'prior' *geste*: "Turpin's allusion to a written *geste* is particularly intriguing, inasmuch as it necessarily precedes the actions which are taking place; the concept of the written *geste* would thus not limit itself to a documentary source for the present poem. In other words, the documentary nature of the events and heroes is already incorporated into the narrated action, effecting at the very least a subversion of the normally intuited relationship between action and narrated account: if the present poem is based on (a) previous *geste(s)* guaranteeing the historicity of the events, the latter are in turn predicated upon earlier written accounts. This perceptual layering, a confusion of act and document (already inherent in the word *geste*), will prove central to the poem at hand" (pp. 896 - 897).

6. For the source of the incestuous birth of Roland see: Alina Clej. "Le Miroir du Roi: Une réflexion sur la *Chanson de Roland*," *Romance Philology* XLIV: 1 (1999) pp. 36 - 53.

OUTLAWS

1. Peter Haidu, *The Subject of Violence*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. Haidu correctly recognizes that the failure to guarantee protection in the *Roland* is systemic: "The failure of the *garant*, the absence of protection from the feudal superior, in spite of the vassalic contract, is thus not a personal phenomenon but one that is generalized: it is not just a particular actor who is aimed at, it is the role (in the semiotic sense) that is inculpated. Roland, Charles, Baligant, all fail to fulfill their contract of protection with their social and military subordinates....." (p. 93).

2. See: Haidu. In examining Blancandrins' proposal it becomes clear that the alterity Saracen/Frank undergoes erasure. Haidu remarks upon the

collapse of one polity into the other: "Insofar as the alterity of 'Saracen' has no substantive consistency, the figure of the "Saracen" in the *Roland* becomes merely another representation of the essential problematic which is at work in (the representation and reality of) the Frankish polity. We will see, in fact, that the same pattern of complex political relations and (non)fulfillment of contracts obtains within the figure of the Saracens as within the Christian camp" (p. 38).

3. Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis*, trans. Willard R. Trask, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Auerbach points out that the epic *is* history not in that it recounts 'actual' events but that it performs a 'historico-political function': "It is only about the year 1200 that the first vernacular chronicles are composed, but they do not relate the past, they are eye-witness accounts of contemporary events, and even so they are strongly influenced by the epic style. And indeed, the heroic epic *is* history, at least insofar as it recalls actual historical conditions –however much it may distort and simplify them –and insofar as its characters always perform a historico-political function" (p. 122). Through the manipulation and alteration of the sequence of narrative –events Roland gives the reader a brilliant example of how fiction 'creates' history: by putting into place forces (vengeance) that will result in an alteration of the historico-political reality.

4. Albert Gérard, "L'axe Roland-Ganelon : valeurs en conflit dans la *Chanson de Roland*," *Le Moyen Age : Revue d'histoire et de Philologie* 76 (1969) pp. 445 - 466. Charlemagne's unmitigated abrogation of vassal obligation clearly points to the privileging of the 'royal person'. Gérard connects this moment with the shift toward the privileging of the nation state: "Si l'épisode de la mort de Roland met en question le primat de la gloire personnelle sur l'intérêt de la nation, le procès de Ganelon met en relief, de façon parallèle et complémentaire, l'absolue suprématie de la personne royale sur les droits et privilèges des vassaux" (p. 460).

5. Brigitte Cazelles, "Outrepasser les Normes : L'invention de soi en France Médiéval," *Stanford French Review* XIV (1987) p. 69 - 92. Roland's status as 'other' provokes a societal instability that mitigates against his continued existence. Cazelles speaks of the destabilizing desires that 'otherness' can evoke: "Outrepasser les normes permet au héros de dépasser ses rivaux; l'admiration que suscite cette singularité ne va pas sans jalousie, sans désir d'être comme l'autre, d'être l'autre, d'être autre" (p. 88).

6. Gérard. Ganelon's situation contrasts starkly with that of Roland in terms of their open and furtive, respectively, betrayals of those in their charge: ".....Ganelon n'a pas trahi : il a annoncé sa vengeance ouvertement, clairement et loyalement (laissez XX à XXIV), il a respecté les obligations du code de l'honneur traditionnel" (p. 454).

7. Gérard. Gérard describes the hesitancy of the French thus: "Les barons ne refusent pas à Charlemagne le droit de réclamer vengeance : il est

assez évident qu'il a été lésé ; mais Ganelon avait agi selon son droit et dans le respect des formes. On se demandera, dès lors, pourquoi les barons ne déclarent pas formellement que Ganelon n'a pas trahi. C'est que leur perplexité porte précisément sur ce concept de trahison, dont la polyvalence les trouble" (p. 455). The view that the French in this scene are perplexed by the question of Ganelon's treason is a common one. I contend, however, that the French initially judge 'correctly' according to feudal law and that only then does Charlemagne confront them with the fact that the old law has fallen and largely by merit of the doings of the Franks themselves. Charlemagne introduces the French, in an incontrovertible manner, to their own culpability in transgressing the 'old law'.

8. Haidu. The fact that the text describes the social structures of the Saracen in terms identical to those of the Franks makes Blancandrins manipulation of the same all the more plausible: "The fact that the Saracens are portrayed as feudal lords and vassals makes them reliable judges of feudal obligations" (p. 91).

9. Karl-Heinz Bender, *König und Vassal, Untersuchungen zu Chanson de geste des XII. Jahrhunderts*, Heidelberg: Winter Verlag, 1967. The execution of Ganelon's kin indicates that a far greater 'victory' has been won than mere dominance over his vassals. Charlemagne's *dreit* impinges upon all aspects of feudal society: "Ein Zweikampf bringt die Entscheidung zwischen Pinabel, dem Repräsentanten der Sippe Ganelons, und Tierri, dem Vorkämpfer der lehnsherrlichen Gewalt. Mit dem Sieg Tierris über Pinabel triumphiert die Autorität des Lehnsherrn nicht nur über das unbeschränkte Fehderecht der Barone, sondern auch über die Macht der Sippe. Ganelon und seine dreißig Verwandten, die dem Ideal der Feudalgesellschaft zuwiderhandelten, werden auf Beschluß aller anwesenden Vasallen hingerichtet" (p. 35).

HONUR E DREITURE

1. Clej, Alina. "Le Miroir du Roi : Une réflexion sur la *Chanson de Roland*," Romance Philology XLIV: 1 (1990) pp. 36 -53. Clej recounts the tradition that assigns to Charlemagne the sin of incest: "Seule parmi les écrits de l'époque, la *Karlsmagnus Saga* rédigée vers 1230 - 50, mais fondée sur des textes plus anciens, décrit ce péché terrible....." (p. 40).

2. Peter Haidu, Peter *The Subject of Violence*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. Charles' behind the scene manipulations are noted by Haidu: "Because the nomination is made by Roland, it is at Roland that Ganelon's anger can be vented. But that nomination would not have had the meaning for Ganelon it does have, had it not been preceded by Charles's exclusion of the peers. It is Charles's active narrative role in the deliberations that produces the insulting meaning of Roland's nomination of his stepfather" (p. 93).

3. William Paden, "Tenebrism in the *Song of Roland*," *Modern Philology*, 86: 4 (1989) pp. 339 - 356. Paden assigns the spirit of vengeance principally to Ganelon: "Ganelon is the enemy of Christians and pagans alike. It is he who stages the battle of Roncevaux, which is a defeat for both sides and a victory only for his unfathomable rage for vengeance" (p. 352). To the contrary, Roland is clearly the one to call for vengeance in the text and it is a clever Charlemagne who manages to turn the workings of that vengeance upon Saracen and Frank alike.

4. Bernard Cirquiglini, "Roland à Roncevaux, ou la Trahison des Clercs," *Littérature* 42 (1981) pp. 40 - 56. In a profoundly subtle reading of Ganelon's response to this excess of *orgueille* Cirquiglini notes that as Ganelon manipulates circumstances so the author of the text manipulates narrative to ensure the elimination of Roland. Not just Roland but the social and political order which he emblemizes is purposefully overturned by the narrative: "L'orgueil de Roland, qui le fait inconsidérément s'exposer au danger, va lui porter malheur : Dieu le punire" : ce discours nous est familier. Dans la C.R., c'est, par trois fois, Ganelon le traître qui le prononce (devant les païens, puis devant Charlemagne). L'interprétation cléricale c'est, en somme, celle de Ganelon" (p. 49).

5. Karl D. Uitti, "*Alexis, Roland, and French 'Poésie National'*," *Comparative Literature Studies* 32: 2 (1995) pp. 131 - 150. The geographic nomenclature *dulce France* is one of the surest indicators that this text is as much as anything about the struggle to establish a 'royal ideology' in eleventh century Capetian France: "But to what, geographically speaking, does the term apply? "France," within the Carolingian framework, is an anachronism.....In fact, it turns out that *Roland* and the "dulce France" it so frequently calls to mind, reflect closely the Capetian, or French, royal ideology of the eleventh century" (p. 137).

6. George Jones, "Friendship in the *Chanson de Roland*," *Modern Language Quarterly* 24 (1963), pp. 88 - 98. "To appreciate personal friendships and hatreds in the Middle Ages, we must liken medieval individuals to modern sovereign states. Now that the state protects its citizens or subjects, private individuals are no longer in such constant fear of aggression as they were in the Middle ages, when every free man was responsible for defending his own life, property, and honor. Kings and other rulers protected their subjects from foreign enemies but not from each other, since all free men had the right to settle their own disputes by feud" (p. 90). If we accept Jones' definition of 'ami' as such then we are able to glimpse the perverse nature of the relationship Charlemagne/Roland: Roland is Charles' protector! Furthermore, Charlemagne sacrifices not just '*un ami*' in sacrificing Roland, rather he sacrifices this defining paradigm of feudal organization.

7. Paul Zumthor, *Essai de Poétique Médiévale*, Paris: Seuil, 1972. It is interesting that Zumthor should see in Charlemagne a figure emblematic of

the 'collectivity': "Moins que reflet d'une réalité ou d'une expérience passée, la chanson est conscience de soi. Elle compense la rupture survenue entre le réel et l'imaginaire. Elle exploite moins un souvenir qu'elle ne le projette en prophétie.....En ce sens, le sujet réel de l'action, c'est la collectivité même : ces pluriels interchangeables, *Francs, Français, Chrétiens, barons*, rythmant et glosant de leurs exclamation périodiques le récit du *Roland*; tout Charlemagne, figure impériale qui les englobe et les représente" (p. 336). In fact, I would argue that the prophetic nature of the *Roland* is not in its representation but in its creation of a future subject. The *Roland* gives the reader not a tableau of '*Francs, Français, Chrétiens, barons*..... as Zumthor suggests but the outline of subjectivity determined by its relation to the newly emerging nation state.

8. Emmanuel J. Mickel, "Ganelon's Defense," In *Romance Epic: Essays on a Medieval Literary Genre*, ed. Hans Erich Keller, Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publ. (1987), pp. 163 - 172. "In his speech Ganelon emphasizes that he loves France and would never betray Charlemagne. Roland had wronged him, he argues, and he had defied his stepson, Roland, in open court. As everyone knows, once formal ties of fealty had been broken openly, a man could no longer be accused of oath breaking, and hence treason, if he were to kill his adversary in a subsequent confrontation" (p. 163).

9. Karl-Heinz Bender, *König und Vassal, Untersuchungen zu Chanson de geste des XII. Jahrhunderts*, Heidelberg: Winter Verlag, 1967. The opposition *reis/emperere* is read as a reflection of the increasing power of the Capetian dynasty: "Wenn nun Charlemagne bereits im ersten Vers der *Chanson de Roland* als: *Carles li reis, nostre imperere magnes* eingeführt wird, dann entspricht die Verwendung dieser beiden Titel nicht nur der Überlieferung von Karl d. Gr., sondern auch der staatsrechtlichen Konzeption der kapetingischen Monarchie am Ausgang des XI. Jahrhunderts" (p. 27).

10. Eugene Vance, "Roland, Charlemagne, and the Poetics of Illumination," *Olifant* 6: 3 - 4 (1979) pp. 213 - 225. "Though Charlemagne languishes to be conjoined with Roland and the twelve peers in heaven --to a point where he is ready to join bodily in the grave-- he remains a prisoner of his role of emperor of this world, a prisoner of both language and history....." (p. 222). Vance is quite right in suggesting that Charlemagne's anguish derives from the fact that, unlike Roland, he cannot escape this existence; unlike Roland Charlemagne cannot cease to be. As 'prisoner of language and of history' Charlemagne is condemned to the sisyphian torment of having to endlessly sustain narrative.

VEIRE PATE(R)NE

1. Peter Haidu, *The Subject of Violence*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. Haidu notes how in that scene Roland is depicted as author within the text: "Part of the extraordinary quality of the death scene is that Roland is not only arranging a scene but disposing his own body and Adjuvants into a message. The Destinator uses himself as the signifier to transcend his own death as meaning to be apprehended by those dear to him who survive. There is a self-conscious semiotic manipulation of self as object that is remarkable, even if it is recounted briefly and receives little emphasis in the narration. But this *mise-en-scene* of the process of semiotic production has an unexpected secondary effect: the assertion that is produced by the semiotic message (it is stressed by the text) is that of the Destinator in the text, not by the text as Destinator. The text, by deploying this structure, does not take it upon itself to say that Roland died a conqueror; it merely cites him as saying so....." (pp. 29 - 30).

2. Leopold Peeters, "Le 'faire' et le 'dire' dans la *Chanson de Roland*," *Revue des Langues Romanes* 81 (1975) pp. 377 - 93. The 'deed' and the 'word', as Peeters points out, are largely one: "La parole, au moyen âge, n'est pas seulement désignation ni expression ou communication, elle est essentiellement manifestation. Elle n'est pas du tout surajouté aux choses existant en soi (par le terme choses je désigne tout ce que la parole peut manifester : objets, sentiment, idées) mais ce par quoi tout se manifeste, ce qui est incarné dans le monde. Le verbe appelle les choses à l'existence. Il n'y a pas de solution de continuité entre le dire et le faire, entre le verbe et le réel, mais le dire est le manifestation du faire" (382).

3. Haidu. "The issue of Roland's innocence or culpability is inversely related to that of Charles's innocence or culpability" (p. 92).

4. See Bédier's note (*Roland*, p. 339) on the abbreviation of the name Roland in the Oxford manuscript: "Le nom du héros est le plus souvent écrit en abrégé: R. une seul fois (au v. 2118), Roll' 171 fois."

5. Clej, Alina. "Le Miroir du Roi : Une réflexion sur la *Chanson de Roland*," *Romance Philology* XLIV: 1 (1990) p. 36 -53. Charlemagne supporte la blessure du royaume par délégation, dans le corps de Roland qui s'immole à sa place" (p. 49). Though I disagree with Clej's general thesis that the *Roland* moves toward the reestablishment of a lost equilibrium her remarks concerning Charlemagne's willingness to sacrifice Roland are astutely perceptive.

6. *The Holy Bible. Old and New Testaments in the King James Version*, Nashville: Thomas Nelson Inc., 1972.

7. Brigitte Cazelles, "Outrepasser les Normes : L'invention de soi en France Médiéval," *Stanford French Review* XIV (1987) pp. 69 - 92. The act of transgressing the law is essential to the act of artistic creation, as Cazelles well point out: "Ces considérations.....ont surtout pour but de poser la problématique du sujet dans le contexte de la création artistique. Dire que l'invention et imitation sont synonymes, ceci revient à signifier l'impossibilité de toute initiative et originalité personnelles.....au contraire.....la transgression est, dès les débuts de la production vernaculaire médiévale, au cœur de l'acte créateur" (p. 75). Charlemagne's move toward inventing a new social and political order begins with a transgression of the old.

8. Haidu. The refusal of exchange marks a rupture in the social fabric, as Haidu correctly observes: "Not only is the ideal hero of the society dead [...]; the basic principle of social organization --that of exchange-- has been at least interrupted and suspended. This is the ultimate significance of Aude's refusal. If the normal pattern of exchanges encoded in the laws and conventions of the society no longer hold, if the damage to the social fabric is so grievous that its system of compensatory awards is refused by those whom it should benefit, then the very principle of sociality has been suspended" (p. 62).

9. Alexandre Leupin's article (critique 1994) first brought this observation to my attention. Speaking of the 'miracle of the witness' he states: "Étonnant miracle, en effet! D'où vient ce baron féodal survivant, qui existe sans exister, pure fiction don't la *Chanson* souligne de fait la vacuité? Et pourtant, de la chartre qui lui est liée, texte qui authentifie la *Chanson de Roland* elle-même, le destin du sens semble dépendre: sans la connaître, nous n'y entendrons rien, nous dit le texte. En fait, par la référence au témoignage *de visudu* baron Gilles (un nom qui signifie aussi "tromperie" en ancien français) qui n'était pas à la bataille, pure "fiction qui avère la vérité," la geste s'authentifie elle-même, circulairement, en renvoyant du même coup à sa propre fictionnalité."

10. Eugene Vance, "Roland, Charlemagne, and the Poetics of Illumination", *Olifant* 6: 3 - 4 (1979) pp. 213 - 225. I fully concur with Vance's thesis that it is Roland who initiates the process of inscription: "Thus, the two halves of the *Roland* clearly convey to us two opposed notions of monumentality, one oral, one textual. Roland, one will recall, died with the certainty that the memory of his legend would live on in good songs that would be sung by future bards. Charlemagne, by contrast, whose army now teems, we are suddenly told, with "bishops, abbots, monks, canons and tonsured priests" (CCXII), after uttering his oral *planctus* lamenting the loss of Roland, immediately proceeds to make plans for supplementing that memory with monuments of stone that is, with inert signifiers that belong to the world of tablets, inscriptions and of the letter" (p. 223).

11. Hans Aarsleff, "Scholarship and Ideology: Joseph Bédier's Critique of romantic Medievalism," IN *Historical Studies and Literary Criticism*, ed. Jerome J. McGann, Madison: University of Wisconsin Pr., 1985, pp. 93 - 113. In a similar fashion Bédier, too, makes the distinction between history and fiction as Aarsleff here summarizes: "Bédier could not accept the principle 'that nothing could be fictive in a chanson de geste and that no one could be so deprived of imagination as a poet.' He was baffled by a 'method of investigation, which, beginning with a simple fictive work, knew how to restore the dignity of history to apparent fictions and discover the themes of lost epics with surprising precision.' The best epics were the creations of good poets, for 'a masterpiece begins and ends with its author,' not with the 'collective, unconscious, anonymous forces' that were used to replace the individual poet" (p. 103).

ICH-VERLUST

1. Harald Binder, "Die Idee ist ewig", In *Hermann Broch - Der Denker*, ed. Harald Binder, Zürich: Rhein Verlag, 1966, pp. 9 - 29. For Broch truth cannot be grasped but only experienced; and yet Broch does clearly insist upon the existence of truth. Cognition (*Erkenntnis*), therefore, is not a 'knowledge' of truth but a process of subjective inter-reflection wherein the subject perceives itself 'perceiving' truth. To illustrate cognition as process Broch alludes to Hegel's preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and in particular to the example of the bud and the rose bush. Where Hegel refers to bud and rosebush Broch refers to fruit and tree respectively: ".....Der Weg zur Erkenntnis fällt mir mit der Erkenntnis selbst zusammen. Von Endergebnissen läßt sich da wohl überhaupt nicht sprechen --so wenig als man Früchte Endergebnisse des Baumes nenne kann" (p. 9)

2. Paul M. Lützler, *Materialien zu Hermann Broch 'Der Tod der Vergil'*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976, pp. 221 - 228.

3. Manfred Durzak, *Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis*, Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978. Broch hopes to leave an experience of death, which is an experience of the 'real', as a literary legacy. Broch projects this received 'real' into the experience of the reader so that this 'real', Broch's own cognitive construct, should find its place in the world. Compare Durzak's observations on the 'real' and the Brochean 'experience': "Die Struktur der Wirklichkeit --und das heißt von Brochs Kantianischer Basis aus: die Erfahrung der Wirklichkeit-- und die Form des Gedichtes sind aufeinander bezogen" (p. 21).

4. Walter Hinderer, "Grundzüge des 'Tod des Vergils'," In *Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung*, ed. Manfred Durzak, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 89 - 134. Hinderer puts forth an argument for Brochean mysticism and his argument can be summed up in this one sentence: "Der Mensch muß, um das göttliche Wunder zu erfahren, seines

ganzen Selbstes und aller Dinge ledig werden" (p. 94). The passage from *T.D.V.* p. 41 indicates not a movement toward the 'mystical' through the spurning of material existence but, to the contrary, a state of trauma wherein Vergil is forceably stripped of all material support. As the novel continues Vergil resituates himself within 'the things of this world' (*Dingwelt*) (compare *T.D.V.*, pp. 179 - 180 *et passim*).

5. Erich Kahler, "Werttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie bei Hermann Broch," In *Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung*, ed. Manfred Durzak, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 353 - 370. The authority of the forebears, consolidated in the fiction of the *Aeneid*, would put in place an ethical framework out of which the individual subject would function. The absence of such a framework results, according to Broch, in the 'autonomous system of values' exemplified by such expressions as "Art for arts sake", "Business is business", and "War is war". The choice for Broch is one of situating the 'deed' –the creative impulse that determine one's actions– either within the direct actions of the 'autonomous subject' or within the 'word', i.e. within the larger fiction of the text. Kahler points out the path to which the purely rational logic of the 'autonomous subject' may lead: "Da nun der Mensch, wenn in ihm die 'Vernunft' Aufdämmert und Befriedigung verlangt, seine Beweggründe zu rationalisieren sucht –'was immer er tut, es ist ihm in jedem Augenblick plausibel, er motiviert es sich mit Gründen, die ihm Wahrheit sind, er stellt es unter eine logische Beweiskette'– so entwickelt sich mit jedem autonom funktionellen Wertsystem, das aus dem Tun der Menschen erfolgt, und dem sie folgen, allmählich eine zugehörige funktionelle Logik: es bildet sich eine 'Logik des Militärs', eine 'Logik des Wirtschaftsführers', eine 'Logik des Malers', einen 'Logik des Revolutionärs', eine 'Logik des bürgerlichen Faiseurs', usw." (p. 354).

6. Maurice Blanchot, *Le Livre à Venir*, Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1959. Blanchot describes a Broch who 'awakened to die' (*s'éveille pour mourir*) cannot seem to exit death's realm, who continues to write his way into death without ever attaining that end: "..... C'est dans la prison où il vient d'être jeté et lorsqu'il est promis à une fin toute proche que Broch commence son oeuvre centrale, un récit qu'il ne peut espérer mener à "bien" que dans cet espace de la mort qui s'ouvre à lui, mais aussi par des années de survie et de calme travail. Celui qui s'éveille pour mourir, écrit donc la première page d'une oeuvre dont l'achèvement lui demandera dix ans. Défi merveilleux, confiance presque effrayante" (p. 159).

7. Richard Brinkmann, "Romanform und Werttheorie bei Hermann Broch," In *Hermann Broch, Perspektiven der Forschung*, ed. Manfred Durzak, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 35 -68. The passage from pages 110 - 111 introduces the concept of 'mute language' (*die Stumme Sprache*) and the three 'wastrels' illustrate this concept well. In Broch *Die Stumme Sprache* is a babelization of language a fragmentation and subsequent dissolution of the 'real' constituted by language: Hier und immer wieder bei

Broch ist von der Stummheit die Rede. Es ist in der Tat einsichtig, daß in einer Welt des Wertzerfalls einer den anderen nicht mehr versteht und einer dem anderen sich nicht mehr verständlich machen kann; denn es gibt keine gemeinsame Sprache mehr. Sie besagt im Grunde nichts mehr; es entspricht ihr keine Wirklichkeit mehr; sie ist ein Arsenal entleerter Symbole.diesem Problem gilt im Grunde Brochs gewagtester und großartigster Versuch: 'Der Tod des Virgil'" (p. 59).

SCHICKSAL

1. Hermann Broch, "Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse," In *Hermann Broch, Philosophische Schriften 2: Theorie*, Frankfurt am Main: Surkamp Verlag, pp. 173 - 194. The 'entombment' of death becomes necessary as Broch concedes that death cannot be experienced directly: ".....einem Fremdling gleich fühlt sich das Ich in den Zeitstrom hineingehalten, und von da aus ist es wohl auch zu verstehen, daß das Ich vollkommen unfähig ist, sich eine Vorstellung vom eigene Tod zu machen" (186).

2. Hermann Broch, "Logik einer Verfallenden Welt," In *Hermann Broch, Philosophische Schriften 2: Theorie*, Frankfurt am Main: Surkamp Verlag, pp. 156 - 172. Compare this passage from *T.D.V.* with the following: ".....das Bewußtsein in seiner solipsistischen Einsamkeit befindet sich im Zustand maximaler Wahrheit" (p. 158).

3. Richard Brinkmann, "Romanform und Werttheorie bei Hermann Broch", In *Hermann Broch, Perspektiven der Forschung*, ed. Manfred Durzak, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 35 -68. Brinkmann states succinctly the blurring of the line between observed and observer in Broch: ".....Der Beobachtungsakt hat selbst Anteil am Beobachtungsergebnis, er wird selbst 'mit in das Beobachtungsfeld introduziert'" (pp. 55 - 56). I would only add that Broch carries this one step further so that not only are 'subject' and 'object' mutually implicated in the moment of observation, 'subject' and 'object' become inter-reflecting positions that constitute a single subjectivity. In this sense, the subject gazing at the observed sees himself observing himself from the 'object' within his view.

4. Maurice Blanchot, *Le Livre à Venir*, Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1959. Blanchot describes death as an indeterminate space reflecting the 'dying poet' and his song: ".....Il n'y aura pas de communication véritable, ni de chant, si le chant ne peut pas descendre, en deçà de toute forme, vers l'informe et vers cette profondeur où parle la voix extérieure à tout langage. C'est donc cette descente —descente vers l'indéterminé— que le poète mourant cherche à accomplir par sa mort. L'espace du chant et l'espace de la mort nous sont décrits comme liés et ressaisis l'un par l'autre" (p. 169).

5. Manfred Durzak, "Hermann Brochs Auffassung des Lyrischen," In *Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis*, Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978. On a larger plane the 'death-recognizing word' (*das todeserkennenden Wort*) is the word (text) that encompasses not only the rational but the 'irrational' as well. For Broch the 'real' embedded in the text is an 'irrational', opaque real. Literary Kitsch, by way of contrast, presents reality as something completely rational and transparent. Below, Durzak notes the difference: "Broch hat den Prozeß des Dichtens als Rationalisierung eines Irrationalen, d. h. als sprachliche Formung konkreten Erlebens gesehen, wobei das Irrationale als Kern bewahrt bleiben soll. Totale rationale Durchsichtigkeit war ihm, ob im Roman oder im Gedicht, ein Zeichen von Kitsch" (p. 302).

6. Paul Micheal Lützler, "Die Kulturkritik des jungen Broch. Zur Entwicklung von Hermann Brochs Geschichts- und Werttheorie," In *Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung*, ed. Manfred Durzak, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 329 - 352. Broch, in repudiation of the rationalist philosophy of his age, locates the 'real' in the irrational, in the 'unknown familiar' of subject relation. Lützler's presents Broch's position vis-à-vis rationalism in an instructive light: ".....Unter dem Einfluß der vielfältigen Strömungen der damals herrschenden Lebensphilosophie betrachtet er als die Denkweise der abendländischen Kultur den Rationalismus, der ihr "Generationengedächtnis" geprägt habe. Agens des rationalistischen Wissensdurstes und der "geographischen Neugierde" sei die 'Furcht vor dem Unbekannten', die zu einem Sich-selbst-Beruhigen-müssen, zum Willen, alles à tout prix erklären zu wollen, geführt habe" (pp. 330 - 331).

7. Erich Kahler, "Werttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie bei Hermann Broch," In *Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung*, ed. Manfred Durzak, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 353 - 370. The 'thing' (*das Ding*) attains reality only to the extent that it 'receives' the human subject; the human cognition constructs the 'real' within the 'thing'. Kahler summarizes this Brochean concept: "Der 'Setzung der Setzung' introduziert das intelligible Ich in alle Dinge der Welt, denn die Dinge können nur durch das Eingreifen eines Wertsubjektes erfaßt werden, ja durch die einheitsstiftende Auslese des Wertsubjektes erhalten sie überhaupt ihren Dingcharakter" (p. 362).

8. Hermann Broch, "Leben ohne Platonische Idee," In *Hermann Broch - Der Denker*, ed. Harald Binder, Zürich: Rhein Verlag, 1966, pp. 31 - 37. In "Leben ohne Platonische Idee" Broch speaks of the hero who is tragic by definition in that he is left to accomplish the impossible deed, otherwise assigned to religion, of overcoming death. Religion overcomes death by the promise of an afterlife the tragic hero, on the other hand, must complete his task through a process 'rebirth' that occurs within the confined of the earthly sphere. Vergil/ Broch, is the potential 'hero' who would 'overcome death' in reshaping the 'real', in refashioning the 'System of values' (*Wertsystem*) that no longer obtains within the political and social context in which the author finds himself living. Broch's hero is discovered by substituting the word

'author' for 'hero' in the passage here cited: "Der Held ist immer tragisch. Das rührt nicht nur davon her, daß er –seinem irdischen Charakter gemäß– außerhalb des umfassenden religiösen Wertsystems steht, daß er also immer innerhalb eines kleineren Wertsystems wirken muß und sein Streben nach Allgemeingeltung von vornherein zum Scheitern verdammt ist, er ist auch mit der Verpflichtung zur Freiheit belastet. Die religiöse Aufgabe der Überwindung des Todes ist ihm, dem Irdischen aufgelastet worden" (p. 48).

9. Manfred Durzak, *Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis*, Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978. 'Discovering' death's form, i.e. experiencing the 'real', leads to a 'self-realization', or to the location of self, of one's proper subjectivity within the 'real'. Durzak outlines the progression: "Die Frage nach dem Ugrund der Wirklichkeit wandelt sich also für den Menschen zur Frage nach der Wahrheit, die zum Orientierungszentrum all seiner Erkenntnis wird. Die Wahrheit wird zum 'Erkenntnisgrund' des Menschen. Durch die Realisierung dieser haltung verwirklicht der Mensch die Idee seiner selbst, er hat Anteil am 'Jetzt seines eigenen Sinnbildes,' d.h. an der Zeitlosigkeit der Platonischen Idee seines Ichs. Daraus erwächst als letzte Konsequenz, daß die 'Erkenntnisaufgabe,' mit der der Mensch an alles Wirkliches herantritt, ihn gleichzeitig zur Selbstverwirklichung führt. Gestaltet ist also in der Tat ein Durchbruch zu einer Erkenntnis, die über das Bewußtsein Vergils hinausreicht, die aber im folgenden wieder ihm zurückführt" (pp. 100 -101).

ROME

1. Hermann Broch, "Zur Erkenntnis dieser Zeit," In *Hermann Broch, Philosophische Schriften 2: Theorie*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, pp. 11 - 80. 'Truth' and the 'real' are to be understood in Broch's writing as 'cognitive-content' and 'cognitive-act' respectively. These terms speak to the interrelation, the exchange, between the cognitive values with which a work is imbued and the effect these values exercise upon, the way in which they *work* themselves upon the world. Subjectivity prominently exhibits this exchange between 'cognitive-content' and 'cognitive-act'. Compare the following: "Die Situation ändert sich erst, wenn auch das Subjekt des Erkennens objektiviert wird. In dieser objektivierten Gesamterkenntnis läßt sich einwandfrei eine Grundscheidung, nämlich eben die [in] Subjekt und Objekt, aufweisen: es ergeben sich aus ihr die bekannten Zerspaltungen in Erkenntnisakt und Erkenntnisinhalt....." (p. 20).

2. Hermann Broch, "Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten", In *Hermann Broch, Philosophische Schriften 2: Theorie*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, pp. 246 - 299. Broch speaks of symbolization as an 'irreversible' process of representation whereby surplus (*das Inhaltsüberschuß*) is produced. This surplus, which he calls the 'indicated unknown' (*das angedeutete Unbekannte*), is the material out of which the 'real' constructs itself. "Symbolisierungen sind irreversible Abbildungs-

prozesse. Zwar ähneln sie den reversiblen, da sie gleichfalls mit Hilfe eines Abbildes ein Urbild 'repräsentieren', aber es wird nun dieses hier nicht mehr wie dort als vollkommen 'bekannt' angenommen, gestattet nicht mehr eine Punkt für Punkt isomorphe (eben reversible) Abbildung, sondern erfordert kraft seines 'Inhaltsüberschusses' eine andersgeartete, eine 'andeutungsweise' Repräsentation. Doch damit erhebt sich schon die verzweifelte Frage: wie soll etwas Unbekanntes angedeutet werden?" (p. 268).

3. Jean-Paul Bier, *Hermann Broch et 'La Mort de Vergile'*, Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1974. The 'divine' and the 'human' unite definitively in death. However, these two qualities, the divine and the human, exist side by side in the brochean subject. It is the supposition that both are immanent to the subject and the presumption of their perpetual 'internal conflict' upon which Broch bases his theory that an alteration of the 'real' begins with a movement within the individual subject. 'Death', as in the Death of Vergil, is a symbolization of the resolution of this conflict in the production of previously unknown 'real'. ".....L'existence humaine est conçue par lui (Broch) comme un mouvement perpétuel et circulaire entre l'éclatement de l'harmonie préétablie du sujet et de l'objet, entre le moi et le monde, et le retour définitif à l'Intemporel initial, l'éveil à l'unité retrouvée que constitue la mort" (p. 126).

4. Manfred Durzak, *Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis*, Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978. The 'deed' can be defined as the agency of the 'irrational' within the 'rational' word as Durzak explains below: "Broch hat den Prozeß des Dichtens als Rationalisierung eines Irrationalen, d. h. als sprachliche Formung konkreten Erlebens gesehen, wobei das irrationale als Kern bewahrt bleiben soll. Völlige rationale Durchsichtigkeit war ihm, ob im Roman oder im Gedicht, ein Zeichen von Kitsch" (p. 23).

5. Bier. In citing Broch's use of the term 'epistemological novel' Bier indicates that such a 'genre' would, to the extent that it were possible, reveal the *épistémè* of its time. I agree with this, however, with respect to Broch's implementation of the term through the writing of *T.D.V.* I would say that such a work would not merely 'reveal' the *épistémè* of its time but would agency its construction. "Cette légitimation du roman par une théorie du monde et de la culture, acquise par des voies rationnelles, était le fondement de ce qu'Hermann Broch appela alors le "roman épistémologique" (H.B. *Lettres*, Gallimard, 1961; p. 25 - sqq.) : le roman se devait d'aller au-delà de l'explication psychologique des comportements humains pour mettre à jour leur fondement 'épistémologique'. Une telle entreprise fondait la valeur cognitive de l'oeuvre littéraire" (p. 49 - 50).

6. Erich Kahler, "Werttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie bei Hermann Broch," In *Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung*, ed. Manfred Durzak, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 353 - 370. This image of Augustus as the 'Person of the One' illustrates well the concept of the 'whole' person,

the completely rationalized subject. It suggests the complete transparency of the subject whereby the void around which subjectivity is constructed is successfully eliminated. Kahler speaks of the 'rationalized system' of which the 'rationalized subject' would be but one example: "Es ergibt sich aber im rationalen System, das prinzipiell lückenlos sein muß, noch eine andere, eine interne Art von Unbekannten durch auftauchende Lücken, Schließunterbrechungen, Unschlüssigkeiten innerhalb des Systems" (p. 369).

7. Richard Brinkmann, "Romanform und Werttheorie bei Hermann Broch", pp. 55 - 56. See Brinkmann for the equivalence in Broch between the deed and the 'real'. "Ein überaus wichtiges Moment in dieser Entwicklung der Neuzeit ist aber auch die Inthronisierung der Tat als eigentlich Wirklichen" (p. 53).

8. Kahler. The underlying rationale for Rome as 'symbol', is based on the idea found in Broch that the concept of 'nation', 'state', and so forth are primarily if not uniquely cognitive constructs. Kahler signals this notion as inherent to Broch's conceptual outlook: ".....für Broch die geschichtlichen Einheiten und Vorgänge –Staat, Nation, Epoche, Stil, Kultur– nur vom individuellen Ich aus faßbar erschienen....." (p. 361).

9. Hannah Arendt, "Hermann Broch und der moderne Roman", In *Hermann Broch, Perspektiven der Forschung*, ed. Manfred Durzak, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 25 -33. Arendt correctly indicates that for Broch the 'moment' of '*noch nicht und doch schon*' is a moment of crisis situated at the 'turning of an age'. The author Broch places himself –places Vergil as his surrogate– just at the center of crisis, squarely in the chaos that exists between the collapse of one age and the birth of another in order to orchestrate a subsequent reconfiguration of the 'real'. "Jede Krise, jede Wende der Zeiten ist Anfang und Ende zugleich. Als solche birgt sie, in den Worten Brochs, ein Dreifaches in sich: das 'Nicht-mehr' der Vergangenheit, das 'Noch-nicht' der Zukunft und das 'Doch-schon' der Gegenwart" (p. 25).

CONCLUSION

1. Ernst Robert Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und Lateinisches Mittelalter*, Bern und München: Franke Verlag, 1948. (pp. 315 *et passim*)

2. Peter Haidu, *The Subject of Violence*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.

3. Brian Stock, "Lecture, intériorité et modèles de comportement dans l'Europe des XI^e s.", *Cahier de Civilisation Médiévale* XXXIII, (1990) pp. 103 - 112. One could almost apply the terms 'tradition' and 'traditionalism', as they are employed by Stock, to Roland and St. Giles, respectively: "Il faut faire la distinction entre la tradition, héritage nonconscient d'une civilisation, et le

traditionalisme, force active 'fabriquée' d'interprétation consciente de la tradition. Dans le deuxième cas, c'est la lecture qui est la force créatrice. Sans lecture, pas d'interprétation : sans interprétation, pas de traditions nouvelles" (p. 112). St. Giles effects change by first 'reading' the highly stylized narrative executed by Roland at Roncevaux. A careful reading of that 'narrative' clearly demonstrate the profound changes and weaknesses that have already come into existence in the feudal order.

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VITA

Thomas Miller lives in a cottage on the Mississippi in a small south Louisiana community whose denizens and creole ambiance remind him still of Carencro, the place of his birth and growing-up. He has had university experience both at home, within the United States, and abroad. In the academic year 1981 – 82 he was a student of exchange, from Indiana University, Bloomington, to the Free University of Berlin. During 1988 – 89 he spent a year in matriculation at the University of Marseilles, at Aix-en-Provence as an exchange fellow from the Louisiana State University. During that time he took the occasion to travel through much of Europe, from Wales to Poland, by bike, on foot, by train and, occasionally, by virtue of his thumb. He currently teaches French and German in the Department of Foreign Languages at Southern University A&M in Baton Rouge.

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: Thomas Lee Miller

Major Field: French


Title of Dissertation: Shaping the Subject in La Chanson de Roland
and in Hermann Broch's Der Tod des Virgil


Approved:


Major Professor and Chairman


Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:











Date of Examination:

30 November 1999