Half Empty or Half Full: Explaining Black Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action.

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HALF EMPTY OR HALF FULL:
EXPLAINING BLACK ATTITUDES TOWARD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Political Science

by
Maruice Louis Mangum
B.S., University of Iowa, 1992
M.A., The Ohio State University, 1993
December 1998

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To my dear and loving mother,  
Mary Ann Porter Mangum  
February 8, 1949 - March 26, 1990
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank several people who made the completion of this dissertation and the acquisition of my Ph. D. possible. Primarily, I want to thank God for his help, strength, and guidance throughout my life. There were many times when I needed direction, assistance, and advice, and He was always there for me. Upon graduation from East High School in Waterloo, Iowa, many members of my church, Antioch Baptist Church, offered the same advice. They said, "Trust God." No better advice was I ever provided with than those two words. One lesson that I have learned is that no matter what, one must trust God, for He knows what one need plus what is best. I knew that with my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ (John 3:16), on my side, I would complete this project and obtain my doctorate (Philippians 4:13).

I owe a great debt to my family. Their love, sometimes "tough love," served as motivation to me throughout my life, including my education. My mother, Mary Ann Porter Mangum, my grandfather, Cass Porter, Sr., (both of whose memories will live with me forever), and my grandmother Linnie Beatrice Porter helped raised me to be a hardworking, persistent, independent, Type A personality young man. To them, I owe my life. I would also like to thank my brothers and sisters as well. Dwight, Linnette, and Gabriel have always been steady and positive influences, but my sister, Tina, and my twin brother, Marcus, disproportionately shaped my life. These two individuals are the ones I look to most for inspiration, besides my mother. They invigorate me when I receive their support.

I would also like to acknowledge those who helped in my education. My teachers, students, friends, and administrators at Theodore Roosevelt Elementary, Abraham Lincoln Elementary, Jack M. Logan Intermediate
School, and East Waterloo High School helped mold me into the scholar that I am today. I want to extend a special debt of gratitude to the political science faculties of the University of Iowa, the Ohio State University, and Louisiana State University. At those institutions, I was given opportunities to display my research and teaching capabilities. Of special note, Cary Covington, Peverill Squire, and Arthur Miller at the University of Iowa, and Herb Weisberg and Samuel Patterson at the Ohio State University served as great mentors and role models. I also want to thank my dissertation committee at Louisiana State University for their helpful comments and suggestions during the dissertation process: James Garand, chair, Mitchell F. Rice, Michael Grimes (sociology professor at Louisiana State University and dean's representative), Kevin Mulcahy, Wayne Parent, and William Clark.

However, the greatest debt of gratitude among teachers and colleagues is owed Dr. James "Jim" C. Garand. Without competition, bar none, he is the best educator I have ever had. Jim has been the biggest influence on my graduate training, for it was his instruction, encouragement, patience, and care that buoyed me during my time at Louisiana State University. He was also very helpful, attentive, and accessible throughout the writing of the dissertation. I learned a great deal from him, and I know that it is his guidance and our friendship that made my graduate career so successful.
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ABSTRACT

Using the Black National Election Study series (1984, 1988, and 1996), I estimate black support for affirmative action. I develop models that capture the effects of self-interest (as reflected in socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, and perceptions of racial threat and racial fairness) and symbolic politics attitudes (the core values of egalitarianism and individualism, political ideology, partisanship, and group consciousness). The method of choice is Ordinary Least Squares Estimation.

An examination of the data shows that what drives black attitudes toward affirmative action are largely symbolic politics attitudes, not the effects of self-interest. Generally speaking, the theory of symbolic politics attitudes has a stronger impact on black attitudes toward affirmative action, particularly when compared with the self-interest theory. That is, I discover that core values, political partisanship, and group consciousness do well at explaining black preferences regarding affirmative action. Blacks mainly support affirmative action because it is in line with their egalitarian inclinations, partisanship, and feelings of black group consciousness.

Although traditional measures of self-interest are less relevant, the racial threat and racial fairness components of self-interest do matter. Several variables used to capture the effects of racial threat and racial fairness are related to support for or opposition to affirmative action among black Americans. It appears that certain effects of self-interest do matter in that blacks support affirmative action largely because they view it as a means of overcoming racial discrimination and as a countermeasure to white threat.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

"The issue really is race. And so we must affirm racial justice as a racial remedy for racial injustice. . . . I will be in California resisting (Proposition 209, a state ballot measure to ban affirmative action in California state and local government programs) to end equal opportunity by making affirmative action illegal. If we lose the California battle, we'll have less access to college, less access to grad school, less access to jobs because you'll have less training, and we'll have less access to banks because they'll continue to redefine . . . The lack of affirmative action is not only morally wrong, but it's illegal."

Jesse Jackson

"I wouldn't accept a job or college admission based on color. I would not want the stigma, the cloud hanging over me. There could be no greater insult. . . . Thirty years ago, we agreed that racism was morally wrong and we embraced affirmative action to remedy the harm done to black people. But somewhere along the line, we became addicted to government and its occupation of our lives."

Ward Connerly

These quotations by two prominent African Americans on opposite sides of the affirmative action debate are representative of the range of opinions among blacks toward affirmative action policies. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is division among black Americans in their views regarding affirmative action policies. According to the Black National Election Study series (1984, 1988, and 1996), black support for affirmative action has ranged from approximately 60-70%, and opposition has ranged from about 28-40%. In this dissertation I seek to explain this variation. Toward this end, I examine the extent and power of the effects of individual characteristics, perceptions of racial threat, core values, political orientation, and group consciousness on support. Affirmative action is an ideal policy to study the effects of these factors not only because of its obvious racial nature, for it seems to
divide not only whites, but also because it causes division within the 
black community as well.

Furthermore, while much is known about white attitudes toward racial 
policies, little is known about black attitudes toward these policies. 
More precisely, while several studies have focused on white opinions 
about affirmative action, there is a paucity of research on black 
opinions toward this very controversial issue. Therefore, I focus on 
the opinions of black respondents. What's more, affirmative action has 
not been subjected to the comprehensive and rigorous examination that 
other racial issues (such as school busing and school integration) have 
experienced. Besides its focus on affirmative action, my dissertation 
is unique in that it tests several hypotheses that have yet to be 
studied as explanations for support for, and opposition to, affirmative 
action. What is more important, my dissertation examines more 
thoroughly black political attitudes.

WHY STUDY BLACK ATTITUDES TOWARD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION?

Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Racial Attitudes

A rather comprehensive investigation of black attitudes toward 
affirmative action is an important undertaking for several reasons. 
First, a thorough investigation of support for affirmative action using 
similar theories used to explain attitudes toward busing and school 
integration can help advance political scientists toward a comprehensive 
theory about racial attitudes in America. Many studies have 
investigated the reasons why white Americans react in a hostile manner 
toward racial policies such as busing, school integration, and 
affirmative action, but not much has been done to study attitudes among 
blacks toward affirmative action and other racial policies. My 
dissertation will help fill this void by examining black attitudes.
Affirmative action is one of very few policies that specifically targets blacks—it also assists some other racial minorities, women, and the physically disabled—yet it does not directly aid white males. Because there are not many policies that do this, affirmative action is one of the more controversial policies in recent history. An analysis of black support for affirmative action may reveal insights into black self-interests, attitudes, values, and group consciousness.

A Dearth of Studies on Black Attitudes and Behavior

Second, there has been quite a bit of writing done on racial attitudes, but most of this literature has focused on the racial attitudes of whites, and only a small amount of work has been on black racial attitudes. Moreover, while much is known about how whites feel toward affirmative action and why they feel as they do about it, very little is known about black attitudes toward the policy (Sigelman and Welch, 1993; Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Perhaps this is so because many social scientists perceive that blacks overwhelmingly support affirmative action, primarily because blacks tend to hold similar views on many other issues (Sigelman and Welch, 1991). That is, these scholars may also buy into the idea of a black monolith when it pertains to racial policies.

Additionally, this may be the view of many social scientists because it is reasonable to expect that blacks would be highly supportive of a policy intended to benefit them (Sigelman and Welch, 1991). However, the assumption that all or even most blacks support the measure is based on faulty logic, for it completely ignores the diversity within the black community. Furthermore, in order to understand fully American support for affirmative action, one must examine the attitudes held by blacks as well as those of whites.
study whites to the exclusion of blacks fails to present an adequate
depiction of America's racial attitudes. It may be the case that many
or all of the factors that lead whites to support or oppose affirmative
action may also lead many blacks to support or oppose it as well.
Therefore, I study black opinions of affirmative action to even out the
body of knowledge, as well as to determine the similarities and
differences between blacks and whites in their support for, and
opposition to, affirmative action.

A New Look At An Old Question

Third, why black Americans support or do not support affirmative
action is in and of itself an interesting question, since affirmative
action is a controversial subject that not only causes division between
black and white Americans, but also because it divides the black
community. While several works have explored the sources of support
for, and opposition to, affirmative between blacks and whites and among
whites, no one has really explored fully the determinants of the
division among blacks. The point here is that we do not know all we
ought to know about public support for affirmative action.

To be sure, affirmative action is a policy that is intended
primarily to aid blacks. Other racial minorities, women, and the
physically disabled also benefit from affirmative action, but the roots
of the policy grew out of the civil rights movement and placed blacks as
the chief beneficiaries. Given that affirmative action is intended to
benefit blacks first and foremost, it would be reasonable to assume that
most blacks would support it. In general, blacks do support affirmative
action, but there are a substantial number of blacks who do not support
it. According to the data from the Black National Election Study
series, in 1984 60.5% of blacks supported affirmative action, while
39.4% were opposed. In 1988, 69.6% supported the program, 30.5% were opposed. In 1996, 57.9% of the blacks stating a preference supported affirmative action, while 42% of the blacks taking a position were opposed. From these results, it is obvious that race is not the factor causing blacks to oppose legislation targeted to assist their race—additional factors, such as attitudes and values must also be at play.

Myth of a Black Monolith

Fourth, this dissertation punches a hole in the myth of a black monolith regarding racial policies. It is often the case that the media and politicians pose issues in terms of monolithic black and white opinion. The general public seems to hold this belief as well, for blacks and whites do seem to be sharply divided on many issues—especially those centered around race—and the chasm seems to be widening. With regard to many major controversial and important issues of the day, blacks and whites are depicted as having separate agendas and different means to reach those goals. The affirmative action debate is another example of this divergence in interests. Hence, the focus tends to be on what separates whites and blacks, rather than on what divides blacks. The fact is that blacks are a diverse group.

Perhaps the division among blacks over affirmative action centers around black preferences on the government's role in dealing with one of the country's most enduring problems—how America is to treat people of color. To some blacks, discrimination is no longer a major problem and blacks should do more to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps, realize that opportunities are there, and stop looking at their skin color as a hindrance. Those who hold these views contend that what has occurred in the past bears little or no impact on the future. The government may only be responsible for preventing additional wrongs
against blacks, but it is not responsible for actively advancing the economic, social, and political status of blacks. To other blacks, the legacies of slavery, Jim Crow, and other vestiges of past discrimination continue to be barriers to opportunities for the present generation. They contend that discrimination still exists in subtle forms that are just as effective as more overt forms of discrimination, and that government should play an active role in advancing the economic, social, and political status of blacks in order to counteract all forms of racial prejudice, racism, and discrimination. I develop models to estimate the effects of these sentiments and others in a later chapter.

Effects of Opinion on Policy

Finally, public support for affirmative action may influence the level of support for the policy by elected politicians. Public opinion often influences whether politicians consider designing and implementing programs that assist certain societal groups (Kamieniecki, 1985). Insofar as public opinion drives elite political behavior, public support and its determinants are quite important for the fate of public policy—specifically, affirmative action, may rest on it (Page and Shapiro, 1983). Conceding that governmental responsiveness to citizen preference is the hallmark of normative democratic theory (Dahl, 1965), whether affirmative action persists or becomes a relic of the past may depend on public sentiment. The preferences of the general public and the power of organized interests sometimes guide the behavior of lawmakers (Page and Shapiro, 1983; Schattschneider, 1960). Given the balanced and formidable forces on both sides of the debate, we can understand affirmative action's longevity in the face of serious discontent. Therefore, a study on public support for affirmative action may provide valuable insight into the underlying motives of elite
political behavior and how affirmative action can be modified to satisfy both opponents and proponents.

PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

This dissertation centers around one primary question: why do some blacks support affirmative action, while others do not? However, there are a number of other interesting questions I seek to answer as well. Which types of blacks are likely to support/oppose affirmative action? What are the most important factors underlying support or lack of support? Does self-interest play a larger role in explaining support/opposition than symbolic politics attitudes? Is affirmative action supported as a perceived countermeasure to white threat? Is support due to the perception that affirmative action is in accord with one's core value of egalitarianism? Is the lack of support due to the perception that affirmative action violates the core value of individualism? What role does group consciousness play among members of the same race? These are just some of the many secondary questions that will be addressed in this dissertation.

In Chapter 2, I provide a backdrop and an historical perspective of the affirmative action debate. I discuss the various definitions and interpretations citizens have of affirmative action. I discuss the why legislators created affirmative action, the legislation that preceded it, and how the meaning of the phrase affirmative action has changed over the years.

In Chapter 3, I summarize the extant literature on affirmative action. I discuss the general racial attitudes of blacks and whites as well as the racial perceptions between the two races. I discuss the research scholars have conducted to explain both black and white attitudes toward affirmative action. I then address some of the
criticisms made of these works and map out solutions so as not to fall into the same trap. Finally, I discuss this study's original contributions in this area of research.

In Chapter 4, I outline the theories and hypotheses to be tested in order to explain black attitudes toward affirmative action. The two theories I test are self-interest and symbolic politics. Self-interest and symbolic politics theories are two common explanations of attitudes toward racial policies. The self-interest model includes items that measure socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, as well as respondents' perceptions of racial threat. The symbolic politics model consists of items that capture the effects of core values, political orientation, and black group consciousness.

In Chapter 5, I discuss the data sets and research methods. The sources of data are the 1984-1988 National Black Election Panel Study and the 1996 Black National Election Study. The National Black Election Study series can be used to improve our knowledge and understanding of black attitudes on many political issues and items. More specifically, one can use these data to gain insights into the determinants of black support for, and opposition to, affirmative action. Using these data, I develop and test a series of regression models of black attitudes toward affirmative action.

In Chapter 6, I present the regression results in order to evaluate the utility of the self-interest and symbolic politics theories in explaining black attitudes toward affirmative action. Self-interested blacks are those who reveal a preference for affirmative action because they perceive more benefits than costs to themselves or their family or oppose affirmative action because they perceive more costs than benefits to themselves or their family. Blacks with symbolic
politics attitudes support affirmative action inasmuch as they hold egalitarianism in higher regard than individualism, insomuch that they are liberals, Democrats, and are group conscious. However, blacks with symbolic politics attitudes may oppose affirmative action if they hold individualism in higher regard than egalitarianism, are conservatives, Republicans, and are not very group conscious.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I bring it all together. There I provide the answers to the questions I posed and then make comparisons between my work here and the work of other scholars in order to provide a more comprehensive depiction of racial attitudes in America.
CHAPTER 2  
DEFINITIONS AND HISTORY

Before investigating black attitudes toward affirmative action, we must first be clear about the meaning of the term. Much of the division between blacks and whites in their support for affirmative action may center on different conceptions of the policy. Therefore, it is important first to understand what affirmative action is in order to understand black attitudes toward affirmative action. In this chapter, I discuss the myriad of definitions and interpretations citizens have of the policy. There will also be discussion on how the affirmative action issue is framed. Then, I discuss the impetus for the creation of affirmative action, the legislation that preceded its adoption, and how the meaning of the phrase has changed over the years.

DEFINING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

What is affirmative action? This is not a trivial question with obvious answers. Some citizens see affirmative action as a harmless policy designed to bring black Americans (and other previously disadvantaged groups) into the economic and social mainstream of American society. For these citizens, affirmative action is a means of overcoming previous and current discrimination. On the other hand, others see affirmative action as an affront to the American ideal of a color-blind society. For critics of affirmative action, such policies are not harmless, but instead inflict discriminatory practices on others, many of whom do not discriminate or who have never benefitted directly from discriminatory practices in the past. Obviously, there is substantial debate about the very meaning of affirmative action, and the divergences in definitions may help to shape the attitudes that individuals have toward the policy.
Affirmative action seeks to remove discriminatory practices and procedures that serve as barriers to opportunity and goods and services for certain segments of society (Edwards, 1995). Affirmative action is a policy that calls for obedience to procedures to open up job and education opportunities to qualified minorities, women, and the physically disabled (Crosby and Clayton, 1990; Edwards, 1995). It is simply a provision that ensures that organizations and businesses that have a contract with the federal government will make efforts to publicize employment and contract opportunities to minorities and women, and that these groups are given as much consideration as the members of the majority get. In addition, organizations and businesses must demonstrate that their hiring and promotion practices do not disadvantage any racial group, women, and the physically disabled (Crosby and Clayton, 1990).

Affirmative action also refers to an array of approaches, including but not limited to special recruiting and hiring goals, that assist racial minorities and women to achieve higher economic status (Idelson, 1995b). Affirmative action may be conceived of as an umbrella policy that encompasses many different programs—such as liberal recruiting guidelines, efforts to monitor the progress in hiring and promotion of members of the targeted group, and contract set-asides for women and minorities—designed to close the racial and ethnic divide between blacks and whites (Steeh and Krysan, 1996). Affirmative action also includes minority outreach, special training programs, goals, and good faith efforts to reach estimates. Each of these are implemented to increase the number of minorities in the labor pool (Levin, 1990).

There are many different interpretations of affirmative action. The discussion on affirmative action has been evolving ever since its
inception into the political dialogue. Over time and within particular debates, affirmative action has come to mean different things according to different individuals and groups, primarily dependent upon who are seen as the beneficiaries of the policy. It may be the case that blacks and whites hold different views on affirmative action because they define it differently. These differences probably explain why blacks and whites often appear to talk past each other on this issue. Whites are probably more likely to oppose affirmative action defined as quotas, but are more likely to support the idea of affirmative action as active nondiscrimination and outreach programs. Blacks are, on average, probably more likely than whites to see the need for and support a more active form of affirmative action. There is probably variation among blacks in defining affirmative action, which leads to a split within the black community regarding support for or opposition to affirmative action.

Affirmative action has a number of frames in which proponents and opponents have discussed the issue. Gamson and Modigliani (1987) define a frame as an organizing idea or line of thinking that gives meaning to and allows a connection among emerging events. Generally speaking, a frame is the manner in which the public understands an issue, signifying which features are more important than others (Kinder and Sanders, 1990). The ways an issue is framed often determines the support or lack of support for the policy in question (Kinder and Sanders, 1990). As Kinder and Sanders (1990) point out, surveys, in addition to measuring public opinion, may activate, shape, and create it. More specifically, question wording, placement of questions, format, and race of interviewer effects can impact survey results. Affirmative action brings many different programs to mind, so respondents may have
difficulty in determining a question's meaning, and may even evoke unintended interpretations (Steeh and Krysan, 1996).

A perfect example of how frames influence evaluations of an issue occurred in the Houston referendum and the California referendum on affirmative action. Opponents of affirmative action wanted the wording of the Houston referendum, Proposition A, to reflect the wording of the California referendum, Proposition 209. However, the pro-affirmative action Houston city council was able to alter the wording of Proposition A so that the issue was framed differently than Proposition 209. California's Proposition 209 was passed, but Houston's Proposition A was defeated.

Essentially three prominent views of affirmative action have vied for public acceptance. One is the "remedial action" view, which contends that affirmative action calls for the use of race-consciousness in order to redress past discrimination. A second is view is the "delicate balance" view. Proponents of this view argue that affirmative action helps minorities without using quotas which adversely affect the majority. They hold that affirmative action is a policy that promotes racial equality through controlled racial preferences. A final view of affirmative action is the "no preferential treatment" view, whose proponents deem affirmative action to be an unfair policy that grants minorities undeserved preference and endorses reverse discrimination (Burstein, 1992). In this guise, affirmative action is taken to mean quotas and hard-core racial preferences. The argument is that affirmative action goes too far in ensuring that blacks and other minorities are represented in the work force or in student bodies in numbers that reflect the proportion of blacks and minorities in the population.
Remedial Action View of Affirmative Action

The remedial action view of affirmative action refers to the employer's use of race as a criterion for purposes of hiring and promoting (Jones, Jr., 1985; Hooks, 1987; Kuklinski, Sniderman, Knight, Piazza, Tetlock, Lawrence, and Mellers, 1997). Often, this results in granting a "plus" to the prospective minority candidate's application (Munro, 1995). Under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, "affirmative action meant that government employers and contractors had to recruit aggressively to bring minorities into the applicant pool. Decisions on hiring, promotions, and appointments, however, would continue to be governed by traditional criteria of merit selection" (Davis, 1992).

Under the remedial action view, affirmative action is taken to mean a policy that increases the number of women and minorities in organizations, be they businesses or institutions of higher education. Affirmative action policies are not intended to be quotas (though some applications of affirmative action may appear to be such) or to mandate that an organization hire or promote unqualified or under qualified employees--yet demographic characteristics may be considered when making employment decisions. Demographics come into the equation after the demonstration of competence (Kravitz and Platania, 1993). Although efforts may be made to recruit minority candidates, race plays no part in the final selection process in that the successful candidate should be the best person for the position irrespective of race (Edwards, 1995). One point to keep in mind here is that it would be to the detriment of affirmative action should social group membership be the primary factor to be considered, for that surely would lead to the hiring, promoting, and admitting into schools minorities and women who
are unqualified or under qualified. While critics of affirmative action assert that this occurs, there would be greater opposition to affirmative action, perhaps even an elimination of the policy, if competence and qualifications were not paramount in university admissions and businesses' hiring and promotion procedures.

In addition, the remedial action view sees affirmative action as a means of overcoming past discrimination (Schwartz, 1984; Edwards, 1994; Summers, 1995; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan, 1997), present discrimination, and future discrimination (Hooks, 1987; Burstein, 1992) by breaking down barriers to employment for minorities and women (Summers, 1995). Affirmative action is considered a means for compensating for past discrimination, rights excluded, and harm suffered (Edwards, 1994). As the argument goes, the present generation of blacks is under-represented in certain occupations and positions due to their long history of discrimination and oppression, which led to their continued state of relative deprivation and low educational achievement levels. This has also compromised the future of many blacks, for they have not been able to enjoy a level of equal opportunity with whites (Edwards, 1994). According to this view, blacks have been relegated to the lowest paying positions with little chance of improving their wages because the highest paying jobs were reserved for whites, and due to their lack of seniority, blacks were denied employment benefits, and subjected to the "last hired, first fired" policy (Shaw, 1988).

**Delicate Balance View of Affirmative Action**

The delicate balance view of affirmative action considers the policy as a measure to enhance equal opportunity (Belz, 1991; Edwards, 1994), a means to equalize access to jobs and advancement opportunities, and to increase equality and justice (Exum, 1983; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo,
and Krysan, 1997). Affirmative action can be defined as a program to equalize hiring, promotions, and admissions for members of historically under-represented groups by taking into account those very same characteristics that have been used to deny them equal opportunity and treatment (Schwartz, 1984; Shaw, 1988; Belz, 1991; Edwards, 1994; Steeh and Krysan, 1996). It ensures that qualified minorities have equal access to opportunities (Bolce and Gray, 1979).

Matheson, Echenberg, Taylor, Rivers, and Chow (1994) state that affirmative action is a social-political remedy to problems originating from injustices against members of disadvantaged groups. Affirmative action is a remedy to the perception that minorities and women are discriminated against based on factors other than merit. They continue to argue that affirmative action aims to break down barriers that have hindered the ability of minorities and women to gain access to opportunities and to facilitate advancement in areas that were previously blocked due to immutable characteristics. Belz (1991) offers a similar definition of affirmative action in that its goal is to establish racial equality by placing blacks into jobs from which they have been historically excluded.

The delicate balance view also sees affirmative action as a means to achieve diversity. That is, race is one of several factors that can be considered in achieving diversity, and that there is value in having a diverse workforce or student body. One of the criticisms of this part of the delicate balance view is that there are many kinds of diversity, of which race is only one.

**Preferential Treatment View of Affirmative Action**

Since 1961 when the term was reintroduced to the popular vernacular by President John F. Kennedy, affirmative action has also
come to mean quotas (Kravitz and Platania, 1993), set-asides (Levin, 1990), preferential treatment, and reverse discrimination (Kravitz and Platania, 1993). Quotas refer to an allocated fixed proportion of jobs for minorities, women, and/or the physically disabled (Goldman, 1979; Munro, 1995). Minority set-asides require a predetermined proportion of construction contracts be awarded to a specified racial or ethnic group, and are deemed necessary to overcome exclusion by the "old boy" network of primary contractors and subcontractors (Belz, 1991).

PRELUDE TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Like most public policies, affirmative action does not exist in an historical vacuum. In fact, affirmative action, as well as other civil rights and anti-discrimination policies, was codified by our nation's leaders in the 1960s to reduce discrimination and to reduce the effects of past discrimination. These policies were adopted to combat centuries-old social and economic discrimination endured by minorities and women. A number of scholars have provided rationales for the implementation of these anti-discrimination laws, including affirmative action. According to Exum (1983, p. 383): "No problem in U. S. society has remained unresolved longer than that of racial inequality."

Attempts to achieve racial equality are impeded by institutional characteristics and choices that continue to disadvantage racial minorities (Exum, 1983). Graham (1990) argues that blacks are a disadvantaged group that for centuries has been the psychological, physical, and economic subordinates of whites, especially white males, and they have been systematically excluded from control of property and political authority. According to Merelman (1992), blacks have been subjected to unusually extreme restraints, arguably more than any other subordinate group in American history. Historically, these restraints
have come in the form of submission to whites in many spheres of life (residence, education, occupation, and politics), a lack of social respect, constrained social mobility, economic inequality, social discrimination, legal exclusions, illegal and legal coercions, and restricted political power. The combinations of these historical conditions have placed blacks at a great disadvantage compared to whites (Merelman, 1992). According to Blair (1987) and Wilson (1980), slavery, individual acts of discrimination, and Jim Crow laws have all worked to create a legacy of disadvantage for blacks. Blair (1987) and Levin (1990) argue that the remnants of the past linger today in that, while blacks enjoy more rights than they possessed even as recently as forty years ago, they lack the resources they would have garnered had they previously been competing on a level playing field. According to some scholars, black Americans live in a world that discriminates against them both as individuals and as a group. Blacks, therefore, perceive widespread discrimination, and they perceive this discrimination to be the major factor causing blacks to have trouble finding employment, descent housing, and other forms of economic and social security (Sigelman and Welch, 1991).

Nonetheless, blacks have, over the years, entered positions of influence and prestige. The size of the black middle class blossomed during the 1960s and 1970s, and blacks made major strides in education, wage-earnings, and occupational prestige (Schuman et al., 1997). Before, but more dramatically after the adoption of affirmative action, blacks have achieved educational and occupational advancement (Kennedy, 1986; Heckman and Verkerke, 1990; Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Some argue that, without affirmative action, high educational and occupational positions would be devoid of blacks (Kennedy, 1986). McCrone and Hardy
(1978) demonstrate that civil rights policies since 1964, and particularly, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, have systematically improved the relative income of black males as evidenced by decreased black-white median income ratios among males, particularly in the South.

However, in spite of the material progress of middle-class blacks (Wilson, 1980; Wilson, 1987), on the average, the economic status of blacks compared to whites has leveled off or decreased (Schuman et al., 1997), and many observers suggest that blacks are still subject to racism, segregation, and discrimination (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). According to some scholars, racial discrimination is still pervasive and persisting in many forms (Wilson, 1980; Walters, 1996). Blacks are still subject to housing and job discrimination (Sigelman and Welch, 1991). Black men earn much less than white men (Burstein, 1992). The average income of the black middle class is lower than the average income of the white middle class because racial discrimination denied older black workers entry into higher wage-earning positions (Wilson, 1980). Unemployment rates among blacks are substantially higher than unemployment for whites (Jones, Jr., 1985), sometimes twice as high (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). According to some scholars, blacks are under-represented statistically in the most remunerative and prestigious occupations (Levin, 1990; Kinder and Sanders, 1996).

Precursors to Affirmative Action

In 1942, Representative Vito Marcantino introduced the first bill proposing a ban on employment discrimination. It would be twenty-two years before the act would be passed, but it was passed, and it became the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Burstein, 1992). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 declared that discrimination—with regard to race, color, religion, or national origin—in relation to education and employment was against
the law. Affirmative action has been one of many tools used to overcome education and job-related discrimination as part of the implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This legislation also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to investigate job discrimination in industry and commerce (Davis, 1992). The EEOC is the arm of the federal government that enforces discrimination laws.

According to Munro (1995), the historical underpinnings of affirmative action begin much earlier than typically recognized. Munro argues that affirmative action, in terms of blacks gaining extra social or legal benefits, finds its roots during the Era of Reconstruction in the aftermath of the Civil War. The Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866—which authorized Congress to provide African Americans with land, buildings, and funds for education (Jones, Jr., 1985)—and the Civil Rights Act of 1866—which declared that all citizens, regardless of race, color, conditions of slavery and servitude have the same rights as those enjoyed by white citizens—are the precursors to affirmative action as it is known today, with President Kennedy's executive order and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 serving as the more popular modern origin. The phrase affirmative action first appeared in the Wagner Act of 1935, which authorized the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) the power to redress unfair labor practices (Jones, Jr., 1985; Graham, 1990; Davis, 1992; Graham, 1992) by ordering the offending parties "to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act" (Graham, 1990).

This century has seen a flurry of congressional activity to end racial discrimination in employment (Graham, 1990). In 1933, Congress passed the Unemployment Relief Act which, in part, forbade job
discrimination based on race, color, and creed, and the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 banned racial discrimination in NRA-sponsored housing programs (Jones, Jr., 1985; Graham, 1990). In 1940, a new civil service rule prohibited racial discrimination in federal employment and discontinued the requirement of providing photographs as a part of the job application process (Graham, 1990). More than 150 civil rights bills were introduced between 1937 and 1946, but not one passed (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). In the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted a number of civil rights laws to combat discrimination against blacks.

Presidents and Affirmative Action

With the behest of civil rights activists, the federal government, and presidents in particular, have played an integral part in dismantling several forms of discrimination. Presidents and their commissions, committees, and agencies that they oversee developed innovative techniques to implement civil rights laws which have produced positive results. Almost every president since 1941 has made a special contribution to national civil rights policy.

Out of embarrassment and under pressure from A. Phillip Randolph's (the NAACP and black civil rights activists) threat to lead a march on Washington, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941, which created the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) whose goal was to eliminate discrimination against minorities with regards to government contracting (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Graham, 1990; Belz, 1991; Munro, 1995; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan, 1997). This five-man committee, equipped with eight staff members, enforced the policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, and national origin by receiving and investigating complaints of
discrimination, redressing valid grievances, and making recommendations on how to carry out the order (Graham, 1990). However, according to Carmines and Stimson (1989) and Graham (1990), this FEPC was weak and ineffective. It lacked necessary resources and staff, had no direct authority over unions, lacked statutory enforcement powers, and lacked political legitimacy both within government and public opinion (Graham, 1990). Therefore, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9346 on May 27, 1943 to eliminate the first FEPC, and put in place a different one equipped with a full-time chairman. He increased its staff and budget, and extended its jurisdiction to war industries in addition to defense industries. The new FEPC declared that all employers and labor organizations, including unions, must eliminate employment discrimination (Graham, 1990).

President Harry Truman kept the legacy of the FEPC alive by issuing an executive order in December 1945 which continued its existence, but it was abolished by a congressional committee in June 1946. To no avail, Truman called for Congress to create fair employment legislation and to create a national FEPC. Then on July 26, 1948, President Truman issued Executive Order 9980 to establish a Fair Employment Board (FEB) to be housed in the Civil Service Commission (Graham, 1990). As its primary function to be an appellate unit, the FEB formalized nondiscrimination policies already in place and served as a watchdog subunit of the Civil Service Commission.

With the election of Republican Dwight Eisenhower as president, the employment discrimination debate was expected to shift into a conservative direction (Graham, 1990). However, with the eroding support of African Americans, the GOP adopted nondiscrimination into their platform. Eisenhower issued an executive order to create the
Government Contract Committee to be headed up by Vice President Richard Nixon whose functions were to develop systematic procedures to process complaints and review compliance (Graham, 1990; Belz, 1991). Eisenhower would later issue another executive order that required all contracting officers to ensure that each contractor made public their commitment to nondiscrimination in terms of recruitment, hiring, promotion, demotion, and transfer (Graham, 1990). A stronger Republican commitment to civil rights may be given credit for the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, but they were criticized largely because they were considered ineffective and lacked enforcement provisions (Carmines and Stimson, 1989).

President John Kennedy declared in a press conference his administration's commitment to equal employment opportunity by government and its contractors (Graham, 1990). Kennedy then issued Executive Order 10925 on March 6, 1961 directing federal contractors to take affirmative action to ensure that while employed, employees are not treated with regard to race, creed, color, or national origin (Graham, 1990; Belz, 1991; Davis, 1992; Graham, 1992; Idelson, 1995b). The order essentially required contractors to recruit aggressively and train minorities on a nondiscriminatory basis to broaden the pool of qualified minority applicants (Bolce and Gray, 1979; Graham, 1990), and provide extensive public notice of all opportunities for employment and promotion (Belz, 1991; Graham, 1992) and work force statistics (Belz, 1991).

President Lyndon Johnson extended the federal government's commitment to end discrimination regarding contracts by issuing Executive Order 11246 to include gender, and require that all contractors who conduct business with the federal government to adopt
affirmative action plans (Goldman, 1979; Idelson, 1995b). It also redefined affirmative action to ensure "equality of results" (Mills, 1994). Executive Order 11246 was a regulatory policy that set the parameters of the employment practices of contractors who do business with the federal government (William and Liss, 1992). It also created the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) and required that all contractors doing business with the federal government have written affirmative action programs and procedures to evaluate minority personnel in order to achieve equal opportunity in employment for minorities (Mills, 1994). It included the requirements of goals and timetables, calling upon employers to ensure that their work force of minority and female employees was roughly in proportion to their presence in the labor pool (William and Liss, 1992). In instances where a significant gap was present, employers had to design comprehensive plans to increase the number of minorities or women by hiring those who possessed the necessary skills or were capable of acquiring them through training (William and Liss, 1992).

Set against a backdrop of urban unrest, President Richard Nixon's civil rights policy was one of incoherence (Graham, 1992). However, his third initiative in civil rights policy succeeded (the first two initiatives--Supreme Court nominations and voting rights proposals--were defeated by the Democratically-controlled Congress). This initiative implemented the Philadelphia Plan on a national scale, and it would be Nixon's most enduring contribution to American civil rights policy (Graham, 1992). The initial Philadelphia Plan was a plan to ensure that the proportion of blacks employed in each trade was equal to the proportion of blacks in the work force of metropolitan Philadelphia (Davis, 1992; Mills, 1994). The Philadelphia Plan was revived in 1969,
when President Nixon joined congressional liberals to rescue it from conservative attacks. The goal was to loosen the grip of the craft unions of the construction industry, expand the black middle class, and dislocate the Democrats' black-labor alliance (Davis, 1992). The Philadelphia Plan under Nixon did not call for a set number of minorities that contractors must hire, but it called for a target range, and this range was to be presented as a percentage (Graham, 1992; Mills, 1994). It was under the Nixon administration's version of the Philadelphia Plan that goals and timetables were developed to measure the progress toward eliminating job-related discrimination (Jones, Jr., 1985; Govan and Taylor, 1989; Davis, 1992; Mills, 1994). Rather than eliminating race in public policy as would be expected under a Republican president, during the Nixon administration the use of race was broadened (Belz, 1991). However, nowhere was there a requirement to hire unqualified or under qualified blacks, and an employer could not discriminate against white workers (Jones, Jr., 1985).

The Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton administrations were rather nondescript as they relate to their contributions to civil rights, but more specifically, affirmative action. President Ford tried to limit affirmative action, but retreated when his policies and actions were defeated by the effective opposition of civil rights organizations. President Carter appeared comfortable with affirmative action and in some ways extended it as evident by his appointments to the federal judiciary (Glazer, 1988). President Clinton is a supporter of affirmative action, and has adopted the phrase "mend it, don't end it" to articulate his position more clearly.

Presidents Reagan and Bush sponsored attacks on affirmative action (Graham, 1992). Their administrations marked a retreat in the
commitment to affirmative action and a decline in civil rights enforcement. Sometimes their administrations enacted policies that repealed or reversed policies adopted by previous administrations (Govan and Taylor, 1989; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan, 1997). The Reagan administration was a determined opponent of affirmative action (Glazer, 1988). According to Schwartz (1984) and Idelson (1995b), the Reagan administration's attacks on minorities and women focused on affirmative action while all the presidents preceding Reagan made constructive contributions to civil rights and affirmative action in some form.

The Courts Respond

Many of the parameters set for affirmative action have not been charted by Congress or the president, but by the courts (Idelson, 1995c). However, the Supreme Court has not been very instrumental in distinguishing the legal and constitutional from the illegal and unconstitutional regarding race conscious policies (Glazer, 1988). Rather, the Court has identified additional controversial issues. In some cases, the Court has even come down on both sides of the affirmative action debate. In addition, the battles waged between the proponents and opponents of affirmative action have largely resulted in a stalemate with affirmative action sustaining relatively few changes.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment based on race, ethnicity, or gender. On the surface that would seem to eliminate the use of race and gender as criteria for making employment and education decisions, and some affirmative action programs have been declared unconstitutional for that reason. However, the courts have generally ruled that affirmative action is consistent with the goals stated in Title VII and may even require it to remedy past wrongs (Idelson, 1995c). Nonetheless, critics would argue that
this interpretation is at odds with the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The Griggs v. Duke Power case in 1971 signaled the court's transition from the equal treatment standards of job discrimination as envisioned by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to an equality of results standards underpinned by proportional representation in the work force (Graham, 1990; Belz, 1991). This case centered around employment qualifications. It was a class action suit brought by black workers at Duke Power Company, whose employment practices included restricting black workers to the labor department, and where the highest paid black employees earned less than the lowest paid white employees in the four all-white operating departments (Graham, 1990). When Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became effective, Duke Power ceased to restrict blacks to the labor department, but required acceptable scores on two general aptitude tests and a high school diploma in order to be transferred to higher paying departments. At trial, Duke Power admitted that the tests did not measure the employee's ability to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs (Graham, 1990). But because the test was administered to both black and white employees, Duke Power argued that it was not in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. However, Duke Power was declared in violation prior to 1965 (Graham, 1990). The Supreme Court ruled in Griggs v. Duke Power that it is illegal to employ employment procedures that discriminate against minorities even if their intention is not to deny them opportunities (Exum, 1983; Graham, 1990; William and Liss, 1992; Mills, 1994). Segregated schooling, as it existed at the time, made it impossible for blacks to compete fairly with whites and the aptitude tests and high school diploma requirements had discriminatory effects (Graham, 1990).
In *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* (1978), the Supreme Court ruled against the practice which set aside 16 slots out of 100 for under-represented student populations (Belz, 1991; Mills, 1994). The case centered around a white male applicant, Alan Bakke, who had been denied admission to the University of California at Davis medical school in favor of minority applicants (Glazer, 1988). Bakke had higher test scores than any of the minority students admitted. The University of California at Davis' program was for the "disadvantaged," but the school failed to admit a white disadvantaged person (McWhirter, 1996). The program sought to admit racial minority students who would not otherwise be admitted. Minority student applications were placed in a separate pile, which meant that minorities only competed with other minorities for the 16 slots allotted for "disadvantaged" students (McWhirter, 1996). The Court declared it unconstitutional for positions to be reserved for individuals based on group membership. In other words, quotas were declared illegal. The Court did state that race could be used as one of many factors in achieving a diverse student body.

However, the next year in 1979, in *United Steelworkers of America v. Weber*, the Supreme Court ratified a lower court ruling that allowed employers and unions to make voluntary agreements to consider race as a factor to eliminate racial segregation and hierarchy (Belz, 1991; William and Liss, 1992). The case centered on a voluntary affirmative action plan that Kaiser negotiated with the United Steelworkers union. The plan called for 50% of the space available for training programs to be reserved for black employees, and training continued until the proportion of black craft workers and the percentage of blacks in the local labor pool were equal (Belz, 1991; Munro, 1995). The Supreme
Court declared that, because it was adopted voluntarily by private entities to eradicate historical patterns of racial discrimination and because it did not harm whites, it was not in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Mills, 1994).

Minority set-asides were first implemented in 1977 as authorized by the Public Works Employment Act (LaNoue, 1992). In an attempt to stimulate a sluggish economy, $4 billion was expended, with 10% of the allocation to be spent on minority businesses (LaNoue, 1992). The 10% set-aside seemed to be the exact kind of policy the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional in California v. Bakke. In Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980), the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 was challenged by contractor associations (Belz, 1991; LaNoue, 1992). The Supreme Court declared the Act was constitutional, and that 10% of contracts on federal public works programs could be set aside for minority contractors (LaNoue, 1992). It was found to be constitutional because there was sufficient flexibility in the parameters of the set-aside to avoid being a quota, but more important, Congress has the authority to enact policies to remedy past racial discrimination (Belz, 1991; Mills, 1994).

In City of Richmond v. Croson, the Supreme Court invalidated a minority business set-aside program instituted by the majority-black city council of Richmond, Virginia in 1989 (LaNoue, 1992). The city of Richmond designed an affirmative action plan that ensured minorities 30% of all subcontracted work on city contracts. This plan was declared unconstitutional, violating the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, due, in part, because those in power of city government were not found to be discriminating. That is, because there was no apparent evidence of past discrimination, there was no need for such an
affirmative action plan. The Court stated that the Richmond Plan denied certain citizens equal opportunity to compete for public contracts due to their race (LaNoue, 1992). Though the Court ruled in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber that Congress has the ability to utilize set-asides, it ruled that city governments do not have the same judicial leeway (Mills, 1994).

Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena (1995) surrounds a Department of Transportation policy designed to reserve some federal contracts to economically and socially disadvantaged business persons (Idelson, 1995d). The policy gives contractors who hire disadvantaged subcontractors a bonus. Minority-owned businesses automatically qualify as disadvantaged business persons, but nonminorities must petition for this designation and demonstrate how they were economically and socially disadvantaged. The Supreme Court did not strike down any affirmative action programs, nor did it denounce special consideration of minority subcontractors. However, the Court ruled that affirmative action will now be subject to "strict scrutiny" (Idelson, 1995d). This places the burden of proof in disparate impact cases on the employee, a reversal of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 which placed the burden of proof on the employer and required the company or organization to demonstrate that the practice in question was both related to the job and essential to business operations (Mills, 1994). Strict scrutiny means that the policy in question is in dubious constitutional standing and must be extremely well-justified in order to survive a court challenge. To survive, the policy must be shown to serve a compelling governmental interest, and employ the narrowest means to that end (Idelson, 1995d). However, regarding affirmative action, the federal government has operated under looser standards, requiring only that affirmative action
aspire to attain important goals and that the means be "substantially related" to those ends (Idelson, 1995d).

The aforementioned cases indicate that the courts have on occasion sanctioned, and at times it has even required, the use of race or gender in order to promote equal opportunity (Idelson, 1995c). In the midst of seemingly contradictory rulings, Idelson (1995c) has identified three general trends. One is that employers are allowed to take race and gender into account when making decisions, but are not able to employ quotas to fill jobs. Therefore, preferences are within the law, but quotas are illegal. A second axiom is that affirmative action is seen as a temporary solution to redressing past wrongs. A third is that employers must consider the effect their affirmative action program will have on employees outside of the affirmative action plan.

A Recap on the Phrase Affirmative Action

From the beginning, the meaning of affirmative action was open to interpretation. On one hand, it was linked to quasi-judicial practices such as hearings, findings of fact to identify victims of discrimination with the intent to harm, cease and desist orders, and redressing discrimination in the form of rehiring or back pay (Graham, 1990). On the other hand, affirmative action implied special efforts by the government to compensate for a history of employment discrimination against minorities (Graham, 1990).

The civil rights era can be viewed as having two phases (Abram, 1986; Graham, 1990; Graham, 1992). Phase I was the charge against discrimination and equal protection of the laws. Phase II was the charge for "compensatory justice." Phase I ended in 1965 when anti-discrimination policies were codified. Phase II took root as the problems of the politics of implementation of anti-discrimination
policies produced a change in focus where the focus shifted from equal
treatment to equal results (Graham, 1990). This meant a change from
positive assistance in the form of recruitment and training to
proportional distribution of benefits (Graham, 1990), a change from a
demonstration of intent to discriminate to disparate impact or
disproportionate results (Graham, 1992). The shift in goals was brought
about by the amalgamation of the process of implementing the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fair Housing Act
of 1968, and the efforts of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, agencies in Congress, and the
civil rights coalition.

In implementing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, government officials and the civil rights lobby found the
principle of equal opportunity to be inadequate in attacking
discrimination and achieving genuine equality, for discrimination had
manifested itself as a more subtle and pervasive social process (Belz,
1991). In defining unlawful practices and procedures, intent ceased to
be the essential element, for it makes impossibly the achievement of
racial equality (Belz, 1991). The traditional concept of disparate
treatment was abandoned in favor of disparate impact. Now the essential
element in defining unlawful practices and procedures is the results of
employment. The focus is on the level of diversity within the work
force as a means of monitoring the extent to which an employer is
providing equal employment opportunity (Belz, 1991). Currently,
affirmative action is subject to "strict scrutiny" (Idelson, 1995d)
which means the employee has the burden of proof in disparate impact
cases to demonstrate that the practice in question was both related to
the job and essential to business operations (Mills, 1994).
CHAPTER 3
PREVIOUS RESEARCH

This dissertation is largely unique because it examines black opinions toward a racial issue. The study of racial attitudes has a long history in political science (Allport, 1944; Myrdal, 1944; Frazier, 1957; Campbell et al., 1960; Rustin, 1965; Brisbane, 1970; Walton, 1972; McConahay and Hough, Jr., 1976; Sears et al., 1979; Carmines and Stimson, 1980; Sears et al., 1980; Kinder and Sears, 1981; Carmines and Stimson, 1982; Hamilton, 1982; McConahay, 1982; Bobo, 1983; Kamieniecki, 1985; Schuman et al., 1985; Sears and Kinder, 1985; Sniderman and Hagen, 1985; Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986; Pinderhughes, 1987; Edsall and Edsall, 1991; Sniderman et al., 1991; Sniderman and Piazza, 1993; Abramowitz, 1994; Link and Oldendink, 1996; Schuman et al., 1997), but little attention has been paid to black political attitudes. This study is unique because it also accounts for the effects of self-interest and symbolic politics attitudes, both of which involve hypotheses that have not been tested systematically as part of an effort to explain black political opinion. Many of the hypotheses tested and most of the data collected were developed solely with white respondents in mind. Only recently has black opinion become the focus of serious empirical work where previous works on black attitudes focused chiefly on racial solidarity (Kinder and Sanders, 1996).

This dissertation branches off from these recent empirical works, using them as a guide to further develop our body of knowledge of black political attitudes. In this chapter, I provide a summary of the extant literature on racial attitudes and affirmative action to date. Included are discussions on the differences between blacks and whites with regard to racial attitudes and perceptions of racial matters. I also discuss...
what other scholars have done to explain both black and white attitudes toward affirmative action. I then address some of the criticisms made of these works and demonstrate how such problems will be remedied in my study. Finally, I discuss what I plan to do by way of originality and the contributions I hope to make in these areas.

GENERAL RACIAL ATTITUDES

Explaining Differences Among Whites

A number of books and articles have examined the trends in white racial attitudes. By and large, they have come to similar conclusions: since the 1940s and 1950s, whites have exhibited increasingly positive attitudes toward the principles of equal treatment, equal opportunity, and racial integration (Lipset and Schneider, 1978; Smith and Sheatsley, 1984; Sniderman and Hagen, 1985; Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Tate, 1993; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Schuman et al., 1997). Over the past several decades, whites have become less likely to espouse sentiments indicative of support for racial segregation and white supremacy (Sniderman and Hagen, 1985; Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Tate, 1993; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Schuman et al., 1997) and they have become more supportive of equal job opportunities for blacks and school integration (Sniderman and Hagen, 1985; Schuman et al., 1997). White Americans have rarely expressed the racial hostility toward blacks that they expressed in the 1940s (Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Schuman et al., 1997). However, scholars (Lipset and Schneider, 1978; Kluegel and Eliot, 1983; Tate, 1993; Schuman et al., 1997) have argued that this has not resulted in more favorable opinions of blacks nor has it translated into greater support for policies geared to aid blacks; at the same time, whites want to keep blacks at a distance (Sigelman and Welch, 1991). Race-specific programs were criticized throughout the 1980s with the majority of white
Americans becoming very resentful and many holding that blacks and civil rights receive too much attention (Tate, 1993). Support for economic assistance to blacks has never been that large, nor has it changed much over the last few decades (Schuman et al., 1997). It would appear that whites demonstrate more support for the principle of racial equality than they do for the programs and policies that purport to put that principle into practice (Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Kinder and Sanders, 1996).

Several studies focus on the gap between white support for the principle of equality and white support for the implementation of this principle in the terms of busing and voting for black candidates (McConahay and Hough, Jr., 1976; Sears, Hensler, and Speer, 1979; Kinder and Sears, 1981; Sears and Allen, 1984). McConahay, Sears, and their colleagues advance the symbolic racism thesis. Essentially, their main arguments are that many whites develop hostile opinions toward blacks in their preadult years, which persist well into their adult years. Racism still exists, but in a more subtle or symbolic form. Old-fashioned racism has all but disappeared. Rather than overt support for discrimination or segregation, opposition to voting for a black candidate or opposition to policies such as busing and affirmative action are the bases of these opinions. These issues have a symbolic attachment to deep-seated fears and prejudice. This suggests that resistance to the racial status quo or attitudes toward racial policies may be due more to racial animosities or individualism, among other things, and less to self-interest. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that white opposition to busing has a moderate correlation to measures of prejudice and little relation to personal self-interest (Sears, Hensler, and Speer, 1979).
McConahay, Sears, Kinder and their colleagues have introduced a very controversial phrase in "symbolic racism" to political science. It is controversial for two reasons. First, some critics of symbolic racism have doubted its necessity and usefulness. They charge that symbolic racism is no more than old-fashioned racism (Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986). In other words, symbolic racism theorists have advanced a rather expansive definition of racism with little or no added value. Second, critics hold that the phrase symbolic racism is too narrow in its treatment of self-interest (Bobo, 1983, 1988). Symbolic racism contends that support for or opposition to public policies is not driven by self-interest, but by symbolic attitudes. Critics disagree and maintain that self-interest and group interest, perhaps in combination with symbolic attitudes, drive preferences. In addition, there are other race-ambivalent symbolic attitudes--like egalitarianism or individualism, liberalism or conservatism--that can account for support for or opposition to public policies. Moreover, the use of the word "racism" to describe opposition to some racial policies invalidates the meaning of the term. In essence, if opposition to, say, affirmative action means "racism," then racism loses its invidiousness. For these reasons, I do not adopt the phrase "symbolic racism," but rather I employ the phrase "symbolic politics."

**Explaining Differences Between Blacks and Whites**

It is a commonly held belief that blacks and whites differ on a wide variety of political and racial matters. Blacks and whites are on opposite sides of many issues, but they are most notably divided on racial policies, including affirmative action (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Sometimes the differences between blacks and whites are taken for granted and blacks are excluded from analysis. At other times
scholars ignore race based on the notion that the political differences between blacks and whites are marginal or uninteresting (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Either one of these approaches fails to improve our understanding about what blacks think about racial matters and why they think as they do. However, there is an ample amount of evidence available that discusses the differences in opinion between the two races (Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Tate, 1993; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Schuman et al., 1997).

Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan (1997) wrote a very thorough book on racial attitudes in America in which they present and make very insightful comments and conclusions from poll data. Their description and presentation of poll data over time and among several poll organizations focuses primarily on white opinion, but they do address black opinion in detail as well. Schuman et al. find that whites blame a low level of motivation when explaining the causes of black disadvantage. Among whites who blame discrimination for black disadvantage, more are likely to emphasize past discrimination than present discrimination. The more popular explanation of black disadvantage among black respondents is discrimination, and this might be expected to translate into greater support for affirmative action. Furthermore, blacks emphasize present discrimination more than past discrimination and slavery as the culprits of black disadvantage. Schuman et al. report that, for items that capture opinions on equal treatment between blacks and whites, more people support the principle of equal treatment than support the implementation of the policy to secure equal treatment. Over time, however, there have been a growing number of whites who believe that whites and blacks should be treated equally, with more support for this among citizens of non-Southern
states than among those from the South. Regarding affirmative action, white support depends on the question's wording. Support has ranged from one-third to just a few percentage points; the preferential treatment interpretation of affirmative action receives the least amount of support, while the special job training interpretation receives the most.

In terms of black social and economic progress, blacks see limited and gradual gains, while whites see black progress as great and rapid (Sigelman and Welch, 1991). This is because blacks are more likely than whites to consider themselves as subject to prejudice and discrimination. Arguably, this is why blacks are more in favor of government intervention than whites. Moreover, support for programs that provide assistance to blacks depends on large part on the attribution placed on black inequality. Blacks and whites who blame the poor status of blacks on situational constraints are more supportive of an active governmental role, while whites who place blame on dispositional factors are less supportive (Sigelman and Welch, 1991).

This is no surprise, for it has long been established that blacks exhibit strong liberal policy positions and group-centric behavior (Tate, 1993). On most issues, blacks are the most politically liberal groups in society, particularly on racial and economic issues (Dawson, 1994). Yet support for government intervention in race relations has also declined among blacks (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo, 1985). Black support of government intervention to provide federal aid to minorities, integrate schools, and efforts to improve the economic and social position of blacks has declined over the past two to three decades (Schuman et al., 1985). This perhaps is the case because civil rights as a policy matter is no longer as salient as other economic and
political issues (Tate, 1993). For many blacks, it may be the case that other kinds of policies are becoming more salient.

BLACK RACIAL ATTITUDES

By and large, the study of black racial attitudes is an under-tilled area in political science. Not much is known about black attitudes, since blacks are under-represented in national surveys and this makes statistical analysis of black attitudes difficult. Much of what is known about racial attitudes is what we know about white racial attitudes. Yet, there are several studies that have addressed the racial attitudes of blacks. From those works, a few axioms can be detected. Among blacks, perceptions of linked fate to other blacks and group interests play a dominant role in shaping black public opinion, while individual economic status plays only a small part (Dawson, 1994). Generally, blacks support government economic redistribution, and they do so much more than whites (Dawson, 1994). With conventional wisdom, blacks support government assistance for minorities, though a majority of blacks also strongly support notions of self-help (Dawson, 1994).

In explaining black political preferences, social class divisions among blacks do not appear to be prominent. Dawson (1994) finds that racial identity and group interests are more powerful than social class status when explaining black support for economic redistribution and government racial policies. Pinderhughes (1987) suggests that black political beliefs are not well-explained by political ideology, but are better explained by an economic policy dimension and a racial group status dimension. She argues that the combination of economic and racial policy concerns of blacks have produced a complex pattern of political beliefs. According to Pinderhughes, this has led to a constraint, but not control, of black opinion by white politics.
Hamilton (1982) also discovers that blacks are liberal on questions of economic policy. Hamilton explains this phenomenon by stating that the historical experiences of blacks with the federal government and their history in the private sector lead blacks to an affinity for government intervention in the economy. However, he does find that regarding some questions, blacks appear to be conservative.

Tate (1993) in her book *From Protest to Politics* investigates the policy preferences and voting behavior among blacks. From her analyses, a number of conclusions are drawn regarding black political opinions. First, civil rights issues and the problem of racial discrimination are not as salient as they were fifteen years ago. She posits that this may be due to a conservative drift among the black electorate during the 1970s and 1980s and/or the worsening of social conditions in the black community, such as unemployment, poverty, substance abuse, crime, and teenage pregnancy. Second, while civil rights issues and racial discrimination are not as central to the political agenda of blacks as they have been in the recent past, they do remain important problems. Tate states that a substantial number of blacks are dissatisfied with the progress of race relations. She finds that a large number of blacks believe that blacks are economically disadvantaged and that their group holds less influence and power than whites, and many do not feel that blacks will become equal to that of whites. Third, a majority of blacks have a strong awareness and allegiance of their race as well as a strong sense of common fate with other blacks. Fourth, political ideology and partisanship rivaled challenged racial identification as determinants of policy preferences.

Dawson (1994) in his book *Behind the Mule* also examines a wide range of political issues and behavior of black Americans, but more
important, he maps out black opinions on economic redistribution and government racial policies. He states that the low economic status of blacks has led to their occupation of the left regarding racial policies, economic redistribution, and government spending. He charges that the relatively poor socioeconomic status of blacks and their close ties to the federal government have led blacks to be progovernment. Dawson discovers that more affluent blacks are less supportive of economic redistribution and government racial policies than are less affluent blacks. However, regardless of affluence, the stronger the perceptions of linked fate with other blacks, the stronger the support for policies of economic redistribution and government racial policies (Dawson, 1994). Democrats are more supportive of economic redistribution than are Republicans. Furthermore, liberals are more supportive of economic redistribution and government racial policies than are conservatives and Republicans.

The literature on black racial attitudes appears conclusive. Among blacks, group interests reign over individual interests. Blacks also have a high degree of race consciousness. Blacks are overwhelmingly more liberal than whites, and blacks are solidly aligned with the Democratic Party. The literature has several works that investigate the overall policy preferences of blacks, but not much of the literature has addressed black policy positions on affirmative action. Tate briefly examines black support for affirmative action, but by no means does she take a comprehensive look at black preferences. Moreover, research on black racial attitudes typically estimates the effects of only portions of the self-interest theory and theory of symbolic politics. Even when the work seeks to determine the sources of black support for or opposition to affirmative action, the models are
underspecified. That is, they do not take account of a wide range of factors that are at play.

ATTITUDES TOWARD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

White Opinions on Affirmative Action

There are a number of works have addressed white attitudes regarding racial policies such as busing (Sears, Hensler, and Speer, 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen, Jr., 1980; McClendon and Pestello, 1982; McConahay, 1982; Bobo, 1983; Sears and Kinder, 1985), and more important, affirmative action (Jacobson, 1983; Kluegel and Smith, 1983; Jacobson, 1985; Schuman et al., 1985; Kinder and Sanders, 1990; Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Summers, 1995; Taylor, 1995; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Alvarez and Brehm, 1997; Kuklinski et al., 1997; Schuman et al., 1997). These scholars have explained white support for affirmative action by testing the effects of self-interest (Jacobson, 1983; Kluegel and Smith, 1983; Jacobson, 1985; Summers, 1995; Taylor, 1995) and symbolic politics attitudes (Jacobson, 1983; Kluegel and Smith, 1983; Jacobson, 1985; Fine, 1992; Alvarez and Brehm, 1997; Kuklinski et al., 1997). The consensus from these works is that symbolic politics attitudes are the primary determinants of white attitudes toward affirmative action, while it appears that the effects of self-interest play only a marginal role.

Sigelman and Welch (1991) discover that not all whites are opposed to affirmative action and that not all blacks support it. They find that changes in question wording elicited similar responses. For instance, blacks and whites overwhelmingly opposed affirmative action if it meant the position was denied a more qualified white candidate. When affirmative action was presented as compensation for past discrimination or giving minorities and women a chance, a majority of both whites and blacks supported affirmative action. They simply present poll data that
shows the varying levels of support for affirmative action under different "frames."

In a more detailed study on support for the different conceptions of affirmative action, Kinder and Sanders (1990) examine white attitudes toward affirmative action for blacks. They collect survey data designed to "mimic a political debate." A comparison of white attitudes is made between their responses and questions on affirmative action when posed as an unfair advantage for blacks and as reverse discrimination. They find that white opinion depends on how affirmative action is framed. There are significant shifts in opinion produced by changes in question wording, format, presentation, and placement.

Using the 1986 American National Election Study, Fine (1992) examines the effects of question wording—i.e., assistance at the expense of the nontargeted group versus assisting the group without hurting the nontargeted group—and symbolic racism on black and white support for equal opportunity programs. More specifically, she examines black and white support for affirmative action in employment and black and white support for quotas in higher education. She finds that whites are less supportive than blacks with regards to affirmative action in employment and higher education. Whites are more opposed when affirmative action is framed as a policy that discriminates against whites than when framed as giving blacks unearned advantages. Regarding affirmative action in higher education, whites are more supportive of the policy when it is framed as giving blacks undeserved advantages than when it is framed as discriminating against whites.

Kluegel and Smith (1983) seek to know why whites are increasingly supportive of the idea that whites and blacks should have equal opportunity to jobs and schools, and why whites lend less support to
programs that propose to provide equal opportunity. They examine the effects of self-interest, racial affect, and stratification beliefs on white attitudes toward affirmative action. Kluegel and Smith find that self-interest has a significant impact on white opposition to affirmative action programs. They also find that negative racial affect, perceived egalitarian consequences of affirmative action, and the denial of unequal opportunity have stronger effects than self-interest.

Summers (1995) examines attitudes toward affirmative action between men and women and their attitudes toward different types of affirmative action programs. He finds that there are some elements of self-interest in that women, members of the intended targeted group, were more supportive of affirmative action in general than are men. He also finds that both men and women are more supportive of affirmative action that provides special training and both are more opposed to affirmative action that employ differential selection scoring for targeted group members, with intermediate support for quota-based affirmative action programs.

Taylor (1995) conducts another analysis that examines the self-interest framework. She tests the white backlash hypothesis with regards to affirmative action. Comparing responses of white workers whose firms practice affirmative action with responses of white workers whose employers do not, she finds that there is no indication of group polarization and no evidence of white resentment. Instead, Taylor concludes that whites whose employers practice affirmative action are more supportive of the policy than white workers whose businesses do not practice affirmative action. Affirmative action does not diminish white support for the principle of equality, nor does it make them more
opposed to interracial contact, or increase stereotyping. More than anything, the data suggest the opposite.

Jacobson (1983) tests the proximity-resistance model and the social-adjustment model in an examination of white reactions to the Bakke decision. The proximity-resistance model—also considered a self-interest model (Sears, Hensler, and Spear, 1979) and as the realistic group conflict theory (Kinder and Rhodeck, 1982)—suggests that whites will become more resistant to integration efforts in the aftermath of a desegregation decision, and those most affected will be even more negative. Regarding affirmative action, Jacobson contends that whites in the upper- and middle-level occupations will be most affected and more negative than lower-level whites. The social adjustment model predicts a different reaction: some whites will show positive or resigned acceptance of court rulings and affirmative action favoring blacks. Consistent with the cognitive dissonance literature, the social adjustment model contends that when one cognition is inconsistent with another, dissonance arises. One way to remedy or reduce dissonance is to downplay negative attitudes or disregard them, in this case attitudes about blacks and affirmative action in general. Jacobson finds support for the social adjustment model, but none for the proximity-resistance model.

Jacobson (1985) examines the impact of self-interest, old-fashioned racism, and new symbolic racism on white support for affirmative action. He finds that self-interest, old-fashioned racism, and the new symbolic racism are all related to white support for affirmative action. The new racism was by far the best predictor followed by old racism, then self-interest (the betas were .31, .13, and .10, respectively). However, it should be noted that self-interest was
not operationalized with sociodemographic variables, but with items that alluded to blacks living in white neighborhoods.

Alvarez and Brehm (1997) discover that modern racism, individualism, and egalitarianism scales are consistent predictors of support for federal contracts to be set aside for black contractors and support for qualified blacks in university admissions. Here modern racism denotes the combination of antiblack affect and traditional American values, holding that blacks get more in terms of attention and other advantages from the federal government than they deserve. They find the modern racism scale to be the most important factor in explaining attitudes toward racial policies.

Kuklinski, Sniderman, Knight, Piazza, Tetlock, Lawrence, and Mellers (1997) examine white opinions toward affirmative action. Using the 1991 Race and Politics Survey, they conduct a series of experiments to determine whether and to what extent prejudiced attitudes permeate through the white community, the extent to which resistance to affirmative action is based on prejudiced sentiments, and whether white opposition is unwavering. They find that prejudiced attitudes still pervade the white population, that a large part of white opposition to affirmative action is based on prejudice, and that this opposition is not permanent.

Kinder and Sanders (1996) offer the most comprehensive treatment on attitudes toward racial policies to date. They test a number of hypotheses and theories to explain the racial divide that exists between blacks and whites. More important, Kinder and Sanders provide a rigorous study on black and white opinions regarding affirmative action. Kinder and Sanders find that self-interest has a negligible effect on support or opposition among white respondents and that self-interest is
largely irrelevant to racial policies. Whites who felt threatened by affirmative action were no more opposed to it than whites who did not perceive threat. It is group interests that play a larger role in explaining support. Whites oppose affirmative action based on potential losses of their collective interests and that it threatens the group’s ability to gain more material wealth. Among whites, racial resentment plays a huge role, resentful whites are located on one end of the continuum and sympathetic whites on the other end. Generally speaking, individualism had little or no impact, but egalitarianism did, especially on opinions of affirmative action, and then it depended on whether affirmative action was framed as equality or an unfair advantage.

From the above discussion, it appears that symbolic politics attitudes, not self-interest, drive white preferences regarding affirmative action. General racial attitudes, core values, political ideology, and group interests have been found to influence support much more than individual self-interest. However, white support for affirmative action also depends on how the survey question is framed. Depending on question wording, white support has ranged from at most a third of the population to a few percentage points. White support for affirmative action in the sense of preferential treatment has never been close to a majority position, but there is considerably more support among whites when affirmative action is posed in terms of nondiscrimination, equal opportunity, and training.

**Black Opinions on Affirmative Action**

In stark contrast to the research conducted on white attitudes toward racial policies--in particular, affirmative action--there are very few works that discuss black attitudes toward affirmative action in
a rigorous and empirical fashion—so few that I am able to summarize the
major works here (Jacobson, 1983; Fine, 1992; Tate, 1993; Kinder and
Sanders, 1996). Jacobson (1983) examines the level of support for
affirmative action programs within the black community, which blacks are
the strongest supporters, and the impact of discrimination and
interracial contact experiences and other related attitudes have on
black attitudes toward affirmative action. Using a nationwide sample of
732 black Americans conducted by the Louis Harris polling organization,
Jacobson tests the effects of the self-interest as measured by
sociodemographic indicators to determine the strongest black supporters.
He argues that middle-class blacks will be stronger supporters than
lower-class blacks. He expected to find that high-income, highly
educated, and the more professional and skilled blacks to be more
supportive than blacks lower on these strata. Also in line with his
self-interest argument, he hypothesized that middle-aged and younger
blacks would be more supportive than older blacks. Finally, he expected
black females to be more supportive than black males.

Jacobson finds strong support for affirmative action among black
people. For the eight items reflecting support for affirmative action
in his analysis, the average positive response was 78.7%. Regarding
self-interest and the strongest supporters, little variance is explained
by the sociodemographic variables. The only significant variables in
this part of his analysis were occupation and education. That is,
professional and skilled blacks and highly educated blacks did
demonstrate more support for affirmative action than blacks lower on
these scales. In addition, Jacobson finds that the middle-class is not
as supportive of affirmative action as he expected. There is relatively
little support for the self-interest theory. However, there is
substantial support for the relationship between experience with
discrimination and attitudes and support for affirmative action. Seven
of eight zero-order correlations were statistically significant.

Fine (1992) is concerned with the phenomenon first stated by
Gunnar Myrdal in An American Dilemma, namely, why our country which is
so committed to the principle of equality still discriminates, exploits,
and subordinates blacks. Using the 1986 American National Election
Study, she examines the effects of question wording, or framing (help at
the expense of the nontargeted group or help the group without hurting
the nontargeted group), and symbolic racism on support for equal
opportunity programs. More specifically, she examines black and white
support for affirmative action in employment and black and white support
for quotas in higher education. She finds that whites are less
supportive than blacks with regards to affirmative action in employment
and higher education. Blacks are more supportive of affirmative action
when it is framed as giving blacks undeserved advantages as opposed to
discriminating against whites. Regarding affirmative action in higher
education, blacks demonstrate the same intensity of support as they did
with affirmative action in employment.

Tate (1993) offers an interesting study in which she covers a wide
range of topics pertaining to the black political experience. More
important, she investigates black opinion on affirmative action using
the 1984 Black National Election Study. She finds no relationship
between social class, party ideology, and partisanship with support for
affirmative action. However, there is a strong relationship between
race identification and support for affirmative action. Highly race-
identified blacks were overwhelmingly supportive of the measure. She
also analyzes the relationship of socioeconomic and demographic
variables with support for affirmative action. Interestingly, there was no relationship to be found between support for affirmative action and individual characteristics such as age, education, income, region, gender, and urbanicity.

Kinder and Sanders (1996) investigate both black and white opinions on racial policies and what they want government to do using the American National Election Study series. They find that blacks and whites are vastly divided over many issues, but especially on matters that have clear and differential fortunes for the two races, i.e., affirmative action. A large gap in opinion is evident on the issue of the government's obligation to ensure equal opportunity, on efforts to aid blacks, and on affirmative action.

Kinder and Sanders discover that self-interest has a negligible effect on support or opposition among black respondents and that the effects of self-interest are largely negligible to black positions on racial policies. Blacks who perceived a gain from affirmative action were no more supportive than blacks who did not perceive a personal gain. Several hypotheses were in direct contradiction to what the self-interest theory would have us believe. Group interests, however, play a large role in explaining black support. According to Kinder and Sanders, blacks believe that they benefit from affirmative action, but largely doubts its effectiveness. That is, affirmative action does not generally work to the benefit of blacks in the face of widespread discrimination. For blacks, individualism had little or no impact, but egalitarianism had some affect, especially on opinions toward affirmative action, and even for them it was contingent upon whether affirmative action was posed in terms of equality or as an unfair advantage.
By and large, the sources of black opinions on affirmative action mirror those of white individuals. That is, symbolic politics reign supreme over the effects of self-interest. Black citizens lend or deny support for affirmative action according to general racial attitudes, group interests, and core values. Also, identical to white opinions on affirmative action, question wording matters, as blacks tend to be more supportive of affirmative action when it is posed as an equality-enhancing measure and less supportive when it is in the guise of preferential treatment.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

We have examined the literature on general racial attitudes between blacks and whites as well as black and white attitudes toward affirmative action. Do we know all there is to know on the subject? Have we exhausted all the possibilities that may explain support for or opposition to affirmative action? The answer to both questions is "no."

The literature is lacking in several interrelated aspects. Recall that the objective here is to explain black attitudes toward affirmative action, therefore, my major criticisms will be focused on that area of research. Essentially, I argue that there are three major flaws of the literature on black support for or opposition to affirmative action: the models are not comprehensive in their treatment of the subject, the scholars apply the theories and hypotheses they are testing too narrowly, and models are misspecified or underspecified due to less-than-desirable data sets that probe black political attitudes.

Lack of Comprehensive Models

Chief among the shortcomings in the literature is the lack of comprehensiveness. While all the scholars—rightfully or wrongly—test the effects of self-interest—and invariably concluding the theory's
poor explanatory power—they do not place in a combined model the alternative theory being tested or they fail to explain support altogether. Jacobson's (1983) model of black support for affirmative action includes a number of predictors, some of which are not placed in my models. However, the only sociodemographic variables he includes are occupation and education. So, Jacobson does not adequately capture the full range of the effects of self-interest. Furthermore, while he does include items that address perceptions of discrimination, the quality of life, interracial contact, black perceptions of black progress, and the effectiveness of black leaders, he does not examine the effects of core values, political orientation, and group consciousness.

As illuminating as Fine's (1992) findings may be, they do not tell us why blacks are more supportive of affirmative action under one frame over another. That is, Fine describes where support is, but does not explain support. She merely constructs contingency tables to tell us the percentage of whites and blacks who oppose or support affirmative action in employment and higher education. She does not seek to determine who are the proponents, opponents, and determine between the races and within the races why they support or oppose affirmative action.

The oversight of Tate's (1993) work is that while she does test the effects of socioeconomic and demographic variables (social class, race, income, education, age, gender, region, and urbanicity), political ideology, and partisanship on support for affirmative action among blacks, her analysis does not consider the effects of core values. Though Kinder and Sanders (1996) do examine self-interest, group interests, threat, racial resentment, and the impact of core values on support of affirmative action, they do not test the impact of political
ideology and partisanship. In addition, they do not adequately test the effects of racial threat, of which I present a different spin. Lastly, they do not use the Black National Election Study series.

My analysis is an improvement on these works. By and large, my models examine more hypotheses under the self-interest and symbolic politics theories. Also, I consider in a combined model both self-interest and symbolic politics. Many studies feature two competing theories as I do here, but not in a combined analysis. Estimating the effects of theories in separate models implies that all explanations are equal, that each may explain what Americans believe about race, leaving us without knowing which explanations are weak and which are strong (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). My analysis does not fall into this trap, for I test both self-interest and symbolic politics theories in a single model.

Narrow Applications of Theories and Hypotheses

A second flaw of the literature is the tendency to test only a few aspects of two competing theories. That is, the scholars pit one theory against another, but only examine a narrow application of each theory or do not consider counterhypotheses applicable to black respondents. In order to fully flesh out the effects of the theories being tested, the explanations should be broadened. That is, because theories were developed with white respondents in mind, they are not currently well-suited to explain the attitudes of blacks. A proper test of the effects of self-interest on attitudes toward affirmative action would include the effects of perceived racial threat. The racial threat hypothesis is an unidimensional hypothesis in that it is a hypothesis developed only to explain white attitudes and behaviors indicative of racial hostility toward an increasing presence of minorities. What about blacks
exhibiting feelings of racial threat? Could blacks harbor feelings and behave in a manner consistent with racial threat? Of course they can, and they do. Yet, the literature does not address this point. Worse than that, there are no data that capture this possibility. However, one can test whether or not blacks support affirmative action to the degree that it does serve as a shield of protection from transgressions against blacks at the hands of whites. That is, I test whether or not blacks support affirmative action because they feel whites are against them achieving economic, social, and political success.

Also, group consciousness is not well-examined by any of these studies. Group consciousness has four components: identification, affect, status consciousness, and blame attribution for the group's status (Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk, 1981). Typically, group identification is addressed, but the other three components of group consciousness are not given any attention. Tate and Kinder and Sanders do capture the effects of group identification, but Jacobson and Fine do not. However, the other components of group consciousness are not measured in order to explain black support for affirmative action. As an improvement on these works, I account for all four aspects of group consciousness.

Where Are All the Good Data?

My final critique of the literature is not altogether the fault of previous researchers. Most of the models seem to be misspecified or underspecified for two reasons: a small sample size of blacks and less than desirable survey items used to measure concepts. Jacobson (1983) and Tate (1993) utilize data sets with an ample number of blacks, 732 (Louis Harris poll) and 831 (1984 Black National Election Study), respectively. However, Fine (1992) and Kinder and Sanders (1996) use
the 1986 American National Election Study and examine only one year, 1986, with the typical small sample size of blacks to conduct their analysis. The sample size of blacks in Fine and Kinder and Sanders ranged from 138-200 respondents. Therefore, they are limited in the number of variables they can put into a model and expect them to gain statistical significance; thus, their estimates will be less precise. My analysis is an improvement over these works in that I have a much larger sample size, and so I am able to consider a more comprehensive model of support and test additional hypotheses. Furthermore because Jacobson, Tate, Fine, and Kinder and Sanders test only one year, I am able to generate more precision and greater confidence in my findings in that I have three test years spanning twelve years.

Unfortunately, with second-hand data, one is handcuffed by what has been asked, not what the scholar would prefer to ask in order to properly test the proposed hypotheses and theories. More precisely, if one is to determine why blacks support or oppose affirmative action, one must capture the effects of perceived discrimination. Fortunately, I am able to test the effects of the levels of discrimination perceived by black respondents. However, another ideal query would be to inquire about the perceived benefits of affirmative action. Surely, if one is to test support for a public policy, perceived benefits would be at the heart of the response. To date, there is no data set that taps the anticipated gains or losses of affirmative action. So, the best one can hope for is to find the best surrogates of concepts that are available within the data sets.

Where Do We Go From Here? <Incomplete Sentence>

The next step in advancing our understanding of black attitudes toward affirmative action is to remedy the problems that have plagued
previous analysis. In that regard, I do have solutions which make my dissertation an improvement over those works and an original contribution to the body of knowledge. First, I provide comprehensive models that estimate support for affirmative action among black Americans. I develop a combined model that houses both of the competing theories I am testing, namely the self-interest theory and the theory of symbolic politics. Second, I broaden these theories and their underlying hypotheses to make them more amenable to black respondents. Third, I make use of data sets that provide a larger number of black respondents so as to provide a comprehensive analysis and that allow for the testing of hypotheses yet to be tested, especially as they regard black individuals.
What explains attitudes toward racial policies, and more specifically, affirmative action among blacks? In discussing the extant literature in the previous chapter, I noted that self-interest has been found to have a small impact on racial attitudes. Logic and reason presuppose that self-interest would matter, and so, the self-interest theory has been tested numerous times even in light of its poor performance. Self-interest has a much stronger impact when the dependent variable is political behavior as opposed to policy preferences (Green and Cowden, 1992). According to Green and Cowden (1992), while self-interest does little to influence opinion, it does determine whether citizens act on their convictions. I also noted that, according to the literature, racial attitudes, group interests, and values matter a great deal in explaining attitudes toward racial policies, particularly affirmative action. Many works were discussed that alluded to the dominance of factors indicative of global or sociotropic considerations and underlying structures such as values.

In this chapter I discuss how I will explore the determinants of black support for affirmative action. The theories to be tested will be self-interest and symbolic politics. Though self-interest may have had poor success empirically in explaining racial attitudes, it would be a major oversight to exclude it from analysis. Also, in light of previous research, group consciousness must also be taken into account. Therefore, it is my contention that these two theories may be instrumental in explaining variation in levels of support lent affirmative action by blacks. More precisely, because public opinion is so complex and encompasses so many factors, I develop models that
capture the effects of self-interest (as reflected in socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, as well as perceptions of racial threat and racial fairness) and symbolic politics attitudes (the core values of egalitarianism and individualism, political ideology, partisanship, and group consciousness). The discussion of the effects of self-interest and symbolic politics attitudes follows a rich tradition in political science, most prominently and recently put forth by Kinder and Sanders (1996). That is, I will speak on many terms and variables deemed as indicators of self-interest and symbolic politics attitudes as designated by the literature.

SELF-INTEREST

"What's in it for me?" Many scholars have examined this aspect of public opinion when explaining policy preferences (Jacobson, 1983; Kluegel and Smith, 1983; Sears et al., 1979; Sears et al., 1980; McConahay, 1982; Jacobson, 1985; Mansbridge, 1990; Bobo and Kluegel, 1993; Summers, 1995; Taylor, 1995; Kinder and Sanders, 1996). It has long been an axiom that what drives individual opinion and behavior are egocentric and selfish considerations. It is readily, and appropriately, assumed that individual self-interest drives political preferences and behavior, for selfish motivations, in part, determine human thought and action. Self-interest comes to play whenever there is a potential for wealth and resources to be redistributed (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). A benefit-cost analysis may be the first task undertaken—whether consciously or subconsciously—when an individual replies to a question or chooses whether or not to take a certain course of action. I also posit here that a benefit-cost analysis is made when an individual expresses his or her support for affirmative action or other racial policies.
Self-interest is taken to mean the maximization of utility (Sears et al., 1980; McConahay, 1982; Mansbridge, 1990) as a result of considering the immediate economic, physical, and comfort effects of affirmative action on the individual and their family (Sears et al., 1980). Self-interested individuals support policies they perceive to maximize benefits and minimize costs to their material well-being (Sears et al., 1979; Sears et al., 1980; Mansbridge, 1990). These self-interested individuals are assumed to harbor attitudes consistent with their preferences (Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997). Self-interested people pursue ends they regard as important, regardless of the means.

Before moving on to describing in more precise terms how the effects of self-interest are expected to shape black attitudes toward affirmative action, the parameters of the self-interest argument I am posing must be made clear. First, self-interest will pertain only to the individual and his or her family. Like Kinder and Sanders (1996), I assume that self-interested individuals are preoccupied with the assets, wealth, and power of themselves and their families, and not the interests or benefits of mankind, the nation, community, or group. Kinder and Sanders argue that it is largely the individual and their family that most Americans expend their energy and attention; this is a reasonable argument, and so that view is adopted here.

Lawrence Bobo (1983, 1988) contends that group interests are a part of self-interest. He argues that members of a group may favor policies and candidates that they think support their group's interests and oppose policies and candidates that oppose their group's interests. Affirmative action seeks to benefit groups, among them blacks; according to Bobo's argument, all blacks would favor affirmative action because
the policy aims to help advance their group's interests. In other words, blacks would favor affirmative action, if not for themselves, then for other blacks.

However, I do not adopt this argument in my analysis of self-interest, but instead, make it a part of the symbolic politics theory, and more specifically, the group consciousness approach (this theory is described later in this chapter). Group interests are not a part of the self-interest argument posed here because group interests and self-interests, while they may be interdependent, may also be independent of each other. The latter is exactly what we are witnessing now. It has already been established that not all blacks support affirmative action. There is no black monolith as this thesis would argue; therefore, group interests and individual interests should be kept separate from each other. Moreover, Bobo's argument does not allow for instances where blacks may support affirmative action for self-interest reasons, and not group interest reasons, and vice versa. While Bobo contends that individual interests are identical to group interests, I do not. In sum, the rigidity of Bobo's argument calls for an all or none hypothesis, which is not appropriate in most cases, especially when explaining black support for affirmative action.

Second, self-interest pertains to tangible benefits or material gains. Similar to Sears et al. (1980), I restrict the boundaries of my self-interest argument to the attainment of material goods. While nonmaterial benefits may be the goals of self-interested individuals, I focus on direct, material benefits. Affirmative action may be perceived to provide nonmaterial gains, but its goal is to produce tangible benefits, and nonmaterial benefits do not fit the popular conception of self-interest. Therefore, I assume that black attitudes toward
affirmative action are a function of real or perceived direct, material benefits.

Third, the effects of self-interest are assumed to be in the short-to-medium term. This is also consistent with the argument made by Sears et al. (1980). While long-term considerations may exert substantial influences on black attitudes toward affirmative action, it is the short-term and medium-term that are more in lines with ordinary versions of self-interest. Long-term evaluations of policies may not directly bear on respondents' attitudes as much as shorter-term considerations. I assume that black attitudes toward affirmative action are a function of perceptions with a reasonable time frame.

Social, Economic, and Demographic Characteristics and Attitudes

A number of characteristics and attitudes are used to account for the effects of self-interest on support for affirmative action. One basic assumption guiding this section is the ever-famous maxim: "Where you stand depends on where you sit." That is, I argue that some variation in support for affirmative action may be explained by examining individual characteristics, which serve as surrogates for self-interest. Some rational and self-interested Americans may feel it in their best interests to favor a policy such as affirmative action, and others may feel it in their best interests to oppose it.

Socioeconomic Status. Generally speaking, those blacks who believe that they are benefitting or have benefitted from affirmative action are expected to be more supportive than those blacks who do not feel they are not benefitting or have not benefitted from it. More specifically, those blacks with more to gain from affirmative action are expected to be most supportive of the policy. Therefore, blacks who are not rising on the social ladder are expected to be more likely than
other blacks to support the policy because they may feel they will benefit substantially from it in the future. Upwardly mobile blacks are not expected to be as supportive of the policy than other blacks because they have already secured a comfortable position in society and will probably receive marginal benefits at best. From the point of view of self-interest and the calculation of benefits, disadvantaged blacks have a lot more to gain than advantaged blacks who may be more conservative.

My contention is not that middle class to upper class blacks will oppose affirmative action, but they will exhibit less support than those blacks lower in these strata. It is very plausible that higher-status blacks are the ones who have benefited from affirmative action, and hence may be more supportive of the policy. William Julius Wilson (1987) argues that anti-discrimination policies such as affirmative action work to the benefit of advantaged blacks because they are the ones most qualified for valued positions, higher wages, promotions, and college admissions. However, Kinder and Sanders (1996) have an opposing view, one that is consistent with my argument. Namely, they argue that middle-class blacks oppose affirmative action because their class interests will move them from the left, and that they will come to espouse more conservative viewpoints. In addition, Dawson (1994) contends that, despite middle-class status, one is likely to favor liberal racial and economic policies if he or she belongs to a family in which some members are in financial straits or if he or she resides in a racially segregated community.

Tate (1993) finds that, though social class has a nonsignificant effect on black attitudes toward racial policies, blacks who identify themselves as high status are less supportive of the idea that
the government should guarantee jobs and a good standard of living for all Americans. She also finds that higher-status blacks are more conservative than lower-status blacks (Tate, 1993), and this would lead to the prediction that higher-status blacks will support the conservative position of opposing affirmative action. Tate also finds that, while education has a mixed effect on black policy attitudes, affluence—family income—leads to greater conservatism among blacks. Even though it can be argued that economically-advantaged blacks will be more supportive than their economically-challenged counterparts, Tate finds no evidence to support this view. Moreover, Dawson (1994) finds that the higher the income, the more likely one is opposed to affirmative action. From the above discussion, I expect blacks lower on socioeconomic strata to be more supportive of affirmative action than their higher stratum's counterparts. However argued, these counter hypotheses will be settled through careful empirical analysis.

Therefore, if, in fact, self-interest is at work, then the less educated, lower wage earning, poorly employed, and lower social class blacks will be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks with more education, higher incomes, better employment, and higher social class. The former group of blacks is hypothesized to be more supportive of affirmative action because they are believed to have more to gain from the policy and the policy may help them over the threshold. The latter group of blacks is expected to oppose affirmative action because they are the ones who have the least to gain, more to lose, and would want to protect their social status positions even from other blacks.

Age. It has been argued that middle-aged and younger blacks stand to gain more from affirmative action than older black adults (Jacobson, 1983). The argument is that, as blacks grow older, their support for
affirmative action will wane. With age, one is expected to become more conservative, and therefore, less supportive of affirmative action (Jacobson, 1983). Since age and conservatism are linked, a negative relationship between age and support for affirmative action would be anticipated on these grounds. This may also be the case due to cohort effects. That is, black respondents who were born prior to the adoption of affirmative action developed attitudes toward the type of racial policies that they find acceptable because of characteristics of the time period in which they were born and came to political age. It may be that older blacks are more likely to oppose affirmative action, not because they have gotten more conservative with age, but because they were socialized to think a given way about racial policies and have held that way of thinking all through their adult years. Older blacks may have a preference for traditional civil rights strategies such as anti-discrimination laws rather than affirmative action.

On the other hand, older blacks are also most likely to remember the period in American history when Jim Crow laws were enforced in the South, times when blacks were subject to harsh treatment and discrimination all over the country, and the experience of witnessing the civil rights movement during the 1960s. Moreover, older blacks are likely to have experienced discrimination more often and in more damaging forms than younger blacks. Sigelman and Welch (1991) discovered that older blacks considered themselves as having been victims of discrimination more often than younger blacks. Therefore, it seems more plausible that older blacks would be supportive of affirmative action rather than opposed to it as Jacobson would have us believe. In other words, in this dissertation, I propose a positive relationship between age and support for affirmative action.
South. Prior to the adoption of affirmative action as a national policy, black Americans experienced substantial racism and discrimination. Following the end of Reconstruction, blacks were at the mercy of racist white Southerners, and they saw their recently bestowed codified civil rights and political rights destroyed (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Black voters were disenfranchised in the South through a variety of practices, including intimidation, violence, unfair and discriminatory registration procedures, poll taxes, and literacy tests (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). It was a common occurrence during the 1960s and 1970s for store owners to deny service to blacks and for the Ku Klux Klan to terrorize blacks. In terms of education, "separate, but equal" was the law of the land. Blacks were consistently paid less than whites (Sigelman and Welch, 1991). Prior to 1965, voting rights for blacks were abridged on a large-scale basis. By and large, most of the racial tension that crippled America occurred in the American South. White southerners were notoriously known to advocate segregation and unfair treatment due to the color of one's skin. Blacks took the brunt of this hatred, but they were able to persevere and obtain human rights most whites had all along.

Because Southern blacks had to endure such treatment, they are more likely than any other group in America to have experienced discrimination. Therefore, I expect Southern blacks to support affirmative action as a way to curb the harsh realities of discrimination and racism.

Economic Insecurity. I also test the effects of self-interest in terms of immediate economic fortunes. To many blacks, affirmative action may serve as an aid to obtaining educational and occupational opportunities as well as a mechanism to providing job security for
employed blacks. Fortunately, there are also items in the National Black Election Study series that tap these financial concerns and fears. With all else being equal, self-interested blacks who are facing economic insecurity might be expected to lend greater support for affirmative action than self-interested blacks who are economically secure. Given this, I hypothesize that those blacks who (1) believe their current personal finances and their family's finances are getting worse, (2) are concerned about their job security, and (3) are worried about not being able to find a job should they lose theirs would be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks answering in an opposite manner.

Racial Threat

The power theory of intergroup relations is a context-driven theory that explains the relationships between groups as competitors in the social, political, and economic arenas (Giles and Hertz, 1994). Groups are assumed to have incompatible goals while competing over scarce resources. Where the presence of a minority group is strong, the dominant group is expected to react in a more hostile or racially discriminatory manner than in contexts where a threat or the presence of a minority group is low. In addition to the numerical presence of blacks, there is a social class component to be considered. Giles and Hertz (1994) contend that the perception of a threat is not a constant effect among all members of the dominant group. Additional increments of threat are perceived by members of the dominant group who are in direct competition with minority members.

Typically, notions of racial threat are applied to whites. Here I will place into my model of black support for affirmative action indicators that tap white threat felt by blacks. That is, it may be the
case that blacks support affirmative action in part because they feel threatened or hindered by whites. In other words, affirmative action may be perceived as a defense mechanism. In racially-charged environments, blacks may feel threatened by whites and may perceive the need for policies (e.g., affirmative action) designed to overcome the effects of discrimination. Moreover, blacks who perceive that whites are threatening to blacks will be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who do not perceive white threat.

One point of contention between supporters and nonsupporters over affirmative action is its necessity. Both sides acknowledge that affirmative action was intended to be a temporary policy. The most glaring distinction between the two opposing sides centers on the perception of discrimination. Opponents argue that the policy has worked so effectively that it is no longer needed (Idelson, 1995a). They contend that discrimination no longer exists or that it does so sporadically in small pockets across the country. Proponents of affirmative action rebut this argument by claiming that affirmative action has not outlived its usefulness, and any substantial retreat will allow for a resurgence of discrimination (Idelson, 1995a). They hold that opponents overestimate the will of some people to do what is fair and just. Proponents of affirmative action charge that discrimination is still a major influence on employment opportunities and educational attainment, thus, insisting that affirmative action remain on the books. According to this argument, where discrimination contributes to social and economic inequalities among groups, it is likely to be indirect, institutional, rarely recognized, pervasive, and largely unchecked, thus calling for the need for affirmative action to remain on the books (Edwards, 1995).
Viewed this way, affirmative action may be perceived by many blacks as a policy to help overcome the perceived problems of being black in America. Closely related to perceptions of racial threat are perceptions of racial fairness. If as threat is perceived, conditions may be also considered unfair. Therefore, I also capture the effects of perceived racial fairness or lack thereof. I hypothesize that blacks who believe that (1) whites are advantaged economically, (2) blacks have too little influence in society and politics, (3) whites have too much influence in society and politics, (4) race is a hindrance in "getting ahead," (5) whites want to "keep blacks down," and (6) equality between blacks and whites is worth achieving will be supportive of affirmative action. The opposite is expected for blacks at the opposite ends of these scales. That is, I hypothesize that blacks who believe that (1) whites are not advantaged economically, (2) blacks have too much influence in society and politics, (3) whites have too little influence in society and politics, (4) race is not a hindrance to "getting ahead," (5) whites want to help blacks, and (6) equality between blacks and whites is not necessary will oppose affirmative action.

The data from 1996 are not as comprehensive as data for other years, so additional items are placed into the 1996 model. I hypothesize that blacks who think (1) what generally happens to black people has something to do with what happens to them, (2) being black determines how you are treated more than how much money one earns, (3) opportunities are affected by how other blacks are treated, (4) discrimination is the most important or second most important problem facing blacks, and (5) there has been little progress in getting rid of racial discrimination are more supportive of affirmative action than blacks on the opposite ends of these scales.
To capture the effects of these concepts, I use survey items taken from the 1984-1988 Black National Election Panel Study and the 1996 Black National Election Study. Serving as the measure of the dependent variable for the models tested using black respondents, the 1984-1988 National Black Election Panel Study and 1996 National Black Election Study have the following item: "Because of past discrimination, minorities should be given special consideration when decisions are made about hiring applicants for jobs." The responses for this statement are "strongly agree," "somewhat agree," "somewhat disagree," and "strongly disagree" (coded 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively). A thorough description of the independent variables as well as their coding schemes are found in Appendix A and C. The models are not the same for all three years because not all items are available for each year. However, an effort was made to include items that could capture the effects alluded to in the previous discussion. The models to estimate the effects of self-interest and racial threat on attitudes toward affirmative action are as follows:

\[
\text{(Affirmative Action}_{1984}) = a + b_1(\text{Education}) + b_2(\text{Family Finances}) + b_3(\text{Family Income}) + b_4(\text{Employment Status}) + b_5(\text{Social Class}) + b_6(\text{Age}) + b_7(\text{South}) + b_8(\text{Job Security}) + b_9(\text{Job Worried}) + b_{10}(\text{Black-White Economics}) + b_{11}(\text{Black Influence}) + b_{12}(\text{White Influence}) + b_{13}(\text{Self/Race Blame}) + b_{14}(\text{White Intentions}) + b_{15}(\text{Black-White Equality})
\]

\[
\text{(Affirmative Action}_{1996}) = a + b_1(\text{Education}) + b_2(\text{Family Finances}) + b_3(\text{Family Income}) + b_4(\text{Employment Status}) + b_5(\text{Social Class}) + b_6(\text{Age}) + b_7(\text{South}) + b_8(\text{Job Security}) + b_9(\text{Job Worried}) + b_{10}(\text{Black-White Economics}) + b_{11}(\text{Black Influence}) + b_{12}(\text{White Influence}) + b_{13}(\text{Self/Race Blame})
\]
(Affirmative Action) = a + b₁(Education) + b₂(Family Finances) + b₃(Family Income) + b₄(Employment Status) + b₅(Social Class) + b₆(Age) + b₇(Black Common Fate) + b₈(Black Treatment) + b₉(Black Opportunities) + b₁₀(Character/Race Blame) + b₁₁(Discrimination First Problem) + b₁₂(Discrimination Second Problem) + b₁₃(Discrimination Progress)

SYMBOLIC POLITICS

While I am confident that these self-interest models will detect some effects of the self-interest variables, it is important to consider an alternative theoretical perspective to self-interest. Based on the findings of previous research, group concerns, racial attitudes, and organizing principles such as core values and political ideology must be taken into account. In this dissertation, I also test the theory of symbolic politics, as have several other scholars who have made contributions to the literature (Jacobson, 1983; Kluegel and Smith, 1983; Jacobson, 1985; Fine, 1992; Tate, 1993; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Alvarez and Brehm, 1997; Kuklinski et al., 1997).

It is necessary to consider the "pictures in our minds" of blacks as determinants of support for affirmative action, for public attitudes toward public policies are group-centric. That is, public opinion is often influenced by the opinions that individuals have toward groups perceived to be the primary beneficiaries or victims of society (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Nelson and Kinder, 1996). Additionally, political and social issues are salient inasmuch as they evoke group interests (Turner, 1987; Uhlaner, 1989). Mass opinions have been shown to be a function of political ideology, partisanship, group interests, and group biases, and prejudices (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1973; Seltzer and
Given this, in this study I also explore symbolic politics as another guiding framework to explain black support for affirmative action.

Symbolic politics theory holds that preadulthood symbolic predispositions (as well as some acquired in adulthood) have an important impact on adult political behavior and opinion (Sears, Huddy, and Schaffer, 1986; Sears, 1988, 1991). These symbolic predispositions are learned, viewed as a reflection of the norms dominating the young person's informational environment, and endure throughout adult life. During adulthood the current informational environment calls forth these symbolic predispositions with symbols, and these are believed by many scholars to be the most influential factors influencing policy preferences and political behavior (Sears, Huddy, and Schaffer, 1986; Sears, 1988, 1991).

A symbol is a representation of something (Edelman, 1971). It organizes a large array of cognitions into understandable meanings (Edelman, 1971). Symbols are collectively created, and they shape perception (Stone, 1988). They serve to influence and control, though it is not always certain who is doing the influencing, how effective the symbols are, and whom the symbols are influencing (Stone, 1988). The meaning of the symbol in question depends on how it is interpreted and used, as well as how people respond to it. The symbols most relevant here are "blacks," "minorities," "whites," "affirmative action," and "discrimination," and I am particularly interested in the respondent's predispositions toward them. It could easily be the case that blacks buy into negative stereotypes or antiblack predispositions of blacks and be opposed to affirmative action just as easily as blacks who disregard
negative stereotypes of other black Americans and support affirmative action.

Symbolic politics theory fuses core values (e.g., egalitarianism versus individualism), political ideology, political partisanship, and group consciousness into a framework that explains political attitudes. Political ideology and partisanship summarize general political stances for many Americans. In addition, I use the group consciousness framework, as a mechanism for adding to the explanatory power of symbolic politics. Black group consciousness and symbolic politics both focus on the individual's sense of group affiliation and the tendency to harbor more favorable feelings for the ingroup and less amicable feelings for the outgroup.

Functionally, core values and political orientation are two underlying structures that hold consistent beliefs and attitudes. Values and political orientations align thinking so that people can agree or disagree with issues, give structure to how we evaluate and judge, and blame or give credit to ourselves or to some entity (Rokeach, 1973). Values and attitudes are related, and sometimes values serve as the best predictors of attitudes (Rokeach, 1973). Issue positions are supported to the degree that they advance or impede the values held by given individuals (Rosenberg, 1968; Dawson, 1979).

I discuss core values, political ideology, and political partisanship with near simultaneity because there are such strong linkages among them. Feather (1984) finds that people emphasizing individualism, or people with a strong Protestant work ethic, tend to have conservative social attitudes. Ladd, Jr. and Lipset (1980) state that liberals stress egalitarianism, while conservatives emphasize individualism. Robinson (1984) finds a significant correlation between
political ideology and partisanship. He finds that more Democrats than Republicans identify themselves as liberals, and that more Republicans identify as conservatives. Sharp and Lodge (1985) discover that ideological and partisan belief systems are similar. That is, the meaning of the concepts of ideology and partisanship are closely (albeit imperfectly) linked. Sharp and Lodge demonstrate that issues, leaders, and groups that are perceived to be liberal are assumed to be Democrat. They also note that at the categorical level the cognitive attributes of ideology and partisanship are interchangeable and they are highly correlated ($\rho = 0.90$).

Values

"Values are core conceptions of the desirable within every individual and society" (Rokeach, 1979, p. 2). Values serve as affective moral codes, standards, and criteria to govern rationalization, choice, evaluation, attitude, judgment, argument, behavior, and attribution of causality that are conditioned, socialized, and reinforced throughout life by society and institutions (Rokeach, 1973, 1979). Values are affective enduring beliefs that view certain thoughts and actions preferable, personally or socially, over opposing thoughts and actions (Rokeach, 1973). Values are often considered to be the connection between a particular symbol and the affective evaluation associated with it (Sears, Huddy, and Schaffer, 1986). Values are very pervasive and important in other respects because they structure conduct in a variety of ways. According to Rokeach (1973, p. 13):

"They lead us to take particular positions on social issues, and predispose us to favor one particular political or religious ideology over another. They are standards employed to guide presentations of the self to others and to
evaluate and judge, to heap praise and fix blame on ourselves and others. Values are central to the study of comparison processes; we employ them as standards to ascertain whether we are as moral and as competent as others. Moreover, they are standards employed to persuade and influence others, to tell us which beliefs, attitudes, values, and actions of others are worth challenging, protesting, and arguing about, or worth trying to influence or change."

Values may vary in presence or extensiveness, application, importance, and priority within the individual and society. Rokeach (1973) contends that each person possesses a relatively small number of values, and everyone possesses the same values in different degrees. Two very common core values are egalitarianism and individualism. According to Kinder and Sanders (1996), egalitarianism and individualism are intrinsic in American social and political relations; they are strong governing influences in our society.

Egalitarianism. Egalitarianism is taken to mean the belief in equal treatment or equal rights for all persons, that all individuals deserve an equal amount of respect, that people should not be oppressed or discriminated against based on ascriptive characteristics or according to economic, social, or political status (Rokeach, 1973, 1975, 1979; Lipset and Schneider, 1979; Rasinski, 1987; Feldman, 1988; Katz and Hass, 1988; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Wildavsky, 1990; Bobo, 1991; Feldman and Zaller, 1992). Sniderman and Hagen (1985) state that egalitarians explain the relatively low status of blacks on powerful and wealthy white people who want to keep blacks down. They do not blame black individuals for their personal failings, and they tend not to
believe that blacks do not work hard enough to improve their way of life. Also, egalitarians support policies that ensure equal rights.

**Individualism.** Individualism is taken to mean the belief that people should be free to pursue their interests by their own initiative with little or no interference from government; in other words, individual freedom, rights, and responsibility are paramount in society (Rokeach, 1973, 1975, 1979; Lipset and Schneider, 1979; Rasinski, 1987; Feldman, 1988; Katz and Hass, 1988; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Wildavsky, 1990; Bobo, 1991; Feldman and Zaller, 1992). Emphasis is placed on hard work and sacrifice (Kinder, 1983). Regarding race relations, while they hold that racial discrimination exists, individualists believe blacks should advance their status in society through individual efforts instead of collective efforts and governmental assistance (Kinder, 1983).

Sniderman and Hagen (1985) state that individualism places an emphasis on personal responsibility, character, individual initiative, effort, and perseverance. More consistent with the study at hand, Sniderman and Hagen suggest that individualists believe that blacks are worse off because they do not work hard enough, and not because rich and powerful whites are out to keep them down. Moreover, individualists are likely to resist attempts to ensure racial equality. Sniderman and Hagen conclude that individualists lack empathy for those disadvantaged by poverty, gender, and race, but it may be equally plausible that individualists just oppose government's role in ensuring racial equality.

**Egalitarianism vs. Individualism.** Matheson et al. (1994) state that the controversy stemming from affirmative action is its perceived inconsistency with individual merit. Opposition arises when considering
social group membership as a criterion for opportunities, for it is perceived by some that affirmative action undermines meritocracy and emphasizes a group-based system of reward. In this manner, affirmative action is considered to be unfair by many of the targeted group, as well as many in the nontargeted group. Furthermore, opponents of affirmative action contend that the policy is inconsistent with its aim. That is, affirmative action is a controversial policy due in part to the fact that it takes race and ethnicity into account when the path to racial equality and integration should be to make race and ethnicity irrelevant (Edwards, 1994). Opponents of affirmative action point out that even if minorities and women deserve compensation, it is unfair to deny positions from the present and future generations of white men and women who may not be responsible for past harm (Shaw, 1988). Inasmuch as affirmative action is perceived as denying opportunities to future generations of whites, individualists are opposed to affirmative action.

However, proponents of affirmative action argue that the only thing white males are denied are the expectations of unearned positions. Only because they benefit from past discrimination do white males stand to lose from affirmative action. White males are not excluded from competition under affirmative action (Shaw, 1988). Therefore, egalitarians do not view affirmative action as a hindrance to merit, but as a means to ensure equal opportunity.

This portion of the affirmative action debate centers on "equality of process" versus "equality of results." Egalitarians are more apt than individualists to focus on equality of results. However, egalitarians may also raise concerns about processes—however fair or unbiased they may seem to be—that generate unequal outcomes. They may attack a policy or procedure if there are unintended results, perhaps
claiming that the practice is defective in some sense, regardless of its seemingly fair and unbiased nature. Individualists seem to focus much more attention on the equality of process—perhaps even supporting equality of process—and the ability of individuals to achieve desirable outcomes if the process is fair and unbiased. For the individualist, inequalities of outcome that occur when there is equality of process are the result of the lack of individual initiative on the part of those who fall below the average outcome. Yet, some individualists believe that individuals should take responsibility for their own outcomes, even if there is inequality of process.

Sometimes the opinion structures Americans use are made of inconsistent values, and this results in some citizens not having an opinion at all or else have one that is not solidly formed (Kinder, 1983). Alternatively, they hold both egalitarian and individualistic inclinations (Bunzel, 1986). Americans believe in a society that supports individualism and free competition. They encourage the belief that everyone should aspire to improve their life through personal initiative on an equal basis. Realizing that everyone does not have equal opportunity, Americans are sometimes willing to support efforts by the federal government to aid blacks and other disadvantaged groups (Bunzel, 1986).

Because in some circles affirmative action is believed to compensate for past discrimination, enhance equal opportunity, and equal rights, it is considered an egalitarian policy. Others contend that affirmative action has unfair compensatory effects because it does so at the expense of individual freedoms and individual rights. The duality of egalitarianism and individualism are reflected in these polarized positions. Those who favor affirmative action are assumed to be
egalitarian in nature while opponents hold individualism in higher regards. So, among blacks, egalitarianism will increase support for affirmative action, but individualism will depress support for affirmative action.

**Political Ideology**

Ideology is a set of broad coherent beliefs and concepts anchored by a small number of central principles that commit adherents to behavior and thought consistent with the ideology (Kritzer, 1978; Kerlinger, 1984; Van Dyke, 1995). Ideology may also be considered a complex, dogmatic belief system used to interpret, rationalize, and justify political attitudes, behavior, and institutions (Hinich and Munger, 1994). Liberalism and conservatism are two of the most important ideologies in the Western world that influence social thinking and behavior (Kerlinger, 1984). The terms liberal and conservative serve as attitudinal generalizations to help explain complex political thinking; they are general sets of linked beliefs and concepts about issues, behavior, and politics (Kerlinger, 1984).

When I provide definitions of terms such as liberalism and conservatism (as with values and ideology), I do not aim to provide absolute meanings, but only to focus discussion and analysis. With that in mind I adopt the definitions of liberalism and conservatism provided in the literature. Liberalism is taken to mean a set of political, social, and economic beliefs that embraces popular participation in government, tolerance of individuals, groups, lifestyles, and ideas that deviate from traditional societal norms, government intervention to solve social maladies and inequalities, a tendency to blame the system or society for what goes wrong rather than the individual, and a belief in equal rights for all including minorities (Lowi, 1969; Erikson,
Conservatism is taken to mean a set of political, social, and economic beliefs characterized by skepticism of popular participation in government, a preference for traditional societal norms, little government intervention to bring about social changes, an emphasis on the social status quo and social stability, a tendency to blame the individual for what goes wrong rather than the system or society, and acceptance of the natural inequality of individuals in society (Lowi, 1969; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin, 1980; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Kerlinger, 1984; Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Van Dyke, 1995).

Conservatives are not overt opponents of extending civil rights and liberties to unpopular groups, minority groups, or women; however, they have been less enthusiastic and more opposed regarding these matters (Ladd, Jr. and Lipset, 1980).

The most important distinction between liberalism and conservatism in this dissertation is the preference for government action. Liberals are those who see a legitimate role for government in solving the problems of society, while conservatives are those who are distrustful of government solutions and tend to prefer that problems be solved through individual initiative or through collective action in the private sector.

**Liberalism vs. Conservatism.** Brady and Sniderman (1985) find that individuals are able to accurately estimate the issue positions of groups, including blacks, whites, liberals, conservatives, Democrats, and Republicans. That is, people are able to "draw an impressively accurate map of politics, of who wants what politically, of who takes the same side as whom and of who lines up on the opposing sides of key
issues" (Brady and Sniderman, 1985, p. 1061). There seems to be a general understanding that liberals and conservatives represent distinctive issue positions, and that these general orientations are related to individuals' preferences on racial policy.

Racial attitudes are very powerful ingredients in structuring political thinking. Carmines and Stimson (1989) state that racial attitudes help structure the liberal-conservative dimension and that this political ideology dimension has racial undertones. According to the scholars, race is a prominent, if not a dominant force behind ideological labels. Racial attitudes are strongly associated with political ideology. So strong are the attachments between racial attitudes and political ideology, Carmines and Stimson state that to know one's political ideology is to know one's views on race. Self-placement on the liberal-conservative political ideology scales predicts racially relevant dependent variables (Sears, 1988).

Blacks are perceived to be on the left on many issues (Hamilton, 1982; Pinderhughes, 1987; Dawson, 1994), while whites are perceived to be on the right of most issues (Brady and Sniderman, 1985). Blacks are noted for their liberal ideological inclinations and policy preferences (Hamilton, 1982; Seltzer and Smith, 1985; Pinderhughes, 1987; Dawson, 1994). This may be the case because "conservative" has a different meaning in the black community than it has in the white community. For many blacks, the term "conservative" is a pejorative, primarily due to the perception that many conservatives are opposed to racial equality and the well-being of black Americans. On the other hand, the explicit racial meaning of the term "conservative" may disappear. Most whites—even liberals—view "conservative" as reflecting a set of political positions that is merely different from those taken by liberals. Given
all of this, I hypothesize that liberalism is positively associated with black support for affirmative action, but conservatism is negatively associated with black support for affirmative action. Simply, conservative blacks will be more likely than liberal blacks to oppose affirmative action.

Partisanship

Race is a powerful cleavage that has a deep symbolic importance in America and has become a significant part of American politics. It has been a major issue since the founding of America, and it is an issue on which the two major American parties have taken different stands since the Johnson-Goldwater presidential contest. Clearly, race continues to be a recurring theme in politics (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Edsall and Edsall (1991) state that racial attitudes have become a central ingredient to ideological identification, to political party affiliation, and whether one casts a ballot for Democrat or Republican candidates.

The Democratic Party has been the haven for racial equality and liberalism since the 1960s. Since 1964, the Democratic Party has been more supportive of governmental intervention for ensuring the rights of blacks. The Democratic Party has been more committed to establishing and maintaining the rights of blacks than the Republican Party. The Republican Party moved toward racial conservatism in 1964 (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). The transformation in which the Democratic Party became the party of racial liberalism and the Republican Party became the party of racial conservatism was reflected in mass perceptions of the parties (Carmines and Stimson, 1982). "As a consequence, responses to racial issues became associated with a set of liberal/conservative positions on a variety of policy issues. Reinforced by partisanship, racial issues
gradually became aligned with other issues on the policy agenda, at last brought within the ideological orbit of the New Deal* (Carmines and Stimson, 1982, p. 5).

Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth (1991) find that the public links parties to groups in their political thinking. Certain groups are associated with each political party. Miller et al. find that the Democratic Party has been consistently perceived as best representing the poor, the working class, common people, Catholics, labor unions, small business owners, and more important, liberals and blacks. The Republican Party has been traditionally linked to the interests of the upper class, the rich, big business, the military, and more important, conservatives (Miller et. al, 1991). In addition, they find that people's affect of social groups has a direct, independent, and significant effect on partisan judgments.

The transformation of the racial policy positions of the parties may be the reason for blacks' attachment to the Democratic Party. Enfranchised blacks voted for the Republican Party for three generations up until the 1930s, when their loyalties benefitted Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Democratic Party, and crystallized in continual support for the Democratic Party by the 1960s (Graham, 1992). Abramowitz (1994) states that, since 1964, blacks have overwhelmingly identified with the Democratic Party, and blacks are much more liberal on racial issues than whites. Mainly on social welfare issues, Democrats do take more liberal stands than Republicans (Robinson, 1984). Many Democrats have been strong supporters of affirmative action, while Republicans have long included critics of affirmative action (Idelson, 1995a). Given this, I hypothesize that Democrats will be more supportive of affirmative action than Republicans.
A Recap of Core Values and Political Orientation

Liberals and Democrats seem to exhibit more egalitarian qualities than conservatives and Republicans. Liberals and Democrats are associated with civil rights and with a willingness to promote social justice when it conflicts with individual interests. Politically speaking, egalitarians are clearly to the left, they are liberals, and they support the idea that government should work to improve the economic and social status of blacks and other minorities (Sniderman and Hagen, 1985). Conservatives and Republicans seem individualistic in nature in that they tend to strongly believe personal freedoms should triumph over collective interests. Furthermore, Sniderman and Hagen (1985) state that individualism is a product of the political right, that individualists are conservative in that they take conservative positions and regard themselves as conservatives. More telling, Sniderman and Hagen find that individualists oppose or are less enthusiastic about government programs intended to assist blacks and other minorities.

From the argument above, it would follow that blacks who emphasize egalitarianism more than they do individualism will support affirmative action. It would also follow that black liberals and black Democrats should show more support for affirmative action than black conservatives and black Republicans, who are expected to oppose the measure. In sum, egalitarians, liberals, and Democrats are expected to express more support than individualists, conservatives, and Republicans.

Black Group Consciousness

Racial and group consciousness explanations are prominent parts of the symbolic politics discussion to explain black attitudes toward affirmative action. Many scholars have noted the powerful effects of
group or stratum consciousness in shaping attitudes and behavior (Sherif and Sherif, 1979; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Gurin, Miller, Gurin, 1980; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk, 1981; Shingles, 1981; Lau, 1989; Demo and Hughes, 1990). From these works one can conclude that there seems to be a tendency for individuals to categorize the world into groups, particularly in "us vs. them" terms. Among other things, the political cognition of citizens is structured in terms of social groups (Hamill, Lodge, and Blake, 1985). Evaluations of social groups influence policy preferences and political attitudes (Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen, Jr., 1980; Brady and Sniderman, 1985). The basic assumptions guiding this discussion are: (1) when it comes to social groups, people are concerned with whom the group is and whether they deserve the benefits they are reaping; and (2) affect is important in that group labels store pertinent information that elicits certain behaviors and attitudes (Conover, 1988). As Conover (1988, p. 51) states:

"People have stored information and emotional reactions to social groups, and that people are purposive in their thinking about social groups in the sense that they are interested in understanding what various groups have obtained and whether it is deserved. The process through which social groups influence political thinking varies significantly depending upon whether an individual identifies with the group in question."

Concepts such as group consciousness, group identification, affect, stereotypes, and blame attribution are of major importance in the affirmative action debate. In accordance with Conover's findings (1988), one might expect that members are more favorable toward their group and less favorable toward other groups. It is also expected that
some of these less favorable attitudes toward other groups are influenced largely by affect and stereotypical beliefs. Hence, I use the group consciousness approach to explain black support for affirmative action. This is an appropriate strategy because group consciousness is a framework that takes into account important elements such as identification, affect, evaluations, and blame attribution. Group consciousness may also account for variation in support primarily from the "have not" point of view. Group consciousness poses groups in terms of relative deprivation, where one group clearly has status and status-enhancing advantages while the other has not. The members of the subordinate group generally share a perspective on its financial and occupational situation, among other things, and view it as lacking when compared to the situation of members in the superordinate group. Relative deprivation is the tie that binds the subordinate group.

By and large, the group consciousness perspective parallels self-interest, but is different in that members of the group are expected to favor policies or behave in such a way to benefit the group over and beyond or in spite of themselves. In other words, the group consciousness framework provides an adequate link between individual self-interest, group interest, and collective thought and action. The major distinctions between group consciousness and self-interest are that (1) group consciousness focuses solely on group interests and (2) these attitudes are built up through the socialization process. For one to have high levels of black group consciousness, one must identify with blacks, share a political awareness of blacks' relative position in society, and be willing to engage in collective action to realize black interests (Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk, 1981). Blacks possessing attitudes and engaging in behavior suggestive of black group
consciousness are expected to support affirmative action over and above the effects of individual self-interest.

There are four components that Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk (1981) discuss in their description of group consciousness: (1) group identification, (2) polar affect, (3) polar power, and (4) individual versus system blame. The first component, group identification, as one would suspect, is a large ingredient of group consciousness. Miller et al. suggest that group identification is the psychological feeling of belonging to a social group, sharing interests with the group, but not with others, and having an awareness of the group's status in society relative to other groups. Group identification for my purposes here is identifying with blacks.

The second component of group consciousness is polar affect. Miller et al. describe a polar affect in terms of the preference for members of one's group and a dislike for those not in the group. In this case, it is a positive affect toward blacks and a negative affect toward other minorities and whites. Arguably, group consciousness does not require negative affect or hostility toward other minorities or whites, but the polar affect could simply be a difference in affect between the ingroup and outgroups and the recognition of noticeable differences between the groups--i.e., that on any given policy, especially affirmative action, one group benefits, while a different group does not. Yet Miller et al. state that hostility toward individuals outside the group and preference for individuals inside the group may develop in the absence of any conflict of interest and merely on the perception of distinctive social classifications or of differences in the beliefs of the members of the ingroup and members of the outgroup (Miller et al., 1981).
The third component of group consciousness is polar power. Miller et al. state that this is satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one's group's status, power, or resources relative to the outgroup. If the ingroup (blacks) uses the outgroup as the reference for comparisons and perceive a lack of status, power, or resources, then deprivation will promote group consciousness. The point is that blacks will see whites in a more powerful or advantageous position. Given this, blacks who are sensitive to the polar power aspect of group consciousness will consider their race deprived and powerless relative to whites.

The fourth and final component of group consciousness is the attribution of individual versus system blame. This refers to the object of attribution for the group's relatively low status in society. The low status could be due to either or both personal failings or the political or social system. Group consciousness would place blame on the system, or even racism and discrimination, rather than on the individual. For instance, blacks who believe their race is a hindrance to improving their status in life are considered to be greater adherents of group consciousness than blacks who blame themselves for their social position.

Group consciousness can quite easily be applied to the relationship between blacks and whites and affirmative action. While any group may have group consciousness, blacks are the target group here because the focus of this dissertation is on blacks attitudes. Whites can also have group consciousness, but white group consciousness is more commonly referred to as racial threat. Therefore, I adopt the phrase "black group consciousness" to reflect the emphasis on black perceptions of group consciousness and to draw distinctions from other forms of group consciousness.
Black group consciousness involves identifying with blacks and sharing a political awareness and ideology with respect to black's relative position in society as well as committing oneself to action to secure black interests. It is the perception of being black and sharing black interests. Black group consciousness would also be the feeling that blacks are deprived, relatively speaking, and the reasons for this position in society are caused more by the social or political system than due to personal shortcomings. Black group consciousness also entails the realization that differences exist between themselves and the dominant group, whites. As a result, there are hostilities between blacks and whites, and social barriers such as discrimination and racism are considered illegitimate because they enhance the status of whites at the expense of blacks. This results in relative deprivation and discontent among blacks.

Blacks who exhibit more black group consciousness are expected to be supportive of affirmative action and see it as a means of changing the social order and improving the status of blacks. Those lacking a sense of black group consciousness are expected to be less supportive of affirmative action. It is assumed that blacks who have black group consciousness are also likely to believe that discrimination is still a pervasive practice in the employment arena and hold that an affirmative action policy can reduce the likelihood that a black person will be turned away from employment opportunities based on race. Blacks who have black group consciousness are further assumed to accept qualifications and merit to be among the criteria for employment, but also feel that sometimes these standards do not result in job obtainment because of their race or because these merit criteria are in place to further keep blacks down. For these individuals, the very concept of
"merit" is majority-defined and, hence, somewhat suspect (defined to reinforce the status quo).

The following hypotheses are tested. In terms of identity, supportive blacks are expected to (1) think about being black a lot, (2) find it more important to be black than American, (3) feel more attached to blacks, (4) feel less attached to whites, (5) feel a common fate with black people, black men, and black women, and (6) believe that blacks and whites should not interact. In terms of polar affect, supportive blacks are expected to believe blacks love their families, are hardworking, care for others, and are proud, honest, and strong. In terms of polar power, supportive blacks are expected to (1) feel that the economic position of blacks is worsening compared to whites, (2) blacks have too little influence, (3) whites have too much influence, (4) place themselves low in social class, (5) believe blacks cannot achieve full social and economic equality, and (6) believe disadvantaged groups can decide how the country is run if they pull together. In terms of individual versus system blame, supportive blacks are expected to believe that (1) race is a hindrance more than the individual black person, (2) most whites want to "keep blacks down," (3) being black determines how one is treated more than income, (4) their opportunities are affected by how other blacks are treated, (5) people are judged more on their race than the content of their character, (6) discrimination is the most or second most important problem facing blacks, and (7) there has been little progress in ridding society of racial discrimination.

To capture the effects of these concepts, I use survey items taken from the 1984-1988 Black National Election Panel Study and 1996 Black National Election Study. Serving as the measure of the dependent variable for the models tested using black respondents, the 1984-1988
National Black Election Panel Study and 1996 National Black Election Study have the following item: "Because of past discrimination, minorities should be given special consideration when decisions are made about hiring applicants for jobs." The responses for this statement are "strongly agree," "somewhat agree," "somewhat disagree," and "strongly disagree" (coded 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively). A thorough description of the independent variables as well as their coding schemes and hypothesized direction are found in Appendix B and D. The models are not the same for all three years because not all items are available for each year. However, an effort was made to include items that could capture the effects alluded to in the previous discussion. The models to estimate the effects of symbolic politics on attitudes toward affirmative action are as follows:

\[
\text{(Affirmative Action}_{1984}) = a + b_1(\text{Help Blacks and Minorities}) + b_2(\text{Special Efforts By Government}) + b_3(\text{Job Criteria}) + b_4(\text{Racial Integration}) + b_5(\text{Jobs/S.O.L. Scale}) + b_6(\text{Political Ideology}) + b_7(\text{Partisanship}) + b_8(\text{Black Centrality}) + b_9(\text{Black Identity}) + b_{12}(\text{Black Attachment}) + b_{13}(\text{White Attachment}) + b_{14}(\text{Black-White Interaction}) + b_{15}(\text{Black-White Economics}) + b_{16}(\text{Black Influence}) + b_{17}(\text{White Influence}) + b_{18}(\text{White Intentions}) + b_{19}(\text{Social Class}) + b_{20}(\text{Self/Race Blame})
\]

\[
\text{(Affirmative Action}_{1985}) = a + b_1(\text{Jobs/S.O.L. Scale}) + b_2(\text{Political Ideology}) + b_3(\text{Partisanship}) + b_4(\text{Black Centrality}) + b_5(\text{Love Families}) + b_6(\text{Hardworkers}) + b_7(\text{Care for Others}) + b_8(\text{Proud}) + b_9(\text{Honest}) + b_{10}(\text{Strong}) + b_{11}(\text{Black-White Economics}) + b_{12}(\text{Black Influence}) + b_{13}(\text{White Influence}) + b_{14}(\text{Social Class}) + b_{15}(\text{Self/Race Blame})
\]
(Affirmative Action) = a + b_1(Help Blacks) + b_2(Racial Integration) + b_3(Jobs/S.O.L. Scale) + b_4(Political Ideology) + b_5(Partisanship) + b_6(Black Common Fate) + b_7(Black Men Common Fate) + b_8(Black Women Common Fate) + b_9(Black Centrality) + b_{10}(Black-White Interaction) + b_{11}(Black-White Economics) + b_{12}(Black SES) + b_{13}(Disadvantaged's Strength) + b_{14}(Social Class) + b_{15}(Black Treatment) + b_{16}(Black Opportunities) + b_{17}(Character/Race Blame) + b_{18}(Discrimination First Problem) + b_{19}(Discrimination Second Problem) + b_{20}(Discrimination Progress)

I now have in place the models that will be used to test the effects of self-interest and symbolic politics. Self-interested blacks and blacks who perceive higher levels of racial threat are hypothesized to be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who are not self-interested and those blacks who perceive lesser amounts of racial threat. Therefore, blacks lower on the social and economic ladders are expected to be more supportive than blacks higher on these strata. Symbolic politics attitudes are expected to have even greater explanatory power than self-interest. I expect that blacks who espouse egalitarian, liberal, and black group consciousness inclinations will favor affirmative action more than blacks who take up sentiments indicative of individualism, conservatism, and lower levels of black group consciousness. Additionally, black Democrats are expected to support affirmative action to a greater degree than black Republicans.

CONCLUSION

What explains attitudes toward affirmative action among blacks? I contend that both self-interest and symbolic politics attitudes drive
black preferences regarding the policy. Based on previous research, I further expect that the theory of symbolic politics will have greater explanatory power than the self-interest theory. However, in order to fully understand black attitudes toward affirmative action and determine whether the symbolic politics theory serves as a better explanation than the self-interest theory, I estimate a combined model. That is, in addition to estimating separate models of the effects of self-interest and symbolic politics attitudes, I merge the variables used to estimate the effects of each theory into a single model. Not only will a combined model determine which theory best explains black preferences, but it will also provide a more comprehensive picture of black attitudes regarding affirmative action.
A dearth of research on black political attitudes has been a recurring criticism raised in this dissertation. This is largely the case due to flaws within this area of political science, particularly in terms of theoretical and data limitations. That is, little is known about black political attitudes because many scholars do not examine black political attitudes in a thorough manner, they adopt stringent interpretations of the theories and hypotheses they are testing, and they do not make use of more suitable data sets to investigate black opinion.

In the preceding chapters I have discussed my strategies to improve this area of scholarship. Recall that I have outlined extensive models to estimate black support for or opposition to affirmative action, expanded the application of the self-interest theory and the theory of symbolic politics, and proposed newly-developed hypotheses to test. In this chapter I discuss my strategies to circumvent the data limitations that have plagued this area of research. The sources of data are the 1984-1988 National Black Election Panel Study and the 1996 National Black Election Study*. The measurement strategies for the variables can be found in Appendices A through D. The estimation procedure used to analyze the data is Ordinary Least Squares Estimation.

DATA

Data limitations are the primary reasons why little is known about the attitudes and preferences of blacks. Namely, blacks make up a very small proportion of survey samples because they are a numerical minority in society. On a closely related point, blacks may be undersampled because they have characteristics that make them less likely to be
sampled in traditional surveys: blacks are less likely than whites to own telephones, they may live in areas interviewers try to avoid, or simply, because the respondents are black, interviewers may avoid interviewing them altogether. In addition, many studies on attitudes toward political issues or political objects have often taken black attitudes for granted (Sigelman and Welch, 1991). Furthermore, data on blacks are limited in scope because questions asked of blacks were originally designed to query whites (Dawson, 1994; Schuman et al., 1997), so many questions asked of blacks may not carry as much significance, have the same meaning, or the questionnaire may not include items or topics more relevant to blacks. Kinder and Sanders (1996, p. 7) allude to these condemnations when they discussed the paucity of scholarship regarding black Americans:

"Sometimes studies simply ignore race, on the idea that the political differences between blacks and whites are either negligible or uninteresting. Or blacks are set aside entirely, on the idea that there are differences, but ones that would confuse analysis of the public as a whole. Both procedures deprive us of any understanding of the ways that black Americans think about matters of race; they also prevent us from hearing the dialogue that takes place between white and black Americans over their common future--however intermittent and halting such a conversation might be."

However, the most prominent reason there is so little known about black attitudes is due to sheer numbers. Blacks do not comprise a large portion of the populace, so many surveys have only small subsamples of blacks. A random sample of the electorate may find that blacks are
disproportionately under-represented because they are in fact a numerical minority (Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Schuman et al., 1997). A national sample of at least 1,500 respondents may include roughly 150 to 200 black Americans, and due to such a small sample size, one needs to include more than one point in time. In other words, to make for more precise and concrete findings, blacks must be examined for more than one year (Schuman et al., 1997).

One way to overcome these data limitations is to rely on the National Black Election Study series as a data set. This series of three election studies is a significant substantive and methodological contribution to the small numbers of blacks that are included in the American National Election Study and General Social Survey. The National Black Election Study series is a telephone survey that focuses on black political attitudes and preferences. A wide range of topics are covered and a variety of questions are asked, but more important, the data sets ask the respondents their opinions on racial issues, government involvement, economic matters, their outlook on life and society, and included information pertaining to demographic characterizations. Random digit dialing was used to interview black households in the United States during the 1984, 1988, and 1996 presidential elections. Respondents were eligible for the survey if they were black Americans and at least 18 years old by election day. Interviewers simply phoned American households and questioned whomever answered if there was an adult that met these qualifications. If there was a black person who would be 18 years of age by election day, the interview continued, otherwise, it was terminated.

The particular data sets used in this analysis are the 1984-1988 National Black Election Panel Study and the 1996 National Black Election
Study. The 1984 and 1988 panel respondents were interviewed prior to and following the 1984 presidential election, and again before and after the presidential election of 1988. In sum, there are four waves of data. The 1984 pre-election sample size was 1,150, but fell to 872 in the post-election phase. In 1988, the investigators made attempts to recontact the 1984 respondents to conduct another pre- and post-election survey. The 1988 pre-election sample size was 473 and the post-election sample size was 392. The investigators state that the response rate for the National Black Election Study series (the 1984 pre-election response rate was 57% and 76% in the post-election phase) is quite comparable to the response rate for the American National Election Study, and does quite well considering it was a panel study. The 1996 National Black Election Study consisted of 1,216 voting-eligible black respondents and an overall response rate of 65% in the pre-election phase and 854 respondents and a 70% response rate in the post-election phase.

The National Black Election Study can enhance our knowledge and understanding of black attitudes toward a multitude of issues and political items. One can gain knowledge of the political attitudes and behaviors of black subgroups, but more important, one can gain knowledge of black support for, and opposition to, affirmative action. The National Black Election Study series is ideally-suited for this research question, since it includes a number of survey items that tap the varying levels of support given affirmative action from a group that includes its primary beneficiaries.

METHODS

The method of choice will be Ordinary Least Squares Estimation. This procedure will allow me to determine the relative impact of each of the independent variables. To test hypothesis convincingly we must be
able to rule out major alternative rival hypotheses" (Manheim and Rich, 1991, p. 280). I will also be able to distinguish which of the two theoretical frameworks best explains black attitudes toward affirmative action. That is, I will determine whether self-interest (accompanied by racial threat) or symbolic politics (accompanied by group consciousness) is a better explanation of support.

Ordinary Least Squares Estimation

Regression analysis is a statistical method that employs the relation between two or more variables so that one variable can be predicted from another, or among others (Blalock, 1979; Neter et al., 1989; Walsh, 1990). A regression model is a formal expression of two ingredients of a statistical relationship: (1) the tendency of the dependent variable to vary with the independent variable in some systematic fashion and (2) the distribution of data points around the curve of the relationship (Neter et al., 1989). One purpose of regression analysis is to estimate the independent effect of changes in the values of each independent variable on the value of the dependent variable (Blalock, 1979; Walsh, 1990; Manheim and Rich, 1991).

Regression analysis has several assumptions: (1) the model is accurately specified, (2) the variables are linearly related and can be summarized by a straight line, (3) the expected value of the error term is zero, the error terms are uncorrelated, the variances for the error terms are constant for all independent variables, and the error term has a normal distribution, and (4) the independent variables are not correlated with each other or any linear combinations of independent variables (Blalock, 1979; Walsh, 1990; Manheim and Rich, 1991; Kennedy, 1992).

To find estimators of the regression parameters, the regression coefficients, I utilize the method of Ordinary Least Squares. Ordinary
Least Squares Estimation involves finding a straight line whose sum of squared deviations of the actual values of the dependent variable from this line is a minimum and less than the sum of squares of any other comparable straight line (Blalock, 1979; Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1987). This is often referred to as the "best" fitting line. Ordinary Least Squares Estimation is a general method of finding "good" estimators (Neter et al., 1989). The estimators are unbiased and have minimum variance among all estimators (Blalock, 1979; Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1987; Neter et al., 1989; Kennedy, 1992). That is, least squares estimators do not underestimate or overestimate systematically, and the distributions of the estimators have smaller variance than all other estimators in a particular class of estimators, i.e., unbiased estimators that are linearly related to the dependent variable.

ISSUES OF CONCERN

There are problems that may arise when interpreting responses to survey questions. In this dissertation, the major issues that may lead to misinterpretation are consistency of question wording, question order, and race of interviewer effects.

Question Wording

Question wording has been demonstrated to be a very important concern in public opinion (Schuman and Duncan, 1974; Schuman and Presser, 1977; Schuman and Presser, 1981; Schuman and Kalton, 1985; Schuman et al., 1997). Minor changes in question wording can bring about major changes in responses and sometimes in relationships (Schuman and Duncan, 1974; Schuman and Presser, 1977; Schuman and Presser, 1981; Schuman et al., 1997). Consistent use of questions over time and exact wording of questions in surveys are important in making generalizations across time.
The data sets used to test the theories and hypotheses I described in the previous chapter use many of the same items. However, because there were changes in private investigators from one survey to the next, some items were not included, or the exact wording from survey to survey may have changed. To prevent contamination due to effects of changes in question wording, a new variable was created for the new question. Rather than label two differently worded question with the same label, a new name was given to the question. Unfortunately, this means that the 1996 results are not directly comparable to the 1984 and 1988 results.

**Question Order**

Question order may have some impact on responses as well (Schuman and Presser, 1981; Schuman and Kalton, 1985; Abramson, Silver, and Anderson, 1987; Schuman et al., 1997). That is, when a change in private investigators is made or when questions are added or deleted from the questionnaire, there is a change in question ordering, which has been demonstrated to have large effects on responses (Schuman and Presser, 1981; Schuman and Kalton, 1985; Abramson, Silver, and Anderson, 1987; Schuman et al., 1997). Therefore, there may be a lack of precision in the models to be estimated due to question wording and question order.

**Race of Interviewer Effects**

There is an abundant amount of evidence that suggests that the race of the interviewer may affect responses to survey items, especially racially-relevant items (Schuman and Converse, 1971; Hatchett and Schuman, 1975; Schaeffer, 1980; Campbell, 1981; Weeks and Moore, 1981; Cotter, Cohen, and Coulter, 1982; Anderson, Silver, and Abramson, 1988a; Anderson, Silver, and Abramson, 1988b; Davis, 1997; Schuman et al., 1997). This literature has found that both black and white respondents acquiesce to the interviewer. That is, the respondent considers the
interviewer's race when responding to survey questions and answers in such a way so as not to offend the interviewer by making disparaging remarks. This could be when a black respondent does not provide problack or antiwhite responses (if the interviewer is white) or when a white respondent does not give prowhite or antiblack answers (if the interviewer is black). Either as a sign of deference or simply sensitivity to the race of the interviewer, respondents of both races are likely to acquiesce. According to Davis (1997, p. 311-312): "In a response to both white and African-American strangers, such acting usually involves regulating one's facial expressions, gestures, tone of voice, and more importantly in telephone surveys, political attitudes in a perfected system of concealment."

However, as many scholars have found (Schuman and Converse, 1971; Schuman and Hatchett, 1974; Campbell, 1981; Anderson et al., 1988a, 1988b), the race of the interviewer may serve as a source of distortion even when the respondent is of the same race. That is, as a way of placating to the interviewer who is of the same race as the respondent, the respondent may give exaggerated responses. A black person may be more likely to give problack or antiwhite responses when interviewed by a black person, or a white respondent may be more likely to provide prowhite or antiblack answers when interviewed by a white person.

There is another way of thinking about this. Imagine that every individual has an attitude on a given issue that is represented by a fixed point on an attitude space. The fixed point represents the respondents' "true" position when their interviewer is of the same race. Another possibility is that the respondent will deviate in the "white" direction when there is a black interviewer. If this is the case, knowledge of the race of the interviewer will create error in the
measure, regardless of whether the interviewer is black or if the interviewer is white.

The saving grace of my dissertation may be that the mode of data collection is via telephone. The Black National Election Study is a telephone survey using random-digit dialing. This is not to say there are not race-of-interview effects when conducting telephone surveys, for they may be present (Cotter et al., 1982; Tucker, 1983; Davis, 1997; Schuman et al., 1997). There are, however, reasons to believe that the effects, if not totally absent, are reduced a great deal (Cotter et al., 1982; Tucker, 1983; Davis, 1997; Schuman et al., 1997). One reason is the level of anonymity, the other is the psychological distance between the interviewer and respondent. In telephone interviews, respondents are not able to see the interviewer and, therefore, may be unable to determine the interviewer's race with certainty. Also, even if the respondent can accurately identify the race of the interviewer, the psychological and physical distance between interviewer and race may preclude the need to acquiesce. Due to the anonymity of the interviewer and the psychological and physical distance between interviewer and the respondent, race of interviewer has little or no effect on responses (Cotter et al., 1982; Tucker, 1983). We may be able to say that one improvement of this dissertation over previous studies is that the data, a telephone survey, is not as contaminated as face-to-face interviews by race of interviewer effects, so my results may not reflect a bias.

**SUMMARY**

By and large, data limitations are the reasons why there is a shortage in the literature on black political attitudes, especially regarding affirmative action. However, I overcome these data limitations in a number of ways. First, I examine black attitudes
toward affirmative action in a more exhaustive manner than previous works. Second, I broaden the interpretations of theories and hypotheses as well as proposing new hypotheses applicable to black respondents. Third, I use a data set that surveys a much larger number of blacks than data sets used in previous analyses. Therefore, I am able to estimate black support for or opposition to affirmative action in a more comprehensive manner by testing more hypotheses and placing both self-interest and symbolic politics models in a combined model. I use Ordinary Least Squares Estimation to estimate the dependent variable. I address the potential contaminating effects of question wording and question order by allowing each survey item to display its ability to have an independent effect on the dependent variable. Based on previous research, the race of the interviewer in telephone surveys has little or no effect on responses, so the reliance on a telephone survey may prevent any biased results due to the race of the interviewer. In the next chapter I discuss the results of the estimation procedures, taking into account the aforementioned issues.
CHAPTER 6
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

There are two major theories of public opinion on racial matters, self-interest and symbolic politics. These theories have been modeled to test the effects of citizen preferences regarding busing (Sears et al., 1979; McConahay, 1982; Bobo, 1983; Sears and Kinder, 1985; Green and Cowden, 1992), school desegregation (Gatlin et al., 1978; McClendon and Pestello, 1982), and affirmative action (Jacobson, 1983; Kluegel and Smith, 1983; Jacobson, 1985; Kinder and Sanders, 1990; Fine, 1992; Tate, 1993; Summers, 1995; Taylor, 1995; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Alvarez and Brehm, 1997; Kuklinski et al., 1997. In Chapter 3 I discussed this literature. I made critical comments, making note of serious shortcomings and outlining different ways to correct them. In Chapter 4 I presented the models designed to estimate the effects of self-interest and symbolic politics attitudes on black support for affirmative action. In chapter 5 I discussed the data used to estimate these effects and the methods used to analyze the data.

In this chapter I report the results of my empirical analyses. I examine the effects of these theories on black support for affirmative action separately, and then estimate the effects of both of them simultaneously in a combined model. First, I present the results for the self-interest models. Second, I explore the level of empirical support for the symbolic politics models. Last, I discuss the results of the models combining these two theories. A combined model depicts a more complete picture of the relationship between black characteristics and attitudes and support for affirmative action, and it enables me to determine which relationships hold and which theory—self-interest or symbolic politics—offers the greatest explanatory power. I also use

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these results to answer the many questions that are the impetus of this dissertation and draw conclusions on attitudes toward racial policies in America. I compare blacks with other blacks in order to discuss the factors that enhance or diminish support for affirmative action and place the discussion in a broader framework to add to the body of knowledge on attitudes toward racial policies. But most important, additional knowledge will be gained on the determinants of black support for affirmative action.

Before moving to a close scrutiny of the data, it may be appropriate to examine the models in a broader sense. Models using survey data tend not to have the same level of explanatory power as models that use aggregate data, and my models are no exception. For the most part, the $R^2$ values for these models are relatively modest, and in no case does one of these models explain more than 20% of the variance in attitudes among blacks toward affirmative action. I suspect that the primary culprit for why the models do not explain much variance is the common cause for many models using survey data, measurement error, which can arise from question wording, question ordering, interviewer effects, or even when the respondent misinterprets the question. Perhaps due to measurement error, the models of black support for affirmative action do not seem to fit the data particularly well. The amount of variance explained by each model is relatively low, even by survey data standards.

An additional reason for the models' low explanatory power may be specification error. Surely, better measures of the concepts the models wish to capture are desired, but at times, there are no measures, or there are only crude ones, for the concepts I wish to operationalize. So, it may be that the models do not perform as well as expected due to
model misspecification and/or underspecification. However, these models do have some redeeming value, for they are able to detect several statistically significant relationships, $p < 0.10$. Clearly, the models are able to distinguish some of the determinants of support for affirmative action among blacks, though it is equally as clear that the overall fit of these models leaves much unexplained.

Another reason for the lack of explanatory power among the models may be due to a lack of a consensus on a definition of affirmative action. This meddlesome problem may even find its way into this study, for the conceptual and operational definitions of affirmative action differ. Though affirmative action is merely taking appropriate steps to make employment and contract opportunities known to minorities, women, and the physically disabled, the more popular conception of affirmative action is the one taken to operationalize the dependent variable.

On a related point, the models may or may not be suffering from the problem of multicollinearity. One aim of multiple regression is to estimate the independent effect of changes in the values of each independent variable on the value of the dependent variable (Blalock, 1979; Lewis-Beck, 1980; Walsh, 1990; Manheim and Rich, 1991). To do this, multicollinearity must not be present. That is, none of the independent variables are correlated with each other or any linear combinations of independent variables (Blalock, 1979; Lewis-Beck, 1980; Walsh, 1990; Manheim and Rich, 1991). Multicollinearity can cause serious estimation problems. "The general difficulty is that parameter estimates become unreliable...an estimated regression coefficient may be so unstable that it fails to achieve statistical significance, even though X is actually associated with Y in the population" (Lewis-Beck, 1980, p. 58-59).
According to Lewis-Beck (1980), nonexperimental social science data are almost always intercorrelated or multicollinear, but it must be demonstrated. He states that one warning sign of high multicollinearity is a substantial $R^2$, but statistically insignificant independent variables. Regarding this warning sign, multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem. An examination of Tables 1 - 18 shows that there is no combination of high $R^2$ values coupled with a number of insignificant coefficients. Lewis-Beck also states that the intercorrelation of the independent variables may be sought for a diagnosis of multicollinearity. He says that bivariate correlations of about 0.80 or larger indicate multicollinearity. The bivariate correlations for the models developed to estimate black support for affirmative action do not suffer from multicollinearity, for none of the intercorrelations were about 0.80. Furthermore, none of the variance inflation factors (VIF) approached 10, the standard point at which variables are considered multicollinear.

**SELF-INTEREST**

The self-interest model predicts that attitudes toward affirmative action are a function of socioeconomic demographics and characteristics, as well as perceptions of economic insecurity, racial threat, and racial fairness. Based on a benefit-cost calculation, I hypothesize that the level of support for affirmative action among blacks is a function of a benefit-cost calculation. Some blacks will have more to gain from affirmative action than other blacks, and therefore, they are likely to be more supportive of affirmative action. I expect that blacks lower in education, income, employment, and social class will be more supportive than blacks higher in education, income, employment, and social class. Older blacks, Southern blacks, and blacks who are experiencing economic
insecurity are expected to be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks on the opposite ends of those scales. Lastly, blacks who perceive racial threat from whites and racial unfairness are expected to be supportive of affirmative action.

By and large, but to no surprise, the models used to explain the effects of self-interest do a mediocre job of detecting relationships or explaining variance. This is no surprise, for the literature paints a relatively unflattering picture of the ability of the self-interest theory to explain racial preferences. In Tables 1, 2, and 3, I report the Ordinary Least Squares results for the self-interest models. An examination of these tables reveals the relatively weak goodness-of-fit for these models. The 1984 self-interest model explains 4.5% of the total variance, it has an F statistic of 2.077, and a small number of significant independent variables. Overall, I conclude that the 1984 model does a rather poor job of explaining black attitudes toward affirmative action. The 1988 self-interest model performs quite similarly to the 1984 model. On three criteria of model evaluation, this model has a slightly higher R² (R² = 6.7%), a comparable F statistic (F = 2.002), but detects a few more significant relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables. I would have to conclude that the 1988 self-interest model also does a rather poor job of explaining black support for or opposition to affirmative action. The 1996 self-interest model is not readily comparable to the other years because it is estimated using a different data set and a different group of explanatory variables. Nonetheless, it is only modestly better than the 1984 and 1988 self-interest models. The 1996 self-interest model explains only about 4.5% of the total variance, does an equally adequate job of detecting relationships between the dependent
### Table 1: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Self-Interest Model, 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.5153</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>6.141</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (-)</td>
<td>0.0166</td>
<td>0.0229</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.6168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Finances (-)</td>
<td>0.0378</td>
<td>0.0425</td>
<td>1.029</td>
<td>0.3036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income (-)</td>
<td>-0.0218</td>
<td>-0.0697</td>
<td>-1.458</td>
<td>0.0726*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status (-)</td>
<td>-0.0186</td>
<td>-0.0083</td>
<td>-0.184</td>
<td>0.4268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (-)</td>
<td>0.0854</td>
<td>0.0672</td>
<td>1.625</td>
<td>0.1046*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (+)</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>0.0175</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>0.3399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Blacks (+)</td>
<td>0.1288</td>
<td>0.0594</td>
<td>1.515</td>
<td>0.0651*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Security (+)</td>
<td>-0.1201</td>
<td>-0.0602</td>
<td>-1.458</td>
<td>0.1452*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Worried (+)</td>
<td>-0.0604</td>
<td>-0.0401</td>
<td>-0.955</td>
<td>0.3400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Economics (-)</td>
<td>-0.0571</td>
<td>-0.0535</td>
<td>-1.278</td>
<td>0.1008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Influence (-)</td>
<td>0.0671</td>
<td>0.0558</td>
<td>1.389</td>
<td>0.1656*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Influence (+)</td>
<td>-0.0322</td>
<td>-0.0362</td>
<td>-0.888</td>
<td>0.3746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self/Race Blame (+)</td>
<td>0.0983</td>
<td>0.0851</td>
<td>2.119</td>
<td>0.0172**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Intentions (+)</td>
<td>0.0607</td>
<td>0.0864</td>
<td>2.201</td>
<td>0.0140**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Equality (-)</td>
<td>-0.0300</td>
<td>-0.0456</td>
<td>-1.124</td>
<td>0.1308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.0451  
F = 2.077  
Prob (F) = 0.0095  
N = 675  

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.  
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.  
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Self-Interest Model, 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.8041</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>4.809</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (-)</td>
<td>-0.0839</td>
<td>-0.1389</td>
<td>-2.291</td>
<td>0.0112**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Finances (-)</td>
<td>-0.0278</td>
<td>-0.0302</td>
<td>-0.551</td>
<td>0.2909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income (-)</td>
<td>-0.0066</td>
<td>-0.0144</td>
<td>-0.258</td>
<td>0.3984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status (-)</td>
<td>0.1527</td>
<td>0.0410</td>
<td>0.770</td>
<td>0.4420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (-)</td>
<td>0.0576</td>
<td>0.0468</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>0.4012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (+)</td>
<td>0.0081</td>
<td>0.1384</td>
<td>2.386</td>
<td>0.0087***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Blacks (+)</td>
<td>0.1840</td>
<td>0.0936</td>
<td>1.758</td>
<td>0.0398**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Security (+)</td>
<td>0.0732</td>
<td>0.0406</td>
<td>0.722</td>
<td>0.2354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Worried (+)</td>
<td>-0.0332</td>
<td>-0.0243</td>
<td>-0.421</td>
<td>0.6740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Economics (-)</td>
<td>-0.0607</td>
<td>-0.0745</td>
<td>-1.302</td>
<td>0.0969*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Influence (-)</td>
<td>-0.0150</td>
<td>-0.0104</td>
<td>-0.197</td>
<td>0.4219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Influence (+)</td>
<td>-0.0244</td>
<td>-0.0285</td>
<td>-0.507</td>
<td>0.6122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self/Race Blame (+)</td>
<td>0.0229</td>
<td>0.0953</td>
<td>1.810</td>
<td>0.0356**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.0674
F = 2.002
Prob (F) = 0.0198
N = 373

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Self-Interest Model, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.1799</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>9.214</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (-)</td>
<td>0.0592</td>
<td>0.1121</td>
<td>3.489</td>
<td>0.0004***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Finances (-)</td>
<td>0.0295</td>
<td>0.0272</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>0.3494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income (-)</td>
<td>-0.0285</td>
<td>-0.0841</td>
<td>-2.518</td>
<td>0.0059***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status (-)</td>
<td>-0.0627</td>
<td>-0.0263</td>
<td>-0.870</td>
<td>0.1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (-)</td>
<td>0.0162</td>
<td>0.0159</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>0.5994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (+)</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0.0140</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.3169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>0.0760</td>
<td>0.0520</td>
<td>1.812</td>
<td>0.0351**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Treatment (+)</td>
<td>0.0250</td>
<td>0.0268</td>
<td>0.915</td>
<td>0.1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Opportunities (-)</td>
<td>0.0127</td>
<td>0.0163</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.5696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character/Race Blame (-)</td>
<td>0.0247</td>
<td>0.0328</td>
<td>1.090</td>
<td>0.2760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination First Problem (+)</td>
<td>0.3159</td>
<td>0.1316</td>
<td>4.251</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Second Problem (+)</td>
<td>0.2732</td>
<td>0.1196</td>
<td>3.910</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Progress (+)</td>
<td>-0.1525</td>
<td>-0.0664</td>
<td>-2.293</td>
<td>0.0220**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.0451
F = 4.363
Prob (F) = 0.0001
N = 1,215

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
variable and the independent variables as the other self-interest models, but does seem to fit the data better than the other models with regard to the F statistic (F = 4.363). Overall, the self-interest models do a rather poor job of explaining black support for or opposition to affirmative action. Next to each variable is a (+) or a (-) to indicate its predicted direction.

**Education (-)**

Education seems to have an erratic affect on black individuals' opposition or support for affirmative action. Therefore, I cannot conclusively discuss the effects of education on black support for affirmative action but to say that it does matter. Education was expected to have a negative effect on support. That is, as the level of education increases, the amount of support given to affirmative action is expected to decrease. Keeping in line with the benefit-cost argument of self-interest, those lower in education stand to gain more benefits and fewer costs from affirmative action than individuals higher in education. In 1988, education dampens support as hypothesized (b = -0.0839, t = -2.291), but in 1996, education has the opposite impact on support (b = 0.0592, t = 3.489). This is an interesting finding. In 1988, it can be assumed that those who had much to gain from affirmative action would be more supportive, and they were. Blacks lower on the educational scale supported affirmative action more than those higher on the educational scale. However, the reverse is the case in 1996. Given this, one leg of the self-interest theory is suspect.

**Family Finances (-)**

Respondents who believe that their family is worse off are hypothesized to be more supportive of affirmative action than people who believe they are getting better. Interestingly, family finances are
found to have no discernible effect on support for affirmative action. It does not matter whether or not the respondent believes that he/she or their family is worse off or better off when explaining black support for affirmative action. The t values for family finances read 1.029 in 1984, -0.551 in 1988, and 0.936 in 1996. Respondents must owe their and/or their family's financial success or hardship to other phenomenon unrelated to affirmative action. Therefore, another leg of the self-interest theory falters against the evidence.

**Family Income (−)**

Family income is hypothesized to diminish black support for affirmative action. As income rises, support for affirmative action is expected to decline chiefly because affirmative action may no longer be necessary to them or they will reap marginal benefits at best. We find that in each of the test years, family income is inversely related to black support, and it is significant in two of the three years. The coefficients for family income in 1984 (b = -0.0218, t = -1.458, prob < .0726) and 1996 (b = -0.0285, t = -2.518, prob < 0.01) suggest that an one unit increase in family income will result in an approximately -0.02 change in the scale measuring support for affirmative action; furthermore, as is evident from the t statistics associated with each of these coefficients, these effects are significant in a one-tailed test. Here we find our first evidence of support for the effects of self-interest on support for affirmative action. Blacks with higher levels of income are less supportive of affirmative action than similarly-situated blacks with lower levels of income.

**Employment Status (−)**

Unemployed blacks are expected to be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who are employed, for affirmative action
may be perceived as helping them in landing a job. Very much a surprise, employment status has no bearing on whether or not a black respondent will support or oppose affirmative action. This is surprising because affirmative action is generally thought of as an employment and education-enhancing measure. For those who are poorly employed and educated, one would expect greater support. But the results demonstrate a null effect between employment status and support for affirmative action.

Social Class (-)

Social class is expected to have a negative effect on support for affirmative action. Blacks lower in social class have more to gain from the policy than blacks higher in social class. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient for social class is positive in all years tested. However, social class is not found to be a significant factor in determining whether or not blacks support or oppose affirmative action. That is, lower class blacks were no more likely to support or oppose affirmative action than upper class blacks. Perhaps social class is unrelated because, as we are coming to find, socioeconomic characteristics do not have an impact on one's level of support for affirmative action. Because social class does not matter, the self-interest theory remains suspect in its ability to explain black attitudes toward affirmative action.

Age (+)

Older blacks have different experiences than younger blacks. Because they are likely to have experienced and participated in the civil rights struggle and have more direct experiences with discrimination, especially in its overt forms, older blacks are expected to be more supportive of affirmative action than younger blacks.
However, the coefficient for age is significant only in 1988 (b = 0.0081, t = 2.386), but it is positive in all three years. It would appear that, as blacks become older, they do not necessarily adopt the conservative position on affirmative action. Instead, as blacks grow older, they are more likely to support affirmative action. Here we find another piece of evidence that suggests that self-interest plays a part in black preferences for affirmative action.

**South (+)**

As hypothesized, Southern blacks were more likely to support affirmative action. These blacks live in a region of the country where government-sanctioned discrimination was part of the recent past, where the legacy of long-time racism and racial animosity toward blacks still linger, and these blacks are more likely than non-Southern blacks to have experienced overt racism and discrimination. The variable was positive and significant in the two years it is tested (in 1984, b = 0.1288 and t = 1.515; in 1988, b = 0.1840 and t = 1.758). Blacks living in the South are probably more supportive than blacks elsewhere because of the persistent racial tension that existed, and arguably still exists, in their region of the country. So, we find one more hypothesis in support of the self-interest theory.

**Job Security (+)**

Blacks who are very worried about losing their job in the near future are expected to be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who are not worried at all. Contrary to expectations, job insecurity has a negative impact on black support for or opposition to affirmative action (t = -1.458 in 1984). Blacks who are very worried about losing their job in the near future are no more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who are not worried at all. This
variable was expected to be positively related to support, but only in one of the two years that the variable was used, 1988, is the coefficient for the variable positive \( (b = 0.0732) \). Perhaps this reflects in part black perceptions of the ineffectiveness of affirmative action as discussed by Kinder and Sanders (1996). They find that while blacks support affirmative action, they doubt its effectiveness in providing jobs and combating discrimination. At any rate, this finding does not support the self-interest theory. More than anything this result undermines self-interest, for self-interested blacks who perceive economic hardship are expected to be more supportive of affirmative action.

**Job Worried (+)**

I also expect blacks who are worried about not being able to find a job should they lose theirs to be more supportive of affirmative action than those who are not worried about finding a job if they were to lose theirs. Unexpectedly, in both years the variable was used, 1984 and 1988, the coefficients for this variable were negatively related to support for affirmative action \( (b = -0.0604 \text{ and } b = -0.0332 \text{ in 1984 and 1988, respectively}) \), though neither of these coefficients reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Here again, this anomaly may bolster Kinder and Sanders' conclusion that blacks find affirmative action to be ineffective in achieving its employment goals.

**Black-White Economics (-)**

As expected, the perception that the economic position of blacks is worse than that of whites predisposes blacks to support affirmative action. Due to the coding scheme, this variable was hypothesized to be negatively related to support. In both years it was included in the analysis, the coefficient for this variable is negative— for 1984, \( b = -\frac{115}{10} \).
0.0571), and for 1988, \( b = -0.0607 \)--though it barely achieves statistical significance at the relaxed .10 level only in 1988 (\( t = -1.302 \)).

**Black Influence (−)**

I hypothesize that blacks who perceive blacks as not being influential will desire to have a policy, such as affirmative action, that will help blacks gain influence and, ultimately, increased affluence. I find little support for this hypothesis. Quite surprisingly, in 1984 blacks who believe blacks have too much influence in American life and politics are more supportive of affirmative action (\( b = 0.0671 \)), though this coefficient is statistically nonsignificant (\( t = 1.389 \), two-tailed test). The coefficient for this variable also fails to achieve statistical significance in 1988 (\( b = -0.0150 \), \( t = -0.197 \)). These results would seem to undermine the racial threat hypotheses posed under the self-interest framework.

**White Influence (+)**

I hypothesize that blacks who believe that whites were too influential in American life and politics would be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believed the opposite. The assumption here is that affirmative action may serve to combat the disproportionate amount of influence whites have in society. While the coefficients are, surprisingly, in the negative direction, this variable does not have a significant impact on support for affirmative action in either year. Again, we have evidence that disconfirms or undermines the racial threat thesis.

**Self/Race Blame (+)**

I expect that support for affirmative action will be higher among blacks who attribute blame for the relatively low standing of blacks in
society to their race rather than to the individual. Because these blacks perceive that racism and discrimination remain in force, they will support affirmative action inasmuch as it is intended to diminish the amount of discrimination and racism that they face in employment.

My findings lend strong support to this hypothesis. The perception that race is a hindrance to blacks getting ahead in America is significant and positively related to support for affirmative action as hypothesized (for 1984, b = 0.0983, t = 2.119; for 1988, b = 0.0229, t = 1.810). This suggests that blacks support affirmative action because they believe they are judged by their race, and in spite of previous findings that alluded to the ineffectiveness of affirmative action, blacks view affirmative action as a means to overcome discrimination and racism. Given these results, we have additional support of the racial threat hypothesis.

**White Intentions (+)**

I hypothesize that blacks who believe that whites are out to keep blacks down will be more supportive of blacks that believe that whites want to see blacks get a better break. This outcome was borne out in 1984 (b = 0.0607, t = 2.201). An one unit increase on this scale results in a 0.0607 change in the scale estimating support for affirmative action. Blacks support affirmative action out of some sense of racial threat from whites and because it combats the efforts of whites to keep blacks down. This further supports the racial threat argument I posed earlier.

**Black-White Equality (-)**

I hypothesized that blacks who believe the country would be better off if we worried more about how equal blacks and whites were would be more supportive of affirmative action. This hypothesis, tested only in
1984, was in the anticipated direction \((b = -0.0300)\), negative due to coding, but the coefficient is not significant \((t = -1.124)\).

**Black Common Fate (+)**

I expect that blacks who believe that what happens generally to black people will have something to do with them are more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believe that their lives are independent of what happens to other blacks. The assumption is that people are judged according to their race and that blacks are treated similarly, whether it is in a positive or negative manner. Recall that the argument is that in order to achieve racial fairness, blacks support affirmative action, for blacks often perceive themselves as sharing the same fate. As expected, blacks who think that what happens generally to black people will have something to do with them are supportive of affirmative action. The coefficient in 1996 suggests that an one unit increase will result in a 0.0760 change in support for affirmative action; furthermore, this effect is significant in an one-tailed test \((t = 1.812, \text{ prob } < 0.05)\). This finding further supports my contention that blacks support affirmative action as a part of gaining racial fairness, a component of the self-interest argument. In other words, blacks who perceive a common fate with other blacks are more supportive of affirmative action than those who do not perceive such a common fate.

**Black Treatment (+)**

I hypothesize that blacks who believe that their race has more to do with how they are treated than their income are more supportive of affirmative action. Again, this is expected because blacks may perceive affirmative action as a means of achieving racial fairness. As expected, in 1996, blacks who believe that their race has more to do with how they are treated than their income are more supportive of
affirmative action ($b = 0.0250$). However, this variable was not significant ($t = 0.915$), and does not support the self-interest theory's racial fairness element.

**Black Opportunities (-)**

Also not reaching an acceptable level of statistical significance is the belief that black opportunities are linked to how other blacks are treated ($t = 0.569$ in 1996). Blacks who believe black opportunities are a function of how other blacks are treated are no more supportive of or opposed to affirmative action than blacks who do not perceive a link. In fact, this variable performed in the opposite direction than that I proposed ($b = 0.0127$). This result seems to undermine the racial threat and racial fairness components of the self-interest argument.

**Character/Race Blame (-)**

Unexpectedly positive ($b = 0.0247$ in 1996), but not significant ($t = 1.090$ in 1996), is the coefficient for the belief that in this country, people are judged more on the content of their character than their race. That is, support for or opposition to affirmative action is not influenced by whether or not one believes people are judged by their race or the content of their character. This, too, is contrary to the expectations of self-interest theory.

**Discrimination First Problem (+)**

The belief that discrimination is the most important problem facing blacks would be expected to be strongly and positively related to support for affirmative action policies among blacks, and this is what I find. The coefficient for this variable is, as expected, positive ($b = 0.3159$ in 1996) and reaches a high level of statistical significance ($t = 4.251$ in 1996). Simply, blacks who believe that discrimination is the most important problem facing black people are more likely to support...
affirmative action than blacks who believe it is not. This is very much in line with the self-interest theory. Those blacks who perceive a large amount of discrimination should rationally support a policy that purports to solve that problem.

**Discrimination Second Problem (+)**

The variable reflecting the relationship between support for affirmative action and the belief that discrimination is the second most important problem facing blacks also has a significant and positive effect on black support for affirmative action ($b = 0.2732$ in 1996, $t = 3.910$). Blacks who believe that discrimination is the second most important problem facing black people are more likely to support affirmative action than blacks who believe it is not. Again, this result is to be expected from self-interested individuals.

**Discrimination Progress (+)**

Surprisingly, blacks who believe that over the past twenty years there has not been much real change in getting rid of racial discrimination are not supportive of affirmative action. Logic and previous findings suggest that blacks who believe there has not been any real change in getting rid of racial discrimination would support affirmative action as a means of reducing the level of racial discrimination in society. However, I find the opposite effect. The coefficient for this variable in 1996 demonstrates that an one unit increase will result in a $-0.1525$ change in support for affirmative action; furthermore, this relationship is significant in an one-tailed test ($t = -2.293$).

**Reduced Self-Interest Model**

Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the Ordinary Least Squares regression results for the reduced self-interest models. The reduced models
Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Reduced Self-Interest Model, 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.3358</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>8.420</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income (-)</td>
<td>-0.0200</td>
<td>-0.0637</td>
<td>-1.620</td>
<td>0.0527*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (-)</td>
<td>0.0698</td>
<td>0.0553</td>
<td>1.413</td>
<td>0.1582*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Blacks (+)</td>
<td>0.0815</td>
<td>0.0390</td>
<td>1.042</td>
<td>0.2977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Security (+)</td>
<td>-0.1275</td>
<td>-0.0636</td>
<td>-1.707</td>
<td>0.0882**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Influence (-)</td>
<td>0.0614</td>
<td>0.0530</td>
<td>1.402</td>
<td>0.1614*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self/Race Blame (+)</td>
<td>0.0953</td>
<td>0.0553</td>
<td>2.176</td>
<td>0.0299**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Intentions (+)</td>
<td>0.0607</td>
<td>0.0864</td>
<td>2.325</td>
<td>0.0140**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.0294
F = 3.075
Prob (F) = 0.0034
N = 717

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.712</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>9.280</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (-)</td>
<td>-0.0820</td>
<td>-0.1358</td>
<td>-2.412</td>
<td>0.0088***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (+)</td>
<td>0.0076</td>
<td>0.1301</td>
<td>2.361</td>
<td>0.0048***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Blacks (+)</td>
<td>0.1814</td>
<td>0.0922</td>
<td>1.756</td>
<td>0.0400**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Economics (-)</td>
<td>-0.0454</td>
<td>-0.0557</td>
<td>-1.034</td>
<td>0.3017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self/Race Blame (+)</td>
<td>0.0205</td>
<td>0.0853</td>
<td>1.653</td>
<td>0.0496**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.0597
F = 4.675
Prob (F) = 0.0004
N = 373

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Reduced Self-Interest Model, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.4675</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>15.992</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (-)</td>
<td>0.0538</td>
<td>0.1019</td>
<td>3.244</td>
<td>0.0012***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income (-)</td>
<td>-0.0275</td>
<td>-0.0810</td>
<td>-2.591</td>
<td>0.0059***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>0.0692</td>
<td>0.0473</td>
<td>1.678</td>
<td>0.0468**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination First Problem (+)</td>
<td>0.3134</td>
<td>0.1306</td>
<td>4.249</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Second Problem (+)</td>
<td>0.2687</td>
<td>0.1177</td>
<td>3.865</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Progress (+)</td>
<td>-0.1475</td>
<td>-0.0643</td>
<td>-2.247</td>
<td>0.0248**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2 = 0.0409$

$F = 8.600$

Prob (F) = 0.0001

N = 1,215

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.

** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.

* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.

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consist only of the independent variables that reached an acceptable level of statistical significance, \( p < 0.10 \), in the full model. In these tables, we see extraordinary stability in the magnitudes of the independent variables. Also, we notice that the statistically significant variables drive much of the explanatory power in the full model. The \( R^2 \) values in the reduced model are less than that of the full model, but still very similar. The \( F \) statistics for the reduced models are much higher than that of the full models, indicating better model performance. One final observation is that the variables result in the same direction in the reduced model as they did in the full model.

**Summary**

Self-interest appears to do only modestly well at explaining support for affirmative action among black Americans. Although there are strong theoretical reasons for expecting a strong self-interest effect on political (and especially racial) attitudes, previous research has found little evidence that such attitudes are driven by self interest. Although many of the variables that capture the effects of self-interest are not strongly related to support for affirmative action, many of the variables used to estimate the effects of racial threat and racial fairness are related to black support for affirmative action. Another finding is that there is evidence supporting the notion that blacks find affirmative action to be ineffective at helping them achieve their employment goals. However, there is also evidence that suggest that blacks perceive affirmative action is effective.

**SYMBOLIC POLITICS**

The symbolic politics model predicts that attitudes toward affirmative action are a function of core values, political orientation,
and black group consciousness. I hypothesize a differential level of support among blacks based on these factors. Some blacks cling more to their egalitarian or liberal proclivities, their Democratic partisanship, or their black group consciousness. Other blacks adhere more to their individualistic or conservative inclinations, their Republican partisanship, or their lower levels of black group consciousness. I expect egalitarians, liberals, Democrats, and blacks with high levels of black group consciousness to be more supportive of affirmative action than individualists, conservatives, Republicans, and blacks who do not share a high level of black group consciousness.

Unlike the models used to estimate the effects of self-interest, the models used to account for the effects of symbolic politics attitudes perform reasonably well in detecting relationships and explaining variance. Like previous research, I find that the theory of symbolic politics does well to explain political preferences.

In Tables 7, 8, and 9, I report the Ordinary Least Squares regression results for the symbolic politics models, estimated separately for 1984, 1988, and 1996, respectively. An examination of these tables indicates a modest goodness-of-fit for these models. The 1984 symbolic politics model explains approximately 17% of the total variance, it has an F statistic of 7.397, and a fair number of significant independent variables. Overall, it would appear that the 1984 model does an adequate job of explaining black attitudes toward affirmative action. However, the 1988 symbolic politics model does not perform quite as well as the 1984 model. On three criteria of model evaluation, this model has a lower, but still respectable, R² (R² = 15%) and a lower F statistic (F=4.276), and it detects fewer significant relationships between the dependent variable and the independent
Table 7: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Symbolic Politics Model, 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.6659</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>1.397</td>
<td>0.0814*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Blacks and Minorities (+)</td>
<td>0.2289</td>
<td>0.1665</td>
<td>4.520</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Efforts by Government (-)</td>
<td>-0.1495</td>
<td>-0.1397</td>
<td>-3.748</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Criteria (-)</td>
<td>-0.0808</td>
<td>-0.0778</td>
<td>-2.108</td>
<td>0.0177**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Integration (+)</td>
<td>0.1136</td>
<td>0.1204</td>
<td>3.332</td>
<td>0.0004***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs/S.O.L. Scale (+)</td>
<td>0.0451</td>
<td>0.0681</td>
<td>1.897</td>
<td>0.0291**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology (+)</td>
<td>-0.0057</td>
<td>-0.0103</td>
<td>-0.283</td>
<td>0.7774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship (+)</td>
<td>0.0073</td>
<td>0.0092</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.4007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>0.0559</td>
<td>0.0772</td>
<td>2.113</td>
<td>0.0175**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Identity (+)</td>
<td>0.1427</td>
<td>0.0890</td>
<td>2.460</td>
<td>0.0070***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Attachment (+)</td>
<td>0.0762</td>
<td>0.0461</td>
<td>1.234</td>
<td>0.1087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Attachment (-)</td>
<td>-0.0006</td>
<td>-0.0004</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.4949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Interaction (+)</td>
<td>0.2172</td>
<td>0.1178</td>
<td>3.250</td>
<td>0.0006***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Economics (-)</td>
<td>-0.0480</td>
<td>-0.0449</td>
<td>-1.210</td>
<td>0.1134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Influence (-)</td>
<td>0.1163</td>
<td>0.0962</td>
<td>2.586</td>
<td>0.0098***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Influence (+)</td>
<td>-0.0745</td>
<td>-0.0823</td>
<td>-2.176</td>
<td>0.0298**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (-)</td>
<td>0.0574</td>
<td>0.0464</td>
<td>1.222</td>
<td>0.2220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self/Race Blame (+)</td>
<td>0.0285</td>
<td>0.0245</td>
<td>0.657</td>
<td>0.2557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Intentions (+)</td>
<td>0.0441</td>
<td>0.0625</td>
<td>1.640</td>
<td>0.0507*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.1650  
F = 7.397  
Prob (F) = 0.0001  
N = 692  
*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.  
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.  
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
Table 8: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Symbolic Politics Model, 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.1332</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>1.759</td>
<td>0.0397**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs/S.O.L. Scale (+)</td>
<td>0.2877</td>
<td>0.2832</td>
<td>5.640</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology (+)</td>
<td>-0.0110</td>
<td>-0.0212</td>
<td>-0.421</td>
<td>0.6742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship (+)</td>
<td>0.0352</td>
<td>0.0479</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>0.3698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>0.0565</td>
<td>0.0882</td>
<td>1.769</td>
<td>0.0389**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love Families (+)</td>
<td>-0.0965</td>
<td>-0.0526</td>
<td>-0.905</td>
<td>0.3660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardworkers (+)</td>
<td>0.1743</td>
<td>0.1112</td>
<td>1.906</td>
<td>0.0287**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Others (+)</td>
<td>0.1717</td>
<td>0.1224</td>
<td>2.194</td>
<td>0.0144**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud (+)</td>
<td>-0.0544</td>
<td>-0.0349</td>
<td>-0.583</td>
<td>0.5606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest (+)</td>
<td>0.1866</td>
<td>0.1170</td>
<td>2.049</td>
<td>0.0206**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong (+)</td>
<td>-0.0823</td>
<td>-0.0549</td>
<td>-0.916</td>
<td>0.3602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Economics (-)</td>
<td>-0.0432</td>
<td>-0.0530</td>
<td>-1.000</td>
<td>0.1589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Influence (-)</td>
<td>-0.0033</td>
<td>-0.0023</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>0.8222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Influence (+)</td>
<td>-0.0636</td>
<td>-0.0744</td>
<td>-1.409</td>
<td>0.1596*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (-)</td>
<td>-0.0157</td>
<td>-0.0128</td>
<td>-0.255</td>
<td>0.3994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self/Race Blame (+)</td>
<td>0.0085</td>
<td>0.0352</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>0.2453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.1519  
F = 4.276  
Prob (F) = 0.0001  
N = 373

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.  
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.  
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
Table 9: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Symbolic Politics Model, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.7805</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>1.465</td>
<td>0.0716*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Blacks (+)</td>
<td>0.0269</td>
<td>0.0572</td>
<td>1.920</td>
<td>0.0275**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Integration (+)</td>
<td>0.1673</td>
<td>0.1746</td>
<td>6.268</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs/S.O.L. Scale (+)</td>
<td>-2.9E06</td>
<td>-6.1E06</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>0.9998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology (+)</td>
<td>0.0602</td>
<td>0.0418</td>
<td>1.496</td>
<td>0.0674*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship (+)</td>
<td>0.1336</td>
<td>0.0162</td>
<td>0.580</td>
<td>0.2808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>0.0503</td>
<td>0.0344</td>
<td>1.182</td>
<td>0.1187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Men Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>0.0855</td>
<td>0.0435</td>
<td>1.395</td>
<td>0.0816*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Women Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>-0.0242</td>
<td>-0.0131</td>
<td>-0.420</td>
<td>0.1716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>0.0583</td>
<td>0.0741</td>
<td>2.601</td>
<td>0.0047***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Interaction (+)</td>
<td>0.0976</td>
<td>0.0550</td>
<td>1.795</td>
<td>0.0252**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Economics (-)</td>
<td>0.0800</td>
<td>0.0059</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.8394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black SES (+)</td>
<td>0.0321</td>
<td>0.0168</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0.2793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantaged's Strength (+)</td>
<td>0.1000</td>
<td>0.0877</td>
<td>3.119</td>
<td>0.0009***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (-)</td>
<td>0.0181</td>
<td>0.0178</td>
<td>0.634</td>
<td>0.5264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Treatment (+)</td>
<td>0.0159</td>
<td>0.0170</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>0.2775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Opportunities (-)</td>
<td>0.0149</td>
<td>0.0191</td>
<td>0.680</td>
<td>0.4966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character/Race Blame (-)</td>
<td>0.0206</td>
<td>0.0273</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>0.1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination First Problem (+)</td>
<td>0.2610</td>
<td>0.1088</td>
<td>3.561</td>
<td>0.0002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Second Problem (+)</td>
<td>0.2196</td>
<td>0.0962</td>
<td>3.195</td>
<td>0.0007***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Progress (+)</td>
<td>-0.1722</td>
<td>-0.0750</td>
<td>-2.621</td>
<td>0.0088***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.0926
F = 6.096
Prob (F) = 0.0001
N = 1,215

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
variables. I would have to conclude that the 1988 symbolic politics model does a weaker job of explaining black support for or opposition to affirmative action. The 1996 symbolic politics model is not readily comparable to the other years, for it is based on a different data set and different explanatory variables. Nonetheless, it is not as powerful as the other models. The 1996 symbolic politics model explains slightly more than 9% of the total variance, though it does do a decent job of detecting relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables, and it seems to fit the data as well as the other models with regard to the F statistic \( F = 6.096 \). Overall, the models do only a fairly adequate job of explaining black support for or opposition to affirmative action.

**Help Blacks and Minorities (+)**

I hypothesize that blacks who support efforts by the government in Washington to improve the social and economic positions of blacks and other minorities will be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks at the opposite end of this scale. Many blacks believe that, if discrimination is eliminated, blacks can achieve levels of social and economic success comparable to that of whites. Inasmuch as affirmative action aims to rid society of affirmative action, blacks who support these efforts by the federal government should support affirmative action. As expected, blacks who support efforts by the government in Washington to improve the social and economic positions of blacks and other minorities are more supportive of affirmative action than blacks at the opposite end of this scale. In 1984 and 1996, the coefficients for the Help Blacks and Minorities and Help Blacks variables, respectively, are both positive \( (b = 0.2289 \) in 1984, \( b = 0.0269 \) in 1996) and significant \( (t = 4.520, \text{ prob } < 0.001 \) in 1984; \( t = 1.920, \text{ prob } < \)
Affirmative action is considered by many blacks as a mechanism by which the government in Washington can improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minorities. Here we have our first piece of evidence in support of my argument that egalitarianism is positively related to support for affirmative action, while individualism is negatively related.

**Special Efforts by Government** (-)

Also, as expected, blacks who believe that the government should not make any special efforts to assist blacks and other minorities were less supportive of affirmative action. For 1984, the coefficient for this variable is negative \( b = -0.1495 \) and significant \( t = -3.748, \text{prob} < 0.001 \). Perhaps these blacks espouse the "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" doctrine, and feel that affirmative action is detrimental to blacks in general. Conversely, blacks who do not buy into this argument will be more supportive of affirmative action. At any rate, these findings further support my contention that egalitarianism has a positive effect on support, and individualism has a negative influence on support.

**Job Criteria** (-)

Blacks who support affirmative action should also be in favor of other criteria besides test scores and other individual qualities coming to bear when judging job applicants. These additional factors that can be considered by employers may include race, gender, physical handicap status, etc. This hypothesis is confirmed, for in 1984, blacks who believe that job applicants should be based solely on test scores and other individual qualities were less supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believe other criteria should be taken into account \( b = -0.0808, t = -2.108 \). Again, this is more evidence of a positive
relationship between egalitarianism and support. This variable is a measure of egalitarianism, for it not only points out and recognizes differences between individuals, but seems to suggest that these differences should be taken into account and not be used against the job applicant.

Racial Integration (+)

Busing is another racial issue that may have ties to affirmative action. That is, one who supports busing in order to achieve racial integration may support affirmative action for the very same reason. This hypothesis is also confirmed. In 1984, blacks who believe that racial integration is important enough to justify busing supported affirmative action. The coefficient for Racial Integration in 1984 suggests that an one unit increase on this scale will result in a 0.1136 change in support for affirmative action; furthermore, this effect is significant in an one-tailed test (t = 3.332, prob < 0.001). Also, in 1996, blacks who believe that racial integration is important enough to justify busing also supported affirmative action. The coefficient for Racial Integration in 1996 demonstrates that an one unit increase on this scale will result in a 0.1673 change in support for affirmative action; furthermore, this effect is significant in an one-tailed test (t = 6.268, prob < 0.001). Again we find another supporting piece of evidence of the positive effects egalitarianism has on support for affirmative action.

Jobs/Standard of Living (S. O. L.) Scale (+)

It is hypothesized that blacks who believe that the government in Washington should provide every person with a job and a good standard of living will also support affirmative action. It may be the case that in order to ensure blacks of a good job and standard of living, affirmative
action may be necessary. The variable capturing this sentiment is both positive ($b = 0.0451$ and $b = 0.2877$ in 1984 and 1988, respectively) and significant in 1984 and 1988 ($t = 1.897$ and $t = 5.640$ in 1984 and 1988, respectively). It was negative in 1996 ($b = -0.0000$, but its impact was extremely small and it did not achieve an acceptable level of statistical significance ($t = -0.000$). With the positive and significant results of this variable, a tally of variables thus far show that all variables used to capture the effects of egalitarianism, save one, are not only positively related to support, but they are significant, save one. So, we have already a sizable amount of evidence that suggests symbolic politics attitudes undergird black preferences toward affirmative action.

**Political Ideology (+)**

I hypothesize that liberals would be more supportive of affirmative action than conservatives. Affirmative action is an attempt by the government to ameliorate one social problem, so liberals are expected to be in favor of the policy. However, in 1984 and 1988, though the variables were not significant, conservatives were more supportive of affirmative action than liberals. In 1996 when the political ideology variable is significant in an one-tailed test ($t = 1.496$, prob < 0.10), liberalism was positively related to support for affirmative action and conservatism was negatively related to support for affirmative action ($b = 0.0602$). It seems that political ideology has only a modest effect on support, for the variable is significant in only one year. However, based on the result of that established relationship, liberals are indeed supportive of affirmative action, and conservatives opposed. This also supports my contention that the theory of symbolic politics explains black support for or opposition to affirmative action.
Political Partisanship (+)

Based on previous literature that discovered a connection between political ideology and political partisanship, I expect Democrats to exhibit the same degree of support as liberals, and for Republicans to be equally opposed to affirmative action as conservatives. However, the political partisanship variable does not reach an acceptable level of statistical significance in any of the three years tested. Therefore, partisanship appears to have no bearing on support for or opposition to affirmative action among blacks.

Black Centrality (+)

I hypothesize that blacks who think about being black a lot would be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who do not. This hypothesis is confirmed. In each year, blacks who think about being black a lot are supportive of affirmative action, and these relationships are significant. It seems that race identification enhances black support for policies that purport to benefit the race. That is, blacks who identify highly with their race support policies that aim to benefit it. Identification is the first component of group consciousness, and we have evidence that supports my argument that group consciousness, as part of the symbolic politics discussion, is positively related to support for affirmative action.

Black Identity (+)

Blacks who believe it is more important to be black than American are also more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who feel it is more important to be American than black or to be both equally, as expected. In 1984, this variable was positive ($b = 0.1427$) and significant ($t = 2.460$, prob < 0.001). The coefficient for Black Identity in 1984 suggests that an one unit increase in black identity
will result in a 0.1427 change in the scale measuring support for affirmative action. Again, we see more evidence of the relationship between race identification and positive support for affirmative action, and therefore, more evidence of the effects of symbolic politics attitudes.

**Black and White Attachment (+) and -)**

Blacks who feel closer to other blacks in ideas and feelings are expected to be more supportive of affirmative action than those who do not. Also, blacks who feel closer to whites in ideas and feelings were expected to be less supportive of affirmative action than those who do not. Both of these hypotheses have the intended outcomes, but they were not significant. Therefore, the level of attachment to blacks or whites are not influencing factors on determining black support for affirmative action.

**Black-White Interaction (+)**

In the two years the survey item was included in the analysis, 1984 and 1996, the belief that blacks should not have anything to do with whites is found to be positively related to support for affirmative action ($b = 0.2172$ in 1984 and $b = 0.0976$ in 1996), as expected, and significant in an one-tailed test ($t = 3.250$ in 1984 and $t = 1.959$ in 1996). It is assumed that blacks who believe that the two races should hold their interaction to a minimum because whites may have ulterior motives or because these blacks may have underlying separatist feelings. On the other hand, true integrationists are less supportive of affirmative action. At any rate, these sentiments undergird a favorable opinion of affirmative action, and support the symbolic politics theory, but more specifically, the group identification component of group consciousness.
Black Stereotypes (+)

Blacks who hold favorable opinions of their race are expected to be supportive of policies that seek to benefit fellow blacks. This hypothesis is largely confirmed. For 1988, blacks who believe that blacks in general are hard workers (b = 0.1743, t = 1.906), care for others (b = 0.1717, t = 2.194), and are honest (b = 0.1866, t = 2.049) are significantly more likely to support affirmative action. Surprisingly, blacks who believe that blacks in general love their families, are proud, and strong are not more supportive of affirmative action. Love of one's family may be too remote from affirmative action to make a connection. The belief that blacks are proud and strong may render affirmative action unnecessary because blacks possess these qualities and do not need affirmative action. Nonetheless, we have ample support of the symbolic politics theory, and particularly the polar affect component of group consciousness.

Black-White Economics (-)

As expected, blacks who believe that the economic position of blacks is much worse than whites are more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believe the economic position of blacks is much better than whites. This is the case in both 1984 and 1988, but in 1996 the variable is positively related to support. However, the relationship between support for affirmative action and perceived racial economic disparity is not significant in any of the three test years.

Black and White Influence (- and +)

It is hypothesized that blacks who believe that blacks have too little influence in American life and politics will be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believe the opposite. It is further hypothesized that blacks who believe that whites have too much
influence in American life and politics will be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believe the opposite. The results of these relationships are quite surprising. I find that blacks who believe that blacks have too much influence are less supportive of affirmative action and blacks who believe that whites are too influential are more supportive of affirmative action. Even more puzzling, the Black Influence variable was significant in 1984 and the White Influence variable was significant in both the models in which it was included, 1984 and 1988. Perhaps these findings reflect the lack of a consensus on the definition of affirmative action or perceived ineffectiveness. At any rate, we still lack support for the polar power component of group consciousness.

Social Class (-)

Social class does not factor into support for or opposition to affirmative action, for at no time do the variables capturing the effects of self-placed social class reach an acceptable level of statistical significance. Admitting to a low social class would indirectly suggest a noticeable difference between these members of the ingroup and minority when compared to members of the outgroup and majority. However, I still do not find any evidence which supports the polar power component of group consciousness. Therefore, I conclude that there is no relationship between the portion of the symbolic politics argument and support for affirmative action.

Self/Race Blame (+)

I hypothesize that blacks who believe that blacks do not do well in life because of their race will be more supportive of affirmative action than those who believe that blacks do not do well because of their own circumstances or shortcomings. Those who see a group basis
are expected to support affirmative action because it may be seen as a way to overcome the problem of discrimination against blacks. As expected, there are positive effects between this sentiment and support for affirmative action. However, this variable is not significant in either 1984 or 1988. So, we do not have confirmation of the individual vs. system blame component of group consciousness as yet.

**White Intentions (+)**

I hypothesize that blacks who believe that whites are out to keep blacks down will be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believe that whites want to see blacks get a better break. The relationship between support for affirmative action and the belief that whites are out to keep blacks down is both positive and significant. The coefficient in 1984 demonstrates that an one unit increase on this scale results in a 0.0441 change in the scale estimating support for affirmative action; furthermore, this relationship is significant in an one-tailed test (t = 1.640, prob < 0.05). Perhaps this result reflects, in addition to the ability of affirmative action to combat racial threat, the polar power dimension of group consciousness. That is, perhaps these blacks support affirmative action because they believe whites have a disproportionate amount of power, such that white can keep blacks down. Affirmative action may then be viewed as a way to fend off white attacks. Now we have some evidence in support of the individual vs. system blame aspect of group consciousness, and therefore, we obtain more support of the theory of symbolic politics.

**Black Common Fate (+)**

I hypothesize that blacks who believe that what generally happens to black people has something to do with the black respondent will be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who do not. This
hypothesis taps not only the group identification component of group consciousness, but more so it captures the effects of individual vs. system blame. The Black Common Fate variable implies similar treatment based on ascriptive characteristics. So, in other words, this variable taps the sentiment that members of the same group are treated the same due to their shared race, thus common fate. However, it appears that this sentiment does not matter when explaining support for or opposition to affirmative action.

Black Men Common Fate (+)
There is a link between the perceived common fate of black men and support for affirmative action. Blacks who believe that what generally happens to black men will have something to do with what happens in their life are likely to support affirmative action. It is assumed that black men are the common targets of racial discrimination and racism, so one who perceives a link between what generally happens to black men and their own personal lives will support affirmative action. This variable is positive and significant in 1996. An one unit increase in Black Men Common Fate results in a 0.0855 unit change in the scale measuring support for affirmative action; moreover, this variable was significant at a relaxed level of significance in an one-tailed test (t = 1.395, prob < 0.10). This variable also captures the effects of the individual vs. system blame component of group consciousness. So, not only does this finding support the group consciousness framework, but in general, it provides additional support for the theory of symbolic politics.

Black Women Common Fate (+)
There is not, however, a link between the perceived common fate of black women and support for affirmative action. It does not matter
whether or not one believes what generally happens to black women has anything to do with what happens in their life. There is no relationship between common fate with black women and support for or opposition to affirmative action. This outcome may be attributed to an overwhelming focus on the condition of black men, and relatively little attention paid to black women.

**Black Socioeconomic Status (SES) (+)**

I hypothesize that blacks who believe that blacks will never achieve full social and economic equality will be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who are more optimistic on this scale. Even though the belief that blacks will not achieve full social and economic equality is positively related to support for affirmative action, it not significant. So this result does not support group consciousness in terms of polar power.

**Disadvantaged's Strength (+)**

I expect to find that blacks are more likely to support affirmative action if they believe that if other blacks, minorities, the poor, and women pulled together, they could decide how the country is run. The assumption here is that affirmative action is viewed as a policy that can help blacks achieve this relatively rosy outcome. Contrary to previous findings that suggest affirmative action is perceived to be an ineffective policy for minorities and women in attaining economic and social success, I find that blacks who believe that if other blacks, minorities, the poor, and women pulled together, they could decide how the country is run are likely to support affirmative action than blacks who believe the opposite. This variable was positive \( b = 0.1000 \) and significant \( t = 3.119 \) in 1996. Here is additional support for my argument that group consciousness, as part of
the symbolic politics theory, helps drive black preferences regarding affirmative action.

**Black Treatment (+)**

It is expected that blacks who believe that being black determines how one is treated are more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believe treatment depends more on how much money one earns. Like several preceding variables, this variable seeks to capture the effects of the individual vs. system blame component of group consciousness. It appears that blacks who believe that being black determines how you are treated are more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believe treatment depends more on how much money you earn. However, this variable does not reach an acceptable level of statistical significance, and therefore, does not support the symbolic politics theory.

**Black Opportunities (-)**

Unexpectedly, blacks who believe that their opportunities to get ahead are affected by how other blacks are treated are less likely to support affirmative action than blacks who believe their opportunities to get ahead are not affected by how other blacks are treated. However, this variable is not significant and shows no support of the symbolic politics theory.

**Character/Race Blame (-)**

I expect that blacks who believe that people judge others more by the content of one's character than one's race will be less supportive of affirmative action. If people judge more by the content of one's character, then racism or discrimination plays only a small part in decision making, if at all. Unexpectedly, this variable is positive, but it is not significant. So far, I report very little evidence which
suggests that group consciousness in terms of individual vs. system blame affects support for affirmative action.

**Discrimination First Problem (+)**

As expected, blacks who believe that discrimination is the most important problem facing black people are more likely to support affirmative action than blacks who do not consider discrimination the most important problem facing blacks. This variable is both positive (b = 0.2610) and significant in an one-tailed test (t = 3.561, prob < 0.001) in 1996. Affirmative action may be viewed by some blacks as a means of overcoming racial discrimination. Here we have more evidence to support my argument that some blacks support affirmative action based on symbolic politics attitudes, and more specifically, the individual vs. system blame component of group consciousness.

**Discrimination Second Problem (+)**

Also as expected, blacks who believe that discrimination is the second most important problem facing black people are more likely to support affirmative action than blacks who do not consider discrimination to be the second most important problem facing blacks. This variable is both positive (b = 0.2196) and significant in an one-tailed test (t = 3.195, prob < 0.001) in 1996. Here we have additional evidence to support my contention that many blacks support affirmative action due to their symbolic politics proclivities, and more specifically, the individual vs. system blame component of group consciousness.

**Discrimination Progress (+)**

Quite surprisingly, the significant relationship between support for affirmative action and the belief that there has been a lot of progress in getting rid of racial discrimination is positive. I
hypothesized that blacks who perceive not much real change in getting rid of racial discrimination would support affirmative action, but I find that blacks who believe there has been a lot of progress over the last twenty years in getting rid of racial discrimination are the ones who are likely to support affirmative action. This significant finding undermines the aforementioned results that established a connection between group consciousness and support for affirmative action.

**Reduced Symbolic Politics Model**

Tables 10, 11, and 12 display the Ordinary Least Squares regression results for the reduced symbolic politics models. The reduced models consist only of the independent variables that reached at least a p < 0.10 level of statistical significance in the full model. In these tables, we see some extremely remarkable stability in the magnitudes of the independent variables. As with the reduced self-interest models, the statistically significant variables drive most of the explanatory power in the full model. Also with the reduced self-interest models, the R² values in the reduced symbolic politics model are less than that of the full model, but still very similar. The F statistics for the reduced symbolic politics models are much higher than that of their full models. By and large, the reduced models perform similarly to the full models, for the independent variables result in the same direction in the reduced model as they did in the full model.

**Summary**

The models used to explain the effects of symbolic politics attitudes do a reasonably good job of detecting relationships and explaining variance, and they do much better at establishing relationships and explaining variance than do the self-interest models. As is consistent with the extant literature that seeks to link symbolic
Table 10: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Reduced Symbolic Politics Model, 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.0644</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>3.147</td>
<td>0.0017***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Blacks and Minorities (+)</td>
<td>0.2586</td>
<td>0.1917</td>
<td>5.521</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Efforts by Government (-)</td>
<td>-0.1450</td>
<td>-0.1371</td>
<td>-3.929</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Criteria (-)</td>
<td>-0.0913</td>
<td>-0.0886</td>
<td>-2.556</td>
<td>0.0177***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Integration (+)</td>
<td>0.1138</td>
<td>0.1209</td>
<td>3.538</td>
<td>0.0002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs/S.O.L. Scale (+)</td>
<td>0.0432</td>
<td>0.0650</td>
<td>1.916</td>
<td>0.0248**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>0.0536</td>
<td>0.0748</td>
<td>2.178</td>
<td>0.0175**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Identity (+)</td>
<td>0.1334</td>
<td>0.0844</td>
<td>2.480</td>
<td>0.0067***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Interaction (+)</td>
<td>0.1572</td>
<td>0.0871</td>
<td>2.542</td>
<td>0.0056***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Influence (-)</td>
<td>0.0896</td>
<td>0.0774</td>
<td>2.261</td>
<td>0.0241**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Influence (+)</td>
<td>-0.0555</td>
<td>-0.0619</td>
<td>-1.758</td>
<td>0.0791**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Intentions (+)</td>
<td>0.0489</td>
<td>0.0697</td>
<td>2.023</td>
<td>0.0217**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.1500  
F = 12.092  
Prob (F) = 0.0001  
N = 765

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.  
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.  
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
Table 11: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Reduced Symbolic Politics Model, 1988

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>prob</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.6737</td>
<td>1.639</td>
<td>0.0510*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs/S.O.L. Scale (+)</td>
<td>0.2935</td>
<td>5.937</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>0.0584</td>
<td>1.860</td>
<td>0.0318**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardworkers (+)</td>
<td>0.1181</td>
<td>1.410</td>
<td>0.0797*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Others (+)</td>
<td>0.1454</td>
<td>1.949</td>
<td>0.0260**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest (+)</td>
<td>0.1369</td>
<td>1.633</td>
<td>0.0517*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Influence (+)</td>
<td>-0.0366</td>
<td>-0.878</td>
<td>0.3808*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2 = 0.1397$
$F = 9.937$
Prob (F) = 0.0001
N = 373

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
Table 12: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Reduced Symbolic Politics Model, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.2918</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>5.703</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Blacks (+)</td>
<td>0.0265</td>
<td>0.0564</td>
<td>2.038</td>
<td>0.0208**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Integration (+)</td>
<td>0.1671</td>
<td>0.1743</td>
<td>6.304</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology (+)</td>
<td>0.0583</td>
<td>0.0404</td>
<td>1.458</td>
<td>0.0725*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Men Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>0.0866</td>
<td>0.0440</td>
<td>1.567</td>
<td>0.0587*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>0.0629</td>
<td>0.0800</td>
<td>2.874</td>
<td>0.0020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Interaction (+)</td>
<td>0.1005</td>
<td>0.0567</td>
<td>2.051</td>
<td>0.0202**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantaged’s Strength (+)</td>
<td>0.1005</td>
<td>0.0882</td>
<td>3.166</td>
<td>0.0008***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination First Problem (+)</td>
<td>0.2551</td>
<td>0.1063</td>
<td>3.516</td>
<td>0.0002***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discrimination Second Problem (+)</td>
<td>0.2158</td>
<td>0.0945</td>
<td>3.165</td>
<td>0.0008***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Progress (+)</td>
<td>-0.1701</td>
<td>-0.0741</td>
<td>-2.645</td>
<td>0.0083***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.0843
F = 11.834
Prob (F) = 0.0001
N = 1,215

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.

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politics attitudes and policy preferences, I discover that the theory of symbolic politics does well at explaining black preferences regarding affirmative action. Moreover, egalitarians, blacks who identify strongly with other blacks, and blacks who are sensitive to discrimination are especially supportive of affirmative action. COMBINED MODELS

In addition to examining the effects of self-interest and symbolic politics attitudes separately, I test both theories simultaneously in a combined model. A combined model provides a more complete picture of the relationship between black characteristics and attitudes and support for affirmative action and enables us to determine which relationships hold and which theory is most explanatory between self-interest and symbolic politics.

In Tables 13, 14, and 15, I report the Ordinary Least Squares regression results for the combined models. An examination of these tables indicates that the overall goodness-of-fit for these models remains modest. The 1984 combined model explains approximately 16% of the total variance, it has an F statistic of 5.146, and a good number of significant independent variables. Overall, I conclude that the 1984 model does an adequate job of explaining black attitudes toward affirmative action. The 1988 combined model performs better in one area of model evaluation, but does not do quite as well on two other criteria of model evaluation. The 1988 combined model does better in terms of its R², for it explains almost 20% of the total variance. However, it has an F statistic of only 3.877 and does not establish as many significant independent variables. The 1996 combined model is based on a different data set, and so is not readily comparable to the other years. Nonetheless, it is not as powerful as the other models. The
Table 13: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Combined Model, 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
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<th>t</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.1743</td>
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<td>0.0110**</td>
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**SELF-INTEREST**

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<th>prob</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education (-)</td>
<td>-0.0111</td>
<td>-0.0154</td>
<td>-0.345</td>
<td>0.3649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income (-)</td>
<td>-0.0197</td>
<td>-0.0632</td>
<td>-1.397</td>
<td>0.0815*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status (-)</td>
<td>0.1090</td>
<td>0.0486</td>
<td>1.120</td>
<td>0.2632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (+)</td>
<td>0.0039</td>
<td>0.0581</td>
<td>1.407</td>
<td>0.0800*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Blacks (+)</td>
<td>0.1032</td>
<td>0.0475</td>
<td>1.268</td>
<td>0.1026</td>
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<tr>
<td>Job Security (+)</td>
<td>-0.1289</td>
<td>-0.0638</td>
<td>-1.617</td>
<td>0.1062*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Worried (+)</td>
<td>-0.0555</td>
<td>-0.0345</td>
<td>-0.847</td>
<td>0.3970</td>
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**SYMBOLIC POLITICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Help Blacks and Minorities (+)</td>
<td>0.2538</td>
<td>0.1827</td>
<td>4.789</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Efforts by Government (-)</td>
<td>-0.1581</td>
<td>-0.1473</td>
<td>-3.825</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Criteria (-)</td>
<td>-0.0621</td>
<td>-0.0598</td>
<td>-1.569</td>
<td>0.0585*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Integration (+)</td>
<td>0.1138</td>
<td>0.1204</td>
<td>3.275</td>
<td>0.0005***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs/S.O.L. Scale (+)</td>
<td>0.0454</td>
<td>0.0695</td>
<td>1.866</td>
<td>0.0312**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology (+)</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.4715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship (+)</td>
<td>-0.0029</td>
<td>-0.0037</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>0.9224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>0.0664</td>
<td>0.0923</td>
<td>2.446</td>
<td>0.0073***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Identity (+)</td>
<td>0.1566</td>
<td>0.0972</td>
<td>2.628</td>
<td>0.0044***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Attachment (+)</td>
<td>0.0671</td>
<td>0.0407</td>
<td>1.661</td>
<td>0.1445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Attachment (-)</td>
<td>-0.0583</td>
<td>-0.0457</td>
<td>-1.125</td>
<td>0.1305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMMON VARIABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Economics (-)</td>
<td>-0.0321</td>
<td>-0.0300</td>
<td>-0.785</td>
<td>0.2164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Influence (-)</td>
<td>0.0914</td>
<td>0.0767</td>
<td>2.015</td>
<td>0.0442**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Influence (+)</td>
<td>-0.0667</td>
<td>-0.0751</td>
<td>-1.927</td>
<td>0.0544**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (-)</td>
<td>0.0773</td>
<td>0.0596</td>
<td>1.316</td>
<td>0.1298*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self/Race Blame (+)</td>
<td>0.0197</td>
<td>0.0169</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.3293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Intentions (+)</td>
<td>0.0412</td>
<td>0.0574</td>
<td>1.484</td>
<td>0.0568*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.1580
F = 5.146
Prob (F) = 0.0001
N = 682

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
Table 14: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Combined Model, 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.9968</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>1.419</td>
<td>0.0783*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SELF-INTEREST</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (-)</td>
<td>-0.1099</td>
<td>-0.1818</td>
<td>-3.010</td>
<td>0.0014***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income (-)</td>
<td>-0.0068</td>
<td>-0.0149</td>
<td>-0.281</td>
<td>0.3893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status (-)</td>
<td>0.1111</td>
<td>0.0299</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>0.05612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (+)</td>
<td>0.0046</td>
<td>0.0781</td>
<td>1.403</td>
<td>0.0807*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Blacks (+)</td>
<td>0.1091</td>
<td>0.0555</td>
<td>1.076</td>
<td>0.1414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Security (+)</td>
<td>-0.0018</td>
<td>-0.0010</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.9852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Worried (+)</td>
<td>-0.0522</td>
<td>-0.0382</td>
<td>-0.701</td>
<td>0.4836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYMBOLIC POLITICS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs/S.O.L. Scale (+)</td>
<td>0.2570</td>
<td>0.2530</td>
<td>5.031</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology (+)</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship (+)</td>
<td>0.0480</td>
<td>0.0654</td>
<td>1.305</td>
<td>0.0964*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>0.0694</td>
<td>0.1085</td>
<td>2.158</td>
<td>0.0158**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love Families (+)</td>
<td>-0.0203</td>
<td>-0.0110</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>0.8506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardworkers (+)</td>
<td>0.1507</td>
<td>0.0962</td>
<td>1.665</td>
<td>0.0484**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Others (+)</td>
<td>0.1942</td>
<td>0.1385</td>
<td>2.486</td>
<td>0.0067***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud (+)</td>
<td>-0.1029</td>
<td>-0.0660</td>
<td>-1.086</td>
<td>0.2780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest (+)</td>
<td>0.1832</td>
<td>0.1149</td>
<td>1.975</td>
<td>0.0245**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong (+)</td>
<td>-0.0808</td>
<td>-0.0534</td>
<td>-0.898</td>
<td>0.3710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMON VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Economics (-)</td>
<td>-0.0617</td>
<td>-0.0758</td>
<td>-1.397</td>
<td>0.0816*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Influence (-)</td>
<td>-0.0064</td>
<td>-0.0044</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>0.4647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Influence (+)</td>
<td>-0.0283</td>
<td>-0.0331</td>
<td>-0.614</td>
<td>0.5396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (-)</td>
<td>0.0427</td>
<td>0.0347</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>0.5122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self/Race Blame (+)</td>
<td>0.0130</td>
<td>0.0543</td>
<td>1.072</td>
<td>0.1422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.1955
F = 3.877
Prob (F) = 0.0001
N = 373

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
Table 15: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Combined Model, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.6689</td>
<td>1.924</td>
<td>0.0273**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SELF-INTEREST</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (-)</td>
<td>0.0560</td>
<td>3.317</td>
<td>0.0008***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Finances (-)</td>
<td>0.0330</td>
<td>1.070</td>
<td>0.2850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income (-)</td>
<td>-0.0261</td>
<td>-2.351</td>
<td>0.0094***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status (-)</td>
<td>-0.0408</td>
<td>-0.574</td>
<td>0.2831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (+)</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.2427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYMBOLIC POLITICS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Blacks (+)</td>
<td>0.0249</td>
<td>1.781</td>
<td>0.0376**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Integration (+)</td>
<td>0.1686</td>
<td>6.292</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs/S.O.L. Scale (+)</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.9582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology (+)</td>
<td>0.0459</td>
<td>1.127</td>
<td>0.1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship (+)</td>
<td>0.0781</td>
<td>1.496</td>
<td>0.0675*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Men Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>0.0895</td>
<td>1.467</td>
<td>0.0713*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Women Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>-0.0268</td>
<td>-0.463</td>
<td>0.6436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>0.0542</td>
<td>2.426</td>
<td>0.0077***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Interaction (+)</td>
<td>0.1045</td>
<td>2.105</td>
<td>0.0177**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Economics (-)</td>
<td>0.0038</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.9244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black SES (+)</td>
<td>0.0353</td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td>0.2604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantaged’s Strength (+)</td>
<td>0.0925</td>
<td>2.875</td>
<td>0.0020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMON VARIABLES</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>0.0498</td>
<td>1.173</td>
<td>0.1205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Treatment (+)</td>
<td>0.0180</td>
<td>0.664</td>
<td>0.2535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Opportunities (-)</td>
<td>0.0156</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>0.4758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (-)</td>
<td>0.0218</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>0.4750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character/Race Blame (-)</td>
<td>0.0220</td>
<td>0.990</td>
<td>0.1612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination First Problem (+)</td>
<td>0.2573</td>
<td>3.518</td>
<td>0.0002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Second Problem (+)</td>
<td>0.2177</td>
<td>3.174</td>
<td>0.0007***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Progress (+)</td>
<td>-0.1619</td>
<td>-2.460</td>
<td>0.0140***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.1047
F = 5.564
Prob (F) = 0.0001
N = 1,215

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
1996 combined model explains only 10% of the total variance, does an adequate job at detecting relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables, but outperforms the other two models in that it has an $F$ statistic of 5.564. Overall, the models do only an adequate job of explaining black support for or opposition to affirmative action.

An even closer examination of tables 13, 14, and 15, shows that what drives black attitudes toward affirmative action are largely symbolic politics attitudes, and not self-interest. It has long been established that blacks are a very cohesive social group, so it is not too surprising to find that symbolic politics indicators fare so well when self-interest predictors are included in the same model. However, the number of symbolic politics items that reach significance compared to the self-interest measures is a bit of a surprise. With regards to the combined model, I discuss only those variables that reached an acceptable level of statistical significance, $p < 0.10$.

**Education**

Education is a significant component in differentiating supporters and nonsupporters of affirmative action. While the coefficient for this variable is not significant in 1984, education has a significant impact on attitudes toward affirmative action among blacks in 1988 ($b = -0.1099$, $t = -3.010$), and this variable is again significant in 1996, albeit in the incorrect positive direction ($b = 0.0560$, $t = 3.317$). In 1988, it is assumed that those who had much to gain from affirmative action would be more supportive, and they were. Blacks lower on the educational scale supported affirmative action more than those higher on the educational scale. However, the reverse is the case in 1996. These mixed results only modestly support the self-interest theory.
Family Income

Family income is another significant factor describing likely supporters and nonsupporters. As expected, those blacks who have lower levels of family income are more supportive of affirmative action than those blacks whose family incomes are higher. Keeping with the self-interest theory, poorer blacks are assumed to be more supportive of affirmative action because they stand to gain the most from the policy, their potential benefits are much greater than their costs. The coefficient for family income is negative ($b = -0.0197$ in 1984 and $b = -0.0261$ in 1996) and significant ($t = -1.397$ in 1984 and $t = -2.351$ in 1996, one-tailed test) in 1984 and 1996, respectively. Family income provides consistent support for the self-interest theory.

Age

Age is the final socioeconomic and demographic factor that can be called upon to locate supporters and nonsupporters. Age is positively related to support ($b = 0.0039$ in 1984 and $b = 0.0046$ in 1988) and is significant in an one-tailed test in 1984 and 1988 ($t = 1.407$ and $t = 1.403$, respectively). As hypothesized, older blacks are more supportive of affirmative action than younger blacks. The argument here is that older blacks are assumed to have more likely been subject to discrimination or have some form of indirect experience with it. Also, they are more likely to have witnessed or viewed on television the civil rights struggles, but in general recall a time in our contemporary history when blacks were more readily relegated to second-class citizenship.

Core Values

As stated previously, symbolic politics largely drives attitudes blacks have regarding affirmative action. We see consistent effects on
support and nonsupport from core values, political orientation, and black group consciousness measures. Capturing the effects of the core values, we find that black egalitarians are more supportive than black individualists. Blacks who believe the government in Washington should help blacks and minorities to improve their economic and social positions are more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believe individuals should try to get ahead by themselves (in 1984, b = 0.2538, t = 4.789; in 1996, b = 0.0249, t = 1.781). Blacks who support busing in order to integrate schools are also supportive of affirmative action (in 1984, b = 0.1138, t = 3.275; in 1996, b = 0.1686, t = 6.292), as are blacks who believe the government should provide everyone with a job and a good standard of living rather than each individual providing for themselves (in 1984, b = 0.0454, t = 1.866; in 1988, b = 0.2570, t = 5.031). Indicators of core values are among the more consistent performers in this analysis, and they work to enhance support for affirmative action, and confirm the positive hypotheses posed between support and egalitarianism, thus providing substantial support of the symbolic politics theory.

Political Orientation

Regarding political orientation, black Democrats support affirmative action more than black Republicans as hypothesized (b = 0.0480 in 1988 and b = 0.0781 in 1996). In 1988 and 1996, the partisanship variable is significant in an one-tailed test (t = 1.305 in 1988 and t = 1.496 in 1996). These results are not very surprising given the strong attachment blacks have had with the Democratic Party the past three decades. However, it is puzzling to note that political ideology is not a factor in any of the three test years. Given the significant relationship partisanship has with support for affirmative
action, the significant relationship some indicators of core values have with positive support for the policy, and the link core values have with political ideology, it is highly surprising that the political ideology variable does not reach statistical significance in any of the models estimated. It may be the case that the link between ideology and affirmative action is not as evident as the link between core values and support and the link between partisanship and support. That is, it may be easier for a respondent to elicit a response to a question that goes to the heart of their core values as affirmative action does and when their political party is widely known on racial policies and affirmative action in particular. In sum, the connection between liberalism and conservatism with support or lack of support for affirmative action may not matter because the connection is not clear or consistent, political ideology may not matter when dealing with discrimination, or that other factors may dominate; factors such as black group consciousness.

**Black Group Consciousness**

Recall the four components of group consciousness: group identification, polar affect, polar power, and blame attribution. We find a number of significant relationships between support for affirmative action and indicators of group consciousness: (1) highly identified blacks, (2) those holding positive impressions of blacks, (3) blacks perceiving a lower status relative to whites, and (4) blacks who blame the system, their race, or discrimination rather than black individuals as the reason for the relatively low status of blacks in society are more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believe the opposite. Black group consciousness does a fine job in supporting the argument that symbolic politics attitudes explain black support for or opposition to affirmative action.
Reduced Combined Model

Tables 16, 17, and 18 display the Ordinary Least Squares regression results for the reduced combined models. The reduced models consist only of the independent variables that reached a \( p < 0.10 \) level of statistical significance in the full model. In these tables, we see some extremely incredible stability in the magnitudes of the independent variables. As with the reduced self-interest and reduced symbolic politics models, the statistically significant variables drive most of the explanatory power in the full model. Also with the reduced self-interest and reduced symbolic politics models, the \( R^2 \) values in the reduced combined models are less than that of the full model, but still quite similar. The \( F \) statistics for the reduced combined models are much higher than that of their full models. By and large, the reduced models perform similarly to the full models, for the independent variables are in the same direction in the reduced model as they were in the full model.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The goal of this chapter was to seek out the determinants of black support for, or opposition to, affirmative action. Toward that end, I developed and tested models of the self-interest theory and the theory of symbolic politics. I developed models that captured the effects of self-interest (operationalized by socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in addition to perceptions of racial threat and racial fairness) and symbolic politics attitudes (an amalgamation of the core values of egalitarianism and individualism, as well as the concepts of political ideology, political partisanship, and black group consciousness). A model was estimated for each theory and each year, in addition to combined and reduced models.
Table 16: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Reduced Combined Model, 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.2366</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>3.162</td>
<td>0.0008***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SELF-INTEREST</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income (-)</td>
<td>-0.0144</td>
<td>-0.0461</td>
<td>-1.205</td>
<td>0.1143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (+)</td>
<td>0.0024</td>
<td>0.0370</td>
<td>1.032</td>
<td>0.1511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Security (+)</td>
<td>-0.1523</td>
<td>-0.0752</td>
<td>-2.146</td>
<td>0.0322**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYMBOLIC POLITICS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Blacks and Minorities (+)</td>
<td>0.2691</td>
<td>0.1965</td>
<td>5.472</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Efforts by Government (-)</td>
<td>-0.1448</td>
<td>-0.1350</td>
<td>-3.714</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Criteria (-)</td>
<td>-0.0768</td>
<td>-0.0746</td>
<td>-2.072</td>
<td>0.0193**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Integration (+)</td>
<td>0.1081</td>
<td>0.1144</td>
<td>3.239</td>
<td>0.0006***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs/S.O.L. Scale (+)</td>
<td>0.0493</td>
<td>0.0751</td>
<td>2.124</td>
<td>0.0170**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>0.0579</td>
<td>0.0811</td>
<td>2.273</td>
<td>0.0111**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Identity (+)</td>
<td>0.1543</td>
<td>0.0964</td>
<td>2.752</td>
<td>0.0030***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMON VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Influence (-)</td>
<td>0.0691</td>
<td>0.0605</td>
<td>1.697</td>
<td>0.0900**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Influence (+)</td>
<td>-0.0400</td>
<td>-0.0454</td>
<td>-1.236</td>
<td>0.2167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (-)</td>
<td>0.0535</td>
<td>0.0426</td>
<td>1.149</td>
<td>0.2511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Intentions (+)</td>
<td>0.0536</td>
<td>0.0346</td>
<td>2.117</td>
<td>0.0123**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.1436  
F = 8.602  
Prob (F) = 0.0001  
N = 732

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.  
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.  
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
Table 17: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for Affirmative Action, Reduced Combined Model, 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.5652</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>1.289</td>
<td>0.0990*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF-INTEREST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (-)</td>
<td>-0.0986</td>
<td>-0.1633</td>
<td>-2.974</td>
<td>0.0015***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (+)</td>
<td>0.0048</td>
<td>0.0826</td>
<td>1.576</td>
<td>0.0579*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYMBOLIC POLITICS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs/S.O.L. Scale (+)</td>
<td>0.2594</td>
<td>0.2553</td>
<td>5.240</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship (+)</td>
<td>0.0448</td>
<td>0.0610</td>
<td>1.254</td>
<td>0.1054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>0.0704</td>
<td>0.1100</td>
<td>2.256</td>
<td>0.0123**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardworkers (+)</td>
<td>0.1166</td>
<td>0.0744</td>
<td>1.410</td>
<td>0.0797*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Others (+)</td>
<td>0.1668</td>
<td>0.1189</td>
<td>2.271</td>
<td>0.0116**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest (+)</td>
<td>0.1346</td>
<td>0.0844</td>
<td>1.601</td>
<td>0.0551*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMON VARIABLES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Economics (-)</td>
<td>-0.0493</td>
<td>-0.0605</td>
<td>-1.218</td>
<td>0.1119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.1803
F = 8.898
Prob (F) = 0.0001
N = 373

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
Table 18: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Black Support for
Affirmative Action, Reduced Combined Model, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>prob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.0981</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>4.253</td>
<td>0.0000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SELF-INTEREST</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (-)</td>
<td>0.0524</td>
<td>0.9923</td>
<td>3.217</td>
<td>0.0013***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income (-)</td>
<td>-0.0246</td>
<td>-0.0724</td>
<td>-2.375</td>
<td>0.0088***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYMBOLIC POLITICS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Blacks (+)</td>
<td>0.0233</td>
<td>0.0496</td>
<td>1.794</td>
<td>0.0360**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Integration (+)</td>
<td>0.1652</td>
<td>0.1724</td>
<td>6.232</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship (+)</td>
<td>0.0803</td>
<td>0.0432</td>
<td>1.562</td>
<td>0.0593*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Men Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>0.0918</td>
<td>0.0467</td>
<td>1.670</td>
<td>0.0475**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>0.0560</td>
<td>0.0762</td>
<td>2.735</td>
<td>0.0031***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-White Interaction (+)</td>
<td>0.1086</td>
<td>0.0613</td>
<td>2.216</td>
<td>0.0134**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantaged’s Strength (+)</td>
<td>0.0947</td>
<td>0.0831</td>
<td>2.991</td>
<td>0.0014***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMON VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination First Problem (+)</td>
<td>0.2480</td>
<td>0.1033</td>
<td>3.421</td>
<td>0.0003***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Second Problem (+)</td>
<td>0.2109</td>
<td>0.0924</td>
<td>3.100</td>
<td>0.0010***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Progress (+)</td>
<td>-0.1570</td>
<td>-0.0684</td>
<td>-2.439</td>
<td>0.0149***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.0982
F = 10.921
Prob (F) = 0.0001
N = 1,215

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.
** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.
* prob < 0.10, one-tailed test.
To capture the effects of the independent variables, I used poll data taken from the 1984-1988 Black National Election Panel Study and 1996 Black National Election Study. Serving as the measure of the dependent variable for the models tested, the 1984-1988 National Black Election Panel Study and 1996 National Black Election Study have the following item: "Because of past discrimination, minorities should be given special consideration when decisions are made about hiring applicants for jobs." The responses for this statement are "strongly agree," "somewhat agree," "somewhat disagree," and "strongly disagree" (coded 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively). I used Ordinary Least Squares Estimation to analyze the data.

Generally speaking, symbolic politics attitudes have a strong impact on black attitudes toward affirmative action, especially in comparison to the self-interest variables. The self-interest models perform poorly, but the symbolic politics models do a fairly adequate job of explaining black support for affirmative action. Moreover, several of the symbolic politics indicators maintain significance even when placed in the same model as self-interest predictors. From this, we can locate the characteristics of the black individual who is a likely supporter of affirmative action: (1) low family income, (2) an older black citizen, (3) adheres to egalitarian value inclinations, (4) a Democrat, (5) identifies highly with other black people, and (6) sensitive to discrimination.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

Contrary to popular belief, black Americans are divided in their opinions over affirmative action policies. Many studies have focused on why white Americans oppose busing, school integration, and affirmative action, but little has been done to investigate attitudes among blacks toward affirmative action and other racial policies. My dissertation helps to fill this void by examining the attitudes of black Americans on this important, but divisive, issue. Until this dissertation, no one explored thoroughly the sources of the division among blacks on racial policies such as affirmative action. I explain this variation by testing the self-interest theory and the theory of symbolic politics. I examine the effects of individual characteristics, perceptions of racial threat and racial fairness, core values, political orientation, and group consciousness.

My dissertation makes original contributions to the literature because it accounts for the effects of self-interest and symbolic politics attitudes, both of which involve hypotheses that have yet to be tested systematically as part of an effort to explain black opinion. Regarding prior research, many of the hypotheses tested and most of the data sets collected were developed solely with white respondents in mind. Black opinion has only recently become the focus of serious empirical work where previous works on black attitudes focused mainly on racial solidarity (Kinder and Sanders, 1996).

My dissertation is unique also because of its detailed scrutiny of black opinion. The study of racial attitudes has a long history in political science, but surprisingly little attention has been paid to black political attitudes. Primarily, data limitations are the reasons
why there is a scarcity of literature on black political attitudes, especially regarding affirmative action. The most prominent of the data limitations is sheer numbers. Blacks comprise a small portion of the populace, so many polls have only a small subsample of blacks. I overcome this limitation by relying on the 1984-1988 National Black Election Panel Study and the 1996 National Black Election Study as data sets. This series of three election studies is a significant substantive and methodological contribution to the small numbers of blacks that are included in the American National Election Study and General Social Survey. The National Black Election Study series is a telephone survey that focuses on black political attitudes and preferences. A wide range of topics are covered and a variety of questions are asked.

My dissertation is also an improvement on the works that preceded it. Basically, I argue that there are three major flaws in the literature on black support for or opposition to affirmative action: (1) the models are not comprehensive in their treatment of the subject; (2) the scholars apply the theories and hypotheses they are testing too narrowly, and (3) models are misspecified or underspecified due to less-than-desirable data sets that probe black political attitudes. I make special efforts to avoid these pitfalls. First, I provide comprehensive models that estimated support for affirmative action among black Americans. I develop a combined model that houses both of the competing theories I am testing, namely the self-interest theory and the theory of symbolic politics. Second, I broaden these theories and their underlying hypotheses to make them more amenable to black respondents. Third, I make use of data sets that provided a large number of black respondents so as to provide a comprehensive analysis and that allow for
the testing of hypotheses yet to be tested, especially as they regard black individuals. In essence, my improvements are that I estimate black support for or opposition to affirmative action more comprehensively than previous research by testing more hypotheses and placing both self-interest and symbolic politics models in a combined model.

EXPLAINING BLACK SUPPORT FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

What explains black attitudes toward affirmative action? I consider how the self-interest theory and theory of symbolic politics explain black preferences regarding the policy. I develop models that captured the effects of self-interest (indicated by socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, as well as perceptions of racial threat and racial fairness) and symbolic politics attitudes (the core values of egalitarianism and individualism, political ideology, political partisanship, and black group consciousness). Based on previous research, I expected the theory of symbolic politics to have greater explanatory power than the self-interest theory. In order to understand fully black attitudes toward affirmative action and determine whether the symbolic politics theory serves as a better explanation than the self-interest theory, I estimate a combined model that includes variables representing each of these two theoretical perspectives.

To capture the effects of these concepts, I use survey items taken from the 1984-1988 National Black Election Panel Study and 1996 Black National Election Study. These data sets of black respondents can enhance our knowledge and understanding of black attitudes toward a wide range of policy issues and political items, but more important, we can gain insight into black support for, and opposition to, affirmative action.

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Self-Interest

Anchoring the self-interest discussion is the notion that what drives individual opinion and behavior are egocentric and selfish considerations. I assume that individual self-interest drives political preferences and behavior, for selfish motivations are among the many factors that in part determine human thought and action. Self-interest comes into play whenever there is a potential for wealth and resources to be redistributed (Kinder and Sanders, 1996).

Self-interest involves the maximization of utility (Sears et al., 1980; McConahay, 1982; Mansbridge, 1990) as a result of estimating the immediate economic, physical, and comfort effects of affirmative action by individuals and their families (Sears et al., 1980). Self-interested individuals support policies they perceive will maximize their benefits and minimize their costs (Sears et al., 1979; Sears et al., 1980; Mansbridge, 1990). Some self-interested blacks may feel it in their best interests to favor a policy such as affirmative action, and others may feel it in their best interests to oppose it.

Socioeconomic Status. Several characteristics and attitudes were used to account for the effects of self-interest on support for affirmative action. That is, it is my contention that some variation in support for affirmative action can be explained by individual characteristics, which serve as surrogates for self-interest. Generally speaking, those blacks who believe that they or their family benefit from or have benefitted from affirmative action in the past are expected to be more supportive than those blacks who do not feel they or their family benefit from or have benefitted from affirmative action in the past. More specifically, those blacks with more to gain from affirmative action are expected to be most supportive of the policy.
Therefore, blacks who are not rising on the social ladder are expected to be more likely than other blacks to support the policy because they may feel that they will benefit substantially from it in the future. Upwardly-mobile or high-status blacks are not expected to be as supportive of the policy than other blacks because they have already secured a comfortable position in society and will probably receive marginal benefits at best. From the point of view of self-interest and the calculation of benefits, disadvantaged blacks have a lot more to gain than advantaged blacks who may also be more conservative.

Therefore, I argue that if, in fact, self-interest is at work, then lesser-educated, lower-wage earning, poorly-employed, and lower social-class blacks will be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks with greater levels of education, higher incomes, better employment, and higher social class. The former group of blacks are hypothesized to be more supportive of affirmative action because they are believed to have more to gain from the policy and the policy may help them over the threshold. The latter group of blacks were expected to oppose affirmative action because they are the ones who have the least to gain, more to lose, and would want to protect their social status positions even from other blacks.

The results suggest that socioeconomic status and perceptions do not matter much when explaining black support for affirmative action. Basically, education and family income are the only socioeconomic variables that do have an impact on black preferences. Education has both positive and negative effects, in different years, and family income has the expected inverse relationship to support.

Age. Older blacks are assumed to be the ones most likely to remember the period in American history when Jim Crow laws were enforced
in the South, times when blacks were subject to hostile treatment and racial discrimination all over the country, and the experience of witnessing the civil rights movement during the 1960s. Moreover, older blacks are likely to have experienced discrimination more often and in more damaging forms than younger blacks. Therefore, I argue that older blacks would be supportive of affirmative action rather than opposed to it. The results confirm this hypothesis as older blacks are more supportive of affirmative action than younger blacks.

South. Before affirmative action, black Americans were the subject of substantial racism and discrimination. Prior to 1965, voting rights for blacks were abridged on a large-scale basis. By and large, most of the racial tension that gripped America occurred in the American South. White southerners advocated segregation and unfair treatment due to the color of one's skin. Because Southern blacks had to endure such treatment, they are more likely than any other group in America to have experienced discrimination. Therefore, I expected Southern blacks to support affirmative action as a way to combat discrimination and racism. This hypothesis is confirmed as the South variable is positively related to black support for affirmative action.

Economic Insecurity. I also test for the effects of self-interest in terms of perceived economic fortunes. I assume that many blacks view affirmative action as an aid to obtaining educational and occupational opportunities, as well as a mechanism for providing job security for employed blacks. That is, with all else being equal, self-interested blacks who are facing economic insecurity might lend greater support for affirmative action than self-interested blacks who are economically secure. Surprisingly, economic insecurity is found to have null effects on black support for affirmative action.

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Racial Threat. Typically, notions of racial threat are applied to the behavior and attitudes of whites. However, I place in my models of black support for affirmative action indicators that tap white threat felt by blacks. That is, I hypothesize that many blacks support affirmative action in part because they feel threatened or hindered by whites, and that they see affirmative action as a defense mechanism to protect them from discrimination by whites. Blacks who perceive that whites are threatening to blacks will be more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who do not perceive white threat. Closely related to perceptions of racial threat are perceptions of racial fairness. Inasmuch as blacks perceive racial threat, conditions may also be considered unfair. Therefore, I also capture the effects of perceived racial fairness or lack thereof.

There is ample evidence supporting these hypotheses. The coefficients for some of the variables are not significant, but there were several significant relationships uncovered in my analysis. Supporting my contentions that blacks support affirmative action due to racial threat and a desire for racial fairness are the following findings: (1) blacks who consider the economic position of blacks to be worse than that of whites support affirmative action, (2) blacks who believe their race is a hindrance to them in getting ahead in life are supporters of affirmative action, (3) blacks who believe that whites are out to keep blacks down are supportive of affirmative action, (4) blacks who believe that what happens generally to black people will have something to do with them are supportive of affirmative action, and (5) blacks who believe discrimination is the most important problem or even the second most important problem facing black people are more likely to support affirmative action than blacks who believe it is not.
Symbolic Politics

Based on the findings of previous research, group concerns, racial attitudes, and organizing principles such as core values and political ideology must be taken into account when explaining support for affirmative action. As I have stated in a previous chapter, there is evidence to suggest that mass opinions are a function of political ideology, partisanship, group interests, and group biases, and prejudices. Therefore, I also test the theory of symbolic politics, for public attitudes toward public policies are group-centric. That is, public opinion is often influenced by the opinions that individuals have toward groups perceived to be the primary beneficiaries or victims of society (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Nelson and Kinder, 1996).

Symbolic politics theory holds that preadulthood symbolic predispositions (as well as some acquired in adulthood) have an important impact on adult political behavior and opinion (Sears, Huddy, and Schaffer, 1986; Sears, 1988, 1991). These symbolic predispositions are learned, viewed as a reflection of the norms dominating the young person's informational environment, and typically endure throughout adult life. During adulthood the current informational environment calls forth these symbolic predispositions with symbols, and these are believed by many scholars to be the most influential factors influencing policy preferences and political behavior (Sears, Huddy, and Schaffer, 1986; Sears, 1988, 1991).

Symbolic politics theory combines core values (e.g., egalitarianism versus individualism), political ideology, political partisanship, and group consciousness into one framework that explains political attitudes. In addition, I use the group consciousness framework as a mechanism for adding to the explanatory power of symbolic
politics. Black group consciousness and symbolic politics both focus on the individual's sense of group identification and the tendency for individuals to harbor more amicable feelings for the ingroup and less favorable feelings for the outgroup.

Values. Values are affective moral codes, standards, and criteria that govern a number of items including rationalization, evaluation, attitude, judgment, and attribution of causality that are socialized, conditioned, and reinforced throughout life (Rokeach, 1973, 1979). Values are affective and enduring beliefs that deem certain thoughts and actions more preferable, personally or socially, over opposing thoughts and actions (Rokeach, 1973). Values also involve the connection between a particular symbol and the affective evaluation associated with it (Sears, Huddy, and Schaffer, 1986).

Two of the more common core values are egalitarianism and individualism. Egalitarianism is the belief in equal treatment or equal rights for all persons, that individuals deserve equal amounts of respect, that people should not be treated according to ascriptive characteristics or based on their economic, social, or political status. Egalitarians support policies that ensure equal rights. Individualism is the belief that people should be free to pursue their interests on their own volition free of governmental interference; in other words, individual freedom, rights, and responsibility are of great import. Regarding racial attitudes, individualists believe blacks should make individual efforts to advance their status in society, not through governmental assistance (Kinder, 1983).

Because affirmative action is believed by many to compensate for past discrimination, enhance equal opportunity, and equal rights, it is often considered an egalitarian policy. Opponents of affirmative action
contend that it has unfair compensatory effects. The duality of egalitarianism and individualism are reflected in these polarized positions. So, among blacks, egalitarianism will increase support for affirmative action, but individualism will depress support for affirmative action.

I find that egalitarianism is positively related to black support for affirmative action. The evidence of this: (1) blacks who support efforts by the government in Washington to improve the social and economic positions of blacks and other minorities also support affirmative action, (2) blacks who believe that the government should not make any special efforts to assist blacks and other minorities were less supportive of affirmative action, (3) blacks who believe that job applicants should be based solely on test scores and other individual qualities were less supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believe other criteria should be taken into account, (4) blacks who believe that racial integration is important enough to justify busing also support affirmative action, and (5) blacks who believe that the government in Washington should provide every person with a job and a good standard of living also support affirmative action.

Political Ideology. Ideology is taken to mean a set of broad beliefs tied by a small number of central principles that compel adherents to behave and think in accordance to the ideology (Kritzer, 1978; Kerlinger, 1984; Van Dyke, 1995). Liberalism and conservatism are two of the more common and important ideologies in America that influence political thinking and behavior (Kerlinger, 1984). Liberalism is a set of beliefs that champions popular participation in government, tolerance of individuals, groups, lifestyles, and ideas that deviate from traditional societal norms, government intervention, and a belief
in equal rights for all (Lowi, 1969; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin, 1980; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Kerlinger, 1984; Seltzer and Smith, 1985; Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Van Dyke, 1995). Conservatism is a set of beliefs characterized by skepticism of popular participation in government, a preference for traditional societal norms, little government intervention, a tendency to blame the individual for what goes wrong rather than the system or society, and acceptance of the natural inequality of individuals (Lowi, 1969; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin, 1980; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Kerlinger, 1984; Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Van Dyke, 1995). I therefore hypothesize that black liberals would be more supportive of affirmative action than black conservatives. In the year that the political ideology variable is significant, 1996, liberalism is positively related to support for affirmative action and conservatism is negatively related to support for affirmative action.

Partisanship. Since 1964, the Democratic Party has been more supportive than the Republican Party of governmental action for ensuring the rights of blacks. The Democratic Party has been more committed to establishing and maintaining the rights of blacks than the Republican Party, while since 1964, the Republican Party moved toward racial conservatism (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Therefore, I hypothesize that black Democrats would be more supportive of affirmative action than black Republicans. This hypothesis is confirmed as I discover that black Democrats support affirmative action while black Republicans are less supportive.

Black Group Consciousness. Group consciousness explanations became prominent parts of the symbolic politics discussion to explain black attitudes toward affirmative action. There are four components of
group consciousness: (1) group identification, (2) polar affect, (3) polar power, and (4) individual versus system blame. The first component, group identification, is the feeling of belonging to a social group, sharing interests with the group, at least more so with one group over others, and having an awareness of the group's status in society relative to other groups. Group identification for my purposes here is identifying with blacks.

The second component of group consciousness is polar affect. Arguably, group consciousness does not require negative affect or hostility toward other minorities or whites, but the polar affect could be an appreciable difference in affect between members of the ingroup and members of the outgroup and an awareness of the noticeable differences between the groups—i.e., that on any given policy, especially affirmative action, one group benefits, while a different group does not.

The third component of group consciousness is polar power. This is the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the individual's group's status, power, or resources relative to the outgroup's. The ingroup (blacks) uses the outgroup (whites) as the reference for comparisons and if there is a perceived lack of status, power, or resources, then deprivation will promote group consciousness. The point here is that blacks who exhibit black group consciousness will see whites in a more powerful or advantageous position. Given this, blacks who are sensitive to the polar power aspect of group consciousness will consider their race deprived and powerless relative to whites.

The fourth and final component of group consciousness is the attribution of individual versus system blame. This is who or what the individual blames for or gives credit to for the group's relatively low
status in society. Group consciousness would place blame on the system, or even racism and discrimination, rather than on the individual.

Group consciousness is applied to the relationship between blacks and whites and affirmative action. Black group consciousness is identifying with blacks and sharing a political awareness and ideology with respect to blacks' relative position in society as well as committing oneself to action to secure black interests. It is the perception of being black and sharing black interests. Black group consciousness is also the feeling that blacks are deprived, relative to whites, and the reasons for this position is caused more by the social and political system than due to personal failings. Black group consciousness also entails the realization that differences exist between themselves and the dominant group, whites. Blacks who exhibit more black group consciousness are hypothesized to be supportive of affirmative action, for it may be viewed as a means of changing the existing social order and improving the status of blacks. Blacks lacking black group consciousness are hypothesized to be less supportive of affirmative action.

The results support my argument that blacks exhibiting black group consciousness would be more supportive of affirmative action. I find that blacks who think: (1) about being black a lot are supportive of affirmative action, (2) that it is more important to be black than American are more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who feel it is more important to be American than black or to be both equally, (3) that blacks should not have anything to do with whites support affirmative action, (4) that blacks in general are hard workers, care for others, and are honest support affirmative action, (5) that whites are out to keep blacks down are supporters of affirmative action, (6)
that what generally happens to black men will have something to do with what happens in their life support affirmative action, (7) that if other blacks, minorities, the poor, and women pulled together, they could decide how the country is run are more supportive of affirmative action than blacks who believe the opposite, and (8) that discrimination is the most important problem or even the second most important problem facing black people are more likely to support affirmative action than blacks who do not consider discrimination the most important problem facing blacks.

Summary

My dissertation centers around one primary question: why do some blacks support affirmative action, while others do not? It appears that blacks support or oppose affirmative action not so much according to selfish motivations—though self-interest is not irrelevant—but more so due to their desire for what they perceive to be racial fairness and according to symbolic politics attitudes. That is, blacks support affirmative action largely because they view it as a means of overcoming racial discrimination and as a countermeasure to white threat. The coefficients for many of the classic surrogate measures of self-interest (education, income, employment, and social class) often do not reach significance or are in the opposite direction that I predicted. Among the consistent findings were the significant and positive effects of core values and group consciousness. Blacks mainly support affirmative action because it is in line with their egalitarian inclinations and feelings of black group consciousness. Based on the results of the estimation procedures, I am in position to identify likely black supporters of affirmative action. The profile of the black individual who is a supporter of affirmative action is one that has a low family
income, is an older black citizen, adheres to egalitarianism, is a Democrat, identifies highly with other black people, and is sensitive to discrimination.

**Self-Interest.** Largely, and to no real surprise, the models developed to explain the effects of self-interest do a poor job of detecting relationships and explaining variance. This is no surprise, for the literature paints a fairly unflattering picture of the ability of self-interest to explain attitudes and preferences. Also, the results of the analyses reported here demonstrate that many of the variables that specifically capture the effects of self-interest are not related to black support for or opposition to affirmative action. By and large, education, income, employment status, social class, and economic insecurity do not consistently influence attitudes toward affirmative action. However, the variables used to capture the effects of racial threat seem to be related. The perceptions that race and discrimination preclude blacks from advancing in the economic, social, and political arenas, and a shared common fate among blacks enhance black support for affirmative action.

**Symbolic Politics.** The models used to explain the effects of symbolic politics attitudes do quite well at detecting relationships and explaining variance. Moreover, the models used to explain the effects of symbolic politics attitudes did a much better job of detecting relationships and explaining variance than did the self-interest models. Like previous literature, I find that the theory of symbolic politics does well to explain preferences. Many of the variables that captured the effects of symbolic politics attitudes are related to black support for or opposition to affirmative action. Supporting the extant literature that sought the link between symbolic politics attitudes and
policy preferences, I discover that core values, political partisanship, and group consciousness do well at explaining black preferences regarding affirmative action. I find that black egalitarians, black Democrats, highly identified blacks, blacks who favorably judge blacks, blacks who perceive a relative deprivation between blacks and whites, and blacks who believe that systemic factors as opposed to idiosyncratic factors hinder the progress of blacks are more supportive of affirmative action than their black counterparts.

**Combined Models.** An examination of the data indicates that what drives black attitudes toward affirmative action are largely symbolic politics attitudes, not self-interest. The symbolic politics indicators maintain significance even when placed in the same model as self-interest predictors. It has long been established that blacks are a very cohesive social group, so it is not too surprising to find that symbolic politics indicators fare so well when self-interest predictors are included in the same model. However, the number of significant variables between the symbolic politics predictors and self-interest predictors is quite drastic. Consistently, the measures of symbolic politics are significant and in the direction hypothesized, while the self-interest variables would often fail to reach significance and on occasion be in the unanticipated direction.

**EXPLAINING THE DOMINANCE OF THE THEORY OF SYMBOLIC POLITICS**

I develop models of self-interest and symbolic politics to determine the relationships between black characteristics and attitudes and black support for affirmative action. Self-interest does add to our understanding of this phenomenon, for several self-interest indicators are significant and some of them are in the proposed direction. However, when I combine the models, variables representing the symbolic
politics model perform much better. The fact that symbolic politics has stronger effects on attitudes toward affirmative action than self-interest can be expected for several reasons. First, evoking symbolic predispositions is a less complicated task than engaging in a benefit-cost analysis which is required by self-interest. When one evaluates a policy, according to symbolic politics, one only needs to consider the affects of the relevant symbols. For self-interest, a utility calculation must be made, and these tend to quite complex. Furthermore, given that policies address group needs rather than individual needs, the effects of self-interest may not matter.

Second, symbols are constantly discussed, but self-interest, perhaps because it varies from individual to individual, is not discussed as often. Issues are presented and reported in terms of symbols, condensing intricate details and concepts into simple symbolic terms or symbols (Sears and Funk, 1991). These simplifications make attitudes and affects, or symbolic politics, readily available. However, the idiosyncrasies of self-interest are largely remote from such discussions and the connection that self-interest has with everyday discussions of political terms is not adequately apparent enough to make individual experiences generalizable and be triggered by political symbols (Sears and Funk, 1991).

Third, self-interest is not normally large, clear, or certain to most individuals (Sears and Funk, 1991). The typical citizen does not perceive the connection between policy and personal benefits and costs. Changes in macroeconomic conditions do not always result in expected preferences or behaviors (Sears and Funk, 1991). In addition, the economic, social, and political status of many individuals may not change, so self-interest may have no bearing on preferences or
behaviors. Symbolic politics makes no such connection between fortunes and preferences or behaviors, so the impact of perceived benefits and costs do not register, therefore, it does not matter whether the policy will help or hinder personal wealth. Sears and Funk (1991) argue that symbolic politics may matter more than self-interest because individuals are not always selfish and that they may weigh the interests of the public more than personal affairs.

TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF AMERICAN RACIAL ATTITUDES

By and large, the study of black racial attitudes is an under tillled area in political science. Not much is known about black attitudes, since blacks are under-represented in national surveys and this makes statistical analysis of black attitudes difficult. Much of what is known about racial attitudes is what we know about white racial attitudes. The consensus from these works is that symbolic politics attitudes are the primary determinants of white attitudes toward affirmative action, while the effects of self-interest plays only a marginal role. General racial attitudes, core values, political ideology, and group interests have been found to influence support much more than individual self-interest. However, white support for affirmative action also depends on how the survey question is framed.

By and large, the sources of black opinions on affirmative action mirror those of white individuals. That is, symbolic politics reign supreme over the effects of self-interest. Black citizens lend or deny support for affirmative action according to general racial attitudes, group interests, and core values. Among blacks, perceptions of linked fate to other blacks and group interests play a dominant role in shaping black public opinion, while individual economic status plays only a small part. Among blacks, group interests reign over individual
interests. A high degree of race consciousness is associated to greater support for affirmative action. Also, identical to white opinions on affirmative action, question wording matters, as blacks tend to be more supportive of affirmative action when it is posed as an equality-enhancing measure and less supportive when it is in the guise of preferential treatment.

In conclusion, I find that attitudes associated with the core values of egalitarianism and individualism along with attitudes toward race are the major factors driving racial attitudes in America. Previous research and the present analysis indicate that the effects of self-interest as reflected by socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes do not matter much. Citizens look to their preadulthood predispositions when stating an opinion on racial matters. That is, to know one’s symbolic politics attitudes is to know one’s views on racial policies.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Surely, not all is known about American attitudes toward affirmative action. More research is necessary in order to determine the answers to the unanswered questions. That begs the question: "Where do we go from here?" First, more work can be done to improve this dissertation. Second, perhaps better data, more specifically, improved surveys, need to be collected. Third, an agenda for future research should be embarked upon to gain a greater understanding of the determinants of support for or opposition to affirmative action.

Doing the Dissertation Differently

Upon reflection, there is very little I would change about this dissertation. Little would be changed because largely I was able to reach two major goals: (1) advance political scientists toward a
comprehensive theory on racial attitudes in America and (2) even out the literature by focusing on the attitudes of black Americans. Chief among these goals was to develop a more comprehensive explanation of black support for affirmative action by testing two major theories of public opinion, self-interest and symbolic politics, that have been used to explain white attitudes toward busing and school integration and help advance political scientists toward a comprehensive theory on racial attitudes in America. This too was achieved in that I examined the effects of self-interest and symbolic politics attitudes on support for or opposition to affirmative action. Another primary goal of this dissertation was to provide a more balanced depiction of American attitudes toward affirmative action by focusing on black preferences. There is no doubt that has been achieved. Simply by focusing on black attitudes to the extent I did here added a great deal to the literature.

**Asking the Right Questions**

The 1984-1988 Black National Election Panel Study and the 1996 National Black Election Study data sets did a remarkable job of providing questions that I believed would capture the effects of the concepts and sentiments I was trying to operationalize. However, it did not do a perfect job, for there are a number of items omitted that would be more beneficial to estimating black attitudes toward affirmative action. For example, a better question to estimate support for affirmative action than the one used to operationalize the dependent variable would be to ask the respondent their views on affirmative action. The item could simply ask how strongly the respondent approves or disapproves of affirmative action. The survey question I use—("Because of past discrimination, minorities should be given special consideration when decisions are made about hiring applicants for jobs."
The responses for this statement are "strongly agree," "somewhat agree," "somewhat disagree," and "strongly disagree," coded 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively) — is a very popular conception of affirmative action, but does not mention the phrase affirmative action, thus, leaving room for measurement error in the form of misinterpretation. That is, to some, the reading of the question may be affirmative action, but to many others, it may not be viewed as affirmative action. Therefore, data sets that include survey items that frame affirmative action both as preferential treatment and as a policy that ensures equal opportunity would be an improvement over the Black National Election Study series.

Additional items could have been included in the data sets to improve this dissertation. For instance, in addition to the aforementioned question that dealt with affirmative action in employment, I would like to have seen a question regarding affirmative action in education. Also, I would have preferred to use questions that estimated the effects of self-interest and symbolic politics attitudes more directly. One question that would have improved the models' goodness-of-fit would be questions that inquired about the respondent's perception that he/she or a member of their household is/was a beneficiary of affirmative action. Surely, those who perceive benefits from affirmative action or those who are related to someone who perceives benefits from affirmative action would be more supportive than those who do not. Another item of import would ascertain the perceived effectiveness of affirmative action in advancing the social, economic, and political power of minorities, but especially blacks. Those who believe affirmative action is effective toward these ends would likely be more supportive than blacks who doubt the effectiveness of affirmative action. In addition, a question on the respondent’s income
may have an impact on support whereas the family income variable did not. It may be the case that family income does not matter to one's attitudes toward affirmative action, but individual income might.

Though relatively satisfied with the independent variables used to operationalize self-interest, I am even more satisfied with the independent variables that were used to tap the effects of symbolic politics attitudes. Also, I believe that the symbolic politics variables do a much better job of capturing the intended effects than did the independent variables that were used to measure the effects of self-interest. Nonetheless, better questions could have been asked of the respondents. For instance, it would have been beneficial if there were questions that asked respondents how important is it for everyone to have equal rights, how important is it for everyone to achieve their goals on their own without help from others or the government, and which of these sentiments is more important. This battery of questions taps the effects of core values more directly than the present set of variables.

An Agenda for Future Research

By no means is this the last word on the subject. Much more research needs to be conducted in order to fully understand American attitudes toward racial policies, particularly affirmative action. Future research should include the effects of the environment or context, the differences in support for affirmative action in education, and examine the levels of support for affirmative action among women, other minorities, and the disabled. Foremost among the factors not considered in this dissertation are contextual effects or the role played by the environment. I test the effects of racial threat sensed by blacks from whites, but I do not take into account the level of
diversity within the respondent's neighborhood or within other aspects of the respondent's environment. The evolving hypothesis would have been that increasing levels of heterogeneity will likely have a positive impact on support for affirmative action. The assumption is that as the level of contact between respondents and members of the targeted group increases, so will the degree of support for policies intended to benefit members of the targeted group. The hypothesis could work in the opposite manner, but the contact hypothesis as stated in the literature proposes a positive effect.

Beyond neighborhood characteristics, I am not able to account for information sources. In essence, what are the characteristics of the people with whom the respondents discuss politics and societal conditions? That is, the people the respondents come into contact with may affect their opinions. Citizens who converse most often about politics and social problems with the poor, unemployed, minorities, egalitarians, liberals, Democrats, and blacks who exhibit group consciousness will most likely support affirmative action more than citizens who interact most often with the wealthy, employed, whites, individualists, conservatives, Republicans, and blacks who do not exhibit group consciousness.

This dissertation examines black attitudes toward affirmative action in employment. I did not examine black attitudes toward affirmative action in education. Largely, the debate over affirmative action is more vocal in the employment arenas than in education. Not to be overlooked are the many court cases that have focused on affirmative action in education, but most of the seminal cases have been in the employment realm. It is my sense that self-interest would have an even smaller impact on attitudes toward affirmative action in education.
Because education is often regarded as a public good, it is often seen as non-excludable and non-rivalrous. That is, students that qualify can obtain a stellar education at many colleges and universities across the country at little or no cost regardless of geography. Moreover, because education is often perceived as a public good, it is not viewed as a zero-sum game like jobs. Jobs are certainly limited, and so the effects of losing are easily felt; not so direct are the effects of losing in education.

Many of the symbolic politics attitudes probably would not have the impact on attitudes toward affirmative action in education as they did on support for affirmative action in employment, but some might. Again, I argue this would be the case because education is often considered a public good, and to many others, education is thought to be a right. To some, it's the obligation of the government to provide an education for its citizens. It would follow from this that egalitarians, liberals, and Democrats may be more supportive of affirmative action in education than individualists, conservatives, and Republicans. Therefore, factors such as the core values and political orientation may have an impact on attitudes toward affirmative action in education, but I suspect that group consciousness and racial attitudes would not.

Lastly, future research might include an intense study on the attitudes harbored by women, other minorities, and the disabled toward both affirmative action in employment and education. All three of these groups stand to benefit from affirmative action, so self-interest is expected to play a part, albeit a small part, in explaining attitudes. Yet there may be nuances within these groups. For instance, white women may be less supportive of both affirmative action in employment and
education due to the influencing factors of interacting with white men. That is, because white women may be quite similar to white men in preferences and because these preferences may be reinforced through contact and interaction with white men who are generally less supportive of affirmative action, white women would be expected to be less supportive than women of color. We know that blacks are largely in favor of affirmative action and why, but we do not know the same about Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, or Native Americans. I suspect the same factors that hold for black support for affirmative action would be the same for these minority groups. However, when it comes to explaining the attitudes of the disabled, I would expect race to play a much smaller part. That is, because the disabled are of all types of races and ethnicities, race would probably matter less. What would be more important is their core values and political ideology. That is, some disabled Americans resent assistance; they do not want the help of others or the government, but would rather be left alone to make ends meet. To other disabled Americans, assistance is needed; they desire and need the help of others and the government. Therefore, egalitarianism, individualism, liberalism, and conservatism are likely to play a greater role than race. Self-interest may still play a role in explaining the attitudes of disabled Americans toward affirmative action. However, I expect that the disabled would generally favor affirmative action in employment, and much more so than affirmative action in education. Disabled Americans are not systematically discriminated against in education, but they are in terms of employment. Even in light of the American Disabilities Act, I would expect the disabled to support affirmative action in employment. Of course, there are probably a number of other research ideas within this
field, but these are the most obvious ones to me. Realizing there is
much more to do in this area, we must conclude that it is in its infancy
regarding empirical examination. Due to its controversial zero-sum
nature, I am confident that more scholarship on support for affirmative
action by various Americans will be produced whether in the
aforementioned suggested areas or not.
NOTES


5. The Houston referendum, Proposition A, reads: "Shall the charter of the city of Houston be amended to end the use of affirmative action for women and minorities in the operation of city of Houston employment and contracting, including ending the current program and any similar programs in the future?" (Page, 1997). The California referendum, Proposition 209, reads: "The State shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting" (CADAP, 1996).

6. The original collector of the data, ICPSR, and the relevant funding agency bear no responsibility for uses of this collection or for interpretations or inferences based upon such uses (Jackson, 1993).
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APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS OF BLACK SUPPORT FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 1984-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affirmative Action</strong></td>
<td>&quot;Because of past discrimination, minorities should be given special</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>consideration when decisions are made about hiring applicants for jobs.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Interest and Racial Threat Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education (-)</strong></td>
<td>1 = 8 grades or less, no high school diploma or equivalency test, 2 =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9-12 grades, no high school diploma or equivalency test, 3 = high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>diploma or equivalency test, 4 = some college, 5 = 16 years+, no college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>degree, 6 = university/college degree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family Finances (-)</strong></td>
<td>&quot;We are interested in how people are getting along these days. Would you</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>say that you (and your family living here) are better off or worse off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>financially than you were a year ago? Is that much better off or somewhat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>better off? Is that much worse off or somewhat worse off? 1 = much worse,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = somewhat worse, 3 = same, 4 = somewhat better, 5 = much better.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family Income (-)</strong></td>
<td>Combined income of all members of your family living with respondent, for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983 and 1987 before taxes. Range: 1 (under $9,999) to 11 ($40,000 or more).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment Status (-)</strong></td>
<td>1 = working, working and retired, working and housewife, working and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>student; 0 = retired, temporarily laid off, unemployed, housewife, housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and student, student, permanently disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = working full-time, working part-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
time. 0 = retired, homemaker, student, temporarily laid off, unemployed, permanently disabled.

**Social Class (-)**

"Which of the classes would you say you belong to?" 1 = poor, 2 = working class, 3 = middle class, 4 = upper-middle class, 5 = upper class.

**Age (+)**

Age in years, ranging from 17-98.

**Southern Blacks (+)**

1 = Southern states; 0 = otherwise.

**Job Security (+)**

"How worried are you about losing your job in the near future?" 1 = not much at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = a lot.

**Job Worried (+)**

"If you were to lose your job, how worried are you about not being able to find a job in the near future?" 1 = not much at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = a lot.

**Black-White Economics (-)**

"On the whole, would you say that the economic position of blacks is better, about the same, or worse than whites?" 1 = much worse, 2 = somewhat worse, 3 = same, 4 = somewhat better, 5 = much better.

**Black Influence**

Blacks (-) and whites (+). "We'd like to get your feelings about some groups in American society. Some people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and politics, while other people feel that certain groups don't have as much influence as they deserve. For each group I read to you, please tell me whether you think that particular group has too much influence, just about the right amount of influence, or too little influence." 1 = too little influence, 2 = just right influence, 3 = too much influence.

**Self/Race Blame (+)**

"In the United States, if black people don't do well in life, it is because they don't work hard to get ahead [coded -1], they are kept back because of their race [coded 1], or both [coded 0]."
people don't do well in life, it is because they don't work hard to get ahead." 1 = agree strongly, 2 = agree somewhat, 3 = disagree somewhat, 4 = disagree strongly.

"In the United States, if black people don't do well in life, it is because of their race." 1 = disagree strongly, 2 = disagree somewhat, 3 = agree somewhat, 4 = agree strongly.

White Intentions (+)  
"On the whole, do you think most white people want to see blacks get a better break [coded 1], or do they want to keep blacks down [coded 5], or don't they care one way or the other [coded 3]?

Black-White Equality (-)  
"This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal black people and white people are." 1 = disagree strongly, 2 = disagree somewhat, 3 = agree somewhat, 4 = agree strongly.

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### APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS OF BLACK SUPPORT FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 1984-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action</td>
<td>&quot;Because of past discrimination, minorities should be given special consideration when decisions are made about hiring applicants for jobs.&quot; 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Symbolic Politics Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Blacks and Minorities (+)</td>
<td>&quot;The government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic positions of blacks and other minority groups.&quot; 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Efforts by Government (-)</td>
<td>&quot;The government should not make any special effort to help blacks and other minorities because they should help themselves.&quot; 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Criteria (-)</td>
<td>&quot;Job applicants should be judged solely on the basis of test scores and other individual qualities.&quot; 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Integration (+)</td>
<td>&quot;The racial integration of schools is so important that it justifies bussing children to schools outside of their neighborhoods.&quot; 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Job/Standard of Living (+)       | "Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good
standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale—at number 1. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these people are at the other end of the scale—at number 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?” 1 = government let each person get ahead to 7 = government see to job and good standard of living. 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = strongly agree.

Political Ideology (+)  
1 = strong conservative, 2 = not very strong conservative, 3 = moderate, slightly conservative, 4 = moderate, 5 = moderate, slightly liberal, 6 = not very strong liberal, 7 = strong liberal.

Political Partisanship (+)  
1 = strong Republican, 2 = weak Republican, 3 = Independent-Republican, 4 = Independent-Independent, 5 = Independent Democrat, 6 = weak Democrat, 7 = strong Democrat.

Black Centrality (+)  
"People differ in whether they think about being black—what they have in common with blacks. What about you—do you think about this never [coded 1], hardly ever [coded 2], once in a while [coded 3], fairly often [coded 4], a lot [coded 5]?”

Black Identity (+)  
"Which would you say is more important to you?” 1 = American, 2 = both equally, 3 = Black.

Attachment  
Blacks (+) and whites (-). Groups respondent feels close to in ideas and feelings. 1 = not close at all, 2 = not too close, 3 = fairly close, 4 = very close.

Black-White Interaction (+)  
"Blacks should not have anything to do with whites if they can help it.” 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree.
Black Stereotypes (+)

"Many different words have been used to describe black people in general. How true do you think each of the following is in describing most black people?" Love their families; hardworking; care for others; proud; honest; strong; 1 = not true at all, 2 = a little true, 3 = somewhat true, 4 = very true.

Black-White Economics (-)

"On the whole, would you say that the economic position of blacks is better, about the same, or worse than whites?" 1 = much worse, 2 = somewhat worse, 3 = same, 4 = somewhat better, 5 = much better.

Influence

Blacks (-) and whites (+). "We'd like to get your feelings about some groups in American society. Some people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and politics, while other people feel that certain groups don't have as much influence as they deserve. For each group I read to you, please tell me whether you think that particular group has too much influence, just about the right amount of influence, or too little influence." 1 = too little influence, 2 = just right influence, 3 = too much influence.

Social Class (-)

"Which of the classes would you say you belong to?" 1 = poor, 2 = working class, 3 = middle class, 4 = upper-middle class, 5 = upper class.

Self/Race Blame (+)

"In the United States, if black people don't do well in life, it is because they don't work hard to get ahead [coded -1], they are kept back because of their race [coded 1], or both [coded 0].

"In the United States, if black people don't do well in life, it is because they don't work hard to get ahead." 1 = agree strongly, 2 = agree somewhat, 3 = disagree somewhat, 4 = disagree strongly.

"In the United States, if black people don't do well in life, it is because of their race." 1 = disagree strongly, 2 = disagree somewhat, 3 = agree somewhat, 4 =
agree strongly. These were combined to make up one item.

White Intentions (+)

"On the whole, do you think most white people want to see blacks get a better break [coded 1], or do they want to keep blacks down [coded 5], or don't they care one way or the other [coded 3]?
APPENDIX C. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS OF BLACK SUPPORT FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action</td>
<td>&quot;Because of past discrimination, minorities should be given special consideration when decisions are made about hiring applicants for jobs.&quot; 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Interest and Racial Threat Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (-)</td>
<td>1 = grade school (grades 1-8), 2 = some high school, no degree (grades 9-12), 3 = high school degree, 4 = some college, no degree, 5 = Associate's/ 2-year degree, 6 = Bachelor's/4-year degree, 7 = some graduate school, 8 = Master's degree, 9 = doctorate/law degree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Finances (-)</td>
<td>&quot;We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say that you (and others in your household) are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago? Is that much better off or somewhat better off?&quot; 1 = worse off, 2 = same, 3 = better off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income (-)</td>
<td>Combined income of all members of your family living with respondent, for 1995 before taxes. Range: 1 (up to $10,000) to 11 ($105,000 and more).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status (-)</td>
<td>1 = working now, 0 = retired, housewife, student, temporarily laid off, unemployed, permanently disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (-)</td>
<td>&quot;Which of these classes would you say you belong to?&quot; 1 = poor, 2 = working class, 3 = middle class, 4 = upper-middle class, 5 = upper class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (+)</td>
<td>Age in years, ranging from 17-90, 91 or older.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>&quot;Do you think what happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?&quot; 1 = not very much, 2 = some, 3 = a lot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Treatment (+)</td>
<td>&quot;Being black determines a lot how you are treated in this country, more than how much money a person earns.&quot; 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Opportunities (-)</td>
<td>&quot;Your opportunities to get ahead aren't affected much by how other blacks are generally treated in this country.&quot; 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character/Race (-)</td>
<td>&quot;In this country, people judge you more on the content of your character than on your race.&quot; 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination First Problem (+)</td>
<td>&quot;Three things often mentioned as problems facing black people in this country are unemployment, discrimination and crime. Of these three, please tell me which do you think is the MOST important problem facing black people?&quot; 1 = discrimination, 0 = otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Second Problem (+)</td>
<td>&quot;Which do you think is second most important?&quot; 1 = discrimination, 0 = otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Progress (+)</td>
<td>&quot;Some people say that over the last 20 years or so, there has been a lot of progress in getting rid of racial discrimination. Others say there hasn't been much real change for most blacks over that time. Which do you agree with most?&quot; 1 = a lot of progress, 2 = not much real change.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS OF BLACK SUPPORT FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action</td>
<td>&quot;Because of past discrimination, minorities should be given special consideration when decisions are made about hiring applicants for jobs.&quot; 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Symbolic Politics Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Blacks (+)</td>
<td>&quot;Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic positions of blacks. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at point 1. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. Suppose these people are at the other end of the scale, at point 7. And, of course, other people have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?&quot; Range: 1 = blacks should help themselves to 7 = government should make every effort to improve the position of blacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Integration (+)</td>
<td>&quot;The racial integration of schools is so important that it justifies bussing children to schools outside of their neighborhoods.&quot; 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job/Standard of Living (+)</td>
<td>&quot;Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Suppose these people are at the other end of the scale, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 1 = government should just let each person get ahead on their own to 7 = every person has a job and a good standard of living.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Ideology (+)</th>
<th>&quot;Do you think of yourself as more like a liberal or more like a conservative?&quot; 1 = conservative, 2 = neither, refuses to choose, 3 = liberal.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Partisanship (+)</td>
<td>&quot;Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and Independent, or what?&quot; 1 = Republican, 2 = Independent, 3 = Democrat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>&quot;Do you think what happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?&quot; 1 = not very much, 2 = some, 3 = a lot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Men Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>&quot;Do you think generally what happens to black men will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?&quot; 1 = not very much, 2 = some, 3 = a lot, otherwise, missing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Women Common Fate (+)</td>
<td>&quot;Do you think generally what happens to black women will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?&quot; 1 = not very much, 2 = some, 3 = a lot, otherwise, missing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Centrality (+)</td>
<td>&quot;People differ in whether they think about being black--what they have in common with blacks. What about you--do you think about this a lot, fairly often, once in a while, or hardly ever?&quot; 1 = hardly ever, 2 = once in a while, 3 = fairly often, 4 = a lot.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Black-White Interaction (+)  "Blacks should not have anything to do with whites if they can help it. 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree.

Black-White Economics (-) "On the whole, would you say that the economic position of blacks is better, about the same, or worse than whites? 1 = worse, 2 = same, 3 = better.

Black SES (+) "Will blacks in this country ever achieve full social and economic equality?" 1 = no, 0 = yes.

Disadvantaged's Strength (+) "If blacks, other minorities, the poor, and women pulled together, they could decide how this country is run." 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree.

Social Class (-) "Which of these classes would you say you belong to?" 1 = poor, 2 = working class, 3 = middle class, 4 = upper-middle class, 5 = upper class.

Black Treatment (+) "Being black determines a lot how you are treated in this country, more than how much money a person earns." 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree.

Black Opportunities (-) "Your opportunities to get ahead aren't affected much by how other blacks are generally treated in this country." 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree.

Character/Race (-) "In this country, people judge you more on the content of your character than on your race." 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree.

Discrimination First Problem (+) "Three things often mentioned as problems facing black people in this country are unemployment, discrimination, and crime. Of these three, please tell me which do you think is the MOST important problem facing black people?" 1 =
discrimination, 0 = otherwise.

Discrimination Second Problem (+)

"Which do you think is second most important?" 1 = discrimination, 0 = otherwise.

Discrimination Progress (+)

"Some people say that over the last 20 years or so, there has been a lot of progress in getting rid of racial discrimination. Others say there hasn't been much real change for most blacks over that time. Which do you agree with most?" 1 = a lot of progress, 2 = not much real change.
VITA

Maruice Mangum was born in Iowa City, Iowa and raised in Waterloo, Iowa. He received his bachelor of science degree in political science at the University of Iowa in May 1992. He was a two-time participant in the Summer Research Opportunities Program, where he conducted presidential research with Professor Cary Covington, and congressional research with Professor Peverill Squire, respectively. He would complete his Senior Honor’s thesis, entitled, “Black Group Consciousness and Political Participation,” under the supervision of Professor Arthur Miller. These works were presented at undergraduate conferences at Benedictine College in Atchison, Kansas and the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

During his four wonderful years at the University of Iowa, he had a steady diet of extra-curricular activities. He was, among many other things, captain and coach of the Intramural Residence Hall Flag-Football Champions, Rienow Raiders and administrative assistant for the Iowa Hawkeye wrestling team. The wrestling team would win two National Collegiate Athletic Association championships and four Big Ten wrestling championships during his tenure.

He received his master of arts degree in political science at the Ohio State University in August 1993. The one calendar year in Columbus, Ohio would prove to be his most challenging experience at the time. Without funding, he took out large loans and worked two, sometimes three, part-time jobs simultaneously to accommodate his course schedule. One of his part-time jobs was spent as a loader during the midnight shift for the United Parcel Service. However, he did find time to serve as the President of Siebert Hall.
He was admitted into the doctoral program at Louisiana State University during the fall of 1993. With financial assistance, he was able to excel in the classroom as both pupil and instructor. He has presented many papers at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, and the annual meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association. These works are currently in preparation for publication.

While in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, he found time to become a proud member of the historically black fraternal organization, Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity, Incorporated. He would serve two years as the Director of Social Action in the Omicron Beta Sigma Chapter. He was also the Senate Finance Chairman and the Senate Academics Chairman of Student Government. Without the burdens of financing his own education, he also pursued another passion, coaching. He coached freshman football two years at two high schools in Baton Rouge, winning two city and two district titles. He had one stint as a wrestling coach, where his high school team won the city, district, and regional championships, and placed second in the state tournament. Finally, he coached little league and American Legion baseball for three summers. Those years would see his teams finish second, first (undefeated league champions), and in a tie for third place, respectively.

On July 1, 1998, he took a position as a Post Doctoral Fellow and Research Associate in the Department of Political Science and the African and Afro-American Studies program at Washington University in St. Louis. On October 1, 1998, he defended successfully his dissertation to earn his degree of Doctor of Philosophy in political science, which will be conferred at the December Commencement in 1998.
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: Maruice Louis Mangum

Major Field: Political Science

Title of Dissertation: Half Empty or Half Full: Explaining Black Attitudes toward Affirmative Action

Approved:

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Date of Examination: October 1, 1998