1998

Rhetoric and Social Struggle: In Search of the Topoi of Violence.

Edward Christopher Reilly
*Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College*

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

**Recommended Citation**
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/6861

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
RHETORIC AND SOCIAL STRUGGLE:
IN SEARCH OF THE TOPOI OF VIOLENCE

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Speech Communication

by

Edward Christopher Reilly
B.A., Northern Illinois University, 1988
M.A., University of Maine, 1990
December, 1998
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to the memory of my mother, Carol M. Reilly, and to the memory of my brother, Mark E. Reilly.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work could not have been possible without the scholarly help of my committee. I cannot express in words the contributions of Dr. Andrew King. His brilliant grasp of rhetorical theory and history, insightful editing and constant good humor provided a needed guiding light. His generosity overwhelms me. Dr. Ken Zagacki has always provided me insightful critiques and pointed me in useful directions. On this project and in the classroom, Dr. Zagacki always pushed me to focus and clarify myself. With so much patience, Dr. Mary Frances Hopkins helped clarify my writing. Dr. Renee Edwards contributed useful discussion and valuable editing to this project. Dr. James Catano was kind, helpful and supportive.

This project would not have been possible without the support of my wife, Amy Reilly. Her kindness and patience helped me though many droughts. The support of my family was always a comfort. Especially enthusiastic were my mother, Carol Reilly, my father, Edward Reilly, and my mother-in-law, LuAnn Hutchins. My friend Steve Braden provided intellectual companionship throughout my five years at LSU, which always made the load a little lighter.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ............................................. iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................... iv
ABSTRACT .............................................. viii

CHAPTER ONE: PERSPECTIVES ON RHETORIC AND VIOLENCE ...................................... 1
Introduction .................................. 1
Research questions ............................ 2
Justification ................................... 3
Method ......................................... 6
Preview ....................................... 8

CHAPTER TWO: CONTRIBUTORY STUDIES ON RHETORIC AND VIOLENCE ................................. 10
Introduction ................................. 10
Social Movement Studies ...................... 11
Domain of Social Movement Theory ....... 11
Violence as Message .................... 14
Violence as Cause and effect ........... 16
Studies in Violence and Rhetoric ............ 17
Studies in Rhetoric and War ............ 19
Case Studies of Violent Episodes ........ 33
Conclusion ................................... 37

CHAPTER THREE: DEFINITION AND METHOD ............ 38
Introduction ................................. 38
Definition of Violence ....................... 38
Method ....................................... 45
Conclusion .................................. 49

CHAPTER FOUR: GEORGE BUSH'S GULF WAR SPEECHES .................. 50
Introduction .................................. 50
The Gulf War Speeches ........................ 50
Analysis of the Topoi of the Speeches ..... 54
First Line: Iraq Against the World ...... 55
Second Line: No Alternative ........... 61
Third Line: Demonize the Enemy ...... 65
Fourth Line: Historical Context ....... 72
Fifth Line: America as a Chosen Place .  .  75
Rhetorical form in The Gulf War Speeches .... 79
President Bush's Audience ............. 80
Narrative in The Speeches ............... 84
Conclusion ................................... 91
ABSTRACT

The rhetorical study of violence tends to examine violence within larger generic boundaries such as social movements studies or war rhetoric. In order to work toward a generalizable rhetorical theory of violence and discourse, this study examines texts which justify violence across generic boundaries. Accordingly, four case studies individually examine texts which justify political violence. This study compares and contrasts the rhetorical strategies of George Bush, the Unabomber, Earth First! and Abbie Hoffman. This study concludes that there are no universal strategies among the four case studies in the justification of violence. However, there appears to be a continuum of rhetorical strategies which rhetors follow depending on whether they are seeking to reinforce social institutions through violence, or destroy social institutions through violence.
CHAPTER ONE

PERSPECTIVES ON RHETORIC AND VIOLENCE

INTRODUCTION

Violence is an unwieldly issue for scholars. It is ubiquitous, sporadic, and multi-dimensional. When human beings intentionally do harm to one another as individuals, as organized bands, or as nations, a multiplicity of variables arise. Endless causes are cited. Circumstances and intentions are scrutinized. Whose motives contributed to the violence? Who instigated it? To whom was it done? In what measure? Even in the arena of domestic disturbances, causal factors appear innumerable. Eliciting accounts from family members may be difficult and contextual data may be unavailable. These problems are greatly compounded in larger contexts when violence is used by nations or by organized factions against states.

The traditional dichotomy between persuasion and coercion has militated against the study of violence as a communicative form by rhetorical scholars. While some research of war discourse between nation states exists, it is not unified into a general theory; rather, it exists as fragmented case studies. Research on the rhetoric of violence in fringe groups is even less developed, perhaps because rhetoricians are traditionally attached to legitimate institutional arrangements. This study aims to begin filling this gap by undertaking four individual case
studies and searching for a set of common rhetorical strategies among them. Like many beginning studies, it is essentially classificatory. This study examines the manifestos and justifications of four separate agents whose discourse arose in four separate arenas. It will seek to identify common features of discourse justifying violence. An audit of common forms, arguments and strategies may help to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate expressions of violence. Finally, it will analyze the rhetoric of violence as a vocabulary of motives that will reveal the symbolic meaning of the act for the perpetrator.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study asks a large question: Are there common topoi for the justification of violence that flow across genres of establishment and oppositional discourse? This question contains sub-questions to be explored across four case studies: (1) What rhetorical forms and strategies, (narrative, metaphor, arguments, etc.) are most often selected to justify the use of violence in each case? (2) Is there a common linguistic "mathematics" for the conception of violence across the case studies? (i.e. How is violence related to larger organizational objectives? How is violence reconciled with group morals? How is violence chosen from a hierarchy of means of influence?).
JUSTIFICATION

This study investigates the arguments, narratives, and images that support large scale, organized violence in the discourse of four diverse advocates: President George Bush, the Unabomber, Abbie Hoffman, and Earth First!.

Several arguments justify this study. First, there is a lack of studies about violence in the field of rhetorical theory and criticism. This gap is ironic given that one of the earliest landmark essays by a founder of the discipline of rhetorical criticism was on this topic. In his essay "The Rhetoric of Hitler's Battle," Kenneth Burke offered a careful study of the autobiographical text of humanity's perfect devil and identified rhetorical patterns from which Burke discovered Hitler's view of the world. Burke's insights contributed to an understanding of Hitler's motives and proved to be prophetic in charting Hitler's subsequent conduct.

The study of perspectives on violence draws largely from the literature of social movement theory, which after thirty years of research still lacks unity. Despite a wealth of social movement research, no general theory exists to explain justifications of violence, perhaps because researchers tend to focus on case studies.

For purposes of studying violence, social movement theory research has two weaknesses: it seldom compares studies of social movement discourse, and it contains a
bias toward successful and ultimately assimilable movements, such as civil rights, feminism, and mainstream reforms. Scholars clearly prefer movements that feature persuasion over violence, and tend to view terrorists and other fringe groups as aberrations that have little to teach us.

Richard Rubenstein (1987) provides a second rationale for this study. He argues that the problem with much of the research on terrorism lies in its tendency to look at its external causes rather than attempting to discover the internal logic of the movement.

Concentrating on the external causes of terrorism such as economic factors, patronage by rogue nations, and the structure of "terror networks" distracts scholars from looking at movements' inner worlds revealed through their discourse. Rubenstein claims that modern terror-oligists are fixated on the supply end of terrorism, such as the intricate tools terrorists use or elaborate schemes for getting false papers. But scholars fail to look at the demand end of the equation: what are the sources of terrorism and from what world view does the rationalization of terrorism spring?

Rubenstein notes that much of the existing literature on terrorism focuses too much on case studies and the tactics of a given group. In short, literature does not build toward a general theory as comparative studies might
do. Too often, empirical studies result in psychologizing and fragmentation. In general, each act of terrorism is treated as unique and unrepeatable, isolated from other terrorist acts or movements (p. 61).

Rubenstein concludes that terrorism is mysteriously rooted in human nature and therefore cannot be ended, only contained or meliorated (p. 63). Despite his essential pessimism, he argues that to offer even a tentative answer to our questions about terrorism, we must understand its recurrent features. Rhetorical justifications of violence, which this study examines, are one potential place to look for these recurring features.

A final justification is that in study of the manifestos of radicals we find evidence of a recurrent generic appeal that transcends time, place and generation. These are utopian visions as much as they are critiques of the present; they may exhibit broad appeals that cut across the variety of oppositional groups that characterize society. The manifesto, as it is addressed to both internal and external audiences, may tell us much about the ways in which language and violent action complement each other in the public arena.

For example, to understand America historically and ideologically, we do not study only the specific details of revolutionary battles, but also the ways in which these events were framed and reframed in the contest for world
opinion between Britain and the colonies. Nor do we study the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as ideal conceptions of polity, but rather as persuasive weapons in a context of nation birthing and world struggle. Therein lies the significance of understanding the rhetoric of violence: to discover the logic and rhetoric of those who advocate violence.

METHOD

Robert Ivie's (1974) examination of rhetorical forms associated with aggressive human behaviors has served as a precedent for studies involving mixed forms of coercion and persuasion. Ivie examines presidential war messages across two centuries to discover forms and patterns. In a similar vein this study examines the discourse of violence in Twentieth Century America in order to identify the topoi which are used to justify it. This examination allows for an informed judgement about the selection, artistry and effectiveness of such discourse.

In four case studies, I examine discourse which justifies violence on a large (societal) scale. I am not interested in the discourse of why Peter hit Paul. I am interested in the discourse of why nations fight, why terrorists bomb, and why insurgents rebel. One case study each of President George Bush, the Unabomber, Abbie Hoffman, and Earth First! will individually examine discourse which justifies violence. Each case consists of
a particular group's texts and/or speeches in which violence is explained and justified to the audience. That this study is made up of four distinctly different groups is a strength which allows comparison of the linguistic conceptions and advocacy of violence across a continuum of legitimate (presidency) to illegitimate (terrorists) sources. This allows us to discover if there is a common discourse of violence for all groups at some level or if there are significant differences between legitimate and illegitimate groups.

This study thus examines the discourse of these groups to discover answers to these questions for each case:

1) What are the main themes and justifications discussed in each case? What are the rationales for violence?

2) How are these adapted to the audience reading or hearing the discourse?

3) What form do the arguments take? Are they rooted in tradition, values or ideals? Do they exist in a vacuum, disconnected from the audience and society?

Each case study will seek answers to these questions so that we may arrive at a bigger picture of how violence is conceptualized and justified.

Discourse practices that display similarities across institutional lines would represent an important gain in our knowledge about this subject. If there are no similarities among any of these groups, we will still gain a significant understanding of the disparate views of radicals on violence and its usefulness, and how those
views both fit into and depart from a mainstream political discourse. A lack of a generalized topoi for violence may show us how little we truly understand about it.

PREVIEW

This dissertation consists of eight chapters:

Chapter One, an introductory chapter, provides background, explains the scope of the study and justifies its importance and outlines the method.

Chapter Two summarizes and synthesizes relevant studies in rhetoric and violence. In so doing, the chapter contextualizes this study by situating it in contemporary theory.

Chapter Three defines the term violence and situates it within a normative historical context. It also discusses the method to be used in the dissertation.

Chapter Four examines ten of George Bush's Gulf War speeches. The chapter will first provide a brief history and context of the speeches, then examine the texts in pursuit of the answers to the research questions.

Chapter Five is a case study on the Unabomber. The chapter will provide a brief history of the Unabomber and examine his manifesto, "Industrial Society and Its Future."

Chapter Six examines Abbie Hoffman's revolutionary writings in Steal This Book. The chapter will provide a brief biography of Abbie Hoffman and a history of his
movement. In addition, it will then analyze this text in search of the answers to the research questions.

Chapter Seven is a case study on Earth First!'s handbook for environmental protection, Ecodefense. The chapter will provide a brief history of Earth First! and examine the text seeking to answer the research questions.

Chapter Eight draws together the results of each of the four case studies. This chapter closely examines the justifications and conceptualizations of the use of violence proposed in each of the four case studies. Comparisons will be used to chart similarities and differences. These findings will be synthesized, and the significance of the findings will be discussed.
CHAPTER TWO
CONTRIBUTORY STUDIES ON RHETORIC AND VIOLENCE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to situate this study within the relevant scholarly literature. This chapter reviews literature in rhetoric and violence and discusses the usefulness of these works with special emphasis on their perspectival and methodological limitations.

As an independent area of study, violence is not defined in communication literature by any set of consistent standards. Instead, it is studied as a part of a larger genre, such as social movements or war studies. In this chapter, contributory articles on rhetoric and violence will be reviewed with an eye toward setting up the present study. This chapter demonstrates the lack of studies that consider violent discourse rhetorically, and it proposes a productive alternative: pursuing the rhetorical construction of violence as an act, rather than pursuing the role of violence in the act; or, put another way, to study the rhetoric of violence, rather than to study "rhetorical violence."

Social violence has been the subject of scholarly study in other disciplines. Marx and Weber examined violence and its role in society. Durkheim examined the role of crime in affecting the collective conscious, and changing societal norms. Richard Slotkin's (1973) seminal
work, *Regeneration Through Violence* examines the myth of violence as a regenerative force in American history. These works are critical to understanding the role of violence in society. But their focus on historical social behavior, rather than specific justificatory discourses, still leave the research questions for this study unanswered. This study examines symbolic discourse which justifies and advocates violence. The remainder of this chapter examines communication literature on social movement theory, war studies, and case studies in violent episodes.

**SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDIES**

Three issues limit the use of social movement theory as a basis for studying rhetoric and violence: the contested domain of social movement theory, the characterization of violence as an extension of language, and the focus on effects of violence in movements. I will discuss each of these individually.

**The Domain of Social Movement Theory**

Despite the rapid growth of social movements as a field of rhetorical study, some researchers have challenged the very idea of "social movement" as a construct. Simons (1970) provides the first substantial attempt to take criticism of social movements from Leland Griffin’s (1952) pioneering, but primitive, perspective into the post-Black (1965) realm of social/cultural rhetorical criticism.
Although Griffin gives his method a Burkean vocabulary in his 1964 and 1968 studies of the New Left, he retained its Hegelian assumptions about counter movements and organizational synthesis. Simons identifies three areas of social movements worthy of study: the challenges to the leaders of social movements, the rhetorical problems that they face, and the range of strategies available to movement leaders (from moderate to militant). From the endless possibilities, Simons seems to frame a reasonable proposal for the systematic study of social movements. Yet, within a decade, other researchers challenged the concept of a social movement as a meaningful category of analysis.

Zarefsky (1980) distinguishes between historical study of movements (movements exist as historical phenomena with the use of rhetoric) and the theoretical study of movements (scholar seeks to make generalizable claims about the rhetoric of social movements). Zarefsky attacks traditional definitions of social movements as a dialectic between establishments/institutions and one or more un-institutionalized groups. He argues that a dialectic between an institution and un-institutionalized groups does not necessarily constitute a social movement. Accordingly, received definitions of a social movement fail to delineate a unique rhetorical form. If movements are not discrete
forms, there is no basis for establishing rhetorical theories to account for them.

Hahn and Gonchar (1980) offer a similar argument, refuting each claim of Simons' 1970 essay. Like Zarefsky, they too contend that movement studies do not represent a distinct theoretical domain. Hahn and Gonchar argue that the challenges posed to social movement leaders are met in precisely similar ways by actors other than social movement leaders. Without theoretical distinctness, there is no need for the theory; social movements do not use a kind of rhetoric different from other rhetors. As an alternative, Hahn and Gonchar promote case studies and caution scholars against the impulse to build theory:

In short, even in the most radical of their rhetorical strategies, social movements do not engage in either rhetoric or behavior that is not already encompassed by extant theory. . . . Rather, it is precisely because each speaker is different that we continue to do rhetorical analyses of significant speakers. And we should do the same with movements - not because we will develop a new rhetorical theory but because movements are significant in our society" (p. 64).

McGee (1980) also offers objections to Simons' social movement theory. McGee (1980) argues for pursuing an account of human consciousness, rather than an account of organizational behavior. Social movements ought not function as a perspectival frame for our research, defining what we want to see, and structuring our results according to our expectations. Rather, it might emerge only as a carefully considered and well argued inference which claims
that changes in human consciousness are of such a nature that a "social movement" has occurred. Or, McGee might argue that one can speak of the rhetoric of a given group as constituting a movement, but the name would be a real fiction or "term of convenience" uttered after the fact. Thus, McGee sees the domain of social movement theory as largely unnecessary.

The preceding arguments indicate doubt about the viability of social movement theory. Notwithstanding the difficulty of constructing a satisfactory definition, scholars continue to use "social movement" as a name to describe popular collective discourse. Furthermore, despite the broad theoretical criticism mentioned here, social movement criticism has no lack of current practitioners.

**Violence as Message**

Another obstacle to using existing social movement theory to study violent discourse is the apparent assumption that violence is a logical and measurable extension of language. In this capacity violence is viewed as a symbolic act which carries a kind of message that language could not, or a message that establishes the credibility and power of certain linguistic utterances.

Haiman (1967) discusses the protests of the turbulent 1960s in terms of what he calls "body rhetoric": sit ins, occupations, and similar
types of protests common to that era. He concludes that when the traditional vessels of expression in public conversation become clogged, protest methods such as body rhetoric gain greater legitimacy. From this same perspective, Haiman (1968) assesses the ethics of physical forms of 1960s' discourse, particularly the increased use of emotion (slogans, polarization strategies, less traditional forms of communication), the increased "body rhetoric" (marches, sit ins, vigils), and the increased civil disobedience, and finds a place for these forms in a free society.

Evaluating direct action as a mode of communication, Haiman concludes it is fair play in a society in which the voice of the people has been outshouted by the government. If people cannot be heard, they have a right to exercise a sort of "higher law" of free expression, provided they interfere only with institutions and not do harm to individuals. For example, the illegal blocking of traffic is ethical ninety nine percent of the time; but a case such as keeping a bleeding child from getting to the hospital is not ethical.

Andrews (1969) finds similar justification for body rhetoric in his analysis of the takeover of Columbia University administrative buildings by students who were upset about university policies. He distinguishes between coercion and persuasion, and evaluates the
actions at Columbia in terms of a "coercive rhetoric."
His conclusions are similar to Haiman's: Coercive acts are not fully justified when they disrupt the everyday activities of those who are not involved. For example, since the people at Columbia did not allow others to attend classes and work, legal and ethical issues were brought into the persuasive process because choices were denied to those who dissented.

Andrews claims that distinguishing between coercion and persuasion might be a good way for critics to reach judgments about them; the act then necessarily becomes a message and moves on the same trajectory as dialogue.

These early studies are simplistic, but they do illustrate a concern of early social movement studies to examine acts of violence or civil disobedience and reflect on the act as the message. The present study departs from this approach by studying texts that justify violence, rather than examining the message the act itself carries. The present study interprets the motives of the actors through their discourse; it does not seek to interpret intentions through an examination of physical behaviors.

Violence as Cause and Effect

A third manner in which violence is accounted for in social movement theory is as a cause or an effect. Violence results from the movement, or violence is the
cause of some sort of action in, on, or concerning the movement.

Bowers, Ochs, and Jensen (1993) note that violent acts, void of apparent symbolism, are likely to cost a movement support of sympathizers and legitimizers and invite outright suppression. Stewart, Smith, and Denton (1994) claim that violent acts, such as the bombing of a University of Wisconsin Army Research Lab, the killing of an abortion doctor, or the sabotaging of logging equipment may neutralize years of protest, even if the acts are by fanatical, minuscule, splinter groups (p. 79). These approaches examine the symbolic capacities of violence as viewed by an audience external to the movement. The logic and rhetoric of the perpetrators is dismissed as irrational, unpredictable or unworthy of study.

Violence in a political context is symbolic action. Violent acts framed in a socially contested event or issue may be construed as messages. The present study reaches beyond the act and its potential or assumed message and examines textual messages associated with violence in movements, rather than the symbolic dimension of the act of violence.

STUDIES IN VIOLENCE AND RHETORIC

The possibility of violence is often omnipresent in public discourse, whether or not violent acts occur. In many disagreements, violence is present as a subtext
although it may never be mentioned in the process of negotiation. One nation's threat to another has an intrinsic element of violence. President Kennedy's threats of violence to the Russians may demonstrate the effective use of threat. Often non-violent acts or civil disobedience are effective because of the potential of violence. The language and body language of the masses behind Martin Luther King were not violent; but the effectiveness of the movements may be due to just the potential of violence. Sometimes Ghandi was unable to control his huge crowds of followers. Violence was not manifest; rather, it waited (usually) silently in the background.

Kinetic energy is the energy of motion; the rock falling is kinetic energy. Potential energy is the energy stored in the rock as it sits atop the mountain, waiting for a disturbance to cause it to fall. The rock on the edge is potential energy; the rock falling is actual (kinetic) energy. Both are documented forms of physical energy. In the same way, the non-violence of certain movements can be as potent a force as violence because of the stored potential of the possibility of violence.

Although studies in violence are most often found in the domain of social movement theory, there are studies with various theoretical approaches outside that domain. These tend to be case studies of individual events
which do not work towards a generalizable rhetorical theory of violence and discourse. Typical of these are studies in the rhetoric of war, and individual case studies on violent historical acts.

**Studies in Rhetoric and War**

To sort through the volumes of work on rhetoric and war is beyond the scope of this study. There are, however, important approaches taken that influence this present study. Most relevant are Robert Ivie's studies on the language and images conjured up in statist war rhetoric.

Ivie (1974) studies the vocabulary of U. S. Presidents to locate the images they project in the justification of war. This "vocabulary of motives" (p. 337) spans 150 years and seven wars. A vocabulary of motives may be thought of as a name of a complete action in the scene that embodies the reason why the act was done. In this sense, motive is broader than the purpose of the act; it is in fact the rationale as well. A vocabulary of motives has a transcendent element that often reveals ultimate systemic principles. Ivie finds that presidents tend to reinforce the ideal of American rights (p. 341), tend to privilege principles over material circumstances (p. 342), characterize the pending situation as a moral as well as a physical crisis, and tend to characterize opposing governments in 'devil terms.' War is recommended only as a
last resort, and after the courses of other solutions have been shown to fail (p. 344).

Ivie notes that the permanence of this truncated logology of war motives warrants concern. Despite different presidents, eras, and enemies, the characterization of the agent and scene by presidents tends to be consistent. Ivie's 1974 study essentially does for war rhetoric what this dissertation seeks to discover about the rhetoric and justifications of violence. His conceptions of motives are not mere reasons for action, but revelations about communal symbols, moral aspirations and the identity of the actors.

Elsewhere, Ivie (1980) examines the role of language more specifically in constituting a mentality of war through presidential discourse. In his study of the discourse surrounding the War of 1812, Ivie identifies force as the master trope of prowar discourse. Ivie focuses attention on the literalization of the trope through a process in which the rhetor paints the desires and interests of the U.S. as desirable, and the motives of the enemy as unjust and not in the interests of the U.S. He abstracts the case of 1812 into generalizations about how prowar arguments are produced from metaphors of force.

More than a mere ornamental artifice of language, Ivie claims the metaphor is a way of understanding
and communicating reality because of its analogical connection of the unknown to the known. When one connects a literal thing to a figurative reference, one has not only "committed an analogy," but also created a reality.

Following Burke, Ivie notes the importance of recognizing that the whole should not be so simply reduced to the part. Analogies need to be considered as potential multiple, flexible, viewpoints. Although there is the temptation to reduce a set of characterizations to one metaphor, the critic needs to keep mind that there are alternate ways of conveying the phenomenon (p. 240).

Ivie urges critics to consider the metaphor as a tentative reality, a singular path taken among the many available. The choice of a given metaphor indicates a perspective of the maker. Whenever similarity is taken as evidence of an identity, it obliges us to understand how the inference is made (p. 241); more specifically, the critic should ask "How does the rhetor arrive at the connection between X image and Y object?" In the case of the War of 1812, war seemed to be the only alternative to the actions of the British upon the U.S., or so the situation appeared after a metaphor of force was stretched to its limits (p. 241).

Ivie argues that attending to metaphors of force and literalization is a key to understanding not only the justifications of war in 1812, but also the development of
prowar rhetoric generally (p. 250). If justification of war involves an upward way toward the sacred, prosecution of the war brings us to a downward way through literal enactment. Literalization of metaphors of force is the principal means of developing such a threatening image of the enemy's advance; when you literalize the enemy into savagery, then submitting to it becomes more dangerous for the nation, and the nation is more likely to go to war for it (p. 252). Above all, Ivie concludes the function of prowar rhetoric is to establish a realistic image of the enemy's savagery in order to eliminate peace as a viable alternative to war (p. 253). For Ivie, this type of discourse reflects the process of power-bound reality construction. Thus, a metaphor of organization as ideology is at the heart of understanding political rhetoric.

Ivie's studies are anecdotal samples of studies in rhetoric and war, but they illustrate well the connection between language and violence. Language gives us permission to use violence, goads us to violence, and allows us to separate the good from the bad in order to justify the use of violence by one group on another group. Language can be violence by other means, allowing us to demonize the enemy, justify his or her death (symbolic or actual) and restore our own national/social cohesion.

Ivie has tended to emphasize forms as psychic prisons. In his work, rhetorical forms generally trap rather than
enable people to make choices. His pessimistic conclusion is that over-rationalized organizational discourse sanctions irrational behavior.

Theodore Windt (1983) examines speeches of Kennedy on the Cuban Missile Crises and Nixon on the invasion of Cambodia, concluding that a genre of crisis rhetoric exists, and has identifiable rhetorical characteristics. Windt was perhaps the first to identify the characteristics of the genre of crisis rhetoric. Windt (1983) examines the discourse of Kennedy on the Cuban missile crisis and the speeches of Nixon on the invasion of Cambodia. Windt claims that crises are primarily rhetorical. An act or a set of acts is not in itself a crisis; a crisis is a human construct, a symbolic action. A crisis is declared. In the practices of national state discourse, we have designated that the president is the who declares a crisis. Accordingly, we have vested the office of the presidency with a powerful ethos which assumes the president is wise and all knowing (even if he is not), and that he has a status that no other world leader has. For Windt, this is an almost mythical stature. He claims, "The psychology present here makes the president's decisions seem wise and prudent . . . The aura of reverence shapes a will to believe the President when he speaks, and places the burden of disproving any presidential statement upon those who disagree" (1983, p. 63).
Windt's analysis compares and contrasts the speeches of a conservative president and a liberal president, concluding that there are common generic features present in both. First, the president announces that he has access to and control over facts. Such access is not usually available to others, as he is advised by experts. Secondly, having claimed access to important information, the president then narrates it. This narrative power is associated only with him, again, because of his position and his access to information that others do not possess.

Thirdly, the president places the conflict in a greater context of the struggle between good and evil. For the presidents under study, Windt finds they put the conflict in terms of the communist threat against the free world. Other scholars, writing after the end of the Cold War claim presidents still finds a despot against which to pit American freedom (e.g., the U.S. versus a hostile Iraq [Pollock, 1994]).

The fourth feature is that the president announces the new policy upon which he has decided. He can count on strong support, as the nation defers to his good judgement and control of information.

Finally, each president appears to engage in "newspeak," characterizing events in loaded or neutralizing terms. For example, Kennedy's blockade of Cuba was called a quarantine. Nixon claimed that his invasion of Cambodia
was not an invasion, but rather the most expedient route to ending the war.

Windt concludes that presidents demand "people forfeit their right to judge for themselves the propriety of a policy. He calls upon the people to invest in the President more wisdom than most Presidents exhibit" (1973, p. 69).

Cherwitz and Zagacki (1986) examine the presidential crisis rhetoric of five administrations in search of similarities and differences in consummatory and justificatory rhetorical responses. Consummatory rhetoric is that which is itself the only response taken by the U.S. to the crisis. When the only response is speech, then it is considered consummatory. Justificatory rhetoric is discourse accompanying further action, usually military intervention. The authors look for differences in crisis rhetoric in situations where discourse was the only response by a President, and in situations in which discourse was accompanied by action.

Five messages are analyzed: Reagan's response to KAL 007, Carter's response to seizure of the hostages in Iran, Johnson's Tonkin Gulf speeches, Kennedy's response to the Cuban missile crisis, and Ford's response to the Mayaguez incident.

Cherwitz and Zagacki discover several differences between the consummatory and justificatory discourses.
They find there is a distinction between the degree of certainty and tentativeness in each. Consummatory rhetoric is circumspect; it emphasizes caution and patience. On the other hand, justificatory rhetoric is irrevocable and less ambiguous, with an air of finality about it. Justificatory rhetoric is decisive and 'tougher talking.'

Consummatory rhetoric calls for perpetrators to act: They must stop their belligerence and apologize, make reparations and amends. On the other hand, justificatory rhetoric closes out the crisis through action. Whereas consummatory rhetoric demands, justificatory rhetoric announces. Consummatory asks, justificatory tells.

Consummatory rhetoric tends to be forensic by outlining the details of the deed that was done, and the problems that caused it. Justificatory rhetoric tends to be deliberative, focusing more on the remedy and its details. Justificatory rhetoric issues its arguments from higher moral grounds.

Finally, there is a distinction between the two types of crisis rhetoric. Justificatory is deliberative and defending, and is aimed at only the two parties involved. On the other hand, consummatory rhetoric is for the world to hear; if the only response of the U.S. is speech (rather than action), then the audience is not limited to the two parties involved, but rather intended for nations other than the two involved in the conflict.
Cherwitz and Zagacki also find similarities between the two types of responses. Crisis rhetoric focuses on America's ability to endure hardships. Crises give presidents opportunities to unite the country around a given theme. In both types of crisis rhetoric, America is characterized as a relatively passive agent, which may justify any military actions taken. The role of passive agent also allows the President to preempt charges that the U.S. is imposing American imperialism on the world.

Cherwitz and Zagacki conclude that features of crisis rhetoric are dependent on the actions the U.S. takes. If the U.S. is taking action along with the rhetoric, then the president emphasizes certain features of discourse. If the U.S. is not taking action, then the President emphasizes other features of discourse.

Cherwitz (1978) examines three of Lyndon Johnson's speeches on the Gulf of Tonkin for justifications Johnson used immediately after the events occurred. Cherwitz finds five recurring characteristics in each speech. First, each of the speeches was a speech of justification. The claims centered around action President Johnson had already taken. The second characteristic concerns the strength of the argument. Cherwitz claims that the President made his case on very dubious evidence. The third characteristic Cherwitz finds are recurring linguistic imagery. President Johnson used vivid language to describe the situation,
loaded heavily with images of 'aggression,' 'hostility,' and 'unprovoked' acts. Such imagery helped characterize the enemy as bad, and the U.S. as a passive, innocent agent, responding to a hostile act.

Fourth, Cherwitz finds that the President localized the acts of aggression. Johnson's discourse made the act, which occurred thousands of miles away, a very local act. He characterized the event in terms of its impact at home, thus bringing it back across the ocean, and making the threat more real and immediate. Finally, Cherwitz finds that the president established personal credibility.

Cherwitz concludes that by addressing the nation and congress about the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin, the President attempted to construct a picture of the events in ways which make the issue pressing to the United States. The events in the Gulf of Tonkin were not salient to the nation until the President made them salient. The President's discourse therefore creates reality by symbolically assembling perceptions.

Mark Pollock (1994) examines George Bush's Gulf War discourse from the perspective of crisis rhetoric. By examining the President's presidential papers, Pollock argues that Bush frames his arguments by rooting them in history. Bush constructed a meta-narrative consisting of fifty three years of historical events, with the Gulf War woven into the story. Pollock argues Bush attempted to
transcend the exigencies of the immediate crisis by drawing on the public memory of the appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938, the successes of WWII, and the failure of Viet Nam.

Pollock argues that the Gulf War presented Bush with at least two exigencies. The first exigency was the immediate crisis at hand, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. But more pressing was the need to deal with the subtext of America's failure in Viet Nam. In 1990-91, America again saw a conflict across the globe pitting our troops against a massive army on unfamiliar turf (the desert).

Pollock argues that by using broad historical references and analogies, Bush mounted a "revisionist lesson of Viet Nam" in which the war was portrayed as an "isolated deviation from the path that had brought us within sight of the promised land- the New World Order" (1994, p. 209).

By associating the present crisis with valorized historical episodes, Bush sought to amplify the crisis, at once transcending the expedience of blood for oil and turning it into a larger historical post-Cold War narrative of good versus evil.

Pollock concludes that notwithstanding the lack of the traditional Cold War enemy, and despite America's fear of another Viet Nam, Bush "shaped a narrative that made his
policies moral imperatives and a test of American character" (p. 221). Pollock claims:

The construction of a narrative in which Munich, not Viet Nam, served as the condensation symbol, amplified the stakes of the crisis and legitimized decisive military action. . . As Bush's discourse unfolded, it moved from an evasion of Viet Nam to an effort to reincorporate that war into a founding story that, if successful, would rewrite Viet Nam as rhetorical event [sic]. That is, Viet Nam would still be a part of the rhetorical resources of American foreign policy rhetoric, but as an argument for intervention and against its dissent.

Kathleen German (1995) also examines Bush's rhetoric on the crisis in the Gulf. German argues that Bush framed the Gulf crisis in terms of directive language, a concept developed by Hayakawa. Four markers indicate the use of directive language: highly abstract, emotive words; a supernatural preeminence order which transcends the secular and mundane; punishment pending by the supernatural; and a demand of sacrifice in order to maintain the established order.

German argues Bush faced two exigencies: public memory of the U.S. failure in Viet Nam, and the dissent, or at least lack of unity, behind Bush's objective of military force. Her analysis of six presidential messages, including speeches, press conferences, and newsprint articles, examines Bush's employment of each of the four aspects of directive language.

First, Bush used emotive and abstract language in reference to the U.S. failure in Viet Nam, success in
World War II, and the U.S. role as the "guardian of democracy" (p. 295). Bush's visionary characterization of the future and the birth of the New World Order are characterized by emotive language which includes depictions of Saddam as evil.

The second aspect of directive language Bush used was reference to the supernatural. Bush invoked a divine being, praying for the safety of American troops, as well as innocent civilians caught up in the conflict by no fault of their own. German claims Bush also invoked the U.N. as a deity, elevating U.N. sanctions and assembled coalition forces to transcendent mandates.

Third, German identifies references in the discourses to justified punishment. U.N. and U.S. actions designed to deter Iraq are cited as metaphorically representing the U.S. as an agent of the supernatural in carrying out punishment.

Fourth, German identifies Bush's calls for sacrifice in order to attain the goal of world peace. Bush's speeches were peppered with this abstract sense of sacrifice needed to achieve the grand goals of world peace and the New World Order. But, German also identifies specific sacrifices requested by the President. Bush asked oil producing nations to increase production, Americans to solve the budget deficit, and the U.N. to outlaw chemical weapons. German concludes that Bush stymied his critics by
connecting the present actions to heroic acts of the past in WWII. In so doing, he encouraged Americans to define themselves as guardians of humanity in the face of absolute evil (p. 300).

The preceding section has important implications for the study of the discourse of violence. First, the studies expose critical threads which pervade presidential war discourse: characterizing America as good and justified, characterizing the enemy as evil and unjustified, and invoking historical references. Second, these studies show the importance of the study of the language used in justifying war. Presidents do not simply convey information, but rather, through their characterization of events, actors, and motives, they create reality.

An important assumption underpins these scholars' findings: the office of the Presidency provides the President with the power to define a set of events as a crisis. An event is not a crisis until the president declares it as such. The president has the powers to define and to sweep away the paradoxes and relativism. This power is creative and allows the president the mandate to "author" a crisis. As Windt (1983) argues, crises are primarily rhetorical: "the President's perception of the situation and the rhetoric he uses to describe it mark an event as a crisis" (p. 62). Few people have the power and the access to the media that the president does, and this
power of definition is not easily contradicted. Yet, Windt made this claim before the advent of CNN, C-Span and the internet as media which may eventually contradict this assertion today. Today, the president is not necessarily the first to present an account of such events.

Perhaps the end of the Cold War has diminished the President's power of definition. President Clinton's foreign policy difficulties suggest he is now reduced to a co-creator with the media, or at least forced to fund his arguments differently as he lacks the backdrop of the Cold War meta-narrative (Kuypers, 1995).

Case Studies of Violent Episodes

Although it is an uncommon topic of research, violence is studied, and almost always in isolated case studies. Rarely are case studies grouped to draw out discursive comparisons or to construct a general theory. Recent case studies demonstrate this point.

Mari Tonn (1995) examines the content and context of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn's 1915 essay Sabotage. In the essay, Flynn advocates the use of sabotage by workers against their own employers in order to further the ends of their collective interests (i.e., union gains and worker's rights). A few years after Flynn wrote this essay, she repudiated its message. Tonn's essay examines Sabotage and Flynn's change of heart through a dramatistic
analysis. Tonn seeks to rectify the conflicting rhetorical viewpoints of the author.

On one hand, Tonn claims that Flynn's essay justifies that the acts of the saboteur can be justified through a 'Burkean mysticism' when the act becomes legitimated by a higher power, or a higher law. On the other hand, Flynn's later repudiation of *Sabotage* is justified by her concern for group cohesion. The acts of a single person are not helpful to the movement as a whole; individuals ought to align themselves with their movement.

Tonn argues that Flynn "vacillated between a materialist perspective in which acts of sabotage by workers were determined by the economic scene that constrained (and even contained) them and a mystical perspective in which any worker's action became justified as the agency to alter scene through revolution" (1995, p. 64). Flynn's change of heart may have stemmed from her eventual conclusion that "elevating individual's needs above the Worker as a class or collective" was undesirable for the movement as a whole.

Jonathan Lange (1990) gives a broad account of the origins and actions of Earth First! in the context of conflict theory. He spent time in the organization, read their papers, interviewed and socialized with members, and read mainstream accounts of the organization. Lange's
analysis focuses on the group's philosophy of no compromise, their philosophy of civil disobedience, and their eco-terrorist tactics.

Lange concludes Earth First! re-contextualizes situations by rejecting the dominant paradigm; since Earth First! cannot argue within a rational paradigm, they must step out of it or destroy it through linguistic or physical means. Lange claims that illegal violent acts against developers may increase the legitimacy of more mainstream environmental groups, such as the Sierra Club. The radical arm of the environmental movement makes less extreme groups appear more centrist.

Like Lange, Brant Short (1990) examines Earth First!'s philosophy and actions within the framework of social movement theory. Short claims that as a form of agitative rhetoric, Earth First! is an influential part of the bigger environmental movement. He concludes that agitative rhetoric is both instrumental towards a movement's ends, and consummatory towards its participants; agitative rhetoric needs to be taken seriously by both those outside of the movement to whom the messages are addressed, and those inside the movement, whom the messages will affect in consummatory fashion (p. 185-6).

Christiansen and Hanson (1996) examine the use of symbolic violence in the process of calling attention to the AIDS crisis. Using Burke's concept of the comic frame,
the authors argue that ACT UP, a direct action protest group, reframes AIDS and HIV positive patients from a tragic frame to a comic frame through rude, angry, and irreverent demonstrations.

The authors argue that ACT UP seeks to change the perception of gays as societal scapegoats by using the comic frame to create perspective by incongruity (1996, p. 158). ACT UP's strategies debunk the tragic frame that positions gay men as victims of immoral acts or as sacrifices that symbolically purify society. ACT UP counters tragic frames through radical, but peaceful, measures as campy theatrical performances, ironic, playful uses of language, and disruptive activities in public places such as church, the stock exchange, and federal buildings. The actions are designed to call attention not only to the problem of AIDS, but the broader problem of societal attitudes towards gays and AIDS patients.

For example, ACT UP members dressed up as business people entered the New York Stock Exchange, unfurled a large banner urging investors to dump certain stock, and used bullhorns to drown out the opening bell. In another event, female members surreptitiously gained admission to a Republican women's cocktail party and unfurled banners reading "Lesbians for Bush." The concealment of identities in such cases is critical because it comically exposes the fact that gays and lesbians look and act like their
heterosexual American counterparts. Criticism of the case of ACT UP is useful because it illustrates the use of symbolic violence in order to draw attention to their cause, or to gain an audience for their message.

These preceding studies demonstrate a lively, yet limited interest in the area of protest, violence, and rhetoric. As such, they lead the way for the present study. What they all have in common is that they are limited in their conclusions to their respective case studies. They do not answer the central question of this study: Is there a common topos for justifying violence across these types of radical discourses?

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined relevant literature in rhetorical studies and violence. Three general areas in which violence is connected to discourse are social movements, war studies, and case studies of rhetoric and violence. Although each of these are valid and have merit in their own right, taken as a body, they illustrate the lack of generalizable theory which the present study seeks.
CHAPTER THREE
DEFINITION AND METHOD

INTRODUCTION

This chapter has two purposes. The first purpose is to frame a definition of violence, a crucial term for the purposes of this study. The second purpose is to articulate and justify the critical method of the study.

DEFINITION OF VIOLENCE

Violence has a variety of meanings, both casual and profound. The former threatens to rob the word of connotations of physical acts (e.g. aesthetic violence, psychological violence). The latter are the main subjects of this study. This section will discuss violence as a form of social action.

Sidney Hook's entry in the *Encyclopedia of Social Science* broadly defines violence as the employment of methods of physical coercion for personal or group ends (1928, p. 264). These methods of coercion may be employed by states or by outlaw groups. The Czarist government maintained statist terrorism and many governments employ armies and navies against their own people. The Chinese' use of force at Tiananmen Square, or Saddam Hussein's extermination of the Kurdish rebels in the 1980s and 1990s serve as recent examples. Even local communities employ violence against their own citizens in the name of social order.
In order to distinguish among different uses of violence, scholars speak of legitimacy. Legitimate violence is that which is construed as moral authority by the community. It is enacted in the name of communal survival for some higher law.

Contests for legitimacy occur when violent conflicts occur between challengers and established governments. Either a charismatic leader forges a new social order, like Napoleon or Lenin, or the state engages in savage repression of the upstart. Either way, violence is justified by both sides in the name of a higher value, either as the price for producing a new order, or the travail for preserving the old one.

Many successful movements of revolt have been compelled to use violence at some point in the process of acquiring power. Lenin exterminated Kulaks, Robespierre instituted the reign of terror, and Cromwell's Commonwealth of Saints was established through the violence of the English Civil War. Even Christians smashed Pagan temples. Hook (1928) notes that those who oppose violence on grounds of humanity almost always justified their own violence by regarding the humans upon which they enact their violence as being outside of the community, thus of lesser value. The designation of an enemy actually assists the group in confirming its identity and mission. This sacrifice of the outsider is rhetorically bound up with destiny (an
unlimited sanction) and with healing the community, two
perennially powerful appeals.

Burke argues that scapegoating is a powerful
rhetorical resource whereby rhetors cast their sins upon a
vessel, then sink the vessel. By transferring the sins to
the victim (or scapegoat), rhetors can then battle their
own sins externally, rather than internally. This is
similar to the projection device in Freudian psychology.

Hook claims violence is a characteristic element of
some movements for four reasons. First, it symbolizes in
dramatic fashion the issues involved in the campaign and
focuses attention on those elements. This symbolism
sharpens the dialectic between sides and provides a
dramatistic frame to the idea(s). Proponents of the Boston
Tea Party best illustrated their degree of commitment and
seriousness by dumping tea into the harbor rather than by
formal written protest, or a boycott of the product. The
act provides a dramatic frame and raises the stakes. The
present day activities of ACT UP or Earth First! not only
help to call attention to themselves, but also define their
commitment to their position by demonstrating to what
lengths they are willing to go.

Secondly, Hook claims that despite the differences in
social processes, power is transferred from one person to
another, not from one concept to another, or from one army
to another. Eventually, the 'laying on of the hands,'
symbolizes the passing of power to a new vessel. Lee's surrender to Grant represented a rebel contingency of thousands surrendering to the federal government. Rather than fifty thousand soldiers individually handing over a sword to Lincoln, the act was undertaken symbolically. The act has a rich tradition.

Thirdly, Hook claims that systematic and consistent refusal to use violence would doom every movement. Even peaceful movements need the threat of violence looming in the background to be effective. The oldest and strongest argument for social reform has always been that it would obviate revolution or worse. For example, Ghandi and Martin Luther King Jr. had thousands of marchers behind them representing the untapped potential for violence.

Finally, Hook claims the history of peaceful movements shows that the threat of violence has often been the catalyst of reason upon the part of groups which possess power. "Such fear," Hook writes, "cannot be experienced where there are no storm signals of violent action visible on the political horizon" (p. 266). Historically, Hook notes, violence which grows slowly and steadily in the movement tends to be more successful than outright violence from the start. Governments can and do crush such violent rebellions outright. Only in times directly preceding civil war is outright violence more practical than gradual doses.
Marxist theory cuts a middle road between the pacifist and putchist tendencies. Prior to Marx and Engels, doctrines tended to be either strongly for or against the use of violence. Marx's theory cut against both of these threads through pragmatic dissection of violence.

To head off moral arguments against violence, Marx points to the non-moral aspects of governmental and military rule as the regulatory arm of industry. Any attempt to take power must be prepared to meet those forces; at some point, violence must meet violence. The body against which one is trying to wrest power is likely to use violence to keep power.

Against those who argued for violence, Marx points out that it only succeeds when it is the cap to the organization of labor, not the predecessor of it. If violence takes the form of individual action, rather than collective social action, it plays into the hands of those in power. Advocacy of such tactics could then be characterized as petty bourgeois anarchy, or simple provocation of the police (Hook, p. 266).

Hook claims that the influence of Marxist thought brought acts of individual terrorism to a halt in the industrialized world. In Latin worlds, such as Italy and Spain, where Marx's ideas did not take hold, anarcho-syndicat notions prevailed and labor disturbances took on an almost revolutionary character. Even in the U.S., the
labor disputes which were carried through without the
guidance of a broad social philosophy were accompanied by
spontaneous individual violence that surpassed in ferocity
anything known abroad. Marxism holds that individual
violence affects the rest of the people by legitimizing
governmental crackdowns. Individuals may regard acts of
violence as good, bad, or neutral depending on who employs
violence against whom. Political violence, on the other
hand, frames violence as a response to illegitimate power
arrangements. Most rhetorical critics believe that
violence is an ambiguous term whose meaning is negotiated
through political dialogue. For example, the Declaration
of Independence was a text that came to legitimize the
violence of the revolutionary separatism.

Generally speaking, there are several great dangers
inherent in the use of violence. First, wide scale
violence results in brutalization by those who employ it;
insensitivity to special conditions which can be fixed by
finesse are then easily steamrolled by violence. There is
a further danger that if the use of violence is successful
enough, a tyrant may use it to settle non-political issues
such as those science, philosophy, or culture.

Secondly, unless care is taken, the powers that take
over will use violence to suppress the masses in the name
of their own interests. Before democratic institutions are
set up, the violence devours its own offspring, as occurred
in the case of the French Revolution or many Latin American
countries.

A third danger is the possibility of a violent cycle of
revenge. Some Serbians of today, for example, saw their
aggression in the 1990-95 Yugoslavian Civil War as a
payback for the brutalities of World War II. Similarly,
violece in Northern Ireland begets more violence.

A final peril is the physical havoc violence wreaks on
a nation. It damages the nation, destroys the
infrastructure, injures the people, and sends many of its
most talented people abroad.

For the purpose of this dissertation, violence will mean
the planned use of physical force by one body (army, agent,
individual) against another body to resolve conflicts of
interest or pursue ideological agendas. The actions
investigated in this study are planned, not random. In
each case study there is pre-mediation evident in the
documents studied. This study examines political violence
that is aimed at altering the power relations in the
community. This violence is a component of a larger
political message delivered by agents who may or may not
possess a license of institutional legitimacy.

In the four case studies of this dissertation,
violece is an embedded component of a political message,
one programmatic tactic among many. George Bush, the
Unabomber, Abbie Hoffman, and Earth First! all justified
violence in which was used to effect change in the behavior of specific agents.

The preceding section has sought to define violence as it will be studied in this dissertation. Although no definition is completely satisfactory, the concept of violence as a component of political action, both actual and symbolic, is flexible.

METHOD

Rather than select a readymade method, as many large studies do, I began with the nature of my project and asked, "What do I want to know about it?" The research questions are designed to reveal connections between violence and verbal discourse. Although they are stock rhetorical questions about speakers, audiences, appeals, strategies, images, and myths, the questions do not assume disjuncture between violent acts and civic discourse. While the study may conclude with censures of violence for pragmatic and moral reasons, its rhetorical analysis will proceed without moral judgement.

A key assumption upon which the method for this study rests is that language is a medium through which rival versions of reality are constructed. Following Burke, Ivie (1980) notes that "language determines society. It orders experience because it creates the forms which make possible the communication experience" (p. 338). Much that we take as observations about "reality" may simply be the spinning
out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms (Ivie [quoting Burke], 1980, p. 344).

In a similar vein, Richard Weaver claims that in a rhetor's arguments we can find the rhetor's view of the world. Weaver (1953) claims that by paying specific attention to the major premise(s) offered by a rhetor, a critic can determine the type of argument offered, and hence tell us "how he (sic) [the rhetor] is thinking about the world" (p. 55). "In other words," Weaver continues, "the rhetorical content of the major premise which the speaker habitually uses is the key to his (sic) primary view of existence" (p. 55). Through argument, the political philosophy of a rhetor is revealed because "a characteristic major premise characterizes the user" (1953, p. 56).

Elsewhere, Weaver more pointedly makes his case. Arguing that speech betrays disposition, he claims that "every use of speech, oral and written, exhibits an attitude, and an attitude implies an act." (1971, p. 221). For Weaver, we cannot separate motive from language; the things we say betray the way we think: "as long as man is a creature responding to purpose, his linguistic expression will be a carrier of tendency" (p. 222).

Weaver thus characterizes language as "sermonic" because we "have no sooner uttered words than we have given impulse to other people to look at the world, or some small
part of it in our way" (1971, p. 224). Speech reveals our central values, core beliefs, and ultimately, the position from which we see things.

Julia T. Wood (1996) provides an excellent example of this approach to studying texts and arriving at underlying assumptions within them. Wood examines three books by self-proclaimed feminists, each of which argues that feminism has hurt itself by encouraging a victim mentality. Wood extracts four unspoken assumptions that lie beneath the surface of the texts. By basing arguments on unspoken assumptions, Wood claims the authors invite the readers to "participate in the premise"; if the audience accepts the argument, the unspoken premise becomes its own, as well as that of the authors. Although the assumptions are not explicitly stated in any of the critiques, Wood shows how the authors not only draw upon them, but also how the reader ends up with a stake in the unstated premise.

Like Wood's study, this present study seeks to probe into the text in order to go beyond the surface claims of the text itself and reveal the undergirding assumptions. Wood's account is a gloss of Burke's frame of acceptance. That is, if one accepts the axiomatic structure of a body of discourse (perspective) one "sees" the meaning in a way consistent with the author's intent. Similarly, Weaver contended that the argumentative form of a work limits the range of interpretation. The perspectives of Burke and
Weaver are consistent with the approach of this dissertation.

In brief, this study is such an attempt to examine the justification of violence in search of common terminology, conceptions, visions, and terministic screens. Four case studies will examine discourse which justifies violence as it is defined in this chapter. Each case will consist of a particular group's texts and/or speeches in which violence is explained and justified to the public.

That this study is made up of four distinctly different groups is a crucial factor because it allows for comparisons of the strategic linguistic conceptions and advocacy of violence across situationally bound constraints. The study asks the question, "Is there a common discourse of violence for all persuaders?" The answer to this question will illuminate whether or not there are similarities or differences between legitimate and illegitimate group's rationale for violence. To answer the research question, I will seek the answer to three questions by examining the texts. These questions are:

1) What are the main themes and justifications discussed in each case? What are the rationales for violence?

2) How are these adapted to the audience reading the text?

3) What form do the arguments take? Are they rooted in tradition, values or ideals? Do they exist in a vacuum, disconnected from the audience and society?
Tactically, these answer will be sought through following these steps:

1) **Identify the topics and sources of arguments of each of the four rhetors.**

2) **Look for patterns and classify arguments among the four case studies.**

3) **Interpret the meaning of similar and different appeals to find universal and situational topoi.**

Each case study examines the selected texts in search of answers to these questions so that we may see if patterns exist in the way violence is conceptualized and justified. The discovery of significant similarities would constitute an immense contribution toward understanding the rhetorical motives for planned, contrived violence. There may be few or no similarities among the rhetorics of these groups; or there may be large similarities. Finally, a lack of a generalized topoi for the use and justification of violence may show us how little we truly understand it.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter has sought to define the pivotal term violence as it functions within the context of political messages and to explain the method to be used in this study. The chapter first discussed the use of violence in societal context. Violence was then discussed as part of an expanded concept of rhetoric. Finally, the chapter explained the assumptions and the analytical categories which will be used to examine the data of this study.
CHAPTER FOUR
GEORGE BUSH'S GULF WAR SPEECHES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines President George Bush's Gulf War speeches. The chapter briefly introduces ten of George Bush's Gulf War speeches to be studied and examines the speeches by identifying recurring themes and characteristic formal elements. This chapter is pursuing "forms" not as generic markers, but as they define the collective morality of the fictive national community and adjudicate among modes of violence.

The previous research discussed in Chapter Two examined presidential war addresses and found repetitive themes and recurring forms. Much of this research is genre criticism, the classification of speech types and assessment of their potentials and limitations as types. Although the present study identifies formal elements, its focus is not upon form as such, but rather on the nature of the arguments and expositions they frame. Despite this difference in emphasis, generic studies provide useful insights to this study.

THE GULF WAR SPEECHES

Between August 8th, 1990, and March 6, 1991, George Bush delivered speeches pertaining to the Gulf War to the people of the United States, the Congress, and the United
The first speech, "Iraq invasion of Kuwait," was delivered from the White House on August 8, 1990, to the American people. This speech was the President's first public discussion of the crisis in the Persian Gulf brought about by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait six days earlier. The speech had several purposes. The first purpose was to define the crisis as an international problem and as an affront against freedom and sovereignty of independent nations. Its second purpose was to state the conditions on which the crisis could be acceptably resolved by the U.S. and world coalition. These conditions were Iraqi withdrawal, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, security and stability of the Persian Gulf Region, and the protection of American citizens abroad. Bush also emphasized the importance of protecting Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression. Finally, he asked the oil producing nations, the American people, and American oil companies to do their part to protect the integrity of the world's economy by using fuel wisely, and refraining from taking advantage of the crisis for monetary profit.

The second speech, "The Persian Gulf," was delivered before the a joint session of the United States Congress in Washington D.C. September 11, 1990. In this speech, Bush emphasized the same themes: stating the four goals of the U.S., listing conditions and objectives of the U.S. positions, framing the conflict as one of Iraq against the
world, and emphasizing the unity of nations against Iraq. He also discussed budgetary concerns of the U.S. in the coming months for the possibility of war.

The third Speech, "Aggression in the Gulf," was delivered to the United Nations on October 1st, 1990. In this speech, Bush reiterated earlier themes, but with an emphasis on the international community, and their collective role in the war. Bush celebrated the end of the Cold War, while urging continued allied unity against a common foe in Iraq.

The fourth, and arguably most memorable speech, was the "War With Iraq," addressed the American people, on January 16th, 1991, the evening the Gulf War started. The President delivered the speech on prime-time television shortly after the networks aired the first pictures of Baghdad under air attack by coalition forces.

The fifth speech was the 1991 "State of The Union," delivered on prime time television to the Congress and the people of the United States. This speech included information about the Gulf War, but also addressed various domestic policies mandated by the genre. War appeals appear throughout the speech but are most heavily emphasized in the conclusion. As the U.S. was headed into recession at this time, Bush had to address several areas of economic concern.
The sixth speech, "Unconditional Withdrawal From Kuwait," was delivered to the American people on February 22nd, 1991. In this brief speech, Bush set the conditions for the cessation of hostilities in the form of an ultimatum: Get out of Kuwait by noon on Saturday.

The seventh speech, "Start of the Ground War," was delivered to the American people the next day, February 23rd, 1991. This terse statement announced the beginning of the ground war as a consequence of Iraq's refusal to leave Kuwait by the deadline Bush had set. The President informed his audience that he had ordered General Schwarzkopf to eject the Army of Iraq from Kuwait.

The eighth speech, "The Iraqi Retreat," was delivered to the American people on February 26, 1991. In this brief address, Bush, perhaps intending to notify Saddam Hussein personally, claimed that the ground war would continue to be prosecuted, as long as Iraq continued to defy the U.N. mandates.

In the speech "Cessation of Hostilities," delivered February 27th, 1991, to the American people, Bush proclaimed Kuwait's freedom and Iraq's defeat. In this speech, Bush announced that U.N. forces would cease hostilities at midnight. Furthermore, he made several demands of Iraq: release all hostages, rescind annexation of Kuwait, and notify Kuwait of the location of all mines. Here, the President made an apparent effort to address the
people of Iraq as well, separating them from the true enemy, Saddam Hussein.

On March 6, 1991, Bush delivered the final speech for this era, "The War is Over," to a joint session of congress on March 6th, 1991. In this speech, Bush praised the major players and soldiers, imposed conditions of peace on Iraq and set forth criteria for full restoration of normal relations in the region.

ANALYSIS OF THE TOPOI OF THE SPEECHES

The assumption that the president's verbal characterization of a crisis is rhetorical is the crucial step in enacting his role as commander-in-chief. George Bush's advocacy of actions in the Gulf was justified by his particular description and interpretation of events. Thus, the ability of the president to define is linked to his act. Successful definition legitimizes and limits the nature, extent, and location of force that may be used.

Features of war messages previously identified by researchers (Ivie, 1974, 1980; Cherwitz, 1978; Cherwitz and Zagacki, 1986; Windt, 1983), and my own analysis point to five recurring themes in the speeches: Framing the war as a conflict between Iraq and the world (not Iraq and the U.S.); arguing there is no alternative to war; linguistically demonizing the enemy; drawing upon historical context; and finally, portraying America as an exceptional nation with a chosen role. This rhetoric not
only forecloses discussion of the nature of the war, it provides a mandate for the large scale of the planning and execution that followed the President's speech. The next section examines each of the lines of argument in depth.

First Line: Iraq Against the World

One exigency Bush faced was to convince both American and international audiences that acting against Iraq transcended American national interests. Implicitly and explicitly, Bush emphasized the unity of other nations in the cause of the liberation of Kuwait, and framed the conflict as broadly as possible. This strategy was necessary to deflect criticism that the U.S. was trying to make up for its shortcomings in Viet Nam by fighting a winnable war; that the U.S. was trying to justify military expenditure and armament in a post-Cold War world; that the U.S. was interested in the war to create nationalist instinct to deflect attention away from a recession; and that the U.S. was seizing a long-sought opportunity to establish a presence in the Middle East to stabilize the U.S. oil supply. Bush's framing of the war downplayed American domination to the extent that purely nationalistic aims seemed muted. The allied coalition's aims echoed the last popular and morally justified war, World War II.

Prior to, during, and after the war, Bush repeatedly framed the conflict as an international effort. In
speeches during Operation Desert Shield, during Operation Desert Storm, and in the aftermath, Bush consistently stressed cooperation among nations.

In his first speech addressing the Iraqi invasion Bush stressed his consultation with other countries,

In the last few days, I've spoken with political leaders from the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the Americas, and I've met with Prime Minister Thatcher, Prime Minister Mulroney, and NATO Secretary General Woerner. And all agree that Iraq cannot be allowed to benefit from its invasion of Kuwait ("Iraqi Invasion," p. 675).

Later in the same speech, Bush defined the events as a world problem: "We agree this is not an American problem or a European problem or a Middle East problem. It is the world's problem" ("Iraqi Invasion," p. 675). Not only is the crisis international, but it also involves as many countries as possible. The emphasis on Saudi participation helped preempt criticism of the effort as a mere attempt to establish U.S. dominance in the Gulf.

In a speech to the U.S. Congress on September 11, 1991, Bush reiterated the role of the world in the actions taken in the Gulf, "These goals are not ours alone. They have been endorsed by the security council five times in as many weeks.... This is not, as Saddam would have it, the United States against Iraq. It is Iraq against the world" ("Persian Gulf", p. 739).

Bush reiterated the same theme of world consensus and universal judgment in his address to the United Nations:
"and this is not simply the view of the United States. It is the view of every Kuwaiti, the Arab League, The United Nations. Iraq's leaders should listen. It is Iraq against the world" ("Aggression", p. 3).

While he could point to limited military cooperation, the President was still able to emphasize a high level of dialogue, cooperation, and nurturing of international consensus: "Secretary of Defense Cheney has just returned from valuable consultations with President Mubarak of Egypt and King Hassan of Morocco" ("Iraq Invasion", p. 675). And he noted that Secretary Baker had consulted with his counterparts in many countries, including the Soviet Union, and he was heading for Europe. All decisions made and actions taken were done only after "unparalleled international consultation" ("Iraq Invasion," p. 674). Despite the fact that only Britain, France and Saudi Arabia directly participated, he emphasized the broad allied role: "From the outset, acting hand in hand with others, we've sought to fashion the broadest possible international response to Iraq's aggression. The level of world cooperation is unprecedented" ("Persian Gulf," p. 739).

Elsewhere, Bush made it a point to mention other countries doing, rather than just agreeing: "Together with our friends and allies, ships of the United States Navy are patrolling the Mideast Waters" ("Persian Gulf," p. 739). Further, he included "Muslims and non-Muslims, Arabs and
Non-Arabs, soldiers from many nations, stand shoulder to shoulder, resolute against Saddam Hussein's ambitions" ("Persian Gulf," p. 739).

Although the start of the ground war included only British and American troops, Bush framed the act as an international effort, not solely the acts of the U.S.: "Once again, this decision was made only after extensive consultation with our coalition partnership" ("Start", p. 325).

In the State of the Union speech, delivered at the height of Desert Storm, Bush emphasized international legality and conceptual solidarity: "The world has answered Saddam's invasion with 12 United Nations resolutions, starting with a demand for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, and backed up by forces from 28 countries of six continents. With few exceptions, the world now stands as one ("State," p. 258).

In his announcement that unconditional surrender was the only agreeable option after the commencement of Desert Storm, Bush again emphasized international effort and international demands, "The United States' forces and its coalition allies are committed to enforcing the United Nations' resolutions that call for Saddam Hussein to immediately and unconditionally leave Kuwait" ("Unconditional," p. 325).
When the war ended, Bush continued to frame the conflict as an international effort. Echoing the WWII victory ethos, his New World Order metaphor pointed toward new international policy. The divisive Cold War had been replaced by a new communal vision. Bush expanded the circumference of freedom from the concrete entity of nations to abstract universals and principles: "No one country can claim this victory as its own. It was not only a victory for Kuwait, but for all the coalition partners. This is a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law, and for what is right" ("Cessation," p. 328).

In the same speech, Bush looked ahead to the future cooperation necessary to map out a new policy aimed at binding the world together as fragmentation gave way to an emphasis on common beliefs, common ideals and common values. He emphasized that the input from other countries was necessary: "There can be and will be no solely American answer to all these challenges, but we can assist and support the countries of the region and be a catalyst for peace ("Cessation," p. 328).

When the war was officially over, Bush continued to praise the efforts of all nations involved, and to call for their input in determining the future: "This is a victory for every country in the coalition, and for the United

He also named specific individuals, once again reaffirming the work of many toward the war, de-emphasizing the U.S. and highlighting the input of previously unknown people: "And let us not forget Saudi General Khalid, or Britain's General de la Billiere, or General Roquejoffra of France, and all others whose leadership played such a vital role. And most importantly, those who served in the field" ("Over," p. 354).

However, in highlighting the actions of others, it is important to note he did not ignore America; he placed America as a partner, albeit retaining a leadership role as the only remaining superpower functioning as an active agent: "To all the challenges that confront this region of the world, there is no single solution, no solely American answer. But, we can make a difference. America will work tirelessly as a catalyst for positive change" ("Over," p. 355).

Later in the same speech, Bush claimed that America would be part of the team, rather than the leader of the team: "Our friends and allies in the Middle East recognize that they will bear the bulk of the responsibility for regional security. But, we want them to know that just as we stood with them to repel aggression so now America
stands ready to work with them to secure peace." ("Over," p. 355).

**Second Line: No Alternative**

As noted earlier, scholars have noted the 'no alternative' line of argument as a recurring theme in addresses describing international crises. This theme is prevalent Bush's addresses as well.

In his first speech on the Persian Gulf problem, Bush claimed that he sent troops to Saudi Arabia only after "exhausting every alternative" ("Iraq Invasion," p. 674). Bush amplified this line of argument on the evening of the 16th of January, perhaps when the U.S. citizenry needed to hear it most. Prior to the speech, Americans saw on television the first bombs falling on Baghdad, along with the dramatic, colorful images of tracers being fired from the ground. At such times, presidential discourse is necessary to explain why we are in this situation. The U.S. had not been so deeply involved in active combat since Viet Nam, and the images on the television may have had an unsettling effect.

The justification of no alternative is presented in four separate arguments. First, Bush stressed that every effort was made by his and other countries' administrations, but to no avail. Second, he stressed the importance of timing: Kuwait is under siege, and it is imperative to get them out, now. Third, he emphasized
Hussein's rejection of peaceful overtones, and the fact that Hussein ignored all warnings. Fourth, he employed a slippery slope argument, in which he claimed if we did not act now, we would be in more trouble later.

Bush first disclosed the efforts made by his administration, as well as the efforts of other countries, and their failure to exact a proper response from Hussein: "Arab leaders sought what became known as an Arab solution, only to conclude that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to leave Kuwait. Others travelled to Baghdad in a variety of efforts to restore peace and justice. Our Secretary of State, James Baker held an historic meeting in Geneva, only to be totally rebuffed" ("War," p. 226).

In this passage, the president argued that efforts by political leaders failed to get the desired response. He then described more pressing efforts made by leaders: "This past weekend, in a last ditch effort, the secretary General of the United Nations went to the Middle East with peace in his heart- his second such mission. And he came back from Baghdad with no progress at all in getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait" ("War," p. 226).

Having described what had been done to prevent the war, the President turned his attention to the present moment, portraying it as one in which there is no alternative to conflict: "Now, all 28 countries with forces in the Gulf area have exhausted all reasonable
efforts to reach a peaceful resolution, and have no choice but to drive Saddam from Kuwait by force. We will not fail" ("War," p. 226).

The second argument of 'no alternative' is forced by the necessity of timing. Bush frames the exigence as immediate; not only must we act, but we must act now:

Some may ask, why act now? Why not wait? The answer is clear. The world could wait no longer. Sanctions, though having some effect, showed no signs of accomplishing their objective. Sanctions were tried for well over five months, and we and our allies concluded that sanctions alone would not force Saddam from Kuwait ("War With Iraq," p. 226).

Timing is not simply a pragmatic consideration. Deleterious consequences are occurring because of our inaction: "While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged and plundered a tiny nation no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities, and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children" ("War," p. 226).

Clearly, Bush defines the moment as one in which the world could no longer wait, because the question is no longer one of cognitive or rhetorical failure, but now one of moral failure.

In a third form of the 'no alternative' line of argument, Bush criticized Hussein for rejecting the proposals for peaceful resolution. In the first line, Bush noted the failure of the policies. In this third line, he
specifically made this failure the responsibility of Hussein because he ignored all warnings:

The United States, together with the United Nations, exhausted every means at our disposal to bring this crisis to a peaceful end. However, Saddam clearly felt that by stalling and threatening and defying the United Nations, he could weaken the forces arrayed against him. . . . Saddam was warned over and over again to comply with the will of the United Nations, leave Kuwait or be driven out. Saddam has arrogantly rejected all warnings. Instead he tried to make this dispute between Iraq and the United States. Well, he failed ("War," p. 227).

Failure to act would result in strategic failure because Saddam viewed U.S. warnings as a game to be played out.

The fourth form of the 'no alternative' argument is demonstrated on two occasions as Bush employed a slippery slope argument. In this often fallacious argument form, claims to action are justified by circumstances because of the far worse possibilities for the future if no action is taken. Bush claimed that if Hussein were not stopped now, we would face worse troubles later: "We must recognize that Iraq may not stop using force to advance its ambition . . . to assume that Iraq will not attack again, would be unwise" ("Iraq Invasion," p. 675). In effect, Saddam would view aggression as a success formula to be repeated.

In the speech of January 16th, Bush uses the testimony of a soldier in a variation of the same argument: "And finally, we should all sit up and listen to Jackie Jones, an Army lieutenant, when she says 'If we let him get away with this, who knows what's going to be next'" ("War," p.
If this is plain to a junior grade officer in the field, surely other world leaders knew it.

**Third Line: Demonize the Enemy**

Another recurring feature scholars find in war discourse is the tendency of presidents to portray the enemy in negative terms to polarize auditors against the foe. In Bush's speeches, this tactic appears in at least two ways: Separating Hussein from Iraqi Citizens, and using stark negative imagery to characterize Hussein, holding him singularly responsible for the acts of the Iraqi military.

First, Bush was careful to point out his sympathy for the people of Iraq, separating them from their leader. He was careful to address them, as well as his constituents. He assured them that the U.S. and the world had no quarrel with them, but only with their leader.

In his first speech on the War before a joint session of Congress on September 11, 1991, Bush first made the distinction between the Iraqi people and their dictator, Saddam Hussein: "Let me also make clear that the United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Our quarrel is with Iraq's dictator and with his aggression" ("Persian Gulf," p. 740). This is of peculiar interest, because, despite separating the Iraqi people from their dictator, he did not separate the American people from their leadership when speaking of the United States. Nonetheless, this
separation prepared the way for the U.S. to take the high moral ground of liberation.

In the next speech, delivered to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Bush stopped just short of a paternal stance: "We also support the provision of medicine and food for humanitarian purposes, so long as distribution can be properly monitored. Our quarrel is not with the people of Iraq. We do not wish them to suffer. The world's quarrel is with the dictator who ordered that invasion" ("Aggression," p. 3). Thus Iraqi difficulties were framed as exploitation by their rulers instead of suffering caused by American military action.

Finally, when discussing the long term military goals of the operation, Bush claimed "Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq. It is the liberation of Kuwait. It is my hope that somehow the Iraqi people can, even now, convince their dictator that he must lay down his arms, leave Kuwait and let Iraq itself rejoin the family of peace-loving nations" ("War," p. 227).

When the war was over, rather than gloat over his defeated enemy, Bush mourned for the people of Iraq, welcoming them back into the world community as soon as possible: "And yes, we grieve for the people of Iraq- a people who have never been our enemy. My hope is that one day we will once again welcome them as friends into the community of nations" ("Over," p. 355).
In the speech addressing the cessation of action, Bush spoke directly to the people of Iraq:

At every opportunity, I have said to the people of Iraq that our quarrel was not with them, but instead with their leadership and above all with Saddam Hussein. This remains the case. You, the people of Iraq are not our enemy. We do not seek your destruction. We have treated your P.O.W.'s with kindness ("Cessation," p. 328).

Thus, before, during, and after the war, Bush repeatedly offered his sympathy and support for the Iraqi citizenry.

Another dimension of Bush's demonization of the enemy was his use of negative imagery. Bush's initial account of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait portrayed it with negative imagery: "Iraqi armed forces, without provocation or warning, invaded a peaceful Kuwait. Facing negligible resistance from its much smaller neighbor, Iraqi tanks stormed in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait in a few short hours" ("Iraq Invasion," p. 674).

This is a powerful statement, painting Iraq as a complete, unprovoked aggressor, and Kuwait as a quiet, helpless victim, able to put up only "negligible" resistance. The tanks which "stormed" are associated with Nazi Germany with the word "blitzkrieg." This language also associates Saddam with Hitler's invasion of Belgium and France in 1940. The "outrageous and brutal act of aggression", ("Iraq Invasion," p. 674) Bush noted, came

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
just hours after Hussein promised there would be no such invasion.

Citing the testimony of a Private, First Class, Bush noted the soldier is proud of his country and "its firm stand against inhumane aggression" ("Persian Gulf," p. 738). This artful citation may be an attempt to heal the Vietnam War split between planners and fighters. The grunts in the field are cognitively and emotionally involved as well as the commander-in-chief. For example, retired Colonel and syndicated columnist David Hackworth claimed he spoke out against the Viet Nam war after five years of lies told by the Pentagon to the public and the armed forces. Bush is showing agreement in emotion and goals between the leadership and the workers.

In his speech to the United Nations, Bush again characterized the invasion as brutal with vivid negative imagery, while invoking images of World War I: "The beauty of the peaceful Kuwaiti desert was fouled by the stench of diesel and the roar of steel tanks. And once again, the sound of distant thunder echoed across a cloudless sky. And once again, the world awoke to face the guns of August" ("Aggression," p. 3).

Later, in the same speech to the U.N., Bush put the present invasion in historical context, evoking Western stereotypes of a backward Arab world emerging painfully in the modern era:
And today the regime stands isolated and out of step with the times, separated from the civilized world, not by space, but by centuries. Iraq's unprovoked aggression is a throwback to another era, a dark relic from a dark time. It has plundered Kuwait. It has terrorized innocent civilians. It has held even diplomats hostage. Iraq and its leaders must be held liable for these crimes of abuse and destruction ("Aggression," p. 3).

In the more recent past, the President noted there have been outrages in Iraq as well, as Hussein (like Hitler) turned against portions of his own people: "But this outrageous disregard for basic human rights does not come as a total surprise. Thousands of Iraqis have been executed on political and religious grounds, and even more through a genocidal poison gas war against Iraq's own Kurdish villagers" ("Aggression," p. 3).

Such actions, Bush claimed, menace not only "one region's security, but to the entire world's vision of our future. It threatens to turn the dream of a new international order into a grim nightmare of anarchy in which the law of the jungle supplants the law of nations." ("Aggression," p. 4).

The final line of argument Bush used to demonize the enemy is his ad hominem attacks on Saddam Hussein. This is perhaps the most consistent line of argument common to all the speeches. Saddam Hussein was repeatedly portrayed as violent, untrustworthy and evil. In all cases, Hussein was associated with and held responsible for the actions of the Iraqi military, as though Hussein himself is doing the acts
and not his massive army. He was the traditional scapegoat, the repository of his tribe's evil. To remove him is to cleanse his nation. This is an important tactic since Bush was able to concentrate the wrath of the world on a single person.

In the State of the Union address, delivered January 29, 1991, Bush claimed the "community of nations has resolutely gathered to condemn and repel lawless aggression. Saddam Hussein's unprovoked invasion- his ruthless, systematic rape of a peaceful neighbor- violated everything the community of nations holds dear. The world has said this aggression would not stand, and it will not stand" ("State," p. 258).

In this excerpt, Hussein is represented as the sole agent responsible for causing the hostilities, not his armies, collaborators, advisers or his allies.

Three weeks later, in an address to the American people just prior to the start of the ground war, Bush continued his attack on Hussein, characterizing a recent speech by Hussein as "defiant" and "uncompromising" ("Unconditional," p. 325). Nor was Hussein trustworthy: "At the same time that the Moscow press conference was going on and Iraq's foreign minister was talking peace, Saddam Hussein was launching scud missiles" ("Unconditional," p. 325). In a reference to Hitler's invasion of Russia, Bush claimed Saddam launched a
"Scorched earth policy against Kuwait . . . wantonly setting fires to and destroying the oil wells, oil tanks, the export terminals and other installations of that small country ("Unconditional," p. 325).

Bush further assailed Hussein by questioning his motives: "Saddam is not interested in peace, but only to regroup and fight another day ("Retreat,"p. 328). Later, in the same speech, Bush noted there was no "evidence of remorse for Iraq's aggression, or any indication that Saddam is prepared to accept the responsibility for the awful consequences of that aggression" ("Retreat," p. 328).

At the end of the war, Bush did not temper his disdain for Hussein, continuing his assault on the man's motives and character:

Tonight in Iraq, Saddam walks amidst ruin. His war machine is crushed. His ability to threaten mass destruction is itself destroyed. His people have been lied to- denied the truth. And when his defeated legions come home, all Iraqis will see and feel the havoc he has wrought. And this I promise you: For all that Saddam has done to his own people, to the Kuwaitis, and to the entire world- Saddam and those around him are accountable ("Over," p. 354).

Still later in the same speech, Bush made his point succinctly, discussing what had been done: "The recent challenge could not have been clearer. Saddam Hussein was the villain; Kuwait was the victim. To the aid of this small country came nations from North America and Europe, from Asia and South America, from Africa and the Arab world- all united against aggression" ("Over," p. 354).
Bush then talked of what the future would hold: "Our uncommon coalition must now work in common purpose to forge a future that should never again be held hostage to the darker side of human nature" ("Over," p. 354).

Fourth Line: Historical Context

Another recurring line of argument Bush pursued throughout the speeches is the placement of the Gulf War in a historical context of ideological struggle. Bush made frequent references to World War II, as well as to the struggles of the Cold War, and pondered the brighter possible future of U.S.-Soviet relations. Scholars have shown that presidents often frame international conflict in the bigger narrative of Democratic/Communist struggle (Windt, 1983). As of 1990, this struggle was largely over; but the theme required attention from Bush because even though Communism was collapsing, democracy was not yet in place.

In his first speech on the Gulf War, Bush made references to WWII, "We succeeded in the struggle for freedom in Europe because we and our allies remain stalwart. Keeping peace in the Middle East will require no less" (Iraq invasion," p. 674). Here he emphasized the importance of history. This comparison drew on the patriotic impulse of the America's past successes. The resolve needed by the American people was not the weak quasi-commitments of police actions, but the near unanimous
support of the nation as was seen in World War II. In this sense he attempted to put the fragmentation and uncertainty of the Cold War behind us.

Bush equated the present struggle with World War II and its attempt to preserve freedom and defeat tyranny: "If history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors" ("Iraq Invasion," p. 675).

In addition to drawing on the historical reference of physical struggle, Bush frequently mentioned the Cold War, and our success in overcoming that obstacle.

Bush mentioned a meeting with Gorbachev, and cited their joint statement:

We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors. Clearly, no longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie the concerted U.N. action against Aggression. A new partnership of neighbors has begun ("Persian Gulf," p. 739).

Not only were U.S.-Soviet relations leading the way, but others were following. Bush claimed we now head into "an historic period of cooperation" in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path of peace, while a thousand wars have raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born ("Persian Gulf," p. 739).
Bush's language sought to build a new fund of appropriate and shared meanings between former adversaries. Later they would be evoked as a guide to mutual action.

In his speech to the United Nations on October 1, 1990, Bush drew on the renewal of hope after World War II,

Forty-five years ago, while the fires of an epic war still raged across two oceans and two continents, a small group of men and women began a search for hope amid the ruins, and they gathered in San Francisco, stepping back from the haze and horror to try to shape a new structure that might support an ancient dream ("Aggression," p. 2).

He updated this historical frame with recent developments in the Soviet Union, showing the modern day realization of past hopes, efforts and ideals:

The changes in the Soviet Union have been critical to the emergence of a stronger United Nations. The U.S.-Soviet relationship is finally beyond containment and confrontation... The long twilight struggle that for 45 years has divided Europe, our two nations and much of the world has come to an end ("Aggression" p. 2).

In his television address of January 16, 1991, Bush again reiterated the importance of this moment in history, as well as the relevance of the end of the Cold War as a catalyst for this present conflict. The stage that had been set 40 years ago was now being realized. This framing placed the immediate conflict in a larger historical context, portraying the crisis as a continuation of historical righteousness, rather than an isolated, military effort, based on circumstances. As the bombs were being dropped on Baghdad, he argued.
This is an historic moment. We have in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the rule of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations ("War," p. 227).

In his State of the Union Address, two weeks later, Bush again rang the same themes of the end of the Cold War, and the promise it held for the future.

The end of the cold war has been a victory for all humanity. A year and a half ago, in Germany, I said our goal was a Europe whole and free. Tonight, Germany is united. Europe has become whole and free, and America's leadership was instrumental in making it possible ("State," p. 258).

Later, Bush emphasized the importance of Soviet cooperation: "If it is possible, I want to continue to build a lasting basis for U.S.- Soviet cooperation, for a more peaceful future for all mankind." The President may have helped Russia save face by portraying them as proactive in forming the new world, rather than as merely reacting to or adapting to it ("State", p. 258).

**Fifth Line: America as a Chosen Place**

Windt (1983) notes that when presidents assume their office, they find rhetorical options are limited by precedent, tradition and expediency. This idea of tradition is an important one for George Bush. Thus far, I have argued that President Bush framed the act and scene as moral imperatives, not expediences. The agency of military action was described as necessary to restore rightful
order. The final ingredient is for Bush to portray the agent as moral. Bush's framing of the conflict reinforced a continuing historical metanarrative of American righteousness and glory. America is distinct from other nations. We are a moral nation which fosters individualism, equality, and opportunity for all people. By stepping into this conflict, we are acting on these principles as stated by Jefferson, by the Turner Thesis and by Woodrow Wilson. It is our destiny to do what is right and to stand up for the autonomous rights of individuals.

Bush characterized America's role as a moral agent, and characterized this conflict as a shining moment in our continuing history. These characterizations included references invoking the past, the present, and the future of the U.S., as well as included appeals to the goodness of the country, and the character of its individual citizens.

The sanctity of the U.S. as the moral entity which will stop evil (Hussein) is most apparent in the two most ceremonial of the addresses given by Bush regarding the war: The State of the Union and the final speech declaring the war over. At the onset of the State of the Union speech, Bush highlighted the historical importance of the address, and the situation the country faced, declaring that "we stand at a defining hour . . . Halfway around the world, we are engaged in a great struggle in the skies and seas and sands. We know why we're there. We are
Americans- part of something larger than ourselves" ("State," p. 258). Bush's characterization of the citizenry was something grander than two hundred fifty million individuals; rather, they were portrayed as a unified whole, fighting a good cause.

Inherent in these claims of America as a chosen state with a special mission are references to larger principles, rather than smaller expediences. Bush noted that in the past "two centuries we've done the hard work of freedom. And, tonight we lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and humanity" ("State," p. 258). Explicitly placing principle over expediency, Bush claimed:

What is at stake is more than one small country, it is a big idea- a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law. Such is a world worthy of our struggle, and worthy of our children's future ("State," p. 258).

Later, he claimed: "Tonight we work to achieve another victory, a victory over tyranny and savage aggression" ("State," p. 259). In these excerpts, the scene and the actions taken were moral. The evidence of this morality was presented by examining the American past in a moral light as well:

For two centuries, America has served the world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy. For generations, America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans
know that leadership brings burdens, and requires sacrifice ("State," p. 259).

Bush claimed that not only was America acting morally, but America also had a tradition of doing the right thing. For example, he claimed we know why humanity turns to the U.S., "We are Americans. We have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. And when we do, freedom works ("State," p. 259). Later, he claimed that "As Americans, we know there are times when we must step forward and accept our responsibility to lead the world away from the dark chaos of dictators, toward the brighter promise of a better day" ("State," p. 260).

Thus, in the State of the Union, the theme of America as a moral country doing the right thing is emphasized repeatedly.

When the war was declared to be over Bush was able to connect the general principles of moral righteousness to the specific examples of American heroism. His claims were broad: "There is something noble and majestic about the pride, the patriotism, that we feel tonight" ("Over," p. 356). Bush was able to provide specific examples of the goodness of the American soldiers. In discussing the capture of Iraqi soldiers, he described a warming scene:

They emerged from the bunker- broken, tears streaming from their eyes, fearing the worst. And then there was the American soldier. Remember what he said? He said: "It's O.K. You're all right now. You're all right now." That scene says a lot about America, a lot about who we are. Americans are a caring people. We
are a good people, a generous people. Let us always be caring and good and generous in all we do ("Over," p. 356).

Employing this example, Bush demonstrated the character of the individual American soldier. In the background, we also saw the Iraqi soldier, reduced to tears. Bush then enlarged the context to the broader collective effort:

We went halfway around the world to do what is moral and just and right. We fought hard, and— with others— we won the war. We lifted the yoke of aggression and tyranny from a small country that many Americans had never even heard of, and we ask nothing in return.

We're coming home now— proud. Confident— heads high. There is much that we must do at home and abroad. And we will do it. We are Americans ("Over," p. 356).

These references may have helped to silence previous protest arguments over the conflict being framed as a war over oil, rather than a war over principle.

RHETORICAL FORM IN THE GULF WAR SPEECHES

Despite the recurring forms in war rhetoric identified by scholars, there are still unique features which make each presidential handling of a crisis different. Although Bush drew on established inventional sources for his speeches, at times he adapted these topoi to the exigencies of the present war. This section addresses both the conventional and unique features of Bush’s Gulf War rhetoric by discussing the President's audience and the eventual narrative that the assembled themes identified in the prior section present.
President Bush's Audience

A primary constraint which merits attention is the question "Who is Bush's audience?" The obvious response is "an aggregate of people across the world." Yet, various segments of this aggregate had differing specific needs to be addressed. A primary challenge for Bush in his speeches was to address the needs of specific audiences within his speeches. This may at first not seem too difficult, but one must consider the dangers of alienating one audience while appeasing another, in the same speech.

James Mackin, Jr. (1991) identifies this problem as "schismogenesis." For example, Mackin argues that while Pericles' funeral oration sought to nourish the local community, it damaged the greater ecological community of Greek city-states. By rigidly defining the immediate community as distinct and superior from other communities, the speaker caused a rift in the greater community. Mackin claims that "using antithesis to intensify partisanship at one level of the social system will necessarily result in the tearing apart of community at another level" (p. 251). Whereas Pericles defined a small community and alienated a larger community, Ron Green (1993) argues that the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, though uniting all Palestinians by delineating them from their oppressors, may have alienated certain subgroups within their own constituency. Green claims that the political independence
in the document is won at the expense of ongoing oppression of women (p. 135).

The same constraints of multiple audiences existed for Bush, and they were further complicated by the public's unprecedented access to information via modern media. When on camera, one necessarily speaks to multiple audiences. The message intended for one constituency is overheard by indifferent, opposed or uninformed groups. With the Cold War recently ended, and amid the presence of notable domestic dissent, Bush did not have the traditional freedom of bifurcation granted by the U.S. versus Communism as a meta-narrative. In the speeches, arguments can be made as to whom Bush was directing his messages. The manifest audience differs slightly for each speech: The U.S. people on television and radio; in person, delivered to joint sessions of congress; in person, delivered to the United Nations. Based on both textual and contextual evidence, I argue that Bush adapted his speeches to multiple audiences implicitly and explicitly. The speeches provided him ample opportunity to reach many audiences, but constrained him in certain ways as well. Although he was obviously addressing the concerns and involvement of the audience to which he was speaking, Bush also reached out to others.

First, throughout his speeches Bush addressed the Iraqi people, emphasizing that they were not the enemy, their leader was. In five of his speeches Bush claimed
that the Iraqi people, despite the hardships inflicted on them by embargoes and war, were not the target of the coalition forces. Bush claimed that he hoped the Iraqis could convince their dictator to withdraw peacefully from Kuwait. At the end of the war, he stressed his hopes that the good people of Iraq would soon join the peace loving world. Bush's policies allowing humanitarian food and medicine into Iraq, despite the embargo, added credibility to his claim that he did not wish for the Iraqi people to suffer.

Second, Bush's speeches targeted Hussein as the locus of Iraqi aggression. In the pre-war speeches, Bush repeatedly emphasized the demands of the coalition for Iraq to extract itself peacefully from the hostilities. Bush demanded that Iraq withdraw and restore the legitimate government to Kuwait. That Bush made these demands repeatedly across speeches indicates that the implied audience included Saddam Hussein. Also, the President acknowledged in his speeches that he had heard Hussein's speeches. Just prior to the start of the ground war, Bush claimed "in the last 24 hours alone, we have heard a defiant, uncompromising address by Saddam Hussein" ("Unconditional withdrawal," p. 325). Four days later, in a speech announcing the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, Bush claimed "Saddam's most recent speech is an outrage" ("Iraqi Retreat," p. 329). The claim that Bush received
Hussein's speeches makes it reasonable to assume that he intended for Hussein to receive his as well.

Finally, if the assumption is granted that the world was Bush's implied audience, the end of the Cold War presented for the first time a monumental constraint for the President. Traditionally, as Windt (1983) argues, the presidents are able to frame crises under the meta-narrative of the Cold War, pitting good against evil, and have no problem in justifying the American actions in the Cold War context. Kennedy did it with Cuba and Nixon and Johnson did it with Vietnam. But, with the world in an uncertain state owing to the recent collapse of Communist block governments, Bush had to avoid speaking of it for fear of alienating the newborn democracies around the world. The broad audience constrained the President from using the traditional first premise for the first time in over 40 years. Further, he had to avoid excluding or offending U.S. allies. He had to be inclusive of coalition forces, NATO allies, and delicately balance harsh attacks on Hussein while not offending the Arab world. Verbal attacks characterizing Hussein as a throwback to barbarianism were framed in terms of Hussein's aggression, not in terms of Arab culture and history.

Finally, Bush was aware of domestic dissent. He mentioned it only a few times, but he referred to it as mostly "responsible." By the time of Desert Storm, public
opinion and Congress were behind him. Though beyond the scope of this study, polling evidence tentatively supports the hypothesis that the President's rhetoric helped, if not motivated, public support to swing behind the war effort.

Evidence in his speeches suggests that Bush was aware of his auditors, domestic and international, and he adapted his discourse accordingly. Bush deftly constructed a narrative without the first premise of the Cold War.

**Narrative in the Speeches**

Each of the central themes underwrites a narrative that orders the events of the war and provides the logic of the story. Some of the themes legitimize the U.S. actions in the Gulf specifically to a domestic audience (themes of U.S. as a chosen agent and references to American history) while others serve to legitimize the war effort to a worldwide audience as well (demonizing the enemy, no alterative).

Three of the topoi legitimize the war. First is the imperative of moral consequences. Bush portrayed the situation as one in which world opinion is unified, a unity of belief that justified collective action. He was careful throughout the speeches over nine months to emphasize a unity that transcended the traditional Western Alliance, pointedly including other European, African, Asian and North American countries. This strategy may have helped to deflect the charge that the U.S. was filling the void left
by Western imperial powers in the Middle East. Further, by broadening the "good guys against the bad guy," he could represent the U.S. as acting agent for the world, even if the world citizenry did not participate directly. Finally, the President could emphasize right rather than might as the defining reason for supporting his effort. In effect, he did not ask other countries to join the U.S. so much as he asked other countries to join the free and moral world.

A second legitimizing strategy is the specification of an enemy and associating that enemy with negative images. With metaphorical and historical references, Bush's argument polarized the scene between good and evil. With references to World War II, Hitler, barbarianism, and naked aggression, Bush clearly identified a bad side in the conflict. Hitler's invasion and absorption of smaller nations such as Austria, Czech Bohemia, and Western Poland made the Kuwaiti analogy seem appropriate. As Burke (1941) notes, the ability of a rhetor to make the opposition seem almost inhuman can give the rhetor significant advantage in bifurcating the issue. In a famous study, Burke examined Hitler's *Mein Kampf* for its underlying rhetorical form. Burke finds that Hitler consistently portrayed the Aryans as pure and community oriented, while Jews were characterized as evil and individual oriented. Thus, by eradicating the Jewish people, the Aryans could do away with self centered individualism; community oriented
Aryans, led by the Nazi party, would form a pure race and desirable unified community.

A third legitimizing strategy is Bush's efforts to make the issue pressing. Bush noted that diplomatic avenues were pursued and exhausted. Many world leaders met and discussed options, attempted to negotiate, and finally agreed on collective action against Iraq. Embargoes and blockades were enacted, meeting with some success, but were much too slow to relieve the good people of Kuwait.

President Bush claimed, "Arab leaders sought what became known as an Arab solution, only to conclude that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to leave Kuwait. Others traveled to Baghdad in a variety of efforts to restore peace and justice. Our Secretary of State, James Baker held an historic meeting in Geneva, only to be totally rebuffed" ("War," p. 226). Acting now eventually became an integral part of the "no alternative" argument by stressing that Kuwait's suffering was too great, that Hussein would only grow stronger, and that letting the standoff continue was unacceptable.

Slippery slope arguments were presented as well: if we do not stop Hussein now, we may face disastrous consequences in the future. Bush argued, "We must recognize that Iraq may not stop using force to advance its ambition . . to assume that Iraq will not attack again, would be unwise" ("Iraq Invasion," p. 675).
Quoting ground soldiers helped boost this argument ("War," p. 227).

In addition to strategies legitimizing the war effort, Bush also raised specific arguments which legitimize, perhaps even canonize, U.S. efforts. The U.S. was portrayed as a nation of moral, freedom loving people, who throughout history have done "the hard work of freedom."

These strategies are most noteworthy in two speeches directed primarily at the U.S.: the State of the Union and the declaration of the end of the war. Scholars have noted the portrayal of America as a special place which God has looked upon favorably. Such claims are spiritual in nature, rather than factual. Ritter (1980) documents the transformation of the religious jeremiad to a secular form, in which images of God and religion are replaced with images of America as a promised land, Americans as a chosen people, and American acts as moral. In the State of the Union, Bush paid particular attention to this theme, claiming that America was doing the hard work of freedom in the past, and now we stood at a defining hour: "But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us. We are Americans; we have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. And when we do, freedom works" ("State," p. 259).

The "hard work of freedom" is not something we do out of occasional politeness; rather, it is a habitual
responsibility: "As Americans, we know there are times when we must step forward and accept our responsibility to lead the world away from the dark chaos of dictators, toward the brighter promise of a better day" ("State," p. 260). Throughout history, Bush noted, we have stepped up to the task: "For two centuries, America has served the world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy. For generations, America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. There is much that we must do at home and abroad. And we will do it. We are Americans" ("Over," p. 356).

The references to America are a constant self-portrayal at a spiritual level. The issue of right versus wrong is bigger than ourselves. Our actions are framed in the name of freedom, and the causes for which we fight not only benefit ourselves, but also act as the shining light for which others may strive to reach. America resides in this light of righteousness and all others strive for it. By invoking to principles which have endured throughout history, Bush raised the argument from the level of circumstances to the level of principle, silencing domestic criticism. The U.S. was then not fighting a war for Texaco, Conoco and Exxon; rather, the U.S. was fighting a war for something much bigger: freedom and righteousness. That oil is involved was a coincidence or side effect.
A second canonizing strategy is the placement of the war in an historical context. While the events were happening in the present, and the war would be prosecuted in the near future, Bush took pains to establish the present conflict in a broader historical frame. As Windt (1983) notes, the present scene is placed in the broader battle between good and evil. In the past forty years, presidents were able to use the Cold War battle as the nexus of good and evil. But, as the iron curtain lifted across eastern Europe and Asia, Bush did not draw on this meta-narrative. Although he made mention of it, he did not explicitly develop the Cold War as the major narrative. This perhaps was because of the sensitive point at which so many of the newly transformed eastern communist block countries stood. Instead, Bush drew on Hitler and Munich as the starting point, and the future of hope and peace in the New World Order as the open ended terminus.

Also of interest is that Bush was not using Viet Nam, the last war the U.S. fought, as the lesson on which to base further actions. He did mention Viet Nam, but only as a failure, not a success. Rather, he used the last Great War, WWII, as the lesson from which to learn. By facing aggression early, we are not capitulating to an aggressor, as was the case with Hitler at Munich. We should learn from Hitler, not from Viet Nam. This has the benefit of drawing upon the success of World War II, despite
capitulation in 1938, as well as omitting the painful memories of the eventual loss in Viet Nam.

Mark Pollock (1994) argues that Bush primarily used an argument from history to frame the conflict, beginning with appeasement at Munich in 1938, continuing through Viet Nam, and then drawn up to the present. Pollock's case is based on evidence from the presidential papers, speeches, press conferences and presidential essays in national outlets. In the speeches alone, there is not much reference to the Munich conference. Nonetheless, there is ample evidence to suggest that this line of argument is pursued because of the necessity of overcoming the failure of Viet Nam, the negative consequences of appeasement to Hitler, as well as heavy emphasis on the successes of America.

The lines of argument repeatedly used throughout Bush's Gulf war speeches complete the narrative outlined for this analysis. The legitimizing arguments of no alternative, Hussein against the world, Iraq as the enemy, provide reasons and evidence for the action to take place, and to take place now. The canonization of America and Americans in the past, present and future make the act moral. Assembled together, these lines of argument provide a cohesive whole of the narrative of Americans in war throughout history. This narrative confirms those which scholars have found in the past speeches of presidents in the justification of war.
CONCLUSION

This chapter evaluated George Bush's Gulf War speeches. This analysis found five recurring themes which helped Bush construct a narrative of the Gulf War. Next, Bush's audience and the development of the overriding narrative for the Gulf War were discussed.

Bush faced several exigencies in delivering these speeches because of the need to satisfy national and international audiences. To emphasize one audience or one line of argument too heavily might exclude another. Further, Bush needed to avoid the loser complex the U.S. public memory had from Viet Nam, as well as frame the argument as one of good versus evil rather than as a mere circumstantial response to the threat to U.S. oil supply. Domestic dissent, which waned over the course of the war, was an obstacle Bush had to keep in mind at all times.

Bush's successful justification for the Persian Gulf War had at least three characteristics. First, the act had to be made consistent with the mores of the audience. Bush successfully argued that America was acting consistently with American ideals; we were not acting to merely protect expedient interests.

Second, the local act of the War in the Gulf had to be placed in a transcendent framework. In this sense, Bush placed the conflict in a greater historical framework, with references to World War I, World War II, the Cold War and
Viet Nam. He made references to our successes in defeating Hitler and winning the Cold war, as well as mentioning the failures of allowing the world appeasement of Hitler, and the domestic dissent of the Viet Nam War.

Third, the justifications invoked communal narratives. The narrative of the Gulf War was placed in the larger frame of American successes, American courage and American compassion.

This chapter concludes that Bush drew heavily on themes to unify Americans and the world against a specific enemy in Saddam Hussein. Bush was deprived of, and avoided, the traditional Cold War arguments pitting America against Communism. Assuming his audience was international and domestic, Bush adapted his arguments to use historical references of good versus evil without the Cold War context.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE UNABOMBER
INTRODUCTION

This chapter is an analysis of the Unabomber's text "Industrial Civilization and its Future." The chapter has three parts. The first part is a brief history of the case of the Unabomber, assembled from news sources. The second part is a discussion of literary, historical and political context. The third part is an analysis of the Unabomber's arguments and his use of a particular form, the jeremiad.

BACKGROUND OF THE UNABOMB CASE

On May 25, 1978, a bomb sent to Northwestern University exploded, injuring a guard. Just under a year later a graduate student at the same university was injured when a package addressed to his major professor exploded. These events were the first of many to occur to individuals affiliated with universities, airlines, and advertising over a seventeen year period. With little to go on, the FBI perceived an initial pattern: the bombs tended to be mailed to those involved with industry and technology. Some were University professors with research interests such as genetics, computer science, technology, and psychology. The professors worked at Vanderbilt, Northwestern, Utah, Michigan, California at Berkeley and the University of San Francisco. The airline industry was also targeted by the bomber. These targets included an
airline fabrication plant, an airplane, the President of United Airlines, and a hoax at Los Angeles International Airport. Finally, a computer store owner, an advertising executive, and a timber industry lobbyist were targets of attack. The tendency of the perpetrator to mail bombs to university and to airline industry sites led authorities to dub the suspect the "Unabomber" (for university/airline bomber).

Aside from the common attributes of the targets, other patterns pointed to a single suspect (as opposed to copycats). First, the inscription "F.C." (which the author claimed to denote Freedom Club) was stamped on a piece of metal found at each bomb site, a shard apparently designed to survive the blasts. Second, a nine digit number appeared on all communiques from the bomber, including taunting letters to victims and the FBI, letters threatening future attacks, as well as all correspondence to the press regarding publication of the manuscript "The Industrial Society And Its Future." The first two digits were 55 (Elson, 1995, p. 32). Either the full number, or the first few digits would appear on each communiqué to verify its authenticity.

The last explosion attributed to the Unabomber occurred on April 24, 1995, when timber lobbyist Gilbert Murray was killed by a package which exploded when he opened it at the California Timber Association in
Sacramento. In the seventeen years, three people were killed and twenty three were injured. Injuries ranged from slight wounding to severe maiming. Out of seventeen documented attacks, three were recognized and disarmed.

Prior to the Spring of 1995, the FBI had few leads on this bomber who attacked at will, and taunted both victims and the FBI. In a letter to the New York Times, the bomber called the FBI a "joke," ridiculing their claim to be the world's greatest law enforcement organization. He referred to them as "surprisingly incompetent." The letter was signed "Frederick Benjamin Isaac Wood," to be interpreted as "FBI wood." Wood was a main component to all bombs, and most return addresses found by the FBI had "woody" sounding names (Morganthau et al., 1995, p. 42).

The bomber's letters characteristically praised the author's cleverness and mocked the FBI for failing to find him. In a 1995 letter, the author complained about having to spend an entire weekend filing fine metal shards for bombs, and then locating isolated Sierras in which to test them (Morganthau et al., 1995, p. 40). In another letter, he revealed that he always wiped off prints, and even sanded down the wood in the bombs, lest telltale skin oil creep into the wood (Klaidman, 1996, p. 32-4).

Since the Gilbert Murray bombing came after a recent drought of activity from the bomber, and immediately after the Oklahoma city bombing, the FBI presumed it was
motivated by resentment because of the extensive attention given to the Oklahoma City bombers.

In late June, 1995, the bomber sent a letter to the San Francisco Chronicle:

WARNING: the terrorist group F.C., called Unabomber by the FBI, is planning to blow up an airliner out of Los Angeles International Airport sometime during the next six days (Elson, 1995, p. 32).

The letter was accompanied with the number 55.

The nation's third busiest airport was tied in knots as federal agents searched in vain for the phantom bomb. There was no bomb. A letter sent to the New York Times the next day announced "No we have not tried to plant a bomb on an airliner recently . . . since the public has such a short memory, we decided to play one last prank to remind them who we are" (quoted in Newsweek, Elson, 1995, p. 32).

Since the bomb at LAX was never planted, authorities assumed that it was a ruse to wrest attention away from the Oklahoma City suspects. But this event helped pave the way to publication of the manuscript.

In April, 1995, the Unabomber mailed a 35,000 word document to the New York Times, the Washington Post, and to Penthouse editor and publisher Bob Guccione. The Unabomber promised that if the manuscript was published in its entirety, the killing would stop. However, property would continue to be a target. The Unabomber also demanded the publication of three annual follow up statements.
Publishers worried about the consequences of accepting the offer. Even if it offered safety from future bombings, acceptance might establish a precedent for further publication of copycat bomber's messages. Then too, there was no guarantee that the bargain would be kept.

The *Washington Post*, in conjunction with the *New York Times*, decided to publish the manuscript. In a brief statement issued by the two publishers, Donald Graham of the *Post*, and Arthur O. Sulzberger of the *Times*, public safety was cited as the overriding concern and reason for publication (1995, Sept 19, p. a7). U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno agreed. But the publication immediately drew criticism, mainly from media figures, interest groups, and academicians. They argued that the Unabomber might continue to bomb, and that the papers were succumbing to blackmail (Kurtz & Kovaleski, 1995, p. A1, A12).

On September 19, 1995, an eight page insert into the *Washington Post* carried the 35,000 word statement, complete with notes. The *Times* and the *Post* agreed to split the $28,000 cost. The *Post* published it because they had the facilities to do it on a weekday; the *Times* could print large inserts only on weekends.

The author mailed a fifty-six page typed, single spaced manuscript to the publications (Elson, 1995, p. 32). The insert published by the *Post* consisted of seven full newspaper pages of regular sized newsprint. Each paragraph
of the text is numbered, the total number of paragraphs is two hundred thirty-two. There are thirty-six end notes. A single small diagram accompanies the text. During the year and a half following the publication of the manuscript, no copycat demands have emerged.

Who is the Unabomber? This question has been answered during the writing of this study. After the publication of the manuscript, the brother of Theodore Kaczynski informed the FBI that he suspected his brother might be the Unabomber. After two months of surveillance, the FBI moved in on the Lincoln, Montana, cabin of Theodore Kaczynski, and found substantial evidence connecting him to the Unabomber's episodes. Kaczynski, a Harvard graduate who holds a Ph.D. in Mathematics from the University of Michigan, was a professor at the University of California at Berkeley for the 1968 school year. Since then he had lived as a hermit in an isolated cabin in Montana. Locally, he was regarded as a quiet and very private individual.

The FBI provided a more detailed picture. Physical evidence found at the cabin included bomb making materials, a completed bomb, a partially completed bomb, ten three ring binders on how to make bombs, a typed copy of the Unabomber's manifesto, a carbon copy of a letter the Unabomber sent, a typewriter whose imprint matched the manuscript, and perhaps most damaging, the nine digit
number (known only to the FBI) the Unabomber used to verify the authenticity of correspondence (Isikoff & Klaidman, 1996, p. 34). *Newsweek* quoted an unidentified source reporting, "We have found evidence on the scene that indisputably identifies him [Kaczynski] as the Unabomber" (Isikoff and Klaidman, 1996, p. 34).

Inquiry into Kaczynski's past placed him in California during times bombs were either mailed or exploded. Evidence includes documented hotel stays and testimony of loans from his brother that paid for the trips. Letters found at his parents' home by his brother corresponded to the content and expression of the manuscript. Apparently, these missives prompted Kaczynski's brother to turn him in. In January of 1998, Theodore Kaczynski plead guilty to charges that he was responsible for the bombings and provided a full confession. He exchanged the plea for a sentence of life in prison and avoiding the possibility of the death penalty.

THE AGRARIAN MYTH AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND CULTURE

Despite the apparent novelty of the Unabomber's acts and ideas, it is important to contextualize them in a long tradition. Terrorism and assassination are older than the Greek Polis. The Agrarian ideals in whose name the Unabomber struggles are deeply rooted in the Jeffersonian
philosophies characteristic of the early American republic. This section will briefly review political and cultural traditions which undergird the writings of the Unabomber.

In one of the founding documents of this country, the Declaration of Independence, the founders take as self-evident that all men are created equal, and entitled to certain individual rights such as liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Yet, Federalists of the Washington and Adams administrations retained a lively sense of fallen human nature and these rights were conditioned by a model of strong centralized government actively engaged in national development and consolidation. The anti-federalists led by the agrarian Jefferson articulated a vision based on the free association of individual citizens (mostly farmers). The government was non-interventionist, with few duties save for maintenance of public order.

In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson reaffirmed the ideals of individual freedom which he had expressed in the Declaration of Independence. The previous administration of John Adams, fearing European entanglements, had passed the Alien and Sedition Acts under which government opposition was stifled. Such powerful government action seemed contrary to the spirit of organic commonality Jefferson had contributed to the project of independence. In his first inaugural, Jefferson affirmed his belief in the inalienable right of individuals to
openly and freely dissent. Jefferson proclaimed that in order for "the will of the majority to be rightful, it must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights which equal laws must protect, and to violate would be oppression." (Reid, 1995, p. 226). This, he called, a "sacred principle."

Those who differ in opinion do not necessarily disagree in principle, as "we are all republicans- we are all federalists." Those republicans who wish to disagree with the idea of democracy altogether must be allowed to "stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it" (Reid, 1995, p. 226).

Jefferson argued that individuals should be granted broad freedom; the government's role was to insure the safety of the individual and state by dispensing equal and exact justice to all, provide friendship and commerce to other nations, and to support the state as the most competent governing agency (as opposed to a centralized, stronger federal government). Jefferson's faith lay in the individual's ability to make good judgment, to make a living, and to be a good citizen.

Henry Nash Smith (1950) argues that it is in Jefferson's ideas that we find the intellectual impetus towards expansion into the undeveloped West. While in France for five years during the Washington administration,
Jefferson twice tried to arrange for explorers to reach the West Coast of America via the Pacific. Both attempts failed. As President, Jefferson commissioned Lewis and Clarke to explore the Northwest to the Pacific, with an eye toward expansion. Smith argues that Jefferson wanted to develop the country as an Agrarian economy to the Mississippi, then leave the rest of the land to fur traders (1950, p. 15). The idea behind the agrarian economy was simple: let the individual work his land, raise his family, teach them as best he can, and be left to pursue his pleasures as he sees fit.

Jefferson believed the agrarian life had a moral dimension superior to that of urban life. Americans will remain virtuous, he wrote to Madison, as long as they are primarily agricultural (Smith, 1950, p. 206). People rooted on the land would enjoy abundance and self-sufficiency while living a peaceful, moral life. Or, as representative Julian declared in 1851, the life of the farmer is peculiarly favorable to virtue because the tillage of the soil was the primeval employment of man, and people are generally happy in proportion to their virtue (Smith, 1950, p. 171). Finally, ownership of private property and civic responsibility were firmly linked in Jefferson's thought.

The conception of an agrarian ideal, an ideology as old as Cato and Cicero, seemed relatively un-controversial
in a nation dominated by farms and large landholders. In Great Britain, however, the pragmatic aspects of the tension between the agrarian life and the economy were being played out physically as the industrial revolution took hold of urban and then rural Britain. Some of the same conflicts were to play themselves out in America years later.

Among the many sketches left by Leonardo Da Vinci were two simple designs for machines to assist in the manufacture of cloth, the teasling machine and the cropper. Both were very simple machines and were well suited to run off of the steam engine or hydro power. Machines of similar design launched the textile industry in England and Scotland shortly after 1750.

As time saving and labor saving economies of the new machines took hold, the need for labor decreased correspondingly. Cottage weavers on hard looms were threatened. Although conservative attitudes and simple lifestyles were deeply entrenched into the Colne and Spen valleys in Northern England, machines began to transform even those "woolen counties" in the early nineteenth century. The worker was getting poorer as fast as the boss was getting richer (Reid, 1986, p. 57).

As early as 1811 in Nottinghamshire, the center of the stocking trade, workers secretly began removing the wires from the machines. At first, the acts were random and
anonymous. But as the idea caught on, disabling the machines became a systematic and violent procedure. Toward the end of 1811, militarized groups were breaking into the factories at night, destroying the machines at an alarming rate. Destruction was selective. Only the large machines which knitted big bolts of cheap cloth were destroyed; all else was left intact.

Despite the efforts of 400 new constables, several troops of yeoman calvary, and several companies of militia, frames in knitting shops were being destroyed at the rate of fifty per week (Reid, 1986, p. 60). As unemployment rose among the displaced weavers and loom workers, the pace of destruction increased.

Local sympathies ran high in favor of the so called "Luddites," who by the Spring of 1812 numbered as high as 400. Origin of the name "Luddite" is inexact; most accounts agree with at least this much: Ned Ludd was a boy who took a beating from either other boys, his father, or by order of a magistrate. In his humiliation and rage, he took a hammer and beat his stocking frame into a heap. Although the boy acted out of rage, and not out of protection for his trade, his name was adopted by the Luddites (Reid, 1986, p. 59). Their anonymity made it difficult for the mill owners to strike back. The society met in secret, used secret signals and took an oath of
silence that intimidated members with death should they betray the others.

Rioting spread to industrial villages all over Northern England, culminating in uprisings as large as 3000 people, and with "sympathy" riots in the less industrial areas. One mill owner, Thomas Garsides, went as far to say the North of England was in "the most desperate and most organised conspiracy that the world has ever witnessed..." which threatened to "set the whole nation ablaze." Another cried that if more military are not sent into the country, they will eventually be coming there not to "protect it, but to reconquer it" (Reid, 1986, p. 126). The British government, locked in a death struggle with Napoleon, was tardy, but eventually dispatched the British Army to crush the rebellions.

By the end of 1812, seventeen luddites had been hanged, sixty six were in prison, and still many others awaited trial. Hundreds of participants, unapprehended or accused, lived out their lives in sullen silence. In 1880, a local journalist, Frank Peel, published a book on the Luddite uprising. Even more than sixty years after the fact, the aged members of the secret society still refused to acknowledge participation in the revolts out of fear (Reid, 1986, p. 285).

Despite their failure, the Luddites became a symbol used to disparage any person or group who opposed
mechanization of any activities. They remain a historical reminder that the displaced and powerless are willing to use violence when they see their way of life destroyed.

The struggles in Britain were real, and were over the physical well being of the workers and their families. In America, the Industrial Revolution did not arrive for decades. It unfolded differently, but had the same effects on the lives of workers and the autonomy of individuals.

Before the industrial revolution took hold in America, there was substantial belief in the ability of the country to maintain itself as a mainly agrarian economic power. In his book Virgin Land (1950) Henry Nash Smith traces the impact of the West on "the consciousness of Americans, and follows the consciousness of this impact in literature and social thought" (p. 4). Smith claims one of the most popular images of the country was the "Myth of the Garden," a depiction of the Western U.S. as a fertile land to be tilled by hearty Western farmers who find abundant opportunity and escape the industrial servitude of Europe and the Eastern U.S. (Smith, 1950, p. 124). Until they founders west of the 100th parallel, farm communities were placed in an advancing Westward line of settlement.

The image of this garden became one of the dominant symbols of nineteenth century American society. It was a collective representation, a poetic idea, that defined the promise of American life. The master myth of the garden
embraced a cluster of metaphors such as fertility, growth, fecundity, and blissful labor in the Earth (Smith, 1950, p. 123).

Jefferson's conception of the ideal agrarian society had freemen tilling their own soil. But, with the rapid growth of the plantation system in the South, and the expansion of markets for cotton world wide, there was a contest between the two visions that would eventually come to a head in the 1850s in debate over Westward expansion: Should states West of the Mississippi be admitted as free or slave?

Some saw the Homestead Act as a watershed cure for poverty and other urban ills of the mid-nineteenth century. The act, if passed, would allow individuals to obtain one hundred sixty acres of land and call it their own if they would agree to farm it for five years. This safety valve would make dependent city dwellers into proud, independent, agrarian entrepreneurs in the West. By taking up farming as a way of life they could support themselves and their families, provide food for the world, and relieve the cities' overcrowding and unemployment. The act failed to pass at first because of the dissent of the South, which feared westward expansion would tip the balance of power against slave states. It passed under the Morrill Act of 1862 when the dissenting Southern States were temporarily out of the Union. Horace Greely was confident that
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of city dwellers would go West and hew out homes for their children as unemployment and poverty would be stamped out (Smith, 1950, p. 189).

Populist orators retailed a florid version of the myth; they averred to the Western farmer that cities were "sores on the body politic" and merchants, bankers, and factory owners who lived in them were wicked and decadent. Land speculation reaffirmed that simple life sheltered the citizen from temptation and vice, and that his farming fostered independence, self sufficiency and integrity of character (Smith, 1950, p. 193).

But the Homestead Act failed to relieve the poverty of the urban ghettos, and the new Western farmer was plagued by debt and drought. Republican policy after the Civil War favored bankers and merchants over farmers, and speculators over settlers. Land speculators and railroads dominated the rush for the West. Further, the individual yeoman farmer did not rush to flee the city as the visionaries had predicted. Smith claims the act failed in this aspect because its goals of small farm settlement were eventually incongruous with the Industrial Revolution. The machine, devices of corporation finance, and the power of big business over congress crushed the myth of the garden. They were also incongruous with the semi-arid realities of the West that called for expensive large-scale irrigation.
Even the seemingly independent farmer was tied to the cycles of the global market, and to get crops to the market he became a slave to the railways, elevator companies, and the Chicago, Liverpool, and New York Grain pits (Smith, 1950, p. 193).

Agrarian individualism seemed a siren song. As the Industrial Revolution in America weakened the individual artisan, it strengthened the voice of the corporate entrepreneur.

Frederick Taylor's *Principles of Scientific Management* (1911) took a bold step toward adapting the individual and the company to thinking about human resources as a commodity. For Taylor, the key to success in the Industrial Revolution was not simply mastering the machinery, but in organizing work to disempower the worker as well. Although the machines and unskilled laborers began to replace the skilled laborer during the late nineteenth century, the remaining skilled craftsmen still exerted considerable control over the pace and the method of the work. This is a problem Taylor sought to overcome through systematic observation of and experimentation with workers and their duties.

In his book *Scientific Management* (1911), Taylor had three purposes. The first purpose was to illustrate the great loss which the whole country was suffering due to the inefficiency in almost all of our daily acts. Secondly,
Taylor argued that the remedy for this inefficiency lay in systematic management, rather than searching for the "extraordinary man." Finally, Taylor argued that the best management is a science, with rules, laws, and principles as its foundation (Taylor, 1911 [1947], p. 7).

Taylor was a foreman at Midvale Steel Company in the 1880s. By observing workers, and eventually conducting experiments to determine the optimum motion and time needed to complete a task, Taylor was able to maximize profits, and, he claimed, motivate his workers to work harder. Yet not all workers liked to be told what to do. They expected that demand for their employment would go down if their autonomy was taken away. Taylor's task was often to convince the workers that increased productivity would ultimately lead to increased demand. This translated into better wages, a compensation for less pride and autonomy that could be enjoyed outside the world of work.

In the Unabomber's era, Taylorization began to encompass intellectuals, who lost their autonomy and sense of mission. The broader social role of intellectuals has been weakened through mass production of professional specialists and technicians, a trend the Unabomber laments.

By the start of the twentieth century, the Industrial Revolution caused the bulk of the U.S. to become connected to and dependent on institutions, rather than on themselves. Urban areas became completely dependent on
technology in the form of work, as well as infrastructure in which to live. Farmers became dependent on markets, and tilling and harvesting equipment, just to keep up with the competition. It was a quiet death for the Myth of the Garden about which Henry Nash Smith wrote.

A group of intellectuals at Vanderbilt University wrote an epitaph to the agrarian dream in 1930. Writing about the conflict of the North and South in terms of agrarianism and industrialism, the authors lamented the decline of the family farm and the dignity and autonomy that went with it. The eventual product, I'll Take My Stand, a collection of 12 essays by the Twelve Southerners, came out in 1930. Each of the twelve essays discusses and defends a different aspect of southern life as it relates to the agrarian life: education, economics, farming, art, religion, philosophy. In every area the agrarian community is said to be superior to the commercial and industrial communities of the north.

In the preface to I'll take My Stand the authors endorse common principles. They argue that agrarian culture can exist in the South in harmony with an industrial North. Core agrarian values to which the authors express allegiance include an appreciation for labor and leisure, a farm based economy, fiscal conservatism, religion, chivalry, and traditional humanist education. The book is set almost entirely against
technological progress, which is associated wholly with the North.

Brant Short (1994) argues that *I'll Take My Stand* occupies an enigmatic position in history: it failed as a rhetorical document arguing for change, yet occupied a more or less treasured spot in history, viewed today as a metaphor for rural independence. Short claims that part of the book's historical status is that it spoke in opposition to the ideograph of progress, and did not have much of a chance at such a time. The depression and the failure of the South to recover its lost prestige after the Civil War made progress an attractive alternative to many. In the end, the allegiance of the Twelve Southerners to their cause was metaphysical and aesthetic; most of them were living in the North within ten years of the book's publication.

The preceding discussion is not meant to place the Unabomber in an orderly progression of ideas, but rather to show the great breadth and perennial appeal of the anti-progressive tradition. There are core appeals throughout history which resonate in the Unabomber's writing. The idea of the freedom and autonomy of the individual was asserted by Jefferson in some of the most prized discourses of U.S. history: the Declaration of Independence and his 1801 First Inaugural Address. Private property is the fundamental human right, individuals must be free to think
and speak as they please, and a government must not usurp personal initiative. Jefferson's citizen is grounded in a literal sense. Further, Agrarian ideals as pitted against technology and industry have deep historical roots as well. Jefferson's intentions were to push the U.S. westward through agrarian, not industrial development. Later, with the passage of the Homestead Act, many of the country's leaders saw agrarianism as a savior of the country from its urban ills.

Anti-technology sentiments have run high in history, and still do today. Labor leaders and environmentalists have long been concerned (albeit for different reasons) with the loss of individual freedom and autonomy that technology brings to society. The violence used by the Unabomber has precedence as well. Even the powerless have risen and used violence when alternatives to it were severely limited.

TOPOI: INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS INDUSTRIALIZATION

This section is an analysis of the main themes which form the anatomy of the Unabomber's argument. Each main theme is identified, and discussed in terms of its relationship to the main claim of the manuscript.

The Unabomber's central thesis argues that technology since the Industrial Revolution has been devastating to the dignity and autonomy of humans. Therefore, a revolt against industrial society should be effected in order to
overthrow, not a government, but a way of life. Although this is an ideological revolution, it is likely to be violent, the immediate results not very pretty, and the human suffering high. However, failure to do so will result in much worse conditions in the future.

The Power Process

At the heart of the problem lies the loss of human control over their psychological well-being. The author maintains that humans have a need, likely biological, to experience a "power process." This need is "closely related to the need for power (which is widely recognized) but is not quite the same thing" (33) (references to the text refer to paragraph number in the Post edition). The power process is accomplished through attaining goals in life by exerting a certain amount of effort. If we can achieve goals through effort and discipline, we are going through the power process to our psychological satisfaction. There are three categories of goals: goals easily achieved, goals achieved with difficulty, and goals never achieved. Non-attainment of certain important goals, such as protecting oneself, obtaining food and water, etc, could result in death. But the non-attainment of other goals still allows humans to survive, but "results in defeatism, low self-esteem or depression" (36). For example, the need to belong is not necessary for survival; but, a person who feels they do not belong will suffer from depression
and low self esteem. The Unabomber is most interested in this part of the power process.

The cause of most social problems is that basic life functions, such as sleep, eating, self-defense, and getting shelter are so easily achieved as to move these goals from those achieved with difficulty to those achieved without difficulty. Whereas basic survival was for centuries a necessary goal to attain, today it is a less significant goal. We no longer hunt, we shop; we do not build shelter, we rent (buy, own, etc). The goals with which humans satisfied the power process are now easily met. This deprives humans of the power process, and eventually leads to social psychosis that is breaking down society.

For example, the Unabomber claims that if you give a person everything that he or she desires, that person will be happy at first, but will "become acutely bored and demoralized (34)." Eventually, individuals may even slip into clinical depression. As an example, the author looks to history, claiming that leisured aristocracies tend to become decadent, demoralized and bored. But this fact is not true of fighting aristocracies, who are so busy defending and attacking to preserve themselves that they have no room for decadence and no time for boredom. No examples are cited for this argument. The author claims "this shows that power is not enough. One must have goals toward which to exercise one's power" (34). If the goal is
a physical necessity, the person could die if he or she fails to achieve them. But, even if the physical necessities are met, the person still needs to have goals in order to maintain psychological balance.

**Surrogate Activities**

Yet, not every leisured aristocrat is demoralized. The Unabomber points out that "instead of sinking into decadent hedonism" (38), Emperor Hirihiito devoted himself to marine biology, a field in which he became distinguished. His goals, though not related to physical necessity, were satisfied through his hobby. When the problems of getting food and shelter and performing adequately at work are easily solved, anxiety overcomes us. When the challenges in human lives move from group two (those goals achieved with much effort) to group one (those achieved with minimal effort), humans compensate for the lack of the power process with "surrogate activities." The author claims "When people do not have to exert themselves to satisfy their physical needs they often set up artificial goals for the selves" (38). People then pursue these goals with the same rigor as the pursuit of survival based goals. Art, literature, and hunting are clear examples of surrogate activities (38). Even science marches on without regard to the welfare of society, obedient to the psychological needs of the scientists,
whose curiosity and desire to make the world a better place are merely surrogate activities.

The term surrogate activity is used to "designate an activity that is directed toward an artificial goal that people set up for themselves merely on order to have some goal to work toward" (39). Human survival is easier now than it was in the past. It takes minimal effort to do the petty technical chore that meets the boss's minimum qualifications for a job. Society is full of surrogate activities. Humanitarian efforts, work, athletics, arts, and hobbies are surrogate activities; finding food and sex are not (39).

The Unabomber claims that for most people, surrogate activities are less satisfying than the pursuit of real goals. They are never satisfied: the moneymaker must make more money; the scientist must move on to the next problem. The key problem is that humans no longer solve the problem of their basic survival, as it is already solved for them.

Although much effort is directed at most surrogate activities, these are not necessary for survival. To test whether or not an activity is surrogate, the author instructs us to ask whether or not survival will be affected if the task is not accomplished: "If the answer is no, then the pursuit of goal X is a surrogate activity" (39). The author claims that most researchers, technophiles, scientists, and engineers all pursue their
careers as a surrogate activity to provide them the illusion of accomplishing needed goals in life. The survival of the engineer does not rely on designing better circuits; the survival of the literature professor does not rely on writing a critical essay. But their psychological balance does rely on these activities.

Therefore, so much of the research that is creating a technologically dependent society is actually done not to buy groceries or protect oneself from natural enemies, but rather to fulfill a psychological need for accomplishment.

**Autonomy**

The primary cause of human suffering in the power process is the loss of autonomy. We feel deprived because we are not required to do any work for our survival. Although workers may be forced to punch a clock and do eights hours of menial labor, the acts are mere obedience, which is often unsatisfying. People crave autonomy, despite the difficulty encountered in reaching it. If autonomy is achieved in a small group, the need can be satisfied. But, in larger organizations, autonomy is not satisfied: "If they work under rigid orders handed down from above that leave them no room for autonomous decision and initiative, then their need for the power process will not be served" (42).

The Unabomber claims that some people have little need for autonomy: "Either their drive for autonomy is weak or
they satisfy by identifying themselves with some powerful organization to which they belong" (43). For example, the soldier who is happy to follow orders blindly is satisfied with a low level of autonomy. Blind obedience serves him well, and he gains satisfaction from his fighting skills. For most, through the process of autonomous achievement of goals, "self-esteem, self confidence and a sense of power are acquired" (44). But, when one cannot complete the power process autonomously, the result is "boredom, demoralization, low self-esteem, inferiority feelings, defeatism, depression, anxiety, guilt, frustration, hostility, spouse or child abuse, insatiable hedonism, abnormal sexual behavior, sleep disorders eating disorders, etc" (44).

The author claims that since the Industrial Revolution there has been a tendency to strengthen the system against human autonomy, thereby depriving us of our freedoms. Autonomy in the conservative, political sense is almost irrelevant. Even the smallest of local communities is deeply enmeshed in the larger economic and cultural system (118). As it became apparent that the industrial society could not satisfy human needs, human behavior was modified to fit the system. The only needs the system does satisfy are those that are necessary for the system. For example, mental health is largely defined as the extent a person can
function in society and serve the system without showing signs of stress (119).

Further, efforts to give people a sense of purpose are at best superficial attempts to make the individual feel as though their needs are being met. Some companies try to give people more autonomy, but workers still achieve company goals, not their own. Even small business owners have little autonomy. They must follow regulations, and they must adapt to society's technologies in order to remain competitive (120). The Unabomber cites a Wall Street Journal report that many franchise companies exclude those from ownership who demonstrate creativity and initiative (65).

Leftism

The problems brought about by the lack of autonomy best manifest themselves in what the author calls modern "leftism." Although leftism as it is used is never concisely defined, it consists in large part of "socialists, collectivists, politically correct types, feminists, gays and disability activists, animal rights activists, and the like" (7).

Leftists, the Unabomber claims, are suffering from feelings of inferiority and from oversocialization. They are individuals who have low self esteem and self hatred, and thus identify themselves with groups and movements whom they perceive as weak (feminists fighting for women)
defeated (American Indians), repellent (homosexuals) or otherwise (13). Those who associate with these movements are often not actually a part of the group they are protecting. According to the Unabomber, leftists are anti-individualist and pro-collectivist. They want society to solve their problems for them: "He is not the sort of person who has an inner sense of confidence in his ability to solve his own problems and satisfy his own needs" (16).

Another characteristic of leftism is oversocialization, a tendency to be so socialized into norms and practices that the individual lives in a state of constant guilt for his or her thoughts and actions. For example, children are taught to respect their elders, to love, not hate, never to lie, and other basic tenets of good behavior. But these tenets are impossible to live up to one hundred percent of the time. The leftist, because he or she is oversocialized, suffers from guilt and anxiety over petty violations of these rules throughout their lifetime. And in a politically correct atmosphere of today, it is much easier for these violations to occur.

The Revolt

The Unabomber wants to revolt against not simply technology, but also the ideology of technology and the psychological problems that destroy individuality and promote uniformity. He claims "the technophiles are taking us all on an utterly reckless ride into the unknown" (180).
By going back to "wild nature" and forcing people to live in small societies of hundreds, rather than millions, the author believed we could restore balance to nature and humanity. Therefore, the revolution does not aim to introduce a new power structure; it aims to defuse power from the centralized, non-human, technological system. In this aim, the Unabomber is not different from radical ecologists; only his methods are.

The actual physical revolution the author proposes is a simple combination of Marxist and Machiavellian strategies, used in politics and revolution throughout history. There are seven points to enact the revolution against technology.

First, the general focus must remain on heightening social stress to hasten the breakdown of the system, and propagate the new ideology. The author provides the example that although the French and Russian revolutions were considered failures by many, they still had an ideology in place to take over when the system collapsed financially in France, and militarily in Russia. At that time, the revolution swept over them (181). While some may argue that the revolutions mentioned were failures, they failed only in their ability to develop a new, perfect society. The revolution against Technology does not seek this perfect society.
Second, the author claims that an ideology must be for as well as against something. The author proposes "Wild Nature" as an alternative, living by natural selection and chance, and God's will (depending on philosophical and religious opinions). People will be hunters, herders and fishermen; local autonomy will prevail because of limited communications and travel. Nature is the opposite of technology. It will not be necessary to set up a society because nature takes care of itself. The industrial revolution turned the table on nature. It is only necessary to get rid of industry. Getting rid of industry will not solve all problems, but it will stem the tide.

Third, because people hate psychological conflict, ideological development should occur on two levels. On one level, the new ideology should be addressed to the intelligent, thoughtful and rational. These people can handle the facts, and will be useful to help in the persuasion of others.

On another level, ideology should also be simplified to appeal to the unthinking so they may see the conflict in unambiguous terms. This form should not be so cheap as to alienate the rational (however, rabble rousing propaganda may be necessary for incitement at the time of the revolution) (188).

Prior to that final struggle, the revolutionaries should not expect to be in the majority. Rather than try
to win over the majority prior to the revolution, they will fare better to get a deeply committed core, rather than a large shallowly committed group (189).

Fourth, the line should be drawn between the masses and the elite. Do not draw a line between the masses and the revolutionaries. Do not portray the masses as idiots, sucked in by the system; portray them as duped by marketing and advertising. Blame the advertiser for manipulating, the public for being manipulated (190). Also, beware of fomenting other conflicts because this may take away focus from the cause at hand.

Fifth, the revolution may not be violent, but will be political. Revolutionaries should avoid assuming power until the system is stressed to the danger point. A Green Party would be a massive failure, because once people taste its policies, it would be voted out of power. It will have to be a revolution from below, not from above (194).

Revolution must be international and worldwide. Nationalism is a great promoter of technology. Attack technology in all nations at once, so the U.S. will not fear China, Korea and the rest of the third world. Revolutionaries ought to favor a world economy, to facilitate collapsing it all at once; the more dependent technological nations are on each other, the better. Do not fail to distinguish power for individuals from power
from the large organizations. Even when we are granted small rights, over technology, rules come with them.

Primitive people actually had power within nature because they could hunt, clothe themselves, and protect themselves. Today, humans do not do provide for themselves (196-8).

Seventh, the ruin of the system must be the only goal. Do not get distracted. Other goals may require technology. For example, if you make social justice a goal, you will have to use a technology to enforce it. You will have to use technology for some things, but make sure the goal is always attacking the system. Humans and technology are an alcoholic with a barrel of wine (203). No other goal may be allowed to compete with the elimination of technology; all others are subservient. If experience indicates some of the sub-claims distract, then get rid of them (206).

RHETORICAL FORM IN THE MANUSCRIPT

Earlier I argued that many of the themes invoked by the Unabomber are rooted in a long tradition of argument and narrative. Echoes of Bible stories, Thoreau, and the protests of the 1960s resonate throughout the text. Consistent with these themes, the Unabomber uses a "quasi-jeremiadic" form, in which the problems the world faces are detailed, the signs of the problem presented and interpreted, and the solution provided which will lead us from the present peril. The author is the prophet who demands a return to the ideals of an organic society.
I call this a quasi-jeremiad because the promise of a hopeful future is muted, if not absent. Bercovitch (1976) argues that the traditional Jeremiad used by Puritan ministers offered hope to the audience in the form of enlightenment that results from re-establishing yourself in the way of the Lord. A more contemporary version, the American Jeremiad, replaces religion with references to the American dream, and our role as a chosen people for exemplary secular projects. Both variant forms rely on traditional motivation: hope and fear. The Unabomber's discourse lacks this sense of hope, noting at the end of the manuscript that the move will be painful, perhaps violent, and he cannot predict what the future will be like. Yet, the call for a return to Eden may still have a spiritual appeal to intellectuals or alienated Third World residents.

The Evils

Advocates of violence linguistically demonize their enemy. Consistent with this strategy, the Unabomber devotes just over half of the manuscript to demonizing technology. Technology is at once more concrete (an inanimate evil) and more abstract (as a mode of dealing with the world) than are people (for example, Jews in the case of Hitler) or governments (Hussein or Castro's regime).
The definition of technology is vague because of the term's breadth. From the manuscript, we can deduce that most things engineered, most things electrical, and most things mechanical are evil. However, rather than define technological instruments in terms of their composition, the author defines them in terms of their effects on humans, such as depriving us of autonomy, causing social psychosis and depriving us of the power process. Like Jacques Ellull, the Unabomber characterizes technology more as a social practice than as an animate object.

When the author does point the finger at humans, he does so in a categorical sense, not an individual sense. For example leftists, educators, engineers, conservatives, politicians are all mentioned as categories, but not as individuals. There are roles that result from technological hegemony. As Ellul would argue, we are situated within technology, thus all of our institutions (religion, business, education, law, the military, etc.) have lost their autonomy and exist within a larger technological structure. Institutions and individuals strive for control, efficiency, and depersonalized expertise. The vision of the future is one of mastery of nature, reduction of pain and risk, and a rising level of material comfort. In this conception, the enemies are both abstract and pervasive, a practice that has penetrated to the roots of culture. This does not provide the audience a
sense of direction to act against any one person. Further, when individuals are criticized, it is usually in terms of their service to the technological system, not as propagators of the system. Researchers are not seen as autonomous seekers, but as human servants of a technological system with its own power imperative. Thus scientists and laity are not divided. All are victims of the technological system.

This portrayal of technology allows for social problems to be discussed as effects and results of technology. For example, the Unabomber argues that mental health is largely defined as the extent a person can function in technological society (i.e., serve the system without showing signs of stress) (119). Mental health is framed in terms of the systemic imperative instead of a particular individual's needs. Eschewing the definition of a specific enemy in terms of who it is (an individual, a type of career, specific technologies) is a rhetorical hallmark of the Unabomber's discourse. Its focus on behaviors solves the problem of endless induction or perpetual definition (for example, recall how the leftist was defined as a broad list of people with a broad list of characteristics), and divisive blame. A pervasive enemy creates another problem. The audience, after all, is reading a newspaper printed on an automated press, delivered by petroleum burning vehicles, and may be
examining the manuscript by a sixty watt light bulb. The audience is not likely to cast the guilt of the enemy completely on something so broad as technology. It is as if society is attacking an enemy that has already conquered it. Such attack involves giving up or killing a substantial part of its identity.

The Solution

The Puritan preacher used the jeremiadic form to move the audience to act. Ritter (1980) notes that the presidential candidates use the secular jeremiadic form to demonize the opponent, and offer a path to hope, which includes supporting their candidacy. The Unabomber's message fails to complete this conventional form. In the secular sense, no hopeful future is offered. In the future, there will be significant social dislocation, violence, and a future in Wild Nature where we renounce and destroy the technologies which have shaped our world so profoundly.

The story of the return to Eden is still present in Western consciousness. Rousseau's return to natural man, Marx's paradise, and Ellul's sense of a re-empowerment of ordinary people in a more humane environment might echo in the Unabomber's text. But these are not explicit promises of hope for the future.

In the context of the American past, the Myth of the Garden provided a powerful metaphor for American
development as one of the most dominant symbols of the nineteenth century (Smith, 1950, p. 123). The image of the individual, pushing westward, ruling the land with their most potent weapon, the plow, continues to reverberate today in agrarian thought and writings. However, the great subtext of cheap, unlimited land has vanished.

The author presents nature and technology as binary opposites. Nature is beautiful; it will not be necessary to set up a society, because humanity will be in nature. The industrial revolution represented a dramatic break with nature and it must therefore be reversed at any cost.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to analyze the arguments of the Unabomber for the substance from which the author begins. Although there are many arguments raised in the essay, and many argued very poorly, there are recurring themes consistently developed throughout the manuscript. More importantly, underlying these themes is the potential for the powerful sentiments which provide a logic for the individual arguments to work. By evoking familiar, conventional narrative forms consistent with the Myth of the Garden and agrarian tradition, the author stands to gain an audience for the individual cases argued. On the level of the individual arguments there is reason to purchase the claims, as they each address small aspects of our lives. It may not be difficult to argue that
individuals have less autonomy than in the past, or that we are slowly being pushed into conformity that an increasingly technologically dependent society requires. But, placed in a larger context, difficulty arises trying to separate nature and institutions. Audiences may accept the separation between humans and nature in small increments, but as a whole it falls short because of its extremity and totality.

The most prevalent theme advanced in the manuscript is the ubiquity of technological evil. Since the time of the industrial revolution, rapid technological advancement has alienated individuals from their world. Humans have become servants of technology, instead of vice versa.

The author also argues that two significant effects result from the growth of technology. One effect is the psychological instability of the individual. The Unabomber argues that humans have lost autonomy, and this loss of autonomy underlies many social problems. Another significant effect is embodied in leftism, characterized by low self esteem, self hatred, guilt, and the need to identify with outgroups.

Both of these effects are supported with weak arguments. Citations are rarely provided, and when they are, they are as examples, not as authority. Specific historical examples are mentioned, but only in fragmentary arguments. It may be that the author uses generic evidence
to avoid challenge to specific details. However, arguing from very vague evidence equally leaves him open to dispute.

Further, when he invokes any type of social scientific or historical example, it is important to remember the quality of the source to which he attributes his evidence: historians, social scientists, and behavioral scientists are all performing their research as a surrogate activity. Though he has made no claims to the nature of truth of verisimilitude in research done as surrogate activities, the author is relying on groups of people he deems inferior.

Finally, the form the arguments take was discussed. Although the author does attempt to polarize the audience against a common enemy, the enemy is not well defined, and is inanimate. It may be the case that antithetical or binary schemes work best when the enemy is an easily identifiable agent. The author fails to develop a positive outlook for the future. In response to the question, "If we abandon technology, what hope and salvation await us?" the author can only answer "primitive society, pain, and darkness."

Underlying this argument is the power of the grand narrative of the Fall and Rebirth. In the jeremiadic sense, this narrative equates with falling out of the graces of God (Puritan), or diverting away from the path of
American destiny (Secular). If the author can convince the reader that the individual has lost his/her autonomy, and thus dignity, then the notion of recovering the autonomy and meaning through empowerment becomes the rational, and more easily accepted route. Perhaps this path is the road to salvation which the manuscript otherwise seems to lack.
CHAPTER SIX
STEAL THIS BOOK: ABBIE HOFFMAN'S REVOLUTIONARY DISCOURSE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is an analysis of Abbie Hoffman's (1971) *Steal This Book*. The chapter begins with a background of Abbie Hoffman followed by a review of communication literature about Hoffman and the Yippies. Next, this chapter evaluates the book to discover the lines of argument the author pursues, and the rhetorical form the arguments take.

BACKGROUND OF ABBIE HOFFMAN

Abbot Howard Hoffman was born November 30, 1936, in Worcester, Massachusetts, to John and Florence Hoffman. His father owned a medical supply company. Abbie was the oldest of three children. Hoffman's ancestors were Russian Jews who emigrated to the U.S. at the beginning of the twentieth century. An avid follower and participant in sports, the young Hoffman was an adept sports gambler, a talented athlete, and an accomplished pool hustler (Jezer, 1992, p. 16). Hoffman attended Seaver Prep Junior High, and later Classical High, a college preparatory public school. He majored in psychology at Brandeis University and became a strong follower of the teachings of one of his instructors, Abraham Maslow. Despite Maslow's later disapproval of Hoffman's antics in the 1960s, Hoffman remained strongly cathexed to Maslow's views.
Particularly, Hoffman was attracted to Maslow's emphasis on the importance of human motivation and the good in the human psyche, as opposed to the prevailing Freudian psychology's focus on the dark side of human nature and the unconscious (Hoffman, 1980, p. 26).

After graduating from Brandeis, Hoffman studied for one year at the University of California at Berkeley. One biographer, Jezer, notes that events in Berkeley may have accelerated Hoffman's move toward open activism. These events include the inception of the sit-in as a form of protest at a North Carolina diner, the execution of a convicted rapist at San Quentin, and the protests against the visit of HUAC to San Francisco in 1960 (Jezer, 1992, p. 37-39).

Hoffman left Berkeley after his first year and married his pregnant girlfriend. They settled in Worcester, where Hoffman worked as a staff psychologist at the state mental hospital. He and Shelia, his first wife, had two children together. They later divorced, and Hoffman married Anita Kushner.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Hoffman became an infamous figure in U.S. cultural history as an effective organizer, anti-war protester, and a master at manipulating the media. Some scholars today confer on Hoffman, along with Jerry Rubin, the status of "public symbol" because they became more than figures who got on the news. They
seemed able to create the news (Jensen & Lichtenstein, 1995).

Hoffman is best known for his activities at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. After organizing and participating in protests surrounding the convention, which eventually erupted into one of the more famous riots in U.S. history, Hoffman and seven others were arrested on incitement and conspiracy charges. In the Chicago Eight trial (later reduced to seven after the removal of Bobby Seal from the case) Hoffman and Rubin seized the opportunity for free publicity. The trial of the Chicago Seven provided Hoffman and Rubin the chance to turn the case around; rather than a trial for the seven defendants, it became a trial of American culture. Masterminding public performances, propaganda, and events mocking the trial, the Yippies were able to gain free notoriety through the media. Julius Hoffman, a conservative federal judge, sat on the bench for the trial. Hoffman and Rubin's antics, such as showing up in court in judicial robes, draping their defendant's table with American and Vietnamese flags, and offering thousands of objections over the course of the trial, made a mockery not only of the trial but also of the judicial system. Although the Chicago Seven were all convicted, the convictions were eventually overturned because of judicial misconduct on the part of the court. In his autobiography
Hoffman claimed that the judge overruled two thousand objections by the defense, while sustaining virtually every prosecutorial objection. By Hoffman's account, in the "one hundred thirty or so decisions in which we felt the judge had made a serious reversible error, the appeals court agreed with us" (Hoffman, 1980, p. 190-91). The only prison time Hoffman served was for contempt of court charges (he swore at the judge in Yiddish). He served less than two weeks in prison.

After the trial the anti-war protest movements waned, and Hoffman turned his attention to speaking engagements and fund raising. In search of quick money and excitement, he brokered a cocaine deal that turned out to be a police set up, and he was arrested. Bail was set at fifty thousand dollars. Fearing a long prison sentence, he fled bail and went underground for seven years. While he was underground, he remained an activist. Under the pseudonym Barry Freed, Hoffman lived life on the run, but took time out to teach, organize, and write prolifically. He wrote his autobiography, Soon to be a Major Motion Picture, while he was underground. In this book he details much of the fear, loneliness and depression he experienced while underground. Though he was always portrayed as the glamorous fugitive, he admits that much of the time underground was very uncomfortable. He reached a deal with
federal officials that eventually allowed him to resurface without serving jail time.

Activist, extrovert, and non-stop talker, Hoffman kept one secret: his diagnosis as a manic depressive. Despite medication and long periods of successful management depression contributed to his death. He overdosed on 150 phenobarbitols mixed with liquor, and died on April 12, 1989.

Although Hoffman was often accused of capitalizing on his public image and selling out his movement, he was never wealthy. Most of his earnings were spent on organizing social movements, defending himself, and supporting his children. His endless reserve of energy (often fueled by the manic episodes of his psychological condition) allowed him to work tirelessly to advance the causes for which he was fighting. In addition to his autobiography, he wrote Woodstock Nation, Revolution for the Hell of It, Steal This Book, and Square Dancing in the Ice Age.

After the Chicago Seven trial, Hoffman wrote what his biographer, Marty Jezer, termed his "magnum opus," Steal This Book. The book "deliberately obliterated the moral distinction between legal and illegal activity" (Jezer, 1992, p. 227). The book is a compilation of information necessary to live free of the constraints of society and its institutions. The book offers legal and illegal ways of exploiting institutions for personal gain. In short, it
is a handbook for the revolutionary. The broad array of topics include getting food, lodging, transportation, phone calls, clothing and furniture for free. The book includes instructions for illegally obtaining welfare, unemployment, health care, legal advice and education. There are also explicit instructions on how to organize rallies and riots, make bombs, and destroy property. Finally, the book offers instructions for organizing movements, creating underground presses and starting radio and television stations. The final four chapters specify where to go and what to do to get by on the street for little or nothing in Chicago, New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles.

Hoffman faced many obstacles in publishing and distributing the book. Random House initiated the project but ultimately rejected it. Hoffman claims publishers felt the book, though incendiary, would stand up to free speech laws. But distributors and book sellers were not willing to market a book whose title encouraged the prospective customer to steal it. Hoffman refused to change the title, and finally ended up printing it himself. He arranged for Grove Press to distribute it. Grove Press was a radical publisher that printed the Evergreen Review.

Initially, stores refused to carry Hoffman's book, most reviewers refused to review it, and newspapers refused to advertise it. Hoffman claims that although the book was on the New York Post's best seller list for eight weeks,
the paper refused to advertise or review it. Finally, Dotson Rader reviewed the book for the *New York Times*, and sellers eventually relaxed their strict policies against the book (Hoffman, p. xii). The initial printing of 100,000 was eventually distributed, but Hoffman notes that a large portion of those never made it to the cashier's counter. Over a million copies of the book were printed and distributed.

The book is a significant text for this study because in it Hoffman details exactly how to carry out the revolution he advocates. The text explicitly details methods for disturbing, upending, or stealing from "the system." It is also a more refined and polished version of his earlier works. In addition, philosophical statements and principles betray values, justifications, and world view. Because it is Hoffman's definitive statement, this text will be examined in the analysis section of this chapter. Previous Studies of Hoffman and The Yippies

Despite the prolific upsurge of social movement studies in communication during the 1970s and 1980s, Abbie Hoffman is the subject of very few. Theodore Windt (1972) examines the rhetoric of the Yippies with the aim of explaining their unique form of social discourse. Windt notes that "lacking the instruments of power available to those conducting the war, demonstrators had to rely on public opinion fashioned through speeches, signs, flags,
lectures, teach-ins, and whatever other methods could be improvised" (p. 1). Reliance on non-traditional public communication forms sometimes put these protesters at odds with their goals and often outraged both opponents and proponents against the war. The use of slogans, obscenities, and profane and illegal acts alienated people on all sides. Why then, Windt asks, did they do it?

To answer this question and to explore the complex role the discourse of the Yippies played, Windt draws on the tradition of the Cynics of Ancient Greece. The Cynics were proponents of a school of thought in ancient Athens who lived their "philosophy of life" through anti-institutional behavior as a form of protest. To act in ways conforming to the ideals of the state seemed to the Cynics a betrayal of mankind because they believed institutional arrangements in Athens were corrupt and oppressive. To accept institutional formulas was to sanction institutional oppression. The Cynics "would not admit that any institution had any legitimate authority unless it was based on the natural rights of man" (1972, p. 6).

To live in an immoral society without compromising oneself, one had either to withdraw completely into contemplation, or to live within the society in ways that did not conform to it. The Cynics resorted to diatribes as their form of rhetoric. In diatribes, logic was inverted,
assumptions were reversed, and the unexpected was expected. The diatribe, Windt writes, "is to conventional speeches what Alice's adventures in Wonderland are to conventional life." It is a "moral dramaturgy intended to insult the sensibilities, to turn thought upside down, to turn social mores inside out, to commit in language the very same barbarisms one condemns in society." (pp. 7-8). Elsewhere, Windt claims the diatribe is to rhetoric what satire is to literature (p. 8). The Cynic attempts to reduce conventional beliefs to the ridiculous, thereby making those who support them seem contemptible, hypocritical, or stupid.

Through acts such as public nudity, public masturbation, refusal to work (only begging for money), and writing and playing out satires directed at society, the Cynics expressed their political beliefs. Although they mocked the practices of society, the Cynics did not offer strong alternatives to remedy social ills.

Windt argues that Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman were modern day Cynics in their practice of social discourse. Finding the contradictions in society paradoxical, they shaped their protests to reveal these paradoxes through a "cynical" rhetoric. The Yippies felt that traditional language as used by institutions had failed America's youth.
Windt quotes a speech of Rubin's in which Rubin claims "when they (authorities) control the words, they control everything, and they got the words controlled. They got 'war' meaning 'peace' they got 'fuck' being a bad word they got 'napalm' being a good word- they got 'decency' that to me is indecent. The whole thing is like backwards, and we gotta turn it around." (p. 10).

Windt claims traditional reason was also ineffective. President Johnson, while acknowledging dissent, ignored its pleas; the government also drew on traditional anti-communist sentiments in its justification. Teach-ins were losing force because of their commonness. Protesters realized that new forms needed to be created to sustain the anti-war movement.

Like the Cynics of Greece, the Yippies believed that humans are not free because they have been conditioned and defiled by institutions. Those who believe in these institutions create and perpetrate war, racism, and oppression through established conventions. Whereas other anti-war factions sought to transform institutions, Yippies sought to do away with them altogether. They rejected the work ethic, advocated ripping off if not destroying institutions and sought to free man from the drudgery of work so he could celebrate life, be creative, and enjoy sex. So, while the Yippies' form of discourse was non-
traditional, it was aimed at traditional goals of public discourse: enacting social change.

Bowers and Ochs (1971) note that while political activism among America's young rose sharply in the 1960s, it was difficult to isolate the reasons for this rise, and the subsequent years of apathy and inaction in the seventies, Bowers and Ochs claim that in part, political and social injustices were becoming more apparent to a generation of young, independent people, reared with a rationale of independent thought and action (p. 57).

Their study of the Chicago riots of August, 1968, at the Democratic National Convention, takes a social movement approach to studying the causes, effects, and uses of symbols in the riots. Specifically, they seek a "persuasive rationale for the words and the symbolic acts of the agitators and the establishment" (p. 58).

Bowers and Ochs dissect the violence into smaller aspects: the ideology of the establishment and agitators, the steps of petition and avoidance, the uses of nonviolent resistance and suppression, and escalation and confrontation. They argue that the riots had the intended effect of establishing an "agitative syllogism" whereby:

\[ p_1 \text{ Chicago acts as the U.S.} \\
\[ p_2 \text{ Chicago acts brutally and oppressively} \\
\[ c \text{ The United States acts brutally and oppressively} \]

(1971, p. 75).

Towards this faulty conclusion, the authors argue, the agitators went some distance towards establishing
credibility. They note that the antics of the Yippies were successful, in part, because of the rigidity of the City in not granting permits, and in countering marchers and protesters with physical force.

Bowers and Ochs' study is useful for its insights into the events of Chicago in 1968, but it does not provide a useful perspective with which to follow up on the incidents. Notably absent are those *topoi* of justification that the present study seeks. The next section proceeds with such an analysis.

**THE TOPOI OF STEAL THIS BOOK**

Analysis of *Steal This Book* (hereafter STB) will proceed by examining claims in the text regarding problems with the present social, cultural, and political system in America, and justifications for changing them. Then the chapter examines the rhetorical strategies of language STB uses by examining recurring metaphors and linguistic paradoxes. The conclusion will discuss the rhetorical form of Hoffman's argument.

**Ideology of The Revolution**

Hoffman's discourse is based on specific assumptions about American politics and culture. This section evaluates some of those assumptions as they are developed in the text. In the introduction, Hoffman describes what he terms the "Demands for a free society:"

A community where the technology produces goods and services for whoever needs them, come who may. It
calls on the Robin Hoods of Santa Barbara Forest to steal from the robber barons who own the castle of capitalism. It implies that the reader is "ideologically set," in that he understands corporate feudalism as the only robbery worthy of being called a crime, for it is committed against the people as a whole (1971, p. xvii).

The institutional violence of American economic and political realities manipulates the values and mores of the people and maintains the power of the elites. Unless this manipulation is understood by the public, Hoffman argues, "we will forever be imprisoned in the caves of ignorance" (1971, p. xix). The possibility of freedom from the tyranny of the system starts with the recognition of the cultural violence of which so many Americans are victims. He claims we begin to think clearly when we see that "the bank robbers rather than the bankers should be the trustees of the universities. . . .; When we see the Army Mathematics Research and Development Center and the Bank of Amerika as cesspools of violence, filling the minds of our young with hatred, turning one against another, then we being to think revolutionary" (p. xix).

Given the nature of the text, the reputation of the author, and the target audience of radicals, it is possible he does not feel obligated to spell out exactly which institutions are doing the violence and exactly what type of violence is being done. This claim may partially explain why these charges are so broad and vague.
Remedying the problem is equally vague. Freedom will be reached, writes Hoffman, "by making war on the machine: Become an internationalist and learn to respect all life. Make war on machines, and in particular the sterile machines of corporate death and the robots that guard them" (1971, p. xix).

The commitment needed from the participants in this revolution is comprehensive; the actors must not only think revolution, but act on it. Hoffman admonishes: "Smoking dope and hanging up Che's picture is no more a commitment than drinking milk and collecting postage stamps. A revolution in consciousness is an empty high without a revolution in the distribution of power. We are not interested in the greening of Amerika except for the grass that will cover its grave" (p. xix).

Despite the anti-establishment acts and strategies advocated in the book, the text is not without something approaching a moral code. But an account of this moral code must be put in proper context. What follows is the sense of right and wrong as it appears in the book. Although Hoffman provides this ethical code, it is not one most law abiding societies would accept, nor is it comprehensive.

Hoffman writes "[w]hether the ways it [the book] describes to rip off shit are legal or illegal is irrelevant. The dictionary is written by the bosses of
order" (1971, p. xvii). The ethical and legal codes of the government, since they are written by the government, are of no concern to the revolution; it has its own code. Hoffman makes moral judgments throughout the book on what is right and what is wrong. For example, he claims "Our moral dictionary says no heisting from each other. To steal from a brother or a sister is evil. To not steal from the institutions that are the pillars of the Pig Empire is equally immoral" (1971, p. xvii). Acceptable targets of physical destruction and theft are those of the establishment, not those of individuals. Hoffman is careful to point out that generally individuals merit freedom from violence; it is the institutions and its agents that are targeted.

By juxtaposing the language used to describe institutional versus radical acts, Hoffman illustrates how the moral code of the establishment easily justifies the moral code of the revolutionaries:

Murder in a uniform is heroic, in a costume it is a crime. False advertisements win awards, forgers end up in jail. Inflated prices guarantee large profits while shoplifters are punished. Politicians conspire to create police riots and the victims are convicted in the courts. Students are gunned down and then indicted by suburban grand juries as the trouble makers. A modern highly mechanized army travels 9,000 miles to commit genocide against a small nation of great vision and then accuses its people of aggression. Slumlords allow rats to maim children and then complain of violence in the streets. Everything is topsy turvy. . . . If we internalize the language and imagery of the pigs, we will forever be fucked (1971, p. xvii).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Hoffman is well aware of how society views the actions he advocates. For example, in describing riot tactics, he notes that a lot of the strategies he advocates may be labeled dirty fighting. But the establishment, using its power of definition, labels the acts as dirty fighting. History shows us "All revolutionaries fight dirty in the eyes of the oppressors. The British accused the minutemen of Lexington and Concord of fighting dirty by hiding behind trees. . . no one ever accused the U.S. of being sneaky for using an airforce in Southeast Asia" (1971, p. 148).

Despite the fact that STB advocates so much violence, it is limited to specific targets and situations. Hoffman argues that killing people is unacceptable. While destruction of institutions and their physical buildings is advisable and desirable, killing the people in them is not. For example, strategies for placing and detonating bombs include not using anti-personnel (shrapnel) mines or bombs, placing them away from doors and windows, and keeping them away from the front of buildings. Further, bombs should be set to go off at night, and only when certain there are no security guards in the area. Bombings should be telephoned in beforehand (p. 166).

The morality dictated in STB supersedes societal codes of behavior. Law breaking is justified in the judgment of the author because the prevailing codes in American society are unfair and imposed upon the public. In this context,
Hoffman sees his own code as superior, and his justifications for revolution reasonable.

**Demonizing the Enemy**

As noted in earlier chapters, when advocating large-scale, organized violence, rhetors often demonize their opponent to unite their audience against a common enemy (Burke, 1941; Ivie, 1974; Cherwitz, 1978). Hoffman's use of this strategy is apparent throughout *STB*. For the critic, it is at once an easy and difficult topic to discuss, because the enemy is ubiquitous. Institutions are referred to collectively throughout *STB* as "the Pig Empire." The members of the empire include public and private institutions, and the decision makers inside them. Therefore, a politician, police officer, grocer, and high school principal, each representative of their respective institutions, serve as easy targets of Hoffman's demonization.

However, this demonization creates two problems: First, the amount of people on the good side is limited to a very few people who are not identified with institutions; second, it forces contradictions when Hoffman advocates things such as purchasing goods at a hardware store, negotiating for demonstration permits (for publicity purposes), and seeking out aid from various governmental agencies. These contradictions, which occur throughout the book, are likely part of a bigger plan in which Yippies use
the system to their advantage, yet destroy it where they are able.

The most prevalent and significant themes in *STB* are arguments blaming social problems on institutions and advocating the destruction of those institutions. These arguments reveal the revolutionary motive in the book. Hoffman is not advocating reforming institutions; he is advocating getting rid of them. Because so much social argument (i.e. political, legal, moral) tends to be based on institutions and aligning human behavior with them (or adapting the institutions to current conditions), Hoffman's discourse lies distinctly outside of mainstream social argument.

Although destruction of the institutions is the hallmark of Hoffman's rhetoric, the term/practice of institution is not explicitly defined in the text. Rather, the definition arises through the descriptions of institutional practice, and how the balance of power in America favors institutions over individual rights and freedoms. Institutions are defined in the text only as targets for physical attack, or as being held accountable for injustices against individual rights and freedoms. This strategy of definition seems arbitrary since it ignores institutions' essential function while highlighting their supposed consequences. The view of social scientists, that institutions are temporary strategies for
collective problem solving, is not considered or appreciated.

Such institutions include federal, state, and local agencies such as police departments, the military, justice systems, and public welfare outlets (schools, universities, welfare offices, and hospitals). Private institutions include banks, corporations, defense contractors, and retail outlet chains. All are apparently responsible for the oppression of individuals and must be eliminated by radicals, along with public institutions.

In the introduction to the book Hoffman points out the imbalance of power inherent in institutions:

Until we understand the nature of institutional violence and how it manipulates values and mores to maintain the power of the few, we will forever be imprisoned in the caves of ignorance (1971, p. xix).

The power vested in these institutions thus sets the cultural and political practices of the public. This power is the central problem from which Hoffman wishes to liberate his audience. When we realize this discrepancy, we approach liberation and enlightenment.

The balance of power is not only vested in institutions, Hoffman argues, but also maintained by them. When discussing Yippie practices, he claims "Laws, cops, and courts are there to protect the power and the property of those that already got the shit" (1971, p. p. 44).

In addition to simply pointing fingers at the enemy, Hoffman continually advocates taking action against them.
throughout STB. In providing instructions on proper "trashing" methods, Hoffman advises to target "the most piggy symbols of violence you can find." Such symbols include banks, large corporations, courthouses, police stations, and Selective Service centers. Campus facilities that support warfare research or ROTC training are also viable targets (1971, p. 155). Police cars, or cars of the wealthy are suitable targets as well. Most importantly, Hoffman cautions, "Every rock or molotov cocktail thrown should make a very obvious political point. Random violence produces random propaganda. Why waste even a rock?" (p. 156). Action then should be directed at those in power. Again, he is vague on why it is appropriate to trash an individual's car; presumably, because the car is a sign of wealth and belongs to an upholder of the system.

Hoffman consistently portrays private industries as wealthy, greedy, self-serving entities: being an oil company is about the easiest way to steal millions. Never call it stealing though, always refer to it as "research and development." In noting that the phone company claims to have lost 10 million dollars to phone call theft the previous year, Hoffman downplays the loss:

Nothing however compares with the rip-off of the people by the phone company. In that same year, American Telephone and Telegraph made a profit of 8.6 billion dollars! AT&T, like all public utilities, passes itself off as a service owned by the people, while in actuality nothing could be further from the truth. Only a small percentage of the public owns stock in these companies and a tiny elite clique makes
all the policy decisions. Ripping-off the phone company is an act of revolutionary love, so help spread the word (1971, p. 50).

Retail businesses such as food and clothing stores are acceptable targets because they inflate prices and operate solely on a profit motive. Food stores are "Mammoth neon lighted streets of food packaged to hoodwink the consumers which still bring in huge profits despite so much stealing going on" (p. 7). These profits evidence "exactly how much overcharging has occurred in the first place" (p. 7). Stealing from companies is justified because "we thieves were helping Big Business reduce weight."

High schools and universities do not escape the wrath of the radicals. Hoffman claims "the aim of a good high school newspaper should be to destroy the high school" (p. 111). Similarly, the "only reason you should be in college is to destroy it" (p. 50). For high school students, publishing and distributing an underground or radical newspaper is not going "to earn you the Junior Chamber of Commerce good citizenship award." Students are advised to lay low until they understand "the ground rules and who controls the ballpark-- the people or the principal." He notes a student paper should aim to "piss off the principal and radicalize the students" (p. 111).

Although medical care for riot participants is a necessity, even doctors and hospital are suspect. Calling an emergency room and asking for advice may work in the
case of talking to younger doctors, but "Older doctors frown on this procedure since they cannot extort their usual exorbitant fee over the phone. Younger ones generally do not share this hang-up" (p. 54). Further, establishment medical facilities carry a certain risk because hospitals in riot areas are used by police to apprehend suspects (p. 166).

In particular, police are viewed with suspicion, and all discussion of them refers to them as "pigs" and describes them only in terms of the violence they wreak on radicals. For example, "The University of California, with the aid of Ronald Reagan and the Berkeley storm troopers, fought with guns, clubs, and tear gas to regain the land from the outlaw people. The pigs killed James Rector and won an empty victory" (p. 40). A pig is described as an "extra-vicious mugger" (p. 149) and references to police beatings are numerous: "When the pigs grab you, chances are they are going to insult you, rough you up a little, and maybe even try to plant some evidence on you" (p. 172). Later he cautions "If you are stopped on the street, it is likely because you are black, or have long hair" (p. 172). Once jailed, the fate of the radical is in the hands of the pigs. In discussing lawyers from the Lawyers Guild, Hoffman notes "The lawyer will either come to the station or meet you in court depending on the severity of the charge and the likelihood you'll be beaten in the station"
(p. 173). Finally, once in the courtroom, the establishment carries on its oppressive practices: "The amount of bail depends on a variety of factors ranging from previous convictions to the judge's hangover" (p. 174).

Aside from the sporadic mention of specific institutions and various posts within them, Hoffman does not provide a clear conceptual definition of the enemy. Perhaps this lack of definition is because he assumes the readers who take the book as a manual have already embraced the paranoid frame.

Oppression of Individuals

Hoffman's references to the Pig Empire as the oppressor(s) are frequent. Less frequent are references to those who are oppressed. Although these oppressed peoples include his implied audience of fellow revolutionaries, he reinforces this group with others who are also oppressed but as yet unorganized or unradicalized. His writings betray a sympathetic rapport with women, minorities, and the unsung hero of the working class--minimum wage cashiers, servers, laborers, etc, all of whom suffer at the hands of the wealthy and powerful gatekeepers of the "Pig Empire."

In describing a con game used in order to get welfare, Hoffman urges the reader to tell the counselor, "...you held off coming for months because you wanted to maintain some self-respect even though you have been walking the
streets broke and hungry. If you are a woman, tell him you were recently raped. In sexist Amerika, this will probably be true" (p. 80).

While describing tactics for graffiti painting, Hoffman notes that "The women's liberation sign with red paint is good for sexist ads" (p. 65). Also, when describing cooking classes, he urges that men take part in them so women can "get out of the kitchen" (p. 13).

Finally, in providing instructions on hitchhiking, he cautions "Single women are certain to get propositioned and possibly worse. Amerikan (sic) males have endless sexual fantasies about picking up a poor lonesome damsel in distress. Unless your karate and head are in top form, women should avoid hitching alone. Telling men you have V.D. might help in difficult situations" (p. 23). He also was apparently pro-choice. Although this is not a major theme of the book, he comments that in getting an abortion, "The red tape is horrendous. Free abortions must be looked on as a fundamental right, not a sneaky, messy trauma" (p. 58).

Just as sexism is not a major theme in the book, racism is not. But Hoffman repeatedly refers to its presence and its deleterious effects on individuals. Food stamp programs, Hoffman maintains, are hard to find because, "Many states, for racist reasons, do not want to make it too available or to publicize the fact that it even
exists" (p. 6). Racism is routinely practiced by the police as well. Should you be stopped on the streets for suspicion, it is likely because "you are black or have long hair" (172). Food cooperatives between community organizations are beneficial because they provide "a ready-made bridge for developing alliances with Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos and other groups fighting our common oppressor on a community level" (p. 12).

The oppression for all people can be seen in the experiences of Blacks: "Amerika is just another Latin dictatorship. Those who have doubts, should try the minimal experience of organizing a large rock festival in their state, sleeping on some beach in the summer or wearing a flag shirt. Ask the blacks what it's like living under racism and you'll get a taste of the future we face" (p. 201).

Hoffman's advocacy of violence, theft, and property destruction emphasizes sparing those in the same plight as the common Yippie. For example, when walking out on restaurant bills, one should "try to avoid getting the employees in trouble or screwing them out of a tip" (p. 4). It is acceptable to steal from the owner of the business, but not from the individual laborer.

Hoffman notes that the "Wages paid to delivery boys, sales clerks, shippers, cashiers and the like are so insulting that stealing really is a way of maintaining your
self-respect. If you are set on stealing the store dry when you apply for the job, begin with your best foot forward" (p. 189).

Guerilla Theater

While many of the actions urged by Hoffman are illegal, parts of the book focus on legal public demonstrations and protests. Not surprisingly, his legal methods are as unorthodox as his advocacy of crime. An important part of the revolutionary movement is the use of theater. This is not conventional theater, but rather gaining free publicity through public displays of irony that bring attention to the contradictions in society.

Hoffman argues that public demonstrations have an added power when theater is skillfully used. Theater helps focus public attention on demonstrations in the media, and provides free publicity and added exposure. He writes that "Guerrilla theater events are always good news items and if done right, people will remember them forever. Throwing out money at the Stock Exchange or dumping soot on executives at Con Edison or blowing up the policeman statue in Chicago immediately convey an easily understood message" (p. 61).

Press conferences should be carried out in a manner which gets as much publicity as possible. He claims, "Everything about a successful press conference must be dramatic, from the announcements and phone calls to the
statements themselves" (p. 63). Traditional press conferences like those of the government or politicians are to be avoided at all costs. For demonstrations, Hoffman claims that a complete understanding of the media is an absolute necessity. Traditional teach-ins and sit-ins are too dull for the press to adequately cover, and failure to manipulate the media is failure to take advantage of all forms of communication available (p. 136). In fact, Hoffman claims theater is often the critical element: "Those who say a demonstration should be concerned with education rather than theater don't understand either and will never organize a successful demonstration, or for that matter, a successful revolution (p. 137).

All aspects of demonstrations are to be carefully planned and timed: "The date, time and place of the demonstration all have to be chosen with skill. Know the projected weather reports. Pick a time and day of the week that are convenient to most people" (p. 137). Further, Hoffman stresses the importance of meaning which transcends the demonstration itself: "Make sure the place itself adds some meaning to the message. Don't have a demonstration just because that's the way it's always been done. It is only one type of weapon and should be used as such" (p. 137). Further examples of the use and importance of theater were Hoffman's dressing up in judicial robes for his conspiracy trial, draping his defense table in a
Vietnamese flag, and painting obscenities on his forehead so photographs would carry the profane image.

A more subtle form of theater advocated by Hoffman is the role playing radicals should use when ripping off institutions. Whereas theater advocated for demonstrations is overt, role playing is covert. It is a form of smaller theater concerned more with blending into the system and taking advantage of it.

For example, one tactic for getting free food entails walking into nice restaurants and taking advantage of any food already on tables. For this, Hoffman advises "To get free food from restaurants, you have to have the proper uniform. . . . Specialized uniforms, such as nun and priest garb, can be most helpful" p. (2). Later, Hoffman advises that every movement organization "should have a prop and costume department" (p. 2).

"In fact, every time we see nuns or priests on the street, we assume they're outlaws just on their way to the next deal or bombing. For all we know, the church actually is nothing but a huge dope ring in drag" (p. 89).

When applying for welfare, Hoffman advises "Have your heaviest story ready to ooze out. If you have no physical disabilities, lay down a 'mentally deranged' rap. Getting medical papers saying you have any long-term illness or defect helps a lot" (p. 79). Sob stories that tell the counselor you "can't make it in a world that has forgotten
how to love" increase your chances for welfare benefits. He advises telling the counsellor that you held off applying for welfare to preserve your self respect, "even though you have been walking the streets broke and hungry" (80).

Youths trying to get into shelters are advised that if you can "hack some bullshit jive about 'adjusting,' 'opening a dialogue,' and 'things aren't that bad,' then these are the best deals for free room and board" (p. 42).

Finally, Hoffman discusses established practices, assuming the reader knows what he means. For example, if caught shop lifting, one is instructed to go into the "Oh, gee, I forgot to pay routine" (184). If one wants free posters of the Houston Astrodome, they should write the organization and "Use the teacher bit" (p. 100).

By arguing that the radical should role-play someone they are not, Hoffman has the agent crossing the line back and forth between those in the system and those working to destroy it. These role-plays make the movement or revolution one from inside the system as well as from outside of it.

RHETORICAL FORM AND STRATEGIES OF STB

Hoffman's Audience

Discussion of Hoffman's audience for STB is fairly simple, as he does little to accommodate the possibility of multiple audiences. He assumes that Yippies, law
enforcement, and corporate interests are all reading the book. In the introduction, he notes that many private and public interests tried to stop publication of the book. Hoffman claims some corporations assigned the book as required reading for their security departments. To combat this exposure, he notes in the beginning that one must constantly come up with adaptations of old scams or new ones altogether to keep up with the changes made to combat earlier publicized criminal practices and tactics.

Perhaps the most distinctive elements of Hoffman's discourse are his strategies of language. The content and topoi discussed above take on a unique character when combined with his use of language.

**Metaphor and Reversal**

Hoffman's use of metaphor pervades the book. Although readers may view his metaphors as a manifestation of a sense of humor, when isolated and examined separately from the discourse, they also serve rhetorical purposes by betraying motive. The metaphors separate the good from the bad; the negative, oppressive enemy is consistently differentiated from the positive, whimsical Yippie. Metaphors also serve to demonize the opponent.

Throughout the book, representatives of institutions, be they government, education, or private corporations, are collectively referred to as the "Pig Empire." Further, police officers are consistently referred to as "pigs,"
"vicious pigs," and "power hungry pigs." These pigs are characterized as being slow in thought and movement, and illiterate. Amerika is referred to as a prison, as well as being spelled with a 'K' rather than a 'C', perhaps as a reference to the Kremlin. Amerika is also called a Latin Dictatorship.

On the other hand, the "good guys" are referred to as "brothers and sisters," "Freedom fighters," and "Robin Hoods of Santa Barbara Forest" stealing from the "robber barons in the castles of capitalism" (xvii). Big business is characterized as overweight and in need of weight loss (accomplished by stealing), high school administrators are referred to as "dinosaurs," supermarkets are referred to as "Mammoth neon lighted streets of food packaged to hoodwink the consumers," and banks are referred to as museums (223).

Windt (1972) claims that the diatribe, as a distinct genre, features exaggeration, parody, puns, incongruity, and burlesque (p. 8). Beyond the use of metaphors, Hoffman's astute observations about language help to explain his own discourse. The dictionary, he claims, is written by the "bosses of order." Thus, terms used to describe certain actions are not absolute, but rather assigned to the benefit of the rhetor: "Again, the dictionary of law fails us. "Murder in a uniform is heroic, in a costume it is a crime. False advertisements win awards, forgers end up in jail" (p. xviii).
By rejecting the establishment's language, Hoffman frees himself from conventional definitions. He claims if "we internalize the language and imagery of the pigs, we will forever be fucked (xvii)." Questions of whether or not stealing is moral or legal become irrelevant. But, reality does not become a vacuum of immorality. Rather, Hoffman explains his own views of morality, whereby stealing from institutions is good; stealing from "brothers and sisters" is immoral. In fact, not stealing from the institutions, "the pillars of the Pig Empire," is equally immoral.

Freed from conventional meanings of good and bad, Hoffman asserts his view of what is acceptable by linguistically reversing traditional truisms. If you are charged more than twenty five percent of face value for stolen plane tickets, "you are getting a slight rooking" (p. 31). If you are broke and do not have a regular relief check coming in, you are "nothing but a goddamn lazy bum" for not applying for aid (p. 78). Also, collecting unemployment, since it is taking from an institution, is a process of honor and dignity. Hoffman writes, "Unemployment can be collected for six months before payments are terminated. Twenty more weeks of slavery and you can go back to maintaining your dignity in the unemployment line" (p. 81).
The reversal of traditional meaning, coupled with the use of metaphor, provides Hoffman with the freedom to define principles and practices in terms of his own set of values rather than the values of the institution. By rejecting the received definitions of what America stands for, he is able to construct his own set of rules, emphasize the problems with the current system, and lay out his vision of what is right and moral.

CONCLUSION

Analysis of the themes discussed and the forms of argument Hoffman uses yields some useful conclusions about his revolutionary discourse. The obvious rhetorical problem for Hoffman and the Yippies is convincing their audiences to act against the system. Like so many radicals before and after them, their failure may be in part due to the pervasiveness and the enormity of the opponent. Aside from putting down riots, brutalizing demonstrators, and trying Yippies on various charges, the establishment did not do much to combat the young foes of the 1960s. They did not have to. Going against the establishment poses so many difficulties on its own. Furthering this problem was Hoffman's vagueness on exactly who the enemy was. Since the establishment is omnipresent, pointing it out to an audience and telling them to attack it is a near impossible task. It is similar to fighting an invisible enemy.
All tactics eventually failed because of the size and power of individual institutions and the power of capitalism itself. Physically attacking on any given front leads to a simple put down of an individual rebellion. Police can easily crush riots and demonstrations. Corporations can change their tactics to protect against shoplifting, phone call theft, graffiti and various acts of vandalism. The government can prosecute perpetrators in individual cases. Most significant, those individuals who have the most power (CEOs, the President, governors, etc) can simply ignore protesters. Windt (1972) notes that while Lyndon Johnson acknowledged dissent, he did not do anything about it. AT&T, against whom Hoffman urged attack, remained a powerful monopoly until its breakup in the early 1980s, and today still remains one of the world's most powerful companies. Kent State, Berkeley, and Columbia all withstood physical attack and restored their reputation after brief but meaningless tarnishing.

In addition to the problem of facing a ubiquitous, undefinable, indomitable foe, Hoffman's arguments against the system are very shallow. He displays a limited understanding of capitalism, he uses gross stereotypes in place of careful analysis, and he fails to recognize society's need for institutions. Without a clear vision of what the future holds after the destruction of social and private institutions, Hoffman's dream of revolution holds
no promises for the quality of life after the battle. The lack of substance in his argument is overshadowed by the dramatic, unorthodox fashion in which he delivered it.

Hoffman's rhetoric did succeed in its attention-seeking form: using unconventional methods to bring attention to conventional problems. The country did listen to his diatribes and the reversal of meaning in them; the country did watch guerilla theater for its novelty. However, not enough people acted. The institutions rolled on because of their ability to withstand attack from individuals. Whereas Hoffman succeeded in attracting attention to his cause, he eventually failed to mobilize a sustained movement capable of enacting the changes he advocated. Overturning the institutions takes more than television coverage, theater, and spotty violence.

Further, whereas presidents can call attention to the urgency of a problem by noting that alternatives are exhausted and action must be taken now, Hoffman either lacked this rhetorical luxury or failed to emphasize it.

This chapter has evaluated Abbie Hoffman's *Steal This Book* for its topoi and rhetorical form. The chapter began with a background of Abbie Hoffman, followed by a brief review of literature pertaining to rhetoric and the Yippies. Finally, the text of the book was evaluated for its major themes and forms. These will be discussed further in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.
CHAPTER 7

THE ENVIRONMENTAL ARGUMENT OF EARTH FIRST!

INTRODUCTION

One of the most radical segments of the environmental movement, Earth First! seems enigmatic. On one hand, their principles and philosophy place the highest value on the ecosystem and human life; on the other hand their destructive tactics enrage the private sector, incense the government, and intimidate the public. This chapter examines the discourse of Earth First! in search of its rhetorical premises, and habitual argumentative forms. Accordingly, I will provide a brief background of Earth First!, and then examine the text of the organization's handbook Ecodefense to discover its characteristic topoi, formal devices and stylistic strategies.

BACKGROUND OF EARTH FIRST!

In 1975 naturalist Edward Abbey published The Monkey Wrench Gang, a novel about four people who defended the pristine deserts and canyon wilderness of the Southwest from development by disabling construction equipment and sabotaging construction areas. The characters dedicated themselves to a struggle against the onslaught of technology, progress, and development. They believed legal recourse had failed and environmental movements were timid or ineffective. Thus, the monkeywrench gang took the law into its own hands, disrupting construction sites,
disabling railroads, and sabotaging bridges. The group had two guiding principles: no one gets hurt, and all sabotage protects the environment.

In the early 1980s, Earth First! emerged as a loosely organized group that attempted to enact the fictional deeds envisioned in the book. Earth First! was inspired by the philosophy of Deep Ecology, which posits that value of human life is equal to that of other life forms, not dominant over them. But Deep Ecology does not advocate violence. Earth First! justifies its acts of environmental sabotage as protecting the Earth from attackers, not as randomly or unfairly attacking humans or their material wealth.

Since its inception Earth First! has been associated with civil disobedience such as sit-ins, blocking the way of bulldozers, and members chaining themselves to trees; symbolic acts such as dressing up as grizzly bears and roaming National Parks, unfurling large banners from the Golden Gate Bridge with environmental messages, and dropping a giant banner down the Glen Canyon Damn that looked like a crack; and illegal sabotage including spiking trees to prevent logging, disabling earth moving equipment, spiking logging roads, and sabotaging power plants.

The media, governmental assemblies and the courts turned attention to the group. Members have been jailed and their meetings have been infiltrated by the FBI. In
1990, Earth First! members were caught trying to cut power lines to a nuclear power plant, which resulted in members going to jail. Public reaction is most often against them.

In 1985 Earth First! published its infamous handbook *Ecodefense: A Field guide to Monkeywrenching*. The book is both an instruction manual for environmental terrorism, as well as a philosophical rationale for it. *Ecodefense* is a three hundred and ten page book divided into nine chapters. The first two chapters provide a brief rationale and historical context for the environmental movement as a whole, and Earth First!’s role in the movement. The remaining chapters address areas of ecological sabotage, including developments, roads and tires, vehicles and heavy equipment, animal defense, miscellaneous sabotage, propaganda, and security measures for the ecodefender.

The book is edited by Dave Foreman, a co-founder of Earth First!. There are two prefaces written by Foreman (one each for the first and second editions), and a forward by Edward Abbey. The rest of the book is written anonymously to protect the identities of its various contributors.

**THE TOPOI OF ECODEFENSE**

Analysis of the content of *Ecodefense* has identified three common topics discussed throughout the text. These are the identification and characterization of the opposition; the protection of all life forms; and the
justifications for violence for monkeywrenching which are embedded in the narratives. This section will identify and explicate these topoi.

Identification of the Enemy

One of the common arguments in the justification of violence is the identification of the enemy. This argument not only identifies the enemy and separates them from the protagonists, but also characterizes the enemy as evil or inhuman. This argument is lavishly employed in Ecodefense.

The enemy includes a broad array of individuals, corporations, institutions, and hobbyists. Examples include government agencies such as the U.S. Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the EPA, Rangers, law enforcement personnel, and assorted "offending agencies." Specific individuals are mentioned only briefly, mainly western congressional officers, "quisling politicians of our Western States (such as Babbitt, DeConcini, Goldwater, Hatch, Garn, Symms, Hansen, Wallop, Domenici - to name but a few) who would sell the graves of their own mothers if there's a quick buck in the deal" (p. 7-8) and other "gutless politicians" (p. 221).

Federal agents, individually or collectively, are identified by the term "Freddie" (a play on the term "federal"). This term is often combined with negative modifiers, such as "blackhearted Freddies" (p. 221), "Freddie Bureaucrats" (p. 238), "Freddie coppers," "Lardass
Freddie law enforcement specialist," "Freddie timber beasts" (p. 234), and "Zealous Freddies" (p. 234).

Various government agencies are also singled out for attack. The U.S. Forest service is referred to as the "Forest Circus" (p. 236), a common appellation in the West (even by their own employees), "offending government agencies" (p. 250), "jellyfish government agencies" (p. 7), and as the evil empire, as in "The Empire is striking back" (p. 4).

Private interests are also specified as the opposition, including logging companies, mining companies, surveyors and developers. Like the government agencies, they are almost always referred to derogatorily such as "bandit enterprises," "Earth raper" (p. 145), "greed heads" (p. 189), "Industrial megamachine," "Offenders," "corporate criminal" (p. 210), "rotten pukes" (p. 220), "Greedheads ravishing Earth" (p. 248), "Land rapist" (p. 254), and "Czarist-family uranium investors (p. 244).

Individuals who make their living independently by harvesting natural resources, or who pursue wildlife and sport as a hobby, are identified. These include snowmobilers, hunters, trappers, dirt bikers, four-wheel off road vehicle drivers. These individuals are referred to as "Boobus americanus" (p. 102), "Snowmobiling cult" (p. 107), "Assholes" (p. 154), "Slob hunters and poachers" (p. 157), "scumbag trappers," "Deserving bad guys" (p. 191),...
"Dildoheads" (p. 204), "Enemies" (p. 206), and "Villains" (p. 200).

Finally, the inanimate objects of the enemy are always listed as legitimate targets for destruction, never the individual. These include heavy equipment, traps, fences, aircraft, and off-roads traversed for sport and harvest. Pick-up trucks are referred to at various times as "the industrial machine (p. 109), "Unattended muscle wagon" (p. 100), "Bigfoot" (p. 106), "Behemoths" (p. 116), and "macho pickup trucks" (p. 183). The machines are not as innately evil as the uses to which they put. For example, the authors note that "Large machines, in the form of earthmoving and logging equipment and haul trucks, are the most pervasive tools of land rape" (p. 118). The key here is that they are the tools of land rape, as opposed to being evil in themselves. Elsewhere, pointed attacks are directed at equipment: "Although actual 'Bigfoots' are still limited in number, they point the way of the current trend of jacked-up muscle wagons cruising the land with epicene youths at the wheel trying to impress others with their virility. We are in an ORV explosion today and every effort must be made to teach these yardbirds to stay the hell out of the wild country" (p. 107).

Earth First!'s definition of enemy individuals, corporations, government agents and equipment lies not in who they are, but in what they do. Unsound environmental
practice is what defines the opponent. The irresponsible harvesting of natural products damns certain loggers and miners. Cruel and inhumane forms of hunting damn hunters and trappers. Irresponsible, sloppy use of the wild in recreation is what labels hobbyist snowmobilers, and off-road vehicle drivers as enemies of the environment.

For example, this excerpt shows how the act, more than the agent, is the key term to the portrayal of the opponents: "With the bulldozer, earth mover, chainsaw, and dynamite the international timber, mining and beef industries are invading our public lands—property of all Americans—bashing their way into our forests, mountains and rangelands and looting them for everything they can get away with" (p. 7). The tools are the agency, but only in conjunction with the act are they characterized as bad.

Destructive practice is also defined by degree. The intention is to stop large scale operations that do the most damage with the most obscene motives. For example, Ecodefense claims, "Locally owned and operated sawmills are seldom a major threat to the wilderness. It is usually the big, multi-national corporations whose 'cut-and-run' philosophy devastates the land and leaves the local economy in shambles when the big trees are cut" (p. 27).

Such distinctions are made clear throughout the book: the enemy is the one who harms the environment, rather than
the one who merely practices the act of hunting, harvesting, etc.

_**Ecodefense**_ consistently employs _ad hominem_ attack. The offenders against the environment are portrayed as inept, sloppy, lazy, and out-of-shape.

Snowmobiles, according to the text, are often operated by "overweight, out-of-shape, poorly-prepared wimps" (p. 108). "Today's welfare rancher," according to the text, is "soft and prefers a pickup truck to a horse. Take away his wheels and you remove his access to the range you wish to protect" (p. 83). Ranchers, referred to as "welfare ranchers," are also "too lazy to keep their fences in good repair" (p. 88). Off road pickup truck drivers are illiterate (p. 104); trappers are "lazy bastards-- they hate to walk" (p. 181), and if you "take their wheels out from under them, they're helpless" (p. 157).

In addition to being lazy, often environmental offenders are violent. Caution is in order when dealing with trappers: "These are not normal people. They are mutants. They are sub-humans who will not hesitate to use modern technology, a high powered rifle, to do very barbaric things to your body" (p. 183). Security guards should also be approached with caution because of the "very real possibility of being assaulted by security guards (or more likely, by miners, ranchers, loggers and other assorted yahoos" (p. 292). "These good ol' boys are armed
and have the law on their side. Don't end up with your hide nailed to some yahoo's barn door" (p. 157).

When dealing with miners, many of whom still have a "forty-niner mentality," the reader is advised, "you are not simply courting jail, but possible death" (p. 73). Finally, ranchers need to be approached with caution: "A monkeywrencher caught in the act by livestockmen may well wish he had never been born. Be careful. Damn Careful!" (83).

Safety of People

A second recurring theme in the book is the emphasis on safety of both targets and bystanders. A main premise of doing damage to logging, mining and development equipment may be summed up in the hortatory "Don't hurt anyone. Respect all life" (260). At best, typical discourse on violence regards loss of human life as a natural, unavoidable consequence of the violent act (war, terrorism, rioting, etc). At worst, violence is advocated in order to take life. Earth First!'s position on acts of sabotage is a radical departure from this feature. The safety of people is stressed at all costs. Any actions resulting in the injury to human beings is deemed counterproductive, unethical, and in violation of the group's first principle, the protection of life. The text of Ecodefense insists on the safety of both innocent
bystanders, and guilty parties whose facilities are being attacked.

Although the list of individuals, corporations, and government entities that Earth First! opposes is long, they take care to define their target in terms of what they do, rather than who they are. As noted earlier, not everyone in government and industry are necessarily bad; in fact, there are good people in those areas who treat the Earth with the respect it deserves.

Ec defense urges eco-raid ers to "choose your targets well. Make sure that the 'victims' of such monkeywrenching richly deserve to be singled out as egregious environmental rapists. There is no place for aimless vandalism in the monkeywrencher's arsenal" (p. 219). Later, the book emphasizes, "There is a difference between monkeywrenching and plain vandalism." Monkeywrenching sends a message; vandalism is random destruction (p. 250). Spray painters are urged not to "spray paint walls belonging to private individuals since this will unjustly aggravate them" (240).

When working to sabotage logging mills and cattle ranches, Ec defense stresses that it is the larger corporate interests that should be targeted:

It is true that in small 'backyard' saw mills the operator might be standing close to the blade, but we would assume that anyone contemplating spiking would never consider doing it on other than the largest timber sales, where the trees are destined for a corporate, rather than a small family operated mill (p. 27).
The same is suggested for the cattle industry. Pains must be taken to identify the target accurately, and distinguish between the good and the bad ranching operations:

Great care must be taken in selecting targets for this kind of ecotage. Despite the negative aspects of the livestock industry, many ranchers are decent folks. They are trapped in a hopeless situation and are trying to do the best they can. In Montana and Wyoming, particularly, there are ranchers who support wilderness, oppose predator control, and have a deep and abiding respect for the land. Some of the best conservationists in the northern Rockies are ranchers. Unfortunately, they are the exception. But the monkeywrencher must be absolutely certain that the intended target of grazing ecotage fully deserves it (p. 82).

Further, the authors argue that some government agents are working for the good of the environment, and should be left alone. For example, game officers working for the government are "providing a valuable service in fighting poaching and should be helped, not hindered or distracted" (261).

In addition to providing for the safety of the good individuals in government and industry, the authors stress the importance of protecting innocent bystanders in all operations. In areas that are targeted for violence, care must be taken to insure the safety of bystanders.

For example, when cutting fences along cattle ranches, ecoteurs are urged to leave fences on highways intact to prevent cattle from getting into roadways. Ecodefense
stresses, "Leave highway fences up. Think about the results of your fence cutting before you cut" (87).

When sabotaging bike trails to protect wilderness areas, Foreman reminds the reader that "many dirt bikers are children. Be careful. Many dirt bikes are travelling at a high rate of speed. Placement of tire puncturing devices should be done with the safety of the rider in mind" (102).

One should also take care in using caltrops, because "an unlucky hiker or passing animal could be injured by stepping on one. To reduce this likelihood, don't place these devices until you know of an impending vehicular intrusion. Know where you have placed caltrops (or other devices), and later return and retrieve them" (p. 106).

Finally, Ecodefense emphasizes the safety of innocent bystanders when perpetrators evade pursuers. The authors claim that high speed chases endanger innocent people, and this endangerment is "morally indefensible" (p. 290).

Bystanders are not the only people who deserve protection from physical harm. The opposition whose equipment is being destroyed is also subject to the same safety provisions as the innocent bystander. When discussing techniques of sabotage, the safety of people is stressed above all.

When spiking trees, Ecodefense advocates secure measures to protect the well-being of the loggers. Pins and spikes should be placed higher than three feet in order
to protect the feller of the tree. The damage done is sought only for the actual sawmill.

Despite the small chance of injuring a logger, they argue against spiking in the lower section of the tree. "As always, avoid placing the pins in the lower three feet of the tree, where they can cause chainsaw kickback, with the possibility of injury to the feller. After all, we're in it to save trees, not hurt people" (p. 53).

When sabotaging remote forested roadways, Ecodefense recommends strategies that will disable vehicles without injuring people. For example, "Avoid areas where a blow-out or flat from the stake might put the driver and passengers of the vehicle in danger" (p. 94). Further, they demand that ecoteurs ask themselves: "Will a flat miles from nowhere endanger a typically overweight, soft ORV wimp (either young or old)?" (95). Care must also be taken not to trap "some poor old fogey in a jeep on a dead-end jeep trail" (113).

The same precautions must be taken when sabotaging snowmobile trails. Ecodefense tells the reader that "snowmobiles are often driven by overweight, out-of-shape, poorly-prepared wimps, who may be put into a life threatening situation if their snowmobile is disabled miles from civilization. Be very conscious of the situation you may be creating and be concerned for the safety of the snowmobiler" (p. 108).
Characteristic of groups, Earth First! often uses the negative to define their identity and their moral codes. They explain who they are not, and what they do not do. When direct damage is being done to sitting vehicles, Earth First! provides explicit instructions on protecting the vehicles’ brake system. Numerous times they stress “Smash fuel pump, water pump, valve cover, carburetor, distributor, or anything else except battery (for your safety) or brake system (for their safety)” (117) and later "Don't tamper with the brake system" (134).

The same strategy is recommended when sabotaging tractor-trailers. Since a careless driver ("the majority") may not check his or her vehicle in the morning before heading out, accidents may occur. Thus, "Never tamper with the air hoses or electrical wires that connect truck and trailer... Do not sabotage brakes, lights or any other safety equipment" (138).

As it would not be difficult to endanger a helicopter or airplane pilot, Ecodefense advises making destruction to aircraft readily apparent. Whereas sabotage to bulldozer engines should be concealed so the engine has a chance to seize up from lack of oil or from abrasive additives, damage to aircraft should not be hidden. Damage should be obvious in order to prevent the pilot from taking the craft into the air. As Ecodefense advises, "The idea is to protect the Earth, not to reduce helicopter pilots to blobs
of protoplasm. The smooth, sneaky approach should give way to obvious destruction so as not to cause an in-flight accident" (p. 145). The goal of this sabotage is to "Get the helicopter where it sits, not while it's flying up in the wild blue yonder" (p. 146).

Further, aircraft engines should be left alone: "[A] mechanical failure in mid-air is extremely dangerous and life threatening. The monkeywrencher should aim to ground the plane without endangering anyone's life. For this reason, any monkeywrenching of an aircraft should be made obvious, with no attempt to disguise the work" (148). The overall strategy of damage to the machine remains the same. But in order to protect the life of the operators, situations endangering the pilot are to be avoided by advising them of the sabotage with obvious destruction.

**Topoi of Justification**

The justification for monkeywrenching lies mainly in principles of natural law: that all life forms are meant to coexist, one should not dominate the other; and that humans are infringing on this right by exploiting nature (Naess, 1973). In practice, Earth First! steps beyond Deep Ecology by playing an active role in protecting other forms of life from humans. There are three types of justifications woven into the narrative of Ecodefense which, although they can be separated, ultimately depend on
each other. These are historical justifications, moral justifications, and circumstantial justifications.

The beginning chapters of Ecodefense provide a historical context for defending the wilderness and argue that humans exist in nature and should not exploit nature. The historical context is invoked to demonstrate what we once possessed. Dave Foreman writes:

At the time of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, an estimated 100,000 grizzlies roamed the western half of what is now the United States. The howl of the wolf was ubiquitous. The Condor dominated the sky from the Pacific coast to the Great Plains. Salmon and Sturgeon filled the rivers. Ocelots, jaguars, margay cats and jaguarundis roamed the Texas Brushland southwestern deserts and mesas... The land was alive (p. 11).

This description provides a footing for how both humans and nature naturally react to encumbrance on their lands. Chapter Three, "The Future of Monkeywrenching," provides a lengthy rational based on the history of the Westward development of the U.S. Ecodefense argues that rebelling against oppression is historically a part of our national consciousness. Further, rebellion is also a characteristic of nature.

Rebellion is a key part of American colonial history. Rebels attacked public and private property such as custom houses and the home of Thomas Hutchinson, governor of the Massachusetts colony. They threw tea into Boston Harbor in response to perceived unfair taxes (19). Ecodefense cites Thomas Jefferson in support of their case since Jefferson
wrote that "strict observance of the written law is doubtless one of the highest duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest... to lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law would be to lose the law itself" (p. 19).

Prolonged and determined protest against slavery is presented as another important historical case where morality was affirmed only through the rebellious actions of people against the institutions. Ecodefense notes that "the sluggish minds of men in government failed to acknowledge the changing times, and another war was needed to resolve the issues" (19).

America's westward development also forced Native American Indians into rebellion, pulling up survey markers and destroying telegraph poles when their traditional homelands were encroached upon. In addition, fence cutting wars emerged when barbed wire was introduced into the West and Southwest. Small ranchers and farmers formed secret societies which sought to free the land from fences, and restore the grassland to the domain of the small farmer. Ecodefense goes so far as to claim wolves and grizzlies attacked farms and killed farm animals in response to encroachment on their territories.

These historical justifications function as argument from precedence, giving sabotage the authority of tradition. Americans did it against the British, the
Indians did it against the Americans, and according to the text, animals did it against developers.

Moral arguments are also raised in the justification of monkeywrenching. *Ecodefense* characterizes nature as a home for all living things. This metaphor invokes a degree of morality. Edward Abbey uses this metaphorical argument in his forward to the book. The argument is syllogistic: nature is defined as our home; human nature dictates that we protect our home; therefore, defending the wilderness is a noble and necessary action. Abbey claims that the wilderness is our "ancestral home, the primordial homeland of all living creatures" (p. 8). For Abbey, home is more than a physical structure:

> For many of us, perhaps for most of us, the wilderness is as much our home, or a lot more so than the wretched little stucco boxes, plywood apartments and wallboard condominiums in which we are mostly confined by the insatiable demands of an ever expanding industrial culture (p. 8).

This establishes his first premise: humans are intricately connected to the land. The second premise is that this land is threatened with "invasion, pillage, and destruction." The conclusion follows that we have "a right to defend that home" by "whatever means are necessary" (p. 8). Abbey claims, "We are justified in defending our homes-- our private home and public home-- not only by common law and common morality but also by common belief. We are the majority; they-- the greedy and powerful-- are the minority" (p.9).
This morality is deeply rooted in nature: "Self-defense against attack is one of the basic laws not only of human society but of life itself, not only of human life, but of all life." (p. 9). On the other hand, industry, development, and technology are not rooted in nature, but in counter-nature, which "has no wisdom. Technology is nothing more than ceasing to be nature. Dehumanization is the process of going away from nature toward dependent technologies" (p. 245).

The final step in the justification of monkeywrenching is argument based on urgent circumstances. Industry, technology and development have encroached upon nature, thereby justifying any means necessary to stop it.

Ecodefense claims that "In the space of a few generations we have laid waste to paradise" (p. 12). Numerous examples are cited of the decimation of prairies because of farming, the extinction of species such as the passenger pigeon, destruction of ancient forests and redwoods, and dams blocking rivers, destroying their natural ecosystems (p. 12). Ecodefense claims too, that "As good patriots, lovers of our native land, it is our duty to resist invasion and defend our planet" (p. 27).

Such circumstances provide license for people to act in protection of the land. "It is time for women and men, individually and in small groups, to act heroically and admittedly illegally in defense of the wild, to put a
monkeywrench into the gears of the machine destroying natural diversity" (p. 14).

Numerous examples of intentional human destruction of the environment are offered to justify acts of ecodefense. For example, mining has run rampant across the West:

Over 90 percent of Utah is covered by oil and gas leases. The holder of the lease has the right to explore for mineral wealth with helicopters, trucks and sometimes earthmoving equipment; roads have been bulldozed for drilling rigs in several Wilderness Study Areas, even though this clearly violates BLM regulations for WSA's. Clearly, mineral exploration, drilling, and mining continue to be regarded in Washington as priority uses for public lands in the West (p. 76).

Logging has also devastated the environment in the northwest: "Thousands of miles of these [logging] roads are built each year, generally at the taxpayer's expense, to the benefit of a few big logging companies and to the detriment of a healthy forest" (p. 57).

These acts are not committed by industry alone. The U.S. government has aided and abetted every step of the way. Abbey claims the "Representative democracy in the United States has broken down. Our legislators do not represent those who elected them but rather the minority who finance their political campaigns" (p. 8).

Average citizens are forced out of the decision making process and deprived of their right to defend their home. "[O]rgans of communications-- the Tee Vee, the newspapers, the billboards, the radio-- that have made politics a game for the rich only. Representative government in the USA
represents money not people and therefore has forfeited our allegiance and moral support" (8). Despite the fact that the citizenry is forced out of the decision making process, "The American people have demonstrated on every possible occasion that they support the ideal of wilderness preservation; even our politicians are forced by popular opinion to pretend to support the idea" (8).

To conclude the topoi of justification, Ecodefense presents arguments that provide a historical context for humans and nature coexisting, a moral context for the protection of the wilderness and justification of the actions, and a circumstantial justification for the acts of protecting the wilderness.

EARTH FIRST!'S RHETORICAL FORM

In his study of the roots of American jurisprudence, Edward Corwin claims there are "certain principles of right and justice which are entitled to prevail of their own intrinsic excellence, altogether regardless of the attitude of those who wield the physical resources of the community. Such principles were made by no human hands" (1928; 1955 pp. 4-5). These laws are independent of will and reason and are eternal and immutable. Human laws, on the other hand, stand in the shadow of the principles of higher law. The higher law stands above human governors, and is superior to their will.
The source of Corwin's claims are Aristotle and Cicero. Cicero discusses "true law" which is moral and harmonious with nature (Corwin, 1928, p. 10). Formal human law may at times part company with the true law and thereby lose its authority. Not all things within written human laws are just within higher laws. True law is "a distinction between right and wrong according to nature; . . . any other sort of law ought not be regarded as such, and not be called a law."

To view the higher law as a source of argument puts it into argumentative form where the minor premise (act) is measured against the major premise (law). When one steals a loaf of bread, one is breaking a human law, and that argument will be made in court. The law forbids stealing the bread; the suspect is accused, then rightly convicted. But what about the case of the suspect who stole to serve a higher purpose (i.e. because they wished to feed their children)? Can the suspect convincingly draw on a higher law, which in turn nullifies or overrules the human civil law? Similar cases are made in our own culture. For example, a subordinate may disobey a superior because the superior ordered a moral wrong or a defendant accused of a crime may have done so in order to save a life.

There is a tension between what is considered morally good and what is considered legal; the law does not always reflect morality. In an essay on the history of terrorism
in the U.S., Lorenzo Cromwell (1987) argues that this tension is central to the justification of terrorism. The appeal to a higher authority, or a higher moral code than American civil and criminal law, has been the most frequent rationalization for terrorist acts in American history (p. 45). Cromwell notes that, though not specifically endorsing terrorism, even Thomas Jefferson wrote to Madison that "a little rebellion now and then is a good thing" in order to keep a healthy government (1987, p. 45).

I argue that in discursive form, Earth First!'s philosophy and methods of eco-sabotage are based upon the principles of a higher law, a law that is not necessarily of human construction, but certainly one humans must respect. Philosophically, the group's principles are sound, and conform to ideals with which most would agree; however, put into practice, that agreement erodes. This text draws on a higher law, specifically, natural law, as its primary sources of argument, and invites the reader to view the world as an entity of which humans are a part rather than as an entity over which we innately have control.

Obviously, the writers of these texts believe in the existence of an audience that will accept these arguments. Ecodefense betrays a strong awareness of exactly who the audience of the text is. The text speaks primarily to those who will use the information to act. The text also
betrays an awareness that government authorities and security personnel are lurking in the audience as well.

Dave Foreman notes in his introduction to the first edition that the media reviewed the book for its novelty of endorsing illegal acts. The book "made a bit of a splash. It has been reviewed or discussed in dozens of publications including the Wall Street Journal and U.S. News and World Report, and was the focus of a five minute report on the NBC Nightly News. . . 5000 copies of the book have been sold in less than a year and a half. Sales have been made in all fifty states and in several dozen countries" (3). Later he notes that police, Forest Service and other government agencies, and industrial security specialists will "study this book in the hope of developing countermeasures," and he advises not leaving the book out in plain view or in your car.

Foreman also notes that industry and authorities are reading the text. He claims that Ecodefense may warn "the pro-development people about what to look for" (154). The book has a standard disclaimer poking fun at itself on the inside jacket, claiming it is for entertainment purposes only: "No one involved with the production of this book--the editors, contributors, artists, printers, or anyone--encourages anyone to do any of the stupid, illegal activities contained herein" (Front leaf).
Foreman notes in his introduction that "We are all fat, out of shape, and would rather drink beer and watch TV at home than go out in the nasty, old outdoors. We're just hoping to make a buck with this book" (2). Although the authors are aware of the broader audience of government and industry, they proceed with a sense of impunity throughout the text.

The arguments presented in Ecodefense all rest on a key assumption: the audience already agrees with its first premise. Although the authors state their principles and invoke the principles of the less radical Deep Ecology movement, these suppositions are not developed enough to convince those who do not already agree. If the arguments are to be accepted by those who are already in agreement, the main premises do not need to be developed, or need only to be invoked in a general sense. But if the arguments are aimed at the opposition, they are likely to fail because the opposition has so much at stake they are not likely to accept the first premise. Therefore, I argue that this text operates under the rubric of a higher law, which acts as a holistic first premise or principle under which the smaller claims fall.

Woven into the text of Ecodefense are appeals to a higher law that seek to protect the Earth from destruction by economic interests. From this text, we can see how Earth First! bases its philosophy not on the human laws,
but on higher laws of nature. The appeals made are obedient to a higher law and in the process human laws are disregarded (at least in terms of obedience; ecodefenders are aware of the consequences of prosecution). Therefore, there are philosophical bases of monkeywrenching that advocate illegal actions in order to preserve natural order. The illegal acts are justified in order to maintain natural order, which is the first premise. Industry, law enforcement and government agents are not likely to accept this type of argument because the laws of the Federal and State governments to pronounce the acts illegal.

CONCLUSION

This chapter sought to discover the common topics and habitual forms of argument Earth First! uses to justify its defense of the wild by acting illegally. Arguments are embedded into the narrative of the text that frame the issues against natural law and Deep Ecology. Should the reader be aligned with this world view, the arguments of Ecodefense are likely to be compelling. Should readers vest more power in human laws and industrial practice, then they will likely be repelled against these arguments.

Earth First! consistently argues with the first assumed premise of higher law. Ecodefense places primary importance on the environment and wildlife, and thus characterizes human intrusion as a violation of natural
law. No human-made laws will constrain them morally in their actions.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

REVIEW OF STUDY

This study has sought to determine if justifications of violence contain common argument forms, stylistic devices, and lines of argument. Although studies of rhetoric of violence exist, they are confined to specific events or persons. Explorations of discourse justifying violence tend to be fragmented case studies of individual movements, texts or events, and tend to be attached to legitimate institutional arrangements.

Because the case studies of "violent rhetorics" followed the conventional categories of civic discourse, scholars had not looked for argument that transcended time, event, nation and categories of legitimacy and illegitimacy. The received opinion had been that charlatans and honest orators may use the same rhetoric, but their good or evil intentions make the difference. In the postmodern era, legitimacy appears to be more fragile; but while the old supports of tradition and the "sacred" have weakened, legitimacy remains as an important distinction, and differences between coercive individuals and coercive governments continue to be taken for granted in the absence of comparative case studies.

In a more fluid moral order it may be more important to seek out the rhetorical forms that are used in common by
those who justify the use of force, whether they be heads of state, terrorists, sub-national groups, or isolated individuals. The discovery of differences among these rhetorics may be even more vital to us. Is there a characteristic rhetoric of legitimacy that stands apart from its anchorage in a widely respected social contract? Do individuals tend to select different appeals when they act alone? Do they use a different set of justifications when they are the spokesperson of a group?

For each case study, three methodological steps were taken. First, lines of argument were identified. This involved thematics, the primary set of beliefs and assumptions. Second, habitual forms of argument were identified, discovering how argument proceeded from its axiological base. Third, stylistic concerns were examined, searching for a "vocabulary of motives" for the rhetor.

Later in this chapter the findings for each case study will be examined as a whole in order to discover any recognizable, predictable patterns.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

This study sought to answer three questions in each of four case studies. The questions are:

1) Do the four case studies exhibit common topoi?

2) Are there common argument forms used in the justification of violence across the four case studies?
3) Are common stylistic devices apparent in the four case studies?

Preparatory to answering these questions I will attempt a communication audit of these features for each of the individual cases.

President Bush

This analysis was consistent with previous studies on presidential discourse and war. Bush followed traditional lines of argument in his addresses, proceeded through previously identified rhetorical forms, and used stylistic devices common to his predecessors in similar rhetorical situations.

Throughout ten speeches, I found five recurring themes that helped Bush construct a narrative of the Gulf War. The first theme was that this war was not solely between the U.S. and Iraq; it was between the world and Iraq. Bush repeatedly made reference to other nations and leaders, framing the conflict broadly. Second, Bush repeatedly emphasized that the U.N. exhausted all diplomatic alternatives prior to taking military action.

In the third theme, Bush used imagery and historical references to demonize the enemy. The fourth theme was the placement of the war within American and world history. Bush invoked historical examples of Munich in 1938, Hitler, and the Cold War to frame the war as a necessary and logical progression of good winning over evil. The final
theme emphasized America as a chosen nation, with a special role in preserving that which is good and opposing that which is bad.

In addition to the use of established themes, Bush employed traditional forms of argument. Bush habitually characterized the conflict as one between good and evil. By emphasizing the past accomplishments of America in world conflicts, Bush aligned U.S. actions with moral imperatives such as justice, freedom, and protection of a helpless nation (Kuwait) against a brutal invader (Iraq). In so doing, Bush drew on a set of values toward which all American actions aim. In this enthymatic form, the second premise, the acts of the U.S. and the world, are aligned with the unstated first premises containing the ideographs of freedom, justice, fairness, and individualism. Bush invited the audience, domestic and abroad, to see the U.S. as a moral nation, with fierce convictions of freedom, justice, fairness and individualism. Should the audience accept these cultural axioms, they would very likely accept the unstated premise that the U.S. was right and the opposition was wrong.

The Unabomber

The Unabomber raised numerous arguments in the manuscript "Industrial Society and its Future." Many were primitively developed and were repeated with only slight nuance throughout the whole of the manuscript. Underlying
these arguments were sentimental axioms which might supply a logic of emotions beneath the formal structure. By evoking familiar, conventional narrative forms consistent with the Myth of the Garden and the agrarian tradition, the Unabomber undergirded his particular arguments with concepts attractive to substantial groups of Americans. Further, appeals to autonomy and against conformity have broad abstract appeal whatever the catastrophic weaknesses of specific recommendations for their achievement.

The most prevalent topos advanced in the manuscript is the ubiquity of technological evil. According to the Unabomber, since the time of the Industrial Revolution, rapid technological advancement has alienated individuals from their world. Humans have become servants of technology, instead of technology functioning to serve human needs. For most auditors, the Unabomber's opposition between nature and technology is so extreme as to weaken even the strongest feature of his message.

The Unabomber also deplored what he took to be two significant consequences of the growth of technology. One effect was the psychological instability of the individual. The Unabomber developed many arguments based on the loss of human autonomy, the use of surrogate activities to replace the lost sense of accomplishment, and the connection between individual psychological problems and technology. Another significant effect was the growth of a Leftist
syndrome: low self esteem, self hatred, guilt, the need to defend under-represented groups, and oversocialization. Both of these consequences were argued vaguely. Citations were rarely provided. Evidence was slight and broadly contextual. When specific historical examples were mentioned, they were fragmentary and undeveloped. It may be that the author used generic evidence to avoid challenge to specific details. However, by arguing from vague evidence, the Unabomber weakened the force of his conclusions.

Although the author did attempt to polarize the audience against a common enemy, the enemy, technology and its advocates, were poorly defined and/or inanimate.

The author failed to develop a positive outlook for the future. To the question, "If we abandon technology, what hope and salvation await us?" the Unabomber can only answer, "primitive society, pain, darkness and death."

Underlying this argument is the power of the grand narrative of the Fall and Rebirth. In the jeremiadic sense, this is the loss of grace (Puritan), or the loss of the American quest (Secular). If the author can convince readers that individuals have lost their autonomy, then the notion of recovering the autonomy and meaning through empowerment may gain a certain rationality and morality. But this road to salvation as a positive alternative was weakly developed in this joyless manuscript.
The stylistic character of the manuscript is a hodgepodge. The language is dry parody of scientific writing with occasional doomsday imagery. No doubt the author felt his crude vision would gain authority if it were masked in scholarly style.

Abbie Hoffman

The rhetorical problem for Hoffman and the Yippies was convincing their auditors to revolt against the system. Like so many radicals before and after them, their failure might have been due to an inability to clearly identify an enemy that could be perceived as coherent, culpable and vulnerable.

Hoffman's text dwells on central themes of oppression of individuals, identification of institutional enemies, and strategies and tactics for defeating them. The primary argument Hoffman advanced is that institutions oppress the individual's freedom. Abundant examples were provided to demonstrate that individuals, particularly youths, are deprived of their rights to free expression by institutional practices which encourage uniformity.

The opposition Hoffman identified is ubiquitous, entrenched, and nearly all powerful. Governmental institutions such as courts, police, schools, and even medical establishments were identified as oppressors. Private institutions are involved in the web of oppression as well. In pursuit of profits, corporations deny
individuals their rights, and seek to exploit them at every turn. What Hoffman's argument lacks is the admission that institutions operate through individual acts: the morality of their acts are not subsumed in the general ethos of the institution. Nor are all behaviors dictated by an institutional formula.

In order to achieve individual freedom, Hoffman advocated destruction of public and private institutions. The book detailed various tactics for the destruction of institutions and the return of freedom to individuals.

Eventually Hoffman did succeed on one level. His unconventional strategies probably brought attention to conventional problems and may have increased the noisy volume of discussion about the role of public institutions. The country did listen to his diatribes and the reversal of meaning in them; the country did watch guerilla theater for its novelty. While millions may have enjoyed the entertainment value of the message, few acted on it. Basic institutions continued to deal with the problems they were constructed to solve. No constructive alternatives emerged in Hoffman's performances.

Earth First!

The central themes found in Ecodefense were the identification of the enemy, the protection of all human life, and three types of rationales used to justify violence. The authors of this text made a special effort
to define exactly who was the enemy. Unlike the Unabomber or Abbie Hoffman, these advocates wanted to isolate the enemy, attack its domain, and leave others untouched. The primary characteristic distinguishing the enemy is its harmful environmental practice. Construction workers, corporations, government agents, and politicians are not bad because of their occupation. Earth First! defined their opposition's goodness or badness by their practices.

The second theme, protection of life, dictates that caution, research, and reconnaissance be used to ensure that proper targets are chosen, and that the well being of all individuals be maintained. Damage to vehicles should not make them unsafe. Damage to any equipment should be done only to disable the machine, not injure the worker. Finally, targets should be chosen carefully in order to convey a clear message. Random attacks on any one logger, miner, or rancher are unacceptable.

The final themes found in the Earth First! text were three types of justifications used to advocate violence: historical, moral and circumstantial. The historical arguments cited past cases where violence had been used to protect the well being of natural habitat. Thus, it is legitimate that violence continue to be used because of successful precedents. The moral arguments justify violence by defining the ill treatment of the land and wildlife as a moral impetus to protect them. The
circumstantial arguments are of a more pressing nature, and claim that something needs to be done now, before it is too late. Circumstances dictate that action be taken.

Earth First! justified its form of violence with arguments framing the issues against a natural law and deep ecology. The agreement of the audience is likely to depend on their alignment or non-alignment with these principles.

The first premise of Earth First's argument is consistently a higher law or natural law. They placed prime importance on the environment and wildlife, and characterized human intrusion as a violation of natural law. No human-made laws constrain their actions.

Stylistically, the text was written in a strident, radical voice. The authors ignored the broader audience, or acknowledge them only sarcastically. Their characterization of the enemy was derogatory and obscene. The powerful negative imagery alone may give the critic cues about the intended audience. Apparently they were not seeking to entice new constituents. Rather they were "preaching to the choir."

A RHETORICAL CONTINUUM

This study identified four significant variations in the arguments of the subjects studied. Different genres of justification do not generally share similar approaches to argument. But, to a certain extent, institutional form dictates rhetorical form. Power influences how we define
words, what arguments we choose, and which cultural myths we invoke. Forms and lines of argument appear to correlate with the rhetor's degree of institutional attachment. Those who are aligned with institutions and who are seeking to preserve or restore them use forms and myths different from those who are seeking to destroy the institutions and restore individual freedoms.

This study identified four distinctions between institutional and anti-institutional justifications of violence. The distinctions are best visualized on a continuum (Appendix). The distinctions are: A) The definition of freedom in each text; B) The enthymatic form of argument in each text; C) The extent of violence employed; and D) The size and scope of the enemy in each text. The following section addresses each of these four areas.

First Distinction: Definition of Freedom

In each of the case studies, violence is justified in the interests of restoring freedom. Yet in each case, freedom is conceptualized differently.

First, George Bush argued for the freedom of nations. Defending Kuwait with force was consistent with the protection of freedom for all nations. The use of force in the Persian Gulf preserved a freedom which transcended individuals. Bush's conception of freedom for individuals is best fostered by governmental institutions. Bush's
arguments centered on the importance of preserving peace and tranquility in the Gulf and making the world "safe for democracy." In this sense, individual freedom is a priority, but it is provided for and defended by the broader freedom of nations. It is a "communal freedom."

Secondly, whereas Bush argued for the freedom of nations, the Unabomber argued for the freedom of individuals. Individual freedom is hampered by a growing dependence on technology as an institutional practice, which not only deprives us of our individual freedom, but perpetuates itself by feeding on human dependence. The Unabomber's concept of freedom is for individuals, not nations. The oppressor is technology, a non-human entity that is incorporated into a human practice. Governmental and corporate development of technology contribute to individual dependence upon it. Thus, the attainment of human freedom hinges on rebellion against technological practice, and all institutions which foster technology.

Abbie Hoffman also argued for individual freedom, but it is a freedom from institutional oppression, rather than a freedom from technology. For Hoffman, destruction of institutions will free individuals from ideological assimilation. Humans are stripped of individualism by the corrupt practices of institutions. Institutions, not technology or other nations, are the evil force against which we must fight for Hoffman.
Finally, Earth First! argued for freedom for the natural environment. Human freedom does not supersede the freedom of nature. Freedom must be granted first to nature. Although humans are and should be free, the thrust of Earth First!'s argument is that human freedom does not surpass the freedom of nature to exist in harmony with all living things. Corporate and governmental interests should be subservient to natural law.

Second Distinction: Enthymatic Form

The second distinction among the justificatory discourses of violence are the rhetors' uses of shared first premises. The more the audience is rooted in a shared first premise, the more likely they will accept the argument. In the four cases studied, the institutional arguments seem more capable of drawing on already accepted first premises than the radical arguments. The radical and terrorist arguments seem to draw on first premises that are not historically established or accepted by society.

In his Gulf War speeches, George Bush drew on dominant narratives and myths rooted in the American mythos. Bush framed America as a benevolent nation. He claimed America is a moral place and Americans are moral people. He argued that freedom and Democracy across the world are of the utmost importance. These are powerful premises already established in American political and cultural history. Bush did not need to define these first premises;
presidents have been using them for decades or centuries (Ritter, 1980; Ivie, 1974; Ivie, 1987). He only needed to place the second premise, the Persian Gulf Crisis, into this American tradition ideologically and historically (Pollock, 1994).

This enthymatic power that Bush was able to successfully exploit also may explain the failure of the other three cases where the rhetor did not have the credibility of the presidency or the power of the American mythos. Protesters, environmentalists, and terrorists have the formidable task of arguing against this mythos. In each example, the rhetor did this marginally, if at all.

The Unabomber's arguments against technology are weak, in part because of the enormous task of contending that three hundred years of the ideograph "progress" is wrong. The audience is reading the text which is printed by computer typesetters, reading by the light of a sixty watt bulb, and perhaps even reading it on the internet. The Unabomber cannot escape these contradictions. Technology is his medium and his weapon, as well as his enemy. Both the rhetor and the audience are so rooted in technological practice that the Unabomber's arguments about humanity's psychological addiction to technology fail.

Abbie Hoffman's arguments also lacked a clear, accepted first premise. To his benefit, Hoffman wrote in turbulent times in which American values were questioned.
But Hoffman's argument lacked the strength of a first premise that institutions were the enemy. This needed premise was not a generally accepted truth at the time. Hoffman's inability to clearly identify the enemy also weakened his arguments. Random destruction of institutions still promised little hope of a future of freedom. Like the Unabomber's position, Hoffman's stance could not escape its own contradictions. Humans are an inseparable part of institutions. To ask an audience to destroy institutions is asking them to destroy themselves.

Finally, Earth First!'s major premise of natural law is not a generally accepted truth. Although environmentalism and ecological sabotage are alive and well today, Earth First!'s arguments about the environment did not attract a sustainable audience. Timber continues to be harvested, mines continue to be drilled, and developments continue to grow across the country. Environmental movements have met with successes in small pockets; even the American public could be said to be thinking more green. But, this change is not due to people spiking trees and burning bulldozers. Earth First!'s reliance on a first premise of natural law lacks the strength of an overriding myth. America was built by conquering and developing nature in the progression Westward, not by respecting nature.
The problem central to the three anti-institutional entities is the lack of a shared first premise with the audience. American government and industry have the advantage of a society normalized into the uniform practices of technology, dependence on social institutions, and reliance on environmental exploitation. George Bush's institutionalized rhetoric was able to take advantage of this normalization by drawing on the mythic power of American history. For outgroups, this first premise is too strong to overcome with conventional arguments to conventional audiences.

Third Distinction: The Totalizing Demands of the Rhetors

The farther the rhetors are from the conventional institutions, the more totalizing their demands. George Bush and Earth First!, seeking to repair the present problems and return to an ideal society, sought extreme measures to return to that place. However, they were seeking to restore the integrity of institutions or the environment. President Bush sought to fix a large problem with isolated military action. Once the problem was resolved through force, the violence would end. The violence is utilitarian and used only to restore order.

In a similar vein, Earth First! advocated violence only to restore natural law and the primacy of the environment. Violence is not used to hurt people, but rather to encourage people to align themselves and
institutions with natural law. There is hope in the form of a return to Eden.

But the Unabomber's and Abbie Hoffman's advocacy of violence is totalistic. The Unabomber advocated violence in order to destroy all institutions and all technology, without exception. His vision of the future is dark: no technology, no urban settlements, and no clear sense of what the future will hold except for pain, discomfort and death. The Unabomber's ultimate goal, to return to tribal villages as a way of life, is not a hopeful journey, but rather a punishment for our growing dependence on technology. There is no payoff in the Unabomber's scheme, only penance. Unlike presidential justifications for the selective use of violence, the Unabomber sought the total use of violence in order to completely destroy society as we know it.

Abbie Hoffman also advocated the totalistic destruction of institutions because they oppress individuals. Although the removal of institutions is a key feature of Hoffman's plans, he did not specify what the world would be like once this destruction had taken place. Oddly missing from his idealistic vision is a hopeful future. Freedom of individuals was often alluded to, but only freedom from institutional oppression. There is no discussion of the dark side of human nature or how individuals will be protected from it. Hoffman could not
offer a an optimistic vision that things would be better once the destruction of government had taken place. Moreover, Hoffman did not acknowledge the impossibility of separating people from institutions. In his totalizing characterization of institutions as bad, Hoffman eventually condemned us all.

A totalistic rhetoric does not offer hope. There is no place for humanity to return in order to be better off than they are now. The reformatory uses of violence with their limited objectives and promise of restored social order offer a finite but hopeful future.

Fourth Distinction: The Scope of the Enemy

Across the four case studies, the ability to define the enemy varies depending on the aims of the rhetor. In this study, the institutionalized rhetors appear more able to identify a concrete opponent. The less institutionalized rhetors appear to address ubiquitous opponents with nebulous identities and vast resources.

George Bush and Earth First!, both seeking return to past ideals, were able to identify a specific enemy. Abbie Hoffman and the Unabomber, seeking to overthrow political, economic, and cultural institutions, were unable to identify a unitary enemy. Their enemy was omnipresent and was rooted in social practice, not in a given individual or set of individuals.
George Bush was able to focus all of his wrath on not only a single nation, but a single leader. His rhetoric explicitly separated the citizens of Iraq from their leader. Bush seemed able to indict Hussien for a particular set of acts. Thus, the former President was able to provide an enemy with a single human face.

The other three cases had formidable hurdles. In each case, the rhetor was arguing against a system or a practice rather than a person.

Earth First!'s task was difficult, although their aims were reformatory. Earth First! conceptualized a set of persons identified by unsound environmental practices. This diverse group was held together by no other apparent bond. Earth First's enemy was not a single individual (like Hussien), nor even a well defined group of individuals (like a politburo). Rather, it was up to the reader to draw distinctions between good miners and bad miners, good loggers and bad loggers, and good hunters and bad hunters. The enemy can only be characterized by their environmental practices.

The Unabomber's opponent (technology) is an even more difficult enemy to identify. Although there may be legitimate arguments within the manuscript, the eventual call for the destruction and abandonment of technology is impossible to make. The enemy of the Unabomber was increasingly seen as a world-wide economic growth and a
force for the eradication of pain, disease and inequality. In short, the Unabomber was trying to identify a problem that much of the audience takes to be a solution.

Abbie Hoffman has a similar problem. His call for the destruction of institutions is a near impossibility, because in a modern society, institutions are densely woven into our daily lives. Institutions reflect the complexity and interdependency of the modern world. Hoffman had the rebellious period of the 1960s as a friendly context in which to write; today there is even less reason for an audience to abandon institutional arrangements.

Hoffman's task was further complicated by his refusal to draw distinctions between institutions. There is no separation between good and bad institutions, or the possibility of reformation of institutions by people of good will.

These findings may support a tentative hypothesis: Centrist reform oriented rhetors are able to identify specific opponents. Institutions such as the presidency, by their very nature, organize the social environment around them. The office of the Presidency provided a moral basis for the logic and rhetoric that allowed President Bush to focus his wrath on a single identifiable foe. In contrast, the revolutionaries were essentially ad hoc crusaders, only able to point out random examples of who their opponent might be.
The findings are instructive. This study underscores the power of deeply rooted ideographs and the mythic resources of legitimate institutions. Institutional rhetors have size, history, and tradition on their side. The individuals who ask the audience to destroy institutions are asking the audience to surrender their way of life, if not their lives, in pursuit of ill-defined utopian goals.

IMPLICATIONS

This study has identified significant distinctions between the discourses of institutions and radicals in justifying violence. There are several implications of this research.

First, although words such as "freedom" are frequent appeals across institutional and radical discourses, they are relativized in institutional discourse. Freedom and order are paired in institutional discourse while freedom is an absolute value in radical discourse.

Second, the premises of institutional discourse (based on collective myth, tradition and history) have greater doxastic force than those of radical discourse (which are based on individual assertion and idealized vision of the future). Third, institutional rhetors seem better able to define a menacing figure and then mobilize resources against it.
Fourth, institutional rhetors call for violence in a limited specific context in the pursuit of finite goals. Violence is framed in terms of morally justified restoration of order. The context for radical violence is less constrained, and the goals are less defined. Although driven by moral imperatives, the goals of change are less defined and less constrained than those of institutional discourse.

Finally, in all cases the justification of violence conceives of violence as a means to attaining a higher moral purpose. The violence is justified by principles more than circumstances. The principles are not always stated, but they often exist as unstated first premises in enthymatic argument. Violence is not seen as revenge or a means to gain material wealth. It is conceptualized in tandem with a higher moral purpose, the preservation of human dignity and freedom.

These findings are significant for researchers studying violence and rhetoric. This study provides a beginning framework for researchers in the future to examine the discourse of terrorists, social movements, and war.

These findings may also be effective in coming to understand terrorism in order to combat it. The government and the mass media often depict terrorism as means to an end in order to forcefully and shamelessly achieve a given
goal. But the effects of such violence often overshadow careful deliberation of motive. Public sentiment is high in most cases, and the media tends to dramatize this effect. But emotions are not an effective means for investigating and preventing similar catastrophes in the future. Locating motive and discovering hierarchies of values behind motives may complement the more technical aspects of terrorist investigations undertaken by governmental agencies.

FUTURE RESEARCH

This study began with questions that arose from gaps in research on rhetoric and violence. Some of those questions have been answered in this study. But the answers lead to other questions. The potential for fruitful research in this area of study is rich. Although terrorism is as old as the polis itself, we are seeing a rise of domestic terrorism in the U.S.: Oklahoma City, Atlanta's Olympic Park, and numerous abortion clinics have been bombed across the country in recent years. Chemical and biological terrorism are also getting more media attention. Further, the presence of militia groups arming themselves against the federal government is on the rise. Many of these groups are organizing to combat the tensions this present study has found: the encroachment upon individual freedoms by the federal government.
One useful direction for future research should aim at understanding the motives of terrorist acts. These may be revealed in first premises and linguistic formulas. There is a budding genre of criticism seen at national conventions in recent years: numerous scholars are engaged in studying presidential responses to terrorism. This research is fruitful for the study of presidential decorum and historical criticism. However, I argue it is not very useful in combatting or understanding terrorism. Terrorists do not pay much attention to what the President has to say about terrorism. The President's role in combatting terrorism is limited to reassuring the public and allocating resources to combat it. But presidential rhetoric in response to terrorism likely has little deterrent effect on the terrorist. Research should continue to examine the texts of terrorists.

A second useful direction for research is the comparative study of more rational, centrist movements and radical, violent movements. Do moderate groups frame arguments within a continuum of freedom versus oppression? Do moderate groups who seek change peacefully use appeals, arguments, and metaphors similar to groups which advocate violence? The answers to these questions could give us a significant gain in constructing a more complete theory to understand the uses of violence and nonviolence, and the framing of freedom and oppression.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Burke, K (1941). *Philosophy of literary form*. Baton Rouge: LSU.


220


## APPENDIX

**ARGUMENT FORM AND CONTENT AND INSTITUTIONAL ATTACHMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Premise</th>
<th>Cultural Myths</th>
<th>Natural Law</th>
<th>Higher Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Institutions Protect Freedom</td>
<td>For All Life Forms</td>
<td>Institutions Oppress Ind. Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Person; Defined, Small in Scope</td>
<td>Limited Practice of Gov/Corp.s</td>
<td>Ubiquitous Social Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Legitimate Action in Institutional Boundaries</td>
<td>Small Scale Illegitimate Action; Outside Boundaries</td>
<td>Large Scale Action to Destroy Institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VITA

Edward Christopher Reilly was born in 1963 in Mount Prospect, Illinois. He graduated from Carmel High School for Boys in Mundelein, Illinois, in 1981. From 1981 to 1988, he worked as a hardware and lumber salesperson, a fire equipment service technician, and a mass transit bus driver. Edward earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Communication Studies from Northern Illinois University in 1988. He earned a Master of Arts degree in Speech Communication from the University of Maine in 1990. From 1990-1993, he taught full time at Iowa State University in Ames, Iowa, and taught part-time at the Des Moines Area Community College. He enrolled at Louisiana State University in the Fall of 1993. In June, 1997, he married Amy Wandro. Edward is on the faculty of Communication Studies at Winona State University in Winona, Minnesota, and will be awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Speech Communication at Louisiana State University in December, 1998.
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: Edward Christopher Reilly

Major Field: Speech Communication

Title of Dissertation: Rhetoric and Social Struggle: In Search of the Topoi of Violence

Approved:

[Signatures]

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signatures]

Date of Examination:

August 21, 1998