Direct United States Military Intervention: the Essentials for Success in the Post-Cold War Era.

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DIRECT U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION: 
THE ESSENTIALS FOR SUCCESS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 

in 
The Department of Political Science

by
Glenn Joseph Antizzo 
A.B., Cornell University, 1985 
M.A., University of Georgia, 1990 
August 1995

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ABSTRACT

Direct U.S. military intervention in the Third World featured prominently in American foreign policy during the post-World War II era. However, the Cold War placed restraints on where and how Washington could intervene. The collapse of the former Soviet Union appears to have removed many of the barriers to, if not the ideological justifications for, American intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has intervened militarily in several countries. However, these post-Cold War interventions seem to be guided by different motives than those traditionally given. Likewise, such operations, now free from the fear of counter-intervention by any other superpower, seem to be governed by a new set of rules.

This dissertation considers the efficacy of direct U.S. military intervention: when it will work, when it will not, and how to undertake such action in a manner that will bring rapid victory at an acceptable political cost. Consequently, this study develops a typology of the preconditions that tend to favor the success of direct U.S. military intervention in the post-Cold War era. The criteria considered relate to the various aspects of intervention, including: the motives underlying the decision to intervene, the nature of the situation in the target country, domestic political conditions, how the
operation is carried out, and exit strategies. In addition, aspects of civilian-military relations are considered, with an emphasis on the role of the theater commander in both the decision making process and the prosecution of the action. The propositions advanced are tested by the use of focused case studies of the major episodes of direct American military intervention since 1989: Panama (1989), Iraq (1991), and Somalia (1992-1994).
CHAPTER I

DIRECT U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION: AN INTRODUCTION

Introduction/Background

As Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. points out in his book, The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy, the doctrines that have guided U.S. foreign policy are not static. Rather, despite recurring themes such as anti-communism, they are pragmatically adjusted on a "need" basis. That is to say that they evolve, adapting to circumstances as the international environment and changing perceptions of national interests dictate. Bearing this in mind, it would seem that the American foreign policy has undergone a gradual, yet discernable, evolution since the end of World War II.

Like nothing before it, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 forced Americans to face the fact that, whether they liked it or not, U.S. security needs absolutely compelled defense of the nation's interests abroad. This became even clearer when, shortly after allied victory, the Soviet Union began to indicate that it would no longer be a friend, let alone an ally, of the United States.

Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, while condemned by the West, was in fact tolerated and accepted. Soon
afterward, however, Communist designs were perceived against areas outside the conceded Soviet sphere of influence. The U.S. response to this challenge, the Truman Doctrine, seems to have set into motion a series of phases though which American policy has passed. They are as follows (approximately):

1947–1957 The use (or at least the implied threat) of direct U.S. military intervention in order to defend established friendly governments from "armed minorities" acting with the aid, or at least the blessing, of the USSR and its allies. Examples of this include U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey, as well as direct military intervention in Korea. In defense of core U.S. interests, particularly Western Europe, the U.S. invokes the doctrine of "massive retaliation," a policy which remains in place until the 1960s.

1957–1973 The use of direct U.S. intervention in the Third World for two distinct, yet complementary, objectives. First, to contain communist expansion by whatever means necessary, including armed force. Second, to help immunize newly emerging nations from communism through the process of U.S. sponsored "nation-building" and Rostowian development policies. Prominent examples of this include Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), and most clearly South Vietnam (1962–1973).

1973–1980 This was a period of relative dormancy in U.S. foreign policy, perhaps bordering on neo-isolationism. Public paranoia over getting involved in "another Vietnam" as well as a general distrust of government due to ten years of lies from both the Johnson and Nixon administrations culminated in congressional micro-management of U.S. foreign policy. The passage of the War Powers Act, as well as the Clark and Tunney Amendments, virtually tied the hands of the executive for two administrations. Though there are some uses of armed force (freeing the "Mayaguez" in 1975, "Desert One" in
1979, supplying Israel in 1973) and threats to use force (ongoing commitments to NATO, South Korea, etc), the U.S. avoids prolonged interventions that characterized earlier periods.

1980-1989 The era of the Reagan Doctrine. This policy took account of the fact that the USSR was a superpower only in the military sense. Furthermore, during the 1970s the Soviet "empire" had become overextended. Consequently, the U.S. sought to exploit the many weak points, thereby rolling-back communism in the Third World while simultaneously bleeding Moscow by forcing it to engage in the costly task of defending its allies for a change. This task was accomplished by funding pre-existing indigenous rebel groups that could cost-effectively press U.S. claims without the need to commit U.S. land forces in a prolonged Vietnam-style conflict. Examples of this include U.S. aid to rebels in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. (It is interesting to note that, in the case of Nicaragua, while the Reagan administration denied any involvement, it used the CIA to mine Nicaraguan harbors and financed the rebels through the Iran-Contra arms sales to Iran as well as actively seeking the financial support of friendly Gulf emirates.)

1989-1995 This period is characterized by the threat and/or use of direct U.S. military power for the achievement of two goals that seem, on the face of it, to be at odds with each other: (1) the protection of national interests such as Middle East oil and the Panama Canal and (2) humanitarian concern in areas of the world, the value of which to vital U.S. interests cannot be readily demonstrated. Examples of (1) include U.S. participation in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1989 intervention in Panama. Examples of (2) include the U.S. mercy mission in Somalia, the food airlift to Bosnia, as well as the stationing of some U.S. ground forces in Macedonia.
1995 - ? Anticipated challenges to U.S. foreign policy:
1. The need to deal militarily with terrorists and the states that sponsor them (e.g. Libya, Iran, Sudan).
2. The need to deal with "loose cannons" that acquire nuclear weapons (e.g. North Korea).
3. The need to intervene again in the Persian Gulf so as to defend U.S. allies, access to oil, ensure freedom of navigation within the Gulf, and/or enforce the terms of surrender imposed on Iraq at the end of the 1991 war.
4. The need to intervene militarily so as to restore order, promote democracy, and prevent mayhem (Haiti, post-Castro Cuba).
5. The need to take direct military action to deal with drug lords(?)
6. The need to again engage in peacekeeping and/or humanitarian relief duties.
7. The need to deter Beijing from attempts to intimidate American friends in the Far East such as Taiwan, Japan, South Korea (or a weak Russia?).

It is these two most recent "periods" that will be the focus of this dissertation.

Purpose of This Study

The central purpose of this dissertation is to develop a new typology of successful direct military intervention consistent with the needs and priorities of the post-Cold War world, as articulated by the Bush and Clinton administrations in the early-to-mid-1990s.

It is expected that the findings will show that, when the principles that will be presented below are adhered to, American forces will tend to enjoy success. Conversely, when these principles are deviated from, military failure, while perhaps not pre-ordained, is made more likely.
Furthermore, the political aspects of the policy become either a domestic albatross for the President as American soldiers die for nebulous purposes that their families cannot understand (Somalia) or a source of decay of international credibility as the President makes threats that he cannot keep (Bosnia) or perhaps had no intention of ever seriously keeping (North Korea).

What then will this study add to our understanding of international politics? This study will yield a new framework which will greatly facilitate the scholarly study of actual and potential military intervention. It will provide criteria which can be used to dissect the various elements of motivation, action, and completion of such operations. As such, we can assess each phase of such operations and diagnose problems that, as a result, need not be repeated later. In a word, the key scholarly contribution of this work: clarity of understanding.

**Literature Review**

Literature regarding intervention as a general topic of discussion is abundant. However, as Richard Smoke has implied, the task of building a body of literature which develops a typology of the number and nature of specific preconditions for successful intervention has largely been neglected. This is regrettable, especially in light of the fact that military options, by their very nature, "require more preconditions in place, for the options to have a
reasonable chance of success at reasonable cost, than do non-military options" (Smoke, 1977: 39). The dearth of literature on this topic should not act as a deterrent to its scholarly pursuit. To the contrary, it is this very void which this study hopes to fill. Although it has been possible to locate only a very few authors who have featured such preconditions as a central concern of their writings, it is enough to get a picture of the intellectual heritage of the development of such typologies.

This literature review will begin with a brief discussion of why intervention will probably figure prominently in post-Cold War politics. The body of this survey, however, will concentrate specifically on literature dealing with typologies outlining the preconditions to be satisfied before an intervention policy can promise a favorable ratio of expected benefits to expected costs. This overview will conclude with a summary of what the literature has thus far provided the scholarly community and what still remains to be said.

Setting the Stage

In a recent article, former National Security Advisor to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, noted that "war has become a luxury that only poor nations can afford (Brzezinski, 1991: 5)." This is because the post-Cold War world is characterized by a dichotomy. On one hand, the threat of nuclear weapons still restrains the actions of
the world's "major players." On the other hand, many countries, due to a variety of reasons, have had loosened the restraints formerly imposed on their external behavior. At the same time, many of these same states have had their domestic dictatorial foundations undermined. The resultant instability, both internal and external, has made these states (primarily, but not exclusively, in the Third World) into sources and/or locations of conflict. Due to the ever increasing interdependence of the world community "it is just as likely that major threats could originate from within states, either through civil conflicts or because of the increased technological sophistication of terrorist acts."

He implies that pragmatically guided, prudently pursued intervention may be an answer to this challenge (Brzezinski, 1991: 6, 20). However, there is a question of sovereignty and its possible violation in such situations. The United States clings to what may be an antiquated notion: that sovereignty places absolute limits on circumstances where intervention is possible (recall that the U.S. was "asked" to "assist" in Vietnam, Korea, Grenada, etc.). Brzezinski, however, sees a possible opening: that the decision of when and where to intervene may necessarily have to downplay a strict view of sovereignty in favor of an appreciation of the scope of a given threat. Specifically, "there may develop situations
in which external intervention in the seemingly internal affairs of a state...may be necessary and justified by the potential consequences of activities that are otherwise of internal character and that do not, of themselves, involve interstate collision" (Brzezinski, 1991: 5-6).

Steven E. Goldman takes this argument further. In essence, he argues that our traditional notions of sovereignty are not only antiquated, but also unduly legalistic. It is ridiculous to assume that all states are equal, especially when it comes to this very central issue. Goldman believes that, in order to exercise full sovereignty, a condition that would legally proscribe foreign intervention, a state must be legitimate in the eyes of modern legality. This legitimacy, of necessity, is predicated on the exercise of political self-determination within the state in question. This self-determination is clearly evident in liberal democracies, as manifested by the conduct of their political institutions and constitutional safeguards.

By contrast, states that are not democratic should not be viewed as possessing the same full untrammelled sovereignty, since the civil population, the nation that is the source and the possessor of sovereignty, has not been allowed even the rudimentary opportunity of expressing its political will. Sovereignty in such cases may be said to be in a state of suspension or impaired (emphasis added). The state in such circumstances is illegitimate and is not the bearer of any degree of sovereignty...(Goldman 1994: 127).
Since, in such cases, sovereignty is said not to exist, democratic states are free, and in some specific circumstances may be morally obligated, to intervene in the internal affairs of undemocratic states when circumstances there represent a threat to the world community, or if the state in question directly threatens its own citizens human rights (e.g. the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia 1975-1979).

It should be noted that Goldman clearly states that while a "right of" intervention exists legally in such circumstances, the "decision to" actually intervene is and "must always remain fundamentally a political judgement" (Goldman 1994: 128). It is the circumstances surrounding this "political judgement" that the next section of this literature review concerns itself.

**Typologies of Intervention Preconditions**

Typologies of intervention are not new to political science. Only a very few authors, however, have featured such preconditions as a central concern of their writings. In many cases, the discussion of this topic is overlapped by, or buried within, literature associated with other subjects such as deterrence, compellence, and political realism. However, these subjects are beyond the scope of this study. Our intent here is to confine discussion to the intellectual heritage of the issue at hand: specifically we will consider literature which lays out specific criteria which would seem to constitute preconditions to any
successful pursuit of interventionist strategies. Due to space constraints, however, this overview will necessarily be of a general and simplified nature.

A concern with direct military intervention seems justified for a number of reasons. First and foremost, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there seems to be an increased reliance by the United States on the use of such direct force. Nowhere was this renewed enthusiasm for military options more evident than in the adoption of an uncharacteristically hawkish stance with regard to Haiti by the almost uniformly liberal Congressional Black Caucus.

Second, while other forms of intervention (e.g. economic sanctions) still have their place in the American arsenal of options, it is evident that an increasing number of dictators will respond only to military force. Whether this is due to their ability to insulate themselves from the effects of such sanctions, their fear that backing down in a confrontation with the U.S. would result in a loss of face that would threaten their hold on power, simple callousness, or possibly failure to comprehend their own interests, tyrants in the post-Cold War era seem increasingly intransigent and unresponsive to lesser forms of intervention.

Finally, as will be demonstrated below, there is a dearth of literature identifying and examining those preconditions favoring the success of direct military
intervention. Because of the advance preparations, as well as the heavy investment of both military personnel and material required to undertake such operations, greater attention to the preconditions for successful intervention is a matter of great urgency and priority.

The most systematic scholarly consideration of intervention in terms of the development of a typology of preconditions was a 1971 study by Alexander George and his associates. This work, entitled The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, compared three instances when the U.S. intervened with "coercive diplomacy," that is to say, diplomatic threats backed up with military force. These case studies led to the development of eight preconditions for successful intervention, at least by the United States under the historical conditions considered. These factors include:

1. The strength of U.S. motivation.
2. An asymmetry of motivation favoring the United States.
3. The clarity of American objectives.
4. The projection of a sense of urgency to achieve the objective sought.
5. The presence of adequate domestic support for the policy.
6. The availability of usable military options.
7. The development of the opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation.
8. Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement. (George et al., 1971: 217-226).

The above criteria rest, however, on several premises. First, force is used as part of a "carrot and stick"
policy, employing both a positive inducement and threat of military force to achieve the desired result. Second, force should only be used to protect well-defined interests. George believed that force cannot be well tailored and successfully applied unless specific, clear objectives are formulated regarding its use. Third, when using coercive force, the coercing power must keep open its channels of communication with its opponent. In this way, the coercing power can transmit its demands, barter terms, and negotiate an agreement which will lead to compliance. Failure to maintain open communication may lead to the misreading of intentions and unnecessary escalation. Finally, a willingness to use force, if necessary, is needed in order for the threat to have credibility, especially if the coercing power's "bluff" is called.

Robert Jervis, while writing on the subject of deterrence, states that "unfortunately no well-structured or verified theory exists that tells us when force and threats work." He does, however, indicate that it is possible to set forth some propositions and draw some preliminary conclusions. Although he does not set out specific preconditions needed for successful intervention of the type articulated below, Jervis argues that threats (and thus deterrence) are more apt to work when the following conditions are present:

1. The other side sees the costs of standing firm as very high.
2. The other side believes that the state making the threats sees its costs of standing firm as low.
3. The other side sees the costs of retreating as relatively low (Jervis, 1976: 100-101).

Jervis enumerates several sub-criteria, especially with respect to the first and third criteria, but does not attempt to develop any operational prerequisites regarding the actual undertaking of military action.

While Jervis is primarily concerned with deterrence, Richard Smoke more directly addresses the circumstances surrounding intervention per se. Smoke believes that an increase in the number of "players" and points of conflict probably yield a "rich menu of possibilities for low level, 'sub-threshold' intervention of various kinds as well as more overt military intervention." When facing such possible intervention situations, decisionmakers often have a wide range of options available and generally will select one that is adequate, even ample, to deal with the existing opposition." In such situations, their decisions concerning the size of the military commitment is often influenced heavily by "the tradeoff between securing a rapid and sure victory on the one hand and minimizing costs on the other" (Smoke, 1977: 30).

Intervention to Smoke is not an "event." Rather, he conceives of it as an ongoing cycle: a diagnosis of the situation, then the choice of a response option, followed by a new diagnosis, and so on. This process, however, is
clouded by what he labels as "reductionism." During diagnosis, this reductionism is manifest in the form of preconceived notions drawn from varied sources such as historical "laws," unwarranted historical analogies (e.g. the opponent as "another Hitler" or the situation as "another Vietnam"), or long term trends. Unfortunately, key information such as the opponent's doctrines or personality attributes are downplayed in favor of "hard information."

"In the context of option handling it [reductionism] appears in the guise of an underemphasis on the analytical preconditions for various strategies, in favor of emphasizing technical aspects of carrying them out" (emphasis added) (Smoke, 1977: 43).

The United States has an unprecedented number of options for action to choose from. There is, however, a problem in that policymakers, for whatever reason, tend to pass quickly through diagnosis to option handling. This haste is perhaps because of cultural bias toward action over deliberation. Smoke suggests that this bias leads to "premature closure" of the diagnosis stage.

An unfortunate consequence of this closure is that "the consideration of military intervention from the angle of ascertaining the number and kinds of preconditions for success is a productive analytical approach that is not always emphasized" (Smoke, 1977: 39). Smoke notes that in their haste, policymakers overlook the fact that "military
options require more preconditions in place, for the options to have a reasonable chance of success at reasonable cost, than do non military options" (Smoke, 1977: 39). Furthermore, because of its often unilateral character, U.S. decisionmakers may not recognize that "in most circumstances there are more preconditions to be satisfied before this policy can promise a favorable ratio of expected benefits to expected costs" (emphasis added)(Smoke, 1977: 39).

Although the early 1990s have seen a marked increase of instances of United States direct military intervention (as well as the proliferation of potential "target countries"), there is surprisingly little writing on actual, specific preconditions necessary for the success of such operations. Thomas Perry Thornton, for example, discusses factors affecting whether intervention is, as he puts it "an appropriate and necessary deviation from a policy of support for regional autonomy" in conflict resolution. However he chooses to steer clear of the issue of preconditions for intervention except to admonish policymakers that in exercising their military prerogatives "an integral part of the planning process should be devoted to seeing how our involvement can be shaped to restore and enhance the autonomy of the nation or system" (Thornton, 1986: 138).
Ted Galen Carpenter points out that the legacy of involvement in Vietnam has "created a lasting element of caution in the calculations of U.S. leaders" concerning intervention. He refers to a 1984 speech made by then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in which Weinberger laid out guidelines concerning the future use of American forces abroad. The speech emphasized that the U.S. should be much more selective in where it felt compelled to intervene, reserving such a drastic option only for areas deemed "vital" to American interests, and even then only as a last resort. Furthermore, Washington must send its forces only if it had "the clear intention of winning" the conflict. In contrast to previous interventions, Weinberger insisted that the United States should clearly formulate its goals, be they political or military, and then send the appropriate manpower to get the mission accomplished. Finally, Weinberger believed that before undertaking such an endeavor, there must be "'some reasonable assurance' of popular and congressional support" (Carpenter, 1992: 158).

Peter J. Schraeder has articulated a three part test which he believes is an aid in establishing "those circumstances in which the use of force is both a legitimate and useful tool of intervention." These include:

1. Whether the forces enjoy "majority support within the target country."
2. Whether the power that the U.S. intends to aid can muster "majority regional and international support."

3. Whether the proposed intervention is consistent with international law, which is valuable as a legitimizing agent (Schraeder, 1992: 396-397).

He concludes that "although the combination of these three guidelines cannot, of course, guarantee a successful intervention episode -- indeed, success depends on a host of factors, including the goal pursued -- they at least enhance the possibility for success and most certainly ensure that U.S. policies foster a legitimacy that will allow it to lead both regionally and within the international system" (Schraeder, 1992: 397).

As this analysis has demonstrated, while there is considerable literature regarding the general topic of armed intervention abroad, relatively little of it deals systematically with the preconditions that would enhance the chances of successful intervention by the United States abroad.

Most of the existing commentaries deal with general, theoretical preconditions for interventionism. While such works (especially that of Alexander George) have considerable validity, they do not seem sufficiently specific or applicable to contemporary conditions. To be more precise, a typology should, and can, be developed that identifies and explains those specific preconditions that
tend to favor successful intervention by the USA overseas. Commentators on the subject, such as Smoke, Levite, and Jentleson, have asserted that the development of such "necessary and sufficient conditions is a crucial task for further research" (emphasis added) (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman, 1992: 318).

Furthermore, this typology should be one that reflects the realities of both the domestic and world political environments of the 1990s, as well as attempts to serve as a set of guidelines for the foreseeable future. A review of the literature indicates that such a project has not been undertaken previously.

It is clear, therefore, that there is a gap in the literature that needs to be filled. This work proposes to do so by articulating, and then evaluating the validity of, such a typology. This task is the objective of the following chapters of this paper.

Pursuit of the Study

As regards the methodology to be employed, it is clear that, due to the small number of instances available, the case study method is the only feasible approach. An additional advantage of this method is the factual richness that such qualitative methods lend to the establishment, and subsequent refinement, of the typology and its fulfillment indicators.
The cases of American intervention in Somalia, Panama, and the Persian Gulf area have been selected for detailed evaluation. This is largely due to the fact they are, at the time of this writing, the only fully completed missions where the U.S. armed forces have been called upon to act, for whatever reasons, since the fall of the Soviet empire. (Haiti, the most recent case of American intervention, is still underway and thus cannot be evaluated as fully as the other cases.)

Three principal sources will be utilized in researching this study. First, scholarly works (monographs and articles) will be used to establish the academic "context" into which this study fits, as well to provide needed factual information and insights related to the cases dealt with here. Second, records of official proceedings -- such as congressional hearings, official statements of policy, as well as "unofficial" speeches of officials who were involved -- will be relied upon in presenting the case studies. Finally, "newspapers of record," such as the New York Times, as well as Facts on File and Keesing's, will be consulted in order to establish the necessary facts of each case. Together these should provide all the necessary information required to make this study possible.
CHAPTER II

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION

Introduction

Military intervention has long been a prominent feature of U.S. foreign policy. It may be recalled that one of the first acts of the Second Continental Congress was to authorize an invasion of Quebec in order to foment an uprising there and perhaps gain an ally - a "fourteenth colony" - in the rebellion against the British crown.

The purpose of this chapter is not to write the definitive history of U.S. military intervention. Rather, it is to give a broad overview of the historical development of American military intervention. For this purpose, our discussion will be general in nature. This chapter will survey intervention over the last century. Utilizing representative instances, the present discussion will illustrate the types of such actions, official U.S. attitudes toward the use of force, the legacy of the Cold War tradition, and the resultant post-Vietnam mindset.

Early Interventions

United States foreign policy, from the founding of the republic, has relied on a resort to the sword. In the late 1790s, President Adams waged an undeclared naval war against France. His successor, Thomas Jefferson, dispatched
the Navy and Marines to deal with marauding Barbary pirates. Furthermore, in 1818 Andrew Jackson was given unofficial approval to conduct an expedition into Spanish Florida (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, [CQWR], January 5, 1991, article by Ronald D. Elving: 37). Modern U.S. military intervention, however, finds its origins in the 1898 Spanish-American War. Prior to that conflict, U.S. foreign policy was largely guided by the principle of non-intervention. Americans, concerned with fulfilling their Manifest Destiny, for the most part ignored the outside world. Conflicts, when they did come, were aimed at expanding the new republic's frontiers.

The organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy was the Monroe Doctrine. Promulgated in 1823, this policy was aimed at European colonial powers who were contemplating the reclamation of their recently liberated colonies in Latin America. While warning European powers from attempting to interfere in Latin American affairs, it also had the effect of demarcating a United States sphere of interest in Western Hemisphere (Gardner, 1992: 27). It bears noting that these bold words were unenforceable without the British Navy guaranteeing compliance. Nevertheless, the Monroe Doctrine, in one form or another, has been invoked well into the Twentieth Century.

The Spanish-American War, although a comic-opera affair in its pursuit, was a watershed event in the history
of U.S. military intervention. Using the destruction of the USS Maine in Havana Harbor (allegedly by the Spanish) as a pretext, the United States invaded Cuba in support of an anti-colonial uprising. The Pacific Fleet under Admiral Dewey engaged the Spanish in the Philippines as well.

The war was short, barely longer than three months, and with surprisingly few combat fatalities. This "splendid little war" is significant not so much on its own merits, but rather because of what resulted from it (Musicant, 1990: 6). With the cessation of hostilities, the United States acquired a small empire. Added to U.S. territory were such far-flung locales as Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands. The United States was now a world power, and jingoists were eager to extend American interests to the four corners of the earth. President McKinley, however, believed that American security and interests did not require the addition of Cuba to American territory. Rather, Washington chose to exercise a European-style "protectorate" over Cuba. That is to say that Cuba would maintain its official independence, but Havana's freedom in foreign policy would be limited by the United States. This policy was codified by the Platt Amendment which, in addition, allowed the United States both basing rights in Cuba, as well as carte blanche to intervene under specific circumstances (Musicant, 1990: 50-51).
Cuba would become a model for American military intervention throughout the Caribbean basin in the first third of the Twentieth Century. Such intervention was virtually institutionalized by President Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt added a "corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine which asserted that the U.S. could engage in unilateral military intervention anywhere within the Americas where conditions might entice a European armed response (Musicant, 1990: 3). As Roosevelt himself declared: "Brutal wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of a civilized society, may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore this duty" (Chessman, 1969: 97).

This broadened interventionist policy is largely associated with the 1904 Debt Default Crisis of the Dominican Republic, when the Santo Domingo government defaulted on loans made by European creditors. Roosevelt, fearing a European "repossession" of the Dominican Republic in violation of the Monroe Doctrine, sent U.S. troops to head-off such a possibility. By the following year, the situation had stabilized. With Washington acting as a loan collector, payments to European creditors resumed.

The most enduring legacy of Roosevelt's policy of hemispheric intervention, however, was his simultaneous construction of both a new nation and a new canal in
Panama. In 1903, a treaty which would have granted the U.S. the right to build a canal across the isthmus in Panama province was rejected by the Colombian Senate. An enraged Roosevelt took advantage of an uprising in Panama. By sending American warships, most notably the USS Nashville, to waters off the Panamanian coast, Roosevelt was able to prevent Colombian troops from suppressing the rebellion. With Panamanian independence thus secured, the U.S. and the new regime entered into negotiations.

These efforts culminated with the signing of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty on November 18, 1903. This compact provided for a ten-mile wide zone, stretching from coast-to-coast, which would be leased in perpetuity to the U.S. for the purposes of canal construction, maintenance, and defense (Musicant, 1990: 136). In addition, the treaty "provided a clear and specific legal basis for...U.S. intervention in the event of disorder," making subsequent U.S. intervention unique in that it was based on treaty rights (Scranton, 1992: 344-45).

Woodrow Wilson, perhaps best known for his post World War I policy of national self-determination in Europe, was not above invoking Roosevelt's corollary in hemispheric affairs. Under the earlier Taft Administration, Washington had engaged in "dollar diplomacy," under which American businessmen were encouraged to invest in the Caribbean basin by guaranteeing their loans with the full diplomatic
and, if necessary, military support of the U.S. government. As such, U.S. loans were made to a number of Latin and Caribbean states. In 1912, this policy was put to the test when U.S. troops invaded and occupied Nicaragua in order to safeguard U.S. lives and interests.

Over time, Wilson continued, yet refined, this interventionist policy. He sought political and economic stability in the Caribbean basin so as to engender "sustained economic growth and [help] to insure the prompt payment of foreign debt" which would keep U.S. [and European] bankers happy while keeping foreign troops out of the Western Hemisphere (Steward, 1980: 17).

In keeping with his established policy, in 1917 Wilson sent 2,600 Marines to prop up the corrupt Menocal regime in Cuba. Likewise, Haiti was invaded in 1915 in order to "prevent anarchy" or perhaps more accurately, to establish a government capable of maintaining a stable environment for foreign investment (Gardner, 1992: 30). The Dominican Republic, also, was invaded the following year and both it and Haiti were placed under U.S. military rule.

During the period 1915-1934, 2,000 Haitians were killed by U.S. troops (Steward, 1980: 20). Indigenous government was not allowed in either Haiti or the Dominican Republic until 1924. It should, however, be noted that the U.S. trained paramilitary forces to maintain order. Steward claims that these groups were the forerunners of the

American intervention during this period was not limited to Caribbean island republics. Wilson ordered U.S. troops into Mexico twice. First, in 1913, American forces occupied Vera Cruz as part of an attempt to overthrow Mexican military dictator, Victoriano Huerta. Again, in 1916 the President dispatched General John "Black Jack" Pershing on a punitive expedition to capture the bandit Pancho Villa, who had killed several U.S. citizens during raids into the American Southwest (Steward 1980: 17). Villa eluded his pursuer and was never apprehended.

Intervention in the Caribbean basin continued into the 1920s, most notably in Nicaragua. U.S. Marines stationed there to prop up the Nicaraguan regime were thought to be no longer needed and were withdrawn in the mid-1920s. However, a new uprising in 1926 prompted the Marines' return. By 1927, U.S. forces deposed the incumbent regime and installed a new one. The rebels, labeled "Bolshevists" by Secretary of State Kellogg and armed by Mexico, were pursued by the Marines until the mid-1930s. In 1934, rebel leader Cesar Augusto Sandino was lured into a trap and killed by U.S.-trained National Guardsmen led by future Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Samoza (Steward, 1980: 24-5). (It may be interesting to note that Sandino's name was appropriated by a group - the "Sandinistas" - who,
ironically overthrew the dictatorship of Samoza's namesake nephew.)

**Isolationism**

The election of Herbert Hoover marked a change in the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Going from interventionism to restraint, this policy during the 1930s would evolve into isolationism. The Hoover policy was most clearly articulated in 1930 with the issuance of the so-called "Clark Memorandum." This document, while not completely disavowing all possible future intervention, did renounce the Roosevelt corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. Henceforth, Washington would be more guarded in the utilization of military diplomacy. President Hoover, consequently, repressed the urge to send the Marines into Panama and Haiti (1931), and El Salvador (1932) (Steward, 1980: 26). In 1933, Hoover withdrew all U.S. forces from Nicaragua.

This retreat from overt interventionism in Central America lasted beyond Hoover's administration. Later, it led the way to "the Good Neighbor policy" during President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration (Gardner, 1992: 32).

During the 1930s, isolationism, a term usually associated with American policy toward European affairs, was the word that best characterized both the political atmosphere and the policy trends of the decade. The U.S. government largely declined to use American troops in
hemispheric affairs, while the strange political bedpartners of communists, Lindburgh-Kennedy style fascist sympathizers, and the apathetic majority managed to forestall any U.S. intervention in Europe.

1947-1957: The Era of Containment

The ordeal of World War II, and the circumstances leading to it, tremendously reshaped the political landscape, especially with regard to American foreign policy. With victory, there was a renewed interest in how events beyond America's shoreline affected national security. This reassessment was fuelled by a number of factors. First among these factors was the belief by many in both government and the public that American non-involvement in European affairs had left the democracies no choice but appeasement, and that appeasement had necessarily led to war.

Second, throughout the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, U.S. policies were, as a practical matter, enforced by British naval power. World War II, however, brought this arrangement to an end. The United States, as the heir to the fallen Euro-centric order that had been dominant in world affairs since the Sixteenth Century, perceived the Soviet Union as "a distinctive challenge" to American goals in the post-war era.

Third, these suspicious views of the USSR's ambitions, especially when taken with hostile Soviet conduct in the
immediate post-war era, as well as the evil nature of Stalin himself, combined to become the what would be called the "Cold War;" an intense ideological competition between the superpowers. It was a challenge that American leaders were eager to take on (Gardner, 1992: 33).

A war-weary public supported the initial demobilization of U.S. forces that accompanied the immediate post-war period. This view had not changed substantially by the time the Greek Civil War erupted. President Truman, however, thought it important to stop the spread of communism; a threat that he believed, sooner or later, would more directly threaten the West if not halted in Greece. The result was the Truman Doctrine.

In a speech before Congress on March 12, 1947, Truman sought $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey in order to help those countries fend off communism. Truman justified his request by arguing: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The clear implication of the Truman Doctrine was that the Soviets needed to be contained within Eastern Europe. Although this policy was originally intended to simply apply to the defense of Western Europe, Truman made it clear that it could be applied in other regions where Communism threatened American interests (Woods and Jones, 1991: 145).
The first major expansion of the Truman Doctrine beyond Europe was not long delayed. In 1949, Chaing Kai-chek's Nationalist armies were defeated by Communist forces and driven off the mainland to Taiwan. This was a jolt to the United States. Congress, alarmed by the "loss" of China, became acutely concerned over the "rising Red tide" and what it perceived as its Soviet source.

On June 25, 1950, Communist North Korean forces stormed across the 38th parallel into South Korea. They rapidly captured Seoul, driving United States and South Korean forces back to the port city of Pusan. Until this invasion, Korea had not been perceived as a major strategic interest of the United States. The President, however, immediately invoked the Truman Doctrine and ordered American troops to repel the North Korean assault (Klare, 1992: 40). United Nations forces (about 90% American) under General Douglas McArthur counter-attacked at Inchon and swept the North Koreans up the peninsula to the Chinese border. With the success of the intervention there was broad support for the "liberation of Korea" (MacDonald, 1986: 57). However, much of this support dissipated with the entry of China into the conflict. The war eventually bogged down into a bloody stalemate and produced considerable public discontent in the U.S. In 1953, shortly after the election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, an
armistice was signed which ended the conflict. The result has been an enduring, if uneasy, peace on the peninsula.

President Eisenhower adopted a scaled-down defense posture, which relied to a great extent on the new doctrine of "massive retaliation," with its implied threat of resort to nuclear weapons, in order to discourage Soviet adventures in the Third World. Emphasis was placed on getting "more bang for the buck" from defense spending. As such, conventional military capabilities were reduced in favor of increased procurement of, and reliance on, nuclear weapons. This "New Look" defense saved money by cutting land forces and the surface fleet. Defense planning during this period was concerned primarily with the Soviet threat and as such really did not contemplate the need for force projection into the Third World until the late 1950s. Only at the end of President Eisenhower's tenure, "with the 1958 U.S. landing in Lebanon and the accompanying Eisenhower Doctrine (authorizing U.S. military action to prevent a communist takeover of Middle Eastern countries), did he envision a direct U.S. military role in regional, nonnuclear conflicts" (Klare, 1992: 40).

1957-1973: The Era of High Intervention

By the early 1960s, the Dullesian doctrine of Massive Retaliation was under attack. It was criticized as irresponsible in a nuclear age, as well as ineffective in fighting communist "liberation movements" in the Third
World. Therefore, after 1960, the Kennedy Administration sought a new doctrine that would not require engaging in brinkmanship as a response to all provocations, regardless of how small.

The solution to this policy dilemma was found in the doctrine of "flexible response." Its major advocate, General Maxwell Taylor, believed that, while the United States was in a position to deter a general war, it should be prepared to defeat smaller-scale, local aggression. Therefore, in order to provide a credible, realistic response to challenges arising in the Third World, there should be a significant expansion of U.S. conventional capabilities. This buildup would enable the president to choose from a wide variety of alternatives, ranging from nonnuclear to tactical nuclear options, the type of forces that would constitute the optimal response to any challenge (Kinnard, 1991: 42; Taylor, 1989: 206, 211, 214-215).

A key component of these expanded options was Kennedy's special emphasis on the creation of counter-insurgency forces to respond to communist challenges in the Third World. Modeled on the British experience in Malaya, counter-insurgency's central purpose was to thwart communist rebels by "winning the hearts and minds" of potentially receptive peasants, while energetically engaging the rebels themselves with direct military force. In the early 1960s, Kennedy found a laboratory where it
would be possible to try out these new ideas on low intensity warfare: Vietnam.

American interest in Indochina dated back to the early part of the Eisenhower administration. It was President Kennedy, however, who authorized a substantial increase in the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam. However, despite its initial role as a laboratory for newly developed weapons and counterinsurgency tactics, Vietnam rapidly generated its own inertia, becoming increasingly important as a symbol. "For, having designated Vietnam as a proving ground for counterinsurgency, it became essential for the United States to avoid defeat lest U.S. failure in Indochina encourage revolutionaries in other countries to undertake guerilla campaigns of their own" (Klare, 1992: 41-42).

There were also other international implications that developed along with such policy concerns. As George C. Herring points out in his America's Longest War, during the Johnson Administration, Vietnam evolved into a showcase of U.S. resolve and credibility to honor its security commitments to current and potential allies. Herring observed that "the United States intervened in Vietnam to block the apparent march of a Soviet-directed Communism across Asia, enlarged its commitment to halt a presumably expansionist Communist China, and eventually made Vietnam a
test of its determination to uphold world order" (Herring, 1986: 279).

The test of American resolve that Vietnam represented was fought on a scale unprecedented for an undeclared war/intervention. Although air sorties started earlier, the first American ground forces, two battalions of Marines, were landed at Danang in March 1965. Within a month, this number was increased to 40,000 (Herring, 1986: 131-132). At the peak of U.S. involvement, 543,000 service personnel were present in Vietnam (Lomperis, 1993: 82).

The style of combat ranged from guerilla/counterinsurgency to strategic bombing to conventional warfare. Although U.S. forces never lost a major engagement against the enemy (even the 1968 Tet offensive was a U.S. military victory), by the early 1970s the situation was had become a stalemate. American troops maintained their secure points, yet were unable to fully stop communist activity in the countryside or traffic along the Ho Chi Minh trail (Herring, 1986: 191). The cost, however, was staggering. Between 1969 and 1973, 20,553 American soldiers were killed (Herring, 1986: 256).

While U.S. troops were able to fend off communist forces, the South Vietnamese regime was largely ineffective in its efforts to engender any degree of internal efficiency of operation or loyalty from its populace. South Vietnamese government was a succession of dictators and
military strongmen. Governmental infrastructure was rife with corruption. The United States, utilizing techniques covering the range from quiet diplomacy to outright involvement in a coup d'état (President Diem was deposed by a U.S.-backed coup in 1963), sought to transform the Saigon regime so that the "democracy" in the South that Americans were dying for would, in fact, exist (Herring, 1986: 69-70, 77, 84, 105-107). Unfortunately, U.S. efforts at "nation-building" in Vietnam ultimately met with failure. Transformation of the political system, if it were to come at all, was going to have to be organic. It never materialized.

President Nixon, tiring of both criticism and long casualty lists, in 1969 started the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces. This policy, called "Vietnamization," was designed to shift the brunt of the fighting (and casualties) from U.S. forces to the South Vietnamese Army. By 1972, Nixon had withdrawn all but 25,000 American soldiers. The effect was a dramatic reduction in the number of casualties (Lomperis, 1993: 82).

Faced with clear evidence that U.S. intervention had long since reached a point of greatly diminished returns, the Nixon Administration entered into negotiations to end the conflict. The result was the 1973 Paris Peace Treaty. As Herring observes:

Only by the most narrow definition can the agreement be said to have constituted "peace with
honor." It permitted American extrication from
the war and secured the return of the POWs, while
leaving the (Saigon) government intact, at least
for the moment. On the other hand, North
Vietnamese troops remained in the South and the
(communist rebels were) accorded a position of
status. The major question over which the war had
been fought - the political future of South
Vietnam - was left to be resolved later (emphasis

For all of the parties concerned, such "peace with
honor" came at a very high price indeed. Although the U.S.
was not nearly as damaged by the conflict as was Vietnam,
the cost was nevertheless enormous. Total war dead for the
American side was a staggering 58,000. Furthermore, "the
war polarized the American people and poisoned the
political atmosphere as had no issue since slavery a
century before. Although Nixon had held out for peace with
honor in order to maintain America's position in the world,
the United States emerged from the war with its image
considerably tarnished abroad and its people weary of
international involvement" (Herring, 1986: 256).

1973-1980: Neo-Isolationism

To many Americans, both in Congress and the public-at-
large, Vietnam was a traumatic experience. This eleven year
debacle was America's longest military conflict, and her
first defeat. Regardless of their political persuasion,
Americans seemed to agree that the war and its outcome were
"the politicians' fault." Liberals, for example, argued
that President Kennedy was mistaken in involving the U.S.
in a land war in Asia. Furthermore, some of those on the
left believed that President Nixon had sinister motives behind his escalation of the conflict, especially the Christmas bombing campaign of 1971-72 and the invasion of Cambodia. Conservatives, on the other hand, argued that President Johnson had compelled U.S. forces to "fight with one arm tied behind their back" because of his rigid rules of engagement and his refusal to carry the ground war into the communist North.

What both camps had in common were concerns about alleged executive blundering and its root cause: an "imperial presidency." In this style of leadership, the executive could commit U.S. forces indefinitely under the aegis of the constitutionally ordained power as commander-in-chief, thus bypassing Congress and the need for a formal declaration of war. As a result, "U.S. citizens and policymakers sought to prevent any repetition of such a fiasco by imposing a number of important restrictions on U.S. military involvement in regional Third World conflicts. These restraints, inspired by the 'Vietnam Syndrome' - a clear and pervasive reluctance on the part of American citizens to support U.S. intervention in local, Third World conflicts - included the abandonment of conscription, a substantial reduction in U.S. military aid to unstable Third World governments, and, under the War Powers Act of 1973, a legislative ban on the extended
deployment (without congressional approval) of U.S. troops abroad" (Klare, 1992: 42-43).

During the administration of Gerald Ford (1974-1977), this retreat from direct involvement in Third World conflict became more pronounced. Except for the insertion of U.S. Marines into Cambodia to liberate the USS Mayaguez and her crew from their Khmer Rouge captors in 1975, there was no direct American military intervention in the Third World. However, covert action continued as the U.S. attempted to curb Soviet and Cuban adventures in the Third World, particularly in Africa.

In the Angolan Civil War (1975-1976) Washington supplied the pro-Western National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Covert aid was supplied by the CIA which used friendly countries in the region, primarily Zaire, as conduits through which arms and supplies could flow. The timing of this aid, however, was historically unfortunate. The first year of major U.S. covert aid, 1975, was only two years after the American withdrawal from Vietnam. Angola was a "far away" war, involving people Americans knew, or cared, little about. This fact, as well as its appearance to many to be a conflict that had no end in sight, made the situation in Angola appear to many to be a "second Vietnam." Because of the powerful hold that the then-newly emergent "Vietnam
Syndrome had on the American psyche, it was politically impossible to help UNITA to the extent that the Ford Administration wanted to" (Hyland, 1987: 15).

Consequently, congressional opposition increased with each passing day. This culminated with the passage of the Clark Amendment in 1975. By a margin of 55 to 22, the Senate voted to cut off funds for the CIA Task Force on Angola. It would be another five years before the U.S. would undertake another such covert operation (Bridgeland, 1986: 155).

The Carter Administration was largely a period of isolation from intervention in Third World conflicts. However, as a result of Soviet aid and/or Cuban intervention, both direct and indirect, the list of what Washington often viewed as new Soviet client states expanded with breathtaking swiftness. Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua were among the more prominent of the new allies that Moscow gathered during this period of U.S. inaction in the 1970s.

Eventually, the Carter Administration came to the realization that a post-Vietnam reassessment of U.S. foreign and military policy was needed. In 1979, against a backdrop of the fall of two American clients, Anastasio Samoza in Nicaragua and the Shah of Iran, the National Security Council concluded that the time had come to reassert American power and influence in the global arena.
This new interventionist consensus was converted, in June 1979, into new programs by several key presidential decisions. These initiatives included: "a commitment to the use of U.S military power to protect key economic resources in the Third World (especially oil); the activation of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), an assortment of units from all four military services earmarked for intervention in the Third World; the acquisition of new basing rights in the Indian Ocean area (Notably in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia); and the permanent deployment of a carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean" (Klare, 1992: 45). None of these initiatives was announced until the 1980 State of the Union message. Circumstances at that time, however, would give that speech far greater importance than anyone ever anticipated.


On Christmas Day 1979, Soviet paratrooper and special forces seized the airport, as well as several other strategic locations in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. After executing the Afghan leader, Hafezullah Amin, the Soviets installed the more reliable Babrak Karmal as a puppet-dictator. Immediately, Soviet forces were "invited" by the Kabul regime to "help" it suppress an increasingly successful uprising by anti-communist tribesmen. Soviet troops poured across the border, secured the major cities and engaged rebel forces throughout the country.
In his 1980 State of the Union address, President Carter devoted most of the text to foreign policy and defense concerns. He outlined a number of responses to the Afghanistan crisis. Among these measures: (1) the U.S. would impose an embargo on the export of grain to the USSR, (2) Washington would curtail sales of high technology items to Moscow, and (3) the U.S. would plan on boycotting the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics (Goldman, 1994: 19).

The most important part of the speech, however, reflected Carter’s concern that Afghanistan was possibly a prelude to a drive to dominate the Persian Gulf area whether by further destabilizing Iran (where U.S. embassy personnel were in their third month of captivity by the Khomeini regime) or by an attempt at military intimidation of Gulf States, if not outright conquest. "In this address, Carter affirmed Washington's readiness to use military force in protecting the oil flow from the Persian Gulf" (Klare, 1992: 45). Articulating what would instantly be dubbed the "Carter Doctrine," the President declared:

Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force (New York Times, January 24, 1980, text of Carter address).

To this day, this policy continues to serve as the rationale for American military activity in the Persian Gulf area.
On April 24, 1980, in his only "major" combat deployment of U.S. armed forces, President Carter sent a commando team into southeastern Iran in an attempt to rescue U.S. embassy personnel being held hostage by the Islamic fundamentalist theocracy in Teheran (Tower, 1987: 157). Although ambitious, the plan was poorly executed. "Desert One" resulted in eight Americans killed, much equipment destroyed (including a C-130 transport) and abandoned, and an enormous embarrassment for the United States in general, President Carter in particular (Daggett, 1992: 203). To the public this episode seemed to underscore conservative charges that Carter had, at the least, neglected the maintenance of American military power and called into question whether the U.S. was capable of projecting force in defense of her vital national interests.

Popular concern over both the fate of the hostages in Iran and the general decline of U.S. power and prestige loomed large in the 1980 elections. A renewed buildup of the armed forces and a resolve to use them were major themes of the victorious Reagan campaign. Once in office, the new President wasted no time in keeping his campaign promises.

In 1981, President Reagan initiated what would become a $2 trillion military build-up. Under this program, the highest priority was given to the development of expanded
force projection capabilities. The focus of these enhancements centered on elite army Special Forces units, the navy's carrier and amphibious fleets, and the air force's long-range airlift capacity (Klare, 1992: 45).

The Reagan military build-up was accompanied by a more aggressive foreign policy posture, especially toward the Soviet Union and its communist/left-wing clients. To Reagan, the USSR was an "evil empire," based on a sinister ideology: communism. In Reagan's eyes, it was clear that Moscow desired to spread communism by destabilizing free, or at least pro-Western, governments. The Soviets were viewed, therefore, as at least indirectly behind the terrorism threatening the West and "revolutionary" upheaval in the Third World (Klare, 1992: 50).

In order to counter the Soviet threat to Europe, the U.S. deployed a new generation of Pershing and Cruise missiles. However, blunting the communist advances in the Third World was going to be considerably more difficult, given the then-still pervasive Vietnam Syndrome which placed a practical limitation on the use of direct U.S. force under such circumstances.

Given the limited options available, President Reagan decided that perhaps the most effective way to engage the Soviets and their clients was to pursue a strategy similar to that which Moscow had long-used to its own advantage: find a revolutionary group to back with both arms and money
in an attempt to undermine, and press claims against, the incumbent Marxist government.

The ideological justification for this policy found its expression in what came to be known as the "Reagan Doctrine." Its theme was simple: America is the leader of the free world, and as such she must protect freedom where it exists and spread freedom to where it does not. As a practical issue, the Reagan Doctrine was this: "the U.S. is prepared to help others protect or restore their freedom and independence, but not to assume responsibility for the task" (emphasis added) (Kirkpatrick, 1985: 12). The object was to help Third World peoples stop communism by aiding, with both arms and money, viable anti-Marxist rebel movements in a given country. As opposed to the traditional Cold War doctrine of "we will do it for you," as was the case in Vietnam, the Reagan Doctrine asserted "we will help you to do it, but if you want freedom, you must fight for it yourselves" (Kirkpatrick, 1985: 14). The U.S. was willing to give financial aid and military support, but would not commit U.S. forces. Under the auspices of the Reagan Doctrine, U.S. aid was given to anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and after the 1985 repeal of the Clark Amendment, Angola.

President Reagan's use of direct force as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy also expanded. "Often disregarding the cautionary advice of his military
advisors, Reagan deployed U.S. troops and advisors to Central America (El Salvador), Grenada, and Lebanon, authorized air strikes against Libya, and sent a powerful naval fleet into the Persian Gulf" (Klare, 1992: 46). This conspicuous readiness, on the part of the Reagan Administration, to use force in overseas conflict situations seemed designed to send two distinct messages. The first, intended for the American people, was that the U.S. needed to reaffirm its leadership of the Free World and in doing so begin to put the legacy of Vietnam behind. The second, intended for other countries, friend or foe alike, was that the U.S. was now ready to reassert itself in the global arena and would actively pursue its interests whatever and wherever they may be.

In a 1984 speech at the National Press Club, Reagan's Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger articulated guidelines under which he believed U.S. uses of direct military forces should be conducted. Weinberger argued that American forces should be utilized only in defense of "vital" interests. If a situation were sufficiently important to warrant intervention, then the troops must be sent "with the clear intention of winning." Furthermore, American forces should utilized in pursuit of "clearly defined political and military objectives." Consequently, troop deployment should be limited to the levels necessary to achieve those objectives. Moreover, there must be "some
reasonable assurance" of popular support for such action. Finally, "the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort" (Carpenter, 1992: 158).

Weinberger's guidelines governed American military intervention during the Reagan years (even if such force was not always used as a last resort). There is evidence that the Bush Administration was equally mindful of these caveats on the use of American military power (Carpenter, 1992: 158). However, these principles were developed at the height of what some referred to as "Cold War II," the renewed hostility between the superpowers that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Rooted as they were in an assumption that potential adversaries would have the backing of a hostile superpower, it remained to be seen whether these principles would retain their relevance in the post-Cold War era. As a practical matter, the Cold War ended with the success of the "Velvet Revolutions" that swept Eastern Europe in 1989. With the 1991 demise of the USSR, the United States became more free to dedicate greater emphasis, and resources, to the protection of its interests in the Third World. While Secretary Weinberger's guidelines showed considerable insight, they are still quite general in nature. To develop specific pre-conditions that would tend to favor the success of U.S. military intervention is a task that, until now, has yet to be
undertaken. The specification of such criteria is the task of the next chapter.
CHAPTER III

A TYPOLOGY OF PRECONDITIONS FAVORING THE SUCCESS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Intervention Defined

To the practitioner of political science, the clarity of terms is important. Words are his tools, so their precise use is essential. The term "intervention" is one that is particularly troublesome to pin down. Its meaning dramatically shifts depending upon the context of use. Eight common uses of this term in a political context may be identified.

1. In general terms, intervention can be defined as the involvement, by whatever means, of one state in the domestic affairs of another state.

2. The term may also be used to denote the entry of a previously uninvolved party into a conflict between states.

   More specifically, the practice of intervention, in this century, has added several connotations to this elusive term, almost all of which carry the implication of the use of armed force. Arranging them in a spectrum of least-to-most violent, we have:

3. Diplomatic Intervention: This idea in turn has two variants. On the benign side, this is involvement of the good offices of the diplomatic corps of a nation, acting as an arbitrator or a mediator, to end a conflict either
between or within states. For example, in the 1970s, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attempted, through "shuttle diplomacy," to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1994 he again attempted to use his stature as a respected diplomat to end violent conflict between loyalists of the African National Congress (ANC) and Inkatha Party in South Africa in the period immediately before the post-apartheid founding elections in April 1994.

However, diplomatic intervention is not without its more aggressive, or intrusive, side. In an effort to get China to adhere to humane standards of human rights conduct, the Clinton Administration dispatched Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Beijing. Armed with evidence that much of China's exports to the U.S. were manufactured with forced labor, Christopher warned Communist authorities that continued flouting of human rights would result in the loss of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status with the United States. Furthermore, Clinton also endeavored to use diplomatic means to get North Korea to curtail its nuclear program, specifically to abandon further nuclear weapons development, as envisioned by the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

4. Economic Intervention: this entails the use of economic tools (often called "sanctions") by one state to compel a change in the position and/or actions of another state (Elliott, 1992: 97). A prominent example of this was
President Carter's 1980 imposition of an embargo on grain exports to the Soviet Union. Undertaken in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter sought to use the embargo as a means of showing that "business as usual" could not be conducted with Moscow under the circumstances at that time. The policy was undercut when Australia, Argentina, and France opportunistically filled in the void created by the U.S. abandonment of its market share.

In 1986 economic sanctions were also placed by the U.S. Congress on South Africa in an effort to persuade Pretoria to dismantle its apartheid laws. The Clinton Administration also placed minor economic sanctions on Taiwan in order to encourage Taipei to restrain its citizens who were trafficking in poached tigers and other endangered species. This is believed to be the first time that such measures have been used to advance purely conservationist goals.

5. Covert Intervention: this connotation is primarily, but not limited to, the use by a state of its intelligence agents to undermine the government of, or change the political situation in, another country (Ransom, 1992: 113). Considerable evidence exists that in 1973, President Nixon ordered the CIA to destabilize, and then assist the Chilean military to overthrow, the Marxist-oriented, yet democratically elected government of President Salvadore Allende. According to some reports, another instance
occurred when the CIA had printed, and distributed, a large quantity of counterfeit Iraqi currency shortly before the 1991 Gulf War, so as to destabilize Iraq's economy and to stir up popular discontent against dictator Saddam Hussein.

6. Coercive Diplomacy: this is more fully explored in Chapter I, but for our purposes here, it may be defined as the credible threat (perhaps underscored by the pre-positioning of military units) to utilize force for the purpose of deterring an adversary from a course of action (deterrence), or to undo an action already undertaken (compellence). As Schelling notes: "coercion depends more on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage already done" (Schelling, 1966: 172).

This was the purpose behind 1990-1991's "Operation Desert Shield." Following Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. and its coalition allies deployed their forces in a defensive perimeter which paralleled the Iraq-Saudi Arabia frontier. This operation was an effort to deter Iraq from advancing farther into the Persian Gulf oil fields; it was also intended to pre-position the forces and supplies necessary to dislodge Iraqi occupation forces from Kuwait, in the event that diplomacy and sanctions failed to do so (as proved to be the case early in 1991).

7. Low Intensity Warfare: this is also referred to as "coercion by proxy." It often involves, but need not be limited to, the utilization by an outside power of a pre-
existing rebel group within a country in order to attain the redress of grievances against, and/or the overthrow of, the incumbent government (Antizzo, 1992: 11).

Fearful of the geostrategic implications of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, under President Carter the United States undertook to utilize the CIA to aid covertly (and later overtly) Islamic rebels who were fighting both the army of the Communist government, as well as Soviet occupation forces (Schraeder, 1992: 137-8). Although they did not necessarily share the same ultimate goals (the rebels sought the overthrow of the communist government, while the U.S. simply desired the withdrawal of Soviet troops that were so close to the Persian Gulf and to allies in the region, such as Pakistan) the U.S. and the rebels enjoyed a nearly decade-long marriage of convenience, wherein Washington supplied the arms and money and the rebels supplied the manpower. The 1989 withdrawal of Soviet forces, resulting in the political mellowing of the Kabul regime, fulfilled U.S. objectives, and aid to rebel forces was terminated shortly afterward.

This pattern was repeated in Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia (Schraeder, 1992: 141-149), where officials in Washington thought that they could utilize pre-existing rebel groups both to press claims against hostile governments and simultaneously to counter Soviet abilities to protect its clients.
8. Direct Military Intervention: this has evolved into three distinct subgroupings: active, reactive, and peacekeeping/order-restoring operations.

Active — This occurs when forces of an outside power intervene directly and forcefully in order to seek to engage and defeat enemy forces. This was the case when the United States intervened openly, and in some cases massively, in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, and the Persian Gulf area.

Reactive — In this form of military intervention, forces of the intervening power establish a security zone within another state's territory and seek to enforce its rules upon the "host" country within the zone. An example was the "no-fly" zones that the United Nations established in Iraq and that NATO tried to enforce in Bosnia. It is also illustrated by the security zone that Israel established earlier in south Lebanon.

Peacekeeping/Restore Order -- This occurs when forces of the intervening power (or powers) get involved out of largely, but not exclusively, humanitarian concerns. Such operations often involve separating belligerents, distributing food and medical supplies to civilians, establishing "zones of safety," and building new, viable structures of state. Examples of this include American and/or UN interventionism in

As this review has demonstrated, a great variety of shades of meaning for the term intervention exists. For the purposes of this study, we will be concerned specifically with direct military intervention (#8 above), dealing with any other forms only as they relate to the cases being utilized.

This limitation of our discussion to direct military intervention seems justified for a number of reasons, not the least of which are personal interest and a desire to fit this work into a single volume. First and foremost, with the collapse of the Soviet Union there seems to be an increased reliance by the United States on the use of such direct force. Nowhere was this renewed enthusiasm for military options more evident than in the adoption of an uncharacteristically hawkish stance with regard to Haiti by the uniformly liberal Congressional Black Caucus. Second, while other forms of intervention (e.g. economic sanctions) still have their place in the American arsenal of options, it is evident that an increasing number of dictators will respond only to military force. Whether this is due to their ability to insulate themselves from the effects of such sanctions, their fear that backing down in a confrontation with the U.S. would result in a loss of
face that would threaten their hold on power, simple
callousness, or possibly failure to comprehend their own
interests, tyrants in the post-Cold War era seem
increasingly intransigent and unresponsive to lesser forms
of intervention.

Finally, as noted earlier, there is a dearth of
literature identifying and examining those preconditions
favoring the success of direct military intervention.
Because of the advance preparations, as well as the heavy
investment of both military personnel and material,
required to undertake such operations, greater attention to
the preconditions for successful intervention is a matter
of great urgency and priority.

**Hypothesis and Expected Findings**

It is difficult to believe that there necessarily
exists any "science of war" that yields rules which, when
followed, automatically guarantee victory. However, when
experience with intervention is carefully examined
regularities emerge. The record of interventions carried
out in recent history demonstrates that, when certain
preconditions are present, military operations quite
clearly tend to be more successful than when such
preconditions are absent.

The demise of the Cold War was an important turning
point, not only in East-West relations, but no less because
of its implications for the pre-conditions that will affect
future intervention by the United States in the Third World. On one hand, Washington is now substantially less fearful that its direct intervention will be met by counter-intervention by another superpower. The chance that global war between great powers would result is no longer a risk. On the other hand, now freed of a need to respond to all Third World crises reflexively lest Moscow gain additional strategic footholds, the United States now has the luxury to be more selective in where it chooses to intervene. However, does the absence of a great power rival with a comparable ability to project force abroad subject Washington to greater temptation to give in to future opportunities for intervention? This question is especially pertinent because for the foreseeable future there will be no other power able, or willing to oppose American action. Considering the United States' post-Cold War military involvement in places as varied as Panama, Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, a preliminary answer would seem to be "yes" (Carpenter, 1992: 157-8).

Clearly, there is a greater potential for American intervention in the post-Cold War era. This potential, taken with the aforementioned circumstances, seems to differentiate the nature of such military involvement today from earlier, pre-1989 forms. Therefore, the specification of pre-conditions favoring the success of interventionist behavior acquires even greater importance. With this in
mind, it may be anticipated that this study will find that the following existing preconditions tend to be associated with successful interventions in the post-Cold War era:  

1. **A clear and attainable goal of U.S. policy exists.**  

   This can be defined, for purposes of this study, as a goal which is clearly and specifically articulated by political and/or military leaders (e.g. to capture General Noriega, to liberate Kuwait). The goal has clear criteria which, once met, signals the time for the termination of interventionist action. By "attainable," it is meant that the goal does not require indefinite or ongoing military action for its fulfillment. For example a major factor leading to the failure of American policy in Vietnam was the seeming inability of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations to articulate such goals, even as the war proceeded. The questions asked both on Capital Hill and within the general public were "Why are we there?," and "What are our sons dying for?" Such questions were never satisfactorily answered by executive policymakers.  

   An ancillary concern is whether the political leadership of the intervening power has established an "exit policy," based on such proclaimed goals. It has become clear that the public is weary of open-ended commitments to be assumed by their sons and daughters abroad. In order to placate and hold the support of public opinion, silence congressional and media critics, and
maintain his own clarity of purpose, the president and his advisors at some point need to formulate a timetable for the withdrawal of American forces. This schedule can be derived either by chronology (e.g. "the troops will be home by Christmas") or by circumstances (e.g. "the troops will be withdrawn when order is restored").

2. **The intervention is not a peacekeeping operation.**

Peacekeeping operations, by their very nature, require an ongoing, open-ended commitment of U.S. forces. This reality has the potential of becoming a quagmire from which the United States is unable to extricate itself. To a significant degree, this danger derives from "peacekeeping's" overall lack of strategic objectives, as well as nebulously defined goals which largely defy measurement or exactitude. In general terms, how does one know when "peace" has actually been achieved within a particular society, meaning that military intervention is no longer needed? More to the point perhaps, in volatile and conflict-prone societies such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Haiti, how does one know what "peace" really is?

Furthermore, experience has shown that in order to be successful, peacekeeping operations require tremendous restraint. For example, on several occasions American troops used for such purposes have either been too lightly armed or worse, not armed at all. The latter was the case in Lebanon (1983), for example, when U.S. forces were
issued guns but not allowed to load them. Their lightly
defended compound/barracks at the Beirut airport made the
Marines stationed there "sitting ducks." This point was
underscored when the barracks were car-bombed by an Islamic
fundamentalist faction. Shortly afterwards, U.S. forces
were recalled and the Reagan Administration was taken
strongly to task by Congress for the misadventure.

3. The intervention is not a humanitarian mission within a
war zone.

Despite the most noble of intentions, humanitarian
interventionism often goes awry. For instance, in a
laudable pursuit of relieving privation in a foreign
society, an intervening nation is often confronted with a
problem that it did not originally foresee: the temptation
to deal with what it sees as the "root cause" (or causes)
of the problem. Since this "root cause" is often perceived
in the final analysis to be political, the result can be
that, deliberately or undeliberately, the intervening power
takes sides in what is essentially a tribal or civil war.
This development, in turn, clearly undercuts the
intervening power's credibility as a "disinterested"
humanitarian provider of relief, as well as dragging it
deeper into a conflict that it neither wanted nor was
prepared to resolve.

A valid question to be asked of operations of this
kind is: "How do such humanitarian operations advance the
intervener's interests?" What advantage accrues to the
nation engaged in interventionism, making it worth the risk of lives and the expense involved? Are not private relief agencies sometimes better suited to provide such relief? Alternatively, if relief distribution is being interfered with by marauding paramilitary units within the society, would the problem not be better dealt with by relying on military protection provided by neighboring states more directly threatened by the instability in the target nation? Finally, how is the success, and thus point of termination, of such operations determined?

4. United States forces are not subject to a multilateral authority.

Great powers in general, and the United States in particular, are fearful of being labeled "imperialist," regardless of the lack of substance of the charge. Frequently, unilateral military action seems in the eyes of critics to be de facto proof of such imperialistic intent. Therefore, for its part the United States often seems to seek multilateral backing for its large military interventions as a means of acquiring a "fig leaf." That is to say that there is often an attempt to rely on or exploit multilateralism as a means of the legitimating, and deflecting criticism from, the use of military force by great powers. This was clearly the case, for example, in 1950, when the United States sought, and was granted, United Nations sponsorship for its intervention in Korea. Essentially, the conflict was a United States war effort
(over 90% of the troops were American, with the whole operation always under a U.S. commander) under the UN flag, and this fact was satisfactory to Washington.

Yet over the last forty years, the UN has become increasingly unresponsive to American wishes. By the end of the Cold War the UN was more able to assert its own wishes and goals when giving its authority in behalf of such military enterprises. While U.S. commanders might still enjoy some considerable discretion on the battlefield, the scope of such discretion has gradually been eroded. A cursory glance at such operations seems to indicate that in recent years the UN Secretary General has become increasingly involved in the micro-management of conflicts that involve UN forces. For example, it had been argued by members of the Senate that UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, by declaring Somali General Aidid a war criminal and authorizing his capture by UN forces, had effectively "hijacked" U.S. foreign policy by forcing Washington to take sides in the fighting among Somali warlords and factions. Because of UN mandates, American forces engaged in interventionism may be effectively beyond the control of their Commander-in-Chief. The result is that such mandates for the use of force, even if initiated by Washington, may be exploited by the United Nations as a way of securing maximum American participation, with a minimum of U.S. control over the operation once it has commenced.
Because they are subject to the scrutiny and approval of the member nations, United Nations "use of force" authorizations may present additional problems. Specifically, the mandate may be so narrow that the military action taken treats only the symptoms, and not the cause, of the society's problems. As a result, Washington may find that it has its "hands tied" politically: it is unable to take the action that its leaders deem necessary to resolve fully the situation that led to intervention initially. During the 1991 Gulf War, for example, U.S. Army General Norman Schwartzkopf believed that his forces could have marched on Baghdad virtually unopposed and unseated the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. However, President George Bush stopped military action early in the ground campaign, justifying his action by citing the U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force. Bush noted that the mandate was for the sole purpose of expelling Iraqi occupation forces from Kuwait and nothing more. Congressman Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) warned that because this premature termination of the war allowed Hussein to retain power and prevented America from rooting out and destroying all Scud missiles and centers for the development (and stockpiles) of chemical and biological weapons, it was a virtual certainty that the United States will have to return to "finish the job" in the near future.
5. **Force is used to defend tangible assets or other vital national interests.**

A definition of "vital national interests," as used in our analysis is required. For our purposes it can be conceived as any asset (e.g. oil), place (e.g. Europe) or principle (e.g. the freedom of navigation in international waters) the unavailability of which places a state at a strategic or severe diplomatic disadvantage, if not directly threatening its independence and/or national security. The most enduring legacy of the Vietnam War is the universally held belief among Americans that as a nation they are no longer willing to sacrifice lives lightly for goals of dubious value (such as "nation-building"). Today, however, there is little debate that the defense of some assets, of which oil is one of the most important, is worth the commitment of forces, when necessary.

It is clear that the defense of important assets such as oil or strategic "choke points," such as the Panama Canal, the North Atlantic sea lanes and the Straits of Hormuz, is a priority for the U.S. The importance of such assets to the national health, and perhaps to the very survival of the nation, acts as not only a powerful motivator to action, but also presents clear goals for policy makers and military planners.
6. **The political situation in the target country is not one of civil war.**

This pre-condition requires answers for several questions that speak to the issue of regime legitimacy. Among these questions are: Is the government that the U.S. proposes to support viable? Does it have the support of the population that it purports to govern, and if so, are the people willing to fight to defend it? Is U.S. support necessary to turn the tide of battle decisively in the favor of the government it is supporting or is such intervention merely a prop which is delaying the inevitable collapse of the client regime? If the U.S. were to enter the conflict, would it, during battle, be able to distinguish "hostiles" from "friendlies?" Would American soldiers be able to distinguish successfully combatants from non-combatants, or would the line between them be obscured, as was often the case in Vietnam? If most of the answers to these questions are in the negative, then this is probably the type of conflict that is likely to become a quagmire from which Washington will find it increasingly difficult to extricate American forces.

7. **There is a strong probability of public support for intervention, or at least indifference.**

As was demonstrated during the Vietnam War, basic differences within public opinion may lead to official indecision regarding the war effort. Attempts to rectify this situation by efforts to balance interests (e.g.
purchasing support for Vietnam with Great Society programs) may lead to the war effort's being held hostage to domestic concerns. Furthermore, the emergence of significant protest may present two additional problems. First, it may convey to the opponent that there is sufficient discontent within American public opinion so that threats made by the president need not be taken seriously. Second, there is the real chance that the opponent may seek to exploit the domestic situation in the United States for its own propaganda purposes.

In an earlier era, the absence of overt opposition to interventionism could be interpreted by the chief executive as a kind of tacit support for the action, on the theory that: "if no one is complaining, then it must be all right". However, in this newer age of electronic media, especially with such sophisticated news organizations as CNN that broadcast 24 hours a day, a commitment of direct U.S. force on any scale is most unlikely to escape media, and thus public, scrutiny as might have been the case earlier.

Even today, however, it may be possible to present the public with a faux accompli, especially if the interventionist operation is narrow or limited in scope. For example, in the case of the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the operation was well underway before the public ever became aware of it. The mission was complete before
any organized opposition could challenge it, and protest was largely limited to a handful of college campuses. Similarly, it is not inconceivable that the president can bypass congressional opposition by commencing an operation while Congress is in recess.

Nevertheless, as a general rule, it may be impossible to overestimate the power of the media in shaping public opinion either for, or against, particular interventions. Because of the emotional power of the images beamed into living rooms across the country, television especially can be decisive in determining whether intervention will be pursued as a policy option. On the one hand, television may present pictures so horrifying and/or pathos-evoking that the state is dragged by public outcry into a conflict that leaders wish to avoid. Comparable considerations led to pressure brought to bear on Washington to get involved in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti.

On the other hand, stories and/or pictures of extensive carnage (especially if it comes from a "least developed" country) may so horrify the public that intervention is made more difficult. The people may become afraid of getting deeply involved in a situation that may become a morass for intervening forces. Despite stories and pictures of the genocide taking place in Cambodia after the communist victory there in 1975, for example, the American people were loath to do anything about it. This also
appeared to be the case with public opinion toward possible involvement in Rwanda and Liberia.

8. **The proposed intervention has the support of the military leadership.**

Support of the military, as usually manifested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is a necessity for two reasons. First, it generally signals that the military has been able to formulate several possible military options, capable of bringing military power to bear in pursuit of the proposed objective. Second, the military is generally much more cautious in urging the president to use force than critics of the military establishment often imagine. Such an endorsement would, therefore, seem to indicate a strong probability of success, as assessed by those who study and engage in warfare as a career.

9. **A willingness exists to support forces in the field.**

During the debate in Congress over the authorization of the use of force, which resulted in the 1991 de facto declaration of war on Iraq, opponents of the measure went to great pains to emphasize that once hostilities commenced, they would vote to see to it that American forces were given everything needed in order to ensure a rapid and complete victory. This position may have been due to sensitivity in Congress over charges that it was the "politicians" who lost the war in Vietnam. Clearly, throughout the Persian Gulf crisis, there was a desire by congressional liberals to avoid being seen as somewhat less
than patriotic in a time of crisis. However, most members of Congress contended that such a position was not taken for reasons of political opportunism, but stemmed from the need to convince the enemy that America was unified and that legislative support for President Bush's policy was not to be underestimated.

Such a show of unity is important not only to preserve high morale both among the troops and the general public, but it is also an influential propaganda tool that may unnerve actual or potential adversaries.

On a more practical level, if they are to accomplish their mission, the armed forces must be adequately supplied. There must, therefore, be a commitment to provide the troops with what they need when they need it. As one illustration of the principle, in Somalia, Secretary of Defense Aspin's rebuff of a field commander's request for additional armor seems to have lead to the military defeat of a company of U.S. Army troops. This defeat appears to have emboldened the Somali warlords as well as prompting a movement at home seeking the sudden recall of U.S. forces similar to the public outcry that followed the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983.

10. A recognition must exist that air strikes alone may not be sufficient to accomplish the policy goals established.

Since the 1980s, the military option of choice has normally been the use of air strikes, usually carried out...
by carrier based F-14s. This is largely because such missions require a minimum of preparation and entail a low level of risk. Due to the incredible accuracy and destructive power that "smart bombs" and cruise missiles possess, thus revolutionizing conventional air warfare, the term "surgical air strike" has acquired renewed relevance in the layman's military lexicon. Video presentations of the apparent success of such weapons, especially in the Persian Gulf War, seems to have solidified the appeal of air strikes among the military options available to political leaders. A recent example of this appears to be the rapidity with which the Clinton Administration chose to publicly threaten Bosnian Serb forces with NATO air strikes if they fired on U.N. peacekeeping forces.

However, it should be clearly evident that air power is not without its limitations. First, often certain targets, such as Scud missiles in Iraq or artillery pieces in Bosnia, are highly mobile. Given the propensity of American leaders to give warnings before bombings, often the weapons are moved out of harm's way before they are in danger. Any personnel or material left behind either can be camouflaged so as to avoid detection or placed into hardened bunkers so as to heighten their survivability. Iraq also made skillful use of decoy Scud launchers so as to divert U.S., British, and French bombers from their true targets.
Second, often the situation on the ground requires the introduction of ground forces in order to "clear and claim" a disputed area or asset. For example, even after a withering two-month air war, it still was necessary to launch a ground offensive to drive the Iraqi occupation army from Kuwait in 1991.

Third, air strikes are not without propaganda value to the enemy. At the least, because of their destructiveness (often against civilians) they can be used to rally support around an otherwise unpopular ruler and thus harden the enemy's resolve to resist. They can also be used in an attempt to rally international public opinion against the intervening power. Perhaps the most famous example of this was the Iraqi protest of the bombing of a "baby formula" plant in Baghdad by U.S. forces during the 1991 conflict.

Once American armed forces have been committed abroad, certain other requirements must be met if they are to accomplish their mission:

11. **A willingness exists to utilize ground forces if necessary.**

Since this issue is largely discussed above, let it suffice to say here that to preclude specifically the use of ground forces before an operation begins is to give what may be a decisive advantage to the enemy. The enemy knows at once that there are limits upon how much force the intervening power is willing to commit in order to
accomplish its objectives; and thus, the opponent can tailor his strategy of resistance accordingly.

12. The war is limited in geographic scope.

Most of the armed conflicts being fought today can be described as civil warfare. If such hatred-fuelled conflicts can be said to have a "good" side, it is that they rarely seem to become broadened in scope by "spilling-over" international boundaries.

Greater care must be taken if the intervention being considered is international, that is between states (as opposed to civil war). If, for example, the region concerned is perceived by other major powers to be strategically important, the chance of counter-intervention, either by neighboring countries or other outside powers, will almost certainly rise dramatically. This prospect was a fear leading to the Carter Doctrine (1980) which was a clear warning to the USSR that if it attempted to move beyond Afghanistan into the Persian Gulf area, Washington would consider this a direct threat to its vital interests.

Finally, prudence must be used in attempting to intervene in nations bordering other great powers. The nature, scope, and intensity of the Korean War changed dramatically from Washington's original expectations when the People's Republic of China believed its vital interests were jeopardized and counter-intervened.
13. **There is a willingness by officials in Washington to commit adequate forces to accomplish the established goals.**

This speaks to the scale of the intervention. Are the number and nature of the troops being utilized sufficient to complete the job asked of them in a timely manner? Much of the discussion concerning the point was covered in points 9, 10, and 11 above.

14. **Theater commanders must be allowed input into decisions related to the conduct of the war effort.**

It would seem clear that no one is more intimately acquainted with the war theater conditions or with the progress of the fighting than the field commander. His advice should be sought before final decisions are made on how to conduct the war. The requirement for the theater commander's input is not tantamount to turning over the formulation of national policy to military leaders; their suggestions are not necessarily binding on the political leadership. Rather, this principle recognizes that experienced military leaders will have important insights concerning how most effectively to pursue the mission. Such a unique perspective may not otherwise be available either to civilian leaders, who may have had no military experience or to White House military advisors who are removed from the arena of conflict and unfamiliar with conditions there.
15. **The theater commander must be allowed discretion in the pursuit of the war effort.**

In effect, this criterion is a plea for liberal rules of engagement. Although civilian political leaders must remain in ultimate control of the military, there is sometimes a real danger that civilian officials will become prone to "micro-manage" the war effort. The resultant effect is to tie the hands of field commanders, who often must be in constant contact with Washington before returning fire. Obviously, it is not in the national interest to allow over-zealous or excessively nervous commanders to engage in hostilities unilaterally. However, when such hostilities have already commenced, and a certain level of violence is considered acceptable by the political leaders, it would seem to be in the interest of all concerned to allow the theater commander to carry out his assigned mission with a minimum of interference by civilian leaders in the actual prosecution of the war. The evidence provided by the war effort in Vietnam, the denial of permission by the Reagan White House allowing the Marines in Lebanon to carry loaded weapons, and the extensive political involvement by civilian officials in military operations in Somalia all provide prima facie evidence of the need to permit field commanders flexible rules of engagement with the enemy.
**Format/Research Questions**

In order to most completely and expeditiously examine the case studies, it is necessary to utilize an appropriate common format. Accordingly, a common framework consisting of fifteen research questions will be applied to the case studies. Each of these questions will serve as the heading for a principal section within each case study. These basic questions are as follows:

1. What were prevailing conditions initially within the "target" country?
2. Why did the United States choose to get involved?
3. What were the intended results, or objectives, of American intervention?
4. What was the nature of the operation? (i.e. peacekeeping, humanitarian, nation-building)
5. What was the American domestic political climate (public and congressional mood about the particular case) during this crisis?
6. What was the position of the military leadership regarding the operation? (i.e. the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
7. How was the operation actually carried out? (i.e. unilaterally, multi-laterally, air strikes only, ground warfare, naval blockade, peacekeeping duties only)
8. What types and quantities of forces were used?
9. Was the conflict limited in scope? (no spillover into the territory of other states)

10. What was the nature of the theater commander's power and influence? (was his advice sought and/or heeded? How much discretion was he given on the battlefield)

11. Was there an "exit strategy?" If so, was it adhered to?

12. What were the immediate results of the intervention?

13. What was the long-term situation? (perhaps one-year later or more)

14. What elements about this case are unique?

15. Was the intervention "successful?" (As well as a discussion on how success or failure is determined in each case)

The answers gleaned from these questions can then be compared against the hypothesized pre-conditions listed above. In doing so, the validity of the typology can be assessed, and if needed, alternatives can then be suggested.

Justification of Cases Selected

As noted in Chapter One, the cases selected for detailed consideration are, in chronological order, Panama (Operation "Just Cause," 1989), Iraq (Operation "Desert Shield/Desert Storm," 1990-91), and Somalia (Operation
"Restore Hope," 1992-94). These three have prima facie similarities which seem to make them the best cases available for this study.

First, they all involved the commitment of U.S. forces in armed conflict. Second, all three have occurred in the period since the 1989 "velvet revolutions," which effectively destroyed communism and ended the antagonisms that marked the cold war. Third, unlike past interventions, no ideological (East-West conflict) justification was given for why intervention was necessary.

A fourth, and related point of commonality is that in none of these cases was there any real fear that entry into the conflict would prompt counter-intervention by any other great powers (i.e. the Soviet Union). Fifth, official justifications for using armed force seemed to center on humanitarian impulses. Perhaps it was a desire to end human suffering (Somalia), or punish "baby-killing, incubator smashing sadists" (Iraq), or to bring to justice a "key figure" in the international narcotics trade (Panama).

Sixth, and finally, implicit in the objectives of each operation seems to have been a neo-Wilsonian concern with the development of a more stable and democratic system within the "target" country, which would, in turn, lead to the development of a "New World Order" of peacefully coexisting democratic states.
CHAPTER IV

Operation Just Cause: The Invasion of Panama

Introduction

At 1:00 A.M. on December 20, 1989, six United States military task forces went into action in Panama, seizing control of the country within hours. This invasion of Panama was the culmination of nearly three years of decay in the relations between the two states, ones that traditionally enjoyed a close, if not always smooth, relationship. This action was, at the time, the United States' largest military undertaking since Vietnam. However, it also marked two equally, if not more notable, "firsts." It was the first time that a drug indictment against a foreign head of state had been used (at least partially) as a justification for deposing that leader. It was also the first use of American direct military intervention in the post-Cold War era.

1. What were the prevailing conditions initially within the "target" country?

With the death of long-time Panamanian dictator General Omar Torrijos in 1981, the way was paved for the rise to power of a new strongman: Manuel Antonio Noriega. Noriega, who in 1983 assumed the command of the Panama's armed forces, the National Guard, was able to use his position to secure his control over the nation.

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The Reagan administration believed that U.S.-Panamanian relations would continue to be cordial. This assessment seemed to be well-founded, especially considering the assistance that Noriega gave to "various U.S. covert initiatives in the region, including the Contra war, training Central American forces in Panama, and Panamanian cooperation in Israeli covert operations" (Scranton, 1992: 347). To Washington, Noriega seemed to be a frontline soldier in the Reagan administration's war on drugs by "providing assistance in disrupting drug trafficking operations" which were then using Panama as a conduit to the American market (Drohan, 1992: 25). For the United States, Panama also proved to be "a strategic asset in its interventionist policies in Central America. This process was facilitated by Noriega's firm control over the expanded and renamed Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF)" (Scranton, 1992: 347).

During the mid-1980s, however, Noriega became an increasingly greater source of embarrassment for Washington, one from which the Reagan administration was eager to distance itself. "Opposition to Noriega among U.S. officials had been growing since 1985, when Panamanian activist Hugo Spadafora was brutally murdered by the PDF and President Nicolas Ardito Barletta, who antagonized the PDF by calling for an investigation of the murder, was removed. Of greater concern to the Reagan administration,
however, was a growing scandal surrounding Noriega's involvement in the Iran-Contra affair, particularly Panama's central role in international narcotics trafficking and money laundering" (Scranton, 1992: 347).

The Reagan administration quickly came to the realization that it was time for Noriega to go. Starting in 1987, Washington attempted to use quiet diplomacy in order to persuade Noriega to depart gracefully. Using officials perceived by the Panamanian dictator to be "friendly," American emissaries met with Noriega, urging him to continue Torrijos' transition to democracy. Ultimately, these efforts proved to be fruitless. The reason for failure, it seemed, was that Washington wanted to preserve Panamanian stability; it was not willing to reinforce diplomacy with the coercive measures that might have forced Noriega to come to the conclusion that he had no choice but to depart (Scranton, 1992: 349).

On February 4, 1988, U.S. federal grand juries in Miami and Tampa, investigating Noriega's activities issued two indictments against him and 14 others for involvement in drug trafficking (Keesing's, April 1988: 35817). Noriega was accused of turning his country into a "vast criminal enterprise." Specifically, he was charged with helping a Colombian drug cartel to ship more than 4,000 lbs. of cocaine into the United States via Panama. Furthermore, he was accused of conspiring to import over $1,000,000 worth
of marijuana into the USA. For his efforts, Noriega was said to have received $4,600,000. If convicted, the general faced a possible 145 years in an American federal prison (Keesing's, April 1988: 35817). At the time, however, prosecution was highly unlikely because U.S. law enforcement agencies did not have any legal authority to take him into custody unless he was within United States jurisdiction.

Another concern for Washington was the direction of Panama's foreign policy. As United States-Panamanian relations deteriorated, Noriega drew closer to the communist regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua, states which were loath to align themselves with the United States on any issue. American animosity was increased by reports that Panama was seeking closer ties with Libya and the Soviet Union (Keesing's, April 1988: 35817).

The Crisis Escalates

In response to the criminal allegations and Panama's increasing diplomatic isolation, on February 25, 1988 Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle dismissed General Noriega as PDF commander. In a televised address, Delvalle delivered the decree authorizing the firing as well as announcing his replacement by Chief of Staff of the Defense Forces Col. Marcos Justines. (Keesing's, April 1988: 35818). Noriega's Legislative Assembly promptly responded by dismissing the President. President Delvalle promptly
went into hiding and vowed to fight to return to office. The Reagan administration made it clear that it considered Delvalle still to be the legitimate leader.

On March 1, 1988, the Reagan administration tightened the noose on Noriega when it "decertified" Panama under a 1986 law requiring the executive to "certify" the countries cooperating with the United States against drug trafficking and to impose sanctions against those that do not. The U.S. then acted to block loans to Panama by international organizations.

The pressure was intensified when, on March 11, Washington ordered the suspension of all U.S. payments to Panama, including $7,000,000 in Panama Canal fees due that month, as well as preferential trade arrangements with Panama (Keesing's, April 1988: 35818). The White House announced that it would direct the placement of all U.S. payments due to Panama into an escrow account controlled by President Delvalle (Watson and Tsouras, 1991: 203).

Throughout 1988, continuing widespread Panamanian domestic opposition and American economic sanctions failed to dislodge Noriega from power. In March, faced with a general strike, Noriega was able to use the coercive means at his disposal to break the action and jail its leaders.

Having rallied some support in his country and throughout Latin America, Noriega felt emboldened to begin taunting the United States. On June 16, 1988, a U.S. Army
private and his 18-year-old wife were assaulted by a probable member of the PDF. The American soldier was beaten and locked in his car's trunk while his wife was raped. This was to be only one of several such incidents in the increasing war of nerves between Washington and Noriega (Watson and Tsouras, 1991: 204).

By April, 1988, American concern about the situation in Panama led Washington to send an extra 1,500 troops to supplement the 10,000 already stationed there. Despite this enhanced presence, Noriega managed to resist American pressure. In May 1988, negotiations between Washington and Noriega collapsed, leaving the General in control (Keesing's, October 1988: 36215).

The 1989 change of administration in the United States brought no change in U.S. policy. Almost immediately, President Bush authorized funds ($10 million) for covert aid to encourage a possible coup by PDF members tiring of Noriega and his increasingly paranoid behavior. In maintaining continuity with his predecessor, Mr. Bush refused to re-certify Panama as "cooperating fully" with American anti-drug efforts, as well as renewing all of the existing economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Panama (Watson and Tsouras, 1991: 205).

The 1989 Elections

Under escalating international pressure, as well as ever-increasing political isolation, Noriega consented to
holding general election on May 7, 1989. An international team of election observers, led by former United States President Jimmy Carter, was on hand to make sure that the elections were fairly conducted. On election day, 90 percent of those Panamanians eligible to vote did so (Keesing's, May 1989: 56645).

Exit polls taken forecast a 3-to-1 margin of victory for the opposition over Noriega's hand-picked candidates (New York Times, May 5, 1989: article by Lindsay Gruson). However, when the votes were being counted, about 4,300 voting tally sheets, certified by both the government and the opposition, were removed, "sometimes at gunpoint, and substituted with faked tally sheets" (Keesing's, May 1989: 36645). One observer noted that Noriega never considered the prospect that people would "vote against him in such numbers" (Keesing's, May 1989: 36645).

President Carter was quick to denounce the fraud. Carter told the international press: "The Government is taking the election by fraud. It's robbing the people of Panama of their legitimate rights" (New York Times, May 5, 1989, article by Lindsay Gruson).

Guillermo Endara, the opposition candidate for President, declared himself president-elect on May 9 and appealed to the international community for recognition. At a rally on May 10, Endara and his two vice-presidential running mates, Guillermo "Billy" Ford and Ricardo Arias
Calderon, were severely beaten by paramilitaries of the pro-Noriega Dignity Battalions. Fearing for their lives, opposition leaders went into hiding (Keesing's, May 1989: 36645).

On May 11, President Bush announced a seven-point plan dealing with Panama. "The plan provided for co-operation with and support for initiatives taken by Latin American governments through the OAS (Organization of American States) and other channels; the recall of the U.S. ambassador from Panama, and the reduction of U.S. embassy staff; the immediate removal of U.S. employees and dependents to safe housing in Panama; a call to U.S. businesses in Panama to move employees' dependents outside Panama; the continuation in force of economic sanctions; the assertion and enforcement of U.S. treaty rights in Panama under the Canal Treaties; and the dispatch of 'a brigade-size force,' described as about 2,000 troops, to Panama to augment military forces already there with the possibility of 'further steps in the future'"(Keesing's, May 1989: 36645-6).

Events Accelerate

A turning point in the crisis came on June 21, 1989, when the United States Department of Justice issued an opinion "that granted the president legal authority to direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to abduct a fugitive residing in a foreign country for violation of
United States law, even if the arrest was contrary to customary international law" (Leonard, 1993: 103). Armed with such authority, President Bush privately ordered the Pentagon to undertake a review of existing military options in Panama.

The Bush administration soon got an opportunity to move against Noriega. On October 2, rebel officers within the PDF, led by Major Moises Giroldi, attempted a coup against the General. Giroldi sought American help, requesting that U.S. forces block major roads into Panama City in order to prevent troops loyal to Noriega from interfering with the planned coup. In addition, the Major appealed to the United States to provide sanctuary for his wife and children (Leonard, 1993: 104). Although safety for Major Giroldi's family was granted, SOUTHCOM commander, General Maxwell Thurman, believed the "coup" to be a trap laid by Noriega and, consequently, recommended against involvement with the coup plotters.

Once initiated, the coup failed miserably. The central objective of the coup, the apprehension of Noriega, was accomplished by the rebels, and he was held captive for four hours (Keesing's, October 1989: 36971). They could not agree, however, on what to do with him. Noriega was allowed by his captors to telephone his mistress, who in turn called for troops to rescue him. (Scranton, 1991: 190). Troops loyal to Noriega, specifically the praetorian
Battalion 2000, quickly responded. The rebels were surrounded and, after several hours of fighting, they surrendered later that morning (Keesing's, October 1989: 36971). The coup leaders were captured, tortured, and killed (Scranton, 1992: 355).

It was later acknowledged by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney that American troops had blocked certain roads for the coup plotters, as well as launched U.S. aircraft and helicopters for possible direct U.S. intervention. Cheney disclosed that, as the attempt came to an end, the U.S. gave no response to a rebel request to help defend routes to the military headquarters which they had seized. The reason for this silence was that the rebels had refused a demand from a U.S. officer to hand over Noriega, preferring him to retire in Panama rather than face charges in the United States (Keesing's, October 1989: 36971).

On October 8, Secretary of State Baker confirmed that General Thurman had been authorized by the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, to seize General Noriega if it could be done "without risking bloodshed, significant loss of American life and without open military involvement" (Keesing's, October 1989: 36971). Unfortunately, the coup attempt had failed before the directive could be carried out.
Congressional reaction to the failed coup and Baker's disclosures was swift and furious. Democrats especially criticized the Bush administration for its inaction and subsequent failure to capture Noriega when the opportunity had evidently presented itself (Leonard, 1993: 105). Conservative and well-respected Democrats such as Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and David Boren (D-OK) faulted the administration for failing to construct contingency plans; blaming top advisors in particular for poor decisionmaking. Furthermore, they criticized Bush, Cheney, and others for keeping appointments scheduled for that day rather than focusing their attention on the unfolding events in Panama (Scranton, 1991: 191). From the Republican side of the aisle, scathing criticism came from Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) who, in lengthy floor speeches, challenged the Bush administration's version of the events (Scranton, 1991: 191).

The sting of the overwhelming criticism from both parties on Capitol Hill, as well as from the press, prompted President Bush to review all of his options, especially military ones. General Woerner, the SOUTHCOM commander until September 30, had been opposed to direct military involvement. However, in light of the failed coup, such action had renewed appeal. The administration even reassessed the ban on the assassination of foreign leaders,
as no policy option was left unconsidered (Scranton, 1991: 193-4).

General Thurman, SOUTHCOM's new commander, was charged with developing a new contingency plan. The existing plan, "Operation Blue Spoon," was a multi-phase plan intended to be implemented over the course of several days. Thurman and Powell were able to compress the plans into an overnight operation (New York Times, December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal). Bush, however, choose not to give immediate approval.

In November and December 1989, the tension between the two sides reached a crescendo. Panamanian authorities harassed and provoked American personnel in Panama. For its part, the United States ran readiness exercises in Panama on virtually a round-the-clock basis. This was done largely to prepare, but also served to mask a massive U.S. troop build-up as well as the actual time of H-Hour (Crowell, 1991: 68).

On December 14, 1989, the National Assembly defiantly declared General Noriega to be "Maximum Leader," confirming his dictatorial status. The following day, the legislative body issued a declaration of war on the United States, thus intensifying the conflict (Leonard, 1993: 106).

The final straw came on December 16 when a U.S. soldier, Lt. Robert Paz, was killed by PDF soldiers at a roadblock. Another American soldier and his wife, both of
whom had witnessed the incident, were arrested. While in custody, the soldier was beaten, and his wife was sexually intimidated (Scranton, 1991: 198-9). On December 17, President Bush decided that "enough is enough." The order was given to initiate the invasion (Leonard, 1993: 107).

2. Why did the United States choose to get involved?

The proximate cause of United States intervention in Panama was the murder of U.S. Army Lt. Robert Paz by PDF soldiers at a roadblock and the subsequent detention of an American couple who had witnessed the killing (New York Times, December 20, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon). This incident was the climax of a policy of systematic violence and psychological warfare being waged by the Noriega dictatorship for over a year. There were, however, several far more basic and serious interests at stake that eventually would compel the United States to act.

First, and perhaps most importantly among these interests, was a concern for the future security of the Panama Canal. Despite the inability of the Canal to accommodate the very largest of U.S. warships, its importance to American commerce made it one of the United States' principal commercial assets (Watson and Tsouras, 1991: 19). Consequently, there was a nagging fear among policymakers in Washington, specifically: to whom would the U.S. have to turn over the Canal in 2000 when the Panama Canal Treaties mandated its return to Panama? The thoughts
of relinquishing control either to a hostile military dictatorship or to a state experiencing revolutionary turmoil were equally unpalatable to the Bush administration (Drohan, 1991: 19-22).

The second major concern was Panama's increasingly prominent role as a center for drug trafficking and associated money laundering activities. For years, Noriega benefitted financially from his arrangements with Colombian drug cartels to allow his country to serve as a transit point for massive drug operations (Scranton, 1991: 80).

A third major concern was the need "to defend democracy in Panama" (New York Times, December 21, 1989, transcript of President Bush's press conference). It is indeed difficult to say that real democracy, as it is commonly understood in western societies, ever fully existed in Panama. However, the "stolen" May 1988 elections, with their massive turnout and evidently decisive results, showed that Panamanians were willing finally to embark down the path to democracy in a meaningful way. The blatant fraud during the election, and the subsequent nullification of its results, served as both a powerful rallying point for the democratic opposition, as well as a powerful propaganda instrument for Washington in its battle with Noriega for world public opinion. Noriega gave himself an additional public relations "black eye" when his Dignity Battalions viciously beat victorious
opposition leaders at a post-election rally (Keesing's, May 1989: 36645). As of May 1989 there was now at least the potential for democracy, and there finally existed legitimate democratic leaders for Washington to support. The political and psychological power of the image of the United States acting to uphold democracy in Latin America clearly provided an impetus for action.

A fourth major concern was regional security. Panama and the United States have always enjoyed a uniquely close relationship, mostly owing to the presence of the Canal and the American role in Panamanian independence in 1903. Although there was some resentment of "Yankee imperialism" because of a long history of U.S. involvement in Panamanian politics and the presence of a virtual American colony in the form of the Canal Zone, most Panamanians, at least by Latin American standards, had a favorable view of Americans. A reservoir of good will existed among Panamanians due to their access to employment with the Canal Company and U.S. military installations. This good will received a strong boost with the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties which provided for a phased return of the Canal and the Canal Zone to Panamanian jurisdiction.

As the crisis leading up to the invasion deepened, United States-Panamanian relations became strained. Groping for support, Noriega pursued an increasingly anti-American foreign policy, which ingratiated him with the Soviet Union.
and radical Arab states like Libya. Most alarmingly, however, was Noriega's increasingly tight embrace of fellow Latin American tyrants Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and Cuba's Fidel Castro (Keesing's, April 1988: 35817). By playing his "leftist card" Noriega signalled a willingness to shift alliances that perhaps gained him some support, both politically and financially, in the short term (Scranton, 1991: 15-16).

Noriega himself is largely believed to be a reason for Bush's decision to intervene. There was a well documented personal animus between President Bush and General Noriega. This mutual enmity can be traced back to their common connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as a personal meeting when the then-Vice President visited Panama in 1983 (New York Times, December 24, 1989, article by Maureen Dowd). During the crisis, Bush was said to have become angry and frustrated by Noriega's intransigence in negotiations and by the General's defiance. A source close to the White House told the New York Times that Bush felt that Noriega "was getting more and more abusive and that at some point he would have to be dealt with..." (New York Times, December 24, 1989, article by Maureen Dowd).

Noriega acted as a virtual "human security leak." There is evidence that he used his position for profit by allowing Panama to be used by interested parties to evade
"the U.S. embargo on technology sales to communist nations" (Drohan, 1991: 25).

Furthermore, the General clearly acted as a double-agent. Although he was originally considered an asset by Washington for his support for U.S. and Israeli intelligence operations (a fact that Bush was made aware of during his tenure as CIA director), evidence shows that he also spied on the United States (Drohan, 1991: 23-4). These charges were documented in a 1985 series of articles by Seymour Hersch in the New York Times. "He also bought arms from Cuba and sold them to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador" (Leonard, 1993: 98). [For a more detailed account, see Rother, Larry, "America's Blind Eye: the U.S for Years has Ignored Corruption in Panama," The New York Times Magazine, May 28, 1988].

Finally, there were factors personal to President Bush. Clearly by December 1989 the president and his closest advisors had come to the conclusion that negotiations had failed and that economic sanctions only were hurting the Panamanian people. It was concluded that all options had been exhausted and that it was impossible to accomplish anything further without the resort to force (New York Times, December 21, 1989, text of President Bush's speech).
3. What were the intended results, or objectives, of American intervention?

The intended results of the invasion of Panama can best be understood by dividing them into two categories: the "political" and the "operational."

The political objectives were clearly articulated by the President in his December 20, 1989 address on Panama. During the speech he stated: "the goals of the United States have been to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty" (New York Times, December 21, 1989: text of President Bush's speech). Not specifically mentioned, but certainly implicit was also the apprehension of General Noriega on drug trafficking charges. Since most of these goals have already been discussed, they require no further elaboration here.

In pursuit of the political goals, several operational goals were established in the invasion plans developed by the military. First and foremost, American forces were to destroy quickly the combat capabilities of the Panamanian Defense Forces. This was to be accomplished by rapidly striking strategic points throughout Panama and overwhelming the PDF.

The second operational goal was to seize facilities related to the operation of the Panama Canal. This was necessary so as to prevent sabotage of the Canal, as well as to protect and defend civilians associated with its
operation. Early seizure of the Canal also would help keep the interruption of traffic through the waterway to a minimum.

A third, and final, operational goal was to apprehend Noriega and to liberate political prisoners being held by government forces (Crowell, 1991: 69-70). (The details of Noriega's apprehension are discussed later in this chapter.)

4. What was the nature of the operation?

The nature of Operation Just Cause is difficult to classify. It exhibits elements of both a humanitarian mission and efforts aimed at nation building.

The concern of the Bush administration with human rights and the suppression of liberties within Panama certainly indicates a humanitarian motivation. The President was very clear in his conviction that it was necessary to allow democratic norms a chance to become established (New York Times, December 21, 1989, text of President Bush's speech). Human rights organizations, notably Amnesty International, had long reported on the sharp increase of human rights abuses since the beginning of the crisis in Panama in 1988. Such violations involved arbitrary arrests, torture, harassment, and sexual abuse (Keesing's, April 1988: 35819). It became increasingly clear that the only way a democratic transformation of
Panama would occur was if Noriega were forced from power by an American invasion.

This intervention, however, also exhibited characteristics indicative of a nation-building enterprise in the sense that democratic institutions were to be restored. One of the main goals was to allow the results of the May 1989 elections to be reinstated. As one of the first acts of U.S. intervention, the Endara government was installed, thus fulfilling its electoral mandate and bringing 21 years of military dictatorship to a close.

Key among Washington's objectives was the destruction of the Panamanian Defense Forces. This was not sought to render Panama permanently dependent on the United States for its defense. Rather, American concern with the PDF was focused on its traditional role as a power base, the institutional support for, and "cradle" of, Panamanian dictators. If it were not eliminated as a source of power independent from civilian control, it would continue to be a potential threat to any embryonic democracy. A successful intervention would undoubtedly have the result of giving Panama a "clean slate" by allowing for civilian-directed change far wider than otherwise would have been possible (Scranton, 1991: 227).

5. What was the American domestic political climate during this crisis?

The Bush administration was very secretive about any intention to intervene in Panama. In fact, during a press
conference held only hours after hostilities commenced, Secretary of State Baker stated: "The President made his decision [to intervene] last Sunday" (New York Times, December 21, 1989: transcript of Secretary of State Baker's press conference). This places the decision at two days before the act. While an invasion was always a possibility, the conventional wisdom was that it was unlikely. This impression was reinforced by the incremental approach toward applying diplomatic and economic pressure pursued by the Bush administration. Only with the events of December 1989, however, was it finally apparent that only a use of force would bring the situation to a final resolution favorable to the United States (New York Times, December 21, 1989: text of President Bush's speech).

When Americans awoke on the morning of December 20 and heard the announcement of the invasion on the morning news, most were surprised, which is just the way the Bush administration seemed to want it. This need for surprise stemmed from two important reasons. First, the military wanted to be able to surprise the PDF so as to keep casualties low. Any discussion of plans to invade would have cost lives on both sides. Secondly, the secrecy would allow the administration to deal a fait accompli to both the public and critics in Congress. Once the invasion started, the public would support it, due to the usual "rally around the flag" effect. Members of Congress,
reluctant to appear even remotely unpatriotic, would not be able to express any displeasure with the action as long as American troops were in combat (for Congressional reaction see New York Times, December 24, 1989, article by Maureen Dowd).

Before the invasion, the public mood had generally been anti-interventionist. Any time that the prospect of intervention was raised, the public would shy away, fearful of "another Vietnam." Opinion polls conducted around the time of the aborted May 1989 Panamanian elections, however, show the beginning of a change in American public opinion regarding a possible invasion. A New York Times/ CBS News poll showed that "Americans grew much more supportive of the use of United States troops to restore order if necessary" in Panama (New York Times, May 13, 1989, dispatch by Adam Clymer). When President Bush announced that he was sending 2,000 additional troops to Panama as the crisis worsened, 53% of those who said that they had heard about the situation supported the President's actions. This same group was evenly divided on whether troops should be sent in to restore order if violence occurred (New York Times, May 13, 1989, dispatch by Adam Clymer). While the poll seemed to indicate rising support for intervention, the public showed little general enthusiasm for ousting dictators. Asked "should the United States try to change a dictatorship to a democracy where it
can or should the United States stay out of other countries affairs?" 29 percent supported intervention and 60 percent favored staying out. (These were basically the same numbers that emerged from a 1986 poll taken during political turmoil in the Philippines.) Intervention tended to be more popular among those with higher incomes, Republicans, veterans and Southerners. Those from the Northeast and college graduates were most critical of engaging in such a policy (New York Times, May 13, 1989, dispatch by Adam Clymer).

Congressional interest in the situation in Panama dated back to 1986, when conservative Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) first conducted hearings into Noriega's activities. These hearings, in turn, spawned others such as those headed by Senator John Kerry (D-MA), whose international narcotics subcommittee later launched an exhaustive investigation covering Panama and the Medellin cartel (Scranton, 1991: 97).

Concern over Noriega, Panama, and the Canal was not the exclusive domain of any particular political party. One of the first signs of this solidly bipartisan approach to Panama came on June 26, 1987 when Senate Resolution 239 was passed by a vote of 84 to 2. This resolution called on Noriega and his cronies to step down from power, and it expressed American "support for human rights and the evolution of genuine democracy in Panama" (Scranton, 1991:
Although it was non-binding, the passage of the resolution showed how few friends Noriega had in Washington (Scranton, 1991: 111).

As the crisis intensified, congressional liberals and conservatives would repeatedly find common cause against Noriega. For example, in May 1988, while negotiations were underway that would have resulted in the dropping of drug charges against Noriega if he were to step down, the Senate passed a resolution opposing such a deal by an 86-10 vote (Scranton, 1991: 150). Throughout the 1988-89 period, this "full spectrum" coalition gained strength. In both the House and Senate, this group frequently proposed resolutions to urge the White House to take stronger action, including the use of military force against Noriega. Such resolutions, however, seldom garnered majority votes on the floor (Scranton, 1991: 136).

The mood of Congress seemed to become considerably more hawkish after U.S. forces failed to act in support of the failed October 1989 coup by PDF officers. Congressional critics severely criticized the White House for its apparent inaction. Despite this, even on the eve of the invasion, there seemed to be no consensus on Capital Hill in favor of the use of force. In the wake of the Dec. 17 murder of a U.S. Marine by the PDF, the voice of caution could still be heard loud and clear in the halls of Congress. Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), a prominent...
liberal and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee dealing with Western Hemispheric affairs, urged President Bush not to act abruptly in responding to Panamanian provocations. Recalling earlier criticism that his colleagues had leveled at Mr. Bush, Dodd stated: "My concern would be that some of the political advisors around him are reminding him of those [critical] headlines and may cause him to act precipitously here" (New York Times, December 20, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon).

As noted above, the preparations for the December 20, 1989 invasion were so secret that most of Congress, including its leadership, was kept uninformed. President Bush told the public that he had "contacted the bipartisan leadership of Congress...and informed them of this decision" to intervene on the night before the operation was initiated (New York Times, December 21, 1989: transcript of President Bush's speech). This assertion, however, was disputed by Speaker of the House Thomas S. Foley (D-WA), who said on the night of the invasion that he had not been alerted by the White House (New York Times, December 20, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon). In either case, the President had, for all practical purposes, bypassed Congress in his decision to intervene in Panama. With the invasion, the legislative branch had been dealt a fait accompli to which it could do little more than react.
6. **What was the position of the military leadership regarding the operation?**

In the case of Panama, the position of the military toward possible intervention was literally a tale of two (perhaps three) generals. The answer to this question can be discovered by examining the views of Generals Frederick Woerner, Maxwell Thurman, and Colin Powell.

General Woerner was the commander of SOUTHCOM (U.S. forces in Panama) from June 1987 until September 1989. Throughout his tenure, Woerner was "reluctant to support large-scale military action in Panama" (New York Times, December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal). It was his position that the only durable solution to Panama's situation was for the Panamanians to solve their own problems without outside interference from the United States. During an interview he stated that: "the only chance that democracy really had in Panama was for the Panamanians to go through the catharsis of removing Noriega" (Woerner interview in Scranton, 1991: 194). In September 1989, when General Woerner advised President Bush how to proceed in Panama, he was quite straightforward: "I can tell you how to go in. What I cannot tell you is how to get out of it and leave behind something worthwhile" (Woerner interview in Scranton, 1991: 194).

The failure of the coup made it obvious that irrespective of the existing strategy to get rid of Noriega, a military coup, along with U.S. aid to the
rebels, was unlikely to work. By late 1989, Noriega had become too well entrenched for such an option to have a realistic chance of success (New York Times, December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal).

At the end of September 1989, the military awarded two promotions that were to have a profound influence on United States policy toward Panama, especially with regard to military options. On September 30, General Maxwell Thurman replaced General Woerner as the commander at SOUTHCOM. The next day, General Colin Powell assumed the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Powell was both the youngest chairman in history (age 53) and the first black to hold the post (Leonard, 1993: 103). A trait that the two generals had in common is that they tended to be more "hawkish" toward Panama than was General Woerner. Powell, in particular, had begun to review the existing military plans for Panama and found them deficient. Those plans, as one administration official put it, "would have kept us from doing anything. It would have taken so long to assemble a large force that by the time you got it together, it would be impossible to do anything" (New York Times, December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal).

Thurman, as commander in Panama, was not just given input into the planning, but he was instrumental in the drafting of a new plan. Thurman and Powell's new strategy
compacted the existing plans for a large-scale attack down into an overnight timetable (New York Times, December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal).

7. How was the operation actually carried out?

In updating the existing military plans for use by the Bush Administration, General Thurman developed three usable options. Option One relied on the use of massive force. Its goal was to overwhelm Noriega with numbers so that he would have to conclude that he had "no realistic chance of survival" (Crowell, 1991: 68). Option Two was to use Special Forces in a raid to seize Noriega, with support from U.S. troops already stationed in Panama. The Third Option was to utilize Panama-based troops to seize PDF headquarters.

When the decision was finally made, President Bush selected Option One. This was dictated by several factors, the most important of which was a fear of prolonged resistance by Panamanian forces. Bush was concerned to keep casualties low on both sides of the conflict. Inflicting massive casualties on Panamanian forces would have had the potential of needlessly stirring up nationalism within the country; and this in turn could prolong resistance and have damaging long-term effects on U.S.-Panamanian relations.

Secondly, the Bush administration wanted to avoid a prolonged engagement that would almost certainly have brought a firestorm of domestic and international criticism.
and pressure. Finally, Options Two and Three would have depended on perfect intelligence and surprise for success. Anything less would have allowed Noriega to evade capture; and his apprehension was, after all, of central importance to American policy toward Panama. Furthermore, Option One would almost certainly have the result of quickly eliminating the PDF as a power in Panamanian politics (New York Times, December 21, 1989, dispatch by Bernard E. Trainor).

As carried out, the United States intervention was a unilateral military action. Under SOUTHCOM were 13,000 United States troops permanently stationed in Panama. In preparation for action, reinforcements from bases throughout the United States were airlifted to Panama, boosting the American presence to 23,000. It was an integrated operation, that is to say that General Thurman, as SOUTHCOM commander, had access to units from all branches of the armed services. The operation was to be carried out by the "simultaneous application of overwhelming military force against all significant centers of Panamanian resistance" (New York Times, December 21, 1989, dispatch by Bernard E. Trainor).

For weeks, massive C-130s had been transporting in additional troops and equipment. In the days immediately before the intervention, these C-130s and C-141s flew around the clock, bringing men and material, including

There were two keys to success that American forces could count on: night operations and complete air superiority. U.S forces were unchallenged in the air; the PDF had no aircraft. An ability to fight at night, provided by accessories such as infra-red gunsights contributed to the element of surprise critical to low-casualty success in the urban environment presented by Panama City (Crowell, 1989: 75).

Generally, American intelligence was quite good. The failed October 1989 coup proved to be a boon to military intelligence officers. An analysis of the rebels' actions pointed out the primary targets that U.S. forces would later attack. Also, because of the presence of American bases in Panama, invading troops had a tremendous advantage in that many soldiers were already familiar with both the target sites and local roads (Crowell, 1991: 79-80). There
were, however, some gaps in the intelligence. The most damaging of these was the "lack of precise, reliable intelligence information, in this case pinpointing the location of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega" (New York Times, December 21, 1989, dispatch by Bernard E. Trainor).

Deception was skillfully exploited by U.S. forces. For weeks, readiness exercises were frequently held. As the invasion date approached, exercises were held around the clock. This disguised both the scope of the operation to come and H-Hour (New York Times, December 20, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon). Although news reports and careless conversation between soldiers on December 19 gave the Panamanians a tip that "something" was planned, the actual date and time of H-Hour were never divulged.

The United States intervention force was organized into six task forces. Each group was given a set of goals to accomplish when H-Hour arrived. Below is a quick summary of each task force and its duties:

Task Force Black was assigned to rescue imprisoned Americans held at PDF prisons. It also had the responsibility to raid sites Noriega was believed to be at. Although it failed to capture Panama's "Maximum Leader," it successfully cut-off possible air and sea escape routes. It later cornered him at the Papal Nunciature.

Task Force Bayonet immediately moved on the Commandancia (PDF Headquarters) and other strategic points
in Panama City. Tanks and Apache helicopter gunships, many of them flown into Panama especially for the invasion, provided massive firepower used to "soften-up" the Commandancia before the final assault.

Troops from Task Force Bayonet also captured PDF installations at Fort Amador. Navy SEALs attached to this battle group were dispatched to Patilla Airport in order to cut off a possible Noriega escape route. The SEALs were able to accomplish their mission by destroying Noriega's plane. SEALs also secured boats in Panama Harbor to prevent an escape by sea.

Task Force Atlantic defeated a PDF force at the coastal city of Colon. At Gamboa, it moved to seize canal-related facilities.

Task Force Red was composed mostly of soldiers flown in from the United States. Stealth fighters dropped 2,000 lb. bombs near PDF barracks at Rio Hato, which so disoriented the Panamanian defenders that they ran for their lives. Rangers units then parachuted in. Fighting was fierce, but successful. With support from AC-130 gunships, the Rangers were able to take Tocumen/Torrijos International Airport. Later, they linked up with Task Force Red to cut-off reinforcement routes utilized by the PDF's elite Battalion 2000.

Task Force Semper Fi, as its name implies, was composed of Marines. The Marines secured U.S. military
installations from possible PDF attack or sabotage. Later, they joined with forces from Task Force Bayonet to secure the Bridge of the Americas.

Finally, Task Force Pacific was flown overnight from Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina in 20 C-141s. This group staged a jump at the international airport and the Madden Dam in order to reinforce U.S. forces there (Crowell, 1991: 83-92).

**Mop-up and the Apprehension of Noriega**

Within eighteen hours of the start of Operation Just Cause, organized resistance ended as the PDF was defeated (Scranton, 1991: 203; Crowell, 1991: 94). However, Dignity Battalions, a pro-Noriega militia, continued resistance for several more days. Yet by the seventh day of the invasion, Panama was pacified (Scranton, 1991: 204).

Nevertheless, General Noriega eluded capture. He managed to evade his pursuers for four days. On Christmas Eve, Noriega showed up at the residence of the Papal Nuncio in Panama City with ten of his followers (Scranton, 1991: 205). Begging for asylum, Noriega and his entourage were admitted. When the American command discovered that Noriega had been granted sanctuary, troops were dispatched to the embassy and the building was surrounded. Papal ambassador Monsignor Laboa refused calls to turn the General over to the USA to face charges in Florida. A stand-off ensued.
The American troops could not violate the sanctity of an embassy, so they tried to coax Noriega out. Soldiers set-up bright lights to shine into the Nuncio. Loudspeakers placed around the building blasted loud hard rock music in order to make life miserable for Noriega.

In early January 1990, Noriega received assurances from the USA that he would not be subject to the death penalty for his crimes. This guarantee, along with Monsignor Laboa’s argument that asylum in a third country was not a viable option, began to work on Noriega’s mind (Keesing’s, January 1990: 37181). On January 4, 1990 at 8:45 P.M., Noriega surrendered to U.S. forces. Although General Thurman was present, he did not allow a formal military surrender. Noriega was taken into custody as a criminal (Keesing's, January 1990: 37181 and Scranton, 1991: 207).

8. What types and quantities of forces were used?

Operation Just Cause was, at the time, the largest operation of its kind since Vietnam. It was the intention of General Thurman to overwhelm the 5,000 man Panamanian Defense Force with both superior numbers and firepower. Therefore, in order to supplement forces already in Panama, a massive airlift brought an additional 9,500 troops in from bases across the United States (Keesing's, Dec. 1989: 37112). At its peak, 26,000 soldiers were committed to the

Not only were massive numbers of troops used, but also a wide variety of forces were employed, drawn from the full range of the armed services. This section will present a brief overview of this broad cross-section that was utilized. Forces were organized according to type, geographic area of use, and by their assigned objectives (Crowell, 1991: 70-1).

Air Units

The then-top secret F-117 Stealth Fighter got its first combat test in the early stages of the invasion. Six of the planes were called in from their air base in Nevada, two of which dropped 2,000 lb. bombs near PDF barracks in Panama (McConnell, 1991: 35). The use of the F-117 was part of a plan which called for using ultra-high technology weapons systems in order to selectively prepare the ground for the assaults that would follow. (McConnell, 1991: 31, 35).

In support roles, SOUTHCOM relied on helicopters. As noted earlier, American forces enjoyed the advantage of uncontested control of the skies. Therefore, helicopter gunships, including such advanced models as the Apache as well as AH-1 Cobras, were used as aerial artillery platforms to pound enemy forces in anticipation of the impending surface attack. Other helicopters, such as the
UH-1 Huey and the UH-60 Blackhawk were used to transport troops, for firepower, and for observation purposes. In addition, some fixed wing aircraft, specifically A-7 fighter-bombers were used. On December 20, a 20 mile by 20 mile square of airspace over Panama City was crowded with "111 transports, 7 AC-130 gunships, 173 helicopters, 21 OA-37s, 6 A-7s, and 6 F-117s" (Crowell, 1991: 76-78).

Ground Units

Impressive firepower was not limited to the aircraft. Indeed, tanks had been moved into Panama "several weeks before the invasion was launched" (New York Times, December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal). Originally intended to support a possible coup attempt by PDF officers, the tanks also were included in military intervention preparations. Plans called for tanks to be used in conjunction with the Apache gunships to freeze the Panamanian military in place (New York Times, December 24, 1989, article by Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Rosenthal).

Ground forces were drawn from across service lines, many of them among the most elite units that each branch had to offer. The Army sent Special Forces teams, totalling 3,500 men. They drew the assignment of tracking and attempting to capture Noriega, as well as quickly seizing strategic locations throughout Panama. The 82nd Airborne and various Ranger units were dropped in to seize airports,
Canal facilities, and other strategic assets. Delta Force, the United States' quick reaction force was also dispatched to Panama and saw action. Other elite units participating were the Marines (Task Force Semper Fi) and Navy SEALs (see the preceding section) (Crowell, 1991: 72-3).

Of particular interest was the use of Psychological Operations Groups. Trained in psychological warfare and fluent in Spanish, these soldiers would attempt to reason with PDF forces they faced before a ground assault was launched. Often they were able to convince the Panamanians of both the hopelessness of their position and of the good intentions of the American intervention. Consequently, they managed to persuade many PDF units to surrender without firing more than a few shots. (Crowell, 1991: 90, 94).

Sea Units

Not much information is available about the role of naval forces in Operation Just Cause beyond the use of SEALs and frogmen to disable vessels that could have been used by Noriega to escape. There is good reason to believe that carrier-based planes provided air cover for transports en route from bases in the United States to Panama (Crowell, 1991: 75).

9. Was the conflict limited in scope?

The answer to this question is a simple "yes." The fighting never spilled over the borders of Panama. As a matter of fact, the overwhelming force utilized helped to
bring about such a rapid victory that it is highly unlikely that other governments or political groups could have acted in support of Noriega, even if they wanted to.

There was, in the minds of Thurman, Powell, and others, a concern about the possible interdiction of U.S. transports by Cuban and/or Nicaraguan jets. However, as mentioned earlier, the United States utilized carrier-based air cover to deal with this problem in the unlikely event such interference occurred (Crowell, 1991: 75). The threat never materialized.

10. What was the nature of the theater commander's power and influence?

Throughout the Panama crisis, the SOUTHCOM commander's opinion was given great weight by the White House. During General Woerner's tenure as SOUTHCOM, the Bush administration heeded the General's admonition against intervention. When Woerner was replaced by Maxwell Thurman at the end of September 1989, the new commander's advice was equally well heeded. As a case in point, even at the very start of his tenure at SOUTHCOM, Thurman was able to convince his superiors not to get involved with Major Giroldi and other rebel PDF officers during the October coup. (McConnell, 1991: 10).

General Thurman was a key player in the development of new plans to get Noriega. Thurman and Powell reworked the existing plans, taking into account a broad range of possible responses (New York Times, December 21, 1989,
dispatch by Bernard E. Trainor). President Bush was advised that a "surgical" strike to grab Noriega would accomplish very little, and warned him that it could prove quite embarrassing if it failed (New York Times, December 24, 1989, article by Maureen Dowd). As was noted above, General Thurman compacted Blue Spoon down into an overnight operation (see above and Scranton, 1991: 196 for more details.) (New York Times, December 21, 1989, dispatch by Bernard E. Trainor).

The President withheld immediate approval, and Thurman had nine weeks to refine his plan. On the morning of December 17, 1989, Thurman phoned General Powell in Washington with the recommendation that the plan be executed. Bush and Powell agreed with Thurman's assessment, and the order was given for Thurman to proceed (McConnell, 1991: 19).

**Freedom on the Battlefield/Rules of Engagement**

In formulating the rules of engagement, General Thurman was given one guideline to follow: to find a balance in the use of force that would both hold down U.S. casualties and Panamanian deaths and destruction to a minimum while successfully destroying the PDF's combat capability (Crowell, 1991: 81). There were two main reasons for this. First, in the interest of good long-term relations, the Bush administration felt that it was imperative to accomplish operational objectives with as
little destruction, and as few casualties, as possible. Second, it was thought by those in Washington that if some sort of restraint were not practiced there would be a backlash against the new Endara government, and this would exacerbate legitimacy problems that surely would be present due to its installation by force of U.S. arms.

The commanders and planners of "Just Cause," consequently, laid down strict rules of engagement (ROE). General Thurman, as SOUTHCOM commander, ordered "the minimum use of power required" to achieve battlefield victory (Crowell, 1991: 81). In practice, Thurman ordered that no one below the rank of Lt. Colonel could order the use of indirect fire weapons such as artillery, mortars, aerial strafing, or bombing. One of Thurman's subordinates, General Stiner, acted to place even more stringent limitations on American forces. He restricted the use of artillery and bombing in Panama City by requiring the approval of a Major General for artillery, himself for bombing (Crowell, 1991: 81).

Thurman also ordered that infantry units attacking PDF barracks be accompanied by Psychological Operations teams. Although discussed earlier, it bears repeating that, using their training and Spanish language skills, members of these teams would call on PDF soldiers to surrender within 15 minutes. If the demand was not complied with, a small burst would be fired as a warning and the demand repeated
with a new time limit. If this second deadline passed, field officers were instructed to call senior officers for authorization to use greater firepower.

Bombing, when used, was usually near, not on, targets. F-117 Stealth fighters dropped their bombs near PDF barracks, a tactic which caused a minimum of damage and a maximum of confusion and panic among enemy forces. Surrender was swiftly obtained. These measures were highly successful in reducing Panamanian losses without raising American casualties (Crowell, 1991: 80-82).

11. Was there an "exit strategy?" If so, was it adhered to?

The answers to these questions are a simple "yes" and "no." There was no formal exit plan because none was needed. Some 13,000 of the U.S. troops are permanently stationed in Panama in accordance with the provisions of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties.

As a matter of politics, the answer was "yes." As President Bush declared: "The United States intends to withdraw the forces newly deployed to Panama as quickly as possible" (New York Times, December 21, 1989: transcript of President Bush's speech). In accordance with this pledge, on January 3, 1990, 300 troops were sent home to bases in the USA. By January 7, the total of the recalled forces had reached 3,300 (Keesing's, January 1990: 37818).

It was Washington's intention to turn over authority to Panamanian civilian leaders as quickly as possible. A
key element of this transition was a need to allow the new Endara government to assume the duties associated with the maintenance of public order. However, the new Endara regime faced a problem similar to that encountered by Lenin in Russia in 1917: What does the new government do when the only personnel with the necessary training to carry out such an essential task are those most closely associated with the old regime? The need to use at least some former PDF officers as the foundation of a new national police force tarnished the new government (Scranton, 1991: 227). The result was that American troops had to remain in a constabulary capacity for an extended period. During 1990, U.S. troops were involved in stopping looting, restoring order, and were even called on to put down a new coup attempt (New York Times, December 21, 1990: Editorial).

This extended role for American troops was not completely unwelcome by the Panamanian public. A January 1990 CBS News poll taken in Panama revealed that 78 percent believed that the United States should stay at least six months or "as long as necessary" (New York Times, January 6, 1990, dispatch by Michael R. Kagay).

12. What were the immediate results of the intervention?

The intervention left the United States in control of Panama. Washington's central concern in Panama, the Panama Canal, was secured within hours. Although the invasion forced the Canal's closure for the first time ever, the
interruption of traffic lasted only one day. This minor inconvenience was more than offset by the successful protection of the Canal and its associated facilities. The primary objective of the invasion, the capture of General Noriega was accomplished by January 4, 1990. He was promptly sent to Miami, Florida to face trial on drug charges. Finally, on December 20, 1989, just as the invasion began, Guillermo Endara and his new government were sworn in at an American military base.

To Americans watching news reports of the invasion, no image was more gratifying than that of U.S. forces being welcomed by the people of Panama. Crowds that greeted American troops throughout the country hailed them as liberating heros (Scranton, 1991: 207). As previously noted, Panamanian public opinion was pro-interventionist. A January 1990 CBS News poll reported the following results: 92% approved of the invasion, with 64% strongly approving; 67% said that they wished that the United States had intervened at the time of the failed October 1989 coup. Seventy-four percent of the respondents believed that American troops had used the right amount of force and 87 percent said "the price paid by Panama to overthrow the Noriega regime was worth it" (New York Times, January, 6, 1990, dispatch by Michael R. Kagay). Panamanians seemed very optimistic about their country's future, with 90% predicting that their nation's situation over the next few
years would improve as a result of the invasion, and 88 percent expressing confidence that Panama would remain a democracy" (New York Times, January 6, 1990, dispatch by Michael R. Kagay).

There were, however, several unanswered questions surrounding the Endara government. Clearly it was legal, but was it legitimate? After all, some argued, it needed an invasion by a foreign power to put it in office. After the conclusion of the U.S. intervention, the new Panamanian regime still relied on American troops to control looting and maintain order (Scranton, 1992: 357). Some critics suggested that, in order to leave no doubt as to its legitimacy, Endara should have re-submitted his government to a popular vote (New York Times, December 21, 1990, Editorial). It should be noted, however, that much of this criticism did not garner support from the Panamanian people, most of whom supported letting Endara finish his term before holding new elections. Furthermore, as noted earlier, there was concern about the inclusion of former PDF members in the new national police (Sullivan, 1991: 169-170).

Although the invasion was extremely popular in Panama, the United States was roundly criticized by the world community. For the first time ever, the USA was condemned by a resolution from the Organization of American States
(OAS), which held that the invasion was a violation of international law (Scranton, 1991: 207).

Washington faced similar troubles at the United Nations. On December 30, 1989 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution "deploring the American intervention by a vote of 75 to 20, with 40 abstentions" (Goldman and Biggers, 1991: 182). While formally condemning the invasion, Moscow did not seem troubled by it. Soviet objections seemed rather perfunctory, as they indicated that the intervention would not stand in the way of the improvement of East-West relations.

Latin American reaction, however, proved to be much more strenuously opposed to the invasion. Peru, in particular, seemed quite upset. Peruvian President Alan Garcia condemned the U.S. intervention as "brutal, excessive, and arrogant." Venezuela's President Perez, while critical of the invasion, also assessed some blame upon the Latin American community for lacking "the necessary determination to force the Panamanian de facto government to change its stand and permit the free exercise of the people's sovereignty." Perez reassured the Endara government that formal relations would be restored when American troops were withdrawn (Goldman and Biggers, 1991: 183).

On January 18, 1990, President Endara appealed to the world community for international aid. In response, on
January 25, President Bush announced a $1 billion aid package to help Panama recover. Half of these funds were earmarked for housing, public works, and economic assistance. The remainder consisted of export assistance and trade benefits (Keesing's, January 1990: 37181). In an effort to provide immediate assistance, the United States offered $6,500 per family in emergency aid to those in the "El Chorrillo" neighborhood, which had been particularly devastated by the fighting. However, the distribution of this aid proved to be a long, frustrating process (Scranton, 1991: 215).

13. What was the long-term situation?

From a political perspective, although Guillermo Endara did serve his full term as President, his popularity declined. His government came to be seen as white and upper class, either unwilling or unable to reach out to Panama's poor, colored majority. It certainly did not help that the coalition ruling Panama after the American intervention had no governing experience. Once the common enemy, namely Noriega, was gone, the coalition began to splinter. (Leonard, 1993: 111).

Panama's infant democracy faced a critical problem: How do you socialize people to embrace democratic norms, when they never have had any real exposure to a democratic system? Despite popular desire for democracy, questions remained about how well it had taken root. In 1990, police
officers staged what was widely characterized as a coup attempt. American troops had to be called in to suppress the unrest (New York Times, December 21, 1990, Editorial).

Another problem that plagued the new government is that it was seen not only as excessively pro-American, but also too dependent on U.S. advisors. Opposition leader Miguel Bernal summed up the views of many: "If you want something done, you talk to the Americans. Then they tell the government what it needs to do. That's a source of deep shame to the Panamanian people" (Scranton 1991: 228). This image was reinforced by the fact that, as much as a year later, U.S. troops were still patrolling Panamanian streets (New York Times, December 21, 1990, Editorial).

There is reason to believe that, even with all of the trouble that it has had to deal with, Panama has finally completed the transition to democracy with the peaceful transfer of power, as a result of the 1994 general elections. On May 8, left-of-center businessman Ernesto Perez Balladares of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), was elected president with a 33.3% vote plurality. An opposition leader, Mr. Balladares was quite open in identifying himself with the legacy of the late General Omar Torrijos Herrera, national hero and founder of the PRD (Keesing's, May 1994: 40003).

Mr. Balladares' successful campaign benefitted from popular discontent with the austerity policies of the
Endara government. The new President's successful platform pledged an attack on poverty, corruption, and unemployment, as well as advocating higher social spending. Furthermore, Balladares promised to honor his country's debt obligations and to maintain tight fiscal policies. He vowed to prevent a return to the militarism of the past, as well as promising continued good relations with the United States (Keesing's, May 1994: 40003).

Conducted under the watch of some 2,000 local and international observers, among them former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, the voting was judged to be free and fair (Keesing's, May 1994: 40003). "Panamanians turned out in large numbers early in the day and the process was widely reported to have been orderly" (New York Times, May 9, 1994, dispatch by Howard W. French).

Also held on May 8 were legislative elections to send representatives to the 71-seat Legislative Assembly. Balladares's PRD won 21 seats. The right-wing Arnulfist Party (PA) finished second with 12 seats; Papa Egoro (center-left) won 6 seats and MOLIRENA (center-right) won 5 seats. The other seats were won by minor parties. It is perhaps interesting to note that "of 1,500,000 voters eligible, 26.33 per cent abstained" (Keesing's, May 1994: 40003).

From the viewpoint of Panama's police force, the United States was faced with a dilemma in the immediate
post-invasion period. Washington did not desire an open-ended commitment as a constable in Panama, nor did it want the old PDF to continue to act in any police function. After all, the elimination of the PDF as a power in Panama had been a goal of the United States and the Panamanian democratic opposition. But what alternatives were available?

Some in Panama advocated abolishing the PDF and replacing it with a "national police," based on the Costa Rican model. Such a force would serve a police function, but the military role would be abandoned. An alternative proposal called for a "dual force" structure which provided for a national police which would be supplemented by specialized para-military units that would serve an anti-terrorism function. The Costa Rican model was adopted, however; a fast reaction anti-terrorism/anti-crime unit was established in August of 1990 in the wake of a series of major bank robberies (Scranton, 1991: 218).

The United States and Panama agreed that it would benefit both countries if the use of American MPs were phased out. However, a dearth of trained police without connection to the old regime compelled a decision to allow members of the former PDF to serve in the new national police, with the worst elements, of course, screened out by the American authorities in Panama. Nevertheless, there was criticism over the decision to reemploy so rapidly those
who simply declared their loyalty to the new government. This apprehension was reinforced by comments made by police officers that were rumored and reported in the press, such as, "when the gringos go home, we'll take over again" (Scranton, 1991: 221). As a result, many Panamanians came to view the police as little more than the PDF minus 410 pro-Noriega officers (Leonard, 1993: 115).

In order to calm public fears, as well as to maximize civilian control of the armed forces, the roles of the service branches were redefined. A prime example was that the air force and navy were relegated to performance of transport services only. The government sought to abolish the army outright; however a November 1992 referendum on this issue was defeated at the polls.

On August 23, 1994, the Legislative Assembly passed a constitutional reform abolishing the army. The members of the legislative body defended their move by arguing that it was essential to avoid a return to militarism. (Keesing's, August 1994: 40138).

A key question in the wake of the abolition of the army was: who will defend the Canal when it reverts to Panamanian sovereignty? A partial answer may have been found in a June 1992 poll, in which it was reported that 70 percent of Panamanians wanted the United States to maintain a military presence in the republic beyond 2000. For its part, the U.S continued to act as if it were "sovereign
regarding the Canal's defense" (Leonard, 1993: 117). What
the final settlement will be remains to be seen.

14. What elements about this case are unique?

Perhaps most striking about this case is the extremely
close relationship that has been the hallmark of United
States–Panamanian relations. Panama came into existence in
1903 because of the exercise of American gunboat diplomacy
against an intransigent Colombian government (See Chapter
II). The United States has always been involved in
Panamanian politics. As a result, Panamanian leaders have
always believed that they could solicit the USA as an
arbiter in their affairs. Over the years, Washington came
to be viewed as the provider of a political "safety net"
for Panamanian politics. Central to the relationship has
been the Panama Canal, arguably America's most important
interest in Latin America. The treaties under which the
Canal was built and operated had long given certain rights
to the United States, not the least of these being the
right to intervene in Panama to defend the Canal. As a
practical matter, such provisions have given the U.S. a
legal justification to get involved in Panama whenever its
interests have been threatened. Although the 1977 Panama
Canal Treaties greatly reduced the degree of American
"sovereignty" over Panama, the provisions of the treaty
dealing with the defense of the canal allowed considerable
latitude in interpretation. The practical result of the new
pact was to leave the basic relationship between the two countries unchanged. In addition, Washington has frequently been called on to supervise Panamanian elections (Scranton, 1992: 343-47).

A byproduct of this close relationship was the enthusiastic support Panamanians gave to United States intervention in 1989. Because of Washington's long-standing, tacit support for dictatorship in Panama, an invasion was seen by many Panamanians as an attempt by the United States finally to correct a wrong that it had created. America's military intervention was seen as an acceptable price for getting rid of Noriega, a dictator who currently has the dubious honor of being the most hated leader in Panamanian history. As noted earlier, public opinion polls indicted that the invasion was welcome and that an overwhelming majority of Panamanians favored an American presence for "as long as necessary" (New York Times, January 6, 1990, article by Michael R. Kagay).

A second variable that makes this case unique was the fact that this was not an "invasion" in the conventional sense. Unlike the 1983 Grenada invasion, wherein all troops were shipped in, Panama had been serving as host to over 13,000 U.S. troops permanently stationed there in accordance with the Panama Canal Treaties. This presence lead to an important advantage for American forces.
Officers attached to SOUTHCOM were able to draft effective invasion plans due to a first-hand familiarity with Panama.

Likewise, the troop presence helped to screen the American force build-up and invasion preparations. General Thurman was able to use "routine" maneuvers as a cover for U.S. invasion rehearsals. Such exercises served an additional purpose. Round-the-clock movements without any incidents lulled Noriega into a false sense of security, thus effectively concealing the exact time of H-Hour. Washington was able to maintain the element of surprise.

The presence of U.S. forces in Panama accrued other benefits as well to the invaders. Officers were already familiar with most of the targets selected. Because of their intimate knowledge of Panama, SOUTHCOM intelligence officers were able to directly observe, and thus more fully analyze, the October 1989 coup. The result was that those targets considered most important were identified and the invasion plans were formulated to take them into account, giving them top priority (Crowell, 1991: 79). A third factor was that the United States had complete control of the air. American superiority was never challenged. Thus, Washington was able to make use of slower flying aircraft, such as Apache helicopter gunships, as mobile artillery. (Crowell, 1991: 67, 75).

A fourth variable unique to this case is the Canal itself. Its importance to United States commerce is clearly
evident. Because it cannot be moved or easily replaced, it must be carefully safeguarded. This need for defense by the USA has been codified by the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties, which oblige Washington to defend the Canal until 2000. Owing to the provisions of the treaty, there is a legal basis for American intervention that may not exist in other cases.

Fifth, and perhaps one of the most striking things making Panama a unique case is that it is believed to be the first time ever that drug indictments against a foreign leader were used as a legal justification for military intervention. On June 21, 1989, the Justice Department issued an opinion that granted the president the legal authority to direct the FBI to abduct a fugitive residing in a foreign country for violation of U.S. law, even if the arrest was contrary to customary international law (Leonard, 1993: 103). This opinion cleared the way for the use of military force to obtain jurisdiction over General Noriega (Drohan, 1991: 25).

A final unique element was the personal animus between President Bush and General Noriega. According to a report in the New York Times, this invasion was largely based on visceral feelings Bush had about Noriega and a belief that all diplomatic means to resolve the crisis had been exhausted. The enmity between the two leaders dated back to the early 1970s when Mr. Bush was CIA director under
President Nixon, and a personal meeting between the two in 1983. Noriega's name became synonymous with doubts about the President's judgement. Some have argued, "why was Noriega not dealt with while Bush was at the CIA?" (New York Times, December 24, 1989, dispatch by Maureen Dowd).

Early in his administration, Bush was tagged with a "wimp" label for his failure to deal sternly with foreign crises, Panama being the most prominent among them (Scranton, 1992: 358). This was compounded by Noriega's harassment of U.S. personnel in Panama. The result was an escalating war of nerves between the two leaders (Scranton 1991: 39-41).

15. Was the intervention "successful?"

There are two ways to assess the success of American intervention in Panama. The first is on the operational level. In other words, did the operation actually work out as planned? The other is on the political level. Did the intervention accomplish those goals that prompted its undertaking?

Operationally, Operation Just Cause was almost flawlessly successful. As observed earlier, nearly all operational goals were accomplished within the first 18 hours of the initiation of the mission. Furthermore, the principal object of the invasion, General Noriega, was cornered by U.S. forces at the Papal Nunciature by December 24, 1989, and was captured on January 4, 1990. He was
sent back to the United States to face his drug indictments and was eventually sentenced to 40 years in a federal prison (New York Times, May 9, 1994, article by Howard W. French). Shortly afterward a Panamanian Court tried and convicted Noriega in absentia for murder (Keesing's, March 1994: 39910).

The best way to assess the success of Operation Just Cause in a political sense is to evaluate it in terms of the fulfillment of President Bush's stated objectives. In a December 20, 1989, speech to the nation, the president outlined his objectives: to safeguard American lives, to defend democracy in Panama (and bring Noriega to justice), to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties (New York Times, December 21, 1989, transcript of President Bush's speech).

In terms of safeguarding American lives, the operation was a resounding success. Once the invasion commenced, only 3 of 35,000 U.S. civilians in Panama died. Even military casualties were much lower than expected: Only 23 U.S. servicemen died in action, and 323 were wounded. Panamanian casualties too were low, considering the scale of the operation. The PDF experienced only 314 dead, 124 wounded. American estimates put Panamanian civilian casualties at 500-1000 (Scranton, 1991: 204).

The second goal, the defense of democracy in Panama, would seem ostensibly to have been fulfilled. Within
hours, American troops had deposed the dictatorship and the democratically-elected Endara government was installed. The Panamanian military, a traditional impediment to democracy, was at first restrained and, in 1994, abolished. A national police force now exists, although questions as to its loyalty and integrity may still remain due to the presence of former PDF officers within its ranks. Free and fair elections were held in 1994. This marked the first peaceful transfer of civilian power since 1960, and only the second time in Panamanian history. While the prospects for the survival of democracy appear to be favorable, it is the next national elections which will provide a truer measure of its endurance.

The third goal was to combat drug trafficking. Obviously, the capture of General Noriega had a serious effect on the drug trade. First, it established the precedent that the United States would act, even against a foreign head of state, if the charges were sufficiently serious, documented, and apprehension was possible. Secondly, the elimination of Noriega removed the Panamanian state from the drug business. Unfortunately, the effect has not been as long-lasting as everyone would have liked. In 1990, the United States ambassador to Panama complained the no drug cases were prosecuted by the Endara government. There were even signs that matters were in fact getting worse. "During 1991, numerous commentators asserted that
the drug trade had not only resumed but actually reached levels higher than before the invasion" (Scranton, 1991: 228). As regards this criterion, the intervention was less than a complete success.

A final articulated American goal was "to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties" (New York Times, December 21, 1989, transcript of President Bush's address). As discussed above, the canal was secured almost instantly by U.S. forces. No damage was done to canal facilities and the fighting only forced the closure of the waterway for one day. The successful installation of a democratic government has been reassuring to both Panamanians and Americans concerned with the final implementation of the Canal Treaties on December 31, 1999. The 1994 abolition of the Panamanian military by the nation's Legislative Assembly has, however, posed some questions about Panama's ability to defend the canal when it takes control at the turn of the century. There is the possibility that events since the 1989 invasion have only increased Panama's dependence on the United States to solve its problems (Sullivan, 1991: 173-6). Oddly, this dependence on its benefactor is not unwelcome to most Panamanians. A poll in 1990 showed that 70% of Panamanians want a joint U.S.-Panama administration of the canal (New York Times, January 6, 1990, dispatch by Michael R. Kagay). Although the official position of the United States is to fulfill the
treaty "as is," there has recently been sentiment to review the defense provisions of the agreement and allow an extended U.S. role in the waterway's defense.

Finally, a goal not articulated by the Bush administration, but certainly not unwelcome, was its effect on the President's political fortunes. The invasion was instrumental in helping Bush shake his "wimp" label. To most Americans, the president finally appeared as a decisive leader in the foreign policy realm. The President's popularity skyrocketed. The action was so popular that even an adversarial Democratically-controlled Congress generally supported the action. Senator Gore went so far as to send his congratulations to the President. Only those on the far left of the political spectrum, like Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY), expressed criticism. Clearly this intervention was a turning point in President Bush's administration. In terms of popular perception of his leadership, Operation Just Cause was a great success (New York Times, January 5, 1990, article by Michael Oreskes; December 21, 1989, article by Thomas L. Friedman).

In conclusion, Operation Just Cause seems to have been an impressive success by almost any standard. However, the goal of stemming the flow of drugs through Panama may have been too ambitious, given both the weakness of the new democratic government, and the pervasiveness of drug activities globally. This failure notwithstanding, U.S.
intervention seems, on the whole, to have been a success and Panama is much better because of it.
CHAPTER V

IRAQ: OPERATION DESERT STORM

Introduction

For most of the decade following the proclamation of the Carter Doctrine in 1980, it was taken for granted that any threat to the Middle East that would trigger an American military response would surely come from the Soviet Union. During the 1980s, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran appeared to emerge as another serious threat to friends of the United States in the Persian Gulf. In order to contain Iran, as well as to present the possibility of prying an ally away from Moscow, the Reagan and Bush administrations tilted United States policy in the region toward Iraq. Despite his clearly aggressive and militaristic nature, few in Washington seemed to foresee the possibility that Iraq's President Saddam Hussein would turn his war machine on a fraternal Arab nation, especially one that had supported Iraq during its eight-year war against the Teheran theocracy. For this reason, when the dormant border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait was revived in 1990, few expected that armed conflict would be the result. The world community was, therefore, taken off guard when on August 2, 1990 Iraqi
troops poured across the border and conquered its hapless neighbor.

1. What were the prevailing conditions initially within the "target" country?

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was prompted by a number of considerations. One such concern, which had been festering for nearly thirty years, was Baghdad's claim that Kuwait was a "lost" nineteenth province of Iraq. According to the Baathist dictatorship, Kuwait had been carved out of the former Turkish province of Basra by the British following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Spencer, 1994: 87). The dispute was ostensibly settled by the recognition of Kuwait by the Baathist regime in 1963.

Tensions over the territorial dispute again flared in the late 1980s, as the border had split the valuable Rumalla oil fields between the two states. Consequently, Iraq charged that Kuwait was cross-drilling the oil fields in such a way that the emirate was stealing millions of dollars worth of crude oil. Baghdad charged that, after its "theft," the oil was being dumped on the international market, an action which depressed oil prices below OPEC targets. These actions robbed Iraq of the hard currency that it needed to finance its war with Iran and subsequent rebuilding.

Therefore, in 1990, a dispute flared-up when Kuwait refused Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's demand for reparations which included: up to $10,000 million in aid;
"$2,400 million in compensation for 'stolen' oil; the cancellation of 10,000 million in debts; the renunciation of Kuwaiti claims to the southern section of the Rumalla oil fields; and a long-term lease on the islands of Bubiyan and Warba, both of which lay off Iraq's short Gulf coast" (Keesing's, August 1990: 37632).

Another motivating factor was most likely Saddam Hussein's thirst for personal power and influence. He craved to be acknowledged as leader of the Arab world. Hussein openly sought to become the "New Nasser." Only as such a great leader could he be assured that he would be accorded respect and that his demands would be taken seriously. To have his demands so flatly rejected by his peers was both personally infuriating and frustrating, no doubt motivating him to action.

Such power could be achieved most effectively and rapidly by bold, specifically military, action to seize what Saddam saw as rightfully his. To gain control over Kuwait would give Hussein over 20% of the world's known oil reserves and thus grant him tremendous influence over oil prices should he choose to exercise his prerogative. For Saddam, the invasion of Kuwait would simultaneously force reluctant Middle Eastern leaders to recognize his "destiny" to lead all Arabs, while giving him access to the tremendous wealth that would allow him to "fulfill his anti-Western, anti-Israel ambitions" (Brune, 1993: 21).
When it finally commenced on August 2, 1990, the Iraqi offensive was swift and decisive. Advance elements of Baghdad's army reached Kuwait City within 3 1/2 hours of the start of the operation. Spearheaded by elite Republican Guard units, the invasion proceeded along a three-prong battle plan (Watson and Watson, 1993: 15). One army proceeded directly down the main highway, straight to Kuwait City. The second prong swept west, seizing Kuwait's inland oil fields. The third group moved directly to the Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia. The ultimate purpose of this particular drive, at that moment, was unknown. The invasion was completed by the fourth day of the operation. On August 8, 1990, Kuwait was formally annexed by its conqueror (Keesing's, August 1990: 37635).

The swiftness of the invasion and the resultant proximity of the world's fourth largest army to the Saudi Arabian border was of great concern in capital cities both on the Arabian peninsula and around the world. A fearful Saudi Arabia mobilized its armed forces on August 4. In support, British and French warships in the region moved into the Persian Gulf (Blair, 1992: 13). In a highly unusual move for the monarchy, Saudi Arabia welcomed American offers to arrange a deployment of United States troops onto its soil to defend the Kingdom from a possible Iraqi invasion. Negotiations between Riyadh and Washington quickly produced an agreement. With the consent of the
Saudi Uлемma, the deployment of American forces on Saudi soil began immediately (Brune, 1993: 57).

In Kuwait, the initial post-invasion situation was fairly calm. Highly disciplined republican guard units maintained order. Such units, however, were soon relieved by the Iraqi General Army, conscripts who lacked the professionalism of the more elite units. Almost immediately, this "uniformed rabble" began to engage in atrocities and various crimes against their newly incorporated countrymen (Rezun, 1992: 72-3). Women, both Kuwaiti and foreign alike, were subject to a vicious orgy of rape. Soldiers also engaged in widespread looting, particularly in affluent Kuwait City, much of it organized by the Baghdad government. Between $3 and $5 billion in gold, foreign currency, and goods were transferred from Kuwait to Iraq. Finally, and perhaps most ominously, the Iraqi secret police dispatched operatives to Kuwait City in order to round up Iraqi opposition exiles, focussing on Communist and fundamentalist Shia opposition figures (Keesing's, August 1990: 37633).

In order to intimidate civilians and discourage resistance, torture became a prominent feature of Iraqi occupation. In one particularly heinous episode, Iraqi secret police cornered a prominent Kuwaiti banker in his house and gouged his eyes out, while shouting insults and ridicule at him. In a final act of disdain, the Iraqis
chainsawed him in front of his family, tossing his dismembered head into the gutter (Rezun, 1992: 73). The story that most outraged world opinion, however, was the one told before a United States Congress committee, in which Iraqi troops removed Kuwaiti infants from their hospital incubators, only to have the machines wantonly destroyed. The accuracy of this tale was subsequently called into question, but its effect was decisive in galvanizing world opinion against Iraq.

The reaction of the world community to the invasion was outrage. The problem was immediately brought before the United Nations in search of a peaceful resolution through diplomatic pressure. Between August 2 and November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council passed 12 resolutions aimed at securing an Iraqi withdrawal. The first was UN Security Council Resolution 660, which passed unanimously, with Yemen not participating. This resolution demanded the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, as well as calling for negotiations to settle outstanding issues. This was the diplomatic "cornerstone" upon which all subsequent resolutions would be based. The more important of these resolutions included:

UNSC Res. 661 (Passed 13-0, with Cuba and Yemen abstaining). This resolution imposed mandatory sanctions against trade with Iraq and occupied Kuwait.

UNSC Res. 662 (Passed unanimously) This act voided the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.
UNSC Res. 665 (Passed 13-0, with Cuba and Yemen abstaining). This allowed the use of military force to enforce the embargo. (Keesing's, August 1990: 37639).

The resolution with the greatest potential effect on the situation, however, was UNSC Res. 678. This resolution set the deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait on January 15, 1991, after which time the world body authorized allied military action to eject the invaders. It was generally understood that January 15 was the deadline at which time military operations would in fact commence if the resolutions were not complied with (Keesing's, January 1991: 37934).

**Military Build-Up**

Within days of the Iraqi invasion, President Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met at Aspen, Colorado, where Thatcher convinced Bush of the seriousness of the situation and of the need to send troops to head off a possible Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. The Prime Minister believed that only the United States was capable of projecting enough force, with sufficient rapidity, to deter Saddam from proceeding farther. The President agreed, but needed to get support from within the Gulf region before he could deploy the ground forces necessary to contain the invaders (George et al., 1993: 21).

The Saudi Arabian Ambassador was consulted by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and General Colin Powell in an effort to secure approval to station American
troops on the Saudi frontier with Kuwait. Although traditionally reluctant to allow foreign troops on their soil, the Saudis were convinced that it was necessary when they were presented with reconnaissance photos showing a massive Iraqi build-up on their border.

Once Saudi Arabia granted permission for troop deployment on its territory, other states promptly followed suit: Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. The next task for the United States was to begin to forge an alliance of nations to face down Iraq. This was done not just to avoid the appearance of the deployment as a case of American neo-colonialism, but also to distribute the burden, both fiscally and militarily, of deterring Hussein among those nations which would benefit from doing so. Furthermore, the formation of such a coalition would make it unmistakenly clear to the Iraqi dictator that it was the entire world community that stood against him (George et al., 1993: 22).

The number and variety of forces committed to Operation Desert Shield varied greatly. Nonetheless it is a tribute to the diplomatic skills of President George Bush that he was able to forge an alliance of some 34 nations, spanning six continents (Blair, 1992: 125). Although the largest and most operationally diverse forces came from the major powers (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Italy), it is indeed important to note that other nations also sent fairly large contingents. The fact
that Egypt provided 40,000 troops and Syria some 20,000 men made it substantially more difficult for Saddam Hussein to rally support from other Arab governments by portraying the standoff as Iraq defending Arabs and/or Islam from "American imperialism." Rather, the scope of the coalition underlined to the Iraqi dictator that he was indeed isolated, an international pariah. Only Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would offer Saddam any support.

Immediately after the invasion, President Bush ordered a carrier group to the Persian Gulf (CQWR, August 4, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty, 2533). On August 13, 1990, allied warships in the region began enforcing a naval blockade against all Iraqi shipping violating UN-imposed sanctions.

On August 7, Defense Secretary Cheney announced the dispatch of United States aircraft to Saudi Arabia. These planes were to be based principally at the Saudi air base at Dahran, near the Kuwaiti border. That same day, the first U.S. ground troops began to arrive. The largest American deployment since Vietnam was underway (Keesing's, August 1990: 37636).

By August 25, over 86,000 allied troops had arrived in Saudi Arabia, over 40,000 of which were American. Meanwhile, a massive show of United States naval power began to develop in the waters surrounding the Arabian
peninsula. Four carrier groups poised for action should it prove necessary: The USS John F. Kennedy in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, the USS Eisenhower in the Red Sea near Suez, the USS Saratoga, also in the Red Sea, and the USS Independence off the coast of Oman (Keesing's, August 1990: 37634).

In order to free more troops for possible action in the Persian Gulf, yet maintain deterrent strengths at other American vital points (i.e. Germany, Korea), President Bush issued an executive order which called up reservists. Such mass mobilization had not occurred since 1968, the height of the Vietnam War.

The projection of American air power from the continental United States and Europe to the Middle East, in terms of both time and distance, was the largest in history. The deployment of warplanes entailed some 46% of the total combat force based in the United States. The airlift of personnel and munitions was equivalent to one 1948 Berlin airlift occurring every six weeks (Alonso et al., 1993: 61).

Air power was deployed in two phases. Phase One, which lasted five weeks, gave the coalition forces superiority in both defensive and offensive aircraft. Phase Two, which ran from November 8, 1990 through January 15, 1991 succeeded in doubling the number of coalition aircraft present in the Kuwait theater (Alonso et al., 1993: 62).
As the January 15, 1991 deadline approached, diplomatic efforts to break the impasse failed. Saddam Hussein was intransigent and the increasing international pressure seemed only to stiffen further his resolve to resist. By the deadline, however, the coalition forces were in place. The allies were poised for war.

2. **Why did the United States choose to get involved?**

The most obvious reason why the United States chose to get involved in this crisis is that the Middle East is considered to be a region vital to the national interest, indeed to national survival. The magnitude of this commitment was underscored by the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine during the 1980 State of the Union speech. During this address, the President made it clear that any attempt to disrupt the free flow of oil by any power would be considered an act of war which would, if necessary, be responded to with military force (Brune, 1993: 52) (For a more detailed discussion of the Carter Doctrine and the circumstances prompting its formulation, see Chapter II.)

This 1990 episode was particularly threatening to American interests because the conquest of Kuwait raised Iraq's control of total known oil reserves to 20%. If Saddam's army were to overrun Saudi Arabia, the dictator would then hold some 60% of the world's most important commodity. Even without the conquest of Saudi Arabia, Hussein's share was sufficient that he could effectively
disrupt the free flow of oil at market prices; an action that would play havoc with the economies of the Western democracies, and thus the world (Brune, 1993: 53).

Another reason for United States involvement was the need to check Iraqi aggression. With the rise of democracy in Eastern Europe, and elsewhere, it was hoped that a "New World Order" was emerging, at least in the sense that nations would shun war as a policy instrument. Hussein's naked aggression was, therefore, an apparent attempt to "swim against the current" of recent history. Considering its implications for the U.S. economy, as well as stability in the Middle East, President Bush was determined that, regardless of the means employed, Iraqi aggression must be rolled back. As he stated in a September 11, 1990 speech to a joint session of Congress:

America and the world must stand up to aggression. And we will...An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors, neighbors who control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless and we won't.

Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt America's credibility and reliability (CQR, September 15, 1990, transcript of address by President Bush: 2954).

To the world, and now to official Washington, Saddam was a monster, or as President Bush put it: "another Hitler." It is common knowledge that Hussein's Iraq is in
an "elite" group of nations (along with the likes of Iran, North Korea, and Cuba) that has set the standard by which political repression and human rights violations are measured. Thousands of opponents have been killed or exiled. Hussein's most "outstanding" achievement, however, has been the use of chemical weapons on his own subjects during the suppression of a Kurdish rebellion in the 1980s. His existing reputation for ruthlessness was magnified when he detained foreigners in Iraq, as well as kidnapping Kuwaiti civilians, for use as a "human shields" so as to discourage retaliation for his aggression (Brune, 1993: 66). When President Bush, therefore, compared Saddam to Hitler, and the situation in the Gulf to that on the eve of World War II, many in the public agreed that there should be no accommodation for Hussein, no Middle Eastern Munich Pact (Rezun, 1992: 76).

In the immediate aftermath of the invasion there was a genuine fear of Iraqi military capabilities with regard to the Persian Gulf region. With 1,000,000 men under arms, Iraq possessed the world's fourth largest army; an army that had become seasoned by eight years of war with Iran (Keesing's, August 1990: 37633). As awesome as such a large military force was, it paled in comparison with the threat posed by Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Although its original breeder-reactor was destroyed by a 1981 Israeli air raid, by 1990, Iraq's nuclear program was sufficiently
advanced that experts predicted that an operational nuclear device was within three years of completion.

Soviet-built Scud missiles, modified to increase their range, would allow Baghdad to hit targets throughout the Middle East and Turkey. Furthermore, Iraq was developing significant chemical and biological warfare capabilities. Polling data showed that most Americans favored war if Iraq posed a nuclear threat (Brune, 1993: 67).

This fear of Iraqi capabilities lead to a concern that, if the United States did not get involved in the crisis, Israel might be tempted again to knock-out Saddam's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction. After all, it was a virtual certainty that this arsenal was developed with the intention of eventual use on the Jewish state.

Reasons for the Offensive War

The discussion above has outlined the reasons for initial American involvement in the Persian Gulf. Operation Desert Shield, however was ostensibly a "defensive" deployment. There are several additional reasons why it was decided that offensive operations should be undertaken in January 1991 to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

The most prominent reason was a belief that, after six months of an extremely tight embargo, sanctions were not having their desired effect; all that they in fact accomplished was to starve the poor. In the view of American military experts, the expected degradation of
Iraqi military readiness never came (U.S. News and World Report [U.S. News], 1992: 187). Although some in the White House (principally General Powell) argued for more time, perhaps up to a year more, for sanctions to work, other concerns more than offset their arguments.

The most important of these arguments was that the international coalition, composed as it was of extremely disparate states, could not be held together indefinitely. The state of readiness of coalition troops was a second factor. Because of the need to "rotate out" forces, readiness could not be maintained under the operational and environmental conditions imposed by Desert Shield for a prolonged period. Furthermore, if Saddam managed to turn the situation into a Arab-Israeli conflict during the additional waiting period, there was a real possibility that the coalition could be shattered by essential Arab participants withdrawing their forces (Brune, 1993: 97; Hilsman, 1992: 84).

There was also a concern about the effect of the weather on military operation against Iraq. Optimal conditions for warfare on the coalition's terms would exist only for a brief period between mid-January and mid-March. To launch offensive operations any later would put the coalition at a disadvantage due to summer heat (Tsouras and Wright et al., 1993: 89).
There was a cultural factor that affected the timing of the ground war. Ramadan, the Muslim holy month of fasting and repentance, was scheduled to begin on March 17. To fight during this period would cause undue friction within the coalition, as well as allowing some propaganda advantage to accrue to Saddam in the eyes of fellow Muslims.

Finally, it was President Bush's strong conviction that negotiations had reached an impasse. Any further talks were viewed as a cynical attempt by Saddam to stall for more time (Hilsman, 1992: 92-3).

All of these factors, combined with the growing realization that sanctions alone would not force Hussein from Kuwait, lead to the decision to launch the offensive (CQWR, January 19, 1991, transcript of address by President Bush: 197). Desert Shield would now become Desert Storm.

3. What were the intended results, or objectives, of American intervention?

During an August 8, 1990 address, President Bush enumerated those goals which would form the basis of United States policy regarding Iraq. These goals included (1) the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from occupied Kuwait, (2) the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government (the al-Sabah monarchy), (3) the protection of the lives of U.S. citizens in Iraq and Kuwait [as noted above, many were being held as "human shields"], and finally (4) the establishment of regional security and
stability in the Persian Gulf basin (Keesing's, August 1990: 37638).

There seemed to be, however, an additional, hidden objective. The fourth goal, the one concerning regional stability, seemed to indicate the specific goal of removing Hussein from power and neutralizing Iraq's war machine, as well as its stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. This was at least partially confirmed by Bush himself during his January 16, 1991 address from the Oval Office when he stated:

We are determined to knock out Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's artillery and tanks will be destroyed (COWR, January 19, 1991, transcript of address by President Bush: 197).

Although Bush would later deny any intent to kill or remove Saddam, it was made clear by the selection of certain targets, in particular a bunker that he was known to use, that the Iraqi dictator was a target. The air force even developed, and used, a new "bunker-buster" bomb that could penetrate layers of concrete and reinforcement (for a detailed discussion, see U.S. News, 1992: 3-6).

Bush's speech also revealed a fifth, more long-term objective: the establishment of a "New World Order." In the aftermath of the Cold War, Bush envisioned a world system that recalled Kissinger's *A World Restored*: international relations guided by certain principles that were enforced by the world community at large. In Bush's conception, the
United Nations would fulfill this role as a global enforcer in order to insure compliance. As the President stated:

Out of these troubled times... A New World Order - can emerge: a new era - freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world... can prosper and live in harmony (COWR, September 15, 1990, transcript of address by President Bush: 2953).

Later, he defined the New World Order as "a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations." Furthermore, Bush foresaw "an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise envisioned of the UN's founders" (COWR, January 17, 1991, transcript of address by President Bush: 197).

The Bush objectives were largely, although not totally, codified into UN policy by UNSC Res. 678 which authorized the use of force to enforce the earlier UN resolutions concerning Kuwait. Specifically, it was the "enabling legislation" which would allow enforcement of Resolution 660. It was careful, however, to limit the United Nation's commitment simply to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Given the broader American objectives, however, there seemed to be a tension between Washington's and New York's objectives. The most obvious question emerging from this tension was: could the armed forces of the United States "legally" remove Hussein from power during the course of the war? [The full text of all U.N. resolutions

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can be found in the appendix of U.S. News and World Report, 1992].

Operational Goals

The operational goals for the Gulf War were developed by the Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Norman Schwarzkopf and his staff as early as 1990. The first phase of the war was going to be an extensive air campaign. The allies were to establish air superiority at the earliest possible time. If command of the skies could be quickly achieved, it would have the dual effect of both simplifying the achievement of the other operational objectives as well as reducing coalition casualties (Hilsman, 1992: 84).

The initial air campaign would not be aimed at Kuwait, but rather against Iraq itself. This is because it was considered important to "blind" the enemy by destroying radar facilities and to knock out the Iraqi command and control system, much of it located in Baghdad. By destroying these command facilities, it was hoped that enemy forces could largely be immobilized. Since the bunkers where these facilities were located also would be the place that Hussein would most likely be once hostilities commenced, it was hoped that air strikes against them would, perhaps, yield the added benefit of killing the Iraqi dictator (Brune, 1993: 108).
The next operational goal would be to neutralize the Iraqi army in Kuwait by disrupting supply lines, as well as destroying both armor and artillery. Such intense bombing would also have the ancillary effect of demoralizing Iraqi conscripts who made up the bulk of the occupation army in Kuwait (Alonso, 1993: 64). The third goal would be to destroy industrial targets essential to the war effort, such as factories, warehouses, and communications facilities, as well as infrastructure targets such as bridges, roads, and railways (Hilsman, 1992: 96).

Finally, once the ground campaign had begun, coalition armies would swing around the far side of Kuwait and cut-off Iraqi forces from their reinforcements. The liberation of Kuwait would then be achieved with a direct drive of coalition forces from northeastern Saudi Arabia to Kuwait City.

Once hostilities began, however, priorities shifted slightly. Going to the top of the list was the destruction of chemical/biological/nuclear weapons facilities and the hunt for both stationary and mobile Scud missile launchers. The latter was especially important because success would mean destruction of a capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction against coalition bases and/or urban centers. Failure to achieve this goal, however, would leave open the possibility that the Scuds could be used as a V-2 style terror weapon against Israel. If that were to occur,
Jerusalem's entry into the conflict would dramatically change the scenario.

4. **What was the nature of the operation?**

   Operation Desert Shield was a multilateral operation. The coalition forces were drawn from 34 nations, united under the auspices of the United Nations. Despite the official classification as a UN mission, the command of military forces was clearly under American leadership. It should be noted, however, that because President Bush sought, and obtained, a use of force authorization from the world body, he was now bound to act within the parameters allowed by the resolutions that the Security Council had passed since August of 1991.

   Getting the blessing of the United Nations had both advantages and disadvantages. In the months leading to January 1991, Bush was able to use the UN resolutions as both a tool to rally domestic and world opinion and as a means to coerce (or embarrass) the Congress to grant him a use of force resolution (which was passed in January 1991). However, once committed to the UN, Bush was reluctant to exceed the mandate that provided the legal basis for the use of force.

   Although the public rationale for action was rather Wilsonian, specifically the desire to roll back aggression and restore Kuwaiti sovereignty, clearly there was a deeper, underlying motive. It is a matter for debate
whether the major powers, which dominate the UN Security Council, would have been as concerned about the admittedly naked aggression, and the subsequent "death" of a UN member state, if these were the only reasons for involvement. Clearly the commitment of over a half million American soldiers would have been difficult, if not impossible, if it were not rooted in healthy self-interest, in this case, access to the region's oil at market prices. There is no doubt that there was clear outrage and disgust over humanitarian concerns, especially the heinous and flagrant disregard of human rights by Iraq within occupied Kuwait. This, however, seems to have been more of a rallying point for public opinion, rather than a motive to action.

5. What was the American domestic political climate during this crisis?

Throughout the crisis, President Bush's handling of the situation enjoyed majority support in public opinion polls. Although it was at its peak in August of 1990, the President's approval rating for his management of the Persian Gulf crisis never dropped below 50 percent during the months leading to war (COWR, January 5, 1991, article by Holly Idelson: 14). ABC News/Washington Post polls taken during the crisis showed continuous support for military action, if that was what the situation required.

Furthermore, support for such action never fell below 65% during the crisis. On the eve of war, it was recorded as high as 74% (Mueller 1994: 217). As a matter of fact, it
is believed that the slippage of Mr. Bush's personal approval rating in mid-to-late 1990 was due to two other factors. First, some of the reduction in popularity can be attributed to a "spillover" effect from the public's impatience with the President (and Congress) during acrimonious fighting over the budget. One may recall that 1990 was the year that the President broke his famous "read my lips" pledge and allowed congressional Democrats to impose what was, at that time, the largest tax increase in United States history (Mueller, 1994: 116). The second force acting to depress the president's polling numbers were those hawks, generally more politically conservative voters, who did not think that Mr. Bush was going fast, or hard, enough in pressuring Saddam Hussein. They demanded more militaristic rhetoric and stepped-up preparations for action (COWR, January 15, 1991, article by Holly Idelson: 16).

However, as is the case with all polling data, and consequently a weakness of quantitative methods, by changing the phasing of a question, the pollster can manipulate its results. For example, in an NBC News poll taken in early December 1990, respondents were asked: "Would you favor or oppose the U.S.' going to war against Iraq if Iraq does not withdraw its troops from Kuwait by the United Nations deadline of January 15?" The answer was 54 percent in favor, 34 percent opposed, with 12 percent
undecided. However, when given a choice between force and a continued embargo, there was an almost even split. Presented with yet a third scenario, should the United States go to war if other nations did not contribute "significant military forces," the numbers dropped to 34 percent in favor, 58 percent opposed, and 8 percent undecided. The same poll showed that the dovish position of getting an agreement that would get Iraq out of Kuwait, but in return give Baghdad some control of the disputed oil fields, had the support of a slim majority of Americans. However, in another poll, 49% said that a successful United States policy must not only secure Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, but also remove Saddam from power, a position more hawkish than articulated U.S. policy goals (CQWR, January 5, 1991, article by Holly Idelson: 15). Because of shifts such as these, pollsters cautioned against using any single polling question as a definitive reading of the public mood. (For a more detailed account of various polling data and their interpretation, see Mueller, 1994).

**Congressional Mood**

In the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, there was strong bipartisan support for the President's policies regarding the Persian Gulf crisis. Even liberal Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) conceded: "My own view is that at some point military action is probably going to be necessary" (CQWR, August 4,
1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 2533). The House gave its solid support to a hard-line policy against Iraq by passing a tough sanctions bill by a vote of 416-0. Although the Senate declined to sign on to that particular measure, it did pass a resolution essentially endorsing the policy of the Bush administration. Passing by a vote of 97-0, the resolution urged the President to seek a diplomatic solution, while conceding that a multilateral military action "may be needed to maintain or restore" regional stability. It should be noted that both houses did pass anti-Baghdad sanctions as amendments to farm bills in late July (COWR, August 4, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 2533).

Democrats, however, admonished the President that their support in the early stages of the crisis was not a blank check to engage in military operations without congressional consent. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) stated "approval for past actions isn't blanket approval for all future actions" (Doherty, September 1, 1990: 2777). This sentiment was echoed by Rep. Dante Fascell (D-FL), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee: "Nobody wants to give the administration an open-ended commitment" (COWR, September 8, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 2838).

Some Democratic critics of President Bush were concerned, even early in the crisis, that the
administration should act, if at all, only with allied military and financial support for the action guaranteed. One such voice was that of Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO): "I have real questions obviously about what we're doing to get some real substantial support from our allies besides votes in the United Nations" (CQWR, September 1, 1990, report by Carroll J. Doherty: 2777). Senator Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was more adamant, stating that he would not give advance authorization for "unilateral" American military action, advocating instead a multilateral approach (CQWR, October 20, 1990, report by Carroll J. Doherty: 3536). Even influential Republican Richard Lugar (R-IN) advocated the establishment of an international "United Way" fund to underwrite the costs of deploying U.S. troops in the region (CQWR, September 8, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 2839).

There were, however, equally vocal critics who faulted Bush for not going far enough. Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), normally one of the most liberal members of Congress, insisted that the only acceptable American policy toward Iraq was one which results in the removal of Hussein. Solarz called any resolution that left the Iraqi dictator in power a "Pyrrhic Victory." In early September, Solarz told Secretary of State Baker that he could count on congressional support "for whatever steps are deemed
essential in order to liquidate the consequences of this aggression" (COWR, September 8, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 2839).

Most in Congress seemed to agree with House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt that the United States was the only nation capable of putting together and leading an alliance to compel Iraq to leave Kuwait. Speaking for his party in the response to the President's September 11, 1990 address to a joint session of Congress, Gephardt said: "America is still the leader - the only power capable of summoning a grand and global alliance on the scale we have seen in Operation Desert Shield" (COWR, September 15, 1990, transcript of address by Representative Gephardt: 2956).

As noted earlier, Congress passed resolutions supportive of deployment for Operation Desert Shield and the Bush policy. There was, however, a nagging fear among some in Congress that such on-the-record statements of support might be interpreted by the Bush administration as a 1990 edition of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was used by President Johnson to dramatically escalate American involvement in Vietnam (COWR, September 29, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 3140). Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), for example, spoke of his "strongly held view (that) the commitment of American forces by the President in a major assault to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait would require
an authorization from Congress" (CQWR, October 20, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 3535).

There was also a concern that the President might attempt to present Congress with a fait accompli by not consulting with the congressional leadership until after the inflow of casualties began (CQWR, October 13, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 3440). This feeling had some basis in fact when key members of Congress [specifically Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and William Cohen (R-ME)] were not consulted regarding the deployment of the United States armed forces. Nunn, in particular, claimed that he found out about the initial deployment only "after the fact."

The clamor to compel the President to invoke the War Powers Act as a means of obtaining a de facto declaration of war, however, was not universally acclaimed. Some members, including Rep. Fascell, were fearful that to do so would tie the President's hands during the crisis and embolden Saddam Hussein, a dictator free of such constraints (CQWR, September 29, 1990, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 3142).

A constant refrain heard on Capitol Hill was "no more Vietnams." There seemed to be, however, no consensus about the meaning of the slogan as its meaning shifted from member to member (CQWR, January 5, 1991, report by Holly Idelson: 14). For liberals it meant that the government should not engage in a war without first developing strong
public support, although these members seem to have forgotten that Vietnam was quite popular up until 1967-68 and the Tet offensive. For conservatives, the phase meant that if the country were to commit itself to military action, America should go in "to win." Specifically, this meant giving the army all that it believed it needed to carry out its mission, and then allowing it to do so without the war effort being micro-managed from the White House.

In the months leading up to January 1991, President Bush would not acknowledge the need to invoke the War Powers Act and congressional Democrats were exceedingly reluctant to press the issue (Keesing's, January 1991: 37934). Up until the final debate on a use of force resolution, the attitude of Democrats in both houses toward the impending war was unclear. This was, no doubt, due to a no-win situation that they saw themselves in. If they were to sanction the use of force, the public would hold them as co-responsible with the administration if the war turned into a debacle for American forces. However, if the Democrats were to vote against the resolution, it would be yet another time they would appear unpatriotic, a charge that Republicans had used, with some success, during the Cold War. The split in the Democratic ranks became very obvious when the liberal Stephen Solarz not only became a
leading advocate of war, but also a co-sponsor of the use of force resolution.

After passionate debate, the House approved House Joint Resolution 77 (the use of force resolution) by a vote of 250-183. As was the case in the early Reagan years, the winning side was a nearly unanimous Republican vote (all but 3 representative or 98% of House Republicans) and the preponderance of Southern Democrats.

In the Senate, the vote for Senate Joint Resolution 2 was much closer, passing 52-47. There, 95 percent, or all but 2 GOP Senators voted to approve the resolution. They were joined by 10 Democrats including Senator Albert Gore (D-TN) (CQWR, January 19, 1991, report by Rhodes Cook, Ronald D. Elving et al.: 190). (For an outstanding account of the vote and a breakdown of vote categories, please see Cook and Elving, et al., in CQWR, January 19, 1991: 190-195.)

6. What was the position of the military leadership regarding the operation?

The initial deployment for Operation Desert Shield had the strong support of the senior military leadership. The operation largely conformed to a pre-existing Pentagon contingency plan: Plan 1002-90. This provided for a commitment of forces to defend Saudi Arabia, but provided for no offensive capability (U.S. News, 1992: 42-3). The plan called for the deployment of two combat divisions, plus air force planes and naval vessels. The total
commitment of manpower under the plan was 200,000 troops. It was estimated that it would take 17 weeks to mount this defensive operation (Brune, 1993: 60-1).

A controversial element of the plan as it was originally conceived was that it called for naval aircraft to carry out retaliatory air raids against the aggressor. Such strikes could inflict damage on the enemy, but unfortunately probably could not be sustained without a larger military presence. Early in the crisis, JCS Chairman General Colin Powell declared his opposition to such raids. Believing that such actions would either accomplish nothing meaningful, or worse, actually provoke an invasion of Saudi Arabia, Powell stated: "There was no point in doing a retaliatory strike...You either reverse an invasion or you don't. But to go pinprick at something had no relevance" (U.S. News, 1992: 51). During the Fall and Winter of 1990-91, Powell continued to favor the strategy essentially envisioned in plan 1002-90, that is, militarily "containing" Hussein's forces, while allowing the sanctions to slowly exact their toll (U.S. News, 1992: 157).

General Norman Schwartzkopf, the CENTCOM commander, however, was working on new plans. Such planning, even as a contingency, was necessary because both military and political leaders agreed that a decision on whether to take the offensive would have to be made early so as to allow for a sufficient military build-up in the theater.
Schwartzkopf placed his faith in a group of "young Turk" military planners nicknamed the "Jedi Knights." Their philosophy was that military action should concentrate on the maximum use of speed and mobility in order to defeat a larger enemy force. Haunted by the specter of Vietnam, CENTCOM planners decided that any ground campaign "must be short, sharp, and decisive, with minimum casualties." They believed that this could be achieved by making use of the allies' technological air superiority to soften-up Iraqi forces before the offensive (Tsouras and Wright et al., 1993: 89).

By October 1990, Schwartzkopf was finally comfortable with his defensive position in Saudi Arabia. At this time, President Bush ordered the build-up called for in the offensive plans to commence (Brune, 1993: 61).

Upon receiving the President's order, Powell asked Schwartzkopf, as theater commander, to define what forces would be required for a successful offensive (Brune, 1993: 61). Powell and Secretary of Defense Cheney then went about the business of planning the outlines of the shape that the offensive would take. Because the Iraqis had heavily fortified the Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia, the duo decided to simply bypass the Iraqi defenses. In a maneuver dubbed the "left hook," allied forces would swing west, into the desert interior of Saudi Arabia and cross directly into Iraq. Then, armor would speed across southern Iraq and
cut off Iraqi occupation forces from their reinforcements in Basra. This move, if successful, would force the Republican Guard to race back to Basra lest Saddam's second largest city fall to coalition forces.

Schwartzkopf, as the theater commander, would be given free reign to "fill in the blanks" of the actual execution of the operation as he saw fit (U.S. News, 1992: 168–9). The final plan was presented to President Bush by General Powell on December 1, 1990 and the President accepted it almost immediately (U.S. News, 1992: 168).

One point must be clarified, to the extent possible. General Powell and other military leaders seem to have been in basic agreement that force was necessary, although there was disagreement regarding its timing and nature. It appears from most versions of the deliberations that Schwartzkopf believed that the conditions for action would be optimal in the winter, especially January and February. General Powell, however, argued that sanctions should be allowed more time to work. The result of a continued "siege" of Iraq would be that the enemy would become increasingly hard pressed to obtain spare parts and food, thus greatly reducing his readiness. Bush, pressed by political considerations, endorsed the earliest possible start of the offensive after the expiration of the UN deadline. The stage was set for war.
7. **How was the operation actually carried out?**

The long anticipated offensive, code named Operation Desert Storm, began on January 15, 1991 with a massive air attack (Keesing's, January 1991: 37936). Schwartzkopf's strategy, as was noted earlier, was to use the air war as a means of wearing down the enemy. This was especially appealing for four reasons. First, Iraq presented a target-rich environment. Second, Iraq had no experience against such a massive, concentrated air attack. Third, the availability to the coalition forces of sophisticated munitions gave the allies technological superiority that would maximize the damage inflicted while minimizing casualties. Finally, the relentless pounding would, as it later became evident, destroy morale in the enemy rear (Rezun, 1992: 80).

The first priority of the air campaign was to destroy Iraq's command and control facilities. This began immediately at the start of the conflict at midnight Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). Allied forces made use of their advantages, especially nightfighting capabilities (Hilsman, 1992: 97). The opening salvos of the war were fired by F-117A Stealth fighters and by navy frigates in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea which launched Tomahawk cruise missiles at targets in and around Baghdad.

The F-117A and Tomahawk strikes were aimed at "cutting off the head" of the Iraqi military so that it would be
unable to transmit orders effectively to its troops in the field, thus making coordinated action difficult, if not impossible.

The second priority was to blind radar installations and surface to air defense missiles (SAMs). Helicopter gunships struck these sites almost immediately.

The third priority was to destroy factories, laboratories, and depots, as well as inflicting heavy losses on elite troops dug in the Iraqi rear, along with their supporting tanks and artillery. A final goal was to hit telephone and electrical facilities (Rezun, 1992: 89-93).

The air war was the most intensive air operation in history. During the first 72 hours, coalition forces averaged one sortie per minute (Brune, 1993: 108). Allied aircraft averaged a total of 3,000-4,000 sorties per day (Rezun, 1992: 91). Air forces involved units drawn from the United States, United Kingdom, France Canada, Italy, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (Alonso et al., 1993: 65).

Coalition forces rapidly gained control of the skies over Iraq. Part of the reason for this was that allied quantitative and qualitative advantages allowed the coalition to dominate the inferior Iraqi air force. As a result, Saddam simply conceded the skies to the coalition. After a drubbing in dogfights with coalition aircraft early in the air war, Hussein simply withdrew his aircraft from
the battle zone. About 700 planes were moved to safety in northern Iraq or sent to seek refuge in Iran. The only defenses remaining were anti-aircraft guns and largely ineffective Soviet-made SAMs (Keesing's, January 1991: 37936).

During the course of the war, air to air combat losses were stunningly one sided; the Iraqis lost 35 planes, yet the coalition lost none (Alonso et al., 1993: 70). Total aircraft loss figures were equally impressive. Iraq had 127 planes confirmed as destroyed, 141 estimated losses, and 148 flown to refuge in Iran, for a total of 416 aircraft lost. Coalition forces lost only 63 planes, of which only 24 were American planes lost due to combat (Alonso and Watson, 1993: 228-230).

After destroying major strategic targets in Iraq, the focus of the air war shifted to Iraqi troops stationed in Kuwait and the routes used to supply them. Republican Guard units, 120,000 strong, were heavily attacked at their fortified positions just north of the Iraqi border with Kuwait. By February 3, 25 of the 30 bridges leading to Kuwait had been destroyed. The resulting bottlenecks allowed allied air forces to wreak havoc on the Iraqi supply and communication lines.

The bombing had a devastating effect. By mid February 1991, Iraqi forces had lost an estimated 750 tanks, 650 artillery pieces, and 600 armored personnel carriers in the
Kuwait theater of operations (Keesing's, February 1991: 37983-37984).

Ground Offensive

The allied ground offensive began at 4:00 A.M. local time on February 24, 1991. The coalition launched a three-prong attack over a 480 km. front. The bombing campaign had its intended effect as the allies encountered only light resistance. (Keesing's, February 1991: 37983-37984).

The goal of the allied strategy was to use its superior speed and firepower to engage the enemy in a short war with few casualties by utilizing flanking movements (U.S.News, 1992: 275). Iraqi forces were initially frozen into place by coalition diversionary tactics. Iraqi conventional wisdom was that the allies would open the ground war with an amphibious assault on coastal Kuwait, done with the aim of liberating Kuwait City as soon as possible. Schwartzkopf encouraged this belief by faking the preparations for such an operation. With Iraqi forces thus occupied, the allies were free to execute their strategy (COWR, March 2, 1991, article by Pat Towell, 552).

One prong of the three-prong offensive, composed of Arab divisions and U.S. Marines breached the so-called "strip of death" and drove toward Kuwait City. The advance forces were aided by Iraqi POWs who alerted field commanders as to the location of minefields and other defenses (Keesing's, February 1991: 37985).
Most of the coalition's forces were committed to the "left hook" or the "Hail Mary," as it was popularly known. Rather than attack Kuwait and deal with the elaborate World War I vintage defenses, most of the allied forces were positioned west of Kuwait so as to outflank enemy forces. This second prong consisted of the bulk of allied armor. Outflanking the main enemy lines, these units drove straight into southeastern Iraq. There they engaged Republican Guard units which were dug in just south of Basra.

The third prong, consisting of French and American units, swung far to the west, advancing on the Iraqi city of Nasiriyah on the Euphrates River. Armored units destroyed an Iraqi division near the junction town of As Salam. Once the area was secured, 400 helicopters were used to set up an allied supply base 60 miles inside Iraq (Brune, 1993: 115).

The net result was a rapid, overwhelming victory for the coalition. The first prong liberated Kuwait City on February 27, 1991. The second prong engaged Republican Guard units and soundly defeated them in an intense tank battle. Coalition forces then drove north to lay siege to Basra. The third prong successfully cut off reinforcements from entry into the theater of operation (Brune, 1993: 117). The Iraqis were so quickly and decisively defeated that Schwartzkopf would later assert that if he had turned
his forces northward, nothing could have prevented the capture of Baghdad.

The one-sided nature of the ground war can largely be attributed to the tactics that each side employed. The styles of warfare contrasted so greatly that it has been said that the Iraqis were fighting World War I while the coalition campaign resembled World War III. The reliance of the Iraqis on inferior Soviet weaponry and a war of attrition may have worked against Iran in the 1980s, but they proved no match for a modern army. The coalition's use of movement and its technological superiority virtually guaranteed an allied victory (Rezun, 1992: 94). The war's final major battle was to graphically illustrate this point.

Iraqi forces, ordered to surrender by the coalition, instead chose to retreat northward along the main highway that connected Kuwait City with Iraq. The slow-moving columns, heavily laden with captured booty, were spotted by allied aircraft. In what was described by the press (and some pilots) as a "turkey shoot," the Iraqis were hit on all sides by allied aircraft. The resulting panic caused a traffic jam which allowed attacking aircraft to inflict heavy casualties. The result was a three mile long "highway of death," a near apocalyptic scene of burned out tanks and trucks, along with perhaps thousands of charred bodies (Brune, 1993: 188; Keesing's, February 1991: 37985-6).
Although these airstrikes were criticized as causing needless deaths, it could have been prevented if Hussein had ordered a proper surrender. An angry Schwartzkopf defended the action by reminding his critics that the allies would not attack any Iraqi soldiers who left their vehicles and offered to surrender. Those who chose to flee in tanks or any other military vehicles were to be considered as legitimate targets if they did not comply (U.S. News, 1992: 395-6).

The coalition victory was so overwhelming that President Bush, perhaps taking the sensitivities of his Arab coalition partners into account, decided to end the ground war nearly two days ahead of schedule. Bush declared an informal ceasefire, to take effect at 5:00 A.M. GMT on February 28 (Keesing's, February 1991: 37986).

8. **What types and quantities of forces were used?**

The total of allied forces committed in Operation Desert Storm numbered 700,000 (Keesing's, February 1991: 37986). The United States contingent was the largest by far, as 532,000 American soldiers were deployed to the region. Although information concerning allied aircraft and carrier groups were provided above, it bears mentioning that the United States also dispatched 2,000 tanks to the Kuwait theater of operations.

The positioning of coalition forces in general, and American troops in particular, allowed the allies to strike
at Iraq from virtually every direction. As noted earlier, carrier groups were maintained in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the eastern Mediterranean. Likewise, land-based aircraft were flown from bases in Saudi Arabia (principally the airbase at Dahran), eastern Turkey, and the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean (Tsouras et al., 1993: 241). Diego Garcia had been site for the prepositioning of equipment, as well as a base of operation for massive American B-52 bombers (Brune, 1993: 54; Hilsman, 1992: 115).

Once war had been decided upon, President Bush committed himself to providing the armed forces everything that the theater commander requested (U.S. News, 1992: 172). A wide variety of forces were used in unprecedented numbers, some seeing combat for the first time ever. The types of units deployed can most efficiently be reviewed by outlining the major weapons used. Units of note included the following:

The M1A1 was perhaps the most advanced tank on the battlefield. Given Iraqi chemical warfare capabilities, the M1A1 was especially valuable because its pressurized cabin would have rendered Iraqi poison gas useless in stopping an allied advance. It also has tougher armor than other tanks used (U.S. News, 1992: 166). The M1A1's most important asset was its superior firepower and maneuverability. Its
longer range cannon prevents an enemy from getting close enough to effectively engage the M1A1 (Brune, 1993: 177).

Another weapon that was highly effective against Iraqi armor was the A-10 Thunderbolt. Affectionately called the "Warthog" because of its ugly appearance, the A-10 had the ability to spend up to 45 minutes over a target. This attribute made it ideal for hunting Scud launchers. The "Warthog" was built to fly even if it were heavily damaged. The A-10's real value, however, was in its two major attributes. First, it was a proven tank-killer. Its 30 mm nose cannon fires heavy shells made of depleted uranium and it can carry up to eight tons of ordinance. Among the weapons that it can utilize are lazar-guided bombs and Maverick anti-tank missiles.

Second, the A-10 provides effective close ground support for troops. By flying at a relatively slow 420 mph, it is ideal for ground cover. These planes are able to remain "at station" for two hours on battlefields up to 250 miles from base. While there were only 144 such planes in the Kuwait theater, the A-10 flew approximately 30% of all combat sorties and accounted for more than 50% of the destruction of Iraqi field equipment (U.S. News, 1992: 160, 322).

The F-117A Stealth fighter again saw action in the Gulf. This time it was more extensively used than had been the case in Panama, and it proved to be extremely lethal.
Despite its classification as a fighter, it acted as a very effective penetrating bomber (U.S. News, 1992: 239). Due to its "stealth," that is to say its radar-proof contours, it was consistently able to elude Iraqi air defenses. No F-117As were lost during the air campaign, despite the fighter's central role in destroying enemy air defenses (Brune, 1993: 174).

Although it comprised only 2.5% of the air forces used in the war, the F-117A was responsible for hitting 31% of all Iraqi targets on the first day (Rezun, 1992: 64). The Stealth fighter, however, was not without its disappointments. First, it did not prove to be as effective at hunting Iraqi Scuds as expected (Brune, 1993: 111). Second, the laser-guided bombs that the F-117A used were only 60% accurate, rather than the 90% originally reported. This lower figure, however, still represented a vast qualitative improvement over the conventional bombs utilized during Vietnam (Brune, 1993: 178).

The war in the Gulf marked the first major combat use of so-called "smart bombs." Originally developed as a weapon for use against Soviet forces in the European theater, they come in both laser and optically (using television images) guided models (Alonso et al., 1993: 75). There have been major disputes over how effective such weapons are. This is because, contrary to video presented to the press during the war, such weapons are not 100%
effective. However, while laser-guided bombs accounted for only 7-10% of all ordinance dropped during the conflict, they hit their targets an impressive 80% of the time (Hilsman, 1992: 157).

Another Cold War weapon that saw its first combat use was the Tomahawk cruise missile. Originally developed as a highly accurate drone that could deliver nuclear warheads deep within Soviet territory by flying below defense radar, the Tomahawk was perhaps the most technically sophisticated weapon in the coalition arsenal. Fired from navy missile frigates, these missiles have on-board computers that contain electronic maps which help the Tomahawk closely follow topographical contours and allow for extremely specific targeting. It is reported to be so accurate that it can be programmed to fly through a building's window to strike at an internal target (Rezun, 1992: 84; U.S.News, 1992: 222). A total of 284 Tomahawks were fired during the 38 day air war.

Originally believed to be able to hit its target as much as 85% of the time, some of the Tomahawk's critics contend that its accuracy was probably closer to 50 percent. However, as is the case with smart bombs, even this lower figure indicates an improvement in missile accuracy (Brune, 1993: 108, 179).

A major advantage of cruise missiles, like the Tomahawk, is that they greatly reduce pilot exposure over
heavily defended targets, especially during daylight hours (Alonso et al., 1993: 64). Used as a means of destroying enemy airfields, it was also said to have been more effective than bombs in destroying hardened bunkers. The effectiveness of the Tomahawks was further improved when they were used in conjunction with unarmed drones which diverted and confused enemy defenses (U.S. News, 1992: 223).

The weapon that is perhaps most closely associated with the Persian Gulf War is the Patriot Missile. Presented to the public during the war as an anti-missile, it was originally to be used as the ground-based component of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or "Star Wars"). During the conflict, it was deployed as a defense against Iraqi Scud missile terror bombing against Saudi Arabia, and later, Israel (Rezun, 1992:84). Patriot battery operators man radars that track incoming missiles and then fire Patriots to destroy them.

In assessing the success of the Patriot, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. During the war itself, the weapons achieved an almost mythical fame as a sort of "silver bullet" that would always successfully intercept and destroy incoming missiles. Although some damage resulted due to falling debris, the Patriot acted as a powerful psychological tool when the United States deployed batteries in Israel. As such, it may have provided
essential reassurance to the Israeli public, thus keeping Jerusalem from retaliation which could have threatened the unity of the coalition.

9. Was the conflict limited in scope?

In a word, the answer to this question is "yes." The war was successfully confined to the Kuwait theater of operations which included Kuwait, southeastern Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia. There were, of course, several attempts by Saddam Hussein to expand the war (Keesing's, February 1991: 37984). The most important of these attempts was the use of Scud missiles to strike civilian centers in Israel as a means of goading Jerusalem into intervening against Iraq. Saddam was convinced that by getting Israel to respond, he could split the coalition by transforming the conflict into an Arab-Israeli war. Israel, bowing to pressure from the United States, did not take the bait and this gambit failed miserably.

Although it is unclear whether this was the case, it is possible that the flight of Iraqi aircraft to Iran was actually an attempt to draw Teheran into the war as Hussein's ally. One can only speculate whether coalition violation of Iranian airspace to pursue the fleeing Iraqi planes would have induced the Iranians to respond.

10. What was the nature of the theater commander's power and influence?

In planning the prosecution of the Gulf War, the influence of the theater commander, General Norman
Schwartzkopf, was great indeed. As noted earlier, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Colin Powell was in favor of the initial deployment for Operation Desert Shield (U.S. News, 1992: 65). As for the actual planning of the options to be used later, Powell assigned the duty to CENTCOM commander Schwartzkopf since the Middle East fell under his purview. Although the Pentagon already had a contingency deployment plan, which allowed Desert Shield to be activated as rapidly as it was, Schwartzkopf's staff believed that this plan provided for too small a force to engage in an operation capable of expelling Iraq from Kuwait should such action prove necessary (U.S. News, 1992: 65).

By mid-October 1990, General Schwartzkopf was comfortable with the defensive position of the coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. When the President was informed of the status of allied forces in the region, he ordered plans and preparations to be readied for a possible offensive. At this time, Powell requested Schwartzkopf to define the nature and number of forces that he believed would be required to undertake offensive action (Brune, 1993: 61-4).

General Powell believed that the key to victory would be the use of overwhelming force, relentlessly applied. Put differently, coalition troops should go "all out," defeat the enemy, and get out quickly (Hilsman, 1992: 96). The plan eventually adopted reflected Powell and Defense
Secretary Cheney's outline for victory: a massive air campaign, followed by a "left hook" ground offensive (see above) (U.S. News, 1992: 168-9).

For his part, once he was given the general concept to follow, Schwartzkopf was given free reign to "fill in the blanks" in his actual prosecution of the war (U.S. News, 1992: 170, 400). The "Jedi Knights," Schwartzkopf's inner circle of planners, believed in mobility and speed as essential elements of any ground campaign (see above) (U.S. News, 1992: 159-160). The resulting refinement of the Powell/Cheney plan reflected the new tactics advocated by Schwartzkopf and his staff. It called for a four week air offensive, followed by a massive ground assault. This basic pattern, which would be followed during Operation Desert Storm, had been decided upon by October 1990 (Brune, 1993: 108).

The specter of Vietnam clearly had a strong influence on the planning of the offensive. Once it was underway, the offensive would be short, sharp, and decisive. The main aim was to secure a rapid victory, while keeping casualties as low as possible. It was considered essential by Schwartzkopf that the war be initiated only after the coalition had achieved both quantitative and qualitative superiority in the Kuwait theater of operations (Tsouras and Wright et al., 1993: 89). President Bush greatly sympathized and consequently authorized General Powell to
grant Schwartzkopf anything he needed to achieve a rapid victory (U.S. News, 1992: 172).

The political decision to use force was, essentially, an executive decision made by President Bush. It was a decision made contrary to the advice of General Powell, who argued against an offensive, pleading for sanctions to be given more time. But, for the reasons outlined earlier, Bush was convinced that the war must be initiated. Bush did not seek advice from his military commanders regarding the actual decision to go to war. The President made up his mind after having consulted his most trusted advisor, National Security Advisor Admiral Brent Scowcroft (Hilsman, 1992: 249-50). Once the choice to begin the offensive was made, Bush conferred with Powell and Cheney about the exact time when the operation could be undertaken. They advised the President that the air war could commence as early as 12:01 AM on January 16, 1991, which it did.

As for the actual prosecution of the war, General Schwartzkopf was given carte blanche to act as he saw fit. Gone was any residue of Vietnam and the micro-management of the war that had characterized the Johnson administration. Liberal critics of President Bush's policy of non-interference in the conduct of the offensive argued that his failure to supervise the military more carefully was an abdication of his role as the commander-in-chief which would undoubtedly result in the unnecessary deaths of Iraqi
civilians during the course of the fighting. As one analyst put it: "The long-term political consequences of a decision to bomb particular targets are not the responsibility of military leaders, nor is the military equipped to make such judgements by either training or experience" (Hilsman, 1992: 210).

As it turned out, however, while there were some regrettable civilian casualties, they were not on the horrendous scale that some academics had predicted. In any case, the President was more concerned with the opinion of the American public than with Iraqi sensibilities. The public, in turn, was concerned with very little except that American casualties remain low.

Not much seems to have been revealed about any limitations placed on engaging the enemy. The only publicly known restriction seems to have been that American pilots were required to positively identify their targets so that damage to civilians was kept to an absolute minimum (Alonso et al., 1993: 65). The liberality of the rules of engagement were revealed after the so-called "highway of death" incident, when it was announced that only if Iraqi forces abandoned their equipment and laid down their arms would they be allowed to surrender. Otherwise, they were to be considered as hostile and dealt with accordingly.

General Schwartzkopf's original plan envisioned a 144-hour ground offensive. However, after consulting with his
theater commander, President Bush decided to call a ceasefire after only 100 hours. There seems to have been several reasons for the decision to terminate the hostilities. The most obvious was the "turkey shoot" incident alluded to earlier. There was a real fear that such carnage might split the alliance, with Arab forces refusing to participate further if it meant slaughtering brother Arabs (Brune, 1993: 118; U.S. News, 1992: 395-6).

The second major reason was a desire on the part of the Bush administration not to exceed the United Nations mandate, which was the legal basis for Operation Desert Storm. The UN use of force resolution simply provided for the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Once this was achieved, there was a sense of pressure on the United States to end the war as quickly as possible (Rezun, 1992: 118). Much of this pressure came from Soviet President Gorbachev, who himself was under increasing pressure from hardliners in his own military. It was feared that, if Baghdad were destroyed, these elements in the military and the KGB might use it as the excuse to topple the Soviet leader (U.S. News, 1992: 401).

A third reason for terminating the war was a fear that if Iraq were too severely weakened, it could no longer serve as a buffer against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. The power vacuum that would be created would almost certainly be filled by Iran. As bad as Saddam
Hussein was, to Washington, the alternative was worse (Brune, 1993: 119).

Finally, there was a certain appeal, in a public relations sense, in ending the war at precisely 100 hours. When asked his opinion about the earlier than expected cease-fire, Schwartzkopf was quoted as having replied: "I have no problem with that" (U.S. News, 1992: 396-7).

Other accounts seem to suggest that, his public professions notwithstanding, Schwartzkopf was indeed unhappy about the President's decision. An aid to the General said that Schwartzkopf asked Mr. Bush to give him a few more hours so the Republican Guard units near Basra could be surrounded. Schwartzkopf was also said to have desired to clarify the situation on the battlefield. There was confusion about the location of key units and no provision had yet been made for the establishment of a demilitarized zone to separate the two sides (U.S. News, 1992: 396).

In a broadcast interview, the General claimed that he, in fact, wanted to continue the war and remove Saddam Hussein from power, but that President Bush had ordered him to stop. Shortly afterward, this statement was recanted, with Schwartzkopf calling Bush's decision courageous and "very humane" (Brune, 1993: 118-119).

Clearly, in terms of the actual prosecution of the war, the theater commander had complete authority and his
opinion carried great weight at the White House. However, the more political choices regarding whether to go to war and when to declare a ceasefire were made by the President, although some consultation with the theater commander was engaged.

11. Was there an "exit strategy?" If so, was it adhered to?

There was no formal exit plan as such. However, during the course of the ground war, the Bush administration decided to limit the offensive to 100 hours. In a speech delivered shortly after the ceasefire, President Bush indicated that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as was prudent. The President stated: "I have directed Secretary Cheney to begin the immediate return of American combat units from the gulf" (COWR, March 9, 1991, transcript of address by President Bush, 624). The first group of soldiers returned that day.

By April 4, some 20,000 troops had arrived home and most returned by the summer. As American troops were withdrawn, they were replaced by United Nations observers and representatives of international relief organizations. Formal control of southern Iraq was transferred to the United Nations on April 26 and the last American troops left Iraq on May 6, 1991 (Hilsman, 1992: 167-8).
12. What were the immediate results of the intervention?

Military Situation

In his speech to Congress on March 6, 1991, President Bush declared: "I can report to the nation: Aggression is defeated; the war is over" (COWR, March 9, 1991, transcript of address by President Bush: 632). Indeed, the immediate result seemed to be one of the greatest military victories in United States history. Kuwait was liberated, and the Iraqi war machine all but destroyed. Some Republican Guard Units, although weakened, were spared so that internal order within Iraq could be maintained in the aftermath of the conflict. It was also envisioned by the Bush administration that these units would be necessary to deter any attempts by Iran to exploit the confusion in Iraq for its own benefit.

Damage to Kuwait was extensive, but could not yet even begin to be estimated. Perhaps the most vindictive act committed by retreating Iraqi troops was the setting of all of Kuwait's oil wells ablaze. This act of environmental terrorism so blackened the skies that the noon sky was a dark as night over much of Kuwait. It would cost the Kuwaiti economy billions of dollars in damages and lost revenue in the months it would take to put all of the fires out (Keesing's, December 1993: 39792; Keesing's, February 1991: 37987).
Iraq, too, suffered heavy, inestimable damage to its infrastructure. Most of the phone lines and electrical grid had been destroyed, which, it was estimated, would take years to fully restore. Both Basra and Baghdad had been bombed so heavily that the country seemed to have been regressed to a pre-industrial state. There were severe shortages of medicine, food, fuel, and other necessities (Keesing's, February 1991: 37984; Keesing's, March 1991: 38082).

Iraqi casualties were staggering. It was asserted by some that as many as 100,000 to 150,000 Iraqis may have died during the conflict, although a more commonly cited figure was a total of 100,000 casualties, of which 35,000 were deaths. The British Defense Ministry estimated that 175,000 Iraqis had been captured (Keesing's, February 1991: 37986).

At the time of the initial ceasefire on March 3, 1991, the coalition forces were in control of 15% of Iraq's territory, including most of the coastal area near the city of Basra (Keesing's: March 1991: 38081).

The immediate terms of the ceasefire included: the prompt release of allied prisoners of war held by the Iraqis, help in locating landmines, arrangements to separate coalition and Iraqi forces so as to prevent skirmishes, Iraqi acceptance of responsibility to pay war
damage claims, and for Baghdad to accept the terms of, and to implement, all UN resolutions regarding Kuwait.

During the negotiations for a formal ceasefire, the United Nations added several stringent conditions. Iraq was to renounce terrorism, Baghdad was to accept the 1963 (pre-invasion) borders with Kuwait; it was to destroy all stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons; it was to dismantle all facilities capable of producing nuclear weapons; it was to destroy its Scuds and other missiles; and it was to pledge to never attempt to acquire such arms again (Hilsman, 1992: 168).

Sanctions were eased on food, medicine, and emergency needs, however, a request to allow Baghdad to sell its oil to pay for these goods was denied (Keesing's, March 1991: 38083). The UN also mandated that 25 percent of all future oil revenues were to be set aside to pay reparations (Hilsman, 1992: 168).

**Economy**

The massive bombing campaign that opened the war, as was noted earlier, inflicted extensive damage on Iraq. Observers described the destruction as being "near-apocalyptic," relegating Iraq to a "pre-industrial age" (Keesing's March 1991: 38082). The lack of food and other necessities lead to rationing. A black market soon emerged that made many items available, but only at staggering prices (Hilsman, 1992: 169). The International Red Cross
sent emergency food and medicine to ward off starvation and epidemic (Keesing's, March 1991: 38082).

Sanctions were kept in force pending Iraqi compliance with all United Nations resolutions. It was the position of the United States, as well as the western allies, that Iraq would be allowed no oil sales or the lifting of sanctions until at least two major demands were met: (1) the dismantling of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles, and facilities capable of producing nuclear weapons and (2) Iraq payment of up to 30% of future oil revenues to Kuwait as reparations (Hilsman, 1992: 170).

**Political Situation**

As the Gulf War ended, Iraq was instantly faced with the outbreak of two major rebellions that threatened to dismember the country. In the south, the Shiite majority and "Marsh Arabs" revolted, and in the north, the long-smoldering Kurdish rebellion flared anew.

The southern rebellion began in the Basra area on March 1, 1991. It quickly spread to other southern cities including Nasiriyha, Karbala, and Najaf, even reaching to the very suburbs of Baghdad itself. The reported aim of the rebels was to establish a state with an Islamic government, presumably resembling that of neighboring Iran.

On March 5, government forces began to counterattack. Spearheaded by the surviving units of Hussein's Republican Guard, armor and heavy artillery pounded rebel forces in
fierce fighting. Saddam's forces, while gaining the upper hand in battle, were having trouble holding what they had captured. As soon as government troops pushed on from a captured area, rebels would reclaim much of the lost territory.

The rebellion was brutally repressed, as 30,000 were believed to have died in shortly over a week of fighting. Government troops were ruthless in their vengeance, as they executed large numbers of captured guerrillas and civilians. By mid-March, Basra had been re-taken by government forces. At the end of March, the rebellion in the south had been subdued (Keesing's, March 1991: 38081).

In northern Iraq, the Kurdish minority took advantage of the post-war disorder to resume their intermittent rebellion. This time, the rebellion was centered near the city of Mosul and the Kirkuk oil region. As in the south, the rebels initially enjoyed spectacular success, threatening to completely overrun Iraqi Kurdistan.

The tide of battle soon began to turn. Iraqi forces used air raids and heavy shelling in a counterattack that lead to the recovery of the major cities by early April. As a result, three million refugees retreated into the mountains in the extreme north of Iraq in order to escape certain retribution and possible genocide. The Iraqi army made use of fixed-wing aircraft (in violation of the UN ceasefire agreement) as well as chemical bombs and
phosphorus shells against rebel forces. Furthermore, it was confirmed that napalm was being used against retreating civilians.

Kurdish guerrillas were able to check the Iraqi advance with heavy fighting near Sulaimaniya. Toward the end of April, Saddam offered to grant "limited autonomy" to the Kurds. Kurdish leaders, however, while open to the negotiations, warned that wide differences existed between the two sides as to the actual nature of "autonomy" (Keesing's, April 1991: 38126-7).

A common link between both rebel groups was the sense of betrayal by the United States. For months, Washington had not-too-subtly encouraged the rebellions, but then did nothing to support the insurgents. The parallels to the ill-fated Hungarian rebellion of 1956 were obvious. Speaking for the Bush administration, State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutweiler denied that Washington ever had called for an uprising against Hussein, reminding reporters that the overthrow of the Iraqi dictator was not a stated American objective.

It is undeniable that Bush had encouraged such uprisings through his fiery rhetoric both before, and during, the Gulf war. However, Bush apparently developed "cold feet" after the war's conclusion. The President realized that, despite the emotional satisfaction that Saddam's overthrow would provide, the collapse of Iraq
would undoubtedly create a power vacuum that Iran, Syria, or both would attempt to fill. Neither of these prospects was in the long-term interests of the United States. The expansion of Iran would be particularly troublesome due to the fact that its brand of Islamic fundamentalism would then be even closer to Israel.

Furthermore, Washington's Turkish allies were alarmed at the prospect of an independent Kurdish state formed from northern Iraq. Most Kurds reside in Turkey, and therefore Ankara feared that calls for a "greater Kurdistan" that would surely follow.

The United States was also afraid, or so it claimed, to directly involve itself in another state's internal affairs. Should Washington embark on this course, it would both set a dangerous precedent for elsewhere, as well as engage it in an open-ended commitment in Iraq.

Ironically, the United States was forced to allow Hussein to remain in power because it could find no credible alternative to the Iraqi tyrant. This, perhaps, explains why Republican Guard units were allowed to survive the war. For better or worse, the status quo assured that internal order was maintained and that greater threats like Iran were kept out. In any case, the Bush administration could encourage a coup by disgruntled officers that would replace Saddam with a more acceptable military regime (New York Times, June 28, 1993, article by Thomas L. Friedman).
As the Kurdish situation became more serious, Bush reversed his non-interference policy. Perhaps feeling a degree of guilt over the plight of the Kurds, the allies set up safe havens along the Turkish border. Named "Operation Provide Relief," this effort established tent cities to house refugees, as well as providing food and medical care. To protect these camps, the United States declared a "no military activity" zone north of the 36th parallel, although the oil region around Mosul was exempted. Any attempt to interfere with relief efforts would be met with military force (Keesing's, April 1991: 38128).

13. **What was the long-term situation?**

**Iraq**

Despite Saddam Hussein's iron-fisted rule, Iraq has been plagued by a degree of political instability. There have been reports of several coup attempts, the most serious of which took place in June of 1992. Rebel officers attempted to assassinate Hussein and seize control of power (New York Times, July 9, 1992, dispatch by Michael R. Gordon). However, a rogue Republican Guard mechanized brigade was intercepted by loyalist forces as it tried to lead or join the revolt (New York Times, July 6, 1992, article by Patrick E. Tyler).

The Bush administration believed that the coup attempt showed that Saddam's hold on power is tenuous. However,
some experts on Iraq drew the opposite conclusion: that Hussein is in very effective control of internal security and that this is proven by his ability to root out such conspiracies (New York Times, July 9, 1992, dispatch by Michael R. Gordon). Saddam has purged military units of those whose loyalty has been suspect. Senior military officers have been systematically arrested, tortured, and killed.

Since 1991, the CIA has been authorized to attempt to destabilize the Iraqi government. To this end, covert contacts were made with sympathetic Iraqi citizens and officials. However, JCS Chief General Colin Powell has warned that the only way that Washington could secure Hussein's departure was the use of American ground combat forces (New York Times, July 6, 1992, article by Patrick E. Tyler).

Despite the concern that the war's bombing and the economic embargo would push Iraq back into a "pre-industrial" age, within a year of the end of the conflict an impressive reconstruction effort was well underway. By July 1992, telephone service had been restored in Baghdad, as was limited international service. Gasoline is plentiful and cheap, which has generated perpetual traffic problems.

According to the Iraqi government, by mid-1992, more than 70 percent of the damage done by allied bombing had been repaired, 120 of 134 bridges destroyed were again
functioning, and most of the electrical grid had been repaired. The electrification of the city of Baghdad in mid-1992 had been restored to 90% of 1989 levels. Clearly, much of the phenomenal recovery is due to the availability to Iraq of money from secret funds abroad, as well as help that it has received from other states in evading United Nations sanctions (*New York Times*, July 14, 1992, dispatch by Paul Lewis).

On the diplomatic front, Hussein has engaged the United Nations in general, and the United States in particular, in a war of nerves. Since the end of the conflict, there have been numerous instances of Saddam challenging various aspects of the ceasefire and/or sanctions, only to back down when faced with the prospect of an armed response. Two such instances stand out from the others.

The first was an Iraqi attempt to assassinate former President George Bush. In April 1993, during a visit to Kuwait, Kuwaiti authorities uncovered a plot to kill the American statesman (*New York Times*, June 27, 1993, transcript of address by President Clinton).

In a speech to the nation, President Clinton revealed that both the FBI and the CIA had conducted an investigation which confirmed that Iraq was behind the plot (*New York Times*, June 27, 1993, dispatch by Gwen Ifil). Evidence included forensic data which revealed that the
device used was consistent with those that Iraq had used in the past (New York Times, June 28, 1993: transcript of address by Madalaine Albright).

To punish Saddam, President Clinton ordered the U.S. Navy to fire 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Baghdad from frigates stationed in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf (New York Times, June 27, 1993, article by Tim Weiner). The target selected by the President was the headquarters of Iraqi Intelligence, the undoubted source of both the plot and the bomb. Mr. Clinton asserted that his response was consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which allows for self-defense. During his speech, Clinton called the attempt to assassinate Mr. Bush "an attack against our country and against all American we could not, or have not, let such actions against our nation go unanswered" (New York Times, June 27, 1993, transcript of address by President Clinton).

President Clinton's action was based on the precedent established by President Bush when cruise missile were used to knockout an Iraqi nuclear weapons facility in January, 1993 (New York Times, June 28, 1993, article by Eric Schmitt). The selection of the cruise missile was also based on a desire to limit civilian casualties and to respond in a way that would not prompt Saddam to strike again in an even more spectacular manner (New York Times, June 28, 1993, article by Thomas L. Friedman).
The other major event was the October 1994 crisis over troop deployment near the Kuwaiti border. On October 12, 1994, 80,000 Iraqi troops massed at the border within 20 miles of the UN buffer zone separating Iraq and Kuwait. The alleged reason for this provocation was Hussein's desire to draw the attention of the international community to the crippling effect of UN-imposed sanctions on Iraq.

The United Nations responded by adopting Resolution 949, which placed new restrictions on Iraqi troop movements. The resolution demanded an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi units from the southern region of Iraq and their subsequent return to their bases. It also mandated that Baghdad refrain from acting in a "hostile or provocative manner [threatening to] its neighbors."

On October 7, 1994, President Clinton ordered American warships to move into the Persian Gulf area in order to deter Iraq. Initially 2,000 troops were sent to Kuwait in order to shore up defenses. By mid-October, the United States had deployed 40,000 soldiers, 600 aircraft, and a naval task force. These forces were joined by 1,000 Royal Marines from the United Kingdom. After several tense weeks, the crisis ended when Iraqi troops were withdrawn unilaterally (Keesing's, October 1994: 40255).

On November 10, 1994, Iraq formally recognized Kuwait's boundaries, which effectively renounced any claim that the emirate was a "19th province" of Iraq. The United
States welcomed this development, yet still refused to lift the sanctions until all other UN resolutions were fulfilled (Keesing's, November 1994: 40302-3).

Iraq has formally agreed to accept long-term weapons monitoring. A United Nations special commission stated that Baghdad's stock of 155 mm shells containing mustard gas had been destroyed. Furthermore, Iraq had begun to send irradiated uranium to Russia for disposal (Keesing's, December 1993: 39791).

Kuwait

The oil field fires ignited by retreating Iraqi forces were finally put out, and the wells capped, on November 7, 1991 (Watson and Lewis, 1993: 182). The Kuwaitis then shifted their attention to the removal of land mines (New York Times, October 15, 1992, dispatch by Chris Hedges).

As in Iraq, Kuwaiti rebuilding has proceeded at a rapid pace. The most incredible change, however, has been political. Kuwait's first free parliamentary elections were held in October, 1992. This fulfilled a promise made by Emir Sheik Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah during the period of Iraqi occupation.

The result of the balloting was a huge defeat for the government, as opposition candidates won 31 of 50 seats. It is particularly noteworthy that 19 of the opposition's seats were won by Islamic fundamentalists. The ability of the opposition to effect real change, however, would appear
to be greatly limited because of the secular/religious division, as well as infighting within the ranks of the fundamentalists. A further limit would appear to exist in the form of the Emir's veto power. There is a real fear that if the Parliament goes "too far" in exercising its prerogative that it will be shut down again, as was the case in 1986 (New York Times, October 18, 1992, dispatch by Chris Hedges).

14. What elements about this case are unique?

The Persian Gulf War was unique in a number of ways. First, and perhaps best publicized, was the introduction of ultra-modern Cold War-inspired weapons systems into a conventional conflict. High Tech weapons such as cruise missiles and M1A1 tanks greatly contributed to the speed of victory and low casualty rates. The premier of these weapons systems answered a question that had long been on the mind of defense planners: "Do these weapons really work?" The answer is "yes." Despite their imperfections, these weapons represent a great stride in military technology (Alonso et al., 1993: 73-76).

A second, yet associated, variable was the employment of the new tactics of movement. Speed and mobility were used, in conjunction with the high-tech weapons, to soundly trounce a force that was believed to be larger in size. Furthermore, flanking maneuvers like the "left hook" or
"Hail Mary" were enormously successful (U.S. News, 1992: 159-60).

A less heralded, but profoundly important, difference from past interventions since 1945 was that the Soviet Union sided with the United States. For the first time, America could be absolutely sure that there would be no counter-intervention by another superpower. Therefore, Washington was able to virtually guarantee victory because it could fight without inhibition; it could do whatever it would take to win decisively (Brune, 1993: 55).

Unfortunately, the Persian Gulf War introduced the world to two new aspects of warfare. The first was the use of hostages as "human shields." Hostages have been taken since antiquity, but, never before have civilians been so shamelessly exploited as when women and children were kept on military and industrial sites so as to dissuade allied forces from bombing. The second was eco-terrorism. Partially as a tactic to fill the skies with smoke so as to "blind" allied airmen and partially as an irrational, vindictive act, Iraqi troops uncapped and set ablaze 732 of Kuwait's oil wells. The fires continued for months, blackening the skies over Kuwait. Furthermore, Iraqi soldiers blew apart oil lines and allowed a huge, 30 mile long oil slick to form in the upper Persian Gulf. Although it was probably intended to either block shipping or to foul desalination plants that provided the emirate with
drinking water, the result was that the regional ecosystem was severely disrupted (Watson, 1993: 214; Brune 1993: 111-112). Allied bombers were able to alleviate some of the problem of open pipelines by bombing to seal them.

Another unique characteristic of this case was Saddam's use of terror bombings. Just as the Nazis had used V-2s 45 years earlier, Hussein used modified Scud missiles, not so much to hit military targets, but to terrorize innocent civilians in a country with which he was not even at war. In their modified form, Scuds were so inaccurate that they had no other purpose but to be aimed at cities to kill civilians and intimidate governments (Brune, 1993: 111).

Finally, a unique and very curious feature of the war was that Hussein, while dramatically posturing in the world media, hardly put up a fight, especially during the air war. His concession of the skies to the coalition so early in the war essentially sealed his fate. The Iraqis were so battered, and the destruction so extensive, that when the ground war finally came, the Iraqi troops were all but waiting for the earliest possible opportunity to surrender to allied troops. The only troops that showed any fight in them were the elite Republican Guard. There still is no adequate explanation as to why Saddam did not fight back in the war's early stages. It may just be speculation, but perhaps he knew that defeat was inevitable and so he chose
to simply endure the punishment and, hopefully, in the process make himself into a martyr.

15. Was the intervention "successful?"

The success or failure of the operation as a whole can perhaps best be evaluated by considering the fulfillment of goals on various levels: operational goal, officially articulated political goals, unofficial political goals, and the establishment of a New World Order.

**Operational Goals**

Operational goal established by military planners were achieved with rapid success. At the outset of the war, the allies were able to cut off Iraqi command and control at its Baghdad source. Unfortunately, the bombing campaign also did more damage to the Iraqi electrical grid than was intended, and thus the citizenry was made to suffer (*New York Times*, February 23, 1992, article by Michael R. Gordon).

The allies were successful in gaining control of the skies and the relentless bombing campaign had the desired effect on Iraqi defenses. Baghdad's military was largely destroyed before it got the chance to face coalition forces in the ground war. Soldiers, mostly conscripts, were demoralized by the constant barrage and surrendered en masse to anyone who would take them, including western news crews. The United States military made skillful use of deception. The faked Marine landing in Kuwait succeeded in
diverting Iraqi forces, thus allowing the allied flanking maneuvers to enjoy overwhelming success. Finally, the ground offensive managed to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait and allowed the coalition to move on Basra in only 100 hours, 44 hours ahead of the anticipated schedule. The only operational failure was that the allies were not altogether successful in discovering and destroying Scud launchers and facilities for the development and storage of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

Officially Articulated Goals

President Bush first articulated American policy goals for this intervention episode in an August 8, 1990 speech, and they were subsequently reiterated in later speeches and official policy statements in the months leading to January 1991.

The first goal, to secure Iraqi withdrawal (or, if necessary, expulsion) from Kuwait, obviously, was fulfilled. The second goal was the restoration of the legal Kuwaiti government. The Emir al-Sabah was, in fact, restored to this throne after the liberation of Kuwait by coalition forces. In addition, as was noted earlier, a limited democracy has been allowed, although its long-term future remains to be seen.

The protection of U.S. lives in Kuwait and Iraq was the third goal publicly articulated by the Bush administration. As far as civilian lives were concerned,
United States citizens who were being held as "human shields" during the summer and fall of 1990 were released unharmed before the start of the war. These nearly 100 Americans were sent home in early December 1990 (Brune, 1993: 66). As far as American soldiers were concerned, military casualties were dramatically lower than predicted. A commonly accepted figure was that coalition forces would suffer up to 100,000 deaths in the war's first three days (Brune, 1993: 94). Actual casualty figures, however, were astoundingly low: 148 combat deaths, 458 combat wounded, and 120 non-combat deaths (Brune, 1993: 121).

The final articulated goal was that of regional security and stability. In this respect, the war seems to have been a success. For the most part, the Iraqis have been contained. The only aggressive act which Saddam has attempted outside of Iraq (the attempted assassination of President Bush) was a failure, and President Clinton saw to it that Iraq was punished for it.

Whether or not it is directly connected to the war is unclear, but during the course of the last four years since the end of the conflict, the peace process seems to have been revived. Israel is finally at peace with Jordan and has an autonomy arrangement with the PLO. Even Syrian dictator Hafez Assad, long an implacable foe of Jerusalem, seems willing at least to talk about peace.
Finally, the United States has finally gotten something that it wanted under President Reagan's "strategic consensus" but was never able to achieve: the right to preposition supplies in several Persian Gulf states. In addition, the United States also has a security arrangement with Kuwait.

Unofficial Political Goals

Perhaps the most ambitious of this class of political objectives was the unstated, yet transparently obvious, desire of Washington to remove Saddam Hussein from power. This has been a total failure.

In direct contrast to American expectations, Iraqi civilians, at least publicly, assign the blame for their woes to the United States and the UN embargo, rather than their own leader and his ruinous policies (New York Times, July 31, 1992, dispatch by Paul Lewis). As a matter of fact, it seems that the worse conditions get, the more that the Iraqi public rallies to Hussein. There is, of course, a very real possibility that this is actually a reaction based on fear. Living in a ruthless police-state, people know what to say and do in public or before western news cameras. They save their grumblings and dissatisfaction for private airings with family and trusted friends.

It is, however, undeniable, that the Iraqi dictator appears to be at least as powerful, at least with regard to domestic politics, as before the war. It can plausibly be
argued that he is perhaps even stronger and more secure than was the case in 1990 (Hilsman, 1992: 205). His ability to uncover and quash coup attempts seems to imply an efficient secret police apparatus (New York Times, July 9, 1992, article by Michael R. Gordon). Despite CIA operations to destabilize his regime, Saddam's two-faced rule (ruthless, yet benevolent) appears to have earned him support among the Iraqi people (New York Times, July 6, 1992, article by Patrick E. Tyler; July 31, 1992, article by Paul Lewis). An ongoing process of thorough purging has largely succeeded in keeping his military in line and loyal to Hussein personally (New York Times, July 9, 1992, dispatch by Michael R. Gordon).

Another goal, implicit in American policy at the beginning of the crisis, and only later publicly admitted, was the destruction of Iraq's military capability. Much of this goal was achieved during the war, as was demonstrated earlier. As the war was reaching its climax, however, President Bush seemed to be rethinking the wisdom of completely disarming Iraq, especially in light of the regional balance of power. This may explain why the ground war was suspended two days ahead of schedule, allowing the elite Republican Guard and some of Hussein's best tank units to survive (Hilsman, 1992: 205). 700 Iraqi tanks were spared destruction (U.S. News, 1992: 412). Iraq also
retained a considerable proportion of its fleet of helicopter gunships.

As regards the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and nuclear facilities, it seems that bombing did some damage to Baghdad's capabilities and United Nations teams are accomplishing much of the rest. Yet given his history, Saddam must still be closely watched in order to insure his compliance (Hilsman, 1992: 205). United Nations Resolution 715 established a permanent UN monitoring system, complete with surveillance cameras. Once this is operational, Iraqi test sites, installations, and weapons facilities can be more easily policed by international watchdogs (Spencer, 1994: 24).

The New World Order

President Bush, like many Americans in 1991, was very optimistic about the role played by the United Nations in confronting Iraqi aggression. There was great hope that the UN finally had lived up to the vision of its founders. This optimism, combined with a certain sense of euphoric invincibility regarding interventionism, may have had the originally unforeseen consequence of encouraging American intervention in Somalia and Haiti, as well as NATO airstrikes in Bosnia.

If the New World Order were to be worthy of its name, it would need a leader, and clearly that leader was the world's only superpower, the United States of America.
However, while American citizens are understandably reluctant to take on all of the responsibilities that such leadership entails, so too have U.S. leaders become fearful of ceding such authority to multilateral organization, especially the United Nations. As a result, over time the phase "New World Order" has all but disappeared from public discourse. The only exception is its use for the purpose of ridicule, along with other memorable phrases as "voodoo economics" or "feeling your pain."
CHAPTER VI

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE: HUMANITARIAN RELIEF IN SOMALIA

Introduction

The overwhelming victory of coalition force in the Persian Gulf War generated a sense of optimism among American leaders, as well as those of other countries. The United Nations finally seemed to be fulfilling its purpose of creating a better, more secure world. In Iraq, UN-sponsored intervention had rolled back aggression. As a result, President George Bush's New World Order seemed off to an auspicious start.

While the war in the Gulf was being fought, in the East African state of Somalia rebel clan militias toppled the 22-year old dictatorship of Mohammed Said Barre. The ensuing civil war and a severe drought combined to cause a famine of biblical proportions. Although it would not become clear for several months more, the New World Order was about to be put to an early test.

Undertaken, as it was for the highest of motives — humanitarian famine relief -- the American intervention in Somalia seemed to be a defining moment for America in her role as the post-Cold War era's lone superpower. Despite its initial success, however, Operation Restore Hope rapidly degenerated into a manhunt for a warlord. Somalia
provides a case study illustrating the limits of multilateral military operations and the failure of "nation-building" in a society embroiled in anarchy.

1. What were the prevailing conditions initially in the "target" country?

In January 1991, the 22 year reign of Somali dictator Mohammed Said Barre came to an end when it was overthrown by an alliance of clan-based militia groups (COWR, October 16, 1993: 2826). Vast stockpiles of arms, accumulated over the course of three decades from Barre's Cold War patrons (first the Soviet Union, then from 1977 on, the United States), were seized by the various factions. United only by their hatred of Barre, the now heavily-armed militias began to turn their firepower on each other. The result was a multi-sided civil war that fragmented Somalia into a series of clan-based fiefdoms (New York Times, December 4, 1992, article by Thomas Gordon).

Despite the multitude of clan-based militias, by 1992, four major contenders emerged. The first group was the United Somali Congress (USC). Led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed, it was based on the Hawiye clan of Central Somalia. The second group was Mohammed Farah Aidid's Somali National Alliance (SNA). Formerly a high official in the USC, Aidid broke away after a falling out with Ali Mahdi in 1991. The SNA was subsequently formed by a union between the Aidid faction and several other clan groups. Based in the Mogadishu area, the SNA drew its strength mainly from the

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Hawiye clan, although others were represented as well (Makinda, 1993: 26, 32).

The Somali National Front (SNF), headed by General Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan, was a third force. It was composed of forces still loyal to Barre, and its power base largely rested in Southern Somalia, near the port city of Kismayu (Bryden, 1995: 147).

Finally, there was the Somali National Movement (SNM). Led by Adel-Rahman Ahmed Ali, it was mostly composed of members of the Issaq clan (Makinda, 1993: 25). Its support base was in northwestern Somalia, in what was known until 1960 as British Somaliland. In May, 1991, the SNM declared its territory to be the independent Republic of Somaliland (Keesing's, May 1991: 38182-3). The republic has received no international recognition.

A 1991 post-revolution peace conference named the USC's Ali-Mahdi as interim president. War, however, quickly broke out among the clans. Farah Aidid, jealous of Mahdi's selection, decided to challenge his leadership militarily (Bryden, 1995: 147).

It bears noting, however, that both Aidid and Ali Mahdi had limited support within the country. This was because in Somalia, clan loyalties have traditionally been stronger than any shared national identity. Only rarely, usually when faced by an external threat (such as the war with Ethiopia in the late 1970s) do the clans show any
inclination toward unity. Even then, when the foreign threat recedes, such ad hoc alliances inevitably dissolve.

Despite various peace conferences, fighting continued among the factions. In terms of its impact on national politics, the most important fighting was between Aidid and Ali Mahdi in, and around, the capital city of Mogadishu (Makinda, 1993: 18).

While the conflict raged in the early 1990s, Somalia was further plagued by a severe drought. The result, predictably, was a nationwide famine (COWR, October 16, 1993: 2826; Makinda, 1993: 41) Starvation was said to threaten 30% of the Somalian population, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), such as the French Medecins Sans Frontieres, the UK-based Save The Children, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were the first to respond to the crisis with relief efforts (Keesing's, July 1992: 38992). However, anarchy, growing out of the warfare engulfing Somalia, interfered with the humanitarian operations. Gunmen associated with the various clan militias looted food and medical depots, hijacked or blocked relief shipments, and kidnapped relief workers. The motive behind these callous acts was usually to gain profit on the black market and/or to prevent rival groups from receiving humanitarian relief (Makinda, 1993: 42).

By May 1992, it was estimated that 4.5 million of the total 6 million Somalis were threatened with starvation,
with the crisis exacting its greatest toll in the country's southern and central regions (Keesing's, May 1992: 38902). According to UN diplomat Mohammed Sahnoun, by late July 1992 as many as 5,000 people a day were dying in Somalia. A further 1.5 million were on the brink of death, with 4.5 million more nearing starvation. Taken together, these figures represented almost all of Somalia's population (Keesing's, July 1992: 38992).

In response to the ongoing suffering, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSC Resolution 767, which established the first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). The resolution created operational zones in Somalia for UN-sponsored relief efforts, as well as authorizing the Secretary General to organize an "air bridge" to speed relief to the famine victims (Keesing's, July 1992: 39992). The resolution further established a peacekeeping force to provide security for UN and NGO aid activities in the greater Mogadishu area. In an action that mirrored previous UN peacekeeping operations, 50 unarmed military observers were dispatched to monitor the Mogadishu "green line" which separated Ali Mahdi and Aidid's forces (Makinda, 1993: 62).

Ambassador Sahnoun was able to secure an agreement with Aidid to allow 500 armed guards to enter Somalia to protect food distribution centers. Sahnoun emphasized the food distribution mission, insisting that armed troops were
not going to engage in peacekeeping. However, on August 28, 1992, the UN Security Council authorized the commitment of 3,000 more armed UN troops, to be deployed as four 750-member strong "security units" (Keesing's, August 1992: 39034).

The United States, too, became involved in the relief efforts by starting an emergency airlift that lasted four months. The supplies were to be shipped directly to Somalia if possible, otherwise the alternate route was to fly into northern Kenya, then tranship the goods to southern Somalia from there. The plan was to send 80,000 tons in the first six weeks, to be followed by another 145,000 tons more after October 1 (Keesing's, August 1992: 39035).

By October 1992, it had become clear that United Nations peacekeepers had failed to prevent armed gunmen from interfering with relief distribution. Believing it to be a problem of manpower, the UN proposed raising its peacekeeping presence to 4,200 soldiers. General Aidid, who at the time controlled most of southern Somalia and two-thirds of Mogadishu, opposed further UN deployment, calling it a threat to Somalia's sovereignty (Keesing's, October 1992: 39132). Aidid's reluctance to permit a large United Nations presence stemmed from his negative view of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who, as Egyptian Foreign Minister, had been close to Barre. Believing
Boutros-Ghali now to be partial toward Ali Mahdi, Aidid viewed the UN with suspicion (Makinda, 1993: 65).

Although the United Nations had approved a deployment of 3,500 men, most of them had not been sent due to objections from the various warlords in Somalia. New York believed that the cooperation of the various clan militia leaders was necessary to the ultimate success of UNOSOM I and, therefore, the deployment was put on hold in order to avoid antagonizing the chieftains. In December 1992, therefore, the strength of United Nations forces in Somalia was 564 total. This figure included 50 military observers, 500 in a security battalion, and the remainder distributed as headquarters staff and logistical personnel.

UNOSOM I had very constrained rules of engagement (ROE). As is the usual modus operandi of such operations, UN personnel were authorized to use force only for self defense. Given the size of the UN contingent and its restrictive ROE, UNOSOM I was largely ineffective in fulfilling its mission of famine relief. Because UNOSOM played virtually no positive role in Somalia, by December 1992 it had become obvious that a larger, better equipped force would be needed if the chaotic situation were to be brought under control (Makinda, 1993: 67-8).

Under these conditions, President Bush offered the United Nations the use of a large American force in order to stabilize the situation in Somalia and thus make
possible the resumption of food and aid delivery (COWR, October 16, 1993: 2826). On December 3, 1992, the Security Council passed UNSC Resolution 794, which formally accepted the American offer (Makinda, 1993: 64).

2. Why did the United States choose to get involved?

It is a generally accepted fact that President Bush initially chose to intervene in Somalia for humanitarian reasons. (New York Times, December 5, 1992: article by Thomas Friedman). The key motivating factor for Bush was the scale of death taking place. As Bush explained it in his address to the nation:

Every American has seen the shocking images from Somalia. The scope of suffering there is hard to imagine. Already over a quarter million people, as many as live in Buffalo, N.Y., have died in the Somali famine. In the months ahead, five times that number, one and a half million people, could starve to death (New York Times, December 3, 1992: Text of Bush address).

The President explained that "anarchy prevails" in Somalia, and that relief workers feared for their very lives. Therefore, Bush declared, "confronted with these conditions, relief groups called for outside troops to provide security so that they could feed people." As a result, it was now clear to Bush "that military support is necessary to insure the safe delivery of the food Somalis need to survive" (New York Times, December 5, 1992, text of Bush address).

Although Bush acknowledged that "the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs," he argued that the
United States must take the leading role to bring aid to Somalia because:

Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death (New York Times, December 5, 1992, text of Bush address).

Bush reassured Americans: "We will not, however, be acting alone. I expect forces from about a dozen countries to join us in this mission" (New York Times, December 5, 1992, text of Bush address).

It is impossible to overestimate the influence television had on the decision to intervene in Somalia. Its persistent displays of grim images of human suffering shocked both the public and the government. The sight of the mass starvation of Somali children was instrumental in leading to American action (Makinda, 1993: 69; Bryden, 1995: 148).

Aside from the generally agreed-upon humanitarian reasons for American intervention, some political observers suggested certain less altruistic motives. One writer speculated that after his electoral defeat, Mr. Bush wanted to leave office in an upbeat, statesman-like manner (New York Times, December 6, 1992, article by Michael Wines). Others suggested that Bush viewed Somalia as the first test of the New World Order. According to this view, Bush was quite embarrassed that his scheme was now being undermined by the mass starvation of children in the Horn of Africa.
If the New World Order was to become more than mere words, action was imperative (Makinda, 1993: 69). Finally, it was also suggested that, with congressional liberals demanding a "peace dividend," the military needed to find missions that would justify its being spared large budget cuts. A relief operation to Somalia was originally perceived as a low-risk means of accomplishing this goal (Makinda, 1993: 73).

3. What were the intended results, or objectives, of American intervention?

During his December, 1992, address to the nation, President Bush outlined the humanitarian mission of the U.S. intervention in Somalia. Despite the apparent simplicity of the two goals that the President set, he did not elaborate on their specifics. As a result, American forces operated in pursuit of rather ambiguously defined objectives (Keesing's, December, 1992: 39225; New York Times, December 5, 1992, text of Bush address).

Bush's first objective was to "create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia so that food can move from ships overland to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation" (New York Times, December 5, 1992, text of Bush address). The potentially open-ended commitment entailed in this goal was quickly pointed out by critics. As a New York Times editorial queried: "Just what is a secure environment?...On this Mr. Bush said nothing, despite expectations in Somalia that
Americans will be peacemakers, not just alms-givers" (New York Times, December 5, 1992, Editorial).

The other objective outlined by Bush was that once this "secure environment" was created, the United States would withdraw its forces and hand over the operation to United Nations peacekeepers (New York Times, December 5, 1992, text of Bush address).

While agreeing in principle with Mr. Bush's objectives, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali believed that under the terms of UNSC Res. 794 which authorized the U.S. action, he had the right to determine what exactly constituted a "secure environment." The Secretary General argued that American and other allied forces could only create a secure environment by disarming clan militias and destroying their heavy weapons. The U.S. Commander for Somalia, however, argued that disarmament was not part of his mission and, consequently, would not be a high priority.

There were several reasons for this disagreement between the United States and the United Nations over what exactly constituted a secure environment. One such reason was that both sides had very different definitions of the term. For the UN, it meant leaving Somalia in a condition that was conducive to peacekeeping and a negotiated settlement of political differences between the clans. If the arms stockpiles were not confiscated, the militias
would undoubtedly become reactivated shortly after the departure of U.S. and allied forces.

The U.S. theater commander, however, saw matters differently. For General Johnston, the goal of humanitarian relief did not necessitate disarmament per se. Supply corridors could be opened, and relief distributed, without unnecessarily engaging Somali militia groups. Furthermore, Washington simply did not want to take on any high risk ventures beyond its stated objective of opening up supply routes.

Another related concern was that disarming the militias would undoubtedly be a long-term operation (Makinda, 1993: 71). Even if disarmament were to be undertaken as an American mission, given the proliferation of weapons in Somalia, how would one ever know for certain when the goal had been accomplished? To engage in such operations would have the potential of keeping U.S. troops in Somalia long after the January, 1993, withdrawal date that the President had set.

These goals originally envisioned by President Bush would later be subject to change; they would be subjected to what would be called later, "mission creep." The evolution of United States and United Nations objectives as the operation continued is discussed later in this chapter.
4. **What was the nature of the operation?**

The United States' intervention in Somalia actually occurred in two phases. The first was the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the other was the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).

UNITAF, or Operation Restore Hope as it was called in the USA, ran from December 1992 until May 1993. The United Nations Security Council authorized the mission by passing UNSC Res. 794 on December 3, 1992. The terms of authorization were similar to those under which Operation Desert Storm was commissioned. Essentially, like the Persian Gulf War, Operation Restore Hope was ostensibly a multilateral UN undertaking, although once again most of the troops sent were American. Likewise, the mission was commanded by a high-ranking officer from the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); Lt. General Robert Johnston was put in charge of the Somali operation (Makinda, 1993: 70).

There were, however, several differences from the earlier Persian Gulf enterprise. Unlike Operation Desert Storm which operated independently under a U.S. command, at the insistence of many Third World states, UNITAF was authorized only on the condition that the American command maintain a close liaison with UN headquarters in New York and with UN officials in Somalia (Makinda, 1993: 70) [For the full text of the resolution, see COWR, December 5, 1992: 3766].
Another difference between the two operations was that while both sought to deploy massive force in order to overwhelm opponents, Operation Restore Hope employed substantially fewer troops. Furthermore, due to its humanitarian nature, UNITAF envisioned the use of forces in a considerably more restrained manner.

UNITAF was largely a humanitarian mission within a low intensity war zone. It was unique in that it had no clear link to any discernable vital interest of the United States (COWR, December 5, 1992, article by Pat Towell: 3761).

By design, UNITAF had a limited operational mandate. American forces were only to engage in relief support missions in southern and Central Somalia, with a focus on the greater Mogadishu area (Makinda, 1993: 76). Also, as noted earlier, due to the consultative mechanism established by the Security Council in the authorization resolution, the UN, in the person of the Secretary General, had a voice in determining when the security aspects of the mission had been fulfilled. Only with the certification of the Secretary General would the Security Council allow the termination of UNITAF and the transition to a more traditional UN peacekeeping operation (COWR, December 5, 1992, article by Pat Towell: 3762).

The United Nations successor operation, UNOSOM II, began in May 1993. Although American participation ended in March 1994, UNOSOM II continued for another year,
concluding in March 1995. It consisted of a multilateral force under a direct United Nations command. Its commander was Turkish General Cevik Bir (Keesing's, May 1993: 39451). Initially, plans called for the United States to commit 5,000 troops. In the end UNOSOM II was to have 20,000 soldiers, drawn from 35 countries (Keesing's, March 1993: 39356). U.S. Major General Thomas M. Montgomery was named deputy commander of UN forces. In part, his role was to oversee American forces in UNOSOM II, most of whom were to function in supply and logistical capacities. Under this arrangement, Bir would decide when the troops were to be deployed to a particular area. Montgomery would then issue the orders which would carry out the mission (COWR, May 22, 1993, article by Gregory J. Bowens: 1304).

General Montgomery also was to have direct command of a 1,300 troop "quick reaction force." Although it was intended to back up United Nations forces, this was an independent United States force, accountable only to Washington (COWR, October 16, 1993, story by Gregory J. Bowens: 2826). Stationed on American ships cruising off the Somali coast, the quick reaction force was intended to act as an "over the horizon" deterrent against the Somali militias (Makinda, 1993: 77).

The original plan envisioned that UNOSOM II would cover all of Somalia, a significant expansion from the earlier UNITAF mission (which included only 40% of the
UNOSOM II's expanded mandate followed three major themes. First, UNOSOM II was to maintain the ceasefire. This included the clearing of mines, the disarming of the various factions, and the destruction of confiscated weapons.

Second, the United Nations force was to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. This meant securing ports and airfields and maintaining supply routes, as well as protecting UN and NGO personnel and their supplies.

Finally, UNOSOM II was to create conditions conducive to a political settlement in Somalia. It was this aspect of the mission that would substantially broaden in scope as the operation progressed. This was originally conceived as achieving national reconciliation among the various clan groups, but it later grew into efforts at nation-building, by means of UN restructuring of national institutions (Makinda, 1993: 76).

5. What was the American domestic political climate during this crisis?

Public Opinion

At the outset of United States intervention in Somalia, the public's opinion of the operation was very favorable. In December 1992, a Harris Poll revealed that 95 percent of Americans had read or heard about the famine and starvation in Somalia. The results of the polling question showed that they seemed to be very affected by the news
coverage of the famine: 75% favored sending in U.S. troops, with only 20% opposed.

By and large, Americans even supported the potentially longer-term objective of nation-building. When asked about the more ambitious goal of staying in Somalia until a "new and more effective government is put in place, even if that takes a long time?," the results were surprisingly positive. Sixty-three percent favored staying until a new government was in place, while 28% favored leaving Somalia in the "hands of warring gangs."

Regarding general attitudes toward using U.S. troops on humanitarian missions, 71% favored sending the military "to save lives and help distribute food in countries where people are starving, but where U.S. national security is not involved." Twenty-two percent opposed this view.

Only a 48% plurality agreed, however, that the United States should send troops "to help restore order and save lives in war-torn countries where effective government has broken down, but where U.S. national security is not involved." A strong 42% opposed dispatching troops in this scenario (Harris Poll, December 10, 1992).

A February 1993 poll (taken two months into Operation Restore Hope) showed continued support for the mission. By a 77% to 20% margin, respondents favored keeping American troops in Somalia until authority could be transferred to a "reasonably stable government." The same poll found that
71% favored the more ambitious, UN-sponsored goal of having U.S. troops disarm the clan militias in Somalis. Twenty-four percent disapproved of such a policy (Harris Poll, February 8, 1993).

As Operation Restore Hope continued past its originally forecast completion date of mid-January 1993, the mission's gradually expanding goals and increasing costs (in terms of both lives and money) caused public opinion to shift. Polls taken in October, 1993, shortly after the fighting escalated, found that two out of three Americans favored withdrawal from Somalia. About half favored recalling U.S. troops even if it meant leaving Somalia in turmoil, and even if a second famine resulted. Even after President Clinton's speech outlined the need to send more troops to Somalia, an ABC news poll showed that 53% did not approve of the President's handling of the situation (New York Times, October 9, 1993, article by B. Drummond Ayres, Jr.)

A poll taken in November 1993 showed that a majority of 56% continued to favor sending American troops to Third World countries to prevent famine. By this time, however, the public had become wary of the type of operation that UNOSOM II had become. Sixty percent now opposed committing troops for the broader goal of restoring law and order in a Third World country, even if the existing government were
to collapse (Los Angeles Times, November 2, 1993, article by Doyle McManus).

**Congressional Mood**

When it commenced, United States intervention in Somalia received strong, bipartisan support on Capitol Hill. As Speaker of the House Tom Foley (D-WA) stated at the time: "there is strong bipartisan support among the leadership for the action the president is taking" (COWR, December 5, 1992, story by Phillip A. Davis: 3760). Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee Lee Hamilton (D-IN), however, believed that such support should not preclude the Congress from giving its formal consent. As Hamilton put it: "It seems to me Congress should act to put [on record] its approval or -- you can imagine the circumstances -- its disapproval with respect to what's happening" (COWR, December 5, 1992, report by Phillip A. Davis: 3760).

A curious feature of the early debate, one that would become more glaring as the operation wore on, was the apparent role reversal between congressional liberals and conservatives. The Congressional Black Caucus was unusually enthusiastic about the intervention. Rep. John Lewis (D-GA) acknowledged that, especially in light of his anti-war activism dating back to the 1960s,: It would seem somewhat out of the ordinary for me to support a military effort, but after going to Somalia and seeing what I consider the violation of just human decency...there are no other
affirmative means to alleviate the situation except for the use of the necessary military power to see that food and medical assistance be available to the people there (COWR, December 5, 1992, report by Phillip A. Davis: 3760).

Although not a member of Congress, Jesse Jackson may have expressed a more underlying motive for some black Democrats, when he stated that the effort in Somalia "breaks new ground, because for the first time we've been willing to risk the lives of American soldiers to save an African people" (COWR, December 5, 1992, article by Phillip A. Davis). Such a quote suggests that, for at least some liberal black Democrats, enthusiasm for the intervention was based largely on racial considerations.

Despite general approval for intervention, there were a few early voices of dissent, mostly sounded by congressional conservatives. Senator Hank Brown (D-CO) believed that President Bush had committed U.S. forces "without clear, precise military objectives." Brown was upset that, given the absence of a clear target date for American withdrawal, the lack of established limits to American involvement, and hazy rules governing their authority, U.S. troops potentially faced a situation resembling other open-ended fiascos such as Vietnam and Beirut. Brown also was concerned that American forces were going to have too prominent a role in the early stages of the operation. He believed that troops from Muslim countries should take the lead in Somalia, since it is an

Other critics were concerned that the United States was shouldering too large a share of the burden for the relief effort. Senator Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) declared: "there is no reason the American taxpayer should play 80 percent of the Santa role in providing military and economic aid to Somalia" (COWR, December 5, 1992, report by Phillip A. Davis: 3760).

The wide-ranging support for intervention notwithstanding, the Senate did not formally consider a resolution authorizing American action for two months after the operation began. On February 4, 1993, by voice vote, the upper house approved Senate Joint Resolution 45, which authorized the commitment of United States forces to the UN-sponsored operation in Somalia (COWR, February 6, 1993: 277). During the debate on the measure, some members of the Senate voiced concern over the lack of a withdrawal date. In addition, the resolution called for the United Nations to take over the operation "at the earliest possible date" (COWR, February 6, 1993: 277).

The House did not take action until May 25, 1993 when it also passed S.J. Res. 45. The tally was 243-179 in a vote that divided largely along party lines. This vote gave retroactive approval for UNITAF (which had ended earlier
that month) as well as authorizing U.S. participation in UNOSOM II for up to a year.

The House debate focused on the congressional role in deploying troops. As adopted, the resolution invoked the War Powers Act, an aspect side-stepped in the Senate version. Democratic sentiment on the issue was expressed by Rep. Harry A. Johnston (D-FL) who argued: "My gosh, if we ever want this establishment, the U.S. Congress, to be relevant to the situation, then we must acknowledge the War Powers Act is the law of the land" (COWR, May 29, 1993, article by Gregory J. Bowens: 1373).

Republicans, by contrast, held to their traditional position that the War Powers Act is unconstitutional. Furthermore, they argued that a dangerous precedent was being set by placing American forces under a United Nations command. Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-TX) stated plainly: "I do not believe that the American people want us to vote to put the destiny and lives of American troops in the hands of UN commanders" (COWR, May 29, 1993, article by Gregory J. Bowens: 1373).

As UNOSOM II's mission began to drift from humanitarian relief into nation-building, and finally deteriorated into a vain manhunt for a fugitive warlord, the congressional mood shifted dramatically, especially as casualty figures climbed. A principal critic of the United Nation's mishandling of the situation was Senator Robert
Byrd (D-W.V.). In reopening the debate, Byrd argued that: "The United Nation's mandate to disarm the warlords and rebuild a civil society in Somalia, approved by the UN Security Council, was never addressed, never debated or never approved by this body" (COWR, September 11, 1993, report by Elizabeth Palmer: 2399).

Although done in a somewhat less strident manner, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) agreed:

No one wants to leave [Somalia] in shambles. No one wants to set up a situation where they go right back into the same kind of despair they had before. But neither do we want to set up a situation where the United States has committed its military to a mission that is very broad and basically has no end point and really no definition (COWR, September 11, 1993, report by Elizabeth Palmer: 23990.

Perhaps unintentionally, other members of Congress invoked arguments reminiscent of the Vietnam era by expressing concern that pulling American troops out of UNOSOM II would "undermine American credibility." Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) argued: "If we pull out prematurely, chased out by a tin pot warlord, I believe that U.S. leadership, prestige, credibility, and national self-respect will be significantly harmed" (COWR, September 11, 1993, report by Elizabeth Palmer: 2399).

However, President Clinton's decision to send in additional troops in the wake of the October 1993 slaughter of American Rangers, and the desecration of their dead bodies by Somali mobs, evoked horror from traditional

Senator Byrd, in particular, was outraged that the Clinton Administration seemed to have no plan or direction except to follow the lead of UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. Many of his colleagues agreed with Byrd that the Somalia mission served no national interest. There was disagreement in their ranks, however, over a proper schedule for withdrawal (New York Times, October 12, 1993, article by Clifford Krauss).

Senator Byrd sponsored an amendment to the annual defense authorization bill (S. 1298) that would have cut off funding for the U.S. mission in Somalia within a month of passage, unless Congress explicitly authorized their continued deployment (CONR, September 11, 1993, report by Elizabeth A. Palmer: 2399). On October 15, however, the Senate approved a compromise which would terminate funding for United States participation in UNOSOM II after March 31, 1994. In passing 76-23, this marked the first time
since Vietnam that either chamber had voted to cut-off funding for an ongoing military operation.

Furthermore, the Senate killed a measure that would have required congressional approval before the President could place U.S. forces under a foreign command. The final tally was 33-65. On November 9, 1993, in a 226-221 vote that largely followed party lines, the House approved a non-binding resolution that endorsed the March 31, 1994 withdrawal date that the President had accepted after heavy Senate pressure (COWR, December 18, 1993: 3457).

6. **What was the position of the military leadership regarding the operation?**

At the outset, the Pentagon had little enthusiasm to get involved in a humanitarian mission in Somalia. President Bush's decision, during the summer of 1992, to engage in relief flights to Somalia, as well as to deploy Marines to the Indian Ocean, were made despite the reservations of the military leadership (New York Times, December 6, 1992, article by Michael Wines).

During the fall of 1992, after military planners studied various options, they decided that a relief operation in Somalia was feasible. This assessment was based on several considerations. One factor was that military planners believed Somali clan militias to be disorganized and capable only of token resistance. Except for a few incidents of sniping and mining, it was expected...
that these groups would retreat when American troops arrived.

A second consideration was Somalia's desert terrain. Its flat, open landscape made conditions on the ground look more like Iraq than Vietnam or Bosnia. Since potential enemies would have little cover, it appeared that the chance of Somalia turning into a quagmire of guerrilla warfare was minimal (Bryden, 1995: 148).

In the official mission statement for Operation Restore Hope, General Powell underscored the humanitarian aims of the mission and went to pains to make clear that the United States did not seek to impose a political solution on Somalia. The plan itself bore a strong resemblance to Operation Desert Storm. It called for a large force to be decisively applied over a short period of time. Once port facilities and supply routes were secured, the humanitarian operation was to be quickly transferred to the United Nations.

General Powell publicly warned the clan militias that they would not be allowed to disrupt relief efforts. Unlike UNOSOM I, UNITAF was going to have the means and the will to project massive force, even taking preemptive measures when necessary. To quote General Powell, force would be imposed "in a rather decisive way so that there will be no question in the mind of any of the faction leaders in Somalia that we would have the ability to impose a stable
situation, if it came to that, without their cooperation" 

The plan concentrated on the delivery of assistance to famine victims. Although it called for the United States to attempt to buy weapons back from the clans, the plan deemphasized disarmament as a central goal. As noted earlier, it was feared that to make disarmament an operational objective would extend the mission further than the political leadership intended, as well as presenting the possibility of drawing the United States much deeper into Somalian politics than was desired. A Pentagon official explained that the main idea of the plan instead was that, "we will be the peacemaking force and then we'll turn it over [to] the UN peacekeeper...". Perhaps foreshadowing future complications, he further mused: "But how do we know when we are done?" (New York Times, December 5, 1992, dispatch by Michael R. Gordon).

The Pentagon's plan was organized into four phases. Phase One began with the arrival of U.S. Marines in Somalia. Once ashore, they were to seize the international airport and the port of Mogadishu, as well as the city's food warehouses. Once these facilities were secured, the Marines would then head inland to the town of Baidoa. This was intended to allow the Americans to bring food overland to the interior of Somalia.
Phase Two called for Army troops to join the Marines at Baidoa, and then to establish bases to the north of Mogadishu at Belet, Uen, Hoddu, and Gailalassi. Within a week after Mogadishu and Baidoa were secured, large numbers of additional troops were to arrive. In Phase Three, U.S. forces were to deploy to the south and west. This would extend relief to the southern port city of Kismayu and the interior town of Bardera.

Finally, Phase Four envisioned turning over the operation to the United Nations. However, the plan was vague as to the definition of a "secure environment," the condition under which the UN would take over the mission. Furthermore, there was a fear that the various clans might just fall back, bide their time, and then reassert their power shortly after the American withdrawal (*New York Times*, December 5, 1992, article by Michael R. Gordon).

The plan concentrated on southern Somalia because it was most severely affected by both the famine and by clan interference with relief efforts. The Pentagon took a "wait and see" attitude before it would make a decision to extend the mission northward (*New York Times*, December 5, 1992, dispatch by Michael Wines).

There was, however, a dispute over the projected duration of Operation Restore Hope. President Bush had envisioned a relatively short mission, with the troops returning home within a few weeks, probably in time for

In the view of the military leadership at the Pentagon, the complex logistics presented by the chaotic, barren country made it a strong possibility that the operation could take much longer than the President believed (New York Times, December 9, 1992, report by Jane Perlez). General Powell refused to give a specific date for American withdrawal, citing the uncertainty of the situation (New York Times, December 5, 1992, article by Michael Wines). He did, however, indicate that he believed the operation could take several months (Makinda, 1993: 72). In addressing the issue of possible withdrawal timetables, Powell acknowledged that a contingent of Marines and a naval task force would probably remain as a quick reaction force, after the main body of troops had withdrawn. Such a force would assist UN forces should trouble erupt later. The General also stated that "a few units" of ground forces would remain in Somalia as part of the UN operation, following the departure of American forces (New York Times, December 5, 1992, story by Michael Wines).
7. **How was the operation actually carried out?**

Operation Restore Hope began on December 9, 1992, when U.S. Marines staged a dawn landing on beaches near Mogadishu. Later in the day an additional 1,800 troops landed (Keesing's, December 1992: 39225). Once ashore, the soldiers quickly gained control of the port facilities and Mogadishu International Airport (New York Times, December 9, 1992, dispatch by Jane Perlez). With the exception of a minor exchange of fire at the airport, the initial landing was a peaceful operation.

On December 9, American and French forces took control of much of Mogadishu and confiscated some weapons. Troops began quickly to seize transportation-related facilities and started to open up routes for relief into other coastal areas and the interior. The Marines captured the former Bali Dogle military airfield, 160 km. west of Mogadishu on December 13. Three days later, U.S. and French troops escorted a food convoy into Baidoa and seized the town's airstrip, encountering no opposition. UNITAF then pushed on to the southern port city of Kismayu. Due to a negotiated settlement with local factions, on December 20 American forces entered the city unopposed. Once secured, Kismayu functioned as a food distribution center for the Juba Valley of Southern Somalia (Keesing's, December 1992: 39225).
Even at this early stage of the operation, there was evidence of "mission creep." On December 23, Brigadier General Tony Zinni, the U.S. military operations director, stated that the United States would begin to seize armed vehicles from Somali factions. This announcement seemed to indicate that American policy was moving closer to the United Nations version of what constituted a "secure environment." The United States began implementing this new policy on December 29, when American forces swept gunmen from Mogadishu in anticipation of a visit by President Bush. American soldiers seized weapons, armed vehicles, and missiles from clan militias (Keesing's, December 1992: 39226).

As a matter of practice, United States troops avoided the fighting among militia factions that did not interfere with relief operations or threaten UNITAF forces. However, by early January 1993, American commanders began to suggest that UNITAF forces might intervene if rival groups did not stop fighting. Furthermore, the U.S. command reaffirmed its policy of confiscating Somalian weapons. As Marine Colonel Michael Hagee stated: "Once we have a definitive location of those weapons, we'll remove those weapons" (Washington Post, January 2, 1993, dispatch by Keith B. Richburg). Although at the outset the United States was reluctant to intervene in clan fighting for fear of being pulled into their conflict, the change in policy seemed to be prompted
by the ever-increasing proximity of the fighting to western relief centers.

Ongoing Mission: Early 1993

On January 7, UNITAF commander General Robert Johnson indicated that his troops had successfully opened up supply routes into the interior and, therefore, the operation was now to enter a "new phase." This appears to have meant undertaking more aggressive pacification operations. As inter-clan warfare continued, U.S. forces raided militia weapons facilities, destroying substantial stocks of arms (Keesing's, January 1993: 39255). Such operations were not without cost. On January 13, Marine Private Domingo Arroyo was killed by gunmen in an attack near the Mogadishu airport. This was the first American fatality of the operation (New York Times, October 7, 1993, chronology: All).

During the operation, the increasingly frequent accidental killings of Somali civilians began to worry UNITAF commanders. Fearing that these deaths may be the sign of a general complacency developing among his weary soldiers, the Marine commander in Somalia, Maj. General Charles Wilhelm, ordered his men to "adjust attitudes" and show greater respect for Somali civilians. United States involvement in the fighting deepened on January 25, 1993 when American and Belgian troops intervened in order to
halt a force loyal to deposed strongman Said Barre from advancing on Kismayu (Keesing's, January 1993: 39255).

UNITAF Winds Down

The American withdrawal began on January 31, 1993, when 2,700 U.S. troops returned home (Keesing's, January 1993: 39255). Early in February, Col. Fred Peck of CENTCOM informed Washington that the military task of restoring security was almost complete. As a result, during February United States troop levels in the theater fell from 24,000 to 17,000. Other nations sent in additional soldiers to replace the withdrawing Americans.

Despite Washington's claims that the situation was under control, violence, often aimed at American forces, began to erupt. UNITAF weapons sweeps, usually directed against Aidid's SNA, fueled the Somali General's suspicions that interventionist forces were beginning to take sides in political quarrels. Rumors that Washington was tilting toward Aidid's rival, General Hersi Morgan, sparked further attacks against U.S troops in February.

In early March, the British newspaper Guardian reported that relief agencies were claiming that the United States deliberately acted to conceal the failure of American intervention in order to accelerate the withdrawal of American troops (Keesing's, February 1993: 39308).
UNOSOM II Begins

On May 4, 1993, the United States formally turned over the operation in Somalia to the United Nation's UNOSOM II force. The U.S. withdrew all but approximately 3,000 troops, which remained on with UNOSOM II, mostly in a logistical capacity (CQWR, October 16, 1993: report by Jennifer S. Thomas: 2826). The total UN force numbered 20,000 troops and was drawn from 35 countries (Keesing's, May 1993: 39451).

The UNOSOM II operation was authorized by the United Nations Security Council on March 26, 1993 with the adoption of UNSC Res. 814. This resolution defined the mission and scope of the new operation. Derived from the provisions outlined in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (the details of which are covered later), UNSC Res. 814 gave the Secretary General, through his field commander, the authority to take all necessary measures, including armed force, to enforce UN resolutions pertaining to Somalia.

UNOSOM II was conceived as a two-tiered operation. As such, it was to act in a peacekeeping mode where possible, yet engage in peace enforcement when necessary (Makinda, 1993: 77). With a scope considerably wider than UNITAF, UNOSOM II's objectives included attempts to foster progress toward national reconciliation, and the reconstruction of
political institutions (Keesing's, May 1993: 39451; Makinda, 1993: 80).

In terms of its operational mandate, UNOSOM II was charged with doing whatever was necessary to maintain the peace in Somalia. The United Nations applied a broad construction to "maintaining peace," so that it included such activities as disarming the various factions, protecting relief workers, clearing mines, repatriating refugees, establishing a constabulary, and engaging in efforts to help rebuild the economy. It was expected that UNOSOM II would cover the entire country (Keesing's, March 1993: 39356; May 1993: 39451).

Entering the Morass

It did not take long for the clan militias to begin to challenge UNOSOM II. On June 5, 1993, Aidid's SNA forces ambushed Pakistani units assigned to the UN force. The result was 24 Pakistanis killed and 54 wounded. This firefight signalled the start of four months of almost daily clashes between UNOSOM II and the SNA (New York Times, October 7, 1993, chronology: All).

The United Nations Security Council reacted to the escalating violence in Somalia by adopting Resolution 837. This measure reaffirmed the nation-building mandate of UNOSOM II. In addition, it authorized UN forces to find and punish those responsible for the ambush (Makinda, 1993: 80). President Clinton endorsed the use of retaliatory
strikes by UNOSOM II and the U.S. quick reaction force. He justified the United Nations' more aggressive posture, arguing that action against Aidid was necessary to restore order, as well as to strengthen the effectiveness and credibility of "UN peacekeeping in Somalia and around the world" (Makinda, 1993: 81). The Security Council backed up its words with action. On June 17, the chamber issued an arrest warrant for General Aidid. A raid aimed at arresting Aidid was launched, but failed to capture him (Keesing's, June 1993: 39499).

The United Nations' actions of June, 1993, were evidence of further "mission creep." As the nature and goals of the operation started to drift, the mission began to take on the appearance of a personal vendetta between Mr. Boutros-Ghali and General Aidid. This impression was further reinforced during the fall of 1993, as the focus of UN operations became increasingly fixed on neutralizing the warlord.

In the view of many Somalians, the United Nations actions seemed to validate Aidid's claim that the UN was, in fact, taking sides in the civil war. For this reason, UNOSOM II efforts to capture Aidid began to have the unintended result of giving the warlord a measure of popularity among the Somali populace. To compound the United Nations' problems, UNOSOM II seemed to be in a Catch-22. If it did not respond to attacks against it,
UNOSOM II would invite more aggressive provocations. However, when it did retaliate, the inevitable result was civilian casualties, which only fueled Somalian resentment against an intervention that only months earlier had been viewed as the country's salvation (Makinda, 1993: 81).

UNOSOM II's problems seemed only to grow worse in October 1993. On October 3, United States Rangers were pinned down by Aidid's forces during a botched raid on his command compound. American losses included 18 killed and nearly 80 wounded. Somali losses were estimated at 300 (COWR, October 16, 1993: report by Jennifer S. Thomas: 2826). To make matters worse, a U.S. helicopter pilot, Michael Durant, was captured and held hostage by the SNA.

Back in the United States, citizens were horrified by televised images of a beaten Durant being forced to read a statement obviously prepared by his captors. However, it was the pictures of a dead U.S. Army Ranger being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in front of jeering mobs that most sickened the American public. This unfortunate episode was to be a critical turning point for United States participation in UNOSOM II (New York Times, October 9, 1993, dispatch by R. Drummond Ayres, Jr.).

Under intense bipartisan congressional pressure, on October 7, President Clinton announced the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Somalia by March 31, 1994, regardless of the situation on the ground. In the interim, however, he
ordered the immediate deployment to Somalia of 1,700 troops and 104 armored vehicles. Furthermore, an additional 3,600 Marines were to join the American fleet off the Somali coast (Keesing's, October 1993: 39675). The President justified the deployment as a measure taken to stabilize the situation, reassure UNOSOM II's other participants, and allow for an orderly withdrawal. Employing language chillingly reminiscent of Lyndon Johnson during Vietnam, Clinton spoke of the need to avoid the appearance that America was going to "cut and run" from Somalia (New York Times, October 7, 1993, article by Thomas L. Friedman). Clearly, the President's actions were at least partially motivated by his need to deflect criticism which arose over revelations that the U.S. commander in the theater, General Montgomery, had urgently requested the deployment of additional armor before the October 3 battle, only to be refused by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin (New York Times, October 9, 1993, article by Steven A. Holmes).

On October 14, after negotiations between the United States and Aidid's forces, Durant was released. President Clinton took great pains to deny that a deal was made to secure the pilot's release. By November, however, there was an obvious shift in Washington's policy toward the fugitive warlord. The most glaring example of this occurred on October 19, when the President recalled 600 American Rangers who had been used in the effort to find and capture
Aidid. Soon afterward, the administration was said to have lobbied the United Nations Security Council to suspend operations aimed at arresting Aidid. American policy now apparently sought to facilitate the public rehabilitation of the General, so that Washington could engage in negotiations with him. The talks between the two sides began on November 18 (Keesing's, October 1993: 39675; November 1993: 39721). In December, 1993, the United States went so far as to use its military aircraft to transport Aidid to a peace conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Keesing's, December 1993: 39768).

The United StatesWithdraws

The final American pull-out from Somalia began in December 1993, when 2,500 U.S. troops were withdrawn (Keesing's, December 1993: 39768). Even though early 1994 found American forces still involved in skirmishes with local clan militias, the withdrawal continued (Keesing's, January 1994: 39806). United States participation in UNOSOM II came to a close on March 25, 1994, when the final evacuation of U.S forces was completed. All that remained of the American presence in Somalia was a 60-man token force. Of this remnant, ten remained at UNOSOM headquarters in logistical support roles, and 50 stood guard at the United States Embassy in Mogadishu. The departure of American, and other western, forces left UNOSOM as basically a Third World operation. Until its termination in
1995, UNOSOM II comprised mostly troops from Pakistan, India, Indonesia, and Egypt (Keesing's, March 1994: 39899).

8. **What types and quantities of forces were used?**

**UNITAF**

When the original United Task Force was proposed in late 1992, military planners believed that Somali militias posed no real threat. For this reason, it was not considered imperative to deploy troops on the scale of Operation Desert Storm. Because Somalia was not perceived to be a "combat mission" per se, it did not seem necessary to arm American soldiers with the full array of high-tech weapons used in the Persian Gulf. Still, the plans called for a massive presence, the aim of which was to both overwhelm and intimidate the local warlords so as to ensure their non-interference with UNITAF operations. At the outset UNITAF numbered 35,000 troops, of which 28,150 were American (Keesing's, December 1992: 39225; New York Times, December 9, 1992, article by Jane Perlez). As noted earlier, the initial landing involved 1,800 U.S. Marines.

To support UNITAF, the United States dispatched a naval task force, which was to remain just off the coast of Somalia. Leading the force was the USS Tripoli, an amphibious assault ship which carried 23 helicopters. Her air complement included 4 AH Cobra attack helicopters, 12 CH-46 Sea Knight medium-lift helicopters, 4 CH-53 Sea Stallion heavy-lift helicopters, and 3 UH-1 Huey support

Soon after this initial deployment, a three-ship carrier task force was diverted from the Persian Gulf to join the Tripoli group. The lead vessel was the aircraft carrier USS Ranger. It was accompanied by the cruiser USS Valley Forge and the destroyer USS Kinkaid. Meanwhile 16,000 troops of the First Marine Expeditionary Force and some 10,000 soldiers from the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division light infantry were sent to the theater. As a result, UNITAF reached its peak of 38,300 troops by mid-January, 1993 (Keesing's, January 1993: 39356). Washington began to withdraw some of its forces after a few weeks in Somalia. In January 1993, the first 2,700 were sent home (Keesing's, January 1993: 39255). [For individual country totals, see Table 6.1 in Makinda, 1993: 73].

UNOSOM II

It was the desire of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that UNOSOM II be a peacekeeping force endowed with enforcement capability. In his view, such powers were necessary so as to avoid simply repeating the failure of UNOSOM I, which had been lightly armed and operated under extremely restrictive rules of engagement. The Security Council agreed with Boutros-Ghali and, as a result, UNOSOM II was much better equipped and better armed than previous peacekeeping missions (Makinda, 1993: 77-8).
The United Nations requested the continued commitment of combat units from states which had participated in UNITAF, but few nations obliged. An exception was the United States, which agreed to send troops to work mainly on logistical tasks. The initial U.S. commitment to UNOSOM was approximately 3,000 soldiers. As noted earlier, Washington also sent a 1,300 strong quick reaction force, to be station off the Somali coast (Makinda, 1993: 77-8).

Following a battle between UNOSOM troops from Pakistan and the SNA militia in June 1993, the Security Council requested that UN member states send heavy weaponry, including tanks and attack aircraft to support UNOSOM II forces. The United States again complied, using carrier-based aircraft in retaliatory strikes against Aidid's forces in southern Mogadishu between June 12 and June 16 (Keesing's, June 1993: 39499).

tanks and armored personnel carriers (New York Times, October 8, 1993, report by Douglas Jehl). In addition, the quick reaction force was expanded to 3,600 men.

Helicopter gunships were also sent to Somalia to provide additional airpower. Additional transport helicopters provided the necessary lift capacity to afford greater mobility. In addition, the U.S. dispatched AC-130 gunships, which are slow-flying planes possessing a rapid-fire cannon that can be used for aerial support of ground forces. These capabilities were placed under a U.S. command and were to depart when American forces withdrew in March 1994 (New York Times, October 8, 1993: article by John H. Cushman).

With these additional forces, U.S. strength in the region jumped from 4,700 to nearly 20,000 troops (this figure includes U.S. forces in UNOSOM II, the quick reaction force, and naval personnel). This increase cheered American military officials who had maintained that the original 4,700 troops had been vulnerable (New York Times, October 8, 1993, story by Douglas Jehl). These senior Pentagon officials had never been satisfied with UNOSOM II arrangements. Their discontent was largely rooted in the fact that U.S. forces were being used in pursuit of objectives defined by the UN Security Council, rather than by America's own leaders (New York Times, October 8, 1993, article by John H. Cushman).
9. **Was the conflict limited in scope?**

The answer to this question is yes. From the outset, UNITAF limited it operations to the southern 40% of Somalia. No attempt was made to expand its area of coverage beyond these hardest hit areas (Makinda, 1993: 15).

Although UNOSOM II's original mandate was to cover all of Somalia, it never succeeded in doing so. The desire to expand operations was effectively checked, as UNOSOM II became increasingly bogged down in fighting Aidid's forces in and around Mogadishu. As a result, UNOSOM II never had the opportunity to spill across Somalia's frontiers; even its plans to expand into northern Somalia never materialized (New York Times, March 26, 1994, dispatch by Donatella Lorch).

10. **What was the nature of the theater commander's power and influence?**

**UNITAF**


Under the terms of UNITAF's authorization, although the United States retained control of the command, the United Nations was given an oversight responsibility. Therefore, while UNSC Res. 794 mandated that the United States inform the Security Council of what was being done...
in the name of the United Nation, the U.S. was essentially free of the kind of close control the UN usually exercises in peacekeeping operations. Washington, in turn, gave General Johnston the relatively free hand in the field that he had desired (New York Times, December 9, 1992, report by Paul Lewis).

Perhaps the clearest example of the freedom in the field that General Johnston enjoyed occurred during a dispute over the issue of disarming the clan militias. As noted earlier, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali wanted United States forces to stay in Somalia until they disarmed the warring factions, removed mines, and restored order (New York Times, December 11, 1992, article by Elaine Sciolino). General Johnston objected, arguing that disarmament was not part of his mission. Johnston maintained that disarmament and mine removal were long-term goals. Such goals clearly went beyond the U.S. objectives of securing supply routes and then removing American forces. Furthermore, Johnston argued, with so many weapons in the country it was too dangerous to try to collect them forcefully. Even if it were possible to do so, how would one know when "disarmament" had been accomplished (Makinda, 1993: 71-72)?

President Bush and Defense Secretary Cheney agreed with Johnston and did not make disarmament officially part of the military's mission per se. They did, however, set
the secondary goal of seizing and destroying as many weapons as possible. In fulfilling this goal, General Johnston and his subordinates were allowed considerable discretion regarding whether to buy weapons from the various factions (New York Times, December 11, 1992, article by Elaine Sciolino).

Although the extent to which Johnston was included in the original planning seems unclear, he appears to have had considerable authority in the theater. It was, for example, his pronouncement that his forces had succeeded in opening up relief supply routes that triggered the start of U.S. troop withdrawal. General Johnston was also allowed to take action in the field as he saw fit. At the outset, Joint Chief Chairman Colin Powell indicated that American forces under Johnston would be allowed to take preemptive action if the situation called for it. UNITAF's actions in early 1993 (such as aggressively engaging gunmen and preliminary attempts at disarmament) showed that Johnston did, in fact, exercise the full authority delegated to him (Keesing's, January 1993: 39255).

The rules of engagement under UNITAF also indicate the wide discretion granted to the theater commander (New York Times, December 5, 1992, report by Michael Wines). In the case of self-defense, unlike UNOSOM I, UNITAF forces were not compelled to wait until shot at before firing on hostile forces. Leaflets dropped on Mogadishu in late
December 1992 clearly warned the Somalis that anyone pointing a weapon at members of the multinational forces would be shot (Keesing's, December 1992: 39226). Although UNITAF soldiers were given strict orders to fire only in self-defense, because of the chaos in Mogadishu, the troops were allowed personal discretion in judging each potentially dangerous situation. As one colonel stated "If an individual vehicle shows hostile intent, we'll take away its ability to do that...we can disarm it or we can vaporize it" (New York Times, December 9, 1992, dispatch by Eric Schmitt). President Bush underscored this "wide leeway" policy for his commanders by stating that they and their troops "have the authority to safeguard the lives of our troops and the lives of Somalia's people" (New York Times, December 5, 1992, report by Michael Wines).

Perhaps as a reaction to the rules of engagement (ROE) used in the past, which were seen as so restrictive that they interfered with the ability to accomplish the mission at an acceptable cost (as in Beirut, Vietnam), the engagement guidelines followed in Somalia left troops relatively free to determine for themselves when they could resort to force. Some military legal advisors believed that in Somalia, American soldiers had been granted more leeway than ever before outside of a traditional combat zone (Washington Post, January 25, 1993, article by Keith Richburg).
UNOSOM II

As both deputy commander of UNOSOM II and the commander of United States forces in the Somalia theater, Maj. General Montgomery had the power to question any order that was opposed by the United States (CQWR, February 20, 1993: 395; March 6, 1993, article by Carroll J. Doherty: 529). As stated earlier, Montgomery also had unilateral U.S. command over a quick reaction force stationed on American ships off the Somali coast (Makinda, 1993: 78).

General Montgomery appears to have been in substantial agreement with UN goals, particularly the capture of Aidid, which he saw as important to the entire humanitarian/nation-building enterprise. During congressional hearings on Somalia, Montgomery would later say that he "thought it made sense to take Aidid off the scene," because, he believed, that if the warlord had been apprehended, the Somali resistance might have crumbled (CQWR, May 14, 1994, article by Richard Sammon: 1234). In another interview, Montgomery reiterated his support of UN efforts to capture Aidid, but expressed slight disagreement with the methods used. Montgomery declared: "I would have done it, but not announced it" (A&E Investigative Report: "A Soldier's Peace," air date: April 23, 1995).

In the fall of 1993, the extent of Montgomery's influence was put to the test. After the ambush of UNOSOM II forces on September 9, General Montgomery sent the
Pentagon a request for heavily armed M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Montgomery said that they were needed to help escort convoys, break through barricades, and patrol more dangerous areas of Mogadishu (New York Times, October 5, 1993, dispatch by R.W. Apple, Jr.).

General Montgomery's request was declined by Defense Secretary Les Aspin, who feared congressional objections (New York Times, October 9, 1993, article by Steven A. Holmes and October 8, 1993, article by John H. Cushman). After the deaths of the American Rangers in October, Aspin would admit that he made a mistake by not honoring the request.

As noted earlier, in response to the killing of the Rangers, President Clinton virtually doubled the American presence while dispatching ample firepower, all of which was placed under Montgomery's direct command. Most of the criticism for the events leading to the Rangers' deaths fell on Defense Secretary Aspin, who later resigned, in large part as a result of the incident.

11. Was there an "exit strategy?" If so, was it adhered to?

No clear timetable was ever articulated for either UNITAF or UNOSOM II. Before UNITAF, President Bush declared that he wanted the troops out of Somalia by January 20, 1993 which was also to be his last day in office. Defense Secretary Cheney and General Powell, however, indicated that the troops might have to stay longer. President-elect
Clinton agreed with their assessment (Keesing's, December 1992: 39225). Even after Operation Restore Hope was underway, the withdrawal date remained unclear.

The Security Council resolution authorizing UNITAF stated that force was to be used to establish "a secure environment." Only when this task had been accomplished to the satisfaction of the Secretary General and the Security Council would the United States be withdrawn (New York Times, December 4, 1992, article by Paul Lewis).

This policy, however, was exceedingly vague and could be construed as permitting an open-ended engagement for Washington. It may be recalled that there was considerable disagreement between the United States and the United Nations over whether a "secure environment" was contingent on disarming the clan militias. The U.S. maintained that the goal was simply to establish sufficient order so that relief could be distributed. As a practical matter, Washington's veto power in the UN Security Council could effectively stop any attempt to keep the U.S. in Somalia any longer than it wanted to be there (New York Times, December 11, 1992, report by Elaine Sciolino).

When, in January, 1993, American commanders began to certify the security of relief operations, the troops started to return home (Keesing's, January 1993: 39255). On March 5, Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed May 1, 1993, as the date that the United States could turn over the operation

Despite the completion of the United States mission in May 1993, some American forces remained in Somalia under UNOSOM II and in the quick reaction force. At the time, General Powell stated that he had "no date in mind" for the final withdrawal of all American forces. He declared, however, that "we'll keep [American forces in Somalia] as long as it's serving a useful purpose" (Washington Post, April 6, 1993, article by Keith Richburg).

UNOSOM II

Backed by American support in the Security Council, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali set several ambitious goals for UNOSOM II. Among the new objectives were: to maintain the ceasefire, to facilitate the delivery of relief supplies, and most ominously, to create conditions conducive to a political settlement. This latter goal carried an implied commitment to building a new state apparatus that could function effectively and maintain order (Makinda, 1993: 76). But this seemed to beg two important questions: First, how does one develop stable political institution out of anarchy? (Makinda, 1993: 31). Second, could military intervention compel the Somalis to address these issues? Such questions, especially those concerning basic identity (i.e. loyalty to clan vs. shared
nationality) are not easily answered, and certainly cannot be imposed.

A more basic question was never addressed. Specifically, given the anarchy and intense inter-clan hatreds, is "unity" a goal even worth striving for? If the clans cannot live together, why not encourage the creation of two, or more, Somalian states?

The pace of events soon compelled a revised timetable for withdrawal. The killing of the Rangers on October 3, 1993 sparked tremendous outrage within the public and the halls of Congress. Under intense pressure, President Clinton devised a new policy, the bottom line of which was that U.S. troops would be withdrawn no later than March 31, 1994, regardless of the state of conditions within Somalia.

The President unveiled four new missions for American forces in the interim period. The first was self-defense for U.S. personnel. The second was to keep open communication routes for UN relief operations. The third objective was "keeping the pressure" on local irregular forces which had attacked American troops. Fourth, and finally, to maintain the security necessary so that "through that pressure and the presence of our forces, [we can] help [make] it reasonably possible for the Somali people...to reach agreement among themselves so that they can solve their own problems" (COWR, October 16, 1993, report by Pat Towell: 2823).
In support of this new policy and withdrawal schedule, President Clinton doubled the size of the American military presence (New York Times, October 8, 1993, Editorial). Citing possible damage to U.S. credibility, Clinton declared that "It is my judgement and that of my military advisors that we may need up to six months to complete these steps and to conduct an orderly withdrawal" (New York Times, October 8, 1993, text of Clinton address). These fears notwithstanding, United States troops were finally withdrawn from Somalia on March 25, 1994, almost a week ahead of schedule (New York Times, March 26, 1994, dispatch by Donatella Lorch).

12. What were the immediate results of the intervention?

At the time of the final withdrawal of United States forces the situation in Somalia remained largely unsettled. The American record had both accomplishments to be proud of and major deficiencies.

On the positive side, by March, 1994, the famine had ended. Relief efforts had been, for the most part, successful. Life in the Somali countryside had largely returned to a "normal" routine. Relief workers could take pride in the fact that many Somali children had been vaccinated against disease. Furthermore, the United States and United Nations had successfully completed numerous public works projects; many new wells and roads had been built. Due to military protection provided by U.S and UN
intervention, agriculture had begun to return to Somalia's few arable areas.

On the political front, in March 1994, fifteen clan groups, including the two major factions (those headed by Ali Mahdi and Aidid) met in Nairobi, Kenya. At the conclusion of the conference, they signed a pact that seemed to give hope for a peaceful future. The terms of the document included: (1) a ceasefire among the factions, (2) a repudiation of violence, and (3) a set date for a national unity and reconciliation conference (New York Times, March 26, 1994, article by Donatella Lorch).

However, the immediate post-intervention situation also had its negative aspects. By April, 1994, the peace process mentioned above had collapsed, as the scheduled reconciliation conference failed to take place. With both major factions accusing the other of undermining the Nairobi agreement, it was clearly evident that the two sides were still far apart (Keesing's, April 1994: 39948).

In March, 1994, although the initial problem of famine was under control, a new problem, pestilence, appeared in the form of a major cholera outbreak. By late March, more than 1700 cases had been reported, with at least 100 deaths confirmed.

Operationally, the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces left UNOSOM II in the hands of substantially less well trained and equipped units from Third World countries. In
fairness, it is difficult to say what the immediate effect of this development would be for Somalia because after July, 1993, U.S. and UN forces rarely ventured out of their secured compounds for fear of taking more casualties. A few patrols were dispatched, but they studiously avoided certain hazardous areas. In fact, some new roads were built around dangerous sections of Mogadishu so that American tanks could bypass them. The relative absence of UNOSOM II patrols allowed a noticeable increase in banditry and looting.

Although the American withdrawal removed a substantial number of troops from the operation, in March, 1994, UNOSOM II still had approximately 19,000 troops in the country. However, the departure of the United States removed substantial firepower and a coercive presence that had acted as a psychological deterrent. There was a pervasive fear, both in Somalia and outside it, that in the absence of a Somalian political settlement, conditions would soon deteriorate (New York Times, March 26, 1994, dispatch by Donatella Lorch).

13. **What was the long-term situation?**

Unfortunately, in the period since the American withdrawal, the situation in Somalia has not substantially changed. Fighting among the various factions continues. The leadership of the northern breakaway Republic of Somaliland has asserted that it will never rejoin Somalia.
For a year, UNOSOM II remained and continued to take casualties in a war seemingly without end. In August, 1994, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali finally acknowledged the possibility that the operation might not achieve its objectives. Furthermore, the few UNOSOM II troops that had been allowed into Somaliland were expelled and the civil war there resumed (Keesing's: March-December 1994). In March 1995, United States forces returned to Somalia, this time to evacuate safely the remaining UNOSOM forces, thereby abandoning Somalia to its fate.

In the period since all foreign troops had withdrawn, inter-clan fighting has continued unabated. As was the case before western intervention, the conflict is inconclusive, with no one group able to achieve a decisive advantage (Bryden, 1995: 151).

14. What elements about this case are unique?

Perhaps the most unique element of this case was the motive behind the intervention. Although altruistic rationales are often applied to American military ventures abroad, in Somalia this truly seems to have been the case. The claim that Operation Restore Hope was undertaken for humanitarian reasons is validated by the fact that there was no discernable American national interest at stake in Somalia. In earlier years, American involvement on the Horn of Africa had been motivated by its strategic location and the need to have a client state in the region to balance
Soviet influence. However, with the demise of the Cold War, these justifications are no longer relevant.

It seems in this case that the scale of human suffering, presented night after night on the evening news, motivated the President's action and gained him a large reservoir of support in both the public and Congress (New York Times, December 5, 1993, text of Bush address).

A second unique element of this case was the anarchical environment in Somalia. In his speech explaining initial U.S. intervention, President Bush accurately declared: "There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down. Anarchy prevails" (New York Times, December 5, 1992, text of Bush address). Somalia presented no "enemy" to defeat, only conditions (e.g. famine, civil war) to deal with; therefore, it was difficult to define goals and determine their fulfillment.

Third, Somalia represented the first time that the United Nations had ever used Chapter VII of the UN Charter to justify an invasion of a member state (Makinda, 1993: 70). This authority arises from Chapter VII, Article 42 of the Charter which states that the Security Council, when necessary, "may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" (United Nations, 1979: 389). A broad construction of the concept of "international peace and security" apparently was accepted by the Security
Council, allowing it to utilize these provisions of the Charter.

Chapter VII, therefore, was the underlying justification for both UNITAF, and later, UNOSOM II. As a case in point, UNSC Res. 794, which authorized the initial UNITAF mission, utilized Chapter VII by granting the military operation the right "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations" (emphasis added) (Makinda, 1993: 70). In comparison to earlier UN peacekeeping/humanitarian operations, the authority granted in this case was broadened considerably, representing a virtual "blank check." Secretary General Boutros-Ghali saw to it that this authority was later extended to UNOSOM II, making it a peacekeeping operation with enforcement power. Because of its concern with peace and international security, Chapter VII was also seen as a way of evading Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, a provision which prohibits outside interference in the domestic affairs of another state (Makinda, 1993: 70).

A fourth distinction is that UNOSOM II marked the first time that U.S. forces were placed under a foreign command. As noted earlier, 3,000 U.S combat-capable troops served under the direct command of Turkish General Bir. Although U.S non-combat forces have served under the United Nations flag in the past, Somalia represented the first
time that combat-capable forces have operated outside of the American chain of command. Although the additional quick reaction force remained under a U.S. command, it too often followed the UN's lead into action (COWR, May 22, 1993, article by Gregory J. Bowens: 1304).

Finally, this operation was very unusual in that it was initiated in a very open manner. Usually, to hold casualties to the lowest possible number, the exact location and time (H-Hour) of a landing are closely guarded secrets. Even the soldiers involved are kept in the dark until the last possible minute. By contrast, in Somalia, United States officials were sent to Mogadishu the day before the landing in order to meet with the two main clan militia leaders. It was hoped that by explaining the humanitarian nature of the UNITAF mission, American officials could secure the militias' cooperation during the initial deployment. The equally unusual result was that the December 1992 landing represented one of the few times that an "opponent" ordered his forces to welcome U.S. troops as "friends" (New York Times, December 9, 1992, dispatch by Jane Perlez).

15. Was the intervention "successful?"

UNITAF

UNITAF, which represented the initial American intervention, was generally quite successful. President Bush had outlined only two goals, and they were largely
fulfilled. The first was to create a secure environment for relief operations. As early as February, 1993, it was clear that UNITAF was having its intended positive effect regarding this objective. Ports and airports in Mogadishu and southern Somalia were secured, greatly facilitating increased shipments of food, medicine, and other relief supplies. Likewise, virtually all supply routes through south and central Somalia were cleared and made usable. Furthermore, bandits had all but disappeared from Mogadishu. The looting of relief supplies was stopped.

As a result of the success of these military operations, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was able to engage in various public works projects. Perhaps the most important indicators of American success was that the death toll from starvation dropped dramatically. In sum, United States forces succeeded in establishing a secure environment for relief efforts in areas where U.S. troops had been deployed (Makinda, 1993: 74).

The other official American objective -- the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces after the establishment of the "secure environment" -- was accomplished during the spring of 1993, culminating with the turning over of operations in Somalia to the United Nations in May 1993.

Despite clashes between American troops and Somali gunmen, casualty figures remained quite low. As a result,
and as long as that remained true, U.S. public opinion viewed the UNITAF operation as having an acceptable cost politically. This is to say that there was a sufficiently low number of casualties in relation to the minimal (in terms of the nation's vital interests) importance of the objectives pursued.

Although some relief agencies claimed that American officials had attempted to cover-up Operation Restore Hope's alleged "failure" in order to hasten the pace of the U.S. withdrawal, when considered in terms of fulfilling the objectives originally set by Washington, the mission was a success (Keesing's, February 1993: 39308). It is interesting to note also that many of the relief workers who originally complained about UNITAF eventually came to see it as a success and requested that it stay longer (Makinda, 1993: 74).

UNOSOM II

UNOSOM II, the United Nation's successor mission to UNITAF, is generally considered a failure. Starting with the ambitious goal of rebuilding the Somali nation, it rapidly degraded into little more than a manhunt for General Aidid.

UNOSOM II was originally conceived as a new type of United Nations operation: peacekeeping with the power to use force to ensure the fulfillment of Security Council resolutions. It was, however, handicapped from the start.
Despite its unprecedented enforcement authority, in terms of both its armaments and manpower quality, UNOSOM II was substantially inferior to the U.S. force that it replaced. Although a quick reaction force was available to assist UNOSOM II, it remained under an American command.

UNOSOM II's original mandate was to cover all of Somalia. In practice, however, it never succeeded in doing so. UNOSOM II's effectiveness largely remained confined to southern and central Somalia. The cause of this immobility was two-fold. First, southern and central Somalia were the regions hardest hit by the famine. Second, the fighting between the two main clan militias increasingly centered on Mogadishu.

In reviewing the ambitious goals that the Security Council set for UNOSOM II, the extent of its failure becomes more evident. The objective of disarming the clan militias was never realized. Given the proliferation of weapons throughout the country, this goal was never very realistic from the start.

In terms of the broader goal -- fostering peace and national reconciliation so that Somalia could be rebuilt -- the mission also failed. The United Nations sponsored at least three major peace conferences. Despite the huge expense associated with them (in the "five to six figures" according to a western diplomat), nothing constructive ever
resulted from these meetings. Afterward, fighting continued unabated.

Although it assumed control of the port and airport in Mogadishu from the United States, UNOSOM II had difficulty maintaining the supply routes from these facilities into the famine-stricken interior areas. Indeed, American forces attached to UNOSOM II actually had to build roads around parts of Mogadishu so that clan strongholds could be avoided.

UNOSOM II was unable to maintain the peace, which was one of its central objectives. To make matters worse, when UNOSOM II did engage in firefights with clan militias, it often took unacceptably high casualties. As a result, UN forces all but abdicated their peacekeeping role, spending the last few months of their mission inside the secure confines of their fortified bases in order to avoid further casualties. When the United Nations force left Somalia in March 1995, the capital was still so torn by fighting among the rival gangs and militias that even relief workers withdrew.

UNOSOM II's one major success seems to have been famine relief. Aid workers believe that intervention may have saved as many as 300,000 people from starvation. So complete has the recovery been for Somalia that the country now produces almost enough food to fulfill its domestic consumption needs. It has even begun to export modest
quantities of livestock and fruit. These exports form the basis for Mogadishu's slow return as a regional trade center (New York Times, March 3, 1995, article by Donatella Lorch).

The political situation is still greatly fractured and unstable. Elections promised for 1995 have not taken place. The effort of the United Nations to act as an agent of Somalian national reconciliation failed miserably, in some measure undone by a personal vendetta that developed between Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and General Aidid (New York Times, March 3, 1995, dispatch by Donatella Lorch). The Security Council clearly erred in making the fugitive warlord's capture a central part of the mission. The other and more important United Nations objectives became subordinated to this goal, as UNOSOM II's "mission creep" allowed the operation to degenerate into a manhunt.

The efforts to apprehend Aidid led to U.S. losses, when in October, 1993, American Rangers were killed by Aidid's militia. This incident may have had unforeseen long-range implications for future UN peacekeeping missions. Appalled by the casualties in what was originally characterized as a low-risk operation, the Congress and the American public demanded that U.S. troops be withdrawn, a move which greatly diluted the quality of forces available to UNOSOM II. More importantly, however, the United States may well have become permanently soured on
the idea of committing troops to any future multilateral operations that are not under direct American command. This disenchanted with United Nations operations seems at least partially justified. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was a poor steward of United States military resources; and toward the end of UNOSOM II operations, he seemed to be more driven by his own ego than by stated policy objectives.

In this case, however, the failings of the United Nations are also largely the failings of Washington's policy. UNOSOM II's operations were overseen by the UN Security Council, where the U.S. was a permanent member with veto power. Therefore, Boutros-Ghali could actually do no more than the United States would allow. In fact, the American Ambassador to the United Nations, presumably taking her orders from President Clinton, supported and loudly praised the Security Council's policies (New York Times, March 3, 1995, report by Donatella Lorch)!

Even the President's own revised, and more narrowly defined, post-October 1993 mission goals remained largely unfulfilled. The additional forces and equipment dispatched to Somalia after the killing of the Rangers did allow U.S forces to protect themselves until they were withdrawn, as promised, in March 1994. The Clinton Administration failed, however, to accomplish its other "revised" policy goals (of maintaining pressure on local irregular forces and maintaining sufficient security in Somalia) that would
afford a breathing space to permit the formulation of solutions for the multitude of political problems that existed in Somalia.

UNOSOM II, and the U.S. role in it, were perhaps best summed up by Senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), usually one of President Bill Clinton's staunchest allies in Congress. Bradley condemned the venture as "a series of ad hoc decisions, divorced from any overall strategy, [that] led our troops into an ill-defined, poorly planned, and open-ended mission" (New York Times, October 16, 1993, article by Clifford Krauss).
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: EVALUATING THE INTERVENTIONIST TYPOLOGY

Introduction

During the course of the preceding six chapters, this work has touched upon issues that cross the breadth of the discipline. Although the chief focus has been within the field of international relations, this study also contains elements of comparative politics (e.g. civilian-military relations, military doctrine) as well as aspects of American politics (e.g. domestic public opinion, U.S. executive-legislative relations).

The primary theoretical contribution of this study, however, is in the subfield of conflict, specifically direct military intervention by the United States. It considers the efficacy of direct military intervention: when it will work, when it will not, and how to undertake such action in a manner that will bring rapid victory at an acceptable political cost.

Although much has been written on the general subject of military intervention, most of the literature centers on other aspects and problems related to the use of force, such as deterrence and coercive diplomacy. As was pointed out in Chapter I, there is a dearth of literature dealing systematically with the preconditions that need to be
fulfilled before an interventionist policy can successfully be undertaken. Much of what has been written largely deals with intervention in the abstract; that is to say, dealing with the subject from a theoretical perspective and unapplied to actual cases. Our purpose here has been to fill this gap in the literature by identifying the specific criteria that favor the success of direct military intervention.

With the policy of the United States more inclined now toward the use of direct military force than during any other time in the post-Vietnam period, this concern with the preconditions necessary for successful intervention acquires unusual urgency. Clearly, military intervention requires more preparation than other policy options if it is going to fruitful. The investment that such a policy entails, in terms of money, hardware, and human lives, is so great that the failure to execute it skillfully and successfully may greatly curtail its availability as a future policy option.

Review of Elements of the Typology

The typology's criteria basically fall into four broad categories. The first (covering items 1-6, and 12) are situational variables. These criteria are concerned with the nature of the situation confronting the United States and call for identification of American interests in each case. This group of variables first requires the
enunciation of a clear and attainable set of goals. On the basis of these criteria, these recommendations are made about how to proceed under certain specific circumstances. These precepts include admonitions against engaging in peacekeeping operations, against involvement in humanitarian missions in war zones, against intervention in civil wars, and against placing American troops under multilateral commands. Finally, collectively these criteria suggest that military force should only be used to defend tangible assets or other narrowly-defined vital national interests.

The second category (items 8-11, 13) consists of operational variables. These deal with how a particular mission is actually carried out. The criteria are concerned with such issues as the American society's willingness to support forces in the field, as well as the quantity and quality of troops and weapons deployed. Other criteria deal with the need to consider alternatives beyond the use of air power, such as the possible need to deploy ground forces in the theater.

The third category (14-15) concerns the dynamics of civilian-military relations. These criteria require that the theater commander be integrated into the decision-making process. This is to be done by giving him input into strategic decisions, as well as allowing him discretion and initiative in the pursuit of the war effort.
The final category concerns the public and congressional reaction to military intervention. It acknowledges that, as a general rule, intervention requires the support of both the public and its representatives at the Capitol. The larger the scale of the proposed operation, the greater the need for such support. There are, however, several ways that the president can circumvent this requirement. As was the case in Panama, the president can quickly and secretly insert the troops into the theater, effectively presenting potential critics with a fait accompli. This acts to impose on Congress an acquiescent silence, since few members would dare to criticize the war effort with American troops under fire and thus risk being perceived as "anti-American." Finally, the president can also initiate action while Congress is in recess, making it difficult for the legislative body to react independently.

Evaluating the Typology

In this section the typology will be evaluated by relating the cases presented in the previous chapters to the criteria set forth in Chapter III. Although few in number, these cases provide an adequate test of the utility of the various criteria identified in this dissertation.

The cases represent mixed results, with Panama and Iraq representing generally successful interventions, while Somalia illustrates the failure of such a policy. However,
as will become readily apparent in our evaluation, the typology's criteria are effective predictors of the outcome of a post-Cold War interventionism by the United States. Consequently, the results of this study will demonstrate that success is associated with adherence to these principles and that failure is a likely product of their violation.

1. A clear and attainable goal of U.S. policy exist.

   This condition is vital because it provides a rationale for the proposed mission. It explains what needs to be done, thereby establishing a standard which, once fulfilled, allows the interventionist action to be concluded and the troops brought home.

   In both Panama and Iraq, clearly formulated and precise goals were articulated. The goals in Panama were to apprehend Noriega, to restore the democratically-elected Endara government, to secure the Panama Canal, and to safeguard American lives in the country. In Iraq, initial policy goals included the ejection of Iraqi occupation forces from Kuwait, the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government, the protection of American lives, and the establishment of security in the Persian Gulf region. Once the fighting began, however, this concern with security was construed to included the destruction of Iraq's destructive capabilities, and, although never articulated publicly, the possible removal of Iraqi
dictator Saddam Hussein. As the crisis continued, the regional security goal was expanded into an envisioned New World Order intended to govern the future conduct of international relations.

As was indicated in the preceding chapter, Somalia involved two different missions. The initial American intervention, UNITAF, had as its objective the establishment of adequate security within the country (the so-called "secure environment"), so that famine relief aid could be safely and effectively distributed. As soon as the requisite level of security was reached, U.S. troops were to withdraw and turn the operation over to United Nations peacekeeping forces. From the outset, however, there was controversy between the United States and the United Nations over what precisely constituted a "secure environment," as well as what role, if any, the disarmament of the various clan militias in Somalia played in creating such conditions.

The United Nations' successor operation (UNOSOM II) was even less clear in its objectives. UNOSOM II had goals that were significantly more ambitious than previous UN peacekeeping operations. However, these ends were so ambiguously defined that they would certainly require a commitment of forces for an indefinite period.

The mission's original intent was to effect the disarmament of clan militias and to rebuild civic
institutions so that, at some unspecified date, authority could be transferred to a viable Somalian government. However, within months, this ambiguity of purpose created real problems, as United Nations policy began to show signs of "mission creep." There occurred a gradual, yet clearly evident, shift from the nebulously-defined goal of nation-building to an almost obsessive manhunt for fugitive warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. The unintended consequence of this development was to transform UNOSOM II from an impartial peacekeeper into a de facto participant in the Somalian civil war.

As noted in Chapter III, an ancillary concern to the existence of achievable goals is the development of an effective plan for military withdrawal or "exit strategy." Such plans serve an important function in domestic politics, since they reassure both Congress and the general public that there is no ongoing or permanent commitment of American forces. However, some critics of such strategies argue that they are too restrictive, setting an arbitrary schedule that may be unrealistically optimistic. The result is that as the date for withdrawal passes unfulfilled, there is a tendency to see a Vietnam-like quagmire where none exists. In reality, it may simply be that from the start, the operation was going to take longer than the White House calculated or thought prudent to reveal.
In all three cases, the development and articulation of such exit strategies was unsatisfactory. From the evidence presented, it appears that plans for the withdrawal of American forces are often developed on an ad hoc or impromptu basis. In Panama, for example, it was not necessary to draw up a detailed plan of withdrawal because most of the troops used during the 1989 invasion were permanently stationed on American bases in the former Canal Zone.

In Iraq, again, there seems to have been no formal pre-arranged exit strategy. President Bush had only promised to bring home American troops as soon as possible. Withdrawal began almost as soon as the truce had been formalized. Most U.S. forces were returned by mid-summer 1991.

In Somalia, there was no exit strategy worthy of the name until near the end of the U.S. presence. During the original UNITAF mission, President Bush proclaimed that United States forces would be home by the time he left office in late January, 1993. However, Pentagon and administration officials, as well as Bush's critics, said that such an optimistic assessment was unrealistic, especially in light of the pursuit of such an ambiguously defined goal as establishing a "secure environment." Agreeing to oversight by the UN Security Council only
complicated matters and made it more difficult to establish a firm date for an American withdrawal.

During the second phase, UNOSOM II, once more there was no pre-arranged plan for the departure of American troops. According to the United Nations, UNOSOM II would be pulled out only after the fulfillment of its goals (see above). Considering the wide scope of UN objectives, the practical effect of such a policy was to give UNOSOM II a virtually limitless mandate. There was even some discussion of reestablishing a UN trusteeship over Somalia during the nation-building process. It was only after the October, 1993, slaughter of the American Rangers in Mogadishu that Washington finally devised an exit strategy. Actually, this plan, articulated by President Clinton in October, 1993, was more of a forced withdrawal than an "exit plan," since the President's hand was being forced by an angry Congress which had voted to cut off funding for the operation. These arrangements constituted a de facto admission of intervention's failure, because the withdrawal was to be accomplished regardless of the situation on the ground.

2. The intervention is not a peacekeeping operation.

This condition is important for four reasons. First, peacekeeping operations by their very nature often require an ongoing, open-ended commitment of forces. Second, hallmarks of peacekeeping are often a lack of strategic
objectives and the pursuit of nebulously-defined goals that have a great potential for leading into a quagmire.

Third, peacekeeping operations generally require a degree of restraint, both in terms of action and armaments, that puts the troops involved in danger. Such restraint is perceived as necessary so as to avoid presenting a threat to the opposing sides; but the result often is that such passive and lightly armed units are vulnerable and unable to function as anything more than a "tripwire." Finally, trained as they are for combat, U.S. troops lack the specialized training required to carry out peacekeeping operations.

Of the three case studies, only Somalia was a peacekeeping operation. In that case, all of the above concerns were present. The usual perils were compounded by the fact that Somalia was in a state of total anarchy. By definition, there was an absence of a government with which the intervening powers could cooperate.

Somalia was embroiled in a multi-sided civil war. There was, in fact, no peace to keep. Furthermore, most of the provocations directed at UNOSOM II came from one side (Aidid's SNA). As a result, military action to keep the peace increasingly focussed on capturing Aidid and disarming his militia. Consequently, to many Somalis, the conflict became to be seen as one between UNOSOM II and Aidid. Ironically, despite the official mission of
peacekeeping, throughout the operation the level of violence spiraled upward. When American, and later UN, forces withdrew, the situation was as bad, if not worse, than when foreign troops arrived!

3. **The intervention is not a humanitarian mission within a war zone.**

   This admonition is critical because often the intervening power is tempted to look beyond the immediate humanitarian situation and try to resolve what it sees as the root (usually political) cause of the nation's instability. As a result, what started as a relief operation may end up as direct involvement in the local war in a well intended, but greatly misguided, effort to impose lasting stability.

   This caveat does not apply in the Panama or Iraq cases except in a very general sense. Only in Somalia was such a concern the central motive for the intervention. From the outset, American intervention had as its primary purpose the delivery of relief aid for the victims of the famine which gripped the country. Such action was deemed necessary because of the widespread looting of relief supplies and the kidnapping of aid workers by gunmen belonging to the warring factions had made humanitarian relief efforts all but impossible.

   As noted above, the UN Security Council came to see the general anarchy and chronic warfare in Somalia as the root causes of the famine. As a result, UNOSOM II was given
significantly broadened objectives to pursue in the search of a long-term political solution. Consequently, willingly or not, UNOSOM II became deeply involved in the civil war as a de facto ally of Ali Mahdi against General Aidid.

Gradually, therefore, the original humanitarian aid mission became subordinated to the political goal of rebuilding a Somalian nation-state. However, with American and allied casualties mounting as a result of the low intensity warfare, the widespread sympathy and compassion for conditions within Somalia that had inspired the initial intervention dissipated. In the United States, popular bitterness over the apparent ingratitude of the Somali people, along with the ever-increasing level of violence, led Washington in time to wash its hand of Somalia. American troops were ordered home no later than March 31, 1994, regardless of the situation on the ground. The failure of the humanitarian relief mission in Somalia appears to have had the effect of making such intervention less likely in the future. For example, despite the graphic images of massive human misery in Rwanda which, like Somalia before it, were presented nightly on the evening news, the reaction of the American people this time was significantly more limited and restrained.

4. United States forces are not subject to a multilateral authority.

On the basis of the evidence of these cases, there are compelling reasons why the United States should avoid
committing its forces to combat under a multilateral command. Since the orders that the American troops will follow will emanate from a source other than Washington, there is a real chance that once U.S. forces are sent into combat they will become, in essence, hostages to the agenda of the multilateral entity. Even if the United States retains a degree of control over its troops, the fact that Washington seeks the imprimatur of a multilateral entity, such as the United Nations, places it in the uncomfortable position of having to potentially subordinate all or a portion of its policy goals to the decisions of the international organization. The mandate that the multilateral command is granted may be either too narrow or too broad to serve American policy interests.

These concerns do not apply to the Panama case, which was a unilateral United States undertaking. In Iraq, although the United States obtained the UN's blessing for the operation, there was no direct military UN role. All American forces remained under the Pentagon's command. Washington determined how the war was to be conducted and chose the operational goals to pursue.

The United Nations was not, however, without its influence over developments in Iraq. An officially unannounced, yet plainly obvious, American objective was to depose and/or kill Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein if possible. As a result, U.S. bombing missions targeted
locations from which the Pentagon believed he could be conducting the war effort. However, when the ground offensive finally got underway, the United Nations mandate for the use of force (which was narrowly constructed to include little more than the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait) acted as a political constraint, preventing President Bush from entertaining the possibility of allowing American troops from marching on Baghdad and removing Saddam from power. Consequently, Hussein is still in power, still posing a threat to the Gulf region, and evidently still pursuing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

In Somalia, the resolution authorizing the original UNITAF intervention was similar to that identified with the Persian Gulf mission. A key difference, however, was that this time the Security Council maintained an oversight role over the operation. Almost immediately, in the case of Somalia there were disputes between the UN and the American command over what was meant by a "secure environment." This disagreement ultimately lead the United States to begin engagement in an unplanned operation to disarm clan militias. As indicated earlier, the result was the start of a long process of "mission creep," entailing a delay in the departure of American troops until May 1993.

In the UNOSOM II phase of the Somalia intervention, the UN command allowed, if not compelled, U.S. troops
committed to it to become involved in the increasingly partisan fighting in Mogadishu. As a result, American troops took mounting casualties in what was rapidly becoming UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's personal war against Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. The Clinton administration found it increasingly difficult to justify these losses to the American public, which was becoming more and more restive as the operation progressed.

It does need to be pointed out, however, that the Clinton administration bears a measure of the responsibility for the policy disaster that Somalia became, because the administration was far too willing to follow the lead of the UN Secretary General. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States possessed a veto which it could have used to stop, or at least slow down, the pace of the mission creep that was overtaking UNOSOM II. Instead, Clinton virtually abdicated his role as commander-in-chief in favor of the Security Council and Boutros-Ghali. Within the Security Council, U.S. representative Madeleine Albright gave an American endorsement to the increasingly frequent retaliatory raids that the council authorized against Aidid. Despite his potential ability to influence misguided United Nations policies in Somalia, Clinton did not publicly challenge Boutros-Ghali's handling of the mission until October, 1993.
and then only after the Congress forced his hand by voting to cut off funding and recall U.S. troops.

Judging by the public and congressional reaction to the Somalia misadventure, any future action in which the United States allows its forces to serve under a foreign and/or multilateral command, with the exception of NATO, is highly unlikely.

The case studies have brought to light two additional concerns with multilateral operations that were not discussed in Chapter III. First, the fact of the matter is that no country sends its best units to participate in UN operations. Although it is not always the case, often peacekeeping responsibilities fall on the shoulders of units from the Third World that simply are not up to the task. In any case, such UN missions often reflect lesser quality manpower and inferior firepower than the armies that they are drawn from. In turn, these weaknesses invite challenges from potential adversaries.

Second, no one has raised the important constitutional issue of whether the president can pull forces from the American chain of command and place them under a completely foreign leadership. Is not such an act both a violation of U.S. sovereignty and an abdication of the president's role as commander-in-chief?
5. **Force is used to defend tangible assets or other vital national interests.**

This point is best summarized by recalling the definition of vital national interest established in Chapter III: "any asset (e.g. oil), place (e.g. Europe), or principle (e.g. the freedom of navigation in international water), the unavailability of which places a state at a strategic or severe diplomatic disadvantage, if not directly threatening its independence and/or national security."

In both the Panama and Iraq cases this criterion was fulfilled. During the 1989 invasion of Panama, the use of force was undertaken with the aim of securing the Panama Canal and associated installations, in the process shutting off Panama as a conduit for the flow of illegal drugs to the United States and toppling Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega from power. Noriega's removal was considered necessary because he was seen as a root cause of the above mentioned concerns, as well as posing a security threat to the region because of his increasingly close embrace of Communist dictators Fidel Castro of Cuba and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua.

Washington's interests in the Persian Gulf area were long-standing and well known. Most important was the security of the region's oil supply, and its continued free flow at market prices. A related concern was the continued freedom of navigation by U.S. and western shipping in the
Gulf itself. The Bush administration also was motivated by a strong desire to contain, if not remove, Saddam Hussein so as to protect allies in the region. Adding to American worries was Baghdad's drive to obtain weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, and nuclear). Hussein had already built up what was thought to be an impressive military machine. Iraq's acquisition of such weapons posed a grave threat to American interests in the region, and with an adequate delivery system, beyond to NATO territory.

In Somalia, however, no such compelling national interest imperative existed. Although Berbera had served as a host for American naval vessels in the 1980s, with the end of the Cold War Somalia all but lost its strategic value for Washington. The sole basis for United States intervention was compassion for famine victims. As noted earlier, despite this laudable motive, because no vital American interests were at stake, intervention in Somalia became increasingly difficult to justify (in term of both lives and money) to an increasingly skeptical public and Congress.

6. The political situation in the target country is not one of civil war.

Again this condition was not present in either Panama or Iraq. Somalia, however, was an extreme case. As originally formulated, this criterion presupposed a civil war as a situation in which a government fights against a
rebel faction contesting its authority. Somalia was unique in that all authority had collapsed and anarchy prevailed.

This fact notwithstanding, the basic premises advanced in Chapter III remained: It was often difficult for interventionist forces to distinguish hostile gunmen clearly from the general population. The result was a high rate of civilian casualties, which had the effect of promoting the increasing alienation of the Somali people, who only months earlier had greeted American troops as saviors.

As noted earlier, the United States was placed in an increasingly difficult situation as mission creep drew UNOSOM II ever deeper into the civil war. In light of the original humanitarian which prompted the initial commitment of U.S. forces, Washington seems neither to have anticipated the type of Somali opposition that evolved nor the possibility that the United Nations would become so actively involved in what was essentially domestic Somalian politics.

7. There is a strong probability of public support, or at least indifference.

Opposition to intervention from the Congress, the public, or both, may have the effect of undermining the president's policy abroad. There is a danger that attempts to "purchase" support for intervention may hold the war effort hostage to domestic concerns. For example, it has been argued that President Johnson used Great Society
programs as a means of attempting to buy support for the effort in Vietnam. Furthermore, there is the real possibility that the opponent may attempt to exploit American domestic divisions for its own benefit. For instance, there is no doubt that anti-war rallies on American college campuses during the 1960s were a boon for North Vietnamese propaganda.

With regard to Panama, the public mood had long been hawkish with respect to President Noriega. There was, however, no consensus, among the public or within Congress, for military intervention to topple his regime. When, in December 1989, the United States invaded Panama, President Bush had executed a fait accompli, as both Congress and the general public were largely taken by surprise.

Interventionism against Iraq, by contrast, always enjoyed wide public support, never commanding less than a majority in most polls. There was, however, significantly more disagreement in Congress over America's response to the crisis in the Gulf. In both houses, while there was wide support for President Bush's initial decision to deploy forces to Saudi Arabia, there was bitter debate about how, or even if, to commit American forces to combat against Iraq. Even as late as January 1991, there was still strong sentiment to give economic sanctions more time to work. A resolution authorizing the use of force passed both houses of Congress, but the strong division of opinion was
especially evident in the Senate, where it passed by a slim 52-47 vote.

Initially, there was broad public support for the humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Only after the October, 1993, battle that resulted in the deaths of the American Rangers did opposition sentiment begin to develop in earnest. Soon, the public demanded an immediate withdrawal, and the Congress passed a resolution compelling an exit by no later than March 31, 1994. This vote marked the first time Congress had ever voted to cut off funding for an ongoing military operation.

Basically, then, this criterion was met in all three cases, at least at the outset. Only in Somalia was there a major reversal of opinion, and even then not until the killing of the Rangers and the subsequent revelation of the mismanagement of the operation, exemplified by Defense Secretary Aspin's refusal to grant the theater commander's urgent request for additional armor.

8. **The proposed intervention has the support of the military leadership.**

The approval of senior military officers is essential if the success of intervention is to be assured. Pentagon officials are very (some believe overly) cautious in advocating a resort to force as a policy instrument, General Clausewitz' famous dictum notwithstanding. Therefore, the assessment of senior officers, based on their study and understanding of the technical aspects of
warfare, should be of crucial importance in the decision to commit military forces to action. Their approval indicates a relatively high probability of success at an acceptable cost. Furthermore, the cooperation of the military is essential for the development of usable military options.

In Panama, SOUTHCOM commander General Woerner was originally opposed to intervention. However, his opposition stemmed more from political, than from military, reasons. When General Woerner was replaced by General Thurman, and General Powell was appointed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at this point the military leadership gave its support to an operation against Noriega. Generals Powell and Thurman reworked the cumbersome existing contingency plans into what became the highly successful Operation Just Cause.

From the outset, high-level military officials strongly supported the initial Desert Shield deployment as a deterrent against further Iraqi expansion. There was also general support in the Pentagon for the later direct intervention that would be called Operation Desert Storm. During the Fall, 1990, Generals Schwartzkopf and Powell, Defense Secretary Cheney, and their staffs developed a plan that would be ready to be implemented by the United Nations deadline of January 15, 1991.

As the deadline approached, General Powell was largely alone in urging President Bush to allow sanctions more time
to take their toll on the Iraqi economy and military. For a variety of reasons, Schwartzkopf pushed for a winter, 1991, offensive, which was the plan that was eventually followed.

By contrast, from the very start of the airlift of August, 1992, the military was extremely apprehensive about getting deeply involved in Somalia. Yet, despite Pentagon warnings, a workable plan of intervention was developed, with emphasis placed on a quick entry and an equally rapid exit from the theater. Military officials especially disliked UNOSOM II because of its pursuit of ill-defined, often-changing UN goals.

In all three cases, the military devised workable options. Only in Somalia did the military seem worried about any potential problems. As early as December 1992, Powell correctly predicted that there would be an American involvement long after the completion of the UNITAF mission.

9. **A willingness exists to support forces in the field.**

   If the military is to accomplish its mission, there must be a commitment on the part of Congress and the president to provide the troops in the field with what they need, when they need it.

   In Panama, such a concern was never really at issue because of the massive permanent U.S. military presence in the country, as well as the extraordinarily short duration of the military action.
During the Persian Gulf War, once the debate over the use of force was concluded in January, 1991, Congress was in basic agreement about supplying U.S. troops what they needed. Both Republicans and Democrats vowed that the armed forces would be given everything they needed to win quickly and decisively.

In Somalia, there was no debate regarding Somalia and the nature of the mission until after the operation was well underway, but Congress nevertheless gave its assent and support. The Clinton administration, however, was afraid to go too far in calling for support for the troops, out of fear of provoking the local warlords and unnecessarily arousing congressional criticism. Only after Secretary of Defense Aspin's rejection of a request by the theater commander for additional armor resulted in the October, 1993, Ranger disaster did President Clinton decide to make a full commitment to support the military operation.

10. A recognition must exist that air strikes alone may not be sufficient to accomplish the policy goals established.

The efficacy of air power has its limits. Although useful in inflicting damage and/or "sending a message" to the adversary, the nature of warfare often requires the use of ground forces to clear and claim an area from enemy forces. Stated directly, air power can damage enemy forces, but it may not, in and of itself, be capable of ejecting an
entrenched opponent. Policymakers must remain mindful of these limits, because a reliance on the air option alone can often result in an unpleasant choice: backing down or escalating involvement by using ground forces.

Because of its focus on removing Noriega from power, from the very beginning Panama was conceived as a ground operation. Therefore, the concern addressed in this section was never an issue in this case.

To the contrary, in Iraq, there was a recognition of this issue from the start. When the Bush administration was reviewing its options in August, 1990, General Powell argued that air strikes would serve to inflict punishment on Iraqi forces, but that ground forces were going to be necessary to roll back the invasion force.

In Somalia, awareness of the limits of an air option was never really an issue due to the relief/peacekeeping nature of the mission. Helicopters were used in both transport and aircover support roles. Fixed wing aircraft were largely absent from the theater until late into the UNOSOM II mission.

11. **A willingness exists to utilize ground forces if necessary.**

This criterion is the logical extension of the other issues addressed in the immediate previous section. To rule out the use of ground forces per se is to give the enemy a substantial advantage. Because an adversary now knows that there is a limit to American intervention, it can tailor
its strategy accordingly. As was stated earlier, such a concern was not a factor in either Panama or Somalia since by their very nature both required the use of ground forces.

In Iraq, however, it was clear from the outset that ground forces would be utilized. The accepted strategy called for a thorough air war lasting up to four to six weeks, followed by a massive, 144-hour ground offensive. The only dispute that emerged concerned when and for how long ground forces should be used, as President Bush and General Schwartzkopf disagreed over when to terminate the ground war.

12. The war is limited in geographic scope.

The main point of concern here is that the intervening power keep the fighting confined geographically so that there is no spill-over into the territory of other countries. Such an expansion of the conflict could have unintended consequences, not the least of which is possible counter-intervention by other great powers.

In all three cases considered here, the intervention remained confined within the original theater of operation.

13. There is a willingness by officials in Washington to commit adequate forces to accomplish the established goals.

This point concerns the scale of the intervention. It asks if the quantity and nature of the forces being
utilized are sufficient to complete the mission in a timely manner.

In all three case studies, it became clear that a new post-Cold War doctrine of the use of force has emerged; entailing overwhelming numbers, well armed troops, and force decisively applied. First developed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, this new doctrine was aimed at remedying the perceived failure of the policies of incremental escalation and tactical restraint relied upon in Vietnam. This new approach called for the use of superior numbers, backed by the use of the ultra-modern weapons developed during the Cold War, to energetically engage and defeat an enemy force. The expectation was that victory could be swiftly achieved, while greatly reducing casualties on both sides. This new doctrine placed a high premium on mobility of forces, calling for the reliance on helicopters for both their lift capacity and their firepower.

The application of this new doctrine was clearly evident in the cases of Panama and Iraq, with the Persian Gulf War serving as a textbook example. Furthermore, Panama witnessed the first combat use of the F-117A Stealth fighter. Iraq, however, was where the full range of Cold War conventional warfare capabilities saw its first combat test. Included were such advanced weapons systems as the F-117A, the M1A1 tank, laser and optically guided "smart"
bombs, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and the Patriot anti-ballistic missile.

In Somalia, the initial UNITAF mission employed what was believed to be an overwhelming force, with 28,150 of the 35,000 troops contributed by the United States. Because UNITAF was perceived as a largely non-combat relief mission, most of the heavy equipment was left at home.

UNOSOM II, by contrast, was a fairly large operation (22,000; 3,000 U.S) and better armed than most previous UN peacekeeping operations. However, this force still lacked the quality of firepower, armor, and aircraft usually employed during unilateral United States interventions. The quick reaction force, while under a direct American command, was not very heavily armed. The military disaster of October 1993 finally prompted the dispatch of firepower qualitatively comparable to that used in Panama and the Persian Gulf. However, with the withdrawal of United States forces in March 1994, the quality of both the manpower and firepower available to UNOSOM II experienced a dramatic decline. As a result, when the fighting escalated, UNOSOM II preferred to remain largely confined in its bunkers rather than risk taking more casualties.

The quantity and quality of American forces and arms clearly accounted for the rapid and complete victories in Panama and Iraq. By contrast, the failure of the efforts in Somalia demonstrate the problem inherent in assembling and

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deploying a United Nations force. UN operations are handicapped by four factors that ultimately place American troops at risk: (1) The force is assembled by soliciting contributions from member nations, but most countries, especially the major powers, will not send their better, more combat ready units. (2) Often UN peacekeeping forces are drawn from Third World countries, which by and large are inferior in their training and arms to their U.S. counterparts. (3) Because of their generally lower level of military professionalism, these other forces may get into trouble from which they must be rescued by better armed and better trained American troops. Finally, (4) by the very nature of their profession, most soldiers lack training in peacekeeping. As a result, they are not adequately prepared for the situation to which they are committed, with unnecessary bloodshed as the result.

14. **Theater commanders must be allowed input into decisions related to the conduct of the war effort.**

This stipulation recognizes that the theater commander has first-hand knowledge of the situation in the arena of conflict. Because of his unique perspective, the field commander usually possesses a clearer understanding of the situation on the ground than his superiors in Washington or at the Pentagon. By sharing his insights, the theater commander is instrumental in helping policymakers to make decisions better based on the most complete information available.
In both Panama and Iraq, the theater commanders had a central role in planning operations. During the execution of the mission, their insights carried great weight within the Oval Office. It was General Schwartzkopf's preferences that largely determined the timing of the start of the offensive against Iraqi forces. The only time that it appears that the theater commander was overruled, in either case, was when President Bush decided to reduce the length of the ground war against Iraqi forces from 144 to 100 hours. This decision, however, was made only after the military victory had essentially been won.

In Somalia, the degree to which General Johnston was included in the planning for the UNITAF mission appears unclear. He was, however, given wide leeway in the pursuit of his mission. When the United Nations challenged his conduct of the operation, his position was fully backed by the Bush administration.

As deputy commander of UNOSOM II, General Montgomery was authorized to question any order that might seem unwise or place American lives at undue risk. However, his counsel did not seem to carry much weight with the Clinton administration. When Montgomery requested Washington for more heavy weapons, his request was ignored at first, then later refused. The commander's influence seems to have been enhanced only after the events of October 1993.
15. **The theater commander must be allowed discretion in the pursuit of the war effort.**

This condition is a conscious reaction to the failure in Vietnam. It demands that theater commanders be granted liberal rules of engagement so that they can achieve victory in the most effective and least costly manner possible. Furthermore, it urges the administration in Washington to avoid the temptation to micro-manage the war from the White House and simply let the military do its job as it sees fit. This condition was present, to varying degrees, in all three cases.

In Panama, General Thurman was allowed to develop his own rules of engagement. The major guiding principle was that he use the minimum amount of power needed to achieve victory, but there was no pre-set limit imposed by Washington. Although the individual rules followed by American soldiers in Panama were fairly restrictive, they were set by the theater commander who had carefully tailored them to the situation there.

In Iraq, Schwartzkopf was given carte blanche to pursue the war as he saw fit. The operation had only one restriction on engagement: pilots had to get a positive identification of their targets before bombing so as to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. A clear example of how unrestricted the rules of engagement were is presented by General Schwartzkopf's order that Iraqi soldiers, even if in retreat, were to be considered hostile if they did
not lay down their weapons and abandon their equipment. Failure to disarm would make them fair targets and they would be fired upon. As noted above, the only time Schwartzkopf's freedom to act was restricted was when the President ordered an early ceasefire.

In Somalia, General Johnston also was permitted liberal rules of engagement. UNITAF soldiers were allowed to consider anyone even pointing a weapon at them as hostile, and as such were allowed to fire first. U.S. Marines were told only to fire in self defense, but were allowed very wide latitude in determining when, in fact, they were in danger.

As for UNOSOM II, there is not much information on the authority of General Bir as the UN theater commander. What is known, however, was that his orders could, under certain circumstances, be questioned by his deputy commander, U.S. General Montgomery. In addition, Montgomery retained a quick reaction force under an independent American command, which could be deployed at his discretion.

**Clarifications and Refinements**

These three cases appear to validate the criteria established in the typology. Panama and Iraq clearly demonstrate that a successful outcome is related to adherence to these precepts. Somalia, by contrast, shows that failure is associated with a failure to be guided by these principles. Despite this correlation between the
criteria and the cases, a few clarifications and admonitions are in order.

First, UNOSOM II, a mission run under the direct command of the United Nations, was a clear failure. However, both UNITAF and the anti-Iraq coalition, remaining under direct U.S. control, were both successful multilateral operations. Bearing these facts in mind, it seems justifiable to revise the fourth criterion by narrowing its scope, to hold that: U.S. forces will not be placed under a direct non-American multilateral command.

Second, the criterion dealing with the need for public support or at least indifference should perhaps be expanded to include public ignorance (This criterion would now read: "There is a strong probability of public support, indifference, or ignorance"). Although the pervasiveness of the news media is such that it is increasingly rare that the public can be kept in the dark about preparations for interventionist action, the Panama case shows that the president can still occasionally take the public and Congress by surprise. Action can in some cases (usually smaller interventions) be taken before the public and Congress can either form or articulate an opinion. This is not meant to advocate the conduct of secret wars from the basement of the White House. To the contrary, the statement entails a simple recognition of the fact that, if the
operation is small enough, it can successfully be concluded before domestic opposition has a chance to crystalize.

Third, in point #8, it was contended that it is necessary that the operation have the support of the military establishment. It is more accurate, perhaps, to redefine this necessary "support" as the absence of any substantive opposition from senior officers. Opposition to some of the technical elements of the operation, such as its timing or composition of forces does not necessarily indicate material or decisive opposition to a particular mission. Conversely, the development of usable options does not necessarily imply an endorsement of a proposed mission, only the availability of a contingency plan. In some cases there are even disputes among military leaders or between the Pentagon and the theater commander regarding the requirements and/or the wisdom of a specific mission. Therefore, it is necessary not to have an endorsement per se, but rather a lack of opposition from senior military officers.

Finally, it appears possible that the requirement to commit adequate force to accomplish the goals set (#13) may be permanently fulfilled by the new post-Cold War doctrine of the use of force: overwhelming number, well armed, decisively applied. It remains to be seen if the Clinton administration will continue official adherence to this philosophy.
Additional Considerations

There are a few points regarding post-Cold War direct military intervention by the United States that, while not directly related to this typology, do impinge on it to a degree. These ideas are presented below.

First, the United States does not have a uniform policy on humanitarian intervention. Washington seems content to await the arrival of a crisis and then formulate its reaction on an ad hoc basis. The result is that policy tends to be driven more by emotion than by clear thought. On the basis of experience, it is almost certain that there will be no such formally articulated doctrine by the time the next "Somalia" appears on the horizon.

Second, as noted earlier, judging by the public and congressional reaction to the UNOSOM II fiasco in Somalia, it seems clear that American participation in future United Nations controlled operations is highly unlikely. This belief has been reinforced by the events in Bosnia in 1995. Even though the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) has issued ultimata, air strikes and military action has been handled almost exclusively by independent U.S. and NATO forces.

This leads to a third and related consideration. If the United States is reluctant to commit forces to a UN-commanded operation and, conversely, the United Nations will not authorize American actions that it cannot control,
then when the next major crisis arises clearly the U.S. will have to act either unilaterally or in concert with its NATO allies. Therefore, it seems that NATO may need to develop a new military doctrine or rationale to address its role in the post-Cold war era.

Fourth, a word regarding the overreliance on airpower as a military option. American officials must remain mindful that if airstrikes are used, there is a real possibility that the planes could be shot down and the pilot captured. The realization of such a prospect leaves officials with a choice between two unpleasant options: either humbly ask the enemy for the return of the downed flyer or escalate the level hostilities as a means of punishing the adversary for firing on American aircraft.

A fifth concern regards the defense budget and the overextension of American power. Somalia notwithstanding, the fairly short duration of recent American interventions and their relatively low cost, in human terms, seems to have fueled a newly found enthusiasm among some in Congress, particularly liberals, for military intervention to solve the world's injustices. If the military is expected to carry out missions of dubious value, while also having its budget cut, there can be no doubt that eventually military readiness will suffer as a result.

As a final insight, in the post-Cold War era, the willingness of American officials to intervene in a
particular situation appears to be determined by the following equation: a high level of severity of the crisis, a low level of military risk, and a demonstrable national interest.

Conclusion

Much has been written on the general topic of military intervention, although most of it is embedded in literature dealing with deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and other related topics. Surprisingly little, however, has been written concerning preconditions that favor the success of interventionist policies, with most of it tending toward the abstract and theoretical. There appears to be no existing literature which identifies specific operational and analytical preconditions which would promote success in intervention, a need that is more urgent given the resurgence of direct military intervention as an American policy option in the post-Cold War era. It is this gap which this study has endeavored to fill.

Although its criteria will no doubt undergo refinement as circumstances change, this typology seems to be essentially correct in its assumptions. While it is recognized that the number of case studies examined has been quite limited, nevertheless, they clearly demonstrate that when the criteria advanced here are followed, success has been the result. Conversely, when these precepts were largely ignored, the result was political and military
failure. It is the author's firm belief that, with the passage of time, our typology will retain its heuristic value.
LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED


Harris Poll. December 10, 1992; February 8, 1993.


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