1997

Americans and German Youth in Nuremberg, 1945-1956: A Study in Politics and Culture.

Harald Thomas oskar Leder
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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AMERICANS AND GERMAN YOUTH IN NUREMBERG, 1945-1956: A STUDY IN POLITICS AND CULTURE

VOLUME I

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of History

by
Harald Thomas Oskar Leder
B.A., University of Freiburg, 1982
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1987
May, 1997
To Alex, who had to share his father with this project
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many individuals and institutions have helped to realize this project. Louisiana State University provided a very stimulating environment, very good research facilities as well as some means of survival. The International Service Center, especially Erin L. Schmidt, rendered essential support for maintaining our legal residency in the United States. Pamela Dean of the T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History introduced me with enthusiasm and skill to the mysteries of oral history and made important equipment available to me. Conducting the interviews was one of my most challenging but also most rewarding experiences. All of my interviewees turned out to be very interested, interesting, and willing to help with the project. The Agricultural Center of LSU made my first research trip to Germany possible. Grants by the Institute of International Education and the German Historical Institute enabled me to conduct my research in Washington, D.C. The latter also generously made its resources and facilities available to me while I was in Washington. All Archivists at the National Archives, the State Archives of the Lutheran Church, and the Bavarian State Archives in Nuremberg were most helpful. Klaus Lehnberger of the archives of the Nürnberg Nachrichten supplied me with materials I would otherwise not have been able to use. My special thanks goes to the staff
of the Nuremberg City Archives, above all to Gerhard Jochem who went far beyond the calls of duty to help me identify and find relevant sources. He made sure that I quoted the materials correctly and made many excellent and helpful suggestions. At LSU Stanley Hilton offered many ideas and much information at the outset of the project and often provided much needed moral support. Robert Becker, Gaines Foster, and Karl Roider also made valuable contributions. David Culbert did not just make important materials available to me but also pointed out some crucial issues I needed to address. David Lindenfeld got stuck with the task of supervising my dissertation. Although I did not make life easy for him, he provided the critical support without which it is impossible to finish such an undertaking. All of these professors did much to improve the dissertation, but none must be blamed for its shortcomings. Last, but not least, I want to thank my family. Without my parents' help and understanding this project would not have been possible. My parents in law also maintained a degree of moral and material support for which I cannot thank them enough. My wife Luzma had to suffer most during the last seven years. In spite of all difficulties she never wavered in her support. She and our son Alex got more than their fair share of the frustration and stress that at times went along with this project. I will never be able to repay my debt to them.
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<td>American Forces Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSC</td>
<td>American Friends Service Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJR</td>
<td>Bayerischer Jugendring (Bavarian Youth Ring)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Br</td>
<td>Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>Bavarian State Archives, Nuremberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Civil Administration Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe, INC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Combined Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEM</td>
<td>Captured Enemy Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Counter Intelligence Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRALOG</td>
<td>Council of Relief Agencies Licensed to Operate in Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D)GER</td>
<td>(Deutsche) Gesellschaft für Erfassung von Rüstungsgut (The predecessor of STEG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E&amp;RAD</td>
<td>Education and Religious Affairs Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E&amp;CRD</td>
<td>Education and Cultural Relations Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>European Advisory Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECAD</td>
<td>European Civil Affairs Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>EKD</td>
<td>Evangelische Kirchen in Deutschland</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERA</td>
<td>European Recovery Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan)</td>
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<td>ETOUSA</td>
<td>European Theater of Operations (until July 1945)</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command, United States Armed Forces (from March 1947 on)</td>
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<td>DEG</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Erfassung von Rüstungsgut</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDJ</td>
<td>Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIAT</td>
<td>Field Information Agency Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOD</td>
<td>Field Operations Division</td>
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<td>FRUS</td>
<td>Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAI</td>
<td>German Affairs Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.I.</td>
<td>Government Issue (nickname of American soldiers during and after World War II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARIOA</td>
<td>Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCU</td>
<td>German Country Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GYA</td>
<td>Army Assistance to German Youth Activities, U.S. Zone</td>
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<td>HICOG</td>
<td>Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>HICOM</td>
<td>High Commissioner for Germany, John J. McCloy</td>
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<tr>
<td>HVA</td>
<td>Hauptverwaltungsamt</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA&amp;C</td>
<td>Internal Affairs and Communications Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Intelligence Division</td>
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<td>ICD</td>
<td>Information Control Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICIS</td>
<td>Information Control Intelligence Summary</td>
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<td>IFZ</td>
<td>Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich</td>
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<tr>
<td>INT</td>
<td>International Military Tribunal</td>
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<td>IRO</td>
<td>International Refugee Organization</td>
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<td>ISD</td>
<td>Information Services Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JEIA</td>
<td>Joint Export-Import Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRO</td>
<td>Kreis Resident Officer (HICOG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KYC</td>
<td>Kreis Youth Committee (German: Kreisjugendausschuß)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KYR</td>
<td>Kreis Youth Ring</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCA</td>
<td>Lutheran Church Archives for the State of Bavaria, Nuremberg</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCB</td>
<td>Land Commissioner for Bavaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LYC</td>
<td>Land Youth Committee (German: Landesjugendausschuß)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LVR</td>
<td>Land Youth Ring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Military Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGO</td>
<td>Military Government Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>Nuremberg City Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKFD</td>
<td>Nationalkommittee Freies Deutschland</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMP</td>
<td>Nuremberg Military Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>NN</td>
<td>Nürnberger Nachrichten (Nuremberg newspaper)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLCB</td>
<td>Office of the Land Commissioner for Bavaria</td>
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<td>OMGBY</td>
<td>Office of Military Government, Bavaria</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMGUS</td>
<td>Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone</td>
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<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
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<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public Affairs Office (HICOG)</td>
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<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>RG</td>
<td>Record Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>Stadtratsprotokolle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEG</td>
<td>Staatliche Erfassungsgesellschaft für Öffentliches Gut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWNCC</td>
<td>State War Navy Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRRA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Refugee Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFET</td>
<td>United States Forces, European Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USGCC</td>
<td>United States Group Control Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIC</td>
<td>United States Information Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJfZ</td>
<td>Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America (Stimme Amerikas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YW</td>
<td>The Young World (Nuremberg Military Post GYA newsletter)</td>
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</table>
ABSTRACT

While American policy makers needed three years after World War II to recognize the importance of re-educating German youth and to develop a consistent policy, a look at Nuremberg reveals that American representatives in the field started positive and constructive programs immediately after the war. American soldiers ignored non-fraternization, the Army became heavily involved in helping German communities survive, while the Youth Section of the Office of Military Government was the first to focus on persuasion instead of coercion in its re-education efforts. It designed long range programs to introduce young Germans to a democratic culture. Official American policy simply confirmed the new direction months later. The Army introduced a completely new concept of youth work, offering alternatives for those who refused to join traditional German clubs with their membership requirements. It also provided almost all transport and equipment for youth activities in the American zone. Private organizations and Washington's child feeding program reached additional German youths. In spite of administrative shortcomings and a constant shortage of personnel, these Americans were able to make significant contributions to youth work and even schooling in Germany, although the effort fell short of institutional reform, especially in recalcitrant Bavaria. With American power and support behind
them, progressive Germans in key positions adopted American ideas and models for youth work and explored new ways of integrating young Germans into the international community. American youth programs and the presence of substantial numbers of soldiers and civilians in Germany had a positive and long lasting effect which went beyond immediate material gains. Many young Germans became acquainted with American culture, ideas, and ideals. Most of those who participated in exchange programs with the United States served as multipliers, introducing American concepts to German schools, social work, and even the churches. American efforts in youth work succeeded because their programs and the mere presence of so many Americans offered different and attractive approaches without dictating them at a time when most young Germans and open-minded members of the older generation were looking for new ideas and alternatives to a discredited ideology and lifestyle.
1. Germany, 1945-1949 (Source: Plischke, The Allied High Commission 2)

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2. Bavaria After World War II. (Source: Gillen, Special Projects IV)

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INTRODUCTION

The United States developed a special relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany during the first decade after World War II. The quantity and quality of historical research in this field reflects the importance of this relationship. The analytical focus of most studies, however, does not go beyond the political and institutional level, discussing the various roles the Office of Military Government (OMGUS), the High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), or the European Recovery Program (ERP) played in the creation of the Federal Republic. A few scholars assess the cultural dimension of German-American relations, but do not venture beyond the traditional topics such as theater or literature.

1Jeffry Diefendorf et al., eds., (American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany 1945-1955 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993)) and Michael Ermarth, ed., (America and the Shaping of German Society (Herndon, VA: Berg, 1993)) represent the most recent research trends over the last decade. The former essay collection is dedicated entirely to political history, whereas the latter includes essays on culture, the economy, consumption, and everyday life as well as personal accounts of American participants in the occupation.


1

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German youth after World War II has only very recently received attention by the historical profession, apart from the standard photos and accounts of American soldiers who supplied children with candy and chewing gum. In the course of the occupation Americans in Germany realized early on the importance reaching out to the youth with their programs. Bringing American ideas and ideals directly to young Germans provided a feasible alternative to American institutional and administrative reform attempts which encountered determined resistance. This study will seek to determine the range and the results of American policy towards German youth on the grassroots level between 1945 and 1955.

The topic involves a political and a social component. In the realm of politics it will be necessary to follow the policy making process in the United States and in Germany.

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4In spite of a considerable number of accounts of American policy in Germany I have not been able to find a satisfactory general study of American policy formulation for post-war Germany. Most works are concerned only with partial aspects of the issue, some reveal a surprising lack of accuracy in dealing with the decision making process in Washington and the constantly changing administrative set-up of Military Government during various stages of the occupation.
To determine the impact of these policies, their interpretation and implementation by Americans in charge of everyday operations in the field will receive special attention. On the social level the study will explore the effects of American policies and policy implementation on youth work in a community. It will also examine the nature of every day contacts which young Germans and Americans developed after the war. The main objective is to draw a clearer picture of everyday relations at the grassroots and compare them with the political arena, in which victors and vanquished became partners in little less than a decade.

Until the 1960s the study of German-American relations after the Second World War remained almost entirely in the hands of American scholars. A surprisingly large number of those who participated in the American occupation in prominent positions published their evaluations of the venture. Later scholars, many of whom had served in Germany in less important positions, focused on the military occupation of Germany. Almost all of them agreed that American programs were not successful during the occupation.¹


¹See, for example, Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977).
John Gimbel's study of Marburg was the only case study among the early publications and in many ways still serves as a model for such an approach.\textsuperscript{7}

When OMGUS documents were declassified in the late 1970s, interest in German-American relations after World War II revived, especially in Germany. Historians have edited and published important primary materials which dealt with the American presence in Germany after 1945\textsuperscript{8} and several case studies have shed new light on various problems.\textsuperscript{9}

Many of these scholars shared the skepticism of earlier works. Their accounts indicate that American re-education and denazification efforts may not have been as successful as


\textsuperscript{8}For example Udo Winkel, ed., \textit{Nürnberg 1945-1949: Quellen zur Nachkriegsgeschichte} (Nürnberg [Nuremberg]: Stadtarchiv, 1989) or Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller, eds., \textit{Lehrjahre der CSU: Eine Nachkriegspartei im Spiegel vertraulicher Berichte an die Amerikanische Militärregierung} (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1984). See also the publication of a great number of documents in \textit{Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte}.

the occupiers had hoped them to be, but the most recent studies tend to draw a more differentiated picture. Winfried Müller, for example, documents that even American efforts at school reform in conservative Bavaria were not entirely unsuccessful. While conservative Bavarians were able to frustrate American efforts to completely remodel the structure of their traditional school system, American educators were able to influence the curricula for the different school types, to improve teacher training for primary schools, and to support various groups of reform minded teachers who had set out to change the traditionally authoritarian classroom behavior of the teachers.11

10James A. Tent (Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American Occupied Germany (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982)) finds that Germans successfully resisted American efforts to reform the educational and economic system. Ettle confirms Lutz Niethammer’s earlier findings that German Spruchkammern, courts and authorities were in fact reluctant to carry through the process of denazification rigorously (Lutz Niethammer, Die Mitläuferfabrik: Entnazifizierung am Beispiel Bayerns (Berlin: Dietz, 1982)). According to Peterson, German society came to fit American expectations only after they had given up their efforts to reform it. Wolfgang Eckart shows that American efforts to reform society and politics soon gave way to an arrangement with the German political elites that was based on pragmatism, not on idealism on both sides.

11Woller, Füssl, and Rupieper interpret OMGUS and HICOG activities in such a manner. For schools in Bavaria see Winfried Müller, Schulpolitik in Bayern im Spannungsfeld von Kultusbürokratie und Besatzungsmacht, 1945-1949, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte herausgegeben vom Institut für Zeitgeschichte 36 (München [Munich]: Oldenbourg, 1995). See also Wolfgang Krieger, General Lucius D. Clay und die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1949, Forschungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 10 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987) and Thomas Alan Schwartz, America’s Germany: John McCloy and
Although a number of case studies on the post-war situation in Germany are available, historians have barely begun to explore the interaction between Americans and Germans in the communities. The authors of these case studies have limited their approach mainly to the relations between local administrations and American Military Government officials. A number of scholars provide useful insights into some aspects of everyday relations, but the subject needs more detailed assessment. Gimbel points out that the experiences of the social and political elites in Germany with Americans were different from those of other parts of society. The wide range of youth programs which OMGUS and its successor HICOG as well as private organizations such as the churches introduced in German communities provide ample material for the investigation of American activities and their results on the political as well as the non-political level at the grassroots.\textsuperscript{12}

While early authors of the military occupation covered the period from 1945 to 1954, most of the more recent studies limit their time frame even more, concentrating either on the four years of Military Government after the war, or on the


\textsuperscript{12}Füssl provides a first model of what can be done combining political history with a look at the grassroots. See also Maria Höhn, "GI5, Veronikas and Lucky Strikes: German Reactions to the American Military Presence in the Rhineland-Palatinate during the 1950s," diss. U. of Pennsylvania, 1995.
subsequent reign of the High Commissioners. This enables the authors to deal with their topics in depth, but makes it difficult to evaluate the impact of American policies and programs on Germany, since HICOG continued the course which OMGUS had charted and also did not modify its objectives. This study therefore will return to the initial periodization that treated OMGUS and HICOG as a unit.

The nature of the subject imposes a limit on the scope of the study and makes a case study approach necessary. The city of Nuremberg in many ways reflected West German society from the beginning of the American occupation in 1945. The city's connection with the National Socialists who had selected it to be the permanent site of their party rallies and the stage for implementing their new racial order in 1935, made it in the eyes of many the representative of an evil Germany. The Allies reenforced this image when they held the war crimes trials in the city. Yet the situation in Nuremberg as well as in the rest of Germany was far more complicated than the appearance suggested. The National Socialists' dramatic gains there at the end of the 1920s were undeniable, but the city had shown considerable resistance to the Nazis before 1933, with the Social Democrats dominating local politics until the Nazis forced them out.13

Together with the surrounding region Nuremberg displays a remarkably diverse social and political structure. It had

---

13Eckart 30-48.
a large population of industrial workers, as well as small

craft-oriented businesses, and served as administrative and

commercial center of the region, with close ties to the

hinterland. Nuremberg and the region also had to absorb

large numbers of refugees after 1945 and had to accommodate

American army units. They remained in the city for five
decades and are still present in the region today.

Since a significant part of the study is concerned with

Alltagsgeschichte, oral history became an integral part of my

research. After an initial wave of enthusiasm, historians

have become more cautious about the possibilities this new

source offers to the profession, but for any project of

recent history which is concerned with social history and

individual attitudes, there are no alternatives to using

interviews when they are available.14

14 For a good introduction to the problems, limits and
possibilities of oral history see Lutz Niethammer, ed.,
Lebenserfahrung und kollektives Gedächtnis: Die Praxis der
Yellow Badge, Oxford, Pergamon Press 1992, is an outstanding
example for the creative and responsible use of oral history
and the possibilities it has to offer.

Locating interviewees is a major problem for the
practitioner of oral history. Since Germans are generally
not as mobile as Americans, it has been possible to find many
interviewees in Nuremberg itself but I interviewed others in

 communities as far away as Bremen. The city of Nuremberg has

conducted a number of oral history projects which I also

incorporated in this study (City of Nuremberg, ed.,
Erinnerungen aus der Stadtverwaltung (Nürnberg [Nuremberg]:
Karl Frey, 1989) and Siegfried Kett, Das Nürnberger
Künstlerhaus: Eine Stadtgeschichte von 1867-1992 (Nürnberg
[Nuremberg]: Verlag Nürnberger Presse, 1992)).
The oral historian distinguishes himself from the sociologist by relying less on a quantitative and more on a qualitative approach—without neglecting the statistical information available. Apart from locating people who were involved in youth work at the time, I attempted to find people of both sexes who lived in different subdivisions and in the surrounding region, represented different ages, and reflected the social stratification within the city. Interviews with native Nurembergers as well as former refugees helped to determine the experiences of insiders and outsiders. Apart from providing me with their recollections, many of the interviewees also made available to me such valuable material as diaries and photographs. In conjunction with traditional sources such as the city’s records, the records of the Military Government and the High Commissioner for Germany, newspapers, and archival records of the Lutheran Church, the interviews added depth and a human dimension to this study. The interaction between the interviews and the traditional sources turned out to be one of the most fruitful features of my research. Archival sources helped me formulate my questions and verify the recollections of the interviewees who provided personal details on written sources or were able to recall important details on specific events. The interviews often directed my attention to issues and sources which I was able to pursue in the archives. The
interviewees' experiences and perceptions form a vital part of the story that is about to follow.

Since "re-education," "democratization," and "Americanization" appear frequently in the sources of the time, in the interviews as well as in scholarly accounts, a word about terminology is in order. Not surprisingly, the definitions and interpretations of these terms vary widely. It is therefore necessary to present the reader with the way I defined the terms for this study.

"Re-education" was used in two contexts before it became one of the features of American policy in post-war Germany. During the 1930s psychotherapists attempted to correct neurotic behavior by trying to replace abnormal ideas with new and healthy concepts. In this way a therapist could lead a patient back to the mainstream path from which he had strayed. Educators developed a similar concept, but for them victims of accidents needed to re-learn the abilities which they had forgotten.¹⁵ We will see that Americans applied both concepts to the problem they were trying to solve in Germany throughout the occupation with much idealism and sometimes even with missionary zeal.¹⁶ Although their views of the roots of the problem may have differed, those in

¹⁵Müller 113-114.

¹⁶Müller 111-113. Tent (Mission) argues that this missionary zeal lay at the heart of American educators' attempts to reform the school system in their zone of occupation.
charge of the American re-education program agreed that the Germans could and should be cured from their exaggerated nationalism, militarism, chauvinism, and their inclination towards totalitarianism. In the long run young people were the group most in need of re-education, not only because they had only known National Socialist doctrines, but also because they offered the best chances to achieve American goals, since it is easier to change the outlook of a young person than that of an adult. To be successful, the Americans’ concept of re-education went beyond schools and universities in Germany, which John Dewey had identified as hotbeds of reactionary ideas and exaggerated nationalism as early as 1915. His book was republished in 1942, just in time to have an impact on people who would be in charge of the German educational system after the war.\(^7\) I define re-education as the American effort to change the minds and attitudes of young people. This could happen by means of official programs to teach them the values of an open and democratic society through schools, youth offices, youth organizations, and the Army as well as by means of informal and formal personal contacts between the occupiers and the occupied.

American efforts to "democratize" German society provide a different challenge for the researcher. Although the issue

remained high on the agenda and played a prominent part in official American rhetoric throughout the occupation, the occupiers never defined their concept of democratization. Scholars still debate whether Americans simply equated their own political and economic system with democracy and wanted to establish very much the same in their zone of occupation and ultimately in the Federal Republic, or if they intended to teach Germans democracy based on a much broader concept, in which hands-on-experience with generally recognized principles of fair play, respect for other opinions, and practical lessons such as discussions or practicing democratic procedures played a central role. The latter approach would have taken Germany's own democratic traditions into account. Looking at American efforts of teaching democracy to the young generation will help to answer this question.

Introducing democracy to the Germans was just one field of the occupiers' alleged attempts or successes to "Americanize" the people under their control. Germans and Americans alike have used the term in many ways to describe the material and ideological impact of the United States on the culture, politics, and the economy of the Federal Republic. The common denominator in this usage seems to be the assumption that Germans not just adopted American ideas and concepts but rather exchanged at least parts of their own culture and traditions for that of the occupiers. This
concept of Americanization, however, is not very helpful in describing the situation in post-war Germany. First, it neglects the diversity of the American political, cultural, and educational landscape which is arguably the very essence of American culture. This study will show that in fact no agency in the United States was able to develop a clear cut 'American' model for the re-education of the Germans which could have served as the basis for American policy after the war. Consequently a great variety of ideas and concepts about education and youth work coexisted among American government and private agencies which were operating in Germany. Furthermore, the necessity of cooperation with the other Allies as well as with an atomized German administrative structure made a flexible and highly pragmatic approach on all sides imperative. In addition to that, the states, not the Federal government had been traditionally in charge of formal education. This constellation most probably would have prevented the Americans from realizing many of their goals, even if they had formulated just one program for Germany.

If Americans had problems creating and pursuing one consistent policy, the Germans had problems finding out what 'American' exactly meant. Undoubtedly Hollywood did much to disseminate a specific if not altogether accurate image of the United States to the Germans, but wherever they met GIs or other Americans, Germans had an opportunity to test their
images of the United States and her people. American
diversity ultimately meant that Germans from all social
groups and many political convictions could find something
attractive in American society, politics, and culture. In
music, for example, the choices during the first post-war
decade ranged from Aaron Copeland and George Gershwin via Big
Bands and Jazz to Elvis Presley and Rock 'n Roll. All three
music styles were and remained tremendously successful with
different people of different ages, and all three were
distinctively "American."

The "Americanization" concept poses yet another problem.
It assumes that two mutually exclusive monolithic cultural,
political, and economic systems existed which remained
antagonistic, giving Germans only the choice of either
defending their old ways or adopting the new ones which the
occupiers introduced. The model allows people to draw clear-
cut conclusions about American policies in Germany which
either failed or succeeded, but it does not provide any room
for pragmatism, synthesis, or compromise. Not surprisingly,
scholars, popular writers, and ordinary people operating
under these assumptions either found an Americanization of
Germany absolutely necessary and good or rejected it in
equally strong terms. Such a rigid definition of mutually
exclusive cultural, political, and economic concepts does not
reflect the necessities and possibilities for improvisation
in every day affairs in Germany after hostilities had ended.
The political and ideological vacuum which the complete military and moral collapse of the Third Reich had created opened up opportunities for individuals as well as administrations to explore new approaches to problems in which occupiers and occupied could combine old and new ideas in flexible, creative ways. This give and take—the very essence of democracy—might not entirely have satisfied either side, but in the long term both parties involved could achieve much as long as they found ways to cooperate. The following pages will tell how Americans and Germans who were involved in youth work in the field quickly found pragmatic and very fruitful ways of cooperation. Their actions at the grassroots ultimately determined Washington's policy formulation and provided American authorities in Germany early on with a practical and realistic re-education concept which Military Government and the High Commission adopted as a model for all of their dealings with the Germans.

"This model of pragmatic interaction between occupiers and occupied is by no means my own. Wolfgang Eckart argues in his case study of Nuremberg that the dire post-war situation forced German administrators and politicians as well as the Americans to approach all issues pragmatically at the cost of ideological and idealistic convictions on both sides. Eckart seems to overlook that pragmatism is the very essence of the American political culture. Flexible cooperation with the Germans did not mean that the occupiers gave up their long-term goals of re-education, but simply that they chose a different, more realistic, and ultimately quite successful approach to reach them. In politics as well as in youth work the form of the system was not important (as long as it was democratic), but rather the convictions of its constituents."
CHAPTER I

Preparations for an Occupation, 1942-45

Throughout the Second World War preparations for the occupation of Germany did not have a high priority among Washington planners, although they began to develop blueprints almost immediately after hostilities officially began in December 1941. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s policy was to defeat the Axis Powers, which meant essentially Germany, first. The President directed all of his and the country’s energy towards this goal. He and his administration, however, did not develop a consistent long range policy for the postwar period. Preparing the occupation of Germany remained rudimentary, because the White House did not provide the necessary leadership. Therefore the different departments involved in planning were unable to reconcile their objectives and coordinate their efforts. Important parts of the American policy directive for the occupation of Germany known as JCS 1067, hastily assembled in the fall of 1944, when German defeat seemed imminent, derived directly from Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s infamous and largely punitive blueprint for the country. Morgenthau, however, dealt predominantly with economic and political issues. Reorienting the German population away from extreme nationalism, racism, and militarism towards the ideals of a democratic society did not figure prominently in
the planning of any government agency in 1944, although the concept of reeducating the Germans had been introduced in early 1943. All three Departments agreed on the necessity of such a program, but its timing and its priority remained a source of discussion. Its punitive economic provisions notwithstanding JCS 1067 provided the basis for a positive and reconstructionist approach in the American zone of occupation.

Between 1942 and 1944 the military had to create a civil affairs section which would be capable of taking over government functions in liberated and occupied areas and of implementing Allied or American policies. Military planners had to operate in unknown territory and without much guidance from Washington, but they succeeded in organizing and integrating a new organization into the military command structure. Military government detachments accompanied the tactical units in the cross channel invasion and provided liaison between civilian agencies and the troops. Their main purpose in Germany, however, was to assume government functions on the local, state, and zone levels. Their first duties consisted of denazification, maintaining or reestablishing law and order, as well as starting the local economies to provide the necessities for the occupiers and the occupied. Youth and educational affairs received only marginal attention and resources.
Preparing the Peace: No Guidance from the White House

Franklin D. Roosevelt approached planning for the occupation of Germany in the same manner in which he had orchestrated the New Deal. He had never developed a consistent program for getting his nation out of the depression, but rather sought pragmatic solutions as the problems arose. The President disliked delegating responsibilities and almost never took a firm stand on issues that divided his subordinates. His administration was known for a lack of coordination and a surprising amount of interagency rivalries. The President preferred informal and personal communications to written accords which might limit his freedom of action. He believed that he could get along well with Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Dictator, and would be able to negotiate the terms for postwar Europe and Germany on a personal and friendly basis.2

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Since this dissertation does not deal with the Cold War per se, but rather with American treatment of German youth, the discussion between realists and revisionists is only of marginal importance. Both schools maintain that American
Roosevelt’s own rather negative experiences in Germany as a schoolboy as well as the political developments between 1918 and 1933 which led to the rise of Hitler held important lessons for him. He was convinced that leniency toward the Germans was useless. Although German forces had requested an armistice at the end of World War I, Hitler and his political allies had been able to take advantage of many Germans’ belief that their army actually had been undefeated in the field, but had been stabbed in the back by democratic forces at home. Unconditional surrender of the German forces this time would not only satisfy Stalin’s never ending need for reassurance, but would also demonstrate to the Germans that they had really lost.3

The aftermath of the previous war also convinced the President that another American retreat into isolationism would be disastrous. The United States would have to remain actively involved in international affairs if it did not want to return to the battlefields. Roosevelt envisioned a policy towards Germany changed due to the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. The reader will see, however, that American policy towards German youth remained consistent throughout the ten years under discussion here.

3Gaddis 8-12; Hammond 355-57; James Tent (Mission 14) and Edward N. Peterson (21) comment on FDR’s negative experiences with Germany; Klaus-Dietmar Henke (Die Amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte herausgegeben vom Institut für Zeitgeschichte 27 (München [Munich]: Oldenbourg, 1995) 53-69) provides an excellent summary of FDR’s policy between 1941 and 1943.
postwar world in which cooperation between the big powers would assure peace.\textsuperscript{4}

The President's third lesson from the past was that without a healthy economy there would be no political stability in the world. The Great Depression had created an atmosphere of despair which in Germany and in Japan had helped radical and undemocratic forces into power. The United States would have to take up the responsibility and assume world leadership in this realm as well.\textsuperscript{5}

Roosevelt's views about postwar Germany were less clear. The President did not think it appropriate to start planning details of this occupation before the war was won. He had four reasons not to commit himself to any clear definition of postwar policy. First he considered it to be detrimental to the war effort because it might burden the rather fragile alliance among Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States with unnecessary preoccupations which could be discussed once the war was over. The conferences at Teheran and Moscow in 1943 and even in Yalta as late as January 1945 had shown that the allies agreed on defeating and occupying Germany, but that neither side was ready or willing to discuss postwar policy.\textsuperscript{6} Second, Roosevelt did not want to

\textsuperscript{4}Gaddis 8-12.

\textsuperscript{5}Gaddis 8-12.

\textsuperscript{6}Hammond (315-17) on Moscow and Teheran, (410) on Yalta and the President's general attitude.
formulate any policies which he would have to base on unknown or constantly changing factors. Nobody could foresee exactly what the situation in Germany would be like at the time of surrender. The Army had assumed, for example, that there would be a central government and that the German economy would still be functioning when hostilities ended. Due to the Americans' rapid gains after the invasion of France and the German officers' attempt to dispose of Hitler in July of 1944, this possibility seemed to materialize, but Hitler remained in power. The German counteroffensive during the winter of 1944 made it clear that the Americans would have to fight their way into Germany and that planning would have to be based on completely different assumptions. The President consistently refused to discuss issues on such shaky grounds.\(^7\) The postponement strategy also was much in line with Roosevelt's political philosophy. He had shown during the New Deal that he preferred to tackle problems when they arose on a trial and error basis and indicated that he would follow the same strategy in Germany.\(^8\) The public discussion of the Morgenthau plan which he and Churchill had endorsed during the Quebec conference in September 1944 finally showed that a premature commitment on any postwar position could


\(^8\)Hammond 315, 324; Ziemke 12-18.
cost Roosevelt votes which he needed in his bid for a fourth term that year.⁹

The White House's refusal to take the lead in planning for postwar Germany left a void that three departments tried to fill. The Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the War Department approached the issue with different conceptions of their own role in the occupation as well as of the role the Germans were to play in the future. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), however, a body that George Marshall had created to coordinate and control different military bureaus, would have to approve any policy statement, since they were directly responsible for planning and carrying out operations in Europe.

*First Designs: The State Department*

The State Department was the logical choice for the formulation of postwar policy planning for Germany. It had a trained staff that was well acquainted with affairs in the country and was in the best position to assess the international ramifications of American activities in Germany. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, however, had grown old and was unable to provide the energy and leadership necessary for the task. He also did not have the close personal ties to the President that would have given the State Department's reconstruction plans some weight at the White House or in the public. Planning for postwar Germany

⁹Hammond 377-379; Ziemke 105.
did not seem to enjoy a high priority within the Department, either. Hull left it in the hands of the Department's lower ranks, who operated without much guidance or interference.10

State Department officials began their search for a policy for postwar Germany in 1942. It was clear from the start that they would base their policy on a reconstructionist approach. Germany would be defeated and occupied, stern measures would be necessary to punish war criminals and eliminate National Socialism, but ultimately the country would have to be reintegrated into the international community. In the summer of that year State Department officials started out with some brainstorming. They formed the General Advisory Committee for Postwar Germany (GAC) to informally collect ideas and opinions from educators, politicians and members of different departments on how their general ideas could be implemented.11

Reeducating Germans was one of the topics in these meetings and the discussions of this issue left a lasting impression on Archibald MacLeish, who attended them in his function as Librarian of Congress. MacLeish, who would become Assistant Secretary of State in January 1945, had by February 1943 reached the conclusion that a program of

10Schoenbaum (32-33) maintains that between the summer of 1943 and the fall of 1944 only about 6% of government publications dealt with the German future in the broadest sense.

11Tent, Mission 17-23.
reeducating the Germans would be necessary as soon as the process of denazification and demilitarization could be finished.\textsuperscript{12} The aftermath of World War I had shown that merely introducing a democratic political system would not be enough to affect profound and lasting changes. Germany could only be successfully integrated into a peace-loving international community if her citizens could be convinced that militarism, racism, and National Socialism were bad and if they would change their political and cultural outlook. This meant that a reeducation program would have to play an important role in the occupation and needed careful planning.

MacLeish did not have much information on the President's position on the issue, but Roosevelt consistently made it known that he did consider it possible for the Germans to return to the family of civilized nations. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 made this possibility the basis of Anglo-American cooperation. At the Casablanca conference in January 1943 Roosevelt and Winston Churchill issued a statement that they wanted to destroy enemy philosophies, but not peoples.\textsuperscript{13} To his dismay MacLeish also had become aware

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{12}Scott Donaldson, \textit{Archibald MacLeish: An American Life} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992) 379-383. Neither Donaldson nor R.H. Winnick, the editor of his letters, (\textit{Letters of Archibald MacLeish 1907 to 1982} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983)) dedicate any space to the important role MacLeish played in finding and formulating an American policy for postwar Germany.

\textsuperscript{13}Roosevelt and Churchill maintained this attitude throughout the war and also committed Stalin to this stance. During the 1944 presidential campaign Roosevelt made clear
\end{quote}
in the GAC meetings that in February 1943 no agency was planning for a reeducation program or working on the formulation of an official policy statement in this realm. Political and economic issues were much higher on the agendas.14

By the summer of 1943 the State Department was satisfied with the information it had gathered from the committee's meetings and proceeded to a more formal stage of discussion. It set up the Interdivisional Committee for Postwar Germany, which consisted of specialists on that country from different divisions of the State Department.15 Under David Harris it developed the first official policy papers for organizing postwar Germany, based on the reconstructionist approach. In March 1944 the group had to direct its attention to educational matters. Prodded by his English counterpart, the chief of the War Department's Civil Affairs Division (CAD), General John Hilldring, asked the State Department to develop a policy guideline for the American military government.

that the Germans would have to pay a price for their aggression, but he also indicated his willingness to readmit the German people into the fellowship of law-abiding nations if they showed that they deserved it. The final communiqué of the Big Three in Yalta again stated that Germans were expected to remain outlaws for quite some time, but that they could hope to be reintegrated in the international community after the elimination of Nazism and militarism.

14Tent, Mission 17-23; the campaign speech is in Hammond (394), the communiqué at Yalta in Hammond (413); see Ziemke (85) for the Atlantic Charter.

15Hammond 318.
Proceedings of a joint committee of the Allies, the European Advisory Commission (EAC), which was planning for the occupation of Germany in England seemed to indicate that the Americans might be the only ones who had not developed any policy in this realm. Harris' committee wrote a paper along reconstructionist lines, but emphasized that education could succeed only as part of an overall policy toward the Germans that apparently included denazification, demilitarization and cooperation between the Allies. The committee further insisted that Germans not only would have to participate in the process, but would have to initiate it and carry it out on their own. At that stage of the planning the committee only considered reeducation to be "scholastic reform," which clearly meant that all efforts should be directed towards the German educational system. Further work came to a standstill because in August and September the Morgenthau Plan forced the State Department to divert its attention and placed in doubt the underlying approach on which it planned to build its policy.16

The Morgenthau Plan

In August 1944 Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau became aware of the State Department's reconstructionist approach. He was appalled by the Department's leniency and immediately decided to develop his own plan. Morgenthau had always disliked and distrusted the

16Tent, Mission 29; Füssl 85.
Germans. Furthermore, he was in close contact with the Jewish community and by the end of 1944 was not only fully informed about the magnitude of Hitler's "Final Solution", but also deeply disturbed by the State Department's alleged obstructionist course which had prevented many European Jews from escaping to the United States. Although the Treasury Department had no obvious role to play in policy formulation for postwar Germany, its influence was considerable. Morgenthau was a good friend and neighbor of the President in New York. His personal bond with Roosevelt made access to the White House easy. In addition to that, Roosevelt shared Morgenthau's dislike of Germany and agreed that elimination of the German threat would require drastic measures. Morgenthau became the most visible and vocal proponent of a very different concept for treating postwar Germany. He envisioned a country that would be deprived of its industry and divided into a number of weak agrarian states.

17 Hammond 448; he seems to underestimate the influence of events related to the Holocaust on Morgenthau's position, especially his animosity towards the State Department. Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut (American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), esp. chap. 9) argue that German atrocities and the State Department's apparent indifference to the plight of the Jews or even to making the facts known to the public in 1943 deeply impressed and angered the Secretary of the Treasury. Thomas Alan Schwartz (17) provides a more balanced evaluation of Washington's reaction to the Holocaust.

Initially Roosevelt was ready to accept it as the official American policy. Morgenthau had brought to the President's attention the Handbook for Military Government in Germany that the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) under General Eisenhower was about to release. The book instructed Military Government officials to make sure that the economy and the bureaucracy in occupied Germany would continue to function. This policy implied that the Germans would be treated leniently and would not suffer any major inconveniences. Roosevelt agreed with Morgenthau that this was not what he had in mind. The Germans would have to pay the price for the misery they had brought upon Europe and would have to feel that they had lost the war. The Americans therefore should shut down German industry and remain aloof of internal German affairs, even if it meant economic and social chaos and starvation. The President instructed the War Department to revise the book in September 1944. That same month he made Morgenthau's blueprint official American policy, when, at the Quebec conference, he initialled with Winston Churchill the document which came to be known as the Morgenthau Plan.19 It envisioned the complete deindustrialization of Germany and a division of the country into several states. Roosevelt,

however, had not counted on the ensuing and largely negative public response in the United States, which was very inconvenient in an election year, as well as strong resistance from the State and War Departments. He quickly distanced himself from the document, even though he continued to see merit in Morgenthau’s plan and avoided endorsing any other policy proposal. Morgenthau’s plan nonetheless came at a time when German collapse seemed imminent and SHAEF urgently requested a directive for military government in Germany. The American policy directive, which came to be known as JCS 1067, incorporated its tone, if not its content.20

Morgenthau’s position on the German economy was clear, but he had not developed a plan for German youth. He shared the State Department’s view that special attention should be given to education. The Secretary even proposed a "fundamental reorientation of German educational institutions." To accomplish that, schools would have to remain closed until teachers, textbooks, and curricula were purged of all negative influences. Institutions of higher education would remain closed longer, but students would have the opportunity to study at universities abroad. Morgenthau, however, did not discuss the issue at length, which is understandable, since the new German agrarian society would

20 Hammond 348-378; Peterson 37-39; Ziemke 102-105; Davidson 6.
not require a large number of academically trained specialists. Furthermore, he did not regard the Germans as capable of changing their minds. The Secretary's ideas, which he outlined in his book in greater detail, indicate that he thought that drastic educational reform in Germany would be necessary to eliminate militarism and Nazi ideology. He doubted, however, that even a stern program would ever be able to cure German thought. Nevertheless his thinking did not challenge the State Department's more constructive approach towards education.21

The War Department

The War Department was the third agency in Washington that became involved in making plans for postwar Germany, since it was clear that army troops would be the first American representatives in Germany. Some type of military government would be necessary to control liberated and occupied areas as long as the fighting continued and to make sure that military requirements were met. Serious planning for the formation of a military government began as early as 1940. The War Department based its planning on the

21Otto Schlander, "Der Einfluß von John Dewey und Hans Morgenthau auf die amerikanische Re-educationspolitik," Umerziehung und Wiederaufbau: Die Bildungspolitik der Besatzungsmächte in Deutschland und Österreich, ed. Manfred Heinemann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981) 41-43. Schlander's assessment of American policy is somewhat simplistic, but he summarizes Morgenthau's views on German re-education well. See also Tent, Mission 17; Hammond 385. The quote is from a memorandum dated 1 Nov. 1944 in which Morgenthau accuses the British of ignoring this issue which apparently he thought was important.
assumption that the military would be in charge of all civilian affairs only during hostilities and then would turn over its military government responsibilities to civilian authorities, presumably the Department of State. This did not mean, however, that the military in any way intended to become involved in policy formulation. On the contrary, throughout the negotiations for a postwar policy statement, the military tried to maintain a position of absolute neutrality. It built up an administrative apparatus that would carry out whatever directives would come from Washington, as long as they could be implemented. The military’s main goals therefore were practical and limited in scope and content. Military government would have to maintain order, to control local authorities and to ensure that military operations would not be hindered by civilians in liberated or occupied areas. Some of the traditional mandates, however, already carried with them clear political implications. The military could best operate when the administration and the economy of the region it occupied were reconstructed as fast as possible. Traditional military government doctrine instructed soldiers to take care of the "welfare of the governed." These principles were bound to collide with other requirements Washington imposed on military government for Germany. Dismissing Nazi officials, for example, would have an immediate impact on local government functions, because most of the administrators were
members of the Nazi party and could not be replaced easily. But not dealing with the Nazis harshly would have serious political consequences in Germany and would cause repercussions in the United States. It also took time to realize that every military government action that relied on any form of cooperation from the Germans would from the start have implications for the political and social life in Germany. This would make it difficult to change the course of events once a long-range program could be agreed on in Washington.22

Experiences in North Africa showed that sharing the burden with civilian agencies during military operations was not feasible. The need for exclusive military control of all aspects of government functions during operations in a theater became painfully clear. The President's decision to divide the responsibilities for government activities between military and civilian agencies caused considerable difficulties. General Eisenhower complained at one point during the campaign that he had more trouble dealing with competing American civilian agencies than with the enemy.23

22 Hammond 319, 324-26; Henke 96-102; Eckart 220-278. Eckart's is one of various studies which document that this conflict actually became one of the major problems with which MG detachments had to deal during the immediate aftermath of the war.

The problems in Africa led the War Department on 1 March 1943 to create the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) to control every aspect of civilian affairs in occupied areas. Consistent with the War Department's philosophy about military government, both Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Chief of Staff George Marshall instructed the head of CAD, General John Hilldring, to avoid taking part in policy formulation as far as possible. CAD would organize the administrative and logistical apparatus and solicit a policy statement presumably from the State Department or the President as soon as the military would find it necessary.\textsuperscript{24} In the realm of postwar treatment of youth and education CAD followed these orders and relied on the State Department's guidance.\textsuperscript{25}

The fact that the Americans did not fight the war in Europe alone and envisioned a joint occupation with Great Britain and the Soviet Union further complicated formulating a policy. During 1942 the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) created various committees in Washington and in London which dealt with civilian affairs of occupied territories and therefore could become involved in policy making. Matters became worse when the three Allies decided to establish a commission that would be responsible for a joint post war policy formulation in November 1943 at the

\footnotesize{\textit{Illinois University Press, 1984) 399-400.}}

\textsuperscript{24}Hammond 320-321; Swarm 399-400; Peterson 31-34.

\textsuperscript{25}See pp. 25-26 above.
Moscow conference. The European Advisory Commission was based in London and represented by the State Department. Washington now not only had to take the opinions of one more ally into account, but also needed to take care of constant friction between its own civilian and military agencies in London. In the end, the commission had not been able to agree to more than the boundaries of the zones the respective Allies would occupy. In the field of education and the treatment of youth it repeatedly served as a catalyst that CAD used to prod the State Department into action.\textsuperscript{26}

With many different committees and conflicting opinions involved, it is not surprising that American planners for postwar Germany had to settle for the smallest common denominator. They managed to agree only on a short term policy statement when German defeat seemed imminent and Eisenhower insisted on obtaining guidance for the occupation of Germany.\textsuperscript{27}

Although the Morgenthau Plan did not occupy the President and the headlines for more than a few weeks, it became the basis of American policy in Germany between 1945 and 1947. The Secretary of the Treasury wielded his greatest influence in September 1944 at a time when the German collapse seemed imminent and SHAEF pressed for a policy

\textsuperscript{26}See pp. 25-26 above; Tent, Mission 30-31.

\textsuperscript{27}Henke 104.
statement. The different departments, however, continued to present the President with contradictory policy drafts. When German resistance stiffened in fall and winter, Roosevelt created yet another committee to solve the problem. The Informal Policy Committee on Germany consisted of the state, war, and treasury secretaries. It initially based the new policy directive in tone and content largely on Morgenthau's plan, but during the next months the State Department managed to infuse it with changes that would leave a number of matters up to the discretion of the commander of the occupational forces. Truman approved the document after Roosevelt's death in May 1945 as the basis for American negotiations in the Allied Control Council.\(^2^8\)

The directive's impact was limited in several ways. Since the British had not agreed to the statement, it could go into effect only after the dissolution of SHAEF and would be valid only for the American Zone of Occupation. As long as hostilities lasted, the Americans would have to follow the CCS's Directive 551 which treated military government actions from the standpoint of military feasibility. This meant that British and American forces would try to return life to normal as quickly as possible.\(^2^9\)

\(^{28}\) Hammond 408-427; Henke 110-115; Peterson 37-44; Tent, Mission 31-32; Ziemke 91-92, 106, 214.

\(^{29}\) Ziemke 91-92, 106, 214. It is important to emphasize in this context that JCS 1067 was written as a stopgap measure. Only events in Germany extended its life and Lucius Clay certainly used it in ways not intended by the Treasury.
JCS 1067 defined four basic objectives for the military government in Germany. First, the Germans needed to become aware that they had brought the destruction of their country upon themselves and that suffering would be inevitable. The directive also made clear that Germany would not be considered a liberated, but rather an occupied country. This provision ensured that military government in Germany would enjoy absolute authority. The primary objective of the occupation was "to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the world." To accomplish this goal the Americans would denazify and demilitarize Germany and punish all war criminals. Military government would keep German industry under close control, but the ultimate goal would be "an eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis."

Even though the tone of the directive sounds harsh and it was partially based on Morgenthau's ideas, the document

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JCS 1067 went through a number of revisions before it reached the field and after. The eighth version became the basis for American policy in the American zone after the German surrender (for the History and various versions of JCS 1067 see Ziemke 214). Scholars disagree about the influence Morgenthau actually had in drafting JCS 1067. Ziemke's interpretation that the tone of the directive was harsh, but that its actual provisions were of a much less vituperative nature than Morgenthau would have wished, seems to be the most plausible explanation.

James K. Pollock and James H. Meisel, eds., Germany under Occupation: Illustrative Materials and Documents (Ann Arbor: George Wahr, 1947) doc. X.

Pollock and Meisel doc. X.
reveals a consensus in some areas. The State Department, for example, at no time opposed denazification, demilitarization, or the punishment of war criminals. The provisions regarding education reveal a constructive side of the directive. JCS 1067 ordered all educational institutions temporarily closed. Only all National Socialist educational facilities had to be permanently closed. Schools opened under Allied authority could continue their operations. All schools would be reopened at the earliest possible time after the purge of Nazi personnel, ideology and books. The directive permitted the American Military Governor to go ahead with an interim school program until the Allied Control Council would formulate a general policy for Germany.33

One of the first objectives of Military Government would be to assert control over the German educational system. Section 14 b of the directive, however, was worded in such a way that the Military Government’s educational mission could be interpreted to be far more than simply supervising or even reforming schools and universities:

A coordinated system of control over German education and an affirmative program of reorientation will be established designed completely to eliminate Nazi and militaristic doctrines and to encourage the development of democratic ideas.34

33Pollock and Meisel doc. X. It would be interesting to compare the texts of the various drafts to see at what stage of the development sections may have been included in the document, but for this study it is important that the provision was included from the start.

34Pollock and Meisel doc. X.
It is not clear who drafted this section of the directive, but Archibald MacLeish was certainly not unhappy with the provision. Upon his appointment as Assistant Secretary of State in January 1945 he set out to make his opinions known. Section fourteen provided a basis for further planning and implementation of policies directed towards reeducating German youth in and out of schools in the American Zone, but Washington still had not been able to formulate a long-range policy towards Germany. At the time of MacLeish’s appointment the War Department’s CAD was not satisfied with the most recent State Department proposals on education. The military planners thought that German participation and responsibilities were overemphasized and would nullify any chances for reform from the start.  

In view of the CAD’s criticisms MacLeish returned to the drawing board. He resurrected the policy paper that David Harris’ Interdivisional Committee had drafted shortly before Morgenthau interrupted its work. MacLeish thought that it formed a good basis for discussion, but that especially its provisions for administering a reeducation program needed additional work. CAD, however, advised MacLeish that a general policy statement was urgently needed, whereas the Army’s field manual for military government was providing sufficient guidance for handling the educational system for the time being. To accomplish this goal, MacLeish returned

35 Tent, Mission 30.
to a suggestion he had made during the meetings of the German Advisory Council two years earlier. He invited a number of specialists in education to Washington who in one way or another were acquainted with the German educational system. MacLeish was able to gather a number of outstanding educators. Staff from the Departments of State and War supplemented the committee. It needed two meetings in May 1945 to agree on recommendations for a policy statement for Germany.36

The educators first weighed the options the United States had in regard to Germany. The United States would not be able to control Germany’s industrial potential or the Germans themselves in the long run because that would mean either the complete annihilation of the German people or a permanent occupation. The American public would support neither option. The committee argued that attempts to deindustrialize Germany would not eliminate the threat, since the real problem lay in the people themselves. The only feasible policy would therefore have to focus on a change of Germans’ attitudes and social behavior. Decision makers in the United States and in Germany should direct all military,

36Tent, Mission 31-34; he erroneously assumes that the meetings took place in May and June, but State Department memoranda indicate that the committee met on May 12-13 and again on May 28-29. This gave the Department a whole month to have the document approved before the Potsdam conference. For the memoranda see National Archives [Hereinafter NA], Record Group [hereinafter RG] 59 Department of State, Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/6-1345, Annex II.
economic, political and social decisions towards that end. Such a course of action would make an extensive reeducation program the heart of American policy in Germany. The committee further suggested that such a program needed to go hand in hand with the elimination of militarism and National Socialism. The recommendations departed from the traditional understanding that reeducation would simply follow the punitive phase of the occupation by making it a top priority. The educators thought that the Americans should rely as far as possible on German initiative to implement the programs on the local, state and national levels. To reintegrate Germany into the international community, Germans should be permitted to resume cultural activities with other countries as well. MacLeish adopted the committee’s recommendations without changes and began to lobby for incorporating it into the American policy formulation at Potsdam.\(^3\)\(^7\)

To speed up the decision-making process within the administration, MacLeish sidestepped the Informal Policy Committee for Germany, in which the Secretary of the Treasury still had a voice, and circulated the draft within the administration for further consideration. His position, however, did not go uncontested. One State Department official, for example, pointed out that the Morgenthau plan indeed was a serious alternative for eliminating the German threat forever. More to the point, he suggested that the

\(^{37}\)NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/6-1345.
United States had other interests in Europe that would quite possibly conflict with reeducation plans for Germany. Nevertheless, the Department of State accepted the committee's recommendations as the basis for its own long-range policy for Germany. During the first week of July Hilldring, McCloy, and Secretary of War Patterson gave their informal approval to the new directive.\(^3^8\)

The new position within the lower echelons of the administration could not accomplish anything yet, because it needed the approval of the Secretary of State and ultimately of the President. Like JCS 1067, it could not be implemented because any agreement the Allies would reach at the Potsdam Conference in July would supersede it. On 12 July MacLeish therefore sent an telegram to Secretary of State James Byrnes in Potsdam urging him to make the new American position the basis for Allied policy. The undersecretary's communication deserves notice because it anticipated and outlined the course the State Department would finally come to follow in Germany during the next decade and beyond. In that document MacLeish pointed out that the Allies had agreed to ensure that Germany would never be a threat to the peace of the world again, but that up to that date there existed no

definition of what concrete steps would be taken to convert the agreement into a tangible plan. He correctly stated that there existed a policy vacuum, because no plans had been made to go beyond the immediate war aims. The Undersecretary argued that in order to achieve the goal of permanently preventing the Germans from waging another war, the United States needed to be clear about its own and its allies' objectives. It would further be necessary to develop a long range policy based on these objectives. MacLeish then outlined the committee’s recommendations with its emphasis on changing the German mind by reforming the educational system. He admitted that short and long term policies could be at odds at times (a clear reference to Morgenthau and JCS 1067), but that the long range objectives should always be kept in mind and ultimately should determine American policy. The Undersecretary went on to say that it was not enough to get rid of attitudes, but that Americans needed to fill the vacuum with new ideals which they should draw from their own history, just as the Russians might try to influence the Germans to become more sympathetic to their own ideas and ideals.39

MacLeish’s efforts were in vain. The participants at Potsdam dedicated almost all of their time to far more concrete and immediate issues such as the German eastern

border, reparations, and a common allied administration. The final communiqué of the conference simply stated that Nazism and militarism needed to be eliminated before democratic ideas could take root. Since it delegated more power to the zonal commanders, MacLeish would be able to implement his plan if he found enough support in Washington to make it official American policy and the Military Governor would be willing to implement it.  

It is not clear why the directive disappeared from the agendas of the higher echelons in Washington during the next months. It seems to be plausible that Washington and Berlin officials seriously believed that the Allied Control Council would be able to function and take care of reeducation in all of Germany. This would make an American directive unnecessary. John McCloy discussed the issue with MacLeish in a telephone conversation on July 5, 1945. He thought that it would be "highly desirable" for the United States to reach an agreement with the other Allies on this subject. Throughout 1945 and well into 1946, General Lucius D. Clay, Deputy Commander of Military Government in Germany, was in charge of setting up the Allied Control Council and making it operational in Berlin. Clay had faith in the joint administration of Germany by the four occupying powers and consequently wanted to defer reeducation to the Allied

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Control Council. In addition to that, denazification and punishment of war crimes as well as practical issues, such as food, reconstructing basic social services and reparations, seemed to be far more pressing. The rather abstract ideas of reeducating the Germans would have to wait until the other matters were settled. It appeared that MacLeish had not made any headway with his suggestions in Washington or in Berlin.41

In the context of this study it is equally important to note that planners in Washington only thought about a reeducation policy for schools and their administration. Even the most serious proponents of psychological change did not go beyond administrative reforms. People did not seem to

41 Memorandum on a telephone conversation between MacLeish and John McCloy on 5 July 1945 which seemed to discourage MacLeish considerably. A handwritten comment on the memorandum that recorded the conversation reads: "I guess I won't send in another [draft] today. Cancel + Forget" (NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/7-545). Obviously he changed his mind not long afterwards and decided to continue the fight for his plan. Füssl argues that, according to MacLeish, the State Department did not want to come forward with a directive yet because it was not directly involved in the operations in Germany. This is implausible, because MacLeish made this statement at the end of May 1945. Had he really not had any interest in making his views official policy, he would not have forwarded them to Byrnes at Potsdam, which was six weeks after he had made the statement Füssl relates to. Füssl also does not take into account the agreement between the State and War Departments, according to which the former would provide the policies for the latter's organization.

be aware that young Germans spent a lot of time away from
schools even when the system functioned. MacLeish's advisory
commission carried the approach a step further and included
adult education and information control on its agenda for
reeducation, but only a small group in the field seemed to
recognize at that time that the young generation would need
more than just school reform.

In April 1945 the technical manual published for the
Welfare Division of Military Government dealt with the issue
in depth. It described German youth work before and during
the Third Reich. The authors of the manual concluded that
youth activities would become one of the most important tasks
of Military Government which would have to initiate its own
program for German youth. The field manual for the Education
and Religious Affairs Division, published two months earlier,
however, did not advocate such a course at all. The manual
instructed officers of this division not to encourage the
formation of youth groups unless they would serve the
purposes of military government. It did not take into
consideration that young Germans had never known anything
else but Nazi ideology. At the same time most had been too
young to experience the horrors of the battlefields
firsthand. The complete collapse of Nazi Germany would leave
them in a void that needed to be filled. This meant that
this generation also offered a chance for American policy
makers because it would be most susceptible to the type of

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re-education MacLeish envisioned, but to achieve this goal American policy makers would need to widen their approach beyond the schools. For the time being the Americans in Washington and Europe focused exclusively on the educational system and consequently assigned youth work to the agency which also would be in charge of the educational system. The Education and Religious Affairs Branch within the Internal Affairs and Communications (IA&C) Division became responsible not only for the schools, but also for taking care of German youth in the American zone of occupation. Since for the time being no policy other than controlling the educational system was in place, much would depend on the quality of military government and the first encounters between the American troops and German civilians.42

Organizing Military Government

The War Department recognized early on the need for organizing military governments for various countries. This meant that a huge number of qualified people had to be found, recruited, and trained. The Army had administered military governments during and after the Civil War, in the Philippines, and most recently in the Rhineland after World War I. The task that lay ahead, however, was not only larger than any previous assignment, but also far more difficult.

42Charles Campbell (German Youth Activities and the United States Army (Frankfurt/Main: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947) 2) discusses the two field manuals.
The occupation of the Rhineland had shown the need for training personnel in establishing and maintaining the functions of a military government. The Judge Advocate General therefore issued Field Manual 27-5 under the title Military Government which had gone through some revisions by December 1943. The manual did not provide any policy statements, but rather concentrated on the practical issues of military government in general. It established some guidelines about the treatment of the population and recommended the retention of existing laws and customs. It made no distinction between liberated countries and occupied enemy territory. The main objective of military government units was support of the tactical operations and ensuring a minimum of interference from the local populations.43

To have an adequate supply of trained military government personnel at hand, the War Department founded a School of Military Government at the University of Virginia in July 1942. Most officers who attended this school were Army regulars who would later serve in staff positions.44

When it became clear that the Army would bear the entire responsibility for Military Government operations in Europe and Asia, it expanded its educational activities for Military Government officers in 1943. To satisfy the demand for field officers the Army had to replenish its ranks with non-

43 Swarm 399.
44 Henke 220; Ziemke 3-12.
professional soldiers which it commissioned directly from civilian life until 1943. The Army’s attempts to recruit experienced personnel were handicapped from the start, because it could only offer them field grade positions which paid considerably less than what qualified people had come to expect in their civilian careers. Nevertheless it managed to obtain about two thousand mature and rather dedicated civil administrators, some of whom came from education. These officers received a month of rigorous basic military and military government training at Fort Custer, Michigan. They were then assigned to three additional months of training at Civil Affairs Training Schools attached to universities throughout the country. By the end of 1943 as many as seven hundred officers per month passed through the courses. Apart from becoming acquainted with the intricacies of the military bureaucracy, the officers received information about the countries they were expected to serve in and went through some basic language training. Since nobody knew, however, in which country or countries they would ultimately serve, the training had to remain very general. Much of the information the officers received, especially about Germany, was outdated. Three months also proved to be too little time for preparing the officers adequately for their jobs. Although they obtained some rudimentary knowledge of the different countries’ histories, cultures, political systems and languages, they were not prepared for the highly complex task
of supervising local government that lay ahead of them. A serious handicap also was a lack of specialists to train them in specific fields. In addition, important up to date information almost never reached the schools, although it was at hand. The Army did not find it necessary to provide the schools with information and experiences it was obtaining during its operations in Europe. The schools ended their courses in the spring of 1944. Officers were transferred to Shrivenham, England, to continue their training overseas, to receive their special assignments, and to be deployed after the invasion. The officers' patience and morale, however, was severely tested overseas. Training could not continue due to the lack of teachers, space and teaching materials, and the sudden influx of huge numbers of Military Government officers who were shipped from the United States in anticipation of quick deployment after the invasion. Because of security concerns, SHAEF was unwilling to disclose the future assignments of the units, so that individual assignments for Military Government detachments could not be made before the invasion. Once they joined their tactical units in the field, Military Government detachments often found themselves doing odd jobs until they could move to their final destinations.45

45Henke 221-226; Tent, Mission 23-24; Ziemke 3-23; Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York: Macmillan, 1947) 6-12; Harold Zink, The United States in Germany (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1957) 5-26. It is interesting to note that Zink's assessment of the quality of
When the first Civilian Affairs Officers arrived at England at the end of 1942, they found that the staffs were not yet prepared for them. Nobody was quite sure how to integrate this relatively new task of the military into a command structure which was in flux anyway due to the preparations for the Normandy invasion. Civilian Affairs initially became part of the American command in the European theater, but with the creation of SHAEF and the appointment of Eisenhower as its commander, planning responsibilities were transferred to the Joint Command and Civilian Affairs became G-5, Military Government (MG). Planning for Germany became the responsibility of the German Country Unit (GCU) from February 1944 on.46

G-5 faced a formidable task. It had to create a military government organization within a very short period of time. Cooperation between British and American officers proved to be more difficult than had been anticipated. In addition to that, practical experiences in Italy and in Germany itself made adjustments in the organizational structure necessary. It was not until the end of 1945 that the Americans were able to resolve their problems in this field. In December 1945 the Office of Military Government, the training of MG officers was much kinder in 1947, when the occupation was still going on and his own memory was still fresh, than it was in 1957. Political events as well as a disillusion about American accomplishments in Germany after the war may have changed his attitude.

46Ziemke 25-30, 81.
U.S. Zone of Occupation (OMGUS) had taken over all G-5 functions. OMGUS was completely separated from tactical commands, but remained under the Commander-in-Chief’s authority. 47

Reeducation received only marginal attention. Just ten officers were assigned to the Education and Religious Affairs Branch of the U.S. Group Council Commission. During the first three years of the occupation the branch did not receive division status and had no direct access to the Military Governor. MacLeish’s efforts to make reeducation the central task of the American occupation did not have any impact on operations in the field during the first year of the occupation. 48

The lack of a clear-cut policy in Washington, differences of opinion between British and American policy makers, as well as constantly changing assumptions about the condition Germany would be in after her surrender, made defining a mission for military government and providing specific instructions a daunting task for GCU throughout 1944. The GCU was ready by August to distribute the handbook which Morgenthau took to the President. Roosevelt’s objections delayed its distribution, although they did not change its content in any significant way. It remained the

47 Ziemke chapters II, IV, VII, XXII-XXIV.
48 Tent, Mission 36-37.
only guide for Military Government until July 1945, since the British did not accept the provisions of JCS 1067.

Coordination between civilian agencies and the military remained a constant problem throughout the preparations for the occupation of Germany in spite of the creation of CAD in 1943. After their negative experiences in Africa the War Department and SHAEF were reluctant to permit contacts between the military and civilian agencies, although they were necessary to coordinate Military Government actions with long term objectives and policy making which the military had explicitly delegated to civilian authorities. The physical separation between SHAEF and Washington as well as the fact that communications had to go through a cumbersome communications system and had to pass several clearance hurdles further aggravated the situation.49

Since Civil Affairs staff officers could not communicate directly with civilian agencies in Washington and also were unwilling to concede the lead to the British, they had to rely on American resources available in England for writing a handbook that would help their officers once they were in Germany. With little updated information about Washington politics at hand and no guidance in form of a policy, they based their Handbook for Military Government on FM 27-5 and adapted it to conditions they were expecting to find in Germany. Their instructions were in line with the little

49Hammond 318-322.
information Ambassador Winant received from the Working Security Committee in Washington which Roosevelt had created after Moscow to determine the American position in the negotiations of the European Advisory Committee. The Military Government detachments' main task initially was to facilitate tactical troop operations. When it became clearer that the military would be responsible for military government also for a period after the end of hostilities, the detachments' tasks were broadened. In July 1944 education and religion became additional responsibilities. Apart from that, the book applied the general directions for military government of FM 27-5 to the situation it expected in Germany. The manual also was in line with military government policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed on in their directive CCS 551 late in May 1945. As we have seen, the handbook caused a considerable stir in Washington and triggered the Morgenthau plan in September 1944, but it survived even the President's requests to revise it surprisingly unharmed. The War Department resented this interference in its internal operations and therefore did not pursue the issue diligently. Since the manual was a joint venture between British and Americans, one side could not simply change it at its own convenience. The British never agreed to the provisions of JCS 1067, so the manual remained the basis of operations until the dissolution of SHAEF in
July 1945, guiding officers in the field through the first crucial phase of military government activities.\textsuperscript{50}

The authors of the handbook did not regard youth as a special problem and focused exclusively with the educational system. Since the instructions the State Department had prepared for CAD never were sent because of the Morgenthau episode, planners in London had even less to draw on in this field than in others. The handbook therefore provided some general guidelines which sought to minimize American control and interference. The authors assumed that, especially in such a delicate area, too much American interference would alienate even the Germans who had not supported the Nazis and whose responsibility it would be to rebuild and reform the system. Schools were to be closed only temporarily. They were to be reopened at the earliest possible moment to keep young people away from black market or resistance activities, to feed them, and to provide them with medical services if necessary.\textsuperscript{51}

Eisenhower's staff realized that the handbook needed modifications. JCS 1067 not only demanded the elimination of National Socialism and militarism in schools, but also envisioned a comprehensive system of reeducation that went beyond them. The Americans' first experiences in Germany may have convinced them as well that some ways had to be found to

\textsuperscript{50} Hammond 355-357; Tent, \textit{Mission} 23-28; Ziemke 83-91.

\textsuperscript{51} Tent, \textit{Mission} 25-28.
occupy German youth when they were not in school. On March 10, 1945 Eisenhower's Civil Affairs Adviser, Robert Murphy, sent a revision of the handbook's education and religion section to American headquarters in Europe, which broadened the scope of the Education Branches in the field. Apart from supervising the educational system, the revised manual instructed educational officers to permit initiatives of youth organizations that would not be connected to schools and to support the introduction of new pedagogical ideals. The new handbook actually initiated a process in which conflicts would be inevitable. It permitted a revival of the traditional German way of organizing youth, but it promoted new departures in youth work at the same time. The directive also revealed that American staff planners from the start pursued dual objectives towards German youth which aimed at eliminating Nazism and militarism in the German educational system, and at the same time laid the foundation for a constructive program of re-education.52

Setting up an organization that would be capable of carrying out the duties of a military government in Germany was a difficult task that did not receive a high priority before the invasion of France. Since this would be the first time that a military force actually would completely take

52Ambassador Murphy, London, to State Department, 10 March 1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 740.00119/3-1045, quoted in Füssl 98. Füssl is the first scholar to make this argument for the treatment of German youth.
over control of local, state and a central government, planners in Europe had to start from scratch. They developed an organization that was well suited to tactical support of troops during operations, but proved to be inadequate for Military Government activities after the end of hostilities. When American troops set foot on German soil at the end of 1944, Military Government detachments accompanied them, prepared to take over local government for some time to come. The training these detachments had received was mostly technical. Their field manuals and instructions provided them only with broad guidelines but in general stressed that Germans should do the work and Americans would supervise it. Due to problems of communication between Europe and America and in part as a result of the nature of the binational command structure, policy decisions in Washington had little impact on the concrete planning for the occupation and would not be in effect during the first two months of the occupation, when many crucial decisions in regard to the Germans would have to be made in the field.

Like politicians and administrators in Washington, military government planners initially focused their attention exclusively on the educational system. They had practical reasons to do so. First, there would not be enough personnel to do more than supervise school activities. Secondly, schools were best suited to keep young people off the streets where they might cause trouble for the tactical
troops. Thirdly, school buildings would be the most convenient places to administer services to young people, such as health care or food. Consequently the only necessary action would have to be to purge schools and teachers of Nazi ideology and textbooks. Furthermore Military Government would encourage administrative reform by the Germans. Organizing youth along democratic principles entered the picture relatively late in the process. Washington and European Headquarters neither envisioned nor desired direct contacts between Americans and young Germans.

Once American troops occupied Germany, however, American policy and its implementation towards youth never remained at a standstill. In Washington the Department of State continued to press for a policy statement that would implement its policies of a comprehensive and positive reeducation of Germany's younger generation. In Germany Military Government leaders faced the task of building an Allied Control Council. Redeployment to Japan and to the United States after August 1945, as well as setting up a functioning administration for the occupation forces and for military government, became major concerns for Lucius D. Clay and his staff. At the same time Military Government would have to take care of desolate economic, political and social conditions in the American zone of occupation that nobody had expected. The rehabilitation of youth consequently received scant attention and resources by the leading men in Germany,
although they recognized the importance of the task. Nevertheless youth work became an important factor in the communities throughout the American zone of occupation. Military Government officials in charge of education never gave up the fight. In the end they received support from some quite unexpected and not always welcome quarters.
CHAPTER II

Becoming Acquainted: 1944-45

The initial phase of the American presence in Germany taught valuable lessons to three groups: the occupiers, the older generation of reform minded Germans, and to the younger generation itself. Initiatives for contacts with the German population came from the over 1.5 million soldiers stationed in Germany and encompassed far more than meeting Fräuleins. These initial contacts in many ways set the tone for future relations and left lasting impressions on the German side. The individual experiences with the American soldiers became a crucial ingredient in the formation of attitudes toward Americans, particularly for the younger generation and those who became involved in youth work after the war.

Occupying Germany

The first months of the American occupation of Germany were more difficult than the Americans had expected because they had not anticipated dealing with a complete political and social vacuum as well as an unimaginable scale of destruction. Military Government detachments in general found the population docile, often eager to serve their new masters. There was no resistance to speak of once the fighting was over. The problems were the same all over Germany: Nazis had fled the premises, often destroying valuable town records before they abandoned their posts.
Where fighting had been heavy, the infrastructure as well as utilities were interrupted. In almost all the bigger cities looting took place before the Americans could reestablish order. As long as the fighting lasted in Germany, a community could be confronted with different Army units and Military Government detachments who might issue contradicting orders. At the same time the tactical troops and their commanders, who were usually higher in rank than Military Government officers, pursued their own objectives which sometimes were detrimental to the occupational objectives. Looting by the troops initially was rather widespread. GIs, however, seemed to be interested in souvenirs rather than doing harm to the people.

By the end of 1944 Americans advanced into Germany. They found the same picture everywhere. Civilians awaited the end of hostilities in cellars, air raid shelters or in the countryside. Most of them simply waited for the ordeal to be over and wanted it to pass quickly. Usually heavy artillery and intense air raids prepared the advance of the Americans. Then the tanks came in and finally infantry cleaned up and advanced to the next community.¹

Nuremberg had suffered greatly from repeated bombing raids. The British targeted the city as a whole, whereas the Americans focused their strategic bombing mainly on

Nuremberg's industry, marshalling yards, and the train station. By April 16, 1945 American forces had reached the outskirts of the city, but even that late in the war, German soldiers did their duty and defended the city. Typically for the National Socialists, their most prominent representative, Julius Streicher had fled, but in a rare display of loyalty to Hitler and probably with no illusions about the fate that awaited them after the war, the mayor and the Gauleiter decided to participate and die in the city's last battle. Fighting lasted for five days, with approximately five thousand German defenders, many of them too young, too old, or too inexperienced to be effective and with hardly any equipment left. They faced almost ten times their number of battle-hardened GIs on the American side who could count on air support and artillery. Fighting was bitter and fierce, but by April 20 the Americans had broken German resistance. They celebrated their victory on Hitler's last birthday at the site of his party rallies. The price for this final and unnecessary bloodshed was the almost complete destruction of everything in the inner city which the bombing raids had left intact, not to mention a long list of casualties. Nuremberg had become a heap of rubble. The remnants of the defending forces marched off to the infamous Rhine valley prison camps. Nevertheless, the civilian population felt relief that the war was over for them. Not quite three weeks after the
battle of Nuremberg Germany surrendered and the occupation officially began.²

First Encounters

The Second World War created misery and death all over Europe. The Germans had demonstrated that warfare could be carried to a new level of destruction with their racial and scorched earth policies in the Soviet Union. Soviet troops encountered fierce resistance all the way to Berlin. Governments in Moscow and Berlin intensified hatred and fear with propaganda campaigns that preached nothing but hatred. German atrocities during the preceding four years undoubtedly contributed to a complete breakdown of any restraints by Red Army soldiers and, when the Soviets finally fought their way into Germany, turned into a nightmare for German civilians. Atrocities occurred on all sides, but on the western front the belligerents adhered far more to the rules of the Geneva Convention than in the East. American soldiers perceived their German counterparts as troops doing a job and usually

²Karl Kunze, Der Kampf um Nürnberg (Nürnberg [Nuremberg]: Verein für Geschichte der Stadt Nürnberg, 1995) provides an extremely detailed, but at times not well organized account of the battle of Nuremberg. In his attempt to do justice to the German side, he tends to overemphasize American atrocities.

It is interesting to note that Kunze actually participated in the final battle as a very young man. He later became a teacher and in this capacity was selected to travel to the United States in the very first exchange group under the auspices of the Fulbright program in 1952. See also Henke (813-843) for a detailed picture of the disintegration of the Nazi party and its effects on the German population.
did not harbor any deep hatred for them. There were attempts on both sides to arrange for a modus vivendi at times when the fronts were stalled, to take care of the wounded, or to observe Christian holidays. Initially GIs reacted strongly to German atrocities they witnessed in concentration camps, but the memories of most were surprisingly short.

The first encounters between Germans and Americans during the final phase of the war should not be underestimated in their significance. No German knew what to expect from the American soldiers. Goebbels' propaganda machine had painted a gruesome picture of rape and looting. Racial prejudices made many people especially apprehensive about African-American troops. The soldiers' behavior

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3Lee Kennet, *GI: The American Soldier in World War II* (New York: Warner, 1987) 155-162; Oliver Frederiksen (*The American Military Occupation of Germany 1945-1953* (Headquarters: United States Army, Europe [Heidelberg]: United States Army, Historical Division, 1953) 130-132); also Henke 244. Frederiksen, an official Army historian, stated that Nazi atrocities initially had an impact on the soldiers' behavior towards the Germans but that many GIs changed their attitude almost immediately after the end of hostilities. This very interesting fact has escaped the attention of some scholars who deal with German-American grassroots relations after the war. Wolfgang Eckart, for example, maintains that American soldiers in general harbored strong anti-German sentiments throughout the occupation without substantiating his claim.


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towards civilians would set the tone for future relations between the victors and the vanquished. Young people who had not known anything else but a Germany that was shut off from the rest of the world by the National Socialists would be especially impressed during their first encounters with a new world.4

Some Germans had become acquainted with the United States as early as 1943. The soldiers of the Afrika Korps who were captured by the Americans ended up in POW camps in the United States. Those of the early prisoners who maintained strong Nazi convictions were able to obtain control of the camp populations and to install a system of military order which also maintained much of Nazi thought and propaganda. Anti-Nazis were usually segregated and sent into special camps. Americans failed to realize that between the two extremes existed a large number of prisoners who expressed nationalism but were not ardent followers of the

4Rolf Schörken (Jugend 1945: Politisches Denken und Lebensgeschichte (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1994) 29-31) and Ruhl (7-53) show that people in Germany were much less apprehensive about an American occupation than they were about falling into Soviet hands. The fears towards the Soviet armies were justified. Apart from Naimark, Guido Knopp (Das Ende 1945 - Der verdammte Krieg (München [Munich]: Bertelsmann, 1995)) presents a less scholarly account containing photos, interviews, and documents from German and Russian sources which draw a stark picture of the realities in the East. Knopp successfully strikes a balance between the German racial warfare in the Soviet Union and the fate of German refugees and civilians once the Red Army caught up with them in 1944 and 1945. Eckart (122-123) emphasizes that Germans only had Goebbels' propaganda as a source and as a result were rather apprehensive about their first encounters with American troops.
National Socialists. Initially the Army was only interested in maintaining order and getting the German POWs to work, mainly in agriculture. It was not until 1945 that Americans made attempts to make re-education a feature in German Camps.5

Germans in POW camps displayed considerable curiosity about the United States and got to know America through their work and their contacts with the local population. Since many of the camps were located in the South, the prisoners became acquainted with a society in which African-Americans were disfranchised and both races were strictly segregated. Their experiences tended to reinforce the racial prejudices many had come to accept in National Socialist doctrine. The men who were exposed to American racial realities would certainly find it difficult to perceive American re-education and democratization programs in their camps as well as in Germany as more than mere and insincere propaganda.6

A number of the German prisoners, however, did take advantage of the chance to learn something new while they were in the United States. Willy Gensmantel, who had lived in Nuremberg before enlisting in the German army and would

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5Arnold Krammer (Nazi Prisoners of War in America (Chelsea: Scarborough, 1991)) is a very well illustrated and documented account of the German POW experience in the United States; see also Rafael Zagovec ("German Prisoners of War and the Homefront in Louisiana, 1943-46: A Cultural Interpretation", M.A. Thesis, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1995) 179-256.

6Krammer 151; Zagovec 179-256; Füssl 66.
return there after his release, was one of the veterans of the African campaign. He was not the typical POW. Born in 1919, Gensmantel came from a working family and had been a member of the trade union youth before 1933. After he had finished his apprenticeship, Gensmantel decided to volunteer for the Reichsarbeitsdienst, the massive Nazi job program for young Germans. After his service there Gensmantel enlisted in the army. His motive for volunteering was that a worker in Germany could not get full pay until he was twenty one years old.7

The Americans took Gensmantel prisoner in Africa in 1943. He spent the next three years of his life in the United States. Initially he shared the fate of most German prisoners and went to a number of camps in the South where he worked in agriculture. He decided that the best way to pass the time without getting homesick was to participate in as many camp activities as possible. Gensmantel played in a band, sang in a choir, became a member of a theater group, and volunteered for kitchen work.8

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7Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995. Gensmantel was one of various leading trade union members whom I was able to interview at the unions' headquarters thanks to the efforts of Horst Klaus, a retired trade union youth secretary, who has been working very hard to make the trade unions' postwar history available to the younger generation.

8Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995; Krammer 50-78.
These activities were the only positive aspect Gensmantel could find in his captivity. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men lived different lives. What he found most objectionable was that Americans made it very clear to the prisoners that they regarded them all as Nazis and made no attempt to differentiate between those who served in the armed forces because they had no choice, and those who had actually supported Hitler. On the contrary, it seemed to Gensmantel that the officers, without whose support Hitler would not have been able to take over the reins of Germany, got the better end of the deal. Officers, for example, always had enough to eat but never bothered to share their food with the enlisted men who had to work hard and got just 1200 calories per day. Gensmantel recalled that the American Army did not react kindly to guards who became friendly with the prisoners. He thought that the Americans were Germany's equal when it came to punishing soldiers who deviated from the norm.

Gensmantel spent time in various states throughout the deep South. The people of German ancestry especially disappointed Gensmantel, because he found many ardent Nazi supporters among them, but he also became aware of the evils of a segregated society. According to him, however, the low

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9 Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995; Krammer (148-151) documents a wide range of attitudes towards German prisoners which went from hatred to aiding POWs in their escape attempts.
status and discrimination of the African-Americans had its advantages for the German prisoners. Both groups were exploited by the same masters, so many African-Americans did not seem to have problems in helping the prisoners whenever they could, above all by providing them with food. Germans who benefitted from this support tried to return the favors. Whenever white persons became aware of the system, however, they did everything to disrupt these ties.

After the first year Gensmantel was sent to a special prison camp because he refused to work. He and others sent there argued that every German who worked in the United States freed an American for war duties that ultimately would kill Germans. Although his argument was consistent with the Geneva convention, the Americans did not like it. Living conditions in Camp Alva, Oklahoma, were considerably worse than anywhere else. His situation improved when he volunteered for one of the re-education and democratization courses which the Army offered to over 23,000 of the 370,000 German prisoners in the United States from 1945 on. According to him, the Americans only accepted people in the courses who had not been members in any Nazi organizations. Since he had participated in the trade union youth, the Nazis had excluded him from membership in the Hitler youth. This enabled him to take part in the program and stay on to the end. He witnessed that others were sent back to their camps as soon as the Americans learned about their membership in
party organizations. Gensmantel was impressed with the personalities and the professional instruction he received. According to him, it was in those camps that he obtained the foundation for his democratic convictions and the motivation for his political activities in Germany. He came back to Germany convinced that the best way to make a German a good democrat was to teach him disobedience.\(^\text{10}\)

The Americans had instructed participants in the courses to look for jobs either in the Counter Intelligence Corps, in agriculture or in the public sector when they got home. When Gensmantel left the United States, American soldiers took away everything he had. He arrived at Nuremberg in May 1946, weighing only 37 Kilos (about 80 American pounds). Working as an American agent was out of the question for him, so he opted for the public sector. Gensmantel immediately found a job in a railroad yard and became an organizer for the trade unions' youth work after just four weeks on the job. At the same time he began to build a youth section in the workers'

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\(^{10}\)Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995; Krammer (219-227) provides additional details on Fort Eustis and the re-education program; see also "Anti-Nazi PW Returns," Office of Military Government for Germany, U.S., Weekly Information Bulletin [hereinafter OMGUS Information Bulletin] no. 37, 15 Apr. 1946: 9. The bulletin served as a link between headquarters and the field. It must have been a vital and welcome source for the field officers because it highlighted, summarized and interpreted the never ending flow of orders. The bulletin's section on German reactions to American policies provided background information for those Americans who did not speak German. Headquarters also included stories on detachment activities it considered exemplary.
sports club in Fürth, Nuremberg’s neighbor city. He would later become one of the most outspoken youth representatives in Nuremberg. The Nuremberg trade unions later appointed him full time youth secretary. His goal was to make the trade unions a second home for young people, because they could offer them support. He knew that the unions could count on American help."

Although Gensmantel’s experiences were rather extreme in some respects, most German prisoners returned to Germany with an appreciation for the United States, its people, but also its power. The Army’s re-education courses provided men like Gensmantel, who were willing to listen to new ideas and had a clean past, with an opportunity to rethink their political and social attitudes and motivated them to actively participate in Germany’s reconstruction along democratic lines.

While German and American soldiers encountered each other on the battlefields from 1943 on, it was not until the late summer of 1944 that German civilians got to know the Americans. In August American troops established their first bridgehead in Germany. They got a surprisingly friendly reception. Once the immediate danger of the fighting was

"Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995. MG headquarters informed its field officers about the purpose of the program in April 1946 and instructed them to give the Germans who had participated in it priority over any others in the clearance process they had to go through when they applied for a job in the public sector. "Anti Nazi PW Returns," OMGUS Information Bulletin no. 37, 15 Apr. 1946: 9.
over, Germans came out to have a closer look at the conquerors. They greeted GIs on the streets and permitted their children to wave at them.\textsuperscript{12}

Keeping their attitude towards German soldiers in mind, it is not surprising that GIs quickly established contact with the population once they entered Germany. It did not take long until pictures showing Germans and American soldiers celebrating the end of the war together reached Washington. Chief of Staff General Marshall informed SHAEF that Washington did not look kindly upon these events. Eisenhower immediately issued orders that prohibited any form of fraternization.\textsuperscript{13} The soldiers were not happy. Arthur Goodfriend, editor-in-chief of the Army's official newspaper, the Stars and Stripes, conducted an unofficial opinion survey among the troops shortly after the orders came out. He found that the soldiers in general were favorably impressed with the Germans. Some even thought that the Germans were "cleaner and damned sight friendlier than the Frogs [French]". Stars and Stripes described the situation in Aachen:

1) German Civilians are giving Yanks the V-sign, the glad hand, the free beer, big smiles and plenty of talk about not being Nazis at heart, and hurray for democracy.

\textsuperscript{12}Ziemke 138-139; on September 14, 1944 the London Times published an article under the headline "Germans Welcome the Invaders" (quoted in Woller 57-58).

\textsuperscript{13}Henke 284-297; Ziemke 97-99.
2) Some G.I.s and plenty of officers are returning the smiles, flirting with the Fräuleins, drinking the beer and starting to think what nice folks the Germans really are.

The headline admonished the readers not to "Get Chummy With Gerry," but Goodfriend and other officers did not think that the soldiers would obey the order for more than a month.  

The American occupation of Aachen and its surroundings took place before the Battle of the Bulge and the discovery of Nazi concentration camps in Germany. Aachen was a border region and overwhelmingly Catholic. Some Americans thought that it was not typical and justified their friendly behavior towards the Germans there in this way. One might assume that the Battle of the Bulge, German atrocities, and the discovery of concentration camps might have changed the initial friendly inclinations of American GIs once they arrived at the heartland of Germany. The region of Middle Franconia in Bavaria seemed to be more representative of Nazi Germany. The biggest community in the region was Nuremberg, infamous for hosting the Nazi party rallies and for the antisemitic laws of 1935 which came to bear its name. Middle Franconia had been a Nazi stronghold with Julius Streicher as its Gauleiter until even the Nazi party could not tolerate his excesses anymore. Americans got there by April 1945, at a time when Nazi atrocities in concentration camps were widely

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14 Ziemke 142-143; Davidson (54-56) documents the intensive campaign against fraternization in the Stars and Stripes.
publicized among the troops. The units involved in the operations in that region had fought in the Battle of the Bulge and, more recently, had to break strong German resistance between Heilbronn and Crailsheim in Württemberg before they could enter Bavaria. They had to fight their last major battle in the ruins of the city. Their behavior towards the Germans could be expected to be less friendly than that of the Americans who had come into Aachen.\footnote{Woller (27-44) provides an excellent overview of the history of region between 1933 and 1945; for American troop movements in the region during the last weeks of the war see Woller 46.} 

In Middle Franconia, just as everywhere else, the first indication of the impending arrival of American troops was a steady stream of German units and individual soldiers who sought a last defensive position or tried to avoid being captured. It was obvious to everyone that this army was completely disintegrating. Young and old people were painfully aware of the sorry physical and mental condition of most soldiers as they stole through forests in an attempt to escape American troops and planes.\footnote{Georg Bergler, *Zwischen Ende und Anfang: Die Erlebnisse des Herrn Jedermann im Jahre Null* (Nürnberg [Nuremberg]: Frankenverlag, 1963) 88-93; Henke 958-964; Woller 46; Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995.}

If there was any fighting for villages or towns it did not last long. Even the city of Nuremberg held out for only five days. Often the Americans entered the communities without having to fire a shot. This was the case in
Hersching, near Munich. H. Wisura, an eighteen-year-old refugee from the Sudetenland in 1945, was there and witnessed the American occupation. According to him, the Americans came to town more as visitors than combat troops. Parts of the population even welcomed them. All little children received Hershey chocolate. In general Wisura thought that the Americans were exceptionally well behaved, especially in comparison with the French troops who were just across the river and did not display the restraint and discipline of the Americans.17

Middle Franconia was no exception. As may be expected from a defeated nation, Germans tried to please the victors. The official history of the 42nd Division, which was involved in the operations in the region, recorded the eagerness with which the Germans tried to serve their new masters. Tank barriers disappeared in a matter of minutes, and many natives offered to help the Americans move into their villages and towns. When the Germans were ordered to turn in their

17H. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994. The events during the initial phase of the Russian occupation are the topic of numerous accounts published above all by German refugee organizations. Knopp and Naimark are the latest and most balanced accounts of the final months of the war in the East; Henke (200, especially fn 191) and F. Roy Willis (France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1967, revised and expanded edition (Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, 1968) 32-33) provide information on the French and Soviet troops' behavior; see also Clemens Vollnhals, "Die Evangelische Kirche zwischen Traditionswahrung und Neuorientierung," Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland, eds. Martin Broszat et al. (München [Munich]: Oldenbourg, 1990) 153.
weapons, they brought guns, pistols, helmets, gas masks, Nazi party insignia and everything else they thought might incriminate them as a Nazi or a soldier. German behavior went a step further than just fulfilling orders. The Army historian reported that the Germans displayed considerable curiosity and friendliness towards the occupiers. This behavior stood in marked contrast to the attitude the Germans displayed towards their own soldiers who marched by to prisoner of war camps. The civilians did not even seem to notice their presence.\textsuperscript{18}

The behavior of the American soldiers during and immediately after the fighting did much to disperse initial apprehension. A little village about forty miles away from Nuremberg, for example, was hit by American planes when remnants of SS units fired at the advancing American troops. The German civilians certainly could not expect American benevolence after the incident, but the story of a seventeen-year-old Hitler Youth leader in full uniform is symptomatic of the GIs' attitude. The young man was so absorbed with firefighting and cleaning up the rubble that he did not realize that an American tank had stopped right behind him. When he became aware of the tank, he allegedly made an awkward attempt to cover his insignia, fearing for his life. He need not have worried, since, according to him, the tank's trap door opened and a black soldier came out laughing,

\textsuperscript{18}Woller 57.
apparently delighted by the little prank he had just pulled on the German. Almost forty years after the event the man recalled that the American had reversed years of Nazi propaganda with one non-blow."19

The situation was the same throughout the region. A resident of Fürth, a city adjacent to Nuremberg, recalled her first experiences with the Americans. Some children first left a bunker once the fighting stopped and soon returned with candy and chocolate. Everybody in the bunker agreed, the eyewitness reported, that the Americans could not be mad at the Germans if they treated the children so well.20 On the other end of Fürth Hanns Bader, a sixteen-year-old Hitler Youth member, had been ordered to report to a Nazi indoctrination camp in nearby Cadolzburg, supposedly to prepare him for subversive actions. In one of Fürth's suburbs he was unable to continue his journey because the Americans had already occupied the road. A German soldier prevented him from trying to get through the lines and sent him home, where his mother took away his uniform and hid it.

19Woller 58. Apparently African-American combat troops operated in and around Nuremberg. Many Germans remembered that Nazi propaganda had made them especially apprehensive about the behavior of African American soldiers. The positive experiences of many Germans, however, provided a stark contrast to Goebbels' indoctrination. We will see in the course of the dissertation that especially encounters with black Americans could do much to disperse racial prejudices and to undermine the very foundations of Nazi propaganda in young people.

20Woller 58.
Bader recalled that the first encounter with Americans was rather tense, but that the GIs behaved correctly and many of them spoke German. When Americans found out about his leadership position in the Hitler Youth, they took him to the courthouse for questioning. Bader could go after the session and did not have to endure any physical or emotional abuse. He recalled that the American who interrogated him turned out to be a former citizen of Fürth. The city had a large and quite wealthy Jewish community when Hitler took over Germany in 1933. It is possible that a number of these Jews were able to emigrate before Hitler went to war and decided to embark on the complete destruction of the European Jews. A good number of emigres seemed to return as Allied soldiers to their home country. They not only provided vital services as interpreters, but many also seemed to have developed an interest in participating actively in reforming Germany.\footnote{Hanns Bader, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994. Henry Kissinger is probably the most prominent member of this group. He was a member of an American military government unit after the war and certainly visited Fürth, where he was born and spent the first years of his life. Many others may have ended up in combat units or even may have volunteered to participate in the occupation of their former home towns. It made perfect sense for the army to rely on people who were familiar with the region and the language. I have not been able, however, to substantiate these assumptions. A study of the military’s use of German emigres in combat units and in the occupation of Germany is long overdue. So far only the Germans who were active in the Office of Strategic Services in Washington have received some of the historians’ attention. Füssl (62-66) bases his account of the Americans’ initial experiences with young Germans entirely on OSS reports. Although they undoubtedly convey accurate information about individual cases, they may not be representative for the entire population. A study on the...}
Many Nurembergers had left the city before the Americans arrived. They had either been evacuated or bombed out, or they simply had left before the last battle began. Since they were widely dispersed, their first encounters with Americans took place under many different conditions and represent the initial experiences between Germans and Americans in general quite well.

Helga Arnold, at the time twenty-one years old, had been evacuated from Nuremberg to Pappenheim, a small town in the Altmühl valley, where she met the first American troops. She remembered that she had apprehensions, especially about African-American soldiers, but that nothing happened to the field operations would be necessary to help evaluate the reports. In view of the past experiences and the very pessimistic view most of the emigres had towards Germany, it is not surprising that their reports seemed to have the tendency to draw a very stark picture of the effects of Nazi indoctrination on the population, which included youth. To my knowledge nobody has examined the backgrounds of the men who conducted the interviews and wrote these reports. An oral history project which Petra Marquardt-Bigman, an expert on the OSS reports, is conducting for the German Historical Institute is conducting at the moment (fall 1996) may shed more light on these questions. Füssl (78-81) himself points out that many emigres were understandably not at all favorably inclined towards Germany. It would have been natural for them to look for evidence which reaffirmed their attitudes. Arno Hamburger, for example, had experienced Nazi discrimination against Jews in Nuremberg firsthand. He joined the British army in Palestine after he had been able to escape from Nuremberg and Nazi prosecution. Hamburger did not make it into Germany during the war, but returned to Nuremberg immediately after the end of hostilities. He did not find that the adults had changed at all. He did think, however, that the young people might offer a chance for changes and became involved in the Army’s German Youth Activities program later (Arno Hamburger, personal interview, 11 Aug. 1994).
civilian population. Americans entered the house where she was staying and searched it, but did not break anything.  

Friedrich Voigt, thirty-three years old in 1945, worked for the telecommunications branch of the German postal services. Together with his wife he had brought some furniture to the little town of Wassertrüdingen, about thirty miles away from Nuremberg. He managed to be there when the Americans came. The inhabitants of this village decided to hoist white flags which they had taken from a train American planes had just destroyed when American troops approached the village. Voigt had thrown his uniform and rifle in a nearby river long before two white and three black Americans entered the house. His wife greeted them in English and Voigt offered the soldiers some fresh eggs. When they saw that he was smoking a cigarette with French paper, they thought that he was a displaced person and left cigarettes for him and chocolate for his daughter. The GIs returned after a few days for more eggs and left more food.  

When fighting actually occurred, Germans in Franconia as well as everywhere else, waited for its end in the basements of their houses or in bunkers. Many met the first American soldiers in these retreats. Heinz Fiegl, at the time fifteen years old, was in Nuremberg during the battle. He remembered that he was a little worried about the safety of the women
when the Americans came in, because he was alone with his mother and a female friend in the basement. All other neighbors had gone to a public bunker. Fiegl recalled that one could tell that Americans were in the house, because their boots had rubber soles and could hardly be heard in contrast to the German army boots with leather soles. Initially the Fiegl’s apprehensions seemed to come true. The two soldiers approached the women, but after some tense moments the Germans were able to change the GIs’ intentions. The Americans even became very friendly, although nobody spoke the others’ language. First both soldiers unpacked some chocolate for the Germans. Then one of them went away, while the other played with the neighbor’s cat. Soon the second soldier returned with some food for the Germans and then both left to continue the fight.²⁴

Even those people who were very skeptical about the Americans or suffered damages from denazification and requisitions of their houses or property later, remembered that the first troops they met behaved correctly. Helga Köhler, for example, was twenty-five years old when the Americans came. Troops searched her house and came downstairs to look for German soldiers. When they did not find any, they left. She recalled that the owner of the house, a small shopkeeper, recognized a number of the American soldiers. They had actually been his Jewish

²⁴Heinz Fiegl, personal interview, 6 July 1995.
neighbors before they had had to flee the Nazis in the thirties.25

Some adults were not afraid to show their relief and happiness about the end of the war. Women hugged the first American soldiers they saw when they were allowed to leave the bunkers after the end of hostilities. Their behavior did not meet the approval of the German men who witnessed it.26

The younger the Germans were at the time, the less apprehensive they seemed to have been. Many of them had their first encounters with Americans in the countryside, where they had been evacuated to protect them from bombing raids and fighting. No fighting meant that Americans and the children of their enemies could meet under more favorable conditions.26

25Helga Köhler, personal interview, 13 July 1994. She was not the only person to observe this. The director of a vocational school, for example, reported that he met an American officer who spoke fluent German while looking for hospital supplies immediately after the end of the fighting. He struck up a conversation and found out that this officer was the son of a Jewish toy shop owner who had emigrated to the United States in 1933 (Nuremberg City Archives [hereinafter NCA] C36/I no. 322). See also Hanns Bader, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994, for neighboring Fürth. It seems that many former Germans returned with Allied troops to Germany, but so far there are no numbers at all to corroborate the impressions of the German interviewees. Arno Hamburger’s experiences may not have been typical for most emigres, but they illustrate well the strange ways in which Germans found their way back into Germany. After the war he found that his parents had miraculously survived the Holocaust. Hamburger became an interpreter at the Nuremberg trials. His parents convinced him not to leave Germany again and so he became one of the few German Jews who actually decided to return to Germany for good. (Arno Hamburger, personal interview, 11 Aug. 1994).

26Reports of Rolf Goetzinger and Vocational School Director Hehl; NCA C36/I no. 322.
circumstances. Winfried Blümel, for example, was twelve years old when he met the first American soldiers in Tirol, Austria. He was impressed with the stark contrast between German and American troops at the end of the war. Blümel remembered German troops herding what looked like concentration camp inmates passed his house just a few days before the Americans arrived. They entered the town exactly on the same street with their guns ready for action. According to Blümel, the initial contacts usually came quickly between children and American soldiers, especially African-American GIs. The children usually were not afraid, and Blümel thought that it was more a matter of mentality how quickly one would leave the house and make contact. The children were interested above all in oranges, chocolates, and the jeeps.

Gerhard Springer was eight years old in 1945. His father was an engineer in a Nuremberg motorcycle factory. Springer spent the last months of the war in Weissenbronn, a little village between Nuremberg and Ansbach, about fifteen miles away from Nuremberg. He lived with the local butcher, who was a World War I veteran, head of the fire brigade, and in this function automatically the commander of the local Volkssturm, Hitler's last attempt to mobilize old men and children for the last battle. Springer remembered the steady stream of German soldiers walking through the woods. His

host parked a gas truck of an SS unit behind his house for a while, but these German troops just like all others just passed through.²⁸

Springer observed that the Americans made their presence felt first with artillery which they directed towards a small street junction behind the village. Then an American tank with four soldiers arrived to negotiate the surrender of the village. As soon as that was done, a tank barrier the villagers had been ordered to construct at the end of the street disappeared within minutes. The Americans arrived with the Germans in the houses watching the scene from behind the windows. Soon the first Germans left their houses, but the situation was still tense. Finally Yugoslav displaced persons who had worked in the fields for the villagers and apparently had been treated well broke the ice. They talked to the soldiers and suddenly the atmosphere changed. The GIs descended from their vehicles to greet the population and to distribute candy. The children inspected the American vehicles. Springer was impressed, because he never had been able to get so close to any German unit and their equipment. These combat troops left almost immediately. The next day Springer saw the first African-American soldiers who drove ammunition trucks at breakneck speed through the village.²⁹

²⁸Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995.
The villagers' initial experience ended on an unpleasant note. An American infantry unit marched in and ordered the entire village population out into two barns where they had to spend the night. When they were allowed to return to the village the next day, the soldiers had cut featherbeds in all houses open and emptied all preserves they could find on them. Since these soldiers were not motorized, Springer suspected later that they either belonged to a unit that was being punished or that they were displaced persons wearing American uniforms.\(^{30}\)

Springer apparently was one of relatively few young people who witnessed negative actions by men in American uniforms. Two years after the war Nuremberg's school superintendent Barthel had students write about their most memorable experiences. It is not surprising that most of the students wrote about the war and the bombing of Nuremberg. A number of the surviving essays, however, also deal with the first encounters the children had with the occupiers. One girl, born in 1934, remembered the bombardment of the village where she was living with her mother by American planes. Soon after the attack the first American tanks appeared on the street. Their crews distributed candy and chocolate while the mother was occupied until the night with helping

\(^{30}\)Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995. Springer's assumption about the supposedly American troops is probably correct. The Americans had difficulties all over their zone with displaced persons who committed crimes in American uniforms (Ziemke 355-356).
the farmers to control the fires the attacks had caused. A boy, who was eight years old at the time, recorded that American artillery severely damaged his family's house. Nevertheless he thought that the end of the war meant the beginning of a "nice time", because the children received lots of food from the Americans. A nine year old boy who had been evacuated to another village recorded a similar experience. After heavy artillery bombardments the Americans came. People left the cellars to watch the new rulers occupying their village. American kindness seemed to help children cope with the destruction of the fighting around them and did much to counteract Goebbels' negative propaganda of impending rape and looting. The boy wrote that the children went up to the Americans and got chocolate. His final remark adequately sums up the young people's experiences: "I had imagined that it would be much worse."3

Refugees who came mainly from Silesia and the Sudetenland made their acquaintance with Americans during their flight from the Russians. Johannes Wahner was sixteen years old in 1945. He and his mother had escaped the Russians in Breslau. Just like Hanns Bader in Fürth, Wahner was ordered to present himself at a camp in the Riesengebirge

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to get some military training. When the men in charge of the camp learned of Hitler's death, they obviously realized that the war was all but over and sent the youngsters home. Like so many refugees, Wahner and his fatherless family spent much time on trains without knowing where they were going. They went to Prague and finally ended up in the Sudeten mountains. His first encounters with Americans were unpleasant. American fighter pilots shot at anything that moved on the streets at the end of the war. Wahner had to dive for cover on various occasions. He remembered that the planes were flying so low that you could actually see the pilots' faces. According to him, young people, who apparently often still regarded the war as an exciting adventure as long as they did not have to confront death directly, did not take those attacks very seriously or personally, whereas adults began to harbor very negative feelings.

Wahner met Americans for the first time when they occupied Mies, where his and his family's odyssey had ended for the time being. Influenced by the Nazi propaganda, he and his family were initially afraid of the African-American soldiers who came and searched their basement. Wahner recalled that the only place where he ever had seen black people was the circus in Breslau, Silesia's capital. The Czechs greeted the liberators enthusiastically. GIs threw candy and chocolate to them from their vehicles. It did not take the German children long to emulate the behavior of the
Czechs and get their share of goodies. Wahner was impressed with the fitness and the size of the soldiers. He recalled that hunger and curiosity overcame any reservations he may have had, so he went with other youngsters to the hotel the Americans had requisitioned. The soldiers wanted to meet Fräuleins. Wahner and his friends were able to provide the contacts and received chocolate in return. According to him, there was no fear once the Germans realized that the Americans looked the same and acted the same as everybody else. Language problems apparently were no barrier against becoming acquainted.32

Since African-American soldiers were physically different and had received much negative publicity by the Nazi propaganda machine, they attracted special attention from the Germans. Some people also remembered the deplorable behavior of Moroccan troops the French had deployed in Germany after World War I, a fact that Goebbels used extensively to instill fear in the German population. Events during the initial phase of the occupation, however, often tended to reverse the apprehensions. Even today black soldiers have a special place in many German recollections. One lady, at the time six years old, remembered the American occupation of Buch, a small suburb of Nuremberg. American tanks stopped right in front of their house and two African-American soldiers knocked at the door with their submachine

guns ready. The girl's mother opened the door, but panicked and locked it again. The girl's father, a handicapped man, showed better judgement and let the soldiers in. The children, impressed by Nazi propaganda that depicted black Americans as cannibals and subhumans, were scared to death and remained in the basement. After the two GIs had satisfied themselves, however, that no German soldiers were hiding in the house, they relaxed and ordered coffee. They did not accept the Germans' coffee substitute made of roasted barley, but provided their own instant coffee which they shared with their hosts. After he had finished his coffee, one of the GIs pulled a roll of drops out of his pocket which he offered to the children in exchange for a kiss. The lady's younger sister was the first one to get the idea and immediately complied. Her older sister followed suit and was rewarded in the same manner. All these experiences left lasting impressions on children and adolescents in the region which they remembered vividly. While in other regions of Germany the war ended in a nightmare, their memories were much more positive. They may not have perceived the Americans as liberators, but the candy, the openness, and the friendliness of many GIs made the beginning of the occupation something positive, may be, even desirable. Instead of bombs and fear there was candy and peace.3

33"Kuß für eine Rolle Drops," Trümmerjahre: 10.
What Germans may not have realized at the time was that these experiences bore special significance for the African-American GIs who came from a segregated society and had to fight the war against Hitler in a segregated army in which they had to face many instances of discrimination. Looking at a white woman or being friendly to a white child could have dire consequences even for a man in uniform in the Deep South. Going out with a German Fräulein or demanding a kiss for some candy from a German child may have meant much more for African-American than for white GIs. It provided a possibility to transgress race barriers without being punished for it. The soldiers who were able to enjoy these kinds of opportunities in Germany certainly formed a pool of men that was very perceptive to the call of the civil rights movement of the fifties at home. The popularity of assignments to Europe among African-American troops showed that they were certainly aware of these possibilities and the lack of discrimination.34

34The role of African-Americans in the occupation of Germany has not received the attention it deserves. American historians recognized African-American discontent with segregation and discrimination in the Armed forces. It is well established now that African-Americans clearly realized the discrepancy between fighting oppression abroad and their own misery at home. Historians also found that a great number of African-American GIs and officers, especially if they were from the north, began to protest the strict segregation and discrimination they found in training camps and in Southern communities where most of the camps were located.

While there exist excellent studies on the African-Americans' experiences with discrimination and on the integration of the armed forces, nobody has examined how the
The rather good behavior of many American soldiers did not mean that Germans got away completely unharmed. One little girl witnessed how four GIs entered their apartment and threw beds and mattresses from her parents' sleeping room on a truck in front of the house. Everybody fled to the basement with the exception of the grandfather. At first the family feared that the soldiers had also taken him along. To everybody's relief the damage was just material. The GIs had left him unharmed in the apartment. It seemed that during the combat phase every GI wanted to take home some souvenir. For many Germans who happened to run into Americans during the operational phase, "USA" quickly acquired a new meaning: Uhrensammler Armee (watch collector army) or Uhren stehlen's auch (they also steal watches).35

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35Essay by a Nuremberg elementary school student: "An Experience which I will not forget;" NCA E 10/1 no. 21, essay no. 44; report of vocational school director Hehl; NCA C36/I no. 322; Woller (57-59) detected the same pattern in the region around Nuremberg; see also Ziemke 250-252, "Uhrensammler unterwegs: Amerikaner interessierten sich für Wertgegenstände," Trümmerjahre: 6. The Germans' postwar
There were, of course, American soldiers who did not show any restraint or friendliness towards the Germans. Rape and serious looting as well as wanton destruction of property did occur.\textsuperscript{36} An elderly lady who was not at all well disposed towards the occupiers reported that parts of the troops quartered in her house displayed rather rude behavior and stole whatever they could. She also noted that occasionally the soldiers destroyed property for no reason. The woman concluded, however, that she "was sorry to say that German soldiers calmly admit that they had not behaved better in enemy countries." She paid special attention to African-American GIs, observing that "niggers" camped on the former party rally grounds, but that one "did not have to be afraid of the 'Blacks.'"\textsuperscript{37}

definition of USA is still very much a commonplace among the people who experienced the American occupation. If many years of listening to stories in the family and among friends in Germany are any indicator, the immense interest for watches seemed to have been one of the few things GIs and Russian soldiers had in common. The difference seems to have been that Russians were more inclined to resort to violence if they encountered resistance, whereas Americans just took the items they wanted without harming anyone seriously. Looting by American troops also usually did not last longer than a few days.

\textsuperscript{36}Woller states that during 1945 only about 1000 rapes were reported in the entire region the Americans had occupied. The Army prosecuted sex offenders of all races and punished them severely. According to Woller (59-60), forty-four soldiers were executed because of sex related crimes, several hundred were sentenced to years of forced labor. Henke (200-201) arrives at the same conclusions, although his numbers are slightly higher.

\textsuperscript{37}Diary entry of a lady 30 April 1945; NCA F5 no. 488.
Nevertheless, Army headquarters and most white officers throughout the war and in its aftermath alleged that African-American troops lacked the discipline of their white counterparts.\textsuperscript{38} Among Germans rumors about African-American savagery persisted.\textsuperscript{39} German authorities in Middle Franconia seemed to corroborate these stories. They complained to the new masters in an official report that sexual transgressions of GIs in the region had not become a serious problem during the initial phase of the occupation, but that some black units which were stationed in the vicinity of Fürth seemed to be the notable exception to the rule. The Germans reported that African-American GIs banded together in groups of six to eight men, looted the houses and molested the women. In another village black GIs allegedly "...hunted women and girls whom they even dragged out of the houses."\textsuperscript{40}

While black troops certainly had their share of criminal elements in the armed forces, their combat experience and their position of occupiers of a society of caucasian people with an extremely racist leadership also may have instilled

\textsuperscript{38}MacGregor 138-39.
\textsuperscript{39}See, for example, Marianne Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug. 1995. Although her family had rather positive experiences with African-Americans, she recalled the town gossip and rumors which dealt with alleged or possible African-American transgressions and behavior towards the opposite sex.
\textsuperscript{40}Woller 59. It is not quite clear what the African-Americans actually did. The German \textit{mißbrauchen} can mean either "abuse" or "rape."
a new sense of superiority in some African-American GIs or units that could have resulted in some transgressions. It may well be, however, that other factors played a role in determining the image of African-American troops as well. Nazi propaganda had undoubtedly impressed many Germans enough to expect that black GIs would behave worse than white soldiers. This expectation made sure that African-American behavior would come under much closer scrutiny than that of white troops. The American, especially the African-American, code of conduct towards the opposite sex also was far more open than anything Germans would find acceptable. This could easily lead to false assumptions and perceptions. In addition to that, Germans may have suffered from the same fears and phantasies regarding the treatment of white women that the white population in the Deep South harbored when they had to confront the specter of free slaves before and during the Civil War. An observer in a little town in Baden, for example, noted in his diary in April 1945 that reports about rapes of German women by African-American soldiers "without exception" turned out to be "all the results of unproven phantasies of overheated brains."41

Official investigations brought to light interesting facts regarding German views of African-American soldiers.

41Quoted in Henke 200, fn 192. Many of the interviewees in Nuremberg made special references to Black soldiers and the effects of Nazi propaganda in this respect. See, for example, Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995; Marianne Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug. 1995.
In October 1945 a survey conducted in the city of Giessen by the Military Government's Information Control Division revealed that 40 per cent of the people asked had held negative views towards African-Americans before the occupation. Only sixteen per cent said that they had a favorable attitude before the Americans came. The survey indicated that many Germans revised their negative feelings once they actually came in contact with black soldiers. Younger Germans with a better education seemed to be more inclined to think that African-Americans were as respectable citizens as white soldiers. Interestingly enough the Germans were aware of the inequality and often discriminating attitudes displayed by many white soldiers towards their brothers in arms. The survey concluded that

\[\text{the favorable shift in opinion was attributed by the Germans largely to the striking impression which the personal, human qualities of the Negro had made. Above all...they had been impressed by the fact that the Negro soldiers loved (German) children and got along so well with them.... Other qualities frequently cited were that the Negroes were "good natured," "friendly," "eager to help," "decent." In addition, a few Germans had changed their opinion because the Negroes had done them no harm.}\]

Investigators further reported that Germans considered white soldiers "more self-confident," "better educated," "more disciplined regarding women," but also "more reserved," while African-Americans were "more friendly," but "less restrained." The pollsters even found one German who thought
that African-Americans forgave more easily and acted less like victors.42

On the whole the black and white combat troops behaved surprisingly well and often displayed a benevolence that the Germans had no reason to expect. Their behavior stood in remarkable contrast to the experiences Germans had with Soviet and French soldiers when they entered Germany. Although he was still fighting the remnants of the German army, the average GI did not seem to think that all Germans were Nazis or should be held responsible for Nazi crimes and acted accordingly.43

Even Lutheran pastors, conservative and not afraid to voice and display their strong nationalism, initially had nothing negative to say about the Americans. Already during the combat phase American soldiers showed a special deference towards the representatives of the Lutheran Church who had been active in the Confessing Church that had openly resisted Hitler. Julius Schieder, for example, a leading member of


43 None of the interviewees had anything negative to say about the American combat troops they met in April and May of 1945. Apart from the above interviews see also Erinnerungen: 19–26. During the twenty five years I lived in the Nuremberg region I did not meet a single civilian who had suffered any serious crime committed by an American soldier during the combat phase.
the Confessing Church, was in charge of the Lutheran congregations in and around Nuremberg. One week after the end of hostilities in the region he could report to his superiors in Munich that the work in the congregations continued. There was only minor damage to church property. Schieder noted that American soldiers were behaving correctly, displaying a great respect toward the Church. Houses of pastors were not requisitioned or were immediately vacated by American troops. Two weeks later he had a

Schieder talked frankly about his political convictions to an information control officer in the summer of 1945. According to the officer, Schieder said that he had almost joined the National Socialists in 1923 because he subscribed to many of Hitler’s ideas, especially that of the need for living space. Schieder also did not think that the Germans had demonstrated a singular kind of barbarianism during the preceding twelve years. He compared German behavior during the war to British massacres in their colonies, to the Soviet behavior in the east (apparently unconcerned about the laws of cause and effect), and even to the American treatment of German prisoners of war. Schieder did not consider himself to be a democrat but rather indicated that he would prefer the revival of an authoritarian state in Germany: "Somebody should be able to give clear orders and they should be followed". In view of the fact that Schieder belonged to the group which had resisted Hitler and that almost fifty percent of the Lutheran reverends in Nuremberg had belonged to the Nazi party, Schieder’s views probably represent the more moderate views among the Lutheran clergy at the time. (Military Government Detachment for Nuremberg, Annual Historical Report from 21 April 1945 to 20 June 1946, section 4 e. 3 and Appendix no. 1, Nürnberg 1945-1949 doc. 5).

Vollnhals (113-168) is an excellent introduction to the problems the protestant churches in Germany were facing and the attempts of the leading men to solve them. See especially pp. 118-123 for the protestant clergy’s attitudes and the American reaction to them. For events in and around Nuremberg see also Johannes Kübel, Erinnerungen: Mensch und

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better idea of the events in his region. According to him, only two pastors displayed a negative attitude towards the occupiers, which only in one case manifested itself in extensive grumbling. Schieder wrote that lives were lost only occasionally and the Americans turned out to be very humane. They provided first aid for civilians wounded during combat activities and transported them to the nearest hospitals. The only trouble in his district came from displaced persons. Schieder reported to Munich that the occupiers wanted church life to continue.45

When the Germans officially capitulated on 8 May 1945, the first phase of the American occupation came to a successful conclusion. Without being aware of it, American soldiers soothed initial apprehensions and tore down some of the racial fears and prejudices Hitler's propaganda had tried to implant in the minds of the Germans. The soldiers' behavior made it easier for many Germans, but especially for young people, to accept their new occupiers and to cooperate with them. It also raised hopes and expectations of leniency, however, which official American policy was not prepared to fulfill.

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CHAPTER III
Organizing the Occupation: 1945

During the first eight months after the war Americans confronted a daunting task. They were facing an extent of destruction as well as social and political disarray which they had not anticipated. Americans immediately needed to pay attention to reestablishing the most basic social services, such as functioning utilities or securing food as quickly as possible to prevent the outbreak of diseases and to assure the survival of the German population. At the same time, however, American military commanders had to deal with several internal problems before they were able to devote their entire attention to the occupation as such. In view of these basic necessities the part of the staff which dealt with German re-education and especially with youth did not enjoy a high priority during the initial phase of the occupation. Nevertheless Clay's headquarters soon developed directives which officially recognized the importance of youth work and provided the foundation for American youth policy in Germany without any guidance from Washington.

Organizing an Effective Occupation Administration

In May 1945 American troops had accomplished the immediate goal in Germany. Hitler's army was defeated and the country completely occupied by Allied troops. The war in Japan, however, was not yet over. It is symptomatic that
General Clay, who officially was in charge of American Military Government in Germany, spent most of his time during the first months after V-E day organizing the redeployment of American troops either to Japan or to the United States. By August troop strength in Europe was down from over three million to 1.6 million soldiers.¹

As long as hostilities in the Pacific lasted, redeployment was merely an organizational problem, but the Japanese surrender in August 1945 created the public demand in the United States and among the troops to demobilize at once. The Army's point system assigned priority to those soldiers who had served longest, no matter where they served. This created an immense amount of restructuration and flux at the unit level which also caused considerable problems for Military Government outfits. The constant reshuffling, together with the expectation to be home soon, diminished troop morale and discipline. Replacements were hard to come by and usually did not have the quality the fighting troops had.² Many capable MG officers left Germany when they came up for redeployment at a time when their services would have been most useful. Some field detachments lost as much as 80 per cent of their original personnel to redeployment. Since the Army constantly had to adjust its expectations for troop

¹Ziemke 328-330; see also Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1964) 281-283.

²Ziemke 422-23; Henke 970-71; Murphy 281.
strength in Germany downwards, Clay decided to reduce Military Government strength accordingly. He wanted to achieve his goal mainly by dismantling the Field Operation units which were scheduled to relinquish all direct control over German administrations by 31 December 1945. They would not interfere directly in local government anymore, but rather supervise the Germans and intervene in cases of emergency.³

The end of the war with Japan caused additional problems for Military Government. Many regular Army officers faced the prospect of losing the rank they had acquired during the war if they remained with the tactical troops after the hostilities. Military Government offered a way to maintain their rank and status. In this way many division and branch chiefs who had participated in the planning from the outset suddenly had to work with superiors who usually did not have any clear ideas about military government and often did not display any interest in becoming acquainted with their duties. These problems extended all the way down to the field detachments and resulted in a very uneven interpretation of directives and a widely varying quality within local MG units.⁴

While dealing with redeployment, General Clay faced additional problems. During the initial phase of the

³Ziemke 404-406; Henke 983.
⁴Knappen 73-74.
occupation, Military Government did not function efficiently. Clay had to address a number of issues in this realm. Military Government detachments were integrated into the tactical command structure which even under normal circumstances was a cumbersome institution. Redeployment made matters worse, as did the fact that many commanders of tactical units were professional soldiers who at best assigned a very low priority to civilian tasks or at worst frequently meddled in Military Government's affairs. They usually outranked MG personnel and had ready access to resources which made the work of field detachments sometimes impossible. In addition to that, military districts did not coincide with the Military Government detachments' areas of jurisdiction. This led to confusion, since MG detachments often had to deal with more than one tactical command. Since commanders at that time enjoyed much discretion over their own fiefdoms, MG units often were confronted with orders that contradicted those in the neighboring districts or undermined their own objectives.5

Clay recognized the problem. Since he and General Joseph T. McNarney, who replaced Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief of the American troops in Europe in the fall of 1945, wanted to turn the military's civilian duties over to the State Department as soon as possible, they created an independent command structure with its own communications

channels. The final version, which lasted from April 1946 to June 1949, completely separated the Military Government units from the tactical troops. They were designated Office of Military Government for Germany (United States) (OMGUS) from December 1945 on and absorbed the functions and some of the personnel from the Army's G-5 section which became superfluous. Tactical and Military Government units were united only by the Commander-in-Chief who would also function as military governor. Clay remained deputy military governor, but in practice McNarney left him in charge of all Military Government affairs.  

Clay's policy went further than simply separating the two organizations. From the end of the war on it was no longer possible to commission officers for military government duties, since it was anticipated that the State Department soon would take over these tasks. As a result OMGUS had to rely on recruiting civilians in the United States. This meant that important members of the staff had to spend much precious time during 1945 in filling their depleted ranks. Since they were only authorized to offer one year contracts and nobody knew how long the appointments would last, many potential candidates preferred secure positions in a less troubled environment at home. Even those who agreed to remain in Germany had to be discharged from the

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6Ziemke 396-403 and charts on 309, 426; Henke 981-984; Knappen 77-78.
Army. They were employed as civilians under the same conditions as new recruits from the United States. This was hardly an incentive to stay on.7

The decision to separate Military Government from the tactical command and to give it a civilian status may have been necessary from an administrative standpoint, but together with the downsizing of the field units Clay deprived his men early on of all resources they may have needed to take an active part in local events. Of course tactical troops were still available in many communities, but their cooperation depended either on the goodwill of the local post commanders or on orders from headquarters which would be very hard to obtain when only local or regional affairs were involved. In spite of all admonitions from Clay, frictions between Military Government personnel, which became increasingly civilian, and tactical troop commanders could not be avoided. Professional soldiers sometimes resented having to help out civilians in uniform, while Military Government representatives often displayed considerable contempt for military red tape, regulations, and professional soldiers already during the war. Throughout his tenure Clay repeatedly had to remind his civilians in uniform that it was

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7Henke 997-1003; Knappen 76; Murphy 282; Ziemke 424.
wiser to ask local officers for help instead of demanding their services.\(^8\)

American officials faced another dilemma in Germany. They did not have any detailed directives regarding their conduct in the field. JCS 1067 only provided the framework. The situation became more complicated after the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. The Potsdam agreements delegated many responsibilities to the Allied Control Council which was yet to be installed. During the following months Clay tried hard to overcome all resistance he encountered—especially from the French—and initiate policies that would be binding for all of Germany. This meant that local detachments had to wait for specific instructions as long as Clay thought that the control council would ultimately be able to produce policy guidelines for all of Germany.\(^9\)

Clay had to deal with an additional problem in the summer of 1945. Fraternization in Aachen had caused a public outcry in the United States in 1944 and stern admonitions from Washington. The negative press in the United States, 

\(^8\)Ziemke 441-442; Knappen's *And Call it Peace* provides an excellent contemporary example of a civilian taking a very critical view of the Army. I will discuss specific incidents or actions that affected American youth activities in and around Nuremberg in the course of the dissertation.

\(^9\)Clay's correspondence with the War and State Departments during 1945 and the first half of 1946 provides ample evidence for his attempts to make the Allied Control Council work for all of Germany. *Clay Papers* Docs. 20 (9 July 1945), 39 (24 Sept. 1945), 109 (11 Apr. 1946), 136 (18 July 1946).
together with JCS 1067 which ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the American forces to "strongly discourage fraternization with the German officials and population," induced the Army to make sure that American soldiers would be ready for their jobs once the war was over.\(^{10}\) As we have seen above, the *Stars and Stripes* warned its readers not to trust the Germans. The Aachen experience showed that GIs would quite naturally abandon their caution and become friendly with the Germans. The War Department's Morale Services Division printed a *Pocket Guide to Germany* for soldiers. To make sure that the GIs did not misunderstand the guide's contents, the Army had the following disclaimer glued on the cover:

This booklet is issued in the interest of informing you about the country you occupy. Nothing contained herein should be considered a relaxation of the Non-Fraternization Policy.  
**Keep Faith with the American Soldiers who have died to eliminate the German Warmakers.**  
DO NOT FRATERNIZE

In spite of the stern warning the guide provided the soldiers with contradictory information. On the one hand the authors admonished GIs to remain watchful after the end of hostilities. The Americans were in Germany to make sure that the Germans would not again become a threat to the world. Only after their task would be accomplished would the Germans be able to return into the community of peace loving nations. The authors did not paint a very favorable picture of German history and the people. According to them, Germany and the

\(^{10}\)JCS 1067, par. 4. Pollock and Meisel, eds., doc. X.
POCKET GUIDE TO

Germany

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Keep faith with the American soldiers who have died to eliminate the German warmakers.

DO NOT FRATERNIZE

Germans had embarked on a militaristic and expansionist course ever since Bismarck had founded the new empire with "blood and iron" in 1871. The former SS soldiers and German youth were two groups against whom the occupiers would have to be especially alert. The guide claimed that "German youth has been carefully and thoroughly educated for world..."
conquest, killing and treachery." At the same time, however, the guide told GIs that Americans did not "like to kick people when they are down." Furthermore, German curiosity would lead to questions about the United States and the customs at home. As far as non-fraternization permitted the Americans would be able to give the Germans a first taste of the democratic and equal society at home. Soldiers should not try to convince Germans in discussions, but rather should let their behavior and pride speak for themselves. The course of time and other influences (possibly a reference to envisioned Military Government actions) would have their effects. In an appendix the booklet contained a brief guide to conversational German. This contradictory message, together with criticism at home, probably convinced Eisenhower initially not to authorize the guide's distribution, but by May 1945 every soldier had orders to carry the booklet in his helmet liner. 

The Army Information Branch also participated in the efforts to see that soldiers would not become involved with Germans. In May 1944 production for a film was underway that would tell American soldiers more about their "Job in Germany" once the fighting was over. George Marshall and

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12 Frederiksen 129-130.
John McCloy approved it for showing to all troops in the European theater in December 1944, but the Battle of the Bulge postponed its official release. After the discovery of Nazi concentration camps early in 1945 the film makers decided to include footage of these incredible German atrocities. The final product was ready for American soldiers in April 1945. The film further documents the American attempts to impress GIs with their task. It was mandatory viewing for every American soldier in the European Theater.¹³

In many ways Your Job in Germany seemed to follow the example the pocket guide had set, only this time leaving out the more conciliatory passages. GIs first got a lesson on recent German history. Just as their pocket guide, the film described all Germans as a people infected with the disease of conquest from 1871 on, no matter who their leaders were. During phony peace periods her population was deceptively peaceful, enjoying dances and fun with a glass of beer or wine. The film went on to explain that after World War I the

¹³David Culbert ("American Film Policy in the Re-education of Germany after 1945," The Political Re-education of Germany & her Allies after World War II, eds. Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson (London, Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985) 175-176, 180-185) not only reconstructs the making of the film, but also tells the very interesting story of its fate in the hands of Hollywood tycoon Jack Warner. Warner was not above selling this Army production as his own. He even accepted awards for it without giving the original film makers any credit or a share in the revenue. The following information is taken from the film Your Job in Germany, U.S. Army Information Branch, [Apr. 1945].
Americans fell for the scam and withdrew. In 1945 they would do a better job which would make it unnecessary to fight the Germans a third time. The narrator admonished GIs not to drop the guard they had needed while the fighting was still going on. Every German could be a potential enemy waiting for his chance to rise again and continue where Hitler had left off.

The film makers depicted young people as the greatest threat. Showing pictures of marching Hitler Youth and other party associations, the narrator told GIs:

These are the most dangerous: German youth. Children, when the Nazi party came into power. They know no other system than the one that poisoned their minds. They are soaked in it. Trained to win by cheating. Trained to pick on the weak. They have learned no free speech, read no free press. They were brought up on straight propaganda. Products of the worst educational crime of the entire history of the world. Practically everything you believe in, they have been trained to hate and destroy. They believe they were born to be masters, that we are inferiors, designed to be their slaves.14

He reminded soldiers that they were not in Germany on an educational mission, but rather to guard an entire people. To do that would require a specific conduct. They would respect German property rights and customs. They would take the people seriously, but they would not become friendly with Germans. Soldiers were told not to accept public or private invitations.

14Your Job in Germany; see also Culbert's transcript of the same passage (201).
Every German is a potential source of trouble; therefore, there must be no fraternization with any of the German people. Fraternization means making friends. The German people are not our friends. You will not associate yourself with German men, women or children.\textsuperscript{15}

The film closed with an impressive sequence showing the consequences of the war all over Europe and for American soldiers. Footage shot on location just weeks earlier reminded the soldiers of German atrocities and concentration camps. The film makers wanted to make sure that their lesson would hit a raw nerve.\textsuperscript{16}

The War Information Branch faithfully reflected JCS 1067 and public opinion in the United States, but the men in Germany were facing a very different reality. As early as May 1945 officers in the field arrived at the conclusion that a ban on fraternization did not make any sense once the hostilities were over. The public outcry against the friendliness which American officers allegedly displayed towards Hermann Göring, whom they permitted to retain his insignia and to give interviews, however, made it almost impossible for headquarters to advocate a more lenient course in May and June. American generals therefore found themselves in the position of having to enforce a policy they

\textsuperscript{15}Your Job in Germany

\textsuperscript{16}Culbert 181.
regarded as senseless and unenforceable. Under the circumstances, the ban would not last long. The first breach in the regulations came in regard to young children. After checking with George Marshall in Washington Eisenhower, decided to lift the fraternization ban for children in June. According to him, the soldiers in general observed the fraternization ban quite well, but "could not be stern and harsh with young children." Eisenhower thought that upholding the ban for young people might justify further illegal contacts and ultimately would undermine the whole nonfraternization effort. The partial lift, however, had exactly the same effect. The Army struggled for another four weeks before it permitted American soldiers to engage in conversation with adult Germans on the streets and in public places. Although the order was cautiously worded and officially permitted only formal contacts, the soldiers dubbed the new directive the "Fraternization Order" and acted accordingly. The non-fraternization policy lingered on, but finally died in October 1945.17

17Ziemke 321-327. He maintains that Eisenhower's argument reflected a rather curious myth about fraternization. According to Ziemke, soldiers were not so much interested in children, but in the opposite sex. His evidence consists of court martial cases tried for fraternization, none of which dealt with children. Eisenhower's perception, however, may have been correct. Children usually were the first ones to get in contact with Americans soldiers. It may be that officers, knowing the attitude of their superiors, either sympathized with the behavior of the soldiers in the field towards children or found it impractical to prosecute a large number of GIs for cases of a rather innocent and beneficial kind of
First Steps

In the midst of the administrative reshuffling, relocation, and a complete German breakdown, Military Government detachments went to work. They had to take care of a completely shattered economy, of several million displaced persons coming and going in all directions, and of a critical shortage of housing. In many cities basic utilities, such as water, electricity, or garbage disposal did not function and threatened to become a factor in spreading disease. Immediately after hostilities ended, looting by Germans, American troops, and displaced persons was widespread. The initial frenzy, however, soon abated on the German side. Americans repeatedly expressed surprise, but were pleased with German docility and readiness to cooperate.18

Young Germans did not become the security threat that Americans had anticipated. Those teenagers who were found to fraternization which the soldiers initiated often even when the shooting still was going on. This interpretation does not say that American soldiers were saints, but rather may reflect the realities of the day more adequately. Becoming involved with German adults may have been an altogether different matter. For JCS 1067 see Pollock and Meisel, eds., Germany doc. X. Clay's "fraternization order" is in Smith (ed.) doc. 22. See also Edward B. James, The U.S. Armed Forces German Youth Activities Program 1945-1955 (United States Army, Europe: Historical Division, 1956) 4.

18Ziemke 138-144, 206-208, 251-252, 354-355; Murphy 283. Neither Gimbel in his A German Community under Occupation nor Woller nor Eckhard find any German obstruction or resistance by German administrators during the initial phase of the occupation.
be suspicious were taken in for questioning about possible resistance activities which Goebbels had called werewolf. Americans usually found it easy to coax them into cooperation. They seemed to be quite willing to betray their comrades once they were convinced that somebody else had already talked. The Army quickly raided alleged or real werewolf facilities without ever meeting any resistance. The raids occasionally revealed that from the start soldiers did not take nonfraternization orders seriously. The raiding parties did not discover any major plots, but they did find a number of GIs in compromising situations with the opposite sex.  

The only serious security problem for the occupiers was and remained the large number of displaced persons. They were hard to control because they enjoyed a special status, the sympathetic ear of the press, and much public sympathy in the United States.

The food situation became the overriding problem during the first three years of the occupation. In 1945 Americans observed that many fields had not been worked on even after the fighting was over. Young people had been drafted by the Wehrmacht and either were dead or in POW camps. Foreigners who had been pressed into agricultural service by the Nazis left the fields and their jobs and tried to get home as soon

\[19\] Ziemke 245-246; Füssl 58-67.

\[20\] Ziemke 284-291, 356-358; Woller, 60-61.
as American troops came in. The Wehrmacht had almost depleted the horse supply. Americans considered the situation to be so serious that Eisenhower began to import food from the United States to Germany in June. In July he issued orders that American trucks and drivers help bring in the harvest of that year. In the winter of 1945 Military Government set up soup kitchens that passed out four and a half million meals a month. Still the situation remained precarious for the next three years and only improved considerably after the currency reform in the summer of 1948.21

OMGUS and Education

All of the events in 1945 had a direct impact on the development of American re-education efforts during the entire occupation period and beyond. The problems that Clay was facing on all sides made re-education a minor issue which would have to wait. From the outset Major John Taylor, the head of the United States Group Council’s Education and Religious Affairs Branch and his staff faced tremendous obstacles. During the initial phase of the occupation OMGUS organizers did not deem his branch important enough to give it division status. During 1945 Education and Religious Affairs was not more than a section; in January 1946 it was promoted to branch level. While this probably saved Taylor the embarrassment of having to put up with a higher ranking

21Ziemke 274-276, 346; Clay 263-281.
regular officer, it had its drawbacks. Taylor only occasionally had direct access to Clay or any other influential officers apart from the usual channels. This meant that his section was unable to secure sometimes even essential things, such as transportation. It was not until spring and summer 1945 that Taylor received permission by SHAEF headquarters to expand his staff from five American officers to about fifty. Even with this authorization in hand he did not have the necessary clout to have the men who originally had been assigned to the Education and Religious Affairs Branch transferred back to his section.

The situation was even more desperate in the field. When Germany officially surrendered in May 1945, detachments in charge of states were supposed to have three full time educational officers, smaller detachments no less than two. In reality, however, no local Military Government detachment had an officer assigned full time to education and only one state detachment had one education officer. During the following months demobilization and demoralization caused many education specialists to return home after two years of waiting in the wings without recognition or promotions. This depletion of ranks aggravated the situation to such an extent that Taylor had to go to the United States to recruit more personnel. The one year limits and conditions in Germany did not attract the outstanding educators Taylor had hoped for during a time when opportunities opened up in the United
States, but he managed to hire competent and idealistic people. Due to complicated clearance procedures a number of the recruits needed more than three months of their first one year contracts to make it to Germany.\textsuperscript{22}

While Taylor was in the United States he did not just look for new recruits. He also participated in the discussions of the State Department’s Advisory Committee on German Re-education in June 1945. Taylor was present when Frank Graham, prominent educator and president of the University of North Carolina, showed the policy statement which became SWNCC 269 the following year to the Civil Administration Division’s chief, General Hilldring, to Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, and to Assistant Secretary, John McCloy. It was Taylor who transmitted their informal approval to the Department of State.\textsuperscript{23} This meant that he knew the direction in which American policy would ultimately go long before it became official almost a year later. Taylor was probably aware of MacLeish’s efforts to make the Advisory Committee’s recommendations the base of official American policy and must have been disappointed by the lack of interest in this issue at the Potsdam conference. It is safe to assume, however, that he did not need any official directives to induce him to implement a policy of positive action in the American zone. He had personally

\textsuperscript{22}Ziemke 277; Tent 46-50; Knappen 76.

\textsuperscript{23}NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/6-1345.
contributed to its formulation and knew that it enjoyed the support of the State and the War Departments.

Clay's decision to reduce Military Government personnel drastically and to separate MG from tactical commands did not seem to have the far reaching consequences for the Education and Religious Affairs Section that it had for other divisions, although it adversely affected the numbers of the already understaffed educators. Actually it was in line with the approach the Advisory Committee had recommended in Washington, with the CAD's policy, and with SHAEF's Technical Manual of Education and Religious Affairs of 1944. The reduction made it imperative to leave the initiative to Germans and to operate merely as supervisors.²⁴

²⁴Füssl maintains that the separation of Army and OMGUS robbed OMGUS of the possibility to start a meaningful youth program of its own. His analysis does not evaluate the situation in 1945 correctly. OMGUS as well as CAD in Washington from the start expected the Germans to do the job. They never included the Army's manpower and equipment in their planning. Hilldring, for example, explained in a letter to an American teacher who had expressed his interest in teaching the Germans in Germany that American policy was and would be to let the Germans reeducate themselves under American supervision (NA RG 59 State Department Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/10-1545). Military Government planners did not recognize the merits of an independent American youth program during the initial phase of the occupation. We will see in the course of the dissertation that the Army's program never enjoyed wholehearted support within Military Government circles, but that in many ways the Army laid the foundation for a completely new way of working with youth which had far reaching consequences. For the SHAEF manual see Tent, Mission 45.
Headquarters and German Youth

According to JCS 1067 and the agreement in Washington, the Education and Religious Affairs Branch focused its efforts towards German youth on the educational system. The first task Taylor and his staff had to master was the reopening of German schools. After hostilities had ended Military Government officials had closed all schools that were still functioning in accordance with Eisenhower's and SHAEF directives. The Army found, however, that it was in its own interest to reopen schools at the earliest possible moment. Young people did not have anything to do and were confronted with many temptations, such as black marketing. Loitering could foster prostitution or criminal behavior. Army commanders also felt that adolescents actually might band together and become a serious security threat once returning POWs might assume leadership of youth gangs on the streets. Schools would be the places to control them, to provide them with food and health care, and to channel their energies away from criminal activities.25

Taylor and his staff had to work hard to comply with the Army's wishes. They faced tremendous obstacles. Many school buildings in German cities had been reduced to rubble. When they remained intact, the Army had requisitioned them to house the troops who were not inclined to give them up for German school children. At the same time the American

25Ziemke 358.
educators had to replace all old textbooks. During the Third Reich the Nazis had even used math books for instilling the young generation with its ideology. Paper shortages and the lack of printing presses made the undertaking almost impossible. Textbooks were finally printed on the presses of the former official Nazi newspaper, the *Völkischer Beobachter* which bombing raids had never taken out of commission.26

The biggest obstacle, however, was a serious shortage of teachers. A disproportionate number of teachers had joined the Nazis. Of course there existed many enthusiastic National Socialists among them. Julius Streicher is the most notorious example. But many had had different reasons to join the party. They were state officials and therefore often faced considerable pressure during the Third Reich to become a member of at least one of its teacher subsidiaries. The denazification mechanism automatically disqualified large numbers of teachers from returning to schools. The Education officers recognized the dilemma, but the public outcry in the United States after Patton’s infamous remarks regarding Nazi party membership in the fall of 1945 made a lenient approach impossible. Taylor and his staff had to resort to drastic measures to revive at least a semblance of schooling in spite of the ongoing denazification process. They commissioned

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26Knappen 82-93; Ziemke 358-60.
retired teachers. Many women had found it less difficult to escape Nazi organizations and could be employed.\textsuperscript{27}

On 1 October 1945 elementary schools in the American zone reopened. Secondary education and universities followed in the next months. Taylor was satisfied with his branch's efforts. In December 1945 he thought that the negative phase of the educators' mission, the denazification of the school system, was almost over and that it was time to think about a constructive program for German education. He therefore proposed to send a fact finding mission from the United States to Germany as soon as possible. Such a group of educators would review the progress up to date and would point out shortcomings of his branch's work. Still, the Germans would have to do the work.\textsuperscript{28}

The reopening of schools did not resolve a basic flaw of the planning. Concentrating entirely on the school system would not take care of young people's free time. Given the shortage of classrooms, teachers, plus the fact that German schools traditionally dismissed their students by noon, these young people would be without supervision for extended periods of time. Reopening the schools would only partly achieve the Army's goal of keeping them occupied so that they would not be tempted to get into illegal activities.

\textsuperscript{27}Knappen 121-138; Tent 51-57; Ziemke 277.

\textsuperscript{28}Tent 69-71.
Educational Reform is not Enough

Americans soon realized that they had to do more than just try to implement educational reform. They had to find ways to replace the Nazi ideas of a generation, which had never known anything but Hitler youth organizations, with democratic concepts. New curricula and free tuition alone would not be sufficient to get the job done. Americans correctly believed that little could be expected from parents who had lost much control and authority over their children over the previous twelve years.29

The first problem for the Americans was to keep young people under control and occupied while the schools were still closed. The abolition of the Hitler Youth and its affiliates created a void that needed to be filled. The Army quickly enlisted the aid of the German churches in its attempt to control young people. A theater directive of 7 July 1945 permitted religious groups to engage in youth activities and to receive contributions for their support.30 Church leaders of the Lutheran Church in Bavaria were most satisfied with the directive. It gave the Churches a head start over other youth organizations and did not interfere with their own policy. The Bavarian Church Council had decided already at the end of May to advise the deans of the

29 According to Füssl (102-103), modern research bears out American assumptions about education patterns in German families at that time.

30 Campbell 3.
different Bavarian church districts that they should not attempt to find new ways of youth work outside the ecclesiastical framework.\textsuperscript{31}

Probably aware that the churches would not be able to take care of all young people, headquarters ordered all German communities under its control in July to prepare work programs for children until schools could be reopened. The directive suggested cleaning of streets and public buildings, agricultural work, gathering medicinal plants, and cleaning and sorting building materials from the rubble for keeping the children occupied.\textsuperscript{32}

Since the Army regarded loitering youth as a serious problem that could lead to unrest, the issue got the attention of the higher echelons of Military Government, in spite of the rather inconspicuous position of John Taylor's Education and Religious Affairs Branch. On 10 August 1945 Robert Murphy informed the State Department that

\begin{quote}
The Deputy Military Governor [General Clay] has advised the War Department that it is believed desirable to establish movements in Germany which would encourage youth in democratic ways of thinking and that the restoration of the Boy Scout movement in Germany might prove a real contribution. General Clay has suggested that it might be well to ask the head of the Boy Scout movement in the US if it would be possible for him to supply a small group of trained Scout executives to
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Minutes of a meeting of the Bavarian Church Council from 31 May to 2 June 1945; LCA, Landeskirchenrat, Akten des Landesjugendpfarrers VI, 1178a, vol III, 1940-45.
\item Campbell 3.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
investigate possibilities here and to aid in the establishment of Scout units."

Clay was obviously unaware that there had been a Boy Scout movement in Germany before 1933. Apparently he also did not pay much attention to details, such as the fact that Boy Scouts wore uniforms and rank insignia not unlike the military's. Both were prohibited in Germany after the war. Even Clay would have found it difficult to bring the right kind of experts to Germany at that time. It is therefore not surprising that initially nothing came of the proposed fact finding mission. The memorandum nevertheless marks an important departure in several ways. First, Clay recognized the need for an educational program that took care of young people when they were not at school. For a professional soldier and an American it was natural that he would think about the Boy Scouts' organization and ideals. Second, Clay for the first time expressed the desire to bring experts to Germany who would help the Germans to set a program in motion. Clay clearly embarked on a positive and constructive approach from the start and tackled problems in a pragmatic way. It took over a year to realize his idea of an American expert program, but Clay had suggested a feasible way of getting American expert help to Germans on the road to reform and re-education.

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35Telegram from Robert Murphy to State Dept., 10 Aug. 1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.4081/8-1045.
Generals in the field and Military Government headquarters in Berlin were quick to react to Clay's suggestions. Lieutenant General Geoffrey Keyes, commander of the Seventh Army's western military district, which comprised Hesse and Württemberg-Baden, was the first to pick them up. On 14 September he announced to his field commanders that he expected them to take an active interest in organizing local youth activities. In lieu of a Military Government policy directive, Keyes issued his own. He pointed out that many German youths remained idle and therefore became "susceptible to organization by subversive agencies". Keyes believed that officers and enlisted men would eagerly seize this opportunity to assist in the regeneration of German youth through the medium of acquainting them with the activities and interests normal to youths of their own age in our country. Woodcrafts and other interests which have been developed by the Boy Scout and Girl Scout movements at home, as well as athletics should...form the major interests in our organized youth activities.

The general also strongly encouraged the troops to develop their own ideas. In a significant departure from denazification practice, Keyes announced that he did not want the soldiers to "differentiate between children of Nazi parents and anti-Nazi, since we are definitely interested in the re-education of the Nazi youth." The general thought
that the Army chaplains should take an active part in the program.\textsuperscript{34}

Keyes' letter contained in a nucleus the basis for the German Youth Activities Program the Army officially adopted in April 1946. It marked the first time that American military personnel officially were asked to do something positive for a part of the German population that went beyond providing practical necessities. The General recognized that young people might be the best group to start a re-education program, and he insisted on incorporating those with a National Socialist background. Interestingly enough Keyes did not find it necessary to issue an order, but rather appealed to the units to go out and start programs on their own initiative.

The directive did not sit well with MG officials who realized that Keyes departed from the Military Government's policy to make the Germans responsible for their own reeducation. Military Government officials also thought that the use of Army chaplains for youth activities would deprive the Army of their services. While these arguments certainly had merit, one may wonder why MG officials were so concerned about these off duty activities of American soldiers which provided them with an alternative to black

\textsuperscript{34} Headquarters Seventh Army, Western Military District, 14 Sept. 1945, letter from Geoffrey Keyes, Commanding General to Corps, Division, Regional Military Government Commanders, and Separate Unit Commanders, in Campbell 31-32, Appendix I.
market activities or becoming involved with the opposite sex. Military Government officials in Clay's headquarters seemed to place policy concerns, protecting their own prerogatives, and matters of principle higher on their agendas than practical solutions to problems in the field.35

Possibly stimulated by the field commander's initiative, Military Government acted as well. On 21 September Major General M.C. Stayer, John Taylor's Division Chief, submitted a "Directive for the Control of Youth Activities" to Clay. Stayer was clearly in line with MacLeish's and the Education Commission's thinking. The directive bluntly stated that

[t]he children of Germany are probably the most important raw material out of which a regenerated Germany can be built. Therefore a positive program should be allowed to develop which will give German youth opportunities to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German life on a democratic and peaceful basis.36

Stayer's proposal picked up the Army's approach and went beyond the educational system. Traditional youth groups, such as Boy and Girl scouts, YMCA and YWCA would be revived under the supervision of denazified persons, but Military Government officers were instructed also to permit the formation of new groups. They would exist "for purposes of culture, religion and education" and should "cultivate the ideals of fair play, tolerance and honesty". Political

35Campbell 6.

activities were not deemed desirable. Stayer had secured the approval of the Army's G-5 Division (Civil Affairs) and then presented the memo to the Group Control Council. Apparently the leading men assumed that the issue was important for Clay and acted surprisingly fast. The Legal, Political, and Public Safety Divisions approved the directive within twenty four hours. Clay approved and signed it on 3 October 1945.37

On the same day Robert Murphy cabled the contents of the directive to the State Department. Murphy apparently needed to justify the Military Government's new approach to policy towards youth which expanded the traditional focus on formal education. He explained that

\[\text{[f]ormal education, as such in the narrow sense of the term, will only partially solve the tremendous problem of what to do with defeated Germany's youth, to give them hope, to form them into decent citizens, and, from a very practical point of view, to keep them 'out of mischief'}.\]38

Clay's new directive appeared in German on 28 October 1945. It admonished American officers to make sure that no youth organizations similar to Hitler youth or militaristic organizations would resurface. Germans would be permitted to form voluntary groups for cultural, religious or entertainment purposes. The target group were boys and girls

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38 US Political Adviser for Germany to State Department, dispatch 1047, 3 Oct. 1945; quoted in Füssl 100.
between ten and eighteen years. These youth groups should foster the development of democratic ideas, independence in thought as well as ideals such as "inner decency, tolerance, and honesty". Military Government officers also were to take care of forming youth committees which would initiate and supervise the youth organizations. Only people who had gone through denazification would be able to become involved in youth work. The directive further stipulated that youth groups had to have a Military Government permit. The Americans would work through the committees to implement their policies. Youth groups were not permitted to become involved in politics and would be severely punished if they tried to revive or justify Nazi or militaristic ideas. They were also not permitted to wear uniforms or to do any paramilitary exercises. German authorities were responsible to implement the directive and were instructed to send men and women to the youth committees who represented different interests, such as welfare agencies, health offices, the Churches and members of the economic community. Germans should also initiate parent and teacher associations which were to assist the committees in an advisory function. The committees would review applications of youth groups and forward them to the American authorities. The directive
emphasized that youth work basically was a service rendered to society which should not be paid.\textsuperscript{39}

The Germans reacted favorably to the new Military Government directive. Since it only talked about youth organizations, it was in line with their traditional way of bringing young people together in clubs or associations. By May 1946 over 2,500 youth groups had formed with approximately 240,000 members. Marshall Knappen, OMGUS Religious Affairs Officer from 1945 to 1946, however, found in 1947 that much remained to be done. Especially the Bavarians did not seem to show much enthusiasm for organizing young people. According to him, only the Army offered an alternative by embarking on an altogether new terrain in German youth work. The soldiers did not require young people to formally join an organization, but rather conducted their activities on an informal basis. Its programs were open to everyone regardless of social background or previous activities. The next years would show if the Germans and Military Government were willing to accept this new kind of youth work.\textsuperscript{40}

Soviet activities in Berlin actually opened up a third field of American youth activities in 1945. Soviet authorities had requisitioned about twenty houses all over


\textsuperscript{40}Knappen 139-140.
Berlin which they transformed into community youth centers under the supervision of the communist Free German Youth before they permitted Americans to occupy their sector of the city. The Americans soon realized that closing the centers in their sector would cause friction with Soviet authorities. They therefore decided to continue them under a different management. *Stars and Stripes* reported on 20 December 1945 on page one about the youth centers. Under the headline "Youth Homes Added to Plan for Rehabilitating Germans" GIs all over Germany were informed that the Berlin centers had good attendance records, that the rooms were open after school hours and were heated. The paper further reported that troop participation had made many of the centers’ activities possible. It was therefore in Berlin that Americans for the first time—and not altogether in a well thought out plan—embarked on running youth centers which did not belong to any specific youth group, but rather were open to everyone. It was obvious that such homes would be more compatible with the Army’s emerging program than with Military Government’s policy, although in the case of Berlin the local Education and Religious Affairs officer was in charge of running the centers. *Stars and Stripes* made sure that the idea spread throughout the American zone.41

During the first months of the occupation General Clay had to dedicate almost all of his time to creating a functioning administrative apparatus and dealing with the chaos of redeployment. He concentrated his resources and manpower on helping Germans in his zone survive and restoring order, leaving the staff assigned to education and youth work with a constant shortage of men and resources. Clay did manage to stimulate his staff to think about the problem which led to the formulation of a directive on youth work for the American zone of occupation just four months after the war ended. After abolishing the Hitler Youth and all other youth organizations under Nazi control, they set out to prevent the German youth leadership of the Third Reich from regaining any influence in postwar Germany. Their decision to leave most of the work up to the Germans seemed to restore the traditional German youth activities structure that had existed before 1933. Grassroots activities initiated by tactical units, however, and an unexpected inheritance from Soviet troops in the American sector of Berlin opened the way for new approaches to German youth work.

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his otherwise excellent Die Umerziehung der Deutschen which focuses on events in Germany's capital.
CHAPTER IV

Working in the Field: Nuremberg, 1945

As soon as Americans had taken over the responsibility for Nuremberg in April 1945, they successfully set out on a course of reconstruction. In the midst of the struggle to help people survive, the Nuremberg Detachment was unable to dedicate much time or thought to youth. Nevertheless, the Americans managed to appoint competent officials and established a solid base of cooperation which did not always please the Germans, but helped them to survive. In spite of extremely difficult conditions Nuremberg’s schools reopened on schedule. In its attempts to take care of young people the city administration built on its progressive traditions from the Weimar republic and took advantage of the political vacuum to initiate its own, community oriented program.

The presence of a large number of tactical units in Nuremberg was a mixed blessing. On the one hand, generous Army requisitions aggravated the difficult housing situation, especially when large numbers of allied personnel came to assist in the Nuremberg trials. On the other hand the Army helped Military Government and the city by providing the facilities, the tools, and the logistic support for securing the city population’s survival. In most cases GIs maintained their generous and open attitude toward young Germans, often helping them in their struggle to improve their lot. Their
actions contributed to awakening the young generation's curiosity and to creating a friendlier attitude towards the United States.

**Military Government in Action**

Immediately after the American victory parade on 20 April 1945 the Military Government Detachment for Nuremberg, E1B3, began its work. Proclamation Number One issued by Military Government officially introduced the new masters to the citizens of Nuremberg. General Eisenhower made clear that the Allied soldiers under his command came as a "victorious army, but not as oppressors." All Nazi and militaristic institutions would be destroyed and people suspected of crimes would be imprisoned, tried, and, if found guilty, severely punished. The proclamation made American officers the highest local authority which operated under direct instructions from headquarters. Germans were expected to follow all orders without hesitation or objections. Eisenhower emphasized that any resistance would be broken immediately and without mercy. Proclamation Number One ordered schools to be closed together with all courts. German administrators were admonished to appear at work and to obey and execute all orders from Military Government.¹

Detachment E1B3, which in the course of reorganization changed its designation to F-211, started its work with

¹The German text of Proclamation No. 1 is reproduced in its original version in Erinnerungen: 26.
fifteen officers and ten enlisted men. By July 1945 it reached its peak strength with forty-five officers and fifty enlisted men. The Americans employed 260 Germans to help with the task. Between July and November these officers made vital decisions that had long lasting effects on the city long after most of the men had gone home.

On first sight and by their own judgement, the quality of the men in charge of the Nuremberg detachment was not impressive. All of the commanding officers were career Army soldiers who did not speak German, which meant that from the start they had to rely on Germans to obtain most of their information. Finding capable interpreters was not an easy task at a time when the great majority of Germans did not speak any English at all. Headquarters realized the problem. It disseminated information on the German reaction to the Americans or American policy from the second issue of its weekly Information Bulletin on. The information came from surveys Military Government's intelligence section conducted. Since the bulletin also contained condensed versions of the latest regulations and explained occupation policies in detail, Military Government officials in the field probably consulted it frequently.²

²See, for example, "Denazification and the Anti-Nazis," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 Division, USFET, Reports and Information Branch, Weekly Information Bulletin no. 1, 28 July 1945: 16. The article was a summary of a German opinion survey conducted by the intelligence section. The problem with this source of information was that the surveys may have provided good insights but were not
Some detachments were lucky and had officers who were able to communicate in German. Apart from the commanding officers many of these men became the most prominent and respected American representatives. To what extent the local commanders were aware of these reports or took advantage of these native speakers cannot be assessed. It seems that the detachments' capacity to function effectively depended largely on the ability of the commanding officers and luck in having an adequate staff. Finding and appointing capable German administrators who would be able and willing to cooperate with the Americans certainly was important as well.\(^3\)

necessarily generally applicable, especially in view of Germany’s cultural and political diversity. What was true in Catholic Munich and upper Bavaria, for example, could not easily be applied to conditions in Protestant Franconia and Nuremberg. The surveys could only provide some general guidelines. Nevertheless, MG headquarters and its successor, the High Commissioner for Germany, must have considered it an effective means of communication with the field officers. Even though the publisher repeatedly changed names, the Information Bulletin appeared first weekly and from December 1947 on bi-weekly until 1952, when the dissolution of the field detachments rendered the bulletin superfluous.

The Nuremberg detachment did not seem to be blessed with the outstanding personnel from which the nearby cities of Fürth and Ansbach or the Bavarian capital of Munich apparently benefitted. None of the soldiers had volunteered for the job. Redeployment also severely curtailed this detachment's efficiency, as much as all the others, during the first year of the occupation. Between April 1945 and June 1946 the Nuremberg detachment had three commanders. Lieutenant Colonel Delbert Fuller headed the unit for just the first four weeks of the occupation. Army inspectors found him a tired man who was burnt out and ready to go home to his wife. Colonel Charles H. Andrews succeeded Fuller in July. Andrews did not have an outstanding personality, but he had been an administrator for the Army and a welfare

Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien 18 (1973): 173-211) and on Peterson's rather negative account of the Military Government officers he interviewed in the 1960s, Eckart does not think very much of the quality of the men in the Nuremberg detachment, especially during the first year. Eckart simply adopts Bungenstab's findings from the time after 1945 to the situation in 1945. Peterson's account, however, is highly critical of American policy and of the two other detachments he discusses, but does not find the Nuremberg detachment at fault. Eckart seems to be unaware of the subtleties of this argument. Generally the historians' criticism or praise often focuses on the ability of military government officers to speak German, which undoubtedly was important for finding the right people for restarting the political process or taking care of denazification. As we will see below, however, the Nuremberg detachment did in 1945 exactly what it had been trained to do regardless of the lack of language specialists. With the exception of denazification, which was not part of the original agenda in the form it acquired during 1945, the detachment was able to get the city out of the worst post war troubles surprisingly quickly and played a crucial part in assuring the city's survival during the next two winters.

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officer in civilian life. He had gone through one of the schools for Military Government in the United States in 1943 and spent some time in Shrivenham before he came via France to Germany. Like so many others Andrews was discharged when Military Government actually would have needed his services most. In December 1945 his deputy commander, Lieutenant Colonel Carlisle Klise took over the job of commander. Klise had also gone through the Army’s Military Government school program and was highly disillusioned by it. He recalled that the Military Government instructors at Shrivenham had to use fifty year old maps because the Army would not grant them access to the latest intelligence and information it had collected in its aerial bombing surveys.4

Although the Nuremberg detachment was plagued by turnover, it actually pursued a consistent policy from the start. All three commanders had gone through the Army’s training program for Military Government officers, which familiarized them with the reconstructionist and pragmatic approach the Army had taught while JCS 1067 was composed in Washington. Eisenhower got the directive just in time for the German surrender in May 1945. It did not become official American policy until July 1945 when the Allied combined command ceased to exist. This meant that during the first three months of the occupation Military Government officers in the field acted under orders to make the reconstruction

4Peterson 318-319; Eckart 148-149.
and rehabilitation of the communities in which they operated their priority.⁵

At the end of the war Germans were without local, state or a central government. Since the traffic and communications systems also were completely paralyzed, the detachments initially operated within a virtual vacuum. As we have seen above redeployment took much of General Clay's time and energy during the initial phase of the occupation. He did not resolve the administrative confusion and cumbersome chain of command of Military Government until the end of 1945. This situation threw the local detachments

⁵Eckart adopts Bungenstab's thesis that the lack of political indoctrination of Military Government officers was a serious mistake. This thesis, however, overlooks that ideological indoctrination at a time when Morgenthau still had the ear of the President almost certainly would have resulted in a far less positive attitude towards the Germans. Morgenthau based his plans on the assumption of Germany's collective guilt, so they almost certainly would not have resulted in any positive steps towards reconstruction or bringing anti-Nazis into power. Since the Army would not have agreed to such an approach for practical reasons, Military Government officials from the start would have been civilians, possibly well versed in politics, but without the expertise and the equipment the Army was able to provide for the physical survival of the Germans. Neither Peterson nor Eckart take notice of the fact that the Army's pragmatic approach, which it had consistently advocated in its manuals and courses, actually aimed at rehabilitating Germany, although this was done purely for practical reasons. As we have seen above, even the President was unable to change the course. All field officers who had gone through Military Government training therefore were programmed from the start to set out on a course which would quickly help the Germans. With the exception of Henke (986-87) historians generally have overlooked the positive results of the Army's pragmatic and reconstructionist approach for the German population. Peterson realized that field detachments had a constructive outlook which helped the Germans, but thought that headquarters destroyed this approach quickly.
almost entirely on their own resources and interpretations of general directives. It was bound to lead to discrepancies between official Washington policy and American actions in the communities. Lacking specific guidance from their own headquarters, field detachments had to rely on the general instruction they had received at the Army’s Military Government schools, on their field manuals, and on their officers’ common sense. Klise had to learn the hard way that Washington’s expectations could be very different from the instructions he had been given in the United States and England shortly after he assumed his duties in Nuremberg in June 1945. When John McCloy visited Nuremberg in the summer, he inquired about the activities of Klise’s detachment. Klise was happy to report the progress he and his men had made in rehabilitating the city, but McCloy became enraged and told him in no uncertain terms that he did not care about reconstruction and the prevention of diseases, but wanted Military Government to take care of demilitarization and denazification.6

6Peterson 318-319; Eckart 149-150. It is interesting to compare the detachment’s reports of September and October 1945 with the annual report for the first year of the occupation. While all mention denazification, it seems that the officers who wrote the first reports treated denazification just as one of many issues. They also voiced their concerns about the effect the denazification program had on their reconstruction efforts. The early reports clearly show the detachment’s interpretation of its mission in Nuremberg. In September the author concluded his report the following way: "In general [...] the rehabilitation and rebuilding of the city of Nuremberg is being carried on with remarkable speed, if one remembers that it was one of the
McCloy was not alone in making denazification a top priority. A new directive of the United States Forces of the European Theater (USFET) from 7 July and Military Government Law No. 8 of September, which regulated the denazification process, added denazification to the agendas of Klise's and all other filed detachments.\(^7\) In October the detachment dutifully reported that "from the beginning denazification was the priority job." According to the report, Military Government had dismissed over two thousand city employees and checked the rest of the city administration for their ties to the Nazi party, but it seems that during the initial phase of the occupation the professional soldiers handled the issue pragmatically.\(^8\) The Nuremberg commanders received lists from their superiors that contained all people who were to be removed from their offices, but they tended to grant local

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most destroyed cities in Europe." The annual report dedicates more space to denazification and lacks the enthusiasm of the earlier papers; see Nürnberg 1945-49, I, docs. 2 (Headquarters MG Nuremberg on 1.9.45: Survey of Activities since Occupation), 4 (MG Nuremberg, IV. The Fall and Occupation, 7-11), 5 (Military Government Detachment for Nuremberg, Annual Historical Report 21 April 1945 to 20 June 1946).


German administrators whom they trusted considerable leeway.\textsuperscript{9}

Often it was not the local detachment that forced the dismissal of an official, but Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) units. They were staffed by many German emigres and seemed to have a different agenda. They did not share the training or the concerns of the field officers, but rather were much more in line with Morgenthau’s punitive ideas. By October 1945 the situation stabilized and many of the appointees remained in office for the next years in spite of repeated denazification efforts by the Americans.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{9}Dastrup 33-36. A longtime member of the city administration recalled his experiences in 1988: He had been a member of the Nazi party. In June of 1945 he found his name in a list of people to be dismissed which the Americans published in the official city bulletin. Mr. K., however, was transferred to a different section within the administration, where he shared the room with the newly appointed director of the Nuremberg police, Stahl, a politically clean social democrat whom the Nazis had dismissed. Stahl intervened on K.’s behalf arguing that he was indispensable. When K’s name appeared a second time in the American lists, Nuremberg’s second mayor Leivié, who had developed a cordial relationship with Military Government officers, was able to maintain him in office. By the third time, however, K. had to leave the administration. He started working for the American Army. Since he was born in 1925, he fell under the youth amnesty and returned to the city of Nuremberg at the end of 1946 (NCA C104 no. 2, Interview K., 29 Nov. 1988). Another member of the city administration recalled that her boss did not seem to take the whole issue very seriously. He appeared every day at work with a smile and asked if he was still employed or had been fired already (Marga Guthmann, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1994).

\textsuperscript{10}Eckart 159-161; Peterson 316-317; Trümmerjahre: 27-28; see also Woller (95-110) who detects the same pattern for the surrounding region. Lutz Niethammer’s Die Mitläuferfabrik is the best study on denazification in the American zone. According to Eckart (238-248), city administrators of all political convictions argued that administrators were specialists who could not be replaced. He shows that
Germans and Youth Work

Theodor Marx in many ways typified the administrators on whom the Americans relied to get the cities in the American Zone functioning again. Born in 1892, he served in World War I, where he was wounded. Marx entered the Nuremberg city administration in 1916, where he initially served in the section for wounded veterans and surviving dependents. In 1925 Marx was appointed vice director of Nuremberg's welfare services. He also became active in nationwide community organizations and devoted much time to private welfare organizations. After the Nazi seizure of power Marx was charged in a disciplinary court, but the city permitted him to retire before the trial came to an end. The Americans reactivated Marx in June 1945. By September he had become director of Nuremberg's youth and welfare department, where he remained until an accident in the Alps ended his life in 1958. Marx shaped Nuremberg's youth policy more than any other person in Nuremberg after the war, but his influence went far beyond the city boundaries. He resumed his activities in the Deutsche Städtetag, the interest group of

American Military Government officials took these arguments seriously and often granted the desired exemptions, undermining the denazification efforts of the special branches.
all larger German cities, where he became one of the chief promoters of new approaches to youth activities.\textsuperscript{11}

Marx faced a challenging task. The war had not only destroyed much of the living space in Nuremberg but also drastically increased the number of young people who needed help or got in trouble with the law. To complicate things further the youth administration’s offices with all their papers and documents had been destroyed, together with almost all the dormitories the city had erected for young people who came from the surrounding region to serve their apprenticeships in the city’s industries. The Americans had requisitioned the one dormitory that was still intact.\textsuperscript{12}

Not all was bad, however. Before the Third Reich, Nuremberg had been one of the most progressive communities in the field of youth work and youth welfare. The idea for an office which dedicated its time and resources entirely to young people and took youth welfare out of the hands of private organizations had been born in Nuremberg in 1910. During the Weimar Republic the city considerably expanded its

\textsuperscript{11}NCA C18/II no. 4508, Theodor Marx; see also "Dr. Marx berufsmäßiger Stadtrat," [Dr. Marx Full Time City Council Member] Nürnberger Nachrichten, 18 Jan. 1947: 5. As we will see in the course of the dissertation, Marx developed his own concepts in youth work, but also relied very much on American ideas and material help in his attempts to restructure youth activities in Nuremberg which he tried to make a model for German communities.

services to young people. In 1920 it opened the first office which was dedicated entirely to taking care of the problems of Nuremberg's young people. Jugendpflege or youth work became an integral part of welfare services. Progressive men in charge of youth welfare regarded it as an essential tool for preventing jeopardized young people from getting in conflict with the law.\(^{13}\)

In December 1924 the German parliament passed the first German law for the welfare of youth, the only law the Reichstag was able to pass unanimously before 1933. For the first time in German history the law assigned the state a general responsibility for the upbringing of young people. In view of the dire economic situation of Germany, however, the newly introduced youth offices never were able to expand their activities beyond welfare. Nuremberg faced additional challenges. Instead of giving communities a free hand, the Bavarian state government decided to assume control of the entire youth sector. This decision hampered the work of the youth administration within the community and made innovative and progressive programs almost impossible to realize.\(^{14}\)

Hitler's rise to power in 1933 saw the complete demise of independent youth work of the communities. The only realm

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\(^{13}\)Erwin Stein, ed., Monographien deutscher Städte: Darstellung deutscher Städte und ihrer Arbeit in Wirtschaft, Finanzwesen, Hygiene, Sozialpolitik und Technik XXIII: Nürnberg (Berlin: Deutscher Kommunalverlag, 1927) 273-277; see also Die deutschen Städte 1-2.

\(^{14}\)Die deutschen Städte 1-2.
in which the city was permitted to operate was youth welfare. All other aspects of youth work became part of the Hitler Youth. Marx clearly recognized in 1945 that the city's isolation immediately after the war, with no state or central government at hand to intervene in welfare and youth affairs, offered him the chance to reorganize the entire area of youth work, including the welfare system and social services as well as youth care, without restraints from above. Before 1933 he had been a prominent advocate of making the communities responsible for youth work. The new situation gave him the opportunity to put his plans into action.15

Youth work actually was reviving in the city. The Catholic and Protestant churches had taken advantage of their right to organize immediately after the end of hostilities. The trade unions and the socialist Falken began to get together again as soon as they were permitted to do so. Nevertheless the start was slow. In January 1946 a mere 7,400 young people had found their way back into seven of the traditional youth organizations whose formation Clay had authorized in October. The two churches initially had the strongest following, but the trade unions soon caught up with them.16

15Die deutschen Städte 1-2.

The October directive also mandated the initiation of youth committees in which all youth organizations together with different community representatives could learn to work and solve their problems together on a democratic basis. The directive seems to have been in line with Marx’s thinking. Nuremberg’s youth organizations also reacted positively to the suggestion. American policy did not seem to be in line with the thinking of the Lutheran Church, however. Church leaders had met in Munich at the end of May 1945. They decided to explicitly instruct all deacons in the state that they should not do anything that would deviate from the traditional youth activities of the church.17

The city’s youth committee came together for the first time in January 1946. Marx’s ideas of the committee’s structure and mission were initially identical with those of the American educators. He tried to foster close cooperation between the city administration and the youth committee. Youth organizations apparently accepted the experts’ lead. During the first years, for example, they elected the director of the city’s youth administration to the chair of the committee. It is important to note in this context, however, that traditionally Germans organized in Vereine, or clubs which dedicated themselves to a specific purpose such

as sports, hiking, singing, or even politics. Military Government officials as well as the Germans initially did not take those young people into account who refused to organize in any way. These people had no way of participating in any youth activities and therefore also had no voice in the committee during the initial phase of its existence.\footnote{Die deutschen Städte 4; Nuremberg Military Government Detachment, Annual Historical Report from 21 Apr. 1945 to 20 June 1946, section 4.e.(2), Youth Activities; Nürnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 5. In his report on Nuremberg’s youth activities of 1950 Marx states that the Nuremberg Youth Committee actually preceded Military Government directives. The sources do not bear his claim out. Clay signed the directive on 3 Oct. 1945 and it was published in German on the 28th of the same month (A copy of the German version of the original directive is in LCA Personen CLXV, Dollinger, 10). Since the city administration repeatedly reported to various American offices that the Germans had initiated the youth committee in Nuremberg, it seems plausible that city administrators and youth leaders had come together on an informal basis and agreed on a similar institution prior to the American directive. Even though, one of the early participants remembered that the American influence on the committee’s policies and its structure was considerable (Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995).}

\textbf{First Aid}

Neither McCloy nor Klise regarded youth as a high priority in Nuremberg during the first months of the occupation. McCloy and many people in Washington wanted to see denazification carried through. The immediate concern of the Nuremberg detachment was, and for the next years remained, the city population’s survival. Denazification as well as youth matters became additional burdens for field detachments which hampered their more important tasks. Nuremberg was completely paralyzed and even the most
essential services had collapsed during the final battle. The officers and enlisted men needed to revive a city that, according to their own estimates, was 90 per cent destroyed and had no water, gas, or electricity. Military Government had to fill the void the Nazi administrators had left behind. At the same time the food situation within the city was alarming. The complete transportation breakdown cut the city off from the surrounding region which normally provided the supplies for its population. Officers found supplies for about ten days when they took stock in Nuremberg in May 1945.19

The Nuremberg detachment immediately went to work. During the summer of 1945 it reinstalled the city’s administration, supervised the reopening of hospitals and

19Annual Historical Report from 21 Apr. 1945 to 20 June 1946, Nuremberg Military Government Detachment; Nürnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 5. I agree with Peterson that field officers regarded instructions from higher echelons, which often reflected Washington’s priorities, as a nuisance which did not help with their tasks in the communities. Clay soon realized that JCS 1067’s economic provisions were completely out of touch with realities in Germany. The economy had to be revived to ensure at least a subsistence level that would take care of paying for the American Zone’s food imports which so far were a part of the American occupation budget. This is why he began to argue in favor of a limited resumption of German industrial activities. See, for example the year end speech Clay prepared for General McNarney, in which he summarizes his position and the Military Government’s achievements in 1945 (Clay Papers doc. 77) and Krieger 98-101. The Nuremberg Field Detachment’s actions were typical for the intial phase of the occupation in which Army regulars were in charge (Lutz Niethammer, "Die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht zwischen Verwaltungstradition und politischen Parteien in Bayern 1945," Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte [hereinafter cited as VJfZ] 2 (1967): 185-186).
tried to make sure that food would be at hand. American engineers helped their German counterparts to rehabilitate the utility works and the public transport system. The Germans got passes which permitted them to move freely in spite of the curfew, vehicles, gasoline and even building materials that otherwise were not available. It was certainly no drawback that all three commanders were professional soldiers who apparently got along well with the tactical troop commanders. Whenever German administrators were unable to provide vital materials deemed necessary for maintaining the population healthy and quiet, the Army helped out. Hospitals received penicillin for treating the German venereal disease cases. Military Government rearmed the police with American guns to reestablish law and order. American tank trucks provided parts of the population with water and went out to the surrounding region to collect milk to feed the children. The transportation breakdown as well as JCS 1067, which initially closed down German coal mines, also prevented the city from obtaining the coal it would need to keep its citizens from freezing during the winter. In accordance with Eisenhower's instructions American forces provided transportation for bringing wood into the city. In Nuremberg they also made sufficient tools available to do the job. When the city could not get enough people to cut the wood, the Military Government officer in charge of the action simply requested and got several thousand prisoners of war to
do the job, organized the necessary tools and picked the site for the cutting. The Army's wood transports continued throughout the winter of 1945-46.\textsuperscript{20}

German refugees from Eastern Germany and the Sudeten mountains received the special attention of the occupiers. In view of the acute shortage of housing the city of Nuremberg had imposed a ban on returning Nurembergers if they could not prove that they had a job and a place to stay, but the Americans were not bound by those rules. Shortly after the fighting ended they began to ship large numbers of refugees whom they picked up in their trucks to Nuremberg without even advising the administration of these shipments. The city obviously was not pleased with the developments. In the course of the next months Military Government officials tried their best to make the situation in the camps bearable by providing bedding materials and other necessities for the

\textsuperscript{20}The detachment's report of May 1945 describes the milk action in Nürnberg 1945-1949, I, doc. 6a; see also the detachment's various reports covering the time between April 1945 and June 1946; Nürnberg 1945-49, I, docs. 3,4,5. "Tankwagen als Helfer in der Not: Menschen standen in langen Schlangen an," ([Tank Trucks Helped in Emergencies: People Stood in Long Lines] Trümmerjahre 1945-1950: 3) contains the information on utilities from a German perspective. Apart from the annual report see Peterson (319-320) for the wood cutting action. Peterson's eyewitness account is not quite correct. Capt. Richard Mershon, who apparently became Civil Affairs Officer some time in the summer of 1945, recalled in an interview that he had to steal the tools. The city administration, however, maintained a record of the tools it had received in 1945/46. All of them had either come from German captured stocks or from the local American Army units who lent them to the city of Nuremberg. The city bought the tools from the Army in Oct. 1947 (NCA C28 no. 43, 44; details of the transports are in NCA C28 no. 39, Dec. 1945-May 1946).
hopelessly overcrowded camps. Cooperation from the city was not easily forthcoming. The city did not pasteurize the milk it provided for the camp until the refugees complained to the Americans in June and refugee representatives reported in the same month that without the help of the Americans they would not have been able to disinfect the camp. Four weeks later the refugees once again had to appeal to the Americans. Health inspectors had found that the toilets were completely inadequate, but the city only went into action when the Americans intervened.21

Initially nobody knew how long these refugees actually were going to stay in Nuremberg. Captain Mershon of the Nuremberg Military Government detachment informed the Germans in June that the city would not have to provide additional space for the refugees since the Americans would soon begin to return them to their homes. In response to this information about 800 expellees from the Sudeten sent a petition to the American authorities in which they made clear that they had actually not fled their homes, but rather had been deported and come to Nuremberg on American trucks. They inquired when the political circumstances would enable them to return home. Lieutenant Callicott informed them in August that he had forwarded their inquiry to the appropriate higher authorities. In the meantime the city reported to the

21Reports of 28 June, 2 July, 8 July 1945; NCA C25/I no. 1087; monthly report for Schafhof and Witschelstraße, 23 June 1945; NCA C25/I no. 1086b.
Bavarian Government's representative, the President of Middle Franconia's regional government, that the Americans did not return any of the refugees and did not even permit them to leave the camps. The author thought that "these people will most probably remain in Germany in the foreseeable future." Since most of the refugees either were women or children, additional problems loomed large on the horizon. With the men absent the women would have to go to work, but nobody knew what to do with the children.  

**Struggle for a New Start: Reopening the Schools**

In view of the more pressing tasks of assuring the survival of the city it is not surprising that Military Government officials only dedicated as little time and resources as possible to youth, but the Army regarded functioning schools as essential for getting young Germans off the streets where they might get into trouble and cause problems. The Education and Religious Affairs Branch in Berlin set 1 October 1945 as the deadline for the field detachments to reopen the first four grades of elementary schools. Eisenhower informed the Germans in August 1945 that their schools and courts would be reopened "as soon as they are cleansed from Nazi influences." Eisenhower promised that a judicial and an educational system which would be based on

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"real democratic principles" would find strong American support.23

Policy formulation and orders are one matter, their implementation is another. The field officers in charge of the task did not always carry out their orders in a way which headquarters would have approved. In Eichstätt, a town halfway between Nuremberg and Munich, for example, the education officer did not seem to care at all about his task. He simply ordered that the schools be opened by the deadline. When the German school superintendent objected because denazification had eliminated most teachers, the officer told him to employ housewives. This was in line with the letter of his directives, but certainly not with the spirit. The superintendent later recalled that the officer was not at all inclined to offer suggestions or to listen to German problems. He brushed all legal or administrative objections aside and was only interested in meeting the deadline he had

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23 Proclamation of General Eisenhower to the German people in the American Zone of Occupation of 6 Aug. 1945, in Amtsblatt der Militär-Regierung Deutschland, Nürnberg no. 23, 15 Aug. 1945: 1 (reproduction in Nürnberger Nachrichten, special issue, 40 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Wiederaufbau 1945-49: 5). It should be noted here that this proclamation addressed the Germans in the second person, "Ihr", instead of the formal and customary "Sie". Germans, especially the members of the middle class, regarded the use of the second person as a serious offense which clearly demonstrated a lack of respect towards the person addressed in such a way. Although headquarters may not have been aware of the difference, the authors of the German version of the proclamation demonstrated in this way that the Americans not only came as victors, but that they also had lost their respect for all Germans and had no intention of meeting them on equal terms.

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gotten from headquarters. His only help consisted in a car and gasoline for the German administrator. When the schools opened, he convened the teachers and told them in no uncertain terms that he considered them all as Nazis and would not help them in any way even if regulations permitted him to do so. In spite of his apparent lack of interest and documented hostility towards the Germans the officer remained with Military Government in the region for the next four years, but was hardly seen in Eichstätt.24

The situation in Nuremberg was similar in some respects, but had much better results. Education and religion did not seem to enjoy a high priority even for a major city like Nuremberg. In May 1945 the position of the Education and Religious Affairs Officer in detachment B-211 remained vacant. Subsequent reports indicate that the Monuments and Fine Arts Section, which was established after May, also was taking care of schools and the Churches. First reports from the field show, however, that the officer in charge of this section had to devote much of his time to the enormous art treasures stored in Nuremberg, some of which had to be returned to their original locations in Poland, the Soviet

24Peterson 312-313. As we have seen above, Education and Religious Affairs Branch had no officers who could devote their full time and attention to education. It is most likely that the officer in charge of Eichstätt had been ordered to take on the opening of schools as an additional duty on which he was not inclined to waste any more time than absolutely necessary. His anti-German feelings only worsened a potentially bad situation.
Union and in Austria. He therefore had to limit his other activities. His only action in the religious and education realm consisted of a meeting with church leaders in April 1945. He ordered them to resume their activities and to register with Military Government.\(^{25}\)

In the course of the city administration's reorganization and denazification Military Government appointed the new superintendent for schools in Nuremberg, Dr. Hans Raab, on 25 May. Raab had been an English teacher and served as interpreter for the city administration. Former school director Otto Barthel joined him as head of elementary schools in June.\(^{26}\)

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\(^{25}\)The telephone directory of the Nuremberg detachment from May 1945 shows that there was an office and a telephone reserved for the education and religious affairs officer, but that nobody was in charge of the office at the time. Detachment reports from April 1945 list education and religious affairs under the arts section. It seems that Lt. Col. James Barnett, the detachment's deputy commander, who remained in Nuremberg until 1948, early on took an interest in education and religious affairs and may have taken over the duties of the position when it was vacant. *Nürnberg 1945-49*, I, docs. 5 (Nuremberg Detachment Annual report 20 Apr. 1945 to 21 June 1945), 6a (Summary Det. E1B3 Functional Work in Nuremberg on 22.4.1945), 6b (Summary Det. E1B3 Functional Work in Nuremberg on 23.4.1945); information on Barnett is in Eckart 125. Nuremberg seemed to be harder hit than smaller communities, but basically had to deal with the same problems. See Müller (55-100) for a general assessment of the school situation in Bavaria at the time.

Finding and reconstructing classrooms became the first obstacle Germans and Military Government had to overcome for the reopening of schools. Just as the rest of the city, school buildings had suffered considerably during the war. Looters did not spare public buildings in April. They took everything from furniture to electrical appliances from the schools the war had left intact. American troops, refugees or parts of the city administration moved into the buildings that could still be used. Since no other facilities were available, butchers and milk distributors had to open their shops in some school houses.  

The city took stock in June 1945: fifty-six of the existing 123 school buildings in Nuremberg were completely destroyed. Another twenty could not be repaired in the foreseeable future. The administration thought that twenty-four buildings could be restored fairly easily, provided that it could obtain the necessary materials. Only two smaller buildings had escaped any damage. Seventy-two of the buildings had been elementary schools. Twenty-one of those were considered to be repairable within the time limit.

27"Metzgerei zog ins Schulhaus: Kinder bekamen nur dürftigen 'Betreuungsunterricht','" [Butcher Shop Moved into School: Children Received only Meager 'Maintenance Lessons'] Trümmerjahre: 31.

Since the schools were closed, the city administration ordered all teachers to participate in the rehabilitation of Nuremberg's school houses from May on. A number of teachers who had not survived denazification and were dismissed returned to the schools in construction crews during the summer. Military Government helped where it could. It tried to clear school buildings the Army had requisitioned for housing soldiers. By May 1946 the Army had returned to the Germans most of the ten school buildings it had occupied. To facilitate the acquisition of materials Military Government opened a dump for captured German materials on the Nazis' former rally grounds. The Germans could pick up whatever materials they needed. This help was only a drop in the bucket, however, because everybody needed the materials. Utility companies or hospitals certainly had priority status. The city reported that a lack of building materials prevented even the most urgent repairs. Two days before the deadline Nuremberg had about one hundred rooms in twenty-nine buildings ready, less than one tenth of the peace time number. These rooms had to accommodate almost 24,000 elementary school children. Only a part of them had windows, so there would be problems as soon as temperatures began to fall in October.29

29Monthly report of the Lord Mayor of Nuremberg for Sept. 1945; Nürnberg 1945-1949, I, doc. 100; Nuremberg Military Government Detachment, Annual Historical Report 21 Apr. 1945 to 20 June 1946, sections 3.e and 9.d.4.(1); Nürnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 5; see also a report of 7 July 1945 in the
Nuremberg also had to deal with the serious shortage of textbooks and teaching materials. The Education and Religious Affairs Branch in Berlin had been able to produce a considerable number of books, but they were not nearly enough to satisfy the demand. Once more each detachment had to rely on its own resources. In the case of Eichstätt nothing happened at all in this respect. Nurembergers were luckier. Although the number of textbooks remained a constant worry for the next three years, the field officers did their best to help out. When the schools opened in October, for example, the Americans had organized from Magdeburg in the Soviet Zone math books which had been used there before 1933.³⁰

Nuremberg faced an equally difficult task in finding teachers for the children. Since teachers were entrusted with the future citizens of Germany, it was logical that Military Government was particularly eager to rid the profession of all Nazi and militaristic influences. German Church and city officials, however, argued for leniency, and above all for an evaluation of each individual case, not a

³⁰Trümmerjahre: 31. Raab acknowledged American efforts during the next years, especially the support of a Major Morell, but found that MG only enjoyed limited success in its attempts to provide new textbooks (NCA C36/I no. 324).
blanket wave of dismissals based on party membership. On July 19, 1945 Raab sent a "Memorandum of Removal of Administrative and Teaching Personnel" to the Americans. According to him, all German officials, including the proven enemies of the Nazi regime, asked Military Government officials to discriminate between the real criminals and those party members who had been "non-aggressive" and "inoffensive." He wrote that not entering the Nazi Party or one of its affiliations could have serious consequences for members of the civil service which ranged from dismissal all the way to the deportation to a concentration camp. Raab proposed that those Nazi members who had not harmed anybody or had entered the party under pressure should be retained and be "subject to an adequate period of probation," possibly accompanied by salary cuts. He also suggested that the whole procedure could be handled much better if the Americans consulted German authorities before they decided on dismissals. Echoing a wide spread conviction among leading Nurembergers, Raab predicted dire consequences for the future relations between the Germans and the occupiers and even for world peace if Military Government did not moderate its denazification policy.31

31 Raab's own summary and conclusion of the memorandum is in Nürnberg, 1945-49, I, doc. 10c. Eckart (112, FN 12) evaluates additional parts of it. Raab himself discussed text and impact of his memorandum for the city chronicler in 1948 (NCA C36/I no. 324). Eckart (112-121) shows that Raab's allegations were far from correct. It had been possible throughout the Third Reich in Nuremberg to remain in the city...
In August the city repeated its plea with the Americans. In his monthly report Martin Treu, an old and respected Social Democratic leader whom the Americans had appointed Lord Mayor in July, downplayed the importance of the teachers' involvement in Nazi organizations. According to him, the Americans should regard membership in lesser Nazi organizations as a sign of evasion or even camouflage of anti-Nazi feelings rather than active participation. Treu insisted that an individual evaluation of each case was indispensable. The American denazification policy was leaving many older teachers without pensions at a time and age when they could not be expected to change professions. Treu further argued that the American directives also were draining the city of the experienced specialists it so urgently needed in those difficult times.\(^{32}\)

administration without becoming a party member, since even the Nazi Lord Mayor to a surprisingly large extent accepted the administrators' argument which they would use for the Americans again: civil servants were apolitical specialists. This does not imply, however, that many of them were not attracted to the Nazis who had incorporated many nationalist and conservative ideas into their program. Even Nazi antisemitism was not unwelcome to many (Eckart 72–74). Schieder severely criticized the American denazification policy as well. He thought that it should be carried out on an individual basis. If the Americans continued their course, they would cause communism and even renazification of the people. (Nuremberg Military Government Detachment, Annual Historical Report 21 Apr. 1945 to 20 June 1946, Appendix No. 1; Nürnberg 1945–49, I, doc. 5)

Nuremberg officials, like those in other communities under American control, did not get the desired response. By August 1945 the Americans had dismissed ninety-six teachers. Two days before the schools opened the number had swollen to 160, compared to 139 teachers who could start working. The city had little hope that Military Government would permit more than 50% of the remaining forty-one teachers who were still under investigation to return to the classrooms.33

The Nuremberg detachment tried harder than their counterpart in Eichstätt to remedy the situation along the lines permitted by headquarters. In good American tradition the officers looked for practical and quick solutions. They began to train substitute teachers without any regard for German civil service regulations or educational prerequisites. Only those could apply who had never been members of the Nazi party or its affiliations. The new teachers got their training in crash courses which lasted eight to twelve weeks in 1945. The city did not find the crash program in any way adequate. Lord Mayor Treu thought that many of the new teachers accepted the post only out of economic considerations without having the necessary inclinations or capabilities. The long term experience, however, proved him wrong. Many of those who went through

the courses remained in the profession in spite of prejudices
and obstacles they had to overcome as outsiders.3 4

Raab’s and Treu’s attitude towards denazification brings
an important difference between German and American educators
to light. The Germans maintained that schools were part of
a body of civil servants who, as apolitical experts, had to
do their duty regardless of the political environment to
which they had to adapt. They simply had to be reprogrammed,
that is, made acquainted with the new rules and they would
function adequately. It was in line with this thinking that
Raab convened his teachers once a week not only to discuss
practical questions, but also to familiarize them with the
new ideology. Teachers listened to presentations dealing
with "educational goals, democracy and school, and
fundamental ideas about the curriculum." Americans did not
share this "apolitical" interpretation of the German civil
service, and especially teachers. No matter where they stood
on Germany’s future, they agreed that German schools had been
crucial during the Third Reich and earlier in disseminating
militarism, antisemitism, and Nazi ideology. Those who did
not regard Germans as capable of being reeducated wanted the

3 Die Situation der Lehrer, monthly report of the Lord
Mayor for Aug. 1945; Nürnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 99b; "Lehrer
mit reiner Weste: Schulhelfer absolvieren ihre Ausbildung in
einem Schnellverfahren," [Teachers with a White Vest: School
 Helpers Receive Training in a Hurry] Trümmerjahre: 31;
"Nothelfer in Schulen: Kurs von zwölf Wochen für Ersatz-
Pädagogen," [Emergency Helpers in Schools: Twelve Week
Courses for Substitute-Educators] 40 Jahre Bundesrepublik:
15; Dastrup 56.
Nazis to be punished and the schools closed with no further action afterwards; those in favor of rehabilitation regarded denazification as the essential first step towards reform. JCS 1067 as well as Eisenhower's directives reflected this common denominator. Schools were as important as the law courts which the Nazis had corrupted. A look at Nazi textbooks, which even treated math problems in militaristic terms, confirmed the Americans' view. If Raab had assessed the teaching profession's involvement in National Socialist propaganda realistically, he might have realized that his interpretation of the teachers as apolitical servants did not hold. Americans could not accept the rather cosmetic changes he was proposing. The occupiers initially neglected the fact, however, that they would not be able to carry out structural reform without convincing German educators about the validity of their views and rather different attitudes towards the goals and meaning of education. Ultimately democratic values and less authoritarian teaching methods might be more important for re-education than the reform of the educational system itself, but the success of either approach depended on the Americans' ability to break up old patterns of thinking and teaching.

GIs and Germans

Nuremberg's city administration continued to function with almost no interruption and was in close and daily contact with American Military Government officials.
Ordinary men, women and children, however, were more likely to make their acquaintance with the occupiers on the streets or in their apartments. During the immediate postwar period practically all Nurembergers had to face American soldiers in one way or another. Germans had to deal with Americans who searched or even requisitioned their apartments and houses after the fighting ended. Since schools did not open until October, German children and adolescents had much time to spend for organizing food, becoming familiar with the new situation and with the occupiers as well.35

Hans Eckstein, born in 1913, had worked in the supply department of a unit throughout the war. He was one of the many German soldiers who resolved not to fall into Russian

35Gimbel (A German Community) was the first scholar who examined this aspect of the American occupation. Ziemke also dedicates much space to the development of German-American grassroots relations. The more recent German case studies by Eckart and Woller, however, almost entirely ignore this issue. While Eckart is mainly concerned with the American influence on Nuremberg’s city administration, he occasionally ventures into the realm of opinion and perceptions of the population in general. He argues, for example, that the withdrawal of Military Government from active management of German affairs in many ways removed it from the German population. According to him, this permitted special branch activities, above all denazification, to penetrate German society and perceptions much more profoundly than Military Government actions (160-162). While this interpretation may have its merits, Eckart never bothers to test it. He also does not take into account the presence of many thousand American soldiers in Nuremberg who certainly contributed in one way or another to the German perception of Americans in the city.
hands. In May 1945 he escaped the Russians who had captured him and began to march towards the west. During the first few days of his journey he became responsible for a small group of refugees, consisting of civilians and soldiers like himself who all wanted to make it to the region controlled by the Americans. When they had finally reached their destination, the group dispersed. Since Eckstein was still in uniform, he decided that it would be best to give himself up to an American soldier. He marched in the next village and shook hands with the first GI he encountered, making it clear that he considered the war to be over for him. The GI did not seem to have any apprehensions, but rather gave Eckstein part of his rations and sent him to the local courthouse for further processing without any guard. Before he entered the courthouse, Eckstein, who had worked in the development section of a car factory before he was drafted, helped an American to adjust the engine of a German truck. He waited with a number of other German soldiers for an American officer who, according to rumors, could provide them with discharge papers that would return the soldiers officially to civilian life. Eckstein was able to obtain the coveted paper ahead of everyone else because the American NCO who accompanied the officer had been the man who had had

36Henke (674-693) provides a detailed account of the attempts of German soldiers and civilians to make it to the American lines. Of course not all Germans were lucky, but on occasion American troops provided considerable assistance to their undertaking.

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trouble with the truck. He recognized Eckstein, and after a short conversation with the officer, the German obtained his release paper and was allowed to leave.

Eckstein continued his journey towards Nuremberg. On the way he made his discharge paper available to other soldiers who managed to get their discharges by simply having a local teacher copy it for them. Since the paper stated that he was from Nuremberg, he did not have problems with American patrols. On the contrary, Eckstein was able to fetch a ride on a German bus driven by a former SS-man and an American soldier. In a typical display of American behavior at the time, the GI did not stop for Eckstein, but rather for a German lady with a child who needed a ride. Eckstein was able to sneak up on the roof of the bus. At the next American road block the Americans discovered him. They inquired about his destination and he was permitted to ride inside, much to the chagrin of the driver. When the GI became aware that the driver and Eckstein did not like each other, he made it a point in taking Eckstein directly to his house in Nuremberg, where he arrived on 27 May 1945, his wedding anniversary.37

Friedrich Voigt also decided that he needed to return to Nuremberg after the end of hostilities. In his village Americans ordered all former soldiers to register at the town hall, but just like others Voigt preferred to wait and see

what happened. Those who did register were taken to France, where they would have to work for the next years. Armed just with his official telecommunications identification card and fresh eggs, he walked back to Nuremberg in spite of regulations which did not permit Germans to leave the communities in which they were staying. Voigt knew the region very well, but even when he met American patrols, he presented his ID together with the eggs and continued his journey unmolested. GIs even provided him with cigarettes. He thought that African-American soldiers generally were friendlier than their white counterparts.

Once in Nuremberg, Voigt immediately reported back to work. Since his skills as a telephone repairman were in urgent demand, his superiors simply ignored the fact that he was not eligible for work because he had not been officially discharged. Voigt remained on his job without any interruptions until he retired over thirty years later.38

Heiko Kistner, eighteen years old in 1945, fought the war beyond the cease fire. Russians took him prisoner two

38Friedrich Voigt, personal interview, 26 July 1994. Americans usually seemed to have ordered German soldiers to appear in uniform at the courthouses. Those who did often marched into prison camps, but GIs did not seem to be overly worried about netting all former soldiers of the Wehrmacht. Those who did not appear usually seemed to have been left alone. See "Soldaten verwöhnen 'Blondy' mit Schleckereien: Die kleine Waltraud vergaß bald alle Warnungen vor den Feinden - Ihr Bruder beneidete sie sehr," [Soldiers Spoil 'Blondy' with Goodies: Little Waltraud Soon Forgot All Warnings about the Enemy - Her Brother Envied Her a Lot] Trümmerjahre: 10.
days after the official German surrender. He managed to find his way back to the west as well. Kistner did not have any problem finding a job as a messenger for an American unit in Oettingen, about forty miles south of Nuremberg, where he had located his family. He decided to enlist American help for his return trip to Nuremberg. In his spare time Kistner worked for a farmer who paid him with homemade schnapps. African-American soldiers were happy to exchange this commodity for gasoline. As soon as Kistner had enough to provide for the trip and pay the driver, he was able to move the family back to Nuremberg in fall of 1945. Kistner recalled that he got along with the African-Americans "very well."39

Everywhere American soldiers searched houses for Nazi materials and hidden soldiers immediately after the end of hostilities, but often also took along other desirable objects. A seventeen-year-old girl discovered her favorite stuffed animal in a jeep on her way home from work. Although GIs were standing nearby she ran to the jeep and took her tiger back without any interference. The GIs apparently were more interested the opposite sex than in keeping their war trophies. The girl walked away accompanied by whistles and shouts. When Americans searched her apartment for a second time, one soldier decided to take along one of the two eggs the girl and her mother still had. The girl took the egg out

of his hand and put it back in its place. The Americans left the dwelling without any further incidents.\footnote{Maunzerle' als Kühlerfigur: Mädchen entdeckte Lieblingsstofftier am Jeep," ["Maunzerle" as Radiator Mascot: Girl Discovered Favorite Stuffed Animal in Jeep] Trümmerjahre: 3.}

Marianne Hassel, at the time twelve years old, recalled a similar incident. Her first contact with Americans was in Schwäbisch Hall, a small town in Württemberg. African-American soldiers searched their house, but did not display any hostility. On the contrary, she found a black soldier in the kitchen who had picked up her little sister and carried her around. Another GI, however, had taken her recorder. In spite of her fear Ms. Hassel decided to negotiate with the soldier and was able to persuade him to return the recorder to her. During the next months Americans repeatedly left food at her house or gave the children chocolate, but her family remained reserved towards the occupiers. She overheard adults discussing rumors of rape or venting their disapproval of German girls and ladies going out with American soldiers, especially African-Americans. Although she had a number of encounters with GIs, Hassel never got to know them by name or got into closer contact with them.\footnote{Marianne Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug. 1995.}

Once again the refugees had their own very special experiences with Americans. Johannes Wahner's family resumed their odyssey shortly after hostilities ended. They joined

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the thousands of people whom the Czechs expelled from their homes. Apparently anticipating the Potsdam agreement that this operation had to be carried out as humanely as possible, American trucks and troops came to the region to pick the Germans up and bring them to Germany. Many of the refugees had been able to save some of their belongings and gathered them at the assembly points. Wahner remembered that GIs in charge of the transports actually prevented Czechs from stripping the Germans of their last belongings. From Mies they went directly to Nuremberg and found themselves in a camp that during the war had served as air defense command in a Nuremberg suburb. In June 1945 alone the city became responsible for several thousand refugees in this way. As we have seen above, the refugees had to rely on Americans to receive some of the necessities of life and help from the Nurembergers.42

The refugees soon seemed to develop a special relationship with the occupiers. Just four weeks after the GErman surrender African-American soldiers blasted a hole in the wall surrounding a German refugee camp, apparently to be able to visit their girlfriends undisturbed. The refugees' representatives notified Nuremberg's city administration which in turn alerted Military Government. The following

day Lieutenant Callicott inspected the scene. He became especially concerned about the contacts between children and African-American troops. Callicott, who was in charge of the local detachment's youth section, was unhappy about refugee children begging for food when the GIs were having lunch or dinner. The city tried to do something and reported a month later that it had stopped those activities. Johannes Wahner and his friends, however, continued their visits of the American kitchens in spite of the admonitions, because they provided them with food they needed to survive. Wahner recalled that black soldiers maintained their goodwill towards young people and shared their food with them. If the children were lucky and spotted an African-American cook, they could be sure that he would save some food for them. The city officials also could not stop American soldiers from visiting the camp. During the next months reports about American visits from annoyed camp inhabitants repeatedly reached the city administration.43

Not all American GIs were so well disposed towards young Germans. Gerhard Knöchlein, seventeen years old in 1945, recalled that not all attempts to begin a friendly conversation with GIs were successful. He and a friend had begun to talk to an American soldier at the entrance of a requisitioned house when suddenly another soldier showed up

and began beating Knöchlein’s friend without warning. The two Germans decided to retreat rapidly in view of such adversity. Ironically the incident took place at the building which later on became the home of the Nuremberg Post’s largest and best equipped youth center.44

Wahner, his brother, and his friends also found out the hard way that not every American was well disposed towards young Germans. According to him, white GIs generally preferred throwing their leftovers in the trash to giving them to the children. When one of them caught Wahner’s brother picking raisins from a container with leftovers, he decided to dip the boy’s head in the unappetizing slop. A little later, a Mexican-American soldier invited Wahner and a friend to pick up laundry from a requisitioned house. The two soon found themselves thrown down the stairs and locked up with a native Nuremberger in the basement of the house. They discovered a large collection of German arms there, but were more interested in boxes with tuna cans stored in the room. All three boys ate until they were sick. They had to pay a price for the delicacies, however. In the evening the American opened the door. All three boys had to run a gauntlet made up of GIs before they made it back to freedom. The Germans learned quickly to stay away from this kind of company.45

Even those who kept their distance from the occupiers at times could not help being surprised. In Nuremberg the lady who had recorded the rude American behavior in April confided to her diary in May that she had given some juice and dessert to her neighbors who in return presented her with little boxes of American coffee. She went on to say that "we are enthused. We haven't had something this wonderful for decades."^46

Some of the Germans who were offended by the Americans' contacts with the opposite sex decided to resort to more drastic actions to show their disapproval. In September 1945 Military Government's Intelligence Division reported that relations between GIs and German Fräuleins "have been more than some young Germans, particularly returning P[risoners of] W[ar] have been able to stand." In Heidelberg, for example, posters went up which not only denounced the fraternization in very drastic terms, but also threatened the German girls involved with dire consequences. In and around Nuremberg flyers appeared which expressed the hope that the girlfriends of African-American soldiers would have "black and white speckled children." The poem that followed described women who went out with GIs in the worst possible way. Make-up, improper dresses as well as smoking American

^46 Diary of an elderly lady, 5 May 1945; NCA F5 no. 488.
cigarettes seemed to be trademarks of this kind of betrayal.\footnote{United States Group Control Council [hereinafter USGCC], Information Control Service, ICIS #12, week ending 29 September 1945: 9; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion Survey Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/2; the Nuremberg flyer is in Henke (199). According to him (198-200), this phenomenon occurred throughout the American zone.}

The authors of the report noted that German officials could not agree on what the posters actually meant. German girls reacted to them on an entirely individual basis. Those from "good" (middle class?) backgrounds at least understood the German men's motives and respected them by not going out with Americans, even when they were employed by the Army or Military Government. They also pointed out, however, that going out with an American soldier was very attractive, because GIs were easy going and did not have marriage in mind. The girls revealed that many families actually supported liaisons with Americans because of the material benefits. The young women, whose names and addresses were made public on the posters, had nothing but contempt for the German purists. Military Government investigators reported that "German women thus pilloried poutingly indicated their determination to carry on now with even greater enthusiasm."\footnote{USGCC, Information Control Services, ICIS #12, week ending 29 September 1945: 10; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion Survey Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/2. Henke 199 also points out that a number of the women attacked in this way justified their behavior with equal creativity. Liselotte Arnold, who worked for the Americans from 1945 to the sixties,
The ladies did not have to worry too much about the threats. Nobody would touch them as long as they were with their boyfriends. Some neighbors certainly kept their moral reservations to themselves because they also benefitted from the generosity of the GIs who came to see their girl-friends. In addition to that, the Americans were eager to maintain law and order, especially in regard to men who might form a threat to the security interests of the occupiers. Counter Intelligence officers kept a close eye on male teenagers who followed ladies fraternizing with Americans. In Heidelberg a twenty year old man who had just been released from a POW camp, was the first to be tried for attacking a fraternizing girl. He had watched her talking to a GI at the train station, then attacked her and tried to cut off her hair. Since this was the first case of this kind on trial, the American judge set a precedent and found a unique justification for his sentence. Since it would have taken the girl nine months to regrow her hair if the young man had corroborated this information. According to her, girls from reputable families could work for the occupiers, but should not date American GIs. Serious relationships, however, were generally accepted (Lieselotte Arnold, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995; see also Helga Köhler, personal interview, 13 July 1994).

When asked if the neighbors did not object to the relations between African-American soldiers and German girls in his neighborhood, Friedrich Voigt pointed out that the generosity of the GIs certainly served to appease any hard feelings the neighbors may have had (Friedrich Voigt, personal interview, 26 July 1994).
succeeded, the offender would spend the same time in prison.\textsuperscript{50}

Fraternization was not the only issue that led to irritation in some German circles. Army requisitions from the start became a bone of contention in German communities. Nurembergers, for example, lost control of their opera house which had escaped the bombing. Apart from enjoying the traditional German repertoire, the Americans used the building as a club, a boxing arena, a movie theater, and as a stage for their own shows. The Army permitted German functions twice a week, but continued operation of the club. German actors had to put up with sometimes rather rude behavior or at least an informality they were not accustomed to. On the positive side the Americans often provided the artists with food and other luxury items.\textsuperscript{51}

In spite of widespread destruction and the influx of refugees, the Americans initially did not exercise any restraint in requisitioning buildings. Although the Army targeted mainly Nazi property, it also expanded into many private dwellings with no apparent connection to the Nazis. Usually the occupants of the buildings were given short notice and were not allowed to take anything but the most necessary items along. The situation in Nuremberg became

\textsuperscript{50}Henke 199-200.

even more unpleasant in the fall of 1945 because the Americans needed room for the Allied personnel participating in the Nuremberg trials. Erlenstegen, a rather wealthy Nuremberg suburb with nice houses which had escaped much of the destruction, became their prime target. House owners found themselves and the people they were accommodating out in the streets. Some of the new occupants permitted landlords to return to their houses to retrieve additional items or to use their gardens, but many others did not. The issue remained a much resented feature of the occupation in Nuremberg and in other cities of the American zone for almost a decade.52

Having the house requisitioned, or at least sharing it with Americans during the initial phase of the occupation, could result in not entirely undesired consequences and sometimes even led to unexpected displays of goodwill. One family found food which the American occupants had left for

52Eckart 170, fn 64; "Amerikanerin enttäuscht: Sie wollte Göring hängen sehen," [American Lady Disappointed: She Wanted to See Göring Hang] Trümmerjahre: 34; Helga Köhler, personal interview, 13 July 1994. Ms. Köhler lived in Erlenstegen and was well acquainted with a number of people who had to give their houses up for the Americans. John Gimbel (A German Community 54-57) detected similar difficulties in the city of Marburg. Not everybody, however, regarded the requisitions as unjustified. Two of my interviewees, obviously not members of the middle class, thought that American policy hit just the right people in suburbia who had supported Hitler and complained bitterly in spite of the fact that their property was still intact and they got rent for the requisitioned properties. (Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995; Friedrich Voigt, personal interview, 28 July 1994)
them when they temporarily returned to their apartment to get items they needed. Another family had to put up with an American officer who showed considerable reserve towards the Germans in whose house he was living. Significantly it was the young people who were able to break the ice. The boys of the family thought that it would be a nice gesture to give the soldier a little present for Santa Claus' day in November 1945. Apparently impressed by their kindness, the soldier opened up and began to provide the children with chocolate, chewing gum, oranges, and many other things. The children found out that he had a German grandmother who seemed to have told him much about the way she had celebrated Christmas. The officer began to inquire what one would need to make the upcoming holiday a typical German one. Much to the astonishment of the Germans, he began to organize the things he had heard about. The family, including the American, feasted on a goose their benefactor had requisitioned in the countryside and a barrel of beer on Christmas eve of 1945.53

"Chewing gum" or "Hershey’s Chocolate" became household names for German children who also learned to appreciate American oranges. Even the Stars and Stripes took notice of the phenomenon. Side by side with a story about the very

bleak Christmas Germans were facing in Frankfurt in 1945 the paper printed a cartoon which depicted two American soldiers. One of them had children sitting on both arms and his shoulders who obviously enjoyed his company while the other was running from an angry mob of youngsters. The caption read: "Out of Chewing Gum again, Bill?" Just a few days later another cartoon captured the conversation of two German women commenting that GIs were replacing nannies in their neighborhood. The background showed a smiling and obviously good-natured American sentry at a car pool playing with children.54

Providing children with chewing gum and candy was just one facet in the relations which GIs and young Germans began to develop in 1945. Boys and girls often found the casual behavior of the soldiers attractive. We have already discussed the little boy who had to wait for Americans to be able to get hands-on experiences with military equipment.55 Another lady recalled her astonishment when she watched for the first time how an American soldier did his sentry duty in front of a former German military installation. She remembered vividly the contrast between the behavior of the German sentries and that of the Americans. Whereas the

54Stars and Stripes [Altdorf], 3 Dec. 1945: 2. In the interviews I conducted the GIs' generosity was one of the most frequent associations German interviewees had when I asked them about their first encounters with Americans.

"Out of chewing gum again, Bill?"

"You're lucky having a guard on your corner. We have to pay a girl to mind our kids."

Germans always displayed the Prussian drill and discipline, the American leaned his rifle in a corner, organized himself a chair, and put his feet with boots on a desk. Even officers who passed could not disturb the soldier’s tranquility and utterly unmilitary manners.56

In the long run the most important asset of many American soldiers was their uncomplicated and casual behavior which helped to build bridges to the young Germans. As early as June 1945 GIs began to teach German children American games, such as baseball, basketball or American football. In the Bremen enclave the soldiers pioneered the work which general Keyes recommended to the commanders in his district. Under the headline "Germany Hears 'Play Ball' as Yanks teach U.S. Games" Stars and Stripes reported in November that many German children were learning American games thanks to the willingness of American soldiers to teach them. The GIs probably had no idea that they were actually introducing an entirely new concept of youth work to Germany. Their open house policy would have a lasting impact not only on the children who participated in the programs, but also on people who were thinking about new ways of taking care of the large part of the younger generation which refused to participate in any new form of youth organization. In December Stars and Stripes reported the first numbers. 22,000 German boys and girls were taking part in the soldiers' programs under the

guidance of Military Government education officers and Army chaplains.\textsuperscript{57}


Old Demons Die Hard

Although many German children and adolescents did not seem to have any problems in befriending American soldiers and seem to have been impressed with the behavior of the occupiers, they still had to deal with the legacy of the previous twelve years. The war had uprooted many and burdened them with experiences most adults would find difficult to digest. A great number of them had lost their homes and their families. Many teenagers had participated in the fighting in one form or another. The complete military defeat, unconditional surrender, and the occupation by foreign troops as well as the Allies' efforts to acquaint the Germans with Nazi atrocities had shattered their belief in the greatness of the \textit{Führer} and the superiority of Germany.\textsuperscript{58}

The American Group Control Council's Information Control Section which later was integrated into OMGUS dedicated

\textsuperscript{57}Campbell 4-5; \textit{Stars and Stripes}, 16 Nov. 1945: 3, 8 Dec. 45: 2. It is interesting to note that many of the most successful basketball clubs during the nineteen sixties and seventies actually did not come from big cities, but rather from towns with large army bases, such as Heidelberg, Bamberg, Rosenheim etc. When I learned to play basketball in the seventies, our older coaches and trainers, who had been teenagers after the war, once in a while talked about their trips to basketball games on American Army trucks. It only became clear to me in the course of my research that the basketball program of my home town probably had its roots in the postwar Army programs.

\textsuperscript{58}Schörken, 7-54.
several surveys to youth in 1945. It examined the re­
education potential of German teachers and the situation in schools after their reopening in October. In August 1945 the researchers tried to find out more about young people’s attitudes. The secret final report of the survey revealed that many young Germans were living in a world of internal conflicts and contradictions. On the one hand, they accepted the fact that old ways needed to make room for new ideas and systems; on the other, they were unable to shed the ideas which they had learned under Hitler. Apparently their first encounters with Americans had positive effects. A majority of the young people thought that Germans were not better than Americans. Significantly they still regarded Germany as their undisputed homeland in which they wanted to live, but, according to the survey, the United States was the next country after Germany that attracted them. Anti-communism was a striking feature in young people’s attitudes. The Soviet Union proved to be the country they disliked most. Although an overwhelming majority considered National Socialism to have been a good idea that had been poorly executed, they recognized that that system certainly would not return to Germany and assumed that it would be replaced with a democratic system in the American zone of occupation. Almost half of the boys and girls thought that Germany would need another Führer to emerge from her present crisis. For the time being, however, political problems seemed to occupy
a rather low spot on their agendas, compared to the challenges the struggle for survival offered. An overwhelming majority considered the lack of food their most pressing problem.\textsuperscript{59}

Undoubtedly much to the relief of American officers, the pollsters neither found any danger of a continuing threat based on Nazi ideology or organizations nor a hatred towards the Western Allies. On the contrary, young Germans quite willingly had thrown their old leadership overboard and replaced it with the Americans. Intelligence officers made clear, however, that for them the rest of the picture offered little ground for optimism.

Anti-Nazi and pro-American lip service, however, should not be construed as evidence that those youth are now young democrats - they are still totalitarian youth in search of a new leadership. They now echo what they consider to be the official view of their current masters. In a sense, the very manner in which they quickly pick up and express democratic and pro-American views reveals their attitude of implicit and uncritical submission to authority, ingrained by Nazi education and German tradition.\textellipsis Untrained in democratic action, many of these youths presume that American leaders will now solve their problems in an authoritarian fashion\textellipsis without the youth themselves having to do any more than obey orders and profess adherence to the official creed.

Moreover, the fact that these youth have doffed one coat and put on another does not mean that they have changed their basic character, and quickly discarded

\textsuperscript{59}USGCC, Information Control Service, ICIS #7, week ending 24 Aug. 1945: 7-14; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion Surveys Branch, Box 157 5/234-2/2. Only a limited number of the surveys survived in the branch records. The titles of all others are in the Index to the Information Control Review, 14 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion Surveys Branch, Box 158, 5/234-2/5. Eckart (181-220) also identifies the daily struggle for survival as the major concern in Nuremberg in 1945.
those Germanic and Nazi traits that have caused trouble in the past and may cause trouble in the future: hypernationalism, subservience and blind obedience to superiors plus domineering over inferiors [a point not covered in this survey!], lack of personal responsibility for group action, undue reliance upon state authority, excessive admiration for power, lack of respect for individuals' rights as against group values, political fanaticism, uncritical mass thinking, etc.60

In December another intelligence report summed up the situation of German youth and American policy at the end of 1945. According to the researchers, a lot of German community leaders were worried about their young people whom they found to be in a state of utter confusion over ideas and ideals. Many of them could not find jobs, training, or even go to school, since secondary schools were still not open. The report pointed out that some Germans illegally had begun to form youth organizations to help these young people, among them the churches and political parties. The authors briefly discussed the USFET directive which had led to the creation of the Kreis Youth Committees. Their main point of criticism was that the directive had as its objective only keeping German youth out of trouble, instead of approaching the task of "denazifying their minds." As far as execution of the directive was concerned, there was much room for improvement. The pollsters maintained that the prohibition of political activities from the start stifled any attempts at re-educating German youth, since people were afraid to go

against American directives. They further thought that cooperation between Military Government and the tactical troops did not function very well. Frequent shuffling of units, redeployment, the lack of German speaking personnel and indoor facilities, as well as the reliance on volunteers instead of assigned officers, made the tactical troops' program hard to realize, given the enormity of the task. The pollsters also found that some soldiers still did not want to become involved in activities to help people at whom they had been shooting just a few months earlier, although they allegedly liked to give children candy.

According to the authors, one of the largest obstacles to better results was the lack of a clear cut overall policy and directives that would guide units in the field. Such a policy would ensure greater uniformity and less insecurity on the side of American officials. The pollsters found that American interpretations of the youth directive varied considerably and led to much confusion and frustration on all sides at the end of 1945. As far as the Germans were concerned, the pollsters reported that the churches had taken advantage of their preferred position and organized youth on a decentralized basis. According to their sources, YMCA leaders were being trained and plans were made to provide Germans with the opportunity to meet Americans on a different basis than that of fraternization with soldiers.
ICD submitted its own evaluation of the state of mind of German youth in the conclusion of the report. Apart from the features already mentioned, the authors found that young people largely rejected the idea of collective guilt and still thought that National Socialism basically was a good idea. The Germans suspected that their present hardships were much more of a punishment than the result of the war Hitler had brought upon Europe. The report also found that young persons displayed a remarkable lack of compassion for the victims of the Nazis at home or abroad. On a more positive note the researchers stated that, while completely rejecting the Soviet Union, young Germans appeared to have open minds for ideas emanating from Great Britain or the United States.61

Although the report confirmed that the Nazis had been able to deeply implant their ideology in the minds of the younger generation, its authors did not consider the case hopeless. On the contrary, their main point of criticism about American occupation policy was that the United States had not yet embarked on any positive re-education efforts. This clearly implied that the researchers considered the young people in the American zone of occupation capable of escaping the old German traits of militarism, blind obedience and racism. Although the boys’ and girls’ motives for

fraternizing with Americans were far from idealistic, the pollsters apparently thought that this was a chance Military Government should not let slip. The doors were open for a more encompassing re-education effort.

The first months of the American occupation were crucial for setting the tone for the future. Military Government in the communities was unable to dedicate many resources to youth work during the initial phase of the occupation, but rather had to concentrate on restarting the city's life by reconstructing utilities, reopening the vital connections with the hinterland on which Nuremberg depended for food, and by providing the city with fuel for the winter. American officials followed a pragmatic course and rendered generous help in the form of experts, equipment, and transport. They did not even let Washington's denazification program interfere too much with their work. Schools and education were the only notable exception to this rule. In spite of strong German objections, education officers weeded out most Nazis from schools and youth organizations during the first months after the war. This made the difficult task of reopening schools at the earliest possible moment even harder to accomplish. Nevertheless, most children got off the streets and into schools by October 1945. Once again the field detachments did much to alleviate the situation although field officers could not dedicate much time to youth work. They managed to appoint capable administrators for
schools and for youth work in Nuremberg who reestablished a progressive youth office with a mandate to expand its activities into youth work apart from administering the traditional welfare programs. Germans and Americans found that they shared many ideas in this field and quickly established a functioning youth committee in the city which initially tried to revive and coordinate youth activities along the traditional pre-1933 lines.

The most radical departure in dealing with youth in the field came from American soldiers. Their casual, uncomplicated and—despite their uniforms—very civilian behavior stood in marked contrast to the experiences and drill young Germans had seen and experienced in the Hitler Youth. Without knowing it American GIs opened the door to an entirely new approach to youth work for many young Germans when they began to introduce American games to German children. Taking stock at the end of 1945, the Americans realized, however, that they had to do much more to provide the guidance necessary for eliminating old ideas and replacing them with new ideals. Many young Germans clearly understood that they needed to reorient their lives, but they still did not know where to go. During the next years the seeds that the occupiers had sown would have to receive a lot of American water and nurturing in order to germinate.
CHAPTER V


Between 1946 and 1948 it became clear that a new constellation was emerging in world politics. The United States and the Soviet Union became increasingly involved in controversies which soon resulted in the creation of two huge power blocks that defined the Cold War for the next forty years. At first glance American policy did not show any signs of vitality or direction during the one and a half years after the end of the war in Europe. The rapid succession of secretaries of state between 1945 and 1947 apparently reflected this lack of direction. It would be wrong to assume, however, that nothing of importance happened during this lull in American diplomatic activity. Behind the scenes American diplomats and politicians were trying hard to evaluate the new state of the world and to come to terms with the role the United States should play in it.1

George Kennan's long telegram, dispatched from Moscow in February 1946, marked the beginning of a new departure in American foreign policy although it would take over a year to become official. President Truman based his new approach of containing the Soviet influence in Europe and wherever else it might threaten American interests on Kennan's analysis.  

Revisionist historians argue that American policy makers wanted to rebuild Western Germany as a bulwark against Soviet aggression. According to this interpretation, the fight against the Nazis and for reform in Germany became the victim of the Cold War. In spite of growing concerns over Soviet actions and motives, however, the problem of Germany remained on the agenda. The concept of totalitarianism linked the two forms of undemocratic regimes together. If anything, the additional threat of communism provided a strong motive for many Americans to proceed with the re-education of the Germans at an accelerated speed.²

Since Roosevelt had consistently blocked all attempts to develop a long range American policy statement regarding Germany, the Truman administration had to start from scratch. After the unconditional surrender in May 1945 Americans took their time to assess the situation there and to develop a comprehensive policy. While still trying to make the Allied Control Council work through its representative in Berlin,

²John Lewis Gaddis (Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) chapters I, II) deals with Kennan and the Truman administration. Although Kennan’s argument was far more sophisticated than described here, it basically arrived at the same conclusion and had the same consequences for the situation in Germany. For a recent and thoughtful appraisal of the American Cold War historiography see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History," Diplomatic History 17 (1993): 1-16. In Germany the discussion for a long time remained fixed on the allegedly punitive American policy symbolized by the Morgenthau plan and the alleged sudden change of American policy towards the Germans from 1947 on. A good German summary is in Füssl 15-17.
Washington embarked on a number of fact-finding missions to survey what was happening in Germany, or at least in the American zone of occupation. It was not until January 1947 that Military Government in Berlin finally got a binding directive for German youth.

Truman rather quickly began to pay attention to the problem of German re-education. Henry Morgenthau's dismissal before the Potsdam Conference made clear from the start that the President wanted the State Department to regain its prerogative in foreign policy planning and formulation. As we have seen above, the group that promoted re-education of the Germans as a central objective of American policy was unable to get the ear of either Secretary of State Byrnes or the President during the Potsdam Conference, but at least they had been able to present their views to the highest echelons without being blocked by the Treasury. Free from outside interferences, the State Department staff could resurrect its plan for re-educating

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3 Of course any general account of the Truman years would not be complete without discussing the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin Blockade, the Marshall Plan, or NATO. Nevertheless one wonders why one of the largest attempts to reform an entire people with vast amounts of American money and manpower usually does not even seem to merit mention in a footnote. One of the most recent examples of this trend is Robert H. Ferrell, *Harry S. Truman: A Life* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1994) 246-267.
the Germans with the ultimate goal of re-integrating Germany in the international community.4

Alarmed by negative publicity Military Government got in the American press especially with regard to denazification, Truman decided to send a special envoy to Germany to assess the situation. In the fall of 1945 Byron Price travelled to Germany to study the relationship between the victors and the vanquished firsthand. In December the President’s envoy submitted his report to the White House. Price addressed a number of issues: he criticized the denazification process and suggested that Military Government be transferred to the State Department as quickly as possible. As far as young Germans were concerned, he thought that they needed far more attention than Americans had given them so far. According to him, the Nazi ideology and membership in the Hitler Youth had made a lasting impression on the younger generation. The United States could only hope to counter this brainwashing with an extensive youth program which was only at its very modest beginnings in the American zone of occupation at that time. Apparently the White House thought that the report could do something to set the record straight and released it to the press, which commented favorably on Price’s findings.5

4Ferrell 186-87; see also pp. 40-43 above; for Morgenthau’s dismissal see Henke 116.

5The Department of the Army sent the report and the press comments on to General Clay in Berlin who deemed them important enough to disseminate the information to the field detachments. "The Price Report," OMGUS Information Bulletin
Truman seemed to be especially concerned with Price's discussion of German youth. To find out more about the specific problems of young Germans, the President decided to send Bishop Bernard J. Sheil of Chicago to Germany to conduct a survey. Sheil was well known in Washington. As the head of the Catholic youth organizations in the United States, he had already served as expert counsel on youth questions for the Roosevelt administration. In Mid-december 1945 the bishop went to Germany to investigate the problems German youth was facing in all four zones of occupation and to become acquainted with the different approaches of the other three occupying powers. He remained in Germany for four weeks and returned to the United States with a rather optimistic report. Sheil acknowledged that there were serious problems, but according to him, these problems had their roots in the social and economic destruction of the war, not in Nazi ideology. Contrary to the assumption of collective guilt on which American policy had so far been based, Sheil thought that Hitler and his henchmen had only been able to brainwash a small part of the young Germans. Still, much would depend on the action of the occupiers who would have to work hard to bring German youth into the fold of a democratic and peace loving community. Sheil criticized denazification, which in his eyes severely hampered all efforts at democratization and re-education. Just like

no. 21, 15 Dec. 1945: 23; see also Füssl 111.
Price, Sheil advocated an extensive and long-range youth program for Germany. The bishop recommended that Americans pay special attention to the selection and training of youth leaders. MG officials should look to the well developed youth activities of the churches as fine examples for such work. To bring Germans out of their isolation it would be necessary to initiate international exchange programs with the United States and to publish youth magazines which would disseminate new ideas. Truman got Sheil's report in January 1946. Apparently the President approved the recommendations. In February the War Department forwarded the report to General Clay.\footnote{Füssl 110.}

OMGUS reacted quickly, but not very positively to the Bishop's report. John Taylor did not agree with many of Sheil's specific recommendations. Taylor only liked the Bishop's proposal to open club houses and youth hostels. According to the chief of the Education Branch, all other recommendations were either unfeasible at the time or not in accordance with current OMGUS policies.\footnote{Memo from John Taylor, Chief Ed. Section, OMGUS, 5 Mar. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 147, 5/296-3/16.} Clay also made clear that he was not happy with the criticism of the denazification process in his own official reply to the report. He thought that the Bishop was too focused on Christian religion as the only way of saving young Germans.
Nevertheless, the Military Governor agreed with Sheil that youth was important and that an extensive program would be necessary to re-educate them, but took no further action.¹

Apart from re-education, the churches also became involved in the question of humanitarian aid to Germany. Sending relief supplies to Germany became an issue soon after the war. Apparently unaware of Eisenhower's policy not to grant entry permits to Americans into the American zone of occupation, Truman had authorized L.W. Goebel, the President of the American Evangelical and Reformed Church to travel to Germany on a fact finding mission. It took the State Department a week to clarify the matter, but in September 1945 Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed the White House that of course the President had the right to override any decisions of his military staff and in fact had done so in Goebel's case, who should be free to go.⁹

To obtain a clearer picture of the situation and to find ways to start a relief program, Truman dispatched another personal mission to Germany in January 1946. It consisted of representatives of private relief agencies who were to decide what they would be able to do to diminish the misery in the


⁹Memo from Matthew Connelly, Secretary to the President to Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, 7 Sept. 1945; reply Acheson to Connelly, 14 Sept. 1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.404/9-745.
country. They did not receive a warm welcome from Clay, but upon their return Truman himself took action. On 13 February 1946 he created the Committee of Relief Agencies Licensed to Operate in Germany (CRALOG). Over the next years this institution not only provided vital food and clothing supplies, but, led by the example of the American Friends Services Committee, CRALOG members also became actively involved in social programs for young Germans in the American zone and Berlin.¹⁰

Clay’s cool reception of the committee was due to the fact that additional agencies only complicated his problems. If they had their way, he would have to house and feed more American civilians over whose work he would have no control. In addition, the general never deviated from his conviction that the Germans should be responsible for their own rehabilitation. Help would be welcomed as long as the Germans wanted it and would be in charge of it. Clay wanted to avoid any attempts by outsiders to patronize them. Many weeks passed before the relief agencies were able to overcome OMGUS resistance and administrative hurdles.¹¹

The arrival of CRALOG agencies in Germany was one of the smaller problems the Deputy Military Governor was facing. An


¹¹Tent, "Simple Gifts" 69.
important issue in Washington was the definition of the roles which the War and State Departments would play during the further occupation of Germany. Clay had based his decision to separate Military Government and tactical troops in 1945 on the assumption that this would be the first step towards transferring the former's responsibilities to the State Department. Releasing personnel from the Army and rehiring them as civilians was another step in the same direction. When the Patton scandal and denazification caused negative headlines in the United States in the fall of 1945, Eisenhower and Clay decided that it was high time to let the State Department assume responsibility for Military Government. Although they initially were able to convince President Truman that it was "not a job for soldiers," they finally had to give up their hope for a quick withdrawal of the Army from these duties. The ensuing discussions in 1945 and 1946 ended in an agreement between the State, War, and Navy Departments in April that reaffirmed the State Department's policy-making prerogative, while continuing the War Department's role in carrying them out.\textsuperscript{12}

This agreement did not ensure smooth cooperation, however. In order to develop a specific policy directive for German youth, for example, State Department officials needed to gather data on the situation in Germany. Bishop Sheil and Byron Price had undoubtedly provided some useful insights,\textsuperscript{12}Henke 997-1004.
but Eugene Anderson, in charge of Germany and Austria in the Department's division for occupied areas, found it useful to learn as much as possible from the field. The administrative setup proved to be a considerable obstacle to this undertaking. A meeting between Anderson and Hilldring, who was about to leave his CAD position to become a member of the State Department in February 1946, dealt exclusively with the cooperation between the two departments in the fields of information control, religion, and education. Anderson complained that the Army simply did not provide his department with much information about conditions in Germany. Without such information writing a useful policy was out of the question.\textsuperscript{13}

Although Anderson had to develop a policy that took the specific situation in Germany into consideration, he acted in a much broader context with its roots in the 1930s. To make Roosevelt's good neighbor policy with Latin America more effective, the State Department had created a special Division of Cultural Relations which developed an extensive exchange program between Latin American countries and the United States.\textsuperscript{14} This first program was so successful that

\textsuperscript{13}Füssl 111.

educators and politicians thought about expanding it to other countries after World War II. Senator William Fulbright solved the problem of financing such an endeavor in a unique way. Many countries needed the surplus material American armed forces had used and left behind. Bringing the material back to the United States would be too costly and would burden the American economy. Another way of getting rid of the material was to sell it to the countries where it was. They usually had suffered from war damage and needed the materials. Since they usually were not able to convert their currencies into dollars, Fulbright thought that it would be a better idea to invest the profits of sales of military surplus in trust funds in these countries. The funds could be used in two ways: First, they could pay for the stay of American students abroad. Second, they would provide the money for financing the journeys of foreign students to the United States. The Senator's rationale for bringing foreign persons to the United States was straightforward:

My belief in the program is based on the assumption that when foreigners come to our shores what they see will be good. In spite of our occasional strange aberrations, I believe that America is a great country, that its virtues outweigh its faults. If the people of the world can understand us, they will throw in their lots with us.\(^\text{15}\)

Fulbright received strong support from the Department of State and American educators. The Institute of International

\(^{15}\)Tristram Coffin, Senator Fulbright: Portrait of a Public Philosopher (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1966) 84-87 (the quote is on 86); Kellermann 173.
Education and the State Department cosponsored a conference with university professors from all over the United States to discuss the possibilities of expanding the American cultural exchange activities which the United States had initiated with Latin America to other countries. The delegates discussed practical problems they had encountered so far with the exchange programs. They also officially recommended and supported the expansion of the existing programs. The educators promised to support US information policy abroad with all means at their disposal and endorsed the bills by Fulbright and Bloom that would provide financial support for such an expansion. These bills became the famous Public Law 584 a little later and provided the basis for one of most successful efforts to promote goodwill towards the United States through first hand information and experience in the United States. Apparently the delegates were confident that the bills would pass, because they immediately began to tackle the practical problems which the expansion of the exchanges would bring.\footnote{Abstract of the Proceedings of the Conference of Foreign Student Problems and Policies, called by the Institute of International Education and the Department of State, Chicago, Ill. 29 Apr. to 1 May 1946; NA RG 84 Foreign Service Posts, Munich Consulate General, General Records, 842.}

The Fulbright Act was the culmination of a sustained effort by the Department of State to expand its information activities after the war. In December 1944 Roosevelt created
the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Affairs to which he appointed Archibald MacLeish. When MacLeish left, William Benton took over his post. Within the Department, the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs emerged to coordinate the Department's efforts in this field. By December 1945 it had defined its mission. Its main task was to maintain and service sixty information centers the State Department had established all over the world and to supply American diplomats with documents and all other available information and materials about life in the United States. The Department of State would supplement the traditional diplomats with public affairs officers whose sole task was to provide information about the United States. The office also began to develop a program of documentary and newsreel films about the United States. Finally, the State Department also would establish its own world wide short wave radio broadcast program which came to be known as Voice of America.\textsuperscript{17}

During trips to various parts of the world in 1947 a considerable number of members of Congress experienced first hand that people in many countries, not just the former enemies, did not have a clear picture of the United States.

\textsuperscript{17}Henry Pilgert, \textit{The History of the Development of Information Services Through Information Centers and Documentary Films} ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Historical Division, 1951) 1-2.
Their experiences led to the Smith-Mundt Act which the President signed in January 1948. The Act considerably broadened Fulbright's initial objective by establishing the United States Information Service in addition to an educational exchange service. Substantial appropriations during the following fiscal years document that Congress indeed saw an urgent necessity for these programs. The emerging Cold War probably provided sufficient justification for these new expenditures. By April 1948 sixty-eight centers were operating in all corners of the globe such as Ankara, Warsaw, Cairo, and Bangkok. Latin America had an additional twenty-eight centers, established on the basis of the 1938 act which had provided the basis for the good neighbor policy.  

Germany, however, did not appear on the initial list of countries that would benefit from the new programs. For the time being the United States still had to come up with a policy that would outline re-education in the American zone. Nevertheless, the State Department made it clear as early as June 1945 that it intended to encourage cultural contacts between carefully selected Germans and other countries at the

18Pilgert, Information Centers 2-3; for the details of the program in April 1948 see list of educational materials sent to US Information Libraries and Cultural Centers, 8 Apr. 1948; NA RG 84 Consulate General Munich, General Records, Box 26, 842 Education Dispatches 1948; more information on the Smith-Mundt Act and its predecessor of 1938 is in a dispatch from Dept. of State to Consul General, Munich, 27 Jan. 1948; NA RG 84 Consulate General Munich, General Records, Box 26, 842 Student Exchange 1948.
earliest possible moment. It wanted to avoid yet another isolation of Germany from the rest of the world after the Nazis had interrupted almost all cultural contacts for twelve years.\(^{19}\)

To formulate this policy Anderson may not have been able to count on direct information from Germany, but advice from fellow Americans abounded. The topic of re-educating the Germans seemed to intrigue many Americans. In the course of 1946 numerous letters from all over the country reached the State Department. They offered a wide range of suggestions which differed considerably in tone, content, and quality. Vera Petschek, for example, was a naturalized citizen originally from Czechoslovakia. She had been able to witness events in Germany and Europe firsthand before she came to the United States in 1941 from Central Europe. She wrote the Department on 5 February 1946 about the necessity of supplying Germans with reading materials. State Department officials were not above taking advice from the population. Hans Speyer, then the chief of the division for occupied Europe, reacted promptly. Five days after Petschek had written her letter, he invited her for further elaboration of the proposal. Most of the correspondence, however, never received more than a brief reply.\(^{20}\)

\(^{19}\)Secretary's Staff Committee, Long Range Policy for German Re-education, 13 Jun. 1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/6-1345.

\(^{20}\)NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/2-546.
Another American, Edward Hascall, had just returned from Germany, where he had been MG education officer in a small town in Upper Franconia. Hascall reported in a letter he directed to Archibald MacLeish, who was then representing the US in the founding procedures of UNESCO, that the Americans had just finished weeding out the Nazis in time for opening the schools in October 1945, but that many of the teachers they had selected were young and needed further guidance. He felt that the Americans apparently were forgetting about the re-education of the Germans and suggested that the United Nations should arrange for educators to go to Germany to support the Germans with the task because they were "quite helpless" if left to their own resources. Hascall felt strongly about re-education and probably represented well the views of his fellow officers who were still struggling in Germany. He concluded:

It is important that those children who are just beginning in school have a different start than did their older brothers and sisters; and, although the older brothers and sisters seem far from help, we must try to bring them back. We are not trying now; not nearly hard enough. Are we quitters? Do we turn our backs to a job half done?21

The State Department's initial answer must have disappointed Hascall. Two months after he had sent his letter, Anderson informed him briefly and in a very formal fashion that his idea was unfeasible since Germany was still

21Edward O. Hascall to Archibald MacLeish, 25 Feb. 1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/2-2546.
under four power control and the UN did not have anything to do with the problem. Hascall, however, apparently was not satisfied with the answer. In May he replied to Anderson's note and seems to have reiterated his ideas of the necessity of a cultural exchange. This time he aroused the State Department's interest. In June Anderson inquired whether Hascall knew of any evidence that the American people, as well as college and university professors, would welcome a plan that would send German educators to the United States for one or two years.22

In his search for information Anderson also engaged the Department's intelligence section. By the end of March 1946 he got a preliminary report. As far as youth was concerned, its author first described the desolate situation for young people in postwar Germany. They did not have nearly enough school hours or materials. Their teachers were overworked and their homes either devastated or overcrowded. In view of those conditions it would be good for Americans to focus their special attention on extra-curricular activities. The author had more in mind than the sports program the Army had started just a few months earlier. He envisioned that outside institutions would have to come to the rescue of schools by providing young people with information about

22Eugene Anderson to Edward O. Hascall, 22 Apr. 1946; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/2-2546; Eugene Anderson to Edward O. Hascall, 11 June 1946; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/6-1146.  

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international affairs and foreign countries. Young people also should have the opportunity to participate in cultural activities. In one important aspect the report did not provide any fresh ideas. It was not the author's aim to develop a new and positive approach to dealing with German youth. Just as with the Army's disease and unrest formula, he justified such a program with the argument that it was in the interest of maintaining the security of the armed forces to keep young Germans off the streets and out of trouble. According to him, extra-curricular activities provided the best way to do just that. The report found a lack of almost everything necessary for youth activities in Germany. There were no suitable leaders. The author further argued that MG had composed youth committees in such a way that they could do little to help young people. Not enough club houses and sports facilities were available. His recommendations swept the whole range of youth work: young Germans should have sufficient equipment for their sports activities, but also should have arts and crafts materials as well as libraries at their disposal. Recreational facilities and activities should be guided by qualified youth leaders who would be trained by skilled American teachers and social workers. International contacts also would be advisable.23

By April 1946 Anderson was ready for a preliminary report to his superiors. Contrary to Taylor's and his staff's thinking and actions in 1945 he advocated a two-fold approach to German re-education which would greatly expand American responsibilities and activities in Germany. First, Americans should try to eliminate militarism and authoritarianism from the German character, and then they should try to reform the institutions that promoted these attitudes, a clear reference to school reform. Obviously Anderson rejected the notion that there would be any capable Germans available who could be trusted with the task. He suggested that reaching these goals would require a massive effort which could only be sustained with the help of private institutions. In line with MacLeish's and the Advisory Committee's previous recommendations on re-education, but borrowing more from psychiatry than from educational ideas, he thought that it would be necessary to explain to the Germans what the Americans were trying to do with them so that they would be able to adapt to the new conditions. Clearly a cure for the disease could only be prescribed by the doctor and required the cooperation—but not the input—of the patient. Anderson went on to develop a very sophisticated system of committees in the United States that would address each German weakness, find a cure and send experts to Germany to discuss the cure with "selected Germans". He estimated that about 250 experts would have to
go to Germany on such a mission in the following fiscal year and reported that the War Department's CAD had requested that funds for these experts be included in the War Department's budget. In addition to the experts Americans would have to use all resources available such as films, radio programs, books, and magazines to help the Germans in the process of recuperation. Anderson finally informed his superiors that he was working with the Department's intelligence section on "a list of weaknesses in the German character which we might try to overcome."24

Although this draft probably did not reach the State Department's highest echelons and obviously was never implemented in this form, it contained a number of thoughts and suggestions on which Anderson, who became one of the chief architects of American re-education policy, continued to build. First, Anderson thought that in fact all Germans possessed a militaristic and authoritarian mind, but at the same time he was convinced that massive outside intervention could change that. Second, he clearly realized that the task was so big that it would require resources in personnel, material, and expertise which the American government could not muster alone. Anderson introduced all the ingredients which would become part of the American reorientation effort:

24 Memorandum from Eugene Anderson to Messrs. Leverich and Speyer (for Hilldring), 5 Apr. 1946; NA RG 59, Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/4-546; see also Tent (Mission 256) for a very brief summary of the memorandum.
Visiting experts, information and education centers which offered literature, practical help, as well as extensive documentary film collections with the necessary projectors. Anderson also seems to have assumed from the start that the policy should not be directed towards all Germans but should rather target an elite which then could serve as multipliers.

A few days later Anderson added another dimension to his plan. In yet another memo he suggested reviving the Advisory Committee on German Re-education. The primary purpose of this revival would be to discuss the feasibility of bringing carefully selected German leaders and students to the United States whom private organizations would sponsor. Anderson pointed to the Federal Council of Churches’ plan to bring Martin Niemöller, a pastor who had resisted Hitler and spent time in concentration camps, to the United States. He suspected that other organizations soon would follow suit and that the State Department needed to be prepared. Anderson clearly favored such an exchange, but wanted to gather information and support with regard to American and German public opinion as well as the possible costs involved in such a program. The committee would be ideally suited for recruiting the private sector as well as coordinating private with government activities. According to him, various
foundations had already set aside substantial sums for the revival of cultural relations with Germany.\footnote{Memorandum Eugene Anderson to Messrs: Leverich and Speyer, 9 Apr. 1946; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/4-946; also Tent, Mission 257.}

Other events in the first half of 1946 helped Anderson to get closer to his goals. Early in the year the Americans had sent an education mission which consisted of a number of high ranking educators from the United States to Japan. General MacArthur highly commended the mission for its work and thought that its recommendations would be very useful for reforming the Japanese school system. American educators had suggested a similar mission to Germany as early as the summer of 1945, but had not received a positive reply.\footnote{Williard E. Givens, Executive Secretary, National Education Association of the United States to Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, 14 Jun. 1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/6-2845. The War Department referred his request for a mission to State, but informed Givens that at that time travel to and from Germany was restricted to the "absolute essential minimum."} In the spring of the following year and with the success of the mission to Japan to back them, they tried again.\footnote{William Carr, Assistant Secretary of the National Education Association of the United States to David Harris, Dept. of State, 6 May 1946; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/5-646; letter from Friends Committee on National Legislation to Secretary of State, James Byrnes, 3 May 1946 and Anderson's reply of 21 May; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/5-346.}

This time the State and War Departments reacted favorably. Clay had no objections, but insisted that such a mission had to be very small. Initially the State Department
wanted to have only highly qualified educators who would not only be familiar with German education but also with its political system. At the same time, however, the State Department had to satisfy political demands at home. The educators had to represent a number of organizations, various educational branches, and different regions of the United States. As a result only one of the mission members, Reinhold Niebuhr, had been involved in the formulation of German re-education policy from the start. The State Department tried to make up for this deficiency by sending Anderson along with the delegation as its liaison officer. A second mission member, T.V. Smith, was familiar with the German situation. The others were competent educators whose judgment could be valuable although they were not thoroughly acquainted with the conditions in Germany. The State Department gave all mission members a brief orientation session in Washington before the mission left for Germany with George Zook, the president of the National Education Association, as chair.

28 Memo from H. Speier to E. Anderson, 14 May 1946; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/5-1446.

29 Tent Mission, 112-115. The State Department could not accommodate every prominent educator. Stephen Duggan, the director of the Institute of International Education at the time, for example, apparently had found out about plans for the mission and offered to go to Germany. Henry Leverich, Anderson's colleague in the Occupied Areas Division, diplomatically referred him to the War Department and out of the way (NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/7-146).
Before the Department officially invited the educators to participate in a mission to Germany in July, it was able to obtain a directive from the State War Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) which outlined the goals of American re-education. While it did not mention youth specifically, the statement paved the way for later directives which would deal exclusively with the topic. SWNCC 269/5 stated that the re-education of the German people was an integral part of a comprehensive American program. Eliminating Nazis from influential positions was the necessary precondition for starting any positive steps towards rehabilitating Germany. SWNCC 269/5 further explained that Americans needed to teach the Germans respect and tolerance. They would have to instill in the individuals a sense of their rights as well as their responsibilities and the desire for searching the truth in order to serve justice. The directive explicitly stated that Americans would rely on German manpower and resources to the widest possible extent. To achieve their goals the Americans would have to overcome the isolation which National Socialism and the war had caused. International cultural contacts would help to assimilate the Germans into the community of nations. 

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Apart from the general directive the State Department provided the mission with its marching orders in July. Clearly bearing Anderson's mark, the Department directed the attention of the mission members to everything it believed was wrong. It criticized Military Government for failing to secure competent personnel and its educators for focusing their efforts mainly on material reconstruction and administrative questions. Concentrating entirely on formal education had neglected to instill the Germans with positive values and especially had not yet built up youth work along democratic principles. The mission would therefore face a threefold task:

1. stating a philosophic approach to the problem, pointing out the defects of our present program, and indicating the main lines of our future effort; 2. arousing US [sic] interest in and persuading qualified people to offer their services to the program; 3. influencing US officials in Germany to accept necessary changes in the present program, without the strain on relations between Washington and the theater which would occur if far-reaching proposals originated here without the benefits of the mission's recommendation. 31

Zook and his colleagues spent August and September 1946 collecting information from a great variety of sources. Clay received their final report at the end of September. The mission members directed the first part of their paper clearly more towards the public, politicians, and educators in the United States than to the Military Governor. Their

31 Office Memorandum, US Government, 8 July 1946: German Educational Mission; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 740.00119/7-846, quoted in Füssl 111-112.

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report described the widespread destruction and the lack of nearly all materials of importance for a good educational system. According to the mission, the war not only had wrought havoc to educational facilities, but also to the educators and the population in general. Millions of refugee and expellee women and children, and the imprisonment of most able bodied men further exacerbated the situation. Largely agreeing with SWNCC 269/5 the mission members called for an all encompassing re-education effort. The Americans' major challenge would be to introduce democracy to a country with a rigid caste system and to a people whose majority did not display any interest in such a political system. Such an effort also would take care of the Germans' desperate material situation which could only be ameliorated by permitting the Germans to resume industrial production. The educators explained that Americans had taken on a special obligation towards their former enemies and the world when they agreed to become one of the occupying powers and assume complete control over Germany. Clay certainly concurred with the educators' statement that people who had to live below the recognized level of subsistence did not make good targets for any democratization effort. The mission members did not question any of the principles that underlay Clay's policies, especially denazification, which the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism had delegated to the Germans under American control and on which the Allies had
agreed in Potsdam. On the contrary, they commended Military Government for the work it had done.

The mission nevertheless took up a number of issues which it thought needed improvement. The German school system was the most important part of the education package the Americans addressed. According to the mission members, however, the rigid caste system and political apathy in Germany needed to be addressed on many different levels. Reform of the school system would be necessary, but at the same time the mission found that the system did have its merits. They wanted to preserve Germany's "high standard of literacy and its excellence in trades and professions." Americans also should recognize that German educators had made significant strides towards democratizing the system during the Weimar Republic. Educators would have to retain the valuable sides of the system, but should continue to promote drastic reforms. The main goal should be a higher degree of equality which meant equal educational opportunities for everyone. The mission found Clay's policy to return most responsibilities to the Germans to be correct, but recommended that Americans should maintain their veto power and ultimate authority.32

The report reveals the Americans' attempts to find a compromise between the American and the German educational systems. Based above all on John Dewey's educational philosophy, American educators understood their mission to be more than just the teaching of academic subjects. Dewey defined education as an important means of providing young people a basic academic training but also with the essentials of an egalitarian and democratic society. As a result, American children of all classes and races went through twelve years of comprehensive schooling under the same roof, with the notable exception of the South, where schools remained segregated until the 1960s. Colleges took care of the academic requirements for the more advanced students after high school. This philosophy differed sharply from that in Germany, where children, teachers, and parents had to choose between very different types of schools at an early stage of their childrens' education. While schooling was compulsory and resulted in an extremely high literacy rate, only a tiny elite was admitted to a variety of secondary schools which provided highly advanced and theoretical training. Only those students who made it through its rigorous curriculum and passed the comprehensive final exams after twelve years would be allowed to attend universities. The great majority of the students continued with a very basic eight year education which lead to an apprenticeship directly to the job market. Some of those who were deemed
more gifted went to still another type of middle school from which they graduated after ten years with some basics in clerical training which enabled them to apply for apprenticeships in these fields. Dewey was highly critical of this system because more often than not it did not work according to abilities—as German educators claimed—but served to maintain class stratification. School fees and the selection process for the secondary schools made them fortresses of the middle class, while members of the working class had to be content with basic education. Nevertheless German educators could point out that this stratified system had worked very well in the past, providing universities with the intellectual elite they needed for research on one end of the educational stratum and industry with skilled and unskilled workers on the other.3

As far as the state of mind of young Germans was concerned, the mission found the situation to be far from hopeless. The report conceded that the Third Reich had demanded a special commitment from young people. The

3This paragraph provides only a very rough sketch of the two educational systems and philosophies. For more detail see Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education (ed.), Between Elite and Mass Education: Education in the Federal Republic of Germany (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983) 11-18, 26-35; Müller 138-175. I do not agree with his interpretation of the Zook report as the recommendation to introduce the American school system in Germany. The report acknowledged the German system's merit, but also correctly insisted that its basic flaws, above all its function to maintain a rigid class system, needed to be changed.
complete collapse and occupation of Germany had left them bewildered, confused and hopeless. But, the authors continued,

there is more residual health among the German youth, despite these difficulties, than outside or casual observers might suspect.... Despite difficulties of every kind, spiritual and physical, the youth of the nation exhibit a widespread eagerness to participate creatively in rebuilding their nation, in making contact with the outside world after years of isolation, and in reconstructing their own broken world of ideals and loyalties. There is, therefore, no reason to despair of the fruitfulness of the task of reorientation upon which we are embarked.³⁴

Since most of the school children could not attend school for more than twenty hours per week, the Americans should pay special attention to extracurricular youth groups and activities. Here the mission members again referred to German tradition, which, according to them, had been healthy and anti-authoritarian before Hitler incorporated all of the youth groups in the Hitler Youth. That tradition could serve as a basis for reviving youth work, but here as everywhere else young people lacked almost all essentials: they did not have food, transportation, clubhouses or equipment. The report considered the lack of responsible leadership as another severe handicap. In line with the State Department’s suggestions from July, the mission suggested that youth should become more involved and responsible for their own affairs. The report also found that adults dominated the youth committees and tended to use them for controlling and

³⁴Education Mission: 3.
registering youth groups instead of supporting them. It would therefore be necessary to make yet another attempt to involve young Germans in managing their own affairs. MG should consider introducing youth councils which would be free of adult supervision prevalent in the youth committees. The mission pointed out that it regarded leadership training in Germany as essential and recommended bringing in American specialists on a short term basis for the purpose. The Army's assistance program could become a considerable help for American policy in Germany, provided that the Army would be able to supply it with sufficient and adequate personnel. The Germans also would have to be informed about the objectives of the program, and the Army and MG should maintain close liaison at the top level.\(^{35}\)

The mission found another advantage in the presence of American troops in Germany. In April 1946 the first dependents of American soldiers had arrived there. This would not only provide American children and families stationed in Germany with excellent opportunities to serve as ambassadors for their country and the American way of living, but their schools could also serve as laboratories and examples for progressive German educators. Although the mission's optimism and idealism regarding German-American contacts on this level in the long run proved to be

\(^{35}\) *Education Mission*: 33-36.
disappointing, it led to a number of interesting experiments during the next years.\textsuperscript{36}

The report finally admonished its readers to consider the re-education of the Germans as a goal that needed to have the highest priority. This would make it necessary in Germany to elevate the Education and Religious Affairs Branch to division status and at least to double its personnel. The mission criticized MG for not even filling all positions which the table of organization permitted. In the United States it would be necessary to pool all available resources. Washington would have to incorporate the services and contributions of private institutions and individuals into its efforts.

On their journey throughout the American zone, the mission members also had detected a desire by many Germans to come to the United States on an exchange basis. They highly recommended such a program. It would bring Germans out of their isolation and at the same time would provide them with the best hands-on experience in the democratic process. A permanent advisory committee would be able to assist the government in decisions regarding German reorientation and could help coordinate the private and the government sector. Zook and the mission members appealed to all Americans that

\textsuperscript{36}Education Mission: 28; Frederiksen (119-128) provides detailed information about the first years of the American military communities in Germany.

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there could be "no turning back in our support of that program so vital to the enduring peace of the world." \(^{37}\)

Anderson could be satisfied with these recommendations and the publicity this high calibre delegation received back home. Whereas the mission dealt with reorientation in the broadest terms, however, the four weeks in Germany had convinced him that extracurricular youth work would be the real testing ground for American efforts. According to his own analysis, the generation between twenty-five and forty-five years would not be able to participate in the re-education process. Those who had survived the carnage of the previous six years were either in POW camps or politically discredited because of their participation in the Nazi state. One could therefore observe that old people who had not been tainted by the Nazis took over political responsibilities. Anderson observed that on the other side of the spectrum stood the young generation. According to him, the old people refused to entrust this generation with power and authority. He argued that older Germans thought that the Nazis had succeeded in indoctrinating the youth and had stripped it of all moral values, an attitude Anderson did not share at all. He predicted that the exclusion of young people from the

political process would hurt the American reorientation effort because the Germans prevented their own youth from finding and trying out new ideals. This constellation would promote a tendency towards a withdrawal towards extreme egoism and make young people susceptible to one sided indoctrination. Since the Germans obviously were incapable of finding a solution to the problem by themselves, Anderson concluded once more that it would be necessary to intensify all American reorientation efforts. Taking advantage of the only avenue SWNCC 269/5 left open for direct American involvement, Anderson suggested that a broad exchange program of persons and materials would be vital for achieving this goal. It would offer young people the orientation they needed.38

Anderson received strong and articulate support from Undersecretary of State, William Benton. In October 1946 Benton advocated sending several thousand "carefully selected German students annually" to the United States. According to him, such an expenditure would be far more productive than spending the money on economic rehabilitation or the military occupation of Germany and would help eliminate the root of the German problem. If they decided to introduce such measures, Americans "would be approaching a major disease with the surgeon's knife instead of a scalpel." Benton also thought that sending experts to Germany on re-education

38Füssl 113-114; Tent, Mission 258-59.
missions was an excellent idea. According to him, the Americans should not limit their efforts to schools, but should further encourage youth activities in Germany at all levels.39

Benton's statement immediately followed James Byrnes' famous Stuttgart speech in which the Secretary of State had announced to Germany and to the world that the United States was going to change its course. Frustrated by Soviet obstruction at the Paris conference of foreign ministers and urged by Clay to counter the massive Soviet propaganda efforts with a constructive proposal of the United States, the Secretary of State went to Stuttgart in September 1946 to deliver a speech which Germans and foreign observers alike immediately recognized as a turning point of American policy. For the first time since the end of the war, a leading politician of the former allies did not talk about the Germans, but rather to them. Byrnes did not announce a softening of American policy in Germany. He also did not withdraw from any of the provisions President Truman had agreed to in Potsdam. The difference from previous announcements lay in the Secretary's statement that it was time for the Germans to start their way back into the community of nations and that a united Germany would soon have to be able to make its own decisions. He commented that

the recent merger of the British and the American zones and the invitation to the other occupying powers to follow suit was the first step in a more constructive direction. Byrnes also made clear that the United States did not expect Europe to recover without the help of Germany’s industry. He officially laid to rest the ghost of a permanent agrarian state which had arisen anew in Germany when Military Government published JCS 1067 just six months earlier, although it was outdated and had never been a serious option in American policy. Cloaked in a stern warning to the Germans that the Americans would not shirk their responsibilities as occupiers, he made clear to Germany, Europe, and the Soviets that the Americans would stay. In his conclusion Byrnes offered American help to the Germans on their way back into the community of “free and peaceloving nations of the world”. German reactions were immediate and positive. The Germans in the western zones knew now that they would be able to start the physical and psychological reconstruction with American help and be protected from Soviet aggression.40

The continuity and strength of anti-Soviet feelings is certainly the most impressive evidence that Americans did not have to make any concessions to the Germans to win them over

40Address delivered in Stuttgart, 6 Sept. 1946 (the full text can be found in Department of State Information Bulletin 15 (Sep. 1946): 496-501 and in Germany 3-8); see also Clay 78-82; Davidson (145-156) describes the West German reactions to the speech.
to their camp in the emerging Cold War. Of course some influential Americans argued this way. Following his trip with the education mission to Germany, the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, proposed in an article in *Time* that the United States would have to enlist the Germans in the impending struggle with the Soviet Union. Enlisting Germans against communism, however, was not the problem. Germans had invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. National Socialists were certainly among the most reliable opponents of communism. It was German aggressiveness, National Socialism, militarism, and racism that had inflicted two catastrophic wars in three decades. This is why the State Department was not happy with Niebuhr's proposal. Hilldring, by then Assistant Secretary of State, noted that Niebuhr had forgotten that the basis for the re-education program was not the fight against communism, but rather the attempt to replace National Socialism and militarism with democratic values. Since Soviet propaganda and actions in its zone of occupation only offered a different brand of totalitarianism, Hilldring found that developing an extensive re-education program which especially targeted youth in the west should be one of the State Department's top priorities.41

Clay's insistence that JCS 1067 was a solid basis for his actions and his refusal to let Military Government officials participate in the policy formulation process,

41Füssl 119.
however, did not help the State Department in its attempts to assess the situation and needs in Germany and incorporate them in a new general directive. The cumbersome committee apparatus also prevented the Department from quickly formulating more specific guidelines for youth activities. In August 1946, however, the first obstacle fell. Apparently frustrated with four power negotiations, Clay finally signalled his willingness to accept a new directive for the American zone of occupation. As far as re-education was concerned, he thought that a broad statement would be sufficient. SWNCC 269/5 would serve well as the implementing directive for OMGUS headquarters. Apparently he wanted to give his officers in Germany as much leeway as possible.42

On the surface the Department of State accepted Clay's wishes, but between August 1946 and January 1947 the directive underwent constant revisions. In October, for example, apparently riding on Benson's support, the State Department succeeded in integrating the exchange of persons and materials between the American zone and the United States in the directive. Initially this exchange was to take place only between the United States and the American Zone. In 1947, however, the Americans expanded the program, permitting Germans to travel to other European countries and experts from those countries to come to their zone of occupation.

The ninth version of the directive, issued in January 1947, exclusively dealt with the reorientation of German youth. It became the basis of American policy until the official end of the American High Commission in 1955.\textsuperscript{43}

SWNCC 269/9 assessed the problems German youth were facing in 1947. The authors of the directive seemed to base their evaluation almost entirely on the findings of the OMGUS intelligence section of the previous December. First, they described the consequences of Hitler’s policy and the war for young people. In line with the field report and with Anderson’s thinking, they identified the main problem as the youth’s search for a new Führer instead of a different ideology. The directive confirmed the course of American policy in the field, but it introduced a new dimension to the efforts. According to the authors, Military Government had completely neglected the large numbers of those who refused to join any organizations. In general it drew a dire picture of the present status of American efforts and German youth:

[to what an extent the spiritual and political reorientation of German youth has made headway is doubtful. The sometimes enthusiastic response to efforts made in that direction has always come only from a small minority. The great majority of German youth is described as distrustful, apathetic to political questions if not outright cynical, and altogether uncertain as to where to fix its wavering loyalty.

\textsuperscript{43}SWNCC 269/8, 269/10, 269/11 reflect the development of the exchange program; they are in Germany 611-14; SWNCC 289/9 is the main youth activities directive; it can be found in Germany 578-583.
SWNCC 269/9 concluded by identifying nine objectives that Americans would need to target to help young people to get back on the right track:

a. To substitute Nazi and militarist thought by a new set of values compatible with democratic ideals and essential to social progress.

b. To protect German youth against undesirable political influences and to provide for the adjustment of Nazi youth in order to facilitate their political rehabilitation and their absorption by the community.

c. To provide German youth with new moral, social, and political incentives so as to invite their active participation in the reconstruction of their country and to overcome their indifference of hostility to community affairs, their intolerance and lack of initiative.

d. To foster youth groups as a means of control, as a means of facilitating reorientation, and as a means of self-expression.

e. To permit youth groups to operate in connection with adult civic groups, including political parties, in order to further civic education and to prevent clandestine or subversive activities by uncontrolled political groups.

f. To reduce the danger of mass loafing and delinquency by enhancing the social usefulness of youth through work projects and intensified vocational training.

g. To promote and to perpetuate community interest in youth and youth activities and to secure cooperation of youth with the community.

h. To rejuvenate existing political and civic bodies.

i. To overcome the isolation of German youth by resuming contacts between German youth and youth outside Germany.

Although the directive often simply legalized policies and objectives MG detachments had already pursued before April 1946, it also officially clarified the American position. Simply eliminating the old evils, for example, was
no longer enough. Americans would have to replace them with other ideals. The directive for the first time ominously mentioned that not just Nazi influences would be unwelcome in the American zone. The fight against National Socialism slowly began to become more inclusive by applying the more general concept of totalitarianism, but Americans did not give up their original goal. The directive also took Clay's youth amnesty into account and made clear that the rehabilitation of former Hitler youth was not only possible, but highly desirable. The most important message of the directive seemed to be that Americans had to succeed in integrating and reconciling young Germans with the emerging political and social system. Contacts with the rest of the world would certainly further this progress considerably by exposing Germans to other democracies and widening their horizons in general.

The directive also provided detailed practical suggestions for its implementation. Military Government officials were to "advise" local authorities on what to do with the young people who were living in their communities. MG would have to make sure that youth organizations would be free of former Nazi activists. All youth activities would be based on experiencing the democratic process first-hand by voting and granting fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, tolerance, and cooperation to everyone. German administrators would have to cooperate to make hands-on
experience in community affairs under their guidance available to young people, especially in the field of youth work. The Americans also emphasized youth leadership training. As far as the rehabilitation of Nazi youth was concerned, the directive made clear that the Germans would have to develop special programs for this group, but that their attempts at reintegration should not have any punitive character. Finally Military Government would be responsible for creating a wide variety of opportunities for German and non-German youth to become reacquainted with each other.44

1947 brought the final turnaround of Washington's policy in Germany. The first indication of a change came with former President Herbert Hoover's mission to Germany during the harsh winter of 1946/47 to assess the food situation. With the constant haggling over the enormous amounts American taxpayers had to come up with to feed the Germans in their zone of occupation, President Truman needed to investigate the matter. Hoover was the ideal man for the job. He had directed the American relief efforts for Belgium during World War I, he was familiar with the problems in Europe after World War II and his integrity was beyond reproach. Hoover had visited other countries in Europe earlier that year and had reported back to Washington that the situation there was serious, but that nobody in Western Europe would be starving. His report on Germany, however, sounded an alarming note.

44SWNCC 269/9; Germany 578-83.
Hoover found widespread undernourishment which affected especially the young and the old. Hoover proposed that 10 million tons of food be made available to American authorities in Germany immediately. The far-reaching economical suggestions Hoover made so that Germans would be able to pay for their own food did much to change public opinion about reparations and deindustrialization in the United States. Still more important for the Germans, especially young people and children, was the fact that Hoover immediately set out to save Germans from starvation. His interest in the plight of children resulted in a special program which from April 1947 on provided additional calories for every child in the American zone. Germans gratefully named the program after its founder.45

In March 1947 George Kennan published his X-article in *Foreign Affairs* which brought wide attention and recognition of his containment theory. Just three months later, George Marshall, who had just replaced Byrnes as Secretary of State, delivered his address at Harvard University which outlined the American support program for Europe and became known as the Marshall Plan. Marshall recognized that Europe would not be able to recover without Germany, but the question remained, how the Germans could come back into the

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45Davidson 158-161; Ruhl 184-86.
international arena without becoming a menace to the international community again.\textsuperscript{46}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive that replaced JCS 1067 to govern general American policy in Germany over two years after V-E day revealed the changes in attitude and tried to provide the answer to the question. The new guidelines differed considerably from JCS 1067 in various respects. Whereas before the Americans had held out the hope of Germany's reintegration in the community of nations in the distant future, in 1947 the time had come. Germans would join the international community as quickly as possible. JCS 1067 had emphasized the negative aspects of American policy, such as de-industrialization, demilitarization and denazification. Not surprisingly the new directive, JCS 1779, reflected the reconstructionist approach. Clay certainly was delighted to find that Washington finally agreed with his point of view that a functioning economy would serve as a pillar for a democratic and peaceful Germany. He may have been more surprised about Washington's decision to elevate the importance of re-education dramatically. The authors of the directive admonished the general that re-education of the Germans had to be "an integral part of policies intended to help develop a democratic form of government." Clay should regard it as one

\textsuperscript{46}Tent (Mission 282) provides an excellent summary of American policy in 1947.
of his most urgent duties to coordinate these efforts with the other occupying powers. Military Government would encourage Germans further to develop their own initiatives and would support the development of international cultural relations in every respect, but Americans were far from abandoning all of their original objectives in Germany. Clay would have to "continue to effect the complete elimination of all National Socialist, militaristic and aggressively nationalistic influences, practices and teachings from the German educational system." Although the time had come for reintegrating the Germans into the international community, it could only happen if the old demons remained under control.47

In view of the increasing emphasis on extra-curricular activities it is hard to understand why the authors of the directive limited their instructions entirely to formal education. JCS 1779 admonished the American educators in Germany to "encourage and assist" the Germans in the development of educational methods, curricula, materials and even schools. Germany should end up with a "healthy, democratic educational system." It is not clear from the directive whether American policy planners considered formal education as the most important task of Military Government, or whether they were satisfied with the provisions in SWNCC

47The full text of JCS 1079 is in Germany 33-41; see also Tent, Mission 282-83.
269 and simply filled the void the previous directive had left, just as Clay had suggested. At any rate the planners in Washington had finally succeeded in providing Military Government with new guidelines for the Germans. It remains to be seen what effect these guidelines and policy statements actually had in Germany. Military Government planning and actions in the American zone of occupation as well as the youth activities in a community will answer that question.
CHAPTER VI

OMGUS: Reorientation, 1946-48

The fact that Washington needed almost two years to provide Military Government in Germany with specific guidelines concerning youth did not mean that Americans in the field remained idle. On the contrary, Washington's inactivity provided the men and women of Military Government youth operations in Germany with opportunities to develop their own ideas about re-educating young Germans in their zone of occupation. Undeterred by a lack of recognition within OMGUS and administrative chaos, the field officers successfully developed their own objectives. Their decisions needed time to be accepted by the higher echelons, but ultimately the youth officers determined American policy in their field. Private agencies as well as the tactical troops stationed in Germany provided additional vital support.

Headquarters, Clay, and Re-education

In 1946 the men and women who were charged with the re-education of German youth could not hope to achieve much without adequate recognition and organization. Their immediate superiors, John Taylor and R.T. Alexander, were completely absorbed in their struggle with German authorities about denazification, school reform and university matters and did not pay much attention to other issues from the beginning. Their long and hard struggle with recalcitrant
German educators who simply did not seem to be willing to compromise on anything probably made it inevitable that they did not look beyond these three issues. They did not realize that the youth activities experts in their section were developing alternatives. The youth experts created an organizational structure based on German experiences with American innovations which many Germans and Americans found satisfactory. While their superiors were trying to achieve re-education by means of structural reform and tight controls, the youth activities branch developed a more flexible alternative which in the long run proved to be successful, but it had to wait almost two years until it found support within OMGUS for its concept of reorientation.

Various factors contributed to the delay. The lack of status of the Education and Religious Affairs Section within OMGUS reflected the low priority which reorientation in general enjoyed in the thoughts of General Clay and his immediate staff in Berlin. Despite the Zook Commission's recommendations in 1946 to elevate the Education and Religious Affairs Branch to Division status and to increase the number of people who were involved in re-education, Clay did not pay any more attention to John Taylor and his section. Throughout 1946 it had to suffer several cuts in spite of the fact that it never had reached its full strength. Clay was determined to save the American taxpayer as much money as possible by keeping the staff of his
apparatus at the absolute minimum. For a while he even considered phasing out education and religious affairs completely.¹

Sending Germans to the United States is a case in point. Although Clay had endorsed the Zook Commission's recommendation to send Germans to the United States in 1946, OMGUS needed two years to implement the program. OMGUS field officers had pushed for such a program long before SWNCC 269/8 officially permitted it.² Berlin, however, proved to be a bottleneck. Clay from the start made clear that the German economy would not be able to provide the funds required for such a program. Any appropriations for the exchange of persons would have to be charged to the future export proceeds from German industry. In view of the difficult position of the German economy in January 1947, Clay naturally was reluctant to charge an account which did not yet have a positive balance and might not have one in the foreseeable future. Having his hands full with securing the bare survival of the Germans under his care during the extremely cold winter of 1946/47, Clay also did not want to divert his energies and resources to anything that he regarded as not vital. Since nobody could predict how long the crisis would last, it was only logical for him to oppose any expansion of non-essential items. In case the German

¹Tent, Mission 259-60.

²For the details see chapter XII.
economy would not come through, the American taxpayer would ultimately have to pay the bill. Clay was resolved to keep it as small as possible, but even if he had not faced the economic problems in his zone, he probably would not have approved a government sponsored program. In line with his Republican convictions he argued that "the German student sent to the United States at government expense would be less effective on his return than if his visit was financed with private funds."³

In view of headquarters' reluctance to extend any aid to re-education efforts, it is not surprising that youth officers in the field had to fight for everything they needed. In July 1946, for example, Hans Thomsen, youth officer in Bavaria, complained to Munich headquarters that OMGBY had failed to assign him a vehicle on a permanent basis, although he needed to be in the field about 80% of the time and also had to attend youth meetings at nights and on weekends.⁴

Press criticism of the educators' in the United States for not sufficiently denazifying higher education, paired

³Memo from Clay to [Daniel] Noce [Washington, CAD], 31 Jan. 1947; Clay Papers doc. 190; see also Tent 265-67. Whereas Tent thinks that Clay only paid lip service to the exchange program, I believe that he did not want to obstruct the program, but rather based his actions on his conviction that the government should not finance such endeavors.

⁴Memo from Hans Thomsen to Office of Military Government, Bavaria [hereinafter OMGBY] re.: Improper transportation impedes youth activities work; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 40, 10/43-3/22.
with the Germans' insistence that the Americans were too strict in that field, certainly did not endear the section to Clay, who did not like criticism. To make matters worse, his chief educators did not seem to be able to make any progress towards school reform. Especially in Bavaria they encountered determined resistance throughout 1946 and 1947. Alois Hundhammer became minister for cultural and educational affairs in Bavaria in January 1947. The educators became involved in an increasingly bitter but ultimately hopeless battle with conservative politicians—above all the obstinate Hundhammer—which one historian adequately described as a Kulturkampf. The difficulties with authorities in Munich, however, overshadowed the successes American educators could claim even in Bavaria as well as in other areas under American control, most notably in Bremen and Hesse, where many reforms and projects were underway which progressive Germans either supported or initiated.5

5 Tent, Mission 74-253; Kellermann 30-31. Tent dedicates considerably more space to the difficulties in Bavaria than to the successes the Americans had in Bremen, Berlin, and Hesse, although he mentions them. Winfried Müller argues that American ideas and efforts had a positive impact even in Bavaria, which was and remained the only state in the Federal Republic in which the Americans were unable to score any success in the field of educational reform. Müller finds that Americans in Bavaria were actively involved in the physical reconstruction of the schools and scored successes in revising schoolbooks and curricula. Like all other states Bavaria added social studies to its curricula, for example, although Bavaria indeed was the only state in which Americans were unable to initiate or support serious reform attempts. For a contemporary assessment of the situation in the 1940s see Henry Pilgert, The West German Educational System: With Special Reference to the Politics and Programs of the Office
Alexander more than once came to feel that he did not enjoy the support of his own boss. Clay and his chief educator at best often did not maintain good communications. When Alexander publicly announced, for example, that Hundhammer would be dismissed, Clay issued a statement from Berlin that he was considering the matter, but had not yet made a decision. Hundhammer stayed in office, which clearly undermined Alexander's authority and credibility. At worst the two men had completely different attitudes towards the task Americans had to fulfill in the educational sector. The chief educator, for example, made no bones about his disappointment over Clay's decision not to ask Congress for funds for the exchange program. He thought that Clay's decision would deliver a devastating blow to the American re-education effort. Clay thwarted all his efforts to bring American university professors to Germany in 1947. Clay and

Interestingly, Bremen, Hesse and West Berlin, which developed the most progressive school reform plans after the war, remained at the vanguard of the reform movement. The polarization between these three states on the one hand and Bavaria as the conservative bastion on the other remained a constant in West Germany's school reform plans for the next fifty years. During my own tenure as student representative for Middle Franconia at a Bavarian Gymnasium in the 1970s, I witnessed that Bavaria was the last state to reform the last two years of the secondary schools. The modifications were minimal compared to other states. Munich never permitted and even outlawed statewide high school student organizations. It also never made any serious attempts at integrating the different school tracks. Hesse and Berlin supported statewide student representation and tried to create an integrated Gesamtschule.
Alexander also violently disagreed about the feasibility of creating a "Free University" in Berlin. The educator thought that the Germans were not yet ripe for such an undertaking. He was unable to agree with the Military Governor on the procedure of setting the university up when Clay made up his mind. This led to the virtual exclusion of Alexander from the project.6

Alexander's lack of administrative skills further aggravated the position of his section. Since this type of reorientation had never been tried before, Americans did not have any precedents to build on. Programs needed time and creative administrators to develop, especially in view of the complicated and cumbersome administrative apparatus that was operating in Germany. The American visiting experts program illustrates the difficulties involved. Both Eugene Anderson and the Education and Religious Affairs Branch began to lobby for a program of bringing American experts into Germany to help with the re-education effort, but Clay dragged his feet. He preferred to incorporate experts as staff into OMGUS rather than having to deal with short term visits which would cause a range of logistical problems and from which the Germans in his opinion would not benefit. He found an unlikely ally in Hundhammer, who arrived at the same conclusion, even if for very different reasons. A pilot program in 1946 seemed to bear Clay out. Alexander did not

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6Tent, Mission 267-72, 286-299.
seem to be able to take care of the organizational side of the project. By 1947 OMGUS was able to overcome the Military Governor's reservations, but in that year only fifty experts in different fields of expertise ranging from agriculture to education made it to the American zone, with mixed results. The next year the number increased to 82. It was not until the last year of the occupation and after a thorough reform of the OMGUS administration that the number of exchange persons began to grow dramatically. In 1949 over 150 experts came to Germany. The High Commission continued the program.7

The bureaucratic tangle went beyond the boundaries of the Education and Religious Affairs Branch in Berlin. The exchange of persons and cultural materials initially became an administrator's nightmare. Clay's decision not to ask Congress for more appropriations for re-education in 1947 came after Washington officials had led private organizations to believe that the government would bear a part of the burden. An appeal by the Institute of International Education and others to American institutions of higher learning had been surprisingly successful in the spring of 1947, but Washington was only able to get SWNCC 269/8 and 269/10 in place to officially authorize the exchanges of persons and material. OMGUS had not found a way to coordinate the different divisions involved in the program. Germans needed to be selected and screened for possible Nazi

7Tent, Mission 262-64.
activities by intelligence. Obtaining their travel documents required another division. Furthermore OMGUS could only provide support for them to the boundaries of the American zone. Since Clay's decision not to ask for re-education funds had excluded the government from financing the journeys, private sponsors had to step in. As a result few people, among them one student from Bavaria, made it to the United States in 1947.

By 1947 it was clear that the Education and Religious Affairs Branch would only be able to carry out any meaningful reorientation program if it could improve its status as well as the organizational framework in which it operated. SWNCC 269 and later JCS 1079 officially made reorienting Germans a top priority of Military Government, but as long as Clay could not be convinced of the necessity, nothing would change.

Help for the educators came from an unlikely quarter. In May 1947 the Bureau of the Budget in Washington sent a task force to Germany. The primary target of the group was an investigation of the organizational setup of the armed forces, but Washington also instructed them to examine the bureaucratic structure of OMGUS to find ways in which the American taxpayer might be able to save money. Usually such recommendations led to cuts in personnel and a tighter

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8 Tent, Mission 266-68, 302; see Kellermann (31-32) for the role the Dept. of State played in developing the program.
organization. The task force did exactly that in other fields of OMGUS operations. In the case of the Educational and Religious Affairs Branch the task force also advocated greater efficiency, but actually resulted in strengthening the troubled branch. The men were impressed with the effort and degree of cooperation that existed between Americans and Germans in this field. With full support from their superiors in Washington the task force pointed out to Clay that his emphasis on economic and financial matters certainly was necessary, but that he needed to include "the stimulation of a democratic culture" in his program if he wanted to assure long term success. In view of the importance of the reorientation task, they informed Clay that he would need an adviser for education and cultural affairs. This adviser would have to bring the re-education activities which were scattered over various divisions under one umbrella. The task force argued that the education branch would be the right place for such a move, but that in view of the importance of its mission it would have to have division status to assure direct access to the Military Governor.9

The timing was fortunate. Clay, who had been promoted to Commander-in-Chief and Military Governor in March, needed to find a new head for the Education and Religious Affairs Branch. At the same time CAD signalled to him that Washington would appoint a cultural adviser on its own if

9Tent, Mission 282-286.
Clay did not take the initiative soon. Reorganizing the branch and elevating its status might help him to bring in an outstanding educator in spite of the negative press the educators had received in the United States. For the first time Education and Religious Affairs did not suffer from any cuts while other divisions had to accept drastic reductions in the reorganization which followed the task force's recommendations.\textsuperscript{10}

Exempting the Branch from budget and personnel cuts was the first step into a brighter future. Clay immediately set out to find a man who would be able to help him solve the administrative problems and would be able to recruit a competent successor for John Taylor. Herman Wells, then President of Indiana University, was one of the most competent educational administrators in the United States at the time. Wells had served the United States during and after World War Two on various important missions and was urgently needed at Indiana, but prodded by urgent messages from Clay and the War Department, the university decided to let him go for a brief time to resolve the most pressing problems in Berlin.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10}Tent, Mission 282-286.

Wells came to Germany in November 1947 and lost no time reorganizing the American re-education effort within the grander scheme of streamlining OMGUS. By March 1948 Wells was done. He succeeded in elevating Religious Affairs Branch to Division Status and made it the only part of Military Government which actually expanded. Formal education now was just one of several branches within the new Education and Cultural Relations Division. His first innovation was the establishment of a Cultural Exchange Branch which would be responsible for coordinating all efforts in this realm. Wells thought that the exchange program would have to be a cornerstone of American reorientation and democratization. Without it all American efforts would ultimately fail. At the same time he also gave Group Activities and its chief, Lawrence Norrie, equal standing with the other branches. Since Norrie came from the American YMCA in 1946, he had given special attention to youth work from the beginning. His promotion meant that youth activities would play a much greater role in official American policy in Germany in the future.¹²

Reorganizing the branch was just one of the tasks Wells had to tackle during his stay in Germany. Since he

¹²Tent, Mission 302; Kellermann 33-34; see Weisz, ed. (69) for the personnel roster of the new division.

Weisz, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte herausgegeben vom Institut für Zeitgeschichte 35 (München [Munich] Oldenbourg, 1994) 57-76.
considered the exchange programs essential, he paid special attention to developing an intricate network of committees on both sides of the Atlantic which could coordinate the different parties and interests involved in the effort. Wells was able to enlist the financial backing of various foundations in the endeavor. He demonstrated his continuing interest in the German exchange program by becoming the chair of the Commission of Occupied Areas in the United States which functioned as the supervising and advisory body for the entire exchange effort. By the end of his tenure in Germany Wells had taken care of the administrative weaknesses of the exchange apparatus. Among other accomplishments he had reduced the clearing and documentation process from nine months to ten days. He also was able to persuade Clay that the exchange was actually a good idea and that Germans would not encounter hostility on American campuses. As a result the number of exchangees increased from 81 persons in 1947 to 354 in 1948. Two-thirds of the latter group were German students going to the United States. Americans had taken the first step towards reviving and strengthening the cultural ties between the two countries which they hoped would result in a stronger democratic orientation on parts of the German intellectual elite in the long run.13

When Alonzo Grace, former Commissioner of Education in Connecticut, assumed the post of Education and Cultural

13Tent, Mission 302-303; Kellermann 34.
Relations Division Chief in Berlin in the fall of 1948 on Wells' recommendation, the stage was set officially for a new phase of American reorientation policy and with it, American youth work. A look at the youth section's work reveals that Wells simply had to re-organize and re-orient headquarters along the lines the youth activities branch had been following almost from its inception. The tremendous work of dedicated Americans and Germans in this field quickly overcame the negative phase of American policy and replaced it with a concept which became the model for all future efforts in American re-education long before policy makers in Berlin and Washington had sorted out their problems. Youth officers not only recognized early on the need for a constructive reorientation program, but also implemented it at a time when they had enough authority to introduce new programs against resistance of some German officials. Even more importantly, they relied on an approach of cooperation and encouragement. Youth activities were the only field in which Americans actually made use of the tactical troops' resources in manpower and material.

Establishing a Framework for Youth Activities

American education experts dedicated almost all of their efforts to the reopening of schools and the problems related to this issue during the first year of the occupation, although OMGUS headquarters soon realized the need to expand its activities beyond the schools. Following the philosophy
that the Germans should be in charge of their own affairs under American supervision, the directive of October 1945 permitted young people to form their own youth groups, provided they adhered to democratic principles and did not exclude members based on race, religion, or socio-economic status. Based on this policy Germans began to organize themselves. At the same time the youth committees which Military Government officials had installed began their activities at the county level. The committees were to operate on a volunteer basis and to consist mainly of German officials who in one way or another were interested in youth work.14

OMGUS Education and Religious Affairs youth officers from the start left no doubt that they intended to embark on a positive program at the earliest possible moment. Two of its representatives from Bavaria reported that the keynote of their zonewide monthly meeting in December 1945 was "the positive reconstruction of German cultural life." At the same conference their superiors informed them that cooperation between tactical troops and Military Government officials could do much to achieve that goal. They portrayed a sports program at Karlsruhe which the local tactical unit

14See pp. 127-129 above.
and the field detachment sponsored together as a model for the entire American zone.\textsuperscript{15}

Members of the Education and Religious Affairs Branch in Bavaria met in February 1946 to discuss the progress of their programs, but youth activities only appeared at the bottom of the agenda. At that time headquarters could do no more than inform its officers in the field that there was progress in formulating directives concerning youth activities and teacher education.\textsuperscript{16}

Two months after the meeting OMGUS issued the first changes of the regulations that governed German youth activities. In line with Clay’s general policy to permit the Germans activities on the state level, the new guidelines of April 1946 laid down the basis for the formation of statewide youth committees which would represent all youth of a state. These "Land Youth Committees" would be formed by the existing Kreis Youth Committees. They had to bring together the different youth groups and coordinate their efforts to provide the young people in a state with adequate leisure time activities. The state committees also would represent the youth organizations’ and Kreis committees’ interests to the states’ youth authorities. The state ministries in

\textsuperscript{15}OMGBY, Intelligence Division [hereinafter ID], After Action Report, Dec. 1945: 20; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Historical Reports, Box 50, 10/76-3/11.

\textsuperscript{16}OMGBY, ID, weekly report no. 39, 31 Jan.-7 Feb. 1946: 25; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Box 169, 10/85-3/6

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charge of youth were advised to establish liaison with the Land youth committees and to support them. Franz-Joseph Strauss, one of the West Germany's most prominent post-war politicians from Bavaria, started his career in this capacity in the Munich ministry for Culture and Education in May 1946. In addition to their representative duties the Land committees had to process applications for statewide youth organizations. Military Government would continue to supervise and issue licenses.\textsuperscript{17}

Headquarters did not only issue new directives, but also made sure that the field officers knew what direction Berlin wanted them to take. The OMGUS Information Bulletin announced to its readers that Americans would provide "Another Chance for German Youth: Through Carefully Planned and Guided Leisure Time Activities Germany's Youngsters May Soon Find 'The Road Back.'" The author dedicated a special box on the first page of the article to impress his readers with the importance of doing their jobs along positive lines:

\begin{quote}
[t]o deny the possibility of a decent, peaceful future, in which the abilities of all may be employed constructively, is to smother the aspirations of youth and to reap the consequences in lawless and possibly dangerous political behavior.
\end{quote}

The article went on to describe the initiatives Military Government officials had developed so far in the field. It

\textsuperscript{17}Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), Change 1 to Title 8, Education and Religious Affairs, 1 Apr. 1946; NA RG 84 Munich Consulate General, Misc. Records 840.1B; see also Füssl 123-24.
also informed its readers that international Christian youth organizations, among them the YMCA and the American Friends, were about to resume their activities in Germany as well. Most of the space and photos of the article dealt with the still informal youth program of the tactical troops in the American zone of occupation.18

Not only Military Government members were impressed with the GIs' success. Headquarters of the United States Forces, European Theater (USFET) in Germany had already taken steps to recognize and support the GIs' attempts to teach young Germans American games officially. General McNarney seized the opportunity which the soldiers' own initiative offered to keep them and German youth out of trouble by transforming their informal and voluntary activities into an extensive Army program. On 15 April 1946, just a few days after OMGUS had issued the changes in its regulations, headquarters USFET defined the role which both OMGUS and tactical troops should play in the American re-education effort. The disease and unrest formula still provided the basis for the military's efforts. McNarney stated that OMGUS programs and the tactical units' youth activities had proven their value during the past months by diminishing juvenile delinquency and should therefore be extended "by all practical means".

The directive established that close cooperation between Military Government officials and tactical commands was essential to ensure maximum efficiency. Since the Army had recreational facilities, equipment, and personnel at its disposal and the Germans were in dire need of them, it would concentrate its efforts in this area. As far as OMGUS was concerned, the directive established for the first time that qualified officers or civilians would dedicate their full time to the implementation of OMGUS youth directives at headquarters as well as on the Land levels. On the tactical level McNarney instructed the commands of all branches of the armed forces in Germany to assign "mature, qualified" officers full time to youth activities. They would be in charge of maintaining liaison with the appropriate Military Government authorities and Land Youth Committees and to help them correct any deficiencies and implement their programs. The directive instructed unit commanders to survey the recreational facilities the Army had requisitioned and make them available at least part time to German youth committees. Furthermore the units would stop requisitioning recreational equipment from the German economy. The Army could release items which it did not need from captured German stocks or which GIs did not use to German youth groups. Qualified Army personnel further should actively support young Germans if they were invited to do so. To educate GIs about the new policy, the directive set one hour per month aside for
instructing them accordingly. The directive finally defined the different spheres of operation for OMGUS and tactical units. Military Government continued to be in charge of developing American policy and all aspects of appointing and supervising German officials and youth groups. Tactical units would dedicate their efforts to the actual field work: they would assess the needs of youth groups and share with them the facilities necessary to implement American policies. Only six months after the non-fraternization policy had died, the generals wanted to encourage GIs to participate in the youth program. The Army would expand its activities considerably: it would help German youth groups establish youth centers, which would include reading rooms. The Army would also make suitable films available. Apart from competing in sports, young Germans should also have the opportunity to attend informal trade and handicraft classes. Tactical units could further assist them in reconstruction and rehabilitation projects of youth centers and youth hostels. The directive also encouraged soldiers to sponsor meetings in which young Germans would be able to learn about other democratic countries. To make sure that the tactical units complied with regulations, the directive established mandatory monthly reports.19

OMGUS officials had mixed feelings about the Army’s capabilities to carry out such a program. A preliminary report in February 1947 by Alvin Fritz, chief of the OMGUS Youth Activities Section, stated that it was too early to judge the program’s success, but that American GIs had done a remarkable job in "winning the trust and goodwill" of many young people and adults. Fritz thought that in spite of shortcomings within the program and a considerable lack of cooperation between OMGUS and Army field officers, "a very satisfactory contribution has been made in assisting the German youth."\(^{20}\)

The main problem for OMGUS officials was that GYA remained outside of their jurisdiction. Throughout the existence of OMGUS, youth officers recognized the merit of the program, but constantly complained about lack of interest by the highest Army echelons, about unqualified officers in the field, but above all, about a lack of cooperation and support for their own objectives. According to Military Government officials, all the problems could be solved by giving them control over the program and additional personnel to do so.\(^{21}\)


Other decisions by OMGUS headquarters made clear that Americans did not regard young Germans as incorrigibles or fanatics. On the contrary, young Germans were the first ones whom the occupiers officially began to release from having to accept responsibility for Germany's Nazi past. The denazification law of March 1946 did not require prosecution of anybody under eighteen years of age. Nevertheless it still contained punitive clauses. Members of the Hitler youth who had been part of that organization for more than four years and had been automatically absorbed into the Nazi party after that could neither attend universities nor become teachers. 22

Some German authorities began to take up the cause of their young people. In May the Hessian Minister of Cultural Affairs and Education, for example, inquired with the American Military Government in Wiesbaden whether it might not be justifiable to permit former Hitler Youth leaders who had proven themselves as members of the new youth groups to occupy leading positions within these groups. The minister

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22Füssl (115) comments on the age limits of the law; for a detailed description of the effects the law on persons who wanted to study and were born after 1 Jan. 1919 see Proposal for the Readmission of Excluded German Youth to Educational Institutions from Vaughn DeLong, Chief of Education and Religious Affairs Branch, OMG Hesse, to Director, OMGUS IA&CD, 15 May 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/1.
reported that a survey conducted by his office revealed that young Germans themselves did not regard leadership in the lower echelons of the Hitler Youth as a grave handicap to their work, provided that they were willing and able to cooperate in a free, responsible, and democratic manner, were good comrades, and were elected. The Minister thought that the young generation had been drawn to the Nazis without really knowing what they were doing and would definitely receive a big moral boost if the Americans granted them some leeway.23

The Minister found open ears and an able advocate for his ideas in American offices. Apparently based on similar communications as well as on his own convictions, Vaughn DeLong, chief of Hesse’s Education and Religious Affairs Branch, had already worked out a detailed proposal which he directed to John Taylor. He strongly argued for the rehabilitation of German youth, which, according to him, the denazification law made impossible for a considerable number of young people. DeLong continued that especially the intelligent and capable part of the youth suffered because they had believed in an idealistic cause and therefore joined the party after they had proven their leadership qualities in the Hitler Youth. Quoting evidence from the OMGUS

23Memorandum, Minister of Cultural and Educational Affairs for Greater Hesse to Military Government Education Branch, Wiesbaden, 8 May 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/1.

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Information Bulletin, he argued that the party often had registered these young people automatically and that they otherwise had been under enormous moral pressure to join. DeLong noted that the current negative policy deprived a large part of the younger generation of the possibility to become respectable members of German society and led to a huge degree of hopelessness among them. He found that German churches and worldly authorities alike were justified in their deep concern about this state of affairs. If not offered some way to enter society as respectable members, these young people in the long run would cause considerable trouble and would be lost for the democratic cause. DeLong therefore advocated that American authorities should think over their approach and give all youth born after 1918 who had not been involved in Nazi crimes a new chance by displaying and granting "unqualified forgiveness". Young people should receive the chance to participate in the reorientation process and should be allowed to assume leadership positions once they had demonstrated that they were willing and able to operate within a democratic framework.

DeLong thought that the unconditional amnesty he proposed was just the first step for rehabilitating young Germans. He provided a long list with specific suggestions he thought were essential for converting German youth into committed democrats. Instead of aiming at administrative
reforms, DeLong suggested that it would be essential to reach out for the minds of young Germans. This would necessitate a positive program of extra-curricular activities, courses in democracy at schools, changing teacher-student relations from an authoritarian style to one of cooperation, and the establishment of Parent Teacher Councils. To achieve this goal American experts would have to be brought in and young teachers and teacher trainees would need special orientation courses. The memorandum emphasized that all these measures should have a positive and constructive character and should replace the negative policies in place up to that date.24

It is not clear to what extent the paper from Hesse influenced General Clay’s decision to grant youth the general pardon DeLong had requested, but on 2 July he could register with satisfaction the Deputy Governor’s announcement to German politicians that OMGUS would grant a general amnesty to all people born after January 1919. Just as DeLong had advocated, only those who had participated in crimes would not be included.25

24 Proposal for the Re-admission of Excluded German Youth to Educational Institutions from Vaughn DeLong, General Chief of E&RA Branch OMG Hesse to Director, OMGUS IA&CD, Public Health and Welfare Branch, Education Section, 7 May 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/1.

Gathering Information

Certainly encouraged by the recent turns of events, officers in charge of youth activities travelled to their first zone-wide conference in Berlin in July 1946. They did not come unprepared. Apart from their own observations they could rely on a steady, but somewhat small and not always reliable, stream of information about German youth which the Intelligence and Information Control Divisions were gathering. These divisions were probing youth problems, young people's attitudes, and their reaction to Americans and their programs throughout the American zone since August 1945, but the information was not always reliable. ICD in general made a conscious attempt to base its surveys on representative samples. Based on a survey of 134 young Germans, ICD researchers found in May 1946 that the children did not express much hostility towards Americans and thought that the economic situation was better in the British and the American zones than in the other two. According to the pollsters, all of the children were fully aware of the failure of Nazism, but more than a third still harbored Nazi ideas. Many others displayed an extreme nationalism or chauvinism which apparently came very close to National Socialist doctrine. OMGUS personnel could read in the Information Bulletin, in which ICD disseminated its findings, that German youth was "The Big Problem in Germany." The article also included a set of samples taken from the essays.
on which the division had based the survey. Only one out of the fourteen samples clearly expressed the hope that Germany would become a peaceful and democratic nation. Judging from this source, Military Government officials certainly had to act quickly and with full force to re-educate young Germans.26

The Intelligence Division's reports were not always reliable. Those which dealt with German youth conveyed contradictory information. One of ICD's "special sociological investigators", for example, conveyed a report from Bavaria to headquarters which published it in February 1946. He investigated the attitudes of young people in Miesbach, a little town in upper Bavaria. The picturesque setting, combined with the rather strange behavior of the inhabitants of the community, apparently appealed to the intelligence officer who based his report entirely on his own observations and arrived at surprising conclusions. According to him, young people in Miesbach did not display much concern about their future or the future of Germany. Regardless of their social status or background they showed a remarkable lack of interest in politics. Almost all of the youth in Miesbach did not seem to have liked joining the Hitler youth. Those who did were attracted by outdoor activities and sports or by the possibility of gaining

prestige. The investigator did not find any ideological indoctrination in Miesbach's youth. Almost all of them seemed to have confidence in their own future and had definite ideas about their careers. If one was to believe the report, promiscuity was widespread and often tolerated by adults. The town continued to have a rigid social cast structure in which each person had his or her assigned roles. The investigator stated that girls of civil servant families, for example, "generally do watercolors and play the piano, and develop romantic crushes on young officers," while the daughters of unskilled workers either married or became "maids, barmaids, and prostitutes." Their brothers roamed the streets and coffeehouses, went to the movies and listened to jazz. Their main goal in life was to move up to the ranks of skilled workers, but, the author noted, "they usually fail because of lack of steadiness." Although he did not bring it up in the narrative of his report, the intelligence officer concluded that young Germans in Miesbach demonstrated a "remarkable unanimity" in their opinions of Americans. According to him, these young people thought that Americans listened to jazz and mostly were "lazy, weak, likeable, superficial, and undisciplined." 27

The report had several flaws. The author not only chose a region which researchers then and today would hardly have

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found to be representative for German or even Bavarian youth. Miesbach in almost all respects represented the exception to the rule. The town had not suffered extensive war damage and did not house any refugees. The author also assessed mores and habits of all social classes in a town with no industry to speak of and probably a very small number of middle class families. Disseminating fairly sensational information about sexual behavior of young people, which probably was more noteworthy for its rarity rather than serving as a rule, may well have attracted more readers, but it also helped to spread a somewhat problematical picture of young Germans. Since most of the Intelligence Division's members were German native speakers, the author of this report must not have taken his mission very seriously. Possibly his lack of a sense for realities—a hallmark of German academic thinking—survived emigration. Since headquarters printed and disseminated the report, distorted information reached an audience which did not speak German and had to rely on these reports.

Findings from other intelligence officers clearly contradicted the Miesbach report. The picture they painted seemed to be more realistic. Kurt H. Ehlers, apparently a naturalized American citizen who operated as intelligence team chief in Bavaria, for example, reported in September 1946 that German youth were in dire need of American assistance if they wanted to face the future with some hope.
In the long run young people would need better housing, jobs and vocational training. Before the Germans could reach this goal, however, Ehlers thought that Americans would have to do something to keep them off the streets and to occupy their minds constructively. He suggested co-educational club facilities which should contain libraries and educational movies; they should also encourage theatrical and literature groups under adequate leadership. Since ICD personnel were best acquainted with the local conditions, Ehlers proposed that they could expand their roles as mere observers and secure the cooperation of local groups. Ehlers also thought that OMGUS could employ ICD specialists profitably as discussion leaders in summer camps which he wanted to provide free of charge to young people.28

Eric Feiler, chief of the Intelligence Section of the Nuremberg Detachment, also did not concur with the Miesbach report. Feiler thought that the situation was rather desperate for young people, but they also were open to new ideas to fill the void the complete military defeat and moral collapse of the Nazis had left. He provided headquarters for Bavaria with detailed summaries of answers to questions he had received, apparently in preparation of another youth survey. Feiler called the two German administrators in Nuremberg who could be expected to know the situation best,

Theodor Marx, who was in charge of the city’s welfare and youth affairs, and Karl Maly, the director of the Nuremberg youth office. Feiler also tapped the leaders of the Nuremberg churches’ youth activities as well as leading local politicians and the head of the school administration. He verified their information within his own detachment before conveying it to Munich. In April 1947 he sent his information to headquarters. Feiler noted that he should have more time for this kind of work. It would enable him and other field officers to obtain more reliable information.29

Organizing Field Work

OMGUS youth activities officers apparently stepped up their efforts in gathering data from the field in preparation for their first zone wide conference in July 1946. OMGUS representatives from all states under American control convened in Berlin to discuss and coordinate their work. Two thirds of those present did not have any military rank, among them Richard Alexander, then acting chief of the Education and Religious Affairs Section in Berlin, and Hayes Beall, the OMGUS Youth Activities chief. This first meeting mainly served as a sounding board and an exchange of ideas.

29Memo from Eric Feiler, Team Chief, Intelligence Section, Nuremberg Detachment OMGY, Information Control Division, to Chief of Intelligence, OMGY, 25 Apr. 1946; NA RG 260 OMBGY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12.
From the outset the delegates seemed to have assumed that the negative phase of the American occupation was over. They did not find it necessary to include issues such as denazification and demilitarization on their agenda and concentrated on what could be done to rehabilitate young Germans. All conference participants agreed that they were facing a challenging task and that they would not be able to reach their goals by issuing orders. In view of the recent youth amnesty they decided to define "youth" as broadly as the directive had done. This meant that young adults would also become targets of parts of their program.

One of the most important tasks of the conference was to assess the practical needs of young Germans. Malnourishment, as well as the lack of equipment and buildings for young people, surfaced as the most pressing problems, but to solve them the youth officers also had to fight within their own administration for more recognition. Conditions in Bavaria seemed to be worst. The members of the Bavarian delegation reported that OMGBY only recently had appointed a full time youth officer and therefore lagged behind the other states in the development of youth activities. For this reason Bavaria had not yet completed the creation of the youth committees through which OMGUS hoped to carry out its policies. Hans P. Thomsen reported that Bavarian authorities did not show the least interest in youth work, but that the formation of the Land Youth Committee in May had improved the
situation. The Bavarian government in Munich supported it with money and office space. Thomsen urged youth officers to spend as much time as possible in the field to support the youth committees throughout the American zone against the German bureaucrats. The participants agreed that German government bodies would have to provide material support to the recently established committees, but should not be allowed to exercise any control over their work.

Since the committees were the backbone of the Military Government efforts, the officers spent much time discussing the possibilities for improving them. They found that one of the most serious problems was to find qualified youth workers to staff the committees which for the most part consisted of older people. American authorities in Hesse and Württemberg-Baden had already initiated youth leadership training programs to remedy the situation.

As far as practical youth work was concerned, the youth committees seemed to function adequately. They had helped to organize considerable numbers of youth organizations much along the traditional lines. Most of young Germans joined sport clubs, although the churches at that time maintained the largest membership numbers. OMGUS officers recognized the contributions which the tactical units had made so far in the field by providing young people with facilities and equipment. Many of the conference participants reported that the tactical troops were rendering excellent services, but
also detected shortcomings which the Army would have to remedy. They were skeptical about the Army’s ability to carry such a long term program through and to cooperate with OMGUS. In addition they noted that the Army had not yet revised its orientation practices to win more GIs over to working in the program. The occupation handbook continued to depict Germans and especially German youth as the incorrigible enemy and the soldiers still saw Your Job in Germany when they reported for duty in Germany. Nevertheless the conference participants welcomed the help the Army would be able to render.

An important goal of the Berlin conference was to establish liaison with other divisions involved in youth work. ICD, for example, had two youth magazines in circulation, but could not expand these activities due to the paper shortage. The film institute in Munich reported that only a limited number of educational films were available. Some of the films from the United States were not exactly useful for youth work, while others could not be shown because the available projectors could not handle them. So far the only alternative would be German educational films. A member of the welfare division briefed the officers on the situation of youth welfare before 1933 and the practical problems the German welfare authorities were facing at the time. The most pressing of those were unemployment and homeless young people.
Five months after Truman had initiated CRALOG, the conference members took up the issue again. Since qualified help was so hard to find within Germany, the field officers strongly recommended that OMGUS invite American voluntary agencies to participate in the task and to send American specialists to Germany.\(^{30}\)

Although the Berlin conference basically had served only as an orientation session, it bore its fruits. The discussions of this conference apparently needed quite some time to get Clay's attention, but eventually the military governor responded to the criticism on the troops' indoctrination. In October he personally launched a public relations campaign on behalf of German youth among the tactical units. Under the headline "'Fanatical' Nazi Youth Secretly Laughed at Hitler, Clay Asserts," *Stars and Stripes* carried an interview with the Military Governor in October 1946. Clay laid the previous description of German youth, which the Army and the Washington had tried to impress upon their soldiers in Germany, officially to rest. He maintained that young Germans had not liked the drill and militaristic aspects of the Hitler Youth, but rather had joined because it gave them the opportunity to engage in many exciting activities. Whereas the Army information materials had depicted young people as the ones most affected by Nazi

\(^{30}\)Minutes of Conference of Regional Youth Activities Section Personnel Berlin 2-3 July 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 120 5/293-1/7.
doctrine, and therefore the most dangerous after the war, Clay now stated that these young people knew from their own experiences that militarism led to disaster. According to him, the democratic leadership of Germany was quite old and tired and would have to be replenished with "some new blood." German youth were vigorous and they offered "the greatest hope for restoring Germany as a peaceful nation along democratic lines." 31

To make sure that the soldiers received the new message the Army replaced its old warning signs about Germans and the dangers of fraternization with new admonitions posted everywhere in its military installations. Some of the older catchwords survived, but now they had a different meaning. Just as in 1945 posters reminded soldiers that they had an important mission and needed to do their jobs well if they wanted to justify the sacrifices of their fallen comrades in two wars and if they wanted to avoid a third war. This time, however, their job description had changed. GIs were admonished to "shun perverted fraternization." Another poster made clear what that meant. It told GIs to "associate with decent youth... not V.D pickups." The posters were designed to encourage soldiers to go out and permit young Germans show them that "not everything German is bad." Army personnel should try to become acquainted with the young people's language, their arts and crafts, and their sports.

GIs now had two jobs to do: They had to carry out their duties well, but the Army also expected them to participate fully in a "positive program for the rehabilitation of Germany."  

The conference also had immediate results for youth officers in the field. Headquarters realized that providing them with background information about German youth work before, during, and after the Third Reich was as essential for tackling the problems of the present as giving them guidelines for their work in the communities. Consequently it published a brief brochure explaining youth activities in Germany. Apart from a history of youth activities in Germany before 1945, the booklet also summarized the American activities to date. Its authors emphasized the interest Americans had shown in German youth from the start and described the development of OMGUS and Army policies and programs. According to them, one of the main difficulties for the occupiers was to find and train capable German youth leaders and to provide German youth groups with all the materials they urgently needed for their work. The pamphlet molded the various ideas discussed during the previous conference into six long range objectives. The title of their publication already indicated that the section was not content with preventing youth from getting into trouble, but

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32 Posters issued by the US Army [1946]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Branch, Box 43, 10/44-1/9.
STEER CLEAR OF THE BLACKMARKET
SHUN PERVERTED FRATERNIZATION
Show them
AMERICANS ARE GOOD SOLDIERS
GOOD CITIZENS

7. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
You have an important job in an army that has an important mission.

8. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
RELIGION IS INTERNATIONAL
GO TO CHURCH
ASSOCIATE WITH DECENT YOUTH...
NOT V·D PICKUPS

Remember

The American dead of two wars lie in Europe

10. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
You have 2 jobs

1. Highest performance of your primary military assignment...

2. Full participation in positive program for the rehabilitation of Germany

11. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
MILITARY GOVERNMENT alone CANNOT REHABILITATE GERMANY

EVERY AMERICAN MUST HELP!

12. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
NOT EVERYTHING GERMAN IS BAD

LET GERMAN YOUTH SHOW YOU SOME OF THE GOOD . . .

Study their ARTS and CRAFTS

Learn their LANGUAGE and their SPORTS TOO.

rather aimed at "Giving Youth New Goals." The title also revealed that the youth section had no intention of doing the work for the Germans. Young people in the American zone would have to reach the goals by themselves. Americans would only offer advice and recommendations. Youth leadership training programs formed the top objective, followed by the expansion of activities as well as facilities and equipment. Americans would help to provide suitable youth literature as well as radio programs and films. International travel and exchanges would bring the "best influences" from the outside world back into Germany. Finally, youth should organize voluntary labor services for constructing or rehabilitating their own facilities, a topic the officers had discussed in Berlin as well.33

Apart from providing the field officers with practical and necessary ideas which were remarkably free of ideological content, the booklet also appeared just in time for the arrival of the Zook Commission and Eugene Anderson. The field officers and their section chief had done their homework. The mission's final report shows that the mission members were impressed with the work OMGUS was doing in this field. The educators from the United States wholeheartedly endorsed the youth section's objectives.

The mission's support prompted a favorable reaction from Clay, but did not lead to any significant changes. OMGUS headquarters commented on the report's recommendations in October 1946. As far as youth work was concerned, all parties involved agreed that much needed to be done. There also existed a consensus about the way the Americans should tackle the problem. OMGUS headquarters pointed out that its divisions already were carrying out many of the mission's recommendations. Clay officially also found strong words of support for the idea of letting Germans go to the United States as well as bringing American experts into Germany to help with the re-education efforts. Contrary to the spirit of the mission's recommendation, however, he argued that he did not see the need for an expansion of this sector of Military Government, but rather wanted to keep it at its present level. The Military Governor also did not follow the mission's demand for upgrading the Education section within his command structure. Education and Religious Affairs, and with it the youth section, had to wait until other needs were taken care of.\(^3\)

Clay's response mentioned an additional re-education initiative OMGUS was just introducing in Germany. As early as July 1945 ICD had begun to open the American libraries in

various cities for the use of the German public. The immediate goal was to counter German notions of the "American cultural retardation" by introducing Germans to American art, literature, and science. The Americans also regarded the libraries as an opportunity to fill the gaps in literature, but also in psychology, sociology, or even in the sciences which the Nazis had opened. By the end of 1945 ICD had established information centers in three cities. Eight more were to follow in the course of the following year. These centers formed the nucleus of the Amerika House program which in the course of the next years would expand into many larger cities in the western zones and in Berlin's American sector. It would eventually be able to reach out even to the smallest communities in the American zone in the form of reading rooms, film programs and mobile libraries, or book mobiles. While they did not target young people specifically, they also developed programs and offered books for them.35

In spite of Clay's apparent reluctance to assign re-education a higher place in his administration and his

priorities, the youth section pressed ahead. Early in October 1946 the men and women in charge of youth activities met in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. This time they widened the scope of their considerations considerably. They invited the officer in charge of the Army's German youth activities program. Well before they knew anything about the new directive from Washington, the conference organizers decided to bring representatives from the British and the French Zones to Garmisch for an exchange of ideas and information on their respective policies and activities. Another first was the participation of German representatives in some sessions of the conference. With their objectives in place this time, the participants concentrated entirely on the practical problems they were facing.36

On the whole the picture looked encouraging. In the American zone the Land youth committees were in place and functioning. Throughout the zone Military Government had been able to help the Germans establish leadership schools which the state governments supported even in otherwise recalcitrant Bavaria. They also had successfully introduced a number of youth publications, but encountered major difficulties in maintaining them because of the paper shortage. The officers reported that youth groups in many

cities and counties began to see the merits of cooperation in the youth committees, but wanted to pursue their own goals without interference from officials or the local governments. They came together in their own organizations, the Jugendringe or Youth Rings which often tried to take over the functions of the youth committees, the Jugendausschüsse, in which adults still had a dominant voice. To further encourage these activities members of youth activities sections throughout the zone reported that they were making progress in organizing young people and setting up leadership training courses. The Bavarian delegation, for example, could report that it had opened four youth leadership training centers in Bavaria under the auspices of the State Youth Committee. OMGBY had secured the support of the Ministry for Food and Agriculture, an important asset in times of scarcity and food stamps.\textsuperscript{37}

Other divisions had not been idle either. ICD representatives, for example, had made sure that radio stations devoted eight hours per week to youth programs and provided youth leaders with ample opportunity to be on the air.\textsuperscript{38}

The youth officers at the conference also learned that ICD had launched a film program directed specifically at the younger generation which, according to its representatives, 

\textsuperscript{37}Garmisch Conference 1-4, 16-17.

\textsuperscript{38}Garmisch Conference 16-17.
showed much promise. Once again the idea for the program had come from the field. Shortly after the first conference on youth activities in July the youth activities officer of a detachment in Bavaria suggested to headquarters that German youth needed something more than classroom instruction in the field of education. He thought that young Germans would probably be quite receptive to US motion pictures and modern American music. As usual the mills of the OMGUS administration ground slowly, but four weeks after he had sent his memorandum the youth officer received an invitation to spend three days in Munich to discuss the details of his proposal and OMGUS policies. Military Government actually had an official policy regarding films for Germans in place since May 1946. Clay, who had to settle the dispute over who was in charge of the program, decided that ICD would be in charge of producing educational films and their contents. E&CRD would take over the responsibilities for distributing the films to individuals and institutions. By July they were ready to make movies available to youth activities.39

In spite of the encouraging news, obstacles remained. A number of participants complained about considerable lack of communication and support within OMGUS. Furthermore

German bureaucrats were making life difficult by attempting to get youth activities under their control. Apart from their isolation within OMGUS, the youth officers felt that they needed to find a way to contact the American public. Without the support of Americans back home they would not be able to carry their objectives through. ICD added to the list that German youth publications so far had been disappointing in their re-educational value.\textsuperscript{40}

The Army's program (GYA) received special attention throughout 1946. The Garmisch conference was just a part of a series of meetings between Military Government officers, Army representatives and German youth officials. In June 1946 the three groups in charge of youth work in Bavaria had met to achieve a greater degree of cooperation. Military Government officials were eager to make sure that their agency would not be degraded to become a mere supplier for German youth groups. At the same time they insisted that they should have exclusive control over the distribution of all equipment which the Army could make available to German youth. Germans would receive all captured enemy materials with no strings attached. As far as youth centers were concerned, GYA officers pointed out that youth groups had a difficult time to hold on to their homes when pressured by German authorities once the Army released them to them. The

\textsuperscript{40}Garmisch Conference 2, 21-22.
only solution would be for the Army to retain control of the facilities and make them available to all youth groups.\textsuperscript{41}

Apparently OMGUS representatives felt uneasy about their coalition with soldiers in re-educating German children. The numbers the Army provided during the Garmisch conference were impressive. The officer in charge of GYA reported that throughout the American zone more than 15,000 American personnel had contacted nearly 290,000 children since April. The ensuing discussion brought to light that, even though the directives provided for liaison and the exchange of information, contacts in the field needed to be closer. Military Government representatives also suggested the establishment of a training program for Army personnel participating in GYA. The very success and size of the program caused some apprehensions. Some officers felt that the Army was acting too independently and charged it with deviating from the official policy of leaving the actual activities in German hands. Another OMGUS representative argued that GYA claimed and received all the credit for actions his section had planned and initiated when they had merely asked the Army for help. A third critic pointed out that the Army's approach to children through sports and parties did nothing for the long range objectives the Americans were pursuing. All the GYA representative could do

was to reaffirm the Army's willingness to lend a hand to the agencies which were "primarily responsible" for youth activities. He explained that the Army was most experienced in the realm of sports and had the necessary equipment and facilities, so it was only natural that it mainly offered children these kinds of activities. The GYA officer added that suggestions for improvements would be most welcome.42

The conference revealed that it was hard to coordinate two organizations working in the same field. Between August and October 1946 OMGUS and Army representatives repeatedly met to discuss their respective roles in German youth work. The Army adhered to its traditional views that it should leave policy making to civilian authorities and therefore did not contest OMGUS prerogatives in this field. Both sides also agreed that the Army would have to change its objectives. Instead of simply trying to keep children and GIs out of trouble, GYA would have to participate in the American re-education effort. This meant that GYA would have to offer a more sophisticated program for young Germans. The key question was whether the Army would be allowed to take up a more active role in developing its own initiatives or should only provide assistance to German youth organizations who asked for it. The Army command favored the former solution, but OMGUS and Clay insisted that GYA should not try to compete with, or replace German youth organizations and

42Garmisch Conference 14-15, 22.
should only supplement already existing German programs. Both sides finally agreed that the Army should be able to initiate its own programs, but should try to turn them over to the Germans as soon as they would be ready. Military Government officials suggested conducting forums and discussion groups with the youngsters to train them in democratic procedure.43

The resulting directive of October 1946 tried to satisfy all sides involved. Obviously based on the successes of the youth centers the Army had inherited from the Soviets in Berlin, the directive also permitted USFET to requisition buildings for youth groups in the vicinity of military communities. It authorized GYA to hire German employees in subordinate positions and American dependents who were permitted to come to the theater from April 1946 on. This meant that headquarters officially did not permit the Army to develop its own program, but provided it with all the tools and resources to do so if the Germans did not take advantage of the resources the units were required to offer.44

The directive came at an unfortunate time. The Army was in the middle of a complete reorganization of its troops in Germany. In June 1947 headquarters had to issue an extensive

43Minutes of Conference on Army Assistance to German Youth Activities Held at Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, 7-9 Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9.
44Jones 14-17.
order to the commanders of the newly formed military posts which admonished them that the new administrative structure did not free American officers and enlisted men in any way from their obligations to assist young Germans. To make sure that units complied with their duties, headquarters introduced a system of weekly consolidated reports.45

In spite of the difficulties the Army made the best of the October directive. In January 1947 headquarters provided its posts with detailed procedures for obtaining films. At that time youth officers could choose from sixteen American feature films such as The Gold Rush, Madame Curie, Abe Lincoln in Illinois, or Young Tom Edison, which young people would be able to see for a moderate fee. They had four German films, five films from allied or neutral countries, and twenty-one American documentary films at their disposal. German documentaries and fairy tale films which ICD had approved completed the list.46

Another order from June clearly indicated that headquarters was doing everything it could to get American soldiers and civilians involved in the program. It reminded commanding generals that the November directive authorized

45Responsibility for German Youth Activities, AG 353.8 GOT-AGO, HQ European Command, 5 June 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1428, 9/12-2/16.

46Headquarters US Forces, European Theater to Commanding Generals, 23 Jan. 1947, subject: Procedure for Obtaining Motion Picture Films or the German Youth Activities Program from Information Control Units; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1428, 9/122-2/16.
soldiers to use up to four hours of their weekly training
time for working with youth in manual arts. The authors of
the directive made clear that they considered the program to
be very important. Using the four hours for working with
young Germans could be "of limitless value both to the troops
themselves and to the occupation forces' efforts for the re-
education of Germany."47

The Army also recognized the need for good public
relations. A EUCOM directive of May 1947 instructed GYA
officers to do everything they could to keep the program in
the public eye. They were encouraged to inform the German
and American press not only in Germany, but also in the
United States, and to provide the Army Pictorial Services
with photos and motion pictures about their activities. AFN
was instructed to cover GYA activities with live broadcasts
if possible.48

Apparently headquarters did not need to worry about lack
of enthusiasm. Early in 1948 GYA operated 295 youth centers
in the American zone and in Berlin. Between September 1947
and April 1948 attendance at GYA activities peaked at almost
700,000 children in December and dropped below 360,000.
Almost 420,000 German children attended over 27,000 meetings

47Headquarters, European Command to Commanding Generals,
18 June 1947, subject: Use of Training Time for Group
Activities in Manual Arts Installations; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1428, 9/122-2/16.

48EUCOM Directive, 22 May 1947; NA RG 260, OMGUS, E&CRD,
Community Education Br., Box 141, 5/295-3/7.
in April 1948. 389 officers and enlisted men supervised their activities full time. They were assisted by 589 military volunteers, 620 American and Allied civilian volunteers, and 1,056 German civilians employed by the Army.\(^4\)

The number of participants only provided part of the picture. After the first year of GYA operations, ICD decided to explore the reaction of German adults to the program. According to its survey, a majority of all Germans in the American zone had actually heard of GYA. The pollsters found that over 80% of the Germans interviewed would permit their children to participate in GYA activities. Even of those who had heard about the program, however, only about 10% indicated that their children actually had attended any activities. Interestingly, those whose children had taken part in some GYA program had a much better opinion of the Army's efforts than those who had just heard about it. The authors of the report did not think that such a small percentage, which, according to them, still translated into hundreds of thousands of children, would actually hurt the program, as long as GYA successfully implemented its re-education goals. In this realm the findings were promising. German adults seemed to understand clearly that the program was designed to introduce their children to democratic

principles and thought that it did. At the same time, however, the survey revealed that the Germans appreciated GYA for its practical results: only the well educated of those whose children participated in the program let them go with

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the specific purpose of learning more about democracy or the American way of life. Most of the others mainly sent their children because GYA kept them away from the streets and gave them something meaningful to do during their abundant free time.\textsuperscript{50}

In April 1947 the Army polled its soldiers to find out about their participation and their opinions of GYA. At the same time ICD conducted a survey about the program with young Germans. The Army's findings were not surprising. Most of the GIs and officers surveyed had heard about the program and thought that GYA was a good idea for which it would be worthwhile to volunteer. A majority of the GIs found that GYA could teach them something about the Germans as well as the young Germans about democracy and the United States. As is the case with any volunteer effort, only a small percentage of soldiers and their officers sacrificed their time and energies as volunteers. Only about 6% of the enlisted GIs and 15% of officers had taken part in the program. Soldiers who spoke some German, who had done volunteer work in the US, and who had a rather favorable

\textsuperscript{50}Office of the Director of Information Control, Opinion Survey Unit, Report Number 46, \textit{Army Aid to German Youth Activities Evaluated by German Adults}, 19 Feb. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 142, 5/296-1/1.
attitude of young male Germans, tended to render their services more willingly than others.\textsuperscript{51}

The survey on young people is remarkable insofar as it shows that young Germans were much more cautious in their answers than their parents. The deep trauma of the war and their experiences with the Hitler Youth had made young people suspicious. A very large number of them preferred not to answer most of the questions. As far as participation in the Army's youth program was concerned, the survey confirmed the results of the adult survey. Only about 10\% of children surveyed in Kassel, Munich, Heidelberg, and Frankfurt said that they had ever attended GYA activities. Their main motivation for participating in the program was the food which the Americans usually offered. Re-education or the desire to learn something about the United States did not seem to attract much attention in view of the very harsh realities young people in the American zone were facing at the time.\textsuperscript{52}

In spite of the impressive numbers and the rather positive evaluation of GYA by adults not even one year after

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51}Headquarters, US Army, Troop Education and Information Group, Soldier's Opinion Concerning the Army's Assistance to the German Youth Program in the European Command, 15 June 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 144, 5/296-2/1.
\item \textsuperscript{52}Office of the Director of Information Control, Opinion Survey Unit, Report Number 56, German Children Appraise the Youth Program, 26 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/13.
\end{itemize}
its initiation, this highly visible part of the American re-education efforts for youth attracted criticism. In May 1947 the *New York Times* reported "U.S. Program for German Youth Reaches Only Small Percentage: 85% of 1,000 Polled in Cities Do Not Take Part — Candy and Food Are Found to Be Chief Lure For Those Who Do." The author of the article obviously had received a copy of the ICD report on German youth and faithfully—but without any further investigation or background knowledge—forwarded the information to his readers. As a result the public got a rather distorted picture of American youth activities in Germany. The *Times* correspondent was not aware of the fact that the report actually dealt with only a part of American re-education efforts, namely GYA. A short investigation with Norman Himes, OMGUS Education Officer, did not seem to clarify the issue. The *Times* merely reported that Himes thought it just natural in view of the dire situation in Germany that young Germans considered food to be extremely important and defended GYA as a rather new program which had made some progress.53

Vice Consul Robert Beghtol of the Munich Consulate General composed a report to the State Department along the same lines, criticizing the Army's efforts in no uncertain

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terms. Robert Murphy, Clay's liaison with the State Department in Berlin, wrote to James Wilkinson, Beghtol's superior officer in Munich, that Clay regarded the report as "unfair." Just like the Times, Beghtol had completely ignored OMGUS re-education efforts and simply had focused on the Munich GYA activities and the German response. Clay thought that the Army was making a "praiseworthy contribution ... for which all Americans should be grateful -- it has no other purpose than to help." Murphy also explained to Wilkinson that OMGUS did not appreciate sending this kind of internal information to Washington instead of headquarters in Berlin where constructive criticism would always be welcome. He thought that Beghtol's efforts to gather information on the youth program were laudable but limited in value because the Vice Consul relied only on the personal information he had been able to gather in the city and could not provide an accurate picture of the general situation in the American zone. Murphy advised Wilkinson to take this kind of observation to the local military authorities in the future.\textsuperscript{54}

Clay's response did not stop with a reprimand of the vice consul. In August the general dispatched a personal message to the War Department in which he explained in detail

\textsuperscript{54}American Consulate General, Munich, to Secretary of State, Washington, 2 June 1947, dispatch no. 653; Murphy to Wilkinson, 12 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 145, 5/296-2/7.
OMGUS policies. Clay took special care to defend GYA against the attacks in the press and by Beghtol. He thought it unfortunate that the ICD report did not explain the purpose of the Army program which, according to him, was a mere auxiliary in the overall American effort of re-education. Obviously hurt by the negative publicity Clay found it surprising how many people think that the GYA program is our youth program for Germany. It is equally surprising how little credit the Army is getting for its willingness to be a good neighbor and to share its facilities with German youth.55

Clay's vehement defense of the youth activities under his command did not mean that he was blind to the pitfalls of the program or unwilling to listen to constructive criticism. In response to a critical memorandum to Berlin, the Internal Affairs Division suggested that Clay should render more public support to youth activities in general and should make sure that the commanding officers selected capable men as youth officers. The Division further recommended that "professionally trained" youth officers should be appointed to all OMGUS Land offices. Clay would have to remind his tactical commands that they were not competing with the Germans, but rather should assist them in their activities.56

55Clay to Dept. of War, 24 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/5.

56Memorandum from Internal Affairs and Communications Division to General Clay, 5 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/5.
While most of the points of discussion in 1946 dealt with matters of improving the program which OMGUS had already in place, participants in conferences also tried to confront more fundamental issues. Since the youth program was without question extremely important in the re-education of Germany because of its potential for producing social changes and instilling an understanding of democracy, Abe Vinik from OMG Hesse wondered at the Garmisch conference whether the youth activities section was pursuing the right course. According to him, the Americans so far had focused entirely on organizing youth, but had neglected their actual target, young people themselves. Clearly the officer had spotted a weak point in the project. Simply introducing new features to the organizational structure of youth activities in Germany might not be enough to change the minds of the younger generation. Vinik proposed that youth officers should not discuss these problems isolated from the other issues German society was facing and should bring in parties from all parts of Military Government as well as from German society to try to find an integral solution which Americans and Germans could implement. The conference participants agreed that more was indeed necessary, but Vinik must have been disappointed with the response. Apart from some practical proposals to remedy this deficiency, such as the initiation of discussion groups or bringing in experts to help with problems, the members of the conference did not
respond in any way to his proposal. In October 1946 the time had not come for profound changes in a program which was barely one year old.5 7

Although OMGUS representatives always emphasized that Germans should be responsible for carrying out youth activities and had even invited some Germans to Garmisch, the minutes of the conference reveal that OMGUS personnel were not ready to turn the responsibility over to the Germans. They clearly felt these activities were a vital part of the American re-education effort in which the occupiers had to set the parameters of action. The conference was the first step, however, towards giving Germans a bigger voice in youth affairs and to open up a dialogue on a zone-wide basis which apparently was already taking place between Germans and Americans in several states. Nevertheless, OMGUS representatives made clear that the Germans would have to develop their own initiatives within the framework they had established.

With the parameters in place, OMGUS officials tried hard during the next year and a half to initiate a dialogue with German officials. The annual report for 1947/48 noted that German-American conferences in September and November 1947 were most successful. In the earlier of the two both sides agreed that the democratization of youth groups had made considerable progress, but that both, Germans and Americans

57Garmisch Conference 5-6.
were neglecting the German mind over their attempts to reform the system. The Germans who attended the conferences appreciated the lack of ideological indoctrination and in general seemed to share the goals of their American counterparts. They certainly belonged to a group of progressive educators who were eager to establish a dialogue and to promote new ideas.\(^5\)\(^8\)

One problem Germans and Military Government shared was the Army's GYA program. Both sides agreed that GIs were interfering with their own arrangements by actively introducing programs the Germans had not asked for. They did not recognize at the time that this unwelcome intrusion in the traditional settings actually was opening new horizons in youth work. The problem with the approach of OMGUS officials to remain in the background was that it gave Germans the opportunity to simply continue their traditional concepts of youth work which largely neglected those who were unwilling to organize or forced them to join a youth group if they wanted to pursue their interests. GYA offered an alternative model of youth work open to everyone for young people as well as for progressive educators.\(^5\)\(^9\)

\(^{58}\) OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., German Youth Between Yesterday and Tomorrow: 1 April 1947-30 April 1948, 3-4, hereinafter cited as German Youth 47-48; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Box 189, 10/51-3/9.

\(^{59}\) German Youth 47-48 3-4.
Some Americans recognized this shortcoming in MG policies. James R. Wilkinson, for example, American Consul General in Munich, informed Washington in November 1946 about the progress of American youth work in Bavaria. He pointed out that growing membership numbers in youth organizations indicated some progress, but he thought that neither OMGUS nor the Army had yet been able to overcome the inability of the Germans to understand—let alone adopt—the democratic principles inherent in American youth work, which was open to everyone, did not adhere to specific ideologies, and did not depend on a tightly knit, well organized and hierarchical structure of command. Wilkinson warned that Americans would not succeed in their reorientation efforts if they failed to add their own democratic concept of youth work to their agenda.60

Youth activities officers met again in January 1947. Apart from the usual consideration of issues concerning the field work in the American zone and cooperation with GYA, the major issue on the agenda was the development of new field directives which would comply with SWNCC 269/9. The conference clearly demonstrated that OMGUS youth officers had anticipated many of the policies and did not hesitate to adapt the directives from Washington to their own needs and prerogatives. Under the able guidance of Lawrence Norrie,

60Political Report, American Consulate General, Munich to Secretary of State, Washington, 5 Nov. 1946; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.489/11-546.
the director of the Group Activities Branch, the discussions revealed that Washington was actually lagging about nine months behind the decision making process in Germany. Washington policy makers, for example, reiterated the disease and unrest formula as the only basis for action long after American officials in Germany had thrown it overboard and adopted a clear cut positive long range re-education policy regardless of the physical conditions in the American zone.61

In April 1947 OMGUS published its annual report on youth activities for the second year of the occupation. The authors maintained that April 1946 had brought a definite reorientation of American policy in Germany. According to them, youth officials had completed the eradication of Nazi and militaristic organizations and could begin to embark on a more constructive program during their second year of activities. This included the formation of the Land Youth Committees, a dramatic increase of the Kreis Youth Committees, and attempts to raise the number of young people who joined youth groups, but the report continued that these measures were just a beginning. Although life in Germany had somewhat returned to more normal levels and the shock of the defeat was wearing off, young people in the American zone still suffered from a lack of almost everything they needed for organizing and participating in youth activities. A

61Minutes of Youth Activities Conference, Berlin, 6-7 February 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 120, 5/293-1/7.
leadership program was in place and operating well, but the authors thought that it would take years to provide the young people in their zone with an adequate number of trained youth leaders. In spite of these shortcomings the Youth Activities Section could report that, apart from some isolated cases, young Germans had decided to stay away from any large scale subversive activities.62

Youth experts also had to deal with some setbacks. In spite of specific provisions by SWNCC 269/5 the authors noted that fewer than fifteen youth leaders, almost all of them older persons, had been able to go abroad. The situation was similar for foreign experts coming to Germany. Youth activities officers were clearly irritated by the fact that they had to be content with a very limited number of visitors while it seemed that American businessmen could come to the American zone almost at will to exploit the situation. The report concluded that the previous year had brought significant advances in the creation of a healthy exterior structure for youth activities, but that the process of a "democratic reorientation of German youth" had hardly begun. American objectives for the following year should therefore concentrate on "the re-awakening of certain moral and spiritual forces among German youth" and educating youth leaders who would clearly recognize the mistakes of the past.

and would be willing to reconstruct youth work along democratic lines. To achieve these goals, changes in the young peoples' physical environment would certainly be desirable. German authorities would have to furnish sufficient funding for youth work and permit school reform in their states. The authors of the report concurred with Clay's basic tenet that ultimately only the improvement of the economic and political landscape in Germany as well as in the world could lead to a standard of living which would enable the people to set their interests beyond the immediate needs of bare survival.  

The material side, however, was just one part of German reconstruction. American youth officials were convinced that German youth would benefit tremendously from increasing contacts with the outside world and went to great lengths to overcome the spiritual isolation of Germany during the Third Reich. In January 1947 Berlin introduced a program which would help young Germans find a pen pal in the United States. Students of all ages could contact the US Office of Education on an individual basis, whereas the National Social Welfare Assembly would take care of group correspondence. During the next twelve months about 10,000 children made use of this official route, others approached youth organizations directly. The churches provided an additional avenue for

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63Report on German Youth, Second Year of the Occupation, 1 Apr. 1946-31 March 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 145, 5/296-2/6; German Youth 47-48 32-34.
establishing contacts. GYA caught on to the idea a year after the Military Government initiative had started. When GYA officers investigated if their children would be able to participate, Lawrence Norrie informed them that he "appreciated the effort," but that he considered an additional program unfeasible since the volunteer agencies involved could barely handle the existing volume of letters they received. He therefore asked the Army not to rely on OMGUS channels, but rather use its own.64

In spite of some apparent organizational pitfalls, the American decision to permit contacts between young Germans and people abroad certainly helped to overcome the isolation of the previous years. Official and unofficial contacts with Americans satisfied a real need and desire and provided young Germans for the first time with the opportunity to learn first hand about their peers in other countries. Many took advantage of the opportunity.

The young generation's interest in opening up to the world also manifested itself in a dramatic rise in the number of people who participated in youth organizations. By March

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64OMGUS Press Release, 23 Jan. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/13; German Youth 47-48 30; Commanding General, EUCOM, to Lawrence Norrie, OMGUS, E&CRD, 18 Apr. 1948; Norrie to Commanding General, EUCOM, 3 May 1948; NA RG 260 E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/13. The correspondence of my father--16 years old in 1947--with Lutheran reverends as well as with lay persons of congregations all over the United States documents well the possibilities church connections offered. All of his correspondence started as a thank you note for material help.
1948 more than 1.2 million young people had joined youth organizations, an increase of one hundred per cent. Trade unions and sports groups enjoyed the most dramatic growth.\textsuperscript{65}

Summer camps became one of the most important aspects of their activities. They were generally regarded as an excellent way of getting young people out of the destroyed cities into a healthy environment. Military Government, the Army, and American YMCA representatives developed an all encompassing program to make summer part not only recreational, but also re-educational events.\textsuperscript{66}

The American YMCA had done pioneer work in this field already in 1946. The Army had provided the tent materials. Supplies from the United States made sure that the young people would be able to get additional calories. This established the pattern for the future, but American representatives had not been overly impressed with camp leadership in 1946. According to them, adults took complete control of the camps the German YMCA had organized. Young people expected to be taken care of and adults did not encourage them to take over any responsibilities. The Americans were not aware that not all camps operated in the same way. The Falcons' Republics, for example, reemerged in 1946 as well. These large tent cities, organized by the socialist Falcons, functioned entirely as democratic

\textsuperscript{65}German Youth 47-48 11-21.

\textsuperscript{66}German Youth 47-48 21-24.
institutions in which young people got hands on experiences with the procedures and learned to take over responsibilities.\textsuperscript{67} Compared to the church oriented groups, however, the Falcons only made a small minority of the overall summer camp population.\textsuperscript{68}

The Americans were resolved to improve the situation in the following year. D.A. Davis, president of the World's Committee of YMCA, contacted Lawrence Norrie, whom he apparently knew well from his previous job with the American YMCA, to develop an all encompassing plan for making summer camps in 1947 not only a material, but also a re-educational success. During the following months Norrie called several conferences to coordinate the Army's material help with leadership training and practical guides for organizing summer camps. Norrie emphasized that American authorities needed to take special care of unorganized young people whom the organized groups tended to neglect.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{67}It needs to be stressed here that the Falcons were close to the Social Democratic party and did not subscribe to any of the doctrines which came from Moscow. They based all their proceedings on Western democratic principles.

\textsuperscript{68}Memorandum Edward T. Ladd, Youth and Sports Office OMGUS Bremen to Chief, Civil Government Division, 19 Aug. 1946; Memorandum on Trip by Sgt. Tracy Strong to German Youth Camps, U.S. Zone, 30 July to 3 Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-1/25; for the Falcon Republics see Willy Pröß, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994.

\textsuperscript{69}D.A. Davis, World's Committee of the YMCA, Geneva to Lawrence Norrie, OMGUS, 10 Feb. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-1/25; summary of Military Government conference on German Youth Activities
As usual Military Government provided the necessary guidance to youth groups in the form of bringing an American expert, Elmar Ott from the American Camping Association, to Germany. During his six months stay Ott not only examined the situation, but also conducted leadership seminars and participated actively in camps throughout the American zone. Most of the camping equipment either came from former German Wehrmacht stocks which the Army released to the Land Youth Committees, or from Army surplus materials. The Army also provided much needed assistance in transporting young people to their destinations. The food for the camps came in part from Herbert Hoover's program as well as from the agencies organized in CRALOG. According to American sources, friendly German farmers did their share in securing the caloric supplies.70

In spite of some initial organizational problems, the camps were a great success. The undernourished participants gained weight dramatically, but Military Government's main objective of providing an additional avenue for reorientation did not seem to function very well. Ott reported that in the camps he visited food became the focal point for many of the young participants. According to OMGUS personnel, most of the organizers failed to transform the camps into communities

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70German Youth 47-48 21-24, 31.
in which the campers actively participated. Nevertheless, the officers spotted some young people who showed promise for becoming future leaders and lauded Elmar Ott for introducing Germans to the concept of making camping an educational as well as a recreational affair.\textsuperscript{71}

The camping program revealed that many problems remained the same. In spite of Military Government's efforts to provide leadership training, it could not keep up with the increasing demand. The annual report for 1947/48 made it once more a point that it would certainly help the American reorientation effort to send German youth leaders to the United States where they would have the opportunity to observe and learn different approaches to youth work first hand. The youth activities section maintained that young Germans were barely starting to respond to American reorientation efforts. OMGUS youth officers thought that many older Germans did not help at all by trying to use youth organizations to disseminate their own political or ideological agendas. One of the most serious shortcomings was that many youth groups did not base their proceedings on democratic principles. They also had a tendency to exclude anybody from their activities who was not a member.\textsuperscript{72}

In view of these rather discouraging observations leadership training in Germany and in the United States

\textsuperscript{71}German Youth 47-48 21-24, 31.

\textsuperscript{72}German Youth 47-48 32-34.
became a vital issue. To secure the necessary funds and their long term objectives, Military Government—undoubtedly with the support of Herman Wells—successfully approached the Rockefeller Foundation for support. The foundation promised to provide the necessary finances for leadership schools in Germany. It was also prepared to send American experts to Germany and to sponsor the journeys of six German youth leaders to the United States where they would be able to study youth work for six months.\textsuperscript{73}

In spite of this considerable support, the program had to overcome additional hardships in 1948. Currency reform initially wiped out many existing funds and put schools in jeopardy. Raymond Spahn, in charge of youth activities in Bavaria, for example, urgently requested money from his branch chief to assure the survival of a leadership school. Spahn argued that without support from this source, which he estimated to be about 3,500 Marks per month, the school would have to close. This would defeat "the primary function of this section as well as the occupation mission in Bavaria."\textsuperscript{74}

OMGUS officials were beginning to reevaluate their general approach to youth activities as well. Whereas before 1948 only the revival of youth groups on a democratic basis

\textsuperscript{73}Minutes of the 15th Conference on MG Youth Activities, 8-9 Apr. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 136, 5/291-1/19.

\textsuperscript{74}Memo from Raymond Spahn to Chief of Education Br., 1 July 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 37, 10/43-2/1.
had received attention, youth officers recognized in 1948 that a large segment of young Germans were not and would not be affected by the traditional German youth activities. Cooperative community planning for these youths would be necessary. As a first step to reaching out to these young people OMGUS planned to render special support to youth groups which would be open to all young people, not just particular interests.\textsuperscript{75}

OMGUS received help from private organizations who also began to operate on an increasingly large scale in Germany from 1946 on. After Truman's initiation of CRALOG the American Friends were the first to arrive in Germany. Together with other American agencies they soon developed an extensive program for helping Germans survive. In June 1946 the Council of American Remittances to Europe (CARE) signed an agreement with Clay, which permitted Americans to send food parcels directly to Germany. Initially CARE purchased three million surplus ration packages from the Army which American citizens could buy for friends or relatives in Germany. Due to its tremendous success, but also in response to the scarcity in Europe and especially in Germany, CARE expanded its operations in the course of 1947. In January it began to offer a variety of parcel types which not only consisted of food, but also of wool blankets with thread. The patterns for transforming these blankets into clothes

\textsuperscript{75}German Youth 47-48 32-34.
were available upon request in Germany. From June on Germans could also receive fabric for making their garments. The great majority of CARE parcels went to the three western zones of Germany and to Berlin. The first parcels arrived in August, just in time for helping Germans through one of the most severe winters they ever had to face. By April 1947 CARE had delivered nearly one million food parcels, two thirds of the total for Europe, to German families.  

CARE was not the only American relief operation in Germany. CRALOG reached an agreement with Military Government in June 1946 and began to make supplies available for feeding Germans. German children, 70% of whom the Americans found to be undernourished, were a special target group. The agreement stipulated that Germans were not allowed to donate anything to CRALOG or to the Red Cross to avoid any discrimination. During its first year of operations CRALOG delivered about eleven thousand tons of food as well as three and a half thousand tons of clothing to Germany. Most of the help came from various denominational

76Military Government of Germany, Monthly Report of the Military Governor [Hereinafter OMGUS, Monthly Report], no. 12, 1-30 Jun. 1946: 25-26; "CARE Program," OMGUS Information Bulletin, no. 56, 26 Aug. 1946: 16-17; "Cooperative for American Remittances for Europe," OMGUS Information Bulletin, no. 89, 21 April 1947: 5-6, 10. The city of Bremen’s and the German government’s official celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the arrival of the first CARE parcels at the port documents well the importance of this help not only for the physical well being of the German population, but also its psychological impact (This Week in Germany, 19 July 1996: 8).
groups in the United States and went to the relief organizations of the two major churches. The organizations set about one fifth of the food aside to feed children at schools.\textsuperscript{77}

Although they dedicated much of their resources to welfare efforts, many organizations actively promoted youth work. In June 1947, for example, John R. Mott, President of the World's Committee of the YMCA, visited the three western zones and opened the first YMCA sponsored center in Frankfurt. The YWCA followed suit. American and Swedish representatives operated in Berlin, where they opened a youth center, and Stuttgart.\textsuperscript{78} The Friends also became active in youth work in Frankfurt, but they followed a different approach. They were the first group which recognized that traditional German youth activities would not reach a substantial number of young people. In May 1946 Willis D. Weatherford, the American Friends' Service Committee's commissioner for Europe therefore approached Clay directly with various proposals to remedy the situation. He suggested the opening of conference centers where German professionals who were involved in youth work would be able to come together and develop their own strategies "in a democratic manner" and the establishment of neighborhood centers which


\textsuperscript{78} OMGUS, Monthly Report, no. 24, 1-30 Jun. 1947: 31; German Youth 31.
would take care of young people much in the way Hull House did in Chicago. The idea for the establishment of these centers originated with Hertha Kraus, a German emigree, who had been one of the most influential German social workers during the Weimar Republic. Her philosophy and actions actually were very similar to those Jane Addams was pursuing in Chicago at the same time. After Hitler’s rise to power she was forced to leave, took a teaching appointment in the United States, but did not lose interest in her home country. She actually proposed the idea of neighborhood centers in postwar Germany as early as 1943 to the AFSC.79

Since resources for constructing such a center were not available in Germany, the Friends had organized all of their materials elsewhere. Trucks loaded with everything necessary for the buildings were waiting in France for OMGUS approval, but the Quakers needed much patience in spite of the general consensus about the necessity of such a center in Frankfurt. They were facing the several dilemmas. In May 1946 Clay was still not inclined to permit American civilians to work in the American zone. Since he also insisted that all initiatives had to come from the Germans, the Friends had to find a way to comply with this policy. It was not until March of 1947 that Military Government headquarters approved the Friends’ plan after the Lord Mayor and the city’s youth

79Tent, "Simple Gifts" 66-75; see also German Youth 47-48 32.
council had officially requested American help in this specific sector. During the following year the Friends added centers in Darmstadt and in Berlin.80

The three centers which the Friends ran actually were the first projects which consciously dealt with the issue of unorganized German youth. OMGUS officials only recognized the problem much later, while the Army never became involved with the theoretical implications of its activities, although the GYA centers often did exactly what the Quakers were doing with their enterprises: they provided a place where all young people would be able to get together and become actively involved with each other and with helping their surrounding community.

Religious groups such as the Friends not only provided the personnel to organize relief and places to stay to young Germans. They also tried to learn more about the situation in Germany and were among the first to send men and women to the American zone of occupation whose task was to help wherever they could. Jews, Catholics, and Protestants had already sent envoys to Germany in July 1946 to facilitate communications between Military Government and the different denominations as well as with the outside world.81 In 1947 the World Council of Churches had three representatives in

80Tent, "Simple Gifts" 66-75; also German Youth 47-48 32.

81OMGUS, Minutes of Conference of Regional Youth Activities Section Personnel, Berlin 2-3 July 1946: 7; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Box 120, 5/293-1/7.
Germany to assist with youth work. Their assignments ranged from assisting in camping and training of youth leadership and supervising emerging Boys’ Towns. One of the three, Chester P. Baird, went to Nuremberg to help the youth pastor in charge of Bavaria, Martin Helbich, to reestablish contacts between his Bavarian youth and Protestant youth groups in other countries.82

All of the objectives and policies which OMGUS and the Army developed in 1946 remained the basis for their activities throughout the American occupation and HICOG activities. OMGUS maintained a philosophy to induce young Germans to learn and internalize democratic behavior, while the Army’s GYA program continued to provide practical assistance to the youth in the communities. By 1947 Washington had caught up with the youth officers’ practical approach. OMGUS received help in Germany from American youth and welfare organizations who provided young people with urgently necessary food and clothing, but the Friends also recognized that youth work needed to overcome the traditional organizational boundaries. They introduced a concept of youth work which opened the door for young people who did not intend to become organized in any way. Fruitful youth work within Germany, however, could only become a reality if the four occupying powers would be willing to coordinate their

82German Youth 47-48 31-32.
efforts. Events throughout Germany and especially in Berlin soon revealed that this cooperation would not be forthcoming.
Re-educating German youth did not take place in a vacuum and was by no means an exclusively American undertaking. While youth activities went underway in all four zones of occupation, differences in the approaches of the three western powers and of the Soviet Union not only threatened to paralyze youth activities in Berlin, but also brought the profound political and ideological differences between the Soviets and the three western allies to light which ultimately led to the division of Germany.

Four Occupiers: Four Approaches

Lucius Clay soon had to learn that American ideas about postwar Germany in many respects differed sharply from those of the other occupying powers. The former allies were unable to agree even on minor issues. Not just the Soviets were giving Clay serious problems. Initially the French were most adamant about avoiding any political or administrative move that would strengthen the Germans in any way. Even while the Germans were still fighting, Charles de Gaulle had tried to expand French influence in Germany. French troops refused to leave Stuttgart to the Americans, for example, in an attempt to incorporate a major city in their zone of occupation and only withdrew when Eisenhower applied massive pressure. De Gaulle also insisted on the French exclusive right to redraw
the western border of Germany, which included the annexation
of the Rhineland.¹

French, British, American, and Soviet occupiers brought
very different philosophies and cultures into their zones of
occupation. The British, for example, decided to retreat
from direct controls over the Germans already early in 1946.
They did not attempt to introduce a thorough re-education
program but rather tried to gain the trust of the Germans and
guide them through council and advice. The French, on the
other hand, had a tendency to retain direct control over
German authorities as long as possible. They were the last
to permit elections in their zone of occupation and exploited
it economically to the largest possible extent. Americans
occupied a middle ground in administrative matters, but were
the most adamant denazifiers. The Soviets struggled with
formulating and pursuing a coherent occupation policy, but
from the beginning overturned the political system in their
zone and eventually replaced it with a Stalinist regime.²

¹Krieger 72-85, 104-109; Willis 7-31; see also Schwartz
29-32.

²For British Policy see Michael Balfour, "In Retrospect:
Britain’s Policy of ‘Re-education’," Nicholas Pronay and
Keith Wilson, eds., The Political Re-Education of Germany and
Her Allies After World War II (London & Sydney: Croom Helm,
1985) 139-51; for the French outlook and policy see Krieger
104-109, Willis 32-46; French initiatives in the cultural
realm are also in Henry Pilgert, Community and Group Life in
West Germany with Special Reference of the policies and
Programs of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for
Germany. ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the U.S. High
Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary,
Historical Division, 1952) 76-77; see also Schwartz 29-32;
When Clay realized that governing Germany as a political and economic unit was impossible, he opted for the next feasible solution, the unification of the Western zones. His motives were not the well being of Germany but rather the huge financial burden the American zone of occupation posed for taxpayers in the United States. Once again he found the French to be obstinate. They had nurtured the particularist movements in Germany's southwest while at the same time preparing the incorporation of the Saar region into France. Not surprisingly, the French needed eighteen months, considerable pressure from the United States, as well as economic incentives to join the bi-zone and did so with reservations.3

Although Paris recognized that Europe's economic recovery depended on that of West Germany, its military government officials in Germany found it difficult to give up their control over the new West German government in 1949. They insisted on reserving as many powers for direct intervention in German affairs as possible for the High Commissioners who were going to replace the Military Governors. In the end American and British overcame the French resistance. An International Authority of the Ruhr provided the French with the means to guarantee their access

for the results of Soviet policy see Naimark 9-68, 141-204, 353-397.

3Krieger 282-289; Willis 17-31.
to German coal and maintaining their influence in Europe's most powerful industrial area, while NATO bound the United States to Western Europe from 1949 on. It took the three Western Allies another six years, however, to find a way to integrate the Federal Republic in such a way into the Western camp that France's security needs could be satisfied. West Germany's autonomy coincided with the Republic's admission to NATO, a step which not just strengthened the Alliance but also provided adequate security against any future German aggression. American, French, British, and Canadian troops remained in Germany as allies.4

Cooperation in the West

While Clay was fighting his battles over reparations, deindustrialization and decentralization with the French and the Soviets, OMGUS officers in charge of youth work did not seem to face the same difficulties. They took an interest in the activities of their allies early on. Whereas the first American meeting dedicated to youth activities in Berlin in 1946 was an entirely American affair, a conference in Garmisch-Partenkirchen in October 1946 included participants from the British and the French military governments. At this conference the Americans were not just reporting about the progress in their own area of occupation, but also were

4Krieger 23-24; Schwartz 28-42, 57-83; Elmer Plischke, History of the Allied High Commission for Germany: Its Establishment, Structure, and Procedures, ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary, Historical Division, 1951) 21-27.
eager to hear the British and the French representatives describe the situation and policies in their zones. The officers found lots of common ground. Colonel R.T. Percival, the British representative, reported to the Americans that the British basically had pursued the same objectives as the Americans. Their approach from the start had aimed at reconstruction. They had permitted youth organizations and laid responsibility for youth activities in German hands soon after the war and were satisfied with the results. Just as in the American zone, Military Government officials remained in the background as far as possible.

Colonel Percival also pointed out some differences between the British and the American policies. First of all, the British mainly targeted a much smaller proportion of young Germans, namely just those between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years. British officials also had never made the past of young people an obstacle to their participation in youth activities after the war. Percival commented that the British were more reluctant to let the army participate in the youth program. He argued that, although they might share the same objectives, they would always be at odds, unless the army could be closely supervised by Military Government's youth experts. With these ground rules clearly established, the British army just then began to start a small scale program. While Clay's first thought on youth had included the feasibility of encouraging and readmitting
the scout movement in his zone, Percival reported that a British general, who was an authority in this field, had advised his government to refrain from such an action, because the Germans were not yet ripe for this type of activity.

The problems in the British zone also were similar to those of their neighbors: Percival reported that many young Germans had lost their families and homes and were just wandering. It was a challenging task to help them back into a normal life. The Colonel also talked about the shortage of material. Apparently the British army did not have anything to spare, so Military Government there had to rely exclusively on captured German material which did not go very far to satisfy the enormous need. There also was a serious shortage of literature, which the British had been trying "desperately hard" to eliminate.

As far as the future was concerned, British authorities in Germany energetically promoted an international exchange and were trying to convince their Foreign Office of the necessity to facilitate travelling. Percival thought that it would provide a real solution to many problems to permit Germans to travel abroad and to bring people from other countries to Germany, especially if they had been neutral.5

5Garmisch Conference 4-5.
The British Field officers' efforts were successful. By January 1947 they had an official and extensive exchange program in place with their zone of occupation.  

Interestingly, an American pointed to an additional British program which he thought deserved the attention of the members of the conference. Abe Vinik, Youth Officer in Greater Hesse which bordered the British zone, informed the participants at the Garmisch conference that the British were trying to find ways to provide youth organizations with professional advice and support without having to resort to German youth offices, whom the British mistrusted. The occupiers had introduced full time Jugendpfleger. According to him, these youth secretaries, who were professional youth workers, dedicated their entire energy towards the promotion of youth activities. Vinik reported that some German youth leaders thought that the British initiative was worth copying in the American zone.  

On the whole American and British youth officers seemed to share the same objectives and problems. British military authorities had embarked on an official reconstructive program long before Washington had made up its mind, but they were even harder pressed for material assistance for youth activities than the Americans, who could draw to a certain extent on their army's vast resources.

6Pilgert, The West German Educational System 76-77.  
7Garmisch Conference 6.
In view of the economic exploitation and the way French troops and officers lived off their zone, one would expect that French re-education efforts did not go very far. Nevertheless, in what one historian called a "paradoxical occupation" the French military government made far reaching attempts to cure the Germans from the disease of exaggerated nationalism and militarism. Capable officers directed its re-education efforts and pursued a very far sighted and effective policy. German schools in the French zone were the first ones to reopen in Germany after the war. The French introduced more new school books per child than either the British or the Americans. While it did not pursue the far reaching goal of a complete school reform, the French military government made some significant changes which facilitated transferring between the different school tracks. At the university level, the French purged 30% of the faculties at the two universities under their control, but had them running again in 1945. To alleviate the desperate situation for many students, they reinstated the university in Mainz which had been closed in 1817, an interpreter's college in Germersheim and a school for administrators in Speyer.8

As far as French goals were concerned, Major Moreau, one of the two representatives of the French zone at the Garmisch conference, distinguished the French efforts from those of

8Willis 44-45.
their neighbors. He explained to his colleagues that continental Europeans tended to assign great importance to ideologies, whereas Anglo-Americans seemed to regard democracy as a more practical undertaking, a "habit of life."

Moreau pointed to some important differences between his zone and its two neighbors. Since the French area of occupation did not include any major or capital cities with their intellectual and political elites who could act on the occupiers' behalf, he argued that the French had to interfere with German lives, institutions, and youth work in a far more direct and visible way. Therefore French authorities had played a much more active role in German youth affairs than their neighbors. They also had reinstalled the German youth offices at the end of 1945, but had not given them much power. Just as their British and American counterparts, the French considered the available staffs too old, too set in their traditional behavior, and simply not dynamic enough to be up to the post-war challenges. The French also found that adequate replacements were very hard to find and introduced youth committees in the communities as important devices of the democratization process. These committees had similar tasks and consisted of the same groups of people as those in the other zones. The French agreed with their allies that the committees had to maintain their independence from government influence.
Moreau further reported that his youth section had authorized the resurrection of traditional German youth groups just like the Americans and the British. In all three western zones the Catholic and Protestant churches claimed the largest following, but French authorities were the only ones who heavily promoted the Friends of Nature movement. According to Moreau, this youth group had a democratic structure with roots in Switzerland and a record of resistance to Hitler, at least in the French zone. Moreau was far more skeptical of the youth hostel movement which he considered to be undemocratic. The forty youth hostels open in the French zone therefore operated under the supervision of provisional committees with good results. Moreau continued that the French had permitted political formations, such as the Falken and the Free German Youth, which came from the Soviet zone, under the provision that they could not be part of any official party structure.9

All three occupying powers assigned leadership training high priorities, but the French military government developed a unique solution to the problem of finding and schooling youth leaders. Whereas British and American military government officials tried to establish independent leadership schools, the French enlisted the help of Volkschulen, a type of evening school, into their efforts. British and American authorities also were

9Garmisch Conference 10-11; see also Willis 45-46.
supporting these institutions which had been a product of the Weimar Republic, but mainly used them for educating and reorienting adults. According to Moreau, the French tried to use these schools exclusively for learning about democracy and discouraged their traditional role of continuing education. They had found that 80% of the participants of evening school courses were under the age of thirty. Since these Germans obviously were interested in re-education, they seemed to be the natural pool for recruiting youth leaders and could remain in a familiar environment for their training. To achieve their goals, the French strongly encouraged these schools to cooperate closely on a zonewide basis. Moreau thought that this task was at least as important for future developments than the promotion of adult education.

The emphasis on cultural affairs with the official approval of Paris gave French youth officers a stronger position within military government than that of their colleagues who encountered difficulties with their governments and superiors when it came to international contacts. The French agreed with the others that international contacts would help the Germans to overcome their isolation and were already in the midst of an extensive exchange program. Since many organizations, such as the YMCA, the Boy Scouts, the Catholic Church, young workers, and political parties already had international contacts, French
authorities simply encouraged contacts between the German and French branches. Moreau said that French students had gone to the university of Tübingen and discussed "fundamental problems, such as war guilt and Nazism" there. According to him, the results of this visit were better than expected and so plans were underway to expand the program. By 1948 the French had established a far-flung exchange operation between their zone of occupation and France which included partnerships between cities.  

Apparently the French did not have to worry as much about homeless and wandering youth as the British or the Americans. Moreau reported that French authorities did not face the same problems as their colleagues in the other zones. Since their zone of occupation was largely rural and much smaller, they had left all welfare activities to German authorities. While their zone was small and furthest away from the huge population movements which were taking place in the east of Germany, one may wonder if Moreau did not simply justify his military government's inactivity in this realm.  

The French exchange program expanded significantly during the next years. French authorities assigned lecturers to the universities and--according to American observers--French language teachers to practically all schools in their zone of occupation who not only taught courses, but also were

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10 Willis 46.

11 Garmisch Conference 10-11.
instructed to cultivate informal contacts with the German faculties of the universities to which they were assigned, something Americans were not yet officially permitted to do.12

The French efforts to bring their civilization to the Germans also included institutions similar to the America houses. Four of these institutes offered Germans information, cultural programs, lectures, free concerts, and language courses. Like the Americans, they arranged for exhibitions to reach those Germans in their zone who could not travel to their institutes. Personal contacts often led to official Franco-German societies and helped mitigate the economic exploitation and occasional transgressions of the occupational troops.13

All three delegations in Garmisch agreed that they should cooperate closely. Interestingly, even the French delegation agreed that the interzonal travel restrictions were one of the largest obstacles to a fruitful cooperation between German youth leaders, although their commanders were largely responsible for these restrictions. All youth officers decided to bring their desire to lift the

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12Pilgert, The West German Educational System, 75-76; Pilgert, Community and Group Life 77-78.
13Willis 46.
restrictions on interzonal travel to the attention of their commanding officers.¹⁴

During the next year and a half not much changed in the relations between the allied powers. The annual report for 1947/48 only stated that the Allies held numerous formal and informal conferences during the preceding year, but they mainly served consulting purposes. The author of the American report also found it "interesting to note that American and British policies are more similar than either the French or the Russians."¹⁵

When the High Commissioners took over in 1949 they decided to improve relations at the grassroots and introduced an exchange program between the American Kreis Resident Officers who were in charge of HICOG’s local detachments and their counterparts in the French and British zones. Coburg’s Kreis Resident Officer Francis Lindaman, for example, reported favorably on his experiences in the French zone and lauded above all French administrative efficiency. He was also very impressed with the fact that Kreis Resident Officers were the ranking officers in their military districts regardless of the ranks of officers in charge of tactical units. The American found the practice to assign a French national as teacher in the faculty of every school was

¹⁴Garmisch Conference 16; for French resistance to interzonal travel see Willis 17.

¹⁵German Youth, 47-48 5.
Their most effective reorientation device. Apart from that he found that French and American reorientation programs were remarkably similar. His counterpart cultivated contact with the German population and maintained an open-door policy for every concerned citizen just as he was trying to do in Coburg. Lindaman finally pointed out to his superiors that people in general were very interested in the United States but that many misconceptions about America as well as the American zone existed.16

Anthony Sega, Kreis Resident Officer in Schwabach, a town in the vicinity of Nuremberg, was chosen to spend some time with a British Resident Officer in Oberhausen, an industrial town in the Ruhr area. Sega noted that the British did not have an explicit reorientation program and were rather skeptical about the American attempts to sell theirs, but this did not mean that the British were inactive. Sega noted that they had a very busy social schedule and tried to encourage democracy through informal contacts. According to the American, the British paid much attention to youth. They worked hard to counteract any Communist influence they might detect by organizing youth rallies and

16Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Resident Office Coburg to Kenneth L. van Buskirk, Chief, FOD, Office of Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Munich, Germany, 28 Jun. 1950; Guy A. Lee, ed., Documents on Field Organization of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany 1949–1951 ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary, Historical Division, 1951) doc. 16.
providing funds for youth groups who did not like communism. Sega reported that the only but very successful special reorientation program in which the British were investing much money and effort was Die Brücke (The Bridge), an institution similar to the Amerika Häuser in the U.S. zone. Sega and his wife had a most cordial reception and found the British trying to make their stay as comfortable as possible. Obviously getting along in the field was easier than at the conference table. Just like his colleague from Coburg, the American found that German residents of the British zone were well disposed towards the Americans and very curious about the United States, but also about the conditions in the American zone, an indicator of how difficult travel was still five years after the war’s end.\footnote{Anthony S. Sega, Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Resident Officer Schwabach to Kenneth van Buskirk, Chief, FOD, Office of Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Munich, Germany, 24 Aug. 1950; Lee, ed. doc. 17.}

**A Different Concept in the East**

The opening of Soviet and former East German archives after the collapse of the Soviet empire reveal a surprising picture of Soviet planning and policy making for post war Germany. While the Soviets from the start regarded the occupation of Germany as a struggle between communism and capitalism, they did not have a blueprint for the future of their zone of occupation, but remained open to maintaining the unity of Germany as long as they perceived a chance that
they would be able to expand their influence further west. According to one historian, they began to rebuild the Soviet zone based on the only model they knew and accepted: the Soviet Union.18

Interestingly, the Soviets neither had sufficiently trained military government personnel at their disposition nor were they able to eliminate rivalries and competing interests between different agencies such as the secret police, the tactical commands, military government units, party representatives, and the returning German communists. Graft, violence especially against women, and corruption remained a feature of the Soviet occupation throughout its existence which officially ended with the creation of the German Democratic Republic in 1949. The Soviets never seemed to formulate specific policies, but rather relied on communist and Stalinist ideology to provide the guidelines for the occupation. Not surprisingly, the results varied widely. It could happen that Soviet officers kept former Nazis in important administrative positions much to the annoyance of the German communists who wanted to see them removed. Although the Soviets increasingly delegated political power to the German communists, they always maintained the ultimate authority and made very clear even to their German allies that they knew best which way to go in establishing a new socialist state in Germany. Many of the

18Naimark 465-468.
occupiers displayed an arrogance and assumed an air of superiority which even long term members of the communist party often found intolerable. Walther Ulbricht and his comrades ultimately were only able to wrest control of the Soviet Zone's affairs from the occupiers by catering directly to Soviet demands and making the fulfillment of Soviet policies their highest priority—a behavior that secured their power, but cost them and their ideology almost all public support.  

Promoting Russian and Soviet culture in Germany took on special significance for the occupiers in the east. First, it was a way to prove wrong Nazi propaganda which had incessantly denigrated Russian and Soviet culture. At the same time making culture available to the masses was an important part of communist doctrine. In contrast to the Western zones the Soviets were not content with simply making Russian and Soviet films, literature, and music available to Germans for their information. To assure that cultural activities would serve their political agenda, the Soviets tried to control every aspect of cultural and intellectual activity. They promoted and supported authors such as Gerhard Hauptmann or Heinrich Mann who had written books that had exposed flaws and injustices in the capitalist order, but they also introduced censorship and increasingly oppressed deviating ideas or criticism by German intellectuals. The

19 Naimark 9-140.
very narrow minded dogmatism of Soviet and German party members who did not tolerate any apolitical activity or deviation from stalinist doctrine completely alienated even those German intellectuals who were favorably inclined towards reform. Many opted to vote with their feet and took residence in the west.20

Interestingly, the idea of a cultural exchange program also circulated in the Soviet zone of occupation. German communists as well as some Soviet officers regarded it as a good chance to show those who had not been to the Soviet Union the achievements of the socialist state first hand. While the occupiers in the West integrated such a program as an essential part of their re-education efforts, Moscow remained very cool to the concept. Sending delegations from the Soviet zone to the Soviet Union was a major undertaking reserved for very few select people. The beginning campaign in the Soviet Union against those who maintained contact with the outside world further stifled any attempts to establish closer personal ties between German and Soviet citizens. The arrogance and insensitivity the few Soviet educators displayed who could be convinced to travel to the Soviet zone even towards serious German communists showed that an exchange program did not automatically lead to better relations. Once a delegation from Germany made it to Moscow, the hosts took their re-education mission very seriously and

did not leave the slightest details to chance, but their efforts were hampered by the fact that the Soviet leadership relegated the German visitors to the role of passive observers whose sole task was to admire the achievements of the Soviet Union.21

Not surprisingly, cooperation between the Soviets and the western allies was not forthcoming. While OMGUS reports stated that all four allies met regularly, it seems that Soviet delegations did not venture beyond the limits of the Berlin Kommandantura or the Allied Control Council. No Soviet youth officers, for example, participated in the Garmisch conference in October 1946. The minutes do not reveal the reason for their absence. It is possible that the Soviets declined to participate in such rather informal meetings without the basis of any formal agreements by the Allied Control Council, but American youth officers may not even have invited them. Events in Berlin and in the Soviet zone of occupation had made sufficiently clear by October 1946 that Soviet authorities followed a completely different approach to youth work which they were not willing to compromise.

German communists in exile began preparing for post war youth work quite early. Those who had gone to England decided to create a youth organization in 1939 which they called the Free German Youth. The organization’s main goal

21Naimark 406-408, 450.
was to unify all exiled young Germans under the banner of antifascist activity, but the communists soon had to realize that they did not strike a responsive cord. Free German Youth did bring together a number of youth activists who worked in English factories and donated their wages to the English war chest or to the Soviet Union. Many of them joined the British army when they finally were permitted to do so in 1943. Those who survived formed the nucleus of communist youth leaders who, claiming a right to leadership based on their war time activities, expected to be employed in key positions in Germany immediately after the war. The British, however, were slow to permit them to return to Germany. Most of the communist emigres from Great Britain finally made it to Berlin, where they joined their comrades who had arrived from Moscow. 22

Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, German communists who had survived the purges in Moscow, became the key figures in planning and determining the political course of the Soviet zone of occupation after the war. Whereas youth work and even schools were just a minor aspect in American planning and did not acquire a prominent position until 1948, the communists assigned youth work a high priority already in the planning stages. According to them, Hitler’s Germany had completely annihilated Germany’s scientific achievements, had destroyed the country’s educational system and pushed the

22 Füssl 207-212.
Germans' socio-cultural values to the lowest imaginable standards. It would therefore be urgently necessary to start a program of reconstruction at the earliest possible moment. The communists targeted youth, because young people were the ones who would be most capable of learning from the past and would be the group which most likely would be able to take over leadership positions in a new Germany, soon. The young generation therefore needed to receive a special place within the re-education agenda. Since Hitler's policies had led to a complete social levelling, the communists thought that for the first time they would be able to reach the formerly hostile bourgeois classes with their message, since basically every German had to start her or his life at the same abyss.23

The planners in Moscow concentrated on two aspects of re-education. Not surprisingly they advocated a complete school reform which would eliminate the class differences in Germany. Especially the secondary schools which taught ancient languages and thought to a traditionally bourgeois elite would have to go. The communists in Moscow thought that they would be able to win the bourgeois middle classes over to their plans because they assumed that Hitler's policy and the devastation of the war had eliminated much of the class differences which had previously existed.24

23Füssl 205-206.
24Füssl 198-204.
As usual planning a complete school reform was one thing, implementing the plan quite another. As far as schools and universities were concerned, the Soviets and their German helpers initially had to come up with solutions for the same immediate problems the Americans, British, and French were facing in their zones of occupation. Many of the school buildings lay in ruins and the number of children who needed schooling had swollen dramatically due to the influx of refugees and expellees from the east. There were no heating materials or light bulbs, no textbooks, paper, or writing utensils or other teaching materials. Just as in the western zones, a vast majority of elementary school teachers—up to 90%—had belonged to the Nazi party.\(^{25}\)

To remedy the dramatic shortage of teachers and to take the first step in the direction of their democratization ideal, the Soviets introduced short courses with the aim of transforming farmers and workers into school teachers. Initially the three weeks courses, conducted under the most primitive circumstances, provided just the most rudimentary education for these future teachers. Parents and responsible administrators complained that they did not know their materials and often also demonstrated serious deficiencies in spelling and grammar. Consequently and in line with their general denazification policy, the Soviets soon allowed nominal Nazis to return to the schools, but made sure that

\(^{25}\)Naimark 454-455.
they would not replace the new teachers and could not rise to supervisory positions.26

While the situation in the western zones improved perceptibly from 1947 on, schooling conditions in the Soviet zone remained beyond any acceptable levels throughout the occupation and beyond. Just as the Americans, Soviet educators and their German helpers made almost no progress in their attempts at school reform during the first four years after the war. Even after the foundation of the German Democratic Republic they never achieved the complete transformation of the traditional German school system.

Much to the communists' dismay, teachers also refused to accept the role of political vanguard the party expected them to play. Even many of the new teachers either remained apolitical or showed a distressing tendency to join the ranks of the conservative party. At the university level the situation was even more alarming. Communists in the Soviet zone had to deal with recalcitrant young men and women, a good part of whom remained staunch nationalists while others began to embrace western ideas of democracy. Although the communists finally managed to make political reliability and indoctrination key parts of their admission policies to higher education, it seems that they never were able to transform a great number of those who went through the

26Naimark 455-57.
process into convinced followers of the new socialist regime.\textsuperscript{27}

The German communists made extracurricular youth activities another pillar of re-education. To reach this goal they would introduce an all encompassing youth organization. According to Wilhelm Pieck and others, the atomization of youth work, which even had divided the socialist forces before 1933, had been one of the major factors in preventing young Germans from forming a national antifascist front which could have effectively resisted Hitler's rise to power. The exiles argued that neither the communists nor the social democrats nor the bourgeois youth groups had been able to satisfy the young Germans' wishes for a unified youth which included both sexes, and the solution of the "national question." Hitler's creation of a national

\textsuperscript{27}Naimark 440-452, 456-459. I have not been able to find a study on the long term impact of communist indoctrination attempts. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, I participated in regular illegal conferences between West German and East German school teachers in East Berlin with a church affiliated organization. According to many of the East German teachers, most students and teachers regarded the official indoctrination as an unwelcome nuisance. SED as well as army recruiters usually were pressed hard to fill their quotas and did not attract the more successful students. People my age who were active in the Lutheran church but were permitted to study nevertheless, simply complied with the required Marxist-Leninist rhetoric in their application papers and the courses in ideology which formed part of the curricula even at medical schools. Friends who studied to become teachers or relatives with closer affiliations to the party, police, or army, however, avoided contacts with the West such as letter writing because it could hurt their chances for promotions or even could lead to losing their jobs.

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organization and his emphasis on the young generation had superficially satisfied the young people's desires. The communists from the start thought that German youth would have to come to terms with its share of the blame for the catastrophe, because they had followed Hitler blindly and quite willingly. Since all young people were equally guilty, all would have to undergo the same treatment. The logical step for postwar Germany therefore would be the creation of the national front which had eluded the youth organizations before 1933. This thinking was in line with the communist strategy of creating antifascist people's fronts. It also had the advantage that young Germans would have a sense of continuity, since the nationwide structure would rely on many components of the Hitler Youth. The communist planners decided that recreating a separate youth organization of their party would not be necessary. They would concentrate on occupying the key positions of the new, all encompassing movement. It would also have the advantage that relatively few people would be able to control a large apparatus. They would be in a position to suppress attempts to create independent youth organizations in the name of unity. Of course such a strategy would make it initially necessary to scale back communist agitation.28

Even such a limited program required additional help. Nazi prosecution had depleted all ranks of the communists and

of course had made recruiting of young people impossible for twelve years. Soviet attempts to fill the gaps from the millions of prisoners of war resulted in the creation of the National Committee for a Free Germany (Nationalkommittee Freies Deutschland or NKFD), but had meager results. The great majority of the prisoners regarded those who joined the committee as traitors. Nevertheless the German exiles were able to win some converts which could help with the implementation of the youth programs. Fritz Rücker, for example, had been a member of the circle around the legendary Paul Oestreich, himself a communist, and his Alliance of Determined School Reformers. The Nazis had stripped Rücker of his job at a Berlin secondary school and sent him to the eastern front, where he became prisoner in 1942. Rücker soon began to realize the merits of Marxist doctrine and the shortcomings of his own bourgeois reform attempts. He set out to develop new curricula for the schools under Soviet rule in 1944 along Marxist lines and under Ulbricht's and Pieck's supervision. After some more examining on the part of the German communists and the Soviets, Rücker returned to Berlin in August 1945, where he joined Ulbricht and his small group of activists and would later play a prominent role in reforming East Germany's educational system. Heinz Keßler deserted to the Soviet army already in 1941 and was one of the first Germans to join the NKFD. Thoroughly indoctrinated, he became the leading communist figure in
Berlin's youth work from 1945 on. Apart from these two, about eighty youth activists arrived in Germany immediately after the German capitulation and took up their positions following an intricate plan. One of the most influential figures in the creation of the new movement was not a member of the returning exiles, but rather a communist who had survived Nazi imprisonment for eight years. Erich Honecker was young, intelligent, and had the necessary flexibility to deal with the problems the communists were soon facing on their way to an East German unified youth. All of the converts, the returning exiles, and the liberated communists who reached influential positions acted only on behalf of the small and tightly knight group around Ulbricht and ultimately did nothing without the explicit approval of their Soviet comrades.  

On 4 June 1945 an early morning conference between Ulbricht, who was accompanied by two other Germans, and Stalin and Molotov took place. During this meeting the Soviet dictator approved of the German comrades' plans to initiate youth committees in the Soviet zone which would prepare the creation of an all encompassing German youth organization. Interestingly Stalin told his German friends in the same meeting that he expected Germany to become permanently divided, in spite of the present unity of the victorious allies.

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29 Füssl 190-95.
Even before they had Moscow's approval for their plans those returning from exile had to prepare the ground for action in the Soviet zone of occupation and in Berlin. Ironically some of the first groups they had to deal with belonged to their own camp. Communists who had remained in Germany and had participated in underground work and sabotage had created their own anti-fascist youth groups immediately after the end of hostilities. Since independent communist groups did not fit into the postwar concept, Ulbricht and his spearhead detachment needed to bring them into line with Moscow. Not even two weeks after the German surrender Ulbricht reported to his Soviet liaison that he had eliminated the problem and dissolved the groups.30

While Americans were still in the process of creating an administrative structure for military government and did not have more than the purely negative instructions of JCS 1067 to govern their zone, the German communists who were the only ones who had developed a concept for youth work in the Soviet zone quickly set out to implement their plan in the areas under their influence and in Berlin, which remained under exclusive Soviet control until August. They created youth committees in all of Berlin’s sectors and requisitioned houses in which young people would be able to meet. Although they invited all young Germans, they made clear from the start that only communists had earned the right to occupy

30 Füssl 214-16.
leadership positions. At the same time the Berlin magistrate set up a committee within the office for the people's education which was going to supervise and coordinate the activities of the different districts. Its mandate was to re-educate the youth which was "contaminated by fascism" on a voluntary basis. Heinz Keßler became its chairman. At the end of July Marshal Zhukov, the commander of the Soviet Zone, expanded this system of youth committees with close ties to the local governments into all communities of the Soviet Zone.31

Young Germans in Berlin soon made clear that they had their own ideas about youth work. They expressed their discontent with the communist leadership practically from the start. When the chairmen of the district youth committees met just six weeks after the German surrender to constitute the new youth committee for all of Berlin, they agreed with Keßler's demands that youth should not again become a tool for waging war, that they should cultivate friendship with the Soviet Union, and that all young people should come together to solve their problems. The overwhelming majority of those present, however, vehemently rejected Keßler's thesis that all young people were responsible for the rise of Hitler and the Second World War. Even fellow communists complained to Ulbricht that Keßler maintained an unacceptable attitude.

31 Füssl 218-219.
The communists did not fare better two days later at the first mass meeting the organized for young people. In an internal appraisal the communist leadership concluded that the majority of the 1,500 persons present neither liked the extremely long and obviously very boring admonitions of the speakers, nor had they much positive to say about the content of their presentations. Young people thought that the only interesting part of the whole affair had been the opportunity to get a free ride to the center of the city. Fifty per cent of those surveyed stated that they would not attend similar events in the future.\footnote{Füssl 218-220.}

The work in the districts during the following year revealed the same conflicts. Whereas the young people wanted to come together and have a good time, the communists accepted parties and dances only reluctantly as necessary evils. Since many of the youth committees' chairs were not trained youth workers, they did not recognize the young people's needs and desires and therefore were unable to address them. They made the situation worse with constant attempts to use the centers and meetings for indoctrinating and convincing the youth about their share of the war guilt. It is not surprising that such a course of action very soon led to an alienation of most boys and girls and to dwindling attendance records.
The behavior of the Soviet troops did not make the German communists' tasks easier. Rape, violence, and arbitrary arrests of young people remained everyday occurrences throughout the Soviet zone, although incidents became fewer in the course of the occupation. A group of Berlin youth, for example, agreed to help with the harvest in a region west of the Oder river which had just become the border between the Soviet zone and the area the Soviets had annexed from Germany and set under Polish administration. They found themselves east of the Oder, in the midst of expulsions and hard feelings on all sides. Working under Polish authority, they suffered from maltreatment and got almost no food. The female members of the expedition only barely escaped repeated attempts by Soviet soldiers to rape them. After about three weeks the young people were able to make it back to Berlin without any support.33

Undeterred by such setbacks, the communists proceeded with their plans. In September 1945 they founded a central youth committee for the Soviet zone under Honecker's leadership. This youth committee became part of the education administration. Honecker defined its main tasks: The committee would take care of all young people up to age twenty one. It would become a presence in all aspects of the young people's lives, their jobs, schools, sports, and in cultural affairs. Honecker's main goal was the ideological

33Füssl 220-225; Naimark 69-140, 382-85.
re-education of German youth which, according to one of his closest co-workers, "had succumbed to a very reactionary militaristic policy."

During the next months Honecker and his aides had to work hard to overcome resistance and to maintain an appearance of unity. The communists scored an important victory when they were able to convince the Social Democrats that it would be better to cooperate in a united front than to found a separate organization. In December the communists felt sufficiently strong to launch the drive for a Free German Youth in the Soviet Zone, but the meeting in a Berlin school, in which young Germans themselves were supposed to demonstrate and express their desire for a united youth front went all but smoothly. An American observer noted that in spite of the "definite communistic background and complexion" of the meeting he was surprised to see very pronounced opposition to the proposal emerging from the floor. Above all delegates from various Berlin districts either completely opposed the foundation of a unified front or wanted to create independent organizations within the front. The opposition notwithstanding the communists made sure that their motion to unite all youths in the Soviet zone carried the day.

The churches were the last considerable stumbling blocks towards creating a united front, but Church leaders of the two denominations soon had to realize that they did not have much choice. Honecker's constant pressure, which he paired
with promises of openness and compromise, brought them in line. They also hoped that their conditional cooperation would enable them to influence the course of the movement. With the last obstacles removed, Pieck dutifully noted at the end of the year that he approved the creation of the front but that Moscow would have to decide the matter. The green light from the Soviet Union came in February. While church leaders were still admonishing the communists to guarantee diversity within the front in February 1946, the distribution of the offices within the Free German Youth revealed their true intentions. When the organization officially started operations in March, communists occupied all key positions in the new organizations, relegating most minor offices to the Social Democrats. Only one member of the Christian Democratic Party received an administrative post. All committees would continue to receive government funding. This organization scheme foreshadowed the forced fusion between the communists and the Social Democrats in the Soviet zone the following month. From that moment on until the reunification of Germany in 1989 the Free German Youth in fact remained the German Democratic Republic’s only and all encompassing youth organization. Just as its founders had envisioned, its organization and its practices in many ways continued the work the National Socialists had done during the previous twelve years.¹⁴

¹⁴Füssl 226-232, 238-41.
Conflict in Berlin

Events in the capital soon revealed the major differences between the allies in approaching youth work and provided young Germans with the opportunity to voice and enact their own preferences. The frictions did not become immediately apparent. Americans, French, British, and the Soviets agreed that National Socialism had done serious harm to young Germans and needed to be eliminated from their minds. Americans certainly could have no objections to the professed goals of the communists to return German youth to decent behavior and a good work ethic. The American education officer in Berlin, Captain Paul F. Shafer, also could observe that the Soviets were serious about re-education. While Shafer was alone and still had to wait for directives, an administrative setup, and an increase in his office’s personnel, he could observe that the Soviets were already busily implementing their policies with an adequate staff. The four allies apparently also agreed that they should leave youth work in the hands of the Germans, although the Germans in the Soviet zone clearly had no inclination to do anything without Moscow’s approval. The political orientation of the youth committees and of the centers the Americans inherited from the Soviets in their sector were bound to lead to conflicts in view of the American policy not to permit any political organizations in their zones. Since the Americans were slow to organize in Berlin as everywhere
else and did not assign their education staff the high priority the Soviets obviously found necessary, it was not until 1946 that they became active.

The mere presence of the three Western Allies in Berlin, however, encouraged the young Germans who were living in their sectors to take the initiative themselves. Young people from different organizations in the districts of Wilmersdorf, Zehlendorf and Steglitz openly contested the communist claims to exclusive leadership of the committees late in 1945. Heinrich Schiller, for example, twenty-one years old in 1946, was one of the most active opponents the communists encountered. The National Socialists had prosecuted him because of his partly Jewish heritage, but he survived and returned to Berlin in 1945. Schiller became a full time city employee for cultural affairs in August and was able to interest a considerable number of secondary school students in youth work. Since almost all of them opposed communism, the organizers of the Steglitz youth committee faced an uphill battle in the predominantly middle-class district. Schiller also soon recognized the value of living in the American sector of Berlin and established close contact with the occupiers, above all with David Cozart, who became the city’s American youth officer in January 1946. Not surprisingly, Steglitz was the first district in which the Americans dismissed the communist chairs of the youth committee.
Apparently encouraged by his successes in Steglitz, Schiller organized a conference in May 1946 in which representatives of the city's western districts stated that a large majority of the Berlin youth criticized the youth committees' orientation into just one direction. The representatives demanded that the Berlin youth should determine the composition of their committees through free elections and that the Free German Youth should not be the only organization representing them. The initiative had immediate results. To counterbalance the communist monopoly and to support the democratization efforts, Military Government decreed at the end of the month that OMGUS representatives would have the last word in the determining who would represent young people in the American sector. This step clearly reveals that the positive side of the American program earlier or later would have to come in conflict with the communists. Not being content with simply eliminating National Socialism, Americans in the field supported democratic procedures against any form of dictatorship. The American initiative quickly spread to the French and the British sectors, where the youth committees reorganized themselves along democratic lines. The last communist in West Berlin lost his office in June 1948. Interestingly a large number of the young people who carried the fight against the communists in West Berlin in 1945 and 1946 in later years came to occupy prominent positions in the Federal
Republic's social and political life. Schiller went to the United States to study social work at the University of Minnesota. He was probably the first German after the war to receive a degree from an American institution. He returned to Berlin and became involved in the training of social workers there. In 1953 he accepted a position as assistant professor of Nuremberg’s new school of social work and became its director in the sixties. Schiller still is one of the most prominent teachers of social work in the Federal Republic.35

The following one and a half years saw a deadlock in the Allied Commandantura between the Americans who were determined to deny the Free German Youth a monopoly, and the Soviets, who did not want to permit any other youth organizations. While this deadlock could not stop practical youth work, German initiatives for creating a central youth office failed to gain the recognition of the Allies. The situation seemed to be hopeless, but in October 1947 the British were able to find an acceptable compromise which led

35Füssl 244-47. He also provides short biographies of a number of those involved in West Berlin’s anti-communist youth activities (295-97). Many of them became prominent politicians in Bonn and Berlin. Others went on and occupied leading positions in journalism or in the business world. Ralf Dahrendorf, then sixteen years old and member of the Social Democrats, started his distinguished career resisting the communist advance in youth work. See also Heinrich Schiller, personal interview, 26 July 1995; for details on the school of social work see chapter XIII below.
to the official recognition of various youth groups for Berlin only.

The allied compromise could not overcome the deep polarization in Berlin. The Free German Youth had lost its bid for taking over control of all young people in Berlin and had to limit its activities more and more to the eastern sector of the city. The only other youth group which tried to operate on a city wide basis, the Falken, soon had to withdraw from the east due to persecution.

Youth work suffered considerably from the lack of consensus between 1946 and 1947, but it did not stop. Since it was impossible to reach a consensus about permitting German youth organizations, Clay decided to take the only route open to him. He expanded GYA, which was a purely American venture, into Berlin six weeks after its official inauguration in the American zone in April 1946—against the advice of Shafer who predicted difficulties with the Soviets. Once the army found a suitable youth officer for this unique assignment, it went to work. For over one year GYA remained the only active youth organization in West Berlin. At the inauguration event in August 1946 12,000 young Berliners showed that Clay had correctly assessed the need for such an organization. During the next months GYA expanded its activities. Although GYA had to deal with some internal problems due to the constant fluctuation of personnel and attacks from the Soviets on the "militaristic character" of
the program, the army took its mission seriously. It dramatically increased the number and the quality of youth centers in its sector. A more sophisticated reorientation program replaced the initial emphasis on sports. Young Germans became involved in discussion groups or drew up constitutions for their own youth organizations with the help of American soldiers. Of course GYA continued to support German youth organizations with material and transport facilities. 1947 saw the start of a summer camp program within Berlin with the aim to improve the health of the city’s young population. The army also initiated a program that enabled young Berliners to spend their summer vacations in the western zones or even in Switzerland. The participants of all the camps not only enjoyed a change of scenery, but also received health care and much needed additional calories.\textsuperscript{36}

GYA was not the only successful American endeavor in Berlin. Just as in the American zone, military government youth officers in Berlin regarded the training of youth workers as essential for reaching their re-orientation goals. 1948 saw not only the creation of the Free University in West Berlin, but also the opening of the renown Wannseeheim, a joint German-American venture in which Germans had the opportunity to learn the ins and outs of effective youth work. As long as it was still possible to cross the zonal

\textsuperscript{36}Füssl 255-56.
borders, the center also attracted a considerable number of people from the Soviet sector and zone.37

The direct confrontation between the two competing systems in Berlin led to a remarkable phenomenon. American surveys conducted during the late 1940s and early 1950s showed that the process of transforming the minds of German youth was indeed a slow one. The pollsters found that many young people had not yet internalized democratic ideas or shed all of the Nazi indoctrination. While this did not come as a surprise in a country which was just then slowly beginning to recuperate from the war, it is interesting to note that Berlin youth consistently fared much better in the surveys than their counterparts in the western zones. Their anticommunist attitude does not explain this phenomenon, since one does not have to be a democrat to reject socialism. According to Füssl, Berlin's special position was responsible for this difference in young people's attitudes. The open fight against the communists in Berlin made a much closer and more intense contact between Americans and the other western allies and young Germans in the city inevitable. It not only led to an immense increase in the significance of youth work, but also resulted in a socialization process which took place outside of the institutional boundaries of the school. This socialization process provided a much stronger impetus and therefore accelerated the process of democratization in young

37Füssl 248-270.
people who participated in it. It should be added that the American model also was the most visible and the most attractive alternative. It fought communism, emphasized individual rights, and was able to produce seemingly boundless riches and opportunities.38

Youth work in the four zones as well as in Berlin in many ways anticipated the political and economic division of Germany. On the one hand American, French, and British military government youth officials in the field agreed on most of the basic assumptions and on the principles that underlay the course they were steering in re-educating young Germans early on, although their policies differed considerably. In all three zones the Germans were mainly responsible for re-establishing their youth activities. The British apparently were much more willing to delegate authority than the French, who insisted on control, and the Americans, who went to great lengths to sell their programs. All three western allies had introduced youth committees, which were surprisingly similar in their organization, to open up youth work to a democratic decision making process. International contacts as well as introducing a new generation of youth workers became their main goals, but only the Americans were trying to involve their tactical troops in the re-orientation effort. On the other hand Soviet authorities had other objectives and a very different idea

38Füssl 268-270.
about the meaning of bringing democracy to youth work in Germany. They were the only ones who came to Germany armed with a master plan. German communists under Soviet supervision set out to make drastic changes in formal education and to bring youth work under communist control. The Soviets assigned youth work and education a high priority from the start of the occupation on, whereas the leading officers of the western allies, especially in OMGUS, seemed to recognize the importance of youth work, but did not follow through with the necessary administrative adjustments until 1948. The unique situation in Berlin led to a special relationship between the younger generation in the western sectors and the western allies. A closer look at the field in the American zone will have to show to what an extent Americans there would be able to play a role in defining the direction which youth activities and youth work in the western parts of Germany would take in the future.
VOLUME II

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CHAPTER VIII

While Americans and their former allies were discussing politics and beginning to implement their programs for German re-education, life for young people went on. For the first three years after the war they were facing difficult times. German authorities and private organizations did their best to help young people, but few new patterns in organizing them emerged. Youth groups developed a surprising interest in cultural activities. Giving children, adolescents, and young adults something meaningful to do during their spare time became one of the main objectives for youth organizations. Summer camps and week-end trips acquired a central place in youth activities. They were a way to escape the drab city and to offer some physical and mental relief from the struggle to survive.

Life in Nuremberg

Just as in any other city the time between 1945 and 1948 was for most people in Nuremberg a daily fight for survival and young people were no exception. Many had lost either their homes or their families or both. Often their fathers or brothers were prisoners of war so that it was up to them to provide their share for the support of the family. Heiko Kistner, for example, had to look for a job and work as long
as his father remained in captivity. Many who did not have a home lived in train stations or in the woods and travelled all over Germany. Not surprisingly the criminal delinquency rate in Nuremberg rose dramatically after the war. The effects of the occupation were causing considerable concern. In April 1947, for example, German police reported that the conditions of the occupation had a negative influence on many young people in the city. According to the police, clubs for African-American soldiers were hotbeds of moral decline for Nuremberg's youth: "It was generally observed that young people of all ages not only are involved in intense bartering with colored soldiers, but also have immoral dealings with them." The authors of the report noted that the desire to get to know and to become acquainted with the foreigners soon replaced the initial reservations which had existed on both sides. Children were the first to overcome the barriers, but, the police noted, some of these contacts made it necessary for responsible German circles to intervene. Boys and girls left their families to move in with American units or their American boyfriends. Soon profiteering replaced curiosity. According to the police, not only teenage girls but also a considerable number of their mothers became involved intimately with American soldiers, spreading disease

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2 The three special editions of the Nürnberger Nachrichten, Trümmerjahre, Wiederaufbau, and Erinnerungen provide a vivid picture of life in the city after the war.
among GIs and their own families. The authors stated that many children, often with the encouragement of their parents, were spending most of their time loitering around American facilities hoping to obtain goods or food. The police found that these contacts with Americans often led to black market activities, kept children away from school, work, or their apprenticeships. Since black market activities and American friends could be quite profitable, some young people even refused to work. In looking for the causes the authors showed a clear grasp of reality. They noted that the reasons behind this moral decline often were not "moral weaknesses," but rather "naked, merciless want. People have lost their homes, they lack clothing and food. They trade their moral decline for an economically better supply through contact with the occupation forces."

The numbers indicated that the problem had not reached major proportions. At the time about 300,000 people were living in Nuremberg. German and American courts had to deal with 276 cases which were in some way connected with the occupation between August 1946 and February 1947. Thirty young people were arrested for illegally crossing zonal borders, twenty one because they owned American property. Becoming arrested for the latter offense was not at all difficult. Military Police apprehended Heiko Kistner, for

example, for owning American occupation dollars. Kistner had sold his bicycle to a man for the highly valued currency. A few days later he was arrested for illegal possession of foreign currency. The bicycle buyer had stolen the dollars and Military Police were trying to recover the fortune. The Americans confiscated what was left of the treasure and brought Kistner to a Military Court in the Military Government building. Apparently not much happened to him and the "crime" never affected his career in any way.4

Roughly half of all offenders had committed crimes against the public order, which included loitering and prostitution, but could also be simply not having their identification papers with them.5 In a twelve months period between 1946 and 1947 courts tried a total of 685 juveniles, two thirds of them boys. This meant that cases involving illegal contacts or deals with Americans seemed to occupy most of the judges' time. The numbers declined steadily during the following years. An official publication of the city in 1950 pointed out that the vast majority of the city's

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young people in one way or another tried to find their way back into a normal life.  

Living normally at that time more often than not meant that Germans had to spend much of their time "organizing" food and other necessities. Many went to the countryside where they tried to exchange food from the farmers for amenities such as china. Others had to bring their cameras and other luxury items to the black market where they would barter them for butter, potatoes, or for American rations. Even Nazi literature found its buyers. Gerhard Springer recalled that his father made a good deal with an American to whom he sold Alfred Rosenberg's *Mythus des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, the main opus of Hitler's chief philosopher. An improvement of the situation made it unnecessary for him to part with a special edition of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* which already then was a much sought after collector's item among Americans. The most pressing problems for the citizens and the city administration were the constant lack of food and

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6*Die Deutschen Städte und ihre Jugend* 11, 15-16.

7Heiko Kistner recalled that almost everybody in one way or another became involved in illegal dealings (Heiko Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994); see chapter IX for some of the activities in which Germans and Americans directly interacted.

8Eckart 193-202; Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995.
the deplorable living conditions which Army requisitions continued to aggravate.\textsuperscript{9}

Many people blamed the occupiers for the crisis. Even Nuremberg's Lord Mayor Ziegler, a Social Democrat whom the Nazis had prosecuted, stated in 1947 that one constantly heard that Hitler was to blame for the current crisis, but that the war had been over for over two years and the situation had gotten worse. Fritz Linnert, a liberal town councilor, showed a rare portion of courage and insight in his reply. According to him, Hitler indeed was to blame for the misery, but many people did not want to confront that truth. Germans had lived well throughout the war only because they had plundered and robbed other peoples. Those who claimed that the situation had been better indeed were right, but Linnert argued that they failed to realize that they had lived at everybody else's expense.\textsuperscript{10}

Linnert certainly did not endear himself to the public or to the majority of his colleagues in the city council with his remarks. A sixteen-year-old boy, who described the situation in a school essay in rather drastic terms, probably came closer to the sentiment of many people during the difficult times:

\begin{quote}
[t]he first [concern] is naturally the extremely miserable grub, because one cannot talk about food here,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{9}Nürnberg 1945-1949, II, docs. 138, 156, 161-176; Eckart 181-193.

\textsuperscript{10}Eckart 209-211.
and the ragged clothing. With the exception of the black market one cannot buy anything. And now the Ami [American] wants to make us believe that there is a food crisis all over the world. All these are nursery tales. When the German cities were suffering from the continuous terror bombings, we had our food and now in peacetime we don't have anything. Just because the Ami wants it this way. One does not get an education in the shop because all is in ruins. An incredible mass bunk instead of an apprenticeship. One lives in half a house with a broken chimney, with a little wind from the west the oven smokes like a factory chimney. The only thing the Ami has done was to beat up our cities and to brag in a great way, but most of these cowards never heard a bullet whistle. When one sees them in their clubs, they are completely drunk and have their feet on the table. And that kind of people want to bring us culture and ease the misery?*

Another German youngster wrote to the Land Youth Committee to vent his anger. According to him, young people in the American zone were especially critical towards the occupiers and would be negatively influenced by the wanton acts of Americans. He thought that the Americans in no way were living up to their alleged promises of coming as "liberators and not as oppressors." The author of the letter was apparently very incensed about requisitioning policies which did not differentiate between former Nazis and those who had not supported the system. He argued that soldiers in the Soviet zone had to live in barracks and showed a remarkable sympathy for the plight of the Germans, whereas in the American zone apparently every sergeant could requisition

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11Brief student essay by a boy, sixteen years old, father at home; essay no. 8 accompanying a presentation regarding the state of mind of the Nuremberg youth by A. Staudt; NCA E 10/33 no. 6; for a general account of the mood in the city see Eckart 203-05, 212-13.
a whole house. Interestingly, he compared American "un-Christian" behavior during a "period similar to peace" unfavorably with that of German troops during the war. It provided him with a reason to declare the occupiers morally bankrupt. He thought that the American actions had forfeited their right to judge the Germans and accused them of pursuing a course of mass impoverishment and an "obvious extermination policy." The author concluded that this type of behavior certainly did not endear young Germans to democratic principles and even less to the Americans. Land Youth officials informed the Americans that apparently the young man had just lost his home to requisitions, but forwarded the letter to American authorities "for their information about realities."\(^12\)

German and American authorities also had to fight with the opposite extreme. Detachment B-211 reported that the German welfare organizations had considerable difficulties with "underage girls" who were staying with American soldiers and with young boys who preferred working for the occupiers to attending school.\(^13\)

Even those who did not fall into either extreme often displayed a deep skepticism about their present situation.

\(^{12}\)Herman Schild, Nürnberg an den Landesjugendausschuß, München, 14 Sept. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/10.

\(^{13}\)OMGBY, Det. B-211, Daily Report for Monday, 14 Jan. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, District III, Reports, Box 1055, 13/27-1/7.
A young girl, for example, wrote to her aunt in the United States that

perhaps twelve years of National Socialism have spoiled us so much that we are not yet ready to become democrats. We lack every understanding for it. Our father often wants to convert us, especially Konrad, Martha and me, but we still want action to prove that the new system is better than the old one. The parties are continuously fighting now and none of them has any power.... Why should we blame our uncle Richard for being a member of the SS? They were not the worst kind of soldiers...and he is still in prison just because he had an important position.¹⁴

Changing these attitudes and helping young people return to a normal life in the middle of want and hunger was a daunting task.

Opinions on Youth Activities

In view of the fight for mere survival it is surprising that many of those in charge of young people on the local level found time to develop their own ideas for youth activities. Initially the Germans did not have the privilege of assembling their experts on youth work, youth welfare, and education to develop plans beyond their communities, so they had to limit their concepts to the local boundaries. In spite of the considerable burden which scarcity, reconstruction, and denazification caused, many people in Nuremberg still managed to find time for reflecting on the city youth’s situation. A poll taken by ICD director Feiler in April 1946 revealed a remarkable degree of agreement

between the different institutions responsible for youth work, but also staked out some major differences.

As the head of the city's welfare organizations, Theodor Marx became one of the most important men for shaping Nuremberg's youth activities after the war. He had very clear ideas about young people and what authorities should do to help them. According to him, young people in 1946 found themselves in a vacuum. They were disappointed by the Third Reich and shocked by the outcome of the war. At the same time they had developed a very critical attitude towards everything and therefore did not show much inclination to follow the ideas which had existed before 1933. Marx felt that it would be best to leave young people a free hand in the process of finding themselves. Consequently the city administration should not try to exercise any influences which went beyond making sure that young people did not break the law with their activities. Nevertheless, Marx saw encouraging signs within a year after the war. According to him, the majority of the young people was not looking for material satisfaction, but rather was trying to satisfy an "inner yearning".

Marx, of course, had his opinion of the role which local, state, and eventually the national government would have to play in youth activities. According to him, legislation from the Weimar Republic gave sufficient guidance in this matter, but the Bavarian state government in Munich
remained a real obstacle. Marx thought that the Munich authorities had never shown any inclination to accept any responsibility for youth activities or for the welfare of the young people in general and did not seem to be willing to change its course.\textsuperscript{15}

Marx argued that the youth committees should be guided and supported by qualified experts. Apparently he did not see any contradiction between this proposal and the statement he had made earlier during the same conversation. Marx did not want to see politically active youth groups in the immediate future, because he did not think that they were ready for this kind of activity yet. For the same reason Marx opted against the creation of a unified anti-fascist youth movement. In his opinion it would not be wise to create a purely negative movement with no constructive goals in place to fight a demon which definitely belonged to the past.

When asked about the main goal for the future of young Germans, Marx clearly demonstrated his strong patriotism and a deeply rooted idealism. According to him, young Germans

\textsuperscript{15}Memo from Eric Feiler, Team Chief, Nuremberg Detachment, OMGBY, ICD, Intelligence Section, to Chief of Intelligence, ICD, OMGBY, Political Affairs Section, 25 Apr. 1946: results of a survey conducted on youth activities; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12. Marx had no problems telling officials in Munich in no uncertain language what he thought about the Bavarian government's efforts to help young people in the state. See his account of a meeting with responsible officials in Munich in the minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 2. Dec. 1946, Enclosure 6; NCA C7/IX no. 1232.
should develop a sense of responsibility for the long term reconstruction of Germany. They would have to educate and prepare themselves for this task. Marx hoped that ultimately all young Germans would come together as one big community to master this great task they were sharing.16

The ICD survey revealed that a majority of the responsible youth leaders in Nuremberg did not favor politically active youth groups in 1946. Of the eleven persons Feiler polled, six, among them the chairmen of the Communist Party and of the Free German Youth, agreed with Marx that young people were not yet ready. Of the other five only the chairman of the Democratic Party’s youth group gave his unqualified approval.

As far as an antifascist front was concerned, only the communists and the leaders of the Free German Youth supported the idea, but emphasized at the same time that of course the members of all youth groups should have a right to participate in the movement in any way they wished. It seems that all the other people who were surveyed had already recognized the nature of the antifascist movement in the Soviet zone. While the Social Democrat argued along Marx’s lines, others were less diplomatic. Not surprisingly the Lutheran Youth Pastor for Bavaria, Martin Helbich, and the

16Memo from Eric Feiler, Team Chief, Nuremberg Detachment, OMGBY, ICD, Intelligence Section, to Chief of Intelligence, ICD, OMGBY, Political Affairs Section, 25 Apr. 1946: results of a survey conducted on youth activities; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12.
chairman of the just recently founded youth chapter of the Conservative party in Nuremberg had almost identical arguments. They thought that such an idea reminded them strongly of the youth organization of the previous twelve years. His Catholic colleague did not think that it would foster any democratic understanding in young people. The member of the Liberal Party made his point even clearer. He suggested that such a movement should be directed against any kind of dictatorship. Interestingly, the leader of the Socialist youth organization, Hans Schubert, in many ways voiced the most optimistic opinion about young Germans' capabilities for recognizing any dangers to the democracy and addressing it in a truly democratic spirit. He argued that youth would have to form their own opinion and should have the opportunity to join any group they wanted. According to him, anti-fascist groups did not permit this kind of political freedom.

Schubert's goals for the future also came closest to the re-education ideas of the Americans. Apart from eliminating National Socialist doctrine from schools and homes, the Socialist Education Movement wanted to eradicate materialistic thinking and create an independent individual which would not be another subject to anyone. He explained that the people within this movement cultivated respect for other persons and ideas and tried to implant the will to work for the community and to accept responsibilities.
Interestingly, many of those people whom Feiler polled also emphasized the desire to integrate Germany in the international or European community. With the exception of Rev. Helbich and the chairman of the Communist Party, the men surveyed also included democratic ideals in their main objectives, but did not become any more specific. In contrast to the Catholic chaplain in charge of youth affairs, Helbich defined the main goals of his Church's youth work exclusively along Christian principles. The communists not only refused to endorse democratic principles but also concentrated so much on eliminating the past that they had no future-oriented program to offer which might have supplemented their anti-fascist stance.17

The Authorities: Emergency Management

Young people had plenty of time to pursue their legal, semilegal, or illegal activities, although all schools in Nuremberg had reopened by the spring of 1946. In April 1947 the city reported that the lack of schooling, which had already started during the war, would result in disastrous consequences for the young people as well as for the future of Germany if authorities would not be able to remedy the situation anytime soon. According to school authorities, many children under ten years were almost complete

17Memo from Eric Feiler, Team Chief, Nuremberg Detachment, OMGBY, ICD, Intelligence Section, to Chief of Intelligence, ICD, OMGBY, Political Affairs Section, 25 Apr. 1946. Results of a survey conducted on youth activities; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12.
illiterates. The education of apprentices and all other students at the different branches of secondary education revealed the "gravest deficiencies." School officials thought that these deficiencies would significantly hamper the reconstruction of Germany for a long time to come. The city fathers further stated that the lack of schooling and supervision also affected the moral fiber of children and adolescents negatively. According to them, the percentage of girls who were infected with venereal disease had reached proportions which earlier would have been unthinkable. In addition to that the lack of food also threatened the health of the generation which was facing "the especially hard duties of reconstruction". The local MG detachment reported in July 1947 that during the previous twelve months elementary schools had been open just two and a half hours a day, while secondary schools provided their students with four hours of daily instruction. The report identified the lack of teachers, rooms, and school materials as the causes of the misery. By September 1947 the situation had improved somewhat. The head of the Nuremberg school administration, Raab, reported to the city council that the number of students had only slightly increased, but that now


many more teachers were available, as well as rooms. Although conditions were still far from ideal, Raab announced that the schools had been able to increase instruction from twelve to sixteen hours per week.\footnote{Minutes of the City Council session on 24 Sep. 47, Point 7/8, present situation of the elementary schools; Nürnberg 1945-49, II, doc. 131c.}

The lack of heating materials during the winter months, however, forced the city to close schools for extended time periods between 1946 and 1948. The local MG detachment estimated that the schools had lost about twenty per cent of their school days due to the lack of fuel during the harsh winter of 1946/47.\footnote{OMGBY, Det. B 211, Annual Historical Report, 1 July 1946-30 June 1947; Nürnberg 1945-49, II, doc. 118.}

Even when the schools were open, many children could not attend classes because they had no shoes or clothing or because they were sick. One teacher reported to the city administration in March 1947 that

\begin{quote}
90\% of the girls do not have any shoes anymore, 75\% [have] no warm underwear, 50\% of the families no heating materials, 6\% of the families no potatoes. There is a lack of thread and wool everywhere. The situation is particularly bad with stockings. 10 girls do not have coats anymore, there are five cases of scabies in the school. 20 children got frost bite, 1 child got a bladder disease, 1 a kidney infection. Better food remains to be of utmost importance.\footnote{Nürnberg 1945-49, II, doc. 194; see also the reproduction of a letter of excuse a Nuremberg mother wrote for her son in April 1946 in Trümmerjahre: 32.} 
\end{quote}
To alleviate the desperate situation a little, Mayor Levié wrote to the Bavarian government in Munich requesting to have several thousand pairs of shoes which were stored in Nuremberg made available to the population.

In view of these facts, the city administration found it necessary to develop special programs for young people. Under the forceful leadership of Theodor Marx the Nuremberg welfare authorities tried their best to revive youth activities in the city. In September 1946 the Social Democrats made a motion in the city council to allocate special funds for youth work. During the coming months the city slated 88,000 Marks for youth work which did not include welfare activities. A few months later Marx announced that the city would make one high rise bunker available to youth groups as a youth center, but that the younger generation would have to help with its decoration and furnishings. This new youth center would replace one that had not survived the bombing raids. The bunker was conveniently located near the center of the city, but a full year passed before the administration actually was able to turn the center over to

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young Germans. By then the bunker harbored a youth hostel, several club rooms, a youth restaurant, a library, and a reading room, but just before its inauguration Nuremberg's new youth house almost fell victim to the Army's program to destroy all defense installations within its zone. It took the combined effort of the Youth Committee, the city administration and above all, of the local GYA officer who had proposed the project, to save the building.25

Apart from establishing a new youth center, Marx also tried to provide for those who might not be able to reach the bunker during the winter of 1947/48. If lack of fuel would force the city to close the schools again during the cold season, there would be at least one stove in each building to provide some heat for the students. Secondary school students would receive emergency classes in selected schools. Marx further stated that the city carried all these measures

out in addition to the activities of the private welfare institutions.²⁶

Marx also was concerned with the problem of homeless young people. In December 1946 he suggested to the city welfare committee that it would be necessary to initiate a project which would provide these persons not only with a place to stay, but also with opportunities to learn and to develop roots which would prevent them from resuming their restless lives on the streets.²⁷

In view of the limited resources of the city, winning the support of American authorities for such a project would be the best way to get it underway. In September Marx immediately responded to an article in the Neue Zeitung, the official German language newspaper sponsored by OMGUS. The paper had reported that American authorities in Frankfurt were supporting a German initiative for constructing a youth village by supplying it with barracks and tents. Marx inquired with the local detachment about the possibility of getting the same support for his community. Colonel Callicott dutifully forwarded the letter to OMGBY, but no answer is recorded. Marx, however, had found another American partner who showed more concern. In December he


²⁷Minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 2 Dec. 1946; NCA C7/IX no. 1232.
told the welfare committee that the American youth officer in Nuremburg, Major Mark Selsor, had demonstrated much interest in such a project and promised his support. Selsor had just taken over his duties as GYA officer for the Nuremberg Military Post in summer.28

During the next year the city fathers considered various sites for their youth village. American troops had occupied a former German Luftwaffe landing field in a little village in the vicinity of Nuremberg. Marx found out that the Americans would soon evacuate the barracks and included the property on the city's wish list to the Bavarian property control office. Apparently Marx was successful. In November 1947 the city council's welfare committee decided to set up a youth village at the former air force base. The city fathers also planned to attach dormitories for students and for apprentices to the property, but apparently they had acted too quickly. Although eighty boys were living in the barracks in May 1948, the Munich Property Control Office could not make up its mind and was threatening to dispossess them of the property.29

28Marx to Det. B-211, 18 Sep. 1946; Col. Callicott to OMGBY, 23 Sept. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 40, 10/43-3/24; minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 2 Dec. 1946; NCA C7/IX no. 1232; for Selsor's appointment see Det. B-211, Monthly Historical Intelligence Report, Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Reports Control Br., Box 207, 10/81-3/7.

29Minutes of welfare committee meetings, 2 Oct. 1947, 27 Nov. 1947; NCA C7/IX no. 1233; Headquarters, Nuremburg Military Post, German Youth Activities Section, GYA Staff
In view of these developments the city council began to look for alternatives. It scouted a second property closer to Nuremberg. The former Nazi party rally area had much space and some accommodations to offer. After an inspection of the site the committee found the barracks from which the architects had guided the construction of Hitler's rally grounds a suitable place for another village.30

Since Nuremberg only had limited funds at its disposal, the city was looking for a private sponsor for the project. This kind of help did not immediately materialize. Nevertheless the city obtained the right to use the buildings, for which it did not have to pay, for social purposes such as youth work by the end of 1947.31

For the time being a new and unique private organization received permission to temporarily use the facilities until it would be able to construct its own youth village for homeless young people nearby which it called "Peace Village". The idea for this organization actually did not have its roots in Nuremberg, but rather goes back to one of the first attempts to launch a project designed to foster cooperation between Germany and other nations. The organizers of an

30 Minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 3 July 1947; NCA C7/IX no. 1233.

31 Minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 2 Oct. 1947, Enclosure 14; NCA C7/IX no. 1233.
international youth camp in Munich founded an organization with an international board of directors which would address the problem of homeless young people by providing them with the opportunity to build their own boys towns. The venture not only tried to get young people off the streets and into a regular life, but also set out to bring young Germans back into the international community by looking for sponsors from abroad and organizing youth camps with participants coming from all over the world to help with the work of reconstruction. These ideas received a warm welcome. Members of the Nuremberg youth council supported the project as did city officials like Marx, as well as the local GYA officer. The young people who came to live in the barracks would soon begin building their own homes on the former Nazi rally grounds. 1948 would be the official start for the project.\textsuperscript{32}

In spite of these efforts the relief, welfare, and youth activities of the city administration were by no means sufficient to satisfy even the most urgent needs. Nuremberg's authorities were overtaxed with the tremendous tasks they were facing during the first three years after the war, especially since they did not operate in a vacuum, but increasingly had to deal with state and even the bizonal

administrations. The whole apparatus was cumbersome and more often than not did not function. Nuremberg's connections to the surrounding region suffered from a considerable lack of enthusiasm on the side of the farming communities to support the city. Hitler's much propagated "folk community" simply did not exist. Each German seemed to fend just for himself or possibly for the tightly knit group to which he or she belonged. Many farmers, for example, did not meet their quotas, but were able to provide goods for the black market or to city people who had something attractive to offer. Even without these obstacles the situation would have been extremely precarious. Germany needed time to recover from the complete collapse of the Third Reich, and not much could be done without outside help. As a result, Nurembergers became increasingly disillusioned with their administrators and representatives. An ICD survey in 1948 revealed that a majority of the city's inhabitants suspected their city administrators of acting selfishly and not caring about the public good. The survey revealed more about the Nurembergers' state of mind than about their local government. Apparently they were not aware or overly concerned with the obvious discrepancy between their own behavior and the expectations of their local government.\textsuperscript{33}

It comes as no surprise that the occupiers also came under attack during the bitter months of 1946 and 1947, but

\textsuperscript{33}Eckart 191-202.
it is interesting to note that those who negotiated with the local detachment on a day to day basis differentiated between the men with whom they were dealing and those in charge of politics. The city fathers recognized that the Americans who were in charge of them at the local level did much to support them. In general relations between detachment B-211 and the city administration remained quite friendly. Local politicians and administrators usually limited their attacks on American policy to the men in charge in Washington.34

A Youth Committee in the Making

As far as coordinating youth activities was concerned, we have already seen that city officials and MG in Nuremberg had developed the same concept at about the same time in 1945. Nuremberg was one of the first cities to have a functioning youth committee. Just as Americans had observed in general, the committee in Nuremberg initially did not have much input from young people. It consisted of five members of the city administration and the leaders of the nine youth groups which had registered with local authorities and applied for licenses.35

One of the committee's first actions was to take stock. In February 1946 the Nürnberg Nachrichten reported that "Free Youth Work Revives." Announcing to young Nurembergers

34Eckart 205.

that they would soon be able to resume their youth activities, it informed its readers that all organizations, clubs and persons interested in youth activities should turn to the youth office for further information.\(^{36}\)

In April 1946 the Youth Committee established its own constitution. The authors of the document clearly wanted to establish a legal and organizational continuity with the time before 1933. They referred to the responsibilities in the field of youth activities which the Youth Act of 1926 had established for the communities. The authors thought that the best way to respond to the demands would be to reestablish the traditional youth groups from before 1933, since many of their former leaders were still available and could serve as important guides in the future. The constitution made clear that the committee under no circumstances aimed at recreating the unified youth movement of the Third Reich, but rather wanted to coordinate the activities of all youth groups and help them to develop their own initiatives with the greatest possible respect for their ideological, religious and organizational structures. The committee also included specific goals, such as reopening youth hostels, the creation of youth centers, and the organization of retreats in its constitution. It would serve as a visible pressure group and try to direct the interest of the administration and of politicians towards the problems of

\(^{36}\)NN, 6 Feb. 1946: 5.
all young people. An additional task would be to make sure that youth groups complied with Military Government regulations before they received their licenses. Only those youth groups would be licensed who made sure that they would eliminate all National Socialist or militaristic thought and would try to educate their members towards becoming free, independent, and peace loving citizens. Any person who had been connected to the National Socialists would be excluded from leadership positions in the new organizations.37

Although the Nurembergers created a body based on democratic principles, Military Government officials pointed to a significant flaw in the committee's organization. Colonel James C. Barnett, second in command who later became commanding officer of the Nuremberg Detachment, advised the local authorities that their constitution only represented organized young people. He insisted that it would be necessary to develop some kind of representation which would assure that the voice of all those young people who did not opt for becoming members in an organization would be heard. Barnett introduced an entirely new concept of youth work to Nuremberg which also signalled a new departure in MG policies. Although a number of people had recognized that unorganized young people so far had not received sufficient

37"Jugendring Nürnberg," [before April 1946]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12; monthly intelligence report, Det. B-211, July 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Reports Control Br., Box 207, 10/81-3/7.
attention by German and American authorities, nobody had officially taken steps to remedy the situation. Barnett was the first American representative who raised the problem in his community and forced Nurembergers to come up with their own solution to the problem.

By June 1947 they were ready. The committee adopted the new constitution "after lively discussion". Depending on the number of its members, each organization would have one or more representatives in the general assembly. One person from each school would be elected to represent all unorganized young people. To assure proper communication with the city administration, delegates from various branches involved in youth activities also had a seat in the assembly. Adults would not occupy more than seven seats, a number which just matched that of representatives of the largest Nuremberg youth organization, the Trade Union Youth. At that time about fifty per cent of all young Nurembergers had joined a youth organization. It was quite fitting that the chair of the youth committee invited Colonel Barnett to the Nuremberg Army youth center to participate in first session of the youth committee under its new constitution. Americans regarded the Nuremberg constitution as a model which other German communities should emulate. The fact that Germans came up with this constitution in the city of the Nazi party rallies and the Nuremberg Laws may have enhanced its significance for the occupiers. They may well have regarded
it as the first indicator of the success of their democratization policies.\textsuperscript{38}

The youth committee was not just a coordinating body with no real power. On the contrary: Americans made sure that the Youth Committees had something to offer their members. The American Army released its own surplus clothing, camping materials, and other equipment as well as that of the former Wehrmacht to the Land Youth Committees which they in turn distributed among the local bodies. When the program began on a large scale in 1947, MG in Bavaria released 1,000 tons of camping materials and promised to take care of the transport of the children and the necessary gasoline or field kitchens. MG could not keep all of its promises, but after initial problems and some confusion on both sides, the program got underway. Together with the materials the Youth Committee issued guidelines for camping in which it stressed the importance of exercising democratic

\textsuperscript{38}Report on youth committee meeting, 29 Apr. 1947; Invitation from Andreas Staudt to Col. Barnett, 30 May 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1427, 9/122-3/1. A visiting expert who examined Land and Kreis Youth Committees in the American zone during the summer of 1948, for example, quoted the statutes and activities of the Nuremberg Committee verbatim as an example for others to emulate (David F. Demarch, "Report of Survey on Land and Kreis Youth Committees and Youth Rings, Sept. 1948: 78-85; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 138, 5/295-2/7).
procedures in the camps. By the end of the summer 75,000 Bavarian children had participated in the program.\(^3\)

Since the city administration also was interested in the committee, it supported the committee’s activities with a substantial amount of money and with a 75% discount for public transport to the camps if it was available. More importantly, the local food office issued special allocations for the hiking and camping activities of all licensed groups. The fact that the Land Youth Committee hired a full time employee for Nuremberg who dedicated all his time to administering the use of the equipment and helping young people to organize these activities, shows how important it was for them to leave the city. In view of the dire schooling situation, the city of Nuremberg had even decided to take advantage of the refreshing camp atmosphere and continued some classes in the field to catch up with its work. Well over 4,500 young people had participated in summer camps which lasted between ten and fourteen days at the beginning of August, with about six weeks left in the

\(^3\)Minutes of Youth Activities Conference, Stuttgart, 18-19 March 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/14; minutes of 7th Youth Activities Conference, 15-16 May 1947, NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 120, 5/293-1/7; Jugendring, München an die Jugendabteilung der Militärregierung in Bayern: Bericht über die Zeltlageraktion 1947, 18 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2; see also list of equipment released to LYC [1947]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/2; report about negotiations between Bavarian Youth Reverend Helbich and MG, 8 Nov. 1946; LCA Kreisdekan Nürnberg 318, Jugendarbeit.
season. When the summer was over, more than 10,000 young people had spent some time in summer camps which lasted on average ten days and included a substantial increase in calories.\textsuperscript{40}

The program was such a success in 1947 that Americans and Germans considerably expanded their plans for the next year. In February 1948 MG youth officials noted that in Bavaria alone 200,000 young people had applied for camping materials. The Bavarian Youth Committee had already scheduled a conference for camp counselors and leadership training for camp supervisors.\textsuperscript{41}

Summer camps remained very popular well into the next decade, providing many young Germans with an opportunity to spend their vacations away from the city, but the returning

\textsuperscript{40} Helmut Stühler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994; Bayerischer Jugendring, München an die Jugendabteilung der Militärregierung in Bayern: Bericht über die Zeltlageraktion 1947, 18 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2; Berichte des BJR an OMBY für Zeitraum bis 15.8. 47: 4; 15.9.47: 4; 15.10.47: 8; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 146, 5/296-2/9; list of summer camps in Bavaria, 13 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2.

\textsuperscript{41} Letter from Lawrence Norrie, Chief Group Activities Br. to Col. Cunningham, E&CRD, Economic Br., 19 Mar. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/17; minutes of 13th MG Youth Activities Conference, 12-13 Feb. 1948; NA RG 260, OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 120, 5/293-1/7; many of the interviewees, especially those of the trade unions and two directors of youth centers, remembered these camps very fondly; for trade unions and their summer camps see also Birgitt Grieb, ed., Mit Hordentopf und Rucksack: Zur Geschichte der Gewerkschaftsjugend in Nürnberg und Coburg nach 1945, Oberursel: P.V. Werkdruck, [1987], 42-46.
prosperity brought an end to the programs. During the 1950s more and more young people and their families were able to afford their own holidays farther away from home or chose more comfortable accommodations for their vacations. Nevertheless, the program had served its purpose. Young people received calories and could recuperate from the still rather devastated city for a while. Many of them also for the first time acquired hands-on experiences with democratic procedures. And all of them, no matter to which youth group they belonged, literally could feel American support.42

These benefits notwithstanding, not all Germans were easily convinced about the value of a Youth Committee and its activities. Although it was well known that all youth organizations would have to register through the committees, Bavaria's Lutheran Youth Minister Helbich announced to his brothers in the congregations in February 1946 that he considered denominational youth groups to be exempt from these provisions. He instructed those who wanted to register their groups with Military Government not to do so. Helbich thought that church representatives should be present in the newly created youth committees, but that they should limit their participation to giving "supportive advice." The minister informed his youth leaders that the committees certainly could do some good, especially if they supported

youth activities by trying to reopen youth hostels, getting price reductions for youth groups, or obtaining equipment, but he apparently did not want to jeopardize the independence of his own flock or give up any part of his control over it. During the next months Helbich had to admonish several of his pastors not to apply for licenses, since these precedents would undermine his own course.\(^43\)

In November 1946 Helbich was still negotiating with OMGTY about the necessity of licensing Lutheran youth groups, but by then it was clear that he would not have much choice in the matter, although MG did not seem to force the issue. Helbich conceded that obtaining a license would be very beneficial for the work of the youth groups, since the Americans had taken care to invest the youth committees with a monopoly over the distribution of all the commodities urgently needed for youth work. Youth hostels also were exclusively reserved for licensed groups. In view of these realities, the church authorities decided not to hold out any longer, especially after both Military Government and the

\(^{43}\)"Stand der Jugendarbeit des Landesjugendpfarrers," 12 Feb. 1946; LCA Landeskirchenrat VI; 1178a 1946-1964, Akten des Landesjugendpfarrers Bd. IV; exchange of letters between Reverend Dollinger and Helbich, April-May 1946; LCA Personen CLXV Dollinger 14. Protestant youth groups were conspicuously absent from a list of youth organizations who had applied for licenses with Det. B-211. Of the eleven applicants MG did not grant a license to only one sports group because one of its sponsors was not employable under denazification laws (MG, Det. B-211 to Lord Mayor of Nuremberg, 25 Oct. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGTY, FOD, Det. B-211 Box 1439, 9/126-1/19).
Land Youth Committee assured Helbich that they would not attempt to exercise any influence on Lutheran youth activities. In view of these incentives the church leaders announced to their congregations that they should apply for licenses. The memorandum also noted sourly that some reverends who had applied for licenses on their own initiative had not made negotiations any easier. The decision came just in time to participate in the final elaborations for the new constitution of the Nuremberg Youth Committee. The Lutherans joined an organization which had evolved away from adult influences towards a truly representative body of all young Nurembergers. During the following decades it would have to weather a number of storms, but remained to be a democratic institution which fought for the interests of all young people.4

By 1947 the city administration, youth groups, and Military Government had created an organizational structure for the representation of the city's youth which would continue to serve young Nurembergers for the next fifty years, although it underwent significant changes.45

4Report about negotiations between Bavarian Youth Minister Helbich and MG, 8 Nov. 1946; LCA Kreisdekan Nürnberg 318 Jugendarbeit.

45Ulrike Fuchs (Kreisjugendring: "... gemeinsam für die Interessen der Jugend? Eine kritische Bilanz über 30 Jahre Jugendpflege (Nürnberg [Nuremberg]: Kreisjugendring Nürnberg-Stadt, 1980) 14–79) provides an interesting discussion of the development of the Nuremberg Youth Committee. Military Government records as well as those of the Nuremberg city archives and of the Lutheran church, however, reveal that her
Reviving Youth Activities

The Nuremberg Kreis Youth Committee became one of the pillars of the city's youth activities from the start. The committee organized the first "Nuremberg Youth Day" in September 1946. About three thousand young people had the opportunity to relax and enjoy games at twelve different locations throughout the city. American observers noted that youth organizations had prepared games, songs, plays, and dances for their peers. According to the report, the Youth Committee, MG, and tactical troops had cooperated closely to make the event a success.46

At about the same time young people in Nuremberg could read on posters all over the city about another innovation. The committee opened an office whose sole task consisted of listening to the needs and complaints of the younger generation. The office was only open two hours a week, but it was the first attempt by the youth committee to reach out to young people. It also provided an opportunity for those account and conclusions are not entirely reliable, especially for the early stages of the committee's existence. She does not recognize, for example, the very active role Americans played in the foundation of the committee and the formulation of its constitution.

46OMGBY, Weekly Report, Youth Activities, 4 Sep. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 143, 5/296-1/17; monatlicher Bericht des Bayerischen Landesjugendausschusses für den Zeitraum bis 15.10.46; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 143, 5/296-1/20; see also Fuchs 24.
who were not organized to look for help or voice their concerns.47

One of the most pressing problems in youth work remained the lack of trained youth leaders. Americans, German church leaders, and those in charge of more mundane organizations agreed that much needed to be done in this field. The Bavarian Youth Committee and on the local level the Kreis Committees soon became actively involved in this task.48 In the fall of 1946 forty-two people in Nuremberg responded to a campaign to create an amateur theater group. They were just in time for the opening of a new fifty-six room youth

47 Monthly Report, Land Youth Committee to OMGBY, 14 Sep. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/10.

Translation of the Poster:

Attention Young People!
War and the collapse has brought much harm and misery to our youth. Nuremberg’s Youth Organizations are taking care of the fates and worries of all young people and are providing advice and help to all boys and girls! Everybody may come to our new COUNSELLING OFFICE which is open every Tuesday and Thursday from 5-7 p.m. in the orphanage at 34 Reutersbrunn Street.
Boys and girls come and see us!
The Kreis Youth Committee of the city of Nuremberg

48 Youth leadership training was one of the main concerns of one of the first German-American conferences on youth, 12-14 Sep. 1947 (for the minutes see NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 120, 5/293-1/7). Although the German Lutherans in general were reluctant to cooperate with other groups, they shared their concerns. See, for example, the presentation of German youth pastor Manfred Müller at a conference called by the Youth and Reconstruction Department of the World Council of Churches in Prisingen, Switzerland, 27-30 Oct. 1947 which Lawrence Norrie also attended (NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 150, 5/297-1/13).
Jugend gib acht!

Durch Krieg und Zusammenbruch ist viel Unheil und Not über unsere Jugend gekommen. Die Jugendorganisationen Nürnbergs nehmen sich der Geschehnisse und Not aller Jugendlichen an und stehen jedem Jungen und Mädel mit Rat und Hilfe bei!

Wende sich jeder mit seinen Anliegen an die neu errichtete BERATUNGSSTELLE die jeden Donnerstag von 17 bis 19 Uhr im Waisenhaus Nürnberg, Reutersbrunnenstraße 34/1, geöffnet ist.

Jungens und Mädels kommt zu uns!

DER KREIS-JUGENDAUSSCHUSS NÜRNBERG-STADT I.A.: A. STAUDT

15. Poster, Nuremberg Youth Committee, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/10)
leadership training center, Burg Feuerstein, located in a small town about thirty miles north of Nuremberg. The site actually belonged to the Catholic Church, but Military Government turned it over to the Bavarian Youth Committee specifically for training youth leaders. Feuerstein was just one of many leadership schools. In December five young Nurembergers went to Seeshaupt, a small town near Munich, to attend a leadership training course there.49

After the reorganization of the committee, the young people in charge announced in May 1947 their intention to create a youth parliament which would consist of representatives of various administrative offices, organized youth groups, and unorganized young people. Since a similar institution in Munich previously had led to utter chaos and quite turbulent scenes, the young people themselves decided to limit their agenda entirely to questions which concerned

49OMGBY, weekly report, "Youth Activities," 4 Sept. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 143, 5/296-1/17. "... und auf der Jugendburg Feuerstein," [... and in Feuerstein Youth Castle], NN, 26 Oct. 1946: 6. Actually Feuerstein was a Catholic institution which the Archbishop of Bamberg had officially handed over to young people in his diocese in September 1946 (Weekly Report, 27 July 1946, Group Activities Br.; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Act. Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/10). Judging from a common MG procedure, the Catholic Church probably would not have been able to reclaim the property if it had not opened the facilities to all youth.

List of participants of a youth leader training camp, 2-7 Dec. 1946 in Seeshaupt; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/3. Three of the five Nuremberg residents were university students, one was a secondary school student and one a medical assistant.
young people. City council members reacted to this development with "satisfaction" and, undoubtedly, relief.\textsuperscript{50}

Hans Eckstein represented the trade unions in this body. According to him, it functioned well and managed to discuss a wide variety of topics. Although this youth parliament did not attempt to run the city, it had a highly political agenda. Practical youth activities were rarely discussed. The young people rather focused on their legal status, their working conditions, and their training. According to Eckstein, adult council members of the different parties took the ideas of the young people up and included them in their own agendas.\textsuperscript{51}

Apart from the material support it received from Munich, the committee could count on very dedicated volunteers in the youth groups. The trade unions became one of the strongest pillars of the new structure. Denazification, the insecurity of factory owners and managers about their future, and Allied Control Council Directives actually had given the unions a strong position in the shops of which they immediately took advantage. They not only revived their organizations and initiated workers' councils, but also focused on bringing young people into their unions. During the first three years after the war, they were able to organize the great majority of young workers and apprentices in big and medium sized

\textsuperscript{50}Minutes of a meeting of the city welfare committee, 5 May 1947, Enclosure 9; NCA C 7/IX no. 1233; Füssl 126-129.

\textsuperscript{51}Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995.
factories. In September 1945 the trade union leaders appointed a youth secretary, Loni Burger, who immediately set out to revive youth activities. In the course of the next years trade union representatives were able to provide apprentices with remedial courses which they could take during working hours to make up for time and schooling they had lost during the war. They also began to cooperate closely with the Nuremberg vocational schools which apprentices were required to attend. This cooperation provided union leaders with the opportunity to reach out to all apprentices and keep them informed about their rights.\footnote{Grieb, ed. 8-19; see also Karl Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 July 1995.}

Surprisingly, cultural activities became the focal point of the unions' youth work. Burger and his colleagues recognized that political issues were important, but that young workers also needed to catch up with activities such as reading books which had been burnt during the Third Reich or becoming aware of culture in other realms during their free time. Trade union youth groups were among the first to develop programs for others. In November 1946 young people were invited to the first variety show with music, theater sketches, folk dances and poems, but also were invited to participate in an essay writing contest in which young people should develop their own ideas about democracy and their expectations from the trade union movement. Of course Loni
Burger did not pass up the occasion to inform the youngsters about the trade unions. It is noteworthy that Nuremberg's GYA officer Major Mark Selsor, not a member of the Military Government detachment, represented the Americans.53

Theater and public performances attracted many young people, but most of them preferred sports. In 1947 only twenty-nine of the 765 youth groups in Nuremberg were sports clubs, but over one third of all organized young people belonged to them. Willy Gensmantel, for example, began where he had left in 1933. He had been a member of a local workers' sports club and immediately upon his return from the United States began to organize a youth section of the local sports club in Fürth, where he was living.54

Most of the Nuremberg youth organizations who applied for licenses had existed before 1933. The first ten groups


54Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995. OMGBY, Det. B-211, Quarterly Historical Report, 20 Oct. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det B-211, Box 1425, 9/124-1/6. The number of 765 is astounding even for a city like Nuremberg. The reason for this number is that MG counted every single group within the youth organization of which it was part. Although the vast majority of young Germans belonged to the two major denominations, for example, the Nuremberg detachment listed 465 religious groups with about 10,000 members. With an average of about twenty persons, one suspects that this number not only included youth clubs, Boy Scouts and YMCA but also the churches' individual Sunday school classes. Either the churches registered every conceivable group with German thoroughness or the groups hoped to obtain more material support from the Kreis Youth Committee by registering individually. See also weekly report of Field Team, 17 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 37, 10/43-2/2.
were the Catholic Youth, the Choir and Orchestra Community of Nuremberg, Boy Scouts and various sports clubs, one of which did not obtain a license because one of its sponsors had been a member of the Nazi party. The trade unions, the Socialist Youth, and the Free German Youth had registered their activities with the city administration already in March 1946. The only new member of this group was the Free German Youth which obtained its license from German and American authorities without any problems.\textsuperscript{55} The churches simply revived their activities on a large scale. Workers not only revived their trade unions but also made cultural activities and sports programs a central part of their activities for young people. They made sure that young members immediately became involved in these activities and took care of organizing their peers to the largest possible degree. Interestingly, the communists took the lead in this postwar organizing drive. Karl Schmidbauer recalled that the local trade union youth committee initially consisted of seven members of the Free German Youth, which in Nuremberg was the equivalent of the Communist Party's youth organization, and only three Social Democrats.\textsuperscript{56} Traditional sports clubs, the

\textsuperscript{55}Memorandum from Eric Feiler, Det. B-211 ICD, to Chief of Intelligence, OMGBY, 25 Apr. 1946: results of a survey of 17 Apr. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Director, Box 17 10/110-1/12; OMGBY, Det B-211, Monthly Historical Report Oct. 46. NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.

\textsuperscript{56}Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995; Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995; Karl Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 July 1995; see also

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Nuremberg YMCA, as well as the Socialist Falken, could look back on a long tradition and relied on members from before 1933 who were willing to lend a hand in reconstruction. Apart from the Free German Youth, Nuremberg only witnessed the creation of one more newcomer, a German-American Youth club which became active in 1947. The great majority of the youth organizations relied on their traditional and well known ways.

American policy directives did not permit youth groups to become politically active. On first sight Germans in Nuremberg complied with this request. Americans kept a close eye on those who had a political background, such as the Falcons. Willy Prölß, for example, remembered that his group repeatedly ran into problems with Military Government representatives, because of its close affiliation with the Social Democratic Party.

Surprisingly, the Free German Youth did not suffer from the same type of scrutiny. Especially trade union members and those of the more moderate left recalled that FDJ members in Nuremberg seemed to have established a close relationship

Schmidbauer’s recollections in Grieb, ed. 8-11.

57 For the Falken see Willy Prölß, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994. Gerhard Knöchlein recalled the revival of the local YMCA (personal interview, 24 July 1994).

58 For the German-American Youth Club see chapter X, below.

with Major Selsor and the GYA who did not seem to mind their Communist background. News of the Free German Youth’s attempts at taking over youth work in Berlin and the Soviet Zone under Communist leadership also did not seem to affect their standing with the Americans in Nuremberg. Looking back, trade unionists and a former member of the Falcons recalled that Free German Youth members seemed to enjoy a somewhat preferential treatment.60

A closer look, however, reveals that all political parties had either youth committees or actually ran their own youth groups. American authorities in Nuremberg were aware of the situation but did not report any of them as officially registered by Military Government. Eric Feiler’s survey of April 1946 reveals that he obviously knew the men in charge of youth activities in all parties and was well informed about their work. Interestingly, only one of the party men in charge of youth thought that young people should actually become involved in political affairs. Even Hans Schubert, chairman of the most visible politically oriented youth

60See, for example, Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995; Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995; Willy Pröß, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994; Karl Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 July 1995. All four men volunteered this information without being asked about it. Eckstein thought that Americans probably targeted especially the Communists for re-education and therefore gave them a preferred treatment, while Pröß suspected that the better position of the Free German Youth was probably due to the good personal relationship between one of its leaders and Major Selsor. None of them was very happy that communists seemed to get more from the Americans than those groups who were truly democratic.
group, the Falcons, thought that political activities were not a good idea for young people, although all of the leading members were clearly and openly affiliated with the Social Democrats. It seems that the Falcons and possibly the other groups concentrated more on practicing democracy and teaching their members more about the political process than becoming involved in party politics. The Americans apparently were aware of this pattern and supported it. The Falcons maintained cordial relations with the local detachment throughout the occupation. 61

We have seen above that summer camps became an important means of providing young people from Nuremberg and in cities throughout the American zone with valuable recreation and additional calories. All youth groups became involved in hiking and organizing summer camps from 1946 on. In Nuremberg the Socialist youth group set up the first of its "Falcon Republics" next to the Feuerstein youth leader center. Other groups did the same. Trade unions were among the first groups to use youth hostels, Lutheran groups had

61 Memorandum from Eric Feiler, Det. B-211 ICD, to Chief of Intelligence, OMGBY, 25 Apr. 1946: results of a survey of 17 Apr. 1946; NA RG 260, OMGBY, ID, Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12. The Falcons repeatedly invited Lieutenant Callicott, who apparently was in charge of youth activities in 1946/47, to their meetings and activities. See, for example, their invitation to their first state wide conference in Nuremberg of 18 Mar. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Box 1415, Det. B-211, 9/127-1/16.
their camps near a castle not far from the city. The YMCA did its share of camping as well.62

Camping only offered a partial solution to the recovery needs of young people. Permanent constructions could be used year round not only for camping but also for retreats and leadership training. Burger, who also was a leading member of the youth hostel organization in Nuremberg, was able to have some of the buildings which had belonged to the organization before 1933 released. Hans Eckstein became the man in charge of organizing everything necessary for getting the buildings ready for operation again. He spent half a year travelling throughout Bavaria soliciting donations. Eckstein was able to bring the necessary items together. His work earned trade union groups the right to be among the first ones to use the reopened facilities.63

These efforts notwithstanding, space for youth activities and for leadership training remained at a premium. Youth organizations, the city administration as well as the churches all were looking for suitable places to provide young people with the necessary accommodations. In 1947 a


GYA youth group stumbled across an old castle in the vicinity of Nuremberg which was almost ideally located and offered enough space for establishing a youth hostel and training facilities for the city. After an initial cleaning by American women, young trade unionists, as well as members of the Peace Village, volunteered their time to reconstruct the old buildings, install plumbing, heating and other amenities needed for year round operation of youth castle Hoheneck. The Land Youth Committee initially leased the property, but Nuremberg later took it over for its youth groups, as well as youth leadership training. The city also used Hoheneck as training site for its own employees.\(^6\)

As usual the churches preferred to have their own facilities. Due to Military Government regulations the Catholic Church shared Feuerstein Castle with other youth organizations, but some groups, such as the Lutherans, wanted their own places. In December 1947 Carl Schweitzer, one of the leading men of the largest Protestant welfare organization in Germany, the \textit{Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen in Deutschland}, approached various OMGUS officials in Berlin and Bavaria about a project of rehabilitating yet another castle in the vicinity of Nuremberg, named Hohenstein. Schweitzer apparently was aware of American

\(^6\)June Selsor, \textit{Is the German Youth a Lost Cause?} (Manuscript, typewritten, 1950, in possession of the author) 16-18; Grieb, ed. 43-45; \textit{Erinnerungen aus der Stadtverwaltung 50}, Illustration 66.
support of leadership training and proposed that OMGUS sponsor the construction of a Christian leadership camp at the site. Lawrence Norrie forwarded the proposal to the WCC in Geneva, but did not find any support there. Clearly unhappy that the youth section and not religious affairs had approached him, Robert Tobias of the WCC declined to sponsor the project. He suggested to make the center a joint venture with other youth organizations, especially since Schweitzer seemed to have acted on his own behalf rather than in any official capacity for the EKD. OMGBY officials endorsed Schweitzer's plan after a visit of the castle in February 1948, but apparently wanted other youth groups to become involved just as Tobias had suggested. They explained to Schweitzer that they would not sponsor the project or requisition materials for it and referred him to the Land Youth Committee for further consultations which also proved to be disappointing for Schweitzer. Apparently the two concepts were too far apart for compromise. For the time being, nothing came of his proposal.65

The Nuremberg Youth Show

In spite of all difficulties, Marx and other members of the city administration were determined to make the best of

the situation and to demonstrate to the public the importance of youth work as well as its successes to date. In September 1947 the city administration informed Major Selsor, whom it apparently regarded as the man in charge of all American youth activities in the city, that Nuremberg was planning to organize a youth show for the coming year and asked for support. Selsor forwarded the request to OMGUS headquarters in Munich. The people in charge of youth activities there thought that it was a good idea, provided that such an exhibition was "proposed and desired by German youth and responsibility is definitely assumed by them, through their schools and organizations and through the Stadt- and Land Kreis Committees". Military Government did not think that the occupiers should participate in such a venture "with displays in order not to confuse the issues," but exempted extracurricular contacts between young Americans and youth groups from that rule. Detachment F-211 also endorsed all assistance the Nuremberg Military Post would be able to provide.66

During the following months the project made progress. With American endorsement assured, planning went ahead. In December Marx informed the American authorities in Munich that the city would put the youth house, which was still

under construction in a bunker, at the exhibition’s disposal. Contrary to Military Government wishes he told OMGBY headquarters that the city council also had decided to "charge the Municipal Administrative Board of Nuremberg with the preparation and the execution of the exhibition." Neither currency reform which the Western Allies carried out in June, nor the resulting Berlin crisis could stop the project. In August 1948 the youth show opened its doors to the public. In their introductory remarks Marx and Andreas Staudt, the two leading men in charge of youth affair in Nuremberg, discussed the dire situation in which young people found themselves in 1948. According to them, nobody knew if the currency reform would kill or heal the economy. Apart from that officials did not refer to the present political situation but rather attempted to show educators, youth leaders, and the general public what young people as well as the city authorities had been able to create in spite of the immense misery in the city. They also tried to show what would be necessary to create a solid future for the generation which would have to shoulder Germany’s reconstruction.67

67"Youth Show 1948 in Nuernberg," memorandum from Theodor Marx, representing the Nuremberg City Council, 15 Dec. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 42, 10/44-1/5; official program of the Nuremberg Youth Show, Aug. 1948: 1-6; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Branch, Box 121, 5/293-1/9; see also "Youth Exhibition Nuernberg 1948," Jugendnachrichten des Bayerischen Jugendringes, August 1948: 3.
The Nuremberg show demonstrated that Nuremberg indeed had made some progress towards the democratization and elimination of old habits which American authorities regarded as essential for the spiritual recuperation of Germany. Otto Barthel, one of Nuremberg's school superintendents, pointed out that for the first time in the city's history many different organizations had cooperated to make the show possible. The group charged with its organization had been able to enlist the help of many departments within the city administration, the regional government, and the Kreis Youth Committee. Almost all of Nuremberg's youth groups, including the Free German Youth, contributed with theater plays, musical performances, or folk dance evenings. Distinguished speakers informed the public about youth related topics ranging from welfare and guardianship of homeless young people to their health and, of course, the school system. Films completed the effort.68

The public could have a first hand look at the achievements in twenty-seven rooms of one of the city's rehabilitated school houses. Six rooms dealt with practical elementary school work, explaining the importance of new forms of teaching for the formation of young children. Adequate nutrition was extremely important, so the Hoover plan which helped to provide Nuremberg's children with

urgently necessary additional calories had its own room in the exhibition, in which many children's drawings expressed their gratitude. The health department, youth office, youth radio, as well as the youth organizations occupied additional rooms. To help young people in their job search, the city's vocational schools and industry occupied a quarter of the available space. Following Munich's instructions neither the local MG detachment nor GYA participated in the show.⁶⁹

The city's initiative found a positive echo. Under the headline "Youth Show 1948 - Symbol of Hope" one of the local newspapers provided its readers with detailed information about the exhibition. An American observer also found that the effort was a "good one" and recommended that American representatives visit the show which was just a ten minute walk away from the Palace of Justice. In 1948 it not only housed the IMT personnel but also the OMGUS Community Education Branch which had just moved from Berlin to Nuremberg.⁷⁰

American officials also could be satisfied with the outlook of Nuremberg's school administrators. They proposed to incorporate modern concepts of teaching into the

⁶⁹Official program of the Nuremberg Youth Show, Aug. 1948: 12-20; NA RG 260, OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Branch, Box 121, 5/293-1/9.

⁷⁰Report on the Opening Meeting of the Nuernberg Jugendschau 1948, [August 1948] (Lawrence Norrie received the program together with the report); NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Branch, Box 121, 5/293-1/9.
exhibition. History teachers would no longer dwell upon political and militaristic subjects, but focus on the history of civilization. Civics or Social Sciences for the first time found attention as a "very up to date" subject. Geography would serve as a vehicle to become acquainted with other peoples and to demonstrate the interdependence of the world's community. Teachers would also discuss "universal reconciliation" in geography classes.\(^7\)

The show also demonstrated that Nuremberg still had a long way to go. In typically German fashion the authorities planned the enterprise and occupied most of the exhibition's space. The organizing committee consisted entirely of administrators. Marx and his colleagues never asked young people for their ideas for an exhibition which was dedicated to them. Youth organizations were relegated to organizing the entertainment section of the show. Clearly adults had made the exhibition for adults to inform them about activities and possibilities in the realm of youth work.\(^7\)

\(^7\)"Youth Show 1948 in Nuernberg," memorandum from Theodor Marx, representing the Nuremberg City Council, 15 Dec. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 42, 10/44-1/5. Interestingly, the proposal for geography did not talk about "nations" but preferred "peoples." This wording may be an indicator for a turn away from the power politics approach which had promoted chauvinism and an extreme nationalism towards the neutral concepts based on ethnology and anthropology.

\(^7\)Willy Gensmantel described Marx as a very energetic man who undoubtedly invested much of his energy in youth activities but who also in some ways remained in the traditional ways of thinking. According to Gensmantel, Marx expected young people to accept and respect his authority.
In the immediate postwar period, however, young people were not yet ready to tackle these issues. They had more pressing practical problems. The food situation remained desperate. Many facilities, gymnasiums, and sport fields were either destroyed or requisitioned. Youth groups also did not have equipment, shoes, or clothing for sports. There were no tents or food for camps. Travelling even to the immediate vicinity of the city remained difficult. Only the occupiers seemed to have everything. And they helped out.

without any questions (Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995).
CHAPTER IX

American Assistance at the Grass Roots, 1946-1955

Although the American presence in Nuremberg caused some problems and hard feelings towards the new rulers, it also opened many opportunities for the German population. The occupiers did much to alleviate the dire situation. In addition to that the Americans modified but continued their reorientation efforts. Many Germans used the increasing opportunities to become acquainted with American history, politics, and culture. Most of the programs were designed for the entire population, but all of them included special features for the young people. The younger generation benefitted disproportionally from American jobs, food programs, and support for its activities. These contacts not only provided additional calories, but also quite favorable impressions.

Working for the Occupiers

Large-scale black market activities or prostitution were not the only ways to become involved with Americans. In spite of negative feelings which a considerable number of Nurembergers seemed to harbor towards the occupiers, many others, among them a large number of young people, did not mind either officially earning their living by working for the armed forces, or doing their share of dealing with the occupiers on a much more innocent, if not always legal,
basis. Getting a job with the occupiers was enormously attractive because it meant that food would almost be sure to be on the table. According to a woman, at the time twenty years old, nobody was concerned with furthering his career after the war, but everybody had to fight for survival. Her husband took up a job as a janitor with the Army in 1946 which he kept for the next three years.  

Heiko Kistner, nineteen years old in 1946, also had to look for employment immediately after his return to Nuremberg, because his father was still in an allied prison camp. Since he had worked for the Americans before, he decided to look for a job with them again. Kistner slowly worked his way up from dishwasher to waiter in an American club. When he applied for a job, he observed that Americans handled everything in a much more casual manner than German authorities. Papers of the past of a candidate did not seem to interest the soldiers in charge of hiring. They employed people based on their impressions and on the Germans' ability to communicate in English. Kistner never obtained official release papers from the Army or from a prisoner of war camp, for example, but the Americans never asked for them. He soon found a job in the Army's special services' entertainment section. Between 1946 and 1948 Kistner travelled with German floorshows as master of ceremonies to units stationed across northern Bavaria to entertain them. He was not only

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{Mrs. H., personal interview, 1988; NCA C104 no. 2.}\]
responsible for arranging the shows, but also for the welfare of the troupe. According to him, the artists were international, but rarely American. Since he only worked at night, he was able to support his family and finish his secondary school education at the same time. Kistner's employment with American troops ended with the currency reform of 1948.²

Kistner also learned an unexpected lesson from the Americans after American Military Police had arrested him for illegal possession of foreign currency and brought him to the American court. When the judge entered the court, he stood at attention until the judge asked him why he did not stand at ease. This remark made him aware of the deep roots the training of the Hitler Youth and in the military had in him. At that moment he decided to eliminate the Third Reich's remaining influences on him.

Kistner recalled that he never got into close relations with American soldiers. He did have some friends with whom he went on sightseeing tours around Nuremberg, but in general he saw enough Americans doing his job. He maintained his distance from the Americans, because, according to him, a psychological barrier prevented him from seeking too much contact with them. After all they were the occupiers and the Germans were the occupied. Apart from that, working and

going to school at the same time did not leave him much room for other activities.3

Johannes Wahner also began to work for the Americans in 1946 at age seventeen. He obtained a job with the Army through the local Labor Office. During the next years he did a variety of jobs which ranged from packing and crating the possessions of soldiers who returned home, to handiwork. Since he was living in one of the largest and poorest refugee camps, he constantly was searching for something they might be able to use. He remembered that occasionally he had "organized" things before, but when he started to have a regular income he did not have to steal anymore. According to him, most of the time the Americans were very willing to help him out anyway. When he asked, for example, if he could take home some wood from crates which the Americans were discarding so he could heat his accommodations, he promptly received a paper that he could do so. Instead of just the one crate, however, the soldiers loaded one of their GMC trucks with wood and took Wahner and his treasure home. He retained his job with the Army until the 1950s, when he joined the German border police forces.4

His job did not only provide Wahner with work and opportunities to organize valuable commodities for his family and the refugee camp, but also enabled him to experience

American culture firsthand. According to him, American parties, to which German employees and their friends or families also were admitted, were very popular. For a nominal fee one could indulge in unheard of quantities of food, but also could mingle with Americans, listen to American music, and dance. Some personal relationships started in these events. Wahner remembered how he met a very attractive African-American lady on one of these occasions. They began to see each other more often. The affair became so serious that Wahner decided to introduce the lady to his parents and began contemplating emigration to the United States, obviously without being fully aware of the situation he would have to deal with overseas.

While all of his friends envied him for going out with a very attractive American lady, his parents displayed much less enthusiasm for the affair. Although his father, a carpenter, also had shortly worked for the Army, he did not share his son’s attitude towards the occupiers. Wahner remembered that his father was quite embarrassed by pictures of nudes in a bar which he helped to furnish for GIs. He became suspicious about American morality in general, but the deciding factor for him was the color the girlfriend’s skin. Going out with a black woman was too much for Wahner’s parents who, according to him, were unable to overcome their deeply rooted racial prejudices. Left with the choice of losing his family or ending the relationship, he opted for
the latter. Fifty years later Wahner still regretted the way this encounter had ended.\(^5\)

Germans who were able to play an instrument also had a good chance of finding employment and food with the occupiers. Hanns Bader and H. Wisura, seventeen and nineteen years old in 1946, began earning a living playing jazz and swing music for the occupiers. Since sheet music was not available and the Nazis had outlawed jazz as "degenerate," listening to the latest songs on the American Forces Network became vital for the musicians' success. Wisura successfully played the piano as a soloist, whereas Bader was one of thousands of young men who joined one of the many jazz and swing bands in the Nuremberg area and throughout the American zone. Playing this new music was more than simply earning a living. Bader began to collect swing and jazz records and made the music a lifelong hobby.\(^6\)

Bader was not alone in this passion. Ironically, the Germans got to know the light and easygoing music of Glenn Miller and Benny Goodman as well as jazz and George Gershwin's compositions at a difficult time and when the American audience actually had passed on to something new.


Nevertheless this new style of music became an immediate and long lasting success in the American zone of occupation. AFN helped to disseminate the new music and seems to have attracted more German than American listeners. Serious Jazz fans soon opened their own club which featured live entertainment and long jam sessions of German and American musicians, many of whom were GIs.7

Even those who would not tune in to the American radio station got their share of the new music. The "Ten of the Week," which brought almost exclusively American songs from 1946 on, became one of the most popular programs for young people on the German radio station in Munich. In spite of the paper shortage the station received about 1200 letters

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each month, many of them requesting particular songs. An OMGUS survey found in December 1947 that about 70% of all young people listened to the radio. Under 10% of those between ten and seventeen years of age listened to the news, but 57% listened to music which was not considered to be serious. An additional 37% declared that they listened to school and youth programs which undoubtedly also included broadcasts such as "Ten of the Week." 78% of those between eighteen and twenty-five listened to the non-serious section of the German radio music scene as well. Since the broadcasting landscape in Germany did not have much variety to offer, it is reasonable to assume that a good sized part of the light music listeners tuned in to AFN or programs such as the "Ten of the Week" which proved to be popular all over Europe. The OMGUS Radio Control Branch reported that the program had fans in Great Britain, Switzerland, Norway and Holland. According to one lady in Nuremberg, the new music simply went "into your legs."

AFN was probably the most popular radio station in the American zone and West Berlin for young people. It did not just provide the latest music but also represented an entirely new way of using the radio. Winfried Blümel,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{8}}\text{Marga Guthmann, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1994; Radio Control Branch, OMBGY to ICD, Monthly After-Action Report, 1-30 Nov. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Historical Reports, Box 56, 10/66-1/2; the survey is in OMGUS, ICD Opinion Surveys, Report No. 99, 5 Mar. 1948: 12, 16; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/13.}\]
fourteen years old in 1946, for example, became fascinated with the way American disc jockeys were able to communicate. According to him, the Germans still made radio news an affair of state, while the Americans provided news and information in a much more relaxed, but no less credible manner. Blümel felt that AFN often was able to reach its listeners in ways unthinkable in German programs. He recalled that one night he was listening to AFN in bed when he suddenly heard a serious voice asking "are you smoking in bed?" and alerting its listeners to the dangers of doing so. Since Blümel had a lit cigarette in his hand exactly at that time, the message got immediately through. AFN remained his and many others' favorite radio station well into the sixties, when German and other European broadcasters began to introduce programs which emulated the American example.⁹

Wisura's job as musician was not his only source of income from the occupiers. It also enabled him to initiate his own business. Like many other people, he became involved in illegal activities with the occupiers in order to survive. Alcoholic beverages seemed to be an especially attractive field of trade. Kistner was able to obtain the gasoline he

needed to return to Nuremberg through his trade with schnapps. Wisura had to adapt to different tastes to become successful. Americans did not like the high percentage schnapps distilled from fruit he obtained, so he diluted his raw material with water, colored it with sugar caramel and sold it as cognac in appropriately labelled bottles. Apparently his product was popular. Wisura recalled that one of his best costumers was a member of a Military Police unit. His neighbors soon got used to the regular appearance of an MP in full uniform mounted on his heavy motorcycle who came to refuel at Wisura's house.\textsuperscript{10}

In 1951 Wisura exchanged the work at the piano with a job in the photo laboratory of an American air base. He recalled that the sergeant in charge of the facility did not ask for any papers, but rather wanted to see if Wisura would be able to do the job. Soon, he did not just develop films, but also took photos for the Air Force. After hours he was often invited to American parties and remembered well that the sergeant had no problem entrusting him with his new American car to bring intoxicated guests home.\textsuperscript{11}

Wisura stayed on the air base until Washington returned it to the new German \textit{Luftwaffe} in the late 1950s. Although

\textsuperscript{10}H. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994. Maar (24) and Kistner (personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994) stated that this kind of activities was by no means exceptional in Nuremberg.

\textsuperscript{11}H. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994.
the Germans wanted him to continue his work, he was highly disillusioned with their behavior and with the new atmosphere on the base. While the American sergeant had run the entire photo laboratory in a rather informal but very efficient manner, the Germans needed an officer for the task who introduced a very authoritarian and inflexible work environment. Even worse, Wisura witnessed that the German air men developed an attitude towards their American partners which he found objectionable. He recalled that the Americans cordially received the first Germans who arrived at the base to prepare the takeover. They were invited to the clubs and even to the homes of their allies, and the German soldiers, outcasts just a few years earlier, were grateful. As soon as the new German Luftwaffe was in control of the base, however, the remaining Americans had to bear the brunt of a reemerging self-confidence and arrogance which Wisura could not accept. According to him, the German air men at the base were aloof and did not even allow American officers in their clubs. Wisura remembered that the U.S. Air Force officers who were treated in such a way began to wonder if American policy makers had not made a serious mistake in permitting rearmament. Wisura preferred to leave such an environment and looked for work elsewhere.\textsuperscript{12}

During the 1940s Hans Eckstein also at times had a commodity available which he could convert into American

\textsuperscript{12}H. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994.
cigarettes. The prosecutor in one of the war crimes trials in Nuremberg ordered him to appear repeatedly at his office to provide him with information about the situation in the factories during the Third Reich. To get to the International Military Tribunal (IMT) building at the other end of the city, the company provided Eckstein with a car. When he was returning to the factory for the first time, he gave GIs a ride who were stationed near his workplace. To his surprise the soldiers gave him packs of cigarettes, the unofficial currency in the American zone, for his service. From that moment on Eckstein never failed to take an American soldier along, sometimes repeating his trips between the IMT and the factory several times before going back to work.13

Not only men found employment with the American forces. Two sisters who had just returned to the city also applied for a job with the Americans in 1945. Both started to work in a Red Cross club for African-American soldiers. They quickly overcame their initial apprehensions when they found out that the different culture and different behavior of African-Americans did not in any way interfere with their jobs. Working for the occupiers not only meant that they got additional calories and became acquainted with exotic drinks such as Coca Cola, but, according to them, it also saved the life of their mother who could not eat the German bread due to a serious health problem. The white bread from the club

which the sisters were saving for her every day helped her survive. Both continued to work for the Americans in different capacities when the club closed in 1947.\textsuperscript{14}

Friedrich Voigt's wife also helped support the family by working for the American forces. According to him, she found a job in the kitchen of a club next to the train station. The work there enabled her to bring hamburgers and real coffee home, which not only served as a welcome commodity, but also as a precious exchange object. Voigt recalled that on occasion the women were allowed to bring their families along and that there were special parties for the children.

A job with the Americans could lead to more extensive contacts. While working at the club, Voigt's wife also got to know a GI whose parents had emigrated from Denmark to the United States. The Voigt family was able to provide a room for his girlfriend who had followed him from Alsace-Lorraine. Johnny showed his appreciation by providing them with many amenities. They got corned beef and one time could have a party with a fifty liter barrel of "real" beer which a Nuremberg brewery made only for the occupiers. The contact continued even after Johnny moved into a requisitioned apartment. Voigt helped him repair the house's heating system and in return Johnny kept him equipped with shoes as well as blankets and thread which the Germans could transform

into Bavarian costumes and coats. Voigt was impressed with the quality of the products. He kept some of the thread for almost fifty years.\textsuperscript{15}

Working for the occupiers was by no means an isolated phenomenon. During the first three years after the war the Army was one of the largest employers in the Nuremberg region. In the period from October to December 1947, for example, over 28,000 Germans worked for the American forces stationed in and around the city.\textsuperscript{16}

These numbers did not include jobs Germans were doing for American soldiers on a private basis. Many Nurembergers began to do the laundry for American soldiers. The GIs usually paid in cigarettes or food. Hans Wahner remembered that many refugees were able to obtain additional calories in this way, but that the business was not always easy. Occasionally GIs did not come up with their end of the bargain. It is interesting to note that—according to Wahner—African-American troops had a reputation for never cheating the Germans. This might account in part for the

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{15}Friedrich Voigt, personal interview, 26 July 1994.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{16}Headquarters, Nuremberg Military Post, Quarterly Operations, Fourth Quarter 1947, Section V - Logistical Support; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 118.
increased activities German authorities noticed around African-American clubs.\textsuperscript{17}

**American Help**

Marx and the city council did their utmost to carry the city and its citizens through desperate times, but both the administration and many Germans had to rely on the occupiers for their survival. Whenever the situation became serious, Nuremberg officials had no other way but to appeal to Americans for help. During 1946 and 1947 Nuremberg's mayor Levié repeatedly asked for assistance with the city's wood cutting program. In clear reference to the Army's disease and unrest formula, Levié informed the commander of the local infantry regiment that "15-20 big trucks with motor fuel" for the transport of wood would be enough to avoid the outbreak of epidemics.\textsuperscript{18}

As we have seen, the Army usually complied with these requests, but American trucks did not just transport wood. Whenever the Nuremberg city administration was unable to provide the necessary transport facilities, a call at the local detachment was enough to send American trucks out to secure supplies from the region. In November 1946, for example, a shortage of tires had left 50 of the city's 90

\textsuperscript{17}Johannes Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995; see also "Nescafe als Lohn für Englischunterricht," [Nescafe was salary for English lessons] *Trümmerjahre*: 6.

\textsuperscript{18}Mayor Levié to Colonel Williams, Commander, 26th Inf., Nuremberg-Fürth enclave, 12 Sept. 1946; *Nürnberg 1945-1949*, II, doc. 165c; see also docs. 165a, b, d.
trucks immobilized. During the next weeks the Army took over. Every day about a hundred trucks, "including drivers and gasoline," went to the surrounding villages to pick up the food the city needed. When shipments were not yet ready, the truck drivers did not hesitate to help with packing and loading the precious commodities. Mayor Leivié publicly thanked the American authorities and tactical units for their support.19

Young people found that American vehicles could alleviate the public transport crisis in a more informal way. Heinz Fiegl lived in a little town just out of Nuremberg after the war. Since public transport to the village was not yet reopened, he had to find other means of transportation. Luckily for him an American transport unit was stationed nearby so that many trucks commuted between the city and their base. Fiegl remembered that he never had a problem getting a ride back home, especially since this was a Black unit and African-Americans tended to be more cooperative in this respect than white GIs.20

Detachment B-211 also had to deal with requests which were harder to fulfill. In December 1947 the director of the


20Heinz Fiegl, personal interview, 6 July 1995.
city food office described the situation of provisions to the local Military Government detachment. The severe drought during the previous summer had made an already very poor situation even worse. According to the director, the city did not even have enough potatoes to satisfy the need of December. People had not seen vegetables for months. Basically all available foodstuffs were cut to the bare bone. If American flour or grain would not arrive soon, there would be serious problems by the end of January, he warned. Beyond that, only massive American supplies would be able to prevent the impending catastrophe.²¹

It is not clear how American officials reacted to this specific plea, but their help was forthcoming. As usual young people were the first to benefit from it. During the summer of 1946 the city had initiated an emergency feeding program for children who were getting dangerously close to starvation. The city's program only reached about 15% of the school children but, according to Marx, 90% of them showed signs of malnourishment. In July the first help arrived. Marx informed the city council about a feeding program for children with American supplies.²² This private relief help enabled the city to expand its program by October 1946 but it was scheduled to last just two months. Although it provided

²² "Kinderspeisung," in minutes of welfare committee meetings, 18, 25 July 1946; NCA C7/IX no. 1232.
660,000 meals, the program was not large enough for improving the situation significantly. Nevertheless it halted the downward spiral. Of the 30,000 children who benefitted from the program less than 10% lost weight and about 20% maintained their weight, but the 70% who gained weight only showed a maximum increase of a little more than a pound. To make such a program work it would be necessary to carry it out for a much longer time.\textsuperscript{23}

By April 1947 much more substantial help was on the way. Marx later reported gratefully how the American government came to the rescue with former President Herbert Hoover's plan. In April the city dispatched sixty trucks to the port of Bremen to pick up the first shipment of food for the children. From April through September 1947 all school children between six and eighteen years of age participated in the program. In spite of cuts during the following school year, 85% of all children---about 47,000---still were able to get additional calories at school. In 1947/48 the Hoover plan provided Nuremberg's children with more than twelve million meals.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{23}MG Detachment B-211, Intelligence Report, 18 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.

\textsuperscript{24}"Die Schulspeisung in Nürnberg," [The School Feeding Program in Nuremberg] Councilman Dr. Marx to MG Ansbach, Mr. Thomson, 1 June 1948: 1-2; Nürnberg 1945-49, II, doc. 182b; for details on the transport see MG Detachment B-211, Intelligence Report, 18 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.
Currency reform ended the worst crisis, but the American plan remained in place until 1950. By then the number of recipients had dropped to 30,000 and the city administration was able to continue the feeding program with its own resources. During the next two years the number of needy children declined dramatically. In 1951 only 13,500 students received additional meals at school, by 1952 the number dropped to 4,000. During the next eight years the city only provided a nutritious breakfast and subsidized milk sales at schools.\(^{25}\)

Many ordinary Nurembergers found ways to express their opinions about the American food program. The newspaper printed a little girl's description of the first days of the "Hoover Feeding" in her school in 1947. According to her, all children in her class were very excited about the additional meal they were about to get. The girl and her fellow students enjoyed the variety and taste of the food, above all the chocolate they received. When the paper printed a letter to the editor from a lady who complained about the taste and the presentation of the food in her neighborhood school, it got an immediate and overwhelmingly positive reaction. One mother wrote: "I think that I speak in the interest of many mothers when I say that it is about time not to criticize in an ugly manner all the time. In

\(^{25}\)Barthel 73.
this case the American state really tries to help our youth."

Aid from private organizations also received much attention in the local news. The Nürnberger Nachrichten reported in detail about the first shipment of food the AFSC sent from New York in March 1946. In April the press informed its readers about the formation of CRALOG under the headline "American Gifts for the US-Zone." Throughout the next years the newspaper updated its readers on the quantity of CARE parcels and other relief shipments. When CARE terminated the program fourteen years later, Germans had received nearly ten million CARE packages.

In Nuremberg CARE parcels reached their recipients in many different ways. The families of workers of an American owned factory, for example, were probably very pleased when each of the workers found a CARE parcel at his workplace shortly before Christmas 1947 which the owner and of the plant and workers of his American factories had sent. In August 1948 Congressman Louis Warbington arrived at

26"Es schmeckt fein!" [It Tastes Great!] NN, 3 May 1947: 5; "Klagen über Kinderspeisung," [Complaints About Child Feeding Program] NN, 17 May 1947: 3; "Alle helfen mit," [Everybody Pitches in] NN, 4 Jun. 1947: 3; all of the interviewees who were students at that time expressed their gratitude for the additional calories of the Hoover program.

Nuremberg with 1,000 CARE parcels for the suffering population. He had collected 50,000 Dollars from his constituents in Ohio. This was enough to provide eight of the hardest hit cities in the American zone with 1,000 parcels, all of which included the addresses of the donors. It is safe to assume that a considerable increase in mail to Ohio took place during the following months. Undoubtedly some longer lasting exchanges of letters especially among young people were the result, opening an avenue for widening horizons on both sides of the Atlantic.28

In spite of all American efforts the demand always seemed to exceed relief shipments from the United States. Throughout 1946 and 1947 the headquarters of the most important Lutheran Church's relief organization in Bavaria, the Innere Mission, was swamped with requests from Lutheran kindergartens throughout the state who asked to be included in the feeding program it was administering for the Americans. The Nuremberg office could only answer that not enough was available for everyone and that especially the rural areas would have to rely on their own resources.29

Tactical units as well as individuals also did their share in offering relief to the needy. In 1946 the Bavarian


29LCA Diakonisches Werk 1742, Schulspeisung.
Ministry of the Interior informed the state's youth office that American families living in Bavaria were planning to present German families with Christmas presents. Local authorities were advised to name deserving orphanages, refugee camps or kindergartens close to the American bases. Nuremberg responded with a long list which the city sent express mail to Munich with names and addresses of kindergartens, refugee camps, the city's school for the blind and hospitals.30

Nuremberg's children were not disappointed. In December the Nürnberger Nachrichten reported on its special page for young people that GIs were "Diligent Workers for Santa Claus." In Nuremberg and Fürth alone, Americans invited about 10,000 children for the first time to Christmas parties. The soldiers were busy making presents for older and younger people, but were also gathering candy and money which they would invest in the much desired CARE parcels for German families. American parties and gifts for needy children became a standard feature of Nuremberg's Christmas preparations during the next decades, although their importance diminished with the returning prosperity after currency reform.31


31 "Fleißige Helfer des Weihnachtsmannes: Amerikanische Soldaten sorgen für strahlende Kinderaugen," [Diligent Helpers of Santa Klaus: American Soldiers make Childrens'
Tactical troops did not limit their efforts to Christmas parties. A GYA youth club sponsored by a unit stationed in the city had an idea of providing support for undernourished children of an orphanage and the soldiers put the plan to action. In March 1947 the unit set aside a building for the care of ten orphans who not only received "donated food," but also went through a special exercise program. Army doctors supervised the program which the soldiers expanded from ten to twenty children and reported "excellent results." As usual, Military Government's policy makers needed some time to catch up with the actions in the field, but by September 1947 headquarters signalled that it was not opposed to welfare activities as long as the troops cooperated with German authorities and provided "qualified personnel for liaison." GYA personnel in Roth, a town in the vicinity of Nuremberg, had no problems with the directive. They not only established a visiting program for young patients at the local hospital, but also donated much needed additional calories. Interestingly, the page on which the paper reported about the GYA activity also displayed an ad that admonished German farmers to produce more milk in view of the fact that Americans were making sacrifices to help the Germans.32 Even the children of the American families in

Eyes Shine] NN, 7 Dec. 1946; see also Maar 30-31.

32USFET, GYA Report for March 1947, 30 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9; Memo, D. Sims, OMGUS Internal Affairs, 15 Sept. 1947; NA RG
Nuremberg pitched in. They enlisted the help of the German Red Cross to organize an Easter party for young Nurembergers in 1947.\(^3\)

**Escaping the City**

American support became not just important for obtaining food, but also was crucial for assuring the success of German summer camps. The Nuremberg Military Post cooperated closely with Detachment B-211 in this venture and enjoyed full support from headquarters. Directives in 1947 and 1948 instructed military post commanders in the American zone and Berlin to render all possible help to German youth groups with personnel, transportation and supplies. Units could sponsor their own camps if they did not find German organizers.\(^4\)

With Army support the Nuremberg Youth Committee became the city's largest sponsor of youth camps. In 1947 the Nuremberg GYA officer received 100 tons of camping material

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\(^3\) Signal Corps Photo, 28 Mar. 1947; NA RG 111 Still Photo Collection, U.S. Army Signal Corps [hereinafter SC] 1941-1954, Box 131, 28 30 15. All Signal Corps Photos not only provide visual evidence but also have detailed information about the captured events on the reverse side.

\(^4\) [EUCOM] Summer Camp Bulletin No. I [early 1947]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2; Directive from EUCOM to: All Theater Commanders, 13 Apr. 1948, subject: Army Assistance to German Youth Activities, Summer Camping Programs; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 128, 5/294-1/16.
which he turned over to the youth committee. All equipment initially came from captured enemy stocks or from Army surplus. The equipment was incomplete, arrived late, and sometimes was in a sorry state, but the Army provided the materials at no cost. Since the German corporation which handled the released materials had come under harsh criticism for overcharging youth organizations for the equipment they needed and refused to sell any more material to youth organizations in 1948, EUCOM drafted an extensive list of Army materials it wanted to distribute among German groups before they would be released to the German economy. Over 60,000 tents, 18,000 cooking stoves and more than 600,000 sleeping bags were slated for the 1948 summer program in the American zone and Berlin. Headquarters also "encouraged" post commanders "to authorize the loan of unit expendable or non-expendable supplies for assistance to summer camping programs." As a result the big American troop tents as well as smaller versions became an indispensable part of every German youth camp and were deeply appreciated. Germans cleaned their drinking water with American tablets, acquired field kitchens and the necessary fuel for them, and they received food from American stocks, but even this source could not satisfy all German wishes. The local Military Government detachment had to deny a Lutheran reverend's
request for an entire field kitchen he wanted for his rather small Christian boy scout group.  

Occasionally it took the experience of those who had been exposed to American culture before to use American utensils correctly. One reverend reported that it would take time for young people to learn to construct their camp with the American equipment. Young people who camped with Willy Gensmantel did not have these problems, since his internment in the United States had introduced him to everything they saw for the first time. He not only helped them with the construction of their tents, but also made sure that they properly used previously unknown products. Food was one of the essentials for the summer camps, but the Army also made sure that boys and girls took care of hygiene by providing them with soap, toothpaste, tooth brushes, and other items. Since all of them had English labels, some mishaps were inevitable. In one camp a boy used tanning lotion as shaving

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creme, much to the delight of his comrades. Children in a trade union camp thought that American toothpaste was mint candy and ate it instead of brushing their teeth. It took Gensmantel some time to set the matter straight.36

Americans also tried to alleviate the lack of facilities for youth organizations. The local youth committee, Falcons, Trade Union Youth, and many other groups used facilities requisitioned by the Army for youth or sports activities without any charges. When Willy Gensmantel needed a gymnasium for his sports club in neighboring Fürth, he found an understanding sergeant in charge of youth activities who secured the necessary facilities from the local unit.37

Mark Selsor, the officer in charge of the American Army’s GYA program in Nuremberg, actively took part in decorating the bunker the city had handed over to youth and successfully intervened with his superiors on behalf of the Nuremberg youth groups when the Army was going to destroy the


bunker just shortly before its official inauguration in 1948.38

Youth groups desperately needed equipment for their activities and once more the Army provided help. Skis, backpacks and some sports equipment came from captured enemy stocks, balls and uniforms from American surplus, but in spite of pooling all these resources the Nuremberg Post never had enough equipment to satisfy the enormous demand.39

Army trucks remained the only reliable and available means of transport to and from summer camps as well as for weekend trips and picnics for young people throughout the postwar years. The Germans were impressed with the willingness of many GIs to sacrifice their spare time and drive them wherever they needed to go, even if the trip lasted longer than a day and led to other zones of occupation. Many of them not only drove the trucks, but also shared their rations or even brought extra food along for the journey.40

38See above, chapter VIII; for Selsor and GYA see below, chapter X.

39"Eine Bitte der NN," [NN Asks for a Favor] NN, 9 Nov. 1946: 4. The lack of equipment was a constant complaint of local GYA centers to Major Selsor which he reinforced and sent to headquarters. See, for example, Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly Report for First Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 124.

Since many African-American GIs belonged to transport units, they did a considerable part of the driving. Apart from their apparently friendlier disposition towards the Germans, they may have had deeper motives than simply good will for their volunteer jobs. Karl Schmidbauer recalled that his youth group always had one specific driver whose all black unit was fittingly stationed in the former SS quarters near the Nazi party rally grounds. This GI took them wherever they wanted to go as long as a blond and blue-eyed German girl sat next to him while he was driving. If the Germans were unable to come up with a girl, he refused to drive. Schmidbauer thought that this behavior was noteworthy because the soldier never made any advances to the girls who accompanied him in this way. For the German this behavior was not more than an amusing episode, but the soldier may well have undertaken his first successful attempt at desegregating his own world, apart from getting the satisfaction of being able to demand the presence of good looking female company.\(^4\)

Initially only those youth groups whose members had personal contacts to a local unit received the transport they needed, but Major Selsor made sure that organizations who were not able to arrange for their own transportation with individual units also came to enjoy the benefits of American trucks. Selsor used an average of more than two thousand

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gallons of gasoline per month for these additional services.\textsuperscript{42}

**Re-education Continues**

While local detachments and units usually tried their best to help the Germans with their material plight, they often were hard pressed to satisfy the desire of some Germans to find out more about the United States and to learn from the occupiers. A young German secondary school teacher in Nuremberg, for example, inquired with the local American authorities in October 1946, if it would not be possible to carry the American re-education work beyond the highest echelons:

\begin{quote}
[i]n our endeavor to guide our youth according to the principles of democracy we regret very much that all discussions so far have concerned only the deans of the different high schools, while the teachers, especially the younger ones, had no chance to exchange opinions and receive first-hand information about American high school education. I take the opportunity to assure the MG officer in reference, that the teachers of Nurnberg’s high schools should appreciate with gratitude any forthcoming meeting with American colleagues and experts. We all certainly should be grateful to learn about American conception of high school training and we are convinced that we should profit greatly by such discussions as they are already established in other towns.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{42} Helga Stadtländer, personal interview, 15 Aug. 1995; see also GYA Quarterly Report for the Third Quarter of 1948; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125.

\textsuperscript{43} From Lewis Maussner, teacher at the high school Wölkernstraße-Nürnberg to MG Nürnberg, Officer for Education, 24 Oct. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1415, 9/127-1/15.
In his reply Klise could only inform the teacher that his proposal "contains merit," but that the staff of his detachment had been reduced so much that the only education officers on duty were in Bavarian headquarters in Munich.4 4

The more progressive teachers in Nuremberg had to wait another year until they were able to satisfy their curiosity and to engage in discussions with Americans at the grassroots. In October 1947 OMGUS opened an Education Service Center in the city to accommodate the needs of the teachers. The centers actually document that Americans from the start pursued their goals on different levels in this field. While in Bavaria the Kulturkampf between the German ministries and the American authorities was still raging, some OMGUS educators obviously had come to the conclusion that in the long term persuasion and discussion with progressive teachers might do more for their goals than a rather hopeless fight with an entrenched Bavarian Minister of Cultural Affairs. They also realized that teacher behavior in the classrooms might be just as important for the democratization process as administrative reform.4 5

To support their new grassroots approach of persuasion instead of directives the Americans needed to provide German educators with the means to obtain access to the latest


45Müller 134-138.
literature and publications in their profession. Initially Americans had opened textbooks centers in 1946 to help with the production of school books without militaristic and chauvinistic contents or Nazi ideology throughout the American zone. The centers had American directors and several German employees to assist teachers who visited the centers. Nuremberg was one of the first eight cities in which OMGUS opened centers in 1947. All of them were well equipped with literature, but the German teachers who could not read English initially found the choices rather limited.46

With their mission largely accomplished by 1948, the centers expanded their activities during the following years both under OMGUS and its successor, the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG). They still supported the writing and publication of democratically oriented textbooks as well as curriculum revision, but the emphasis shifted to personal education and help with practical problems that would aid teachers in the classrooms. The centers had special translation programs to introduce German teachers to

46Pilgert, Information Services 40-43. Pilgert does not seem to have had reliable information on the opening dates of the centers. According to him, the Nuremberg center did not open until December 1948, for example. The official invitations for the opening ceremonies, however, establish the date as 31 October 1947 (NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Branch, Box 41, 10/44-1/2). Since the center initially shared a building with the local Amerika Haus, Pilgert may have mistaken the move to a different location for the official opening date. See also Maar 59-60.
the latest pedagogical trends, they promoted the publication of periodicals, organized parent-teacher organizations, and hosted their meetings. They also tried to interest teachers in the use of modern teaching aids, for example audio-visual equipment. Most importantly, the centers initiated or supported research in education, especially in the field of student evaluation which Germans had virtually ignored up to then. It was not until 1951 that Americans decided to consolidate the program, but they still left six of the fifteen centers open. HICOG also supported new German institutions, such as the Munich Test Institute which instructed Bavarian teachers in the administration and development of student testing or the Institute for International Educational Research in Wiesbaden, with funds, visiting experts from the United States, and exchange programs for German researchers and educators.47

Just as all other institutions, the Nuremberg center soon became involved in more than just writing textbooks or developing curricula which Bavarian ministries did not accept. Nuremberg traditionally had been a center for the more progressive currents among German educators. Together with the Americans they developed curricula for individual subjects as well as for a reformed school system but much to their disappointment they were unable to penetrate the defense of the Munich authorities and had to be content with

47Pilgert, Information Services 41-51.
some token concessions in 1950. In 1955 the Bavarian ministry at least expanded elementary school education from eight to nine years.48

Since the center had a dormitory that could accommodate up to seventy persons, it was able to organize rather large week-end or week-long workshops. In 1948 the center hosted a pedagogical conference in which educators discussed the possibilities of the use of audio-visual equipment at school. With American help they did not have to theorize long. At the end of the year OMGUS made one thousand radio receivers available to German schools in the American zone, of which Nuremberg received thirty-five. OMGUS was aware that this new medium would need some explaining and so it combined the official delivery of the equipment with lectures by German experts on the use of radio in the classroom. A second conference in 1949 resulted in the foundation of the German Association for Education which began to publish its own monthly magazine. Since many members of the organization

48Barthel 66-68. Interestingly, Barthel does not mention the American institute at all in his book, although there are indications that the school office relied on American help. Barthel describes the contribution of Nuremberg teachers to the development of school books at length. Much of this undertaking undoubtedly took place in the textbook center since it was the only place which was able to command any resources, such as paper.
also were in charge of educational radio programs, Nuremberg became the center of research in this field.\textsuperscript{49}

The center did not limit its activities to specialized workshops. One of its main functions was to promote progressive ideas among German teachers. Young teachers from Nuremberg and the surrounding region, for example, started their own organization of "determined educators." The center was their logical choice for meetings. When the local Kreis Youth Committee did not have a place to meet, it was welcome to use the extensive facilities as well.\textsuperscript{50}

The center apparently also organized presentations for teachers by American educators. In May 1948 Freemont Wirth, who had been a professor at a teacher's college in Nashville, Tennessee before he joined OMGUS headquarters in Berlin, visited Nuremberg to introduce vocational school teachers to the concept of social studies. According to Nuremberg's school superintendent Raab, the teachers would have to pay special attention to this new subject if they wanted to help their students in becoming independent citizens instead of the subjects they had been before. As usual the American did not waste any time with theoretical discourse, but rather limited his informal presentation to explaining to the


\textsuperscript{50}Karl Ritter, personal interview, 26 July 1995; Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
Germans how schools in the United States incorporated social studies in their curricula and gave some practical advice on how to do something similar in Nuremberg.\textsuperscript{51}

The efforts of progressive educators such as the chancellor of the Erlangen university, Eduard Brenner, to reintegrate German educators into the international teachers' organization met with success in 1949. In March the organization extended an invitation to Bavarian educators, represented by Otto Barthel in Nuremberg, and invited them cordially to participate in its upcoming conference in Switzerland.\textsuperscript{52}

While the first attempt by OMGUS to officially promote re-education through German-American cooperation in the educational field needed some time to become a reality, it had a successful predecessor long before American educators in Berlin discovered this avenue. In the fall of 1946 Frank J. Klier, Press Officer for Detachment B-211, decided to introduce the German public to the United States on his own initiative. He offered a course at the Nuremberg evening school under the title "Discussion about America." Klier obviously was the right person for the job. He had taught at the university level before joining Military Government and spoke excellent German. Klier's course actually served three

\textsuperscript{51}"Schule fürs Leben," [Schooling for Mastering Your Life] NN, 8 May 1948: 5.

\textsuperscript{52}"Zusammenarbeit aufrichtig gewünscht," [Cooperation Earnestly Desired] NN, 16 Apr. 1949: 3.
purposes at the same time. First he was able to still the
Germans' hunger for information from the outside world. In
his lectures he also introduced democratic procedures in
theory and practice by talking about several aspects of the
American political process. The third goal of his mission
was more subtle. Klier conducted the classes in a manner to
which his students had not been exposed previously. Instead
of just lecturing, he permitted them to choose their own
topics, and to discuss them in depth. His audience
apparently appreciated his informal teaching style which,
according to the local press, tore down any barrier which
might have existed between the American and his audience.
The newspaper praised above all Klier's openness, his
willingness to be critical about his own country when he was
answering questions, and his ability to acknowledge when he
did not know something which apparently stood in stark
contrast to the attitude and behavior of many German
professors.53

Klier continued his work at the evening school in 1947.
In six two-hour discussion groups in which about fifty people
participated, the Germans dealt with a wide range of topics.
Klier encouraged them to choose their own agenda. According
to him, the topic which aroused most interest was emigration
to the United States. The question whether Germany could

become an American style democracy also ranked high on the Germans' interest scale, whereas the Germans relegated issues of educational reform, comparisons between conditions of specific groups in Germany and the United States, or finding means of parliamentary self-help against maladministration, to the bottom of the agenda. Klier estimated that about 60% of those attending were under thirty-five years old. He was impressed with the quality of the presentations he had assigned to the twenty-four to thirty-five year old group "despite limited means of research." Those over thirty-five usually were outstanding in the discussion of any topic. Klier noted that during the discussions the Germans did not display bitterness and also did not resort to heckling or baiting although "lively exchanges of opinion were frequent." Klier informed his superiors that his courses found due attention in the local and regional German newspapers, but that his duties did not permit him to continue his courses at the evening school during the current trimester. He expected to resume them in the fall of 1947.5

Some members of Detachment B-211 did not feel that the higher echelons attached any importance to their re-education efforts. In his annual report for 1947/48 the officer in

5Report on Re-educational Work from Frank J. Klier, Press Control Officer, Detachment B-211 to James A. Clark, Chief ICD, OMGBY, 20 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/13; see also "Mr. Klier stellt richtig," [Mr. Klier Clarifies] NN, 19 July 1947: 3. The paper reported that Klier's approach found a very receptive and grateful German audience.
charge noted that he and eight German workers had to take care of a district with half a million people living in it. According to him, only the understanding commander of the Nuremberg Military Post allowed him to maintain even that small number of personnel. He wrote to Munich that the complete lack of cooperation from headquarters did not leave much room for going beyond the routine administrative tasks. Even when his busy schedule permitted him occasionally to include re-education in his agenda, he had a very hard time getting the materials he needed, especially films, for his activities in Nuremberg. The author concluded that Military Government had become "Penny-wise, but pound-foolish."

Bringing America to Germany

In spite of this complaint of an overworked OMGUS field officer, the situation was not as bleak as he painted it. The ICD's information center program, for example, did not seem to have these problems. As was the case with other projects, OMGUS field officials developed the program. They collected Army surplus materials for their centers and held regular meetings to develop a consistent policy, to coordinate the efforts of the different centers and reading rooms, and to use their resources throughout the zone to the largest possible extent. Tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States became apparent during the Berlin 

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crisis in 1948 and seemed to make German reorientation towards Western ideals even more urgent than before. By then Information Control had established a sound system of "overt education" in the American zone and in Berlin and was ready for expansion.56

The program reached Nuremberg long before the Cold War made its appearance. In November 1946 the city got its own American library which was located in the basement of the building which housed Detachment B-211.57 Under the headline "Books - Messengers of Peace," Germans learned in their newspaper that the American Congress had appropriated an annual budget of $15,000 for the Nuremberg Information Center which offered over two thousand books in three "nicely furnished, well heated rooms." The article informed its readers that patrons would be able to check out almost all of the books without any charges. The center's goal was to inform Germans about the United States and the world and to fill the gaps which Hitler's book burnings and the war had

56"The United States Information Centers: General Information," 17 Aug. 1946; OMGUS, Director of Information Control, 3 Oct 1946, subject: agenda for USIC meeting in Stuttgart; Subscription orders to various American newspapers by the Frankfurt USIC, 7 Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibitions Br., Box 313, 5/314-3/10; Maritta Hein-Kremer, Die amerikanische Kultur-offensive: Gründung und Entwicklung der Information Centers in Westdeutschland und West-Berlin (1945-1955) (Cologne: Böhlau, 1996) provides the first and long overdue scholarly study on the subject. Her book, however, was not yet available in the United States when this dissertation was approved.

57For the roots of the program see above, pp. 280-82.
opened in German libraries. In his opening speech Col. McMahon, Chief of ICD, OMGBY, emphasized that he hoped that especially young Germans would be able to become acquainted with American literature, the United States in general, and the world. Interestingly, the American dignitaries who participated in the opening presented their speeches in German while mayor Levié responded in English. The press noted that the only drawback which would hopefully soon be remedied was that most of the books were in English.58

Three months later the press revisited the Information Center. By then the reading rooms were stocked with three thousand volumes and had much to offer to those who were acquainted with some "basic understanding of the English language." Apart from American authors the users also could find a selection of German writers whom the Nazis had banned. 1,200 people had taken advantage of the borrowing privileges during the first three months, but, according to the paper, many more frequented the "cozy reading rooms." The choice of books clearly indicated the Germans' desire to overcome the isolation of the previous twelve years. The vast majority of the users wanted to learn as much as possible about other countries and parts of the earth, but many tried to catch up with the latest technological trends and advances as well.

American magazines and newspapers also became the focus of much attention. The paper further reported that interested Germans could participate in "free and open discussions" about American literature with an American. The journalists learned from the reading room personnel that plans for a move and an expansion were already underway.⁵⁹

In line with ICD policy and in step with many other cities, the Information Center grew considerably during the next months. Not even a year after its inauguration it needed a new location. In October 1947 the library moved to a very representative villa close to the center of the city and to the major hub of the city authority's public transit system. The Americans initially used 12 rooms of the building and also expanded their activities. The center sponsored discussion evenings and exhibitions from November 1947 on. The number of volumes grew to over 4,600 and monthly attendance rates went from about 1,000 at the old location to well over 8,000 in December 1947. The German patrons also had given the library its official German designation: Amerika Haus. As with all other American enterprises, the stage was set for a new take off in 1948.⁶⁰


⁶⁰Pilgert, Information Services 76; Report "Amerika Haus Nürnberg," [June 1949]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ICD, Information Centers Branch, Box 335, 5/319-3/3; "Die Umerziehung beginnt in der Bibliothek: Das Amerikahaus sollte die Deutschen auf dem Weg zur Wahrheit über die Welt führen - Gutbesuchte
In January 1948 Patricia van Delden, the head of the Exhibitions and Information Centers Branch of ICD, travelled throughout Bavaria to evaluate the program in the state and to make suggestions for its further development. For the Nuremberg region she noted that the Amerika Haus in the city as well as the reading rooms in Ansbach, Bamberg, and Coburg, were functioning very well with German personnel under the local Military Government officers' supervision. Neighboring Erlangen had a facility which cooperated closely with the university. According to her, American employees, many of whom were about to arrive, would strengthen the program if Military Government would be willing to free German authorities from the task of having to provide rooms and supplies. For more efficient operation and greater attractiveness, van Delden recommended that all centers be equipped uniformly and should have attractive light fixtures, curtains and furniture. Three trailer trucks would be necessary to provide them with the necessary supplies, but also to function as mobile libraries and information centers that could reach out to villages and small communities which otherwise would not have any access to American information.

Van Delden's report also reflected the growing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. She recommended that two more centers be opened in the immediate

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future. One of them, which would be located in Hof, was particularly important, "because it is close to the Russian line of demarcation." Reorientation would have to counter an additional totalitarian threat to democracy, this time in the form of Stalinist socialism.61

The report found a warm reception. In February 1948 headquarters not only authorized the two additional centers van Delden had asked for, but also complied with her suggestions for revising the general policy statements. The Information Centers and Exhibitions Branch lost no time and developed operating procedures along the revised policy directives to ensure close cooperation and the best use of the resources available in Germany, including American guest speakers.62


62 Memorandum from OMGUS, Office of the Military Governor, to OMGUS Land Directors, subject: U.S. Information Centers, U.S. Zone, Feb. 1948 (Draft Revision); Memorandum from Cecil Headrick, IC Br., OMGUS, to Captain Chester S. Wright, Chief, Exhibitions and Information Centers Br., OMGBY, subject: distribution of films, 4 Feb. 1948; Memorandum from Patricia van Delden, Chief, Exhibition and Information Centers Br., OMGUS, to Chiefs of Exhibition and Information Centers Branches in the Land Detachments, the American zone of occupation, subject: Exhibit Instructions to Information Centers, 2 Feb. 1948; Memorandum from Patricia van Delden, Chief, Exhibition and Information Centers Br., OMGUS, to Chiefs of ICD in the Land detachments; subject: procurement of German books with reorientation funds, 9 Feb. 1948. These are just a few examples of a considerable number of new policy directives and guidelines for the field operations which van Delden and her staff developed between February and
In Nuremberg the arrival of an energetic American, Amelia Horn, as director of the Amerika Haus marked the beginning of a new era. During the next months the new director considerably expanded the activities of the facility and reached out to the surrounding region. By 1949 Horn had established ten reading rooms in the bigger communities of Middle Franconia. The list of employees grew from eleven Germans in January 1948 to forty-two in December 1949. Most of them served as librarians.\(^6\)

In spite of a persisting uncertainty of the future of the Amerika Haus program and a lack of a specific budget which currency reform aggravated even further, Horn managed to renovate the new facilities and to bring the program to life. She was able to enlist the help of the local Military Government detachments for her projects and also enjoyed the support of the Nuremberg Military Post’s commanding general. Generally the detachments found suitable locations for reading rooms, often in their own buildings. GYA as well as

Military Government officials conducted at least some of their activities in these rooms.64

Support from other American agencies in the field was urgently necessary in view of much confusion and a considerable lack of communication between the field agencies and headquarters. In 1948 the Amerika Haus had vastly improved the quantity of its reading materials. Its patrons were equally impressed with the facilities and the available material. Horn found that German patrons did not show any interest in a considerable number of magazines which OMGUS provided, but that many Nurembergers searched in vain for scientific literature and magazines. They seemed to be available in the Munich Amerika Haus but not in Nuremberg, although the city traditionally had been Bavaria’s leading industrial center and now looked to the Information Center to catch up on recent technological information.65

64Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October 1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/11. Horn never hesitated to turn to higher authorities to have bills paid or to get some uncooperative local Army official in line. See, for example, Amelia Horn, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, OMGBY, FOD to OMGBY, Munich, ICD, Exhibitions and Information Control Branch, 27 July 1948, subject: payment of bills for Amerika Haus and Reading Rooms; Amelia Horn, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, OMGBY, FOD to OMGBY, Munich, ICD, Exhibitions and Information Control Branch, 1 Oct. 1948, subject: repair work for Amerika Haus; NA RG 260 OMGUS ICD, Exhibitions and Information Control Br., Box 313, 5/318-3/18.


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Obtaining reading materials was just a minor problem of the operation. Horn thought that the whole *Amerika Haus* program should be much better organized. She explained to her superiors that the lack of funds and a firm budget prevented her from reaching out to the public and expanding the program in a way she desired because she simply could not pay the bills. Apart from that, nobody seemed to be sure about responsibilities. In spite of Patricia van Delden's efforts to provide the Information Center directors with guidelines, her field officers felt that a clear cut policy which defined and assigned responsibilities within OMGUS was necessary. Horn thought that more centralization and logistical support would certainly improve the program because the local directors would not have to waste time on the procurement of supplies and the classification of books. In addition to that, she made clear to her superiors that she would need more personnel for the very extensive operations she felt were necessary to make the program a success.66

The OMGUS film program was a special case in point. In February 1948 OMGUS headquarters issued a directive which outlined in detail a new 16 mm re-education and reorientation film program. The directive determined exactly how many film projectors would be available for each city and county and

provided a list of all available films. Horn did not seem to be aware of the instructions, although the Amerika Haus obviously had received the projector it was supposed to get and had employed a projectionist by June 1948. The director related to headquarters that Nuremberg had been fortunate in obtaining documentary films for her program, but had had to rely entirely on the resources and connections of local personnel. According to her, supply or distribution centers had not shown any support in this field. Horn stated that she "would be very much interested in knowing who started the film program, how they expected it to function and what happened to it, like "Topsy" it seemed to grow, I heard a lot about it and nothing happened. She would not have had to go far to find out about the directive. The local detachment had received and faithfully filed it apparently without distributing the paper within the American community. Neither Ms. Horn nor the local GYA officer ever received a copy of the directive from James Barnett, the Nuremberg detachment's director.67

Horn would have been able to gather further information from the local newspaper as well. In March 1948 the Nürnberger Nachrichten reported that Military Government

would make about eleven film projectors with about one hundred films about culture available. Above all schools, churches, and the villages around Nuremberg would benefit from the program. 

The start was difficult. In April 1948 Nuremberg Military Government officials had one projector at their disposal. By December twenty projectors were available and the same number of Germans were trained as full time projectionists. It also took OMGUS officials until the end of the year to allocate the necessary budget for the program.

Obtaining an adequate supply of films proved to be another obstacle. ICD alerted its information centers to an "immediate source", the Signal Corps Training Film Libraries throughout the American zone. Their films would certainly complement the documentaries available to OMGUS so far. In this way, Germans got to know "A Small Town in USA," "Washington," or "A Suburban Family." By the end of 1948 OMGUS was taking steps to reorganize film distribution and overhaul the available material. From June 1949 field
detachments could order film packages for specific audiences which included newsreels, documentaries, and entertainment films.\textsuperscript{70}

In Nuremberg James Barnett made young people his priority. His detachment began to show forty five-minute programs to children. Barnett also negotiated with the Nuremberg school superintendent about bringing a projector and movies to each school every two weeks. Adults had to be content with whatever time would be available, but as soon as Barnett had enough projectors and material, he developed a program for adults which included discussions of the movies the audience had seen. Headquarters agreed with this emphasis, as long as the showings had a definite reorientation mission and were accompanied by discussions or presentations of the local Liaison and Security Officer.\textsuperscript{71}

During the next years the film program became one of the most important pillars of American reorientation policy. Each projectionist toured the countryside, introducing the

\textsuperscript{70}ICD, Information Centers Br. to Directors of Information Centers, 19 Feb. 1948, subject: Army films available to Information Centers; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ICD, Information Centers Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/20; OMGBY, Reorientation Staff Unit, minutes of meetings, 30 Nov. 1948, 7 June 1949; OMGBY Reorientation Committee, minutes of meeting, 16 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, CAD, Democratization Br., Box 112, 13/150-2/13.

\textsuperscript{71}MG Det. B-211, From James Barnett, Director, Supplemental Intelligence Report, 24 Aug. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ICD, Information Centers Br., Box 312, 5/314-2/12; OMGBY, minutes of Reorientation Staff Unit, 7 June 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, CAD, Democratization Br., Box 112, 13/150-2/13.
local population to American films. A HICOG study revealed that in some regions the American films were the first moving pictures the people had ever seen. Usually turnout was very high. Entire village populations attended shows in local restaurants, gymnasiums or even in the open air. USIC produced a considerable number of movies on the functioning of the democratic process, but documentaries about the United States proved to be the most popular feature of the program. HICOG spent almost one million dollars for these activities in 1950 and 1952. In that year it also decided to replace the old and not very reliable projectors with new ones which were smaller, easier to use, and had a better sound quality.\textsuperscript{72}

HICOG was not content with bringing American films to Germany and synchronizing them. It continued the production of the weekly newsreels and also produced many films in Germany which addressed specific reorientation issues, especially the practical application of democratic principles in many different situations ranging from the democratic procedures in local government to elections in trade unions or youth organizations. Young people learned about the American student exchange program for Germany. To teach them more about youth work in the United States, OMGUS produced

\textsuperscript{72}Pilgert, Information Service 61-76; memo from HICOG to Dept. of State, 11 Dec. 1950; memo from HICOG to Dept. of State, 19 Sept. 1951; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 511.62A5/12-1150, 511.62A5/9-1951; Franz Schmalz, personal interview, 5 July 1994.
films about the function of youth centers, progressive schools, or community initiatives for more playgrounds.\textsuperscript{73}

Attendance numbers in the Nuremberg area were impressive. An average of more than one hundred people came to each show. In 1948 about 26,000 persons saw American reorientation movies every month throughout the region. Three years later the HICOG Kreis Resident Officer for Nuremberg reported that the film program for his area had just registered its 500,000th visitor.\textsuperscript{74}

The popularity of the program also made it an attractive feature for private sponsors. The German Shell Corporation, for example, decided to make its name better known to the rural areas of Northern Bavaria through its own film car. The local GYA newspaper reported that the car would "stop at every youth center and school" to show educational films.\textsuperscript{75}

In Nuremberg many youth groups took advantage of the program. After taking a course in handling the portable equipment, youth representatives were able to check a projector and films out of the \textit{Amerika Haus} and show it to

\textsuperscript{73}ISD Motion Picture Branch Monthly Report - November 1950; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 511.62A5/1-251.


\textsuperscript{75}Caption and photo, YW, vol. 4, no. 6, 2 June 1950: 8.
their youth groups. Horst Klaus, a trade union youth leader, decided to take up the reorientation offer from the Americans and make it part of his work in one of Nuremberg's factories. He had developed a taste for American movies previously when the GIs stationed close to his home allowed children to attend their unit's shows. Thanks to his efforts management agreed to grant apprentices part of their work time for educational purposes. Klaus obtained the necessary equipment for showing movies from the Information Center. To comply with the education mission he would first show a documentary about the work of trade unions in the United States or about the function of the democratic process. A second movie invariably would deal with the culture or different regions of the United States and other parts of the world. According to Klaus, the program was very popular with the apprentices and served him well in his work for the trade unions.76

In line with traditional Military Government policy to leave as much as possible to the Germans, HICOG officials decided to turn the films and most of the projectors over to the Germans from 1951 on. HICOG field officials carried their task out, but also let headquarters know that they did

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76OLCB, District III Report: HILITES for January 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, FOD, Director, Box 2; Horst Klaus, personal interview, 11 Aug. 1994.
not understand why HICOG was cutting such a successful program.\footnote{OLCB, Public Affairs Division [hereinafter PAD], monthly reports, June 1951, Sept. 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, PAD, Box 1.}

The film program led to another interesting reorientation feature for young people in the American zone. In 1950 the Nuremberg Resident Officer began to develop quizzes which followed the films. Young Germans reacted enthusiastically to this new and fun way to expand their horizons. GYA groups and the German-American Youth Club organized their own quiz bowls and HICOG introduced a zone-wide competition. By 1953 these contests had become a standard feature in many of Nuremberg’s youth groups’ activities.\footnote{Harald Lund, Kreis Resident Officer for District III, to Kenneth E. van Buskirk, Chief, FOD, OLCB, 20 Sept. 1950; NA RG 466 OLCB, FOD, District Land Office Activity Reports, 1950-52; District III Hilites for January 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, "EEI" Reports, 1950-51. The local newspaper reflected the success of the idea: see, for example, "Quiz-Abend beim KJR: 13 Verfassungen in der Bundesrepublik," [Quiz Bowl at the Kreis Youth Ring: 13 Constitutions in the Federal Republic] NN, 3 Mar. 1951: 13; "Die besten 'Quizer' sind ermittelt: Fränkische Endausscheidungen der HICOG-Quiz-veranstaltungen - Antwort in 15 Sekunden," [The Best "Quizzers" Were Found: Finals of HICOG Quiz Bowls in Franconia - Answer in 15 Seconds] NN, 14 Dec. 1951: 9; "Betriebsjugend löst Rätsel: Sechs Großfirmen treten in Wettstreit," [Youth in Factories Solves Riddles: Six Major Firms to Compete] NN, 18 Mar. 1953: 9.}

In 1948, however, these successes seemed to be far away. The information centers program still needed to secure support from higher echelons. Horn was not the only one to...
At the Army Youth Center #2, Nurnberg, Germany, a quiz was held between German members of the German-American Youth Club of Nurnberg [sic] and Dependents of the Nurnberg-Furth [sic] Military Post. The Quiz was sponsored by the youth club as part of their cultural program. The final score of the quiz was: the U.S. dependents: 350; the German youth: 395.


criticize procedures within Military Government. Amerika Haus directors throughout Bavaria had similar grievances. Local Liaison and Security Officers were equally frustrated by the lack of coordination between headquarters and the field. Coburg and the surrounding region were immediate neighbors of the Soviet zone of occupation. In view of the mounting tensions with the Soviets and Patricia van Delden’s awareness of the importance of this region in American reorientation efforts, the frustration of the local field officer is surprising. In October 1948 he reported about the condition of the Coburg Amerika Haus program and its attached
reading rooms. Coburg had just recently been upgraded to the status of Amerika Haus. The detachment's most pressing problem was the lack of personnel. In the town three employees were running the facility at the time. The officer noted that he would have no problems finding qualified personnel "if and when the proposed allocation of employees for this Amerika Haus is authorized." Until that moment it would be "necessary to beg, borrow or steal assistance from every possible source." The situation was even worse for the reading room in Kronach which was equally close to the border. The two employees there actually were paid by Special Branch. Since the branch was being phased out, they would be terminated by the end of the month. While the detachment had supplies and space available for a number of additional reading rooms, it had no employees at its disposition to run them in October 1948. Apparently the problems in Coburg were resolved. In 1950 the town still had its own Amerika Haus, but plans were underway to consolidate American activities. Coburg became a branch of the larger institution in Hof.79

In spite of all obstacles, Horn transformed the Nuremberg Amerika Haus into a vibrant cultural center which tried to offer something for everybody and enjoyed

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79Lawson R. Beard, OMGBY, FOD, Area Coburg to OMGBY, Office of the Land Director, Munich, 12 Oct. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibition Br., Box 313, 5/318-3/18; Pilgert, Information Services 38, 76.
considerable success. By September 1948 the twenty-five employees of the Information Center were busy. They had issued over 7,000 readers cards to people who took advantage of the open shelf system—a new feature in Germany—and had a home to enjoy the literature. 4,000 of the almost 18,000 available volumes were checked out during that month. 7,200 people came to the library during September to study books or to read magazines. The center offered 124 English courses in which more than 2,500 people participated. The demand for these courses was so great that teachers had to limit participation. Twenty-one discussion evenings attracted 1,800 participants. Concerts and recorded music hours found 880 listeners. Lack of suitable films and their low quality did not seem to bother German audiences. The center’s film hour was an extremely popular feature and performances usually enjoyed capacity audiences. In September 1948 twenty-four performances for adults netted 2,400 people. An additional 1,200 visitors came to see an exhibition at the center. Over 20,000 Nurembergers had found their way to the *Amerika Haus* during that month.80

During the next months the Center was able to increase these numbers considerably. In February 1949 almost 30,000 people used the facilities. Half of them came to read or

borrow books, the other half took advantage of the English courses, listened to American and German lecturers on topics ranging from American authors to Psycho-Analysis. The film program introduced Germans to Ireland, the British Empire, Mexico, and life in the United States. Woody Woodpecker and Mickey Mouse entertained the children. The Amerika Haus also increasingly developed into a center of the city's cultural life. Various classical music groups performed works by modern American and German composers, but also included the traditional works by Bach, Händel, Mozart, Ravel, Brahms, and Chopin in their programs. Even in this realm, however, the staff did not forget its reorientation mission. Discussions about the music always followed the performances.81

Reading rooms were in no position to make similar programs available to their patrons, but almost all of them offered more than just library services from the start. English courses and story times for children were the most popular choices. One year after the reading rooms had opened their doors they had consolidated their activities. Ansbach, Middle Franconia's capital about thirty miles west of Nuremberg, for example, had about 33,000 inhabitants at the time. In August 1949 two employees were in charge of the

local reading room which was centrally located. 1220 registered borrowers could choose from 628 German titles and 5,100 English books. The library had 390 books in German and 3,406 books in English available for young people. Summer traditionally was the slowest time of the year, but nevertheless 2,160 people visited the reading room. Although Ansbach was largely an administrative center, technical magazines were among the three most popular items, but the people who came were not just interested in American literature. A considerable number of users wanted to find out more about the American Constitution. American office management was another popular topic. Significantly, over half of the patrons at the time were juveniles who took advantage of the library’s large youth section. The reading room also offered a special children’s hour which introduced the youngest patrons to translated American stories and poems.82

82Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October 1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/11; library data report, U.S. Reading Room Ansbach, attached to US Information Center Nuernberg, month of August-September 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibitions Br., Box 326, 5/316-2/47. The folder contains reports from all other reading rooms serviced by the Nuremberg Amerika Haus. The Ansbach reading room is representative of the rest of the region. All reading rooms which were not within easy reach of the Amerika Haus in Nuremberg served between 5 and 10% of the population living in these communities. The percentage of young readers was usually about 50% of the total. The fact that many of the reading rooms also hosted GYA activities may play a role in the high proportion of young patrons. It also could reflect a greater degree of curiosity and a more pronounced desire to get to know more of the world.
Its success obvious success notwithstanding, the Amerika Haus program had to endure considerable cuts and uncertainty about its future when the War Department finally handed over military government responsibilities to the Department of State at the end of 1949. By then the Cold War, which turned hot in Korea in 1950, clearly influenced the agenda. Harry Truman and Dean Acheson announced that the United States needed to expand its own world wide information services program to counter Soviet propaganda. To provide HICOG with the necessary guidance, the State Department’s German desk sent daily cables, weekly information letters and a special series of notes on Soviet activities to Berlin, but a Republican Congress which was eager to save money only reacted slowly to the demands for more funding of the Democratic administration. Even within the State Department the expansion of the program did not enjoy unanimous support. Considerable cuts in allocations and a drastic consolidation program by HICOG were inevitable.83

In spite of these cuts, the U.S. Information Agency maintained an impressive presence in Germany. In 1953 forty-seven Amerika Häuser with fifty-four American and 961 German employees spent three million dollars to maintain their own operations which included twenty book mobiles and 115 German-American libraries. Nuremberg employed two Americans and

83Pilgert, Information Services 1-6, 37-38.
forty-two Germans in 1956. Throughout the 1950s the Nuremberg Amerika Haus retained a large children's section.®4

Americans continued to reach out to the countryside. Franz Schmalz, a member of the USIC staff since 1948, recalled the consolidation phase vividly. Initially he had been a member of the reading room staff in Ebermannstadt, a small town in Upper Franconia. When the room closed Schmalz decided to remain with USIA and moved to Bamberg. In 1950 he became director of the Amerika Haus in Hof. He remembered that book mobiles became one of the most important vehicles to keep the population of his district, which bordered the Soviet zone, informed. According to him, the American book mobile not only provided the population with reading materials, but also brought exhibitions and information materials to the most remote areas.®5

Schmalz observed firsthand that during the 1950s young and old people were "hungry for information" about the United States and the world. Most patrons and visitors wanted to fill the void which the twelve year long isolation under


Hitler had left. Many members of the older generation came to the American institutions to request books which the Nazis had burnt and therefore were not available in German libraries anymore. School classes visited the center in Hof, and in Bamberg many secondary school students became regular patrons, but, according to Schmalz, USIA did not particularly emphasize youth work.\textsuperscript{86}

American Aid to Churches

Lutheran church leaders displayed a considerable reserve towards OMGUS and HICOG programs as well as the Army's GYA, even though members of the churches appreciated American help as long as it came from the right sources. As early as 1946 Bavarian Youth Reverend Helbich could report that Nuremberg had re-established contacts with the World Council of Churches (WCC) and with churches in Switzerland. Helbich welcomed these contacts because in this way the Germans would be able to clarify "many misunderstandings."\textsuperscript{87}

Nuremberg saw the first prominent international Christian youth leader in June 1947, when John R. Mott, President of the Young Men's Christian Association, visited

\textsuperscript{86}Franz Schmalz, personal interview, 5 July 1994.

\textsuperscript{87}Stand der Jugendarbeit des Landesjugendpfarrers, 12 Feb. 1946; LCA Landeskirchenrat, Akten des Landesjugendpfarrers VI; 1178a 1946-1964, Bd. IV.
the city to confer with YMCA leaders, as well as with church representatives and American authorities.88

The WCC maintained close contact with the occupation authorities and kept them abreast of its intentions and actions. In March 1947 OMGUS representatives encouraged the WCC to participate in the reorientation effort. Robert Tobias of the WCC in Geneva informed OMGUS in July 1947 that the council was "in the process of selecting suitable candidates."89 Four weeks later he provided OMGUS with a detailed plan of the mission of six WCC representatives whom the WCC would assign to "strategic centers." One of them was slated to go to Nuremberg where he would be "attached to Protestant Youth Council of Bavaria in area leadership for conferences, camps, over-all planning, field work."90 In September 1947 Reverend Chester Baird, born in China, recently ordained and just twenty-five years old, arrived at Nuremberg to coordinate and revive the international contacts between the Lutheran youths of Germany and abroad. The reverend stayed until 1949, but actually does not seem to have done more than listen and observe. He made it a point

88Cable from JCS to OMGUS, 29 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-1/[2].


not to participate in Nuremberg's social life in order to be able to concentrate on his mission in Germany. According to him, churches in Germany and overseas were achieving the goal of reconciliation fast, because "there were no boundaries between Christians the world over." Baird thought that the real problem for Germany were those young people whom the churches were unable to reach.  

In spite of the Nuremberg Lutheran youth leaders' criticism of the materialistic attitudes which American programs for children in Nuremberg allegedly promoted by distributing food, candy and Coca Cola, those involved in youth work found that love in fact became a matter of the stomach as the German proverb says. The reverend who organized one of the first youth camps of the Lutheran church in Bavaria in June 1946 gratefully reported about the food he obtained from the Americans. This time it was not the Army but rather Lutherans, Mennonites, and Baptists, who, the

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91 Application [for residence in Germany], Carl Chester Baird; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 150, 5/297-1/13; "US Church Worker Lives Quietly in Nurnberg: 'No Borderlines between Christians ...'," YW, vol. 2, no. 17, 1 Jun. 1948: 2. With the exception of an article by Pastor Helbich in which he bid good-bye to Baird in 1949, I was unable to find any materials on or from Baird in the Lutheran Church Archives in spite of the fact that he spent two years in Nuremberg. Interestingly, MG approached Baird in January 1948 and asked him to provide MG with reports of his activities and a list of capable youth leaders. Baird probably took great care not to compromise his position. I found no answer to the request. (Letter from Richard T. Alexander, OMGUS, to Carl C. Baird, Nuremberg, 28 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 126, 5/293-3/15)
reverend observed, had already started to collect food for hungry Germans while the war was still raging in Europe. Without the help of canned beans, dried milk and vegetable preserves, the author noted, the children in his summer camp would have gone hungry. American visitors recorded the same gratefulness for American food supplements in church organized summer camps throughout the American zone.92

American generosity in this field, however, did not reach all Germans. American churches had not only collected food in the United States, but in 1947 also sent 50,000 Dollars to Switzerland to procure food for summer camps in Bavaria. Military Government officials initially assumed that all youth groups were included in the program, but the churches did not show any signs of Christian charity. They were not willing to share their resources, which left Military Government and German authorities scrambling for alternatives just weeks before the program was to start. The action certainly did not endear the Lutheran clergy to

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92Pentecost 1946, Camp in Georgensgmünd; LCA Personen CLXV Dollinger 16; see also Dr. Arnold Dannemann, report on summercamps for German boys, [Fall 1947]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/14; "Bericht über die Lagerarbeit des CVJM Ev. Jungmännerwerkes in der amerikanischen, britischen und französischen Zone," Summer 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-1/25. This report contains a considerable number of thank you letters, some of which came from boys who lived in Nuremberg.
Military Government, German administrators, and youth workers who were not affiliated with the churches.93

The practical assistance many American institutions rendered to Nuremberg's population and especially the city's youth during the postwar period did much to tear down barriers between the victors and the vanquished. Nurembergers had countless opportunities to get in contact with Americans, to become acquainted with their culture, and last, but not least, to survive with their support. Americans continued their efforts to re-educate young Germans by means of a more democratic school system, but they adapted their strategy to the situation in Bavaria. Amerika Häuser, Education Centers, and the OMGUS film program worked towards the end of instilling democratic ideas and ideals in young and old Germans alike, but almost always took special care to reach out to Germany's youth. CRALOG, CARE, and the Hoover program became household names in Nuremberg.

While Lutheran church leaders maintained their reserve about American authorities in Germany, they established a separate track of communications with the United States through the World Council of Churches which also was designed to alleviate the physical needs of Germany, but also to reintegrate the Lutheran church and its members into the

93 Bayerischer Jugendaring, München an die Jugendabteilung der Militärregierung in Bayern, Bericht über die Zeltlageraktion 1947, 18 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2.
international community. The tactical troops' willingness to help out wherever it was necessary left a long lasting favorable impression on many young and older Germans who certainly appreciated the effort. A close look at GYA activities in Nuremberg will show that the Army not only assisted German youth organizations, but went beyond the traditional boundaries of German youth work in the American zone, providing German administrators as well as young people with alternatives to the traditional German ways.
The Army’s program in Nuremberg developed from small beginnings into a full fledged operation with a wide variety of programs designed especially for those who did not want to join a youth organization. Besides a warm place to stay and the famous candies and cookies, the Army centers of the Nuremberg Military Post offered a wide range of activities. Many of them were educational, others offered hands-on experiences in democratic procedure, respect, or individual initiative. The open door approach offered an attractive alternative to the strictly regimented life the younger generation had come to know in the Hitler Youth and which the Free German Youth continued in the Soviet zone. An impressive number of young Germans in the region took advantage of the many GYA programs. Many German youth leaders, however, resented this encroachment on their traditional turf. Nevertheless GYA served as a model for progressive German educators and youth workers.

Laying the Foundation

Just like everywhere else in the American zone of occupation, American soldiers and their units in and around Nuremberg began to start making contacts with young people early on. The Army directive of April 1946 made youth work
an official responsibility of the local commanders. GYA activities in the region initially consisted almost entirely of sports. Some officers in Fürth had established boxing teams, other Americans introduced young Nurembergers to American sports such as baseball, football, or basketball, since equipment for German sports was not yet available. Weekly stage shows in the Fürth opera house provided youth with the only GYA-sponsored cultural activities. In Nuremberg 1st Lt. William Schroeder, the officer in charge of the city’s extensive sports facilities which the Army had requisitioned for GIs, was the first man to become active for GYA. He soon was well known among D.P. children who lived in a camp close to the sports facilities, but also to young Germans, many of whom inhabited a nearby refugee camp.¹

Mark Selsor received his appointment as head of the Nuremberg Military Post’s German Youth Activities program in August 1946. He remained with the assignment until May 1950 and became one of the most important and respected figures in the city’s and the region’s youth work. The Nuremberg Post area for which he was responsible included the city of

Nuremberg, the entire region of Upper and Middle Franconia as well as parts of the Upper Palatinate.²

Selsor was well equipped for the job. He had spent time in Germany during the twenties and spoke German well. A difficult childhood had helped him to develop a deep understanding for the problems young people faced during hard times. As a professional soldier, Selsor was able to combine these gifts and a high degree of idealism with a profound understanding and respect for the organization he was serving. From the outset, he and his family not only tried to give something to young Germans, but actually made an attempt to share some of their misery with them. The Selsors decided to skip one meal a week and donate the proceeds to needy people. Soon, many families of the military community did the same. This combination of inside knowledge, skills, and dedication enabled Selsor to secure support of his superiors and to mobilize the enormous facilities the Army had to offer in spite of constant difficulties in the personnel sector. Capable officers and enlisted men were transferred and could not be replaced, and qualified

²All of the interviewees who were directly involved in leadership positions in Nuremberg youth groups remembered Selsor well and expressed their respect and gratitude for the American youth officer, although they did not always see eye to eye with him about youth activities in the city. See also Maar 106.

Selsor retired as a Colonel and to date has not lost his willingness to lend a helping hand. In spite of serious difficulties with his health, he and his family were extremely helpful and provided me with very valuable information and documents.
indigenous personnel was equally hard to locate. The Major's dedication, qualities, and tact also earned him the respect of the German youth leaders, with whom he remained in close contact, and the admiration of many of the young people who experienced first hand Selsor's and his wife June's work in Nuremberg. Originally assigned to work at the IMT, the major immediately volunteered for the job as youth officer for the entire Post when it became available. From the start Selsor cultivated good relations between German authorities and his office. Even more important, he successfully reached out to the German youth organizations in Nuremberg, but also offered alternatives to those who did not find their way into youth groups.\(^3\)

One of Selsor's main objectives was to support German youth groups as much as he could. MG was only able to assist German groups with the help of the tactical command. All material and assistance the Army which provided in the Nuremberg region went through the GYA office.

\(^3\)OMGBY, Det. B-211, Monthly Historical Report, Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2; "Ein Porträt: Nürnberg's Jugendoffizier," [A Portrait: Nuremberg's Youth Officer] NN, 11 Jan. 1947: 6; for Selsor's permanent struggle with adversity see especially his almost complete monthly narrative reports for 1948 (NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9, Box 47, 10/19-3/16, Box 34, 10/43-1/4); June Selsor (10) reports about the meal skipping initiative. Mrs. Selsor's manuscript provides a unique and very thoughtful perspective of her family's four years in Germany, as well as her and her husband's work for GYA.
The Major and his co-workers were not content with the rather limited approach of the program for which he had taken responsibility. GYA made it into Nuremberg's newspaper for the first time in September 1946. Nurembergers found an interview with Lieutenant William Schroeder on the sports page in which Schroeder announced that he was planning to introduce a city-wide youth sports club open to everyone. Young Germans would be able to become acquainted with American sports but would also have the chance to revive the traditional German disciplines under American supervision. The officer told the press that the Americans would provide all the equipment necessary for these activities. Although the interview appeared on the sports page, Schroeder went far beyond the realm of physical education. Probably with the blessing of Major Selsor, he provided the Nürnberger Nachrichten with a complete outline of the program which the GYA intended to establish for the city's youth. During the winter young people would not only be able to use local gymnasiums for playing ping-pong or chess, but the Americans would also try to provide them with "spiritual values." Schroeder counted on the generosity of the local troops to donate food and candies so that the events would have a nutritional value for those who would attend. The first lieutenant explained that the Army would make club rooms available which were not used to capacity by local units. Trucks would provide safe transportation home for those who
came during the long winter nights. Obviously impressed by this news, the interviewer noted that the city administration should be grateful for the initiative and should support it above all through the schools.4

Schroeder did not deliver empty promises, although he left Nuremberg just four months after his interview.5 The Nuremberg Military Post initiated an all encompassing program throughout the region. While GYA's first attempt to bring young Germans to the requisitioned Nuremberg opera house did not meet with an enthusiastic response, Schroeder did not give up. An amateur theater performance of Erich Kästner's "Emil und die Detektive" broke the ice. According to the local paper, the function attracted many young Nurembergers and was a tremendous success for everybody involved.6

Nevertheless GYA did not take off with a resounding success. ICD collected contradictory information about the program. While a study of March 1947 concluded that about 50% of all Germans in the American zone knew GYA and about 10% of the zone's youth participated in it, a second survey—conducted just two months later—reversed the positive


findings. The new study stated that very few people knew the program and an even lower percentage were actually involved. Questionnaires of the Nuremberg ICD unit, which were apparently part of the latter survey, supported the more negative findings. According to them, adults usually thought that the Americans either wanted to educate young people for democratic ideals or simply wanted to keep them out of trouble. Almost all of the parents indicated that they would not object to their children attending American youth activities. Boys and girls were curious and signalled their willingness to participate, but in general did not have any opinion about the purpose of such a program.7

Going to the Movies or Having them Delivered

The survey was conducted only two months after Selsor had introduced the GYA youth film hour which soon would become one of the most successful American programs in the city and assured that GYA became widely known. The 35 mm film program came just in time to provide young people with a warm place to go to during the cold winter months. For a

7Adolf Küfner, Bericht über die Freizeitgestaltung der Jugend, 28 Jan. 1947. Küfner, a German ICD employee, seems to have based his report on a rather small sample of sixteen adults and sixteen children. The sample included one member of the upper class, one member of the upper middle class, and one member of the lower middle class. The rest of the people he polled were members of the working class. In spite of its obvious limitations, it probably is a good indicator for German sentiment in Nuremberg at the time. The two surveys are Information Control Weekly Review no. 15 (15 Mar. 1947) and no. 23 (10 May 1947); NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion Surveys Br., Box 158, 5/234-2/5 and 5/234-2/6a.
mere thirty Pfennigs young Germans could attend functions in the opera house from December 1946 on. Under the guidance of Ignaz Wühr, a qualified and dedicated German volunteer who owned one of Nuremberg’s movie theaters, the film program became one of the major attractions for young people in the city. By March 1947 already 24,000 children and adolescents had visited the American movie hour. Selsor made sure to establish close contact with city officials. The schools took care of ticketing and the collection of the fees, and German as well as American officials were at hand to explain the significance of certain movies to the young audience. Not even four months after its inauguration Selsor could celebrate the fiftieth function and announced that over sixty thousand children had visited this GYA program to date. It continued to be part of the Nuremberg youth activities for many years. A little over twelve months after the first show Selsor informed the press that 120,000 tickets had been sold for the one hundred functions the program had given so far. In January 1947 sixteen American, two Swiss, one British, one French, and one Soviet, as well as three German feature films stood at the program’s disposal. Charlie Chaplin’s "Gold Rush" was one of the favorites, but "Young Tom Edison," "Union Pacific," or "Madame Curie" also filled the theater. Twenty-one documentaries dealt with topics which covered
American technical and governmental achievements as well as life, history, and culture of the United States.

GYA field work leaped ahead of the policy makers as well as Military Government activities. In March 1947 EUCOM decided to integrate film programs into GYA. To counteract the tendency to provide the GYA visitors just with inexpensive entertainment officers were instructed to use "suitable motion pictures [...] to the fullest as a means for illustrating democratic life." Entertainment films needed Military Government approval and had to be combined with documentaries. Selsor was sorry about the limited number of films and the rather poor physical condition of the available copies, but he thought that they were better than nothing. Success proved him right. The program expanded further in 1948. During the second quarter of the year over 316,000 young people in Nuremberg, Hof, and Bamberg took part in the film hour.

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From EUCOM to Field Forces, directive re.: motion pictures, 11 Mar. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 141, 5/295-3/7; Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly Report for Second Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Movie Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mittwoch, 9. Juli</td>
<td><em>Richter von Colorado</em> (Farbfilm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mittwoch, 16. Juli</td>
<td><em>Unter schwarzer Flagge</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mittwoch, 23. Juli</td>
<td><em>Mit Büchse und Lasso</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mittwoch, 30. Juli</td>
<td><em>Liebesbriefe aus England</em></td>
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Currency reform in 1948 suddenly wiped out all cash reserves and for a time saddled GYA with considerable debts, almost eliminating the program, but Wühr, the heart and soul of the film hour who had been mainly responsible for organizing the films, managed to overcome that crisis as well. In December 1950 he could look back to 400 performances, 400 different films and over 300,000 guests. To celebrate the occasion, Wühr provided an audience of teachers and 1,200 students with the synchronized version of "Lassie Come Home" in color. To accommodate some people who criticized the choice of the films GYA had announced in the summer of 1950 that it was planning to introduce a screening committee consisting of educators, both churches, and GYA Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125, [1].

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which would be responsible for selecting the movies. Until such a committee could be organized the film hour would continue in its traditional manner.10

One year later the film hour moved to a new Army theater next to the opera house which the city had constructed with considerable HICOG help to regain full use of its own facilities. By then participation had increased to 430,000. Almost every show was sold out. Wühr tried his best to organize valuable films. In January 1950 "The Jungle Book" made its debut before a packed audience. For the 500th show he was able to obtain the Swiss film "The Search" which had been shot partly in Nuremberg and nearby Ansbach. The film ran for the first time in Germany and received a very positive review in the papers. One of the last shows once more demonstrated the popularity of the film hour. In spite of competition from Hollywood, quality films still attracted large audiences. 2,000 young people tried to get one of the

10 "Nürnberg's Jugendfilmstunde feierte Geburtstag: 400 Vorstellungen, 400 Filme und 307 000 Gäste: Trotz Kritik: Die besten Filme für die Jugend!" [Nuremberg's Youth Film Hour Celebrated its Birthday: 400 shows, 400 films and 307,000 guests: In spite of Criticism: The Best Films for Youths!] YW, vol. 4, no. 12, Dec. 1950: 3. Interestingly, this article did not have its English counterpart in the paper. Often the authors modified articles under the same headline specifically for the German or American audience. "Council Named for Youth Films," YW vol. 4, no. 8, Aug. 1950: 2.
920 tickets available when "All Quiet on the Western Front" stood on the program.11

The days of the film hour were numbered, however. In March of 1952 the GYA officer and the director of the city's youth office reached an agreement that the Army would cease its operations as soon as the new city youth home, which also housed a small movie theater, would be opened in fall. Some city fathers continued to attack the quality of the program. The city council's art committee initiated an investigation about the "educational value" of the youth film hour, especially about the selection procedure for the films. Apparently the investigation touched a raw nerve with Otto Barthel, by then the city's school superintendent. He reported that in view of some questionable choices, the city had attempted to establish a screening committee in 1950. According to Barthel, Wühr had not cooperated in the venture which had resulted in a considerable controversy in the press. Apparently upset by Wühr's independence, Barthel had refused to continue the promotion of the program in the city's schools. Not everyone shared Barthel's negative assessment. Andreas Staudt reported that most of the movies

were very valuable, although some of them seemed to be too difficult for the young audience. He thought that the city should not revive the controversy since the administration would take the film hour under its wings when the new city youth house would be finished.\textsuperscript{12}

35 mm films were not the only movies for young people. In 1948 GYA also became involved in the 16 mm film program which ICD had initiated. Like Amelia Horn, the director of the Nuremberg Amerika Haus, Selsor had to find out by himself what policy OMGUS officially pursued. Directives from headquarters informed him about the five hundred projectors OMGUS was making available throughout the American zone and Berlin. Apparently unaware of James Barnett's efforts along the same lines, Selsor reported in July that the initiative was well accepted in spite of the lack of suitable films and that he would try to include schools and other German institutions in the program.\textsuperscript{13}

Selsor and his successors were able to establish a successful venture by using the versatility of the smaller

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{12}Nuremberg Post Journal, 31 Mar. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122; minutes of a meeting of the committee for school and cultural affairs, 4 July 1952; NCA C7/IX no. 1307.
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\textsuperscript{13}Directive from OMGUS to Field Detachments, subject: distribution and use of re-education and reorientation 16 mm films and projectors; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 118, 5/292-2/1; Headquarters, Nuremberg Military Post, German Youth Activities Section, GYA Staff Report, 20 July 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9.
\end{flushright}

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format to their advantage. The Nuremberg GYA center no. 1 had its own full time staff and film library which included educational, cultural, and entertainment movies. Three film projectors and one for slides were available to show the material. Movies came mainly from HICOG and the Army, but GYA also acquired German documentaries as well as entertainment movies. The German Shell corporation supplied some technical films. All youth groups and schools could either borrow them for a nominal fee or arrange for a complete performance which included a projectionist, the equipment, and the movies.\textsuperscript{14} In 1950 GYA Nuremberg obtained a four wheel drive Dodge Army pick up truck which was converted into a film car, enabling a German driver and projectionist to reach out even to the most remote villages in the region. Just when everything was in place the program had to take a first setback. In November 1950 GYA announced that it was not permitted to show 16 mm feature films anymore. Apparently commercial theaters were afraid of the competition.\textsuperscript{15}

Although young Germans had a number of choices to see American movies, GYA remained very busy in this field. Practically all youth groups took advantage of the program.

\textsuperscript{14}"Film Library Starts Work Again After Inventory," YW, vol. 4, no. 9, Sep. 1950: 4.

The trade unions were among the most frequent users, followed by sports clubs, the YMCA, the protestant youth groups, and the Falcons. Youth groups in factories arranged for showings. GYA provided displaced persons from Czechoslovakia, Russia, and Poland, who lived in camp Valka on the former Nazi Party rally grounds, with shows as well as German expellees from the Sudetenland and Silesia who occupied other camps in and around Nuremberg. In this way the Army introduced several thousand young people each month to American culture, to the United States, but also to the principles of democracy. A certainly not unwelcome side effect of the very popular shows was that it filled the coffers of youth organizations with the new currency which was otherwise hard to obtain. Between 1948 and 1950 German youth groups in the region earned about 10,000 Marks, a substantial sum at the time.16

The trade union youth used the offer to feature a weekly show in their centers which attracted capacity crowds until the middle of the next decade. The increasing prosperity of young people, who by then were able to buy tickets to see commercial movies which GYA was not permitted to show anymore, brought about the end of the program, but Americans

made sure that the Germans could continue the work. The trade unions, for example, received a projector when the Army phased the program out and continued to use it for their own educational endeavors.\textsuperscript{17}

**Youth Centers**

Movie theaters were not the only place that offered young people a place they could visit. Soon after he assumed his post, Selsor began to search for a suitable youth center in Nuremberg. As a first measure, American soldiers had decided to share their club facilities with young Germans during the cold winter months. The soldiers would not only provide the facilities, but also initiate discussion groups and organize sports events.\textsuperscript{18} In Nuremberg young people could use the requisitioned track and field installations and the swimming pool. During the wintertime the Americans provided them with opportunities for ice skating. GYA estimated that about 45,000 children throughout the Post area had participated in these activities during the first six

\textsuperscript{17}Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995. Trade Unionists agreed that the beginning of prosperity was the end of many of their activities. Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995; also Grieb, ed. 41 (Horst Klaus); for the termination of the film program see Grieb, ed. 71 (Erwin Schönleben). It should be noted here that GYA and the USIS did not coordinate their film programs officially. Since cooperation between GYA and MG was good in Nuremberg, Americans there probably managed to avoid duplication in effort and material.

\textsuperscript{18}Newspaper clipping, "In Bayern," [In Bavaria] Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1 Sept. 1946: n.p.; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/10.
months of 1947. The numbers increased substantially during
the next year. In May 1949 it passed the 100,000 attendance
mark for one month. At the end of the year over 140,000
young people in one way or another received GYA support. It
was only natural that GYA supervisors and volunteers who took
care of the installations began to instruct the children who
came to their facilities. As a result American football and
basketball matches between teams from different Posts became
a feature. GYA also organized its own soccer league within
the Post area as soon as it was able to obtain the proper
equipment.19

Selsor soon began to look for a center which young
people would have all to themselves. In early 1947 the major
found a requisitioned restaurant in the suburb of Erlenstegen
and made it the first GYA center in Nuremberg. The
restaurant not only had a kitchen and rooms but also was
surrounded by a park for outdoor activities. The fact that
many German dignitaries attended the inauguration of the new
center shows the importance German authorities attached to
GYA which was growing rapidly. Just six weeks after the

19OMGBY, Det. B-211, Annual Historical Report, 1 July
1946-30 June 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box
1425, 9/124-1/6; Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly
Reports for First, Second, and Third Quarter 1948; NA RG 338
Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 124, 125; the
Young World reported in detail about activities throughout
the post; see, for example, "Participation Booming," YW vol.
4, no. 2, 1 Feb. 1950: 2; see also Willy Gensmantel, personal
interview, 10 Aug. 1995, and "Education," OMGUS Information
official inauguration of the first youth center GYA moved to a larger home with a park in a requisitioned huge villa not far from the Nuremberg party rally grounds. Selsor's close connections with the city helped him in remodelling the place quickly. While the Army provided the building materials and furniture, Mayor Levié was able to mobilize Nuremberg craftsmen to finish the job quickly. The new center not only had more rooms available to everyone, but also offered a kitchen where the young visitors often got ice cream, doughnuts, or candy and could learn about American recipes.20

The center soon became the focal point for many activities. The youth committee, trade union groups and many other youth organizations took advantage of the facilities, but the center from the start also offered its own programs for those who did not want to join a German club. The center's largely German staff had much to offer to young Germans: A music teacher and a singing instructor, a manual arts instructor and a sports teacher, as well as a librarian and her assistant occupied full time positions. All these professionals also were in charge of helping units in the region with setting up specific programs. Interestingly, MG officials noted that the IMT, which continued to prosecute

German war criminals throughout the forties and maintained many of the international staff from the first trial, provided a considerable number of enthusiastic international volunteers who were willing to support the Army with its re-orientation efforts.21

The center’s employees were always busy. Young Germans came to sing in an English choir, a children’s choir and a choir for young adults. The repertoire ranged from traditional folk songs to classical music. Since EUCOM permitted Americans to teach German youths handicrafts in June 1947, the new facility also offered workshops ranging from woodwork to photography. Sewing and needlework ranked high on the girls’ agenda. Materials for their activities came either from Army scrap or directly from the United States where GYA was able to mobilize considerable support.22


22Selsor managed to have various reports on GYA activities with appeals for support published in English and German newspapers in the United States as a result of which GYA received books, cloth, clothing, and shoes. See, for example, "Friends, Helpers, and Visitors: Many thanks to all the friends from the United States listed below, who have assisted GYA Nurnberg with their gifts," YW vol. 4, no. 4, 1 Apr. 1950: 4.
Boys and girls had the chance to take dancing lessons which they could put to good use in the graduation balls their schools frequently held in center no. 1 as well.

"Since Willy is a member of a GYA craftshop he is so very industrious!"
"Seit mein Willy in der GYA-Bastelstunde ist, ist er mächtig fleißig!"


Early in 1948 Selsor was able to inaugurate the Junge Bühne in the villa’s basement which featured a full fledged stage. A serious lay theater group, the Fränkische Volks- und Jugendspielbühne, became the main beneficiary of the installation and attracted large audiences. Throughout the Nuremberg Post area playing theater became a successful venture in the larger cities. Meetings and mutual visits of different acting clubs within the region and in the American zone formed part of their activities. The room in Nuremberg
also served as the center’s movie theater which usually attracted capacity crowds.²³

Members of German Youth Activities from the Darmstadt Junggesellen Leben Club who presented a show for the Nuremberg members of the activities. Heidelberg, Germany, 12 July 1947.


Selsor continued to look for possibilities to improve the center for the benefit of young Germans. Shortly before he left Nuremberg in 1950, the major was able to inaugurate the center’s own youth hostel which offered twenty beds for young travellers. In August of the same year participants of an international youth camp rehabilitated the park of the

youth center and constructed outdoor sport facilities with the help of heavy Army equipment.  

Apart from the help GYA rendered to support German summer camp activities, it also sponsored those who were unable to join those camps or did not belong to an organization in its own camps. In 1947 9,000 children attended GYA camps in the Nuremberg Military Post district. Currency reform in June 1948 severely hampered the organization of summer camps by wiping out the entire German currency funds of the Nuremberg GYA, but still 5,000 children participated in the summer program. In 1949 the numbers rose to 9,000 again. In 1950 GYA sponsored or co-sponsored ten tent camps throughout the Post area, but the returning prosperity put an end to the program. In 1952, its last year of operations, only a few hundred young people spent their time in one consolidated summer camp for the entire region. The unit in charge of the camp made sure that the needy also would have a chance to attend by assuming the costs for those who were unable to pay the fees.

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25 Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly Report for Second Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125; Report from Headquarters, Nuremberg Military Post, Youth Activities Section, to Commanding Officer, Nuremberg Military Post, subject: GYA staff report for week covering 26 June-2 July 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9; Report from Headquarters, Nuremberg Military Post, Youth Activities Section to Commanding General, Headquarters EUCOM, ATTN: Director of GYA, subject: monthly narrative GYA report for
From the start GYA provided young Germans with educational opportunities. One of the more popular choices for older boys and girls were the English courses many centers offered. During the first half year of its operations in Nuremberg, seven teachers taught nine English courses at center no. 1. GYA could count on a number of international volunteers who were employed by the International Military Tribunal at the time. Hans Lamm, a Jewish emigree who had returned to Germany as interpreter at the IMT, became one of the most popular teachers. As a member of the occupation forces he was living in rather luxurious accommodations in Nuremberg's undestroyed suburbs and invited his students there. Lamm was an excellent teacher who used progressive methods. He not only introduced his students to American literature, but also made them speak, something unheard of in German classrooms at the time. To overcome the language barrier and to induce his students to speak freely, Lamm rewarded those who were able to give presentations in English with much coveted contents of CARE

parcels. Needless to say that Lamm always had a group of highly motivated students.\textsuperscript{26}

A request was made by GYA, that books be sent to the German Children in GYA clubs throughout the zone. German papers, printed in the United States, let the request be known, and many books are now being donated by American and German citizens. German children at the GYA center in Nurnberg [sic!] start looking through the books even before they are unpacked.


Books and reading materials became an important issue for Selsor and his staff. Initially GYA just supported the idea of a book drive of the local newspaper by supplying the necessary transport. Apparently a simple appeal was not very successful for filling the gaps on the shelves which the war

\textsuperscript{26}OMGBY, Annual Historical Report, 30 June 1946-1 July 1947, chapter IV, Youth Activities; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1425, 9/124-1/6; Gerhard Knöchlein, personal interview, 24 July 1995; Arno Hamburger, personal interview, 11 Aug. 1994; Maar 113.
and National Socialism had opened. Selsor found an additional incentive for youngsters to donate the books they did not need to the Army center. In December 1947 GYA announced in Nuremberg that there would be cake and ice cream as well as a free library card for every donor of a book. Those bringing more than one book would receive a special prize, a free pass to the GYA's film hour at the opera house. The results of the ensuing book party exceeded the greatest expectations, in spite of bad weather. The major and his wife made sure that all children received their promised rewards. By the end of the day the center had acquired almost 2,500 German books for its patrons. The Nuremberg public library helped cataloging them. Similar book drives in the towns and cities throughout the Nuremberg Post made sure that all GYA centers held an impressive number of suitable reading materials for their visitors. Many young people undoubtedly found their way to the center through their stomachs, but Selsor made sure that they got something more than food before they left. In March 1948 the center handed out its 1000th library card to a young Nuremberger.27

German children wait for books at the GYA children's library, Nurnberg [sic!]. The library, which has now been open three years, stocks more than three thousand books.

22. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 335833, 25 Nov. 1949

During the following years the library continued to expand. By June 1948 the Nuremberg Youth Center's holdings of youth books surpassed those of the city library. City officials also conceded that GYA in Nuremberg actually had more young patrons than they did. Selsor and other dedicated GYA workers were able to mobilize donors in the United States and bought many books in Switzerland. In this way the library in Nuremberg grew by about fifty books a week in 1949. Interestingly, young people shared their parents' interest in technical and scientific literature, but it was impossible to satisfy the demand in these fields. Nevertheless, three years after the inauguration of GYA
Selsor could proudly report that six libraries throughout the Post had 22,000 volumes available to young readers. GYA center no. 1 in Nuremberg offered 6,000 books to its patrons and cooperated closely with the city’s library. At the end of 1951 the Nuremberg Post GYA libraries had 15,600 German and about 9,000 English books on their shelves. In many towns, such as Ansbach, Americans ran the only library specifically designed for young people.28

To reach out even further to young people who did not have the chance to visit one of the GYA libraries, Selsor decided to furnish the Post’s own book mobile, an idea which the Air Force had pioneered late in 1946. As was the case with GYA, EUCOM transformed an initiative in the field into official policy.29 Headquarters furnished a 2 1/2 ton truck


Once again, GYA and the local Amerika Haus did not officially cooperate. It seems, however, that the Amerika Haus staff referred children and teenagers to the GYA center for many youth programs, although the Amerika Haus also had a room dedicated to children.

29 The GYA book mobiles served exclusively the needs of young people and schools. As we have seen in the previous chapter, U.S. Information Centers copied the idea. When GYA ceased its operations, the Amerika Häuser were able to pick up the slack.
German youth eagerly read books obtained from the bookmobile during its visit to a German High School in Schweinfurt, Germany. The Wurzburg [sic!] Post bookmobile placed in operation in June 1948 travels through the post area giving children an opportunity to read American fiction and magazines. Also in demand are more serious books on science, psychology and geography. School authorities, teachers, and parents, as well as the students have expressed appreciation for this book service.

23. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 313582, 7 Oct. 1948

for each Military Post and instructed the local commanders to convert them into mobile libraries complete with their own German drivers and librarians. The program was supposed to be in place by July 1947. In Nuremberg a refurbished truck was ready for action in August. Apparently it was easier to get the truck than the books necessary to operate it. By November it had only about two hundred mostly American books on its shelves,--not enough to satisfy the demand of readers between the age of ten and twenty years in small towns.
throughout the region. Nevertheless Selsor reported in December that the book mobile finally had started operating. Four months later it had to cease operations temporarily once more because there were not enough books available to run it, but in the course of 1948 the Post GYA was able to solve the problems. The mobile library became so busy that Nuremberg headquarters furnished a second truck for this mission during that year. The situation in other Posts was much the same.30

Selsor tried to make sure that parents were informed about their children’s activities. They received invitations to get to know the center. GYA representatives took the opportunity to explain to parents that their program was not intended to transform German children into little Americans, but rather to help them become responsible and articulate citizens. To assist parents and educators with the task, the Major invited German parents and teachers to discuss the education of their children at home and at school and use the center’s facilities for their meetings. Apparently teachers

and parents responded to the offer. In March 1949 the Nuremberg newspaper reported that the city’s school administration officially endorsed the program. According to the paper, Otto Barthel, who had succeeded Raab as Nuremberg’s school superintendent, thought that this type of cooperation between parents, teachers and the GYA could help all parties to solve some of the problems they were facing in this field.31

Although GYA Youth Center no. 1 in Nuremberg remained the best equipped facility in the Post area, Selsor made sure to spread his efforts throughout the region. To communicate better with his co-workers, the major introduced an information bulletin in English immediately after his appointment in 1946, in which he informed them about the latest developments. In January 1947 the bulletin became a newsletter, followed four weeks later by a German version for GYA participants as well as for the employees. By May 1948, just two years after GYA’s inauguration, The Young World made the transition from a mimeographed newsletter to a full fledged printed bilingual newsletter with a circulation of two thousand copies. It changed its format several times,

31Caption on photo, 12 July 1947, NA RG 111 SC 1941-1954, Box 133, 286777; "Elternabend beim GYA," [Parents Meet at GYA] NN, 26 Mar. 1949: 6; see also Lore Falter, personal interview, 29 June 1995; "German Parents to Visit Army Youth Center Nr. 1," "Eltern trafen sich im Jugendhaus Dutzenteich: Deutsche Kinder sollen keine "Amis" werden!" [Parents met in the Youth Center Dutzenteich: No Intentions to Transform German Children into "Little Amis"!] YW, vol. 3, no. 4, 1 Apr. 1949: 3.
but it always faithfully recorded American youth activities. As should be expected, the emphasis lay on successes and achievements of the Nuremberg Post's program. Even budget cuts and the Army's policy to turn the program over to the Germans after 1951 could not stop its publication. Captain Lorraine Schultz, at the time the Post GYA officer, approached the problem in typical American fashion. In July 1952 she found a local sponsor for the paper. Nuremberg's largest supplier of photographic equipment assumed the cost of producing the paper and had it printed in his business's print shop. In return, he had one page of The Young World
for promoting photography in general and advertising his products. The newsletter continued until the end of the program in 1954.32

Selsor’s efforts to promote GYA within the Nuremberg Post area in 1947 were not in vain. During that year many units throughout the Post started their own programs under his and his staff’s guidance. By 1948 forty-five centers were operating in the region for which the Nuremberg headquarters was responsible. Throughout the region an average of more than 60,000 young persons per month participated in GYA events which an average of 450,000 people attended. Three officers, three enlisted men, one American civilian and eighty-eight Germans worked full time for the recreation and re-education of young Germans.33

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32MG, Det B-211, Annual Historical Report, 20 July 1947; NA RG 260, OMBGY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1425, 9/124-1/6; see also Maar 47-49; most issues of the Young World are in NCA AVPer 202.2 (apparently the newsletter found wide attention within Military Government: the first issue is in NA RG 260 OMBGY, ID, Box 52, 10/60-1/46, the first German issue in NA RG 260 OMBGY, E&CRD, Group Act. Br., Box 48, 10/43-2/14); Nurnberg Post Journal, 11 Jan. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122; "USAREUR GYA Thanks Mr. Porst," YW, vol. 7, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 1953: 5.

German Children of the 385th Station Hospital GYA Club in Nurnberg [sic!], Germany, work their private plots of ground in the GYA garden. Each boy or girl may grow whatever he pleases in his own plot. There are approximately 150 small gardens in the Nurnberg [sic!] area that are cared for by the German children of the Nurnberg [sic!] GYA clubs.

25. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 301250, 21 May 1948

Not all GYA efforts met with success. When the Kreis Youth Committee in neighboring Fürth asked the Army to derequisition a house so that it would be able to transform it into a youth center, the Army refused to oblige because it had made plans for constructing a bowling alley there. German youth groups in Fürth would have to wait a while longer for their own facilities in spite of Selsor’s

21-23.
intervention on behalf of the project. In the meantime they continued to rely on various GYA centers in the city.\textsuperscript{34}

Wives of officers and enlisted men act as hostesses at the grand opening of the Erlangen Youth Center, which is operated by the Erlangen Air Force.

26. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 283024, 2 Apr. 1947

In spite of obstacles, many units in the Post area emulated the example which the GYA center in Nuremberg set for them. Erlangen, for example, opened its own youth facility in March 1947. It featured a library of over 5,000 volumes, a sports clinic, and, from May 1948 on, its own 35 mm film hour. Together with most units in the area the local GYA offered summer camps for needy children and had a publication to disseminate its news. Like many others, the

\textsuperscript{34}Letter Dr. Kaltenhäuser, Fürth KYC to LYC and OMGBY headquarters, 21 Jan. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/3.
managers of the Erlangen center found that a garden project appealed to its patrons. Erlangen also developed its own initiatives. The local GYA chapter introduced youth day rooms which permitted working mothers who did not have a husband to leave their children under supervised care. "Many and urgent requests" caused the local Post to expand this part of its program in 1948. By June GYA Erlangen was providing day care facilities for 160 children.\(^{35}\)

In the course of 1947 the Army conducted extensive inspections in Upper Franconia which revealed an interesting picture. Major Townsend, the inspecting officer, found much praise for the majority of the youth centers he visited. None of them operated under similar conditions or could even rely on the same resources. In general the centers functioned to Townsend's satisfaction, although he thought that there was much room for improvement and that GYA officers and enlisted men should pay more attention to the re-educational parts of their mission. On only two occasions the major recommended to remove personnel or to close down a

\(^{35}\)"GYA Activities," Nuremberg Military Post, Erlangen Subpost, Historical Report April-June 1948; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 119, [1]. Erlangen was a quite typical local operation. All of the posts had their own libraries by 1948, many offered summer camps and had garden projects for which Selsor was able to obtain seeds and other planting materials (Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly Report for Second Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125). Day Care Centers also were not unique to Erlangen (see "Day Care Centers," OMGUS Information Bulletin, no. 113, 6 Oct. 1947: 2-4).
This acrobatic act is staged at the opening night of the Erlangen youth center. More than 2,000 youths belong and it is operated by the Erlangen Air Force.

27. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 283025, 2 Apr. 1947

center. In his reports Townsend took unit commanders and other officers to task for being indifferent to the Army program, for not providing the necessary personnel and support, and for the high rate of turnover which often left a good program in limbo and young Germans bewildered. According to him, German authorities did not always render the desired cooperation. When American troops withdrew from Kronach, for example, local authorities initially kept the GYA center and the youth hostel in the town's old fortress open, but soon after the units were gone the city fathers dismissed the German manager allegedly because of lack of funds and closed the facilities at the castle, although the
young people of the town urgently needed a center and a youth hostel and had demonstrated their support for the GYA institution.

Townsend also detected a lot of creativity and innovative programs. In Coburg, which was practically surrounded by the Soviet zone from three sides, the major found a well managed youth center under GYA auspices which the local youth had constructed themselves. They also handled the administration of the facilities in a democratic fashion. The local GYA officer had managed to steer the center free of political controversy, a task which was certainly not easy in the vicinity of the very different political outlook and content of the programs the FDJ offered just a few miles away. Apart from the already familiar features, the young people who participated in the center’s activities had initiated a program for taking care of single mothers and their babies, most of whom had been fathered by American soldiers. 36

1948 saw the inauguration of a very successful zone wide GYA program which the Army designed to foster young peoples’ sense of fair play and sportsmanship, apart from providing them with a meaningful occupation during their spare time. In December Nurembergers witnessed the first soap box derby

in their city. To everybody's surprise the local population demonstrated a tremendous interest in the races. Over 40,000 people assembled on the ruins around the old fortress to see more than one hundred young boys and seven girls race down the steep hill on cobblestone streets. All of them had constructed their cars at GYA centers. Encouraged by the success, Selsor promised additional derbies for the coming year. The next time police had to terminate the event early because it was unable to control the crowds. From the start GYA enlisted the support of private sponsors such as the German Shell Corporation, General Motors, or local factories. Successful racers could win new motorcycles and bicycles, cameras, plane trips from Nuremberg to Munich, vouchers for clothes, and rain coats made by GYA sewing classes from scrap materials the Army had donated. The Adam Opel Car Factory, a subsidiary of General Motors, provided the racers free of charge with axles and wheels from 1949 on. Many GIs, but also local HICOG Resident Officers, acted as sponsors or lent a helping hand during construction. German teachers in Fürth showed their interest by offering their help and expertise to soap box enthusiasts in their schools. In 1950 more than a thousand racers participated in preliminary races throughout the Post area. The winners came to Nuremberg to race in the regional qualifiers which 15,000 spectators attended. The champion of the zone-wide finals could look forward to becoming the owner of a motorcycle and a two week journey to
the United States with all expenses paid by Opel and General Motors for the parents as well.  

The soapbox derbies enjoyed much attention of the local press from the first race on. With corporate sponsors well established, GYA retreated from center stage in 1950, but German enthusiasm for this new sport did not wane. In 1952 12,000 spectators witnessed the races in Nuremberg. Of course the Army still was willing to lend a helping hand. Young Germans continued to build their soap boxes in GYA centers. Army Engineers built a ramp for the event at the former party rally grounds to make sure that operations went smoothly and safely.

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38 For German coverage of the events see, for example, "Was ein richtiger Rennfahrer werden will...: 40 000 Nürnbergers wohnten dem Burgbergrennen bei. 'Nervenzersetzende Rivalität' in Seifenkisten," [Who Wants to Become a Real Race Car Driver...: 40,000 Nurembergers Attended Race at the Fortress Hill; "Nerve Wrecking Rivalry" in Soap Boxes] NN, 22 Nov. 1948: 4; "Kinderjubel um das 'Seifenkistl'-Rennen," [Children’s Cheers for Soap Box Derby] NN, 30 May 1949: 5; for the construction of the ramp in 1952 see photo and
A soap box derby, sponsored by German Youth Activities, with the help of various German industries, was held for German children in Nurnberg on 29 May. Young dare devil wins the third race in his midget car.

28. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 323455, 29 May 1949

The following year a Nuremberg apprentice won the West German championship. He received a cheque for 5,000 marks to help pay his education, the trip to the United States, and an invitation to participate in the American championships. Extensive newspaper coverage accompanied him on his journey to the New World and reported in detail about his experiences at the championships in Akron, Ohio. Even the Department of

State's official shortwave radio broadcast "Voice of America" featured the guest from Germany.39

Other GYA programs also received much publicity. From 1949 on, for example, the Army organized zone wide handicraft contests for boys and girls. Projects ranged from needlework and sewing to building boats and even model roller coasters. GYA furnished the materials and facilities for the young people. In 1950 over 3,500 boys and girls participated in the new program within the Nuremberg Post. The following year, judges had to evaluate the work of over 40,000 zone wide contestants. The Nuremberg region always did well in the contests, a fact the local press duly acknowledged. Exhibitions of the young people's work throughout the Post area provided additional opportunities to generate public support.40


Examining the items of the GYA handicraft exhibition at the GYA center are: Dorothea Erhardt, German handicraft teacher; 1st Lt. L.A. Schultz, Assistant Post GYA Officer, and Mrs. Harold Carroll.

In 1949 Major Selsor and the Nuremberg GYA initiated a zonewide program designed to revive West Germany's cultural life. From 1950 on Nuremberg hosted the Meistersinger contest for aspiring young singers of classical music.

Selsor from the start tried to interest Germans in the project. He was able to assemble a committee of German musicians, music critics and other dedicated men and women close to the music scene in the city who worked out the regulations. The highest American and German dignitaries, among them High Commissioner John McCloy and the Federal Republic's first President, Theodor Heuss, acted as honorary chairpersons. Local firms and factories provided many attractive prizes which made the contest a resounding success from the start. Preliminaries took place throughout West Germany. The finalists met in Nuremberg and competed in the opera before a carefully selected jury and a packed house. The winners received considerable cash prizes, but more important for their further development was the publicity and scholarships in the United States which obviously helped to launch them successfully. Hermann Prey, one of Germany's most accomplished postwar singers, started his career in this way.41

41 James 36. Both, the Young World and the local newspapers extensively reported about the Meistersinger contest throughout its existence. See, for example, "Mrs. and Mr. McCloy Ehrenprotektoren im Sängerttewettbewerb," [Mrs. and Mr. McCloy Honorary Chairpersons of Singing Competition], YW vol. 4, no. 3, March 1950: 1; "Meistersinger Working Comm. Sets Dates for 1951 Contest: Seven Equal Prizes for the Winners - Age Limit from 18 to 25," YW, vol. 4, no. 9, Sept. 1950: 1; "President Heuss and High Com McCloy, John Handy as Meistersinger Co-Chairmen," YW vol. 6, no. 3, Mar. 1952: 1; "1952 GYA Meistersinger Proclaimed," YW, vol. 6, no. 6, July 1952: 1.
Reorientation

Although GYA focused on recreational and educational activities, Selsor and his successors never lost sight of the re-orientation aspect of their work. In November 1947 the Nuremberg Military Post reported that steps had been taken to organize German advisory councils for the three largest centers in the Post area. The idea was a success. In Erlangen, for example, 450 parents discussed the next year of the program in 1950 and elected their representatives for the advisory council.\(^2\)

Selsor and his superiors also tried to make sure that American and German employees received adequate training for their rather difficult mission. MG criticism prompted the Army to initiate training programs for American GYA officials. To improve the program further, headquarters hired an American civilian youth specialist as its official adviser. In September 1948 GYA also began to establish training schools for its German employees. In addition to that, MG and GYA representatives met at regular intervals to discuss their problems. To be able to assess the situation better on the state level, they invited representatives from the Bavarian Youth Committee to their conferences from 1950 on. On the local level Selsor initiated round table conferences for all American and German employees within the

Post area. The turnout was not always satisfactory, but Selsor also maintained personal contact by means of frequent inspections of the centers throughout the Post. German employees and volunteers of the Nuremberg GYA also had the
opportunity to attend courses in youth leadership schools such as Ruit near Stuttgart.43

Selsor’s efforts were not always recognized by high ranking members of the OMGUS youth section which had relocated to Nuremberg from Berlin when the blockade began. In July 1949 Selsor prepared two training conferences for German GYA employees of the Nuremberg Military Post. He invited Norrie to participate in a panel discussion. Selsor explained that conversations with both Americans and Germans have shown that there must be a meeting of the minds of German youth, German parents, German youth officials, and those Americans who are endeavoring to build up a program towards the reorientation of German youth, the preparation of German youth for participation in future democratic Germany.

Apparently Norrie was not impressed with Selsor’s efforts and did not participate. A brief handwritten note on the invitation stated: "Not important. Only suggesting a discussion between GYA, MG, and Germans."44


While all support activities lay well within the reorientation framework of MG, GYA carried its mission further. Whereas OMGUS always made it a point to remain in the background, the Army reached directly out to young people. The American sponsors of GYA activities did much to help them gain a new perspective on their place and responsibilities in society and in the world. Activities
within the centers offered many opportunities to practice democratic procedures. GYA encouraged youth groups to write their own constitutions and to elect representatives. At the start the undertaking was not easy. Many young people had never participated in elections or taken over responsibilities for a group. In 1950 GYA center no. 1 invited all youth groups and individuals connected with its activities to form a youth council whose task it would be to develop operating procedures, to support those groups who needed help, and to participate in the scheduling and planning of all events within the center. Selsor’s successor, Major Robert A. Norman, was satisfied with the first meeting, but also pointed out that the young people had wasted considerable time because they were not acquainted with democratic procedure. The council would provide them with the opportunity to practice.45

GYA officers in other communities carried the idea of democratizing young people a step further. In February 1950 Charles Emerick, the High Commission’s Resident Officer in Fürth, discussed the possibility of having a "mayor for a day" program with local authorities and the GYA

45"Jugendbeirat im Haus am Dutzenteich," [Youth Advisory Council in Dutzenteich Youth Center] YW vol. 4, no. 6, 2 June 1950: 5; "Dutzenteich Youth Center Accepted House Constitution," YW vol. 4, no. 11, Nov. 1950: 4. Many other youth centers had similar institutions. See, for example, "Bayreuth: Musterbeispiel eines Jugendrates," [Bayreuth: Fine Example of Youth Council] YW, vol. 5, no. 6, Jun. 1951: 3; see also Selsor 5-6.
representatives in Zirndorf, a small town in the vicinity of Fürth. According to him, the response was immediate and positive. Without any further help from Mr. Emerick GYA officers and local officials cooperated closely in making his proposal a reality. In March 1950 students of the local schools elected officials to occupy the most important positions in city hall, which the adults quite willingly left to them for that day. The Nuremberg radio station even provided the town with its own branch, which a young reporter supplied with the news of the day. Emerick thought that all candidates the young people had selected were "exceptionally good". As a first sign of changing times, the young people chose a girl for second mayor. She was the first female ever to hold an office in the town. All parties involved agreed that the idea had been a success and should be carried on the next year.46

Hands-on experience in democratic procedures was just one of GYA's reorientation features. Its managers encouraged

young people to initiate or participate in community projects which ranged from playing music in hospitals to constructing playgrounds or youth centers. To help them overcome their previous isolation, the Army introduced its Youth Helps Youth program which provided groups and individuals with pen pals in the United States. In the Nuremberg Post area alone the Army was able to initiate contacts between more than 4,000 German and American boys and girls. GYA also provided many of the quiz bowl programs which HICOG initiated in the 1950s with the necessary facilities.47

Of course much depended on the way staff and volunteers interacted with young Germans. Reorientation in the Nuremberg GYA often had a very personal note. Lore Falter had been a member of the Nazis' girls organization where she mainly participated in folk singing groups. She took advantage of the possibilities the GYA center offered to revive a singing group. Since nothing else was available, she used a book the Nazis had printed. Besides the usual Nazi lore, the book also contained traditional and unpolitical German folk songs. Falter took great care to

47James 36-38; "GYA to Copy HICOG with Reorientation Quizzes," YW vol. 4, no. 11, Nov. 1950: 1; "Quiz Programs enjoy Increasing Popularity," YW vol. 5, no. 4, Apr. 1951: 4; for specific activities in the Nuremberg area see, for example, "Dutzenteich Singing Group Practises Community Service," YW vol. 5, no. 6, June 1951: 5; "Sorghof Youth Center - Community Service Project," YW vol 5., no. 13, Dec. 1951: 3; "4000 Deutsch-Amerikanische Freundschaften vermittelt," [4000 German-American Friendships Arranged] YW vol. 6, no. 4, Apr. 1952: 8.
hide the book from American eyes, but one day Selsor asked her to show it to him. Falter was afraid that he would either confiscate her book or even might regard her as a Nazi and terminate her appointment as singing instructor. The Major, who was certainly no stranger to the lack of suitable singing materials, did nothing of the sort. He took the book with a smile and promised to look the other way if he found anything that should not be in there. Instead of censorship and punishment, Falter got a valuable lesson in tolerance, understanding and respect which she never forgot.48

Surprisingly, even young people with a solid Nazi background participated in GVA activities. The Selsors took great care to be especially attentive to them, since they felt that this group needed reorientation most. One girl came from an ardent Nazi family and was herself the prototype of an enthusiastic and unrepentant admirer of Hitler in 1947, when she visited the Nuremberg center for the first time. June Selsor never challenged her convictions or excluded her from the girls' activities, but rather spent more time with her which even included driving lessons. On one of these excursions the car was passing in front of the tribune where Hitler had made his appearances during the party rallies. As if in a trance the girl stood up in the car with the Nazi salute and her foot firmly on the accelerator. Mrs. Selsor finally managed to push the girl's foot off the accelerator

48Lore Falter, personal interview, 29 June 1995.
at almost fifty miles per hour just in time to prevent a nasty accident. According to Mrs. Selsor, the girl's Nazi convictions slowly subsided. She became a close friend of the family with whom she remained in contact over the next five decades.49

The German-American Youth Club

One of Selsor's first initiatives in the realm of reorientation actually caused a considerable stir within Military Government. Apparently unaware of the very real differences between Military Government Detachment B-211 and the Nuremberg GYA, the Nürnberger Nachrichten reported in November 1946 that the "Office for the Support of the German youth of the American Military Government" (GYA) invited all young Germans between fifteen and twenty-five years of age to attend the initial meeting of a German-American discussion club. With the Major's encouragement, his German secretary, Richard Sperber, had decided to found a club with German and American membership to initiate the intellectual exchange between the two nations. In spite of Selsor's support the Military Government detachment's public safety officer refused to grant the new club a license because at that time joint German-American ventures were not officially permitted. Selsor decided to take the case to the leading youth officer in Bavaria, Hans Thomsen. He explained to him that OMGUS could not accept several passages in the statutes as well as  

49Selsor 13; personal correspondence with Mrs. Selsor.
the name of the club, because German-American cooperation was still illegal. The Major did not give up and ended up with Lawrence Norrie, the man in charge of all youth activities in the American zone. Norrie showed more understanding. He thought that the club could have a license as long as Selsor promised that he would supervise its activities closely.\textsuperscript{50}

Norrie's support notwithstanding, the affair reached tragicomical dimensions during the following months. Apparently headquarters did not disseminate the news about the granting of the license to all divisions. In January 1947 the CIC became involved in the affair. Sensing the brewing of a subversive storm of sizable proportions, a special agent decided to conduct a "discreet investigation," after he had learned from the Nuremberg security officer that the club was operating without a license. In best secret service fashion he employed an infiltrator who was working for the GYA in Fürth to become a member of the club for spying purposes. The agent dutifully reported that the club was still functioning and even accepting Americans as members in clear violation of Military Government directives. He provided personal profiles of the two leading German members together with their Third Reich backgrounds. Further evidence included a membership card of the infiltrator, as

\textsuperscript{50}"Deutsch-Amerikanischer Diskussionsclub," [German-American Discussion Club] NN, 23 Nov. 1946: 4; Hans Thomsen, OMGBY to Director, OMGBY, 5 Mar. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Intelligence Predecessor Organizations, Box 11, 10/87-3/11.
well as an invitation to a costume ball in January 1947, undoubtedly an ideal setting for sinister purposes. Although the club received its license by the end of January, the CIC investigation made sure that it would receive further attention. In March the news reached the director of the Bavarian Land Detachment who demanded and received an explanation from Hans Thomsen. Information control continued to keep a close eye on the club’s activities, but obviously
Norrie understood the complete nonsense of the whole affair. Apparently due to his initiative, OMGUS issued new directives in July 1947 which permitted Americans to become involved in joint German-American ventures as long as they "promoted understanding of democracy" or furthered "worthy projects in the local communities." The Club and Selsor had made an important step towards officially changing the relations between victors and vanquished into those of more equal partners.\textsuperscript{51}

The directive opened the way for similar ventures throughout the Nuremberg Post. In October 1948 Ansbach and Hof inaugurated their own German-American youth clubs. Erlangen followed suit in March 1949.\textsuperscript{52}

Untouched by internal Military Government affairs the Nuremberg club flourished. Local Military Government and German dignitaries, among them the Bavarian Government's Representative for Middle Franconia, Lord Mayor Ziegler, and

\textsuperscript{51}Headquarters, Sub-region Nürnberg, Counter Intelligence Corps Region VI, memorandum Julius Stein, Special Agent, to Headquarters, 11 Jan. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Intelligence Predecessor Organizations, Box 111, 10/87-3/11; Det B-211, ICD to OMGBY Political Affairs Division, Bericht über den Diskussionsabend am 26.3.47 im Künstlerhaus; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Director, Box 17 [Envelope containing classified material]; OMGUS, Commanding General, Berlin, 28 July 1947, subject: formation of Military Government (US) discussion clubs; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Intelligence Predecessor Organizations, Box 104, 10/86-3/7.

\textsuperscript{52}Two New Youth Clubs Open in Nbg. M.P.," YW, 1 Oct. 1948: 1; Erlangen Sub-Post, weekly information bulletin, 30 Mar. 1949; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 121.
Mayor Levié participated in the inauguration ceremonies in December 1946. One year after its inauguration it boasted over seven hundred members.53

From the start, Lamm tried to make the club a truly joint venture. In November 1948 he alerted the director of the OMGUS Education and Cultural Relations Division which had just recently relocated from Berlin to Nuremberg, to the existence of the club and invited him and "and all members of your Division" to attend a meeting in the club home located in the city’s youth bunker.54

Using his connections with the IMT, Lamm brought together members of his club and American high school students in the courtroom to hold their discussions there. Participants debated whether the tribunals were fair or if world government could solve their present problems. To help developing this spirit and apparently upon the request of the club members, Selsor provided the Club with 1,000 verbatim translations of the American constitution, of which 950 were distributed within a few weeks. The change of rules and these very constructive activities apparently induced the local MG detachment to throw its full support behind the venture. In December 1948 it reported to headquarters that

53Chronik der Stadt Nürnberg 1945-49: 209, 7 December 1946; NCA F2 no. 48.

54Letter from Hans Lamm to Director, E&CRD, 1 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/17.
Approximately two hundred American and German youngsters gathered in the main court room of the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg, where Goering, Ribbentrop and other bigwig Nazis had to account for their atrocious misdeeds. The youth gathered in this impressive hall to discuss a question which may decide their fate and ours: "Will world government save us?" With amazing maturity and alertness, with refreshing candor and frankness, opinions were exchanged. There was no uniformity and no regulated thinking, but agreement on one issue; that the peoples of the world must learn to live together and must force their governments to adopt effective measures for preventing war. The German youngsters, former members of the Hitler Youth, and the Americans, high school students, demanded world unity for freedom and peace for all peoples. A lengthy question and answer period was conducted in the style of American town hall meetings and gave youth the opportunity to express their doubts, hopes, and convictions. This is democracy in action, reeducation in practice and groundwork for a better future without ado and fanfares.

33. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 315814, 20 Dec. 1948

the German-American Youth Club was "what has been needed for so long in Germany." The authors suggested that local school officials should become actively involved in this interchange of ideas between Americans and Germans. MG observers noted
that the majority of the participants in the latest
discussion round in the halls of the IMT

both German and American, raised their hands in favor of
one World Government. They felt that the only way out
of the present dilemma is for the establishment of one
World Government. The result of this forum speaks for
itself.55

During the next years the Club continued to discuss
topics of current interest ranging from the Nuremberg Trials
in 1947, school reform in 1949, to West Germany's social
problems, or the role Germany would have to play in defending
the West in 1951. Lamm succeeded in interesting prominent
Americans such as Chief Justice Telford Taylor or Land
Commissioner Murray van Wagoner in addressing the club. In
February 1950 Helen McCloy, the High Commissioner's wife, not
only gave a presentation about "The Responsibilities of Young
People in a Democracy" but also promised to attend an
informal discussion with club members after the end of her
official program. With these high calibre speakers it comes
as no surprise that local German politicians became frequent
guests at these events.56

55Caption photos 315814, 315815; NA RG 111 SC 1941-54;
Det. B-211, bi-weekly reorientation report, 16-31 Dec. 1948;
NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Headquarters Records, Box 342, 10/54-
2/20.

56"Schulreform im Bild," [School Reform in Pictures] NN,
"Deutsche Schicksalsfragen": 5 Jahre Deutsch-Amerikanischer
Jugendclub," [Vital Questions For Germany: 5 Years German-
American Youth Club] NN, 24 Oct. 1951: 5; "Alle Parteien sind
'sozial': Ein Diskussionsabend beim Jugendclub," [All Parties
are "Social Minded": A Discussion Evening at the Youth Club]

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Not all local dignitaries were willing to help with the re-education effort. The director of Nuremberg's art collections, Schulz, for example, displayed a lively interest in the Nuremberg GYA's efforts to revive the city's cultural life and even offered to participate in these ventures. In March 1950 a member of the German-American Club approached Schulz and inquired if he would be willing to inform its members about the current state of the city's reconstruction. Apparently thinking that the Club was part of Major Selsor's domain, Schulz approached him in May about the possibility of giving such a presentation. After a considerable amount of confusion which Selsor helped to clarify, Schulz became aware that the club was not connected with the American staff. Schulz's reply to the major's request to support the club in spite of this fact came promptly. He wrote to Selsor that he would support the American authorities, but that he had no intention of wasting his time with the German-American Youth Club. At the same time Schulz informed the club that preparations for the city's impending 900th anniversary were taking up all his time, making it impossible for him to accept the club's invitation. Apparently lecturing Americans about progress in Germany was one thing, supporting young

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NN, 17 Nov. 1951: 5. The Chronicler for the Nuremberg City Archives dedicated considerable space to the German-American Youth Club. See, for example, Chronik der Stadt Nürnberg 1945–1949: 284, 22 July 1947; 387, 13 February 1948; NCA F2 no. 48.
Germans' attempts to become informed citizens quite another.57

At the end of 1947 Lamm, by then one of the chairpersons of the club, began to reach out to other organizations with similar interests and prepared a conference of German-American clubs in Bavaria. Since statewide organizations were not yet permitted, both Selsor and Raymond Spahn of OMGBY Youth Section thought that the idea was premature. Instead of insisting on his original plan, Lamm settled for a community wide discussion meeting to which he invited the man in charge of Bavaria, Governor Murray van Wagoner. These meetings developed into Nuremberg's widely publicized youth forums. The organizers always were able to find topics of current interest and distinguished speakers for these events. Even when prominent people were not able to come to Nuremberg, they usually found the time to respond to Lamm's requests with enthusiasm. Lamm received messages from Lucius D. Clay, John McCloy and even Eleanor Roosevelt.58 Under the

57Letter Demleitner, GYAC, to Schulz, 21 Mar. 1950; Schulz to Selsor, 2 May 1950; Schulz to Demleitner, 4 May 1950; Selsor to Schulz, 11 May 1950; Demleitner to Schulz, 13 May 1950; Schulz to Selsor, 16 May 1950; Schulz to Demleitner, 16 May 1950; NCA C34 no. 17.

58See, for example, his exchange of letters with John McCloy throughout his tenure as High Commissioner. Although McCloy never was able to attend one of the forums, he made sure to comply with Lamm's request for a letter addressing the participants and that a high caliber speaker from HICOG would be available. Lamm to McCloy, 23 Apr. 1950; McCloy to Lamm, 26 Sept. 1950, 11 Oct. 1950; Lamm to McCloy, 23 Jan. 1951; McCloy to Lamm, 12 Feb. 1951; Lamm to McCloy, 7 Nov. 1951; McCloy to Lamm, 15 Nov. 1951, 6 Dec. 1951; NA RG 466.
guideline "We Build Our World", the first youth forum featured representatives of Military Government, of the Bavarian State, as well as of local authorities who introduced the participants to the different functions of a democratic government and engaged in lively discussions on the role young people would have to play in this process. Although the newspaper dedicated a full page to the forum, it did not mention that the east-west conflict had begun to encroach on reorientation. Major Selsor, who attended the forum as well, reported to headquarters that the Free German Youth had been the most vocal group during the event. According to him, they designed their questions "to embarrass the speakers" and "appeared to have a political import." 

Political agitation notwithstanding the club continued along the lines it had set. A second forum took place in the

HICOG, Security-Segregated General Records, 1949-1952; see also Maar 110-111 for a list of important personalities with whom GYA members became acquainted. Much of the HICOG material is still classified, which makes working with this source difficult.

fall of the same year, in which prominent men and women from France, the Untied States, India and Germany, among them Frank Klier who was still in Nuremberg in 1949, and Franz Joseph Strauß, the man in charge of youth for the State of Bavaria, tried to analyze the current crisis. In 1951 Germany's role in Europe aroused much interest.60

Interestingly, some Germans began a witchhunt against suspected communist agitators even before the infamous Senator Joseph McCarthy took center stage in Washington in 1950. Lutheran ministers in Nuremberg consistently had warned the Americans from 1945 on that they should concentrate on the fight against "Bolshevism" instead of trying to denazify, re-educate, and democratize Germans.

These efforts would invariably drive Germans into the arms of the Soviets.61

During the following years the presence of Soviet troops and a Stalinist regime in the Soviet zone of occupation certainly had an impact on Nuremberg and the surrounding region. The Nuremberg Military Post bordered the Soviet zone in the north and Czechoslovakia in the east. Events like the Berlin blockade made Americans and those Germans who had cast their lots with them apprehensive about the future. June Selsor recalled that a number of dependents who were living with their husbands in Nuremberg decided to return to the United States in 1948. German rumors that communists had marked the houses the Americans occupied for "plunder and murder" in case the Russians were coming, certainly did nothing to ease the tension. Mrs. Selsor and her husband had to deal with worried GYA employees who inquired if the Selsors would be able to secure a place for them and their families on American planes in case of an evacuation. Others related to their American friends or employers that they were on ominous lists which the communists allegedly had written. Selsor and German GYA workers also found that many boys and

61See, for example, Dean Schieder’s "Ansprache vor den amerikanischen Kriegspfarrern, 17.12.45 in Zirndorf." Schieder’s answers to an ICD survey conducted by Hans Feiler in Nuremberg showed that he had not changed his mind in 1947. As far as the political future of the world was concerned, Schieder commented that it was clear to everyone that earlier or later there would be a confrontation between East and West and possibly war (LCA Kreisdekan Nürnberg 138).
girls were reluctant to visit their centers or to become involved in GYA activities because they were speculating that the communists might come and did not want to face retribution in case of an American withdrawal. The obvious success of the Berlin airlift in 1949 seemed to boost confidence in the Americans. Attendance numbers throughout the Post increased dramatically from May of that year on.\textsuperscript{62}

The Cold War brought to light that even some of those people who were much in favor of the American presence in Germany and of a reorientation of German thought sometimes did not understand the American mission. Richard Sperber, the first president and founder of the German-American youth club, who had been secretary in Selsor's office in 1946, found himself at odds with Hans Lamm in 1949. A letter to Lamm under the headline "About Freedom of Speech in the Club" strongly objected to the Club's invitation of former Lord Mayor Hans Ziegler—a Social Democrat who had been expelled by his own party—to talk about his recent journey to Moscow. According to Sperber, Ziegler had previously accused the United States of trying to provoke a war and to "slander the American nation, the same nation, to which you have the good fortune to belong," without being punished for it. Sperber demanded the immediate cancellation of Ziegler's appearance at the club because Ziegler would certainly use it as a forum

\textsuperscript{62}Selsor 10-11; "Participation Booming," YW vol. 4, no. 2: 2.
for further anti-American and pro-Soviet agitation. He thought that such an action certainly would disrupt the rather fragile beginning of the German-American friendship. Sperber suspected that Ziegler's invitation was just part of a sinister plot on Lamm's behalf. He constructed the fact that Lamm had publicly protested against Ziegler's decision to invite only Free German Youth members to a peace rally as a clear indicator of Lamm's intentions. Sperber also noted that Lamm had invited three prominent communists to the previous youth forum, which "was quite a lot for such a small and insignificant party." Unwittingly using vocabulary which clearly had its roots in the Third Reich, Sperber concluded that he had not

founded the German-American Youth Club so that you permit it now to be abused as a welcome propaganda stage for communist fellow travellers!
The healthy and democratically thinking members of the club therefore should defend themselves with all its energy against attempts to carry the virus of disintegration in its youth organization.63

63Richard Sperber to Hans Lamm, 2 Nov. 1949 (underlined in the original). Apparently American officials had not forgotten the 1947 order of monitoring the Club's activities. The letter and Lamm's reply found their way into the intelligence reports which Hans Feiler, still in Nuremberg as intelligence officer for HICOG, sent to Munich (NA RG 466 OLCB, ID 1949-1950, Bi-weekly Reports from Nuremberg Field Office).

Sperber's choice of words betrays the deep and lasting impact of antisemitic vocabulary even after the Third Reich was gone and discredited. Daniel Goldhagen (Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996) esp. 64-65) cites impressive evidence that comparing Jews with vermin and deadly diseases, depicting Jews as an evil enemy in the midst of Germany, was not just a Nazi invention. The Nazis expanded the target group to Bolsheviks and legitimized the phraseology.
Lamm's answer revealed his commitment to fairness and his faith in the strength of democratic principles. He pointed out to his predecessor, who, according to Lamm, had not attended Club activities for years, that the Club's executive committee was convinced that it can only serve the healthy and democratically thinking club members if they deal with representatives of all [political] directions. It appears to be a matter of course to us that we do not make an exception to the principle of free speech in the case of a man whom the SPD has expelled.

Lamm rejected any form of pre-selection or censorship of people scheduled to speak at the club. He found that Sperber's anticommunist zeal often led him to misrepresent the facts or at least to misinterpret them. The Club president pointed out to Sperber, who was a member of the Social Democratic Party and was working for the Social Democratic newspaper, that none of his party's leading men had found it necessary to attend the youth forums to which they had been invited while the Communists apparently had regarded them to be sufficiently important to be present. Lamm further noted that three Germans had talked about their experiences in the United States during the previous months so that it would only be fair to give another German—who

Sperber's letter supports Goldhagen's argument about a deeply ingrained racist antisemitism in Germany's population, although his conclusions are certainly open to dispute. Apparently Sperber was neither aware of its racist implications, which must have been all too familiar to Lamm, nor of the irony that he was actually verbally continuing Hitler's fight against the enemy that had survived World War II and Germany's racial cleansing.
still considered himself a Social Democrat and not a Communist--the chance to talk about his experiences in the Soviet Union. He thought that the members of the club were sufficiently mature and critical to resist any pro-Soviet propaganda that might occur. The interpreter also called Sperber's attention to the fact that the Communists made no bones about their dislike of the German-American Youth Club, because it resisted any attempts to be abused for party politics. Lamm concluded that

we are and will remain above party politics and defend the freedom of speech for everybody, as long as he respects existing laws; as little as we permit the KPD to order us about, as little we can and want to become dependent on the party to which the esteemed founder of this club happens to belong at the time.64

Apparently the matter did not stop there. According to Lamm's former secretary, McCarthyism caught up with the IMT interpreter. CIC repeatedly interrogated him, a fact that considerable dampened his enthusiasm for his reorientation work. Nevertheless he organized one more forum in Nuremberg. In 1952 he left the city to return to the United States. Without Lamm's support and untiring efforts in this realm, this promising initiative came to an end.65

64Lamm to Sperber, 7 Nov. 1949; NA RG 466 OLCB, ID 1949-1950, Bi-weekly Reports from Nuremberg Field Office.

65Maar 84-85, 139-140; for a short biography of Lamm see Joseph Volk, Kurzbiographien zur Geschichte der Juden 1918-1945 (Munich: Leo Baeck Institute, 1988) 212; Lamm's Departure from Nuremberg did not go unnoticed: see Chronik der Stadt Nürnberg 1952: 503, 15 July 1952; NCA F2 no. 49; Nuremberg Post Journal, 15 Sept. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122.
For a while GYA tried to continue the tradition. In September of 1951 another forum for Northern Bavaria took place under direct GYA sponsorship at GYA center no. 1 in Nuremberg, but the emphasis shifted from political topics and intellectual reorientation towards practical suggestions, extensive workshops, and a good deal of entertainment. The American organizers also did not pass the opportunity to promote their own goals and included educational reform on the agenda. On the practical side young participants, among them Willy Gensmantel who represented the Nuremberg KYC,

It is not quite clear to what an extent McCarthyism really was responsible for the CIC actions, since Maar does not provide dates. At least some members of the intelligence community obviously disliked the Germans and at the same time harbored the most outrageous phantasies about German and Soviet designs. We have seen above that members of the CIC seemed to be eager to follow even the most unlikely leads to uncover allegedly subversive action (see, for example Situational Report by Donald T. Shea, Director, OMGBY ID to Land Director, [1949]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Land Director, Box 284, 13/144-2/11). Shea also undertook to discredit GYA with a "fairly hot number" a fellow intelligence officer had organized. He decided to circulate a very negative report by a German boy, who obviously was disillusioned with the Munich GYA, within OMGBY headquarters. The result of this type of action should not be underestimated. Information which obviously came from the boy's report suddenly appeared in a number of MG's evaluations of the Army's program (Jim Clark to Mr. Don Shea, 23 Aug. 1948; Shea to Clark 23 Aug. 1948; Clark to Shea 24 Aug. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/14). The fact that the exchange of letters between Lamm and Sperber went to Munich, reveals the interest which intelligence in Bavaria had in the affair. It remained at the state level, however. McCloy's correspondence with Lamm in 1951 does not indicate any knowledge of the CIC interviews and allegations. Judging from the available evidence it seems that Sperber's letter actually triggered the CIC investigation. When Feiler sent his factual report to Munich, he was probably not aware that he was initiating a witchhunt against Lamm. Joseph McCarthy simply provided a good way of justifying such actions from 1950 on.
suggested that their generation should have a greater voice in youth work. They found that the different youth organizations needed to achieve a much higher degree of cooperation and worked out a list of suggestions for reaching this goal. Apart from that, the forum participants adopted a resolution addressed to the Bavarian State Ministry of Education in which they suggested that the administration should include social studies in curricula of Bavarian schools. American exchange teachers and students from the local high school were at hand to explain their concept of student and teacher participation in school affairs. According to the Young World, this part of the forum evoked much interest and considerable enthusiasm among the participants.66

Organizing youth forums and discussions with prominent persons found much attention of the newspapers and made the German-American Youth Club well known, but they were not the only club activities. Its affiliation with GYA and American volunteers provided the members with ample opportunities for occupying their leisure time. To further their understanding of parliamentary procedures, club members travelled in American trucks to Munich to attend the sessions of the state legislature. Their "roving reporter" even found his way to the floor where—much to his surprise—he discovered that

leading politicians such as Thomas Dehler, Wilhelm Högner, and even Alois Hundhammer proved to be accessible and listened to his questions. The reporter conveyed another lesson to his readers. Although Högner, Hundhammer, and Dehler belonged to different political parties and certainly had opposing opinions about issues such as school reform, they did not seem to harbor any personal animosities.67

Apart from politics, American literature and culture became popular topics for workshops. The club had its own theater group. Music, hiking, and "unforgettable excursions" on Army trucks or buses formed part of the agenda. Well attended and apparently rather wild parties, in which American music became a standard feature, remained one of the club's most popular features.68

In view of the popularity and the activities of the club it is surprising that it did not maintain its momentum and failed to carry the torch of German-American understanding much beyond 1951. Just as in any other organization, much depended on capable leadership which was hard to come by. It

67"Nürnberg Jugendclub besuchte Landtag: Minister Dr. Dr. A. Hundhammer spricht mit Jugendreporter - 'Wie lange soll Schulreform in Bayern dauern?' Dr. Dehler und Dr. Högner begrüßen Mitglieder des Deutsch-Amerikanischen Jugendklubs Nürnberg," [Nuremberg Youth Club Visited State Legislature: Minister Dr. Dr. A. Hundhammer Speaks with Youth Journalist - 'How Long Will School Reform in Bavaria Take?' Dr. Dehler and Dr. Högner Welcome Members of the German-American Youth Club Nuremberg] YW, vol. 3, no. 4, 1 Apr. 1949: 7.

68Gerhard Knöchlein, personal interview, 24 July 1995; Arno Hamburger, personal interview, 11 Aug. 1994; Maar (70-135) provides an excellent picture of the club activities.
also seemed that the post war situation provided an environment for such an organization which it was impossible to continue once life returned to normal. Since most of the club's members were students, it was natural for them to move on to universities or careers in other locations. The increasing wealth and the pursuit of their careers did not leave them the time and energy they had been able to dedicate to the enterprise. Last, but not least, negative experiences with individual soldiers, for example the murder of a Nuremberg taxi driver, who was a popular member of the club, by a GI, as well as CIC activities did much to dampen enthusiasm for the enterprise. Although initially he belonged to the occupiers, Hans Lamm's further career is symptomatic of that of many Germans. He only returned briefly to the United States. In 1955 he went to Munich, where he pursued a successful career, during which he held many distinguished positions and became the head of the Jewish community. Many other club members became professors, doctors, managers, notaries and lawyers. A number of them, among others Richard Sperber, decided to emigrate to the United States.\footnote{Maar 110, 113, 116-123; Volk 212.}

The Girl's Club

While the German-American Youth Club took care of many intellectuals among young men and some women, June Selsor, Mark Selsor's wife decided with a number of other American
Twelve members of the GYA prepare to write the constitution for GYA Center no. 1, Nurnberg, Germany. The constitution will be put to a vote before the members of the club as soon as it is prepared. The Nurnberg girls council has spent the last eight months studying "democratic practice" before undertaking this important step in the foundation of the club. Three of the officials of the club [GYA] help the girls put it in writing.

34. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 294874, 15 Dec. 1947

women to become active with GYA and to do something for the less progressive members of the opposite sex. She had been approached informally by many girls who were looking for somebody to help with their problems or to ask for advice. In April 1947 Mrs. Selsor issued official invitations to initiate a girls club within GYA. Over two hundred young ladies appeared for the first meeting. They came from a wide variety of social backgrounds. It took Mrs. Selsor and her co-volunteers some time to introduce democratic rules, and even more importantly, to install a democratic spirit and a
willingness to take up responsibilities in the group members, some of whom still were ardent and unabashed admirers of Hitler. Under the leadership of Mrs. Selsor and other American volunteers the girls wrote their own constitution and practiced democratic procedures. The girls club organized its own summer camps and skiing excursions. GYA provided transportation and equipment, but the food had to come from a different source. After the first camp had almost ended in nutritional disaster, Mrs. Selsor made sure that the girls club never left without a considerable stock of American supplies which the local military community as well as the Selsor family generously contributed. Other allied volunteers and workers operated in a similar fashion. It is noteworthy that GIs and volunteers provided all drinks, food, and candy available at the American youth activities out of their own pockets or collected the items within the military community.\textsuperscript{70}

On the lighter side, American women introduced German girls to the mysteries of being a modern woman. A zone wide GYA publication, \textit{The Idea Exchange} reported in December 1947 that

\begin{quote}
\textit{two former stateside models, American dependents, inaugurated the Nuremberg Charm School. In addition to
}\end{quote}

lessons in graceful movement, the girls are taught the art of rising and sitting with ease, proper posture and balance. Useful hints are given the girls to enable them to dress to the best advantage on the limited clothing available to them.

The women's section of the local newspaper had much praise for the course. Even in this realm reorientation could be an issue. The article noted that the Third Reich had tried to transform the opposite sex into uniformed paramilitary "birth machines." The charm school provided the girls with the means to become more independent and to take care of their own interests with a "secure, self-evident grace." The paper lauded the attempt to show the girls one side of their personalities which they should not neglect.71

"Reorientation" could acquire many different faces and reach very different people. We have seen how Hans Lamm exercised spiritual and intellectual guidance in the German-American Youth Club. Approached by Lamm, Arno Hamburger also found his way into GYA as a volunteer. Born in Nuremberg, he had experienced Nazi discrimination, prosecution, and the burning of the synagogue first hand before he managed to leave Germany in 1938. During World War II he served in the British Army and returned to the city in 1946 to help his


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parents—who had survived the Holocaust—rebuild their existence. The girls under his care did not attend discussions, but rather participated in one of the many sports groups which GYA sponsored. Nevertheless, Hamburger, an excellent athlete, saw a chance to help them understand what their fathers and grandfathers had refused to learn. He organized outings and week-end trips. Whenever his group did not have enough supplies, he made sure that they would not go hungry by obtaining food in the Army stores to which he had access as an employee of the IMT. Under his guidance the girls not only did physical exercise, but also were able to discuss the fate of the Jews in Nuremberg with a witness who spoke like them, who had grown up in the city, and who was able to relate to them first hand what most of their parents and grandparents chose to repress. The girls learned in this way not only about the terrible consequences of their city’s recent past for people who were just like them. They also came to understand that practicing tolerance and understanding, as well as building a democracy would help them to lay the old demons to rest. According to Hamburger, the girls began to ask and he was able to provide some answers in a way which the group could understand and to which it could relate. The bond went so deep that the girls actually called him "Dad." Some of them remained in occasional contact with him fifty years later.
Interestingly, not only the girls benefitted from this relationship. Looking back, Hamburger did not think highly about the older generation in Nuremberg. After his return he found that most people had not changed and never would, but working with the girls gave him hope that not all might be lost. He considered the time he spent with his GYA group to be the best he had had in Germany.\textsuperscript{72}

\textbf{German Perceptions}

Of course the widespread American support for young Germans did not go unnoticed and certainly was not unwelcome. When GYA celebrated its fifth anniversary in 1951, many local dignitaries, among them the President of Middle Franconia's government, the Catholic dean in Nuremberg and even the Lutheran youth pastor in charge of the city, sent their congratulatory notes. All of those who wrote were grateful for the material help they had received from the Army without which their youth work would have been next to impossible. The Catholic dean spoke of "five years of good will, sincere concern, advice, and active support" which the GYA "idealists" had invested in German youth. The Lutheran pastor pointed out that young Germans "came to know far away

\textsuperscript{72}Arno Hamburger, personal interview, 11 Aug 1994; see also Maar 63-70; Frank Stern's \textit{The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge} is an excellent study of the way in which West Germans dealt with the Holocaust and Jews after World War II.
countries and their peoples projected on the walls of our narrow rooms."

In spite of much praise not everybody was happy with the American activities. At the end of 1947 a Nuremberg journalist criticized the trend in Germany to concentrate American re-education efforts on the younger generation. According to him, young people had never known anything else but Nazi ideology. This brainwashing had made young people "stubborn, obstinate, and diabolical," and therefore a hopeless target for re-education. According to him, people over thirty-five years still remembered the Weimar Republic and therefore would be more open to the American efforts.

A conference of Bavarian youth leaders in November 1947, at which no Americans were present, also brought to light some interesting opinions about the American activities in Nuremberg. Church leaders in general seemed to be far more reserved about the Army's GYA program than anybody else and made no bones about their dislike. Other leaders of

73"Five Years of Army Assistance to German Youth," YW vol. 5, no. 7, July 1951: 1,3.

The following section deals exclusively with the Nuremberg GYA. A detailed study on GYA throughout Bavaria which the Intelligence Division of HICOG carried out in 1950 indicates that the situation in the city and in Northern Bavaria was very similar to that in other areas (Office of Intelligence, HICOG, Essential Elements of Information on GYA, 25 May 1950; NA RG 466 OLCBY, ID, Elements of Essential Information 1950-51).

Nuremberg youth groups did not have much positive to say about GYA either, although everybody present seemed to appreciate the helping hand of Major Selsor. "Materialism" became the catchword of the day. Many thought that the Americans were far too generous with their material support which was spoiling the young people and raising too many expectations from the side of the youth which German clubs and authorities would never be able to fulfill. Others complained that GYA youth centers attracted and protected young criminals. Apparently the youth leaders did not see eye to eye with Americans in Nuremberg about educational values, but opinions on what exactly GYA was doing wrong differed considerably. Some complained that American soldiers simply transferred the military tone and behavior to the centers, while others detected a lack of discipline and order which would ultimately lead to the deterioration of moral standards.

As far as GYA successes were concerned, a number of Nuremberg youth leaders and city officials were skeptical. In general the new and freer education methods did not meet much approval. One Nuremberg school principal revealed that he was clearly aware of the American goals, but remained completely entrenched in his authoritarian thinking. According to him, "German children want to be told what to do and not to be educated according to American free methods." Re-education apparently had not reached this educator, but
more progressive youth leaders and teachers welcomed the changes which they detected in the children who attended the American programs. Another school principal thought that the contact with Americans had led to an increased interest of students and awakened the desire to become more active in their school affairs.\textsuperscript{75}

A zone-wide GYA study conducted in 1950 confirmed the director's observation. Young Germans in general revealed that they were still not as convinced about democracy as teenagers in the United States. While 65% of young Americans indicated that they regarded a free government under the control of their constituents as the most desirable form of government and 35% did not have an opinion on the issue, 15% of young Germans were against such a government, 47% had no opinion and only 37% supported the democratic form of government. GYA participants revealed a stronger support of democracy than those who did not attend the program. 51% of GYA members supported democracy, 40% had no opinion and only 9% were against it. While the results were certainly not ideal, Weldon Shofstall, the GYA's civilian adviser who had

\textsuperscript{75}"Appendix to Report on Attitudes Towards the Army Assistance Program to GYA," 26 Nov. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/245-3/4. The appendix actually is a report about a youth leader meeting of the Bavarian Youth Committee. The author noted that no Americans were present and the Germans took the opportunity to voice their opinions freely.
conducted the survey, noted that these results were encouraging.76

Nevertheless GYA was facing a constant uphill battle. The program did not reach a considerable number of young people in Nuremberg.77 Others did not find their way to a youth center because they and their families avoided contact with Americans.78 Although incidents between soldiers and German civilians were rare, they tended to undermine what Selsor and his colleagues were trying to build.79 The Major repeatedly had to defend the program against attacks from

76"Attitude of Youth Towards Control of Government by the people," "GYA Hits the Target," YW, vol 4, no. 5, 4 May 1950: 5. Füssl (162-63) suggests that this survey should be used with caution since, according to him, it was conducted with the intention to justify the GYA program against attacks from MG and Germans. The rather extensive sources on GYA and MG conferences, however, indicate that the Army and its civilian adviser, Weldon Shoestall, made an honest attempt to evaluate the program. This chapter also shows that reorientation indeed was a concern for the Nuremberg Military Post GYA personnel and had the desired results.

77Some of the people I interviewed were not aware of its existence or only became acquainted with parts of the program (see, for example, Peter Fries, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1995; Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995).

78Marga Guthmann, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1995; Helga Köhler, personal interview, 13 July 1994. Helmut Stühler also recalled that some parents instructed their children to go to the German homes of the open door instead of GYA when they opened in 1950 (Helmut Stühler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994).

79Helmut Stühler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994; see also Maar 84, 124.
members of the Bavarian Youth Committee or other organizations. \(^8\)

Although dissatisfaction was widespread in some circles, many other Germans did not share these opinions. In May 1947 the Army's program in Nuremberg was just beginning to embark on a more sophisticated approach. Nevertheless Nuremberg's school superintendent Raab defended GYA against criticism from local OMGUS officials even at that early stage. The Military Government officers had demonstrated their solidarity with some German critics by publicly declaring that it was time to give German youth something for their minds instead of sports equipment and Coca Cola. Raab thought that the GYA approach actually was serving the American reorientation mission quite well. According to the superintendent, young Germans were suspicious of any kind of ideological instruction and needed above all food and jobs. He argued that sports activities helped raise morale, occupied the youths' idle time, and provided hope for the future. Participating in sports activities with Americans

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\(^8\) See, for example, Nuremberg Military Post, GYA officer to Commanding General, Headquarters EUCOM, Attn.: Director of GYA, subject: monthly narrative report for July 1949. Intelligence reported in 1949 that Martin Faltermeyer, the President of the Bavarian Youth Committee, added much to the dissatisfaction about GYA when he claimed that his organization had to pay thirteen million marks for maintaining GYA, a figure that turned out to be ten times the real amount (letter from Donald Shea, Director OMGUS Intelligence to Mr. Arndt, Director, OMGUS Intelligence, 24 Mar. 1949, in which he also sent the "guinea pig report" of the German boy from Munich to headquarters; NA RG 260 OMGUS, Director ID, Box 17, 10/116-1/1).
and sharing their Coca Colas would ultimately result in an increased confidence in American ideas and intentions. More on the practical side, a trade unionist noted in 1950 that his youth work would not have been possible without GYA support and that he simply could not understand how anybody who was active in youth activities still managed to criticize a program that was doing so much for young people.81

The discrepancy between the actual operations of the Nuremberg GYA and the opinions which a number of youth leaders and even some city youth officials voiced is striking. A closer look at German complaints reveals some of the difficulties the Germans were having with the American program. In one of its monthly reports to the Bavarian Military Government the Bavarian Youth Committee, for example, severely criticized the lack of cooperation between GYA and youth groups in 1947. Its authors also complained that American support went mainly to GYA activities and not to German youth groups, an opinion which Martin Faltermeyer, President of the Bavarian Youth Committee, reiterated in 1949. The example of Nuremberg shows, however, where the real problem lay. While Selsor did support organized groups he was also stressing the need to concentrate the program's focus on those who did not want to join youth organizations.


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The Major considered himself to be the spokesperson for these people. This emphasis did not escape the Germans’ attention.82

The results of a HICOG investigation of GYA activities in Bavaria in September 1949 proved that Selsor was addressing a real problem. According to the youth specialists from Munich, Germans in general were not aware of the problems unorganized youth were facing. The commission commended Selsor for his cooperative attitude, but found that both Andreas Staudt and Theodor Marx, the most important city administrators in the field, displayed a rather negative attitude towards the program.83 This was not surprising. The fact that GYA provided opportunities for young people without forcing them into a firm structure was a novelty which completely undermined the very essence of German youth organizations. The program threatened their reason for existing by offering attractive programs which otherwise were only available by joining a club. GYA would go away, but the principle of open youth work might not. In this context the constant demands by the Germans that American help should be channeled through German youth organizations and the complaints that the Americans did not adapt their activities

82OMGBY, Field Research Section, Bi-weekly Intelligence Report, 8 Sept. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 3, 10/107-1/49.

to the German situation reveal the anxiety of the old school youth leaders in Nuremberg. They were very much afraid to lose control of a large segment of young people in Nuremberg and with that, the basis of their organizations' power.

Occasionally the conflict erupted openly. In Zirndorf, the GYA officer reported in July 1949 that he was making some progress towards "building up better cooperation in that town." According to him, the local sports club was the main obstacle to reaching good relations. Its leadership did not want to make the town's only gymnasium available to non-members because it would undermine its power. The officer concluded that "some manipulation is still in order in Zirndorf, but should succeed in the near future in bringing about the desired results."84

German fears were not unfounded. Hans Werner, who became director of a GYA center in Fürth in 1948, recalled that a number of young people decided to open a photo group at his facility. Werner had to adjust to many changes. First, the center was relocated, then consolidated with Nuremberg center no. 1 which also moved to a new location. Werner remained director of the center when it came under the control of the Nuremberg city administration. According to him, the members of his photo group as well as others decided to relocate with Werner and remain under his guidance because

84GYA, 16th Infantry Report of 8 July 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-2/5.
they found the traditional German club life with its membership requirements rather restrictive. The group continued to meet long after it had outgrown the youth centers. Werner still received invitations to its get-togethers in 1995.\textsuperscript{85}

Of course youth leaders who criticized the Americans for being materialistic knew that they could not compete with candy, cookies, and even cigarettes one could obtain at GYA centers. These incentives, as well as the fact that the centers had so much more to offer than any German youth group at the time, undoubtedly made many of the youth leaders apprehensive about the strong competition which had emerged for their own organizations.\textsuperscript{86}

The less democratically inclined the leadership was, the more problems it had with the American approach. An American survey revealed that Lutheran church youth leaders were among those who did not practice a democratic regime in their youth groups. We have seen already that Bavarian youth pastor Helbich, who had his offices in Nuremberg, from the start opposed any movement that threatened to infringe on his domain and on the control he exercised over his youth groups. Not surprisingly, Nuremberg Lutheran youth leaders proved to

\textsuperscript{85}Hans Werner, personal interview, 21 Aug. 1995; for more details on the further history of the GYA centers in Nuremberg see chapter XI, below.

\textsuperscript{86}See, for example, Willy Pröß, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994 and 4 Aug. 1995; Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995.
be the group most opposed to the American youth program. Of course the older generation in general also remained strongly nationalistic. Quite a few youth leaders expressed their resentment or at least their discomfort with the impact which American culture had on young people.87

Older youth leaders and the churches had reason to fear the new currents. The youth leader meeting of 1947 revealed that especially children who were not organized appreciated the opportunities the centers offered to them. Many found a warm room and company in the GYA facilities. Even one of the most outspoken critics conceded that in general parents did not object to their children becoming involved in the local GYA activities. GYA also gave young elites an opportunity to become acquainted with the outside world by means of magazines and books. One youth leader even thought that especially those between fourteen and fifteen years were attracted to GYA activities because they represented the

87"Appendix to Report on Attitudes Towards the Army Assistance Program to GYA," 26 Nov. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/245-3/4. An OMGUS survey on youth actually found that 70% of all religious groups in the American zone appointed their leaders while 70% of all other groups followed democratic procedures. Members of the church groups also tended to have more pronounced anti-democratic attitudes than those of other youth groups. OMGUS, ICD Opinion Surveys, report no. 99, 5 Mar. 1948: 8-9. NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/116-1/13. The surveys were conducted at about the same time in which the meeting took place.
complete opposite of the Hitler Youth which many had come to dislike.8

The last observer revealed a sound judgement. Young people found more in the Nuremberg GYA center than meets the eye. After years of strict discipline at home and in the Hitler Youth, GYA offered them new ways of getting to know themselves and the world. Fifty years after their stay in Nuremberg, Major Selsor and his wife evoke respect, fondness and even strong emotions because of their humanity and their genuine concern for the needs of the young people under their care. June Selsor actually decided to initiate her girls club because German girls had approached her on a personal basis with their concerns and problems. The fact that two hundred girls from all walks of life showed up for the first meeting of the club documented this search for something new and humane in a harsh environment.89

The Army's GYA program undoubtedly was one of the most extensive and quite successful relief programs of the United States in its zone of occupation. A look at the Nuremberg Post revealed that the Army did far more than simply provide

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89Selsor 4; see also Maar 106.
candy and sports. Many of GYA's programs offered new approaches to young people and youth work in general. It remains to be seen, however, to what an extent young people and the Germans who were responsible for youth work were willing and able to continue on the way which American reorientation programs were trying to pave for the future.
CHAPTER XI

Reorientation Continued: 1948-1952

The Office of the High Commissioner for Germany under John McCloy continued and in some ways intensified the reorientation course for young people on which OMGUS had embarked, although it had relinquished all its mandatory powers in this realm. The American focus shifted from school and administrative reform to political pressure on German governments, an increased support of German projects, and on the formation of individual attitudes. On the local level German-American cooperation assured that many new ideas and concepts made lasting contributions to the way Germans conducted youth work.

American Policy Formulation, 1948-1952

1948 was an eventful year for Germans and Americans in Germany. The Berlin Blockade and currency reform dominated the agendas, but Military Government officials also received notice that the political changes and the move towards forging the three western zones into one state would bring the long envisioned transition of American authority from the Department of Defense to the State Department. The latter set up an organizational structure in Washington that would slowly bring the programs in Germany in line with the same operations elsewhere in the world. The State Department also had come to the conclusion that OMGUS needed to reorganize as

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well to streamline the command structure and to avoid duplication and waste of funds. One of the central propositions of a fact finding mission from Washington in 1949 was that all reorientation efforts should come together in one office which should have equal rank with other offices and direct access to the High Commissioner. McClay took up the idea and created the Public Affairs Office (PAO) in 1949 which reflected the fact that HICOG and the State Department regarded reorientation as one of the most important missions the Americans still had in Germany. PAO consistently employed more than 50% of the entire HICOG staff in headquarters as well as on the state levels. In December 1950, for example, the office had 3345 employees of a total of 6123 at headquarters. On the state level the ratio was less impressive with about 1,500 employees for PAO against a total of 4,374.¹

The administrative reorganization meant that most divisions needed to take stock and define their missions to secure their continuation under the State Department. Clay had successfully carried out his program of bringing civilians into MG. This meant that the High Commissioner for Germany, John McCloy, would be able to rely on an experienced

¹Kellermann 80-93; the figures for 1950 are in Guy A. Lee (ed.), Documents on Field Organization Docs. 22, 23.
staff in the areas in which he would continue the work of OMGUS.\footnote{Tent, Mission 307.}

Alonzo Grace and his Education and Cultural Relations Division were no exception to the rule. At a conference in Berchtesgaden in November 1948 Grace charted the future course of his Education and Cultural Relations Division which, according to him, would have to play a far more important role than it had previously in order to achieve the objectives of the occupation. Grace emphasized that the material reconstruction of West Germany in form of the Marshall Plan certainly was useful and important, but that Germany's "spiritual, moral, intellectual, and cultural redemption" from Nazi rule and Hitler's successful indoctrination could not be neglected.

To deal with minds and hearts which have thus been conditioned, plus the effect of the war, presents a problem far beyond the comprehension of those who would view education or cultural relations as something that should occur only after material reconstruction has been completed.

Clearly departing from Alexander's re-education concept which emphasized structural reform, Grace found that "true reform" could only "come from within". According to him, organization or structure of German schools probably would be less important for the future of Germany than the contents of the curricula or the quality and convictions of the teachers.
Grace maintained that the future of American efforts would depend on a higher degree of coordination between American agencies. GYA, for example, could provide tremendous help if the Army found ways to cooperate more closely with the Youth Activities Section. Ultimately, however, Grace insisted that only cooperation with German authorities and citizens would bear fruit. He advocated an expansion of the exchange program which should include all social classes, not just an elite, and an increase in American cultural activities in Germany.¹

Grace’s address clearly reflected the evaluation work his field officers had done during the previous months. Harold Patrick, OMGBY youth activities officer in Munich, for example, sent a detailed analysis to Grace through Norrie in November 1948. According to him, OMGUS needed to address several serious shortcomings in its activities to date. While he recognized that schools, teachers, and educational reform were certainly necessary, Patrick provided statistical evidence that young Germans actually were spending as much or more time out of the classrooms than at school. He continued that OMGUS had done nothing to address the issue of leisure time although experts agreed that these activities were vital for forming the personalities of young people and developing

their political habits. The youth officer argued that the youth groups to which OMGUS tended to delegate its work, often aggravated the problem. The OMGUS approach to work through the traditional German organizations tended to reinforce the typical "Central European" authoritarian behavior patterns and did nothing to change the social structure. Since youth organizations generally had a monopoly on resources and facilities, young people were exposed to "political, religious or ideological influences before they are mature enough to make their own decisions." Patrick also alerted Grace and Norrie to the fact that so far only 25-30% of all young people had chosen to become part of youth groups. This meant that about 70% had much leisure time at their hands which they could use creatively if they had opportunities and facilities available.

Patrick suggested that OMGUS should take action on several levels. He proposed that OMGUS would have to use its leverage far more than previously to induce state and local governments to develop programs for all youth, not just the

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4 "Brief analysis of task facing Youth Activities Section," by Harold Patrick, OMGBY, Youth Activities Section, 18 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18. Patrick's report is just one of many. American youth experts in general believed that progress had been made but that German youth leaders still tended to use authoritarian methods and did not pay attention to their membership. Many reports also critically commented on the exclusiveness of German youth organizations which only tended to look after themselves and their members. See, for example, Situation Report by Charles Winning, Director, E&CRD, OMGBY, [1949]: 15-20; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Land Director, Box 284, 13/144-1/19.
organized groups. Patrick thought that OMGUS also would have to make sure that the German authorities clearly understood and shared the American concept of a democratic education. To help with this task Military Government should shift the emphasis of its programs to young people in general regardless of their affiliations. Patrick argued that youth leadership programs were an essential tool for accomplishing that mission. He estimated that Bavaria alone needed between ten and eleven thousand trained youth leaders in 1949, and German institutions did not seem to be willing to take up the task. The cultural exchange programs which OMGUS was developing would provide youth leaders with opportunities to acquire first hand knowledge of different approaches to youth work. Patrick thought that the 150 GYA centers operating in the American zone were actually serving as the type of community centers he was envisioning for German youth, but that the Army needed advice in administration and program development. Therefore OMGUS and GYA would have to cooperate much more closely. The youth officers also would have to determine the amount of support they might be able to receive from the Amerika Häuser, Education Centers and the film program. Patrick informed Grace and Norrie that his staff was already developing projects along the lines he had outlined, but that the Youth Activities Section would need additional personnel to be effective. Although Grace chose not to include Patrick's main concern in his address at
Berchtesgaden, it became one of the major pillars of the HICOG reorientation efforts.⁵

Apparently headquarters maintained close contact with its officers in the states. Lawrence Norrie submitted a summary of the activities of his Group Activities Branch and an outline for further action to his superiors just before the Berchtesgaden conference, which essentially went along the lines Patrick had suggested. He dedicated most of the paper to youth activities. Norrie did not waste any time with the discussion of directives or policy statements but rather provided Grace with nine "specific aims" most of which had been on the agenda since 1946.

(a) Through active encouragement and aid to increase and widen German voluntary efforts to develop an educational and recreational program for the leisure time of all German youth.

(b) To afford German youth a wide choice of activities and interests, aimed at the development of individual initiative, personal dignity and integrity, civic responsibility and a social conscience.

(c) To encourage approved German public and private youth serving agencies to work on selected projects as part of a total community plan; to fit non-German agencies and resources in integral part of the German plan.

(d) To assist youth itself in assuming responsibility for the planning and conduct of its own programs with a reasonable amount of adult guidance.

(e) To discover and train young German leaders in a type of program planning and operation consistent with a changing German social structure and present-day German youth needs.

⁵"Brief analysis of task facing Youth Activities Section," by Harold Patrick, OMGBY, Youth Activities Section, 18 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18.
(f) To aid in the establishment of a voluntary, coordinating committee responsible for the supervision, coordination, and development of youth organizations in every Kreis and other designated local areas.

(g) To encourage German youth serving agencies to experiment in training for responsible and constructive citizenship through such means as youth rings, international work camps, cooperative community service projects, international conferences and community youth centers.

(h) To facilitate opportunities for German adult youth workers and older youth to study youth organizations and method in democratic countries.

The list shows that Norrie and his section did not modify their goals in any way, but rather supplemented them. Leadership training would provide an effective tool for securing the American mission in the long run. OMGUS also recognized for the first time that it would have to pay much more attention to those who did not join any kind of organizations, since many of the German youth groups did not show much interest in furthering democratic goals.

Interestingly, Norrie and his officers did not find it necessary to refer in any way to the developing Cold War. Just as Grace did at Berchtesgaden, the head of the Group Activities Branch and his youth activities officers continued to emphasize the necessity of reorienting German youth away from their traditional patterns of behavior towards democratic ideals. They did not seem to recognize the potential benefits for their cause and their section which

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transformed their crusade against the Nazi past into a fight against the communist threat, which increasingly captured the attention of the American public and politicians, might bring.\footnote{Apart from Norrie's analysis see also "Brief analysis of task facing Youth Activities Section," by Harold Patrick, OMGBY, Youth Activities Section, 18 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18. The question of the influence of communism on young people in West Germany did not arise until the beginning of 1950.}

The comments to a proposed Senate investigation which was to examine the alleged renazification of West Germany and the failure of American programs in June 1949 reveal MG's foremost concerns. In reply to the question "whether or not there is development in German youth of appreciation and devotion to democratic institutions", John Fixley, Norrie's Deputy Chief, wrote that less than one percent of young Germans were affiliated with the communist party or the "communist front organization" Free German Youth. He thought that "this is significant since the communist party more than any other political party offers the external trappings of National Socialism. These include: symbols, flags, organization structure, authoritarianism." Fixley also presented a number of additional facts to show that youth actually had made progress in the field or reorientation but he warned that "many cultural elements which permitted National Socialism to rise in 1932 still exist." According to him, Americans needed more time to teach these young
people the practical side of democracy which they had never experienced.8

At headquarters, however, reorientation did not make much headway. Wells had been able to awaken Clay's interest in German re-education and had helped the educators to acquire Division status, but plans for HICOG clearly envisioned cuts on a broad front and certainly not the expansion of personnel which Grace and youth officers were hoping for. Grace also was disturbed by the fact that education would not be one of the areas over which Americans were planning to maintain direct control. Although he mobilized American educators, above all Herman Wells, in the United States he was unable to change the provision. The reduction of his Division to Branch status within the HICOG PAO in September 1949 brought about Grace's immediate resignation.9

It seems that the loss of its prominent head and the power to order changes did not affect HICOG's reorientation work for youth adversely. Norrie, Patrick, and many other MG veterans remained in charge of youth activities under HICOG and undoubtedly continued the work they had outlined. McCloy and his staff apparently were happy with the OMGUS approach.

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8 Memo from John Fixley, Community Education Branch to Alonzo Grace, E&CRD, 22 June 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18.

9 Kellermann 75-80; Tent, Mission 307-311.
HICOG officially adopted OMGUS policy statements as its own.¹⁰

Not just the higher echelons stayed on. Harald Lund, for example, had assumed his first assignment as Military Governor of Kronach in the summer of 1946. His family had emigrated from Norway to the United States after his birth. He and his wife spoke German. Lund later moved to Schwabach as Security and Liaison Officer, and succeeded James Barnett as Director of the Nuremberg MG detachment. In 1950 he became HICOG Kreis Resident Officer for Upper and Middle Franconia which included Nuremberg. HICOG’s decision to officially accept OMGUS policies as the basis for its own actions ensured continuity in youth affairs.¹¹

Contrary to Grace’s fears and allegations, John McCloy focused much more on reorientation and especially on youth than his predecessor had done. The apparent Soviet attempt to win over young people to the cause of socialism in a giant Whitsuntide youth meeting in East Berlin in 1950 during which

¹⁰Lawrence Norrie, oral history interview conducted by Lewis Schmidt, Georgetown University Library, 18 Jan. 1990: 3-7.

the communists made every conceivable attempt to impress young people with their culture and the progress of the Soviet System alarmed Americans.\textsuperscript{12} The outbreak of the Korean War in the same year seemed to make it necessary for HICOG to pay special attention to young people and win their allegiance. McCloy and his deputy Benjamin Buttenwieser repeatedly emphasized that the future of Germany depended very much on the attitude of its young people. In July 1950 McCloy met with youth representatives for the first time. It was clear by then that the American democratization mission not only had to deal with the past but also with a new totalitarian threat, communism. McCloy told the young men (women had not yet entered the top ranks of West German youth organizations) that he was not willing to revive "the old Hitler system of marching masses" as the East German government had done. According to him, Americans would not exert any pressure on young people or "put young Germans in shirts of a different color and have them march through the streets with flags". HICOG rather wanted to help alleviate the bleak employment situation in the new Federal Republic and provide assistance for its young citizens' "self-education". At the end of his speech he encouraged the youth

\textsuperscript{12}Lawrence Norrie, oral history interview, Georgetown University Library, 18 January 1988, 37-38.
leaders to come forward with their own suggestions to use American help more effectively.13

HICOG youth activities officers tried to capitalize on the attention youth was getting from the highest echelons. Harold Patrick once again wrote an extensive report outlining the goals and shortcomings of the reorientation programs so far. He thought that the policies and goals which had evolved since 1945 were basically sound and still valid but that support of German activities could only be successful under sufficient American supervision. This meant that HICOG would have to expand its personnel in youth activities considerably because it was "quite impossible to do more than has been done with a staff as woefully inadequate in size as the one in Bavaria."14

In August 1950 McCloy invited Norrie to provide a detailed picture of the work his section was carrying out.

13Rupieper 153-55; the complete speech is in Erika Fischer and Heinz-D. Fischer (eds.), John J. McCloy's Reden zu Deutschland- und Berlinfragen: Publizistische Aktivitäten und Ansprachen des amerikanischen Hochkommissars für Deutschland 1949-1952 (Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 1986) 105-109 (quotes are on 107-108). The book contains a representative sample of McCloy's speeches in Germany and in the United States. He not only spoke to young people frequently, but also deemed the subject important enough to consistently incorporate it in his speeches on both sides of the Atlantic. See also minutes of HICOG staff meeting, 11 July 1950: 28-29; NA RG 466 United States High Commissioner for Germany John M. McCloy [hereinafter HICOM], Extracts from HICOG Staff Conference Meetings 1949-1950.

14Proposal for Furthering the Development of Youth Activities in Bavaria as a Democratic Force, 7 July 1950; NA RG 466 OLCB, Central Files, 1948-52, Box 28, 570.5.
After an in-depth orientation Norrie pointed out that his office had been understaffed for a long time, but still had been able to carry out its objectives in cooperation with the Germans. Although he was talking to a perceptive audience, he had to give up any hopes for expanding his office significantly. At the meeting the HICOG staff also discussed the outlook for the future. Norrie learned that Congress would probably cut its appropriations for the High Commission by 10% in the next fiscal year. This meant that the present level of personnel could be maintained but would not be expanded. He was assured, though, that in view of the high priority his work began to enjoy, he might get additional help through shifting personnel within HICOG. Norrie also was informed that this would probably be the best solution anyway because the economic boom in the United States made it increasingly difficult to recruit qualified people. Americans were not willing to sacrifice secure and well paid jobs for the rather uncertain year to year appointments HICOG was able to offer. In 1951 his branch, which also dealt with women’s affairs, community activities in general and other programs, consisted of eleven Americans at headquarters and thirty-five in the different states and in Berlin. Bavaria had ten American officials at its disposal, only one of whom seemed to be in charge of youth activities. The youth officer’s staff in Munich consisted of ten German consultants, two secretaries, and two stenographers to do the
work. Each consultant was in charge of a special area of youth work which included leadership training, youth forums, or youth centers.15

The High Commission also did not make any changes in the field. OMGUS Liaison and Security Officers in the communities simply became Resident Officers under HICOG. Headquarters recognized their importance as key figures in the German communities who not only maintained liaison with headquarters but also became the first ones whom German authorities approached with wishes or problems they might have. Often they served as mediators between German authorities and the U.S. Army whenever problems arose.16

15 Minutes of HICOG Staff Conference, 8 Aug. 1950; NA RG 466 HICOM, Extracts from HICOG Staff Conference Meetings 1949-1950; for personnel numbers see Pilgert, Community 12; for Bavaria see monthly report, OLCB, PAD, E&CR Br., Dec. 1950; NA RG 466 OLCB, Central Files, Box 2, E&CR, Monthly Reports.

16 Rupieper 83-110. The situation in Nuremberg was typical in many ways. One of the biggest bones of contention was the American refusal to return the Opera House which it was using as a recreation center for its soldiers to the city. After much negotiations between the local Resident Officer, his superior, the High Commissioner, Army headquarters in Heidelberg, and the city in 1950, the city finally decided to build a movie theater for the Army which the occupiers would return to the city as soon as they would not need it anymore. HICOG provided almost one third of the projected costs and the Army paid another third as well as a substantial amount for renting the building. In spite of the publicly displayed cordiality demonstrated at the opening of the building in September 1951, city officials were not satisfied with the American efforts. Apparently some administrators took additional American help for granted when they permitted construction costs to exceed the original projections by about 50%. There was much haggling over the responsibility for paying permanent fixtures in the new building which the Americans had not requested but the
view of their importance, HICOG actually increased their number in 1949. They had to be very dedicated, well versed in many different areas, possess diplomatic and organizational skills, and needed to be able to speak German. Many of them took a special interest in reorientation and in youth activities. Harald Lund had been involved in youth work already in his previous assignment in nearby Schwabach. In Nuremberg he kept close ties to the German American Youth Club and participated in the club's activities whenever he could.\footnote{See for example his correspondence with the German-American Youth Club in 1949 and his opening address of a youth discussion group in April of that year (NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1425, 9/126-3/7, Box 1427 9/122-3/1). In his previous appointment as MG representative Lund had also organized special events for young people (see, for example, "Kinderfest der GYA und der Militärregierung," [GYA and MG Organize Children's Festival] NN, 27 Sept. 1947: 3).}

Although McCloy apparently did not need any prodding, the State Department informed him in September 1950 that a Conference in Washington on German youth had emphasized the importance of youth work in Germany. Washington admonished its High Commissioner that he should not limit his objectives...
to "'playground' activities, but must encompass political, economic, and social aspects as well." 18

HICOG surveys indicated that American reorientation efforts to date had not yet attained the desired effects on German youth. Studies conducted in 1950 and 1951 found that most young Germans still maintained their critical distance to the occupiers and to democratic ideas. According to the surveys, most members of the younger generation, above all refugees, females, and those who had not had much formal education, did not demonstrate any interest in politics. 40% of the sample did not even know the chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer. 19 Clearly reflecting that their economic plight occupied them most, many of those who had been in the Hitler Youth thought that the government should reintroduce mandatory work service years for all young people. 20

In the same vein the majority of the young Germans did not think that diversity in youth work was a good thing.


They preferred a central organization which would give youth power and respect.\textsuperscript{21} Although the efforts of the politicians in the Soviet zone to woo young people to their cause did not go unnoticed, a majority of those living in the American zone did not think that the communists were doing more for their generation than politicians in the west. The "appreciable minority" which stated that the East German government gave more attention to the young people there, felt that "the kind of attention is often quite other than desirable."\textsuperscript{22}

The surveys also indicated that many young people did not particularly like American reorientation efforts. According to the pollsters, less than half of the young people living in the American zone welcomed OMGUS and HICOG attempts to familiarize them with democratic values and a different culture. Youths even more than adults rejected the idea that Germans could learn something from Americans in the realm of culture and education, although old and young alike thought that German youth was more susceptible to new ideas than adults.\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21}HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "Do Germans Want a Single Youth Organization in West Germany?" Report no. 73, series no. 2, 13 Apr. 1951; NA RG 306 Reports on German Public Opinion.
\item \textsuperscript{22}HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth View the American Program I: Some General Evaluations," report no. 38, series no. 2, 9 Oct. 1950; NA RG 306 Reports on German Public Opinion; see also Füssl 164-167.
\item \textsuperscript{23}HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth View the American Program II: American Reorientation Efforts," report no. 40, series no. 2, 23 Oct. 1950; NA RG
\end{itemize}
The young people's rather negative outlook should not have come as a surprise, even five years after the war. Unemployment ran high and the scars of the war remained very visible in many cities, including Nuremberg. The programs they had come to know and appreciate under Hitler provided the only models which had effectively given young people jobs and security. The leading politicians of the Federal Republic belonged to a generation which was removed from young people and did not seem to deal with the very real and urgent problems of the younger generation. Those who were less reflective might have objected to some of the Hitler Youth's features but certainly not to the attention and the privileges they had gotten from the Nazis. Americans recognized that communists gained an advantage among some young people by exploiting the younger generation's desire towards recognition. They appointed very young people to prominent political positions and focused their attention on youth much like Hitler and his henchmen had done.²⁴

The picture was not as bleak as the surveys indicated. The American zone of occupation actually served as a testing ground for social scientists who were exploring this rather new field of examining public opinion. Although the

³⁰⁶ Reports on German Public Opinion.

²⁴See, for example the Land Commissioner's of Hesse evaluation of youth activities and the communist attempts to sway youth in its favor in the Soviet zone and in his state in his report of 19 Mar. 1951; NA RG 466 HICOM, Classified Central Files, Box 25, D (51) 264/B.
pollsters were recognized for their pioneer work and found Germans in general cooperative, their surveys may not have been entirely reliable. Even today surveys in general do not always reflect public opinion accurately. Modern pollsters have not been able to develop a consistent theoretical basis for developing surveys. The design of the questionnaires has a profound influence on the results since it can channel opinions in preconceived ways. Equally important is which information to include and which to leave out. We have seen, for example, that pollsters completely overlooked AFN in their surveys on radio listening. Some historians argue that the designers of the surveys tended to incorporate American value systems and expectations to such an extent into the questionnaires that they were unable to detect specific German features in the democratization process, for example. They also seemed to expect rather negative results from their surveys. Their evaluations of the data often emphasized discouraging features while minimizing progress.25

25 For an excellent overview of the problems which survey designers and sociologists are still trying to solve see Enrique de la Garza Toledo, ed., Hacia una Metodología de la Reconstrucción: Antología para la Actualización de los Profesores de Licenciatura (Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma de México-Editorial Porrua, 1988); for a brief introduction to the work of OMGUS and HICOG pollsters in Germany see Leo P. Crespi, foreword, Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany: The HICOG Surveys, 1949–1955, eds. Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980); Eckart (19) discusses specific problems of the OMGUS surveys which historians have detected over the years.
Neither McCloy nor Norrie were convinced that the pollsters provided an entirely accurate picture of the situation of young people in Germany.26 Although the pollsters reached rather pessimistic conclusions in their interpretations of the surveys, some of the data they had collected actually substantiated Norrie's and McCloy's points of view. The surveys revealed, for example, that young people in the cities tended to be more positively disposed towards American ideas and programs than those living in the countryside. Additional studies indicated that many young people displayed a remarkable curiosity towards the United States and made ample use of the programs the Americans offered. 73% of all young people, a higher percentage than that of the adults, knew the Amerika Häuser, for example. In the cities the percentage jumped to over 90%. About twice as many young people than adults claimed to have visited these American institutions. 25% of all young Germans listened to the Voice of America broadcasts from Washington. 50% of the youths polled knew the American documentary film program, although only 17% claimed to have seen at least one American movie. Within the youth group, 25% of all teenagers had

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26 Norrie, for example, expressed this view in a staff conference in August 1950, shortly after McCloy had met the West German youth leaders. McCloy seemed to agree. In his public speeches in the United States and Germany between 1950 and 1952 he consistently assessed the mind frame of young people in West Germany much more positively than the pollsters had done (see Fischer and Fischer (eds.) 107-108, 126, 148, 231).
visited the American shows while only 10% of those between 15 and 25 had done the same. The film program was the only American project which more rural than urban youths knew and attended. Clearly HICOG, GYA, and private sponsors had correctly assessed the need for this kind of program.27

The pollsters did not seem to attach much importance to the presence of American troops on the outlook of young Germans and did not explore this venue in any way in 1950. Surveys studying the differences in opinion between young people living in cities and towns with American garrisons and those who did not may have provided an additional field of investigation. An intelligence report from the previous year provided some interesting insights. Its author arrived basically at the same conclusions as the HICOG surveys a year later and recorded an interesting additional phenomenon. The intelligence officer found that the attitude of young Germans towards an African American unit stationed in a little Bavarian town was "favorable and in many cases friendly. The author noted that young people did not object to

interracial relationships as long as they were based on love, not a "mercenary attitude" displayed by some German women which exploited the "Negroes' generosity". According to him, Nazi propaganda, which had depicted African Americans as animals with no sexual restraints, probably did much to make them more attractive once they were in Germany, but that these perceptions were not the only ones responsible for the African Americans' popularity. The author continued that the Negroes gained widespread approval, not only for their sexual prowess, but for their great courtesy, cheerfulness, and kindness. Their attractive voices were frequently remarked on. It was difficult to elicit any comment indicating that young people resented the presence of the Negroes more than they would white troops. In fact, several volunteered the opinion that they preferred the Negro troops to the white tactical unit that had preceded them. The investigator's conclusion was that the Nazi propaganda on racial purity, however effective it may have been, was not strong enough to resist the influence of amiable personal relations.28

There are additional clues that direct contact with Americans, their institutions, and their culture may have had some influence on young Germans. All surveys indicated that young people in the cities consistently displayed more interest in democracy and a higher degree of awareness and approval of American programs and culture. The pollsters quite correctly attributed the phenomenon to the fact that city youths in general were better informed than those living in the countryside, but they also established that apparently

28OMGBY Youth and Youth Groups Intelligence Report, 2nd draft [1949]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Analysis Br., Box 188, 10/51-3/12.
young Germans from all walks of life were interested in these programs and used them whenever they had a chance to do so. Naturally those living in the cities had many more opportunities in this field.

The HICOG survey on the radio listening habits of young people also revealed this remarkable lack of awareness of the armed forces' impact on young people. It included questions on the Voice of America program from Washington, but never took into account the American broadcast station in the American zone of occupation, AFN. We have already seen that the military radio network had an impact on many people in the Nuremberg region. Since only 25% of the people surveyed listened to VOA, it must have come as a surprise to the pollsters that one of the few areas in which a majority of young Germans thought they could learn something from the United States was in the field of radio broadcasting. AFN probably had much to do with this result.29

The extensive HICOG surveys certainly helped to maintain the problem at the top of McCloy's agenda. By March 1951 the High Commissioner was ready to reevaluate the efforts of American youth activities to date. He asked the Land

Commissioners to submit detailed reports and recommendations and to comment especially on the threat of communism for young Germans. In view of the attractive features which some of the commissioners as well as the surveys detected in the youth work of the communist regime, the reluctance of young Germans to team up with the Free German Youth must have been surprising. Although the Land commissioners differed considerably in their assessments of the state of youth work in their domains, all of them agreed that to date communism and the Free German Youth had not made any headway in the Federal Republic. Membership numbers bore them out, but the commissioners cautioned that this did not mean the victory of Western ideas. They pointed out that many young Germans still maintained a skeptical neutrality towards democratic ideas, the United States, and its representatives. Basically they repeated the argument American youth officers had made since 1945, just with an additional enemy in mind. If Americans were not able to fill the void the collapse of the Nazi regime had left, the propaganda and ideology of the communists might ultimately succeed. It would therefore be necessary to maintain or even intensify American efforts, although some like George G. Shuster, who was in charge of Bavaria, thought that Americans probably had given away their
chance to reorient young Germans in 1947 or 1948. Now it might be too late to achieve anything.\textsuperscript{30}

In spite of the general focus on the fight against communism, Americans by no means were blind to developments on the extreme right of the political spectrum. The virulent anti-communist rhetoric of a newly founded ultra-conservative youth group, the Bund Deutscher Jugend (Alliance of German Youth), in 1950 and 1951, for example, did not endear it to American authorities. The Alliance, which claimed 16,000 members at its peak at the end of 1950, openly appealed to former soldiers and Hitler Youth members and advocated an immediate German rearmament to fight the communists once again. With the exception of Bavaria's conservative party and its youth specialist, Franz Josef Strauss, almost all German youth groups and youth committees refused to recognize the group or to cooperate with it. Interestingly, the youth organizations used the same argument with which they had confronted the Free German Youth before: Since the Alliance pursued a largely negative anti-communist program and had nothing constructive to offer, it was not worth any support. In spite of some German suspicions of American backing for

the group, whose considerable wealth surprised many, the High
Commission's intelligence section painted a very different
picture. Although it apparently welcomed the strong anti-
communist stand of the Alliance, it was unwilling to accept
the old demons to get rid of the new ones. In June 1951
Intelligence reported to the State Department that

[The Alliance's] relations with other groups and youth
organizations have been marked by several unfortunate
[!] faux pas which have isolated the BDJ from all groups
except those on the right fringe. This outcast status
plus the lack of a really democratic internal
organization, characterize the BDJ as another political
youth group with fascist potential.31

HICOG published its new youth directive no. M-4 in
October 1951. Its provisions clearly revealed that the
Americans were looking for ways to combat the new enemy but
certainly had not given up their older reorientation goals.
The directive stated that Americans had made "significant
progress" in their reorientation efforts of Germany's youth.
The authors recognized that they still needed to "strengthen
their [young Germans] confidence in Germany's democratic
future" and "further among German youth loyalty to the ideals
of Western democracy". HICOG's six specific objectives
demonstrated the continuity in American youth work. They

31 Füssl 144-146; the intelligence report is quoted on
146; see also the assessment of the formation of new youth
groups in Bavaria at the end of 1950 in OCLB, E&CR monthly
report, January 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, ID, Essential Elements
50-Feb. 51.
simply made the nine aims Norrie had outlined three years before official in a slightly modified form:

1. To help youth realize the inter-relationship between individual freedom and social responsibility. To this end civic and political educational programs are to be furthered.

2. To generate among German youth active resistance to totalitarianisms of both the Right and the Left, and dynamic support for German participation in the defense of the free world.

3. To stimulate interest and confidence in democratic governmental and political institutions and practices, as well as to encourage active participation in local community organizations working for the public benefit, and in public affairs in general.

4. To interpret and increase the understanding of the American way of life.

5. To develop and strengthen the cultural, political, economic, and social ties between Germany and Western democratic countries.

6. To cooperate with Germany youth agencies working toward the integration into the community of homeless and unemployed youth.

To reach these objectives HICOG would

encourage, advise, and assist German youth, youth organizations, and youth serving agencies in carrying forward desirable plans of action in behalf of German youth through publications, radio, press, conferences and workshops, training projects, youth centers, and demonstrations which further the education of German youth towards citizenship in the Western political and cultural world.

HICOG would also continue to conduct its own evaluations of "needs, interests, and attitudes" and launch pilot projects to support research.32

With the new policy statement in place, McCloy was ready to take part in a conference with representatives of the
three Western Allies in London at the beginning of 1952. They discussed the successes and shortcomings of their programs to date. American, British, and French participants agreed that they had by no means won the battle for young Germans yet. To fill the vacuum which Hitler Germany had left they would have to intensify the international integration of Germany and their efforts to replace nationalism with the idea of a united Europe. The three allies would cooperate more closely in the future, but would not resort to any overt propaganda measures although this would make their reorientation efforts more difficult in view of the massive communist indoctrination in the Soviet zone. The meeting clearly reflected the rather limited choices the three countries had at their disposal seven years after the war. It also revealed a consensus that Germans had just begun to embark on their way towards a true democracy. The Americans were doing everything they could to assure that they stayed on their path.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{33}Füssl 143-44; see also Rupieper (168) for the concept to replace nationalism with the pan-European idea.
Since the new HICOG youth directive came at a time when the Americans were actually withdrawing from their active participation in the communities and dissolving their local and state offices, it is easy to assume that the new American policy did not have any impact on youth work in Germany anymore. Directive no. M-4 was not so important for what it would do in the future, but rather for summarizing the work American officials had been doing in the previous four years; it reflected their attitude towards German youth very well. Interestingly, the rather close contact between tactical units, American dependents, and the local population which had existed throughout the occupation began to give way to a segregated coexistence. This pattern determined German-American relations at the grassroots throughout the American presence in Germany at a time in which military cooperation between Americans and Germans became the order of the day.

Although McCloy and the High Commission had to carry out their tasks with a reduced staff, they made considerable amounts in American and German currency available for reorientation and especially youth work between 1950 and 1952, the peak of HICOG activities. Youth and community activities had over ten million marks and one million dollars
at their disposal. This amount did not include expenditures for GYA or John McCloy’s special project funds. In addition to that, other divisions sponsored programs from which youth benefitted directly. Lawrence Norrie estimated that the Americans were spending about fifty-two million marks (at the time about fifteen million dollars) for the reorientation of German youth in 1951. The next year the PAO received about $48 million, almost half of the entire HICOG budget, for its reorientation programs. Youth activities undoubtedly got a considerable portion of the budget.1

1952 marked a turning point because HICOG was unable to maintain its level of involvement and aid. It depended on Congressional appropriations, and many people in the United States still seemed to doubt the wisdom of the American reorientation policy. In February 1952 Lyndon Johnson, at the time already an influential senator from Texas and member of the Committee on Armed Services, forwarded the following letter from one of his constituents to the State Department:

Honorable Sir:

I noticed that you were back in Texas for a few days, and that you are on one of the "Watch Dog" committees on expenditures. Well, looks like some should be a watch dog on $10,000,000 for US culture on Germans. Senator, such truck that the Fair Deal is putting out, and spending the USA citizens' hard earnings is nothing else than the stealing in the tax collection officials. Senator, you boys better wake up.

1Pilgert, Community 10-11; Kellermann 84.
Johnson requested that the matter be given "serious consideration" and a prompt reply. In March State explained to Johnson that "much blood has been given by United States citizens largely because of events originating in Europe and especially Germany." The Department argued that German attitudes as well as the "durability of the new democracy" were vital for American interests in the Cold War. Apparently the argument did not meet widespread approval in a Congress that wanted to save money. It cut HICOG's appropriations for 1952/53 in half which brought an end to its field organization.\(^2\) The dissolution of the local HICOG offices in 1952 also curtailed all of the High Commission's community and youth projects. From then on it would be up to the Germans to show if American efforts and expenditures had been successful.

**Looking for Partners**

Entering Nuremberg by car today the attentive observer notices signs listing the partnerships between the city and many other European communities. Unlike smaller towns in the surrounding region Nuremberg does not boast of a sister city in the United States. Americans and Germans actually thought

\(^2\)Charley Cook, McKinney, Texas, to Senator Johnson, Washington, D.C., 14 Feb. 1952; Johnson to State Dept., 18 Feb. 1952; State Department to Johnson, 10 Mar. 1952. Interestingly, the Department not only chose to justify the money spent for German reorientation but also explained to Johnson at length that the American libraries in Germany indeed contained no communist literature (NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 511.62A1/2-1852). For the HICOG budget see Pilgert, Community 10-11.
about the idea of creating closer ties with an American community after the war, but their motives were too different to make it work.

In the course of its reorientation efforts OMGUS had devised a plan to provide German communities with "parent cities" in the United States. For Nuremberg the Information Control Division envisioned Houston, New Orleans, or Indianapolis as suitable matches, but Nuremberg’s city council reacted rather coolly to the idea. The welfare committee simply took notice of a letter from OMGUS without any further action.³

Apparently inspired by the American suggestion, but for entirely different motives, Lord Mayor Ziebell decided to act. He tried to enlist the services of a leading industrialist to support him in his search. His motives for connecting with an American city were twofold:

Nuremberg wants to demonstrate that it is not the City of the Nazi Party Rallies or of the Nuremberg Laws, but wants to be a German center of culture and the economy with a cosmopolitan outlook. We would like to ask our American partner city to support us with our exterior, economic, and cultural reconstruction, possibly to deliver books to our libraries, instruments and medication to the hospitals, to conduct an exchange between artists and scientists, and to provide our undernourished children with opportunities for their recuperation.

Ziebill thought that Philadelphia or Cincinnati would be good targets and asked his partner to use his connections to establish contact with his American acquaintances "in high places." The Lord Mayor made his priorities abundantly clear when he delegated authority for future negotiations to the city's finance department because of "possible negotiations for loans" in the future. Apparently the industrialist's connections were not as good as Ziebill had hoped. Nothing ever came of his proposal, and Nuremberg remained without an American partner. At any rate Ziebill's wishes were coming true without establishing official ties to one community.4

International Exchanges

Some of the projects the State Department considered to be vital lived much longer than the High Commission. One of them was the exchange program. Since Americans were trying to reintegrate Germany into the international community, it was only natural that they would assign exchanges a high priority. As we have seen, the State Department and Congress laid the foundation for a global cultural exchange Program in 1946, but did not include Germans in the original provisions of the American legislature. Nevertheless OMGUS had received explicit orders to begin an exchange program with the United States in 1947. With the help of Herman Wells it devised an

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4Letter from Lord Mayor Ziebill to Egbert Fischer, MAN Nürnberg, 5 July 1948; NCA C35/II no. 159. Ziegler had most of his wishes fulfilled by OMGUS, HICOG, GYA and the generosity of GIs.
efficient system by 1948 to bring American experts to their zone of occupation and to let Germans travel to the United States to observe the democratic process and life in a free society first hand.\(^5\)

Under John McCloy the program expanded dramatically. HICOG actually created a new division within the Public Affairs Office which was exclusively in charge of channelling and coordinating all exchange projects. Offices within the administration were advised accordingly. The number of people who travelled to the United States under the auspices of HICOG went from a total of eight in 1947 to over nine hundred in 1949. 1950 and 51 saw a peak with almost 2,500 exchangees per year which declined to about 1,800 in 1953, less than 600 in 1954 and a mere 173 in 1955, its last year of operations.\(^6\)

The HICOG and OMGUS programs for Germany actually showed some remarkable differences compared with other exchange programs the State Department had initiated under the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt Acts. While the State Department

\(^5\)See chapter VI above.

\(^6\)Kellermann 261, 263-65. Kellermann, one of the organizers of the German exchange program in the State Department, wrote the definitive story about it. He tends to overemphasize HICOG and State Department achievements at the expense of OMGUS, however. This point of view creates the impression of a dramatic new departure under HICOG which, at least in the realm of youth work, did not exist. See also Henry Pilgert, The Exchange of Persons Program in Western Germany ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary, Historical Division, 1951).
concentrated almost entirely on elites and academics, HICOG—following the precedents OMGUS had set—made community leaders its priority. The Americans were aware that 90% of all Germans at that time never obtained any college education. Nobody denied that university students actually formed a significant part of Germany’s political elite, but McCloy and his advisers did everything to reach out to other parts of society as well. The most important program targeted German leadership in the broadest sense. 885 German educators formed the strongest group of those who went to the United States between 1951 and 1953. HICOG was aware that extracurricular activities needed special attention, so 314 youth leaders went to the United States to study specific aspects of youth work. Actually the number was higher because the groups of trade unionists and religious leaders, listed as separate categories, also included youth leaders in their groups. With the exception of the first full year of the program’s operations, university students remained a minority among those who spent between three months and a year in the United States until the end of the HICOG program in 1955.7

None of the Germans came just as tourists to the United States. In Germany OMGUS had developed a large number of projects, all of which were designed to introduce topics of special interest to small groups of specialists in a

7Kellermann 98-123; Pilgert, Exchange 58-65.
particular field. HICOG continued along the same lines. The State Department set up an intricate organizational structure with private sponsors which would provide the necessary network in the United States. Youth leaders became mostly charges of social agencies coordinated by the National Social Welfare Assembly. Projects included the "Observation and Experience of Urban German Youth in the United States" Assistance to Youth Self-Help Projects", "Planning and Administration of Youth Organizations and Programs", or "Community Recreation and Sports".\(^8\)

Although the programs had no precedents and required a considerable amount of extra time and effort, the American sponsors cooperated closely with OMGUS officials and generally tried their best to accommodate the particular needs of groups. Elizabeth Lam, the officer in charge of the exchanges of OMGUS Youth Activities Section, for example, established direct contact with the National Welfare Assembly in New York which had already established an advisory committee of outstanding youth specialists who came from the national organizations of the YMCA and the Girls Scouts, the CIO, the American Friends' Service Committee, the US Childrens' bureau, the New York School of Social Work and a university. Although Lam was not even able to determine

\(^8\)Kellermann 109-113, 133-150; for specific Programs see Pilgert, Exchange 80-86. 41 of the 131 HICOG projects in 1951 were designed for teachers, seven were specific youth projects.
whether there would be finances available for her youth projects, planning went ahead at full speed. Cooperation between the OMGUS youth expert and the Assembly was close. Lam received extensive reports and evaluations of the German participants and their American hosts immediately after their departure.9

 Apparently the Assembly did not have problems mobilizing its members. In 1950 thirty-eight communities throughout the United States hosted Germans and an additional forty stood by for future assignments. Interestingly, the South, with the exception of Houston, Texas and Winston, North Carolina, did not seem to share the interest in German reorientation. Eleven colleges and universities had accepted German students and visitors who also participated in conferences throughout the nation.

Young people increasingly benefitted from the programs. 24% of the German participants came under youth program projects. Apparently Americans targeted especially those young people who had been exposed most to the indoctrination of the Hitler regime at school. 44% of the visitors were between eighteen and twenty-three years old, an additional

24% were between twenty our and twenty-eight, which meant that they had received their entire education during the Third Reich. In 1949 Americans introduced an additional program exclusively for teenagers. In that year the AFSC had arranged for 100 of them, mostly refugees and expellees, to come to the United States. During the next six years over two thousand German teenagers packed their mostly meager belongings for the journey across the Atlantic.

American officials soon encountered special problems with this program. Almost all of the teenagers adapted quickly to their new living conditions after their initial culture shock. In fact they became so well integrated into life in the United States that many teenagers and their host families requested extensions of their stays or even to remain in the United States permanently. Obviously these requests alarmed the State Department since they defeated the very purpose of the program. Consequently extensions were rarely granted.

Returning to Germany was just the beginning of a difficult time for many teenagers. They experienced severe

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11Kellermann 121-23; Pilgert, Exchange 60-62; see also United States, Department of State, Preparation for Tomorrow: German Boy's Year in America, European and British Commonwealth Series 20 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951) 1-16.

12Preparation for Tomorrow 39-41.
cases of reverse culture shock. It was hard to readjust to Germany's poverty, but also to a very different way of thinking and a much more regimented life. Often those who had stayed at home regarded the returnees as "Americanized" and rejected any proposals for changes at schools or clubs which the young boys and girls advocated with much fervor. Not surprisingly, teenagers frequently looked for ways to return to the promised land, or at least to escape Germany. A young participant of a conference which the State Department had arranged for teenage returnees in Germany recalled that one of the most popular topics was not on the official agenda. Since the American government would not permit them to emigrate to the United States for several years, they looked for alternatives, such as emigration to Canada. The fact that the largest portion of former German exchangees who emigrated to the United States came from this program indicates that the problems indeed were very serious for some.13

In spite of these difficulties, an internal State Department study of 1956 revealed that the benefits by far outweighed the problems, although the long term results of course could not yet be assessed. Vaughn DeLong, who had

13Pilgert, Exchanges 62; Kellermann 122-23. Professor Dr. Lehmann, Director of the Max-Planck-Institute of History at Göttingen, was one of the teenagers selected in the fifties to go to the United States. He provided the information on the proceedings at returnee meetings when we talked about my research project in the summer of 1995.
given up his job as re-educator in Germany for that of an exchange specialist in Washington, pointed out that the teenage program was by far the most popular American undertaking in the exchange field. According to him, this type of exchange produced much positive publicity and attracted so many private sponsors that the Department was unable to satisfy the demand. Many American families apparently did not mind the considerable expenditures which hosting a young German boy or girl incurred for them. DeLong reported that the program produced much grassroots support and pressure from the private agencies involved which prevented members of Congress from cutting appropriations for exchanges in general. The exchange specialist concluded that it would be a serious mistake to phase the program out, since it provided a "considerable segment" of the American population with an opportunity to play an active role in American foreign policy. The exchanges operated as "two way streets" in which not just the Germans learned something but their hosts also became acquainted with the problems of Germany and would better understand American foreign policy. The program's popularity with private sponsors ultimately enabled the State Department to completely withdraw its support without jeopardizing the enterprise. It still forms a significant part of the German-American exchange programs today.14

14Office Memorandum from Mr. DeLong, IES, to Mr. Richard Staus, GER/P, 15 Sept. 1954, subject: effectiveness of German teenager programs: justification for 1956 budget request; NA
To support its reorientation efforts in Germany, OMGUS and HICOG also relied on the services of specialists it brought from the United States to investigate or provide guidance for specific projects. Initially there seemed to be much confusion, which slow administrative procedures aggravated even more. Many specialists came ill prepared or did not have a clear idea of what OMGUS expected them to do, some just wanted to take a nice vacation in Europe or pursue their own research in Germany. The language barrier proved to be another detriment to the effectiveness of American specialists. HICOG officials agreed in one of their first sessions with McCloy that only about 50% of the specialists were effective and worth their money. McCloy and his staff consequently decided to scale down the program and invest the money they saved in bringing more Germans to the United States. Nevertheless, between 1947 and 1955 more than 800 specialists had been in Germany.15

In spite of the skepticism within HICOG, many American specialists made lasting contributions to youth work in

RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 511.62A3/9-1954. My oldest brother and I participated in a three week teenage exchange program sponsored by the Bavarian Youth Committee in 1973 and 1975. In spite of the considerable cost for transport to the United States at the time there were enough participants to fill a chartered jetliner. In 1978/79 the United States hosted 880 high school students and 330 trainees from Germany, three times as many as in 1954 (Max Planck Institute 48). 15 Kellermann 123-27, 264-65; Pilgert, Exchange 66-67; minutes of a HICOG staff meeting, 11 Oct. 1949; NA RG 466 HICOM, Extracts from HICOG Staff Conference Meetings 1949-50.

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Germany. Emigres like Hertha Krauss or Annemarie Schindler, another professional youth worker who had had to flee Hitler, returned to Germany in that capacity. Schindler travelled throughout the American zone to render advice to schools for social workers as well as to the recently established youth leadership schools. Klara Kaiser from Columbia University was scheduled to spend three months in 1949 in one of the leadership schools as a resident faculty. Eight out of seventy-six specialists had specific youth projects in 1949. All of them either occupied leading administrative positions in youth offices of American communities or were involved in practical youth work.  

Like Mrs. Schindler, most experts travelled throughout the American zone. Ruth Norris, who came from the New York School of Social Work, focused her efforts on developing curricula in youth leadership schools. She also emphasized hands-on experience. In June 1949 she travelled to Nuremberg to conduct a two day workshop in amateur theater with youth leaders there. According to her, playing theater was not just fun, but also taught communication and understanding. Apparently she found a perceptive audience. Just one month later one of the participants of the course began to organize

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his own theater workshop at youth castle Feuerstein to which he invited a Swiss specialist.\textsuperscript{17}

American specialists also helped Germans to identify the needs of their youth. In 1950 HICOG brought Jay M. Ver Lee, a specialist in planning, to Germany to assist with the development of all encompassing plans for the development of youth work in Munich and Nuremberg. Interestingly, this time the American officials did not act on their own initiative but brought the expert after the two cities had requested their help. Ver Lee began his work on Nuremberg in November 1950 and submitted a detailed report to the city in January 1951. The youth specialist made eight youth centers the center of his proposal. He suggested locations for them and maintained that they should be open to all young people. Although the "Ver-Lee-Plan" was never implemented entirely, it provided the basis for Nuremberg's blueprints in this field.\textsuperscript{18}

The American academic exchange programs followed the trail of the general political developments. In 1952 the

\textsuperscript{17}Letter from Ruth Norris to OMGBY, 10 June 1949; letter from Toni Budenz to OMGBY, 26 July 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3.

\textsuperscript{18}Jay M. Ver Lee, "Eine Übersicht über Jugendbauten und - Freizeitprogramme:" Eine gemeinsame Arbeit der Stadt Nürnberg und des Landeskommissariates Bayern, Nürnberg, im Januar 1951; Bavarian State Archives, Nuremberg [hereinafter BSA] Kreisjugendring Nürnberg Stadt, 1/1; "Acht neue Heime der 'Offenen Tür'," [Eight New Homes "of the Open Door"] NN, 16 Mar. 1951: 10; I will discuss the further development of Nuremberg's youth centers below.
three Western Allies finally reached an agreement with Chancellor Adenauer which ended the occupation, although it did not yet grant the Federal Republic its sovereignty. Nevertheless the time was ripe to acknowledge Bonn as an equal partner, and the official resumption of international exchanges offered a good way for doing it.

Negotiations to include the Federal Republic in the Fulbright program started in 1951, but Germans and Americans actually could look back to a long tradition of academic exchanges. Many influential American intellectuals and researchers had attended German universities during the nineteenth century to pursue their studies at what was considered to be the world’s most advanced system of higher education. This initial phase of academic contacts was almost entirely a one way street with the Germans gladly serving as mentors for their American students and German-Americans emulating the German educational system and philosophy to the highest possible degree.

World War I interrupted the exchange and also altered the parameters. The strident nationalism, chauvinism, and totalitarian attitudes which most German academics, high school teachers, and students displayed alienated American

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19Schwartz provides the most recent and complete account of the role the United States and John McCloy played in the formation of the Federal Republic. See especially chapter 9 for the contractual agreements.

20Max Planck Institute (ed.) 1-11.
intellectuals and severely damaged German prestige in the United States. Before, during, and after the war technological and research breakthroughs as well as the rise of the United States to the status of global power boosted American self-esteem considerably. During the 1920s educators in Germany tried to overcome their country’s isolation by creating two government agencies, the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation and the Academic Exchange Service, to promote closer ties with the United States. Both agencies cooperated with the Institute of International Education, a pattern they would reestablish in the 1950s. Already in the 1920s a growing number of German students went to the United States, while at the same time many private donations helped German universities through their chronic lack of funding caused by Germany’s economic woes. Starting with just thirteen German students in 1922, the numbers increased to over 400 ten years later. They sharply declined after Hitler’s rise to power, although the exchange service continued its operations well into the war.\footnote{Max Planck Institute (ed.) 15-26.}

During the Third Reich the transatlantic connection became once again mainly a one way street, but this time from east to west. Only those interested in studying National Socialism first-hand found their way to Germany, while many prominent German scholars were driven out, followed by others when Hitler’s armies occupied their countries. Their exodus

\footnote{Max Planck Institute (ed.) 15-26.}
had a dual effect. German universities experienced a drain of highly qualified researchers from which they never recovered, while those in the United States proportionally benefitted from this unprecedented influx of scientists and scholars, many of whom enjoyed a world wide reputation. World War II completely cut all academic connections between Germany and the United States. HICOG and the Bonn government would have to start in this field where they had left off in 1932.\textsuperscript{22}

McCloy and Adenauer signed the treaty shortly before the contractual and European Defense Community Agreements on 18 July 1952. The Fulbright treaty took the academic community away from HICOG's administration and integrated West Germany into the State Department's worldwide programs. Mutual understanding replaced the reorientation concept. The commission in charge of administering the program in Germany consisted equally of Germans and Americans. During the first year of its operations 178 graduate students, 33 professors, and 8 teachers went to the United States. At the same time German universities accepted 192 students, 19 professors and lecturers, and 12 teachers. In 1955 over 700 German students went to the United States. The program enabled more than 800 Americans to study or teach in Germany that year. Initially Fulbright just supplemented many other HICOG programs, but

\textsuperscript{22}Max Planck Institute (ed.) 35-46.
from 1955 on it became the United States' only exchange program in Germany and stressed German cooperation.  

The Bonn government took its share in this "two way street" seriously. Even before negotiations for including West Germany in the Fulbright program began, the Americans noted in March 1952 German universities had invited fifteen professors from abroad for teaching assignments. The state ministries for education also had taken steps to support the cultural exchange. The states revived the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst or DAAD) and were preparing to send twenty-five teachers to the United States with their full salaries paid. This time they were not sent to demonstrate the superiority of the German educational system but to promote mutual understanding. To provide German secondary school students who could not go to the United States the opportunity to become acquainted with the culture on the other side of the Atlantic. Washington also took notice that only two of 104 youth leaders who attended an international conference in Paris had been unable to come up with their own travel funds. The author of the report found this remarkable because the youth leaders had actually been sent by the State Department. Bonn did not stay behind. The Federal government's financial contributions to the Fulbright program soon began to outweigh

\[Kellermann 173-205.\]
the American ones. It remains to be one of the most prestigious and coveted exchange programs among German students to this day.24

Pursuing Their Own Course: The Churches

OMGUS and HICOG would not have been able to manage such a diversified program without the cooperation of a large number of private organizations which Wells had managed to mobilize. As usual the churches were not content with a supporting role. We have seen that the Friends initiated the teenage exchange program. The WCC and a number of other religious groups also began to play a significant role in reviving the contacts between young Germans and people from all over the world. They continued to send their own specialists to Germany. When Carl Baird returned to the United States in 1949, the WCC replaced him with William

24Report from Sam H. Lynch to Mrs. M.E. Allen, 20 Mar. 1952; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-1954, 511.62a3/3-2052; Kellermann (176-177) provides the information on German financing of Fulbright. Since the Fulbright program continued beyond the scope of this study, it does not receive the attention it actually deserves. Interest in the program remains high. Even almost fifty years after the program’s inauguration the Fulbright commission never has a shortage of applicants. Interestingly, it was not until the 1980s that young Fulbright returnees decided to create the German Fulbright Alumni Association. Although it is fairly young, it boasts around 700 paying members and organizes very informative conferences. It also takes an active interest in forwarding the idea of cultural exchanges and openmindedness in any conceivable way.
Graffam who came from Boston where he had studied psychology before deciding to become a reverend.25

Graffam was already familiar with the city when he came. He had visited the city as a participant in an international work camp and was a friend of Baird. Graffam seemed to be less reluctant to become a visible presence in Nuremberg. He stayed with the Bavarian Youth Ministry for six years. Like his predecessor, Graffam participated in the ministry's activities such as youth retreats, but he also became editor of one of its monthly Das Baugerüst and managed to increase its circulation considerably. The American wrote about topics such as celebrating Christmas in the United States, but he also introduced new ways of thinking and behaving in his contributions to the youth publications. In June 1953, for example, he told his readers that "actions speak louder than words." Graffam suggested to young Germans that they should follow the example of some young Christians in Philadelphia who were carrying out small community projects without waiting for the authorities to solve problems. He not only admonished his readers to do the same but also provided them with practical tips for organizing this type of activity in their own communities. Probably without being


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aware of it, Graffam promoted the same democratic principles as OMGUS and HICOG officials: he suggested electing a committee which should not just include the reverend but also the local mayor or other important people. Graffam also recommended that Christian youth groups cooperate closely with youth rings and other youth organizations. Writing did not just mean articles but also theater plays which Graffam produced with youth groups. The American also tackled difficult problems such as the meaning of modern life or what consequences "being different" actually could have for a young Lutheran.26

One of Graffam's main fields of operation was ecumenical work. With the support of the WCC the American began to organize services in English and German in the town of Oberammergau, site of a world famous passion play, in the summer of 1950. Oberammergau was such a success that the Bavarian church decided to make gatherings with other Protestants an integral part for young people and reverends alike. With Graffam as interpreter the Bavarians' first tour abroad led them to East-London where they visited a congregation who had suffered the loss of its church and community center from German V 1 rockets during World War II. The next year they set out for Scotland and also hosted

international camps with participants from the United States and many European countries in Germany. In 1955 Graffam defended this "ecumenical work" against "parochialists" as necessary. He found it comforting to find that the Christian church had "world wide dimensions." Graffam also thought that the international work had a political dimension. According to him, "the church must not only preach peace and love but also demonstrate them at a time of hatred between the peoples of the world."27

Before Graffam left Nuremberg in 1955, he wrote about his impressions and experiences in Germany. He did not just have praise in his farewell note. He maintained that the shabby way in which the Lutheran church treated the women it employed drove many of them away from the church. Graffam thought that theology was indeed important for working with young people, but that at the same time an exclusive emphasis on theology did not take the fact into account that many poor theologians turned out to be excellent youth workers. Graffam's major criticism was the lack of practical experiences of most theology students. He noted their complete detachment from real life and even from their colleagues at other faculties of their university. The guest from the United States pointed out that German theology students received one lecture on youth work during their entire course of study. He found it not at all surprising

27Helbich 101-103.
that most vicars were completely helpless in the presence of young people and often did not understand that they needed to take practical issues such as laws or working hours into consideration in their attempts to reach out to young people.28

In spite of Graffam's severe criticism of the German Lutherans in 1955, he seemed to prefer the imperfections of Germany to those of the Protestant churches in the United States. Getting married to a German lady was the outward sign that he felt comfortable and welcome in Nuremberg. When he returned to his home land it did not hold him long. After some years of missionary service in other countries Graffam decided to return to Germany and join the Lutheran church there. He became reverend in a North German congregation where he continued to write theater plays for young people. He is still living there after his retirement.29

From 1948 on church organizations also introduced international work camps in Germany. Young people from abroad and from Germany would provide their labor free of charge in self-help projects to German communities or groups in special need. This would not only generate good will but also enable young Germans and their peers from all over the

28Helbich 104-107.

world to get to know, to understand, and to respect each other.\textsuperscript{30}

Youth camps also took place in and around Nuremberg. As usual the AFSC was among the pioneers of this type of work. In 1947 one of the initiators of the Peace Village asked the AFSC if it might not be possible to support the project with international volunteers. The AFSC replied promptly. By the end of 1947 the Friends obtained permission for one of their representatives, William Weber, to take up residency in Nuremberg. Weber went to work immediately and by June 1948, just a few months after the laying of the cornerstone for the project, international volunteers began to arrive to help with the construction of the project, but also to promote a better understanding between young people from around the world. Weber made no bones about the difficulty of the task. In his project description he informed applicants that they were not just expected to do heavy construction work free of charge, but also to participate actively with contributions to the spiritual life of the work camp. Those who wanted to

\textsuperscript{30}See, for example, minutes of the OMGUS Youth Activities Staff Meeting, 14 and 15 Apr. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18; Beryl R. McClaskey (The History of U.S. Policy and Program in the Field of Religious Affairs under the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary, Historical Division, 1951) 26-29) provides a very general overview over the international contacts of the churches.
come generally were expected to pay their travel expenses out of their own pockets.31

In spite of Weber's "job description" about fifty international volunteers arrived at Nuremberg to help the inhabitants of the Peace Village with their construction work, but currency reform wiped out the funds for the project, so that the volunteers had a difficult time continuing the work they had begun after June. The participants of the youth camp did not just have material problems, however. Communication was difficult since none of the Germans spoke any English and few of the volunteers commanded German so that discussions were cumbersome. Bad weather made living under normally difficult conditions in crowded quarters with a meager diet even harder. Building an "effective democratic organization without falling into the extremes of formless laissez-faire or over-authority" proved to be another challenge for the organizers. Nevertheless, the Friends' representative regarded the experiment as a success. An average of twenty volunteers per day had provided fifty-five work days in labor, but the Quakers found the less tangible results equally important:

In a spirit of good will, service, and seeking, through the medium of cooperatively and democratically shared

work, play, meditation and discussion, our work camp has been a humble attempt to lessen the occasion for war by building positive attitudes towards the world’s problems.\(^\text{32}\)

During the next two years the Peace Village received further help from international volunteers, who were not just recruited by the AFSC but also by the World Council of Churches.\(^\text{33}\)

Of course exchanges between the United States and Germany were not the only avenue to international contacts. OMGUS and HICOG did not ignore the possibilities which exchanges between Germany and its European neighbors offered. The British and the French had established their own exchange program early on, but the Americans were the first to broaden

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\(^{32}\) Bradford Rowland (AFSC Paris) c/o William Weber, Nuremberg, Germany to Dr. Swanson & Dr. Raymond Spahn, Educational & Youth Division OMGBY; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 127, 5/294-1/1.

\(^{33}\) Apparently international work camps were one of the areas in which Chester Baird became active. In July 1949 he requested an extension of stay from OMGUS for various Americans who were participating in a work camp in 1949 (NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3); "Jugend ohne Völkerhaß: Deutsche und Amerikaner, Franzosen und Holländer, Schweizer und Indochinesen zu Arbeit und Spiel vereint im 'Friedensdorf'," [Youth Without Hatred Towards Other Peoples: Germans and Americans, French and Dutch, Swiss and Indochinese Joined in Work and Play at the "Peace Village"] NN, 1 Aug. 1949: 5; "Geist und Kraft Vereint: Internationales Treffen im Friedensdorf, [Spirit and Power United: International Meeting at Peace Village] NN, 22 July 1950: 14. Of course these camps were not the only ones: We have seen that international students spent time at the Nuremberg GYA center in 1952. The Lutheran Church institution in Stein, a suburb of Nuremberg also became the site of an international youth camp in 1950 ("Praktische Arbeit, keine Ideologien: Internationales Studentenlager in Stein," [Practical Work, No Ideologies: International Student Camp in Stein] NN, 19 Aug. 1950: 11).
their horizons beyond the boundaries of their own zone. A steady stream of European specialists went to Germany and many Germans were able to travel to their neighboring countries with American aid. At the end of this part of the exchange program over two thousand German leaders had gone to other European countries and 532 European specialists had spent time in Germany to take care of reorientation.34

The Nuremberg YMCA seemed to be especially active in this realm. Possibly with the help of Lawrence Norrie, who maintained close contact with Nuremberg's YMCA, eighteen Nurembergers went to Switzerland in August 1949. At the same time twelve others got the opportunity to travel to Sweden. Members of other church youth groups were able to travel to Holland. Trade unionists re-established contacts with France and later began to organize journeys to Italy and Yugoslavia. Young Germans were taking advantage of all opportunities to break through the isolation the Third Reich had created.35

34 Kellermann 127, 261.


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American planners of the cultural exchange program were aware that the seeds they were sowing probably would need a long time to bear fruit. Their own evaluations of the exchange program were cautiously optimistic. According to their first impressions and surveys, many of the exchangees in fact became the multipliers the Americans had hoped they would be. Interestingly, briefing conferences and returnee meetings seemed to indicate that university students were least likely to benefit from their overseas experiences.36

Young Nurembergers as well as youth leaders had ample opportunity to travel to the United States from the start. Two students were the first ones who left for a journey across the Atlantic. The American YMCA sponsored one of them, Church World Services enabled a theology student from the Lutheran college in nearby Neuendettelsau to continue his studies in the United States. In 1948 eleven members of

36Kellermann 209-252. Since Bavaria was considered to be a stronghold of the "traditionalists", American experts paid special attention to the effects of returnees there and were satisfied with the immediate results the exchanges showed in all age groups and among participants in a wide variety of projects designed for helping young people. See, for example, despatch from HICOG, Frankfurt to Department of State, Washington, 17 and 26 Jan. 1952; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-1954, 511.62A3/1-1752 and 511.62A3/1-2652; for an evaluation of returnees and a very clear opinion about German university students see Russel S. Wise, Consul General, Hamburg, to Dept. of State, Washington, 22 Aug. 1952; NA RG 59 Decimal File 1950-54, 511.62A3/8-2252; a study conducted by the Institut für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsforschung for the USIA in 1955 confirmed his impressions (USIA, Research Staff, Report no. 224, Study of Impressions and Disseminations by Information Specialists and Students from the Exchange of Persons Program, 30 Dec. 1955; NA RG 306 Research Reports on German Public Opinion).
various youth groups in Nuremberg left Germany with a grant from the Rockefeller foundation. 1949 saw youth specialists like Karl Maly, the third man in Nuremberg's youth work behind Marx and Staudt, together with Armin Schrotberger, an elementary school teacher who worked for OMGUS, participating in one of the youth leader projects. Martin Helbich went to the United States with another pastor from Nuremberg and two from the surrounding region under the sponsorship of the Federal Council of Churches. The first group of Fulbright scholars in 1953 was still very much connected to reorientation, but demonstrated well the new approach of targeting persons instead of institutions which the OMGUS youth section had pioneered. The Americans brought 105 teachers to the United States. Five of them, two ladies and three men, came from Nuremberg. By that time State Department objectives were not just to prove Nazi propaganda wrong, but also to counteract erroneous impressions which Hollywood movies seemed to cause. During the next years trade unionists, students, teenagers, young farmers, more teachers, and members of the Churches followed in their footsteps.37

All Nurembergers who went to the United States were most impressed with their host country. It seemed that the United States had something to offer for everyone. Karl Maly spent most of his time in the North-East. As a Social Democrat he did detect differences between rich and poor, but also noted that the poor in the United States still had more than the average German. Maly found the absence of any deference towards higher social classes or authorities one of the most striking features of the country. He also reported back to Germany that the United States in fact was the "Country of Youth" because it seemed that youth activities and education received almost unlimited public and private support. In view of the Peace Village and the other Boys' Town project in Nuremberg it is not surprising that Maly also wanted to become acquainted with a Boys' Town in the State of New York. His sponsors complied with his wishes. Maly was impressed with the democratic procedures the young people practiced there.38

Bavaria's Youth Pastor had a different approach. According to him, America in many respects was not much different from Germany. Martin Helbich talked about New York found the names of the five Nuremberg teachers in newspaper clippings which had been included as an appendix in the report and was able to locate three of them in Nuremberg in 1995. Another had passed away and one could not be found. The Nürnberger Nachrichten maintained a steady supply of reports of exchangees throughout the 1950s.

precincts in which German was still the predominant language and he related to his readers back home—undoubtedly with satisfaction—that he had discovered a Café Hindenburg, named after the ultraconservative general, German World War I hero and last President of the Weimar Republic. Although Helbich came from the conservative camp, he shared a number of Maly's observations. Like Maly, Helbich commented that he had ample opportunities to meet with leading experts in his field of Protestant youth work and to learn about youth work not just in theory but also in practice. He was impressed with the way in which American teachers managed to interest their teenage students in political issues and tried to practice democracy in the classrooms. Helbich also noted the prosperity which, according to him, made youth work much easier over there than in poor Germany, but the Bavarian Youth Pastor thought that this wealth was not always a blessing. He noted that the American YMCA had really fancy houses, but at the same time had become a secular service operation which seemed to forget its foundation in faith. Interestingly, Helbich reported that he had not fallen into unlimited enthusiasm but that getting to know that part of the world was well worth the trouble. He recommended to everyone who had the chance to take the trouble and make the journey.39

39Letter from Hans Martin Helbich to his friends in Germany, 23 May 1949; LCA Landeskirchenrat, VI, 1178a, vol. IV.
Not all Lutherans shared this view. Nuremberg’s Dean Theodor Schieder, for example, maintained his distance from the occupiers throughout his tenure. When HICOG approached his superiors in Munich to recommend people for the exchange program in 1951, he informed them that he "could not think of one man who would be able above all to stay away from his profession for such a long time." Schieder consistently declined invitations by the Nuremberg Amerika Haus to participate in or at least to attend discussion evenings. In 1950 he declined to participate in a German-American Easter service which Army chaplains were trying to organize. According to Schieder, the time was not yet ripe for such an undertaking. "One has to respect the feelings of the people which happens to be the vanquished". Schieder thought that Americans first would have to "practice" community by visiting German services and "respectable Christian German families". 40

Although Schieder was one of the leading men in Bavaria, he was unable to stop American advances in areas which were not under his jurisdiction. In spite of his reservations, an

40Schieder to the Lutheran State Council in Bavaria, 26 Oct. 1951. The folder contains numerous letters in which Schieder declines to participate in discussions or other events at the Amerika Haus in spite of repeated attempts by the director of the institution to involve him (see, for example, Dr. Ernest G. Schweibert, Director, Amerika Haus Nuernberg to Oberkirchenrat D. Schieder, Nuernberg, 8 Feb. 1950; LCA Kreisdekan Nürnberg 138). For Schieder’s position on the Easter service see his Erklärung des Sachverhaltes, 13 Apr. 1950; LCA Landeskirchenrat, 525.
Easter service took place in Munich the same year. It seems that especially youth reverends had less problems with the occupiers. In July 1949, for example, youth reverend Bammessel from Nuremberg invited Harold Patrick, the Bavarian OMGUS youth officer to observe the Lutheran Church’s own youth leadership training.41

Bammessel also provided the Americans with names of students who were willing to go to the United States. In spite of Schieder’s opinion, other Bavarian reverends continued to travel to the United States. Especially the staff of the Mothers’ Home in Stein, who were very active in youth leader training, had the opportunity to expand their horizons and to learn something new in the United States. The head of the Bavarian Inner Mission travelled to America as well. He took the opportunity to thank American congregations in person for their charity work, which, according to him, had done so much good for the still devastated country.42

American churches did not just welcome German reverends and lay persons to the United States, but also took every

41 Youth Pastor Bammessel to Mr. Patrick, 30 May 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/5.

42 List of Candidates for study in the US submitted by youth reverend Bammessel, 11 July 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3; final report of Reverend Heinz Diez, Director, Innere Mission of his trip to the United States, 27 Sept.-19 Dec. 1951 (Diez’s report also contained train and bus tickets); LCA Diakonisches Werk, 2427; for the journeys of the Mothers’ Home staff see LCA Gemeindehelferinnen, Box 5, HICOG.
opportunity to gather information and observe the situation first hand. Delegations of reverends and theology students arrived at Nuremberg as well as individuals who wanted to observe specific problems for which they were trying to find solutions or funds back home.43

Heinrich Schiller was one of the first students to obtain a degree in the United States. He went to the University of Minnesota to study social work with Gisela Konopka, a German emigree who was teaching in Minneapolis. Schiller not only acquired theoretical knowledge of a new approach to social work, but also got the chance to test the theory in the field. Schiller lived and worked in several institutions for children and teenagers in Minneapolis. He returned to Berlin with his Master’s degree in 1951, but two years later went to Nuremberg to teach social work there. Schiller’s dissertation which contained the new approach to social work became a standard textbook throughout Germany. Schiller continued his career first as director of

43"US Studenten in Nürnberg: Sie besichtigen kirchliche Einrichtungen," [US Students in Nuremberg: They Visit Church Installations] NN, 6 July 1951: 11; "Sie wollen die Not kennenlernen: US Kirchenvertreter besuchen auch Nürnberg," [They Want to Get to Know the Misery: US Church Representatives Also Visit Nuremberg] NN, 14 Jan. 1952; "US Pastoren besichtigen Nürnberg," [US Reverends Inspect Nuremberg] NN, 18 July 1952: 10; see also correspondence between Nuremberg ministers and their American colleagues regarding their visits, for example Pastor Henry O. Yater, Ann Arbor, Michigan to Reverend Diez, Nuremberg, 8 Feb. 1952, in which the American thanks for the hospitality he received on his visit and asks Diez to take care of a German student who is about to return home from Ann Arbor (LCA Diakonisches Werk, 778c).
Nuremberg's own School of Social Work, from 1967 as director of a completely new school of social work the Lutheran church established in the city. He also served as president in international organizations and helped the United Nations to promote social work in Thailand. 4

Schiller was not the only person to become involved in looking for new ways in social work. In September 1951 German community and church social workers who had been to the United States met in Stuttgart to collect and evaluate their experiences. They adopted a resolution which recommended the introduction of "case work" and "group work" and demanded that "concurrent field work" become part of the education of social workers. They also demanded that social work--up to then a domain of the opposite sex--be opened to men. The assembled social workers further thought that "child guidance" and "team work" were useful concepts and that the child should be the center of all attention, apparently something which was new in Germany. The Bavarian

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4 Heinrich Schiller, personal interview, 26 July 1995; see also "Dr. Schiller leitet evangelisches Sozialinstitut: Einem neuen Ruf gefolgt: Der anerkannte Fachmann ging von der Sozialen Schule an die neue Bildungsstätte," [Dr. Schiller Head of Lutheran Social Institute: Followed a New Call: the recognized expert went form the School of Social Work to the New Educational Institution] NN, 7 Sept. 1967: [n.p.]. Newspaper clipping, NCA C74 no. 138.
participants agreed on a follow-up meeting six months later.\footnote{Minutes of a meeting of exchangees in social and health services in Stuttgart, 24/25 Sept. 1951; LCA Diakonisches Werk, 947. The social workers did not have German equivalents for the American terms, so they simply adopted them.}

Almost from the start of the program OMGUS followed up on the returnees' plans and activities. In May 1949 Charles Winning and the German advisory committee sent a questionnaire to all returning Germans. Wining asked for their full cooperation so that Americans and Germans involved in the planning and selection progress would be able to improve the program. In the summer OMGBY invited Karl Maly and Armin Schrotberger to participate in one of various conferences "to discuss further plans in youth activities in the light of your experiences in the States." The Americans paid for the expenses and made sure that the school superintendent for Munich was present to listen to any suggestions.\footnote{Letter, Charles Winning to returning Germans, 31 May 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Cultural Affairs Br., Box 17, 10/120-1/1; letters, OMGBY to Karl Maly and to Armin Schrotberger, Nuremberg, 2 Aug. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3.}

OMGUS and HICOG did not have to twist many arms to have people attend their follow-up conferences. Returnees in general decided to remain in contact in Germany. Almost all Bavarian exchangees reacted positively to an initiative in 1950 to found what was to become the Society for
International Exchange (Gesellschaft für internationalen Austausch). Even the Bavarian Lutherans deemed the new association important enough to send a representative.\footnote{OLCB to Bavarian State Church Council, 15 Mar. 1950; Council to OLCB, 29 Mar. 1950; OLCB to Council, 20 Apr. 1950; LCA Landeskirchenrat, 525.}

All of these activities of returnees clearly indicated that in fact they were doing what the State Department had hoped they would do: they served as multipliers. Most of the exchangees did their part of the reorientation work in a quiet manner. They brought ideas back to Germany which they were trying to implement in their own environment and sometimes in rather unexpected places. Willy Pröhl, for example, went to the United States in his capacity as a youth leader for the Falcons in Nuremberg. Like so many others Pröhl was impressed with the American openness and hospitality. He also noted with disapproval the dark side of a completely segregated social system in the South, but almost fifty years after his journey to the United States, Pröhl, then mayor of Nuremberg, regarded the most valuable experience in the United States his practical lessons in dealing with a car oriented society. He remembered that he was very impressed with the modern systems of traffic lights in smaller communities when the city of Nuremberg did not have more than five of these innovations to regulate the city traffic. Pröhl thought that he made good use of these
experiences during his long and distinguished career in the city's political arena.\textsuperscript{48}

Many other returnees decided to put their knowledge to good use, although the teachers were not always impressed with the American educational system.\textsuperscript{49} Karl Kunze, participant in the Fulbright teacher exchange of 1953, founded the \textit{Nürnberg Kolleg}, an institution that opened up alternatives in formal education for people who had jobs. His companion on that journey, Karl Ritter, English teacher at a secondary school in Nuremberg, introduced American studies in his classes as much as the curriculum permitted. He used materials and books he had bought in the United

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\textsuperscript{48}Willy Prölß, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994.
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\textsuperscript{49}Karl Ritter as well as another of the participants, Elisabeth Oberndörfer thought that the German school system provided more opportunities for advanced learning. While the American system was democratic the German system seemed to take better care of its academic responsibilities. A little frustrated by the reorientation efforts which did not seem to find anything good in the German educational system, Oberndörfer confided to her diary that the Americans actually could learn quite a bit in regard of academic standards from the Germans. (Karl Ritter, personal interview, 26 July 1995. Elizabeth Oberndörfer, Diary, in the possession of the author). In general, however, the teachers did not differ from others in their assessment of their trips as extremely valuable for learning about their profession and about Americans. See the reports of Karl Kunze, Peter Moritz, Elizabeth Oberndörfer, Karl Ritter, and Ingeborg Seelig to the State Department. Four of them are in excellent English, only one was written in German. Although the five teachers went to different locations, their evaluations were remarkably similar. Interestingly, the teacher who spent most of his time in Tennessee came to adopt the racial views of his white hosts, something the State Department surely regarded as counterproductive (NA RG 59 General Records, Bureau of Public Affairs, IES, German Teachers Program, Box 3).
States. He also tried to incorporate the different method of teaching in his classes whenever he could. In the seventies the Bavarian Ministry for education put Ritter in charge of supervising the training of young English teachers in the region. Whenever he could, Ritter included a visit to one of the American High Schools the Army maintained for the dependents of the many military installations in Middle Franconia.50

Not everybody in Germany was happy with the cultural exchange. The wife of one of the exchangees, a Foreign Service trainee, who lived in Hersbruck near Nuremberg while her husband was in the United States, received an anonymous note:

Don’t you think that we do not know what your husband is doing in the United States against Germany. What has he done in Switzerland two years ago?

We know it all and we warn you. Watch your children and yourself closely so that nothing happens. We hate all who sabotage German unity and have many of them blacklisted and will soon take action.51

Since the lady’s husband did not want to jeopardize his career, he did not think it necessary to start a police investigation and asked HICOG to be discreet about the

50Karl Kunze, personal Interview, 17 July 1995; Karl Ritter, personal interview, 26 July 1995. HICOG also found much evidence for this type of grassroots activity of many returnees, regardless of age. See, for example, Telegram (Confidential security information) John McCloy to Secretary of State, Washington, 26 Jan. 1952; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950–54, 511.62A3/1–2652.

matter. He took the threat serious enough, however, to move his family from Hersbruck to his mother-in-law in another village near Nuremberg.52

Occasional unpleasant notes notwithstanding, Senator Fulbright would have been pleased with the success of the program if he had been able to follow the public relations activities in Nuremberg of returnees and those who still were spending time in the United States. A considerable number of articles of globetrotters from Nuremberg appeared in the city’s newspapers. With the exception of one businessman who probably was the first person to travel through the United States at his own expense, all of those who had been in the United States as specialists, university students or high school students, in one way or another provided factual, perceptive, but above all positive information of the United States. Germans at home learned that Americans did "not just chew gum" or dwelled in riches. They got a glimpse of life at high schools and universities. They found out about New York and life in small communities. They got an eyewitness account of Christmas in Arizona or the beaches in Florida. American friendliness and hospitality as well as hard work were recurring themes.53


53 See, for example "Ein Nürnberger berichtet aus den Vereinigten Staaten: Als deutscher Student in Amerika," [A Nuremberger Reports from the United States: As German Student in America] NN, 25 Mar. 1950: 8; "In den USA gut aufgenommen:
Those who did not make it into the local news nevertheless disseminated the same message. Nuremberg’s first exchange student, a YMCA member, wrote about his experiences in a Lutheran youth publication. Armin Schrotberger, one of the youth specialists, gave presentations about his journey. Even youth pastor Helbich’s extensive article for the Baugerüst, the Bavarian Lutheran’s youth publication, was surprisingly positive. Helbich repeated his criticism of superficial work of which he found especially the YMCA guilty, but he also had praise for the way in which American congregations involved their young members in the everyday church work which began with Sunday school and ended with participation in the choir and in the eucharist. Helbich shared with his readers that the.

Plauderei mit Nürnbergern, die ‘driiben’ waren,“ [Good Reception in the USA: Chat with Nurembergers who were "over there"] NN, 29. Aug. 1951: 4; "35 Nürnberg fahren nach USA: Zum Studienaufenthalt bis zu einem Jahr," [35 Nurembergers Travel to USA: Study Trips of up to One Year] NN, 27 June 1952: 10; "Dora schreibt jetzt in elf Länder: Nürnbergerin kam nach einem Jahr USA wieder heim--‘Die kauen nicht immer Gummi’," [Dora Now Writes to Eleven Countries: Nuremberger Returned Home--"They Do Not Always Chew Gum] NN, 3 Sept. 1954: 9. The only article expressing a largely critical attitude I found was a wealthy business man’s "Kritik an ‘Gottes eigenem Land’: Nürnberg Photo Kaufmann erlebte die Vereinigten Staaten," [Criticizing "God’s Own Country": Nuremberg Photo Dealer Experienced the United States] NN, 24 Nov. 1953: 7. His experiences did not indicate a hostile attitude towards Americans in general. The same man supported GYA activities and sponsored the Young World.


Armin Schrotberger to OMGBY, 24 July 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3.
Germans were in dire need of emulating the example which Americans were setting in training young people in the art of discussion at an early age. He continued that he was surprised and humbled by their willingness to listen to his opinion, to take it seriously, and to correct mistakes on the spot without much ado. Helbich even came out in favor of co-educational activities, although he cautioned that separating the sexes certainly also had its place in the church’s youth work. All in all Helbich’s commentaries demonstrated that he had gone to the United States with an open mind and a willingness to learn which certainly justified the expenditure and the effort the Americans had made. He was just one of many.56

And many more wanted to go. A journey to the United States remained the dream of a good number of those who did not belong to the select few. Helmut Stühler, who became director of one of Nuremberg’s new youth centers in the fifties, was one of those for whom a journey to the United States would have meant the opportunity of a lifetime to get to know youth work as it should be done and to apply it to his youth center in Nuremberg. Stühler was fully aware that the city had as much to say in the selection of candidates as had the Americans. Although he understood that he was

urgently needed in Nuremberg, he was never quite convinced about the wisdom of the selection process. Not quite five decades later he thought that it might have been better to send a man who practiced the trade to America instead of an administrator.⁵⁷

While Stühler did not even get a chance for an interview, others did not make it through the selection process. Hermann Glaser, one of Germany’s most prominent cultural historians, for example, did not have fond memories of the interview process. Although he had applied repeatedly for scholarships as a student, he had never been selected. Glaser suspected that only those who demonstrated decidedly pro-American attitudes and fit into American stereotypes were actually allowed to go, whereas those who proved to be overly critical usually did not survive the screening process. Glaser’s observation may not have been entirely true. He may have overlooked the fact that Americans were trying hard to win students over to their concept of democracy. Since he belonged to the rather rare species of students in the fifties who were convinced democrats and believed in progressive education there was no need for him to go to the United States. McCloy made clear in 1952 that Americans did

not "need internationalists on the Exchange Program as much as we do nationalists; it might cure them."\textsuperscript{58}

Not surprisingly, Glaser found out when he finally made it to the United States in the sixties that American educators were just humans and their schools and teaching methods often far from the ideals which the education experts had preached in postwar Germany--and which Glaser was trying to implement in the classroom. But experiences like Glaser's were rare in the fifties and possibly belonged to a later, more critical generation.\textsuperscript{59}

**Material Help**

When John McCloy came to Germany in 1949 he was impressed with the lack of essential equipment in hospitals and other public facilities which these institutions simply were not able to acquire because they did not have the funds. The Marshall Plan would take care of Germany's infrastructure and housing, but beyond that the misery could still be seen and felt everywhere. Although the situation was improving, the economic miracle had not yet taken off. McCloy thought that it would be a good idea to set aside a special fund to

\textsuperscript{58}Hermann Glaser, "Die Regel war trist: Ein Rückblick auf 'pädagogische Hoffnungen'," *Facing America*: 104-106; memo McCloy to Shepard Stone, Mr. Burns, 29 Jan. 1952; NA RG 466 HICOM, Central Classified Records, Box 36, D (52) 281.

\textsuperscript{59}Hermann Glaser, "Die Regel war trist: Ein Rückblick auf 'pädagogische Hoffnungen'," *Facing America*: 104-106. Glaser finally made it to the United States when he was a teacher in the 1960s. He later became a regular guest and lecturer in the United States.
satisfy these needs. After the legality of such an undertaking had been established, the High Commissioner immediately set aside fifty million marks from GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas, Department of the Army) funds and one million dollars from the funds that Congress had set aside to finance HICOG which had not yet been allocated for any other purpose. McCloy wanted the program to help especially young people.60

In January 1950 the High Commission inquired with German political and church leaders which areas it should target for special projects. The Federal Republic’s first President, Theodor Heuss, immediately appointed an official who would be in charge of coordinating the German side of the program. Refugees and expellees, invalids, students and returned POWs stood highest on the German list of the needy. McCloy emphasized self-help and American cooperation in German efforts. German institutions and government agencies were expected to match the funds for which they applied with an

60J.F.J. Gillen, The Special Projects Program of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary, Historical Division, 1952) 3-4.

The American contribution to Nuremberg’s reconstruction was in fact considerable and would deserve a study of its own. The Marshall Plan did much to accelerate the planning and construction of affordable apartments for the lower classes. Nuremberg architects went to the United States to observe modern city planning. Americans with ties to the city contributed millions to the reconstruction of churches and even an orphanage. Since these projects were not connected to youth work, I did not include them in this study.
equal amount of their own money. The High Commission would only support long term projects which contributed to the reorientation efforts and whose future funding was secured. In this way McCloy hoped to lay the foundation for many projects which would continue long after American help would no longer be available.\textsuperscript{61}

HICOG tried to spread the money evenly throughout West Germany and Berlin. In August 1950 the other two Allies were informed that the French would have nearly four million and the British nearly eight million marks available for projects within their zones of occupation. Of the areas under American control Bavaria received almost one fifth of the total funds.\textsuperscript{62}

McCloy kept his course to make youth the main target of the program. HICOG spent twelve million marks to support youth activities and self-help projects. This meant that young people continued to receive massive support. The nature of the grants also forced organizations as well as local and state administrations to fund projects if they did not want to loose the money, effectively doubling the amount set aside for these projects. Another twenty million marks went into education, half of it to universities. Apparently there was no lack of projects. Not even a year after the program’s inauguration, the McCloy Fund administrators had to

\textsuperscript{61}Gillen, \textit{Special Projects} 5-7.

\textsuperscript{62}Gillen, \textit{Special Projects} 7-8.
advise Kreis Resident Officers not to accept any more applications. HICOG allocated an additional four million marks to pending projects.63

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributions (DM)</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>American</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model School</td>
<td>213,420</td>
<td>171,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Residence Hall</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence Club for Young Women</td>
<td>145,161</td>
<td>97,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedensdorf</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Castle Feuerstein</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home for Young Men and Community Center Sterntor</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union Center, Hersbruck</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Women’s Work Program</td>
<td>9,285</td>
<td>11,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s Home, Stein</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>69,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater (planned construction costs)</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>696,866</td>
<td>1,131,408</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. McCloy Fund contributions to projects in Nuremberg (Sources: Gillen, Special Projects 49-76; Chronik der Stadt Nürnberg 1951: 326, NCA F2, no. 49)

Nuremberg benefitted substantially from the McCloy Fund. In the city as well as elsewhere, projects to help young people received the lion’s share of the allocations. The city administration was able to construct a model school and a student residence hall. The Bavarian Association for Labor Welfare (Arbeiterwohlfahrt) constructed eighteen homes for

63Gillen, Special Projects 8.
apprentices throughout Bavaria with substantial contributions from HICOG, of which at least one was probably slated for Northern Bavaria’s industrial center. The YMCA received funds for a home for young men which would also function as a community center. To maintain the balance HICOG financed part of a residence project for young women in Nuremberg. McCloy also injected vital funds in the Peace Village. The Lutheran Church received aid to maintain a retreat for exhausted mothers in Stein, one of Nuremberg’s suburbs, which OMGUS and HICOG used for youth leadership training as well. The Lutheran nurses who ran the facility got additional help from a German emigree who donated 300,000 of the 450,000 marks needed for building a new orphanage on the premises. The newspaper reported that it would incorporate the latest American models in child education in its activities and run its own school. Since Nuremberg’s trade unions were among the most active in youth work, HICOG helped them with the construction of the Hans-Böckler-Haus, a youth retreat in nearby Hersbruck under the condition that it had to be open to all youth. The nearby Feuerstein castle of the Catholic church also got a facelift with the help of American money.64

64Gillen, Special Projects 49-76; see also Chronik der Stadt Nürnberg 1951: 326; NCA F2 no. 49; for the Lutheran orphanage see "Ein Kinderparadies am Stadtrand: Eine großherzige Spende aus Amerika half der Diakonissenanstalt 'Martha Maria,'" [A Generous Gift from America Helped Lutheran Nurses Home "Martha Maria"] NN, 28 Nov. 1952: 12; for the provisions on Hersbruck see Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
McCloy made sure that not just the big city youth profited from the funds. Upper and Middle Franconian communities received funds for fourteen projects related to youth in addition to several model schools, community centers, child guidance and welfare programs, kindergartens, and even hospitals. By 1953 the McCloy Funds had supported 65 projects in Northern Bavaria with DM 3,800,000 the equivalent of almost one million dollars.65

In addition to the allocations by headquarters the Land Commissioners received special funds for supporting small projects, such as buying sewing machines for a refugee camp in Nuremberg or equipment for youth centers. These contributions could not exceed 1,000 marks, nevertheless the Land Commissioners regarded the program as such a valuable asset to their reorientation efforts that they soon requested more money.66

The High Commission did not just spend its own money for youth projects, but also tried to convince the Federal Government that this was a vital area which deserved support from Bonn. In 1950 Bonn complied. The Federal Government announced in December its first youth plan for which it


slated 52,700,000 marks. Most of the money went to projects which would alleviate the dire job and housing situation of apprentices and young workers in Germany. Adenauer also allocated two million marks to the border region with the Soviet zone to combat communist influence there. Established youth organizations received one million marks to operate on the federal level, youth leadership training centers and
institutions which promoted the concept of a unified Europe also received sizable allocations.\(^{67}\)

Bonn continued its support of youth work during the next years. In 1952 the government spent over fifty million marks again, mainly for rehabilitating work shops and living quarters of apprentices. It also supported the newly founded Bundesjugendring which served as the parent organization of the different state youth committees. Bonn apparently had learned something from the set up of the McCloy funds as well. It reserved five million marks for grants-in-aid. Some funds went to international exchanges and an international camp at above the Rhine river.\(^{68}\)

In spite of the rather massive allocations to youth related issues the Federal government did not show any inclination to embark on a new departure in youth work in Germany. Most of the support went into reconstruction measures designed to create and secure jobs for young people. Bonn allocated some money for leadership training sites, but did not demonstrate any inclination to support projects which would help young Germans who did not belong to the traditional youth groups.

Nuremberg benefitted substantially from the plan. During the first two years the federal government supported twenty-three projects in the city, above all the construction

\(^{67}\)Pilgert, Community 21-23.

\(^{68}\)Pilgert, Community 23-25.
of dormitories which would provide 2,360 apprentices from the surrounding region with places to stay while they were learning a trade. The city received almost two million marks during the first three years of the plan's operation.69

Bonn's financial policy reflected the outlook of those in charge of the formulation of youth policy. From 1946 on German administrators, among them Theodor Marx, had begun to discuss the future of German youth work. American attempts to create a network for youth activities which would remain independent of government influence met the decided resistance of German officials who immediately began to create semi-official organizations in which the specialists discussed the future of youth work and a revision of the youth legislation of 1926. Even progressive welfare specialists like Marx thought that the federal and state governments should make youth work their legal responsibility. Although German authorities left the youth committees in place and granted them a representative body on the federal level, some committees soon lost their interest in representing all young people and developed into an official lobby for youth organizations. The power of the purse and some legal maneuvering in Bavaria, for example, left Americans apprehensive about the future of the youth committees they had created. The new youth legislation of

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69 Excerpt of a list with projects which were supported by the Federal Youth Plan; NCA C75 no. 124/1.
1953 did not give the Americans much to cheer for either. The only new provision the federal government passed was that from 1953 on communities and states had an obligation to become involved in youth work. Bonn maintained the traditional framework which did not take care of unorganized youth and left HICOG alone with the burden of reorientation.\textsuperscript{70}

\textbf{Leadership Training}

We have seen above that OMGUS officials had realized early on that one of the biggest problems for young Germans was the lack of trained youth leaders. OMGUS had opened the Wannsee school in Berlin in 1948, but a similar school in Bavaria for which the Bavarian Youth Ring was responsible always was on the brink of faltering between 1948 and 1949. OMGBY on various occasions admonished the Bavarian Ministry of Education that funds for such a venture were available, but that Munich would have to show stronger support than in the past for the idea.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{70}Füssl 133-137; Pilgert, Community 29-31. Marx played a leading role in the Association of German Cities, an influential organization of all large communities in the Federal Republic. See, for example, "Nürberger Referat auf dem 'Deutschen Städtetag' im 1900 jährigen Köln fordert: Jugendbetreuung als staatliche Pflicht," [Nuremberg's Presentation at the "German City Congress" in 1900 year-old Cologne Demands: Youth Care a Must for Government] NN, 1 July 1950: 7.

\textsuperscript{71}OMGBY, Report on Youth Leadership Training Site, 27 Oct. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-3/18; Clayton Jones, Report on Niederpöcking youth leadership school, 2 Aug. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/6; Esther Test, Youth
By 1950 the youth leadership school was finally in place and its financing secured mostly with funds from OMGUS and later on, HICOG. OMGUS officials also had developed a curriculum for the training of professional youth workers in 1949. We have seen above that OMGUS and HICOG invested heavily in the Nuremberg region, establishing and expanding youth leadership training facilities in Stein, at Burg Feuerstein, and for the trade unions in Hersbruck. Many Germans in charge of training their youth had gone to the United States and were convinced about the necessity of focusing on young people who were not organized.  

Despite this encouraging development, the proponents of traditional youth work were by no means defeated. Youth organizations had restructured the Bavarian Youth Ring in such a way that they were able to retain control over its operations, which included the budget of the youth leadership school in Niederpöcking although it was financed by HICOG. Not surprisingly the youth organizations preferred to use the activities expert, Cleveland, Ohio, Report on Leadership Training and Youth Activities, Jan. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 138, 5/295-2/7; for American attempts to gain support of Bavarian authorities see Charles Winning, OMGBY, to Minister President of Bavaria, 3 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/5; Charles Winning to Bavarian Minister of Education, 9 Dec. 1948; Winning to Minister President of Bavaria, 22 Dec. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-3/17.

Pilgert, Community 32-33; minutes of a youth activities staff meeting, 14-15 Apr. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18.
money and the facilities for their own benefit while HICOG and the leadership school's staff wanted to emphasize open youth work. It seems that ultimately both parties reached a compromise. Niederpöcking began to train professional youth workers, but at the same time continued to train the youth organizations' youth leaders.\(^7\)

Helmut Stühler and Karl Kleyer, two of the four directors of the city's youth centers, received their training in Niederpöcking. Both had become involved in youth work immediately after the war. Kleyer had become active in one of the Friends' youth centers in Berlin, where he also had met Heinrich Schiller. Stühler had been in charge of administering the camping equipment for the Bavarian Youth Ring from 1947 on. Although the staff at Niederpöcking consisted only of Germans at the time Stühler attended his courses, he thought that everybody was aware that their training was based almost entirely on American ideas and concepts. According to him, the training provided him with the essential tools he needed in his work in Nuremberg. Stühler regretted that he had so little time to explore these concepts. As we have seen above, he would have liked to complete his education in the United States. Once Stühler and Kleyer graduated from Niederpöcking they became directors

\(^7\)Pilgert, Community 32-34; OLCB, Monthly Report, Feb. 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, District Land Office Activity Reports 1950-52, Box 2, Monthly Reports 1951.
of two of the new youth centers the Nuremberg Kreis Youth Committee was opening in Nuremberg in 1950.74

The Kreis Youth Committee was not content with hiring staff for the new centers. In the same year it decided to rely more on professional support and employed a youth worker whose task it was to coordinate its activities and to develop new programs. Georg Wolfring, another graduate from Niederpöcking with close ties to the trade union youth, became the city’s first professional youth worker. True to his training, Wolfring emphasized that he would concentrate his efforts above all on unorganized young people. Wolfring remained in Nuremberg for several years before he relocated to Munich. Apparently he had proven the position’s worth. A professional youth worker became a permanent presence with the Nuremberg Kreis Youth Ring. Even today in times of severe cutbacks the Nuremberg Kreis Youth Ring continues to hire professional youth workers to help with its work.75

GYA in Troubled Waters

In spite of the expansion of GYA activities in 1949 and 1950, the program was in trouble from 1948 on. The first


complaints came from tactical troops who maintained that the emerging Cold War and the Berlin crisis did not leave them enough time for looking after young Germans and asked to be released from this responsibility. General Clay reacted accordingly. He revised the GYA instructions and streamlined the program, without, however, curtailing the activities.\textsuperscript{76}

A more serious threat came in the form of Military Government officials. They had always been critical of the Army running this program without permitting GYA officials any control. Alonzo Grace regarded GYA as "Candy and Coca-Cola Program" with little educational value. GYA had been able to attract much attention in the United States which apparently caused some jealousies. Lawrence Norrie, who always had felt that the program could not be adequate as long as it was not under his control, led the charge. Although he maintained that he had been much in favor of creating GYA in 1946, he thought that currency reform and the returning prosperity were rendering the Army's program superfluous. In addition to that, Norrie told prominent GYA supporters from the United States that, based on his own observations, the program suffered from poor management, a lack of qualified personnel, and drew considerable hostility from the Germans because of unpleasant incidents. Norrie in fact could substantiate his claim, but he also chose to withhold the ample evidence at his disposal about GYA

\textsuperscript{76}James 40-43.
successes. His presentation of the Nuremberg GYA clearly shows his rather selective choice of arguments. As we have seen above Norrie had resided in Nuremberg and indeed knew the operation in the city firsthand. He told the visitors that GIs involved in the Nuremberg GYA had left sports equipment with a group of young boys but preferred to spend the next hours with their girlfriends instead of supervising the boys' activities. In view of the overall quality of the program in and around the city and the close cooperation between the MG detachment and GYA, of which Norrie certainly was aware, he must have known that this kind of behavior was not the rule but rather the exception in the Nuremberg Post area.

On first sight it seems that Norrie, who came from the American YMCA, and Grace, a university educator, were unwilling to concede that the Army actually was capable of planning and carrying out qualified youth work, but their reasons for attacking the Army's youth program lay deeper. OMGUS and HICOG consistently pursued a policy of working through German channels and trying to bring all young Germans into democratically structured youth organizations. GYA activities often seemed to run contrary to these goals. The Army's concept of youth centers which were open to everyone apparently diverted many young people away from youth groups. Norrie may also have looked with some envy on the extensive

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James 43-44.
Army program which was not under his control while he had to make due with a very small staff, although he was officially in charge of American youth programs in Germany. In 1948, for example, the Youth Activities Section consisted of twelve Americans, with Clay refusing to increase that number, whereas 263 officers and enlisted men worked full time for GYA.78

Interestingly, Norrie and Grace were depriving those groups whom HICOG surveys had identified as the ones who were most in need of reorientation of an opportunity to become acquainted with the Americans and possibly with democratic ways of thinking and acting. Most Kreis Resident Officers in Bavaria agreed that GYA actually was reaching those who did not have anything. According to the officers, the lower classes as well as outsiders, especially young refugees and expellees, tended to use GYA facilities and to praise the Army's program. The higher classes and established groups, especially when they came from a conservative background, seemed to have a more difficult time accepting it.79

Money became a major bone of contention in the civilian youth officers' struggle against GYA. In 1949 Alonzo Grace began to argue that the Army had been using German occupation funds illegally for the program. In view of this situation he instructed the Community Education Branch that he did "not

78For the employment figures see James 40.

79Rupieper 158-59.
want us in any way associated with an organization supported in any way by occupation costs." Norrie was informed that consequently OMGUS should "do nothing at any time that would appear we were endorsing GYA." A withdrawal of the funds in German currency would lead to the immediate collapse of all GYA activities because the Army would not be able to pay the rent or the buildings and the salaries of its German employees. Since OMGUS had control over all counterpart funds in German currency, Grace's move either would have eliminated the competition or brought it under OMGUS control. In this situation John McCloy, who had just arrived in Germany, came to the military's rescue. He agreed to provide the necessary mark funds for the next fiscal year from HICOG funds. In return EUCOM promised to transfer its centers gradually to German organizations and authorities.80

Transfers, New Beginnings, Disappointments

Although the new source of funds eliminated the legal problem, it also meant that the Army had to compete with other HICOG offices for constantly decreasing funds. In 1951 GYA got only 50% of the 8.4 million Marks it had requested and consequently was forced to give up half of the centers it had maintained.81

80James 40-47; Memo from John Pixley, Community Education Br. to Lawrence Norrie, 19 May 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/295-3/6.
81James 49-59.
For GYA officers attempts from outside agencies to take over their programs was nothing new. OMGUS officials had made it abundantly clear that they wanted to control GYA. In many cases German authorities also had set an eye on the well equipped centers which usually offered much needed additional space. Military Government’s Internal Affairs division had found it necessary as early as 1947 to inform its field detachments that all communities who tried to take over GYA centers would have to maintain them open for young people. Exceptions could be granted if communities clearly had greater priorities or if there was no support at all for youth activities. These instructions left the door wide open for community leaders to reclaim the facilities without taking care of young people.  

Apparently Major Selsor had had his own share of negative experiences when Andreas Staudt approached him to discuss the possibility of a German takeover in November 1949. Staudt reported to the city’s welfare committee that Selsor was willing to discuss possibilities to make GYA homes available to more people and to accommodate the needs of the younger generation, but, according to Staudt, he "emphatically declined" to turn over control to the city administration. The major argued that his experience had taught him that German authorities were not interested in the

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kind of youth work GYA promoted and usually closed the centers as soon as they could lay their hands on them.83

His successors did not have much choice in the matter. Following instructions from headquarters they began to explore the possibilities of a German takeover of the 33 Army youth centers in the region. A number of communities reacted positively. The mayor of Neumarkt, for example, cooperated closely with the Americans in the takeover of the local GYA center. In Schwabach negotiations needed more time but also led to the desired result.84

Other communities did not show any interest. In April 1951 GYA closed nine of its youth centers in the region. One year later just a few centers remained open. Negotiations continued with mixed success. The Fürth city administration refused to take over any of the five centers located within its jurisdiction. GYA finally consolidated all youth centers and opened one center to the army barracks of a unit which was willing to sponsor youth activities on a voluntary basis. Fürth officials commended GYA for its efforts. In view of their reluctance to take over these responsibilities the GYA officer took their remarks as a sign of improving relations.

83Report on conversation between Mark A. Selsor and Andreas Staudt to city welfare committee, 17 Nov. 1949; NCA C7/IX no. 1235.

Fürth GYA activities had survived downsizing and continued their reduced activities until the discontinuation of the program.85

In Coburg negotiations had been underway already in December 1951. A German working group which was sponsored by HICOG and whose goal was to support "suitable open door projects" signalled its interest in maintaining the youth center open. Based on this promise the Americans obtained a commitment by the mayor to make even more rooms available to young Germans in January 1952, but just a few weeks after their meeting with the mayor the group which had sponsored the two employees for the center suddenly withdrew its support. When German authorities took over the facility in June 1952 its future was by no means secured.86

Nuremberg's Youth Center no. 1 faced several obstacles before it was clear that it would remain open. While negotiations were underway to transfer the centers in the region to German authority, the GYA officer was not yet ready to concede defeat in the city. In 1952 the center moved to a smaller and more affordable location, but had to share the building with a hotel for American women who worked for the


Army. There GYA continued operations with reduced staff and a new director for another year, but in June 1953 the Army had to close its last youth center as well, but help was just around the corner. The city negotiated with the Army about a possible takeover of the facility. In August Karl Maly, who had replaced Staudt as director of the Nuremberg Youth Office, signed a very favorable contract with the Americans. The Army would continue to provide the space free of charge as long as it was not needed otherwise. GYA donated the entire inventory, including an expensive and very popular photo laboratory, to the Germans. The city had no obligation to continue the Army employees but maintained Hans Werner, long time GYA employee and director of the center, in his capacity. The Army promised to continue providing logistic support.87

This arrangement lasted two years, but when the Army announced that it needed the space for other purposes the Germans had to look for a new location. The youth center with Hans Werner and most of its visitors moved to the

recently established city youth house at the old Imperial Fortress where it still remains open to young people today.8

Not surprisingly attendance throughout the American zone dropped proportionally. Whereas in July 1950 over half a million young people had participated in GYA activities, the number dropped to about 180,000 in July 1951 and 100,000 in July 1952. The Army continued to modify the program, but by July 1954 only 32,000 children found their way to GYA centers of activities. The program lingered on for another two years, but on 30 June 1956 the Army’s excursion into the realm of youth work officially came to an end. It had outlasted HICOG which had ceased to exist the previous year.89

The German-American Advisory Council

The retreat of HICOG and GYA from the local scene did not mean that contacts between Americans and Germans in the communities suddenly died. In July 1952 a representative of the Nuremberg Military Post invited Lord Mayor Otto Bärnreuther to participate in an advisory council in which prominent Germans and Americans would be able to discuss problems of mutual interest which the Kreis Resident Officer


89James 49-59.
had previously managed. Bärnreuther declined to participate but nominated Mayor Julius Loßmann to represent the city. Other Germans were less reluctant to send their top representatives. The President of Middle Franconia’s government, Hans Schregle, responded to the call as well as Gustav Schickedanz, owner of one of Europe’s largest mail catalog businesses located in neighboring Fürth. Less prominent members included Lt. Lorraine Schultz, the Nuremberg GYA officer, Pauline Schwickert, a school expert who had returned to Nuremberg from American exile after the war, the principal of the local American dependents’ school as well as various teachers and principals of Nuremberg schools. To facilitate communications the Army provided one interpreter and a secretary for each subcommittee.90

The committee was designed to be a cooperative venture in which Germans and Americans had equal rights and shared the chair. Its members decided to constitute four subcommittees, one of which was in charge of education. Schregle made clear after his election to the German chair that he did not want the committee to be just a debating club with no connection to the community but wanted the committee

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90Minutes of the second meeting of the German-American Advisory Council, 2 Oct. 1952; NCA C 85/I Verkehr mit Stationierungskräften, no no.; see also Chronik der Stadt Nürnberg 1953: 24, 213; NCA F2 no. 50.
to have an impact on the communities in its quest for fostering German-American friendship.91

The subcommittee for education took Schregle’s wishes to heart. Just one month after its foundation the committee members reported about their first project. They invited ten girls from the American school in Nuremberg and ten girls from a Nuremberg secondary school to participate in a day tour to the old town of Rothenburg, about fifty miles away from Nuremberg. The girls would have ample opportunity to get to know each other on the trip. A photo contest in which the girls could develop their pictures in the Nuremberg GYA center would ensure a follow up encounter. The subcommittee further reported that it was working on a teacher exchange between the American and German schools as well.92

During the next months an intensive exchange between the American and German schools began to develop which boded well for the future. The committee also reported that contacts between American students and the German-American youth club had intensified again. In March 1953 the subcommittee decided to launch a pilot project to investigate the

91Minutes of the second meeting of the German-American Advisory Council, 6 Oct. 1952; NCA C85/I Verkehr mit Stationierungskräften, no no.

92Minutes of the third meeting of the German-American Advisory Council, 28 Nov. 1952; NCA C 85/I Verkehr mit Sationierungskräften no no.
feasibility of letting Germans and Americans experience life in the other schools for extended periods of time. 93

By May the committee was ready to launch its pilot project. Accompanied by local press representatives, Peter Fries became the first German exchange student in Nuremberg who did not have to go to the United States to get the American experience. Born in 1937, Fries had met his first Americans in a little village in 1945. They had provided him with huge quantities of chocolate and had not even entered the house in which his family was living when they became aware of an old aunt who wore her Red Cross dress. According to him, the attitude towards Americans among his peers and in his family after the war was generally positive. Fries loved the GYA’s youth film hour, but did not get the chance to see American films very often because his parents restricted his visits. According to him, they did not consider actors like Frank Sinatra or Hollywood Westerns to be suitable for young people. 94

Fries enjoyed his stay at the American school and with the American family. He thought that at that time American


Post Exchanges displayed the signs and goods of an affluent society whereas the Germans still were on their way to recovery. Fries found the atmosphere at the American high school more informal, but most of his teachers at his German school managed their students in a humane way as well. Learning about American football and baseball, as well as getting a first shot at golf which was and still is a very exclusive game in Germany, in just a week proved to be impossible. Fries was surprised to find that Americans took their school prayer, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the American flag in every classroom very seriously. His feelings revealed not just the long standing secularism in German public schools but also that Fries belonged to a new generation of young Germans who preferred to discuss a united states of Europe to any nationalistic tendencies and did not feel overly comfortable with displays of national pride. What impressed him most was that neither his host family nor anybody at the school or at one of the numerous barbecues he attended displayed any hostility or arrogance towards him.

The American's visit with the Fries family seemed to have been equally successful. According to Fries, not just the young people established contacts but also their parents who continued their private contact long after the exchange.

He remembered that young Germans and Americans were curious to find out more about each other. Fries was sufficiently impressed with his visit that he actually discussed a journey to the United States as an exchange student with his parents but did not meet any enthusiasm on their side.

Fries went on with his life and became a lawyer in Nuremberg. He did not forget the lesson he had learned in 1953 and maintained a friendly and very positive attitude towards the United States, even through the turbulent 1960s. He later sent one of his own children on the one year student exchange to the United States which he could not have and stated that it in fact had had the positive impact on his daughter he had hoped for. 96

The pilot program was a success in every respect so that both sides agreed to continue and extend it in the future. At the same time exchanges between American and German teachers became more frequent as well. 97

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96Peter Fries, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1995. Interestingly, Fries' father displayed a very rare openmindedness. After the war the Americans had sentenced him to several years in prison for his participation in hiding the imperial jewels so that they would not be returned to Vienna from where Hitler had brought them to Nuremberg in 1939. Instead of turning bitter because of this treatment, however, he encouraged his son to be open minded, never had anything negative to say about the occupiers, and had no objections about his son's application to become an exchange student which included hosting an American at his house.

97Letter, Lowell Bennett, Public Affairs Field Center, Nuremberg to City of Nuremberg, 27 June 1953; minutes of the eighth meeting of the German-American Advisory Council, 25 Sept. 1953; minutes of a meeting of the committee for school and cultural affairs, 5 Nov. 1953; NCA C7/IX no. 1307;
While there was considerable enthusiasm on both sides for this type of activity during the first half of the 1950s, it seems that it was not enough to make the programs a standard feature of German and American schools in Nuremberg. The German-American advisory council increasingly became what Schregle had not wanted. When Schregle retired from his chair in 1959 the fate of the Council was set. From 1960 on prominent Germans met with American officers to organize welfare parties and a German-American friendship week each year which included a fair, sports events between Germans and Americans and open houses held by the Army for German civilians, but left out student and teacher exchanges or activities in which both sides had to communicate. A German-American women’s club became an equally formal affair which emphasized welfare activities, but also sponsored a German student to go to the United States every year.*

*It is not clear when the Advisory Commission abandoned its more active approach. By 1960 its activities and membership very much fit the pattern which I got to know in Ansbach from the late 1960s on. Compare, for example the programs for the First German-American Friendship week in 1954 with that of 1960 (Chronik der Stadt Nürnberg, 10-16 May 1954; 1-8 May 1960; NCA F2 no. 50, 53). Tina Hoekstra ("Der Deutsch-Amerikanische Frauenclub Nürnberg-Fürth: Geschichte, Organisation, Struktur, Aktivitäten und Zukunftsaussichten," Zulassungsarbeit zur ersten Staatsprüfung für das Lehramt für Grundschulen in Bayern (Spring 1993)) provides an interesting and detailed history of Nuremberg’s German-American Women’s Club.
It is not clear why relations cooled off after such a promising start. The construction of American housing areas in which everything from electrical outlets to washer and dryer facilities was American probably provided American families with all the amenities they needed without having to deal with the language barrier and a different culture. In spite of repeated American protests to the contrary, many families preferred the isolation and security the housing areas provided to the challenges contacts with Germans could bring. The German chairperson of the German-American women's club, for example, found it increasingly difficult in 1958 to invite American families to German homes. At the same time German dignitaries in Nuremberg never had German-American relations very high on their list. None of Nuremberg's Lord Mayors ever appeared in a meeting of the German-American Advisory Council, while their wives also did not find the German-American women's club important enough to join or to display any interest in its activities. An observer who was very well acquainted with both sides of the story in Germany thought that both sides had missed the incredible opportunities which the presence of American soldiers and dependents offered for really promoting mutual understanding.99

99"Mehr Tuchfühlung schafft Freunde," [Closer Contact Creates Friends] NN, 15 Sept. 1956; newspaper clipping; NCA C74 no. 30; minutes of a meeting of the German-American Advisory Council, 26 June 1958; NCA C85/I Verkehr mit Stationierungskräften, no no.; Winfried Blümel, personal...
Other actions by Nuremberg authorities during the 1950s also betrayed a sometimes rather cool relationship with the occupiers. In September 1954 the city council's committee for school and welfare discussed the possibility of continuing the Meistersinger contest from which the Army was about to withdraw. Although some of the participants of the discussion acknowledged the public relations effect the contest had had in the past, it seemed that Nuremberg's city fathers were not aware that the Americans had initiated an outstanding cultural event which took place in packed houses and at the same time provided young singers with a nationwide audience and Nuremberg with much needed positive publicity. The committee members did not investigate any alternatives such as private sponsoring which the Americans had done successfully, but simply decided that the Army had had the luxury of simply ordering its units to organize the preliminaries and send the finalists to Nuremberg. Nobody seemed to be aware that GYA officers had had to rely on their own organizational skills to build the program from scratch and that the program took place throughout West Germany. It included the French and the British zone where the Americans did not have any possibility to rely on the tactical commands

interview, 28 July 1994; Dr. Renate Pröpper was one of the charter members of the German-American Women's Club. In a conversation with me shortly before her death in 1995 she expressed her frustration at the indifference which Nuremberg's first lady had displayed throughout the thirty year tenure of her husband in the office of Lord Mayor.

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for support. In the end the committee agreed that spending considerable amounts of money for an event which, according to them, promised little in return, could not be justified. It unanimously voted not to participate in any way in the organization of future Meistersinger contests. The decision meant that 1955 was the last year of the Meistersinger contest.100

The American Education Center in Nuremberg which had become an international center with an American director and a French and British library had a similar fate. Americans and later on their two Allies had opened the institute with the expectation that the city of Nuremberg or other agencies ultimately would take them over. In December 1954 the Committee for Schools and Cultural affairs discussed the issue. Its members came to the conclusion that it was unreasonable to spend 60,000 marks per year for an institution which the occupiers had introduced and from which the city could not expect to derive any material gains in the future. Nuremberg's city fathers determined that the institute was a regional affair and therefore should be sponsored by the regional government in Ansbach or the state government in Munich. Those agencies, however, had decided that such an institution was entirely the city's responsibility. The committee followed the recommendation by

100Minute of a meeting of the committee for schools and cultural affairs, 3 Sept. 1954; NCA C7/IX no. 1320.
the Lord Mayor's office to inform the public that the city of Nuremberg would be unable to maintain the institute although it recognized the valuable work it had done in the past. The city would certainly welcome a continuation of the institute's activities as long as those who had been sponsoring it in the past would also pay the bills in the future. Needless to say that the institute closed its doors for good in 1955.101

Despite these disappointments American initiatives on the whole were quite successful. The American programs provided the framework and the skills for many Germans to develop their own initiatives. They also helped them to carry projects on once American money would not be available for them anymore. Nuremberg was no exception to that rule.

101Minutes of a meeting of the committee for school and cultural affairs, 10 Dec. 1954; NCA C7/IX no. 1320; Chronik der Stadt Nürnberg 1955; NCA F2 no. 51.
CHAPTER XIII

Joint Ventures: German Initiatives at the Grass Roots
1948-1955

1948 marked the beginning of a new era in youth work in the Federal Republic. Although currency reform had crippled public finances in the short run, it provided the basis for long term planning. Progressive planners in communities such as Nuremberg were looking for ways to improve the lot of young people in many ways. Relying on German traditions as well as on new American ideas, they targeted health care, school counseling, providing young people with jobs or places to stay, and last, but not least, continued the concept of open youth work which GYA had initiated and HICOG had come to endorse as well. The extensive network of exchanges, material help, professional advice, and leadership training which OMGUS and HICOG had created helped the Germans considerably at a time when want was still very visible in the Federal Republic. Through this type of cooperation many American concepts and ideas showed results long after HICOG and GYA had ceased to exist.

Youth Welfare

1949 provided Theodor Marx with the opportunity to make Nuremberg one of the most progressive cities in caring for its children. In June of that year OMGBY invited him to name capable social workers who had to be under thirty years old.
and had to be "receptive to new ways of thinking". English was another requirement for those who would be chosen. One month later Marx had selected four city employees, one of them a former POW in the United States.¹

In December 1949 Marx approached HICOG about the possibility of supporting a new kind of counselling service. Nuremberg had pioneered the idea of psychiatric help for young people in Germany during the Weimar Republic. After the war Marx and his coworkers recognized that Germany had completely missed out on vital developments in the field between 1933 and 1945, while researchers in the United States had done pathbreaking work. One first step to help young people was the Kreis Youth Committee’s counselling service, which, according to him, the Youth Office in fact operated and staffed. To pool resources and assure cooperation, Marx initiated the formation of the Association for the Cultivation of Welfare in Nuremberg (Verein der Nürnberger Wohlfahrtspflege e.V.) in which the leading welfare organizations within the city as well as the city administration came together to promote especially youth welfare. Marx found open ears at HICOG which tried to introduce these new concepts in child guidance to German

¹Albert Schweizer, CAD, OMGBY, to Welfare Administration, Nuremberg, 10 June 1949; Marx to Schweizer, 13 July, 27 Sept. 1949; Interoffice memorandum from Erna to Mrs. Groves, 12 Nov. 1949, re.: telephone conversation with Theodor Marx; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 40, 10/43-3/21.
communities at about the same time. German emigres had played a leading role in developing new approaches to social work and welfare in the United States. We have seen that a number of them returned to Germany to work for OMGUS and HICOG. Hertha Krauss and Hedwig Wachenheim, for example, were important voices in HICOG's Welfare Division. They could rely on the support of many other emigres who were willing to lend a helping hand and came for shorter periods of time as advisers and specialists.²

In view of the favorable disposition on both sides it was no surprise that HICOG reacted promptly and favorably to Marx's request. Just six months after Marx had sent his letter the Nuremberg Child Guidance Clinic opened its doors. HICOG had arranged for Gisela Konopka to come from Minneapolis to lend her support during the initial phase of the operation. She discussed with Nuremberg's leading welfare officer and others the necessary details for introducing the American model of child guidance—especially the new concept of case work and operating in teams—and provided many practical solutions to initial problems.³

²Theodor Marx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst Nürnberg (Nürnberg [Nuremberg], Ortsverband der Nürnberger Wohlfahrtspflege e.V., 1954) 5-12; Marx to Hedwig Wachenheim, HICOG, 14 Dec. 1949; NCA C7/IX no. 1235. Interestingly, the emigres working for OMGUS and HICOG enjoyed an exceptional degree of authority and respect.

³Marx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 11.
One of the greatest handicaps at the start was the lack of suitable facilities in the still largely destroyed city. Marx and the Welfare Association set out to remedy the situation quickly. In November 1950 Nuremberg had a new welfare center which American observers found "simple, bright, and cheerful." The only problem was that it soon proved to be too small for the growing numbers of people who desired welfare services.4

The clinic turned out to be such a success that the association expanded it considerably after its first year of operation. Once again Marx's call for financial support found receptive ears at HICOG headquarters which provided almost half of the clinic's operating budget.5

Gisela Konopka was not the only American specialist who provided support and guidance to the German teams. Three other German and Austrian emigres took time off from their faculty positions in the United States to come to Nuremberg. Psychiatrist George Frankl stayed several months and played a crucial role in reorganizing the clinic and making sure that the workers remained focused on their most essential tasks. Kurt Reichers spent a summer explaining the concept

4 Marx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 9; for a brief description of the child guidance clinic see also Dept. of State, Young Germany: Apprentice to Democracy, European and British Commonwealth Series 24 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951) 56-58; the quote is on 56.

5 Marx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 9-10; Jahresbericht des Sozialen Beratungsdienstes, 1 Apr. 1951-31 Mar. 1952; NCA C74 no. 3.
of case work to Nurembergers in 1952, while Susanne Schulz arrived from Chicago in 1953 to hold a seminar at Nuremberg’s college of Economics and Social Science which dealt with the training of new social workers.6

The clinic became an immediate success. Its staff registered rapidly rising attendance numbers which included more and more young people who came on their own initiative seeking advice. From 1953 on the clinic had to deal with an additional task it had not expected. Experts from all over the Federal Republic descended on Nuremberg to seek advice for launching their own clinics or to participate in formal seminars the city had set up with American support to prepare social workers, psychiatrists and other people involved in the teams for the task. Since the clinic was unable to expand its staff and the numbers of people seeking help exceeded even the wildest expectations the clinic’s employees were booked to the limits of their capacities. With several other clinics in place across the country, however, conditions normalized after 1953. Child guidance clinics became permanent institutions in Nuremberg and many other communities.7

6Marx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 11.

7Marx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 10-11; see also a report on the visit of the students and faculty of the Women’s School for Social Work in Stuttgart of June 1951. The group stayed at the American Institute of Education which had moved to the former witness house of the Nuremberg trials in 1949 and had much space to offer. Its members did not just visit the child guidance clinic but also a number of other new
Marx was not content with creating a clinic. As early as 1946 he had suggested to hold conferences to prepare curricula for courses designed to train social workers, a task he considered to be essential for securing the supply of trained social workers which would be much needed in light of the social disruption the war and Hitler's regime had caused. With the help of Andreas Staudt, the director of the city's Youth Office, Marx developed a curriculum for a two year evening course which would end in a state examination and certify the participants as social workers. Marx received the approval of the Bavarian authorities and in November 1947 the first course began. The curriculum was highly technical with an overwhelming emphasis on legal and administrative matters. It also introduced the students to all fields of social work, but focused especially on youth welfare. The course was not easy for the participants who had a demanding workload apart from their day jobs and life in a devastated city in which survival still was high on the agenda. Nevertheless most of them came through and were the first social workers in Nuremberg to successfully pass their state examinations in 1949.8

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8 Auszug aus einem Abschlußbericht über einen Sonderlehrgang für Sozialbeamte, City of Nuremberg to OMGBY, 1 Aug. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 40, 10/43-3/21.
The course was just a first step. Marx informed Bavarian authorities that he was thinking about ways to replace Nuremberg's School for Female Social Workers with a more modern institution which would also admit men into the ranks of social workers. He discussed the idea one year later with Ms. Wachenheim and Krauss when he attended a seminar they held on basic problems of training for social workers.9

Once again the Nuremberg city councilman struck a nerve with the OMGUS representatives. Hertha Krauss reported one year later that the Education Branch had completely overlooked the aspect of social work in its leadership training program. The exchange program could do much to remedy the situation, but clearly Germans and Americans would have to do something more in this realm.10

Marx, by then the representative of municipal organizations in the executive committee of the newly founded German Working Association for Youth Welfare and Youth Work (Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Jugendpflege und Jugendfürsorge), continued to push for his plans in Nuremberg. He approached the problem on several tracks.

9Marx to Bavarian Youth Office, 6 Feb. 1947; memorandum by Marx about his participation in an OMGUS seminar on basic questions of training in social work on 10-12 Sept. 1948 which he pursued further with local MG officials; NCA C74 no. 137.

Since Nuremberg already had a college for Economics and Social Sciences it appeared to be easiest to develop a curriculum for social workers within its framework. Although American specialists came to teach at this institution, the entirely theoretical approach of the college and a lack of qualified faculty made this approach unfeasible.11

Marx also had to fight against intrigues within the city administration. In a memorandum he described the rather unpleasant situation which he was confronting in January 1950. On the one hand it seemed that the men in charge of schools in Nuremberg did not appreciate Marx's intrusion into what they considered to be their realm. Marx also found out that the director of the Woman's School of Social Work in Nuremberg was conspiring to unseat him and save her institution and her job. Should she be successful, Marx warned his superiors, many of the pledges of support he had obtained for the new undertaking had been given to him personally and would not be binding if somebody else took over his post.12

Obviously Marx won the struggle and went on with his plans. By January 1951 he had secured HICOG financial support for the project which he wanted to use for the development of a library as well as payment of an assistant

11Report A.S. Wheelan, OLCB, PAD to Florence Black, HICOG, PAD, 12 Dec. 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, Central Files, Box 29.

12Memorandum Theodor Marx, 25 Jan. 1950; NCA C74 no. 137.
and a professor for two years, but had not been able to solve the space problem. An attempt to house the school in the American Education Center did not succeed because the Americans had actually withdrawn most of their support from the institution which continued to operate as an international institute on a much reduced scale.\textsuperscript{13}

It was not until the next year that Marx finally was able to bring all the parts together. In January of that year Dora von Caemmerer accepted a call as director of the institute from Nuremberg. Caemmerer had studied in England and had been to the United States after the war to become acquainted with American methods of social work. She came from West Berlin where she had trained social workers in the American methods in a program financed by HICOG and was probably the best expert in the field at the time. Von Caemmerer insisted that she would only come if her assistant, Heinrich Schiller, would be given a full time position as tutor or supervisor. The future director regarded Schiller's role as essential since German schools of social work so far had completely neglected the individual development of their students. Schiller would supervise their work on a one on

\textsuperscript{13}Memo of a conference between Marx, Staudt, directors of schools of social work, and HICOG representatives about possibilities of obtaining financial support for their institutions; application for a HICOG grant for the planned institute for practical social work [1950]; memo re.: support of School of Social work from HICOG, 23 Jan. 1951; Marx to Dr. Ackermann, Director Education Center, Nuremberg, 15 May 1952; Ackermann to Marx, 6 June 1952; NCA C74 no. 137.
one basis and would also pay attention to developing mature personalities. A few days later the city's welfare committee approved the school. Marx also obtained the promise from the Bavarian Ministry of Education to fully support the measure. The Ministry requested in its letter that Marx cooperate in developing similar curricula for the entire state. Just one day later it officially accredited the school, explicitly welcoming the new teaching methods and curricula which were based on American models in spite of the higher costs involved. On 21 January 1953 the Nuremberg city council voted unanimously in favor of the new school of social work.\footnote{Dora von Caemmerer to Marx, 11 Jan. 1953; Marx to Bavarian Youth Ministry, 14 Jan. 1951; minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 15 Jan. 1953; memorandum of conference with Ministry of Education, 16 Jan. 1953; memorandum of a telephone conversation with Min. Dir. Ritter, Munich, 19 Jan. 1951; minutes of city council session, 21 Jan. 1953; NCA C74 no. 137; for von Caemmerer's previous experiences see "German Social Work," HICOG Information Bulletin (November 1952): 26.}

In April 1953 Marx was finally able to officially open the new school. Proudly he declared that

the second full time lecturer, Mr. Schiller, is one of the few and possibly the only active teacher in Germany with a degree in social work from an American university. Therefore we find ourselves in the fortunate position—without Americanizing—to transfer the many experiences from the other side of the Atlantic to our German conditions just as we did it with recognized success in our Child Guidance Clinic.\footnote{Opening speech by Theodor Marx, 27 Apr. 1953; NCA C74 no. 137.}
Marx was right, but neither von Caemmerer nor Schiller were quite happy with the arrangement. The curriculum was a curious mixture between old and new, still emphasizing heavily the administrative and legal aspects of social work. The city fathers also did not want to spend too much money on the enterprise which remained a point of friction throughout von Caemmerer’s and Schiller’s tenure. With the exception of the two full time employees all of the school’s eleven teachers came from the city administration. The only other lecturer trained in American social work concepts was the director of the child guidance clinic who taught psychology.16

In spite of these handicaps the students immediately recognized the dramatic departure in teaching methods. Von

16List of lecturers at School of Social Work, April 1953; NCA C74 no. 137; Heinrich Schiller, personal interview, 26 July 1995. Schiller recalled that the school was fairly protected from cuts and outside interference as long as Marx was in office. After his death, however, the situation deteriorated steadily because the new head of the Welfare Office did not have his predecessor’s imposing personality and was unable to defend the institution. When Schiller was appointed director, he found the situation far from satisfactory. At that time the Lutheran Church in Bavaria had decided to thoroughly reform its own training for social workers and asked Schiller to take over the task in 1967. Schiller was granted a free hand and a considerably larger budget. Since the school opened in Nuremberg, he did not even have to move. He remained there until he retired. See also "Dr. Schiller leitet evangelisches Sozialinstitut: Einem neuen Ruf gefolgt: Der anerkannte Fachmann ging von der Sozialen Schule an die neue Bildungsstätte," [Dr. Schiller Head of Lutheran Social Institute: Followed a New Call: the Recognized Expert Went from the School of Social Work to the New Educational Institution] NN, 7 Sept. 1967: [n.p.]; Newspaper clipping, NCA C74 no. 138.
Caemmerer remained a rather authoritarian person who instilled respect in the students. In contrast, most of them were impressed with and thoroughly enjoyed Schiller's tutorial style which was easy going, very personal, but at the same time remained demanding. Of course it helped that Schiller was not much older than many of his students who were thrilled to go out and do actual casework and discuss their experiences in class. These practical experiences seemed to make up for the dryness and drudgery of some of the other courses which emphasized the traditional legal and administrative issues. With the opening of the school teaching social work had entered a new era in Germany. The first class of graduates found work in Nuremberg and the surrounding region, but also went to far off places such as Hamburg, Lübeck, Kassel, and Wuppertal.  

The new breed of social workers did not have an easy time in the field. Horst Volk, for example, found a job with the city of Nuremberg and was assigned to one of its homes where difficult young people were literally kept under lock.

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17 For the student's experiences see "Unsere Soziale Welt: Eine Festschrift über den Galgenhumor der 13 Prüfungs- kandidaten, Ostern 1958;" NCA C74 no. 136; Heinrich Schiller, personal interview, 26 July 1995; Horst Volk, personal interview, 2 Aug. 1995. Volk belonged to the first class to graduate from the school. Frederike Noetel, personal interview, 14 Aug. 1995. Ms. Noetel had previously done social work for the Lutheran Church and described her experiences at the school in the 1950s as a revelation. According to her, the difference between her schooling at the church institutions and the new school were "like day and night."
and key. Volk remembered that none of the older social workers there thought that one could or should do anything with those hardened cases whom they considered to be hopeless. Volk met ridicule when he began to work with the worst offenders, but did not need long to prove the old school wrong. He did not spend much time at his first assignment because of the intransigence of his colleagues, but Volk continued a lifelong commitment to the new brand of social work he had studied and put it to good use. His career culminated in the construction and management of one of the most successful enterprises employing handicapped people in Germany.18

Although American support was most visible in the city's welfare department, others also tried to embrace the new age, although it seemed to be harder for some than for others. Nuremberg's educators, for example, had to deal with one of

18Horst Volk, personal interview, 2 Aug. 1995. Interestingly Volk made no bones about his rather negative feelings towards the United States, a common feature among intellectuals in a city that up to last year was a Social Democratic stronghold where it was not fashionable to show much sympathy for American policies. When I interviewed him, however, I had the impression that he had many features which one finds more in the United States than in Germany. Volk was very easy going and informal in spite of his position when I visited him in his office. Since he was one of Schiller's most successful students, he certainly internalized the American models and the practice oriented approach Schiller taught at the school. Volk did not seem to have much patience for the all powerful and cumbersome German bureaucracy, looking rather for practical and pragmatic solutions to problems. So in fact I found a person who seemed to be very American in outlook and behavior but at the same time was convinced that not much good could come from the other side of the Atlantic in the political realm.
the few emigres who actually decided to return to their former work places. Pauline Schwickert had been in a leading position in the city’s school administration when the Nazis dismissed her in 1933. She emigrated to the United States in 1936 and became professor at Ohio State University. She returned to Nuremberg in 1949 to resume her work there, but found considerable resistance from members of the city administration who argued that her twelve years in exile had "alienated" her and accused her of wanting to experiment too much with influences of the American education system. Schwickert took these charges head on and said that indeed she wanted to fight for changes in the vocational school system which should also teach some theoretical subjects to its apprentice students. She planned to support especially economics and social sciences since the United States demonstrated that people who were educated in these subjects were able to make independent decisions. Apparently she won the argument and was reinstated. 19

In 1951 Schwickert took the initiative and proposed to offer English as an optional subject for all vocational students. Nuremberg’s school committee had no objections as long as enough rooms could be found and a certain academic standard could be maintained, but it rejected Schwickert’s suggestion to introduce a fee for the course to insure the

19Minutes of a school committee meeting, 1 Apr. 1949; NCA C7/IX no. 1285.
participating students’ motivation. This case revealed a dilemma in American efforts. Schwickert wanted to introduce an idea with which she had probably become acquainted in the United States, but it ran against the intentions of OMGUS and HICOG officials who had been working hard to abolish school fees. In this case the city of Nuremberg had long advocated such a policy so that the council members rejected one American idea while at the same time supporting another which had long been on their reform agenda anyway.20

The committee demonstrated that it was willing to act on new ideas from the United States in another case. It adopted a welfare measure at schools which was in common use in the United States but had not been found necessary in German institutions. In 1951 HICOG approached the city to create positions of psychologically trained counsellors at all of its schools. In the spring of 1952 the school committee had agreed to introduce two year training courses for counsellors. The American director of the International Institute, the former Education Center, agreed to support the project with rooms and his own expertise in August. In January 1953 the State Department granted 10,000 marks for the project and sent a psychologist who gave a number of presentations and helped set the program up. The International Center arranged for a conference with foreign

20 Minutes of a school committee meeting, 20 Apr. 1951; NCA C7/IX no. 1285.
experts in Nuremberg that dealt with the topic. By October 1954 the first participants had passed the course successfully and began their work in Nuremberg’s schools. With the first results in, the Committee for Cultural Affairs decided to recommend the continuation of the program in November 1954. The city council had supplemented it earlier that year with a small library to help teachers orient themselves in the latest trends in education and psychology.²¹

Children of the Occupiers

The Americans did not always provide support for welfare agencies but sometimes also created problems for them. Not surprisingly relations between GIs and German women often had rather undesired consequences. In 1952 an estimated 94,000 children had fathers who belonged to the occupying forces. Nuremberg’s statistics in the 1950s reveal that between 10 and 20% of all children under the city’s guardianship had an American father. Of those less than 10% came from a relationship with an African-American GI. Most soldiers accepted their fatherhood and supported the mothers even if the couples did not get married but many others did not. German authorities or civilians could not expect any help from the Army in these cases, since Americans were not

²¹Minutes of meetings of the committee for schools and cultural affairs, 6 Feb. 1953; NCA C7/IX no. 1306; 20 Feb. 1953; NCA C7/IX no. 1307; 12 Mar. 1954, 26 Nov. 1954; NCA C7/IX no. 1320.
legally obliged to provide child support for their offspring in Germany.²²

Although the numbers were minute, children from African-American soldiers provided a special and highly visible challenge for Nuremberg's society and welfare authorities. In May 1952 fifty-two of the 3758 first graders registered for school had an African-American father. Most of them lived with their families and tried to lead normal lives, although all had to cope with the problem of being physically different which meant that they were stared at in public places and often became targets of other children as well as of discrimination by adults. A sympathetic social worker observed that they developed a strong sense of independence and pride which many were willing to defend anytime anywhere.²³

Interestingly, the presence of African-American soldiers had done much to improve their image in Germany. We have seen evidence that many of them felt more comfortable in Germany than in the United States because they did not have to live with the open racism and discrimination they were


²³"Eine Umfrage der 'NN': Tausende von Kindern ohne Vater," [A Survey by "NN": Thousands of Children Without Father] NN, 21 Sept. 1949: 10; Helmut Stühler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994. The city administration asked Stühler on several occasions to accompany these children on special trips to Denmark. He also seemed to have some of them as guests in his youth center.
still facing at home, but the Germans' apparent tolerance towards African Americans should not be overestimated. A look at the welfare administration in the 1950s demonstrates that many Nurembergers were unable to shed prejudice and racial stereotypes. Welfare officers usually segregated children of African-American fathers who came under foster care into special homes. One lady in a small village near Nuremberg, for example, provided a foster home for five mixed children. In November 1953 she requested extra support for heating materials and clothing from the welfare authorities. According to her, it was a well known fact that children of African-American descent were extremely susceptible to colds so that it was necessary to maintain the entire house well heated.24

Her reasoning was by no means unique. In 1955 the Nuremberg welfare office wrote an extensive report to the regional government of Middle Franconia. The author of the report argued that the city of Nuremberg had to take care of the development of about 260 children who had African-American fathers. According to the author, extensive analyses had revealed that about half of those children had developed "their characters and sentiments in an incorrect way". The office detected the reason for this trend in the fact that these children, "even if the environment does not

reject them", were developing an inferiority complex because they felt their physical difference strongly. The author thought that this complex pushed the children towards being violent or insidious, while others became shy and intimidated, "in one word: unfit for life". The welfare officer argued that this development took place regardless of the place in which the children lived. He continued that the children in foster care suffered more from belonging to an "alien race" than those who lived in families. With those alarming signs on the wall the Nuremberg welfare office thought it necessary to take steps early so that these children would not become a burden to society or failures later in their lives.

The office's cases to support its argument once more reveal the deep seated prejudices which foster parents and the welfare officials shared. The reports stressed that the children in general suffered considerably from their "alien heritage" and sometimes tried to take revenge for belonging to a different race on white children. Most of the reports described children of an African-American heritage in foster homes as wild and hard to control. Many only seemed to be happy when they were together with other mixed children. The welfare authorities thought that all of these features clearly had their roots in the different race to which those children belonged. With this racial explanation it was not
necessary to examine the causes of the young boys’ and girls’ feelings of alienation in any depth.

The welfare officer in charge accumulated all this evidence to convince the authorities in Middle Franconia that more money was necessary to provide the children of black soldiers with the means to master their later lives. To achieve this goal, Nuremberg wanted to send a number of especially difficult children to international camps in Switzerland to provide them with a more suitable environment. While the intention was laudable, the ultimate reason for sending them abroad revealed the unwillingness of Nuremberg’s authorities to actually deal with this new phenomenon and to integrate these children into the community. Their reason for sending the children abroad was to accustom them to a foreign country and to provide them with an education in such an environment. The welfare officers expected them to emigrate from Germany later in life.

Middle Franconia’s welfare officials did not share these opinions. They reminded their colleagues in Nuremberg that the children indeed were Germans and would have to decide by themselves if they would want to emigrate or not. One should not expect such a move and preparing them for such an unlikely eventuality early on in life would simply be a waste of money.\(^{25}\)

\(^{25}\)Nuremberg Welfare Office to Bavarian Welfare Association in Middle Franconia, 28 March 1955; Middle Bavarian Welfare Association in Middle Franconia to Nuremberg

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Nuremberg's welfare officials did not yet realize that their own evaluations actually were the largest part of the problem. The frequency in which the words "alien" or "foreign" appear in all reports clearly indicated that Nuremberg authorities—and with them probably many Nurembergers—were not prepared to accept that being a Nuremberger or a German did not depend on the color of your skin or your race, but was determined by your environment. No attempt was made to integrate the children into the rest of the community. The authorities did not seem to be aware that their segregation policies contributed to the childrens' psychological problems. Treating these children differently and regarding them as strangers only aggravated the problems which many of them had growing up in unstable homes. They felt that they did not belong and were not welcome anywhere except among their peers. This constellation certainly could lead to the behavioral deviations which authorities documented. The projected remedies were not designed to solve the problem. Instead of trying to change the preconceptions and prejudices of the community, the administrators thought that the only solution would be to provide the children with some help to cope with their preconceived fates. Since they were perceived as "aliens", it was just logical to assume that they would certainly want to leave Germany sooner or later.

[n.d.]; NCA C25/I no. 489.
Mixed children could look to a few bright spots, however. The largest local newspaper tried its best to disseminate the message of tolerance and understanding. The authors of articles dealing with the subject made clear that the children who had black fathers were no different from others: they spoke the same easily detectable Nuremberg dialect and for the most part had the same names as other children of their age group. Some relief for these children came in the form of invitations to spend their summer vacations in Denmark. The Danes had proven their integrity and tolerance during World War II and they demonstrated once again an exceptional sensitivity. In 1955 Stig Guldberg, who had pioneered the idea of integrating handicapped people into society, invited sixty children of African-American descent to Denmark. Many other families followed his example so that almost half of the 260 school children were able to spend a vacation abroad. Since all of them came from poor families or foster homes, the welfare office provided the train tickets for the eighteen hour ride. The newspaper reported that many Danish families had indicated their desire to adopt the young outsiders. They would provide them with homes in a society which seemed to be more ready for them than the one into which they had been born.26

26Minutes of the Welfare Committee meeting of 21 Apr. 1955; NCA C7/IX no. 1354; "44 Mischlingsskinder fuhren gestern von Nürnberg zu dänischen Familien: Ferienwochen im 'Land des Specks',' [44 Mulatto Children Left Nuremberg Yesterday to Go to Danish Families: Weeks of Vacation in the "Country of
Taking Care of Homeless Youth: The Peace Village

Children of American soldiers often had at least their mother's family to fall back on, but the war had left many others without parents and homes. Americans successfully promoted the idea of Boys' Towns modeled after Father Flanagan's self-help institutions which not only took care of the boys' physical needs but also introduced them to democratic procedures, taking up responsibilities, and an education. Nuremberg's Peace Village was one of these communities and recognized the debt to Flanagan—who had died in Berlin while promoting his idea in Germany—by naming the main square of the future settlement after him.27

With supporters from all over Europe, the local GYA and MG officers, and the city of Nuremberg the undertaking seemed to rest on a solid foundation and enjoyed much attention in the press as well as by international authorities. The State Department also reported favorably about this new experiment.

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Bacon", NN, 20 July 1955: 9; "Die kleine 'Toxi' erobert die Herzen: Ein Film von R.A. Stemmle um ein Mischlingskind," [Little "Toxi" Conquers Hearts: A Film by R.A. Stemmle About a Colored Child] NN, 15. Oct. 1952: 9. It would be interesting to investigate this issue further, but most welfare records of the time in Nuremberg are still closed to the researcher. One also has to take into consideration that the welfare offices only dealt with problem cases. The children who grew up under more normal conditions never attracted the attention of the authorities.

27 Chronik der Stadt Nürnberg 1945-49, 19 June 1949: 457. NCA FZ no. 48; see also "Cornerstone for Peace Village Laid," YW, 1 July 1948: 1. One of the first American feature movies OMGUS brought from the United States was Boys' Town with Kirk Douglas as Father Flanagan.
in which young people were building and administering their own homes and workshops.28

During the first years of its operation the Peace Village seemed to be on the right path. Nuremberg’s welfare administration watched with interest. Apparently the city fathers were sufficiently impressed with its work that they decided to merge their own plans for a youth home at the location with those of the Peace Village. In February 1949 about fifty young men between the ages of fourteen and eighteen had decided to try it out; eight months later their number had almost doubled. By 1951 115 homeless young people had decided to make the Peace Village their home.29

In spite of the publicity the experiment was in financial trouble from the start. A Nuremberg newspaper commented as early as 1949 that the village would need considerable support from German authorities and

28 Chronik der Stadt Nürnberg 1945–49, 19 June 1949: 457. NCA F2 no. 48. OMGUS had sponsored the international conference from which prominent participants, among them Carl Zuckmayer who had emigrated from Germany to the United States and Elisabeth Rotten, the director of one of the leading Swiss international welfare organizations, went to Nuremberg for laying the cornerstone of the future peace village. For press coverage see "'Das Experiment scheint zu glücken'," ["The Experiment Seems to Succeed"] NN, 29 July 1950: 10; the State Department’s evaluation is in Young Germany 53–56.

organizations in addition to the help the Friends and other international institutions provided to be able to survive, but the project continued to suffer considerably from the lack of funds. The frugal city fathers decided to support the venture only after serious admonitions from Marx with a one time shot in the arm of 10,000 marks in November 1950. Construction contracts between the city and the bricklayer apprentices of the institution in the city’s projects for young people secured additional funding. Peace Villagers provided much of the professional work force in reconstructing Hoheneck Castle, the city’s youth retreat and training center, and participated in the ambitious reconstruction of a part of the old imperial fortress which became the Nuremberg’s new youth home. The city saved a considerable amount of money since the apprentices were much cheaper than private contractors, but when the local construction industry complained about the competition, the cooperation came to an end in 1953.30

The material support from the city was not enough to maintain the project afloat. In March 1951 John McCloy rescued the village from bankruptcy with a check over 82,000 marks to finish the construction at least of the first two

houses which had been dedicated the year before. Two years later the director of a British organization dedicated to help European refugees decided to support the Peace Village with finances and machinery since it not only housed refugees who by then largely came from the Soviet Zone, but also provided Czech and other Eastern European Youth who were living in the nearby refugee camp with opportunities to learn a trade.\textsuperscript{31}

Although the village survived until the end of the decade, it never became the Boys' Town its founders had envisioned. By 1959 its situation had not changed. An inspection by the city's welfare committee revealed that nothing had changed since 1953. About 120 young men, 80% of whom had fled from the Soviet Zone, were still living in unfinished facilities and did not have the money to carry the project through, but by then the Boys' Town was not necessary anymore. Those whom the war had orphaned had grown up. In 1961 the East German government decided to effectively lock up its citizens. With typical German thoroughness it constructed an extremely sophisticated and deadly system of border fortifications which ended the influx of refugees from the east for good. This action eliminated the last group of


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young people who had come to live at the Peace Village and
the experiment came to an end in Nuremberg.\textsuperscript{32}

Youth Work

While Nuremberg's city administration was actively
looking for American cooperation in the field of youth
welfare, the Nuremberg Kreis Youth Ring took the lead in
promoting and implementing the new ideas in youth work the
Americans had introduced. Le Van Roberts, the local Resident
Officer reported to Munich in October 1950 that the mood of
people in Nuremberg in general was quite gloomy. According
to him, Nurembergers regarded the current economic upswing as
only temporary. The dire housing situation remained the most
popular topic in the city, while people did not seem to be
interested at all in occupation costs or cultural matters.
In spite of their proximity to the Iron Curtain and the
Korean war, Nurembergers also did not seem to be worried
about the outbreak of a war in Germany. Roberts noted that
Nuremberg's young people as well as the city's youth
officials were the notable exception to the rather sad
picture. The expulsion of the Free German Youth from the
Youth Ring for "lack of cooperation" demonstrated to Roberts

\textsuperscript{32} Chronik der Stadt Nürnberg, 1958: 478; 1959: 356; NCA
F2 no. 52, 53.
that they certainly took a stand against totalitarian ideas.\footnote{From Le Van Roberts, Resident Officer, Nuremberg, to George N. Shuster, Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Report on the Mood in Nuremberg, 13 Oct. 1950; NA RG 466 OLCB, District Land Office Activity Reports, Box 2, 120.5/20.}

Nuremberg's Kreis Youth Ring gave evidence of its democratic convictions in other ways as well. Combining the ideas of a youth parliament and permitting young people to "run" a community for a day, the Kreis Youth Ring came up with the concept of "Political Education in the Community" (Gemeindepolitisiche Erziehung). Together with the city administration the committee started a program in 1949 which was designed to help young people understand the function of city government and the possibilities it offered for help and employment. For several weeks all departments of the city administration opened their offices to young people. Prominent administrators and politicians gave presentations on topics of interest. Not surprisingly, the job situation remained high on young people's agendas. American observers were impressed with this new approach of introducing democracy to the younger generation.\footnote{Circular from Nuremberg Kreis Youth Committee to all schools in minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 10 Mar. 1949; NCA C7/IX no. 1235; "Jugend hat wertvolle Arbeit geleistet: Der Kreisjugendring Nürnberg berichtet über seine Tätigkeit im vergangenen Jahr," [Youth Has Done Valuable Work: Kreis Youth Committee Reports About its Work During the Previous Year] NN, 21 Sept. 1949: 10; Le Van Roberts, RO Nuremberg, to K. Van Buskirk, Chief, FOD, 25 July 1950; NA RG 466 OLCB, Central Files, Box 28; see also Chronik der Stadt Nürnberg, 17 Mar. -17 May 1952; NCA F2 no.49.}
The Youth Ring's commitment to democracy and peace manifested itself in other ways as well. In December 1949 the committee targeted the famous Nuremberg Christmas market to protest the reappearance of militaristic toys on the stands. Eric Feiler reported that about eighty youths marched from city hall to the trade union building while about forty others marched to the market and picketed the market lanes. According to Feiler, some middle aged people tried to interfere with the demonstration while the older generation "expressed their approval". The Intelligence Officer also noted that the police did not interfere with the demonstrators in spite of complaints of the stand owners. Although the demonstration never reached large proportions, it was successful. A city ordinance which is still in effect today banned the sale of militaristic toys in the future.35

Although Americans certainly could be pleased with their efforts of demilitarizing German youth, their previous policy of demilitarization had some unwelcome side effects. The Kreis Youth Ring did not stop with protesting military toys at the Christmas Market. Two days before Christmas of 1949 Andreas Staudt, acting as chairman of the Kreis Youth Ring, sent a resolution the committee had adopted to the American High Commissioner. In this resolution Nuremberg's youth

representatives protested all attempts of German political parties and government representatives to promote the rearmament of Germany. The members of the Nuremberg Youth Ring thought that it would be wiser to concentrate on vital issues such as unemployment which was especially high among young people.36

The Youth Ring did not shrink back from political issues, but it did not neglect the practical work for its constituents either. The employment of a professional youth worker was just one of the steps to improve the situation especially for those who were not organized. In January 1950 Trade Union Youth Secretary Loni Burger and Karl Maly decided to explore the possibilities for erecting centers for young people throughout Nuremberg. Apparently they had taken a close look at GYA center no. 1 and kept in mind that many of their constituents came from the working class. Maly and Burger thought that it would be best to combine open youth

36Letter from Kreis Youth Ring Nuremberg to John McCloy, 22 Dec. 1949; NA RG 466 HICOM, Security-Segregated General Records 1949-52, Box 136. McCloy had to deal with this attitude constantly. He had to walk a diplomatic tightrope in this respect. On the one hand he had to reassure Germany’s neighbors that Americans did not want to reestablish Germany’s military might unchecked. On the other hand he needed to convince Germans about the necessity of rearmament for defensive purposes. Americans expected Germans to contribute to the defense of the free world. McCloy told Germans that nobody would force them to take up arms for the democratic cause if they did not want to, but he also made clear that there probably would be dire consequences for a free Europe if they decided against rearmament. See, for example, his speech to trade unionists in Hamburg, 25 Nov. 1950 in Fischer and Fischer, eds. 127-135. See also Schwartz, chapter V.
work with dormitories and workshops for apprentices. They contacted the Bavarian Association for Youth Welfare to find out about the possibility of funding such a project. The association's representative promised that he would sit down with them to discuss the issue but also thought that it would be more fruitful to assemble all interested parties and discuss the issue in depth.\textsuperscript{37}

By July 1950 the strategy for implementing the plan was set. The Nuremberg Kreis Youth Ring solicited 7,000 marks from the McCloy funds for the erection and maintenance of Nuremberg's first "home of the open door". One professional youth worker and several volunteers would be in charge of the center which would render its services free of charge. Karl Maly, the author of the application, emphasized the need for supporting unorganized young people. The Kreis Youth Committee had already located a suitable building part of which the city administration had repaired. The Peace Village had submitted an estimate of about 9,000 marks for making the other part of the building suitable for a youth center. Maly also reminded the HICOG administrators that Resident Officer in Munich, Harold Patrick, had already assured the committee of HICOG support informally in March.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{37}Memo of a telephone conversation with the Chairman of the Bavarian Association for Youth Welfare, 3 Jan. 1950; NCA C74 Vorakt Ref. X, no. 113.

\textsuperscript{38}Kreis Youth Ring to HICOG, Application for a grant from McCloy Funds, 15 July 1950; BSA Kreisjugendring 1/1.
The application was successful. Actually HICOG footed the whole bill. It provided the Bavarian Youth Ring who officially funded the facilities as well as the personnel with the money for the enterprise. In October 1950 the Kreis Youth Ring opened Nuremberg's and Bavaria's first of five planned youth centers under German control. The new center was unable to compete with GYA's luxurious accommodations but it functioned along the same lines. The center's three rooms were open to all young people and functioned as library, discussion rooms or as movie theaters. The center also planned to install a small workshop in which, according to the newspaper, working youth would be able to deepen their vocational education. A large playground completed the picture.39

The new director of the center, Eberhard Schmall, had his hands full from the start. So many young people wanted to come and stay that initially he had to limit access to the facilities to those who needed it most. Schmall tried to establish contact with the young people and with their parents.40


40"Das Haus soll zu einer kulturellen Bindung für die Jugendlichen werden': Eine Tür ist jeden Tag für alle Kinder offen," ["The House is Planned to Foster a Cultural Connection for Young People": Every Day a Door is Open to All Children] NN, 29 Dec. 1950: 9.
While the center at the Herschelplatz had received all of the press's attention, the Kreis Youth Ring had created two additional youth centers which were located in refugee camps to provide those young people who were still there with opportunities to spend their leisure time in a meaningful way and to escape the drab and crowded living conditions and were financed by HICOG through Munich. Interestingly, the Germans justified their actions in the same way the Army had done: since young people in the refugee camps tended to become frustrated and angry, one had to do something to keep them out of trouble and away from the streets.41

As we have seen, the Germans had solicited the help of an American specialist to develop an all encompassing plan for Nuremberg's youth work in the future, but before Jay Ver Lee began working on his project Theodor Marx introduced his own plan. Although the city had a long standing tradition of supporting youth organizations with club rooms in its own city youth house, Marx envisioned a completely new approach to youth work for the future which would intensify and professionalize youth work and at the same time try to reach out to that part of Nuremberg's youth who in all probability would never join any youth organization in their lives. According to him, the post war years had clearly demonstrated that youth organizations only had a limited appeal to the

41Theodor Marx, "Aufbau und Ausbau der Jugendarbeit in Nürnberg: Entwurf zu einem neuen Plan" [hereinafter Marx, Entwurf]: 4; NCA C74 no. 3.
city's young people and would never be able to attract more than about one third of all youth in the city. It was therefore urgently necessary to recognize the needs of unorganized young people and to devote a considerable part of the resources available for youth work to them. The city councilman thanked the Kreis Youth Ring for its valuable contribution, but he wanted more. Although he had not been in the United States Marx apparently was determined to introduce the idea of voluntarism in Nuremberg. He wanted to introduce youth councils in every district of the city. These councils would consist of volunteers who would become the liaison between those people in need and the authorities who often did not understand the realities of the world outside their offices. Marx proposed that the councils should work hand in hand with professional youth workers.42

Marx did not want those workers to operate in a vacuum. He thought that they should also be in charge of a center which would be open to everyone. Marx found the idea of open youth work which GYA practiced successfully in its center no. 1 was very good, but thought that the Americans were doing too much of a good thing. According to him, the costs for running a center of this type were prohibitive and German authorities would never be able to take it over from GYA in its present form. Marx suggested open youth work on a far more moderate basis: the city would need six small homes of

the open door: five in the more outlying districts and one in the city's new and very generous youth facility which Marx had been planning since March 1950 at the old Imperial Fortress. He maintained that such homes of the open door were certainly affordable. Since three existed already and the city would certainly be able to reach an agreement with the Army about taking over GYA Youth Center no. 1, Nuremberg would only have to finance two more centers. One could be sponsored somehow while the sixth would be incorporated into the new facilities where Marx sought to bring the traditional and the new together. The city youth house would include a youth hostel, rooms for the existing organizations, a dormitory for apprentices, facilities for meetings and movies as well as a home of the open door. It would serve as the nerve center of Nuremberg's youth work and replace the Bunker which youth organizations were still occupying at the time. Nuremberg's welfare committee agreed to make the plan the basis for the future youth work of the city in October 1950, one month before Jay Ver Lee began his evaluation of the situation in Nuremberg.43

43Marx, Entwurf: 1-7; minutes of a meeting of the welfare committee, 19 Oct. 1950; NCA C7/IX no. 1237; Marx introduced his plans for the city youth house in March 1950 (see "Finanzierung des Stadtjugendhauses," [Financing the City Youth House] NN, 6 Mar 1950: n.p. (newspaper clipping, NCA C74 no. 4)); for Marx's opinion about the GYA center see minutes of conference between Mr. Textor, Marx, Staudt, and Maly, 23 Aug. 1950; BSA Kreisjugendring 1/2.
Ver Lee agreed with the concept of youth work Marx had developed, but neither the new concept nor Marx's plans for an admittedly expensive youth house met with general approval in Nuremberg. The Kreis Youth Ring was not happy with the city's sudden emphasis on open youth work. As long as the Americans were paying for the enterprise, the youth leaders apparently were willing to support open youth work, but as soon as the interests of their youth organizations were in jeopardy their attitude changed. The majority of the Kreis Youth Ring members were not happy at all with the competition. They questioned the value of this type of youth work and argued that only a minority of all young people would benefit from the youth centers for which the city was planning to spend ten times the money it had allocated for the youth organizations, although the members of the organizations felt that they were doing the most valuable youth work. Marx countered that youth organizations would never be able to attract more than just one third of all young people and that international experiences had amply demonstrated the value of homes of the open door.4

Some people also were not happy with the new project at the castle. Willy Gensmantel was one of the youth house's most outspoken opponents. He thought that the city would be

much better advised to invest the enormous sums it was planning to spend on this prestige object in practical youth work or in help for unemployed young people, but youth representatives had no chance against the energetic and quite authoritarian Marx.\(^4\) \(^5\)

Although the city's leading welfare official and the American expert agreed in principle, they differed on important issues. Ver Lee's evaluation of the situation called for eight youth centers in Nuremberg. The one in the inner city was last in priority since the American did not expect its reconstruction to take place any time soon. None of the youth centers would be located at or near the castle. Ver Lee suggested that the Nuremberg youth house at the fortress probably would serve its purpose as youth hostel and administrative center for the city's youth work well, but that he doubted that the planners would be able to provide adequate facilities for a modern youth center.\(^4\) \(^6\)

Marx was not happy with Ver Lee's report. Throughout 1950 he had carefully enlisted all Americans within his reach such as Major Selsor and Hedwig Wachenheim to support the project. Wachenheim alerted him to the McCloy Funds even

\(^{45}\)Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug 1995.

\(^{46}\)Ver Lee Plan: 4; BSA Kreisjugendring Nürnberg Stadt 1/1. The State Department included Ver Lee's evaluation in its booklet Young Germany: Apprentice to Democracy. Marx was seriously offended when he became acquainted with its contents in 1952 (Marx to Lowell Bennett, Foreign Service of the US, Public Affairs Regional Center, Nuremberg, 20 May 1952; NCA C74 no. 7).
before application procedures were established and Marx had
not lost any time in sending his application.47 Since he
expected the McCloy Funds to provide about a quarter of the
construction costs for the new youth house, he called
conferences with American officials in February and March
1951 to point out the flaws in Ver Lee's argument, set the
record straight, and to explain to them once again what he
hoped HICOG and GYA would do for him and the city. Harold
Patrick, OLCB's youth officer in Munich, however, had to
dampen his enthusiasm. While he pointed out that he
personally supported the project, he alerted Marx to the fact
that the competition was keen and that the city of Nuremberg
would have to lower its expectations at least by two thirds
of the targeted sum. Even then it was not certain if it was
going to receive any money at all.48

Apparently Marx could not take no for an answer.
Clearly irritated he enlisted the help of everyone who
possibly could help from Hans Lamm to Franz-Josef Strauss who
had moved to Bonn in the meantime. The fight for the money
dragged on throughout 1951 and a good part of 1952. Neither
Marx's persistence nor his obvious opinion that the Americans
had a moral obligation to help him and Nuremberg's young

47 Application for a grant for Nuremberg's youth house,
Marx to Le Van Roberts, OLCB, 2 May 1950; NCA C74 no. 7.

48 Minutes of a meeting of the youth-welfare committee, 15
Mar. 1951; minutes of a conference with Le Van Roberts on 16
Feb. 1951; NCA C74 no. 3.
people out after supposedly promising their support did anything to advance his cause. In April 1952 the Americans informed the welfare specialist in no uncertain terms that he should not have counted on money for which he had applied but never received a written agreement. The author of the letter also reminded Marx that the McCloy Funds had already provided the city with close to one million marks. Nuremberg apparently had gotten far more than its share. In spite of this slap in the face Marx still was not willing to give up. When John McCloy visited Nuremberg on his farewell tour Marx took the last opportunity to ask for American help. In a detailed letter which included all of the evidence in the case Marx expressed his disappointment at the runaround and the final denial of support. According to Marx, the American attitude and actions in this case were not just very unpleasant for him and the city administration but also were undermining American prestige among young people, a statement that probably would not have held up under close scrutiny.49

Even without American support the new facilities grew rapidly. In August 1952 Marx presided over the inauguration of the youth hostel, the dormitory for apprentices, and

49Marx to Strauss, 26 Sept. 1951; NCA C74 no. 4; Marx to Lamm, 20 May 1952; Lowell Bennett, Public Affairs Officer, American Consulate General, Public Affairs Regional Center, to Marx, 8 Apr. 1952; Marx to McCloy, 25 June 1952; NCA C74 no. 7. No answer is recorded, but McCloy clearly signalled that he did not like the quarrelsome city on his farewell tour. He spent just enough time to satisfy the protocol in Nuremberg before he went on to the small town of Rothenburg to spend the night there.
facilities for conferences and concerts. In 1953 an expensive film studio followed which carried on the tradition of the GYA film hour as well as Nuremberg's own youth film stage which the city had constructed in 1924 and lost in 1942 through Allied bombs. This time a committee made sure that young people only saw approved movies, but even under this close scrutiny young Germans continued to see American documentaries which a newly established film service distributed. The city's oldest structure, a tower adjacent to the reconstructed youth buildings, became the home for Nuremberg's youth groups in 1954. In 1955 Marx finally was able to complete the project. When the Army decided to terminate the city's contract at the old location, Hans Werner and the former GYA youth center no. 1 found a new home in another of the Imperial Castle's old towers.50

While Marx obviously was disappointed with the American contribution to Nuremberg's youth house, he demonstrated that he had not developed his youth plan just to receive money for his prestige project. In November 1951 the Bavarian Youth

50Theodor Marx, 5 Jahre Ortsverband der Nürnberger Wohlfahrtspflege e.V. (Nürnberg [Nuremberg]: Ortsverband der Nürnberger Wohlfahrtspflege e.V., 1954) 13-25; "Im Turm der Nürnberger Burg zog das 'Heim der offenen Tür' ein: Freizeit im 'Luginsland','" [Home of the Open Door Moved to Tower in the Nuremberg Castle: Recreation at the "Luginsland"] NN, 20 Oct. 1955: 9; for the youth film program see report of Nuremberg's Association for the Cultivation of Welfare, Feb. 1954 (NCA C74 Vorakt Ref VI no. 120a) and an invitation to the showing of six short movies by the Film Service for Youth and Public Education (NCA C 74 Vorakt Ref. X no. 113/1). Three of the six were American and, according to the invitation, popular with audiences.
Ring informed the city that HICOG had suddenly cut its grants for the youth centers. Without the American funds the Youth Ring would not be able to keep the centers open. Marx immediately stepped in. In spite of some continuing resistance from committee members who did not want to see more competition for Nuremberg's youth organizations, Marx, Staudt, and Maly were able to convince the welfare committee to include the support of the three homes of the open door in the city's budget and assure their survival. One year later the city also took over youth center no. 1, but it never carried out plans for further expansion. The city fathers had considered the erection of a special youth center for the Eastern European refugees in camp Valka, but never went beyond the planning stage. Helmut Stühler, whose youth center was not far from the camp, would also have to take care of those young people who came to visit his house of the open door from the camp.51

Although the city fathers never provided the youth centers with the luxurious equipment and personnel that GYA had been able to afford, the homes of the open door had extremely dedicated staff who devoted their lives to the centers and the young people who visited them in spite of a

51 Minutes of a meeting of the welfare committee, 29 Nov. 1951; NCA C7/IX no. 1239; minutes of meetings of the welfare committee, 11 Feb. 1952, 17 Apr. 1952; NCA C7/IX no. 1299; minutes of a meeting of the welfare committee, 10 July 1952; NCA C7/IX no. 1300; Helmut Stühler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994 and 12 Aug. 1995.
constant battle over allocations and priorities. Over the years the barracks at the refugee camps gave way to permanent structures. They remain open to young people to this day.\textsuperscript{52}

Although relations between Americans and Germans were not always without misunderstandings at the grassroots, Nuremberg city officials and youth leaders demonstrated that they were quite willing to adopt American ideas and concepts and incorporate them into their own youth work and welfare activities. American material support as well as HICOG's extensive reorientation programs created the framework and educational possibilities for those who were willing to learn. With HICOG financial support Germans were able to initiate many programs for which they assumed the responsibility when HICOG withdrew and the economic situation had improved.


The city actually ventured into the realm of self-determination for young people in the sixties when Hermann Glaser--then in charge of cultural affairs in Nuremberg--invited Nuremberg's youth basically to run their own center in a building the Americans had requisitioned until 1955 and for which the city did not have any other use. In theory the center came closest to the ideal which GYA had promoted in the forties and fifties, but it caused much controversy from the start because of alleged drug trafficking, violence, and the inability by young people to manage the center. Nobody seems quite to know what to do with it today (Kett 115-143).
CONCLUSION

Forty years after the official end of the occupation, the question remains what long-term effects the American presence may have had in Germany after World War II and how successful American re-education efforts towards young people actually were. Washington needed a long time to define a clear re-education mission for the American zone, but those in charge of the field work developed a remarkable degree of initiative to help the Germans in their communities back on their feet and to start the process of re-education at the earliest possible moment. They actually developed the programs which Washington's policy statements officially approved. While this approach took time to evolve, often led to confusion, duplication, and much waste, it also kept American programs practice-oriented and in close touch with the needs of German communities. The occupiers reached a surprising number of young people from all classes in many different ways.

Americans who did not try to impose their will were most successful in implementing their policies. Although Germany had lost the war, the occupiers had to rely on the German administrative apparatus to carry out their policies and consequently provided them with leverage to negotiate which enabled them to resist drastic reforms. The fight over Bavaria's school system is symptomatic for this struggle.
Field officers recognized the problem much earlier than OMGUS headquarters did. They looked for ways to cooperate with the Germans and to open up a dialogue which would help them to implement their re-educational goals. Establishing a dialogue proved to be the Americans' most successful strategy. They did not become preachers in the desert but found many Germans ready to cooperate who regarded change as inevitable and necessary. These Germans were quite willing to take up offers and suggestions which came from the occupiers as long as they were permitted to participate actively in the decision-making process which enabled them to adapt new models to the situation in their community. As a result many American ideas successfully took root in German thought and actions, sometimes forming a symbiosis with German traditions in which the American origins became indiscernible. This process in youth work suggests that American re-education and reorientation efforts could have a profound and lasting impact which went far beyond the end of the occupation. Youth administrations, welfare agencies, and youth organizations adopted organizational models but also new views of treating young persons which emphasized the individual and tried to develop independent, creative personalities. For the first time an individual did not have to join youth organizations for his leisure time activities, while welfare workers, many youth groups, and government agencies began to rethink their traditionally authoritarian
approaches. Undoubtedly, the American re-education efforts in this realm had a considerable impact which spread throughout the Federal Republic as time went by.

Contrary to the assertions of many contemporary observers and some scholars, the American personnel who occupied key positions in youth work in the American zone and in Nuremberg generally were qualified for doing their job well and dedicated to their tasks. When the American YMCA refused to grant Lawrence Norrie another year of absence, he resigned from a job which undoubtedly was financially more lucrative and burdened with less controversy and frustrations to remain in charge of youth activities in Germany. He later joined the State Department. Equally Mark Selsor probably would have been able to find assignments in the Army which would have advanced his career. Both men, as well as many others in youth work, stayed on their posts because they felt that they had an important mission in Germany which needed time to accomplish its re-educational goals. These goals remained a constant in American policy in the field from 1945 on to the end of the occupation. OMGUS and HICOG officers came to regard communism as just another brand of totalitarianism, very similar in its appearance and goals to National Socialism. Consequently they just added the new threat to their list of enemies, but did not have to modify their agenda, since reorientation would provide the best results against either system.
Interestingly, the only program which neither Military Government nor the Germans were able to control provided the most radical departure from traditional German youth activities. The Army's GYA introduced the Germans to a model for open youth work which initially neither German officials nor the members of traditional youth groups nor Military Government youth specialists regarded as necessary or desirable. Luckily for them, the Army maintained the program until some Germans and Military Government officials began to recognize its value.

While it is possible to trace American influences within Nuremberg's youth work and welfare administration, the impact of the American presence on young Germans themselves is harder to assess. Interviews and documents revealed that many Germans in Nuremberg had contacts with Americans during the immediate postwar period. People wore American clothes, ate American food, smoked American cigarettes, or landed a job with the occupiers. Undoubtedly some Germans took American aid and generosity after the war for granted or regarded it as a kind of compensation for the destruction the occupiers had brought on Nuremberg and for the problems the occupation was causing, but many others genuinely appreciated American aid. Through their generosity, American authorities and individuals opened an avenue of communication and evoked in many people a respect or at least a benevolent attitude towards the United States. When the hard times were over,
most Germans returned to their normal lives in which Americans generally did not occupy any significant role, but looking back after fifty years, many of them still maintained a positive attitude towards the American people—although they often voiced criticism of American domestic and foreign policy over the last five decades. This might explain in part why a majority of politicians from the left and from the right as well as their constituents supported the Federal Republic’s integration in the Western Alliance under American leadership even beyond the end of the Cold War.¹

Young Germans increasingly looked to the United States for their role models, copied American fashion trends, and listened to American music, a behavior which many observers interpreted as "Americanization." Kaspar Maase’s intriguing study on young people’s behavior and attitudes during the second part of the 1950s, however, leads in a different direction. According to him, this generation adapted American ideas and American fashions to their own needs and environment, often changing the original meaning in the process, just like their grandparents had done in the

¹Interestingly, the only serious critic of the Federal Republic’s western integration was Oskar Lafontaine, a younger Social Democratic politician from the Saarland, the only region which had not been exposed to American post-war policies and programs. Although Lafontaine remained very popular in the Saar region, his ideas regarding the Federal Republic’s place in the international community never found much public favor even in his own party.
political realm.² What is interesting about this behavior is not that it was exceptional (it took place in very similar fashion in France, Great Britain and elsewhere), but that young Germans for the first time did not remain outside a general current. They embraced it like their peers in other countries.

Their older brothers and sisters, the members of the Hitler Youth generation, probably had a harder time to reconcile their old values and with the new. They needed to make a conscious effort to replace Nazi ideas with new ones about which they were learning in schools, in their youth organizations, or from the Americans directly. We have seen that a much larger number of young people than had previously been thought actually took advantage of the many different opportunities to have a look at the outside world and to break out of the intellectual and spiritual isolation they had experienced during the Third Reich. Here, as with their younger siblings, a majority most likely would have correctly rejected claims that their activities led to an Americanization, but that would not have meant that American programs had no impact on them. Many of them seemed to accept the new political system and to embrace the basic values of a democratic culture: freedom of expression, a higher degree of tolerance, and at least participation in the

electoral process. West Germany's voter participation throughout the 1950s and 1960s remained at very high levels. This generation also was the first one to travel to foreign lands (in the 1950s Italy was the preferred spot) and in general did not have problems accepting other European guest-workers in their midst. But many also retained a feeling of national pride which even today expresses itself in surprising ways.

To what extent Americans succeeded in introducing not just a democratic political system in their zone of

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3Interestingly, the arrival of Turkish guest-workers changed some of their attitudes. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s negative feelings towards foreigners living in Germany seemed to be directed exclusively against Turkish guest-workers. While working on the shop floor in a major car factory in the middle of the 1980s, I had the impression that Germans and other Europeans from Spain, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia, most of them skilled workers, got along with each other well. All of them seemed to regard Turks, who generally were unskilled and whose different religion had many implications for their dress and behavior, as outsiders. The most vivid and probably honest expression of this current was graffiti in the bathrooms, which almost exclusively depicted tensions between Turkish and German workers.

4See, for example, "Marlene's Street of Dreams? To the Barricades!" New York Times, 16 Dec. 1996: CF 258. Just as Times correspondent Alan Cowell did, many observers even within Germany interpret this occasional appearance of a very strong patriotism among this generation of Germans as an indicator for the survival of Nazi attitudes. Given what we have seen in this dissertation this view probably oversimplifies the rather complex adaptation process that took place within young Germans after the war. The curiosity and desire of so many to break out of the Nazi imposed isolation certainly documents a widespread search for new ideas. To expect young people to throw all of their sentiments overboard, especially regarding the sacrifices they had made and witnessed during the war, would be as unrealistic as maintaining that most of them refused to change at all.
occupation but also in instilling democratic convictions in the Federal Republic's young constituents is almost impossible to answer, but five decades later there are some indicators that Americans helped West Germany's citizens on their way towards changing fundamental attitudes. Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, one of Germany's most prominent politicians after the war, had been among the first young Germans who had travelled to the United States. Many years after her journey she stated that

Unlike a constitution, one cannot develop a democratic culture on the drawing-board, proclaim it, and promulgate it. It is something like an inner constitution—which takes shape from unconscious, possibly subconscious, historical preconditions and vibrations of a community [Gemeinwesen] and determines the political climate\textsuperscript{5}.

If she is correct, there is good reason to believe that the American presence and American re-education programs did contribute to changes in the shape of that inner constitution of many young Germans in the American zone. Since large numbers of them took advantage of American offers to widen their horizons or simply experience a different way of dealing with each other, the exposure to American behavior and programs provided them with food for thought and new perspectives. These experiences could serve as building blocks for changing young people's outlook on their own lives, on the world around them, and also on their political convictions. It seemed that Senator William Fulbright had

\textsuperscript{5}Quoted in Eckart 3.
assessed the situation correctly: American ideas and society had something to offer for many people. If others had the chance to observe American society first hand, they would come to understand the United States but also the very principles of a democratic society better and might cast their lots with the western world.

Those who expected young Germans to completely adopt and copy American society and institutions certainly went home disappointed. An Americanization of this generation and those which followed never took place. This undoubtedly disappointed many Americans and led to the conclusion that American policy had failed. For the same reason it must have delighted the older Germans who remained on the watch against this kind of foreign influence. Even those who went to the United States or harbored a positive attitude towards the occupiers, maintained some reservations. In fact, most young Germans probably did not become enthusiastic fans of the United States. They often remained critical observers of American policy and American institutions. This did not mean, however, that the re-education mission had not succeeded. The very process of choosing, criticizing, arriving at one's own conclusions, and expressing them freely are strong indicators for the presence of a truly democratic thought process. Many of the young Germans who had spent some time in the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s assumed leadership positions in political parties on
the federal, state, and local levels, in the trade unions, in schools, in higher education, and in administrations. Having been overseas at that time opened doors because it provided an experience which was apparently much in demand. This generation took over the political reins from those who had still known Weimar. It helped to manage the economic and political crises of the 1970s and 1980s and successfully negotiated the re-unification of Germany at the end of the Cold War without giving up the country's integration into the West.

Many of their younger brothers and sisters also demonstrated an unequivocal commitment to democracy. The students of West Berlin's Free University, the very symbol of a joint American and German commitment to American ideas and ideals, assumed the leadership in the student protests of the 1960s. Those who took to the streets to demonstrate for education reform, but also against the Shah of Persia or America's war in Vietnam, were not directed by any government, but did so defying their representatives' wishes. The demonstrators had internalized American values. They used democratic means to protest against a policy which must have struck many as going against the very grain of American culture and the rhetoric with which they had grown up. The behavior of both generations over the last forty years is probably the clearest indicator for the success of American reorientation efforts among them between 1945 and 1955.
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