The South and American Foreign Policy, 1894-1904: Regional Concerns During the Age of Imperialism.

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THE SOUTH AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1894-1904:
REGIONAL CONCERNS DURING THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of History

by

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B.A., Baylor University, 1986
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1989
December 1995
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ABSTRACT

After the depression of 1893, some New South prophets advocated a more assertive, foreign policy as a means to attain regional economic uplift. With the objective of obtaining overseas markets, some of the prophets even supported the use of force to create American colonies as an appropriate goal of American foreign policy. The acquisition of new territories, and hence, new markets, the prophets maintained, would be an economic boon to southern producers of cotton, textiles, and other goods. And the economic stimulus accompanying an increase in foreign trade would lift the region out of poverty, promote the growth of southern port cities, and provide additional capital for the modernization of the South.

Most southerners, however, did not share this optimistic vision in the potential of overseas expansion to cure many of the South's most serious problems. Instead, an aggressive, assertive foreign policy produced more fear and anxiety than hope. From their own historic experience with African slavery, Civil War, defeat, humiliation, and Reconstruction, most southerners found it difficult to fully embrace the imperialist vision. Southern white racism, the fear of expanded federal power (especially the creation of a large military and bureaucracy to administer colonies), opposition to increased taxes to support overseas expansion, and suspicion of Republican motives, all contributed to produce widespread opposition to the nation's expansionist policies.

While most in the region supported McKinley's declaration of war against Spain in 1898 as a means to prove the South's loyalty to the Union and liberate Cuba from harsh Spanish rule, the experience of war did little to allay southern suspicions and fears.
McKinley's handling of the war, the paucity of opportunities for southern soldiers and firms, and the degeneration of the war to liberate Cuba into one to conquer the Philippines, proved disappointing to the South. Consequently, traditional attitudes were reasserted and blended with the New South desire for trade to produce a southern foreign policy consensus that rejected the use of force in favor of neocolonialism.
INTRODUCTION

To the confident promoters of a New South built upon industrialization and economic diversification, the expansionist foreign policy pursued by the national government in Washington during the 1890’s presented an opportunity for the material advancement of their region. Overseas expansion and the acquisition of foreign markets, New South advocates predicted, would produce incalculable benefits. The new capital attracted by foreign commerce would alleviate the crushing poverty faced by millions of rural southerners and fuel the growth of southern cities and businesses. The foreign trade that would follow the acquisition of new territories overseas would produce special benefits for the South’s port cities. And, with the completion of an isthmian canal, cities such as New Orleans, Galveston, Mobile, and Pensacola, would become the new commercial centers of the nation. Armed with this glowing vision for the future of the South in an age of American colonialism, the New South prophets eagerly sought to convince their southern brethren to support a more aggressive and expansive foreign policy. Yet after a decade of public agitation, not only had the prophets failed to win many converts to territorial expansion, but the content and context of their own message had been significantly altered by the forces of southern culture and the region’s collective memory. Beginning with territorial designs in Hawaii, through the war with Spain and the Philippine insurrection, the southern public displayed remarkable underlying continuity in their foreign policy beliefs. Southern white racism, resentment over the expansion of federal power, and the fear of a large, permanent military establishment, prevented most southerners from fully embracing the vision of the New South prophets. Instead, by 1904,
as the nation prepared to begin construction of an isthmian canal, a southern foreign policy consensus had emerged that reflected both the fears of southern traditionalists and the modernizing influences of the New South advocates. This consensus rejected the use of force and the physical acquisition of overseas possessions in favor of a foreign policy approach that relied on trade to force open markets. The southern consensus, then, evolving for the better part of a decade, appeared consistent with the new national policy that reflected national frustration with the federal government’s handling of possessions acquired from Spain at the end of the Spanish-American War. Given their unique historical perspective, many southerners arrived at this neo-colonial solution before their northern counterparts, and, in retrospect, their warnings regarding the pitfalls of imperialism appear somewhat prophetic.

Historians have examined virtually every facet of American foreign policy during this period in an attempt to understand the motives of American policymakers. Why would America’s leaders abandon the nation’s historic policy of isolation and become entangled in foreign affairs and foreign wars? In one of the most important of these discussions on American foreign policy, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, William A. Williams asserted that economic considerations determined the course of American policy. More specifically, American business interests pressured the government to use its power to open new markets for American goods and to protect them once acquired. Whether by diplomacy or by the use of force, the tools of American foreign policy were wielded in behalf of the nation’s largest economic interests. Williams’ paradigm found even more forceful expression in the works of his students and followers, such as Walter LaFeber and
John Dobson. For the better part of a half-century, the economic roots of American foreign policy have dominated the field of American diplomacy.¹

Not all historians of the period, however, agree that economics determined the course of American policy. A growing number of scholars, including Julius W. Pratt, Michael Hunt, and Robert Dallek, have argued that American expansion was as much a product of social and cultural factors as it was a desire for overseas markets. According to these historians, feelings of Anglo-American superiority, the American sense of mission and noblesse oblige, and intense nationalism contributed to overwhelming support for a more expansionist policy in the 1890’s. Gerald Linderman, in one of the most effective studies of this genre, The Mirror of War, concluded that America’s flirtation with imperialism reflected popularly held attitudes and beliefs and the need to assert American power. American foreign policy, he concluded, resulted from a complex mix of economic, social and political factors. That America’s aggressive, expansionist policy was widely supported by the public, Linderman argued, largely reflected the degree to which popular literature—from magazines and newspapers to school textbooks—had convinced the population of Anglo-Saxon superiority, the inferiority of foreign people, and the humanitarian mission of the United States to improve the lives of others. Significant in emphasizing the importance of public pressure in shaping American foreign policy, Linderman’s “mirrors” both reflected and shaped the way Americans viewed the world.²

Despite the extensive literature dealing with American foreign policy in the 1890’s, the role of the South has received scant attention. Since the South still lacked political and economic power relative to other sections, and few southerners were among the
foreign policy elite, the value of a study of southern foreign policy attitudes is not readily apparent. Consequently, existing foreign policy surveys often dismiss the South, or make generalizations about the region based on certain economic and social characteristics. Yet a systematic study of the South's response to American expansion is critical for those scholars interested in the impact of culture and historical experience in the formation of foreign policy beliefs. Clearly, as this study suggests, southerners weighed a variety of social, cultural, and economic factors in shaping their world view; in the absence of any direct knowledge of foreign affairs, it is not surprising that many in the region relied on more familiar themes of culture and history for understanding.

The purpose of my study is two-fold. First, I hope to more fully explain the sources of the South's foreign policy perspective during the period. Like many other historians, I have attempted to uncover the economic as well as the socio-cultural origins of the region's attitudes. More important, I hope to provide the reader with a greater awareness of how the South's unique history shaped the foreign policy beliefs of its people. In a provocative essay in his classic study, The Burden of Southern History, C. Vann Woodward described the South as the only region that experienced war, defeat, humiliation, and subjugation and, therefore, southerners could be expected to have a better understanding of the ramifications of American imperialism on both the United States and native people living in overseas colonies. Others have questioned the lingering effect of the southern experience in shaping a distinctly regional world view. Gaines Foster, in Ghosts of the Confederacy, asserted that southerners no longer carried the burden of the Civil War and enthusiastically supported the Spanish-American War to provide further
testimony of their commitment to the nation. But my conclusions do much to confirm Woodward’s suspicions; the South, did, indeed, show greater reluctance to fully embrace the imperial policy advocated by the jingoes. And, their opposition to colonies, and the dire predictions made by southerners on the impact of imperial wars of conquest, came long before similar calls from the North gained national attention. In short, the South’s world view, shaped by a multiplicity of factors, including its own unique history that included experiences with slavery, war, and defeat, made it a far better predictor of the problems associated with American imperialism than is generally acknowledged.3

Second, I hope to provide a comprehensive and systematic examination of southern foreign policy attitudes and, thus, fill a gap in the existing literature. Robert May, in The Southern Dream of Caribbean Empire, and Alfred Hero, in The Southerner and World Affairs, have provided excellent overviews of the South’s foreign policy views for the periods before the Civil War and after World War I, respectively. Yet no studies have been made of the region’s beliefs during the crucial decade between 1894 and 1904 when America embarked on its policy of global expansion. Numerous biographies of southerners interested in foreign affairs, including Joseph Fry’s recent study of Senator John T. Morgan, provide the views of a few exceptional individuals and may leave the false impression that most southerners supported an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy. Similarly, Tennant McWilliams, in The New South Faces the World, examined the beliefs of a handful of southern leaders interested in foreign affairs in the century after the Civil War and proclaimed the importance of the New South ethic in southern foreign policy thinking in the 1890’s. Both of these historians have provided valuable insight into
the minds of the New South prophets who advocated an expansionist foreign policy, but they fail to address the level of support for such policies across the region. Other historians, notably Willard Gatewood, Christopher Lasch, and Robert Beisner, have correctly pointed out the importance of racism in the formation of foreign policy attitudes. While perhaps the most important issue to many white southerners, racist attitudes toward non-white people fails to fully explain the depth and complexity of the region's foreign policy beliefs. Studying this period in detail and acknowledging the importance of a wide range of factors, I believe, can provide important insight into regional attitudes toward imperialism and provide a better understanding of the extent to which the South’s historic experience with slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction still shaped southerners’ world view.4

My study, then, seeks to define, categorize, and analyze the sources of the South’s foreign policy attitudes from 1894 to 1904. This is not a study of public opinion in the contemporary sense. In the absence of hard, quantitative data, such a study is impossible. Since modern public opinion polling did not begin until the 1930’s, the historian of past public attitudes is left to rely on more impressionistic evidence and forced to employ less precise terms as “many,” “some,” and “most.” Furthermore, the scarcity of relevant primary material dealing with the foreign policy attitudes of women and African-Americans in the South makes the task of drawing meaningful conclusions about these groups even more difficult. Nonetheless, by examining the regional press, private manuscript collections, congressional voting behavior, periodicals from the period, memorials and resolutions, and other primary materials, I believe that one can reconstruct the boundaries of public discourse and draw valid conclusions about popular sentiment.
Certainly, my approach is not unique; Louis Galambos employed a similar technique in his study of the image of big business in the public mind. And political scientists Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, in an examination of the functional nature of heuristics in the process of forming foreign policy attitudes, concluded that most people organize abstract ideas, such as foreign policy issues, within a schema of pre-existing knowledge. For the southerners under review in this study, those cognitive frameworks include the familiar experiences of slavery, war, defeat, and humiliation at the hands of a perceived foreign power. By examining the South's world view, this study provides a better understanding of the way southerners viewed themselves, their nation, and, to some small degree, their future.⁵
CHAPTER 1
A FOREIGN POLICY OF HOPE:
THE SOUTH AND ECONOMIC UPLIFT

If you wish to interest the people of the South to-day, talk to them of the resources and development of their section. Once they enjoyed more the eloquent words of the political orator, but now the plain business presentation of questions connected with material growth finds the most attentive listeners.

---Hoke Smith, 1894

... what we want is more industries, more varied production, more ways of earning a living, more small farmers, more capital. Our great need is to utilize our wealth... With Morgan leading on the Nicaraguan canal and Walsh all on fire with earnestness and enthusiasm for the material development of the South, we are going to get some great benefits out of the United States Senate.

---Birmingham Age-Herald, 1894
Between the end of the Civil War and the 1890's, southerners expressed very little interest in the foreign affairs of the nation. In the absence of any serious international crises, and with only a handful of businessmen and politicians emphasizing greater diplomatic activity, foreign affairs failed to stir the imagination of the southern masses during the Gilded Age. But they were not unique in their disinterest; most Americans cared little about events abroad. Even the instruments of American diplomacy during this period remained crude, unsystematic, and unfocused, reflecting the general lack of interest in international relations in the nation as a whole.3

With overwhelming domestic concerns in the 1870's and 1880's, southerners may have exhibited even less enthusiasm for foreign involvement than most Americans. After the Civil War, most southerners faced the more mundane concerns associated with everyday life. Millions of families eked out meager livings on the land. The second coming of the cotton kingdom in the 1870's proved to be an added curse to those committed to producing a staple crop that's average price plummeted far faster than the cost of most of the commodities they consumed. As a result, more and more southerners proved unable to meet their financial obligations to creditors; many lost even the marginal independence of owning their own land and fell into sharecropping and farm tenancy. The towns of the South offered little refuge for those seeking to escape the desperate poverty of the rural South. During the period, thousands trekked to the region's squalid towns looking for the few available jobs in commerce or industry. But rarely did they find new opportunities. Most town dwellers also suffered from chronic unemployment and low wages. Thus, though circumstances differed from locale to locale, the common
experience for millions of southerners became indebtedness, crushing poverty, poor living standards, and a growing sense of despair.

Regional political developments, too, deflected southern attention from foreign affairs. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the politics of the South focused on the white majority's efforts to achieve social control over the freedmen. With millions of free blacks in their midst, white southerners after Reconstruction resorted to a host of devices, legal and extralegal, to place African-Americans back into a position of inferiority and servitude. The ruling whites in the South, commonly called Bourbons, consistently raised the spectre of black domination and resorted to violence and fraud to beat back political challenges from groups bent on altering the existing order in the South. Given the region's preoccupation with these immediate problems it is not surprising that most southerners remained largely uninterested in foreign affairs during the 1870's and 1880's.

Although mass disinterest in foreign affairs characterized the period, a handful of southerners worked during the Gilded Age to foster interest in foreign affairs and, thereby, prepared the way for international activism in the 1890's. Since shortly after the end of the Civil War, proponents of a "New South" articulated programs for the social regeneration of the region, reconciliation with the North, and economic uplift through a variety of schemes---most often, by developing the South's natural resources and attracting industrial development with the aid of northern capital. In addition, these New South prophets focused new attention on the benefits of southern urbanization as potential mass markets for burgeoning regional industries. In the 1870's and 1880's, these proponents of change in the South---most of them young, progressive editors, businessmen, and
educators—concentrated on rebuilding and reshaping the Southern economy to compete and prosper within the domestic sphere. Nonetheless, their activities created a new public awareness of the importance of markets that ultimately led to greater public interest in America's foreign policy.⁵

One part of the New South boosterism of the 1880's and 1890's, the cotton mill campaign, emphasized the importance of foreign affairs to the economic health of the South. Spokesmen for the program recognized that the South lost millions of dollars annually by selling only raw cotton to middlemen and textile agents in Liverpool and New York. As a result, they stressed the need for southerners to manufacture raw cotton near the source and to market their finished products, thus, eliminating onerous middle traders. Historian Patrick Hearden, in Independence and Empire, noted that support for the cotton mill campaign in the South cut across occupational lines; farmers and entrepreneurs alike stood to gain by eliminating European and Yankee factors. The explosion of cotton mills across the South suggested a significant commitment to the plan. In fact, the South experienced a 700% increase in mills in the 1890's, which placed it ahead of New England in the number of spindles in use. Not surprisingly, the success of the cotton mill campaign and the enormous increase in textile production that followed caused southerners to look more favorably upon programs designed to provide greater entry of their goods, especially manufactured cotton goods, into foreign markets.⁶

In the aftermath of the economic collapse of 1893, many southerners longed for solutions to the region's economic malaise and thought they might find one in the vision of the New South prophets. Many southern political figures embraced the message of
economic rejuvenation and accentuated the need for the South to search for foreign markets. More comfortable with the South's place in the Union, more assertive in the halls of Congress, more confident of the South and its resources—the prophets genuinely believed that their region's lot could be made better if the federal government would pursue a foreign policy designed to provide economic opportunities for the South. Important regional spokesmen—Hannis Taylor, Hilary Herbert, John Gordon, and John Morgan, to name but a few—offered southerners a future of economic uplift built upon the expansion of international trade. All of these men championed a common southern approach to foreign affairs in the 1890's. To be sure, many small farmers in the South turned to agrarian radicalism for hope and inspiration; many others probably remained focused exclusively on the problems of making a living on their own plot of earth. But for millions of other southerners in towns and on farms crippled by economic depression and hard times the hope that serious domestic ills could be remedied by pursuing an active foreign policy aimed exclusively at gaining access to international markets was particularly compelling.  

* * *  

The depression of 1893 struck farmers and agricultural workers in the South far harder than people in other parts of the country. Prices for the region's chief staple crop, cotton, edged downward beginning in 1890, and then plunged precipitously during the depression. Prices for the region's other leading staples suffered as well. (See Table I)
TABLE I

Prices of Selected Southern Commodities, 1890-1894
(average price per pound, in dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1892</th>
<th>1893</th>
<th>1894</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>raw cotton</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sugar</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tobacco</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
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(Table derived from Historical Statistics of the United States, pp. 207-209, 518)

While southern agricultural prices lost nearly a third of their value during the period, the overall cost of living dropped only slightly. Therefore, the impact of the panic on the southern economy was widespread and dramatic; it caused people across the region to search for economic palliatives in many different areas.

Like their contemporaries in the rest of the nation, many people in the South recognized the importance of foreign trade to the domestic economy. Not only did foreign markets supply America with raw materials and luxuries unavailable in the home market, they provided an outlet for surplus American goods that otherwise would remain in the domestic market to further deflate prices during a period of chronic deflation. This relationship between markets and deflation of agricultural prices received considerable attention among southern farmers—who witnessed calamitous declines in the prices of the region's chief crops after 1893.8

During this crisis, southerners expected sympathy and aid from the rest of the nation, as well as material relief and action from the federal government, controlled by Democrats for the first time since 1860. Indeed, many southerners occupied important
positions in Washington during the Cleveland Administration. Hilary Herbert, of Alabama, and Hoke Smith, of Georgia, served in the president's cabinet. Isham Harris, of Tennessee, became President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and Charles Crisp, of Georgia, became Speaker of the House. The return of southerners to positions of leadership in Washington raised the hopes of those in the South who desired to see government take concrete steps to improve their condition. Senator John Morgan, in a speech before a gathering of farmers near Opelika, Alabama, suggested that it had been too long, "since we got under the government what we deserved." Morgan concluded by urging his people to forcefully articulate their concerns and make their interests clear to their elected representatives.9

In 1894, consideration of the tariff question did, indeed, provoke considerable comment among southerners. By the 1890's, many southerners perceived a correlation between customs and overall regional economic vitality. In other words, high tariffs protected Northern industry, increased the prices southerners paid for many manufactured goods, and discouraged the opening of overseas markets for southern exports. Because of the grave condition of the southern economy after 1893, and the South's reliance on exporting agricultural goods for desperately needed capital, most southerners hoped that Democratic electoral victories would lead to significant tariff reductions.

When the battle over tariff reform reached Congress in 1894, a protectionist minority emerged from the South in opposition to free trade. The most vociferous opponents of the Wilson Tariff bill and its provisions to place sugar on the free list came, not surprisingly, from the sugar producing regions of Louisiana. In a letter to

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Congressman Marion Butler, J. H. Stauffen, Jr., of New Orleans, chairman of the Sugar Industry of Louisiana, relayed his organization's members disbelief that Congress would "willingly, or knowingly, consent to strike down and destroy an industry of such magnitude and of such growing importance to the entire country." Furthermore, he expressed his fear that such changes in the tariff schedule would bring "ruin and disaster, to both our City and State." Hundreds of sugar planters and manufacturers, assembled in mass meetings, passed similar resolutions expressing their disapproval of the Wilson bill as disastrous for their industry. In fact, anger at Congress over the tariff left many in South Louisiana despondent over the actions of the Democratic party. An Iberville Parish planter suggested that "sugar being put on the free list has depressed our people, and everything is confusion." Indeed, popular animosity ran so deep in some parts of Louisiana that many involved in the sugar industry "bolted" the Democratic party in favor of the G.O.P. and protection in 1894.10

Louisiana congressmen who voted to protect sugar during the tariff debate received sharp criticism from across the South. Consequently, southern protectionists found themselves on the defensive; they had to justify their actions as consistent with Democratic principles and as a pragmatic expression of economic survival. The chief journal of Louisiana sugar production condemned the leaders of the Democratic party for supporting free sugar and the Republican principle of protectionism. A Baton Rouge newspaper praised its congressman for voting against a tariff measure that "would unquestionably do violence to the industry." The "Wilson bill, in so far as sugar was concerned was undemocratic, and . . . our representatives were right in opposing it."11
Despite the efforts of South Louisiana protectionists, most opponents of the Wilson bill were not ready to abandon the principle of free trade and open markets. On the contrary, their opposition stemmed from a perception that the seriously flawed Wilson bill would do great injury to their vital economic interests. A. K. Miller, president of the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce, expressed the dual commitment of businessmen in that area to the protection of the region's chief industry and to the important concept of free trade. Speaking before the Chamber, Miller proclaimed,

A great commercial city like New Orleans is interested in having trade as free as possible, and as little trammelled by tariff taxes and regulations; and the mercantile classes would naturally favor any legislation having these objects in view. They expected and desired an intelligent tariff measure; one that would provide the government with sufficient means to pay its debts, and that would stimulate foreign trade, but would do this without injury to our home manufactures . . . . The Wilson bill has not fulfilled these conditions.12

Unlike the sugar protectionists of South Louisiana, the vast majority of southerners remained steadfast in their commitment to the principle of free trade. The protectionist duties of the McKinley Tariff of 1890 had been soundly denounced across the region for placing undue burdens on consumers and for aggravating the business depression and industrial stagnation of 1893-4. Not surprisingly, the debates over tariff reform sharpened intense partisan and sectional animosities; southerners were quick to place the blame on northern capitalists and the Republican party. One Arkansas paper indicted the G.O.P. for the "political crime . . . of preventing tariff reform." A leading Texas daily also condemned Republicans and trusts for violating the "rules of special privileges to none and equal protection of the laws." Furthermore, some editors placed the current tariff debate in a broader historical perspective; they blamed the Republicans
for decades of hardship and economic subordination. With Democrats in power for the first time since the Civil War, these southerners hoped, their native region would become "the favored section of this great country." From across the South, cries for tariff reform reflected the popular mood against protection.13

The Wilson bill, passed by Congress in August of 1894 as the Wilson-Gorman Tariff, placed some important items such as lumber, wool and copper on the duty free list. In addition, it lowered average duties approximately ten percent to 39.9%. Even though Wilson-Gorman was not all they wanted, most southerners accepted it as a major improvement over the McKinley Tariff and a substantial retreat from protection. This modest political and economic victory served to create a hopeful mood that more open markets could solve a host of the region's ills. A Texas congressman, Roger Q. Mills, "voiced the sentiments of the great body of democrats" who urged the passage of a reform bill to alleviate economic distress. After tariff reform was accomplished, Mills maintained, then "night will disappear, darkness and distress will leave the land, prosperity will come to our borders, . . . and the country will once more resume its career of prosperity."14

The South's perspective during the tariff debate of 1894 was hardly unique. Since the founding of the republic, the South generally favored lower tariffs and tended toward free trade. As the nation's supplier of raw materials and staple agricultural products, and a net importer of manufactured goods, the South had little to gain from tariffs designed to protect nascent industries. By the mid-nineteenth century, many southerners felt victimized by protective tariffs that increased the cost they paid for manufactured goods in order to benefit northern industry. Like their antebellum counterparts, southerners after

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the Civil War continued to view protective tariffs as a malignancy of American democracy that had fostered the creation of the great trusts—corporations that pillaged the consumer, fixed prices and victimized working people everywhere. Buoyed by Democratic victories in 1892, the South looked hopefully to substantial reductions in the tariff in the 1890's. Not surprisingly, southerners were virtually unanimous in support of tariff reform during the heated debates over the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894.

* * *

During the 1890's, southerners who hoped to attain economic uplift through a more activist foreign policy focused attention on an historic aim of American diplomacy—the construction of an isthmian canal. American interest in such a project antedated the Civil War. Discussions of a canal to link the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans had begun in earnest during the late 1840's and 1850's. Proponents saw it as a way to speed transportation between the east coast of the United States and the territories acquired after the Mexican War. The discovery of gold in California in 1848 and the ensuing migration of thousands of Americans to California created a new sense of urgency to build a canal. Americans traveling from New York to San Francisco over the Rocky Mountains faced innumerable difficulties; consequently, many sought alternate routes by sea. Some made the expensive, 13,000 mile trip around Cape Horn; others sailed to the Atlantic Coast of Panama or Nicaragua and traveled the short distance overland to the Pacific Coast where they continued their voyage by sea. Because of its proximity to American ports, more healthful conditions, and shorter overland passage, Nicaragua, by the early 1850's, became
the preferred means of traversing the isthmus and, therefore, emerged as the preferred route for an American-built canal.

Despite the growing demand for an American canal in Nicaragua in the 1850's, several factors worked to forestall its construction. America had obtained rights in the region that employed the mouth of the San Juan River as the Atlantic end of a canal. However, in 1848, Great Britain extended its authority all along the Mosquito Coast—including the area known as San Juan del Norte. Anglo-American tensions rose as Great Britain acquired territory in western Nicaragua that had been coveted by the United States. Americans became deeply suspicious of British motives in the area and feared that England might build its own canal. Furthermore, some Americans clamored for war against Great Britain because it had violated the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1850, amidst growing diplomatic tension, the United States and Great Britain agreed in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty not to obtain or exercise exclusive control of an isthmian canal. Although some Americans chafed at its provisions, the treaty diffused the immediate crisis and prevented England from ever developing a canal in the region.

After the Anglo-American imbroglio subsided, American capitalists seized the opportunity to develop alternate routes across the isthmus. Cornelius Vanderbilt, the shipping magnate, developed the Pacific Mail Steamship Company to bring a steady flow of Americans to the Nicaragua's eastern coast by 1853. Combined with his Accessory Transit Railroad Company, Vanderbilt made it possible to traverse the isthmus quickly and with only minimal discomfort. Indeed, during the boom times of the early 1850's, nearly 2,000 people a month traveled across the Vanderbilt line. Given the success of
Vanderbilt, and the restrictions imposed by Clayton-Bulwer, the debate over a Nicaraguan canal lost much of its urgency by 1860.\textsuperscript{15}

But during that decade, the South, more than any other region, maintained an especially keen interest in developments in Nicaragua. Southerners' concerns, however, reflected largely sectional, partisan considerations and had little to do with a nationalist desire to construct an American-owned isthmian canal. The acquisition of territories after the Mexican War had not given the South opportunities to expand the institution of slavery westward and, in so doing, destroyed the southern balance of power with free states in the Senate. The resulting fear of permanent political inferiority led many southerners to cast their eyes toward Latin America, where new, economically viable slave states might be carved out of the semi-tropical environment.

No individual symbolized the expansive mood of the antebellum South as well as William Walker of Tennessee did. With a handful of men, Walker emerged victorious from a civil skirmish in Nicaragua and proclaimed himself president of the Central American republic in 1855. As president, Walker sought American recognition and aid. In order to shore up his support, he reinstituted slavery and won almost universal praise from the South. When Walker returned to the United States after his ouster in 1857, he received a warm and enthusiastic welcome from southerners who drew inspiration from the success of the filibustering activity in Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{16}

Where antebellum southern interest in Central America, especially Nicaragua, focused on a sectional desire to bring additional territory under the political and economic influence of the slaveholding South, regional interest in Nicaragua in the 1890's reflected
the nationalist goal of building an isthmian canal under American control for commercial and strategic reasons. More importantly, southerners hoped that a transisthmian canal would open up new markets for southern goods in Latin America and Asia. In the absence of slavery and with a growing interest in developing international commerce as a means of attaining economic uplift, many southerners again turned to Nicaragua in the 1890's as an attractive location for such a canal.

The sense of urgency that surrounded the debate over an isthmian canal in 1894-95 reflected the fear that failure to develop a project immediately would provide Great Britain with an opportunity to exploit its position in Latin America and acquire access for its own transisthmian route. Although the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 remained in effect, Americans still bristled at its provisions. Furthermore, the landing of Royal Marines at Corinto, Nicaragua, in 1894, and British demands for an indemnity from the Nicaraguan government in 1895, provoked anxiety over British intentions in the region. Indeed, many Americans jumped to the conclusion that Britain's actions represented nothing less than an attempt to recolonize portions of the Mosquito Coast in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Similarly, many Americans were outraged at Britain's recalcitrance in refusing American or international arbitration over a boundary dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela.

Despite the existence of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, southerners genuinely feared that Great Britain would seize any opportunity to construct their own canal. To be sure, many Americans balked at the huge projected cost of the project (estimated at around $100 million), but most southerners believed that it would be money well spent. Indeed, southerners became alarmed that the refusal of the federal government to provide money
for beginning feasibility studies and preliminary construction costs would only encourage Britain to pursue its own canal project. An article in a Little Rock newspaper declared, "The United States is asked to lend its credit to the extent of $100,000,000 for the completion of this project or permit Great Britain to build and control this great highway for the improvement of commerce." Aware of public anxiety regarding the future of a canal, Senator John Morgan, speaking at a political rally in Birmingham, challenged the government to begin work on the canal at once, for "if this government does not soon undertake it Great Britain will . . . ." Fear of foreign, especially British, control over an isthmian canal was as intense in the South as in any other region. Consequently, most southern supporters shied away from private schemes involving American and foreign capital in favor of publicly funded plans under the direct ownership of the United States government. In 1894-95, business groups from Nashville to New Orleans to Ocala, Florida, submitted petitions to congress "praying for the construction of the Nicaragua Canal by the United States Government." 17

In addition to fearing British intrigue in the Isthmus, many southerners shared a suspicion that northern capital had conspired to prevent the speedy construction of a canal. Railroads, more than any other sector, bore the brunt of the South's vilification. Southern farmers had long complained about discriminatory rates levied for transporting their goods; in the 1890's, many accused the railroads of using their political power to block the Nicaragua canal for equally selfish reasons. The Southern Pacific Line, as the leading carrier of transisthmian freight, received the harshest indictments. Some in the South suggested that the "Pacific railroads--the Southern Pacific especially--have again
got control of the transportation route to the east by way of the isthmus of Panama and
the Panama railroad" and, with their monopoly had enacted "extortionate" rates. Southern
anti-monopoly sentiment led them to support a canal as a means to "facilitate the exchange
of commodities, between the two sections of the country . . . giving to each the products
of the other, with much less taken out for freight than is now charged." While much of the
southern criticism of the canal's opponents focused on prevailing perceptions of trusts and
monopolies, some reached the conclusion that nothing less than a sectional battle for
economic supremacy was at stake. A rural Alabama editor suggested that the Nicaragua
Canal would transfer "the seat of business and industry" to the South, and "the North and
East would suffer. For that reason the canal is opposed by men from those sections . . . ."
Further, he urged southerners who supported the economic uplift of their region to insist
upon the quick completion of the canal despite opposition from other regions.18

The idea that the canal would make the South the great commercial center of the
nation captivated the entire region. Southerners looked at the Pacific coast as a potential
market for many of its agricultural products, especially tobacco and fruit. Some
southerners even believed that the canal would provide the South with the ability to break
the dominance that eastern manufacturers held over the West. Eastern commercial
hegemony hindered the development of longitudinal trade patterns, they reasoned;
consequently, most of the products of the interior were shipped by rail to the East Coast
for local consumption or transshipment overseas. Southerners hoped that the cost and
distance advantages associated with an isthmian canal would redirect the trade of the
western United States from eastern to southern ports. As a result, numerous pundits
predicted future greatness for the port cities of the region. A leading southern business journal anticipated that upon completion of an isthmian canal, Galveston, New Orleans, Savannah, Charleston, Port Royal and Newport News would assume increasing importance as great export centers.19

The report of a federal commission in 1895 declared the Nicaraguan route feasible and bolstered regional confidence that the domestic products of the nation would be exported from the South. The Austin Daily Statesman predicted that no state would benefit from the construction of a canal as much as Texas, and that work should begin immediately to establish safe harbors along the Texas coast. The state's ports, in the future, would be great "entrepots for the trade that will flow through this channel as well from Texas as from other States of the West and Northwest." Mobile and New Orleans also expected to capitalize on the western trade that would follow the opening of the canal. A rural Alabama newspaper editor, for example, believed that with the canal, "Mobile will expand so fast, that they won't be able to 'see how we grow' unless they neglect everything else." On the floor of the House, Samuel Pasco, a Democratic representative from Monticello, Florida, claimed that the people of his state expected great things from the canal given Florida's southernmost location in the Union. Such a location, Pasco concluded, "promises us a large share in the commercial advantages which will come from the successful completion and operation of this great work."20

Not only did the South expect to benefit from an increase in the domestic trade with the Pacific states, but many in the region also envisioned vast, new markets opening for southern goods in the Far East. They pointed to how the opening of the Suez Canal in
1869 gave Great Britain a significant advantage in trade with the countries of Asia and predicted a Nicaraguan canal would provide similar benefits to the United States. Because of increased American missionary activity in China in the 1880's and early 1890's, some southerners suggested that closer Sino-American relations were possible. In the minds of many, 400 million Chinese presented a potential market too vast to be ignored, especially during the depression years after 1893. Clearly, this interest in the Far East was rooted in the possibilities of the future, not the realities of the present. The attention given to Far Eastern trade far surpassed the region's significance as a trading partner with the United States. At no time during the years between 1894 and 1904 did the value of commerce with China, Japan and Hong Kong exceed 5.5% of total American trade. In fact, trade with China and Japan was dwarfed by trade with Great Britain and significantly overshadowed by trade with Cuba and Mexico. Nonetheless, the prospect of securing and exploiting Far Eastern trade received enormous attention around the turn of the century as a means of providing for substantial economic growth into the next century.21 (See Table 2)

In the 1890's, the prospect of increased trade with China excited many of the South's beleaguered cotton growers who struggled economically and confronted special problems. High cotton prices immediately after the Civil War led many farmers to abandon other crops in favor of cotton. The fever to plant the staple crop produced enormous crop yields; by the early 1870's, the South was annually producing more cotton than at any time since before the Civil War. Increased production, however, led to steadily declining prices during the remainder of the century. Prices plummeted from a postwar high of around 43
TABLE 2

Value of U.S. Imports and Exports to Selected Countries, 1894 to 1904 (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Value of All U.S. Imports-Exports</th>
<th>Value to Destination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>1547</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>1663</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2244</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>2285</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>2452</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg.</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table derived from Historical Statistics of the United States, pp. 903-7 and Dennett, p. 581.)

cents a pound in 1866-67 to less than 10 cents a pound in the 1870's. Nonetheless, for the next three decades southerners continued to produce more and more cotton. With over a million farms in the South devoted primarily to the production of cotton, the steady decline in prices in the Gilded Age was calamitous. Consequently, when the depression of 1893 drove cotton prices to a record low of 5 cents per pound, many in the region saw overseas markets as a potential source of relief.\textsuperscript{22}

The importance of cotton in the South's economy predicated the region's keen interest in potential new markets in China and the Far East. In the 1890's, both China and Japan imported the vast majority of their cotton goods through Great Britain. Furthermore, amidst the disintegration of the Ming dynasty in China, it appeared as though European powers were jockeying for position to carve out ever greater spheres of influence in Asia. By 1898, France, Russia, Germany, Japan and Great Britain had
forcibly obtained exclusive rights to develop certain regions and mineral deposits from the Chinese Empire. Many southerners feared that failure to build a canal and establish an oceanic highway to Asia would allow European powers to establish permanent control over Asian, especially Chinese, markets and lock out future American economic penetration.23

In early 1895, an article in the Arkansas Gazette expressed the common concern that European nations would capitalize on China's weakness in the wake of its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. The paper noted, however, that American economic exclusion from China could be averted. If the United States completed the Nicaraguan canal at some early date, "it would place this country in a position to command the commerce of the world . . . and make us all the busiest people on the face of the globe . . . . The South has nothing to lose and everything to gain by the construction of this canal." Numerous other articles in southern newspapers and journals suggested that the Far East represented a great market for the South's leading staple crop. Similarly, New South spokesmen heralded the possibilities of increased trade with the Orient. Former Minister to Siam, John Barrett, exhorted the New Orleans Board of Trade to prepare for a new age of commercial greatness that would accompany the opening of markets in the Far East for southern cotton. Not only did China and Japan constitute a ready market for southern textiles, Barrett contended, but anticipated growth in the Asian textile industry would provide enormous opportunities for the South to sell raw cotton.24

Clearly, by 1895, a consensus of opinion existed in the South favoring the construction of a Nicaraguan canal under the direct control of the federal government.
Southern support for a canal project cut across occupational lines and was rooted in a common hope that an isthmian waterway would provide economic opportunities—agricultural, industrial and commercial—for the entire region. Farmers expected the canal to eliminate onerous freight charges on their products and open up vast new markets in the Pacific United States and in the Far East. A rural north Georgia paper saw the canal as "the greatest enterprise now before the business world . . . [that would] open a new country for American products, particularly cotton, lumber, and naval stores . . . ."

Another regional editorial proclaimed that with the canal, Japan would "buy all their cotton from the American planters." Given the economic malaise of the region, and near record low prices for the section's chief staple crop, cotton, agricultural interests looked at the canal project as a sure means to improve the lot of southern farmers.25

Commercial and industrial interests in the region's towns, cities and ports also showed great concern in the proposed canal. An isthmian canal promised to provide a huge economic stimulus for the region's nascent manufacturers, especially textiles and iron, by opening up new markets. Indeed, southern business organizations provided the most vocal support for a canal throughout the early 1890's. In a petition to Congress in February of 1894, the Nashville Board of Trade and Chamber of Commerce declared that "our people regard the Nicaragua Canal as the only available project holding out to our producers and merchants the project of permanent relief, in the desideratum of cheap freights to the great markets of the world." "This beneficent work," the petition continued, "will inaugurate a new era of prosperity in the Gulf States of our Republic, and throughout the great valley of the Mississippi." Several months later the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of Louisiana unanimously supported a petition urging Congress to build and control the Nicaraguan Canal. The Louisianians maintained that when the canal was completed, it would "attract the World's Commerce to such an extent as to give results compared with which the already enormous profits of the Suez Canal enterprise will sink into insignificance."26

Business leaders across the South expected the canal to provide immediate economic relief for the region and to enhance permanently the commercial prospects of southern ports. Consequently, when the federal government sent a team of experts to survey the situation in Nicaragua in May of 1895, a national publication accurately noted that news of the action "has been noted with a special satisfaction by the press of the southern seaport towns . . . . Commercial bodies in the southern ports are looking forward with high hopes to an era of great prosperity which they believe will follow upon the opening of the Nicaraguan Canal."27

Given the region's support for a canal, it was appropriate that a southerner, Senator John T. Morgan, of Alabama, emerged in the 1890's as the leading spokesman for the Nicaragua Canal. Morgan, an ex-Confederate officer and Bourbon, took a southern approach to foreign policy that was both intensely nationalist and conciliatory, yet fiercely regional in its origin. While noting both the economic and strategic importance of an isthmian canal for the entire nation, Morgan emphasized his concern for the uplift of his native region. He hoped that an active internationalist foreign policy would lead to the acquisition of overseas territory and markets made even more accessible to the South by way of an American-owned isthmian canal. With overseas markets opened to southern
goods, Morgan predicted, his native region would enjoy unprecedented prosperity and the ports along the Gulf coast would become the preeminent entrepots for American commerce. In the end, Morgan's vision of the world represented both a deep desire to see his country achieve world prominence and a passion—as a southerner—to see his native region realize its economic potential and thus liberate itself from its economic dependence on the North.  

Morgan's extreme internationalism, especially his support for the acquisition of overseas territory, was not shared by the majority of southerners. Indeed, most southerners' foreign policy attitudes rejected colonies outright. Nonetheless, Morgan won universal praise across the region as the leading spokesmen for an isthmian canal. To be sure, few southerners were as obstinate as Morgan in clinging to the Nicaraguan route, but most recognized the advantages in distance and cost for the South in such a proposal. Despite Morgan's position as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the prospects of a canal in Nicaragua remained but a hopeful dream to most southerners in 1895.

* * *

In several aspects, the Atlanta Cotton States and International Exposition reflected southern popular attitudes regarding the role of international markets to the economic health of the South. Although small and quaint compared with the massive, white columned buildings at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago, the mere presence of numerous, solidly built structures at Atlanta's Exposition served as a testament to the progress the South had made since the Civil War and as an advertisement that the region
was ready to compete in the international market. In addition, exhibits from across the South portrayed the region as teeming with vast, untapped natural and human resources. Some exhibits featured mineral resources found in abundance in Alabama and Tennessee; others featured citrus and other produce from Florida; still others emphasized the progress southern workers had made through technical education. A leading journal of southern industry proclaimed that the exhibits "tell a wonderful story to the peoples of the world" of how southerners by their own industry had "worked a revolution in the land."29

On the surface, the exposition served as a source of pride and optimism for the South. More important, the exposition sought to impress guests from outside the region of the South's great potential for investment or trade. Over a year before the fair's opening, many southern business leaders, not just those in Atlanta, spoke of the economic opportunities that the exposition might create. In May 1894, a large and enthusiastic gathering of members of the Little Rock Board of Trade endorsed the exposition, especially its attempt to obtain a greater share of the trade "of all the lands south of us which belongs to the United States by geographical neighborhood . . . ." New Orleanians, too, supported the exposition's mission to "not only make the North and Europe better acquainted with Southern resources, but open Latin American trade to us." In order to make their case to the nations of Latin America, the fair's promoters sent to the region a personal representative, Colonel Isaac W. Avery, to indicate the South's desire for closer trade relations and to solicit official participation at the exposition from their governments. Although Avery secured only four exhibits from Latin America, he did convince Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica to send delegations.30
Governor William Y. Atkinson of Georgia, in *The North American Review*, discussed the importance of the exposition—for the South, the nation, and for the future of international trade. To be sure, Governor Atkinson's interest in the fair's mission to attract Latin American business stemmed from a growing southern desire to see regional industry, especially manufactured cotton goods, challenge the dominance of Britain on the South American continent. Atkinson recognized that South America furnished "close at hand a vast market for the very grade of cotton goods that the South is now manufacturing in greatest abundance."  

Popular southern support for government efforts to make foreign markets more accessible also found expression at the exposition. On November 30, 1895, Nicaragua Canal Day, the scheduled festivities included speeches supporting the canal and a call for those present to sign petitions urging Congress to act. The Vice-President of the Exposition, William A. Hemphill, presided over the day's events and spoke of the canal's importance to the South and the nation. Hemphill emphasized the economic benefits that the canal would provide by making markets more accessible. In addition, Hemphill read a message from Senator Morgan in which he vigorously urged the nation to build the Nicaraguan Canal at the earliest possible date. After the morning's speeches, the attendees passed resolutions urging Congress to give the matter early and earnest consideration.  

Support for the canal and a desire for low tariffs reflected majority opinion among southerners in the early 1890's. Many southerners blamed the economic malaise of the period on protectionist tariffs and the inability of the domestic market to consume southern goods, especially cotton. Falling agricultural prices and concomitant economic
deprivation in the South caused many in the region to search for solutions to the region's poor economic health. Many leaders in the New South had long urged the region to end its international isolation; in a period of chronic economic decline, these messages found a receptive audience. Low tariffs and an isthmian canal would end the South's economic isolation, open up new markets for southern goods, and pave the way for the prosperous future the New South prophets had long proclaimed. This vision of the potentialities of foreign policy activism inspired hope among southerners--hope that American internationalism would provide the South with material rewards.
CHAPTER 2
DOLLARS AND CULTURE:
THE SOUTH, VENEZUELA AND HAWAII

President Cleveland's special message to congress is a strong and patriotic exposition of a doctrine, the enforcement of which has been held by every American statesman from the time of its original assertion to be essential to the national welfare. It has been made painfully evident by recent aggressions of Great Britain in Central America that our government was confronted with the alternatives of a virtual waiver of the Monroe doctrine or of its positive re-assertion and enforcement at any hazard and at any cost.

—Ft. Worth Gazette, 1895¹

The future of Hawaii, under a government that can provide for and control its assured development, such as the United States, Great Britain, or Germany, is full of interest to all the maritime nations, and is of the greatest importance to the commercial world.

John T. Morgan, 1898³

It seems that war with England is threatening. May it be averted. A war with England—our own blood and tongue, even if a necessity, is little short of a crime against civilization. England and the United States—mother and daughter, are the last two peoples who ought to go to war.

—David T. Boyd, 1895²

Happiness and freedom within only to be attained by peace without. Such peace was to be maintained only by the notorious possession of power to resist aggression; power could, in the absence of standing armies and great fleets, lie only in an immense territory, compact, contiguous; filled by a population homogenous, free; proud of their freedom and jealous to maintain it, and equally jealous to maintain their country's independence and unity—for these are the expression and the shield to the outer world of their freedom.

—John S. Williams, 1898⁴
Two foreign policy crises in the mid-1890's revealed that southerners' view of the world reflected a level of complexity that transcended economic determinism. The New South prophets' campaign to build widespread southern support for a more expansionist foreign policy ran into difficulty when their rhetoric challenged some of the deeply-held socio-cultural values of the great majority of southerners. In developing positions in the public debate over American policy regarding the Venezuelan boundary dispute and the annexation of Hawaii, most southerners relied on social and cultural factors, some unique to the South. Consequently, while the prophets emphasized economics and markets, most southerners continued to examine foreign policy from the perspective provided by a common southern cultural experience. The result was that issues such as national and regional honor, racism, partisan politics and group identity played a far greater role than economic opportunity in determining the southern response to both of these foreign policy events.5

* * *

A long-standing boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana constituted the most serious breach in Anglo-American relations in the mid-1890's. The Venezuela boundary dispute began shortly after Great Britain acquired the provinces of Berbice, Demarara, and Essequibo, from the Dutch in 1814. Renaming the provinces British Guiana, the territorial cession lacked a definite western boundary with Venezuela. As a result, questions arose over ownership of approximately 50,000 square miles in the sparsely settled Orinoco River Valley. In 1835, Great Britain appointed Sir Robert Schomburgk, a geographer, to determine a legitimate boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela. Citing earlier records of Dutch exploration and settlement, Schomburgk
determined that the Dutch cession included most of the disputed territory, including the strategic Point Barima that controlled traffic through the Orinoco River. Angered at Britain's claims in 1841, Venezuela rejected the Schomburgk Line in 1841 and requested further negotiations on a boundary settlement. After several fruitless efforts to resolve the matter, diplomats from both countries agreed not to allow their nationals to settle in the disputed territory.

Until the 1870's, the boundary dispute received little attention outside of London and Caracas. However, in the mid-1870's, the discovery of large deposits of gold in the disputed territory caused both nations to push for a permanent boundary settlement. To be sure, both coveted the region's newly found mineral wealth. Venezuela requested that the entire dispute be resolved through arbitration; Britain refused to place any territory east of the Schomburgk Line up for mediation. As the weaker party, Venezuela invoked the Monroe Doctrine in an attempt to elicit American intervention. In 1887, Secretary of State Thomas Bayard offered to assist in arbitrating the dispute, but Britain refused. Despite the offer of American good offices and the bravado of a few politicians, most Americans paid little attention to the dispute since it did not seem to affect any national interests.

In 1894, the American public began to pay more attention to the dispute over territory in Venezuela as a result of the propaganda efforts by the Venezuelan government. The government in Caracas hired a Georgian who had once served as the United States Minister to Venezuela to serve as a legal adviser and special agent to the Ministry of State, especially on matters pertaining to the boundary dispute with Great Britain. In this role, William C. Scruggs noted that the issue had heretofore attracted little
attention among Americans because they worried more about domestic problems stemming from the depression. With this overwhelming public disinterest in the imbroglio, Scruggs doubted that any public figures in Washington would champion the cause of a resolution to a foreign boundary dispute. Scruggs, therefore, believed that his first task would be to engage in a public education campaign "to create an interest in the Venezuelan question."7

The task of making a foreign boundary dispute meaningful to the lives of ordinary Americans would be difficult—especially during the depression. Scruggs, therefore, tried to exploit what he believed to be a deeply-held, persistent commitment among Americans to the Monroe Doctrine. By providing the American public with only the Venezuelan side of the dispute, Scruggs hoped to generate overwhelming public sympathy for Venezuela.

In 1894, in a pamphlet entitled "The Venezuelan Question," he presented the case to the American public in very simple terms:

Briefly stated it [the question] is about this; whether, under pretexts afforded by a controversy which she obstinately refuses to settle in any just and reasonable basis England shall be permitted to dismember an American republic, and to indefinitely extend her colonial system on this continent in violation of public law and in disregard of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.8

In October of 1894, Scruggs published "British Aggressions in Venezuela, or The Monroe Doctrine on Trial," his most important piece of propaganda. At his own expense, Scruggs distributed copies of this work to newspaper editors, members of Congress, governors, and other important political leaders. The pamphlet presented the history of the boundary dispute and asserted that Venezuela's claims antedated Britain's by several years; in addition, Scruggs rejected many of Britain's claims as groundless. Britain's
demands, therefore, represented an illegitimate attempt to seize Venezuelan territory. Finally, Scruggs concluded that the refusal of England to accept Venezuela's offers of outside arbitration, dating back to 1844, suggested England's territorial designs in the hemisphere were not restricted solely to the Orinoco River Valley.

Most damning of all in the court of American opinion, however, were Scruggs' charges that Britain's actions violated the prohibition against "recolonization" contained in the Monroe Doctrine. Regardless of its validity in international law, its principles, Scruggs claimed, constituted "an unwritten law of a fundamental character which had already become as sacred to the American people as the Constitution itself." Since its formulation by Monroe, the doctrine had "been confirmed by every subsequent President of the United States." Given the gravity of Britain's transgressions, Scruggs concluded that America's failure to intervene "would be an explicit and final abandonment of those principles [of the declaration of 1823]; and that would involve a sacrifice of national honor and prestige such as no first-class power is likely ever to make, even for the sake of peace." Scruggs emphasized the near universal American approval of the doctrine; many, he maintained, held it to be inviolable. The former foreign minister from Georgia rightly perceived the immense popularity of the doctrine; his appeals, more than anything else, elevated public awareness of the boundary dispute and increased support for direct intervention.9

In January of 1895, Scruggs' pamphlet, already in its fourth printing, began to have an impact on the government's Venezuela policy. Leonidas F. Livingston, a congressman from Scruggs' district in Georgia, introduced a resolution urging Great Britain and Venezuela to refer the boundary dispute to friendly arbitration. In support of the resolution, Livingston repeated many of the charges leveled against Great Britain by
Scruggs in "The Monroe Doctrine on Trial." Livingston challenged the validity of Britain's claims and expressed his concern at Britain's refusal to accept arbitration. Like Scruggs, Livingston suggested that England was exploiting a small, weak Latin American republic for its own selfish ends; he also argued that as the weaker party in the dispute, Venezuela had a right to expect American intervention under the Monroe Doctrine.

During an impassioned plea before the House in February of 1895, in what could have passed as an excerpt from Scruggs' own work, Livingston concluded:

> To abandon that doctrine and repudiate the whole traditions of our Government touching its policy toward the South American Republics now would be not only an act of bad faith, but would involve us in international disputes and complications the end and consequences of which no man can foresee. It would be not only such a surrender of national prestige as would make us the jest of the civilized world, but it would be such an act of pusillanimity as the people of the United States would never ratify. . . . There is but one honorable course before us. Come what may, we have no choice but to resolutely maintain our self-respect and prestige as a nation.10

On February 22, 1895, Livingston's resolution was approved by the unanimous vote of both houses.

Despite Scruggs's propaganda campaign and Congress's resolution, the Venezuelan question failed to capture the imagination of the southern masses early in 1895. Nonetheless, Anglo-American relations remained strained; especially during April and May when Great Britain directly intervened in Nicaragua. This episode, the so-called Corinto Affair, stemmed from the arrest and deportation of a British consular official by the Nicaraguan government. Britain accused Nicaragua of acting illegally in the matter and of unduly insulting the honor of both the consular official and Great Britain. After Managua ignored Britain's demands for a public apology and an indemnity, Great Britain dispatched four hundred Royal Marines to the port city of Corinto to collect
compensation. During this crisis, Managua appealed to the United States to intervene to expel the British under the Monroe Doctrine. Cleveland and his Secretary of State, Walter Q. Gresham, refused to act. The Cleveland Administration maintained that the British occupation of Corinto was temporary and, therefore, did not constitute a direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine's prohibition against future colonization by a European power. In the end, the intervention of the United States in the matter was a moot question; by May 2 the British marines had left Corinto.11

By the late spring of 1895, President Cleveland faced mounting criticism over such inaction. A general campaign of jingoism, waged largely by the Republican press, had created a reservoir of hostility toward Great Britain. Viewed in this light, the policies pursued by Secretary of State Gresham regarding alleged British aggressions in Nicaragua and Venezuela appeared inconsistent with public opinion. Some national business leaders believed that the administration's refusal to stand firmly against Great Britain would make it more difficult for American capital to penetrate Latin American markets; other critics condemned Cleveland's refusal to uphold the honor and integrity of the Monroe Doctrine. Regardless of their origins, these attacks against Cleveland caused serious concern in the White House and paved the way for a shift in policy after Gresham's sudden death in May.12

The real crisis in Anglo-American relations arising from the Venezuelan question occurred under Gresham's successor at the State Department, Richard Olney. Olney quickly abandoned Gresham's conciliatory posture and responded to administration critics by sending a stern message to the British prime minister. Olney's letter of July 20, 1895, outlined the history of the boundary dispute and of Britain's repeated refusals to accept
arbitration of all the territory in question. More important, Olney vigorously asserted that by its actions in Venezuela, Great Britain had violated the Monroe Doctrine. America was, therefore, justified in interfering in the matter since Britain's prior refusal of American offers of arbitration constituted a disregard for American law and honor. Finally, Olney requested that British Prime Minister Salisbury respond to this offer of arbitration in a timely fashion, so that President Cleveland could announce it to Congress in his next annual message.13

In the fall of 1895, southerners expressed their opinions on the Venezuelan question amidst leaks to the press regarding the serious nature and forceful tone of Olney's letter. Most southerners supported Olney's broad interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that reaffirmed the provisions prohibiting European colonization. Indeed, the South shared Olney's view that the Doctrine represented a canon in American public law. Southerners differed, however, over how strongly to press the matter. Joseph Wheeler, a congressman from Alabama and ex-Confederate general, represented the jingoist minority who suggested military action against England should Salisbury refuse arbitration. Writing in the North American Review, Wheeler proposed that the United States use the Monroe Doctrine to demand arbitration from Great Britain in the matter as a pretext to challenge and reverse Britain's commercial hegemony in the Western hemisphere. In regards to the Monroe Doctrine, Wheeler believed "that the United States should extend its policy and look to the establishment of depots and naval stations around which American colonies would locate, sufficiently strong to encourage and protect our trade and commerce."14
Unlike Wheeler, the majority of southerners did not view the Venezuelan question as serious enough to warrant armed intervention; nor did most southerners expect any great commercial benefit to follow from strong American demands. Most business interests consistently opposed American action in the dispute that threatened peaceful relations between the United States and Great Britain. Many southern businessmen involved in the cotton trade were mindful of the fact that Britain was the largest foreign consumer of southern cotton. Given the small volume of trade, especially in southern cotton, with Venezuela, anti-British jingoes made little headway in influencing southern opinion in the summer and fall of 1895. (See Tables 3, 4 and 5)

Along with the regional concern over markets for cotton exports, many southerners concluded that there were too many common bonds between Great Britain and the United States to risk a war over a foreign boundary dispute. Arguments against war based upon Anglo-Saxon kinship were particularly compelling in the South where much of the population was of English stock. More than any other section of the country, the South remained relatively untouched by the flood of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe that came to America after the Civil War. By 1900, when nearly half of America's non-southern population was either foreign-born or born of immigrant parents, only a tenth of the South's residents were classified in that category.  

Undoubtedly, the close economic and cultural relationship between the South and Great Britain affected southerners' perception of the boundary dispute. While much of the nation was gripped in anti-British hysteria, many in the South maintained their traditional affection for British culture, customs and institutions. One southern observer noted that
TABLE 3

Value of U.S. Imports and Exports to Great Britain and Venezuela, 1895 (in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>387.125</td>
<td>159.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>546.209</td>
<td>13.814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4

Quantities of Domestic Raw Cotton Exported to South America and the United Kingdom, 1893-1895 (in pounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country to Which Exported</th>
<th>1893</th>
<th>1894</th>
<th>1895</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1,181,587,898</td>
<td>1,485,451,425</td>
<td>1,776,890,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>70,643</td>
<td>130,145</td>
<td>140,714</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5

Commercial Cotton Crops and Exports to Great Britain, 1894-1895

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Commercial Cotton Crop (in thousands of bales)</th>
<th>Exports to G.B.</th>
<th>Exports to G.B. As % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>7,532</td>
<td>2,861</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>9,837</td>
<td>3,449</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Tables derived from Statistical Abstract of the United States—1895, pp. 84-110, 286-287.)

while jingoes in Congress talked of war with Great Britain, southern representatives emphasized the "many common ties, hopes and purposes" we shared with that nation.
Furthermore, the South rejected the notion that a territorial dispute in a Latin American republic was sufficient cause to go to war with England. Most in the region shared the view "that two great nations, largely of the same blood, and speaking the same language, are not going to fall to cutting each other's throats . . ."\textsuperscript{16}

On the eve of Cleveland's message to Congress in December of 1895, a majority of southerners expressed both a strong rhetorical commitment to the Monroe Doctrine and a desire to see the Venezuelan matter resolved without bloodshed. Most in the South understood the boundary dispute as a legitimate test of the Doctrine, but hoped that American policy could be adequately upheld through successful arbitration. An Arkansas editor succinctly expressed this view when he noted, "We favor the Monroe Doctrine, but we don't believe in jingoism." Other southerners expressed the view that the boundary dispute would not serve as a suitable pretext for war; indeed, such a pretext would "not meet with the approval of the people."\textsuperscript{17}

Cleveland's efforts to maintain a conservative position in the boundary dispute became increasingly difficult as political pressure mounted to take decisive action. The administration faced growing resentment in some parts of the nation for its apparent unwillingness to force Great Britain's hand in the matter. Lord Salisbury's failure to respond in a timely fashion to Olney's letter angered Cleveland and forced him to alter his message to Congress of December 17, 1895. Cleveland's address reflected the growing partisan conflict surrounding the debate over the Venezuelan affair as well as his desire to exonerate the administration and his party from charges of weakness in its dealings with Britain.

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Cleveland's address emphasized the relevance of the Monroe Doctrine to the dispute and of British challenges to the hallowed American doctrine. In his account of the long history of the boundary dispute, and of Britain's repeated refusals of American arbitration, the president argued that Britain's abuse of power in Venezuela clearly violated the principles of Monroe. He also declared that the United States must enforce respect for the principles of the doctrine not only for Venezuela's sake, but for the purpose of maintaining "our peace and safety as a nation and . . . the integrity of our free institutions . . . ." More important, Cleveland portrayed the episode as a challenge to national honor and warned of the consequences for failing to act. According to the president, "There is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor . . . ." In concluding, Cleveland firmly established his commitment to defend the principles of the Monroe Doctrine by calling for Congress to create a boundary commission with full authority to impose a boundary settlement should Great Britain and Venezuela fail to resolve the matter.18

Cleveland's message to Congress caused many southerners to reconsider the Venezuelan question. The president's assertive position and his attempt to give the impression of unity and strength within the Democratic Party produced a marked shift of public attitudes in the South. In the weeks after his December 17 speech, Cleveland successfully rallied southern support for his new, more militant approach. Where previously only a minority had supported American intervention, a majority of southerners now embraced the president's call to defend the Monroe Doctrine, even if it meant war with Great Britain.
The South appeared more willing to accept war with Great Britain after Cleveland placed the honor of the United States at stake in the controversy with Great Britain. By firmly declaring that Britain's actions violated a fundamental principle of American law, Cleveland portrayed Salisbury's repudiations of American offers of arbitration as a sign of disrespect and dishonor. Failure to force British compliance, Cleveland suggested, would make the United States appear weak to the other nations of the world. In Savannah, a newspaper editor noted the grave nature of the crisis and concluded "that the time has come for this country either to insist upon a proper recognition of the Monroe doctrine or to abandon that doctrine altogether." His community, the Georgia editor continued, stood squarely behind the president and "nothing . . . will alter the determination of the American people to uphold the Monroe doctrine . . . ." Others in the region asserted the nation's honor-bound commitment to take forceful action to prevent Britain from disregarding American rights in the hemisphere. For the United States to allow Britain to impose unilaterally a boundary line in Venezuela "would be bad faith to Venezuela and cowardly on the part of this government to such an extent that we would lose respect and standing among the nations of the earth . . . ." Even the staunchly pro-commerce Mobile Daily Register declared that in this matter honor must take precedence over "trade, commerce, and profits in dealing with Great Britain."19

Similar expressions of support for the president came from across the South. In Public Opinion, a survey of editorials in selected southern Democratic newspapers indicated that approximately seventy percent of them supported the Administration's tougher stand. Another informal survey by the Birmingham State Herald found that most
governors approved of the president's position on enforcing the Monroe Doctrine and, that most of the residents of their respective states supported "his patriotic efforts in behalf of the honor and dignity of the United States."20

In Congress, Cleveland's message received universal acclaim. Partisans from both sides of the aisle scrambled to show their support for the president and the revivified Monroe Doctrine. On December 18, 1895, amidst considerable applause, Charles Crisp of Georgia declared, "If the American people have a fixed opinion upon any question, it is the opinion that no European country shall be permitted to acquire territory on the American continent by force." After a few questions regarding procedural matters, the House voted unanimously to create an American boundary commission "to investigate and report upon the true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana . . ." and appropriated $100,000 for its operation. A few months later in the Senate, Newton Blanchard of Louisiana delivered a ringing endorsement of the president's action and castigated Lord Salisbury for Britain's continued obstinance. The popularity of the doctrine, Blanchard proclaimed,

is not confined to any section or class of our people. It pervades all alike; it leaps over party lines and rises above party feeling . . . . Go ask the people of the . . . rapidly recuperating South, and they will tell you that the time has come for a broadening of the scope of the Monroe doctrine of 1823, and for a much more enlarged application of it.21

Senator Blanchard's rhetoric captured the rising jingoist fervor that gripped the nation; however, his assessment of the geographical breadth and emotional depth of public support failed to recognize the persistent opposition to intervention of key conservative groups in the South. These critics of Cleveland's policy represented a cross-section of the
southern middle class. As a group, they disliked the intense partisan tone of the debate over Venezuela and feared that Cleveland and Congress might risk war with England to obtain political advantage. Jabez Lamar Monroe Curry, former minister to Spain during the first Cleveland Administration, ridiculed the notion of fighting a war with England over the boundary of a "contemptible little republic." Curry also observed that, "There seems to be a rivalry between the two parties in Congress as to which shall be the readier and more blatant in jingoism." Similarly, Henry Hammond of South Carolina, scion of the late wealthy planter James Henry Hammond, chided politicians for their jingoist rhetoric and actions and declared that he "would as soon go to war with Kit and Alf [his brothers] as with England."  

Other anti-jingoist spokesmen represented the commercial class of the South. Their arguments, too, criticized the partisan nature of the debate and the seemingly irrational actions of Congress. In addition, some southerners feared that a war with England would be economically devastating for the South because it would drive southern cotton prices downward. A leading conservative Texas daily asked its readers if "any man with sober sense considered one of the semi-annual rackets of Venezuela sufficient cause for a disturbance of the commercial relations between the United States and friendly European customers?" Another southern editor hoped that the "war-scare" would subside due to the antipathy to war with England shown by the commercial interests of the country. He, like many other southerners, continued to urge arbitration despite the pleas of jingoes in Washington.

Especially important in reducing war hysteria in the South was Parliament's decision of January 11, 1896, to open negotiations regarding the boundary dispute. The
British Parliament made it clear that arbitration of the matter would be acceptable if certain guidelines were followed by a boundary commission. Parliament's action largely diffused the crisis in Anglo-American relations, though some jingoes continued to bluster over the slow pace of the talks and the need for the United States to impose a boundary line between the two parties.

Many southerners cheered Parliament's decision and saw it as an opportunity to build closer Anglo-American ties in the future. In the weeks following Parliament's acceptance of negotiations, some southerners expressed a desire to establish a formal mechanism for Anglo-American arbitration to resolve future controversies. In the Senate, John W. Daniel of Virginia proclaimed,

> Arbitration is the modern and the rightful method of settling differences between nations. It is the substitute for war. It appeals to humanity. It is necessary to civilization. It is Christianity.

In North Carolina, the yearly meeting of the Society of Friends lamented the fact that war passions against Great Britain had become so inflamed as to threaten amicable relations between the two countries. A resolution from the North Carolina Quakers to Congress reiterated their commitment to pacifism and their satisfaction that many Americans joined them in opposing war. The group expressed their thanks "that the spirit of peace began to assert itself, first by the religious organizations and benevolent associations, then by commercial organizations, and now by the people, until the prevailing sentiment seems to be in opposition to War." The North Carolinians, too, urged Congress to consider establishing a system of arbitration between the United States and Great Britain.24

On February 22, 1896, a mass meeting in Chattanooga, Tennessee, expressed similar support for Anglo-American arbitration. The Chattanoogans resolved that "all
Christian nations should abandon war as a means of settling international disputes." More specifically, the group suggested that "on account of their peculiar relations, of language, civilization and blood . . .," the United States and England should create a mechanism whereby all disputes could be resolved peaceably. Likewise, the faculty of a Virginia college expressed their regret that the United States and Great Britain had faced the prospect of war because no court of arbitration existed between the two nations during the negotiations regarding Venezuela.  

The final resolution of the Venezuela boundary dispute proved to be anticlimactic. In February of 1897, Great Britain and Venezuela signed a treaty of arbitration that placed the matter before a tribunal of five men. As a result, the American boundary commission disbanded and turned over its findings to the new body. Two and a half years later, in October 1899, the arbitration tribunal unanimously awarded Great Britain ninety percent of the disputed territory; however, Venezuela received the strategically important port at Barima that gave it control of the mouth of the Orinoco River.   

Although Venezuela's extreme claims were rejected, most southerners seemed generally satisfied with the decision. Indeed, after the first few months of 1896, the entire question of the boundary dispute disappeared from the headlines and years later evoked little public commentary on the actions of the tribunal. Southerners, like other Americans, confronted more pressing issues, both domestic and foreign, in the interim. During the crisis, most southerners had hoped that the Monroe Doctrine could be honorably maintained without resorting to a war with England—with whom the South shared common ties. The decision by Great Britain to accept arbitration satisfied those who
wanted British recognition and respect. In addition, there was no strong southern opposition to the size of the British award; on the contrary, southerners probably preferred to see the matter settled to the satisfaction of Great Britain so as to preclude any future territorial disputes in the region that might involve American intervention. The relative absence of southern commentary on the Venezuelan question after the spring of 1896 suggests that the South's goals in the matter would be realized through arbitration.

The South's reaction to the Venezuela boundary dispute suggested that several key factors shaped public attitudes. Like many other Americans, southerners revered the Monroe Doctrine; failure to uphold its principles represented a loss of honor. Nevertheless, the South's desire to maintain good commercial relations with Great Britain and feelings of Anglo-Saxon kinship contributed to strong pro-British sentiment in the South during this entire debate. The volume of trade between the South and Great Britain had always been large; and clearly, the prospect of increased trade with Venezuela seemed dim. Most important, Great Britain had always served as a model for southern culture and institutions. Few southerners, therefore, seriously contemplated waging war against Great Britain on behalf of a Latin American republic whose people and institutions were completely foreign.

The rallying of southern public opinion around Cleveland in the weeks after his message to Congress was an aberration which did not reflect the most deeply held foreign policy attitudes of southerners. Rather, the apparent shift in opinion that occurred in late December 1895 and early 1896 was more an uncritical show of support for the beleaguered president and the Democratic Party. To be sure, as tensions mounted during
the winter of 1895-1896, both parties sought to move out ahead of public opinion on the question of the boundary dispute. Many southerners temporarily expressed support for the president’s policy, but it was for purely partisan reasons. Given the importance of maintaining Democratic unity in the South, it is not surprising that southern opinion briefly coalesced around Cleveland’s policy despite its intrinsic unpopularity.

* * *

More than the debate regarding the Venezuelan boundary dispute, the question of Hawaiian annexation raised southern concerns over the proper course of American foreign policy. American interest in the islands as a promising site for a naval station and as a stopover in the Asian trade dated to the early nineteenth century. In 1875, in an attempt to prevent any other nation from taking advantage of Hawaii’s prime location, the United States signed a reciprocal trade agreement with the islands that allowed their goods into the United States free of duty. The result of reciprocity was a boom in the local economy driven by a marked increase in sugar production. Hawaiian planters, many of them Americans, imported cheap labor from Asia to meet the resulting need for more laborers. In addition, the trade agreement virtually insured that the islands would become an economic dependent of the United States. Despite some native Hawaiians’ resentment of the dramatic changes that had taken place in their kingdom, reciprocity was renewed seven years later.

In 1890, a new American tariff policy depressed the Hawaiian economy and led to political unrest. The McKinley Tariff removed Hawaii’s competitive advantage by eliminating duties on all imported raw sugar. American sugar producers received a two-
cent-per-pound bounty as compensation for their loss of tariff protection. For Hawaiians, the elimination of their exclusive tariff exemption and the payment of a bounty to American producers proved calamitous. Sugar production declined dramatically, incomes fell, and unemployment soared. The islands' ruler, Queen Liliuokalani, rallied support among nativists who blamed the island's misfortune on the onerous influence of Americans. Consequently, in 1893, she attempted to impose a new constitution that would seriously limit the political power of foreigners.

Queen Liliuokalani's actions raised fears among Americans and their European allies in Hawaii that the monarchy could not or would not protect their substantial investments on the islands. By 1893 there were over sixty-two sugar plantations in Hawaii capitalized at over $31 million; Americans alone had invested over $13 million. A group of Americans in Honolulu, therefore, organized a Committee of Safety to oust the monarchy, establish a provisional government, and pursue American annexation.

On January 16, 1893, the Committee launched its "revolution." Claiming that Americans needed protection from the queen's forces, the Committee appealed to the American Minister John L. Stevens to provide aid. Under Steven's authority, one hundred and fifty men from the U.S.S. Boston landed and quickly surrounded the queen's palace. The next day, the Committee announced the end of the monarchy and established a provisional government. A few weeks later, Stevens declared Hawaii an American protectorate and raised the American flag over Honolulu. The provisional government, aided by Stevens, then drafted a proposal for the annexation of Hawaii to the United States and forwarded it to Washington for consideration.²⁷
Within a week of assuming office, President Grover Cleveland withdrew this hastily drawn treaty. Along with his Secretary of State, Walter Q. Gresham, Cleveland suspected that Stevens had abused his position in Hawaii to bring about the overthrow of its rightful leader. In addition, the president was apprehensive of the former Republican Administration's duplicity in the episode. On March 10, 1893, Cleveland appointed James Blount, of Georgia, to lead an investigation into the Hawaiian affair. After three months of conducting personal interviews and reading individual testimonies, Blount delivered a serious indictment of former minister Stevens and the other Americans on the islands. Blount asserted that American businessmen in Hawaii, aided by Stevens and the United States military, overthrew the native government for their own self-aggrandizement. He also accused the provisional government of misrepresenting the will of the people on the islands when it claimed widespread popular support for annexation. In actuality, Blount argued, fully eighty percent of native Hawaiians opposed annexation. In the end, Blount's arguments not only established a Republican conspiracy in the coup of 1893 but also discouraged those who would seek annexation on the basis of native popular support in the future.28

Blount's investigation into Hawaiian affairs slowed the efforts of pro-annexation forces in Washington. During the fall of 1893, President Cleveland failed to act decisively on the matter. The president's indecision stemmed largely from his inability to find a morally and politically acceptable policy. Cleveland felt outraged by the conduct of Stevens and the members of the provisional government; yet removing them from power would be difficult. Even more vexing was the problem of restoring Queen Liliuokalani, who had made no promises to guarantee the lives and property of those involved in the
coup, without alienating American public opinion. In the end, Cleveland failed to execute either measure and placed the entire problem in the hands of Congress.29

By portraying the episode as a morality play, with himself and his party as just and honorable, Cleveland made the subject of Hawaiian annexation an intensely partisan one. Republicans were forced to defend the actions of the previous administration, its advisors and their party against charges of malfeasance; Democrats felt pressure to support their president. The debate in Congress from December 1893 to February 1894 established the tenor of the broader public discussion of the Hawaiian question that took place in towns and cities across the South.

In 1893-94, southern public opinion appeared split on the question of Hawaiian annexation. A minority of southerners appeared to be in favor of or ambivalent toward the annexation of Hawaii. Surprisingly, the sugar cane producers of Louisiana, who had a vested economic interest in the matter, failed to express any strong opposition to annexation in late 1893 or early 1894. The chief journal of the industry, the Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer, never even addressed the subject. Nor did the sugar cane growers' associations petition Congress in opposition to annexation. Although Louisiana's two senators, Edward White and Donelson Caffery, opposed annexation, the remainder of the state's congressional delegation did not.30

In all likelihood, the silence of southern sugar interests originated from an ambivalence on the question of Hawaiian annexation. Perhaps they failed to appreciate the determination of annexationists to bring Hawaii into the Union or overestimated the power of the national Democratic party to block such an effort. More likely, southern
sugar growers were preoccupied with issues that would provide for the long term competitiveness of domestic cane. The two-cent-per-pound bounty virtually guaranteed a profit for domestic growers, but the continual payment of their unpopular subsidy was not assured. In addition, southern sugar producers faced immense pressures to modernize their own industry or be driven out of business by much larger producers, especially in Cuba. Consequently, the question of Hawaiian annexation seemed relatively unimportant to most southern sugar producers in 1893-1894.31

During this period, southern opponents of annexation voiced a number of ideological concerns about incorporating the Hawaiian islands into the American union. Some southerners echoed Cleveland's claims that it was immoral to recognize the provisional government and annex the territory in the absence of popular support among native Hawaiians. Such an action would be unethical and tantamount to "stealing" the islands from the natives. Often, however, critics of annexation averred that forcing American rule upon the Hawaiian people represented a repudiation of the highest ideals expressed in the Constitution. On December 6, 1893, Senator Roger Q. Mills of Texas challenged the legitimacy of the annexationists' arguments:

We are told that the Provisional Government is a republican government—a government boosted and upheld by American bayonets and living under the shadow of muzzles of American cannon. If our Government will get out of the way and let the people exercise the same rights that we claim, and which our fathers claimed were inalienable in the Declaration of Independence, the right to institute whatever government they pleased, they will institute a government which will be in accordance with their will. . . . 32

Two months later, Representative Hernando DeSoto Money, a Mississippian sympathetic to annexation, declared that even he could not endorse the current situation in Hawaii
because of Stevens' malfeasance. Money accused Stevens of abusing his authority and unduly intervening when no threat to American lives or property existed on the islands.33

Charges by southern Democrats against the G.O.P. resonated in Congress and among the southern population. Many southern anti-annexationists compared Republican intrigue in the Hawaiian revolution to the actions of Radicals in the South after the Civil War. To some southerners, Stevens' attempt to use force to create a pro-American annexationist government that represented only a minority of the islands' population was no different than the imposition of Radical Republican rule on the South thirty years before. In addition, southern Democrats quickly charged the Republicans with hypocrisy for supporting white rule over Kanakes (non-white Hawaiians) in the islands while attacking Bourbon rule in the South. Representative Josiah Patterson, of Memphis, raised both of these issues in a disparaging attack in Congress:

Can this country ever forget that the same Republican party, that now so piteously pleads for white supremacy and Christian civilization in the Hawaiian Islands, only a few short years ago deliberately turned South Carolina, one of the Southern States of America, one of the original thirteen states... over to the dominion of a race inferior to, and less progressive than, are the Hawaiians?

In concluding his diatribe, Patterson scoffed that the Republicans now had the gall to appeal to the public for support of the annexation scheme in the name of "Christianity and civilization, and a white man's government."34

Another southerner, William Oates of Alabama, followed Patterson in the Congressional debate and declared his support for Cleveland's decision to oppose annexation. He, too, condemned the Republicans for their hypocrisy in supporting annexation and the provisional government. Oates reminded Republicans that "they set up
negro carpetbag governments over the white people of the Southern States . . . ," but now they sought to disfranchise non-whites in Hawaii. According to Oates, the party's recent actions were wholly inconsistent and represented a complete reversal on the "negro question." When debate ended in May of 1894, the Senate joined the House in rejecting the immediate annexation of the Pacific archipelago; thus, temporarily removing the Hawaiian question from public scrutiny.35

On January 7, 1895, a Royalist uprising in Hawaii caused Congress and the American public to re-examine the annexation question. The coup, supported mainly by natives and half-castes loyal to Queen Liliuokalani, consisted of only a few brief skirmishes and was quickly crushed by the provisional government. Nonetheless, annexationists in Congress argued that this civil disorder could have been prevented had the United States maintained a military presence on the islands. In addition, since the provisional government defeated the Royalists without American help, they had proven their legitimacy and were entitled to seek annexation. Although neither of these arguments led to votes on annexation, they did spark a new debate on the merits of such an action.36

As in 1893-1894, southern congressmen ardently opposed Hawaiian annexation based on race, republican principles and the memory of Reconstruction. They contended that the annexation of the islands would be but the first step toward American imperialism and concomitant problems such as race mixture, the extension of executive power and militarism. Consequently, most critics of annexation warned that the United States must not begin down the "slippery slope" of imperialism; instead, the nation should remain true to traditional sources of foreign policy--the appeal by Washington to avoid entangling
alliances and the example of Jefferson to support expansion only on contiguous territory. During the debate in 1895, many southerners also assailed the sugar trust as the real power behind the 1893 revolution. These anti-annexationists suspected that the trust's desire to obtain cheaper, raw sugar from the islands caused them to provide material support to the provisional government in Honolulu and Republican annexationists in Washington. Certainly, the Hawaiian episode appeared as a warning of the potential for governmental abuse and corruption should the United States embark on a colonial policy.

In a blistering attack against the annexationists, Senator Donelson Caffery of Louisiana averred, "Under the present condition of affairs in that island, inhabited as it is with the population that it has, under the drastic authority by which it is necessary to govern that population, I am not willing to incorporate that heterogeneous mixture of all the nations . . . into the American Union." Caffery further declared his support for Cleveland's Hawaiian policy and chided Republicans for trying to force annexation down the nation's throat. Finally, the Senator affirmed his commitment to upholding the rights of American citizens everywhere on the globe, but he refused to "have the Navy or the military arm of this country used to oppress any people . . . "

Less than a week later, the fiery senator from Texas, Roger Q. Mills, leveled additional charges against the annexationists. Like Caffery, his attacks fell squarely on Republicans in Congress and on the late Harrison Administration. He, too, stressed that Republicans supported an anti-republican regime in Hawaii against the popular will of the islands' inhabitants. Mills' sarcastically asked his colleagues on the other side of the chamber if they had forgotten that this was a Democratic government that believed in
individual rights and the Declaration of Independence and, in the right of the people to overthrow governments if they failed to protect their lives, liberty and property. More importantly, Mills also injected a greater element of sectionalism in his obloquy. He found it unusual that the greatest support for the provisional government and for annexation came from the extreme East. Indeed, the Texas senator suggested, Republican support for annexation came from its affiliation with the powerful sugar trust. It was the powerful sugar trust of New York City, Mills argued, that overthrew the Hawaiian Monarchy and provided assistance to the provisional government. In concluding, Mills proclaimed that the current controversy over Hawaii stemmed from the Republican Party's nefarious relationship with the trusts.38

In the southern press, editorial opinion generally supported the efforts of the region's representatives in Congress to block annexation schemes. It savaged Republicans for the unsavory conduct of Minister Stevens and the Harrison Administration during the revolution of 1893. A New Orleans editor noted how the recent Royalist uprising proved that the provisional government lacked universal support. Indeed, the coup showed that reports suggesting "that the Hawaiians are supporting the Dole government were without foundation except perhaps in the imagination of a few annexationists." The Chattanooga Times, too, expressed its sympathy with the Hawaiian rebels who, "reduced to a condition of serfdom, and denied all voice in the government" were fighting for their rights. An Arkansas editor summarized the question of annexation simply when he declared, "unless the republics are mockeries the majority will rule . . ."39

Although not a major reason for opposition to annexation in 1895, the issue of race was raised by some southerners to justify their anti-annexationist sentiment. These
southerners deemed native Hawaiians as racially inferior and "not fit to be formed into a republic . . ." The result would be interminable domestic turmoil that would require periodic American intervention to restore order. In addition, others suggested that it would be impossible to incorporate Kanakes into the American union because they were inherently unassimilable. Where other foreigners might be welcomed into the United States "because in a short time they fall in love with our institutions of so much personal freedom . . .," Hawaii was "inhabited by a people totally unlike our people . . ." who could never be absorbed. Nonetheless, even opposition to annexation based upon racial prejudice often returned to the theme of republicanism. To that end, as an Austin editor argued, to embark upon an imperial policy, with the acquisition of colonies inhabited by non-white peoples, would "depart from the organic form and traditions of a republican government . . ."\(^{40}\)

During much of 1896 and 1897, the question of Hawaiian annexation received little attention in Congress or in the American public. In Congress, partisan bickering on the question produced deadlock; consequently, there were no new annexation resolutions in the offing. Annexationists bided their time until a more sympathetic president occupied the White House. More important, the Marti Revolution in Cuba entered into a bloodier phase and threatened to entangle the United States. At home, domestic politics, especially the money question, engulfed the unpopular Cleveland. In November 1896, the Republican William McKinley won a sweeping electoral victory and entered office with Republican majorities in Congress. For annexationists, the election of a Republican president promised new hope that another annexation effort might produce results.
The debate over Hawaiian annexation resumed in January of 1898 amidst increasing fears that a war with Spain over Cuba would be unavoidable. Unlike earlier debates, those in 1898 more fully engaged the American public and southern members of Congress. Southern annexationists, led by Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama, represented a minority in the region. Morgan viewed the annexation question in the context of his own vision of expanded commercial opportunities for the South. The senator declared that on his visit to the islands in 1897, he gained a greater appreciation for the native Hawaiian people and culture. Ironically, the Bourbon from Alabama concluded that native Hawaiians were as American as any other foreigners who had become United States citizens and equally capable of self-government. More important, Morgan argued, Hawaii occupied a strategic position in the Pacific that would serve as an important stopover for American merchantmen on the way to Asia and for American naval vessels protecting American commerce and the Pacific entrance to a Nicaraguan canal:

Annex Hawaii, and we will rapidly build up at Honolulu, in sight of Pearl Harbor, a commercial mart, like Hong Kong, protected by a fortress, easy of construction, far stronger than Gibraltar, that will stand sentinel over the surrounding ocean for thousands of miles.

In his final analysis, Morgan feared that American failure to annex the islands promptly would allow a foreign power, most likely Great Britain or Japan, to use its influence on the island to overthrow the pro-American government of Sanford Dole and replace it with a monarchy hostile to the United States.41

As in previous debates, Morgan spoke for the minority of southerners who favored the acquisition of Hawaii as a means to achieve commercial expansion in the Pacific. Only a few supporters for an economically revitalized New South ever embraced the colonial
policies of Morgan, but those who did usually shared Morgan's concerns regarding the commercial and strategic value of the islands. James Field, a Virginia lawyer and planter, expressed his distress at the rejection of the annexation treaty in January. Field criticized this action as "a backward movement . . . and a surrender of our Pacific and Oriental commerce." Failure to annex Hawaii, he maintained, opened the door for another power to seize it; in that event, "We should abandon all ideas of the Nicaraguan Canal . . . ."

Another prominent southerner, Walter Clark, a liberal judge from North Carolina, shared Field's concern over Hawaii's strategic importance for the development of our commerce and fears of a foreign takeover. In a letter to Senator Marion Butler, Clark stated that, "A few years hence our commerce in the Pacific will be 50 fold what it is now--or more, if China awakes to new life as Japan has done, and then Hawaii will be indispensable to us."

Despite the pleas of Morgan and other annexationists, a majority of southerners in 1898 still opposed the incorporation of Hawaii into the American union. Southern sugar producers, who had remained relatively silent during earlier debates, feared that annexationists lacked only a few votes in the Senate to achieve success, so they mounted a spirited campaign to undermine support for annexation. Southern sugar interests complained that they had only survived in the 1890's with bounties and tariff protection from foreign producers. Favorable governmental policies in the early 1890's had stabilized the industry and provided investment capital to centralize production to insure long-term profitability. The annexation of Hawaii, however, would bring a flood of cheap, raw sugar duty free into the United States and permanently cripple domestic cane producers. Because of their higher labor costs, southern sugar producers claimed they could not
compete with Hawaiian raw sugar, produced by "semi-slave labor." It was unfair to subject "our own free labor, American-grown... sugars," to unfair competition. Some sugar producers even suggested that because of the disparity in labor costs, all the "farmers of this country oppose annexation." Finally, the leading journal of domestic sugar producers challenged the assertions of annexationists that Hawaii was incapable of producing more sugar than it currently produced and, thus, posed no significant threat to the domestic cane growers. On the contrary, the *Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer* asserted; Hawaiian sugar production would "double or triple in the next five years..." Such an increase, the journal concluded, would do irreparable harm to domestic cane growers.43

Outside of the sugar growing regions of the South, most people based their objections to annexation on their paradoxical commitments to white supremacy and to republican ideology. A Florida editor warned against the United States following the lead of European empires by acquiring "distant lands and strange people..." Such a policy would "contribute to our ultimate undoing." Others feared that a colonial policy would unnecessarily entangle us with foreign nations, enlarge executive authority and lead to an expensive military buildup. To many, imperialism meant:

> entering upon a policy wholly at variance with the teachings of the founders of the republic—a policy that is out of harmony with the spirit of our institutions... in annexing Hawaii without the consent of the Hawaiians a fundamental principal of the republic would be ignored—the principal that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.44

During the debate in the House and Senate on the Hawaiian question, which ran from March to July in 1898, southern congressmen generally reflected the popular
attitudes of their native region. Congressman John Sharp Williams of Mississippi warned his colleagues of the dangers of imperialism. He pleaded with other House members to remain faithful to traditional expansion only to contiguous territory. Williams predicted that the march of colonialism could not stop at Hawaii, but would go on and on acquiring additional "stepping stones" across the globe at great expense to the treasury. This "fool's procession" of imperialism "would be to the democracy of America identical in kind . . . what the dead weight of the Indian Empire will some day prove to be to Great Britain."

Amidst loud applause, Williams concluded:

> when a self-seeking oligarchy, or a mistaken patriotism, or a criminal covetousness . . . leads our country and that flag [Stars and Stripes] out in the endless race for conquest and domination, it has lost its honor and should be furled in disgrace.\(^4\)\(^5\)

Other southern congressmen issued their own dire predictions regarding the longevity of republican institutions should the country acquire Hawaii. Thomas Ball of Texas suggested that any member mindful of "the teachings of our fathers" and of "the traditions of the past" must oppose the current measure. To annex Hawaii would violate the highest ideals of the Constitution and be the first step in making the military arm of the government superior to the civil arm. At that point, Ball exclaimed, "farewell, my country; thy honor and thy glory have departed forever, thy strength proved thy weakness."\(^4\)\(^6\)

Still other southern representatives used racial prejudice as a rationale for opposing Hawaiian annexation. Indeed, after almost seventy years of exposure to American missionaries, planters and businessmen, fewer than three percent of the islands' residents were American. Asian immigrant laborers and native Hawaiians composed the vast
majority of the population. (See Table 6) Some southerners feared that such a
heterogeneous, non-white population could never be assimilated into the body politic.

TABLE 6
Population, by nationality, of Hawaii, 1896

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number of Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiians</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>24,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>15,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>21,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian mixed blood</td>
<td>8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian and French</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other nationalities</td>
<td>1,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>109,020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table from 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Reports, no. 681, p. 43.)

Representative Adolph Meyer of Louisiana asserted that America could not have a
colonial system, "with inferior and mongrel races and mongrel governments . . .," without
sacrificing our own freedom and liberty. Furthermore, Meyer added, it was patently unfair
to place American free labor in competition with "hordes of Asiatics, Japanese, Chinese,
and others . . ." who worked in a condition of quasi-slavery."47

When debate ended in the House and Senate on the Hawaiian question in June and
July of 1898, respectively, southern congressmen voted overwhelmingly to defeat a joint
annexation resolution. In the House, only fifteen of seventy-six southern representatives
who voted favored the measure. In no instance did more than half of a state's
representatives favor the measure. Only Alabama, North Carolina, Tennessee, and
Virginia provided more than a single affirmative vote. Southern senators also provided the bulk of opposition votes. In the Upper House, of the twenty-one negative votes cast against annexation, over half (eleven votes) came from the South. Five additional southern senators would have voted no had they not been paired with other members. Clearly, the political representatives of the South made a strong indictment against colonialism and its perceived ramifications with their votes on the question of Hawaiian annexation.48

* * *

The minority of southerners who supported the annexation of Hawaii emphasized the important commercial and strategic position of the islands. Like many of their northern counterparts, southern annexationists pleaded that the United States needed a coaling station at Honolulu as a "stepping stone" to the much coveted markets of Asia. Furthermore, they viewed the acquisition of Hawaii as a vital component of projecting American military and economic power into the Pacific Basin. Finally, some southern annexationists, especially John T. Morgan, believed that the United States must seize control of Hawaii to protect a future American-built Nicaraguan canal. To allow Hawaii to fall into foreign hands would jeopardize the feasibility and the defense of the entire canal project.

In the end, the economic rationale for the annexation of Hawaii failed to persuade many southerners of the wisdom of such a measure. Most southerners feared the cultural and ideological implications of Hawaiian annexation. Certainly, many white southerners objected to the inclusion of native Hawaiians (Kanakes) and Asians into the American
body politic. Not only did many in the South harbor racial prejudice against non-whites in Hawaii, but they doubted their ability to administer affairs on the islands. In addition, southern whites feared that their own labor, especially in sugar production, would be degraded and devalued as a result of the inclusion of Hawaiian forced labor into the American union.

More important, the debate over the annexation of Hawaii touched the historical memory of southerners and raised ideological fears that the acquisition of Hawaii would lead to the ultimate destruction of the Republic. In the Hawaiian affair, many southerners quickly drew parallels between Minister Stevens' activity in Honolulu and the actions of Radicals in the South after the Civil War. In both instances, a "foreign power" intervened on behalf of a minority to establish a "carpetbag regime" to rule over an unwilling majority. By implication, southerners feared that Republicans and other jingoes would stop at nothing to obtain foreign territory and foreign peoples in absolute disregard for the Constitutional principles of self-rule and the Jeffersonian tradition of territorial expansion. The end result of colonialism, according to many southerners, would be the end of republican institutions, the erosion of states' rights and civil liberties, onerous taxes to support a bloated military, and the creation of an imperial government.

John T. Morgan's vision of a reinvigorated New South buoyed by increased international trade, an isthmian canal and the annexation of far-flung territories in the Pacific directly challenged the ideological and cultural norms of his native region. According to Joseph Fry, the chief biographer of Morgan, the Senator's rationale for annexation was "a southern rationale." Nonetheless, a majority of southerners rejected his
opinion. Morgan, in his capacity as a spokesman for a New South, defined the world in economic and strategic terms; he pursued policies that he thought would increase international trade opportunities for the South and, hence, provide economic uplift. A majority of southerners, however, found it difficult to support policies that ran counter to the region's sense of history and tradition or that challenged well-established cultural norms. In the case of Hawaii, southerners clearly repudiated the promise of economic uplift at the expense of sacrificing deeply-held principles.\textsuperscript{49}
All over the Union the cry is going up for the recognition of the rights of the Cuban patriots. The will of the people is manifesting itself in a way not to be resisted.

---Ft. Worth Gazette, 1895

We shall know in a few days what action, if any, in the matter of the Cuban insurrection, the President of the United States will recommend to Congress to take; but it is almost past hope that he will recommend the taking of any action at all. Mr. Cleveland appears to be convinced that the insurgents have done nothing to call for recognition or assistance. In which conviction he is at variance with a vast majority of his countrymen.

---New Orleans Times-Democrat, 1896
American intervention in Cuba in 1898 and the Spanish-American War had far reaching effects on shaping southerners' foreign policy attitudes. Far more than the debates over the acquisition of Hawaii or the construction of an isthmian canal, the aftermath of the war caused most southerners to reevaluate America's role in world affairs. In the late 1890's, southern interest in Cuba was hardly new; many in the South had coveted the island of Cuba as a logical point for the expansion of southern slave power in the 1840's and 1850's. The island's tropical climate, fertile soil and slave labor made it the world's leading producer of sugar by mid-century and the wealthiest of Spain's remaining colonial possessions. Socially and economically, the South and Cuba appeared to have much in common. Indeed, during these two decades, southerners viewed the acquisition of Cuba as the most important goal of American foreign policy.

Southerners had hoped that James K. Polk and the leadership of the Democratic Party could initiate and approve a plan for the annexation of the island as part of a broader program of national expansion. Polk campaigned on the theme of American expansion westward and southerners believed that he would be receptive to the idea of further expansion into the Caribbean. In 1848, pressured by leading expansionists within the Democratic Party, Polk urged his Secretary of State to offer up to $100 million for the purchase of Cuba, but Spain quickly rejected the offer. Efforts to acquire Cuba resumed during the Franklin Pierce administration. A northern Democrat, Pierce made the annexation of Cuba one of his major foreign policy objectives, believing such a move would appease southerners upset over the addition of free territory in the Mexican Cession and, thus, remove much of the vitriol from the debate over slavery. In addition, Pierce realized that many southerners feared that Spain, under British pressure, might abolish
slavery on the island of Cuba, thereby placing additional "free" territory on the periphery of the slave South. The idea of a "free Cuba" did in fact alarm many southerners because it could serve as a place of refuge for runaway slaves and as a potential source of slave revolt in the American South. In other words, the "Africanization" of the island, they feared, would be a potential source of trouble for maintaining their own social control over African slaves in the South.

Supported by leading expansionists in his own party, Pierce requested that his Secretary of State, William Marcy, draw up a plan for the peaceful acquisition of Cuba. In turn, Marcy appealed to America's most important foreign ministers in Europe—Pierre Soule, John Mason, and James Buchanan—to participate in the discussion over the cession of Cuba to the United States. Rather than conclude an agreement with Spain for the United States to acquire Cuba, the three ministers threatened Spain with the infamous Ostend Manifesto that warned Spain that the United States would be justified in seizing Cuba to protect its own national interests should Spain refuse to sell the island. The inflammatory rhetoric of the manifesto was seen as a dangerous expression of American jingoism; it also suggested that the southern slave power held undue influence over determining the goals and methods of American foreign policy. Public criticism of Pierce's failed Cuban policy destroyed any possibility that the island might be annexed during his administration.

By the mid-1850's, southern interest in Cuba had indeed acquired a purely sectional character. The South no longer looked upon the annexation of Cuba in the context of a broader, more expansive foreign policy begun by Polk and the Mexican War. Instead, many in the South, alarmed at congressional refusal to allow for the expansion of
slavery in the western territories, claimed that expansion into Cuba was vital to the economic health of the region and for the maintenance of its social institutions. Ironically, efforts to acquire Cuba, seen by Polk and Pierce as a means to alleviate sectional discord, provided an additional source of sectional animus as the possibilities of Cuban annexation faded in the late 1850's.

After the Civil War, the destruction of the South's social and economic institutions left it with little reason to be interested in Cuban affairs. Gone were fears of free labor in Cuba or of the possibilities that Cuba could promote unrest in the South; gone too was the possibility that the South could expand the institution of slavery to Cuba to exploit economic conditions on the island. As a result, southerners took no significant part in shaping American policy toward Cuba during the numerous rebellions on the island from 1865 to 1890. Although many Americans objected to a European colony so close to American shores and sympathized with rebels fighting for their freedom against a colonial power, preoccupation with domestic affairs in the late 1860's and 1870's prevented the United States from intervening in Cuba. Indeed, the nation maintained strict neutrality even in the wake of repeated appeals by native Cuban rebels, thus, assuring the defeat of various insurgent movements to Spain.³

* * *

In late February of 1895, news that another rebellion had been launched in Cuba began to appear in the southern press. Many southerners, familiar with other failed attempts to overthrow Spanish rule, gave this rebellion, led by Jose Marti, little chance for success. They quickly dismissed the latest outbreak of violence as nothing more than another attempt by a small band of disaffected Cubans, poorly led and equipped, to
challenge the power of Spain's colonial rule. A leading New Orleans newspaper declared that given the immense violence and bloodshed that accompanied past rebellions, future revolts "should not be encouraged . . . as the only result is increased burdens on the people of Cuba."  

Although the initial accounts of the Marti Revolution received little attention across the South, a report of a Spanish warship firing upon an American vessel off the coast of Cuba prompted many southerners to call for a reexamination of America's relationship with Spain and its colonial administration of Cuba. On March 8, 1895, a Spanish ship allegedly fired shots at an American mail steamer, the Alliance, as it passed through the Windward Passage. Although the steamer was not visibly damaged when it arrived in New York, the ship's captain, James Crossman, told the press that it had been fired upon despite proudly and prominently flying the "stars and stripes." Largely on the basis of Crossman's charges, Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham demanded an immediate apology and reparations from Spain. Gresham also warned Spain that it could not use the rebellion in Cuba as justification for suspending maritime rights in international waters. Even though diplomats worked quietly to diffuse this crisis, the episode lingered in the minds of many southerners and raised concerns regarding the defense of American honor.  

Southerners, generally, favored the strong assertion of America's claims and demanded a formal Spanish apology for the Alliance incident, although few suggested using the affair as a pretext for war. In addition, some in the region used this occasion to assert their own loyalty to the American flag and their determination to uphold American maritime rights. One Arkansas editor noted that the overwhelming mood of the South
regarding the affair could be seen in "the quick demand made by the press of the south for an apology from Spain for the conduct of her man-of-war . . . ." Undoubtedly, most southerners favored the forceful diplomatic assertion of America's claims and a peaceful resolution of the matter.6

On the other hand, a minority of southerners adopted less moderate views during the public debate over the Alliance affair. This small group of jingoes questioned whether a Spanish apology alone would satisfy American honor and, instead, suggested that reparations or a large indemnity should be demanded from the government in Madrid. A few extremists even argued that the nation should intervene in Cuba in order to end Spain's reason for maintaining a naval presence in the Caribbean. The price for Spain's perceived insult against the United States, such jingoes concluded, "should be the liberation of Cuba."7

In April of 1895, Secretary of State Gresham received a formal, public apology from the Spanish government, thus diffusing the immediate crisis in Spanish-American relations. Southerners appeared satisfied with the resolution of the Alliance incident; calls for punitive actions against Spain dwindled to insignificance. Indeed, the virtual absence of criticism in the South over the Cleveland Administration's handling of the episode suggested widespread approval for the peaceful resolution of the affair. Nonetheless, at a time when news of the rebellion itself was scarce, the Alliance episode focused attention on the possible complications for the United States that accompanied the rebellion in Cuba. In the end, southern reaction to the Alliance affair revealed the region's lingering concern over its perceived loyalty within the Union. Southerners addressed the issue with patriotic rhetoric and stated their desire to uphold national honor. Few in the South,
however, suggested that the Alliance affair provided a justification for engaging in a war against Spain to prove the South's loyalty.

As press accounts of the Alliance incident dwindled in April and May of 1895, news reports indicated that the Cuban rebellion was growing in strength and scope. Rebel operations moved beyond the eastern highlands in Oriente Province to the rich, sugar growing regions of central Cuba. Military confrontations in this region exacted a heavy toll on sugar and tobacco plantations and other ancillary industries, such as railroads and processing facilities. Prior to the rebellion, the volume of American trade with Cuba exceeded that of all other Latin American countries. In fact, the United States purchased almost ninety percent of all Cuban exports. As the rebellion spread westward, this trade was adversely effected; thus, some Americans with vested economic interests in Cuban affairs began to press Cleveland to intervene to stop the loss of lives and property on the island. Edwin Atkins, a Boston native and one of the largest sugar producers in Cuba, made repeated appeals to the president to use his influence to end the rebellion and preserve Spanish authority as the best means of protecting American investments on the island.8

While Atkins, his American Sugar Refining Corporation (known as the Sugar Trust), and important elements on Wall Street supported the continuation of Spanish rule on the island, many southerners expressed strong sympathy for the Cuban rebels. In addition, southerners welcomed reports of Spain's inability to terminate quickly the revolution led by Jose Martí. A rural Alabama editor observed that "... nearly every American sympathises (sic) with the oppressed islanders in their endeavor to throw off the
oppressive yoke of Spain. The efforts to secure liberty always arouses the intense sympathy of Americans.9

On June 12, 1895, Cleveland reaffirmed America's historic policy of neutrality toward the warring parties in Cuba. The president feared that abandoning neutrality would open the way for private American citizens to aid the rebels. Cleveland foresaw a flood of American supplies and arms being shipped to the insurrectos, as well as countless filibustering expeditions aimed at bolstering the rebel armies in the field. The consequences, therefore, of discontinuing American neutrality would likely lead to direct armed conflict with Spain and, possibly, its European allies. Given these alternatives, Cleveland hoped his Cuban policy would prevent a costly war with Spain and provide an opportunity for American diplomacy to end the rebellion in Cuba peacably.10

As a matter of official policy, most southerners understood the rationale behind Cleveland's declaration of neutrality. On a more emotional level, however, some southerners showed a visceral affection for the Cuban rebels and expressed anxiety that the United States could not do more to aid the cause of Cuban freedom. Undoubtedly, press reports of native Cuban rebels fighting for their own independence against a European power played upon the South's own collective understanding of the American Revolution and the Civil War and evoked considerable southern support. Some in the region glorified the exploits of Jose Marti and other rebel leaders who waged a war for freedom just as their own "Revolutionary Fathers" did in 1776. Still others compared the Cuban rebels with the heroes of the former Confederacy—Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and Jefferson Davis. From across the region, southerners praised the insurrectos as "struggling patriots" fighting against "oppression and tyranny." They arrived at the
conclusion to support belligerent rights for the Cuban rebels based upon the South's experience to gain similar recognition for the Confederate States of America during the Civil War. One observer noted that the South had "an established government, a fixed capitol, a large and victorious army . . . all the elements necessary for a strong and independent republic." Therefore, it was "right and proper for foreign powers to declare neutrality" during the American Civil War. Given the current rebellion in Cuba, it was clear that war existed between the rebels and the mother country. The rebels had even achieved victories in the field and had established a provisional government. Consequently, one southerner noted, "It is manifestly the duty of congress, as soon as it meets in December, to pass a joint resolution declaring neutrality and thus giving the Cubans belligerent rights."11

Although neither side in the rebellion observed the rules of civilized warfare, news reports in the popular press emphasized, and often exaggerated the level of Spanish barbarism. Reports of the wholesale slaughter of Cuban civilians and the summary execution of rebel prisoners proliferated in the popular press. Many of these stories emanated from either the "yellow press" in New York City or from pro-rebel Cuban juntas in Florida. As a result, the rebels gained increasing sympathy during the course of the rebellion.12

In the South, the most ardent supporters of "Cuba Libre" criticized Cleveland's conservative stance and favored the recognition of Cuban belligerency regardless of the consequences. They feared that the insurgents would be crushed unless Americans were allowed to offer their direct assistance. The United States, they added, had a moral obligation to support the efforts of "patriots" fighting for their freedom against a despotic
European power. Many favored the recognition of the insurgents because it would be "just and right." In light of the horrible stories of atrocities against the insurgents, it was not surprising that "sympathy for the Cuban patriots" rapidly increased.\textsuperscript{13}

As the rebellion progressed, several groups across the South assembled to voice their opinions on the Cuban crisis. At an October meeting of the Houston chapter of the Typographical Union, for example, members unanimously approved a resolution expressing their concerns and desires regarding the rebellion in Cuba. The resolution captured many of the popularly held attitudes in the South concerning the conflict and its relevance to the United States. It condemned Spain for its "harsh and arrogant" rule that subjected the island's residents to a system of peonage. Such a brutal administration could not be permitted to exist because "the enlightened system of liberty . . . must prevail in the New World." The resolution also expressed profound sympathy "to the struggling patriots of Cuba who are seeking . . . to throw off the Spanish yoke and enjoy their God-given right of self-government." Finally, it called upon the Cleveland administration to grant the rebels belligerent rights in the name of "justice, humanity and liberty."\textsuperscript{14}

Popular support for the recognition of the Cuban rebels continued to mount in the South during the fall of 1895, and calls for congressional intervention came from across the region. To many southerners, "the first duty of Congress at the approaching December session should be to recognize the belligerency of Cuba. The people . . . demand it." Congressional recognition, many believed, would put an end to Spanish atrocities against rebels and civilians and "force Spain to treat them with some degree of humanity." In addition, recognition would allow Cuban "relatives and friends in this country to go there and aid them with men and arms."\textsuperscript{15}
Organized groups of Cuban sympathizers also contributed to this growing popular support for "Cuba Libre" in the South. During the first months of the revolution, few mass meetings on behalf of Cuban freedom occurred. By the fall of 1895, however, various "Cuban clubs" sponsored meetings to raise money for the insurgents and create broader popular sympathy. In New Orleans, a local Cuban club held a large "camp meeting" in November to excite sympathy for Cuban freedom and to urge the federal government to extend belligerent rights to "the patriots of the island." The event included entertainment and a series of distinguished speakers, including Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Samuel D. McEnery. One by one, each speaker delivered impassioned pleas for "Cuba Libre" and urged the attendees to make generous contributions to the cause. At the close of the meeting, a resolution was read and unanimously approved imploring Congress to recognize the belligerent rights of the Cubans.16

Other groups and organizations in the region also assembled in support of belligerent rights for the Cuban rebels. In late October, the city councils of West Tampa and Jacksonville, Florida, passed resolutions urging Congress to recognize the insurrectos. Copies of their resolution were forwarded to their United States Senator, Samuel Pasco, who was called upon to take a leading role in securing such an accord during the upcoming session of Congress. In Roanoke, Virginia, a large crowd braved bad weather and assembled on behalf of "Cuba Libre." Several speakers, including the mayor and local clergymen, noted that Spain was wantonly disregarding the inalienable rights of man as articulated in the Declaration of Independence. "If any people since history began ever had a right to throw off the foreign yoke by force of arms," Reverend R. W. Patton explained to the meeting, "the people of that island are surely justifiable in the great and
unequal struggle they are making to drive Spanish tyranny from their land." The mass meeting concluded with a unanimous call to Congress to recognize the belligerent rights of the rebels.17

The only areas where significant opposition to the granting of belligerent rights developed was in certain port cities along the coast. In these communities, often regional centers of business, commerce and finance, some people—often from among the commercial class—expressed concern over the growing support for the Cuban revolution. These opponents of congressional recognition understood the "popular sympathy with the Cuban patriots in their struggle for independence," and proclaimed their own hope that the rebels would prove successful. Nevertheless, they maintained, such expressions of popular sympathy would "not justify the Government in transgressing the plain mandates of international law and treaty obligations." The United States, they concluded, must maintain strict neutrality during the rebellion in Cuba.18

Most southern opponents of granting belligerent rights probably felt less concern for the minutia of international law than they did for the perceived implications of congressional recognition. To some, sympathizing with the rebels was one thing, "but the extending to them the protection of the United States Government is another matter altogether." Commercial interests in southern port cities, already injured by the economic depression that began in 1893, undoubtedly feared that a Spanish imbroglio over Cuba might cripple southern seaborne trade. Indeed, some believed that Spain would view congressional recognition as a *casus belli* and establish a naval blockade of southern ports. In any event, coastal cities figured to be adversely effected by any Spanish naval
operations in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Consequently, some along the coast urged Congress not to "take so serious a step as that [recognition] ... unless they are anxious for a war with Spain."19

By December of 1895, several important factors had emerged in shaping southern public attitudes regarding the Cuban question. The Cuban rebels clearly enjoyed almost universal sympathy in the region. Accounts of Spanish atrocities proliferated in the southern press and created an overwhelmingly negative view of Spain's administration of the island. A few southerners even condemned Cleveland's policy of neutrality and advocated a more active, interventionist policy for the United States in Cuba. But calls arose across the South, from Texas to Florida to Virginia, for the recognition of belligerent rights, even if it threatened amicable Spanish-American relations. Other southerners, especially those associated with the region's leading business and commercial interests, expressed concerns over the rising tide of public support for a more active American role in the Cuban rebellion. Most of these opponents of recognizing the belligerent rights of the Cuban rebels lived in the coastal cities of the South, and, generally objected to recognition for strategic and economic reasons. They feared recognition could lead to a war with Spain in which their cities would be far more vulnerable to attack than any point in the interior. Also, leading business and commercial interests in the South's primary port cities undoubtedly feared that a war with Spain would paralyze oceanic commerce and slow international trade, thus, compounding the nation's economic problems arising from the depression of 1893.

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In December of 1895, the Cuban rebels launched a major offensive into west-central Cuba. After quickly marching through Matanzas province and destroying numerous sugar plantations and refineries, the insurrectos approached the outskirts of Havana. There were several reasons for the invasion of the west in December. First, the insurrectos wanted to strike Spain closer to the center of colonial authority in Havana. Such a show of force would demonstrate to other Cubans the viability of the rebellion and might encourage them to join the rebel forces. Second, the invasion sought to devastate Cuba's ability to produce sugar and, thus, impair Spain's ability to pay for the war effort. Finally, leaders of the revolution apparently saw a western invasion as a means to influence the upcoming debate in the United States Congress over the recognition of belligerent rights. Several rebel leaders, including Antonio Maceo and Estrada Palma, believed that if the insurrectos could demonstrate effective control over Cuba's sugar producers then Congress would be more likely to accord belligerent rights. If Congress recognized the rebels, it would substantially aid their attempt to obtain desperately needed ammunition and supplies for a final assault upon Havana and Pinar del Rio.20

Amidst the rebels' invasion of western Cuba and growing public sympathy in the United States for the insurrectos, Congress grappled with the question of recognition. From January to April, much of Congress's attention focused on Cuban affairs. Congressmen in both parties recognized the immense popularity of "Cuba Libre" and sought to move out ahead of public opinion on the subject of recognition. Consequently, some in Congress attempted to wrest control over recognition from the president and employ it as an issue to further injure the already unpopular Cleveland.21
The prospect of congressional recognition heightened the fears and concerns of those in the coastal South. Some residents of its port cities followed the debates with keen interest, fearful that recognition would lead to a war with Spain. Many of the leading business and commercial interests in southern port cities accepted the inevitability of a conflict with Spain and embarked on a program to ensure that their communities would be adequately defended in the event of war. As part of this "preparedness campaign," numerous business groups from the coastal South petitioned Congress to enhance their defense capabilities. In Savannah, Georgia, for example, the Cotton Exchange, the Board of Trade and the City Council petitioned Congress, "for the improvement of the coast defenses . . . ." Other resolutions came from the Chamber of Commerce, the Cotton Exchange, the Young Men's Business League and the City Council of Charleston, South Carolina, "favoring passage of a bill to provide fortifications and other seacoast defenses." Business groups from Virginia to New Orleans passed similar resolutions calling upon Congress to build up the coastal defenses of the South before passing any measure that could precipitate a war with Spain.22

Residents of coastal communities were not unanimous in their opposition to greater congressional involvement in Cuban affairs. On the contrary, outside the business communities of these coastal cities, considerable public support existed favoring the recognition of the insurrectos. In a mass meeting on January 11, 1896, in Lake Charles, Louisiana, local residents packed the courthouse in support of "Cuba Libre." Several judges delivered speeches condemning Spain's brutal administration of the island and sharply criticized the United States government for its failure to act. A local minister expressed his alarm at the policy of neutrality and "called on America to aid Cuba in the
name of liberty." At the end of the meeting, the Lake Charles gathering answered those conservatives who claimed that the rebels had not met the preconditions for recognition as outlined in international law. On the contrary, "the Cuban patriots now fighting for their independence have proven that they are able to engage in and conduct civilized warfare, maintaining order in those provinces where they have their forces." As a rebel government, exercising effective control over the territory in their possession, it was the duty of Congress "to secure for the Cuban people recognition of belligerent rights."23

Impressive levels of public support also emerged in the South's leading commercial center, New Orleans. At a mass meeting on January 20, over four hundred people braved bad weather to attend a meeting on behalf of the Cuban rebels. The planned event, including a benefit concert, raised a considerable sum of money to help widows and orphans of Cubans killed in the rebellion. A month later, two local Cuban clubs, the "Liga Cubana American de Sonoras de New Orleans" and the "Circulo Cubano Americano" organized a celebration marking the first anniversary of the revolution. Over fifty guests attended the formal ceremony, including Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Samuel D. McEnery. McEnery delivered an impassioned speech on behalf of the struggling Cubans and expressed his belief that the sympathies of most people were with the rebels.24

Public debate in Florida's coastal cities also suggested growing support for the Cuban rebels. Large numbers of Cuban immigrants lived and worked in these cities and actively supported the Cuban cause. More importantly, business and commercial interests in Florida's port cities expected to profit handsomely in the event of a war with Spain. Given Florida's proximity to Cuba, it was assumed that the state would be the major point of...
of deployment for the armed forces. With this in mind, the Jacksonville Board of Trade broke ranks with most other business organizations in southern coastal cities and supported the congressional recognition of the Cuban rebels. A similar attitude seemed to prevail on Florida's opposite coast. On February 22, 1896, a mass meeting in Tampa sponsored by local Cuban clubs attracted over three thousand persons. An observer of the meeting noted that in addition to hundreds of local Cubans, the gathering had "behind it the active sympathy and good-will of the greater portion of the English-speaking people of the city." Finally, the resident of Tampa suggested that the vast majority of Americans supported the Cuban cause and that it was only a matter of time before adequate pressure would be brought to bear upon our government to make them respect the public will.²⁵

The opposition of most southern commercial interests along the coast to the recognition of Cuban belligerency contrasted sharply with the views of other southerners. In much of the southern interior, sympathy for the rebels and support for the recognition of the insurrectos was widespread and diverse. From rural regions of North Carolina to commercial centers in the interior to immigrant communities in central Texas, support for the Cuban cause remained extremely strong. Support for the rebels also transcended most class lines; farmers seemed just as likely to support the rebellion as those in the professions or skilled trades. From across the South came a chorus of voices in January and February of 1896 urging "Congress to accord belligerent rights to the people of Cuba . . . in their struggle for freedom."²⁶

On January 28, 1896, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee introduced Cuban belligerency resolutions for consideration by the Senate. The majority resolution was concurrent; therefore, it had to be approved by both houses and did not require executive
action. It stated that a condition of war existed on the island and that full belligerent rights should be accorded the rebels. In addition, the committee reported out a more conservative minority resolution that made no demands on the president to recognize the rebels' belligerent rights. It only urged the president to offer his good offices to Spain for the purpose of recognizing the independence of Cuba.27

Debate on the resolutions began on February 20, 1896. Senator John T. Morgan, Democrat from Alabama, spoke for the majority. He reiterated the public's humanitarian concern over the widespread suffering of civilians on the island. Morgan also expressed outrage at the Spanish army's treatment of captured prisoners of war. The senator believed that recognition was justifiable given the situation in Cuba.

If we are ever called in question for making a humane declaration in favor of these victims, we shall be . . . supported by an array of facts that will call forth the sympathies of all Christendom. As the action we propose is based on justice and our regard for human rights, our sympathy for the oppressed needs not to be justified . . . by a recital of all their wrongs and sufferings.

Morgan concluded by urging his colleagues to vote for the resolution even though Spain would likely view such a measure as a *casus belli.*28

Wilkinson Call, a senator from Jacksonville, Florida, joined Morgan in supporting the passage of the majority resolution. He reviewed the last thirty years of Spain's tyrannical rule over Cuba and concluded that Spain could neither crush the current rebellion nor maintain effective control over the island in the future. As a result, the United States must secure Cuban independence in order to prevent constant turmoil in the Caribbean island. The senator also quoted extensively from documents, provided him by the Cuban junta, that served as proof that a legally constituted rebel government existed on the island. Call hoped these records would allay the concerns of opponents of
recognition who claimed that the rebels did not merit recognition under international law. As for critics who demeaned the racial composition of the rebels, Call countered, "This revolt was brought about by the intelligent and educated Spaniards who live in Cuba, natives of Cuba, and I undertake to affirm that no country, no period of time, presents a record of more distinguished ability, more heroism, more patriotism, more self-sacrifice and courage than that which is presented by the effort of the people to establish their independence."29

Finally, Senator Call drew upon America's own experience with foreign powers granting belligerent rights to the Confederacy during the Civil War as a precedent to guide American actions toward Cuba and Spain. Call noted that Spain accorded belligerent rights to the Confederate States of America thirty five years ago. He also claimed that Great Britain had recognized the belligerency of the "Southern Confederacy in its inception." Even the United States had recognized the independence of Spain's liberated colonies earlier in the century. By precedent and by example, Call implored, the nation was obligated to recognize the rebels and stop the "cruel and brutal outrages committed upon the people of Cuba."30

Only a few southern Senators spoke in opposition to recognition. The most vocal critic of the resolutions was Donelson Caffery, a sugar planter from St. Mary Parish, Louisiana. Caffery raised numerous concerns about the recognition of the rebels. The senator averred that Congress lacked the proper authority to intervene in Cuba; only the executive could recognize the rebels. Caffery also asserted that Spain, as one of the civilized nations of the world, deserved the respect and protection accorded under international law. Caffery agreed with the Spanish government that the revolution in Cuba
was a purely internal matter. Finally, Caffery declared that the Cuban rebels had not yet erected a viable government on the island, and hence, the most crucial precondition for recognition had not yet been met.  

Caffery's actions in the Senate appeared wholly inconsistent with popularly held attitudes in his home state. Although business and commercial interests in New Orleans opposed recognition, sympathy and widespread support for recognition was pervasive in that city and the state as a whole. Even most sugar planters, who had a vested economic interest in the continuation of the rebellion and the destruction of Cuba's capacity to produce sugar, failed to actively oppose recognition in 1896. Senator Caffery probably based his position not on any real concern for international law, but on his own perception that American recognition would hasten the success of the insurrection and provide for a more timely recovery of the Cuban sugar industry. Caffery, unlike many of his other colleagues in the sugar industry, believed that a restoration of the Cuban sugar industry would lead to economic ruin for domestic producers, like himself.  

Despite the objections of Caffery and others, a concurrent resolution recognizing the belligerent rights of the Cuban rebels and urging the president to offer his good offices to Spain for the purpose of achieving Cuban independence passed the Senate by a lopsided margin on February 28. Of sixty-nine votes cast in the Senate, only twelve members voted against the resolution. Among southern senators, only William Bate of Tennessee and James George of Mississippi joined Caffery to oppose the resolution. The remaining thirteen southern senators, including both members from Arkansas, Florida, Texas, and Virginia, followed their party's leadership in the Senate and voted for the measure.
Most southerners seemed satisfied that the Senate, by passing the resolution, had acted in accord with public opinion on the question. The New Orleans Times-Democrat heralded that chamber's move as atonement for its past apparent lukewarmness in behalf of the Cubans. Another editor observed that the Senate's vote "meets with the approval of the vast majority of the . . . people." Given the history of the Cuban rebellion, some found it impossible "to see why any citizen of this republic of any religion, party, or faction" could oppose the belligerency resolution.34

Southerners feared that Cleveland's desire to avoid war with Spain would prevent him from signing the belligerency resolution. By 1896, many in the South believed that opponents of recognition, such as Cleveland, used the threat of war with Spain as a diversionary tactic to protect business and commercial interests. Most dismissed the possibility of war because "a country which cannot manage a war with Cuba will hardly care to engage in a war with the United States." Calls for Cleveland to ignore big business and act in accord with public sentiment came from across the South. An Alabama physician, Thomas Parke, commented:

'Business' interests are beginning in the East to discountenance and discourage any recognition of the insurgents in Cuba, but then 'Business' interests never encourages anything that will interfere with the ordinary course of business. For one I heartily hope he [Cleveland] will act and act promptly.35

The Senate's passage of a resolution recognizing the belligerent rights of the Cuban rebels caused some southerners to reexamine their attitudes toward the revolution in Cuba and retreat from support of greater American involvement. Most southerners concluded that the passage of the belligerency resolution moved the United States closer toward war with Spain and that such a war, if prosecuted successfully, could have far-reaching

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implications for the South. In addition to business interests along the coast who continued to voice their displeasure with any proposal that might lead to war with Spain and the possible destruction of southern port cities and commerce, public debate in the interior reflected a slight diminution of popular support for recognition. In the interior, opponents of recognition cared little about the implications of the belligerency resolution on coastal commerce or the possibility of naval assaults on seaport cities. Instead, the views of anti-recognition forces stemmed from anxiety over racial issues and the cost of a war.

Some southerners in early 1896 expressed apprehension about the United States becoming involved in Cuba on behalf of non-white persons. While few sympathized with Spain, opponents of recognition feared that American help for the rebels would be wasted because their racial composition made them morally and socially incapable of governing themselves. One observer noted that "The main body of the Cuban people is a compound of Spanish and negro, the composite mass being worse than either of the ingredients."

Furthermore, some argued that despite the pro-rebel rhetoric of the "yellow press" and the Cuban juntas that glorified the liberty-loving insurrectos, the racial composition of the insurrectos—"hordes of ferocious and depraved mongrels"—predisposed them to be animated by their own libidinal impulses to "live by rapine and pillage and . . . the desire to plunder . . . ."36

Some southerners also opposed recognition because they feared the high cost of a possible war with Spain, especially at a time when America's resources were seriously taxed by the depression. Even if a war with Spain was relatively short and inexpensive, they believed, the cost of providing pensions and veterans' benefits would bankrupt the country. Union pension rolls after the Civil War served as a constant reminder of the
protracted costs of war and of the possibilities for abuse in the veterans' bureau.

Southerners were particularly sensitive to this issue because they resented paying taxes to support Union veterans and their families. Based on our experience with Union veterans' pensions, one southerner concluded, "in 1930 we would be paying pensions to more soldiers than were engaged in the war!" Given the high cost of a war with Spain, and the pressing needs of Americans at home, some in the South suggested that it would be best "If Congress would leave Cuban affairs alone for a while and give some attention to those of this country . . . ." 37

Despite growing public reservations about an active policy toward Cuba, the House of Representatives debated its own belligerency resolution early in 1896. There, unlike in the Senate, southern opponents of recognition figured prominently. Henry St. George Tucker, of Virginia, was the lone member on the House Committee of Foreign Affairs to oppose reporting out a resolution recognizing belligerent rights. During debate in the House, Tucker pleaded for Congress to respect the doctrine of foreign non-intervention as preached by the Founding Fathers. He noted that idle talk and sympathy are usually cheap, but, in this case, they could lead to a costly war with Spain. In addition, he castigated those who supported the resolution for hiding behind their expressions of sympathy to conceal their real intent to conquer Cuba. Finally, Tucker stated that he, and the South, opposed any measure that might bring war:

\[\ldots\] our people are not for war. I see in these resolutions the occasion for it. The Southern people have had enough of war. They know what it is. For four years they endured and suffered as no other people ever did. 38

In a similar appeal, Henry Turner of Georgia, pleaded for Congress not to provoke a war with Spain. Turner believed that a war would bring terrible consequences to the
nation. War would likely curtail American commerce and paralyze seaborne trade. He also feared that war would further depress cotton prices. The South as "the section of the country already desolated by war would be still further impoverished . . . ." Since his native region had yet fully recovered from the horrors of one war, he vowed his opposition to any measure that risked another war.39

Turner continued his speech by appealing to the racist views of many white Americans. He suggested that in the future, when Americans reflected upon America's experience after the Civil War, they would conclude that the problems of Reconstruction stemmed from empowering racially inferior people in the South. African-Americans, he averred, belonged to a race that was incapable of self-government. Extending his arguments to the situation in Cuba, Turner remarked that a high percentage of people on the island were of African descent; therefore, they lacked the requisite characteristics "for liberty and good government and free institutions." Appealing to the basest fears of many Americans, Turner alleged that the current rebellion was largely a race war and that the United States should not interfere. Amidst considerable applause in the House, Turner concluded, "I, for one, . . . have had enough of reconstruction."40

On April 6, 1896, the House voted on the concurrent resolutions. The measures passed by a huge margin; two hundred and forty seven members voted for the measure with only twenty seven members opposed. Eighty representatives did not vote. Although the vast majority of southern congressmen voted for the measure, one-third of all the negative votes came from the South. With this vote, the Congress of the United States went on record as supporting the recognition of Cuban belligerency and the active involvement of the president to effect the independence of Cuba.41
The rebel invasion of western Cuba in 1895-1896 not only spurred Congressional action, it also brought a more forceful response from Spain. Few in Spain could believe how quickly the insurrectos had reached the outskirts of Havana. The Martí Revolution could no longer be summarily dismissed as merely another attempt by a small, indigenous, separatist group to weaken Spanish rule. This revolution had assumed national proportions and had as its intent the destruction of Spanish rule over the island. Recognizing a significant challenge to Spanish sovereignty, Madrid immediately reorganized and enlarged their forces on the island. By early 1896, Spain had almost 200,000 men in the field. Madrid also replaced the Spanish Governor General of Cuba, Martinez Campos, with a veteran commander, General Valeriano Weyler.

General Weyler arrived in Cuba in February of 1896 and implemented a new strategy designed to crush the rebellion. Weyler believed that the rebels received sustenance from sympathetic non-combatants across the island. With the Cuban peasantry free to move from town to town, they could offer supplies, aid and intelligence to the insurrectos. Weyler's approach, therefore, was to "answer war with war." He dramatically escalated the level of violence and brutality on the island. The general ordered the wholesale destruction of homes, crops, and livestock; peasants in certain zones were forced to relocate into densely packed, filthy, garrisoned towns, appropriately called "reconcentration camps." In these squalid, disease-ridden camps, "reconcentrados" died by the tens of thousands.  

The attitudes of African-Americans in the South to deteriorating conditions on the island and the United States government's response to the Cuban question is extremely difficult to discern. The dearth of southern black newspaper accounts for this period and
of extant manuscript evidence on this subject provides few opportunities to render firm conclusions. In addition, it is likely that many African-Americans feared acting on any sympathies they may have held because of the possibility of white retaliation. The historian Willard Gatewood, Jr., using primarily northern black newspapers as his source, suggested that African-Americans generally sympathized with the Cuban rebels. African-Americans, given their history of slavery and servitude, identified with the struggle of another oppressed people, native Cubans, in their fight for independence against Spain. Mrs. Bishop C.C. Pettey, a black woman from New Bern, North Carolina, indicated her horror at the stories of Spanish atrocities and her impatience with American policy. In an article in *The Star of Zion*, Mrs. Pettey concluded, "If the United States had recognized the belligerency of the insurgents... peace would have doubtless reigned on the island today." She added that God would soon punish Spain for its malevolence and then Cubans could "rejoice in the triumph of their political freedom."43

Despite the horrible images of war that appeared in the press, the opposition of some white southerners to recognition or other forms of intervention remained steadfast. After the passage of the concurrent resolution by the House, a New Orleans editor warned the president not to sign the measure because the "result might be war with Spain... [and]... war would not result in any great gain for the U.S. and would cost much money and considerable number of lives." The resolutions also excited the passions of some in Mobile who feared that the action of Congress was "equivalent to a declaration of war."44

The passage of the belligerency resolution undoubtedly heightened the anxiety of those in southern port cities over the possibility of war with Spain. Spain's action and rhetoric further compounded the fears of a naval attack. An article in the Spanish press by
Lieutenant Gutierrez Lobcal, the naval attaché of Spain at Washington, ridiculed America's seacoast defenses and its inability to repel a large naval assault against its port cities. Based upon their knowledge of southern seacoast defenses, few in the coastal South could refute Lobcal's assertions. Lobcal's article caused some southerners to question the wisdom of Congress unnecessarily provoking Spain. One southerner remarked:

> It is difficult to understand how Senator Morgan and others can conscientiously urge a course in respect to Cuba that would almost, certainly, result in war knowing that all of the coast cities . . . are more or less exposed to hostile navies . . . . What is to hinder a fleet from destroying Savannah, Mobile or Galveston?45

Amidst growing public debate over Cuban recognition, President Cleveland refused to act on the concurrent resolution recognizing insurgent belligerency and urging him to use his good offices to bring about peace on the basis of an independent Cuba. Instead, Cleveland and his Secretary of State, Richard Olney, continued strictly enforcing neutrality laws while working toward a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of the Cuban crisis. In April of 1896, Olney sent a diplomatic message to the Spanish minister, Enrique Dupuy De Lôme, detailing the administration's position regarding the rebellion. In his message, Olney expressed his disappointment that Spain had not lived up to its promises to quickly crush the rebellion, since outside of the towns, the rebels held the upper hand. The magnitude and length of the rebellion, Olney continued, had seriously injured the productive capabilities of the island. Since the beginning of the revolution in 1895, the productive value of Cuban goods had declined seventy-five percent. Nonetheless, Olney reassured Spain that the administration was loathe to intervene on behalf of the rebels because of concerns that they were incapable of self-government and would embroil the island in a race war. Consequently, Olney urged Spain to enact meaningful reforms on the
island and ask the American president to serve as mediator. Two months later, Spain responded with an unqualified rejection of Olney's demands.\textsuperscript{46}

After Spain refused his offer, Cleveland sought information and advice from his newly-appointed consul-general in Havana, Fitzhugh Lee. The administration had appointed Lee, a Confederate general, nephew of Robert E. Lee, and former governor of Virginia, because of his military expertise. Cleveland expected Lee to evaluate fairly and accurately the military situation on the ground and offer insightful analysis. Lee concluded that the war was at an impasse and that Spain could never completely subdue the rebels. The consul-general also maintained that the insurrectos would not accept any Spanish reforms short of absolute independence. To end the conflict, therefore, Lee believed that the United States should offer to buy the island from Spain.\textsuperscript{47}

Lee's reports from Cuba alarmed the president. Cleveland hoped that conditions on the island would provide opportunities for future diplomatic initiatives. The military stalemate and the obstinacy of both parties left the administration with very little room for maneuver. As for Lee's proposal to buy the island, Cleveland gave the measure little serious consideration. Since the United States did not want the island, it would be foolish to buy it and turn it over to native Cubans, who he suspected were incapable of self-rule. Thus, the summer of 1896 was marked by an impasse among public opinion, Congress and Cleveland.\textsuperscript{48}

Many southerners added Cleveland's obduracy on the Cuban question to a long list of grievances they held against the president. Although the Democratic South had held firm against Populism in 1892, Cleveland's support in the region had declined markedly since the depression. Cotton prices had dropped, Populism was revived and the
president's fiscal policies threatened to split the Solid South. Cleveland also suffered in
the South from allegations that he had engaged in nefarious dealings with the House of
Morgan and other Wall Street financiers to secure a contract for a bond sale of $100
million to shore up the nation's gold reserves. Indeed, reports of meetings between the
Treasury and Wall Street bankers received almost universal condemnation in the southern
press in 1895. Most important, however, Cleveland's unflinching support for the gold
standard alienated southerners who rallied around a radical reform of the nation's currency
system with the remonetization of silver. Indeed, by the time of the Democratic
nominating convention in Chicago in July of 1896, all of the southern state Democratic
organs had indicated their support for free silver. As the convention progressed, it became
apparent that Cleveland had not only lost the support of the once Solid South, but of the
national Democratic party as well. The delegates nominated the free silver champion from
Nebraska, William J. Bryan.49

After the Democratic Convention of 1896, many southerners framed the lame-
duck president's Cuban policy in the context of his perceived failings in the area of
financial reform. During the political battles over the money question in 1895-1896, many
southerners concluded that Cleveland's sound money policy was the result of his
obsequiousness to America's wealthiest capitalists. So, too, many southerners suspected
that Cleveland's Cuban policy, which seemed to defy public opinion, derived from a similar
cabal. A Populist editor reminded his readers of the horrible atrocities taking place in
Cuba, of the congressional resolutions supporting belligerency rights for the rebels, and
the historic parallels between the Cuban struggle for liberty and our own. Cleveland's
indifference in the matter was simply unfathomable and led one southerner to exclaim,
"Hang such a president... why didn't he recognize as belligerents the brave Cubans."

Other more moderate spokesmen expressed dismay at Cleveland's commitment to neutrality that prevented "the true feeling of the American people... from manifesting itself."

During Cleveland's last months in office, southern supporters of a more aggressive policy toward Cuba continued their attacks against the White House. Many of them realized that,

nothing need be expected of Mr. Cleveland, who... has shown a brutal indifference to public opinion... when the last word in the history of his administration shall have been written, no darker chapter will be found there than those which tell the story of the Cuban struggle and of Cleveland...

Due to widespread dissatisfaction with Cleveland, many southerners eagerly anticipated a change in the White House. Although they preferred a Bryan victory, they felt assured that even the Republican candidate would be more responsive to prevailing popular sentiment on the Cuban question than Cleveland had been.

The Cuban question received scant attention in the final months before the election of 1896. During the party nominating conventions, the respective party platforms presented a different vision for the future course of American foreign policy, including a response to the Cuban Revolution. The Democrats largely endorsed Cleveland's policy of neutrality, but they did express sympathy to the people of Cuba. Republicans, on the other hand, endorsed a more aggressive foreign policy, including a call for the United States government to "actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the Island." Nonetheless, neither national party emphasized these
differences during the presidential campaign. Instead, domestic issues such as currency
reform and the tariff dominated the parties', and the public's, attention.52

Although the election in November produced a resounding victory for McKinley
and the Republican party, Cleveland made one last attempt to resolve the rebellion in
Cuba. In his final message to Congress on December 7, 1896, he clearly articulated his
Cuban policy to the public. After almost two years of war, the president observed, Spain
appeared no closer to crushing the rebellion than at the time of his last annual message a
year ago. Spain still exercised virtual control of the large cities and their environs; the
countryside had "either given over to anarchy or is subject to the military occupation" by
the rebels. Nonetheless, Cleveland repeated his opposition to recognizing the putative
insurgent government because it had "given up all attempts to exercise its functions" as
required by international law. Cleveland then issued a stern warning to Spain. He
asserted that America's patience with Spain's inability to restore peaceful authority over
the entire island was reaching a critical stage. More and more Americans desired active
United States intervention to protect their investments on the island; still others railed
against the cost of policing our coastlines to prevent unlawful filibustering expeditions
from reaching Cuba. In addition, Cleveland warned that if Spain's authority became
completely ineffective, and the war became one of wanton and useless destruction of lives
and property, then the United States would be forced to intervene on humanitarian
grounds.53

Cleveland's warning to Spain represented no significant change in the
administration's position. Despite the message's firmer tone towards Spain, the president
still refused to recognize the belligerent rights of the Cuban insurrectos. He also

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challenged jingoes in Congress by declaring that recognition was impossible since the rebels had no government to recognize. Not surprisingly, the Spanish Foreign Minister in Washington, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, perceived the message as favorable to Spain; clearly, he concluded, Cleveland planned no further action on the Cuban question during his final months in office.54

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By the time of McKinley's election in November of 1896, southern public attitudes regarding the situation in Cuba were well-established. The continued opposition of commercial interests in southern port cities to a more aggressive policy toward Spain remained almost universal. Certainly, the passage of congressional resolutions recognizing the belligerency rights of the rebels added a new sense of urgency to their opposition. In general, business and other financial interests in southern coastal cities feared that recognition would provoke Spain into declaring war against the United States. In the event of a war with Spain, their cities could be expected to bear the brunt of attacks by the Spanish navy. Certainly, the inadequacy of the South's coastal defenses heightened their feelings of vulnerability to a Spanish naval attack. Finally, business groups in many southern port cities believed that a war between the United States and Spain would virtually paralyze seaborne commerce in the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic. Such a diminution of trade would have a profoundly negative impact on local economies and jeopardize the prospects for an economic recovery from the depression.

Only in Florida's coastal cities did business interests appear unconcerned over the prospect of war. In fact, several business groups in Florida supported the congressional recognition of the rebels. The proximity of Florida to Cuba made it likely that the state
would serve as the nation's primary staging area in the event of a war with Spain. The flood of men, material and federal dollars that would be sent to the state could translate into large profits for many of Florida's businesses. In addition, the large number of Cuban immigrants and the activities of the Cuban juntas in the state's coastal cities supported the position taken by leading commercial interests in the state.

In the rest of the South, support for recognition and for a more active policy was widespread. Most southerners felt sympathy and compassion for the rebels. Spanish atrocity stories shocked many in the region and led them to demand an American policy that would relieve much of the human suffering on the island. The South, too, felt a special bond with the Cuban rebels. Native Cubans, like an earlier generation of southerners, sought to throw off the yoke of a tyrannical power. A common experience in seeking self-determination led many to support the insurrectos in their quest for liberty. In short, humanitarianism and historical memory combined to produce extensive southern support for "Cuba Libre."

The passage of a concurrent resolution by both houses of Congress early in 1896 caused some in the South to reflect more carefully on the ramifications of direct intervention in the Cuban crisis. While congressional debates and the resolution did little to alter prevailing attitudes in the region, actions in Washington created more anxiety among those who feared a war and its consequences. Some southerners raised concerns that American intervention on behalf of non-white Cubans would be improvident; southern racist assumptions held that the Cuban rebels were incapable of self-rule. Still others in the South suggested that involvement in Cuba against Spain would be an extremely costly affair. Given the depressed state of the American economy, it seemed foolish for the
nation to provoke a foreign war that would further drain America's resources. Although only a mere rumble in 1896, southern critics of a more aggressive policy outside of the South's port cities began to raise important questions that would gain far greater acceptance as the crisis in Cuba intensified.
CHAPTER 4
THE SOUTH AND THE DRIFT TOWARD WAR,
1897-1898

An incident that happened at the opera house in this city last Saturday night demonstrates the intense feeling that pervades the public mind relative to Cuba. A comic actor...was giving the Bowery style of ordering the wants of customers in a restaurant. A girl wanted a dessert and finally asked for "a floating island." The head caterer immediately shouted "One Free Cuba." The mention of the name caused a wild burst of continuous applause. There is no mistaking the temper of the people in sympathy with the struggling patriots.

—Shreveport Times, 2 March 1897

What defense is there for...the port of Mobile in case of war with any first-class naval power? Fort Morgan is undergoing great improvement, but the great guns that are to be the weapons of defence are as yet on the cars in this city. The old guns at the fort, if still in position, could not be relied upon to do any damage to a modern war vessel. If attacked, Fort Morgan would have to surrender, for it is wholly defenceless. Pensacola is in the same fix, only worse, for that city can be bombarded from the sea. New Orleans is not any better off. Galveston is likewise helpless....

—Mobile Daily Register, 29 Jan. 1898
Prior to McKinley's inauguration, southerners appeared seriously divided over the proper course of action regarding the Cuban question. Southern interventionists, especially in the rural interior, viewed the situation in Cuba based largely upon their own historical memory and their understanding of domestic politics. These southerners often compared the rebels in Cuba fighting for independence against Spain with their own heroes—the Founding Fathers of the American Revolution and the leaders of the Confederacy. Therefore, they claimed that the United States should aid the rebels in their quest for self-determination against the Spanish monarchy. In addition, southern interventionists tended to evaluate the government's policy toward Cuba in the context of their attitudes toward their own society and national politics. Many of them suspected that just as large capitalists and financiers conspired to defeat a popular outcry for "free silver," so, too, they plotted to prevent American intervention in behalf of the oppressed people of Cuba. The notion of a conspiracy among Republicans, wealthy capitalists, and "gold-bug" Democrats had great explanatory power to the people of the rural interior, in both domestic and foreign affairs.

In many coastal cities of the South, in contrast, most residents seemed apprehensive about becoming entangled in Cuban affairs. Although many people in the coastal plains sympathized with the Cuban rebels, they feared direct American intervention would lead to a war with Spain. And if it did, they predicted, the coastal South would suffer both physically and economically. Spanish naval ships would likely bombard southern ports and blockade access to seaborne commerce in the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic. Such attacks would be devastating to the South.
During McKinley's first year in office, changing circumstances in Washington, Madrid and Cuba led many southerners, especially interventionists, to reevaluate their position on the Cuban question. The election of 1896 produced Republican majorities in both houses of Congress and presaged a rising tide of jingoist rhetoric from Washington. Partisan wrangling in Congress led both parties to take a more aggressive stance on the Cuban question out of fear that they would be assailed by a public they perceived as favoring stronger action. Reports of failed negotiations between Washington and Madrid and of continued atrocities in Cuba produced a distinctly anxious public mood that made the prospect for war more real. During these months, southerners looked more carefully at the possible consequences of war with Spain. Some southern Democrats then sought to place their party squarely ahead of public opinion on the subject of Cuba. Other southerners voiced concerns about a foreign war and its implications for the future of the American republic. On the eve of war, the South remained divided; only when official reports linked Spain to the humanitarian disaster in Cuba and the destruction of the U.S.S. Maine did a southern consensus for war emerge.

*   *   *

Despite widespread southern opposition to Cleveland's policy, few in the South expected any real changes after the inauguration of William McKinley. Many viewed the Republican president-elect as even more closely aligned to big business than his predecessor. During the presidential campaign, the G.O.P., under the able leadership of Marcus Hanna, raised vast sums of money for their candidate and many southern Democrats assumed that these large campaign contributors would profoundly influence McKinley's policy toward Cuba.³
The fears of southern interventionists that leading business interests would pressure the president to avoid direct involvement in the island's affairs stemmed from the important position Cuban trade occupied under Spanish rule. American investors on the island and those engaged in Cuban-American commerce had been seriously injured since the beginning of the rebellion. From 1894 to 1897, total imports and exports between the two nations declined one-third; Cuban sugar and tobacco imports into the United States plummeted nearly eighty percent. As a result of declining Cuban production, the powerful American Sugar Trust had to pay three to four dollars more per ton for sugar imported from other sources. In addition the spread of the rebellion caused American property owners on the island to fear that their holdings would be destroyed or seized should the rebels prove victorious. American investors in Cuba, with holdings estimated at about $50 million, were sure to place the same demands on McKinley that they had placed on Cleveland—a quick end to the war and the maintenance of Spanish sovereignty.4

McKinley's inaugural address of March 4, 1897, did little to ease the doubts of those who sought a change in America's policy toward Cuba. McKinley cited George Washington's policy of non-interference with foreign nations and pledged that his administration would not meddle in the domestic affairs of other nations. McKinley issued no expression of sympathy for the rebels nor pointed to any contingency that would require direct American intervention. He concluded his cursory comments on Cuba with the statement, "War should never be entered upon until every agency of peace has failed; peace is preferable to war . . . ."5

McKinley's inaugural message, therefore, offered little insight into what changes, if any, his administration would make in Cuban policy. Obviously, though, he had rejected

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the appeals from the public and members of his own party who supported immediate intervention. McKinley, like his predecessor, preferred a more moderate course of action. The new president sought to give Spain every possible opportunity to enact reforms that would bring an end to the revolution in Cuba and restore Spanish authority. During the spring of 1897, in sum, McKinley continued Cleveland's policy of neutrality while gathering additional information about conditions on the island.6

In the spring of 1897, public sentiment in favor of American intervention increased with the publication of various reports of Spain's mistreatment of American citizens on the island of Cuba. Thousands of Cubans became naturalized citizens of the United States in the hope that Spain would not injure their lives or property. Spanish officials rarely recognized the legitimacy of their American citizenship and captured many of them as insurgents or seized their property. Claims made by these recently naturalized United States citizens, combined with those filed by American nationals, mounted steadily in 1897. Finally, and most importantly, consular dispatches from Havana corroborated many of the press reports and confirmed that at least eight hundred American citizens had been placed in Weyler's reconcentration camps. In the South, some viewed these revelations as evidence that Spain ignored the rights of American citizens abroad and failed to respect the power and dignity of the United States as a nation. Although most southerners believed that the United States should simply negotiate with Spain to protect its citizens and preserve its national honor, some extremists suggested that the situation warranted direct American intervention. One observer condemned McKinley for allowing "American citizens in Cuba to be butchered" and hoped that he would not delay too long before intervening. Given the present desperate situation on the island, and the "extreme cruelty"
practiced by Spain against American citizens, he wrote, "something should be done and that quickly." 7

In an attempt to seize the initiative on the Cuban question from the president, Congress took up the issue in the spring of 1897. Called into special session to deal with tariff reform, Congress quickly turned its attention to Cuba. In the Senate, on April 6, John T. Morgan of Alabama introduced a joint resolution recognizing Cuban belligerency. Since a state of public war existed between Spain and Cuba, the resolution maintained, strict American neutrality demanded the recognition of the belligerent rights of both parties. Speaking in support of his resolution, Morgan reiterated his outrage at Spain's conduct toward Cuban civilians and American citizens on the island. The latter group, Morgan exclaimed, had had "their rights, liberties, and lives . . . placed under the power of a brutal authority . . . ." American recognition of the rebels would lead to better Spanish treatment for Cuban rebels and American citizens alike. After a month of intermittent debate, the Senate passed the resolution by a vote of 41 to 14, with 33 abstentions. Southern senators voted almost unanimously in favor of the measure. Among southerners who voted, only Donelson Caffery of Louisiana voted no. Undoubtedly, the large southern vote in favor of Morgan's resolution reflected southern members' loyalty to Morgan and their desire to use the issue as a political club against the Republican party and the president. 8

In the House, Joe Bailey of Texas, the leader of House Democrats, shared the belief that his party could use the Morgan Resolution, the issue of recognition, and the question of appropriations for the relief of Americans suffering in Cuba to turn public opinion against the McKinley Administration and embarrass the president. Although
Bailey disliked the notion of war with Spain, and opposed American territorial expansion, he waged a spirited battle with the White House and Republicans over Cuba. He often attacked the motives of Republicans, especially the president, and accused them of being proxies for the moneyed interests of the nation.

On May 20, when the Morgan Resolution reached the House, Speaker Thomas Reed blocked a vote on the measure. Reed disliked the insurgents and supported McKinley's policy of non-recognition. In addition, the speaker feared House passage of the belligerency resolution would embarrass both the Republican party and the president. On the other hand, Reed supported congressional efforts to appropriate money for the relief of Americans suffering in Cuba. Consequently, Reed sought unanimous consent of a resolution authorizing $50,000 for Cuban relief. At this point, Bailey rose to oppose the relief bill unless the resolution favoring the recognition of Cuban belligerency was attached to it. In a parliamentary maneuver, Reed blocked consideration of the Morgan Resolution and sparked a vigorous protest from Bailey and other House Democrats.9

During the raucous debate that followed Reed's ruling, virtually the entire two hours allowed for debate dealt not with the legality of Reed's ruling, but with other aspects of the broader Cuban question. In a bitter partisan speech, Bailey suggested that McKinley ignored the Republican platform favoring the recognition of the insurrectos, not because conditions have changed . . . but because powerful influences have been exerted to prevent your proceeding. The stock gamblers have become alarmed, and they would rather see their country insulted than to have their operations disturbed . . . preferring, as you always have, the interests of wealth above the rights of humanity, you are endeavoring to evade and postpone this [Cuban] question.10
Two other representatives, John Sharp Williams and Joseph Wheeler, followed Bailey to the floor of the House and expressed their concerns regarding the Cuban question. Their speeches emphasized common themes—the obligation of the United States to intervene on behalf of a people struggling for liberty, humanitarian concerns, and, most important, the malignant influence of "the money power" over foreign policy. Williams, of Yazoo City, Mississippi, spoke first. He delivered a scathing partisan attack on Republicans and the Speaker of the House and suggested that "a plutocratic influence" dictated their inaction. Williams believed that the United States was duty-bound, because of its history, its sense of mission, and its "superior" racial composition, to rally to the aid of the insurgents fighting for freedom in Cuba. To continue to do nothing reflected a "sad change in the character of the Anglo-Saxon race, which previously rallied to the cause of liberty." But thus far, he exclaimed, American policy toward Cuba reflected only the subordination of the nation's democratic goals and moral values to the corrupting influence of big business.

For a nation . . . to come to the conclusion . . . that the only thing to be considered in their relations with the other nations of the earth is the money question, the trade question, the effect on stocks and bonds, and the disturbance of business, carries degradation so far that I do not believe any man was ever gifted with power to express the contempt that a real man ought to feel for it.11

Joseph Wheeler, of Alabama, spoke shortly after the conclusion of Williams' remarks. He, too, castigated Republicans for their failure to lead on the question of granting Cuban belligerency and charged that they employed subterfuge to block the passage of a belligerency resolution. He dismissed Republicans' claims that a state of war did not exist on the island and, therefore, the entire question of recognition was moot.
Wheeler, a former Confederate general, reminded his colleagues that Spain had more soldiers in Cuba than the Confederacy had under arms in 1863. Clearly, a state of war, "cruel, brutal, murderous war," existed in that "Gem of the Ocean." Wheeler, like Williams, blamed "the pride of gold" for thwarting the popular will that supported Cuban belligerency. Wheeler contended that Congress must reject the wishes of powerful economic interest groups and pass the belligerency resolution. Amidst loud applause, he concluded, "If we fail to do this, we are recreant to our pledges . . . to civilization, to humanity." In the end, the House passed only the bill providing $50,000 for humanitarian relief as House Republicans sustained Reed's rule prohibiting a vote on the belligerency resolution.12

Despite the support of southern members in Congress, the Morgan Resolution proved far less popular with the southern public. While a majority of southerners still sympathized with the insurrectos and "Cuba Libre," many in the South feared the resolution would push the nation dangerously close to war with Spain. Criticism of intervention, once largely confined to the coastal South, began to appear in the interior among southerners who had no clear connection to coastal commerce. In addition, opponents of the Morgan Resolution raised many different objections to Congress's actions, some of which had not figured prominently in earlier debates on Cuba.

Some southerners criticized jingoes in Congress for pursuing a course of action that threatened to involve the United States in the internal affairs of another nation. To these critics, Spain legally possessed the island of Cuba and was justified under international law in suppressing the rebellion. "The island of Cuba belongs to Spain just as much as Arkansas belongs to the nation . . .," an Arkansas editor explained. Another
critic of the resolution, Rebecca L. Felton, a Georgia physician, minister, and champion of progressive causes, dismissed the argument that the United States had a higher obligation to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Felton noted that Spaniards and their immediate descendants owned virtually all of the property in Cuba, and that the Spanish ruling class on the island favored the continuation of Spanish rule. Therefore, Felton contended, American intervention in Cuba could only be regarded as a move to appease the jingoes, for such a crusade lacked popular support in Cuba. Spain was not a "heartless invader;" it owned the island. On the other hand, Felton asked, if "the United States [should] send over its soldiers to aid the Cuban insurgents, would not the United States be regarded as the invading nation?"13

Some southerners also feared that Cuban intervention and a war with Spain would undermine several principles that had long shaped America's foreign policy. George Washington's warning to avoid alliances with foreign nations and the Founding Fathers' policy of non-interference in the affairs of other nations bolstered the arguments of non-interventionists. Abandoning America's historic isolation, some southerners feared, threatened to involve the United States in the conflicts of Europe and its periodic wars. Others in the South suggested that a war with Spain would mark not only the end of the volunteer army but the very ideal of the citizen-soldier. Since the founding of the Republic, most Americans viewed standing armies as anathema; they were unresponsive to public control and threatened the liberty of ordinary citizens. During the debate over Cuba, some southerners suspected that the most ardent expansionists "would not hesitate to create [foreign] disturbances as a means of rendering such enlargement tolerable." Southern non-interventionists, wary of the motives of expansionists, raised the possibility
that a greatly enlarged, permanent military establishment could someday be turned against
the citizens of the nation. These concerns appeared particularly alarming to southerners
who still chafed over the military occupation of the South during Reconstruction.\textsuperscript{14}

Most often, though, racial concerns dominated the public discourse of southern
non-interventionists during congressional consideration of the Morgan Resolution. The
unvarnished racism of some in the South bred determined opposition to any policy that
jeopardized peaceful relations with Spain in order to help native Cubans. Regardless of
reports of cruelty and suffering, one southerner stated, the United States should not be
concerned "over a lot of dagos and mongrels in Cuba." Some southerners also deemed
the rebels incapable of administering civil affairs on the island in the event they gained
independence. While virtually all white southerners agreed that Anglo-Saxons had
mastered the art of politics, "the cut-throats, brigands and otherwise detestable insurgents
in Cuba . . . mixtures of Negroes, Indians and low Spanish," were unlikely ever to advance
beyond the state of barbarism.\textsuperscript{15}

The South's reaction to debate over the Morgan Resolution reflected the region's
growing concern over the long-term implications of a foreign war on the United States
and the South. Congressional consideration of the resolution raised southerners' fears that
a war with Spain was probable and, therefore, caused many in the region to reevaluate
their position. Widespread feelings of sympathy for the Cuban rebels and concern over
humanitarian abuses against Cuban natives stemmed from some southerners' visceral
identification with the Cuban revolution based on their own understanding of the
American Revolution, the Civil War and Reconstruction. Public discussion of the Cuban
question, especially among non-interventionists, had addressed the possibility of war as an
abstract concern; few in the South actually expected it to occur. Support for intervention, however, diminished as the likelihood of war raised significant issues of importance to the South about the perils of foreign wars and the possible acquisition of foreign territories.

The rhetoric of southern congressmen during the debate over the Morgan Resolution betrayed the growing division of opinion in the South concerning the issue of the recognition of Cuban belligerency. Morgan, author of the resolution, believed his measure enjoyed widespread popularity in the South. Similarly, other southern congressmen, such as Bailey, Williams, and Wheeler, played important roles in advocating passage of the resolution in the House. The irony of their action, however, was that in supporting the recognition of Cuban belligerency, and raising the specter of war with Spain, they weakened support for recognition in their native region. Rather than reflecting majority sentiment on the Cuban question, these politicians sought to lead southerners toward a consensus for recognition and intervention.

During the late summer months of 1897, American consideration of the Cuban question took another turn after the assassination of Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo. The assassination of Castillo produced a governmental crisis; the Queen Regent named a new government led by General Marcelo Azcárraga, the former Conservative Minister of War. Most Spanish politicians realized that Azcárraga's appointment represented only a temporary solution to Spain's vexing problems because he lacked the requisite political stature to unify the Conservative Party. Despite the new government's precarious position, Azcárraga and his Minister of State, the Duke of Tetuán received an important American diplomatic mission only a few weeks after assuming power.16
On September 18, 1897, the United States Minister to Spain, Stewart L. Woodford, conveyed the substance of McKinley's Spanish policy to the government in Madrid. McKinley, trying to counter the efforts of legislators who would use his inaction on Cuba to embarrass the administration, issued a sharp rebuke to Spain for its inability to restore peace on the island in a timely fashion. He pointed out that Spain exercised only nominal control over much of Cuba, and questioned whether it could ever restore its relationship with Cuba, even if it did crush the rebellion. Woodford also indicated to the Spanish government that although the president wanted peace with Spain, he could not sit idly by while American lives and property were destroyed by the conflict. Finally, Woodford, speaking on behalf of the president, issued a veiled threat of American intervention unless Spain showed some meaningful signs of reform by November 1.

McKinley's message further complicated Spain's domestic political situation. Spanish political leaders realized that Azcárraga and Tetuán were neither likely to rally popular support against the American demands nor to propose any substantive reforms. On September 29, 1897, therefore, they agreed to accept a new Liberal government headed by Práxedes M. Sagasta, an arch-critic of Cánovas's Cuban policy. Once in office, Sagasta indicated his intention to abandon the policy of the Conservatives and implement a broad program of reform designed to grant Cuba limited autonomy within the "Spanish Commonwealth." To demonstrate his government's good faith, Sagasta recalled General Weyler and declared an end to the policy of reconcentration. He also pardoned all political prisoners and released Americans held in Cuban jails. Finally, Sagasta announced a plan to grant native Cubans a large degree of self-rule. Spain, however, would retain sovereignty over the island's military and foreign affairs.
After the diplomatic activity of August and September, southern interventionists received the news of a change in the Spanish government and its promises of reform with considerable skepticism. Given the military success of Cuban rebels in the field, the notion of limited autonomy within the Spanish empire appeared as a last desperate attempt by the Sagasta ministry to retain sovereignty over the island. These southern interventionists questioned the veracity of the new Liberal government and urged others to embrace direct intervention as the only means to stop Spain's inhumane policies in Cuba. Previous Spanish governments had promised reform for Cuba, yet nothing substantial had ever been implemented. One southern observer mocked Sagasta's pledge to create a freely-elected legislature in Cuba as a sham since "the veto power would rest in the mother country!"

Most important, however, southern interventionists recognized Spain's complete inability to restore order on the island. Unwilling to allow the present Cuban war to drag on for years, they continued to urge the administration to intervene and hasten the inevitable collapse of Spanish authority over the island.19

Sagasta's promise of reform also failed to satisfy Hannis Taylor, of Alabama, who had served as Cleveland's minister to Spain during his second term. When the rebellion began in 1895, Taylor had counseled Cleveland to adopt a moderate course of action toward Spain. Over time, though, Taylor became increasingly frustrated by Spanish politics and that nation's unwillingness to settle claims of Americans whose property had been destroyed by the Cuban war. He also reached the conclusion that Spain was simply unable to restore peace and order on the island. Alarmed by events in Spain, and by reports of the slaughter of civilians under Weyler, Taylor returned to the United States in 1897 as an ardent interventionist.20
In November of 1897, Taylor published an article in the North American Review that supported American intervention in Cuba. Spain's inability to re-establish sovereignty over the island, according to Taylor, had led Canovas and Weyler to pursue a policy that had "degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject matter of the conflict itself."

Taylor also expressed his doubts that Sagasta's accession to power would produce any real changes. Despite Spain's proposals for reform, Taylor concluded that Spanish leaders--civil, clerical and military--would never tolerate losing the "Gem of the Antilles."  

Like many other southern interventionists, Taylor believed that the United States had a moral obligation to intervene in Cuba. He was appalled at the course of the war under Weyler and wary that Spain would never alter its policy of rapine, destruction and carnage. Given these dire circumstances, Taylor asserted, continued inactivity by the United States government was unconscionable. On several occasions, he proclaimed that the United States, as a Christian nation, "must . . . discharge its duty to itself and to humanity . . ." by using its power to end the Cuban war. Otherwise, the United States would forfeit its place as the moral steward of the new world. He concluded that "In its final form the question [of direct U.S. intervention] is one of moral dignity."

On December 6, 1897, President McKinley addressed the Cuban war in his annual message to Congress. Unswayed by Taylor's and similar widespread criticism of his policy, McKinley reiterated his sympathy with native Cubans' desire for self-government without officially recognizing the belligerent rights of the rebels. In doing so, he severely criticized the inhumanity and widespread destruction wrought by the insurgents, but
stressed the dramatic shift in Spanish policy since the departure of Cánovas. Under Cánovas and Weyler, Spain's inhumane policy of reconcentration had "shocked the universal sentiment of humanity." Sagasta, however, removed Valereano Weyler from command and proposed substantial reforms to pursue the conflict in a more humane manner. After praising these reform efforts of the Liberal ministry, McKinley maintained that Sagasta should be given more time to implement his plans. McKinley was especially hopeful that Spain's autonomy plan would bring a quick end to the war since it offered both Spain and the Cuban people a just and honorable settlement. In concluding his comments on Cuba, the president appealed to Republicans to support his moderate position and resist the calls of jingoes who advocated an illegal and unwise war with Spain.23

McKinley's call for patience evoked even greater criticism after the collapse of the Liberal ministry's reform efforts in January of 1898. The removal of General Valereano Weyler and the installation of a new Autonomist regime led to a series of riots in Havana sponsored by the military and business elite. Both of these groups remained loyal to Spain and threatened to resist the Autonomistas with force. The autonomy plan also met vigorous resistance from the leaders of the Cuban insurrection. Even before Sagasta revealed the details of his proposed reforms, the rebel leaders Maximo Gomez, Calixto Garcia, and Domingo M. Capote, dismissed the concept of limited autonomy as unacceptable. Anything short of independence could not serve as the basis for negotiations and peace. Despite widespread opposition in Cuba, among Loyalists and Cuban rebels, the Liberal government stood firmly behind its plans as the best means to provide a peaceful resolution to the island's troubles.24
The apparent popular rejection by Spaniards and Cubans of Sagasta's reforms coincided with additional reports of a growing humanitarian crisis on the island. For years, Americans had been shocked by accounts of life in the squalid, densely populated, disease-ridden reconcentration camps. To be sure, many of these reports were little more than propaganda disseminated by the Cuban junta and the yellow press; nonetheless, most Americans realized the horrific nature of these camps through the observations of more responsible spokesmen such as the consul-general, Fitzhugh Lee. Beginning in 1897, limited relief efforts began under the Cuban Relief Fund, a private organization created to solicit and distribute funds directly to reconcentrados. With several hundred thousand persons in reconcentration camps, however, the efforts of the Cuban Relief Fund were pitifully inadequate to deal with the crisis.

In another concession, Sagasta agreed in December to allow Clara Barton and the American Red Cross access to the suffering reconcentrados. On Christmas Eve, the president appealed to the American public for contributions to the Red Cross for the purpose of providing Cuban relief. To collect and distribute the funds, McKinley created a Central Cuban Relief Committee. To start the program, he anonymously donated $5,000. The initial response from the public was extremely disappointing. By early January, less than $2,500 dollars had been collected, excluding the president's initial gift.

In January, the Central Cuban Relief Committee renewed its appeals for private contributions. To bolster their fund-raising efforts, the committee dramatized the conditions in Cuban reconcentration camps, with a special emphasis on the suffering of women and children. The new campaign yielded more donations and allowed for an expansion of relief operations. Despite this increased American charity, it became clear
that private relief was wholly inadequate to deal with a humanitarian crisis of this magnitude. Fitzhugh Lee, in his analysis of conditions in the camps, estimated that it would cost approximately $20,000 per day to take care of the reconcentrados. Ultimately, he concluded, only the restoration of peace could provide for the dispossessed.25

Apparently, many other southerners agreed with Lee's assessment that the situation in Cuba remained desperate despite Spanish promises of reform. Reports that the Spanish military still maintained reconcentration camps and summarily tortured or executed those suspected of being insurgents led to new American calls for direct intervention. In Mississippi, the state legislature received information from George Donald, a former major in the Confederate Army and long-time public official from Clarke County, confirming the tales of horror emanating from the reconcentrado camps. After a visit to Cuba, Donald reported that during the past year over 90,000 persons, mainly women and children, had starved to death in Santa Clara province alone. He also charged that in Cuba's principle cities and towns, he could not "go twenty steps without some poor, starving woman or child begging him for something to eat." His observations of conditions on the island led Donald to conclude that Spain's official policy was to exterminate native Cubans by starvation and other equally barbaric methods. Donald's account of conditions in Cuba shocked Mississippi's state legislators. "Speaking for the people of Mississippi and in behalf of humanity, and the Christian civilization of the world," members of both houses passed a joint resolution favoring intervention by the United States government in the war between Spain and Cuba and forwarded the resolution to Congress.26

In Congress, Hugh Dinsmore of Arkansas expressed his own impatience with McKinley's policy of inaction. Prior to 1898, Dinsmore had consistently favored caution
on the question of American intervention and preferred to see the resources and energies of the nation channeled toward ending the depression at home. Deteriorating conditions on the island, he finally concluded, demanded immediate American intervention. Dinsmore, therefore, announced his support for the recognition of Cuban belligerency and of direct intervention to end the Cuban war. Amidst loud applause, the Arkansas representative proclaimed:

I think the time has come for action. We may no longer close our eyes to the scenes and deafen our ears to the sounds of sickening, harrowing human misery and death. These scenes, these sounds, are at our very shores. We have a certain responsibility, and in self-respect, in the name of civilization, for the sake of humanity, we should take some step toward ending them.27

Bitter partisan rhetoric characterized Congressional debate on the Cuban question in January-February of 1898. The ranking minority member on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dinsmore, blasted Republicans for blocking efforts to pass a belligerency resolution in Congress. The Arkansan accused the Republicans of hypocrisy for savaging Cleveland's failure to recognize Cuban belligerency, yet standing behind McKinley's refusal to do the same. In a lengthy diatribe, Dinsmore accused the Republicans of demagoguery by campaigning during the last presidential election as the party for Cuban independence, but once in power, thwarting the popular will and doing nothing. As a result, Dinsmore concluded, Republican pronouncements about Cuban independence appeared to the insurrectos fighting for liberty as "an empty shell," and their continued inaction was resented by all champions of freedom.28

The successful effort of House Speaker Thomas B. Reed to limit debate on Cuban belligerency further angered southern interventionists. An Austin editor noted that one of
Texas' representatives, Joseph Bailey, had called for the recognition of Cuban belligerency and independence on the floor of the House until Republicans suspended debate. The editor proclaimed,

Rather than rising to immediate action on this important question—appealing to the sympathy of the American people, republican representatives in congress postpone it indefinitely, while rapine, and murder stalk bloody handed over the Antilles . . . on the flimsy pretext of the technical violation of the rules . . .

Despite his inability to force the issue of Cuban belligerency and independence, Bailey and other House Democrats had forced the Republicans to go on record "against the popular will of the people."29

In the South, a common hatred of both trusts and the Republican Party continued to produce widespread hostility to the apparent conspiracy between moneyed interests and the G.O.P. Southern interventionists, like their counterparts in other parts of the nation, embraced the popular notion that American business interests, especially in the Northeast, worked through the Republican Party to prevent a humanitarian war to liberate Cuba. Regarding the continued refusal of Republican leaders to act, one southerner observed,

It is pretty well understood that the power behind such action is centered in Wall street and that the moneyed and business interests of the country are made paramount to the question of right . . .

Although claims of a conspiracy against the public will were often exaggerated, large contributions from financial interests to the Republican Party and big businesses' public opposition to war seemed to confirm some of the interventionists' charges.30

In February of 1898, a series of events dramatically altered the diplomatic situation between the United States and Spain and united southern opinion for war. On February 9, 1898, the New York Journal, under the headline, "The worst Insult to the United States in
Its History," published a private letter written by Dupuy de Lôme to a friend in Cuba. The letter, intended for Don Jose Canalejas, editor of the Madrid Heraldo, was intercepted by a Cuban insurgent and turned over to William R. Hearst's Journal. In his communication, the Spanish minister made some disparaging comments about President McKinley.

Besides the natural and inevitable coarseness with which he [McKinley] repeats all that the press and public opinion of Spain have said of Weyler, it shows once more that McKinley is weak and catering to the rabble and, besides, a low politician who desires to leave a door open to himself and to stand well with the jingos of his party.31

De Lôme's letter closed with comments pertaining to the pursuit of a commercial treaty of reciprocity between the United States and Spain. Since the beginning of the year, Madrid had made diplomatic overtures regarding the importance of a reciprocity agreement as a further element of economic reform designed to restore peace to the island. Regarding these negotiations, de Lôme suggested,

It would be very advantageous to take up, even if only for effect, the question of commercial relations, and to have a man of some prominence sent hither in order that I may make use of him here to carry on a propaganda among the Senators and others in opposition to the junta and to try to win over the refugees.32

H. Wayne Morgan, a leading scholar of the McKinley administration, concluded that the de Lôme letter irreparably damaged relations between the United States and Spain. The contents of the letter suggested that the entire autonomy scheme was merely a ploy to buy time for Spain as it pursued total military victory on the island. De Lôme also indicated that Spanish diplomacy had been perfidious and insincere. The bad faith demonstrated by de Lôme thus served to define the character of the entire government in Madrid. Other studies have asserted that de Lôme's letter greatly increased Americans' hostility toward Spain. The content of the Spanish minister's letter appeared in papers

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across the nation within a matter of days. Fueled by constant harangues from the "yellow press," many believed that further negotiations with the hypocritical Spanish would be pointless. To some, the revelations of de Lôme served to heighten the sense of disgust felt toward Spain's conduct toward the United States and its handling of the Cuban War. The letter also led some moderates to abandon their position and call for intervention.33

Unlike in other parts of the country, though, southern attitudes changed little after the publication of the de Lôme letter. To jingoes in the region, the incident merely offered further proof of Spanish treachery and deceit, and they quickly added it to their litany of grievances against Spain that justified intervention. Most southerners, though, considered the letter from the Spanish foreign minister appeared as simply a personal indiscretion. Some even questioned whether or not the remarks were de Lôme's or if they had been manufactured by Hearst or his subordinates. Certainly, most in the region did not view the letter as a *casus belli*. As one editor put it, "That De Lôme was indiscreet in... criticizing the President is true, but that this should bring about a war with Spain is absurd." The failure of Democratic southerners to rally around the Republican president after the de Lôme letter, as residents of other sections quickly did, indicated the extent to which partisanship guided southerners' view of McKinley and his policy toward Cuba.34

The failure of liberal reform efforts and a surge of violent opposition to the autonomy plan in Havana led the administration to consider a more direct response to events in Cuba. Riots led by Spanish military officers, many of whom formerly supported Weyler, now disrupted civil administration in Havana and threatened to destroy American property in the city. The American consul-general, Fitzhugh Lee, reported to the State Department that mobs loyal to the military attacked the offices of pro-autonomy
newspapers and roamed the streets, shouting "Death to Autonomy!" and "Viva Weyler!"
Although Spanish authorities eventually brought the crowds under control, Lee feared that
future riots might endanger American citizens and property in Havana so he urged
McKinley to prepare for any contingency that would require the use of force to protect
American interests on the island.

Based largely upon Lee's reports, McKinley decided to send a United States
warship to Havana. The president reassured Spanish authorities that the U.S.S. Maine,
which arrived in Havana on January 25, did not represent a threat to Spain. To further
allay Spanish concerns, Secretary of State William Day told Spanish minister Dupuy de
Lôme that McKinley wanted to give Sagasta's autonomy plan a little more time. In
addition, since the two nations were at peace, the United States navy should resume visits
to Havana as a sign of friendship. The pleasant diplomatic exchanges between Madrid and
Washington betrayed the growing sense of frustration felt by the leaders of both nations.
In Madrid, Spanish officials believed that the autonomy plan would work if only the
United States would suppress the activities of the Cuban Junta. On the other hand,
McKinley's patience had nearly reached its end. At the same time McKinley offered
support for autonomy, he authorized both humanitarian relief on the island and the
assembly of United States naval vessels near Key West.35

On February 15, less than a week after the publication of the de Lôme letter in the
Journal, an explosion aboard the U.S.S. Maine, anchored in Havana harbor, killed 266
American sailors and officers. Secretary of Navy John Long and McKinley received
consul-general Lee's dispatch regarding the catastrophe shortly after 1:00 A.M. on the
morning of February 16. The massive destruction caused by the explosion led Lee to
conclude that it would be impossible to determine the origin of the explosion, but he believed that it had been accidental. Also, Lee probably doubted Spanish duplicity in the affair because he witnessed the heroic efforts of Spanish officials to rescue American sailors after the explosion. On the other hand, the commander of the ship, Charles Sigsbee, fearing that the explosion might be blamed on the negligence of his command or his crew, counseled Long to withhold judgment until additional information could be obtained.\(^{36}\)

In his first public statement regarding the Maine disaster, McKinley asserted that his administration would not assess blame for the explosion until a full investigation had been made. The president convened a naval court of inquiry to investigate the facts pertaining to the explosion and resumed his diplomatic efforts to get Spain to surrender the island and grant Cuban independence. During this period of profound anxiety, the public engaged in reckless speculation as to the origins of the explosion aboard the American battleship. In general, opponents of intervention preferred to believe that the explosion was the result of an accidental overheating of internal coal bunkers. Interventionists, goaded by sensational reports from the "yellow press," quickly blamed the explosion on Spanish treachery.

Several historians have concluded that the explosion of the Maine created a popular consensus for war that politicians could no longer ignore. Despite McKinley's pleas for moderation, this view holds, the vast majority of Americans blamed Spain for the tragedy in Havana and demanded intervention in order to exact vengeance. In the immediate aftermath of the Maine disaster, therefore, political opposition to war crumbled; McKinley succumbed to overwhelming popular opinion and called for war.\(^{37}\)
Southerners' reaction to the Maine explosion, however, challenged this explanation of events. In the South, persistent cleavages in public sentiment regarding Cuban intervention remained even after the disaster in Havana harbor. A southern consensus for war did not materialize at this point. In a survey of twelve regional newspapers, including several that had supported intervention in the past, the Birmingham Age-Herald found that none of them supported an immediate declaration of war. Such a finding confirmed the observation of a Louisiana editor who declared, "With calm dignity and amid breathless expectancy the people... await future developments."\(^{38}\)

In the aftermath of the Maine explosion, a surprisingly large number of southerners, from commercial centers along the coast to small towns in the interior, expressed their continued apprehensions about war with Spain. In southern port cities, many repeated the familiar arguments that war would be devastating to their communities. Residents of Savannah, Mobile, Galveston, New Orleans and other coastal cities continued to lament the almost complete defenselessness of their region to seaborne attack. In the event of war with Spain, Spanish naval artillery could easily bombard "Pensacola and other seacoast cities in Florida, and Galveston and other ports of Texas..." Spanish ships could also strike at will against the cities along the Mississippi River. Aside from the physical destruction that a war with Spain might bring to the region's cities, southerners in commercial centers also feared that the Spanish navy would paralyze "the ocean commerce of all the Gulf ports of the United States." Given these concerns, many southerners along the coast condemned those who called for a war with Spain without first making adequate preparations to defend the Gulf Coast.\(^{39}\)
Southern anti-interventionists feared that jingoes would exploit the national hysteria over the tragic explosion and rush the nation into war regardless of its unpreparedness or the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry. One southerner noted that after the tragedy in Havana, "the jingoes are talking on every street corner in the land . . . ." Jingoes, some who had long challenged the patriotism and martial spirit of opponents of a war with Spain, bore the brunt of bitter personal attacks from some southerners. Eager to deflect criticism from those who challenged their patriotism and manly vigor, some in the South reaffirmed their own loyalty to the Union while steadfastly opposing being driven into a war "by the hasty and ill advised actions of a few hot headed men who will never get near enough to a war to learn the smell of gunpowder."  

In North Carolina, a Populist newspaper turned the tables on the jingoes in Congress by questioning their manhood and patriotism. Calls for war, the editor wrote, reminded us "of the racket that comes from an angry male cat--the further from the enemy the louder the racket." In a similar indictment, a rural Alabaman voiced the common belief that if war broke out, most jingoes would seek positions far from the seat of war. Others would probably seek medical exemptions. In the event of a war with Spain, he continued, Rheumatism, lameback, sprains, bad eyes, and consumption will hold high carnival. You just can't tell what a sickly country this is till a war comes on. Some patriots will take to the woods.  

A general disdain for jingoism helped forge an anti-interventionist coalition between the commercial centers along the coast and points in the interior. These critics of jingoes in the interior, like their counterparts in the South's port cities, bitterly attacked the character of those most adamant for war. Some southerners claimed important financial interests with vested interests in Cuba largely controlled the interventionists. More
specifically, many of the attacks against advocates of war centered around their alleged association with financiers that had purchased several hundred million dollars of bonds floated by the Cuban junta. They pushed for American intervention as a means of insuring a rebel victory and, according to some anti-interventionists, guaranteeing the payment of interest and principal on the Cuban bonds. The jingoes' support for American intervention and war, therefore, was sometimes explained as yet another example of the nefarious power of key financial interests over American policy. A Savannah editor expressed his disgust by suggesting, "If the speculators and Cubans in New York could only get the well-balanced people of this country to lose their wits... and thereby cause a war... there would be much rejoicing among the unpatriotic Americans and patriotic Cubans."

The editor then praised the calmness of the administration and urged continued moderation.42

The perception that a war with Spain in 1898 could injure their own economic interests also led some in the southern interior to oppose war, even after the Maine explosion. Agricultural producers feared that a Spanish blockade of Gulf and South Atlantic ports would make it impossible for their goods to reach distant markets. In such an event, "cotton wouldn't be worth 50 cents a bale... there would be no demand for it..." Similarly, others believed that a war would lead to a decline in prices for such southern goods as lumber and sugar. In addition, some southerners expressed concern that a war would lead inevitably to the annexation of Cuba and increased competition from Cuban agricultural producers. According to one Arkansan,

Viewed from any standpoint the South needs no war. It needs peace and development—not war and stronger competition to reduce it to beggary.43
The historian C. Vann Woodward has suggested that southern opposition to a war with Cuba stemmed largely from a fear that a foreign war would divert northern capital and national treasure away from the South. The cost of fighting a foreign war, and the possibility that American capitalists would invest heavily in an American-occupied Cuba, threatened to limit the amount of money available for the development of the South. And, indeed, many southerners did feel profound anxiety over becoming involved in a war with Spain just as the nation was recovering from the depression of 1893. Aware of the horrible suffering produced by the depression, and the immense capital needs of their own region, many in the South opposed intervention in Cuba and a war with Spain. Public discourse in the region reflected this widespread desire to keep American capital at home for use in domestic development. Given the difficult economic times through which the United States had just passed, a Populist editor averred, "We don't think the United States is in condition to look after the interests of the people of some other country at present."

Senator Donelson Caffery, of Louisiana, also feared the economic repercussions on his region in the event of a war with Spain. Writing to his wife, he suggested that in the event of a Spanish war and the inevitable acquisition of Cuba, "our part of the country won't be worth anything . . . ."44

Unanimous Congressional approval of a $50 million appropriation war preparedness measure during the first week of March further alarmed those southerners who feared that a war would divert American capital away from the economic and social uplift of the South. One critic from Georgia suggested that national treasure would be better spent building school houses and sending more children to school. Furthermore, the Georgian conjured up images of the devastation of the post-Civil War South as a warning
to those who would rush heedlessly toward war. Rather than spending its money on
peaceful pursuits,

this great government proposes . . . to murder thousands of human beings,
beside desolating one or more countries and making countless widows and
orphans. General Sherman spoke truthfully when he said 'war is hell.'

During the final two weeks of March, 1898, the prospects for a peaceful resolution
to the Spanish-American crisis diminished markedly. On March 17, Senator Redfield
Proctor, a conservative from Vermont, delivered a powerful speech before the Senate in
which he presented an eyewitness account of conditions on the island of Cuba. A self-
made millionaire and former cabinet officer, Proctor enjoyed widespread credibility both in
Congress and among the general public. More important, Proctor's conservative leanings
earned him the respect of Wall Street and the financial community. When Proctor rose
from the well to deliver his speech on Cuba, therefore, his words carried far more weight
than those of Cuban propagandists associated with the junta or those of the yellow press.

Proctor's thoughtful analysis of the situation in Cuba struck an emotional chord
with many Americans. During his two-week visit to the island, Proctor interviewed scores
of leading officials and businessmen and concluded that the situation was indeed
desperate. Although he could not confirm press reports that approximately one quarter of
the population had died since the beginning of the rebellion, he did verify that nearly four
hundred thousand Cubans had been forced into reconcentration camps. There, Proctor
revealed, "with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none," one-half of the
reconcentrados had died and one quarter of the survivors were critically ill.

Proctor's speech dramatically affected several important groups that had been
consistently opposed to intervention. The emphatic humanitarian appeal of the senator's
remarks helped erode resistance to war among America's clergymen. In the national religious press, support for intervention became much more widespread. More importantly, Wall Street and leading businessmen enthusiastically rallied around Proctor's message and ended their long-standing opposition to war. Several of the nation's leading commercial journals reversed their editorial position and called for war; similarly, a group representing some of the most important firms on Wall Street petitioned the president to intervene in Cuba to end the horrible slaughter of civilians.47

Increased humanitarian concern after Proctor's speech also forged broader southern support for war in late March of 1898. For years, southerners had been exposed to newspaper columns accusing the Spanish, especially under General Weyler, of committing heinous crimes against the civilian population of Cuba. Reports of brutal, inhumane conditions in the reconcentration camps also appeared regularly in the southern press. Undoubtedly, these press accounts served to build widespread sympathy for the Cuban cause across the region. However, many southern editors often counterbalanced these "yellow press" accounts with queries regarding the veracity of the stories. Consequently, southerners, like other Americans, viewed many of the most outrageous accounts from Cuba with a great degree of skepticism. The influence of Senator Proctor's report on conditions in Cuba carried considerable weight among southerners eager to intervene in the island for humanitarian reasons, but lacking adequate justification.48

In light of Proctor's revelations of Spanish barbarity and cruelty, American temporizing and moderation were no longer possible. The senator's speech shocked the nation and prompted one southerner to observe,
The feeling is almost universal that the time has arrived when the United States must interfere in behalf of the suffering Cubans—that the hour has arrived when the horrid barbarities of the Spaniards must cease.

Even the editor of the Savannah Morning News, long an opponent of intervention, proclaimed that Proctor provided ample justification for war. The time for American neutrality was over and it was time for the nation to answer the "call of humanity." 49

Just a few days after Proctor's speech in the Senate, four naval officers briefed Secretary of Navy Long regarding the conclusions of the Naval Court of Inquiry over the explosion of the Maine. The next day, March 20, Long discussed the report with McKinley and other key Cabinet officers. The findings of the court probably surprised none of the men present; the full report of the court, which would be turned over to the president on March 24, blamed the explosion of the Maine on a submarine mine of unknown origin. In an effort to maintain control of events after the public release of the court's report, McKinley worked furiously to build a bipartisan consensus for his policy of seeking a diplomatic solution to the growing crisis. The president believed that ending the war, providing aid for the Cuban people and terminating Spanish rule over Cuba should take precedence over avenging the loss of the Maine. McKinley, therefore, sent the report of the Naval Court to Congress with his recommendation for $500,000 for Cuban relief and a threat to Spain to end the war or face American intervention on humanitarian grounds. Regarding the Maine, the president informed Congress that he had forwarded a copy of the court's findings to Madrid and expected Spain to respond as an honorable nation. In sum, McKinley continued to counsel patience, yet he understood that Spain's failure to cooperate with large-scale American relief would give the United States a cause for war. 50
The events of March 1898, the speech by Senator Proctor and the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, converted some southern opponents of intervention. Yet these revelations did not completely break southern opposition to war against Spain. The editor of the New Orleans Daily Picayune, a paper with close ties to the city's commercial community, believed that America should help suffering Cubans by sending food and medical supplies. American's humanitarian concerns and sympathies for the Cuban people, the editor continued, "should not get [us] in a war with Spain." Several commercial bodies in the South continued to oppose direct intervention and war because of their long standing concern that a war would do considerable economic and physical damage to the region. In New Orleans, representatives of the leading commercial organizations of that city unanimously adopted a resolution praising McKinley's effort "to exhaust all honorable means to avert the horror of war . . . ." The group also declared the president's desire to secure "peace with honor...[as] the true part of patriotism . . . ."

Similarly, the Augusta Georgia Exchange and Board of Trade forwarded a resolution to Washington commending "the wise and conservative course of the president" and urging their representative to support the administration's policy.51

In addition, some of the South's cane sugar producers supported the president's policy of non-intervention. The region's largest cane growers, many of whom had bolted the Democratic Party over the question of tariff protection, undoubtedly felt a stronger sense of partisan allegiance to McKinley than other southerners. In addition, they realized that Republicans had been largely responsible for the passage of the Dingley Tariff of 1897 which restored some tariff protection for their staple. More important, however, large sugar producers feared that a war against Spain and the liberation of Cuba would restore
peace to the island and allow for the speedy recovery of the Cuban sugar industry. As the largest producer of cane sugar in the world, prior to the Cuban Rebellion, Cuban producers could flood the American market with cheap raws and deflate prices for domestic cane. Fears that Cuba might be annexed and placed under an American trade umbrella created even greater anxiety. According to Senator Donelson Caffery, himself a large sugar planter from St. Mary Parish, Louisiana, "The permanent acquisition of Cuba is the destruction of our sugar industry." The combination of these concerns led a planter from the heart of Louisiana's sugar producing region to exclaim, "The war scare does not meet with much encouragement in Assumption [parish]; a very large majority of the planters and business men look with disfavor on the craving for battle shown by the jingoes."  

Other southerners publicly opposed war because they believed the war would place undue burdens on the South. Because of its proximity to Cuba and the relative defenselessness of its seacoast, some in the region expected the South to bear the brunt of fighting. Not only would southerners be forced to muster in large numbers for the defense of their seacoast, but some believed that southerners would be called upon to invade the island of Cuba because of their familiarity with tropical climates and a supposed immunity to tropical diseases. One North Carolina woman, anxious about the high cost of war to the South, proclaimed, "I am clear for the South's letting the Yankees have their way about the war . . ."  

Alexander Clay, a senator from Georgia, sympathized with many of the concerns raised by southern opponents of war but concluded that American intervention in Cuba
was necessary. In an April 4 speech before the Senate, Clay expressed some of the unique issues that confronted the South as the nation braced for a war:

> Coming as I do, from a Southern State, I realize the South will be the great sufferer in case of war between Spain and the United States. I know that our seacoast and our citizens will have to bear the brunt of the invasion, if any occurs.

The senator continued by predicting that war would bring ruin to "the products of the South, especially her cotton . . . ." Nonetheless, Clay concluded that despite the possible injury to his native region, he would make the difficult decision to support a war if all other measures failed to secure Cuban independence.54

After the release of the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, many southerners, like Clay, advocated war with Spain as the only honorable means to avenge the loss of 266 American sailors and the U.S.S. Maine. Southerners, like citizens in other parts of the nation, reacted with horror to the destruction of the battleship and the loss of life; so, too, many reacted with fierce indignation at the official report that suggested Spanish culpability. In light of Proctor's speech and the Naval Court's report on the Maine explosion, most southerners, like Clay, joined long-time interventionists in support of a war against Spain. Indeed, some even predicted that intervention in Cuba and a foreign war could have positive implications for the South. For the first time in the debate on the Cuban question, southerners often claimed that a Spanish-American war would greatly advance the cause of national reconciliation. If the South supported the war and sent soldiers to fight, the region could end the socio-cultural isolation and political ostracism that lingered as a result of Civil War and Reconstruction. Furthermore, a foreign war offered the South an opportunity to affirm its loyalty to the Union and redeem its martial
image. William Fleming, a congressman from Georgia, raised these issues in a speech before Congress. During the period of national crisis after the Maine explosion,

the bitterness of strive and the rivers of blood that separated us from 1861 to 1865 can not now separate us from the love that we bear that old flag of our fathers. We love it still and stand ready to defend it, if need be, with our lives.

A southern newspaper editor, mindful of the rural character of his audience, raised the possibility that a Spanish-American war could reunite the sections in his own unique way; "They've talked of the Concert of the Powers---s'matter with Yankee Doodle and Dixie."55

The former consul-general to Cuba, Fitzhugh Lee, also sounded the themes of southern loyalty and national reconciliation. During a speech in Chicago to dedicate the erection of a Confederate monument, Lee reaffirmed his and his native region's absolute loyalty to the Union. He also averred that as citizens of the United States, "it is our [southerners'] duty to promote its glory, its grandeur, and its growth." And if war with Spain did come, he urged his audience, northerners and southerners alike, to support the government and work to make the United States "a great, undivided republic." With both sections united, Lee predicted that the United States would triumph over any foe and emerge as one of the world's great powers.56

Many southerners reaffirmed their own patriotism and loyalty to the nation by criticizing those interests who supported a "peace-at-any-price" policy toward Spain. Weary of continued opposition by Wall Street even after the events of March, a New Orleans interventionist proclaimed, "It is time for the United States to take some action even though the money lords . . . disapprove." The belief that northern capital controlled American foreign policy, a constant fixture in shaping the South's world view, reflected
both the region's widespread hostility toward big business and a belief that the best
interests of concentrated capital were often hostile to the public good. One southerner
observed that a war with Spain was preferable to having "the government of this proud
and free people . . . driven by the order of the money power . . . ."\textsuperscript{57}

Although some southerners discussed the impact of a war on national
reconciliation and sectional redemption, it is doubtful that these ideas represented
important factors in shaping the South's view of events in Cuba. Instead, most in the
South developed an opinion on the Cuban question based largely on their understanding of
similar situations in the history of the United States; more specifically, the attitudes of
many southerners derived from their historical memory of certain parallel events, such as
the Civil War and Reconstruction. In addition, other southerners, especially those in the
coastal South or engaged in seaborne commerce, formulated their opinions regarding
American policy in Cuba based largely on economic considerations. Among these more
commercially-oriented southerners, the economic implications of a possible war with
Spain seemed to determine their position. Only when a war with Spain appeared
inevitable did notions of reconciliation and redemption receive widespread acceptance in
the South. As noted by Gaines Foster, in \textit{Ghosts of the Confederacy}, public discussion of
these themes appeared prominently in southern discourse in the days and weeks following
the report on the explosion of the \textit{Maine}.\textsuperscript{38}

On March 28, 1898, President McKinley delivered a message to Congress in
response to the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry. In his communication, the president
indicated that he had sent the details of the report to Spain and expected the government
in Madrid to act honorably to resolve the matter. Furthermore, he called on both Spain
and Cuba to declare an armistice. Until Spain responded to his memorandum, the
president indicated his desire for Congress to exercise restraint and give full consideration
to his plan of action. 

Many southerners expressed disappointment at McKinley's message. In
Lynchburg, Virginia, a group of residents met the day after the president's address and
drafted a resolution expressing their outrage at the apparently neutral tone of his message.
Nowhere, their statement proclaimed, did the president express the "horror and
indignation at the atrocious crime" felt by most Americans. Nor did the president display
appropriate compassion and sympathy for the families of those who lost their lives aboard
the Maine. In an impassioned plea for action, the Lynchburg resolution concluded,

It is not necessary to say the President's present Pro-Spanish position is
humiliating and disappointing to Virginians. We demand that the
unmeasurable insult to our flag and the murder of 266 American sailors
shall not be treated as a mere 'incident' but our Government shall demand
satisfaction, and accept no compromise . . . .

Other southerners personally attacked the president's character for failing to take
stronger action after the Maine report. Some in the South viewed the Maine tragedy as an
act of "cowardly assassination," and believed that Spain deserved the harshest possible
punishment from the United States. Only the president's lack of patriotism prevented
popular opinion from manifesting itself in a declaration of war. According to a New
Orleans editor, "It is a pitiable spectacle to witness the President of 70,000,000 free
people acting like a bulldozed negro and shedding tears in the face of an enemy . . . ."
Like other southerners, the New Orleanian urged Congress to circumvent the president
and act on the public's behalf.
In the Senate, Marion Butler, of North Carolina, bitterly denounced McKinley's message and reaffirmed his region's dissatisfaction with the administration's Cuban policy. Rather than providing for the immediate independence of Cuba, McKinley's appeal to Spain and Cuba to declare an armistice would force Cubans to "stop fighting for their liberty and surrender to the cruel rule of Spain." Such an outcome might satisfy the demands of Spanish bondholders, but it would meet the strong disapproval of the American public. Regarding the president's comments on the Maine, Butler scorned, "Shall we sit two months after our vessel and our sailors have been destroyed by Spain and refer to the outrage and the crime as an 'incident' and talk of arbitration?"

Butler concluded that "stock jobbers" and "bond sharks" had not destroyed Americans' patriotism and that the American people would demand a satisfactory outcome to the Cuban question--revenge for the Maine and the independence of Cuba.62

* * *

The consensus for war that emerged in the South after March of 1898 reveals very little about the region's deeply held attitudes and beliefs regarding either the Cuban question or American foreign policy. Clearly, after the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry implicated Spain in the explosion of the Maine, southerners, no less than persons in other regions of the country, viewed war as an acceptable means of exacting vengeance for the loss of 266 men and a U.S. battleship. So, too, many southerners, after Proctor's speech in Congress, supported a war against Spain as the only way to end the humanitarian crisis on the island of Cuba. Consequently, the South's reaction to these emotionally charged events differed little from the rest of the nation's.
An extended examination of Southern discourse from the beginning of the Cuban Revolution, however, revealed several deeply-held values and traits that shaped the South's world view prior to the crisis of 1898. Many southerners, especially in the rural, interior regions of the South, displayed considerable sympathy for the rebels and for American intervention. This group of southerners, generally located outside the major centers of commerce and trade, felt compassion for the Cuban rebels whom they often identified with as liberty-loving patriots struggling for freedom. On many occasions, these southerners drew historical parallels between the Founding Fathers or the leaders of the Confederacy and the Cuban rebels fighting against an oppressive, tyrannical power. Undoubtedly, southern racism toward non-white peoples often diminished their commitment toward the cause of Cuban freedom. Although sympathizing with the rebels and supportive of Cuban intervention, they often doubted the insurrectos ability to succeed either militarily or politically without substantial American aid.

On the other hand, southern non-interventionists appeared most prominent in the region's coastal cities where commerce served as the economic life-blood of the communities. Spokesmen for a New South, often editors and businessmen in these port cities, feared that a war with Spain would seriously injure the economy of the region. They predicted that a war would devastate the South's port cities, paralyze the region's economy and siphon away much needed northern capital. Support for war among this group of southerners emerged only on the eve of McKinley's declaration of war. Undoubtedly, some believed war preferable to the economic stagnation that accompanied the uncertainty of American policy toward Cuba in late 1897 and early 1898. More likely, however, their public opposition to war diminished amidst widespread popular approval.
for intervention and war for fear of being portrayed as unpatriotic or as minions of the
money power.

The most important features of earlier debates revealed how southerners perceived
not only events on the island, but their government and the formation of foreign policy.
The popular image that emerged of the federal government, among both interventionists
and non-interventionists, was marked by extreme cynicism. To many southerners,
interests hostile to the South controlled the foreign policy of the nation. Wall Street,
northeastern big business, and the money power dictated policy prerogatives through the
Republican party and the president. Southern interventionists blamed these groups for
obstructing the public will; southern non-interventionists blamed them for inflaming
jingoes to secure the payment of foreign bonds. In sum, despite the region's return to the
halls of power in Washington, most southerners still felt a profound sense of
powerlessness to control the foreign policy of the nation.

Finally, themes reminiscent of classical republicanism marked much of the rhetoric
of southern non-interventionists. From the beginning of the Cuban Rebellion, some in the
South articulated their concerns over foreign involvement. To some southerners,
intervention in Cuba would lead inevitably to American occupation, colonization, a larger
role for the federal government and a vastly increased army and navy—all of which were
anathema to a republican government. As the nation embarked on its first foreign war in
over fifty years, these troubling concerns about the future of American foreign policy were
temporarily subordinated in the rush toward war. Nonetheless, they lingered in the minds
of many southerners.
We were told the [McKinley's Cuban] message would be so scathing of Spanish treachery and crime, so charged with genuine American patriotism, so strong and firm for Cuban independence, that war would immediately follow. But here is the message—it is in the interest of Spain and not in the interest of Cuba; a message in the interest of the bondholders and not in the interest of liberty; a message that causes rejoicing among the bond dealers and stock gamblers in Wall Street; a message that causes every Spanish fiend and devil who has been persecuting Cuba and dishonoring our flag to build bonfires and rejoice.

---Senator Marion Butler, 12 April 1898

[Women] need to study and practice the science of peace to draw men away from war. Universal peace at the fireside will do more to educate man to universal peace among nations than many arbitration treaties, which may at any time be declared null by warlike man.

---Sallie Cotten, 11 May 1898

The Negro should not haste to arms in this war between the United States and Spain, because he has not had a chance to learn the tactics of war. His barns and storehouses are empty, and he should stay home as long as possible and take care of his family. He has nothing to fight for unless it is for the exercise of his part of the constitution....

---S.C. Moore, 9 June 1898
By early April of 1898, southerners appeared ready to rally around a presidential declaration of war against Spain. Humanitarianism and a desire to avenge the loss of the Maine inspired southerners to support such an action. Southerners even talked of the possible benefits of war, especially the prospect of achieving national reconciliation by cooperating with the North against a common foe. Proponents of overseas expansion, including those in the South, also hoped a war would lead the nation into an era of increased international activity. Following a war, expansionists believed, the United States would possess territories that could either serve as additional markets for American goods or could serve as supply and naval bases for American merchantmen en route to larger markets in Asia and Latin America. For those who prophesied commercial greatness for the South, like John Morgan and Hannis Taylor, the prospect of obtaining additional markets for raw cotton and southern textiles overseas was compelling. The benefits of internationalism, these expansionists hoped, would quickly become evident and forge a broad consensus across sectional lines in support of American internationalism.

The South's experience in the Spanish-American War, however, doomed any prospect that the region would support a policy of annexation of foreign territory and colonies. After McKinley's declaration of war, the southern consensus of opinion began to break down over questions about the motives of those in power and the wisdom of an aggressive foreign policy. During the war, southern enthusiasm for the conflict diminished rapidly as a result of the government's conduct of the war. Among southerners hoping for national reconciliation, the appointment of mainly northern officers in the army and the deployment of largely northern units to the front proved very disappointing. In addition, reports of mismanagement in the War Department and the resulting deaths of thousands of
volunteers in camps did little to inspire southern confidence in the federal government. To many in the South, the end of the Spanish-American War offered more problems than promise; the aftermath of war appeared to foreshadow the end of republican institutions and the beginning of American empire.

* * *

On April 11, 1898, President McKinley sent to Congress his assessment of the Cuban situation. The president stated that his own goals were to end the conflict in Cuba and, thus, relieve the suffering of innocent Cubans. He also wanted to end the war because doing so would prevent any further threats to American property and lives on the island. Reflecting his own frustration with the situation, McKinley also outlined the failure of recent attempts to negotiate a settlement with Spain. Given the "intolerable" state of affairs on the island, and the impasse in negotiations, McKinley asked Congress to approve the use of force to impose peace on the island.

McKinley's message also addressed the subject of the recognition of Cuban independence. The president reiterated his opposition to recognition because he believed that it would do nothing to bring about the immediate pacification of Cuba. Furthermore, he doubted that an indigenous Cuban government existed that could meet the conditions of recognition as established in international law. More important, however, the president realized that American recognition of a Cuban government could restrict the United States' freedom of action in dealing with Cuba in the future. A legally recognized Cuban government might overrule the actions of the United States or it could dictate terms and conditions of peace at the conclusion of hostilities. After the conclusion of the rebellion, McKinley averred, the United States could alter its position regarding recognition as the
situation warranted. In the meantime, he believed it was best for himself and the nation to maintain complete freedom of action in resolving the crisis in Cuba.\(^4\)

Many members of Congress criticized McKinley's message as being too conservative. Democrats were especially critical of the president's refusal to recognize Cuban independence. Attacking the president for being out of touch with public opinion on the subject, Democrat Joseph Bailey of Texas condemned McKinley's statements as "weak and inconclusive." William J. Bryan, the Democrat's presidential candidate in 1896, proclaimed his support for recognition of a government in Havana of such a character that the United States would not have to fear that one of its ships would blow up while under its supervision.\(^5\)

In the Senate, Marion Butler, a Populist from North Carolina, bitterly condemned the administration's policy. Although he had made few comments on the Cuban question, Butler had supported an earlier attempt to raise $50 million for war preparedness. The president's message, the North Carolina senator complained, failed to guarantee Cuban independence. Now, claiming to represent the political opposition, Populists, Democrats and free silver Republicans, Butler introduced a joint resolution proclaiming that the sinking of the Maine as an act of war and Spain's failure to administer affairs on the island humanely justified American intervention. Speaking shortly after the reading of McKinley's message on April 11, 1898, Butler stated, "These resolutions express my feelings and sentiments, and I believe that they express the feelings and sentiments of the American people. The crime of February 15 must be avenged by Cuban independence!"\(^6\)

Despite considerable support for Cuban independence in the Senate, Butler could not overcome the opposition of the well-organized Republican majority that had declared
its fealty to the administration. Nonetheless, Butler launched a vicious verbal attack on the president that reflected both his desire to inflict political damage on McKinley and the Republicans and his concern for the future course of American policy in Cuba.

Undoubtedly, the senator also believed that many of his fears were shared by his constituents in North Carolina and the South. He claimed that American intervention in Cuba was justified under the circumstances, but Butler questioned the wisdom of giving the president the authority to intervene without first recognizing Cuban independence. Butler noted that since Spain had already suspended hostilities against the Cubans, American intervention would effectively stop "the Cuban patriots, who are struggling for their liberty." The senator vowed never to approve of a measure to intervene without recognizing the independence of Cuba because to do so would mean "to become an ally of perfidious Spain to crush the Cuban patriots . . . ." Finally, Butler raised the common southern concern over the influence of Cuban bondholders on the administration's policy. The bond syndicate, he maintained, opposed the recognition of Cuban independence because they feared their bonds would never be repaid by an independent government in Havana. The administration, according to Butler, had refused recognition so that bondholders might barter for the independence of the Cuban Republic in the future and saddle the next generation of Cubans with an onerous mountain of debt. In a final appeal to his fellow senators, Butler asserted that, "If you fail to declare the independence of the island, all of this is possible."7

House Republicans, in support of the administration's policy, introduced their own resolutions authorizing the president to use force to end the war in Cuba and establish a free, independent government on the island. Consistent with McKinley's message, the
resolutions did not recognize either the Cuban government or Cuban independence. Because of a ruling by the House Rules Committee, under the leadership of Republican Speaker Thomas B. Reed, debate on the resolutions was limited to only forty minutes. Prior to introducing the resolutions, Republican leaders had received assurances from their party's members that they would support the measures, and, thus, show their solidarity with the president. Democrats responded to the Rules Committee's limit on debate with outrage; several congressmen engaged in a brief fracas. Order was quickly restored, however, and debate began on the Cuban resolutions.

Hugh Dinsmore, a Democrat from Arkansas and the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Affairs Committee, led his party's opposition to the Republican resolutions. Dinsmore, along with John S. Williams of Mississippi, submitted the minority report from the committee as a substitute; it differed from the majority report in that it required the recognition of the Cuban government. During House debate of the resolutions, the congressman from Arkansas assailed Spain's administration of Cuban affairs and then condemned Republicans for failing to recognize Cuban independence. Like Butler, Dinsmore raised the possibility that financial interests guided the Republicans' strategy in dealing with the Cuban question. In the absence of an officially recognized Cuban government, the United States would be liable for the payment of outstanding bonds in the event of American intervention. Most important, Dinsmore alleged that the United States had an obligation to recognize the Cuban government because of its achievements in the struggle for Cuban liberty; he objected to any plan that gave the president the authority to impose a government on the island without the consent of the native Cubans. In an
impassioned plea amidst great applause from fellow Democrats, the congressman proclaimed,

We talk about liberty. Then, let us give to the Cubans liberty. We talk about freedom. Let us give to them the right to establish a government which they think will be a free government, and which does not reserve to us, The Government of the United States, the right to say, after it is established, "Ah, this is not a 'stable' government; we can not turn it over to you yet; we must look after this thing."8

Although Dinsmore's remarks failed to convince House Republicans to break ranks with the administration, they did help solidify Democratic opposition to the Republican resolutions. On April 13, in a highly partisan vote, Congress defeated the minority's substitute resolution by a vote of 150 to 190. Southern members provided over one-half of all votes in favor of recognizing Cuban independence; only eight southern representatives opposed the measure. Southerners' votes for the substitute reflected a variety of concerns. To be sure, many members believed that their constituents supported Cuban independence. Others genuinely distrusted Republican motives for intervention and hoped that recognition of the Cuban government would restrict the administration's efforts to install a "puppet" government in Havana. Most important, however, the vote on the minority resolution was an attempt by Democrats to appear out ahead of public opinion on the question of Cuban independence and embarrass Republicans by forcing them to vote against it. After the defeat of the Democratic substitute, Congress passed the majority resolution authorizing the president to use force to intervene to stop the war in Cuba by a vote of 325 to 19. Reluctant to use military force to end the rebellion in Cuba, 7 other southern members joined the 8 who voted against recognition to provide 15 of the 19 dissenting votes. Although southern members provided the bulk of negative votes, the
vast majority of southern Representatives, unwilling to go on record against intervention and the perceived wishes of the southern majority, voted overwhelmingly for the measure.9

Unlike the brief debate on Cuban resolutions that occurred in the House, the Senate took four days to consider the alternatives and pass its resolutions. The majority report from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adhered closely to the president's request that he be given wide latitude to intervene in Cuba without recognizing Cuban independence. The majority resolutions authorized McKinley to use the full armed forces of the United States to demand a Spanish withdrawal from the island and to establish a free and independent government in Havana. A minority report, introduced by David Turpie and Joseph Foraker, both northern congressmen, recommended a substitute resolution that recognized the Republic of Cuba. Much of the debate during the four-day period centered on the minority resolution.10

Most of the South's senators spoke in favor of the Turpie-Foraker resolution. Like their southern counterparts in the House, the region's senators reviewed the history of the Cuban crisis and the accomplishments of the Cuban rebels against Spain. They also reaffirmed the notion that the Cuban insurgents shared with heroes from America's history a common desire for liberty and self-determination. Senator William Bate, of Tennessee, suggested that in a search of history, one will always find the words "rebel and insurgent" linked with the word "liberty." As the leading defender of liberty in the hemisphere, Bates argued the United States should "do that which is right" and recognize the Cuban government. Recognition, he concluded, was not only morally correct, "but reflect[ed] the will of our constituents."11
Southern senators also attacked the proposition that the United States should not grant recognition to the Republic of Cuba because the rebels had not met all the legal conditions required for recognition under international law. Opponents of the minority substitute, including the "senator of the sugar trust", Donelson Caffery of Louisiana, proclaimed that the rebels could not guarantee law and order over much of the island and lacked control of any major port; therefore, they did not merit recognition. Caffery's opposition to the Turpie-Foraker resolution probably had far more to do with his concern for the economic future of domestic sugar cane growers, including himself, than it did his concern over legal minutiae. Caffery, along with many other domestic sugar producers, feared that the end result of American recognition would be the incorporation of Cuba, the world's largest sugar producer, into the American union; the subsequent loss of possible tariff protection, sugar producers feared, would be disastrous for the domestic sugar industry. Ironically, Louisiana's other senator, Samuel D. McEnery, emerged as one of the most vigorous critics of Caffery's subterfuge. While not attacking Caffery personally, McEnery's remarks in the Senate were clearly designed in response to Caffery's claims rejecting recognition of the Cuban Republic. McEnery asserted that the rebels had met a higher obligation for recognition than existed under international law. After three years of conflict, he argued, the rebels had proven their commitment to liberty and self-determination. Now, McEnery averred, we must admit that "the Cuban people have internal sovereignty, that they have the right to determine their political end, that they have the right to establish their own form of government."12

Finally, southern senators supported the minority resolution because they feared that without its passage, the majority resolution would give the president a free hand to
pursue a war against Spain and erect a government in Havana that would be a mere proxy for the administration. Most of the South's senators found the Republican plan to be politically unwise, and, perhaps, unconstitutional. They also raised the popular southern concern that Cuban bondholders directed the Republican's policy toward Cuba. Senator Augustus Bacon, of Georgia, reiterated the belief that without the recognition of the Cuban Republic, the United States would be liable for paying bondholders.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite their opposition to the president's policy and the majority resolution on the question of recognizing the Cuban Republic, southern senators affirmed their support for armed intervention to end the war in Cuba. They also reaffirmed their loyalty to the nation and their region's commitment to the cause of Cuban liberty. Augustus Bacon, in a speech before the Senate, declared the righteousness of America's cause, the loyalty of the South to the Union, and his region's commitment to the cause of Cuban liberty in spite of the many possible hardships the South would face.

In the histories of peoples a time comes for sacrifice. Such a time seems now at hand. I doubt not that the North is equally ready to make sacrifice with the South, but in the condition of things the sacrifice to be made in this war must be more serious in the South than in the North. We have few or none of the factories at the South which will make the munitions of war . . . nor are we the large producers of the food crops which will be needed to supply them [troops]. On the contrary, our enterprises will be largely paralyzed by war, and our great product of cotton is to be put to a price that will not only not be remunerative, but be an absolute disaster to the man who produces it.

Bacon continued by predicting that war also threatened great physical damage to the South. Contact with Cuba would bring yellow fever to the South's shores, and "the first hostile gun that is fired will find its echoes in our hills and valleys." Nonetheless, Bacon
averred that the South was willing to make these sacrifices, not for the holders of bonds, but for humanity's sake.14

On April 16, at the conclusion of debate, the Senate took a series of important votes on the matter of Cuban intervention. In a highly partisan vote, the Senate approved the resolution recognizing the Cuban Republic "as the true and lawful government of that island." Eleven Republicans joined with the Democrats to pass the measure by a vote of 51 to 37. Among southern senators, 18 voted in favor of the resolution; only three southern senators, Caffery, Morgan, and Pritchard opposed. Shortly after the passage of the Turpie-Foraker resolution, the Senate then adopted a measure by a voice vote, the Teller amendment, disclaiming any intention on the part of the United States to exercise sovereignty over Cuba, thus, asserting the right of self-government for the people of Cuba.15

The deadlock between the House and Senate on the question of the recognition of the Cuban Republic resulted in the creation of a conference committee. Speaker Reed worked successfully to keep House Republicans in line behind the president's plan that opposed recognition. Republican leaders in the Senate also gained additional support for maintaining McKinley's complete freedom of action. Aware that they were losing ground, Democrats in the conference committee agreed to delete the Turpie-Foraker amendment from the Senate resolutions. In short, the conference report recognized Cuban independence without acknowledging the legitimacy of the Cuban Republic. At approximately 2:45 on the morning of April 19, both chambers of Congress passed the compromise report by large margins. By passing the resolutions, Congress ended the
possibility of future negotiations with Spain and paved the way for the president to seek a declaration of war.\textsuperscript{16}

Although the South's congressmen differed on some of the details surrounding Cuban intervention, virtually all of them agreed on the necessity of using force to stop the Cuban war. They believed that by supporting war, they accurately reflected the prevailing public mood of the South. Aware of widespread southern support for war against Spain, especially after Proctor's speech and the Naval Court's findings relative to the Maine explosion, no southern politician risked publicly opposing the actual war resolution of April 20, 1898.

During debate in Congress over the various resolutions pertaining to Cuba, some in the South felt compelled to assert their loyalty to the Union. Anxiety over the question of loyalty resulted not only from the experience of the region in the Civil War, but from a perception in some quarters that southern Democrats' actions in Congress represented an attempt to obstruct the administration's plan for intervention. In addition, articles from the Spanish press, reprinted in southern newspapers, suggested that the sectional divisions of the Civil War had not been resolved and that the South would be disloyal in the event of a foreign war. A Populist from Alabama, defending his region's loyalty, proclaimed, "The South is just as loyal as the North, East, or West, and in case of a conflict, southern men will be found at the post of duty . . . ."\textsuperscript{17}

As the nation prepared for war, many southerners confirmed their loyalty to the Union and their support for war against Spain through public demonstrations and by offers to enlist in the armed forces. During a celebration in Austin marking the anniversary of the Battle of San Jacinto, a speaker proudly stated that today, "there is no north, no east,
no west, no south, but there is a common country." He also praised the president for signing the congressional resolutions and the ultimatum that demanded Spain's exit from Cuba. These actions, the speaker continued, were exemplary of the "temper and atmosphere of this hemisphere, which was dedicated to freedom by our revolutionary war" and reaffirmed at the battle of San Jacinto. At the end of the address, he made a passionate plea,

Let us then meet together today and renew the spirit that animated our fathers to dedicate this continent to Christian civilization and let us live together the American revolution, the independence of Texas won at San Jacinto and the independence of the Cuban patriots. 18

At a mass meeting at Cathedral Hall in Galveston, several hundred spectators witnessed a procession of speakers pledging their loyalty to the Union and praising American intervention in Cuba. A nearby observer, Ethel Hutson, noted that the favorite quotation of the speakers seemed to be "My country, right or wrong!" She also remarked that "Dixie" was played after every other speech and elicited great applause. Hutson's keen observation of the meeting clearly revealed the dual loyalties felt by some southerners. While speeches expressing southern loyalty to the Union brought "fragments of enthusiastic patriotism" from the crowd, the playing of "Dixie" produced raucous "cheers." Amidst the excitement and popular enthusiasm for war, some in the South continued to cherish the memory of the Lost Cause at the same time they celebrated the possibility of reunion. After witnessing the events at Cathedral Hall, Hutson wondered if her brother, a native southerner, could subordinate his affections for his native region and grow, "after fighting for the 'Stars and Stripes,' to feel an ardent affection for the ugly thing."19
Despite some southerners' reservations about fighting under the banner of the Union, thousands in the region vowed to join the army in the event of a war with Spain. Many different motives probably inspired southerners to volunteer for war in 1898. Like other wars, the conflict with Spain offered excitement and opportunity; fighting in a war appeared a good alternative to those bored with the mundane affairs of agriculture and business. One prospective volunteer predicted that "army life . . . will be no worse than manual work and so long as the war lasts there will be plenty of excitement." For younger southerners, the Spanish War also offered an opportunity to prove their martial worth to the rest of the nation and to their parents who had fought in defense of the Old South. Having grown up in the shadow of the generation of the Civil War, a foreign war presented young southerners with a chance to capture glory and honor previously reserved for their fathers. In a letter to a friend, Willis Brewer, congressman from Alabama, remarked,

This generation . . . like the several which preceded it, must have the glitter and dust which constitute the twin elements of glory. We are Crusaders again, as we were in 1861 and 1846. It seems that somewhat like a quarter century is sufficient time in which to capitalize or bank up our sympathies. On these we now move to bloodshed.

Still other southerners offered their services to the army because they felt sympathy for the cause of "Cuba Libre" and were outraged by the actions of Spain. The end result, Joseph Wheeler observed, was a flood of offers of service from across the South "that very far exceeded the number it would be possible for the Government to accept."

Veterans of the Civil War in the South seemed particularly captivated by the idea of serving in the army. For Confederate veterans, a foreign war offered not only the chance for them to prove their loyalty to the Union, it also presented them with an
opportunity to reassert and restore the martial reputation of the region. Volunteering their
services, therefore, provided former Confederates with a chance to exorcise some of the
demons that had haunted them since the end of the Civil War. On May 3, five United
Confederate Veterans camps in New Orleans tendered their services to the army and
proclaimed that "no warmer defenders of their country's honor and flag . . . will be found
in this crisis." Similarly, a Confederate veterans' group in Florida pledged their personal
services "to the country whenever and wherever the nation's needs require." Many other
individual Confederate veterans also volunteered to join the army. In offering their own
services to the government, members of the Grand Army of the Republic from Virginia
and North Carolina praised the response from the South's Confederate veterans. In a
resolution, the G.A.R. camps proclaimed:

We rejoice in the consciousness that in the impending struggle all the
people of our beloved land--knowing no East, no West, no North, no
South--are vying with each other in their readiness to defend the flag, help
the oppressed, resent the insult to our country, and avenge the lives of our
gallant seamen treacherously slain aboard the Maine. . . .

The enthusiastic response of southerners to the call to arms led many southerners to
predict an end to sectional animosity. Josephus Daniels, editor of a Raleigh newspaper,
suggested that after the South's men volunteered and fought under the Stars and Stripes,
"no bloody shirt waver can hereafter obtain an audience."21

John Brown Gordon, the commanding general of the United Confederate
Veterans, also believed that the Spanish-American War offered special opportunities for
the South. As a New South prophet, Gordon tirelessly encouraged reconciliation with the
North as the best way to attract northern capital to the region after the Civil War. On the
other hand, he remained a southern romantic who glorified the Lost Cause and sought to
preserve the South's social order. The war with Spain, he believed, could advance both of these goals. By supporting the war effort, he believed the North would more fully accept the South and provide additional economic investment for the region; he also believed that a foreign war would provide an environment conducive for the further embellishment of the martial spirit of Confederate arms. Consequently, amidst calls to cancel the United Confederate Veterans' reunion in 1898, Gordon ordered that preparations continue despite the declaration of war. In a General Order to other U.C.V. camps ordering that the reunion proceed as planned, Gordon suggested,

The assembling of the surviving heroes of the Confederacy—will act as a stimulus, as it will revive the martial spirit of the people, and will be an object lesson, and inspiration for the youth . . .; it will awaken sentiment, arouse enthusiasm, inspire and quicken the patriotic resolve and purpose to enlist in defense of the flag . . . as many of our old Veterans and their brave sons are doing. In our holy reverence for our dead, and care for our living heroes, we honor our Nation.

At the reunion in Atlanta, Gordon declared that the war would completely "obliterate" all sectional distrusts, reunite the American people, and produce an era of cooperation and national greatness.22

Despite the ubiquitous and forceful arguments in support of war advanced by the region's interventionists, jingoistic debate in Congress in April and the likelihood of an armed conflict with Spain provided a sense of urgency for southern critics of war who had withheld much of their vitriol after the Maine explosion and Proctor's speech. Afraid of being characterized as disloyal or unpatriotic, few southerners openly revealed their continued opposition to intervention in Cuba during February and March of 1898. The apparent consensus for war that existed in the region, therefore, was based on public discussion of the issues unduly shaped by external pressures rather than representing the
actual attitudes and concerns of the South's population. In April, the resurgence of southern opposition to war reflected a sense of desperation; critics of intervention undoubtedly feared that their last opportunity to prevent actual hostilities was slipping away. Renewed southern opposition also resulted from their trepidation over the future course of American foreign policy after becoming involved in a foreign war and, most likely, acquiring overseas territory. Finally, opponents of war in the South again raised their concerns that their region would likely suffer the greatest burdens in a war with Spain without receiving any tangible benefits. With a multitude of voices from the South once again raised in opposition to war, it became evident that the consensus that had existed was illusory.

Southern sugar producers, especially in Louisiana, emerged as the most vocal critics of war. By 1898, tariff reform and dramatic reductions in Cuban sugar production had restored profitability and economic stability to the South's sugar growing regions. Since the beginning of the Cuban Rebellion in 1895, the amount of sugar imported from Cuba had declined significantly. Given the shortages in raw sugar, southern producers found a ready market at higher prices for their product. Fear that a war with Spain might result in the acquisition of Cuba and its inclusion under an American tariff umbrella alarmed the region's sugar producers. So, too, they felt anxiety over the prospect of a complete recovery of the island's sugar producing capability after the removal of Spanish authority. Not surprisingly, several newspapers in the sugar growing parishes of Louisiana continued to oppose war even as Congress made the final preparations for armed conflict. An Opelousas, Louisiana, editor proclaimed that the people of his region "deprecated war . . . if it could be avoided." Other individuals found a remarkable absence of enthusiasm
for war in other parts of the sugar growing parishes of Louisiana. Frank Richardson observed that in New Orleans, the commercial center for Louisiana's sugar trade, "War shouts seem to be filling the air everywhere and still very few I meet are in favor of it." In a letter to the Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer, an Assumption Parish planter observed,

The war scare does not meet with much encouragement in Assumption [Parish]; a very large majority of the planters and business men look with disfavor on the craving for battle shown by the jingoes. If the jingoes would be the only sufferers from the miseries of armed conflict, perhaps there would be less opposition.23

Outside of the sugar growing regions of the South, opponents of war resurfaced in different parts of the region and represented a variety of interests. Many southern agrarians, especially cotton producers and some Populists, shared sugar growers' concern over the consequences of a war with Spain on their own economic livelihood. These farmers tended to focus on the short-term impact of a war on their ability to find markets and on prices paid for raw cotton. In general, they feared a war with Spain would produce a blockade of southern ports, thus, denying the South's cotton access to markets. Without available markets, they predicted, the price of cotton would plunge dramatically. Their opposition to war, however, resulted from more than just a narrow concern over the price of cotton; they believed that farmers would bear an unfair burden for financing the war without receiving any material benefits in return. Louis de Lacroix, in an angry letter to Populist Senator Marion Butler, attacked him for betraying Populist principles and voting for a $50 million war appropriation to pursue an unnecessary war. While southern farmers suffered deprivation, he concluded, Butler, and others in the federal government, "increased the national debt and the burden of taxes resulting therefrom." Finally, Lacroix

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reminded the senator that, "The bills must be paid, paid by the common people, your constituents, the horny handed sons of toil, whose interests you profess to foster."24

Other southerners opposed war after evaluating the expected costs of intervention against the anticipated results. Although few in the South sympathized with Spain, many southerners questioned the wisdom of intervening in Cuba to provide independence for non-white people on the island. Sympathy for the native Cubans did not warrant the spilling of American blood, the destruction of southern commerce and the devaluation of the South's agricultural goods. Undoubtedly influenced by the anxiety of the local business community, a New Orleans editor proclaimed, "Few who consider the matter seriously will justify such a war." Southern opponents of intervention also raised the race question since most native Cubans were non-white. Consequently, many in the South believed native Cubans to be racially inferior and, therefore, incapable of enjoying freedom or self-government. Recalling the region's experience in the Civil War, a southern editor warned,

> A little over thirty years ago the crest and rivers of our own dear southland almost ran with blood split [sic] to free the dear negro--a war in the interest of humanity .... God deliver us from any more wars in the interest of humanity.

An article in a leading agricultural journal, *Southern Planter*, echoed the reservations of those who viewed Cuban affairs in terms of race. According to the journal, "the Latin races are not fitted to govern themselves, and are still less fitted when having amongst them negroes and half-bred negroes, Indians and Spaniards, as in Cuba." America, the journal article concluded, should heed George Washington's advice and avoid entanglements with foreign people and nations.25
Finally, significant opposition to intervention in Cuba reemerged in some of the South's leading industrial and commercial centers, especially in those cities located in coastal regions. Earlier pleas to arrive at a diplomatic resolution to the Cuban crisis in order to save the South's coast from naval bombardment and its commerce from a paralyzing naval blockade having failed to stem the rush toward war, southern business opposition easily embraced the idea that Congress and the president desired war for purely selfish reasons. According to these critics, politicians desired war with Spain because they had been paid off by bondholders and other powerful economic interests; in addition, war and the acquisition of overseas territories would greatly enlarge patronage opportunities for the party in power. As a result, they believed that what Congress portrayed as a war for humanity, was "really for ulterior political purposes, and finally for conquest." Harsh condemnation also appeared in Dixie, a leading southern industrial and commercial journal. In an article on the causes of the war, the journal's editor rejected the notion that the war was about humanitarianism or the revenge of the Maine. Instead, moneyed interests, the owners of the "yellow press" and corrupt politicians were all responsible for the conflict. The editor continued,

In the halls of Congress the political demagogue has brayed long and loud for war. His mouthings have been spread broadcast over the land and fell like sweet music upon the ears of unthinking people. Scenting a harvest of dollars, the scavengers of journalism took heart and inaugurated a propaganda the like of which has never before cursed the peace of nations. The cesspools of the world were dragged in search of evidence that would embroil the nations in bloody war, and all this under the cloak of patriotism.

Far from being inspired by patriotic motives, he concluded "it was greed for gold" that unleashed the chain of events that led the United States into war. As a spokesman for the
region's industries, he envisioned nothing of benefit from the struggle with Spain; instead, he predicted "desolation and ashes of war, all for the miserable reward of money."\textsuperscript{26}

The attitudes of southern women and African-Americans regarding the Cuban question is more difficult to discern given the scarcity of extant public commentary on the subject. Although most southern white women probably sympathized with the Cuban insurgents in their revolt against Spain, they, too, rejected American intervention and war as an alternative to diplomacy. White women in the South, like most men, appeared to be offended by Spain's maladministration of Cuban affairs. They shared a humanitarian concern over alleged abuses of civilians on the island under the policy of reconcentration. Nonetheless, the thought of a war with Spain often evoked painful memories associated with the desolation wrought in the South during the Civil War. A young North Carolina woman observed that her grandmother "worried over it [the war] a good deal, and nanny conjures it up in her imagination as much like the Civil War." Undoubtedly, white women's opposition to war also emanated from their role in the home, as parent, spouse, and caregiver. In these capacities, they voiced their objection to sons and husbands volunteering for service in the army. Mary Hutson, of Texas, after being asked by her sons to support their efforts to volunteer, declared, "I see no necessity for either of you going, and I would not . . . . I am not very patriotic about this war, believing we are going to be made to bear the brunt of the war . . . ." One southern newspaper editor revealed his observations regarding women's behavior when confronted by the prospect of their sons and husbands volunteering for war. In an article laced with sarcasm, the editor wrote,

\begin{quote}
The war fever is just raging within our bosom and our patriotism has been on the very eve of bubbling over several times, causing us to talk of going out and joining the mighty army . . . ., but the very mention of it causes a
rebellion in the home circle, Mrs. Holland leading the host of little Echoes against us and declaring that our first duty is to them, and so far they have quelled every outbreak of ours that threatened the destruction of Spain.\textsuperscript{27}

Historian Judith Papachristou has suggested that women's worldview emerged from their belief that they had a larger responsibility as the moral preservers of the society. In other words, while male policymakers, and their male peers, viewed the Cuban question in terms of political economy and aggressive nationalism, women emphasized calmness and moral reflection. According to Papachristou, women viewed the declaration of war as the ultimate act of moral declension. Some southern women probably embraced the idea that they could influence the course of policy by their efforts in the home. Sallie Cotten, speaking at the Women's Exposition in Charlotte, North Carolina, emphasized women's responsibility to "elevate society." "Women," Cotten contended, "need to study and practice the science of peace to draw men away from war." Cotten urged women to take up the cause of universal peace by educating their families to practice love and peace at home. By using their moral influence, women could temper the aggressive nature of men and promote the cause of peace.\textsuperscript{28}

Following the first battles of the war, women in the South lamented their losses. A young ensign from North Carolina, Worth Bagley, was the first casualty of the war; his death created anxiety among southern women that the war could be long and bloody. As casualty lists mounted, some women questioned the government's motives for going to war. Aware of the hardships faced by the army in hot, tropical camps in Florida and Cuba, Addie Daniels, the daughter of Josephus Daniels, "prayed that the United States was right" in declaring war. "It would be fearful to go through all this," she concluded, "if it were not a righteous cause."\textsuperscript{29}
Despite their fear and anxiety about the future course of the war, many women still undertook the task of providing support for their loved ones in the army. While most women engaged in private efforts to provide the best possible care for their sons, husbands, and others, others coordinated their activities by forming temporary relief organizations. These organizations provided moral support at home, bolstered patriotism in the community and coordinated the collection and distribution of supplies, food and medicines to soldiers in the volunteer army. One of the largest and most successful women's relief organizations in the South, the Louisiana Women's War Relief Association, had approximately one thousand dues paying members from Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. From its headquarters in New Orleans, the L.W.W.R.A. provided a wide variety of supplies to troops stationed in Florida's camps. The support provided by women during the Spanish-American War, however, did not represent support for American policy. It merely reflected their concerns as wives, mothers and sisters for men placed in harm's way.

At the war's end, S. A. Cunningham, the editor of Confederate Veteran, praised the efforts of southern women during the war despite their obvious disapproval of the government's policy. Cunningham noted:

Our noble women who are not going to be 'reconstructed,' but who have sons, husbands and others dear to them in the volunteer army, have gone about providing for their comfort, just as might have been expected; yet in all they have done and are doing there is the same undying devotion to Dixie and its sad yet glorious memories.30

The experience of southern white women during the Spanish-American War confirms many of Papachristou's conclusions regarding how women developed their view of the world. In the South, the historical memory of the Civil War substantially shaped the views of all those who opposed America's declaration of war against Spain in 1898. Men
and women, however, differed in the meanings they attached to the Civil War experience. Where most southern men opposed war in 1898 on the basis of economic and legal concerns, women objected to it because of war's damaging effect on family and society. For women, war should be avoided not because it threatened the Constitution or commerce, but because of its deleterious moral impact on individuals. As the moral guardians of their families, therefore, they used their influence at home to muster opposition to a violent solution to the Cuban question.

African-Americans in the South reacted with ambivalence to the events leading up to McKinley's declaration of war. From the beginning of the Cuban Revolution, their views regarding direct American intervention on the island appeared neither consistent nor unanimous. Although most southern blacks sympathized with the Cuban rebels, and hoped for the success of their revolution, they were undecided on the benefits of American intervention in achieving Cuban independence. In general, African-Americans viewed the struggle in Cuba as a revolution of native blacks against the oppressive rule of Spanish white officials. Since many of the leaders of the revolution were of African ancestry, such an analysis proved compelling. While American intervention would hasten an end to the fighting, many blacks doubted it would achieve Cuban independence. Given their own experience of slavery and life in a white dominated America, many southern blacks feared that the United States would intervene in Cuba and block indigenous efforts to create an independent Cuban republic governed by black Cubans.

The destruction of the Maine, allegations of continued humanitarian abuses against native Cubans and the national rush toward war, appeared to allay temporarily the fears of blacks who questioned the government's Cuban policy. The Maine disaster seemed
particularly significant in building black support for war against Spain since over thirty African-American sailors lost their lives in the explosion. The entire record of Spain's barbarous conduct in Cuba, many blacks agreed, justified American intervention by April of 1898.31

Booker T. Washington, and some other African-Americans, saw opportunities in black support and participation in the war against Spain. White Americans, they believed, would be more likely to accord them acceptance and respect if they volunteered their services in defense of the nation. Service in the army also offered blacks a chance to prove their valor, martial worth and manliness in combat; their efforts in the army, therefore, would destroy popular notions of white racism based upon the inferiority of blacks. At the end of the war, some blacks believed, black participation in the war effort would result in whites according them greater social equality in American society. For some blacks, the crisis of war represented a test of their loyalty and patriotism to the Union, and an opportunity for social advancement. Aware of these concerns, Booker T. Washington, in a speech marking the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Hampton Institute, declared, "What need the Nation may have for our service, I know not, but this I know, that whether in slavery or in freedom, the Negro has always been loyal to the Stars and Stripes, and should the clash of arms come, the Negro, with voice and sword, will be found by the side of his late Southern master, willing to lay down his life for his country's cause."32

True to the spirit of Washington's message, thousands of African-Americans rallied in support of their nation in the days following the declaration of war. In New Orleans, over four hundred black residents attended a mass meeting at the Grand Army Hall to hear
patriotic speeches and offer their pledges of support in the war against Spain. Other mass meetings were held across the South. More important, however, tens of thousands of African-Americans flocked to army recruiting stations. In some states of the South, especially in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Texas, military officials summarily rejected black recruits. Even when they had difficulty meeting their state's quota of volunteers, most southern states preferred to keep their militia units completely segregated. North Carolina and Alabama, the only two southern states that allowed black volunteers, refused to place black units under the command of black officers. Consequently, both potential black recruits and black volunteers quickly became disillusioned with the volunteer army as a means to bring about social change; for it appeared as nothing more than another instrument of white supremacy.33

White racism seriously dampened the enthusiasm and patriotism displayed by the South's African-Americans. Rather than accepting black expressions of loyalty and service at face value, many southern whites questioned the motives of African-Americans. Undoubtedly, southern whites believed the decision to muster-in black volunteers was a direct challenge to white supremacy and would make it much harder to maintain a segregated South after the war. If blacks successfully served their country in a foreign war, it would be more difficult for white segregationists to deny them the rights of full citizenship. Samuel Robertson, congressman from Louisiana, feared that if large numbers of African-Americans were allowed to fight in Cuba,

they will claim to be saviors of the country, and when they return it will be impossible to live in peace and quiet with them in the South; I believe that the glory of the defense of our country should be committed to the hands of the Caucasian race... The feeling here is so strong in this matter that
I would advise you not to agitate the question as it will be exceedingly unpopular.

Other white southerners responded violently to the presence of black volunteers in their midst. Reports of racial violence against black troops in Florida, North Carolina, and South Carolina exposed the difficulties faced by blacks seeking an opportunity to serve their nation. In Anniston, Alabama, white authorities spread rumors regarding the misconduct of black soldiers in order to rally violent opposition to them. The white commander of the Third Alabama Colored Infantry, Robert L. Bullard, praised the conduct of his men who maintained strict order even when attacked by "a howling, frantic mob."³⁴

During the first months of the war, the experience of African-Americans in a white-dominated army confirmed rather than refuted the arguments of black opponents of war. From the beginning of the conflict, black opposition to the Spanish-American War had been strong and vocal. They doubted that African-American support and participation would achieve any of their race's goals, especially freedom for native Cubans and greater social equality at home. Many southern blacks recognized the irony of blacks volunteering to fight for a country that refused to recognize their own civil rights. America's history of slavery and racism created anxiety that the federal government would merely use black troops to conquer non-white peoples for further exploitation. Aware of these concerns, preachers often urged their congregations to think long and hard before rushing to enlist in the army. One black clergyman from Virginia feared that black Cubans might find American rule harsher than Spanish rule; he suggested that the United States would likely create a segregated "Jim Crow" colony under the "Mississippi Plan" once in control of the
island. In addition, many black opponents of war feared that a foreign war would shift public attention away from racial injustices at home and focus it on race issues abroad. Indeed, the editor of a Richmond African-American newspaper, John Mitchell, Jr., predicted an ironic fate for those blacks who joined the army and fought to provide greater freedom for the black race. Mitchell doubted the humanitarian motives that filled white policymakers' rhetoric; he, too, predicted that once conquered, blacks in Cuba, the Philippines, and elsewhere, would face life in a white-dominated, segregated society. For African-Americans, therefore, they should not expect more liberal racial policies in the aftermath of war. On the contrary, the conquest of darker-skinned peoples overseas and the creation of white ruled governments would only reinforce white supremacy at home.\textsuperscript{35}

African-American opponents of war sought to carefully balance their love of country and sense of honor with their own historical experience with slavery and racial oppression in evaluating the wisdom of volunteering their services. Many concluded that blacks should not volunteer unless white authorities guaranteed them a greater degree of equality at the end of the war. A letter to the editor of a black North Carolina paper stated,

\begin{quote}
The Negro should not haste to arms in this war between the United States and Spain because . . . He has nothing to fight for unless it is for the exercise of his part of the Constitution . . . . The Negro from the Revolutionary war on down to the Civil War has fought gallantly—in the first he fought for 200 years of slavery; in the last for a proclamation minus freedom. The white man says to him to-day, "You are not a man, sir, and you are to serve and take such punishment as I see fit to give you." There is not much encouragement to fight . . . . We are politically disfranchised in many places, lynch law is king, and Jim Crow car is forced upon us. Let the Negro stop and think and not rush too fast into battle unless he sees he is going to be treated better after it is over.\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}
The experience of African-Americans in the Spanish-American War disheartened those who predicted it would provide substantial opportunities for the elevation of their race abroad and greater social equality at home. Disappointment with the United States' failure to recognize the government of the Cuban rebels or the rebellion of native peoples in the Philippines indicated that the American government was willing to export the germ of white supremacy to its newly acquired colonies. At home, white soldiers monopolized the glory received from the war rather than face the ignominy of acknowledging the valuable contributions made by black troops, especially at the battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill in Cuba. In the South, black troops faced the additional indignity of provoking violent attacks with their mere presence. After Spain's military defeat in Cuba, one black observer commented, "From the race riots and lynching going on in the South and among black and white soldiers, the American-Spanish war has not as predicted brought about a better feeling among the two races."37

Undoubtedly, widespread disappointment existed among African-Americans in the failure of their patriotism and volunteerism to redefine race relations. Their belief that overseas expansion and war presented real opportunities for their race at home and abroad led many African-Americans to offer qualified support for their nation's foreign policy. To be sure, some falsely believed the government would turn to blacks to help administer the affairs of colonies populated by non-white peoples; others hoped they could capitalize on economic opportunities in the new possessions. At the very least, it was assumed that the colonies would offer an escape from the repressive racial atmosphere of the United States. Most African-Americans, however, expected their support for expansion and war to be rewarded by a significant improvement in social conditions at home. In almost every
respect, the Spanish-American War failed to produce any real benefits for African-Americans. Instead, blacks' experience with war bred even greater suspicion of the government's motives for expansion and led many to the conclusion that the United States was determined to exploit native peoples in overseas colonies under the administration of white rulers. Such a plan of expansion not only offered African-Americans no real opportunities, it reinforced racial hostility and white supremacy at home.

* * *

The apparent southern consensus in favor of war against Spain proved illusory. As the nation readied for war, southern opposition reemerged voicing a variety of concerns. Southern women, who had been virtually silent during earlier debates on the Cuban question, expressed great anxiety over the possibility of their homes and families once again being destroyed by the ravages of war. Although they provided great aid and comfort for loved ones during the conflict, they remained vigorous moral opponents of war against Spain and a jingoistic foreign policy. African-Americans in the South, too, quickly turned against the war and a policy of overseas expansion. Initially, many blacks believed the war offered them opportunities for economic and social advancement. Most southern states refusal to accept black volunteers, a universal ban on black officers, and widespread attacks by whites against their presence in camps across the South, discouraged African-Americans about the possibility of dismantling the institutions of white supremacy. Ultimately, most blacks viewed the war as a means for the United States to export white supremacy abroad and exploit other non-white peoples.

White southerners, too, expressed reservations about war. The refusal of McKinley and Congressional Republicans to recognize the Cuban Republic troubled
southerners suspicious of Republicans' motives for supporting war. The rejection of Turpie-Foraker suggested that Republicans had other goals than just the liberation of Cuba from Spanish oppression. Southerners also saw few real economic opportunities resulting from a war with Spain. For the South, neither Cuba nor the Philippines appeared to be lucrative potential markets for the region's goods. On the contrary, the products of both islands competed with those of the South. In addition, residents of southern commercial cities along the coast expected to suffer considerable physical and economic damage from the Spanish navy. Finally, white southerners preoccupation with race led many to question the wisdom of intervening on behalf of non-white peoples. The white South's racial concerns were clearly demonstrated by its response to black volunteers in their own region. Most troubling of all, however, southerners anticipated that the end of the war would create a host of new problems, political, social, and economic, that would greatly outweigh any possible benefits of America' 'Splendid Little War' with Spain.
Clark Howell, of Georgia, in an address at Buffalo, tells the attitude of the South on the Philippine question in a way which will give very little aid and comfort to the 'anti-expansionists' of any part of the country. He says the Philippines are as actual a part of the national domain as are California, Alaska or Oregon, and the only question with him is, "What are we going to do with them?" This may be called the voice of the new south....The Georgian takes a practical view of the Philippine case, for he sees in the islands a market for a large amount of the leading product of the south, cotton manufactured into fabrics. It is to the interest of the south...that as much as possible of the country's products in raw material be manufactured here before it is exported.

---Beeville Bee, 29 Dec. 1899

[The Philippines] will make a number of nice places to be filled by the President....These offices, judiciously promised in doubtful states, might be used to good advantage in the campaign. The Philippines seem doomed to a carpet-bag government.

---Savannah Morning News, 19 June 1900

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The speed and decisiveness of the United States' victory against Spain in the Spanish-American War raised the hopes and expectations of those southerners who had supported the war. The complete destruction of Spain's Pacific Squadron by George Dewey's Asiatic Squadron on May 1 revealed the weaknesses of the Spanish Navy and allayed the fears of southerners in coastal communities who expected a naval attack from Spain. Less than two months after Dewey's victory in the Pacific, the United States Navy destroyed Spain's Atlantic Squadron at the Battle of Santiago Bay. With the bulk of its navy destroyed, and its armies isolated from reinforcements and supplies, Spain sued for peace in July of 1898. Given the United States' commanding position in the Pacific and Caribbean, most observers assumed the terms for peace would require Spain to surrender many of its colonial possessions, including Porto Rico, Cuba, and all or part of the Philippine archipelago.

During the brief summer of war, some white southern expansionists lobbied in support of the war effort and extolled the virtues of overseas expansion. For this small group of southerners, including several New South prophets, the war presented unique opportunities for the uplift of the South. Undoubtedly, the war raised the hopes of those who desired sectional reconciliation. Southern popular support for the war and the participation of thousands of southern soldiers in the army would silence those who questioned the region's loyalty. In the future, the people of the South did not expect to be taunted by the spectre of "the bloody shirt." In the absence of sectional antagonism, some southerners expected their region to be fully accepted in national life.

During the war against Spain, unfolding events on the battlefield, in the halls of diplomacy, and in Congress, raised serious concerns among southerners that revealed a
persistent division of opinion on the proper course of American foreign policy. Rather than promote the cause of sectional reconciliation, the war and its aftermath produced bitter feelings. The South received few opportunities to vindicate itself on the battlefield, and few southerners received positions of leadership in civil and military posts during the war. More important, however, the national government appeared to abandon the goals it professed when it declared war against Spain, and instead adopted a policy of conquest. For southerners, who originally rallied around war as a means to avenge national honor and liberate suffering Cubans from the oppressive rule of Spain, this shift in policy served as a shocking repudiation of the nation's highest ideals and raised fears that the very nature of the American republic was undergoing a dangerous transformation.

* * *

During the summer of 1898, some southerners defended the war against Spain as a means to promote the cause of sectional reunion. The image of thousands of southern volunteer soldiers dressed in blue uniforms and serving under the flag of the United States provided a visible and powerful response to those who questioned the South's loyalty. New South promoters hoped that the South's participation in the Spanish-American War would permanently erase anti-southern prejudice in the North and lead to material benefits for the region. In a commencement address at the University of North Carolina, only one month after Dewey's victory at Manila, the former minister to Spain, Hannis Taylor, proclaimed that reunion had been attained by the South's support of the war. The nation had "pledged its troth as one man," he concluded, "and by the perfect spirit of union that has bloomed out of that resolve has been driven from the temple of our national life the last lurking spectres of the civil war."
Matthew C. Butler, a former Confederate officer and long-time senator from South Carolina, also sounded the theme of reconciliation. Speaking before the Empire Society of the Sons of the American Revolution in New York, Butler proclaimed that the Spanish-American War had helped Americans forget the passions produced by the Civil War and its aftermath. It had also given all white Americans a chance to reflect on universal traits. White Americans, he continued, shared a common racial and cultural heritage; so, too, they were brought up under a common system of government. Regarding the prospect for reconciliation, Butler averred, "Never in our history have the American people been so united in heart and purpose as they are to-day." Butler then addressed the concerns of anti-imperialists who feared the divisive social effects of the war's aftermath by proclaiming his own supreme confidence in the American people, operating through democratic institutions, to resolve all matters arising from the war in the best interests of the nation. "As for me," Butler concluded, "the cry of imperialism [holds] no terrors. We are not made of the stuff that tolerates imperialism." 4

Contrary to Butler's pronouncements, most southerners did not see the Spanish-American War as an event that ended sectional differences. The brevity of the war also provided the South with few opportunities to establish its loyalty within the Union. The South exalted its heroes from the war, Richmond Hobson, Worth Bagley, Fitzhugh Lee, and Joseph Wheeler, but most believed that McKinley's War Department offered southerners too few opportunities to prove either their loyalty to the Union or their martial prowess. With the opening of peace talks in July and a formal armistice in August, only a few thousand southern volunteers were ever attached to expeditionary forces for assignment in a theater of war; partisan considerations dictated that most assignments
were given to regiments from states friendly to the Republican Administration in Washington. As a result, most southern volunteers waited out the war in army camps, primarily in Tennessee and Florida. One southern volunteer reported that his unit was "disappointed by the speedy surrender of the Spaniards. We feel cheated." Rather than engaging a foreign enemy, as they had hoped, most southern volunteers battled tropical diseases in stateside camps. As casualties mounted from disease, and with few opportunities to prove themselves against Spain, many southerners blamed the administration, especially the War Department, for betraying the cause of sectional reunion.

The war also failed to alter fundamentally regional attitudes about an aggressive foreign policy, especially a policy of territorial expansion. To many southerners, the end of the Spanish-American War produced a Pandora's Box of potential problems for the United States. Recalling their earlier objections to war, southerners warned that acquiring overseas territories, especially the Philippines, would doom republican government and usher in the age of American Empire. The evils associated with this transformation, including a more powerful, centralized government and a greatly enlarged, permanent military establishment, seriously alarmed southerners who still held vivid memories of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Most important, the acquisition of overseas territories raised vexing questions about the status of the islands' people within the American Union. For most southerners, the difficult debate centered around their own hostility to their government maintaining people in colonial status thousands of miles from America's shores balanced by their own desire to maintain white supremacy at home.
Despite their anxieties over territorial expansion, southerners expressed far fewer concerns over the American occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico than over the Philippines. Most southerners predicted that the cost of administering the Caribbean Islands and providing for their defense would not require an enormous increase in taxes. Nor did they feel that islands so close to American shores would require either the creation of a vast, new colonial bureaucracy or an enormous increase in America's military forces. By the conclusion of the armistice, the American army had pacified Spanish resistance on both islands and taken steps toward establishing new civil governments. In Porto Rico, the American army, under the command of General Nelson Miles, administered affairs on the island without incident. After Spain's capitulation, the American military governed Porto Rico with widespread popular approval from the island's inhabitants. In Cuba, the Spanish army required considerably more time to evacuate the remnants of its army that had once numbered over 150,000 men. In addition, the problem of erecting civil government in Cuba was more problematic because of the existence of the Cuban Revolutionary Government.

Although most southerners supported the recognition of the Cuban Republic prior to the declaration of war against Spain, white racism and attitudes of Anglo-Saxon superiority led many of them to retreat from their support for immediate Cuban self-government. By the summer of 1898, most southerners appeared satisfied with the provisions of the Teller Amendment, which denied any American intention of permanently exercising sovereignty over Cuba, but gave the United States a free hand to influence and shape a new Cuban government. To be sure, some southerners remained fearful that Cuban occupation would provide the Republican Administration with opportunities for
patronage and self-aggrandizement, but most sympathized with McKinley's reluctance to 
turn the reins of power over to native Cubans. For many southerners, the war revealed for 
the first time that most of the Cuban rebels, including its leaders, were of African ancestry. 
The natural resentment felt by Cuban rebels at America's reluctance to recognize them as 
the legitimate rulers of the island increased tensions between American officials and 
members of the Cuban Revolutionary Army. Reports of inauspicious encounters between 
Americans and native Cubans on the island only reinforced white southerners' negative 
stereotypes of black Cubans.

Many southerners doubted the Cubans' ability to govern themselves without a 
prolonged period of American supervision. Matthew Butler, as a member of the United 
States Commission in Cuba, reported to Secretary of War Russell Alger that Cuba's racial 
and social problems complicated the task of granting self-government to the Cubans. 
Although the rebels had struggled gallantly for their freedom, Butler acknowledged, "to 
go to the extent of recognizing their Government . . . would retard good government." 
An Arkansas editor praised the Cuban rebels for their bravery on the battlefield, but added 
that "as a body they are without discipline, headstrong and turbulent." Undoubtedly, many 
southerners agreed. In a commentary that summarized these growing doubts, as well as 
reflected popular notions of white paternalism, a Houston editor proclaimed:
The Cubans will be disappointed if they imagine they are to be turned loose at once to 
work their own sweet will upon the island. They are evidently incapable of establishing 
now such a government as we want to see in Cuba. The war has disclosed weaknesses in 
the Cubans that we of this country did not know existed some months since . . . . we can 
not turn them loose until they are strong in mind and body and able to 'walk alone.' Until
then the United States must and will exercise a general supervision over the island. If, southerners and other Americans concluded, native, non-white Cubans could not govern themselves, then the United States should take up the "White Man's Burden" and educate and civilize the people of Cuba. One rural Alabama editor suggested that the superiority of American culture and institutions would serve to uplift the people of Cuba. Americans, as Anglo-Saxons, he stated, possessed the "hand of industry, progress and prosperity—a triple alliance—and under its magic touch, the Pearl of the Antilles will be the gem of the ocean.6

Southern expansionists touted the material benefits that would likely accrue to the South after acquisition of territory in the Caribbean. The new possessions, they maintained, offered potential new markets for southern goods, especially raw cotton and textiles. In addition, southern expansionists supported American possession of Cuba for strategic purposes. Given its strategic location astride sea routes into the Gulf of Mexico and proposed routes to a Central American canal, southerners maintained a keen interest in controlling Cuba as a means of protecting Gulf Coast commerce. According to some southerners, surrendering control of the island jeopardized America’s ability to assert economic power in the entire hemisphere

John T. Morgan, Hannis Taylor, Daniel A. Tompkins, and other commercially oriented southerners, vigorously endorsed plans to establish American authority in the possessions acquired from Spain. After the string of American military successes in the war, Taylor, who before the war had campaigned for intervention in Cuba as a humanitarian measure, now lobbied vigorously for establishing American sovereignty on the island for economic and strategic reasons. He thought that American capital could

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profitably exploit the island's natural resources and that the navy could establish stations to safeguard America's vital waterways in the Atlantic and the Gulf. Unlike most southern expansionists, Taylor dismissed the idea that Cuba's racial composition posed any serious difficulties for the United States. He proposed that America could force segregation on the native people and create an all-white government. Convinced that white supremacy could be maintained, Taylor actively supported the acquisition of overseas territories and eventual statehood for Cuba.  

The most prominent and vocal southern expansionist, John T. Morgan, shared Taylor's belief that the United States should control its new island possessions for commercial and strategic reasons. While rejecting the extreme notion of annexation of all of its new possessions, Morgan believed that the United States could exercise effective control over overseas territory simply by building military bases on them or by sending cultural missionaries. The United States, rather than establishing its sovereignty over the islands, could use its moral and political influence to educate native peoples regarding Christianity and democracy. To aid in the task of "Americanizing" its new possessions, Morgan wanted to offer free homesteads to southern blacks who emigrated to the islands. The resulting mass emigration of African-Americans, Morgan believed, would lessen racial tensions in the United States by reducing the number of black citizens; at the same time, African-American émigrés would serve as missionaries for American culture and institutions abroad. Like Taylor and other southerners who supported territorial acquisition, Morgan championed the "southern solution" regarding the extension of citizenship to native, non-white peoples. Morgan, as a southerner, realized that simply granting citizenship did not necessarily confer any meaningful political power. Comparing
America's perceived responsibilities in the territories with southern whites' experience with slavery, Morgan stated,

We tried the institution of slavery, in the actual and physical control of an inferior race and, while it lifted up the negro to a state of civilization far above that of his family in Africa and was, in that sense and in the Christian sense, the greatest missionary work that was ever done, it reacted upon our people with a degenerating effect . . . . The political slavery of the inhabitants of any of the islands we may occupy, would possibly entail evils upon our home Government of like kind, in the outcome. The most we can do for the advancement of those people, is to secure peace and liberty of action to them.

Eventually, Morgan continued, the native people would recognize the obvious superiority of American political and religious institutions and adopt them as their own.8

In the interim, while native populations received education in American culture and democracy, the United States must maintain a strong, visible presence in the islands for strategic and commercial reasons, Morgan believed. The United States, as a burgeoning world economic power, needed naval stations in overseas territories to protect its commerce on the high seas. In addition, numerous naval stations would help guarantee America's freedom on the seas. Naval stations, Morgan argued, would not only serve the interests of America's navy and merchant marine, but they would give the United States a preponderance of influence over the affairs of the islands where they were located. In an article in The Independent, Morgan discussed his views of territorial expansion in terms similar to those of the philosopher Brooks Adams in The Law of Civilization and Decay. Morgan, like Adams, stated that the failure of the United States to maintain effective control over its new possessions was equivalent to accepting America's inevitable decline. The United States, as a "progressive and competitive nation," must use "the genius of our race, employ the energies of our people" and accept the challenge of overseas expansion.
Otherwise, Morgan concluded, "our posterity will be led to regret that their fathers had not bequeathed to them the greater benefits that our race have secured under the British flag." nine

The idea of the United States exercising control over Spain's former colonies in the Caribbean enjoyed considerable public support in the South. Few southerners disputed the strategic value of both Porto Rico and Cuba; American control of the islands would allow the United States to keep commercial channels open in the South Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. If some foreign power, or a native government hostile to the United States, assumed control of the islands, they could threaten seaborne commerce, especially that trade originating from the region's Gulf ports. American control of these possessions seemed especially important amidst continued debate regarding the construction of an isthmian canal. Southerners also recalled their region's antebellum desires for Caribbean expansion. Like an earlier generation of southerners, contemporaries defined Cuba and, to a lesser extent, Porto Rico, as within the territorial limits of America's "Manifest Destiny." Given their proximity and strategic value to the South, Cuba and Porto Rico fit well within the limits of most southerners' definition of the "American System." ten

But if southerners seemed untroubled by the idea of governing Cuba and Porto Rico, reports from within the administration that McKinley might retain permanently the Philippines seriously alarmed them. During the summer and fall of 1898, newspapers across the South printed editorials critical of the administration's expansionist rhetoric. In August of 1898, a national journal conducted a survey of the American press and found that none of the South's major newspapers favored "colonial expansion." The survey,
published in *Public Opinion*, indicated that about half of the South's newspapers opposed expansion without reservations; the other half consistently opposed expansion in the past, but offered qualifications. Although a crude gauge of public attitudes because of the small sample involved, the results of the newspaper survey probably accurately reflected popular attitudes. A clear majority of southerners opposed colonial expansion after the Spanish-American War. The uncertainty shown by a segment of the press undoubtedly stemmed from the methodological criteria established by *Public Opinion*. Rather than determining separate opinions for the acquisition of Porto Rico and the Philippines, the survey combined the two possessions to determine approval or disapproval of "colonial expansion." Given many southerners' approval for keeping Porto Rico, as reflected in the regional press, it is likely that the newspapers classified as "wavering" supported the acquisition of Porto Rico but not of the Philippines.\(^1\)

During the period of diplomatic negotiations between Spain and the United States over the future status of the Philippines, a southern consensus existed against the retention of the Pacific archipelago. For many in the South, the goals of the Spanish-American War had been achieved with the defeat of Spain's military and the liberation of Cuba. To go beyond the narrowly defined objectives of the administration's initial policy, by seizing colonial possessions in the Pacific, would jeopardize America's credibility abroad. Southerners, most of whom supported a war against Spain to liberate Cuba and avenge national honor, refused to endorse a policy of colonialism because it violated many of their own deeply held beliefs, such as a fear of a stronger central government and a large, standing army. Still scarred by the memory of Reconstruction as an attempt by corrupt northern politicians to exploit and pillage a prostrate South, many in the region considered
colonialism yet another manifestation of the depravity of American politics. Southern white racism toward non-white Filipinos, too, contributed to widespread hostility to a policy of Philippine annexation. William Tarry, in a letter to his sister, discussed the common southern concern that American foreign policy had been unduly corrupted. It is "a war waged by the politicians of the country for the purpose of plunder & conquest & robbery. The black Republican party north waged the war against the South for the purpose of stealing our slaves & robbing the people generally & now they want to rob Spain of her property . . ." In an equally critical fashion, a North Carolina Populist newspaper editor, alarmed at reports that officials in Washington were considering the acquisition of the Philippines as a colony, condemned the President and congressional Republicans as "greedy Shylocks" and urged them to "give us a rest and not press their plan to make this a war of conquest and plunder."12

Most southerners also opposed the permanent retention of the Philippines based on their belief that it would lead to a radical transformation in the nature and scope of the federal government and necessitate burdensome new taxes. From a practical standpoint, many southerners opposed a policy of colonialism due to the high financial costs associated with empire. The war alone had cost approximately $250 million; maintaining colonies in the future would require similarly large appropriations on an annual basis. Consequently, a majority of southerners, especially poor southerners, found it extremely injudicious for the government to raise taxes and expend millions in public funds to secure territory abroad while so many Americans still suffered from crushing poverty at home.

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war, but for all associated costs in the future, such as administering territory and paying veterans' pensions. The end result of an expansive foreign policy, he concluded, would be billions in public debt, high taxes, and continued poverty for millions of southerners.\textsuperscript{13}

Equally important to many southerners was the widespread fear that the permanent acquisition of the Philippines would lead to the creation of a large, standing army. During debate at the Texas State Democratic Convention, for example, a majority of delegates spoke against "the acquisition of any territory, the government or control of which will necessitate an increase in the standing army of the United States." In drafting their state platform, Texas Democrats passed a resolution specifically renouncing the permanent retention of the Philippines for that very reason. The creation of a large, standing army, these Texans and many others believed, defied the republican principles of the Constitution and represented the entering wedge of military government. Rather than viewing the army solely as a means for the United States to defend its own sovereignty and to defend its colonial possessions, southerners, thus, regarded it as a potential threat to their own liberty.\textsuperscript{14}

Anti-annexationists outside of the South occasionally speculated that the government pursued a colonial policy for the purpose of building a large army for use against political radicals, labor unions and various dissident groups; in the South, the public feared the military might be turned against the region's segregated social institutions. In other words, American colonialism and the concomitant growth of the army and the federal bureaucracy, represented a potential threat to the liberty to maintain white supremacy in the South.\textsuperscript{15}
Finally, and most important, racism played a significant part in shaping southern white's attitudes on the Philippine question. To most white southerners, and many northern whites as well, the non-white people of the Philippines were semi-civilized; they could never be assimilated. Not only were Filipinos unassimilable, some in the South suggested that the attempt to integrate "nine millions of savages 8,000 miles away from home" into the American body politic would have devastating effects on American society. Workers, some predicted, would see their wages slashed with the introduction of millions of people willing to work for a fraction of prevalent wages. Although a few big businesses might benefit from cheap Filipino workers, the "fate of the working man would be imperiled." In the long term, such a misguided policy as annexation, one southerner remarked, would not only injure the American working class, but it threatened to "overrun [the U.S.] with a horde of ignorant and vicious people [who] imperiled our very democratic institutions."\(^{16}\)

The white majority's commitment to white supremacy placed many southerners in an awkward position on the Philippine question. In erecting an elaborate system of segregated institutions in their own region, southerners claimed African-Americans lacked the requisite social and political skills to participate fully in American society. By passing Jim Crow laws, and creating a *de jure* system of segregation in the South, southern legislators not only reflected the white majority's hostility toward African-Americans, they degraded all non-white people. When northern politicians suggested creating similar social and political institutions for the Philippines, however, southerners bristled. Some northern supporters of annexation stated that Filipinos might profit from a brief period of tutelage as a colony under white American rule. During that period, native Filipinos could
be instructed in American democracy and civilization in preparation for eventual self-
government as a state in the Union. Again, southerners realized that the inclusion of the
Philippine population into the American union, with full political rights, jeopardized their
own ability to permanently maintain rigid segregation in the South. In a poignant editorial
in the Confederate Veteran, S. A. Cunningham clearly defined the position of most white
southerners on the Philippine question. He reaffirmed not only the South's commitment to
the Union, but to the founding republican principles "established by the blood of their
ancestors." In the recent struggle against Spain, he continued, northerners should not
have been surprised at the South's display of support and loyalty. If the national
government, however, embarked upon a policy of conquest and the annexation of territory
inhabited by millions of non-white people, the South would strenuously object as one
people. For, as Cunningham concluded, "[w]e are determined upon a white man's
government, and when race riot begins [w]e may be counted and recounted to a man to
maintain [our] part of it, and in doing which neither cost nor privation will be
considered."\textsuperscript{17}

Widespread opposition in the South to Philippine annexation was best indicated by
petitions to the Senate in late 1898 and early 1899 urging that body to reject any measures
to extend colonial rule over the archipelago. Across the region, Erving Winslow of the
Anti-Imperialist League distributed postal cards for citizens to petition the Senate to reject
the annexation of "any other foreign territory without the consent of the people thereof,
believing such action would be dangerous to the Republic, wasteful of its resources, in
violation of constitutional principles, and fraught with moral and physical evils to our
people. From the armistice in August of 1898 to the final vote on the Treaty of Paris in February of 1899, hundreds of southerners signed and mailed these cards to their senators and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These petitions arrived from every state of the South and were signed by people in a wide variety of occupations. Approximately half of the cards were signed by farmers; the other half from various professionals, including attorneys, educators, and clergymen. White women, as well as men, contributed to this campaign to defeat Philippine annexation. Among the more notable signatories were Henry Ingersoll of Tennessee, a member of the American Conference on International Arbitration; Warren Candler, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South; Josephus Daniels, editor of the Raleigh News and Observer; and five bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church. By February of 1899, Anti-Imperialist petitions containing the signatures of over 2,100 southerners had arrived in Washington for consideration by the Senate.  

Southern opposition to retaining the Philippines increased as McKinley edged ever closer to a "large policy" of expansion that included the annexation of the Philippines. Among the five delegates appointed to attend peace talks in Paris, only George Gray, a Democrat, stood in opposition to the designs of the administration. The remaining members, William Day, Whitelaw Reid, William Frye, and Cushman Davis, operated under instructions from McKinley to acquire the entire Philippine archipelago from Spain. At Paris, the American delegation demanded that Spain surrender Cuba, cede Porto Rico and an island in the Marianas in the Pacific (Guam), and the Philippines. Given the United States' superior military position, Spain made only a few perfunctory challenges to the peace terms. In order to soothe Spain's injured pride and hasten a conclusion to the talks,
Senator William Frye, a delegate at the conference, proposed a cash payment to Spain of twenty million dollars. On December 10, 1898, with a profound sense of resignation eased only by the prospect of receiving a monetary settlement for the Philippines, the Spanish delegates agreed to sign the Treaty of Paris.²⁹

McKinley's decision to acquire the entire Philippine archipelago resulted from his belief that it represented the best available course of action. Relinquishing control of the islands after the war, he believed, would be both imprudent and impolitic. McKinley realized that the American public would not likely accept returning the islands to Spain. Nor would Republican expansionists and businessmen sanction turning over control of the Philippines to a third party, especially if it was a commercial rival of the United States.

The president also dismissed another alternative, maintaining an independent, neutral Philippines, because it lacked any substantial public support. Over time, the public would demand to know what it received from the Philippines in return for the expenditure of millions of dollars to defend and guarantee the independence of the islands. Faced with no acceptable alternatives, McKinley rallied public opinion and Republicans in Congress in defense of the treaty with Spain.²⁰

During Senate debate regarding the Treaty of Paris, southern senators expressed general satisfaction with its provisions regarding Cuba and Porto Rico. Given the existence of the Teller Amendment, the status of Cuba after the treaty's passage was largely predetermined. As for Porto Rico, southern senators accepted its eventual acquisition because it seemed to conform more closely with historical patterns of American expansion. Porto Rico's proximity to the United States made it easy to defend and administer, and its inhabitants seemed accepting of American rule. Most important,
southern members argued, both Caribbean islands were defined as a part of North America by the Monroe Doctrine and could be easily "Americanized." According to John McLaurin of South Carolina, the powerful civilizing influence of "our people will rapidly bring them into harmony with our free institutions."  

The disposition of the Philippines, on the other hand, was an entirely different matter and became a major source of contention. To some of the South's senators, acquiring the Philippines meant a rejection of historic American isolationism that had served the nation so well in the past. George Washington's admonition to avoid foreign entanglements, they argued, rang as true during the present debate as it did a century earlier. America's enormous material wealth and relative domestic tranquility, southern senators maintained, stemmed from the fact that America had focused its energies on domestic concerns and wisely avoided the wars of Europe. To obtain the Philippines, however, would "throw ourselves upon the red-hot stove of international politics in the Eastern Hemisphere." Given the charged climate associated with imperialism in the Far East, with Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan all vying for territory, American acquisition of the Philippines seemed an invitation to perpetual conflict with other colonial powers. In an appeal to his colleagues in the Senate, Alexander Clay of Georgia, offered this analysis:

The danger of frequent and almost constant wars between foreign nations in the far East, which always bring ruin and disaster, should be a warning against the acquisition of this foreign territory and population. Why do we want to invite a condition of affairs that will take a hundred thousand of our citizens from peaceful pursuits and transfer them to military life, to be shot down in defense of Malays? In the language of Mr. Carnegie, "Why do we wish to enter the far East, a mine of dynamite, always liable to explode?"
Other southern senators objected to the acquisition of the Philippines because they thought the imposition of colonial rule over Filipinos undermined the United States Constitution and the concept of republican government. As a constitutional republic, the United States could not govern people against their will unless it was for the purpose of extending the full rights of citizenship at some future date. A senator from Georgia admonished his colleagues, "We can not have and maintain one form of government for citizens of the United States and another form of government for a subjugated race. Subjects are unknown to our form of government."23

Such remarks made southern senators appear hypocritical. While they denied suffrage to most African-Americans in their region, many southern senators raised constitutional objections to taking similar measures against non-white people in the Philippines. Their rhetoric, however, was calculated for effect. Aware that most Americans rejected statehood for a territory populated by Malays, Asians, and Spanish, southerners hoped they could defeat annexation schemes by denying the possibility of holding the islands as a colony. In other words, if the United States was unwilling or unprepared to grant eventual statehood to the Philippines, it should relinquish control of the islands at the earliest possible date. In defending their anti-annexationist position, southern senators sought to shame their Republican counterparts by raising these vexing constitutional questions. Donelson Caffery even tried to use the words of the Republican party's greatest leader against it. He quoted the Gettysburg address, "that this was a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, that liberty might not perish from the earth." During the Civil War, Caffery proclaimed, when the attention of most men was determined upon ruin and destruction, Abraham Lincoln "arose in our midst,
inspired, as it were, from on High . . . and uttered [this] sentiment and announced [this] truth." If Republicans wanted to remain true to their founding principles, Caffery concluded, they would have no choice but to oppose the annexation scheme.24

The region's senators understood that by defeating annexation, they could achieve several important goals consistent with their own subjugation of black southerners. For one thing, it represented a partial vindication of their claim that Reconstruction had been unconstitutional. In addition, it lessened the possibility that the federal government would impose its will against the white majority in the South in order to reverse segregation in the future. Finally, and most important, by forcing the issue of Philippine statehood and defeating annexation, southern senators blocked the inclusion of approximately seven million non-white people into the American Union. Their entry into the American population, as either citizens or colonists, it was assumed, would destroy the nation's racial homogeneity, further complicate the delicate race question, and threaten the ability of white southerners to maintain separate, racially segregated institutions.

Southern senators also warned their colleagues that pursuing a colonial policy toward the Philippines threatened to involve the United States in a military quagmire. In rejecting the Filipino's right of self-determination, the United States could expect opposition from nationalist groups on the islands. Prior to the Spanish-American War, native Filipinos, under Emiliano Aguinaldo, challenged Spanish sovereignty in the archipelago. Spain managed to suppress Aguinaldo and the insurrection for a time by buying off rebel leaders, including Aguinaldo. In exchange for approximately 400,000 pesos, the Philippine revolutionary and some of his followers agreed to leave the islands for Hong Kong in December of 1897. During Spain's war with the United States,
however, Aguinaldo and his followers seized the opportunity to launch another revolution against Spanish rule. Returned to the Philippines from his exile in Hong Kong in May of 1898 by George Dewey and the United States Navy, the revolutionary leader rallied native Filipinos against Spain. Within weeks, Spanish authority collapsed, and Aguinaldo and his followers established a provisional government and asserted their independence. Given the sympathy and aid shown by Dewey, and the silence of American authorities concerning the creation of the provisional government, Aguinaldo and Filipino nationalists fully expected the United States to recognize the legitimacy of his government at the end of the conflict with Spain.25

By the end of 1898, as the Senate wrangled over the question of Philippine annexation, Aguinaldo and his provisional government exercised virtual control over the entire archipelago. United States forces, on the other hand, controlled only the city of Manila and portions of Luzon province. Several southern senators warned against the annexation of the islands because any attempt to assert American sovereignty over the rest of the islands would likely provoke forceful resistance from Filipino nationalists. Senator James Berry of Arkansas, expressed his sympathy with the Filipinos' desire for self-government. Recalling his experience with Reconstruction, Berry remarked, "those of us who live in the States of the South have some knowledge of the wrongs and outrages that may be perpetrated even by Americans where they seek to govern by strangers and by military power and unwilling people." Claiming that the South waged the Civil War in defense "of the doctrine that all just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed," he proclaimed his steadfast opposition to forcing "upon the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands . . . the curse of carpetbag government."26
Another southerner in the Senate, Hernando Money, warned his colleagues that the United States should renounce any intention to annex the islands; otherwise, a war that began in the name of freedom and liberty, would become one of conquest and subjugation. The result, Money predicted, would be "a call for fresh volunteers" with "thousands of the best American youth laying their bones upon the plains and in the jungle of Luzon and in other parts of the Philippines." Southern anti-annexationists in the Senate concluded that Aquinaldo and his followers were no more likely to accept American colonial rule than they had Spanish colonial rule; the Treaty of Paris in its present form merely transferred an anti-colonial war from Madrid to Washington. The dilemma of asserting American rule over the Philippines, many of the South's senators grimly warned, could result in a long, expensive, and bloody war of conquest in the Philippines. Rather than fight a colonial war thousands of miles from America's shores, southern senators argued, the United States should allow the Filipinos the right of self-determination.27

Southerners in the Senate also spoke out against the annexation of the Philippines because they predicted the costs associated with extending and maintaining American sovereignty over the islands far outweighed any possible benefits. Their objections countered claims made by some northern senators that the Philippines would provide the United States with a valuable strategic and commercial presence in the Southwest Pacific. By the time debate began in the Senate regarding the disposition of the Philippines, numerous northern trade journals had predicted great things for the Philippines. The islands could prove extremely valuable to the United States both as a potential new market and as a source of raw materials. In addition, the port at Manila, some annexationists contended, could be developed into an American "Hong Kong" as America penetrated the

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enormous market of China. With Manila serving as a coaling station for America's merchant marine and navy, the ability of the United States to project power in the Far East would be greatly enhanced. Annexing the Philippines, therefore, had incalculable value to the American economy.28

Southern senators expressed a much different view of the economic value of the Philippine Islands. Although interested in acquiring new markets overseas, southern spokesmen doubted the potential of the Philippines to consume America's surplus goods. They also understood that Filipinos would never be major importers of southern products, especially agricultural staples. Donelson Caffery, senator from Louisiana and a leading sugar producer, claimed that the Philippines represented more of an economic liability for the nation than a potential asset. In an analysis of Filipinos as consumers, Caffery concluded,

What do the dwellers near the equator consume? A half-civilized man wants but little. Such people always export more than they import. Their wants are very few. They feed at home, and the balance of trade is always in their favor. Those distant possessions would cost more in ten years for garrisons than they would yield profit to the United States in a century.29

Like Caffery, most southern Senators rejected northern assertions that the islands would provide an important new market for American commerce. Senator John McLaurin of South Carolina, for example, claimed that in the context of the total import-export trade of the United States, the addition of the Philippine trade would be insignificant. Reiterating Caffery's allegations that "semi-civilized people" made poor consumers, McLaurin caustically remarked, "We will have to teach them to wear shirts and breeches before we can trade with them much." In the meantime, McLaurin concluded, the expense
to the nation of maintaining the islands would be immense compared with the possible economic benefits.30

Trade figures between the United States and the Philippines prior to the Spanish-American War supported the allegations of southerners who minimized the importance of the Philippines to the economy of the United States. In 1896, the total import and export trade between the Philippines and the United States amounted to only $5,145,303 or less than 8.5% of all trade between the United States and Asia and Oceania. Furthermore, if existing trade patterns remained intact, the value of trade between the archipelago and the United States worked to the distinct advantage of the Filipinos. Again, using 1896 figures, the United States recorded almost a $4.85 million trade imbalance with the islands. Although these trade figures represented commercial relations under Spanish control of the islands, southern senators doubted that American annexation would result in any significant improvement in the trade picture with the Philippines.31

Given the slight economic benefit of the Philippines, southern Senators challenged those who favored sending an army of occupation to the islands to guarantee American control. Most American observers of foreign policy agreed that in order to maintain a stable government in the Philippines would require an army of from 100,000 to 400,000 men. Given this scenario, Alexander Clay of Georgia submitted an appropriations estimate for 1900 designed to show the high costs associated with American colonialism. According to these estimates, naval appropriations would increase 50% and army appropriations a staggering 500% over the previous fiscal year. Clay conceded that not all of the increases in military appropriations resulted from United States involvement in the
Philippines; he did, however, claim that if the United States did not become involved in territory outside the Western Hemisphere, such increases would not be required.32

Rather than send an army of occupation to the Philippines, as many northern annexationists and the administration suggested, several southern senators recommended using American economic power to assert authority over the islands. As a group, they rejected the notion that the United States either had to annex the islands or concede the trade of the Orient to other colonial powers. Instead, the United States could pursue a policy of neo-colonialism in the archipelago, monopolize the trade of the Philippines, and acquire access to markets in other parts of the Far East. Senator Money asked his colleagues if it "was necessary to the spread of American products, either manufactured or raw" to subjugate or conquer foreign consumers? On the contrary, he concluded, the superiority of American labor and the high quality of United States products had created access to global markets and would continue to do so with or without the formal annexation and occupation of the Philippines.33

Despite their material concerns, the most important issue for the South's senators appeared to involve questions of race. The Philippines' population consisted of approximately seven million people, with only a small fraction being white. The vast majority of the inhabitants of the islands were non-whites of Asian origin. Southern senators, like some northern anti-annexationists, emphasized the racial composition of the islands as a means to defeat annexation. Because the Constitution denied the right to acquire colonies, they argued, the archipelago would have to be granted eventual statehood and its inhabitants extended citizenship. Their line of reasoning played upon widely held racist assumptions regarding the inferiority of non-white people. According to
the South's senators, the islands' population was biologically inferior and unassimilable; efforts to include them in the American body politic would erode America's racial homogeneity and, therefore, the Anglo-Saxon character upon which republican institutions rested.34

Senator Donelson Caffery urged his fellow senators to reflect upon the racial composition of other territories acquired by the United States in the past. Except for Hawaii, which he claimed to be an anomaly due to strategic considerations, all territory previously acquired by the United States contained a sizable white population or the capacity to support a large white population after its annexation. As a result, the transition from territorial self-government to statehood comported with existing democratic institutions. Given its distance and hostile equatorial climate, however, the Philippines were never likely to attract large numbers of whites. The majority of the population would remain largely Asian in character and incapable of establishing self-rule.

In conclusion, Caffery stated, "If we know in advance that a certain territory is inhabited by a people incapable of self-government, we know that we can not take them into our Union, and, knowing that, we know that we ought not to take them at all."35

Senators from the South claimed to speak with more authority on the race question than those from the North. They claimed that their more intimate experience with African-Americans, as slaves and as freedmen, provided them with greater insight into the mind and capability of people they deemed to be inferior. Benjamin Tillman, of South Carolina, speaking before the senate as the professed "Senator from Africa" because of his state's majority black population, criticized northern annexationists for failing to appreciate the significance of racial concerns. Tillman attributed their position to their ignorance of
African-Americans; I "realized what you are doing, while you do not . . . for I would save this country from the injection into it of another race question." South Carolina's other senator, John McLaurin, also proclaimed his expertise in matters involving "inferior races." As a senator from South Carolina, he felt "peculiarly qualified to speak upon [this] phase of the question, and it is that pertaining to the incorporation of a mongrel and semibarbarous population into our body politic, a population that, so far as I can ascertain, is inferior to but akin to the negro [sic] in moral and intellectual qualities and incapacity for self-government." He, like Tillman, proclaimed that Philippine annexation would seriously complicate relations between the races and weaken white American's control over their common social and civil institutions.36

New South promoters, however, dismissed many of these concerns and favored retaining the spoils of America's war with Spain, including the Philippines, as a means to increase commercial activity in their native region. During consideration of the Treaty of Paris and the annexation of the Philippines by the Senate, southern champions of territorial expansion renewed their efforts to convert other southerners to their cause. After the Spanish-American War, support for Philippine annexation and a "large policy" of overseas expansion seemed to be strongest in the South's larger business centers and among those involved in large-scale commercial enterprises. In these communities, progressive newspaper editors, expansionist politicians, and various business leaders, built support for a policy to exploit the spoils of the war with Spain. These spokesmen urged the United States government to expand American power and influence over newly acquired territories in order to secure new markets overseas for American goods. According to their plan, southern exports of agricultural staples, textiles and manufactured iron and steel
products to global markets would provide an economic boon to the South and alleviate the region's chronic poverty.

The relative absence of opposition to the Treaty of Paris and Philippine annexation in some of the South's larger cities indicated the appeal of the economic vision of the New South boosters and their ability to articulate their message. Unlike their rural counterparts, few urban southerners answered the Anti-Imperialist League's appeal to petition the Senate to defeat both measures. In the case of Texas, fewer than thirty persons mailed petition cards from the cities of Dallas, Forth Worth, Galveston, Houston, and San Antonio; over three hundred petitions came from various small towns in rural parts of east and central Texas. The almost complete absence of petitions from the South's leading commercial centers along the coast is particularly striking. Residents from coastal cities, including Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, New Orleans and Galveston, sent less than 5% of all the anti-expansionist petitions received by the Senate. The response of the South to the postal card campaign sponsored by the Anti-Imperialist League clearly suggests that in those communities more closely tied to the national and international market, namely large coastal cities and commercial cities in the interior, the expansive policies of the McKinley Administration enjoyed their greatest support. In these towns and cities, the New South message of expanded overseas markets and economic uplift appeared to offer more promise, rather than anxiety, regarding the future of America in the age of imperialism.37

Southern supporters of expansion also benefited from the public reaction to reports of Filipino attacks against American forces outside of Manila. For some southerners, the assault of Filipino rebels, composed of "half-civilized tropical savages,"
against American trying to bring liberty and democracy to the islands raised a number of important issues that required the United States to maintain and assert its authority over the islands. The deaths of American soldiers and the challenge to American authority made the Philippine question a matter of national honor and international credibility. According to some southern editors, those responsible for the attack should be punished and the rebellion crushed; otherwise, both Filipinos and European colonial powers would doubt the United States' resolve to hold its territory. "To haul down the flag now," a Little Rock editor proclaimed, "would be a national disgrace and would make the United States the laughing stock of the world." Still others in the South understood the Philippine situation in terms of the "white man's burden" that required the United States to maintain a "firm hand" over the archipelago. The attack against American forces was launched by "ungrateful savages" who neither appreciated nor understood the superiority of American democracy and its civilizing institutions. Despite this setback in United States--Philippine relations, it remained "the duty of the American people . . . to consider the conditions and needs of the people in our possessions, and to work out for them a scheme of government which will develop the best that is in them . . . ." Only with the strong and determined hand of American influence, some suggested, could the Filipinos ever be capable of any form of home government.38

On the eve of the vote on the Treaty of Paris, with its provisions for the acquisition of the Philippines, southern senators were keenly aware of how the fluid situation in the Philippines had shaped public debate in their native region. Still, most of these senators, like many of their constituents, remained deeply concerned over a broad range of issues regarding the expansion of American sovereignty to the remote Pacific archipelago.
Underlying all of their objections, however, were two fundamental factors: a fear of enlarged federal power and a desire to maintain white supremacy in the South. To be sure, the two items were not unrelated. For southerners, the experience of Civil War and Reconstruction provided valuable guidance in evaluating the present situation. The memory of a large, powerful military exercising sovereignty against the will of the white majority in the South seemed analogous to what imperialists proposed for the Philippines. A policy of colonialism, southerners claimed, defied the Constitution and republican government, paved the way for militarism, and offered little or no protection for individual civil liberties. Given their own history, southerners feared providing the federal government with the tools to accomplish the acquisition of the Philippines, a large military, an extended colonial bureaucracy, and additional tax revenue. No matter how remote, many southerners still feared that the powers of the federal government might once again be unleashed on the South to remedy the evils of segregation. Furthermore, the prospect of the federal government intervening on behalf of African-Americans in the South appeared more likely if the Philippines were incorporated into the American Union. In the event of statehood, Filipino representatives would form a powerful voting bloc in Congress. More than one southern senator raised the spectre of one-seventh of all House members representing Filipino constituents, constituents who shared a different religion, culture, language and values than white Americans. Surely, they reasoned, it would be much more difficult to maintain an oppressive, segregated society in the South in the presence of a more powerful federal government influenced by significant numbers of non-white constituents. To most southerners, whether in Congress or back home in their
native region, Philippine annexation represented a huge gamble. Few appeared willing to accept the risk.

On the afternoon of February 6, 1899, the Senate entered into executive session for final consideration of the Treaty of Paris. After weeks of long and arduous debate, the fate of the treaty still remained very much in doubt. Events leading up to the vote, however, bolstered the administration's position that ratification was necessary. News reports on February 5 indicated that Filipino rebels had attacked an American garrison outside of Manila causing numerous deaths and casualties. Pro-treaty forces used these reports to rally support for the passage of the treaty as a show of American resolve and determination to exercise control over the Manila-area. In addition, the administration and other Republicans proclaimed the Filipino attack a direct assault on American sovereignty; in an executive order the previous December, McKinley had declared United States sovereignty over the entire archipelago. Passage of the treaty and the acquisition of the islands now became a matter of patriotism and national honor. To reject the treaty, administration spokesmen contended, would give the appearance of indecisiveness and jeopardize the lives of Americans already in the Philippines. Aware of this attack, and the apparently fluid circumstances in the islands, the Senate ratified the Treaty of Paris by a margin of one vote, 57 to 27.39

In contrast to their harsh rhetoric condemning the Treaty of Paris and the annexation of the Philippines, southern senators did not vote en masse against its ratification. Of the 21 southerners casting votes, eight voted in favor of the treaty, while the remaining 13 voted against. Although the South provided almost half of the negative votes, those who broke with their established southern position and voted in favor of the
Some of the yes votes came from southern senators who claimed to have been swayed by the attack on United States forces by Filipino rebels. In executive session, Senator McLaurin, one of the most outspoken critics of the treaty, decided to vote in favor of ratification "in light of the news that has come to us over the cable in the past two days." The attack had changed conditions on

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(Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate, p. 1184.)
the island, he proclaimed, and required that the United States stand firmly behind the administration's plans to pacify the Filipinos. Another southern senator, Samuel McEnery of Louisiana, changed his mind regarding the treaty after receiving assurances that his resolution against the permanent annexation of the Philippines be considered after the conclusion of the treaty vote. Finally, the Democratic Party and its leader, William J. Bryan, did little to preserve party unity on this crucial vote. On the contrary, resolution against the permanent annexation of the Philippines be considered after the conclusion of the treaty vote. Finally, the Democratic Party and its leader, William J. Bryan, did little to preserve party unity on this crucial vote. On the contrary, the national party appeared divided on the treaty question. Although most Democrats opposed ratification, Bryan urged senators to vote for ratification and take up the matter of the Philippines at a later date. In the meantime, he counseled the passage of the Treaty of Paris as the best means to conclude formally the war with Spain. Faced with these circumstances, and assured that they would be given the opportunity to vote on the McEnery Resolution, eight southern Senators voted for the measure.40

*  *  *

In the months after ratification, many southerners who had supported the treaty tried to mobilize the South in support of the new expansionist policy. The South's leading spokesman for territorial expansion, Senator John T. Morgan, appealed to white racist beliefs in seeking to build broader support for Philippine annexation in the South. Morgan, one of the southern Democrats who crossed party lines to vote for the Treaty of Paris and Philippine annexation, embraced most features of the McKinley Administration's expansive foreign policy. He suggested that the acquisition of territory in the Caribbean
and the Pacific would provide new markets for southern goods, especially Alabama steel and iron, cotton, and textiles. Insular possessions also offered strategic advantages for the United States in penetrating the potentially vast markets in Latin America and Asia. The Senator from Alabama, unlike most other southerners, did not believe the annexation of territory, inhabited by millions of non-whites, would complicate the race question. On the contrary, he urged southerners to support Philippine annexation because it would offer an attractive location for the mass emigration of African-Americans. The resulting out migration of blacks, Morgan concluded, would reduce the African-American population and ease racial tensions. To allay the anxieties of those who feared the addition of the Philippines as an American state, Morgan suggested the "southern solution;" non-white Filipinos might be citizens, but they would not necessarily have political power. In sum, Morgan claimed the potential benefits of expansion, for the nation and the South, far outweighed any political or social problems that might arise.41

Another Alabaman, Joseph Wheeler, shared Morgan's enthusiasm for overseas expansion. A former Confederate general who commanded American forces during the war with Spain, Wheeler defended the extension of American sovereignty to insular possessions as perfectly consistent with the United States Constitution and the teachings of America's greatest statesmen. Speaking before the 1899 Confederate Veterans' annual reunion in Charleston, he proclaimed that to forbid the extension of American constitutional power to overseas territories admitted to some deficiencies in our political institutions and people. Wheeler then recalled the history of expansion across the North American continent and the wisdom of the leaders who made it possible; he also emphasized the prominent role played by the South in the extension of American
sovereignty over the western territories. Regarding the aftermath of the war with Spain, Wheeler averred,

The position in which the American people find themselves to-day was not sought by them, but is the logical result of conditions thrust upon the country by a course of events beyond our control. No power in our grasp could have stayed the tide, and now we stand before the gaze of civilization confronted by grave responsibilities. The supreme test of American institutions is involved, and the American system of government is on trial.

Given the challenges produced by the aftermath of war, Wheeler concluded, President McKinley was absolutely correct in asserting American control over the Philippine archipelago.42

Even Senator John McLaurin, who surprised his colleagues in the Senate by voting for ratification of the Treaty of Paris, emerged as a prominent spokesman for overseas expansion. In part, he defended his actions in the Senate by shifting attention away from constitutional questions involving the status of Filipinos toward the commercial advantages offered by Philippine annexation. In embracing neo-colonialism, McLaurin avoided the vexing questions of race and the constitutionality of holding formal colonies within the American Union. During a speech at the annual American-Asiatic Association banquet, the South Carolina senator extolled the commercial benefits of expansion for the South, especially for iron, steel, and textiles. In a brilliant summary of the foreign policy position taken by many New South prophets, McLaurin declared

In striving for commercial progress, commercial expansion and commercial supremacy, I would not favor the incorporation into our body politic of any semi-barbarous races totally unable to appreciate our system of government, but I do favor the policy of expansion. The South cannot stand still and conservatively oppose commercial expansion. To do so means to go backward toward the ruinous conditions of thirty years ago. The unexpected and unintentional acquisition of the Philippines is to mark
an epoch in the history of this country. The world's conflict in the East at this time is in reality the outgrowth of commercial competition. It is a question of markets and market places.43

Several New South newspaper editors also joined in the public debate in support of overseas expansion. Led by Charles Mooney of the Memphis Commercial-Appeal and Howell Clark of the Atlanta Constitution, these editors created a vision of a dynamic New South sharing in the riches of international trade. Hostile toward anti-imperialists, they supported McKinley's foreign policy and his decision to annex the Philippines. Expansion into the Pacific, Mooney suggested, would give the South a huge competitive advantage in seizing the trade of the Orient. Southern cotton growers would no longer be plagued by the problem of overproduction, nor would they chafe at sharing profits with British middlemen. Control of the Philippines, Mooney concluded, would produce an economic boom in the region when the "700,000,000 people who wear cotton" in Asia turned to the South for textiles. Howell Clark, in a speech at Buffalo in December of 1899, reiterated the vision of the New South to an audience composed largely of northern Republicans. The Atlanta editor supported expansion in the Caribbean and the Pacific as consistent with American history and the Constitution. The inevitable "Americanization" of the insular possessions, Clark noted, would produce vast new markets for southern goods, especially textiles. After the passage of the Treaty of Paris, the editors of other New South newspapers, in Baton Rouge, Chattanooga, Galveston, Little Rock, Nashville, and New Orleans expressed similar expression of support for McKinley's foreign policy and the annexation of the Philippines as a means of achieving regional economic uplift.44

The escalation of the conflict in the Philippines between Filipino rebels and American forces doomed any chance the New South prophets had to create a consensus in
support of McKinley's policy toward the Pacific archipelago. In the weeks following the brief skirmish outside of Manila on February 4, both sides built up their resources in preparation for future conflict. On February 23, having secured the assistance of rebel groups in the city of Manila, Aguinaldo launched a poorly coordinated attack to seize the city from American forces. The Filipinos suffered heavy casualties, largely as a result of American artillery, and quickly withdrew into the jungles north of Manila.

During March and April, American forces under the command of General Elwell S. Otis, extended the area of American control approximately thirty miles north and east of the city of Manila. Led by General Lloyd Wheaton, an American punitive expedition into the jungles north of Manila resulted in the seizure of two small villages, Pasig and Pateros. With the arrival of reinforcements in March, Otis ordered Wheaton to move on the rebel capital at Malolos. On March 30, Americans and Filipinos fought outside the earthworks of the city. The next morning, Americans overran the Filipino positions only to discover that Aguinaldo and his main forces had evacuated the city under the cover of darkness. Otis, sensing that Aguinaldo would view the capture of his capital as a fatal blow, failed to order the immediate pursuit of the rebel army. Instead, he waited in Manila to receive word of Aguinaldo's surrender. It never came.

The conduct of General Otis during the Philippine War evoked considerable condemnation of the administration's Philippine policy. Despite his early successes, Otis failed to capitalize on these victories and push ahead for a complete victory. Deemed to be too cautious by his critics, "nervous Nelly" Otis displayed an obsession for protecting his lines of communication and for the paperwork associated with a colonial bureaucracy. Many of his concerns were grounded in the difficulties of extending American authority...
into the jungles of the Philippines. Nonetheless, the popular image in the United States of "Grandma Otis" was of a general who avoided searching for Aguinaldo and his forces in favor of sitting safely in Manila poring over mountains of paperwork and filling out additional requests for men and materiel.

The United States army campaigns in the Philippines during the summer of 1899 only added to the scorn for Otis and raised new doubts regarding the wisdom of the American annexation of the islands. The summer months, or the rainy season, produced fewer American expeditions, limited successes, and a sharp decline in the morale of American forces. Several towns were captured in Luzon but abandoned because Otis was reluctant to detach units for garrison duty. As the summer progressed, poor weather, bad sanitation, and inadequate transportation created enormous health problems for American troops. Tropical diseases, especially dysentery, were rampant in some units. By August, only half of the men in these were healthy enough to fight. Letters from soldiers in the Philippines revealed the desperation of their situation and their dissatisfaction with the war. In a letter to his parents, George Briggs, a North Carolina volunteer in Manila, reported that he was "sick of this country" and would be willing to "give my hope of heaven to get back to America." Since the war with Spain was over, Briggs continued, "we feel that our contract is filled and want to get back to god's country again." For many of the soldiers in the islands, what was desired was either a total war effort to destroy the rebels, or to abandon the Philippines and return to the United States.45

The growing dissatisfaction with the war felt by some American soldiers in the field was shared by much of the American public. Many southerners, who had protested against the annexation of the islands, pointed to the conflict in the Philippines as proof of
the administration's misguided policy. Southern anti-annexationists, along with their
northern counterparts, had warned of the dire consequences that would result from the
United States annexation of the islands. As the war bogged down into a bloody, brutal,
and costly operation against bands of roving guerrillas in the jungles, the worst fears of
anti-annexationists were realized.

Even during the earliest, most successful phase of the Philippine rebellion, southern
critics of annexation seized the war as an issue to use against imperialists and the
administration. Letters from soldiers appeared in the southern press and painted in stark
relief the horror and brutality of fighting a war in jungles 7,000 miles from home. Capt.
Elliot of the United States army, on duty in the islands, had a portion of a letter reprinted
in several regional papers. A beleaguered Elliot reported, "Talk about war being hell, this
war beats the hottest estimate ever made of that locality!" A Georgia editor followed
Elliot's letter with the American casualty lists to date in the Philippines: "210 killed, 51
died from wounds, 278 died from disease, 1,184 wounded, 15 missing...Is it any wonder
they call the island on which we have had most of the trouble Luzon." 46

The ever increasing costs associated with annexing the Philippines also brought
complaints from across the South. In addition to paying $20,000,000 to Spain for the
islands, the cost of quelling the insurrection and asserting American authority in the islands
would likely double or triple the original cost of acquisition. Many southerners questioned
why the administration would go to such extraordinary lengths to acquire the Pacific
archipelago whose people resisted American rule. Some concluded that jingoes in
Congress, especially Republicans, pursued a policy of colonialism for selfish ends. They
expected to benefit from increased patronage opportunities with the addition of overseas

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territory. McKinley and the executive branch were blamed for grabbing additional territory as an excuse to increase the personal power of the president. Along with territories, and a colonial war, would come a vast new bureaucracy and a large, permanent military establishment under the direction of the chief executive. One Houston editor, in a succinct analysis of the situation, declared, "every day we keep up the policy of imperialism brings us a day nearer to a monarchy."  

General Otis's summer campaign generated great scorn among southerners. The indecisive nature of the conflict and the apparent caution displayed by Otis in engaging the enemy irked southerners who favored Philippine annexation. American authority, southern annexationists suggested, must be asserted quickly and forcefully across the islands. Sufficient force should be employed in the islands "to convince the Filipinos that they have masters now different from the effeminate creatures who formerly attempted to rule them." Most southerners, however, blamed Otis and the president for the problems in the Philippines. Otis, one South Carolinian observed, lacked the energy to conduct the campaign in the Philippines. Until the administration adopted a firmer policy in the Philippines, "things will drag along pretty much as they are dragging along now. And it will cost the lives of more of our soldiers and the lives of more Filipinos and vastly more money to continue the conservative policy . . . . The taking of the islands was a mistake."  

Black southerners, too, appeared divided on the question of Philippine annexation. During the war with Spain and the Philippine insurrection, thousands of African-Americans volunteered for service and fought in America's overseas possessions. Black supporters of expansion favored the annexation of the islands and suggested that
participation in the war would advance the cause of social equality for African-Americans at home. P. B. S. Pinchback, former Radical governor of Louisiana, and John Lewis, an Atlanta Methodist preacher, urged blacks to place their country ahead of their race and support the administration's policy in the Pacific. The successful annexation of the Philippines, and the pacification of the islands, they declared, would bring great economic and political opportunities for blacks who fought in the war. Black participation, furthermore, might be rewarded with white respect and a loosening of social controls. Another black expansionist, J. W. Smith, editor of the A. M. E. Church organ, Star of Zion, pleaded with members of his race not to be left behind in the inevitable march of civilization. The spread of American civilization and institutions would proceed with or without the cooperation of African-Americans. Smith, therefore, believed blacks should participate in the extension of American authority as a means of demonstrating their loyalty to the Union and their usefulness as a race. "The duty of the Negro," Smith wrote, "is to go in and work side by side with the white man in developing these new possessions, for all of them will be Americanized in time . . . . When this becomes a fact, the future of the Negro will be bigger with promise than ever before."49

Most African-Americans in the South, however, condemned the war in the Philippines, which they viewed as an unjust and immoral attempt to force white supremacy on unwilling Filipinos. And they feared a war waged against dark-skinned people in the Philippines would unite white northerners and southerners and threaten African-Americans' limited freedoms at home. In other words, the popular vilification and degradation of Filipinos might result in domestic racial violence or in the enactment of even greater restrictions on the conduct of African-Americans. There were well-founded
reasons for this fear among blacks, especially in the South. Several prominent white politicians, including Donelson Caffery and John Morgan, suggested colonizing millions of African-Americans in the Philippines as a means of solving the race question. Even Senator Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina, an outspoken champion of white supremacy, received surprisingly warm receptions for his racist rhetoric in many parts of the nation during a series of lectures in 1900. A black editor in Arkansas expressed the common fear of African-Americans regarding the Philippine War when he admonished members of his race not to volunteer "to fight the brave men there who are struggling and dying for their liberty." To do so, he concluded, would be,

to curse the country with color-phobia, jim crow cars, disfranchisement, lynchers and everything that prejudice can do to blight the manhood of the darker races, and as the Filipinos belong to the darker human variety, the Negro fighting against himself. Any Negro soldier that will cross the ocean to help subjugate the Filipinos is a fool or a villain.\textsuperscript{50}

Amidst this growing tide of criticism from southerners, congressional imperialists and their allies in the press challenged the patriotism of the South. Despite the rhetoric of reconciliation and reunion associated with the war with Spain, the early stages of the Philippine insurrection produced a sectional division of opinion. Widely perceived as a war waged by northern Republicans to further their political careers and the interests of northern industry, southerners did not flock en masse to volunteer for service in the Philippines. As one Louisiana editor wryly observed, "Two weeks of enlistment of volunteers to fight the Filipinos have passed without anybody getting killed in the rush at the recruiting offices." Some southerners defended their lack of enthusiasm for the war as a sign of genuine patriotism. They were reluctant to volunteer to support an imperial war of conquest that disgraced the Constitution and the honor of the country. Responding to
charges that efforts to recruit volunteers in south-central Virginia had been
"discouraging," a Danville editor replied,

The failure of enlistment to thrive in the South is due to patriotism, rather
than lack of it. Southern people are not in sympathy with the war for
which they are asked to enlist for they stand for the principles enunciated in
the Declaration of Independence, and for their application abroad, as well
as in our own country. Our people are opposed to the policy of territorial
expansion by conquest and the war that is being waged on a people who
desire to be free.

It is unlikely that most southerners shared the high-minded idealism expressed in the
Danville Register. Certainly many southerners spent the summer of 1899 working the land
during the important growing seasons for cotton, tobacco and other staples. Nonetheless,
the editorial did accurately reflect widespread southern hostility toward a war that was
seen as misguided and unnecessary. 51

As the war dragged on for month after dreary month, troop levels in the
Philippines were steadily increased. Some in the South predicted that Philippine
annexation would lead to a massive increase in the permanent military establishment of the
United States. They feared, however, that considerations beyond the scope of national
defense contributed to the creation of a large, standing army. Some southerners adopted
the view that corrupt politicians and the nation's largest businesses merely used the
Philippine War as an excuse to build an army for use against those who threatened
domestic tranquillity. To that end, the permanent army being created for the Philippine
War would likely see action against Populist agitators, labor unions or any other
individuals or groups who threatened the status quo. In the future, the army might even
be turned against southerners who refused to abandon segregation and white supremacy.
Although an extreme view, it was one shared by some northern anti-imperialists and
Midwest Populists. In a scathing attack against the Republican architects of the Philippine policy, a Birmingham editor concluded,

Outside of the demands of imperialism and colonialism, many large influences are clamoring for a large standing army. The trusts and plutocrats in general want an army strong enough to crush labor uprisings. . . . If labor rises in strength, they want enough, aided by machine guns, to mow them down in the streets. While the republican party remains in power [the consumer] will be a cipher.\textsuperscript{52}

By the end of 1899, victories by the United States army in pitched battles with the Philippine insurgents compelled Aguinaldo to adopt new tactics. In November, he ordered his units to break into small, roving bands of guerrillas to harass enemy lines. Aware that he could not achieve a military victory in a direct confrontation against superior American forces, Aguinaldo sought a protracted conflict that would break the United States' will to fight. Filipino guerrillas, ill-equipped to accommodate prisoners of war, often killed wounded American soldiers rather than cared for them. American troops, fighting a frustrating war of "search and destroy" against guerrillas, often resorted to the brutal "water cure" to extract information from captured prisoners and civilians alike. Despite fairly rigid press censorship, atrocity stories filled American newspapers. One southerner observed that the newspapers contained numerous horrible reports about the Philippine war "that sickened his heart." Furthermore, he could not conceive "of anything more causeless and unjustifiable than this wanton sacrifice of human life, and of Government money that is going on in the Philippine islands." By the end of the year, with over 70,000 American troops in the Philippines, and with the human and financial costs of the colonial war mounting daily, many southerners hoped imperialism would become a major issue to use against Republicans in the election of 1900.\textsuperscript{53}
Among southern whites, widespread public opposition to the war in the Philippines was manifested during the presidential campaign of 1900. After the vote on the Treaty of Paris, William J. Bryan defended his support for ratification on the grounds that the disposition of the Philippines could be taken up at a later date. The first goal, according to Bryan, was to reach a formal conclusion of hostilities with Spain. In the interim, however, Bryan expressed his strident opposition to the administration's policy toward the islands. He neither anticipated nor supported a colonial war against Filipino insurgents. In preparing for the Democratic convention, Bryan forcefully articulated the common constitutional and moral objections to the Philippine War. In the process, he placed himself in the ideological camp of the Anti-Imperialist League. When the League's national convention met in early 1900, they approached Bryan about abandoning free silver and accepting a possible third party bid for the election in November. Unwilling to desert his basic principles, Bryan continued to push for the inclusion of an anti-imperialist plank in the Democratic platform.

At a state Democratic convention in March, Bryan declared that the three most important issues in the upcoming presidential election were silver, trusts, and imperialism. In a broader sense, he viewed the election in terms of "Who would rule America?," the plutocratic alliance of big business and corrupt politicians or the common people. A few months later he again sounded his battle cry in the North American Review. He attacked Republicans for clinging to the gold standard as a means to further consolidate the wealth of the nation in the hands of a privileged few. He also suggested that the administration's foreign policy, especially in the Philippines, was symptomatic of the contemptuous way in
which Republicans viewed common Americans. The forcible annexation of the islands and the handling of the Philippine insurrection, according to Bryan, violated every principle in the Declaration of Independence. Proponents of the war who claimed annexation would offer material rewards for the United States should be prepared to place a cash value on the lives of American soldiers killed in action. In typical Bryan fashion, he concluded, "We cannot set a high and honorable example for the emulation of mankind while we roam the world like beasts. . . ." The need in the next election, therefore, was to defeat the plutocrats whose action defiled the constitution, impoverished American citizens, and degraded mankind.  

Aside from southern goldbugs and Republicans, most people in the South supported Bryan's position on the dual issues of silver and imperialism. Across the South, the Democratic majority thundered their protests against the war in the Philippines as another manifestation of the Republicans' disregard for the Constitution or the interests of the common man. Just as the administration had sponsored high tariffs and the preservation of the gold standard to enrich its benefactors, it now waged a colonial war for equally selfish motives. The war, many southerners concluded, would consolidate power in the executive branch and provide extensive business opportunities for the nation's leading commercial interests. One southern observer reached the conclusion that only self-aggrandizement could explain a foreign policy that offered so few rewards for the nation. After the long, bloody colonial war of conquest in the Philippines, he hypothesized, the political "spoilsmen" and the "tariff and trust gatherers" would line up to receive their rewards.
Many other prominent southerners shared this critical view of McKinley's war in the Pacific. Willis Brewer, a congressman from Alabama, reprinted for campaign distribution a speech he delivered in Congress under the title of "This Damnable War." Unlike many Democrats, he did not condemn the entire Republican party for a war instigated by the president; he acknowledged that there were Republicans who opposed the president just as there were "thoughtless" Democrats who supported him. The question of imperialism, Brewer affirmed, and "the evils of this policy of conquest and spoilation" were so great, that he offered to give his support "to any Republican who antagonizes it [rather] than to any Democrat who favors it." To that end, he blamed the war in the Philippines on the perfidious conduct of the McKinley administration and its failure to respect the liberty of native Filipinos. In deploying thousands of American soldiers to the islands and forcibly crushing any resistance, what message had the administration given to the Filipinos? What encouragement, Brewer continued, had we offered for them to submit to American rule? The Civil War and Reconstruction provided guidance for the nation in its present dilemma. Amidst loud applause, Brewer thundered:

For my part, I have lived under the lawless domination of aliens, and I know what it means. They pillaged the States of the South for many years; men who came among us as adventurers, with lust in their eyes, poverty in their purses, and hell in their hearts. What better sort are we to give to a civic government in the remote islands Mr. McKinley is so anxious to conquer?"

Aside from a concern for native Filipinos, Brewer asserted that the current policy would have a devastating effect on the people of the United States. The conquest of the Philippines would come only after the loss of thousands of American lives and the expenditure of millions of dollars. More important, it would forever alter the nature of the
national government, entangle the country in foreign imbroglios, and lead to the moral and racial degradation of the United States.56

The conclusions reached by Brewer in his speech before Congress held special resonance for southerners. The memory of the Civil War and Reconstruction did prove instructive. Within its powerful frame of reference, southerners understood the war in the Philippines within the context of their own historical memory of an earlier conflict. At a Memorial Day celebration held at the Confederate Memorial Cemetery in Atlanta, Governor Allen Candler of Georgia presented his own thoughts about the government's conduct in the Philippines. He praised southerners who served in the Spanish-American War as soldiers who "fought not to promote the ambition of a crowned head... but for the God given right of local self government." But Candler then blasted Republicans who pursued a war of conquest against the Filipinos who wanted nothing more than to govern themselves. The colonial war being pursued by McKinley denied the rights for which the United States was founded, "and for which you fought as no men have fought in two thousand years at Manassas and Shiloh, Gettysburg and Chickamauga." Republicans, "drunk with [their] excesses of usurpation," are enslaving Filipinos for their own selfish ends, without governmental representation, "just as they held you and taxed you in the days of reconstruction."57

Bryan, and national Democratic leaders, continued to pound away at the issue of imperialism throughout the summer of 1900. At their national convention in July, the party declared in their platform that "imperialism was the paramount issue of the campaign." Although Bryan continued to address the twin themes of silver and imperialism on the stump, on August 8, before a crowd of fifty thousand people, he
deviated from his standard presentation and delivered a speech exclusively on the subject of imperialism. The speech, which later became a major campaign document, challenged the administration's Philippines policy on economic, constitutional and moral grounds.

"The contest of 1900," Bryan declared, "is a contest between Democracy on the one hand and plutocracy on the other." He attacked those who promoted the annexation of the Philippines as a means of asserting America's commercial power for placing profit ahead of humanity. He also lashed out at those who directly benefited from the war and expansion—army contractors, ship owners, and most of all, public officials. According to his interpretation of the Constitution, the Philippines could not be held as a colony; therefore, the army should evacuate the islands and prepare for the gradual extension of local self-government. Finally, Bryan questioned the motives of those who clamored for the creation of a large standing army for use in the Philippines. Most supporters of a large military, he asserted, were Republicans closely aligned with the nation's business interests. Bryan, like many southerners, feared that the real motive for the massive expansion of the army was anathema to individual expression and liberty. Could it be, Bryan suggested, that the Republicans sought an army for use to suppress domestic dissent? Or to disable those who challenged the authority of the Republican party or the status quo? The Democratic nominee even suggested that the Army built forts near large cities to intimidate labor activists and other dissenters.58

Bryan's address condemning McKinley's Philippine policy received enthusiastic support from most southerners. Except for a few goldbug newspapers and single-issue silver independent papers, the regional press was effusive in its praise for Bryan's anti-imperialist stance. The editor of a Savannah newspaper praised "The Commoner" for
making the issue of imperialism so clear to the average person. "The Philippine policy of the Republican party is a mistake," he declared, "and should be abandoned at once."

Another southern editor asserted that Bryan had laid the issue before the American public in such a way that it would be difficult for McKinley to justify his course of action in the Pacific. During the election, he continued, "the people are not fools and know a snake when they see its tail. They will not submit to imperialism." For some southerners, the issue of imperialism appeared as important to the future of the nation and their region as free silver. Given the tide of militarism that infected American institutions since the Spanish-American War, some suggested that "the republic established by the fathers is in peril." 59

Although the issue of imperialism and the national election elicited little commentary among southern white women, Rebecca Felton of Georgia urged the region's women to use their moral suasion to influence men's votes in the upcoming election. Felton, a prominent Populist spokeswomen, condemned McKinley's policy of imperialism as nothing more than a policy of "greed and usurpation" that threatened to destroy the republican institutions of the United States. The president's decision to wage war without the consent of Congress, Felton maintained, established a dangerous precedent for the government. In the future, the executive might ignore other powers reserved for the legislative or judicial branches; in effect, the president could establish a monarchy.

According to Felton, many of the evils associated with Republican foreign policy resulted from the party's close ties with big business. She blamed the architect of this relationship, Senator Marcus Hanna, for promoting a war against Filipino rebels as a way to appease key contributors from the commercial sector for their financial contributions to the party.
"Hannaism," Felton affirmed, "means a more costly, bloody and prolonged war" in the Pacific. The only way to prevent these men from plunging the nation into deeper trouble was to vote them out of office.  

Republicans, on the other hand, sought to minimize the issue of imperialism and close the distance between their party's position regarding the Philippines and that advocated by Bryan. On the stump, McKinley and his supporters emphasized the prosperity of the nation under McKinley and the gold standard and portrayed rebelling Filipinos as inferior people who failed to respect the legal acquisition of the Philippines from Spain. Characterizing Aguinaldo's forces as barbarous savages, Republicans asserted that it was the United States' responsibility to take up "the white man's burden" and bring civilization and good government to them. In other words, McKinley's party suggested that the United States must prepare the people of the Philippines for self-government, by force if necessary, and then extend that privilege to them when they were ready for it. In many respects, this policy differed little from what Bryan advocated for the islands. However, by failing to define what he meant by self-government, or providing a timetable for its implementation, McKinley did not commit his administration or party to any specific course of action. Finally, in speeches and in the Republican press, McKinley's supporters challenged the patriotism of those who questioned the administration's policy in the Philippines. By questioning the government's policy while American forces were in combat in the Philippines was associated with giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Bryan, Democrats, and the Anti-Imperialist League all placed the lives of American soldiers in jeopardy by opposing the war effort. The anti-war movement, and those who
favored abandoning the islands, provided moral support for Aguinaldo's forces and encouragement for the rebels to continue their struggle even in the face of desperate odds.

In the final month before the presidential vote, Bryan backed away from imperialism in favor of free silver as the "paramount issue" of the campaign. Republican charges of Democratic treachery in prolonging the war and increasing the danger to American soldiers compelled Bryan to focus less attention on foreign policy. Bryan also understood southern Democrats' reluctance to engage in a national debate on the race question. The Democratic party's reliance on the white majority of the South discouraged their presidential candidate from appearing too determined in defense of "dark skinned Filipinos." The hypocrisy of Democrats pleading for self-determination for Filipinos while maintaining white supremacy in the South also weakened the party's ability to make imperialism the central issue in the November election.61

The election of November 6, 1900, resulted in yet another resounding victory for McKinley and the Republican party. While not a mandate for imperialism, the issue probably served as a contributing factor to McKinley's increased margin of victory. By wrapping his administration in the flag and associating his party with the army in the Philippines, McKinley picked up additional support among recent party converts in the Upper Mississippi Valley and the West Coast. For most Americans, the return of economic prosperity served as a powerful antidote to Democratic charges that imperialism threatened the survival of the Republic. Bryan, in failing to articulate a dramatically different course of action in the Philippines, failed to elevate the issue of imperialism beyond a battle of semantics. He, like McKinley, spoke of eventual self-determination for the Filipinos; but he, unlike the president, would haul down the flag before demanding that
the rebels respect and consent to American authority on the island. For many Americans, especially those who already supported McKinley and the gold standard, the thought of retreating from the Philippines while engaged in a military struggle with the native population was simply unacceptable. National honor and international credibility, as the Republicans stated in their platform and in public speeches, demanded the United States to pacify the Filipinos and command their respect.62

Not surprisingly, Bryan carried every state of the former Confederacy by large majorities. In seven of the eleven southern states, he increased his percentage of the popular vote by an average of almost 3.5 percent over the election of 1896. Although the issue of imperialism had less to do with Bryan's greater vote totals than did the absence of an independent Populist candidate, the tone and content of southern public discourse confirmed the South's sympathy with Bryan's stand against McKinley's foreign policy and the war in the Philippines. Bryan's warnings of the evils of imperialism conformed with their own fears and anxieties over the future course of a colonial foreign policy. As the region most profoundly touched by the Civil War, and psychologically and emotionally scarred by its aftermath, many southerners found it impossible to ignore the historical parallels between the conduct of McKinley in the Pacific archipelago and Radical Republicans during the age of Reconstruction. To many southerners, it appeared as though Republicans had malevolent intentions in the islands that compelled them to support a colonial war despite its high cost in lives and treasure.63

The rhetoric of the campaign and the presidential vote also indicated the failure of the New South prophets to allay the region's fears of empire. Spokesmen for the New South emphasized the economic possibilities offered by overseas expansion, including the
annexation of the Philippines, for the nation and the South. Proponents of expansion promised new markets for southern goods, especially iron, steel, and textiles, in Latin America and Asia. With these new markets, the South would achieve unprecedented economic prosperity and never have to face the problem of cotton overproduction and crushing poverty. Despite its glowing promise, the New South vision failed to carry the battle over imperialism in 1900. One historian, H. W. Brands suggested that the failure of anti-imperialists resulted from the fact that "the perils they predicted lay beyond the horizon of the present, a frontier often nearly impenetrable by political argumentation in America." Yet in the South, the "perils they predicted" had precedent in America's recent past. In the South, where the historical memory of the Civil War provided guidance for the future, and the predicted perils of empire included a complication of the vexing race question, the promise of the New South prophets seemed far more ephemeral than the consequences of empire.64
The question of finding profitable markets for American cotton goods is one of supreme moment. It is right here that the Nicaragua Canal opens up possibilities so vast and so alluring. It is right here that the Nicaragua Canal opens up po way which that the mind pauses almost staggered before their contemplation.

— Sidney Story, 1900

It has always been insisted that the South was to be especially benefitted by the canal, and now when it seems that the president has adopted the course that seems likely to give it to us in short order, the Democrats rise up and oppose it. The people are with the president on this question, and if the Democrats adopt the plan suggested, they are going to bring the party into ridicule and contempt. The people want the canal and they want it the quickest way possible, and this stuff about not being fair to Columbia is the merest twaddle.

— Henry Sheffield, 1903
Southerners did not find all of the foreign policy initiatives of the McKinley administration as objectionable as the one pursued in the Philippines. As a forcible annexation of an unwilling people, the Philippine War evoked among southerners the unpleasant memory of Reconstruction. Many in the South feared the war in the Pacific archipelago would prove the entering wedge of militarism and confer vast new powers upon the executive branch. In the future, some southerners claimed, the American government would rest on the fiat of a virtual monarch, not the will of the people. And the military might necessary to seize and defend overseas territory might easily be turned against American citizens. Finally, southerners questioned the wisdom of forcibly annexing territory inhabited by non-white people. With their racist assumptions, southern whites held a low opinion of Filipinos and other tropical peoples; their incorporation into the American body politic, these southern racists argued, would only degrade American democracy, complicate the race question and challenge white hegemony in the South.

Southern expansionists shared many of the anti-imperialist biases held by others in their section. They, too, harbored racist assumptions about foreign peoples and feared any dramatic expansion in the power of the federal government. Consequently, full-fledged imperialists were rare in the South; most southerners sympathetic with the aims of the McKinley administration's foreign policy emphasized commercial over territorial expansion. Conquest of territory, they argued, was unnecessary to achieve the goals of increased trade opportunities in Latin American or Asia. The superiority of American products, culture and institutions would pry open markets overseas without having to resort to military force to seize colonies. Neo-colonialism, therefore, was seen as a means for the South to attain economic uplift without dangerously increasing the power of the
military and executive branch and without seriously complicating the race question at home.

* * *

The South's embrace of neo-colonialism, as well as its anxiety about employing United States' troops abroad, became clear in its response to McKinley's policy toward China. Japan's humiliating military defeat of China in 1895 exposed the weaknesses of the government in Peking and led to direct intervention by European powers. In return for compelling Japan to return seized territory in northern China, Russia, France and Germany demanded economic concessions and exclusive "spheres of interest," which restricted foreign access into the Chinese market. By 1899, with the Manchu government in Peking virtually powerless to resist, parts of China had been reduced to semi-colonies of the European powers and Japan.

In the United States, Americans interested in protecting future trade with China, especially import-export firms, producers of petroleum and railroad equipment, and a wide range of speculators associated with Wall Street, demanded help from Washington. In the South, the most adamant calls for protecting trade with China emerged from New South promoters interested in finding new markets for the South's raw and manufactured cotton goods. Led by the lobbying efforts' of the American Asiatic Association, organized in 1898 to promote trade with Asia, the McKinley administration slowly formulated a response to the carving up of China.

In September of 1899, alarmed that American trade might be excluded from China at a time when the United States enjoyed a significant territorial advantage in the Pacific as a result of the war with Spain, Secretary of State John Hay sent notes to all of the major
powers involved in China requesting that they preserve commercial equality for all nations in any spheres of influence under their control. Hay asked each power to repudiate certain forms of trade discrimination regarding treaty ports, customs duties, and railway and harbor use fees in areas under their control. These so-called "Open Door notes" did not mention special exclusivity arrangements in mining, railroad, and capital investments, they merely urged equal commercial opportunity in China. The notes clearly represented the administration's and the Sino-American business lobby's desire to protect the Chinese market for American trade without specifically guaranteeing China's territorial sovereignty.

The response of the major powers to Hay's notes was largely negative. Only Italy, which did not even maintain a sphere of influence in China, endorsed the concept of the Open Door. The remaining powers issued evasive and ambiguous statements indicating their support for the principle of commercial equality under certain conditions. Nonetheless, in May of 1900, Hay publicly announced that the foreign powers had given him definitive assurances of support for the Open Door and left the American people with the impression that his diplomacy had protected American commerce and prevented the destruction of China by hostile powers.

Shortly after Hay's announcement, a violent nativist uprising in China threatened to provoke large-scale military intervention by the European powers and the further partitioning of China. In June, thousands of Chinese belonging to a secret society named the Boxers assaulted communities that contained Western missions. Boxer attacks against Western targets culminated with an assault on Peking, where they laid siege to the foreign legation. The crisis in Peking created concern in Washington that the foreign powers
might use the incident to extract additional concessions from the Chinese government or to enlarge their spheres of influence. In response, Hay issued a circular to the parties involved urging them to preserve China's territorial integrity after the rebellion was crushed. At the same time, the Administration dispatched approximately 2,000 United States marines from the Philippines to aid in the rescue of Westerners trapped in Peking. America's military presence in China, Hay believed, would curb the land-grabbing desires of other powers and give the United States a negotiating presence once the siege was lifted. By the end of August, after an overland march from the port city of Tientsin, Western forces entered Peking, lifted the siege and crushed the remnants of the rebellion.3

The McKinley administration's China policy, especially the Open Door initiative, received considerable support in the South. Coming as it did on the heels of massive United States intervention in the Philippines, Hay's notes comforted some in the South who feared the Administration's drift toward imperialism and militarism. For most southerners, Hay's response to events in China represented a pragmatic search for a means to protect America's commercial opportunities there without becoming involved in another military quagmire in Asia. By emphasizing the United States' concern for markets in China while specifically renouncing territorial aggrandizement, Hay deftly united many anti-imperialists and imperialists in a common cause. In the South, Hay found a broad consensus in support of his policies. They received support from many New South prophets, large producers of raw cotton, manufacturers of textiles, iron and steel, and others involved in foreign commerce, as well as many who had consistently opposed most elements of McKinley's "large policy" of overseas expansion. The editor of the Memphis Commercial Appeal spoke for many southerners when he praised the president for
"pursuing the best course left open to him" in China. The Open Door, the editor claimed, would allow our people to trade with the Chinese without controlling them.⁴

Other southern newspapers and journals supported the policy of the Open Door. Some not only informed the public about the aims of Hay's policy, but sought to enlarge the Open Door constituency by championing it. These editorials and reports, written by New South proponents and influenced by the southern textile industry, often exaggerated the importance of the Chinese trade to the economic health of the South. An article in Dixie, one of the leading journals of southern industry, made the claim that "the enormous development of Southern cotton factories has been largely due to the trade opened with China." In an appeal tailored to create sympathy among the southern masses, the article further proclaimed, "The men, women and children who have been brought from the mountains, and from impoverished fields, to work profitably and successfully in cotton mills in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama, have become dependent for their daily bread upon the sale of the product of those mills to the Oriental millions. They will hardly approve a policy of our government which will tamely surrender the market upon which they are dependent for their daily support."⁵

Other editors placed the Chinese question in the context of the New South prophets' vision of future economic uplift through increased overseas trade. According to them, keeping the Chinese market open for American goods complimented the southern goal of building an isthmian canal to facilitate the exchange of southern goods and to shift the nation's foreign commerce southward to ports along the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic. To fulfill this vision, "it should be the aim of Southern statesmen to prevent . . . the partitioning of China." The failure of American diplomacy to maintain
open markets and Chinese sovereignty, many southerners suggested, would do serious harm to southern people and industries. "[Our] interest in the construction of the isthmian canal," a Georgia editor affirmed, "would be minimized. English and German spinners would hold the advantages they now enjoy as against the American mills." Nonetheless, the editor emphatically proclaimed, "Our whole purpose should be, not to acquire territory but to conserve our trade."6

McKinley's decision to send marines to rescue the foreign legation in Peking alarmed southerners who feared the move represented a retreat from neo-colonialism. Their support for the use of force in China, therefore, rested on the strict assurances of McKinley that their mission in China would be strictly limited to breaking the siege in Peking. Such a move appeared acceptable to most in the South because of the presence of many American missionaries, businessmen and foreign service personnel in the Ancient City. Some southerners also hoped that American participation in the relief expedition might prevent other foreign powers from using the incident to close the Open Door and completely dismember the rest of China. With American marines as a part of the allied force, many southerners reasoned, the other foreign powers would be more reluctant to press the Chinese government for additional territorial or economic concessions. Jabez Curry, a leading New South educator who promoted greater commercial opportunities for the region, praised McKinley and Hay for their handling of the European powers during the Boxer affair. In a letter to his son, the elder Curry commended the Administration's pragmatism in balancing the high-minded rhetoric associated with Hay's circular letter demanding guarantees for China's sovereignty with a commitment to send United States' troops to the Orient on a qualified basis so the United States was not "left in the cold in
the final partition of the sick man's estate." Secretary of State Hay, Curry concluded, "acted with discretion and showed considerable diplomatic ability."7

In August, after the liberation of the foreign legation in Peking, most southerners demanded the withdrawal of American forces. By rescuing foreign ministers and missionaries, they argued, the chief aim of the expeditionary force had been accomplished. The participation of American marines in the relief effort and the diplomacy of Secretary of State Hay indicated the importance of China and free markets for American goods to the rest of the world. Interested parties in the South recognized that the United States had earned considerable good will with the Chinese government as a result of its words and actions during the Boxer Rebellion and did not want to jeopardize that relationship with a prolonged military presence. Given the favorable position held by the United States in China, one southerner suggested, "we should be extremely careful not to become entangled in any of the schemes of the other powers for acquiring territory." A rural editor, mindful of the jealousies and intrigues of other powers in China also warned against further American involvement in the Asian country. Instead, he advised, "American troops should be withdrawn as speedily as they were sent there. We have enough on our hands in the Philippines without buying or snatching more trouble in the Flowery Kingdom."8

No group of southerners watched events in China as closely as those associated with the region's textile industry. Although the volume of total trade between the United States and China was minuscule compared to that with European nations, American cotton goods exports to China had grown dramatically in the 1880's and 1890's as Chinese consumers showed a preference for the coarser cotton goods produced in American mills.
over more expensive types of British textiles. Southern textile mills benefited from the increased volume of trade with China and lobbied to protect and expand the dominance of American textiles in the China market. In January of 1901, some of the leading cotton goods manufacturers in the South signed a resolution "expressing their approval of the action of the United States Government in the protection of American interests in China, known as the "open-door" policy." The signatories of the resolution emphasized the importance of the China market not only for the manufacturers of cotton goods, but for "the Southern planter and cotton grower... and the thousands of employees and laboring classes who are engaged in cotton mills..." The resolution, signed by representatives of forty-six southern cotton mills with capital investments of almost $16 million, was forwarded to the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to demonstrate not only their keen interest in the open door policy toward China but to urge the administration to pursue greater access to markets in Central and South America.9

Southern enthusiasm over the possibilities of trade with China and support for the Open Door partially reflected the extent of the public's faith in New South promoters' vision of the future and the depth of their own economic despair. The chronic poverty of the South, and the crippling effects of the 1893 depression, made the South more sympathetic toward those who championed economic panaceas that did not threaten the deeply-held social and cultural beliefs of the white majority. For New South promoters, the case of China presented no special difficulties because the administration's policies provoked few serious discussions of territorial acquisition and its associated problems. As a result, the prospect of increasing trade with China became a popular goal of New South promoters and the mass public alike. Although southern enthusiasm over trade with China
far overshadowed commercial realities, the allure of a potential market of four hundred
million Chinese purchasing southern textiles and manufactured goods formed an important
component of the New South's economic vision.

The South's neo-colonial consensus in foreign policy was best demonstrated by the
region's persistent support for an isthmian canal. For most southerners, especially the
New South prophets, an American-built canal across the isthmus of Central America
would produce an economic boom in their region without challenging any of the South's
beliefs and values. Because southerners believed a canal would be of special benefit to
their region, many advocates of a canal in the South attacked opponents of the project as
sectional or partisan obstructionists. The foremost proponent of the canal, Alabama
Senator John T. Morgan, consistently championed it as vital to the nation's economic well-
being and security as well as emphasized the project's special benefits to the South. The
completion of the canal, Morgan believed, would make the New South the center for
exporting the nation's trade and influence around the globe. In addition, it would provide
new markets for the South's agricultural products and stimulate industrial growth. While
stopping short of proclaiming the canal an economic panacea, Morgan clearly portrayed it
as the South's best hope for prosperity. Morgan's persistent support for a canal, observed
historian O. Lawrence Burnette, Jr., resulted partially from a feeling of southern
inferiority. Morgan viewed the South as an economic and political dependency of the
North. Opponents of the canal, therefore, desired to employ the federal government as a
tool to perpetuate the South's inferiority within the Union by blocking the one measure
that would restore some semblance of economic and political parity.10
Morgan was not alone in viewing the canal question in terms of historic sectional antagonism. The failure to build a canal was often blamed on the federal government's bias toward northern interests and the Republican party's cozy relationship with financial interests that opposed an isthmian canal. The federal government, one Georgian observed, should ignore selfish economic and partisan interests and proceed with the construction of the canal for the good of the nation. The people of all sections would gladly support a canal whether initiated by Republicans or Democrats for "it is the greatest undertaking of the times and will be an event that will signalize any administration that inaugurates the work." Construction of the canal was also seen as a way for the Republican administration of William McKinley to reward the South for its support during the Spanish-American War and further promote sectional reconciliation. Because the South had accrued few direct benefits as a result of the war, some argued, construction of the canal would equalize federal largesse. A Birmingham editor, after touting the canal's benefits for southern industry and agriculture, concluded, "The completion of the Nicaragua canal would equalize governmental benefits. At present the disbursements and privileges of the federal power favor one section, but the building of the canal would give all sections of the south advantages that would go far to equalize federal power."1

Because the South had always been in the vanguard on the canal issue, some southerners accused special interests in the North for delaying the construction of the canal for sectional and economic reasons. The railroads, as an industry which already had a poor reputation among the South's farmers, were often blamed for blocking plans to build a canal in order to protect their profits. The nation's largest railroad and shipping concerns generally transported goods longitudinally for export from ports in the North and
East to markets overseas. The construction of a canal, some southerners argued, would place southern ports in closer proximity to most foreign markets and, thus, produce a readjustment of domestic export products southward. According to one Arkansas editor, "One reason for their [northern] opposition to the canal was because it was a measure that tended to benefit the people of the South." Although an extreme view, some southern critics of the canal's opponents accused northern special interests of blocking the canal because they viewed the possibility of the South's economic rebirth as a direct threat to northern economic hegemony.12

Many southerners, especially the New South prophets, continued lobbying in support of a canal after the Spanish-American War for economic reasons. They realized that the cost of transporting their goods to markets along the Pacific coast of the United States, Central and South America, and Asia, would be greatly reduced and provide a competitive advantage for southern products. So, too, would a canal allow southern goods to reach markets in a more timely fashion. Southern farmers and manufacturers alike, southern advocates of a canal proclaimed, would reap huge economic benefits from the construction of a canal. Finally, New South prophets and the commercial class predicted the completion of the canal would alter the existing trade patterns for both domestic and foreign commerce away from ports in the Northeast toward ports in the South. Given their proximity to an isthmian canal, southern ports expected an enormous increase in the volume of imports and exports handled at Galveston, New Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, Savannah, and other southern ports.13

New South prophets and other regional supporters of a canal benefited greatly from heightened concern for national security after the Spanish-American War. An
Isthmian canal would shorten lines of communication between the United States and its newly acquired territories in the Pacific and facilitate the defense of possessions in both the Atlantic and the Pacific without necessitating the construction of a two ocean navy. During the war, the sixty-seven day voyage of the U.S.S. Oregon from Puget Sound to the Caribbean had captured the public imagination and underscored the difficulty of transferring naval power in the absence of a canal. The Oregon's trip, canal proponents claimed, would have been reduced by two-thirds, from 12,000 miles to 4,000 miles had a canal existed. With widespread support in the administration, and among the American public, building a canal became a popular national cause by 1899.14

After the election of 1900, southern advocates of a canal continued to emphasize the economic benefits that would accrue to the nation, and especially the South, from the construction of an isthmian canal. Since the Republican Platform endorsed the "speedy construction of an isthmian canal," and the Administration had taken diplomatic steps to secure the necessary legal rights to build a canal along the Nicaraguan route, the re-election of McKinley did not appear to jeopardize the crusade for a canal. To be sure, many southerners condemned the election results and the sum of McKinley's foreign policy accomplishments as representing the "Republican tendency towards centralization and empire." Nevertheless, most southern Democrats continued to support neo-colonial policies for the peaceful expansion of trade without expanding the nation's permanent military establishment, raising taxes, creating an imperial bureaucracy, or "inviting foreign complications and the acquisition of distant territory...." Unfazed by the election, New South proponents and commercial interests continued their efforts to promote the cause of the canal as the best means to promote industrial activity and economic uplift for the...
South. After the completion of the canal, a Louisiana editor boldly predicted "that the Southern States [would] become a veritable bee-hive of human industry and activity; that its commerce and its manufacturers will eventually dominate the Western world."15

In the months before the new Congress began its discussions of the canal question, southern business leaders redoubled their efforts to impress upon southern legislators the importance of an isthmian canal for the economic future of their region. They urged Congressmen to avoid partisan wrangling on the subject and to act quickly to obtain land and money for the construction of a canal. Although implicitly non-partisan, for their chief aim was to secure the construction of a canal, the rhetoric of members of southern Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade revealed frustration and anger at Republicans' failures to pass earlier resolutions by Alabama's Democratic Senator John T. Morgan. Republicans, they suggested, desired to undermine Morgan's position as the "father of the Nicaraguan Canal project" for partisan reasons; they chafed at the Democratic Senator's ability to appear out ahead of public opinion on the canal question. Nonetheless, southern business leaders spent little time blaming those who they perceived to be obstructionists and preferred to lobby and influence those members whom they believed could secure the ultimate passage of a canal bill.16

In December of 1900, the Southern Industrial Convention, one of the largest business organizations in the South, gathered in New Orleans for its semi-annual discussion of common concerns among the region's business interests. The five day meeting attracted hundreds of delegates from every southern state, as well as delegates from the Ohio Valley, Middle West and California. During the proceedings, numerous speakers spoke on behalf of the Nicaraguan Canal Bill, expected to be considered during
the upcoming congressional session. Sidney Story of New Orleans, an officer in the organization, proclaimed the canal question the most important issue facing the country. He noted that Americans' interest in a canal dated back over one hundred years, yet it had failed to materialize. After praising the Administration and the Senate for its negotiations with Great Britain providing legal access to the Nicaragua route, Story urged Congress to reject the arguments of the American Trans-Continental Railroads and move forward with the construction of an isthmian waterway. After the completion of the canal, he predicted the commerce of the nation would flow from southern ports and that "New Orleans, 700 miles nearer the eastern terminus of the Canal than New York... will control untold advantages." Remarking on the spectacular growth of the southern textile industry during the previous twenty years, Story concluded,

> The question of finding profitable markets for American cotton goods is one of supreme moment. It is right here that the Nicaragua Canal opens up possibilities so vast and so alluring that the mind pauses almost staggered before their contemplation.17

Other speakers at the convention sounded the familiar arguments for building the Nicaraguan Canal. Former Confederate General John B. Gordon of Georgia, in his role as a New South spokesman and businessman, proclaimed that the South looked "with palpitating heart toward the boundless Orient as an outlet for her great staple—she wants the Nicaragua canal connecting the Eastern and Western ocean." Gordon then praised the Administration's Open Door policy toward China; he believed it offered opportunities for southern farmers and businessmen alike. In the future, Gordon suggested, the United States should recognize the lessons of the Open Door and use American diplomacy and economic power to pry open overseas markets without resorting to force. Other
speakers, including regional business leaders and academics, spoke in support of a canal as an instrument to promote greater industrialization and economic diversification in the South. For New South promoters, who viewed the construction of a canal as an integral part of the region's economic uplift, those who opposed the canal project effectively acted "to keep caravans of progress from entering our midst to dump their loads of wealth into our laps for generations to come."18

In a massive show of support for the Nicaragua Canal bill, the delegates to the Southern Industrial Convention unanimously passed a resolution calling for a memorial to be sent to the United States Senate. The petition first reminded senators that business representatives from nineteen states had come to New Orleans for the convention and had dedicated much of their time to discussing the canal question. The delegates' unanimous support for the canal, the memorial continued, stemmed from their belief that no measure currently pending in Congress "could benefit our mining, manufacturing and agricultural interests in a greater degree, than by aiding in the cheapening of the cost of transporting their products to markets. The building of this [Nicaraguan] canal is to-day the most important factor looking to the benefit of our producers in all branches of industrial pursuits." The convention's delegates, claiming to speak on behalf of the whole people, urged the Senate and the entire Congress to take up the measure of the canal at the earliest possible date as the best means to improve the material interests of the entire nation.19

Responding both to public pressure and the determination of key members, Congress resumed its discussion of the canal question in December of 1900. Much of the debate during this session focused on the question of the best possible location for an
Isthmian canal. For over a decade, John T. Morgan had urged construction of a canal across Nicaragua to take advantage of a large natural lake, Lake Nicaragua, that spanned much of the isthmus. A Nicaraguan route, moreover, was closer to major American ports, especially those in the South, and would more dramatically cut transportation costs and travel time than canal projects proposed further down the isthmus. Morgan's plans received an important endorsement from the findings of the Walker Commission, an official body created by Congress to study the canal question. Its preliminary report reiterated the enormous benefits to American commerce offered by any isthmian canal, but after assessing costs and benefits, proclaimed the Nicaraguan route preferable. A canal in Nicaragua, the body determined, would greatly reduce distances traveled between American ports on the east coast with ports on the west coast and in the Pacific. Furthermore, by the time the United States acquired territory in Panama, and purchased the remains of the French New Panama Canal Corporation, the costs of completing either a Nicaraguan canal or a Panama canal were almost identical. In addition, the Walker Commission indicated that the New Panama Canal Corporation had shown no disposition to sell its rights and assets in Panama for fair market value, making the estimated cost of a Panama canal difficult to estimate. In the final analysis, based on the legal difficulties posed by acquiring the New Panama Canal Corporation, the commission recommended Nicaragua "as the most feasible route."

Despite the endorsement of the Walker Commission, treaty obligations with Great Britain prevented immediate congressional action. Negotiations between Secretary of State Hay and the British Ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, had resulted in the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1900. Under the provisions of the treaty, Great Britain renounced
its rights to joint ownership or control of an isthmian canal with the United States as provided by the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. In return for the exclusive right to build, own and operate a canal, however, the United States agreed to guarantee the neutrality of the waterway and not to build any fortifications in the canal zone. When the provision forbidding the United States from fortifying the canal zone became public, opposition to the treaty developed and stalled action on the canal question. When finally approved in December of 1900, the Senate offered three amendments to the original treaty's provisions. These dealt primarily with the stipulations prohibiting the fortification of the canal zone. Initially, Great Britain ignored the Senate's objections, but vexing foreign policy problems in South Africa and on the continent of Europe made good relations with the United States a diplomatic imperative. After months of negotiations between London and Washington, Hay and Pauncefote signed a new agreement in November of 1901 abrogating the restrictions of Clayton-Bulwer and giving the United States complete freedom to build, own and defend an isthmian canal. With the major diplomatic obstacle out of the way, and with the blessing of the official canal commission and important leaders in Congress, the House, by unanimous consent placed a bill authorizing the immediate construction of a canal in Nicaragua on the legislative calendar for consideration after the Christmas recess.21

Most southerners welcomed the news of the second Hay-Pauncefote agreement and the sentiments of congressional leaders as powerful indicators that construction on a canal would begin immediately. Debate in Congress, they assumed, would be perfunctory and quickly lead to the passage of a bill authorizing the purchase of territory from Nicaragua to begin construction of the canal. With the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, a southern editor remarked, "nothing will stand in the way. . . . The necessary legislation for [that] purpose should be completed before the adjournment of congress."

According to many New South spokesmen, no other foreign policy issue was as important to the economic uplift of the South as the immediate American construction of a canal. "There is no prospective feature of commercial and national import more conspicuous or important than the construction of the isthmian canal," observed the editor of the Little Rock Arkansas Gazette. "There is no enterprise more essential to the advancement of commercial and national interests than the proposed Nicaragua canal, and particularly to the southern half of the United States."22

The region's greatest naval hero from the Spanish-American War joined in the chorus supporting the immediate construction of a canal in Nicaragua. At the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, Richmond P. Hobson delivered an address that echoed many of the teachings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose monumental work The Influence of Sea Power Upon History influenced generations of naval officers and policymakers alike. Hobson, like Mahan, made the case for a powerful navy as the best defender of America's sovereignty and commercial rights abroad. Naval power, he stated, "had exerted a profound and determining influence upon the struggles of races and nations, for prosperity, for greatness, and for life itself." Now, Hobson argued, with the United States ascending among the ranks of world powers, and its commerce increasing at a remarkable rate, an isthmian canal had become even more important to the national defense and to continued prosperity. Aside from the question of the canal and commerce, Hobson defended the idea of a large navy as a more economical way to provide for the national defense than a large standing army.
To allay the fears of many southerners and other critics of imperialism, the Alabaman suggested that a rapid naval build-up would be relatively inexpensive and require fewer additional personnel than the army. "Indeed," Hobson proclaimed, "naval personnel would remain so few that there can be no possible apprehension of militarism." And, of course, the naval forces required to defend the United States could be further reduced with the construction of a canal. It is impossible to isolate the source of Hobson's anxiety about a large standing army. As a naval officer, his remarks could have reflected prejudice against another branch of the armed forces that competed with the navy for available resources. More likely, however, Hobson's speech reflected his desire for the United States, and the South, to prosper economically in an age of great power conflict without challenging deeply-held ideas and values about the nature of the American Republic. As a southerner, Hobson was acutely aware of his region's fears and anxieties regarding the expansion of the army and the annexation of overseas territories; his proposals provided a means to attain economic uplift without again embroiling the United States in a national debate over vexing foreign policy questions.24

When Congress reconvened in January of 1902, the odds that a canal bill would be passed seemed certain. The assassination of William McKinley and the elevation of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency placed an even more ardent supporters of a canal in the White House. On January 7, 1902, as John Tyler Morgan lowered the gavel to begin discussions of the canal bill, he did so with exuberance and a feeling of deep personal satisfaction. The senator from Alabama, who had dedicated much of his life in the senate to building an isthmian canal for the benefit of the nation, and especially the South,
appeared on the brink of success. For Morgan, the time of public adulation for "the father of the Nicaraguan Canal" was at hand.25

In the House, southern representatives played a prominent role in championing the cause of the Nicaraguan Canal project. Over several days in early January, their speeches discussed the merits of a House measure "to provide for the construction of a canal connecting the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans" and authorizing the President to take all necessary steps to secure the necessary legal arrangements with Nicaragua. Southern members, although careful to point out the commercial and strategic benefits to the nation, emphasized the importance of the canal project to their region's economic future. William Richardson, of Huntsville, Alabama, claimed that the progressive spirit of the South over the past decade had made it one of the world's chief producers of textiles, almost exceeding the production of northern mills. Given the completion of a canal, he speculated, the region's great stores of iron, ore, coal, timber and agricultural commodities such as rice, oats, tobacco, cotton and corn would elevate the South from poverty and make it one of the world's great sources of wealth. For too long, Richardson contended, southern goods were handicapped in foreign trade, especially with Asia, because of high transportation costs. What the South today wants, Richardson stated, "was increased commerce and trade. Give us the Nicaraguan Canal and our just share of the trade of the Orient, and twenty, yea thirty million bales of cotton in the South will not be a surplus, and 5-cent cotton will become a memory of the past, while 12-cent cotton will come to stay."26

Congressman Henry Gibson, of Knoxville, Tennessee, echoed Richardson's support of the canal bill and noted the great public outcry for immediate congressional
action. "The newspapers. . . and the magazines have contained elaborate essays upon the subject," and they are unanimous in support of an isthmian canal. For commercial and strategic reasons, Gibson maintained, the public and the press demanded that the United States to begin construction on a canal. The question today, Gibson averred, when confronted by facts, figures and the overwhelming support of the public, was "whether we shall stand up like men, like American citizens, like people of progressive ideas, like statesman who can forecast [the future], and do the duty which we owe not only to the present generation of our countrymen, but to all the generations yet to come." Or would Congress, pressured by the lobbying efforts of the transcontinental railroad and the speculators and stockholders associated with the rival New Panama Canal Corporation to select the Panamanian route, continue to delay until the body resembled the ass "who saw two stacks of hay—one on the right hand and one on the left—the two seeming equally desirable; and, not knowing which to choose, stood in his tracks and died in starvation within reach of both." To Gibson, and other southern supporters of the canal in Nicaragua, the time for delays had passed. At the conclusion of debate on the canal bill on January 9, the House voted 308 to 2 in favor of passage. After two canal commission reports had recommended the Nicaraguan route, and the passage of the Nicaraguan Canal bill in the House, only the feverish lobbying efforts of those who stood to gain financially from the selection of the Panama route stood in the way of the final approval of the measure in the Senate.27

The efforts of lobbyists for the New Panama Canal Corporation to have Congress select their route over the Nicaraguan route are unparalleled in the annals of American politics. Stockholders of the corporation, which owned the exclusive right to build a canal
across Panama, feared a complete loss of their investment if the United States selected the canal route in Nicaragua. Although the corporation had made little progress toward completing a canal, and much of their machinery lay rotting and rusting in the tropical jungles of Panama, stockholders demanded over $100 million in return for their assets and franchise rights when approached by the Walker Canal Commission in 1901. Sensing a complete loss for their stockholders as Congress embraced the Nicaragua route, the New Panama Canal Corporation hired the services of a powerful New York lawyer and lobbyist, William Nelson Cromwell, to launch a campaign to salvage the Panama route. Cromwell, along with one of the corporation's largest stockholders, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, launched a relentless fight to persuade Congress to approve of the Panama route and purchase the assets of the New Panama Canal Corporation. In addition, in response to the passage of the Nicaragua Canal bill in the House, the corporation quickly lowered the asking price for its assets to $40 million.28

Rather than marking a session of great legislative accomplishment, and the crowning moment of his public life in the Senate, Morgan found Senate debate in 1902 to be tiresome and discouraging. The efforts of the New Panama Canal Company to find political allies in Washington proved successful and thwarted Morgan's plans to speed a Nicaraguan Canal bill through the Senate. After winning the support of the powerful Ohio Senator Marcus Hanna, the New Panama Canal Company employed his influence with the president to convince Theodore Roosevelt to support the Panama route. On January 19, 1902, acting as the agent of the administration, Senator John Spooner of Wisconsin offered an amendment to the Hepburn Nicaragua Canal bill that authorized the president to pay not more than $40 million for the holdings of the New Panama Canal Company and
to begin construction of a canal through Panama at the earliest possible date. If the president could not arrive at satisfactory terms with either the New Panama Canal Company or the government of Columbia, which exercised sovereignty over Panama, he was then to proceed with the canal project in Nicaragua.

Despite the near unanimous approval of the Hepburn Act in the House in January, the Senate fight over canal routes lasted another six months. Morgan soon realized that his past support for Republican foreign policy objectives did not assure him of the administration's support for his chief legislative goal. By persuading key Republicans to vote for the Panama route, the New Panama Canal Company introduced a strong element of partisanship into the debate. Republican leaders and the president appeared uncomfortable with the thought of having a southern Democrat emerge as the "father of the canal." More important, however, during Senate debate the practical advantages of the Panama route became clear; the Walker Canal Commission, analyzing the data with the purchase of the assets of the New Panama Canal Company for $40 million (instead of the $110 million that was originally demanded), revised its earlier findings and recommended the Panama route. Panama, the commission concluded, offered fewer engineering obstacles, provided for a shorter route, and would cost approximately $5 to 6 million less to construct.29

Aware that he was losing the battle for the Nicaraguan route, Morgan made a final appeal to the public and his colleagues. In an article published in the May edition of the North American Review, the Alabama senator reiterated his familiar arguments for the Nicaraguan route. A canal in Nicaragua, he stated, would provide greater advantages to American commerce because it was the shorter route between the eastern and western
coasts of the United States. Perhaps reflecting his desperation, he also attacked the character of the inhabitants of Panama as being "people of a low order" who lacked industry and agriculture. These people, Morgan claimed, would create serious problems for the United States in extending its sovereignty and establishing law and order in a canal zone in Panama. Nicaragua, on the other hand, was more sparsely settled and would, therefore, cost less to defend against native uprisings. Morgan then proclaimed that Nicaragua had a more healthful climate; Panama as the "dead centre of barometric pressure" had an "infected atmosphere" that made deadly fevers more widespread.

Despite his objections, Morgan stated that he would agree to the Panama Canal project if Columbia agreed to grant the United States a perpetual lease to a canal zone in Panama.30

Beginning on June 5, the Senate spent the better part of two weeks debating the best possible route for an isthmian canal. Speaking in support of the majority report that endorsed the Nicaraguan route were key Democrats, including John Morgan and the junior senator from Alabama, Edmund Pettus. Several Republicans, led by Hanna and Spooner, spoke for the minority report endorsing the Panama route. On the afternoon of June 19, debate ended and a vote was taken. By the narrow margin of eight votes, the minority report was approved, 42 to 34. The vote was extremely partisan with Democrats providing most of the opposition to the minority report. Among southern senators who cast votes, only one, Jeter Pritchard, a Republican from North Carolina voted for the Spooner Act. Thirteen other southerners voted against the measure. Historian, Edward Chester has suggested that the vote on the Spooner Act reflected southerners' concerns with Roosevelt's aggressive foreign policy style. More likely, however, southern members voted out of loyalty to their party and out of a strong sense of personal allegiance to John
Morgan. In subsequent votes, southern members appeared far less willing to obstruct plans to build an isthmian canal even if it did bear the stamp of the Republican Party.  

Although there was some disappointment in the South over the selection of the Panama route, most southerners expressed satisfaction that the prospects for the immediate construction of an isthmian canal appeared more certain. Throughout congressional debates over the selection of a route, southerners remained more concerned over the early construction of a canal rather than its location. In this regard, Alabama's Senator John Morgan misread his region's commitment to the Nicaraguan Canal project. City leaders in New Orleans, the South's chief commercial center, were delighted with the actions of Congress. With the construction of a canal appearing imminent, they anticipated the Crescent City would become the leading port of access to the canal given its proximity to the isthmus. Business leaders in New Orleans campaigned to make their city a railroad hub linking interior cities such as Memphis, St. Louis, and Chicago to the canal via the port of New Orleans. Other southerners were also pleased by the idea of a Panama Canal and predicted enormous economic benefits for the entire South after its completion. In November of 1902, Dr. W. C. Stubbs, the director of the Audubon Sugar School in New Orleans, addressed the annual southern Banker's Convention on the subject of the economic future of New Orleans and the South. "Our agriculture, interwoven with other industrial activities, have created a system whose present achievement challenges the admiration of the world, and almost bewilders the imagination in its possibilities of wealth-making and power. Our greatness and commercial grandeur," Stubbs concluded, "will be given a large impetus by the completion of the canal."
As stipulated by the provisions of the Spooner Act, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hay opened negotiations with the government of Columbia to secure the right to build a canal across the isthmus of Panama. After months of long, grueling discussions in January of 1903, the two sides agreed to a plan that provided the United States with a 99-year lease on a six-mile-wide strip of land in Panama. To compensate Columbia for this territorial concession, the United States would pay Columbia $10 million upon execution of the treaty and an additional $250,000 annually during the life of the agreement. The accord reached between Washington and Columbia, entitled the Hay-Herran Convention, was presented to the Senate in late January to generally favorable comments. The provisions of the treaty were straightforward; it had been produced by months of serious negotiations between the two parties. Despite the persistent opposition of Morgan, the treaty was ratified on March 17 with only five dissenting votes. Among those casting votes against the Hay-Herran Treaty were four southerners, including John T. Morgan. The fact that the majority of the South's senators approved the measure confirmed the importance of the canal project to the region regardless of route or party sponsorship.33

In the next few months, reports of debate in the Columbian Congress regarding the Hay-Herran Treaty indicated considerable hostility to the agreement. Many Columbian legislators suggested that Herran had sold out Panama for a pittance; the annual payments of $250,000 as specified by the treaty merely equaled the revenue Columbia received annually from the Panama Railroad Company. Given the value and importance of the project to American and global commerce, Columbians believed, they should be compensated more than $10 million for surrendering sovereignty in a canal zone. Within a
few months of its passage in the United States Senate, it was clear that the Hay-Herran agreement was in serious trouble in Bogota.

Many southerners condemned the Columbian government for delaying ratification of the treaty. Canal supporters had waited long enough for construction of an American-built canal and vented their anger toward Bogota. Southerners generally accepted the terms of the Hay-Herran Treaty as honestly negotiated and expected Columbia to abide by its part of the bargain. They also considered the financial and territorial arrangements to be fair to Columbia. Delays by the Columbian government were seen as a stalling tactic to extract additional money from the United States. "Columbia," one Louisiana editor remarked, "will hold out for $40,000,000 for that little strip of land needed in the construction of the Panama canal." Rather than suffer through additional delays, the United States should make Columbia understand "that we could lick them and take the whole country away from them cheaper than that." Although few southerners openly advocated a war of conquest in Panama, the comments of the Louisianian reflected the common anger and frustration with Columbia's delays.34

In August, to no one's surprise, the Columbian Senate unanimously rejected the treaty and sent the Roosevelt administration scrambling for options. Irate over Columbia's rejection of the treaty, Theodore Roosevelt and his chief advisers contemplated seizing the isthmus and building the canal without the consent of the Columbian government. Such an act, he realized, would violate international law and bring condemnation from other major powers. Bunau-Varilla, of the New Panama Canal Company, approached Hay with a possible solution to the Administration's dilemma. With the tacit approval of the United States, Bunau-Varilla and his company could offer financial and military assistance to
native Panamanians eager to rebel against the government in Bogota. Roosevelt and Hay, aware of reports from military reconnaissance personnel in Panama, understood that the native population was seething with discontent. When confronted by Bunau-Varilla's offer, they indicated their interest in an independent Panama but refused to offer direct assistance. On November 3, 1903, a group of approximately three hundred men rebelled against the Columbian government, seized the provincial capital at Colon, and declared the independence of the Republic of Panama. Within a few days of the rebellion, the United States officially recognized the new nation and resumed plans for the construction of the canal.35

The timing of the Panama rebellion and the Administration's unseemly affiliation with Bunau-Varilla raised some concerns among southerners that the president had little regard for the Constitution and would employ any method to achieve his objectives. People in the rural South seemed especially concerned with Roosevelt's apparent duplicity in the isthmian rebellion. More isolated from the commercial culture of the New South prophets, these rural southerners appeared unwilling to sacrifice constitutional principles for the sake of the profits that seemed certain after the completion of the canal project. They feared Roosevelt, like other Republican presidents in the recent past, ignored both the Constitution and Congress in dealing with Columbia and Panama. In tacitly encouraging the rebellion and immediately recognizing Panama's independence, Roosevelt exposed the blatant hypocrisy of his Administration and the Republican Party. A rural Georgia editor noted that "forty years ago a civil war was brought on this country because a few states seceded" and the Republican administration of Lincoln condemned the action as anarchic. Today, he continued, Roosevelt "hastens to recognize the secessionists of"
Columbia... as a good thing now to help us along... " toward his goal of building a canal in Panama.36

Other rural southerners echoed this displeasure with Roosevelt's tactics in securing an isthmian canal route. Although few expressly opposed proceeding with a canal in Panama, some in the South feared that the president's conduct in Panama could set a dangerous precedent for the future. In short, some southerners suggested that by his actions, Roosevelt paved the way for the executive branch to conduct foreign policy without regard to either Congress or public opinion. During previous expansionist episodes, the greatest support came from northern Republicans. "Now," a rural Louisiana editor declared, "President Roosevelt the very embodiment of Republican theories, the personification of Northern ideas, with his cabinet steps forth in violation of law and recognizes the secession of Panama from the Columbian government. Congress only could recognize Panama as an independent government, but his strenuosity is much larger than the government and in overriding the constitution and international law, he also overrides long established principles sanctified with blood in admitting the right of Panama to secede." A North Carolinian, W. W. Gordon, also raised suspicions regarding the motives of northern Republican political leaders during the Panama uprising. In a letter to Congressman R. Wayne Parker, a Republican from New Jersey, Gordon sarcastically praised Parker's party for being politically clever enough "to act first and demand the support of the country afterwards." Gordon suggested that Republicans preyed upon the public's patriotic desire to support the Administration after it involved the nation in a foreign policy imbroglio. Despite the efforts of Republicans to conceal their motives, "nothing can disguise the fact that we acted towards Columbia in a way we should not
have. . . . I believe the country is willing to have the Isthmus from Columbia, but objects to the New England custom of cloaking a steal of this sort with all kinds of cant and hypocrisy.\textsuperscript{37}

Despite considerable criticism of Roosevelt's handling of the Panama affair, most southerners shared the Administration's frustration in dealing with the government in Bogota and accepted his actions as a pragmatic attempt to hasten the construction of an isthmian canal without directly involving the United States in a war against Columbia for control of Panama. Even many of the president's chief critics in the South believed that the importance of the canal project to the economic future of the South justified his actions. A southern editor proclaimed, "The Bronco-busting, Hell-roaring style of statesmanship does not appeal to us, but the practical kind such as has been exhibited in this Panama affair meets with Southern approval." Southern commercial interests voiced little criticism of Roosevelt; they merely wanted construction of a canal to begin at the earliest possible date. In response to allegations that the Administration had used the United States navy and marines to block the landing of Columbian troops in Panama, a Lake Charles editor expressed complete indifference. "Whether we get the Panama canal by consent of the Columbian government or by the revolution and landing-troops-to-preserve-the-peace method, what difference does it make?"\textsuperscript{38}

The Roosevelt administration acted promptly to secure a canal treaty with the newly-created Republic of Panama. The nation's first minister to the United States, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, quickly agreed to terms granting the United States the use and control of a canal zone in Panama into perpetuity. For $10 million and an annual fee of $250,000, the United States received exclusive rights to build and fortify a canal across a
ten-mile wide strip of land across the isthmus. In late November of 1903, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla agreement was presented to the Senate for ratification.\textsuperscript{39}

Roosevelt's conduct in the Panama affair produced considerable opposition across the nation. Leading newspapers in New York, Philadelphia and Chicago condemned the actions of the president for ignoring the Constitution, Congress and international law in stealing away the canal zone in Panama. In the Senate, powerful Democrats, including Maryland's Arthur Gorman and Alabama's John T. Morgan remained opposed to the Panama scheme because it was the product of Roosevelt's failure to abide by the provisions of the Spooner Act. Given the Democrats control of over one-third of all Senate seats, passage of the Panama Canal Treaty was not certain.\textsuperscript{40}

Most southerners appeared willing to overlook the numerous constitutional issues raised by Roosevelt's actions in Panama because they believed acquiring the Panama Canal Zone was an economic necessity. Judge Henry C. Sheffield, of Georgia, complained to a friend that he feared Democrats in Congress from the South would mount a challenge to the Panama scheme for purely partisan reasons. "I am sorry to hear this," Sheffield stated, "and had expected better of the Democrats, and especially the Southern Democrats."

Most southerners, he continued, did not care which party got credit for the canal, they merely wanted the canal finished. In conclusion, the Georgian noted,

\begin{quote}
    It has always been insisted that the South was to be especially benefited by the canal, and now when it seems that the president has adopted the course that seems likely to give it to us in short order, the Democrats rise up and oppose it. The people are with the president on this question, and if the Democrats adopt the plan suggested, they are going to bring the party into ridicule and contempt. The people want the canal and they want it the quickest way possible, and this stuff about not being fair to Columbia is the merest twaddle.\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}
The editor of the South's leading commercial publication, Dixie, expressed further dismay at the opposition of some southern Democratic Senators to the Panama Canal Treaty. Like Sheffield, articles in Dixie blasted opponents of the canal for placing partisanship above the economic interests of the southern people. "With the exception of a few hair splitting people," the editor claimed, "the South is a unit in favor of the digging of the isthmian canal." The Dixie editorial further proclaimed that the region's business interests did not care where the canal was dug, just so it was completed. When asked, most southerners would probably advise the government to "Dig it [the canal] where you can place men, the material and machinery and get the work completed the quickest!" The canal, he predicted, would mean explosive economic growth for all of the South's seaboard cities from Norfolk to Galveston; cities and towns in the interior would also benefit from additional trade opportunities for their agricultural and manufactured goods. Given the great importance of the canal to the South, the editor did not see how any one, "especially business men of the South," could find any objection to the ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.42

In a special message to the Senate on January 4, 1904, Theodore Roosevelt presented the Panama Canal Treaty for ratification. The president claimed his actions in Panama had been justified to protect the interests and safety of the United States; he also urged the Senate to pass the treaty so that construction of the canal could begin immediately for the benefit of all of civilization. Roosevelt's speech probably did little to influence either the debate in the Senate or the final vote on the treaty. Most members had already made up their mind how they would vote. And if Roosevelt sought to defend his actions to the public, few southerners required such a noble and moralistic explanation.
The rhetoric of southern Senators during debate of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty reflected the region's commitment to an isthmian canal. Although Southern Democratic senators were highly critical of Roosevelt's methods, they accepted the independence of Panama as an accomplished fact and, therefore, saw no reason to reject a canal treaty with the new republic. Most important, however, southern Senators recognized the enormous support for the treaty among their constituents. In a speech before the Senate, Augustus Bacon of Georgia, condemned Roosevelt's conduct in Panama; but defeating the treaty would in no way reverse the situation in the isthmus or amend relations with Columbia. As a representative of the people of Georgia, Bacon felt it was his duty to vote in accordance with the wishes of the vast majority of his constituents who favored ratification. As for his colleagues from the South who threatened to oppose the measure, Bacon reminded them that the people "of the whole South have been striving for this canal for fifty years, and they are naturally impatient of anything which they think will cause any additional delay in the beginning and prosecution of the work of building an isthmian canal."³⁴

On February 23, 1904, the Senate ratified the Hay-Bunau-Varilla by a vote of 66 to 14. A split among Democrats provided the margin of victory as a majority of southern Democrats abandoned their party and supported the president's measure. Of the southern Senators who cast votes on the treaty, eleven voted for ratification; only eight opposed. Given the highly charged partisan atmosphere associated with Roosevelt's handling of the Panama affair, the defection of eleven southern Democratic senators indicated the importance of the canal project to the South.⁴⁴
After the Spanish-American War, New South prophets continued their campaign to impress upon other southerners the importance of overseas commercial expansion. McKinley's handling of the war, and especially the situation in the Philippines, however, angered most southerners and fueled greater suspicion and cynicism toward the expansionist policies of the Republican administration. More aware of the region's political and social sensitivities, New South prophets more clearly embraced a policy of neocolonialism after 1900. Neocolonialism, they understood, would provide new overseas markets for southern goods without challenging southerners' deeply-held beliefs regarding republican government or white supremacy. During public debate on the question of the Open Door in China, most southerners supported the efforts of Secretary of State Hay to use diplomatic means to maintain open markets in China. When confronted by the Boxer Rebellion, few in the South objected to direct American military intervention because the Administration of William McKinley had no far-reaching territorial designs in China.

In 1904, with the passage of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, construction of an American owned canal in the isthmus proceeded. The beginning of the construction of an isthmian canal represented the culmination of over a decade of foreign policy activism among New South prophets who had campaigned tirelessly before Congress and the southern public to build support for the canal. As the single most important foreign policy goal of southern politicians and commercial interests for over a decade, few southerners seriously challenged the methods employed by Roosevelt to obtain a canal zone. Southerners wanted a canal built under exclusive American control and defended by United States arms; the canal agreement reached by Roosevelt and Hay satisfied these concerns. Most important, by not involving the United States in a war against Columbia
over Panama, and by not seeking the annexation of more than just a narrow strip of land across the isthmus, Roosevelt's handling of the canal issue provoked little concern among southerners that the construction of a canal would accelerate American militarism, transform republican institutions or, seriously complicate the nation's race question with the introduction of millions of non-white people.
Conclusions

After the depression of 1893, southerners paid more attention to the foreign affairs of the nation than at any time since the Civil War. Led by a small group of New South prophets, primarily progressive editors, entrepreneurs, and leading commercial interests, the region moved closer toward embracing a more assertive foreign policy with the goal of obtaining greater access to overseas markets for southern goods. Foreign markets, some southerners claimed, could relieve the suffering caused by the depression and guarantee the future economic prosperity of the South. A few of the prophets even suggested direct intervention with military force in overseas territory and the creation of colonies as acceptable goals of American foreign policy. More important, the New South prophets waged a persistent campaign in support of freer trade and the construction of an isthmian canal to facilitate the exchange of goods from southern ports. By 1894, the prophets' campaign combined with the South's depressed economy to produce renewed interest in foreign markets across regional and occupational lines. Farmers and industrialists, from commercial centers along the coast to rural points in the interior, supported the acquisition of foreign markets as a means to provide economic uplift for the entire region.

Despite the success of the prophets' in creating greater public awareness of foreign policy issues, their tactics faced considerable criticism from the southern white majority. Most southern whites, while sympathetic to free trade, expressed hostility to direct American intervention in the affairs of other nations. Public discussions of foreign policy concerns in the South revealed a region torn between tradition and modernity. Unlike the
prophets, most southerners interpreted world events based on their own experiences and recollections of war, defeat, occupation, and race adjustment. Events of the past shaped their understanding of current world events. Since the Civil War had brought death and destruction to virtually every part of the South, most whites in the region opposed the use of force to either resolve foreign policy disputes or to conquer foreign territory.

Southerners, more than persons from any other region, understood the horrors of war and were reluctant to pursue policies likely to involve the United States in a war with a foreign power. Consequently, when the United States confronted Great Britain and Spain in the 1890's, most southerners supported forceful diplomacy rather than armed conflict to resolve the crisis.

White southerners' unpleasant memory of Reconstruction also created opposition to an aggressive foreign policy and the forcible acquisition of overseas territories. During Reconstruction, the South had been occupied by the United States military. Most whites chafed at the military occupation of their region and the imposition of state governments opposed by the white majority. According to many southerners, the federal government, in carrying out these policies ignored the principle of the consent of the governed, and thus, violated the Constitution. In the 1890's, southerners understood colonies to be similarly incompatible with republican government. Under the Constitution, people could not be held as subjects in colonial status. Yet with the annexation of Hawaii, and the forcible acquisition of the Philippines, the United States again violated the fundamental principles of the Constitution. America's new colonies, most southerners claimed, would lead again to an expansion in the power of the executive branch and a dramatic increase in
the size of the army. Acquiring colonies, in other words, was seen as the entering wedge of militarism and imperialism.

The opposition of many southerners to American overseas expansion also rested on white racism. More than any other factor, racist attitudes led most in the South to oppose the annexation of foreign territories inhabited by non-white people. Non-white people, southerners contended, were inherently inferior and incapable of governing themselves. Their introduction into the American body politic, white racists claimed, would dilute the nation's racial homogeneity and seriously complicate the nation's race problem. Most important, though, southerners feared that the inclusion of millions of non-whites as citizens of the United States would make it more difficult for the South to maintain segregated political and social institutions. Millions of new non-white citizens, electing political representatives with a different racial perspective, would undoubtedly pressure the federal government to use its power against the "Jim Crow" South. The South's racial fears were only compounded by the spectre of increased power in Washington as the result of the expansion of American sovereignty to overseas possessions.

The Spanish-American War proved to be a decisive event in the creation of a new southern foreign policy consensus. The South's overwhelming support for the war stemmed from the region's humanitarian concern for Cubans suffering under Spanish misrule and from the South's desire to avenge the destruction of the Maine. After these goals were accomplished, most southerners proclaimed, the war should end. Rather than ending American military involvement after concluding a peace treaty with Spain, the Republican president, William McKinley, prosecuted a war against Filipino rebels. The
Philippines, according to most southerners, had become a spoil of war that the Republicans wanted to exploit for their own selfish reasons. The three year war in the Philippines merely confirmed the worst fears of southerners that northern Republicans had larger designs in carrying out their foreign policy. Many prophets, too, became fearful of the implications of annexing territory overseas on the nature of the American republic and struggled to define a foreign policy that both respected the unique concerns of white southerners without abandoning the goal of obtaining foreign markets for southern goods.

With the lessons of the Spanish-American War firmly in mind, the New South prophets championed neo-colonialism as the best course of action for the South, and the nation. According to the prophets, the superiority of American products and institutions were better tools to pry open foreign markets than the use of force. The southern majority, long fearful of militarism in the federal government and the annexation of foreign territory, easily embraced the concept. Neo-colonialism, southerners agreed, could be pursued without involving the United States in more onerous forms of intervention. Consequently, when John Hay announced the "Open Door" policy toward China in 1899, it was greeted with near universal acclaim in the South.

By 1904, a virtual consensus on the goals and aims of American foreign policy had emerged in the South. Desirous of economic uplift for their region, most southerners embraced the tenets of neo-colonialism. In this regard, the South favored free trade, the Open Door, and greater access to world markets. Nonetheless, unlike other sections of the country, the South had been far less willing to use military force to seize markets or territory. Similarly, southerners had been far less supportive of plans to annex overseas territories populated by non-white people. The foreign policy consensus that emerged
after 1900 was produced by the campaign waged by the New South prophets, disillusionment with the war in the Philippines, a distrust over Republican control of the army and other instruments of foreign policy, and a desire to maintain socio-political control over African-Americans in the South unhindered by the introduction of additional non-white people into the American body politic.
NOTES

Introduction


2. Birmingham Age-Herald, 1 May 1894, p. 4.

3. For an excellent overview of American foreign relations for the period see: Robert Beisner, *From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865-1900* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1975), pp. 3-71. Beisner's synthesis of Gilded Age diplomacy emphasizes both the poor condition of America's instruments of foreign policy and the absence of mass interest in foreign affairs. See also David Healy, *U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890's* (Madison, Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), pp. 3-6. Again, Healy concurs that the Gilded Age was a period of diplomatic inactivity and, therefore, unlikely to elicit great public interest. An intriguing discussion of the ineptness and venality of the State Department in the Gilded Age can be found in Robert Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), pp. 224-240. It should be noted that even those historians who have challenged the notion that the Gilded Age marked a period of diplomatic inactivity, Milton Plesur, *America's Outward Thrust: Approaches to Foreign Affairs, 1865-1890* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971) and Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1984), de-emphasize the role of governmental officials in pursuing expansion during the period. Moreover, they concur that their was little mass interest in foreign affairs until the 1890's.


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12. *North American Review*, 158 (March 1894): 318-321. A similar ambivalent view of the tariff is expressed in *The Southern Planter*, 55 (April 1894): 212. It should be noted that some historians have found considerable southern opposition to protective tariffs in the fruit and lumber industries. While this opposition did exist, my research found it to be relatively weak and isolated.


23. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, pp. 603-605.

24. Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, 27 Jan. 1895, p. 4. For Barrett's comments see Mobile Daily Register, 19 Nov. 1895, p. 4. Additional comments supporting the canal in the interest of Asian trade for the South can be found in Mobile Daily Register, 10 July 1894, p. 4; Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, 28 Dec. 1894, p. 4; Birmingham State-Herald, 28 Nov. 1895, p. 4; and, W. C. Oates, "Industrial Development of the South," North American Review 161 (Nov. 1895): 566-574.

25. Quotes are from Dalton North Georgia Citizen, 22 Nov. 1894, p. 2, and Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, 27 Sept. 1894, p. 4. For additional comment on importance of canal to southern agriculture, see Dalton North Georgia Citizen, 7 Nov. 1895, p. 2, and Birmingham Age-Herald, 11 June 1895, p. 4.

26. 53rd Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Record Group 233, "Petitions and Memorials." National Archives, Washington, D.C.


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circumstance, yet he does offer keen insight into Morgan's commitment to the Nicaraguan canal project.

29. For a brief discussion of the Atlanta Exposition, see Ayers, Promise of the New South, pp. 322-325, and John Ezell, The South Since 1865 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), pp. 331-332. The Cotton States and International Exposition and South, Illustrated, comp. by Walter G. Cooper. Atlanta: The Illustrator Company, 1896, is the official history of the exposition and is extremely useful for detailed research into the planning and day-to-day activities in Atlanta.

30. Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, 3 May 1894, p. 1, New Orleans Times-Democrat, 27 June 1894, p. 4. See also Birmingham State Herald, 12 Oct. 1895, p. 4, for additional comment on growing interest in Latin American trade.


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6. The best overview of the Venezuelan boundary dispute can be found in Paul Fossum, "The Anglo-Venezuelan Boundary Controversy," Hispanic American Historical Review 8 (Aug. 1928): 299-329. Numerous textbook accounts of the dispute are available; notable are John Dobson, America's Ascent: The United States Becomes a Great


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26. See Perkins, *Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 180-185. Particularly interesting is his observation that by the end of the nineteenth century, "it had . . . become extremely difficult for the British masses to envisage with complacency a war with the United States, with its similar instinct for democracy, its common language, and its ties of blood." For final resolution of dispute, see DeConde, *American Foreign Policy*, p. 334.


30. For the relative silence of the sugar industry see *Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer*, December 1893-February 1894. For actions in Congress, see Thomas Osborne, *"Empire Can Wait": American Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981), pp. 24-25.

31. Regarding the preoccupation of the sugar industry with other issues, see Marshall Schott, "Louisiana Sugar and the Cuban Question, 1895-1898," *Louisiana History* 31 (summer 1990): 265-266.


34. Ibid., (5 Feb. 1894), p. 1891.

35. Ibid., p. 1892. See also *Little Rock Arkansas Gazette*, 9 Feb. 1894, p. 4.


40. "are not fit . . ." is from Pine Bluff Commercial, 18 May 1895, p. 2. Remainder of quotes are from Austin Daily Statesman, 12 Dec. 1895, p. 4.


43. Quotes are from Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer, 22 Jan. 1898, p. 1. See also Ibid., 1 Jan. 1898, pp. 1-2. For resolution of sugar planters' association, see 55th Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Record Group 46, "Petitions and Memorials." National Archives, Washington, D.C.


46. Thomas Ball's comments are in Ibid., (15 June 1898), p. 5975.

47. Ibid., p. 5985.

48. Description of voting on annexation resolution can be found in Edward Chester, Sectionalism, Politics, and American Diplomacy (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1975), pp. 133-134. House vote is in 55th Cong., 2nd sess.,
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1. Ft. Worth Gazette, 1 Nov. 1895, p. 4.


4. Quote is from New Orleans Daily Picayune, 27 Feb. 1895, p. 4. Discussion of inequities between Spanish forces and rebels in (Little Rock) Arkansas Gazette, 3 March 1895, p. 4. An example of rural comment is Homer (La.) Guardian-Journal, 6 March 1895, p. 2.


7. Shreveport Times, 24 March 1895, p. 4.

9. Quote is from Uniontown (Ala.) Canebrake Herald, 5 April 1895, p. 2. See also Homer (La.) Guardian-Journal, 3 April 1895, p. 2, and (Dalton) North Georgia Citizen, 18 April 1895, p. 2.


19. First quote is from Ibid., 29 Sept. 1895, p. 4. Second quote is from Savannah Morning News, 7 Nov. 1895, p. 4. See also Galveston Daily News, 26 Aug. 1895, p. 4, and 10 Nov. 1895, p. 10.


24. Mass meeting and benefit concert reported in Ibid., 21 Jan. 1896, p. 3. For ceremony marking one year anniversary of the revolution see Ibid., 25 Feb. 1896, p. 2.


29. Ibid., pp. 1968.


32. For a different view of Caffery's motives that emphasize his independence of thought and action, see Lucille Roy Caffery, "The Political Career of Senator Donelson Caffery," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* 27 (July 1944): 41-48.


37. Quote is from Greenwood (Miss.) Southern Farmer, 1 April 1896, p. 2. See also *Galveston Daily News*, 4 March 1896, p. 4. Second quote is from *Texas Farm and Ranch* as reprinted in (Benton, La.) *Bossier Banner*, 2 April 1896, p. 2. The fears of the possible high costs of war were not without foundation. Since the rules for eligibility of veterans' benefits were liberalized in 1879, pensions had become a significant drain on the Treasury. In fact, total pensions paid to eligible Union veterans and their dependents was over 250% greater than the actual cost of the war. For figures and calculations, see *Historical Statistics of the United States*, p. 1140.


40. Ibid., p. 3587. See also the comments of Tazewell Ellett of Virginia in Ibid., pp. 3581-3586.


42. Perez, Jr., Cuba, pp. 164-168.


44. First quote is from New Orleans Daily Picayune, 7 April 1896, p. 4. Second quote is from Mobile Daily Register, 8 April 1896, p. 4.


48. Langley, Cuban Policy, pp. 93-94.


50. First quote is from (Natchitoches) Louisiana Populist, 31 July 1896, p. 3. Justice Samuel McEnery's remarks ("the true feeling") are in New Orleans Daily Picayune, 5 Aug. 1896, p. 2. See also Shreveport Times, 6 Oct. 1896, p. 5.


54. Offner, Unwanted War, pp. 31-32.

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5. Quote is in Gould, Presidency, pp. 34-35.


7. "American citizens . . ." is from Franklin (La.) Banner-Democrat, 6 March 1897, p. 2. "Extreme cruelty . . ." is from Columbiana (Ala.) People's Advocate, 11 March 1897, p. 2. A slightly more moderate view is expressed in (Little Rock) Arkansas Democrat, 2 March 1897, p. 4. See DeConde, American Foreign Policy, p. 340, and Offner, Unwanted War, p. 44.


13. First quote is from Pine Bluff (Ark.) Commercial, 16 July 1897, p. 2. Felton's comments are from Rebecca Latimer Felton, "Cuba and the United States," Handwritten article, no date, Rebecca Latimer Felton Collection, University of Georgia Library, Athens, Georgia. See also (Fayetteville) Arkansas Sentinel, 1 June 1897, p. 4.

14. Galveston Daily News, 1 July 1897, p. 4. See also Felton, "Cuba and Liberty."


16. May, Imperial Democracy, pp. 107-111. See also Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, pp. 173-175, and Offner, Unwanted War, pp. 51-53.

17. Langley, Cuban Policy, pp. 97-98.


19. Quote is from Shreveport Times, 6 Oct. 1897, p. 4. See also Birmingham Age-Herald, 26 Oct. 1897, p. 4.


overstated the importance of Taylor's remarks on southern public opinion; her study focused primarily on southern politicians, a group more sympathetic to Taylor's pleas for intervention than the public.


24. Perez, Cuba, pp. 148-149.


27. Dinsmore's comments are from 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (19 Jan. 1898), vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 769.


31. The best discussion of events surrounding the acquisition and publication of the de Lome letter is Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, pp. 232-235.


34. Quote is from *Pine Bluff* (Ark.) Commercial, 11 Feb. 1898, p. 2. George Auxier, "Middle Western Newspapers and the Spanish-American War, 1895-1898," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 26 (March 1940): 523-534, suggested that local editors could, and did, provide an editorial counter-balance to many of the sensational stories emanating from New York. Even the Pine Bluff editor, mentioned above, advised moderation toward de Lome's letter, "if he ever wrote it, which we doubt." Overall, the volume of editorial comment on de Lome's letter in the southern press is remarkably circumspect. Perhaps southerners were less sensitive to personal insults against a Republican president.


36. Gould, *Spanish-American War*, pp. 35-36, and Offner, *Unwanted War*, pp. 122-123. Most comprehensive account of the facts surrounding the explosion is Hyman Rickover, *How the Battleship Maine was Destroyed* (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Navy, Naval History Division, 1976). Rickover concluded that the blast was caused by the overheating of forward powder magazines. Neither Spanish nor Cuban treachery was involved.


38. For survey, see *Birmingham Age-Herald*, 18 Feb. 1898, p. 4.


42. Savannah Morning News, 19 Feb. 1898, p. 4. See also Birmingham Age-Herald, 18 Feb. 1898, p. 4.


45. (Dalton) North Georgia Citizen, 17 March 1898, p. 2. See also article from Helena (Ark.) World reprinted in Pine Bluff (Ark.) Commercial, 28 Feb. 1898, p. 2. Article in Uniontown (Ala.) Canebrake Herald, 16 March 1898, p. 2, contains discussion of editor with local notables of Marion County, Alabama. He found consensus against war. See also Lake Providence (La.) Banner Democrat, 5 March 1898, p. 2.


49. First quote is from Fort Smith (Ark.) Weekly Elevator, 25 March 1898, p. 4. Second quote is from (Savannah) Morning News, 29 March 1898, p. 4. See also Lafayette (La.) Advertiser, 9 April 1898, p. 4.

50. This brief account of events surrounding the president and the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry is further discussed in Gould, Spanish-American War, pp. 41-43. Different interpretations of McKinley's motives are found in Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy, pp. 126-129.

51. Quotes are from New Orleans Daily Picayune, 19 March 1898, p. 4. Public hysteria surrounding the release of the Naval Court's report is found in May, Imperial Democracy, pp. 133-147. Action of New Orleans' commercial bodies is from Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Record Group 46, "Petitions on Cuba," National Archives, Washington, D.C. Augusta reaction found in Augusta Herald, 6 April 1898, n.p., as found in William Fleming Scrapbook, vol. 6, p. 55, University of Georgia Library, Athens, Georgia. In addition, for persistent commercial opposition in Mobile, see McWilliams, New South, pp. 60-61.

52. First quote is Donelson Caffery to son, Donelson Caffery, Jr., 9 April 1898, in Scrapbook 6, p. 142, Caffery Family Papers, Manuscript Department, Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. Second quote is in Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer, 23 April 1898, p. 260. Although opposed to intervention and war, many of the South's sugar producers were not extremely assertive in their views. Most probably accepted the idea that Cuba would someday enter the American Union; consequently, their efforts focused on streamlining and consolidating their own industry to make it competitive in the long term. See Marshall Schott, "Louisiana Sugar and the Cuban Crisis, 1895-1898," Louisiana History 31 (summer 1990): 265-272, J. Carlyle Sitterson, Sugar Country: The Cane Sugar Industry in the South, 1753-1950 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1953), pp. 330-341, and John Heitmann, The Modernization of the Louisiana Sugar Industry, 1831-1910 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), pp. 248-249.


54. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (4 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4, pp. 3494-3499.


56. Lee's comments in *Confederate Veteran* 6 (April 1898), p. 156.


60. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Record Group 233, 29 March 1898, "Petitions on Cuba," National Archives, Washington, D.C.


62. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., *Congressional Record* (11 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4, p. 3703. Support for Butler's position found in T. R. Robertson to Marion Butler, 11 April 1898; Morrison Caldwell to Marion Butler, 11 April 1898; and, J. B. Alexander to Marion Butler, 13 April 1898, Marion Butler Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

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2. Quotes are from Sallie Cotten, Speech at Women's Exposition on 11 May 1898, reprinted in *Charlotte Observer*, Lyman Cotten Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

3. Moore's comment from (Charlotte) Star of Zion, 9 June 1898, p. 3.
4. McKinley's message to Congress discussed in Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the New, pp. 127-128, Gould, McKinley and the SAW, pp. 47-49, Morgan, America's Road, pp. 61-63, and Offner, Unwanted War, pp. 182-183.


6. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (11 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4, pp. 3703-3704.

7. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (12 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4, pp. 3731-3733. Butler's resolution was never voted on. On April 13, minority report from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee supported the recognition of Cuban independence. Minority report was signed by four members, including Roger Mills of Texas, and John W. Daniel of Virginia. See Ibid., (13 April 1898), p. 3776.

8. Ibid., pp. 3815-3816.

9. Ibid., pp. 3815-3821.

10. Offner, Unwanted War, p. 188.

11. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (16 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4, p. 3965.


13. Bacon's comments in Ibid., pp. 3949-3950. See also Offner, Unwanted War, pp. 188-89.

14. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (16 April 1898), vol. 31, pt. 4, pp. 3949-3950.

15. Ibid., p. 4105.


17. Quote from (Uniontown, Al.) Canebrake Herald, 13 April 1898, p. 2. See also comments from H. M. King to Joseph Wheeler, 13 April 1898, Wheeler Family Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery.

19. Ethel Hutson to father, Charles Hutson, 23 April 1898, Hutson Family Papers, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans. Report of a demonstration of cadets at Texas A. and M. University in which Weyler is burned in effigy on the football field is found in Mary Hutson to daughter, Ethel Hutson, 29 April 1898, Hutson Family Papers.

20. First quote is Henry Hutson to parents, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Hutson, 14 April 1898, Hutson Family Papers, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans. Second quote is Willis Brewer to Robert McKee, 23 April 1898, Robert McKee Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery. Third quote is Joseph Wheeler to Governor Joseph Johnston, 16 April 1898, Wheeler Family Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery. See also Frank Carter to Marion Butler, 27 April 1898, Marion Butler Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. During the war, approximately 43,000 southerners volunteered for service in the armed forces. Volunteers from the South constituted over one-fifth of all volunteers nationally. A compilation of United States volunteers can be found in 55th Congress, 3rd session, House Report No. 2192, *Reimbursement of States and Territories for Expenses Incurred, etc. in the War with Spain*.

21. Offer of New Orleans U.C.V. camps found in Circular Letter No. 84, from U.C.V. Adjutant General's Office, 3 May 1898, United Confederate Veterans Collection, Louisiana Historical Association Collection, Tulane University, New Orleans. Florida U.C.V. camp resolution in *Tampa Tribune*, 3 May 1898, p. 2. For examples of offers of service from individual Confederate veterans, see Thomas Rosser to John W. Daniel, 20 April 1898, and 25 May 1898, John W. Daniel Papers, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, and Spier Whitaker to Marion Butler, 21 April 1898, Marion Butler Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Resolution from Grand Army of the Republic and Josephus Daniels' quote are in *Raleigh, N.C. Farmer and Mechanic*, 16 May 1898, p. 4. Josephus Daniels, too, embraced vision of the New South and saw the war as an opportunity to promote reconciliation. See Joseph Morrison, *Josephus Daniels: The Small-d Democrat* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp. 12-15. For additional comment on enthusiasm of Confederate veterans for war, see *Natchitoches (La.) Populist*, 1 April 1898, p. 3.

22. Long quote is from John B. Gordon, U.C.V. General Orders No. 204, 28 May 1898, United Confederate Veterans Collection, Louisiana Historical Collection, Tulane University, New Orleans. A good biography of Gordon that examines both his nationalism and his commitment to the social order of the Old South is Ralph L. Eckert, *John Brown Gordon: Soldier-Southerner-American* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989). At the U.C.V. Reunion in Atlanta, the members unanimously
passed resolutions pledging their loyalty to the Union and their willingness to support the president. Text of resolutions found in Houston Post, 22 July 1898, p. 4.

23. "deprecated war" is from Opelousas Courier, 16 April 1898, p. 1. "War shouts" is from Frank Richardson to his daughter, 14 April 1898, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. "War scare" is in Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer, 23 April 1898, p. 260. See also (Baton Rouge) Daily Advocate, 14 April 1898, p. 2. Declining production and value of Cuban sugar (see Tables I and II) is from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1899, pp. 341-345.

TABLE I

Quantity and Value of Sugar Imported from Cuba

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>In Pounds</th>
<th>In Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>2,127,497,454</td>
<td>63,147,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>1,845,762,623</td>
<td>40,100,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>1,093,171,312</td>
<td>24,102,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>576,260,997</td>
<td>11,953,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>440,225,111</td>
<td>9,828,987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Impact of declining Cuban sugar production on domestic market (Table II) from Ibid., p. 213.

TABLE II

Wholesale and Retail Price of Sugar, 1895-1898
(in cents per pound)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wholesale Price</th>
<th>Retail Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. For comment on the perceived impact of war on cotton, see Homer (La.) Guardian Journal, 13 April 1898, p. 2, and The Southern Planter (Richmond, Va.), 59 (May 1898): 236. Lacroix's comments are in Louis de Lacroix to Marion Butler, 27 April 1898, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Press. See similar comments in article from Texas Farm and Ranch reprinted in St. Helena (La.) Echo, 30 April 1898, p. 1. See also quote from Birmingham Ledger reprinted in Mobile Daily Register, 16 April 1898, p. 4.

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25. First quote is from New Orleans Daily Picayune, 20 April 1898, p. 4. Second quote is from Ruston (La.) Leader, reprinted in Ibid., 18 April 1898, p. 8. Other quotes from Southern Planter 59 (May 1898): 236.


29. Addie Daniels' quote is from Addie Daniels to mother, Mary Daniels, 2 May 1898, Josephus Daniels Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. For other expressions of southern women's anxiety and concern over war see Eleanor Patterson to mother, Mary Patterson, 17 May 1898, Patterson Family Papers, North Carolina Department of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina, and Mrs. Albert Coble to husband, Albert Coble, 5 July 1898, Albert L. Coble Papers, Manuscript Department, William Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

30. The organization of the "Girl's Home Guard" in Charlotte is discussed in (Raleigh) Farmer and Mechanic, 3 May 1898, p. 2. The papers of the Louisiana Women's War Relief Association are part of the Louisiana Historical Association Collection at Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans. Of special importance in this collection are Mrs. Thomas Cotes to Mrs. Josephine Ellis, 2 Aug. 1898; Mollie Gray to Mrs. J. B. Richardson, 2 Aug. 1898; and, Mrs. J. Pinckney Smith to Mrs. Josephine Ellis, 3 Aug. 1898. Final quote on southern women during the war is from Confederate Veteran 6 (Nov. 1898): 512.


35. Gatewood, Jr., *Black Americans*, pp. 29-34.

36. Quote from *(Charlotte)* *Star of Zion*, 9 June 1898, p. 3. A black Tennessee clergyman expressed similar concerns in *(Charlotte)* *Star of Zion*, 22 Sept. 1898, p. 3.


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10. The Caribbean Islands as part of America's "natural domain" discussed in platform of Texas Democratic Convention as published in Houston Post, 4 Aug. 1898, pp. 2-3, and in interview with Congressman William Terry in (Fayetteville) Arkansas Sentinel, 13 Sept. 1898, p. 2.


12. First quote is from William Tarry to Sally Tarry Harrison, 7 July 1898, John Bullock Papers, Manuscript Department, William Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C. Second quote is from (Charlotte) People's Paper, 24 June 1898, p. 2. See also (Little Rock) Arkansas Democrat, 8 July 1898, p. 2, and article from Nashville American reprinted in Beaumont Weekly Enterprise, 13 Aug. 1898, p. 4. In addition, see comments in Opelousas (La.) Courier, 14 Jan. 1899, p. 1.


18. 55th Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Record Group 46, Petitions on Philippines, 1898-1899, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


23. Ibid., p. 964.


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37. 55th Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Record Group 46, Petitions on Philippines, 1898-1899, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


43. Quote from *(Little Rock) Arkansas Gazette*, 30 Jan. 1900, p. 4. See also a partial reprint of McLaurin's speech for the *Manufacturer's Record* in Ibid., 6 Feb. 1900, p. 4.


46. (Dalton) North Georgia Citizen, 4 May 1899, p. 4. See also Homer (La.) Guardian-Journal, 3 May 1899, p. 2, and Montgomery Southern Argus, 26 May 1899, p. 2.

47. Houston Herald in Austin Statesman, 11 May 1899, p. 4. See also (Dalton) North Georgia Citizen, 4 May 1899, p. 2; Austin Statesman, 13 May 1899, p. 4; and, Lake Charles Daily American, 26 May 1899, p. 2.


50. Long quote is from Helena (Ark.) Reporter, 1 Feb. 1900, p. 2. See also (Charlotte) Star of Zion, 9 March 1899, p. 7, and 26 July 1900, p. 7. See also Gatewood, Black Americans, pp. 184-191 and 219-263.

51. First quote is from Lake Charles Daily American, 19 July 1899, p. 2. Long quote is from Danville Register reprinted in Tampa Morning Tribune, 28 Sept. 1899, p. 4.

52. Birmingham Age-Herald, 19 Aug. 1899, p. 4. See also Brands, Bound to Empire, pp. 27-30, for discussion of northern anti-imperialist and Populist condemnation of militarism.

53. Quote is from Frank Evans to Albert Evans, 14 Nov. 1899, Evans (Nathaniel and Family) Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. See also Linn, U.S. Army, pp. 12-20; Brands, Bound to Empire, pp. 50-57; and, Henry Graff, ed., American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. xiv.


Papers, Manuscript Department, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

56. Brewer's speech in Willis Brewer, Printed Speeches, 12 April 1900, Willis Brewer Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama. Many of these ideas also expressed by Sydney Bowie, a Populist candidate for Congress in Alabama, who insisted that the nation could not survive "half republic and half empire." His comments found in (Columbiana, Ala.) The People's Advocate, 18 Oct. 1900, p. 2.


60. Felton's comments in Atlanta Journal reprinted in (Dalton) North Georgia Citizen, 19 Sept. 1900, p. 4. Former first lady of the Confederacy, Mrs. Jefferson Davis, opposed annexation, largely due to racial concerns. For her attitudes, see Mrs. Jefferson Davis, "White Man's Problem: Why We Do Not Want the Philippines," The Arena 23 (Jan. 1900): 1-4.

61. Welch, Response to Imperialism, pp. 67-71. Problems faced by Democrats in making imperialism the paramount issue discussed in J. L. M. Curry to Manly Curry, 12 July 1900, J. L. M. Curry Papers, Manuscript Department, William Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, and in Felix Robertson to Dr. J. O. Scott, 19 Aug. 1900, Felix Robertson Papers, Manuscript Department, Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

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2. H. C. Sheffield to James Griggs, 13 Nov. 1903, James Griggs Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.


5. *Dixie* 16 (July 1900): 40.


8. "we should be extremely careful" from Savannah Morning News, 14 Aug. 1900, p. 4. "American troops" from (Dalton) North Georgia Citizen, 23 Aug. 1900, p. 4. See also J. L. M. Curry to son, Manly, 17 Aug. 1900, J. L. M. Curry Papers, Manuscript Department, William Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C.


16. Example of southern business lobbying found in petition from Little Rock Board of Trade, 15 Dec. 1900, and letter from G. B. Ross to Little Rock Board of Trade, 11 Dec. 1900, submitted to 56th Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Record Group 233, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


18. Gordon's comments in *New Orleans Times-Democrat*, 5 Dec. 1900, p. 6. Last quote is from J. L. Lauretta in Ibid., p. 6. Extensive coverage of the convention and the delegates' support for a canal found in Ibid., pp. 1, 6-8.

19. Memorial published in Ibid., 5 Dec. 1900, p. 1, and found in 56th Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Record Group 233, 4 Dec. 1900, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


22. First quote from (Little Rock) Arkansas Gazette, 14 Nov. 1901, p. 4. Second quote from Ibid., 20 Nov. 1901, p. 4. See also (Fayetteville) Arkansas Sentinel, 12 Nov. 1901, p. 4, and (Uniontown, Ala.) Canebrake Herald, 11 Dec. 1901, p. 2.


24. Ibid.


27. Gibson in 57th Cong., 1st sess. Appendix to the Congressional Record (8 Jan. 1902), vol. 35, pt. 8, pp. 23-25. See also similar comments from George Burgess of Texas in 57th Cong., 1st sess. Congressional Record (8 Jan. 1902), vol. 35, pt. 1, p. 519. Burgess proclaimed that "no State in the American Union" had a deeper interest in the completion of the canal than his home state of Texas. Vote on H. R. 3110 in Ibid., (9 Jan. 1902), pp. 557-558. Only one southerner, Thomas Lassiter of Petersburg, Virginia, voted against the bill. Since he made no public comments on the question, his motives for opposing the measure are unknown.


32. Quote from Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer, 15 Nov. 1902, pp. 310-312. See also Tampa Tribune, 6 Feb. 1902, p. 4, and (Fayetteville) Arkansas...


35. McCullough, Path, pp. 361-386.

36. (Dalton) North Georgia Citizen, 12 Nov. 1903, p. 4.

37. First quote is from Farmerville (La.) Gazette, 18 Nov. 1903, p. 2. Gordon's comments from W. W. Gordon to R. Wayne Parker, 22 Dec. 1903, Gordon Family Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. See also (Dalton) North Georgia Citizen, 24 Dec. 1903, p. 2.


41. H. C. Sheffield to James Griggs, 13 Nov. 1903, James Griggs Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

42. Dixie 20 (Jan. 1904): 19. See also similar comments by Senator Murphy Foster of Louisiana in Lake Charles Daily American, 5 Jan. 1904, p. 5, in which he predicts the canal will make New Orleans "the greatest export market in the world."


44. Ibid., p. 2261.
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