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Plato's Republics: A Dramatic Interpretation of the Early Cities in Plato's "Republic"

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PLATO'S REPUBLICS: A DRAMATIC INTERPRETATION OF THE EARLY CITIES IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by

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To my wife and our girls

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	iii
Abstract	v
Introduction	1
Chapter One. The Titan’s Burden	47
Chapter Two. A Place for Justice	82
Chapter Three. The Taming of the Warriors	150
Chapter Four. The Guardians and “The Guardians”	229
Conclusion	292
Works Cited	298
Vita.....	301

ABSTRACT

This dissertation will demonstrate a new methodological approach to reading Plato's *Republic*. I develop and apply a dramatic, dynamic hermeneutic to Book II and part of Book III in the text. This method holds that each speech is the product of a preceding agreement or disagreement between two speakers. Agreements lead to the argument's advancement and disagreements result in a regression to a previous agreement from which to restart the exchange. The focus section is largely on the early exchange Socrates has with Adeimantus. I argue that Socrates is an unwilling participant in the famous discussion on the meaning and value of justice and injustice. This makes the text's argument a struggle for him to be freed of the several challenges he receives. Among several things, what makes the position of Socrates so difficult is that he must satisfy the demands of so many interlocutors concerning justice and that he must address a series of hostile fictional challengers that the sons of Ariston array against him in their opening speeches. He cannot directly speak to the brothers about their personal beliefs on justice and injustice but must blame the opinions of those that they report from non-present sources. Hence, he proposes a roundabout method to praise justice: constructing a city in speech and then examining the soul. The result is that he and Adeimantus go through a series of stateless cities before settling on the true city. The true city is rejected by Glaucon because he is disgusted with its living standards and desires to see affluence reconciled with the praise of justice. The institutionalization of the principle of excess leads to the genesis of the state, or the regime, in the guardians. These guardians shift the focus from the polis to the state and the guardian's proper education and rearing, lengthening the argument again. The main struggle between Socrates and Adeimantus is over opposing conceptions of the guardians under the guise of their

moral education: will they be selfless warriors or oligarchic lords? In the end Socrates gets Adeimantus to concede to his vision for them.

INTRODUCTION

I.1. Plato the Sage

The very name “Plato” seems to elicit something rather than nothing in the minds of most. Couple this name with that of another Greek “Socrates” and the association and opinion becomes a little more defined. To normal people the Plato of popular culture is something of a sage seen through his most famous protagonist and dear teacher, Socrates. Known mostly by clichés excerpted from some dramatic moments in his works, “the unexamined life is not worth living”, or by a variety of real or apocryphal Socratic quotes loosely related to Stoicism and self-help exhortations for young men, or for the memorable image of the cave that is seen to illustrate the painful process and high reward of learning, this Plato occupies the cultural mind as someone with insightful or poetic advice on the topic of self-overcoming. This makes sense since the main users of these forms of Platonic cultural engagement, certain social media websites and the audience of college credit classes, are overwhelmingly young people. Plato has written his dramas in such a lively fashion to be relied on as an acceptable pedagogical device for exhorting the young in our society. Is there a higher tribute he could have paid Socrates? Is there a stronger indictment on us?

Over time our acquaintance with Plato fades into the haze of half-forgotten things from previous parts of our lives related to drudgery or youthful curiosities. Even for those privileged enough to lead a relatively consistent life of the mind, Plato is often reduced to one’s personal familiarity with the Socrates he is so often associated. But if one were to open the pages of the *Republic* again and experience the full energy and wit of the drama, and witness the stunning contradictions placed into the very mouth of Socrates, one would be hearing Plato inviting this reader to take up the search after some of life’s most important questions to read it again.

I.2. The Use or Abuse of Plato

The above is about one way Plato affects us, and by “us” I mean normal people leading everyday lives. There is a group of people who relate to Plato in a more consistent way. This group is privileged enough to lead the life of the mind in academia. These people give their careers, or a substantial amount of their productive energies, to carefully study Plato’s works. While this is obviously admirable, even here Plato still stands distinguished in comparison to most other major thinkers by the type of relation he and his works have to most of his contemporary students. The English language literature on Plato is immense. There is likely no way anyone could closely read all of it in a career even if one contained himself to reputable academic journals and presses. Plato is also one of the few productive ancient authors who we believe to have surviving copies of his major works.¹ Fortunate as this is, there is a noticeable trend among contemporary Platonic scholars to reject this tradition. This could be accepted from adherents of rival philosophical schools, but to come from a relatively small circle of specialists dedicated to the study and translation of Plato is bewildering to the newcomer. What do I mean by the scholarly rejection of the Platonic corpus? This treatment appears in three major forms from greater to lesser intensity.

The first type of textual abuse is, to me, the most egregious. This consists of the complete alteration or rearranging of the critical edition of the text. Alteration of the text is a translator’s or scholar’s way of saying something like this: “Plato did not, or could not, have written this in such a way”. These corrections are done for the reasons of assisting Plato as an author, to make the text “make more sense” logically or to help him to clarify an important argument and take it

¹ Strauss, *The City and Man*. The University of Chicago Press. 1964, 55; Laertius, Diogenes. *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers: Compact Edition*. Oxford University Press, 2020, 3.50-51.

out of tension with something he said earlier in the same work.² This is essentially the same thing as altering good data you receive in an experiment to make the interpretation process easier. Little consideration should be placed on those that engage in this practice since they have causality greatly confused. They are not concerned about whatever their respective subject matter will reveal to them to the point they believe they can draw scientific conclusions about a different subject matter that is created by the introduction of their own artifice. This is then asserted to be the original. There is an extreme mistaking the previously viable content with one's partly finished product that is laden with analytical presuppositions.

The second form of textual abuse is not as extreme but still severe. This is that of omission. This is mostly a translator's error that operates on the premise that it accepts the text but makes small yet substantive stylistic changes to the dialogue when rendering them into a different language. Complete omission would consist of instances of leaving out the responses of interlocutors for the sake of the reader's excitement. Partial omission could be either altering the form of the interlocutor's response from third person report of a narrator to first person or changing the words from a literal to a current idiom.³ The most prominent kind of partial omission is that of intentionally not giving a literal rendering of a dialogue.⁴ Omission differs from alteration in that it does accept the reality of the given text, however satisfactory or

² Schofield, Malcolm. "A Displacement in the Text of the Cratylus." *The Classical Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (1972): 246-253.; Cooper, John M., and Douglas S. Hutchinson, eds. *Plato: Complete Works*. Hackett Publishing, 1997. p. 103.

³ Something that the admirable and reliable Shorey often lapses into in his translation even when the Greek portion his interlinear text has the correct reported response of third person rather than the performed response of first person. For example, see Shorey, Paul. *The Republic: Volume 1 Books I-V*. Harvard University Press. 1978, 222-223. For the performed-narrated distinction see Strauss, *The City and Man*. The University of Chicago Press. 1964, 58.

⁴ Cooper, John M., and Douglas S. Hutchinson, eds. *Plato: Complete Works*. Hackett Publishing, 1997. p. xxvi.

unsatisfactory it is deemed, but those practicing it decide from personal shortcomings or for literary concerns to alter what has been preserved over millennia. It overlays the text with a much different text.

In addition to the existing language barrier the translator places himself between Plato and the modern reader. The practice of this kind of translator confuses the knowledge of ancient Greek for the knowledge of what Plato meant to convey using that medium. To notably change the text due to pedagogical or stylistic reasons assumes one possesses a complete grasp of what Plato used the language for.⁵ The noble desire of translation to make authors like Plato accessible to those without his language would be lost as well. Plato cannot be met in late 20th century or early 21st century colloquialisms and stylistic omissions.

⁵ Every translation involves a judgment call on the part of the translator using all available methods, personal knowledge of the context and even the author if there is reliable biographical information available, to render a text from one language to another. This objection concerns those who might have the ability and the information at their disposal yet make the choice to prioritize not accuracy in their translation but wider accessibility. "Every translator is plagued by this problem of reconciling accuracy with readability, and the translator of the *Laws* is plagued to an unusual degree. Here I can only record my attempted solution. My aim has been a simple plain clarity, and I have stuck as closely to the Greek as seemed consistent with this ideal. *A number of colloquialisms have been admitted as a spice*, but I have not gone out of my way to seek them." Saunders, Trevor J., ed. *The Laws*. Penguin, 1970, 39-40. (Italics added). Also, "The translator must perforce go to some trouble to present and interpret his modern readership. He must, to put it crudely, be a showman." (19) And, "Nor is it even difficult to vary one's style take account of the tone of particular passage. For instance, I found that it was the least of my problems to write informal and colloquial English when the dialogue demands it." (22) Lastly, to the objection that Saunders' translations are "louder than the originals", he replies, "the rebuke is just. I confess the fault, and boast of it. A cardinal principle of translation is involved. The style of a version must, it is true, be determined partly by the nature and purpose of the original text; but it must be determined also by the current status of the characteristics of the intended readers." (23-34) He calls this method "overtranslation". Saunders, Trevor J. "The Penguinification of Plato." *Greece & Rome* 22, no. 1 (1975): 19-28. For a scholarly critique of this method and attempt to give a consistently accurate rendering see, Pangle, Thomas L., ed. *The Laws of Plato*. University of Chicago Press, 1988, x-xii.

The last form of abuse is the lightest but still intriguing to someone who views this scene with new eyes. Here we have mostly interpreters rejecting the meaning of a given passage, section, or entire part of a dialogue. This is done because of a dissatisfaction of the reader with a Platonic protagonist to properly anticipate contemporary philosophical ability, scholarly expectations, or moral sensibilities.⁶ Examples from the two most influential English language academic books on Plato should suffice to illustrate this most common type of rejection.

Julia Annas has the following to say about Book X of the *Republic*: “All the same, we are driven by the peculiarities of Book 10 to see it as an excrescence.”⁷ The serious meaning of the last book of Plato’s greatest work is rejected because it does not fit into her interpretation.⁸ For the same reason Annas also judges that Plato failed to make his first city, that which he has Socrates call the true city, pertinent to his main argument. Gregory Vlastos, the most influential and cited Plato scholar of the past several decades, has the opposite opinion of the *Republic* from Annas. He concludes based on tradition and from a strict analysis of the content of all the dialogues that Book I of the *Republic* is a separate, or “early” dialogue that gives a faithful depiction of the historical Socrates employing his elenctic method while Books II-X are “middle” period additions upon its dramatic setting.⁹ In support of this finding Dr. Vlastos offers us the diagnosis that the only possible way the teachings in each of these now sundered works

⁶ McDavid, Brennan. "On Why the City of Pigs and Clocks Are Not Just." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 57, no. 4 (2019): 571-593, 579; (78).

⁷ Annas, Julia. *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*. Oxford University Press. 1981, 335.

⁸ This is strange since she seems to have a different opinion on Book X at the beginning of her monograph. (70). The change of heart on this mystifying section of the text likely occurred somewhere in the meantime.

⁹ The logical problems with this method should be evident even to people who are not analytically trained. The categories are explained by the content. The content then becomes explained by their categories.

could share the same philosophical space is if this mind was plagued by schizophrenia.¹⁰ This type of treatment is better than those above in that it accepts the text as given, and even given literally, but rejects that some parts can have any meaning in relation to the whole.¹¹ As mentioned above this is done on the basis of Plato not adhering to a presupposed conceptual problematic or a formal scheme.

I.3. Approaches to Plato

Indeed, these two things, certain conceptual problematizations of the text and what is called in the literature “developmentalism” which claims to know the dialogue’s compositional chronology based on stylometric criteria, are the major tools of modern methodological approaches to interpreting Plato.¹² Ultimately, these assumptions, along with those below, rest on the belief that since Plato is a philosopher there is a body of rational content, some Platonic doctrine, embedded in his dramas. These impositions are also some of the primary methods of obfuscation that impede the type of encounter I believe Plato wishes the reader to have with him through his texts. I will attempt to demonstrate this claim in this dissertation. The following methods of interpretation are different in kind from the above discussion on the abuses of Plato since they are seriously concerned about divining the meaning of the given text. Rather than a

¹⁰ Vlastos, Gregory. *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*. Cornell University Press. 1991, 46, 248-251. Hence Vlastos is forced to separate their compositional chronology.

¹¹ In fact, many of these types of analyses, especially Vlastos’, admirably make a strong use (to the point of overuse) of the Greek in an attempt to stay as close as possible to the original medium.

¹² Debra Nails believes that developmentalism and the belief that Socrates was a moral philosopher relative to the dogmatic metaphysician Plato are “the orthodoxy of Anglo-American Platonic Studies”. (273). She is undoubtedly right about the first point. But clearly the second doctrine, the belief that one can use the Platonic dialogues to distinguish between the historical Plato and Socrates, is largely derived from the former.

rejection of the text or its meaning we are given interpretative principles that ultimately accept both aspects. There is an attempt to give a positive account of what a dialogue means.

Because of the status and age of the *Republic* the literature on it is enormous. Many thinkers from all time periods since its creation have interacted with it. To have a literature review that includes a comprehensive sweep of what classical commentators from the history of thought have said about it would be its own monograph, or multiple ones. This literature review is limited to Platonic scholarship, specifically that on the *Republic*, within living memory in the English-speaking world. The major modern interpreters will be covered for the sake of space but also to illustrate the claims about the state of the scholarship made above. This will also allow me to position my own contribution to the scholarship in a very clear manner. The classical interpreters like Aristotle and Xenophon do not completely disappear in the literature review. They are simply absorbed into the various conceptual impositions on the Platonic text by both orthodox and heterodox methodologies.¹³

Why is this the case? When the dramatic glow and poetic intoxication of Plato's writings wear off, an unsettling question persistently confronts the close reader: what is he talking about? Looking back on what has just been read with this newly achieved sobriety, the content and the sequence of its presentation become bewildering. This causes those interpreters who do not fancy abandoning Plato to the pulls of life or the simplicity of ideological reduction to cast about for makeshift hermeneutical tools for relief. One of these tools is to employ the authority of a close contemporary to graciously give them the answers. And so, Plato is seen through a modern interpretation of a classical writer or a contemporary of his.

¹³ Another popular form of historical support is the so-called Platonic *Letters*. Voegelin's interpretation relies heavily upon them.

I have tried to arrange my findings into three general categories, or genera of methods, that each contain multiple species. The three methodological genera are literal, ironic, and dramatic. The ordering principle of this schema is an approach's relative emphasis on a contextless rendering of the dialogue's verbal content all the way to a deemphasis on its verbal content relative to the action, and many positions in between. Depending on which part of the text gets interpretative priority in Plato, mixed with the personal convictions of the reader, so goes their conclusions.

For instance, if one is under the impression that Plato through Socrates says that a government in the ideal city will need a state-administered eugenics program for the elite warrior class and the rule of philosophers, then it would be simple to conclude that this is what the historical person of Plato really believed. Likewise, if one thought that the whole city-building exercise of the *Republic* is clearly an institutional pretext to examine more fundamental questions, like that of justice, happiness, and consciousness, then one might not be so inclined to classify Plato as a totalitarian zealot. Instead, one would see "Plato" through Socrates his beloved teacher attempting to impart something deeper than a political program. Lastly, if one were to not assume Plato speaks directly through any character at all since *all* the words of all the characters in his fictional dramas are his creations, one would look for more direct authorial clues like title, setting, or dramatic action that signify the intended meaning.

I.3.1. Literal Interpretations

The literal approach to Plato is to place interpretive emphasis on the verbally affirmed content in a dialogue by a protagonist. Since these readers all acknowledge that Plato is responsible for the composition of all the characters, they make the distinction between Plato and opposing views by adopting the spokesman, or mouthpiece theory. This holds that we can know

what Plato thinks or is communicating to the reader indirectly through the drama's main protagonist. This is often Socrates, although not exclusively. It appears that this approach, as well as the subsequent ironic one, are products of the reader self-inserting into the dramatic context as one of the (mostly) Socratic interlocutors or auditors who are respectfully or incredulously listening to the great man discourse on the most important human things.¹⁴ The way these types of readers understand Plato is to transform him into his protagonist and engage with him indirectly through commentary. One could not imagine the same operations being seriously considered for an analysis a film, for instance. For personal reasons disbelief has been suspended. What greater honor could a writer wish for?

1.3.1.1. Manifesto

Karl Popper was no stranger to controversy in his life. It is clear that he was man of deep convictions, one of the deepest being his consternation at the failure of others to accept that he was right about the topics he chose to discourse on. To classify *The Open Society and Its Enemies* as a polemic would be both an insult to books like Nietzsche's outbursts in *The Genealogy of Morals* which bears the subtitle "A Polemic", but fitting if the genre of sectarian religious polemics is meant by the term. The writing, language, and force of elocution of this book's first volume are of an intensity that have yet to be matched, much less surpassed, in the Platonic literature. It reads as a desperate attack on an unassailable enemy, like the last public

¹⁴ Popper makes this extremely clear of this when he gives a tortured summary of the passage that defines political justice in Book IV of the *Republic* while taking the dramatic position of Glaucon. Popper's dissatisfaction with the exchange and answer to Glaucon produces the conclusion that Plato is just full of rhetoric and is not scientifically or philosophically serious. Popper, Karl. *The Open Society and Its Enemies: Volume I: The Spell of Plato*. Princeton University Press. 1963, p. 98-99. Hereafter I will refer to this specific volume of the work as *The Open Society*.

words afforded to a condemned man by a sentencing judge. The foreword and then the body of the book make it clear that Popper saw his work here as his contribution to the wartime efforts against the Germans.¹⁵

Why does this matter? Because Popper lent his considerable weight as a philosopher of science to influence the interpretation of Plato. It does not appear he was very successful among academics or the laity, but more so among the educated laity and chattering cultural classes of the time. And while Popper appears to have lost his influence in a positive way among many of Plato's post WWII interpreters this community has seen his stunning two volume effort as worthy of both explicit and implicit response.¹⁶ The major exception to this generalization is Martha Nussbaum, a prominent moral philosopher, who states that Plato's *Republic* "is really making serious political proposals...They were understood as such by his contemporaries, and attacked as such by his greatest pupil, Aristotle...Plato's proposals constitute a living and deadly assault on democracy; it is correct to take that assault at its face value...So Popper is right: Plato

¹⁵ "It [the harsh tone of the book] springs rather from my conviction that, if our civilization is to survive, we must break with the habit of deference to great men." (vii), and "the final decision to write it was made in March 1938, on the day I received the news of the invasion of Austria." (viii). The nadir of the Bolshevik terror in Russia had largely passed by this time and a conventionally accepted regime had become entrenched. He retroactively claims that it was meant to be a critique of communists as well, but insinuations of racism and accusations of totalitarianism fly fast and frequently throughout this volume. This makes sense since the Soviets were wartime allies.

¹⁶ The book has over fifteen thousand citations on Google Scholar, a massive number for any philosophy work. In comparison and using the same metric, the most famous and influential scholarly work on Plato post-WWII is Vlastos' *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, having just over two thousand. The two most sophisticated interpreters of the *Republic* in this timeframe, Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, feel compelled to address the Popper issue. Strauss with his characteristically indirect way in *Liberalism: Ancient and Modern* in a chapter titled "The Liberalism of Classical Political Philosophy" takes a literal positivist interpreter as his interlocutor. In the volume of *Order and History* that contains his interpretation of the *Republic*, Voegelin repeatedly condemns in the argument and footnotes the "anti-Plato" scholarship that has arisen and the approach that takes the text literally. These will be covered in greater detail below.

is our enemy, and Plato is to be feared.”¹⁷ The only major point of difference she has with Popper is that she manages to see Plato as more than some type of aristocratic ideologist given to writing manifestos in dramatic form but a serious philosopher with a sophisticated account of human moral psychology.¹⁸

The literal approach taken by Popper is a mixture of developmentalism, linking Plato’s dialogues to other pre-Socratic writers, reliance on the Platonic letters, biographical information, psychological speculation, and the righteous assurance afforded by ideology.¹⁹ It is untroubled by the facts that Plato never speaks to us directly in his dialogues or by the parts of the text where Socrates seems to repeatedly indicate that he did not want to engage in conversation during the festival of Bendis or with the many times Socrates says or indicates that the city might not be real.²⁰ The effect of this hermeneutic is to reduce Plato to some type of proto-totalitarian

¹⁷ Martha, Nussbaum, *Plato’s Republic: The Good Society and the Deformation of Desire*, 1998, 10.

¹⁸ Ibid, 11. This is another way of saying that her analysis will deemphasize the political and social elements of the city-soul analogy to emphasize the clear psychological themes that are often overlooked. Her understanding of Plato is that he was one of the first philosophers to link structural considerations to the psyche. Since the *Republic* places democracy within the defective list of regimes Nussbaum takes this as an attack on the virtue of modern democrats (i.e., herself) and democracy.

¹⁹ Ibid. On the assumed developmentalism see pg. 39, 190-196, 208 n. 5, 306-312. “Plato, his [Socrates’] most gifted disciple, was soon to prove the least faithful. He betrayed Socrates, just as his uncles had done tried to implicate him in their terrorist action, but they did not succeed since he resisted...I cannot doubt the fact of Plato’s betrayal, for that his use of Socrates as the main speaker of the *Republic* was the most successful attempt to implicate him.” (194-195). These conclusions are based on making the distinction between the Socrates of the *Republic* from the Socrates of the *Apology*, both of which are written by Plato. On the use of the *Seventh Letter* see pg. 19, 208 n. 5. It is listed under the section of the text labeled “Index of Platonic Passages”, pg. 338.

²⁰ Bloom, Allan. *The Republic of Plato*. Basic Books. 1991. All my Stephanus page citations and quotes for the *Republic* refers to this second edition of Bloom’s translation, unless otherwise noted. I will use Shorey’s translation to supplement and contrast periodically, yet the Stephanus pagination for the two are not always identical between sub-sections. I will cover the dramatic principle of unwillingness below in the discussion of my method. For the stated or insinuated fictionality of the city’s regime see, (369a), (443c), (473a-b), (540b), (592a-b).

(i.e., fascist) thinker who, by the power or beauty of his writing was able to enchant generation after generation of readers with a historicist form of thought that after several millennia was finally brought to fruition in the early 20th century. One of the only people Plato's spell did not work on is Popper.²¹

The main reason Plato was unsuccessful is due to the function he serves for Popper. In Plato, Popper sees an arch philosophical "historicist", one who can be understood to believe that social organization and history have a rationally determined scheme gained from a conditioning teleology (i.e., is deterministic) that is only known to a few who must employ this knowledge for a collective good.²² Taking his aristocratic upbringing and its disdain of democratic pretension, some passages in the Seventh Letter, and linking Plato to literal readings of Heraclitan fragments, Popper senses in Plato the deeply reactionary figure, similar to contemporary political figures.²³ Subsequent readings of the *Laws* and the *Republic* only serve to confirm his hunch.

Once this person is made into the foe that Popper requires, he proceeds to take Plato to task by interpreting his social and political thought to be characterized by a deep instinct to retard any type of social change and to freeze human existence at some previous golden age.²⁴ This program is given a metaphysical basis in the Theory of the Forms. The social order that is based on the historicist form is the "closed society", the antithesis of the open society, in which the warriors in a tribal patriarchy rule the people. This society is non-scientific and characterized by

²¹ Popper, *Open Society*, 8, 87-88. Volume One is called "The Spell of Plato".

²² Ibid, 7-9, 40, 75.

²³ Ibid., 11-16, 18-21, 24, 70, 104.

²⁴ Ibid., 19, 74, 103. "The idealist formula is: *Arrest all political change!* Change is evil, rest is divine." (86. Italic Popper's).

a deeply mystical perspective on reality.²⁵ Popper takes a passage from the *Seventh Letter* about an experienced “giddiness” regarding the rate of political change in Plato’s youth as the motivating psychological reason for his metaphysical reaction (i.e., The Forms) and his closed (i.e., totalitarian) political program.²⁶

In case the intensely personal and polemical nature of this interpretation has not made clear enough, Popper goes so far to locate, in classical Athens, the beginnings of a social revolution, the flowerings of a fundamentally different mode of social existence, a humanitarian open society based on individualism and liberal humanism which shocked Plato’s aristocratic biases and psyche so thoroughly that he became its sworn enemy. In the Athens of antiquity Popper can make out the beginnings of liberal democracy, as he defines it, in the classical figures of Pericles and Lycophron.²⁷ We again see that Popper has managed to read the past into the present. The battle lines between the historical forces of good and evil are drawn and have ever been drawn.

With his reduction having now reached a satisfactory condition, Popper then interprets Plato’s political project as a grand attempt to bring himself psychological solace. The closed

²⁵ Ibid., 20-21, 37, 39-41, 86-87, 202 n. The confusion between a proximate tribal group that is martially organized and the Spartan regime with extreme social stratification and an individuated state should also serve to illustrate that this “closed society” association is made meaningful for Popper due to a personal necessity and not analytical clarity or serious anthropological research. For his association of this with Sparta, see *ibid.*, 41, 108, 177, 198.

²⁶ Ibid, 19, 37, 103-104, 109, 218-219 n. 3. “I wish to make it clear that I believe in the sincerity of Plato’s totalitarianism. His demand for the unchallenged domination of one class over the rest is uncompromising...”. Ibid, 108.

²⁷ Ibid, For the democratic protagonists in Popper’s narrative see Pericles see p. 95-96, 102 and for Lycophron see p. 114-117. It is also interesting that Popper accuses Plato of not dealing with the “democratic” egalitarian theory of the state, something he clearly does in Glaucon’s opening speech in Book II of the *Republic*, only to later admit that it is covered by Plato but in a way that does not make the proper moral alignment with the understanding of individualism that Popper demands. Ibid, 93-94.

society is proposed to stop the giddiness he feels at the flux in political affairs by the creation of some unchanging social organization based uncritically on some immutable metaphysical standard. Because this is Plato's motivating desire it is easy for Popper to then look at his two longest works, and especially at the *Republic* with its passages about philosopher-kings and state administered eugenic programs, as laying out very serious political proposals.²⁸ Plato the anti-democratic ideologue has been able to accomplish this program by associating the individual with vice and self-interest and the collective with virtue and goodness through the repurposing of our innate humanitarian instincts for a personal end and to 20th century historical catastrophe.²⁹

One would think that an easier way of demonstrating the connection between communist or fascist thought to Platonism would be to cite the influence of Plato on the intellectual leaders of either movement.³⁰ Popper does not seem to think this is possible. Therefore, fascism and communism are linked to Plato quite indirectly, by a very long chain of forefathers in whom Popper senses an adherence to this historicist form of philosophy that carries within it the peril of the closed society. Plato is related to fascism and communism through Aristotle and then Hegel.³¹ If this very mediated form of association is enough to make Plato the philosopher-king of totalitarianism several millennia after he wrote, coupled with the generally accepted opinion that the *Republic* and the *Laws* were highly influential texts in multiple intellectual traditions, one begins to wonder what he is not politically responsible for in some way. It becomes more

²⁸ Curiously, Popper associates the group marriage scheme in Book V with the democratic Pericles, Plato's elder. See Ibid, 266 n. 64.

²⁹ Ibid, 109, 119. As Popper makes clear, Plato's sleight of hand is to permanently associate altruism with collectivism and egoism with individualism. Popper believes this is fallacious and that one can be an individualistic altruist. Ibid, 100-101. See the discussion of humanitarianism below.

³⁰ Popper identifies Marx and Gobineau as examples of thought leaders of either movement. Ibid, 9, 203 n. 4.

³¹ Ibid, 10, 203n4. This is the introductory subject of Volume II.

evident that the Plato of *The Open Society* is the methodologically reduced opponent of Karl Popper from the paradoxes that color the second half of the first volume. I will only mention three as proof of this claim.

Popper accuses Plato of methodological essentialism, which is “to reveal essences and to describe them by means of definitions...”, and by the swear word “essence” the science of philosopher Popper means “hidden reality”.³² Once this unobservable reality, or the being, of an entity is defined, a truth claim about it is permitted. This implies that there is some immutable reality behind the change we experience that is rationally ascertainable and communicable. Essentialism is contrasted to what Popper calls methodological nominalism, which he identifies with.³³ This method does not bother asking essentialist questions about things but rather aims to describe their instrumentality according to universal laws.

The reason why Popper favors the latter approach to science rather than the former is that it understands politics in terms of tangible demands.³⁴ Before proceeding to the demands placed upon the undefined entities and offering an argument for not giving an account of the “what” before the “how” of the undefined thing, Popper does not mince words: “he [the nominalist] will reply [to the essentialists], if at all, by pointing out that he much prefers that modest degree of exactness which he can achieve by his methods to the pretentious muddle which they have achieved by theirs.”³⁵ As to what degree of scientific exactness can be achieved by a method that proceeds to talk about the behavior of a thing without telling the reader what that thing is Popper does not say in this work. Instead, he shows us how this method is employed.

³² Ibid. 31-32.

³³ Ibid, 32.

³⁴ Ibid, 109, 112, 121.

³⁵ Ibid, 32.

This means that Popper is comfortable with the practice of assuming that what he is referring to is known and just discussing the practical implications, descriptive or normative, of this entity. This is done to distinguish him from the Platonists and sophistic essentialists who want to quarrel and stupefy their reader with words to conceal their own ignorance, fear, or nefarious designs. However, Popper seems to abandon this nominalism when he deals with two closely related things near to his project: morality and state form. Here we see how methodological nominalism operates. After rejecting the essentialist approach to political philosophy in multiple places, Popper proceeds lay out a political program he calls “protectionism”. Protectionism is characterized by the demand to protect the weak from the aggression of the strong by state limitations of the freedom of individuals.³⁶ In addition to this Popper is also comfortable with more than preventative public policy, for “Liberalism and state-interference are not opposed to each other. On the contrary, any kind of freedom is clearly impossible unless it is guaranteed by the state.”³⁷ Popper then goes on to say that a “certain amount of state control in education...is necessary, if the young are to be protected from a neglect which would make them unable to defend their freedom.”³⁸ This is an indirect way of saying that the state should indoctrinate the youth to be good liberal democrats as a form of domestically consolidating its regime.³⁹ They are able to do this because of the normative consequences of failing to do so.

³⁶ Ibid. 109-113, 115.

³⁷ Ibid, 111. Again, on the same page he says, “For there is no freedom that is not secured by the state...”

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Popper qualifies this statement by saying too much state control would be indoctrination. A protectionist state having a compulsory education system that presumably teaches children how to “defend their freedom” does not seem to qualify as so for Popper.

Put another way, Popper believes his moral principles hold that the individual should be forced by the state to sacrifice for a collective good, in this case as he explicitly states, the good of the many and weak. Here we see that what constitutes the concepts he uses nominally, “state”, “freedom”, and the assumed “rational” good of such policy, are not made clear but known as types of elemental social powers, of these things that must produce a predetermined social effect. This leads us to another paradox of Popperian political theory. Popper accused Plato of being a collectivist utilitarian in his political thought willing to sacrifice and denigrate the good of the individual to that of a closed, hierarchical collective.⁴⁰ However, as we have seen above, what else would Popper base these demands upon the state other than his humanitarian theory of justice? This ethical theory makes three demands: the elimination of natural privileges, the primacy of the individual, the protection of the individual by the state.⁴¹ Popper calls this theory “humanitarianism” because he believes it to be innate to humanity.⁴² I suppose Popper would not be satisfied with state upholding these principles only for a certain group of people within the state at the expense of others and that these are meant to be generally applicable to everyone within a protectionist state. We have again the state being commissioned by some type of ethical version of the good to behave in such a way to bring about a given social result or consequence.

Plato is the deep reactionary that wants to return to a mythical golden age of the closed tribe from a fear of democratic development in Greek politics. To this end he proposes a totalitarian state that does not value the freedom of the individual. From this preliminary sketch of his political theory Popper sounds very similar to the European social democratic orthodoxy

⁴⁰ Ibid, 107-108, 138.

⁴¹ Ibid, 94.

⁴² Ibid, 263 n. 54.

that was in danger of being swallowed up on the Continent by the Germans and the Soviets.⁴³

Would Popper's ethical principles and political philosophy allow there to be any acceptable change? Obviously social evolution is not allowed to become totalitarian for Popper, but he does indicate that he would be comfortable with what he calls "the engineering control of international crime" by extending the methods of protectionism "to international crime and in international conflict...".⁴⁴ This is a euphemistic way of saying that Popper wants a one world federation of protectionist states or at least the superintendence of protectionist states into the domestic affairs every country. Popper wants liberal imperialism and dismisses anyone who would dream of calling his proposal "utopian" as historically unaware since these same executive controls on violence that are so successful domestically were ridiculed similarly before they were put in place.⁴⁵ It seems since Popper has a system and he either wants it in medium or very large quantities. It must apply to everyone. Is this something that even Plato at his most crude and literal demanded through any of his protagonists?

There is claim upon claim by Popper that he is holding and exercising the true mantle of science and rationality: what we read in his text are the conclusions of reason based on a universal laws and empirical observation. They are abrasive in their delivery, but nonetheless pure in content. Upon retrospect in 1950 Popper believes his book was critical and even hopeful and that he was struck "by the strong feeling of optimism that pervades the whole book".⁴⁶ One cannot help but leave this grand opening statement on the meaning and value of Plato for the

⁴³ This would not be surprising since he was born in Austria and lived in New Zealand while writing *The Open Society*.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 113.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid, ix.

post WWII West with the admonition of Strauss about the tendency for axiological self-deception in positivistic methodology.⁴⁷ No Plato can be encountered here.

1.3.1.2. Reformation

The other major species of literal Plato interpretation is that of reformation. These readers are more sympathetic to Plato and do not hold him responsible for the atrocities of 20th century political regimes. Instead, they read him as a philosophic reformer that was making a serious effort to connect thought and practice, philosophy and politics. Their relatively charitable treatment of Plato does not mean they are right in their rendering of the text. The main virtue of this species is that their literal assumption coupled with a respect allow them to be open-minded and attempt to give a respectable summary of the text in the order it presents itself.⁴⁸ The primary example of this interpretation will be Stanley Rosen's commentary on the *Republic* because of its breadth and thoughtfulness.

Rosen problematizes the *Republic* as Plato's attempt to solve the antinomic forces of philosophy and poetry in the soul of the highly erotic man.⁴⁹ This dialogue becomes an autobiographical tale of Plato's self-overcoming, of leaving behind the poet he was previously and becoming the philosopher Socrates inspired him to be according to legend.⁵⁰ The authentic

⁴⁷ Strauss, "What is Political Philosophy?", p. 349.

⁴⁸ Examples of this method are Rosen, Stanley. *Plato's Republic: a study*. Yale University Press, 2008; the classical commentary of Cross-Woozley. *Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Interpretation*. St. Martin's Press Inc. 1964; Pappas, Nickolas. *Routledge philosophy guidebook to Plato and the Republic*. Routledge, 2004; and Trepanier, Lee. "Socrates' Homer in the *Republic*: Retaining the Poetic Past and Preparing for the Philosophic Future". *Expositions* 11.1 (2017): 79-100.

⁴⁹ This is assumed both from the many places poetry's relationship to philosophy is brought up within the work and by some quotations of Nietzsche illustrating this spiritual struggle in these types of souls. Rosen, *Plato's Republic*, 4.

⁵⁰ Laertius, Diogenes. *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers: Compact Edition*. Oxford University Press, 2020, 3.5.

actualization of philosophy requires a radical proposal delivered through his trusty mouthpiece Socrates that details a series of literal political reforms to the polis to make this personal adjustment. The major objection to this classification is that this sounds more ironic because Rosen's proposed psychological meaning behind the narrative. While this is applicable in Rosen's case, here he believes that the effect of each element, Plato's personal reasons for the dialogue and the famous proposals he makes through Socrates in certain parts of it, result in a very literal reading. Writing to respectfully separate himself from the Straussian tradition he was affiliated with, Rosen says, "The revolutionary nature of the *Republic* in my opinion lies not in its exposure to the dangers of extremism in the name of justice but in the frank, shockingly open statement by Socrates of what is required if we take seriously, and follow consistently, the political implications of philosophical wisdom. Socrates (*and so Plato*) makes it quite clear that the rule of wisdom is tyrannical..."⁵¹ So the written drama, while an extension of the inner torment of Plato's soul, still expresses a literal and shockingly blunt political proposal.

Rosen must explain why Plato would present these proposals in dramatic form. He claims that Socrates (Plato) converses with Glaucon and Adeimantus in the text to persuade a Glauconian type to this cause of a powerless philosopher. Rosen keeps the Straussian types in this narrative by making Glaucon stand for the erotic and spirited man and Adeimantus for the

⁵¹ Ibid, 5. Italic added. There is *pro forma* agreement with Strauss on the dramatic approach several pages earlier, but this method along with its conclusions about the dangers of philosophy's relationship to the political seem jettisoned here. Rosen's book demonstrates the thesis quoted above. The point Rosen makes above is a strong one: what is so esoteric about proposing things that are blatantly offensive to your host, interlocutors, and auditors? It's not like Plato wrote in secret and had this published posthumously. Things like separating wealth, political power, speech, family pedigree and structure from the elite class through the abolition of the citizen military, and elevating philosophers to king are not subtle suggestions to a city locked in the Peloponnesian War.

austere man.⁵² Rosen claims that there must be something deeper between Socrates (Plato) and Glaucon (the “lieutenant”) by pointing to the length and importance of topics that Glaucon speaks about with Socrates relative to his brother.⁵³ The *Republic* is a way for Plato to live a unified existence again, and its proposals contain a serious means of overcoming the influence of Socrates. “It would be more accurate to say that the *Republic* (and not only the *Republic*) is an advertisement for philosophy, in terms that are intelligible to the companions of Socrates, in particular to Glaucon and Adeimantus. That is to say that within the dialogue, Socrates addresses primarily guardians, not philosopher-kings.”⁵⁴

I.3.2. Ironic Interpretation

The ironic approach to Plato is the most prominent genus in the academic literature. It is also the most diverse. I have grouped it into two main categories: moral and psychological. Within the moral species there is another noticeable divide by philosophical method, what I will call the textualist and analytical. The methodological commonalities of the ironic approach and the literal approach are the near universal adherence to the spokesman thesis and some type of developmentalism. The ironic approach diverges from the literal by its tendency to deemphasize the literal understanding of the political and social speeches in the *Republic*. It focuses more on a fundamental theme in which these broader issues become a heuristic to illustrate in discussion with the less capable Socratic interlocutors. Contra Nussbaum’s admonition, these readers often think that the political passages are to be largely “treated metaphorically, as mere devices

⁵² Ibid, 7-9, 74-75, 79.

⁵³ Ibid, 12-15. A point that is further emphasized a subsequent chapter by spending only one page on Adeimantus’ speech in Book II and many pages on Glaucon’s, even though the former’s is longer.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 8.

through which Plato is making statements about psychology and ethics.”⁵⁵ This occurs because there is a closer consideration of the dramatic elements of the genre resulting and a decreased inclination to read a dialogue as a treatise or manifesto in which the author presents all different sides of an issue. The ironic then is the intermediary between the literal and the dramatic according to its interpretative principles.

I.3.2.1. Moral

This is by far the most common approach. These interpreters take the ethical problematic that characterizes most of the work as their major clue. This is a reasonable procedure since Plato has Socrates and his interlocutors agree and reaffirm several times that their whole undertaking is for the sake of defining justice and injustice and to praise the former and blame the latter.⁵⁶ If an interpretation of the *Republic* were to be based on Plato’s indirect treatment of justice and injustice in the soul through cities in speech it would have a stronger and broader textual basis than the literal approach.

There is one book that stands far above every other in the literature on the *Republic*. Julia Annas’ Oxford Press, *An Introduction to Plato’s Republic* is easily the most cited work in the literature on this dialogue, and one of the most cited in the broader sweep of Platonic studies.⁵⁷ This might be a controversial classification since Annas says things like, “Plato *is* writing a manifesto, but he is too good of a philosopher not to raise important and difficult philosophical issues in the process...”, or, “It [the *Republic*] gives us systematic answers to a whole range of

⁵⁵ Nussbaum, *The Good Society and the Deformation of Desire*, 10.

⁵⁶ (354b-c), (358d), (367d-e), (368e-369a), (371e), (427c-e). Bloom’s index lists the Greek word for justice in well over one hundred sub-sections.

⁵⁷ Annas, Julia. *An Introduction to Plato’s Republic*. Oxford University Press. 1981. Hereafter cited as *IPR*.

questions about morality, politics, knowledge, and metaphysics...”.⁵⁸ Yet it becomes very clear throughout the rest of the introduction and for the remainder of her book that Annas does not see this as a “systematic” work.⁵⁹ Annas sees Plato’s most famous work as the creation of a great literary artist that has written to intentionally provoke the audience to be his indirect interlocutors on these important topics. This provocation is largely done in the *Republic* by stunning political proposals that Plato knew would scandalize many of his readers, even posthumously.⁶⁰

Because Plato wrote with this type of hermeneutic in mind, we should not be surprised at how radical he comes across. How else would a man who wrote thousands of years ago be able to shake us out of the dogmatism of our democratic slumbers? This is obviously a more charitable assumption than that of Popper, but no argument is produced to support this presupposition. This thought is for rhetorical and likely for personal reasons. Plato must be made approachable for late 20th century Westerners. Rather than becoming hostile or explaining away the clear inegalitarian themes that stain many his writings, Annas chooses to make Plato safe for us. The decision to do this seems practical for someone writing the definitive introduction to this work for the foreseeable future. It also appears personal due to a deference and respect that

⁵⁸ Annas, *Ibid*, 1.

⁵⁹ This is modified later after Annas’ interprets the text as a work of moral philosophy. “The *Republic* is best viewed as a magnificent balancing-act, an attempt to answer troubling problems about justice by providing an improved account of what justice is.” (*Ibid*, 162). Also, “Plato’s political proposals are often misunderstood through being inflated. He is not trying to put forward a whole ‘political philosophy’ dealing with all matters important for the relation of individual and state.” (*Ibid*, 171).

⁶⁰ Annas uses language like “we” and “us”, implying that Plato’s method of shocking address is not only aimed at 4th century Greeks but 20th century westerners. *Ibid*, 2.

Annas treats Plato with throughout her commentary, even when she must correct the great man or reluctantly take him to task on the several major lacunae of his argument.⁶¹

That Annas sees the *Republic* as a kind of moral treatise shows from the focus her book takes. In chapter 2, “The Form of Plato’s Argument”, she positions the virtue ethic she believes Plato (through Socrates) will argue for as an exciting synthesis between consequentialism and deontology.⁶² If Plato is correct about there being some definition of the good that can be characterized as the famous “mixed” good that Socrates places justice in and praises it relative to the other goods, intrinsic and instrumental, then this would be an invaluable contribution to moral philosophy.⁶³ Annas believes that Plato gives modern thinkers an interesting form of ethical thought that is “agent-centered” rather than a modern ethic that is “action centered”.⁶⁴ The latter tends to define the good in regards to proper action: proper here being that which is in conformity to universal principles. The agent-based theory of virtue ethics is attractive to Annas because it would allow for a consideration of the specific context in which an action is to be taken rather than a one-size-fits-all, rule-based approach.⁶⁵ To this sub-species of readers Plato is primarily an important moral philosopher concerned about the good of the individual’s soul. Any

⁶¹ Ibid 151, 335. “I think we have to conclude, though reluctantly, that Plato has not given the first city a clear place in the *Republic*’s moral argument.” (78).

⁶² Ibid, 60-62.

⁶³ (358a). “Plato carefully distinguishes three classes, not two, and deliberately (if briefly) places justice in the second. And so, if we take the form of his argument seriously, we cannot interpret it as being either a deontological or consequentialist one.” (62) Therefore, “Rather than forcing the argument to fit, and discussing it in terms whose applications depends on modern assumptions, we should try to stand back from modern debates and learn from Plato.” (63). Also, Ibid, 161.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 157.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 159-160. This is about the ethical value or prudence.

other themes, like the political with its city and regime, although evident throughout the *Republic*, are often dismissed, diminished, or examined in relation to moral philosophy.

Annas is the primary example I wish to give of one type of the ironic-moral methodological divide. She and those like her are textually acceptant. They tend to take the dialogue and work through a section, or the entire text, essentially the sequence in which we have received it. This is in great contrast to what I will call the analytical branch of the ironic-moral method. These interpreters bring the rigorous tools of analytical philosophy to bear upon the text.⁶⁶ These readers state crisp theses, often employ symbolic logic, and use close chains of reasoning to analyze Platonic dialogues. This takes the form of arranging the text thematically relative to a single dialogue, a “group” of dialogues (i.e., according to the author’s personal version of developmentalism), or even across the entire corpus, to arrive at conclusions about what Plato thought on that given theme. This approach is known through scholars like Gregory Vlastos or C.D.C Reeve.⁶⁷

In *Philosopher-Kings*, his respected commentary on the *Republic*, Reeve organizes his main discussion of the text into four thematic chapters according to the principle of “my sense of what presupposes what in the overall argument of the *Republic*.”⁶⁸ And while Reeve admits that “this will conceal much that a sequential reading would reveal”, this is done for a good reason

⁶⁶ For a good sampling of this procedure see the collection of essays, Vlastos, Gregory. *Plato: Modern Studies in Philosophy*. Anchor Books. 1971.

⁶⁷ Vlastos, Gregory. "The Argument in the Republic that 'justice pays'". *The Journal of Philosophy* 65, no. 21 (1968): 665-674; "Happiness and virtue in Socrates' moral theory." *The Cambridge Classical Journal* 30 (1984): 181-213; *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 157-178.

⁶⁸ Reeve, C. D. C. *Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic*. Princeton University Press. 1988. p. xii. This sense happens to weight philosophical themes before the political or ethical ones.

for “having tried the latter approach [thematic grouping], and having seen what it revealed *to me*, I am persuaded that the benefits of the one I have adopted outweigh its costs.”⁶⁹ To these textual vivisectionists it is natural to cut straight to the point, slice out all the wordy excess of the dramatic exchanges, splice together themes like metaphysics, epistemology, politics, psychology, and ethics from all corners of the text, and observe the behavior of these collections when placed under the magnifying power of many carefully formulated hypotheses. Driven by their version of developmentalism and aided by a demanding logical method, the question does not seem to occur to them as to why Plato would have a certain character say X at a certain point in his dialogue, let alone most other dramatic considerations. Maybe these propositions can only, or primarily, have any type of meaning within the fictional context they were active in? Theirs is the Plato of the morgue made readily digestible, methodologically reduced for the palate of analytical philosophy.⁷⁰

I.3.2.2 Psychological

This species is separated from the moral one within the ironic genus for the interpretative weight its adherents place upon the psychological, or existential, subtext they see conditioning the structure and sequence of the *Republic*. Kenneth Dorter argues that the dialogue can be understood according to a complete superimposition of the Divided Line schema onto the whole text. Read from roughly the middle of the story, Dorter views the discussion as dialectically leading up to that sacred image of the Form of the Good that we glimpse near the end of Book VI. The remaining dialogue serves as the falling action proceeding through the lower states of

⁶⁹ Ibid. (Italics Reeve’s.)

⁷⁰ Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 17. The conceptual clarity afforded by this method are obvious. Its application to a series of dramatic texts is not as clear.

consciousness.⁷¹ This means that even the most dedicated reader must read quite far into the plot to really understand what Plato is trying to say. Once this formula has been acquired it becomes much easier to go back and forward and fit the pieces together. This type of approach casts Socrates as leading his interlocutors in an ascent to catch sight of the Forms out of the “cave” of the Piraeus. That the discussion only resorts to empirical objects and images as a means to facilitate this journey means the *Republic* is to be rendered as depicting a psychological process of enlightenment. All the talk about cities, regimes, education, human institutions, and the soul are instrumental to this objective and are not to be taken as literal proposals.⁷²

Eric Voegelin’s chapter on the *Republic* in his *Order and History: Plato and Aristotle*, stands as one of the two most elevated commentaries in the literature. It is by far, without question, the most heterodox and thoroughly exemplifies the ironic-psychological species of interpretation.⁷³ Voegelin was influenced by Husserlian phenomenology, which in essence attempts to give a scientific, pre-theoretic description of intentional state of consciousness and its acts.⁷⁴ Voegelin developed a complex theory describing the historical process of “representation”, or of human consciousness’ intelligibly manifesting an existential ground of transcendence through symbolization, signs that express this experience.⁷⁵ Essentially, this asks

⁷¹ See also Dorter, Kenneth. *The Transformation of Plato’s Republic*. Lexington Books. 2006. See p. 12-16.

⁷² Ibid, 245-246. Although Dorter defends the just regime that Plato has the interlocutors construct in Books V-VII from the judgments of being totalitarian or oppressive, but as one characterized by non-coercion. Ibid, 218.

⁷³ Voegelin, Eric. *Order and History: Volume Three - Plato and Aristotle*. Louisiana State Press. 1957.

⁷⁴ Walsh, David. “Voegelin and Heidegger: Apocalypse Without Apocalypse.” VoegelinView, July 5, 2018. <https://voegelinview.com/voegelin-and-heidegger/>; Embry, Charles R., and Glenn Hughes. *The Eric Voegelin Reader: Politics, History, Consciousness*. University of Missouri Press, 2017, xiii, 10, 44.

⁷⁵ Voegelin, Eric. *The New Science of Politics: An introduction*. University of Chicago Press, 1987. See p. 31-33. “The truth of man and the truth of God are inseparably one. Man will be in

the question: why did these cultures at this time use these symbols to express the same, or a related existential experience? By transcendent existential experience I take Voegelin to mean something like the unified experience of the idea of totality. This is the only true basis on which the thinker can then craft symbols by which to properly order human existence: this consciousness-society correspondence expresses Voegelin's famous "anthropological principle".⁷⁶

What does this mean for the interpretation of the *Republic*? It means that Voegelin reads the *Republic* as the most elaborate and one of the most powerful symbols of "representation" in the history of ideas.⁷⁷ It is a stunning attempt, "handicapped" without a well-defined phenomenological-existential language, to express the soul's new connection to the transcendent.⁷⁸ According to Voegelin this specific existential portal/symbol was produced by the Athenian corruption of the previous way of representation in the Greek Tragedians at the hands of sophistic chaos, along with the influence on Plato of the Socratic soul.⁷⁹ This process plays out dramatically in the sense that Socrates (referred to as Socrates-Plato), the philosopher who has had this founding experience, responds to the cry for help from the disordered but grasping souls of the sons of Ariston as victims of this existential disorder. He then leads them

the truth of his existence when he has opened his psyche to the truth of God; and the truth of God will be- come manifest in history when it has formed the psyche of man into receptivity for the unseen measure." (Ibid, 69).

⁷⁶ Ibid, 61; *Order and History: Plato and Aristotle*, 86.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 83.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 83 & 101.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 10-14, 61-63, 72, 78-81. Voegelin also bases his interpretation of Plato on the *Seventh Letter* and concludes from its depiction of his relationship with Dion that Plato was using his dialogues to express an erotic, "existential community" of like-oriented souls. (Ibid, 14-20). He quotes from Diogenes in support of this conclusion, Laertius, Diogenes. *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers: Compact Edition*. Oxford University Press, 2020, 3.30.

up by means of an “inquiry that started from the luminous depths of the Dionysiac soul.”⁸⁰ This might sound mystical and strange to the modern reader. What I believe Voegelin to mean is that the *Republic* occupies a place of utmost importance in the history of the soul’s, and therefore civilizational and cultural, development and experience because of the process it clarifies and the power and originality of the symbolization expressed in it.

For the sake of this section this discussion is to confirm that Voegelin does not see the *Republic* as expressing a literal political proposal, but something much deeper and more transcendent than a temporal political arrangement. This conclusion is not left to inference. Voegelin explicitly states that “The interpretation must, therefore, under no circumstances try to extract a Platonic ‘doctrine’ of order from the *Republic*, but must fix the levels of clarification and explore the symbols developed on each level.”⁸¹ And also, “Hence, Plato does not offer a recipe for moral conduct; and with regard to a right paradigm of life he does not go beyond a hint that in such matter the mean (*meson*) is preferable (619a). The point must receive some emphasis because it will recur in the interpretation of Plato’s construction of a right order for the polis, which all too frequently is misunderstood as a recipe for a good constitution.”⁸² If the meaning of the *Republic* is to be found in recurring symbols, then it is open to being interpreted by the use of a few of these symbols after the benefit of reading the entire text. For instance, Voegelin’s chapter on the *Republic* is 86 pages: 25 of them are spent on using an analysis of the symbol of “descent” that Voegelin believes brackets the entire dialogue (Piraeus-Hades) to frame his interpretation. The discussion of what is traditionally held to be the argument proper does not

⁸⁰ Ibid, 51, 92. “The inquiry, the *zetema*, is the conceptual illumination of the way up from the depth of existence.” (Ibid, 83). For “Socrates-Plato” see Ibid, 19.

⁸¹ Ibid, 85.

⁸² Ibid, 57.

occur until about halfway through this chapter. Voegelin passes over the musical education of the guardians in a footnote with reference to another scholar's work.⁸³

Voegelin has no need to interpret the text page-by-page because of the reliance of several heuristics. The first has been mentioned in a footnote above: he falls back into using historical sources as a means of illuminating what the dialogue says. Secondly, because of his philosophical presuppositions regarding the historical nature and behavior of consciousness, he comes to the text supplied with a very complex methodological toolkit that will already tell him what the dialogue should mean. And thirdly, like Dorter and because of his methodology, Voegelin relies upon a Book VI Divided Line schema to order the text for interpretation.⁸⁴ Because the dialogue must be a symbol of representation it then centers on the men's "ascent" to the idea of the Good (the "Agathon") and their fall back to Hades. And like Dorter, the schema must have some type of aesthetic balance to it, even though the quantities of text that it overlays is clearly asymmetrical.⁸⁵ There is good reason that Voegelin senses in Plato a kindred spirit to his own philosophical system and its temporal aspirations, but would Plato sense this in Voegelin?

I.3.3. Dramatic

The dramatic method of interpretation is the genus that tends to deemphasize the analytical focus on a dialogue's verbal content relative to its dramatic action. There is an

⁸³ Ibid, 101n15.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 46-52.

⁸⁵ Voegelin even takes a fellow scholar to task for not abiding by this symmetrical scheme by taking away a fourth section of the "Epilogue" and leaving it with only three relative to the "Prologue's four sections. Ibid, 50-51. No explanation is supplied as to why the text quantity that Plato wrote does not mirror this balanced organization. I suspect this is motivated by Voegelin's desire to prove the greatness of the *Republic*, something I wholly agree with. I disagree that these types of oddities are satisfactory means of demonstrating this claim.

interpretative priority placed on what is shown by Plato rather than what is said by his characters. The meaning of what is said is always placed within the dramatic context it is uttered in. It denies that the verbal meaning of whoever is speaking, Socrates included, can ever be divorced from the specific fictional setting constructed for the occasion by Plato. One strength of this approach is that it attempts to make use of as much of the Platonic text as possible. It does not skip or skim through the dramatic parts where Plato sets the scene or connects them. It counts and holds that there is significance in the form of how Plato has the main interlocutor respond (report, mixed, imitation), or to remain silent and permit a monologue. While there are some thoughtful things said about the dramatic setting and tension by several of the authors above, these usually stop after the first page of the *Republic* and the conversation is joined in earnest, giving the philosophers gist for their mill.⁸⁶ Their light focus on drama and overwhelming weight giving to philosophical analysis will also help explain a great gap in the literature, especially book-length commentaries on the section this dissertation will focus on: the early exchange between Socrates and Adeimantus in Books II-III.

One weakness of this approach to Plato is that his works are largely dialogues, not historical epics in the Homeric or Thucydidean sense that contain a relatively equal mixture of speech and heroic action. Plato's works have a context and action, but in terms of content they are greatly outnumbered by the verbal sections. And within these verbal sections there is not an equality of voice given to the main characters, like those of Homer's *Iliad* or in Thucydides. If that is the case, why should a serious reader pay much attention to the drama of a text, let alone give it interpretative priority? Even if this method was persuasive enough to be considered, two

⁸⁶ See, Rosen, *Plato's Republic*, 19-21, 165-167; Annas, *IPR*, 16-21; Pappas, *Plato and the Republic*, 9-20, 29-30.

other problems arise: how should one go about reading Plato dramatically, and how should one safeguard against the error of making Plato be what you make him and say what you want? This later danger has the possibility of being even greater here because the words of a protagonist would not be accepted as a correction to a personal conclusion that is drawn about Plato, whereas a practitioner of the literal or ironic approach can point to something more concrete in a certain set of words as the basis for their reading. The problem and charge of esotericism associated with the dramatic approach is a mixture of a legitimate methodological concern of getting to what Plato really means and a dislike of the movement it is largely associated with.

1.3.3.1. Static Elements of the Part

The dramatic approach is mostly associated with students of the Straussian school of thought.⁸⁷ These interpreters take their cues on how to read the *Republic* from several of Leo Strauss's works.⁸⁸ The basic hermeneutical mechanics of how to perform a dramatic reading of Plato are clearly laid out by Strauss in *The City and Man*.⁸⁹ The main principle that Strauss believes should inform our reading of great men, especially men like Plato, is "logographic necessity" where, "Nothing is accidental in a Platonic dialogue; everything is necessary at the

⁸⁷ Bloom, Allan. "Interpretive essay." *The Republic of Plato* (1968): 346-348, 408; Howland, Jacob. *The Republic: The Odyssey of Philosophy*. Paul Dry Books, 2004; "Plato's Republic and the politics of convalescence." *American Dialectic* 1, no. 1 (2010): 1-17; "The Mythology of the Philosophy: Plato's *Republic* and the Odyssey of the Soul." *Interpretation* 33, no. 3 (2006): 219-242; Benardete, Seth. *Socrates' Second Sailing: On Plato's Republic*. University of Chicago Press, 1992.

⁸⁸ Strauss, Leo. "On a new interpretation of Plato's political philosophy." *Social Research* (1946): 326-367, p. 350-355; *The City and Man*. The University of Chicago Press. 1964, p. 50-138; *Liberalism Ancient and Modern*. University of Chicago Press. 1995, p. 26-64; *History of Political Philosophy*. 3rd ed. University of Chicago Press. 1987, p. 33-68; *Natural Right and History*. University of Chicago Press. 1971, p. 120-164.

⁸⁹ Strauss, *City and Man*, 50-62.

place where it occurs.”⁹⁰ The first thing a close observer might notice from reading through Plato is that he only communicates indirectly through a cast of characters and never directly in the first person, implying that there is something he intends to conceal.⁹¹ One might notice the aristocratic quality of the selected characters for the protagonist to engage with, in addition to the dialogue’s title as the primary means by which “we hear Plato himself as distinguished from his characters.”⁹² Other static elements of a single drama might include the specific time, location and context (party, courtroom, market, outside Athens etc.), and always include characters present (minor speakers and auditors), and the major interlocutors interacting with the protagonist who are not always identical at every moment throughout a single work.⁹³

Standing with Voegelin’s effort, Strauss’ chapter on the *Republic* in *The City and Man* contains the most rigorous interpretation of the work within living memory. This effort is also supplemented and summarized by his chapter on Plato in *The History of Political Philosophy*.⁹⁴ Strauss does not approach the canon of western political thought as philosophically unproblematic. The famous distinctions overlaid onto the history of thought are “classical natural right” and “modern natural right”. To Strauss these categories concern the ultimate human good, or “what is justice”, with “nature” being defined by a rationally grasped teleology

⁹⁰ Ibid, 60. Also, see Ibid, 53.

⁹¹ Ibid, 59; also, “One does not need the evidence of the *Seventh Letter* to see that Plato ‘prohibited’ written expositions of his teaching. Since Plato refrained from presenting his most important teaching ‘with all clarity’, the prohibition against written expositions of his teaching is self-enforcing”, Strauss; “On a new interpretation of Plato’s political philosophy”, 350-351.

⁹² Ibid, 57. Strauss appears to take the aristocratic qualities of mainly Socratic interlocutors as a sign that Plato is attempting to say something about the relation between politics and philosophy. There is another way to construe this dramatic curiosity.

⁹³ Several of Plato’s dialogues have more than one protagonist-interlocutor pairing. The *Republic* famously has three major pairings. The *Gorgias* and the *Lysis* have three. The *Cratylus* has two. Other texts are mostly, but not exclusively, monologues.

⁹⁴ Their commonalities expressing Strauss’s efforts will be noted shortly.

according to the classical understanding.⁹⁵ If one presupposes that human life and therefore politics, formulated by the positive problematic of the “best regime” according to reason by nature, is to be understood and arranged along this totality, then it is not surprising that the classical thinkers will exhibit this form of thought.⁹⁶ Because Plato falls within this categorization’s “classical” period he not only is classified as such a thinker, but the “essentially political character of the classical natural right doctrine appears most clearly in Plato’s *Republic*.”⁹⁷

What is the source of this criterion’s teleology, and therefore the interpretive lens through which we are supposed to view Plato? And is it consistent with what we have just learned about a Platonic dialogue’s concealment, logographic necessity, and dramatic elements, especially when we turn to the chapter in *Natural Right and History* that is specifically dedicated to situating the *Republic* within the tradition of classical natural right? For Strauss at least, this interpretative horizon is clearly drawn from Aristotle, a man whose works appear in treatise form. This is made clear by the herculean effort Strauss undertakes in Chapter IV of *Natural Right and History* to associate the two greatest thinkers of all time as primarily teleological in their thought concerning the human good. Aristotle is clearer to understand in this sense: his surviving works come to us as treatises. Because of this literary form, it is less objectionable to

⁹⁵ Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 7-8, 10.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 144.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

take his texts as propositionally charged and subject them to philosophical criticism.⁹⁸ It is also tempting to use him as an interpretative tool for Plato.⁹⁹

Is it consistent for Strauss to treat Plato similarly when citing dozens of passages from Socrates in the *Republic* and the Athenian Stranger in the *Laws* as proof that *Plato* believed in something akin to the Aristotelian sounding rule of the mixed regime that requires an aristocratic elite and urbane gentleman to govern for the common good?¹⁰⁰ As mentioned above, I will not attempt to give a summary of Aristotle's interaction with the *Republic* since that would take me too far afield. Even the most erudite, learned, and diverse interpreters like Strauss and Vlastos summon the authority of Aristotle to divine Plato's meaning.¹⁰¹ What I mentioned above is that many of Plato's classic interpreters' ideas or classifications (i.e., the *Republic* as the best regime in speech but the *Laws* as the best regime in action) become transposed into the literature and hardened into textual problematics in part because Plato is extraordinarily difficult to understand.¹⁰² In Strauss' case it is because of the requirement of a concept taken from Aristotle.

⁹⁸ On the difficulty of assuming an Aristotelian hermeneutic see Melzer. Arthur M. *Philosophy Between the Lines*. University of Chicago Press. 2014, p. 26-46.

⁹⁹ On whether this is a good idea see Zuckert, Catherine H. *Plato's Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues*. University of Chicago Press. 2009, pg. 5n11.

¹⁰⁰ Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 142. While citing plenty of passages from the *Laws*, Strauss does not cite any from the *Republic* to support this assertion, the text he tells us the classical natural right teaching appears most clearly in, but plenty in Aristotle. Strauss attempts to distinguish "Socratic-Platonic" and "Aristotelian" natural right (Ibid, 146), but this is after he had used Aristotle to set the groundwork for the analysis. The same objection above would apply to this distinction.

¹⁰¹ Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 49, 81-106.

¹⁰² This famous pithy review of Plato's regimes was made by Aristotle. As anyone who has read Aristotle knows, these types of statements, when compared to sections like Book II of *De Anima*, Book Theta of the *Metaphysics*, and most of the *Categories* are well beneath his best efforts. This opinion is echoed by Strauss as indicative of the whole approach to natural right and its demands on prudence, connecting thought and action, another Aristotelian discussion. "To summarize, one may say that it is characteristic of the classical natural right teaching to culminate in a twofold answer to the question of the best regime: the simply best regime would

The efforts of Strauss in his *The City and Man* and *The History of Political Philosophy* where he deals exclusively with the *Republic* do not treat the proposals made therein as literal. These contain a much more sophisticated attempt to demonstrate the relation between reason and politics. Strauss rightfully notes that the fictionally recorded discussion on justice in the *Republic* takes place because Socrates was compelled to return to the Piraeus and discuss with the Athenian procession contingent at the house of a metic. Strauss goes into extreme detail about the number and personages of the *dramatis personae*, associating the puppet regime of the Pro-Spartan oligarchy called “the Ten in the Piraeus” to the dialogue’s *dramatis personae*.¹⁰³ Instead of focusing on the topic of justice and injustice Strauss believes this is a politically charged evening with the young men and Socrates looking at a restoration of public health.¹⁰⁴ After this dramatic capture by the warlord Polemarchus and leading the hostage back to his house the conversation is joined.

In both texts Strauss attempts to interpret the institutional waves that will be proposed in Book V from the speeches of the three main interlocutors of Book I, Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus, by depicting their claims in terms of natural right: that of the human good.¹⁰⁵ This is done to refute the questioned unity between Book I and Books II-X and to depict the rest of the dialogue as an exchange about the nature of the good between the philosopher and the rising Athenian scions that are looking to leverage their pedigree for political influence. This

be the absolute rule of the wise; the practically best regime is the rule, under law, of gentlemen, or the mixed regime.” Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 142-143.

¹⁰³ Strauss, *The City and Man*, 63. This is obviously not true because the unnamed auditors, the “some others” (327c) of the Athenian contingent from the procession, appear to accompany Socrates and Glaucon to Polemarchus’ home. It is also likely that Polemarchus’ slave boy is present. Even if he is not, Cephalus exits the stage very early, never to return.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 63; *The History of Political Philosophy*, 34.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 34-42; *The City and Man*, 65-85.

method allows Strauss to read things that we only find at a later point in the text into an earlier point. Even though Plato has Socrates express his relief from being freed from the argument at the beginning of Book II *and* that that he believed his constructive efforts were finished at the beginning of Book V, both before the famous three waves, Strauss's method in combination with his natural right problematization holds that one cannot fully understand the dramatic meaning of Book I without the aid of a later section.

Using Cicero, Strauss concludes that the natural right teaching of the *Republic* is that the ideal regime in conformity with the idea of justice (i.e., philosophy), though communism is not possible because of the particular nature of the polis as being composed of regular artisans.¹⁰⁶ The discussion is "ironic" in the sense that it is a warning as to the dangers of directly bringing philosophy down from the heavens and into the city. It does not believe the regime described is or can be real.¹⁰⁷ The true political teaching is that the best relationship reason can have with politics is not a direct but a mediated one in a mixed regime ruled by aristocrats. But the ironic teaching is shown through the coercive (unjust) actions upon the philosopher by his conventional associates to formulate a just society in speech. Even if one were to generally agree with Strauss methodologically, the primary questions become whether its application is correct and if the resulting conclusions drawn from it are Platonic or the products of external factors.

1.3.3.2. Dramatic Developmentalism

The last person I wish to cover in this section and the literature review is Catherine Zuckert. Her approach to Plato is that of a dramatic developmentalist. This is an addition to the dramatic genus because Zuckert argues in her magisterial work *Plato's Philosophers* that the

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 138; Strauss, *The History of Philosophy*, 67-68.

¹⁰⁷ Strauss, *The City and Man*, 65; Rosen, 5, 9.

primary interpretative clue left to us by Plato is dramatic chronology. “I have taken as Plato’s indications of the times at which the conversation took place merely has hints of the order in which he wanted his readers to imagine the conversations taking place. The coherence of the narrative that emerges when one strings the dialogues together in the order indicated corroborates the character and significance of the dramatic dates. Read in the order indicated by their dramatic dates, the dialogues will tell a story”¹⁰⁸ For us, this is another way of saying that the static, dramatic clues of a text are to be rendered by their relation to the unity of the whole corpus. In order to know what any dialogue, or part, of the Platonic corpus means, one would have to first arrange the whole temporally and string together the teachings of the protagonists (i.e., Plato’s philosophers) to then construct a dramatic early-middle-late scheme, or developmental template.

The narrative Zuckert finds if we adopt the dating she proposes is one of the development of Socratic philosophy dealing with the question “what is it to philosophize”¹⁰⁹. She begins with a narrative that consists of scenes depicting a period antedating the Socratic turn (expressed by the Athenian Stranger & young Socrates), then the negative beginning phase during the first part of the Peloponnesian War. Next the partially critical but often positive phase that employed myths to attack the conventional beliefs of his interlocutors occurring at the latter part of the Peloponnesian War. A fourth, mostly positive stage has Socrates searching for an adequate account of the whole (dated 410-400 B.C.). Finally, there is a last stage in 399 B.C. of the events surrounding his trial and death consisting of Plato’s defense of his master.¹¹⁰ The change in philosophers and the topics they are tasked to deal with at the specific dramatic date Plato

¹⁰⁸ Zuckert, *Plato’s Philosophers*, 10-11.

¹⁰⁹ Zuckert, *Plato’s Philosophers*, 27.

¹¹⁰ Zuckert, *Plato’s Philosophers*, 12-19.

assigned to them show a coherent narrative to the Platonic corpus. Here we have philosophy in infancy, its critical adolescence, a more middle-aged and balanced approach using reason and myth, a more metaphysical, wisdom phase, and the eulogy of philosophy. This is her methodological contribution to the dramatic genus. The *Republic* is located at the middle of the third, the middle-aged phase that shows Socrates using a mixture of reason and myth to indicate to his interlocutors that he possesses wisdom about the highest human things.¹¹¹ Zuckert depicts it as philosophy's struggle against traditional poetry for the soul of the Socratic interlocutors, ironically often using poetry in the process.

The main methodological issues I have with this approach are as follows. It is not at all clear what the dramatic chronology of many Platonic dialogues are. Sometimes this information can be easy to come by, like Socrates' death or his discussion with Parmenides as a youth, but often they either can only be inferred from the context and allusions, and other times there is essentially nothing solid on which to base a conclusion.¹¹² Secondly, her narrative of how the dialogues should be broken up, from the Socratic turns from nature to reason, and reason to opinion, are told in a specific dramatic setting. The issue here is whether it is permissible to take these stories and use them as real dramatic markers in a developmentalist scheme.

Lastly, if Plato wanted the reader to be able to understand an individual text why would he leave us such inconsistent or inconclusive clues? What we do know about each text are the titles, characters, dramatic action, and what is said in the dialogue. If Plato is to be read dramatically, it is more plausible that he has concealed his meaning in one or several of these

¹¹¹ Ibid, 9, 337.

¹¹² Ibid, 25. She locates four dialogues *without* dramatic dates, *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, *Lovers*, *Philebus*. She associates *Philebus* with the *Republic* in her chronology, an inferred move that uses the similarity of content rather than the context as her marker.

elements. Logographic necessity would not only pay attention to the fact that Plato presents his thought dramatically, but also in fragmentary form. Plato is the author of many self-contained works that have a beginning, middle, and end. I can understand the impulse to unify these pieces and make it into a coherent whole, but as I hope to demonstrate in the argument proper, I don't think Plato allows this type of shortcut to the person seeking an encounter with him. There seems to be a purpose behind the episodic rather than epic form of his corpus.¹¹³

I.4. The Argument

The intended contribution of this dissertation is an attempt to elicit, if possible, a political teaching from Plato's *Republic*. It is well-known that Plato engaged in the theoretical construction of a perfect city (or polis) in the *Republic* with the expressly stated purpose of finding justice in the city and the soul. Or was it one city? A close attention to the text gives the reader a minimum of *five* cities that appear. These cities are not my inventions: they are expressly stated by Socrates himself. In order of their textual appearance these cities are the true/healthy city, the feverish city, the happy city, the good city, and the beautiful city.¹¹⁴ True to form, does the title of this famous book appears to be ironic? Maybe so, for within the text we are introduced to many *poleis* and *politeiai*. On top of the several current interpretations of the *Republic*, one question we must ask ourselves is which one of these (if any) does Plato endorse and why? Another question concerns method: how can we secure a way to know that our conclusion about this text is the same as the author's?

This dissertation intends to explicate and demonstrate a methodological contribution to reading Plato. It is a species of the dramatic genus. Employing this new approach it will show

¹¹³ Both Zuckert and Strauss claim the fragmentary nature of the dialogues is to mirror the fragmentary nature of being. Ibid, 42-43; Strauss, *The City and Man*, 61-62.

¹¹⁴ True/healthy (372e), feverish (372e), happy (420c), good/right (449a), beautiful (527c).

that at least the *Republic* must be read according to a dynamic hermeneutic used in the construction of the text. I will show in the following chapter that this constructive method is endogenous to the text both verbally and in action and is therefore not a foreign imposition. I feel that this is the only sure way to clearly encounter Plato, to pass beyond condescending translations, “Socrates”, Aristotle, developmentalism, ideological complaints, modern moral philosophy, philosophical idiosyncrasies, and any other barrier that stands in the reader’s way. My serious exposure with the Socratic descriptions of the true city and the feverish city did not initially allow me to approach the text free of supposition. After many years of labor and being humbled passage upon passage I believe that I have been disabused of any serious foreign constructs by which to distort the Plato one gradually meets in the action of the dialogues. Personal difficulty in interpretation is obviously not an argument for the truth, but it can serve as a positive phenomenological indicator that a radical reorientation has occurred and that a proper, or at least clearer, standpoint as been gained from which to view the subject matter.

I.4.1. Method: Dynamic Hermeneutic

The interpretive device I will apply to the text is what I will call a dramatic, dynamic hermeneutic. As mentioned above, this approach is acquired from both explicit statements in the *Republic*, and by the close observation of its effect on the action. Both sources are products of Plato’s. Inherent in this method is the conclusion that each dialogue is hermeneutically independent of another dialogue even if there is a very clear relation between some (e.g., *Apology* and *Crito*). The thesis that I believe this method demonstrates is that each city of the *Republic* is constructed according to the rhetorical agreement or disagreement of every single exchange that occurs between Socrates and an interlocutor. This is done by Socrates being tasked, unwillingly, to realize the agreed upon purpose of the argument proper: to praise justice

and blame injustice for the men at Polemarchus' house. For our purpose, this demand is directly placed upon him by the sons of Ariston and indirectly by Thrasymachus. Socrates proposes to accomplish this task through a city-soul analogy, a starting point he receives from previous speeches in the dialogue as I will show below. This means that each of the cities that are completed are wholly the products of a series of agreements or disagreements between the speakers.

Why there are so many different cities in a dramatic context where Socrates is operating unwillingly? One can simply observe that this is explained during the construction of a given city. Here an auditor always speaks up and rejects it as deficient for some conventional but dramatically important reason. The reason why this dynamic process of agreement takes so long is that Plato does not allow Socrates to leave previously rejected agreements remain in that state. This would indicate the strong presence of group disunity. Only the agreement created by Socrates can produce the requisite unity and therefore progress in the overarching objective of gaining a position to successfully praise the life of the just and to blame the life of injustice to the men present. A dramatic agreement to a Socratic speech is caused by several rhetorical approaches: saying things the interlocutor personally values, image, monologue, giving the argument to the interlocutor, reasoning from what was previously effective, blame, shaming, praising a desired response, saying things that cannot be denied in polite society, and passing things over.

The types of dramatic-rhetorical relations that are produced by these techniques are the following: agreement, formal agreement, disagreement. The two qualities Socrates appears to be looking for in each speech exchange are persuasion and articulation. Agreement is if Socrates feels, or thinks that his auditors feel, that the person is persuaded by his speech and indicates so

verbally. Formal agreement is when the person explicitly states like Thrasymachus (350d-e, 352b) that he will give Socrates a verbal assent but remains volitionally unpersuaded by his speech, or if Socrates senses that this is what an interlocutor is doing with him in a facetious, sarcastic, or unenthusiastic response. Disagreement is a rejection of some previous statement by not giving Socrates an agreement. Socrates often interprets formal agreements as rejections. Types of rejections are those claiming ignorance, passive-aggressive answers that assert the interlocutor's personal preference, or explicit rejections. The effect of what Socrates interprets as an agreement is that the argument progresses towards the praise of justice and blame of injustice in either the city or the soul, depending on where in the argument the men are. A product of a rejection is the reversion back to the topic of the previous dramatically produced agreement. If the disagreement is substantial enough Plato has Socrates behave by reverting to the place in the argument that is referred to by the rejection's content.

This method was gleaned from taking the primary textual tension of multiple cities as a challenge, a close reading of the text, putting together dramatic patterns, organizing them, and reapplying them to see if the text behaved as they predicted it should. It also means that one cannot and should not interpret the *Republic* by what I will call "cheating": one cannot read back into a present section what will eventually happen in the future. The anticipatory reading violates the dramatic reality that the characters are not omniscient gods. Plato shows them making tactical mistakes, even Socrates. Also, the fact that there is a dramatic tension indicates a similarity of power among the characters that the plot will release. Indeed, the fact that the hero falters periodically but still wins through in the end appears to be important to the dialogue in which Socrates speaks the most.

I.4.2. Argument: Plato's Republics

I take the empirical observation of the multiplicity of cities in the *Republic* as a challenge and accept the burden of proof to explain why this is. How can one reconcile this tension in the text, especially when Plato has Socrates frequently state that he is satisfied with a previous city?¹¹⁵ If this argument and its corresponding method are correct, the presence of multiple cities is produced by the dramatic tension between the interlocutors. Rather than this being some type of collaborative, friendly, or even pedagogical charged undertaking, I hope to depict a type of fierce struggle of the protagonist in a hostile dramatic context conditioned by the social parameters of urbanity.¹¹⁶ Any agreement will advance the men to the completion of the main task. Any rejection, explicit or passive, will result in a return to a previous agreement from which to advance the argument again. If the philosopher is unwilling, as is the case in the *Republic*, and if the products of the exchange are determined by Plato's rigorous adherence to this constructive method, there is no reason to believe in the rational content of any of these agreements. It is after this methodological reduction has been made that one can start to make out Plato's meaning behind the action and words.

This dissertation's focus covers Book II through a third of the way through Book III (357a-398c), about forty Stephanus pages. The major dramatic sections of this portion of the text are Glaucon and Adeimantus' opening speeches and the methodological agreement (357a-367e), and passage to the first two notable cities in the true and feverish city (367e-374a), the second methodological agreement (374a-376d), the theological reconstruction (376e-383c), the heroic

¹¹⁵ (372e), (420b), (449a), (450a).

¹¹⁶ Shorey, Paul. *The Republic: Volume I Books I-V*. Harvard University Press. 1978, p. 392; Rosen, 2.

reconstruction (386a-392c), the Socratic shame of Adeimantus through the poets (392c-394d), and the role of imitation in the guardian's rearing (394d-398c). Chapter one will cover the opening speeches, chapter two deals with the city-soul methodological agreement and the true and feverish city, chapter three is on the two major poetic reconstructions, and chapter four is on the Socratic blame of Adeimantus and the rules for the guardian's ability to engage in imitation.

Anyone familiar with the *Republic* will recognize that this is a section of the text that deals mostly with Adeimantus. This does not mean Glaucon is unimportant to the action of the dialogue, as I hope to clearly show, but this section is chosen as an example to illustrate the fruitfulness of the proposed dynamic hermeneutic because it constitutes a beginning of sorts in Book II and a natural end point when Socrates and Adeimantus finally disengage in Book III.¹¹⁷ Compared to the more "philosophical" content there is a predicable gap in the literature and commentaries for the section dealing with the guardian's speech education (*paideia*) in Book II-Book III.¹¹⁸ Therefore this dissertation will not only propose and demonstrate a new method, but it will do so on a section of the *Republic* that is largely treated with extreme philosophical neglect.

¹¹⁷ I give the dramatic explanation of why this is a natural terminus at the end of chapter four. Those who want to know why it is at this moment can refer to the last few pages of that chapter.

¹¹⁸ In their 300-page book Cross-Woozley spend a page and half on it in the appropriate chapter and about three pages on when discussing Book X. Reeve spends 4.5-4.6 and 4.13, three subsections of his book in a loose discussion of this section (again, often in relation to Book X). Pappas spends four pages on it. Dorter nine pages. Annas' discussion in 79-101 is so off topic and full of personal opinions and reactions to the educational model that it is of little serious interpretive value. Voegelin disposes of this section with a footnote, "I do not go into the details of the educational program because they are set forth admirably by Werner Jaeger in his *Paideia*, II." Voegelin, *Plato-Aristotle*, 101. In his essay entitled "Plato's Educational State", Gadamer barely mentions it. Strauss spends a little more than two pages on it in *The City and Man* and in *The History of Political Thought* only one page. Among the major commentators only Bloom, Rosen, and Bernardete give it a serious consideration even though it is large part of the dialogue.

Because I have disclosed the originating observation for the project, laid out my hermeneutical presuppositions, and have aimed to show my work in an exhaustive fashion, I hope to avoid charges of esotericism upon the presentation of my results. Complexity need not be dissimulation. In fact, I think that this reformulation of the dramatic method extracted from the text and reapplied back to it is a clear piece of evidence against these charges. Fundamentally what this means is that one need not be affiliated with any school or philosophical method or have adopted any type of problematic to access Plato. I have found that only the patience of a long and lonely approach can do this. If I am right, then this dynamic method will be able to explain the choice and sequence of content within the dialogue. I present the results to this process below

CHAPTER ONE. THE TITAN'S BURDEN

Book II of the *Republic* is prefaced with the comments of a narrator, Socrates, who appears within the *Republic* twice, as a dramatic character and its fictional narrator. It is only reasonable to ask why Plato would choose to make someone who did not write down any of his own teachings and actions as the fictive author of a work in which he speaks and acts the most. This produces a question about the relationships between both the real and fictive author, as well as between the two Socrates we encounter within the text. The narrator has absolute power over the character. We would not know anything that the performer Socrates said or did throughout the entirety of the *Republic* if the narrator chose to leave it out or unfaithfully recollect it. The Socratic narrator “speaks” much less than his dramatic counterpart throughout the text. The most frequent occurrences of his speech happen when he indicates who is speaking by “I said” and “he said”. Regarding a fully narrated passage, when this Socrates does speak, he addresses a different audience than the speaker within the text. Socrates as the fictive narrator speaks to the reader, the absent consumer of his writings. Socrates the interlocutor spends most of his time and energy addressing the sons of Ariston, Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato’s brothers. A difference in tone emerges when listening with one ear to the narrator and another to the protagonist.

This chapter will largely demonstrate the argument’s dramatic hermeneutical structure by extracting it from Book I and applying it to the beginning action and speeches of Book II. This will also show that the first book in the *Republic* is linked with the rest of the work. Socrates depicts himself as being taken captive several times throughout the *Republic*, and for our purposes there are two major dramatic captures. The first dramatic capture is the focus of the opening scene in Book I. Socrates as narrator and character portrays himself as being taken back to the Piraeus by being outmaneuvered and outnumbered by a group of Athenians from the

procession party, and because of his traveling companion's betrayal. After his energetic efforts in Book I he believes himself to be "freed from argument", only to get taken captive again by Glaucon and Adeimantus a second time in the form of some powerful challenges on behalf of injustice. These are the challenges that Socrates spends the rest of the dialogue attempting to neutralize and by arriving at a praise of justice that all those present can agree to. Because these are the opening challenges, they have grave dramatic significance for the first several books of the *Republic*.

The speech that Glaucon makes on behalf of the ashamed Thrasymachus demands that Socrates praise the intrinsic goodness of justice while showing that it would still lead to a powerful life full of worldly blessings, and to blame the belief that justice is just an agreement made among the weak to prevent the oppression of the strong. Adeimantus gives Socrates an additional challenge by blaming the praise of justice from those who are friendly to it and arguing that both religion and wisdom encourage the young powerful man to choose the life of perfect injustice over the just life. Both speeches reject the Socratic speeches in Book I that moral character aligns with desert and demand a new praise of virtue that does not explicitly look to the consequences of action *while* demonstrating that just life is the most powerful means of obtaining these. The goods of the just life cannot be used as a justification for virtue but must be a necessary, unintended effect of the just life.

If this is not so the sons of Ariston threaten to interpret the failure of Socrates to praise justice as him conceding two things: (1) that justice is not an intrinsic good and is only valuable as a means towards an end (like exercise, laboring etc.), an admission that people are only "good" because they want to get something from it (like happiness or the security of the weak), or (2) that even if justice inherently good it is powerless and the life of the just man relative to

the unjust man is one of extreme unhappiness. The dilemma the brothers are formulating to trap the Socratic protagonist in claims that the life of justice cannot both be inherently good *and* powerful. Virtue and consequence are inexorably unaligned in this world. Justice can either be drudgery or a sure path of pain. The perfectly unjust man can transcend this dilemma by choosing vice and reaping all the benefits of virtue. The perfectly unjust man is either a man of extreme daring according to Adeimantus, or a godlike man by Glaucon's account. Because of this rational formulation of the meaning of life, neither of these men would have any incentive or reason to submit to the shackles or pain of the just life.

Chapter One analytical outline

1. The two captures and method

2. Glaucon's Speech

The justice of convention

The hypothetical interlocutor and the Gyges Image

The praise of injustice

3. Adeimantus Speech

The praise of the fathers

The blame of the religious malpractitioners

The blame of the hypothetical interlocutor: the cunning man of the polis

1.1. The Two Captures and Method

Our narrator Socrates begins Book II by stating the following:

Now, when I had said all this, I thought I was freed from argument. But, after all, it seems like it was only a prelude. For Glaucon is always most courageous in everything, and so now he didn't accept Thrasymachus' giving up...¹

¹ *Republic* (357a).

The language from the quote above is one of captivity and of being held in a place by a person (or group of people) against one's will.² This opening statement of the argument proper should be considered in the reading of all that follows. It casts doubt that these speeches contain a political program delivered by an authoritarian zealot eager to euthanize those with defective souls and bodies, implement a censorship agenda over a military class, and curate a state-operated eugenics program.³ The freedom that is to be snatched from Socrates should also cause the reader to question if what follows is a positive ethical theory taught to acolytes using oblique speaking methods. The narrator's prelude to the explosive opening scene expresses a desire to be "freed from argument", the implication being that Socrates, the loquacious philosopher who wandered around Athens in constant conversation, did not want to engage in argument at this time. The opening scene of Book II depicts Socrates being taken captive by the courageous Glaucon.

This statement should not startle anyone who has read the dialogue from its beginning since something very similar occurred in the opening lines of Book I. In the opening scene Glaucon and Socrates are returning to the city after descending to the Piraeus to observe the inaugural Bendideia and pray.⁴ They are waylaid indirectly by Polemarchus son of Cephalus by means of a young slave boy. In this exchange the slave boy says that he has been hereby

² "Thought I was freed from the argument" is taken from "ᾧμην λόγον ἀπηλλάχθαι" (*ōmēn logou apēllakhthai*). Shorey renders it "I supposed I was done with the subject". With the text's use of "ἀπηλλάχθαι", signifying to set free or to deliver from, Bloom's rendering is more dramatically sensitive here and stresses the unwilling undercurrent at play, something Shorey's more ambivalent "done with" loses. Cf. Grube's "I thought I had done with the discussion". All Greek passages are taken from Shorey's text. All definitions of the Greek terms have been taken from the digital version of the Liddell-Scott's, *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon*, as accessible at Perseus: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0058>.

³ Euthanasia (409e-410a), censorship (377b), eugenics (459e-460b).

⁴ Bendis was a Thracian goddess associated with the native Artemis, a chaste huntress.

commanded to stop and Socrates and wait for Polemarchus. Glaucon quickly consents to the command of the young slave boy.⁵ When Polemarchus and the Athenian contingent (including Adeimantus) catch up to the three tarriers, Polemarchus issues a friendly challenge to Socrates that he has to either best his group in battle or submit to their desire which is that the two men stay in the Piraeus. It appears that he and the Athenian contingent of the religious procession everyone has just witnessed are going to Polemarchus' house. Socrates wittily offers a third option of their being persuaded by both him and Glaucon to "release" them to the city.

Polemarchus refuses this option by refusing to listen and finds an ally in this refusal in Glaucon's affirmation of the impossibility of the effectiveness of persuasion on the festival contingent.⁶ Eschewing Polemarchus' more direct approach to things, Adeimantus attempts to persuade Socrates of the value of staying in the Piraeus by mentioning to him that there would be a torch race by horseback that evening in honor of the goddess. When Socrates appears to be less than amused by this reason Polemarchus, taking his cues from Adeimantus, offers up several more goods that will be consumed that evening: a nocturnal festival, dinner, conversation, and interaction with young men, and then ends the appeal by reverting to his original approach with two more direct orders, to stay and obey.⁷ All of this in honor of the goddess, Bendis. One or many of these mentioned activities appears to greatly appeal to the tastes of Socrates' valorous

⁵ (327b).

⁶ (327c).

⁷ (328a). In response to the statement of Adeimantus that the festival will involve a torch race on horseback Socrates responds, "On horseback?", I said. 'That will be novel. Will they hold torches and pass them to one another while racing the horses, or what do you mean.?' The condescension should be clear. A repetition of a statement as a question is a form of Socratic rejection. It is a way of not agreeing. In this case, to delay accepting Polemarchus' invitation.

travel companion Glaucon, who immediately says, “It seems we must stay”, to which the elderly Socrates replies, “Well, if it so resolved, ‘I said, ‘that is how we must act.’”⁸

With the dramatic details of the opening scene firmly in mind we should not be shocked at Socrates’ statement regarding his liberation at the beginning of Book II. Nor should we suspect like some modern interpreters that Book I is largely alien to the rest of the dialogue proper (Books II-IX) or draw other inferences in the direction that Book I is more “Socratic” because it contains the true Socrates while Books II-X are Platonic. The words spoken by Socrates in Book I and those uttered to the reader by Socrates at the beginning of Book II are those of a man that has been handed over to his captors but has managed to shrug off the yoke of argument due to the labor expended in forging a hard-fought agreement among festival friends. This figure will only have another, heavier burden placed on him due to a second captive-taking by the courage of the original betrayer: there is a unity between Book I and the rest of the dialogue in the repetition of the dramatic action of capture at the opening scenes of Book I and Book II.

What is the dramatic significance to this prelude? It is permissible to interpret Glaucon’s second capture and the subsequent burden he and his brother place upon Socrates as a rejection of the previous agreement that was crafted through argument in the first book? Glaucon says in Book I that he is unconvinced by the power of Thrasymachus’ arguments for the superiority of the value of injustice over justice but does not give a reason as to why he remains unconvinced. Socrates is both surprised and very pleased by their common agreement in this matter.⁹ At this lull in his exchange with Thrasymachus, Socrates and Glaucon discuss the proper method of

⁸ (328b).

⁹ (347e-348b).

approaching issues like the nature and value of justice and injustice. During this short interruption Socrates lays out a trifold typology of political goods for a city's ruler.¹⁰

The form of this discussion uses another typology. Socrates claims there are two ways of handling questions about justice and injustice. The first method requires at least three parties (a broader audience is implied but not required) and is necessarily hierarchical and adversarial since it involves two advocates speaking for the value of both injustice and justice. These men will continue setting speech against speech for a judge who will render a final verdict in favor of one side. For Socrates there is a danger that without a judge the present speakers are liable to go on pitting speech against speech and opposing argument against argument for their respective case without a means of ending the disputation. According to this dialogical structure the men are without a means of formulating a lasting agreement among the group. The second method dissolves this hierarchy by decreasing the number of required parties from three to two and making these two parties both the "pleaders" and judges of the arguments at hand. Both parties become advocates in the sense of pleading their side and judges in the sense of rendering a final verdict in the form of an agreement or disagreement for a given topic.¹¹

Much to Socrates' relief he and Glaucon agree to select the second choice in this typology at this point in Book I.¹² This accord is struck for the immediate and explicit purpose of persuading the beleaguered and vigorous Thrasymachus that the value of justice and the just man's life is superior to that of injustice and the unjust man's life. After several failed attempts to get Socrates to agree with his praise of injustice Thrasymachus rejects Socrates' praise of justice

¹⁰ (347a).

¹¹ (348a-b).

¹² (348b). "Agreement" here is taken from "*ἀνομολογούμενοι*" (*anologoumenoi*), meaning "to come to an understanding", or "to come to an agreement".

several times, stating that while he will dutifully play his part and nod his head in rhythm to Socrates' assertions, he remains unpersuaded by the content of Socrates' efforts.¹³ Socrates the narrator shows his character acting jovial while he willingly obliges Thrasymachus' requested manner of dialogue.

This exchange is the dramatic origin of the dialogical procedure employed throughout the rest of the occasion. This less stratified method is deployed with Thrasymachus for a different purpose than persuasion though, namely, for coercion.¹⁴ In an ironic twist, we read that Socrates could have discovered the typology for the manner of argumentation, and therefore the possibility of employing argumentation coercively, from Thrasymachus himself earlier on in their exchange.¹⁵ Whatever the origin or reason for this shift in tone, Thrasymachus is disposed of by a famished Socrates who brings the discussion to a close by forcefully having his "fill... at the banquet of the festival of Bendis...".¹⁶ It seems fitting this is the case since a feast and discussion with young men are indeed part of what these accidental guests were promised as compensation in honor of the deity.

In the closing scene of Book I Socrates laments the fact that while his feast of reason was filling and consumed in a buffet style by sampling many different types and courses of food, it was not satisfactory because it was taken in without consideration of the proper sequence. The desserts, the delicacies, and the relishes regarding the relative value of justice and injustice were partaken of before the entrée: collectively arrived at definitions of justice and injustice. This has

¹³ (350e), (351d), (352b), (354a).

¹⁴ This should explain the substance of Glaucon's challenge of Socrates having failed "to truly persuade us". This formal agreement is interpreted by Glaucon as a rejection of Socrates' arguments resulting in the second capture.

¹⁵ (345b).

¹⁶ (354a).

stripped his previous labor of its investigative value.¹⁷ It would seem the attempt to arrive at a conclusion about the relative value of justice and injustice in the soul would suffer greatly if the terms “justice” and “injustice” aren’t defined before the valuation is made.

This feeling of nausea that Socrates expresses at the end of Book I isn’t necessarily all his fault, for in Book I where he attempts to give a positive definition of justice he is interrupted in the process.¹⁸ There are even times where Socrates manages to state a definition of what justice is and what its effects are.¹⁹ These attempts to offer a definition and state the effects (i.e., the “value”) of justice and injustice by Socrates in Book I conflict with those who read the *Republic* as essentially a two part work. This holds that Book I is a Socratic dialogue containing a furious attempt to define important terms that results in aporia and is attached to the “positive” section of Books II-X where definitions and reasons for important terms are often offered in the form of vivid images and soliloquies.²⁰ The negativity of its aporetic conclusion should be reconsidered since Book I shows Socrates attempting to give a positive definition and a valuation of the terms. I suspect that the cry of aporia here is interpreted as a challenge by Glaucon.

There is an overwhelming concentration on the speech of Glaucon relative to the speech of Adeimantus. I hope to show the speech of Adeimantus is more powerful: it is fiercer because of its existential desperation, and it makes explicit that nothing short of the meaning of life is at stake in the dispute over the value of justice and injustice.²¹ Aside from my personal conclusions

¹⁷ (344e).

¹⁸ (337d). Reeve accuses Socrates of only being negative and not constructive in Book I. Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings*, 3.

¹⁹ (337c), (339b), (350d), (351a), (351d).

²⁰ Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 46, 248-251.

²¹ Strauss says that “Adeimantus is far more sober than Glaucon.” Strauss, *The City and Man*, 91. Rosen agrees, “That is to say, Adeimantus is representative, or better still, the symbol of justice as temperance.” Rosen, *Plato’s Republics*, 72.

about its relative importance it is also longer than Glaucon's, a possible indicator of its Platonic importance. Without exception, all the sources I encountered gave a majority of exclusive emphasis to Glaucon. Strauss spends five pages on Glaucon and one on Adeimantus, Bloom has four pages on Glaucon and half a page on Adeimantus, Rosen has five pages on Glaucon and two on Adeimantus, Bernardete with six for Glaucon and a page and a half for Adeimantus, Cross-Woozley an entire chapter to Glaucon and nothing for Adeimantus, Annas gives great focus on Glaucon's typology of goods and awards his speech six pages to a page and a half by Adeimantus; Pappas gives Glaucon over three pages and Adeimantus one, Dorter gives Glaucon twice as much space as Adeimantus, Voegelin is impressed with Glaucon's speech and gives it seven full pages to Adeimantus' one, Reeve discusses the content and importance of Glaucon's speech for seventeen pages and passes over Adeimantus.²²

I am unsure of what explains this neglect, but this dissertation will attempt to address it. The profession's passing over Adeimantus' speech also has the consequence of making their commentaries give interpretative priority to Glaucon's issues. I will only surmise it is for two reasons, none of which I can strongly prove. It seems that the philosophers especially like the analytical usage they get from the typology of goods Glaucon gets Socrates to agree to. It seems like the political philosophers like his "contract theory" of the popular origins of justice and the Ring of Gyges image he gives. While these are important for the whole dramatic exchange since Glaucon is the most frequent interlocutor for Socrates, their focus has the effect of passing over the important early exchanges Socrates has with Adeimantus.

²² Strauss, *The City and Man*, 85-90; Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*, 339-343; Rosen, *Plato's Republic*, 62-67; Benardete, *Socrates' Second Sailing*, 35-42; Cross-Woozley, *Plato's Republic*, 61-74; Annas, *IPR*, 59-66; Pappas, *Plato and the Republic*, 51-56; Dorter, *The Transformation of Plato's Republic*, 57-61; Voegelin, *Plato and Aristotle*, 73-81; Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings*, 24-41.

1.2. Glaucon's Speech

At this point in the plot there should be a pause to correct a statement that was made above: the courageous Glaucon begins Book II with what appears to be more than one rejection. Not only is he unpersuaded of the arguments Socrates uses to end the discussion with Thrasymachus and therefore ruins his hard-fought agreement in Book I, he also seems to reject the methodological accord that was reached between him and Socrates earlier on, placing himself as judge over both of the disputing parties, throwing out the verdict that the parties were content to have achieved, and instead ruling that a mistrial of sorts has occurred.

Picking his words wisely Glaucon begins the action of Book II with a challenge to Socrates by giving him the choice of wanting to only persuade the listeners of his case or of truly persuading them of it. Socrates responds that he would choose the latter option “if it were up to me.”²³ Glaucon tells Socrates that he has failed to truly persuade them of the clear superiority of the just man's life. This is a rejection of aporetic conclusion to Book I. He then constructs a tripartite typology of goods demanding that Socrates inform him of which he believes justice to be. After Socrates does, Glaucon commands Socrates to convince him that justice is of a certain category of good.

The three types of goods are: (1) those that are intrinsically good for themselves alone, (2) those that are both goods for themselves alone and for their pleasant effects, and (3) those that are only good for their effects and not intrinsically.²⁴ Socrates answers that he is of the opinion that justice is a good of the second kind (2), a “mixed” good.²⁵ Glaucon responds by demanding that if Socrates wants to successfully persuade the men of the value of justice contra

²³ (357b). Considering what Socrates did as described in Book I the qualifier becomes clearer.

²⁴ (357b-c).

²⁵ (358a).

injustice he must argue that justice is a good of the first type (1), an intrinsic good that is chosen due to the value of itself and not from any of the benefits (or effects) it might bring. Only when justice can be seen in this light will Glaucon be truly persuaded by Socrates and not simply persuaded by him, a position he already had before the exchanges of Book I occurred.²⁶

The demand that Glaucon places on Socrates is confusing for several reasons. The first is that Socrates had previously identified justice as a mixed good (2), and not an intrinsic good (1). Requiring that he defend justice as an intrinsic good and not a mixed good seems odd. The confusion here is that Glaucon appears to be essentially dictating that Socrates define justice in certain way, that he is redefining Socrates' opinion of what justice is. The purpose for this casual redefinition seems similar to the major point of dispute encountered in the first book: everyone appears more eager to judge the practical value of justice and injustice than to define the meaning of the terms. The beginning of Book II is no different. Glaucon wants to know the relative value of justice and seems willing to subordinate the classification of Socrates to this end.

The other reason this request seems strange should be obvious from our recent discussion regarding the two primary philosophical issues surrounding justice, namely, its definition and value. Socrates has already attempted to define the “what” of justice and its value in the previous exchange with Thrasymachus. There Socrates clearly says that, “...we had come to complete agreement about justice being virtue and wisdom, and injustice both vice and lack of learning” and that its effects were claimed to produce “unanimity” and “friendship” while injustice

²⁶ (358b-d).

introduces “hatreds”, “quarrels” and “factions”: accord becomes disagreement among friends.²⁷

These previous agreements appear to give some type of positive answer to both questions at hand and could be seen to reaffirm the Socratic classification of justice as a mixed good. With these in mind it is of interest to us that Glaucon appears to not accept these answers. Instead, he blames the weakness of Thrasymachus in the face of the dialectical compulsion for Socrates’ lack of persuasiveness.

Once Socrates selects which type of good he believes justice to be, Glaucon is quick to inform him that this opinion differs from that of the “many”. Conventional wisdom holds that justice is a good only for the effects it elicits for its practitioner. Its value is from public honor and wealth, and possibly power: it is not intrinsically good. It is simply a form of socially incentivized drudgery among a group of individuals that are functionally equal and resigned to their impotence contra a collective. Socrates’ response to the prospect of defending justice against this type of challenge is interesting. He states that he is “aware” of the conventional opinion regarding justice and that he understands himself to have successfully dealt with such an opinion during Book I by coming to an agreement with Thrasymachus about its truth. He sarcastically mentions that he must be a “poor learner” concerning the nature of justice, a reference to the fact that he and convention hold different definitions about its value.²⁸ The Socratic non-acceptance, or rejection of Glaucon’s challenge with statement that he has already dealt with Thrasymachus’ argument is a dramatic indicator of unwillingness.

²⁷ (350d), (351a), (351d). The word “agreement” in 350d is taken from “διωμολογησάμεθα” (*diōmologēsametha*), coming from “διωμολογέω” (*diomologeō*), meaning “to make an agreement”, or “to mutually agree upon”.

²⁸ (358a). This reference could also be interpreted to have a second meaning that refers to Glaucon reminding him of what convention believes and is therefore attempting to burden him with the same argument that he thought himself free of.

To illustrate the weakness of Thrasymachus' claim that justice is the advantage of the stronger Glaucon speaks "as the many", as a provisional advocate for the masses. He tells Socrates that his reformulation of the question will have three parts. His feigned objection to Socrates' opinion about justice and injustice will cover: the (1) people's story about the origin and definition of justice, (2) whether justice is performed under necessity or freely, (3) and its value (i.e., its product, effects). Glaucon reiterates that this speech in praise of injustice is not his own but that of "Thrasymachus and countless others" while the argument that justice is "better than injustice" has gone without a capable public advocate.²⁹ Glaucon suspects that he has located such an advocate. Socrates must blame injustice and praise justice as an intrinsic type of good else one might never fully know why anyone would ever choose the path of justice: maybe it was chosen for its effects and benefits?

Glaucon gets this rhetorical structure of offering praise and blame as payment for a received speech earlier in the dialogue in Book I. There is a point in the melee when Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of being ungrateful by always taking and refuting, of using the dialectic to negate positive content without offering any contribution of his own. Socrates protests greatly at this characterization of the value of his contributions by arguing that he does indeed fully repay valuable things he hears from others during an exchange with praise.³⁰ Socrates' emphasis on praise as his form of payment within an exchange might serve to clarify

²⁹ (358c-d). The number and quality of the of interlocutors and auditors permit this to be a public speech. It is surely not an exchange between two isolated men like those in the *Phaedrus* or *Euthyphro*.

³⁰ (338b). Praise is taken from "ἐπαίνειν" (*epaivein*), meaning "to compliment publicly, panegyryze".

his reaction to Cephalus in the earlier part of the text and his reaction to the speeches the brothers are about to place forth on behalf of injustice without being persuaded by its value.³¹

Before Glaucon proceeds with his vicarious apology for injustice, he asks Socrates to evaluate his speeches to see if they are to his liking (praise). Socrates answers:

Most of all," I said. "What would an intelligent man enjoy talking and hearing about more again and again?"³²

With this answer an obvious problem seems to arise in the argument. Until now it has mainly attempted to link Books I and II together by showing their methodological unity within a more explicit context of framing the major terms and motives for the speeches and action that are about to occur. The problem is Socrates originally seems unwilling to continue this exchange because of the recently created accord between the group. However, here it looks as if he has changed his mind and consented to continuing the nocturnal discussion with these young men during the festival for the deity.

Why could this be? Is it because Socrates had previously consented to “truly persuading” his interlocutors of the superiority of justice over injustice and would not be satisfied with what was perceived to be a coerced rhetorical victory over Thrasymachus? Is it because there is a disagreement that has arisen between friends, turning them into the disputants and therefore leaving the group momentarily in discord and Socrates in debt? Is it because Socrates is pious and has a duty to defend the honor of justice in the face overwhelming odds posed by convention?³³ Is it because to know justice is no “small matter” and “the basis of which each of

³¹ (329b), (329e-330a), (330c), (331a).

³² (358d). See also (450b) & (614b).

³³ (368b), (427e).

us would have the most profitable existence”?³⁴ Whatever the reason, Socrates consents to hear Glaucon’s praise of injustice and render a verdict by repaying him with praise or blame.

1.2.1. The Justice of Convention

Speaking as the previously referenced “many” when covering the masses’ definition and origin story of justice, Glaucon states that the origin of justice and injustice stems from the fact that there is not an individual strong enough to freely do injustice without suffering its negative effects incurred from the united efforts of those who are inevitably wronged in its performance. The isolated effects of both lifestyles lead to the opinion that acting unjustly is naturally good while being its recipient is naturally bad. Justice arises out of a compact between self-interested parties in the form of law because the pain of constantly suffering injustice is greater than the benefits an individual can experience in acting unjustly towards others.

Justice is essentially a mean between relatively impotent individuals that is formalized into law and collectively enforced to avoid the worst possible outcome, a systemic suffering of injustice, and at the cost of forfeiting the best individual outcome which is freely enjoying the fruits of injustice without the negative repercussions. These risk-adverse individuals are like the purchasers of insurance in the present to minimize potential losses incurred in the future. A strong man would utterly refuse to abide by this convention and choose to realize the life of injustice because no one would be able to impede him or persuade him of the rationality of this compact between equals, for he is clearly not their equal. Therefore, justice is chosen not for its own sake but because of the effects, because of the ceasefire it produces among a group of proximate individuals.³⁵ This indirect formulation of the conventional view of justice and

³⁴ (344e).

³⁵ (358e-359b).

injustice by Glaucon is mostly a genealogical account of terms, exhibiting great deference to the conventional understanding of these terms that runs contrary to his intuitive skepticism of them in Book I. The “many” appear, like Glaucon, to define the terms of “justice” and “injustice” in light of their value, suggesting a deeper accord with the many that Glaucon is unaware of.

1.2.2. The Hypothetical Interlocutor and the Gyges Image

Pivoting to the second part in his praise of injustice that covers the necessity or willingness with which one would choose to act justly, Glaucon introduces a hypothetical interlocutor, an accuser to indirectly claim that justice is indeed practiced, but only from a lack of strength and ability to act completely unjust. The principle of justice is that of necessity, implying that it is not an intrinsic good of the first kind but that of the third kind, one of drudgery chosen for its effects. One is just because one *must* be. To prove his point about the principle of justice Glaucon constructs an image, a thought experiment of sorts, that vividly illustrates a caricatured version of both the just and the unjust man to the audience by crafting and contrasting these two ideal types. The conclusion Glaucon intends for us to draw and render judgment by means of this myth is that when given the power both types of men will act in an identical fashion, identically unjust that is.³⁶

The image of the Ring of Gyges might sound familiar since there is another myth that illustrates the powers that a ring affords to the individual that encounters it, and on the surface there appears to be some strong parallels. In both myths there is an unsuspecting man caught in an event that forces him to travel through strange dimensions; for Gyges the Lydian it is performing the simple, honest duties of a shepherd. He then gains access to a subterranean world

³⁶ Since no meter is used in Glaucon’s image this is not “poetry” as it often claimed. For meter and poetry being connected see (393d), (400a-c).

populated with many wonderful things when a thunderstorm and an earthquake part the ground of his pasture, a divine omen to be sure. Venturing down he discovers a large bronze horse serving as the tomb of a giant being inside, on whose finger rests a ring. The natural phenomena in this myth that allow Gyges to gain access in the beginning of his journey mark the end of the journey of the protagonist in the other myth. Gyges takes the ring from the giant corpse and returns upward, back to the dimension he was meant to dwell in, a similar move to that of the other man with the previous caveat that his return to normal occurs at quest's end. Upon rejoining his fellow shepherds, the honest Gyges learns through experience that the ring bestows the power of invisibility upon him. Realizing this he wastes no time using it to obtain his most cherished desires, which include that of regicide, adultery, staging a coup, and the consolidation of political rule. This development shares similarities with the other myth, for the experience of a great ring supplies the protagonist with a deeper insight into the nature of reality and elevates his status. Yet, unlike our tragic-hero Gyges we are unsure if he learns the valuable lesson from its guardians about properly wielding this ring's power.³⁷

Finishing his mythological construction Glaucon draws the obvious conclusion it offers in support of his provisional praise of injustice: the principle of justice is that of necessity. If a man like the good shepherd Gyges were to be gifted by the gods the power to become qualitatively superior to other mortals he would not hesitate to use it for complete injustice. He would trade in his staff for a knife and murder the king, seduce the queen, and declare himself monarch of the realm. At the very least, surely no rational person would remain out in the pasture, a glorified slave of the king, when he had acquired the means to single-handedly overpower any man or group of men he desired. If this is so, Glaucon's fictional interlocutor

³⁷ (359d-360b).

concludes, then justice is literally the drudgery of the weak to more mighty conditioning social forces. It is a sham. There is no indication that the ringbearer would act with integrity by keeping away from what belongs to others. Now a god among men, he would lay ahold of what they hold most dear without the fear of consequence that stays the hands of the impotent commoner.³⁸

1.2.3. The Praise of Injustice

The concluding portion of Glaucon's paean to injustice touches on what appears to concern him the most: rendering judgment regarding the happiness or misery of the perfectly just and unjust man's life. We will see this happiness consists of increased access to conventional goods.³⁹ Speaking for himself in this portion of his praise, Glaucon wants the valuation between each man's life to be based off the most extreme construction for both types, showing the close relationship between the animating principle of each form and its product. Glaucon believes that to absolutely say, and rationally persuade him, that the life of the just man is qualitatively better than that of the life of injustice, the final judgment would consider the following.

The first theme of contrast revolves around the distinction between appearance and reality in a social context. In large, individuated societies like 5th century Athens there was no way of intimately knowing every single person, or even every citizen, dwelling within its walls and the surrounding countryside. The importance of this seems obvious: if there is going to be an apparatus populated by citizens that can ultimately pass judgments of life and death on any individual within its domain there is bound to be an extreme asymmetry of knowledge of the citizens wielding state power to the cases they are obligated to decide. In such a large city one

³⁸ (360d). This should be compared with the Herodotus version of this tale. Gyges is a favorite member of the king's personal guard. He is forced to see the queen naked and then forced by the queen to marry her to alleviate her sense of shame. See Dewald, Carolyn, ed. *The Histories*. 5-8.

³⁹ (361b-c).

could very well vote on matters of life and death for someone whom one has never talked to, has never met, and maybe has never even seen before. To render judgment about such a person one would have to rely upon epistemological means other than repetitive proximity of other more proximate contexts like the family, the band of warriors, the village, etc.

Glaucou seems to have absorbed this distinction from conventional sensibilities and does not explain its structural or genealogical cause, but it can be inferred from the above paragraph. Taking this distinction between appearance and reality, or popular reputation (public opinion) and the authentic self, Glaucon insists that in order to truly persuade him that justice is superior to injustice the unjust man must be able to enjoy the goods of the third type of good (those chosen for their effects): he must be capable of acquiring all the benefits that come from publicly appearing to be just, such as wealth, honor, status, and even political power, while incurring none of the negative consequences from actually being just. He must have the reputation for being just without being just. If he is caught and his public perception is pierced, he will have the power of speaking persuasively and the money or power to intimidate to avoid suffering any of the consequences of injustice. The truly just man must suffer all the indignities of being unjust without actually acting in this manner. He must have a reputation for being ruthlessly unjust while actually being just and acting justly throughout his entire life.⁴⁰

Midway through the construction Socrates, in a rare occurrence, interrupts his interlocutor by apparently praising the zeal with which Glaucon is creating his two men:

My, my," I said, "my dear Glaucon, how vigorously you polish up each of the two men—just like a statue—for their judgment."⁴¹

⁴⁰ (361b-d).

⁴¹ (361d).

The second theme this construction of types revolves around is the punishment, or the effects, of the just and the unjust man. It appears to be an application of the above distinction between appearance and reality in light of public opinion. The urbane and affluent Glaucon reveals some personal anxieties in his “rustic” description of the truly just man’s fate at the hands of convention. This is not really spoken or wished by him, “but rather those who praise justice ahead of injustice.”⁴² The man unwilling to use force, intrigue, slander, or dissimulation to mask his true nature to the power of conventional opinion will incur the most excruciating punishments, including whippings, beatings, racking, having his eyes burned out of his head, and crucifixion.⁴³ The unjust man will obtain and experience political rule, unlimited marriage options for his family, continuous victory in public and private contests, wealth that he uses explicitly for his personal advantage and interests, and the material means that are of higher quality and worth than the persecuted just man.⁴⁴

Based on the consequences of a comparison between the lives of the unjust and the just man the conventional masses will ultimately conclude that it is clearly better to seem just while actually being unjust than it is to be just with the public appearance of perfect injustice. We see that even though Glaucon hazily invokes philosophy with his epistemic distinction of appearance and reality to formulate the concept of reputation, both of his discussions are drawn to the effects, or power, of justice and injustice. Glaucon is clearly interested in the question, “what is the ability of justice to produce happiness?”

1.3. Adeimantus’ Speech

At this point the Socratic narrator breaks in:

⁴² (361e), (613d).

⁴³ (361e-362a).

⁴⁴ (362b-c).

When Glaucon had said this, I had it in mind to say something to it, but his brother Adeimantus said in his turn, 'You surely don't believe, Socrates, that the argument has been adequately stated?' 'Why not?' I said.⁴⁵

There is an indication that this Socrates wanted to respond to Glaucon's praise of injustice. Does this imply that Socrates believed Glaucon's formulation of the problem to be sufficient to warrant an answer? Socrates offers an ambivalent retort to Adeimantus' interruption and challenge to him, the second challenge Socrates has received in Book II. Adeimantus insists that the most important thing in the praise of injustice has been passed over. This assertion forces Socrates to give his second concession of Book II by permitting Adeimantus to leap to the defense of his brother. Socrates praises Glaucon's eulogy of injustice as possessing the strength that he has been defeated and is ready to surrender "on his knees" at the futility of aiding justice, so powerful was the onslaught of his younger interlocutor.⁴⁶ Accepting Socrates' invitation to come to the aid of his already victorious brother Adeimantus proceeds to formulate his praise of the power of injustice in a different manner, this time without interruption from Socrates or any interlocutor present. This is the second-longest monologue in the entire work.

1.3.1. The Praise of the Fathers

Taking the opposing position to his brother and speaking as a father would to his son or as "all those who have care of anyone", Adeimantus states justice is actually praised and injustice is blamed conventionally, but only for the social consequences.⁴⁷ Here the reader gets a praise of justice as greater than injustice, but only because it is a means to some greater end (good type 3) and not because it is inherently good (good type 1). This differs from Glaucon's

⁴⁵ (362d).

⁴⁶ (362d).

⁴⁷ The locution for the caring man is taken from "*πάντες οἱ*", or (*pantes oi*), similar to that from which "fathers" is taken "*πατέρες*" (*pateres*).

treatment of justice since according to the concerned father or the caring man it is better than injustice and not only good for one's appearance in a broader, more impersonal social context. The implication of the distinction here suggests that there are two types of sub-goods under the third type of good (i.e., those of consequence) determined by the quality of the principle used during its acquisition. There is now a type that is the drudgery of legal convention encountered in Glaucon's speech and the other is agreeable engenders a natural willingness to pursue it. The body politic of Glaucon's original objection and of Thrasymachus' powerful oration in praise of injustice claim that justice is the product of state and conventional coercion of the first sub-type - it is more of a "bad" and is reluctantly settled upon - while the praise of the fathers seems to indicate that the justice of tradition holds it is valuable as a means because it produces good outcomes. It is freely chosen although not inherently valuable.

These caring men base their convictions about the cosmic symmetry of virtue and desert on the authority of the "honorable" traditional Greek poets Homer and Hesiod who claim the gods bless the just with a rustic fecundity like "oaks, bearing acorns on high", or being like "the black earth bear[ing] barley and wheat".⁴⁸ These men believe that virtue and effect are truly aligned at the collective level and not completely misaligned or desperately aligned through force of law and convention. However, their alignment is still based on the power of self or communal interest and not because it is intrinsically good. This is what allows their justice to fall within the third category of goods and not be a mixed good of the second type for Adeimantus.

In addition to acquiring temporal goods through the power of justice this power is also useful in securing eternal rewards from the gods in the afterlife. Adeimantus has the fathers of

⁴⁸ (363b-c). Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 232-243; Homer, *The Odyssey*. trans. Robert Fagles. Penguin Books. 1996: XIX. 109-113.

Athens summon the authority of Musaeus and his father Orpheus to demonstrate that the gods have graciously construed social reality to collectively incentivize justice and “make it pay”, so to speak.⁴⁹ Since there are apparently higher types of goods than those which receive value by their effects the gods must not think very highly of justice to make it only a means to the pleasure of the “holy and oath-keeping man” in this life and in the next as an inebriated victor, crowned in honor and toasting the gods in Hades, mocks Adeimantus.⁵⁰ It is true that the respect these homespun men of the hearth pay to justice is higher than the value placed upon it by both the many in Glaucon’s speech or the next speakers, but it is deficient relative to another form of praise.

After speaking from familial authority Adeimantus does a curious thing: he continues his speech, not in praise of justice and blame of injustice according to the agreement he and Socrates had reached before, but within the familiar landscape of praising injustice and blaming justice.⁵¹ After considering the speech of Glaucon we are used to the provisional advocate of viciousness change speaking position according to the stage in the case being laid out against justice, but we are not prepared for such a radical and unsolicited change in the vicarious speaker’s value of justice and injustice. The question should be raised about why there appears to be a reiteration of the Glaucon’s thesis. Why is there essentially a return to Glaucon’s praise of injustice and blame of justice when Adeimantus claimed he would perform the opposite task? This is a fair question since this blame of justice in Adeimantus’ speech is about four times longer than its praise. Does this differing length of themes mean that Adeimantus was lying to Socrates in order to obtain his consent to speak on a topic that was previously covered? Is the pious, moralistic Adeimantus

⁴⁹ (363c).

⁵⁰ (363d), (620a).

⁵¹ (362e).

prone to being side-tracked during a dialogical exchange? Even though he agrees to say one thing about a topic, is he susceptible to forgetting or is not taking seriously the convictions produced in the verbal exchange of the exotic form of argument?

1.3.2. The Blame of the Religious Malpractitioners

There are two types of people Adeimantus speaks on behalf of and one he speaks alongside of in his praise of injustice. The first type of person on whose behalf he speaks in the praise of injustice is the conventional religious malpractitioner. These are figures that have obtained a position of power within society and ply their trade by twisting the traditional poets to give a theological rationalization for what a disciple of Thrasymachus would say: the gods have arranged social reality to misalign virtue and desert. This means that good men that act justly are regularly punished according to the will of the gods and that the unjust often receive great blessings.⁵² They selectively cite certain passages in Homer and Hesiod as support for their self-serving theology.⁵³

And self-serving this theology is since these priests and diviners, continuing in their insistence on corrupting the traditional sources of piety, cite Musaeus and Orpheus as the authorities bestowing upon them the knowledge and the power of ritually manipulating the gods through public and private rites.⁵⁴ Their occupation is a perversion of the hearth's traditional religiosity and morality for the sake of individual gain in a more impersonal political context. Ranging the city as hired guns, they proclaim that the only way for the affluent of the polis to curry favor with the gods and atone for their past injustices or obtain indulgence is to employ

⁵² (364b).

⁵³ (364c-e).

⁵⁴ (364e-365a).

their services as experts in purification rituals like sacrifices, public games, or invocations to the deity.⁵⁵

1.3.3. The Blame of the Hypothetical Interlocutor: The Cunning Man of the Polis

This theological corruption eventually results in a moral corruption of the youth, especially the young men of “good natures”, earnest young men whose experience with the diversity of the polis leaves them unable to go through their lives unexamined.⁵⁶ Young men who now consciously set out on a search for answers and meaning to the newly discovered absurdity of this fleeting quantity of life arbitrarily allocated to them in a given time, unconsciously searching for the unarticulated comfort of the home snatched from their souls. The doctrines of these religious malpractitioners transform the good young man from a filial and pious boy to a raging young lion who expresses the deep wounding caused by the loss of traditional religious assurance through the confusion caused from twisted theology by setting out on a cynical path of wrath and injustice. No longer content to accept things as given from customary sources, the newly corrupted young man finds the “truth” about social reality in the predictable sources.

These contemporary secular literary practitioners of the polis believe themselves to be simply “describing” the injustice of reality to their target audience with the expectation that the impressionable young man of potential will confuse their social descriptions for the normative exhortations of their former fathers. The social diagnosis that these wise intellectuals like Pindar, Simonides, and Archilochus give to the young men are both familiar and grim: the only value of justice is that of appearance, and it is better to be unjust and appear just than to be just and appear unjust. Not only do the unjust acquire all the earthy riches that come along with a

⁵⁵ (364e).

⁵⁶ (365a).

reputation for justice, but they also curry the favor of the gods in return for an eternal reward with the goods they unjustly acquire on earth among men.⁵⁷ Justice alone is weak. It is the preoccupation of the naïve, fools, or the rustic fathers.

Enticing as these words are when whispered into the ears of the vulnerable youth, it appears that they are not immediately convincing. The youthful piety of the fathers and of caring men is activated in the young man. It musters its forces for a desperate counterattack against these new ideas that are expressed in an exotic form of prose and the familiar medium of lyrical poetry. The “someone” Adeimantus introduces as a new speaker here appears to be the conscience of the traditionally pious father or caring man objecting to the extreme risk of only appearing to be just and not be unjust. Being caught as unjust without being powerful enough to transcend the dilemma of Glaucon’s “many”, the relative impotence of the individual to the politically organized collective, would surely result in “paying the price”.⁵⁸ Adeimantus’ rebuttal to this counsel is remarkable for several reasons. The first reason is that he answers in the first-person plural “we”, suggesting that the previous “good young man” has largely completed his conversion into a worldly man of cunning and is now in the process of confronting any lingering paternal, common-sense objections to this newly adopted path his intellectual journey has forced him down.⁵⁹

The second thing we should note is the end for which justice now needs to be praised by Socrates. This conventionally immoral path of behavior is undertaken by this young man for happiness. How else would a great soul obtain solace upon recently learning at a impressionable age that the gods appear to speak in a contradictory manner within their own sources and these

⁵⁷ (365b-c).

⁵⁸ (365c-d).

⁵⁹ “We shall reply” in (365d) is translated from “φήσομεν” (*phēsomen*).

apparent contradictions are also in great ethical tension with what you have been told to be true by your family and friends your entire life, resulting in a loss of faith and a monumental attempt to fill this void by means of agnostic intellectuals, foreign spirituality, hedonistic relationships, the glory of raw power, or glamorous goods that the cosmopolitan polis can offer to a vigorous nature which refuses to acquiesce to the anesthesia of nihilism and the will to nothing? Time is of the essence, is it not? This desire for meaning and will to feel, the inability of this type of soul to be satisfied with mundane conventional goods, is all too often stripped from it by the structural power of routine and convention over the course of a lifetime until a weary assent at the cry of the spiritually exhausted “vanity of vanities!” is felt to be a sufficient negative totality to the absurdities offered by the human condition. Isn’t the vehemence with which some provisional advocates of injustice speak not merely for the sake of argument but also for the sake of rescuing a lost boy? Wouldn’t the caring man, be he naïve as Gyges’ sheep or cunning as the city fox, either insist on or cultivate the instinctually maintained value placed on justice by the moralism of this youth’s homeless idealism? For us, the audience, is this the remedy that is ultimately prescribed? Even more dangerous, is the demanded cure by the anguished soul the required remedy of its solace? Is it not also a cause of the sickness? And a symptom?

The third thing introduced by Adeimantus and the cunning man are the structural means of “getting away” with injustice. In response to the wisdom of the fathers counseling against injustice Adeimantus plans for secret associations to be organized for the application of force against his most effective accusers and opponents. The unjust man will team up with well-trained sophists deployed in the public sphere to captivate the masses by persuading them of the virtue of his just reputation.⁶⁰ As for the gods and the punishment he to incur from them in this life

⁶⁰ (365d).

or the afterlife, Adeimantus and the cunning man reply that if there are no gods or if they are of the disinterested sort then the quality of one's actions on earth are theologically irrelevant. If they are personal gods the only sources we have concerning their nature and behavior are from the traditional poets (Homer and Hesiod) of convention, but as the religious malpractitioner has shown us, these gods can be ritually manipulated to absolve injustice.⁶¹ Therefore, considering either men or gods, it is more rational to act unjustly in this life to acquire the means of securing one's temporal happiness and eternal rewards than it is to be just and be oppressed by the strong and only receive the removal of punishment from sin by the gods in the afterlife. Contra custom, the cunning fox of the polis appears to escape punishment of both men and gods and avoid paying the heavy price of injustice.⁶²

Adeimantus continues his praise of injustice in discussing its principle: that of willingness. Because of the extreme structural and theological disincentives of social reality no one willingly does justice. The only people that willingly act justly are those that either have a divine nature which is intrinsically averse to vice and is virtuous regardless of environment, or one that has achieved a knowledge of what justice is and uses it to avoid acting unjust. The principle of justice is necessity since people only do it because of a deficiency (relative impotence).

Socrates is again assaulted by Adeimantus and the cunning man, an improved Thrasymachus, in stating the exact question "they" desire to be answered and subsequently framing the way in which it must be answered. All literary sources and forms, both poets and prose writers, agree in their praise of justice and blame of injustice is determined by the effects

⁶¹ (365e).

⁶² (365a-b).

of each. There is a conventional literary agreement on categorizing justice as a third type of good in Glaucon's typology, goods for the sake of another end. However, no one has dared to argue that justice is stronger than injustice in the soul when it is stripped of these social goods of wealth, power, and reputation.⁶³ Speaking in terms of Glaucon's formulation of the question, no one agrees that the principle of justice as an intrinsic good is more powerful than that of injustice.

If the fathers of custom had praised the power of justice from childhood in this manner instead of its products would not each man "be his own best guard, afraid that in doing injustice he would dwell with the greatest evil"?⁶⁴ Would not this type of praise allow the impressionable boy to realize the true power of justice while being kept in a constant state of fear at the awesome power of the heavy price to be paid both on earth in the soul and before the gods if one were to take this teaching for folly?⁶⁵ Surely a correction to the father's deficient praise would have saved his son the hardship of going through form after form of socially available sources to obtain the happiness that this erroneous praise has stolen from him. Instead of the power of justice being an external principle in the form of a ceasefire created among a group of relatively weak individuals, wouldn't it be as eagerly adopted and practiced by the individual as self-interest currently is? A high praise of virtue would remedy the complaint of Glaucon's "many" by exchanging the true principle of justice from the coercive necessity of a proximate group of weak individuals that quietly desire to commit the gravest offenses on one another to that of an eager willingness of the content individual within a community. Is Adeimantus implying that this solution, the focus on principle instead of effect, would negate the need of the state along with its

⁶³ (366e).

⁶⁴ (366e-367a).

⁶⁵ (367a).

coercive laws and instead require the properly taught custom of the deme as the only institutions required to obtain an acceptable social equilibrium?

This suggests that Adeimantus is not so much interested in the intersubjective effects or products of justice as in its power to produce happiness in the soul of the individual. The solution Adeimantus proposes to this fundamental error in the instruction of children is this:

Now, don't only show us by the argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but show what each in itself does to the man who has it that makes the one bad and the other good.⁶⁶

Beyond the demands of Glaucon and Thrasymachus, Adeimantus wants Socrates to show him using a new form of persuasion in argument more than the “strength” of justice contra the power of injustice in a political context. For the tormented soul that has lost all assurance for any certainty regarding the grand questions of life and of solace, for a young man that is too old to dwell merrily in the boyhood obliviousness of familial custom and not old enough to have been taught apathy by suffering defeat after defeat from the conditioning social environment, but just old enough to feel, for the one who knows what it is to receive the sentence of homelessness in one’s home, the goods of this world will not suffice. A more noble task is required from reason for justice. Clothed in a new form of dialectic a rational scheme of justice must situate itself in the soul of the “good natured” youth and fulfill the function that customary myth once did. The true eulogist of justice will be able to praise its power to make one good over that of injustice’s power to make one bad by attaching the reputation of injustice to the just man and of justice to the unjust man whether or not it is noticed by men or gods.

While Adeimantus appears to recognize Socrates’ previous classification of justice as a mixed good, he seems to reject this for the sake of argument, commanding him to praise it as an

⁶⁶ (367b).

intrinsic good. It is revealing why Adeimantus implores Socrates to praise justice for its intrinsic power in the soul rather than its social effects, for he claims that Socrates has spent his “whole life considering nothing else than this”.⁶⁷ The suggestion here appears to be that the singular dedication of Socrates to obtaining answers about life’s most important questions, to the point of his loss of social prestige and his penury, appear to be an impressive counter-structural witness against the new intellectual sources which have influenced Adeimantus. This recognition by Adeimantus coupled with the burden he has laid upon Socrates finds its explanation in a rhetorical appeal to Socrates’ honor to satisfy his youthful desires.⁶⁸ Or it could imply that he interprets Socrates as one of “those who have care of anyone” (*pantes*), as a caring figure of custom who’s only major difference is that instead of instructing a naïve boy armed only with the myths of Homer and Hesiod he must persuade a cynical young man with the employment of a strange verbal method in the company made of fortune. Is Socrates able to accomplish in a conversation what Ariston failed to perform in during an entire childhood?

What is a possible dramatic explanation for the difference in these brother’s objections to Socrates’ praise of justice in Book I? Maybe it is that Adeimantus’ full participation in a religious procession for a foreign deity, from marching in the Athenian contingent to planning on celebrating the Thracian deity all night, might indicate his concern with custom and desire to know the normative power of justice. Glaucon’s apparently nominal religiosity, his taste for the exotic, and his weakness in the presence and promise of younger men explain his injunction that Socrates must prove that justice alone does not result in the dumbfounding litany of punishments meted out by the awesome power of convention and his explanatory reliance on abstraction and

⁶⁷ (367e).

⁶⁸ (367a).

beauty. Whatever it is, it is likely that the mode and content of the younger sons of Ariston's vigorous objections are too heavy a burden for their elder to bear, especially this late in the evening. The youthful zeal of their provisional assault against the value of justice will result in Socrates offering his terms of surrender, unable to seriously continue to hold the position in front of his listeners that justice is virtue and wisdom and produces unity.

1.4. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that Socrates is operating unwillingly at this setting in the Piraeus because of the two major dramatic captures he experiences. If Socrates repeatedly indicates he is unwilling to be there and discuss the question of justice at length (358d) then this should call into question most literal or ironic interpretations of the *Republic*. These perspectives largely assume Socrates to be some type of mouthpiece to deliver a positive Platonic teaching about metaphysics, ethics, politics, etc. The reason why there is a Book II, or the rest of the *Republic* at all, stems from Glaucon's rejection of Socrates' speeches, particularly against Thrasymachus, in Book I. This is done in the form of an open challenge for Socrates to "truly persuade" the men present that he is right in substance, not only because he is victorious over Thrasymachus. I argue that Plato's brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus make a provisional blame of justice and praise of the life of injustice in their own ways. Glaucon speaks for the many about the true origins of justice and gives a mythological flair to a Herodotean story about the Ring of Gyges as his method of blaming the power of justice and praising that of injustice. Adeimantus lacks this artistic talent but makes up for it in existential intensity by giving the men a loosely autobiographical account through a series of hypothetical interlocutors that tells of the gradual corruption of a promising youth who is forced by all circumstance, evidence, and reason, to choose the life of injustice as the ultimate means of obtaining happiness.

Most commentators focus on Glaucon's account because of the mythological or political content, and because he eventually becomes the primary interlocutor of Socrates in the dialogue, especially for the weightier philosophical exchanges. However, this is not the case in the beginning. Here philosophy as seen in Books V-VII is mostly absent, and the characters do not know that it will eventually come to dominate their exchange. At the start, Adeimantus gives the longest and most stirring Thrasymachian speech, and his exchange with Socrates dominates things early on. The similarity between the brothers and Thrasymachus concerns ethical substance. Their difference with him is that they both do not speak in praise of injustice openly, but provisionally, or as they claim indirectly, as spokesmen or mouthpieces for things they have heard from other sources. Because of the example Socrates has just made of Thrasymachus before everyone, their rhetorical position calls into question what their true beliefs about justice and injustice really are. Are the brothers actually unpersuaded or undecided about the value of justice and injustice?

If so, this would make them good faith partners with Socrates, and their efforts to define and value justice and injustice could be collaborative and propositionally instructive. If it is a reputational calculation about the desire to speak handsomely and daringly about life's most serious issues before all those who are gathered without risking the shame of humiliation from Socrates by not speaking in their own name, then it would set the scene for what follows to be more competitive. If this is the case, coupled with Socrates' unwillingness, there should great doubt on the positive content that is produced from such an exchange since it is a means to an end, not the end itself. This opening dramatic option therefore puts both what follows, the relational quality between the three main speakers and the verbal content generated from their

interactions, into tension with most versions of what is believed to occur for the remainder of the text.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ See the above discussions of the Literal and Ironic genus in the Introduction for examples of this belief.

CHAPTER TWO. A PLACE FOR JUSTICE

This chapter will show us the initial Socratic response to these powerful challenges and the first results of the famous city in speech approach the men agree to adopt for the definition and valuation of justice and injustice. Socrates' will originally express doubt at being successful in praising justice in the way demanded by the brothers. Hadn't he just praised justice and blamed injustice in Book I? Did they not hear it? While these speeches were rejected by Glaucon at the beginning of Book II, what about them specifically was unpersuasive to the brothers? Their challenges are mostly silent on this topic, leaving Socrates to not approach the same topic he has recently spoken on with success in the same "dialectical" way. Instead, a joint effort between the men to build a city in speech is selected as the way Socrates will praise justice and blame injustice. I think it is important to mention that they decide to make a city in speech, not a regime or state in speech. This is important because the dialogue's title is *Politeia*, not *Polis*. The *politeia* only becomes the topic of discussion after the emphasis on the polis is broken, and after much resistance by Socrates.

The opening discussion of the city (polis) in speech with Adeimantus is often known as being productive of the "true city", the first city in speech. However, I will show, in partial agreement with commentators like McKeen that there are multiple cities formed in this exchange, three to be exact: the true city (*alēthinē polis*), the most necessary city (*anagkaiotatē polis*), and the little city (*smikra polis*). I claim that the multiplicity of cities in this short section is a product of a series of rejections by Adeimantus: there is a direct dramatic cause to their existence. I argue that the *sunoiikia* at the beginning of the discussion is the true city mentioned to Glaucon and described to Adeimantus at its end are the same, and that the reversion from the little city to it is allowed by the agreement to include laborers into the little city.

Ultimately, the true city, a stateless, village existence, is left at the insistence of Glaucon for a city that reflects his own personal tastes. This gives allowance to the demand that the city the men are discussing does not need to be only in speech for the sake of praising justice and blaming injustice as was originally agreed upon but must reflect personal prejudices. Plato has Socrates show that the creation of the state is caused by excess (i.e., demand for delicacies), not because he is eager to construct a complex political system. The political dilemma of the guardian class of being gentle towards domestic fellows and spirited towards foreigners lead the men to shift to the topic of their education. The education of these guardian youths in speech is depicted as a roundabout method of constructing a city of speech to perform the dialogue's major task, not something that Socrates proposes early on and demands the men dwell on.

Chapter Two analytical outline:

1. Socrates' Reaction to the Sons of Ariston
2. Methodological agreement: the city in speech
3. Adeimantus: the true city
4. Glaucon: the feverish city and the creation of the state

2.1. Socrates' Reaction to the Sons of Ariston

The *Republic* does not show Socrates being coerced into an agreement with the brothers that praises injustice and blames justice. One would think that after the length and intensity of the blame combined with the pattern of a hesitancy of Socrates to philosophize with these men, this traditional protagonist would simply accept the praise of injustice, state that he remains unpersuaded by it, and relieve himself from the exchange. After all, there is an established precedent for this principle of agreement. Socrates should know, he created it with Thrasymachus.

This is precisely what does not occur. Instead, the Socratic narrator depicts his reaction at the conclusion of Adeimantus' speech as one of "wonder" and "delight". This response to the brothers' praises of the value of injustice and ruthless blame of justice is one of praise. If we are to take the statement concerning the remuneration methods of an impoverished philosopher in Book I seriously, then this unexpected reaction to the brother's speeches is one of rendering repayment to a party. To repay someone implies that one has incurred a debt to another party and that in giving them their due one is rendering to them what is owed. There was a relation of disequilibrium within a unity that is being made right. The reaction is worth quoting in full:

I listened, and although I had always been full of wonder at the nature of Glaucon and Adeimantus, at this time I was particularly delighted and said, 'That wasn't a bad beginning, you children of that man, that Glaucon's lover made to his poem about your distinguishing yourselves in the battle at Megara:

'Sons of Ariston, divine offspring of a famous man.'

That, my friends, in my opinion is good. For something quite divine must have happened to you, if you are remaining unpersuaded that injustice is better than justice when you are able to speak that way on its behalf.¹

Here the repaying of the brothers come in several parts. The first form consists of a silently narrated praise uttered by the Socratic narrator about the "nature" of the two brothers. The second component of this praise consists of Socrates using the authority of a "poet" and his poem by reciting a line from it concerning the brother's valor in battle for their city. Aside from the poetic reference possibly being another allusion to the dramatic affects driving Glaucon this should be a familiar form of praise if certain passages of the brother's speeches are kept in mind.

¹ (368a-b). Shorey translates the first part of this praise as "While I had always admired the natural parts of Glaucon and Adeimantus...", rendering "φύσιν" (*phusin*) as "natural parts", Bloom's "nature" fits better here.

The third part of praise here is spoken directly by Socrates, addressing them as “children”, reaffirming their valor in combat, and insisting that there must have been “divine” intervention on their behalf to rationally articulate the praise of injustice in such a way while remaining unpersuaded by it. The wonder (ἡγάμην, *aigamain*) and delight (ἡσθην, *haisthain*) of Socrates at the divine nature of the two brothers appears to be that they can speak in such vehement praise of injustice and blame of justice without being consciously persuaded to adopt conventional views about their relative value. Apart from the methodological discussion of the rendered praise that supports the hermeneutical structure, the primary interpretative question here concerns the divine nature of the brothers. Examination of Socrates’ praise of their character will give us some insight into the meaning that Socrates assigns to the two primary discussants.

When dealing with this question of Socrates’ understanding of the “divine nature” the first thing we should note is the usage of his language. The word choice of using the predicate “divine” (θεῖον, *theion*) to ascribe to their nature should not come as a shock to the reader or be seen as sarcastic, even if it is ironic. I think Socrates is drawing this predicate from the typology of what we will call the “naturally just man” that was recently formulated.² Recall that near the end of his tandem speech with the “calculating” political man which discusses the principle of both justice and injustice Adeimantus declares that because of the bewildering and inexorable array of conventional powers that conspire to denigrate the efficient power of justice - its deficient customary and familial praise, the impiety of religious malpractitioners, and the nihilism of the cunning fox of the polis - a type of person who still chooses justice is only “someone who from a divine nature cannot stand doing injustice or who has gained knowledge

² This happens only two Stephanus pages prior. (366c-d).

and keeps away from injustice, no one else is willingly just...”.³ In light of the current conventional state of affairs regarding the value of justice the only two causes of an elite man willingly practicing justice are: 1) deity of nature, and 2) knowledge.⁴ It appears that Socrates either agrees with this typology of the conventionally “willing” just man or is influenced by it since he returns to this classification by ascribing the first type of individual, one having a “divine nature”, to both brothers in his praise of them.

It should be clear that Socrates does not actually think the sons of Ariston are gods or demigods since he directly names their human father (Ariston) through Glaucon’s lover and leaves the mother (Perictione) unnamed, hence the irony. But is this sarcasm? In what sense then does Socrates mean that the brothers are “divine” (θεία) in their “nature”? Taking into account the previous links this phrase has to Adeimantus’ division of the willingly just man and the apparently contradictory product of their speeches in being unpersuaded by the value of injustice while speaking so highly in its favor, it could be that the root of the Socratic praise of the brothers’ nature (φύσει) stems from his opinion that their “divinity” comes from being able to believe in the relative value of justice irrationally, without argument, and contrary to the compulsion and necessity of convention. Judging from the thematic focus of their speeches in blame of justice it is evident that Glaucon and Adeimantus are confident in their grasp of its definition in order to provisionally blame it in such a manner or else they wouldn’t demand that Socrates present them with an argument in favor of its intrinsic goodness.

However, this “knowledge” of what justice constitutes must be an intuitive one and not based on the power of reason since the reason of the polis has been corrupted and twisted by its

³ (366c). “Divine nature” at this point is referenced as “θεία φύσει”, (*theia phusei*), with θεία also being able to mean “sent by the gods”, or “godsent”.

⁴ Taken from “οἶδεν”, (*oiden*) in (366c).

social heterogeneity and impersonality of being, its abstraction: this “logos” has shattered the mythos of family custom. Adeimantus is desperate for an ethical teaching based on the newly ascendent thought form of reason to replace this loss. Glaucon wants to be assured of its temporal products. Both yearn to experience its power in one form or another. It could be that Socrates’ attributing the brother’s divine nature to unreason, to the irrationality of instinct as the divine path to justice, is a nod to Adeimantus’ distinction between this path and that of knowledge through reason and argument. The route of the “divine” to virtue is different than the route of the “wise” to it.

More importantly for us, it should be noted that while the sons of Ariston may be naturally divine in this specific sense they agree about their curiosity in the other route the leads through knowledge.⁵ A dialectical apology of this way to justice is required for them to be “truly persuaded” of the Socratic association between justice, virtue, and knowledge. The Socratic exchange with the powerful short accuser of Thrasymachus within the dialogue and the forces of public opinion’s long accusation are inadequate to consciously persuade the brothers of injustice’s superiority in value.

We claim to have confirmation of our interpretation of Socrates’ classification of the brothers as naturally divine when he confesses that he bases his praise on the evidence of their character and not their arguments.⁶ The unspoken actions and qualitative states of being

⁵ (450b).

⁶ “Now you truly don’t seem to me to be being persuaded. I infer it from the rest of your character, since, on the basis of the arguments themselves, I would distrust you.” (368b) Shorey: “And I believe that you are really not convinced. I infer this from your general character since from your words alone I should have distrusted you.” Bloom turns “λόγους” (*logos*) into “arguments while it becomes “words” with Shorey. The debate about the meaning of this important word is long and complex and cannot realistically be settled here, but among many of its possible use-meanings, another is “tale”, or “fable”.

expressive of the nature of each brother and not their spoken words exemplify their nature to Socrates. What is it about the character of Glaucon and Adeimantus that is a testament to their divinity? Isn't it by speech that they have communicated they are unpersuaded by the praise of vice? More directly, why aren't the brothers persuaded by the praise of injustice? Why haven't they succumbed to the might of popular valuations? What is the source of their divinity? Even though Adeimantus is intellectually well-versed in all the standard and cliched critiques of the secular detractors of justice it might be that his ability to disbelieve the teachings of convention concerning justice is the residual power that familial custom and religious myth have on his soul. So then, even though Adeimantus has been intellectually and existentially introduced to this transvaluation of custom, his instincts, or his heart, still refuse to accept them. We know this because he demands that Socrates use argument to bring his head back into alignment with that of his hearth. And Socrates might attempt to do just this, but only by becoming a legislator and to a formal polis.

The praise of Socrates brings him to a dilemma: because of his claim that the character of the brothers which dictates the contents of their beliefs rather than that of argument, Socrates arrives at two conclusions. The first is that he is unable to employ his gift in reasoning to come to their aid and truly persuade them through dialectical argumentation that justice is superior to injustice.⁷ Even though both brothers agree with the conclusion of Socrates' relative ordering of virtue over vice his way of arriving at it has been rejected by them. The powerlessness Socrates expresses for helping them obtain their end originates from the fact that each brother demands that he use the very same tool and method that has previously failed (in Book I) to persuade them

⁷ "On the one hand, I can't help out. For in my opinion I'm not capable of it; my proof is that when I thought I showed in what I said to Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice, you didn't accept it from me." (368b).

in service of essentially the same goal: to make an argument or demonstration of justice's superiority in the immediate aftermath of its dramatic rejection by both brothers. The second part of the dilemma Socrates states he is in comes from a fear of impiety. Socrates says he would be afraid to leave the honor of justice undefended while he is still able to speak.⁸ This fear of impiety that is the stated dramatic principle of Socrates' agreement to continue his exchange on the topic of justice could be seen as his repaying the gods and giving them their due by "succoring justice" and not allowing disagreement to stand between friends.

2.2. Methodological Agreement: The City in Speech

The consummate exchange between the three major discussants begins with this recollection by the narrator, giving us a clearer image of the dramatic structure that begins the proper discussion about justice. More specifically, if our method is correct, most of the remainder of the *Republic* constitutes Socrates' praise of justice and blame of injustice:

Glaucón and the others begged me in every way to help out and not to give up the argument, but rather to seek out what each is and the truth about the benefit of both. So I spoke my opinion.⁹

Socrates is reminding us that these men who had exercised a kind of coercion to situate him within the primary dramatic location of Polemarchus' house in the Piraeus are now exercising a type of persuasion on him to change the principle that Socrates has been operating according to from unwilling to willing. The specifics of their begging Socrates to continue discoursing with them, the fourth time Socrates has been exhorted to either begin or continue speaking through the whole work, has two components. The first concerns the way, the method, or form of discourse. Rather than carry on with impressive polemical bursts like Thrasymachus,

⁸ (368b).

⁹ (368c).

a colorful monologue like Glaucon, or autobiographically like Adeimantus, the group insists that Socrates employ his familiar dialectical form of argumentation in this case.¹⁰ This is a method of reasoning that was recently used in Book I with Polemarchus and Thrasymachus.

Dialectical reasoning generally consists of a verbal exchange between two parties about an issue that there is discord or confusion about. In the Socratic dialogues these issues often revolve around either the definition of a term or the being of an entity. The structure of this type of reasoning involves two interlocutors, one in the “active” role of asking the other questions about his beliefs and the other in the “passive” role of answering. Implicit within this choice of discussion form are the contents that are generally put through this refining process.

Traditionally these contents consist of the raw materials of conventional opinion some interlocutor holds about an entity or its being. Expressed within this process of the dialectic should be an “ascent” from opinion to knowledge. In a dialectical exchange both parties begin with (presumably) dissonant beliefs about something and attempt to sing in harmony at the end of the exchange. This happens by a lively yet rigorous process of question and answer that reworks or clarifies the belief under inspection until a consensus about it is arrived at once a successful agreement is reached. If unsuccessful, one party will refuse to continue discoursing and leave the exchange before a final judgment can be rendered about the topic at hand.

The second component of the group’s request to Socrates concerns the end for which this method is employed. In this case it appears to be twofold: a definition of what injustice and justice are and the truth about their relative value. In essence, the truth about two closely related things. Therefore, we can more fully define dialectic as a verbal method employing questioning and answer between two parties to arrive at a mutually agreed upon truth about something.

¹⁰ Both Bloom and Shorey translate “λόγον” (*logon*) in (368c) as argument.

Dialectical reasoning is mainly distinguished from eristic reasoning by the purposes for which it is employed rather than their formal identity. The purpose of the dialectic is to obtain truth by arriving at clearly defined terms whereas that of the eristic is to obtain victory by using opaquely grasped terms as if they were clearly defined.¹¹

Socrates begins the fulfillment of his attempt to praise justice by beating a methodological retreat of sorts. He is hesitant to approach his task of defining justice and injustice and arguing for the superiority of justice head on. It could be that this retreat is a tactical maneuver and is taken by Socrates because of its failure to persuade his audience of these very topics in Book I. To attempt to discuss the same thing again in the same way would be foolishness even if there are different parties populating the positions of the auditors, identified by Socrates as “the others”. Instead, Socrates admits that this approach would be more fitting for a “clever man”, or “one who sees sharply”.¹² This mention of a “clever man” is a nod to the hypothetical accuser of justice introduced by Adeimantus, the calculating man, one who claims to have absolute answers to both of the questions Socrates and the others are after.¹³ Because the brothers and the group are not persuaded by the arguments of these clever men of the polis, of public opinion, or of caring man, Socrates proposes an indirect route to the question at hand through the polis.

Likely taking his cues from Adeimantus, Socrates introduces two “someones” (τις, *tis*) into the dialogue when setting up the proper method of approach to the question at hand. The

¹¹ (454a).

¹² (368c-d). “Not clever men” comes from “οὐ δεινοί, δοκῶ” (*ou deinoi doko*), and men who “see sharply” from “ὄξυ βλέπουσιν” (*ochu blepousin*).

¹³ The words for “wise” and “sage fox” as Bloom poetically translates them are “σοφοί” (*sophoi*) and “σοφωτάτων” (*sophotaton*) in (365c) when referencing the secular intellectuals of the polis, and “φίλε, ... λογιζόμενος” (*phile ... logichisiomenos*) as “one who calculates” according to Bloom, or “calculating friend” by Shorey at (366a).

first “someone” appears harsh and coercive, an individual that has previously ordered a group of poor-sighted men to read small letters from a long distance.¹⁴ This obviously won’t do, at least among the people under our dramatic concern since they are not among those who “see[s] sharply”, like the cunning man of the polis. Unlike this social type Socrates and then others do not claim to have absolutely persuasive answers concerning the definition and value of justice and injustice. If they (or one of them) did they would not be undertaking such an activity. In order to rescue this group of philosophically poor-sighted men another “someone” (τις) is introduced by Socrates. This someone is called a “godsend” and has the divine idea to turn their gaze upon the same letters but in a different location that depicts them in a much larger form.¹⁵ For the purpose of addressing the relative value of justice and injustice this would be a more practical way of approaching an answer given the limited capabilities of the seekers. The tactic here is to read these same letters in their larger form (yet different location) and then use this knowledge of them when deciphering the smaller, harder to read letters.

One of the primary epistemological assumptions this analogical method rests on is mentioned by Socrates in an aside, “if, of course, they do happen to be the same.”¹⁶ This “if” (εἰ) is an important qualifier for several reasons. The first is that it appears to leave open the possibility that there is not a valid analogy between the two parts it is composed of.¹⁷ The second

¹⁴ Bloom correctly translates “τις” (*tis*) as “someone” each time it appears in this passage. Shorey leaves the first “someone” untranslated and implied, rendering the sentence as: “...if we, with not very keen vision, were bidden to read small letters from a distance...”.

¹⁵ (368d). Both Bloom and Shorey translate “ἐφάνη” (*ephanai*) as “godsend”. See the above footnote on (366c) for another similar word “godsent”, “θεία φύσει”, (*theia phusei*). The similarity between the declinations of φύσις (*phusis*) to express a divinely associated nature is clear.

¹⁶ (368d). Where “if” is taken from “εἰ”.

¹⁷ This admission should temper the desire of interpreters to view the “Anthropological” principle as the of key to unlocking all of Plato’s works. Disregarding what appears to be a multitude of answers given to similar questions throughout his corpus, and often propounded by

hints at another epistemological assumption that appears to go unchallenged by the group's members. This operation of displacing one's focus from the specific form of justice and injustice to a more legible horizon by the godsent man implies that this someone already has knowledge of these smaller letters. To propose an inference within this set of opposites from smaller to larger, and back to smaller would be invalid unless someone already possessed knowledge of the smaller.¹⁸

This larger location is the polis. It is the analytical focus that is established upon the agreement between Socrates and Adeimantus. Its smaller counterpart is the individual man, specifically, the soul of the man as we will find out.¹⁹ The specific approach of these eulogists of justice consists in establishing the form or pattern of justice within the larger context of the city in speech to gain a better grasp of its meaning and value and then turn "inwards" towards the soul of the man. The assumption appears to be that this man is also one of speech, and not any specific man currently or previously existing. In addition to catching sight of justice in the relatively bigger city Socrates also proposes a genealogical approach similar to that of

different protagonists, these readers hold that the ultimate Platonic metaphysical doctrine that conditions his writings is that there is some kind of macrocosmic-microcosmic relationship between the human and cosmos. This is one of the primary proof texts procured in support of these types of readings. It is admirable for the emphasis on the symmetry it sees in the form of Plato's thought and also for the attempt to seriously engage with Plato's texts. Read literally this methodological insistence should be taken with caution. Read dramatically it should be highly doubted.

¹⁸ Rosen attempts to dismiss this paradox by the assumption that being able to witness justice coming into being rests on knowledge "from our experience of cities... That is to say, we already know what justice is; otherwise we could not recognize it when it appears." Rosen, *Plato's Republic*, 71. This rests on its own assumption that there is an agreement about what justice is, making its observation of coming into existence pointless. Since this agreement clearly does not exist between the men, justice must be "observed" through a painfully obvious construction of something like a city. Annas denies that when Socrates demands an agreed upon meaning of the terms in dispute, he does not want a definition of them. Annas, *IPR*, 23.

¹⁹ "There is, we say, justice of one man; and there is, surely, justice of a whole city too?" (368e).

Glaucón's, claiming that this process of watching the city's becoming, or coming into being, will be of aid to their identifying justice.²⁰

Like the analogical component to this retreat of method, this genealogical component also seems open to the observation that it would be a useless methodological tool if someone already possessed knowledge of what justice and injustice are. If not, who would know what to look for and watch come into existence during the polis' development? Socrates asks his interlocutor Adeimantus if this way of proceeding is "resolved" with a warning that the attempt to undertake this quest will be "no small job", echoing previous statements of hesitancy and giving Adeimantus and the others one last chance to renege on their demands before this famous conversation begins. Answering for the entire group and without any indication of conferring with the others present Adeimantus exclaims that it has "been considered" and ends with a command to not "do anything else."²¹

There is a question of why it is that Adeimantus and not Glaucon is the first major interlocutor with Socrates in the famous discussion about justice. One would think that Glaucon might have been the intended original target since his name only appears alone a few sentences above when the narrator relays to us that everyone begged him to continue discussing with the men.²² There is also the chosen method of proceeding, with its emphasis on abstraction and ideal types that seems to favor Glaucon's approach. Is it the idealism of Adeimantus that is eager to receive answers to his questions and gain solace which makes him speak up first, possibly against the intentions of Socrates? The multiple references to his speech in the theological language of "godsend" or the nod towards the hypothetical "someones" may have activated

²⁰ (358c), (358e-359a).

²¹ (369b).

²² (368c).

Adeimantus' inquisitiveness. Was it the mention of the contrivance of a structural solution in dialogue with the "calculating man's" plan of getting away with perfect injustice that resonates with Adeimantus and motivates him to take over for his brother? How else does one explain the sudden insistence of Socrates about the city being the primary unit of analysis instead of the individual man? Surely Socrates believed there to be other social units of analysis that possess justice. Even though it is easy to read this part of the text with the feeling of anticipation of the constructive part due to a previously acquired knowledge of what the *Republic* is famous for if we abstract from this customary expectation we should ask ourselves this: does this move to the polis by Socrates reasonably follow from the previous conversation unless a method makes it clear?

2.3. Adeimantus: The True City

The question over the presence and the reason for the presence, of multiple cities in a dialogue where *a* city in speech is to be founded is the most important empirical clue to the necessity of adopting a dramatic hermeneutical method to read the *Republic*. Are there multiple cities? If this is so, why are there multiple cities? Most commentators believe there are multiple cities found in the *Republic*. Traditionally there is an accepted sequence of the true city, the feverish city, and then Kallipolis.²³ There are others who believe in four cities reading, accepting the true, feverish, happy, and beautiful city (Kallipolis).²⁴ Others find there to be five explicitly

²³ Annas, *IPR*, chat. 4 & 7; Cross, *Plato's Republic*, cht. 4-5; Zuckert, *Plato's Philosophers*, 345-353; Rowe, "The City of Pigs: a key passage in Plato's *Republic*", 59; Pappas, *Plato and the Republic*, 61-64, 110-111; McDavid, "On Why the City of Pigs and Clocks are not Just", 572.

²⁴ Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings*, 178; Voegelin combines the happy and good into one with the "purified city", *Plato and Aristotle*, 97-98; Dorter combine parts of the same two cities to make the "rational city", *Transformation of Plato's Republic*, 102; Benardete, *Socrates' Second Sailing*, 44-54, 109, 123.

named cities: the true, feverish, happy, good/just, and beautiful.²⁵ I argue that there are multiple cities contained within the main argument of the *Republic* because of the frequent rejections Socrates is dealt at the hands of his interlocutors. This indicates that the account given in the *Republic* is not a linear account of a utopian city done with passive or cooperative partners but is a fragmented account because of the dramatic struggle that Plato is having Socrates report.²⁶

When describing the origins of the city in an attempt to observe the origins of justice and injustice Socrates and Adeimantus agree that one of its generating principles is that of necessity, and traditionally understood that is how the beginning of the first city is interpreted.²⁷ However, it is clear that the text lists another generating principle of the city, mainly that of the proximity of several “helpers” and “partners”. This proximate partnership generates a primitive division of labor to produce a “common settlement” (συνουκία, *sunoiikia*).²⁸ Socrates gets Adeimantus to agree that this common settlement of “partners” constituted for the sake of lifting the burden of scarcity that the individual necessarily experiences is by definition what is called “the city”, or

²⁵ Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*, 346, 348, 370, 379, 409; Strauss, *The City and Man*, 95-96, 104-105, 129; Rosen, *Plato's Republic*, 72-141, 293.

²⁶ Pappas thinks that “The most noticeable difference between Thrasymachus and Plato’s brothers is their docility towards Socrates. With the transition to Book 2 the *Republic* settles into a long Socratic lecture, sometimes interspersed with questions from Glaucon and Adeimantus.” Pappas, *Plato and the Republic*, 51. Annas thinks something similar: “...Book I contrasts sharply with the rest of the *Republic*, where in spite of the dialogue form there are no strongly characterized interlocutors, and Socrates delivers what is essentially a monologue.” Annas, *IPR*, 16. While eventually recognizing the dramatic tension between the men Bloom agrees, “With Glaucon and Adeimantus, Socrates becomes a teacher.” Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*, 337. This is to deny or minimize the intense dramatic tension underlying all the speeches.

²⁷ (369b). Not self-sufficient, or lacking self-sufficiency comes from “οὐκ αὐτάρκης” (*ouk autarkais*).

²⁸ (369c). Also, “συνουκία” (*sunoiikia*) could be translated as a (1) body of people living together, (2) a settlement, or (3) community.

polis (πόλις).²⁹ The nominal content of this definition should be more than enough to give the attentive reader a pause and make them at least suspend the unconscious imposition of any current or classical models (i.e., ancient Athens) into the substantive meaning of the word “polis” at this point.

The next few sentences give this same reader a stronger reason to abandon superimposing the social content of these assumed models into this *sunoikia*, or common settlement. Socrates continues his description of this settlement in speech by revealing to us a maintaining principle. In addition to its generating causes (e.g., necessity and functional proximity) and end (e.g., a variety of needs) there is sustaining principle that keeps the social form “animate”: that of mutually beneficial exchange. These partners do not simply gather together into a spatial proximity and simultaneously produce and consume their own goods without any interaction. This would defeat the purpose of this ingathering, which is the lifting of necessity due to the individual’s relative impotence in the face of nature’s scarcity. These partners or helpers that constitute this *sunoikia* are its content, or parts. It is the citizens as “partners” and “helpers” that associate together for the mutually beneficial end of producing “many things”.³⁰ We should treat this word *pollon* in a similar manner as the word “polis”, devoid of our basic connotations, since Socrates is about to found a city that does not look like a metropolis, nor will this place possess what we would assume to constitute “many things”. There is a double irony here, for the

²⁹ Interestingly, there is a mention of a “state” in Shorey’s translation being “assigned to” (ἐθέμεθα, *ethemetha*) a city (πόλιν, *polin*), “we give the name city or state...”. This appears to be an interpolation for “state” that is not found in the Greek text.

³⁰ This phrase “many things” is taken from “πολλῶν” (*pollon*). It clearly shares the same noun root as polis, or city. The allusion to whole, or form by its contents, or parts, a constitutive type of entity with this root “many”, is evident.

common meaning of the qualifying words does not appear to coincide with the technical description Socrates gives them. This irony leads to its dramatic negation.

At this point in the description of the city in speech there are several things we should note. The first two things are structural observations. The first is that there is no list of the basic goods that are produced in this common settlement. In a closely related note and in an apparent contrast to what will be established, there appears to be a division of labor that functions devoid of occupational specialization.³¹ Of methodological importance is the difference in nature that Socrates' genealogical account as compared to Glaucon's account given in his speech. In contrast to his vicarious narrative that depicts the parts of the city as autonomous individuals acting in a thoroughly self-interested manner with the desire to use violence and cunning to get the best of others living in proximity to them and requiring the coercion of the state's laws to produce a functional equilibrium in this war, these major elements appear to be absent in Socrates' account. The parts, or actors that compose his city are maybe "driven" into proximity with each other by necessity for basic satiation but are depicted as joining and staying together voluntarily with each other once this proximity is generated by necessity.³²

This is a far cry from the internecine war being prosecuted, or the previous killing war that has been momentarily abolished, through the mutually destructive use of state power. The

³¹ This Specialization Principle (SP), the "one man, one job" criterion of Socrates' construction, is made much of in the literature and is taken as foundational to the city in speech's form. It is seemingly violated in several places in the instance of certain occupations. Here is the only social form at large that appears to be devoid of this differentiating principle entirely. The distinction that is being pressed here is that a social order can have a division of labor that is unconditioned by the Specialization Principle.

³² To "take on" (*παραλαμβάνων*, *paralambanon*) meaning to associate with. This wording in the text leaves it open as to whether people are really forced to come together to form the *sunoiikia*, with it reading: "when one man takes on another, for one need and another for another need...". (369c) This verb *παραλαμβάνων* could also mean "to receive" or "to invite".

uneasy truce of Glaucon's polis is only maintained through the subjugation of a part by another part, hostile faction against faction, until the coming of the great man, a godlike tyrant, takes the sword of state in hand and wields it mercilessly against the whole. The Socratic response to Glaucon's cynical interpretation of human weakness is to assume that same weakness and transform it into a good. Our weakness and fear can cause the construction of the state to prevent the tyrant's oppression, or it can drive us into a peaceful cohabitation to live better than we would have as suffering individuals.³³

The second contrast between the two genealogical accounts has already been mentioned but we will endeavor to make it clearer. The two speakers have agreed that the common settlement, the city, is founded according to the necessity and proximity that produces a social equilibrium and expressed through some type of division of labor. This contrasts with "Glaucon's" conventional contention that the city's social equilibrium is only created by necessity of the ceasefire produced by the violence of law: an artificial skill (*arete*) and not nature (*phusis*). The apparent "refutation" of Glaucon's city seems to be that in the current city being described there do not appear to be any laws present to perform this function.

Once the two men have established the specifics of this common settlement there appears to be a common exchange of goods that occurs. This common exchange of goods is described as the following by Socrates:

Now, does one man give a share to another, if he does give a share, or take a share, in the belief that it's better for himself?

Certainly.³⁴

³³ Pappas, 62.

³⁴ (369c).

Descriptively this appears to be a choice in the distribution mechanism of this common settlement that Socrates offers to Adeimantus. This is not so obvious from the wording of the question. The question lays out a goods distribution structure that is based on voluntary and mutual exchange of the undefined unit of a general good (“shares”) operating on the principle of self-interest. What is the implied choice Socrates silently offers Adeimantus? Isn’t it that of a redistribution of goods among partners and helpers? Instead of being primarily self-interested and diligently trying to get ahead of their fellow settlement dwellers, wouldn’t a common settlement composed of helpers implement a mutually beneficial distribution mechanism that refuses to institutionalize faction? The important similarity between these two schemes is that both are non-coercive and do not require the law for them to function. The major difference is that the former operates according to self-interested gain of the individual while the latter operates for the communal interest of the settlement. It is this change in principle that Adeimantus seems to accept, that of exchange that operates by the idea of it being “better for” an individual. Or in its negative construction, Adeimantus rejects the exchange principle of communal reciprocity.

Is this a strained argument? A rejection of something that has not explicitly been mentioned by Socrates as proving the existence of an alternative distribution method? And on top of this, isn’t there a dramatic objection against this interpretation? Why should the careful reader accept that Adeimantus rejects this more intimate form of distribution for a more “Glauconian” model of self-interest? Perhaps, although it will be argued that the following paragraphs lend it further support. The interpretative rivals concerning the relationship between what we have identified as the common settlement and the next place mentioned are that they either are identical and only expressed differently, or that there is a progressively specific

narrative leading from one name to the other. I will argue that they are in fact different places and that there is a punctuated narrative expressing their relationship that has a dramatic explanation.

The first reason we offer for this interpretation of Adeimantus' rejection of communal reciprocity is that a principle of exchange is not a necessary attribute to list when founding a city in speech and subsequently for using a genealogical account to observe the coming to being of justice and injustice. The major ontological components that a founding requires are a generating principle, an end, a form (whole), and its contents (parts). Specifically, the polis discussed in 369b-c has the generating principle(s) of many needs and proximate relationships, helpers/partners as its contents, its social form is identified as a common settlement, and the lifting of the necessity of scarcity as its end. These pieces are the minimum that create a city in speech. There need not be a fifth part to this structure that details an efficient principle that maintains the form that has been generated by the previous structural components. While all existing cities have a distributing mechanism, its explication is beyond the required means of the descriptive founder, and subsequently beyond the analytical purpose for the city in speech. The temptation to specify and rationalize the unarticulated is one of the main motifs of the *Republic* according to this dramatic reading, and the casual response of Adeimantus presents a clear example of it. He goes beyond what is agreed upon, beyond what is analytically required, and makes Socrates give an account of the dynamic element of his city by rejecting that which was previously implied. This has the effect of lengthening the exchange and introducing a principle of faction within the polis.

The next arguments that are offered for the non-identity of the two cities that are to be compared are textual. The first of these is that Socrates' response to Adeimantus' rejection is to

“make a city in speech from the beginning”.³⁵ This could be interpreted as Socrates beginning his creation of the city in speech with the previous discussion viewed as a formal prelude of sorts. The question remains about what city came “into being” in 369b, as Socrates apparently claims.³⁶ As it has been argued above, all the sufficient structural components of a polis have been procured by Socrates and Adeimantus for a genealogical account of a social form adequate to the task at hand. Is there a new or absolute beginning expressed in Socrates’ words in 369c?

The second textual reason for our interpretation is the noticeable difference in the articulation of the structural components between these places. In the common settlement the generating principle(s) are proximate relationships and many needs.³⁷ Here, after this announced beginning Socrates now enumerates the types of needs (*χρεία*), starting with food and listing clothing, housing, and a vague category of other good, “and such”.³⁸ After this Socrates pauses and asks about the self-sufficiency of the city and its ability to produce such specific goods. It is here that we receive a second enumeration, that of the occupations of the people who compose the polis. Farmers, housebuilders, weavers, and even shoemakers and a long locution used to describe doctors all become parts of this city, the latter two being additions to the three occupations implied by the original three goods.³⁹ The increasing specificity in the parts that compose the city is an articulation of its parts, previously that of simply “partners and helpers” and “shares” of the common settlement.

³⁵ (369c).

³⁶ “...a city, as I believe, comes into being because...”. (369b).

³⁷ Shorey translates “πολλῶν ὧν ἐνδεής” (*pollōn ōn endeēs*) as “in need of many things”. Bloom’s phrase is “in need of much.” (369b).

³⁸ (369d). “τῶν τοιούτων” (*tōn toioutōn*). A term expressing impreciseness like “as such” or “just such”.

³⁹ (369d).

Similar to the above development in topical focus, these two enumerations (generating principles and parts) are enough to produce a nominally different social form, which serves as the third textual reason produced for our interpretation. Socrates and Adeimantus agree that this city is “of utmost necessity” and would only be composed of “four of five men”.⁴⁰ This ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις (*anagkaiotatē polis*) can also be translated as the most necessary city, or proper city.⁴¹ The city founded by utmost necessity and composed of parts that have close ties characterizes the proper city. With the text’s emphasis on the small and sparse nature of this social form’s population and goods we should again refrain from superimposing any type of large image of a metropole we typically associate with the word “city” into this context.

The next reason to believe that this proper city is not the *sunoinia* occurs when Socrates and Adeimantus discuss the principle of interpersonal exchange and its subsequent structure of labor in the proper city. Considering what is detailed above, the movement from generating principle(s), to parts, to end, to city, and then to questions about its maintenance, the arrangement of structural components in the discussion of the proper city here which again culminates with a discussion of exchange modality should not come as a surprise. This marks the conclusion of a second revolution by Socrates to construct a city that is adequate to obtain the primary end of the agreement. Socrates asks Adeimantus about the exchange principle through a speech of the production structure in the following way:

⁴⁰ (369d). “τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν”, (*tettarōn ὁ pente andrōn*). It is of note that the word for men in this sentence, “ἀνδρῶν”, is related to the Greek for “man” in the singular masculine sense (*aner*), and not the general meaning of human beings (*anthropos*).

⁴¹ The superlative of “ἀνάγκη” (*anagkai*), in this word denotes a social realm populated by persons connected by blood ties, e.g., kinsfolk. The name “proper city” is taken from Bloom. Cf. Bloom’s footnote on the proper city: *Republic*, ft. 26, pg. 448. Shorey translates “ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις” as “the indispensable minimum of a city”, which loses some of Socrates’ emphasis on necessity.

Now, what about this? Must each one of them put his work at the disposition of all in common—for example, must the farmer, one man, provide food for four and spend four times as much time and labor in the provision of food and then give it in common to the others; or must he neglect them and produce a fourth part of the food in a fourth part of the time and use the other three parts for the provision of a house, clothing, and shoes, not taking the trouble to share in common with others, but minding his own business for himself?

And Adeimantus said, Perhaps, Socrates, the latter is easier than the former.⁴²

The choice Socrates offers to Adeimantus is this: should there be specialization in the production of a good with a communal distribution method among the fellow citizens, or should there be no specialization of labor for these primary goods and *no* distribution method for these produced goods that are apparently made for self-consumption? As the text above makes clear Adeimantus chooses the latter option of autarky requiring non-specialized production and a pattern of self-consumption of goods.

This is a serious choice. For instance, this is a rejection of the previously agreed upon specialized division of labor that must constitute the proper city, casting the existence of that form into great doubt. More seriously, it is a rejection of the generating principle(s) of the city in general since it was agreed upon that there were “many needs” (e.g., that self-sufficiency is insufficient to lift necessity) and the proximity of others. The “latter” choice, as Adeimantus puts it, does not require a city at all. One could live without a proximate group of people that willingly cohabitate together for a common purpose if a lifestyle that did not subject action to a

⁴² (369e-370a).

basic division of labor, specialized or non-specialized is adopted, and if there is no regular attempt to share or exchange the products of labor.⁴³

The autistic exchange that Adeimantus seems to accept is a rejection of the ground of every social form that has been previously agreed upon. Adeimantus passes over the problematic at hand and chooses the existence of a god since humans (“each of us”, 369b), it was agreed, are impotent in relation to their desires. Subsequently, it is a rejection of Socrates’ method of giving a genealogical account of the city to identify and evaluate justice and injustice. In essence, it is an attempt to abandon the entire endeavor. But one would not confuse the human deficiency in knowledge about justice as a divine trait. Because of the previously agreed upon form of discourse to arrive at conclusions about justice this divine route is closed to Adeimantus.

Socrates does not allow him to pass over the problem at hand and level his city. He will compel him to keep his eyes peeled and open as they struggle to make out the letters that promise to give them answers about the grandest things.

The question we must pose is why Adeimantus makes this choice. A noticeable commonality between each of these early rejections is that he accepts an egotistical method of exchange while rejecting a more “communal” method of exchange. Adeimantus chooses a mode

⁴³ In the first edition of his translation of the *Republic*, Bloom translates the preference expressed by Adeimantus in the opposite way, saying “And Adeimantus said, Perhaps, Socrates, the former is easier than the latter”, instead of the latter being easier than the former as mentioned above. In the preface to the second edition published shortly before his death Bloom concludes with this, “I have corrected many minor mistranslations or misleading formulations for this second edition. I must also add that there are certainly many more I did not catch. This is regrettable but inherent in the nature of the task and the nature of this translator.” (x) This is a would constitute an important dramatic omission in the argument, for if Adeimantus answers the way he does in the first edition then there would be no need for an explicit agreement to the SP and no little city. The change made in the second edition, the one I refer to throughout this dissertation, is kept in the posthumous third edition. Bloom Allan ed. *The Republic of Plato*. Basic Books 1st edition. 1968; Bloom Allan ed. *The Republic of Plato*. Basic Books 3rd edition. 2016.

of direct exchange based on self-interest in the common settlement and autistic exchange in the proper city while rejecting a communal form of redistribution in both places. Is it here that we see a dramatic example of the tension and paradox in the soul of Adeimantus, the young moralist and reluctant defender of customary piety? Against his rationally articulated desire to see a defense of justice using dialectical argument and eagerly accepting the moral reformation there seems to be a hint of metropolitan corruption. What explains this attraction towards the self even when his provisional blame of justice is meant to set the stage for Socrates' vindication of piety, and by extension to Adeimantus, of custom? We see that he gives us a little explanation when responding to Socrates above, saying that he preferred the system of autarkic exchange because it "is easier" than one of direct exchange.⁴⁴ Is Adeimantus adverse to the necessity of rustic living even though he is a defender of the customs and institutions that are its products?⁴⁵ If so, there is the increased risk that Socrates is fundamentally wrong about the character of Adeimantus.

Adeimantus' choice causes Socrates to react in several ways. The first step he takes is to defend the recently established specialized division of labor within the polis. The argument he chooses to use has several steps. Natural inequalities related to productive function are introduced to forge an agreement about the requirement for the specialization principle (SP) in this city and with it the division of labor. The variation in human nature in respect to occupational quality is the first type of absolute differentiation introduced into the city, even if it

⁴⁴ (370a). "Easier" is translated as *ῥᾴον* (*raon*).

⁴⁵ Even worse, is he lying about his provisional blame of justice and instead of demanding an articulated doctrine of morality to replace the mythic content of custom that has been snatched from him? Maybe he is really the cunning fox of the polis that is only interested in temporal goods? Is he scouting the most formidable caring man out in order to formulate effective responses to the most powerful song to justice?.

is horizontally rather than vertically stratified. One could think that Socrates' recent enumeration of occupations is an earlier example in 369d of an absolute distinction but there is nothing in his discussion that demands a certain person, due to a factor beyond their control, must perform a certain job. The conditioning force of a rationally knowable nature is not invoked to separate people by job in that speech. The quality produced by these naturally occurring distinctions in the citizens supply the ground for the attention and expertise in action a larger and more efficient production output requires.⁴⁶ To successfully craft or construct a thing you must have devoted a considerable amount of time and training into learning the skill a certain good's art requires. Socrates mentions to Adeimantus that specialized labor will be "easier" if adopted, getting him to quickly accept this proposal and prospect of increased leisure time while salvaging the methodological approach they had previously agreed upon.⁴⁷

After this articulation of previously vague concepts that were agreed upon earlier the conversation takes another strange turn. Socrates notes that this new production structure is without a material basis for the occupants to perform their jobs "well" or "fine".⁴⁸ Because of the qualitative component introduced into the argument to directly secure the existence of the SP and to indirectly preserve the division of labor there is now a new need to summon the proper means for these laborers in the founding occupations to perform their work well. While Adeimantus did not understand this at the time, this new agreement has generated a whole new class of supporting manufacturers and craftsmen to produce the tools the original workers need. If a farmer does not have a plow or a housebuilder is without his tools how else would they be able

⁴⁶ (370c).

⁴⁷ (370c) "Easier" is a translation of ῥᾶον (*raon*). This is a reference to Adeimantus' recent comment about autistic exchange being perhaps "easier" only a few lines above at 370a.

⁴⁸ (370c) κάλλιον (*kallion*).

to make good products? It seems that this newly located class of workers become fellow “partners in our little city”, increasing its size from four citizens to that of a “throng”.⁴⁹ Because of their agreement on the institutionalization of the SP with this qualitative criterion the little city also requires herdsmen to tend the work animals used in the course of production (e.g., sheep’s wool, draft beasts etc.). While Socrates rightly notes that this addition to the supporting manufacturing class in the city obviously increases its size, he believes that “it wouldn’t be very big yet” if they were added for the sake of preserving a qualitative form of the SP.

Adeimantus gives a more revealing response, countering that “nor would it be a little city”.⁵⁰ This apparent disappointment should come across as odd since he has rejected distribution and production models that would have brought a smaller polis into being. According to the proposed method, it seems that his recent rejection of the division of labor itself that has forced Socrates to rationally explicate the little city (πολιχνίου) by transforming it. Socrates’ response to this criticism is to pass over it without acknowledgment since it still contains a tacit acceptance of his proposal. After this the march towards the end of their city in speech is largely set. Socrates and Adeimantus agree that founding a theoretical city in an isolated location without the need to import goods is “impossible”. This leads to the creation of a

⁴⁹ (370d). The “little city” of Socrates is translated from πολιχνίου (*polichiniou*), the diminutive neuter form of “little town”, or “fort”. Shorey translates it as “hamlet”. Strangely enough the doctor, the fifth founding occupation of the proper city, is absent in Socrates’ new production structure. At the very least it is not mentioned.

⁵⁰ (370e). The “little city” of Adeimantus is translated from μικρὰ πόλις (*smikra polis*), meaning “small”, “little”. McKeen’s careful and thoughtful article was the other source I could find that admitted there was such another city that preceded the feverish city. She combines the necessary city and the little city into the “micropolis”. McKeen, *Swillsburg City Limits*, 83. Benardete calls the sunoikia the “dialogic city” and the necessary city the “city of bodily needs”. Benardete, *Socrates’ Second Sailing*, 50.

merchant and trader class, a seafaring sector, and a larger agricultural and manufacturing base to conduct foreign exchange with the productive surplus that is now present in this polis.⁵¹

Socrates again brings Adeimantus to the topic of the interpersonal exchange of goods, asking him how this will occur and reminding him in order to head off any new rejections (with his previous wholesale rejection of it in 370a in mind) that it is for this reason that men gather together in a partnership to produce a polis.⁵² Foreign exchange is one thing, the method of domestic exchange is another. Adeimantus answers they will exchange their goods through “buying and selling”.⁵³ While this is an acceptance of interpersonal exchange and a rejection of autistic exchange, it is also a rejection of Socrates’ originally proposed sharing model. Also, Socrates does not think it is specific enough for there are two major forms of interpersonal exchange, the direct exchange of good for good in barter, and the indirect exchange of a medium of exchange for goods.⁵⁴ It seems that Socrates’ smaller sharing models were able to rely upon the former due to the simplicity of the production structure and intimacy of the sparsely populated city’s inhabitants. Indirect exchange is adopted in this city by the two men to be used in a common marketplace (agora) because of the relatively more impersonal nature of its increased population size and the finer specialization introduced by the adoption of the SP. The SP increases the size of the population but also restricts the founders to a one man-one job rule.

With this in mind, using the specific example of farmers Socrates objects to the producers also having to double as sellers of these goods in the market. The idleness and time-wasting of someone doubling as a producer and a seller is the result of the impersonal social context devoid

⁵¹ (370c-e), (371a).

⁵² ““Now what about this? In the city itself, how will they exchange what they have produced with one another? It was for just this that we made a partnership and founded the city.” (371b).

⁵³ (371b).

⁵⁴ Services can also be substituted for “goods” in the sentence above when appropriate.

of the proximate economic knowledge that a handful of partners would have of each other. Without this knowledge of who is producing what, in what quantity, and without a sharing redistribution model grounded in barter, each person would be left to guess how much they should produce and when they would need to bring their goods to market to successfully exchange them. Maybe the consumer in need of their goods is gone during time their supplier has set up shop. This ignorance in connecting buyers and sellers of the city's goods therefore now requires a specialized occupation, the middlemen, whom Socrates identifies as tradesmen or shopkeepers, the first of the servant class.⁵⁵

In addition to abiding by the SP's rule and increasing the efficiency of the workers by reducing their time spent at the agora Adeimantus believes these people are naturally suited to be servants because they are a combination of an invalid coupled with a calculating mind able to buy and sell goods.⁵⁶ They are essentially "entrepreneurs" in that their actions serve as the main price formation mechanism expressed in a generally accepted medium of exchange, the epistemic substitute for proximity that all large social forms have for the semi rational allocation of goods. Their "craft" and function are to connect suppliers with consumers in this new social context. Since the text does not present them as charity workers or public servants their art appears to be buying low and selling high, making a living by pocketing the difference between their exchanges and the clearing service they perform for both parties. The last occupation that comes into the city are the laborers or wage-earners. These people are physically capable of

⁵⁵ Identified as *καπήλων* (*kapēlōn*) in the Greek. The disdainful connotations attached to this word might help to gauge Socrates' tone at this point in the exchange with Adeimantus: huckster, peddler, hawker, retail dealer.

⁵⁶ These men are described as having "bodies that are weakest and are useless for doing any other job." 371c. Useless here is taken from *ἀχρεῖοί* (*akhreioi*), meaning useless, disabled, or damaged.

working but are mentally incapable of fully joining in a city's partnership. These wage-earners appear to sell their labor in exchange for money.

Upon Socrates' insistence for the inclusion of wage-earners and his description of their occupation several things should be considered. The first is that with the institutionalization of the SP based on nature there is not only an absolute horizontal differentiation that has solidified in the city in speech with every man having only one job, there now appears to be a slight hierarchy in it. The wage-earners are depicted as inferior to the original classes, the manufacturing classes and the foreign trading classes. The suspected reason is that they do not produce anything to bring to the market for mutual exchange. Structurally, the wage-earning class appear to be "jacks-of-all-trades", unskilled men without the ability or opportunity to engage in skilled labor, to use modern terms. The similarities of these men to the partners of the *sunoi* are disquieting. Another point of interest is that in this city where everyone engages in indirect exchange for the goods they produce, everyone is essentially a wage-earner. Wage-earning is a type of occupational master genus.⁵⁷ And lastly, this agreement to have a group of unskilled laborers in the polis seems to be a violation of the SP that is introduced by Socrates and agreed upon by Adeimantus. While it could be argued that there will be a surplus labor force that is not occupationally defined in a city, this empirical reality need not be present in a city in speech and is not one of the agreements both men were operating under. It is this rejection of a thorough application of the SP that might explain the following move in the dialogue.

Adeimantus has apparently rejected all three governing principles of Socrates' proposed production structure for each polis, and with them, it seems, the subsequent social form that had

⁵⁷ At least if Socrates' argument that justice is necessarily the rule for the sake of others is to be believed in Book I. (346e-347e).

already come into existence. It is clear the Adeimantus has some type of formal preference or else we would not hear the hopefulness in his voice when he opts for an “easier” system that holds out the possibility of increased leisure or the dejection when he laments the increasing size of the previously “little city. The question remaining for the reader is: what does he really want? Or, is not this the problem? Isn’t it clear that Adeimantus wants a polis made to satisfy his own desires concerning justice? He is not content to let Socrates complete a city without falling into the trap of prolonging the founding by turning to the “how” of the polis. Instead, Adeimantus is pleased to increase the burden of his interlocutor and demand more from him than was agreed upon. Surely Adeimantus’ desires concerning justice and injustice do not include ascertaining their meaning, for if it did then he would refuse to insist upon the dynamic account of the polis that goes well beyond the genealogical one that was, as agreed upon by him explicitly, required for poor-sighted men to watch both justice and injustice “coming into being.”⁵⁸

When Adeimantus agrees to the presence of unskilled laborers in the city whose parts must conform by the SP as determined by nature Socrates asks him if their city is done, if it has “grown to completion”.⁵⁹ Adeimantus’ ambivalent response of “perhaps” only serves to support the above dramatic interpretation that accentuates the conflict between the original methodological agreement with and Socrates and the subsequent values he insists upon subjecting this method to. Adeimantus is not a man that is convinced the city in speech being

⁵⁸ (369a).

⁵⁹ (371e). Completion being taken from *τελέα* (*telea*). In the immediate context this word can also mean “having reached its end”, “complete”. It also has a religious connotation referring to the qualitative component of an object of a religious rite, the fulfilment of prayer by the gods, or a complete narrative of the gods, i.e., its “perfection”.

constructed by him and Socrates is really *telea*. His agreement is primarily based on coercion and frustration.⁶⁰ He is not truly persuaded.

Like his reaction to his interlocutor's last acquiescence to the fact that the little city must shed its form and become larger Socrates accepts this forced, partial agreement and asks the question for which their way of examining the city in speech was originally adopted, "'Where in it, then, would justice and injustice be?'"⁶¹ Adeimantus' response only strengthens the above thesis: "'I can't think, Socrates...'"⁶² He surmises that justice and injustice might have come into being among the mutual need each part has for the other, a reference to the generating principle of the polis and affirmation of the cooperative nature of society. In return Socrates offers an ambiguous praise of this attempted response, prefacing it with the familiar "perhaps" ἴσως (*isōs*) offered just above and continues to his question. In his eagerness to be successful he demands twice that they "consider" where these terms come into being until an agreement is reached.⁶³

After this there is a marked shift in the exchange. Socrates proceeds to give a short description of what he will call the "true city" devoid of any give and take with his partner.⁶⁴ There are three major observation of this pivotal section (372a-372e) that are important to the interpretation at hand. The first is primarily textual, the second is methodological, while the third is structural. The first is that the true city is uninterruptedly described in about six sentences.

⁶⁰ "Perhaps" being taken from ἴσως (*isōs*), meaning to make equal, or equally. It is inferred that its colloquial usage here comes closer to the more resigned "sure", or "I guess".

⁶¹ (371e).

⁶² (372a). ἐγὼ μὲν (*egō men*), used to express personal uncertainty.

⁶³ Socrates' construction is more negative here, exhorting Adeimantus that they must not give up or back away. (372a).

⁶⁴ The true city comes from ἀληθινὴ πόλις (*alēthinē polis*) and can also mean "real city".

Nine if the additional three sentences used to reply to Glaucon's objection are included.⁶⁵ The first description is worth quoting at length here:

First, let's consider what manner of life men so provided for will lead. Won't they make bread, wine, clothing, and shoes? And, when they have built houses, they will work in the summer, for the most part naked and without shoes, and in the winter adequately clothed and shod. For food they will prepare barley meal and wheat flour; they will cook it and knead it. Setting out noble loaves of barley and wheat on some reeds or clean leaves, they will stretch out on rushes strewn with yew and myrtle and feast themselves and their children. Afterwards they will drink wine and, crowned with wreathes, sing of the gods. So they will have sweet intercourse with one another, and not produce children beyond their means, keeping an eye out against poverty or war.⁶⁶

The length of the true city is brief. Much briefer than seven or eight books long. Is there an explanation for the remaining length of the dialogue that is more persuasive than the traditional offerings claiming that the *Republic* is some type of lengthy moral teaching, or that this a clear glimpse into the desires of a disgruntled reactionary who yearns for an inhuman amount of control over those living with him.⁶⁷ The few sentences that compose the description of the true city alone should cause some doubts about this. These sentences should ring like bells and awaken us out of the routine and conformity of superimposing traditional frameworks and models onto the text which emphasizes a certain topical element or theme as if they were arranged aphoristically. It should disallow us from reading certain passages like closed problematics when originally learning about the text, treating them in extreme isolation to everything else, and attempting to produce a "doctrine" from.

⁶⁵ (372c-d).

⁶⁶ (372a-b).

⁶⁷ The remaining length of the *Republic* is about 250 Stephanus pages. The entire dialogue is about 294 Stephanus pages. A full 85% of the text remains after this description of the true city.

The second textual note is methodological: there is no mention of justice or injustice anywhere in this description. If the city in speech has been constructed for the express purpose of seeing these two things come into being at a perceptible scale, and Socrates has suggested this city has *grown to completion*, then the absence of this identification by Socrates surely must be discussed.⁶⁸ One option is that this method of Socrates failed. Specifically, was this method meant to fail? Rational knowledge of justice and injustice are the products of some type of reasoning faculty. We notice that there is no such specific occupation in the true city that contains this skill. The closest thing to the philosopher that we know of so far is the doctor mentioned in the little city.

Is Socrates suggesting that this is a place beyond justice and injustice? Maybe the power of necessity on the instincts of a group's members living in a spontaneous unity does not require an articulated ethical system to reach a functional equilibrium, let alone live with basic human decency. It may be that the power of necessity here is so severe that the theme of justice and injustice are not capable of even becoming the contents of these people's consciousnesses. Are the questions, "what is justice" and "what is the value of justice" the fancies of a sickly mind exiled from innocence by cultural advancements and the idleness of affluence, producing a mind that is capable of wandering away from itself through the power of abstraction? If so, it deceives itself that it can "take itself" or "its society" as an object of thought simply because it is able to manipulate some symbolic placeholders it associates with relatively empty envisaged units of meaning that it mistakes out of pride, fear, or sadness, for the whole of its existence.

The broad reaction to the true city is mostly negative. It ranges from puzzlement to disbelief to anger. Most cannot accept the fact that Plato (through Socrates) is seriously arguing

⁶⁸ "Grown to completion" as τελέα (*telea*).

for anarchy.⁶⁹ It seems that because anarchy is an obviously discredited political philosophy there is no way that Socrates, who many of these people have a personal attachment to, can be advocating for it. Bloom dismisses it by claiming “The first city is obviously impossible. It depends on an unfounded belief in nature’s providential generosity, in a “hidden hand” which harmonizes private and public interests...”; after admitting that Socrates seems to indicate the reality and preference of this city Rosen claims that “the neediest city is subnatural rather than natural”, a city that is grounded in “the nonhuman animals.”⁷⁰ Annas has no need of the true city and dismisses it as irrelevant to the argument: “I think we have to conclude, though reluctantly, that Plato has not given the first city a clear place in the Republic’s moral argument.”⁷¹ There is a small group of interpreters that cannot dismiss the city that Socrates calls by the praiseworthy names of “the true city” or “the healthy city”. They take this as a serious or qualified endorsement of his anarchist leanings in a text that is famous for its authoritarian political proposals.⁷² The problem they have with this argument is explaining why Socrates agrees to leave this city for one he clearly dislikes. I hope to give a dramatic explanation for both issues: expressed preference for the true and its abandonment for another city.

What explains the laconic description of the true city above? Plato’s text informs us that after the above quotation there is an interruption in Socrates’ train of thought, this time by Glaucon, whose interruption concerns an objection about the food these inhabitants are

⁶⁹ The notable exception to this is Strauss and his sarcastic encomium for the true city. Strauss, *The City and Man*, 94-95. There can be no excellence in this city according to him.

⁷⁰ Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*, 346; Rosen, *Plato’s Republic*, 76, 81.

⁷¹ Annas, *IPR*, 78.

⁷² Silverman, Allan. “Ascent and Descent: The Philosopher’s Regret.” In *Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*. The best review of this dispute between those who argue Socrates favors the true city or the beautiful city see McDavid, Brennan. “On why the city of pigs and clocks are not just.” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 57, no. 4 (2019).

consuming. The articulated reason why Socrates' discussion about justice and injustice is cut short stems from an interruption, which the argument at hand has interpreted as a rejection of a previous dialectical agreement. He voices disdain at the scant range of the citizen's feast, noting that they dine without relishes, translated as ὄψον (*opsiou*), meaning small cooked meats, or primarily fish in the Athenian context.⁷³ It should be recalled that the occupation of fisherman was not introduced into the polis in the previous discussion of maritime jobs, that all the animals added to the polis are there only for production and not consumption purposes, and that the above description of the true city is devoid of meat consumption. Glaucon consciously dislikes the fare of the true city because it does not conform to the desired standard of living that a well-heeled young man of Athens has grown accustomed to. Its blandness and rusticity disgusts his conventional tastes.

Obviously, there is a dramatic reason that explains this outburst of Glaucon's in addition to an analysis of its implications. So far, the deity's feast appears to be mainly verbal. While Socrates seems capable of keeping body and soul together on the products of discussion alone, several of his companions suffer the human deficiency of being affected with the first stages of hunger. The description of what appears to be a full day's religious activities with the promise of dinner in the Piraeus if Glaucon and Socrates acquiesce to the command of Polemarchus suggests a dramatic opening to the dialogue of late afternoon or early evening. Being currently well-removed from this beginning it is inferred that it is either dinner time proper, or past dinner time for these men. The normal agitation that all non-philosophers feel in the first stages of

⁷³ ὄψον (*opsou*). (372c). These relishes were eaten with bread to increase the breadth of its plain flavor.

hunger, coupled with Socrates' prolonged description of the inhabitant's banquet, is likely a dramatic reason for this interruption and partial rejection.⁷⁴

There are several observations of the structural part of the analysis to Socrates' true city that are believed to support my argument that it is rejected. The first is that Socrates' description of the true city essentially details the labor and leisure objects and activities of what appears to be a bucolic existence led by the inhabitants of a small village. The rural production methods and products, along with a homely type of lifestyle speckled with some light (and lightly clothed) labor here and a communal feast there, the use of literal grass and sticks as cooking implements, beds, and clothing should lead to the obvious conclusion that this is not a "polis" in the sense of a large Greek city. Rather, this looks like it describes the existence and rhythms of a small town or even a village.

And the description itself is odd, is it not? For instance, it only seems to include the occupations of farming, shoemaking, housebuilding, tailoring, and baking (no meat is cooked). Gone are the shepherds and smiths of the manufacturing class. Absent are the sailors, navigators and merchants of the foreign trading class. The agora and its money of domestic exchange along with the servant class and its tradesmen and laborers also do not appear. Gone is the "grown" city with the well-defined production structure which succeeds the proper city of utmost necessity and its "four or five men". Here again is the proper city with its farmers, shoemakers, housebuilders, and tailors. Or is this the proper city? Doesn't the description portray these inhabitants engaging in many different tasks one-by-one? There is a change in the production method and the allocation of price system of the most recent form to one with non-specialized

⁷⁴ Rosen, *Plato's Republic*, 75; Strauss, *The City and Man*, 95.

labor of mainly communal tasks that contains a common redistribution of food in the institution of communal meals. What social form is this?

The true city as described by Socrates might look familiar because we have seen it before, or at least have run across one of its family members. It bears a close resemblance to the common settlement, the *sunoi* of Socrates' first attempt to give a genealogical account of the city in speech wherein justice and injustice can be spotted. If true, this appears to signify a sort of double purge of both the medium-sized town of Adeimantus and the proper city by Socrates. Is he insisting on strictly adhering to the method of giving a genealogical account of the city in speech even after all the previous derivations it has gone through with Adeimantus? Why this double purge? It could be that it is the product of another rejection of the SP by Adeimantus upon his agreement to have a large class of unskilled laborers in the polis. This rejection of the SP and acceptance of unskilled laborers reinstates the structural conditions for the common settlement. Does this explain why Socrates is so eager to suggest that their city has grown to completion and is quick to accept a coerced agreement from his partner?

What is the structural evidence for this argument about the identity of the true city's real form and its difference from the other ones proposed? The production materials and tools used by these people are mostly described as rudimentary. These unprocessed or low processed implements imply little to no labor specialization. People often work without full clothing and shoes: tools are either in scarce supply or not mentioned in the passing description of their labor. The only capital goods mentioned are the leaves that are used as plates for their food. In all, these production goods are essentially unprocessed or are of a low-processed quality.

In this city the production structure seems to be characterized by a division of communal labor, not an adherence to that SP of the little city and the large town. With all the occupations

and goods listed after the little city in 370 this development implies that that there is little or no specialization of labor and therefore no common exchange market for goods and services. An examination of their consumption yields a similar conclusion. The type of goods produced also appear to be mostly unprocessed herbs, plants, and nuts (figs, pulse, beans), or low processed foods that employ the essentially ubiquitous technology of fire as a form of pre-mastication for goods such as bread, berries, and roasted nuts.

Thirdly, there appears to be an abundance of leisure activities relative to the ardor demanded by specialized labor.⁷⁵ The inhabitants of the true city perform basic preservative labor in the construction of houses, clothes, and shoes. These all appear to be used infrequently, implying the superfluousness of specialized labor's continual production and employment of skill. Once houses are built, they also make garments and shoes which will only be worn at varying times.⁷⁶ The only labor process that is detailed in the true city is the collective making of bread. The leisure process that is described is that of a party, consisting of consuming wine (whose production process is passed over), eating the rustic foods, wearing clothing made from plants, singing songs to the gods, and engaging in demographically responsible intercourse. The reasons for this have already been mentioned: there has been a change in the production structure's form from specialization to a common division of labor, and a change in principle from material self-interest to the community's health. Hence Socrates' second name for the true city as the "healthy city".⁷⁷

⁷⁵ (369e).

⁷⁶ (372a). The verbs used in this passage are all plural: "ποιῶντες" (make bread), οἰκοδομησάμενοι (to build houses), ἐργάζονται (to work) etc. Clothing that is worn in the winter is mostly shed in the summer during labor. Also, after parties, people do not seem to use their houses to sleep but sleep outside on grass.

⁷⁷ The "healthy city" coming from ὑγίης (*hygiēs*).

The people of the true city have informal institutions generated and maintained by a conditioning necessity. This is a village based on the naivete of instinct. A social equilibrium exists in the institutions of the family, children's education, religion, leisure, labor, wealth equity, self-defense (foreign affairs), and domestic peace that does not require the wisdom of philosopher-kings and the force of their auxiliaries. These institutions are described as existing without the requirement of a founder giving a thorough account of their origin or without a supreme legislator articulating their organizing principles. If I am right about Socrates' methodological focus on institutions as a means for gaining knowledge about justice and injustice, then this Socratic account of the polis is given in response to Adeimantus' cunning man of the polis.⁷⁸

Looking into the dialogue's future with the benefit afforded by a familiarity of the text's basics this account of the polis could also be placed in contrast with the cities that are to come. From childhood education, international relations, wealth equity, family structure, marriage law, mythopoetic content, melody, instruments, diet and more, there are not many topics covered in the remaining 250 Stephanus pages of the *Republic* that do not first make their appearance in the two short paragraphs in which Socrates describes the true city and its customs. This city's description is one of the most dramatically important passage in the *Republic*, next only to the opening captivity of Socrates, his second captivity with the sons of Ariston's vigorous speeches in praise of injustice, and his closing monologue in the Myth of Er.

One of the most important observations that should be accounted for in Socrates' description of the true city is its absence of the state. There is no centralized institution of

⁷⁸ The dramatic reason for his focus on the relation between institutions and justice comes from the brother's speeches.

compulsion made up of a specialized group of individuals in the true city. A “regime”, or what will be called a *politeiai*, does not occur within the text at this point. In the true city we have a “city” without a state, a polis without a *politeiai*. In addition to there being no formalized stratification introduced by the existence of a state there is also no production hierarchy introduced by the SP. The social trait which most likely characterizes this place is a naturally occurring unity by a voluntary redistribution of goods and reciprocity in labor within an intimately familiar group. This is a foreign image compared to the coerced unity that is dependent upon all the belabored twists that Socrates and his interlocutors will have to agree upon in the next cities. The seeming absence of a state in the true city should serve to greatly increase the explanatory power of the multiple cities interpretation contra the one city reading. It would be hard to believe that the *Republic* contained exactly one republic when there are multiple cities in the text, and two, when the first polis does not even have a “republic” to speak of.

Lastly, there is an absence of what Plotinus called “civic virtues”. Referring to the end of the story that many know due to prior contact with the text, we do not read about the cardinal virtues of justice, courage, wisdom, or moderation in their articulated forms. Whether they are there, for instance, whether these people can successfully practice self-determination without some commonsense form of what we understand to be courage and wisdom is a separate argument. Certainly, they don’t appear concerned with acquiring positive answers to the definition and value of these terms in order to produce a well-ordered society. Why should they? Looking at this dramatically, is the possession of a rational ethic the cure or a symptom of vice?

2.4. Glaucon: The Feverish City and the Creation of the State

After Socrates responds to Glaucon's first objection about the true city's food, specifically its quaintness and absence of meat, by nonchalantly reiterating the rustic dietary customs of the inhabitants Glaucon famously interrupts again, this time much more forcefully:

And he said, "If you were providing for a city of sows,
Socrates, on what else would you fatten them than this?"⁷⁹

Socrates response to him is quite telling:

Well, how should it be, Glaucon?" I said.⁸⁰

Socrates' insistence on the rustic food and living pattern by people in this city disgusts and frustrates Glaucon. The value of justice should be greater than this. He demands something more "conventional" and familiar to his metropolitan tastes. His city must have things like couches instead of grass beds, tables instead of leaves for setting things upon, meats instead of bread, and sweet desserts instead of roasted nuts and berries. He wants his leisure to be luxurious. Moreover, because of these refined tastes he misinterprets the contentedness and leisure activities of the true city's inhabitants for the misery and drudgery of savagery. "Sows" (ὕων, *huōn*) or also "wild swine" should not take on the meaning of decadent affluence. Instead, it should be seen as a reference to an "animalistic" living standard. Glaucon surely thinks these are savage people living below the level of barbarians since he laments the absence of basic civilizational amenities like furniture and specialized delicacies that are the products of a highly specialized production structure.

This second interruption has several dramatic implications that are of the utmost interest for the hermeneutical structure being applied to the text. The first has already been mentioned

⁷⁹ (372d).

⁸⁰ (372d). "ἀλλὰ πῶς χρεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων" (*alla pōs chrē, ēn d' egō, ō Glaukōn*;). Semi-colons are questions marks in Attic Greek.

but will now be made explicit: Glaucon is not interested in hearing just any account of justice and injustice. The goods of the true city do not contradict what his definition of justice is, they challenge what it's power should be. If Socrates would have continued adhering to his analogical method until its completion he should have given an account of these things right after the city's description. It is now apparent that this is not the answer Glaucon wishes to hear. He interrupts Socrates right when he was about to complete his examination of the true city. Methodologically this can be interpreted as a rejection of the true city, and with it the stateless world of custom.

Being undeterred by Socrates' courteous treatment of his first objection and having not paid close enough attention to Socrates' previous treatment of animals, Glaucon's second objection contains a sarcastic cannibalism reference by insinuating that there is an insufficient feeding of the sows for the slaughter in the true city. Because Glaucon rejects the true city we now see why Socrates was so eager to pass over Glaucon's first objection: the attempt to introduce meat consumption into the polis amounted to a clear rejection of the city which Socrates has constructed with Adeimantus, for in order to add this delicacy that Glaucon desires the entire city must be reworked. Both objections center around the introduction of a change in diet from herbivores to omnivores. Glaucon's insistence upon the inclusion of more familiar consumption objects in his desired city forces Socrates to introduce a material and institutional edifice that can support his tastes. This results in the abandonment of the true city and a subsequent change in the polis' form and principle to incorporate "conventional" preferences in consumption.

The response of Socrates to this final insistence upon including conventional Athenian amenities is of the greatest importance to the present argument, and since it serves as the pivot for the remainder of the entire dialogue it will be quoted from extensively below:

All right," I said. "I understand. We are, as it seems, considering not only how a city, but also a luxurious city, comes into being. Perhaps that's not bad either. For in considering such a city too, we could probably see in what way justice and injustice naturally grow in cities. Now, the true city is in my opinion the one we just described— a healthy city, as it were. But, if you want to, let's look at a feverish city, too. Nothing stands in the way. For these things, as it seems, won't satisfy some, or this way of life, but couches, tables, and other furniture will be added, and, of course, relishes, perfume, incense, courtesans and cakes—all sorts of all of them. And, in particular, we can't still postulate the mere necessities we were talking about at first—houses, clothes, and shoes; but painting and embroidery must also be set in motion; and gold, ivory, and everything of the sort must be obtained. Isn't that so?⁸¹

This reaction is dramatically rich in several ways. There is an acquiescence which can be interpreted as an admission of methodological failure. Socrates, it appears, was hoping to only give an account of the “naturally” growing city that is suitable for the purposes of examining justice and injustice. Since Glaucon has consistently shown that he is more concerned with the power of justice, he rejects the city that is constructed for the original purpose. In Glaucon’s city justice and civilizational affluence are reconcilable by definition. Socrates must now incorporate another conventional value into the dynamics of the argument and produce a city in speech that all can agree upon and that can be used for the current objective. That city which was adequate to this task was the true city, or the “healthy city”, according to Socrates. This is a pivotal dramatic moment in the text. Would there even be a feverish city without Glaucon? Without the feverish city would there be a Kallipolis?

The next part to this reaction shows Socrates repaying Glaucon for his speech in the form of blame. In contrast to his rushed praise of Adeimantus upon his forced agreement about the

⁸¹ (372e-373a).

true city's completion, "perhaps what you say is fine...", here Socrates uses a third person "some" to mete out chastisement to Glaucon by remarking that the goods and lifestyle of the true city "won't satisfy some".⁸² Socrates' reluctance at leaving the true city is another textual fact that belies many standard readings that are premised upon a dramatic principle of a willingness of Socrates to give his interlocutors and the reader an elaborate system of thought or doctrine. The debate among those in the literature who acknowledge the existence of multiple cities concerning Socrates' "willingness" to leave a city he seems to prefer should also be clarified by the method being employed. To construct a polis that will serve as an analytical focus to examine justice and injustice there must first be an agreement among the speakers about what that city is. If faction reigns then Socrates cannot speak about what justice and injustice are, let alone their intrinsic value. Socrates departs from the true city because he is forced to by Glaucon. This is the dramatic argument as to why Socrates leaves the true city and travels to the feverish city.

The subsequent segment of Socrates' response consists primarily of him asking Glaucon whether he really desires the luxury of convention. Upon Glaucon's affirmation Socrates tells him that the acceptance of these goods will result in the city having to increase in population, "the city will have to be made bigger again."⁸³ There has to be an expanded production structure as the material basis for this demanded mode of consumption that far transcends the "mere necessities".⁸⁴ This expanded production structure reinstitutes the specialized division of labor that was apparently purged by Socrates upon Adeimantus' acceptance of non-specialized labor into the city since it would be impossible for one person to acquire functional skill (*techne*) at

⁸² For Adeimantus' praise see 372a. Reflecting the urbanity required by a selective dinner party the "some" here is not plural but singular referring to Glaucon.

⁸³ (373b).

⁸⁴ Translated from "τὰναγκαῖα" (*tanakaia*).

even a small portion of the occupations that are now introduced into the polis. The true city is a small group of helpers capable of housebuilding, shoemaking, farming, making clothes, and making wine and baking. This is a narrow range of skills that could be serviceably acquired by young adulthood with a learning-by-doing educational method that most small groups employ for the education of their young. The text never states that these tasks are done “well”, only that they are done and their products appear to produce contentment in the inhabitants.⁸⁵ With the expansion of the production structure comes the death of the true city’s relational proximity and unity and the beginning of a factious city that Glaucon seems comfortable with.

Socrates’ description of the feverish city after Glaucon agrees that things like furniture, relishes, cakes, paintings, and the ostentation of gold and ivory must be allowed is the continuation of his blame.⁸⁶ He is clear that what is happening with Glaucon’s rejection and shift in unit of analytical focus is an exchange of the primary conditioning principle of the polis from that of necessity in the true city to excess in the feverish city. In contrast with the true city he describes the feverish city as being engorged and swelling up with ugly masses (ὄγκου ἐμπληστέα) of people and goods: hunters for the consumption of wild game or for sport, poets, imitators, singers, rhapsodes, dancers, actors, contractors, and craftsmen for their tools and female adornment are now necessary. A large service underclass comes into existence as well with teachers, governesses, wet-nurses, beauticians, barbers, cooks, more doctors available to

⁸⁵ I take “well” or “fine” as κάλλιον (*kallion*).

⁸⁶ Strangely enough, courtesans (ἑταῖραι, *hetairai*), high-quality call girls, are roughly introduced by Plato at this point. It is odd that the first profession of the feverish city are glorified prostitutes. Besides this, it is strange that a state-affiliated occupation is mentioned before the existence and institutionalization of a state. Since this presents any interpretation of the text with a logical puzzle the word ἑταῖραι could also be rendered “concubine”. These can exist apart from a well-established state court in the presence of an institutionalized system of wealth inequality: something the feverish city clearly expresses. Since I do not think the text is meant to be interpreted logically, see the footnote below for the dramatic explanation of the *hetairai*.

treat the standard iatrogenic illness of what is conventional. Glaucon's cherished relish-makers also make a pronounced appearance.⁸⁷

Emphasizing his displeasure at Glaucon's rejection of the true city Socrates explicitly includes swine-herders for the consumption of domesticated meat, indicating that the feverish city is the actual city of sows. This description of the feverish city is much more detailed and longer than that of its predecessor, and it depicts an expansion of a social order not only horizontally differentiated with a noticeable increase in occupations and their specialization, but one that is also well stratified, with this hierarchy creating and determining many female roles. Many of these female jobs, like governesses, wet-nurses, courtesans (or concubines) are clearly the products of a society with structurally persistent inequalities based on individual wealth.

Once excess has been agreed upon and securely institutionalized domestically, Socrates takes the next step towards the establishment of the state and its regime in his discussion of this principle's consequences for foreign policy. The creation of a production structure that is capable of making highly refined consumption goods will require the expansion of arable land to support the massive increase in this new city's population. The need for land to grow the requisite crops to feed the people will result in the feverish city having to take land from other cities by force, provoking a military retaliation from them by a mobilization for war. Glaucon readily agrees to the necessity of the slaughter and death of war as a price to maintain his desired level of

⁸⁷ (373b-c). The mention of many of the above occupations continues the enumeration of the female aspect of the stratified feverish city before and apart from that of the male. The tendency of their prominence in the city that Glaucon requests is a form of blame, or punishment by Socrates since there have been several references or allusions to Glaucon's sexuality. Socrates is punishing him with integrating women into a previously male space. Looking ahead, he does something similar at the beginning of Book V in the first wave. Later in this same book, when he needs his agreement, he allows pederastic practices among the guardians at 468b-c. Earlier in Book III he purges the excesses of this practice with Glaucon after using it in a prolonged illustration. This is to say, Socrates plays on the sexuality, the eros, of Glaucon strategically.

affluence, even going so far as to agree, without a hint of the irony in Socrates' blame, that war is the primary cause of "evils, public and private", in the city.⁸⁸ There appears to be no mode or quantity of blame that Socrates can give to Glaucon to dissuade or coerce him to change his mind and acquiesce to a different, possibly simpler, social order devoid of highly processed meat relishes and skillfully made furniture. The physical desires Glaucon is presently experiencing and the unconscious desires about the power of justice do not allow him to accept that the effects of the institutionalization of excess make the feverish city a deficient form worthy of being abandoned. The derogatory names, the unflattering depictions of its development, the prominence and abundance of women, and the existence and carnage of war are all powerless to get Glaucon to reject the feverish city.

The final step of the regime's creation occurs when Socrates gets Glaucon to agree that the SP must be applied to the group of warriors that are called into existence to both facilitate the taking of surrounding land and to defend the feverish city from foreign invasion. Glaucon does not immediately do so, revealing his Athenian and democratic prejudices by questioning Socrates about whether the military can be composed of citizens. Socrates rejects this appeal by reminding Glaucon that because of "a fine agreement you and all we others made when we were fashioning the city...", they must adhere to the SP.⁸⁹ It should be remembered that this principle was specifically agreed to between Socrates and Adeimantus at 370b-c. The statement by Socrates above insisting upon its reimplementation between him and another interlocutor should reveal that Socrates views whoever the current interlocutor is as a "spokesman" for the entire

⁸⁸ (373e).

⁸⁹ (374a). Blooms translates "ὁμολογήσαμεν" (*hōmologēsamen*) coming from "ὁμολογέω" (*homologeō*) as "agreement". It primarily means to speak together, or to speak the same language. It shares a close meaning with "ὁμόλογος" (*homologos*), meaning agreeing or of one mind. Shorey words it as "admission".

group capable of entering into dialectical agreements or disagreements with Socrates on behalf of the others concerning the topic at hand.⁹⁰ Glaucon's desire that Socrates institutionalize the principle of excess in his polis through an insistence upon the inclusion of several conventional goods that are absent in the true city results in the institutionalization of the organized means of state violence for the enjoyment of these goods and for glory. In contrast to Socrates and Adeimantus, Glaucon's desired state is a decadent imperium.

It is worth repeating again for the sake of clarity that the text presents both the origin and reason for the state's existence in the *Republic* as Glaucon's refusal to abandon the enjoyment of certain cultural luxuries in an imaginary city. The state's existence is a mechanism of establishing a social equilibrium in a new context of excess and "unlimited acquisition of money".⁹¹ The text does not portray Socrates enthusiastically introducing the state into the dialogue as a panacea for political ills and then giving a prolonged homily about justice, nor does he give an encomium about the perfection of its warrior class in his famous discussion of their education, nor an secretive apology about a special relationship between the state and the philosopher. Concerning the republics in the *Republic*, the state comes last. The remaining "core" of the dialogue is mostly about the form and content of this institution, not about its presence or absence.

⁹⁰ Socrates' reference to the SP as agreed to between him and Adeimantus previously, coupled with his reference to the previous city as the true city presents the current interpretation with a difficulty. It would mean that the true city is really a medium sized town with specialization and not a village, i.e., that it is the little city and not the common settlement. A solution could be that Socrates is only referring to this prior agreement to remind Glaucon of their current rules, since all the occupants to the feverish city that appear before the military already adhere to this principle, making its rearticulation here superfluous in a sense. Its presence could also serve to support the present interpretation, since Glaucon's objection to a specialized military is an attempt to reinstitute the previous non-specialized labor of a social form he has just rejected.

⁹¹ (373d).

The present method asserts this because of Glaucon's burdening Socrates with a certain content, a dynamic regularity that we have seen many times before in Book II. In this point it is a consumption good requiring a new production structure and an institution, the state. With this remaining analytical emphasis on the state, we see that the primary structural contrast between Adeimantus and Socrates' early discussion with the remaining cities is Adeimantus and Socrates' disagreement about the principle of production and distribution. This caused a change in polis, while from here on a fundamental disagreement and change will concern the state's regime. Analytically this could be viewed as a shift in focus from that of the whole (polis) to part (politeia).⁹²

Socrates formally introduces us to the warrior class of the feverish city through an argument articulating why they would have to adhere to the SP and could not be a citizen military. Efficiently fighting with weapons is a skill, just like shoemaking, farming, or weaving are skills that require specialization to produce quality products. If this is true, Socrates concludes that it would be inconsistent to expect fine fighting that obtains victory to be just like a game that one can periodically play and expect to regularly win. The tools of fighting are just like any other tools, requiring time and energy to learn how to wield them properly for an end. If fighting well does not require specialization then to perform it well would require enchanting tools, allowing the user to wield them skillfully without any serious practice.⁹³ Glaucon wittily agrees to this, quipping that these tools would be invaluable if this were the case, the irony apparently being lost on him that the Athenian army of citizen-soldiers in which he has been

⁹² This also explains why the artisan class famously recedes into the dialogue's background after Book II.

⁹³ (374b-d).

recently praised by Socrates for giving distinguished service does not seem to suffer crippling repeated defeats in combat.⁹⁴

These warriors will require both more leisure and more skill in art to become fine practitioners of their occupation because their job is of “more importance” than the previous occupations that have been brought into existence.⁹⁵ Even though the substance of this statement turns out being one of the most institutionally important passages in the text, this line about the nature and value of the guardians is asserted by Socrates and not argued.⁹⁶ A reader with a dramatic focus might be tempted to explain this philosophical gap by an appeal to rhetoric. One could say that Socrates is just playing to the expectations of his current interlocutor who is “war-like”, “honor-loving”, and seems comfortable with this type of military stratification. While this might partially explain the success Socrates has in getting Glaucon to agree with him about the necessity of applying the SP to the military, this alone does not contain an evaluation about the truth content of his statement. With this particular approach, we are able to combine both method and evaluation in our analysis and infer the association of the rhetoric and the guardians from the claim that, according to Socrates, without this class of warriors the material basis that is required to produce a certain quality of consumer goods would not be able to exist.

However, with this introduction of the guardians as a class required to affirm the conventional content Glaucon has placed upon Socrates, I will clarify several things before continuing. When Socrates gives illustrations of all the occupations that require adherence to the SP for the creation of quality products as a means of persuading Glaucon to accept the SP for the

⁹⁴ Even compared to their famous Peloponnesian rival and its specialized military, if the rejoinder is made that maybe Athenian military success is due to their fighting other non-specialized military units.

⁹⁵ (374e). Rendered as ὅσῳ μέγιστον (*hosō megiston*).

⁹⁶ Guardians as φυλάκων (*phulakōn*).

military, he specifically lists only the founding crafts of the little city and ends with the locution “or...any other art whatsoever” as a general statement about specialization.⁹⁷ The prohibition against the occasional occupational practitioner of an “art” (τέχνην) here appears comprehensive, and Glaucon’s agreement with the application of the SP to the ruling class is of great importance. Institutionally what we can call the original guardians (φυλάκων) appear in the feverish city without hierarchy.⁹⁸ The core parts of the state’s first regime seem to be an unstratified group of warriors. There are no rulers of any sort that are part of and yet elevated beyond them that are mentioned at their inception, another textual clue that Plato is presenting more than one city and regime to the reader.

Secondly, while the guardians with a monopoly on coercion come into being due to the institutionalization of vice and its creation of the feverish city, we will see that the feverish city is transformed due to the necessity of having guardians behaving virtuously towards the civilian population. This genealogical and substantive ordering of vice and virtue in a political context populated by a state remains steady throughout the dialogue.

Lastly, concerning the roles of the speakers themselves, in addition to letting necessity determine and place its inhabitants in a role according to their nature in the common settlement, or of necessity producing an individual with a certain nature and having the founders “assign” this nature to its corresponding match of limited crafts in the little city, Socrates and his interlocutors will now have to both select and educate the natures which are latently suited to the

⁹⁷ (374c) ἄλλην τέχνην ἡντινοῦν ἐργαζόμενος. Shorey translates the word τέχνην as “trade” with his reference to ἐργαζόμενος, which mostly refers to manual labor, either with animals or with material goods as a craftsman.

⁹⁸ (374c).

city's guardianship.⁹⁹ Once Glaucon agrees to the task that the interlocutors must now match the nature of prospective guardians with their occupation, Socrates warns of the gravity of this responsibility of theirs, saying that this is "no mean thing", but finishes by appealing to Glaucon's honor by stating that they both "must not be cowardly" in their efforts.¹⁰⁰ Glaucon agrees that they must indeed not be cowardly, accepting the challenge to match these guardians up with their job and the change in dialectical function that this agreement entails.

The group commits to locating the passive individual conditions and constructing an environment to develop the natures that are fit to be the city's guardians. Socrates' opening invocation is one of the most jarring and puzzling lines in the dialogue:

Do you suppose," I said, "that for guarding there is any difference between the nature of a noble puppy and that of a wellborn young man?"¹⁰¹

If the previous flow of the conversation is accounted for, apart from the mention of "nature" and "guarding", the suggestion of what we can call the dual nature of the guardian class as a mixture between a well-heeled youth of the polis and a dog seems arbitrary. Its strikes the committed reader as incongruous and disorienting. Most interpretations pass over Socrates' opening choice of words here, eager to discuss both the duality of the famous spirited-gentle nature of the guardian that is formulated here and its future political or ethical implications.¹⁰² A few careful readings notice it and will resort to rhetorical explanations, informing the reader that

⁹⁹ (374b). "Assigned" being translated from ἀπεδίδομεν (*apedidomen*). This word has the connotation of being the passive or indebted recipient in an exchange that must occur.

¹⁰⁰ (374e).

¹⁰¹ (375a).

¹⁰² Rosen, 82-87; Bloom, 350-351; Reeve, 179, Cross-Woozley, 96; Annas, 80-81.

this metaphor works well here since the honor-loving, martially inclined Glaucon would be amenable to images that have to do with war, such as noble dogs.¹⁰³

While image and rhetoric are obviously being employed here, it could also be that Plato has Socrates say such things at critical junctures for ulterior motives, especially if there is a principle of unwillingness that is operative. The method of inserting seemingly arbitrary things into the conversation by Socrates might be a means of dramatically liberating him. The introduction of apparently unrelated content by Socrates into the dialogue is a way that the philosopher reverses the direction of the dramatic relationship by going on the offensive against the group, imparting content (be it images or values) of his own that must be worked out in the course of the exchange. Why? Since this type of content is volunteered by Socrates, would it be conjecture to think that it is not completely unrelated to the objectives of redeeming that which has been imparted by his interlocutors to produce a stable agreement with them for the grander purpose of gaining knowledge about justice?¹⁰⁴

If this turn in the dialogue is viewed as the strategic association of dogs and rich boys in the same nature it should not be so puzzling. Glaucon, however, is not so sure, and has the natural reaction to hearing Socrates' surmise "What do you mean?".¹⁰⁵ Socrates begins drawing parallels between the two entities, stating that each must possess strength, good senses, and speed to subdue their prey. Glaucon learns that physical capacity alone is not efficacious, and

¹⁰³ Bernardete, 54-58; Strauss, *The City and Man*, 97. We find out later in Book V (459a-b) from Socrates that Glaucon is something of a dilettante dog and rooster breeder and has a keen interest and familiarity with the activity, hence Socrates' frequent employment of dogs throughout the text.

¹⁰⁴ Socrates might not be as free as this interpretation makes him. Noble dogs are mentioned again three exchanges after alongside horses in 375a, the same animal that is mentioned concurrently with the first instance of "dogs" in the *Republic* during Book I (335a), and within this reference there is also the first mention of the word "virtue" (arete).

¹⁰⁵ (375a).

that in addition to it the noble dog and rich youth will also need courage to employ these capabilities towards an end. Here we have Socrates' first mention of a civic virtue, courage, when drawing an image between humans and dogs. The next thing Socrates says should cause those who are interested by the reading being given here great pause.

Then, will horse or dog—or any other animal whatsoever—be willing to be courageous if it's not spirited? Haven't you noticed how irresistible and unbeatable spirit is, so that its presence makes every soul fearless and invincible in the face of everything?¹⁰⁶

Now, if we are to take Socrates seriously about the agreement the group have settled on for examining the city in speech as a means of gaining knowledge about justice and injustice before the inward turn to its examination in the individual's soul, the question about whether our protagonist breaks the rules of his method, and therefore the group's agreement, should be raised. The requirement for this shift in focus on the soul was to be the completion of the polis and the articulation of the two primary questions about justice within its confines. If the feverish city is indeed complete, we have had no verbally expressed agreement about it. If justice and injustice in it have been clarified, we could not point to precisely where this occurs between Glaucon's final rejection of the true city and the assertion of the necessity of spiritedness in the soul of the guardian.¹⁰⁷

Here Socrates depicts spiritedness as a principle of the will that is required for the activation of the guardian's physical and character capacities for an end. Based on observation of empirical phenomena the conclusion is drawn that without this principle of the will, a

¹⁰⁶ (375a-b).

¹⁰⁷ Socrates was able to speak to Adeimantus and Glaucon previously about the "nature" of the city's inhabitants without mention of the soul, so one cannot use his discussion of "nature" here as an excuse for this seeming violation of agreement.

willingness, the guardian will be deficient and fail to perform his work finely; one can be passively courageous and physically capable, or capable but cowardly, but if one is without or unwilling to exercise these abilities then no fine product will be procured.

Dramatically is it worth noting that this discussion of courage and spiritedness is occurring between Socrates and Glaucon, the “most courageous”. At the surface, the fact of Glaucon’s military deeds might be employed to explain this pairing by Plato, but Adeimantus was included in Socrates’ praise of the brother’s valor by citing Glaucon’s lover. Isn’t this the same Glaucon that has acted less than courageously with Socrates when faced with choosing between him and some of his deepest desires? Glaucon could not resist the appeal of the young slave boy, nor the words of Polemarchus at the promise of the nocturnal companionship of young men, nor could his soul be satisfied with the answers Socrates gave to Thrasymachus in Book I about the value of justice. More recently his stomach could not be satisfied by the fare of the true city.

All these are important junctures that explain many of the stages in the story so far. Glaucon’s desire could be seen as a principle of unwillingness for Socrates. The retreat of Glaucon’s courage in the face of the overwhelming strength of his desires is a dramatic regularity throughout the first few books of the dialogue. The presence of his courage has managed to bring the first mention of civic virtue to light. There is no reason to believe that a principle of willingness is the only, or even best, means of activating the abilities of the guardian. Instead of spiritedness one could image (or maybe even have observed) a group of strong and courageous fighters, or a lone fighter, adequately fighting under a principle of unwillingness, such as extreme fear. The feeling of necessity in the agreement between Socrates and Glaucon about the sufficiency of spiritedness for the fineness of the guardian’s product is missing. Even if

spiritedness is the sufficient condition of being a good guardian with courage, would Glaucon really know this from experience?

Socrates gets Glaucon to quickly consent to the physical traits, the virtue, and the principle of the guardians without any serious articulation. Glaucon's eagerness quickly fades when Socrates mentions a dilemma caused by the relation between this occupation and its nature. It appears that the agreement of Glaucon and Socrates to have such a nature in their city will result in a group of individuals with a monopoly on state violence that are savage to both the citizens they should be protecting and amongst themselves as a class.¹⁰⁸ The very existence of this type of nature in its current institutional form is a contradiction because of the domestic faction and destruction it will cause. The guardians were brought into existence to defend the new population required by a highly specialized and stratified production structure from the attacks of their neighbors due to land theft, but with their training, physical strength, and spiritedness they will end up going to war and killing each other before they can even successfully field an army against foreign hostiles. Spiritedness alone will result in the internal collapse of the state. In order for this class to function properly they must be gentle towards their domestic charges and savage towards the out-group. This set of opposites of the will latent within the necessity of a functioning polis, not to mention a well-functioning city in speech, must first be present within the soul of the guardian before they are disentangled.

This will require a nature that is both spirited and gentle, an apparent contradiction.

Glaucon and Socrates agree that:

Yet, if a man lacks either of them, he can't become a good guardian. But these conditions resemble impossibilities, and so it follows that a good guardian is impossible.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ (375b).

¹⁰⁹ (375c-d).

Without the ability of the guardians to exercise their formidable abilities according to the correct principle of will towards the proper objects they cannot be good guardians. I will make the stakes in Socrates' speech more explicit. Without the existence of good guardians that are capable of properly acting on a correct friend-enemy distinction, there can be no specialized military that can defend the productive capacity of the feverish city. This capacity is the non-negotiable material basis for the enjoyment of civilizational delicacies. Without the requisite land capable of feeding the increase in population necessary to produce this excess there can be no relishes, furniture, or anything else within the conventional universe of Glaucon's refined tastes. The impossibility of the guardian's nature does not just mean the impossibility of this institution and therefore the state, it means that the feverish city itself is impossible and must be rejected.

Glaucon's response to this speech of the impossibility of the guardians is one of the only moments that takes Socrates by surprise in the entire dialogue. "I'm afraid so."¹¹⁰ This constitutes an admission on the part of Glaucon that the feverish city is impossible, and therefore his willingness to reject it. No wonder the text depicts Socrates halting in stunned silence, forcing the narrator to speak for him, the only time he will speak in a prolonged fashion until the beginning of Book V (449b).¹¹¹ Why was Socrates speechless? It could be that this is the first time he has been successful in bringing the passions of Glaucon to heel and getting an admission of defeat from him. It is likely that Socrates did not expect Glaucon to surrender the city that he

¹¹⁰ (375d). κινδυνεύει, ἔφη (*kinduneuei ephē*). Shorey translates this as "it seems likely", which is more accurate than that of Bloom's poetic rendering above since "κινδυνεύει" expresses probability and signifies a hesitancy to acquiesce. For us this means that Socrates was able to get an agreement to an important point in his argument based on coercion and an unwillingness of the party to fully accept the truth of his statement even if they agreed to it verbally. It is not a willing agreement based on acknowledged persuasion. Shorey's translation indicates the former, Bloom's is closer to the latter. Dramatically it is important to make this distinction.

¹¹¹ "I too was at a loss..." (375d).

had so vehemently demanded. Glaucon's admission signifies not only a momentary instance of continence against the soul's desires, but also an openness to agree to a city in which the power of justice is not ultimately expressed in the procurement and consumption of delicacies. It hints at an openness to alternative products of the men's speeches, and since Socrates has been tasked by the group with setting the deliverances of reason before them the rejection of the feverish city indicates a willingness to enjoy a different flavor of justice than what was recently demanded. What was it about the duality of the guardian's nature that "tamed" Glaucon? What was it that he felt that was more momentarily persuasive than the demands of his desires? His first full experience with power of reason? In the form of a dilemma, no less?

The pause could also have confounded Socrates since he has agreed to construct a city in speech that is able to exhibit justice and injustice. Upon Glaucon's reaction to the dilemma of the guardian's soul Socrates is currently empty-handed. The nature that Socrates is proposing is naturally impossible. An inherent gentleness and spiritedness coupled with courage and a physique capable of violence is not something generated by nature and presented to the founders for its occupational commissioning. We know this because the means that Socrates proposes to solve this dilemma is no less than a change of function within the chosen method. This is actuated by a change in the men's roles from being founders giving genealogical descriptions of a city coming into being to that of lawgivers speaking on the institutional specifics of the city's regime. The men must go from a more structurally passive role of assigning the pre-formed materials of nature to their respective occupations according to qualitative differences in skill to that of legislators and educators taking individual natures and developing them through a process. The former required little to no rational effort by the philosopher. The latter, as I hope to show, will require a hero's effort. In fact, it is this effort that is largely responsible for the

Republic's fame. The suggestion is that with this fundamental change in the nature of the polis from stateless to political the speakers will have to undergo a change in function from that of founders giving a genealogical description of a city in speech to the more laborious task of educators and lawmakers taking on more responsibility by using a roundabout process to reach an agreed upon social equilibrium. We see now why Socrates exclaimed that the task of selecting the guardians was “no mean thing.”¹¹²

The other part of this pause has Socrates reflecting on what was said before, and only speaking up with a proposed solution to this false dilemma that has managed to level the feverish city. “It is just, my friend, that we're at a loss. For we've abandoned the image we proposed.”¹¹³ This appears to be a dramatic rescue of the feverish city. Since it has been argued that there is a noticeable element of unwillingness operative in Socrates, this maneuver presents a challenge for my argument. Why does Socrates fail to take this opportunity to reject the guardian class and the state that they compose and reinstitute the true city, or some version of it?

The continuation by Socrates does not refer to the polis but to the regime within a polis. Socrates saves the institution of the guardians within the city, not the city. He saves them because Glaucon has rejected the possibility of good guardians (not guardians in general) before the founding and completion of an agreed upon city. This leaves Socrates in a bind, for if Glaucon had agreed that the feverish city was complete before the birth of the guardians then there is no clear reason why Socrates could not have easily purged them at this point if he wished. However, the interlocutors are currently homeless and without a definite city, therefore

¹¹² (374e).

¹¹³ (375d) δικαίως γε, ἦν... ὃ φίλε, ἀποροῦμεν: ἥς γὰρ προυθέμεθα εἰκόνοσ ἀπελείφθημεν. Shorey translates “εἰκόνοσ” as “comparison”, but Bloom’s rendering of it as “image” is more accurate.

Socrates must use the last demand of convention for the obtainment of this constructive purpose. It is the fame of the *Republic* as to what exactly Socrates does with a dilemma of his own. It results in the transformation of the institution of the guardians by means of their musical education. This transformation will result in the gradual purge of the remnants of Glaucon's feverish city.

It should be noted that with his rejection of the feverish city and agreement that these types of guardians are impossible Socrates refers to Glaucon as his "friend" (φίλε, *phile*).¹¹⁴ It seems the unity of friendship has been restored between these two. Dramatically this is pertinent since this term of endearment, or more technically, of praise, was not bestowed upon him when he interrupted and rejected the true city's description. To avoid the guilt of accusing the hero of sophistry, Socrates' mention of justice ("just", δικαίως, *dikaiōs*) in his response to Glaucon assumes an understanding of its meaning.¹¹⁵ Naturally Glaucon will not pause to demand an explanation of what Socrates' means here, so fixated is he in being persuaded in his soul of the power of justice. A careful partner might have halted Socrates and refused to continue the conversation by forcing Socrates to give an account of the word he had just employed in a seemingly confident fashion during a search for its very meaning. This suggests that Socrates might be offering Glaucon a quick means of ending the undertaking, or it is an ironic quip. Glaucon interrupted the closing description of the true city and denied Socrates the chance of giving an account of justice and injustice in it. In vain Socrates gives him a chance to directly request its meaning.

¹¹⁴ This term could also mean "beloved", or "dear one".

¹¹⁵ The word "δικαίως" (*dikaiōs*) also could be rendered as "right", "lawful", or "lawful claim" in an exchange around the time Plato wrote. It has a more archaic meaning of being properly observant of custom.

As Socrates suspects, Glaucon passes over this chance, tempted before the gathered men at the prospect of building a polis with a state and military that suit his desires. In this sense he is like those who brush off subtlety, skimming past the words in a text itself to get on with it all, eager to see what scheme of reason the philosopher has concocted to solve the political problem. Maybe with this form things will be different. And so reason is heavily laden before one's journey with the inheritance of our problematics. What need is there of a fundamental questioning in political philosophy when its ultimate questions have been assumed in the subject matter? Radically understood, our discipline is not a dispute about the "best regime" according to human nature between the democrats and oligarchs, for this assumes a necessity that there must be a regime to organize and characterize human existence. As Plato indicates, thoughts dealing with human "nature" are connected to a political philosophy that has been happy enough to cede to ethics: the meaning of existence. What could a reoriented political philosophy contribute to a question like the meaning of life?

Socrates' solution has already been mentioned: the introduction of the "dual nature" of this warrior, being both spirited towards enemies and gentle towards friends agreed upon by him and Glaucon through the medium of an image. The additional theme Socrates uses to expand this image to transform the spiritedness of the guardians into one capable of in-group gentleness is familiarity. Familiarity is associated with knowledge, and knowledge with a love of learning and a love of wisdom, goes the image, therefore the proper guardian will be both spirited and philosophic in nature.¹¹⁶ This duality is agreed upon by the following steps. Glaucon affirms

¹¹⁶ (375e) Bloom translates προσγενέσθαι φιλόσοφος (*prosgenesthai philosophos*) as "to be a philosopher", while Shorey translates it with the locution of "having the love of wisdom", i.e., adjectivally as a quality (e.g., philosophic), rather than Bloom's rendering of it as a noun and an occupation (e.g., philosopher). The context alone would make Shorey's translation more accurate since Socrates is talking about the nature (φύσιν, *phusin*) of the guardian and not its occupation

Socrates' assertion that dogs treat those they are familiar with gently and are savage with those they are unfamiliar with. This move breaks the dilemma that they had arrived at concerning the potentiality of the good guardian.

The second step in the demonstration comes when Socrates makes the empirical claim that the dog's use of familiarity as its basis of making group distinctions means it must be philosophic in nature in addition to being spirited. There is a problem with this leap in reasoning, causing Glaucon to implicitly reject it by disagreeing with Socrates with a confessed ignorance.¹¹⁷ This causes Socrates to articulate his insistence about the philosophic nature of the dog, and by extension the guardian, by appealing to common experience about the generally positive reaction of noble dogs to their familiars and generally adverse reaction of them to strangers. All this is based on the dog not being exactly philosophic, but a lover of learning.¹¹⁸ Glaucon agrees that this trait surely characterizes the dog. Socrates then gets an agreement that the love of wisdom and the love of learning are the same.¹¹⁹

If this is the case, the final step in the roundabout way to agree about this dual nature is reached when Socrates concludes that if the dog in their image possesses such a nature then the good (*kalos*) and fine (*kagathos*) city guardian must have a nature possessing strength, courage, spiritedness, and be philosophic.¹²⁰ The only trait of the guardian's nature that required elucidation by Socrates is the last one, all the others are accepted by Glaucon without hesitation.

primarily. Also, the verb προσγενέσθαι, means to come to possess or to accrue, indicates possession, or the having of something. Finally, the – ος ending for φιλόσοφος indicates a genitive declension, also suggesting an adjectival usage. Bloom translates the same word φιλόσοφος as “philosophic” a few sentences below in 376c.

¹¹⁷ (376a). πῆ δῆ; or Bloom's dramatic rendering: “How is that”, he said, “I don't understand.”

¹¹⁸ Or, φιλομαθὲς, *philomathes*. Not the *philosophos*, or lover of wisdom previously at 375e.

¹¹⁹ (376b).

¹²⁰ The “good” (καλὸς, *kalos*). The fine (καγαθὸς, *kagathos*).

With Glaucon concurring that the guardian must have a philosophic quality of the will to act gently towards the citizens of the polis an agreement is reached. There is now dramatic unity after Socrates has completed what he failed to do at 376a when Glaucon introduced disagreement between them with his ignorance of the relationship between the philosophic and familiarity. This focus on adjusting the nature of the guardians has been undertaken to ensure their functional quality as a means of keeping the state, and by extension the polis, in existence and equilibrium.¹²¹

Socrates states that the good guardian would have this nature at the beginning of his life.¹²² This potentiality is then to be taken by the founders and transformed into a fine product through the process of education. Similar to the first methodological dilemma the founders of a city in speech faced in being able to properly identify the forms of justice and injustice coming into being without preceding knowledge of them, there is no mention of the difficulty of properly

¹²¹ We are now in a better position to see why Socrates would abruptly introduce the concept of spiritedness into the conversation without any serious argument or precedence for it. The immediate purpose it serves is to embed a psychological contradiction into the feverish city by means of the state. Even though it does not necessarily belong there its presence makes the feverish city “impossible”, leading either to the abandonment of the entire methodological approach of constructing a city in speech if Glaucon requests to know what Socrates means by “just”, or leaving room for its later transformation. If the second option is taken, then Socrates has the ability of structurally embedding these qualities of will together through means of a contrived analogy which will compose the subsequent hierarchy he will spend the next several books separating until an agreement about the final form of the polis is reached. As we have observed, the text does not present the original guardians as hierarchically organized amongst themselves based on any special quality or ability within their own class. Socrates’ political reforms have the structural effect of progressively radicalizing this stratification based on the philosophic element and the subordination of the spirited. We will see in Books III and IV that this hierarchy within the guardians does not immediately take the form of philosopher-kings and their auxiliaries is a strong textual clue that Plato is operating by something like our hermeneutical method, and that there are multiple cities at minimum. This is to say, the end state of this hierarchy among the guardians is grounded in this dual nature and ultimately contingent upon the men’s final agreement to a polis and not some preordained scheme.

¹²² (376c). “Beginning” is translated from (ὑπάρχοι, *huparchoi*).

identifying what the “courage” or the love of “wisdom” will look like in the unmixed nature of these guardians. Even if there were such guardians occurring naturally, ready for their educators to take and mold them their educators should have an idea of what these qualities are beforehand so they can properly identify the right prospects. If they are deficient in this area, they are in danger of educating the wrong guardians. This makes the problem of the impossibility of good guardians a reality again, and subsequently, the issue of a functional polis not full of savagery between its own inhabitants.

Socrates tasks the group with the education and rearing of the guardians.¹²³ Now the men have arrogated two different functions to themselves. Unlike the true city these guardians require a rationally articulated rearing and educational program to maintain the social order, a much longer set of speeches. Aside from the congruence this development has with the remarks about the change in the speaker’s roles and its dramatic implications with the advent of the state (i.e., a more roundabout form of praise), this also signals the transition to another polis. Instead of no guardians or original guardians, the men speaking will have good guardians. The fact that there needs to be such a process of education and rearing by the speakers casts serious doubt about how truly natural the guardian’s nature really is. Surely many people in the other occupations can naturally possess strength, courage, the anger of spiritedness, and a love of learning. Possession of these alone need not make one a potentially good guardian. It is the process that these natures are put through that bestows upon them this superlative and their occupation.

The question about the function of this discussion of the education and rearing of the guardians is raised by Socrates. Should this be the particular means for the men to construct a

¹²³ “Education” as (παιδευθήσονται, *paideuthēsontai*), and “rearing” as (θρέψονται, *threpsiontai*).

city in which justice and injustice are visible for the poor sighted? Socrates also gives another warning about the length of such an undertaking, stating that “We don't want to scant the argument, but we don't want an overlong one either.”¹²⁴ That fact that it is Adeimantus who jumps back into fray, excitedly exclaiming that this task will most certainly “contribute to that goal” should give the reader a mixed reaction. It was Adeimantus that agreed to the method of building a city in speech for examining justice and injustice, but now it appears that he is eager to change the analytical focus from that of the city to the soul, or a class of souls. Even if the objection that the education of the guardians is mostly an institutional event and therefore it counts as being structural is plausible, the focus still shifts from the polis to the regime.

However, I am not at all by surprised that Adeimantus interrupts and eagerly agrees that this focus on the education of the city's elite youth is relevant since this is the young man that has given the fiercest provisional blame of customary *theological* education. If we remember, Adeimantus states that if the education of pathos and custom rightly praised the power of justice as an intrinsic good rather than as a respectable means towards temporal and eternal ends then there would be no need of the state's coercion in the form of the law to properly adjust people to their social environment. The power of justice would be forged in the hearts of every young boy at home, making its collective strength among many other highly spirited men a foregone conclusion, even with the presence of outliers. The “public” or collective sphere would essentially be a continuation of the hearth. There would not be such a radical disconnect between the love of the father and the caring man for the boy with the impious schemes the city's cunning man whisper to him. This is high praise for the power of education. Similarly, we should

¹²⁴ (376d). Socrates' first warning about his concern for the length of the argument occurs at 369b.

remember that it is Adeimantus and the cunning man that are the first to invoke the persuasive power of institutions to delude the masses from their actions in their blame of justice against the concerned father's objections. It then should be of little wonder why Adeimantus is eager to discuss a political elite's education and rearing since it specifically promises to address many of his previous provisional objections.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter focused on giving dramatic readings of the following: the group's methodological procedure to find and value justice and injustice, the series of pre-state cities that rise and fall in the discussion between Socrates and Adeimantus, and the rise of the feverish city and the state (regime). Socrates does not proceed like he did in Book I because he was unsuccessful, but in a "constructive" manner using the city in speech to locate the coming into being of justice that can then be used to examine the soul of the individual. The absurdity, or at least paradox, of this analogy was noted: although the city-soul approach is agreed upon to define and value justice and injustice, it requires at least one of the watchers who are present to have previous knowledge of what these are. If not, then it would be hard to identify their generation. This is apart from whether the virtues and vices that are identified in each entity (soul-city) can be a useful philosophical analogue.

I have argued that the lead-up to what Socrates calls the "true city" constitutes a series of small, stateless cities that are proposed, developed, and rejected. Upon allowing unskilled labor into the little city Socrates interprets this as a rejection of the specialization principle: his subsequent description is of the first city he proposes, the *sunoiakia*. This primitive city is rejected by Glaucon because he is disgusted with its inhabitant's lifestyle. He wants luxuries like relishes and furniture. This requires Socrates to create the material basis for this principle of excess by

expanding the production structure, introducing wealth stratification, and reintroducing specialization. Most importantly the last specialized worker, the guardians which compose the state, appear. If this is right, the guardians are both the products of the material principle of excess, something Socrates blames throughout the creation of the feverish city, and something that he introduces unwillingly. Because the guardian class dominates much of the subsequent discussion in the early parts of the *Republic*, this interpretation is at great odds with most traditional readings that see it as closely linked to a positive Platonic doctrine.¹²⁵

¹²⁵ See the above discussions of the Literal and Ironic genus in the Introduction for examples of this belief.

CHAPTER THREE. THE TAMING OF THE WARRIORS

This is the most turbulent section in the part of the *Republic* covered in this dissertation. It is the Socratic attempt to leave the feverish city that has been instituted by Glaucon for a new city where justice can be found, called the happy city at the beginning of Book IV.¹ It gradually becomes apparent that Socrates and Adeimantus have very different desires for what the guardian class, the political elite of a city in speech, should be. Adeimantus appears highly concerned with securing for them the conventional prestige and privileges an Athenian aristocrat might enjoy while Socrates is more focused on subordinating their happiness to the common good for the sake of making them efficient warriors that must fight and die. Socrates wants an austere warrior class because of their function within the city he has proposed to use in his task of praising justice, and because of argument length. Adeimantus wants idle aristocratic lords.

The exchanges over piety and courage are unsuccessful. Adeimantus does not agree with an education for the guardians that prepares them for a violent death in battle for the freedom of the artisan class: justice cannot mean this type of sacrifice for him. Because of this the second theological law making the guardians pious and courageous has much trouble getting his agreement, and it is eventually rejected at the beginning of Book III. The section on courage proper is a disaster for Socrates. He meets with stiff resistance at any mention of praising courage to the guardians by blaming politically inexpedient content from the poets and storytellers. After this Socrates abandons speeches about the gods for some time and turns to the heroes. It is only through moderation that Socrates is able to make the guardians self-controlled young men by blaming certain heroic excesses in Homer and pre-Homeric sources. The sequence of topics, piety and the gods, courage with the gods and heroes, and moderation and the heroes,

¹ (420c).

is explained by the constant disagreements between Socrates and Adeimantus about the political function and general life outlook of the city's political elite.

Adeimantus interrupts Socrates and Glaucon's speeches on the education of the state's guardians by insisting that a discussion of their rearing and education will greatly benefit the main task at hand, i.e., to arrive at a definition and value of justice. It is important to emphasize that this is not only a modification of the previous agreement to the approach of finding and valuing justice relative to injustice by the same person who had previously insisted upon it, but it also changes the dramatic roles of the discussants from founders giving a genealogical description of the city's necessary structural components to that of educators and stewards of the regime's workers.²

Chapter Three analytical outline:

1. Piety: the failed theological reconstruction
2. Courage: the failed heroic reconstruction
3. Moderation: the successful heroic reconstruction

3.1. Piety: The Failed Theological Reconstruction

The preface to the discussion of the guardian's education consists of three things: a friendly address, a playful exhortation concerning the role that they are adopting, and a comment on the length of the argument. With the interruption and modification of the previously agreed upon method in favor of speaking about the guardian's theological education Socrates addresses his interlocutor with a strong oath "by Zeus" and directly as "dear Adeimantus".³ This is one

² The previous agreement was that only by constructing a city in speech, not by educating and rearing the state's regime, would they be able to see what justice is and arrive at its value. Also, by "workers" is meant those that will be working "in" the regime, i.e., the guardian class.

³ φίλε Ἀδείμαντε (*phile Adeimante*) (376d).

way of solidifying this new agreement and to ensure that it is not changed yet again by someone who seems prone to this behavior. Secondly, Socrates mentions that the discussion about the education of the guardians (the *paedeia*) “mustn’t be given up even if it turns out to be quite long”, another reminder of the dramatic principle of unwillingness that Socrates is operating under in the dialogue and the second mention of his concern about the length of the argument about justice to Adeimantus in Book II alone.⁴ If knowledge of justice has the value Socrates claims in Book I his constant asides to his interlocutors about the pace of the argument are strange.⁵

And thirdly, now that the specialized class of warriors that are the sufficient condition to maintain the state form and its institutional principle of excess must be raised and taught correctly, Socrates maintains that he and Adeimantus are “men telling tales in a tale at their leisure”.⁶ This is a reference to Adeimantus’ previous blame of the conventional father’s theologically defective praise of justice to their sons.⁷ Instead of praising justice as a means, both Adeimantus and Socrates will now become the “fathers” these well-heeled lost boys require. They will do what their actual fathers failed to do. They will properly praise justice to their sons as an end in itself and not as a means to gain rewards in this life and the hereafter. It is up to these caring men to create a new customary understanding about the value of justice for a fictional group of adolescent boys.

⁴ (376d). The other has already been referenced and is found when Socrates and Adeimantus agree to the first method of inquiry at (369a-b).

⁵ (344e).

⁶ (376d) The reference to tale-tellers is “μυθολογοῦντές” or (*mythologountes*), meaning to “invent a mythical tale” or “frame an imaginary construction”.

⁷ (363a).

The education of the guardians discussed by Socrates and Adeimantus in this section can be understood as them playing the role of “caring men” answering the slanders of the religious malpractitioners by means of a theological reconstruction for the children the argument has given them. Because of this it should not be a surprise that the entire discussion is framed in the context of custom and traditional education, a decision that is quickly accepted by Adeimantus for this is a fitting choice for caring fathers.⁸ Within this customary arrangement gymnastics for the body and music for the soul are quickly agreed upon by Adeimantus, with the guardians being taught music, particularly the rational content of speeches, before gymnastic.⁹

The famous typology that composes the music species of the guardian’s education contains the categories of speech, harmonic mode, and rhythm; however, we are not told that the musical education has the latter two parts until much later.¹⁰ For Adeimantus, the only focus that Socrates emphasizes in this exchange are both the rational content and mode (*lexis*) of proper speech.¹¹ Speech content is divided into two forms, a true and a false form, with the latter being the first thing Socrates covers with Adeimantus. This emphasis on first educating the youth in speech in the false form of speech during their impressionable years leads to a disagreement

⁸ “What is the education? Isn't it difficult to find a better one than that discovered over a great expanse of time?” (376e).

⁹ Technically speaking this cannot be true once we find out what constitutes “gymnastic” for Socrates, at least within his conversation with Glaucon, which, admittedly, could be different than what the word might mean in his exchange with Adeimantus. Later in Book III we see that a large part of “gymnastic” means dietary restrictions and customs, resulting in the purging of all the delicacies of the feverish city. It would be hard to imagine the guardian class being allowed to eat freely from the decadent food goods of the feverish city from birth until they received and completed their moral education in late adolescence and only then be taught how to eat correctly. The method herein does not allow this to be included in the analysis. These observations only serve to illustrate the dramatic and not literal character of these speeches.

¹⁰ (397b-c). In another place, other parts to music are admitted, but passed over in 398c.

¹¹ Originally only the content is mentioned. I will show that speech mode is a later invention.

through ignorance by Adeimantus.¹² This forces Socrates to rearticulate the argument. He claims that the first tales we tell children are mostly false with elements of truth in them, therefore speech must be taken up before gymnastic.¹³

Socrates' line about the developmental priority of false speech before its true form does not match his response wherein he restates the priority of music over gymnastic. Logically this is to explain the ordering of a species by the ordering of a sub-species. How can we make sense of this disagreement and the strange response to it? The dramatic explanation of this move is that Adeimantus misunderstands the meaning of the true/false speech distinctions he had previously agreed to at 376e. Socrates means that false speeches are the customary myths parents and caring men use to praise justice and blame injustice. These are speeches that they in turn were taught and likely believe in a qualified, general sense. Adeimantus is puzzled by Socrates wanting to teach the youth "false" speeches since he equates this to intentional lies. This confusion occurs because Adeimantus does not categorize the myths epistemologically as either true or false but believes Socrates' does. Adeimantus has a utilitarian view towards religion, custom, and morality, understanding them in the normative categories of good or bad for an end, something that will become apparent to the reader.

The reiteration of the priority of music to gymnastic is caused by the rejection of what Socrates means by false speech. This then implies a rejection to the agreement to educate the soul before the body, something that was done several lines earlier¹⁴. If Adeimantus does not understand Socrates to define the true and false by expedience here, as his rejection indicates, then Socrates must retreat to the previously valid agreement. This agreement is the traditional

¹² "I don't understand how you mean that." (377a).

¹³ (377a).

¹⁴ (376e).

educational categories of gymnastic and music, not their priority. This position is chosen due to the content of the disagreement: the confusion over the meaning of false speeches. To not know what Socrates means here is to reject the priority of music over gymnastic.¹⁵ Only when Socrates explains what he means by true and false speeches and upon Adeimantus' agreement to this definition is the conclusion demonstrated about the priority of music to gymnastic. Socrates figured he would be able to pass over this explanation based upon the speech Adeimantus gave about the role of religion in the child's life.

It is only after Adeimantus agrees to this dramatic chain of reasoning that Socrates goes on to argue for the priority of myth relative to true modes of speech in the guardian's education. He does this through making what are likely some of the most famous claims Plato is known for. The importance of the beginning, especially in the education of the young, is derived from a broader statement made about the malleability of human nature at a young age. The young are overly impressionable and can be formed according to the purposes of the environment's conditioning powers and learning models. The thought that it is the broader context and social environment that is the determining factor in a human's development is currently a popular one. It is also congruent with Adeimantus' view of human nature, since he believes that the power of justice properly praised in one's youth will contain the power to reform society into a more communal and altruistic unity devoid of serious institutionalized faction, hence his emphasis on the normative power of justice over a pathos that lacks self-awareness. The explanatory power of social environment relative to the individual's soul we will call Educational Model II.

¹⁵ "That what I meant by saying music must be taken up before gymnastic." (377a). Again, this is stated by Socrates as a conclusion to the trouble of Adeimantus to understand why false *speeches* are to be taught before true ones. This does not make much logical sense. The dramatic demonstration clarifies this passage.

Educational Model I is present in the true city and appears to hold that necessity determines one's nature, and this nature in turn produces the broader social environment.¹⁶ Socrates has therefore gone from one model of education with Adeimantus to an opposing model, the latter of which Adeimantus heartily agrees with.¹⁷

The literature and conventional interpretations of the education of the guardians is frequently problematized negatively as Plato engaging in some type of censorship.¹⁸ My argument holds that both Socrates and Adeimantus are in the position of caring fathers that are capable of properly praising justice, so that dramatically the enterprise is positive. Yet the popular instinct is not divorced from the text at this point. The theological reconstruction that is required to raise guardians that value justice as an end and not as a means requires the old stories to be both praised and blamed.¹⁹ The implementation of the "censorship" of this reconstruction

¹⁶ Educational Model III is laid out in Book VII. Yet this is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The irony (relative to the text's speech content) is that the pedagogical statement above contradicts the dramatic relationship of Socrates to the brothers. These young men were not truly persuaded of Socrates' definition and valuation of justice in Book I. They reject his classification of justice as a mixed good and demand that he praise it as an intrinsic good. They do not directly ask Socrates for his definition of justice, and they (will) continually reject the cities he tries to construct in the pursuit of giving an answer to their challenges. This should serve to qualify the previous statements made about Adeimantus' view of human nature. At the specific level of the dramatic it is of some concern that Adeimantus readily agrees to a view of human nature that he does not seem to demonstrate. Generally, it should also cast doubt about the power of dialectic he requests to produce an agreement about the definition and value of justice.

¹⁷ "Don't you know that the beginning is the most important part of every work and that this is especially so with anything young and tender? For at that stage it's most plastic, and each thing assimilates itself to the model whose stamp anyone wishes to give to it."

"Quite so."

"Then shall we so easily let the children hear just any tales fashioned by just anyone and take into their souls opinions for the most part opposite to those we'll suppose they must have when they are grown up?"

"In no event will we permit it." (377b) Notice the emphatic affirmations here in comparison to more curt or even forced agreements in other exchanges.

¹⁸ Annas, 83-100; Popper, 52-53; Reeve, 228-229; Pappas, 66-69.

¹⁹ While we have taken the modes of speech of "praise" and "blame" to be methodologically significant, showing a repayment of a debt incurred by the speaker by his interlocutor and as

will not be done directly by the caring fathers. Instead, it will be institutionally mediated through the nurses and mothers of the children who are to be guardians.²⁰ The word in the text that is used for “mother” is μητέρα (*maiteras*), meaning “mother”. At this point Socrates appears to believe that the guardian children are to be raised within the context of a nuclear family, or at least a context with their mother. This is a large textual clue for the multiple cities thesis that this argument is advancing since Plato famously has Socrates abolish the kin-related family (at least among the guardian class) in Book V in favor of a group marriage structure. It appears to be at odds with Plato’s “second wave” of Book V. The education of the guardians begins with the persuasion of their first storytellers, their mothers, nurses, and elders regarding the content of these tales.²¹ Only tales and myths that are in conformity with the principle of the current theological reconstruction can be told (i.e., are praiseworthy); those that do not conform to it will be “thrown out” (i.e., are blameworthy).

What is the model, or principle, for this education? And what is this model by which theology must be reconstructed in order for the guardians to fulfill their specialization properly? Political necessity, the practical good, expediency. If the method’s interpretation of the state in the *Republic* is correct, this is a fitting principle. Without the guardian’s functional specialization there can be no state, and without the state there is no institutionalized principle of excess. Without this material principle there is no massive, specialized division of labor required to produce the luxury goods it is expressive of, and without this we are back in the pre-political.

ways to produce agreement between them, Adeimantus explicitly mentions the “blameworthiness” of the content Socrates will purge from the poets in (377d).

²⁰ “We’ll persuade nurses and mothers to tell the approved tales to their children and to shape their souls with tales more than their bodies with hands.” (377c)

²¹ (378c-d)

The “false” speeches of the poets are transformed into the expedient “lies” of the polis and its state.

Adeimantus agrees with this procedure and asks which tales out of all the formative poet’s tales and myths are blameworthy and will therefore be forbidden. Socrates answers indirectly by stating that the important stories will serve as a model for the smaller, less important ones. Interpreted according to the dramatic principle of unwillingness this is a method of narrowing the request Adeimantus has made for Socrates to make an exhaustive list of forbidden tales to now agreeing to only hear exemplary models of those that are blameworthy. It is a way of shortening the exchange. Adeimantus disagrees through an ignorance of what Socrates means by this, persisting to request examples of this censorship principle. Again, Socrates does not appear to answer his request directly by listing examples, but lays out a general blame against mythmakers, accusing Homer, Hesiod, and “other poets” of intentionally composing false stories and telling them to impressionable people in the past and present.²² The blame he lays at their feet is that they were incapable liars and made deficient representations of the gods and heroes, the moral examples that the formative youth are destined to idolize.²³

The traditional and current poets are guilty of impiety. This is a serious charge for Socrates to plead before Adeimantus since piety is a sign of justice.²⁴ To be pious is a sign of

²² (377d) This is likely an allusion to Adeimantus’ praise of the “noble Hesiod and Homer” (363a-c) in the form of a rebuke. The other poets are Orpheus, Musaeus, and the contemporary Athenian ones.

²³ The exact wording of Socrates’ blame may have a wider scope than just the poets. “When a man in speech makes a bad representation of what gods and heroes are like...”. (377e) This would include the hypothetical interlocutor of the religious malpractitioner that slanders the character of the gods for personal gain that Adeimantus speaks vicariously for in his speech at the beginning of Book II.

²⁴ (366d). Bloom translates ὁσίου (*osiou*) as “holy”, Shorey renders it as “pious”. It can mean hallowed, religious, devout.

justice. Therefore, to be impious is a signification of injustice. The biggest liar about the biggest thing was Hesiod. There are three lies that Hesiod tells which are so grave that Socrates does not even articulate them and instead settles for vague allusions to them, expecting his Greek companions to be fully aware of what they are.²⁵ The three incidences that Socrates blames Hesiod for occur in his *Theogony*. The first is when Uranus began rejecting the monstrosities that his offspring began to appear as by inserting them back into the genitals of his mate Gaia and subsequently impeding their release.²⁶ The second reference is to the revenge of Cronos when he plotted with his mother to use his position from the inside of her to sever the genitals of his father during coition with a weapon she crafted to be used explicitly for that purpose.²⁷ Cronos' deeds and suffering at the hands of Zeus (his son) is a reference to the war and coup orchestrated with the help of his mother Rhea by Zeus against his father for world rule.²⁸ Unlike Hesiod, Socrates is pious and will not repeat what so is crassly and brazenly said in the depiction of sacred figures.

Additionally, if these things about the gods happen to actually be true they should be ritualistically preserved, secretly passed down among only a select few from generation to generation, guarded with a valuable sacrifice, and substituted with fine lies about the gods for the sake of the youth.²⁹ Ignorance and what is normatively, or now, politically true, must now

²⁵ First, "I said, 'the man who told the biggest lie about the biggest things didn't tell a fine lie—how Uranus did what Hesiod says he did, and how Cronos in his turn took revenge on him. And Cronos' deeds and his sufferings at the hands of his son...'. (377e-378a) Bloom seems to agree with Socrates' sense of propriety towards depicting the gods in so shocking a light since his translation's notes contain the meager reference to the literary source and not a description of what Socrates is alluding to.

²⁶ Hesiod, *Theogony*, 139-158.

²⁷ Ibid, 160-180. Hesiod has Cronos explicitly state that he will perform the act, "since I do not care that ill-named father is ours."

²⁸ Ibid, 453-506.

²⁹ (378a)

subordinate the truth of custom. What can explain this odd aside by Socrates about the ritualized preservation of harsh truths? It also seems to be a reference to Adeimantus' depiction of the arts of the religious malpractitioners' methods of persuasion. In particular, to the public and private rites and initiations they offer as efficacious to satisfy the god's anger at injustice on behalf of their patrons.³⁰ Unlike the perverted rituals that institutionalize and make powerful the practice of injustice, the rites implemented by the fathers of this new city will institutionalize the power of justice and emphasize piety in exchange for the truth. Adeimantus agrees with this sentiment: these speeches of Hesiod about the greatest things, the gods and their character, are "harsh" and should be banned.³¹

Besides these irreverent depictions of the gods, no speeches that legitimize or trivialize "the extremes of injustice" by the guardians are to be allowed. It is to be the most blameworthy thing for a guardian to act like Cronos and "punish the unjust deeds of his father" by taking revenge for past wrongs³². In doing so they would not, like Hesiod contends, be acting like a mighty god, but instead acting in the most shameful and blameworthy manner possible. The legitimization of filial insubordination is based on impious theology and normalizes unspeakable acts by attributing them to the greatest of all gods. This would only serve to erect yet another vicious theological model praising faction to the guardian youth. To his credit Adeimantus quickly agrees with an oath to Zeus that these types of speeches should not be allowed since they are not "fitting".³³

³⁰ (364e-365a).

³¹ The word here is *χαλεποί* (*chalepoi*), which Blooms makes to be "harsh" and Shorey gives as "hard". Other meanings could be "painful", "grievous", "difficult", or "dangerous".

³² (378b) Here the guardians still seem to have identifiable fathers that they can take revenge on, implying that the family unit has not been replaced by the group marriage of Book V.

³³ (378b).

Stories depicting strife between the gods and their kin are banned as well for it would be shameful for the protectors of the city to hear such stories uttered about the gods. The mechanism of shame would be elicited by a theology that praises the gods while depicting them as acting in a disunified manner. Teaching the guardians such a truth would be politically inexpedient, for we must remember that the “lies” which Socrates and Adeimantus are trying to combat with their theological answer to the slanderers of the gods are not necessarily based on reality, but on what is provisionally true. To maintain and firmly institutionalize the state apparatus is the means to preserve the material principle of excess previously demanded by Glaucon. This section is told with a Homeric focus, in contrast to the previous Hesiodic one. The impartation of a new pious understanding of the gods with these myths when the guardians are very young will be done by the elders and when they get older by tightly restricted poets producing tales in conformity with this political imperative.³⁴ Children have no ability to separate the literal and metaphorical content of the traditional myths, and since (according to their recent agreement) the socialization of children tends to set their nature permanently, the first myths they hear should only exemplify the finest models of virtue.

There is a noticeable similarity in these three injunctions that Socrates gets Adeimantus to agree to. All three mention the gullibility and impressionability of youth, the baseness or shamefulness of the myth, the general utility of the proposed instances of censorship, and piety as a product of the communicated familial unity or disunity of the gods. It seems obvious enough from the text and dialectical task at hand why the gods must be normatively remade. If the method being demonstrated herein is descriptive of Plato’s construction of the text what is not so

³⁴ (378d).

obvious is why Socrates seems to largely repeat himself on the same familial theme when Adeimantus seemingly agrees with Socrates about piety each time.

The constructive method this argument aims to demonstrate claims that agreements, unity, between parties are dramatic signals that Plato will have the characters proceed with whatever the previously agreed upon task or purpose of their exchange is. If disagreement, or blame, is elicited at something that was said by either party, then the progress of the argument ceases, and a new direction is taken. Repetition of themes occur in the *Republic*; that is to be expected since there has been a disunity and faction introduced at the beginning of book two. However, there are few trifold repetitions by Socrates of what look to be identical themes. This is a clear methodological challenge to the argument at hand. Alternatively, does Plato depict Socrates as forgetful of what he's talking about? Or is he just trying to drive a moral point home to the reader even though he can simply re-read a single part if he was interested? What can explain this?

The explanation is twofold. It involves a dual rejection by Adeimantus. The obvious response to this explanation is that when talking about which tales are good and bad, and in detailing the specifics of censoring the poets the two men are still discussing the means of educating the guardians and therefore there has been no rejection, and hence, no need to account for the repetition. The prefacing issue concerns why there is even a blame of traditional poets and their myths. Socrates rhetorically asks if they, as founders and stewards of these precious wards, will "so easily let the children hear just any tales fashioned by just anyone and take into their souls opinions for the most part opposite to those we'll suppose they must have when they

are grown up?”³⁵ Adeimantus emphatically replies that they will not.³⁶ Adeimantus then requests that Socrates blame traditional religiosity. Textually, this request of his is made at the mere mention of Socrates in a throwaway line at the end of his discussion of the means of socialization (i.e., the how), which says, in reference to the current tales, “Most of those they now tell must be thrown out.”³⁷ Adeimantus seizes upon this chance to blame to get Socrates to disparage customary beliefs, and by implication, of fathers that failed to properly fortify his soul against the corruption of the city. His strong feelings about shielding the children from impious tales are overcome at his desire to hear these impious stories spoken by Socrates.³⁸

This then is the dramatic explanation of the prefacing issue. This is not trivial since Plato (through Socrates) is often hated or regretfully accepted as some type of authoritarian who argued for the indoctrination children. If the text indicates that Socrates (Plato’s mouthpiece to most readers) is hesitant to be specific in his blame of religion and censorship of poetry this would be a strong argument against these opinions.

The second moment in the repetitive sequence occurs because the response of Adeimantus does not appear to agree with Socrates about prohibiting these impious stories about the gods.³⁹ Even though it is said that these speeches might be “harsh” “χαλεποί” (*chalepoi*) this does not mean they must be banned.⁴⁰ Adeimantus might be partial towards stories depicting the

³⁵ (377b).

³⁶ “In no event will we permit it.” (377b) This seems to express more than a passing agreement of “yes”, and “surely” that are frequent in the text, especially towards its end.

³⁷ (377c).

³⁸ When Socrates is trying to lay down a general framework for the blame, which is a way of avoiding getting into details, in the short section of 377d-377e Adeimantus impatiently asks three times specific examples of what is to be blamed.

³⁹ “These speeches are indeed harsh...”. (378a).

⁴⁰ This is something that Socrates prompts Adeimantus to admit at the beginning of the second repetition, “And they mustn’t be spoken in our city, Adeimantus”. (378b).

most divine figures performing butchery on each other, with a particular taste for the formula of patricidal sons maiming or murdering their fathers. Socrates tries again by stating that these revenge stories at the “extremes of injustice” done to the father are not to be told to these warriors in the polis, for they would destigmatize factious behavior and give the guardians hallowed moral examples that treat each other and the people of the polis like literal enemies in a war. Adeimantus agrees to this with an oath to Zeus.⁴¹

If there is an agreement here, then why a final pass? It is because Adeimantus has still not agreed to banish these speeches from the polis for the sake of the guardians. His agreement is impious (taking Zeus’ name as an oath) to a speech blaming impiety in the youth. It sarcastically agrees with Socrates that the speeches mentioned in the second moment are bad, not that they should be banished from the city. Besides repetition and its deficient formal agreement as evidence that Socrates interprets it as a rejection, another dramatic reason to conclude that the last speech is repetitive and not just the next thing Socrates is saying is its length. Length of speech in the mouth of Socrates is used by Plato in the *Republic* for one main purpose: to radically assure agreement. So “agreement by monologue” is an effective method of creating unity between the two speakers.⁴² The subsidiary function that monologues serve in the mouth of Socrates is to resolve previous contradictions that have arisen between him and a speaker. In this case Socrates uses monologue, departs from questioning, and wholly attempts to produce the outcome he desires. It is a form of coercive persuasion he employs, typically when he is frustrated or worried about a rejection. Formally there is a strong association with the length of

⁴¹ (378b).

⁴² Instances like the Noble Lie, the image of the ship of state, the Nuptial Number, and the Myth of Er might come to mind. I will not cover any of these, but I will cover the passage on laments and the recitation of Homer’s opening scene to the *Iliad* as examples of this same method.

Socratic monologue and the amount of previously disputed (rejected) content he means to dissolve in it.

To clarify this discussion and its relation to the hermeneutical structure before we conclude this section, 377e-378e. An attentive reading of the speeches on examples of the gods' blameworthy behavior will notice that there is a repetitive pattern. Socrates appears to say a variation of the same thing three times sequentially: 377e-378a, 378b, 378b-e. What can explain this if he is operating unwillingly and since Adeimantus does not explicitly reject what Socrates is saying? Is this just an instance of Socrates dwelling on a topic dear to his heart? My dynamic reading claims that this repetition is caused by what Socrates interprets as rejections from Adeimantus. This in turn forces Socrates to retreat to the last valid agreement. Because Adeimantus agrees with Socrates that impious things are blameworthy and should not be said (377e) *before* this first speech is rejected by an incomplete agreement (378a), Socrates is able to *return* there as the basis for his second, shorter speech (378b): hence its thematic similarity. Therefore, if the second speech has been rejected by a sarcastic, incomplete affirmation this method claims that Socrates will return to the agreement *before* this original one he has just retreated to for his second speech. In that speech Socrates blames the poets for being clumsy artists, like bad painters, who fail to properly represent their subject matter.⁴³

If I am right about this deduction, taken completely from my method, then the following speech at 378b-e will have a blame of the poets with an example from the visual arts to illustrate it. This is not only Plato's way of linking the text together by making Socrates behave in such a manner: it is how he, the author, communicates directly to us.

⁴³ (377e).

Like the speech at 377e blaming the poetic “bad representations of the gods and heroes” like a bad “painter who paints something that doesn’t resemble the things whose likeness” of what is depicted, now the guardians “are far from needing to have tales told and embroideries woven about battles of giants and the many diverse disputes of gods and heroes with their families.”⁴⁴ While it was clear that the men must “persuade the nurses and the mothers to tell the approved tales” to the guardians and “supervise the makers of tales”, it is now important that the founding fathers ensure that, “such things that must be told the children right away by old men and women; and as they get older, the poets must be compelled to make up speeches for them which are close to these.”⁴⁵ Whereas previously only the “greater” tales of the poets that exemplified the theological principle were to be examined, and where they were piously alluded to in the first repetition, clear examples and depictions of the impiety of Homer that falsely portrays the gods engaged in petty conflict with each other, in “Hera's bindings by her son, and Hephaestus' being cast out by his father when he was about to help out his mother who was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods Homer made...” are bluntly given.⁴⁶

Since the souls of things are so “young and tender” and overly impressionable to external influence, these tales depicting faction among the gods are to be banned since “A young thing can't judge what is hidden sense and what is not.”⁴⁷ This makes a kind of sense, since as we all learned that in youth the young are “most plastic, and that thing assimilates itself to the model whose stamp anyone wishes to give it”, whereas now what “he takes into his opinions at that age has a tendency to become hard to eradicate and unchangeable.”⁴⁸ And since it is was incumbent

⁴⁴ (377e) and (378c).

⁴⁵ (377b-c), (378c-d).

⁴⁶ (377c) and (378d).

⁴⁷ (377b) and (378d).

⁴⁸ (377b) and (378d-e).

upon the founders to instill the model of their work in the souls of the guardians by not allowing them to “so easily let the children hear just any tales fashioned by just anyone and take into their souls opinions for the most part opposite to those we'll suppose they must have when they are grown up”, it is now evident that they “must do everything to insure that what they hear first, with respect to virtue, be the finest told tales for them to hear.”⁴⁹

What is strange is that even after all this there is no agreement. Adeimantus responds with the semblance of assent, “That’s reasonable”, but immediately brings in a vicarious interlocutor (“someone”) and asks what the specific texts and tales that will be praised will be.⁵⁰ He is curious from hearing the end of Socrates’ long speech and now wants Socrates to praise the poets in this capacity by giving him concrete examples of their “fine” tales. Socrates reminds Adeimantus that they are not poets regarding content and therefore are not currently in a constructive role but are founders laying down models and laws for those who will be telling tales. It is a reminder to him of the task that they had agreed upon: that of education by general models, not to create the curriculum. Adeimantus agrees with Socrates about this boundary and presses him by asking addressing: “what would the model for the speech about the gods be?”⁵¹

The answer to Adeimantus’ question is a direct discussion of both the sovereignty and nature of the gods. The two men agree without any argument that the god is good.⁵² What is the good? The content of this theological principle which determines the nature of the gods, and therefore how they must be spoken of by the educators of the guardians, is the beneficial and not

⁴⁹ (377b) and (378e).

⁵⁰ (378e).

⁵¹ (379a).

⁵² (379b).

harmful.⁵³ The implications of the god's nature to his sovereignty is that if the gods are good they can only be the cause of good things, especially to the humans that revere them. While this seems intuitive enough there are some dramatic implications of note.

The first is that if the gods can only be the cause of the good they cannot be the cause of its inverse, the bad or the evil.⁵⁴ This appears to be a limitation that is imposed upon the sovereignty of the gods by their nature, and this nature itself is a normative principle produced by an agreement about political necessity, which is itself a necessity to maintain the state.⁵⁵ In addition, this seems to be a broadside at both traditional theology and that of the malpractitioners since both of them hold to a view that the gods are completely sovereign and act in an unrestrained manner between each other and with lower life forms. Lastly, it appears that Socrates, due to pressure from Adeimantus, is narrowing the nature and the sovereignty of the gods to produce an agreement with Adeimantus and therefore shorten the exchange. It is effective, for Adeimantus heartily agrees with this curtailment of the god's sovereignty in conformity with their nature as determined by the city's "good".⁵⁶

This agreement by Adeimantus to this educational principle and to its opposite, that the gods are not the cause of the bad, leads to an important part in the entire dialogue. Its importance

⁵³ (379b). The word used for "good" here is "ἀγαθόν" (*agathon*), while that word used to express its meaning, Bloom's "beneficial", and Shorey's "beneficent" is "ὠφέλιμον", (*ōphelimōn*), which could mean helping, aiding, useful, or serviceable. It appears that Socrates and Adeimantus have a practical meaning of the good in mind.

⁵⁴ Plato uses both words in this exchange to refer to the opposite of the good. Both Bloom and Shorey render "κακόν" (*kakon*) as "evil": it can also mean "ill" or "bad". Later in (379b) Bloom uses "bad" for "κακῶν" instead of the "evil" used above and Shorey makes it "ill". Immediately below in (379c) Bloom translates "κακῶν" (*kakōn*) as "bad" while Shorey makes it "evil".

⁵⁵ This principle of political expediency was reaffirmed by Socrates and Adeimantus at 378c.

⁵⁶ "What you say," he said, "is in my opinion very true." (379c). The word for "very true" is "ἀληθέστατα" (*alēthestata*), a superlative of "true". Shorey gives a clearer translation of it as "most true".

is indicated by the fact that it turns out to be one of Socrates' longest monologues.⁵⁷ The only other speeches that contain more words and more Stephanus pages are the "myth of Er" which concludes the entire work, the "nuptial number" in Book VIII that begins the decay of regimes, the "ship of state" image in Book VI, and the defense of the recently rejected happy city in Book IV.⁵⁸ This monologue has several parts. The first part is the specific application of the theological principle (i.e., the god is "good", or "beneficial") to the Greek canon, particularly Homer and Aeschylus, who are largely singled out and blamed as violators of this principle. Here we see Socrates attempting to head off any frivolous challenges from Adeimantus asking him to give recognizable illustrations of what he means, but instead of focusing on praiseworthy passages he focuses on blameworthy ones.

Socrates takes the initiative and supplies examples of the "which" concerning tales for him. Any myths or tales depicting the gods as the efficient cause of evil will be blamed and hidden from the souls of the guardian children. Again, it will be reiterated that Socrates' direct quotations of these Homeric passages that depict the gods as agents of both good and evil is a direct response to the passages Adeimantus quotes in place of the religious malpractitioners in his opening speech of Book II.⁵⁹ Even the gods' causing of "bad" things to happen to a bad person is actually good since this is a corrective and beneficial type of action they are meting out against the evil while alive.⁶⁰ Since this initiative has to be taken due to the previous rejections and disagreements of Socrates' approach to the same topic, it fits well very into the

⁵⁷ We do not know its relative length for the whole at the time of reading this. Regardless, what we do know is that up until this point it is the longest monologue by Socrates.

⁵⁸ There is some question on whether the apology of the political uselessness of the philosopher in Book VI (496a-e) has more words in Greek. By Stephanus pagination it is shorter.

⁵⁹ He directly quotes from both Hesiod and Homer and mentions Musaeus and Orpheus as well. (364d-e).

⁶⁰ (380b).

hermeneutical structure the argument at hand is attempting to demonstrate: failure to agree forces Socrates to retreat and explicate further, to use more words for a previously rejected or disputed content.

The second part to this monologue is the explanation and demonstration of the purpose of the agreed upon theological principle, or the speech model. Any form of utterance of the model's opposite claiming either that the gods prefer to cause harm to people or that the gods are causes of both good and evil are to be prevented from reaching the ears of *everyone*.⁶¹ It is of note that Socrates passes over what exactly these "great exertions" that will be taken to enforce poetic conformity to this principle are and Adeimantus seems content to let this pass.⁶² There are several reasons given for this insistence on the specific nature and sovereignty of god. There will not be widespread obedience to the laws if people learn that the gods intentionally cause bad things to happen. These sayings are "not advantageous" for the polis, i.e., they are not useful and expedient.⁶³ This is an effective soliloquy by Socrates, for Adeimantus agrees with this sentiment, playfully stating that he would cast his vote in favor of Socrates' defense of the law censoring any blame of the gods and stating that it "pleases" him.⁶⁴

⁶¹ (380b). "anyone's", τινὰ, (*tina*). This is quite a change in the agreed upon group to be educated and raised by the founders.

⁶² "διαμαχετέον", (*diamacheteon*), meaning "to absolutely deny". Shorey translates this word as the phrase to "contend in every way". These "ways" are not revealed to the reader.

⁶³ The phrase is οὔτε σύμφορα, (*oute sumphōra*). Plato is rhyming words here, for *sumphōra* is a strange word to use for "profitable", which is one of its meanings, but not one of its primary ones. What explains its usage? It rhymes with the phrase "nor in harmony" (for Bloom) or "not concordant" (Shorey), "οὔτε σύμφωνα", (*oute sumphōna*), which means "agreeing", "harmonious", "friendly", or "in unison", many meanings of which *sumphōra* claims. The pertinent part of the last sentence is, "οὔτε σύμφορα ἡμῖν οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς.", "nor would they be profitable to us or concordant with themselves." (380c).

⁶⁴ "Pleases" comes from "ἀρέσκει", (*areskei*). This has a more negative/neutral connotation than what Bloom gives it, meaning "appeases", "satisfies", "amends", or likely "suffices". (380c).

We are now into the legislative section proper of the text. Socrates takes the metaphor Adeimantus uses of him being a jury member passing judgments on Socrates' arguments – a metaphor taken from the methodological discussion Socrates has with Glaucon in Book I (348a-b) – and extends it, asking him again to consider this next law, or “appeal” he will set before him.⁶⁵ The first law, or educational model, established a principle that defined and identified the sovereignty of the gods along with its application to humans in the polis. The second model (or law) focuses on giving an apology for the simple, good nature of the gods. What explains this distinction and partition of the theology here into two laws? It is drawn from Adeimantus' vicarious critique of theology concerning the (a) nature of the gods and (b) their actions.⁶⁶ The first model is largely the Socratic attempt to answer the objection to (b) the actions or real-world products of the god's behavior while the following law is his response to (a), the challenge that the gods are fundamentally unjust or indifferent to the sufferings of humans.⁶⁷

This section on the god's nature breaks down into the nature of the god's deed and speech. Socrates employs a relatively new rhetorical tactic with Adeimantus when discussing this model. He attempts to include the blame of a certain idea with the response he wants an

⁶⁵ Some focus on the “apologetic” tone and rhetoric in the *Republic* and from this an attempt is made to extract some type of teaching about the relationship of the philosopher to conventional power. The method here interprets the occasional legal rhetoric employed as metaphorical, and mainly used by Socrates when he thinks it will produce a certain outcome.

⁶⁶ The nature is reference in (365a) and their actions or effects, products, etc. in (366e, 367b, 367e).

⁶⁷ It can be objected that the discussion of the good or beneficial is included in the first model, and that this is a statement about the nature of the gods. The primary focus of that model is their sovereignty in relation to man. The latter could not occur without the former, true, but little time is spent on the former. This, instead, takes center stage in the second model, and this includes instances of the god's actions. Neither model in Book II is exclusive in its theological topic, but each has a topic of emphasis.

agreement to in the question itself.⁶⁸ Socrates asks Adeimantus why the gods would want to lie in either speech or deed, if the god:

is a wizard, able treacherously to reveal himself at different times in different ideas, at one time actually himself changing and passing from his own form into many shapes, at another time deceiving us and making us think such things about him? Or is he simple and does he least of all things depart from his own idea?⁶⁹

One would think someone concerned with piety would be hesitant to answer in the affirmative that god is a wizard, yet Adeimantus passively does in his rejection of Socrates' question by claiming a momentary ignorance about its answer.⁷⁰ What explains the uncertainty of Adeimantus at this point? Is he confused by the contrasting theological claims on the god's appearance between the new political theology of Socrates and the religious malpractitioners and of custom? This new dogma makes the gods simple and unchanging while the conventional canon is replete with instances of the gods constantly changing forms and shapeshifting to accomplish their purposes and fulfill their more carnal desires.

Socrates has pushed too hard in this speech about the gods. In fact, he is trying to disabuse Adeimantus of two claims here: this is not offering up an either-or choice. The blameworthy opinion is that the gods change their own form, the second is that they alter our perception of them to cause a deceptive representation of their form in our perception of them. The latter does not require them to change but exercise their superior powers on humans. The rejection causes Socrates to break these two claims down and deal with them one at a time, again

⁶⁸ This is a technique used to shorten discussion and reach agreement more quickly. It is to ask a painfully obvious rhetorical question.

⁶⁹ (380d). The word for "wizard" Plato uses is "γόητα", (*goēta*), meaning a "sorcerer", "enchanter", even a "cheat", or "one who howls at enchantments". This last potential meaning comes from the related word "γοητής", meaning "wailer".

⁷⁰ (380d).

illustrating his unwillingness of (i.e., getting agreement on two things in one short speech instead of one at a time).

This rejection through ignorance forces a retreat to the agreement that was just made, approaching the first claim now about the god's voluntarily changing their nature.⁷¹ We know this because he reformulates his question generally in the terminology of a thing's ("something", not "a god") relation to its *idea*.⁷² When Adeimantus agrees that things are either changed by something else or by themselves Socrates states that the god cannot be changed in act by something else or by themselves. This is concluded on the argument that the best things require or undergo the least amount of change from their original idea.⁷³ Since what is by nature is now agreed to be the least susceptible to change and most fine, by extension the god is included in this group of entities.⁷⁴ Adeimantus agrees to this principle-particular movement.

Even if the god does not bow to stronger, finer, external pressures to change its form, would the god willingly change it, and by extension, be deceptive to mortals? The men agree that if the gods were to change form it could only be done by them. Socrates asks Adeimantus if the gods can change into forms that are superior to that which they possess, or worse and uglier. Adeimantus answers that any change from the nature of the gods must necessarily be to that which is inferior since attributing a change into its opposite would be to predicate some type of

⁷¹ He goes back to "And it's very satisfactory" in 380c whenever he starts up by saying "What about this" in 380d.

⁷² (380d-e). He simplifies his claim into one thing and uses similar language, taking the roundabout path to the conclusion he wants.

⁷³ (380d-e). The word used here for "idea" is "ἰδέας" (*ideas*), meaning "form" or "outward appearance" of a thing. This is opposed to the other famous word Plato employs for "idea", *eidos*, which refers to the essence or being of that which is. It is translated by Bloom as "form". The word for "fine" used here is not *kalon* but "ἐχόντα" (*egonta*) derived from "ἔχω" (*egō*), meaning to have or being a property or possession. The suffix denotes a superlative.

⁷⁴ (381b).

deficiency of the gods.⁷⁵ Socrates is pleased with this answer and repays it with praise by saying that it is “rightly spoken”, seeming to take a liking to the finality and strength of his answer with its invocation of strong words like “necessarily”.⁷⁶

It is “impossible” for the god to want to voluntarily change its form since it is already in the most desirable and finest possible form. Therefore, since they must remain good, simple, and unchanging, certain passages portraying the gods as shapeshifters from Homer are excised. Socrates supplies Adeimantus with what he believes to be a pleasing blame of traditional poetic sources in the form of examples.⁷⁷ This is no inconsequential proposal, since none of the gods in Homer, besides Themis to her son Achilles, appears to any human or demigod, in their original form. The implication of this law is to purge almost any direct interaction of god and mortal. Here we witness another curtailment in the god’s sovereignty taking place. There is a rehabilitation of their character for the political purpose of maintaining the state. In addition, the mothers (μητέρες, *mēteres*) of the guardians are prohibited from repeating these tales as a type of “ghost story” to scare the children into obedience since it would be impious and inexpediently produce cowardice in their souls.⁷⁸ We should note that both men are still operating with the understanding that the guardians still have mothers that are raising their own children and are responsible for carrying out the tasks of the founder’s laws for early childhood rearing.

All this, however, is the application of the Socratic theological principle to the nature and deeds of the gods. The next discussion is on the second claim in the previous rejected statement.

⁷⁵ (381c-d).

⁷⁶ Or “ὀρθότατα, ἤν”, (*orthotata ēn*), meaning “straightly”, or “justly said”. Also, we see that Socrates praises Adeimantus for making such a strong claim since he immediately goes on to get him to affirm that these things are “impossible” for the gods to do.

⁷⁷ (381d). These examples might also serve to support the general model agreed to.

⁷⁸ (381e).

The question is “do they [the gods] make us think they appear in all sorts of ways, deceiving and bewitching us?”⁷⁹ While the gods might not actually be bad and cause bad things to happen to humans, they might use their power to cause our perception of them might be so inaccurate and structured in such a way that we simply perceive them as taking on a multiplicity of forms and causing harm to people. Even though Adeimantus has been in strong accord with Socrates’ previous thoughts on the nature of the gods and their simplicity of form here he falters, he rejects this notion indirectly with a “perhaps”.⁸⁰ This is the second time Socrates has used the colorful language of “bewitching” in a short span to clearly suggest a desired answer, and the second time Adeimantus has rejected this type of speech.⁸¹

One can sense the frustration behind Socrates’s “what?” to this answer. Why else does Socrates finish his speech here with a, “Would a god want to lie, either in speech or in deed, by presenting an illusion.”?⁸² I believe it is because he interprets the last response of “No, they shouldn’t” to his blame that consisted of poetic examples as a rejection. Adeimantus’ response is not emphatic enough like the prior responses that use strong language like impossibility and necessity, although it is formally affirmative. This is why Socrates begins his speech in 381e, “while the gods themselves be transformed...” as a continuation of this strong affirmation that Adeimantus has just given him in 381c about the necessity of the gods maintaining their form.⁸³

⁷⁹ (381e).

⁸⁰ (381e). Or “ἴσως”, (*isōs*). We’ve seen this equivocal answer above in Adeimantus’ rejection of the SP and the division of labor he and Socrates made before the central description of the True City occurs in (3371e).

⁸¹ The other time was at 380d. This repetition should be a clue that there has been a rejection that has happened, and that Socrates is returning to a point to create dialogical unity.

⁸² (382a).

⁸³ (381c).

In other words, Socrates opens up 381e's speech on the agreement of Adeimantus in 381c because he takes the "No they shouldn't" as a rejection.

While provocative, this argument is further borne out by the next several exchanges. In response to Socrates restating his loaded speech in 382e about the gods being deceptive and bewitching I said just above that Adeimantus gives him a rejection with a "perhaps". If I am right about the structural dynamics at play Socrates will retreat to the speech that produced the agreement that includes, "That's entirely necessary", in it. We see the similarity of language questioning why a god would "want" to alter himself used in both speeches. The desire of the god in 381c to not "want" to alter himself is now dynamically linked to the desire of the god in 382a to not "want" to lie in speech or deed. The rejection Adeimantus hands Socrates again with an "I don't know" causes him to do several things. The first is to mock him in blaming his intelligence as a preface to his response, "Don't you know...".⁸⁴ If I am right above then Socrates will make a speech that is similar in content to the one previous to what he just used as his advancement point. He will move from the second speech in 381c that states the impossibility of the god to "want" to alter himself to the speech right above it.

This is what he does. This dramatic reading explains the specific content of Socrates' "true lie" riddle. How else could anyone explain the sudden change in thematic focus from the gods to "all gods and human beings [that] hate the true lie" that happens here? This method demonstrates this is so because of the rejection of the previous speech about the gods wanting to lie. This causes Socrates to go back to his first speech in 381c where he asks why "*anyone, either god or human being*, willing make himself worse".⁸⁵ The subjects in 382a that hate the true lie,

⁸⁴ (382a)

⁸⁵ (381c). Italics added.

all gods and human beings are taken from the Socratic retreat to this standpoint, as predicted by the method. To reiterate, this could not be the case if the blameworthy speeches Socrates gives the poets in 381d-e were not interpreted as a rejection. Since they were, the two subsequent rejections, “perhaps”, and “I don’t know” are able to align the argument about the true lie with the first speech in 381c. I believe that this is one of the clearest examples of Plato’s hermeneutical dynamic of the section in the *Republic* that I cover. It is in the identification and reconstruction of these that one can, I believe, begin to make out a consistent Platonic voice beyond the clash of his characters.

Socrates introduces this enigmatic saying of the true lie to silence and subdue Adeimantus, the third thing that happens in this speech.⁸⁶ This seems to work momentarily since the following two responses are essentially unique for the entirety of the Socratic-Adeimantine pairing in the *Republic*. Adeimantus gives two admissions of ignorance that Socrates does not take as rejections. Socrates believes these are good faith admissions of ignorance. This is the case because there is not a phrase that has been previously uttered that Socrates could hold Adeimantus responsible to know and respond correctly, unlike his previous speeches about the gods.⁸⁷ This type of rhetorical approach is like besting a person that is being publicly argumentative by asking them a question in such a way or asking them about a fact they would have absolutely no means of knowing. This is done to elicit enough shame to subdue them. This method often has the psychological effect of redistributing rhetorical power and superiority in the heat of the moment to the person who asked the impossible question, even if it’s just that, an

⁸⁶ The other two being to mock his intelligence and then to retreat to the first speech in 381c.

⁸⁷ This is one reason for his use of the qualifier “if that expression can be used”. The other reason likely relates to its overtly contradictory character.

impossible question. This is what Socrates resorts to after his previous, more polite, queries were unsuccessful.

The ensuing discussion where Socrates makes a distinction between the “true lie” and “truly a lie” to prove his point about the gods being honest and not deceptive looks like an arbitrary device or contrived argument. A logical or even common-sense reading should be given pause at this passage since the concepts and phrasing are paradoxical (e.g., true lie) and its timing and subject matter (i.e., the gods and human beings) do not fit the flow of the prior speeches about educating the guardians, not speaking about divine preferences.⁸⁸ This method makes sense of its starting point, the purpose behind its dramatic deployment, and as I will now show, its dramatic meaning.

To make his point clear Socrates gives a non-explanation to what the true lie means: that everyone is averse to lie to the most sovereign thing in him about the most sovereign things. This intentionally nonsense response is given to force Adeimantus to again plead ignorance before everyone, something he does.⁸⁹ Socrates’ next explanation ironically contradicts the mocking preface that Adeimantus’ confusion is misplaced because he (Socrates) does not “mean something exalted” here as Adeimantus suspects. The explanation makes it evident that the true lie is both mundane and exalted. Socrates continues, saying that this phrase means to lie to the soul about the “things that are”, to be ignorant, and to hold these lies there with one’s will even though there is a universal hatred of this practice.⁹⁰ The phrase “things that are” is taken from the word “ὄντα”, (*onta*), which is a conjugate of “εἶμι” (*eimi*), the verb “to be”, arguably the most

⁸⁸ How would Socrates or any of the men know what a god thinks about riddle like a “true lie”?

⁸⁹ “I still don’t understand”. (382a).

⁹⁰ (382b). Bloom uses the word “voluntarily”, but the word ἐθέλει (*ethelei*) means “to will, “to wish”, or “to purpose”, taken from ἐθέλω (*ethelō*), “to be willing”. Shorey renders ἐθέλει as “willing”.

general verb of language. This is a serious charge. The “true lie” is a form of perpetual self-deception about the very nature of the being of entities to one’s very soul by employing the will to both give it to and maintain this deception in the soul. If one is doing this by one’s will as the faculty which supplies and intentionally sustains the self-deception, and against one’s will because of the natural hatred of this practice, then the one who does this stands to lead an existence of severe derangement or intense anguish.

Before I turn to the mundane aspect of this charge, I will note that this is one of few places in the *Republic* that Socrates indicates that there is a more fundamental self-relation than the parts of one of the *Republic*’s most intriguing fascinations. I think this is not a hyperbolic statement since the tripartite conception of the soul has excited old and contemporary commentators. The efforts of formulating a Platonic moral psychology that is drawn from this doctrine has already been discussed. Even those who are not ethicists believe the calculation-spiritedness-desire partition of the soul is foundational to the meaning of the text since it contains the ostensible individual’s analogue to a future city’s class structure. Here Socrates indicates that there is something external to a person’s soul that can exercise a type of mastery and power over it. This mastery is not inconsequential but pertains to the “most sovereign things”, one’s ontological and normative beliefs. Elsewhere, Socrates reiterates a similar understanding of this fundamental self-relation of will to that of the soul that precedes the qualitative relation of the soul’s parts.⁹¹

The mundane meaning of this passage is that it consists of Socrates blaming the speeches that Adeimantus has recently made. Is there a dramatic precedent that this abruptly introduced

⁹¹ (437b). This part in Book IV is beyond the scope of the text I want to cover. The reach of my method is not allowed to analytically help itself to events that have not dramatically happened in a primary way.

riddle is drawn from? Potentially. We see again that this is all within the dialectical context of attempting to properly answer the blame of justice by the religious malpractitioners and correct the father's deficient praise of justice. Within the section of Adeimantus' speech there is quite a long address of the anguished young man, grown disillusioned with religion, now seemingly wise at how social reality "actually is", to *himself*.⁹² In a full length interpretation of the *Republic* the entire eruption would be worth quoting, but for the purpose of this essay it will simply be noted that it is a point expressing a decision of an intensely torn young man's rationale for rejecting the customary values of justice in exchange for the corrupted view that favors injustice. Premised with the phrase "he would say to himself", the young man goes on to state in the first person that by way of appearing just and doing great injustice he will be able to obtain temporal reward and ritually satisfy the gods. This instance of Adeimantus and Socrates rejecting the true lie, the lie to the self about the highest things, others and the gods, is Socrates' first of several serious attempts at neutralizing these tragic statements.

The true lie of above, now "truly a lie" (and a real lie in 382c), is the lie in deed or act. It is to be self-deceived about the most serious things in existence. Neither the gods nor humans would dare do such a thing. It appears only the most deranged or anguished fellows would suppress the truth about these types of things. After Adeimantus agrees to this Socrates turns to the lies in speech. He turns to this topic because it is the second part of the speech from 382a he is trying to produce an agreement on.⁹³ Lies in speech are not as serious as self-deception since they are imitations of the affect the true lie performed by the will on the soul.⁹⁴

⁹² (365b-c). Also see (366b-c).

⁹³ "Would a god want to lie, either in speech or in deed...". (382a). The discussion of the true lie was his agreement on prohibiting the lie in deed. Now he begins transitioning to discussing the lie in speech.

⁹⁴ (382b).

Socrates has premised this discussion by sarcastically claiming he means nothing exalted but here we find him continuing a very technical discussion to subdue his younger interlocutor. I take Socrates to mean that the lie in speech imitates the true lie (i.e., deed) on the side of its affection, or the external administration to the soul by power of an entity which is not the soul. The true lie is done by the will, the lie in speech is done by another speaker. These are also different because the former is held there by one's will, while the latter is held by the soul as true. This lack of self-administration and purposeful maintenance is why it is not an "adulterated lie" like the true lie.⁹⁵ When Adeimantus agrees to this he agrees with Socrates, by means of a technical psychological argument, that the gods will not "lie" in deed, or in other words, that they will not deceive humans. Socrates has had to use several different devices to produce an agreement on something that Adeimantus had a pattern of hesitancy to confirm.

The agreements on whether the gods can lie in speeches go quickly. The gods need not lie in speech since this is useful for deceiving one's enemies, preventing the folly of friends for their benefit, or in education, as in the case of the men, deficiency of a historically accurate account of the gods. Ignorance has its rightful place in the education of citizens. Since the gods are not impotent, do not associate with other insane gods, and are not lacking in facts about their own history, they have no need to lie in speech.⁹⁶ Socrates moves to produce a general agreement with Adeimantus about the previous models, asking him if he believes the gods are of a simple nature and free of illusion in speech and deed. Adeimantus gives a coerced agreement with a sarcastic answer, "that's how it looks to me too when you say it."⁹⁷

⁹⁵ (382c).

⁹⁶ (382d-e).

⁹⁷ (382e).

This is not good enough for Socrates; simply too much labor has been expended to chance a future rejection on something so important and he will accept no form of defiance in Adeimantus, however passive. This explains him explicitly restating his question using words from the earlier problem sections that mocked the conventional depictions of the gods as “wizards” and bluntly demanding an agreement to it, asking if the second model of speech will state that the gods do not change their form and they do not trick humans in their actions or speech.⁹⁸ Socrates closes this topic with a repayment to Adeimantus by giving him specific examples from Homer and Aeschylus that run contrary to this law. These sayings will be banned and the teachers (διδάσκαλος, *didaskalos*) will be prohibited from sharing them with the guardians. Adeimantus indicates he is persuaded and fully agrees with Socrates that if the guardians are to be pious when they reach maturity these tales cannot be taught and in his role as a founder accepts them as laws for the city.⁹⁹

3.2. Courage: The Failed Heroic Reconstruction

There is not a clear-cut movement from the gods in Book II to the heroes in Book III. Socrates still lingers on the gods in his discussion of Hades. The “Hades” that he refers to is the god, not the location. Socrates is worried about the poetic blame of “Hades’ domain”. The traditional blame of this location is an indirect way of blaming the gods. This is an additional theological category to the ones of the scope of the god’s sovereignty and appearance. Courage is a transition section, ranging from 386a-389d. Here Socrates abruptly decides to quit his speeches about the gods and focus on the heroes. This is most clearly a transition section because of a strange variety and short length of topics. The beginning of Book III is still Socrates making

⁹⁸ (383a). Adeimantus gives a curt agreement.

⁹⁹ (383c).

theological speeches because he is dealing with the afterlife. This is theological not because of the question of life after death, but as an indirect way of removing blame from Hades. The speeches here are directly about the Homeric blame of “Hades’ realm”, which is to say, the god Hades.

Socrates begins Book III by pronouncing that the general things about the gods have been said to produce men that are to become pious, god-fearing warriors that keep their promises to both gods and men and take serious the unity of friendship with each other by praising justice through the gods in previous manner.¹⁰⁰ But, due to prior agreement with Glaucon or from common sense about the realities of war, mustn’t the guardians also be made courageous if they are to be proficient warriors in battle? There is admittedly a great amount of intuitive sense for this topic and the guardians. My method attempts to explain why a certain theme is spoken on at a specific point: in this case, why courage, and why now? Weren’t the men just speaking of piety and the gods? Not exclusively. If we look back on the second law (380d-383c) a noticeable theme that runs through it is courage and fear.¹⁰¹ A closer reading of this law that forbade the guardians to be told that the gods are deceitful in appearance and go around lying in speech was given for the purpose of making them courageous as well as pious.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ (386a). Adeimantus agrees with Socrates here. The locution, “not take lightly their friendship with each other” in Bloom and “not to hold their friendship with one another in light esteem” in Shorey comes from τήν τε ἀλλήλων φιλίαν μὴ περὶ σμικροῦ ποιησόμενοις (*tēn te allēlōn philian mē peri smikrou poiēsomenois*), to have or make little or small (smikrou) of something, here means the opposite of serious. This will be dramatically important for the section on laughter at 388e-389a.

¹⁰¹ (381a, 381e, 382d).

¹⁰² “Nor should the mothers, in their turn, be convinced by these things and frighten the children with tales badly told—that certain gods go around nights looking like all sorts of strangers—lest they slander the gods while at the same time making the children more cowardly.” (381e).

The unenthusiastic response by Adeimantus to Socrates' pronouncement in the opening passage of Book III that the speeches on the gods have reached a satisfactory level for the political purpose they have been given explains why Socrates asks about courage. Because they have already reached a conclusion about courage through the second law of the gods, if Adeimantus agrees to the need to make the guardians courageous he would be rejecting the second law. This is another test to see if Adeimantus really agrees with the speeches Socrates just made in the second law about the god's integrity of appearance and speech and its political importance. We should remember that this was a troublesome topic to produce an agreement on with Adeimantus. Socrates had to shame the youth into submission by resorting to riddles and making technical psychological distinctions. When Adeimantus agrees with an oath to Zeus that if the guardians are afraid of death, they will not be courageous, the second law is rejected, forcing Socrates to begin the argument on courage from 380c.¹⁰³ What he means is that there have not been any speeches on the education for the guardian's courage, something the second law was partly on.

This regression explains why the blame of the Homeric heroes that dominates early in Book III does not occur immediately. The heroes are not covered after the gods are originally signaled to be completed at 386a because the men are still speaking about the gods. Socrates gradually steers the conversation to the heroes because he learns that Adeimantus is more open, or susceptible, to agreeing with him when reasoning from heroes to humans rather than from gods to humans. The gods fade into the background and the heroes become the focus in the courage section because Socrates fails to get an explicit agreement with Adeimantus about it.

¹⁰³ From the agreement in that section, "And it's very satisfactory". (380c).

The trouble Socrates has is expressed in the mixed speeches on the gods and heroes, and the parade of topics dealt with (the afterlife, its names, laments, laughter, truth) in such a short span.

With the rejection at 386b the argument returns to 380c, and courage is dealt with in relation to the gods indirectly through the afterlife. It is approached this way because of the clear resistance of Adeimantus to permanently admit the gods don't lie and deceive, an indication that his speech on behalf of the religious malpractioners and the cunning man may not be provisional.¹⁰⁴ Hades is discussed because the speech of the unjust politically calculating man spurns the warnings of the fathers about paying the price of injustice in Hades.¹⁰⁵ The discussion of Hades' domain (named that way twice in 386b) is to make the abode of a god praiseworthy by purging it of the Homeric anguish and shame. The dramatic linkage to 380c comes from Socrates using the finished law about the goodness of the god's sovereignty to create agreement on another political virtue.¹⁰⁶ The passage giving examples of Homeric instances of the death screams of slain warriors and ghoulish complaints of the dead, including two passages by an unnamed Achilles, are prefaced and concluded with explicit statements that exposure to them will detract from the courage, and therefore political efficacy, of the guardians.¹⁰⁷

As part of this model of speech all the derogatory names and eponyms for the afterlife must be purged, else the founders run the risk of the guardians interpreting the pejoratives for Hades' realm as indicative of what awaits them if they experience death in battle. Adeimantus

¹⁰⁴ (365e-366a).

¹⁰⁵ (366a-b). The conventional picture of the father's is mocked by Adeimantus as just a long state of drunkenness in 363c.

¹⁰⁶ Socrates links the utility of piety with a general respect and obedience to the laws in 380b-c.

¹⁰⁷ (386c-387b). I am not persuaded at an empirical or "common sense" level that the fear of death is an environmental thing. One does not have to wait to hear Homer's grim depiction of the afterlife to be afraid of situations that could bring about death. It seems the opposite is more the case, what Socrates goes on to say: that it takes some type of positive narrative of the afterlife to adjust a person to their death, to make it "okay", either in battle or from natural causes.

responds sarcastically to this request to nominally praise the afterlife that “our fear” of this causing cowardice in the men “is right”.¹⁰⁸ Socrates interprets this as a challenge, a potential rejection to his speeches on the afterlife, and demands a reaffirmation of his speech: “Then they must be deleted?”¹⁰⁹ The curt response of “Yes” is not good enough to move on. Socrates belabors the point, making sure everyone present understands that Adeimantus does in fact agree with him on this topic, querying “Must the model opposite to these be used in speaking and writing?”, proposing an agreement to essentially the same thing a second time and nominally a third time. He takes the sarcastic reply of “Plainly” as a final rejection.¹¹⁰

There have been three failures to make the guardians courageous by means of blaming the poetic depictions of the gods. There was an attempt in Book II at 380c-381e, one that spans Book II-III at 382a-386a, and one in Book III at 386a-387c. This shows that Plato does not have Socrates operate with a type of unfair omniscience by effortlessly demolishing all the speeches of his interlocutors. Plato does not assign a passive function to all the interlocutors in the *Republic*. The men in the Piraeus are not an eager audience for Socrates; some are men armed with their own beliefs and pride who give him fierce resistance well into the night’s events. These failures to arrive at an agreement about courage through the gods explains why Socrates invokes the heroes, or the “famous men”, when talking about the laments. This will be his last attempt in this section to make the guardians courageous.

The dramatic precedent for this maneuver is twofold: Socrates retreats to the agreement and oath at 386b to make the guardians courageous, the dramatic and topical basis. He does this because the speeches about Hades and his realm have been rejected, and the agreement that the

¹⁰⁸ (387c).

¹⁰⁹ (387c).

¹¹⁰ (387c).

guardians must be courageous precedes the proposal to speak about Hades. But isn't the discussion here about the gods? How then can Socrates be consistent in his change of poetic subject from gods to heroes? This is permissible because of the still standing agreement made in 377e to blame the poets for their slander of gods and heroes, not just the gods.¹¹¹ The gods were chosen by Socrates originally because Adeimantus offers him a choice of what to blame, but this does not mean the heroes can never be dealt with. Therefore, Socrates has to retreat back to 386b as his starting point but relies upon an earlier agreement to speak about the heroes.

Laments are the roundabout way of purging the poetic blame of the afterlife from the guardian's education for the purpose of making them brave warriors in battle. The put-on exasperation of Adeimantus that if what "went before was necessary, so is this" allows Socrates to continue his speech on this topic. Since what went before was not "necessary" for Adeimantus because it was rejected, his response here is a concession of sorts that Socrates uses for a specific purpose.¹¹² The following section is not about the guardians for they are brought back in at 388a, it is a blame of the follower of the cunning political man. Contrary to this man, the decent (suitable) man (*ἐπιεικής ἀνὴρ*, *epieikēs anēr*), not the guardian, does not think death is a horrible state for the soul, but is actually the state in which one receives an elevated type of being and becomes more autonomous, "sufficient unto himself" with the least need of anyone else for his happiness and existence.¹¹³ Because of the superiority of the afterlife to this life the decent man

¹¹¹ "What ought to be blamed first and foremost," I said, "especially if the lie a man tells isn't a fine one."

"What's that?"

"When a man in speech makes a bad representation of what gods and heroes are like, just as a painter who paints something that doesn't resemble the things whose likeness he wished to paint." (377d-e).

¹¹² "Now, consider whether we'll be right in taking them out or not...". (387d).

¹¹³ Both Shorey and Bloom agree on translating "αὐτὸς αὐτῷ αὐτάρκης" (*autos autō autarkēs*) as "sufficient unto oneself". (387d).

will not wail and scream when deprived of something valuable by fortune.¹¹⁴ The young man who the cunning political man has persuaded about the value of injustice gives voice to the anguish felt at the decision he must make between virtue and happiness on this earth.¹¹⁵ The decent man does not have to make this choice: since virtue and desert in his mind are aligned he will be happy, he will not lament. The lack of explicit mention of the guardians and the progressively short responses Adeimantus gives to each praise of the *epieikēs anēr* indicate he understands what Socrates is doing.

Because of this, Socrates concludes “we’d be right in taking out the wailings of renowned men”, a reference to his original question in 387d asking “consider whether we’ll be right in taking them out or not”.¹¹⁶ The logic here should be clear from the above paragraph: because of the blame of the cunning political man in Socrates’ praise of the *epieikēs anēr*, the men should purge the guardian’s speech education of heroic laments, which are implicit instances of the living’s blame of the afterlife, and therefore, the gods. Previously in Book III the blame of the afterlife was done by the dying, the dead, or through Homeric description. Achilles, who had two examples of blaming Hades in the first pass at purging the afterlife’s blame (in 386c and 386d) is now mentioned by name since the heroes are being used to produce the present agreement. He is not to be allowed to behave disgracefully at the death of his friend Patroclus since he is a demigod.¹¹⁷ Nor is Priam allowed to mourn in such a depraved manner since he is descendent of Zeus.¹¹⁸ If the heroes with the most noble pedigrees cannot lament death, then certainly Achilles’

¹¹⁴ (387e).

¹¹⁵ 365b-c).

¹¹⁶ (387e).

¹¹⁷ (388a-b).

¹¹⁸ (388b).

mother and Zeus himself are not to be portrayed as lamenting people who have not even died.¹¹⁹ If these stories were to be tolerated and not laughed out of one's mind from the extreme shame and embarrassment felt at depicting these great figures in such compromising, undignified conditions, then the mortal guardian's would not think it beneath their dignity to do likewise and operate under the belief that death is the most miserable experience possible.¹²⁰ Like the decent and unlike his vicious opposite, so the renowned, and like the renowned, so the gods, and like all three good models (i.e., the decent, heroes, and gods), so the guardians.

When Adeimantus gives another one of his canned assents, Socrates administers the final test to see whether or not his previous speeches were truly persuasive to his partner by suggesting that their truth is merely conditional, it can be reworked or changed if another argument about these matters persuade them.¹²¹ This is a clear reference to the coerced agreement covered in 387d, about the "necessity" of purging laments "if" censoring the derogatory names for Hades was also necessary.¹²² To this Adeimantus agrees with what Socrates has explicitly said about laments and implicitly said about the values of the great man is simply optional: there is no *need* for it to be accepted as true.¹²³

This is a clear rejection of the agreements about purging the laments of gods and heroes. It is no wonder that Socrates changes the subject from laments to somberness, or those that are not to be "lovers of laughter".¹²⁴ What is the textual connection? There are several immediate

¹¹⁹ (388b-d).

¹²⁰ (388d).

¹²¹ "What you say is very true," he said.

"But that mustn't be, as the argument was just indicating to us. We must be persuaded by it until someone persuades us with another and finer one." (388e).

¹²² "If," he said, "what went before was necessary, so is this." (387d).

¹²³ (388e).

¹²⁴ The word for this locution is "φιλογέλωτάς", (*philogelōtas*), meaning "laughter-loving".

ones. Plato has Socrates move from the previous topic of laments to that of laughter, from one extreme of the soul to the other. This banishing extreme laughter in addition to lament goes along well enough with his general project of using argument to narrow the range and expression of the soul that was introduced to it by the acceptance of the principle of excess in the feverish city. Also, Socrates does mention laughter in his speech about lament by making laughter a type of blame and a behavioral expression of the psychological safeguard against mimicking impious and cowardly behavior that Homer so openly attributes to exemplary figures.¹²⁵ Additionally, Socrates gives an immediately explicit reason for banning excessive laughter: because those who engage in this behavior proceed to desire a dramatic change in their condition.¹²⁶ Great laughter, especially at things that are the most sacred, trivializes the greatest and most important things, like one's conception of the gods and society, for instance. By this reasoning anyone, a poet or a customary tale-teller, or even a "man who has some power—of soul, money, body or family" is prohibited from depicting not only heroes, but especially the gods in such an unjust light.¹²⁷

But why laughter here and now? If the last speech on the education of courage from the poets is rejected then the argument seems to have retreated to 386a, the opening statement on the seriousness by which the men must take their conventional piety and relationship to each other.¹²⁸ This explains the continuity in both the topic and the theological subject Socrates uses as its blameworthy example.¹²⁹ Socrates attempts to persuade Adeimantus of this point by

¹²⁵ (388d).

¹²⁶ (388e).

¹²⁷ (388e-389a). "After all that has been said, by what device, Socrates, will a man who has some power—of soul, money, body or family—be made willing to honor justice and not laugh when he hears it praised?" (366b-c).

¹²⁸ See footnote 1 of this section for my explanation of why the locution used for "not take lightly their friendship with each other" means seriousness.

¹²⁹ (389e). He does this after reasoning quickly from the heroes, something he knows he will get a quick agreement on at 388e.

rhetorically attributing this argument to Adeimantus when asking for an agreement upon it; “They mustn't be accepted according to your argument.”.¹³⁰ While seeming to accept what is said about laughter Adeimantus all but rejects this approach by Socrates by passively stating that it is not his argument.

The issue that should confront any careful reader of Plato is the meaning of the occurring disordered conversation. Socrates interprets this refusal to accept the argument as a rejection of his reversion to the discussion of piety at the very end of Book II and changes topics again from laughter to truthfulness:

Further, truth must be taken seriously too. For if what we were just saying was correct, and a lie is really useless to gods and useful to human beings as a form of remedy, it's plain that anything of the sort must be assigned to doctors while private men must not put their hands to it.¹³¹

Should we allow ourselves to be carried away with the flow of the dialogue made possible by the effortlessness of Plato's masterful writing? How does it necessarily follow that after laments and strong laughter are discussed truthfulness should clearly be the next topic of analysis? This is not to say that this associative interpretation is incorrect. It very well might be. Maybe Plato has made Socrates particularly excitable at this point in the drama and we only find this sequence sensible because we read the *Republic* with a certain level of familiar anticipation: this is the part where Socrates and Adeimantus purge the traditional corpus and censor the poets, poets are censored here, hence it makes sense. My argument holds that this associational assumption is not precise enough. Even if there are structurally similar characteristics (i.e., passages of Homer that are purged) in each section, it does not explain *why* or *when* these particular topics are brought up. Reading the text without this in mind has a high price. Instead,

¹³⁰ (389a).

¹³¹ (389b).

these abrupt changes in topic can be dramatically interpreted as attempts by Socrates to produce an agreement after a rejection by one of his interlocutors.

With the section on laughter rejected Socrates brings the argument to the last relevant agreement in 380c, the agreements in Book II that preceded the first speech in Book III. In this section in Book II (383a-c) the gods are found to not be deceptive in deed and liars in speech. In the section on truthfulness the word “further” in the text appears as “καὶ” (*kai*), typically the word for the copulative “and”, yet here it receives the meaning “further” when it can also mean “indeed” and “yet”. Why? Rather than being the first word of the sentence in the Greek text as Bloom arranges it, it is the third word, coming after “ἀλλὰ μὲν”, (*alla mēn*) which literally means in combination with *kai*, “But truly further”, or “But verily yet”. Bloom drops the “*alla mēn*”, while Shorey more accurately keeps the “but” (*alla*) and drops the “*mēn*”. The point here is that *kai* here is a rhetorical device, “used to mark an objection introduced by the speaker himself.”¹³² Using a singular “further” (*kai*) without any of the prefacing words gives this section about the “truthfulness” of the polis a sense of *continuity* with the preceding argument, when in fact this the language is a dramatic indication that there is not.¹³³

In addition, Bloom uses the word “seriously” in reference to truth.¹³⁴ The reason why this word choice is significant comes from the fact that we have read the guardians are to be serious and somber about laughter, and that they should not “seriously” consider behaving in an

¹³²<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=kai%5C&la=greek&can=kai%5C0&prior=mh\n&d=Perseus:text:1999.01.0167:book=3:section=389b&i=1#lexicon>.

¹³³ Bloom uses the same device when he translates the “ἀλλὰ” that precedes the section on extreme laughter, a section we have argued that was the result of a rejection of his efforts for laments, as “further”. It is better rendered “but”, or “otherwise” and used when a previous clause (in this case Adeimantus’ rejection of Socrates by accepting the provisional nature of his speeches) is being negated (i.e., Socrates trying to negate the rejection).

¹³⁴ Shorey gives a more literal translation of “περὶ” (*peri*) as “highly valued”.

effeminate manner in wild laments.¹³⁵ Seriousness and shame are some of the previously proposed psychological mechanisms to reinforce the founder's education. The use of "seriously" again gives the section on truthfulness the feeling on continuity with the previous arguments, but this is incorrect. The word Bloom makes "seriously" is "περί" (*peri*), which means "highly valued" or "prized", a different, positive connotation: it is an important intuition to deploy when trying to create a consensus with someone about something like justice.

Plato has Socrates preface a reference to the point in Book II with, "if what we were just saying", with the temporal indicator "just" meaning "even now" or "presently".¹³⁶ Literally speaking, this is incorrect. The words that precede this section refer to purging Homeric depictions of the gods impiously laughing at other gods, and with Adeimantus rejecting this argument.¹³⁷ Nothing there is said about the utility of lying in the hands of men or the high value of truthfulness. It would be hard to argue that the reference to the "presently" is the antecedent section on the god's laughter since neither topic (laughter) nor subject (the gods) correspond between the two passages. This phrase might be read dramatically to mean something like "as mentioned in a previous pertinent agreement, truthfulness must be held in high value".

At this point in the exchange another image is abruptly introduced into the dialogue: that of the "ruler".¹³⁸ This ruler is also contrasted with the private individual, the layman (*ιδιώταις*, *idiōtais*), one who does not take part in political affairs. The ruler is distinguished from the private individual in that he can use lies as a remedial means for the enemies and citizens of the

¹³⁵ (388d).

¹³⁶ "For if what we were just saying was correct, and a lie is really useless to gods and useful to human beings as a form of remedy...". (389b). "Just saying" comes from "ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι", (*elegomen arti*), with *arti* meaning "just now", "even now", or "presently".

¹³⁷ (389a).

¹³⁸ Or "ἄρχουσιν", (*arkhousin*) from the word "archon", meaning "ruler" or "commander".

polis, or more colloquially, for the public good. All citizens are prohibited from lying. This seems like a generally healthy practice for a group of people, and that's the interesting part; this injunction that serves to narrow the permitted modes of speech seems to apply to everyone, not just the guardians. The precedent of an elite group of men that are the stewards of a set of ideas that can be wielded for the whole clearly comes from 378a, the last major reference to institutional guarded truth that has occurred between Socrates and Adeimantus.¹³⁹ The oblique citation of the practice of ritual and secret rites, the current recentered point of the dialogue in Book II to 380c, and Socrates using a quote from Homer that sanctions state violence against "diviners" should alert the reader that Socrates is addressing the religious slanderers of the gods, a vicarious opponent of his throughout the discussion of the gods in Book II.

But who are the rulers who must be harsh protectors of the truth and banish lies from the mouths of the people? And what does Socrates mean by "lies"? Based on the pronoun in 389d Bloom holds that there is only a singular ruler introduced here.¹⁴⁰ While the text indicates a singular pronominal is used instead of the word *archon* for ruler, the previous reference in the paragraph indicate there are multiple rulers.¹⁴¹ Only in the administration of punishment of the

¹³⁹ Other mentions of it between the two men are found in (377a) when distinguishing between speech forms, (382a-e) when restricting the god's ability to change their form and deceive humans, and (386a) when narrowing negative depictions of the afterlife.

¹⁴⁰ Bloom, *Republic*, n17, 451.

¹⁴¹ The "ἄρχουσιν", (*arkhousin*) from (389b). Bloom also claims in the Book III endnotes, number 19 that it is knowledge, or art, that bestows rule and that private men "in principle" do not rule. This is incorrect, at least according to the argument Socrates and his interlocutors have agreed upon. The SP means that each artisan has their own knowledge that the other does not have. Practically speaking, rulers are subject to this principle if the agreement is not to be nullified. If each artisan and occupation possess some type of knowledge, which is what the structural meaning of the SP is, and yet there is a hierarchy, then rule must come from another principle if it is to have a basis in reason. Book IV's distinctions on the whole that prudence knows about relative to the mere part of the artisan have not arisen yet. Even so, the challenge to this assertion based on the SP still stands.

founder's legislation pertaining to falsehood does any class individuation occur. It is interesting to note that while the guardians are to be raised on falsehoods and customary tales reconstructed according to the principle of political expediency, they are to not allow the citizens to lie. This is confusing unless we remember that Socrates is addressing the impious religious slanderers and the use of remedial lying. "Lie" appears to mean "utter impieties about the gods" in Book II and slanders about heroic figures in Book III.¹⁴² This principle of theological reconstruction seems to be completely assumed by Socrates and taken as dogma. As a final measure to support the claim that we are in a pre-Book III, non-courageous, context, there is the question as to why lies are to be banned from the mouths of the artisans. Because of the disunity, or the "subversive" unchecked effects, this speech is a clear allusion to the pragmatic reasoning of Book II's theological sections on piety.¹⁴³

Adeimantus answers this section on truthfulness and the violent implementation of violating this law sarcastically, indicating there is a compelled agreement.¹⁴⁴ We are now far enough into the present interpretation of this section's choppy waters to draw some more "political" conclusions from this answer. Taking both the earliest discussion about the many small stateless cities and the discussion about the rulers here into account, there seems to be a dramatic pattern of Socrates instituting a more specialized hierarchy and division of labor as a

¹⁴² The latter was understood to relate to the former by the Greek audience. Almost without exception, every heroic figure in Greek mythology was either a demi-god (god-human paternity, e.g., Heracles, Achilles,), or was the descendent of a god only several generations removed (e.g., Odysseus, Hector, Nestor Agamemnon, Menelaus, Ajax, etc.) and this pedigree seems instrumental to their royal claims. The only hero in the Homeric corpus that is not a demigod or does not appear to have a divinity (a god or daimon) in their lineage is Diomedes.

¹⁴³ "Subversive" here being taken from "ἀνατρεπτικό, (*anatreptikos*), to "turn upside down" or "upsetting". The allusions to faction are clear.

¹⁴⁴ "That is, at least," he said, "if deeds are to fulfill speech." (389d). This is an allusion to the speech-deed distinction in (382e-383a).

response to repeated disagreements by Adeimantus.¹⁴⁵ Continual rejections in the first section pertaining to the True City led a to highly individuated village with a laboring class. In this section they have resulted in a ruling class wielding violence on the artisans and likely the guardians.

Previously all enforcement mechanisms were informal, done at the word and demands of the lonely founders, Socrates and Adeimantus. The rejection of the last few sections has produced a hierarchy that looks more familiarly state-like to the modern reader but with a certain oddity: the rulers coercively enforcing compliance with speech laws over specialized, *idiōtais*, which appears to include the artisans and guardians. Although I cannot help myself to these sections here, looking forward to Book IV, we will see that the more Adeimantus agrees with Socrates, the more antinomian Socrates becomes with him. Looking all the way to Book V, it is when Adeimantus demands Socrates rationally articulate the very institution he and Adeimantus agree to pass over in Book IV that Socrates produces the famous three waves, renowned for their authoritarianism. This is all to say that Plato appears to be depicting Socrates as having learned something about Adeimantus that we should note.

3.3. Moderation: The Successful Heroic Reconstruction

It has been argued that the failure of his speeches about courage with Adeimantus has forced Socrates to backtrack to his discussion of impiety and friendship in the last few Stephanus pages of Book II. Like the host of other preceding themes another theme is now abruptly introduced. Socrates rhetorically asks Adeimantus if the children will need moderation.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ These disagreements can take the forms of rejections or coerced agreements. Both show that Adeimantus is not “truly persuaded” by Socrates at a given point, and subsequently there is still discord and faction in the group.

¹⁴⁶ (389d). Moderation comes from “σωφροσύνης”, (*sōphrosyne*), and can also mean “temperance” or “self-control”.

Adeimantus responds with a perfunctory, “of course”. But this agreement is not based on any reason given by Socrates whatsoever. In comparison with many of his other passionate or enquiring replies this disengaged response begins a series of quick acquiesces to Socrates that will complete the content section proper of the guardians rearing and education. Like the tamed Thrasymachus at the close of Book I who gives a dialectically formal agreement for Socrates to finish the argument and satisfy himself while remaining internally unpersuaded by the speeches about justice and injustice, Adeimantus here humors Socrates by supplying him with the knowing affirmations of coerced agreements.

At this point there can now be a clarification about the ambiguity of coerced agreements in the *Republic*. “Coerced agreements” have been defined above as resulting in a dialogical agreement and unity between the interlocutors while simultaneously expressing a disagreement within the targeted individual towards the topic Socrates is trying to praise or blame. There is a formal-informal disjunct between assent and persuasion.¹⁴⁷ If the proposed method is roughly accurate, there is a question as to why Plato has Socrates interpret coerced agreements the way he does (either as agreements to proceed with the exchange or as rejections forcing a retreat to the last agreement). If there is no discernable pattern to Socrates’ behavior when confronting both of these dialectical products, then the interpretation could be open to charges of arbitrariness. Wouldn’t the interpreter make coerced agreements mean one thing when in fact they might mean the opposite?

The solution is based on what the text reveals, often in clues like repetition: Socrates tends to interpret coerced agreements on a topic as rejections if there has been little to no prior

¹⁴⁷ Whereas true agreements, or simply agreements express a formal-informal unification, while rejections dramatically depict a formal-informal disunity.

disunity on that same topic. If there has been a long series of rejections Socrates seems content to formally accept a coerced agreement and proceed with the argument. This principle can be witnessed in his exchange with Thrasymachus, this current exchange, and looking forward to a large section of the text we will not cover in this essay, most of the last three books (Book VIII-X). Why? It seems due to the fact that Socrates' interlocutors get annoyed or disgusted with talking to him and capitulate, allowing him to finish his argument to simply silence him.

This is the dramatic principle which seems to be operating here. Like Thrasymachus and his politely edifying "old wives" engaged in the ritual of swapping associative tales with each other, Adeimantus here simply "nods and shakes" his head with Socrates.¹⁴⁸ He remains unpersuaded. This distinction in how Socrates interprets coerced agreements is that in order to remain clear on whether these are taken as rejections or not we would have to find a previous agreement in the dialogue that Socrates reverts to and then uses as a means to proceed again. Aside from the methodological discussion above the main textual clue that there is a continuity between this section that is ostensibly on moderation and the previous passage on truthfulness is that, in an effort which Adeimantus and Socrates had confirmed to constitute the education and rearing of the state's guardian class, legislation is procured for what the multitude must do, not the guardians. The only other reference to the artisan class as a whole - apart from the mentions of isolated ones like poets and myth-tellers – occurs right above in the prohibition and punishment for lying.¹⁴⁹

This section begins with a coerced agreement. The "of course" Adeimantus utters when Socrates asks if the guardians will need moderation is interpreted as a rejection. How can we

¹⁴⁸ (350e).

¹⁴⁹ (389d).

claim this? Because Socrates immediately formulates a typology of moderation that must be adhered to by the multitude, not the guardians.¹⁵⁰ Subsequently, where is the last place that the men discussed the multitude? Right in the preceding section on truthfulness which in itself is a product of the dramatic rejection of courage as a useful civic virtue by Adeimantus. In a specific section that opens with the rhetorical question of whether the guardians will need moderation, and within the broader project of rearing and educating the state's guardian youth for the city in speech, the abrupt change in pedagogical object is confusing without recourse to the dramatic reading. If read as is, the reader would have to admit that Plato has Socrates desire to educate the guardians in moderation and choose instead to talk about the moderation of the multitude right after expressing this desire, even though Adeimantus does not refuse his proposal. Apart from making sense of this disjointed approach to discussing the guardian's moderation one would have to produce some type of explanation of why moderation is even being covered after truthfulness (which will be done shortly) and why Plato has Socrates behave so erratically.

Undeterred, Socrates insists on pursuing the virtue of moderation. However, due to the hesitancy of his current interlocutor, he must approach the topic of the guardian's moderation indirectly. Socrates suggests there are two types of moderation that apply to the multitude: the institutional and individual, and within these two categories are multiple sub-categories. Within the institutional category lies the obedience of the many and the great, while the individual category of what I will call continence contains discussions on the pleasure of physical and temporal goods.¹⁵¹ Using a discussion of the multitude's civic virtue and the bridge from Book II, Socrates attempts to finish what he failed to do under the auspices of courage: complete a

¹⁵⁰ (389e).

¹⁵¹ Again, it must be noted that not all of these, particularly the first topic of the obedience of the masses to the leaders applies to the guardians.

politically expedient reconstruction of the heroic. This is undertaken because it was agreed upon that both the gods and heroes were being slandered by the religious malpractitioners with their twisted interpretations of the poets.¹⁵²

If the last section of Book II was largely an attempt of Socrates to reconstruct the gods along the lines of political expediency for the sake of institutionalizing the state in the city in speech, excepting the opening few speech, Book III has been largely an attempt to do the same with the heroic. However, unlike in Book II, Socrates does not have to deal with a partner that fully rejects the primary theme he performed this operation with (i.e., piety) as he does in Book III (i.e., courage). There is no sustained disagreement between Socrates and Adeimantus that impiety is politically important, only about the meaning and implementation of it. This was not the case with courage. There was a settled rejection of it as the appropriate vessel in which to discover and praise justice in the city, hence the advent of moderation. This preface to the discussion of the guardian's moderation in Book III was tasked with the difficulty of explaining why the group under examination at its beginning is not the guardians, and how it relates to truthfulness. What is the dramatic relation of this section to both Book II's discussion of the gods and to the previous one of courage?

The proposed solution to the textual difficulty is as follows. In review, the discussion on piety and impiety was used as the Socratic means of theologically reconstructing the conventional myths of the gods according to the political principle on which the state in the feverish city was agreed to rest on. With the movement from piety to courage it seems that

¹⁵² “‘When a man in speech makes a bad representation of what gods and heroes are like, just as a painter who paints something that doesn't resemble the things whose likeness he wished to paint.’
‘Yes, it's right to blame such things,’ he said.” (377e).

Socrates believes it was an unsuccessful approach to this end. However, with a clear pivot expressed in the section on truthfulness there is an indicator that this theme of courage has been largely rejected. Therefore, the discussion of moderation that comes after truthfulness is not a “regression” to an even more distant point in Book II than that of truthfulness (382c-d), but a proceeding of the men’s exchange under a new civic virtue. Courage, which follows the discussion of lying and the gods in Book II, has clearly been shown to be ineffective in persuading Adeimantus of its heuristic and political importance, therefore moderation, a virtue previously mentioned by Adeimantus, now becomes the discussion’s focus.

First, in a negative sense, how do we know that this is not a regression to a further point in Book II? There are several pieces of evidence that indicate so. The first obvious one is the change in reference to the guardians, to the multitude, and back to the guardians again, all in one continuous section (389e-390a). Beside from the section on truthfulness, the only other place something like a “multitude” or “private men” can be found is during the founding of the feverish city. This would mean that Socrates would have to be referring to this passage, indicating a radical reversion in the argument, a *pre-state* movement, if this is true. However, his insistence on applying the acceptability of moderation to the “young” (i.e., the state guardians) indicates that he does not mean this and that the institutionalized hierarchy is still in place.¹⁵³ The presence of a class difference in the expression of moderation is not amenable to a pre-state reading.

We see Socrates do several things to connect this section of truthfulness to the current argument. Socrates proposes a new virtue of moderation on which to politically reconstruct the heroes. This appears to be taken from Adeimantus’ opening speech in Book II where it appears

¹⁵³ (390a).

alongside justice as a high virtue that is blamed by the religious malpractices in the mind of this young man.¹⁵⁴ It is clear that the abandonment of courage, or at least courage as Socrates defines it at the beginning of Book III, is an indicator that Socrates has discovered a large mistake in his approach to this step in the guardian's education with Adeimantus and has corrected course accordingly. Moderation instead of courage is now the thematic focus by which Socrates will attempt to reconstruct the heroes and complete the speech content for the guardian's education. As previously noted, Socrates also appears to heavily use the rhetoric of Book II's piety and impiety, so its utilization here when there has been a noticeable failure in persuasion, and in such an important part, makes sense from the standpoint and anxieties of the protagonist.¹⁵⁵ And lastly, we see Socrates resort to a tactic he has used several times against Adeimantus already: the monologue. Whenever there has been a problem in producing an agreement on a specific topic one of the most powerful methods of persuasion Socrates has at his disposal is to forestall exchange and resort to monologue.¹⁵⁶

If indeed we are not seeing a complete regression at the rejection of truthfulness, but an accepted forced agreement between the two men, then there are about several questions that must be answered that the text introduces and composes this section. Firstly, why does courage fail? Why does Adeimantus reject it? Explaining this will explain why Socrates is even talking about moderation since it has been established that Socrates is operating under a dramatic principle of unwillingness and is worried about the length of the endeavor. It is clear within the discussion on courage that Adeimantus balks at the devaluation of the present life for the provisional praise of

¹⁵⁴ (364a).

¹⁵⁵ Or, it is a more conservative way, a tried and true means of producing an agreement and therefore decreasing the length of the argument.

¹⁵⁶ (378b-e), (379d-380c).

the afterlife required by fine guardians. This is evident in the lament passages, particularly his sarcastic response to Socrates' query that a decent man would be least of all saddened at a bad turn of fortune, exemplified with the loss of a brother, son, or money, or "of anything else of the sort."¹⁵⁷

What are other "things of the sort"? They would appear to be temporal goods. And not the temporal goods of the slave or metic, but those of the eminent, the great man of the polis. These are the contemporary equivalent of the heroic man, the man who is marked for greatness by both gods and men, doing what he wills on earth and suffering (or reaping) whatever its consequences are in the afterlife. Because it has been revealed that Adeimantus has a tyrant's heart and desires an autonomous life free of temporal constraints (either through solitude or the subjugation of others) and eternal repercussions (by accepting the slandering of the gods and being afraid of the uncertainty of death), any attempt to praise a regime that requires from its "greats" – the mature and young guardians, who he clearly identifies with – the most severe of sacrifices for a common good is destined to be unacceptable and unpersuasive to him. The devaluation of life at the expense of the great man, in Adeimantus' image, will not do. Justice cannot imply or demand such a price, and so courage is cast aside for moderation.

Secondly, why is there a heavy usage of the rhetoric of piety and impiety in a section that is presumably about moderation and not piety? Because of its previous effectiveness in producing an agreement about the content of the guardian's education, as previously noted above. Methodologically, the similarity in rhetoric here is mainly rhetorical and not dramatic.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ (387e). The response being, "Yes, least of all." Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Rhetorical meaning its employment in persuasion. Dramatic meaning an indication of a movement, or the effect of an instance of praise/blame (i.e., proceeding due to agreement or retreating due to rejection).

This form of rhetoric was heavily employed during the formation of the first law, the theological principle that the god is good and the cause of only good, with a fair amount of success. Here the application of this appeal to piety occurs in the brief mention of Ares and Aphrodite and a detailed description of the incontinence of Zeus as a technique to ensure an agreement.¹⁵⁹ These passages follow a speech praising the value of youthful self-mastery, which is now a form of moderation. Both the description of Zeus losing self-control with Hera and the tale of Ares recall the greater-lesser form of reasoning Socrates employs when discussing piety in Book II: if the gods, then how much more the heroic, and by insinuation, the human? If the incontinence of the gods is being blamed, why wouldn't the same theme with different, inferior subjects suffer the same fate?

We see that the themes treated under moderation go from obedience, to self-mastery, to avarice and liberality. Apart from the question of whether these species are full treatments of the virtue in question, what explains this content progression in the moderation section? For instance, at the beginning of the discussion the typology of moderation only consists in two forms: obedience and self-mastery, but this self-mastery is of what may be called the "sensual", or consumptive pleasures, some for which the feverish city was founded: food, drink, and sex. After these are covered there is an abrupt insertion of control over a different type of goods and desires in the discussion of self-mastery. Socrates includes the blame of avarice and liberality concerning wealth with that of incontinence because he has learned during the courage section

¹⁵⁹ (390c). This is a continuation of the impious language that was used in Book II (378b-e) that describes faction, or injustice, that the poets depict among the gods. The gist of the story is that Ares does not have the self-control to wait to have intercourse with Aphrodite in a more discrete place and insists upon it right away, in Hephaestus, her husband's, bedroom upon the marriage bed. Like animals, they are caught in a cleverly concealed trap constructed for this very purpose by the master craftsman. See *Odyssey*, 8.300-410.

that Adeimantus, unlike Glaucon, favors these types of goods. Socrates begins his attempt to use moderation to reconstruct the heroes with two moves: by subjugating the masses to the rulers and by fully introducing the heroic element in the discussion at this juncture with Adeimantus. He does the latter after he has established its application to the guardians through a series of poetic examples that involve both the gods and heroes. To Socrates, this must be to increase the assurance of an agreement consisting of a mutual blame of these monetary goods and vices.

And what about this? Won't our youngsters need moderation?

Of course.

Aren't these the most important elements of moderation for the multitude: being obedient to the rulers, and being themselves rulers of the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating?¹⁶⁰

The explanation of why there is a change from the guardians (“youngsters”) to the multitude has been given. Socrates retreats to the main referents in the preceding on truthfulness, whose verbal subjugation to the rulers he has imposed with Adeimantus, to produce an agreement for moderation. The alternative reading would have to give some type of explanation of why there is such an abrupt change in the subjects under focus, a straight reading that holds this transition “makes sense” since there is a unifying theme (i.e., moderation) whose application is being explored with both. I believe this associative thinking will not do here.

Adeimantus is resistant to the idea that the great men of the polis should have any structural or qualitative restraints on their actions, hence his rejection of the political necessity of courage and his tepid agreement with the prospect of moderation’s necessity. Therefore, Socrates must introduce a group whose educational or social “constraint” Adeimantus is largely

¹⁶⁰ (389d-e).

ambivalent about as a technique to establish an agreement over the institutional basis of moderation for the masses, and then apply this agreement to the guardians to reconstruct the heroes. For these masses, moderation takes two forms: being obedient to rulers and self-mastery for the sensual pleasures of drink, food, and sex.

One cannot help but notice that most of the Homeric quotes that Socrates now uses are gross distortions, misquotes, or misattributions.¹⁶¹ The examples will be covered in the commentary of these passages. Why is this? It should be recalled that this section of the dialogue is the caring man's proper praise of justice to the young political elite. It seems that for Socrates to persuade Adeimantus of his heroic reconstruction based of the political principle of expediency he must become a religious "slanderer" of a sorts too, one who unwittingly, or even knowingly, slanders the heroes of Adeimantus with undeserved blame for a higher purpose: in this case, to define justice and ascertain its value. Like the slanderers, Socrates accepts this content from tradition but imaginatively reinterprets it for a fatherly purpose that counters the slanderer.

It is shown according to the Homeric examples that are given, with Diomedes's silencing Sthenelus' rebuttal and blame of Agamemnon's public shaming, and a composite quote about the Greek's marching to battle silently, that obedience for the masses means *silence*. We have an intensification of the truthfulness legislation here which only banned a certain form of speech in the mouths of the private man. Before moderation the rulers were content to only reserve the usage of falsehoods as their prerogative and allow truthfulness to enjoy a broader usage. Now, it seems, little speech is being afforded to the masses. Silence is now their lot if they are to act

¹⁶¹ Something that Trepanier notes. See Trepanier. "Socrates' Homer in the *Republic*, 84.

virtuously. These passages of Homer that exemplify the silence of the underlings in the presence of their rulers are praised by the two men as “fine”.¹⁶²

If these passages and examples above of the public’s obedience to their rulers in Homer are praiseworthy there are some that are blameworthy. Of this type the one that is strangely singled out is Achilles’ insolence towards Agamemnon at the beginning of the *Iliad*, the rift that causes all the subsequent action in the text.¹⁶³ For Socrates, at this point in the argument, the behavior of Achilles towards Agamemnon for the agonizing shame of having Briseis taken from him is a blameworthy example of the private man’s behavior towards his rightful ruler.¹⁶⁴

Achilles, who is likely the grandest Homeric hero, a grandson of Zeus and son of Thetis, armed with god-bestowed horses and weapons for the war, the crowned-prince of the Myrmidons and acting king in their war efforts, is transformed into a layperson, an *idiōtōn*. This is more than likely not the interpretation of Achilles that Homer intends, especially when he pits him against Agamemnon. The struggle there is a portrayal of the demands of one born into the position of

¹⁶² (389e). “Fine” in the text from “καλῶς” (*kalōs*). We see Homer receive some praise from Socrates.

¹⁶³ *Iliad*, 1. 260-355. The fight is a public feud over the relative balance of honor between the two men, expressed in who would keep their consort taken as loot in a previous battle. Agamemnon spurns the gifts and pleadings of an Apollonian priest to return his daughter, causing Apollo to inflict the army with plague. To stop the plague Achilles calls a general muster and essentially strong-arms Agamemnon before of the whole military into returning the girl to her father. In return, the vainglorious Agamemnon vows to take Achilles’ prize, Briseis, as “compensation” for losing his own and a way of humiliating the man responsible for shaming him. In return, caught between the paradox of submitting to the humiliation and shame of allowing his consort to be taken without response or sailing for home in defeat, Achilles vows neutrality in the war between the Achaeans and Trojans, while petitioning his mother to have Zeus slay the Achaeans as payment for their part in his dishonoring by siding with Agamemnon. The idleness of Achilles in the subsequent battles is portrayed as the primary reason for the equality between the two sides, allowing them to take turns slaughtering each other.

¹⁶⁴ “Private men”, or man, coming from “ἰδιωτῶν” (*idiōtōn*), the same as “ἰδιώτη” (*idiōtē*), used when referencing the multitude in the preceding section on truthfulness (389c).

conventional power to a man of godlike qualities and enormous power, not the dispute between a ruler and his subordinate.

There is an example of this layman insolence that occurs in the *Iliad* shortly after the drama with Achilles ends. The only commoner in the entire text to receive both a name and dramatic part is Thersites, an aristocrat's caricature of the plebian, the *idiōtōn*. A Quasimodoesque figure, he is insolent and sardonic, blaming and shaming Agamemnon as a campsite warrior and wartime coward set too hardily on food, drink, and sex with everyone's consorts.¹⁶⁵ He is repaid for his daring to shame the confederation's leader with a public beating and verbal humiliation by Odysseus. Nothing else is heard from him thereafter, his fate in the war is not thought worthy of documentation. The passing over of using the obvious blameworthy example of moderation in favor of blaming Achilles by making him an *idiōtōn* that has no business trading words with Agamemnon is a way of getting Adeimantus to yield his conception of how the elite guardians should behave, something that was previously done at the beginning of Book III in the blame of Hades.¹⁶⁶ This a provisional form of blame Achilles must endure for a broader application of moderation to take place.

This suspicion of Achilles' provisional "dishonoring" at the hands of Socrates is further supported by the next step in the argument he takes by asking Adeimantus if this type of blameworthy behavior of underling insolence to a ruler is "fit for the young to hear, in so far as moderation is concerned."¹⁶⁷ The word for "young" here is "νέοις" (*neois*), a clear reference to the young guardians that the men are attempting to properly praise justice to through their rearing and education. Adeimantus agrees that the display by Achilles is not "fit" or "ἐπιτήδεια"

¹⁶⁵ *Iliad*, 2.262-281.

¹⁶⁶ (386c-d).

¹⁶⁷ (390a).

for the young to hear.¹⁶⁸ The question of why the behavior of a private man would matter to the young rulers is not answered, suggesting again that this preliminary discussion of moderation in the masses has only been a means towards the end of persuading Adeimantus of its elite application. Achilles is relegated to the ranks of the commoners for the sake of accepting the institutional legitimacy of moderation in the form of obedience between the ruler and the ruled. He is then elevated again almost back to his traditional status at the end of the example as a man worthy of note to the city's young generation of eminent men. We will see his full reputational investiture by Socrates shortly.

This interpretation is supported even more by the following section. Here, Socrates completely abandons his typology of moderation and its implications for the masses, which we remember consisted of obedience to rulers and mastery of the desires for sensual goods, and produces a storm of Homeric quotes and examples that apply the self-mastery species of moderation to the guardians. Like Thersites, the multitude are again forgotten.¹⁶⁹ Socrates has gotten Adeimantus to accept moderation's application for the guardians.¹⁷⁰ The necessity of their self-mastery concerning food and drink are dealt with in a swift fashion, producing a quote blaming Odysseus for praising the decadent consumption of foods and wine "as the "finest thing of all".¹⁷¹ However, Bloom correctly states in his endnotes that "Odysseus, at the court of the

¹⁶⁸ "ἐπιτήδεια" (*epitēdeia*), means "fit for an end or purpose".

¹⁶⁹ This isn't an inconsequential point, since it has been argued there is a textual pattern of Socrates attempting to redeem, or unify with an agreement, any content that has been inserted into the dialectical structure existing between he and his interlocutors. So then, what about the multitude's self-mastery over their more banal desires? If these were not introduced strictly as means towards an end, Plato would be responsible for having Socrates deal with them at some point. Because they are solely instrumental it is possible Plato does not see it as a break in his method to drop and pass them over.

¹⁷⁰ "'As you say,' he said." (390a). Socrates accepts this forced agreement and moves forward.

¹⁷¹ (390a-b). It should also be noted that the first explicit application of moderation to the guardians is presented in the form of a monologue and ended with examples involving the gods,

Phaeacians, says in this passage that among the "finest of all things" is a whole people in harmony listening to a singer.¹⁷² Odysseus is attempting to flatter King Alcinous by stating that the "best that life can offer" is for a kingdom to have a godlike bard like Demodocus to entertain a unified group of listeners with his voice and tales in an uninterrupted fashion.¹⁷³ Socrates continues to either misquote or misattribute a quote to the hero Odysseus, the "wisest of men" (a very high superlative), by claiming he praises overindulgence while lamenting that "hunger is the most pitiful way to die and find one's fate."¹⁷⁴ This quote is actually from Eurylochus, Odysseus' close attendant turned mutinous first mate who uses this appeal to a fear of death to persuade his companions to eat forbidden food.¹⁷⁵ Socrates continues the tactic of apparently slandering conventional heroes by claiming they warrant, using the Homeric text, undeserved blame as a way to commend moderation for the guardians.

With incontinence in the consumption of food and drink blamed using Homeric heroes the self-mastery of moderation ends in giving two examples from Homer about the god's incontinence when it comes to sexual desire. This is a strange approach when reconstructing heroes. It appears to be done to ensure Adeimantus' agreement to accept the moderation of the guardians. Using similar frank, impious language that is familiar from a passage in Book II Socrates blames the incontinence of the gods, and by extension the guardians, as a behavior that is unworthy of the warrior class in a city where justice is supposed to be found.¹⁷⁶ This ends a

two techniques Socrates uses to forestall disagreements. Also, within this monologue Socrates will ask rhetorical questions to Adeimantus, and then answer them in his place.

¹⁷² Bloom, *Republic*, pg. 452.

¹⁷³ Fagles, *Odyssey*, 9. 1-11. The reappearance of the motif of the unmolested speaker and silent interlocutors should be considered.

¹⁷⁴ (390b).

¹⁷⁵ *Odyssey*, 12. 368. Bloom notes this Socratic misattribution as well. Bloom, *Republic*, pg. 452.

¹⁷⁶ The first example comes from Book XIV of the *Iliad* and consists of Zeus being tricked by Hera into having intercourse as a diversion for Poseidon to rally the Argives against Hector, the

monologue where the moderation of self-mastery in the heroic has been covered. Adeimantus heartily agrees both of these things are indeed blameworthy and not proper for a young man's self-mastery and that they are blameworthy for the guardians.¹⁷⁷

From the agreement on the blameworthiness of these things follow an agreement about a praiseworthy example of self-mastery. A monologue from Odysseus exhorting himself to exhibit endurance in the face of overwhelming odds is commended to the city's young men.¹⁷⁸ The usage of the word "endure" (καρτερία) should clearly recall a rhetorical similarity with the discussion of the blame of heroic laments in the section on courage in Book III.¹⁷⁹ The Socratic usage of the passage suggests that a anti-lament characteristic is being agreed to under the concept of self-mastery. Read within its literary context this passage is clearly a call for the practical use of cunning to outmaneuver the domestic opponents of Odysseus.¹⁸⁰ During the context of praising the heroic (using Odysseus) Socrates does not need his guardians to be

Trojan who Zeus is handing victory to as compensation for his looming death. This consists of acquiring a aphrodisiac from Aphrodite with a lie to seduce Zeus, wearing her best clothes, and enlisting the help of an ally in Sleep to make Zeus unconscious after the act on Mount Ida. This appears to be akin to a conspiracy and not a regular behavior pattern on the part of Zeus. The second example comes from a tale Demodocus sings which portrays Ares as being incapable of controlling his impulse for Aphrodite, so he has her defile her marriage bed. Hephaestus catches them in the act with the aid of contraptions he built explicitly for this purpose, much to the other male gods' amusement. Another reason why the gods might be favored to give examples of sexual incontinence is that, generally speaking, the heroes of Homer do not appear to be incontinent. A majority of the text depicts them as acting especially continent. Agamemnon or Achilles do not deflower Briseis, Hector does not remain in Troy with his wife although Hecuba, Helen, and Andromache all ask him to.

¹⁷⁷ (390c). Self-mastery being "ἐπιτήδειον" (*egkrateian*), meaning "Self-control".

¹⁷⁸ (390d).

¹⁷⁹ Earlier in Book III the word is "καρτερῶν" (*karterōn*), which Blooms translates as "endurance" and Shorey as "restraint" but could also mean "patience" (388d). In the present context of moderation "καρτερία" (*karteriai*) means "patient endurance".

¹⁸⁰ Homer, *Odyssey*, XX. 11-26. That Homer would have Odysseus call for prudence and not valor makes sense if the previous superlative at the hands of Socrates as "the wisest of men" is correct.

intelligent or prudential. This implied form of blame of denying the heroic as prudential constitutes another structural marker that there are no eminently rational philosopher-kings: at this point in the argument, the guardians are commended to be valorous and continent, not prudent and wise.¹⁸¹

Having finished the originally stated typology of moderation Socrates then moves to finish his reconstruction of the heroic with a previously unstated species of moderation, in addition to obedience and self-mastery. Avarice is blamed beginning with the quote, “Gifts persuade gods, gifts persuade venerable kings.”¹⁸² Bloom notes that, “The source of this passage is unknown”.¹⁸³ The presently employed method would tell us several things about this section and its opening quote. It would explain why there has been an additional virtue to be covered under, or in addition to, moderation, and why it is covered last. Socrates believes he has learned something about the true desires of Adeimantus from the exchanges on piety and courage. There appeared to be a great hesitancy to praise the need for the disregard of the absolute value of this life by instilling a traditional fear of the dishonor of slavery and captivity, and to blame the guardian’s attachment to the earthly things, among these “son, or a brother, or money, or of anything else of the sort.”¹⁸⁴

The inclusion of money and the locution “anything else of the sort” stands for temporal goods. The prospect of making the praise of justice teach the young guardians and future eminent

¹⁸¹ The argument might be made that the prudence of the philosopher is not the same as the prudence of the cunning, calculating man. While this might be admitted, Socrates will develop the wisdom of the philosopher out of the practical prudence of the ruler from Books IV-VII. Also, it is possible that Socrates holds that “the wisest of men” is also capable of being cunning when necessity arises.

¹⁸² (390e).

¹⁸³ Plato, *Republic*, pg. 452. He cites Euripides’ *Medea* as a possible source. A possibility since it was produced before Plato’s birth.

¹⁸⁴ (387e).

men of the polis that this life is nothing in relation to the glory that one will enjoy in the afterlife as a politically expedient way to reconstruct conventional heroes is unacceptable to Adeimantus, according to Socrates' estimation. Therefore, after beating a retreat from courage, the more temporally oriented virtue of moderation is chosen as the value with which to depict the heroic. After moderation is gradually accepted as applicable to the guardians (often using synonyms, e.g., the young men) avarice comes last and unannounced because of the Socratic fear that Adeimantus will again reject its application to the heroic.

This constitutes the reason for and placement of the discussion on avarice. The opening quote that has no source is a clear reference to the quote Adeimantus gives during his opening speech in Book II.¹⁸⁵ Bloom correctly notes that this quote of Adeimantus is an edited quote with the original including a reference to the god's greater qualities of "power, honor, strength".¹⁸⁶ Greater than whom? Within the context of the original quote the gods are compared to and found greater than the heroic, specifically Achilles. The quote by Socrates that "Gifts persuade gods, gifts persuade venerable kings", is itself a paraphrased and summarized quote of Adeimantus' own edited quote. Since we have witnessed Socrates using the Homeric text liberally in this section, including a using composite quotes as real passages as a strategy to produce agreement, this unknown quote and its employment should not come as a surprise. The gods of the quote are the traditional gods, the "venerable kings" is a reference to Achilles. Now that avarice is to be blamed for the guardians of the polis Achilles is transformed from previously being the *idiōtōn*

¹⁸⁵ 'The very gods can be moved by prayer too.
With sacrifices and gentle vows and
The odor of burnt and drink offerings,
human beings turn them aside with their prayers.
When someone has transgressed and made a mistake.' (364e).

¹⁸⁶ Homer, *Iliad*, IX. 604.

to a warrior-monarch, a figure of obvious note and influence on the formulation of young, eminent souls.

Adeimantus selectively quotes Achilles' teacher and mentor, Phoenix in Book II.

Therefore, it would make sense that after mocking this quote Socrates immediately goes on to blame the improper praise of Achilles' childhood mentor, Phoenix.¹⁸⁷ Socrates depicts Phoenix as full of avarice by interpreting his appeals to Achilles to take up arms for the Achaeans as contingent upon the acquisition of wealth. This is not the intended meaning of the original appeal. Instead, Phoenix attempts convince Achilles that he should fight now while he has the support of Agamemnon's princely offer rather than fight for nothing when necessity arises. The whole parable he tells of Meleager, a Calydonian prince, who refuses to fight for the preservation of his polis because of the dishonor his mother publicly heaps upon him but is eventually forced to fight when the enemy is about to sack the city, is told for this very reason. Meleager is offered a princely price for this valor from the entire city but refuses. When he finally does take up arms he receives nothing in exchange for it. Phoenix ends his appeal to Achilles by correctly saying that he will eventually fight, wealth or no wealth, and that if he fights now, "the Achaeans will honor you like a god!"¹⁸⁸ Ultimately, Phoenix counsels his royal charge in the most persuasive way possible: to fight to maximize both the wealth and the honor he will receive. His appeal is not presented in the form of a hypothetical.

¹⁸⁷ "Nor must Achilles' teacher. Phoenix, be praised for making a sensible speech..." (390e). "Sensible" here, as Bloom notes, comes from *metrion*, a word he renders as "measure". Bloom, *Republic*, 452. The word means "average", "common", or "middling". This is another way of calling something crude, being said without regard to refined sensibilities, something typical of the "lesser" classes. For a prince like Phoenix to directly call for a demigod king to be a mercenary-in-arms without regard for honor would be something beneath the dignity of everyone involved, even if this is what Achilles wants. Dramatically this is a way of blaming the speech of Phoenix as giving moral advice that is shockingly unbecoming for cultured, aristocratic men.

¹⁸⁸ Homer, *Iliad*, IX. 734.

The above strongly supports the claim that the unmerited blame of Phoenix by Socrates occurs because of his abuse at the hands of corrupt men. These men use the pretext of piety and conventional religion to enrich and empower themselves. As the sworn opponent of this method Socrates turns their theology against them and provisionally blames Phoenix for the sake of ensuring that in a polis where justice is known and properly valued the elite men will not be lovers of wealth. We also see Socrates use this part of the discussion to resolve a previous tension about the relation of wealth and prominent men by producing an accord on Phoenix's quote.¹⁸⁹

The next hero to be accused of avarice is Achilles. Socrates insists that it would be unworthy to think that Achilles would seriously heed such advice from Phoenix.¹⁹⁰ Achilles is not to be portrayed as so consumed with greed that he would both accept these gifts from Agamemnon or refuse to surrender Hector's corpse without payment from the Trojans.¹⁹¹ Achilles is eventually rewarded the initially promised portion of Agamemnon's gifts, but only after vehemently rejecting them at their original offer and again right before he goes to battle in Book XIX.¹⁹² Later on Achilles not only refuses Priam's entreaty to accept the ransom he offers for Hector's body and gives him back to his father without charge, but he lies to the corpse of his dear friend Patroclus that he accepted a "priceless ransom" for the body of the very man who

¹⁸⁹ (391a).

¹⁹⁰ The advice being the blameworthy interpretation of Socrates: to fight contingent upon gifts, not the more contextual interpretation I gave in response to this blame.

¹⁹¹ (390e).

¹⁹² His acceptance is portrayed as coerced and being outmaneuvered by an alliance between Agamemnon and Odysseus: Agamemnon because he does want Achilles to be seen as doing him a favor and rescuing the army by fighting for "free", and Odysseus as repayment for Achilles' previous spurning him when he served as Agamemnon's main emissary to offer the gifts. Homer is not ambiguous about the good these heroes value.

slew him.¹⁹³ All this despite the fact that Achilles swears to Hector while he is dying that he will feed him to the dogs and birds even if Priam personally offers a princely ransom for him.¹⁹⁴ There is ample evidence that Homer's Achilles is not solely, mainly, or even partially motivated by avarice.

However, Achilles must be motivated by avarice within the context of properly praising justice to Adeimantus since this man will not so easily accept a political reconstitution of heroic myth that stigmatizes this behavior among the elite. If Achilles, who is for the sake of the argument the greatest Homeric hero, receives blame for being greedy, how much more blameworthy would a young guardian in a just city be if he was motivated by the love of money?¹⁹⁵ Adeimantus agrees, that it is “not just” (δίκαιόν, *dikaion*) to “praise such things.”¹⁹⁶

Not only is it not just to praise “such things”, but it is potentially impious to attribute them to Homer himself and believe them when other people attribute them to Achilles. Here we see Socrates defending the honor of the long-deceased Homer and blaming those who are vicious enough to seriously entertain his and Achilles' current slanderers, something the men in Adeimantus' speech clearly do. These slanderers tell of an Achilles and a poet that give the dangerous association of the stunning impiety of the great and their disregard for respectable

¹⁹³ Homer, *Iliad*, XXIV. 650-669.

¹⁹⁴ “No man alive could keep the dog-packs off of you, not if they haul in ten, twenty times that ransom and pile it before me and promise me a fortune more - no, not even if Dardan Priam should offer to weigh out your bulk in gold!”. Homer, *Iliad*, XXII. 411-415.

¹⁹⁵ Part of Achilles' heroic pedigree is listed at (391c).

¹⁹⁶ (391a). “δίκαιόν” (*dikaion*) has a more archaic meaning than Bloom's rendering of “just”, even though it can mean that. It's main meaning seems to be “persons observant of custom and social rule” but can also mean “right”, and “lawful”. This admission that it is not “just” to use the poets to praise avarice to the youth is a serious admission if Adeimantus' hypothetical interlocutors to be the standard from which the Socratic praise and blame of justice and injustice is judged.

customs. The dramatic reason for their association is the new Socratic diagnosis of Adeimantus' soul. The likelihood of the association of these vices is mentioned near of the end of this passage with Socrates sarcastically claiming that avarice and impiety are "two diseases that are opposite to one another".¹⁹⁷ Heroic piety is now a form of moderation, an abstaining from the brutal extremes of spirited behavior: it seems like a type of self-mastery. Under the species of heroic impiety Achilles is blamed for many scandalous instances that occur in the *Iliad*. The taunting of Apollo in repayment for deceiving him to make him believe he is Hector, to taunting and fighting Xanthus, to his public vow-breaking to Spercheus (a Phthian river) by offering his hair to Patroclus instead, the ritualized defilement of Hector's body, and the disgraceful slaughter of war-captives as repayment for Patroclus' death, are all blamed.¹⁹⁸ Adeimantus curtly agrees.¹⁹⁹

These things must not be attributed to Achilles or believed about him since this was a prince, son of a goddess, third from Zeus himself, reared by the loyal Phoenix, raised by "most-wise" Chiron, god-beloved, wielder of divine horses and arms, handsome and tall as a god.²⁰⁰ This man cannot be permitted to be both a base lover of money and capable of the most horrific forms of impiety towards both gods and men. There is an irony to this blame here. While it has been argued that the Achilles of Homer was not driven by avarice the same apology cannot be made regarding impiety. Unlike most of the examples Socrates gives about Achilles and greed, Achilles does indeed do the things Socrates accuses him of, and even more than these. When Socrates says that Achilles has a confused soul housing impiety and avarice, diseases that are

¹⁹⁷ (391c).

¹⁹⁸ (391a-c). It is clear from Homer's editorialization of these events that he does not condone them. Both Homer and Socrates (here at least) seem to agree that Achilles' behavior is blameworthy.

¹⁹⁹ "What you say is correct," he said." (391c).

²⁰⁰ (391c). Homer, *Iliad*, XXI. 121-123.

typically “opposite to one another”, he is correct with a view to expediency. According to Homer, Achilles’ soul is not confused, at least in the way Socrates insists it is. This does not speak to the fact that these diseases can be concurrent in the souls of petty religious malpractitioners and those persuaded by them, something that Socrates appears to affirm the possibility of by explicitly associating them together in discussion.

The final burst of blame involves the censorship of all impiety done by any hero.²⁰¹ Here near the end of the heroic movement in the argument Socrates uses monologue to blame heroic, not Homeric, examples of shocking impiety and shameful disregard for custom. This general statement is clearly a way to signal the end of Socrates’ politically expedient treatment of the heroes of legend. The last two men that are mentioned by name in this passage are Theseus and Pirithous (also known as Pirithous), the son of Zeus and preeminent Athenian hero and monarch, and a son of Poseidon and king of the Lapiths in Thessaly, respectively. As contemporaries and friends both men were from the generation that fathered the heroes that sailed to Ilium for the Trojan war. Nestor, the king of Pylians and last of the figures from this preceding generation of Greek heroes, commends both Theseus and Pirithous as, “the strongest mortals ever bred on earth”, and that, in comparison to Agamemnon and Achilles, the two leading men of the war party, these men, “were better men than you”, and, “I’ve never seen such men, I never will again”, and that Theseus particularly was, “a match for the immortals.”²⁰²

²⁰¹ “...let us not believe, or let it be said...that any other child of a god and himself a hero would have dared to do terrible and impious deeds such as the current lies accuse them of.” (391d).

²⁰² Homer, *Iliad*, I. 303-310. This is quite a boast to make to the captains before the entire army. According to Nestor, Theseus and Pirithous are superior to even Achilles, a figure of which there is a near universal consensus of his unsurpassed quality among the Achaeans. These are not Homeric heroes because their deeds are not recounted by Homer.

The problem here is that Theseus and Pirithous are not mentioned directly anywhere in the *Republic* either before this passage or after it. If so, is Socrates directly mentioning them as a way of producing a unity on a previous rejection like he does in the person of Phoenix? What can explain their sudden intrusion into the discussion? There is a passage in Adeimantus' opening speech where he and his hypothetical interlocutor blame the praise of the fathers for justice as being one that only considers its effects (or value), rather than the power over the soul it has itself. If the fathers, "beginning with the heroes at the beginning...up to the human beings of the present..." had praised justice as intrinsically powerful then Adeimantus believes that the Glauconian problem of justice as being an uneasy political ceasefire between all self-interested individuals would not exist. If justice received its proper due the need for the state might cease since each man would be the most concerned guardian of their own soul, fearing that the doing of injustice would visit the most horrific state upon it.²⁰³

What does this locution of Adeimantus, "the heroes at the beginning", mean? Shorey more accurately translates this phrase "heroes of old" from "ἀρχῆς ἡρώων", (*arkhēs hērōōn*). "*Arkhēs*" means "origin", "from the beginning", "from the old", while "*hērōōn*" (i.e., "hero") is used in Homer to refer to "the Greeks before Troy." Socrates explicitly blames the depiction of pre-Trojan heroes in a direct answer to the challenge of Adeimantus and his calculating man of the polis. They have openly blamed the fathers and caring men for not properly praising the *arkhēs hērōōn* during the boy's formative years. One might be tempted to read these names, recognize according to different levels of acquaintance with Greek myths that they are demigods, understand that their placement here makes sense since Achilles was the previous topic of

²⁰³ (366e-367a).

discussion, and move on.²⁰⁴ If the present argument is closer to the mark there is still a question of whether the content of the blame is accurate. From what I could reasonably gather there is no existing ancient source that portrays either Theseus or Pirithous eagerly undertaking rapes.²⁰⁵ Since this blame relies upon references of complete sources that might be lost to us - unlike Homer's two volumes - it cannot be ruled out as false, but nor can it be affirmed. If Homer is both to be believed and is the reference in question here it is actually Pirithous (and maybe Theseus) that stop the rape of Pirithous' bride at his wedding by the drunk centaur Eurytion, a battle depicted in the Centauromachy, a formative event and motif mentioned several times in

²⁰⁴ The reason why these two heroes are chosen specifically might not be available for us to know since much of the materials that Plato would have known about them might be missing. Much of what we know of them comes from post-Platonic sources and poets. The superimposition of these narratives on the *Republic* to arrive at conclusions about Plato's intended meaning seems ill-advised. One guess could be that these men appear to have begun as rivals and then became friends and performed many heroic feats and even crimes together. This could stand as an image of the two sons of Ariston (although Theseus and Pirithous were not brothers) or of Adeimantus and his hypothetical interlocutor that counsels him to undertake daring impieties and injustices. This is conjecture and falls outside the rigors of the method. However, the *Odyssey* contains a reference to both men together. Coming near the end of Odysseus' tale of his passage in Hades, he claims to have, "held fast in place, hoping that others might still come, shades of famous heroes, men who died in the old days and ghosts of an even older age I longed to see, Theseus and Pirithous, the gods' radiant sons." Homer, *Odyssey*, XI. 719-722. Here is the possible source of the "*arkhēs hērōōn*" which Plato would be aware of.

²⁰⁵ Shorey incorrectly asserts that "Theseus was assisted by Perithous in the rape of Helen", (391d). According to sources in the first century B.C., several hundred years after Plato, Theseus is assisted by his comrade in the bride capture of Helen, then a teenager, who is then promptly dropped off at his mother's house so Theseus can assist Pirithous in the failed bride capture of Persephone, daughter of Zeus and queen of the Underworld. Heracles is enlisted to rescue the heroes from Hades but only manages to save Theseus. This tale has many markings of late fabrications (i.e., involving the impressive and contrived ensemble of a young Helen, Heracles, Theseus, Pirithous, Persephone etc.). Yet even if it was true, there is no claim that Helen was raped by either of the men. Bride capture or the taking of royal consorts is universally practiced by the heroes in the Homeric texts and not blamed by Socrates. In fact, three bride capture events, that of Helen by Paris from Menelaus, that of Chryseis by Agamemnon from her priestly father Chryses, and that of Briseis by Agamemnon from Achilles, are fundamental to the action of the entire Homeric epic.

Homer.²⁰⁶ This slander of Socrates of these demigods as rapists would largely fit with his treatment of Odysseus, Phoenix, and Achilles in this section: it is motivated by political expediency and dramatic considerations and should not to be taken as descriptive.

The poets must now be compelled to not depict heroes acting in such a manner by either removing these acts from them and giving them to humans or denying they occurred at all.²⁰⁷ If not they would risk sending the message to the youth that the highest strata of mortals are guilty of committing acts of astounding viciousness. The final two appeals Socrates gives to produce an agreement with Adeimantus on this issue calls up several of the agreements about piety the two men have previously reached in Book II and uses the pious rhetoric from the monologue on Achilles above: “as we were saying before, these things are neither holy nor true”.²⁰⁸ The language of piety is a reference to Socrates’ recent assertion that it would be impious to believe the Socratic blame of Achilles as given to avarice (391a).²⁰⁹ The appeal to a prior agreement on the truth is to the excessively impious deeds of Achilles fighting Xanthus, being insolent to Apollo, dishonoring Spercheius, dragging Hector around the campsite, and the ritual killing of Trojan captives.²¹⁰ These events are not to be spoken of by the poets because there was a previous agreement that, “it's impossible for evil to be produced by gods.”²¹¹ This seems to be an allusion to the first law agreed upon in Book II, that “the god is not the cause of all things, but of the good.”²¹²

²⁰⁶ Homer, *Odyssey*, XXI. 330-340; *Iliad*, I. 311-313.

²⁰⁷ (391d). This is similar to the measures taken in the section on truthfulness.

²⁰⁸ (391d). Shorey translates this sentence, “...as we were saying, such utterances are both impious and false.”

²⁰⁹ “I hesitate to say that it's not holy to say these things against Achilles and to believe them when said by others...”, (391a).

²¹⁰ “...we'll deny that all this is truly told.”, (391b).

²¹¹ (391e).

²¹² (380c).

There are two things to note about this remembering of the previous agreement about the gods by Socrates to produce unity about the heroes at the present time. The first is that it is stronger than the original one found in Book II where there is no mention of necessity with the term “impossible” (ἀδύνατον, *adunaton*). This seems to be a term introduced to ensure that Adeimantus is persuaded enough to agree.²¹³ Secondly, Socrates makes the gods become demigods, or qualitatively noteworthy men. This is not the same greater-lesser form of appeal that occurred in the earlier part of Book III when courage was under discussion. Socrates appears to be directly applying a previously agreed upon theological law concerning the sovereignty of the gods to the heroes. Like the gods, heroes cannot be the cause of evil, or non-good: it is beyond their potentiality of action. The logic for the equal application of the first law here seems to be found in the shared divinity of both classes of entities. These appeals of Socrates are successful because Adeimantus agrees with his blame and his compulsive prescription of preventing this version of the heroic from being heard by the guardians.²¹⁴

The value of this blame and censorship of the poets by the founders is explained by Socrates. If the young guardians are exposed to this type of heroic content they will not have an internal check against committing bad deeds since they will have a ready rationalization for them as being done by greater men.²¹⁵ This point is driven home with two quotes demonstrating the hero's close kinship to the gods from the non-extant *Sorrows of Niobe* by Aeschylus, the play that Socrates also quotes at length from at the end of his speeches on reconstructing the gods in

²¹³ Something that Socrates had used with some success in a part of the second theological law at 381c. See 3.1 above.

²¹⁴ A marked change from his sarcasm towards Socrates' coercive proposals in truthfulness (389d).

²¹⁵ (391e). Entities that share the same being as they, i.e., humanity.

Book II.²¹⁶ The gamble Socrates makes with the repetitive conclusion to both the gods and the heroes pays off. Similar to the strong agreement for the speeches on the gods at the end of Book II, Adeimantus likewise gives him his approval for the heroic with an, “entirely so.”²¹⁷

Socrates asks Adeimantus what they must discuss since they have arrived at an agreement on the content over the gods “and demons and heroes, and Hades' domain.”²¹⁸ This restatement of the scope of the previous agreement is exaggerated since neither the demons or Hades received any kind of extended treatment. Demons were only agreed to not be liars insofar as the gods themselves are free from falsehood.²¹⁹ Both clear references between Socrates and Adeimantus to the daimons seem to be afterthoughts and abrupt, introduced by Socrates into the discussion when the final agreement on both the gods and heroes is immanent, and then quickly fades in favor of the main subject of discussion. If this is what Socrates means by agreement (by “been stated”, λέγεσθαι, *legesthai*), then it is a new use of the term if a comparison with the protracted efforts of the gods and heroes has any meaning. The addition of Hades into the list of things that have “been stated” for politically expedient speech is a clue that this is a test by Socrates to see if Adeimantus is satisfied and ready to move on or is still in disagreement since there is no explicit or implicit agreement reached between the men on Hades. Uncomfortable forays into the afterlife have made Adeimantus recalcitrant and the demonic does not stir him, he does not desire to explore the political ramifications of either topic. The justice of his city is

²¹⁶ (383a-c). It is identified as such by Shorey (391e). This play seems to have been a paradigm of impiety since it appears in many places where the gods are held to be blameworthy in the *Republic*.

²¹⁷ (392a). Shorey renders it “Most assuredly” from “κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν” (*komidē men oun*).

²¹⁸ (392a).

²¹⁹ On the demonic, it needs little mention here that Socrates does not mean the Christian formulation of the term but of one for beings that are wholly divine but lesser in power than a god. See (382e) and (391e).

without an afterlife and only considers the demonic in close relation to that of the actions of the gods and heroes, the association being that all three will occupy a shared space in the guardian's education and rearing from the commonality of their divine nature.

Socrates mentions that the only category of discussion missing from this list is that of human beings.²²⁰ An agreement from Adeimantus draws a term of endearment from Socrates ("my friend", ὦ φίλε, *ō phile*) but he demands to pass over their reconstruction since it would be presently "impossible".²²¹ When Adeimantus challenges this move Socrates responds ironically by saying their exchange is likely to contain the familiar refrain of blaming the poets for their depictions of humans by praising injustice and blaming justice, the predictable censoring of such tales, and an exhortation to produce stories where justice is praised and injustice blamed.²²² Adeimantus agrees, he is all too familiar with this song and rhyme and wants no part of it.²²³ According to the above description there is no apparent reason why a reconstruction of the "human" in the poetic would be an "impossible" task, especially since something similar has already been done before, twice. It appears that Socrates has identified another set of entities that Adeimantus is not interested in giving a rationally articulated account of in addition to demons and the souls in the afterlife: human beings.²²⁴

It seems that the children of the city in speech whom Adeimantus identifies with only need to know what the gods and heroes should be like. Of what the lesser gods and humans both dead and alive are to be like in a city where justice is appropriately praised, particularly for its

²²⁰ (392a).

²²¹ "Well, my friend, it's impossible for us to arrange that at present." (392a). "ἀδύνατον", (*adunaton*) as also meaning "unable".

²²² (392a-b).

²²³ (392b).

²²⁴ Taken from the generic "ἀνθρώπων", (*anthropōn*).

most eminent citizens, there is no clear teaching. The word “clear” here is used as a qualifier since the form of the greater-lesser appeal that is employed by Socrates to produce an agreement on a law, particularly when covering the value of a law (i.e., its political expediency) for the young guardian youth is used quite frequently and very recently.²²⁵ With the agreement to pass over the human moment of the education it seems like Adeimantus is calling into question the dialectically produced unity about the value of these laws, and by extension, the political principle of their the value.

There seems to be another topic that Adeimantus isn’t exactly interested in either at this point: that of a clearly defined statement of what injustice and justice mean. This increases the irony of Socrates’ comment about passing over poetic speech about humans. As proof of this point Adeimantus immediately concurs with Socrates that if the previous remark on the cliched and predictable sequence of an extended poetic treatment for humans is correct, then he and Adeimantus have finally “agreed” to what the group has been looking for with the dialectical procedure of Socrates.²²⁶ If we are to take the original agreement about the purposes of the method of constructing a city in speech and educating the guardians as being about finding the

²²⁵ The recent use is only a few lines above (391d-e), where Socrates gets Adeimantus to agree to a complete reconstruction of the heroic since it could leave the guardians open to the rationalization that since a certain vicious act has been performed by a demigod it is not unworthy of themselves and “that heroes are no better than human beings.” Shorey translates Bloom’s “human beings” as “men”, but the Greek word is “ἄνθρωπον” (*anthropōn*), the word for humanity, the same word used in (392a). Other references to the human within the context of “applying” the agreements between the men can be found at: (378b), (378d-e), (380b-c), (383c), (388a), (388d), (389a), (390a), (390d), (390e-391e).

²²⁶ The original agreement at (368c).

meaning and value of justice and injustice for man (*ἄνδρὸς. andros*), then an agreement to this statement about the task being completed would seem to be monumental.²²⁷

Amazingly, Adeimantus agrees with Socrates' speech about the comprehensiveness their discussion would reach if they engaged in this exercise, replying to him "Your supposition is correct" and not challenging Socrates to praise and blame humans as they are poetically depicted. He does not demand that Socrates tell him what he means by "justice" and "injustice" or who an "unjust" or a "just" man is exactly. This is a dramatic signal of a rejection of the entirety of the previous speeches on the gods and heroes since the terms and their values were not clearly articulated. Alarmed, Socrates attempts to save the substance of the exchange and ensure that it still covers the terms of the original agreement by proposing that the explicit treatment of the human be put off until the men, "find out what sort of a thing justice is and how it by nature profits the man who possesses it...".²²⁸ Adeimantus agrees with this proposal, signifying his disinterest in the topic by offering conciliatory agreements that have the power to dramatically reject or reaffirm the fundamental reason for the incomplete discussion.²²⁹

It should be reiterated that if Adeimantus rejects the procedure of coming to an agreement about an articulation of the principle of expediency to the human sphere, then the entire undertaking is in vain since the second part of the original agreement concerns the implication of the terms "justice" and "injustice" for a man, not a god or hero. The efforts of Socrates to insist upon a future speech for this is congruent with the principle of unwillingness he is operating

²²⁷ "Then, if you were to agree that what I say is correct, wouldn't I say you've agreed about what we've been looking for all along?" (392b). On the human subject (*ἄνδρὸς*) for which their efforts apply see (368e).

²²⁸ (392c).

²²⁹ "Very true." (392c). Shorey has it as "Most true" from "*ἀληθέστατα*" (*alēthēstata*). The behavior of Adeimantus here could be seen as another failed Socratic test, particularly of his commitment to the issue at hand.

under, for it is way of shortening his efforts by not risking having to rebuild everything from the ground up, including all the cities along with the agreements concerning the state and its guardians, and even the methodological approach. Completely acquiescing to the rejection Adeimantus offers him risks an even longer and greater effort to produce a final unity on the terms and their values among the partygoers.

3.4. Conclusion

This section was the first full demonstration of the antagonism between Socrates and Adeimantus concerning how the elite should act in a city in speech where justice arises. The education and rearing of the young guardians were taken on by the two men, putting them in the position of caring men who will properly praise justice to the future political elite of the polis. Rather than being a topic that is eagerly introduced and expounded upon by Socrates, the existence and rearing of the guardians is seen by Socrates as a roundabout way of completing the original task of the speeches. It is seen as a means to the end, and even then, not an originally proposed means by Socrates.

The first major topic in the guardians' education is the blameworthy speeches about the gods in the poetic tradition. This topic is chosen to directly meet the challenge of the religious malpractitioners of Adeimantus' speech, those who claim the traditional religious text shows that the gods do not always align moral character with desert. Adeimantus appears agreeable to the blame Socrates levels against tradition when it shows the gods behaving badly towards each other, but ultimately rejects the proposed law that the gods are simple in speech and deed in relation to humans. This is to say that he disagrees with Socrates that the gods are not deceptive or malicious towards humans. He misses the point: the gods might very well be deceptive and malicious, but to the guardians of an imaginary city they cannot be.

The second major topic is a complete disaster, hence my dramatic explanation for the procession of topics within such a short span. Socrates fails repeatedly to produce an agreement on the political value of courage for the city's guardians. This is stunning because one would think that the virtue of courage and fearlessness in the face of death would be encouraged for any group of warriors. Adeimantus mockingly rejects the reality that the military of the city in speech must have a warrior ethos instilled in them, forcing Socrates to retreat deep into the discussion of Book II's speeches on piety to restart the argument. This gives Socrates the important piece of information that Adeimantus is a lover of the standard goods afforded to oligarchs, a class of men that desire justice allow the political elite to act like lords over a slave class, not like servants who willingly sacrifice and even die for the artisans' freedom.

Lastly, Socrates gets Adeimantus to agree on the political utility of moderation by strategically slandering the traditional heroes, figures that any elite Greek young man would identify with. However, the speeches on educational content are rejected at the end when Adeimantus claims that what went before is not applicable to human beings, even though the whole endeavor and often-employed reasoning for the content purges was their political expediency for a group of humans of the city in speech. This chapter demonstrated that rather than a collaborative undertaking between teacher and student, or elder and youth, the relation between Socrates and Adeimantus becomes strained due to their different models of who the guardians are and how they should behave.

CHAPTER 4. THE GUARDIANS AND “THE GUARDIANS”

This section brings the disagreement of the two men about the position and function of the guardians to a head and resolution. I argue that the speeches concerning content have been completely rejected by Adeimantus, making the argument retreat deep into Book II’s original discussion about educational categories. Socrates learns that to successfully make these guardians into warriors and not propertied idlers he must restrict their political power by severely curtailing their speech patterns and content. Socrates tries to get an agreement on the speech portion of the guardian’s education by directly treating what they may and may not say, not what others may and may not say to them. This is a move to separate political power from persuasive speech. A guardian class with strict speech rules will be unable to use persuasion to consolidate power and lead a lordly life at the expense of the artisans.

This maneuver is set up by Socrates with a lengthy indirect blame of Adeimantus through Homer. If he can shame him enough there is a chance he can finish these arguments on the speech portion of the guardian’s education, just as he did near the end of Book II in his speeches on “true lies”. Lastly, Socrates turns to the speaking modes of the guardians and after many false starts and rejections, persuades Adeimantus to purge most imitative poetry from the city. This will not allow the guardians a broad manner of speaking, ensuring their delicate nature is not corrupted and the city lost. The subtext to this section’s speeches on imitation is that it serves as a way of blaming those who praise vicious things indirectly using the mask of a fictional person rather than speaking daringly in their own name.

Chapter Four analytical outline:

1. Transition to Speech Style: *logou v. lexis*
2. A Blameworthy Detour
3. Transition to Imitation and the Guardians
4. Imitation and the Guardians

4.1. Transition to Speech Style: *logou v. lexis*

Socrates states the men can move on to discussing the mode in which speeches must now be given since they have come to an agreement on the speech content within a form of the guardian's education.¹ This move from content to mode is qualified with an, "I suppose", indicating a Socratic sarcasm at the "reluctance" of Adeimantus to continue the discussion on justice and injustice within the sphere of a theme that is not likely to be as interesting to Adeimantus. Or this sarcasm might be at continuing a discussion that Adeimantus has just agreed to have found what he was looking for all along.²

If we are to take the above agreement (392c) about the timing of dealing with the human things with any sort of seriousness, the transition from what must be said to how it must be said is important for the overall scope of the argument in the *Republic*. Socrates states that with the "complete" consideration of both categories of speech within education the "what must be said" regarding human beings will have been covered.³ By implication, this means that justice and injustice and their respective values will be articulated and agreed upon within this discussion or

¹ (392c).

² Bloom's "I suppose" is rendered as "I take it" by Shorey from "ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι" (*hōs egō oimai*). Bloom's translation seems more appropriate here, both literally and dramatically, since it indicates the hesitancy with which Socrates approaches the mode of speech.

³ (392c). "Complete" παντελῶς (*pantelōs*), here can also mean "absolute" or "entire".

else the content of the guardian's speeches cannot be addressed, according to the men's agreement.

Now Adeimantus expresses confusion at this proposal of Socrates to cover speech mode and return to its content, responding with a rejection through ignorance, and for good reason.⁴ This sub-category of speech was not in the original agreement about the major educational genera, music and gymnastics.⁵ Nor do any other logically equivalent categories of speech appear at that original point in the argument besides that term "speech" (*logou*) which essentially stands for the many forms of verbal content, including arguments and myths or tales. Under this declension of *logos*, the agreement is found to have the two forms (*eidos*) of true or false, but there is no concept pertaining to the word's discernible delivery.⁶ The word Socrates uses for what Bloom translates as "style" and what Shorey lists as "diction" is *λέξεως* (*lexeōs*), from *lexis*, which refers to the way or act of speaking and not what is said in this saying.⁷ So it is unsurprising that Adeimantus is confused at this being the "supposed" next topic of discussion.

4.2. A Blameworthy Detour

Now that I have established that there is a *logos-lexis* distinction that is both currently present but not articulated and agreed upon when the former term and its species were proposed and accepted in 376e, the question of motive confronts the close reader in this major transition

⁴ "I don't understand what you mean." (392d).

⁵ (376e).

⁶ (376e). Shorey translates the *logou* of this passage as "tales" which seems to be more appropriate to the subsequent dramatic agreement produced between Socrates and Adeimantus concerning the poets and their stories. This rendering is not necessarily clear without the benefit of hindsight.

⁷ Shorey reiterates this distinction Socrates is introducing here, "λόγων here practically means the matter, and λέξεως, which became a technical term for diction, the manner, as Socrates explains when Adeimantus fails to understand." (392c).

point. Why does Socrates introduce this distinction into the exchange, especially if he is operating under the dramatic principle of unwillingness as I have argued?

A common sense solution to the sequential arrangement of *logos* and *lexis* in Books II-III could be something like this: if the form (true and false) and the content (myths) of a speech have been agreed upon between the two men with a view to the political principle of expediency, of producing a group of specialized warriors that will both be vicious towards outsiders and gentle towards their domestic charges, it only makes sense that the mode of this speech's delivery should be covered. It is an implied task within the agreement and general endeavor of the interlocutors. Therefore, no serious objections or questions to this can, or need be, raised. This is precisely the type of reasoning that results in difficult interpretations of Plato's works. Because of the power of his writing we are tempted to superimpose an equivalence of our own empirical psychology and behavior, and to judge based off of this the plausibility of a current argument or textual transition. If this is the correct interpretative method then there is no reason to read the text as it is written, which is dramatically, as a dynamic exchange between characters based on some central plot tension that requires the author's ability to gradually unwind and resolve. It is to largely deny the dramatic nature of the text and the ability of the author to get his message across to us through demonstration rather than speech, and to leave the reader with dozens of apparent propositional tensions on hand.

Dramatically, with Plato and the *Republic*, not much is left to the associative. The concept *lexis* was not a previously agreed upon topic of discussion like its counterpart *logos*. Why should Socrates and Adeimantus explicitly agree to discuss speeches within the framework of music, focus that which is blameworthy in them, and then end their exchange on this same topic with a provisional agreement to return to it, while *lexis* should not receive similar

dialectical care? This *logos-lexis* distinction of Socrates is a dramatic invention. It is an invention because the previous attempt by him to reconstruct the guardian class indirectly through the speech content of the poetic tradition that caring men use when exhorting the young men they steward has been rejected by Adeimantus.

Also, Socrates is still operating unwillingly, but he is not operating omnisciently as is often supposed. Plato subtly shows us the hero's flaws. He has learned that despite Adeimantus' provisional blame of justice and praise of injustice, the major defect of the fathers and caring men praise of justice is not necessarily related to the selection of proper content. Therefore, instead of trying to work the traditional poetic texts again for another round of blame and purgation, or even risk giving an account focusing on what is praiseworthy in them, Socrates has decided to change his approach for the same end of producing an agreement on what can be said about human beings. Therefore, like the blame of poetic content that was used to reconstruct the gods and heroes and their associated virtues, and by implication the guardians, now speech mode stands to be used to directly treat the guardians, i.e., the human things. Yet these are not the human things of the poetic tradition. Socrates is opting for a more direct approach to the problem at hand, turning aside from his previously indirect one.

This rejection through ignorance by Adeimantus forces Socrates to articulate style by listing a typology after repaying him with blame by insisting that he must understand.⁸ This blame begins a long line of personally leveled blame of Adeimantus by Socrates, an interesting yet unsurprising approach at this point to causing agreement. Interesting considering both Adeimantus' personality and his aristocratic self-conception and unsurprising because of the

⁸ "'But you just have to,' I said." (392d). This is a clear reference to Adeimantus' ignorance before the group.

magnitude of the rejection he has just handed Socrates concerning the content portion of the guardian's education. The shaming tactics that Socrates employs on Adeimantus throughout this section are congruent with the emotion he would likely be experiencing.

What is said by both poets and romancers is defined by the general concept of narrative. Under this there are three categories, "what has come to pass, what is, or what is going to be..."⁹ This statement becomes almost bewildering if reflected upon. To be clear, Socrates has just now defined his narrative typology of poets and mythologists temporally (past, present, future) according to terms of existence. Poets and mythologists tell us what an actual representation of reality is rather than heuristically stylized or completely fabricated stories.¹⁰ It is a point like this the dramatic method distinguishes itself, for previously we heard much blame about the poets as liars and corruptors of the youth. Now poets and mythologists are truth tellers of things that have happened, are occurring, and will happen. These seemingly contradictory characterizations of the poets and tale-tellers are agreed upon between the same men within a close period of time relative to the entire length of the text. What is a possible resolution?

The issue that a dramatic interpretation must confront upon each rejection in the text is its extent. What portion of the preceding agreements have been rejected? In turn, this will give us the new beginning point - which was previously agreed upon - from where Socrates attempts to advance the argument. We have been presented with several indicators that a rejection has occurred. The first is the introduction of a topic into the argument that was not previously agreed

⁹ (392d). The formulation of this typology is prefaced with condescension by Socrates, "Perhaps you'll grasp it better in this way." (Ibid).

¹⁰ Just in case the reader is skeptical of this interpretation the entire passage in question is this: "'But, you just have to," I said. "Perhaps you'll grasp it better in this way. Isn't everything that's said by tellers of tales or poets a narrative of what has come to pass, what is, or what is going to be?" (392d). The word used for the "what" signifying an entity, here a state of being, used is "οὐσα" (*ousa*), meaning "to be" or "to exist".

upon. The second is the appearance of a seemingly contradictory understanding of the poets and tale-tellers producing narratives containing blameworthy lies and descriptive truths. Adeimantus' previous rejection of the impossibility of directly dealing with the human things according to the principle of political expediency coupled with the new Socratic emphasis on truth narratives indicate that there has been a substantial rejection, at least to 376e-377a. The new starting point is the category of true speeches told to children.

The "such speeches" of 392c that Socrates decides to save for later refer to the blameworthy, or false, politically speaking, famous censorship of the poets and tale-tellers that he and Adeimantus have performed from 377a until this stage in the exchange. During that section the speeches the young guardians needed to be educated with first so that justice is properly praised and injustice blamed are the false speeches told about the gods and heroes of conventional sources.¹¹ This was all done without defining what justice and injustice meant, allowing their subsequent value to be assumed during this procedure. When it came time to deal with the issue at hand and directly consider guardians by applying this procedure to human beings it was "discovered" through a test that there was such a shortcoming, even though human beings were mentioned consistently throughout this blame of the poets and their false speeches, something Adeimantus could have easily pointed out.

According to this original agreement (376e) there are two forms of speech, false and true. A blame of the former was attempted with Adeimantus and failed. It failed because it was revealed that Adeimantus, far from being concerned with the moral habituation of the youth and the proper praise of justice (i.e., as intrinsically powerful rather than a means) was more concerned about ensuring the guardians, the elite of a theoretical city where justice is to be

¹¹ (377b-c).

found, look similar in wealth, power, and influence to the elite class of a classic Greek city-state. In essence, there is a concern that they are not to become soldiers whose job is to valiantly fight and possibly die for a city and its people but are a class of men exercising a kind of lordship over their underlings. Because of these conflicting conceptions of the guardians there has been a substantial disagreement between Socrates and Adeimantus. This disagreement and failure of blaming false conventional speeches has resulted in the argument being thrown back to the agreement on speech forms, true and false, with the former being the only remaining option to choose from. If this is the case, it should not surprise us that Socrates begins his attempt to pick the conversation of music's speech up by changing the topics from content and blameworthy, or false speeches, to mode and true forms of speech.

To further clarify before moving on, I am arguing that the introduction of *lexis* and a focus on true speeches at the beginning of this section are dramatically consistent with a rejection of content and false, or blameworthy speeches, that ended the last section. The essentially simultaneous appearance of *lexis* and true tales as the focus of discussion can be given meaning dramatically, according to the specific extent of the rejection. The argument reverts to true tales because the blame of false ones failed. Socrates leaves directly discussing content and invents speech mode as the vehicle in which to do this.

Regarding the present argument (392c-394d) there are two rejections by Adeimantus that force Socrates to explicate a previous form of speech content that he apparently wanted to pass over, now within a discussion of speech mode, indirectly rather than directly within their exchange on content. The first was the rejection of the blameworthy, false speeches proper. As I mentioned above, the second rejection is ignorance expressed at Socrates' distinction between mode and content. By not allowing Socrates to pass over this distinction unchallenged this

second rejection has Socrates combine both mode (or style) in terms of its content (or “what must be said”) to create the narrative typology.¹²

To Socrates’ propositionally troubling yet dramatically coherent formulation of poetic and mythological narratives as dealing with reality and truth, Adeimantus sarcastically replies, “what else could it be?”.¹³ However, Adeimantus rejects through ignorance Socrates’ subsequent narrative typology of simple, imitation, and mixed.¹⁴ Where does this typology come from? The following passages in this section seem to draw heavily from Homer; no other poet is directly mentioned or alluded to.¹⁵ We learn that as someone who employs the mixed form, Homer is uniquely situated to illustrate wholly or in part all three types of narratives. This has dramatic precedence in the Socratic blame of Homer’s narrative style before early on when the false stories about the gods were under scrutiny.

Socrates claims that poets like Homer serve to praise injustice and blame justice by presenting the gods as perpetually in strife to young, impressionable children of the city’s elites. This in turn slanders the gods and pleads the cause of injustice in the city once this generation matures and takes up rule. He mentions that even if Homer is writing with a “hidden sense” and does not mean what his depictions show, the naïve youth (as well as their simple fathers) will not know the difference.¹⁶ So there is an isolated example of Socrates blaming the mode, or narrative style of a poet (particularly Homer) before this section where Homer becomes the direct object

¹² (392d).

¹³ This is likely sarcastic since the two men have just gone through great lengths to heap blame upon these men for being liars and slandering both the gods and heroes.

¹⁴ (392d).

¹⁵ The only “allusions” to other poets are when the genres of imitation or simple narrative are mentioned in isolation, implying people like the Athenian playwrights, at the least. Yet they remain unnamed, which is a change from the previous section when Aeschylus is mentioned several times.

¹⁶ (378d).

of blame regarding mode. However, if our argument is correct about the substantial rejection that 392b-c represents, this possible section of poetic blame (378d-e) that would give Socrates' narrative typology some precedence would be invalidated by the rejection since it is included in the arguments on speech content.

There is another potential source for this division that Socrates could draw from: the brothers' speeches. In these, and particularly in that of Adeimantus, we see all three of these forms demonstrated. Glaucon and Adeimantus speak for and as themselves when demanding that Socrates praise justice and blame injustice and when reporting its deficient praise from others. Glaucon reports what the popular opinion of the many think justice is and what Thrasymachus is always telling him about injustice.¹⁷ Adeimantus is able to report what the fathers and caring men, the religious slanderers, and Thrasymachus say about justice and injustice.¹⁸ Adeimantus is able to employ a type of imitation when placing forward the debate between the caring man who praises justice and the cunning political man who schemes and desires to do perfect injustice for the sake of obtaining happiness. Adeimantus brings him in as a hypothetical interlocutor and mimicks the battle for the soul of the eminent young man who starts down the path of the tyrant.¹⁹

I claim that Socrates takes the narrative typology from the brother's speeches, especially that of Adeimantus, and uses it in this section as a proposal. What would be some subsequent issues that would support this proposal the dramatic basis for this narrative typology? One major indicator is that Socrates noticeably stops mentioning the guardians whom the men are supposed to be educating with the proper praise of justice. The guardians go without a mention in this

¹⁷ (358a) and (358c) respectively.

¹⁸ (362e), (363e-364a), and (367a).

¹⁹ The caring man as the "someone" of (365c) and the "man who calculates" (366a).

entire section (392c-394d). The speeches here mostly consist of blaming the poets, particularly Homer, for the mode their works occur in. This deemphasis of the guardians here is likely due to the realization by Socrates of the differences the men have concerning the implications of justice for these guardians. To directly deal with the human things through the subject on which deep disunity exists is a very risky strategy, so Socrates approaches it somewhat obliquely.²⁰

Besides the alarming absence of the primary subjects through which justice and injustice were to be brought into light in part, the remainder of this section can be described as “emotional”. In this short section we see Socrates directly refer to or make veiled insinuations to Adeimantus’ lack of intellect about ten different times. The familiar theme of blame unifies this section, but instead of blaming the poet’s stories for the sake of the guardians now Homer is directly blamed without any sight or sound of the city’s protectors. If we take into account the dramatic basis for the narrative division, the startling absence of the guardians, and the many insults to the intelligence of Adeimantus, the dramatic purpose of this section is not so much to further the argument proper at hand, which involves the construction of the city in speech for an analysis of justice and injustice, but to attempt to dramatically ensure agreement so that the main argument can eventually proceed.

Why should this be the case? Socrates uses this section to blame Adeimantus before a group of men as a means of producing unity because he is angry at the previous rejection which erased the agreements on content. Plato depicts Socrates as almost wrathful and abrasive in this section, never missing a chance to cut Adeimantus down to size and elicit shame that will make

²⁰ He will be forced to directly deal with the guardian’s and speech in the following section. But again, Socrates will intentionally deemphasize the guardians as an occupation and praise their nobility as a way to produce this agreement with Adeimantus as someone deeply concerned about the prestige of this elite class.

for a more compliant companion. Taking what we know, and what Socrates likely knows, to be true about Adeimantus and his self-image it is not surprising that this approach ultimately results in another Socratic failure.

Socrates reacts to the rejection through ignorance at his narrative division by feigning that this claim of Adeimantus' comprehension troubles rest on his inability and opaqueness as a teacher. As Shorey correctly notes at this passage, "Socratic urbanity professes that the speaker, not the hearer, is at fault."²¹ This signals that Socrates is placing the blame of this confusion on Adeimantus since the typology that is given, "simple, or produced by imitation, or by both together", is clear enough, verbally at least.²²

The second instance of blame happens directly after this. Using mocking language similar to their methodological agreement to found a city in speech which compelled them to speak of the whole before the part due to their ignorance about the meaning and value of justice and injustice, Socrates here narrows the focus of his speeches on narratives to "attempt to make it plain to you what I want."²³ Socrates refers to both himself and Adeimantus indirectly as incompetent men who must take this longer procedure to understand the proposed narrative distinction.²⁴ By this, Socrates means Adeimantus is incompetent since Socrates clearly seems willing and competent enough to speak of the whole rather than breaking it down into its parts and giving an explanation and example for each one.²⁵

²¹ (392d), fn 3. Shorey gives other examples of this rhetorical maneuver, *Protagoras* 340 E, *Philebus* 23 D.

²² (392d).

²³ (392e).

²⁴ It is indirect since he qualifies it with "just like men who are incompetent at speaking".

²⁵ Willing since it is obvious that speaking of the whole rather than its parts can greatly shorten an exchange.

Socrates begins this explication of narrative's species by asking Adeimantus an insulting question that brings the quality of his intellect into question.²⁶ Even the youngest child growing up in the furthest reaches of Greece and its colonies would know the opening scene of the *Iliad*, let alone someone with a pedigree like the sons of Ariston possess, these aristocratic scions of Athens in its imperial glory. This rhetorical question will also increase the chance that Adeimantus will not reject what he is about to say. Socrates gives a short description of the opening scene involving the priest of Apollo, Chryses, petitioning Agamemnon to return his daughter to him, and then the subsequent curses invoked on the Greeks when his request was refused. With Adeimantus' curt agreement that he does know this scene, Socrates continues to give a quote from the text as an example of simple narrative and then hastily mentions the Chryses speech as an example of poetic imitation. Here the author is attempting to trick the listener into thinking that the speaker is really someone else and not a fabrication of the artist. Put together the description of the action and the speeches, are examples of all three types, simple, imitation, and mixed.²⁷ This seems straightforward enough.

We should wonder if there is any other dramatic significance to this passage. Why does Socrates choose this the opening scene of the *Iliad* with all its details rather than another? Surely if Socrates wanted to only insult Adeimantus and ensure future agreements he need not choose the opening scene of the *Iliad*, and in the way he describes it.²⁸ I believe there is a deeper significance to this particular choice of this Homeric passage. Who are the relevant characters in the Socratic summary? We have the old priest who is powerless and wants something valuable

²⁶ "Tell me, do you know the first things in the *Iliad*..." (392e).

²⁷ (392e-393b).

²⁸ Which, as Bloom reminds us in his footnote, leaves some things out. Bloom, *Republic*, n. 39, pg. 452.

returned, his daughter Chryseis, who goes unnamed by Socrates and is signified with a title “his daughter”. We also have the assembled Achaean military host and “Atreus’ two sons, the marshallers of the host” referring to the kings Agamemnon and Menelaus, with Agamemnon receiving special mention for his impiety and harshness with the old man. Lastly, we have the god to whom the spurned old priest petitions and calls down curses upon those who dishonored him.²⁹

What is the dramatic significance of this character cast, specific to the Socratic task at hand? Maybe Socrates is the old, disempowered man that must obey the whims of a much larger group of men from the procession to rescue, or succor a valuable woman, in this case, Dike? This is done at the urgings of the men presumably, but especially at the exhortation of two men, spirited, aristocratic brothers.³⁰ Agamemnon’s harsh treatment of Chryses seem like the rejections Adeimantus hands to Socrates in his attempt to save justice from their blame and praise of injustice. The failure to arrive at an agreement between the two parties causes Socrates to use his dialectical superiority to repay Adeimantus with blame for the rejections and persuade him to come to an agreement about justice.³¹

²⁹ Agamemnon treats Chryses with disdain before the entire army, sending him away like a common beggar, by rejecting his valuable ransom object (left out by Socrates since it would not exactly fit the purpose), and threatening his life if he ever approached him again for Chryseis.

³⁰ Socrates claims that his engagement in the discussion after the brother’s speeches is based on piety, to not let the name of Justice suffer offense, and that he will “succor her”, or rescue her from the charges against her value. (368c) Glaucon is quick to remind him of this in the form of blame when Socrates claims that the city is founded for the sake of finding and valuing justice and injustice and not because of piety. (427d-e). Socrates concedes this rebuke.

³¹ In the *Iliad* Chryses calls down the curses on the host of Achaeans and not just Agamemnon, something Socrates leaves out since it does not fit the dramatic reason for the passage’s use. Also, there might be a veiled reference to his infamous daimon as “the god” if this demon was responsible for telling him what to do and what to say.

Continuing the theme of blame in this section, the fourth instance of blame occurs with a rhetorical blow to Adeimantus when Socrates responds to his claim that he was familiar with what is probably one of the most famous scenes in all of Greek literature by passively insulting his knowledge, which seemed to recently fail with Socrates, with “Then you know...”.³² Socrates gives the example of simple narrative that mentions the two sons of Atreus, seemingly meant to symbolize Glaucon and Adeimantus. It is obvious that Adeimantus and any Greek, including all those present, would be familiar with these lines from Homer. This serves to mock Adeimantus as selectively intelligent, or in a word, unintelligent.³³

Besides the dramatic function of this passage Socrates give, which is overlong and unnecessarily detailed for the overt use Socrates employs it for (i.e., to give us the types of narrative), Socrates does not appear to be doing what he claimed the men would do to come to an understanding of each part. Here he gives a direct example of a simple report in the passage above but strangely leaves out one of imitation and denies Adeimantus a direct quotation from Chryses.³⁴ This is clearly something Socrates is capable of because he does this repeatedly during his discussion of speech content, demonstrating an impressive command of Homer’s material to Adeimantus and audience. Since this is a time-consuming process, Socrates had intended for his superior command of Homer to persuade Adeimantus about the gods and heroes.

Yet here he does not quote Homer. As we will see imitation is brought up several more times and in each instance Socrates abstains from direct quotation, instead giving negative

³² (393a).

³³ This appears to be the equivalent of something like a modern person slowing the rate of his speech and over-enunciating to ease communication with someone who is hard of hearing, very young, a foreign speaker, or mentally slow. When done to someone who is neither of these, which Adeimantus is clearly not in relation to Socrates, it serves to come across as patronizing and humiliating.

³⁴ (393a).

definitions of what imitation is rather than a demonstration. The absence of direct imitation examples in a place where the stated point was to make plain the meaning of the three narrative types is another indicator of this section's dramatic purpose. To clarify, the glaring absence of poetic imitative examples in a place where Socrates wants to spell out his typology when we know he can recall massive amounts of pertinent quotes out of a two-volume set of around one thousand pages during the heat of argument indicates that this section is about blaming Adeimantus and not about educating the guardians.

In relation to the dramatic abstention from imitation at 393a Plato has Socrates explicitly blame Homer twice in the following lines from the *Iliad* quote, depicting Homer's imitation as deceptive or a type of cowardice.³⁵ The comparison between the detail and care he gives to simple narrative imitation should remind us of the complaint Socrates has of Homer's narrative. It is potentially laden with hidden meaning but presented in such a way to be a force for injustice for those it pleases upon its delivery.³⁶ While this can be a mark of a great artist, this incongruence between high quality and political expedience was mostly found to be blameworthy, especially with matters concerning the gods and heroes. These political lies make it easy for conventional people to misinterpret the poet's gods as partly disordered and vicious, resulting in deficient praise of virtue to their sons during their youth. These youths in turn can grow up and in the pride of life give rousing encomiums about the glory and might of perfect injustice at elite dinner parties to win honor for themselves with their display.³⁷

³⁵ "...the poet himself speaks and doesn't attempt to turn our thought else- where, as though someone other than he were speaking. But, in what follows, he speaks as though he himself were Chryses and tries as hard as he can to make it seem to us that it's not Homer speaking...." (393a).

³⁶ (378d-e), also (397d).

³⁷ (560c).

However, the main complaint of Socrates at this point is the deceptiveness of imitation. It allows a speaker or writer to place one's own opinions in the mouth of another, often fictional, person. It seems that Socrates is attempting to stigmatize imitation in this sense as rhetorically dishonest by abstaining from using it throughout this section and explicitly blaming Homer's use of it with Adeimantus. The issue with imitation is that the speaker or author's views can potentially be concealed behind another figure, giving a layer of protection between them and the critic. In an argument, like this one that the *Republic* dramatizes, this could be especially hard to deal with for someone who is there unwillingly. Not only would this person have to deal with the substance of the arguments, which may be hard enough, but if these arguments were mostly claimed to be reported or put into the mouths of hypothetical interlocutors in such a strong and forceful manner, merely for the sake of speaking, and not for the speaker delivering them, then one could not directly deal with the person, but instead would have to deal with the challenger indirectly, or through whomever they have invented for the occasion.

From a logical standpoint this could be confusing since it was Socrates who helped himself to this rhetorical device first in Book I several times.³⁸ But from the dramatic vantagepoint this is not very puzzling. Socrates is attempting to blame Adeimantus', and maybe even Glaucon's, usage of hypothetical interlocutors to present personal arguments and hiding from confronting him directly because they had learned a lesson from the humiliation of

³⁸ (329e), (337b). This occurs many times throughout the text, most famously in his sarcastically pretending to be a Muse in Book VIII at 545d-e and 547a-b to forestall any potential rejection to his blame of injustice. Also see 420d in response to Adeimantus using another hypothetical interlocutor, even after the blame here, to reject the happy city being constructed and (487b) for his rejection of the philosopher-king, resulting in the famous Ship of State image. This is also a favorite technique that Plato has Socrates use in other dialogues, like the *Gorgias*, the *Crito*, *Hippias Major*, and so on. But that is beyond the present argument's scope. The implication here is that its usage by *both* brothers could be seen by those present as an offensive pastiche of Socrates' standard mode of procedure.

Thrasymachus.³⁹ He uses Homer to blame the brothers to the point of painful obviousness for all the listeners. Instead of them attempting to cleverly appropriate one of Socrates' rhetorical techniques and employ it against him for their own gain, Socrates turns it back against them in a way, using Homer, a hypothetical interlocutor of sorts, to shame them for doing exactly what he had previously done.

Mixed narrative is formulated by Socrates as a product of adding one to one, simple to imitation, in this iteration of explicating narrative typology.⁴⁰ Socrates qualifies Homer's epics as not entirely mixed (just simple and imitation), noting that "in this way he made pretty nearly" the rest of his works.⁴¹ First, this means that not all of what Homer left for us is either simple report of action or imitation of character speeches. There are several times during the *Iliad* and once during the *Odyssey* where Homer addresses himself in the first person singular when making an invocation to the Muse to supply him with the power to be able to recount specific events. He also addresses the shepherd Eumaeus repeatedly throughout the second half of the text in the second person when Odysseus is in Ithaca.⁴²

Besides interesting literary reasons to mention these qualifiers to the narrative typology Socrates is using Homer to construct, it is important to note dramatically because it appears to be

³⁹ The issue with this more conservative (or cowardly) approach is that if Thrasymachus was successful his honor would be greater since he spoke in his own name while the brothers, if successful, would likely not receive as much honor since they spoke in the name of others. Thrasymachus risked more, hence his reward would be greater. The brothers seem to want to risk less and receive a similar reward for stumping the great Socrates, the champion and defender of virtue.

⁴⁰ "And in this way...". ((393b). Meaning, in a way that is simple (characterized by the third person, non-imitative speech) combined with imitation (false first-person speech).

⁴¹ (393b).

⁴² This might cast doubt on the claim that Homer speaks to us "in this [mixed] way" for the "whole Odyssey". (393b).

an explicit affirmation of Homer as the creator, not the mouthpiece, of the gods.⁴³ If true, then Socrates directly attributing the events largely to Homeric invention as the one who “made” the famous epic narratives rather than having their divine source in the Muse is in direct contrast with the recent agreement that narratives, or “everything that’s said by tellers of tales or poets” are forms of truthful speech.⁴⁴ If we remember, this narrative definition included a broad scope of “everything that’s said” which its categories covered. This would have to include Homer’s self-addresses to the Muse and personal references to Eumaeus.

What if Socrates’ qualifications salvage the truth of Homer’s first and second person addresses? Even so, Socrates clearly attributes all the speeches to Homer in his blame, which would have to include those about Olympian gods. If this understanding of the blame of imitation as deception by Homer is correct, then the agreement by Adeimantus to this typology’s formulation in 392e-393b is a rejection of the originally stated definition of narrative (i.e., as true speech, including that of the past, which Homer claims to access through the Muse). If this analysis is right then it shows Socrates getting carried away in his blame of Adeimantus and making an uncharacteristic mistake of defining a more general term one way and then making one of its categories contradict it, all within the same argument and only in a few breaths.

⁴³ As Bloom excitedly notes in the above-mentioned footnote. Bloom, *Republic*, n.39, pg. 452. This is incorrect and the subsequent meaning he gives it does not follow. Firstly, he claims that Socrates does not mention the opening invocation to the Muses when he states that the “first things in the *Iliad*” (392e) from him are without reference to the goddess. As we can see this is not right. Socrates does not directly mention the goddess by name but does so indirectly with the qualifier of “pretty nearly” (393b), meaning almost all, not absolutely. Also, the alleged silence of Socrates as implying that the philosopher must be secretly critical of conventional religiosity does not follow from the facts listed above, and definitely not from the blame of the poets in the speech content section of Books II-III. Even if the historical facts confirmed Bloom’s view about a Socratic attribution of Homer as inventor rather than messenger of the gods, the dramatic function of an agnostic Socrates should condition any claim to read this passage as the confirmation of a theory.

⁴⁴ (392d).

How do we know that there has been a rejection here even though Adeimantus has agreed with Socrates' speech on the different types of narratives through his detailed use of the opening scene from the *Iliad*? Because there is a repetition of the same topic that was just discussed. Socrates immediately gives another definition of what narrative means following an agreement from Adeimantus.⁴⁵ This is narrative without reference to true forms of speech.⁴⁶ Narrative now has a very specific meaning for Socrates, consisting of what "he" (within this context, Homer) says in the character's speeches and what comes in between the speeches. If we compare this to the types of narratives listed originally this appears closely related to what were called "mixed" narratives, or combinations of both reports (mostly of action) and speeches (monologues of gods and heroes). In other words, this is the third type of narrative, meaning that, instead of proceeding like "men who are incompetent at speaking" and defining what the whole means through an examination of the parts, Socrates now defines the whole by the part. We witnessed an agreement to understand each of the parts to grasp the whole only a few lines above (392d-e). If this has been rejected (which is what the argument claims) then this methodological stipulation would be void, explaining why Socrates feels like he can define narrative in terms of Homer's epics to facilitate this understanding for Adeimantus.

This mixed definition of narrative has Socrates again focus on his blame of imitation, twice depicting it as deceptive or cowardly.⁴⁷ This repeated blame should not surprise the

⁴⁵ "Isn't it narrative when he gives all the speeches and also what comes between the speeches?" (393b).

⁴⁶ Dramatically this is consistent. It means the argument has retreated to the declaration to give an account of what and how a speech must be said (392c) since the mode, or narrative style, is still under discussion here. This agreement occurs before the first definition of narrative as true speech.

⁴⁷ "...when he gives a speech as though he were someone else...", and also, "'Isn't likening himself to someone else, either in voice or in looks...'. (392c).

dramatic reader if I am right that the previous attempt at both defining and blaming imitation have been rejected. Also, the main dramatic purpose of the whole section is on display here since Socrates moves from directly using Homer to define imitation to expand this definition from speech and words to “looks”. Surely Homer isn’t guilty of this charge of deceiving the audience member with his looks, immortal a poet as he surely is. No, but he that “likens himself to someone, either in voice or looks” is guilty of imitation. This could apply to people giving vicarious speeches blaming justice using hypothetical interlocutors.

Imitation is mentioned in 393c *three* different times in succession, indicating that Socrates is attempting to get Adeimantus to accept its long-avoided blame. He interprets the formulaic response of “certainly” (or a variant) Adeimantus gives him for each speech as only formal agreements. The thrice repeated definition and double blame of imitation ensures to everyone listening that Adeimantus has both “understood” the Socratic meaning of the term and has accepted the blame for using it against him. The difficulty of a standard, or linear reading of the text in this short section should now be more evident. How could one explain within the span of one Stephanus page (392d-393c) two definitions of narrative four definitions of imitation, many instances of blaming Homer for using imitation in his narratives, why direct examples of simple narrative and not imitation were given, and a reason why the opening scene of the *Iliad* was chosen with many of its details accentuated and many suppressed, without holding that Plato has made Socrates some type of pedant who for some reason is very focused on these topics?

After the rejection at 393b Socrates gives us mixed narrative and imitation (using the original terms in 392d), but what of the simple form? This is not forgotten and given to the audience in what is one of the longest speeches by Socrates in the entire *Republic* until this point. It clearly stands out in Book III, so far a turbulent scene between the two men. We know that

Socrates typically does not resort to monologue unless he is worried about the risk of his argument being rejected, so its use is a type of persuasive technique to produce an accord. Here “simple” narrative gains its meaning as being the praiseworthy opposite of imitation, something the poet uses to hide behind.⁴⁸ There is what one could call a facetious use of monologue for the Socratic purpose of producing a conversational unity.

The explanation of the passage’s length is linked to the fifth and most direct insult leveled at Adeimantus before the core of the long speech. In a move that should remind us of the direct quote from the *Iliad*’s beginning in 393a where Socrates cuts off any rejection through ignorance by commanding Adeimantus to not tell him again that he doesn’t understand what he means by this definition, here he will in long, humiliating terms, spell it out to him before all the listeners.⁴⁹ This demonstrated example of turning a Homeric passage, which typically includes both speech and action, into one without imitative speech is for the overt reasons of demonstrating what simple narrative is and of shaming Adeimantus into agreement.

It is fitting and predictable that Socrates chooses a familiar scene, the opening one between the priest Chryses, the Argive kings, and their Aegean hosts, this time “without meter” because Socrates claims to not be poetic.⁵⁰ While Socrates might not exactly be poetic in the Homeric sense of fitting words into meter, this doesn’t rule out that he, among others, might be a tale-teller, a “mythologist” (*muthologōn*), spinning yarns among acquaintances for the sake of

⁴⁸ “If the poet nowhere hid himself, his poetic work and narrative as a whole would have taken place without imitation.” (393c-d). The first instance of simple narrative being defined in the terms of blameworthy imitation happens at (393a). This repetition is dramatically consistent since the previous negative definition was rejected.

⁴⁹ “So that you won’t say you don’t understand again, I’ll tell you how this would be.” (393d).

⁵⁰ (393d). Although the poetic, or metrical, version of this same passage was just given above (393a) and Socrates has quoted from Homer at length in meter throughout the entire educational effort of the guardians. Apparently, Socrates has decided that another layer of separation from poetic imitation, including reciting the simple action parts, must be taken here.

collectively defending justice.⁵¹ This group of speakers, present in the original definition of narrative as true speech at 392d, have strangely dropped out of the discussion here and will not be mentioned until Socrates attempts to summarize his argument in a few lines at 394b-c. The curt “I understand” upon this speech’s completion with a “my comrade” (*hetairos*) from Socrates shows that Adeimantus has clearly received the message.⁵²

This concession is not enough for Socrates; he must ensure that Adeimantus truly agrees with him about imitation, which receives its third topical treatment and sixth individual speech within the space of about one Stephanus page (393b-394b), something a standard reading of Plato would have trouble explaining.⁵³ To do this he gives Adeimantus his sixth insult of this section, responding to his curt claim to understand what Socrates meant in his prosaic retelling of the *Iliad*’s opening scene with a command to “understand” its opposite.⁵⁴ The opposite of simple narrative is when “someone” (*tis*) removes all the connecting action and leaves only the speeches. This description of poets who create imitation as copying Homer is a reference to the current Athenian playwrights and their work as inferior and derivative since they must use his text and characters as the basis for their own creations. Socrates seems to be setting up some type of contrast between these men and himself since he was the “someone” who does this for simple imitation with the speech from which this present definition is taken, unmetered of course.⁵⁵

⁵¹ The word used at 392d is the plural μυθολόγων (*muthologōn*), a romancer, tale teller, mythologist. This appears to be the prose counterpart to the meter of the poet.

⁵² The use of “my comrade”, or *hetairos*, here is our equivalent of saying something like “buddy”, or “pal”.

⁵³ I came across no author that thought it important enough to give an account of this strange repetition. Instead, those that decided to treat it at all did so in summation without explaining why imitation is mentioned so many times within such a short span.

⁵⁴ (394b).

⁵⁵ The contrast, since simple narrative is not blamed while that of imitation is, seems to be a form of self-praise at the least, or the assertion of superiority of Socrates over those who he is accusing of using imitation, unlike himself, at this moment.

If we remember, Adeimantus rejected both the opening argument that speech's mode must now be examined and the first narrative typology through ignorance, or with claims that he didn't "understand".⁵⁶ Socrates' response with the same word is a way to mock Adeimantus as one that is now able to understand after being shamed into it, whereas before he seemed to misunderstand things quite frequently.⁵⁷ The repetition of imitation's definition here in a negative manner (i.e., as the opposite of simple report) and without any hint of blame, indicates that Socrates will not accept short, curt responses and coerced agreements to his speeches now, but wants something more from Adeimantus. Therefore, we can say that Socrates interprets his arguments defining Homer's epic poetry as the whole with repeated attempts to define and blame imitation as being rejected by the short, blasé responses of Adeimantus. Regarding imitation, Adeimantus must clearly demonstrate to all the listeners that he understands what is being said, hence its repetition.

Adeimantus responds to this insult about his understanding with an affirmation that he indeed understands what Socrates means by imitation, which itself would likely be taken as a rejection by Socrates. Yet the young man has learned and quickly adds an empirical example of his acquired knowledge to illustrate this understanding to everyone, namely, tragedies.⁵⁸ Consistent with our dramatic rendering of this entire section, this deeper understanding, or obvious accord that is demonstrated by Adeimantus for all to witness, wins repayment from his

⁵⁶ "And Adeimantus said, 'I don't understand what you mean.'" (392d) for the speech content-mode distinction, and, "I need," he said, "a still clearer understanding of this as well." For the typology, the very issue being discussed is 392d. This "misunderstanding" was the very thing that Socrates commanded Adeimantus to not voice at the beginning of the monologue above (393d) and the reason for its length.

⁵⁷ "Now, I said, understand that the opposite of this comes to pass...". (394b).

⁵⁸ "That I understand, too," he said. "That's the way it is with tragedies." (394b).

previously ridiculous teacher in the form of praise and a statement that they can now proceed with the argument at hand. Or in other words, now they can begin where they left off.⁵⁹

While this praise makes one believe that Socrates is starting to see a path to a final unity about speech, we should remember that this whole section has a specific dramatic function and is not the argument proper, the one pertaining to the guardians of the city in speech that men must properly educate since they are completely unmentioned here. Following this praise Socrates hands out his seventh, eighth, and ninth insults to Adeimantus within short order, stating that even with the correct supposition of Adeimantus about tragedy being a type of imitation, he (Socrates) will now aim make his previous attempt to give the types of narrative, “plain to you [Adeimantus]”.⁶⁰ Here Socrates mocks the type of realization that he puts into the mouth of Adeimantus (i.e., supposition) and his previous inability to grasp (i.e., agree) with what was said before.⁶¹ True to a dramatic understanding, with this openly stated return to a previous argument we see now that poets and tale-tellers, the mythologists, are again included in those who speech with certain modes that are to be categorized by the men.⁶²

Socrates’ elucidation of the narrative types for Adeimantus now become defined in terms of their concrete poetic genres and not a form of true speech as before. Storytellers are not explicitly mentioned to lessen the risk of rejection. Imitation is illustrated by the genres of “tragedy and comedy”, words Socrates puts into the mouth of Adeimantus to “give” him

⁵⁹ "Your supposition is most correct," I said. (394b).

⁶⁰ (394b).

⁶¹ In (392d).

⁶² (394b-c). This contrasts when the tale-tellers drop out of those who have speech modes after Adeimantus’ second rejection through ignorance (392d), making Socrates decide to focus directly on poets and their deceptive practice of imitation. It is implied (but not stated for the obvious reason) that non-Socratic tale-tellers, past and present, are included in this blame. If we can remember, Socrates has identified the men’s current activity of educating a group of people from a city in speech as “men telling-tales in a tale and at their leisure...”. (376d).

ownership of this clause, even though Adeimantus has recently only identified tragedy as a type of imitation.⁶³ An example of simple narrative as produced by the report of the poet is often known as the dithyramb, a chorus sung in union by a group of men (or even boys) gathered in a circle under the guidance of a coryphaeus in honor of the god Dionysus.⁶⁴

The “mixed” is referred to by Socrates vaguely as “still another” and would be seen in things like Homeric, epic poetry and “many other places too”.⁶⁵ The locution of “many other places” in the category of “mixed” speech that is composed of the speaker’s own report, his directly presented words, and imitations, or his words presented in mediated fashion, is a clear reference to the tale-telling of the yarn-spinner, a man who uses both direct and indirect speech to present his thoughts to others. Socrates finishes this direct reformulation of narrative with his ninth insult to Adeimantus to ensure agreement, “if you understand me.”⁶⁶

The final instance of blame in this section occurs in the next exchange when Socrates asks Adeimantus to “remember” (*anamnasthai*) what their original task was, or to remember what they were talking about before Adeimantus claimed ignorance and lengthened the argument for Socrates.⁶⁷ This topic was the “how” or what Bloom calls “style” (*lexis*) of speech rather than the “what” or its content. This is technically not right since the content, or the what of speech, was the defining quality of the original narrative definition, but the general point of Socrates about the main topic within the setting of a dramatic verbal exchange is accurate.⁶⁸

⁶³ (394c). For Adeimantus’ claim that tragedy, and not comedy, is imitative see 394b.

⁶⁴ Oftentimes there were satyr elements to the song and appearance, as well as strophe and antistrophe.

⁶⁵ (394c).

⁶⁶ (394c).

⁶⁷ (394c).

⁶⁸ Existing things in the past, present, or future, were the defining trait of narrative early on at 392d.

This word for “remember” is chosen by Socrates to blame Adeimantus since his response to the new poetic narrative typology asserts that he understands what Socrates was trying to say “at the time”, or “τότε” (tote).⁶⁹ This “tote” is clearly a reference to the previous, original exchange that caused the second rejection through ignorance.⁷⁰ Since Socrates has created an agreement on something the two men were previously disunified on he attempts to unify them about the first rejection of this section by using the temporal reference Adeimantus has just given him and telling him that, in addition to remembering that specific confusion, he should also remember the original confusion that caused Socrates to give long account of narrative.⁷¹ Accepting this blame of being unable to properly “remember” Adeimantus replies that he “remembers” (συνίημι, *sunīēmi*) what Socrates meant then.⁷²

This entire section allows Socrates to propose the argument that he claims to originally have “meant” when he made the style-content distinction in speech after Adeimantus’ rejection of the theological and heroic reconstructions.⁷³ Without any hint of blame Socrates explicitly tells Adeimantus what he wants from him; an agreement (διομολογήσασθαι) about the relation between the poet’s works and imitation “for us”.⁷⁴ For this purpose Socrates formulates a new typology of narrative in terms of the concept of imitation. While different then before, this does not signify a rejection by Adeimantus for the following reason. The previous section was used by Socrates for a specific dramatic purpose of increasing accord between the two men. Here we saw him use blame ten times to elicit shame in his younger companion. Also, in no place were the

⁶⁹ (394c).

⁷⁰ (392d). This concerned the confusing realism of poetic and mythologic narratives.

⁷¹ The rejection through ignorance of the *logou-lexis* distinction.

⁷² (394c).

⁷³ (392c).

⁷⁴ (394d). “For us” being Bloom’s rendering of “ἡμῖν”, the first-person plural of “I”.

institutions proper to the argument, the guardians, the city in speech, or its legislators and educators, ever mentioned. With this agreement newly in hand, there appears to be a signaled reversion back to the argument proper with the explicit mention that there must be an agreement about something else and the direct mention of an office within this hypothetical polis, the guardian's educator, or "us" (i.e., Socrates and Adeimantus).

The typology itself has imitation called after itself, mixed narrative as that which "imitate some things and not others" and simple report negatively as "whether they are not to imitate at all."⁷⁵ Gone is any indicator of tale-tellers since the blame that needed to be repaid for this type of speech has been levied and accepted. Things are put in terms of imitation because Socrates has learned from the previous section it is apparent that Adeimantus has a special interest in it and is very sensitive to its relationship with poets and speakers. Thinking he will please Adeimantus by speaking to him in terms of things he seems attracted in order to move the main argument along, Socrates makes a large tactical error. Adeimantus responds to this demand for an agreement about things that directly deal with the city and its guardians, and whether imitation will even be permitted for the poets by responding "I divine," he said, "that you're considering whether we'll admit tragedy and comedy into the city or not."⁷⁶ The sarcasm is a way to blame the redundancy of Socrates' narrative formulation, based exclusively on imitation by making fun of it, or casting Socrates as awkwardly one-minded.⁷⁷ This is not only a rejection of the typology that Socrates has clearly presented to him for an agreement by focusing on the part of imitation rather than the

⁷⁵ (394d).

⁷⁶ (394d).

⁷⁷ This should not surprise the dramatically inclined reader, considering the unifying theme of that section is the Socratic blame of Adeimantus.

whole which is what Socrates desires to consider, it is a rejection of a much more fundamental scale than even the previous one regarding the permitted content of the guardian's speeches.

The response of Socrates is telling because it is a mixture of things.⁷⁸ There is clearly a note of exasperation in his words with many a passive-aggressive "perhaps" uttered. If Plato is having his protagonist operate by the dramatic regularity that this argument claims, we know that Socrates is blaming the lack of cooperation on Adeimantus by falsely presenting his own arguments as "apparently" aimless: grasping attempts to arrive at conclusions about their topics when in reality this meandering structure is due to his interlocutor's disagreement.⁷⁹

Dramatically speaking, what Socrates' statement to this rejection really constitutes is a threat. It is a threat to speak about this same topic with Adeimantus at great lengths if necessary until they agree about the musical education of speech for the guardians. Adeimantus gloats with a reply of praise to this speech, confirming his rejection of the speeches and blame of Socrates in the previous section.⁸⁰ For now, the shamelessness of youth has prevailed.

To conclude the discussion of this section: Socrates uses it primarily to repay Adeimantus in blame for the preceding serious rejection he has handed him and to ensure the remainder of the argument consists of a greater unity between the two. With all the preceding textual clues offered this should be seen as relatively obvious, not a secret hidden message within the text that only those with the proper theoretical key can decipher. Everyone, regardless of ideological or philosophical background, has access to the "empirical" clues offered as proof of this argument

⁷⁸ "Perhaps," I said, "and perhaps something still more than this. You see, I myself really don't know yet, but wherever the argument, like a wind, tends, thither must we go." (394d).

⁷⁹ Socrates had clearly stated what he wanted the outcome to be (an agreement) and on what topic. This remark is similar to one covered earlier in Book III where Socrates again mentions the provisionally persuasive character of his arguments upon another rejection from Adeimantus. (388d).

⁸⁰ "What you say is fine". (394d).

since they are directly from the text. What stops them from becoming “clues” and therefore indicators of Plato’s intended meaning are previously learned assumptions exogenous to the text. Reading Plato often requires a radical reorientation of sight rather than acquiring the right problematic which to strain the text through. Besides the beauty and strength of the writing, a power of Plato is that he can supply the willing viewer with these tools to achieve this perspective.

4.3. Transition to Imitation and the Guardians

I have argued that in the previous section Socrates operates strategically. Most of the things that characterize the *Republic*’s famous argument like the city in speech, its individual analogue in the soul, the guardian class, statements about justice or injustice, all disappear. In their place we are presented with a blame of Adeimantus’ rejection of educational content through that of the poets and their narrative types to both repay Adeimantus for his actions and to ensure greater future agreements. Adeimantus ends up rejecting the narrative typologies once Socrates finally formulates them with an explicit view to advancing the argument, in relation to the guardians, who are a fixture of the city in speech.⁸¹ In general, my argument holds that every substantive rejection involves a regress in the argument to a previously agreed upon point from which to then proceed. This includes deciding whether there has been a rejection or not and then determining the dramatic meaning that Plato has Socrates give this instance, i.e., at what past point he believes this leaves the argument to ensure a complete sense of unity. The response of

⁸¹ “...we must come to an agreement as to whether we'll let the poets make their narratives for us by imitation; or whether they are to imitate some things and not others...” (394d) The “we” here being the caring men, or educators, those who properly praise justice to the young men, the guardian class in the city in speech.

Socrates in the form of a threat to Adeimantus' rejection of the imitation narrative typology indicates that he has interpreted this as a disagreement.

Another textual indicator that a rejection has occurred is that Socrates begins talking about a slightly different topic than what was spoken of before. Instead of speaking about the speech mode (style) of the poets and tale-tellers, presumably for the guardian class in the city in speech, Socrates begins the argument by asking Adeimantus to directly decide about the specialization of the guardians.⁸² As a way of producing agreement Socrates asks Adeimantus by way of a demanding that he consider whether the guardians will be imitators or not, and then answers for him in the negative.⁸³

Now, the institutional issue with the application of the specialization principle is this: if it is not applied to the guardians then there can be no city in speech (since the true city has been rejected) because there will be no specific guardian class. Without a specific guardian class to form the city where the material principle of excess has been institutionalized there is no way to find and value justice and injustice, at least according to the early methodological agreement made among the men. This would make the entire argument unsuccessful for Socrates and might force him to admit that injustice is stronger than justice. If he was unwilling to make such a concession it would force him to completely propose a new method upon which to defend the cause of justice and substantially lengthen the argument.

The methodological questions for the argument concern the Socratic interpretation of the rejection at 394d. To what location does the argument retreat? And is this proposed location consistent with the dynamic regularity Plato uses Socrates to demonstrate? There are three

⁸² (394e).

⁸³ (394e). That they will not be imitators.

possible solutions, closest to furthest from 394d-e. The first option is 392a at the remark of “plainly” by Adeimantus. Here Socrates asks if “it only be human beings who remain” to praise and blame in relation to the content of the Greek’s mythopoetic tradition since gods, heroes, demons, and Hades have been treated.⁸⁴ Socrates now (394e) raises the question about “human beings” and the occupational boundaries of the city’s young guardian class. This solution is unsatisfactory on several accounts. If the above section about blame is correct, then dramatically speaking this present section dealing with the guardians and imitation cannot be linked to this since all the speeches blaming the content of the tradition have already been rejected by Adeimantus.⁸⁵ Subsequently, it was this rejection that caused Socrates to indirectly blame Adeimantus through Homer with the invented category of speech mode. Even at a less obscure and more propositional level, 392a does not make sense since Socrates has conditioned the discussion of the human things after justice and injustice have been defined and valued.⁸⁶

The second possible solution of 376e has just been alluded to. It is taken from the claim above that Adeimantus’ rejection of speech content makes Socrates bring the argument back to the first educational agreements. At these broad, preliminary educational agreements we read that Socrates invents a speech category by introducing style or mode (*lexis*) into the discussion. This would hold that the rejection has brought Socrates back to this original place of agreement, or roughly to the place he began with in 392c.⁸⁷ Also, we see that Socrates had picked up the

⁸⁴ (392a).

⁸⁵ Specifically, it is rejected in the following lines at 392b-c.

⁸⁶ (392c). A close reader might object to the line of evidence and claim that Socrates did not mean the humans things in general, like discussing the guardians, but the human things within the context of the poetic tradition that this rejection happens at. The point still stands since Socrates has indeed discussed human speeches within Homer’s works without meeting the stated criteria when discussing Chryses, who is neither a god or a hero, and when mentioning (in brief) the infantry’s “pious” response to Chryses’ plea in 393e.

⁸⁷ Meaning, that the speeches in 392 are dramatically linked to 376e as I argued in 4.1.

exchange with the topic of the guardians and their speech, the two things that seem to be the primary themes discussed during the drawing of the major pedagogical categories at this section. Another major qualifier to the dramatic point of 376e is that in this section Socrates seems eager to render decisions about the poet's speech content that will inform the guardian's soul, not discuss the specialization of the guardians directly. This appears to be a settled issue at the speech at 392c on the human things in the poetic tradition.

One could object to my denial of 392c as the point of the argument's retreat by claiming that Socrates and Adeimantus subsequently speak about several of the agreed upon sub-categories of music that are ultimately discussed with Glaucon, like harmonic mode and rhythm.⁸⁸ These repeated mentions of the other traditional elements of the Greek understanding of music by Socrates indicate that there is still an agreement in place to musically educate the men in speech. Or dramatically speaking, that the argument has not regressed beyond some point at 376e-377a.

While textually observant the method of this argument rejects looking ahead and pointing to passages in the future to demonstrate the meaning of the present. Instead, it demands the opposite, looking to past agreements and the content of the speeches to give meaning to the present. There is no future in Platonic dialogues, dramatically speaking, since this would imply some type of omniscience of the human cast (or protagonist). It is one of the major methodological points of my demonstration to show that Plato does not cheat and make Socrates this godlike figure by using him as a mouthpiece who must effortlessly or inevitably subordinate all challengers because he is the chosen vessel that says what Plato thinks. Plato shows us Socrates making errors because he is a character in Plato's dramatic world. It appears from the

⁸⁸ (397b), (398b).

language Socrates uses when taking the argument back up that he bases his response on the rejection to whether the guardians will imitate on a previous agreement.⁸⁹

According to Socrates “what went before” (*emprosthen*) was the agreement that every worker would only be able to do a fine job if they adhered to the specialization principle and they would fail to obtain fame if they failed.⁹⁰ If this is where Socrates claims the exchange is now operating from, the puzzle which the argument must then solve is what specific point in the past this refers to and why this point is chosen.⁹¹ Looking at the speech that rhetorically asks if the guardians will be imitators in a strictly textual manner there are a few problems. The first is that there is no agreement on the mutual exclusivity of the guardian’s occupation from that of imitation that directly precedes this assertion.⁹² The second one is that there is no previous point in the argument that explicitly has both politically expedient qualifiers (i.e., quality of work and fame) together. What can be done is look through the several places where the specialization principle is since we know through empirical familiarity with the text that this has been brought up and agreed upon several times. After this we can dramatically work from there to see which instance this could be referring to, and how Socrates thinks he can refer to it.

The two major preceding instances of the SP being discussed and agreed upon are in the discussion of the necessary city between Socrates and Adeimantus at 369e-370a and when separating the guardians from the artisans with Glaucon at 374a-e. The former occurred during the discussion of the necessary city, a place without a state apparatus and therefore a guardian

⁸⁹ "Now, Adeimantus, reflect on whether our guardians ought to be imitators or not. Or does this follow from what went before...". (394e).

⁹⁰ (394e).

⁹¹ The “why” is the dramatic meaning which Plato has Socrates give to the rejection.

⁹² What went before this was Socrates’ typological formulation in terms of imitation, Adeimantus’ rejection of it, and then the Socratic “threat” concerning the radical openness of the argument.

class. The instance with Glaucon is during the birth of the feverish city whose excess and large population incentivize imperialism and thus requires a guardian class to protect it from a neighboring backlash. Institutionally speaking the choice between these two points is clear.

Are there any other hints that could decide in the feverish city's favor? Dramatically speaking, yes. All the cities that Socrates and Adeimantus created were rejected by Glaucon's insistence that the city where justice was to be found looked culturally and materially like Athens. Socrates would not be dramatically consistent if he returned to this pre-state city where the institutional criterion of the specialization principle first arose within the argument proper.⁹³

Lastly, there is a textual clue in this exchange with Glaucon at 374 that lends this location more support. In addition to his reminder about the guardian's specialization for the sake of finely produced work, Socrates adds a second appeal for separating guarding and imitating for Adeimantus that would serve to secure his agreement: fame.⁹⁴ A word that is related to this appeal is mentioned back in the 374 exchange with Glaucon during the speeches for the guardian's specialization from peacetime occupations. Here in 374 Socrates mentions twice that without the requisite leisure for the necessary wartime training the guardians will not be "fine" ones and will fail to defend the city.⁹⁵ The words used for leisure are "σχολῆς" (*skholēs*) in 374d and "σχολῆν" (*skholēn*) in 374c. This characterization implies a class of people that exist free from the necessity of having to closely attend to a skilled labor for the creation of quality products. Because of this association Adeimantus agrees at 394e that the same imitator is unable to make fine imitations of many things. The principle of specialization has successfully been

⁹³ There were many discussions of occupation in relation to justice in Book I by almost all the interlocutors, but no rigorously applied principle that was agreed upon.

⁹⁴ (394e). From the word "ἐλλόγιμος" (*ellogimos*), also meaning, "famous", and, "to be held in account."

⁹⁵ (374c) and (374d).

applied to both guardians and imitators. The association of the institutional distinction that Socrates wants (the absolute specialization of the guardians) with the outcome of what Adeimantus wants (guardian prestige) as a way of advancing the argument is Socrates signaling that he is going forward from 374.

What is left is to make Adeimantus accept the general imitator's lack of fame. This association between the risk of commonness from not specializing is made clearer at 395a. Here Socrates warns that the imitator who insists upon imitating many things will "hardly" be able to enjoy and engage in "the noteworthy activities": he is doomed to going through life like an unnoticed artisan.⁹⁶ The qualifying word for "hardly" that is required for the practice of these noble activities that are a means towards the end of fame and honor is "σχολῆ" (*skholē*), the same word from the passage at (374c-d).⁹⁷ Socrates then ends his speech for Adeimantus to agree that specialization includes the good of fame by using two examples of imitation that are related (i.e., tragedy and comedy) and rhetorically asks if Adeimantus has not just said these were types of imitation.⁹⁸ Adeimantus agrees to Socrates' arguments that he made this claim recently and that the same speaker is unable to be both a fine rhapsode and actor, but there is a rejection when Socrates demands that he apply this specialization principle to the occupation of acting.⁹⁹ Adeimantus appears comfortable with accepting that those who make or produce imitations, like

⁹⁶ "Noteworthy activities" being taken from "ἀξίων...ἐπιτηδεύμάτων" (*axiōn...epitēdeumatōn*): pursuits, customs that are acclaimed and praiseworthy. Shorey translates noteworthy activities as "worthy pursuit".

⁹⁷ (395a). Bloom translates *skholē* as "hardly", whereas Shorey renders it as "Still less". "*Skholē*" could mean "at one's leisure", i.e. scarcely, hardly, not at all. This is the same word used for leisure in 374c-d.

⁹⁸ "Weren't you just calling these two imitations?" (395). This is a way of Socrates "giving" Adeimantus ownership of an argument that is not his. A reference to the rejection of (394d).

⁹⁹ (395a). Rhapsodes and actors were already separated in (373b) when the feverish city was being created.

poets or tale-tellers, cannot do so finely and seriously expect to acquire fame. When it comes to those who perform, or *do* these imitations through action, he hesitates, admitting to Socrates that tragedy and comedy are imitations but resists when it comes to explicitly agreeing to separate the same actor by genre. This rejection forces Socrates to take up the argument again. This last effort will lead to the end of his turbulent exchange with Adeimantus in Book III.

This section has attempted to establish the new dramatic starting point for the argument at 374d since Adeimantus rejects Socrates' attempt to discuss the educational value speech mode typologies for the guardians at 394d. It has done so by establishing there was a rejection and linking several textual indicators in the new speeches of Socrates (e.g., fame, specialization, guardians) in these two passages. The sarcastic remark by Adeimantus of divining that Socrates will consider whether they will allow imitation in the city poses a serious problem. The problem is this: imitation has already been admitted into the feverish city by Socrates and Glaucon, so the insinuation that it hasn't, sarcasm or not, is to essentially propose the rejection of the entire polis.¹⁰⁰ If Socrates humors the jab of Adeimantus and agrees that they have not been let in to the city before they are purged then he would be breaking the agreement between him and Glaucon to allow imitators, which would improperly nullify the feverish city.

Why doesn't Socrates abandon the state and its guardian class at this opportunity and create a polis that would take less work if he is operating unwillingly? As said above, there is no other city beyond the feverish one to revert to: Glaucon has rejected them. If Socrates did try this move at this point in the argument it would essentially be to concede defeat at the hands of the panegyrists of perfect injustice and accept the charge of impiety for being unable to defend the value of justice, not to mention the widespread uproar that abandoning the young guardians

¹⁰⁰ Imitators are let in at (373b).

would probably cause among the audience. Seeing this, Socrates begins again by attempting to solidify a separation that has already occurred but was in question: that between the guardians and all the other artisans, imitators included.

4.4. Imitation and the Guardians

Interpreting the partial agreement of Adeimantus at the prospect of limiting the abilities of those who actively imitate as a rejection, Socrates reverts to 394e.¹⁰¹ Socrates retreats beyond focusing just on the guardians and imitators, making the more general claim that “human nature...is unable either to make a fine imitation of many things or to do the things themselves...”.¹⁰² We see that this statement covers both imitation’s production and performance, the creating author’s writing and those who act it out. Socrates continues in the same speech to blame imitation and assert that its products are “only likenesses” of the “many things” of reality.¹⁰³ Adeimantus tersely agrees to this without comment or asking for an elaboration.¹⁰⁴ Propositional readings of the text might find this statement on human nature to be in great tension with earlier assertions about its plasticity.¹⁰⁵ I say that the restarting of the argument with a general statement about the abilities of human nature is a way for Socrates to load the subsequent exchange in his favor that seeks to separate the power of imitation from political power: it is his way of accomplishing what he has repeatedly failed to do. If the

¹⁰¹ A partial agreement on the secondary part of a speech is to disagree with the substantive part, here being the limit of the actor to act finely, with qualitative distinction, in both comedies and tragedies.

¹⁰² (395b). “ἀνθρώπου φύσις” (*anthrōpou phusis*) for “human nature”.

¹⁰³ (395b). No argument is given for this.

¹⁰⁴ “Very true”. (395b).

¹⁰⁵ Places like (377a-b) and (378d-e) talk about the endless impressionability of youth. If the youth were as impressionable as these passionate statements seem, then the “smaller coin” it now comes minted in at this point do not coincide with this view of the human. At the least, the hard limits this view seems to express, that quality of product is directly tied to nature, is not evident in the first two statements.

statement is general then it logically includes the guardians, in addition to all playwrights, poets, and actors.

This is not the only tension in this section that would demand an explanation to the attentive reader. In the very next two sentences Socrates both prohibits and permits the guardians to practice imitation:

If, then, we are to preserve the first argument—that our guardians must give up all other crafts and very precisely be craftsmen of the city's freedom and practice nothing other than what tends to it—they also mustn't do or imitate anything else. And if they do imitate, they must imitate what's appropriate to them from childhood; men who are courageous, moderate, holy, free, and everything of the sort; and what is slavish, or anything else shameful, they must neither do nor be clever at imitating, so that they won't get a taste for the being from its imitation.¹⁰⁶

Socrates is referencing the preservation of the “first argument” of the guardian’s specialization in 374b-d, the place I have argued this entire section reverts to because of the recent rejection by Adeimantus.¹⁰⁷ In addition to the issue of their specialization (i.e., that they are distinct) we must understand the appeals to the quality of the guardian’s craftsmanship and their craftsmanship itself (i.e., what they do) in this statement above if things are to be dramatically coherent since these are the other two elements that compose this dramatically related speech.¹⁰⁸ Above at 395b-c the guardian’s specialization is noted in a negative sense, in that they must “give up all other crafts” and to “practice nothing other than what tends to it” and for them to be this “very precisely”. The concern for the product is alluded to in the “city’s freedom” in relation to this specialization. Lastly, they are called “craftsmen” of this freedom.

¹⁰⁶ (395b-c).

¹⁰⁷ At 395b, where Adeimantus does not wholly agree with Socrates with a “Yes they are imitations”.

¹⁰⁸ (374b-c) cover both the guardian’s specialization and product quality. (374d) covers their craftsmanship.

This confirms my claim that Adeimantus has rejected the first attempt at separating the power of persuasive speech from that of the guardian class. The depicting of the guardians now as a specialized group of craftsmen among the other craftsmen of the polis is both a form of blame to repay the rejection and dramatically consistent with the part in the argument this rejection would have forced Socrates to return to.¹⁰⁹

As stated previously, this passage in 374 contains a speech of Socrates that successfully persuades Glaucon to apply the principle of specialization to the newly created guardian class, something that contradicts Glaucon's conventional Athenian prejudices that took pride in having a citizen military.¹¹⁰ This is done by reasoning from the fact that it is not the craftsmen's tools but the skill and technical know-how of those who wield these tools as means that possess the power to create fine products. If the soldiers are to fulfill their sole function in the polis like every other worker - and these guardians are depicted as just one of the workers now - then they will need to have the same specialization criterion applied to them as every other worker.¹¹¹ To clarify, the text shows Socrates casting this class of soldiers that were just depicted as eminent, well-heeled youths enjoying the requisite leisure time that the city's specialization affords now as craftsmen similar to the common laborer, something that would surely strike Adeimantus as distasteful. He performs this rhetorical movement because the argument has regressed to 374,

¹⁰⁹ There is an indirect reference to the guardians as craftsmen in the long speech that demands their separation from the artisans by Socrates at 374d. This is the speech which Socrates would have to fall back upon since his speech began at 374e, depicting the guardians as nobles taking their leisure, was unsuccessful.

¹¹⁰ This maneuver could also qualify, or clarify, the Socratic praise at the end of the brother's speeches at 368a. In this praise Socrates mentions that both brothers, as soldiers in this citizen military, had distinguished themselves as men of valor in battle and that both were "divine offspring".

¹¹¹ It is only over time that they receive an elevated status and eventually become the dramatic focus of a large part of the text. The dramatic reason for this should be evident by now.

and to blame the rejection of Adeimantus to separate institutional power from speaking ability, which is essentially to refuse its general application to all occupations.¹¹² This rejection forces Socrates to revert to the speech that pleads for the specialization of the guardian-artisan class at 374d, moving one exchange back from 374e.¹¹³

Dramatically it has been demonstrated that the response of “Yes they are imitations.” by Adeimantus at 395a was interpreted as a rejection by Socrates. Since it had been argued before in Section 4.3 that Socrates has chosen 374e as the point to pick the exchange back up it is therefore dramatically consistent with how Socrates has been operating for him to return to the prior agreement from the original reversion point (i.e., from 374e to 375d, “In that case,” he said, “the tools would be worth a lot.”). In addition to relying upon the general dramatic regularity of choosing this previous location in the argument I have also attempted draw a connection between the similarities in content from the speeches at 374b-d and 395b-c; i.e., that they both allude to many of the same elements and use the same language to refer to the guardians (as craftsmen), further tightening their dramatic connection. All this is to say that the language used in the speech at 395b-c is taken directly from what it is dynamically linked to by a constructive textual principle that determines the progression of the content. For instance, Plato did not just decide to have Socrates decide to reference a “first argument” and then start calling the guardians “craftsmen” at this point for the sake of avoiding repetition.

¹¹² If *actors* can perform both comedies and tragedies well, shouldn’t someone be able to write both well?

¹¹³ (374e) is the original point where Socrates takes the argument to after the rejection in (394d), as argued in section 3 of this chapter above.

If the dramatic explanation of this repetition is correct the major logical issue for us at this final major juncture in the argument at hand is this: why does Socrates both prohibit and prescribe imitation? How can he say something like this? The statement “If, then, we are to preserve the first argument... they also mustn't do or imitate anything else. And if they do imitate, they must imitate what's appropriate to them from childhood...” is not as clear as it might sound to the expectant reader. This appears to be Socrates giving contradictory signals. A more charitable reading (one that assumes Socrates is expressing something of pedagogical substance) might refuse my objection to this passage and hold that Socrates is giving a limited, or qualified license of the guardians to engage in imitation. The qualified, or “common sense” reading, might believe Socrates to mean something like this: it is permissible for the guardians to imitate as long as they imitate occupationally appropriate figures like other guardians. I think that this cannot be what Socrates is really saying, at least, without some major qualifications of my own. These qualifications will result in a strategic distinction that Socrates makes to finish his speeches with Adeimantus in Books II through III. It is the formulation of this distinction that should give us the rhetorical key to unlock the remainder of their exchange.

Socrates cannot be granting the guardians this commonsensical ability to imitate for several reasons. The first is that an occupational pedagogy based on imitation, one with an imitation component, would also not be possible. It is an institutional impossibility because there are no other, older guardians who they can imitate. One could object to this construction of the text and claim that Socrates does not actually say the guardians must imitate other guardians, but they may imitate “appropriate” examples.¹¹⁴ This might mean the guardians can imitate people that serve some type of qualitative occupational function even though they are not actually

¹¹⁴ (395c).

guardians. Even if this were the proper reading it would contradict the specialization principle and nullify the quality of their action's products, if the agreement between specialization and quality is to be taken seriously and maintained. If there aren't specialized guardians and if they are consistently unable, or very unlikely, to be victorious in wartime and maintain the domestic peace, then the polis which the men are creating will fall and justice and injustice will go undefined and escape judgment.

A grant to imitate, and even imitate occupationally appropriate figures, would place the polis in jeopardy since the reader has just been informed in the directly preceding speech by Socrates and with an agreement from Adeimantus that "imitations in fact only likenesses" of "the things themselves".¹¹⁵ According to this statement allowing the guardians to imitate virtuous men, or even guardians, as a way to train them would only serve to produce imitations of the real thing. If these guardians were trained to do their actual job using imitation they would both not turn out to be true guardians but mere imitations of them, and if they were mere imitations of them (or of some vague "virtuous man") they would be inefficacious to their political function. Far from being fine guardians that could defeat the enemy and keep the peace, they would be bad guardians, and a deficient guardianship would result in the destruction of the polis.¹¹⁶

I have made the case that there cannot be a direct relation between imitation and the actual "practice" or the doing of the guardian work.¹¹⁷ There is a distinction between a guardian

¹¹⁵ (395b). The closeness and agreement of this speech gives its dramatic importance to the interpretation of the present passage.

¹¹⁶ While this has yet to occur, we find out in Book VIII that this is exactly what happens: Kallipolis falls and the regimes become increasingly more debased in the polis because the philosopher-king guardians become ignorant of the state's nuptial numeral and produce deficient rulers.

¹¹⁷ Both "Practice" at 395c is rendered as "pursue" by Shorey from the word "ἐπιτηδεύειν" (*epitēdeuein*) meaning just that: to pursue, to practice, or to make one's business, and "do" from "πράττειν" (*pratein*), meaning to accomplish, to achieve, to bring about.

qua guardian and one that imitates in this passage. If so, what is their relation in regards to their education and rearing? Socrates continues in the same speech that makes a command and distinction between imitation and occupational practice to list the types of praiseworthy and blameworthy things regarding imitation. Unsurprisingly, virtues like courage, moderation, piety, freedom and “everything of the sort” are praiseworthy traits the guardians may imitate and what is slavish and shameful are blameworthy traits to be avoided.¹¹⁸ An important clue to the issue of these guardians and their rearing comes from the reason why these traits have received their respective valuations. The men must be cautious about what the guardians imitate because a continual performance of these imitations is liable to “become established as habits and nature, in body and sounds and in thought...”.¹¹⁹

Coupled with the distinction between likeness and reality of action for the guardians I think Socrates is basing his argument to separate the guardians from fine speaking as an actual practice, as part of their job, by relegating it to an inferior level of the guardian’s existence, to that regarding imitation, not their occupational training. The guardian’s specialization has been stated in the first part of the passage since these youths have now been made craftsmen *and* are now said to “practice” and “do” only what tends to the end of a guardian.¹²⁰ This implies that the qualitative element, being that of fine action towards an end, is already present within their specialization. If this is right, then the discussion of imitation does not have to do with their specialization, or occupational training in a direct fashion, but only indirectly, as that which can negatively affect the already existing quality of the guardian’s actions that are inherent within the

¹¹⁸ (395c).

¹¹⁹ (395d).

¹²⁰ See footnote 659 above and its paragraph for my definition and dramatic discussion of these terms.

assumption of specialization. The relation of imitation to the “doing” of their occupation comes from the affect of imitation’s content on their education and rearing. If a guardian’s imitative habituation is shameful, then it could eventually erode their quality by breaking their specialization. If it is praiseworthy it will only reinforce what is already present.¹²¹ Socrates’ confusing statement on imitation does not contradict the prior speech about human nature and imitation at 395b because the quality, or fineness of product, of this nature is assumed within the specialization criterion. Now the content and scope of imitation must be agreed upon to preserve it.

There are two major textual clues that demonstrate this argument of the strategic relegation of imitation’s value. Socrates stops talking about the guardian’s specialization, stops calling them by their name, and now begins calling them alternative, praiseworthy names while going through what they can or cannot imitate. The specialization principle is not mentioned until much later, after all the imitative models for the guardians have been agreed to. This principle’s application to the guardians becomes indirect, with Socrates using the term “warriors” and not guardians within a broad contrast of prestigious and mean jobs to illustrate this specialization.¹²² Also, because the specialization of the guardians is now bracketed, Socrates has the two men take the mantle of caring men again (395d) and begins calling these guardians by names like “good men” (395d) and real gentlemen (*kaloskagathos*, 396c). This would be a persuasive notion for Adeimantus since Socrates knows that he does not want guardians that are mean craftsmen who are liable to get killed on the battlefield for the freedom

¹²¹ I.e., it won’t negatively affect it.

¹²² (397e).

of the lower classes. If the argument were to proceed according to the concept of specialization at this point, Socrates knows that Adeimantus would end up disagreeing with him.¹²³

This is the immediate dramatic consideration for this clever switch from practice to imitation. The primary dramatic purpose is that Socrates can finally blame the ability to speak finely, including lying to commit perfect injustice by a man who calculates, by separating its actual practice (which someone like an actor would have) from political power and making the guardian's speech model of imitation extremely narrow and simple. Rather than the best men of the city being perfectly duplicitous through a power of fine speech and convincing performance, the city's elite are now simple in speech and largely opposed to forms of blameworthy imitation. Adeimantus is persuaded the city's eminent men should not adhere to the specialization principle and that they should possess wealth, honor and political power, often through the use of oppression and deceptive speech.

He has demonstrated this by being highly resistant to curtailing these positions of privilege and making them subject to a common good that is more valuable than their own lives by applying imitation restrictions to their speech. Therefore, 395-397 appears to furnish us with a successful Socratic attempt to indirectly blame this "man who calculates" through this imitation discussion by not allowing the guardians to have a "counterfeited, seemly exterior" (366b). This is quite an assertion. The textual evidence that is offered in support of it concerns what proceeds from this speech.¹²⁴ Socrates states that as "caring men", a position that Adeimantus blames alongside the city's fathers in the first part of his speech in Book II, they cannot allow the boys to imitate a long list of shameful and blameworthy things. It seems strange for Socrates go right to

¹²³ He would likely disagree because the guardians are now, due to previous rejections, craftsmen of liberty that risk their lives for the whole to perform their job finely.

¹²⁴ From (395d-e), beginning with the paragraph of, "So, then".

what is blameworthy and dwell on it for so long if this section was simply about the guardian's instruction.

The list of blameworthy things that Socrates mentions ostensibly contains the many parts in a play an actor might perform. This is a plausible reading since one of the controversies here is who is allowed to imitate what. Yet the further down this list the eyes wander one cannot help but reject this as the explanation. There are five sections of blameworthy things that the caring men of this polis cannot allow their youths to develop a taste for by means of imitation. The first thing these youths are prohibited from imitating are women.¹²⁵ This prohibition of the young men on imitating women seems general enough. There do not appear to be any exceptions to how Socrates formulates this statement that might allow for Adeimantus or another interlocutor to construe it as a qualified prohibition and that would allow for the guardians to imitate any women. If true, this makes the many different types of prohibited women that Socrates proceeds to list confusing.

Since my argument holds that this section has a dramatic function of blaming the hypothetical interlocutor of Adeimantus by making the best men of the city where justice is to be found simple in speech by separating fine speech from political power, this section and the following categories of blameworthy things of imitation are not so confusing. The types of women that the guardians cannot imitate are young, old, abusive to husbands, those striving with the gods and believing themselves to be blessed, ones who wails and screams when caught in misfortune, and none who are sick, in love, or engaged in child labor.¹²⁶ Bracketed between a set of general traits and qualities that could apply to any women throughout her lifetime (i.e., being

¹²⁵ "So then," I said, "we won't allow those whom we claim we care for and who must themselves become good men to imitate women—since they are men—". (395d).

¹²⁶ (395d-e).

young and old, and being sick, in love, or in labor) there are three very specific blameworthy types of women: those who abuse their husbands, those who exhibit a type of shocking impiety, and those who become emotional when unhappy due to circumstance. These three things are a clear reference to the previous blame of Achilles who Socrates depicted as being insubordinate to Agamemnon before the entire Achaean host in the *Iliad*'s opening scene, who displayed a shocking impiety when dishonoring Apollo and taunting the river Scamander during his *aristeia*, and who wailed without regard for honor when his friend is killed by Zeus as repayment for being forced to honor him by demigod's indirect appeal through his mother, Metis.¹²⁷

The reply of Adeimantus does not satisfy Socrates at this point, forcing him to repeat his attempt at blameworthy imitations.¹²⁸ We can infer this because if Socrates interpreted it as an agreement he would not have prohibited the imitation of a certain kind of woman again (i.e., slavish ones) in his next speech. Socrates knows Adeimantus distains the laboring underclass and is inclined to agree with him so nothing is expanded upon here.¹²⁹ Socrates takes this easy agreement and uses it to blame the next category of the prohibited: bad men that are cowards.¹³⁰ The men who are bad do "the opposite of what we just now said...".¹³¹ From the following list of blameworthy things this "opposite" is a clear reference to the short list of praiseworthy traits above: courage, piety, moderation, and valuing freedom.¹³² Socrates blames these men by

¹²⁷ For previous reference to Achilles' abuse of Agamemnon see (389e-390a), for his impiety see (391a-b), and for his wailing see (388a-b).

¹²⁸ "That's entirely certain, " he said." (395e). This is a way of saying something akin to, "Sure. Whatever you say" after someone gives an overly long and passive-aggressive speech aimed at you.

¹²⁹ (395e). Women are again a prohibited subject of imitation in this passage.

¹³⁰ (395e).

¹³¹ (395e).

¹³² (395c).

comparing their speech to that of drunkards, even when sober, as abusive and shameful and generally vicious.¹³³

Even worse than these bad men who commit unmentionable injustices against both good and bad men are the madmen (μαινόμενοις, *mainomenois*).¹³⁴ The youths the men care for and desire to properly praise justice to cannot be allowed to imitate bad men or madmen in speech or in deed. Socrates is explicit in his blame of a man that looks similar to the cunning man of the polis who uses the appearances of speech and deed to commit perfect injustice while having the reputation of perfect justice. This eminent man (according to Adeimantus) is stripped of his value and is now blameworthy, now being likened to the bad, the worthless, or the raging lunatic. The distinction between the youths and these shameful men is made clearer when Socrates claims that the virtuous youths will know shameful men and women but will never imitate them.¹³⁵

Still, Socrates does not interpret the response from Adeimantus as an agreement and attempts to separate fine speaking from political power. Using the same method just employed, Socrates begins again by asking Adeimantus a question he knows will result in an agreement, for they concern behaviors an aristocrat with any sense of self-respect would clearly avoid. Being prohibited from the imitation of smiths working their trade and any craftsmen seems obvious from the above agreements.¹³⁶ Yet if we are dealing with an attempt to dispel a disagreement then we should understand that the repetitious nature of the content here signals a dramatic tension. It

¹³³ (395e-396a).

¹³⁴ (396a).

¹³⁵ (396a).

¹³⁶ Minus that which makes the guardians craftsmen of the city's liberty. See the above footnote on why the imitation of even other guardians would not produce fine guardians, and why the agreement here does not violate this occupation-imitation bracketing.

is only when Adeimantus responds with a hearty concession that Socrates then moves on to a case even more extreme than the imitation of the artisan class and the slaves.¹³⁷ This case is extreme because it blames what Socrates has been trying to unsuccessfully blame twice before. The examples are extreme because the risk of rejection is high: the shocking and almost comedic nature ensures or at least increases the chance of agreement.

In this section I have argued that characters which could plausibly be imitated by actors in a play during Greek festivals are really dramatic instances of Socratic blame of a man that has been indirectly praised and subsequently defended by Adeimantus. This last category of blameworthy things is yet another demonstration of the strength of this reading. Socrates informs Adeimantus, in an almost playful manner, that the youths cannot imitate natural phenomena: things like horse and bull noises, crashing rivers and thunder, and the roaring sea are all prohibited.¹³⁸ If all the things above can be attributed to parts an actor could naturally perform in a play this grouping seems to defy that explanation. Are there many or any contemporaneous extant Greek tragedy or comedy parts that had humans play horses or bulls or the sea?

Prohibiting these things would also seem uncontroversial to Adeimantus' sense of honor. Serious men with an eye to public power were not likely to make it a habit of communicating to others in the whinnies or lowing of draft animals or the crashes of thunder. Doing these would result in an unfathomable amount of shame. This is confirmed in Adeimantus' response to this speech, likening the whole idea to madness.¹³⁹ If not for these reasons, why does Socrates list them? Besides the blame of the calculating man, there appears to be a dramatic precedent here

¹³⁷ "How could that be," he said, "since they won't even be permitted to pay attention to any of these things?" (396b). This is qualitatively different than the three curt or mocking affirmations above.

¹³⁸ (396b).

¹³⁹ (396b).

in the rejected speeches on the gods. For instance, the horses and bulls can be seen as a reference to the previously incorrectly used example from the Centauromachy (391c-d).¹⁴⁰ The essence of this association is that the youths are prohibited from imitating non-human beings of superior, beast-like strength. The references to the natural elements are less strained: the river that was previously mentioned was the Scamander, and it is clear who the gods of the sea and thunder are.¹⁴¹ This seems to be saying that these youths, unlike the perfectly unjust man who thinks he is powerful enough to harm everyone without suffering any repercussions and desires to be god-like, may not liken themselves and their power to that of the gods.

The dramatic reading of this passage concerning that which is blameworthy of imitation by the guardians can explain two confusing things about this whole section. It is not clear when these guardians would imitate people and things like slaves, women, smiths, animals, or weather occurrences. It is also not clear how imitating things like the weather or animals would conform with the general principle of imitation's value (395d) and affect one's nature and habits over the course of time. One could see how Adeimantus would agree to the corrupting influence of slavish behavior or womanly activity on these men, but how would imitating thunder or bulls affect their nature? What the nature of a guardian who has been permitted to imitate these things would be upon maturity is hard to say, apart from maybe being a man that is prone to mimicking these noises periodically. My argument proposes a reason why each of these things is prohibited from the guardians. They are used to blame the calculating men with content from previous arguments that Adeimantus has rejected.

¹⁴⁰ (396b). Kentarous, with "tarous", or "bull" coming from this word. "Ken" meaning "piercing". According to the Centauromachy allusion earlier in Book III those who pierced these beings were the ancient heroes Theseus and Perithous.

¹⁴¹ Poseidon and Zeus, the two most powerful Olympians.

The words Adeimantus uses in agreement to this last speech banning the imitation of the mad is emphatic enough to have Socrates end this section and “give” Adeimantus its summation as the last test of unity. Adeimantus says that boys are unable to be or liken themselves to the mad.¹⁴² This section has been directly about imitation, that which people do when likening themselves to something. The additional admission of Adeimantus that they also cannot *be* mad and that this too must be part of their nature and occupational abilities is a large concession to Socrates, particularly with the previous agreement about the definition of madness.¹⁴³ Socrates suggests that if Adeimantus thinks this and that the previous things were blameworthy he (Adeimantus) must be persuaded of the opposite of this Socratic blame. Instead, the “real gentleman” (not the madman who rages on in speech and deed) has a speech mode he employs when saying something close in nature to who he is and another when reporting the actions and speeches of those who are not.¹⁴⁴

Adeimantus rejects this vague statement and rhetorical gifting of the argument through ignorance, asking for Socrates to list these speech modes of the real gentleman for him. This forces Socrates to articulate these two speech modes, which explains some of the repetition in content. It also explains why he expands the number of speaking modes from the two previously mentioned to three and why the guardian youth is transformed from the real gentleman to a commoner.¹⁴⁵ The three new categories of speech modes consist of what the “sensible man” is willing, less willing, and unwilling to imitate. Bloom uses this translation of “sensible man” for

¹⁴² (396b).

¹⁴³ At 396b. It is one that looks like it strongly blames the antics of a perfectly unjust man.

¹⁴⁴ (396b-c). In addition to being neither a bad or mad man, the real gentleman is also not the “guardian”.

¹⁴⁵ The two previous modes in the speech right before this are that mode which the real gentlemen would narrate in and that which is “opposite” of the former.

the phrase (μέτριος ἀνὴρ, *metrios anēr*). Shorey instead uses an awkward locution for it: “A man of the right sort”. “Metrios” means “moderate” and is clearly distinguished from moderation’s “sophrosyne”, a praiseworthy virtue, by taking on the mean connotations like “average”, “common”, and “middling state”.¹⁴⁶ Neither translator captures the dramatic reason for this Socratic title and the jarring change from identifying this same group of men as their opposite of Bloom’s “real gentleman” (taken from *ontē kalos kalgathos*), or Shorey’s “really true and good man” just a handful of words before.¹⁴⁷ I think that it is a form of blame against Adeimantus, by devaluing these youths again and bringing them down to the level of the common artisans that they were previously separated from for the sake of imitation’s proper praise.¹⁴⁸

This sensible man could only willingly imitate the prudent and steady speech and deeds of the good man. The word used for steady are (ἀσφαλῶς, *asphalōs*), meaning firm, immovable, not liable to fall, and the one used for prudence is not *sophia* but (ἐμφρόνως, *emphrōnōs*) meaning rational, intelligence, sensible, or shrewd. Both imply a commonplace substitute for the superior qualities of courage and prudence. The sensible man can rightfully pretend these actions and speeches to be his and “report them as his own”.¹⁴⁹ The dramatic meaning of this exercise indicates that the use of less exalted language in place of the more noble terms regarding the virtues goes along with their Socratic blame. This sensible man will be more unwilling from a sense of shame to imitate this “good man” when he is “unsteadied” by sickness, love, or

¹⁴⁶ See the discussion on the blame of Phoenix’s speech (390e) and *metrion* in Chapter 3.3.

¹⁴⁷ “Kagathos” meaning good, true, noble, brave. A reference to class and one’s pedigree here.

¹⁴⁸ They were agreed on to be “craftsmen” of the city’s liberty, but a successful ending to the argument with Adeimantus required Socrates to partition their occupational status from imitation’s treatment, in which he could allow the fiction that these men were still elites of the polis.

¹⁴⁹ (396c).

drunkenness, or other misfortunes.¹⁵⁰ When the sensible man encounters men that are inferior to him, unlike the good man, he will be completely unwilling to imitate them out of a shame of representing himself as one of them.¹⁵¹

The response of Adeimantus with an “it’s likely” is exactly what the close reader would have expected to Socrates devaluing of the city’s youths as sensible and common. It forces Socrates to retreat to the last agreement made in 396b. He grounds the proper speech model for these youths by referencing the previously rejected models in the section of personal blame and challenging Adeimantus, rhetorically, to call him wrong or incoherent, raising the stakes of a disagreement.¹⁵² This previously rejected model gives Socrates what he initially wanted: to minimize or separate imitation from the guardian class.¹⁵³ The fact that the proper mode of speech (i.e., report w/ little to no imitation) for these youths is in contrast with what is now the commoner’s mode of speech can be explained by the fact that the argument has regressed beyond this change because of the youth’s devaluation by Socrates as a means of blame.¹⁵⁴

The commoner, or the man without any sense of shame, will not stoop to imitating any absurdity. He is incapable of seeing that the identification of himself with the most bizarre and lowly of objects or phenomena is unworthy of a greater man’s dignity. Socrates specifically

¹⁵⁰ This content shares similarities with the blameworthy qualities of the woman and bad man from 395d-e.

¹⁵¹ (396d). Socrates seems to leave open the possibility of this sensible man imitating the inferior man by mocking him by jest, or (*παιδιάς paidias*), meaning child’s play, sport, or game. (396e).

¹⁵² This refers to the narration models in 392-394, i.e., “Homer’s verses”. If these were all agreed upon, as a traditional reading might claim, why is Socrates mentioning them again for the same reason?

¹⁵³ We learn that the model placed forth in the previous speeches on Homer would have a guardian class that employs, “a little bit of imitation in a great deal of speech”. (396e).

¹⁵⁴ Shorey uses the word “debased” instead of Bloom’s “common” for the word (*φαυλότερος, phauloteros*), meaning persons of low or meanness of rank. In the speeches above both modes were combined in one person, now they are separated into two people.

relates that the speaking mode of this kind of man are indicators of a common man.¹⁵⁵ The list Socrates gives does not encompass everything, or even most of what was previously prohibited, but only seems to fit into the last category of things that a madman would undertake to publicly imitate. The only reoccurring item on the two lists is the item of thunder; everything else in the current list is a Socratic addition.

The reasons Socrates appears to fall back upon this category of imitation are that he is hoping to utilize its persuasiveness since it was the cause of a strong agreement with Adeimantus, and to shame him into unity by offering the most embarrassing and caricatured examples of imitation as illustrative of the man who does so indiscriminately.¹⁵⁶ For this man imitation will be readily at hand for all things in all social circumstances. This agreement to essentially limit the guardian speeches to report, or simple narration, is a great victory for the Socratic attempt to successfully blame and silence the madman of the city. To reiterate, if the previous speeches about the sensible man and the true gentleman had been agreements there would be no reason for Socrates to then reference a model in a previous part of the exchange for the same purpose of giving the guardians a speech model.

Adeimantus agrees to this blame of the commoner who crudely imitates everything that suits his fancy.¹⁵⁷ Socrates responds with an insult by telling Adeimantus that the above

¹⁵⁵ (397a). The things just mentioned being an apparent reference to the last category of the prohibited in 396b: like thunder, wind noises, voices of trumpets, hailstorms, axles, instruments, and dog barking and bleating of speech. The reference comes from the phrase, “everything we were just mentioning.” (397a). The fact that Socrates is mentioning these categories as prohibited for imitation for the youth is another dramatic indicator that the first attempt to do as has been rejected. Shorey translates the phrase takes his “everything we were just mentioning” as “including those we just now mentioned”, from *καὶ ἅ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν* (*kai ha nundē elegomen*).

¹⁵⁶ The speech could even be more absurd and overwrought upon a deeper reading since it would be hard to imagine how a man who’s style will include both “speech and looks” will imitate noises in his looks.

¹⁵⁷ (397b).

descriptions of the two speaking modes are what he really meant to say, and receives a short “So they are” in return from his interlocutor.¹⁵⁸ Socrates appears to finish out the musical education of the guardians by getting Adeimantus to pass over giving a complete examination of both the harmonic mode and rhythm that apparently will accompany this simple speaking mode. Naturally the other mode that emphasizes the use of imitation will require all types of harmonic modes and rhythms to complete it.¹⁵⁹ To a reader that is familiar with the following exchange between Glaucon and Socrates this is a puzzling agreement since it indicates Socrates does not want to give a rational account of the supporting parts. It is also confusing because we learn that Glaucon and Socrates eventually agree to two harmonic modes rather than the single one indicated here.¹⁶⁰ If the interruption by Glaucon is interpreted as a rejection of this attempt to pass over a discussion of these to musical elements the confusion is dispelled.¹⁶¹

After finishing the speech mode and content of the youths a reconstruction of the creators and performers of speeches is attempted. These are the poets and actors whom Socrates refers to by the locution “the men who say anything.”¹⁶² This is a startling turn of approach from all the previous efforts consisting of blaming the poets and tale-tellers by reconstructing the conventional gods and heroes to create a model for the guardians. Instead, the speech and musical model of the men guarding the polis will be used to determine what the poets and actors say.

Socrates administers a test to Adeimantus concerning the previous agreement by asking which of these men they will allow into the city: all of them, the mixed, or the unmixed

¹⁵⁸ (397b).

¹⁵⁹ (397c).

¹⁶⁰ “Harmonic mode”, from the word (*ἁρμονίαν*, *harmonian*), the singular, feminine of *ἁρμονία*.

¹⁶¹ This brief glance into the future of the dialogue is not being used to derive any meaning about the present agreement to pass rhythm and harmonic mode over, but to illustrate the problems of a linear reading and the virtues of a dramatic one.

¹⁶² (397c).

(simple).¹⁶³ This can be considered a test because the previous agreement in 395d concerned the imitation habits of the guardian youth, not the actors or poets that are currently being spoken of. The *Republic* famously places them in the feverish city early on even when there is no strong logical connection between the soldiers and imitators. Dramatically speaking the relation is intimate since there is still an outstanding disagreement between the two men about the proper function of the creators and performers of speech within the polis. An agreement between the two men is forged by narrowing the imitative range under the scope of the city's guardians because of the preceding dialectical unity on this theme.¹⁶⁴ If this interpretation is correct Socrates will get agreements on the two major rejections that caused the previous positive discussion on the guardian's speech mode: that on the content and narrative mode of speech creators.¹⁶⁵

Adeimantus responds sarcastically to the question of admitting different types of speakers and creators by remarking: "If my side wins," he said, "it will be the unmixed imitator of the decent."¹⁶⁶ It is understandable that Adeimantus is emotional here since Socrates is using the wording of the previous substantial rejection in 4.2 as a specific way to now create an agreement over the same topic of poetic imitation. We should remember that Adeimantus rejected Socrates' blame by asking whether imitation will be allowed into the polis even though this is specifically not what Socrates commanded him to speak on, and because imitators were already allowed

¹⁶³ (397d).

¹⁶⁴ In other words, an agreement about the proper speech model for the guardians has been obtained before one for the poets, tale-tellers, and actors, so dramatically speaking the latter will be reconstructed according to the former if Socrates is an unwilling participant. This is what happens.

¹⁶⁵ The section of the text covered in 4.2 in 392c-394d.

¹⁶⁶ (397d). Socrates asks if the men will admit the listed different types of poets here. As a reminder, in 394d Adeimantus mocks Socrates' narrative typology by joking if Socrates is fretting over whether to admit imitation into the polis.

in.¹⁶⁷ Now however, Socrates has posed the question about what type of imitators will be admitted to the city using the same language Adeimantus employed in his rejection.¹⁶⁸ The substance of his response also reveals he is aware that he has been outmaneuvered by Socrates, since there is ostensibly no opposing “side” to impede his choice if he and the older man are truly on a cooperative mission to educate the guardians of a city in speech. Finally, an “unmixed imitator of the decent”, the answer Socrates seeks, would be an incredibly rudimentary artist relative to his mixed counterpart. This is essentially to say that almost no poet or actor, conventionally understood, would be allowed.

Encouraged by this large agreement on the praiseworthy type of poet, Socrates gives Adeimantus another chance to take his answer back since the previous conversation has indicated that this is not his true preference. Socrates reminds the younger man that the mixed poet, that man who uses both report and imitation is pleasing. Beyond him, the unmixed imitator of the crude, common, and mad, the most blameworthy poet, is the most pleasing to people with the most shameful, primitive taste in entertainment, like the masses or, for instance, rich boys and their clueless teachers.¹⁶⁹ These poets give justice and its defenders great pains by praising injustice and the most shameful actions and speeches as what is free and best to naïve boys and the caring men in charge of rearing and educating them. Adeimantus agrees that naïve boys and their caretakers heedlessly indulge in these types of poets.¹⁷⁰ At this Socrates is quick to pose the challenge to him that this unmixed imitator of the mad will not “harmonize” with the simplicity of the city’s regime they have agreed upon. In this regime, Socrates claims, the men must abide

¹⁶⁷ (394d).

¹⁶⁸ "I divine," he said, "that you're considering whether we'll admit tragedy and comedy into the city or not." (394d).

¹⁶⁹ (397d).

¹⁷⁰ (397d).

by the specialization principle, meaning there can be no double man that can do two things finely, let alone a man that can do just about everything at this level.¹⁷¹

The response of Adeimantus that this is the case is a further agreement to purge the guardian that has pretensions of speaking finely. This would institutionalize the separation of power and speech that was previously rejected if this is interpreted as an agreement.¹⁷² It is clear Socrates does not interpret it as an agreement to the entire preceding speech, but as an agreement that the poet does not harmonize with the polis. The question of the specialization principle is still left unagreed upon for both a double and manifold man. This explains why Socrates goes on to give examples of certain empirical occupational impossibilities in their city, consisting of the men not being able to couple a common job with a prestigious one. In this list of occupational prohibitions it is asserted that skilled warriors, not called guardians here, are not allowed to be money-makers.¹⁷³ The agreement of Adeimantus to this further restriction gives the reader a picture of a guardianship that looks less like an Athenian elite and more like a Spartan soldier.

The last main speech consists of Socrates purging the manifold man from the city, the man who is capable of imitating all things, since he failed to do so in 397e. If such a man that is able to become and imitate “all things” were to come to the city the men would be forced to expel him since there is now a law that all men must abide by the principle of specialization.¹⁷⁴ The manner of his expulsion is of great dramatic interest. It consists of several actions of great civic honor, of prostration, anointing, and a coronation.¹⁷⁵ The proper course of action for

¹⁷¹ (397d-e).

¹⁷² (397e).

¹⁷³ (397e).

¹⁷⁴ (398a).

¹⁷⁵ (380a). Philosophers, the rulers of the beautiful city, are eventually “coronated” rather than expelled.

handling these types of men, read in the context of Greek hospitality rituals and superstitions, make it clear that Socrates is saying that this would not be a man, but a god. This is to say: there is no man alive that is capable of this power, only a supernatural being would be able to successfully pretend to be all things to all people.

The Greeks thought that unnamed visitors could potentially be gods, which explains the rigor of their hospitality laws and the sacredness with which they treated the traveler. To expel such a being as described by Socrates would be risky and should be done with all the caution that is counseled. To indirectly counsel their expulsion for the sake of successfully creating a city in speech is a testament to how serious Socrates takes his friendship and its dialectic unity with both Adeimantus and the rest of the men. In addition to the issue of piety the manner of his expulsion is a concession to Adeimantus, for it depicts the ousting of his favored poet or performer in terms of high honors and euphemisms as a way to ensure agreement.¹⁷⁶

Instead of accepting such a godlike figure into their city as a poet the men agree to choose a more simple one “who would imitate the style of the decent man and would say what he says in those models that we set down as laws at the beginning, when we undertook to educate the soldiers.”¹⁷⁷ Adeimantus agrees that this will be the course of action with a snide remark that it will be done “if it were up to us.”¹⁷⁸ It is of course up to no one else other than these men. Adeimantus seems to indicate that the “we” Socrates uses in his previous expulsion of the godlike poet did not truly speak for him, that this was *Socrates’s* idea. Socrates cannot help but take the agreement positively since it has quite literally just produced an agreement on all, or at least most, of the speeches from Books II through III on content. Dramatically this unparalleled

¹⁷⁶ Getting expelled becomes “send him to another city”.

¹⁷⁷ (398b).

¹⁷⁸ (398b).

agreement is indicated with Socrates repaying Adeimantus by calling him “friend” and claiming that their speeches about musical education of the guardians has now ended.¹⁷⁹

Adeimantus has agreed to the guardian’s models of speeches (397a-c), that the poets and actor’s speech mode must be made according to these models of the guardians (397c-d), and to the content within the previous speeches (398b). There is nothing left to discuss in a prolonged fashion for musical education in general. Socrates indicates this by voicing his desires to pass over “manner of song” (ὁδῆς τρόπος, *ōdēs tropou*) and melody (μελῶν, *melōn*).¹⁸⁰ The word Bloom uses for melody (μελῶν, *melōn*) and Shorey for “tunes” means “lyrical poetry”. Socrates venturing to pass over lyrical poetry because of the claim that they will be is clear by means of implication from the models of speech mode and content is to say that he wants to pass over what the Greeks would have recognized as “music proper”. He suggests this course probably because the speech portion that he insisted upon adding and treating first was unexpectedly difficult. It should also be noted that both song and lyrical poetry are not the same as harmonic mode or rhythm that were previously passed over and will be treated between Socrates and Glaucon when they finish music.¹⁸¹

Socrates is not so lucky and the spirited Glaucon challenges this assertion that these things are self-evident, coaxing Socrates back to the argument of musically educating the

¹⁷⁹ (398b).

¹⁸⁰ (398c).

¹⁸¹ (403c). Glaucon and Socrates do this without consideration of the manner of song (*ōdēs tropou*), something that is here said by Socrates to be a part of music. Socrates begins his discussion of music with Glaucon in 398d by making melody (μελῶν, *melōn*) a master category of music above speech, harmonic mode, and rhythm, rather than a coequal part of music alongside speech and manner of song it is in 398b. This is done so he does not have to cover song content with Glaucon and instead only focus on the remaining two elements that he had already agreed to pass over with Adeimantus. In short, it is done to shorten the argument, not add another musical category to his labors.

guardians. If we were to count the philosophical education of the philosopher-kings as part of the musical education, this recapture is not something Socrates manages to disentangle himself from for quite some time.¹⁸²

4.5. Conclusion

No commentator I have read argues what I do in this chapter. No one seriously notes, let alone questions, the introduction of *lexis* into the discussion.¹⁸³ All mention of the guardians, directly by name or indirectly by other names like “the young”, vanish here and the poets and mythologists, Homer specifically, become the objects of a harsh Socratic blame. I believe this signals a clear break in the previous argument that focused on the education and rearing of the guardians to address the dramatically important issue of Adeimantus’ intransigence. The attempt to shame Adeimantus is mediated through the blame of Homeric imitation. Socrates is shaming the youth by taunting him before the audience for not having the courage to speak daringly in his own name, but for hiding behind the imitation of invented interlocutors. These men say the most stunning things about justice and injustice and vanish into the ether, never to be heard from again, denying Socrates a chance to directly face his challenger, and therefore greatly prolonging the argumentative burden he must experience. When Adeimantus rejects these speeches, it forces Socrates to return to a deep point in Book II.

The imitation of the guardians and the speech portion of the education is settled by the clever Socratic distinction between what the guardians do and the qualitatively negative function

¹⁸² There is a slight reprieve near the end of Book III to the middle of Book V. But dramatically speaking, it would be several more hours before he is fully clear of this task and moves on to blaming the unjust regimes in Book VIII, let alone being completely free of all argument in Book X.

¹⁸³ The exceptions are Rosen who briefly mentions it in his argument and Bloom in an endnote but not in the pertinent section of his commentary. Neither of them asks why this topic arises.

of imitation. This means that the guardians are assumed to be qualitatively adequate for their position but can only imitate things that reinforce this being and not detract from it. Imitation is therefore not developmentally positive but can be so negatively. The central struggle here is the Socratic attempt to separate political power from persuasive speech, something that Adeimantus wants to reserve for the guardians to exercise for the sake of only appearing just and not having to be so. The result is that the speech laws of the guardians are agreed upon by directly determining how they can speak and what they can say, not indirectly as before in what others may or may not say to them. These laws are then applied to the poets and storytellers of the city who were the original group of people approached by the founders for the moral education of the guardians.

CONCLUSION

The preceding is a demonstration of what I believe to be the proper approach to interpreting the *Republic*.¹ The method itself is a contribution to the literature and constitutes its own species within the dramatic genus. The main weakness in the argument above is that it does not give a systematic principle for the choice of interlocutor response, whether it is reported or performed, only that they can be interpreted as agreements or rejections.² I am convinced that only in a methodological standpoint like this does the text take on a holistic meaning. My dramatic method holds that each present exchange is the product of the previous interaction, which in turn takes on the meaning Socrates gives it as being either an agreement or a various form of rejection (ignorance, overt rejection, not answering the way Socrates wants, etc.). Why is this? Because of the struggle between the men to rhetorically enforce their will on the other. This occurs indirectly after Book I because of all the rhetorical barriers the brothers place between their opinions on the greater value of injustice relative to justice (e.g., spokesman, mythologist, hypothetical interlocutor). Its process is strictly organized because of this desire for eminence, Socratic unwillingness, and the customs of urbanity which mostly prohibit persuasive speech from the direct expression of personal feelings about another speaker.

¹ I have applied this approach to other works of his and have been just as successful. However, the scope of this type of claim could never be proven in a dissertation. It might be reasonable to infer from the part to the whole, and that is the procedure I undertook when exploring other dialogues with this method. Yet this is only an inference and not a textually based argument which I think the structure and content of the *Republic* affords me to show. There are dialogues in which Socrates is a willing participant and speaks much or little, and those in which he is unwilling and refuses to speak.

² Although the reason for when it is completely narrated, like several of Thrasymachus' responses in Book I appears to be Socrates condensing the narrative to save Thrasymachus from the embarrassing extremes of pride and defeat. See 338a, 346c, 350c-d.

The weightier implication of this is that the speeches on justice and injustice in Books II-X are a pretext for the dynamic elements unlaying the mostly tense exchange. It is tense since everyone present knows Socrates does not want to be there but will not let him leave and continually force him to speak. This is not to say that there is nothing of positive philosophical value in the *Republic* expressed verbally. However, whatever we believe to take from it, like teachings about the soul, political order, epistemology, and metaphysics, must all be read within the dramatic function they serve, which is ultimately to gain a hard-fought Socratic freedom. They are conclusions that are based on agreements for an end. It is hard-fought because Socrates can always admit that the blame of injustice by the sons of Ariston is too powerful to overcome through argument, which is what he does several times near the beginning of Book II, and then concede their point, fall silent, and then do what he wants to do and leave. Most of the *Republic* happens because neither side, the brothers (and possibly many of the auditors) and Socrates refuse to let Socrates' ironic cry of *aporia* at the end of Book I be the last word. Glaucon rightly interprets this as gloating and turns it into a challenge. Likewise, Socrates correctly interprets both speeches at the beginning of Book II as rejections of his speeches in Book I and as new challenges expressing a relational disunity among the group.

Where does Plato get this? I believe he receives this literary method organized by dramatic concerns about the relative deficiency or superiority in honor and glory from Homer. Homer depicts both the gods and most of the heroes as incorrigible lovers of honor. So much so, as I have attempted to show in my discussion and footnote commentary on the heroic passages from Homer above in 3.3 and 4.1, his text is generated by a similar dynamic. Since a discussion on Plato's relation to Homer would be its own book, I will give only a few further examples of

what I mean and hope that my commentaries on Homer in the argument above will have illuminated it.

The ending scene in the *Iliad* between Achilles and his suppliant Priam is determined by a strict adherence of someone emerging victorious. Achilles demands Priam stop weeping and offers to seat him, to which Priam refuses and demands his son's body. Achilles must resort to threat of force and impiety to silence the old man and "win". He then hands his son back to him and forces Priam to eat a meal that he specifically prepares for him, now placing him in his debt. Priam then requests to rest before he returns, an attempt to take up space in Achilles' quarters, but Achilles slyly banishes him to the porch under the pretext of the possible intrusion of military messengers. Knowingly defeated, Priam gets a concession from Achilles to not attack Troy until they have properly mourned Hector.³

There is a consistent refusal of the heroes in Homer's works to announce their own names because it was seen as disgraceful. Instead, they had heralds or companion perform this task. The three most absurd examples of this behavior are Odysseus' refusal to answer who is he when asked by Alcinous, making his hosts resort to calling him stranger. When Odysseus is finally forced to name himself, he does so in the classic way: through the longest monologue in Homer full of self-praise of his heroic exploits, a way of compensating for the dishonor of acting as his own herald and repaying his host for insisting upon his name.⁴ The other two occur when meeting with Penelope and Laertes for the first time in twenty years. Even after this largely self-imposed absence he is still unable to simply introduce himself as Odysseus and presents himself

³ *Iliad*, 24. 560-790. This mourning period is very long, eleven days. Enough time for a besieged city and its army to rest and conceivably refortify itself.

⁴ Homer, *Odyssey*, 9. 12-32.

as a stranger to his wife and through a hypothetical interlocutor to his father.⁵ Without reference to honor and glory I believe these speeches and behaviors do not really make sense.

What I believe Homer is trying to say about this heroic perspective is to offer us a critique of the state and its mass centralization of resources, including its awesome ability to mobilize manpower: warrior after warrior is introduced and killed off by a hero, all because of a bride capture. But why should they? Bride captures are meaningless apart from a human interpretation. Living in an agonizing middle with the body of an animal and the consciousness of a god a man might interpret the capture of his bride as a stain on his honor, worthy of a ten-year war that mobilizes an entire people and the cost of countless lives. Homer portrays the deepening and therefore fragmentation of our new god-like consciousness as a tragic development, one that results in the most absurd scenarios to our natural sensibilities: of gods using humans instrumentally for their own honor, of demigods defying and fighting the gods, giving up the chance of immortality, and staying away from home for twenty years because of an intense love of honor and relative value that a developed consciousness produces. When coupled with the machinery of the state it results in a type of madness that leads to the most unbelievable social outcomes and the deepest kind of unhappiness. Homer seems to be saying that the greatest among us (i.e., the heroes) are prisoners of their own consciousness, and with the advent of the state and its mobilization power (i.e., the *net* of war), we too through them.

We see that not all heroes are this spiritually evolved yet. The loyal and simple giant Ajax complains about Achilles' rejection of Agamemnon's "gifts" (something he could not directly offer Achilles but sent his leading lieutenants, kings in their own right, as emissaries to do) because "any man will accept the blood-price paid for a brother murdered, a child done to

⁵ Homer, *Odyssey*, 19. 113-142 and 24. 283-312 respectively.

death”, but that “You – the gods have planted a cruel, relentless fury in your chest! All for a girl.”⁶ The “undeveloped” man here asks how Achilles be so mad about his new war bride Briseis when other people’s anger at greater wrongs can be assuaged by much lesser offerings? The answer is, of course, that Achilles does not rage about Briseis, but about his honor. Since he is portrayed as one of the most mentally developed heroes, his experiences of disequilibrium are sharper and demand more to “recompensate”. Ultimately Zeus outmaneuvers him since he is a god that actually has the power to match his mind.

Where Plato differs from Homer is that this spiritual development and its implications concerning honor are still depicted as absurd, but in more of a comedic way. Characters like Thrasymachus rightfully exclaim these men are acting “like fools making way for one another”.⁷ In a more domestic context those who desire to win glory must make passive-aggressive speeches and pretend to be friendly while concealing their rivalry or dislike of the other person, even if everyone knows that it exists. Plato’s commentary on this context in which honor-seeking plays out is more of a lampooning of its absurdity, because of its pettiness, especially of the protagonist. To grasp this Homeric structure that Plato repurposes is to hear his voice. We have seen in the literature review and in the argument that Plato’s enigmatic writings allow him to function as a mirror of philosophers: they see in him what is desired, self or foe. This has been a wildly effective mask. Beyond the broken glass of words and frame of dramatic action stands someone who is more than a foe or a self.

⁶ *Odyssey*, 9.772-773, 9. 778-779. Achilles answers him knowingly, like a parent to a confused child. Very young children are shameless. The relational complexities of adults are bewildering to them. The language and brief length of his reply to Ajax differs considerably from his responses to Phoenix and Odysseus.

⁷ (336c). I take this to mean something like two people making displays of being overly agreeable with each other in manner and speech while simultaneously attempting to assert or demonstrate their relative superiority before everyone.

Plato has Socrates recite that he traveled to the Piraeus with Glaucon son of Ariston “to pray to the goddess”.⁸ The assumption here is that Socrates is referring to Bendis, the new Thracian goddess that was recently made part of the Athenian pantheon, something that had only ever happened once before.⁹ “The goddess” is rendered from (τῇ θεῷ, *tē theō*), the article being feminine but the noun masculine. Shorey notes this is likely “Bendis (354 A), though, as the scholiast observes, Athena is *hē theos* for an Athenian.”¹⁰ It is said in Homer that Athena the goddess guardian of Odysseus lavished marvelous splendor and strength upon him at the harbor to defeat the challenges of the Phaeacians and then in the form of a swallow struck terror in the hearts of the suitors so Odysseus could right their outrages.¹¹ Whether Socrates was able to satisfy the *theō* with his speeches is for the dedicated reader to decide. It should, however, clarify to that reader as to why Socrates was so eager to recount an episode of this length the next day.

⁸ (327a).

⁹ Pappas, 20.

¹⁰ Shorey, *Republic*, 3.

¹¹ Homer, *Odyssey*, 8.20-26, 22.250, 22.311-313.

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