Education, Faith and the Critique of Reason.

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EDUCATION, FAITH AND THE CRITIQUE OF REASON

A Dissertation

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As I went through the wild waste of this world, I came to a place where there was a den, and I lay down in it to sleep. While I slept, I had a dream, and lo! I saw a man whose clothes were in rags, and he stood with his face from his own house, with a book in his hand, and a great load on his back. I saw him read from the leaves of a book, and as he read, he wept and shook with fear—then he let out a loud cry, and said, "What shall I do to save my soul?" .... Now he had not gone far from this own door, when [those] who saw him, gave out a loud wail to beg of him to come back; but the man put his hands to his ears, and ran on with a cry of "Life! Life!" (Bunyan, 1678/1939, pp 1-3)

This passage from that classic novel by John Bunyan, Pilgrim's Progress, is amazingly descriptive of the posture within which I began the course of study that culminated in the present work. Indeed I have been as the man who slept and dreamed this dream, and as the man in rags, in fear and trembling, burdened and crying out for my soul and for life. In a very real way, this work is a result of the journey borne from this plight: a testimony of my own "progress" from "darkness to light, from servitude to redemption"; and the diary of my own education, encounter with reason and trial of faith—not to mention my dreams of deliverance and life. And through it, in a sense, my soul has been saved and I have found life anew.

Yet, while the quest has been my own, while it has been a solitary one, I have not truly made it alone, and had not persevered in it and penned this record were it not for the help of a host of others. To this day, I write and I teach because I believe in and have known the transformative and regenerative power of the word. For in this journey, I have found comfort, guidance, encouragement, wisdom and light in the leaves of many a book and in the books of many a life to whom I owe a debt of gratitude beyond
expression. To speak of these "many" who have been so beautifully with me and for me-and of their gifts to me—is difficult because, as Bunyan's pilgrim has so clearly put it, "I can find them with my heart, though I know not how to speak of them with my tongue" (p. 7). With all my heart, though, I shall try to speak of them and acknowledge them here, well aware that any expression I give will fall painfully short.

To my committee I am most grateful, for they kept faith when I seemingly had none: Dr. William Doll, my major advisor, beloved mentor and personal Evangelist, who led me first to the "scroll," lighted my way to the Wicket Gate, upheld me in times of doubt, and reminded me continually to "hope all things"; Dr. Dwayne Huebner, whose words of wisdom have many a time quenched my thirsty soul, whose careful critique has kept me from the Land of Vainglory, and whose silent presence has been as instrumental in directing me to the blessed Room Peace; Dr. Pinar, who, having first invited me to Interpreter's House, has faithfully steered me from Ignorance with kindness and grace and challenged me to press for deeper understanding; Dr. Petra Munro, who has enriched my journey by ever opening my eyes to new vistas and adventures, who with Prudence and Discretion has tenderly shown me that to which I have been blind, and who has been a friend through thick and thin; Dr. Ann Trousdale, who has done and been the same, dear Hopeful, who with Charity has cautioned me against the snares of Mr. Heady and prompted me to return always to the Spring of Life; Dr. Denise Egéa-Kuehne, my Good-Will, whose example and support have been an inspiration to me; and Dr. Bainard Cowan, a guide to the Delectable Mountains of the Western tradition,
whose keen commentary has directed me away from Mr. High-Mind, and an ever-present source of encouragement and comfort.

To all my family, I owe enormous thanks, especially my parents Louis and Jane Quinn, for their unfailing love and devotion and faith; my niece, Marcie Lemieux, for reminding me always of the joy of life and of the wisdom of play; and Jim Rhorer, who has done likewise, and has bore with me through much and helped me slay the Giant Despair. I have been surrounded, as well, with "so great a cloud of witnesses," dear friends who have stood with and for me to whom I owe tribute: Doug McKnight, Steve Triche and Jeff Gagne, fellow-sojourners who have read, critiqued and celebrated my work, and upheld me in every hour and frame; Vicki Hillis, Anne Pautz, Elaine Riley, Peggy McConnell, Al Alcazar, Natalie Adams, Kim Vannest, and John St. Julien, who have laughed with me, cried with me, intellectualized with me, and enriched my life with their presence; Sundar, who has been an ever-present source of support, technical and otherwise; and Brendan McGuckin, whose friendship this past year has sustained me.

As a pilgrim unfortunately given to melancholy, there are those souls to whom I must extend deepest appreciation as they have succoured and strengthened me through many dark times: Lysah Kemper, who as the truest of friends has taken each step with me up the Hill of Difficulty, ever cheerful, ever encouraging; Martha Self, my guardian angel and Help, who has with great patience and care walked with me through the Valley of the Shadow of Death and lighted the way to the Celestial Gate; Cathy Green, who has rescued me on numerous occasions from Doubting Castle; and Harleigh Jones, my Faithful, who with big ear and heart has listened and dragged me more than once from
the Slough of Despond. Dr. Hayes and Dr. Baker, too, have helped me find my way out of the Vale of Humiliation; and Janice Goodloe, Marti Wilson and Deborah Lee have been faithful to remind me that to care for my body is also to attend to my soul. I cannot forget to acknowledge, as well, those who reside in the Great House Beautiful, the coffee house—beautiful because, in joy and peace, I was able to write there: Dan Stigall, Meg Jones, Rhonda and all the "Cave-Dwellers," whose daily warmth and kindness to me and faithfulness to their own studies inspired me to press on; Natalie, John, Angie, Marge and all the "Counter Crew," who have kept me well fed, well caffeinated, and let me set up my office there; and Carla Kriner, David Lewis, Douglas Bourgeois and Hampton Peele, kindred spirits, ever before me with a smile and an encouraging word.

I have known the grace and mercy of God, divine love, indeed through these dear souls, and untold others who I can only hope will forgive this frail memory that so often fails me. Were I not inclined to such grand and lofty prose, to waxing overly poetic, I should but say it affectionately after this manner: Many thanks to all of you; the achievement is not mine, it belongs to us all; the victory, not mine, but ours. Let us rejoice.

The Pilgrim
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ABSTRACT

The world situation, and life, in the contemporary West, since the rise of modernity, has been described most frequently as one of crisis, marked by a breakdown of life's intelligibility. It is the aftermath of the "death of God," the disappearance of humanity's relationship to a transcendent reality which historically has served as the center of meaning, effecting what has been called the world's disenchantment or the life-world's despiritualization, marked by a loss of soul. This process has involved a reduction of what constitutes the cosmos and human existence in it. In addition, reason, believed in as humanity's guiding principle, has become reduced to a tool in the service of technical society. The "soul" of reason, grounded in the question of the good, has been lost, in this way, followed by a growing indictment against reason itself as the source of contemporary woes.

The intent of this study is to explore this crisis of Western culture, particularly to identify and investigate its origin and development as the logic or reign of "death" in human consciousness. The aim is to look into the ensuing spiritual crisis: from the "death of God" to the "death" of faith, of the cosmos, of the human subject, and also of reason. Required is an inquiry into the "kernel" of Western Civilization which can be, perhaps, most accurately depicted as the relentless pursuit of reason and an unwavering faith in it as humanity's hope for achieving the knowledge of the good, and the good itself, and the true and beautiful—the legacy of Plato, and Socrates. Such involves an attempt to elucidate the relationship between reason and faith, and their historical
dissociation and antagonism, and also to understand the project of education, as the
guardian of reason and the avenue through which human faith in reason is expressed, and
the crisis in which this project, too, has culminated. Advocated is a reconciliation of
faith and reason, a redemption of the foundational insight from which education in the
West emerged, seemingly lost or forgotten, that the unexamined life is not worth living.
PROLOGUE: GOING OUT, NOT KNOWING WHITHER

By faith Abraham, when he was called to go out ..., went out, not knowing whither he went. (The Holy Bible, 1985, Hebrews 11:8)

It is required of me that I begin this work with an introduction, a beginning by which to bring my reader into the life and purpose of this work. In truth, I grasp for such a beginning, yet find myself unable to find one, or unable to settle upon one among many possible beginnings. The task amounts to rendering an account for what I have said, to granting the reader some insight into the questions and understandings which have led me to say what I have said in the way that I have said it, and even to telling and explaining to the reader what I have in fact actually said in this work. Thus, I begin with Abraham, because like him, I not only presently "go out" not knowing exactly whither, but also I have "gone out" in this work, in my own education, and in my life, because of a certain call, though definitively an uncertain one, shrouded in mystery, not knowing, and not knowing whither I went. This autobiographical confession is, as well, not only significant with regard to the project which I have here taken up, but directly related to it, in fact.

The call of which I speak, for lack of a better language, is the call of faith, of spirit, of the sacred, of the inescapable and essential mystery of life. In a very real sense, it is the call of the universal, of the eternal, and of the divine, as well, and the recognition of its import and place in the particularity, historicity and temporality of human life. For humanity, the being whose very being is at issue and whose existential meaning is care in its temporality (Heidegger, 1927/1962), faith is universal (Derrida, 1994, October 3); in
the words of Paul Tillich (1957), faith is "the state of being ultimately concerned" (p. 1). According to Clement of Alexandria, "faith is the ear of the soul" (cited in Mead, 1989, p. 131). It hears and hearkens, and, more often than not, is compelled to go out not knowing whither. "Faith is the daring of the soul to go farther than it can see" (Clarke, cited in Mead, 1989, p. 131).

Yet faith can be sorely tried and lost, in the sense of having been forgotten or denied, or become idolatrous, perversely directed against life and spirit, the animating principle of life, toward the visible only. In this way, it is possible for humanity, in forgetfulness, to set under erasure even the idea of the invisible, and the very question of ultimacy and concern itself: ideals regarding the good, the true and the beautiful in the life-world not taken for granted or argued over even, but completely buried and entirely unthought. As it is said, "Where there is no vision, the people perish ..." (The Holy Bible, 1985, Proverbs 29:18) because faith is perishing, the imagination and language of vision, "the heart of the mind" (Anonymous, cited in Mead, 1989, p. 129).

This dire possibility is that which my soul has heard, an actuality practically, in fact, in the Western world, to which my soul has been summoned to respond. By whatever description—"the disenchantment of the world," in the words of Max Weber; the "despiritualization" of the life-world and of human existence, in the thought of Joel Kovel—the consciousness which pervades and prevails in the West today is secular consciousness—our knowledge of ourselves, of the world, of life and human existence nearly void of any notions of the sacred or transcendent. While this situation may be viewed as admirable in these post-Nietzschean times, and a mark of human progress,
enlightenment and liberation, it seems that, in our attempts to gain this world, we have, in the process, lost our souls.

Tillich (1988b) describes our world situation, our historically constitutive interpretation of existence, as one of crisis, marked by this loss of "soul." The relation of the human subject and of human society to a transcendent reality, which historically has served as the center of meaning for humanity, is gone or no longer has power. In addition, reason, believed in as humanity's guiding principle, has become sacrificed as "the power of truth and justice embodied in man as man" (p. 4) for "technical reason," a tool in the service of technical society, usually at the expense of the common good, or of personal good. The "soul" of reason has been lost, as well, one could say. He goes on to say that in our attempts to control nature, a "second nature" has arisen, born of humankind, but not subject to humankind—a Leviathan, a Frankenstein, threatening to swallow or strangle us whole. In effect, "the decisive feature of the period ... is the loss of control by human reason over man's historical existence" (p. 7, emphasis in original). Thus, this crisis ensues: of faith, of reason, of human existence and subjectivity in the world.

The psychoanalytic scholar Robert Romanyshyn (1989) states it in these terms:

Having dominated the earth out of our increasing distance from it, we have come to believe that we are masters, and even creators. And in so doing we have lost the sense that we are sponsored, which means supported, upheld, and already sent on the way. In this respect, we have lost something of the religious sense of human life, in the root meaning of that term, the sense that we are already bound, and connected to, and limited by something beyond ourselves. In breaking the bond of gravity [via space technology] we have broken more than a physical restraint. We have broken the spiritual condition of humanity. (p. 25)
The resultant loss is the dismissal of the spiritual, the absence of depth. For Tillich (1988a), the loss of the dimension of depth is, in fact, the loss of the religious. Depth is religion itself, and religion is the substance of culture. It is the passionate search for the meaning of existence and "the state of being concerned about one's being and about being universally" (p. 42), the call of faith. This depth from which we have departed can be described, then, as the ability to answer for ourselves the crucial and pressing question: "What is the meaning of life?" Through this loss of depth, not only can we not answer the question, but we also lack the courage or consciousness, the ability to even ask the serious questions life poses us. We neither hear nor receive, as well, the answers. I might add that without this dimension, without this search, without this call, humanity is without vision, without soul; humanity is neither free nor full humanity.

I am in agreement, too, with Harvey Cox (1984) that while secularization, the heir of the prophets who have preached against the injustices sanctioned in the name of religion, has been a strong force in the history of human freedom and a "legitimate response to the illegitimate use of the sacred" (p. 170), it has pushed itself to excess, manufacturing its own "pseudosacral devices" like the "goddess of Reason" and the

---

1The word "soul" has an unclear etymology, and its definitions vary greatly with use. However, the term is ever referential of that which is vital, cojoined with life. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "soul" signifies "the principle of life ...; the principle of thought and action ...; the spiritual part ...; the seat of the emotions ...; the vital, sensitive, or rational principle; the inspirer or leader ...; the active agent, prime mover ...; and the essential, fundamental, or animating part, element or feature of something" (1989, Vol. XVI, pp. 40-41). Joel Kovel (1991) describes "soul" simply as "the spiritual form taken by the self" (p. 33), in relation to humanity in particular. The loss of soul of which I am speaking in this case connotes, then, the deprivation of the self's spiritual principle.
"tomb of Lenin," and created its own illegitimate sanctions against freedom and justice. "If freedom once required a secular critique of religion, it can also require a religious critique of the secular" (p. 171). I construe this present work as a part of such a critique, although I prefer to consider it something of a deconstruction of the secular which makes manifest its internal relationship with the sacred and elucidates the possibility of a kinship between a hermeneutics of suspicion and a hermeneutics of restoration (reason and faith, knowledge and value, secular and sacred, the critical and the creative). This work suggests the possibility of legitimate transcendence—the path of depth, of affirmation in the light of negation and critique, of a liberatory hermeneutics of redemption. In the words of Theodor Adorno (1974/1978), "The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in the face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption" (p. 247).

The form of this inquiry may best be described, then, as a philosophical history, in the words of Hegel, which is the prerequisite for all historical writing, according to R. G. Collingwood (MacIntyre, 1984): a narrative of fall or decline, marked by order and disorder, achievement and failure, and of recovery. Richard Bernstein (1991b) speaks similarly of the centrality of narratives in philosophy, and this "common rhetorical

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Redemption is, of course, usually perceived as a religious term, and well it is, particularly here in the interest of recalling "spirit" or "soul" in the contemporary world, in the human realm, of nurturing hope on the other side of modern darkness and despair. The origins of the word, however, introduce a much broader meaning, found in the Latin infinitive redimère, meaning: to buy back, to regain, to recover, to reclaim, to restore, to make good, to free, and to fulfill (QED, 1989, Vol. XIII, pp. 410, 412).
pattern" of "anticipations, setbacks, and trials" which "culminate with the progressive realization of truth and reason" (p. 31), particularly some truth not seen before yet revealed as in a glass darkly to the philosopher telling the tale. However, he speaks also of the dramatic reversal of this pattern, begun with Nietzsche in his genealogical exposure of the history of reason concluding in nihilism: the narrative of "relentless decline, degeneration, catastrophe, and forgetfulness" (p. 32). In this work, I am clearly seeking to reckon with and take up both of these genres of philosophical narrative, which obviously necessitates the need for something along the order of redemptive hope, perhaps in the dialectical manner posited by Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1972). Even still, within Nietzsche's philosophy can be gleaned the structure and trace of the common rhetorical pattern, nihilism the truth seen by him through a glass darkly and restorative speculations brought forth.

I am struggling here to make my aim and my approach to that aim explicit for and transparent to the reader, which is not without its irony. I have begun this endeavor with the quandary of Abraham, for this reason, because I am faced with the problem of a thesis and of prefacing, in the words of Jacques Derrida (1972/1981), the problem of seeking to reduce thought, to constrain meaning, to tie the text down to the graspable and known, which is also the problem of not trusting in the power of language—of the logos, the word—to speak meaningfully in manifold ways, nor in the efficacy of the reader's experience of interacting with the text, of textual encounter. Yet, at the heart of the hermeneutical position is that understanding "happens" only in the inter-"play" of dialogue, and I hope here for the happening of understanding, and the experience of the
"inner infinity of the dialogue" and also of the "infinity of the unsaid" (Gadamer, 1960/1992). In many ways, such a requirement is born from a kind of faithless faith, in which the ultimate concern is for control, for certainty, the possession of the unknown; it operates by the assumption (or should I say delusion?) that humanity can wholly master knowledge, language, reality, the entire realm of meaning: that humanity can gain the whole world. I am writing about faith, about our cultural crisis of faith, and yet I am asked in the writing to go out, knowing quite well whither, and to send my readers on their way, giving them as well, the knowledge of the precise path and destination. I am seeking to address the issue of this loss of depth or soul in our society: the denial of the mysterious, of that beyond us and beyond all our knowing, of the "moreness" (Huebner, 1995, in press) felt but to which we can never truly arrive; or in that impulse to connect with the sacred, to experience the transcendent, its reduction. Yet, I am asked to reduce this address to an explanation, a thesis, and a methodology—to create in an introduction this elaborate imitation of control, a kind of performance which is the mark of modern practice in the West, and what I see to be a harmful compulsion from which we need deliverance.

Says Kenneth Wilber (1995):

We might have lost the Light and the Height, but more frightening, we have lost the Mystery and the Deep, the Emptiness and the Abyss, and lost it in a world dedicated to surfaces and shadows, exteriors and shells, whose prophets lovingly exhort us to dive into the shallow end of the pool head first. (p. xi)

I am frightened of these shallow waters, and while I am here compelled to draw from the depths in the making of some shallow pool for its presentation, I do it under protest,
calling attention to the very act and subverting it, and I would not dream of recruiting any divers. For this reason, I have crafted the substance of this work in a very particular way, written it intentionally in a different or non-conventional manner: through the use of story, and through the non-use of the proverbial "I." Both "techniques" work in concert with the aim of reconciliation, of reviving depth, of pointing to the universal, to that beyond the self, and beyond telling. The assertion of the "I" risks the separation of the writer from the reader, and the suggestion that the author autonomously wields the text. The stories are ours as much as mine. Stories, as well, tending to show rather than tell, exceed explanation—theoretical postulations, thesis statements (Trousdale, Woestehoff & Schwartz, 1994).

A story is synthetical or analogical, able to articulate similarity-in-difference (Tracy, 1981), rather than analytical; thus, in relation to story we speak of the notion of narrative unity, and coherence. Stories bring together, rather than break down. In addition, as Thomas Berry (1995, January) has said, the parts are exalted in the whole beyond themselves, and the whole shows forth the divine in more beauty than do the parts. If the crisis of our day can be described as a crisis of faith, which is also a breakdown of meaning and of intelligibility productive of alienation, then it can also be characterized as a crisis of story and of understanding and of the imagination and of language. Understanding is primarily narrative. It is not only a historical legacy to conceive of the self, of life, in some narrative form, but it is also the natural mode of self-perception (MacIntyre, 1984). In this way, I agree with Fredric Jameson that narrative is an essential epistemological category: "Reality presents itself to the human mind ... in
the form of stories" (Selden, 1989, p. 47), which are aesthetic creations of the human imagination (Chase, 1960).

Clearly, story and imagination are integrally related. Story is, perhaps, imagination's performance. Whatever the case, it seems clear that without story, no imagination is manifested, and without imagination, no stories could exist.

Without imagination, nothing in the world could be meaningful. Without imagination, we could never reason toward knowledge of reality.... Imagination is our capacity to organize mental representations ... into meaningful coherent unities, ... our capacity to mold experience, to bring something new out of the old, or to sympathetically project [ourselves] into the position of another. (Johnson, 1987, pp. ix, 140,141, emphasis mine)

A crisis of meaning, of coherence, then, is a crisis of the imagination, of understanding, and of story. Such, as I have said, is also a crisis of language. In the prosaic contemporary West, lost somehow is the poetic, story's language and source and style (Pellowski, 1977), the language of the imagination, of vision, of faith. Thus, I have attempted in this work to revive the poetic, to include story, because we are poetic by nature and because we are our stories.

Narratives comprise, then, the basic structure of existence, or at least that structure by which existence is interpreted, understood, given value. Each of us, in the course of living, participate in narratives of one sort or another, and comprehend our existence in terms of the narratives we have lived out. Self and world coherence depends on a sight of these larger contexts within which we all dwell, the narratives which have made us, the histories into which we have been born. We come to understand the lives of others, as well, both past and present actions, and their aspirations for the future, in
terms of a narrative context and of narrative histories. Our own utterances and actions are only meaningful as they find their place within some narrative. We are held accountable for them, as well, and for the narratives of which we are authors, or subjects, and those within which we participate; we must answer for them in some intelligible and responsible manner. Of course, we are never the sole authors of these stories, perhaps not even lead ones; thus, there is this element of unpredictability or mystery within a partially teleological structure. There are constraints, then, to their intelligible continuance; our narratives can lapse into unintelligibility, which seems to be a part of the crisis. Before we know what we should do, we must have a sense of what story or stories in which we find ourselves. Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) goes on to say further and as well that "there is no way to give us an understanding of any society, including our own, except through the stock of stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources. Mythology, in its original sense, is at the heart of things" (p. 216).

I, therefore, draw explicitly on certain myths I feel to be influential in Western thought or particularly helpful in giving us insight into the development of thought in the West. I am asserting, then, as well, the indelible connection and virtual inseparability of story, myth and imagination. Myth literally means "story." Ortega y Gasset (1957/1961) has described myth as the "leaven of history" and traces the distinction we make between myth and story as involving a development in human thought, akin to Weber's notion of disenchantment and Kovel's idea of despiritualization, in which we could no longer believe in the historical and cosmogonic reality of our own narratives. However, he maintains that "even deprived of all religious significance, the epic themes, the mythical
seeds not only endure as splendid irreplaceable phantoms, but they gain in liveliness; ... hoarded in literary memory, they constitute a poetic leaven of incalculable energy" (p. 128). I might add, as well, that this energy is not without religious significance, though its influence may be denied, unexamined, wholly unthought.

Richard Chase (1960), in fact, situating the power of myth as in its function of mediating dualisms, claims that humanity lives in two worlds, essentially: the mundane world of the everyday and the "magico-religious" world. In accordance with his theory, we, as humans, employ both psychic and social means to keep these two worlds separate. It could be said that we know two principles of causation: the natural and the supernatural. Chase prefers to use the word preternatural rather than supernatural, which implies a distinction between the objective world and "supersensuous" experience which ought not to be made. The preternatural is the extraordinary, the uncanny, the mysterious, the powerful or numinous, that which has "mana." While the preternatural is set off from the world as ordinarily experienced, it is not because the preternatural is less than real as commonly known, but because it is more than ordinarily real. The mythic within any narrative—and I would add, constitutive of narrative, or story—is that which unites the real and ideal (the imagination). Chase speaks of it as that which "suffuses the natural with preternatural efficacy (mana)" (p. 135).

The mythic power of story lies, then, in its "resurrection of a primeval reality, told in satisfaction of deep religious wants, moral cravings, social submissions and even practical requirements" (Malinowski, cited in Chase, 1960, p. 135). I concur with Chase that story, as a Promethean force, somehow acts as a mediator between God and
humankind, and as such, is crowned with life-giving potential. Chase describes its action well:

"Story dramatizes in poetic form the disharmonies, the deep neurotic disturbances which may be occasioned by this clash of inward and outward forces, and that by reconciling the opposing forces, by making them interact ... toward a common end, ... [it] performs a profoundly beneficial life-giving act. (1960, p. 143)"

Thus, story seems, to me, to be the perfect medium through which to revive the question of faith, a main interest in this work. Faith, too, is a mediator between the human and the divine, between the eternal and the temporal, between the preternatural and the mundane, between the ideal and the actual. In acts of reconciliation, faith, too, "makes the discords of the present the harmonies of the future" (Collyer, cited in Mead, 1989). Faith is often also expressed in terms of its object, most often in the West expressed in the idea of God, an idea which obviously ever needs unpacking symbolically, one which has even been declared "dead" in the world of Western modernity. John Dewey (1934), wrestling with this symbology of God in human consciousness, defines the concept in this way: "It is this active relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name 'God'" (p. 51, emphasis in original). In like manner, Alfred North Whitehead (1978), discusses the primordial conceptual nature of God and the consequent derivative nature of God, the tension between permanence and flux. He identifies God as "the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality," and "the eternal urge of desire," "the initial object of desire," establishing the beginning of every subjective aim (p. 343). The crux of the matter, he suggests, is
"everlastingness," "the content of that vision upon which the finer religions are built--the 'many' absorbed everlastingly in the final unity" (p. 347). Whitehead concludes:

The concept of God is the way in which we understand this incredible fact [that which is beyond understanding]--that which cannot be, yet is.... In this way, the insistent craving is justified--the insistent craving that zest for existence be refreshed by the ever-present unfading importance of our immediate actions, which perish and yet live forevermore. (pp. 350, 351)

My interest in this sort of inquiry has been a consequence, in part, of my own personal crisis of faith, and of the "death of God" in my own consciousness, and, therefore, of my need to interrogate my own education: that which I had been taught and the way in which I had been taught it, that which I had learned and how I had learned it--the development of my mind, the movements of my soul, which had brought me to this state of crisis, and to this "deadly" culmination. Such would mean a reflection, as well, upon the nature of education itself--what it is, what it purports itself to be, what it claims to effect, its aims and ends. My purpose, then, is not to address faith and God solely or explicitly, but rather to consider them in the context of and as they are brought to bear on (as they operate within) the West's great and enduring project of faith, the project of education, reason's guardian, the faith of reason. Of course, such is a project and a faith in crisis also in our day--"the sweet dreams of reason dying," as has been said.

Clearly, my notion of education encompasses a great deal more than the content of schooling as it presently stands, although schools, in some senses, have taken the place formerly occupied by church and family in the education of the young. What I mean is that it seems great expectations are being placed increasingly on schools by
parents and educators, by society, in terms of our ultimate concerns involving not only economic and material security and global competitiveness, but also cultural preservation and transformation, individual actualization and fulfillment, the plight of the oppressed, and the promotion of values and recovery of some normative ethics. A part of the crisis of contemporary experience, in fact, rests within this frame. Ever becoming more apparent is that the "good life" cannot be reduced to the mere acquisition of material goods, of economic success, of material well-being, nor the comfortable life of leisure these possessions afford. The politically powerful, the wealthy, and the famous—generally via the possession of knowledge or money or skill, seen as the fruits of reason—are not necessarily the free or blessed.

The education of which I am speaking, then, is something more and other than the accumulation of knowledge or transmission and acquisition of competencies and skills, though these are important and not unrelated to its spiritual and religious function or grounding, which is where my interest lies because it is a grounding which, with this loss of depth of which I have been speaking, has also been lost. Dewey has said that education is concerned with what does not yet exist (Noddings, 1993); as such, it is humanity's attempt to negotiate paths between the actual and the ideal—in this sense, related to and not at all unconcerned with the idea of God, at least as Dewey and Whitehead have characterized this idea, symbolically. Education is a project of faith, in this way, referential of the spiritual journey of humanity—of society, of culture, of civilization, of self. Such is also education in its classical sense, the upward journey of the soul, in the words of Plato, concerning freedom and transcendence. This journey is
built on the assertion of Socrates that the unexamined life is not worth living, which implies a faith that the examination of life might assist us in living lives of worth and meaning, in creating such lives, which implies a passion for the possible beyond what is. The primary impulse behind the project of education is, as it were, related to that impulse behind religion which Tillich has described as the search for depth, the question of life's meaning. It is an existential enterprise which concerns the art of living, involving an inquiry into being in the world and an examination of the life-world, in relation to the question of human existence and agency, to the possibility of living in a worthwhile way.

In Chapter One, "Dying Idols, Difficult Commandments and the Call of Faith," I tell the story in Western Civilization of humanity's relationship to the sacred. Such involves an inquiry into our changing perspectives on the divine, on that which claims ultimacy in human consciousness. Inclusive therein are also changes with respect to our view of ourselves, each other, the life-world, and even the stories we tell about human existence through time. I draw primarily upon such stories as they are told by three European scholars: Frederick Nietzsche (1883/1982a), Paul Ricoeur (1969/1974) and Jacques Derrida (1992/1995). These men address our culture's most fundamental problems with boldness, insight, critique and vision. At their core, the crises of our times are crises concerning our own consciousness of ourselves, the cosmos and our place in it, and of what constitutes the good in human life. My aim is to provide a background for grasping more fully the troublesome and enigmatic nature of the present, to set up a broad framework for inquiry into its historical origins, for understanding better the changes through which Western culture has passed, culminating in the current historical
moment. Implicit is the assertion that the problems we face must be seen in terms of
their historical genealogies and investigated in such a way that they are not addressed
superficially in terms of present symptomology, but rather probed into regarding their
origins and roots, by digging up, raising and attending to the foundational questions at
their very core.

The chapter opens with and is framed by Nietzsche's (1883/1982a) narrative, "On
The Three Metamorphoses," which presents us with three transformations of the spirit
and three images—a camel, a lion and a child—considered as they stand metaphorically in
relation to human life, through which I illumine humanity's history with the sacred in the
West, and trace the evolution of spirit wrought in its people and culture. Beneath this
genealogy, and upholding it, is the affirmation of the primacy of spirit and transformation
in human life. Each metamorphosis can be seen as a pivotal moment in the human
history and consciousness of Western civilization, each image a representation of the
tenor and spirit of the times, of the dominant human stance taken in and toward life.

The metamorphoses parallel the movements of humankind upon which Ricoeur
(1969/1974) looks in "Religion, Atheism, Faith." He seeks to inquire into faith, which I
 liken to Nietzsche's spirit of the child, as a movement and future hope through which we
 might traverse the dialectical relationship between religion, or camel-spirit, and atheism,
 the spirit as lion. In this way, faith is not seen as a linear conclusion following on the
 heels of the human evolution from religion, in its primitive sense, to atheism, which for
 Ricoeur is inclusive of more than its literal sense. It is, however, forward-looking, a kind
 of synthesis involving religion and atheism, and yet also a metamorphosis moving
humanity beyond them. Clearly seen are the idols of religion, hidden and dying, and
keenly felt, the difficulty of the commandments once presumed to give life. The people
of the West, for the most part, no longer revel in carrying burdens into the desert like the
camel; the burden of "Thou Shalt" is no longer a weight wholly welcome. Rather, we
are brought to a new appreciation of atheism through this awareness it announces.
Paradoxically, like one crying out a "sacred 'No'" in the wilderness, analogous to the
message of repentance, the beauty of atheism is in the roar of the lion who awakens its
jungle inhabitants to the sound of freedom. Yet atheism, too, is insufficient, unable to
enter the game of creation, to begin anew, or utter a "sacred 'Yes'" to life. We are left,
then, with the spirit of the child as that transformation, desirable, longed-for, but not yet
present, the yet-to-come promise of faith.

The work of Derrida (1992/1995) is introduced to inquire further into this
history—to illumine the continuities and disruptions extant in these human
metamorphoses, to shed light on the tensions formed between sacred and secular, as well
as to elucidate the concepts in question, and the relationships among them: religion,
atheism, faith, the sacred, the eternal, the temporal, the death of God, the birth of the
human subject, freedom, responsibility, and history. Derrida's history is what he calls a
"crypto- or mysta-genealogy of responsibility," in which he claims that history (European
history, the history of Western civilization) finds its meaning or function in this
movement of humanity toward responsibility, and posits history itself as responsibility.
Religion here is considered in a different sense from the way in which Ricoeur considers
it (though they are related), synonymous with responsibility in Derrida's formulation,
primarily because in looking at the West he must center his discussion of religion in Christianity. Christianity, as a religion, carries within it the call by grace to transcend primitive religion grounded in commandment, obedience, duty and fear. Responsibility in Derrida is linked not only with religion, and with freedom and faith, but also with the birth of the human subject, which corresponds to the rise of reason and initiates the critique of religion, culminating in "the death of God," and atheism, secular history.

This genealogy, beginning before and lying beneath religion, begins with the "daimonic" self of humanity enmeshed in the "orgiastic sacred" and traces its metamorphoses through the Platonic self, which has denied and yet retained the sacred mystery, to the responsible self or the fully differentiated human subject, which has of course incorporated the former and is expressed via religion in terms of the unfathomable depth of the human soul, compelled to respond in its singularity before the ultimate Other, God. While Ricoeur traces for us a historical process involving the demythification, demystification or demythologization of human consciousness in relation to itself, the cosmos, the sacred, Derrida unmasksthe repressed yet incorporated and constitutive sacred mystery at the core of human consciousness and metamorphosis. His is a process of remythification, remystification, remythologization: the revelation of history's intra-mythology, the religious or sacred which lies at the very heart of history.

Recognizing this, history's secret, also critical to understanding the crises of our times is the moment in human thought, or history, when the declaration is made that "God is dead," and the aftermath of such a conclusion. Ricoeur suggests that we in the West dwell still in this aftermath, a time of confusion, mourning, even anger—violent
reaction to this loss. Raised, then, is the primacy of the question of faith, for herein
human faith is sorely tried, perhaps even overthrown. Yet faith, like the sacred mystery,
ever is, however repressed, denied, forgotten or misdirected. In this sense, though gods
may die, divinity lives on; and humankind is condemned to faith, to some ultimate care
and concern. Both Ricoeur and Derrida are thus drawn to faith's call, in response to
contemporary straits, and Nietzsche to this metamorphosis of the spirit as child—an
image of faith: fulfillment of the past, blessing of the present, hope of the future. At the
chapter's end, I leave the reader with the promise of faith, but the task remains to
uncover the effects of God's death upon us and our world.

Yet, can God ever in truth be dead? We kill one god, and raise ourselves up
another, whether it be in the fashioning of a golden calf or of ourselves as sovereign—or
some other object of faith. Yet die, gods do, or we kill them. It is in Chapter Two,
"Curse, Crisis and the Reign of Death," that I invite the reader to look into the aftermath
of this burial of God in the West. Such an inquiry is not simply an avenue through which
I can establish the crisis of the present day, explicating it and tracing some of its sources,
and posit it as a crisis of faith, the crux of which is ultimately spiritual—ontological or
soul sickness at the heart of humanity. The endeavor also provides a means through
which I might seek to elucidate this state of things in our times, that we may glean
insight into it and hopefully better understand or know how to find our way in it and
through it redemptively.

Admittedly, in describing the nature of this crisis—its extensiveness, its severity,
its all-encompassing scope, I attempt, in fact, to "prove" its existence, and begin laying a
groundwork toward providing a rationale for looking anew at human faith, for insisting upon its import in our constitution of the self, of society, of the world, and all their destinies. These dark days are presented, then, in terms of the human crisis of faith in Western civilization, and as the manifestation of a spiritual crisis—in the presence of my interest in exhorting the reader to a renewed concern with the spiritual matters of existence, and in reviving a language that can speak spirit and grant it breathing room. Through such, we might think more deeply upon the source and summit of our present plights and most pressing cares, and perhaps respond more wisely in and to them.

Picking up from Chapter One, I proceed with this large, overarching history of where we are ontologically and spiritually, from whence we've come—more specifically, where we Westerners are and where we have led and are continuing to lead the world. From Nietzsche's 'God is dead' proclamation, I am seeking to further escalate the urgency of things globally, and suggest, that where God is dead—as the author and source and breath of life—so begins the languishing of all things: for banished, as well, is life, and spirit, the animating principle of life. The death of God, in this sense, intimates the Reign of Death in human consciousness. God is not only dead, then, and we have not only killed him ourselves, but with our posture, we are also effecting the death of the world, of humankind itself, of ourselves, as well. Tracing this fatal process, my aim is basically to discuss and cite the "death" of the world and of humanity through modern thought, the seeds of which are found much earlier in Western history and thought, to explicate what I call this "Logic of Death" and illustrate its historical operation.
The discussion is framed by the Judeo-Christian story of Creation and of the "Fall of Man" (The Holy Bible, 1985, Genesis 1-3) because it is a foundational myth of origins concerning the creation of the world and humankind and human knowledge, regarding humanity's relationship to the world, the divine, itself, and this thing we call death. Moreover, it is not merely a story but one of mythic proportions within a tradition which has a profound influence on Western consciousness. Herein, again, is affirmed the primacy of the imagination in human thought and action, the images we set before us defining the world, human existence in the world, and what is sacred to such existence. This story is really about the death of "man," however, not the death of God. The proclamation of the sentence of death is made against humanity. In this light, Nietzsche's declaration that God is dead might be seen as another one of those great reversals for which he is so famous. Yet, the two pronouncements are related, a connection I strive to show.

I rely upon a number of thinkers to document this domination and development of death—each Weberian, or "very dark," in their presentation of the progress of humankind and human reason in the West, and in their critique of its primary worldview. These scholars, four in number, are: 1) Morris Berman (1981), with his discussion from Max Weber on the modern "disenchantment of the world"; 2) Joel Kovel (1991), with his explication of the "despiritualization of the world" and its relationship to advanced capitalism; 3) Douglas Sloan (1983), with his critique of Western ways of knowing via science and its quantitative emphasis; and 4) Martin Heidegger (1950/1971a, 1952/1977a, 1952/1977b, 1954/1977c, and 1962/1977d), with his examination of the
impact of our stance toward and in the world, our present way of being in it, in the
 technological age—world violence, dehumanization, and the antithesis of freedom.

What is at issue, then, I am suggesting, is how we are in the world, how we know the world, ourselves and the divine—and how we relate to these and to all things.

Death is separation, and the history of the West, in this sense, has been the separation of all things: subject, object, God, "man," mind, body—and spirit has been excommunicated. Heidegger calls our position in the world one of "enframing" in which we challenge nature, and all the world, to reveal its treasures; and grab them up, store them and use them up at our own will. In this way, we have not only killed God, but have initiated as well the systematic killing of the world which we have objectified.

Humanity, the human subject, the homeless, languishes too while slaying the earth, its home. Heidegger describes how we ourselves are sucked up into this clutching grasp, and objectified, freedom become an illusion. Distorted images of the divine, of humanity and of the world reign. From the "Ye shall be as gods" promise in our Genesis story, I identify "enframing" with the quest for godhood, the will-to-power gone awry in an incessant plucking and consumption of forbidden fruit. We are left with the bleak picture these statistics paint: Cain slays Abel, and Holocaust and Hiroshima ensue. God has perished, and we shall not only surely die, but also be the instruments of death.

Chapters Three and Four may be read together, as they are parts one and two respectively of the same general theme: "Education, The Upward Journey and the Faith of Reason." Certainly, by Chapter Two, I have left the reader with a very dark picture of our present plight, and of the journey and destiny of Western civilization. Yet, as ancient
wisdom is fond of reporting, where there is great darkness, great light also shall be. Thus, I frame these chapters with a story of light, one prophetic of progress, goodness, truth, and beauty—as opposed to curse, crisis and the reign of death. In truth, however, in the biblical story of the creation of the world and the fall of humanity, lies also the seed of redemption, the foreshadowing of the great light of salvation. Yet, with the mythology of Judeo-Christianity is another equally powerful influence in Western thought and development: the Socratic tradition, Greek philosophy, Greco-Roman thought, the vision of Plato. Plato's "Allegory of the Cave" (c.a. 380 b.c./1992) not only construes human existence and the evolution of humanity in terms of light, but also as constitutive of an upward journey of light and to light. The human soul is liberated from the dark confines of the cave to make its way upward to the brilliant light of the sun and the wide world warmed and lit up by such light.

The question is, again, one of reconciliation: How might we reconcile this story of the human attempt to make the godward ascent via the consumption of the fruit of knowledge, resulting in destruction, and this similar one of ascension, resulting in blessedness and the sight of the good? More to the point, how has this sojourn of light, explicated by Plato in such glowing colors, turned so easily to darkness in the West, especially since the presence of any light at all is known to dispel darkness? In these chapters, I explore these questions, explicating Plato's image here of the education of the human soul and establishing its significance in the Western imagination, in the course of human progress. The inquiry, pursued in the light of the crises in which we now find ourselves, ultimately aims at opening up our understanding, uncovering not only the
dregs of the past but also its forgotten treasures, toward some redemptive path and avenue of hope; yet, it is undertaken, Plato's (subsequently, the West's) journey of light is considered, in regard to its relationship to the journey of darkness traced in Chapter Two involving the dis-integration and de-spiritualization of the world, supplementing and continuing this history.

For, following the death of God, the world, etc., comes this reign of death: the impending "death" of the subject, and the "death" of reason—biting questions regarding human agency and efficacy in knowing and promoting the good, the true and the beautiful in the life-world. Reason, subjectivity, the self, and the notion of life even construed as a journey of some narrative unity are under scrutiny. As Viktor Shklovsky (1929/1990) has put it, "the prosaic universe [the modern world] is just one damn thing after another" (p. ix). Traumas of meaning, value, significance, faith, in the presence of great darkness and in the absence of the light of the good. Fundamental, then, to what is currently at issue in our culture is this crisis of reason, doubts regarding its import, function, place and centrality. Richard Bernstein (1991b), in his analysis of the situation, calls it the "rage against reason." Once our most prominent and revered possession, reason has now been found seriously wanting, and in many cases is indicted as the cause of all the world's present woes.

Yet the kernel of Western civilization can be most accurately depicted, in fact, as the relentless pursuit of reason and an unwavering faith in it as humanity's hope for achieving the knowledge of the good, and the good itself. Plato is, as well, the man we regard as the father of reason in the great Western tradition, or at least the representative
of its father Socrates; and his "Allegory of the Cave" is the expression of not only the "glory" of reason, but the faith of reason wherein education is set forth as the avenue through which this faith is manifested and practiced—through which reason is aspired to, discovered, acted upon and actualized—toward the realization of human good. Because of the pervasive logic of death and of severing—the de-spiritualized world, according to Kovel—in which we live and move, it is at first difficult for us to ascertain the relationships between some of these concerns, particularly here for us to hold together the notions of faith and reason, usually construed as unrelated and more often as antagonists. Thus, in discussing Plato's image of education as the transcendent journey of the soul to spirit, and the guardian, midwife and path of reason, conceived by him as divine, I do so with an eye toward elucidating this idea of reason's faith, of reason's grounding in faith, the ultimate concerns of humanity, and toward investigating the historical dissociation of faith and reason in Western consciousness. Highlighting this "original" unity (between faith and reason, knowledge and value, etc.) also sheds light once again on the communion of the secular and sacred, the sacred at the heart of the secular, the "religious meaning," in the words of Ricoeur, or underpinnings, to history, human subjectivity, reason, etc.—the omnipresence and omnipotence of mystery, despite Western attempts at certainty, mastery, control, comprehensive knowledge and power.

Plato's portrait of education is viewed, then, as a metaphor for the journey of humanity in the Western world, involving ascending climbs from the cave to the light of the sun, the intelligible realm, and descending returns to its dark confines, the visible realm of the senses. Just as Derrida identifies the Platonic self with the beginnings of the
birth of the human subject, a "heightened" consciousness which has differentiated itself
from the "cave" of the earth in some measure, Kenneth Wilber (1995) presents an
evolutionary history of the Kosmos, a history of spirit and humanity and human
consciousness in relation to the world and to spirit, that is consistent with Plato's
allegorical journey of the soul. I draw upon his work to consider through time the
progressive reduction of the Kosmos—in the Greek sense of the full-bodied whole, the
"All" (physiosphere, biosphere, noosphere and theosphere) and that which can only be
symbolized yet never fully come to, or apprehended—to the cosmos, the totality of which
we speak today which primarily rests upon the physical aspects of the universe alone.
From this perspective, the death of the world through the logic of severing is achieved
and viewed as evolutionary differentiation gone too far, into dissociation, subsequent
integration in a higher embrace involving the negation and preservation of the former
denied—pathology. In the language of Plato, the transcendent journey upward to the
intelligible realm of the one (noospheric awareness, depth, interiority, universality) is cut
off from the descending journey of return to the sensible realm of the world's eminent
manyness (physiospheric and biospheric embodiment, exteriority, particularity)—
pathology, and mis-education.

The sundering of faith from reason, the movement of reason from that treasured
in the West to that deconstructed, doubted and despised, and the renunciation and denial
of the faith which is its ground and guide, are traced in the context of the wars fought
between these two journeys (faiths, gods, teleologies) espoused in the West—of ascent
and descent, having been separated, each truncated and having repressed the other. In
Part 2, or Chapter 4, I look specifically into the history of education in regard to these issues, as an institution, and as institutionalized, explicitly concerned with the education of the human "soul," and implicitly, with the advancement of reason in humanity as a whole. I draw predominantly on three different works in curriculum through which to tell this story of education: Curriculum History by David Hamilton (1990), which begins with the "birth" of education tracing it through to its mutation into "curriculum" with an added emphasis on the tensions therein between absolutist/methodistic and enlightenment thought; Understanding Curriculum by William Pinar, William Reynolds, Patrick Slattery and Peter Taubman (1995), a historical piece investigating curriculum in terms of these tensions as well with a focus on the movement in the field from an interest in development and procedure to an attempt at understanding; and The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education: A Curriculum for Justice and Compassion in Education by David Purpel (1989), which posits and explicates the state of education as one of moral and spiritual crisis, seeking to address such by looking again at the traditions which have formed Western education, particularly that of prophetic Judeo-Christianity, in addition to Socratic rationalism. A discussion of education as a project of faith, of faith in reason as the avenue through which humanity might address its deepest care and attain its highest good, is inclusive herein. In tracing broadly this history—exemplary of the splits, wars, pathologies, documented in Chapter 3 (Part 1), the narrowing and trivialization of the very notion of education itself is clearly evidenced and seen. We are brought indeed to the "death" of reason, at least in the "original" or Platonic sense, inclusive of the notions of attunement with the Kosmos, blessedness, and friendship with all that is
human and divine. Begun with Plato as the spiritual pilgrimage of the soul upward, the
faith of reason to actualize goodness, truth and beauty, and a foundational unifying
construct through which to consider humanity's ultimate happiness and concern,
education becomes and is reduced to little more than the business of schooling, an
academic area of research, an economic insurance policy, a material possession for
soul-less human societies and selves.

This work I present in an effort toward redemption. For, the thesis turns on the
primacy of education, its historical import in the aspirations of humanity in Western
civilization and in our constitution of life and knowledge and human existence in the life-
world—that deemed sacred or of ultimate concern; and the present need to address its
abnegation and trivialization, its "death" via dissociation, repression, reduction—faithless
reason or reasonless faith, the loss of a prior and primary grasp of the Kosmic whole
(Sloan, 1983), a ground of value and meaning. I am advocating a redemption of sorts, a
revival or restoration of that foundational insight of the fathers of education (of Socrates,
to be exact), seemingly forgotten or lost: the unexamined life is not worth living; of
education, the faith of reason, as the faithful examination of the life-world, involving our
posture before and participation in the essential ambiguity of life and mystery of spirit,
toward this end of living that is worthy, toward apprehending and actualizing the good,
the true and the beautiful in human life.
CHAPTER 1

DYING IDOLS, DIFFICULT COMMANDMENTS AND THE CALL OF FAITH

I tell you of three metamorphoses of the spirit: how the spirit becomes a camel; and how the camel becomes a lion; and how the lion, finally, becomes a child.

I tell you of the spirit first that would bear much, whose way is hard, for this spirit is strong and reverent, and its strength requires the difficult and the most difficult. "O heroes, what is difficult, and most difficult?" the spirit that would take all upon itself asks, kneeling to the ground like a camel ready to be fully loaded. "I shall take such upon myself that I may exult in my strength," it declares.

"Is it 'feeding on the acorns and grass of knowledge and, for the sake of truth, suffering hunger in one's soul?" (Nietzsche, 1883/1982a, p. 138).

"Or is it dwelling in rancid waters if they be the waters of truth, and not flinching in the face of seething snakes or icy toads?"

Like a camel well burdened, the spirit that would bear much and the most difficult things speeds into its desert.

In the desert most lonely occurs the second metamorphosis: a lion, who would master his own freedom and overcome his own desert, the spirit becomes. Here he searches out his last lord and god with whom he wishes to fight to the death. The ultimate triumph for which he longs is in the battle with the great dragon.

This dragon, no longer to be known as master and king, who is he? "'Thou shalt' is the name of the great dragon" (p. 138). But "I will" is the spirit of the lion. "Thou shalt" stands before him as an immoveable obstacle; it is a beast of gold, with scales all over its body. Values they are which shine from these scales: upon each scale shines a "golden 'Thou shalt'" (p. 140).

The lion, though he cannot himself create, with the "I will" of his spirit prepares the way for invention, for new values. For without for oneself the creation of freedom, new creation is not possible. Thus, the lion is the spirit of a sacred "No," that realizes illusion and caprice in "Thou shalt."

The spirit moves once again, and the preying lion becomes finally a child. With the child comes the game of creation. The child, a new beginning, innocence and forgetting, utters now a sacred "Yes." The spirit wills its own will, and having been lost to the world, now triumphs over its own world.
I have told you of three metamorphoses of the spirit: how the spirit became a camel, and how the camel became a lion, and the lion at last a child.

A retelling of Nietzsche's "On The Three Metamorphoses," from Zarathustra's Speeches in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883/1982a)

We do not readily speak of Frederick Nietzsche (1883/1982a) as a man of faith.

Yet, here is Zarathustra, his wise prophet, speaking of spirit and transformation. Here is the crowning metamorphosis of spirit as child.¹ What is the child but an image of faith?

¹Nietzsche does not expound on the signification of this image of the child, nor does he develop any mythology of the child as such; we are merely left with the image, and the few words recounted in the story. However, the symbol of the child figures prominently in Western and non-Western cultures from ancient times, powerfully central in mythology, religion and folklore. The child is often divine and typically endangered, orphaned, hidden in obscurity and enduring trials of all sorts, later to rise up as a great leader or savior. In Greek mythology, the great god Zeus as a child lives under the devouring threat of his father Chronos, and his son Dionysus, a messianic figure, is in danger of being ripped to pieces by the Titans in his absence. The Roman twins Romulus and Remus are abandoned as infants, set adrift on the river Tiber. The mighty deliverer of the Jewish people, and chosen of Yahweh, Moses is hidden as an infant in a basket on the river among the bulrushes for fear of death at the hands of Pharaoh. The Christian child divine, Jesus, enters the world with a similar plight, and "wise men" come to worship him. Krishna's birth, as well, is threatened by another ruler, King Kansa, who decrees the slaying of all newborns (Capacchione, 1991). Folklore is full of child heroes who overcome, for example: Hansel and Gretel, Little Red Ridinghood, Rapunzel, Cinderella, and Jack and the Beanstalk, in the fairytales of Europe.

Some scholars, particularly Carl Jung and Joseph Campbell, have suggested that myths and the symbols with which they are imbued live on because they speak to universal human experience that transcends culture and history. The image of the child throughout history has been associated with the prophetic message of hope, liberty, and empowerment. In the Old Testament scriptures a vision is told of the lion dwelling peaceably beside the lamb, and of a child which leads them (The Holy Bible, 1985, Isaiah 11:6). In the New Testament scriptures, Jesus is credited on several occasions with saying that one must become as a little child to inherit the Kingdom of God (Matthew 11:25, 18:3; Luke 18:16-17)—the child as a way to serenity, joy, peace, salvation, divinity. The child is said to represent the core of human being, full humanness, aliveness, openness, wonder, play, enthusiasm—which means literally "in God."
The child is the hope of the future, the fulfillment of the past, and the blessing of the present. The child, as innocence and forgetting and a new beginning, adopts in the movement of creation a "sacred 'Yes.'" The child responds to the world, to being-in-the-world, with a grand "Amen." The child is the pure affirmation of existence, the utterance of a "sacred 'Yes'" to life, which is the substance of faith.

Paul Ricoeur (1969/1974), in an essay entitled "Religion, Atheism, and Faith," presents something of an ontological history of humanity's relation to the sacred, or at least a sketch of a history of faith, as it were, in Western civilization. Ricoeur's scheme, interestingly enough, is well-suited to the images of Zarathustra's transformations of spirit. A response to the Nietzschean critique of religion and the hermeneutics of

Contemporary psychology has picked up on this image to help hurting individuals toward healing and wholeness through "Inner Child" work (Capacchione, 1991; Whitfield, 1987; Whitfield, in Capacchione, 1991). Alice Miller (1983, 1984) claims that humanity manifests authenticity and creativity only through listening to and making a dwelling for this voice of the Child within, through the social and personal respect for the preciousness of the child.

Jung (1949/1989) identifies the image of the child as an archetype, a symbol in the collective unconscious of the human race. The child announces a path for future change; it signifies transformation, and synthesis, particularly of unconscious and conscious elements held before at odds. It is the archetype bearing the power of regeneration, a symbol of wholeness and of being in its totality. The child reveals to us our journey as a whole, where we have strayed and the treasured aspirations we have lost or forgotten along the way (Fontana, 1994). Jung (1949/1989) says of the child: "It is ... a symbol which unites the opposites; a mediator, bringer of healing, that is, one who makes whole" (p. 83).

The notion of "being-in-the-world" is drawn from Heidegger (1927/1962) in Being and Time, referential to an understanding of subjectivity which is inseparable from objectivity, to his identification of human being as "Dasein," or being-there, the world always and ever constitutive of the being that is human.
suspicion, Ricoeur boldly advocates a path, or eschatological metamorphosis, from
religion through atheism on the way to what he calls "faith." Clearly, aware of the
dangers of such a formulation, Ricoeur is careful to posit a faith distinct from religion;
his endeavor—though a personal radical challenge to accept the critique of religion and
still remain a Christian—is not a deceptive and hypocritical method aimed at preserving
the "faith of our fathers," snatching back with one hand what the insights of atheism have
compelled him to yield with the other. Ricoeur claims, "Atheism is not limited to the
mere negation and destruction of religion but ... rather, it opens up the horizon for
something else, for a type of faith that might be called ... a postreligious faith or a faith
for a postreligious age" (p. 440). Ricoeur looks forward to, grasps after, the spirit of the
child.

Ricoeur begins with the spirit of religion—the spirit as camel in Zarathustra's
parable. The camel, a beast of burden, goes about bearing happily the loads placed upon
it in the fulfillment of duty. The camel, reverent and submissive, exults in such exhibition
of virtue as it serves to assuage guilt and deliver comfort. Religion, in this sense, is a
primitive form of life rooted in the fear of punishment and the desire for protection.
These two drives correspond to the two main facets of religion, taboo and refuge, as
well as to the two central countenances of religious feeling, accusation and consolation.
This primordial structure, says Ricoeur, is one that must always be overcome by faith.
However, he is quick to admit that, perhaps, it is the case that these features represent
the corrupt parts of religion, in the same way that Marx viewed theology as the corrupt
part of philosophy.

Nevertheless, the God of religion is here one who both threatens and protects.

He is the ultimate danger and the ultimate protection. He is the God of morality.

\[1\] A word should be said about the gender of God here. From Ricoeur, I am using
the pronoun "he" to refer to God, which Ricoeur has taken undoubtedly from Nietzsche
and Freud. In Nietzsche's famous pronouncement that God is dead, accounting this God
male, Nietzsche (1882/1974) goes on to say that we—you and I—have killed him. The
murder of God, as well, in Freud's line of thought, is akin psychologically to the murder
of the Father figure, obviously masculine. This is neither to establish "the reality we call
'God' [which] exceeds all human expression" (Armstrong, 1994, p. xxi), an indescribable
reality we can only humanly symbolize, as male, nor to accuse Freud or Nietzsche or
Ricoeur of sexist conceptions of God, though they may, in fact, hold them. It is to posit,
rather, that "the human idea of God has a history" (p. xx), and that in tracing the history
of this idea in the West, the development of the sacred in Western thought, we are
primarily inquiring into a masculine idea, emerging from a patriarchal worldview. Says
Karen Armstrong (1994) in A History of God: "Because this God [the Judeo-Christian
God, and the Muslim God, as well] began as a specifically male deity, monotheists have
usually referred to it as 'he'" (p. xxii). Since I am here investigating the history of the
human stance toward this God, in the West, and presenting the ideas of thinkers who
refer to God as "he," in the Western tradition, I am maintaining the "conventional
masculine terminology," the use of "he" in reference to this God—too, for the sake of
historical accuracy. The God who has died, in the West, is a male God.

Clearly, in contemporary times, with good reason, feminist scholars have called
into question this gendered, masculine conception of God. Some feminist theologians
have even adopted what has been called a "hermeneutics of rejection," dismissing the Old
Testament even, as an embodied testament of a patriarchal society. Feminist thinkers
have also keenly brought to light how the subjugation of women is inscribed in our
language, in our very definitions and "conceptualizations of God, whose omniscience and
omnipotence are thought to be the religious pattern of human rationality and freedom"
(Companion Encyclopedia of Theology, 1995, p. 491). Other theologians have drawn
attention to the actual double-gendered nature of the Judeo-Christian God of the Old
Testament and to "his" problematic representation in the West, particularly as construed
in English translations. In the Hebrew and in Arabic, certain references to God are
grammatically feminine (Armstrong, 1994). In the Book of Psalms (Psalms 22:9), God
is likened to a midwife, having brought David forth from the womb, a female image

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operating by the law of retribution. Religion is set up as the foundation of morality, and through this rational scheme of the law, also a moral vision of the world: the God of Providence rules the world by this law of retribution. Human response to the sacred is in heeding prohibitions and following commandments—the edicts of "Thou Shalt," commandments eventually found too difficult to bear.

Ricoeur's aim is not formally a history or genealogy or evolutionary trace. Rather, he seeks to examine atheism as a spiritual passageway from religion to faith. Atheism is seen as a link between religion and faith which looks back at what it denies and forward toward what it makes possible. For this reason, Ricoeur does not discuss religion in great length, as such, but religion as it has been laid bare and exposed by the work of atheism. The spirit of atheism comes on the scene, like the image of the lion, roaring a "sacred 'No.'" If the camel is subjection, the lion is rebellion. The lion is the spirit of "I will" who slays the great dragon "Thou Shalt," having discovered illusion therein. Atheism—ferocious, majestic, free, in the spirit of critique, dismantles and rips away at the foundations of religion.

ascribed to the divine deity (Companion Encyclopedia of Theology, 1995). Even in the English translations of the Old Testament, the womb and breasts of God are mentioned on several occasions (The Holy Bible, 1985, Genesis 50:8, Job 21:24, and 38:39, for example). Certainly, the conception of God in the West, however, has been principally a male conception. This fact, as well, seems to support the feminist claim "that all human knowledge is shaped by the perspective of the knower, and that as knowledge has been constructed in the Western world, those knowers have largely been the dominant males" (Companion Encyclopedia of Theology, 1995, p. 492).
The focus in Ricoeur is on the atheism of Nietzsche (1883/1982a, 1886/1966, 1887/1967a and 1898/1967b)—and Freud (1925/1958), as well—because it represents a different kind of criticism unlike that of empiricism or positivism. Rather than fussing over the proof of the existence of God or the meaning or meaninglessness of the concept of God, this atheism uncovers the disguised symptoms of fear and desire at the heart of religion. In an assessment of religion as refuge, the critique of the God of morality is fully accomplished. Atheism, then, lays bare a hidden meaning to religion that is concealed from the believer through an "act of dissimulation" which blocks any investigation of consciousness into its true origins. Religion is seen as a part of the cultural dimension of experience, and the cultural function of illusion is manifested. This illusion is not along the order of error or the ethics of the lie, but rather of a hidden meaning that requires the stripping away of masks, the deconstruction of the camel's burden. Ricoeur (1969/1974) situates atheism within this enlightenment: "The public meanings of our consciousness conceal true meanings, which can be brought to light only by adopting the attitude of suspicion and cautious critical scrutiny" (p. 442).

Atheism is justified.

In the Nietzschean critique, the ideal realm of being of the absolute good and the intelligible—of metaphysics—is interrogated; and this invisible source of all values is found to be empty, in so far as it is ideal, outside and above humanity, and a projection into the heavens of human frailty. This realm is akin to the superego, the seat of moral conscience, in the language of Freud. The God of prohibition does not exist and yet is
the author, or father of all prohibitions. Obligation is shown to be grounded in this secret process referring back to an original act of accusation, rooted in the will.

Accusation is, then, at the center of duty. Thus, the consolation provided by this God is, first, founded on fear, and second, on an infantile desire for protection. The instincts of fear and desire are discovered behind religion.

The figure of God becomes, in many ways, ambiguous because he is not only the one who condemns and punishes, but also the "Father" who comforts and protects. Such relates to Freud's insight that religion is the highest function of culture in that it does not primarily set up an absolute authority to guide moral consciousness, but rather attempts to address and ease the severity of life. Here is Freud's "nostalgia for the father," and religion becomes a covert operation of the "pleasure principle." For Nietzsche, it is weakness of will.

The nature of this God is revealed: He is the God of prohibition and accusation, of refuge, of morality, and of metaphysics. Metaphysics here represents that tightly-knit system of philosophy and theology in the form of theodicy that attempts in the face of evil to justify and defend the absolute goodness and power of God. The atheistic critique exposes some of the underlying motives behind theodicy, but also behind those philosophies—like those of Kant and Hegel, for instance—which claim to go beyond theodicy and still seek to reconcile rationally natural law with human freedom. Thus comes the proclamation that must come through critique and the spirit of a "sacred No": "God is dead." Metaphysics, too, is fatally wounded.
As atheism, then, announces the death of god and draws attention to the emptiness at the source from which ethics and values spring (Derrida 1990; Nietzsche 1886/1966, 1887/1967a and 1898/1967b), nihilism is not far behind. Nihilism, as such, is not the creation of atheism, or Nietzsche, but only that historical process to which both bear witness. It is the historical manifestation of the nothingness at the heart of the illusory origin, the ideal realm. It is the soul of metaphysics borne, and an agonizing

4 Nihilism, from nihil meaning "nothing," is generally defined as a loss of values: ethical, political, religious, social—the death of "God." It involves a skepticism which rejects all that is designated as real/unreal, or being/nonbeing, etc.; it denies the value of all distinctions; the conclusion drawn is that there is no objective, actual foundation of truth, that nothing is knowable, and that all human knowledge is illusory, relative, and meaningless. Ultimately, there is found no justification for moral values esteemed and posited. The universe knows no aim or purpose either, no meaning (Angeles, 1981). It is the manifestation of nothingness.

Nietzsche (1887/1967a) calls nihilism a European Buddhism, the "sinister symptom" of a morality gone sinister, the morality of pity, in which the human will in fact turns itself against life. Nihilism is this weariness, wherein humanity is sorely tired of humanity itself: lost are the hopes for the human family, the love of it, humanity's will to itself. The human being, diminished and levelled, gives way to the "Great Nausea," this will to nothingness spawned from the tyrannical ideal, against the earth and life and humanity; nihilism is the consummation of fear and nausea, or pity: terrified of the vacuous, of the void, humanity must choose to will nothingness than not will at all. It is the process in which the will to truth has gained self-consciousness, has overcome itself, a process Nietzsche identifies as not only the most awful and dubious of phenomena, but also possibly the most hopeful.

Heidegger (1952/1977b) interprets nihilism, in the Nietzschean sense, as a movement in history, the inner logic of the West, that which has always reigned but is manifest and determining in modern times. The word that "God is dead," then, has already been uttered, insinuated in the very history of the West as decided by metaphysics. God is the ideal realm, the suprasensory, as understood by late Greek and Christian appropriations of Platonic philosophy: opposed to the sensory, visible world, and that alone which is real. Yet, Nietzsche's affirmative stand remains: nihilism and its consequential loss of faith calls for not only the devaluation of man's highest values, but also the endeavor of revaluing.
cultural challenge. In Freudian terms, this process involves a personal renunciation of the "father," which is a process of mourning. One realizes the relative nature of the superego. Ricoeur suggests that these are the two ways in which the origin of values is restored to itself—via nihilism and mourning. The god who has perished is the god of morality and accusation; the murderer, not atheism but this cultural process called nihilism, and the personal one of mourning in relation to the father figure.

Yet is God really dead? Perhaps, we peruse the landscape, and find him still alive and well. Some of us might even respond with relief; should the god of morality die, we would resuscitate him. Others of us may wish he would just go on and finally die already. Yet, it seems clear that historically something dramatic, however slowly, has taken place—a "metamorphosis" such as this. Ricoeur says that, in regard to this god, we think we know also what is the cause of death: metaphysics' self-destruction via nihilism. Who, however, has made this pronouncement of death? All is called into question, for it is the madman (from *The Gay Science*, 1882/1974), or Zarathustra, or Nietzsche himself, who we all know lost his mind as well. Or the ferocious lion who is utterly free and wild, measuring the world by himself alone, by the strength of his will. Of this pronouncement, Ricoeur concludes: "Nothing is capable of proving it [the death of this god], unless it be the new form of life that this message makes possible, or the affirmation" (1969/1974, p. 460).

The affirmation must come on the heels of critique; the "sacred 'No'" must be followed with the "sacred 'Yes.'" The aftermath of this critique—the impact of the
arrival of this spirit of atheism and the "sacred 'No'"—is the destruction of the god of morality as not only the source of accusation but also of protection. Ricoeur asserts that if atheism has a religious meaning, and he believes that it does, that meaning is found in its movement toward faith of a new and different kind. It is a faith that positions itself in relation to classical metaphysics in the same way as the character of Job in the Old Testament stood in relation to his friends. Contrary to his friends, Job’s God is not the god of morality ruling the world under the auspices of commandment, duty and the law of retribution (The Holy Bible, 1985, Job). Ricoeur admits, renouncing something of the linearity of this formulation, that there have always been people of faith who rejected this God of retribution, though few—whom we identify as saints, prophets, master teachers, great souls. Theirs was the tragic faith of Job, beyond assurance and protection.

Through atheism, the cultural burial of the God of providence, and nihilism, points to the possibility of this new kind of faith, for many—a democracy of great souls.

Nietzsche himself, despite himself, seems to believe in this opening to faith, as evidenced in the story of Zarathustra, as well as in other shimmerings of a positive philosophy found in his works: like the affirmation of Dionysus, the amor fati (the love of fate), the eternal return of the same, and even the yearning for the overman6—one

6The Dionysus affirmed by Nietzsche changes from his earlier to later works. While Dionysus is ever passion, in The Birth of Tragedy (1872/1957) he is passion unbridled and intoxicated, and in Twilight of the Idols (1889/1982b) he is passion mastered and creatively engaged. The figure exuberantly, however, in all cases, positively affirms this world, and human passion (Kaufmann, 1967). The eternal return of the same is that doctrine to which Nietzsche (1886/1966) is brought in plumbing the
could argue. After Nietzsche—atheism, the lion—the question is left open; nothing is as yet decided. The way ahead is fraught with danger and uncertainty. However, the way to faith is ahead, asserts Ricoeur: "I believe we are henceforth incapable of returning to an order of moral life which would take the form of a simple submission to commandments or to an alien or supreme will, even if this will were represented as divine. We must accept as a positive good the critique of ethics and religion that has been undertaken by the school of suspicion. From it we have learned to understand that the commandment that gives death, not life, is a product and projection of our own weakness" (1969/1974, p. 447).

Yet we have also learned of the insufficiency of atheism, that the lion's reign, too, is an unsatisfactory conclusion. Though Nietzsche has these sprinkles of the "sacred 'Yes'" throughout his work, it is dominated by rebellion and critique. Ricoeur states: "This positive Nietzschean philosophy, which alone is capable of conferring authority on his negative hermeneutics, remains buried under the ruins that Nietzsche has accumulated around him.... His aggression against Christianity remains caught up in the attitude of resentment; the rebel is not, and cannot be, at the same level as the prophet.

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depths of pessimism through thought. He claims that doing so has freed him from the simple-mindedness and reduction of this century's world-denying thought, and has opened his eyes to a new and opposite ideal which is aliveness itself, high-spiritedness, and world advocacy. Such is akin to the amor fati, his love of fate, an "amen" to the infinite occurrence of what is. For Nietzsche's (1883/1982a) discussion of the overman, man's positive triumph of himself and "the meaning of the earth," see section 3 in the "Prologue" of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883/1982a).
Nietzsche's work remains an accusation of accusation and hence falls short of a pure affirmation of life" (p. 446-447).

We must find our way, then, to this "sacred 'Yes'" to life, to the affirmation of the child, to faith. For Ricoeur, the work of the philosopher toward this end lies in exploring what he sees as something of a dialectic between religion and atheism, in digging beneath the present antinomy and reviving the question. The task is opening up a measure of inquiry which could conceivably accomplish a negotiation by way of atheism toward faith for a postreligious age. Of course, such a negotiation could not be a meager reconciliation of a hermeneutics of suspicion, that seeks to slay generations of idols, and a restorative hermeneutics, that works to resurrect the original living symbols behind those idols. Yet, according to Ricoeur, the philosopher can only think and question in this interim time--this period of mourning, nihilism, instability, before the emergence of a new spirit, the recognizable metamorphosis from lion to child, atheism to faith. The rest is the job of the prophet, perhaps.

Nevertheless, the challenge is posed: "We must now go further. Our critique of metaphysics and its search for rational reconciliation must give way to a positive ontology, beyond resentment and accusation. Such a positive ontology consists in an entirely nonethical vision, or what Nietzsche described as 'the innocence of becoming'" (p. 457). Such a vision is, as such, beyond good and evil. Moreover, it must remain open, having overcome dogmatism, lest it fall under the accusation of its own critique. It is a vision without certainty, then, having given up the fear and also the protection
through its "becoming innocence." For Ricoeur, it involves the prophetic preaching of a freedom free from condemnation, and also consolation—at least of the former kind. He says: "An heir to the tragic faith of Job,... it would be a faith that moves forward through the shadows, in a new 'night of the soul'—to adopt the language of the mystics—before a God who would not have the attributes of 'Providence,' a God who would not protect me but would surrender me to the dangers of a life worthy of being called human" (p. 460).

Jacques Derrida (1992/1995), in The Gift of Death, has taken up in part, albeit not explicitly, the challenge of Ricoeur, the task of the philosopher in response to this interim period of loss. In addition, he has both supplemented and complicated this formulation of humanity's history with the divine which we have been investigating. He has gone on to dig deeper than Ricoeur, perhaps, before religion and further beneath it, uncovering more that is not only hidden, but also secretly retained in subsequent stages or changes beyond. Within this frame, he elucidates what we might call the "religious meaning"—for lack of a better word—at the heart of the secular, indeed at the heart of history itself. Of course, this religious meaning, we may more appropriately speak of as the esoteric or the sacred, perhaps even demonic meaning—the mystery, the inaccessible, the Cloud of Unknowing (Anonymous, ca. 1300/1957). Following Jan Patočka (1975/1981), Derrida focuses on Western religion and philosophy, specifically Christianity and Platonism, as the birthright of responsibility, integrally linked to
freedom, faith, history and the human subject. His central interest is in the growth or development of the notion of responsibility in European history out of humanity's relation to the sacred, and the moral and ethical meaning of such a notion.

In Heretical Essays on the History of Philosophy, Patocka discusses the relationship between responsibility and secrecy or the mystery of the sacred, highlighting what Derrida calls their heterogeneity, or connection in opposition. "He warns against an experience of the sacred as an enthusiasm or fervor for fusion, cautioning in particular against a form of demonic rapture that has as its effect, and often as its first intention, the removal of responsibility, the loss of a sense of consciousness of responsibility" (Derrida, 1992/1995, p. 1). Religion represents a break with this demonic secrecy in that it appeals to a free and responsible self. Derrida, grounding his inquiry in the work of Patocka, does not fault him for reference only to the Christian religion, for the omission of some sort of comparative analysis. He asserts: "It seems necessary to reinforce the coherence of a way of thinking that takes into account the event of Christian mystery as an absolute singularity, a religion par excellence and an irreducible condition for a joint
history of the subject, responsibility, and Europe" (p. 2). We might say this
"Eurocentric" view is justified given the uniquely European legacy that this history is,
and also given the crisis in which this history seems to culminate.

Derrida, thus, reaches before religion to the "orgiastic sacred." Religion only
arrives once this demonic secret is surpassed or outstripped. Here, we refer to the
concept of daimon* in which the boundaries between the divine, the human, and the beast
are blurred, crossed, lost. This daimon is the mystery of desire, prior to any form of
responsibility; as such, it is irresponsibility, or non-responsibility. It is that place before
which any call to respond has arrived, any injunction to explain oneself before the other
has been issued. It is before the complete formation of the subject, the "I." We do not
say that it has been destroyed in religion, but rather integrated or in some way subjected
to the domain of responsibility. Derrida explains that religion, if it is anything at all, is
responsibility, at least in the Christian sense. Moreover, he claims that history obtains its

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*The word daimon comes to us in the English as a transliteration from the
Greek, indicative of a spirit, or spirit itself, which may be benevolent or evil: in the
Greek, it is frequently a tutor-deity—in some measure in the service of humankind; in the
Latin, it is often an evil spirit. The meaning of daimon is not just the notion of divinity,
or the spiritual, intangible and invisible force animating all of life, but also is seen as the
source of inspiration in a human being, its genius and most influential life force. Though
the term demonic is drawn as well from this root, it does not signify spiritual darkness,
although it might. The universe itself is daimonic, the daimonic being central to the
affairs of the cosmos as well as those of humanity. Desire, the flesh, the earth, the
heavens—all are expressions of the daimonic. Wild forces they are that when too
powerful, might drive one to madness, a condition through the daimonic felt to be very
near genius—inspirational powers gone awry (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, Vol. IV,
pp. 217, 445).
meaning or function from this "metamorphosis" or journey to responsibility, this deliverance from the esoteric: a movement to the history of responsibility and to history as responsibility. What Nietzsche calls "the stroke of genius called Christianity," Derrida identifies as the history of Europe.

"The history of the responsible self is built upon the heritage and patrimony of secrecy, through a chain reaction of ruptures and repressions that assume the very tradition they punctuate with their interruptions" (p. 7). Derrida links the responsible self with the birth of religion, specifically Christianity, and with the present moment that has endured in the history of the sacred, however secular. He traces this heritage of secrecy, beginning with the demonic sacred and passing through Platonism to Christianity, and Europe. Derrida coins this history as the "crypto- or mysta-genealogy of responsibility" (p. 33).

Platonism represents the initial break with the demonic mystery, the initial experience of the notion of responsibility. The orgiastic sacred is retained in part, the secret is incorporated. Complete differentiation is not accomplished. Responsibility extends only to the political dimension of life almost exclusively. The self of Platonism is the ethico-political self. Plato's anabasis, or upward journey from the cave of darkness to the light of the sun, does not signify the death of the mystery, yet perhaps its denial. It is one mystery come to dominate or suppress or envelop another. This Platonic conversion is one of turning away from or forsaking the cave—what one scholar calls "earth-mother," and seeking to extricate oneself from it, in order to move toward the sun with
fixed eye upon the light of the good and intelligible. It is the ascending path of the soul to eternity, and the fountain of eternity. Thus begins the subordination of the orgiastic mystery to responsibility. Patočka (1975/1981) considers this a conversion toward interiority, the constitution of a "new mystery of the soul," that is the quest for the "good," the genesis of the internal dialogue. Hannah Arendt (1978) attributes the birth of the will as a faculty of the soul, as well, to the internalization the Christian stance achieves, bound up in the notion of responsibility.

What Derrida (1992/1995) describes as becoming responsible or becoming historical is intrinsically bound to the *mysterium tremendum*, or the Christian event of

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*Mysterium tremendum* is a term coined by Rudolph Otto (1917/1950/1960) in his classic study on "The Idea of the Holy." For Otto, the expression signifies the most profound and foundational element in true religious experience. The modern or contemporary idea of the holy, according to Otto, is derivative, having been reduced to a moral signification. While such is inclusive in the concept, it signifies first and foremost, eminently, what he calls "this unnamed Something" (p. 199), this overplus and excess of meaning, evading signification even. Further, all genuine religion has such as its sanctuary, center or innermost essence. The mysterium tremendum—the tremendous mystery, or mysterious trembling—is, for him, the only adequate expression of this experience of the holy, before its schematization, "a unique original feeling-response" (p. 199). It is the experience of the *numinous*, irreducible to any other experience, penetrating the inexpressible surplus, beyond goodness. He goes on to call it "creature-consciousness" or "creature-feeling"—the overwhelming sight of the numinous or "The Wholly Other." Defining elements include feelings of awfulness, overpoweringness, energy or urgency, and fascination.

The *OED* defines *mysterium tremendum* as "a term used to express the overwhelming awe and sense of unknowable mystery felt by those to whom this aspect of God or of being is revealed" (1989, Vol. X, p. 173). In this sense, the mysterium tremendum does not denote that which is hidden per se, for it involves a revelation, one, however, which even upon and after delivery remains inexplicable, beyond expression, mysterious, in a way which may simultaneously evoke a sense of ecstasy or rapture and of fear or dread. There exists, then, in this moment something of a confrontation with
mystery. The moment of becoming a person is one of fear and trembling, of being paralyzed before the fixed stare of God in one's irreplaceable uniqueness. The good and intelligible sun becomes this ever-eyeing God and the one taking the ascending path, the "I" in naked singularity. The advent of the Christian mystery accomplishes the process begun in Platonism from exteriority to interiority, and also from the accessible to the inaccessible. The mysterium tremendum of Christianity finally, reports Derrida, entreats and enables me to respond, stirs and awakens me to responsibility. Against the Platonic mystery, which has itself incorporated the demonic, the Christian mystery arises; yet, it arrives upon that mystery, in the same instance repressing it, the mystery that is in fact its foundation.

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"There is the possibility that the question of "access" is that which has not even been considered before, the question itself requiring a certain measure of interiority and self-consciousness. In this sense, perhaps Christianity is inclusive of a turn back toward orgiastic mystery, at least in an acknowledgement and awareness of inexpressible, inexplicable mystery, a kind of disciplined admission of something heretofore repressed. However, we may also distinguish between the thought of Plato and Platonism, for Plato admits to the inaccessible, to the mystery, involving the sight of the good and the "mystical" experience of the One, of the One in the Many.

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Thus, we have in humanity's relation to the sacred a complicated history, full of repressions, ruptures, envelopments, and abysses upon abysses—at least in the West. It is not then a matter of a clear and straight progression from the demonic to the Platonic to the Christian, nor from religion to atheism to faith. Rather, Derrida calls attention to the "logic of the conservative rupture" of each advance, which like his economy of the trace keeps what it gives up, retains something of what it has surpassed, subordinated, denied, and buried. Of course, such still involves mourning and a sense of loss, as if nothing were retained, as if all were relinquished. Always at play is "the burning memory

"The development seems rather to center in a kind of tension between absolute objectivity and absolute subjectivity as the ground of authority or justification. Moreover, the movement, while along a continuum, becomes strangely circular, wherein the one absolute turns easily into the other, even though the two are progressively differentiated, separated and polarized. The gaze of God in one instance becomes absolute objectivity in the moment it is felt by human subjectivity at its height, though in the person of God it is absolute subjectivity. The orgiastic can be construed as absolute objectivity in the unquestioned experience and acceptance of what is, as absolute subjectivity in terms of the center of value and the lack of a felt need to respond to the other.

"The concept of the trace is central in Derrida's thought, particularly in his earlier works. In the French, the word connotes powerfully notions of a track or imprint. In this sense, it attests to the absence of presence, the infinitely referential. The trace records the mark of a former origin or presence, the residue; it testifies to the necessity of an origin and to its erasure, as ever receding, evasive, illusory. Derrida says: "The trace is not only the disappearance of origin—within the disclosure that we sustain and according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did not even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin" (1967/1974, p 61). The trace is akin to his notions of "arche-writing," and "différence." For more on the concept, see Derrida's Of Grammatology (1967/1974), although the term is found and discussed in a number of his works.
or crypt of a more ancient secret" (p. 9). Derrida refers to this as an enveloping of immortality by immortality—eternity within eternity.

The incorporation undergone in Platonism whereby responsibility begins to overcome this orgiastic mystery is the gesture whereby the immortality of the soul is established. It is an immortality of the individual in search of the good, an endeavor requiring discipline. Discipline is the work, the exercise, the training needed to keep the secret of the demonic mystery, and to keep the secret at the service of the Platonic sacred. This discipline is philosophy, as well, and the dialectic—secret and yet revealed. Mortal and yet immortal, we are taught by it how to die in order to gain eternity. Derrida here evokes the image of philosophy given in the Phaedo (Plato, c.a. 395 b.c./1951) by Socrates: philosophy is "the attentive anticipation of death,... the experience of a vigil over the possibility of death, and over the possibility of death as impossibility" (Derrida, 1992/1995, pp. 12,13).

We see the mystery, the secrecy at the heart of the individual responsible self's constitution. This care over death is inseparable from an authentic concern for the soul and for life. In fact, says Derrida, "this awakening that keeps vigil over death, this conscience that looks death in the face is another name for freedom" (p. 15). Thus, the administration of responsibility—including freedom and faith with it¹³—involves a triumph

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¹³Paul Tillich (1957) defines faith in terms of the action of the total personality, at the heart of the personal life, involving all of its elements, the participation of conscious and unconscious aspects of the personality. In fact, he asserts that the act of faith is "the most personal of all personal acts" (p. 4) and "the most centered act of the
over death, which is also a triumph of life. Always too, vestiges of struggle persist in any triumph. We find here a genealogy consistent with and resonant of Martin Heidegger's (1927/1962) analysis of Dasein, being-in-the-world, being-towards-death, and the meaning of human being as care in one's temporality. There is, as human mind" (p. 4). He goes on to equate, in this, sense, freedom and faith: "For faith is a matter of freedom. Freedom is nothing more than the possibility of centered personal acts. The frequent discussion in which faith and freedom are contrasted could be helped by the insight that faith is a free, namely, centered act of the personality. In this respect freedom and faith are identical" (p. 5).

"Dasein, literally "There-Being," is a term coined by Heidegger to discuss the Being that is human, principally pointing to the insufficiency of the segregated notions of the subject and the object (subjectivity and objectivity). Constitutive of human being is its "there," the world in which it finds itself with things and others.

Heidegger identifies "Being-in-the-world" (Ger. In-der-Welt-sein) as a fundamental structure of the Being that is human. For him, it is a unitary phenomenon that must be seen as a whole. We, as humans, are never without a world within which we always are and from out of which we can never be taken for analysis. One cannot consider human existence apart from this world. For more on Heidegger's explication of this concept, see: pp. 78-90 of his Being and Time. (1962). (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). San Francisco: Harper. (Original work published 1927).

"Heidegger's term to connote the nature and end, the directedness and projective quality, of the being that is human. We are always "more" than we factually are, always our "not yet." Furthermore, our very being is teleological, directed toward an end. Death is that end, our utmost and ownmost possibility, inescapable, not to be outstripped. The coinage denotes, as well, the singularity and irreplaceability of each human life. No one can represent or stand for another in this case, the meaning of such ever our own alone. As the being whose very being is at issue, this end as well is ever at issue for each person, whether evaded, denied, repressed or openly faced.

"Care, for Heidegger, is a primordial totality. It is a concept referring to the ontological structure of Dasein. Heidegger makes clear that it does not have anything to do with trials or the cares of life, per se. Melancholic, happy, and carefree designations are only ontically (factually, existentially) possible, he says, because our being is care. It
well, a striving of being regarding truth, authenticity, and resoluteness conjuring up the Heraclitian image of being as war itself.

With Christianity, the ultimate triumph of death, there is hidden from oneself and others more than the secret of the orgiastic mystery but also of one's own mortality, which is both refused and denied in the experience of victory. It is what Patočka (1975/1981) calls a "new mythology" which makes the genealogy of responsibility, the birth of absolute freedom, ambiguous and disquieting. It is founded on a duality which positions the authentic and responsible over against the sacred and extraordinary. It is also a politics, a war, and the ground of Western politics.

History does not annul that which it secretly bears. Thus, the return of the orgiastic mystery, even in the place of secularization, is found indefinitely. Such is especially true in the space of change or unrest, of metamorphosis. Derrida, with Patočka, sees in this insight contemporary political significance as well. He says, "Every revolution, whether atheistic or religious, bears witness to a return of the sacred in the is concern and solicitude in a world of and with things and others. The being that is human is Being-in-the-world, it is Being-toward the world, toward entities in the world, toward others. Care is our very Being, and we are emersed in it, it includes our everyday attitude of concern toward other things and living beings around us, and our deepest existential longings.

"Heidegger asserts that whenever we interpret or seek to understand the being of a thing, we must do so with time as our standpoint. Time, then, must be illumined and conceived as "the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it" (1927/1962, p. 39). The closest Heidegger comes to a definition of temporality is the following: "This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been" (p. 374).
form of an enthusiasm or fervor, otherwise known as the presence of the gods within us." (1992/1995, p 21). Durkheim (1915/1968) also, he notes, emphasizes the propensity, perhaps inevitability, of society to fashion its own gods or even raise itself up as a god. Patočka, referring to the fervor or god-making of the French Revolution, says: "This is of course an enthusiasm that, in spite of the cult of reason, retains its orgiastic character, one which is undisciplined or insufficiently disciplined by the personal relation to responsibility. The danger of a new fall into the orgiastic is imminent" (cited in Derrida, 1992/1995, p. 22). Patočka says, "in spite of the cult of reason," the demonic endures, whereas we might argue it is at least also because of reason's reign. The esoteric is, in fact, embedded therein.

Further complications and dangers follow the metamorphosis from Platonism to Christianity. "Platonic rationalism, the Platonic desire to subordinate responsibility itself to the objectivity of knowledge, continues to secretly influence Christian conceptions" (Patočka, cited in Derrida, p. 24). Yet herein lies the aporia of responsibility: to subordinate it to such objectivity would be, in fact, irresponsible, what Derrida describes as a "technical deployment of a cognitive apparatus, the simple mechanistic deployment of a theorem" (p. 24). The consensus and complaint of the two thinkers seems to be that Christianity has failed to fully repress its covert Platonism. Moreover, their feeling is that to the extent that the politics of the Platonic tradition continues to hold sway in Europe and the Western world—even beyond Christian influence—the less the capacity for responsibility, and the greater the opportunity of totalitarianism of one kind or
another. Derrida informs that politics excludes the mystical, denies the mystery essential to responsible living.

The assertion, then, is that there is much that remains unthought in Christianity, but yet cannot truly be thought within it. For, having repressed the Platonic as well as the demonic sacred incorporated therein, Christianity cannot reflect wholly upon itself, namely upon the Platonic thinking and demonic mystery which it retains. Such amounts to an inadequate thematization of responsibility, which is also an irresponsible thematization. Herein, as well, is the irreducible complexity original to responsibility as aporia. "The secret of responsibility would consist of keeping secret, or incorporated, the secret of the demonic and thus of preserving within itself a nucleus of irresponsibility or of absolute unconsciousness ... 'orgiastic irresponsibility'" (p 20). In order to act in the world responsibly, it is essential that one know what being responsible means, and yet, it seems, this knowledge is not possible. The notion of responsibility intimates praxis; responsibility is activated in a conscious decision, a response. The decision, the act, is always before and beyond theoretical or thematic determination; it is independent of knowledge. Thus, any thematization of responsibility is always inadequate and must be, according to the notion of freedom itself in practice. To follow the edicts of objective knowledge, the commandments derived from them, is to be neither free nor responsible.

In this way, Derrida explains that because of this idea of freedom, heresy and heterogeneity are inherent to responsibility. Responsibility is condemned to resistance
and dissent. In the exercise of responsibility, there is simply no choice but paradox, heresy, and secrecy. Without heresy—some creative break from rule, authority, tradition, orthodoxy, there is no responsibility. Ever-present, as well, is the risk of apostasy or renaissance.

Yet, Christianity is not fully inadequate, not fully Platonic, especially in relation to responsibility in all its complexity. The mysterium tremendum of Christianity includes a terror unknown in the transcendent experience of Platonic responsibility associated with the city. This terror involves, in the words of Derrida, "the abyssal dissymmetry that occurs when one is exposed to the gaze of the other" (p. 28). It is a frightening secret that comes before and surpasses the assuming relation between subject and object. Awareness is given to the absolute disproportion that brings me, and mine, together with the unseen eye of another, secret and yet commanding. Because of Christianity's grounding in the unfathomable chasm and depth of the soul, the assertion is made that it endures as the most compelling way to traverse the reaches of this abyss of responsibility.

Derrida, in fact, maintains that Christianity has not yet come to Christianity. The new responsibility declared through the mysterium tremendum has not yet reached its fulfillment. The future of Europe, and modern civilization as such, is then found in the promise. The call is, in part, to a more extreme break with Greco-Roman Platonic politics. The promise is the location or scene of the most consummate enigma, the gift of what is still impenetrable, unrepresentable, secret. Christianity, retaining a certain
Platonism, conceives of the responsible life as a gift, along the order of the good, and yet it is a gift neither present nor accessible, but one to which humanity is forever bound. In this sense, the gift is a mystery to which belongs the final word.

Derrida brings the question before us, as well as a response:

What is it that ails 'modern civilization' inasmuch as it is European?... Why does it suffer from ignorance of its history, from a failure to assume its responsibility, that is the memory of its history as responsibility?... At the heart of this history there is something of an abyss, an abyss that resists totalizing summary. Separating orgiastic mystery from Christian mystery, this abyss also announces the origin of responsibility. (pp. 3, 4)

Historicity itself, then, is a secret that keeps. Perhaps, Patocka (1975/1981) suggests, it is not a question so much of the decline of civilization in our day but whether or not historical humans can acknowledge history—the abyss that undermines what we think we know. The danger is an excess of knowledge along the order of detail that assists us in forgetting not only the fundamental questions but also the grounds that have given rise to such questions and problems. This saturated objective knowledge does not ensure or even advance necessarily responsible thought and action.

"History can be neither a decidable object nor a totality capable of being mastered, precisely because it is tied to responsibility, to faith and to the gift" (Derrida, 1992/1995, p. 5). Derrida describes responsibility as that which is made outside knowledge, lest it be mere calculation or the technical application of reason to a particular situation. As such, responsibility involves, in the moment of absolute decision, going through "the ordeal of the undecidable" (1990, 1992/1995). Faith precedes
responsibility or is borne with it, by this venture into absolute risk which is involvement with the other, beyond knowledge and certainty. This engagement with the other, this care for the other, summons a response. The gift Derrida speaks of is more specifically the gift of death, an ambiguous concept he describes as a marriage of responsibility and faith, and the excessive beginning of history. By the gift, one is confronted with the transcendence and infinite alterity of the other, with one's relation to this other, God and selfless goodness. Such amounts to a new experience of death. Thus, says Derrida: "Responsibility and faith go together however paradoxical that might seem to some, and both should, in the same movement, exceed mastery and knowledge" (1992/1995, p. 6).

In his exploration of the history of responsibility, in his tracing of humanity's relationship with the sacred, Derrida too comes to faith. Derrida attends to the cry of a waning historical moment, a time of distress and decline, and to the call of responsibility, the plea to respond in such a time. Questioning responsibility, he finds aporia, paradox, an abyss at the heart. Yet, he also finds faith, responsibility's other half. Perhaps it is that faith itself acts as a mediator of sorts which, acknowledging the abyss at the core of responsibility, returns responsibility to its origins in the sacred, in demonic desire, in mystery. Perhaps, faith is the mystery, the paradox, the abyss. Certainly, faith is a difficult concept, burdened down with connotations of every variety, yet powerful, enduring, expressing a reality we cannot continue to ignore.

Faith, either explicitly or implicitly, bears this relationship to the mystery of historicity. It is a being-towards-death; it involves care and concern, this vigil over
death. The theologian Paul Tillich (1957) defines faith as "the state of being ultimately concerned" (p. 1). As concern with the ultimate, faith reaches beyond historicity in passion for the infinite, embraces infinite passion. Faith admits humanity's yearning for eternity and immortality; it suggests the need of the historical for the eternal, and of the eternal for the historical. Faith, in this way, also mediates in the space of an abyss separating impossibility from possibility, mortality from immortality. The finite and infinite, the historical and the eternal, find each other in faith. Faith too, owning human finitude and longing, confesses the repressed marrow of responsibility. We do not mean here to explicate the nature, essence or substance of faith—though such is important, necessary and even perhaps pressing, only to acknowledge its importance and its aporetic complexity. Heidegger has explicated the very meaning of human being to be its temporality, made visible or evidenced as care. This care is unique to humanity for whom at issue is our own being. In this way, we might postulate that faith, as a condition of care toward the ultimate, is, in fact, central to the meaning of human being in Heidegger's sense, and constitutive of it, at least in the moment of becoming a person, a subject—as Derrida puts it, in becoming historical, responsible. Faith is then integral, perhaps foundational, to existential and ontological meaning and value. Here is Ricoeur's "life worthy of being called human."

Derrida's contemplation upon these sacral metamorphoses in human history, in Western human history, has not only served to compliment but also to complicate Ricoeur's formulation, and the images of Zarathustra. Ricoeur, we might say, proceeds
to unfold a historical process of demythification, demythologization, the death of the
gods as it were, and posits a movement toward faith. Derrida, however, uncovers the
repressed mythology operating at the heart of this disenchantment; his accomplishment
is, in this sense, the re-mythification and mystification of history, or the manifestation of
history's "intra-mythology"—the mystery, the enchantment internal, original to history,
and yet hidden therein. Faith is already and ever present. Such a discovery works to
confirm Ricoeur's belief in a religious meaning to atheism, and the need for a new kind of
faith. Nietzsche, along with many a scholar, has postulated, in fact, atheism as
Christianity's logical end, or at least consequential of its internal logic. If, as Derrida
asserts, religion is responsibility, atheism identifies the operation of the repressed
irresponsible at religion's core. The camel in fact abdicates responsibility in dutifully
carrying out injunctions given; in the guise of responsibility, the spirit denies its fear and
need for protection—its own desires.

The limits of the rational and the responsible are clearly outlined as well. Even
within atheism, and not simply beyond it, endures the sacred. "To destroy idols causes
one to enter into the sacred" (Serres, 1986/1989, p. 78). Moreover, the rational, the
critical, cannot reach the aporia, the paradox, the mystery that life is. Both Ricoeur
(1969/1974) and Derrida (1992/1995) respond to these limits and return to a look at the
sacred. Although presenting different formulations and different insights, both arrive at
this enigma of human historicity, this abyss, this emptiness at the heart. Both put forth
this promise, as well, the hope of a faith beyond what we have known or know; both
realize a certain historical moment in need of metamorphosis, a moment on the verge of dying or being born anew.

It is not, then, a matter of gaining faith in our time or regaining it, but of coming to a new kind of faith, perhaps. As Tillich (1957) asserts, faith always is; the issue is the ultimacy of the concern, that within which faith is placed, or misplaced as atheism has found the case to be. "The danger of faith," says Tillich, "is idolatry and the ambiguity of the holy its demonic possibility. Our ultimate concern can destroy us as it can heal us. But we can never be without it" (p. 16). This new kind of faith, Ricoeur's postreligious faith, is conceivably a knowing and yet unknowing faith that exceeds knowledge and stands beyond reflection and critique, coming after it, on its heels, in response to it. It is a faith that speaks a sacred "Yes," a grand "Amen;" a faith that consists in a pure affirmation of life, despite and in the midst of sacred "No's," dying idols and difficult commandments. "A god disappears, divinity remains" (p. 18).
CHAPTER 2
CURSE, CRISIS AND THE REIGN OF DEATH

In the beginning, God made the world, man and woman, and all that is therein. Heaven and earth, sun and moon and stars, light and darkness, sea and firmament, grass and herb, seed and fruit and tree, winged fowl and great whales, cattle and creeping things—all of these did the Lord God speak into being. Lights there were summoned for signs and seasons, for days and years—greater lights and lesser lights to rule over day and night. Moving creatures of every kind did the Lord God also shape: beasts of the earth, fish of the sea, and fowl of the air. God commanded the man and the woman, whom he had fashioned in his own image, that they be fruitful and multiply, that they replenish and govern the earth over which they were granted authority.

The Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden in which from the fertile soil, he made trees to grow. One was called the tree of life, and the other, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. He made also a river running out of Eden to water his garden. From the dust of the earth, the Lord God fashioned man, and quickened him by his very breath. He placed the man in the garden to dress and keep it. The man named the creatures of the earth; among them, however, no companion was found. Then did the Lord God put the man into a deep sleep and took from him a rib out of which he fashioned a woman. Both the man and the woman lived peacefully with God in the garden, naked and unashamed. Now, the Lord God also commanded the man, saying: "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest eat freely, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, of it thou shalt not eat: For in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die."

In the midst of the garden dwelt the most subtle and cunning of all the beasts of the field, the serpent, who one day spoke to the woman, saying: "Yea, hath God said that ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?"

The woman answered: "The fruit of the trees of the garden we may eat, but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God has said to us, 'Of it ye shall not eat, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die.'"

But the serpent answered back to her: "Surely ye shall not die: For God knows that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes will be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil."

The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that to the eyes it was most pleasant. A tree desired to make one wise, she took of
its fruit and did eat, and gave also to her husband with her, and he did eat. Then they knew that they were naked, for their eyes were opened, and they made aprons for themselves out of fig leaves.

In the cool of the evening, they heard the voice of the Lord God walking through the garden. Among the trees, they hid from his presence. Still the Lord called to them. When he found them, the man said: "We heard Thy call and were afraid because of our nakedness." Then did the Lord God know that they had eaten from the fruit forbidden to them. "The woman you gave me, she brought to me the fruit and I did eat," replied the man. The woman likewise reported of the serpent's cunning.

Then did the Lord God curse the serpent to crawl upon his belly and to eat of the dust of the earth. He did also put enmity between the serpent and the woman, between his seed and hers, declaring: "Though ye shall bruise his heel, he shall bruise thy head." And to the woman the Lord God delivered sorrow in childbirth, sealing also her desire for her husband and his rule over her. And he cursed the ground for man's sake, that in grief he should eat of it. He made it to bring forth thorns and thistles, that by toil and sweat only should the earth yield her fruit.

"From dust were ye made and to it shall ye return," said the Lord God at last to the creatures he had made in his own image. Then he made coats of skin to clothe them. He likewise drove them out of the garden, away from his presence, and set cherubim and a flaming sword at the garden's entrance to prevent their return and to guard the tree of life.

A retelling of the Judeo-Christian "Story of Creation" and of the "Fall of Man," from the Old Testament scriptures, (The Holy Bible, 1985, Genesis 1-3)

In the beginning: God, creation and the breath that is life. Shortly thereafter, however, follows the "fall" into death—humanity excommunicated, the earth cursed. In contrast to the Nietzschean prerogative that "God is dead" and long before it, we have here God pronouncing the sentence of death upon humanity. Yet, can we establish some coherent relationship between these two epitaphs? Some pathway from this ancient tale of curse and condemnation to the perpetuated crisis of the modern age, with Nietzsche's confirmation of the death of the divine? To attempt such a journey may not be necessary, and we may in part have already accomplished it with Ricoeur in looking at
humanity's movement from religion to atheism and with Derrida in tracing the birth of
the human subject.

Again, too, the contrast might not be as great as it seems; perhaps it is primarily
a matter of perspective. In the beginning, God is the author of death. In the beginning,
God declares his human creatures guilty and banishes them from his garden paradise.
From that point on, however, they, and we, are in the middle of things—in medias res, in
some measure separated from the divine, expunged from his presence. God might as
well be dead. It is now left to humanity alone to read and to understand these things.
Possibly, by asserting the death of God in our imagination, we cunningly permit the
denial of our own death, pronounced and eminent. Perhaps, we have been so long out

1In order to be true to the Biblical account of the story, or at least consistent with
it, God is referred to throughout my exposition as a male deity, with the use of the
pronoun "he." Genesis 1:27 reads: "God created man in His own image; in the image
of God He created him; male and female He created them" (The Holy Bible, 1985,
emphasis mine). The dominant view of God in the history of the West, as well, has been
a male-oriented one. For more on this topic, and for a brief discussion concerning the
question of God's gender, the gender issues around the concept of God, see Chapter 1,
Footnote 3. The serpent, in addition, having been identified with Satan, the Devil, in
other parts of the scriptures, is identified therein as male (The Holy Bible, 1985,
Revelation 12:9, for example), thus the use of "he" in reference to this figure also
throughout the chapter.

2The anthropologist Ernest Becker, in his Pulitzer-prize-winning book The Denial
of Death (1973), claims that all humans are born with a fear, innate and borne
throughout life: this ever-present haunting terror of death. His contention is that in
order to live, humanity deludes itself—we deceive ourselves—with a "vital lie" in which
repressed is the knowledge of human mortality—more specifically, of our own mortality,
i.e., the denial of death. This repression, he argues, is evidenced in human thought, the
way we think about and know the world and ourselves, as well as human behavior, the
way we act and the way we are in the world; it also lies at the core of anxiety and
mental illness. In like manner, Martin Heidegger (1927/1962), in Being and Time,
describes "being-towards-death" as constitutive of our very being as humans. He posits
that this, our ownmost possibility which is death—inescapable, unable to be undertaken
of Eden that we have altogether forgotten the experience of the divine and our own eviction, and assume rather that it is God who has taken the last breath. Yet, we might be concerned by the haunting question that follows: Can God, the breath or spirit—the author of life, be dead and his creatures, his creation, endure, live on, and sustain life?

Surely, the story holds much for us to ponder. For it is not merely a story, but one of mythic proportions, within a tradition (though borrowed from the East) which bears a profound impact upon Western consciousness. This story of beginnings, this foundational Western myth of origins, concerning the creation of the world and humankind and human knowledge, though ancient, abides with us; we might even suggest that it still very much resonates within us, shaping particularly our present conceptions of knowledge and of human knowing—what we think we know of ourselves and of the world and of the divine, and how we think we know these things. Here, the myth will serve to illumine for us the state of things as we have been considering them, in a sense as a prophetic point of departure, from which we may finally address and attend to the call of faith in our own times—and understand and feel more fully the urgency and import of such a call. For, from our perspective, God is dead, as Nietzsche first

by another in our stead, is known, and yet fled from. This constitutive human state of "falling" is the abnegation of our own mortality, a fleeing in the face of death and of ourselves and our own non-relational possibility, the possibility of non-being.

Martin Heidegger (1954/1977c) claims that "the distinctive character of modern knowing ... consists in the decisive working out of a tendency that still remains concealed in the essence of knowing as the Greeks experienced it" (p. 157), tracing our own thought back to classical thought. In like manner, it is here suggested that the character of modern knowing might be traced back even further to pre-classical times, seeds of it found in myths regarding human knowledge such as those of "The Creation" and "The Fall."
observed, but there is more, it would seem. Humanity, as well, is in the grip of death's messenger. Moreover, the world too, with humanity, is hurtling toward its grave. Everywhere and in all places death appears to reign. And our Genesis story has foreshadowed and prophesied this destiny which we know to be our own.

The progress of history, particularly the birth of the responsible subject, it seems, is essentially characterized by death. As God dies or the gods die, so too begins the languishing of humanity and the natural world from which the divine has fled. Death is a symbol of alienation (New Bible Dictionary, 1982), the cessation of wholeness, the departure of the life or spirit. To die means to separate or to be separated (Vine's Expository Dictionary, n.d.). In the story of "The Fall of Man," upon taking of the forbidden fruit, the man and woman do not then physically die—though of course later they do. Theirs is, in a sense, a slow and painful death, or deaths upon deaths. They are torn asunder, separated from their God and maker and friend, and from their garden home. Humanity, fashioned by the hand of the divine, no longer lives with God in harmony and communion in the living paradise of his earthly garden. Rather, excommunication, curse, condemnation. And humanity exists not only at enmity with God and the spiritual world (including the serpent), but also at enmity with the earth: the earth no longer gives of itself freely; a rift is born between human creatures and other

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'Martin Heidegger (1959/1971b) gives an interesting explication of the "rift" in his essay on "Language" in Poetry, Language, Thought. Hopeful in a way, the rift is pain which tears asunder, but not wholly apart; thus, not only in the rift is there a separating that divides but also a separating that gathers, like the horizon where what is held apart in separation is also drawn and brought together. This site of pain may be that place where that which is sundered is healed and made whole.
created things—the world, and all of creation. Moreover, bloodshed shortly follows.

Man against man, brother against brother, Cain slays Abel in the next generation.

Humanity surely now possesses the knowledge of evil. The separation that is death prevails, long before Adam and Eve find bodily burial in earthly graves. It has been postulated that for the ancients death signified primarily the separation of the spirit from the corporeal body. Later in the development of this philosophy of death, and also theologically, there emerge further differentiations involved in this splitting which is death: both mind and spirit, or heart and soul, are severed from the body, or the flesh.

We know that to dissect something—to cut or separate the whole of it into parts—is to kill it, if it is living.

"Not only have the gods and the god fled, but the divine radiance has been extinguished in the world's history," says Martin Heidegger (1950/1971a, p. 91), in a commentary on modern times. In the words of Max Weber, in the aftermath of divine departure, "the disenchantment of the world" begins. Joel Kovel (1991), in History and Spirit, calls it the "despiritualization" of the world, man, and human existence.

Spirit,⁵ as the animating principle and the force of life, once exiled, gives way to death.

⁵Spirit comes from the Latin spiritus, meaning breathing or breath, as in the breath of God, that which in our creation story gave Adam, the image of humanity, life—the breath of life. The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) records the numerous and expansive meanings of spirit in five full three-column pages of fine print. Spirit is "the animating or vital principle in man; that which gives life; ... immaterial being ... , intelligence; the soul of a person; ... the active essence or essential power of the Deity, conceived as a creative, animating or inspiring influence; the Holy Spirit; ... the essential character, nature, or qualities of something; that which constitutes the pervading or tempering principle of anything; ... the immaterial intelligent or sentient element or part of a person; ... ardour, courage; ... a subtle or intangible element or principle in material things" (Vol. XVI, pp. 251-253); and the "breath" of its meanings go on.
This despiritualizing process also initiates the pulling asunder of all things. What has begun, in Derrida's composite (see Chapter 1), with Plato as the upward journey from the cave, the ascending path of the soul to eternity, culminates in the complete separation of the soul from the cave, the earth, the world and its inhabitants—or the birth of the subject. Kenneth Wilber (1995), using a developmental approach, traces the direction of the "spirit of evolution" as a movement toward differentiation and then integration. What has gone awry, in his estimation, is this differentiation. What naturally ought to strive toward integration has degenerated into dissociation. The result is a broken world and broken spirit, fragmented thinking, and a fractured worldview (Wilber, 1995; Sloan, 1983)—the reign of death.

God has been dead a long time, though. It is that genius Nietzsche who, as early as 1882 in The Gay Science, pronounced his death. Even earlier, Hegel, in Faith and Knowledge (1802/1977), noticed a certain unacknowledged or unrecognized feeling among the religious of his day that God himself was dead. Perhaps, however, "genius is prophetic; it does not so much re-present as pre-figure" (Kovel, 1991, p. 12). Ours has been described as the "God-forsaken and Goddess-forsaken world of modernity" in

In his book History and Spirit (1991), Joel Kovel discusses spirit and its immensity—its vast, excessive significations—through the use of six separate chapters, covering: "Spirit as Vital Force," "Spirit as Occult Being," "Authentic Spirit," "Spirit and Desire," "Divine Spirit," and spirit as related to the "Paths of Soul." In addition, he devotes the entire prelude to the definition of spirit. While Kovel spins out the "varieties of spirit" and its various definitions, he summarizes succinctly a central core of its meaning: "From the breath of a god, to an animating principle, to the real significance of something, to an unseen other, to what is immaterial and opposed to flesh, to the divine itself—the term spirit seems at first to have as its only coherent meaning, that which is vitally important, endowed with power, yet beyond immediate sense perception. It is not present—yet powerfully present. It belongs to what is 'other' to us" (p. 18).
which in our attempts to better our condition, we are destroying the earth—bent on saving ourselves through suicide (Wilber, 1995, p. x). Our Genesis story, too, foreshadows the death of God in human consciousness, along with the decline of humanity and the life of the cosmos. Ricoeur (1969/1974) calls ours an age of confusion: the impact of the death of religion has not yet been revealed. As such, ours is a parched time; as if waiting in a desert, we remain thirsty, in search of cool waters; it is an agonizing slow period of struggle, and of preparation. "The period of mourning for the gods who have died is not yet over" (p. 448).

Of course, according to Nietzsche, God has not merely died—we have killed him. If Nietzsche has prophesied, we might add, it has been in seeing the inevitable consequence of a logic begun centuries ago in the history of human thought (Berman, 1981), what we might call the "Logic of Death," of separation and of severing. In the aftermath of divine death begins the systematic killing of the world, humanity's home. Set in place in the seventeenth century with the rise and advancement of science and the birth of modern philosophy, this logic has been identified generally as the logic of modernity or the modern paradigm—though one finds clearly the seeds of it much earlier, even—as we can see—in this creation myth of antiquity. It is characterized by this process of extreme differentiation and dichotomization; i.e., despiritualization, disenchantment, death: the separation of the human and the divine, of the mind and the body, of the subject and the object. Following the excommunication of God—of Spirit,
the Enlightenment, modernity's usher, seeks to address a plethora of crises, and yet also further propels them: of tradition, of religion, of metaphysical reason, of faith. A loss of authority accompanies these attempts to free humanity through reason and knowledge (of the subject) from the constraints of tradition (Metz, 1977/1980) rooted in the precepts of a divine sovereign. Poignantly expressed in An Anatomie of the World by John Donne (1621/1927, pp. 20-21) is this sense of crisis (central to the work of the Enlightenment):

And the new Philosophy calls all in doubt,  
The Element of fire is quite put out;  
The Sun is lost, and th' earth and no man's wit  
Can well direct him, where to look for it.  
..."Tis all in peeces, all cohaerance gone. (lines 205-213)

Therefore, to recover a sense of control and stability becomes a central aim of the modern project (Habermas, 1989), including the quest for certainty (Dewey, 1929) and the establishment of new authority. The historical making of the human subject, Heidegger (1952/1977a) suggests, places humanity at the center, as the rational core, as that form of life upon which all that is, concerning its nature and its truth, is grounded.

"Of course, we are only sketching the historical manifestations of this logic in Western civilization and its impact, jumping around and skipping vast periods of human history—not even calling into question the traditional "periods" as they have been laid out and perpetuated by Western scholars, the legitimacy and unity of such constructions, as well we might. Thus, ours is not a formal or chronological tracing of this history; and if the Enlightenment is modernity's usher, escorting this "Logic of Death" to its impending consummation, then we might likewise liken the Scientific Revolution to its host, the Reformation to its doorman, the Renaissance to its coach, ad infinitum.

"Again, the origins of the historical making of the human subject are slippery, identified by Derrida (1992/1995) with Plato's anabasis and the Christian notion of the soul, and as central in the workings of Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment thought, as well as in the logic of Modernity.
It is as if Durkheim is right: we have no more gods, thus eventually, we ourselves become as gods and attempt our own salvation. The echo of the serpent sounds through the corridors of history: "Ye shall be as gods." Of course, such an ascent means that humanity, that we, must pluck the forbidden fruit of knowledge—found in nature, separate from and outside of us, yet within our grasp. We might say, in addition, that this grasping or taking of the fruit signifies a particular stance toward the world—the human quest for godhood.

To attain the similitude of gods, it is required of humanity to fully separate from the world as nature, to see ourselves no more as creatures but as world creators (Romanyshyn, 1989). With the stolen good of knowledge, we are indeed creators—subjects, but forget, though, that we are creatures too. The new certainty obtains in the subject making truth sure as "the known of his own knowing" (Heidegger, 1952/1977a, p. 148), and humanity establishes and strengthens the self as the measure and ground of authority—i.e., god. The freedom bought, Heidegger adds, is freedom of the subjectum.

The coming of this subject position, distant and distancing itself from the world as object, marks also the coming of science, the dominant way of knowing of modernity. Heidegger has called modernity the age of the world picture: the world via science becomes humanity's representation. Science requires of us that what is must be at the disposal of representation, a representation that explains. Truth—originally signifying

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*Heidegger (1927/1962), in Being and Time, as well as in many subsequent works, returns to the Greek origins of the word "truth," aleteia, which means not to escape notice, not to be concealed. "The truth may thus be looked upon as that which is un-concealed, that which gets discovered or uncovered" (p. 57). Truth is "Being-uncovering" or uncoveredness, unconcealment. Truth happens in the unveiling, the
unconcealment, the revealing and manifestation and coming-to-presence of what is—has become the certainty of representation. "Certainty is the modern form of truth" (1952/1977b, p. 83), and the ambition of Western civilization.

The quest for certainty necessitates control through objectification, reification, representation, manipulation. To know something certainly, one must kill it. A small thing like breathing, like the butterfly effect, changes everything. Representation itself becomes assault and murder. Having set ourselves apart from the world, from nature, in order to know it, we "pluck" it and take it in hand. Then, we set out to rule. The quest for godhood, of course, bringing with it the need for certainty, calls for order and hierarchy. To conquer, we must divide, classify, authoritatively represent. Moreover, if we represent nature simply, we will easily master it. Descartes refutes Bacon's assumption that to command nature, we must first obey it (Serres, 1977/1982); Cartesian knowledge, scientific knowledge, the knowledge of modernity gives us a well-polished, fixed model of the world with which to work—self-enclosed, self-sufficient, complete with identifiable numerical parts (Doll, 1993, Markley, 1991)—not breathing, not living, i.e., dead. To know is to know without a doubt. And there is certainty only in death, if then.

This human stance in and toward the world is not then a living stance, not one of wonder or engagement or participation. Rather, it is one of alienation. Scientific consciousness is alienated consciousness (Berman, 1981). Devoid of mystery and of spirit, the breath of life, the organic unity that is life is banished; the separation, showing forth, the manifestation of what is, its coming-to-presence.
alienation and isolation that is death reigns. As an object of knowledge, the cosmos is no longer a place of belonging, and eventually loses meaning altogether. It is as if all the world were Eden from which humanity has been evicted. Incidentally, banishing the world or being banished from it, it is not long before we become even banished from ourselves, as we shall see. Of course, Descartes, it might be said, has already accomplished the severing of our minds from our bodies. No longer is it, "I breathe—in the sense of spirit, filled with the breath of God; therefore I am"; but rather: "I think; therefore I am"; and the earthly body does not enter into the equation, or only peripherally.

Through the progressive disenchantment of the world via science—what Berman (1981) calls an alienating and severing consciousness, psychic wholeness too is cut up, and lost is a "participatory consciousness" that is generative of life and meaning. The extremes of human subjectivity create the absolute reification of all things through objectification; all that is, even the human subject, is object, a thing among other things without value, deprived of life and rendered meaningless. The connectedness and interdependence of all things in the cosmos go unrecognized. Wholeness becomes perverted in the modern mindset into either a collection of separate entities or a singular uniformity in which all exists to merely serve the whole. A living, creating, integrated unity which sustains diversity cannot be thought. For, such an image of life, reality, the world, "calls for a thinking, a way of knowing, that is itself alive, creative, and integrating—a living thinking" (Sloan, 1983, p. 38). Yet the thinking that dominates resists the living; denying the complexity and ambiguity inherent to life and the cosmos,
humanity opts for death—separation, simplicity, certainty, control. And wholeness cannot endure within this logic of severing, the Logic of Death.

Heidegger (1962/1977d, e) describes this severing through which we not only distance ourselves from the world as nature, but set upon nature, challenge nature, to reveal its truth. Adam and Eve no longer enjoy divine life in a garden paradise; rather, they, humanity, we are after something; for the knowledge of good and evil, we set upon nature, pluck its fruit and consume it. Commanding nature, as gods, we seek to master it, rule over it, control it. Even Bacon himself declares that the aim of science is to place nature on the rack, to torture her secrets from her (Sloan, 1983).

The knowledge of innocence, perhaps a human reality before the fall, is a knowledge of which we know nothing. Rather, death has come, the knowledge of evil and the technology of shame. Adam and Eve make aprons to cover themselves. The woman labors in birth with a husband who rules over her. The ground is cursed, bringing forth thorns and thistles unto the man. Nature conceals, she hides her treasures from human eyes. Yet, the promise of the forbidden fruit seems always greater than the sentence of death. It is ours simply to reach out and grab it; thus, we wrest nature's treasures from her. Torture, the rack, violence. "To know is to kill, to rely on death" (Serres, 1977/1982, p. 28). Michel Serres (1977/1982, 1986/1989) devotes much of his writing to this issue of violence, the tragic reality that knowing in the West, that our knowledge, is violent. Our knowledge, he claims, presupposes a "king"—a sovereign, a god, as we have said, one in command of it. The king is clearly the man who killed the former king, yet also the person who is awaiting death at the hands of his heir. While we
may say we "fight" for knowledge and truth, Serres asserts that we really fight to fight, that for us, life's secret wisdom is war. Presented is the image of a "ravenous owl," the "priest of knowledge." The owl hovers about the "tree of science." It is his tree, since he has killed his predecessor, "who supported another theory" (1986/1989, p. 47). We kill over theories. We know too well the knowledge of evil, but somehow the knowledge of good evades us, and the tree of life is dying. We ravenously devour it.

This violence is the essence of modern technology, in the service of science. It is what Heidegger (1962/1977d) calls a "challenging revealing," whose chief features are regulating and securing: "The challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed and what is distributed is switched about ever anew" (p. 16)—regulation is secured. Put forth, in the name of reason, is the unreasonable demand that nature supply for us what can be extracted and stored; we challenge nature to reveal and then gather her up as fuel. Nature, devoid of spirit, reduced and deadened, becomes not only an object for human consumption, but also humanity's storehouse, in Heidegger's words—our "standing reserve."

This standing reserve consists not simply of stock or of a store or supply that endures, but encompasses the way in which all things are known through this stance of challenging toward all that is; what is stressed is the substitutability and orderability of all things, to ensure the unthreatened reign of humanity. "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by" (p. 17), to stand on call for future ordering. Ours is the task of setting in order, which can no longer mean to take care of or maintain as it may have in
Eden before "the fall," but rather this challenging, this grasping. In this sense, even objects actually lose their character as objects; their objectness is obscured, as everything is converted at the hands of humanity into and organized as nothing but standing reserve. The fruit is no longer fruit, nor the tree a tree, but that which is "desired to make one wise" (The Holy Bible, 1985, Genesis 3:6). Humanity does not reign over, cannot control knowledge, unconcealment, or truth (i.e., nature revealing itself, the manifestation or coming to presence of nature's living energies), but attempts to in this subject-position god-striving: truth, again, is certainty through ordering. This is the history of science, of Western civilization, and the reign of death. Knowledge is power; to know is to dominate; to know is, again, to kill (Serres, 1977/1982). The world, in order to be known, falls beneath the dissecting knife of humanity, denied of its life-breathing power.

Alfred North Whitehead (1925) has described poignantly the impact of this Logic of Death upon the world: "Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly" (p. 80). Life itself has been extricated from the world, from our world—and with it, value, worth, quality and purpose. As such, it is what Wilber (1995) calls a "cardboard cosmos," one "gone slightly mad" (p. 523); the cosmos—having been reduced, disenchanted, disqualified—is only a shadow of what it once was in "the nightmare known as modernity" (p. 415).

Thus, the world is not simply dying but is dying at the hands of humanity. Yet, we must also note, the person with the knife is caught too in the web of death, perhaps more profoundly even than his or her victim-world. Humanity, as god of the cosmos and
lord of knowledge, is the orderer of this standing-reserve; therefore, the human subject—
says Heidegger (1962/1977d)—stands even more originally within the standing reserve;
the human subject is, in fact, challenged and ordered to exploit the energies of the world.
In this way, the subject itself is on the brink of the place where the self too is standing
reserve. The greater this threat, the greater the need for certainty, for lordship of the
human subject over the object-ive "other" world. This drive, further driven, endangers
the subject in relation to itself and to all that is. All truth, all knowing in and of the
world, is banished to ordering, this form of knowing which is the knowledge of death—
separation, grasping, challenging, severing, consuming, etc. Soon all that is is standing
reserve, and any other possibility is effectively blocked: to know the world is to know it
this way; truth, revelation, knowledge, is the domain of science alone, via technology—
at least truth that is certain, and real.

Without question, human reality, in the West at least, is now in profound ways
determined by Western European Science, and increasingly so through its vehicle of
technological advance. The knowing of science impacts humanity and the world perhaps
primarily through the vehicle of modern technology. Humanity itself is consumed in and
by this way of being in and toward the world—this grasping, plucking, devouring, striving
quest incessantly engaged; this "entrapping securing procedure" in which humanity itself
is entrapped is a key element in the maintenance and employment of the Logic of Death.
The realm within which we live and move and sustain ourselves is fundamentally directed
by this logic, by science, as a theory of the world, as a primary avenue through which
what is presents itself to us. As such a theory, science is also an epistemology of the
real, which has become the certain, economized into cause and effect, consequence, that which is ordered linearly and can be grasped and determined in advance.

According to Heidegger, only since the seventeenth century, the birth of the modern epoch, has the real come to mean that which is certain. Being obtained and secured by the human subject in objectness, precedence is then given to method, i.e., dissection. What is real can be measured, that is real which can be measured. Life is uncertain and changing, that which is living is uncertain and changing, thus, the world, to be known, is objectified, entrapped in objectness, and calculated in advance; nature is muted and diminished to the inanimate, that humanity might achieve its desperately sought-after certainty. Yet, humanity—we—cannot escape the effects of this life-grip, this calculation of all that is. If we hope to be "real," we, too, must eventually fall beneath this measuring imperative.

Douglas Sloan (1983) describes the development as one in which science has become the only valid way of knowing anything, the only legitimate source of knowledge. Moreover, it is not science, essentially, that is the problem, but rather the distortion of science—what we may call a misplaced faith, and scientism (Doll, 1993), through the Logic of Death. This distortion involves grandiose claims about science as a method and as a worldview, including its intrusion into domains in which it does not belong. "The heart of the problem, as Michael Polanyi has striven repeatedly to demonstrate, lies not in science and technology but in the distorted images of the world that have come to supply the context within which they are pursued and employed" (Sloan, 1983, p. 25). All problems are not answerable, scientifically or technologically.
To believe they are, to live and proceed as though they are, is "technolatry," in the words of Frederick Ferré (1976). Pre-eminence is given to methodology, technique and means. Of course, the West maintains, perhaps beside itself, this almost religious attitude toward technology equivalent to dogmatism. It is the instrument of our ascension to the throne of the gods.

Such is the Western mindset of modernity, says Sloan (1983), constitutive of a number of scientistic notions that have gone unquestioned, productive of a tunnel vision that fixates upon one aspect of reality which is taken to be all of reality—the quantitative one highlighted by the methodology of modern science. The resulting worldview—which if not omitting, certainly inadequately addressing questions fundamental to human experience—essentially makes no room for human existence, for what it means to be human.

The view of reality that dominates is materialist, reductionist, quantitative. As such, it is indeed a reality that humans can easily control. Yet, the qualitative nature of the cosmos, of existence, is eliminated or excessively undermined. "The unwarranted extension of the purely quantitative to encompass the whole of experience is eventually to create a dead universe in which quality, meaning, and life have no place. "The

*While modern science has proved itself amazingly efficacious in addressing many aspects of human life in the world, its power is limited—modern science unable to answer to our ultimate questions and concerns. Huston Smith (1982) in Beyond the Post-Modern Mind identifies some of those extremely important aspects of human experience, essential to human experience, before which science stands ineffectual: value, which is internal and normative rather than instrumental or explanatory; purpose (and intentionality), a response to the question "Why?"; meaning (significance), involving issues that are existential and universal in scope; and quality, drawn from life experience and feeling and varying levels of consciousness.
exclusive preoccupation with quantity,' Lewis Mumford has written, has 'disqualified the real world of experience,' eliminating all that makes human life worthwhile and driving the human being 'out of living nature into a cosmic desert'" (p. 11).

Sloan calls it a "disqualified universe," where all that matters is quantity, where the impersonal presides. It is a universe marked by the conquest, the surrender of the person. Humanity is reduced to a machine—mechanistic metaphors pervade even in the realm of human affairs, with all their complexities and idiosyncrasies. Like Adam and Eve, we clothe ourselves in the aprons of a scanty, shallow rationality: the narrow technist reason of instrumentality has been equated with the whole of human thought and being in the world. Though Einstein, scientist par excellence, does not make an explicit indictment against modern science or the modern world, and though he does not lay the charge of this Logic of Death upon humanity, he states the case, perhaps unwittingly, of that to which humanity has been brought, and calls it by its rightful name; he says: "Whoever remains unmoved, whoever cannot contemplate or know the deep shudder of the soul in enchantment, might just as well be dead for he has already closed his eyes upon life" (cited in Stassinopoulos, 1978, p. 137). In despiritualizing the world, in effecting its disenchantment, we ourselves have turned our backs upon life, invoking suicidally the death of humanity.

The philosopher Hans Jonas (1979), discussing contemporary ethical quandaries in relation to the joint advancements of technology and biology, calls it the "metaphysical neutralizing of man" in which we have deprived ourselves of any valid image of humanity, lost any understanding of what it means to be human. Made in the image of
the divine, we have killed that image, marred the face of the earth, and inadvertently lost any mirror with which to reflect upon ourselves. Our modern notions of reality omit the significance of persons, of the human being. Thus, Jonas warns that we are not ready to responsibly handle the possibilities of genetic technology, dangerously capable of, in fact, altering beyond comprehension the nature, mind and body of humankind.

Yet, humanity has already been altered, we might observe. For the cosmos—and with it, the real—has been altered. The real is not only certain but that which can be broken down into separable parts and ordered—organized logically and manipulated technologically. Guiding principles, integrating purposes (i.e., faith) are irrational, not exactly "real." Effected is the principle of non-restraint. If we can invent it, we must implement it. Progress is the standard by which all is measured. Values, too, become objects, for in the modern interpretation of things anything that is must be represented, and made certain. Wrought through human subjectivity by the establishment of the self within the world as picture, values become human needs objectified as goals (Heidegger, 1952/1977b). The overriding need for absolute control, for godhood through certainty, achieves pre-eminence; the ultimate aim is progress and the ascending path; value, too, is sucked up as well into the standing reserve; and "life [itself is] judged by the extent to which it minister[s] to progress, progress [is] not judged by the extent to which it minister[s] to life" (Mumford, 1934, p. 185).

Value is removed from humanity, from human activity. Kovel (1991) asserts that it is instead placed in the object, but not merely the object: the object of progress, the marketable object—of which Marx's "fetishism of commodities" is descriptive. Thus for
Kovel, capitalism is the culprit—fueled by the driving forces of scientism and individualism. It is not simply an economic mode, but a way of being in the world, describing a particular stance toward the self, toward others, toward nature and all the world. It is the "will-to-power," as it were; the desire for power is pre- eminent, perhaps all- eminent—omnipresent: humanity is motivated by power, driven by and toward power, compelled to grasp after and establish it. Capitalism is, perhaps, the material and economic manifestation of this incessant pursuit for divine elevation.

The theologian Paul Tillich (1957) has further suggested that modern society has at least as one of its deities, particularly heightened in the competitive and capitalistic West, this god of Success. "It does," he says, "what every ultimate concern must do: it demands unconditional surrender to its laws even if the price is the sacrifice of genuine human relations, personal conviction, and creative eros. Its threat is social and economic defeat, and its promise—indefinite as all such promises—the fulfillment of one's being" (p. 3). He adds that much of modern literature is made religiously important, as it were, because it is descriptive of the wreckage and collapse of this order of faith. The pervading metaphor of consumption crops up over and over again in modern novels, reflecting the modern malaise effected by capitalism's "manipulative mode of moral instrumentalism" (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 24). The promises of this god of Success, when met, are found wanting: "Not false calculations, but a misplaced faith is
"In the midst of all that is correct, the true withdrawal" (Heidegger, 1962/1977d, p. 26).10

Yet, Kovel (1991) might protest that we cling still to the promises of this god, that this order of faith is, unfortunately, not utterly wrecked. His thought is consistent, however, with Tillich's in concurring that as the essence of capitalism, this adoration of material wealth, revenue and acquisition wages war against spirit—and thus, against life: at issue is something spiritual in this sense. He asserts that, in fact, the modern tradition consists in a repression of spirit where ever present is "the pressure or tendency in social institutions to devalue the spiritual dimension, render it irrational, or even suppress it altogether" (p. 6). We dwell in the thick of a "profound spiritual crisis." There is a living wholeness to spirit that the logic of severing cannot endure. The deadness of despiritualization ever threatens humanity in modern circumstances. Establishing the rule of a science that is against all that is spiritual and repressing fundamentally what it means

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"Heidegger (1962/1977d) explicates this difference between the correct and the true in his essay on "The Question Concerning Technology." The correct is the truth (in terms of unconcealment) that is revealed in the mode of a challenging-revealing, in ordering. In this mode, other possibilities of unconcealment are blocked, and there stands a heightened danger of humanity misinterpreting what is shown to it. For example, Heidegger suggests that even God in this case threatens becoming the god of philosophers, represented in a cause-effect understanding; the divine then loses its distantial mysteriousness, its exalted and holy character. "In a similar way the unconcealment in accordance with which nature presents itself as a calculable complex of the effects of forces can indeed permit correct determinations" (p. 27), but the truth of it is not reached. For an in-depth critique of Heidegger on the ethos of the true versus the correct, and his perspective on the modern subject in its relationship to modern knowledge as the science of technology, see Richard Bernstein's (1991a) "Heidegger's Silence? Ethos and Technology" in The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity.
to be human, it "displaces the core of human activity from human beings to things"
(p. 11).

Not only, then, has God been lost in this Logic of Death that reigns, and the
world fallen prey to its violence, and human faith and value and action been distorted out
of measure by it, but so too has humanity itself succumbed to its effects. With all the
world, humanity has, in short, already undergone a kind of alteration. We may call it the
impact of human objectification, reduction, quantification, disqualification, or
desperitualization. Heidegger (1962/1977d) goes on to explain it in terms of his concept
of the standing reserve. Maintaining that the "unity of objectness" is preserved but also
transformed in the continuity of the standing reserve, he says again that the object itself
also vanishes into humanity's storehouse. The pure relational character of subject and
object is seen as all is ordered, fixed, commanded, stored and regulated in the standing
reserve. With the disappearance of the object into standing reserve, it is not long before
the subject is sucked up with it as standing reserve—which does not mean that the duality
of the subject/object relationship vanishes but rather--claims Heidegger—that it reaches
extreme dominance. Beyond the godward advance of humanity via this knowing which
separates from and sets upon nature to reveal its truth, this challenging act comes back
to us; it sets upon us: We too are challenged forth, compelled to become standing
reserve—human resources. Rather than achieving the liberation and wisdom promised in
clutching the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil, we ourselves are brought into the
clutch's grip and dominated by it. This is why Heidegger can call our way of knowing,
our ever-striving after this knowledge-grasp, and the essence of modern technology,
"enframing" and a means of "enframing," which ironically entraps us, humanity, in its regime.

Enframing is the "challenging claim" that calls upon humanity to order, to control the happening of truth and fix and establish it as standing reserve. The real becomes the standing reserve. In the modern age and in contemporary times, with the growing pervasiveness of technology, humanity is challenged forth in this way strikingly so, and ever more extremely. Heidegger defines enframing as "the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man; i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve" (p. 20). Humanity fails in the very act of striving for freedom to achieve it, set upon and challenged and compelled to clutch and control truth and knowledge, to reign in the world as gods. God, tradition, and the forces of nature may have been overthrown, but something other still rules: humanity is constrained to obey this "challenge"—perhaps the inordinate need, the secret desire for certainty and perfection, to reign as god; perhaps the incessant drive to know completely and to infinitely progress, this constant plucking and grasping and ordering; perhaps the tyranny of reason's call; perhaps the enduring power of the serpent's defiant claim, his offer and his challenge. Human freedom, the freedom of the subjectum, in this sense, is an illusion, profoundly and ironically related to the antithesis of freedom, in fact. The freedom of the modern subject is lost in the objectivity commensurate with subjectivity, in the creation of the standing reserve. With the birth of the human subject in the world—as constructed by the Logic of Death through science and technology, freedom, we see then, is ever at issue.
Related to Heidegger's notion of humanity as standing reserve, is Herbert Marcuse's (1964) identification of the human laborer (or "human resource") as "one-dimensional." In this sense, where preeminence is given to the ordering of reserve, to progress and production, work is paramount but meaningless and the human is reduced to mere "economic man." Moreover, when technology "becomes the universal form of material production, it circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a historical totality—a world" (p. 9). The human subject is drawn into this totality as well, so much so that Marcuse goes on to claim that alienation and freedom themselves may not be at issue—there is perhaps no longer a subject to be alienated or free. The "System"—i.e., the maintenance and regulation of the standing reserve—has won; humanity has been bought off to it, as it were, and identifies with it completely. "People recognize themselves in their commodities; they have become what they own" (p. 154). Perhaps, meaning no longer even matters. Humanity is lost to itself, and to its own meaning. As Heidegger puts it in *Language, Poetry, Thought* (1950/1971a), the time is destitute because God is not only dead, but mortals are as yet unaware of their own mortality, are not capable of taking ownership of their own nature: pain is a mystery still concealed; death endures as at issue and dubious; love has yet to be learned. No longer discernable is the trace of the fugitive gods, of the holy. At question is whether mortals can still know the holy. "The destitution is itself destitute" (p. 97), because mortals no longer even experience it.

Yet, we know that they must experience it, and that meaning matters still. While it is true that the time may be destitute, contemporary times do not entirely reflect Heidegger's account of oblivious mortals completely out of touch with the sacred or
Marcuse's description of the "Happy Consciousness" of those who have become one with the production of technology, with their own commodities. We somehow resist in some corner of our souls materialization, objectification, complete absorption into standing reserve. Thus, we are not at peace, we are not oblivious, we are not happy. Study after study and statistic after statistic attest to the fact that all is not well with us: suicide rates soar, divorces mount in number, mental hospitals expand; and millions upon millions from all walks of life testify to a general malaise, the experience of meaninglessness and emptiness in their own vocations and lives (Berman, 1981; Kovel, 1991; Sloan, 1983). Consumerism, it seems, is merely a form of anesthetization, an anxious compulsion enacted paradoxically in the desire for freedom and meaning.

Robert Bellah's (1985) study of middle-class America testifies to the fact that the most advanced society, an exemplar of modern progress (via science and technology) and consumerism, while achieving a good measure of freedom and comfort for a great number of its people, has done so at enormous costs: individuals largely experience a pervasive sense of meaninglessness in their everyday lives, of alienation from others in the absence of collective commitment and conscious engagement with the concerns of a larger community—a result of the Logic of Death, and severing.

According to Berman (1981), life in the West today is best characterized by its increasing entropy, where the death that reigns, as it were, has taken on an alarming "life" of its own. All about us we find economic and technological chaos; we dwell in the midst of ecological disaster and fight against psychic disintegration. The contemporary landscape is bleak. What is fundamental to human existence—sadly
lacking and therefore at issue—is meaning. In the absence of meaning and wholeness—stripped from the cosmos through our prevailing logic—which is expressed humanly most often in community, comes the collapse of traditional values and the ensuing void; revivals follow, fueled by hysteria, or many retreat into a sort of catatonic state, anesthetizing themselves through drugs, television, entertainment, tranquilizers.

Therapy is a national obsession in the United States, pinnacle of the West. It represents in singular fashion the human search for life in a milieu of death, a desperate attempt to ward off the alienation and the "pervasive feeling of anomie and cultural disintegration" (p. 17) that threatens to overwhelm the human soul. Depression, perhaps, can no longer be maintained as an illness, as it is the norm for our age. Walker Percy (1983) in *Lost in the Cosmos* is so bold as to assert that it is in fact insane to not be depressed in the world in which we find ourselves. The only people not depressed—and thus the only alternatives to depression—are fundamentalists and surfing dudes, i.e., the anesthetized.11

The problems that threaten to engulf us on every side actually seem to multiply and grow worse with every new advance in knowledge and its applications. The spoilation of nature; the continuing suicidal buildup of nuclear weapons; a spreading illiteracy, apathy, incivility, and violence among the citizenry; the breakdown of personal relations; a

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11Maxine Greene, in a lecture at the April 1996 American Educational Research Association (AERA) conference in New York on "Imagination, Possibility and Curriculum," discusses the import of the imagination as a mode of cognition left out of modern discourse on the nature of human knowing. She speaks of ours as a time of darkness and enormous desperation, a time in need of social transformation possible only through love, a love of the world, and of life itself. For Greene, an engagement with the arts is central to nurturing this love, even in the bleakest of times. She highlights the aesthetic as that which arouses, that which deepens our awareness and heightens our consciousness of qualities that give life meaning, of open possibilities that give us hope. She contrasts the aesthetic with its opposite, the anaesthetic; the aesthetic counteracts this deadness.
miasma of low-level depression; a haunting sense of futility in all that we do; signs of a deepening cynicism in individuals and society—the problems range from the global to the excruciatingly personal, and we become more daily familiar with them. (Sloan, 1983, pp. xi-x)

In addition, as problems escalate, the solutions offered amount to two equally dangerous, unsatisfactory and ineffectual choices: to press on more urgently in what appears to be an ungrounded faith that we will stumble upon some new technology that will fix all our problems, or to relinquish our search for knowledge completely and focus wholly upon the concerns of human existence through an emphasis on values, commitments, and relationships. For Sloan, the rift—in these proposed remedies, unacknowledged and unwittingly perpetuated—between human knowledge and human value is foundational to the problems of modernity. He says: "One of the chief problems of the modern world is that our conceptions of knowledge frequently give rise to views of reality that provide little place and support for the values and personal-social commitments necessary for a rich, whole, and life-enhancing existence" (p. x). It is rather the case where shared loyalties inspiring sacrifice and the feeling of awe or wonder are lost, where indifference reigns. Moreover, with the disappearance of a public world, the retreat into the private world has intensified; yet, it is a world lacking substance.

Kovel (1991) traces this development via capitalism, in which simple participation with the production of life has been surpassed and life is essentially experienced non-spiritually; a great part of existence is spent in estranged labor, or empty leisure to combat the ill-effects of life devoid of spirit. It is a view of reality which—since it works to alienate spirit vital to human existence and also to promote this
strong sense of individualism—compels individuals to withdraw and to dissect themselves, desperate to preserve spirit in some part of their souls. This stunted spirituality is then wholly privatized and purely internalized, the soul having retreated from a despiritualized world in complete inwardness; spirit is relegated exclusively to the personal, dissociated from that which is social or political, from the external, public world. Reason itself becomes narrow, technical, despiritualized and cut off from the whole of human experience and knowing—a reason that is dead and deadening. Spirit-split and reason-reduced are hazardous and homicidal. Kovel describes the key contours of our social world, surrendered to absolute increase and instrumentalism, and "the heritage of an enlightened reason split from spirit" (p. 12): poverty, pollution, waste, war, Hiroshima, and Holocaust. To keep at bay the horror that pervades, human existence in a deadened world is something bland, blunted, an innocuous numbness. "Faced with the holocausts regularly prescribed in the name of efficiency, order, and profit, the soul takes refuge in inwardness, or is simply turned off" (p. 13)—cut off, slain. In the course of historical progress, our consciousness of our own identity has become more and more weak, and damaged, the experience of a fragile identity in a culture of apathy, at the mercy of indifference (Metz, 1977/1980).

Individual choice has become the only authority and yet the ideal of individualism, of freedom and equality, has in the pervasive, mechanistic worldview become little more than a controlling cultural uniformity. Brought to fruition through the rise of the modern subject is "the sterility and danger of a quantitative, anonymous mass culture" (Anshen, 1957, p. 135). Human equality is levelled to interchangeability,
that which is numerical. Such conceptions of freedom deny humanity of personhood, and eradicate the irreplaceability and dignity of the human person. Specialization, bureaucratic organization and the establishment of hierarchies based on societal function effect "the sacrifice of independent intelligence, the sweeping away of individual differences, local customs, local diversity, and all the infinite branchings of humanity that enrich life" (Nicoll, cited in Sloan, 1983, p. 37).

Heidegger's standing reserve. He makes this bold, frightening statement and prediction: "Subjective egoism, for which mostly without its knowing it the I is determined beforehand as subject, can be canceled out through the insertion of the I into the we. Through this, subjectivity only gains in power. In the planetary imperialism of technologically organized man [sic], the subjectivism of man attains its acme, from which point it will descend to the level of organized uniformity and there firmly establish itself. This uniformity becomes the surest instrument of total, i.e., technological, rule over the earth" (1962/1977a, p. 152).

We continue to play the gods; we see our treasures grow, our power, our importance, or so we think, and "the shadow of Hiroshima stretches over the world" (Serres, 1986/1989, p. 77). The gods author not only life, but death as well. In the knowing that dominates, propagated technologically, irreversible changes are exacted upon the cosmos, nature is methodically broken down and with it, the human community, and the human soul. C. S. Lewis (1947) is said to have predicted this perversion of human freedom as power is increasingly exerted over nature and humanity.
unrestrained scientific power gives those in control of science and technology license to exert this power over other fellow beings.

The black ash-cloud of Hiroshima looms above our heads. The blood-cry of Auschwitz rumbles beneath our feet from graves that will not be silenced. Yet, we are perhaps not only like S.S. men, camp wardens, ordering and effecting death, but like the Capos, prisoners ourselves, though with special privileges: living under a grandiose image of our own power, we are crueller in the exertion of that power, and more hardened—looking only at the numbers we've inscribed upon human limbs, upon life, while the dark deafening void within echoes images of our own death. The German theologian Dorothee Soelle (1971/1974) evokes a similar image in her exhortation that we must account for and address this internalized operation in our critique of modern society, "the capitalist or the concentration camp guard that is in each of us" (p. 92).

Kovel (1991) describes that to which humanity has brought itself and been brought in this manner: "a world order that commits planetary suicide in the search for profit while driving the majority of human beings into despair and poverty, ... a killing/producing machine without a spiritual center" (p. 12). Indeed, the fruit is plucked and consumed;

"Humanity needs a spiritual center, for we are spiritual beings. Spirituality is a cosmic affair, a matter of life and death, as Kovel (1991) says, "the mythopoetic framework [which makes] existence intelligible" (p. 8). History is seen to bear out this fact, recording innumerable fights to the death of spiritual systems at odds. Wherever human existence is, there also shall be spirituality, for it is the very stuff of which humanity, human life in the world consists. Perhaps, the unintelligibility and senselessness of life felt by so many today is a result of the systematic war humanity has launched against spirit, the logic and reign of death—first God, then the world, and in its turn, humanity. Cut off spirit, separate and banish it from all that is, soon all that is is lifeless, meaningless, without sense or significance, dead.
separation from (the "death" of) God, the spirit (of life), the world and all of creation
effected, or being effected. Curse, crisis and the reign of death. Enter Cain and Abel
and bloodshed. We shall not only surely die but also be the instruments of death.
CHAPTER 3

EDUCATION, THE UPWARD JOURNEY AND THE FAITH OF REASON (1)

I present to you the story of the education of a human soul. Give a listen; look and discern the gift of education upon our nature, in contrast to the lack thereof.

It is likened to an experience such as this: Imagine the family of humanity dwelling underground in a cave-like abode where there is little light. Yea, there would be no light at all were it not for a fire burning, and for an opening equal in breadth to the cave itself, though it be a long way up—far above reach, beyond which great light shines. From a child has lived there every one, secured in place and position unchanged, bound at the neck and legs. As the fetters prevent any movement of the head, turns either to the right or to the left, the field of vision is limited to only that which lies ahead and before. From a fire which burns behind and far above these human beings, light is afforded them. Behind them, as well, on higher ground, there stretches a path which leads up to the fire, and to the light. Observe also that a low wall has been erected along the path, akin to the screen of the puppeteer above which he presents his puppets.

Then, see in your mind's eye that upon that wall, and projected above it, there are people, some talkative and some quiet, bearing artifacts of every variety: human and animal relics of all kinds of materials like wood and stone. Except for the shadows cast by the fire on the wall in front of them, do these prisoners see anything of themselves or of each other? Can they even, with heads confined, immovable, for the duration of life? And of the things along the wall that are carried, the same: shadows only do they watch. We are as they. Should they perchance be capable of conversation between themselves, they should think that the shadow-things they saw passing before them were the things themselves, and that the words and names they used addressed and pertained to them in actuality. Moreover, should the wall facing them in the prison have an echo, would they not think that whenever the carriers of the artifacts passed along the wall talking, they heard the voices of the shadows moving before them? Thus, the prisoners would know in all things the truth to be solely found in the shadows of those trophies, nothing more.

Ponder, then, the event of freedom, being loosed from their shackles and delivered from their ignorance, how it should be felt and
received. One of them, when set at liberty and obliged to rise to his feet, move about and turn his eyes up to the light, would at first suffer and be unable to see the things whose shadows he had viewed before, dazed and blinded by the brilliance of the light. Would not this person be astonished and disbelieving when told that the things upon which he formerly cast his eyes were without substance and that now since turned toward the things that are, he sees more rightly? For he can still as yet make no sense of the things which now pass before him. If, as well, he were constrained to set his gaze upon the light directly, it should pain him, and he must surely retreat to his former place, to the things able to be seen by him, believing the former things to be truer than that presently being shown to him.

Would not this person also if someone carried him away against his will from those things and up into the sunlight, be angry and distressed by such handling? Not one of the matters said to be true can he see, with the sun filling his eyes. Time is required before the world above can be ascertained. Shadows should be at first discerned most easily, followed by images of humans and other creatures which the waters reflect, and then the things themselves. At night, study might be devoted to the sky itself and those items contained therein—by the light of the moon and stars. By day, the light of the sun sheds light on all things, and at some point, the man shall behold the sun itself, in its heaven, and learn of it. Soon he comes to know that the sun reigns over all things in the visible world, and is the cause of those things he formerly observed.

What of his remembrance of former things? Of his first home and kindred inmates? Of that taken for wisdom there? Of a certainty, he should consider himself happy and grieve for the others. Nor would he esteem or covet the honors bestowed upon those prisoners who best and most brilliantly recognized or remembered and thus predicted the patterns of shadows appearing on the cave wall in front of them. Indeed, would he not be like Homer and preference servitude, poverty and suffering before again partaking of their ideas and experiences?

Think on this as well. Should he descend again to his place of origin, his eyes would soon fill with darkness, having left the keen and acute light of the sun. In a contest of identifying shadows at the challenge

"Though a retelling of Plato's "Allegory of the Cave," in an attempt to be as faithful to the original telling as possible, I am maintaining the prisoner as a male figure, with the understanding that, for Plato especially—who posited the intelligence of women and their ability to achieve, with men, the status of philosopher-kings and to make the upward journey of the soul, the prisoner is representative of all human persons, male and female. Thus, the reader will find, not only throughout the re-telling, but also in the presentation of Plato's explication of his allegory, the prisoner made reference to through the use of the pronoun "he."
of the cave-dwellers, he would surely fail, for needed is some period of adjustment, and his sight would as yet still be dim. Might he not even elicit ridicule and evoke the belief that the upward journey is a most unworthy one, certain to ruin a man's eyesight? Might not the response be against him who attempted to free others and lead them to the light of the sun, even perhaps violence and the sentence of death? Nevertheless, that soul shall ever press upward, for such is the path to truth, to understanding; it is that soul, then, who acts sensibly, who is most reasonable.

The whole picture can be fathomed, and what I hope to articulate, with the understanding that the upward path and the contemplation of the things above is the ascending journey of the soul, its education, unto the intelligible realm. "Whether it's true or not, only the god knows" (Plato, ca. 380 b.c./1992, p. 189).

A retelling of Plato's "Allegory of the Cave," from the dialogues of Socrates in Republic (c.a. 380 b.c./1992)

What a grand image Plato (ca. 380 b.c./1992) paints for us concerning humanity, our divine journey and destiny and path to wisdom. It presents us with a journey—though fraught with difficulty—of ascent, in fact, akin in this sense to the journey we have presently left off contemplating, the upward or godward quest of Western Civilization (see Chapter 2). Further, we might posit even the traces of an explication or embodiment—an incarnation, a prototype, a concretization, a mirroring as it were—of this very story in the history of the Western world, or at least in the various tellings of this history by Western scholars. Derrida (1992/1995), as we have seen, in attempting to elucidate the historical emergence of the person, the human subject, and the notion of responsibility to which this emergence is indelibly connected, begins with the daimonic, humanity's original embeddedness in and lack of dissociation from the earth—Plato's cave dwellers (see Chapter 1). He follows the "evolutionary" route through and beyond, as he

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Although in retrospect, the image Plato here sets forth is, as well, perhaps inherently ambiguous or even grandly perilous, harrowing, horrific, alarming.
sees it, Plato's realization of the political self—a perhaps now released from the "cave"—chains and yet immersed still in the dark earth of culture and society or bound in measure to its path—to the Christian actualization of the soul alone, internalized, and utterly responsible before God as absolute Other—i.e., free, or open to the light of the sun.

Derrida's formulation is especially intriguing in that he investigates and makes central to this development the repression and thus also envelopment of former ways of being in the world at each new historical advance. In similar fashion, Ricoeur (1969/1974) sees a type of dialectical return as potentially constitutive of human advance, and yet it is still advance of which he speaks. His is a mediation via the arrival of atheism on the historical scene which might assist religion, chronologically prior to atheism and critiqued effectively by it, in making its way to faith. For atheism has exposed the self-deceptions of religion in taking shadows for substance; yet, freed from the shadows of unacknowledged desires projected as real, atheism fails to discern, embrace or realize what is, ever fixing its gaze upon shadows or statues of things, the cave, what is not and yet believed to be true. Its "No" in this sense is indeed sacred, and yet it can never come

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3 In contrast to Derrida's formulation of Plato, Kenneth Wilber (1995) posits Plato as a mystic, along the order of one who has achieved subjectivity, responsibility, yet without losing the sense of the connection to all things, the interdependence constitutive of earthly life. Plato's political self then, along these lines, more fully represents one who has ascended to the fullness of human subjectivity, and in so doing, makes a descending return to the world of the Many, finding oneself embedded in and devoted to participation in common life with others in a world. The earth, as well as the human being, is an embodiment of spirit, which is one. In this way, the birth of the human subject as outlined by Derrida might more accurately signify the moment of repression, and dissociation, the alienation of humanity from the earth, from spirit, from the ties that bind, as it were—excessive subjectivity, pathological.
to the articulation of a "Yes," as in Nietzsche's three metamorphoses of the spirit: the
lion is released from the chains by which the camel is bound, with some measure of light
renouncing them, but only the child seems to have reached the light of the sun, in full
possession of a grand "Amen" to what is (see Chapter 1).

Kenneth Wilber (1995) in his "Kosmos trilogy" takes an explicitly developmental
and evolutionary approach in tracing the history of the Kosmos, which is a history of
spirit and of humanity and human consciousness in relation to the earth and to spirit.
Including a critique and commendation of the position of Western Civilization within
this evolution, he, in fact, alludes to Plato's image of the "evolution" of the human soul,
its educational journey upward, to support his explication and interpretation of
humanity's ontological and cosmological history. In addition, even concerning the
mythic Adam and Eve and the story of their "fall" we see parallels with as well as
departures from the Platonic soul and the allegory of its "rise": Plato asserts that the

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"Presently Wilber has published but one volume, Sex, Ecology, Spirituality: The
Spirit of Evolution (1995), of a three-volume series on the "Kosmos," which he identifies
as his "Kosmos Trilogy."

Wilber (1995) makes a distinction between the Kosmos and the cosmos. The
icosmos is that totality of which we speak today, conceived as the whole, and yet
markedly reduced through modern thought, stripped of its interiority, its depth, of spirit.
The Kosmos, of Greek origin, refers to that universal total spoken of not as the whole
but rather as the "All," with the recognition that never do we fully arrive at that which
we symbolize. It is what we know of the breadth and depth, encompassing the domains
of the physiosphere, biosphere, noosphere, and theosphere: matter, life, mind, and spirit.
While we get our term "cosmos" from the Pythagorean "Kosmos," Wilber contrasts their
common understandings: "The original meaning of the Kosmos was the patterned nature
or process of all domains of existence, from matter to mind to theos, and not merely the
physical universe, which is usually what both 'cosmos' and 'universe' mean today" (p. 38).
human aim in the ascent is to see the good, to realize knowledge; and our garden representatives also seek, in having their eyes opened, to obtain knowledge, which definitively includes the knowledge of good. Yet, in this story the human attempt is forbidden and cursed, while the Platonic initiative is the human path to eternal bliss. The destiny carved out and prophesied in the creation myth, which we have traced through the history of humankind in the West, is as well all the more tragic for its irony, though its conclusion is at least foreshadowed, foretold. No tragic premonition of this sort taints the Platonic vision for humanity, except perhaps should one put weight upon the displeasure and hatred of the cave dwellers toward those souls aspiring deliverance from the cave, to apprehend the knowledge of the good. In any case, it seems we enter into this image of the education of the human soul in darkness, finding in it a grave contrast from where we have come: while the project and journey of Western Civilization is in many ways congruent with this Platonic analogy of light and ascension, Plato's is a pilgrimage in the direction of the good, the true and the beautiful, and the journey we have heretofore gleaned turns rather to be a trek of death, darkness, decline—of

'Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), in *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, suggests that Plato's condemnation of the poets lies in his opposition to their tragic view of human life. Plato, in this sense, the father of the Ideal realm, is viewed not only as an idealist but also a perpetual optimist. In line with Socratic thought, Plato seems to believe in the basic goodness of the Kosmos and of man, and conceives of the source of evil along the order of ignorance, the result of acts of the human will rooted in thoughtlessness, irrationality. Of course, while Plato emphasizes the import of human agency and freedom, his objection to the poets and their presentation of the tragic element in human existence might not exactly signify the denial of such an element therein, only his distaste for the way in which it serves to undermine human power, the possibility of transformation and the realization of the good through human effort. Plato also, in some instances, correlates the work of poets and storytellers with falsehood, opposed to truth.
descension in that sense, in which perhaps most apparent is the realization of the evil, the false, and the base, vile, or repugnant (see Chapter 2).

Still, the sojourn of the West has not been utter darkness, and even the "Fall of Man" can be conceived as having been initiated by the human desire for light, as well as our present deposing or abandonment by sincere intentions to apprehend the good. Plato's "Allegory of the Cave" provides the West from early on, in fact, with a beacon of light by which to tread its path, even a vision of the journey as a journey of light, an effectual and sure ascension by which humanity lays hold of knowledge, and attains to the good, the true and the beautiful. Plato's centrality to Western thought is generally

"Plato views human life as a journey of the soul, a spiritual pilgrimage, if you will—both individually and collectively. A journey is intelligible; it is a lived-out narrative along the order of the quest. Seen in this way, narratives comprise the basic structure of existence, or at least that structure by which existence is interpreted, understood, given value. Each of us, in the course of living, participate in narratives of one sort or another, and comprehend our existence in terms of the narratives we have lived out, as well as those of others. Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), in After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, looks at and discusses at length this classical perspective on human life as a sojourn, on what he calls the narrative unity of human life, and its relationship to the virtues of antiquity. "The unity of the human life is the unity of a narrative quest" (p. 219). He further considers the breakdown of the virtues in modernity, of the very concept of virtue and of the narrative unity of life, of human life conceived of as a soul-journey. The modern philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, for example, seeks, in fact, to expose the narrative assumption as false: to represent human life in narrative form is to misrepresent it; it is to impose a kind of order upon human action which it does not in truth exhibit. MacIntyre goes on to interrogate and challenge Sartre: What would true human actions deprived of falsifying narrative look like? Sartre himself fails to answer the former question; moreover, to deconstruct and negate narrative, to prove it in every case inauthentic, he must in fact do so and does so with the use of a narrative. Though the West has lost this sense of life as a journey, of history as the collective spiritual travels/travails (story) of humanity, traces remain: the inheritance of Plato. MacIntyre actually suggests that it is not only a historical legacy to conceive of the self in some narrative form, but also the natural mode of self-perception.
unquestioned, although perhaps resented, forgotten or purposely ignored. Alfred North Whitehead has gone so far as to say that "the safest general characterization of the European [Western] philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato" (1929/1978, p. 39); and Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) has reminded us further of the strong historical relationship between philosophy and the social, political, cultural context of which it is a part. Plato is not what we imagine him to be: the first academician in his ivory tower, lost in thought, oblivious to and ineffectual in the real matters of life. In a more general sense, as one of the great-souled ancients is reported to have said: "For as he [a man] thinketh ..., so is he" (The Holy Bible, 1985, Proverbs 23:7). In like manner, as a people think, as a culture thinks, so is it, so shall it be. Indeed, our thoughts have been formed historically by the thoughts of Plato.

Yet to what importance may we give this particular portrait of Plato regarding the education of the human soul and the upward path of light? In what way may we find its alliance with, its share in, and its elucidation of the question of faith we have brought to bear upon present times and turmoils in the West? We have already suggested and

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'MacIntyre's thesis (1984) is that philosophy only loses its central position historically when it fails in its project to justify morality on the grounds of reason alone, a project brought about by the changes of the Enlightenment; yet, such does not mean that the legacies of philosophy are not strong, enduring, still operative in the ways we think and act in the world, the ways we view ourselves and the earth.

John Dewey (1930/1960) suggests the importance of looking at Plato, and criticizes those who promote a Plato of the "Ivory Tower" variety: He speaks rather of the "Plato of the Dialogues, trying one mode of attack after another to see what it might yield; ... the Plato whose highest flight of metaphysics always terminated with a social and practical turn, and not ... the artificial Plato constructed by unimaginative commentators who treat him as the original university professor" (p. 13).
hope to further develop that there are traces of this image which throughout history have
pervaded our conceptions of human life, yet still, in this, we have not reached to our own
troubled times, or to the thesis concerning faith we are putting forth. The importance of
this portrait lies in its relation to a/the central crisis of our time—a crisis which seems to
be finding expression in a variety of domains of existence from popular culture to
political discourse to theological inquiry to philosophical and academic study: a crisis,
for lack of a better word, a conundrum regarding the import, function, place, and
centrality of reason.

Richard Bernstein (1991b) has called this contemporary crisis or phenomenon the
"rage against reason." Reason, for one reason or other, has been found wanting, and a
certain "retro-romanticism" saturates our present landscape (Wilber, 1995): a
widespread, directed attention to non-Western cultures traditionally not subject to
reason's reign, and an expectant reliance upon these cultures to provide us with answers
to our present woes. Evidence of the case can be seen in the renewed interest in
questions regarding the quality and meaning of human existence; the rise of religious
concerns; the explosion of New Age spiritualities and alternative medicine perspectives,
the poignancy and pervasiveness of multicultural issues in educational, political, social,
and cultural arenas and institutions; and the abundant problematizing, denigration,
deconstruction, or outright attack of reason by the various eco, feminist, post-structural,
and post-modern philosophies.10 And what is Plato but the father of reason—or at least

10 Given the scope and focus of this work, it is not possible for me to present,
explicate, or even introduce here these various critiques of reason—vast in scope and
number, originating in myriad milieus of thought, and moving in different though similar

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the representative of its father Socrates, and what is the kernel of Western Civilization through him but the pursuit of reason and an unwavering faith in reason as humanity's hope for achieving all that is good?

We have previously highlighted the all-pervasive, ever-present character of faith in human life as ultimate concern or care in the context of our finite world existence (see Chapters 1 and 2). It appears that before humankind is rational animal, or along with so being we could say, it (he/she) is faith-full animal: that creature who cares; conscious that its own being is at issue (Heidegger, 1927/1962), knowing its own mortality, it perpetually goes about making meaning, valuing and judging. Humankind is interested, involved, engaged, anticipating, venerating, transcending animal, in this sense. Yet, still, we are not comfortable speaking of faith and reason together; in fact, we are heirs to centuries of debates that have pitted one against the other with the decisive ultimatum: faith or reason, one choice. Then, of course, faith loses its standing even as a viable, serious opponent, eventually—or is separated from reason altogether and relegated to its own realm, one of little consequence in the real world of affairs or in the advancement of humanity. Yet faith is, we have seen, not what it was, and neither is reason. One cannot speak of reason, particularly with regard to its present demise and state of disarray,

directions according to their own particular arguments, aims, and purposes—though these critiques are important. References to a few such critiques shall be made throughout the body of this work, but I have chosen to rely primarily on the work of Richard Bernstein (1991b) here because he, quite "reason-ably" I believe, steps back to question, to inquire into and re-think this popular, contemporary "rage against reason"—rather than, with the academic "masses" as it were, take for granted reason's depravity and plunge directly into insuring its undoing, ironically ever using the very tool of reason to effect such a negation, however unwittingly (something like the dog biting the hand that feeds it).
without speaking also about faith. However, faith is a language lost, denied, repressed, in many respects driven from human consciousness.

The problem can be stated and is perceived in varied and sundry ways: our faith in or exaltation of reason is the problem and must be discarded; at issue is reason itself which, depreciating human concerns regarding quality and meaning and value, must be marginalized, decentered, at least—if not thoroughly denigrated or annihilated. Or perhaps the crisis centers more around the issue of pathological reason, reason gone mad, made unreasonable. One explanation arising within this line of thought addresses a reason reduced: victim of the Logic of Death (see Chapter 2), and of severing, of which we have spoken, reason opts for knowledge which has unfortunately been split from value (Sloan, 1983; Wilber, 1995). We might prefer to call it, in a variant of the language of Freud, the cultural "fixation" of the West: stuck in reason and having repressed prior elements of development fundamental to the full, healthy consummation and presentation of reason, we cannot grow beyond reason and reason itself is expressed unreasonably, perversely, neurotically or psychotically. Reason in a rut—stagnated, and gone awry.

Whatever the case, whatever the cause, reason is under scrutiny; what we think of it, what we do with it, is at issue in our day. It is clear, as well, that this trial involves more than reason as it is generally conceived; our perplexing situation consists in a complex nexus of questions and crises of freedom, authority, meaning, and faith, among a plethora of others. It follows that even as reason is the problem, it is only a part of it, and yet that part of it which seems to have received the most attention, perhaps because
it is most apparent. For with the Platonic tradition and on up to and past the Enlightenment, reason is our most prominent and most admired legacy, if not also most ambiguous, paradoxical, distorted, dangerous. It only makes sense, then, to undertake an excavation of sorts—to dig beneath as it were the perceived problem, to attempt an archeological expedition which begins at the tomb of Plato. For reason is not only not what it once was, but we have lost too its grounding in faith; even the later historical vehemently-heated arguments over reason versus faith—the two having been antagonized, sides having been taken and those sides having battled it out—are practically utterly foreign to us.

In any sort of genealogical endeavor, even in the one to follow—sketchy at best and necessarily selective, it is pertinent to remember that anything revisited is also transformed: thus, reason's and faith's interrogation and reconceptualization. The task we have carved out for ourselves is grand indeed, if not grandiose, and we find the need to set constraints upon ourselves, to pick our sites carefully, and proceed with our general aim in mind. It is with that frame of mind, then, that we highlight this realization: Plato's expression of reason is also the expression of the faith of reason, and education is conceived by him as the broad and central avenue through which this faith is manifested, acted upon—through which reason is aspired to, apprehended and practiced. It might at first appear strange to modern sensibilities to include education at all in such an inquiry, but of course, education, as well, is not what it once was. For Plato, education is nothing other than this pilgrimage upon this upward path; it is the ascending journey of the soul to the intelligible sun, the good, the true and the beautiful—the faith of reason.
Stranger still, without this grounding, then, is the suggestion of the centrality of education to these questions regarding reason and faith, of the possibilities within the educational enterprise today to assist us in these struggles. Education, as we know it or generally construe it, has become little more than schooling, divorced or at least sheltered from the larger context of living, of human existence in the world, except as preparation and hopefully insurance for economic and material survival. However, we see a small measure of its Platonic legacy now and then, the seed of this faith; for example, in the expectations collectively placed upon schools and in the harsh judgements issued against them when they fail to meet those expectations. Clearly, though, most of us, most communities, most people—most teachers, most students, most parents, most principals, most educational superintendents, most professors of education, most philosophers even—do not generally conceive of education in this light: it is not a journey; it is not a quest; it has little to do with the pursuit of the good, at least as Plato conceived of it. Nothing of faith is to be found explicitly in our discussions about education, and little of reason, in fact.

Like weeds devouring Plato's grave, there has proliferated a grand forgetfulness covering over that foundational insight of the "fathers" of education, expressed most directly in the words of Socrates: the unexamined life is not worth living. The so-called birth of education in the West comprehends no split between knowledge and value, reason and faith. In fact, education is established, undertaken, taken as an examination

'The work of Jonathan Kozol (1975/1990) is exemplary of this harsh judgment against public schools in America and this disappointed faith.
of life toward this end of living that is worthy, toward apprehending and actualizing the
good, true, and beautiful in human life. As problematic as this notion is, there remains
the possibility that this legacy, and these origins, stand in a position to support us in
addressing our present difficulties in regard to faith, to reason, to education—in
addressing the crises of our times; and certainly to give us insight into them. We pursue
then, with these things in mind, these excavation sites in our archeological expedition,
seeking in Part 1 (Chapter 3): to uncover and brush off this Platonic image of education
as the faith of reason and clarify more specifically this notion of reason's faith, and to
explore broadly the sweep of this faith in terms of the Platonic vision as it has been
played out historically and ontologically; and in Part 2, (Chapter 4): to probe into the
ever-smaller context of its operation in the educational institution, explicitly concerned
with education, and implicitly with the advancement of reason; the historical
development of the field of education, exemplary of the endurance of this faith.

I.

But if we are persuaded by me, we'll believe that the soul is
immortal and able to endure every evil and every good, and we'll always
hold to the upward path, practicing justice with reason in every way.
That way we'll all be friends both to ourselves and to the gods while we
remain here on earth and afterwards ... Hence, ... we'll do well and be
happy.

(Plato, ca. 380 b.c./1992, p. 292)

None has so profound a commitment to education as has Plato, or so great an
ambition for it. Through education—through perseverance and constancy in a blessed
journey, through the faith of reason, through the pursuit and practice of reason as
ultimate concern directed toward the good itself—to do well and be happy, here on earth
and afterwards, befriending both ourselves and the gods: here is a grand and glorious aim indeed. This is ambition, indeed, and faith— the ambition and faith of Plato.

This metaphor of the upward path which Plato sets forth in the Republic, as we inquire into it, serves to give us insight into this somewhat foreign notion of education as reason's faith. He likens the process of education to the journey of underground cave dwellers out of the dark enclosure of their world into the wide world of light. Not only does the uneducated person live in the cave, but he is also a prisoner of the cave: his neck and legs are bound, he can turn his head neither to the left nor to the right. The field of his horizon is the cave wall. Plato vividly describes the conditions of the cave; behind the prisoner on higher ground is a fire which both gives light and casts shadows. The prisoner sees his own shadow and the shadows of others who walk behind him carrying artifacts which too cast shadows upon the cave wall. The only truths this prisoner knows are the shadows he sees before him. He takes shadow for substance: the shadow is the real; it is his sole reality.

In Plato's explication of his own metaphor, he first identifies the cave habitat, the home of the prisoners, with the sensible or visible realm; and the fire's light within the cave with the sun's efficacy. The pilgrimage of ascent from the cave and the exploration of those things beyond its entrance is likened to the education of the soul as its journey upward to the intelligible realm. In this sense, we glean that education is here

"Plato's sharp distinction between the sensible and the intelligible realms is believed to have involved the accommodation of Heraclitus' insight that all is flux into Plato's more firmly established foundation in stability, the permanence of the Forms. The Forms bear the influence of Parmenides' notion of being, the belief that all is one. In this sense, for Plato, good, virtue, reason, being, god, are all terms for the same thing, that
developmental in nature, a progression of the soul from matter to mind, an ascent from
the physiosphere (matter) and biosphere (life) to the realm of the noosphere (mind).

Education is then also, ultimately, about transcendence. We take note of and highlight
quickly this fundamental feature in Plato's construction, not only because it resonates
powerfully with our notions of faith as they are generally construed, but also because it
contrasts sharply with our conceptions of reason; and yet here it is the case in which
reason figures prominently in acts of, in the aim of transcendence.

The intelligible, or knowable realm, at its pinnacle, consists in the form of the
good, sight's finale—arrived at only with great difficulty. The good is realized as the
origin of all that is true and beautiful; the visible realm's source, too, is found herein as
the good is also the bearer of light. It directs understanding and apprehension of truth;
thus, to live most sensibly with oneself and with others, to act in the world in a way most
fitting, it is required of one to indeed gain this sight of the form of the good. For Plato
then, the uneducated can have no experience of truth. While such an assertion is
generally offensive as it falls on modern ears, in the light of its own context, it makes
perfect sense because education itself is in part the pursuit of truth and the experience of

which is, unchangingly. Obviously in this vein, of great importance for him is the
maintenance of an ethical order and the stability of the concepts of justice and the other
virtues (Grube, in Plato, ca. 380 b.c./1992). Including the sensible then, yet separating it
from the intelligible, he can leave intact his preference for the all as One, the unifying
Forms, admitting still to multiplicity, diversity, and the reality of change. With such a
separation of realms, and denigration of one by the other, it is not difficult to see the soil
in which the seeds of the Logic of Death (see Chapter 2) may most easily sprout if left
unattended, and it is at this point, in fact, that Plato has found a great deal of subsequent
criticism. However, ours is presently to grasp his vision as a whole, his unifying faith,
which in many ways serves to undermine this separation and this bias.
such. In like manner, the educated are, in fact, the virtuous; for "only really virtuous people can actually gain genuine knowledge of ethical truth, because they alone can achieve genuine understanding of the good itself" (Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./1992, p. xv), and this understanding is of course achieved only through education.

Plato (c.a. 380 b.c./1992) contrasts his own, perhaps radical, notion of education to those of others:

Education isn't what some people declare it to be, namely, putting knowledge into souls that lack it, like putting sight into blind eyes.... The power to learn is present in everyone's soul and ... the instrument with which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light without turning the whole body, ... cannot be turned around from that which is coming into being without turning the whole soul until it is able to study that which is and the brightest thing that is, namely, the one we call the good.... Education is the craft concerned with doing this very thing, this turning around, and with how the soul can most easily and effectively be made to do it. It isn't the craft of putting sight into the soul. Education takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn't turned the right way or looking where it ought to look, and it tries to redirect it appropriately. (p. 190)

The aim of education,13 by Plato's assertion, is not to put knowledge into a person's soul, but to change the desires of the heart; what is required is that the soul must be turned

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13The word "educate" is said to have come from the Latin educare, meaning to rear, to bring up, or to train. In former times, it has been associated with the physical nurturing or rearing of plants or animals, and the support of growth in such (Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. V, 1989). The Latin educere, however, has also been associated with our English transliteration "educate," signifying to draw or lead out. This origin resonates well with Plato's notion of education as the upward journey of the soul—the "student" is drawn or led out of the cave's darkness, away from lower desires to higher ones. The term is shown to have been used in a number of senses including the leading forth or bringing out of troops for military battle, a bringing forth into a country or province, or a bringing forth of, for example, a person of magnitude. In addition, educere can mean to draw forth or unsheathe, as in a sword (Oxford Latin Dictionary, Vol. 1, 1984). The link made between educate and educere as a leading forth or drawing out of intellectual abilities has been traced back to nineteenth century romanticism.
around, in order to face and thus see light, directed toward the good as envisioned through the faith of reason, in order to look upon it and take it in. It is at this point where human desire becomes central to this notion of education as reason's faith. Thus, Plato weaves into his story his belief in the three parts of the human soul: the appetitive, the spirited, and the rational. Three different kinds of desire they are, residing within the human soul, one of which generally maintains dominance and thus governs the life of that soul, its existence in the social world. In the appetitive, food, drink, sex, or money for the acquisition of things are the goods toward which the soul strives; in the spirited, honor, victory and the comfort of a good reputation are its aim; the rational is motivated by the search to realize knowledge and truth. Education is, then, a transcendent sojourn of the soul in which the educated moves from being predominately ruled by the appetitive part to that divine rational one, with the faith that by the rule of reason, the good, the true, the beautiful—virtue, justice, freedom, human and divine friendship, happiness—can be obtained.

What follows from these three variants of desire is an embryonic theory of psychological types (Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./1992), or at least a schema by which to characterize souls dominated by these particular desires. Three types are identified: the money-lover, dominated by desires that are appetitive; the honor-lover, motivated by longings that are spirited; and the wisdom-lover, governed by reason, desires that are rational. The three types are embodied in the social world of Plato as producers, guardians and philosophers. That desire which rules the soul, directs the personality, and much of what is desired, depends on what the good is perceived to be. For Plato, the
only claim that can be ultimately supported is the claim of reason upon the soul, the notion of the good as perceived by philosophers, or those along reason's transcendent path.

To be virtuous is to be a lover of wisdom—it is to have achieved the place where the reign of the soul is in its rational part. Education, then, as it aims in making souls virtuous, seeks to turn souls from desires that are spirited or appetitive, and to change those desires, or to encourage and establish those souls already ruled by reason. It involves teaching the faithful pursuit of true happiness, found in knowledge, truth, the apprehension of the good. Education, if successful, makes one virtuous. It is what happens as the internal rule of the soul moves from the desires in one part of the soul to those in another part, progressively leading to that part of the soul which is rational. In this sense, education is exactly not about obtaining a body of knowledge or acquiring a set of skills, although such possessions are secondary gains. Education is the way to inner transformation—and faith in such—that makes virtue possible and that effects a way of being, or living, that is meaningful, worthwhile, imbued with value.

In the context of these human desires, Plato explains the progress of education in this way through four stages: first, there are prisoners who see only shadows of models of things, the uneducated who are ruled by unessential appetites; next, where there is education in a craft or in music, poetry, or physical training, some of these prisoners are freed from their chains to see the models of things and to be possessed only by appetites

"Herein is Plato's faith, as faith directs itself toward care or concern that is ultimate."
that are necessary; then, through education in math and science comes liberation from appetitive bonds and the authority of spirited desires—the cave is left behind and, for the first time, things themselves are seen; finally, education in the dialectic and in the practical governance of the city ushers in the rule of the rational—achieved is the sight of the good itself, and the greatest object of study.

Further clarification is made of four conditions of the soul, also progressive in nature: imaging is the lowest condition of the soul; belief follows as a level above imaging; next proceeds that which is still greater, being thought; and finally, the highest of all such conditions is understanding. Imaging and belief are along the order of opinion, whereas thought and understanding are functions of the intellect. The source of opinion's care is becoming, while the intellect's is being. Being is to becoming as intellect is to opinion, as knowledge is to belief, as thought is to imaging. Thus, we have an outline for a general developmental schema of the soul's journey upward, its education, and evolution as fleshed out by Plato:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[VISIBLE]</th>
<th>[INTELLIGIBLE]</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>imaging --&gt; belief --&gt; thought --&gt; understanding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opinion/becoming</td>
<td>intellect/being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appetitive producers</td>
<td>spirited guardians rational philosophers-kings</td>
</tr>
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It seems apparent that Plato privileges being over becoming,\footnote{Perhaps, in this privileging lies the seeds of repression, of violence against becoming, and thus of subsequent pathology. Plato may in fact be interpreted here as one who devalues and denigrates imaging and belief, rather than highlighting them as fundamental to the development of full-bodied thought and understanding—as prior to,} that the path to bliss and
thus the course of education entails a certain betrayal of the sensible, of becoming, in the
quest for the intelligible, for being. The implication is that the good cannot be seen in
that which is coming into being, but only in being itself. Yet perhaps, as Wilber (1995)
possits, within the entirety of Plato's thought, the main thrust centers around the
incompletion of becoming, the need of diversity, of flux, to find its meaning, and its
completion, in its relationship to being, to permanence, to the transcendent. For the
enlightened, educated soul is charged with the responsibility to return to the cave, with
this larger, greater context, this higher sight, through which to view shadows and
artifacts and models of things in the cave; is summoned to participate in the creation of
human life "worth living" by education's contemplative light, with the sight of the good
that is brought home to the soul only through this journey of examination.

Hence, we have this quest for being, a striving toward that which is, with the
anticipation of blessing. In such a quest, too, the one undertaking it is changed,
transformed: the desire of the soul—the soul itself—has been turned, moved. As the path
to being, Wilber likens Plato's vision to those of the contemplative traditions the world

foundational to and constitutive of thought and understanding. The problems of
modernity may be traced to this condemnation, in terms of a loss of the symbolic life so
fundamental to thoughtful living, the removal of the imagination and of belief from the
production of knowledge, from what is taken for knowledge. Even Plato must use this
image of the cave and the human journey out of it to the light of the sun to impact the
beliefs of, to evoke thought in, to promote understanding in his readers, his listeners.

We see faith, as well, figures prominently in this debate, as the great mediator of
becoming and being, of the historical and the eternal; as the state of being ultimately
concerned, faith engages also the whole person, serving an integrative function which
takes up, frames and brings together images, beliefs, thoughts and understandings.
Plato's faith of reason and its explication here evidences this integration well, although
perhaps its denial by him too.
over: it is akin to the path traversed by the mystics—who have spanned the centuries, male and female, from every religion, culture and walk of life. His is primarily a journey of inner transcendence that achieves this "good" blessed vision and insight of the Many encompassed in the One or All, and vice-versa.

Of course, few cast Plato in this light, and more, in fact, diametrically disagree with such a cast; certainly, Plato is not normally perceived or considered in this way; rather upon first hearing, it sounds ludicrous even to compare Plato to the mystics at all or the Platonic tradition to the mystical one. Indeed, should we continue further, fleshing out his own explication of the cave metaphor, and the "curricular" and "methodological" implications he gleans from it, would we not be presented with this traditionally "narrow" path of study marked out by reason as we know it? Not exactly. But it is not our aim here to map out all the details laid out by Plato, delineating from his cave allegory, regarding curriculum design, pedagogical methodology, etc., nor to make of Plato a mystic; rather, we seek to investigate broadly his foundational concept of education as the faith of reason.

The disciplines of study, the sequences and methods prescribed therein, are themselves beneficial, necessary, pursued, in the larger context which aims at moving the soul through reason to a vision of the good, and to a life empowered by such a vision. We simply state that what Plato's exegesis does seem to evidence is the radical import and influence of historicity, of particularity, of the social and cultural conditions of existence, upon the concretization of an image or narrative such as this, its application or perceived actualization in human life, in the actual education of real individual souls, in
both personal and public domains. For we even read the *Republic* as a whole and marvel at the conclusions to which Plato is drawn, or to which he has Socrates come—markedly different from those we should make given the same images, addressed with the same questions, even following the same general logic—in fact, we are appalled by many of his proposals—such as, for example, separating the young for early educational inculcation, or the censorship of stories, tragedies, poets, and storytellers.

What we take note of here is his radical—and radically different from our own—portrait of education. It is the education of the soul, for one; and it is its transformative, transcendent ascent to the good, the true, the beautiful—to wisdom, to happiness, to a life of meaning and worthwhile efficacy, to virtue. It is its spiritual journey, undertaken in and through faith—"from faith to faith" (*The Holy Bible*, 1985, Romans 1:17), as it is said, the faith of reason as divine. For, says Plato (c.a. 380 b.c./1992), comparing reason to other virtues of the soul: "The virtue of reason seems to belong above all to something more divine, which never loses its power ..." (p. 190-191).

It may be contested that Plato's notion of "divine" is markedly different from the contemporary one handed down to us through Christianity—that, in fact, his notion is along the order of mathematics, that Pythagorean divinity centered around numbers and geometric forms. Yet, such an argument does not hold when we look further at the specifics Plato lays out in regard to the study of math and its place in the divine journey, and at his explicit teleology, the aim and end of this quest. Plato neither questions the existence of the gods, nor their divinity, nor the importance of the human need for a relationship to the divine, which is more than numerical if that. More importantly,
though, we remind ourselves that the key pedagogical and curricular question for Plato is this: "What subject ... draws the soul from the realm of becoming to the realm of what is?" (p. 193). He identifies that which awakens understanding, in this way, as that which by sense perception brings to pass no sound result. Aporias, perhaps, or paradoxes, these he calls "summoners," shooting off into opposite perceptions at the same time—like a thing that through the senses announces itself as x and as counter-x in one and the same moment. It is the mysterious, the puzzling, the inexplicable or incommensurate—the antinomy—which draws us, intrigues us, lures us, evokes inquiry which leads the soul to and upon this path of ascent. Again, one judges if a matter is worthy of study in this wise: the criteria consist in whether or not the study of such matter shall move the soul to attend to being, rather than to becoming alone.

Math—i.e., the study of numbers, ratios, geometric forms—is counted worthy, then, as an object of study by Plato as that which directs the soul to truth because it concerns numbers, where one is able to see the same entity as both one and unlimited, whole and part, finite and infinite. The danger, he adds, is that calculation and the various mathematical functions can be practiced for the sake of a trade alone; and if pursued not for the sake of knowing, the understanding is not compelled to enter into the pursuit of truth. When pursued knowingly, however, this study can drive the soul's sight to things above, and promote the desired ascent to the invisible world. It is true that Plato has a certain obsession with numbers and ratios, directly attributable to a Pythagorean influence, yet probably more a result of Plato's intense desire for stability, to define with certainty those concepts of concern, at issue for him and his society, which
seem to evade definition, like justice, beauty, etc. (Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./1992)—
and numbers can give one this sense of security and definitiveness. Indeed, the West is
marked by this Platonic desire, indelibly ingrained in it, and much of its history has been
guided and directed either consciously or unconsciously by this concentrated need.

However, is this Pythagorean study the aim, the end of the divine journey? Is it
the culmination and crown of reason divine? Definitively, it is not. Plato vehemently
concludes: "Don't you know that all these subjects [including those which are
mathematical] are merely preludes to the song itself which must be learned?" (c.a. 380
b.c./1992, p. 203). The song is that which dialectic sings, intelligible and echoed in the
agency of sight. As through sight one may apprehend the visible at its height in
beholding the sun, "whenever someone tries through argument and apart from all sense
perceptions to find the being itself of each thing and doesn't give up until he grasps the
good itself with understanding itself, he reaches the end of the intelligible" (p. 204).
Dialectic is said to bring the soul to a peaceful abode, in a sense, to the end of
journeying; for the soul has reached the end of the journey, and its aim. In the language
of faith, the soul has reached the ultimate; its ultimate concern has found intelligible
realization.

Plato, of course, has developed this method he calls "dialectic" from the elenchus
of Socrates, a procedure of examination in which contradictions, inconsistencies in
reasoning, are realized and rectified. And this search for sufficient definitions of the
concepts of things is pursued with nothing short of moral transformation as its goal
(Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./1992). The habitual performance of such examination
assists humanity in worthy living, promoting virtue and blessedness; it gifts the giver, and those with whom the giver shares this gift, with truth, beauty, and goodness.

Thus, the effect of pedagogy, in the Platonic sense, is dramatic—concerning such things as beauty, truth and goodness. First, the soul must be set free—the shackles removed—and turned from the cave wall toward and brought into the light which shines through the opening of the cave above. The aim and intent in education, then, is liberation, in fact—it comes to set the captives free. The process is described as a dizzying, dazzling, confusing experience. With it lies the temptation to turn back, to choose shadow over substance. When the eyes accustomed to shadows first meet light, they are blinded and still cannot yet see what is. It takes a while to get used to the light. But once this is accomplished, the vision—the view—is never the same. Curriculum as conversion? This portrait resonates noticeably with that one of the Christian experience of St. Paul, blinded by the light on the road to Damascus. Or in more contemporary terms, curriculum as paradigm shifting, perhaps. Of course, Plato precedes Christ—and Kuhn—in the chronology of things. By any comparison, Plato's notion is pretty radical, in fact, and it is not as absurd as upon first consideration to see something of the mystic in him.

More to the point, Plato has a faith which abides: it is the faith of reason, of philosophy, to effect such a profound and blessed transformation of the human soul, and through such, of the human community, as well. True philosophy is that ascent to what is, for Plato, and education, too, as the upward journey, and the hope of reason, is true philosophy, the philosopher's path. In the Phaedo (c.a. 395 b.c./1951), he further
describes philosophy as that vigil over death—being towards death, as it were, and care in
such being. It includes that concern and that attempt to reconcile the seemingly
irreconcilable: flux and permanence, the particular and the universal, the historical and
the eternal, mortality and immortality, diversity and unity, becoming and being, being and
nothingness, the Many and the One—in such a way that life may be lived fully, in contrast
to the unexamined life which is little more than the life of the living dead. In this way,
for Plato, reason—including education as reason's faith and the enactment of that faith,
directing one to a vision of the form of the good—is the ultimate, the object of ultimate
care and concern, or is at least indelibly tied to the ultimate as the only path for
apprehending such (i.e., the good, true and beautiful, etc.); thus, via education, the
persistent hopeful quest for it, the search for its actualization. Plato's notion of reason is
constitutive of the transcendent function. And, of course, it is, in fact, this whole nexus
exactly within which faith is said to operate.

Now at this point—according to Plato in the unpacking of his own image, the
saved cave-prisoner, of course, cannot go back to the cave. He sees the world in
altogether different terms. He cannot see as once he did. In fact, he pitied those whose
eyes chase after shadows as though they were the substance of tangible things. If he
were to return to the cave, he would be ridiculed for his poor eyesight. Shadows no
longer signify the real or ultimate to him. In Plato's allegory, he explains that a soul
having seen the light and returned to the darkness of the cave would rather be as Homer
choosing servitude over the opinions of dark imprisoned souls; he quotes here, in fact,
from the Odyssey (c.a. 1000-850 b.c./1980), echoing the words spoken by Achilles'
ghost-shadow to Odysseus during his visitation in Hades (Grube, in Plato, c.a. 380 b.c./1992, p. 189, fn.). In this sense, likening the cave inhabitants to the dead—the living dead, Plato is making the claim that education brings life to the otherwise lifeless, dead—the uneducated. And here we have another image which coincides strongly with the Christian one of regeneration—an image found, of course, in mystical traditions of all varieties. Reason is divine.

Thus, the soul proceeding in its education, in due time, looks happily upon the sun itself rather than just its rays reflected upon the water, and the light of reason has dawned. Herein, in Plato's description of education, is presented most clearly the schema for an "Enlightenment." Within some schools of thought, Plato's cave metaphor should be seen as indeed descriptive of the upward journey humankind has taken historically, and not just literally (beginning as "cavemen," etc.). The discovery of the rational part of man, it would be claimed in this case, marks the birth of reason and ushers in the age of Enlightenment. Clearly, the age of the Enlightenment is characterized most frequently and faithfully as the age of reason, or perhaps more directly as the craze of reason, and a neo-classicist revival—although obviously inclusive therein is a neo-reason, and hardly exactly the reason of Plato. The phrase we have taken up, "the faith of reason," has in fact been previously taken up by Charles Frankel (1948) in a book of that name on Enlightenment thought and the idea of progress foundational to it and to the present legacy of reason's faith. Frankel points out that while such a faith is construed by contemporaries to be a mistaken one, it involves "a complex and uneasy combination of beliefs" (p. 2) which needs careful examining, especially as the predecessor of our liberal
faith, "the idea of human improvement through the use of organized intelligence ... central to liberal philosophies" (p. 4). Thus, we move now from the faith of Plato, and his reason, to the archeology of its significance in the development of Western Civilization: a basic and broad exploration into the structures built upon this foundation as well as the rents and cracks, the unleveling and sinking effects rendered upon it. Our inquiry concerns the enduring presence of the Platonic vision, the historical operation of the faith of reason, whether manifested via its alteration, denial, repression, inversion or aggrandizement.

II.

Clearly, the Enlightenment represents a most visible high point in the history of this vision in the West (at least seemingly so)—though some 2000 years since its inception— as the advocate and beacon of reason, reason's cultural triumph and pinnacle. Thus, its obvious import in this archeology. Yet, just as certainly by this time, something has already happened to reason and to the journey of the soul indelibly tied to it, to the faith of reason—things are neither as they once were, nor rarely as they seem. It is necessary to remember that in early Greek thought, the Kosmos is one (comprised of all domains—physiosphere, biosphere, noosphere, and theosphere); all of its different aspects constitute an interrelated and unbroken expression of Spirit, all essential and intrinsically valuable. Extant is this great chain of being and this journey from matter to life to mind to soul, and then to spirit, telos and summit. Wilber (1995) claims, in fact, that this view of the world persists in some form until the close of the nineteenth century. For Plato, then, reason is the way of human access to spirit: "To be rational [means]
attunement with the Kosmos" (p. 399). The heart of the Platonic quest in which reason
is central is this knowledge of the One, the good, that beyond being, Spirit. Such
involves two reciprocal and continuous movements: the ascent from the Many to the
One, the intelligible realm, transcendent spirit; and the descent from the One to the
Many, the visible realm, immanent spirit. The first involves the contemplation of the
good, the second, participation in the world's goodness.

"Reason, in Greek—logos, is divine. Martin Heidegger (1927/1962) suggests
that, for Plato, logos signifies discourse primarily—constitutive of the term "dialectic" as
well, the meaning of which is obscured historically, however, through numerous
translations. The logos involves a making manifest in discourse, it is an expression
which allows something to be seen, in a sense by pointing it out, in its "togetherness." Its
relationship to truth, then, is found in terms of discovery, of manifestation, in which
something is revealed, is taken out of hiding. In its function of letting things be
perceived, it signifies reason. It has the character of speech, of utterance—an active,
living efficacy. Divine reason speaks things into being.

Logos is generally translated as reason, judgment, concept, definition, ground,
relationship, reckoning, account, and also as utterance, discourse or speech, mind. In
this sense, it is inward thought itself, the embodiment of a concept or idea, the revelation
of a message (uttered or expressed), generally construed as divine: thus, the cause or
ground, divine expression, the Divine itself—God (Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. XIII,
1989; Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible: Dictionaries of the Hebrew and
Greek Words, n.d.; Vine's expository dictionary, n.d.). For Heraclitus, the logos
controls the pattern of the Kosmos; as the principle of order in the universe, it not only
determines pattern in the physical world, but also in the world of events, imbuing all with
purposiveness. The logos is the source of all human thought, recognition of truth, and
moral judgment. It is this sense of order which fascinates the Greeks, especially the
Stoics, and Plato as well, and thus, a devotion to reason. Such is the power which puts
coherence and meaning into the world; it speaks it into being, puts it into motion, keeps
it growing and going. Reason, from this Greek perspective, pervades all things: the
thought of God branded on the Kosmos; through it, the worlds are made, and all things
therein bear its stamp. Reason is the great mediator between God and the world,
between the divine and the human, between the intelligible and sensible realms (Barclay,
1955). William Barclay (1955) calls it the priest which brings the soul before God, the
manifestation of the creating, guiding, directing power of the divine.
While it is true that in Plato's cave allegory he emphasizes the movement of ascension and disapproves of humanity dwelling solely and persistently in the "cave" of the world's manyness, in his explication of the image he affirms the necessity of descension, an enduring response of the one who has made the journey upward. In fact, while the father of the "Ideal realm," Plato likewise is said to have possessed an "exuberant kind of this-worldliness" (Lovejoy, 1936/1964, p. 45); Arthur Lovejoy claims that for Plato, "the shadows were as needful to the Sun as the Sun to the shadows; their existence was the very consummation of its perfection" (p. 53). In the *Timaeus* (c.a. 360 b.c./1965), Plato speaks of the Kosmos as a visible sensible God, spirit-infused—all matter, life, and consciousness. Wilber (1995) calls Plato's journey a great circle—which we note is a symbol of wholeness and eternity, and the way of faith—in which the upward path and the descending return find communion; the injunction is: "Flee the many, embrace the one; having found the one, embrace the many as one" (p. 326). In a concrete way, the importance of this injunction is seen in Plato's intense concern over establishing the ideal city, the "republic," and his emphasis of the responsibility upon philosophers—those having undertaken the upward path—to return to city life and serve the people. But the West, it appears, has not heard the injunction aright, or only part of it. More appropriately then, the Western tradition, in this way, is comprised of "fractured" footnotes to Plato (p. 320). Thus, early on, reason as well—the reason of Plato—is alternatively construed, or misconstrued, perhaps.
This two-directional or "circular" nature of the soul's journey, of humanity's education, seems to undergo a kind of splintering as early as with the thought and

"Admittedly, I am here attempting a very broad, impressionistic presentation of human history in the West, specifically with regard to humankind's ontological stance toward the journey which is life, and tendency toward "splintering"—privileging the one, the universal, ascent or the many, the particular, descent. In this way, I am, of course, guilty of a good deal of over-generalization, although such a crime seems inescapable given my present aim, the nature of the task I am seeking to undertake. Theorizing, at a certain level, requires over-generalization—desirable, as well, for a glimpse of a larger view, particularly when one is addressing cosmological and ontological concerns. For example, it is as important to be aware of and take in the forest as it is to study and examine the trees, and the bark (of the trees) finds its meaning, or at least a greater or more expanded meaning, as viewed within the larger horizon and contextualized landscape of the forest.

This is not to ignore, undermine or discount the legitimate criticisms made against the problem of theory, particularly against its tendency toward abstraction and discourse that is universalizing and totalizing. In this way, clearly, in and of itself, such discourse runs the risk of violence—silencing, excluding, erasing the multiplicity of diverse voices, perspectives, the reality of particularity and difference. Herein, unwilling to run such a risk, I would like to say from the outset that the following historical presentation is merely an attempt at an overview of a particular line of dominant thought in the West which seeks to evidence this "splintering" tendency. In this sense, it lacks the subtlety and complexity required of a full-bodied, in-depth historical study or investigation of these time periods, which given the aim and scope of this work I have been unable to undertake here. The view set forth is undoubtedly like a view of the forest, though not in an attempt to undermine the importance of looking further at individual trees and the barks of those trees to supplement or challenge that view. However, today, with attention directed, understandably (as I think the following presentation will show), so singularly at difference and at the voices and views of particular peoples and cultures not represented or heard in the main, the problem seems to be more along the order of missing the forest for the trees, or the tendency to discount the legitimacy of the forest altogether.

In addition, it is important to differentiate between the thought of influential individuals, and their thought as inherited, taken up and propagated by mainstream culture and by subsequent generations. Plato is not equal to Platonism, nor Aristotle to Aristotelianism, nor Marx to Marxism. Neither is the complexity of medieval thought equal to medievalism, of Christianity to Christendom, of modernity to modernism. I am here focusing on something of the "isms" which have dominated, the prevailing effects of ideas as reduced and assimilated culturally, their social sedimentsations and presentations (or "conventionalizations"). Such is not to deny the margins of culture, nor the voices of dissent and resistance ever present in every age, though I do not deal with them here.
impact of Aristotle, Plato's student. Ironically, while Aristotle is traditionally taken as the "this-worldly" philosopher in contrast to Plato, his Divine—in which we have seen Reason plays a key role—turns to represent a kind of Pure Ascension, Transcendence; god becomes primarily altogether other-worldly. The two paths taken separately are contradictory—antagonists, opposing directions and journeys. It becomes a matter of choosing the world or losing the world—rejecting it. After Aristotle, then, the upwardness of the journey takes precedence. Moreover, with the subsequent reign of an official Christianity, influenced by Aristotle, the split is decisive and esteemed is the path of ascent only (Wilber, 1995). This world, the body, the senses are denigrated, despised, declared evil. The church's legacy and lineage becomes repression, asceticism; the violent and dogmatic rule and domination of Ascension, of the mind, of the One as construed by the Church, at the expense of and in abnegation of the Many, of the body, of the import of Descension. Pathological Ascent.

Since I am relying heavily on the work of Kenneth Wilber (1995) in this regard, who has been accused of reporting a caricature history of the West, I have felt the need to comment on these things. My construction, as with Wilber's, is but one story about the development of thought in the West, specifically concerned with the notion of the universal therein, as well as an attempt at a generalized cosmological and ontological story of the West—fully aware that "the West" itself is no simple, well-defined, unified, unchanging, non-contradictory construct. Obviously, no one story or interpretation of history can claim to be truly representative of reality, and to profess a full and genuine understanding of any historical time frame is to make a false profession (Munro, 1996). The problem of history—its "appearance of unity, of coherence, of order, [which] is predicated ... on the suppression of contradictory stories, ... this silencing" (p. 3); its need for origins and ends; and its affection for simple linearity—is the problem, too, of human understanding, constituted by narrative selectivity and unity, and in the search for intelligibility.
Interestingly enough, however, the ascent promoted by the Church as establishment is not only severed from any return or descent, and in fact privileged over against descent, but also this ascent is ironically truncated, thwarted, controlled, cut off. The seeds are sown for dualism to prevail: body versus mind versus spirit, nature versus culture, human versus divine. This god threatens becoming absolutely separate from this world. Wilber calls this god "the unearthly trinity" who, ironically and tragically, is denied the status of the truly transcendent, in fact, but is rather made in the image of the establishment: anthropocentric, geocentric, egocentric to the core. As the achievement of reason at its core is antithetical to such an image, perhaps what occurs is the actual denial of reason, in the name of reason, and the relentless prevention of its actualization.

"From a developmental perspective of the human individual, as well as of humanity at large (like those of Kenneth Wilber, Jürgen Habermas and Jean Piaget, for example), reason is seen as an advance, a higher form of thought, over archaic, magical or mythical thought—or sensorimotor, preoperational or concrete-operational function. Reason represents, in its best manifestation, a transcendence of the physiosphere and biosphere into the realm of the noosphere, of mind. True transcendence, it should be noted, does not involve the repression or denial of these more fundamental spheres but their negation and embrace in the more significant sphere of the mind, in which we might also include spirit. Even those who eschew developmental notions of the person and of the history of humanity seem to retain something of this structure in their discourse.
culturally. At any rate, full transcendence and ascension (in the Platonic sense) is
deemed heresy; the upward journey of the Christ is forbidden to others, the path
anathema: transcendental reduction, limited ascent under the sole/soul direction of the
Church. Moreover, the powers that be ferociously and vehemently come against those
who seek the upward path without such imposed limitations; they are mystics or
profanes, whether secular or religious, who blasphemously pull God down from his
throne, or strive pridefully to reach up to that sacred place themselves, tainting the divine
with their impure touch; they must be extinguished. Many are burned at the stake, in
fact. Reason ripped of reason, truncated—unreasonable reason, if that. Therefore,
instead of the ascent to the Light of the Sun, the Dark Ages.

It is at least by this point that "the West was locked into a perpetually frustrated
Ascendant yearning—a yearning for a Goal that would never be officially allowed" (p.
335). The "desperate face," Janus-like, of the West, as we know it, finds the source of
its present countenance and incessant spiritual hunger, perhaps, here exactly. This
hunger never fulfilled, the blessedness sought in this journey constantly denied, it is not
long before the faith of it, already altered, is further changed, denied altogether even, and
the path itself despised. Of course, this is not to say that reason itself is denigrated—it is
simply not what it was and is becoming progressively other than it was. In fact, reason is
again lauded, yet it has no consciousness of its own faith, or only a faint one. Incessant
debate has threatened the complete separation of reason from faith, and the overthrow of
faith—faith, of course, as defined by the Church to control thought and silence the voice
of rational criticism. The path of ascent, via the Church, is delegitimated, has been given

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a bad name, and faith with it in some measure. With the Renaissance and the accompanying rise of science, the call of reason is again taken in hand, the journey as prescribed by religion rejected or undermined, and a new course drawn up—and with it, a reversal, a new direction: the journey of Descent (Wilber, 1995). Reason released and yet redirected, and the faith of it lost in the shuffle, and redirected as well.

Wilber identifies the initial shift of emphasis from ascent or transcendence to world descent and immanence with the Renaissance and the science of the Renaissance. The center of interest turns around "the great plenitude;" it is now "this" world which has preeminence, the other world out of fashion after the long disquiet—failed attempts to apprehend it. The domination of ascent is zealously broken, one stunted reason replaced with another; one insufficient god conquered by another; faith underground yet likewise re-routed. Renaissance science seeks still the laws of God, but the logos or reason of this descending god—creative, effluxing. Again, only a part of Plato has been taken up: in this case, his doctrine of plenitude. These ideas of Plato predating the establishment of scientific evidence for their support are the aprioris substantiated in the research program of the Renaissance. Nature consists in this great chain of being, the task of science being to uncover the missing links. The encyclopedia is born here as well, classifying, organizing, putting together the pieces to gain a comprehensive view of the world. This world is not just the many, but now also the one. The quest gathers around solely that which can be seen, the exteriors. The rise of science contributes to these changes: crude instruments, though partial, purport to reveal all the world. Wilber calls it the flatland or collapsed cosmos, also and better known as the mechanistic
worldview. In addition, the second law of thermodynamics adds to such deterministic thinking, and the thinking of descent—the order of the universe, rather its disorder, or the universe in decline.

Yet, with Darwin, evolution, and the developmental conception of the biosphere, the split that has already occurred is brought clearly into view, even within the empirical sciences dedicated to the external world alone. The "mechanical" physiosphere is winding down while the organic biosphere is winding up. Incommensurable descent and ascent. The Kosmos is now the cosmos, neither spirit-infused nor exactly whole: matter dead, mind disembodied. Radical efforts are offered to try to restore the Kosmos: materialism considers the idea that all is matter, phenomenalism suggests that all is mind. Eventually, however, the natural sciences are separated from the human sciences, natural philosophy from moral philosophy, and the biological sciences are caught between the two poles (Wilber, 1995). Things are not as they once were, the path is forked, if still a path, and even the journey of descent is not as secure as it at first seemed. Reason's faith is torn, its aim perhaps conflicted.

Yet still, reason marches on—and underneath, the "everlasting" arms of faith. Akin to Derrida's (1992/1995) look at history as responsibility, a human evolution of increasing interiorization, the crux of which he locates in Christianity (see Chapter 1), Wilber (1995), among others, has considered the history of the very Kosmos as evolutionary movement toward greater depth or interiority. Human consciousness is construed in this way as the manifestation of the Kosmos conscious of itself. Reason, as well, plays a key role in this inward turn. Even in its apparent perverse manifestation in
the West, interiorization seems to utter a particular kind of wisdom—the wisdom of the ancients speaking across time and culture, in fact, whom Wilber describes as "figures of the future," rather than primarily of the past, prophets of human possibility. In concurrence with Derrida's thought, Paul Tillich (1967) has identified Augustine, a Christian father, as a central spokesman for the West, its rendering of the soul's journey—the message: Go within to get beyond. Within is ascent; depth is ascent, which ought to take the soul beyond to include a descending embrace.

Both Wilber (1995) and Habermas (1976/1979) identify the emergence of this greater human interiority with the time of Plato, the "Golden Age of Greece." A movement of the soul from a dominant role identity to the beginnings of an ego identity corresponds with this emergence, and with the human "birth" of reason. However, both scholars, as well, see reason, this ego identity, the manifestation of the noosphere, reaching cultural fruition in the sixteenth century. Also, with the emergence of the ego identity comes the accomplishment, in evolutionary terms, of the differentiation of the Kosmos: physiosphere, biosphere, and noosphere, at least. Development is seen likewise as envelopment, proceeding from the most fundamental to the most significant; thus, to move powerfully into noospheric awareness is movement upward. In this sense then, the upward path, the journey of ascent, the telos of transcendence, in some measure prevails despite the people of the West, their historical vengeance against it. Yet with greater advance, and thus also complexity, lies the potential for greater pathology as well. Differentiation is distinguishable from dissociation or alienation, and the call of integration ceaselessly follows upon it. And of course, there is, in the West,
already this truncation, this stunted growth, this splitting—the presence of pathology. Reason, faith, humankind, is not what it could be. Yet it is interesting to note that in the sixteenth century, for the first time, reason in the name of faith is asserted against the unjust, unreasonable domination of the Church. The Reformation claims for the individual the ownership of this upward journey, the mind to read, interpret and understand for oneself the divine as expressed in the Scriptures. Still, the splits remain, grow and perpetuate; historically, it seems, faith is heard for the last time in relation to reason, and that only peripherally. For faith has already been identified with pure ascent: that evil, oppressive and controlled sojourn against reason, against the pursuit of knowledge, against humanity itself. Nevertheless, the faith of reason is bolstered in this historical moment, and with it, if only indirectly, the path of ascent.

Thus, accompanying the Enlightenment, is this resurgence of human agency and enthusiasm and passion for reason; with the bold confirmation of the descending journey, taken as the whole journey of reason and the antagonist of the upward pilgrimage, the quest of ascent is likewise unwittingly reinvigorated, "ever-ascending yearnings for the light" renewed (Wilber, 1995, p. 323). The journey rewritten—transcendence simultaneously incorporated, denied and translated—becomes the quest for progress, the sojourn forward. The solution of the "infinite ahead" as aim seems to answer the frustration and feebleness, the disheartening dissatisfaction and divisiveness felt in both the purely ascending and descending paths. Wilber claims that in the Enlightenment creed of progress, the intuition of the infinite is displaced onto the horizon of a temporal and disturbed and unquenchable hunger for this material world—infénitive
yearning denying the infinite. In religious terms, Enlightenment faith is idolatrous faith, attempting to make ultimate that which never can be so.

The eye of reason's faith is strong and yet strongly directed toward that alone which can be seen. Ironically, then, the faith and the reason which thrive constitute the bare bones of each, in fact, denying their own ground and essence. For reason and faith by nature concur on at least one point with the "divine" intuitions purported in other traditions centered in God, the Tao, etc., which is that things are not as they at first seem; that the cosmos is much more than what the naked eye beholds or the senses perceive; that beneath the visible world in all its diverse singularities lies some deeper order (Wilber, 1995), some unifying pattern. By faith, the invisible is beheld; the eternal is held within the temporal, the infinite within the finite; reason, likewise, is the gateway to the unseen, the universal, the realm of multiple possibilities beyond the given and the apprehension of their interrelationships. However, in the Enlightenment, the zealous pursuit of reason is the pursuit of a reason, in betrayal of its nature, that regards exteriors only. Its faith rests in gaining this world alone, minus its interiors. The reason affirmed is monological reason, the ascension esteemed merely progress forward in the descending path of studying the visible world. For, it is this world alone which is real, and reason which is real is that which obtains this world through empirical science.

Wilber (1995), arguing for reason as a legitimate advance from mythic thought that is literal and egocentric, summarizes the Enlightenment in this way: "The necessary collective evolution from mythic to rational was the Enlightenment's great achievement; the unnecessary collapse of the Kosmos to the holistic flatland was its great and enduring
crime" (p. 344). The surface, the interlocking order of exteriors, is taken for the whole world. Differentiation, thus, though having been realized, has pushed itself to excess; it has become dissociation: the interior split off from the exterior; likewise, the individual, the singular, the organism, being, split off from the communal, the plural, the inter-relational, the environment, being-with in the world. Existing uncomfortably, even antagonistically, together—though more predominantly apart—are the mind and the body, culture and nature. The Enlightenment advance indicates a strange and mutated transcendence, in one sense gone too far, into repression—denying nature and the body (both physiosphere and biosphere), rather than enveloping them in a higher embrace (negation without preservation); in another sense not gone far enough, into regression—cutting off access to transcendence, having denied also depth and interiority and qualitative distinction. The charge is not merely against the "gross" reductionism of thought that is atomistic, individualistic, or behavioristic; but also the "subtle" reductionism of thought that is holistic, functionalistic, structuralistic, systemic, instrumental. In either case, the "inside" of the universe is dismissed; attended to is the material alone. Yet still, the atomists and the holists battle it out over their "cardboard cosmos" (Wilber, 1995); they war over its most fundamental aspects, and disqualify its most significant ones. Brought to fore in the Enlightenment is the perplexing problem of a subject who can describe an objective world but cannot account for himself or herself, who has little to say about the consciousness which, in fact, does the describing and which can render accounts (of the world). As Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960/1992) puts it, with its "prejudice against prejudice," Enlightenment thought can neither
acknowledge its faith nor its inner ground—reason working against reason, which is also reason working against humanity, and ultimately against all the world.

The Enlightenment inheritance is a profoundly paradoxical reason, identified by some scholars with "the dialectic of progress" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/1972); its world holism makes for the atomistic self. Humanity, via this reason, is left with a "disengaged ego dangling" in "self-autonomous agency," who can't find its place in a tight-knit closed system of interlocking objects, an empirical and objective world (Wilber, 1995). The subject separate from the object and the objectified world in which he or she lives, and the external world taken for the whole—even ever so subtly through "holistic" world perspectives regarding structures and functions and systems, not only is the Kosmos itself under palatial erasure, but also the subject itself—erasing itself, in fact, and this via reason, and the force of reason's faith. By denying the unseen, by approaching all things through objective empiricism, by construing objects of awareness instrumentally as merely parts of the whole; this stunted, monological, contradictory reason reigns, in the service of what has been in retrospect called a "dehumanizing humanism." Such reason compels the subject to become object, the all objectified, and as value and meaning are functions of the internal world, of depths not acknowledged, they too begin to lose hold, to pass away.

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"Richard Bernstein (1991b), in "The Rage Against Reason," lays out the thought of Max Weber, Theodor Adorno and Martin Heidegger—thinkers he identifies as central to the critique of reason—with regard to this historical development whereby the West is left with a humanism that is ironically and tragically dehumanizing. He indicts Heidegger especially for a view devoid of redemptive possibility: humanism, freedom, and the like are farces only. Bernstein, however, seeks to redeem reason, and a humanism which might humanize."
By the close of the eighteenth century, then, the dominance and increase of this rationality, accompanied ever by a loss of significance, works to firmly establish world dissociation and human alienation, the tension building between the human subject and the world object. In addition, extensive growth in humanity's knowledge of the external world via science serves to further overwhelm and undermine the interior world, and heighten this tension (Wilber, 1995). The reason, then, that brings the West to the modern age— though with all its promising advantages and genuine achievements—is evidently problematic, climaxing in this fundamental agonizing enigma concerning subjectivity and objectivity, the human subject's place in and relationship to the world, including its relationship to the world of other human subjects and human communities. Rather than the realization of Plato's ideal city, forerunner historically of a plethora of social utopian visions never actualized, reason has indeed brought humanity it seems to eviction from the garden, from Eden as such—ontological homelessness; and to enmity with each other, the earth, the divine, and oneself as well. In the words of Martin Heidegger: "How far [modern] man [sic] is from being at home in his own essence ..." (1953/1959, p. 156). Effected is what Augustine (c.a. 398 a.d./1982), in fact, calls evil: the journey taken brings humanity to a within that is withdrawn, rather than a within that transcends and moves beyond (Wilber, 1995); for evil is reflexivity enclosed in on itself (Taylor, 1989, p. 139). And we are reminded again of the tree of knowledge—of good and of evil, but sadly evil mostly; the good seems to ever elude us.

Lost, then, somehow is the good and true and beautiful aspired to by Plato, those aspirations once indelibly tied to the faith of reason. Truth, in a sense, becomes the only
valid measure by which to judge things in a world reduced to the "Big It" (Wilber, 1995), the objective visible realm; of course, truth, as well, is other than it was, as defined by this truncated reason apprehending this truncated world; and itself becomes a major problem in the issue of reconciling subjectivity and objectivity, humanity with all the world. Wilber utilizes his concept of the "Big Three" to highlight the distortions of modernity and— we might add— its distorted reason and perverse, pervert-ed faith. First, objective, interobjective truth, Plato's sense of the true, corresponds to both the individual, behavioral, organistic and social, structural, functional, environmental aspects of the external world— Wilber's "Big it" and the primary realm and "truth" acknowledged and legitimated in the modern paradigm; second, the good connotes rightness, justness, mutual understanding, in the intersubjective, internal cultural realm, the "We"; third and finally, the beautiful is discerned internally as well, though subjectively in terms of intention, truthfulness and sincerity centered in the individual, the "I." Wilber finds his schema of three differentiated realms, each with their own claims to reasonable (reasonable) knowledge and validity, analogous not only to those of Plato but also of Popper, Habermas, and Kant. Obviously, ideas regarding what constitutes the good, the true, 

*Plato’s major issues are with the true (concerning objective truth), the beautiful (concerning the personal-aesthetic) and the good (concerning cultural justice). Popper speaks of three worlds: World I (inclusive of the objective "It"), World II (inclusive of the subjective "I"), and World III (inclusive of the cultural world of "We," including, embedded in, material social institutions and systems). Habermas discusses three different criteria for validity: truth (regarding objects), truthfulness/sincerity (regarding subjects), and rightness/justness (regarding intersubjectivity). Wilber (1995) likewise claims that his three realms correspond in some measure to the critiques of Kant: of pure reason, of practical reason and of aesthetic judgement.
and the beautiful evolve together and in regard to each other; in this sense the "Big Three" are integrally related: behavior affects intention, structure affects meaning, cultural notions of life rely upon existing social bonds and practices, conceptions of the self and its narrative forms—and vice-versa. Yet, at his point, the good and the true and the beautiful, and judgements concerning them, whether repressed, split, dissociated or delegitimated, have collapsed in a sense—fallen to the monological truth of representation. The good, true and beautiful are subjected to the criterion of truth as defined by the "Big It."

"Modernity as it actually unfolded (and still unfolds) was (and is) heavily weighted toward the knowing and manipulation of the first world [the it-world, external, objective and inter-objective realms], of a 'disenchanted' and objectified world dominated by an 'instrumental' or 'technical' rationality (Berman, Habermas, Heidegger, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Merchant, MacIntyre)" (p. 417). Moreover, the substance of the internal world of the I and the We is increasingly subjected to arrangement as afforded by the system of empirical science and this calculative reason. Reason no longer aspires to attunement with the Kosmos; reason, and its advocate truth, has become simply the methodology of mapping out the cosmos. Likewise, behavioral fitness is emphasized over personal meaning, and social integration or the smooth operation of the system over cultural values and understanding.

Herein truly is blind faith, and misdirected. Only that which can be seen is legitimated, the unseen depths needing interpretation forsaken: humanity's self-betrayal—faith's and reason's as well. As Foucault has said of modern thought: "If it couldn't be
laid out on a flat table of representation, then it didn't exist" (p. 420). Of course, the consciousness doing the representing cannot itself be accounted for within this frame—the table's inner drawer whose existence is objectively inexplicable. Even with the monological world of a monological reason's construction, a great divide, a rift and split, persists. And while the modern project is primarily one of descent via reason exploring the material world, the path of distorted ascent endures as well, translated into the path forward and ahead, the creed of progress. The West, then, is saddled still with two gods (Wilber, 1995), in fact, both wanting. These gods basically purport incommensurable and antagonistic worldviews, embodying different ideas of what constitutes the good life and humanity's ultimate aim and end, different values and corresponding behaviors and lifestyles, and contrary notions about what it even means to be human. The modern god is a "schizoid god," irreconcilable forces whose "secret marriage remains secret" (p. 363)—each vying for humanity's soul. Full ascent is denied, and full descent is lost, all in the name of reason, and its newborn child, progress.

Even after the "death" of this god as such (primarily the god of ascent), in modern times, the tensions and rifts find no real reconciliation—the aftermath consisting of a period, whether slowly or rapidly, waxing worse. The death, in fact, might only signify the recognition of the splits and tensions, only the very beginnings of a realization that it is not well with the soul of humanity, also possibly with its beloved and central reason, only unfortunately perhaps signaling a desperate and reinvigorated denial which actually perpetuates and reinforces the split, inferior reason and inferior faith. In some instances, reason is lauded against the ascending god; in other cases, reason is seen as
being operative with the enemy. As Martin Heidegger (1952/1977b) has put it, for example: "Thinking begins only when we have come to know that reason, glorified for centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary of thought" (p. 112). Thus, from then till now: mounting stress, mounting conflict, mounting confusion. It is "the agony of modernity," two warring poles, both right and both wrong: The "ego camp" (representative of wayward ascent) radicalizes the ego--the noosphere, the human individual and mind. In this instance, spirit is relegated to this alone, an absolute subject; the "eco camp" radicalizes the eco-sphere—biosphere, physiosphere, environment (representative of contrary descent). Spirit is consigned to this realm only, an absolute object (Wilber, 1995).

Of course, historically, the progressive force of the ego has proved strongest, thus most visible, including its negative impact on the cosmos and upon the psyche in hyper-ego alienation. The claims of the eco camp, then, are partially a reaction and response to the excesses of the ego, but the solution offered is partial, and bears as well, if only unconsciously, the Enlightenment negation of the internal domains of the cosmos. Rightly attacking the Enlightenment heritage of infinite and unbridled progress, its anti-traditionalism, and its hyper-individualism, eco-advocates conceive of regression as the only alternative, and the path of wisdom. Differentiation is taken in all cases to be dissociation—and transcendence, repression. Reason slides into disrepute; for it would seem that it is responsible, that it is reason alone, in fact, which has brought us to where we are; and this place is obviously wanting, actually terrifying and outright shameful in its global presentation. The ego camp, aware of these problems, still cannot concede to
the dissolution of noosphere into biosphere, the eco camp actually utilizing egoic advantage to denigrate the egoic.

Post-modern thought makes attempts at some form of reconciliation, integration, or at least aporetic resolution, if only in ambiguity or paradox, and the revival or retrieval of slighted inner realms; but, in many cases, reason is still seen therein as the ultimate culprit—like before, the faith construed by the powers that be, the church, once was; reason is taken to be what Westernism, scientism, materialism, capitalism, an idolatrous faith, has made it. Remaining opposition to any kind of ascension, and residual promotion of a kind of creed of progress, is evidenced perhaps, if only tacitly, in the self-reference and identification of current philosophies: they are post-modern, post-structural, post-colonial—always "post" and never "trans."

The fetish of the West for reason thus taken leads it into compulsive, incessant and often violent argument over dualities: ego-agency versus eco-community, reified subjects against objects as equally absolutized—and historical, astronomical violence. And/Or into existential angst and despair and a sharp and biting crisis of reason's faith: "No longer protected by anthropocentric gods and goddesses, reason gone flat in its happy capacity to explain away the Mystery, ... we stare out blankly into that dark and gloomy night, which will very shortly swallow us up as surely as it once spat us forth" (p. 263)—alienation from both source and summit. It is as if having for centuries "binged" on reason—and something of a cheap substitute for it (an inferior strain of it) at that, the West, stuffed and sickened, cries out and calls for a grand cultural purge. And thus we arrive at Bernstein's declaration of the present historical moment as "the rage against
reason." Faith goes unscathed, of course, perhaps unheard, unnoticed; for it was
overthrown long, long ago; still, it too is in dire straits. Forgotten long ago, as well, is
the reason of Plato, and its faith in the virtuous, good, true, and beautiful journey of
education. Rather, reason's faith, as experienced today, has been found false; as it is
said, "the sweet dreams of reason" dying. It is not surprising then, that education, too,
as the designated guardian of reason, to which we now turn, finds itself presently in
something of a nightmarish and arresting place, humanity's hopes regarding it profoundly
stressed or already dashed.
CHAPTER 4

EDUCATION, THE UPWARD JOURNEY AND THE FAITH OF REASON (2)

While in modern times it does not go without saying, the relationship between civilization (culture, society, etc.) and education is strong—integral, intimate, reciprocal; many scholars have in fact said such, as well as worked to investigate, evidence and explicate this relationship (Apple, 1979/1990; Counts, 1962; Dewey, 1899, 1916/1966; Freire, 1970/1993; Giroux, 1992; MacIntyre, 1984; Purpel, 1989; etc.). Of course, an age dominated by dissociation, repression, the logic of severing, warring ascending and descending aberrations, seems to have little consciousness of such relationships, and further, serves to sever them. The enduring remains of Enlightenment ahistoricism contributes as well, perhaps, to this perforation and lack of relational awareness. Without bearing out, then, the whole history of education in the West, we may yet note certain points of parallel development with the path reason, the faith of reason, has taken as highlighted in the "biographical" sketch we have just drawn concerning it—though education historically has been increasingly excluded and separated from such a biography; it once was the biography. The survey should serve to help us glean insight into this phenomenon, the state of education today, as well as into the activity and influence of the faith of reason, even as it has mutated throughout history, in the project of education and its institutionalization.

David Hamilton (1990) in his Curriculum History—which is a history of education of which, he argues, curriculum is a central concept, particularly in the development of
its face in the West—begins his account with the faith of reason (though not with Plato), humanity's hope in the potential achievements of the noosphere. Hamilton says:

At some point in its early history, Homo sapiens developed a capacity to think and to reflect upon its circumstances. Earlier experiences—stored as memory traces—could be revisited, re-evaluated and recast. Humans re-imagined the past and, in the process, rethought the status quo. Thinking became a productive activity—a means of grasping the world and rebuilding it in the form of new (mental) constructions.... In the process, human beings enhanced their capacity to make the future something different from the past. The concept of social change became thinkable; and the practice of social change became doable. As the human species began to appropriate nature (Ingold, 1986), it took over its own history....

Human beings began to pay attention to child-rearing. Young members ... were given a lifestyle (or culture) by their surrounding adults. Children did not grow up; they were brought up. Their lives were shaped jointly by their material circumstances and by the conscious intentions of their carers. Just as human beings adopted routines and rituals to domesticate their environment, they also invented routines and rituals to domesticate themselves and their successors. And such intention-laden upbringing entailed a uniquely human activity—education. David Purpel (1989) makes central to this intention-laden activity a certain "faith in the [very] educability of humanity" (p. 10), faith that we can "contribute to the creation of a more loving, more just, saner world" (p. x), faith that we can "overcome the demons" (p. xi). It is the faith of reason to effect transformation in terms of what

"We are strongly impressed by the fact that wherever men have lived together there has been some group interest in education" (Frost, 1989, p. 207). Since the dawn of humanity, in fact, it appears that people have sought to learn, from others and from their habitats (Smith & Smith, 1994). The universality of education is here posited and affirmed, as well as its ancient character, its long history. We might also suggest its foundational history and nature, for education is tied up with human faith, involving profound trust and committed action with regards to the ultimate concerns of humanity. In this sense, education is prior to, and the ground of, all disciplines of study and human endeavor.
Plato would call the good, the true and the beautiful. Or as Purpel would put it, it is the human conviction "that we can and should intervene in nature to create a joyful and abundant society" (p. 54)—an intervention directed, of course, by some common vision of meaning including the good, true and beautiful.

Clearly, at this point, education is felt to be central to human survival: it is integral to social life (Hamilton, 1990) and to the preservation of humanity. Children are taught how to hunt, gather food and prepare it, defend themselves and their people and war against adversaries. The growth of customs and traditions brings about the need for new, more expansive and comprehensive forms of instruction: the elders tutor the young in cultural lore, religious beliefs and rites of initiation foundational to such education.

Naturally, centers for learning tend also to be places of worship, and religious leaders and thinkers first assume the role of teachers (Frost, 1989). At issue, then, are the most fundamental and significant questions of human existence. By its early official "fathers"-philosophers, for whom education was a major concern—education is deemed to be, in fact, a matter of life and death. Wilber (1995) speaks of the death of Socrates as a martyrdom for reason—Socrates lays down his life for reason's faith. For Purpel (1989),

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3We refer to the "fathers" of education, and indeed they were, at least formally, for women did not have the opportunities of men at that time (nor, perhaps, even today). Yet, in fact, the earliest Greek—and thus we might say, Western—educator on record was a woman named Sappho (c.a. 630-572 b.c.), head of something akin to a women's finishing school. Little is known of her educational ideas and practices, however, because by the authority of Rome in 1073 her writings were publicly burned. Only fragments of her poetry were not lost (Smith & Smith, 1994).

3Of course, such an interpretation of Socrates' death is not without controversy. For another view, opposing what is perceived to be the valorization of the man, see Smith & Smith, 1994, pp. 13-20.
the trial of Socrates is a compelling metaphor for conveying the import and power of education, its value and its danger—what we may say, its interest in that which claims ultimacy. As Plato himself has said: "The virtue of reason seems to belong above all to something more divine, which never loses its power but is either useful or beneficial or useless and harmful, depending on the way it is turned" (c.a. 380 b.c./1992, 190-191). Education here encompasses the whole of the human journey, ascent in aspirations of the higher, descent in embraces of the lower. Its faith is strong, at least unquestioned, among its advocates.

While not a great deal can be known with certainty regarding the ancient past, it is true that classical education makes more of teachers and texts than some formalized notion of schooling, or codified one of curriculum. There are as yet, in fact, few or no such notions. Rather, the classical "school" consists in an informal congregation of interested persons around a well-known master who teaches a variety of subjects and talks equally as much or writes about teaching itself, and learning (Hamilton, 1990). Teaching appears in the context of strong personal relationship (Smith & Smith, 1994), education itself highly personal—in terms of engagement and investment. Of course, we have already looked at Plato on the subject, one of the first to actually elaborate a theory of education. And it is the philosopher who is the educator—concerned with the nature of reality, the meaning of humanity and of the Kosmos, in search of the good and true and beautiful; once found or believed to be found, the question becomes how others

Plato, in his Republic, also warns strongly of the ill-effects of philosophy in the wrong hands; education must be accompanied with virtue, a sight of the good.
might be helped to enter into this knowledge, this virtue, this bliss—into reason, and reason's faith. "And the answer [is] always 'through education'' (Frost, 1989, p. 209).

For Plato, heir of Socrates and his dialectic method (aimed at common meaning—that which could be agreed upon—by delving deeply into issues to uncover their essence or truth), education is liberation and delivers humanity to happiness; the happiness of the individual is consistent with the welfare of the whole community or society. Of course, it follows that what can be dangerously if only tacitly justified, then, is education as a form of social control, though in the service of social good.5 The faith in education—more specifically in control through education—either in the perpetuation of the status quo or in the creation of a new social order is a faith manifested again and again in the history of the West, and one often attacked (Doll, 1993, 1997). We notice, though, that the ego and eco spheres here are interrelated; personal freedom and social responsibility are one.

Aristotle, while he agrees with Plato on the aim of education being virtue in its social context6—the creation of good "men" and thus also good citizens, denies in part the ascending path of reason, Plato's transcendental soul. As we have said, such in effect, begins the truncation and severing of the soul's circular journey encompassing

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"For example, some scholars have called attention to Plato's disillusionment with democracy, following Socrates' disdain for it. The view is "that the soul must order and control irrational and chaotic impulses within the individual, and philosopher-kings must order and control the chaotic and irrational individuals in society" (Smith & Smith, 1994, p. 23).

"The path of which is, of course, the contemplative life, which is also "ultimate happiness," in the words of Aristotle."
both upward and downward paths. It is Aristotle who is credited with the first major theory of the divisions of knowledge, knowledge's breakdown into three different sciences or disciplines: theoretical knowledge, which includes theology, mathematics, and physics or natural science; practical knowledge, comprised of ethics and politics; and productive knowledge, involving art and craftsmanship, the technical arts. In fact, the contributions of this period are generally purported to be not only the proliferation and preservation of ideas, but also the formalization of knowledge, or at least the beginnings of its organization (Hamilton, 1990). Herein lies the seeds of the redirection of reason's faith, as subtle a shift as it is. The mapping out of our knowledge of the external world, the import of method, will in time become something of an obsession, education's aim and focus, to the exclusion of all else—faith's object. Yet, Aristotle as a teacher is said to have encouraged his students to pursue whatever interested them, whichever forms of knowledge to which they were particularly inclined (Smith & Smith, 1994)—rather than mapping out for them a course of study.

Of course, rivals of the times, the Sophists, are said to actually have had a greater impact upon the educational practices of the day (Frost, 1989), emphasizing more strongly the individual, and education as a personal pursuit of success and happiness—this, too, perhaps, bearing a seed that would later sprout: individualism and what Tillich (1957) would condemn in modern times as the false "God of Success." Whether or not such is in fact the case, even with the Sophists, education is centered around value: education is in the service of encouraging human growth, making a person better in all ways; the best orator is also the best "man" (Frost, 1989). Individual interests, even...
when central, do not powerfully conflict with the interests of society and culture. Yet still, the Sophists perhaps encourage a growing skepticism in regard to the passive acceptance of the traditions and beliefs of the day, what Julian Jaynes calls "the development of consciousness" (Smith & Smith, 1994).

From the Romans specifically, we inherit the patriarchal underpinnings which seem to endure in contemporary conceptions of education. In some ways akin to Plato's faith, the hope is achieving through education divine guidance for excellence in public service, a large part of which, however, is military service. Thus, while the mother teaches in the home, the sons must soon follow the father, or pater and governor of the home, who is equipped to teach them the ways of war and to initiate them into public life. Several levels of schooling are available: the ludus (much like our elementary school), the grammaticus (although the rich prefer hiring in-home tutors), the tirocinium fori (providing apprenticeship), and the rhetor (oratory training). Cicero, something of a paragon of Roman education, states that the aim of education should be to produce "wisdom, patriotism, courage, Aristotelian temperance, moral goodness, and oratorial eloquence" (p. 39). Such includes a strong working knowledge of logic, law and rhetoric, for which the Greek, Aristotle, is especially prized. Yet, in Rome, education is primarily oratorical, for what seems to be given the greatest weight is the ability to impress the people with one's persuasive power (Frost, 1989). Perhaps, Plato's honor-lover is more ideal to the Romans than his lover of wisdom. Still, the quintessential Roman educator and first hired chair in Rhetoric in the empire, Quintilian, while he speaks of the necessity of eloquent speech and exalted thought, reaffirms the first faith,
as it were: through study, a person acquires the good, is brought to goodness; education produces virtuous souls (Smith & Smith, 1994). Even in this, there appears to be a much more "this-world" oriented approach to education in comparison to the Greeks, though one which does not last for long. At this time, however, it is the collegia (the Latin word from which we get "college"), the congregation of priests responsible for conducting public worship, who govern the practices of law and of keeping legal records and documenting cultural history—tasks soon to be taken up by Christian monasteries.

Rome undergoes intensive and extensive change with the advent of Christianity. The torture of early Christians and their persistence in the face of martyrdom, perhaps, actually serves to give greater force to the movement, stamina—vehement, revolutionary. Soon, through Constantine, Christianity is made legal and promoted. The "Church" is born, now political and powerful and home of the aristocrat. The Bishop claims as much honor as the Emperor, and the Roman church claims the task of education in the broadest sense, preserving and passing on language, law, and custom, creating and building Rome. Like Derrida (1992/1995), Smith and Smith (1994) say of Christianity, however, that:

> at the heart of the new religion was a potential increase in consciousness, for it stressed ... correct thinking and self-analysis. **What one thought was as important as what one did** ... The Christians did not invent the ideal of perfection, but they combined it with a powerful faith and added the notion that anyone—free or slave, poor or rich, man or woman—could achieve it. (emphasis in original, p. 44)

The ideal realm, the human quest for perfection or completion, what Plato calls rest and the end of journeying, is re-affirmed and renewed in the Christian turn, and in a sense,
democratized. Central in consciousness and in discourse is now the virtue of faith; still, it is faith in the Word, as it were: in Greek, Logos, akin to Plato's Kosmological Reason. This early faith urges humanity toward reason perhaps in the pursuit of peace and wholeness for all of humanity against the accepted violence of the journey as promulgated by the establishment of the day. Yet, its institutionalization and uptake by the establishment thwarts, distorts, changes it radically. The potential of this movement is little realized. Rather, conflict, debate over differences in interpretation, nationalistic coalitions around interpretations, and violence abound. Wilber's stunted ascent, reason de-reasoned.

The Medieval Period or Middle ages is a misnomer in part, however, because more than a dark era or an "in-between" period which saw no progress in reason, in education, no innovation or classical revival, it represents the marriage or synthesis of a number of diverse and powerful practices, beliefs, cultures, worldviews: primarily Greek, Roman and Christian (rooted in Jewish Culture). This amazingly complex and conflicted coalition is foundational to the materialization of the West as we know it, its influence reflected not only in modern educational structures, but also in many of today's other social/cultural institutions. It is the substance, the language, the thought, from which the West is formed, shaped and created. The best and worst of our culture, as it were, can in many cases be traced back to this time in history, as we have already seen. It is the Middle ages to which we can actually attribute the preservation of classical thought, rather than its decline. We note here the contribution of Cassidorus in promoting the practice of collecting the existing fragments of classical thought and of

Thus, a commitment to study endures throughout Roman and post-Roman culture, through the possession of both Christian and pagan texts, both drawn upon though not easily reconciled. In both, however, religious concerns still figure prominently. Augustine manages to achieve a semblance, at least, of peaceful coexistence between these different texts and belief systems in the form of an affirmation that theology is concerned with all things, and that all things are helpful in the study of theology, Christian or pagan. Thus, an updated version of classical education, in the form of the "liberal arts" is still promoted, particularly as providing a body of analytical tools with which to uncover the mysteries of the sacred texts (Hamilton, 1990). Yet of Christian education even after Rome's fall, it is said: "Although the Roman empire was dead, Greek and Roman cultural ideas flourished in Christian schools fastened securely on Roman underpinnings" (Smith & Smith, 1994, p. 53).

Hamilton (1990) cites "On the Marriage of Mercury and Philology," a fifth century piece of prosaic verse by Capella, as the "seminal representation" of the liberal arts. Taken from the myth, the bride Philologia (scholarship) is attended by seven maidens, each an advocate of one of the liberal arts. The seven arts include grammar, dialectic or logic, and rhetoric, corporately called the trivium (with a primary focus on language, the internal world); and geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and harmony,
known together as the quadrium (with a primary focus on things, the external world).
The content and aim of the liberal arts are seen as practical—the word "art," the Latin
translation of the Greek techne, from which we get "technique." Hamilton adds,
however, that both Latin and Greek words for "school," schola and ludus are rooted in
earlier significations connoting leisure. Some argue that the liberal arts are not exactly
the pursuits of free persons as such, but perhaps of persons with free time, the
contemplative life a luxury afforded few (Piltz, 1981). This "rift" of sorts—between
thought and action, theory and practice— is something which will endure and grow and
continue to plague debate over the aim and end of education, even up to the present day.

With the rise of Christianity, re-emphasized, of course, is education in the service
of something "more divine," in this instance though, increasingly of the church and its

‘Heidegger (1954/1977c) makes an interesting observation about language and
the radical changes which may be effected or at least reflected in translations from one
language to another. For the Greek theoria, from which is drawn Plato's notion of the
"contemplative" life (bios theoretikos), is viewed as "the consummate form of existence"
(p. 164). A distinction is made contrasting such with the practical life (bios praktikos)
only insomuch as the practical life is "dedicated to action and productivity" (p. 164),
while the life of "contemplation," is "the way of life of the beholder, the one who looks
upon the pure shining-forth of that which presences" (p. 164). The way of beholding is
seen, according to the Greeks, "in its purest form as thinking, the highest doing" (p. 164,
emphasis mine), as a reverent attendance and a watching over truth. Obviously, one with
leisure time may be freed up for this kind of doing, for time to think, yet the contrast is
not as great as we might assume; this kind of activity is the consummation of practical
human existence, not its opposition. Heidegger goes on to explain that with the
translation from Greek to Latin, theoria is transformed into contemplatio, which brings
to the fore the inclination toward "a looking-at that sunders and compartmentalizes"
(p. 166). For "this translation, which issues from the spirit of the Roman language, that is,
from Roman existence, makes that which is essential in what the Greek words say vanish
at a stroke. For contemplari means: to partition something off into a separate sector and
enclose it therein" (p. 165). In the very work of human language we see a sort of
sundering and severing occurring.
interpretation of the divine. Reaffirmed is the place of religion in education, the centrality of addressing the cosmological and existential questions of humankind.

Students as members of a community of faith, though, are required to learn its dogmas and customs and adopt them; instead of the initial Christian impetus toward self-examination and genuine internal personal belief, in the name of Christ, the Church secures its representation of the Christian movement and the spread of its religion through inculcation, another case of education as social control. The faith here manifested is in reason to exert power over the minds of others, to "de-reason" them in a sense, to maintain the political order, perhaps believed ultimately to be the order of the divine. Pagan schools increasingly looked down upon, monasteries appear, grow and flourish. Some scholars actually credit the birth of the monastery to a reaction against the corruption of the Church. Religious thinkers like St. Benedict are said to have chosen and initiated the monastic way in order to escape the evils of Rome, free to pursue fully a pure religious life (Frost, 1989). Others identify the monastery with the control of the Church (Hamilton, 1990): well-studied apologists are made and the

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*A shift in perspective is, perhaps, represented here: that granted authority is no longer "truth disclosed to mind and heart" but "an external norm for the obedient will" (Tracy, 1981, p. 99); authority collapses into authoritarianism, tradition into traditionalism, and the dogmatic stance born. Another aspect of the problem might be seen in the nature of institutionalization itself. Practices, religious or educational or otherwise, it would seem, only endure with the support of institutions, but such practices are also threatened by these very institutions. Practices are concerned with internal goods, while institutions are of necessity concerned with external goods. The ideals and creative advances of a practice are, in this way, susceptible to institutional "acquisitiveness." The competitive nature of the establishment can undermine the cooperative care for common goods internal to a practice (MacIntyre, 1984). Heidegger (1952/1977a), in like manner, defines institutionalization as "the making secure of the precedence of methodology over whatever is" (p. 125).*
pedagogical form of the catechism is developed, a question and answer strategy, all to assist in the defense of the faith, the faith of the Church.

Under the rule of Charlemagne in the ninth century, the monastery finds its institutionalization, as the guardian of education and reason's faith, largely in service of the powers that be and the interests of the Church—though not always, and often unwittingly. The Emperor organizes in his court a committee of "academics" for the improved management of his kingdom. Most notable is Alcuin, a lover of classical thought, who implemented a program of sorts for the education of the people. Inclusive of the liberal arts, Alcuin is said to have envisioned an academy (in reference to Plato's school) in France, blessed with what he calls the "seven-fold gift of the Holy Ghost," the resurrection of Athens (Piltz, 1981). Ironically perhaps, and wisely, Charlemagne, in order to govern more securely, calls for the education of all, and urges that the monastics content themselves not with solitary life alone, but with the active service of teaching those who can learn. Thus, monasteries become, in every sense, centers of learning, and priests open "cathedral" schools in villages and towns throughout the Empire. There are schools interni, or internal schools, to prepare one for monastic life; and schools externi, or external schools, for the instruction of those who will return to the life of the layperson (Hamilton, 1990). Salvation of the soul is ever an aim, as well as competence in the arts, deemed to assist one in the way of salvation. At issue is whether the faith expressed here lay primarily in education or reason as the path to inner transformation, Christian conversion, eternal life, or more profoundly in its power to establish and secure an empire, cooperative subjects for the-here-and-now. For Charlemagne, it is perhaps
more strongly the latter, for Alcuin, the former. Not altogether mutually exclusive, education in both cases profoundly influences human consciousness.

Schools at this time are built around texts more than anything else, for example: Cicero and Quintilian for rhetoric. Little else can be said of the "curriculum" the students received as it were; writing, reading and singing figure prominently. The liberal arts, rather than comprising a unified and organized course of study, are probably seen as an aggregate of instructional materials upon which to draw. Representations of them tend to be pictorial and suggest no real chronology or sequence, figured in circular fashion (Hamilton, 1990). The claim has also been made that the quadrivium suffered until the first millennium, barely addressed, and that dialectic too was excluded: either, if dealt with at all, not with intellectual rigor but as exercises in rote memory (Knowles, 1962). This disciplinary and intellectual reduction persists in many forms in contemporary approaches to education, as well. Rhetoric, in good Roman fashion perhaps, is given pre-eminence at this time. Yet, more importantly, these negations seem to support the claim made earlier that something has indeed happened to education as the upward journey of the soul, to reason and the faith of reason. With the dismissal of the quadrivium, the world of things are denied, or at least undermined as legitimate objects of study—descension repressed, severed from and rejected by ascension. The absence of dialectic, however, points to the truncation of ascension as well—"yes" to reason, but "no" to it, really.

The liberal arts increasingly fade or are at least expanded and changed with the onslaught of new texts and new ideas upon Europe in the thirteenth century, primarily
from Spain and Sicily, "important frontier posts between Eastern and Western thought" (Hamilton, 1990, p. 14). Of greatest significance is the discovery of the later works of Aristotle, unknown to the West before this time (his Physics, c.a. 340-323 b.c./1929-1934; Metaphysics, c.a. 340-232 b.c./1947; Ethics, c.a. 340-323 b.c./1973; and Politics, c.a. 340-323 b.c./1959), the content of which becomes "the new logic." The new logic, new knowledge, new ideas about what constitutes knowledge, rethinking the old and the new and the horizons of knowledge—such characterizes scholasticism and scholastic schools. New interpretations and reinterpretations, especially of the classics, are propelled further by acute arguments between those compelled to embrace the advances and those convinced to hold to the established thought of the day—faith divided in terms of reason's aim and effect.

Basically, revived, in some measure, is intellectual rigor, and dialectic, though seriously reduced and narrowed. It is perhaps not so much a newness, as a renewal—the enhancement and clarification of formally existing intellectual practices and methods of inquiry. Dialectic is again emphasized, most directly as a method of discerning truth. The Church, of course, claims possession of the truth. The orthodox have already identified faith and reason as irreconcilable, worlds apart—one spiritual, the other secular. Reason has come to be seen, then, as a threat to faith, the faith of the Church. Yet, with the path of reason re-energized, debate over faith and reason abounds throughout the middle ages. Education directs itself around the interrogation of the claims of the Church with the assistance of dialectic, or also with this tool, the re-affirmation of theological doctrines. Students gather ardently once again around teachers and texts, the
explication and interpretation of texts paramount, Christian and classical. Hamilton (1990) seems to suggest that no normative order yet exists, though, in terms of pedagogical method or curricular content—the dialectic studied is itself fluid and diverse in practice, not much about it agreed upon or set, or maybe even understood. Study does center, at least, around issues, ideas, topics, customs, that are believed to be of ultimate concern—they are matters of faith, whether promoted in the name of reason against faith or not.

Even before this time though, Anselm and Boethius, for example, work to rationally solidify the faith, particularly the belief in the existence of God, and in the Divine Trinity as triune and yet one. In addition, during this period, foremost is Aquinas who, embracing the new forms of thought and inquiry, claimed that faith and reason were, in fact, not adversaries; that faith was a matter of understanding and that theology required an attitude of inquiry toward all aspects of the world and of life, a comprehensive view of reality. Here, however, reason, for many, appears as an enemy of the faith. Academically, on the rise is the secularization of philosophy, its growth beyond the narrow scope of strictly Christian concerns, its redirection to the things of this world (as inspired by Aristotle); many teachers are perhaps more self-consciously philosophers concerned with the new logic than theologians concerned with religious thought. Born is, then, a seed of anti-Christian sentiment, insurrection against the monopolization and mutation of humanity's upward path by the Church. Contributing to the waning supremacy of the Church is the rise of guilds, schools designed primarily for vocational purposes apart from religious concerns; and the widening appeal of neo-
classical ideas about education, emphasizing harmony of the soul, mind, body and spirit (ex. the school of Vittorino Da Feltre). Of course, classically, such ideas make no distinction as such between sacred and secular. The rift, though, is now set in place, a rift that will endure and increase and pose problems over and over again throughout the history of the West, even up to modern times, and not only in the realm of education.

Through the Renaissance, and the triumph of reason over faith as now separately construed, education begins its embrace of the descending journey, and reason's paradoxical rejection of ascension, transcendence and the "invisible world." Religion maintains a fight for its claim to education, but education primarily falls into secular hands. With the rise of the kinds of separations and reductions, repressions and regressions of the Kosmos we have formerly traced, education begins to lose any of its former sense as a spiritual journey, but increasingly becomes rather a narrow instrument of use in the journey, although humanity progressively seems to lose as well, in this process, the unified conception of life as a journey (Sartre, 1943/1992; MacIntyre, 1984), especially as a spiritual one. In line with education's narrowed conception, it is this time at which the notion of curriculum is born and reaches centrality within the enterprise of education—specifically in Northern Europe which becomes the primary patron of the West, one still dominating educational thought. The new emphasis on the visible world in all its plenitude, at this point, sets in motion the further transformation of the liberal arts, thinkers of the day in search of a method by which to map out the external world, and humanity's knowledge of it. It is a faith akin to Adam and Eve's: through human agency, through the human mind grasping, getting hold of and
consuming knowledge as its object of desire, all the world may belong to them. The good figures here as well, though perhaps not as explicitly, and with lessening reference to the sacred or divine.

An art is an abundant collection of propositions.... But ... in setting up the various arts a certain, short and direct way, a kind of short cut has to be used.... This the Greeks call method ... such as may be used for teaching and communicating. (John Sturm, founder of the Strasbourg Gymnasium, 1539, cited in Hamilton, 1990, p. 23)

"Method," according to Hamilton (1990), becomes the catchword of humanist educators from the early 1500's on--the shortcut to reason, of reason, and faith's relinquishing of the infinite, eternal, invisible journey. Method, moreover, is the womb from which curriculum is born. This practical emphasis on procedure reflects the ideology of order and routine to which scholasticism gave way in the early sixteenth century. For scholasticism, it seems, breeds too much independence in thought and belief to fit in with the Europe of the Counter-Reformation and of advanced Protestant dogma. The movement is made by teachers away from individual classroom example to a more generalized notion of (what would become) a humanist "curriculum," an interest in a range of institutionalized "curriculum" subjects and their arrangement and organization.

Peter Ramus, whom Hamilton has called "the high priest of method" (p. 23), might rightfully bear, as well, the title, "father of curriculum."9 A prominent professor at

9Petra Munro (1996) challenges this gendered perception of curriculum history, the predominance of the "fathers of the field" discourse pervasive in most historical renderings, in that it works to perpetuate the subjugation and exclusion of women that has characterized the patriarchal West, failing to acknowledge and serving to erase women's contributions to Western thought, culture and achievement. She strives to
the University of Paris, Ramus gives preeminence to the dialectic, which has come to mean basically "the careful sorting out of ideas," and begins the grandiose task of mapping out the totality of human knowledge. In the Ramist Method, related "common places" or topics are clustered in a branching taxonomy. According to Ramus in 1569, in method "that enunciation is placed first which is first in the absolute order of knowledge, that next which is next, and so on: and thus there is an unbroken progression" (cited in Hamilton, p. 22). The earliest recorded use of the word "curriculum" in an educational context has been found in a Ramist Map appearing in the Professio regia, a collection of Ramus' maps published in 1576. Curriculum is born of method, method's child. The educational journey turns into a "course" to be run, mapped out and pre-determined.

"What" to teach (the totality of knowledge) is now presumably given, and the logical maps of Ramus appeal to educators as a powerful aid, providing also an answer to "how" to teach. In addition, Ramus makes the universal claim that his method recover the female voices in history, particularly in curriculum history, which have been neglected of silenced. The task is a difficult one, and the issue complex, for much of Western history and thought has been shaped, dominated, recorded and preserved by men—the accomplishments of women wittingly or unwittingly left out, lost, forgotten or passed over. I am not herein, through the use of the term "father," supporting a patriarchal view, though the history of the field of education has seemingly been constituted by certain patriarchal ideals, and the academic curriculum field dominated by men. Ramus is the "father" of curriculum only in the sense that the first use of the word "curriculum" educationally applied is attributed to him.

"Curriculum comes from the Latin currere, meaning "to run." While once it signified a course for running literally, or the vehicle for racing itself—the chariot, it came to be used in the context of curriculum vitae, the course of life; from which then was drawn its educational sense as we know it today: curriculum as a course of study or training, or a career (Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. IV, 1989).
(including the maps produced thereby) is nothing less than the externalization (the ever-growing emphasis on the external) of the cognitive processes of the human mind. An order unprecedented is brought to teaching; with the series of templates, the mapped-out routes of Ramus to direct teachers, little more is required but to carry them out, deliver them to students. With the recognition of the power and efficiency this kind of formalization can bring to schooling, the ideas of Ramus are widely embraced. The faith of reason to control, achieve certainty, gain mastery over the natural world, is manifested. The "will-to-power" as it were overrides the good, the true, the beautiful as humanity's ultimate concern.

Of course, Ramus' ideas are not without controversy, and some critics level against him that his methodization not only irreparably dilutes education but vulgarizes it as well. Apparently, not everyone wholeheartedly embraces such abstraction of the cosmos; such detachment from actual engagement with the real world, visible or invisible—things and activities and ideas; such objectification and eventual reification of knowledge and thus also of the world; nor do all concur with this notion of the pursuit of knowledge or of world-existence as constitutive of some pre-packaged, pre-delivered bundles brought to pre-determined destinations which teachers load faithfully into the minds of others. Not everyone concurs that education's ultimate concern is adherence to rule, and delivery, and efficiency of delivery. Perhaps, there are no short-cuts to thought, to worthy living. Plato's educative journey of reason certainly knows none.

Yet, Ramus' success—as "master of the short-cut"—with his new "analytical apparatus" to create a new order, and absolutism, resonates powerfully with the
concerns of the sixteenth century Reformation and is taken up, as it were, by the political powers coming-to-be. In the disorder of the times and in the perceived need for reformation, the positing and promise of order is compelling. Ramist method not only links up nicely with the Calvinist emphasis on discipline, but the term "curriculum" is already in widespread use by Calvinists as curriculum vitae, the course of life. In the works of John Calvin we find an idea persists of life as a course full of obstacles through which Christians must traverse, of course without the idea of the "shortcut" involved. This notion, though, is not exclusively Calvinistic, and we might find in any system of thought tightly tied to the text of the Christian Bible glimpses of this life-as-course motif. The New Testament is full of images of life as a course, and the follower of Christ a runner in it (The Holy Bible, 1985, Acts 20:24, Heb. 12:1, 2 Tim. 4:7). Inclusive here, however, is this holistic notion of life as a spiritual journey uniting all of its different aspects, a notion under erasure historically, ever fading away, especially in conceptions of education, ever narrowing in its scope.

Some historians make the controversial argument that Renaissance teaching and humanist schools primarily served the social function of perpetuating the status quo. They claim that the rote-learning and regimentation was not directed primarily at character formation and the ideal of the humane public servant but rather at creating servants of the interests in power. What is clear is that by the seventeenth century the establishment of discipline is central in matters both church and civil, and Ramist and Calvinist ideas serve to strengthen and support the ground and growth of political absolutism. The world of absolutism is one of route-plans and approved destinations,
and the absolutist underpinning of the concept of education as curriculum seems hardly
deniable—the power of reason used against reason itself, at least by those in power
seeking to dominate the thought of all. We see, then, this image of reason's faith
directed toward control, predictability, certainty—a very stunted faith in a very stunted
reason to apprehend the whole world by merely mapping it out; humanity hopes in its
power through reason to command, determine and fix "the good" and the external world,
rather than behold and experience and participate in them; humanity seeks to gain the
whole world (now, thoroughly external) through losing its soul. Such is an image and a
faith that will dominate the field of education for some time. Education, via curriculum—
productive of reverent, disciplined, methodical and intellectually deferent souls—becomes
absolutist through and through. Of course, even the existence of "soul" will also
eventually be brought into question.

"Criticism"—the application of the intellectual powers of discrimination and
judgment—becomes the catchword in eighteenth-century Europe, and its distinguishing
feature (Koselleck, 1988). Hamilton (1990) suggests that behind the rise of critique and
dissent, which served as the catalyst for transforming the dogma of the Reformation into
Enlightenment attitudes, is the extension and growth of reason. We shall call it the re-
introduction of the ascending journey, though an altered and stifled conception of it, for
reason naturally aspires to transcendence—growth, enlightening development, the
"moreness" not discovered by method and material alone. Reason—content neither

11The term "moreness" used here is taken from an article entitled "Education and
Spirituality" by Dwayne Huebner (1995, in press). Huebner coins the term to express
the reality that there exists always more than we know or can know or will ever know.
with the material world, nor biosphere, nor physiosphere alone—needs soul and spirit, interiority and depth.

Originating earlier, most prominently in the work of Francis Bacon (1561-1627), reason begins to replace divine light as the source of knowledge—the old knowledge or reason against faith construction. The laws of nature more telling than divine revelation, the focus is re-directed toward God's design as it can be extracted from nature rather than from the sacred revelation of the scriptures. Of course, later nature would lose its character as God's design altogether, and the notion of revelation would be seen as little more than mythic residue. "Driven by efforts to harness the power of reason and unravel the complexities of nature" (Hamilton, 1990, p. 35), this spirit of critique and freedom is born, compelled to question established authorities and accepted truths. To unquestioningly accept the "method," the map of knowledge handed down via education, is blind faith, as erroneous as resting on the faith of the Church was in former times. The hope seems to be re-directed in terms of its emphasis on what humanity may achieve through reason, how humanity may progress through mind, over what may be secured or set in stone.

The spirit of the times addresses the search for new knowledge and its incorporation into more sophisticated taxonomies, which actually eventually leads to the increased fragmentation and specialization of knowledge—and ironically, perhaps, its reaffirmed reification. Central, though, is the new emphasis on freedom. Out of it

His moreness refers to the world-presence of excessive complexity, depth, richness, strangeness, mystery.
emerges the modern university, founded on an open-minded search for truth, and the seminar, a pedagogic form constituted by research and discussion rather than by lecture. In fact, the growth of criticism has been associated with the rise of the seminar (Hamilton, 1990). This form is akin to Plato's dialectic, in a sense, in its faith in dialogue, study, the work of reason to reach truth, beyond mere appearance or sight.

Hamilton accents the restlessness of the movement. With the unity that once existed between science and theology rapidly disappearing, the secularization of teaching rapidly progresses; with the destabilization of once-revered authorities, the field of education is characterized by controversy, perhaps more than anything else. Such restlessness gives rise to certain strands of thought brought to light and developed after the Enlightenment in the modern period, what Hamilton calls "post-Enlightenment" thought, among which includes: the assertion that curriculum is a selection from available knowledge, a selection made on the basis of secular purposes, and made to promote the advancement of society. Taken up, however, in the service of an on-going critique and an assertion of freedom from the establishment, they can be seen as a continuation and extension of Enlightenment thought. Hamilton traces these new insights back to the initial inquiry of Herbert Spencer who, in 1859, asked the question: "What knowledge is of most worth?"

The question is interesting because the issue of value has explicitly come to the fore again; however, it is strictly asked around the context of knowledge as ultimate concern—no longer the examination of life toward the creation of blessed living, or only tacitly. The curriculum insight may have been that method is not of most worth, that the...
most worthy is perhaps beyond technique. It may also have been a realization that
efficient social control may not work in the service of true social progress or human
good. One result is the proliferation of alternate maps and paths in the curriculum
"course." Hamilton focuses primarily on the critique directed at culture and society from
the seventeenth century to the present and the emphasis upon the individual, and
freedom. A movement in the field toward the experiences of the learner and away from
the experiments of curriculum design is described—definitely an inward turn, toward
depth and ascension. The declaration of Rousseau (1762/n.d.) is picked up and taken
seriously: "Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains" (p. 5). Faith is a matter of
freedom, and where humanity finds itself captive, faith is found to be wanting or false,
but as faith is becoming a concept little thought, attention is turned to reason at least,
and reason seems to rest in the individual, society its hinderance, and its burden.

Hamilton goes on to situate John Dewey in the line of Rousseau and
progressivism, and to highlight him as a central figure in this curricular turn—the
movement from absolutism to enlightenment, from method to critique; a novel re-
incorporation of reason's ascent. Dewey (1902/1964a) says:

We get used to the chains we wear, and we miss them when removed....
Unpleasant because meaningless activities may get agreeable if long
enough persisted in.... Yes, that is the worst of it; the mind, shut out
from worthy employ ... takes an interest in a cabined and cramped
experience. (p. 355)

While the journey of reason, through the Enlightenment, has become, for the most part,
the "infinite ahead," progress of the individual and of humanity as a whole, its upward
aspirations and its faith are re-invigorated—meaning and worth again at issue, evidenced
here in the words of Dewey. Herbert Kliebard (1986), a historian of curriculum in America, describes Dewey as something of a "ghost" hovering over the field of education as a whole. For Dewey does not describe himself as a progressive, and fails in many ways to fit into the currents of his day, but still exerts a strong kind of influence upon it, at least the haunting presence of his thought felt therein.

Though centuries after the Enlightenment, it is Dewey, in fact, who is credited with this ascending revival of reason in educational thought. Clearly, at some point in this history occurs the solidification of the cultural presence of the two separate, distorted gods at enmity of which we have formerly spoken—broadly described as the descending god and the ascending god respectively, which war it out in the West over the centuries over a world no longer quite whole, with incomplete reason, incomplete faith. Historically manifested, then, is the recurring dominance of one or the other, or the hegemonic battle between them, even in the realm of education. Perhaps Dewey fails to find an identifiable place in the field of education because of the nature of his faith in regard to reason, particularly in an American field that was during his time dominated by an altogether different one. Perhaps his book, *A Common Faith* (1934), is inspired by his awareness of such incommensurable faiths and by his attempt to reconcile them.

An example of this reversal and recursion (of descendant versus ascendant dominance, manifested in innumerable splits, such as practice versus theory, eco versus ego, etc.) can be seen in the development of education and educational thought in the United States, from its foundation destined to become the patron and pinnacle of Western thought. With its Puritan absolutist underpinnings, the path of ascent is lauded
in the New World yet in fact cut off, akin to the work of the Church in a Europe of former times. The focus being the creation of a city set upon a hill, the New Zion, with all of their infamous practices of self-examination, the Puritans actually effect a program of social control, subduing the wilderness and the evils of the human mind and soul. Faith, and the good, features strongly, but it is, perhaps, more akin to what Dewey (1922/1964b) has described as the "pathology of goodness." This legacy endures, despite the Enlightenment ideals upon which the United States is established, especially in the realm of education.


"Dewey (1922/1964b) describes the pathology of goodness as that sort of "goodness" nurtured in the separation of morals from the reality of human nature, physiologically and psychologically, which accounts oftimes for the "badness of good people" (p. 63). For example, the following description is one which we might apply to Puritanism: "There are others who take seriously the idea of morals separated from the ordinary actualities of humanity and who attempt to live up to it. Some become engrossed in spiritual egoism. They are preoccupied with the state of their character, concerned for the purity of their motives and the goodness of their souls. The exaltation of conceit which sometimes accompanies this absorption can produce a corrosive inhumanity which exceeds the possibilities of any other known form of selfishness" (pp. 65-66). The introspective emphasis in Puritan thought, paired with strong social imperatives and convictions, may have served to promote such pathology. The autobiographies of many of these believers bear this out, like that of John Bunyan, as well as the expository writings of many Puritan thinkers, for example: Alleine's Alarm, by Joseph Alleine (1671/1978); Precious Remedies Against Satan's Devices, by Thomas Brooks (1652/1987); and The Christian's Great Interest, by William Guthrie (1658/1982).
deemed to be a muscle in need of vigorous exercise in order to stay fit and active. Thus, recitation, rote-learning and memorization are again esteemed as primary instructional methods in education. Incidentally, Cotton Mather (1662-1727), the founder of Yale University, advocates from the start the logical and exhaustive approach of Johann Alsted, who published his *Encyclopaedia* in 1630 (cited in Hamilton, 1990), a comprehensive work which relies heavily upon Ramist diagrams for much of its organization, and a foundational resource in most Calvinist-inspired universities including Yale (Hamilton, 1990). The infatuation is with reason as the power by which humanity may reign securely over the natural world—taken externally, clarified and organized; and subsequently, over the social systems built through such mastery. Notions located in earlier European history resurge, then, in American educational development and, it would seem, increase in strength.

There are to be found, of course, voices crying out in the wilderness; the ascension of Enlightenment reason has also made its way across the Atlantic. Francis Parker (1837-1902), dubbed by some as the father of progressivism, is one such voice: he posits the common school as an "embryonic democracy," yet he is largely unheard. The leadership of Charles Eliot (1834-1926), a proponent of faculty psychology, and the influential committees on secondary and elementary education of 1893 and 1895 procure the victory of classicist ideas in the nineteenth century. G. Stanley Hall (1844-1924), also something of a progressive, challenges the status quo and calls for change, positing education as the major hope of the world. Education is, however, the hope, too, of those who hope to keep the world as it is. Yet Hall's strong faith in progress is coupled
with an equally strong faith in the role of social science, which—modeled after science—is primarily defined by its method, the careful application of the scientific method to humans. Even the dissenters perpetuate the notion of education as curriculum as method and its preoccupation with order, development, procedure, stability.

William Torrey Harris (1835-1909), commissioner of education, emphasizes school as a force for social stability. Hamilton (1990) points out this general tendency in humanism to lose sight of the individual, of the particular; in its gaze upon "abstract man," real human persons in the concrete world are generalized out of the picture. Though primarily secular in name at this point, education serves purposes in accord with those served by the Puritan forefathers. Curriculum standardization is sought; curriculum is a powerful tool of social control, and long forgotten is education as an inner journey central to the spiritual life of the student. Rather, it is an institutional program, a policy to be implemented. It is schooling.

Later in the nineteenth century, and into the twentieth, other faint murmurs against the faith of reason as control and masterful method can be detected with the curricular move toward child-centeredness of the Herbartians. Johann Herbart (1776-1841) brings to curriculum the concept of Bildung, central to educational thought in Germany. Curriculum is primarily a North European concept extended to the United States. Bildung, drawing attention to the notions of social shaping and cultivation, shifts the gaze of scholars in the field from the map of knowledge to the map of the learner; it is a movement within, of depth, transcendence, and yet still a map to be comprehended—
and unfortunately, perhaps, regulated. The active nature of the child in learning is
highlighted, and passive rote methods are discouraged.

Yet even the focus upon the child—and curriculum as mapping out, attending to,
and mirroring the developmental growth of the child—is still bound to the search for the
method in education, or better foolproof methods. Faith is placed, it seems, ever in
reason's capacity to procure the externalization and regulation of things. The president
of the National Herbartian Society, Charles De Garmo, brings Herbart's ideas to the U.S.
for the first time in 1889 with the publication of his Essentials of a Method (cited in
Hamilton, 1990). Through the notions of concentration and correlation, the
preoccupation with the development of curriculum is strengthened. In concentration the
aim is organizing curriculum around topics or concentrations. Such concentration—and
the advocated correlation of all subjects, an attempt at curriculum coherence and unity—
leads to the schematization of a general and clearly defined route to be followed in both
curriculum planning and implementation. The well-paved path consists of a series of
sequential steps to be taken: preparation, presentation, association, generalization, and
application. Curriculum becomes almost synonymous with method and continues to
focus on design to the exclusion of all else.

At this time, the landscape is, to be sure, peppered with voices of dissent, the
stirrings of another direction for faith on the rise, in the numerous predecessors to the
progressive movement of the early twentieth century. Yet even the movement itself—its
success—is short-lived, not to be fully voiced and articulated in the states until some time
later, falling beneath the fear of reason's power to transform, to critique, to effect
unpredictable change. Progress is ever the American vision, at least rhetorically. Yet, in actuality, it conflicts with an enduring love affair with certainty, control, the domestication of the North American "wilderness": real progress, deeper thought, could disturb the content of the American dream.

In the name of reason, scientific curriculum making with the aim of social efficiency, this on-going absolutism of method, prevails for much of the twentieth century. Edward Thorndike (1874-1949), a prominent figure in the field in the first part of the century, is strongly informed by the behaviorism of experimental psychology. He says: "Education is a form of human engineering, and it will profit by measurements of human nature and achievement as mechanical and electrical engineering have profited by using the foot, pound, calorie, volt and amphere" (Thorndike, cited in Pinar et al., 1995, pp. 91-92). Such allegiance to method allows for the prediction and manipulation of behavior to desired ends, humanity's quantification. Frederick Taylor's (1856-1915) theory of scientific management is readily taken up by scholars in the field in the interest of efficiency. Through "task analysis," education can be further specialized and routinized. Factory and labor metaphors abound in an ever-growing "assembly-line curriculum." In contrast to Plato's notion of education as the journey of the soul toward expanded consciousness, it is now the business of schooling toward dumbing consciousness down.

Some historians even locate the beginning of the story of curriculum in the U.S. with the publication of The Curriculum in 1918, a book directed at improving the performance of schools, by Franklin Bobbitt (1875-1956). By this time, the field is so
deeply entrenched in the dogma of social efficiency, it is taken as a given not to be questioned. Ralph Tyler's *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction* in 1949 undermines and basically drowns out the criticism of progressives which had become audible in the twenties and thirties. Identified by Pinar et al. (1995) as "the single most influential curriculum text ever written," the book serves to perpetuate the emphasis upon social efficiency and curriculum as method.

Curriculum is achieved through a series of steps: the selection and definition of learning objectives, the selection and design of learning experiences corresponding to those objectives, the arrangement and organization of those learning experiences for optimal effectiveness, and the evaluation of outcomes in terms of their ability to meet predetermined objectives and to meet them efficiently. The "Tyler Rationale" inspires the notion of curriculum as technique—a functionalist, instrumentalist conception of education. One might ask, then, what education has become, and if it still works at all in the service of life and the human journey. One might inquire, in fact, what education has to say in modern times about what constitutes life, and the creation of life worth living, and how humanity has come to construe human existence in the world.

By the 1950s, and continuing through the 1960s in the U.S., many begin such questioning. There is a growing discontent in the field with curriculum as method and technique, with its absolutist underpinnings. Herein, in such disquiet, is the beginnings of something very much like an enlightenment within the field of education. The "old" faith waning, and reason, averse to being strapped down, reconsiders the import of reaching the heights and plumbing the depths, the import of meaning and value. As Hamilton
(1990) puts it, absolutism breeds its own antithesis and inevitable breakdown. The same might be said of any reason, any faith, directed at pure descent or pure ascent. Reason aspires to higher things, though in preservation of the lower, thus, may be characterized as progressive, in a certain sense—which is perhaps why Hamilton associates the growth and expansion of reason with critique (of what is, in the sight of what could be, with faith that the mind of humanity can effect good) and the progressive movement in education. In its spirit of critique, the whole notion of education is problematized, at least what this notion has become. As Malcolm Skilbeck (1984) has observed: "One of the consequences of the progressive's concerns ... was that the term 'curriculum' itself had to be reconceived" (p. 24). The god of disengaged descent is challenged.

A call toward reconception and a renewed interest in the ideas of Dewey—more specifically, in the experience of democracy in education and in the critique of society become, then, central features in the movement of the 1970s in the American curriculum field, what Pinar et al. (1995) describe as a movement from an emphasis on development to one of understanding. Joseph Schwab (1969), a key figure foreshadowing this movement in the states, pronounces the curriculum field "moribund" in 1969. The indictment is repeated in the 1970s: Dwayne Huebner (1976) declares it "dead," and William Pinar (1978) describes the field as "arrested." Definitely, seen here is a crisis of faith in education, in reason, at least as it has been construed and manifested in and by the field. Yet, we might ask: Is the faith utterly dead? Perhaps, but as Nietzsche (1883/1982a) has said so directly: "Only where there are tombs are there resurrections" (p. 225). Reason demands, in a sense, the resurrection of the upward journey, the
journey of the inner realms and of spirit. Coming up from the grave is like coming up from Plato's cave.

Pinar et al. (1995) locate the roots of what would be called the "Reconceptualization" of the field in the activity of the 1960s. Certain lone individuals are found questioning the basic assumptions underlying work done in the field and critiquing the dominant Tyler Rationale. The two primary prophetic voices, described as the "intellectual parents" of the reconceptualization, are Dwayne Huebner and James McDonald. Both resist the existing traditional paradigm and stand for the creation of freedom. Rejecting the dominant technism, methodism, reductionism, they seek new ways in which to talk about curriculum—ways that may promote personal meaning and growth and the creation of a more just society and world. Glimmers again of the good, the true and the beautiful, of the interior realms.

In this movement away from method via criticism, Pinar et al. (1995) place the beginnings of the Reconceptualization. Rejecting the traditional preoccupation with method and development, the purpose of the movement is understanding, of the kind sought after in the humanities. Before in the grip of the social sciences, the field is introduced by these prophets to other perspectives and forms of inquiry associated with the humanities, such as history, philosophy, theology, and literary criticism. Herein is seen a reconstruction of sorts, of education again as referential of life's journey, a unifying effort toward wholeness, a spiritual infusion.

By the 1970s, the field, "moribund," in crisis, is ripe for a metamorphosis of spirit, or "paradigm shift." The disarray is the culmination of a number of factors: the
discontent stemming back to the 1950s, the fall of the progressives, and the blow to the field in the 1960s when the Curriculum Reform Movement essentially ignored curriculum thinkers (Pinar et al., 1995). Of course, the spirit of criticism is already unleashed at large with the worldwide protests of students in the 1960s, calling for cultural revolution and bringing on "counter-culture." Conventional ideas are not only challenged but the whole notion of convention itself. This kind of challenge is exactly what is levelled at the traditional field of education by the Reconceptualists in the seventies (1970s).

Beginning in the academic conferences of the 1970s and continuing into the nineties (1990s), William Pinar, a prominent figure in the reconceptualization of the curriculum field, is called upon on several occasions to define the movement. Such a task proves to be difficult in one respect: to seek to define the reconceptualization might suggest a thematic unity not present therein. One point of undisputed cohesion is in its criticism of the traditional field. Agreement centers around the common contention with the reigning Tyler Rationale as reductionistic, de-politicized, ahistorical, anti-ethical, esteeming procedures over persons.

What can be said is that a definitive move is made away from an emphasis on development to an attempt at understanding—away from method to critique. Curriculum is reconceived along experiential and structural lines; a proliferation of understandings are set into motion: autobiographical, existential, phenomenological, political, historical, racial, feminist, post-structural, post-modern, cosmological, etc. Yet the thousand voices are united in their criticism of the absolutist rule of "methodism," in their attempts
to re-humanize education, and in their collective introduction of a "sophisticated theoretical wing" to the field.

Counter-attacks are made against the bearers of this new faith, new line of reason-ing, in the field. Denounced as "new alchemists and concierges of counterculture ideology" (Tanner & Tanner, 1979/1981, p. 390), the "reconceptualists" are accused of attempting to denigrate and overthrow reason. Ironically, the rise of criticism and dissent associated with the movement, and its search for new knowledge outside the limited domain of social science, suggests that it represents more appropriately the actual and logical extension and enhancement of reason. Understanding and "enlightenment" liberate reason from its cramped, cabined, burdened existence in the narrow confines of method, order, procedure, scientism; of the external world alone.

Yvonna Lincoln (1992) says of this new line of thought within the discipline of education:

What began [in the 1970s] as a radical but small group of critics of contemporary curriculum theory has now become a groundswell.... The reconceivers of the curriculum studies are not just postulating that a new world could exist but also creating it—voice by voice, criticism by criticism. (p. 94)

Yet a world cannot be made solely through critique; curriculum cannot live by critique alone. The educative journey of reason strives after a vision of the good. Pinar et al. (1995) report that as early as the 1980s, the movement begins to lose its cohesiveness: its opposition to Tylerian conceptions of curriculum are no longer strong enough to keep the thousand voices agreeing to speak a common tongue. Perspectives proliferate within the movement, going their separate ways or turning in upon each other to continue their
critiquing there. The new “ascension” of reason prevails, perhaps in a battle won too well (Another failure at a descending embrace?). As Pinar et al. (1995) suggest, the success of this metamorphosis in the field is also its own demise.

The field today, one could say, is still dominated by this spirit of critique, and yet, it is critique ever turning in upon itself; it seems. Very soon, in the field, its own ground in the faith of reason will come itself into question. It is as if the temperate wisdom of Socrates has pushed itself to excess: Yes, the unexamined life is not worth living, but the examined one is sometimes not worth living because not lived, at least, the overly-examined one. It is Socratic tyranny, Nietzschean madness, and reason’s ascending negation without preservation, and a new battle call, as it were—mounting tension, again.

Of course, in his history, Hamilton (1990) leaves the field of education as a whole in the West (European and American) in the twentieth century, up to the present time, with this permanent tension (our two gods)—introduced, he says, in the aftermath of Enlightenment upheaval: the attempt, on the one hand, to re-establish the world of absolutism with certain methods, maps, routes and destinations; and the effort, on the other, to redefine curriculum thought along progressive lines with a primary interest in the autonomy of teachers and students—the inner freedom and unhindered growth of persons. Both sides defend their position in the name of reason, at least originally, with the view of the opposing side as reason’s adversary.

While the tensions and disputes over education persist at large, and the public faith in education waxes and wanes, the faith of reason to promote the "best" for and in humanity has tended to hold, until the most recent times. This faith is directed toward
education generally though, primarily through schooling, whether such is reasonable or not—truly representative and supportive of, in the service of, human reason or not. The dis-integration of the Kosmos which has occurred has led to the virtual dis-integration of all things, including education, the faith of reason, life, as a unified, spiritual, transcedent journey of the soul; in fact, the idea of the soul, having basically been replaced by the notion of the "self" in modern times, even falls prey to the divisive-ness of critique, claims regarding any unified view of the self regarded as "essentialist." The arrival of the "self" itself represents a reduction and amputation of what soul once was—individualistic and separate from the Kosmos.

Such dissection is attested to in the matter of education—of faith, of reason. In relating its history, even broadly and briefly, a cosmological perspective is lost over time; in chronologically or progressively marking time, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the grip of this perspective, because education itself, as conceived and explicated and practiced, loses this hold, ever narrowed, relegated to small, incomplete, specialized domains. Where we begin with life, the examination of life toward meaning and worth, and the upward journey of the soul, we end with curriculum, a scholarly "field," and schooling, a state "institution," a kind of economic insurance policy. Thus, evidence of the dissolution and division of the human journey is manifest, stunted ascent versus stunted descent. In the now small world of education, it is evidenced most clearly in what seems to be this irreconcilable rift and war between practice and theory. The changes here traced, then, particularly from the modern period, occur primarily in the scholarly field of education alone; schools remain little changed, and an absolutist
conception of education endures in them in the mainstream, even today—the same managerial, mechanistic metaphors dominate (predominantly in the United States). In this sense, the examination of life has been almost completely separated from the living of it.

Some educational scholars have, perhaps wisely (especially given the state of schools as they are), supported the maintenance of a certain distance from the schools to prevent the field's reduction to only what is, on the surface of existing institutions. This position evidences the call of reason, a universalizing structure which aspires to transcendence, the transformation of what is through a vision of the good. The work of the theoretical wing, a scholarly sector in the university, is construed, in this way, to be grounded in but not limited to educational experience. Such grounding, it is hoped, will prevent the field's collapse into discourse.

Yet the present situation threatens, in a sense, just this kind of collapse. Having lost its paradigmatic unity, the field, even within itself apart from the practice of schools, suffers from something of a fractured identity. As we have said, curriculum cannot live by critique alone. The field risks being torn apart by sectors knowing neither how to speak to one another nor listen; the field risks balkanization with its contemporary tendencies toward localisms and particularisms (Pinar et al., 1995). Thus, the small corner of refuge in the realm of education, for reason, a reason which again, it seems, seeks the upward path, some vision of meaning and value, some examination toward the worthy and the good, some view of a larger cosmological context, loses sight, too, of this search. Battling internally, it finds itself ineffectual, in a crisis of sorts, in which
reason comes to be seen as the culprit. Reason, it seems, is not multi-cultural, is not an advocate of the marginal and disenfranchised, is not consistent with freedom. Reason, it appears, is rather European, white, male, patriarchal (Pinar, 1997). Mainstream educational thinkers plod along, attending directly to the problems of school and its narrowed context, in which case reason is not really brought to task or questioned, nor the faith upon which their work is grounded. The program is simply carried on in the schools, regardless, it seems, of what is happening, what anyone is saying or feeling. Clearly, though, by all the "war," the division, is felt in term's of reason's emptiness: its split from value, meaning and goodness. Education, the faith of reason as such, has not brought humanity to life worth living; rather, as we have seen, death seems to achieve a global reign (evidenced in the rise of pollution, toxic waste, violence, suicide, divorce, feelings of hopelessness and despair, anomie, etc.; see Chapters 2 and 3). Education is blamed, but not wholly, because it now sits somewhat ambiguously in its relationship to smaller personal issues and larger social and cultural concerns.

David Purpel (1989), in *The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education*, stresses this forgotten relationship between education, culture and society as integral to what he calls the larger moral and spiritual crisis constitutive of enormous dangers to the cosmos and threats to our most treasured ideas about human life. The power of education is evidenced, he continues, in the perpetual debates over it between so-called conservatives and liberals, the most important dimension of which revolves around the issue of faith in the educability of humanity, a question regarding the very nature and destiny of humanity. Clearly, education is a source of political and pragmatic power, which can
operate in the service of humanity's liberation or captivation, of perpetuating existing power relations or of challenging them. In this sense, education can be construed as both the child and parent of culture.

Yet, its narrowing in all this world dis-integration, and its adoption of the illusion of neutrality, has made education appear to have little to do with culture or society or the fundamental questions of human existence—the orphaned child, the cast-off parent. Education is schooling, a cultural vestige of little import. Purpel calls it the trivialization of education, evidenced in its discourse and in its proposed reforms—evading and neglecting issues of critical significance through distracting obsessions with the merely technical. Focusing on the American scene, he chides the contemporary institution of education for failing to address or even acknowledge these larger pressing problems in a time of human crisis—of meaning and faith and moral courage. He complains:

The public is trying to grasp what is fundamental to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and in response educators give them more standardized tests; the culture yearns for meaning and hope, and the schools suggest more homework and a longer school year. The world teeters on the edge of a new holocaust and our leaders urge us to consider merit pay. (p. 22)

The trivialization of education is also its vulgarization and its abnegation of responsibility. Educators, in an attempt to avoid moral choices, are making them nonetheless, though without thought, or are unquestioningly submitting to such choices already made; thus, the field of vision is the confined and cramped "accessible present, ... vocational preparation and economic need" (p. 2)—the vulgar god of success (Tillich, 1957). Schools are not neutral, are not peripheral or inconsequential to the spiritual...
crisis at large. They ignore the search for wisdom, truth, meaning, goodness, and rather, choose to propel and embody this empty faith: materialism, secularism, scientism, technolatry—progressive representatives of a culture in its worst, most unreasonable aspects. As such, schools prove themselves to be, according to Purpel (1989), "intellectually and morally bankrupt": enhancing the growing sense of alienation and meaninglessness, contributing to mindless instrumentalism, perpetuating the reification and externalization of knowledge—and reason's split from faith and value, and antithetical even to the true spirit of science, and of reason, which encourages serious inquiry. It is, in fact, without reason, irrational, to discuss education or to engage it apart from the spiritual concerns of humanity, from some moral vision of who we are and what we hope to be and become, of the culture we would like to make for ourselves and the world. While such a realization is articulated by few, it is felt more and more by many, as this crisis of our faith in education, and in reason as that journey to human good.

Henry Perkinson (1977), however, in The Imperfect Panacea: American Faith in Education, 1865-1976, argues that to "convert" social problems to educational ones is, in fact, a way for adults to abnegate responsibility. The schools are saddled with all the ills of society. Such, in effect, diminishes the already limited authority of schools, making them subject to interest groups of every variety. Perkinson also makes the distinction between the faith of educators in education as a panacea for the world's ills, as the answer to society's problems and progress, and of the general public, parents with desires for their own children specifically, as an avenue by which to personally escape social ills.
Yet, his argument appears as something of a covert affirmation of Purpel's position. In each instance, social ills figure prominently, whether viewed from a personal/individualist perspective or from a public/communalist one. The views themselves represent this educational problem as a social one in which the individual project is seen as antithetical to the communal one, and vice-versa. He recognizes the faith of both in crisis—the efficacy of education as either a social or personal panacea now seriously in question, and sorely doubted, which cannot be separated from larger societal, cultural, and world problems and the felt sense of crisis they stimulate. He acknowledges, as well, the problem of construing schooling as a way to escape from social evils, rather than as an avenue through which to address them. In contending also that the school is not the primary advocate of culture, that extant are a host of other informal agencies of education, and that, unfortunately, the school has come to be believed in and seen in this light as primary, Perkinson tacitly identifies and disapproves the narrowing and trivialization of education of which Purpel has spoken. He has, in fact, shown that educational concerns are social ones, and social ones, educational.

Perkinson admits, then, to the social power of education, and to an all-encompassing faith—here, of Americans—in its political function, traditionally in the preservation of civilization and in the preparation of the young for economic survival, more—he feels—than in a true sense of progress. As a panacea in service of the national purpose, though imperfect, schooling has been, for most of its history, effectual for white, middle-class America, sustaining its position, the status quo. Yet even this has been brought under duress not only with the generations of middle-class students
rejecting the values of their parents and the educational institutions which are seen to embody those values, but also with the public indictments of revisionist historians and curricularists against schools as sites of oppression and indoctrination and moral abnegation (Apple, 1979/1990; Giroux, 1992; Purpel, 1989; Kozol, 1975/1990; etc.). Some of the stronger critiques have argued that education actively promotes injustice and inequality, the capitalist virtues of exploitation and manipulation and power-mongering. Moreover, education seems to no longer insure security and power for even the privileged. These things serve to only deepen and darken the crisis of faith in education. The conclusion is: schools actually hurt humanity; thus, they must be radically altered or abolished altogether. And according to Perkinson, "with this last wave of radical critics we reach the edge of educational nihilism" (1977, p. 235).

Education is not as far from culture as we thought. The question of, the search for, "worth" echoes again in Perkinson's final questions, questions for which he says none of us seem to have responses: What then are schools for? What is education even about? What knowledge is worth knowing?

And we are drawn back to the major premise of the Platonic quest that through examination humanity might find worth--life worth living, that education as the upward journey of the soul by the faith of reason might bring humanity to an apprehension of the good and true and beautiful. Of course, this premise, if remembered, is seriously in doubt. The examined life, it turns out, is also not worth living; in fact, reason seductively lures one in an infinite regress away from life: the examined life seems to be unlived--worse still, against life. This time, then, faith, if any remains, is aimed against
reason as the obstacle which has prevented the human race from valuable, meaningful worthy existence and thwarted the realization of goodness, truth and beauty. Or at least its faith is stumbling, undergoing great trials of immense doubt—the faith of reason on trial.

Richard Bernstein (1991b), in attempting also to understand this contemporary rage against reason, associates its movement with Nietzsche's genealogical unmasking of reason's history. In the Nietzschean critique, our reason takes us to nihilism, and does so logically. At this point, it is not surprising to us at all to find reason, nihilism, and the death of God within the same nexus. Reason is divine, or some might say daemonic, and has been operative through a faith involving ultimacy. Bernstein seeks to tell the story, as it were, of reason in Western civilization through four characters, philosophers he finds central to the telling of it: Condorcet, Weber, Adorno, and Heidegger.

Admittedly, he says, the tale is partial, for it is not yet told out, the narrative of reason's development incomplete and also held together by lots of tension.

"The tale is partial, as well, obviously in the sense that Bernstein makes no attempts to include in his inquiry critiques of reason made by women or people of color, for example. Yet, in his defense, he is drawing on thinkers he feels to be central to the telling of the story of reason in the West. Clearly, women and people of color have not been given centrality traditionally in any Western meta-narrative, particularly that of reason—little involved in the Enlightenment project, outright silenced or excluded from it, or relegated to its margins. Via the cult of reason, many voices, lives, stories, cultures, have been excluded obviously, invalidated by the rational center which has determined what counts as legitimate knowledge (Munro, 1996). Thus, many of the contemporary critiques of reason have been made from the margins, as it were. Feminist scholars, for instance, have insightfully demonstrated how "reason" has been used to justify male domination over women, to rationalize it away as "natural." They have also pointed out the potential violence or injustice to which any totalizing discourse is susceptible (Hey, 1988). Perhaps, however, what is primarily being attacked is the baggage with which the notion of reason has been saddled: the assumption of the autonomous self and of absolute freedom; the denigration of the emotions and of ways of knowing which do not fall within the project of science; and the privileging of certain
values of objectivity, neutrality, mastery, hierarchy and control, for example. The problem with some of these critiques seems to be in the way reason is construed as a unitary and non-complex construct, as an essentialist idea, the way it is unquestioningly associated with imposition and reification, and the way it is pitted against meaning and context and value, and rejected as irredeemably male—linearity, rationality, logic, and clarity equated with "male"; and non-linearity, non-rationality or irrationality, emotion, intuition and ambiguity equated with "female" (Flax, 1990; Harding, 1991; Munro, 1996; Okruhlik & Harvey, 1992; Sawicki, 1991). Even the work of eco-feminists which seeks unity, to speak beyond women's concerns solely, for the whole cosmos, evidences a certain failure to move beyond perpetuating essentialist male/female dualisms. For example, Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein (1990), in *Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism*, define "our culture's devaluation of natural processes [as] ... a product of masculine consciousness [which has] ... denigrated and manipulated everything defined as 'other' ...") (p. ix).

Jana Sawicki (1991) affirms, in response to such problems, a "politics of difference," with the recognition that there are battles within feminist discourse itself among the various strains—womanist, radical, and liberal, etc. She also highlights the "double bind" within which feminist scholars must work: to critique the tradition necessitates an entering into that tradition and into the very discourse which has marginalized women in the first place. In like manner, some thinkers have called for a sort of reconceptualization of reason, the creation of a new epistemology, in which the traditional standards of rationality that have served to exclude women are undermined and new standards, inclusive of women's ways of knowing, are posited (Okruhlik & Harvey, 1992). In addition, Wendy Kohli (1995), a committed feminist, is also an advocate of reason, unwilling to give reason over to the rule of the patriarchy. In the final analysis, "some notion of reason hangs behind all scholarship [feminist or otherwise]; scholars speak in the voice of reason" (Pinar, 1997, p. 6). For it is reason which makes appeal to human rights, justice, and equality. One cannot fight, then, against oppression or injustice without some kind of appeal to some idea of universal reason (Seigel, 1987). In this way, it might be said that the feminist project has emerged, in fact, from the Enlightenment project of reason—it follows a "reason-able" and rational line of thought.

There are, as well, many other marginalized groups which have laid indictments against reason, all of which are not without poignancy and importance. As someone interested in the history of Western thought, however, and in the dominant thinkers within the modern tradition, I shall focus here, with Bernstein, on such thinkers. The critiques of reason presented by these scholars—primarily white, European males who ought to have an interest supposedly in perpetuating reason's reign—are of particular import, I think, in shedding light within a much broader frame on the problematic developments of reason as construed in the West, the fatal flaws internal to this reason, productive of oppressing effects universally (upon the earth as well as humanity, for example), and not just upon particular cultures and classes of people.
The amazing feature Bernstein highlights is how this thing we call reason could once conjure up visions of liberty, virtue, happiness, justice and goodness; and yet now call to mind images of repression, oppression, domination, terror and violence. For Condorcet, a major figure of the French Enlightenment, "Reason" is humanity's hero, her savior. Platonic in this sense, Condorcet sets forth a historical perspective on the development of the human mind, and reason is that crowning achievement central to the indefinite teleological progress and perfection of humanity, to a future utopia.

Reason passes through difficult trials. It must triumph over the devious tactics of priests, tyrants, despots, and cunning hypocrites. But in the course of history, it gains an overwhelming momentum; [and] ... with the discovery of printing, the good works of publicists and especially through public education, the full illumination of Reason spreads to all of humankind. (p. 33)

Reason makes for virtue, peace and happiness for all of humanity. By the faith of reason, Condorcet (1795/1955) can hope: "The time will therefore come when the sun shall shine only on free men who know no other master but their reason" (p. 179). Of course, Condorcet is not the only one throughout history to feel this way about reason, only an exemplar.

Yet today, reason is viewed with an altogether different eye, is seen in a very different light, if in any "light" at all. Bernstein (1991b) spends a great deal of time in his essay with Weber and his biting critique of Enlightenment thought and its zealous devotion to reason, because Bernstein, with MacIntyre (1984), feels our age in its commentary of itself is principally Weberian. Weber unmasks the "dialectic of Enlightenment"—a term coined by Adorno and Horkheimer—and highlights its dark side.
which advances its own self-annihilation. His is the exposition of the modern
"disenchantment of the world" (see Chapter 2) via a reason increasingly dominated by
"purposive rationality," oriented to ends and means and results, dominated by science
which is powerless to tell us what to do and how to live, to give us meaning and value.
His conclusion is that our ultimate concerns (i.e., our faith) can rest upon no scientific or
rational foundation. Paradoxically, this "reason" of scientific rationality shapes all of life
in such a way that, rather than promote, it threatens democracy, freedom and the very
existence of humanity, the autonomous agency of the individual. Weber thus calls the
future an "iron cage" and perhaps a stage for the drama of war and oppression.
"Modernity is not characterized by a universal assent to, and institutionalization of,
natural rights, but by a new polytheism of warring, incommensurable value
commitments, by a new and violent struggle of gods and demons" (Bernstein, 1991b,
p. 37).

In some ways, Adorno's portrait of reason and its rule in contemporary times is
even more grim than Weber's. All types of rationality appear to involve attempts to
master reality; thus, at reason's root, at least as reason is conceived in the West, lies the
will to control; hidden is a repressive logic present in and foundational to the genesis of
Western culture, "identity logic," which Adorno posits is inherently domination, the will
to be rid of singularity, difference, and otherness. The result is the subjugation, for
example, of nature, of women, and eventually of the self.14 "The Enlightenment has

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"The Creation myth including the "Fall of Man" begun with in Chapter 2 and
foundational to much of Western thought is exemplary of this hidden logic of which
Adorno speaks. Behind the act of plucking and consuming the forbidden fruit from the
always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/1972, p. 3). Of course, one might question if the earth is truly fully enlightened, or enlightened at all. Yet even still, Adorno lays claim to some of the promises of the Enlightenment faith of reason, for social freedom as inseparable from enlightened thought, for example--aware also of the danger of the dark side, in this case, the realization of freedom's opposite. Bernstein (1991b) calls it the "mimesis of redemption" which Adorno presents: the dialectic is radicalized to account for the boundless abundance of the promise, able to break the power of identity logic, to transform social reality through such bursting. Thus, Adorno self-consciously embraces the utopian ideals and hopeful aspirations of the Enlightenment, the faith of reason, though not in entirety and fully aware of the dangers. We see here highlighted the risk of faith, and its indelible relation to the promise.

Heidegger, however, takes the depravity of reason to its height, according to Bernstein, where it is travesty and something of a farce to even speak of humanism, liberty, freedom, happiness, anymore--the promise of good offered through Enlightenment reason found to be empty.15 Rather, the "prefigured possibilities of Plato" tree of the knowledge of good and evil is, with this desire for wisdom and the knowledge of all things, the will to mastery or control, to identify with God, to possess the identity of God. Of course, too, the result is the "curse": the alienation of humanity from nature, man from woman, the "soul" of humanity from itself, and the domination of humanity over nature, and of man over woman--thus, subjugation.

15While Heidegger is without doubt a critic of reason, particularly as it has been construed and expressed in the modern West, as it has been played out in the history of the West, I do not agree with Bernstein's portrait of Heidegger in this regard. I do not
have been played out to bring us to the forgetfulness of being, the "cosmic night" of nihilism, wherein only a god can save us. The specter of Nietzsche is obviously found in all of these critiques, and given the histories we have traced, and the explicatons of these and other thinkers on the path and destiny of reason, we can certainly begin to understand the cries against it, the wrath unleashed upon it.

Yet, despite all this and perhaps because of it, Bernstein finally reaffirms the faith of reason, those Enlightenment dreams of freedom, equality, peace and happiness for all of humanity—hopes actually long preceding the Enlightenment, historically. He claims that these hopes animate us still, inspiring even the scholars who are reason's utmost critics. For we note, these scholars make use of advanced reason, in fact, to discredit reason and posit alternatives. Says Bernstein: "Many of us still share [this] faith in the potential power of public discussion and education" (p. 35)—education still somehow seen as a power, and a central conduit of reason. Bernstein seeks, then, to revive reason or reconceptualize it—the faith of reason—in highlighting, with Habermas, the rationality of communicative action above purposive action.

Habermas complains that the critiques of reason have failed to understand fully the nature of social action, undermining the import and primacy of communicative rationality, evidenced most clearly in speech which is not directed at success but at

believe Heidegger throws over altogether any talk of human and world hope for freedom and for good. He does problematize this discourse, the unthought-through notion of human agency, and in fact, contrasts what has come to be called "reason" with thought, which he extols. See, for example, Poetry. Language. Thought (1971) and The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977) in their entirety.
shared understanding. Instead, undue power and prominence are given to purposive rationality. Of course, these critiques perhaps have simply recognized that to which dominance has been given, what reason has become—or is in threat of becoming reduced and narrowed to—in the modern age, in the system of capitalism's selective rationality. Nonetheless, while admitting to such selectivity and dominance, and a corresponding bent toward the disfigurement/contortion of the life world, he refutes the idea that this plight is somehow unremittably predestined as the teleological actualization of Enlightenment thought. Motivated by "the conviction that a humane collective life

While I am not ready, as some feminists seem to be, to assign reason to the masculine domain, to "give" rationality over to men or to describe it as a male construct or characteristic or function, I cede that reason is clearly gendered, at least existentially and ontically. However, despite the pathology of the transcendent or universal function in Western culture, I am not ceding the necessity or reality of this function, though it must be counter-balanced with an acknowledgment of the particularity, the historicity, and the temporality of human existence (including gender, class, race, age, etc.), and of all things in the cosmos. This is to say that reason is, as well, a construct which reaches beyond gender, laying claim by definition to something universal and transcendent. Yet, a fruitful line of inquiry regarding the gendered development of reason in the West might be found in this distinction Habermas makes between purposive and communicative rationality. In the sense that reason in the West has been funneled into the much narrower expression of purposive rationality, and that this form of rationality seems to be the dominant one exhibited in males, we might associate the reason which has reigned with the masculine. This is not to say, however, that females cannot or do not operate in the world purposively, as well. In like manner, females have traditionally been more inclined to, or more gifted in, the communicative form of rationality. Developmentally, girls generally outshine boys in verbal and communication skills at an early age.

While males and females are constituted by both masculine and feminine principles, capable of purposive and communicative expression. Males have typically, in the West particularly, been described as agentic, aimed at success over or with the Other—females, in contrast, as relational, oriented toward understanding the Other. In this way, the West may indeed stand in dire need of the introduction of the feminine principle, a resurgence of communicative reason. It is possible to suggest, as well, that there may be a biological element at work in the different rational strengths found in males and females—reflected metaphorically, for example, in the figures of the phallus and the womb—although such ideas are hotly debated.
depends on the vulnerable forms of innovation-bearing, reciprocal and unforcedly egalitarian everyday communication" (Habermas, cited in Bernstein, 1991b, p. 45).

Habermas claims that rationality is in fact inherently dialogical, that communication, though threatened by contemporary forces, is foundational to, at the heart of, reason.

Interestingly enough, in affirming reason in this light, in attempting to salvage it, Bernstein turns to Gadamer who not only asserts that humanity by its very nature, that being-in-the-world, is ontologically dialogical, but also lauds Plato as the great advocate of communicative rationality in the West, and works to revive what he calls an underground tradition and forgotten theme of the West, and of reason. Plato, often seen as the great villain who introduced the West to the dualistic destructiveness of reason, is here affirmed as the great hero, the father of the dialogues, in defense of spoken and written conversation, understanding through communication. Bernstein remains in agreement with the insight of many "post" philosophical critiques that notions like communicative rationality, dialogue and community bear with them the potential for becoming oppressive and imprisoning ideas, and have become such, in fact, in the past, just as has reason, rationality, truth, etc. Indeed, much can go wrong in the "lines" of communication, and in truth, the West has tended to institutionalize monologue rather than dialogue, a singular conversation--if it can be called that, a false and fixed "We" violently globally imposed, silencing the "other," the marginal, difference.

Still, aware of the danger--particularly in our present technological age of information where communication is often seen as a mere exchange of data, Bernstein sees a greater danger, namely, that dialogue is not even possible without something
shared: beliefs, passions, values, commitments—mutual care, a common faith. Reason presupposes virtue, as well: the "good will" to listen and genuinely strive to understand what is different and other, the humble courage to venture one's own treasured beliefs and ideals. Of course, herein are points of deficiency and lack, too often denied with the pretence of some enforced consensus, imposed mutuality. Moral skepticism has its place, then, but as critical if not more so, is moral passion—the faith as well as the doubt of reason—for this enduring yet broken and vulnerable ideal of "dialogical communicative rationality." The voice of nihilism must be heard and heeded, says Bernstein, but not the temptation to fatalistically assign the West to infinite decline and ultimate destitution and death, nor to write reason's history in an essentialist manner that ends entirely in undisclosed forms of violence. The conclusion, in agreement with Wilber (1995) as well as Plato (c.a. 380 b.c./1992), is that:

The claim to reason has a 'stubbornly transcending power [emphasis mine], because it is renewed with each act of unconstrained understanding' and with 'each moment of living together in solidarity' [Habermas, 1982]. But never before has this claim to communicative reason been so threatened from so many different directions. A practical commitment to the avenging energia of communicative reason is the basis—perhaps the only honest basis—for hope.

(Bernstein, 1991b, pp. 52-53)

Hope, commitment, courage, good will, dialogue, virtue, moral passion, shared faith—such constitutes Bernstein's ultimate response to the contemporary rage against reason, cognizant of the ease with which these ideals may be spoken of and lauded but the difficulty of achieving their realization. Although he does not directly return to Plato or to that original concern around which reason rallies regarding the examination of the
life world in the service of its enrichment, regarding education as the upward journey of
the soul to goodness and worth, he does affirm anew the faith of reason (through public
discussion and education). And it is definitely more akin to the reason of Plato, imbued
with and indelibly tied to value, grounded in a faith, than the reason of today so decried.

Reason is perhaps, then, not humanity’s ultimate problem or enemy: not the
crime of Plato, not the failure of the Enlightenment, not the compost of modernity, not
the discredited history of the West. Reason as construed, manifested, operative in
contemporary Western culture has, however, become in many respects antagonistic to
human life as well as the life of the Kosmos, and thus a problem of ultimate concern.
Yet, it is a distorted, narrowed, truncated and repressive reason—unreasonable, probably
hardly worthy of the name. Still, whether reason is raged against for this reason, or
defended, little addressed is the faith of it, more fundamentally at issue. For the rage
against reason or the desperate attempt to salvage it expresses not primarily reason in
crisis but the crisis of our faith, of the faith of reason—faith being reason’s critical ground.

In our excavation, in the historical labyrinths we have traversed, we have
uncovered not only or primarily this Platonic image of reason, but of education as the
upward journey of the human soul in which reason figures prominently—more directly,
the faith of reason. We have traced not only its enduring power, its rendering, in the
West, and the altercations of this faith and thus also of the image of reason therein, but
also its denial, its reduction, its repression, its deformation—its dis-integration. Most
clearly, we have gleaned it in what education as we know it, via schooling, seems to have
become. For it is barely even, if at all, any more in the service of reason, splintered
almost beyond comprehension or meaning, buried beneath the trivial. It is little more than a dead relic unable or unwilling to attest to Plato's living transcendent journey of the human soul.

The sundering and narrowing of reason, its abnegation of transcendence on the one hand and dissociation from the natural world on the other, serve to alienate it from its ground in faith, to distance it from a consciousness of care and ultimate concern, of temporality. Nevertheless, there is the presence and pervasiveness of some ultimate care, it has simply been overthrown, in the sense that the whole concept of ultimacy has been buried, disavowed, denied. The concept of ultimacy is seen in association with faith, which is felt to be operative against reason, that which enslaves rather than emancipates humanity. By it, humanity loses not only this world, but its soul as well, in search of some other world, nonexistent, always promised, never delivered. Faith, then, is little spoken of or thought about, especially in relation to reason.

Although, with reason disturbed in contemporary times—humanity's new scapegoat, its centrality and value definitively in crisis, talk of faith is again beginning to be heard, though perhaps not always directly (Bernstein, 1991b; Derrida, 1992/1995; Ricoeur, 1969/1974; Purpel, 1989; etc.; as well as in popular culture through the lyrics of musicians and vocalists like Natalie Merchant, for example, and the literature of widely-read writers such as William Bennett, 1993, 1996; and Mother Theresa, 1995). For, through reason, it seems humanity is losing itself and all the world. The appeal to faith, the call of faith, at large and in the field of education, entails a common exploration of the source and summit of humanity's ultimate care, or an examination of life, of human
existence, in terms of value, meaning, worth. This call of faith is, in this way, an appeal to Plato's faith of reason, rooted in that foundational Socratic notion that the examination of life may be undertaken toward the creation of worthy living.

While we must seek to settle our issues with reason, clearly, a response to the crisis involves, then, more than the interrogation of reason: its overthrow, reaffirmation or healing restoration; before and beyond this, it entails the question of faith, beneath reason, here not as reason's alternative or opposite but as its ground and guide. The reason that has reigned—with a subterraneously operative faith, unacknowledged and misdirected—has shut out in many ways both body and spirit, lost soul. So reduced, this reason has stripped humanity, the earth and the heavens of their unknowing mystery and liveliness and significance: no inspiration, no awe, no wonder before the infinite temporality and finite eternity of the Kosmos. Even language by which humanity might express and reflect upon and dwell in the heights and the depths has been stripped of its "glory." Yet, for the ancients like Plato, the very fount of meaningful knowledge is found in this presence and experience of wonder and mystery—reason's alpha and omega, its beginning and end (Sloan, 1983). It is faith which is reason's energia, axiologically directive and empowering.

Thus, in the call of faith, against the backdrop of this rage against reason, might lie reason's redemption. It will, of course, involve a venture into faith, an honest examination of that which Western culture has unconfessedly made ultimate, and an inquiry into the source and summit of human care in the context of our temporal existence, our being-in-the-world together. And it will probably involve repentance,
literally meaning, as Heidegger would call it, a "turning"\footnote{See Heidegger's (1962/1977e) "The Turning," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays.}: the reconceptualization, transformation of faith, reason, the faith of reason—negation, preservation, integration, transcendence. Reason, by a renewed faith, might then be grounded once again in value and worth, in the language of vision, in spirit, in education as an enlightening upward journey of the soul, the human-soul, the world-soul. Like the reason of Plato, it might behold an image of the good, and live in the light of this view. For as it is written, "Where there is no vision, the people perish ... " \cite{Holy_Bible}, and all the Kosmos, it seems, as well. Indeed, such vision must be self-conscious, regenerative, akin to Adorno's self-conscious affirmation of certain Enlightenment ideals. With reason, then, would come affirmation, a sacred "Amen," a "Yes" to life. For now, it might be named faithful reason \cite{Phenix}, rooted in "a prior and primary grasp" \cite{Sloan}, of the Kosmic whole, or reasonable faith. We should, perhaps, call it post-rational reason, or trans-rational. For, it would be a reason beyond reason, as it is known this day, able to imagine and seek again the good and true and beautiful in human life. Only then, perhaps, will reason have, finally, a reason to hope.
EPILOGUE: SOJOURNING IN THE LAND OF PROMISE

By faith, he [Abraham] sojourned in the land of promise, as in a strange country, dwelling in tabernacles with Isaac and Jacob, the heirs with him of the same promise. (The Holy Bible, 1985, Hebrews 11:9)

It is required of me that I leave this work with a conclusion, a summation of sorts, a closing statement in which I disclose to my reader the implications of this study, its meaning and significance, or perhaps suggest from it a future path, program, plan, and destination, particularly with regard to the project of education. Yet, to conclude is to intimate completion, closure, a final word. I am presently, however, more accurately faced once more with the "inner infinity of the dialogue," the "infinity of the unsaid" (Gadamer, 1960/1992), and the abiding call of faith: à venir, yet to come, grounded in hope and the promise. And gladly so. I am personally wary, too, of the "immediate presentation" of thought here occasioned, particularly with respect to standing before

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1 I have borrowed this French expression from Jacques Derrida (1990), in "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority," in which he discusses the idea of justice in its relation to the act of deconstruction. Regarding justice, Derrida speaks of an infinite, irreducible debt owed to the other, a debt we cannot pay and yet a debt demanding payment. Justice, as law, can only be exercised in a decision that cuts, made in the "night of non-knowledge" (borrowing from Kierkegaard), of non-rule, holding within it some irruptive violence; thus, he says: "Justice remains, is yet to come, à venir" (p. 969). Justice is, then, that to which we never arrive, but that to which we aspire, having the character of hope and promise. Also, "faith is the sister of justice" (cited in Mead, 1989), according to an old Latin proverb.

2 Derrida (1989) borrows this phrase, and the cautionary note behind it, from Martin Heidegger. The context in which he uses it concerns the question of reading Heidegger, and is a response to those who condemn and censor such reading because of Heidegger's association with Nazism. Derrida unveils the complexity of the issue, reiterating the word of Heidegger in warning against the danger and thoughtlessness of "immediate presentation." Derrida says more generally that this means "less ease in armed declarations and morality lessons, less haste toward platforms and tribunals, even
the Mystery, and seeking to "explain" it to myself or others, that which is essentially inexplicable, and yet which is the essence of life—spirit, the animating principle. I am again as I was when I began, then, like Abraham, "going out, not knowing whither," yet going out all the same, and also sojourning as in a land of promise, which is a dwelling with others who are also heirs with me of the promise. I find such an image to be, as well, descriptive of this project we call "education"—once stripped, of course, of our pretensions at certainty and control regarding human knowledge and destiny—or at least a compelling image, perhaps, through which to re-imagine what it means to educate.

The Canadian scholar David Jardine (1992) states that education—the word itself drawn from the Latin educere, meaning "to bring forth"—is fundamentally concerned with the "bringing forth" of human life. In this way, we are reminded of Plato's notion of education via his "Allegory of the Cave" in which the uneducated is likened to the dead, the living dead, and the process of education to that of liberating the prisoner and drawing the life of the soul out of its shackles and out of the confines of the cave to the light of the sun, to spirit, and fullness of life. In like manner, Socrates is said to have seen himself as a midwife, drawing out the inner life of his students, and as a gadfly as well, stirring up the lazy and lifeless to thought and understanding. Jardine goes on to describe education, then, as "essentially a 'generative' discipline, concerned with the emergence of new life in our midst, and what it is we might hope for this new life, what it is we might wish to engender" (p. 116).

if it were to respond to acts of violence, rhetorical or other" (p. 8).
Ideally, this new life is the embodiment of human possibility, the possibility that we might transcend the actual, that we might aspire to that beyond what is, that life also might endure, ever begetting newness of life and transformation. Such is, of course, both the problem and promise of education: how to "educe new life" (p. 116) and yet preserve what is, and yet also serve what might be. Education involves, then, our understanding of and response to life, and its continuity and ever-renewing character, and our desire for an understanding and faithful response which allows us to continue living together with respect for what is (inclusive of what has been) and with hope and openness toward what is yet to come. It is the faith of Socrates we affirm, and the aim of education: that the examination of life and of the life-world and our place in it—that an inquiry into them as they are and as they have been and as they could yet be—might assist us in the creation of lives of meaning and worth (aspiring to the good and true and beautiful), personally and collectively; and that through on-going engagement in this endeavor, future generations might be heirs too, with us, of this promise.

It follows that central to the educative process or to pedagogical method is hermeneutical inquiry, because such inquiry differs from others in that it is by nature educational, directed toward these very concerns:

Hermeneutic inquiry has as its goal to educe understanding, to bring forth the presuppositions in which we already live. Its task, therefore is not to methodically achieve a relationship to some matter and to secure understanding in such a method. Rather, its task is to recollect the contours and textures of the life we are already living, a life that is not secured by the methods we can wield to render such a life our object.... Hermeneutics wants to recover the original difficulties of life, difficulties that are concealed ... in the attempt to render human life objectively presentable. (pp. 116, 118)
Dwayne Huebner (1974) affirms similarly the "Hermes Process" as the pedagogical process, bringing forth and making present that which is unintelligible or foreign into the light of understanding. I would add that a part of its task, as well, is to elucidate the all-too-intelligible, familiar and thereby unthought, by making it strange and perhaps unintelligible. Curriculum content is "Otherness," in a sense, and in one moment, we make it a part of us, opening up to it and taking it into ourselves; in another, we marvel at the Otherness within. In this way, the question of meaning is ever before us, and the necessity for ongoing acts of interpretation. Hermes, from which hermeneutics is derived as the art of interpretation, is the messenger-god of the Greeks, responsible for communicating with humanity, for presenting to humanity in receivable form, that which is beyond human understanding; as such, he is a mediator between the human and divine, and he is also construed as the great trickster, who sometimes trips up the vulnerable lines of communication. Where Hermes is present, present also is difficulty and ambiguity and insaturability, and the call to ever engage anew the question of meaning, and as Richard Rorty (1989) has said, to keep the conversation going.

Thus, I am here struggling, for the form of this inquiry has been hermeneutic, in order that it might not only be educative in this way, but also in the way of affirming the essential ambiguity and mystery of human life—its depthfulness, and the need for those who are concerned with the project of education, who call themselves educators, to dwell within this affirmation and this difficulty. Herein, as well, is my resistance in writing a conclusion, and in seeking to directly apply what I have gleaned through this work to educational goals and practices, or concretize its implications in terms of
curriculum content and design, teaching and pedagogical method, or classroom procedure and the practice of schooling. To many it is unclear if schools actually provide education at all, or are even concerned with the process of educating human beings; in fact, some assert that schools actually mis-educate, or serve to hinder the educational process. Yet, if so, it does not follow that this has to be the case. I do not wish here to enter into this question, although it is related to the problem to which I am alluding. Schooling, as an institution, tends to give method and procedure precedence over all things, to make human life, and education as the bringing forth of human life, something "objectively presentable." This is to say that the overriding concern seems to find expression in an attempt to pin life down, to fix the educational enterprise, in such a way so that it might be certain, so that there is nothing left to say, in order to achieve the final word. Similarly, it appears to me that such activities which attempt to address the task of education by breaking it down into these identifiable separable elements which are then delineated definitively, that a great deal of the discussions on the goal of education or on curriculum content or on pedagogical method, for example, are largely shaped by this incessant quest for certainty, this faithless or idolatrous need to strip life of its difficulty, its ambiguity, its mystery. It is the search for this final word, which is more accurately the death of the word, an attempt to kill it, which is also the death of thought, and ironically antithetical, in fact, to the educational impulse.

I concur with David Jardine who speaks, rather, of education as a hermeneutical endeavor and hermeneutics as a "returning of life to its original difficulty [which also] is a returning of the possibility of the living Word. It is a return to the essential generativity
of human life, a sense of life in which there is always something left to say" (p. 119).

Prior, then, to any discussion of teaching or of curriculum, is an image of life, and thus of
education, from which a particular kind of discussion about these matters is always
generated, or in some cases closed off. Thus, I have sought first to investigate these
images in Western Civilization throughout this work, and suggest here the primacy of the
need to not only inquire into the images we hold regarding education, but also to re-
imagine them, so that the Word might live, so that there is always something more to
say, so that life may in fact be brought forth. Technical, methodological, material and
scientific images, for some time, have dominated, constraining our thoughts about
education, aimed at overcoming or solving life's difficulty and ambiguity, rather than
giving voice to them and entering into them in faith. Honored, in this sense, is the letter
of the law, instead of the spirit of the Word.

These interests, investigations and affirmations are obviously related to what I
described in the Prologue as a religious critique of education, concerned with the lack of
depth and loss of soul evidenced today, the forgotten questions which life is ever raising
about its meaning and regarding concerns of ultimacy. The religious perspective has to
do with our relationship with forces and powers beyond the known world. Clearly, these
forces shape what is known, and how we know. Religious questions are directed toward
our kinship or affiliation with the cosmos, with what is not known and not knowable,
with what is Other to us, and even with the Otherness we find within—the mysterious
"moreness" (Huebner, 1995, in press) which ever eludes our grasp, beyond
understanding, but yet within which "we live and move and have our being" (The Holy
The religious attitude is fundamentally hermeneutical, and gravitates toward questions of origin, meaning, and ultimacy and calls humanity to respond to them (Purpel, 1989). Educationally speaking, for instance, if today we are pressed by the need to address our global ecological problems or the issue of multiculturalism, we must reinvite the religious in order to attend to this call. I am seeking to validate, then, the religious attitude, an attitude I feel is beneath the human impulse to "educate," however denied in modern times. Robert Nisbet (1974) speaks of "religion's profound relation to the structure of human society and to the deepest regions of human consciousness" (p. 157, emphasis mine). Kitarō Nishida (1990) has put it this way: "The religious demand is the demand of life itself. Those who think seriously cannot help but feel an intense religious demand" (p. 152).

Obviously, the task of education is strongly associated with the task of thinking "seriously," with teaching students to think, with exposing students to the thoughts of others we deem important, those we have recognized culturally as significant and serious and thought-ful. Unfortunately, we often forget these thoughts have been judged thus in their contribution to a particular vision of life, and in their power to speak to present human need and to the human condition. Education also involves entering into a reflection with students upon what it, in fact, means to think, into a thinking upon the very process of thinking and where such thinking takes us, and upon the products of our thought. Yet, for example, I have this encounter one day in the coffee house with a well-esteemed university professor of science: he inquires after what I have been so diligently applying myself to day in and day out—the dissertation. Of course, he then wants to
know the "field" in which I am pursuing a doctorate. The mere mention of the word "education" provokes a diatribe by him about the absurdity of such a field, of a College of Education finding place in the University, of such a subject being afforded academic credibility. Teaching is merely a question of skill and technique, not an intellectual pursuit, he informs me. He laughs about departments which have their "little" laboratory kindergartens and concludes with the assertion that all one needs to teach is a knowledge of the discipline, a chalkboard and a piece of chalk.

My first thought is that I would like to throw him into a classroom of thirty five-year old children with nothing more than a knowledge of his discipline, a chalkboard and a piece of chalk and see if his hypothesis holds. Clearly, there is a history to this kind of thinking about education, a history tied up in the Northern European birth of curriculum with its emphasis on methodological concerns, a history not shared, for example, in Germany where the concept of bildung3 has dominated educational thought, where practice and theory are not so markedly distinguished, where research is neither sharply separated from teaching, nor esteemed above it. Clearly, as well, this professor's attitudes are understandable in light of the field's attempt to model itself after the sciences, which is to make of it a "pseudo-science," and its endearment to images of a technical, managerial nature. Yet, what I find to be so disturbing about his stance is, in

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3The German concept, bildung, is referential of an interest in culture and human development and potential; its history has origins in medieval mysticism, and Herder has so aptly described it as a "rising up to humanity through culture" (cited in Gadamer, 1960/1992, p. 10).
fact, its thoughtlessness: it is a thinking which has stopped thinking, which has found the final word. The attitude implies that this man is estranged from the very nature of what he does as an educator in the university.

The university is founded on the premise of education, the value of the open-minded search for truth, the necessity and worth of the practice of inquiry, of life informed by inquiry. Yet, here is a university professor who neither questions the meaning of his work, nor the boundaries of the discipline within which he works, nor apparently encourages this questioning in his students. He no longer seems to ask questions regarding what constitutes knowledge within this frame and how it is constituted, or the value of what is counted as knowledge therein and its limits. The assumption is expressed, too, that knowledge is something static that can be finally gotten and possessed, like some object which then can be passed on to the next generation with the stroke of a piece of chalk. Apparent, as well, is the absence of any historical consciousness regarding that in which he engages. He does not consider that science arose in the West from the practice of philosophy, and that at one time, philosophy and education were deemed to be one and the same. His discipline would not exist were it not for the project of education—it is a part of that project—and the original impulse from which it was generated. I am not here intending to defend the study of education against such assaults, but to demonstrate with a tangible example evidence of

‘Evoking the image of the Logic of Death spoken of in Chapter 2, Hannah Arendt puts it this way: "Without the breath of life the human body is a corpse; without thinking the human mind is dead" (cited in Waithe, 1995, p. 252, emphasis in original).
this loss of depth, Nishada's "serious" thought, of which I am speaking, thus the need for
religious critique and the religious attitude brought to bear on the practice of education,
and to direct myself, for the benefit of my reader, toward the implications of such a
critique and such an attitude for education.

These matters come together for me, at least, in Heidegger's (1927/1962) critique
of modernity, characterized by what he calls the forgetfulness or forgetting of being, or
the loss of the very question of the meaning of being in human consciousness. His
project, in response to this loss, has been described as the "quest for being" (Spiegelberg,
1982; Collinson, 1987), what I would submit is, as well, a religious critique of
modernity—albeit not in name—because he seeks to revive the question of the meaning of
human existence, of life, and being, the lost dimension of depth or soul. While I do not
wish to take a detour here into the intricacies and complexities of this critique
(particularly because it is in the same line with Kovel's notion of the despiritualization of
life and Weber's discussion of the disenchantment of the world we have already fleshed
out in the substance of this work), I would like to highlight the inextricable kinship and
interrelatedness of concepts like being, spirit, soul and logos, or word. "Being" as
referential of life, existence, essence, a person human or divine, is tied to "spirit,"
immaterial being, the animating principle of life, the vital principle and active essence of a
human person, the breath of the divine (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, vols. II and
XVI, pp. 80, 251-253). "Spirit" has likewise been defined as the soul of a person or
being, and "being" as the active, vitalizing immaterial soul, as well, embodied as the
world soul, or the human soul, or the soul of the divine (Vine's Expository Dictionary,
n.d.). Soul, too, is that which is immaterial, and also that which is figurative, symbolic, mythic.

For Heidegger, the logos, the word, language, is the house of being and speaks the mystery of being. Gadamer (1960/1992) explains it in this way: "The articulation of the logos brings the structure of being into language, and this coming into language is ... nothing other than the presencing of being itself, its *aletheia* [truth]. Human thought regards the infinity of this presence as its fulfilled potential, its divinity" (p. 457). Logos denotes word, and also utterance, discourse, reason, mind—the immaterial force which is said to direct life, at least life human and divine. It is the expression of thought, the creative power which provides inspiration, wisdom, and guidance to humankind (Angeles, 1981). With the Stoics, logos is intimately tied to destiny, fate, teleology. It is an active, underlying principle, cosmic and divine. As it is said, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (*The Holy Bible*, 1985, John 1:1). The Greek logos has here been taken up to refer to the divine Christ, the incarnation of the spirit, the embodied manifestation of the deity, the expression of the mind of God (*Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible: Dictionaries of the Hebrew and Greek Words*, n.d.; *Vine's Expository Dictionary*, n.d.).

What is then seen is how the forgetting of being in human consciousness might be said to coincide with the excommunication of spirit, the loss of soul or of the religious, disenchantment and the death of the word, i.e., the institutionalization of the final word. Heidegger (1927/1962) describes this mind-lessness or thought-lessness toward being, particularly heightened in the modern world, a world reduced by the tendencies of
science: attention is directed to the study of specific entities or beings, rather than being itself, or the meaning of being. In addition, he asserts that because of initial interpretations of being in Western thought, the question of being (and its meaning) has been viewed as self-evident and superfluous. Its neglect has actually been sanctioned.

Yet, primary to the problem, like the ambiguity of life, is the enigma of being:

"Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything toward which we comport ourselves in any way, is being; what we are is being and how we are" (p. 26), yet since we live already in a vague understanding of being, the question is trivialized, taken as obvious, self-evident, and thus ignored. Thus, the meaning of being is still hidden from us, veiled in darkness; perhaps so familiar, we do not grasp it at all, though we conduct all of our activities in and with this unexamined understanding of being.

I take, then (and I am suggesting), a religious attitude toward teaching, which is not so much characterized by its particular content or method as by its spirit. It is an attempt to faithfully dwell with students in "the land of promise," keeping ever before me the call to remember being, to acknowledge the presence of spirit—the "moreness" which speaks and moves beyond me and my own understanding, to remain open to the power of the living Word, to inquire into the meaning of my work with students, and to address issues of ultimate concern in the creation of a vision where the good, true and beautiful are ongoingly aspired to, though never fully reached. This is, as well, a critical stance which recognizes and interrogates the present pervasiveness of "powers and principalities" (Huebner, 1995, p. 20; forces tied up with idolatry, commandment and the reign of death; see Chapters 1 and 2) which seek to forget being, to exile spirit, to
say the last word, to undermine questions of meaning and ultimacy, and to thwart human
vision. Of course, I also seek to encourage such a posture in my students because I
believe it is generative of life, and because I believe in the possibility of redemption and
transformation. In this way, my teaching is also an act of witnessing, of giving
testimony, for I do not believe I could be an educator unless I could attest to education's
potential efficacy in bringing forth life, in contributing to the transformation of my own
soul.

Students in my undergraduate classes are usually initially very confused by my
call to examine the unexamined, and by my incessant questions of meaning. They are
confused because what I ask of them seems at first ridiculous, a useless inquiry into the
self-evident. They are confused because they have generally never been asked to think in
this way, to consider the unthought, or even the meaning of what they are doing when
they are being "educated." Knowledge is all too often split from the question of value,
and made an object which students are taught to passively receive. Most shutter in
trepidation, though a few thrill with delight, at my mention of philosophy's original
kinship with education, at my postulation that the philosophical impulse (perhaps, simply
put as the love of and search for wisdom) is primary to the notion of education. I think
at first they suspect that since I love philosophy, I am determined to impose it on them,
even in a course which is not philosophy. The fear is that I will inflict Descartes' A
Discourse on Method (1637/1912) on them, although I would be more inclined to
introduce The Passions of the Soul (1649/1989), given the deficiencies of contemporary
culture.
"What is education?" I ask, for example. "What does it mean to be educated?"

"What do you mean when you speak of yourself as educated or as being educated?" Or in the case with preservice teachers, the question is what it is they mean when they express a desire to be educators and to work in the field of education. Statements are made which we seek to unpack and possibly critique, but I wish also to go beyond this to the soul or spirit behind the statements. Thus, I ask them to conjure up the images they have of education, and also images of education which they feel are promoted culturally and collectively. I introduce the symbolic, the metaphorical and the mythic. For akin to the forgetting of being, "we have forgotten or suppressed that imagination is a foundation of our so-called 'givens,' [that] our language, practices, and resources are merely the embodied or materialized images in which we choose to dwell" (Huebner, 1995, p. 13). We need to consider, then, the images within which we have chosen to dwell, whether by explicit intention or unconscious inheritance, if we are to participate in ever re-imagining. Are they tabernacles of faith and promise in which we can peacefully together dwell with hope?

Students are then allowed to play these images, personal and societal, against each other and against other images, as well, held in the memory and tradition of Western culture, and ideally of other cultures too. These images may include, for instance, Plato's "Allegory of the Cave," or Boethius's vision of Philosophy (the great educator, and mother of all disciplines of study). Visiting and talking with Boethius in prison, she is an enchanting and beautiful figure who enlightens and comforts him, and gives him a clearing through which to transcend his plight— to obtain freedom of the soul,
though body is bound. There is, as well, the first known representation of the liberal arts of the fifth century, "On the Marriage of Mercury and Philology," from the myth describing the bride Philologia (scholarship) who is attended by seven maidens, advocates of the liberal arts. Ramist maps of knowledge and Tyler's rationale (see Chapter 4) are also images implying what it means to educate, though more demythified, literalized, perhaps manifesting the suppression of the imagination, or what Huebner calls the "hegemony of technical language" (p. 13).

I believe endeavors like this are important (and we can ask these questions of all the disciplines, of the practice of study and of the act of teaching, as well) because of this forgetfulness, this human condition I share with my students. I feel it in my own experience of education; I see it in the experiences of my students; I hear it in the dominant educational discourse which trivializes what it means to educate and forgets the most significant questions and problems with which the task of educating is challenged. Pervasive are mindless processes, unquestioned assumptions, and empty promises. Students, remembering autobiographically, speak of fragments of meaningless names and dates and facts, rote exercises lacking personal investment, and uncaring teachers or professors. More often than not, they have never even thought to ask what education, or teaching, or history, or study, etc., has been, is to them, ought to be, or could be. It is the danger of sheer socialization into that which exists, which is taken as given, which limits the imagination and the future (Huebner, 1974). Even then, in such a case, we do not really know what is, and "so long as we do not, through thinking, experience what is, we can never belong to what will be" (Heidegger, 1962/1977e).
Of course, I am reflecting here on that which needs redeeming. There are experiences to be remembered from which to draw hope, as well: moments of insight, gifts developed and bestowed, and acts of love on the part of both students and teachers. Such probing activities are akin to Socrates' dialectic in which ideas or practices are inquired into, the actual and ideal are negotiated, and light is shed on the ways in which the legacy of the past has shaped both what is and that to which we aspire, the possibilities and problems we have inherited through it. As well, we are brought to the limits of our own knowledge with a view of the amazing complexity of all things beside our simple, taken-for-granted representations. We also run up against that which is beyond our understanding in the aporia, the oppositions and paradoxes which somehow hold in tension and yet in harmony the many in a complex unity. Boethius is both imprisoned and yet free. Education socializes us into a tradition and encourages us to question that very tradition and revitalize it and move beyond it, binding and yet liberating. William Doll (in press) has captured this activity and aim so beautifully: "This is an education which questions the being of all we hold sacred while at the same time manifests a faith that such questioning will lead us to the sacredness of being" (p. 12).

As a teacher, I, too, enter into this questioning, and am opening myself to newness of life. I may present students with texts, questions and processes through which to interrogate that which is under examination, yet they bring to them their own responses, ideas, experiences and questions. Basically, the act of teaching is no longer something I control: covering the material, staying on schedule and insuring that
students take from me what I intend to give or get across to them is now secondary to creating a space, opening a clearing, for the happening of understanding, a happening which transcends text, teacher and student, allowing us to experience the moreness, the transformative power of the living Word. Students draw on their own experiences, bringing them to bear on the Otherness with which they are confronted, for example, individually, through autobiographical investigations, essays and commentaries of texts, and collectively, through discussion, debate, dramatic interpretation and creative production. They are making something of this content, personally and together, making meaning, which is also a making sense of life. Yet, I also am doing the same. I question the taken-for-granted nature of what they think they know, and how they know it, and their assumed responses. They are living questions, too, about what I take for granted (Huebner, 1974). It is my desire that they enter into the discipline (discourse, knowledge, subject), the riches of the Other, our collective wealth and the concerns which constitute the public world, but also that they be not overwhelmed or alienated or disempowered by the Other. Rather, my hope is that, as with myself, they might be blessed and enriched and challenged, engaged by the Other, invited to enter into a relationship wherein they, in turn, may bless and enrich, and participate in the critique and re-construction of the public world. Education becomes this sojourning together in the land of promise, a living together in which memories, trials, triumphs and aspirations are shared, and in which we work and play together in the creation of shared visions and worlds.
I have taught, for example, a course in the "Curricular Disciplines: Social Studies" for elementary preservice teachers at the University for almost three years now. Not only has my syllabus changed significantly during this period, and the aims and texts and activities I have drawn upon, but also I, myself, have been changed, through having laid myself open to the questions and before the mystery and through entering into study with students. One thing I have learned is that if one listens, the call will come. In this case, I can attest to this question which formed itself and began addressing itself to me, calling also for my response: How could the teaching of social studies be imbued with deep personal and collective meaning? How could teachers and students come to see and feel their part in the spiritual civilization of humanity? More importantly, how could they connect their own personal struggles with the struggles of others and the pain of the world? How could this reality and affect be taken up to make social studies an avenue for freedom, hope, faith, love, a site to inspire and enable teachers and students to become active participants in creating a more just, compassionate, beautiful world?

I have not even begun plumbing the depths of these questions, but I am on this quest, and I invite my students each semester to become fellow pilgrims with me in this journey. Every semester is different, every semester I encounter new questions and another aspect of the mystery, which includes moments of fear and disappointment, and moments of peace and inspiration. As for my students, those who truly enter in are changed too, though in ways uniquely their own. Thus, I begin the course with a welcome and an invitation, and openly confess that I do not know exactly what is in store for us, only that my hope is that we can faithfully investigate this discipline we call
social studies and come into some insight about what it might mean to teach social
studies to elementary school children. In addition, I also encourage them to find out and
develop who they are as teachers and to give themselves fully and joyfully to the art
(there art) of teaching in the field, as there is a field experience component to the course.
I share my faith, too, that they and I and the children we touch will be blessed and
changed in these endeavors. I find I must usually respond first, of course, to the anxiety
my express not-knowing creates. A jewel of Nietzsche's (1883/1982a) has become one I
wear and share: "I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give
birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves" (p. 129).
The challenge is not to reach for the stars, nor to become a star, but to give birth to one
that not only shines but dances as well, to trust in the hidden order and power of chaos.

What has developed and emerged thus far in this course is broadly an
investigation of the question: What does it mean to teach social studies in the elementary
school? Such has entailed uncovering the meanings—often forgotten, taken-for-granted,
or obscured—buried in the concepts social studies, teaching, schooling, etc., personally
for each one of us and collectively as a group. It has meant looking at ourselves as
teachers (or prospective teachers) and as learners, drawing on our own experiences as
students of social studies, questioning our own attitudes and assumptions and beliefs
concerning different aspects of social studies like history or geography and regarding
various social and political issues, and involvement with a number of "materials" and
"methods" connected with the teaching of social studies. It has meant doing all of this
together, as well, which has required a willingness to enter into a community, a
community of seekers who participate in critical and caring dialogue with themselves, with others, with the world—to sojourn together in faith.

Students write about why they wish to teach, for instance, inquiring into the underlying impulse behind this desire. This reflection involves how they conceive of the act of teaching, the life of a teacher, the practice of education. They are exposed to the visions of others, as well, like Paulo Freire, or bell hooks, for example. All of these images are shared and compared. Groups of students create collaborative representations of the typical teacher, of the "actual" teacher, involving what comes to mind in the presence of this signifier and drawn from past experiences as students in relationship with teachers. Other images are then generated; yet, this time, they are ideal images which emerge from creatively imagining what might be, from thinking about the kind of teachers they would like to be and would like to see their children and all children know. In doing so, they address not only the characteristics of the "actual" teacher in need of redemption, but also their own inner calls and the calls of their classmates and the dreams of other teachers—perhaps, like Ghandi or Jesus or Mother Theresa—who have inspired them, in the light of a vision of education which reflects that which is true and good and beautiful.

I am all-too-keenly aware, in this whole process, as the "teacher" in the class, of having set myself up first and foremost as the object of this critique; it is a position which is not always comfortable, at times reproving, but always instructive. Yet, I believe in the value of self-examination, and as it is said, to attend to the beam in my own eye before addressing the mote of my brother or sister (The Holy Bible, 1985, Matthew
7.3-5). I concur with "Aristotle [who] once said that teaching does whatever it does 'as to a friend'" (Noddings, 1993, p. 134), which is also as to oneself. I also believe in "modeling" that which I encourage, practicing what I preach, at least striving to embody the vision I share, however feebly, and admitting my failures.

This endeavor is akin to the process James Macdonald (1974) advocates as what the aim of education should be: "the centering of the person in the world" (p. 104), a process he asserts cannot occur unless the teacher is also immersed in the practice of centering. He goes on to describe centering as that which addresses the problem of alienation from the ground of one's being (Heidegger's forgetfulness of being), a religious or spiritual experience involving an attitude which "encompasses the search to find our inner being or to complete [our] awareness of wholeness and meaning" (p. 104). It is also the work of self-regulation, reaching for wholeness, for the meaningful integration of inner and outer realms, striving toward inner integrity and strength. As a teacher within this frame, I am ultimately one who is "engaged in the art of living,... [immersed] in the process of living with others [students] in a creative and spontaneous manner, having faith" (p. 115), keeping vision alive and encouraging the same in students.

What is particularly interesting, in this regard, is that in almost all cases, the reasons students give for wanting to enter into the life of teaching are spiritual or religious in nature, in the way of some vision, or ideal, some conviction of the soul. "Theoretically, the presence of 'God' in a person's life can be measured by his or her activity in the direction of an ideal" (p. 105), says Nel Noddings, in line with Dewey's thought. It follows, then, especially once students have gone into the schools and seen...
firsthand the lives of teachers, so consumed by bureaucratic and managerial demands and
standardized test scores and content coverage, that we need to interrogate these forces
in schools, societies, cultures, within ourselves, which seek to kill "God" in the soul, to
bury these visions, to cause us to forget and stray far from these deep original impulses.
In these cases, what is lost sight of is the ultimate aim of education, which Macdonald
identifies with the process of centering, and Huebner (1995) with the journey of the soul.

These forces, the overall effect of which I have called the logic or reign of death
(see Chapter 2), seem to dominate our (social/cultural/political/etc.) world in the present
historical moment. Huebner describes them as the principalities and powers—idolatry
and enslavement, their effect: a "derailing" which seeks to direct the soul's journey away
from the pursuit of "God" and ultimate concern, restricting and thwarting it, defining it
beforehand. Huebner says:

The principalities and powers bring us into their spheres of interest where we serve their ends, rather than the ultimate end,... the pursuit of lesser ends or outcomes.... They restrict and impede the religious journey, condition human life to the mundane world, or fixate human life before the journey is completed. (p. 20)

They promote a false faith, in this way, in denial of the ultimate and transcendent, and a faith not our own, imposed on us from without. We find such a journey with aspirations (if they can be so called) which do not bring forth life, but death. We find such a journey of oppression, in which we are enslaved by the edicts forced upon us. Nothing but dying idols and difficult commandments, once realized.

In many ways, this moves us into further inquiry regarding the meaning of education, schooling, teaching and social studies, and a critique of the meanings already
imposed and constructed. Students role-play various ethical positions taken by teachers in classrooms (for instance: exclusively neutral or partial, impartially neutral, or impartial yet committed) in a panel discussion and reflect on them. They conduct a debate in which they defend and challenge the three dominant traditions which regard social studies as either citizenship transmission, or social science, or reflective inquiry, in building their own living tradition. They bring to consciousness their own prior assumptions and memories of social studies in school. Together, they create collages of these histories, and judge them in light of thinking about what social studies could and perhaps should aspire to realize. They engage with texts, critiques of the dehumanizing powers-that-be in education which sanction injustice and work against freedom and perpetuate the spiritual crisis of modernity, like those of Jonathan Kozol and David Purpel, presenting commentaries of them and participating in class discussion.

What is being done is in kinship with Purpel's (1989) notion of education in a prophetic voice: which cries out first against evil, injustice and "sin;" which in reminding us of our highest aspirations, calls attention to how we have failed to remain faithful; and which engages in criticism in the hope of redemption. Believing it evil to resign ourselves to evil and faithless to cede to the actual, the prophet not only reproves, reminds, reconceives, but also participates in ongoing "research" with those exhorted, to continually develop the qualities and gifts which might contribute to the "possibility of justice, community, joy" (p. 105). In this religious language, it is perhaps the spirit of prayer that is aroused, what Dewey calls inquiry, the "seek and ye shall find" attitude (Noddings, 1992). Students inquire into the ideologies hidden in the information
presented in social studies textbooks to children, comparing them with primary sources and different perspectives such as are reflected in children's literature, for example.

More and ever clear becomes the power of language, of the word—of the text, its promise and its danger. In this sense, too, the power of education is revealed, of teaching, as primarily a being with others in language (Huebner, 1968), encountering texts with them, and encountering oneself and each other and the world through texts, and through the word—a force that can, in fact, empower or imprison, enlighten or anesthetize. To confront the principalities and powers, then, is to not only critique the images of being they promote, but also the language used to support them. In a materialistic age, set on pinning life down, the word threatens materialization in the creation of the "reified word-thing ... [which leaves only] the shell of the word, [its] naked corpse" (Bahktin, 1975/1992, p. 292). As teachers, in a system enamored with the language of technology and bent on reaching the last word, we are vulnerable to this death of the word in which it is:

perceived purely as an object.... In such a word-object even meaning becomes a thing: there can be no dialogic approach to such a word of the kind immanent to any deep and actual understanding.... It is completely separated from the living, ideological power of the word to mean.... There can be no conversing with such a word. (p. 352)

Certainly, as educators seeking to educe understanding, we must attend to and care for language, communicate with our students, encourage dialogue and discourse which "lives, as it were, beyond itself in a living impulse" (p. 292); for we are commissioned with the "bringing forth" of human life. Again, we are like "the prophet [who] is engaged in a battle for language, in an effort to create a different epistemology
out of which another community might emerge, ... [with] the hope that the ache of God might penetrate the numbness of history, in a yearning that grows with and out of pain" (Brueggemann, cited in Purpel, 1989, p. 1). I believe this is why I am, as a teacher, so drawn to the language of religion which inspires us to surpass our present selves for something better, to reach beyond ourselves in loving others, and to the language of the symbolic, the mythic, the poetic, which seems to open up spaces for the breath of the living Word to ever speak. Poetry, drama, art, story and music find their place, then, even in a social studies class, perhaps, especially in a social studies class. Through them, the person is touched by the Other in a way which lends itself to the experience of empathy and intimacy, an experience which draws us out of our present selves into connection with another.

This experience is all the more important because of the forces at work today which serve to alienate, dis-connect, provoke indifference—characterized as despiritualizing, disenchanting, dissecting, deadening. Kovel (1991) says that spirit is revealed in the overcoming of splitting, the lived process of this overcoming, which is the way of emancipation and of life. The concern of the prophet, which is "with the search for meaning through the process of criticism, imagination and creativity" (Purpel, 1989, p. 105), is also, then, the concern of the teacher: seeking to invite spirit, the healing balm of wholeness, into what is splintered, without a sense of connection and fullness and significance and solidarity through the logic of death. Religious language is, then, also the language of the personal, bringing the person to deep understanding, and one must come to the self before moving beyond it. For this reason, I take the central
constructs of history and tradition and culture in social studies and invite students to find
meaning therein through personal life history research in which they seek to negotiate
passages between the public and the private and find the connections between their own
histories and larger ethnic, racial, religious, cultural histories. Students engage in
autobiographical investigations, trace family genealogies, interview family members, look
into family records and memorabilia of all kinds, and investigate the history of their
family names and the symbologies behind them.

Together we create a picture history timeline of the world, discussing it in
relation to our personal histories which we share, the impact of historical events directly
or indirectly upon the quality and character of our own lives. Later, we critique it in
terms of the voices and histories not voiced in the story we have told, left out of it, and
bring some of these voices to our timeline. Reviving the cross-cultural tradition of
storytelling, each student peruses the landscape of lore, selecting and learning a folktale
from one of her cultures of origin. The choice is made not solely upon cultural
background, but also with regard to personal significance. The tale is told in class, and
a commentary given concerning its cultural and personal relationship to the person telling
the story. In a sense, we are literally sojourning together, looking at and reflecting on
our past journeyings, uncovering the problems and possibilities brought to us through
them, and finding that terrain we share—telling the stories of where we have been, where
we are and where we hope yet to go.

5 Ann Trousdale (1994) speaks, as well, of a kind of authority that comes from
self-knowledge, with knowledge of a personal nature. I think we all need this kind of
authority in our lives, particularly do teachers, as well, in their work.
In this way, education here is as Dewey (1938) has described it, consisting in the reconstruction of experience, or as Madeleine Grumet (1992) has suggested, it "emerges as a metaphor for a person's dialogue with the world of his or her experience" (p. 29)—and with the worlds of others' experiences. Huebner (1974) has affirmed, in this vein, "education as concern for the evolving biography of the person and the evolving history of societies or communities" (p. 37). I believe going through this process with students has been my attempt to respond to the questions I had, concerned with endowing the study of social studies with personal and collective meaning, and with calling attention to our place in something larger and beyond us, the spiritual history of humanity. What generally develops through it is a strong sense of community, but one in which a multitude of before-hidden differences are actually brought to light, and appreciated, and which serve to enrich the whole. Yet, beyond this, as we are drawn into the lives of others, into their stories of joy and pain, we are more profoundly left with the recognition of our common humanity, that we are bound together in powerful ways despite our differences.

Nel Noddings (1992), looking at education in this way, conjures up the religious image of the congregation, because it involves ecologies of love and vocation, the calling forth and confirming of each other's gifts and giftedness for the divine, that beyond oneself. David Purpel (1989), similarly, speaks of the potential of schools to be "centers of inquiry and growth" where those who dwell there can share their different talents and capabilities in "the pursuit of the common goal of creating a culture of deepest meaning" (p. 110). I tend to share these sensibilities, although I am not sure schools are receptive
sites for such activities and aspirations. Both allude, in any case, to the necessity of vision, or perhaps I should say, of visions, or eternal vision-ing. My feeling is that education might be a kind of shepherding of being, in the language of Heidegger.

Teaching could be a caring for and attending to this journey of the soul which includes a concern for the sacred, for the transformative presence of the mystery in the lives of students, and for the creation of a society which attends to and cares for the sacred. In this sense, the suffering of the oppressed and the pain of the world is a major part of the curriculum, and pedagogy involves the active exhortation to participate in the creation of a world where pain and suffering are no more. It is the call of faith, as "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen" (The Holy Bible, 1985, Hebrews 11:1), which brings vision to life, making that which is not yet but aspired to operative in the present by bringing it into and holding it in the imagination from which the future dawns. To educate means, in Hebrew, to commit or to affirm (Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible: Dictionaries of the Hebrew and Greek Words, n.d.).

Thus, I share my vision with students, and invite them to examine and express their own visions, and also enter into visioning with me. As it presently stands, then, in this particular course, two new aspects have emerged. The first is that I challenge students with the very questions with which I have been challenged concerning the teaching of social studies: they now spend their time in the field with children participating in a vision, expressing their visions and encouraging students to envision. The form these lessons take is open, and highly personal, and dependent on the needs of the supervising teachers in the schools. The commission is to make, in their own ways,
according to their own inner calls, social studies an avenue for freedom, hope, love and social justice, a creative site to inspire and empower students to actively dream a better world. As it is written, "Faith without works is dead" (The Holy Bible, 1985, James 2:26). The returns have been, I must admit, delightfully surprising. I could not begin here to describe all the kinds of activities I have witnessed as a result of this open-ended assignment. Often, in the elementary grades, the subject of social studies is entirely overlooked because of the constraints of time and the attention required of reading and math. Often, when it is taught, students are not engaged and meaning is lost. Often, social studies consists of the "holiday" curriculum almost exclusively, superficial at best.

Yet even one typical Thanksgiving lesson, here, became an occasion for students to not only share their own holiday traditions in contrast to the Pilgrims, and reflect on all for which they had to give thanks, but also to consider those less fortunate than themselves and the life-giving act of giving. Moved by "The Giving Tree," by Shel Silverstein, thirty second-grade students came up with the idea to put together a Thanksgiving basket for the children at the homeless shelter, each student parting with a favorite toy, article of clothing, book or snack. On Veteran's Day, fifth-grade students engaged in a serious discussion about war, and wrote letters to patients in the Veteran's Hospital, thanking them for their bravery, and asking them questions about the personal experience of war. Some also shared their feelings about the Gulf War as children of men and women who fought. Many of their letters were answered with powerful effects.

Another lesson I observed in a truly multicultural context—a second and third grade combination class of African-American, Vietnamese, white, deaf, and handicapped
children—was a culmination of their studies in racism. The students had put together a reader's theater performance centered in the life and activism of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the triumph of the Bus Boycott. They had constructed a bus on stage to produce a visual representation of the change won. The performance concluded with a reading of Langston Hughes' poem, "Hold Fast to Dreams." As one child read, another child signed. In the discussion afterward, one little girl noticed the different talents which were exhibited, all needed to put on the show—some were obviously gifted performers, others attended well to the art of writing or stage production. Another child liked the part on the bus because "you could see blacks and whites finally sitting together and it was exciting." Still another appreciated reading the poem at the end. She thought it was great to end the play this way because her friend who was signing the poem next to her was different, not because of the color of her skin, but because she was deaf, and yet they were together too. She said that it would be just like racism to have bad feelings about her because she could not hear. This child, unwittingly perhaps, was pointing to the universality of Otherness, and of the suffering and oppression which often accompanies it. In truth, however, the beauty, the power, the wisdom, of those voices who have suffered, like the African-American people for whom Martin Luther King, Jr. spoke, evidenced in their culture via folklore and art and song and way of life, is primarily found in their movement beyond Otherness, beyond oppression and oppressor, beyond the self, in transcending and rising above their existential condition. The ability of the human spirit to be lifted up in this way is a wisdom, a gift, we all need, regardless of race, class, gender, age, time, or place. I was learning some things from this second-
grade girl, or at least incited to think on these things. There are, of course, many more examples I could give.

The last month of the course the students present what they have done in the schools, reflecting on the experience and its impact on them and on the children, and submitting it to class critique and celebration. We also create a four-week storytelling program for children at the homeless shelter, which is the second aspect of the course which has emerged in this way, in which we prepare food to eat together, share folktales with the children and invite their participation in some drama or art activity. By the end of the course, I am no longer teaching my students; rather, my students and I are teaching together. My hope is that, within these contexts, my students have experienced something of the beauty and power of the transcendent, of participation with others in a common vision of meaning, and of tradition that is vital and flourishing. I trust, as well, that they have been awakened to the beauty and power of study and of language—of the word, the text, the logos, the Other—to move and transform their own souls and the souls of others. For my own education has blessed me with these gifts, gifts I would also like to share. Life with my students is not neutral, then, and generally can never truly be; the educator affirms visions and inquires into them, as one who contributes to, critiques and celebrates (Purpel, 1989) humanity's participation in the transcendent, and seeks to inspire the same in students, hopefully taking part with them in this process of living in love, with spirit and faith.

Education, if it is to truly be the bringing forth of life, then, must dwell in the mystery, the strangeness, the complexity, the "moreness" which is life. Such entails a
recognition of our inability to control or contain life, or even this thing we call knowledge. As creatures immersed in life,

we know more than we can say, and often say more than we know.... There is more than we ... can know, will ever know. It is a "moreness" that takes us by surprise when we are at the edge and end of our knowing. There is comfort in that "moreness" that takes over in our weakness, our ignorance, at our limits or end. It is a comfort that cannot be anticipated, a "peace that passeth all understanding".... One knows of that presence, that "moreness," when known resources fail and somehow we go beyond what we were and are, and become something different, somehow new.... The "moreness" in the world ... is a "moreness" that infuses each human being. Not only do we know more than we say, we "are" more than we "currently are." That is, human being dwells in the transcendent, or more appropriately, the transcendent dwells in the human being.... The spirit dwells in us.... The fact that we partake of the transcendent means that we are never complete, until death. We can always be more than we are.... [This "moreness"] is that which transcends the known, the expected.... It is the source of hope. It is manifested through love and the waiting expectation that accompanies love. It over comes us.... One whose imagination acknowledges this "moreness" can be said to dwell faithfully in the world. (Huebner, 1995, pp. 15-18)

What I am reaching for is education imagined in this way, which dwells in hope, carrying us beyond the limits of our own knowing, inspiring us to become more than we are, which waits expectantly for transformation. Herein is just something of what I have gleaned in this work for the theory and practice of education. Elliot Eisner has described theory as "the result of our desire to create a world we can understand" (cited in Pinar et al., 1995, p. 863). In like manner, we may describe practice as the result of our desire to create a world we can change or act upon, or in the sense encompassing Western obsession with certainty and method, to order or control. Perhaps, however, "to dwell
faithfully in the world," to sojourn together in the land of promise, implies a desire
beyond both of these, a desire to create a world we can love, respond to with a grand
"Amen"—bringing forth a sacred "Yes" to life. Or possibly rather, this journey-dwelling
inspires the desire to embrace a world beyond all our acting and knowing, within which
we are enveloped in its sacred affirmations.
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