Continued Consequences of Race-Based Redistricting: An Analysis of Incumbent Roll-Call Voting Behavior and Candidate Emergence in the 1990s.

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CONTINUED CONSEQUENCES OF RACE-BASED REDISTRICTING: AN ANALYSIS OF INCUMBENT ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR AND CANDIDATE EMERGENCE IN THE 1990S

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by

Christine LeVeaux Sharpe
B.A., Spelman College, 1992
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1994
May 1998
DEDICATION

To
heroes unsung
whose
sacrifice and struggle made this dream obtainable
Thank-you
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank Jim Garand for everything! Everything includes always being assessable, showing a sincere interest in the subject matter, giving insightful opinions about the topic, introducing me to new and exciting statistical applications (that made life a little easier), making my goals his goals, and of course spending the endless hours reading and editing this dissertation.

In addition I would like to thank Pam Monroe for dealing with the late night, early morning and weekend meetings. Also, her opinions and advisement in the last couple of months were truly invaluable.

I must also thank the members of my committee, Wayne Parent, Stacia Haynie, Bill Clark, and Jeanne Ringel for their expertise and constructive comments. These professors have played an integral role in my thesis and dissertation work and I thank them for their continued interest and support.

I also would like to thank my mother, Thelma Louise for instilling in me the belief that anything is possible with hard work and dedication.

Last and most special, I must thank my husband, Malcolm and my son, Elijah. I thank my husband for years of encouragement, support, opinions and fresh perspective, patience, and endurance. I thank him for giving me the room to make my dream a reality. Also, I thank my son for being my inspiration.
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ABSTRACT

There have been many claims made that the creation of the majority-black district has led to a more conservative Congress, both in terms of roll-call voting behavior and partisan membership. I contend that there is a direct relationship and an indirect relationship between the creation of majority-black districts and increased conservatism in the House. The direct relationship focuses on the roll-call voting behavior of the House member. The indirect relationship focuses on the partisan makeup of the House. The analysis is couched in broad-based rational choice theory, asserting that incumbent House members and prospective House candidates behave strategically in an effort to achieve electoral success. In addition, I assert that the 1990s redistricting yield ongoing and lasting effects.

The dissertation is divided into roll-call voting behavior and candidate emergence analyses. According to the roll-call voting behavior analysis, House members respond to the changes in racial composition directly after redistricting, but do not remain responsive several years after redistricting. Instead, House members respond to the level of black population in the mid-1990s. The responsiveness differs for non-white and white House members. The larger the black population, the more liberal the non-white House member and the more conservative the white House member. Thus, House members in 1995/1996 are not responding to the changes in racial composition, but rather to the level of black population.

According to the candidate emergence analysis, in 1994, House members who were not responsive to changes in the racial composition of their district were faced with higher quality challengers. Furthermore, the higher quality challengers tended to identify
with the Republican Party. When focusing on the South, lack of responsiveness again attracts higher quality candidates. However, the candidates are no more likely to identify with either party.

The race-based redistricting of the 1990s did have some immediate effects and may have indirectly influenced the increased conservatism in the House of Representatives. However, there does not appear to be strong evidence to suggest that the redistricting produced direct or long-term effects toward conservatism in the House.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The decade is just two short years from a close, and yet there is still uncertainty and dissatisfaction with the redistricting that took place in the early 1990s. In the past, redistricting was a relatively static process. At the beginning of a ten-year period congressional districts are reapportioned based on population shifts, and district lines are drawn to reflect the changes. Ideally, for that ten-year period the district lines remain the same, and candidates campaign and win within the specific and semi-permanent district boundaries. Although states have experienced multiple redistricting in the past, the uncertainty that accompanies the 1990s districts is unprecedented. During the ten-year period that started in 1990 and will end in the year 2000, there have been over 15 challenges to majority-minority districts that were created in the South.¹ Lawsuits challenging the districts drawn after the 1990 census began as early as 1991 in Texas, North Carolina, Alabama, and South Carolina. After several court cases, five of which went to the Supreme Court, districts are still in flux in North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia. The relentless amount of litigation throughout the South has served to keep House members, as well as prospective challengers, guessing what their congressional districts will look like for the next election.

With each lawsuit there is the prospect of district line changes. And with this possibility, there are changing incentives for all actors involved. For instance, the creation of majority-black districts in the early 1990s gave blacks an incentive to run

¹ Court cases surfaced in all eight southern states that created majority-black districts. Court cases in Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas made it to the U.S. Supreme Court.
viable black candidates. For many districts this marked the first time in years that there was the possibility that a black candidate could win the congressional seat. By the same token, these districts changed the incentives for white House members and candidates both Democratic and Republican. Some white Democrats had to decide if they would run in a district that had a very large black population. Some white moderate Republicans had to decide if they would abandon their moderate platforms and move further to the right to reflect the reduction in black population in their districts due to the redistricting aims.

Due in large part to the intervention of the judicial branch into the redistricting process, several district lines changed between the 1992 and 1996 elections. Therefore, what was once a relatively static process has now turned into a dynamic process in the 1990s. The possibility of district lines changing has remained throughout the this ten-year period, and accompanying each court case and subsequent district line change is the possibility of a shift in incentives for those affected by the congressional boundaries.

It is important to put the preceding discussion into context. One of the major goals of the 1990s redistricting was to increase the representation of minorities in the United States Congress. Achievement of the goal was attempted, in large part through the creation of majority-black congressional districts. These districts were formed by concentrating at least 55-65% of blacks in a district in order to insure the election of a black candidate. By most accounts the policy worked as expected. Of the 23 African-American members in the 1980s, only one-sixth of those members represented southern

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2 Eight majority-Hispanic districts were created nationwide in 1992. These districts have also been challenged in Texas, Illinois and New York. For the most part, however, the effects of the 1990s redistricting are focused on majority-black districts in the South.
districts. Between 1991 and 1993, the number of African-American members of Congress grew from 27 to 40, largely as a result of the creation of several majority black districts. The strategy of the redistricting was aimed at the southern states. Accordingly, the South is where the impact was the greatest. Of the 27 African-American members in 1991, only five of them were from the South. In stark contrast, of the 17 African-Americans elected between 1992 and 1994, 13 of them were from the South.

Although the numbers of African-Americans in Congress have increased, the 1990s redistricting may ultimately threaten the overall representation of African-Americans. There have been many claims made both by scholars and political pundits that the creation of the majority-black district has led to a more conservative Congress, both in terms of roll-call voting behavior and partisan membership. Although there is increasing diversity in the political interests of blacks, as a group they still remain overwhelmingly liberal and Democratic.3 Therefore, a more conservative Congress is seen as jeopardizing the overall representation of black interests rather than enhancing it.

I contend that there is a direct relationship and an indirect relationship between the creation of majority-black districts and increased conservatism in the House. The direct relationship focuses on the roll-call voting behavior of the House member. Simply put, the change in black population in a district leads to change in roll-call voting behavior. The indirect relationship focuses on the partisan makeup of the House. As we

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3 In Katherine Tate's *From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections* 1993, the author explores the political views of blacks by studying their response from the National BlackElection Study (NBES). Tate finds that although African Americans have become more conservative in terms of ideology in the last thirty years, they are still overwhelmingly liberal. An analysis of an National Election Study (NES) policy position table spanning 36 years shows that blacks have remained liberal across a wide range of policy issues.
know the Republicans took control over the House in 1994 and some believe that the creation of these districts influenced that shift in party control. The idea here is that majority-black districts are formed by removing blacks from surrounding districts. These subsequent districts are now “bleached” or more white, and by the simple fact that a large liberal voting bloc has been pulled from these districts, the district is now more conservative, and more attractive to prospective Republican candidates.

How could the creation of majority-black districts lead to a more conservative Congress? As mentioned above, when majority-black districts are formed, the surrounding districts are “bleached”, because they have lost a substantial portion of their black population. Many political observers contend that House members in these “bleached” districts will change their roll-call voting behavior to better reflect the interests of their new constituency, which has a higher white population proportion than previously. Therefore, as a result of the creation of one majority-black district, there may be several House members who become less liberal in their roll-call voting behavior due to the loss of a large liberal voting bloc.

Political observers also claim that the loss of large numbers of Democratic House seats in 1994 can be attributed to the creation of majority-black districts. In 1992 there were three Democratic incumbents defeated as a direct result of the creation of majority-black districts. The defeated members were Ben Erdreich of Alabama, C. Thomas McMillen of Maryland and Jerry Huckaby of Louisiana.

The 1994 election marked the first time since Reconstruction that Republicans made up a majority of the southern congressional delegation. Many techniques have been used in an attempt to determine how many of the Republican victories were direct
results of the creation of majority-black districts. The different techniques have generated variant results. I will discuss these results in the next chapter.

Perhaps more important than determining the actual number however, is understanding why the districts would cause such upheaval. As Bullock (1995:22-23) explains, "[b]etter [Republican] candidates, Democratic incumbents trying to defend their records before more conservative constituents, and perceptions that winning might be possible . . . " all played a role in making Republican candidates competitive. Thus, the "bleached" districts may have attracted more experienced and qualified Republican candidates.

There are two major themes that will be addressed throughout the dissertation. First, the redistricting of the 1990s represents a dynamic process in which the effects of the changing boundaries must be looked at across time. Many past studies on this topic look at the effect of the changing district racial composition on a House member's roll-call voting behavior for a one year or two year period (Bullock 1995; Overby and Cosgrove 1996; Lublin 1997; Sharpe and Garand 1994, unpublished). Instead, I argue that there are both delayed effects as well as on going effects of the 1990s redistricting. Second, and more broadly, this dissertation is an attempt to understand better congressional responsiveness in general, and more specifically the representation of black interests at the congressional level.

In this dissertation I seek to answer the following questions: (1) Was the congressional responsiveness in roll-call voting behavior observed in 1993 maintained years after the initial redistricting? (2) Did southern states where race-based redistricting occurred have a relatively higher rate of quality candidate emergence than the rest of the
nation? (3) Were House members who were not responsive to changes in racial composition of their districts, met with more quality challengers?

By answering these questions, this dissertation begins to answer the larger, overarching question of whether black congressional representation is impaired by the creation of majority-black districts. In particular, the question to be answered is whether the formation of majority-black districts inadvertently led to a more conservative Congress in both its roll-call voting behavior and its partisan makeup.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The 1990s redistricting fits into an historical context that is very important to the arguments developed in this dissertation. Redistricting, as we know it has existed since the early 1960s. What then makes the 1990s redistricting so different from redistricting in the past? There are two answers to that question: (1) race, and (2) more importantly, reactions to the redistricting.

Race continues to be an intense issue in the United State as a whole, as well as in the political arena in particular. The 1990s round of redistricting affected the political system like no other redistricting before it. Through the manipulation of district lines, districts were created that allowed black candidates a chance to win election to the U. S. House of Representatives. Up through the 1980s many of the southern states drew district lines in such a way to deny black citizens the opportunity to elect a representative of their choice. The 1990s redistricting attempted to correct this trend, and was met with high levels of resistance. The 1990s, however, is not the first time blacks were elected to Congress in large numbers and it is not the first time that their election fostered resistance.
African-Americans entered the U. S. Congress for the first time in 1870 during Reconstruction. The number of African-Americans serving in Congress between 1870-1901 averaged five members. However, with the overthrow of Reconstruction, African-American members were threatened, injured, and murdered in the attempt to remove all African-Americans from Congress. In 1901 the last African-American, George White of North Carolina, was purged from Congress. African-Americans did not return to Congress until 28 years later when Oscar Depriest of Illinois was elected to the House of Representatives. In the southern states the wait was longer. Barbara Jordan of Texas and Andrew Young of Georgia marked the re-entrance of African-Americans into Congress with their election to the House in 1973. For other southern states like Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, North Carolina and South Carolina, blacks did not serve in Congress again until approximately ninety years after the resignation of Congressman White in 1901.

During post-Reconstruction and the years that followed, African-Americans in the South were effectively removed from political life through tactics such as the poll tax, literacy tests, the grandfather clause, and lynching. Although there were small victories in the struggle for suffrage from 1900 through the 1960s, the most significant gain did not come until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). The VRA of 1965 prohibited voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting or any standard practice, or procedure by any state or political subdivision that would "deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." The Act was different from previous attempts to end racial discrimination in the political arena. Unlike the Voting Rights Acts of 1957, 1960 and 1964, it demanded compliance by giving the Justice Department
authorization to intervene in the political activities of states with a history of racial discrimination in the election process.

Yet, with all of its good intentions, the VRA of 1965 was unable to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination in the electoral process. One of the most common methods used to minimize the number of black elected officials was the racial gerrymander. Black voting power was undermined through one of two basic techniques. A congressional redistricting plan can effectively disperse electoral strength, or it can over-concentrate electoral strength. These techniques are respectively known as diluting and packing. When diluting takes place, a large black population is broken down into several smaller groupings and divided into surrounding districts where they make up a minority of the district population. The result is that the blacks do not have power in numbers to elect their chosen candidate in any of the districts. When packing occurs, the amount of blacks in a particular district far exceeds the amount of blacks needed to elect a representative of their choice. Consequently, votes that could be used elsewhere are wasted. In addition, the likelihood of a black candidate being elected in diminished considerably in the districts bleached to create majority-black districts. Both of these techniques diminish the electoral efficiency of blacks as a group.

Throughout history blacks have considered the Court a safe haven where their complaints could be heard and their needs met. Blacks looked to the courts because the other branches of government did not seem willing to aid blacks in their struggle for social, economic, and political advancement. The issue of redistricting proved no different.
Before the 1960s, state and federal courts were reluctant to intervene in matters involving reapportionment or congressional redistricting. These issues were considered to be political question, better answered by another branch of government or by the electorate. However, the Court heard a case in 1960 that set the scene for further court involvement in redistricting and reapportionment concerns. In *Gomillion v. Lightfoot*, the Court held that the Alabama Legislature could not draw city limits for the city of Tuskegee in such a way that would exclude almost all black voters.

The 1960s case was considered one of the few exceptions to the rule of no court involvement in apportionment and redistricting matters. However, the precedent was broken with the historic 1962 *Baker v. Carr* decision. In its decision the Supreme Court established the principle of population equality in districts, and the Court has continued to exercise great influence in the area of apportionment and redistricting ever since.4

Two court cases that were most influential in the 1990s formation of minority black districts were *City of Mobile v. Bolden* and *Thornburg v. Gingles*. In the case of the *City of Mobile v. Bolden* the majority “...held that a voting rights suit grounded on the Fourteenth Amendment must demonstrate that a questioned practice or law was established or maintained with racially discriminatory intent” (Grofman, Handley and Niemi 1992:35). Therefore, the burden of proof would be placed on the plaintiffs of such cases to prove that the discrimination that occurred as a result of a certain plan was purposeful. This decision gave rise to emotional criticism and protest. Members of the

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4 Emphasized in the majority opinion of *Baker v. Carr* was the belief that the federal judiciary had the power to review the apportionment of state legislatures under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
civil rights community demanded answers for what they considered to be a blatant disregard for the fundamental right to vote.

The civil rights community received the answer they were looking for a couple of years later with the passage of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. These amendments were in direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden. Congress passed an amendment that eased the burden of proof for those alleging discrimination in voting rights matters. Section 2(a) of the amended Voting Rights Act states that:

... no voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results (emphasis added) in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) (Voting Rights Act Section 2 Amendment).

The Act now prohibited any practice that had the result of discrimination, regardless of the lawmakers' intent.

The amended Voting Rights act did not provide guidelines as to how courts were to determine whether vote dilution existed. Therefore, many different interpretations surfaced in the lower courts. The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the courts' position in the 1986 decision in Thornburg v. Gingles. The Court upheld the "result" test laid out in the 1982 amendments and developed a three-pronged test to assess vote dilution claims. The following three conditions have to be present before vote dilution could be considered: "... First the minority group must be . . . sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority of a single-member district . . . . Second, the minority group must be . . . politically cohesive . . . . Third, the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate" (Thornburg v. Gingles 478 U.S. 30, 1986). This case was considered a major victory for the civil rights community, as well as a signal to state legislatures to establish majority-black districts wherever possible.

In considering the 1990s redistricting, the Justice Department applied the requirements laid out in Gingles rather broadly. Under the Voting Rights Act, the Justice Department must pre-clear redistricting plans in 14 states with a history of racial discrimination.\(^5\) In these states the Justice Department pressed for state legislatures to draw more majority-minority districts than already drawn. In essence Justice Department approved plans resemble more of a proportional type of electoral system in which the number of majority-minority districts roughly coincide with the proportion of minorities in the state.\(^6\)

This prodding was reflected in the 1992 congressional elections. Prior to the 1992 elections, the 11 southern states held 116 congressional seats, only five of which were held by African-Americans, even though about 25% of the population in these states is black (Leo 1992:33). After the elections, 12 new southern House seats were won by African-Americans, bringing the southern total to 17 and the national total to 40.

In addition, the 1992 elections marked the first time since Reconstruction that blacks won congressional seats in Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina and

\(^5\) The states requiring pre-clearance are Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.

\(^6\) Lani Guinier (1994) contends that a proportional type of electoral system would eliminate the need for race-based redistricting all together.
Virginia. Louisiana and Texas increased black membership by one seat, and Georgia gained two black seats in 1992.

Although the number of majority-minority districts remains fairly small, their creation has been met with much resistance. The resistance has manifested itself in a series of cases heard by the Supreme Court. The first case to be heard by the court was Shaw v. Reno. A suit was filed by five white North Carolinians who claimed that their 14th Amendment right to "equal protection under the law" had been violated due to the creation of two meandering majority-black districts. The court ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to raise concerns under the 14th Amendment because "bizarrely shaped districts designed to promote minority voting strength may violate the constitutional rights of white voters." The court did not attempt to answer whether the creation of majority-minority districts was always a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but it did rule that the plaintiffs might have a valid complaint (Kaplan 1993:1762).

The ruling was seen as a victory to opponents of the majority-minority districts and a defeat to proponents of the majority-minority district. Opponents of the districts claimed that the ruling simply meant that the drawing of district lines with race having a disproportionate or exclusive role is prohibited. Proponents of the districts felt that the ruling jeopardized majority-minority districts and invite litigation aimed at dismantling the districts.

One of the biggest criticisms of the Shaw v. Reno ruling was that there seemed to be a double standard set for redistricting based on incumbency, partisanship, and other minorities versus redistricting based on race, specifically African-American.
In his dissent Justice John Paul Stevens verbalized this feeling:

'If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause' (Kaplan 1993:1763).

The Court’s focus on the “bizarreness” of the shape of a district also seemed contradictory to some observers. The following example illustrates the problem that critics have with the ruling. In the state of Texas there were four unusually shaped districts. Two of the four districts were declared unconstitutional due to a district court ruling that implemented the Shaw v. Reno decision. It is difficult if not impossible to examine an illustration of these districts visually and determine which ones the court struck down. All four districts seem to violate the compactness standard, and they all seem bizarrely shaped. The two districts struck down were district 18 which is 50.9 percent African-American, and district 29 which is 60.6 percent Latino. In the same decision district 6 which is 90.9 percent white and district 3, with 89.3 percent white were upheld.

The vagueness of the Court’s Shaw v. Reno decision led to a series of court cases challenging the creation of majority-minority districts. Several cases have reached the Supreme Court.

The first case that applied the Shaw decision in order to strike down a redistricting plan originated in Louisiana. In July 1992, three whites and one black filed suit challenging the congressional districts drawn for the 1990s. They argued that the creation of these districts stripped the subsequent minority group of all of their political power. The number of whites in the majority-black district was too small to have any
political impact. Conversely, the black plaintiff argued that blacks left in the now ultra white districts also did not have any political influence because of their small numbers. In *Hays v. Louisiana*, a three judge panel ruled that “the length the Legislature went to in creating the second of two black districts exceeded the limits implicit in the Supreme Court’s *Shaw* ruling” (Kaplan 1994:29). When the case went to the Supreme Court many hoped that the Court would set specific guidelines for states that felt a need to establish majority-minority districts. However, this was not the case. In *United States v. Hays*, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs in the case had no grounds to sue because they did not live in the contested 4th district.

Oral arguments in *Miller v. Johnson*, a case from Georgia, were heard along with the *Hays*’ arguments. In the 1993 *Shaw* decision the Court expressed its concern with “bizarreness of shape.” The court went a step further in the *Miller* decision, explaining that a peculiar shape is just one indication that race might have played an extreme role in constructing districts. In the majority opinion, the Justices questioned any districting plan in which race was the “predominant factor.” In order to show that race was a “predominant factor” in creating districts, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said ‘a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial considerations’ (Idelson 1995:1946). In other words, if race is more important in shaping districts than compactness, contiguity, political subdivisions, and common interests, there are grounds for suit. On June 13, 1996, the Supreme Court solidified its position on race-based redistricting. In the North Carolina case of *Shaw v. Hunt*, and the Texas case of *Bush v. Vera*, the court ruled that both states focused too much on race and
not enough on the traditional districting principles when they created four majority-minority districts. This decision follows the precedent set in the Miller case a year earlier. With this ruling the Court struck down both states' congressional district maps.

This brief history illustrates the circumstances that lead up to the 1990s redistricting, and the atmosphere in which the redistricting took place. In addition, it highlights the continuing court battles that still, as of the 1996 elections, make the southern districts uncertain.

CONCLUSION

It is not enough to examine House members' roll-call voting behavior the year after redistricting was completed. Instead we must consider House member's responsiveness once the focus has been taken off of the 1990s round of redistricting. Equally important is the fact that roll-call voting behavior is not the only factor to consider when determining the possible conservative effect that the race-based redistricting had on Congress. Included in this study is a discussion on the role of the 1990s race-based redistricting on the emergence of quality Republican candidates in subsequent elections.

The combination of roll-call voting behavior and candidate emergence analyses will facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the role the race-based redistricting of the 1990s played in the creation of a more conservative Congress.

Plan of the Dissertation

The next chapter discusses the previous literature related to the topics in this dissertation. I draw from several bodies of research including rational choice theory, strategic politician theory, challenger quality research, congressional responsiveness
research, and race-based redistricting research. Scholarly contributions in each of these bodies of work are examined in this chapter.

Chapter 3 proposes a broad-based rational choice theory. How would we expect politicians, as rational actors, to respond to the race-based redistricting of the 1990s? The prospect of changes in district boundaries induces incentive changes in incumbent roll-call voting behavior as well as the challengers' decision to run. This is the point of departure for the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 4 describes the data and methods used to test the propositions outlined previously. This dissertation focuses on several different questions and thus, depends on many different sources of data. Roll-call data are utilized, as well as election results, and challenger quality information.

Chapter 5 examines whether the responsiveness observed directly after the initial redistricting in 1992 signaled a sustained change in roll-call voting behavior among affected House members, or have those members reverted back to their pre-redistricting behavior.

Chapter 6 explores the effect that changing district lines have had on challengers' decision to run for office. Did the more quality challenger run in 1994 and 1996 in districts and states that had been affected by race-based redistricting?

Chapter 7 discusses the results and their implications for representation in the 21st century. The 1996 congressional elections may have marked the end of court ordered race-based redistricting. What effect this may have on the ability of African-Americans to win election in the House of Representatives will be discussed in this chapter.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

In Chapter 1, a general theory of congressional roll-call voting behavior and candidate emergence was presented. The theory is based on the proposition that the 1990s redistricting has proven to be a dynamic process that has yielded continued changes in both roll-call voting behavior and candidate emergence throughout the decade. Arguments constructed in this study are drawn from several different bodies of literature. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the literature and explain its relevance in the context of this dissertation.

The first area of research focuses on roll-call voting behavior. The main issue addressed in this research is the degree to which House members are responsive to changes in the constituency composition. The study focuses on how roll-call voting behavior responds to changes in district composition due to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as well as the decennial redistricting process.

The second area of research deals with candidate emergence. Candidate emergence literature focuses on two main areas. First, the literature analyzes what type of potential candidates run for office. Second, the research examines what national and local factors determine who runs for office, and when they run for office. Examples of both of these arguments are included in the review of the literature.

The last area of research analyzed in this chapter is in the beginning stages of development. After Republicans took control of the Congress in 1994, many political observers began to question whether there was a causal relationship between the creation of majority-black districts and the Republican sweep. The studies supporting and
refuting that claim are included in this section. These are the first attempts at trying to explain candidate emergence in the 1990s as it relates to the race-based redistricting that occurred.

ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR

The framework of this dissertation is based on the theory that the United States House of Representatives, deemed to be the most representative institution in our government, is in fact responsive to constituency interests. Given this, it is important to determine whether this legislative system, which boasts accountability, is in fact accountable to the people. As numerous scholars have suggested, reelection is the primary goal of House members (e.g., Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978). If this is the case, we should expect to see House members attempting to garner constituency support through many forms of behavior, including roll-call voting.

Pitkin (1967) describes representation as “acting in the interest of the represented in a manner responsive to them.” Like Pitkin’s definition, most definitions of representation center around the idea of policy responsiveness, which refers to the congruence between the constituents’ opinions and interests and the representative’s legislative actions. However, it is important to note a more inclusive definition of representation. Eulau and Karps (1977) claim that representation is a multidimensional concept. In addition to policy responsiveness, they maintain that there is service responsiveness, which is the representative’s ability to render services to constituents. Allocation responsiveness refers to the representative’s ability to bring government projects from Washington to the district (pork). Last, symbolic responsiveness refers to the representative’s ability to offer political gesture to improve trust and popularity.
Although the present study focuses more directly on policy responsiveness, it is necessary to mention the other forms of representation. There are some benefits to having a black representative that are not as easily measured as policy issues, but they may fall into one of the other three dimensions of representation. For instance, Fenno (1978) recounted a conversation between a House member and one of his staffers. The congressman stated that he concedes the black vote. In reference to a black neighborhood they were driving through, the staff member says - "I wouldn't want to be out there walking on the sidewalk." The congressman replies that "[i]t's like some Caribbean country" (Fenno 1978:21). In stark contrast, former Congressman Cleo Fields of Louisiana walked the streets of rural, predominately black areas in the state. In many areas the people remarked that he was the first congressman who ever came into their neighborhood to listen to their concerns.\(^1\) It is difficult to quantify the value of an attitude change that might occur when a person feels that their representative is interested in their opinion.

In this dissertation I explore representation and responsiveness as it is affected by redistricting. Redistricting refers to the drawing of constituency boundaries with the purpose of redistributing congressional seats designated to a state. Morrill (1981:17-28) enumerated criteria for redistricting. He explained that there are two criteria, which are based on the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The criteria were not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but rather became law as a result of judicial interpretation of the Constitution. The first criterion, equality of population, states that congressional districts should be as equal in number as possible. The second criterion is equal

\(^1\) Interview with Congressman Cleo Fields (D-LA), January 20, 1995.
probability of representation. This refers to the drawing of congressional districts that give racial and ethnic minorities an equitable chance of representation. The other criteria are strongly advocated, but not required by law. They are as follows: (1) congressional districts should conform where possible, to local boundaries, commentates of interest, and lines of communication; (2) congressional districts should be as geographically compact as possible and no part should be completely unconnected with the rest of the district. (3) congressional districts should be drawn to be as fair as possible between political parties; and (4) congressional districts should foster party competition and alternation.

Much of the pre-1990s research on redistricting focuses on whether there is partisan influence in the redistricting process, and if there is, who benefits from it.

Glazer and Robbins (1985) use the backdrop of redistricting to test for the impact of changing partisan composition of the constituency on a representative's vote behavior. The authors develop a cross-sectional model of roll-call voting behavior, and then take the coefficients from that model to generate predicted changes in roll-call voting based on changes in the partisan composition after redistricting. They find that changes in partisan composition due to the 1980s redistricting led to changes in representatives’ vote behavior that reflected the partisan changes.

Another study that shows evidence of congressional responsiveness is Fleisher (1993), who finds that the level of southern Democratic liberalism has increased over time due to several factors. First of all, with the emergence of legitimate two-party politics in the South, Republicans have begun to forge competitive campaigns. Fleisher

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explains that the presence of formidable Republican candidates leads Democratic
candidates to further differentiate themselves from Republican candidates in an effort to
secure the vote of liberal blacks and whites. These efforts by Democratic candidates are
reflected in the liberalization of their roll-call behavior.

As this subject relates to race there have been conflicting findings. In a study that
focuses exclusively on the roll-call voting behavior of southern House members, Whitby
and Gilliam (1991) find that southern Democratic members of Congress became more
liberal after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The authors attribute the
altered vote behavior to House members' effort to accommodate the surge of black, and
mainly liberal, constituents. They also find evidence of generational replacement. The
responsiveness toward the more liberalized electorate is not only evidenced in current
House members' roll-call voting behavior, but also in the increased liberalism of new
members entering the House.

Combs, Hibbing and Welch (1984) study the effect of changes in black
population on congressional roll-call voting over an eight year period. These authors find
that in the North and the urbanized South, the liberal roll-call voting behavior of the
representative increases as the black population in a district increases. This is the
expected relationship if the House member is responsive to changes in black population.
However, in the rural South, there is a curvilinear relationship. When the black
population is small, the member's roll-call voting behavior is more conservative. As the
black population grows, a member's liberalism increases up until a point. When the
black population is relatively large (30-40%), the liberal vote behavior of the House
member decreases.
Two studies in particular ask probing questions about the effects of race-based redistricting before the issue was thrust on to the national agenda in the mid-1990s. These studies have laid the groundwork for an entire body of research that took root after the 1990s redistricting.

Grofman, Griffin and Glazer (1992) explore whether an increase in the black population leads to a higher probability that a Democratic candidate will be elected to office. The authors find that in both the Southern and non-Southern states, a certain threshold must be reached in black population before it will have an effect on the party and ideological identification of the winning candidate.

For instance, if there are two southern districts, one with 55% black and the other with 15% black, the authors contend that it would be more beneficial to the Democratic party, to divide the blacks in those district evenly. When divided evenly, each district could have 35% black population. Grofman et al. (1992) find that southern districts that have 30 to 40% black population will almost definitely elect a liberal Democratic candidate. Outside the South the same phenomenon occurs, however, the threshold is lower. Democrats and liberals are elected with 20-30% of the population being black.

The authors make an important point in this article. The threshold for securing a Democratic candidate is much lower than the threshold for securing a black candidate. Therefore, so the argument goes, it does not benefit the Democratic Party to form majority-black districts. What appears obvious from this study is that for white Democrats, majority-black districts waste votes.

In a second study, Handley, Brace and Grofman (1987) ask the question “Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Help Republicans?” In this state level study, they
find that the necessary packing of Democrats into a district in order to insure the election of a black representative results in surrounding districts being overwhelmingly Republican. The authors claim that the creation of majority-black districts, and the consequent wasting of Democratic votes, leads to an unintended consequence, the loss of Democratic districts.

Grofman and Handley (1991) ask whether the increase in black legislators in southern state legislature between 1965 and 1985 was due to whites' new willingness to vote for blacks, or whether the increase is due to redistricting aims that increased the number of black majorities and eliminated vote dilution tactics. They find that the number of black officials has increased because the number of black majority districts has increased, not because whites are voting blacks into office. The elimination of multimember districts, along with enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, is the major contributing factors of the increase in black legislators.

Although Grofman and Handley find support for a claim that many political observers also find to be true, there are political science scholars who think differently. Themstrom (1987), Swain (1993), and Lublin (1997) all suggest that black legislators can be elected in congressional districts that do not have a black majority. In fact, Swain suggests that, instead of exerting effort on increasing black representation through the creation of black districts (a process which she argues has been exhausted), blacks should attempt to gain political strength in districts that are represented by white Democrats. She also asserts that black representatives should seek (and can win) office in majority-white districts.
The works by Swain (1993) and Lublin (1997) are part of a flurry of research that has been carried out following the 1992 congressional elections. This body of research focuses on the effect of changing black population on a House member’s liberalism (Bullock 1995; Lublin 1997; Sharpe and Garand 1994, unpublished) and on sensitivity towards black issues (Overby and Cosgrove 1996; Whitby 1997). Lublin (1997), Sharpe and Garand (1994, unpublished), and Overby and Cosgrove (1996) all observe a change in white House members’ roll-call voting behavior as a result of the changing racial composition in his district due to redistricting. As the black population in a district decreases due to redistricting, the House member’s roll-call voting behavior becomes more conservative.

Bullock (1995) offers a different finding. He examines districts in which black population increased, and finds that an increase in aggregate black population across the districts led to an increase in liberal roll-call voting behavior. Yet, when he disaggregates his findings by race, he observes that only black legislators have increased their liberalism in response to increases in the black population. In actuality, white House members do not exhibit substantial increases in black population and do not change their roll-call voting behavior because of the increases.

Similarly, Whitby (1997) does not find a significant relationship between racial composition changes and the roll-call vote of white House members. However, regardless of this finding, Whitby emphasizes that black substantive representation suffers if Democrats lose seats in surrounding districts due to the creation of a majority-black district.
The difference in the results of the above studies is somewhat puzzling because the same general methodology was used for each. However, the measurement of the dependent variable changed from study to study. Several different types of measurements of ideology were used: Committee on Political Education (COPE), Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), Poole and Rosenthal, and each measures a slightly different phenomenon.

Substantive Versus Descriptive Representation

Many critics of race-based redistricting contend that the creation of majority-black districts may actually weaken, rather than strengthen, the overall representation of black interests. The line of reasoning goes as follows: In order to create a majority-black district, black citizens are taken from surrounding districts in order to pack enough blacks into a district so to ensure the election of a black representative (Grofman and Handley 1989; Grofman et al. 1992; Lublin 1997). As a result of the expulsion of part of their black population, the surrounding districts are proportionately more white, and presumably, more conservative. Consequently, the change in the demographic and ideological characteristics of the constituency results in more conservative roll-call voting behavior on the part of the representative. It also results in an increased likelihood that a Republican or conservative Democrat will be elected in the district.

At the root of this criticism is the debate over whether descriptive or substantive representation is the desired relationship between a representative and his constituents. In her 1967 book, The Concept of Representation, Pitkin defined substantive representation as the correspondence of goals between the representative and the constituency. Descriptive representation is the correspondence of demographic
characteristics between the representative and the represented. Pitkin asserted that the more effective form of representation is substantive representation because it implies "...acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" (1967:209) (emphasis added). She claimed that we mistakenly "...assume that people's characteristics are a guide to the actions they will take...the best descriptive representative is not necessarily the best representative for activity or government" (1967:89). Pitkin asserted however, that descriptive representation could be accompanied by substantive representation to bring about effective government.

The inclination of many scholars however, is to address descriptive and substantive representation in an either-or manner. For instance, Swain (1993) and Lublin (1997) both suggest that substantive black representation is compromised due to the increased number of black representatives. However, these two forms of representation are not mutually exclusive. In fact, in the case of the dyadic relationship between a black House member and his/her constituency, substantive representation usually accompanies descriptive representation. As stated earlier, blacks as a group remain markedly liberal. As research has shown, the same can be said for the average black Democratic House members. They are more liberal than the white members of their party regardless of region (Tate 1993; Bullock 1995; Lublin 1997; Sharpe and Garand 1994, unpublished).

This is really an issue of dyadic versus collective representation (Weissberg 1978). Even if black House members are responsive to their constituents (dyadic representation), if their election leads to a House that is collectively less substantively representative of blacks, then as Swain (1993) purports, black faces do not necessarily correspond to black interests. On the other hand, if white House members do not become
more conservative in response to the loss of liberal blacks in their districts, then substantive representation is not damaged by an increase in black House members.

Swain acknowledges that, although the strategy of creating majority-black districts in order to increase black representation has been exhausted, there is one advantage. The black members elected in the early 1990s now may benefit from incumbency advantage. This seems to have been the case in the 1996 congressional elections. Civil rights activist and members of the Congressional Black Caucus were concerned with the prospect of losing majority-black districts due to the Supreme Court's decisions in 1993, 1995, and 1996.

In response to the Court's decisions new state district maps were drawn in Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas. In all four of these states the majority-minority districts were struck down and new districts were drawn. Cleo Fields of Louisiana did not choose to run in the new district. However, the black House members in Florida, Georgia and Texas chose to run in the new districts that were no longer majority-black. Representatives Corrine Brown of Florida, Cynthia McKinney and Sanford D. Bishop of Georgia, and Sheila Jackson-Lee, and Eddie Bernice Johnson of Texas were all reelected under the new district plans. Many political observers believe that these black House members benefited from their incumbency status. It is doubtful whether a non-incumbent black candidate could have won in these districts.

This brings us to an interesting point that has been articulated by Gerber (1996). He examines the black members of the House of Representatives in terms of their career patterns. Specifically he looks at the exit rate of black House members, and compares this with all other members of Congress. Gerber finds that black House members have a
substantially lower exit rate than other House members. In particular white Democrats’
exit rate is five percent higher than black Democrats’ exit rate. Gerber (1996:840)
explains, “As a result of low exit rates, African American members of Congress will have
more seniority than the average Democrat. When there is a Democratic majority, their
high seniority levels will lead to a sizable number of African American chairs of
important committees and subcommittees.” Therefore as Gerber suggests, even if the
number of African Americans in Congress does not significantly increase, those members
who did win election due to the 1990s redistricting aims, may prove to be a very
powerful and influential tool of black representation.

Canon, Schousen and Seller (1996:848) combine representation and candidate
emergence to examine how “politicians respond to the changing electoral context
imposed by new district lines . . .” The authors claim that the newly constructed
majority-black districts foster a politics of commonality rather than a politics of
difference, due to the type of candidate more likely to win in these districts.

According to the authors, the new majority-black districts attract several different
types of black candidates, and possibly some white candidates. They distinguish between
“traditional” and “new-style” black candidates. Traditional blacks practice a politics of
difference, while new-style blacks practice a politics of commonality. What types of
candidates run for office will determine what type of politics will be practiced.

The authors contend that in the new majority-black districts, a biracial coalition
consisting of white voters and moderate black voters will elect the winning candidate. In
a challenge between a traditional and new-style black candidate, the new-style black
candidate will garner the support of the ideologically moderate biracial coalition.
The percentage of blacks in majority-black districts has fallen and the percentage of whites in these districts has grown. Because of this, whites in the district can play a pivotal role in determining whether a traditional or new style black candidate will win election. Unlike traditional black candidates who focus on issues of race, new style black candidates focus on their political experience and expertise. It is this expertise that makes the new style candidate more attractive to the white electorate. Through personal interviews, newspaper articles, and various political journals, the authors were able to identify ideological leanings of the candidates. They found that about half of the newly created majority-black districts elected new style black candidates who practice a "politics of commonality".

Canon et al. begin to ask the question of how the new electoral context created by the majority-black district affects candidate emergence and constituency representation. Most of the research on the impact of the 1990s redistricting focuses on the same general question: what effect does the increase or decrease of black population have on a House member's roll-call voting behavior? In this dissertation I broaden the scope. The 1990s redistricting signaled a dynamic process that cannot be explored by simply examining roll-call vote behavior for a one-year or two-year period. This six-year period of change has fostered many changing incentives, which affect who, and when people run for office, who votes, how people vote, and who wins.

CANDIDATE EMERGENCE

The discussion of candidate emergence, and more importantly, quality candidate emergence, in congressional elections is part of a larger debate on whether national or local forces are most influential in determining the presence of a quality challenger in an
election. Scholars who believe national forces have the most impact on election outcomes focus on presidential coattails, midterm election effects and economics to explain the results (Tufte 1975; Calvert and Ferejohn 1983; Campbell 1985; Campbell 1986; Cover 1986; Campbell 1991; Cohen, Krassa and Hamman 1991). On the other hand scholars who believe local forces have the most impact on election results focus on incumbency advantage and challenger quality (Mayhew 1974; Ferejohn 1977; Fiorina 1977; Johannes and McAdams 1981; Jacobson and Wolfinger 1989).

Jacobson and Kemell (1983) integrate national and local forces to develop a model of the strategic politician. The authors argue that career politicians are sensitive to both local and national conditions when calculating their probability of electoral victory. In fact, it is not the voters who consider national forces when choosing a congressional candidate, rather it is the strategic politician who incorporates national factors into their decision to run for office, which in turn colors the campaign and the outcome of the election.

The idea espoused by Jacobson and Kemell, that potential candidates calculate the utility of running for office, is a concept that has commonly been applied to candidate emergence literature.

Rohde (1979) construct a theory of progressive ambition in order to determine how U.S. House members decide whether or not to run for the governorship or a Senate seat. The term progressive ambition, borrowed from Schlesinger (1966), refers to incumbent politicians who seek to gain a higher or more attractive office. Rohde tests several hypotheses about progressive ambition based on the probability that the House member will win office, the value of the higher office, the value of the current office, and
whether members are risk takers. Rohde concludes that House members do consider the above conditions when deciding whether to run for higher office.

Brace (1984) extends Rohde's work by analyzing the extent to which Rohde's conditions, such as the value of the current and higher office, increase or decrease the likelihood that a House member would run for higher office.

Other scholars have adopted the strategic politician concept to explain why quality challengers emerge in some congressional races and not in others.

Using campaign finances and political experience as a measure of challenger quality, Bond et al. (1985) attempt to explain why certain incumbents attract quality challengers. They analyze 1980 House races in which an incumbent member's seat is challenged. The factors that affect whether an incumbent attracts more quality challengers deal with partisan forces such as the previous vote for the incumbent, whether the incumbent is a member of the dominant party in the district, and whether the national tide is in the incumbents favor. Another factor that affects challenger quality is whether the incumbent's policymaking has remained aligned with the interests and policy preferences of his/her constituents.

Krasno and Green (1988) also attempt to understand what has a larger effect on challenger quality emergence, local or national forces. National forces refer to the nationwide standing of the challenger's party. Local forces are defined as the challengers' party vote percentage in the previous election. Krasno and Green develop a measurement of challenger quality based on attractiveness and political skill to test the relationship. They find that the local political climate has the largest effect on a quality challenger's decision to run for office.
Two scholars that apply challenger quality analysis to the U.S. Senate are Squire (1989) and Lublin (1994). Squire analyzes Senate elections from 1980 to 1986, and finds the main factor in determining whether a high quality challenger will emerge is the size of the pool of potential candidates. Larger states by their very nature have more avenues for office seekers to enter politics. Consequently, those states have a larger pool of potential candidates who have had some political experience. Further Squire finds that high challenger quality translates into higher amounts of campaign contributions.

Lublin (1994) develops a scale of political experience to determine what type of political experience is most beneficial in regards to U.S. Senate elections. Focusing on elections from 1952 to 1990, Lublin finds that members of the U.S. House of Representatives receive a higher proportion of the vote than governors, lesser statewide officials, former senators, local officials, or state legislators. Many studies have focused on whether the local or national political climate has a larger influence on the decision of quality challengers to enter a congressional race (Bond et al. 1985; Born 1986; Krasno and Green 1988; Squire 1989; Lublin 1994). I add to this body of literature by applying the strategic challenger theory to the 1990s elections. National conditions are believed to have played a role in the election outcomes in the 1992 through 1996 elections. However, the main concern in this dissertation is the effect that local conditions had on the emergence of quality challengers and outcome of the elections; more specifically, the local conditions of interest center on black population shifts and congressional responsiveness to these shifts.
ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR AND CANDIDATE EMERGENCE

Since the Republican Party gained control of Congress in 1994, there has been much speculation over whether the creation of majority-black districts was in some way responsible for the shift in party control. Many political researchers and pundits assert that the race-based redistricting gave rise to Democratic seat losses in 1992 and 1994.

The most important empirical study to date is by Hill (1995). He explores the direct impact of "...the actual reduction in percent black to the point that Republicans become either competitive or actually win in districts controlled by Democrats" (1995:400). Hill examines the electoral and district-level census data for congressional districts in eight southern states. He finds that in the 1992 election, of nine seats that Republicans won in states in his analysis, four were due to the creation of majority black districts.

Hill concludes that, although race-based redistricting has had an impact on the southern electoral system, Republican candidates won seats in all types of districts, regardless of whether they did or did not lose black population. He claims that this is just a sign that the South finally has a legitimate two-party system.

Bullock (1995) simply looks at the number of seats a Republican won by a margin smaller than the reduction of the black voters in a district. He finds that in 1992, there were six districts where this was the case. In 1994 three more Democratic districts were lost as a result of the race-based redistricting.

Contrary to these findings, a report published by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (1994) asserts that the creation of majority-black districts actually saved the Democratic
Party some seats that would have otherwise been included in the Republican sweep in 1994.

These works look at the question of what impact the creation of majority-black districts has had on Democratic seat losses by simply observing whether districts, which lost black population proportions, were won over by a Republican candidate.

I seek to answer this question by answering a broader, micro-level question: Did quality challengers emerge in those districts that experienced changes in their black population? As Jacobson (1981) explained, incumbents who appear vulnerable attract higher quality challengers. Many political observers feel as Bullock (1995:22) does that "bleached" districts "...attracted more formidable Republicans than would have emerged had the racial proportions remained unchanged." I empirically test this proposition.

In their analysis of a majority-black district in North Carolina, Canon, Schousen and Sellers (1994) explain that racial factors surrounding redistricting can influence candidate emergence. The authors divide their study into several contexts that impacted prospective candidates' decision to run for office in North Carolina's 1st district in 1992. The context important to this dissertation is the structural context. The authors claim that redistricting was the main source of uncertainty of whether the candidates would run for office. Based on interviews with several prospective candidates, Canon et al. report that the uncertainty of the district boundaries delayed prospective candidates' decision to run. All prospective candidates interviewed "...said they did not begin organizing their campaigns until after the general assembly's approval of the first redistricting plan . . . . (1994:34)"
I assert that it is for this reason that the Republican Party exhibited gains in 1994 and 1996 rather than in 1992 when the districts were first drawn. Many potential candidates, especially the higher quality candidates, were not willing to organize a campaign when it was not certain what the district would look like.

CONCLUSION

Theories formulated in the literature on redistricting, representation, candidate emergence, and race-based redistricting and candidate emergence have been synthesized in an effort to develop a clearer understanding of the full impact of the 1990s redistricting.

The importance of congressional responsiveness measured through vote behavior has been extracted from the first body of literature. The idea that candidates, both incumbent and non-incumbent are strategic actors, who base their decision to run for office on several different factors, has been borrowed from the second body of literature. Last, the proposition that the creation of majority-black districts and the Republican takeover of Congress are possibly related to each other has been obtained from the third body of literature.

In Chapter 3 the theories espoused in the literature discussed above will be applied to this study in order to create a new theory of congressional roll-call voting behavior and candidate emergence.
CHAPTER 3
THEORY

The arguments presented in this dissertation are grounded in a broad-based rational choice theory. The idea behind rational choice theory explained by Anthony Downs is that the rational person "moves toward his goals in a way which, to the best of his knowledge, uses the least possible input of scarce resources per unit of valuable output" (1957:5). He further explains that any analysis using rational choice (or alternatively, economic) theory must first determine what an individual's goal or desired end is. Second, the analysis should determine what is the most efficient method for the individual to achieve that end. It is then expected that the individual will choose the most efficient method because he is "rational".

Downs' application of rational choice theory is at the heart of this analysis. Downs explains that a government or government officials develop policies with the belief that the success and popularity of these policies will translate into popular votes. He elaborates that the expected party differential "implies that each citizen casts his vote for the party he believes will provide him with more benefits than any other" (1957:36).

For the purposes of this dissertation, each citizen casts his vote for the individual he or she believes will provide the most benefits. Recognizing that the voter is rational in his selection of elected officials, the individual running for office must too act rationally. In both the roll-call voting behavior analysis as well as the candidate emergence analysis, the desired end is electoral success in the form of reelection or election. As rational actors the incumbent House members, candidates, and prospective candidates are expected to behave in a way that maximizes their chance of election or reelection. In
both instances the individual running must choose what means will most efficiently lead to the desired end. As Downs explains, rationality refers to the means or the "processes of action", not to the ends.

In the roll-call voting behavior analysis the desired end is reelection. Accepting the assertion that the primary goal of incumbent House member is reelection (Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978), it follows that their actions while in office will be geared toward increasing their chances of reelection. As rational actors, one of the main methods or means employed to reach the desired end is to consider the interests of the constituency when making policy. In other words, an incumbent House member interested in reelection will vote in a manner that is commensurate with the ideologies and preferences of their constituency.

In the candidate emergence analysis the desired end is election. Behaving rationally, prospective candidates will search for the electoral atmosphere in which the possibility of electoral victory is high.

Rational choice theory is one of the dominant paradigms in political science, which is evidenced by the frequent application of rationality in politics. The remaining sections will be devoted to detailing some of those works and explaining the applicability of rational choice theory in this dissertation.

ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR

Many studies have explored the relationship between the representative and his constituency. In particular, several studies examine constituency influence on representatives' decision-making (Miller and Stokes 1963; Matthews and Stimson 1970; Fiorina 1974; Erikson 1978; McCrone and Kuklinski 1979).
Fiorina (1974) contends that reelection is the primary goal of the House member, and the constituency controls reelection. He explains that as a consequence, “... constituents' preferences are reflected in a representative's voting (if at all) primarily through his concern for his electoral survival” (1974:31). Thus, House members vote in a way that will increase their chances of reelection.

Matthews and Stimson also comment on the purposive nature of congressional decision making. They claim that “...congressmen seek to cast their votes as rationally as possible” (1970:16). They assert that House members recognize the benefits of casting votes in a rational way, and also understand the costs of not behaving rationally when casting votes. The cost in this case would be electoral defeat.

The rational behavior explained above has been explored through spatial modeling of roll-call voting (e.g., Poole and Daniels 1985; Poole 1988; Krehbiel and Rivers 1988; Segal et al. 1991). In the context of congressional roll-call vote behavior, spatial modeling assumes the existence of an ideological space. Each issue is represented by this space. The representative has an ideal point in this space based on utility maximization. There may be several outcomes that fall under this utility function, but again, the most important would be reelection. Thus, the representative will choose the alternative closest to his ideal point. Application of this point for the current analysis will be diagrammed below.

Drawing from these previous studies, and accepting the notion that the primary goal of incumbent House members is reelection, it follows that their actions while in office will be geared toward maximizing their chances of reelection. House members maximize their reelection chances through constituency service, bringing federal money
and projects to the district, and by representing their constituents’ interests in Washington. The representation of constituents’ interests is reflected in the congruence between the constituency interests and the House member’s policy decisions as manifested in their roll-call voting behavior. Although each of these behaviors is important, in this study I will focus on the last type of behavior.

After the 1990s redistricting many incumbent House members were faced with a new district composition. House members had to decide whether they would alter their roll-call voting behavior to reflect the changed constituency, or maintain their previous roll-call voting behavior regardless of the new district.

Normally when new district lines are drawn, the criteria discussed in the previous chapter are considered (e.g., conformity to local boundaries, contiguity, compactness, etc.). In addition to those criteria, however, efforts to protect the incumbent House member’s interest are also considered. Minimizing the change in district boundaries or constituency composition achieves this goal. When there is no dramatic change in district composition, policy preferences of House members remain remarkably stable over time (Asher and Weisberg 1978).

Due to the 1990s redistricting several districts did undergo substantial changes in boundaries and composition. What happens to voting stability after the changes occur? Do incumbent House members change their behavior, and is this change a “stable” one?

As rational actors working toward the goal of reelection, one would expect most incumbent House members to alter their roll-call voting behavior to reflect the changes in their constituency (Combs et al. 1984; Glazer and Robbins 1985; Whitby and Gilliam 1991; Fleisher 1993). Most previous works on race-based redistricting find that House
members were responsive to changes in their district composition that occurred after the 1990s redistricting (Overby and Cosgrove 1996; Lublin 1997; Sharpe and Garand unpublished). Figure 3.1 illustrates this point. In 1991, before redistricting, on a liberal-conservative scale, the constituencies' mean ideology may be located at point A. The incumbent House member's ideal point, taking into consideration both his personal ideology and the ideology of the constituency may be located at point I.

After redistricting, if a House member lost a substantial portion of his/her black population, the median constituency preference or ideology may move to point B. It would then be expected that the House member would modify his roll-call voting behavior in an effort to remain representative of his constituency. In 1993/1994 the House member may still be slightly more liberal in his ideology than his constituency, but he has shifted in the direction that the constituency shifted (I').

In 1995/1996, the incumbent House member maintains his position. He recognizes however, that the ideological distance between his constituency and him, (represented by the dotted line between point I and point B) must be smaller than the ideological distance between a prospective candidate and the district constituency (represented by the dotted line between point B and point C). Thus, in order to ensure that he does not become vulnerable to a challenge, he will shift his position accordingly.

In this study I assert that the responsiveness observed among southern House members directly after redistricting remained throughout the many court battles, which threatened to change district composition. House members recognize that constituents reward and punish them based on their policy views. Therefore, House members interested in reelection will attempt to please their constituents. Thus, until the shift in
FIGURE 3.1: SPATIAL STRUCTURE EXAMPLE
district composition actually occurs, the House member's roll-call voting behavior will remain consistent with the interests of his district.

**CANDIDATE EMERGENCE**

Prospective challengers are profit maximizers as well. Quality challengers will likely choose not to compete in an election that they have no chance of winning. Instead, they will wait until the national and/or local political environment is more favorable for their candidacy. As Kazee (1992) explains, prospective candidates must ask themselves when is the right time to run. Timing is a contextual factor important to a potential candidate's decision to enter a House race.

Ambition theory, first presented by Schlesinger (1966:7-8), argues that “...potential candidates behave rationally, that is, they assess the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action and choose the course that they perceive to be most consistent with their political ambitions.” The theory also asserts that “...politicians are rational decision makers and do not hanker after offices they cannot hope to attain . . . .” Thus, it is not cost efficient to seek an office when the probability of winning is low or nonexistent.

After redistricting, prospective challengers examine the new political environment in order to see if the time is right for them to run, and if electoral success is possible. The decision calculus associated with the notion that politicians are rational actors is:

\[ U = (PB) - R \]

In this equation:
- \( U \) = utility of target office \( O \),
- \( P \) = probability of winning election to Office \( O \),
- \( B \) = value of Office \( O \),

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R = risk (e.g., cost of campaign, intrinsic value of base office, opportunity cost of losing base office) (Jacobson and Kernell 1983:22).

The most important component of the formula for the purposes of this discussion is the probability of winning election (P). Redistricting gives rise to several concerns that a prospective candidate must weigh in order to determine his probability of electoral success. This decision calculus will be applied to the current study below.

Redistricting and its results are actually one of Kazee's (1992) contextual factors that determine a potential candidate's decision to run for office. Potential challengers ask questions such as how the districts have changed in terms of partisanship and race. They may also be concerned with what the final map will look like, and when it will be completed. As Representative Vin Weber, R-Minn., explained in 1991, several potential candidates told him, 'If I don't know what the district is going to look like, I'm not going to run' (Congressional Quarterly 1991:3325). In the 1990s, the potential candidates also had to be concerned with whether a court challenge may change the existing district.

Also, the potential challenger might pay close attention to the roll-call voting behavior of the incumbent to see whether his/her behavior has changed as a result of constituency changes. If the incumbent's behavior does not appear to change, the prospective challenger may see an opportunity to defeat the incumbent.

In addition, the redrawing of congressional lines may signal a change in the opportunity structure. In many districts, the incumbents are considered so "safe" that their House seat is actually not considered part of the opportunity structure. However, when district lines are redrawn, and possibly substantially altered, the incumbent may become more vulnerable electorally.
The idea that all of these factors would affect if and when a potential candidate ran for congressional office is commensurate with Jacobson and Kernell’s (1983:34) strategic politician theory. Their theory asserts that “[p]oliticians do act strategically. Their career decisions are influenced by their assessment of a variable political environment.” Thus, prospective candidates weigh the costs and benefits of running for office at a particular time.

In this study I assert that quality challengers emerged at an increased rate in 1994 and 1996. In several of the southern states the district plans were not finalized until shortly before the 1992 elections, making it impossible or unattractive for a candidate to run in the election. Instead, I assert that the number of quality challengers in 1994 and 1996 was high because candidates waited until the time was right to run for election. If this assertion were accurate, the following factors would influence quality challenger emergence.

First of all, the more quality challengers emerged in states where race-based redistricting occurred. With the creation of majority-black districts, several congressional districts in a state were restructured. These restructured districts attracted more quality challengers who hoped that shifts in district boundaries would lead to a decline in incumbency advantage. Incumbent House members who previously relied on their name recognition and their record of service and roll-call voting behavior are now thrust into a “new” district. In this district the constituents may not be aware of the incumbent’s voting record or name. Because of this, the incumbent is now electorally more vulnerable.
Furthermore, within these states, more quality challengers should have emerged in districts where the incumbent did not adequately change his roll-call voting behavior to reflect the interests of his new constituency. In districts with large changes in constituency composition, there may have been too large of a gap between the incumbent House members' ideology and the ideology and policy preferences of the new constituency. Anticipating the incumbent's inability to accurately represent the interests of his/her district, a quality challenger may strategically choose to run against the incumbent. By the same token, if an incumbent House member actually does not change his roll-call voting behavior to reflect the interests of the constituency, he too will be challenged by an individual who recognizes this discrepancy.

Applying the decision calculus $U = (PB) - R$ to the current study, the components can be described as follows:

$U =$ utility of target office - benefits associated with being a House member (e.g., power, prestige, fame) taking into account the probability of electoral success and the cost associated with seeking office.

$P =$ probability of winning election to office – probability increases in states that underwent race-based redistricting, in districts that experience large changes in constituency, or if incumbent was not responsive to changes in his constituency composition.

$B =$ value of office – benefits associated with being a House member (e.g., power, prestige, fame).

$R =$ risk – costs incurred by seeking office (e.g., money allocation, time allocation, possible loss of current office).

The probability of victory ($P$) will be greatest in states that underwent race-based redistricting, in districts that experienced large changes in constituency or in districts where the incumbent was not responsive to the changes in the constituency. Accordingly
more quality challengers will emerge when these conditions are met due to the fact that the utility of seeking the office (U) will very likely be positive.

In this dissertation I formulate three hypotheses based on rational actor theory:

H1: Southern House members, who were responsive to changes in their district composition directly after redistricting, remained responsive to the changes in the constituency several years later.

House members who changed their roll-call voting behavior in 1993/1994 in order to reflect changes in their constituency represent members acting in a manner that increases their chance of reelection. It would be expected then that this maximizing behavior would continue through the years as long as the desired end is reelection.

H2: In southern states where race-based redistricting occurred, quality challengers emerged in the 1994 and 1996 congressional elections.

In order to create the majority-black district in the South, several other district boundaries were altered. Due to district changes, both anticipated and actual, I contend that the electoral vulnerability of incumbents in southern states that underwent race-based redistricting increased.

H3: In southern districts where House members were not responsive to constituency changes that occurred due to the 1990s race-based redistricting, quality challengers emerged in the 1994 and 1996 congressional elections.

Large changes in the racial composition of a district will usually be accompanied by changes in the ideological preference of the constituency. For instance, if a large black voting bloc is added to a district, the expectation is that the district’s median ideology will shift leftward. If the House member is a moderate who now finds himself
in an overwhelmingly liberal district, he may find it impossible to accurately represent the preferences of his constituents.

Furthermore, the advantages of incumbency are lessened when there are large shifts in constituency. Incumbent House members who were guaranteed reelection in the past find themselves introducing themselves to a large portion of their constituency. Both of these factors may attract quality challengers.

House members who are interested in reelection must be responsive to changes in their constituency. If they do not make an effort to change their roll-call voting behavior to more accurately reflect the preferences of their constituency, there is a high probability that they will be met with a high quality challenger in southern districts where there were large changes in racial composition of districts due to the 1990s race-based redistricting, quality challengers emerged in the 1994 and 1996 congressional elections.

CONCLUSION

Incumbent House members as well as prospective House candidates are rational actors whose goal is electoral success. Both incumbent members and prospective candidates select the method or means that will yield them the largest probability of success. The most efficient method for incumbent House members is to vote the preferences of their constituency. The most efficient method for prospective House candidates is to choose elections where the conditions are favorable for electoral victory.

These profit maximizing decisions were made in the context of the 1990s redistricting. Rational House members who lost substantial portions of their black constituency due to redistricting should have become more conservative in their roll-call
voting behavior. Strategic politicians deciding whether to run for the House also considered the redistricting induced constituency changes in their decision calculus.

In the next chapter an explanation of the data and methods used to test the theories described above will be presented. As illustrated in this chapter, the dissertation is divided into two major groups of analyses. The first group focusing on roll-call voting behavior and the second group focusing on candidate emergence. An extensive discussion of each type of analysis is included in Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 4

DATA AND METHODS

There has been much discussion over the role that race-based redistricting in the 1990s played on the increased conservativism in the House. I contend that there is a direct relationship and an indirect relationship between the creation of majority-black districts and increased conservativism in the House. The direct relationship focuses on the vote behavior of the House member. The change in black population in a district leads to change in roll-call vote behavior. The indirect relationship focuses on the partisan makeup of the House. Some political observers believe that the creation of these districts influenced that shift in party control by making the districts that lost portions of their black population more attractive to prospective Republican challengers.

With this in mind I study the impact of race-based redistricting on roll-call voting behavior as well as partisan makeup in the House. In the roll-call voting behavior portion of the analysis I examine whether the responsiveness witnessed directly after redistricting carried through several years after redistricting. In the candidate emergence portion of the analysis, I examine whether more quality challengers emerged in states and districts affected by race-based redistricting. A description of each analysis and the variables used follows. But first it is important to explain why I focus exclusively on majority-black districts.

In addition to an increase in black districts, the 1990s redistricting also resulted in the creation of eight new majority-Hispanic districts. Yet, I make a distinction between the representation of blacks versus Hispanics because of the unique history that has existed between black and white Americans in the United States. Black and white
Americans continue in some respects to have an antagonistic relationship that stems from a history of separation and discrimination. Thus, although it is a fact that many ethnic and racial minorities in the U.S. experience discrimination, the relationship between white and black Americans is distinct because of its history.

The antagonistic relationship manifests itself in many aspects of representational politics in the U.S. First of all, black candidates find it nearly impossible to win election in majority-white districts. In fact, in U.S. history only nine blacks have been elected to serve in majority-white districts. This is largely due to a phenomenon confirmed in Terkildsen's 1993 study. She found that racial prejudice drives white voters' evaluation of a candidate. White voters are more likely to prefer a white candidate to a black candidate with identical background and qualifications. This phenomenon is not unique to whites voters. With the 1990 retirement of Democrat Lindy Boggs of Louisiana, there are no majority-black districts represented by a white House member.

Second, Grofman and Handley (1991) find that, even after the Voting Rights Act of 1965, there has not been a change in race-conscious roll-call voting behavior among whites. The authors claim the only reason for an increase in black legislators elected in the southern states is due to enforcement of the VRA and the creation of majority-black districts.

Third, research has shown that some white House members feel threatened by large black populations. In districts with large black populations, it is expected that responsive House members will reflect the size of the population through their roll-call voting behavior. In some instances this does not occur. Instead of voting in accordance with black interests, as expected, House members will vote against black interests. Giles
(1977) refers to this phenomenon as the hostility hypothesis. Researchers who have hypothesized this relationship claim that as the relative size of the black population in an area increases, up to 50%, whites perceive a greater threat from blacks. This perception of threat increases the probability that whites will act against the interests of blacks.

In addition to the above stated reasons for focusing on majority-black districts, there is a technical reason as well. There is an entire body of research that focuses on the representational relationship between black and white Americans (Whitby, 1987; Fossett and Kiecolt, 1989; Grofman and Handley, 1989; Welch, 1990; Whitby and Gilliam, 1991; Grofman, Handley, and Niemi, 1992; Swain, 1993, Tate, 1993; Terkildsen, 1993). This dissertation therefore, is grounded in previous political science research that has contemplated the representational relationship between black and white Americans.

ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS

A major portion of this analysis focuses on the actions of individual House members. More specifically, one of the major functions of a member of Congress is policy-making. Roll-call votes are recorded for all House members voting on a particular piece of legislative action. These votes are scrutinized in an effort to understand, explain, and predict House members' roll-call voting behavior.

Interest Group Scores

Interest groups select several key votes on issues that concern the group and then rate the House member based on these votes. Much of the research done on this general area of study uses interest group scores as a measure of House members' roll-call voting behavior in an attempt to ascertain how supportive of the liberal or conservative position a House member is. Other researchers use interest group scores that measure how
supportive a House member is to civil rights issues, or "black issues". However, there is no consensus on which is the best measurement of ideology, or support for the interests of blacks.¹

Scores given by liberal and conservative interest groups are often times criticized for being unreliable, inconsistent, and biased (Keller, 1982:1607-1609). First, the method for selecting which votes will be used to rate House members is subjective. For instance the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) have a committee of ADA activists who select approximately 20 of the most important votes during the session. This list is then passed on to the ADA's national board for approval. Thus, there is no scientific method used to determine vote selection.

Second, most interest groups only select a small percentage, or sample, of hundreds of roll-call votes cast. Therefore, interest group scores have been characterized as a limited indicator of congressional vote behavior rather than a thorough and complete indicator. Some argue that by selecting some votes and excluding others, interest groups bias their ratings toward extreme ideological positions. This bias is evidenced in the distribution of House members' interest group scores. James Snyder (1992) examines this phenomenon. He finds that the distribution of interest group scores is bimodal, with most House member in a given year being either extremely liberal or extremely conservative. More of a normal curve distribution would be expected, recognizing that House members' roll-call voting behavior on average is more moderate.

Third, some interest groups have been inconsistent when choosing which votes to include in their rating. For example, The American Conservative Union (ACU) consistently counted a vote to raise the federal debt ceiling as a negative towards a House member. However, when President Reagan supported an increase in the debt ceiling, ACU simply stopped including that issue in its scoring (Keller, 1982:1608). In essence, the meaning of conservatism may have changed throughout history.

Roll-call voting behavior ratings compiled by the Committee on Political Education (COPE) and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) seem more appropriate for the current study that focuses on legislative issues important to blacks. However, the use of COPE ratings may be problematic because of its interest in foreign policy and other issues that do not uniquely affect African-Americans.

The use of LCCR scores has been criticized in this type of study because the LCCR also focuses on many issues that are not salient to blacks; hence, the rating may be a misrepresentation of a House member's position on black issues. Also, the LCCR scores are reported biennially rather than annually. This makes it difficult for scholars researching current vote behavior in Congress to use the LCCR scores.

Despite the insufficiencies of the interest group scores, they are the most commonly used method of gathering information on congressional roll-call behavior. Therefore, for purposes of comparability, models using ADA scores are included in the study. However, taking into consideration the criticisms of these methods, I have chosen to concentrate on a different method for obtaining patterns of House members' roll-call voting behavior.
Poole and Rosenthal Scores

Poole and Rosenthal (1991) use a spatial model to capture House members’ roll-call voting patterns. In their model they include every recorded roll-call vote between 1789 - 1996. For the purposes of this study I focus on the years from 1991 - 1996. The point to be emphasized is that their estimation includes all roll-call votes, except for those with less than 2.5% minority support. They also include every member of Congress who cast at least 25 votes during a two-year period. This is in contrast to most interest groups, which focus on ten - twenty votes.

The authors’ spatial model includes two dimensions, both of which capture House members’ political positions. The first dimension ranges from strong loyalty toward one party (Democrat) to weak loyalty to either party to strong loyalty to the second, competing party (Republican). The first dimension accounts for almost the entire variance in vote behavior. Eighty percent of the behavior is captured in the first dimension, while only three percent is captured in the second dimension (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991:235).

The second dimension focuses on ideological loyalty. It ranges from liberal to conservative within the two parties. This dimension is really only necessary when the party system is in upheaval. The authors give two examples of when the second dimension would increase the explanatory power of the model. The first period of instability was from 1815 to 1825 after the disintegration of the Federalist Party. The second period of instability was in the 1850s when Whig Party collapsed and tension over slavery grew. Poole and Rosenthal assert that:

The distinction between the two dimensions is a fine one. Loyalty to a political party and loyalty to an ideology have a similar behavioral implication of
consistent, stable voting patterns. This is the reason that—especially during periods of stability—a one dimensional model accounts for most voting in Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991:230).

Taking into account the previous discussion, the Poole and Rosenthal scores from the first dimension will be used in Chapters 5 and 6 as an indicator of liberalism according to his/her roll-call voting behavior. This measure will be used as a proxy for House members' support of issues that are more likely supported by African-Americans. As mentioned earlier, Tate (1993) finds that blacks as a group remain overwhelmingly liberal. The exhaustive technique used by Poole and Rosenthal is superior to the other rating methods. Although it does not focus on issues specific to African-Americans, it also does not limit its scope by selecting votes that may or may not be salient to African-Americans.

The Poole and Rosenthal scoring system presents a comprehensive measure of ideology that will better help us to understand fluctuations in House members' roll-call voting behavior.

RESEARCH DESIGN FOR ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS

In Chapter 5 I examine the roll-call voting behavior of members of the United States House of Representatives who served from as far back as 1991 (before redistricting), until 1996.

Both the Poole and Rosenthal scores and the ADA scores are presented in this dissertation. ADA scores are tabulated yearly. The years of interest are 1993 and 1996. Poole and Rosenthal scores on the other hand, are based on congressional terms. This study focuses on the 103rd Congress and the 104th Congress. House members included in the 103rd Congress were elected in 1992, and served from 1993 through 1994. House
members included in the 104th Congress were elected in 1994 and served from 1995 through 1996.

These scores are used to obtain the liberal or conservative leanings of the House members. These scores, which capture roll-call vote behavior, serve as the dependent variable in this analysis. In their original form, Poole and Rosenthal scores range from -1, which is the highest liberal voting score, to 1, which is the highest conservative voting score. In this study I have rescaled the Poole and Rosenthal scores to be consistent with ADA scores which have been used in several previous studies on roll-call voting behavior. Consequently, in this study the Poole and Rosenthal scores range from -1, which is the highest conservative voting score, to 1, which is the highest liberal voting score. The ADA scores range from 0 to 100, with 0 representing the most conservative position and 100 representing the most liberal position.

In order to uncover whether congressional responsiveness observed after initial redistricting, marked a permanent change, I compare changes in House members' roll-call voting behavior from 1991 to 1996 to the changes observed from 1991 to 1994.

The independent variables that are most important to this analysis are those that deal with the black population of the district. This is the relationship in which I am most interested. What effect does the black population proportion, and more importantly, the changes in black population have on the roll-call voting behavior of House members? Also, what if any change in the impact of black population can be observed in the last two to three years.
Baseline model

I develop an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to determine to what extent changes in black population proportions between 1991 and 1996 have affected the roll-call behavior of House members. I first replicate a model developed by Sharpe and Garand (1994, unpublished) that estimates legislative responsiveness for 1994. I estimate this model using both the ADA and Poole and Rosenthal scores. In this chapter however, I will construct the models using Poole and Rosenthal scores. As the point of departure I first test the following model:

\[
\text{Poole and Rosenthal 1993/1994} = a + b_1 (\text{Poole and Rosenthal 1991/1992}) + b_2 (\text{Party}) + b_3 (\text{South}) + b_4 (\text{Seniority}) + b_5 (\text{Change in Democratic Presidential Vote between 1988 and 1992}) + b_6 (\text{Change in Black Population Proportion Due to Redistricting}) + b_7 (\text{Black Population Proportion Post-Redistricting})
\]

This model will explain what effect the change in black population had on a House member's roll-call voting behavior in 1993/1994. A complete description of the variables can be found in Table 4.1. The results from this equation will then be used to compare congressional responsiveness in 1993/1994 to responsiveness in 1995/1996.

The above model can be replicated for 1995/1996:

\[
\text{Poole and Rosenthal 1995/1996} = a + b_1 (\text{Poole and Rosenthal 1993/1994}) + b_2 (\text{Party}) + b_3 (\text{South}) + b_4 (\text{Seniority}) + b_5 (\text{Change in Democratic Presidential Vote between 1992 and 1996}) + b_6 (\text{Change in Black Population Proportion Due to Redistricting}) + b_7 (\text{Black Population Proportion Post-Redistricting})
\]

The dependent variable is Poole and Rosenthal 1995/1996, which is based on the Poole and Rosenthal scores. These roll-call vote scores are obtained for all House members who served at least as far back as 1991 up to the 1996 congressional election. I
have also included several independent variables in this model that help to explain the roll-call vote in 1995/1996.

First, I include Poole and Rosenthal 1993/1994, which is a lagged roll-call score. This variable is included because House members' roll-call voting behavior has been found to be relatively consistent over time (Asher and Weisberg, 1978). Thus, I expect that House members' roll-call behavior in 1995/1996 will be a function of their previous roll-call behavior.

Second, Party is a dummy variable coded 1 for Democratic House members and 0 for Republicans. Historically, Republicans vote more conservatively, while Democrats' roll-call voting behavior tends to be more liberal. The expected relationship between the two variables is positive. The more democratic a House member, the higher the Poole and Rosenthal roll-call score.

Third, I include a South variable that takes into account the fact that Southern House members are relatively more conservative than their non-Southern counterparts (Rohde, 1991). This is measured as a dummy variable, coded 1 for representatives from southern states and 0 otherwise. The coefficient for this variable should be negative. The southern House members are more conservative in their roll-call voting behavior, giving them a negative Poole and Rosenthal roll-call vote score.

Fourth, I include a Seniority variable to capture possible generational differences in roll-call voting behavior. There have been conflicting findings over this variable's effect on roll-call voting behavior. Some scholars have observed a relationship between

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2 This variable refers to the 11 states of the Confederacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
seniority and support for public sector growth (Payne, 1991; Moore and Hibbing, 1995). In their 1994 study, Sharpe and Garand find no discernible effect between seniority and congressional liberalism. Thus, I include the Seniority variable in the analysis to clarify its impact.

Fifth, Change in Democratic Presidential Vote between 1992 and 1996 refers to the change in the partisan composition of the district. This variable is measured by comparing the Democratic presidential vote proportion in 1992 with the proportion in 1996. I expect a positive relationship. As the Democratic vote in the district increases, roll-call liberalism should increase.

Sixth, Change in Black Population Proportion Due to Redistricting reflects any changes in black population experienced in a district during the 1990s redistricting. I expect House members to exhibit more liberal roll-call voting behavior as the black population increases in their district.

Seventh, I also include a variable, Black Population Proportion Post-Redistricting, in order to explore whether House members are responsive to the interests of their black population in 1996. This is an important variable due to previous findings by Sharpe and Garand (1994, unpublished), who find that House members are responsive to the changes in black population in their district, but not very responsive to the level of the black population in their district.

Although this variable does not seem to have an effect on the dependent variable in the previous study, I consider the timing on this study a significant factor that may impact the results. Concerns with changes in black population may have overshadowed concerns
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADA scores 1993</td>
<td>House members' Americans for Democratic Action Score based on members' 1993 roll-call voting behavior. Variable ranges from 0–100.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>1 = Democratic House member; 0 = Republican House member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>1 = 11 southern states 0 = all other states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>The number of consecutive years a member has served in the House up until the year of interest-1993/1994 or 1995/1996.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Democratic Presidential Vote between 1988 and 1992</td>
<td>Change in proportion of presidential vote for the Democratic presidential candidate in 1988 and 1992 using the 1992 geographic district for both years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Black Population Proportion Due to Redistricting</td>
<td>Actual change in black population as a proportion of the congressional district’s total population before and after redistricting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population Proportion Post-Redistricting</td>
<td>Actual black population as a proportion of the congressional districts' total population after 1990s redistricting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Democratic Presidential Vote between 1992 and 1996</td>
<td>Change in actual district level vote for Democratic presidential candidate in 1992 and 1996.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with the actual levels of black population. With reelection as their primary goal, I expect House members to be responsive to the level of black population in their districts.

CANDIDATE EMERGENCE ANALYSIS

This analysis focuses on the emergence of quality challengers in states that underwent race-based redistricting, districts with large racial population shifts, and districts where the incumbent did not exhibit a change in roll-call voting behavior to reflect population changes.

As mentioned earlier, researchers concentrate on both local and national factors to explain the emergence of quality challengers. In his study focusing on the strategic politician thesis, Jacobson (1989) uses two variables to measure local conditions. The first variable is the percentage of votes won by the candidate of the challenger's party in the last election. The second variable is whether the seat switched party hands in the last election. Jacobson uses the economy and presidential approval to measure national conditions. He finds that both local and national conditions affect whether the Democratic challenger is a high quality challenger. On the other hand only the local forces seem to affect the probability of the Republican challenger being considered a quality challenger.

I suspect that this trend has changed in the 1990s, with the change in political climate that has taken place. The 1992 election marked the first election in 12 years that a Democrat won the presidency. This should change the impact of national forces such as presidential popularity, presidential coattails and midterm effects. In particular, midterm elections are often considered a referendum on the president’s performance.
(Tufte, 1975; Campbell, 1985; Campbell 1991). Invariably, the president's party loses congressional seats during the midterm election. When Republicans dominated the presidency, the Democrats benefited from this midterm effect. Now that a Democrat has occupied the presidency, the national forces thought only to influence Democrats in the past now also influence prospective Republican challengers.

Jacobson and Kernell's (1983) research has generated a lively scholarly discussion of challenger quality and how it should be measured (Bond, Covington and Fleisher, 1985; Abramowitz, 1988; Krasno and Green, 1988; Stewart, 1989; Squire 1989; Lublin, 1994). Jacobson and Kernell simply measure challenger quality by whether a candidate has ever held elective office. Those challengers who have held elective office are classified as quality challengers, whereas those challengers who have not held elective office are not considered quality challengers.

Jacobson and Kernell's measure is somewhat crude. There may be gradations of challenger quality that are not captured in a measure that only distinguishes between those who have held elective positions versus those who have not. Because of this, many scholars have attempted to refine Jacobson and Kernell's measure of challenger quality.

Perhaps the most extreme attempt at improving the measure is offered by Krasno and Green. The authors divide challengers into those whom previously held office and those who did not, giving a value of four for candidates who have held office and zero for those who have not. They then assign additional points for each criterion that a candidate meets within their grouping. Group one is for challengers who have held political office and it includes (1) Type of office; (2) Currently in office; (3) Previous congressional run and (4) Celebrity status. Group two is for challengers who have not held political office.
and it includes: (1) Previous candidate for political office; (2) Previous congressional run; (3) Non-elective office; (4) Type of non-elective office; (5) Political activist/party connections/political aide; (6) Professional status and (7) Celebrity status. Each challenger adds a point to his base score of four or zero, for each criterion that apply to his experiences. The authors admit that this is a rather arbitrary way to measure challenger quality.

Jacobson and Kernell (1990) changed their measure of challenger quality, focusing on campaign spending instead of previous experience. But as Squire (1996:894) explains, ". . . using money raised as a measure of candidate quality confuses potential ability with the result." Using challenger spending as a measure of challenger quality leads to a circular argument. The higher the quality of the challenger, the more money he or she can raise, and the more money a challenger raises the more quality that challenger appears.

Recognizing the fallibility in the scholarly efforts to devise a more accurate method of measuring challenger quality, Lublin (1994) has created a measure that can be justified on empirical grounds. In a study examining the U.S. Senate, Lublin offers a measure of challenger quality that ranks the impact of holding one type of political office versus another. Thus, there are levels of challenger quality based on an ordinal scale depicting different types of political service.

I adopt this basic concept, and construct a hierarchical scale for House members. Following the lead of previous studies, I do not include challenger spending in my explanation of challenger quality due to the circularity of the measure (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher, 1985; Krasno and Green, 1989; Squire, 1989; Lublin, 1994). This data will
be used in Chapter 6 to answer the question: what influenced challenger quality in the 1994 and 1996 elections?

RESEARCH DESIGN FOR CANDIDATE EMERGENCE ANALYSIS

In Chapter 6, I analyze U.S. House of Representatives elections in 1994 and 1996. I assert that quality challengers emerged at an increased rate in 1994 and 1996 in states and districts affected by race-based redistricting. In several of the southern states the district plans were not finalized until shortly before the 1992 elections, making it impossible or unattractive for a candidate to run in the election. Instead, I assert that the number of quality challengers in 1994 and 1996 was higher than in 1992 because candidates waited until the time was right to run for election. If this assertion were accurate, the following factors would influence quality challenger emergence. I assert that more quality challengers emerged in 1994 and 1996: (1) in states that underwent race-based redistricting; and (2) in districts where incumbents were not responsive to changes in the racial composition of their district.

In order to predict challenger quality, I first construct a model that predicts incumbent vote. The results of this model are used to devise a hierarchical scale of challenger quality; this scale then becomes the dependent variable in Model 2.

**Model 1**

The dependent variable is the vote for the incumbent and is measured as the margin of victory between the incumbent and the challenger.

The independent variables that are of greatest importance in this model are the variables which focus on which offices a challenger has previously held. Those independent variables are state legislator, lesser statewide office, and local official. The
coefficients for these three types of office are used to make a scale of the relative importance of different types of political experience. I develop an OLS regression model to test the relationship, controlling for other independent variables, which are related to the incumbent’s margin of victory:

\[
\text{Incumbent Margin of Victory} = a + b1 \text{ (State Legislative Experience)} + b2 \text{ (Other Statewide Office Experience)} + b3 \text{ (Local Office Experience)} + b4 \text{ (Incumbent’s Margin of Victory in Previous Election)} + b5 \text{ (District Level Presidential Vote)} + b6 \text{ (Member of President’s Party)}
\]

The dependent variable is Incumbent Margin of Victory. I specify this model for 1992 and 1994 elections. I regress the dependent variable on several independent variables.

The first three independent variables focus on whether the House challenger held elective office prior to his/her run for House election, and if so, did their office fall under State Legislative Experience, Other Statewide Office Experience, or Local Office Experience. Each of these is a dummy variable coded 1 if the challengers’ previous office fit into the specific category and 0 if it did not. The relationship between these variables and the dependent variable should be a negative one. As the quality of the challenger increases, the margin of victory for the incumbent decreases.

Incumbent’s Margin of Victory in Previous Election takes into account how popular the incumbent was in the last election. Those incumbents who won by large margins in the previous elections will very likely win by large margins in the next election.

District Level Presidential Vote refers to the percentage of district votes the president received in the previous presidential election. In order to account for partisan
differences, this variable is multiplied by -1 if the incumbent is a Republican and 1 if the incumbent is a Democrat. During the years analyzed in this study the president is a Democrat. Therefore, the coefficient for this variable should be positive. The higher the presidential vote the higher the Democratic incumbent vote.

Member of President’s Party distinguishes whether the incumbent House member is of the same party of the president or not. This variable is coded 1 if the House member and the president identify with the same party, and 0 if they do not. I expect a positive relationship between this variable and the dependent variable during presidential election years.

I expect an opposite effect during 1994 due to the fact that it is a midterm election year. Vast research has been carried out confirming the negative effect of midterm elections on the incumbent of the same party of the president (Tufte 1978; Kernell 1977; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984; Campbell 1993). These studies confirm that the president’s party always loses congressional seats in the midterm because voters use the midterm basically as a referendum on the president’s performance. Therefore, expectations of the relationship vary depending on what year is being analyzed.

Model 2

I will utilize the coefficients obtained from Model 1 to form a hierarchical scale of challenger quality. This hierarchical scale then becomes the dependent variable in the subsequent analysis.

There are also several independent variables that determine whether a quality challenger emerged in the 1994 and 1996 congressional elections. I use an ordered logit
regression model to test the relationship between challenger quality and several independent variables:

\[
\text{Challenger Quality} = a + b_1 (\text{Incumbent's Margin of Victory in Previous Election}) + b_2 (\text{District Level Presidential Vote}) + b_3 (\text{Member of President's Party}) + b_4 (\text{Race-Based Redistricted State}) + b_5 (\text{Responsiveness to Racial Changes in the Constituency Due to Redistricting})
\]

The dependent variable is challenger quality, which is based on whether a challenger held previous political office. The variable is an ordinal scale including no experience, state legislator, lesser statewide office, and local official. This model is also specified for 1994 and 1996.

Incumbent's Margin of Victory in Previous Election is used to measure what effect the local environment may have on whether a quality challenger emerges. If the incumbent won by a large margin in the previous election, the more quality challenger may opt not to enter that particular House race. Thus, there should be a negative relationship. The higher the previous incumbent’s vote, the lower the level of challenger quality.

The second independent variable is the District Level Presidential Vote. As in Model 1, presidential vote is based on the percentage of the district vote the president received in the most recent election. Again this variable will be multiplied by 1 if the incumbent House member is a Democrat, and -1 if the incumbent House member is a Republican. I expect a negative relationship (i.e., the higher the presidential vote, the lower the level of challenger quality when the incumbent is a Democrat).

Member of President’s Party captures information on whether the House incumbent is a member of the same party as the president. If the incumbent is of the
president's party in 1996, this will have a negative impact on the dependent variable. However, if the incumbent is of the president’s party during the 1994, midterm election, the coefficient will be positive. Incumbents who share a party label with the president during midterm will be more likely to attract higher quality challengers.

Race-Based Redistricted State represents whether a state underwent race-based redistricting in the 1990s. If a state experienced race-based redistricting, the possibility that high quality challengers will emerge increases. Only eight of the eleven southern states of the Confederacy experienced race-based redistricting. These states are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. This variable's coefficient should be positive. In states that underwent race-based redistricting, more quality challengers emerged in 1994 and 1996 due to the increased electoral opportunity that the boundary shifts initiated.

Challenger Party indicates what political party the challenger identifies with. The expectation is that the higher quality challengers in 1994 and 1996 identify to a greater extent, with the Republican party. I expect this relationship to be accentuated in the Southern states where race-based redistricting very likely made incumbent Democratic House members more vulnerable.

The Responsiveness to Racial Changes in the Constituency Due to Redistricting variable accounts for any ideological discrepancies between expected and actual roll-call voting behavior changes as a result of shifts in the racial composition of districts. In order to construct this variable, I construct a model of roll-call voting in 1993/1994 using Poole and Rosenthal scores. This equation yields predicted Poole and Rosenthal scores for 1993/1994. I then subtract the actual Poole and Rosenthal scores in 1995/1996 from
Table 4.2: Candidate Emergence Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Margin of Victory</td>
<td>Actual proportion of district vote by which incumbent defeated the challenger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Legislative Experience, Other Statewide Office Experience</td>
<td>Previous political experience. Each of these is a dummy variable coded 1 if the challenger held the office prior to running for Congress and 0 if he did not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent’s Margin of Victory in Previous Election</td>
<td>Actual proportion of district vote by which the incumbent defeated the challenger in last election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Level Presidential Vote</td>
<td>Actual proportion of district vote the president received in last election. This variable is multiplied by -1 if the incumbent is a Republican and 1 if the incumbent is a Democrat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of President’s Party</td>
<td>1 = House members who share same party with president; 0 = House members who do not share the same party with the president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger Quality</td>
<td>Ordinal scale including no political experience, state legislative experience, statewide office experience, and local office experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race-Based Redistricted State</td>
<td>1 = states that underwent race-based redistricting in the 1990s; 0 = all other states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger Party</td>
<td>1 = Democratic challenger; -1 = Republican challenger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to Racial Changes in the Constituency Due to Redistricting</td>
<td>Discrepancy between predicted roll-call behavior based on replication of Glazer and Robbins’ model and actual roll-call behavior of incumbent House member.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the predicted Poole and Rosenthal scores in 1993/1994. The outcome of this equation becomes the predicted change in Poole and Rosenthal scores. I then subtract the actual Poole and Rosenthal scores in 1995/1996 from the actual Poole and Rosenthal scores in 1993/1994. The outcome of this equation becomes the actual change in Poole and Rosenthal scores. The last step is to subtract the actual change in Poole and Rosenthal scores from the predicted change in Poole and Rosenthal scores in order to obtain the Responsiveness to Racial Changes in the Constituency Due to Redistricting variable.

I expect a positive relationship. The higher this value, or the larger the difference between expected Poole and Rosenthal scores and actual Poole and Rosenthal scores based on changes in the black population the less responsive the incumbent House member. The less responsive the incumbent House member, the more likely that House member will attract quality challengers.

Model 3

A third model is constructed that deviates slightly from the above model. In this model I include a variable identifying the party affiliation of the challenger. It is important to know which one of the two parties fielded the stronger candidates in 1994 and 1996, and whether this relationship was stronger in the South or the non-South. The variable measuring whether the incumbent is a member of the same party of the president is excluded from this model due to the fact that these two variables are highly correlated.

CONCLUSION

There are delayed and ongoing effects of the 1990s race-based redistricting. It is important to compare the effects directly after redistricting with the effects several years
after redistricting. The models described in the roll-call voting behavior portion of this chapter focus on the ongoing effects of the redistricting.

Equally important is the impact that the creation of majority-black districts had on candidate emergence. In particular, the models described in this chapter seek to explain what factors influenced the decision of quality challengers to run for election in 1994 and 1996.

A complete explanation of the models constructed in this chapter will be presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
CHAPTER 5
ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR

In most of the studies on race-based redistricting carried out in the early 1990s, scholars found House members to be responsive to the racial composition changes in their districts due to redistricting. With the benefit of time we can now evaluate whether those changes in roll-call vote behavior were short term or long term changes. In this chapter I construct a model of legislative responsiveness using the Poole and Rosenthal scores for 1993/1994 and 1995/1996 as the dependent variable; a similar set of models is estimated using ADA scores from 1993 and 1996. It is necessary to first obtain the results from the 1993/1994 regression model in order to compare responsiveness directly after redistricting with responsiveness several years after redistricting. In addition, I estimate two models for each year analyzed. I estimate separate models for all House members and for all white House members (i.e., excluding black and Hispanic members). It is important to disaggregate the effects that redistricting has had on white members versus all members. Presumably, white House members experienced a notable loss in their black population at a higher rate than non-white House members. It would not be surprising to observe different reactions to the racial changes in constituency between white and non-white House members.

Models using both the Poole and Rosenthal scores and the ADA scores are presented in this chapter because the scores measure different phenomenon. As explained earlier, Poole and Rosenthal scores include basically all roll-call votes with the criteria for excluding a vote being based on lack of opposition (i.e., 2.5% or less minority support). Conversely, ADA scores are based on approximately twenty votes that an
ADA committee deems to be most important to the organization’s political objectives. So while Poole and Rosenthal scores give us a comprehensive measure of ideology based on roll-call voting behavior, ADA scores might be depicted as based on the more ideologically divisive votes in which a clear liberal or conservative position is represented (Snyder 1992). The difference in what these scores measure is evidenced in the results presented in this chapter, and will be explained at length.

POOLE AND ROSENTHAL ANALYSIS

Before discussing the multivariate models, it is important to mention some noteworthy descriptive results. Due to the 1990s redistricting, 23 districts represented by white House members experienced a drop in black population ranging from 10% to 28%. Only three districts represented by white members experienced an increase in black population ranging from 10% to 22%. Also important to note is that, before the 1990s redistricting, 28 districts represented by white members had black populations ranging from 30% to 72%. After redistricting, only nine districts represented by white members had black populations ranging from 30% to 52%. This data confirms the fact that several white districts did lose portions of their black population due to redistricting. The multivariate analysis will expose some of the unintended effects of the race-based redistricting.

Also, interesting to note is the shift in roll-call voting behavior that occurred between 1991/1992 and 1995/1996. For all members the Poole and Rosenthal scores shifted from 0.09597 in 1991/1992, to -0.1336 in 1995/1996. Thus, House members have become more conservative in general throughout the 1990s. Figures 5.1 through 5.3 illustrate the shift in roll-call voting behavior among white members. The same shift
FIGURE 5.1: POOLE AND ROSENTHAL 1991/1992

FIGURE 5.2: POOLE AND ROSENTHAL 1993/1994
FIGURE 5.3: POOLE AND ROSENTHAL 1995/1996
occurred in the all member model, but the shift that occurred among white members is more pronounced. In 1991/1992 the average Poole and Rosenthal score for white House members was 0.05. By 1995/1996, the average score is -0.23. This signifies a large shift to more conservative roll-call voting behavior. It is possible that this shift is associated with the race-based redistricting that took effect between the years mentioned above. However, it is important to keep in mind that this shift is observed in an analysis including all House members who were in office between 1991 and 1996.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Regression Estimates for Poole and Rosenthal 1993/1994

The regression estimates for the 1993/1994 Poole and Rosenthal model are presented in Table 5.1. Model 5.1 (a) includes House members who served in Congress from 1991 through 1994 (N=304). Model 5.1 (b) includes only white House members (N= 277), who served in Congress from 1991 through 1994. Both of these models have an adjusted R² of 0.98, proving to be a superlative fit to the data.

Keep in mind that the Poole and Rosenthal scores have been rescaled so that a −1 represents the most conservative voting record and a 1 represents the most liberal voting record. In general the findings are consistent with those of previous studies.

First of all, in the all members model as well as the white members only model, House members' roll-call voting behavior in 1993/1994 is largely influenced by their previous roll-call voting behavior. This effect is captured by the coefficients for a lagged Poole and Rosenthal score variable for 1991/992. This finding confirms the idea that House members' roll-call voting behavior is consistent over time.
Table 5.1: Parameter Values for Models of District Level Effects of Black Population Change on House Member's Voting Behavior Using Poole and Rosenthal 93/94 Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All House Members (1a)</th>
<th>White House Members Only (1b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>4.564***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poole and Rosenthal 91/92</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>47.180***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>1.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in DEM Population</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Black Population</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>2.059**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population Post Redist</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted $R^2$: 0.980, 0.979  | N: 304, 277

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
Second, the coefficient for the party variable does not attain statistical significance in either model. This finding is surprising because this may suggest that levels of liberalism and conservatism in 1993/1994 were not related to partisan identification. A more feasible explanation is that the effects of party are captured in the lagged Poole and Rosenthal variable. As explained in Chapter 4, the Poole and Rosenthal scores used in this study measure House member's level of liberalism evidenced by their roll-call voting behavior.

Third, the results suggest that House members from southern states do not vote more liberally or conservatively than House members from other regions of the country. The coefficient for this variable carries an unexpected positive sign, and is not statistically significant in either model.

Fourth, seniority does not appear to have an effect on House members' roll-call voting behavior. Due to the disagreement over the direction of impact seniority should have on roll-call voting behavior, only a two-tailed test would be appropriate in determining statistical significance. In Model 5.1 (a) as well as Model 5.1 (b), this variable fails to attain significance.

Fifth, roll-call vote behavior does not seem to be affected by changes in the partisan composition of the district that were brought on by decennial redistricting. This is counter to previous research findings that show partisan composition changes to have an significant effect on roll-call voting behavior (Glazer and Robbins 1985). This finding lends support to the possibility that partisan composition changes were overshadowed by racial composition changes. Blacks constitute a large Democratic voting bloc, so there is
definitely overlap between the two variables. However, the effects of race prevail over party.

At the center of the analysis are the variables measuring district level changes in black population pre- and post-redistricting, as well as black population post-redistricting. These variables become increasingly important as they are compared with 1995/1996 regression results. The coefficients for the black composition change variable are positive and significant in the all member model and the white members only model. Using a one-tailed test, the coefficient attains statistical significance is attained at the .02 level for all members and at the .05 level for white members. For all members, a 10% change in black population is expected to lead to a .017 point change in Poole and Rosenthal scores. For white members, a 10% change in black population will result in a .015 point change in roll-call liberalism. Thus, white members seem to be somewhat less responsive to changes in black population than non-white members. This is not a huge effect, but because of the consistency in House members’ roll-call voting behavior any change is worth noting. Also, this result confirms past research findings that House members are responsive to changes in the racial composition of their district in 1993/1994.

Last, the coefficients for the black population post-redistricting variable did not attain statistical significance. This suggests that although House members in 1993/1994 are responsive to changes in the black population, they are not responsive to levels of black population as a constant. This is not to say that House members do not represent the interests of their black constituents, but rather, there was a greater force influencing their roll-call voting behavior in 1993/1994.
In the 1993/1994 model, the only variables that prove to have a significant effect on House members' roll-call voting behavior are the House members' previous roll-call voting behavior and the district level change in black population from pre-redistricting to post-redistricting. This suggests that in the early 1990s, House members may have been preoccupied with the racial changes occurring in their constituency. This is not surprising considering the national attention given to the 1990s redistricting process. Interestingly, white House members were basically just as responsive to the changes as non-white House members. This finding contradicts earlier findings by Bullock (1995) and Whitby (1997) that show white House members to be unresponsive to racial composition changes that occurred due to the 1990s redistricting.

The fact that white and non-white House members are both responsive to the changes is also interesting, considering what we know about the descriptive nature of constituents in each type of district. Most of districts represented by black and Hispanic House members are majority non-white. On the other hand, most of the districts represented by white House members are majority white. Thus, the level of black population does not seem to have a discernible effect on House member' responsiveness to changes in that black population.

**Regression Estimates for Poole and Rosenthal 1995/1996**

The regression estimates for the 1995/1996 Poole and Rosenthal model are presented in Table 5.2. Model 5.2 (a) includes 240 House members who served in Congress from 1991 through 1996. Model 5.2 (b) is based on the 216 white House members who served from 1991 through 1996. Both of these models achieve an adjusted...
Table 5.2: Parameter Values for Models of District Level Effects of Black Population Change on House Member's Voting Behavior Using Poole and Rosenthal 95/96 Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All House Members</th>
<th>White House Members Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2a)</td>
<td>(2b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.143</td>
<td>-7.835***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poole and Rosenthal 93/94</td>
<td>0.879</td>
<td>22.065***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>7.303***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>-4.971***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in DEM Population</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-1.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Black Population</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population Post Redist</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>2.154**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
$R^2$ of 0.96; although this is not as efficient as the 1993/1994 model, it still proves to be a good fit.

As in the 1993/1994 model, past roll-call voting behavior proves to be a good predictor of present roll-call voting behavior. This relationship is explained through the inclusion of the lagged Poole and Rosenthal score.

Unlike the results from Table 5.1, party emerges as a significant variable in this model. The party coefficient attains statistical significance at the .01 level. The coefficient is also in the expected direction. Holding the effects of other variables constant, Democratic House members are more liberal than Republican House members are. This finding is sustained in both the all member model and the white members only model.

The variable identifying southern members of the House also yields significant coefficients in the expected direction. In 1995/1996, southern region appear to have an effect on roll-call voting behavior, unlike in 1993/1994. Specifically, both white and non-white members from the South are more conservative in their roll-call voting behavior than other House members.

In 1995/1996 the coefficients for the partisan change variable falls short of attaining statistical significance in the model including all members. In the model including white members only, partisan changes in the district composition have a negative and significant effect on roll-call voting behavior. This suggests that, although white House members did not react to partisan changes directly after redistricting, they were cognizant of the changes, and responded to them several years after redistricting once the focus shifted away from racial considerations.
As in the 1993/1994 model, seniority does not seem to have any identifiable effect on roll-call voting behavior for white or non-white members in 1995/1996. The length of time a member holds office does not impact his roll-call voting behavior.

The variables measuring black population change and black population post-redistricting yield very interesting findings. In 1995/1996, the effect of black population changes drops out. In both the all members model and the white members only model, the changes in black population in the district due to redistricting do not have an effect on House members roll-call voting behavior in 1995/1996. House members are no longer contemplating the increase or decrease in the black percentage of their district when voting. In effect, the responsiveness observed in 1993/1994 was not sustained several years after redistricting.

Equally as interesting are the findings dealing with black population post-redistricting. The black population post-redistricting has a positive and significant effect on roll-call voting behavior in the model including all House members. Thus, in 1995/1996 members are not responding to the changes in black population, but instead are responding to the constant level of black population in the district. This would suggest that House members are taking into account the size of their black population when making voting decisions in Congress, and therefore, are responsive to the racial composition levels in their district. This outcome is to be expected. It would not be effective for House members to concern themselves with the amount of change in black population occurring three to four years earlier. Recognizing the goal of reelection, House members should focus on the actual makeup of the current district when voting.
The white members only model has a very different finding. In fact, the black population level has a negative and significant effect on white members' roll-call voting behavior in 1995/1996. This finding implies that for white House members, the higher the black population in 1995/1996, the more conservative their roll-call voting behavior. This is commensurate with the threat hypothesis posited by Key (1949) or the hostility hypothesis offered by Giles (1977). However, more recent studies assert that this inverse relationship no longer exists (Voss 1996; Giles and Buckner 1996). Evidence reported here strongly counter claims that the phenomenon known as threat or hostility no longer exists.

In 1993/1994, the distinction is made that although white House members are not responsive to the levels of black population in their districts, they are responsive to changes in black population. Therefore, there seems to be no threat to black representation. White House members responded to racial composition changes in the expected manner.

In 1995/1996, white House members are no longer concerned with the racial composition changes that occurred in their districts in the early 1990s. It is expected then that the responsiveness toward the changes in black population will be replaced with responsiveness toward the levels of black population. This in fact is the case. In 1995/1996 white House members are responsive to the level of black population. However, their responsiveness is in an unexpected direction. The fact that white House members become more conservative as their black population increases may actually indicate that they are being responsive to the majority of the constituency, if the black population does not exceed 50 percent.

The regression estimates for the Poole and Rosenthal change model are presented in Table 5.3. Model 5.3 (a) includes 304 House members who served in Congress from 1991 through 1993, and reports estimates for change in roll-call voting behavior between those years. Model 5.3 (b) includes 240 House members who served in Congress from 1991-1996, and reports estimates for change in roll-call voting behavior between those years. These models are included to test the validity of the baseline Poole and Rosenthal model developed above. Due largely to the exclusion of the lagged Poole and Rosenthal variable, the adjusted $R^2$ drops to 0.012 in Model 5.3 (a) and 0.311 in Model 5.3 (b). It is important to note however that the findings are very similar to the findings in Model 5.1.

The change in black population is one of only two significant variables in the 1991-1993 change model. As expected, the larger the change in the black population the larger the change in the Poole and Rosenthal scores.

Also in the model focusing on the change in voting behavior from 1991-1996, it seems that more traditional factors effect House members voting behavior. However, the black population level after redistricting seems to have a slight effect on the dependent variable just as it did in the baseline model.

Regression Estimates for Model Including House Members in Office 1991-1996

The regression estimates for the model including only House members who served at least from 1991-1996 are presented in Table 5.4. Model 5.4 (a) includes 240 House members who served in Congress from 1991-1996, and reports estimates for change in roll-call voting behavior between 1991 and 1993. Model 5.4 (b) includes the same 240 members in the previous model, and reports estimates for change in roll-call
Table 5.3: Parameter Values for Models of Change in House Member's Voting Behavior for 1993 and 1996 Using Poole and Rosenthal Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993 (3a)</th>
<th></th>
<th>1996 (3b)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>4.726***</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>-5.382***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-1.718</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>8.539***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>1.550</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
<td>-3.223***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.020</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in DEM Population</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Black Population</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>2.089**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population Post Redist</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.330</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>1.318*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted $R^2$ 0.012 0.311
N 304 240

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
Table 5.4: Parameter Values for Models of District Level Effects of Black Population Change on House Member's Voting Behavior For Members in Office from 1991-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4a)</td>
<td>(4b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b t</td>
<td>b t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.033 3.663***</td>
<td>-0.114 -5.515***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poole and Rosenthal 91/92</td>
<td>0.993 43.479***</td>
<td>0.892 19.762***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-0.005 -0.516</td>
<td>0.124 5.812***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.010 0.953</td>
<td>-0.085 -3.954***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>0.000 0.504</td>
<td>0.001 0.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in DEM Population</td>
<td>0.000 0.057</td>
<td>-0.000 -1.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Black Population</td>
<td>0.001 1.830**</td>
<td>0.000 0.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population Post Redist</td>
<td>0.000 0.289</td>
<td>0.001 2.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.983 0.953</td>
<td>0.953 0.953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>240 240</td>
<td>240 240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
voting behavior between 1991 and 1996. By focuses exclusively on House members who were in office throughout the entire time period, this allows a direct comparison of roll-call voting behavior and changes based on those factors hypothesized to have an effect. The findings presented in Table 5.4 confirm the findings obtained from the baseline Poole and Rosenthal model.

**Discussion**

I construct identical models for 1993/1994 and 1995/1996. However, the factors that influence members’ roll-call voting behavior change drastically from one Congress to the next. A comparison of the 1993/1994 and 1995/1996 Poole and Rosenthal models provide several interesting findings. First of all, in 1993/1994 only two variables have a significant effect on House members’ roll-call voting behavior. Lagged roll-call voting behavior scores and the change in black population appear to be the only significant explanatory factors in 1993/1994. The fact that House members’ roll-call voting behavior remains constant over the years is a common and expected finding. However, the fact that the change in black population is the only other variable to achieve significance is noteworthy. The expectation is that the change in the black population would effect House member’ roll-call voting behavior, along with other factors. It appears that House members’ voting decisions were dominated by attention to racial composition changes in their district. This preoccupation with race seems to have overshadowed other factors that usually affect House members’ roll-call voting behavior.

In 1995/1996, on the other hand, several factors influence roll-call voting behavior as reflected by the Poole and Rosenthal scores. The variables measuring a member’s past roll-call voting behavior, party identification and region all prove to be
significant. In addition, black population after redistricting, is significant. Thus, in 1995/1996, several factors influence House members’ roll-call voting behavior.

As mentioned above, the most striking finding concerns the relationship between changes in black population and roll-call voting behavior versus levels of black population and roll-call voting behavior. The primary question that the analysis seeks to answer is: are House members responsive to changes in the racial composition of their district? According to the results, the answer to this question is yes. Yes, House members’ roll-call voting behavior is a function of the level of black population proportion in their district. The assumption however, is that responsiveness implies voting in a manner reflective of the interests of the constituency. For example, the larger the black population, the more liberal the voting record of the House member, this signifies a positive relationship. The fact that white House members are not responsive in a positive manner to the black population level, is problematic and may suggest that black interests may not be adequately represented at the congressional level in 1995/1996. However, this finding may simply suggest that the black population is not large enough to affect the reelection prospects of House members, and thus they are voting more in line with those in the political majority in their districts.

ADA ANALYSIS

Unlike Poole and Rosenthal scores, which range from -1 to 1, ADA scores range from 0 to 100. As in the Poole and Rosenthal analysis, I begin with a brief explanation of some of the important descriptive findings. First, I analyze the mean ADA scores of white House members from 1991 to 1996. The average ADA score for white House members dropped from 42 in 1991 to 34 in 1996. Interestingly, there was a rise in liberal
FIGURE 5.4: ADA 1991

FIGURE 5.5: ADA 1992

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FIGURE 5.8: ADA 1995

FIGURE 5.9: ADA 1996

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roll-call voting behavior in 1992, followed by a continual drop in liberal voting among white House members. ADA scores plunged between 1993 and 1994. There is a possible explanation for such a large drop in such a short period of time. With redistricting coming to a close in 1991 and as late as 1992 for several states, House members were unsure of the breakdown of their district composition. By 1994 House members had a better grasp on their district composition and who within their district was part of their reelection constituency. Average ADA scores are also tallied for all members. As expected the inclusion of Hispanic and African American members of the House inflates the ADA scores, but the pattern is unchanged.

Figures 5.4 through 5.9 display the distribution of ADA scores for white House members from 199 to 1996.1 These charts show an interesting pattern. In 1991 ADA scores are somewhat evenly distributed, with a slight conservative curve. In 1992 a bimodal pattern begins to develop, with a high number of House members on each extreme of the ADA scoring scale. In 1993, that bimodal pattern begins to breakdown, and evidence of a conservative slant is exhibited. In 1994, there is an obvious drop in the number of white House members with high ADA scores. The number of members with low ADA scores remains constant in this year. The charts displaying ADA scores in 1995 and 1996 tell an interesting story. Notice the number of members in 1995 with an ADA score of zero. Almost 120 of the 380 members included in the analysis have an ADA score of zero, with the rest of the members distributed fairly evenly over the rest of the scale. In 1996 the pattern continues, with approximately 170 of the 374 members

---

1 Figures including all members are also constructed with marginal effects on the overall distribution of score. There is a slight increase in frequency on the liberal side of the scale.
included in the analysis reflecting ADA scores between zero and ten. Again the other members are distributed evenly across the rest of the ADA scale.

The evidence presented in these charts give irrefutable support to the contention that white House members have become increasingly more conservative in their roll-call voting behavior from 1991-1996. The results of the multivariate analysis will shed light on whether changes in the racial composition of the district are responsible for that trend.

Regression Estimates for ADA 1993

The regression estimates for the 1993 ADA model are presented in Table 5.5. Model 5.5 (a) includes 304 House members who served in Congress from 1990 through 1993. Model 5.5 (b) includes only white House members, 277, who served from 1990 through 1993. Both of these models achieve an adjusted $R^2$ of 0.95, which prove to be a good fit.

Model 5.5 is a replication of the model used in an earlier work (Sharpe and Garand 1994, unpublished). The results of this model can be compared with the results obtained from the 1996 model. The coefficients for the lagged ADA scores further corroborate evidence that there is consistency in House members' roll-call voting behavior. The coefficients for the lagged ADA variable attain statistical significance in both models.

Second, the coefficients for the variable measuring party identification also attain statistical significance in both models. This finding supports the idea that Democrats are more liberal in their roll-call voting behavior than their Republican counterparts.
Table 5.5: Parameter Values for Models of District Level Effects of Black Population Change on House Member's Voting Behavior Using ADA 1993 Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All House Members</th>
<th>White House Members Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5a)</td>
<td>(5b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>1.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>0.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-2.090</td>
<td>-0.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in DEM Population</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Black Population</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population Post Redist</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adjusted R²</th>
<th>All House Members</th>
<th>White House Members Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.950</td>
<td>0.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test  
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test  
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
Third, the coefficient for the South variable is negative and significant in both models. This finding indicates that southern House members are more conservative in their roll-call voting behavior than non-southern House members.

The coefficients for seniority remain positive through both models, but only attain significance in the white members only model. This would suggest that the more years a white House member serves in Congress, the more liberal he becomes. In addition, changes in partisan composition of the district seem to have little effect on the roll-call voting behavior of House members in 1993. The coefficient for the partisan change variable does not achieve significance in either model. As mentioned earlier, this counters results found in research using the 1980s redistricting (Glazer and Robbins 1985). It is possible that some other factor distinct to the 1990s redistricting overshadowed partisan change.

That other factor may be the change in racial composition that resulted from the 1990s redistricting. In fact, coefficients for the variable measuring changes in district level black population attain statistical significance in both models. It seems that for all members of Congress, one major concern was being responsive to changes in the racial composition of their district. This variable is central to the analysis. For the model including all members, a 10% change in district level black population leads to a 1.6 point change in ADA score. For white members, the magnitude of the change is greater, indicating that a 10% change in black population would lead to a 2.3% change in roll-call voting behavior. These are not huge effects, liberal House members are still liberal and conservative House members are still conservative, but small change does occur and the findings are significant.
Last, the coefficients for the black population post-redistricting is positive in the all members model and negative in the white members only model. This would suggest that as the size of the black population in a district grows, white House members actually become more conservative in their roll-call voting behavior. This finding is inconclusive, however, because neither model achieved statistical significance. In fact, in each model this variable just fell short of attaining significance. The expected direction of this coefficient is positive based on evidence that House members are responsive to their constituency composition. With this in mind, a one-tailed test was used for the model including all members, but significance was not attained. Due to the unexpected negative coefficient in the white members only model, only a two-tailed test would be appropriate in this model. Again, significance was not attained.

Regression Estimates for ADA 1996

The regression estimates for the 1996 ADA model are presented in Table 5.6. Model 5.6 (a) includes 234 House members who served in Congress from 1991 through 1996. Model 5.6 (b) includes only white House members, 211, who served from 1991 through 1996. Both of these models achieve an adjusted $R^2$ of 0.93, which signals that the models are a relatively good fit.

The first three variables maintain results captured from the 1993 ADA models. Lagged ADA scores, partisan identification, and southern region all have statistically significant and expected effects on ADA scores in 1996.

The variable identifying changes in partisan composition does not have an effect in 1996 for the all member model or the white members only model. This is a variable in which reaction would most likely have been observed directly after redistricting. In the
Table 5.6: Parameter Values for Models of District Level Effects of Black Population Change on House Member's Voting Behavior Using ADA 1996 Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All House Members</th>
<th>White House Members Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6a)</td>
<td>(6b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.515</td>
<td>4.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.453*</td>
<td>1.714**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average ADA 91/92</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>0.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.770***</td>
<td>20.628***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>5.202</td>
<td>5.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.041***</td>
<td>4.183***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>- 2.953</td>
<td>- 3.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1.723**</td>
<td>- 1.646**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>- 0.064</td>
<td>- 0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 0.737</td>
<td>- 0.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in DEM Population</td>
<td>- 0.082</td>
<td>- 0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1.132</td>
<td>- 0.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Black Population</td>
<td>- 0.025</td>
<td>- 0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 0.190</td>
<td>- 0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population Post Redist</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>- 0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>- 0.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.929</td>
<td>0.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
early 1990s this did not occur, and it seems that there has been no lagged effect of district level partisan change on the House members’ roll-call voting behavior.

Interestingly, the coefficients for the seniority variable in 1996 are in the opposite direction of the coefficients in 1993. No substantive conclusion can be drawn from this result however, because the coefficients for the seniority variable did not attain significance in either model. This is an important finding considering that coefficients for the seniority variable were significant at the .10 level in the 1993 white members only model. This suggests that a member’s seniority is not necessarily associated with the ideological nature of his roll-call voting behavior.

Results from the black population change variable enable me to explore whether the responsiveness observed in 1993 carried over to 1996. The coefficients for the black change variable are negative in both models. Further, they do not achieve significance in either model. This indicates that the responsiveness observed in 1993 was not maintained through the years. A full discussion of the implications of this finding follows, but first, it is important to report the findings for the black population post-redistricting variable. It would be plausible to expect the black population post-redistricting to take the place of the effect that the changes in black population had on House members’ roll-call voting behavior.

This is not the case. The coefficients for the variable measuring black population after redistricting do not attain significance in either model. The coefficients are in the same direction as the 1993 model, with white members showing a propensity to vote more conservatively as the numbers of blacks in their district increase.
According to ADA scores, the racial composition of the district does not influence House members' roll-call voting behavior in 1996. Interestingly, neither white House members nor non-white House members seem to be responsive to race in the 1990s. This result may reflect the fact that there is some overlap in the variables. Lagged scores and partisan identification may diminish the raw effects of race on roll-call voting behavior.

Discussion

The determinants of House members' roll-call voting behavior change noticeably between 1993 and 1996. In general, in 1993 more factors influenced House members' decision making on legislation. Using identical models in 1993 and 1996, seniority and change in black population are significant factors in both the all members model and the white members only in 1993. However, the impact of these variables drops out in the 1996 model. It appears that House members in 1996 are driven by the more traditional factors thought to affect House members' roll-call voting behavior (e.g., lagged voting scores, party identification southern region.) After the 1990s redistricting, no white House members represented majority-black districts. It may be plausible that white members are not responding to levels of black population because the black constituency is inconsequential to them. It is somewhat perplexing that non-white House members do not seem to be influenced by the size of the black population in their district. One possible explanation is that any aspect of roll-call voting behavior associated with the racial composition of the district may be captured in the lagged ADA score. Also, African American members have been accused of not representing the wishes of their district, and taking on the representative role of "trustee", rather than that of "delegate" (Swain 1993).
Regardless of the possible reasons why neither the black population change variable or the black population level variable is significant, this is a finding that will require additional analysis in the future.

CONCLUSION

One of the main thrusts of this dissertation is to analyze whether the congressional responsiveness in roll-call voting behavior in 1993 was maintained several years after redistricting. The analyses in this chapter indicate that House members did not remain responsive to the changes in black population proportions. This is an important finding indicating that changes in racial composition had an effect on roll-call voting behavior immediately after redistricting, but that was the extent of the impact.

There seems to be little long-term effect of the changes that took place due to redistricting in the 1990s. An argument could be made that this is an expected outcome. In 1995 and 1996 House members may not be responsive to changes that occurred up to six years ago. Instead they may be responsive to the levels of black population that they have had since redistricting. According to the Poole and Rosenthal analyses, this does prove to be the case. House members are no longer responsive to the change in black population, but they are now responsive to the level of black population. According to the ADA analyses, not only are House members unresponsive to the changes in black population, they are unresponsive to the levels of black population as well.

As a whole, House members have become increasingly conservative. Factors other than change in black percentage or levels of black percentage in a district must be responsible for this rightward shift. This evidence is contradictory to the idea that House
membership has become more conservative as a result of the race-based redistricting of the 1990s.

The discrepant findings between the Poole and Rosenthal analysis and the ADA analysis justify the inclusion of both measures in this dissertation. The most obvious discrepancy deals with the role of black population levels several years after redistricting. The basic question asked is: does the level of black population have an effect on House members' roll-call voting behavior in the middle 1990s? In other words, is there a pattern observed that, based on the level of black population in a district, people have similar voting records? When relying on the Poole and Rosenthal scores, all roll-call votes are included. When analyzing all votes a pattern exists. On the other hand, when relying on the ADA scores, approximately 20 roll-call votes are included. According to the 20 votes, a pattern does not exist.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the ADA along with other interest groups may bias their ratings toward extreme ideological positions. Thus, an interpretation of the ADA's analysis on black population levels might conclude that there is no evidence that members show signs of extreme liberalism or conservatism based on the level of black population. On the other hand, an interpretation of the Poole and Rosenthal analysis may conclude that members show tendencies toward the liberal or conservative ideology based on the level of black population.

It is important to note that this distinction is not made throughout the above explanations of each model. However, it is important for the reader to consider the fact that Poole and Rosenthal and ADA measure slightly different phenomenon.
Chapters 6 will delve deeper into what role the 1990s redistricting played on the rightward shift in Congress. This chapter is concerned with whether the redistricting is partly responsible for the changing partisanship of Congress.
CHAPTER 6
CANDIDATE EMERGENCE

The 1994 elections marked the first time since Reconstruction that Republicans made up a majority of the southern congressional delegation. A small number of scholars have attempted to determine how many of the Republican victories were direct results of the creation of majority-black districts. As mentioned earlier, knowing the actual number is not as important as understanding why the creation of these districts would cause such an upheaval. One explanation is that more quality Republican challengers emerged in affected districts because their prospects of winning were enhanced. The premise is that majority-black districts are created by pulling blacks from surrounding districts. Not only does this leave the subsequent districts overwhelmingly white, but also it diminishes a large liberal voting bloc in the district. The result is more conservative districts that offer a better chance of electoral success for prospective Republican candidates. I expect to see this relationship, especially in the South, where the bulk of the race-based redistricting took place. Also, high quality challengers are expected to emerge in districts where the incumbent House members were not responsive to constituency composition changes. Discrepant voting records make House members more vulnerable and more likely to be faced with serious challenge because it serves as a point of attack for the challenger. I test the effect of the creation of majority-black districts on the emergence of quality challengers in 1994 and 1996.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Regression Estimates for Incumbent Margin of Victory

As explained in Chapter 4, before testing a model of candidate emergence I must first construct a model predicting incumbent vote. By including different types of political experience in the model, I am able to obtain estimates on the impact each type of experience has on the percentage of the total vote the incumbent receives. The results of this model allow me to devise a hierarchical scale of challenger quality. The coefficients for different types of political experience are ranked ordered. That ranking then becomes the measure of challenger quality used in the subsequent model. I contend that the larger the coefficient for a certain type of challenger political experience, the smaller the margin of victory for the incumbent.

The regression estimates for the incumbent vote analysis are presented in Table 6.1. I report the model for 1994, but also conducted analyses for 1992 and 1996 yielding similar results. The most important variables measure different types of candidate experience. Challengers with local office experience reduce incumbent vote by 14.646, in comparison to those challengers with no experience. Candidates with state legislative experience reduce the incumbent vote by 14.317, while those candidates with statewide experience reduce the incumbent vote by 23.512. It important to notice that the coefficients are negative as expected. With the margin of incumbent victory as the dependent variable, these results suggest that challengers with local office or state legislative experience decreases the vote percentage for the incumbent. The impact of holding local or state legislative office is basically the same. On the other hand, in races where the challenger has held statewide office, the incumbent margin of victory is even

105
Table 6.1: Parameter Values for Models of House Incumbent Margin of Victory in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incumbent House Members</th>
<th>( b )</th>
<th>( t )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>12.901</td>
<td>2.415***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Incumbent Margin</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>7.444***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Office Experience</td>
<td>-14.646</td>
<td>-1.748**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Legislative Experience</td>
<td>-14.317</td>
<td>-2.022**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statewide Office Experience</td>
<td>-23.512</td>
<td>-1.858**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of President’s Party</td>
<td>-16.011</td>
<td>-9.601***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Level Presidential Vote 1992</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>2.657***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted \( R^2 \) 0.399

\( N \) 243

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
smaller. The impact of statewide office is almost double that of the other two types of political experience.

Because the coefficients for local and state legislative experience are equal, these two categories of political experience are combined to form the second level on the hierarchical scale of challenger quality. Those challengers who did not have any political experience represent the first level (and lowest level) of the scale. Candidates who have statewide experience will represent the third and highest level of challenger quality.

Thus, the dependent variable in the challenger quality analysis is measured as a three-point scale, with 0 being no political experience, 1 being local and state legislative experience, and 2 being statewide office experience.

**Regression Estimates for Quality Challenger Emergence 1994**

Having constructed the dependent variable, the task now is to answer the question: what explains variation in challenger quality across districts?

The regression estimates for the 1994 quality challenger model are presented in Table 6.2. Model 6.2 (a) includes 234 districts in which an incumbent House member’s congressional seat was challenged in 1994. Model 6.2 (b) includes only white incumbent House members (N=210) who faced a challenge in 1994. It is also important to note that the number of cases also reflects the inclusion of the variable comparing roll-call voting behavior from 1991 to 1996 (responsiveness), which further reduces the sample size. In both models in Table 6.2, the dependent variable is the three-point challenger quality scale; each model is estimated using ordered logit.

First, in Model 6.2 (a), the coefficient for incumbents’ previous margin of victory is negative and significant. This finding indicates that as House incumbents’ margin of
Table 6.2: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All House Members</th>
<th>White House Members Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2a)</td>
<td>(2b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Margin of Victory 1992</td>
<td>-0.348</td>
<td>-2.373***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Level Presidential Vote 1992</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of President’s Party</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race-Based Redistricted State</td>
<td>-0.432</td>
<td>-0.710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to Racial Changes</td>
<td>4.596</td>
<td>2.173**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>1.794</td>
<td>1.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td>3.593</td>
<td>1.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-74.216</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test  
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test  
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
victory in the last election increases, the quality of the challenger decreases. As should be expected, a House incumbent who wins by a large percentage in the previous congressional race will, barring scandal, retain that popularity in the following election.

This is also consistent with the strategic politician theory. Calculating prospective candidates run for office in congressional races that they believe they can win. A high level of popularity, reflected in a large margin of victory, discourages the strategic politician from challenging the incumbent. Strategic prospective candidates will not waste precious time and resources on a campaign they cannot win.

Second, the coefficient measuring the district level presidential vote does not attain significance. This suggests that challengers' decision to compete for a House seat is not influenced by the popularity of the president in the district, regardless of the party with which the challenger identifies.

Third, there does not seem to be a relationship between the quality of the challenger and whether the incumbent identifies with the same party as the president. The coefficient is in the expected positive direction, however, possibly signifying the influence of a midterm election.

Fourth, congressional races occurring in states that have undergone race-based redistricting in the 1990s are no more likely to generate quality challengers than other states. The coefficient for this variable carries a negative sign, and does not attain statistical significance.

The finding of most interest deals with how responsive House members are to the changes in the composition of their constituencies. The variable measuring responsiveness to racial composition changes in the district is positive and significant.
Recall that the responsiveness variable accounts for any ideological discrepancies between expected and actual roll-call voting behavior changes as a result of shifts in the racial composition of districts. Therefore, the higher the value the less responsive the House member is; the less responsive the House member, the higher the expected quality of the challenger. Thus, House members unresponsive to changes in their constituency were held accountable through more rigorous electoral competition.

This is an extremely important finding. Simply put, those House members who did not change their roll-call voting behavior to reflect their new constituencies were more likely to face a high-quality challenger. This finding is also compatible with strategic politician theory. Strategic politicians considering candidacy evaluate the incumbent House members’ roll-call voting behavior, or overall ideology, in an effort to determine whether it is commensurate with the interests of the constituency.

Model 6.2 (b), focusing exclusively on white House members, yields similar findings. The only two variables that attain significance are the incumbent margin of victory in the previous election and the variable measuring ideological discrepancy. For white House members as well, the larger the ideological discrepancy between the expected and predicted roll-call voting behavior based on changes in racial composition, the more likely the were met with a strong challenge. For white members the magnitude of the coefficient increases slightly, suggesting that unresponsive white House members were more likely than others to face a quality challenger in 1994.

A second model is constructed by including a variable identifying the party of the challenger. The results are presented in Table 6.3. The variable identifying whether the incumbent identifies with the same party of the president is excluded and a variable
Table 6.3: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Alternative Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All House Members</th>
<th>White House Members Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3a)</td>
<td>(3b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Margin of Victory 1992</td>
<td>-0.333</td>
<td>-2.084**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Level Presidential Vote 1992</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
<td>-0.630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race-Based Redistricted State</td>
<td>-0.329</td>
<td>-0.540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger Party</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
<td>-1.619*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to Racial Changes</td>
<td>4.885</td>
<td>2.493***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>1.306</td>
<td>1.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td>3.125</td>
<td>1.537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-71.838</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
identifying the party of the challenger is included in the analysis. As explained in Chapter 4, these variables explain slightly different phenomenon. This variable specifically captures partisan trends in a given year (i.e., are Republican challengers stronger on average than Democratic challengers). For that reason, it is important to include a variable that explicitly identifies the party of the challenger.

The two variables that attain significance in the baseline model retain significance in this model. The challenger party variable also attains statistical significance. According to these results, quality candidates who challenged incumbents were more likely to identify with the Republican Party. This implies that Democratic incumbents were more likely to face challenge by high quality candidates than Republican incumbents were.

This is a very important finding. It offers evidence that the quality of Republican candidates was high throughout the nation. A model including only southern districts can be tested in order to observe whether this relationship persists when examining the southern states exclusively.

Similar findings can be observed for white House members. Again, the same variables that attain significance for all members, attain significance for white House members. For white House members, the more quality challengers were Republican. Also, unresponsiveness in roll-call voting behavior led to higher quality challengers. Again, the magnitude of the coefficient for white members is markedly higher than for other members.
The regression estimates for the quality candidate emergence in 1996 are presented in Table 6.4. Model 6.4 (a) includes 238 incumbent House members who faced a challenger in 1996. Model 6.4 (b) is based on 214 white incumbent House members who were challenged in 1996. The number of cases also reflects the inclusion of the variable comparing roll-call voting behavior from 1991 to 1996 (responsiveness), which further reduces the sample size.

In the 1996 congressional election, the most important explanatory variable appears to be the incumbent's margin of victory in the previous election. The coefficient has a negative sign, indicating that the lower the incumbent's margin of victory, the higher the quality of the challenger. This is as would be expected.

Second, the coefficient measuring the district level presidential vote does not attain significance. The coefficient for this variable is multiplied by \(-1\) for Republican incumbents, and \(1\) for Democratic incumbents. In 1996, the expectation is that for Republican House members, as the district level (democratic) presidential vote increases, the quality of the challenger would increase. This however, does not appear to be the case, and the coefficient is not in the expected direction.

Third, similar to the results reported in 1994, the fact that an incumbent House member is of the same party as the president does not seem to have an effect on candidate emergence. The coefficient remains positive, which is not the expected result in 1996.

Fourth, the fact that a state experienced race-based redistricting in the 1990s does not impact whether quality challengers emerge in House elections. In other words, congressional races in those states that underwent race-based redistricting were no more
Table 6.4: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All House Members</th>
<th>White House Members Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4a)</td>
<td>(4b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Margin of Victory 1994</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-2.443***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Level Presidential Vote 1996</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of President's Party</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race-Based Redistricted State</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>-0.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to Racial Changes</td>
<td>1.534</td>
<td>0.902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cut 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cut 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudo R²</th>
<th>Log Likelihood</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>-109.267</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>-99.629</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
likely to have an increased number of higher quality challengers than states that did not experience race-based redistricting.

The contention made is that the race-based redistricting seemingly caused such uncertainty in the congressional district plans and congressional elections in the affected states. Because of the upheaval, prospective candidates would view the incumbents as more vulnerable due to possible shifts in their district composition. This however, does not prove to be the case. Thus the fact that a state underwent race-based redistricting does not appear to have a direct impact on the emergence of higher quality challengers.

Fifth, in the 1996 model, the responsiveness variable drops out. In the 1996 election, House members who did not adequately represent the racial changes in their district were not met higher quality challengers than other House members. Thus, it appears that the 1996 election was too far removed from the 1990s race-based redistricting and the constituency changes that occurred as a result. Prospective candidates did not hold the incumbent accountable for a lack of responsiveness that occurred directly after race-based redistricting.

Table 6.4 (b) reports the findings for the model focusing on white incumbent House members. The model yields similar results, with incumbent margin of victory being the only variable to attain statistical significance. In this model as in the model including all members, the responsiveness variable no longer achieves significance. White House members are also not met with quality challengers based on their responsiveness to changes occurring in their district composition in the early 1990s.
In Model 6.5, a variable indicating the party of the challenger is included. The results are presented for all House members in Table 6.5 (a), and for white House members only in Table 6.5 (b).

According to this model, in the 1996 House elections, the coefficient for the variable measuring incumbent margin of victory in the previous election attains statistical significance. All other variables fail to achieve significance. These results carry through to the white members only model as well. An important observation is that in 1996, quality challengers are no more apt to identify with the Republican Party. This suggests that there is not a long-term relationship between challengers identifying with the Republican Party and having more political experience. This effect is only observed directly after redistricting suggesting that it is the likely result of the race-based redistricting.

Regression Estimates for Quality Challenger Emergence 1994 – South Only

I have also constructed a model focusing exclusively on the southern states in order to determine whether the results discussed above can be observed when examining the southern states alone. A model focusing on the South is important because, through this analysis, we begin to understand what impact occurrences unique to the South have on candidate emergence. In particular, we recognize that race-based redistricting was largely limited to the South. It is important to ascertain whether the variables included in the models above, based on all states, have different or exaggerated effects. If, in fact, the effects of key variables are stronger in the South, there is evidence that race-based redistricting may have been influential in the emergence of more quality challengers.
Table 6.5: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Alternative Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All House Members</th>
<th>White House Members Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5a)</td>
<td>(5b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Margin of Victory 1994</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-3.112***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Level Presidential Vote 1996</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race-Based Redistricted State</td>
<td>-0.264</td>
<td>-0.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger Party</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>1.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to Racial Changes</td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>0.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>1.352</td>
<td>0.974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td>5.349</td>
<td>1.386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-108.969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>238</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
Model 6.6 includes all House members in the South who were met with a challenger in 1994 (N = 64). The models concentrating on the South generate interesting results.

In Model 6.6 (a), the margin of victory of the incumbent does not seem to be an important factor in determining whether a quality challenger emerges in the 1994 election. This is an important finding considering the effect of this variable in the full models analyzed above. The incumbent margin of victory is the most important determinant of challenger quality emergence above, but in the South this effect drops out completely. Some other phenomenon must be driving prospective candidates’ decisions in the South in 1994.

The variable measuring district level presidential vote in 1992 falls short of attaining significance. In fact, if a one-tailed test is applied, this variable does attain significance. However, because the coefficient carries an unexpected positive sign, a two-tailed test must be applied.

The fact that an incumbent House member identifies with the same party as the president does not appear to have a discernible effect.

Last, the coefficient for the variable measuring the effect of responsiveness is positive and significant in the South model. Those members in the South who were not responsive to the racial composition changes in their district were met with high quality challengers. Notably, the magnitude of this variable (20.074) takes a huge leap from the magnitude (4.596) reported in results presented in Table 6.2 (a).

This finding indicates that incumbent House members in the South who were unresponsive to constituency changes that occurred after the 1990s redistricting were much more likely to be faced with quality challengers than their non-South counterparts.
Table 6.6: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1994 for South Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline (6a)</th>
<th>Alternative (6b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Margin of Victory 1992</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-0.740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Level Presidential Vote 1994</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>1.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of President's Party</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger Party</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to Racial Changes</td>
<td>20.074</td>
<td>2.225**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cut 1  
Cut 2  
Pseudo $R^2$  
Log Likelihood  
N  

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test  
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test  
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
This suggests an increased awareness on the part of prospective candidates in the South to analyze incumbents’ voting records in relation to the 1990s redistricting.

In Model 6.6 (b), a variable identifying the challengers’ party is included in the analysis. Again the only variable attaining statistical significance is the responsiveness variable. Interestingly, the party of the challenger, which attained significance in the full model, is not significant in the South only model. Republican challengers do not seem to be the quality challengers in the South that they seem to be in the non-South in 1994.

**Regression Estimates for Quality Candidate Emergence 1996 – South Only**

Model 6.7 includes all House members in the South who were met with a challenger in 1996 (N = 66). In Model 6.7 (a), as well as 6.7 (b), which includes the party of the challenger, the variable measuring incumbent House members’ responsiveness to constituency changes does not attain significance. As in the full model, in the South, House members’ roll-call voting behavior is taken into account directly after redistricting, but not several years after redistricting.

In Models 6.7 (a) and 6.7 (b), no variable achieves significance. This is an unexpected finding. It seems plausible that the effect of incumbent House members’ unresponsiveness to constituency changes may have overshadowed the effect of the incumbent margin of victory variable. However, once the effect of the responsiveness variable drops out, it would seem likely that the incumbency margin of victory would emerge as a significant factor in determining candidate emergence.

**Discussion**

Note that the models explain a relatively small amount of the variance. The Pseudo $R^2$ ranges from .05 to .34. The level of performance of these models is
Table 6.7: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1996 for South Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline (7a)</th>
<th>Alternative (7b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Margin of Victory 1994</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Level Presidential Vote 1996</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of President’s Party</td>
<td>1.187</td>
<td>0.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger Party</td>
<td>.....</td>
<td>.....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to Racial Changes</td>
<td>-2.005</td>
<td>-0.493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>2.138</td>
<td>2.180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R²: 0.113 0.066
N: 66 66

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
commensurate with other similar studies on challenger quality (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Squire 1989). As Bond et al. explain, there are several "personal and idiosyncratic" factors that prospective candidates consider that are unquantifiable. In addition, several national forces that impact decisions to run for office are excluded from the analysis due to the nature of the analysis and its focus on local forces. Due to the low explanatory power of the models, these findings cannot be considered definitive. Having said this, the analyses manage to yield several significant findings which do have explanatory worth.

The analyses have been divided into three separate groups in this chapter. I have examined the effect of several variables on candidate emergence in congressional races that included all incumbent House members, white incumbent House members only, and southern incumbent House members only. The analyses yield different results and these differences are interesting and noteworthy.

First of all, in the 1994 baseline model (Model 6.2), it is apparent that incumbent House members who were not responsive to the racial changes that occurred in their constituency attracted higher quality challengers. Presumably, the prospective candidates made themselves aware of the altered composition of the district, the House members roll-call voting behavior, and/or the incumbent House members' party identification when deciding whether to run for office. In addition, those challengers who identified themselves as Republicans were more likely to be the quality challengers in 1994, or in other words, Democratic incumbents were faced with stronger challengers in 1994.

However, in 1996, quality House candidates did not emerge at a higher rate in congressional races against House incumbents who were unresponsive to racial
composition changes in their district. In effect, prospective challengers in 1994 were aware of district level factors that were affected by the 1990s redistricting. In 1994, those strategic politicians chose to compete for office in districts where the House member did not change their roll-call voting behavior to reflect the changed constituency composition. Those truly strategic challengers attempted to take immediate advantage of the upheaval that the 1990s redistricting caused.

The models focusing on white House members yields basically the same results, with the only difference being that the magnitude of the coefficient for the House members' responsiveness to district constituency change. White incumbent House members who were not responsive to racial changes in their constituency were more likely to face a formidable challenger in 1994.

More important for the purpose of this dissertation is the impact of the independent variables on candidate emergence in the South. If the analysis of the South yielded similar findings to the full model, then conclusions can be drawn about the impact of the 1990s race-based redistricting on Republican, conservative candidate emergence. However, the analysis focusing on the South yields different results.

First, the incumbent margin of victory in the previous election does not attain statistical significance in any of the South models. Essentially, safe incumbents in 1994 are equally likely to face a strong challenge in 1996, as those incumbents winning by small margins in 1994. This finding is perplexing considering the importance of this variable in the full model.

It is possible that the effect of lack of responsiveness overshadows all other factors. Incumbent House members in the South were held accountable for their...
ideological discrepancy to a much larger extent than non-South members. Yet, once the
effect of responsiveness drops out in the 1996 models, the incumbent margin of victory
variable does not become significant.

Also interesting is the fact that the variable identifying challenger party does not
attain significance in any of the South models. This indicates that the emergence of
quality challengers in the South is not associated with the party identification of the
challenger. In the full model, the Republican challengers were the more quality
challengers. In the South model, this does not appear to be the case.

This finding brings into question the contention that the race-based redistricting
which occurred in the southern states in the 1990s influenced the partisan makeup in the
House of Representatives. In fact, there does not appear to be any evidence to suggest
that the South gave rise to increased numbers of quality Republican challengers. Thus, it
appears that the southern states did not play an exaggerated role in the Republican
takeover of Congress in the 1990s.

RE-SPECIFIED MODELS

Models Using ADA Scores

Identical analyses are conducted using ADA scores. The models yield somewhat
similar results in 1994, but there are notable differences in the analysis. The results for
the ADA analyses are presented in Table 6.8 and 6.9.

As in the baseline model using Poole and Rosenthal, previous incumbent margin
of victory and ideological discrepancy are the two statistically significant factors in the
model. However, once the variable identifying challenger party is included in the model,
the responsiveness variable loses significance. Yet, the challenger party variable
Table 6.8: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality 1994 Using ADA Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline (8a)</th>
<th>Alternative (8b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Margin of Victory 1992</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-2.326***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Level Presidential Vote 1994</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of President's Party</td>
<td>-0.157</td>
<td>-0.529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger Party</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race-Based Redistricted State</td>
<td>-0.390</td>
<td>-0.650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to Racial Changes</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>1.420*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>1.162</td>
<td>1.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td>2.938</td>
<td>1.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-75.606</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test  
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test  
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
Table 6.9: Parameter Values for Ordered Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1996 Using ADA Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Baseline (9a)</th>
<th>Alternative (9b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Margin of Victory 1994</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>2.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Level Presidential Vote 1996</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of President’s Party</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger Party</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race-Based Redistricted State</td>
<td>-0.277</td>
<td>0.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to Racial Changes</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>2.016**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>1.346</td>
<td>0.951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td>5.378</td>
<td>1.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-107.788</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>239</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test  
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test  
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
achieves significance. The coefficient is negative, suggesting as in the Poole and Rosenthal model that the Republican challengers were the higher quality challengers.

Also, of interest is the fact that the responsiveness variable maintains significance from 1994 to 1996. In all other models, this variable drops out in 1996. I assert that the effect of the responsiveness variable drops out in 1996 because the attention to certain district level factors has waned. The different results speak to the phenomenon that each measure represents. Because ADA scores include the more extreme votes, discrepancy from expected ADA scores is magnified. Also, because of the small number of votes used in the ADA scores compared to the Poole and Rosenthal scores, not voting as expected on three out of 20 votes yields different results than not voting as expected on three out of 125 votes. Thus, the responsiveness variable is a much more extreme variable in the model using ADA scores.

**Model Using Dichotomous Challenger Quality Variable**

In an effort to test the accuracy and utility of the scaled challenger quality variable constructed in this chapter, I test the baseline challenger quality models using a dichotomous challenger quality variable.

Specifically, any incumbent challenger with experience in elective political office is assigned a one. Any incumbent challenger with no experience in elective political office is assigned a zero. Also, the variable measuring responsiveness employs the Poole and Rosenthal scores.

The models presented in Table 6.10 and 6.11 yield identical results to the model using the scaled dependent variable. Furthermore, the model using the scaled dependent
Table 6.10: Parameter Values for Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1994 Using Dichotomous Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline (10a)</th>
<th>Alternative (10b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.624</td>
<td>1.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Margin of Victory 1992</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>2.361***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Level Presidential Vote 1994</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of President’s Party</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger Party</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race-Based Redistricted State</td>
<td>-0.523</td>
<td>-0.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to Racial Changes</td>
<td>4.587</td>
<td>2.134**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-64.038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
Table 6.11: Parameter Values for Logit Models of District Level Challenger Quality in 1996 Using Dichotomous Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline (11a)</th>
<th>Alternative (11b)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.221</td>
<td>1.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Margin of Victory 1994</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-2.466***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Level Presidential Vote 1996</td>
<td>0.005</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of President's Party</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.751</td>
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<tr>
<td>Challenger Party</td>
<td>.....</td>
<td>.....</td>
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<tr>
<td>Race-Based Redistricted State</td>
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<td>-0.485</td>
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<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to Racial Changes</td>
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<td>0.937</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.058</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-104.470</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>238</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at .01 level, one-tailed test
** significant at .05 level, one-tailed test
* significant at .10 level, one-tailed test
variable does not seem to have a greater explanatory value than the simple dichotomous variable suggested by Jacobson (1983).

**CONCLUSION**

The task to be accomplished in this chapter was to determine what effect the 1990s race-based redistricting had on the emergence of strong Republican candidates in the 1994 and 1996 House elections.

In the model that includes all House members, Republican candidates prove to be the higher quality candidates in 1994. Conversely, this effect is not maintained in the model that includes only southern House members. Therefore, in 1994, Democratic incumbents in the South do not draw stronger challengers than their southern Republican incumbents.

Also, a variable identifying states that had experienced race-based redistricting was also included in the Poole and Rosenthal models for all House members. This variable does not attain significance in any model. Thus, states that underwent redistricting were no more likely than other states to attract more quality challengers.

Further, quality challengers did emerge in districts where the House member was not responsive to the racial changes in the district. However, this is not a phenomenon limited to the South. In the 1994 model including all members and the model including Southern members only, incumbent members were held accountable in for not voting the interests of their district. For the purposes of this analysis, the prospective challenger, and not the voter, renders accountability.
Another interesting finding deals with the analyses that focus on white incumbent House members. It appears that white House members are held to a higher standard when it comes to representing changes in the black constituency. The results in this chapter show that white House members are much more likely to face a quality challenger if they do not adequately change their roll-call voting behavior to reflect racial composition changes.

A possible explanation for this effect is that because blacks are considered a liberal voting bloc, losing or gaining a substantial number of blacks should inevitably lead to a marked shift in roll-call voting behavior. In many instances, the white House member may not be willing to make the extreme shift necessary to please the new constituency. Recognizing this dilemma, quality challengers will emerge, whether or not they are aware of the white incumbents' voting record.

Another possible explanation is that black House members are difficult to defeat once they have won a congressional seat (Swain 1993). Recognizing this, strategic politicians will not waste their time analyzing the roll-call voting behavior of black House members. Prospective challengers realize that, even if the incumbent black House member is not responsive to racial composition changes, he or she will still likely experience electoral success.

To summarize, this chapter does not offer support for the contention that the loss of a substantial number of Democratic House seats can be attributed to the creation of majority-black districts.
It appears that the success the Republicans experienced in the House elections in 1994 and 1996, was a nationwide phenomenon that was in no way magnified in the southern states where race-based redistricting occurred.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Between 1980 and 1990, the laws regulating redistricting changed drastically in favor of minority representation. The change began with the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and continued with the 1986 Supreme Court Case, *Thornburg v. Gingles*, which was widely interpreted to mean that states should create majority-minority districts whenever possible. The positive change ended after the 1990s redistricting and the effort by many states and the Justice Department to comply with the Supreme Court directive.

The desired goal was the elimination of discrimination based on mainly on race or ethnicity in the electoral system. The Court and the Justice Department could claim victory. As stated in Chapter 1, there was a marked increase in the number of victorious minority representatives in the 1992 House of Representatives’ elections compared to previous elections.

However, there were also unintended consequences that occurred due to the race-based redistricting. In particular, many critics have questioned the role that the creation of majority-black districts played on the increased conservatism in the House. In this dissertation I examine two factors in an effort to determine whether the effects of the 1990s race-based redistricting have continued throughout the 1990s, and what effect the redistricting has had on the overall representation of blacks at the congressional level. In essence, has the formation of majority-black districts inadvertently led to a more conservative Congress in both its roll-call voting behavior and its partisan makeup?
ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR

The first effect of race-based redistricting examined is roll-call voting behavior. Directly after redistricting, House members appeared to change their roll-call voting behavior in response to changes in the black population of their constituency (Lublin 1997; Sharpe and Garand 1994, unpublished; Overby and Cosgrove 1996). As the black population in a district decreased due to redistricting, the House member’s roll-call voting behavior becomes more conservative. However, in 1995 and 1996, House members no longer appear to respond to the changes that occurred in the early 1990s. Instead, they are concerned with the actual level of black population of their constituency. According to the findings in Chapter 5, white House members are “responsive” to the level of black population in their district, but there is an inverse relationship. As the number of black constituents increased in 1995 and 1996, white House members become more conservative in their roll-call voting behavior.

This finding is interesting considering the assumptions made in the dissertation. According to rational actor theory, an incumbent House member interested in reelection is expected to vote in a manner that is representative of the ideologies and preferences of their constituency. The theory that white House members lose portions of their black population due to race-based redistricting, and that the loss is reflected in more conservative roll-call voting, is based on the premise that House members’ roll-call voting behavior reflects the interests of their constituency in the first place.

Rational House members reacting to the loss of portions of their black constituency due to redistricting became more conservative in their roll-call voting behavior.
behavior directly after redistricting. Yet, it is questionable whether they exhibit rational behavior in subsequent years.

The implications of these findings are complicated. House members responded to the racial composition changes in 1993 by becoming more conservative. So, in 1995 and 1996, House members are already more conservative than they were before redistricting. This is damaging to the representation of black interests. But further, it appears that House members become increasingly conservative as the black population level in their district grows.

Considering the findings, I offer two divergent explanations. First, one may claim that it is impossible to deduce what ongoing effect the 1990s race-based redistricting has had on the increased conservatism in the House, when it appears that white House members' in 1995 and 1996 disregard the interests of their black constituency. This indicates a tendency toward conservatism in the mid-1990s that is not related to the size of the black constituency, and thus is not a delayed effect of race-based redistricting.

On the other hand, one could make the argument that this seeming lack of consideration for the interests of the black constituency is in fact a delayed effect of the 1990s race-based redistricting. As stated above, majority-black districts were created by transferring portions of black population from one district to another. It is plausible that the loss in black population was large enough to justify the lack of responsiveness. In other words, the black population in the “bleached” districts is so marginal, that there is no need for the House member to consider it in his decision calculus. Thus, as the findings indicate, the larger the black population, the more conservative the House members' roll-call voting behavior. In fact, the level of black population may no longer
be large enough to warrant electoral concern on the part of the incumbent House member. Further analysis is needed to determine what impact the lower levels of black population have on the House members' roll-call voting behavior. However, this may suggest that House members are actually acting rationally by voting the interests of their reelection constituency.

CANDIDATE EMERGENCE

The second factor examined is candidate emergence. In the 1994 and 1996 House elections, the higher quality candidates were more likely to be Republican. This is true however, only when considering all House challenges. When focusing exclusively on the South, there does not seem to be a similar pattern. In fact, in the South, there is no relationship between challengers' party and the quality of challengers.

Borrowing from strategic politician theory once again, this suggests that there were some national forces (e.g., Democratic president, midterm election) at work. Considering national forces that indicated a shift in the partisan tides, it seems that high quality Republican candidates ran for House seats throughout the nation.

The focus on local forces in the South does not yield the same conclusion that prospective candidates are behaving strategically or rationally.

The "bleached" districts, which formed as a result of the creation of majority-black districts in the South, did not attract more experienced and qualified Republican candidates. This finding counters the contention made by Bullock (1995) that the creation of majority-black districts indirectly leads to higher quality Republican challengers.
Another important point to be made is that House members’ who are unresponsive to the changes in their racial composition are held accountable in subsequent elections. In the context of this study the electorate does not hold them accountable, but rather the prospective challenger holds them accountable. House incumbents who were not responsive to redistricting induced changes in the racial composition of their district were more likely to face high quality challengers in 1994. This relationship is observed when examining the entire country as well as when focusing exclusively on the southern region.

Again, this is in keeping with the strategic politician theory. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the potential challengers may pay close attention to the roll-call voting behavior of the incumbents in an effort to observe whether their behavior has changed as to match constituency changes. This finding offers evidence that the prospective challenger recognized the lack of responsiveness on the part of the incumbent as an opportunity to defeat the incumbent.

To summarize, the findings in this dissertation indicate that the immediate effect of the race-based redistricting of the 1990s was more conservative roll-call voting behavior among white incumbent House members. However, the ongoing or delayed effects of the redistricting that can be considered responsible for the continued increased conservatism in the House, in terms of roll-call voting behavior or partisan membership are questionable at most, and nonexistent at the least.

These findings challenge the validity of the contention that majority-black districts, created to enhance black representation, actually jeopardize black representation at the congressional level. The contention is rooted in the debate over substantive versus
descriptive representation that is discussed in Chapter 2. The findings present an interesting dilemma. It does not appear that the creation of majority-black districts has a long term negative impact on black substantive representation. If this is the case then the loss of majority-black districts will only impair the effectiveness of black representation at the congressional level.

In fact, it is very difficult to determine what part the creation of majority-black districts played in the conservatism that has swept the nation in the 1990s. Were there more powerful forces at work? Did the timing of the court-ordered redistricting unjustly implicate the majority-black district? These questions are difficult to answer. However, two important factors must be considered. First of all, the creation of majority-black districts coincided with the election of the first Democratic president in 12 years. The significance of this relates to the argument over divided government and split-ticket voting. If we accept Fiorina's (1992) contention that voters purposely divide their vote, then it would follow that the election of a Democratic president would be accompanied by the election of a Republican congress. Explaining why this effect was not immediate is outside of the scope of this dissertation. However, although Republicans did not win control of the House in 1992, they have maintained control since their takeover in 1994.

The fact that the increase in conservative voting and quality Republican candidate emergence was not limited to the South lends credence to the proposition that the increased conservatism had less to do with the creation of majority-black districts and more to do with an unrelated national trend. It is also important to note that the Senate, unaffected by the race-based redistricting of the 1990s, also came under Republican control in 1994.
The second factor that must be considered is the realignment in the South. The South remained a one-party system from shortly after Reconstruction to the 1990s. For approximately 100 years, southern politics has been dominated by the Democratic Party. Throughout the 1990s we began to witness a shift in the electoral base of the Republican Party in the South. Many conservative Democrats no longer accept the stigma attached to the Republican Party from the Civil War and Reconstruction period. In fact, several conservative southern House members who identified with the Democratic Party largely for electoral purposes switched their affiliation to the Republican Party in the 1990s. Large portions of the southern white electorate that identified with the Democratic Party also began to switch their party affiliation. It is important to recognize that both the public officials and the white voters did not change their political ideology or philosophy. They simply changed the party that they identified with. Thus, the rise in Republicanism was seen throughout the South. As Kevin Hill (1995:400) illustrates, Republicans in the South “... gained seats in both districts losing blacks and those relatively unaffected by racial redistricting. ...” Again it is difficult to determine what aspect of the increased Republicanism can be attributed directly and exclusively to the creation of majority-black districts.

According to the findings in this dissertation, descriptive representation does seem to negatively impact substantive representation directly after race-based redistricting. But this relationship does not continue throughout the 1990s. In other words, the increase in the number of black House members in the 1990s, does not appear to have a direct impact on the continued conservatism in the House in the 1990s.
What does this mean for black representation as we head into the year 2000? Through the issuance of several decisions in the 1990s, the Supreme Court solidified its position on the creation of majority-minority districts. By the 1996 House elections, many of the majority-black districts were dismantled. With this being the case, however, most of the districts still remained overwhelmingly minority. All black incumbent House members who ran for reelection in 1996 were successful. However, in the year 2000, a new round of redistricting will begin. The question then becomes: what impact will the 2000 redistricting process have on the descriptive representation of blacks? Without the federal directive to create majority-minority districts, the fate of the black Representative is again largely at the mercy of the individual state. Of course there are safeguards in place, including the 1982 Voting Rights Amendments, that will ensure that the redistricting process does not revert back to that of the 1970s and 1980s. However, it is very likely that the numbers of black House members will drop, but will substantive black representation suffer?

There have been many arguments made explaining how blacks will achieve power at the congressional level after the 2000 redistricting.

First of all, it is possible that, as observed in the 1996 congressional elections, black incumbent House members will enjoy some level of incumbency advantage. Based on several Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s, majority-minority districts were dismantled, and new districts were drawn in time for the 1996 congressional elections. All but one of the formerly majority-black districts had a large enough proportion of blacks to ensure the reelection of the black incumbent. It is possible that several of the
districts created in 2000 will retain a large enough black population that, while not a majorit, will still ensure the reelection of some of the black incumbent House members.

Incumbents have several opportunities to strengthen their chances of electoral success. Incumbents enjoy advantages over challengers because of their name recognition, ability to address constituency concerns, and their franking, or free mailing privileges, to name a few. When reelection is the primary goal, incumbents will act in a manner that maximizes these advantages. Black incumbent House members whose districts are in jeopardy pending the results of the 2000 redistricting, can begin preparing themselves for the changes that may occur. In particular, the most important factor in incumbency advantage is pleasing the constituency. Recognizing that a shift in constituency is possible, these House members can heighten their focus on pleasing and servicing as many constituents as possible. Anticipating these changes, the black incumbents can attempt to do everything in their power to position themselves to be recognized as hardworking and productive incumbent House members. This may dampen claims that they are black incumbent House members only in office due to court ordered redistricting and only concerned with the interests of the black portion of the constituency.

This first argument assumes of course that the 2000 redistricting does not completely overhaul current redistricting plans. However, there is the very real possibility that this type of descriptive representation will be diminished after the 2000 redistricting.

In the last several years, the Congressional Black Caucus experienced an increased level of influence due to its sheer numbers. With close to 40 black Democrats
in the House, they served as a formidable voting bloc. However, the decrease in numbers that is anticipated after the 2000 redistricting will reduce some aspects of their influence. One area where blacks may possibly exercise increased influence however is in their role as the more senior members in Congress. This argument, proposed by Gerber (1996), is introduced in Chapter 2. With the high rate of turnover in the House in the 1990s, many black incumbents who were elected in the 1970s and 1980s now enjoy a high level of seniority. These black House members are elected in “historically black districts” and experience high levels of voter loyalty (Swain 1993). This voter loyalty translates into continued electoral success for House members from these districts.

An important point to make here is that the senior status of black House members does not yield power and influence when Democrats are the minority party in the House. The only way that the seniority of black House members will benefit the congressional influence and representation of blacks is if the Democratic Party regains control of the House. If one accepts Fiorina’s purposive split-ticket voting theory, black congressional power may be contingent on what political party wins the presidency. Another factor to consider will be to what extent the Republican elected in the 1990s enjoy high levels of incumbency advantage.

After the year 2000, there will be a new challenge to elect black House members. Two factors will influence whether blacks are successful in their bid for House election. The first factor deals explicitly with the electoral system. Will districts be drawn in a manner that will enable or allow the election of black Representative? The second factor focuses on the role of the black population. The size of the black adult population and the black electorate need to be the same. In other words, blacks must be a politically
active and mobilized force in these southern districts where their numbers are high, but not high enough to constitute a majority. Blacks must focus on the factor that is directly in their power to control.

As stated throughout this dissertation, reelection is the primary goal of incumbent House members. Thus, House members respond to that part of their constituency that they consider their reelection constituency, regardless of race. If blacks prove to be an important and influential voting bloc, white House members will respond to that power. As Swain maintained in 1993, before, the fate of the majority-minority district was revealed, blacks must be a politically active and vocal force in congressional politics.

Considering the sequence of events leading up to the 1990s redistricting, it is unlikely that the redistricting process will revert back to the way it was before the passage of the 1982 Voting Rights Amendments. After all, the racial gerrymandering of the past is still considered a violation of the law. With this said, it is possible that in place of the district plan that effectively dispersed the black population throughout the state, there will be several districts that have at least 40% black population. These “minority influence” districts can serve as an important tool for obtaining influencing politics at the congressional level.

There is no doubt that the Supreme Court has not heard the last of this debate. However, the current membership of the Court has made their position on the topic of majority-minority districts clear. Thus, although there will continue to be litigation on this topic in the future, blacks must decide what they can do currently do combat the negative consequences of the Courts’ 1990s decisions.
Now more than ever, prospective black House candidates in the South, must consider a strategy of deracialized politics. Black candidates who employ such a strategy de-emphasize race in an effort to win the support of white members of the electorate. Again, in districts that have a sizable black population, black candidates may attempt to broaden their electoral base slightly by focusing on issues that affect lower class citizens of all races for instance. Douglas Wilder’s successful bid for Virginia governor in 1989 has largely been attributed to his pro-choice stand during a time when abortion issues were at the center of many Virginians’ attention.

The application of deracialized strategy conflicts with the goal of substantive representation. In particular, if black candidates are concerning themselves with issues that affect the white majority in their district, descriptive representation may be achieved, but substantive representation of black interests is not achieved.

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation I contend that there is a direct and indirect relationship between the creation of majority-black districts and increased conservatism in the House. The direct relationship focuses on the roll-call voting behavior of the House member. The indirect relationship focuses on the partisan makeup of the House. The theory supporting this contention is that incumbent House members as well as prospective House candidates are rational actors whose goal is electoral success. Thus, their actions will maximize their chances of achieving this goal.

There does seem to be evidence that incumbent House members as well as prospective House candidates are rational actors. Incumbent House members act rationally in 1993 and 1994 when they change their roll-call voting behavior to better
reflect their altered constituency. However, they do not act rationally in the mid-1990s when their roll-call voting behavior fails to reflect the level of the black population in their district.

Prospective House candidates also act rationally when they run for election in districts in which incumbent House members may be vulnerable because they have not been responsive to the racial changes that occurred in their district. There is also evidence that prospective house members did not take advantage of the possible added vulnerability of incumbent House members in the South affected by race-based redistricting.

Although there is evidence to support rational actor theory, the evidence is mixed on whether incumbent House members and prospective House candidates, acting strategically, increased the conservatism in the U.S. House of Representatives in the 1990s. The 1990s redistricting does represent a dynamic process, with the effects still being felt. With this in mind, we begin to prepare for a new round of redistricting.

In anticipation of the 2000 redistricting process, scholars and political pundits have begun to speculate on what impact the 2000 plans will have on the partisan and racial composition of the House of Representatives. The expectation is that the descriptive representation of blacks will decrease. Many civil rights activists claim that descriptive and substantive black representation is inseparable. If one accepts this contention, overall black representation will be jeopardized.

If one believes that even with the expected changes blacks will continue to exert influence in the House of Representatives, the question then becomes how much influence will they have and through what avenue?
In 1949 V. O. Key proclaimed that southern politics was dominated by race. The predominant role of race was due to the fact that the South was composed of a large black population and a prejudice white population that continually constructed obstacles toward black advancement and enfranchisement. Arguably, race still dominates politics in the South. In the 1990s the most dramatic aspect of the redistricting process was the creation of majority-minority districts. Now as we brace ourselves for the new millennium, fifty years after Key (1949) made his profound statement, issues of race continue to dominate the redistricting process in the South.
REFERENCES


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VITA

Christine LeVeaux Sharpe received her bachelor of arts degree in Political Science in 1992 from Spelman College in Atlanta, Georgia. She began her graduate study in Political Science at Louisiana State University in August of the same year. After earning her master of arts degree in 1994, she pursued her doctorate also at Louisiana State University. Christine's major field of study is American Politics. Within American Politics, she has concentrated on the areas of Legislative Politics and Black Politics. Her second field is Comparative Politics, and her third field is Public Administration.

Christine's scholarly research has centered on Legislative Politics, Black Politics or a combination of the two. Christine has submitted several research projects to scholarly journals. She has two co-authored projects that are currently being revised and will be resubmitted to the Journal of Politics and the Political Research Quarterly. Christine is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor at Southern University. Classes under her direction include Advance Seminar in American Politics, Readings in American Politics, Black Politics and Louisiana Politics.

Christine will obtain her degree of doctor of philosophy in May of 1998. She has accepted a position at the University of Houston where she will have a joint appointment with the Department of Political Science and The Honors College. She will begin teaching in the Fall of 1998.
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: Christine LeVeaux Sharpe

Major Field: Political Science

Title of Dissertation: CONTINUED CONSEQUENCES OF RACE-BASED REDISTRICTING: AN ANALYSIS OF INCUMBENT ROLL-CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR AND CANDIDATE EMERGENCE IN THE 1990S

Approved: [Signature]

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signatures]

Date of Examination: April 3, 1998