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Toward a New Concept of Local Curriculum.

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TOWARD A NEW CONCEPT OF LOCAL CURRICULUM

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
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Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
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ABSTRACT

This study aims at exploring the possibility of a new concept of local curriculum. On the basic recognition that the New National Curriculum in Korea which is allegedly localized is not a localized one, this study analyzes the problems of Korean education and the New National Curriculum, and examines the new Korean curriculum in relation to debates on curriculum localization in the United States and England. The debates in the United States and England have been proved to be centered around the relinquishment of power of the central government to the local educational authorities and schools.

To search for a new concept of local curriculum, Foucault's and Lyotard's concepts of locality have been derived from their poststructural and postmodern philosophies. The main thesis in the concept is that validity of all knowledge is determined by the local participants. Consequently, a teacher's role in the classroom should be defined differently from the traditional way. This study suggests "deprofessionalization" as a teacher's role in localized
curriculum, invoking the Foucauldian concept of self-detachment and Lyotardian imagination and paralogy.

"Dialogue" is suggested as a more concrete practice of deprofessionalization in the classroom. Some arguments for dialogue are analyzed and Bakhtinian dialogism based on such concepts as unfinalizability, heteroglossia, death of the author, meaning as a "historical event," intertextual construction of meaning, etc. is suggested as helpful to the practice of local curriculum.
INTRODUCTION

Despite the recent efforts to centralize the power of curriculum decision-making by some right-wing politicians and fundamentalist religious groups in the United States and the English curriculum reform in 1988, localizing curriculum seems to be the general trend along with the gradual demise of authoritarian political systems over the world. Especially in Korea where authoritarian governments have had a very centralized curriculum policy for almost 50 years, the central government has begun to relinquish curriculum decision-making to the local educational authorities and schools, corresponding to the recent democratizing trend in politics. However, this localizing policy does not seem to be sufficient to solve the vexing problems that Korean education has been having since 1945. Although this localization of curriculum in policy has produced some desirable by-products, such as the abolition of the so-called policy-subjects which have been used to justify the governmental system and dictatorship, the right to choose the actual content and method of curriculum still remains in the hands of the central government.
This study begins with a brief description of the Korean curricular reform history to reveal the problems of the Korean education and curriculum. This will show why the Korean government presented localized curriculum as a solution to the problems of Korean education. An analysis of the new National Curriculum which is allegedly localized will be provided to examine whether the new curriculum policy can be truly called a "local" curriculum. Debates around the issue of centralized-decentralized curriculum in the United States and England will be reviewed as well as compared with the new curriculum in Korea.

A basic assumption of this study is that a mere change in curriculum policy will not guarantee change in actual classroom practice, e.g., to local curriculum practice. The teacher's role is critical in realizing the idea of local curriculum. Regarding the teacher's role in the classroom, Foucauldian theory of power-knowledge and Lyotardian postmodern philosophy is helpful in clarifying the concept of "locality." This study tries to extract the Foucauldian and Lyotardian concept of locality and relate it to the concept of local curriculum.
This study will suggest dialogue as a more concrete practice of local curriculum. Some contemporary educational theories about dialogue will be examined to find if these are appropriate in the practice of the local curriculum this study will develop. A Bakhtinian concept of dialogue will be suggested as a possible method of dealing with local differences in the classroom.
CHAPTER ONE

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CURRICULAR REFORMS IN KOREA

1.1. Before the Colonial Period (-1910)

Before Japan annexed the Korean peninsula as its colony in 1910, Korea had developed its own educational system and curricula through almost 5,000 years of written history. The Koreans traditionally prized the humanities and regarded technicals and pragmatics as vulgar. The nobility learned Confucian ethics and philosophy from the primary community schools, and the practical subjects were for "the common people." All the primary schools and some secondary schools were established and managed privately, and the rest of the secondary schools were run by the central or provincial governments. The central government was responsible for higher education. Generally speaking, the curricula of the schools were for the state examination; that was the only means to becoming a government official.

Korea had been known to the Western countries as "the land of morning-calm" (Gregor, 1990) or "the hermit nation" (Griffis, 1905) until the feudal dynasty decided to open
the country to foreign intercourse in the mid-19th century; accordingly the Western missionaries - Catholic, Presbyterian and Methodist in turn - began to land in this apparently serene country, carrying their belief not only in God but also in the priority of their own culture. They opened, with a small group of children, the modern Western style (primary) schools as a part of their missionary work and taught them arithmetic, reading and writing of the Korean language as well as basic English. The dynasty too showed great interest in the new educational institutions and invited some teachers (H. V. Allen, H. B. Gilmore, B. A. Bunker) from the U.S. and established some schools in the Western style. They began to teach foreign languages and practical technologies such as medicine in 1886. Those schools were recorded as the first modern schools in Korea (Underwood, 1926, pp. 11-16).

The government soon provided laws and ordinances for the new education along with other policies to reform the whole society, and local educationists began to establish new private schools for children of their community. In these private schools some teachers who recognized the peril their country confronted tried to inculcate
nationalistic spirit in their students and especially to bring to them an awareness of Japan's sinister intrigue to colonize Korea.

Because of the geopolitical nature of the country, however, Korea became the arena of the Power's competition; and the Great Powers such as the U.S., Japan, Russia and China did not let it take voluntary steps to modernize. After winning the Russo-Japan war, Japan forced Korea to conclude a protectorate treaty in 1905, by which Japan intervened in almost all politics in Korea. The Japanese supervisor started to implant the Japanese educational system and curricula into Korea and oppressed especially the nationalistic private schools.

Even before annexation, almost half of the officers of the central Ministry of Education were Japanese and they regulated the whole curricula of the primary and secondary schools. Japanese teachers came into the country and were placed in national and public schools. The proportion of class hours for the Japanese language education was the same as or more than those for the Korean language (Ham, 1976, pp. 28-29, 33-34). If a private school did not educate according to the curriculum the school could not be
authorized as a regular school. Textbooks which had not been published or approved by the Ministry were banned in schools; obviously this doctrine was aimed at those books used in private schools which promoted patriotism and the spirit of independence.

Dissatisfied even with this treaty, Japan in 1910 replaced it with an annexation treaty making the Korean peninsula its colony; thus, all the efforts of the Korean government and people to modernize the education of this country ended in vain.

1.2. The Colonial Period (1910-1945)

Korean education during this period can be summarized as "Japanization and mobocracy." Japanization, or assimilation was officially expressed as "educating the subjects loyal to the Japanese Emperor" and mobocracy as "schools should educate aiming at making human workers according to the condition and standards of the people" (Ham, 1976, pp. 65-67). In spite of the fact that Japan was constituted of small islands, they called their land an "inner continent," and "integration of inner land and Korea" was the official slogan which undergirded all the colonial policies. However in actuality, the educational
policy of colonial Japan was to differentiate and
discriminate the Korean from the Japanese. Underwood
(1926), who had been himself a missionary and educator in
Korea since the late 18th century, summarizes the policy as
follows:

The policy of the government...meant to all Koreans three things
against all three of which they mentally rebelled. First,
separate and different education for Koreans in Korea and
Japanese in Korea. Second, the frank and rather bald statement
that the chief object of the education offered was the making of
loyal citizens of Japan; third, that education in Chosen (Korea)
was to be adapted to the backward conditions and low mentality
of the people (p. 192).

In other words, Korea was regarded as an object of
exploitation not of investment. They did not permit higher
education for Koreans. Korean students were to learn
Japanese as their mother tongue and vocational training was
inforced. Humanities were reduced to the minimum amount in
the school curriculum. For example, history and geography
were not taught in the primary schools. The Japanese tried
to control and eventually close private schools, which were
more in number than national and public schools. Regarding
private schools, the Proconsul admonished the local
governors as follows:

Among private schools, many are established and managed by
foreign missionaries though there are some established by
Koreans. Each governor must watch if the schools observe the
laws and regulations, if the teachers perform their duties, if
they are using textbooks published or approved by the Ministry of Education, and if they inspire useless patriotism and the spirit of independence by teaching some strange songs and others. Especially, mission schools have not been intervened by the Ministry because of diplomatic immunity. From now on, discipline them by emphasizing separation of religion and education, but be cautious not to offend their feelings (Lee, 1948, pp. 180-181).

This policy of "Japanization" and "mobocracy" in education was salient during the first decade of the colonial period.

To control private schools the Japanese revised "the Private School Law" (1915) in addition to the general educational laws and regulations so they could put the private schools in double fetters (Ham, 1976, pp. 72-74; Underwood, 1926, pp. 195-208). The establishment of private schools became more complicated and difficult and teaching the Bible was banned by law. When a private school wanted to replace its principal or one of its teachers, approval from the local Governor was needed. A school teacher needed to have not merely a certificate but also a great command of Japanese. He was required to wear a uniform and sword while on duty. Great was the surprise at this severe policy among the founders, and teachers of the schools and protests soon came into bud.
Even in the traditional informal community schools which numbered almost 25,000 in the nation, they forced the teaching of Japanese and the use of textbooks published or approved by the Ministry (Underwood, 1926, p. 179). As a result, the number of schools and enrolments had continuously decreased until 1917 after the annexation (pp. 175-178).

In 1919, a nation-wide independence movement which was influenced by "the principle of self-determination of peoples" proposed by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, broke out. Although the movement ended after six months with numerous deaths and arrests, the Japanese government changed its colonial policy, at least outwardly, from a military to a cultural one. The system of Military Police was abolished and teachers did not have to wear swords any more. School years for the Korean primary and secondary students were extended to the same years as those for Japanese students, and higher education was opened for Koreans.

The principle of "vocational education for the Korean" was partly abrogated, and humanities appeared in the school subjects along with foreign languages. They loosened the
strict qualifications for private school teachers and tried to appease the foreign missionaries by mitigating the absolute principle of separation of education from religion. The missionaries had been playing important roles in the protest, corresponding between the leaders of the independence movement in Korea and those of the Korean government-in-exile in Shanghai, China and publicizing the miserable state of the Korean people to their own government and people after returning to their countries.

However, the change of policy was so cunning that only three Koreans were appointed to the "committee of education" organized of 28 members to examine educational demands of the Korean people after the movement. Although Korean language was inserted into the primary and secondary school curricula, credit hours for it were still a third or a half of those of Japanese, and all textbooks were written in Japanese. Korean students still needed to learn the Japanese language, history and geography as if those were their own (Oh, 1964, pp. 284-286).

The major premise of colonial policy, that is, "Japanization and mobocracy," was not changed, so that the new educational laws regulated that the foremost goal of
the primary and secondary schools was "cultivating educated workers loyal to the National (Japanese) spirit" (Ham, 1976, pp. 120, 125). Students' strikes continually broke out and arrests of teachers and students followed.

In 1937, Japan opened war against China, accordingly education became a part of war organization. The most salient change in education was that the name of the schools for Koreans had the same name of the schools for Japanese and the Korean language became an elective subject from a required one. They prohibited Korean students from speaking Korean in schools and forced all Koreans to change their names to the Japanese style. Students were told even to watch one another lest they speak Korean.

After the air raid on Pearl Harbor, school years in colleges were reduced so that they could draft as many students as possible for the war. Humanities in the curriculum were replaced with science and technology, and the name "school" was literally changed to "training center." All the students either went to the battle front, or were utilized to provide their labor mobilizing war materials and foods or constructing runways and trenches.

On August 15, 1945, Japan announced unconditional surrender to allied forces, and Korea was liberated from the Japanese colonialism according to the Potsdam Declaration. However, the liberation was an uncompleted one. Because the allied forces did not appreciate the Korean people's struggles for independence in and out of the Korean peninsula, the Potsdam Declaration regulated that Korea, different from other Western countries such as France, would be under the trusteeship of the U.S. and Russia. Regardless of the Korean people's will, the destiny of Korea was determined according to the interests of the powerful countries in the same way that Japan had won the tug of war over the peninsula some decades before.

After landing in the country, the U.S. military appointed, as the administrator of education, Captain E. L. Lockard who had been an English professor in a city college of Chicago. He organized the Korean Committee on Education, composed of 10 boards whose chairs were all Koreans. It was the most urgent for the committee to replace Japanese officials, provincial superintendents, principals, and teachers with Koreans. In the primary
schools over 40 percent of the teachers were Japanese, and the percentage in the secondary and higher level was more than that (Sohn, 1992, p. 248; Underwood, 1951, p. 19).

However, because it was very difficult to find qualified people for the places after 36 years of colonial mobocracy, they could not strictly screen those who collaborated with the Japanese colonial government. It was also natural that those who had studied in the U.S. and could speak English had great influence in selecting personnel and deciding educational policies. After a few months the military government and the committee finished organizing the Department of Education. Apart from the Department, the Korean Committee on Education was rearranged and expanded to the Educational Council; it numbered about 100 members, a few of whom were from the American military.

Although the new Ministry adopted almost without modification the decisions made by the Council, the fact that the military government failed to punish traitors, or at least to exclude them from office, and that they mainly depended upon opinions of pro-American or pro-Western intellectuals, laid the groundwork for a series of anti-American movements some decades later. The U.S. Military's
identification of itself as "occupation forces" while the Russian Army called itself the "liberation army" did not help the American image. These rash behaviors and ignorance of the Korean history and culture of the occupation commander Gen. John R. Hodge and his staff have been frequently criticized not only by some Koreans (Sohn, 1992) but also by some American scholars (Cumings, 1981; 1983).

The Military government reopened all schools and prepared temporary courses of study for these schools. They prohibited the use of textbooks written in Japanese and regulated that Korean should be used as the instructional language. However, education could not be normal because there were limited numbers of qualified teachers and virtually no textbooks written in Korean. Great efforts were made to teach Korean and train teachers. They were also concerned with adult education, by which they tried to teach the new social order and eradicate illiteracy. Probably at this time, the Korean people might have publicly heard the word "democracy" for the first time in their history. The illiteracy rate of those over 12 years-old was then 77 percent (Committee on Compilation of
History of Education, 1960, p. 110). A 6-3-3-4 system, which was modeled itself after the American educational system was adopted as the basic structure of education. Japanese language classes were replaced with Korean, and English was put into the secondary school curriculum.

From September 1, 1946, the integrated subject "Social Studies" newly appeared in the primary school curriculum, which was an obvious influence of Deweyan Progressivism and of the Korean Educational Commission whose members had visited America for four months from March 1946.

Although textbooks of Korean language and Korean history were promptly published by a few Independent Movement groups that had maneuvered underground during the colonial period, other classes depended mainly upon blackboards and materials mimeographed by teachers because of the lack of the textbooks. The content of education could not far exceed that of the colonial period. In other words, despite getting their lost identity back, e.g., their own names, language, and history, they could not get rid of inertia because the Korean identity was not one they had won for themselves but was one others had suddenly brought to them. At this moment the American Educational
Mission introduced Deweyan concepts such as "experience" and "life." As a result, the so-called "New Education Movement" expanded throughout the nation. It seems to be the case that, taking into account the historical and cultural situation of the day, teachers and educationalists never fully or even well understood and appreciated the Deweyan educational theory based on democracy that undergirded the New Education Movement.

Although some name this period as the "period of no educational contents," paradoxically, this was the only period when Korean teachers enjoyed their freedom and autonomy regarding the content of education. Teachers could teach what they wanted because there were no curricula coerced from the outside.

1.4. Period of Subject-Centered Curriculum (1948-1962)

On August 15, 1948, the constitution was ratified, and Korea started its new history as a Republic, in spite of the vehement opposition from those who did not want a solid fixation of the partition of the country.

Even after the departure of the Republic of Korea, the situation in education did not improve from before. Shortage of teachers, facilities, equipment, and textbooks
confused and bewildered Korean education. The most urgent need was to give some guidelines to teachers who had been just treading the colonial footsteps. According to The Law of Education enacted in 1949, "subjects of schools except for colleges, colleges of education, and informal schools shall be prescribed by a Presidential decree, and courses of study and class hours of those by a regulation of the Ministry" (Korean Education Law, Article 155). The Ministry of Education regulated that the government publish all textbooks of the primary schools and textbooks of a few policy subjects of the secondary schools such as Korean language and literature, Korean history, and social life and that the rest of the textbooks be examined and approved by the government.

The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950 when the government was trying to take more specific steps to provide textbooks to teachers and students. During three years of the wartime, education continued only nominally in the temporary tents wherever there were no battles. Even during war time, classes of the primary and secondary schools were mainly focusing on entrance examinations. Entrance examinations for both middle and high schools
existed until the 1970s. Even today, the college entrance examination is still most powerful, virtually dominating the contents and methods of the primary and secondary school curricula.

The results of the war regarding the content of education manifested itself in the government's scrutinization of school curriculum and its strengthening of the ideological in education. Anti-communism permeated all humanities and as in the U.S. communism became an antonym of the word "democracy." This anti-communist ideology and the central control system exerted great influences on the contents and methods of education, and consequently on teachers' autonomy thereafter.

As soon as the war ended -- technically it was suspended, at least officially, by the armistice agreement between the U.N. and North Korea -- the government announced the curricula for the primary and secondary schools in the form of a law in 1955, which was based upon Curriculum Handbook for the School of Korea published by the third American Educational Mission to Korea (Sohn, 1992, pp. 446-449). This has been recorded as the first official Korean curriculum after 1945. In this law,
curriculum meant the "organization of subjects and other educational activities of schools." The government decided what, how much, and when to teach. Even for the subjects whose textbooks were not to be published by the government, courses of study including detailed chapters and contents were prepared.

Teachers and curricularists of the day seem to have accepted the General Transfer Theory or Mental (Formal) Discipline Theory. Except for broad-field subjects like "Social Studies" and an introduction of extracurricular activities (club activities) into the curriculum for one or two hours a week in the curriculum of 1955, no evidence could be found that the American Educational Mission that visited Korea 10 times from 1952 to 1961 and their Deweyan theory had influence upon classroom practices. Subject barriers were thought to be fixed and individual needs and differences subjected to the pre-organized uniform curriculum.

1.5. Period of Experience-Centered Curriculum (1962-1973)

In 1960, the authoritative President S. Lee, who had been in power from 1948, resigned and took refuge in Hawaii after a series of student protests against rigged
elections. However, even before various democratic measures of the new government were implemented, the government was overthrown in 1961 by a military coup d'état. As a result, local superintendents and officials of education who had previously been elected by the inhabitants' vote were now appointed by the central government. On the one hand, the military government announced anti-communism as "its utmost policy," in order to get political support from the U.S. government who had at first been suspicious about the coup leader C. Park's ideological background. On the other hand, the coup leaders pledged economic development to console the Korean people.

In 1963, the curriculum was revised mainly to include contents justifying the coup in Humanities textbooks. "Anti-communism" appeared as a distinct subject in the primary school curriculum. At this time, the Deweyan theory of "education as experience" was officially adopted, and curriculum was defined as "all learning activities which students experience under the guide of the school" (Research Committee of Curriculum and Textbooks, 1990, p. 11). William Kilpatrick's Project Method was introduced to
teachers, and peer group problem solving was encouraged to meet students' individual differences. However, curricular decisions were still made by the central government, and classes still focused on entrance examinations. Teachers were regarded as technicians who should sincerely transmit pre-selected and organized educational contents to students. Peer group problem solving was often misunderstood as solving the same problems in the same class by group.

Apart from the official introduction of the concept of experience-centered curriculum, the government's devotion to economic growth brought another impact on school curriculum. Efficiency emerged as an important virtue in Korean society and was used as a major excuse to amend the Constitution and hence to justify the long-term authoritative rule. Variety, differences, and discussions were rejected as inefficient. They even instituted and forced students to memorize "the National Charter of Education" (1968), which stated that efficiency and practicality were "to be respected." In the political and social situation like this, education was almost
indoctrination and Deweyan theory had no place in
curriculum practice.

Moreover, B. S. Bloom's *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives* (1956, translated into Korean in 1966) and R. F. Mager's concept of behavioral objectives (1961, translated into Korean in 1976) along with behavioral psychology were introduced and enjoyed general popularity among teachers and educators because of their efficiency-based nature. McClelland's Achievement Motive Theory was used to justify education for economic development, and B. Chung's definition of education was taught in colleges as the one and only definition: "Education is deliberate change of human behavior" (1970, p. 15). Education was regarded as the means to an end imposed externally, and nobody seriously raised questions about this.

Thus, despite the official definition of it, actual curriculum managed by classroom teachers was not unlike traditional subject-centered curriculum. Curriculum was still regarded as the means to an end extrinsically imposed, whether it was economic growth of the country or the growth of students' mental ability; and teachers were to transmit efficiently curricular knowledge to the passive
students. Continuing vestiges of Japanese Imperialism and a powerful hierarchical Confucian tradition could not be excluded from the various factors influencing Korean education and curriculum management. There were other reasons that experience-centered curriculum could not go beyond the level of an empty slogan - the overall qualities of teachers, poor facilities of schools, and objections from parents who wanted their children to pass without difficulty the entrance examinations to junior high, senior high schools, and colleges. Entrance examinations to junior and senior high schools were finally abolished for the "normal management of school curriculum" in 1968 and 1974 respectively.


In 1972, President C. Park, who had already been in power for a decade, declared a state of emergency amidst incessant student protests against his tyranny and amended the Constitution so that a provisory clause which had regulated the Presidential term limit was eliminated. After this second and pro-government coup d'état, the curriculum was revised again. Contents justifying the coup were newly included in such subjects as National Ethics,
Korean History, and Social Life. At this time curriculum was defined as structures of the disciplines (Research Committee of Curriculum and Textbooks, 1990, pp. 19-20).

J. Bruner's theory of the structure of knowledge (1959) was fully accepted, and all the school subjects were encouraged to be organized into spiral curricula. Bruner's structure of knowledge was thought to correspond to J. Piaget's psychological schema. These theories were combined so effectively with the already renowned Tyler-Bloom-Mager rationale that curriculum should be composed of certain steps.

First, aims or objectives should be pre-determined. Broad and ideal aims should have already be set by the government, sometimes in the form of a law. Those specific to each subject should be decided by such specialists of the subjects as biologists for biology with the help of Bloom's taxonomy.

Second, the scope of the contents of each subject should be defined to achieve efficiently those aims and objectives. The contents should be structures which could represent characteristics of each subject. Again, subject specialists would be able to do those jobs.
Third, the contents should be organized in a spiral form by the specialist. Bruner's and Piaget's theories, such as the three stages of representation - enactive, iconic, and symbolic - (Bruner, 1959) and the development of schema, would be very helpful in deciding when to teach particular concepts. Bloom's taxonomy and Mager's behavioral objectives would also help in this process. If the contents of each subject were well organized, teaching itself would not have great significance.

Fourth, teachers should measure, rather than evaluate, the degree of students' achievement according to the pre-specified aims and objectives.

Teachers and even curricularists had no place in the school curriculum. So long as they did not raise serious questions about the contents they were teaching nor question the official methodology, teachers were safe. Good teachers were those who transmitted efficiently textbook knowledge. They did not have to research something because a textbook was the only thing they should be concerned about, and the content of it would remain unchanged at least for the decade in which it was published.
To make matters worse, the government was so autocratic in this period that various control over the contents of classroom teaching as well as over the press was prominent. Military training had already been a required subject in senior high schools and colleges since the late 1960s, even in girls' high schools. The school picnic was officially named the "Military March." Although national security against the bellicose communists of North Korea was always the excuse of oppression, that was actually a measure for staying in power by terrifying the people.

The Korean curricular field in this period was obviously swayed by the theories of the structure of the discipline. Among those theorists, R. S. Peters (1966) and P. H. Hirst (1965) contributed not only to justifying Bruner's theory of the structure of the discipline but also to reconsidering what had been regarded as granted. Similarly to Dewey, Peters and Hirst showed, using ordinary language analysis, that the current concept of education, and therefore curriculum as a means to an end, was wrong. They began to denounce the theory of extrinsic values in education which undergirded the Tyler-Bloom-Mager rationale
and to arouse sympathy, mainly from some professors in colleges and departments of education, for education as its own end.

At the same time, some dissident teachers began to be expelled from schools because of the content they had taught in classrooms, and they formed an important anti-government group. They started, as a plausible reaction to the expulsion, to study political, especially Marxist, theories of education, particularly those of P. Freire, M. Carnoy, L. Althusser, M. Sarup and K. Harris. This was plausible because there seemed to be no better theory than those of Marxists to explain the political (and educational) situation in Korea and, moreover, to suggest a solution, namely a revolution. For a good example, Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970) had long been a banned book but was read widely among radical teachers and scholars, and his concept of "conscientization" became a common word describing "teaching something anti-governmental or anti-capitalistic, therefore communist."


Park's autocratic government, which had been in power for almost two decades, collapsed as the chief of the
Korean C.I.A. assassinated the President on October 26, 1979. In spite of the Korean people's bursting expectation and demand for a freer society and for the civilian democracy which had been restrained so far, a group of generals who were afraid of losing their vested privilege carried out another military coup d'état, killing hundreds of innocent civilians in May 1980.

As had usually been the case, the national curriculum was revised once again in the next year after the new government started. This time the new curriculum claimed to be humanistic. One or two school hours per week were reduced, and extracurricular activities were emphasized in order to normalize the management of school curriculum by relieving students from the excessive burden of preparation for college entrance examinations. Integrated subjects were also introduced into the primary schools. However, students, especially high school students, were to stay at school almost until midnight under the name of "autonomous classes" or "compensatory classes," and the extracurricular activities were never conducted outside school. At the same time, the government strictly banned private tutoring which had long been a social problem because of its high
cost and hence its availability only for the rich. The risk increased the cost, and secret tutoring became a lucrative job in Korea. As a result, the overall expenditure of private tutoring became bigger than that of the regular schooling (Kong and Chun, 1990). From this time on, colleges were forced to reflect applicants' high school grades in their selection of the students.

The sanguinary coup in 1980, on the other hand, made the dissident groups, especially those composed of student activists, more violent and more biased to Marxist theories. Anti-Americanism began to appear openly in students' demonstrations after this coup, which was finally acknowledged by the U.S. government officials who had, as before, preferred autocracy to "instability" in the Korean peninsula. Dissidents were no longer afraid of the government's oppressive power, and anti-government riots more frequently burst out. In the same way, comparatively young scholars and professors in academic circles did not conceal their interests in radical social theories. Thus, such jargon as "neo-colonial monopoly capitalism" has been used to define the nature of Korean society (Park and Cho, 1989).
In the field of education, a British version of the New Sociology of Education and the Conflict Theory from the U.S. were introduced into Korea. The New Sociology stimulated the Korean educationalists' taken-for-granted view of curriculum, while Jean Anyon's study into the American History textbooks (1979) was often quoted to reveal distorted ideological reflection in curriculum. Some of Michael Apple's books were translated into Korean. Some curricular theorists began to raise fundamental questions about the usefulness and validity of the Tyler-Bloom-Mager rationale (Lee, 1982).

It was in this period that W. Pinar's reconceptualist curriculum theory (1981) was introduced as an alternative approach to the traditional taken-for-granted view of curriculum (Kwak, 1981; Lee, 1983). In his effort to classify curricular researches imported to Korea into some categories, Lee (1983) pointed out the looseness of the term "reconceptualist," and he broke Pinar's reconceptualists into two separate camps: those who had Marxist or political backgrounds and those who showed more humanistic interest focusing on the individual. Pinar's study also made some Korean curricularists reconsider the
nature of curriculum itself, which had been only an administrative significance. However, Pinar's phenomenological and autobiographical emphases were so unfamiliar to the Korean curricularists that many were not illuminated as to his broader interest in reconceptualizing the curriculum field.

Inspired by an expanding atmosphere of more freedom in overall society on the one hand and in intellectual circles on the other, some teachers tried to organize the Teachers' Labor Union in the mid-1980s. Their theoretical support was mainly provided by the teachers who had been expelled from their schools and who had been fascinated by the political educational theory since the 1970s. Some of the parents showed an aversion to the word "laborer" which seemed to identify their children's teachers with the "vulgar" manual laborer and the government was able to criminalize the movement. More than 1,500 young teachers who refused to secede from the Union were fired and formed an important dissident group. Although some of the initial activists among the teachers were excessively biased toward Marxist theories of education as a reaction to the prohibition of Marxist theories of any kind, their on-the-
spot experience enabled them to make many practical researches, and they began to publish a series of critiques of the content of the textbooks and classroom knowledge (Union of Association of Subject Teachers, 1989; Teachers Association for Korean Language and Literature Education, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990; Teachers Association for Moral and Ethics Education, 1989; Teachers Association for History Education, 1989; English Teachers Association, 1991; Department of Subject in Teachers Union of Korea, 1990; Association of Korean Language and Literature Teachers in Chung-Nam Province, 1988).

"Open education," which had been introduced into Korea with A. S. Neil's Summerhill School, was also revitalized as another possible alternative to the uniform national curriculum. Since it is too early to evaluate the result of the movement which is still in an experimental stage in about 10 schools, it would be sufficient for the present to value the teachers' voluntariness and enthusiasm to respect students' individual differences, creativity, and autonomy in spite of the prevailing uniform curriculum.

The military training as a required class, which had been a symbol of both authoritative policy of education and
the partitioned state of the country, was abolished in this period and will be eliminated from the high-school curriculum in 1995. The content justifying government power has been removed from so-called policy subjects.

In 1993, the new President Y. Kim was inaugurated, and a "civilian" government has been launched. Because he is the first President who has not been from the military since 1961, many people look forward to a more democratic and free society. In 1994, most of the teachers who had been fired because of the Union Movement returned to their schools, giving up the Union but not its ideals. The future finally may be "open."

1.8. Summary and Review

One of the most noticeable features in the history of curricular reform in Korea is that the reforms always followed major changes in the political situation. This is especially conspicuous after 1945. In other words, those who seized the political power always needed the reform of the national curriculum in order both to include the content justifying the process of taking the power and to accord the curriculum to the contemporary educational and curricular theories that had been introduced into Korea.
Every national curriculum since 1945 was the result of the subtle, sometimes very odd, combination of these two purposes, producing situations where it has not been easy to distinguish which one of these two purposes was the prior.

Consequently, official curriculum policy could not help being authoritarian, and control of the central government over planning and managing the curriculum was almost inevitable. There has been no room for teachers, students, parents, and even curricular theorists, whose roles were not neglected so completely even in the Tyler rationale, the most influential model for the Korean curriculum.

Thus, the Korean national curriculum has been most vulnerable to Marxist criticism, such as K. Harris's work, namely that curriculum is used as a major means to present "a distorted view of the world," and to offer "a misrepresentation of reality" (1979, p. 164). This line of political critique about education and curriculum was so flourishing in the mid-1980s that few dared to point out its weakness, afraid of being stigmatized as conservative. However, as many scholars have properly indicated, these
political theories of education and curriculum have been successful in raising problems but have failed in offering solutions to the problems. Especially in Korea, the harsh political condition has made some intellectuals biased toward radical political theories, which posed rather than eliminated many problems.

More than twenty years ago, a curricular theorist symbolized the history of Korean curricula since 1945 as a period of objectives model. He diagnosed rote learning and teaching as a major malignant symptom of the Korean education and pointed out that the symptom grew from the fact that the objectives model was widely held by teachers and educationalists. He proposed a content model as an alternative (Lee, 1977); this idea was obviously inspired by Peters, Hirst and Bruner, and was not very different from L. Stenhouse's (1975) "process model." Although he suggested, leaving aside political or Marxist concerns, that Korean teachers and educationists alter the concept of curriculum itself, many problems still remain unsettled, problems inherent in the objectives and content models of curriculum.
Another distinctive feature of the Korean curriculum through its history is that it has continuously been influenced by foreign theories. It was altogether instituted by foreigners even after the foundation of the country; since the introduction of modern education, the Western theories especially have exerted a great impact on the theory and practice of the Korean curriculum. Thus, the lack of indigenous and idiosyncratic theories and practices of curriculum has been frequently mentioned as one of the problems in the Korean education. As a possible reaction to this, some radicalists sought a way of liberating the Korean curriculum from the Western, particularly American influence. It was also in the mid-1980s that North Korean President Il-Sung Kim's version of nationalism, "Idea of Self-Reliance," was introduced to the young radicalist underground. This effort, however, sometimes showed a very chauvinistic tendency and raised other important questions regarding curriculum: Can and should there be indigenous or nationalistic curriculum? Can one be indigenous without being nationalistic or chauvinistic?
On the other hand, from the curriculum revised in 1987, the government accepted the concept of local curriculum in order to break down the uniformity which has been pointed out as the major cause of the curricular problems in Korea. This concept of localization has further developed to become the most important characteristic of the new curriculum which will be implemented in 1995. Although the new policy appears to be more democratic and very timely in this postmodern era, this concept of localization provides grounds for its own questions and disputes.
At the end of 1992, the Korean government prepared a new national curriculum, which is to be implemented in 1995. The government alleged that it had tried to "resolve the uniformity, rigidity, and closedness that had been frequently pointed out as major problems of the Korean curriculum by decentralizing the right to decide the content of education and enlarging range of autonomous discretion of schools and local authorities of education" (The Ministry of Education, 1992a, p. 6). Although there are some other points the Ministry publicized that it had placed emphasis on in the process of the revision, such as education for democratic citizenship or cultivation of creativity, these are not very different from the slogans that appeared whenever the curriculum was revised. Thus, this new curriculum is called localized curriculum.

Because the most salient, and perhaps most notorious, feature of the Korean curriculum has been an authoritative government control over the uniform curriculum, as was indicated in the prior chapter, the new localized
curriculum is an attempt to solve many problems of Korean education and curriculum, at least to solve the uniformity, rigidity, and closedness, as the Ministry intends. However, the new curriculum is not very promising in solving the vexing problems of the Korean curriculum not only because it prescribes localization as a solution without altering the concept of curriculum itself but also because the new curriculum is not as much localized as it appears.

2.1. The Concept of Localization in the New Curriculum

A document published by the Ministry of Education shows that "the decentralization of curriculum decision-making" (1992a, 1992b) is a core point of the revision. So, localization means officially that the central government decentralizes the right of curriculum decision-making to local educational authorities and school units, and ultimately to the teacher.

Under centralized curriculum policy, the central government develops and mandates the whole curriculum. "Desirable human nature" or "educational aims" are usually prepared before the curriculum is developed, and curriculum is identified with the contents which are selected and
organized in order to achieve these aims and objectives most effectively. Curriculum is looked upon as a means to an end. The teacher's role is to produce by means of curriculum the desirable human nature out of raw material, that is, the student. Teachers are forced to teach predetermined content provided to them in a document called "curriculum" in predetermined ways. From the viewpoint of the superior offices, such as the Ministry and the local educational authorities, teachers are no more than technicians who apply the predetermined curriculum to students. Those teachers who reflect seriously on why, what and how to teach become problem teachers. Not only curriculum but also teachers and students become means to an end.

On the other hand, decentralized curriculum policy attributes all the responsibilities and rights regarding curriculum development and management to the teacher's role. Under this policy, teachers are no longer the objects of supervising by the superior offices and, extremely speaking, can teach whatever they want to. Many of the problems inherent in centralized curriculum policy can be resolved (Kwak, 1989, pp. 165-166): First, the
teacher could escape from the role of mere deliverer. Second, students' differences, local particularities, and different educational views can be reflected in the curriculum. Third, such democratic characters as openness and forebearance can be developed. Fourth, education and teachers will no longer be regarded as means to an end. However, economy and efficiency that are characteristic of centralized curriculum policy will be decreased considerably. In addition, because there will be no such notion as prespecified content to be taught, the teacher can and should decide what and how to teach by him- or herself. Thus, the teacher's job-related burden will be so heavy that there is a danger that incompetent teachers could teach anything.

Localization in the new Korean curriculum also has another meaning, that of "understanding of the student's own province by curricularizing various information about the local history, geography, economy, culture and current events, or by using it" (Inn, 1988, p. 13). This geographical notion of localization is called "cultures of learning argument" by Weiler (1993, p. 57), which argues that localization "can provide greater sensitivity to local
variations" (Weiler, p. 64) or "[can adapt] the educational efforts to local conditions, both in terms of local economic activities, and in terms of knowledge and understanding of the special characteristics of the local region" (Weiler, p. 64). This concept of localization has already been introduced into the Korean national curriculum since 1987, as shown at the end of the prior chapter. In Social Studies in the primary school, "Life of Our City and Province" is suggested as a localized unit. In the new curriculum, on the other hand, an optional course hour in the primary school and an elective subject in the secondary school can be used as a localized unit. The optional course of the primary school can be used "either as a supplementary or enrichment class of a regular subject or as a creative educational activity class depending on the unique educational needs of schools or the demand of students." In either case, "directions from local educational authorities should be observed" (The Ministry of Education, 1992a, p. 18). The elective subject of the secondary school is one of those subjects such as Chinese Characters, Computer, Environment, or other necessary subjects (for the Middle School) and one among Philosophy,
Logic, Psychology, Education, Everyday Economics, Religion, Environmental Science, or other necessary subjects (for the High School). One of these other subjects can be a localized subject, complying with directions of local educational authorities (p. 44).

However, considering the current situation of Korean education, it is not probable that both primary and secondary schools will select a localized class for the optional course or the elective subject. It is more probable that the optional course of the primary school will be used as a supplementary or compensatory class to regular classes, which will be more easily managed than designing an entirely new (localized) class. For the secondary school also, the situation will be the same because selecting one among the given subjects as an elective will be much easier, consequently more feasible, than creating a whole new subject, which will necessarily require extra research and efforts from staffs and teachers of the school whose primary concern will be college entrance examinations. Moreover, despite its meaning and validity as "a means of recognizing and accommodating the diversity and importance of different cultural environments
in one society" (Weiler, 1993, p. 66), the diversity and
difference do not seem to be significant enough to
influence the whole curriculum of general education in a
small and homogeneous country like Korea. For instance,
according to research about the educational needs of the
Korean people (Chin et al., 1989, pp. 98-99), there is
almost no difference in the kinds of educational needs
among the people according to their place of birth and
residence. The result may be a reflection of the Korean
people's homogeneity in ethnicity, culture and language.
Schubert (1991) admits that "if the society is rather
homogeneous, differences by locale would be diminished
considerably and curriculum goals would be centralized by
default" (p. 105). Although Pinar (1991) suggests,
analyzing Southerners' "presentism," the significance of
place or locale in curriculum, to lay the same emphasis on
the Korean curriculum, especially on curriculum for general
education seems to be almost impossible. The impossibility
might come from the significance of the place called Korea
that has homogeneous race, culture, and language, unlike
the United States of which heterogeneity is one of the most
important characteristics.
Thus, by the concept of localization, the Ministry seems to be placing emphasis on decentralization of the right of curriculum decision-making rather than on geographic localization of curriculum content. The level of decentralization, nevertheless, shows that the new curriculum is not at all as decentralized as it appears.

2.2. The Level of Localization

The level of localization or decentralization of the curriculum decision-making could be varied according to what extent the central government relinquishes its power. Hannaway and Carnoy (1993) distinguish decentralization into three levels: system-level decentralization (decentralizing decision-making from national to local jurisdiction), organization-level decentralization (decentralizing decision-making from central authorities to school-level actors), and market decentralization (decentralizing decision-making to parents) (pp. xi-xii). It is also possible to categorize the levels into two (Kwak, 1989): the active level or localizing enactment of curriculum in which local authorities and schools have the right to decide and legislate their own curriculum, and the passive level or localizing management of curriculum in
which local authorities and schools restructure and manage national curriculum in accordance with the specific circumstances of a province and a school (p. 166).

In the new curriculum for the primary and the middle school, the right of decision making in curriculum is not more decentralized than in the prior curriculum. But in the high school curriculum, the right of designing and implementing curriculum appears to be relinquished considerably to local educational authorities and schools. This change is so revolutionary that no such policy can be seen in the prior curricular revisions since 1945. Until the present curriculum, the Ministry of Education has regulated the subjects, class hours for them, and the grade year when those subjects should be taught for all kinds of high schools. In the new curriculum, on the other hand, the Ministry designates 70 units of compulsory subjects out of 188 units that the high school student should complete in three school years (a unit means a class hour per week in a semester). Local educational authorities and individual schools decide 106 units and 12 units each.

Statistically seen, these figures might be seen as representing a dramatic decentralization of curriculum
decision-making, like one that corresponds to Hannaway and Carnoy's system- or organization-level decentralization and Kwak's active level of localization. However, numbers, figures, or statistics show nothing real in this case as in other numerous cases. The right of local educational authorities and schools to select the content of education is virtually blocked because the Ministry still specifies the subjects, out of which the electives should be selected. The 106 units that local authorities can decide for the academic (not vocational) high school, for example, should be selected from 53 subjects, whose properties, objectives, and outlined contents are specified by the Ministry. Instructional and evaluational emphases in every subject are also prescribed.

Thus, the substance of decision-making that the Ministry decentralized does not include the right to select contents for the curriculum but only to select subjects out of the given number of subjects. This is not at all the decentralization of curriculum decision-making about which Hannaway and Carnoy are writing, but at the most, only the passive level of localization in Kwak's word.
From the perspective of teachers who will actually manage the curriculum, therefore, the localization or decentralization which has been so highlighted as a new feature of the new Korean curriculum will not have any significance. It is not different from the prior organizations. Moreover, the Ministry inherits textbook policy of the colonial period, that is, to publish textbooks of so-called policy subjects such as Korean Language and Literature, Social Life, National Ethics, and Korean History of secondary schools and all textbooks for primary schools and to inspect and approve others. Because the objectives, content, and instructional and evaluational emphases of all the subjects are prescribed in the form of a law by the Ministry as forementioned, virtually all the textbooks are published by the central government. This policy of curriculum and textbook design is applied to all primary and secondary schools, no matter how they were established, privately or publicly. Under these circumstances, teachers do not need to be concerned about the curricular matters. All they have to do is to conduct their classes as they did: to deliver the prescribed textbook knowledge in a prescribed way. They have been
identifying textbooks as curriculum, and this (mis-)identification will continue until the revision of the Article 155(1) of Education Law: "Curriculum shall be decided by the Ministry of Education."

Mayors and governors of local cities and provinces who have been appointed by the central government will be elected by the inhabitants' vote in the same year the new curriculum will be applied. Local legislative assemblies were already constructed a few years ago. Habermas (1975) has defined this decentralization of political power as a process of compensating "legitimation crisis" and Weiler (1993) uses Habermas's concept to explain the central government's relinquishment of control over education. Considering the overall trend of decentralization of the governmental power in Korea, the new localized curriculum seems to be an obvious means of compensatory legitimation of the central government's authority. But actual control over curriculum decision-making is under command of the central government, and the following quotation of Weiler explains the situation: "Decentralization and community participation are frequently just a model to which it is fashionable to pay lip service" (p. 64).
2.3. Centralization vs. Localization in the United States

When speaking about curriculum policy of the western countries, the United States is frequently exemplified as having decentralized curriculum policy while France has a very centralized system (Chin et al., pp. 45-66). Considering that the Constitution of the United States does not mention education, that the federal government does not have other means of exercising control over state educational systems (Spring, 1994, p. 194), and that the country does not have a national curriculum like that of Korea, it could be true that curriculum decision-making in the United States is decentralized. However, almost all the materials about the United States' curriculum policy point out the federal government's direct influence on curriculum decision through, for example, persuasion, categorical aid, civil rights legislation, and research funding (Spring, 1994, p. 212). Despite the growing influence, especially since the 1980s, on curriculum decision-making of the federal government, it is still the state that holds the final obligatory responsibility for education and curriculum.
At the state level, the control of curriculum decision-making is expressed through state constitutional provisions, legislative acts, state board or department of education requirements, and financial provisions. In general, the state designates subjects to be taught, graduation requirements, time allotments, and special programs and emphases. Curriculum decisions made at the state level control and restrict local curriculum decision-making in other areas as well. Specific accreditation requirements control such curriculum policies as extracurricular activities, organization of classes, library and other resources. State examination systems, supervision and inspection rights, accountability requirements, and legislative investigations contribute to inhibiting local innovation and experimentation (Spring, 1993, 1994; Klein, 1991; Doll, 1986). Their effect is one of regulation, and their influence on local curriculum decision-making is "great" (Peretz, 1981, p. 47). Due to the political and cultural environments of the United States, control over curriculum hardly shows itself as a requirement for uniform curriculum which can be found in Korea. It sometimes takes rather indirect and insinuating forms such as "no-pass, no-
drive" laws or high school graduation as a requirement for getting off welfare, which foreign researchers of American curriculum tend to overlook very easily in studying curriculum control in the United States.

Thus seen, curriculum policy of the United States can not be said to be purely decentralized. Schubert (1991) points out that "today curriculum is controlled at the state level more than ever before in American history " (p. 98), and Phipo (1991) categorizes 23 states into decentralized states in curriculum policy and 21 states into centralized states (p. 77). The history of American education also shows that curriculum policy has been the result of the agreement of the various interest groups and that neither one of curriculum policy, centralized or decentralized, has been the penetrating one through history (Kliebard, 1986; Spring, 1994; Schubert, 1991).

The curriculum field did not begin as a field at all. Unlike educational psychology, philosophy of education and sociology of education, the field of curriculum did not originate as an extension or application of an extant discipline. Rather, the field is usually said to have begun in Denver in the 1920s as a result of administrative 'need'...This origin is very important in understanding why the American curriculum field developed as it did, and why it is undergoing what is now undergoing. (Pinar and Grumet, 1981, p. 20)

The cyclical nature, or "the pendulum swing phenomenon" in Kliebard's term (1992, p. 104), of pros and
cons of argument for centralized or decentralized curriculum decision-making in the United States seems to be related to the origin of curriculum itself, which can be found in the quotation above. As its administrative and managerial nature in origin suggests, American curriculum policy has been largely influenced more by the societal and political milieu than academic theories of curriculum in ways that propitiate collective consciousness of the American people of the time, which Schwab would deplore as not "practical" (Westbury and Wilkof, 1978, Chs. 10-12). Thus, Elmore (1993) maintains that "debates about centralization in American education are mainly debates about who should have access to and influence over decisions, not about what the content and practice of teaching and learning should be and how to change those things" (p. 40), and that this is why the debates have influenced little to the teaching practice of teachers.

Although Franklin argues that social control over curriculum has not disappeared but "muted" (in Pinar, 1988, p. 89), it seems to have never been muted. Especially since the 1980s, this control has been so loud that legal decisions and legislation toward centralized curriculum,
both at the national and the state level, have been
increased continuously. But these tendencies to centralize
curriculum decision-making do not seem always to aggravate
teachers and local authorities. Hannaway's distinction of
"social" from "bureaucratic" processes (1993, p. 152) in
curriculum control is very suggestive in this respect.

Social control, by definition, requires interaction. It is the
process by which individual behavior is affected by the
informational and normative influence of others. (p. 152)

If control of curriculum is a social one, teachers do not
feel unduly restricted by curriculum policies even when
they do not actually participate in curriculum decision-
making.

Curriculum decision-making in the United States, thus
seen, does not seem to be controlled as bureaucratically as
the Korean curriculum, although it is not a completely
decentralized one.

2.4. Centralization vs. Decentralization in England

Another often quoted example, at least until 1988, of
a decentralized curriculum system in which teachers decide
on their curriculum was that of England.

Teachers in England are often said to be much more 'free' than
teachers in other parts of the world, particularly in their
freedom to decide what to teach. There is no centrally imposed
curriculum for schools. (Lawton, 1978, p. 1)
England has been said to have a "national educational system locally administered" (Jones, 1985, p. 27). Until 1833, there was little problem about central control of the curriculum because the government had deliberately avoided financial involvement (Lawton, 1980, p. 13). Since the second half of the 19th century, however, a conflict has developed between those who, in general, hold the philosophy of laissez-faire and those who want some kinds of limited government intervention. By the 1944 Education Act, all regulations that limited teachers' control of the curriculum disappeared due to the united resistance of teachers. The only subject the 1944 Act regulated to be taught in schools in England was religious education (Jones, 1985, p. 44). Thus, after 1945, schools were free to embark upon any kind of curriculum the teachers chose to offer.

Although the central government had sometimes tried to gain some control of curriculum, the effort had not been successful until 1988. Good examples were failures of the imposition of five-subject School Certificate examination in 1950-51 (Lawton, 1980, p. 21) and of the attempt to set up a national curriculum agency - The Curriculum Study
Group - under the government control in 1964 (Jones, 1985, p. 46). The School Certificate Examination had to give way to the New General Certificate of Education (GCE) single-subject Ordinary Level examination, and the attempt to construct a curriculum agency ended up with the Schools Council being dominated not by the government but by teacher representatives.

In 1976, Prime Minister Callaghan questioned whether schools and the education service generally were doing enough to provide the industrial society with sufficient training in the basic subjects, which initiated the so-called Great-Debates afterwards (Lawton, 1980, pp. 24-25; Jones, 1985, pp. 26-27). These Great Debates, obviously the same kind as the debates in the United States after A Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983), The Closing of the American Mind (Bloom, A., 1987), and Cultural Literacy (Hirsch, 1987), brought forth the Education Reform Act of 1988.

According to the Act of 1988, the National Curriculum is mandatory and statutory (Dufour, 1990). The ten defined subjects, the foundation subjects -- English, Mathematics, Science, Modern Language, History, Geography, Technology,
Music, Art and Physical Education -- occupy the majority of the timetable, leaving some place, but not much, for additional subjects to be chosen by schools and teachers, in consultation with governors. In addition, students' attainment in National Curriculum subjects is to be tested at 7, 11, 14 and 16 years of age.

Although this "revolutionary" reform is a result of more broad social demands such as efficiency of education, teacher accountability, economic competitiveness, and basic skills as well as then Prime Minister Thatcher's charismatic leadership (Mclean and Voskrensenskaya, 1992, p. 75), there has been a long history of arguments for clearer central guidelines for curriculum (Hirst, 1978; Hirst and Peters, 1970; Holt, 1978; White, 1973; Becher and Maclure, 1978). But all those who have advocated a common curriculum do not seem to be delighted to accept it. White, for example, criticizes it as "not helpful" because of a lack of educational aims (pp. 9-14). Statements of rationale are so ambiguous, he argues, that a tyrant like Hitler or Stalin would accept these as statements of their educational aims. Besides, the ten foundation subjects are almost identical to the ones Stalin had and the three core
subjects - language, mathematics and science - were also named as "important subjects" by Stalin. Mclean and Voskreneskaya (1992) declare that it "failed in the long term" (p. 72) because it was an educational revolution from above, in the same way Gorbachev's perestroika in the Soviet Union failed because it was from above. Ball and Bowe (1992) argue that the present developments regarding the Act "are not resulting in a curricular provision that is driven by the market, but a provision that is driven by serendipity, ad hocery chaos and the minimum planning that such circumstances allow" and that "the cost of all this within schools is measured by teachers' stress, resentment, illness, absenteeism and the number of those leaving the profession" (p. 98). Furthermore, they see the Act, from an obvious hermeneutical view, as a text and argue that the state control model is analytically very limited because the authors of the National Curriculum are limited in their capacity to control the meanings embedded in the texts; as a result, such texts are read and appreciated differently in different settings (P. 113).

However, according to another report (Cox, Evans and Sanders, 1992), teachers' attitudes towards the National
Curriculum are not so negative. Generally, they view the attainment tests negatively but think the National Curriculum will not seriously deprive the classroom teacher of professional freedom and scope for initiative. They also do not consider the introduction of the National Curriculum as an educationally backward move.

One of the reasons that the teachers do not see the National Curriculum as a threat to their professionality seems to be the fact that the National Curriculum does not seize teachers' actual right regarding the curriculum content they have been possessing. Despite the fact that the foundation and core subjects in the National Curriculum may be strikingly similar to those of Stalin's curriculum or even to those of the Korean curriculum, those do not mean subject names by which schools actually teach students. There are no regulations, unlike the Korean curriculum, regarding time allotment or regarding subjects that should be taught in a particular grade or semester. Neither the Act nor the National Curriculum prescribes the objectives of the grade schools or of each subject. According to the National Curriculum Council:
The use of subjects to define the National Curriculum does not mean that teaching has to be organized and delivered within prescribed subject boundaries. Subject descriptions reflect the way in which school curriculum is now most often planned and, in secondary schools, also organized (Ball and Bowe, 1992, p. 102).

The actual right to organize and to implement curriculum in each school still remains in the hands of principals and teachers. In other words, from the teachers' standpoint, nothing much has changed in what and how to teach, except the attainment tests. This has been also foreseen by a study right before the Act:

The prognosis, however, is that British schools in the 1990s will be very similar institutions to those around today and that the curriculum will also appear very similar. (Jones, 1985, p. 48)

The Act grants individual schools a right to demand funds directly from the central government so that the right of local educational authorities is considerably weakened and that of schools and parents enforced. The main concern of the British National Curriculum seems to be, in the end, in the attainment tests rather than in what to teach and, borrowing Elmore's and Weiler's terms, in securing the government's share of power in access to curriculum decision without jeopardizing their legitimation.
2.5. Centralization vs. Decentralization Revisited

From the examples of the United States and England, debates about centralization and decentralization have been shown to be centered mostly around administrative hegemony, not around what should actually be taught in concrete classrooms, and thus have little influence on teaching practice. Although curriculum policies of these two countries can not be said to be completely decentralized, teachers in these countries, unlike Korean teachers, appear to have some extent of autonomy in deciding what and how to teach. No matter to what degree the central power over the curriculum policy is decentralized, however, actual classroom practices tend to remain largely the same, as has been frequently pointed out. This is, and will likely be, the case for the new Korean curriculum, too. Even if the level of decentralization or localization in the new Korean curriculum has been proved to be far behind that of the United States and England, actual influence of the curriculum policy on classroom practice is not so great. Speaking more concretely, science teachers in England under the new centralized curriculum policy and those in Korea under the new localized policy may not have to be
distressed about what and how to teach, nor they must fear lest the time-tables in schools should disappear suddenly.

From a Foucauldian view, debates about centralization and decentralization which have been provided so far are themselves meaningless, or at least stale, because power no longer centers around the State. Aiming obviously at such Marxists as Althusser (1971), Foucault (1980) categorizes the way power is exercised only in terms of the State apparatus as "juridical" (p. 115). He suggests another frame of power analysis; that is power-knowledge. This concept of power-knowledge decentralizes the State from the center of discourses regarding power and overcomes the State-people dichotomy in power relations.

We should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests...We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. (Foucault, 1979a, pp. 94-95)

According to him, knowledge is developed by the exercise of power and is used in turn to legitimate further exercise of power.
School is most frequently articulated by Foucault as an institution of governmentalization, which he uses to analyze complex power relations in the modern industrialized society. Instead of violent and brutal exercise of power, the new and gentle methods of discipline, "not to punish less, but to punish better" (1979a, p. 82), have emerged in order to produce docile bodies. School is one of those gentle and "caring" institutions, along with the prison, hospital, asylum, military, and work place, within which knowledge has been developed, refined, and used to shape individuals in more elaborate and fine ways.

What makes teachers' classroom practices remain unchanged, especially regarding the content, in spite of centralized or decentralized curriculum policy? Why do teachers teach nothing too much differently from what the central or state governments, or more generally, people of the society want to them to?

Answering these questions, Foucault's approach seems to be very useful. While Cherryholmes (1988) tries to explain why reform attempts, such as the efforts to centralize curriculum in the United States, do not usually
have much influence on the actual teacher's classroom using a Foucauldian approach, his explanation overlooks Foucault's insight into power-knowledge relations.

The immense size, complexity, and decentralized nature of American education mitigates against quickly instituted, enduring changes. Foucault's approach to discursive practices provides a likely characterization of American education as an anonymous, powerful, slowly changing discourse that we inherit and over which we have little control. (Cherryholms, 1988, p. 135)

Cherryholmes seems to be right in pointing out that we have little control over an anonymous and powerful discourse that is a product of power-knowledge relationship, but he fails to explain more concretely that the teacher's own professionality or specialty itself is a product of power and that the teacher or his/her own subject itself implies power. The teacher usually thinks that his/her own field of knowledge is outside power relations and that his/her profession is to teach this knowledge to the student regardless of the changes of curriculum policy. Thus, the teacher shows no serious interest in the changes of curriculum policy as far as it does not infringe his/her professionality - to teach his/her own professionalized knowledge as a fixed knowledge.
Historically, the general content of education has been justified under various names such as disciplines, subjects, forms of knowledge, or basics by J. Bruner (1959), H. Broudy (1964), P. Phenix (1964), and J. Schwab (1964) in the United States and R. Peters (1970), P. Hirst (1970), and J. White (1973) in England. In this process, as Cherryholmes indicates, invoking Derridean deconstructionism, disciplinary structure became a transcendental signified for curriculum (p. 139). A teacher usually has one's own field or subject and thinks s/he is "specialized" or "professionalized" in that discipline. But s/he hardly recognizes that professionalization of knowledge is a form of a discipline to create "docile bodies" which may be subjected, used, transformed and improved. To quote Foucault again, there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. Time-tables, classifications, and examinations which do not seem to disappear in schools, regardless of which curriculum policy, centralized or decentralized, they take, are also other major examples Foucault refers to directly
as methods to discipline docile bodies (1979a, pp. 149, 181, 184).

Thus, it is no more than an illusion for the teacher to think that all s/he must do is to teach his or her "professionalized" and "politically neutralized" knowledge regardless of the changes in curriculum policy. It is also an illusion for the teacher to think that s/he can produce his or her own discourse and become a "subject" under a decentralized (from the State or a political power) curriculum policy because discourse produces the subject, not vice versa. Under a decentralized and individualized curriculum policy, it might seem to be possible that the teacher can be an autonomous subject and can produce autonomous subjects. However, for Foucault, not only totalizing but also individualizing forms of power are used ("a double bind"; 1983, p. 216) as technologies of producing docile bodies.

At the local level, of course, there is often a high degree of conscious decision making, planning, plotting and coordination of political activity. Foucault refers to this as "the local cynicism of power"...The fact that individuals make decisions about specific policies or particular groups jockey for their own advantage does not mean that overall activation and directionality of power relations in a society implies a subject. (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 187)
He suggests individualization is maximal for the upper regions of power in a feudal society: the more power or privilege one holds, the more one is marked out as an individual. In a disciplinary régime, on the other hand, individualization is descendant: to the extent that power itself becomes more anonymous and functional, those on whom it is exercised tend to be the more strongly individualized (Foucault, 1979a, pp. 192-194).

Foucault describes the school as a blockage of capacity-communication-power (1983, p. 218). The school is an important part of society's régime of truth, that is, "the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true" (1980, p. 131).

The following description by Cherryholmes shows how régime of truth occurs actually in schools:

Educators speak as educators, for example, after becoming proficient in their professional discourses. Certifiably so. Following certification one is permitted or asked or compensated
to speak with authority on education. Such speakers, however, have no direct access to the origins of the discourses. (1988, p. 34)

Not only the teacher him- or herself is a docile body but s/he also creates docile bodies unless s/he comes awakened from his or her illusion that s/he can reach "the lost origin" (Foucault, 1977, p. 143) of his or her knowledge and unless s/he struggles against the régime of truth with which s/he engaged and within which s/he is constituted.

This struggle should be not only against centralized power but also against decentralized or individualized power.

The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries. (Foucault, 1983, p. 216)

As Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest (pp. 206-207), Foucault leaves to his readers questions about the concrete methods and strategies of liberation, resistance, or struggle. However, he clearly and frequently expresses his opposition to all kinds of universal and totalizing discourses; this permeates all his writings. For him, intellectual does not mean the "bearer of universal values" (1980, p. 132). Rather, it is the person occupying a specific position -
but whose specificity is linked to the general functioning of an apparatus of truth. Thus, the struggle must be local and specific. Only this local and specific struggle can have effects and implications which are not simply professional and sectoral. The intellectual can operate and struggle at the general level of that régime of truth which is so essential to the structure and functioning of our society.

Thus seen, the Foucauldian sense of localization is not just a relinquishment of power from the State but a struggle against all kinds of disciplinary discourses -- totalized or individualized, violent or gentle, blatant or subtle. This struggle is a role of intellectuals, thus of educators and teachers.
3.1. Foucauldian Locality and Local Struggle

In fact, the way that we should resist or struggle against the disciplinary power and the possibility of the resistance or struggle itself are not at all obvious in most of Foucault's writings. It may be because he is "notorious for his reluctance to make value judgements" (Kusch, 1991, p. 218) or because of his "ascetic refusal to go beyond his concrete demonstrations" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 205). The concept of locality is not directly mentioned in the writings by and about Foucault. The concept of locality is usually presupposed tacitly as a main theme in the Foucauldian theory of power-knowledge, and it is also an important point at which Foucault's post-structuralism is linked to postmodernism. As the word "post-structuralism" suggests, such key ideas as decentralization and difference are omnipresent in Foucault's thought.

First of all, for Foucault, the concept of power is decentralized from and non-reductive to the State, as
described in the preceding chapter. Thus, a political change in modern history when capitalism emerged was not a transmission of power from the State to civil society but an increased governmentalization of power relations. He does not think of power in the sense of a unified state apparatus whose task is to ensure the subjection of the citizens of a particular society. Nor does he mean a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, the effect of which spreads to the whole society. Power should be understood as the multiplicity of power relations at work in a particular area of society. Power does not reside in some primary, central point. Power is ubiquitous because it is produced at every moment: "Power is everywhere... Power is not an institution, nor a structure, nor a possession. It is a name we give to a complex strategic situation in a particular society" (Foucault, 1979b, p. 93). In the process of governmentalization, which denotes the shift of power relations between the sovereign and individuals from the time of Machiavelli to the modern state (Marshall, 1990, p. 15), methods which Foucault calls micro-technology are used. These methods bring together the exercise of power
and the constitution of knowledge in the organization of space and time along ordered lines, so as to facilitate constant forms of surveillance and the operation of evaluation and judgement. Thus, power-knowledge produces a distinction between normality and abnormality. This view of the power-knowledge relation presupposes locality and particularity of truth and is very different from the traditional Marxist view of ideology. According to the classical Marxist view, power relates to knowledge primarily through the ways it serves to distort or mystify the truth. However, according to Foucault:

Truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits...Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its régime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (1980, p. 131)

In order to analyze this power-knowledge relations, he uses genealogy, which also shows his strong antagonism toward any kind of universal and totalizing discourse. Genealogy denies continuity in history and "does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken
continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things." Neither is it genealogy's duty "to demonstrate that the past activity exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a predetermined form to all its vicissitudes" (1977, p. 146).

So, for Foucault, an exploration into the past (which is an examination of or search for "descent") is "not the erecting foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself" (1977, p. 147). He seems to be denying the Western optimism that the absolute and universal Truth lies at the origin of what we know, and says, "the origin lies at a place of inevitable loss, the point where truth of things correspond to a truthful discourse, the site of a fleeting articulation that discourse has obscured and finally lost" (1977, p. 143).

What is important for Foucault is not search for the lost origin, the absolute Truth, or the universal and unifying Spirit but faithful genealogical exploration into the past.

If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is "something altogether different" behind the things: not a timeless and
essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms. (1977, p. 142)

This genealogical exploration into the past made him notice such local and subjugated things as discontinuity, irrationality, and madness which had been "behind the things," that is, behind the disguise of continuity and universal rationality of history. His focuses were, in structuralist terms, not only on the historical presences, but equally on the absences which had made the presences present in history by way of differences. He freely travels into the past, "free from the restraints of positive knowledge," and "descends to seize the various perspectives, to disclose dispersions and differences, to leave things undisturbed in their own dimension and intensity" (1977, p. 156).

However, once again, he warns against the danger of totalization in genealogy:

these genealogies...were not possible and could not have been attempted except on one condition, namely that the tyranny of globalising discourses with their hierarchy and all their privileges of a theoretical avant-garde was eliminated. (1980, p. 83)

His local, and probably too humble, attitude towards power and struggle made some critics call his description of
power "Schopenhauerian will" (Taylor, 1986, p. 88) for which no one is responsible. This line of criticism usually comes from those who prefer emancipatory discourse. As Lather maintains (1990, p. 32), however, the emancipatory discourse is much a part of Foucault's "régime of truth." In the Foucauldian space, the binaries that structure so much of emancipatory discourse implode from "us versus them" to a multi-centered discourse with differential access to power. The totalizing desire to establish foundations is displaced by a move toward a self-critique that traces our own collusion in the very cultural dominations we are opposing via the intersection of our liberatory intentions and the "will to power" that underscores interpretation.

For Foucault, power is not the prerogative of a dominant class which exercises it actively upon a passive, dominated class; and the working class, or the intellectual, has no historical mission in acquiring it. Actually, there can be no such thing as a historical mission in Foucauldian historical contingency. Because power is multiple and ubiquitous, the struggle against it must be localized. Although genealogy is a radical form of
criticism, its specific critical contribution is not so much, or not primarily, to criticize institutions and persons, but instead to make criticizable the forms of knowledge, the standards of rationality, or principles of reasoning not only on the basis of which such institutions arise and turn out to be "reasonable," "useful" and "self-evident," but also on the basis of which the violence of these institutions becomes natural and justifiable (Kusch, 1991, p. 214). The power relation is not to be found in terms of causality, of events at one level causing or explaining events on another, but rather in a series of aims and objectives. However, these are not attributable to an individual subject, not even to a ruling caste, but arise in an apparently anonymous way from local situations in which they first appear. Where there is power there is resistance; power relations depend on a multiplicity of points of resistance, which serve at once as adversary target, support, foothold (Sarup, 1983, p. 99).

So, rather than analyzing the working of factually existing institutions, genealogy seeks to identify the network of knowledge, the standards of rationality or rationalities that make these institutions possible and
that justify them. Since it is the central premiss of genealogy that knowledge and power are internally-essentially related, genealogy cannot remain on the level of violence and coercion in institutions like prison; it has to study the frameworks of thinking and knowledge that inform these institutions. As Foucault himself admits (1977, pp. 206-207), activities and effects of The Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons (G.I.P.) in the years 1971-1972 (Foucault, 1980, p. 143; Patton, 1979, pp. 109-111, 138; Sheridan, 1980, p. 130) illustrate this genealogical concept of local struggle and local victory.

Some Marxists criticize Foucauldian theory as "abandoning class analysis," "ignoring that disciplinary power techniques are applied precisely to ensure the reproduction of the social relations of the capitalist mode of production," and "severing power relations from an understanding of class domination and the state as a political form of the rule of the capital" (Sarup, 1983, p. 101).

Foucault not only rejects class analysis, which attempts to derive existing forms of power from the productive relations of capitalist society; he also repudiates the concepts of ideology, state and party. The Foucauldian approach, though it produces very interesting work, puts into question many categories that marxists take for granted. (p. 102)
However, the points that are made by some critics as weaknesses of Foucauldian theory, on the contrary, give us an important insight into the way of breaking the limit placed by an attempt to understand society from a totalitarian view. A myth of totalization and universalization not only evidences the teleological speculation immanent in the Marxist view of history but also is related to the reductionistic tendency which reduces all social problems to the capitalist mode of production. This reductionism is inherent also in class determinism and econo-centrism. This seems to be the fundamental reason that so-called orthodox Marxism has become vulgarized and dogmatized despite its embellishment with dialectic and praxis, which can be seen easily in social movements in Korea. Through discourse analysis which decenters and localizes power, the Foucauldian approach contributes to extend the logic of resistance and liberation by unshackling it from the teleological speculation.

Thus, despite some critics' interpretation of "his reluctance to make value judgements," Foucault's attitude
towards the possibility and form of resistance to power is pretty firm:

One should not assume a massive and primal condition of domination, a binary structure with 'dominators' on one side and 'dominated' on the other, but rather a multiform production of relations of domination which are partially susceptible of integration into overall strategies...there are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised; resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real, nor is it inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power. It exists all the more by being in the same place as power; hence like power, resistance is multiple and can be integrated in global strategies. (1980, p. 142)

Foucault calls the element of resistance inherent in power relations "a certain plebeian quality aspect" (p. 138). While doubting that the plebs is a genuine sociological entity, and while denying that the plebs can be identified with the proletariat, he suggests that the plebeian quality is "a centrifugal movement, an inverse energy, a discharge" and that it can be found all over the social body "in a diversity of forms and extensions, of energies and irreducibilities":

This measure of plebs is not so much what stands outside relations of power as it is their limit, their underside, their counter-stroke, that which responds to every advance of power by a movement of disengagement (p. 138).

3.2. Local Intellectual and Local Knowledge

As a matter of course, Foucault does not think every power relation is bad in itself although he describes
mainly negative and repressive power in one of his early writings (1971). He makes a distinction between inevitable or harmless, and avoidable or harmful forms of power. Thus, because "'truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power," we cannot emancipate it "from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power)." What matters is to detach "the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time" (1980, p. 133). While, as described before, genealogy is suggested by Foucault himself as the concrete method of analyzing hegemonial power, he makes it clear in many other contexts that the form of power against which we should struggle is a "negative," "repressive," "bad form of," or "hegemonial" power. But, according to him, a mode of action which acts directly and immediately on others is not power. He excludes this mode of action from the concept of power, thus also from the hegemonial power, calling it violence.

Power exists only when it is put into action...it acts upon their (other's) actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future. A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things...On the other hand a power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two elements which are indispensable
if it is really to be a power relationship: that "the other" (the one whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts...In itself the exercise of power is not violence. (1983, pp. 219-220)

Thus, Foucault's (local) struggle or resistance is only against hegemonial power, analyzing and deconstructing the system of discourses produced by the combination of hegemonial power and knowledge. This local struggle cannot be performed by the "universal" intellectual, the "bearer of universal value" (1980, p. 132) who was "derived from a quite specific historical figure: the man of justice, the man of law, who counterposes to power, despotism and the abuses and arrogance of wealth, the universality of justice and the equity of an ideal law" (p. 128). The universal intellectual speaks for humanity with the tone of prophecy and promised pleasure and locates him- or herself, as spokesman for conscience and consciousness, in the privileged spot "outside of power and within the truth" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 130). Foucault advises the intellectual to abandon his arrogance or, perhaps, burden of "can and must apply universally" (1980, p. 128) and emphasizes the role of the new local or specialized intellectual.
The figure in which the functions and prestige of this new intellectual are concentrated is no longer that of the 'writer of genius', but that of the 'absolute savant', no longer he who bears the values of all, opposes the unjust sovereign or his ministers and makes his cry resound even beyond the grave. It is rather he who, along with a handful of others, has at his disposal, whether in the service of the State or against it, powers which can either benefit or irrevocably destroy life. He is no longer the rhapsodist of the eternal, but the strategist of life and death. (1980, p. 129)

Because Foucault describes the term of local or specific intellectual always as "not of the universal intellectual," the meaning of the term is somewhat ambiguous and uncertain, which Foucault himself admits (1980, p. 132). However, Poster observes the specific intellectual as "a creature of the twentieth century with its fragmentation of knowledge, its multiplication of disciplines, its infinite expansion of research centers, its explosion of the printed world, its professionalization of discourse" (1982, quoted in Kenway, 1990, p. 175). In other words, Foucault decenters the universality and centrality of the (universal) intellectual. While the universal intellectual claims to struggle for the universal Truth, the local intellectual's aim is more humble and vivid. While the former can be easily isolated from the masses because of the abstractness of his aim, the latter can struggle
against hegemonial power more effectively by virtue of the vividness and concreteness of his aim.

Like the universal intellectual in Marxist discourse of ideological struggle, the local and specific intellectual is referred to in the context of (local) struggle against hegemonial power. Thus, such writers as Giroux (1992; 1988; Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991) and Kenway (1990) equate the Foucauldian local and specific intellectual with the counter-hegemonic intellectual described in Gramsci's hegemony theory although Aronowitz distinguishes Foucauldian intellectual's work, calling it "antihegemonic," from Marxism's counter-hegemony to liberalism or dictatorship (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991, p. 155). Giroux maintains that Foucault's notion of the specific intellectual must be combined with Gramsci's notion of the engaged intellectual "who connects his or her work to broader social concerns that deeply affect how people live, work, and survive" (1992, p. 82). This equation or combination of Foucault's and Gramsci's intellectual seems to be possible because the hard-liner Italian communist, like his non-Marxist counterpart and
unlike other Marxist theorists, negates econo-centrism and class determinism.

However, all the ideological critiques, including Gramsci's concept of hegemony which is said to be built on ideology, presuppose, at least "ideologically," a state of truth after being awakened from false consciousness. Thus, the ideological critiques tacitly presuppose the bifurcation between false consciousness and truth, on which Foucault does not agree. For Foucault, as quoted at the beginning of this section, we cannot emancipate truth from every system of power because truth is already power. So, "the essential political problem for the intellectual is not to criticise the ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or to ensure that his own scientific practice is accompanied by a correct ideology, but that of ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth. The problem is not changing people's consciousness...but the political, economic, institutional régime of the production of truth" (1980, p. 133). Truth is not a privilege which can be enjoyed only by those who have emancipated themselves from false consciousness. It is not "the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered
and accepted" but rather "the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true" (1980, p. 132).

The local struggle or resistance by the local or specific intellectual aims, in the end, at analyzing and deconstructing the present social, economic, and cultural hegemony by detaching the power of truth from them. As examples of these local struggles, Foucault lists those which have emerged since the late 1960s: women have begun to question male dominance more radically, children question the authority of their parents, and psychiatry is criticized for its control over the mentally ill, medicine is criticized for its treatment of the sick, and administrations and bureaucracies are criticized for their interventions in the realm of the individual (1983, p. 211). These resistances have similar local character, that indicates "an autonomous, non-centralized kind of theoretical production, one that is to say whose validity is not dependent on the approval of the established régime of thought" (1980, p. 81). Local, specific, or subjugated knowledge means, on the one hand, "historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence
or formal systemisation" and, on the other, "something
which in a sense is altogether different, namely a whole
set of knowledge that have been disqualified as inadequate
to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive
knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the
required level of cognition or scientificity" (1980, pp.
81-82).

For Foucault, knowledge is arbitrary and truth is
related to particular rationalities. He does not believe
in the absolute truth or universal rationality. In every
society, the production of discourse, the word Foucault
uses interchangingly with knowledge, is "at once
controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according
to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert
its power and its dangers" (1971, p. 216). There are a
number of procedures of exclusion operating in discourse.
Those are prohibition, division-rejection, and opposition
between the true and the false. Needless to say, the third
procedure of exclusion, that is, the opposition between the
true and false, is the most dominant and the most all-
pervasive although Foucault admits that speaking of the
opposition is "a little risky" (p. 217). It is risky
because he apparently does not want to be fettered with the absolute relativism or Sophists' paradox. Thus, he says:

Certainly, as a proposition, the division between true and false is neither arbitrary, nor modifiable, nor institutional, nor violent. Putting the question in different terms, however -- asking what has been, what still is, throughout our discourse, this will to truth which has survived throughout so many centuries of our history; or if we ask what is, in its very general form, the kind of division governing our will to knowledge -- then we may well discern something like a system of exclusion (historical, modifiable, institutionally constraining) in the process of development. (p. 218)

The truth, and power, of discourse resided, not in what was said, but in who said it and how it was said. Plato's will to seek true knowledge also could not be excluded from this Foucauldian concept of will to truth or to knowledge. In discussing how different disciplines are constituted, he shows that knowledge can fix meaning, representation, and reason; that the very organization of the discourse can be an exercise of power, controlling and restraining what can be said as well as the right to speak. Formation of the modern human sciences, too, is a new feature of the will to truth and knowledge and is to discipline people effectively (1979a; 1979b).

However, while he urges insurrection of the local and subjugated knowledge against the privileged, so-called "absolute and universal" knowledge, and while he holds that
rational judgements can only be made on the basis of historically contingent standards, the concept of the local knowledge does not seem to be endorsing Kuhnian cyclical incommensurability. Instead, Foucault himself demonstrates, case by case, how allegedly timeless categories have had historically contingent origins, as his works show. Thus, in a very similar way that Lyotard presupposes the existence of the particular rule(s) in a particular language game, Foucault denies neither the use of the concepts "true" and "false" nor the possibility of the particular and local rationality within one local discourse.

3.3. Lyotard and Locality

Although the existence of a set of rules is necessary in order for us to communicate at all with one another in a particular language game, Lyotard does not admit any possibility of communication between different language games. His main point in the debates regarding postmodernism is very simple and flat: rejection of all kinds of grand theories. He defines *postmodern* as "incredulity toward metanarratives" (1984, p. xxiv). According to him, science, especially contemporary science,
has tried to legitimate its existence, since Plato, with recourse to (philosophical) narrative because "the language game of science does not have the resources to legitimate their truth on its own" (1984, p. 28). Science shuffles off the legitimation to the (philosophical) narrative and seeks the good, justice, truth, emancipation, progress, etc. Lyotard calls this grand narrative.

Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is true knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all. (1984, p. 29)

He sees contemporary science, which is founded on and which seeks for performativity and efficiency, as positivistic (1984, pp. 53-54). Needless to say, his pejorative use of the word "positivism" reflects the history of the debates about the nature of science, after the demise of logical positivism and after Kuhn and Feyerabend. In the postmodern science,

working on a proof means searching for and "inventing" counterexamples, in other words, the unintelligible; supporting an arguments means looking for a "paradox" and legitimating it with new rules in the games of reasoning. (1984, p. 54)

The anti-metanarrative theme is characterized as a surprising transformation, new experiments, or a sudden rupture with the past. It is rejection of social, moral, political, or psychological theories, as well as any
metaphysical or epistemological views that posit a synthetic or natural/historical telos towards which we are inevitably heading or which we might prescribe. The postmodern science rejects any identification with any established systems of knowledge by undermining continuously its own basis of legitimation. Its legitimation process is equated with the generation of other statements and other rules of language game.

"Science possesses no general metalanguage in which all other languages can be transcribed and evaluated" (1984, p. 64). There is no "grand scheme" of the natural and social world that is unfolding or capable of being enacted.

Lyotard criticizes those totalizing social theories of Parsons and Luhmann. He calls those "terrorist." By terror he means, the efficiency gained by eliminating, or threatening to eliminate, a player from the language game one shares with him. He is silenced or consents, not because he has been refuted, but because his ability to participate has been threatened (there are many ways to prevent someone from playing). The decision makers' arrogance, which in principle has no equivalent in the sciences, consists in the exercise of terror. (1984, pp. 63-64)

He, in a strikingly similar way to Foucault's explanation of knowledge and power, combines the problems of knowledge with those of society. According to him, the
question of the legitimacy of science has been indissociably linked to that of the legislator since the time of Plato.

The right to decide what is true is not independent of the right to decide what is just...there is a strict interlinkage between the kind of language called science and the kind called ethics and politics...knowledge and power are simply two sides of the same question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided? In the computer age, the question of knowledge is now more than ever a question of government. (1984, pp. 8-9)

In this postmodern computer age, then, knowing tends to "amoralize" itself because knowledge is no longer mind-training power (Bildung) (1984, p. 4) but an object of consumption. "Knowledge ceases to be an end in itself" (1984, p. 5). It no longer matters whether knowledge contributes to a grand, synthetic telos. But he never sees the postmodern society as being amoral, that is, putting ethical problems aside, and depending only upon the automatized information process. Thus, he criticizes Habermas's concept of the universal Diskurs which is allegedly based on the universal consensus through communication as "doing violence to the heterogeneity of language games" (1984, p. xxv). Lyotard maintains:

Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value. But justice as a value is neither outmoded nor suspect. (1984, p. 66)
In fact, he locates Christianity as the root of the "Occident" grand narrative such as Habermas's project of Enlightenment, Hegel's dialectic of Spirit, or Marx's project of emancipation which seems to have "lost all of its critical power" as ethical and political theory after the Berlin Wall fell (1993, p. 114). Against metanarratives which totalize historical experience by reducing its diversity to a one-dimensional, all-encompassing logic, he posits a discourse of multiple horizons, the play of language games, and the terrain of micropolitics. As Giroux summarizes (1991, pp. 19-20), Lyotard, against the formal logic of identity and the transhistorical subject, invokes a dialectics of indeterminacy, varied discourses of legitimation, and a politics based on the "permanence of difference."

In order to advocate postmodern culture, Lyotard borrows Wittgenstein's concept of language games. In his view, all the events in postmodern society are language games or transformations of them, and the language games can be analyzed in terms of their performativity and consequent claims to legitimation and power. The narrative form lends itself to a great variety of language games,
among which are denotative statements about the natural
world; denotic statements regarding social relations;
interrogatives, evaluatives and so forth (1984, pp. 9-10).

Language game is defined as follows:

Each of the various categories of utterance can be defined in
terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which
they can be put -- in exactly the same way as the game of chess
is defined by a set of rules determining the properties of each
pieces, in other words, the proper way to move them (1984, p.
10).

Language games have the following three rules. First,
their rules do not carry within themselves their own
legitimation but are the object of a contract, explicit or
not, between players. Second, if there are no rules, there
is no game, that even an infinitesimal modification of one
rule alters the nature of the game, that a "move" or
utterance that does not satisfy the rules does not belong
to the game they define. Third, every utterance should be
thought of as a "move" in a game (1984, p. 10).

Thus shown, Lyotard's emphasis in his reading of
Wittgenstein is obvious. He seems to be combining
Wittgenstein's language game with the arbitrary character
of signifier, signified, and thus, language in Saussurian
linguistics. He wants to focus on the arbitrary character
of the rules of the various language games and of the
various forms of life, and eventually of the thing we call knowledge. Consequently, the character of postmodern knowledge consists, unlike Habermas's argument, in dissension, not in consensus in opinion. "Consensus is a horizon that is never reached" (1984, p. 61). Because the professional or the elite has the power to decide which knowledge should be acquired by consensus and which knowledge is true, in Lyotard's view, paralleling Foucault's, Habermas advocates knowledge produced by the elite. On the contrary,

it is possible to conceive the world of postmodern knowledge as governed by a game of perfect information, in the sense that the data is in principle accessible to any expert; there is no scientific secret. Given equal competence (no longer in the acquisition of knowledge, but its production), what extra performativity depends on in the final analysis is "imagination," which allows one either to make a new move or change the rules of the game. (1984, p. 52)

As it is impossible to judge the existence or validity of narrative knowledge on the basis of scientific knowledge and vice versa (1984, p. 26), and as nobody speaks all languages and there is no universal metalanguage (1984, p. 41), a particular language game can not dominate nor control (an)other language game(s). There is an incommensurability between language games (1984, p. 23). This recognition of the heteromorphous nature of language
games is, for Lyotard, a first step to an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to that of consensus. The second step is

The principle that any consensus on the rule defining a game and the "moves" playable within it must be local, in other words, agreed on by its present players and subject to eventual cancellation (1984, p. 66).

Thus, Lyotard sees all kinds of knowledge, language games, and forms of life as locally determined. In other words, validity of knowledge is judged only in a particular language game by the local players of the game, here and now, and is not transferable to any other forms of knowledge or language games. Viewed in this light, Lyotard does not seem to reject a possibility of consensus between the players at least in a language game, and at least in his *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, which is most frequently referred to among his writings and on which this section of my study is mostly dependent. As a matter of fact, the latter Wittgenstein's concept of language games presupposes consensus of opinion among the participants of a particular language game, which becomes ironically, as Prado describes (1992), the foundation of Habermas's universal pragmatics. However, after his *Postmodern Condition*, Lyotard develops further the concept
of incommensurability so that he finally denies any possibility of consensus within a language game, not to mention between language games. Whereas he later renounces the concept of language game and atomizes it to the incommensurability between phrases (1988; 1987; Lecercle, 1992), he suggests, even within a language game, an incommensurability between addressor and addressee. Not only is there an incommensurability within a game between the position of recipient and that of utterer, for example (it is not always pronounced, but it is extreme in the case of obligation), but from game to game, for the "same" position, there is incommensurability: it is not the same thing to be the recipient of a narrative, and to be the recipient of a denotative discourse with a function of truthfulness, or to be the recipient of a command. (Lyotard and Thébaud, 1985, p. 94)

In other words, "tolerance of differences" has been replaced with "respect of differences" in his later works; thus, "a radical pluralism" and "an absolute relativism" have become often-used words to criticize Lyotard. This makes some critics, in Giroux's terms (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991, p. 68), appropriate Lyotardian postmodernism in a reactionary way and others in a progressive way.

It is still disputable whether his emphasis on "the transition between heterogeneous phrases" and on "respecting their heterogeneity" (Lyotard, 1987, p. 180) can be identified with absolute relativism in epistemology
and ethics, or whether he abandoned his interest in truth and justice at all. It seems to be sufficient in this study, however, to point out that Lyotard has never given up his interest in truth and justice, at least in his *Postmodern Condition*, and that, on the contrary, the main interest of his philosophy is in truth and justice, as analyzed so far in this section. He does not insist on the impossibility of truth claims and of moral judgement, but on the possibility of local, and thus plural and multiple, processes of verification and justification according to the various language games.

### 3.4. A New Concept of Local Curriculum

Whereas Foucault says that we should struggle only against a "negative," "repressive," or "hegemonial" power, as was described in section 3.2., he admits the anonymity and evasiveness of power.

If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power holds good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. (1980, p. 119)
"Human sciences" are good examples of disciplinary forms of knowledge which, by objectifying and materializing people, are used to superimpose the power and to produce docile bodies. According to Foucault, a developed industrial society is the carceral, all across which power-knowledge relations distinguish the normal from the abnormal, to qualify, to classify and to punish, using the human sciences ("from psychiatry to pedagogy, from the diagnosis of diseases to the hiring of labour"; 1979a, p. 185) as technique of judgement and examination. The human sciences make disciplinary power exercised "invisibly." The school is "a sort of apparatus of uninterrupted examination" (1979a, p. 186), where this disciplinary power, with the help of the human sciences, forms "a whole series of codes of disciplinary individuality" (1979a, p. 189) and makes each individual a "case" (1979a, p. 191). The human sciences therefore play an important part in the creation of disciplined subjects, that is, individuals who conform to certain standards of sanity, health, docility, competence, and so on. This kind of epistemic view on the human science, or knowledge and discourse at large, can never entail a sense of the absolute Truth or of a unifying
rationality. Rather, as Kusch describes (1991, p. 215), Foucault stresses the analysis of rationality in the plural. However, Foucault suggests to us that to work with the simple opposition between reason and unreason, or with the notion of a bifurcation of reason into emancipatory and technical-strategical, is unhelpful. On the one hand, relying on the dichotomy "reason versus unreason" forces us to say either that the disciplinary institution and its justification is based on reason or that it is based on unreason. In the first case, we place ourselves outside of rationality and thus on the side of irrationality. In the second case, we fail to realize the reasoning underlying the institution, and thus underestimate its specific rationality and effectiveness.

As Foucault's analysis of the human sciences shows, then, we teachers and educators, in a régime of truth called education, or more specifically curriculum, should examine, as is described in 3.1., the basis on which - historically contingent - principles of reasoning, or which local frameworks certain strategies of control and punishment are rationally defensible. To paraphrase Lyotard, we should focus on the particular and local rules
on the basis of which we educators, teachers and students are playing our language game at the present time. A language game called education is:

the instrument whereby every individual, in a society like our own, can gain access to any kind of discourse. But we well know that in its distribution, in what it permits and in what it prevents, it follows the well-trodden battle-lines of social conflict. Every educational system is a political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it. (Foucault, 1971, p. 227)

"Discipline" as a form of knowledge on which teachers' so-called "professionalization" is based also limits and controls our knowledge (1971, pp. 222-224; Sheridan, 1980, p. 126). It constitutes an anonymous system that is available to anyone who wishes to use it: it is a corpus of propositions regarded as true, a set of rules and definitions, techniques and instruments. A discipline is what makes new statements, new propositions possible. But it is not simply all that may be said to be true about something. For every discipline is made up of errors as well as truths, and these errors are not merely foreign bodies to be ejected in time from the organism of the discipline, but have often played an active, necessary part in history. For a proposition to belong to a particular discipline, it must refer to a specific range of objects,
which, however, changes from one period to another. To belong to a discipline, a proposition must also refer to a certain body of theory. The discipline is, thus, a principle of control in the production of discourse. It fixes limits through an identity that takes the form of a permanent reactivation of rules.

The teacher who is professionalized in at least one discipline or form of knowledge unconsciously, or consciously, "excludes" knowledge and discourses that do not conform to the established rules of his or her own language game. The teacher usually does not realize the local, arbitrary, contingent, and transient character of the rules with which s/he is playing his or her language game. New propositions, statements, and rules of the discipline or the language game which are different from those of his or her own professionalized discipline are not allowed. As Foucault points out properly (1983, p. 216), however, the professionalization or individualization is one of the technologies of the power-knowledge relation, along with totalization, to produce docile bodies. Thus, as Labaree (1992) interprets Foucault (pp. 128-129), the process of teacher professionalization is also seen to be a
symptom of growing disciplinary power. Foucault himself is pretty clear about this:

Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized. Where the determining factors saturate the whole there is no relationship of power; slavery is not a power relationship when man is in chains. (1983, p. 221)

At the very moment teachers think they are subjects free from power and have professionality in a localized curriculum policy, they are prisoners of totalizing power called disciplines and are committing a terror of excluding dissents, combining Foucauldian and Lyotardian terminology. Labaree (1992) analyzes the illusionary character of teacher professionality in power relations of the recent effort to professionalize (though not "localize") teachers in the United States supported by the Carnegie Foundation and the Holmes Group, and maintains that the effort is to raise teacher educators' status (in power relations), not teachers' own.

Although McLaren (1994) says, regarding this, invoking Lyotard, "few criticalists in education still ascribe to the notion of freestanding autonomous subject self-fashioned through free will and good intentions" and
"subjectivity is now recognized as bearing a constitutive relationship to social power and the relationships to which it gives rise" (p. 322), it is very doubtful that this remark is appreciated by all "criticalists" and professionalized teachers.

Admitting that the Foucauldian concept of "discipline" is not directly concerned with academic disciplines as forms of knowledge, Giroux borrows the Foucauldian concept to explain arbitrariness of an academic discipline which is the essential part of teachers' professionality:

What is studied under the aegis of an academic discipline at any given time is not natural subject matter, but a field which is itself constituted by the practice of the discipline. Such a field is not arbitrary in the sense that it develops randomly or on whim; rather, a field can be called arbitrary because it is contingent on historical circumstance. Hence it reflects cultural, social, and institutional demands. (1988, p. 145)

While acknowledging their stability in the short run, Cherryholmes (1988) also holds that, agreeing to Foucault's argument that power makes truth possible, "transcendental signifieds for academic discipline are in the long run fictional" (p. 148). It was an accident of history with no single author, according to him (Cherryholmes, 1988, p. 139), that disciplinary structure became a transcendental signified for curriculum. Once it was in place, it
determined who could speak and what could be said. Hence, curricularists and teachers are not in control of their discourse; quite the reverse, dominant discursive practices dictated who is a curricularist and a teacher.

The most visible and official form of these dominant discursive practices in the actual classroom is, of course, the textbook. So-called "legitimate" knowledge is made available in schools through the textbook. Apple (1989; 1986) is one among those who analyze the ideological and political character of the school textbook. According to him (1989, pp. 156-157), the curriculum in most American schools is not defined by courses of study or suggested programmes, but by one particular artifact, the standardized, grade-level-specific text in mathematics, reading, social studies, science and so on. The impact of this on the social relations of the classroom is also immense. Apple estimates that 75 per cent of the time that elementary and secondary students are in classrooms and 90 per cent of the time that they are doing homework is spent with text materials. This phenomenon is more conspicuous in Korea where all the textbooks are published or censored by the central government, teaching outside the content of
the textbook is prohibited as a general rule, and textbooks are (mis)identified with curriculum (2.2. in this study).

In England also, the textbook is regarded as "a composite cultural commodity which provides an authoritative pedagogic version of received knowledge," and textbooks are "not just imposed on pupils by teachers, but imposed first on teachers by their employers or by the state" (Stray, 1994, p. 4).

While Olson (1989) sees the source of the authority of textbooks being from "the divorce of the speaker from his utterance" (p. 233), Luke and others (1989) argue that the authority of textbooks comes mainly from the historical, social, or institutional contexts in which those texts are owned, taught, and studied (pp. 245-260). According to them, textbooks have authority because the social institutions authorize them. Drawing on Foucauldian view of knowledge and post-New Criticism literary theory, they argue that knowledge is not, nor could it be, "in the text" solus and that the background knowledge of the reader and the social situation of the act of reading determine the meaning, interpretation and criticism of the text. In other words, there is no fixed meaning in text. Thus, "the
text is rewritten with each reading" (Luke, de Castell, and Luke, 1989, p. 249). This interpretation of authorship is in exact accord with Foucault's refusal "to maintain the sovereign function of the author with respect to his own texts" (Morris and Patton, 1979, p. 115). Regarding his own texts, Foucault says:

A book is made to be used in ways not defined by its writer. The more new, possible or unexpected uses there are, the happier I shall be. (Morris and Patton, 1979, p. 115)

Like this, Foucault decenters authority of a text from the author to the reader. The Foucauldian concept of author as the unifying principle in a particular group of writings or statements, which is one of procedures limiting and controlling discourse (Foucault, 1971, pp. 221-222), is correspondent to the Lyotardian concept of metanarrator who seeks legitimation of his or her own metanarrative by doing violence to the heterogeneity of the language game, and thus by prohibiting local determination of the validity and the rules of the game.

Unlike ordinary texts, school textbooks always presuppose an existence of an arbiter called teacher. Luke and others describe the relation among the text, the
teacher, and the students as following, which shows what Foucault would call anonymity of the author's power:

The school text is always the object of teacher mediation. One instructs with and through the text; a student confronts textual knowledge via teacher mediation. In classroom situation the text is the locus of information exchange. Inasmuch as the text for a particular subject, theme, or topic constrains the content of classroom information exchange, so does the teacher mediate the exchange between student and text. And within this communicational system of the classroom, a system supporting a particular structure of information exchange, the student assumes acquiescent, non-authoritative status in relation to both the text and the reader. (Luke, de Castell, and Luke, 1989, p. 252)

Thus for students, the text stands as an iconic marker of authority, both a symbol and an agent of institutional power and the teacher becomes a "surrogate author" (Luke, de Castell, and Luke, 1989, p. 257). This authority might be what most debates for decentralization or localization of curriculum seek for under the name of teacher autonomy, as we have seen in the last chapter. However, according to Foucault, this teacher authority or autonomy in (localized) classrooms is only "pseudo-sovereign" (1977, p. 222), and "the man described for us whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself" (1979a, p. 30).

Again, as far as the teacher assumes the status of a surrogate author or a metanarrator, which seems to have
been an important part of a localized curriculum policy or teacher professionalization, s/he is committing a violence in Foucauldian terms and committing a terror in Lyotardian terms to his or her students. The way the teacher can escape from committing this terror or violence and from an illusion of professionality and individuality seems to be, paradoxically, deprofessionalization of him- or herself, in the sense that s/he can be really free from totalizing power and from metanarrative only through what Pignatelli (1993) calls "self-detachment" (p. 417). Self-detachment is an abandonment of Voltaire-like attitude and an insurrection of local, low-ranking, or subjugated knowledge (Foucault, 1980, pp. 81-83), namely local struggle by the local intellectual.

Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political "double bind," which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures. (Foucault, 1983, p. 216)

From a political view, this self-detachment from his or her discipline or professionalization could lead to "an undermining of the hope to discover or create a true theory or an accurate description of a just society" (Beyer and Liston, 1992, p. 374), but could open "the way for a
broader, less privileged, and more public contest about what is valued and who gets heard" (Pignatelli, 1993, p. 422). Instead of Pignatelli's *self-detachment*, Kiziltan and others (1990) pick up the term *limit-attitude* as a strategy of Foucauldian (local) struggle, which Foucault uses in his "What is Enlightenment?" (1984) and which is not very different from self-detachment. The end of this limit-attitude is "to separate out from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, think" (Foucault, 1984, p. 170; Kiziltan, Bain, and Cañizares M., 1990, p. 364).

"The use of paralogy" (Fritzman, 1990; Kiziltan, Bain, and Cañizares M., 1990), which is often considered as Lyotardian strategy for "a war on totality" (Lyotard, 1984, p. 82), is very similar to the Foucauldian strategy for local struggle. It is to respect the little narrative [*petit récit*] and to generate other statements and other game rules. It is to produce not the known, but the unknown and to search dissension, not consensus, by activating the differences. It is to present the
unpresentable and to use imagination, which allows one
either to make a new move or change the rule of the game.

When a teacher deprofessionalizes him- or herself,
s/he can realize, and hence resist the power of régime of
truth, whether it is individualizing or totalizing,
centralized or decentralized to the state. S/he can
recognize the nature of recurring games or régimes of truth
by revaluing the local, subjugated, oppressed, other,
different knowledge. What the teacher should deal with is
not whether something is true or false but determination of
the distinction between true and false and of the criteria
for what is admitted for consideration as true or false

However, this deprofessionalization, self-detachment,
limit-attitude, or use of paralogy never means trivializing
or abrogating teachers' identity and role in the classroom
as much as Foucauldian and Lyotardian anti-humanism does
not mean the death of humanity at all. Rather, as Doll
(1993) indicates, it seeks for local decisions involving
students, teachers, and local mores and traditions instead
of deus ex machina type control and authority (p. 167).
Moreover, it is never an easy task for a teacher to abandon
his or her privileged authority and alleged autonomy within a professionalized discipline, to stress and promote "dissimilarity, constant decentering, endless deferral, and recurring doubt," and to impel "the multiplicity and fluidity of the self, knowledge, and the world" (Kiziltan, Bain, and Cañizares M., 1990, p. 366). It is many times more arduous and perplexing than enjoying one's individuality and professionalism in a closed system of knowledge. It should be an ordeal and a challenge, ontological and epistemological, to a teacher.
4.1. Dialogue and Contemporary Educational Theory

If the teacher appreciates the arbitrariness of disciplines and deprofessionalizes him- or herself, the concept of professional autonomy also has to be changed. Autonomy can no longer be interpreted as an audacious and privileged superimposition of disciplinary (in both senses of the word) knowledge upon students nor as the Cartesian subjectivity of knowledge nor as the Habermasian agent of Enlightenment. It is an autonomy as a generator, not a regulator, of new rules and statements and as an analyzer of régime of truth by delegitimizing willingly one's own specialities. The teacher is no more than a player of language game(s) and has to tolerate and respect other moves of the game(s).

The importance of this self-detachment, limit-attitude, or imagination is not exclusively focused on by so-called "post-" philosophers such as Foucault and Lyotard. Pinar (1980; 1988a; 1988b; 1994) also raises questions about a stable, authentic self. For him, self is
what we create, or construct (or deconstruct), as we read, write, speak and listen. It is "always in motion and in time, defined in part by where it is not, when it is not, what it is not" (1994, p. 220). Although he does not explicitly endorse "post-" philosophies, Pinar's concept of autobiography is affinitive to Foucault's concept of genealogy as counter-memory or as search for descent, thus suggesting more specific ways of applying the concept of local curriculum developed so far in this study. As genealogy disturbs what was previously considered immobile and fragments what was thought unified, autobiography "can serve as a method for enlarging, occupying and building the space of mediation," and it "enlarges the space by pushing back the edges of memory, disclosing more of what has been forgotten, suppressed and denied" (1994, p. 217).

Moreover, Pinar's call for (the curriculum theorist's) continual willingness "to give oneself up, including one's point of view (in dialectic movement)" (1994, p. 119) is in perfect accord with the Foucauldian strategy of local struggle: self-detachment or limit attitude. His concept of currere represents a call for the cultivation of such an internal dialectic. "It is a call to examine one's
response to a text, a response to an idea, response to a colleague, in ways which invite depth understanding and transformation of that response" (Pinar, 1994, p. 119).

The following passage resonates Foucault's antagonism against universal intellectuals and Lyotard's rejection of metanarrative, too:

A few scholars and theorists lay claim to timeless truths, and having completed the task of their own salvation - intellectual not spiritual in this secular age - they devote themselves to the conversion of others. (Pinar, 1980; 1994, p. 119)

He defines the relation between students and curriculum as a "dialogical encounter" (1994, p. 126) between the knower and the known in which social and intellectual situations are dialectically transformed, although his autobiography also includes dialogue between self-self and self-other, as well as dialogue between self-object.

Pinar's early emphasis on this dialogical nature of curriculum theory and classroom activities, on the fluidity of self and knowledge, and on differences seems to have presaged the later influences of the French philosophers on curriculum and education. Recently, albeit in various contexts, the concept of dialogue has been combined with the postmodern concept of difference and further developed
by some curriculum theorists (for example, Burbules, 1993; Bowers and Flinders, 1990; Ellsworth, 1989; Burbules and Rice, 1991; Noddings, 1986; Shor, 1992; Shor and Freire, 1987; Giroux, 1988), most of whose arguments are placed in the tradition of Freire's "critical pedagogy" and invoke so-called "post-" theories to a certain extent.

As is widely known, one of the central concepts of Freire's critical pedagogy is dialogue, along with liberation, reflection, real consciousness, problem-posing, oppression, etc. The goals of critical pedagogy are expressed as a critical democracy (or "radical democracy," Giroux, 1988, p. 75), individual freedom, social justice, and social transformation -- a revitalized public sphere characterized by citizens capable of cultural action for freedom and against domination "inside and outside a classroom where the status quo is challenged, where the myths of the official curriculum and mass culture are illuminated" (Shor and Freire, 1987, p. 12). Dialogue is an important form of praxis to transform the world in critical pedagogy. It is even an "existential necessity" (Freire, 1970, p. 69) because people transform the world by
naming it, speaking their world, and thus achieve significance as human beings.

Dialogue does not exist in a political vacuum... To achieve a goal of transformation, dialogue implies responsibility, directiveness, determination, discipline, objectives... Dialogue means a permanent tension in the relation between authority and liberty. But in this tension, authority continues to be because it has authority vis-a-vis permitting student freedoms which emerge, which grow and mature precisely because authority and freedom learn self-discipline. (Shor and Freire, 1987, p. 16)

In critical pedagogy, dialogic method is proposed as "empowering the disadvantaged" (Shor, 1992, p. 105) and ultimately transforming unequal society by putting limits on the teacher's dominating voice and calling on the students to codevelop a joint learning process. Thus, the critical pedagogy regards the concept of dialogue as an opportunity for the oppressed to express their subjugated voices. As can be noticed in Burbules's works (1993; Burbules and Rice, 1991), dialogue is suggested by some "critical theorists" as an important means to bridge the gap between its traditional (or modern) liberatory discourses and the postmodernist concepts of difference and locality. Consequently, their concept of dialogue can not help putting an emphasis on similarity as well as differences. The similarities would be, naturally, those of oppression, pain, and alienated feelings. In "post-"
theories, they would argue, a politics that highlights different struggles with similar intent is missing (Kanpol, 1992, p. 42). Giroux (1990) also points out that what is sorely lacking in postmodern educational literature is attention to both a theory and politics of similarity within difference and a politics of democracy, difference and cultural struggle (p. 6).

This concept of dialogue is epitomized in a recently published book (Burbules, 1993). Although he uses such postmodernist concepts as difference and incommensurability, Burbules (1993; Burbules and Rice, 1991) places much importance on sameness in the concept of dialogue. He argues, "any concrete discussion of difference also implies sameness: two objects, two people, two points of view, and so on can be contrasted usefully only when there are at least some respects on which they are similar" (Burbules and Rice, 1991, p. 403). He distinguishes two varieties of postmodernism: postmodernism per se and antimodernism. He illustrates the work of Giroux and McLaren as postmodernist and prizes the work as an attempt to reappropriate and expand modernist concepts such as democracy, liberty, rights, citizenship, and so
forth to the postmodernist terrain. He defines antimodernist position as being characterized by a strong antipathy to the languages, issues, and values of modernism, and seeks to formulate an entirely different problematic. Hence it is not concerned with recapturing and reformulating modern values, such as reason and equality, according to him, but with deconstructing them and rejecting them. He further argues:

Having deconstructed all metanarratives and radically relativized all possible values, antimodernism is left with no clear way of justifying any alternatives...Antimodernism lacks a clear conception of a "positive freedom" that identifies social conditions in which freer thought and action are possible; lacking this antimodernism has not been able to articulate a clear and defensible educational theory. (Burbules and Rice, 1991, pp. 398-399)

Thus, his concept of dialogue is related to "a clear conception of a positive freedom that identifies social conditions in which freer thought and action are possible" and heavily relies on the Habermasian communicative competence from which he draws "general rules of communication" (1993, pp. 72-78) and on the Chomskian linguistic competence or deep structure which he does not directly mention. As is widely known, Habermasian communicative theory and Chomskian theory of deep/surface structure presuppose the universal rationality which
enables human beings to communicate with each other "rationally" and, ultimately, reach consensus among themselves and to make sense of other languages (or to make those translatable).

Dialogue aims at the reconciliation of differences or the formation of new common meanings... The ordinary experience of translation across natural languages tells us that the usual case is that effective common meanings can be established, and that sufficient equivalences can be built over time so that speakers of any two languages can achieve a significant degree of mutual understanding and effective coordination of action... our ways of thinking and speaking about our world also exhibit striking commonalities. (Burbules and Rice, 1991, p. 408)

Burbules's goal of dialogue is in exact line with that of Giroux whose theory he strongly supports: "all voices and their differences become unified both in their efforts to identify and recall moments of human suffering and in their attempts to overcome conditions that perpetuate such suffering" (Giroux, 1988, p. 72).

However, he ignores not merely the fact that a simple word like "father" gains other meanings that the original word did not have or loses some meanings that it originally had when it is translated into another natural language. He also overlooks the fact that consensus or common meaning is, if it is possible, as Lyotard indicates (1988), only "a particular state of discussion" (pp. 65-66) and thus
contingent and subject to be deconstructed and disseminated at the very moment the common meaning or consensus is constructed. Moreover, rules of a language game are not the kind that could be pre-set but should be locally determined by the players. Rules of dialogue also can not be prescribed as Burbules tries to do, but determined by the players of the game of dialogue because, as Bowers and Flinders indicate, "dialogue is a locally managed approach to interaction" (1990, p. 149). Generally speaking, dialogue in critical pedagogy, as well as Burbules's, is not based on Foucauldian self-detachment or Pinar's "giving oneself up."

Ellsworth (1989), whom Burbules describes and criticizes as antimodernist, also is critical of these pre-set goals and rules of classroom dialogue. She, quoting Aronowitz, argues that the critical pedagogue is one who enforces the rules of reason in the classroom -- "a series of rules of thought that any ideal rational person might adopt if his/her purpose was to achieve propositions of universal validity" (Ellsworth, 1989, p. 304). Under these conditions and given the coded nature of the political agenda of critical pedagogy, only one political
gesture appears to be available to the critical pedagogue. S/he can ensure that students are given the chance to arrive logically at the "universally valid position" underlying the discourse of critical pedagogy -- namely, that all people have a right to freedom from oppression guaranteed by the democratic social contract, and that in the classroom, this proposition be given equal time vis-à-vis other sufficiently articulated and reasonably distinct moral positions. Consequently, for Ellsworth:

Dialogue in its conventional sense is impossible in the culture at large because at this historical moment, power relations between raced, classed, and gendered students and teachers are unjust...conventional notions of dialogue and democracy assumes rationalized, individualized subjects capable of being fully rational and disinterested...fundamental moral and political principles are not absolute and universalizable, waiting to be discovered by the disinterested researcher/teacher. (Ellsworth, 1989, p. 316)

Burbules tries to escape the weakness that Ellsworth attributes to critical pedagogy and its concept of dialogue by emphasizing repeatedly mutual respect, tolerance of diversity, difference, open-endedness, and so on. However, his attempt to establish a "non-teleological" concept of dialogue does not seem to be successful because he refuses to abandon universal rationality and the possibility of common meaning or consensus as a basis of dialogue, which makes his standpoint somewhat ambiguous and sometimes
equivocal. To paraphrase Bakhtin, Burbules, as well as other critical pedagogists, tries to establish as much predictability as possible, and so to constitute, to some extent a "centripetal," unifying or totalizing force (Emerson and Morson, 1987, p. 46) while trying to admit a fragmenting, centrifugal pull. His own "pragmatic approach" to dialogue has a danger of replacing differences with "rational persuasion" (1993, p. 164, his citation from Bernstein), if not terror or violence.

Thus, the concept of dialogue in most of the contemporary educational theory is not adequate for classroom practice in a context of local curriculum that this study has developed. In Korea where the content of curriculum is prescribed by the central government and teachers are "professionalized" according to the fields in the curriculum, this "rational" dialogue tends to be easily used as a means of accommodating students to the present régime of truth and delivering fixed meanings provided by the form of a textbook.

Besides the inadequacies explored so far, the concept of dialogue in most of the contemporary theories of education and curriculum reveals another limit. It deals
mainly with dialogue between, in Pinar's terms, self-other. The concept of dialogue does not consider dialogue between, again in Pinar's terms, self-self and self-object except that Freire (1970) mentions a bit about the possibility of expanding the concept of dialogical landscape to the relation between self-object.

4.2. Bakhtinian Dialogism

In written speech, lacking situational and expressive supports, communication must be achieved only through words and their combinations; this requires the speech activity to take complicated forms -- hence the use of first drafts. The evolution from the draft to the final copy reflects our mental process. Planning has an important part in written speech, even when we do not actually write out a draft. Usually we say to ourselves what we are going to write; this is also a draft, though in thought only. (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 144)

Vygotsky's emphasis on the dialogic character of inner speech like the quotation above is known as an influence of Mikhail Bakhtin (Matejka, 1986, pp. 171-172) who argues that every discourse refers to at least two subjects and thus to a potential dialogue between them (Todorov, 1984, p. 62). Bakhtin calls this "the phenomenon of internal dialogization" (Bakhtin, 1981). Thus, monologue is dialogic, too.

Bakhtin's dialogue is roughly divided into two kinds. One is dialogue between discourse and the generalized Other which can be seen in his early writings; and the other is
dialogue between discourses themselves, emphasized in his later writings. Kristeva's term of "intertextuality" is used to introduce the later concept of dialogue (Todorov, 1984, p. 60).

The very being of man (both internal and external) is a profound communication. To be means to communicate... To be means to be for the other, and through him, for oneself. Man has no internal sovereign territory; he is all and always on the boundary; looking within himself, he looks in the eyes of the other or through the eyes of the other... Life is dialogical by its very nature. To live means to engage in dialogue, to question, to listen, to answer, to agree, etc. (Todorov, 1984, pp. 96-97)

For Bakhtin, the present discourse is recognized as a representation of a world view and the absent discourse another, and dialogue is constructed between these two different representations of world views. Meaning of a word is no exception:

The word is born in a dialogue as a living rejoinder within it; the word is shaped in dialogic interaction with an alien word that is already in the object. A word forms a concept of its own object in a dialogical way. But this does not exhaust the internal dialogism of the word... The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is at the same time determined by that which has not been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering the word. Such is the situation in any living dialogue. (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 279-280)

All words have already been used and carry within themselves the traces of preceding usage, and "things" themselves have been touched, in at least one of their previous states, by other discourses that one cannot fail
to encounter. Thus, for Bakhtin, the "actual meaning" of an utterance "is understood against the background of other concrete utterances on the same theme, a background made up of contradictory opinions, points of view and value judgements" (1981, p. 281). However, this meaning is never the universal, absolute one. It is a conditional meaning acquired in a situation where one meaning and (an)other dialogue with one another. It is a product of a negotiation which is a part of the process where meaning is continuously recreated in a specific space and time. There is no fixed, universal meaning because meaning is locally determined in an interaction between all possible meanings.

There is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others. Which will affect the other, how it will do so and in what degree is what is actually settled at the moment of utterance...There can be no actual monologue. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 426)

Bakhtin calls this process of creation and recreation of conditional meaning "refraction" (1981, pp. 299-300). When a reader reads a text, he can trace the "angle of refraction" of authorial discourse as it passes through various other voices, or voice- and character-zones. But there are other refracting media as well, including that mass of alien words present not in the object but in the

Bakhtin calls the base condition governing the operation of meaning "heteroglossia" (p. 263).

It is that which insures the primacy of context over text. At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of conditions -- social, historical, meteorological, physiological -- that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that time will have a meaning different than it would have under any other conditions. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 428)

Heteroglossia is a situation where new meanings, new language games, and new rules are generated, the situation of a subject surrounded by the myriad responses he or she might make at any particular point. It is a way of conceiving the world as made up of a roiling mass of languages, each of which has its own distinct formal markers. As Holquist interprets it (1990), heteroglossia assumes that such contingent details as differences in the weather or in the physical condition of the speakers are reflected in utterance and have an effect on the way formal linguistic features can convey meaning (pp. 69-70).

Thus, as Maranhão summarizes (1990, p. 3), Bakhtin explains dialogues between self-(other)self, self-other, and self-object, as mutually constituting. The subject's "conceptual horizon" represents the circle of one's vision, that is, the refractions imposed upon reality and at the
same time constitutive of reality from the point of view of a self addressing an other.

Emerson and Morson (1987) name several terminologies which are foundations of Bakhtin's dialogism: unfinalizability, war on system, dissolving oppositions, polyphony, chronotopes and anachronism, and carnival, all of which correspond to Foucauldian and Lyotardian concepts of locality. "Unfinalizability" is used to imply the human tendency to defy all that purports to be fixed and stable. "Man [sic] is not a final and defined quantity upon which firm calculations can be made" (Emerson and Morson, 1987, p. 44). Humans always have a tendency to dialogue with others, seeking new, open meanings. For Bakhtin, universal system is the antithesis of human freedom. The very notion of system suggests "finalizability" in which desire for dialogue is suppressed and new meanings are shut up, whereas he views the world as an interaction of systemic and nonsystemic elements, each of which merges and emerges in largely unpredictable and contingent patterns. Bakhtin's rejection of Saussurian (or Jakobson's) binary oppositions can be well seen in the following quotation:
My attitude toward Structuralism: I am against enclosure in a text. Mechanical categories: "opposition," "changing in codes"... But I hear voices in everything (as quoted in Emerson and Morson, 1987, p. 47)

Symmetrical opposition between langue-parole, signified-signifier, society-individual, and other-self in Saussurian linguistics is dissolved and replaced with difference and simultaneity by Bakhtinian dialogue because the concept of dialogue is based upon the "inner duality" of each opposition. "Polyphony," which implies that many unfinalizable voices are heard at the same time, uttering the same word differently, and "chronotope," which Bakhtin coined to indicate differences of people and their utterances and thoughts conditioned by space and time, both stand against Habermasian universal rationality, sameness, telos, and all kinds of determinism. "Carnival" is the name Bakhtin gave to the spirit of creative destruction, to revivifying parody. It is similar to Foucauldian genealogy and Lyotardian paralogy.

Carnival... is a means for displaying otherness: carnival makes familiar relations strange... Carnival is both the name of a specific kind of historically instanced thing... and an immaterial force which such particular instances characteristically embody. (Holquist, 1990, p. 89)

Carnival represents the denial of supposedly eternal truths, asserting that there are no eternal truths. It
parodies the official norms synecdochically and preaches the "joyous relativity" of all things. Carnival is the world of dialogue where contradictions are blessed.

As Daelemans and Maranhão interpret Bakhtin (Daelemans and Maranhão, 1990, p. 232), any given language is a congeries of languages. Every utterance is an additional decentering of something already said. The utterance in a dialogic turn taking receives an author who becomes identified as "the creator of the utterance" (Todorov, 1984, p. 61); in the speech situation the utterance is the "face" of the speaker. Nevertheless, the utterance is far from exhausting the uniqueness and individuality of its author. In a way, every utterance creates its author, but for Bakhtin, man cannot be reduced to the statements s/he utters. The utterance only identifies its author in the absence of a correlative utterance expressing an alternative world view. Consequently, to speak means to enter the realm of endless dialogue about the world.

4.3. Dialogue in the Classroom

When asked the question "What does chrysanthemum connote in the poem By Chrysanthemum?," all high-school students and graduates in Korea reply immediately, "A
beauty of maturity!" That would very likely be their answer if they have been "normally" attending the Korean Language and Literature class. They are taught so. It does not matter whether a student was touched by white chrysanthemums at a solemn funeral from which s/he has just returned or has just received the flower from a friend. There is no place for Bakhtinian heteroglossia and dialogue, nor phenomenological pre-understanding. Differences among students are totally ignored by the pre-defined meaning of the word. Only one fixed rule of the language game governs the classroom, and any other rules or new language games are not allowed. No matter who decides the meaning of curriculum and textbooks -- the government, the author, or a specialized art critic or literary critic -- the meaning cannot be "refracted" against other meanings. Students' "other" utterances, inner or outward, are superseded by standardized and objective answers and are forced to remain a monologue.

Competitive college entrance examinations instigate and worsen the situation. Teacher-proof curricular materials are promoted so that any dialogue, between teacher-self, teacher-other teachers, teacher-student,
teacher-texts, student-self, student-other students, and student-texts, is impossible. Teacher-proof materials suppress all possible voices emanating from dialogue other than the one the present régime of truth can allow. Teacher-proof materials turn the teacher into a technician whose major function is to implement someone else's teaching methods and materials, and thus turns one's own voice into someone else's. This monologic method of teaching might have contributed to the Korean students' high scores on standardized achievement tests which demand only one correct answer to a question. However, unlike what some critics argue (Epstein, 1992; Center for the Assessment of Educational Progress, 1989; National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983), scores on standardized tests cannot be identified with the "quality of education." Those high scores are accomplished by reinforcing the teacher, through the process of professionalization, specialization, or individualization, to play a universal author or transcendental metanarrator, and at the price of differences, heteroglossia, and dissents. These are the result of a highly centralized curriculum policy in which only pre-set objectives can be
achieved, as was shown in chapters 2 and 3 of this study. This former policy can not be bettered by just espousing local curriculum policy, especially in Korea where all the contents of curriculum and the methods of instruction are prescribed virtually by the central government.

Under the circumstances where one fixed meaning of a text is anticipated, no matter whether it is centralized curriculum policy or localized one, no dialogue is possible. If it were possible, it would be the one that aims at consensus or "rational persuasion," not at the generation of new meanings, new rules, and new language games. A capable teacher is the one who can accept and provide all possible, not anticipated, meanings of a text and, thus, one Lyotard would call "imaginative." As Gadamer says (1979, p. 216), the belief that one fixed objective meaning can be obtained is an illusion. Meaning occurs at the diachronic and synchronic intersection of dialogue. It is unfinalizable, never ceasing to dialogue with other meanings.

Curriculum, centralized or localized, is implemented and realized by the teacher. Even under an alleged localized curriculum, classroom practices can never be
localized if the teacher is just satisfied with just his or her professionalized disciplinary knowledge and tries only to deliver a prescribed set of knowledge. Such practices, though, would be a much easier job than questioning and deconstructing continuously, both his or her identity and knowledge.

Once again, dialogue in a classroom is possible only when the teacher appreciates the historical contingency of one's own disciplinary knowledge in power-knowledge relations. It is the teacher's self-detachment, limit-attitude, imagination, use of paralogy, giving oneself up, and deprofessionalization that is needed in the Bakhtinian concept of dialogue.

In the end, localizing curriculum is not a matter of transferring the power of "selecting" curriculum content from the central government to the locale. It is localizing the teacher's identity and knowledge, which is possible only by realizing the dialogic nature of identity and knowledge.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study aims at suggesting that curriculum localization cannot be achieved by mere change in curriculum policy. Because the actual implementer of the curriculum is the teacher, any curriculum policy cannot be localized unless classroom practice is localized. From a Foucauldian point of view, power is no longer centered only around the State. The school and the classroom where knowledge is developed, refined and transmitted to students are basically "disciplinary" institutions to produce docile bodies. The teacher cannot escape from the régime of truth and becomes a docile body unless s/he struggles against the régime. However, this struggle against power-knowledge relations is never easy because we have little control over an anonymous and powerful discourse that is a product of power-knowledge relations. The anonymous and powerful discourse not only is used by power, unlike what most of the Marxist critics argue, but also produces power which is multiple and ubiquitous. This study shows that the multiple and ubiquitous form of power in schools and
classrooms is the teacher's professionalized and specialized knowledge. As long as s/he remains in, and is satisfied with his disciplinary knowledge, the teacher produces bodies docile to the régime of truth and is personally a docile body.

The struggle should be local by the local intellectual. The struggle for the local curriculum should be local in the classroom by the local teacher. It should be against totalizing régime of truth of which the teacher is already a part, that is his or her disciplinary knowledge. Foucault calls this local struggle "self-detachment."

Lyotard's rejection of all kinds of grand theories is also related to the concept of local curriculum in that he delegitimates all-encompassing and totalizing knowledge, defining it as terroristic. For Lyotard, knowledge and power are simply two sides of the same question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided? Classroom practice by which "knowledge" is a main concern also is a field of representing power. Thus, playing only one language game by only one rule in the classroom is terroristic, blocking possible heterogeneity
and differences. According to Lyotard, the character of knowledge in this postmodern era consists in dissension, not in consensus of opinion. He sees all kinds of knowledge, language games, and forms of life as locally determined. In the classroom, the validity of knowledge should be judged only in a particular language game by the players, including the teacher and students, here and now, and is not transferrable to any other forms of knowledge or language games.

Despite a promise to localize curriculum in the new Korean National Curriculum, the teacher will be a prisoner of totalizing power called disciplines and will commit the terror of excluding dissensions as long as s/he thinks him- or herself as a subject free from power and armed with professional knowledge. Especially under the condition that most of the textbooks are published or approved by the central government, the teacher's professional knowledge is often identified with that of the textbook and of the dominant régime of truth. However, the textbook does not hold the authority of transcendental signified any more. There is no fixed meaning in the textbook, and the textbook is rewritten with each reading.
Although, in Korea, there have been efforts of teachers to struggle against the authority of the prescribed knowledge in the textbook since 1989, most of those efforts place emphasis on ideological struggles based on political programs that are "emancipatory", rather than on heterogeneity and differences of language games in the classroom or on the local determination of knowledge. This is especially true of the book by the Teachers Association for Korean Language and Literature (Teachers Association for Korean Language and Literature, 1989a). The writers of the book urge teachers to cultivate "true consciousness" among students by helping them understand their own oppressive reality. This emancipatory and liberatory telos assumes a universal grand narrative and fails to recognize and generate new rules of the language game in the classroom other than the ones which teachers pre-decide to be acceptable in order to "conscientize" their students.

Similar schemes are found in contemporary educational discourses about dialogue which is suggested to bridge the gap between the universal emancipatory theory of education and differences in the classroom. Similarity rather than differences is emphasized in the concept of dialogue in the
critical pedagogy of Freire, Giroux, and Shor, as well as in Burbules's argument. The rational human being who has universal rationality for communication is presupposed in the concept.

However, as Lyotard argues, consensus is a horizon that is never reached. Consensus or common meaning deconstructs itself as soon as it is reached. Bakhtin's concept of dialogue, which is based on such concepts as unfinalizability, death of the author, meaning as a historical "event," intertextual construction of meaning, heteroglossia, polyphony etc., could give us more pertinent insight for dialogue which can manage the locality in the classroom.

"Locality" in curriculum localization should be in classrooms. The content of curriculum should be ultimately determined by the players of language games or dialogues in the classroom. Dialogue in the classroom should not anticipate any consensus or common meaning rather than differences and should aim at generating new rules and language games.
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