World War II, Displacement, and the Making of the Postwar Ukrainian Diaspora, 1939-1951

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WORLD WAR II, DISPLACEMENT, AND THE MAKING OF THE POSTWAR UKRAINIAN DIASPORA, 1939-1951

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of History

by

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May 2022
For my grandparents
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Abstract

As a result, in an effort to expand the literature on the Ukrainian DP experience, this dissertation will specifically examine how foreign occupation, forced labor, and displacement impacted the construction of Ukrainian cultural nationalism between 1939 and 1951. Using a variety of memoirs written by Ukrainian DPs, published primary sources, as well as archival material from the online Interview Archive of Forced Labor 1939-1945, Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, the United Nations Archive, and the online Archive of Ukrainian Periodicals it will argue that cultural nationalism not only served as a common link that united Ukrainians, but also served as a means through which Ukrainians exerted their own agency in the face of external international circumstances. Focusing on the Ukrainian experience in detail will not only provide information with which to compare the Ukrainian experience to other groups but will also give insight into the construction of diaspora communities, relations between diaspora communities and their homeland, national groups that lack their own nation-states.
Introduction

One of the main characteristics of post-WWII Europe was the presence of millions of displaced persons (DPS). In May 1945, Allied officials estimated that there were approximately 10-12 million DPS in Germany, 4.25 million of whom were in the U.S. zone of occupation.¹ Some had been forced laborers, concentration camp imams, or survivors of the Holocaust. There were also a significant number of deportees, prisoners of war, refugees who fled Soviet-occupied countries, and people who had collaborated with Nazi Germany. Of the estimated 8.25 million Eastern European DPS, two million were Ukrainian.

The vast majority of these Ukrainians (1.5 million) had served as forced laborers under the Nazi regime while the remaining 500,000 fled the Red Army as it reconquered Ukrainian territory.² Through a massive repatriation campaign, the Allied nations, with the assistance of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), returned the majority of displaced persons to their country of origin. Although most Ukrainian DPS were voluntarily or forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union, between 220,000 and 225,000 refused to return to home, representing one of the largest national groups that refused repatriation.³

¹ Statistics on the total number of persons displaced during and after the war vary significantly and estimates differ depending on the source. Malcolm J. Proudfoot estimates that the total number of displaced persons and refugees in 1944 in Western Europe (excluding the Italy and the United Kingdom) as 10,366,000, although in another context he cites 11,078,000 persons who required repatriation after the war. He also estimates that 40,475,000 European civilians were forced to move during the war. Louise W. Holborn estimated that in early 1945 there were between 21 and 30 million Germans displaced by the war and 8.5 million Europeans from other countries. Newer studies, however, suggest that the number of displaced persons and refugees could be as high as 60 million. Malcolm J. Proudfoot European Refugees 1939-1952: A Study in Forced Population Movements (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1956); Louise W. Holborn, The International Refugee Organization: A Specialized Agency of the United Nations. Its History and Work, 1946-1952, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 15; Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 299; Matthew Frank and Jessica Reinisch, “Introduction: Refugees and the Nation-State in Europe 1919-1959,” Journal of Contemporary History 49, no. 3, (July 2014), 478.


quarter of a million Ukrainians who stayed in Germany and Austria after WWII created the postwar Ukrainian diaspora, which flourished between 1945 and 1951 as a “mini nation-state.” These Ukrainian communities existed within established nation-states, but were largely self-governed, and members forged national identities based on cultural nationalism and their experiences during WWII, which provided individuals with a sense of community and belonging.

Although the years between 1939 and 1951 represent a transitional period, WWII and postwar displacement created a unique environment that allowed Ukrainians from different geographical locations, various socio-economic backgrounds, and diverse political orientations to unite through cultural nationalism in ways that had not been possible in the past. Prior to WWII, Ukrainian lands remained geopolitically divided and the few nationalist organizations that existed were entirely political in nature. These nationalist organizations also remained divided on several important issues and, as a result, failed to appeal to the majority of the Ukrainian-speaking population. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as Alexi Miller argues, Ukrainians “borrowed ready-made [nationalist] constructions and adapted them to their own conditions.”⁴ This meant that the nation was “an idea, a goal, an image to which one could aspire from the outset of the moment rather than a gradually forming concept.”⁵ This resulted in a politically driven nationalist movement within small intellectual circles. Since these Ukrainian nationalists used preconstructed models of nationalist thought, nationalist ideas and images emerged and functioned in a social environment where possibilities of mass communication mechanisms that intellectuals had at their disposal were extremely limited.⁶

⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid.
However, the experience of total war, foreign occupations, mass violence against civilians, forced labor deployment, and displacement not only brought a diverse group of Ukrainians physically together during the war and postwar period, but also created new methods by which nationalists could spread their message to the majority of the Ukrainian-speaking population. Immediately following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) showered state buildings with Ukrainian symbols and flags and established several newspapers to spread nationalist propaganda. More importantly, ethnic Ukrainians in prewar Poland and the former Soviet Ukrainian Republic had a common enemy to rally against. While a significant number of Ukrainians collaborated with the Nazis, by 1942, after it was clear that Nazi authorities would not support the formation of a Nazi-allied independent Ukrainian state, the OUN formed an underground to both fight Germany and the Red Army as it reconquered territory in Ukraine.7

Moreover, during the war, whether under foreign occupation or in forced labor camps, and in the postwar period, Ukrainians built community around certain cultural elements of their shared past such as language, religion, folk traditions, literature, art, history, and education. In this way, cultural nationalism served as a mechanism that helped Ukrainians survive foreign occupation during the war, achieve material gains in forced labor camps, and resist repatriation after the war. It also served as a means of self-portrayal to the Western world as Ukrainians presented themselves as a positive, unified group that staunchly rejected communism through a commitment to democracy and Christianity, which they hoped would establish them as ideal potential immigrants. In other words, fostering cultural nationalism served multiple aims, as it

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7 This is not to say that there were no longer any Ukrainians who collaborated with Nazi authorities. Many Ukrainians still worked with Nazi officials as members of local police units, within the Nazi civil administration, and with the SS, Einsatzgruppen, and Wehrmacht. For Ukrainian collaboration see Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-1944*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
not only provided Ukrainians with a sense of agency, but also served tangible purposes during the war and postwar period.

Despite the proliferation of academic works on the Nazi occupation of Eastern Europe during the Second World War and the growing academic interest in postwar migration and population movements, there is no comprehensive study that specifically investigates Ukrainian displacement and its political, social, and cultural consequences. Historical narratives examining Nazi rule and the Holocaust in Ukraine tend to emphasize the disorganization within the occupying Nazi administration, Ukrainian collaboration in the Holocaust, and the role of partisans in resistance activities against the Wehrmacht. While some historians have extensively researched Nazi civilian policies, including deliberate starvation policies, forced labor, and reprisals against civilians, their periodization coincides precisely with the years of Nazi rule in Ukraine, which does not allow for investigation into Ukrainians forcibly working in Germany until the end of the war. Additionally, these histories also do not include the nearly 500,000 Ukrainians who fled the Red Army at the end of the war and fails to allow investigation into how the war affected displaced Ukrainians politically, socially, and culturally.

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Even though WWII directly impacted Ukrainian postwar displacement and migration, historians have tended to explore these topics separately. Many surveys of postwar displacement and population movements look at displaced persons as a whole group instead of through the experiences of specific ethnic or national groups.\textsuperscript{10} While Ukrainians are included in these studies, they have been historically treated in the larger context of international politics and the emerging tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, overlooking the important ways displaced Ukrainians exerted their own agency.\textsuperscript{11} Others include Ukrainians as one example of the many population transfers that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe either immediately following the conclusion of WWII or throughout the twentieth century, providing a larger framework in which to conceptualize episodes of mass displacement but, again, omit important continuities between war and displacement.\textsuperscript{12}


Moreover, as the historian Peter Gatrell argues, the ways in which DPs saw themselves and how they reacted to displacement remains understudied.\textsuperscript{13} Two works have started to bridge the gap in the historiography concerning the experience of Ukrainian DPs: the edited volume \textit{The Refuge Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II} and Marta Dyczok’s, \textit{The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees}. \textit{The Refuge Experience} includes a variety of chapters on the Ukrainian experience during the war, how WWII directly led to postwar displacement, and how Ukrainian displaced persons who refused to be repatriated experienced life in Germany and Austria. Yet, as stated in the introduction, the edited volume is meant to be an introduction to the topic in an effort to spawn further research.\textsuperscript{14} Marta Dyczook’s study counters older interpretations that Ukrainians were “pawns” in the international arena between 1945 and 1950, arguing that by refusing repatriation, Ukrainians demonstrated agency and determined their own future.\textsuperscript{15} However, important questions remain unanswered such as how nationally segregated forced labor camps became the basis for displaced persons camps, how foreign occupation influenced the construction of political, social, and religious organizations in DP camps, and how the war changed the way displaced persons self-identified.

As a result, in an effort to expand the literature on the Ukrainian DP experience, this dissertation will specifically examine how foreign occupation, forced labor, and displacement impacted the construction of Ukrainian cultural nationalism between 1939 and 1951. Using a variety of memoirs written by Ukrainian DPs, published primary sources, as well as archival


material from the online Interview Archive of Forced Labor 1939-1945, Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, the United Nations Archive, and the online Archive of Ukrainian Periodicals it will argue that cultural nationalism not only served as a common link that united Ukrainians, but also served as a means through which Ukrainians exerted their own agency in the face of external international circumstances. Focusing on the Ukrainian experience in detail will not only provide information with which to compare the Ukrainian experience to other groups but will also give insight into the construction of diaspora communities, relations between diaspora communities and their homeland, national groups that lack their own nation-states.

For the purposes of this dissertation, cultural nationalism refers to the process of creating strong, common bonds through cultural artifacts such as education, art, language, folk traditions, and history. According to Walter Clemens, these cultural artifacts are “symbols that help individuals to imagine that they belong to a larger, defined community” which “can deepen communal ties and help individuals appreciate this community, increasing their willingness to sacrifice their personal well-being for the whole.” Diaspora communities in particular rely on cultural artifacts and symbols since they are “cheap, readily available, spark emotional chords because of their connection to specific events and/or associations, and are often polysemous, conveying different meanings to different groups.” Since Ukrainian DPs hailed from different geographical locations as well as various ideological, socioeconomic, and religious backgrounds, cultural nationalism became a powerful mode of communication within forced labor camps and DP camps. According to Lauren Hilton, who researches Latvian and Polish DPs between 1945

and 1951, the construction of a national identity in the DP postwar environment was not straightforward since DPs had to “agree upon, and consciously adopt, a coherent and unified identity.” Yet, largely through the work of political, intellectual, and cultural elites within the camps, DPs strove to create “a mental realm in which its citizen-members divided in status and interests [could] unite in common identity and common will.” As a result, cultural nationalism placed all Ukrainian DPs on an equal plane even within DP communities, even if they had other, or multiple means of self-identification.

In order to effectively explore how Ukrainian DPs constructed, consolidated, and used cultural nationalism in response to external events between 1939 and 1951, this study relies on three theories of nationalism: Benedict Anderson’s theory of imagined communities, Roger Brubaker’s analysis of “groupism,” and Brendan Karch’s concept of “instrumental nationalism.” Benedict Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” Anderson rationalizes that the nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” His explanation further argues that the nation is imagined as limited, with boundaries, albeit elastic ones, sovereign given the historical context of the birth during the age of Enlightenment and Revolution, and lastly, community focused, “always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship.” Moreover, since nations are redefined and reconstructed on a continual basis,

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22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 16.
they are “cultural artifacts of a particular kind” and, therefore, it is essential to understand how and by whom national identities are created and how they have changed over time.\textsuperscript{24}

The experience of Ukrainians during and after WWII demonstrates several important aspects of Anderson’s theory. First, during the war and postwar period Ukrainians forged national identities through “systems of universal symbolic culture,” which were used to provide Ukrainians with a sense of community and belonging when they could not identify with an existing nation-state.\textsuperscript{25} Secondly, Ukrainians redefined the boundaries of the Ukrainian nation in more flexible terms. In the postwar period, displaced Ukrainians were still Ukrainians in a cultural sense, with a cultural attachment to the homeland, but whereas Ukrainian nationalism during the interwar period placed strict limits and definitions as to who was a member of the Ukrainian nation, Ukrainian DPs expanded these boundaries to include Ukrainians living outside of the homeland. Finally, although military authorities and international communities refused to recognize the Ukrainian DPs as a sovereign entity given the fact that the Ukrainian SSR was part of the Soviet Union, Ukrainians still attempted to posit themselves as an autonomous, unified nation, albeit one without their own nation-state when confronting repatriation, access to humanitarian aid, and to increase their chances of immigration to North America.

Like Anderson, Rogers Brubaker contends that constructing nationalism is a continuous, constantly evolving process of dividing and categorizing groups of people into different and separate populations.\textsuperscript{26} More specifically, he argues that a methodology focusing on specific events allows “groupness,” or the tendency to think and act as members of a group, to be treated as a variable. It also allows investigation into “the degree of groupness associated with a

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{25}Antonia Kłoskowska, National Cultures at the Grass-Root Level, (Budapest: CEUP, 2001), 26-27.
particular category in a particular setting, and about the political, social, cultural, and psychological processes though which categories get invested with groupness.”\textsuperscript{27} This approach helps to determine how and when nationhood is constructed while allowing for flexibility in the ways people identify themselves, perceive others, interact with other members of the nation, and respond to external circumstances.\textsuperscript{28} For Ukrainian DPs the specific experience of WWII as well as the conditions of displacement and migration directly impacted the fashioning of cultural nationalism as Ukrainians started to view themselves as victims of historical circumstance and in opposition to Ukrainians living in Soviet Ukraine.

The period between 1939 and 1951 created several different environments that not only created conditions conducive for Ukrainians to exhibit a high level of “groupness” in the form of cultural nationalism, but also represents a timeframe in which Ukrainians rationally chose to use cultural nationalism in a variety of ways, whether to survive foreign occupation during the war, provide support in forced labor camps, resist repatriation, and/or present themselves as ideal candidates for immigration. Viewing nationalism as a constantly fluctuating, fluid phenomenon, that is continually being made and remade allows for an in-depth study into the motivations, choices, and responses to historical contingencies, which the historian Brendan Karch defines as an “instrumental stance towards nationalism.” Instrumental action, according to Karch, “points simply to the process of weighing multiple values and commitments against one another rationally, as opposed to pursing a singular or unconditional devotion to a single cause.”\textsuperscript{29} Additionally, instrumental rational action takes place when the end, the means, and the

\bibliography{\textsuperscript{27}Rogers Brubaker, \textit{Ethnicity without Groups},” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 12. 
\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., 14.
secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed.” During the war and postwar displacement, external conditions were constantly changing, and Ukrainians had to actively make rational choices in order to survive. More importantly, the construction and practice of Ukrainian nationalism between 1939 and 1945 can be seen as “instrumental” as Ukrainians utilized nationalism for a variety of purposes.

This dissertation is divided into three parts. The first chapter provides a brief history of Ukrainian nationalism from 1900-1939, paying close attention to the specific areas where Ukrainian nationalist thought was most prevalent, the differences between Ukrainian nationalism in Western and Eastern Ukraine, and the types of nationalist organizations and member composition. Using writings by Ukrainian nationalists and secondary sources, it will show how the geo-political separation of Ukrainian-speaking people between the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires prior to 1914 and between Poland and Soviet Ukraine between 1921 and 1939 prevented a single, cohesive nationalism that incorporated the majority of the largely illiterate Ukrainian speaking population from forming. Moreover, Ukrainians also often held multiple or “indifferent” means of self-identification, which could include one or many political, regional, or religious loyalties. As a result, Ukrainian nationalism in the interwar period was an exceedingly divided movement that promoted a variety of ideological frameworks.

The second section looks at the history of the two groups of Ukrainians that made up the postwar diaspora: political refugees and forced laborers. Chapter two looks specifically at nationalist organizations such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationals (OUN) and the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC) as well as nationalist actors who took advantage of

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30 Ibid.
changing geopolitical circumstances during the war in an attempt to spread cultural nationalism. Using nationalist newspapers from the war, the correspondence of the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC), and memoirs by former OUN members it will demonstrate how occupation provided nationalist groups such as the UCC, OUN, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) opportunities to spread their nationalist agenda to Central and Eastern Ukrainians while the environment of total war reinforced interethnic conflicts between Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews. More importantly, it will argue that throughout the war the OUN chose to alter their nationalist agenda and political aims based on which foreign powers were most likely to support the organization’s main goal of establishing an independent Ukrainian nation-state. As a result, throughout the war Ukrainian nationalism transformed from a movement characterized by authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and animosity toward national rivals to an anti-imperialist movement defined by personal liberation, economic equality, and the equal protection of certain—but not all—minorities. This process was in no means absolute, and many members refused to adhere to the new, more democratic changes, which is most notably evidenced by the massacre of Poles in Volhynia in 1943. However, after the war, close to 500,000 Ukrainians, most of whom had been associated with the OUN or other underground subversive efforts fled the Red Army as it retook Ukrainian lands. More importantly, the process of using nationalism to achieve certain aims continued into the postwar period.

The third chapter highlights the experience of Ukrainian forced laborers since they made up the majority of displaced persons in the postwar period. Like the situation of Ukrainian nationalists and political refugees who retreated with the German army at the end of the war, Ukrainian forced laborers also used cultural nationalism to survive forced labor conditions, particularly to access material gains, provide emotional and psychological support, and create
Ukrainian networks that proved essential in the construction Ukrainian DP camps after the war ended. This chapter will show how Nazi racial and economic policies combined to ensure Ukrainians were kept together in labor camps, which produced an environment characterized by poor housing conditions, exhausting work assignments, inadequate food provisions, and extremely limited access to healthcare. Memoirs, interviews with former Ukrainian forced laborers, and collections of testimonies reveal that disparities in the treatment between Eastern and Western European laborers, discrimination, and physical and psychological dislocation fostered a cultural nationalism that united Ukrainians from different backgrounds as they bonded over a shared language, history, and cultural traditions. While Soviet and Nazi occupations during the war caused political refugees to adopt a strong anti-Soviet stance, the forced labor experiences produced a sense of victimhood that became a defining feature of Ukrainian nationalism in the postwar period. Both anti-Sovietism and victimhood were used to resist repatriation and defining characteristic of Ukrainian diaspora communities.

The third section of this dissertation looks at how Ukrainian forced laborers and Ukrainian political refugees used cultural nationalism to present themselves as a unified national group to resist repatriation and present themselves as ideal candidates for immigration to North America. Drawing largely on archival material from the United Nations’ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration archive, the fourth chapter will look at the ways Ukrainians resisted repatriation, rejected their former citizenship, and fought to be classified as Ukrainian citizens. By doing so, different groups of Ukrainian DPs defined themselves in opposition to Russia and victims of Soviet political rule. Moreover, although the process of resisting repatriation began with Ukrainian DPs, it quickly became a transnational movement that involved Ukrainian Americans, Ukrainian Canadians, and international organizations, adding a
transnational dimension to Ukrainian nationalism that transcended the borders of the historical Ukrainian homeland. This, along with the onset of the Cold War in which the United States and the Soviet Union moved from allies to enemies, heightened international awareness of a distinct Ukrainian national identity.

Finally, the fifth chapter will specifically explore Ukrainian cultural nationalism in displaced persons camps between 1945 and 1951, paying specific attention to the ways in which cultural nationalism used as a means to present Ukrainian DPs to the Western world, particularly in contrast to Ukrainians living in Soviet Ukraine. Using Ukrainian DP newspapers and archival material from Harvard University’s Ukrainian Research Institute, this chapter analyzes how Ukrainians sought to demonstrate that they represented a “good” national group that would make their co-nationalists ideal candidates for immigration to the United States and Canada. This was done through the establishment of political organizations characterized by a tolerance for pluralism and multi-party system, the creation of education institutions that prepared Ukrainian DPs to be productive citizens in North America, and social organizations that created a sense of empathy and solidarity for Ukrainian DPs and Ukrainians in other countries.

The years between 1939 and 1951 represent a temporary period in which Ukrainians from different geographical regions, political orientations, and socioeconomic backgrounds united around cultural nationalism for a variety of different reasons. Understanding the ways in which Ukrainians negotiated their place and self-identified in the midst of total war, foreign occupation, mass violence, and displacement provides insight into how groups construct identity when lacking a nation-state. Moreover, Ukrainian nationalism between 1939 and 1951 exhibit nuances which are important in comprehending the nature of Ukrainian identity today, particularly in the midst of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the civil war raging in in the
eastern Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. As President Vladimir Putin continues to justify his actions based on claims that he is securing liberties for the Russian speaking population living in Ukraine, it is important to understand, the historic relationship between Russia and Ukraine, the history of Ukrainian nationalism, and how the development of Ukrainian nationalism differed from other European nations.
Chapter One
Ukrainian Nationalism, 1900-1939

Today, the Ukrainian word for “nation,” natsiia, refers to an ethnic community of people who have a common origin, language, and culture—but do not necessarily possess a state of their own.¹ This definition is fitting since until the end of the Cold War, Ukrainians lacked their own nation-state. Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, ethnic Ukrainians were divided between the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, and during the interwar period between Soviet Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. The division of lands inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians limited the development and consolidation of Ukrainian nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While there were some Ukrainian nationalists and Ukrainian nationalist organizations that believed geographically isolated ethnic Ukrainians possessed inherent commonalities that placed them in the same natsiia, political separation, limited communication between polities, a largely illiterate population, and blurred or multiple identities limited the development of Ukrainian nationalism.

This chapter will provide a brief history of Ukrainian nationalism between 1900 and 1939, paying close attention to the specific areas where Ukrainian nationalist thought was most prevalent, the differences between Ukrainian nationalism in Western and Eastern Ukraine, and the reasons why nationalist movements failed to gain popular support. Certain global events such as the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the dissolution of empires and creation of new states, the formation of the Soviet Union, and the rise of fascism in interwar Europe provided opportunities for the growth and spread of Ukrainian nationalism. While the spread of Ukrainian nationalist activity saw some gains in the 1920s, geopolitical separation in addition to Soviet and

Polish repression against Ukrainians prevented a consolidated movement from gaining mass support.

As a result, prior to WWII, Ukrainian nationalism remained an elite movement, in which national activists claimed that the Ukrainian speaking population could become nationalized by the formation of an independent Ukrainian nation-state. However, members of these political movements and their top-down nationalizing approach were divided over many issues and failed to reach the majority of the Ukrainian speaking population. When global events such as WWI, the Russian Civil War, and the Ukrainian National Revolution presented opportunities for national consolidation, peasants and lower-class workers were more concerned with acquiring land and higher wages and therefore, the geopolitical, socio-economic, and political differences between Western and Eastern Ukrainians remained unresolved.

**Ukrainian Nationalism in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires**

The ancestors of modern Ukrainians lived in dozens of premodern principalities, kingdoms, and empires, which meant that over time they took on various names and identities. The two words that were most commonly used to define Ukrainian land were “Rus’” and “Ukraine.” The term “Rus’ was brought to the region by the Vikings in the ninth and tenth centuries and was adopted by the inhabitants of Kyivan Rus’. The ancestors of today’s Ukrainians, Belarussians, and Russians all adopted the name Rus’ in a variety of forms. For example, in the eighteenth century, Muscovy adopted the Hellenized version of Rus’, “Rossiia,” as the official name of its state and empire. Depending on the time period and region in which they lived, Ukrainians had different appellations: Rusyns in Poland, Ruthenians in the Hapsburg Empire, and Little Russians in the Russian Empire. Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, in an effort to end the confusion, Ukrainian national builders renounced the name Rus’
and clearly distinguished themselves from the rest of the Slavic world, especially from Russians, by adopting “Ukraine” and “Ukrainian to define their land and ethnic group, both in the Russian Empire and in Austria-Hungary.²

The first efforts to accomplish this came from a small group of scholars at the University of Kharkiv who maintained in the 1820s and 1830s that ethnic Ukrainians did not speak a Russian dialect but had their own language that was inherently distinct from Russian. The name “Ukraine” had medieval origins and in the early modern era denoted the Cossack state in Dnieper Ukraine.³ In the collective mind of this group of scholars, the Cossacks, most of whom were of local origin, were the quintessential Ukrainians. Therefore, many Ukrainian historical myths that became part of Ukrainian national tradition place Cossacks as freedom-loving protagonists who bravely defied Russian conquest in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. One of the historians at the University of Kharkiv, Mykhailo Maksymovych, was the first to use the term “Ukrainian” instead of “Little Russian” in his publication of a collection of Ukrainian folk songs in 1827.⁴ In an attempt to link the Rus’ past and the Ukrainian present and future, the historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky wrote a ten-volume series entitled History of Ukraine-Rus”.⁵ The nineteenth century also saw the publication of Ukrainian dictionaries and grammar books in an attempt to transform spoken Ukrainian, which was often viewed as a Russian dialect, into a literary language.⁶ The establishment of Ukrainian elementary schools, Ukrainian newspapers, and Ukrainian cultural organizations in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires are often cited by historians as the beginning of the development of Ukrainian nationalism. However,

³ Ibid.
⁵ Plokhy, The Gates of Europe, xxiii
⁶ Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation, 40.
Ukrainian nationalism, to the extent that it existed prior to the outbreak of the First World War, was confined to a few small elite circles, such as those at the University of Kharkiv, and the Ukrainian intelligentsia held different views as to the meaning and nature of Ukrainianness.

The majority of Ukrainians in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires lived in rural areas, where poverty and illiteracy were widespread, the majority of the population was tied to the land, and national consciousness was largely non-existent. It is estimated that in 1914 ethnic Ukrainians numbered approximately 26 million, with 22.4 million living in the Russian Empire and close to four million living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Not only were Ukrainians geographically and politically divided between the two imperial powers, but strong regional differences also existed. Within the Russian Empire, Ukrainians were a majority in four different regions: Left bank Ukraine, which included territory east of the Dnipro; right bank Ukraine comprising territory west of the Dnipro, Slobidska Ukraine located in present-day northeast Ukraine and southwest Russia; and colonized regions south of the left and right banks. Ukrainians living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire were also regionally divided among the following areas: Galicia with an estimated 3,338,000 Ukrainians, Bukovina with a Ukrainian population near 300,000, while approximately 470,000 Ukrainians lived in the Kingdom of Hungary. Differences existed in terms of dialects, religion, and social structures in each region and Ukrainians coexisted alongside significant, but differing, minorities of Russians, Jews, Poles,

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7 Ibid., 53.
8 Left-bank Ukraine included territory east of the Dnipro River and came under Russian control after the signing of the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667, when Hetman Ivan Mazepa allied his Cossack Hetmanate with Muscovy. Almost a century later, the partitions of the Polish Commonwealth in 1772, 1793, and 1795 allowed Russia to gain the areas of right-bank Ukraine, including the provinces of Volyn, Podolia, and Kyiv. See Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, 119 and Kappeler, “A Small People,” 86-87.
9 Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness, 255.
and Germans. As a result, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ukrainian-speaking population “represented an ethnographic mass, not a single national community.”

Social and economic conditions rendered the Ukrainian peasantry difficult for political mobilization since, for the most part, Ukrainians in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were almost entirely illiterate peasants, many of them, at least to 1861, enserfed. According to the Russian Census of 1897, 87 percent of Ukrainians were engaged in agriculture, with only 2.4 percent living in towns with a population of twenty thousand or more. Not much changed after the First World War: in 1926, 86 percent of Ukrainians still earned their living from agriculture and 94 percent lived in rural communities. Ethnic Ukrainians in the Austrian-rulled Galicia were also mostly engaged in agriculture since ethnic Poles and ethnic Germans dominated the administrative bureaucracy, owned the majority of large estates, and made up most of the entrepreneurial and industrial workers while the Jewish population dominated trade and the commercial sphere. The fact that most Ukrainians were dispersed among numerous small villages made it difficult for the small nationalist elite to reach and organize the bulk of the Ukrainian-speaking population. Another limitation to the development of Ukrainian nationalism prior to WWI was the lack of adequate school systems in both empires, which resulted in high illiteracy rates among ethnic Ukrainians. Although reforms in the second half of the nineteenth century allowed for the establishment of Ukrainian-language schools in Austria-Hungary, which increased literacy in cities and larger towns, the countryside remained largely illiterate. In 1897,

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11 Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 10.
more than 85 percent of Ukrainians were illiterate, which limited nationalists’ accessibly to the peasantry by popular press.\textsuperscript{13}

Moreover, Ukrainian-speaking peasants often identified strongly with their religion, profession, locality, or held multiple means of self-identification instead of characterizing themselves in purely ethno-national terms.\textsuperscript{14} Even the few members of the nascent Ukrainian intelligentsia were highly integrated within the Russian nobility, and many, such as the early Ukrainian patriot, Volodymyr Antonovych, identified as both Ukrainian and Russian.\textsuperscript{15} Consequently, like many smaller European ethnic groups, Ukrainian nationalism remained “purely cultural and folkloric; had no particular political or even national implications; and despite the nature of the social groups first captured by national consciousness, the popular masses such as workers, servants, and peasants were not affected.”\textsuperscript{16}

Even within Ukrainian intellectual circles, writers differed on various aspects of Ukrainian identity such as its relationship to the growing Russian and Polish national movements and whether the language spoken by Ukrainian peasants constituted a literary language. Taras Shevchenko, often cited as the founding father of Ukrainian nationalism, was one of the first poets to write in Ukrainian instead of Russian. After being freed from serfdom, Shevchenko attended the Imperial Academy of Fine Arts where he published his first collection of poems, entitled \textit{Kobzar}, in 1840.\textsuperscript{17} In \textit{Kobzar}, Shevchenko grieves over the plight of his fellow Ukrainian peasants and the injustice caused by Russian nobles and landowners, laments at the dearth of publications written in Ukrainian, and urges Ukrainian writers not to fear Russian

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{13} Steven L. Guthier, “The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917,” \textit{Slavic Review} 38 no. 1 (1979): 31.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{14} Wilson, \textit{The Ukrainians: An Unexpected Nation}, 72}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{17} Ivan Franko, “Taras Shevchenko,” \textit{The Slavonic Review} 3 no. 7 (June 1924): 113.}
critics. Other themes present in the collection include human liberation and the freedom-loving Cossacks of the seventeenth century. In later literary works Shevchenko directly attacked the notion that Ukrainian identity was a regional version of Russianness, portraying Ukraine as an independent nation that had been historically subjugated by Polish and Russian domination.

Other writers such as Mykola Kostomarov, a scholar at the University of Kharkiv, saw Shevchenko’s attack on the Russian Empire as too radical. Kostomarov’s writings frequently compared the histories of Russia and Ukraine, arguing that strong differences existed between the “preponderance of liberty among Ukrainians,” and the “preponderance of communality among the Russians.” Yet, even though Kostomarov viewed Ukrainians as culturally distinct from Russians, he also believed that the two groups were fated to live together as “Two Russian Nationalities,” combining local patriotism with a broader Pan-Slavism. In contrast to Shevchenko, who maintained that the Ukrainian language was vital for Ukrainian cultural expression and should be used by both peasants and intellectuals, Kostomarov believed that while spoken Ukrainian was an important cultural attribute, it should only be developed for “home use” while literary high culture should continue to be conducted in Russian.

The differences among Ukrainian writers demonstrate how multiethnic empires allowed for the existence of various identities such that elites could be a member of the larger Russian cultural community but still support Ukrainian patriotism. For example, the Ukrainian historian and writer, Mykola Markevych wrote in Russian. In a letter written in the 1830s he

23 Alexei Miller, The Ukrainian Question: Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century, 69.
claimed, “the fatherland [Russia] is higher than the native land [Ukraine]; the latter is merely a part of the former; but he whose soul has no native land has no fatherland either.”

Mykola Hohol, better known by his Russian name Nikolai Gogol, expressed similar sentiments when he wrote, “I do not know whether my soul is Ukrainian or Russia. Both natures are too richly endowed by God, and, as if by design, each of them separately contains within itself what the other lacks- a sure sign that they complement one another.”

The idea that Russia and Ukraine were an inseparable, dual entities was a prominent view among many members of the Ukrainian-speaking intelligentsia in imperial Russia, but it is clear that even within these communities, there were differences in opinion as to the meaning and nature of Ukrainianness.

In the age of nineteenth-century national revival, Ukrainians under Russian rule were extremely limited in their national development. Even after serfdom’s official end in 1861, this largely peasant population continued to be deprived of basic civil rights. In response to the series of national uprisings throughout Europe in 1848, and specifically the Polish Uprising of 1863, legislation aimed at suppressing a Ukrainian national identity, along with Polish, German, Tatar, and other identities, was passed to suppress attempts at nationalizing the masses. The Valuev and Ems decrees of 1863 and 1876, for example, prohibited the use of the Ukrainian language in publications, defining all Ukrainian literacy activity as “criminal activity” that “infringed upon state unit.”

The Revolution of 1905 initially legalized hromadas, or Ukrainian clubs, in many major cities and provided Ukrainian activists the opportunity to set up branches of the Provista reading

25 Quoted in Wilson, The Ukrainians: An Unexpected Nation, 88.
27 Ibid.; Johannes Remy, Brothers or Enemies: The Ukrainian National Movement and Russian from the 1840s to 1870s, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 216.
society and peasant cooperatives in the countryside. This allowed for a brief proliferation of Ukrainian publishing, but the reforms did not last long.\textsuperscript{28} Renewed government repression to put down ongoing attacks on government officials in the countryside in 1908 saw arrests of Ukrainian activists, clubs disbanded, and only one Ukrainian newspaper, \textit{Rada}, was able to publish continuously from 1905 to 1914. Although Ukrainian political parties were represented in the First and Second Duma, the tsar quickly dissolved both. The imperial crackdown “effectively prevented the Ukrainian activists from beginning mass mobilization of the peasantry for the national cause,” as “hysteria in the Russian national press branded all manifestations of Ukrainian culture as Austrian-sponsored political separatism.”\textsuperscript{29}

Ukrainians living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire had more opportunities to develop national thought and activities compared to those living in the Russian empire, but remained separated from the majority of the Ukrainian-speaking population. Nevertheless, Ukrainians living in Galicia and Bukovina were freer to develop a national culture and political life due to a series of policies adopted by the imperial government including the decision to allow the Greek Catholic clergy to be educated, which created a Ukrainian intelligentsia in Galicia, and the abolition of serfdom in 1848.\textsuperscript{30} Between 1860 and 1914, Galician Ukrainians had the right to publish Ukrainian newspapers, form legal Ukrainian volunteer associations, including political parties, and to attend educational institutions in their own language.\textsuperscript{31} Consequently, between 1900 and 1914, Ukrainian national activists in the Austro-Hungarian empire, often labeled “Ukrainophiles” by Russian and Polish nationalists alike, made gains spreading Ukrainian as a literary language, creating organizations for cultural expression, establishing a political presence

\textsuperscript{28} Yekelchyk, \textit{Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation}, 59-60
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Plokhy, \textit{The Gates of Europe}, 185
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 189.
in Galicia, and persuading the Ukrainian-speaking population that they and their folk culture “formed part of a larger Ukrainian world,” instead of a local, isolated identity. By the end of the nineteenth century the majority of the Ukrainian-speaking population in Galicia stopped calling themselves “Ruthenian,” and adopted the name “Ukrainian,” a national designation that the Ukrainian intelligentsia within the Russian Empire adopted in the early twentieth century.³² A group of Ukrainian historians also founded the L’viv-based Shevchenko Scientific Society, which eventually became the equivalent of a national academy of sciences, and established several national reading clubs known as Provista societies. On the eve of WWI Ukrainians had successfully created 2,500 elementary schools that used the Ukrainian phonetic alphabet in Austro-Hungarian Empire. Moreover, by forging alliances with Jewish candidates in opposition to Polish candidates who supported Russophiles, Ukrainian politicians secured twenty-two seats in the imperial parliament in 1907 where they fought for a division of Galicia into Polish and Ukrainian districts, but were unable to secure enough support among Polish parties to achieve local autonomy.³³

However, this was not the case for Ukrainians living in Transcarpathia, located in the Hungarian part of Austria-Hungary, where Ukrainians lived under conditions similar to those in tsarist Russia in terms of national development.³⁴ Following the Compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867, which established the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the Magyar government that controlled Hungary did little to spread elementary education, resisted modest democratization of the political system, and strove to Magyarize Ukrainians under its rule.³⁵ As a result, Ukrainians

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³⁵ Ibid., 396.
living in Transcarpathia did not have a clear sense of national identity and the means of self-identification remained local in nature due to the fact that the region was comprised of a largely illiterate population that lacked an intelligentsia.

While the appearances of a group of Ukrainian intellectuals and Ukrainian activists who made linguistic, literary, educational, and political advances is not insignificant for the possible future development of Ukrainian nationalism, it should not be used as evidence to suggest that a widespread Ukrainian nationalist movement existed in the nineteenth century or in the early part of the twentieth century. The extent of Ukrainian national achievements remained confined to a small, specific group of individuals and significant regional differences existed among the Ukrainian speaking population. Additionally, the Ukrainian intelligentsia that existed was small, politically fragmented, and lacked the methods to create a comprehensive program acceptable to the majority of Ukrainians. As the historian E.J. Hobsbawm argues, “whether such a body of people does so regard itself cannot be established simply by consulting writers or political spokesmen of organizations claiming the status of ‘nation’ for it.”

Moreover, John-Paul Himka, argues that the separation “lay at the root of the great identity crisis that racked Western Ukraine in the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century,” which was defined by bitter internal conflict over whether Eastern Christians, Eastern Slavic inhabitants of Galicia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia were Ukrainian, Russian, or Western Ukrainian (Ruthenian or Rusyn). Therefore, despite linguistic, literary, educational, and political advances, the majority

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of the Ukrainian-speaking population did not identify as Ukrainian. If they did, it was often in combination with other identity markers such as religion, profession, or locality.

**Ukrainian Nationalism during the First World War and Russian Revolution**

During the First World War, Ukrainians found themselves fighting for different imperial powers. The idea of independent statehood was not strongly inculcated among the masses, or even among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. German occupation during WWI and the Bolshevik coup d’ état changed the situation, with some Ukrainian national leaders in Russia advocating for the creation of a Russian federation with autonomous national states while others in Galicia favored siding with the Germans in hopes of attaining complete national independence. The Bolsheviks themselves, had encouraged the idea of a complete disintegration of the Russian Empire, at least until they could claim power, and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1919 provided an opportunity for a possible sovereign Ukrainian state. However, despite the fact that Ukrainian nationalists claimed several independent Ukrainian states between 1917 and 1921, the various governing forces differed as to what an independent Ukrainian state should look like, which allies would best protect the interests of a Ukrainian nation-state, and how to implement any laws or declarations. International politics complicated the situation since the Versailles Treaty failed to address the various ethnic and national groups that had comprised the Russian Empire, the German loss erased any hopes for Ukrainian independence, and those loyal to the tsar lost the Russian Civil War. Consequently, the lack of consensus among governing forces in Ukraine, their inability to enforce any political authority, the fact that Ukrainian peasants were more concerned with land distribution than the establishment of an independent state, and the brutal suppression of attempts at Ukrainian independence at the hands of the Red Army inhibited the success of the so-called Ukrainian Revolution.

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Ukrainians living in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires generally embraced the war and supported their respective governments, but in the course of the conflict political leaders in both empires sought to homogenize their multinational populations by uniting the masses under German, Hungarian, and Russian nationalism, which alienated many Ukrainians and led to the formation of radical, anti-imperial, nationalist allegiances to replace former imperial loyalties. Moreover, both empires used nationalism, the promise of self-determination, and independence as political weapons to sponsor separatist movements in the lands of their enemies. For example, the Austrians championed the spread of anti-tsarist and Ukrainian irredentist propaganda among hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian-speaking POWs and actively supported groups of Ukrainian political émigrés from Russia living in Austria who supported Ukrainian independence for the tsarist Ukrainian-speaking provinces. In turn, during the three occupations of Eastern Galicia between September 1914 and July 1917, the Russian authorities supported Ukrainian nationalist movements, promising various degrees of autonomy. Even though each imperial power fought in the name of unity, the outcome was fragmentation, disunity, and collapse in the imperial borderlands.

The rapidity with which the Russian Empire fell apart caught everyone by surprise, forcing those suddenly in positions of authority to act before they had a clear notion of what they wanted. Lenin’s writings were critical of nationalism, and he agreed with Marx that “bourgeois nationalism” contradicted communist ideology. However, Lenin also saw nationalism as an effective way to promote his own political agenda, specifically expediting the development of socialism throughout the Soviet Union, and therefore embraced national self-determination

within a federal structure.\textsuperscript{41} On October 25, 1917, the eve of the Bolshevik seizure of power, the All-Russian Congress of Soviet Workers and Soldiers’ Deputies called for the guarantee of self-determination to all nations under Soviet rule. A few days later on November 2, the Bolsheviks issued the “Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia,” which guaranteed “the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia,” including the right to self-determination, the abolition of all national and national-religious privileges, and the “free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups.”\textsuperscript{42}

Lenin believed that the principal of self-determination would destroy the basis for national hostility, and the principal of the proletariat unity would eventually create solidarity among all workers regardless of nationality. His policy of self-determination, also known as the national territory model, created a federal structure that granted “independent” national statehood to the largest and most ethnically important collectivities. It provided a sense of self-determination, the promise of autonomy, and a “feeling of national representation to the national minorities.” The national territory model divided the USSR along “pseudo-federal” lines, while maintaining a centralized government and party organization, and integrating national minorities into the central institutional framework.\textsuperscript{43} Under this method, Lenin believed that self-determination would create a brief period of independence that would eventually lead to the establishment of a culturally united socioeconomic Soviet state as each minority group matured in its proletariat character and established its own dictatorship of the proletariat.\textsuperscript{44} Therefore, the ultimate goal of Soviet nationality policy between 1917 and 1920 was to bring together all

nationalities and cultures into the Soviet state and allow a certain degree of independence in order to gain support for the Revolution.

In 1917, Ukrainian nationalists took advantage of the deterioration of central authority in the Russian Empire and attempted to form their own independent Ukrainian nation-state; however, the struggle for Ukrainian statehood proved chaotic as nationalists proclaimed various Ukrainian states between 1917 and 1920, all of which lacked solid administrative institutions, could not secure legitimacy, and failed to gain mass support from the Ukrainian-speaking population.45 In Kyiv, in early March 1917, representatives of Ukrainian political and cultural organizations created the Central Rada, a coordinating body headed by Mykhail Hrushevsky, who had been a key figure in the Ukrainian national movement and during the Revolution of 1905 in Dnieper Ukraine. Although the Central Rada was little more than a coordinating committee of Ukrainian political and cultural organizations, it claimed jurisdiction over Kyiv, Podolia, Volhynia, Chernihiv, and Poltava. By July 1917 the Provisional Government in Petrograd recognized it as the regional government in Ukraine, after which all Ukrainian congresses of peasants, workers, and soldiers sent representatives to it.46

Following the October Revolution in Petrograd, the Central Rada proclaimed the Ukrainian People’s Republic as an “independent, free, and sovereign state of Ukrainian people,” which caused the Bolsheviks to declare their own Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic state on December 25, 1917.47 Although the Germans and Austrians recognized the government of the Ukrainian Central Rada and gave it a seat at the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk, after the treaty was signed German troops entered Ukraine and supported the establishment of a new Ukrainian People’s Republic, headed by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. The former leaders of the Central

46 Plokhyy, The Gates of Europe, 205-207.
Rada, in turn, overthrew this government, in November 1918. As civil war raged in Ukraine, several additional governments were formed, but they all lacked any serious autonomy, and repeatedly changed allegiances. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was not able to successfully establish itself until late 1919, which was only due to a partial modification of Bolshevik policy toward the Ukrainian national movement and peasantry demands for land reform.48

The revolution in Ukraine was not a “clear-cut fight between socialists and nationalists” but instead involved a confusing struggle between “Ukrainian patriots of all stripes, as well as among the many varieties of local socialist and anarchists.”49 For example, Ukrainian leaders had different notions concerning what type of Ukrainian state should be formed with ideas ranging from an independent state within a Russian democratic Russian federation, an autonomous socialist Ukraine, a Ukrainian state with a conservative Ukrainian monarchy, and a nationalist military dictatorship.50 The revolution also lacked support among the peasantry, whose main concern was obtaining land, and since various Ukrainian governments failed to address land reform, popular support for Ukrainian nationalism withered. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the Ukrainian movement during the Revolution and its readiness “to pursue opportunistic tactics by forming alliances with such dubious friends as the Bolsheviks and the German occupation forces” resulted in a lack of followers and explosions of racial hatred directed at Jews and Poles.51

50 Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation, 67.
In the case of several Central and Eastern European nations, such as the Poles and Czechs, the presence of a widespread national consciousness preceded the attainment of political independence, yet for Ukrainians, statehood was thrust upon them at a time when the Ukrainian masses were more concerned with land distribution and surviving the brutality of the civil war raging around them. The lack of national consciousness among the masses and their refusal to support an independent state coupled with the insufficient experience of the leading Ukrainian nationalist champions, the predominance of multiple ethnic minorities in Ukraine’s largest cities, and political friction between Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia and east-central Ukraine created a confusing atmosphere and chaotic. Moreover, the repercussions of the First World War, including the Bolshevik Revolution, German occupation, the disintegration of the Russian, Ottoman, German, and Austro-Hungarian empires, and the emergence of new nation-states “radically dislocated existing social organizations, strengthening old antagonisms between groups and inaugurating new ones.” According to Richard Pipes, the result was that the proclamation of Ukrainian independence did not mark the culmination of the nation-forming process in Ukraine, but rather its beginning. The clarification of national aims and the penetration of Ukrainian nationalism into the masses on a large scale occurred only after the Revolution, “after the first and dismally unsuccessful try at gaining political freedom.”

Ukrainian Nationalism in the Interwar Period: Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia

Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles and the Polish-Soviet war, Ukrainians remained divided between four states, with 23 million Ukrainians living in Soviet Ukraine; almost 4-6 million living in Poland, with most concentrated in the provinces of Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and Polissia. Approximately 780,000 lived in the Romanian regions of

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53 Eley, “Remapping the Nation: War,” 207.
Bukovyna and Bessarabia and close to 550,000 Ukrainians resided in the provinces of Subcarpathian Rus’ and the Prešov regions of Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{55} During the interwar period, Ukrainian nationalist activity expanded in some regions; however continued geopolitical separation, Polish and Romanian assimilation policies, and a repressive campaign by Stalin in Soviet Ukraine hindered a consolidated Ukrainian nationalist movement that could overcome the vast array of regional, social, economic, and religious differences that existed among the Ukrainian-speaking population from forming. Moreover, in reaction to post-WWI settlements, specifically the failure to establish an independent Ukrainian state, a group of exiled Ukrainians formed the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a far-right Ukrainian nationalist organization, which had the single of goal of establishing an independent Ukrainian nation-state through any and all means.

Since Poland and Romania had both acquired large ethnic and national minorities in the aftermath of World War I, Polish and Romanian authorities adopted a series of assimilation policies during the interwar period. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires the borders of the newly established Polish state incorporated large minority populations of Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Jews. Ukrainians represented approximately 14 percent of the population in the Second Polish Republic, largely concentrated in the southeastern parts of Poland in eastern Galicia and Volhynia. After avoiding conquest by

\textsuperscript{55} According to the 1926 census there were 23,218,860 Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR out of a population of 30 million. Polish statistics in 1931 put the number of Ukrainians living in Poland between 3-4 million, but some historians and Ukrainian demographers place the number at 5-6 million, or 14 percent of the total population. In 1930 the Romanian government recorded a total of 582,115 Ukrainians living in Bukovyna and Bessarabia, making up about 3 percent of the total population, but other scholars place the number higher. For example, Myroslav Shkandrij states that regions of Bukovyna and Bessarabia, had Ukrainian populations of 302,000 and 461,000, respectively. Official statistics of Czechoslovakia recorded 461,849 Ukrainians living in the country in 1921 and 549,169 in 1930, which accounted for 3-4 percent of the total population. See John-Paul Himka, “Western Ukraine between the Wars,” \textit{Canadian Slavonic Papers} 34 no. 4 (December 1992): 394-395; Joseph Rothschild, \textit{East Central Europe between the Two World Wars}, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 7, 284; and Myroslav Shkandrij, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1957}, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015, 57.)
the Soviets in 1920 during the Polish-Soviet War, the Second Polish Republic adopted the March Constitution on March 17, 1921, which guaranteed freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience and ensured every citizen equality before the law regardless of heritage, nationality, race, or religion. Nevertheless, interwar Poland sought to undo certain features of the previous Austro-Hungarian regime. The new government repealed many of the laws that had protected Ukrainian rights in education and administration, passed statutes aimed at assimilating minority populations, and sought to isolate the former Russian territories of Volhynia from Galicia by separating them by the so-called Sokal border, a special administrative frontier between Galicia and Volhynia to prevent the spread of Ukrainian publications and institutions from Galicia to the northeast.

Some hardline Polish nationalists, such as Prime Minister Władysław Grabski, strongly promoted Polonization, passing a series of laws that mandated the use of Polish in all government offices, even where Polish was not the dominate language, and attempted to close Ukrainian only elementary schools. Poland had inherited an elementary school system from Austria, which had established an estimated 2,151 Ukrainian elementary schools, but the Ukrainian school system in Poland fell victim to a series of assimilation policies which left only 716 Ukrainian language schools in existence by 1930. The remainder of Ukrainian elementary schools were converted to bilingual Polish-Ukrainian schools. However, in reality, teachers and school administrators often used bilingual education to promote a policy of assimilation between Ukrainian and Polish populations. For example, even though laws existed that permitted schools to be established in any language, increasingly more young people opted to attend Polish language schools since they allowed for the best economic prospects. By 1937-1938, only 11

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57 Ibid.
percent of all students in Poland attended bilingual schools. Moreover, Poland revoked its promise to the Western powers to establish a Ukrainian university, closed down the pre-existing Ukrainian chairs at the University of L’viv and restricted Ukrainian attendance at universities throughout Poland.

The Provista Society, which had been active since 1868 and had made progress in increasing literacy among the Ukrainian population in Austria-Hungary by setting up reading rooms, theaters, clubs, and musical groups, was hampered by bureaucratic intransigence and assimilation agendas in the 1930s. The organization was eventually banned by Polish authorities in 1938. As a result of these measures, most of the rural population in the Ukrainian regions of Poland remained illiterate. In 1921, 71 percent of Ukrainians in Polissia, 69 percent in Volhynia and 46 percent in Stanyslaviv remained illiterate compared to the urban centers of L’viv and Ternopil, which had 29 percent and 39 percent illiteracy rates, respectively. Similar to the situation in the Austro-Hungarian empire, high illiteracy rates limited nationalists’ accessibly to the peasantry by way of the popular press.

The autonomy that Galicia had enjoyed under Austrian rule was also abolished, despite the fact that the Polish state had promised the Western powers in 1919 and 1922 that Galicia would continue to remain an administrative unit. The name “Galicia” disappeared from Polish official language and Eastern Galicia was renamed “Eastern Little Poland.” More importantly, the parts of Galicia that held a Ukrainian majority were divided into three palatinates: Stanyslaviv, Ternopil, and L’viv. These new borders were designed to incorporate as many non-
Ukrainians as possible in order to keep Ukrainians geographically separated. According to Polish statistics of 1921, the Stanyslaviv palatine comprised 70 percent Ukrainians, Ternopil 50 percent, L’viv 36 percent. Additionally, the Polish government also supported Russian vestiges in Galicia as part of their divide-and-rule policy regarding minority groups.63

Romania adopted similar assimilation policies aimed at suppressing nationalist activity among minority populations since the state was only 72 percent Romanian after acquiring Bukovina and Transylvania from Austria-Hungary and Bessarabia from Russia. For example, the “Law on Administrative Unification” of 1925 redrew county lines to eliminate some heavily populated Ukrainian counties altogether and to dilute the Ukrainian percentage in other counties. Additionally, the constitution of 1935 abolished provinces as administrative units, including the province of Bukovina. Romanian land reforms also pursued their own nationalist aims, parceling large estates in Ukrainian-inhabited territories to Romanian colonists instead of the local Ukrainian peasantry. The Romanian government also practiced nationalistic religious policies by Romanizing the Orthodox Church in Bukovina and Bessarabia. In 1921 a national church council renamed all Orthodox churches “Orthodox Romanian” and in 1925 the autonomous Bukovinian metropolis was subordinated to the Romanian patriarch. Many Ukrainian clergymen were either dismissed or denied higher office in the church and Ukrainians were often denied admission to seminaries.64 According to the historian John-Paul Himka, “the result of such policies in both Poland and Romania was the accumulation of political frustration on the part of Ukrainians, which would eventually be released in the form of political violence (terrorism) and orientation on the leading revisionist power of the age, Nazi Germany.”65

63 Himka, “Western Ukraine between the Wars,” 399.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 400.
In Czechoslovakia, which consisted of the former Austrian Bohemia, Hungarian Slovakia, and Subcarpathian Rus’, the majority of Ukrainians were concentrated in Subcarpathian Rus’ and Prešov, although neither region had developed a Ukrainian national consciousness prior to the interwar period. Despite the fact that half of the Ukrainian-speaking population remained illiterate, compared to Poland and Romania, Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia enjoyed more freedom for national self-expression. Czech authorities hosted and partially subsidized the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, which existed between 1921 and 1930 and the Ukrainian Husbandry Academy in Poděbrady. Religious policies in Czechoslovakia concentrated on the elimination of Magyar influence in Ukrainian ecclesiastical life and authorities permitted the reemergence of the Orthodox church.\(^66\) Czech authorities had promised Subcarpathian Rus’ autonomy but postponed granting it until Hitler began his disintegration of the country in 1938. Following the Munich Agreement, signed on September 30, 1938, Subcarpathian Rus’ was renamed Carpatho-Ukraine and “became autonomous \textit{de facto} on October 11 and \textit{de jure} on November 22.”\(^67\)

The interwar period also ushered in a new wave of Ukrainian nationalism that mirrored other ultra-right wing and fascist groups that came into being in the wake of the First World War. In 1929, exiled Ukrainians founded the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) under the leadership of Yevhen Konvalets. Initially, the OUN was made up of exiled Ukrainian emigres, supporters of right-wing Ukrainian political parties in Poland, members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and WWI veterans.\(^68\) “The Resolution of the First Congress of the Organization of

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\(^67\) Himka, “Western Ukraine between the Wars,” 399.
\(^68\) The OUN was preceded by the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), which was formed by veterans and Ukrainian nationalists after Galicia and Volhynia were ceded to Poland after the First World War. The UVO technically operated under the authority of the exiled government of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic, but UVO leaders carried out sabotage attacks against the Polish government in the 1920s on their own conviction.
Ukrainian Nationalists,” which was adopted in February of 1929, defined the organization’s main goal as the establishment of an independent state in order to protect the “ethnic synthesis” and “organic national unity” among Ukrainians.69 Later OUN writings, including the OUN’s “Decalogue,” affirmed that the formation of an independent Ukraine should be achieved at all costs and specifically authorized violence, sabotage, torture, domestic terrorism, and acts of war against all enemies.70 Consequently, throughout the interwar period the OUN became characterized by integral nationalism, militarism, and fascist ideology.

“The Resolution of the First Congress of the OUN” defined Ukrainian nationalism as “a spiritual and political movement arising from the inner nature of the Ukrainian Nation…on the basis of similar natural location, common historical experience, and an unremitting urge to realize itself in the completeness of intense efforts.”71 In 1929 members of the OUN recognized that Ukrainian national consciousness among the vast majority of Ukrainians was a prerequisite for the founding of a Ukrainian nation-state declaring, “the fundamental condition necessary for the creation, consolidation, and development of the Ukrainian state is: that the state be an expression of the national being, combining the greatest creative efforts of all the constituent organs of the nation.”72 Leaders also understood that a significant proportion of the rural Ukrainian population in Poland and Soviet Ukraine lacked a national identity, instead identifying

69 The First Congress also vaguely outlined what their imagined Ukrainian state would look like including some form of representative government, the redistribution and private ownership of land, the “rationalization” of industry, the formation of a national bank, a national education system, and freedom of religion. See “Resolution of the First Congress of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” 28 January- 2 February 1929, in Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath, ed. by Yury Boshyk, (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies), 165.
72 Ibid.
themselves by religion, kinship, or geographical region.\textsuperscript{73} Although it was difficult for exiled Ukrainian nationalists to promote their agenda in the interwar period due to the geopolitical separation of the Ukrainian-speaking population, assimilation policies in Poland and Romania, as well Stalin’s repressive campaign in Soviet Ukraine, OUN leaders allied themselves with other ultra-right nationalist governments in Europe, particularly Nazi Germany, and waited for an opportunity to achieve their desire goal.

Prior to the outbreak of WWII, the OUN mainly operated in Poland and the OUN’s goals of establishing a sovereign Ukrainian state attracted large groups of university and secondary students in the early 1930s as well as older well-to-do peasants, townspeople, and tradesmen in cities, many of whom still felt resentment at the fact that Galicia and Volhynia had been incorporated into the Second Polish Republic following the First World War. According to Maria Pyskir, a university student studying in L’viv in the interwar period, “the OUN was a political movement [that] shaped the thinking and instilled Ukrainian patriotism in a whole generation of Ukrainian youth who matured prior to World War II.”\textsuperscript{74} Following Stalin’s forced collectivization campaign, which resulted in the death of an estimated 3.6 million Ukrainians between 1932 and 1933, those living in Soviet Ukraine, who had been aware of the nationalist organization, became increasingly attracted to the OUN’s platform. While some secretly supported the OUN, joining the organization was nearly impossible due to Stalin’s massive campaign against real and imagined political enemies during the 1930s.

Ukrainian students in Poland who joined the OUN did not share a belief in parliamentary democracy, many were anti-communist, and were drawn to the organization’s focus on self-reliance, patriotism, and discipline, which created conflict with the older, exiled generation of

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Pyskir, \textit{Thousands of Roads}, 12.
Ukrainian nationalists. Following the assassination of Yevhen Konvalets in 1938, Andrii Melnyk, a close associate of Konvalets was appointed as his successor, but younger radicals argued that their own colleague, “the dynamic and strong-willed Stepan Bandera,” who had recently been released from Polish imprisonment, was better qualified to lead the OUN.\(^{75}\) The two factions did not disagree on matters of principal, for both groups subscribed to the basic tenants of Ukrainian integral nationalism, but generational differences, personality clashes, and tactical issues divided them. The more moderate members, including the exiled OUN leadership, advocated for securing money, training, arms, and international support for the Ukrainian cause and united under Andrii Melnyk to form the OUN-M while more radical members and young idealists on the ground in Poland formed the OUN-B with Stepan Bandera as the group’s leader. In contrast to the OUN-M, members of the OUN-B criticized the former leadership for relying too heavily on foreign support, neglecting the development of “organic ties” with the masses in Western Ukraine, for being too slow and passive in dealing with the radically changing political scene, and for allowing opportunists to hold leadership positions.\(^{76}\) In September 1939, Bandera demanded that the OUN form a military underground force that would be ready to fight against anyone who stood in the way of Ukrainian independence. He also insisted that the OUN develop contacts with Western Allies as well as with the Germans, but Melnyk and his supporters defended their positions, arguing that ties with Germany had to continue because Western powers had shown no interest in supporting Ukrainian aspirations.\(^{77}\) As a result, following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the OUN-M held a stronghold in central and eastern

\(^{75}\) Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 459.
\(^{76}\) Ibid.
\(^{77}\) Ibid., 460.
Ukraine whereas the OUN-B was concentrated in western Ukraine and eastern Poland. Despite these differences, both factions remained staunchly anti-Soviet, desired to overturn what they perceived as an unjust postwar settlement, and fought for the creation of an independent Ukrainian nation-state.

**Soviet Nationality Policies**

The question of nationalism and the role ethnic minorities should play in the Soviet Union plagued Soviet leaders during the formation of the Soviet Union and throughout the existence of the USSR. There were several challenges Soviet leaders faced in adopting a nationalities policy, including the larger number of ethnic groups in the USSR, many of them with divergent cultural, religious, and economic histories and traditions, and the fact that the First World War caused a growing national consciousness to develop in many of the regions that became republics of the Soviet Union. As we have seen, Lenin pursued a nationality policy that allowed for national self-expression and self-determination in order to gain support for the Bolshevik Revolution. But he also believed that each minority group would eventually abandon ethnicity or nationalism as a means for self-identification in favor of adopting a mature proletarian character. Although Lenin’s nationality policy created an opportunity for Ukrainian nationalism to spread in the 1920s, Stalin believed that nationalism in any form threatened an organized socialist federation. As a result, Stalin’s First Five Year Plan marked a dramatic shift in Soviet nationality policy in Ukraine, which included mass executions and deportations, the destruction of Ukrainian culture, and forced famine to suppress any form of national self-identification.

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Beginning in the 1920s the Soviet government developed a nationalities policy that attempted to create national territories, official national languages and culture, and trained local national communists to serve in the government and party bodies in the different national regions.\footnote{Terry Martin, \textit{The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union 1923-1939} (London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 10.} In June 1923 the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee with Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions, which was formed specifically to deal with the nationalities question, had its first meeting. The Central Committee concluded that the Soviet state would only support forms of nationalism that did not conflict with the central and unitary Soviet state, illustrating the superiority of communist ideals over nationalistic ones and establishing Soviet authority over what types of national identity minority groups could pursue.\footnote{Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) with Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions, June 9-12, 1923, Marxist Internet Archive, available at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1923/06/09.htm#1.}

As a result, the Soviet Union adopted a policy of \textit{korenizatsiia}, which was aimed at overcoming the structural problems experienced by non-Russian groups, especially high illiteracy, economic underdevelopment, cultural backwardness, and the tensions between Russified cities and the non-Russian rural population by integrating non-Russian nationalities into the Soviet government.\footnote{Liber, \textit{Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR}, 35.} In this way, the Soviet regime tried to control the process of nation formation and the development of national consciousness in regions where the majority of the population lacked any type of national identity.\footnote{Hirsch, \textit{Empire of Nations}, 7.}

The result of \textit{korenizatsiia} was the development of local nationalized culture in many regions throughout the Soviet Union. In Ukraine this meant developing and strengthening the use of the Ukrainian language in the courts, administration, and economic sectors; recruiting local members to the Communist Party; developing the press, schools, theaters, clubs, and other

\footnote{Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) with Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions, June 9-12, 1923, Marxist Internet Archive, available at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1923/06/09.htm#1.}
\footnote{Liber, \textit{Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR}, 35.}
\footnote{Hirsch, \textit{Empire of Nations}, 7.}
cultural and educational institutions; and creating a wide network of trade schools to quickly educate future workers. In August 1923 the Soviet Ukrainian government issued a decree on “Ukrainianization” that obliged all public officials to learn Ukrainian, and provided for the gradual transition from the public use of Russian to Ukrainian. The Ukrainian Commissariat of Education was instructed to organize Ukrainian language courses so that within a year all official business would be conducted in Ukrainian. Ukrainianization” encouraged rural Ukrainians to play a larger role in political, scientific, and cultural affairs and led to the creation of Ukrainian scholarship, literature, and art.

The nationalities policy under NEP did not eradicate bourgeois nationalism as Lenin had hoped it would, but it instead stimulated the growth of nationalism in Ukraine. Ukrainians experienced a feeling of “uniqueness and independence” and had a strong interest in the development of Ukrainian forms of expression in government, history, literature, and science. As a result, Ukrainians began to teach their own local history, and Ukrainian literature and culture flourished due to the encouragement and financial support from Moscow. For example Nicholas Skryphyk, a devout communist and strong promoter of Ukrainian cultural nationalism, promoted specifically Ukrainian traditions in language literature, scholarship, and education. Another strong adherent of the promotion of Ukrainian national culture was Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who created a group of scholars to advance the development of Ukrainian intellectual thought. His efforts, along with other dedicated Ukrainian academics created a new generation in Ukraine that was educated in Ukrainian language, culture, and history. Although

83 Liber, Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 35.
84 Ibid., 44.
they were simultaneously educated in communist ideals, young Ukrainians nevertheless were taught to regard Ukrainian culture separately from Russian and Soviet culture.  

Ukrainian writers also encouraged the development of Ukrainian art and literature during this time period. For example, Mykola Khvylovy, a pseudonym of M. Fitilove, was a prominent prose and literary writer and wrote a series of pamphlets that called Ukrainian writers to turn away from Russian themes and styles and to find “all routes to a full flowering [of Ukrainian culture].” In one pamphlet, published in 1926, he proclaimed, “We find it necessary to raise its [Ukraine’s] artistic level to that of world masterpieces. Since the Ukrainian nation has striven for its liberation over a period of several centuries, we consider this to be its irresistible desire to express and realize fully its national (not nationalistic) features.”

Dmytro Donstov, a Ukrainian journalist and essayist, expressed interest in creating a cohesive Ukrainian nationalism. In his 1926 piece entitled Nationalism, he argued that Ukrainian nationalism lacked ideology and a “wholly new spirit.” Further, he stated, “Ukraine does not yet exist, but we can create it in our souls. We can and must sanctify this idea with the fire of fanatical commitment.”

Through their writings, these literary writers and essayists helped develop a separate Ukrainian culture and spread the notion of Ukrainian nationalism.

Prior to 1917 there was a small Ukrainian national movement, but it was solely concentrated among the intelligentsia. According to the contemporary Ivan Rudnytsky, by 1930, however, “Ukraine was approaching the condition of a fully developed, culturally mature state.”

Soviet nationalities policy in the 1920s and the promotion of Ukrainianization helped to create a single Ukrainian national consciousness in Soviet Ukraine by promoting Ukrainian

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culture and stressing the national differences between Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, by sponsoring and organizing the development of national consciousness, the Party created institutions that would promote nationalism among non-Russians. Speaking of the USSR generally, George Liber argues, “In many cases, the party accidentally jump-started modern, mass national movements among the non-Russians in the 1920s.”

Ukraine appears to be one of these cases. Here, local elites reveled in the ability to express their own national culture, and many encouraged the creation of Ukrainian art and literature. The Soviet nationalities policy during the NEP period also, in some instances, provoked ideas of a separate national Ukrainian ideology that favored complete independence from the Soviet Union, which created conflict among Soviet officials in the late 1920s, and offered one reason for the was a shift in Soviet nationality policy in the 1930s.

Stalin originally adhered to Lenin’s nationality policy ideas but starting in 1927 and culminating in the early 1930s he deviated from previous nationality theories and embarked on an extremely centralized Russianification campaign in order to rapidly achieve Sovietization and denationalization. Moreover, under Stalin, Soviet culture increasingly coincided with Russian culture. Stalin defended Russian cultural superiority because the growth of the proletarian class had developed more rapidly in Russia than in other border republics, and because Russia had been the center for the first successfully proletarian revolution under Lenin. Under Stalin’s new nationalities policy, local languages were no longer favored, national histories and culture were replaced by Soviet culture, non-Russian writers were silenced, and local nationalism was now seen as a direct threat to the stability of communism. Any type of official national policy in

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91 Liber, Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 3.
93 Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 132.
the republics was condemned as “bourgeois nationalist deviation.” Since a strong nationalism had developed in Ukraine during the 1920s, it was hit particularly hard by Stalin’s nationalities policy, which included mass executions and deportations, the violent destruction of Ukrainian culture, and forced famine.

Suppression of the national intelligentsia, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian communists began in the late 1920s, and its aim was to prevent a stronger and cohesive Ukrainian nationalist group from forming. Soviet officials especially feared Ukrainian nationalism because they thought it could potentially threaten the Soviet regime, and its control over the region, with its economically and financially important fertile black soil, especially if Ukrainian nationalists could consolidate support among discontent Ukrainian peasants. In December 1932 the Politburo issued two decrees condemning Ukrainianization, which led to a wave of terror in Ukraine against “bourgeois nationalists.” As a result, numerous “suspected” Ukrainian scholars and intellectuals were put on trial, and between 1933 and 1934 hundreds of Ukrainian writers were shot or disappeared. Viktor Druts, a participant in an oral history project on Ukrainian memory and nationalism, recalled how his parents were taken by Soviet police when he was eleven. He stated,

Two men came in plain clothes at six or seven o'clock in the evening . . . My father was falsely accused of terrorist acts against the Soviet state and arrested by the NKVD. I remember not understanding: we were not given a reason for the arrest so we thought that maybe he would come back. I now know he was shot the same night, within five hours of his arrest. My mother, Aleksandra, was also arrested for being the wife of an enemy of the country and sentenced to eight years in the camps. In the week after my mother's arrest - we lived in the center of Odessa - a man from the NKVD came and told us to leave the flat. So we were thrown onto the street: we took what we could but this man took everything.

97 Quoted in Robert Perks, “Ukraine’s Forbidden History: Memory and Nationalism,” Oral History 21 no. 1 (Spring 1993), 45.
While massive purges disbanded several counter-revolutionary groups, the majority of people that were arrested and executed came from all levels of Ukrainian society. Family, friends, and neighbors falsely accused each other of participating in counter-revolutionary activities to avoid being suspected themselves. It is estimated that more than one million Ukrainians and were arrested, deported, or executed without trial between 1932 and 1938.98

Not only did the Stalinist terror against the Ukrainian civic and intellectual elite destroy the Ukraine’s intelligentsia, but it also destroyed the Ukrainian communist leadership. According to the historian Timothy Snyder, in the 1930s “Stalin seemed to have worked out, at least to his own satisfaction, the connection between starvation and the disloyalty of Ukrainian communists, hunger was the result of sabotage, local party activists were the saboteurs, treacherous higher party officials protected their subordinates.”99 As a result, on December 4, 1932 Stalin authorized the deportation of local Ukrainian communists to concentration camps, accusing them of abusing Soviet policies and allowing nationalists to sabotage grain collection. He also accused Ukrainian communist leaders of collaborating with Poland to end Soviet control in Ukraine.100 By 1938 only three out of the 115 committee members of the Committee of the Communist Party in Ukraine who had been elected in 1934 were still alive.101

In 1930 Ukrainianization was officially abandoned, as was the attempt to create a homogeneous Ukrainian language in the region. Stalin adopted a policy of Russianification, which sought to destroy Ukrainian culture and replace it with Russian and Soviet culture. Ukrainian spelling and vocabulary were radically changed to make it more similar to Russian, and Russian became the official language of businesses, publications, and education in

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98 Perks, “Ukraine’s Forbidden History,” 45.
100 Ibid., 37, 44.
101 Perks, “Ukraine’s Forbidden History,” 45.
Ukraine. The process of Russianification was violent, and not only were top Ukrainian nationalists targeted, but many teachers in Ukrainian schools were fired and arrested as enemies of the state for teaching in Ukrainian. Furthermore, Ukrainian cultural activities were transferred to Russian ones, or eliminated completely. As one Ukrainian scholar states, the purpose of Stalin’s nationality policy in Ukraine was “to stop, or even reverse, the process of Ukrainian nation building.”

The most brutal part of Stalin’s repressive campaign, however, came in the form of forced collectivization, which resulted in a man-made famine in Ukraine. Stalin’s First Five Year Plan included forced collectivization, rapid industrialization, increased centralization, and the abolition of a market economy. Collectivization also included the “liquidation of the kulaks as a class” since they had the most to lose from collectivization. As a result, Stalin’s aim during forced collectivization was to extract the maximum amount of grain, through intense grain requisition and brutal force, from a resistant and hostile peasantry. At the end of 1932 he enacted several policies that directly resulted in the killing of millions of Ukrainians.

Although there are very few accounts of the destruction caused by the famine, the few that do exist paint horrific pictures. One survivor described the aftermath of the famine in his autobiography stating:

By the beginning of May our village had become a desolate place, horror lurking in every house and every backyard. We felt forsaken by the entire world. The main road which had been the artery of traffic and center of village life was empty and overgrown with grass. Humans and animals were rarely seen on it. Many house stood dilapidated and empty, their windows and doorways gaping. The owners were dead, deported to the north, or gone from the village in search of

103 Perks, “Ukraine’s Forbidden History,” 45
food. Once these houses were surrounded by barns, stables, cattle enclosures, pigpens, and fences. Now only the remnants of these structures could be seen…The village looked like a ghost town. It was as if the Black Death had passed through, silencing the voices of the villagers the sounds of the animals and the birds. The deathly quiet lay like a pall. The few domestic animals that had miraculously survived the famine were looked upon like exotic specimens.\textsuperscript{106}

Gareth Jones, a young Welsh journalist, also described scenes of bread lines of 40,000 people waiting for days for bread. Pregnant women were denied the right to move to the front of the line and had to wait with everyone else. Some of those in line were too weak to stand and had to be supported by others in line.\textsuperscript{107}

It is impossible to know the exact number of Ukrainians that perished as a result of the 1932-1933 famine since very few records were kept, although there is some evidence that illustrate the massive scale of the famine. Public health authorities in Kiev recorded that 493,644 people were going hungry in that region in April 1933. The Soviet census of 1937 presents an astonishing figure stating that there were eight million fewer people than projected in the USSR. This number mostly accounts for famine victims in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia and the children that they did not have. Nonetheless, most historians estimate that between 2.5 million and 3.9 million Ukrainians died in the 1932-1933 famine and agree that the exact number is probably somewhere in the middle, around 3.6 million.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The era of dynastic empires, WWI, the collapse of the imperial landscape in Eastern Europe, and the creation of new European nation states all had lasting consequences for Ukrainian nationalism. Although blurred identities and multilayered nationalism appeared strongest during imperial rule, the division of Ukrainians in the interwar period also exhibited

\textsuperscript{108} Synder, \textit{Bloodlands}, 53.
similar characteristics as nationalist movements ebbed and flowed in response to internal and external situations. However, geopolitical division, Polish and Romanian assimilation policies, and Stalin’s repressive nationality policies against Ukrainians prevented a consolidated movement from gaining mass support. Frustration at the failure to establish an independent Ukrainian nation-state and the rise of fascist political parties in the 1920s and 1930s also produced an environment conducive for the creation of ultra-right Ukrainian nationalist groups such as the OUN.

Stalin’s murderous purges and forced collectivization policies that led to the death of millions of Ukrainians not only ended any advances in the development of Ukrainian nationalism in Soviet Ukraine during the interwar period but were one of the reasons why many Soviet Ukrainians initially welcomed the Nazi invasion in 1941. Once Ukrainians living in the eastern parts of Poland experienced Soviet rule for the first time between 1939-1941, anti-Soviet nationalist sentiments increased. Throughout the various occupation of Ukrainian lands between 1939 and 1944, Ukrainian nationalist organizations such as the OUN continued to cultivate anti-Soviet sentiments, first to appeal to the Nazis, and later to appeal to Western Allied forces.
Chapter Two
Ukrainian Nationalism in the Midst of Total War and Occupation, 1939-1944

After the start of the Second World War, I remember the beginnings of an active civil movement in the villages…It felt as though our life was changing and that fear, danger, and sorrow were insidiously but persistently accompanying us. Those experiences and the resultant feelings forced themselves on our nation during that cruel war. A colossal psychological mobilization gripped the people and they were ready for anything.¹
--Taras Hunczak
Life’s Journey through World War II and Various Historical Events of the 21st Century

The above observation written by Taras Hunczak, a Ukrainian living in the town of Pidhaitsi in the westernmost part of eastern Galicia, describes how many Ukrainians felt at the start of the Second World War and highlights how occupation, in this case the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland, produced an environment of chaos, fear and uncertainty while also encouraging national mobilization.² The multiple occupations of Ukrainian lands between 1939 and 1944, which proved to be devastating for Ukrainians, were characterized by changing regimes, ethnic conflict, political and economic oppression, racial discrimination, widespread violence, and mass murder. Due to the fact that the conquered territories of Ukraine constituted an ethnically diverse borderland, repression and bloodshed were not solely conducted by occupying forces. Instead, total war and occupation underscored interethnic tensions and hostilities, which not only created an atmosphere conducive for the growth of nationalism, but also elicited class conflict, denunciations, and violence against enemies in the form of terrorism and pogroms.

²It is important to note that Ukrainians experienced the Second World War in a variety of different ways, however, Hunczak’s description of a growing “active civil movement” and feelings of “fear, danger, and sorrow” are consistent with other accounts by Ukrainians living in Polish provinces that came under Soviet rule. See for example, Bill Basansky, Escape from Terror: The True Story of Deliverance from the Iron Fist of Communism and Nazi Slavery, (Lake Mary, F.L.: Creation House, 2005); Amy George, Goodbye is not Forever: A True Story, (Eugene, O.R.: Harvest House Publishers, 1994); Maria Savchyn Pyskir, Thousands of Roads: A Memoir of a Young Woman’s Life in the Ukrainian Underground During and After World War II, trans. by Ania Savage, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 1995); and Vera Tkatshenko Siegmund, My Ukrainian Footprints, (n.p., 1994).
On the eve of the Second World War Ukrainians were geographically divided among four nation-states, with an estimated 23 million Ukrainians living in Soviet Ukraine; 5-6 million living in Poland, with most concentrated in the provinces of Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and Polissia; approximately 780,000 living in the Romanian regions of Bukovyna and Bessarabia; and close to 550,000 Ukrainians residing in the provinces of Subcarpathian Rus’ and Prešov in Czechoslovakia. However, the Second World War led to geo-political shifts in Eastern Europe that caused more Ukrainians to become united under the rule of a single governmental entity, first under the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland between September 1939 and June 1941 and then after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and subsequent occupation of all Ukrainian lands. The environment of imperial occupation during the war provided an opportunity for Ukrainian nationalist groups such as the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalist (OUN), and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) to establish connections between Ukrainians from different regions and socio-economic classes, which had previously not been possible in Second Polish Republic or Soviet Ukraine during the interwar period.

This chapter will look closely at the Nazi occupation of Western Poland, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland, and the subsequent Nazi occupation of Eastern Poland and Soviet

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3 According to the 1926 census there were 23,218,860 Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR out of a population of 30 million. Official Polish statistics in 1931 put the number of Ukrainians living in Poland between 3-4 million, but some historians and Ukrainian demographers place the number at 5-6 million, or 14 percent of the total population. In 1930 the Romanian government recorded a total of 582,115 Ukrainians living in Bukovyna and Bessarabia, making up about 3 percent of the total population, but other scholars place the number higher. For example, Myroslav Shkandrij states that regions of Bukovyna and Bessarabia, had Ukrainian populations of 302,000 and 461,000, respectively. Official statistics of Czechoslovakia recorded 461,849 Ukrainians living in the country in 1921 and 549,169 in 1930, which accounted for 3-4 percent of the total population. See John-Paul Himka, “Western Ukraine between the Wars,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 34 no. 4 (December 1992): 394-395; Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 7, 284; and Myroslav Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1957, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015, 57.
Ukraine between 1939 and 1941. It will demonstrate how total war and occupation produced an environment in which Ukrainian nationalism was made and remade in response to changing geopolitical circumstances. Total war and occupation during the Second World War produced an environment in which Ukrainian national organizations such as the UCC, OUN, and UPA to spread their national rhetoric to an unprecedented number of Ukrainian-speaking people as they took advantage of changing geopolitical situations between 1939 and 1944 for their own nationalistic goals. At the beginning of the war this was accomplished through the showcasing of nationalist symbols, the organization of social and cultural activities, and the distribution of nationalist propaganda. However, following the prohibition of Ukrainian nationalist activities by the Nazi administration in the fall of 1941, national organizations were forced underground where they concentrated their activities on recruiting new members and allies, establishing underground communication networks, and partisan warfare. More importantly, taking advantage of the changing geopolitical circumstances during the war, the OUN and other nationalist organizations also changed their rhetoric in response to fluctuating wartime circumstances. Between 1939 and 1943, the OUN remained committed to its original integral nationalist platform characterized by authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and violent animosity towards national rivals. However, after Germany started losing territory in Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalists publicly proclaimed that they were an anti-imperialist movement and pledged that an independent Ukrainian state would guarantee economic equality and be committed to democratic liberties including freedom of speech, religion, and the protection of minority rights. This shift in rhetoric was merely an opportunistic attempt to gain Allied support for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, and in practice the actions of the OUN and UPA often contradicted the newly espoused democratic rhetoric.
The Nazi Occupation in Western Poland 1939-1941

The Fourth Partition of Poland was agreed upon in a secret protocol to the Soviet-German treaty of friendship on August 23, 1939. The initial demarcation line ran along the Pissia, Narew, Vistula, and San rivers; however, following the signing of a second Soviet-German treaty on the 28th of September, Soviet troops withdrew from central Poland to behind the Bug River in exchange for the recognition of Soviet interests in Lithuania. The German occupation zone comprised 72,000 square miles of Polish territory, which was inhabited by 20 million Poles and approximately 744,000 Ukrainians, although this number increased with the arrival of tens of thousands of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the Soviet regime in Western Ukraine. Once Germany established control over western Poland, they divided it into three administrative zones. Danzig-West Prussia and the Warthegau were incorporated into the Reich while the rest of the territory was renamed the General Government (Generalgouvernement). Most Ukrainians living in the General Government were concentrated along a narrow strip west of the Bug and San rivers in the provinces of Podlachia (Podlaskie) and Kholm (Chełm) in the Lublin district, the easternmost regions of the Krakow district including the cities of Peremyshl (Przemysł) and Jaroslaw (Jarosław), as well as the Lemko region in the Carpathian Mountains bordering Slovakia. Since their efforts during the interwar period had been severely limited, Ukrainian nationalists in the General Government took advantage of the new geo-political borders by working with the Nazi government to display national symbols and spread anti-Polish propaganda, form national

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4 According to the 1936 census there were 338,000 Ukrainians living in the regions surrounding Krakow and 406,000 in the regions of Kholm and Podachia. See “Ukrainerzahl in den besetzten Gebieten des ehem. Polens,” in Correspondence of the Ukrainian Central Committee, 46. For Polish lands that came under Nazi control see Halik Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 96.

5 Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed, 96.

6 Veryha, ed., “The Ukrainian Central Committee and its Documents,” in Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee, 27.
organizations such as the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC), restore Uniate and Orthodox Churches, establish Ukrainian schools, create trade centers and cooperatives, encourage cultural activities, form militias and battalions allied with the German army, and agitating ethnic violence with Poles and Jews.

Given the turbulent relationship between Ukrainians and Poles in the interwar period, Ukrainian nationalists wasted no time in exploiting the new geo-political situation. Immediately following the news of the Nazi attack on Poland, OUN officials sent members to cities and towns to welcome German troops. In celebration, Ukrainians displayed national symbols that had been created during the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic including the national blue and yellow flag and the Ukrainian trident (tryzub), the national symbol and official coat of arms of the Ukrainian state.\footnote{The Ukrainian flag consists of two horizontal bands of yellow and blue. The colors represent the wide blue skies and the yellow wheat fields characterized by the country’s landscape. The trident (tryzub) is made up of a blue shield and gold trident and is historically referred to as the trinity (triystia), or the Sign of the Princely State of Volodymyr the Great, the first Grand Prince of Kyiv.} According to Ukrainian newspapers, Ukrainians hung national symbols next to swastikas on government buildings and entrances to cities where Ukrainians made up a majority of the total population, including the cities of Kholm, Peremyshl, and Iaroslav. The German correspondent, Kurt Reich, described seeing a proliferation of Ukrainian national symbols in the southeastern parts of Poland stating, “As one gets closer to the southeast [of Poland]…The Polish element is decreasing. Ukrainian inscriptions are seen on shops. In many places, the yellow and blue flag is hung above the entrance to the church next to a swastika.”\footnote{Kurt Reykh, “Zakhidnya Ukrayina v dnyakh viyny,” Holos, no. 3, January 14, 1940, 3, Arkiv Ukrayins’koyi Periodyky Onlayn (Ukrainian Online Periodical Archive; hereafter AUPO), available at https://libraria.ua/}

Ukrainian language newspapers also welcomed the German invasion by publishing pro-German articles. For example, one article implored Ukrainians to accept German rule since it provided an opportunity for national growth stating, “For the strength and will of a new national
[Ukrainian] character…There is a rare opportunity to meet new strangers, neighbors, and people with their customs, views, ways of life, state systems, and social orders." Other front page articles emphasized how Ukrainian nationalism would integrate itself with German rule. Ukrainian newspapers also contained a wealth of anti-Polish rhetoric that highlighted arrests of Ukrainians by Polish police, violence enacted by Polish civilians, and laws during the Second Polish Republic that suppressed Ukrainian national expression. In one article, which was based on an interview with a Ukrainian who had been imprisoned by the Polish police, Polish police were described as “vandals” who committed “atrocities against defenseless Ukrainians.” In describing battles between German and Polish troops, other accounts emphasized the lack of Polish military capability and competence. Similar articles and interviews published in December 1939 and January 1940 highlighted national and social oppression at the hands of Poles, especially violent acts committed by Polish police and civilians alike. Even though these accounts are probably exaggerated, Ukrainian nationalists used them in combination with favorable German pieces as propaganda to foster support for the Nazi takeover and subsequent occupation.

In addition to promoting support for German occupation, nationalist newspapers also published articles on the history of Ukraine, using historical myths and themes of blood and soil, national destiny, collective willpower, and sacrifice to invoke a sense of patriotic duty and awaken a “spiritual force” within Ukrainians as a way to gain support for a Ukrainian nation-state, which Ukrainian nationalists hoped would be created as a part of the Nazi “new European

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9 Omelyan Vitkovsky, “Pro sylu voli ta kharakter,” *Holos*, no. 4, January 22, 1940, 2, AUPO.
10 “Pro sylu voli ta kharakter,” *Holos*, no. 3, January 22, 1940, 2, AUPO.
11 “Rozmova z polonenym,” *Holos*, no. 1, December 15, 1939, 4, AUPO.
12 “Buv u Zakhidniy Ukrayini,” *Holos*, no. 4, January 31, 1940, 2, AUPO.
13 “Spetsial’ni sudy v Pol’shchi,” *Holos*, no. 5, January 31, 1940, 3, AUPO; “Z zhyttya Yaroslava,” *Holos*, no. 6, February 20, 1940, 4, AUPO.
order.” The *Primary Chronicle*, the cultural achievements of Kyivan Rus, and various Cossack revolutions such as those of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky were romanticized with the hopes of uniting Ukrainians to work towards a common goal. For example, one newspaper article listing Ukrainian achievements throughout history argued, “All these facts prove that our name is ancient and has a long tradition. It is connected with the best periods in our history, when our neighbors obeyed our strength and when our state borders reached all the way to the Vistula.” Another article reminded Ukrainians to fight as the Cossacks did against foreign enemies: “It’s not about getting honors, but about working for the good of the band, society, and nation. According to Anthony Smith, modern versions of a nation’s historic past, whether based on myths of historic greatness, the retelling of legends, or the resurrection of folk heroes, allows the “homeland” to become a sacred space, a site of the nation’s historic memories. In this way, visions of a historic past including myths of greatness within a golden age were used by Ukrainian nationalists to provide a framework for self-definition, “urging readers to identify with historical leaders and to admire past expressions of group solidarity.”

Under Nazi regulations, any national organizations in the General Government had to be subordinate to German authorities. Although the General Governor, Hans Frank, did not permit centrally organized national associations, in June 1940 he approved the creation of

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14 See for example “Za vladu! Za derzhavu!” *Holos*, no. 5, January 31, 1940, 1; “Viyna z poza reshitky,” *Holos*, no. 5, January 31, 1940, 2; “Nashe natsional'ne im'ya,” *Holos*, no. 5, January 31, 1940, 3; “Dlya vlady! Dlya derzhavy!” *Holos*, no. 4, January 31, 1940, 1; “Proty nadiyi,” *Holos*, no. 8, March 5, 1940, 1, AUPO.
15 “Nashe natsional'ne im'ya,” *Holos*, no. 5, January 31, 1940, 3, AUPO.
16 “Pro sylu voli i kharakter,” *Holos*, no. 4, January 22, 1940, 2, AUPO.
19 Veryha, ed., “The Ukrainian Central Committee and its Documents,” in *Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee*, 27.
representative welfare organizations for Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish nationalities.\textsuperscript{20} This was partially in response to the fact that the International Red Cross and American charitable organizations, which provided assistance in the occupied Polish territories, needed centralized organizations for the distribution of relief supplies.\textsuperscript{21} As a result, Ukrainians formed the \textit{Ukrainischer Hauptausschuss} (Ukrainian Central Committee or UCC).\textsuperscript{22} The main goals of the UCC were to cooperate with foreign relief organizations and maintain contact with German authorities; however, over time the UCC became an actual representative body for all Ukrainians in the General Government “providing not only material aid (i.e. food, money, and clothing), but also assistance to those who needed to acquire professional training or advance their education to improve their material well-being.”\textsuperscript{23} For example, as early as March 1940 the UCC had created a network of local branches and committees throughout the General Government, with the specific task of providing social care for the Ukrainian population including aiding in job placement and the organization of business life, assisting in the education of children and adolescents, and organizing cultural life.\textsuperscript{24} As the war progressed and German demands on the Ukrainian population mounted with the growing war effort, the UCC “sought as

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[21]{Veryha, ed., “The Ukrainian Central Committee and its Documents,” in \textit{Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee}, 27. The Poles already had a Main Polish Relief Council (\textit{Polnischer Hauptausschuss}), and the Jews formed the Self-Reliance Society (\textit{Jüdische Soziale Selbsthilfe}).}
\footnotetext[22]{In November 1939, Ukrainians in Krakow formed the Ukrainian National Alliance, with Dr. Volodymyr Kubijovych as the organization’s leader. Even though Hans Frank approved Kubijovych as the head of the Ukrainian representative body, the ban on national representative bodies prevented him from ratifying the National Alliance’s constitution. Once Frank approved national welfare agencies, the Ukrainian National Alliance became the Ukrainian Central Committee. See Veryha, ed., “The Ukrainian Central Committee and its Documents,” in \textit{Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee}, 27.}
\footnotetext[23]{Professional training mainly consisted of training people in skilled labor so they could work in German-run factories. Veryha, ed., “The Ukrainian Central Committee and its Documents,” in \textit{Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee}, 26.}
\footnotetext[24]{The UCC’s headquarters were located in Krakow but Warsaw and Lublin also had large operational branches. Volodymyr Kubijovych, “Bericht: Über meinen dienstlichen Aufenthalt in Distrikt Lublin und Warschau,” Krakow, March 15, 1940, in \textit{Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee}, 77; Volodymyr Kubijovych, “Denkschrift,” March 9, 1940, in \textit{Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee}, 74.}
\end{footnotes}
best it could to satisfy German war requirements on the one hand, while protecting the Ukrainian population from excessive demands for food deliveries, labor in German factories, and the enrollment of young men in the Baudienst (construction service) on the other.”

With assistance from the UCC, Ukrainians in the General Government began to organize communal life in the beginning of 1940 by reopening Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, establishing Ukrainian language-based schools, creating cooperatives and trade centers, as well as organizing Ukrainian cultural activities. The UCC facilitated communication between German officials and local Ukrainians beginning with memorandums expressing a desire for religious freedom in November 1939. During the Second Polish Republic, many Ukrainian Uniate and Orthodox churches were closed or taken over by the Polish government, and in Podlachia and Kholm Orthodox churches had been converted into Roman Catholic churches. Working with the Nazi government, the UCC and local Ukrainians reconstructed Uniate and Orthodox churches in the Ukrainian populated areas of the General Government, including the “revendication” of the cathedral in Kholm, which had previously been the oldest Ukrainian church in the region prior to being turned into a Roman Catholic Church by the Polish Second Republic.

The Ukrainian Central Committee also worked tirelessly to achieve their goal of reopening Ukrainian schools from the Austro-Hungarian period, which were closed and converted to Polish schools after the First World War. Initiatives included establishing Ukrainian schools with Ukrainian teachers in towns with a Ukrainian majority, securing the

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25 Veryha, ed., “The Ukrainian Central Committee and its Documents,” in Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee, 29.
26 “Denkschrift den Ukrainer aus den besetzten Gebieten des ehemaligen polnischen Staates,” in Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee, 42.
27 Ibid., 44.
28 “Iz pivdennoyi Kholmshchyny,” Holos, no. 14, May 30, 1940, 1, AUPO; “Denkschrift den Ukrainer aus den besetzten Gebieten des ehemaligen polnischen Staates,” in Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee, 44.
rights of Ukrainian language schools in areas where Ukrainians constituted a minority, and receiving permission to establish Ukrainian secondary schools. The UCC’s educational program proved to be successful as Ukrainian language schools were either created or restored in the southern regions of Kholm by January 1940. In Volodava (Włodawa), a town located on the Bug river near the present day borders of Ukraine and Belarus, Ukrainians opened a gymnasium in December 1939, which offered Ukrainian studies and German language courses. The “Mutual Assistance of Ukrainian Teachers” was also reestablished with separate commissions to organize schools, develop programs, and publish journals. Education initiatives were not solely confined to elementary and secondary schools. The UCC held German language classes for adults and conducted regular educational presentations for adults that focused on Ukrainian history and the lives of national heroes such as Taras Shevchenko and Lesia Ukrainka. By offering Ukrainian language based instruction, the UCC not only hoped to promote literacy among Ukrainians, but also aimed to provide a nationalized view of Ukrainian history to school children and adults alike.

In November 1939 German authorities approved the District Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives, an organization that worked with the UCC to develop economic activities among Ukrainians in all areas of occupied Poland such as the establishment of cooperatives, agricultural organizations, and financial institutions. Shortly thereafter, on December 14, 1939, the first general meeting of Ukrainian cooperatives took place in Bila Podlaska, which was attended by more than 300 Ukrainian peasants and established cooperatives in all locations with a Ukrainian

29 “Denkschrift den Ukrainer aus den besetzten Gebieten des ehemaligen polnischen Staates,” in Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee, 42.
30 The areas with the most Ukrainian schools were Beshivshchyna, Tomashivshchyna, Sokal, and Ravna. See “Iz Pivdennoyi Kholmshchyny,” Holos, no. 4, January 22, 1940, 2, AUPO.
31 “Kholmyschchyna orhanizut’sya,” Holos, no. 3, January 14, 1940, 1, AUPO.
32 “Iz Pivdennoyi Kholmshchyny,” Holos, no. 4, January 22, 1940, 2, AUPO.
33 “Z ukrayins’koho zhyttya,” Holos, no. 14, May 30, 1940, 1, AUPO.
majority.\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, on January 16, 1940, a Trade Committee in Krakow was founded with the aim of educating organizers on economic and trade life, creating and maintain relations with major centers of purchase and sale, and organizing financial assistance for Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{35} Single trade centers such as the Ukrainian cooperative in Krakow and the Lemko Union in Sanok provided material assistance to Ukrainians in the form of food and clothing while smaller country cooperatives in Tomaszew, Volodow, Biała, and Podlaska provided Ukrainians an opportunity to exchange goods.\textsuperscript{36} The UCC also created a Ukrainian national bank, with branches in Krakow and Lublin to aid Ukrainian farmers.\textsuperscript{37}

Additionally, cultural activities grew between 1939 and 1941 in the General Government. In the fall of 1939 Otto Wächter, the Governor the Krakow district, issued a circular allowing the use of Ukrainian in addition to German, which was the official language of the General Government. Following Wächter’s statement, the publication of Ukrainian language newspapers, magazines, journals, and books flourished, as evidenced by the number of national newspapers printed between 1939 and 1941.\textsuperscript{38} In Kraków, under the leadership of the Ukrainian scholar Dr. Volodymyr Kubiyovych, the Ukrainian Book Publishing Society was founded in order to “prevent the shortage of Ukrainian printed word for the Ukrainian population in the lands occupied by Germany” and specialized in publishing Ukrainian language textbooks as well as popular scientific books, magazines, books, music, and other printed material.\textsuperscript{39} The Ukrainian Book Publishing House held literary competitions for historical and everyday life

\textsuperscript{34} “Z Pidlyashshya,” \textit{Holos}, no. 4, January 22, 1940, 1, AUPO.
\textsuperscript{35} “Ukrayins’ki kuptsi orhanizovuyut,” \textit{Holos}, no. 5, January 31, 1940, 1, AUPO.
\textsuperscript{36} “Hospodars’ki Spravy v Heneral-Hubernatorstvi,” \textit{Holos}, no. 13, May 20, 1940, 1, AUPO.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Even though Polish and Ukrainian were approved languages in the General Government, Hebrew and Jewish dialects were forbidden. See “Prava ukrayins’koj movy,” \textit{Holos}, no. 4, January 22, 1940, 1, AUPO.
\textsuperscript{39} “Ukrayins’ke knyzhkove vydavnytstvo,” \textit{Holos}, no. 3, January 14, 1940, 1, AUPO.
works that were thematically related to Podlasie, Kholm, or Lemkiv.\textsuperscript{40} The Ukrainian magazine 
\textit{Krakovs'kyi Visti} (Krakow News), self-identified as the Ukrainian people’s magazine of the General Government and edited by members of the Zarevo Literary Society in Krakow, published a biweekly publication along with monthly illustrated books for children and adults.\textsuperscript{41} In addition, German officials in November 1939 permitted the publication of the Ukrainian weekly magazine “Kholm Views,” which reported on daily activities in and around the region in addition to editorials on Ukrainian issues.\textsuperscript{42}

Choir and theater groups were another popular cultural activity that thrived in the first half of 1940. In December 1939 several choirs held Christmas performances for both Ukrainians and Germans, including the Ukrainian Children’s Folk Choir located in Kholm. Other choirs and theater groups held Christmas performances where they sung Ukrainian Christmas carols, recited Ukrainian national poems, and staged Shevchenko’s famous play, “That Field.”\textsuperscript{43} After the 1939 Christmas celebrations, choral groups continued performing in traveling choirs. The largest choral group was based in Krakow but traveled throughout the General Government giving performances in Ukrainian, German, and Italian. Smaller choirs also existed in Kholm and Sanok, where they regularly performed national and traditional folk songs.\textsuperscript{44} Concert performances were repeatedly reported on and published in Ukrainian newspapers, suggesting that these performances were a regular occurrence. Additionally, local Ukrainian social

\textsuperscript{40}“Literaturnyy konkurs,” \textit{Holos}, no. 6, February 20, 1940, 4, AUPO

\textsuperscript{41}“Novi ukrayins’ki zhurnaly,” \textit{Holos}, no. 3, January 14, 1940, 1, AUPO. The illustrated textbook for children was called “Little Friends” and the monthly illustrated book for adults and adolescences was called “Young Friends.”

\textsuperscript{42}“Novi ukrayins’ki zhurnaly”, \textit{Holos}, no. 3, January 14, 1940, 1, AUPO.

\textsuperscript{43}“Iz Pivdennoyi Kholmshchyny,” \textit{Holos}, no. 4, January 22, 1940, 1-2, AUPO.

\textsuperscript{44}“Z ukrayins’koho zhyttya,” \textit{Holos}, no. 14, May 30, 1940, p. 1; “Mystets’ka vystava v Syanotsi,” \textit{Holos}, no. 12, May 10, 1940, 1, AUPO.
organizations held theater performances, arranged art exhibitions displaying works by Ukrainian artists.45

The OUN-B also worked closely with Nazi officials in the General Government in hopes that cooperation would eventually lead to a Ukrainian state allied with Nazi Germany, presumably similar to the wartime Slovak Republic or independent Croatian state.46 For example, in August 1939 prior to the Nazi invasion, Stepan Bandera collaborated with the head of the German Abwehr, Wilhelm Canaris, to form the Nachtigall Battalion, which consisted of 250 OUN members with Roman Sushko as its commander.47 In addition to coordinating training sessions with the Abwehr and Wehrmacht, the Nachtigall Battalion also provided espionage services for the Abwehr in the spring of 1941 and followed the Wehrmacht into Ukrainian lands occupied by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. Working to gain support for the Nazis among local populations, many of these battalions also participated in the rounding up and shooting of Jews during the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union.48 Although collaboration between the OUN and German officials were left unclear and would later cause a great deal of misunderstanding between Ukrainians nationalists and Nazis, the connections established by the Nachtigall Battalion with local Ukrainian populations provided the basis for the OUN’s underground network for the duration of the war and, once it was obvious that the Nazi leadership would not allow an independent Ukrainian state, many Nachtigall soldiers joined the OUN and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).49

45 Ibid; “Mystets’ka vystava v Syanotsi,” Holos, no. 12, May 10, 1940, 1, AUPO.
49 Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 58.
The Nazi occupation of the western half of Poland also created a space for Ukrainians to carry out attacks on their national enemies, namely Poles and Jews. Prior to the Nazi invasion, Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews lived, as Shimon Redlich aptly described, “together and apart” in interwar Poland. However, the destruction of the Polish State provided the opportunity for Ukrainians to “settle scores” with their Polish and Jewish neighbors by looting houses and businesses, using local knowledge to uncover clandestine Polish activity, betraying members of the Polish underground to German authorities, and murdering Jewish and Polish landlords. As one member of the Ukrainian Insurgent Committee stated, “Ukrainians didn’t fight with Poles during the German and Soviet invasion of Poland because Poland had oppressed Ukrainians for six centuries. Germany was not our enemy.”

The Nazi occupation of the western half of Poland created several political, economic, and social changes, and the ensuing chaos provided the chance for Ukrainians to reassess their national identity vis-à-vis other ethnic groups through nationalization efforts, cultural and economic organization violence, which cemented ideas of ethnic and national homogeneity among Ukrainians living in the General Government. Moreover, the defeat of the Second Polish Republic, which suppressed Ukrainian national expression during the interwar period, and the formation of the Nazi-ruled General Government allowed Ukrainians to renegotiate Ukrainian nationalism by linking it to National Socialism. Ukrainian flags flew next to Nazi flags, Ukrainian newspapers printed pro-German propaganda, and the OUN cooperated with the Abwehr and Wehrmacht. The fact that all Ukrainian national organizations, church activities,

52 “Rozmova z polonenym,” Holos, no. 1, December 15, 1939, 4, AUPO.
schools, and publications were under German authority turned non-political national groups like the UCC into transmission channels for German rule. Nationalizing efforts in the form of national symbols and an educational platform that concentrated on Ukrainian history, national myths, and literature expanded Ukrainian national consciousness to Ukrainians who had previously been excluded from nationalist rhetoric while violent conflicts between Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews also reinforced national differences between the three groups while cementing notions of “the other” in the minds of Ukrainians.

**The OUN and Soviet Occupation in Eastern Poland 1939-1941**

Three weeks after Nazi Germany attacked Poland, the Soviet Union invaded Poland from the east, conquering the regions of Eastern Galicia, Polissya, Podole, and Volhynia in Poland as well as Belorussia and Lithuania. The Soviet occupation zone comprised 77,720 square miles, with close to 13 million inhabitants, of which roughly one-third were Ukrainian. Ukrainians made up a clear majority of the total population in the district of Volhynia and the cities of L’viv, Stanislav, Ternopil. Following the Soviet invasion, Stalin divided Western Ukrainian lands occupied by the Soviet army into six administration regions: Vozhnsk, Drohobych, L’viv, Rivne, Stanislav, and Ternopil. On June 28, 1940 the Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna following an ultimatum to the Romanian government threatening the use of force and, shortly thereafter, Northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia were incorporated into Soviet Ukraine. During the Soviet occupation of the eastern half of Poland, Western Ukrainians experienced the

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54 *Holos*, no. 3, January 1, 1940, 3, AUPO.  
55 “Iz svitovykh podiy,” *Holos*, no. 17, July 25, 1940, 2, AUPO. On June 28, 1940, the Red Army captured the main cities of Ackerman, Chernivtsi, and Chrisinau and the rest of Northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia were taken in four days. After annexation, the Council of Native Commissioners of the USSR decided to form the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Republic out of the areas of Bessarabia inhabited by Romanian-Moldavians, which was structurally connected to Soviet Ukraine.
brutality of Stalin’s communist regime for the first time and, although Stalin tried to gain the sympathies of Ukrainians in Eastern Poland by offering Ukrainians government positions that had previously been reserved for Poles, Soviet occupation was characterized by Sovietization; collectivization of agriculture; arrests and deportations of Ukrainian elites, intellectuals, and well-to-do Ukrainian peasants to Siberia; and mass executions. As a result, unlike the Nazi occupation of Western Poland, Soviet occupation limited the ways nationalists could expand Ukrainian national consciousness to simply establishing connections with Soviet Ukrainians based on shared anti-Soviet attitudes. Likewise, the environment of mass chaos and fear surrounding Stalin’s purges of Eastern Poland amplified already tense interethnic relations between Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews and produced waves of ethnic violence that heightened Ukrainian nationalism by creating and “us versus them” mentality.

After the Red Army occupied the eastern half of Poland, the new Soviet government held a staged election that officially incorporated Western Ukrainian lands into the Ukrainian SSR. Shortly thereafter, communist officials introduced policies designed to win the political allegiance of the majority of Eastern Poland’s Ukrainians. For example, Soviet officials dismantled all visible signs of the Polish state, removed the Polish eagle from all signs and monuments, and destroyed all Polish memorials. In Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovyna, and Bessarabia, the new Soviet regime deposed Polish and Romanian elites and replaced them with local Ukrainians, expropriated Polish landlords with the promise of redistributing land, introduced Ukrainian as the official language, and converted Polish and Romanian school

56 On October 22, 1939, Ukrainians voted for delegates to assemblies to request incorporation into the USSR. Soviet officials claimed that the turnout was 99.2 percent and shortly thereafter the newly elected assemblies in Western Ukraine “enthusiastically” voted to join the USSR. Western Ukraine formally entered the Soviet Union on November 2, 1939. See George O. Liber, Total Wars and the Making of Modern Ukraine, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 205; For an in-depth analysis of how the Soviet Union organized and conducted elections in Western Ukraine and Belorussia see Gross, Revolution From Abroad, 71-114.
57 Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed, 124.
systems and bureaucracies into Ukrainian-speaking institutions. Furthermore, under the direction of Ukraine’s Party Chief, Nikita Khrushchev, the new Soviet government abolished Polish Roman Catholic churches, nationalized Jewish markets and industries, and dissolved Poland’s pluralistic political system.

Yet, regardless of the introduction of pro-Ukrainian policies, Soviet authorities simultaneously introduced policies of Sovietization that limited the cultural and political expression of Ukrainians. Almost immediately, propaganda posters extolling the Soviet Union and Soviet leaders appeared on sides of buildings and in schools. Witold T. remembers a poster hung in Lutsk (Łuck):

One [poster] particularly stuck in my mind, it showed a white eagle with a four-cornered Polish soldier’s cap on its head and clawing at the back of a handcuffed worker. A Bolshevik soldier was sticking a bayonet into the eagle. The background was a map of Poland.

Soviet officials also installed loudspeakers in the streets, which broadcasted Soviet propaganda throughout the day, and held film showings in towns and villages depicting life in the Soviet Union. Soviet indoctrination also included anti-religious propaganda and, even though Stalin did not outlaw the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the church was heavily taxed and priests had to carry special passports identifying them as clergy. Moreover, education was Sovietized as Stalin abolished all private and religious schools; banned the teaching of religion, history, geography, and Latin; introduced a curriculum based on the principals of Marxist-Leninism in

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58 Similar policies were developed in areas with a majority of Belarusians. Orest Subtelny, “The Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine, 1939-1941: An Overview,” in Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath, ed. by Yury Boshyk (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 9; Liber, Total Wars and the Making of Modern Ukraine, 205
59 Liber, Total War and the Making of Modern Ukraine, 205-206.
60 Quoted in Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed, 124.
61 Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed, 125; Prusin, Lands Between, 131-132.
elementary and secondary schools, and removed law and the humanities as subjects of universities, replacing them with subjects of Darwinism, Leninism, and Stalinism.\textsuperscript{63}

Political and economic restructuring included the introduction of Soviet administrative structures and collectivization. Beginning in 1940, Soviet officials banned all Western Ukrainian political parties and economic organizations.\textsuperscript{64} Despite the promise of redistributing land held by Polish elites, Soviet authorities collectivized land into large units and imposed a high degree of state control over production, which the peasants bitterly opposed. All animals and possessions were listed and could not be sold or transferred without permission.\textsuperscript{65} By the spring of 1941 there were nearly 3,000 kolhozy (collective farms) in Western Ukraine, but the opposition to collectivization among Ukrainian peasants was so great that by June 1941, just prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Soviet officials had enticed only 12.8 percent of all Ukrainian peasant households to join collective farms.\textsuperscript{66} Nevertheless, collectivization attempts turned many Ukrainian-speaking people against communism, especially among those who had expected vast economic improvements. According to the historian Orest Subtelny, Soviet efforts to deprive Ukrainians of the means of cultural and political self-expression “resulted in the elimination of individuals and political parties representing the middle-of-the-road, liberal tendencies, leaving Western Ukrainians with only one viable political organization- the OUN.”\textsuperscript{67}

Initially the OUN took advantage of anti-Soviet sentiments due to Sovietization and collectivization to expand their membership, spread national consciousness to Ukrainians in rural areas, and make connections with Soviet Ukrainians. As part of restructuring society, Soviet

\textsuperscript{63} Gross, \textit{Revolution from Abroad}, 126-138; Lanckoroniska, \textit{Those Who Trespass Against Us}, 8.
\textsuperscript{64} Subtelny, “The Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine,” 9-10
\textsuperscript{65} Kochanski, \textit{The Eagle Unbowed}, 128.
\textsuperscript{66} See Liber, \textit{Total War and the Making of Modern Ukraine}, 208.
\textsuperscript{67} Subtelny, “The Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine,” 9.
authorities issued internal passports to its new citizens in the Ukrainian SSR, categorizing people in terms of national identity and social class, which allowed for the free movement of people inside Soviet Ukraine. The OUN took advantage of newly opened borders to connect with Soviet Ukrainians by sending *pokhidni hrupy* (expeditionary task forces) to collect information regarding support for an independent Ukrainian state among Ukrainians in Soviet Ukraine.

Initial *pokhidni hrupy* missions succeeded in gaining information about the lives and grievances of Ukrainians living in Soviet Ukraine, particularly anti-communist attitudes and objections to forced collectivization among Ukrainian-speaking peasants.

Initial reports gathered in Soviet Ukrainian towns and village revealed that “the national consciousness in these villages was very weak.” As a result, the OUN conducted an extensive propaganda campaign in which they distributed pamphlets and newspapers throughout Soviet Ukraine appealing to anti-communist sentiment and explaining the Ukrainian nationalist cause as one against Russia and communism. One leaflet distributed in the rural areas of Galicia, Volhynia, and the westernmost regions of Soviet Ukraine, stated “Ukrainians and all peoples subjugated by Moscow! Join the merciless struggle against the Muscovite-Bolshevik yoke! Destroy the Muscovite prison of nations! Freedom to all the subjugated!” The OUN printed their manifesto in newspapers and pamphlets, calling on “Ukrainians, wherever they live” to join the Ukrainian nationalist movement “to fight for the liberation of all Ukrainian people against Bolshevism, which has brought national, political, religious, cultural, social, and economic enslavement to its most extreme.”

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69 Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 68.
70 “Z Radymnyanshchyny,” Holos, no. 21, October 18, 1940, 2, AUPO. This article specifically cites the Soviet Ukrainian towns of Radymno and Sosnytsya.
villages where they read their manifesto and gave speeches encouraging peasants to join the nationalist cause. In one speech given in the small town of Zolochiv just east of L’viv, OUN members appealed specifically to peasants arguing:

Just as every peasant has his own house according to the amount of land, in the same way every nation must have his own state, the ability to manage and develop accordingly, and I attribute this very principal to the 45 million Ukrainian people living in the most fertile land in Europe.73

Other speeches focused on themes of unification, the historical similarities among Ukrainian-speaking people, breaking the bonds of imperial slavery, and fulfilling the destiny of an independent Ukrainian state.74 Another propaganda technique used by the OUN to extend national consciousness to those living in Eastern Ukraine included the writing and singing of national songs and the creation of Ukrainian national youth groups.75 It is hard to quantify the success of pokhidni hrupy missions between 1939 and 1940 as prewar estimates of the number of OUN members varies between 8,000 and 20,000, but one study found that the OUN added 13,000 active members in Galicia, 5,000 in Volhynia, and 1,200 specifically in L’viv in 1940.76

Although the OUN made headway in gaining some support from Ukrainians in Eastern Poland, their success in connecting with Soviet Ukrainians was limited after the spring of 1940 when Stalin embarked on his campaign against real and imagined “enemies of the state,” which included mass arrests, imprisonment, deportations, and executions. Beginning in April 1940 the NKVD embarked on several deportation campaigns, which caused widespread dissatisfaction

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73 “Rozmova z nolonenym,” Holos, no. 1, December 15, 1939, 4, AUPO.
74 “Dlya vlady! Dlya derzhavy!” Holos, no. 5, January 31, 1940, 1; “Nasha natsional’na nazva,” Holos, no. 5, January 31, 1940, 3, AUPO.
among local inhabitations and, in turn, led to more repressive measures. The people in Western Ukraine experienced four waves of deportations between 1939 and 1941 in which the Soviet secret police (NKVD) banished most of the former Polish elite, a large number of Polish settlers who had moved to Western Ukraine between 1919 and 1939, active Polish military officials, large numbers of local Jewish refugees as well as Ukrainian nationalists, political leaders, intellectuals, businessmen, and well-to-do farmers. Initial deportations in February 1940 were selective and included civil servants, local government officials, judges, and members of the police force. However, in April 1940 the categorizes of those affected expanded to families of persons previously arrested, families of those who had escaped abroad, tradesmen, and farm laborers, and in June 1940 thousands seeking refuge from Nazi forces, small merchants, doctors, engineers, lawyers, journalists, artists, university professors, and teachers were deported.

According to one eye witiness, news of Bolshevik deportations occurred in waves and depicted some of the most horrible aspects of Bolshevik terror.”77 Another stated, “no one, literally no one was sure whether his turn would come the next night.”78 Between 1940 and 1941 Soviet authorities deported 1.5 million Polish citizens, of which Poles represented 57-63.5 percent of those deported, Jews 21-24 percent, and Ukrainians 8-10.5 percent.79 While exact numbers vary, it is estimated that the NKVD, forcibly deported nearly 33,000 Ukrainians, with the total number of Ukrainians either arrested, jailed, deported, and executed reaching 400,000.80

The environment surrounding the campaign against “enemies of the state,” fostered distress,

77 Rudnytska, Zakhidna Ukraina pid bol’sheykamy, 453.
78 Lawrence Reynolds, Leaving Home: The Remarkable Life of Peter Jacyk (Vancouver: Figure 1 Publishing, 2013), 6.
79 Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 197. These categories are based on a report compiled by the Polish Embassy in the USSR in August 1943 and included all Polish citizens without national or ethnic designations.
80 Rudnytska, Zakhidna Ukraina, 465; Orest Subtelny, “Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine,” 11. Subtelny cities the Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitan, Andrei Sheptysky, who estimated that 200,000 Ukrainians had been jailed, deported, or executed in L’viv and estimated the losses for the entire Ukrainian population at 400,000.
insecurity, and terror among the population of Western Ukraine, exacerbating tensions between Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews.

More so than the Nazi occupation of Western Poland, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland created an environment conducive to conflict and violence between national groups. Anti-Polish violence was typically promoted by communists and poor peasants hoping to settle scores whereas hatred of the Soviets transferred to the Jewish population, sparking waves of antisemitic violence.\(^{81}\) In the first few days of the Soviet occupation, an environment of chaotic hostilities, long-standing national struggles, and the collapse of states prevailed, which led to fighting between Ukrainians and Poles. Some historians assert that Ukrainians nationalist and communists groups in Eastern Galicia and Western Volhynia may have killed several thousand Poles.\(^{82}\) Moreover, following the division of Poland, Western Ukraine experienced an influx of Polish and Jewish refugees fleeing the Nazis in Western Poland, with close to 225,000 Jews and approximately 50,000 to 150,000 Poles arriving in Western Ukraine.\(^{83}\) The sudden appearance of hundreds of thousands of migrants not only put a strain on goods, services, and food, but also fueled uncertainty and fear, sparking an increase in anti-Semitic and anti-Polish sentiments among the Ukrainian population of Western Ukraine.\(^{84}\) For example, when tens of thousands of Polish refugees fled to L’viv and filled the streets due to lack of accommodation, Ukrainians shouted “abusive tirades” condemning all Poles as oppressive nobles, harassed Poles walking

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\(^{83}\) Liber, *Total War and the Making of Modern Ukraine*, 211.

\(^{84}\) Interehtnic conflict in Western Ukraine was highly complex and also included anti-Ukrainian attitudes among Poles and Jews, anti-Polish attitudes among Jews; and anti-Jewish attitudes among Poles. See Liber, *Total War and the Making of Modern Ukraine*, chapter 8 and Shimon Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919-1945*, (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2002).
down the street, and pushed them out of line in food queues.\textsuperscript{85} Since the largest proportion of refugees were Jewish, their simultaneous arrival with the advent of Soviet occupation seemed to confirm the widespread belief that Jews supported communism.\textsuperscript{86}

One example that demonstrates how brutal Soviet occupational policies in the form of arrests, deportations, executions, and massacres not only poisoned relations between Western Ukrainians and the Soviet regime, but also between Ukrainians on the one hand, and Poles and Jews on the other is the Great Prison Massacre of 1941. Immediately following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the NKVD murdered somewhere between 10,000 and 40,000 political prisoners in Western Ukraine in only eight days.\textsuperscript{87} Although exact numbers are hard to come by, reliable estimates suggest that 70 percent of those slaughtered were Ukrainians, 20 percent Poles, and the rest Jews and other nationalities.\textsuperscript{88} Eyewitness testimonies from Brygidki prison in L’viv describe groups of prisoners being taken to the prison basement, tortured, and then shot in the back of the head.\textsuperscript{89} Prior to being shot, many prisoners had been tortured. When family members went in search of their loved ones after the Soviet retreat, they found mass graves and described corpses that had been burned from boiling water; people’s

\textsuperscript{85} Karolina Lanckorońska, \textit{Those Who Trespass Against Us: One Woman’s War Against the Nazis}, (London: Pimlico, 2005), 2.
\textsuperscript{86} Kiebuzinski and Motyl, “Introduction,” in \textit{The Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre of 1941}, 44.
\textsuperscript{87} There is significant disagreement over the total number of killed prisoners in Western Ukraine. NKVD sources place the number at 9,817, Orest Subtelny estimates the number was close to 15,000, while Polish historians place the number between 20,000 and 24,000. Jan Gross estimates that the total number of prisoners in Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia was as high as 100,000. See Kiebuzinski and Motyl, “Introduction,” in \textit{The Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre of 1941}, 38-40 for an in-depth breakdown of estimated numbers from a variety of sources. Based on their analysis Kiebuzinski and Motyl conclude that the number of Western Ukrainians killed in the Great Prison Massacre of 1941 is between 10,000 and 40,000.
\textsuperscript{88} Kiebuzinski and Motyl, “Introduction,” in \textit{The Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre of 1941}, 41.
noses, ears, and fingers cut off; female prisoners breasts cut off; prisoners fastened together with barbed wire.90

The discovery of tortured and murdered prisoners outraged Ukrainians and sparked waves of violence against the Jewish population. Following the arrival of the German army in L’viv Ukrainians raided Polish and Jewish homes and accompanied Nazi officers around the city helping them hunt out Polish and Jewish enemies.91 Ukrainians beat Jews with sticks and whips, forced them to clean city streets, made them perform various rituals associated with communism, while Jewish women were stripped naked in front of Ukrainian crowds. In a particularly debasing undertaking in the L’viv Jewish Quarter, Jews were required to exhume corpses and carry bodies out of the basement of the nearby prison.92 In an atmosphere fueled by mass grief and the notion that the Jewish population was collectively guilty for the crimes perpetrated against Ukrainians by the NKVD, the purpose of the pogrom was to humiliate Jews as a form of social justice for the prison massacres.93 The German military not only tolerated this antisemitic violence, but also initiated systematic mass executions of Jews living in L’viv and surrounding areas in the first week of July 1941, which according to John-Paul Himka differed from “the pogrom proper” due to the absence of mass crowd participation.94 Nevertheless, Ukrainian nationalists and local police aided in the mass shootings conducted by Einsatzgruppe C, which resulted in the killing of an estimated 4,000 to 8,000 Jewish victims.95

90 Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 179-181.
91 Mick, “Incompatible Experiences,” 338-340. Mick’s analysis uses evidence from Jewish memoirs and makes note that not all Ukrainians participated in anti-Polish and anti-Semitic violence, but in light of the discovery of massacred prisoners, violence was widespread.
93 Himka, “The L’viv Pogrom of 1941, 212.
94 Ibid., 219.
95 Mick, “Incompatible Experiences, 354.
According to James B. Rule, “shared emotional states have a force of their own in explaining the outbreak and subsidence of violent action” and “news of atrocities to a particular group may move members of the group to violent actions that would never otherwise have occurred. Such sequences are unlikely, however, in the absence of enduring tensions or clashes of interest that established targets of such action.” Rule’s analysis of civil violence corresponds to the L’viv pogrom of 1941 since the combination of historical tensions between Ukrainians and Jews in Western Ukraine and collective outrage following the discovery of the prison massacres resulted in communal violence against a specific group. Ksenya Kiebuzinski and Alexander Motyl, argue that the violence following the Great Prison Massacre is central to Western Ukrainian attitudes towards World War II, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Jews since “For many Ukrainians, the Massacre- and especially the gratuitous torture of prisoners- appeared to confirm the indispensability of war against the Soviet Union, the liberation promised by the Germany, the evil of communism, and Jewish complicity in Soviet crimes.” As most of Western Ukraine was already infuriated with the Soviet policies of Sovietization, collectivization, arrests, and mass deportations, Ukrainians collectively felt that the prison killings were a direct attack on their nation and their community.

The simultaneous occupations of Poland between 1939 and 1941 impacted Ukrainian popular attitudes in general, and Ukrainian nationalism in particular, albeit in different ways. While German occupational policies provided Ukrainians with the ability to culturally express their nationalism through the creation of nationalist organizations, displaying Ukrainian national

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98 Ibid., 51. In contrast, Kiebuzinski and Motyl, argue that since Poles could point to a history of bona fide statehood, they were more likely to interpret Soviet policy and, in this instance, prison massacres as directed against their state, which had been destroyed twice.
symbols, the reopening of churches and schools, and promoting literary and cultural activity, the brutal policies enacted under Stalin provoked interethnic violence that strengthened notions of national belonging and, at the same time, disassociation from other national groups. Open fighting between Ukrainians and Poles in the first days of war, struggles for resources between Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews, the massacre of Ukrainian prisoners by the NKVD, and outright antisemitic violence reinforced notions of “the other” during the extremely brutal Soviet occupation.

The Nazi Invasion of the Soviet Union and Subsequent Occupation 1941-1944

On June 22, 1941, three million troops made up of Germany and its allies, divided into three separate army groups crossed the Molotov-Ribbentrop line and invaded the Baltics, Belarus, Eastern Poland, and Ukraine. By November 1941, the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR, with the exception of Voroshilovhrad (today’s Luhansk) and the northeastern part of the Donbas, fell under German control in July 1942; the Crimean Peninsula also succumbed to German occupation. Following the invasion, there was a short gap between the Red Army’s retreat and the establishment of a effectively operating Nazi administration, during which the OUN embarked on a nationalizing campaign through the use of expeditionary task forces (pokhidni hrupy) which set up local civil administrations, reopened schools, published and distributed national literature, and set up trade cooperatives. However, following a campaign of nationalist repression in the fall of 1941, the OUN was forced to move underground where they focused their efforts on recruitment and training operations, the formation of Ukrainian militias, the creation of new nationalist organizations, and gaining outside foreign support for an independent Ukrainian state. Moreover, during the Nazi occupation of Ukraine, Ukrainian

99 Liber, Total Wars and the Making of Modern Ukraine, 211.
nationalist organizations changed their rhetoric in response to international changes during the war, particularly after the German defeat at Stalingrad. As Nazi Germany continued to lose territory in Ukraine in 1943 and 1944, the OUN downplayed its commitment to integral nationalism and the use of terror against national rivals and, at least on paper, proclaimed that Ukrainian nationalism was defined by anti-imperialism, social democracy, economic equality, and the protection of certain ethnic and national minorities. However, actions by both factions of the OUN and the UPA often contradicted this new platform and continued collaboration with Nazi Germany and the ethnic of Poles in Volhynia in 1943 demonstrate that the shift in rhetoric was merely an opportunistic attempt to gain Allied support for an independent Ukrainian state.

In the weeks leading up to Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, both the OUN-B and OUN-M sent pokhidni hrupy into the Soviet Ukraine to seize control of cities, towns, and villages in the wake of the Red Army retreat, with the hope of establishing sovereign Ukrainian administrations prior to the arrival of German troops.\textsuperscript{100} The OUN-B prepared three expeditions for three destinations: the first group, commanded by Mykola Klymyshyn, traveled northeast toward Kyiv; the second group, led by Mykola Lemyk headed east toward Kharkiv; while the third group, led by Z. Matla and M. Rikhta, traveled south toward Odessa and the Donbass.\textsuperscript{101} According to one former OUN-B member, each task force leader oversaw about twenty to thirty villages, moving from village to village at night and by foot ahead of the German army.\textsuperscript{102} The expeditionary forces that headed south proved to be the most successful since they established a broad organizational network in the Donbas region in the oblasts of Kirovograd, Donbas,

\textsuperscript{100} Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 68; Bohdan Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation 1941-1944,” in \textit{Ukraine During World War II}, 18.
\textsuperscript{101} L. Shankova's'kyi, \textit{Pokhidni hrupy OUN (Prychynky do istoriyi pokhidnykh hrup OUN na tsentral'nykh i skhidnykh zemlyakh Ukraïni v 1941-1943)}, 11-13.
\textsuperscript{102} Matla, \textit{Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa}, 9.
Dnipropetrovsk, and Stalino.\textsuperscript{103} Many of the \textit{pokhidni hrupy} traveling through Central Ukraine were broken up by the German army but, nonetheless, by the end of July 1941, expeditionary forces had reached the cities of Vinnysia, Berdychiv, Zhytomyr, and Kryvyi Ruh in Eastern Ukraine where they organized national activity on the local level, recruited new members, and spread news of the Proclamation of Ukrainian Statehood made in L’viv on June 30, 1941.\textsuperscript{104} In the first weeks of war the OUN-B also cooperated with the Wehrmacht by “creating divisionary actions” as the Red Army retreated and actively fought Soviet partisans.\textsuperscript{105} The Mel’ynk faction also sent out their own \textit{pokhidni hrupy} in Soviet Ukraine, although on a much smaller scale, and were most successful in Kyiv where they worked closely with Nazi authorities once a German administration had been set up.\textsuperscript{106}

The invading Nazi forces positioned themselves as champions of Ukrainian liberation from Judeo-Bolshevism. Wehrmacht propaganda units dropped leaflets from airplanes and put posters up declaring that Ukrainians had been “liberated from the tyranny of Jewish-Bolshevik elements.”\textsuperscript{107} Ukrainian nationalists used the stereotype that Jews supported communism to gain supporters by linking the horrors of Soviet rule to the Jewish population, which can be seen in propaganda pieces printed in Ukrainian language newspapers throughout Ukraine. In Brzezany, located in the Ternopil oblast southeast of L’viv, newspapers expressed gratitude to German liberators, with articles extolling “His excellency Führer Adolf Hitler” who “ordered his invincible Army to destroy the Jewish-Bolsheviks.”\textsuperscript{108} Other articles emphasized the devastation to Ukrainian culture, the destruction of schools, and the nonexistence of religious freedom under

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\textsuperscript{105} Shkandrij, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 60.  
\textsuperscript{107} Kotyeva, \textit{Three Worlds of Larissa}, 110, 112.  
\textsuperscript{108} “Druzhniy Vechir,” \textit{Berezhans’ki Visti}, no. 6, August 7, 1941, 2, AUPO.
the Bolsheviks and their Jewish supporters declaring, “the slightest manifestation of national feeling was brutally persecuted and barbarically punished…as if a black cloud passed over the free life of innocent people with terrible force.”\(^{109}\) Newspapers in the Kyiv oblast also encouraged Ukrainians to fight together with the “glorious German army to fight the eternal enemy of the Ukrainian people, Moscow and against the violence inflicted by the Jewish-Bolshevik yoke.”\(^{110}\) On poem reprinted in newspapers in the Kyiv oblast affirmed the Bolshevik-Jewish stereotype:

> Stand up Ukraine! Stand up Ukraine,  
> As the sun rises in the morning  
> To freedom, to your happiness!...  
> Moscow horsemen hordes are deplorable  
> And the world of cursed Jews!  
> Stand up Ukraine! Stand up Ukraine…\(^{111}\)

Propaganda that perpetuated the Judeo-Bolshevik myth fed directly into the Holocaust, which many Ukrainian nationalists willingly participated in. Memorandums circulated in the summer of 1941 also propagated the notion that Poles and other nationalities were often being placed in positions of power by the occupying forces, while Ukrainians were being denounced to the police and arrested.\(^{112}\)

As a result, the Nazi occupation of Ukraine highlighted interethnic conflict and provided a space for Ukrainians to carry out violence against their nationalist rivals. During the occupation of Ukraine, Nazi officials exploited the tensions between Poles and Ukrainians, which amplified fears, resentment, and hatred between the two groups. For example, in 1942 the Germans removed Ukrainians from the local administration in the Reichkommissariat Ukraine

\(^{109}\) “Vidnovlyuymo ridnu kulʹturu,” *Berezhansʹki Visti*, no. 6, August 7, 1941, 2, AUPO.

\(^{110}\) “Kinet’ bilʹshovytsʹkiy panshchyni,” *Vilʹna Ukrayina* (Tetiiv), no. 1, October 14, 1941, 2, AUPO.

\(^{111}\) “Vstanʹ Ukrayino,” *Vilʹna Ukrayina* (Tetiiv), no. 1, October 14, 1941, 1, AUPO.

\(^{112}\) Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 64.
and replaced them with Russians, Poles, and ethnic Germans. Likewise, in the General Government Ukrainians were given a slightly higher political status over Poles. Moreover, Nazi forces encouraged and initiated antisemitic violence, and anti-Jewish propaganda spread by both factions of the OUN emboldened participation and increased collaboration. The OUN specifically complied in Jewish pogroms in Western Ukraine during the first days of the war and local Ukrainian police units helped round, escort, and murder Jews during mass shootings.

Following the Red Army retreat, but prior to creation of a Nazi system of governance in Ukraine, expeditionary forces succeeded in conducting a wide variety of nationalist activities. Some pokhidni hrupy worked for the German army as translators and functional intermediaries to the local population, although they kept their nationalist agenda largely hidden from the authorities. In the summer of 1941 the OUN-B had close to 20,000 members and most reliable estimates place the number of expeditionary forces working in Central and Eastern Ukraine between 750 and 1,500 members. Of those, approximately 300 OUN-B members

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113 Liber, Total War and the Making of Modern Ukraine, 223.
114 Mick, Incompatible Experiences, 347.
115 There has been a wealth of recent research regarding the OUN’s participation in programs throughout the Second World War, with historians disagreeing as to the OUN’s motives. Some historians, such as John-Paul Himka and Dieter Pohl argue the OUN orchestrated and incited the pogroms while others like Yaroslav Hrysak try to explain away the OUN’s actions as a product of ruthless Sovietization or an attempt to gain Nazi support. See John-Paul Himka, “Ukrainian memories of the Holocaust: The Destruction of Jews as Reflected in Memoirs Collected in 1947,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 54 no. 2-3, 427-442; Dieter Pohl, “The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews under German Military Administration and in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine,” in The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization ed. by Brandon Ray and Wendy Lower, (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2010), 23-76; Yaroslav Hrysak, Strasti za natsionalizmom: Istorychi eseyi (Passions for Nationalism: Historical Essays), (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2004).
118 The exact number of members who were assigned to task forces are hard to come by and vary significantly. Z. Matla, the leader of Group South, claims that the OUN had a total number of 8,000 members who worked in expeditionary task forces. See Matla, Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa, 9. L. Shankovs’kyi states that there were 5,000 members total in the three groups sent to Central and Eastern Ukraine (1,500 in Group North, 1,500 in Group East, and 1,000 in Group South) prior to the German invasion. See Shankovs’kyi, Pokhidni hrupy OUN, 11-13. However, recently historians have estimated that the number more likely falls between 750 and 1,500. Ukrainian sources could be elevating the number of members as an attempt to try and claim there was greater support for the OUN that there actually was, using the total number of OUN-B and OUN-M task force members, or the disparity.
acted as translators while the rest were divided into groups of ten to fifteen people and spread throughout Ukraine where they concentrated their efforts on organizing national political, social, and economic nationalist organization.\(^\text{119}\) Similar to the UCC’s activities during the Nazi occupation of Eastern Poland, OUN nationalizing efforts in the summer of 1941 focused on promoting Ukrainian nationalism by displaying national symbols, holding celebrations for the German liberators, and distributing nationalist and pro-Nazi propaganda.\(^\text{120}\) The OUN-B also assisted local Ukrainians in rebuilding and reviving Orthodox Churches, reopening schools and universities, printing Ukrainian language textbooks, restoring trade unions, and creating national organizations such as the Ukrainian Red Cross.\(^\text{121}\) Other nationalizing efforts included the resurrection of *Provisty*, or adult education societies, and the creation of paramilitary youth organizations in different regions in central and eastern Ukraine for children twelve years old and younger.\(^\text{122}\) The expression of Ukrainian nationalism was not entirely the work of the OUN. Ukrainians, especially those in Western Ukraine, also took the initiative to revive civic life locally at every level.\(^\text{123}\) As one Ukrainian wrote, “No one who lived and worked in Galicia at the time waited for permission from the Germans; we took over the institutions in which we worked, out of personal initiative and desire, for the benefit of the Ukrainian state.”\(^\text{124}\)

could stem from the fact that Ukrainian sources used the number of members initially sent to Central and Eastern Ukraine whereas recent studies are using the number of members that actually arrived in those areas. Since its clear that many members in Group North and Group East were either broken up or killed by German soldiers, when speaking of the number of *pokhidni hrupy* actively working in Central and Eastern Ukraine in the summer of 1941, I will use the estimate of 750-1,500.

\(^\text{119}\) Mick, “Incompatible Experiences, 347.
\(^\text{120}\) See for example “Druzhniy Vechir,” *Berezhans’ki Visti*, no. 6, August 7, 1941, 2; “Vidnovlyaymo ridnu kul’turu,” *Berezhans’ki Visti*, no. 6, August 7, 1941, 2, AUPO.
\(^\text{121}\) “Kin’e’ bil’shovys’k’i kiy panshchyny,” *Vil’na Ukrayina* (Tetiiv), no. 1, October 14, 1941, 2; “Vstan’ Ukrayino,” *Vil’ na Ukrayina* (Tetiiv), no. 1, October 14, 1941, 1, AUPO.
\(^\text{122}\) “Druzhniy Vechir,” *Berezhans’ki Visti*, no. 6, August 7, 1941, 2, AUPO.
\(^\text{123}\) Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 59.
\(^\text{124}\) Quoted in Ibid.
Although some OUN-B members described a reluctance of Soviet Ukrainian villagers to join the national movement as sign of political backwardness, others encountered a population with a common national awareness that “served as a basis for common action between Soviet and Western Ukrainians.” Some expeditionary groups noted that national consciousness was greater than it had been during the revolution in 1921, especially in the industrial regions of the Donbass, which saw an influx of Ukrainian peasants in the 1930s. Other OUN-B sympathizers came from the rural and urban intelligentsia or had held posts in the Soviet administration. For example, in Dovbysh the former Soviet inspector of the regional school, the assistant to the regional administration, and the assistant director of the regional cooperative all agreed to work with the Ukrainian nationalists. Furthermore, in the Donbass, members of the OUN-B built a network encompassing a dozen cities. Its organization consisted of more than 500 people, and an estimated 10,000 were considered “active sympathizers.” According to one partisan, M. Omeliusik, the nationality policies of the Soviet Union and Ukrainianization efforts in the 1930s focusing on history, language, and geography provided a basis for common national sentiments as training for OUN members focused on similar topics. According to the historian, Bohdan Krawchenko, “self-organization at the local level was felt to be the first step toward achieving a national government,” and “the OUN’s singleness of purpose and dynamism impressed the still fragmented Soviet Ukrainian population.” As a result, links created by the

127 Brown, A Biography of No Place, 215.
OUN between Western and Eastern Ukrainians in the first months of Nazi occupation were quite successful in connecting Ukrainians who shared common national traits and sentiments.\textsuperscript{131}

The period of national revival was brief and the first efforts to suppress Ukrainian nationalist activity took place on 31 August 1941 in Zhytomyr and by the end October 1941 Hitler strictly rejected any creation of a Ukrainian state. The establishment of a Nazi government in Ukraine included the division of Ukrainian lands into three separate administrative zones: Galicia was added to the General Government; most of Odessa, parts of the Vinnytsia and Mykolaiv oblasts, and Bukovyna were ceded to Romania as compensation for Romania’s loss of Transylvania to Hungary; Volhynia and the vast majority of Central and Eastern Soviet Ukraine became the Reichkommissariat Ukraine under the leadership of Erich Koch; while the most eastern districts of Soviet Ukraine, which remained close to the eastern front stayed under control of the Wehrmacht.\textsuperscript{132} According to Mark Mazower, Hitler’s division of Ukrainian inhabited lands “was of major strategic significance, for together with the handover of Galicia to the General Government, it meant no substantial independent Ukrainian state could emerge under German control.”\textsuperscript{133}

Following the division of Ukrainian lands, Nazi authorities began to crack down on all Ukrainian nationalist activity and removed all Ukrainian troops in the Abwehr and Wehrmacht. The first to fall victim were the expeditionary groups sent by both factions of the OUN and their Eastern Ukrainian sympathizers.\textsuperscript{134} In L’viv the Gestapo registered all known nationalists and then conducted sweeping arrests on September 15, 1941.\textsuperscript{135} Nazi officials arrested leaders of

\textsuperscript{131} Krawchenko, “Soviet Ukraine under Nazi Occupation, 1941-1944,” 19.
\textsuperscript{132} “Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery,” 1 October 1941, in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 vol. 3, (London: H.M.S.O., 1964), 319.
\textsuperscript{133} Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazi’s Rule Europe, (New York: Penguin, 2009), 331.
\textsuperscript{134} Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 106.
\textsuperscript{135} Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 60.
Ukrainian cultural and civic organizations, purged local administrations, shut down the production of Ukrainian newspapers, closed national schools, banned Ukrainian national symbols, and the police were thoroughly eliminated of patriotic Ukrainians. \(^{136}\) Decrees declaring that Ukraine was now a German Commissariat were displayed in cities and villages in an attempt to thwart nationalist activity. One such decree posted in the city of Kremenets in the Ternopil oblast announced, “All political parties are banned; any political propaganda, regardless of purpose, is viewed as a crime against Germany. All power in the town is now transferred to the German Authorities.”\(^{137}\) As a result, on September 3, 1941, OUN-B leaders were forced to move underground and form a conspiratorial organization. OUN-M followers thought they had gained a measure of independence and support from the Germans and despite the ban on public meetings and demonstrations, the OUN-M organized a commemoration at Bazar near Zhytomyr on November 21, 1941 to memorialize 359 soldiers of the Ukrainian National Army who died singing the Ukrainian national anthem after refusing to join the Bolsheviks in 1921.\(^{138}\) German authorities arrested and executed 720 of the 40,000 people who attended and subsequently shut down all Ukrainian literary and newspaper publications in Kyiv. In January 1942 all members of the OUN-M who had not gone underground were arrested, with an estimated 621 members killed at Babi Yar.\(^{139}\)

The overall plan for the Nazi occupation of Ukraine was to secure fertile land and food supplies from Ukraine and eventually settle the conquered territories with ethnic Germans. However, the implementation of Nazi imperial plans was delayed since the German military faced numerous unexpected setbacks on the eastern front, failing to achieve their goal of

\(^{136}\) Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 142-143.
\(^{137}\) Kravchenko-Bereznoy, *Secret Diary*, 56.
\(^{138}\) Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 106.
\(^{139}\) Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 63; Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*, 142-143.
destroying the entire Soviet political system by the winter of 1941.\textsuperscript{140} As a result, the crackdown in nationalist activity at the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942 coincided with the introduction of exploitative economic policies aimed at facilitating a Germany victory in the East. Oppressive policies in the form of forced requisitioning, the expropriation of housing, the forced starvation of millions of POWs and civilians, and the introduction of a forced labor program caused many Ukrainians who had initially supported the Nazi invasion to turn against German rule. Moreover, the Ukrainian-Jewish population was exterminated and Ukrainian civilians were killed en mass in the form of reprisals and counter reprisals. Consequently, Nazi endeavors to eliminate Ukrainian nationalism, economically exploit Ukrainians, and determinately win the war on the eastern front not only caused both factions of the OUN to move underground but also caused civilian support for the OUN to drastically increase.

**Changes to Ukrainian Nationalism 1939-1944**

Despite the Nazi crackdown on Ukrainian nationalist activity and the implementation of successive exploitative occupational policies, Ukrainian nationalists, in defiance of German orders, continued their nationalizing operations to gain support for an independent Ukrainian state. However, since the OUN was forced underground, the organization had to modify its objectives and methods for realizing aims. While achieving an independent Ukrainian state was always the overall goal, immediate wartime conditions demanded a partisan movement. Underground operations included canvassing and recruitment campaigns, secret training operations, the formation of Ukrainian militias, and guerilla warfare. Moreover, in order to gain a mass following from Ukrainians living in Central and Eastern Ukrainian appeal to Western Allies, Ukrainian nationalists transformed their rhetoric and publically defined themselves as an

\textsuperscript{140} For German military setbacks in 1941 see Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941-43, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1985), Chapters 3-4.
anti-imperialist movement against both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union that proclaimed a commitment to socially democratic principals including economic equality, religious freedom and the protection for certain minority groups.

Once the OUN moved underground, both factions continued to use expeditionary forces to recruit new members, obtain local allies, and although the majority of partisan activity was confined to the Volhynia, Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts, the OUN-B established local and rural communication networks throughout Central and Eastern Ukraine. Initially recruitment campaigns were particularly successful in secondary schools. Maria Pskyir, an OUN-B member in charge of recruiting new members from schools remembers:

At our school [in Kyiv], I was told to recruit students to the OUN. At that time many young people were joining the OUN. My generation opposed Germany because we felt we were being reduced to serfs, as the Gestapo implemented restrictions on the freedom of movement and assembly and began to arrest activists.

OUN-B members also circulated petitions in youth organizations such as the “Appeal to Ukrainian Citizens and Youth by the Ukrainian Central Committee President,” which specifically called for Ukrainian adolescents to rise up and join the military struggle against Bolshevisation and National Socialism in L’viv and Krakow.

In the spring of 1942 recruitment campaigns branched out from urban schools and universities and focused on gaining support in rural regions, especially those located near OUN controlled forests. OUN members continued to travel in small groups by wagon, on foot, or bike, skirting cities in order to avoid Nazi officials in an attempt to find support among civilians.

141 Homze, *Foreign Labor in Germany*, 159.
143 “Appeal to Ukrainian Citizens and Youth by the Ukrainian Central Committee President,” 6 May 1943, reprinted in *Ukraine during World War II*, 183-184.
for the nationalist cause. One OUN member remembered, “we spent the days in the forests, but as night approached we would march toward the nearest village where we would find food and make initial contact.” Myroslav Prokrop, one of the more prominent members of the OUN-B, recalled how he approached Ukrainians in the central and eastern regions of Ukraine:

In my trip from L’viv to Kyiv I stopped in the Zhytomyr region; I avoided cities where the Germans were concentrated. I stayed with a contact man in the village, a local supporter who was usually a leader of cultural activities in the village and the most educated. I would clear my identity by addressing my contact first as “Druh” (friend not comrade) and then state that I had arrived from such and such a place in the west. I usually approached the younger ones who were easier to co-opt by asking a broad question like what do you think of the treatment of Ukrainians by the Soviets or Germans. If he did not respond sympathetically then I would disappear into the night. We used pseudonyms for personal and village names. In our written communication we wrote on thin cigarette paper; it could be eaten if we were captured; we relied on locals and the underground to obtain food and supplies.

Many locals who worked with the OUN-B in Central and Eastern Ukraine served as couriers or provided their homes as safe houses, where partisans could stop for food, shelter, or hold meetings between officers to exchange information, which proved to be vital in maintaining communication networks throughout Ukraine. According to one OUN-B commander, task forces were operating in 33,000 locations throughout all areas of occupied Ukraine between 1942 and 1943. In the Donbass, the OUN-B built a network encompassing a dozen cities. Its organization consisted of more than 500 people, and an estimated 10,000 were considered “active sympathizers.” Increases in the number of members and sympathizers were a direct

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144 Brown, A Biography of No Place, 214.
145 Pskyir, Thousands of Roads, 30.
146 Quoted in Lower, Nazi Empire Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine, 39.
147 Hunczak, My Memoirs, 11.
response to the intensification of policies adopted by the Nazi occupation administration such as deliberate starvation policies, forced labor, and reprisals against civilians.

Following recruitment campaigns, new members met deep in the forests where they attended training camps that instructed them in military sciences, map reading, and weapons training.\textsuperscript{150} Training camps also indoctrinated new members in nationalist rhetoric. For example, trainees in Volhynia, who came from mostly from Galicia and regions of the Carpathian Mountains, had to swear an oath to Stepan Bandera and the idea of an independent Ukraine, ending each training session with the singing of the national anthem.\textsuperscript{151} New members also had to read or listen to the “Act of Proclamation of the Ukrainian State,” and carry a pocket-sized version of \textit{Istoria Ukrainy} (The Little History of Ukraine), which portrayed Ukrainian history as an endless timeline of foreign occupations.\textsuperscript{152} Once trained, new members were tasked with delivering mail, gathering intelligence, or going on their own recruitment campaigns.\textsuperscript{153} Since many training camps took place in the forests of the Carpathian foothills, these camps effectively brought young Ukrainians from different regions together and provided a space for the manifestation of a shared political and national loyalty.

Ukrainians joined or decided to provide logistical support for the OUN for a variety of reasons and while the authors of many memoirs cite their political objectives for joining the OUN, they also note that the majority of Ukrainians who supported the OUN did so as a direct result of Nazi economic and extermination policies.\textsuperscript{154} In the winter of 1941 Ukrainians who had initially welcomed the Nazi takeover and defeat of the Soviet Union quickly turned against

\textsuperscript{150} Mykola Klymyshy, \textit{V pokhodi do voli}, (Detroit: Ukraïnska knyharnia, 1987), 297.
\textsuperscript{151} Rossolinski-Leibe, “‘The Ukrainian National Revolution,’ of 1941,”103. Rossolinski-Leibe also mentions that in some areas “recalcitrant parts of the nation” were forced to participate in the OUN either through threats of punishment, fear, and in some cases force.
\textsuperscript{152} Matla, \textit{Pivdeena pokhidna grupa}, 28.
\textsuperscript{153} Pskyir, \textit{Thousands of Roads}, 31.
Germany when soldiers began plundering collective farms and individual homes, Soviet POWs and Ukrainian civilians in large cities were systematically starved to death, and labor requirements forced Ukrainians to work in Germany for the duration of the war. According to one former OUN-B member,

Gestapo pressure and terrorism of the population was becoming increasingly brutal. Jews had been rounded up and taken away to concentration camps. Political activists faced sudden arrest while young, able-bodied men and women were seized and forced onto trains that took them to labor camps in Germany. Every day the population was subjected to senseless brutality.\(^{155}\)

The forced labor program in particular caused young Ukrainians to join partisan groups as partisans helped and provided shelter for those fleeing forced labor in Germany.\(^{156}\) Moreover, once militias began conducting regular attacks on Nazi authorities, reprisals carried out against civilian populations in the form of mass arson left villages burned to the ground and many homeless Ukrainians flocked to the partisan controlled forests out of sheer necessity.\(^{157}\)

The OUN also established an underground nationalist publishing operation to spread nationalist propaganda to prospective members. The Ukrainian Online Periodical Archive’s collection entitled “Ukrainian Propaganda Press in the Occupied Territories 1941-1944” demonstrates the extent to which OUN forces reached various regions of occupied Ukraine. The collection holds 269 newspaper titles, with 195 newspapers printed entirely in Ukrainian. The following chart provides a breakdown of the number of Ukrainian language newspapers that printed nationalist propaganda between 1941 and 1944.\(^{158}\)

\(^{156}\) Ibid.
\(^{158}\) Collection of Ukrainian Propaganda Press in the Occupied Territories 1941-1944, AUPO, available at https://libraria.ua/collections/24/.

Ukrainian Propaganda Press in the Occupied Territories 1941-1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of newspapers</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>L’viv</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherkasy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Poltava</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rivne</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ivan Franko</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sumy</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ternopil</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Transcarpathia</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khmelnytsky</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Vinnytsia</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirovohrad</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Volyn</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhansk</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>11</td>
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</table>

Although some of the newspapers only had a couple editions and others were only published between 1941 and spring 1942, there are others, mainly in larger areas that continued to be published until 1944. Moreover, the collection of newspapers, which spans the entire area of occupied Ukraine, provides a look at the extent of nationalist activity and the amount of support among the Ukrainian population.

In addition to canvassing and recruitment campaigns, training operations, the publication of nationalist propaganda, the OUN-B also formed its own army and actively engaged in guerilla warfare against all political enemies, including the Nazis, but also against Soviet and Polish partisans. The enactment of Nazi economic and extermination policies in 1942 coincided with the emergence of an active Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine. The Communist Party initially organized Soviet partisans and an underground network near the eastern front behind enemy lines that fought to restore the pre-1941 Soviet borders, but as the war continued Soviet partisans expanded their operations first to the northernmost areas of Ukraine in 1942, and then to Western

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159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
Ukraine by mid-1943. One of the most famous Soviet partisans, Sydir Kovpak, a Ukrainian from Poltava, led a regiment of 3,500 mostly Russian and Belorussian troops that raided areas along the northernmost parts of Soviet Ukraine between 1942 and 1944.\footnote{John Armstrong, “Introduction,” in \textit{Soviet Partisans in World War II}, ed. John Armstrong (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 44; Earl Ziemke, “Composition and Morale of the Partisan Movement” in \textit{Soviet Partisans in World War II}, 150. Ziemke argues that approximately 80 percent of Soviet partisans operating in northern areas of Ukraine self-identified as Russian Belarusians.}

In response to the presence of Soviet partisans, who often intentionally provoked German reprisals against the local population, Ukrainian nationalists organized militias and self-defense units.\footnote{Shankovs'kyi, \textit{Pokhidni hrupy OUN}, 47-48.} Early in 1942 the OUN distributed leaflets calling on Ukrainians not to surrender their weapons to Nazi authorities, but instead join the underground militias.\footnote{Shkandrij, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 64.} In the spring of 1942, Taras Bulba-Borovets, who worked with the OUN-M, organized several Ukrainian militia groups in Western Volhynia and Polissia to defend the local population from the German army and Soviet partisans. The OUN-B and OUN-M both had their own military units as well and in October 1942 the OUN-B guerilla units merged with Bulba-Borovets’ groups to form the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (\textit{Ukrainska povstanska armii}, or UPA).\footnote{Petro Sodol, “Ukrainian Insurgent Army,” in \textit{Encyclopedia of Ukraine}, vol 5, 342.}

At the end of 1942, the UPA had approximately 15,000 members, controlling a liberated zone of some 50,000 square kilometers and two million people and by April 1943, the UPA controlled the entire northwest portion of the Volhynia province, completely removing the entire German civil administration. In March 1943, in response to a call by the OUN-B leadership, approximately 6,000 Ukrainian policemen abandoned the Nazis with their weapons and joined the UPA, and by 1944 the UPA had about 40,000 members.\footnote{Although some Soviet and Ukrainian sources claim that at its high point the UPA had over 100,000 members, most historians place the estimated number of members close to 40,000. See for example Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 172; Dean, \textit{Collaboration in the Holocaust}, 145, Mazower, \textit{Hitler’s Empire}, 506; and Peter J. Potichnyj, “Ukrainians in World War II Military Formations: An Overview” in \textit{Ukraine during World War II}, 65.} Unlike other underground
movements that operated in Nazi-occupied Europe, the UPA had almost no foreign support, making “its growth and strength an indication of the very considerable popular support it enjoyed among the Ukrainians.”\textsuperscript{166} UPA soldiers regularly sabotaged factories, raided German supply units, stole Nazi vehicles, set fire to Wehrmacht camps, conducted espionage missions, acted as couriers, killed Ukrainians who worked for the Germans, and conducted espionage missions.\textsuperscript{167} German responses to Ukrainian insurgency included court martials; the shooting of civilians including the elderly, women, and children; burning down entire villages; printing execution orders in newspapers and on posters; and displaying executed bodies, which effectively caused more Ukrainians to join the OUN-B and UPA.\textsuperscript{168} 

Ukrainian nationalist rhetoric also changed over the course of the war. At the beginning of the war the type of Ukrainian nationalism promoted by the OUN was characterized by authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and animosity toward national rivals, and during the occupations of Western and Eastern Poland the OUN relied heavily on emotional propaganda, myths and symbols of historical struggle, notions of collectivism, volunteerism, and patriotic duty. In light of the European balance of power in the 1930s and early 1940s Ukrainian nationalists viewed the Germans as their only potential strategic partner against both Poland and the Soviet Union, adopting fascist and far-right rhetoric. However, once Hitler refused to allow an independent Ukrainian state, the OUN no longer needed an alliance with Germany. Consequently, Ukrainian nationalists tried to find support for an independent state from other

\textsuperscript{166} Subtelny, \textit{Ukraine: A History}, 474.  
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
foreign powers, namely the Western Allied nations, which necessitated a change in rhetoric, which resulted in a redefinition of the OUN’s platform.

In the spring of 1942, the OUN-B began to shift to an anti-imperial stance, which can be seen in the language of the OUN-B’s underground press describing both communists and Nazis as enemies of Ukraine. Not only had Nazi polices enraged the Ukrainian population, but it was clear that Eastern Ukrainians overwhelmingly rejected dictatorship in any form since they had witnessed forced collectivization, the Holodomor, and the purging of civil society at the hands of Stalin. While most propaganda in 1941 focused on fostering allegiance to Nazi Germany, between 1942 and 1944 nationalist rhetoric became increasingly opposed to both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The OUN-B’s wartime journal, *Idea i chyn* (Idea and Deed) began denouncing both Nazi and Soviet rule as early as September 1942.\(^{169}\) However, it was not until August 1943 at the OUN’s Third Congress that the organization officially stated they were resolutely fighting both communism and fascism and adopted an entirely anti-imperialist agenda:

> The Program and Resolutions adopted at the Third Congress explicitly stated:

> The warring imperialist powers are not bringing the world any progressive political or social ideas. In particular, Germany’s so-called “New Europe” and Moscow’s “Soviet Union” are a denial of the right of nations to free political and cultural development within their own states; instead they bring all nations political and social enslavement. For this reason, a victory for the imperialist powers in the current war and an organization of the world according to imperialist principals would bring only a momentary pause in the war and would soon lead to new collisions between the imperialist powers over the division of war spoils and new conflicts.\(^{170}\)

In 1943, calls to action against Nazi and Soviet rule were seen in newspapers throughout Western, Central, and Eastern Ukraine in 1943. For example, Nazi occupation policies were now

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\(^{169}\) Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 74.

described as “plans of German racist imperialism” in nationalist newspapers whereas “Russia ideologically and politically comprised and materially weakened” Ukrainians for centuries.\textsuperscript{171}

The anti-imperialist stance was also closely linked to a sense of victimhood promoted by Ukrainian nationalists. For example, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation council (UHVR) described the experience of Ukrainians under foreign occupation during the Second World War in their platform in July 1944, stating “This foreign domination has been marked by unprecedented oppression, massive plunder of the Ukrainian people, a return of peasants and workers to a state of true serfdom, merciless exploitation, and the extermination of millions of people by means of famine and terror.”\textsuperscript{172}

The OUN also tried to gain support from Central and Eastern Ukrainians since expeditions of \textit{pokhidni hrupy} in Central and Eastern Ukraine over the course of the war revealed collective grievances against the Soviet Union and communism. OUN members found that peasants and workers not only identified as “Ukrainian” instead of “Soviet” or “Russian,” but also strongly opposed collectivization and other repressive communist policies.\textsuperscript{173} Ukrainians from the former Soviet Ukraine wanted a democratic government with a multi-party system, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, independent trade unions, the nationalization of transportation and communication, and the protection of all citizens under the law.\textsuperscript{174} In his summary of expeditionary forces, L. Shankovsky concluded that “In the harsh conditions of German occupation, the Ukrainian popular masses gave support to the organization which not

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} “Platform of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, July 11-15, 1944, in Ukraine during World War II, 196.
\textsuperscript{173} Shankovsky, \textit{Pokhidni Hrupy OUN}, 75-76.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 107, 117.
only was able to shout abstract slogans, no matter how good or convincing they sounded, but which could stand for the living interests of the people."\(^{175}\)

In response to Ukrainian attitudes in Central and Eastern Ukraine, the OUN-B also changed their economic position, which previously had promoted a mixed economy based on the cooperation of the state, cooperatives, and private capital.\(^{176}\) Since the aim was to attain Ukrainian national economic self-sufficiency, increase natural wealth, and protect the livelihood of the population, the First Congress of the OUN in 1929 called for a high level of government control in both the agricultural and industrial sector. Although the OUN touted the right of private ownership of land, the organization’s vague economic program relied on the state regulation of agricultural production and an unspecified amount of state-owned land. Additionally, the program also called for the nationalization of key branches of industry and state-controlled trade operations.\(^{177}\)

However, at its Third Congress at the end of August 1943, the OUN not only reformed its previous economic policy, but provided a significantly more detailed economic plan for a future Ukrainian state. In terms of agricultural production, OUN leaders promised to redistribute land, allow farmers to choose their own methods for working the land, and cap state ownership of land at five percent, which would be reserved only for the building of technical facilities.\(^{178}\) The OUN also called for a universal eight-hour workday, free trade unions, fair wages for all citizens, the right for tradesmen to unite voluntarily in work associations, and options for laborers to receive company dividends. Although the Third Congress maintained that the state would retain

\(^{175}\) Ibid., 58; “Resolution of the First Congress of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” January 28- February 2, 1929, in *Ukraine during World War II*, 167.

\(^{176}\) Ibid., 168-169.

\(^{177}\) Shankovs’kyi, *Pokhidni hrupy OUN*, 58, 79.
ownership of the largest industries, it laid out incentives to encourage the private ownership of smaller industries and affirmed a free marketplace.\textsuperscript{179} Compared to the “Programmatic Resolutions” adopted by the First Congress, which was largely concerned with defining Ukrainian nationalism, the Third Congress made economic considerations as its primary focus, taking up nearly half of the resolutions adopted, which demonstrates the impact that Ukrainians in Central and Eastern Ukraine had on the OUN’s platform.

Another change in the OUN’s rhetoric occurred concerning the role of religion. According to Shankovsky, the Church and religious matters “had not been very popular among Western Ukrainian Nationalists in the thirties,” with most OUN leaders viewing religious conviction as a personal matter for each individual to decide.\textsuperscript{180} The Resolutions of the First Congress of the OUN had adopted a position of “full freedom of religious conscious,” separation of church and state, but suggested that religion should be relegated to the national cause.\textsuperscript{181} However, Orthodox Ukrainians in Central and Eastern Ukraine were strongly opposed to Soviet rule, which made them potential allies for the OUN, and during the war the underground movement protected and hid Orthodox priests and found support among religious Ukrainians who had been denied the right to practice religion under Stalin’s regime. Consequently, over the course of the war, members of the OUN increasingly worked with the clergy and archdioceses to defend religious freedom and create “a new epoch of our Motherland,” in which religion would be closely tied to Ukrainian identity.\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{179}“Programmatic and Political Resolutions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” August 21-25, 1929, in Ukraine during World War II, 187-188.
\textsuperscript{180}Shankovs’kyi, \textit{Pokhidni hrupy OUN}, 36.
\textsuperscript{182}“Slovo mytropolyta: do dukhovenstva virnykh arkhieparkhiyi,” \textit{Vil’ne Slova}, Drohobych no. 2, September 7, 1941, p. 1, AUPO.
Despite the fact that at the OUN spent the better part of the 1930s and first year two years of war striving to root out all “detrimental influences of alien domination in the cultural and psychological life of the nation,” Ukrainian nationalists also slowly began to allow space for the inclusion of certain ethnic and national minorities.\(^{183}\) In Central and Eastern Ukraine the OUN allowed the incorporation of national minorities in the underground organization as anti-Communist attitudes were widespread among Russians in the Donbas, Greeks in Mariupol, and Moldavians and Tatars near Crimea.\(^{184}\) Shankovs’kyi notes that expeditionary forces in Eastern Ukraine were instructed to recruit national minorities, which had the effect of convincing nationalists that “the idea of a sovereign Ukrainian state in which minorities had equal rights with Ukrainians could appeal to and be accepted by Russians, especially those who had been born and raised in Ukraine among the Ukrainian people and who considered Ukraine to be their homeland.”\(^{185}\) When the UPA began to fight both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army it absorbed into its ranks former soldiers from both forces including anti-communist Uzbeks, Georgians, Azerbaidzhanis, Tatars, and Russians.\(^{186}\) Moreover, by the fall of 1943 the OUN promised “equality of all citizens of Ukraine, whatever their nationality, the rights and obligations of citizenship, equal right to work, remuneration and rest,” marking a stark contrast the OUN’s previous rhetoric that encouraged hatred, terrorism, and violence against all national enemies.\(^{187}\)

This shift in rhetoric regarding national minorities was a practical move aimed at gaining support for an independent Ukrainian nation-state after the war ended. In a strategic move, the

\(^{183}\) “Programmatic and Political Resolutions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” August 21-25, 1929, in Ukraine during World War II, 187-188.

\(^{184}\) Shankovs’kyi, *Pokhidni hrupy OUN*, 12, 19.

\(^{185}\) Ibid. 20-21.

\(^{186}\) Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 72.

incorporation of anti-communist minorities in OUN ranks was publicized to the United States and Western Allies. Just as the OUN appealed to Nazi-Germany earlier in the war, it continued in its quest to gain any, as much, international support for an autonomous Ukrainian state.

The OUN-B and UPA also established and worked closely with other Ukrainian national groups, both within Ukraine and abroad. In July 1944 the UPA established the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR), which was designed to speak for all individuals and nationalist groups fighting in the Ukrainian national liberation struggle. The main goal of the UHVR was to unite and coordinate the activities of all the pro-independence liberation forces in Ukraine and throughout Europe.\(^{188}\) Several members of the UHVR were eventually sent abroad to establish representation in the United States and Canada, which marks one of the first coordinated effort by Ukrainian nationalists to unite Ukrainians in Europe and North America. Moreover, the UHVR described the experience of Ukrainians under foreign occupation during the Second World War in their platform in July 1944, stating “This foreign domination has been marked by unprecedented oppression, massive plunder of the Ukrainian people, a return of peasants and workers to a state of true serfdom, merciless exploitation, and the extermination of millions of people by means of famine and terror.”\(^{189}\)

Despite these changes in rhetoric, however, the actions of the OUN and UPA throughout the war often contradicted the new nationalist platform. Many members and leaders continued to collaborate with Nazi Germany, including appealing to German leaders in Berlin through a massive letter writing campaign, and the UPA spearheaded a massive ethnic cleansing campaign of Poles and Jews in Volhynia, suggesting that changes in rhetoric were merely an opportunistic

\(^{188}\) Despite the fact that at the end of the war over half of the UPA also belonged to the OUN, both the UPA and UHVR were officially considered separate bodies. See Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 73.

\(^{189}\) “Platform of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, July 11-15, 1944, in *Ukraine during World War II*, 196.
attempt to gain support from Western Allies for an independent Ukrainian state after the war ended. First, many members of the UCC and both factions of the OUN continued to collaborate with the Nazis throughout the war by continuing to work as policemen and clerics for the Nazi administration in Ukraine. Moreover, in an attempt to salvage their alliance with Nazi Germany, some members of the OUN also organized letter writing campaigns in imploring top Nazi officials in Germany to end the brutal occupational policies in the General Government and Reichskommissariat Ukraine by demonstrating Ukrainian support for a Nazi-Ukrainian alliance that allowed for Ukrainian self-rule. According to research conducted by the historian, Grzegorz Rossolinksi-Liebe, most of the letters came from the regions of Zhytomyr, Kyiv and Lviv, as well from the Ternopil, Kamianets’-Podhil, and Stantislaviv oblasts in Western and Central Ukraine. The letters were generally signed by hundreds of people to show that the OUN’s political aims were widely popular, with the average number of signatures ranging from 60 to 500 depending on locality, which Rossolinksi-Liebe argues indicates that the OUN had a wide range of support. Rossolinksi-Liebe concludes:

> What is interesting is the number of places and districts in which statehood was proclaimed by the OUN-B. According to a group of historians that the Ukrainian government established in 1997 to explore the history of the OUN-UPA, there were 213 districts across Ukraine, 187 in western Ukraine and 26 in eastern Ukraine, in which the OUN-B tried to establish statehood, and mobilized the population to write letters. If each of these districts of the OUN-B found 8,000 supporters, as was the case in the Zolochiv district, then altogether [it is estimated] the OUN-B would have been able to persuade 1,704,000 people to back its state project.\(^{190}\)

As Rossolinksi-Liebe states in the study, these numbers should be treated with caution as it was in the OUN’s interest to keep the number of signatures as high as possible.\(^{191}\) Regardless, the

\(^{190}\) Rossolinksi-Liebe, ‘‘The Ukrainian National Revolution’ of 1941,’’ 108.

\(^{191}\) According to Rossolinksi-Liebe, some letters were affixed with signatures or lists of signatures that make it possible to check the number of signatures declared in the letters but in other cases letters contained only contained
letter writing campaign clearly demonstrates that the OUN-B was trying to maintain an alliance with Nazi Germany at the same time it was changing it rhetoric to appeal to the Western Allies. Additionally, despite the OUN’s promise for the protection of minority rights, the UPA waged civil war against Germans, Soviet partisans, Polish guerillas, and regular Soviet troops between 1943 and the end of Nazi occupation in Ukraine, creating a civil war in Western Ukraine.\textsuperscript{192} The first armed clashes between Ukrainian militias and the German army occurred in the spring of 1942 and, although there were a small number of guerilla detachments operating in Eastern Ukraine, the majority of armed conflict occurred in Western Ukraine.\textsuperscript{193} Reports from UPA commanders detailing battles against German forces between 1943 and 1944 describe frequent armed clashes, reprisals, and counter-reprisals in the areas near Brest-Litovsk, Kovel (Volyn Oblast), Lityn (Vinnysia Oblast), Trypillya (Kyiv Oblast), and Kamianets-Polidskyi (Khmelnysky Oblast).\textsuperscript{194}

The ensuing civil war was the result of multiple foreign occupations of the region during the war in which Poles and Ukrainians experienced the forcible removal and destruction of groups in the name of national politics as victims, accomplices, and sometimes both.\textsuperscript{195} The OUN-B that led the UPA had long pledged to rid Western Ukraine of its national minorities. According to Timothy Snyder, the partisan army’s “capacity to kill Poles depended upon German training, and its determination to kill Poles had much to do with its desire to clear the terrain of purported enemies before a final confrontation with the Red Army.”\textsuperscript{196} The UPA killed staff signatures and merely listed the number of people who apparently agreed with their content. See Rossolinksi-Liebe, “The Ukrainian National Revolution” of 1941, 109.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} “Nazi Eastern Policy and Armed Resistance of the Ukrainian People in Documents,” Galicia, January 21, 1944, S-1492-000-0172, UNA.
\textsuperscript{196} Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin, (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 326.
tens of thousands of Poles and provoked reprisals from Poles upon Ukrainian civilians. Moreover, some 780,000 Poles were shipped to Poland. The killing of tens of thousands of unarmed men, women in children, in which one witnesses described as “a complete annihilation of the Poles of Ukraine” also burned down about two-thirds of Polish villages and forced Polish families to evacuate the territory without their belongings.

**Conclusion**

During the Second World War, Ukrainian nationalism was made and remade in response to changing geo-political occupations that an produced an environment of chaos, fear, brutality, and ethnic conflict. The war also provided opportunities to gain new members, spread their national agenda, and gain foreign support for an independent Ukrainian state. In light of the European balance of power in the 1930s and early 1940s Ukrainian nationalists viewed Germany as their only potential strategic partner against Poland and the Soviet Union, and consequently, adopted a fascist and far-right rhetoric. Between 1939 and the fall of 1941 the goal of achieving an independent Ukrainian state through an alliance with Nazi Germany led to a nationalizing effort focused on displaying national symbols, inciting ethnic conflict through anti-Polish and anti-Jewish propaganda, restoring Uniate and Orthodox Churches, establishing Ukrainian language schools, the creation of Ukrainian trade centers and cooperatives, advertising cultural activities, and perpetrating interethnic violence. Moreover, Ukrainian nationalist organizations directly allied themselves with the Nazi administration, most notably by forming Ukrainian units in the Wehrmacht and Abwehr and assisting in antisemitic violence. As a result, at the beginning of the war the type of Ukrainian nationalism promoted by the OUN was characterized by authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and animosity toward national rivals. During the occupations

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197 Ibid.
of Western and Eastern Poland the OUN relied heavily on emotional propaganda including myths and symbols of historical struggle; principals of blood and soil, which to Ukrainian nationalists represented the ideal of an ethnically defined national body united with the historical lands claimed by ethnic Ukrainians; as well as notions of collectivism, volunteerism, and patriotic duty.

However, once Hitler refused to allow an independent Ukrainian state and sought to eliminate all forms of national expression, the OUN no longer needed an alliance with Germany and changed its national rhetoric and methods for gaining support among the vast majority of Ukrainians. As result, Ukrainian nationalism was remade throughout the remainder of the war in response to brutal occupational policies inflicted on the entire Ukrainian population by the Nazi regime, the spread of nationalist propaganda by expeditionary task forces in Central and Eastern Ukraine, differences in political and economic goals between Ukrainians living in Western Ukraine and the former Soviet Ukraine, as well as the desire to gain Allied support at the end of war.

The changes in Ukrainian nationalism between 1941 and 1944 are extremely important when evaluating and analyzing Ukrainian nationalism in postwar diaspora communities since many former OUN members made up a significant number of displaced persons after the war ended. Ukrainians who outwardly and covertly assisted the OUN also fled westward as the Red Army retook territories in Ukraine due to fear of Soviet retribution and/or refusal to live under the Soviet system any longer. Although many of Eastern Ukrainians who followed the German retreat found their way blocked by Soviet partisans, in the fall and winter of 1943 close to 10,000 Eastern Ukrainians arrived in Galicia, which was still relatively safe and stable at that point. Members of the well-organized Ukrainian community in Kharkiv were also prominent among
the refugees. Since the UCC was still functioning in the General Government, the organization helped evacuate many Eastern Ukrainians and assisted them in finding work and accommodation in Galicia.

However, as Nazi defenses crumbled in the summer of 1944, Western Ukrainians joined the flight westward. Despite the fact that the OUN advised its members to remain in Ukraine to fight the Soviets, many leaders and members fled west with members of the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia, prosperous peasants, and merchants. Moreover, anyone who originally worked with the German administration as mayors, civil servants, or local police fled for fear of Soviet retribution. Although the exact number of Ukrainian refugees are hard to come by, the administration of the General Government reported that as of July 1944 approximately 120,000 Ukrainians left, and of those perhaps 30,000 crossed into Slovakia and 90,000 into Hungary. Many paused after crossing the border, but when it became evident that the Soviet offensive could not be stopped, Ukrainian refugees began the long trek to Germany. All in all, about 30 to 40 percent of the Ukrainian displaced persons in the postwar period were made up of political refugees who fled the Soviet army. These political refugees brought with them their war experiences, including changing notions of Ukrainian nationalism. These shifts and changes were not linear, but by the end of the war Ukrainian nationalists who migrated to Germany and Austria continued to espouse the new nationalist platform defined by anti-imperialism, freedom

200 Veryha, ed., “The Ukrainian Central Committee and its Documents,” in Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee, 27.
202 Reynolds, Leaving Home, 10.
of speech, religious freedom, and the protection of minorities as a way to distance themselves from their Soviet past and demonstrate opposition to communism.
Chapter Three
The Nazi Forced Labor Program and the Displacement of Ukrainians during World War II

With the inherent instinct of the Eastern peoples, the primitive man soon found out that for Germany the slogan: ‘Liberation from Bolshevism’ was only a pretext to enslave the Eastern peoples according to her own methods…With unequaled presumption, we put aside all political knowledge and treated the peoples of the occupied Eastern territories as ‘Second Class Whites’ to whom Providence has merely assigned the task of serving as slaves for Germany.

--Dr. Otto Braeutigam
“Secret Memorandum”

In March 1942 Fritz Sauckel, the Nazi Plenipotentiary General for the Utilization of Labor (Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz, or GBA), created a labor program for the occupied Eastern territories that relied on compulsory labor requirements and the use of force to transport millions of Eastern Europeans between 1942 and 1944 to Germany to work in industry and agriculture. As Dr. Otto Braeutigam, a high ranking official in Alfred Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, noted in a secret memorandum on October 5, 1942, the Nazi forced labor program was predicated on the perceived racial inferiority of the Slavic population of Eastern Europe which, when combined with Hitler’s colonial aims and Germany’s economic needs during the Second World War, proved to be physically and psychologically devastating for those that were conscripted into the program.

In the occupied areas of Ukraine, forced labor deportations to Germany affected an estimated one in every forty inhabitants living in the Reichkommissariat Ukraine and the southern military zone over the course of the Second World War. By August 1942 half a million Ukrainians had already been conscripted for forced labor, a number that doubled to one million on June 24, 1943. Ultimately, between 1.5 million and 1.8 million Ukrainians worked in

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2 The Estimate of one in forty by Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 89.
Germany, Austria, and parts of Czechoslovakia during the war. Understanding the experience of Ukrainian forced laborers can help explain the strength and cohesion of ethno-nationalism in Ukrainian in forced labor camps as Ukrainians used cultural nationalism to survive working as forced laborers.

Using published Nazi materials, memories, interviews with former forced laborers, and archival material from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, this chapter will examine the evolution of the Nazi labor program in the occupied areas of Ukraine. It will highlight how Nazi racial ideology guided the transition from voluntary recruitment to forced labor conscription, determined methods of categorization and segregation of forced laborers, and led to discrimination against Eastern Europeans in forced labor camps to demonstrate another example of the ways in which total war fostered cultural nationalism that helped Ukrainian forced laborers create a sense of community in order to survive the war, overcome bitterness over Nazi racial policies, and gain material advantages.

Since Nazi labor policy developed in response to the protracted war with the Soviet Union it became increasingly radicalized, progressively more exploitative, and steadily continued to interject Nazi racial ideology as Nazi officials made ad hoc responses to unanticipated wartime circumstances. As a result, Nazi racial policies governed guidelines for categorizing and segregating national groups, which physically placed Ukrainians from different regions and socio-economic classes together in collection centers, transport trains, transit camps, and labor camps, and also affected job assignments, housing accommodations, food distribution,

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3 The 1.5 million estimate comes from Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 90 and Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 273. Timothy Mulligan sites 1.7 million Ostarabeiter were working in Germany in August 1943 and Orest Subtelny estimates the total number of Ukrainians forced laborers from both the Reichkommissariat Ukraine and General Government was around 1.8 million. See Timothy Mulligan, Politics of Illusion and Empire: German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1942-1943, (New York: Praeger, 1988) and Orest Subtelny, “Ukrainian Political Refugees: An Historical Overview,” in in The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II, ed. by Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus, (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 14.
access to health care, and regulated leisure activities. Forced displacement, national segregation, and discrimination against Eastern European forced laborers led Ukrainians to create networks, and in some instances small communities, to challenge national classification procedures, provide emotional reassurance, supplement poor material provisions, and practice cultural and religious traditions tying them to the homeland. These networks transcended the boundaries of the homeland and became the basis for the construction of diaspora communities following the war in which national identity was defined by a shared language, history, culture, and a sense of victimhood resulting from occupation, war, violence, and displacement.

**Nazi Labor Policy in Occupied Ukraine**

Nazi labor policy in the occupied areas of Ukraine combined Hitler’s colonial aims in Eastern Europe, Nazi racial ideology, and fact that Ukraine was the only realistic source of grain in which to feed Nazi soldiers and German civilians for the duration of the war. As early as 1925, Hitler outlined his plan to conquer Eastern Europe and exploit the region for its agricultural riches, stating in his autobiographical manifesto, *Mein Kampf*, “and so we National Socialists turn our gaze to toward land in the east...if we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states.”

Eastern Europe was a prominent geographical necessity for Hitler since he intended the region to provide ethnic Germans with additional *Lebensraum*, or “living space,” and because it held the promise of a rural Germanic lifestyle that Nazi ideology glorified. The long-term Nazi *Generalplan Ost* involved seizing Eastern Europe, the consolidation of the borders in the Reich’s eastern empire, the eventual elimination of the region’s native inhabitants, and the vast migration of ethnic Germans to Eastern Europe to live in “a neo-feudal system of farms and model villages interspersed with SS outposts along two main communication routes leading from the Reich to

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4 Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 654
Leningrad and the Crimea.” Ukraine, with its fertile soil and mineral rich Black Sea region, was specifically reserved for an estimated twenty million German colonists that would gradually outnumber the local inhabitants until the country became, in Hitler’s words, “one of the loveliest gardens in the world.”

Hitler’s plans for colonizing Eastern Europe and Ukraine were closely tied to Nazi racial ideology, which not only saw Jews as an “anti-race- a parasitical, polluting people with no authentic culture,” but also classified the Slavic population of Eastern Europe as a “despised and intrinsically inferior race.” Anti-Slavism in the Nazi racial hierarchical order can be traced back to nineteenth century ideas of biological racism and social Darwinism, as well as German aims during the occupation of Poland during the First World War, which foresaw extending formal and informal influence over Poland in order to remove indigenous peoples and replace them with ethnic Germans. As a result, many German soldiers returned from the Eastern Front in 1918 with an increased conviction of their own superiority in relation to the Slavic populations in Eastern Europe. The Russian Revolution and waves of anti-Bolshevism in the interwar period only heightened anti-Slavism in Germany as communism was increasingly associated with Eastern European populations. The legacy of the First World War and anti-Slavic propaganda depicting Slavs as primitive, dirty, unhealthy, ethnically mixed, and in desperate need of Germanic order, coalesced to ensure a brutal occupation for Ukrainians as Hitler’s expansionist aims were

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5 Donald Bloxham, The Final Solution: A Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 180
7 Quotes come from Bloxham, The Final Solution, 140. Slavs were defined as those who spoke Slavic languages, and although there were three major groups of Slavs according to Nazi racial ideology: the eastern Slavs (Russians, White Russians, Ukrainians), western Slavs (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Lusatian Sorbs), and the southern Slavs (Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes), the treatment towards different groups of Slavs varied over the course of the war. See John Connelly, “Nazis and Slavs: From Racial Theory to Racist Practice,” Central European History 32, no. 1 (1999): 4.
8 Bloxham, The Final Solution, 46, 79; Also see Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Cultural, National Identity, and German Occupation in WWI, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
9 Ibid., 82-83
combined with policies centered on economic exploitation and population control of non-
Germans.¹⁰

Ukraine was a vital and necessary part of Hitler’s short-term plan to win the war with the
Soviet Union. Between 1933 and 1939, Germany’s focus on rearmament and military spending,
in addition to the “politicization of foreign trade,” which left Germany paying substantial
agricultural premiums to foreign nations in exchange for loyalty to the Third Reich, prevented
German agriculture from receiving the necessary capital and technology to effectively produce
enough grain to feed its population once the war started.¹¹ According to preliminary German
reports conducted in August 1940, Ukraine produced 40 million tons of grain annually, which
amounted to 40 percent of the entire Soviet Union’s harvest of 100 million tons of grain.¹²
Based on the rationale that Ukrainians had historically endured poverty and hunger for centuries
and had “elastic stomachs,” the Secretary of State for the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, Herbert
Backe, planned to allocate 30 million tons of Ukrainian produced grain to German soldiers and
civilians, despite the fact that this would result in the mass starvation of millions of Ukrainians.¹³
While Backe’s “Hunger Plan” promised Hitler that the occupation of Ukraine would free
Germany from every economic worry, a 1939 report also demonstrated Ukraine’s industrial
capacity, estimating that Ukraine contributed 70 percent of the USSR’s total production of sugar,
60 percent of its pig iron, 54 percent of its coal, 25 percent of its wheat, and 10 percent of its
machinery.¹⁴ As a result, the immediate economic plans for Ukraine during the war prioritized

¹⁰Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine, 23.  On Anti-Slav propaganda and
stereotypes see John Connelly, “Nazis and Slavs: From Racial Theory to Racist Practice,” Central European History
¹¹Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 266, 206.
¹²Alex J. Kay, “The Purpose of the Russian Campaign Is the Decimation of the Slavic Population by Thirty Million:
The Radicalization of German Food Policy in Early 1941,” in Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 105.
¹³Ibid.,111. For more on the Hunger Plan see Lizzie Collingham, The Taste of War: World War II and The Battle for
the requisition of food, raw materials, and industrial equipment from the region as well as the maintenance of collective farms and the use of the local Ukrainian population to harvest food for German soldiers and civilians.\textsuperscript{15}

Hitler’s colonial aspirations for Ukraine and Germany’s wartime economic needs also demanded the exploitation of labor from the native Ukrainian population. Prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, Germany had already employed 1.2 million POWs, most of whom were French, and close to 1.3 million civilian workers, mainly from Poland. Plans for the exploitation of Ukrainian labor were based on labor policies enacted during the Nazi occupation of western half of Poland between 1939 and 1941, which relied on compulsory labor registration and volunteers to work in Germany for three to six month stays.\textsuperscript{16} However, the labor policy that was implemented in in occupied areas of Ukraine between 1941 and 1944 was not the original policy that Nazi economic planners and administrative officials had envisioned on the eve of Operation Barbarossa.

After the invasion of the Soviet Union, Nazi economic officials put in place an initial labor policy that required Ukrainians to be employed with The German Labor Front (\textit{Deutsche Arbeitsfront}, or DAF), but heavily relied on political enemies, POWs, and the Jewish population for the most labor-intensive tasks such as repairing roads, razing buildings that could not be repaired, clearing spaces for new construction sites, and restoring bridges.\textsuperscript{17} Ukrainian-Jewish accounts from the summer of 1941 describe terrible working conditions including long hours, inadequate nourishment, and few breaks. For example, in the Ukrainian town of Pyatikhatka, in

\textsuperscript{16}Homze, \textit{Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany}, 26.
\textsuperscript{17}“Evidence of Witnesses on the Deportation and Killing of Jews in Kislovodsk,” July 5, 1943, in \textit{Documents on the Holocaust}, 428; Redlich, \textit{Together and Apart in Brzezany}, 107
the Dnepropetrovsk region in south-central Ukraine, Nazi officials had the Jewish population fill craters caused by German bombs in twelve-hour shifts with minimal breaks for food and water.\textsuperscript{18} One Ukrainian-Jewish survivor remembered, “we used to take weeds with us to work that we had gathered from the fields and cooked. People collapsed from exhaustion and did not have the strength to return home after a day’s work.”\textsuperscript{19} At times, local Ukrainian police forces aided in the detention and supervision of Jews such as in L’viv and Brzezany where Jews were assigned the horrific task of retrieving and burying the bodies of thousands of murdered prisoners at the hands of the NKVD during the Great Prison Massacres.\textsuperscript{20}

In the summer and fall of 1941, The German Labor Front also required all Ukrainians living in cities between the ages of fourteen and sixty to officially register for work with the DAF. Ukrainians who spoke German were placed in clerical jobs assisting German officials, translating documents, and acting as interpreters while the rest were of the city-dwelling population were employed in factories and offices.\textsuperscript{21} Although these were paid jobs, the amount of payment, the quality of food rations, and working conditions quickly deteriorated over the course of German occupation.\textsuperscript{22} Since labor registration was compulsory, it was not uncommon for Ukrainians to be stopped in the street and asked to show documentation proving their employment status, and as one Ukrainian explained, “if a fellow cannot present proof that he is employed, he gets employed instantly.”\textsuperscript{23} Although the labor policy in the summer of 1941 allowed those who were unable to work due to illness or disability to remain unemployed if they paid a fine, which was typically equivalent to fifty German marks, by the winter of 1941 and

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{18}] “Testimony,” Document no. 2, Jan 6, 1942, in Nazi Crimes in Ukraine, 38.
\item[\textsuperscript{19}] Tal, Fields of Ukraine, 14.
\item[\textsuperscript{20}] Forcing Jews to bury prisoners who had been murdered during the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland occurred in both the L’viv and Ternopil Oblasts during the summer of 1941. For an explanation of the Great Prison Massacre see Chapter Two of this dissertation.
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] Markovna, Nina’s Journey, 183.
\item[\textsuperscript{22}] Kravchenko-Berezhnoy, Victims, Victors, 89.
\item[\textsuperscript{23}] Kravchenko-Berezhnoy, Victims, Victors, 89.
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early 1942 the consequences for failing to register for work became increasingly severe and could result in the confiscation of ration cards, imprisonment, or violent beatings.\textsuperscript{24}

Throughout the fall of 1941 the use of Jews, POWs, and communist detainees as sources of labor decreased following the construction of ghettos, round-up and mass shootings of the Ukrainian-Jewish population, and the systematic starvation of POWs.\textsuperscript{25} Unexpected military setbacks on the eastern front compounded economic hardships and labor shortages, forcing Nazi officials to reformulate their labor policies in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{26} Therefore, in November 1941, The German Labor Front approved a volunteer worker program for Ukrainian men and women that promised a significant increase in wages, higher food rations, and better housing in exchange for working in Germany for six months.\textsuperscript{27} Posters, newspaper ads, and leaflets calling for all able-

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\textsuperscript{24} Berkhoff, \textit{Harvest of Despair}, 144; Kravchenko-Berezhnoy, \textit{Victims, Victors}, 76, 86.
\textsuperscript{25} The creation of ghettos in the occupied areas of Ukraine began as Nazi forces invaded Eastern Poland and Soviet Ukraine, although the process was far from uniform as some ghettos were established in an impromptu manner weeks after the invasion while others were not planned or constructed until the fall of 1941 or spring of 1942. For example, in the Zhytomyr region Nazi officials established several ghettos by the end of July 1941 in areas heavily damaged by the invasion, whereas in the regions of Volhynia and Podolia ghettoization was a more systemized process that occurred in October and November 1941. See Martin Dean, “German Ghettoization in Occupied Ukraine,” in\textit{ The Holocaust in Ukraine: New Sources and Perspectives}, (Washington D.C.: Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, 2013). The most well-known massacre of Jews in Ukraine occurred in September 1941 where an estimated 30,000 Jews were shot at Babi Yar, but mass shooting took place throughout the occupied areas of Ukraine. See \textit{The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization}, ed. by. Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower, (Bloomington: The University of Indian Press, 2008). For the mass starvation of Soviet POWs see Karl Berkhoff, \textit{Harvest of Despair}, Chapter Four.
\textsuperscript{26} For a detailed account of military setbacks during the German-Soviet War see Alan Clark, \textit{Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-1945}, (New York: HarperCollins, 1985) and Chris Bellamy, \textit{Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War}, (New York: Vintage Books, 2007.\textsuperscript{27} Some historians have raised questions concerning the nature of “voluntary action,” and what parameters should be used to judge the meaning of the Nazi voluntary work program given the fact that many people who volunteered to work in Germany were under foreign occupation during war, had witnessed the mass starvation of POWs and mass shootings of Jews between the fall of 1941 and spring of 1942, and specifically cited social distress such as escaping unemployment fines or starvation as motives for volunteering. For the purposes of this study, I am using the term “voluntary labor program” to refer to the period between November 1941 when the voluntary program was approved and March 1942 when Sauckel was appointed as Plenipotentiary General for the Utilization of Labor and began requiring quotas for the number of laborers to be deported from the General Government and Reichskommissariat Ukraine to work in Germany. This differentiation between “voluntary” and “forced” labor takes into account the fact that, concerning the occupied areas of Ukraine, there seems to be a marked change from general recruitment to forced deportation, even though Nazi officials continued to use the term “recruitment” instead of “conscription.” Moreover, Ukrainians who volunteered during this time period cite a wide range of reasons for doing so. For questions concerning “voluntary” and “compulsory” labor see Herbert, \textit{Hitler’s Foreign Workers}, 79-86; Mark Spoerer and Jochen Fleischhacker, “Forced Laborers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers, and Survivors,” \textit{Journal of Interdisciplinary History} 33, no. 2 (Autumn 2002): 169-204.
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bodied Ukrainians between the age of fifteen and fifty to volunteer to work in German factories were distributed all over Ukrainian cities and towns. Some announcements promised Ukrainians the same pay as German citizens and the opportunity to stay in Germany to work after the war ended.\textsuperscript{28} Besides personal gain, Nazi propaganda also used emotional appeals to recruit volunteers, with newspaper ads claiming that leaving one’s homeland to work in Germany constituted a great patriotic duty.\textsuperscript{29} As a part of the attempt to appeal to national duty, Nazi authorities also had Orthodox church leaders publicize the volunteer work program during church services, explain the alleged benefits of working in Germany to their congregation, and call on all Ukrainians to do their part in the fight against “Muscovite-Jewish Communism.”\textsuperscript{30}

Initially the volunteer program was extremely successful, and the number of volunteers exceeded German expectations. According to a report compiled by the Economic Staff East, in the first five days after the volunteer program was announced, 2,000 Ukrainians in Kharkiv signed up for voluntary labor deployment and the city sent two trains a week to Germany with 1,000 workers per train for three consecutive months.\textsuperscript{31} The program was also popular in the western regions of Ukraine as evidenced by a Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC) report documenting thousands of people in Galicia agreeing to work in Germany for six months.\textsuperscript{32} Former Ukrainian volunteer workers cite several factors that contributed to their decision to work in Germany including the hope for better economic possibilities, escaping famine and unemployment as a result of the Nazi invasion in central and eastern Ukraine, the opportunity to

\textsuperscript{28} Alexandrow, \textit{Flight from Novaa Salow}, 58; Markovna, \textit{Nina’s Journey}, 245.
\textsuperscript{29} Kuznetsov, \textit{Babii iar}, 258.
\textsuperscript{30} “Sviatyi oboviazok ukrains’koho narodu, \textit{Ukrains’kyi holos}, June 21, 1942, 3, AUPO. For alleged benefits see \textit{Dzvin voli}, November 27, 1942, 4 and \textit{Ukrains’kyi holos}, March 14, 1943, 3, AUPO.
\textsuperscript{31} Homze, \textit{Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany}, 155.
\textsuperscript{32} “Behandlung aber Ukrainer aus dem Generalgouvernement im Reich,” in \textit{Correspondences of the Ukrainian Central Committee}, 394.
learn professional skills and a foreign language, the pervasiveness of Nazi propaganda, and the
prospect of adventure that came with traveling to a new country.33

However, the initial enthusiastic response to the volunteer labor program lasted no longer
than six months. During their employment, Ukrainian volunteer laborers were allowed to send
one letter or postcard home per month and relatives in Ukraine were encouraged to send letters
and packages with clothes and food.34 Ukrainians working in Germany also found ways to send
letters illegally, usually through German soldiers based in Ukraine or Polish guest workers.35
However, these letters, especially the ones dispatched illegally, more often than not, described
poor housing conditions, lack of proper nutrition, long work hours, significantly less payment
than what was promised, and physical and emotional abuse.36 Letters sent home, or in some
cases not hearing anything from those who volunteered, quickly squashed the previous interest in
the program and the steady stream of volunteers rapidly came to a halt.37 For example, in Kyiv
there was a decline from 4,030 volunteers in June 1942 to 425 in August, with only five
volunteering in September, and zero after that.38 With a significantly decreasing number of
volunteers and the Germany army’s failure to capture Moscow, labor shortages became a major
problem and Nazi economic officials were again compelled to devise a new labor plan for the
remainder of the war.

33 Amy George, Goodbye is not Forever, 78; Khelemendyk-Kodot, Kolhospne dytynstvo, 143; Kuznetsov, Babii iar, 258; Testimony of Katerina M., Heimweh und der Hunger.
34 German authorities printed ads in Ukrainian newspapers encouraging Ukrainians to send letters and packages to their relatives working in Germany. See, for example, Ukrains’kyi holos, September 17, 1942, 3; Ukrains’kyi holos, October 11, 1942, 3; and “Poshta dla tykh, shcho idut’ do Nimechchyny,” Dzvin voli, November 27, 1942, AUPO.
35 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 258.
36 “Behandlung aber Ukrainer aus dem Generalgouvernement im Reich,” in Correspondences of the Ukrainian Central Committee, 394.
38 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 256.
The substantial drop in volunteers coincided with the appointment of Fritz Sauckel as Plenipotentiary General for the Utilization of Labor (Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz, or GBA) in late March 1942, who devised a new labor policy that relied on compulsory labor conscription for all of the Eastern Occupied Territories. As head of labor allocation, Sauckel established commissions to conduct deportations and set quotas for the number of foreign laborers that needed to be “recruited” for work in Germany. His quotas for the Reichskommissariat Ukraine were especially high, demanding 225,000 workers in the last three months of 1942 and another 225,000 by April 1943. In order to successfully fulfill the number of Ukrainian laborers, on March 15, 1943 Sauckel demanded that 3,000 Ukrainians be apprehended every day, a number that increased to 6,000 two months later. He also requested 200,000 Ukrainian laborers from the General Government over the same time period.39 To procure labor, Sauckel passed down his quotas to district and city commissars, who were then required to provide the number of people listed, with severe penalties for failure to do so.40 Sauckel also formed a Recruitment Commission (Anwerbekommissionen des GBA) to oversee the entire labor deportation process and doubled the number of labor officials in all of the eastern territories, including an additional 200 labor officers who were assigned the military rank of Sonderführer to facilitate cooperation for rounding up civilians with the Wehrmacht.41 Sauckel’s new forced labor policy completely overhauled the entire Nazi labor system, and by July 1942, Eastern Workers (Ostarbeiter) comprised 697,000 of the 3.1 million workers in the Reich, an increase of 170 percent over the number of Ostarbeiter employed less than two months before.42

39 Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 81, 83.
40 “Diary entry by Kyiv Commandant, Major General Remer, October 9, 1942,” in Nazi Crimes in Ukraine, 195.
41 Homze, Foreign Laborers in Nazi Germany, 134.
42 Steinberg, “The Third Reich Reflected: German Civil Administration in the Occupied Soviet Union, 1941-4,” The English Historical Review 110, no. 437 (June 1995): 638.
The persistent war with the Soviet Union demanded a substantial increase in manufacturing and armaments production, which combined with labor shortages, the substantial decrease in volunteer laborers, and Sauckel’s labor program based on “recruitment quotas,” led to an increase in the use of force for assigning and collecting people for deportation to work in Germany. Already in August 1942, Sauckel and Alfred Rosenberg, The Reich Minister for Occupied East, approved the use of force by the Wehrmacht during recruitment campaigns if Ukrainians refused to comply, although Sauckel and Rosenberg left it up to the Wehrmacht to decide what constituted “refusal to comply,” and in many instances Nazi military leaders on the ground encouraged the use violence. While it is difficult to determine an exact timeframe as to when Nazi officials began to rely on the use of force to fulfill labor quotas, some historians have pointed to the Battle of Stalingrad as a significant turning point in the treatment of Ukrainians during recruitment drives, as more severe losses on the Eastern front led to more brutal recruitment tactics marked by violence and racially motivated indoctrinated undertones.

Memoirs written by former Ukrainian forced laborers and letters sent to the Ukrainian Central Committee attest to the more radical recruitment tactics used by the Wehrmacht and local police forces in late 1942 and early 1943. According to Volodymyr Kubijovych, head of the UCC, in some areas of Galicia recruitment for forced labor took place in an orderly fashion, with Ukrainians complying with orders to report for deportation, but in other places the process equaled a “massive manhunt,” in which people were picked up off the street, out of their homes, during school, at the market, and in movie theaters without notice and shipped to Germany. For example, at the Ukrainian Technical School and Ukrainian Gymnasium in Kholm, local

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43 Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 87-88.
44 Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 280. According to Herbert, 50 percent of Soviet workers present in Germany after the war arrived after February 1943; Also see Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 271.
45 Volodymyr Kubijovych, “Abietseinsatz im Reich,” in Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee, 480; George, Goodbye is not Forever, 77-78.
police units raided school buildings, detaining students, teachers, and other employees.\textsuperscript{46} One former forced laborer remembers attending church with her grandmother when she and other young girls her age were forcibly sent to a deportation camp on the spot.\textsuperscript{47} In the cities of L’viv, Lublin, and Stanislav, families were separated as people were arrested at night and without distinction, including Ukrainians who were already locally employed by DAF.\textsuperscript{48} Police also threatened to harm relatives to coerce Ukrainians to comply with labor conscription orders and between the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943, failure to accept forced labor enlistment increasingly resulted in people being shot or hanged, their bodies left on display to deter any form of resistance.\textsuperscript{49} In February of 1943, a special committee of pro-German Ukrainian supporters reported to Rosenberg sixteen different instances of violence in labor recruitment ranging from arrests to killings.\textsuperscript{50}

The intensification of unregulated use of force and violence led to an increase in active resistance, particularly among young Ukrainians. There is evidence of young adults drinking a tobacco “tea,” smoking tobacco leaves, and ingesting a small amount of poison to create sickly complexions during medical examinations.\textsuperscript{51} Others resorted to self-mutilation, crippling themselves by jumping out of windows, cutting one’s leg and rubbing dirt in the wound, chopping off fingers and hands, or burning themselves with sulfuric acid to create the appearance of a contagious rash.\textsuperscript{52} Occasionally, young women had sexual relationships with German men with the hopes of becoming pregnant since the Nazis refused to deport pregnant women to

\textsuperscript{46} Volodymyr Kubijovych, “Abitseinsatz im Reich,” in \textit{Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee}, 480.
\textsuperscript{47} Makuch, \textit{Moye zhyttya}, 2.
\textsuperscript{48} Volodymyr Kubijovych, “Abitseinsatz im Reich,” in \textit{Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee}, 479.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal}, vol. 25 (Nuremburg, 1949), 331; “Act on Atrocities in the Town of Slavyansk,” no. 18, September 1943, in \textit{Nazi Crimes in Ukraine}, 64.
\textsuperscript{50} Homze, \textit{Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany}, 160.
\textsuperscript{51} Berkhoff, \textit{Harvest of Despair}, 269.
Germany. Most who fled “the wild and ruthless manhunts,” however, flocked to the forests to hide with partisans, or joined nationalist underground movements.

As more people resisted deportation and partisan numbers increased, officials on the ground developed even harsher techniques for fulfilling labor quotas. For instance, on September 21, 1942, General Commissar Schöne of the Volhynia-Podolia district approved burning the homes of those who refused to show up for deportation. A similar decree from the Commissioner-General in Luzk dated September 31, 1943 stated, “the farms of persons who refuse to work should be burned down, their relatives taken hostage and placed in concentration camps.” As a result, entire villages were burned to the ground such as the village of Bilozirka, located in the Kremenets region of the Ternopil Oblast, which was set on fire after twenty-five people jumped off a deportation train destined for Germany. Nazi officials also began executing civilians en masse similar to an incident in Poltava where sixty-five men who had refused to get on transport trains were hanged. In another incident, forty-five Ukrainians, including eighteen children, were shot on January 29, 1943 in the village of Sumyn in the district of Lublin as retribution for failure to provide the designated number of labor conscripts.

The transition from voluntary labor recruitment to the use of force not only led to active resistance among Ukrainians, but also affected tensions among Ukrainians and Poles in the western regions of occupied Ukraine. Although Sauckel set labor quotas, the local municipal administration was directly responsible for who was conscripted. Once Sauckel initiated a new

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53 Dallin, *German Rule*, 458.
54 Kotyeva, *Three Worlds of Larissa*, 120; Also see Chapter Two of this dissertation for the increase in the number of OUN-B recruits after the implementation of the forced labor program.
57 Letter by Antonina Sidel’nyk in *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal*, vol. 25, 78-79.
58 “Note from the USSR People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs,” May 11, 1943, in *Nazi Crimes in Ukraine*, 43.
59 Homze, *Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany*, 160
recruitment drive, his representatives in the Labor Office relayed the targeted numbers to district commissars, who were then responsible for dividing the quotas throughout the district. Since most of the smaller localities were headed by local administrations, Ukrainian authorities initially chose political adversaries, personal enemies, communist party members, and ethnic rivals for deportation. For instance, in the predominately Ukrainian villages in Western Volhynia, Poles were the first selected for labor deployment, making up 40 percent of the 1,500 recruits sent to Germany in May 1943. Concurrently, Polish administrative officials in charge of areas with large Ukrainian minorities targeted Ukrainians for forced labor deportation.

The evolution of labor allocation in Ukraine, which combined Hitler’s colonial aims, economic necessity resulting from the sustained war with the Soviet Union, and Nazi racial ideology, led to an exploitative labor program centered on the use of severe intimidation, physical force, violence, the vengeful destruction of villages, and community massacres. While the primary purpose of compelling Ukrainians to work in Germany was to satisfy the requirement for the Nazi war machine, the forced labor program was also designed to substantially weaken the Ukrainian population. Since labor recruitment was inexplicitly tied to the xenophobic notion that Ukrainians were, in Erich Koch’s words, “racially and biologically a thousand times” inferior compared to the “lowliest German worker,” the savagery used to fulfill Sauckel’s labor quotas was only one aspect of the brutal forced labor experience for Ukrainians. The process of categorizing Ukrainians in collection centers, transporting them to

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60 “Note for Files: Meeting Between General Government Department of Labor Leader and Ukrainian Central Committee, May 7, 1943, in Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee, 546-549.
61 Stepan Kutsai, Nimechchyna ochyma ostarbaytery: Rozpovid pro perezhytye (Luts’k, 2003), 41-42.
Germany, and the extremely poor working and living conditions Ukrainians faced compared to Western European workers were also tied directly to Nazi racial policy.

**Conscripting and Categorizing Ukrainian Forced Laborers**

The Nazi preoccupation with race, order, and hierarchy was an inherent aspect of the forced labor experience for all foreign laborers working in the Reich. In May 1942 Sauckel issued a decree stipulating that “as far as it is possible, separate camps are to be provided for the members of the various nations” and “in all cases, separate barracks must be provided for the members of different nations.”64 As a result, when foreign laborers went through the registration process, they were categorized based on country of origin, nationality, and citizenship and required to wear a national badge sewn onto their worker uniforms at all times.65 However, Nazi attempts at national segregation were complicated by changing rules and definitions regarding the citizenship and nationality of Ukrainians over the course of the war, which is evidenced by inconsistency and confusion in the assignment of identification papers for Ukrainian forced laborers. Memoirs, testimonies, and interviews with former Ukrainian forced laborers reveal that Ukrainians paid close attention to how they were classified by the Nazi regime, sometimes fought to have their nationality changed if they felt it was improperly registered, and supported a separate Ukrainian national badge to replace those designating Polish (P) or Soviet citizenship (OST), which effectively nationalized the way in which Ukrainians thought about citizenship.

Upon conscription, Ukrainians had to pass through collection centers where they were given a medical exam and officially registered to work in Germany before they were sent to their

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departure points. Collection centers were usually held in large town squares, where as many as 5,000 men, women, and children gathered to wait for transportation to Germany. The wait could last anywhere from two days to a week and Ukrainians had to rely on whatever food they brought with them as Nazi officials provided no nourishment and usually kept the old warehouses or unused complexes where Ukrainians were housed locked. In addition to a medical exam, laborers registered and given a transportation ID (Transportausweis), which contained information such as name, date of birth, address or name of village, departure location, and time and date of departure.

Nazi officials also issued forced laborers an Arbeitsbuch für Ausländer, which served as their official identification papers and employment documentation. Arbeitsbücher had been part of an older tradition in the nineteenth century and continued to be a key instrument for worker registration and the planned organization of labor in Germany since 1935. The goal was to give management a way to keep track of each individual’s employment history and track whether they had been fired for any illegal activities. Employment books were also assigned to foreign workers in order to reduce freedom of movement, limit the number of times a foreign worker could change jobs, and “guarantee the appropriate distribution of workers in the German economy.” DAF required everyone working in Germany during the war to have official employment documentation, which were retained by employers until the worker was released or transferred to another job. Arbeitsbücher included information such as a photo ID with the issuing agency's stamp, country of origin, date of birth, place of birth, citizenship, nationality,

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66 Kutsai, Nimechchyna ochyma ostarbaytery, 43; Testimony by Elsa Ivanova in Working for the Enemy, 173.
67 “Aktennotiz: Besprechung bei dem Herrn Leiter der Hauptabteilung Arbeit in der Regierung des GG, May 7, 1943, in Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee, 546-549. Also see interviews with Anna Nesteruk and Inna Kulagina in Working for the Enemy, 169, 174 and Markovna, Nina’s Journey, 261 for conditions in collection centers.
68 Eikel, Cherez brak liudei, 141; Kanb, Wearing the Letter P, 51.
69 Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 32.
70 Ibid.
marital status, number of children, knowledge of German, home address, and place of residence during work. There was also a section for work history, which listed any occupational training, industrial or agricultural knowledge, and nature of prior employment. The remainder of the document catalogued job assignments while in Germany.71

Information recorded in Ukrainian Arbeitebücher regarding country of origin, place of birth, citizenship, and nationality demonstrates the difficulties Nazi labor authorities had in attempting to nationally categorize Ukrainian forced laborers since Ukrainians comprised a large ethnic group without their own state and German policy for categorizing and documenting Ukrainians changed over time. The vast majority of Ukrainian laborers forcibly sent to Germany technically held either Polish or Soviet citizenship, which was the primary factor in determining how nationalities were to be separated in labor camps, but the process for categorizing Ukrainians was far from consistent. Between 1939 and 1941, Ukrainians living in the western areas of occupied Poland were given identification papers classifying them as Polish citizens without any subsequent ethnic or national distinction.72 Following the invasion of the Soviet Union, Ukrainians and other ethnic minorities who had been under Soviet occupation in Eastern Poland between 1939 and 1941 received identification papers that listed them as Polish citizens, but also contained a box where applicants could circle one of the following nationalities: Pole, Ukrainian, White Russian, Russian, Jewish, or gypsy. Forms also asked for the ethnicity of spouses when applicable and if any ancestors were of German descent.73

71 “Forced Labor Book Collection,” RG 17.009, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives (hereafter USHMM).
72 The form used to issue identity cards to non-Germans living in the General Government between 1939 and 1941 included spaces for family name, birth name, any name changes, first name, birth date, birthplace, address included district and county, profession, marital status, and religion. “Antrag auf Ausstellung einer Kennkarte für nichtdeutsche Bewohner des Generalgouvernements,” in Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee, 357.
73 Applicants were also required to provide evidence of birth and baptism certificates as well as documents verifying place of origin. “Antrag auf Ausstellung einer Kennkarte für nichtdeutsche Bewohner des Generalgouvernements,” in Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee, 357.
However, once Hitler divided Ukrainian lands into the General Government and Reichkommissariat Ukraine, the protocol for classifying Ukrainians changed again. Additionally, as forced labor deployment became ubiquitous, different collection centers had different protocols for designating a worker’s country of origin, citizenship, and nationality in their employment documents, which caused Ukrainian forced laborers to be classified in a variety of different ways.\textsuperscript{74} Since employment documentation required each worker to provide their place of birth, it is relatively easy to decipher whether a Ukrainian forced laborer was originally from Poland or Soviet Ukraine, but Nazi labor authorities at collection centers did not necessarily use this information to determine the country of origin, citizenship, or nationality of Ukrainians, often relying on several different classification methods. Most Ukrainians registered between 1942 and 1944 had either the General Government (\textit{Generalgouvernement}) or Occupied Eastern Territories (\textit{Besetzte Ostgebiete}) listed as their country of origin, but a few had a district or region such as “District Galicia” or Kiev region” recorded in the space dedicated for place of origin. Labor officials often left the section designating nationality blank, but some listed Ukrainian in the nationality section of \textit{Arbeitsbücher}, suggesting that either some Nazi officials considered Ukrainians as a distinct national group, or allowed Ukrainians to determine their nationality when filling out identification and employment forms.\textsuperscript{75} Methods for determining the citizenship of Ukrainian forced laborers proved to be the most complicated, with Nazi labor officials assigning citizenship in a variety of ways including: unexplained (\textit{ungeklärt}); unexplained- Eastern Worker (\textit{ungeklärt- Ostarbeiter}); unexplained- Ukrainian (\textit{ungeklärt-Ukrainer/Ukrainerin}); stateless (\textit{staatenlos}); stateless- Ukrainian (\textit{staatenlos-}

\textsuperscript{74} “Leiter des Ukrainischen Hauptausschüssen an die Regierung des Generalgouvernements Hauptabteilung innere Verwaltung Bevölkerungswesen und Fürsorge, Krakau, November 13, 1941, in \textit{Correspondence of Ukrainian Central Committee}, 355; “Forced Labor Book Collection,” RG-17.009, USHMM.

\textsuperscript{75} See for example, Tanja Hudenko and Natalia Pochilk, “Forced Labor Book Collection, 1938-1945,” RG-17.009, USHMM.
Ukrainer/Ukrainerin); and, in a few instances were classified as Ukrainian citizens (Ukrainer/Ukrainerin).\textsuperscript{76} In comparison, Polish forced laborers from the General Government typically had Poland listed as their “country of origin,” and “Polish” as their citizenship status in their employment ID books.\textsuperscript{77} The use of the subcategories of “Eastern Worker” or “Ukrainian” to clarify a lack of official citizenship reveals that although some Nazi authorities may have recognized Ukrainians as distinct from Poles and Russians, they did not have a definite space within the Nazi racial hierarchy in which to appropriately or consistently categorize them.

Adding to the confusion was the fact that Ukrainian forced laborers from the General Government received a “P” badge to wear on their uniforms despite not being officially documented as Polish citizens while others were given an “OST” badge like all Ukrainians who came from the Reichkommissariat Ukraine. The discrepancy upset Ukrainians from both the General Government and Reichkommissariat Ukraine and caused some to dispute the Ostarbeiter label upon arrival in Germany since the term was often used as a synonym for “Russian.” In one case, a group of Ukrainians deported from the General Government to Trofaiaich wrote to the Ukrainian Central Committee complaining of their misidentification as Ostarbeiter, imploring the committee to help them change their classification so they could move from the Russian camp to the Polish camp.\textsuperscript{78} In another instance a Ukrainian forced labor from Volhynia, a region that had been part of Poland before the war but was added to the Reichkommissariat Ukraine in 1941, went to great lengths to have her OST badge exchanged for a Polish badge, describing the situation in her memoir:

In Antweiler they had lost our documents from Poland. We had no papers, and the Germans did not believe us when we said we were not Russians. We were the

\textsuperscript{76} “Forced Labor Book Collection, 1938-1945,” RG-17.009, USHMM.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Volodymyr Kubijovych, “Note for the Record and Letters from Polish Ukrainians,” May 15, 1942, in Correspondence of the Ukrainian Central Committee, 415-417.
only Ukrainian Poles among the Russians. We had not been made to wear a patch in Antweiler. Only once we got there [to Cologne] did we have to wear an “OST.” I did not agree with that. I did not want to wear “OST.” I said I wanted a “P.” I had to write home, and my parents sent a certificate in German.\(^79\)

Although requests to exchange badges were hardly ever granted, both the UCC and various Nazi governmental bodies registered discontent among Ukrainians when they were grouped together with Russians.\(^80\)

One of the reasons Ukrainians holding Polish citizenship wanted their citizenship officially changed was “instrumental” based on perceptions of better treatment and fewer restrictions compared to Russians and Soviet-Ukrainians.\(^81\) While there is evidence that Nazi officials tried to separated Polish and Soviet citizens within large labor camp barracks, fearing the latter would spread communism to other national groups, it is entirely unclear whether Ukrainians living in Polish camps received better treatment than those housed in Ostarbeiter camps given the fact that working conditions, living arrangements, and the treatment of Eastern European forced laborers varied significantly by location, job assignment, and the personality of supervisors.\(^82\)

Moreover, as the war continued, initial Nazi guidelines for keeping Polish and Soviet citizens separated to avoid Bolshevik infiltration into German society were put aside in favor of immediate economic needs.

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\(^82\) All the Ukrainian memoirs, testimonies, and interviews used for this study, which represent an array of Ukrainians from prewar Poland and prewar Soviet Ukraine illustrate a wide range of treatment by German supervisors varying from daily physical abuse to Germans providing Ukrainian forced laborers with extra food, clothing, and medical supplies. Ukrainians who worked several different jobs over the course of the war also note that treatment and working conditions were different from job to job. For initial plans to segregate Polish Ukrainians and Soviet Ukrainians see “Decrees, Regulations, Announcements,” Doc. 3044-PS, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. 5, 763.
Ukrainians from Soviet Ukraine, who were classified as originating from the Occupied Eastern Territories on worker identification cards, also disputed being assigned an “OST” badge, insisting that they were inherently different from ethnic Russians despite having lived under Stalin’s totalitarian regime before the war. For example, upon arrival in Germany a group of Ukrainians from Soviet Ukraine turned in their *Arbeitsbücher* to their factory supervisors and asked to have their “country of origin” changed from “Occupied Eastern Territories” to “Ukraine,” and although their documentation was reviewed, their IDs were returned unchanged.\(^83\) Other former forced laborers from Soviet Ukraine who identified themselves as Ukrainian remembered constantly being called “Russo-Ukrainians,” “Russian pigs,” or simply “Russian,” which they deplored.\(^84\) As one former Ukrainian forced laborer from Zaporizhzhia in Eastern Ukraine explained:

> It turned out the police did not know how to define us, for they thought that Ukrainians were those who lived in Galicia, the rest of us were Russian for them. The fact that we lived under Stalin’s regime could not cancel out our nationality. We could do nothing about it, such was our fate.\(^85\)

According to the historian, Ulrich Herbert, the discontent among Ukrainians over national classification and badges was so great that Nazi officials discussed creating a badge specifically for Ukrainians in September 1942, but the idea was dismissed due to the practical difficulties of implementing a new badge and reclassifying hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians. Additionally, Nazi officials did not want to create a precedent allowing all minority groups from the Soviet Union to have their own badges. In March 1943, the idea of creating a national badge for Ukrainians was again introduced as a way to potentially increase worker productivity and, although a “U” was never issued to Ukrainian forced laborers, “highly productive workers,”

\(^83\) Interview with Hanna Hrishchenko, za477, ZA.  
\(^85\) Khelemendyk, *Kolhohz Childhood and German Slavery*, 113.
were allowed to wear their “OST” badge on their left arm instead of on their chest, per original regulations. However, in August 1944, based on the notion that Eastern workers had “proved their readiness to cooperate in the struggle against Jewish-Bolshevik global threat,” the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Development announced a new set of badges for all Soviet national groups. The Ukrainian badge depicted an oval wreath of sunflowers with the Ukrainian national trident symbol in the center; however, as memoirs and testimonies are silent on the issue of national badges, it is impossible to know if the new badges were ever widely distributed. The discussion of creating badges for Ukrainians demonstrates that the Nazis could be rather flexible in their national categorization when it proved to be advantageous to them.

Ukrainians presented a stark problem to DAF’s attempt to categorize and classify national groups into a strict hierarchy. Since Nazi labor regulations maintained that forced laborers should be separated by nationality whenever possible, the Nazi system of categorization complicated the actual segregation of Ukrainian forced laborers in labor camps since many Ukrainians holding Polish citizenship were housed with Ukrainians from Soviet Ukraine. More importantly, the Nazi categorization process raised questions concerning identity, distinctions between Eastern European ethnic groups, and the relationship between ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship. Even though the Nazi racial hierarchy did not provide a clear space for Ukrainian self-identification, it is apparent that some Ukrainians not only defined themselves in opposition to Russians, but also correlated ethnic belonging and nationality to citizenship, despite not

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86 Herbert, *Hitler’s Foreign Workers*, 290-291.
88 Belarusians were issued a similar badge with a wreath, ear of corn, and a cogwheel in white and red while the Russian badge consisted of a St. Andrew’s cross of white, blue, and red. See Herbert, *Hitler’s Foreign Workers*, 291.
having their own nation-state. The practice of Ukrainians challenging international definitions of citizenship and nationality began during Nazi labor registration and national segregation within labor camps, and although it was not widespread phenomenon during the war, questioning and disputing national classification processes became prevalent occurrence in DP camps, which will be examined in the following chapter.

**Living and Working in Germany: The Ukrainian Forced Labor Experience**

Despite the challenges labor officials faced registering and categorizing Ukrainians in terms of citizenship, nationality, and ethnicity, Nazi racial ideology governed the separation of nationalities in labor camps, which physically placed Ukrainians together and created a hierarchical environment rife with discrimination against all Eastern European workers. Although conditions varied between industry and agriculture, the structures and atmosphere of forced labor camps led to inequality between Eastern and Western European workers and discrimination against Eastern Europeans in terms of food rations, access to healthcare, and time off. Nevertheless, Ukrainians created communities and networks that not only allowed them to practice cultural nationalism but also helped them survived the forced labor experience by supplementing poor material provisions, providing each other with emotional reassurance, and practicing cultural religious traditions. Similar to those who fled the Red Army, former forced laborers who stayed in Germany after the war also self-identified as victims of total war and domination.

A sense of community first developed as Ukrainian forced laborers left for Germany. As trains moved from the eastern areas of the Reichkommissariat Ukraine toward the General Government, people were continuously picked up along the way at large collection centers and
smaller assembly points. During transport, Ukrainians were physically packed into dirty, overcrowded cargo cars, often with no place to sit or lay down. As one former Ukrainian forced laborer described in brutal detail:

It was a terrible feeling, because we were being transported like animals, everyone in one space. It was already October, it was cold. We slept with our clothes on. We would wake up and no one could wash, everything was dirty. In the truest sense we were [treated] like livestock.

Even though trains were constantly stopping to pick up new passengers, Ukrainians were only allowed to disembark the heavily guarded train once per night and had to rely on whatever food they brought with them since guards provided minimal food and water.

Initial contacts instilled a sense of familiarity in a desperate situation as Ukrainians shared stories from the past, often finding commonalities with other passengers. For example, in her memoir, Vera Siegmund, who was deported with her entire family from a small village about fifty miles from Kharkiv, remembers her parents bonding with the parents of another family from Kyiv over the fact that both families had joined the Soviet work program in Kazakhstan in the 1930s, noting, “with these threads into the past, each family felt that we had found a friend.” Many Western Ukrainians were also surprised to hear people from Central and Eastern Ukraine speaking Ukrainian since they had assumed everyone from Soviet Ukraine spoke Russia. The ability to communicate and discover commonalities with strangers while

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89 Basansky, *Escape from Terror*, 111; Markova, Nina’s Journey, 261.
95 George, *Goodbye is not Forever*, 96; Khelemendyk, *Kolhohz Childhood and German Slavery*, 102.
traveling proved comforting and, in some cases, initial contacts on transport trains turned into friendships that lasted throughout the war.  

Upon arrival in Germany, Ukrainians were placed in a transit camp where they received another medical examination and waited for their work assignment, which could take anywhere from two days to a week. It was during this time that women were also given a second, “racial inspection” to determine their eligibility for the Nazi housemaid program. Conditions in transit camps varied significantly and DAF’s ability to keep different national groups separate depended on the availability of housing conditions. Testimonies and memoirs by former Ukrainian forced labors provide detailed descriptions of these transit camps since this was their first experience and memory of being in Germany. Some describe being housed in empty factories, abandoned warehouses, storage units, or dilapidated barns. Those placed in larger facilities remember being housed with Poles, Russians, and fellow Ukrainians, while those held in smaller, less formal housing often found themselves stationed with people from both Western and Eastern Europe.

Even when Ukrainians found themselves located in transit camps with a variety of nationalities, they grouped together, and in some cases found people they knew from back home. According to one former Ukrainian forced laborer, “As newcomers got acquainted with one another, the atmosphere in our barrack became friendly. All were in the same predicament and tried to cheer each other up.”

96 See for example, the interview with Inna Kulagina and Elsa Iwanowa, in Working for the Enemy, 173.
97 The Nazi maid program employed Eastern European forced laborers to work in German homes taking care of children, performing household chores, and assisting in maintaining small farms. In order to prohibit injecting the German race with any undesirable racial elements, only Eastern Europeans with distinctive German characteristics were assigned as household laborers. For an example of a Ukrainian housemaid see interview with Halyna Jachno, za470, ZA online archive.
98 Testimonies of Ljudmila I., Stanislaw D., and Dorheat T. in Heimweh und der Hunger, 19-22; Kotyeva, Three Worlds of Larissa, 137.
99 Testimony of Henryk O. in Heimweh und der Hunger, 22; Interview with Inna Kulagina, in Working for the Enemy, 175.
100 Kotyeva, Three Worlds of Larissa, 137.
The German Labor Front originally tried to assign Ukrainian forced laborers to jobs based on education and labor skills, but as the war continued and German military setbacks increased, the agency assigned jobs based on war needs.\textsuperscript{101} The majority of Ukrainians worked in the industrial sector in which they were assigned a myriad of jobs in textile mills, sugar refineries, ammunition factories, airplane and railcar manufacturing facilities, chemical plants, rubber factories, and coal mines.\textsuperscript{102} Factories throughout Germany differed in size, but Ukrainians were kept in similar job positions, which were often the heavier, more labor-intensive tasks compared to those assigned to Western European forced laborers.\textsuperscript{103} A large number of Ukrainian forced laborers also worked on small and large farms where they tended and plowed fields, harvested grain and vegetables, milked cows, fed cattle, mucked livestock stalls, and cut weeds.\textsuperscript{104} Ukrainian women employed on farms were also tasked with working in the garden, preparing meals, aiding in household chores, and watching after children.\textsuperscript{105} In both economic sectors working conditions were harsh, with twelve hours shifts, seven days a week and, although all forced laborers were technically paid, payment was about 50 to 85 percent less than German workers received. Foreign laborers also had to pay a social compensation tax to the state as well as “taxes” for food, shelter, and clothing.\textsuperscript{106} Even if a small sum remained,

\textsuperscript{101} “Decrees, Regulations, Announcements,” Doc. 3044-PS, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 5, 759. In 1942 Ukrainian forced laborers were largely assigned to work in agriculture, but as the war progressed the number of Ukrainians employed in industry drastically increased.

\textsuperscript{102} Ukrainian forced laborers were usually employed in Germany but were also assigned to jobs in all territories occupied by the Third Reich including Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Luxembourg. For example, see the interview with Andrij Klyuchko, who worked in Hungary and Yugoslavia building airports. Interview with Andrij Klyuchko, za483, ZA online archive.

\textsuperscript{103} Testimony of Edmund B. in Heimweh und der Hunger, 29.

\textsuperscript{104} Testimonies of Pjotr Grigorjewitsch D., Maria Andrejewna K. and Raisa Kirillowna S., Die Sprache der Opfer, 47-52.

\textsuperscript{105} For a detailed description of daily life as a female forced laborer working on a farm interview with Halya Kassitsch, za482, ZA online archive.

\textsuperscript{106} Markovna, Nina’s Journey, 272.
Ukrainian forced laborers could not buy anything since Eastern Europeans were not allowed in German stores and almost everything was sold on ration cards.\(^{107}\)

It was not uncommon for forced laborers to hold several different jobs over the course of the war and many Ukrainians who had originally been assigned to work in the agricultural sector were transferred to factory jobs in 1944.\(^{108}\) Those who transferred jobs often kept in touch with the Ukrainians they previously worked with, corresponding through letters, which became easier to send in 1943 and 1944.\(^{109}\) Ukrainian forced laborers also corresponded with family members and friends who had been assigned to jobs in different areas in Germany in which they talked about home, their current situation, and plans for after the war ended.\(^{110}\) Letters effectively created a communication network among Ukrainians forced laborers throughout Germany and, for those who decided to remain in Germany after the war, became the basis for community organization as former Ukrainian forced laborers met up with their friends and family members in larger cities after liberation.\(^{111}\)

As on transportation trains and in transit camps, language proved to be an essential feature that united Ukrainians from different geographical locations and socio-economic backgrounds. For example, in industrial jobs, factory managers assigned Ukrainians to specific sections in order to ease communication through an appointed interpreter. Interpreters were typically Ukrainians with German blood like Lydia F., a Ukrainian with Latvian parents and German ancestry, who because of her lineage and ability to speak fluent German was given a job

\(^{107}\) Interview with Oleksandr Iljaschenko, za478, ZA online archive.

\(^{108}\) For examples of Ukrainian forced laborers being transferred to different jobs over the course of the war see the testimony of Julia Konstantinowna L. and Timothy Semjonowitsch G. in *Die Sprache der Opfer*, 47-49.

\(^{109}\) Ibid.

\(^{110}\) Alexandrow, *Flight from Novaa Salow*, 95; ZA, Interview with Oleksandr Iljaschenko, za478, ZA online archive; Testimony of Kamila Felinksa, *Working for the Enemy*, 166.

\(^{111}\) Ibid. Julia Alexandrow, Kamila Felinksa, and Oleksandr Iljaschenko specifically mention traveling to meet family members or friends after the war ended.
as a translator at a factory. Although Nazi racial laws governing the interaction of different national groups prohibited Eastern workers from interacting with their interpreters outside of factories, Ukrainians still socialized with their interpreters since all Ukrainians preferred to speak in their native language. As a result, interpreters not only helped Ukrainians understand and learn German, but it was also comforting to have a small group of people to communicate with, explain situations, and discuss their experiences.

The combination of Nazi racial ideology and Sauckel’s instructions regarding the separation of nationalities ensured that housing facilities kept Western and Eastern Europeans strictly segregated and Ukrainians housed in their own facilities. The responsibility for housing rested with the management of business and factories and in the earlier phases of forced labor deployment, Eastern European lived in unused facilities such as old schools, fire halls, empty warehouses, and basements of factories, but as the number of foreign laborers increased, factory owners constructed wooden barracks for their employees. Camp barracks in industrial centers varied in size, but regardless most have been described as poorly constructed, surrounded with barbed wire, heavily guarded and equipped with one small shared stove, a limited amount of washrooms and toilets, two- or three-story beds with sawdust filled mattress and no blankets. In larger housing complexes such as the camp barracks in Mainz, Poles and Russians resided in separately assigned buildings, whereas in smaller camps national groups were divided into

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112 Kotyeva, *Three World of Larissa*, 144.
113 Interview with Kazimeria K., za209, ZA online archive; Kotyeva, *Three Worlds of Larissa*, 144.
115 Knab, *Wearing the Letter P*, 77. Some factories, such as the Fordwerk factory did not have barracks when forced laborers arrived in the summer of 1942. In these cases, men were tasked with helping to build the barracks and, until they were completed, forced laborers had to sleep in the basement of the factory or in nearby buildings. See Stepan Saika, *Working for the Enemy*, 169-170.
116 In some factories the Reich Ministry of Armaments and Munitions issued a limited amount of bedding including one woolen blanket and one towel, but as the number of forced laborers increased the Reich Minister of Economics indicated that it was impossible to supply workers with any bedding whatsoever. See John H.E. Fried, *The Exploitation of Foreign Labor in Germany*, (Montreal: International Labor Office, 1945), 104-105.
separate rooms with separate washrooms, sinks, and toilets.\textsuperscript{117} In comparison, German authorities allowed agricultural forced laborers to live on the farms of their employers but, as in industrial camp barracks, living conditions differed based on location and the availability of accommodations, with agricultural laborers housed in attics, basements, barns, sheds, occasionally small warehouses, or in small rooms in the same house as farm owners.\textsuperscript{118}

Regardless of the size of barracks, the difference in housing accommodations for Eastern and Western European laborers was a significant detail that most former Ukrainian forced laborers remember. Conditions for Western European workers were similar to the housing conditions for Germans, which were less crowded, outfitted with proper bedding, furnished with tables and chairs, and equipped with a sufficient number toilets and bathing facilities.\textsuperscript{119} Kamila Felinksa, who held Polish citizenship and worked at two different factories, one in which she was housed with Russian forced laborers, and another where she lived in a French camp described the disparity between the two camps as the difference between “heaven and earth.”\textsuperscript{120}

Nazi racial policies that governed the segregation of nationalities in camp barracks allowed Ukrainians to foster a cultural nationalism since it kept Ukrainians physically together. Almost all memoirs, testimonies, and interviews used for this study describe meeting Ukrainians from different regions throughout the occupied areas of Ukraine while living in camp barracks. For example, Tetjana Babitsch from a village near Kharkiv specifically remembers making

\textsuperscript{117} To cut costs, some firms joined together to share housing, resulting in huge complexes and camps where different nationalities lived in the same complex but were housed in separately assigned buildings. Moreover, families who found themselves working in the industrial sector lived in separate camps, also segregated by nationality for Ukrainians, Russian, and Polish families. See Knab, \textit{Wearing the Letter P}, 81-83. For descriptions of large camp barracks see Basansky, \textit{Escape from Terror}, 111; Interview with Stepan Saika, \textit{Working for the Enemy}, 170; and testimony of Stanislaw D., \textit{Heimweh und der Hunger}, 22. For smaller camp barracks see Alexandrow, \textit{Flight from Novaa Salow}, 89; Testimonies of Edmund B., Interview with Tetjana Babitsch, za469, ZA online archive; Marija S., Ksenia F., \textit{Heimweh und der Hunger}, 40-43; and Kotyeva, \textit{Three Worlds of Larissa}, 147;

\textsuperscript{118} ZA, online archive, za482, interview with Marija Kobisista; Testimonies of Ljudmila I. and Marem I., \textit{Heimweh und der Hunger}, 46-47.

\textsuperscript{119} Herbert, \textit{Hitler’s Foreign Workers}, 216.

\textsuperscript{120} Interview with Kamila Felinkska, in \textit{Working for the Enemy}, 193.
friends with “Westerners” from L’viv and Transcarpathia and Halyna Kassitsch, who grew up in Kyiv remembered meeting Ukrainians from L’viv who “spoke a beautiful literary Ukrainian language” that made it easy for her to recognize them as her “countrymen.”¹²¹ Regional statistics from collections of testimonies in the Fordwerk and Domag Metalwerk factories also provide insight as to the extent of the regional diversity in labor camps. At Fordwerk, Ukrainian forced laborers came from several regions including Galicia, Khmelytsky, Rivne and Volyn in Western Ukraine; Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia in Central Ukraine; as well as Kharkiv and the Donbass regions of Eastern Ukraine.¹²² The Ukrainian camp in Hameln, also had a similar regional diversity: out of sixteen Ukrainian forced laborers there were five from Galicia, one from Khmelytsky Oblast, five from Kyiv Oblast, one from Crimea, one from Kherson Oblast, and three from Kharkiv Oblast.¹²³

When newcomers arrived at labor camps, it was customary for Ukrainians already living there to introduce themselves and ask of news from Ukraine.¹²⁴ In some instances, in accordance with traditional Ukrainian customs, new arrivals were greeted with a small piece of food. For instance, when Julia G. arrived in the village of Pilzen with six other women, they were each offered a small piece of bread and part of an apple from two other Ukrainian forced laborers. She was so moved by the gesture that she remembered thinking, “It was with satisfaction and emotion that we accepted the joy which these men showed at seeing fellow countrywomen and accepted the evidence of their solidarity with us.”¹²⁵ Since most Ukrainian forced laborers arrived at their job assignment without any acquaintances, they were relieved to be housed with

¹²¹ Interview with Tetjana Babitsch, za469; Interview with Halyna Kassitsch, za481, ZA online archive.
¹²² See interviews with former Ukrainian forced laborers working at the Ford Werke factory in Cologne, Working for the Enemy, 164-228.
¹²³ See testimonies of former Ukrainian force laborers working in the city of Hameln, Heimweh und der Hunger, 28-50.
¹²⁴ Interview with Eugenia M, za215, ZA online archive.
¹²⁵ Quoted in Wearing the Letter P, 124.
other Ukrainians. Despite being forcibly displaced from their homes and made to work in horrible conditions, sharing a language and common experience made it easy for Ukrainians from different geographical locations and socio-economic classes to make friends with each other since they could understand each other’s circumstances in ways they perhaps might not been able to back home. Moreover, since language is an outward expression of a nation’s particular identity and a significant means of ensuring its continuity, speaking Ukrainian on job sites and in labor camps proved to unite Ukrainians from different backgrounds while also providing a way to hold onto their national identity in a foreign environment that viewed them as an inferior collective group.

In some instances Ukrainians united over a shared experience characterized by persistent hunger and malnutrition, rampant disease resulting from unsanitary living conditions, dangerous working conditions, and limited to no access to healthcare. Although Sauckel’s May 1942 decree guaranteed that housing, food rations, pay, and free time, for all foreign laborers were to be fundamentally similar to that of German civilians “as war conditions permitted,” the ambiguity surrounding the definition of “war conditions” allowed space for discrimination against Ukrainian forced laborers and the original guidelines were rarely followed. Since Ukrainians were, for the most part, nationally segregated in camp barracks, they used their sense of community to supplement poor material provisions and provide each other with emotional and psychological support in the face of persistent hunger and malnutrition, rampant disease resulting from unsanitary living conditions, dangerous working conditions, and limited to no access to healthcare. As Ukrainians united against an alien force by supplementing food rations and caring for fellow injured and sick workers, they solidified their nationalism, which increasingly became used to survive in dismal forced labor conditions.

Food rations depended on whether one was employed in industrial or agricultural sector, with the latter having more options to supplement meager rations. Generally speaking, Ukrainian forced laborers working in factories received one cup of coffee or tea, 200-300 grams of bread, and one or two cups of watery cabbage soup per day, but it largely depended on what food was available. For example, in the Gutenöffnungshutte iron and steel plant in Dusseldorf, female Ukrainian workers only received three slices of dry bread and a watery soup made from carrots, turnips, or cabbage. In other areas Ukrainians received a small amount of potatoes, beets or spinach instead of a cup of soup, but as one Ukrainian forced laborer noted, “occasionally we had to pick bugs and sometimes fat green caterpillars like worms out of our ‘lunch;’ but we ate it anyway. It was all there was.”

In April 1942, following the influx of Eastern workers as a result of Sauckel’s labor quotas, the Nazi administration decreased food rations for German civilians, German workers, and foreign workers. Consequently, Ukrainians barely received enough food to survive and often faced complications from malnutrition. For instance, in the Middledeutscher Motorwerke plant in Leipzig there was an average of 12 percent workdays missed due to malnutrition after the new regulations were put into place. Letters sent to the UCC described Ukrainian forced

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129 Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 172.
130 Quote from Alexandrow, Flight from Novaa Salow, 84; For other examples of spoiled food see interview with Tetjana Babitsch, za469, ZA online archive; and the testimony of Jekaterina M. in Heimweh und der Hunger, 40.
131 Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 173.
133 Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 173.
laborers collapsing on factory floors from hunger. According to the camp physician of the Krupp Steel factory in Essen, Ukrainian workers often had to sit down in the workroom, complaining they were dizzy and not able to work due to lack of nourishment. In one case where malnutrition was the cause of illness, a Ukrainian forced laborer was rebuked for “misbehavior” and food rations and her food rations were taken away as a form of punishment.

In comparison, the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture established a standard weekly ration for German and Western Europeans in the spring of 1942, which consisted of a weekly distribution of 450 grams of meat, 225 grams of fats, 2,800 grams of bread (400 grams per day), and 5,250 grams of potatoes (750 grams per day). Moreover, German and Western European workers also received extra rations for performing “heavy” work or working overtime and were allowed to received packages from the Red Cross. Nazi policies also governed when, where, and how forced laborers were allowed to eat. Many industrial labor camps had separate kitchens and mess halls on the plant grounds for Western and Eastern European laborers to keep the interaction of the two groups limited. Even Ukrainian forced laborers working on farms had to eat at either a separate table or in a separate room if they were employed with other national groups. Vera Siegmund was a child when her mother volunteered to work on a small farm in Germany during the war, and recalls that “besides my mother, there was also a Ukrainian grandmother and four men workers. There were two Yugoslavians, one Polish fellow, and one

134 “Letter to UHA Social Services Committee, June 3, 1942, Correspondence of the Ukrainian Central Committee, 379-380.
135 Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 173.
136 Kotyeva, Three Worlds of Larissa, 139.
137 Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, 272.
138 Ibid., 276.
Ukrainian man. They all had to eat at separate tables.\textsuperscript{140} On one large farm, all twenty of the Ukrainian employees ate their meals together in the basement of the large farmhouse while the rest of the French, Belgian, and German workers ate upstairs in the kitchen with the owners of the farm.\textsuperscript{141}

Since German authorities restricted the sale of non-rationed foods through the use of identification cards and shops were forbidden to sell food to Eastern workers, Ukrainians sometimes worked together in small groups to supplement their meager food rations and combat hunger.\textsuperscript{142} For example, Ukrainian forced laborers who worked unloading ships in the port city of Hamburg collectively stole meat, bacon, and fish off ships when supervision was lax.\textsuperscript{143} Those working in cities often stole potatoes from factory kitchens, snuck out at night to beg for food or ration cards, rummaged through garbage cans, or bartered on the local black market.\textsuperscript{144} Even if Ukrainians obtained extra food, they often had to collectively come up with creative ways for cooking. For instance, one former Ukrainian forced laborer recalled:

\begin{quote}
We often left the grounds, we would crawl under the fence and go to the nearby village. We begged from the Germans who lived there. They often gave us potatoes, but we couldn’t cook these anywhere. But there was one room where the laundry was boiled, where we washed our clothes ourselves. We would wrap the potatoes in a heavy towel, tie them up and cook them there.\textsuperscript{145}
\end{quote}

Ukrainians working on farms had more opportunities to find extra food and frequently stole apples and pears from nearby orchards or spent their time off hiking in the forest picking

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{140} Siegmund, \textit{My Ukrainian Footprints}, 134.
\textsuperscript{141} Alexandrow, \textit{Flight from Novaa Salow}, 84.
\textsuperscript{142} In addition to identification cards, business owners also relied on shop records of to determine who was eligible to buy non-rationed food items as shopkeepers were prohibited from selling food to customers not officially listed in their store records. See Freid, \textit{The Exploitation of Foreign Labor}, 98.
\textsuperscript{143} Interview with Jewodokija Bessubkina, za470, ZA online archive.
\textsuperscript{144} Interview with Hanna Hrishchenko, za477, ZA online archive; Alexandrow, \textit{Flight from Novaa Salow}, 88, 90; interviews with Inna Kuligina and Nadia Shubrawa, \textit{Working for the Enemy}, 177-179; Kotyeva, \textit{Three Worlds of Larissa}, 148.
\textsuperscript{145} Interview with Inna Kuligina, \textit{Working for the Enemy}, 178-179.
\end{flushright}
Some Germans in the countryside gave Ukrainian forced laborers pieces of fruit, baked potatoes, cheese, sausage, or small slices of cake, which Ukrainians often shared with their fellow forced laborers. In a small attempt to make life slightly better, whenever there was extra food, Ukrainian forced laborers in both economic sectors tried to celebrate or hold a “small feast,” where they gathered and sang Ukrainian folksongs “regardless of how terrible it [the food] was.”

Ukrainian forced laborers also faced discrimination in terms of healthcare while working in Germany as German doctors were either prohibited from treating Eastern Europeans or refused to do so. Poor housing and working conditions caused widespread disease, lice and bedbugs, and medication to combat disease was extremely limited and reserved to Western European laborers. According to one report by Wilhelm Hellmold describing the working conditions of forced laborers in the Metalwerke Schwarz in Domag, all the water available to forced laborers in the camp barracks was polluted and contaminated by pollution from the factory. There was no way to practice proper hygiene in many of the camp barracks and the only water available to wash with was dirty and cold. As the number of foreign workers increased between 1943 and 1944, housing and sanitary conditions rapidly deteriorated. The senior German doctor responsible for the Krupp factory camps in Essen described how in a small school housing 1,200 Eastern workers tuberculosis, typhus, malnutrition, and skin disease were

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146 Interview with Tetjana Babitsch, za 469, ZA online archive.
147 Markovna, Nina’s Journey, 272.
148 Interview with Inna Kulagina, in Working for the Enemy, 189.
149 In the few cases where Ukrainian forced laborers were allowed to see a doctor, language barriers caused problems explaining and diagnosing symptoms. For example, see Markovna, Nina’s Journey, 139.
150 Interview with Tetjana Babitsch, za 469; Interview with Hanna Hrishchenko, za477, ZA online archive.
152 Testimony of Jekaterina M., in Heimweh und der Hunger, 40.
rampant, with only the worst cases being treated. Furthermore, if someone had a preexisting condition that was not detected through prior medical examinations, such as one forced laborer who had epilepsy, no medical attention was given to alleviate symptoms and he was left to suffer on his own. Consequently, Ukrainian forced laborers were left to take care of each other in whatever ways they could such as picking lice off each other, sharing blankets with those who were sick, giving up meager food rations to help those with malnutrition problems, writing letters to UCC requesting aid, and praying together.

Forced laborers not only had limited access to general healthcare, but emergency medicine was almost nonexistent despite the fact that factory work could be extremely dangerous. Many Ukrainian forced laborers who worked in chemical or ammunitions plants where they handled caustic materials and inhaled contaminated air. Moreover, accidents due to lack of sleep, inattentiveness, or not being properly trained led to gruesome injuries. For example, in the Fordwerk factory, women were frequently burned by hot metal and debris constantly flying in their eyes, which caused temporary and permanent loss of sight. Others describe cuts and burns from handling harmful materials as there were no protective measures for Eastern European laborers. Again, Ukrainians were left to their own devices to help one

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153 Mulligan, The Politics of Illusion and Empire, 114. For an example of a Ukrainian forced laborer who suffered from typhus see Oxana Markowna M. Die Sprache der Opfer, 45-46. For scabies, interview with Tetjana Babitsch, za477, ZA online archive; Testimony of Elsa Iwanova, Working for the Enemy, 175; and Testimony of Wanda S., Heimweh und der Hunger, 40.
154 Interview with Nadia Shubrawa in Working for the Enemy, 179. Shubrawa also describes the fact that chronic conditions often caused problems with supervisors because they assumed forced laborers were faking an undetected condition in order to be sent back home.
155 Ibid.
156 Only the absolute worst cases were taken to “hospitals” and according to the historian Sophie Knab, “the term hospital can only be applied very loosely to what, in reality, was a quickly converted existing building on the campgrounds or next to an existing hospital.” Knab, Wearing the Letter P, 155; For a description of a “hospital” for Eastern works interview with Oleksandr Ijaschenko, za478, ZA online archive.
another bandaging burns and cuts with old factory rags or bed linens, stealing medicine from first
aid kits, and aiding those with sight problems.¹⁵⁷

Initially, work schedules precluded time off for most Ukrainian forced laborers, but throughout 1943 and 1944, in an attempt to increase productivity, Nazi authorities loosened restrictions regulating time off and leisure activities, which allowed Ukrainians to expand their small national communities beyond the boundaries of labor camps and effectively create city-
wide national communities where Ukrainians practices cultural and religious traditions.

According to Sauckel’s May 1942 regulations,

> The use of the freetime [sic] of the foreign workers and women workers within and outside of the camps is to be made within the framework of the given war-limited possibilities and according to the peculiar qualities of the workers. Extensive regard must be given to the national customs of the foreign workers and women workers.¹⁵⁸

These vague instructions provided German factory management and farm owners a wide range of flexibility in regulating leisure time. As a result, initial regulations for Ukrainians working in the industrial sector prohibited Eastern European workers from leaving camp barracks except to go to work and banned them from interacting with Germans or Western European workers.¹⁵⁹ In April 1942 leisure time was granted for good behavior and exceptional productivity at work, although Ukrainians were only allowed to leave the camp in small groups and had to be accompanied by a German supervisor or interpreter.¹⁶⁰ In contrast, agricultural workers typically had Saturday or Sunday afternoons off and in many cases were allowed to attend church services. However, in 1943 all Eastern European industrial and agricultural forced laborers

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Nadia Shubrawa in Working for the Enemy, 179.
¹⁵⁹ Siegmund, My Ukrainian Footprints, 136.
¹⁶⁰ Khelmendyk-Kodot, Kolholz Childhood and German Slavery, 115.
received one day off a week and were allowed to leave camp barracks without chaperones as long as they adhered to a set curfew and wore their assigned national badge.\textsuperscript{161}

Ukrainians met other Ukrainian forced laborers as they walked and wandered around cities and towns. For example, Ukrainian forced laborers that worked on farms outside the city of Hameln, took the train into the city on their days off and met fellow Ukrainians who worked in the factories there.\textsuperscript{162} Agricultural workers who did not live near a city met other Ukrainian forced laborers by attending church and walking to nearby farms during their time off.\textsuperscript{163} Regardless of whether they lived in an urban center or rural area, Ukrainians often played cards; drank coffee; sang Ukrainian folksongs about Cossacks; danced in barrack dining rooms; celebrated holidays; and if a friend could speak German or French well enough, they drank beer in restaurants.\textsuperscript{164} Since many Ukrainian forced laborers were teenagers or in their early twenties, some forged romantic relationships with each other, such as Julia Alexandrow and her friend Olga, both of whom worked on a farm eight miles away from their boyfriends. The couples would travel to either the nearest town or take turns visiting each other’s respective farms during their time off.\textsuperscript{165}

In July 1943, DAF organized individual meetinghouses for separate national groups in cities with a large number of foreign workers.\textsuperscript{166} For Ukrainians, meetinghouses typically took place in pubs where they held gatherings and social events such as choir performances and dances, listened to radio programs, and watched translated German films. In one instance

\textsuperscript{161} Alexandrow, \textit{Flight from Novaa Salow}, 85; Interview with Anna Nesteruk, in \textit{Working for the Enemy}, 178; Interview with Inna Kulagina, in \textit{Working for the Enemy}, 189.
\textsuperscript{162} Testimony of Jekaterina M., in \textit{Heimweh und der Hunger}, 49.
\textsuperscript{163} Testimonies of Jewdokija B., Ljudmila I., Jekaterina M., and Maria T., \textit{Heimweh und der Hunger}, 40-49.
\textsuperscript{164} Interview with Tetjana Babitsch, za477, ZA online archive; Interview with Jewdokija Bessubkina, za470, ZA online archive; Interview with Anna Nestruk, \textit{Working for the Enemy}, 188. For sneaking into German restaurants see Alexandrow, \textit{Flight from Novaa Salow}, 99-100; Testimony of Kamila Felinkska, \textit{Working for the Enemy}, 193.
\textsuperscript{165} Alexandrow, \textit{Flight from Novaa Salow}, 99.
\textsuperscript{166} Herbert, \textit{Hitler’s Foreign Workers}, 293.
Ukrainians forced laborers formed a bandura band and a Cossack orchestra.\textsuperscript{167} The Ukrainian Central Committee also sent newspapers, which were read aloud in groups and then passed on to other Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{168} Celebrations for Christmas, New Years, and Easter were celebrated by playing balalaikas and harmonicas, singing, dancing, since according to one former Ukrainian forced laborer, “our people always celebrated their holy days with majesty, elation, and reverence. The national traditions lived on and could not be destroyed.”\textsuperscript{169} Having a central location in cities not only gave Ukrainians a greater opportunity to organize communal cultural and holiday celebrations, but also the chance to expand their friendship groups and social networks beyond the confines of camp barracks.

The degree to which Ukrainians associated religion with national identity in the interwar period varied significantly between Ukrainians living in Poland and those living in Soviet Ukraine, who often didn’t hold strong religious convictions. However, several former Ukrainian forced laborers from the Soviet Union rediscovered religious traditions, or learned how to pray from Western Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{170} In one instance, forced laborers placed holy pictures they had brought from home on a makeshift shelf in the camp barracks, took turns praying over the pictures, and held group prayers in the evenings after work.\textsuperscript{171} Ukrainians from both Eastern and Western Ukraine frequently went to church together, gathered to sing traditional Ukrainian hymns, and attempted to recreate holiday celebrations from home.\textsuperscript{172} During Christmas, for example, Ukrainian forced laborers worked together to steal extra bread, beets, potatoes, or

\textsuperscript{167} Khelmendyk-Kodot, \textit{Kolholz Childhood and German Slavery}, 115.
\textsuperscript{169} Hunczak, \textit{My Memoirs}, 14. Also see interview with Halyna Kassitsch, za481, ZA online archive.
\textsuperscript{170} Interview with Jewdokija Bessubkina, za470, ZA online archive. Jewdokija Bessubkina describes in detail the general attitude toward religion in Soviet Ukraine was to not discuss religion or religious topics in public and while some churches remained opened, the majority of people did not attend.
\textsuperscript{171} Interview with Janina M., za252, ZA online archive.
\textsuperscript{172} Interview with Hanna Hrishchenko, za477, ZA online archive.
cabbage, which they would eat on Christmas Eve after singing Ukrainian Christmas hymns. Occasionally the Ukrainian Central Committee sent packages to Ukrainian forced laborers with food and Ukrainian newspapers for Christmas, New Years, and Easter.\textsuperscript{173}

**Conclusion**

C. Hirschman suggests that language, customs, and religion serve as “especially strong factors in maintaining divisions that reinforce cultural definitions of ethnicity,” and this seems to be the case for Ukrainian forced laborers during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{174} Since language, customs, and religion are mediums of expression of ethno-nationalism, speaking Ukrainian, reading Ukrainian newspapers, singing Ukrainian hymns, dancing to folksongs, playing balalaikas, and holding small feasts and celebrations for religious holidays effectively created a greater sense of unity and community among Ukrainian from different geographical locations, political backgrounds, and socio-economic classes.

The experience of forced labor, including living in a system of constant supervision and surveillance, the degrading reality of being classified as racially worthless, disastrous living and working conditions, insufficient nourishment, lack of proper hygiene, and little to no access to medical care, became the factor that caused Ukrainians to practice cultural nationalism in forced labor camps. Many Ukrainian forced laborers recall mental suffering, bad nerves, and periods of extreme sorrow and grief while employed in Germany during the war. When asked in an interview to describe how she remembered the war, Halyna Jachno, stated, “The war was a severe blow of fate for the whole people. You just had to get through it. I suffered along with


everyone.” Remembering the war and the suffering instilled in Ukrainians the sense that they were victims of historical circumstance, which provided a feeling of solidarity between Ukrainians who remained in Germany and those who returned home after the war. As a result, Ukrainian nationalism in forced labor camps was forged under extreme conditions in which cooperation with co-ethnic members was a means a survival as well as a way to transcend the boundaries of the homeland.

In last few months of the war, as Allied bombs destroyed entire industrial centers and a German loss seemed increasingly likely, Ukrainians relied on their small communities for shelter during air raids, began contacting other Ukrainian communities in Germany through letters, and started to form small camps near or around mutations factories, military bases, or centers where forced laborers had worked during the war. Of the 1.8 million Ukrainian forced laborers displaced at the end of the war, between 200,000-225,000 refused to return home after Allied forces liberated Germany in May 1945, making former forced laborers the largest proportion of Ukrainian displaced persons (DPs) living in Germany and Austria in after the war. As makeshift camps grew into displaced persons camps that housed thousands of displaced Ukrainians, Ukrainian displaced persons in the postwar period continued to united around a cultural nationalism, which provided a tool for survival. In other words, this was a nationalism based on a common language, culture, religion, and historical experience but also one that served

175 Quote interview with Halyna Jachno, za479, ZA online archive. Also see interview with Hanna Hrishchenko, za477, ZA online archive.
176 Panchuk, Heroes of Their Day, 85
177 The number 225,000 comes from Wsevolod W. Isajiw and Michael Palij, “Refugees and the DP Problem in Postwar Europe,” in The Refugee Experience, xvi. Isajiw and Palij argue that UNRAA and IRO records, which most historians site, underrepresent the actual numbers of Ukrainian displaced persons since documenting DPs did not begin until the construction of DP camps. Compare to Walter Dushnyck and William J. Gibbons, S.J., Refugees are People: The Plight of Europe’s Displaced Persons (New York, n.p., 1948), 13-39 and Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World (New Haven: George Allen & Unwin, 1953), 59-101, who cite the number of Ukrainian DPs at 206,871 and 201,000, respectively.
as a means to cope with the suffering and trauma resulting from being placed in an alien, and at many times, hostile environment.
Chapter Four
Resisting Repatriation: Redefining National Belonging in Ukrainian Displaced Persons Camps

We are not a State at all; we are a nation, a nation that is not corresponding to a State…[my] own ‘State,’ for instance is Poland, but I am a Ukrainian.¹

--Margaret McNeill
By the Rivers of Babylon

Margaret McNeill, a displaced Ukrainian residing in London after the war, accurately described the complexities surrounding ethnicity, citizenship, and nationality in Eastern Europe, where one may have various means of self-identification, in this case Polish citizenship and Ukrainian national allegiance. She also explains how Ukrainians comprised a nation without their own nation-state and the way Ukrainians distinguished between national belonging and citizenship. The notion of Ukrainian nationhood plagued Western Allies and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in the aftermath of World War II since many officials were under strict instructions to repatriate Ukrainians regardless of nationality. Given that Ukrainians represented the largest national group that actively refused repatriation during the postwar period, the “Ukrainian question” created complications, friction, and inconsistencies as Allied authorities struggled to decipher Ukrainian nationhood and why Ukrainians did not want to return home.

The vast majority of Ukrainians repatriated between May and September 1945 went home willingly, but approximately 200,000-225,000 Ukrainian displaced persons refused repatriation despite considerable pressure by occupation forces, national governments, and international welfare agencies.² These Ukrainians comprised the postwar Ukrainian diaspora in

² The estimation of 200,000-225,000 Ukrainian DPs comes from Vasyl Markus, “Political Parties in the DP Camps,” in, The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II, ed. by Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus, (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 115. Most historians, such as Mark R. Elliott and Mark Wyman cite 200,000 Ukrainian DPs who refused to return home, butas
Germany and Austria between 1945 and 1954 and were made up of a diverse population from rural and urban regions throughout Ukraine, with different socio-economic backgrounds, varied degrees of education, different political and religious traditions, and their own unique experiences of the war. Although exact numbers are hard to come by, approximately 60 to 70 percent of Ukrainian DPs were former forced laborers and were largely young, single, poorly educated Ukrainians, who came from rural parts of Ukraine, and had spent part of the war living and working in Germany or Austria. The remaining 30 to 40 percent of Ukrainian DPs fled the Red Army as it retook Ukrainian territory in 1944 and 1945. In contrast to former forced laborers, these were political refugees who were usually from urban areas, generally had a secondary or university education, typically were either OUN members or had worked with the OUN and UPA during the war and, for the most part, arrived in Germany with their families. Another distinction between Ukrainian displaced persons was the fact that two-thirds had lived within Polish borders prior to the outbreak of war and belonged to the Greek Catholic Church while the remaining one-third were from Soviet Ukraine and were mostly Orthodox.3 Other


3 V. Mudry, “Nova ukrainska emihratsiia,” (New Ukrainian Emigration) in *Ukrainitsi u vilnomu sviti: Iuvileina knyha Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Soiuzu 1894-1954 (Ukrainians in the Free World: Anniversary Book of the Ukrainian People’s Union)*, (Jersey City, 1954), 115-136; Orest Subtelny, “Ukrainian Political Refugees: An Historical Overview, in *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II*, ed. by Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Yury Boshik, and Roman Senkus, (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 14-15. It is important to note, however, that not every Ukrainian DP fit into one of these categories. For example, Larissa Kotyeva was from Soviet Ukraine and had a secondary education, attended a technical school, and worked as skilled laborer before she was recruited as a forced laborer. See Kotyeva, *Three Worlds of Larissa*; However, most of the memoirs, testimonies, and interviews used for this study confirm these generalizations. For example, see Amy George, *Goodbye is not Forever*; Khelemendyk-Kodot; *Kolhospne dytynstvo*; Kuznetsov, *Babii iar.*
important sub-groups included former Soviet POWs who did not wish to return home, released concentration camp inmates, interned members of the Galician Division, and several hundred Ukrainian Insurgent Army fighters who arrived in Germany in 1948. However, despite their differences, Ukrainian displaced persons consolidated their national identity in order to successfully resist repatriation by defining themselves as a distinct national group, separate from Russians and Poles, with their own unique language, history, and cultural traditions.

Relying mainly on the United Nation’s UNRRA collection, this chapter explores the ways in which Ukrainian DPs used nationalism to unite under a common goal to avoid involuntary and voluntary repatriation in a variety of ways despite their political, economic, social, and religious differences. Such methods included organizing their own camps and welfare committees; working with Ukrainian organizations in the United States, Canada, and Britain; claiming refugee status based on the political circumstances in the Soviet Union, and actively fighting to be classified as either Ukrainian citizens or stateless citizens. As Ukrainian displaced persons organized their own national communities, they actively resisted repatriation by challenging postwar resettlement policies, definitions regarding refugee status, and established criteria for citizenship. Fear of repatriation motivated Ukrainians to consolidate their national identity despite the wide range of differences between Ukrainian displaced persons. As a result, they shed previous means of self-identification, advocated for a nationalized definition of citizenship, and defined themselves in opposition to Russians and the Soviet political system. The choices made by Ukrainians to prove their anti-Soviet sentiments proved to be increasingly successful as tensions between the United States and Soviet Union heightened and the two allies

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became enemies. Moreover, Ukrainian DPs united with North American and European Ukrainian organizations and individual Ukrainians living in the U.S., Britain, and Canada over the issue of forced repatriation and objection to communist rule in Ukraine, which expanded the boundaries of the Ukrainian nation to include transnational Ukrainian communities and, thus, began the creation of a global Ukrainian diaspora.

**Postwar Plans for Displaced Persons and Forced Repatriation**

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement in which each country agreed to the immediate repatriation of civilians and prisoners of war. The agreement specifically stated that citizens of each country “will without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities.”

The Soviet Union signed similar agreements with the United Kingdom and France and, although these agreements made no provisions for forcible repatriation, the participating nations agreed to use “all practicable means to ensure the evacuation of these liberated citizens” and prohibited the distribution of “hostile propaganda” that could potentially suppress or delay repatriation efforts. A subsequent agreement signed between the U.S., Britain, and Soviet Union in Halle, Germany on May 23, 1945, reinforced each country’s commitment to the repatriation of “all former prisoners of war and citizens of the USSR” and designated exchange points, regulated the number of persons to be processed daily,

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and established the repatriation of Allied citizens as a postwar priority. However, the two postwar agreements proved to be extremely vague in terms of defining repatriatable persons, citizenship criteria, and the use of force against DPs refusing repatriation, which created friction between Ukrainian DPs and the U.S., Soviet Union, and international organizations responsible for assisting in repatriation efforts. For Ukrainian DPs, the lack of appropriate protocols created an atmosphere of fear as Soviet repatriation officials resorted to a variety of violent means to return as many Eastern Europeans as possible home, regardless of whether or not they were Soviet citizens.

The summer of 1945 represented the height of postwar repatriation and, as a result, by the beginning of July 1945, 1.5 million Soviet citizens had been transported back to the Soviet Union at a rate of 50,000 per day. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and the newly created United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) assisted in the return of displaced persons in the Western zones of occupation. DPs who found themselves in the areas controlled by the Red Army had no option but to return home since neither Western military authorities, welfare agencies, nor the UNRRA could enter the Soviet zone. The procedures for repatriation included creating displaced persons camps to house and care for DPs until they could return home, screening and categorizing DPs by citizenship, registration, relocation to reception centers, and organizing transportation home. By the end of

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9 Although it was an independent humanitarian organization, the UNRRA remained subordinate to American, British, and French occupation authorities. Eventually a division of labor was established in which the detection and eviction of collaborators from the camps was reserved for military personnel while verification of DPs eligibility and providing material aid was the responsibility of the UNRRA. See G. Daniel Cohen, “Between Relief and Politics: Refugee Humanitarianism in Occupied Germany 1945-1946,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 43 no. 3 (July 2008): 442-446
September 1945, SHAEF had delivered 2,034,000 Soviet citizens from the western zones of Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia while 230,000 had been returned from France, Norway, and other Western European countries.10

As part of the repatriation process, all displaced persons were interviewed by a “screening committee,” which determined an individual’s citizenship status and officially registered them for repatriation. However, neither the Yalta agreement nor the Halle agreement provided an explicit definition of “Soviet citizen,” causing confusion and inconsistencies throughout the repatriation process as the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union adhered to their own definitions and criteria for citizenship.11 The postwar incorporation of previously held Polish territories east of the Curzon Line into the Soviet Union particularly presented problems for officials tasked with determining the citizenship of Ukrainian displaced persons. In the summer of 1945, the U.S. and Britain agreed “Soviet citizens” were those who had resided in the Soviet Union at the outbreak of war on September 1, 1939. Therefore, Ukrainians who had lived in Poland before the war were to retain their Polish citizenship, return to Poland, and not be subjected to forceful repatriation at the hands of Soviet officials.12 Similarly, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians were also considered exempt from involuntary repatriation since the United States did not recognize the 1940 annexation of their homelands by the Soviet Union and, as a result, did not classify them as Soviet citizens.13 However, Allied personal were often confused about how to classify Eastern Europeans given the shifting of borders and the multiplicities of

10 Wyman, DPs, 64.
12 Marta Dyczok, The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees, 48.
13 “OMGUS memo to Director, OMG, Western District and Bavaria, Subject: Determination and Reporting of Nationalities,” Determination of Nationality, UNRRA Germany Mission fonds, S-0399/S-0400-06, UNA.
place names in Eastern Europe. More importantly, however, Soviet repatriation officers frequently refused to abide by the distinction between Polish-Ukrainians and Soviet-Ukrainians, insisting that all Ukrainians originating from areas within the new Soviet Union borders were Soviet citizens, and began to demand the return of Western Ukrainians following the signing of the Soviet-Polish border treaty on July 6, 1945.

The Soviet Administration of the Plenipotentiary for Repatriation Affairs (APRA) was the official organization tasked with facilitating the return of Soviet nationals. The Foreign Mission of APRA operated in twenty-three countries, using legal and illegal methods to repatriate displaced persons from Western-controlled areas. The most common tactic used by the APRA was to claim individuals as Soviet citizens and demand their return without producing adequate evidence as to their actual citizenship status. Moscow wanted DPs to return home since the USSR faced a shortage of workers and a war-torn economy and feared that DPs remaining abroad would either become “enemies of the USSR” due to their exposure to capitalism or posed a threat to the creditability of Soviet propaganda, which stressed the success of the world’s first communist state. Additionally, the Soviet Union felt that it deserved to have their repatriation requests sanctioned by the Western Allies due to their disproportionate losses during the war.

14 Dyczok, The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees, 53.
16 The estimated number of Soviet fatalities in World War II is 20 million, compared to 300,000 for the United States and 330,000 for Britain, which Soviet authorities resented. The Soviet Union also suffered 90 percent of the total causalities in the European theater and in addition to the loss of human life, 60 percent of transportation facilities and 70 percent of industrial capacity in the invaded portions of the USSR had been destroyed. According to Soviet reports 1,700 cities and towns and 70,000 villages were obliterated. See Elliott, “The Soviet Repatriation Campaign,” in The Refugee Experience, 342; Frank Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), 181; Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945, (New York: Waveland, 1997), 263; Georgii I. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, (New York, Cape, 1971), 643.
Wishing to placate the Soviet Union in order to ensure the safe return of their own POWs and believing that all displaced persons should return home, Western Allies complied with Soviet repatriation methods including the distribution of propaganda, persuasion, and outright violence. Consequently, SHAEF and the UNRRA initially followed Soviet forced repatriation strategies and on July 8 1945, SHAEF ordered that “citizens of the USSR identified as such by Soviet repatriation officers” be sent home and “will not be offered any option on this score.” Consequently, training packets distributed to all U.S. troops stationed in Germany during the 1945-1946 occupation explicitly stated “individuals identified by the Soviet repatriation representatives as Soviet citizens are subject to repatriation without regard to their personal wishes,” revealing that international organizations and the U.S. Army were not only aware of, but also committed to, non-voluntary repatriation.

As the number of willing repatriates slowed to a halt, Soviet authorities resorted to a variety of methods to return their nationals including an aggressive utilization of Soviet repatriation missions, propaganda, direct appeals to DPs to return home, and outright violence. Since Ukrainians represented a large portion of DPs who did not want to return home, they became one of the prime targets of Soviet repatriation efforts. Throughout most of 1945 Soviet


19 Ibid., 67-68.

20 Because of a lack of accurate data, it is impossible to know how many Ukrainians were repatriated voluntarily or by force between May and September 1945. For examples of former Ukrainian forced laborers who wanted to return home see the interviews with Hanna Hirshchenko, Oleksandr Ijaschenko, Halyna Jachno, and Andrij Klyuchko, Zwangsarbeiter Archiv 1939-1945 (hereafter ZA), online archive, available at https://www.zwangsarbeit-archiv.de/en/index.html, (Accessed June 2020).
officials were freely allowed to visit DP camps in the western zones of occupation to provide information to displaced persons about returning home, during which they often distributed propaganda and intimidated DPs.\textsuperscript{21} Soviet propaganda, which included speeches, personal interviews, films, pamphlets, and newspapers insisted that living conditions under communism were superior to those under capitalism, promised amnesty for all forced laborers, and tried to evoke feelings of nostalgia for the Soviet homeland.\textsuperscript{22} For example, posters displayed in Soviet DP camps proclaimed “Come Home- Your Country’s Calling” and “Death to Fascism- Liberty for the People!”\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, Soviet authorities, with Allied approval, systematically went through work visa registrations of cities, towns, and villages looking for DPs with Slavic names and also attempted to disband all Ukrainian organizations created under Nazi Germany that were providing welfare assistance to Ukrainian DPs like the Ukrainian National Committee and the Ukrainian Red Cross.\textsuperscript{24}

Besides the distribution of propaganda, the Soviet Union also placed their own NKVD agents in DP camps throughout Germany and Austria. Some of these agents had purposefully fallen into Nazi hands with the aim of investigating Nazi collaborators and maintained their cover after the German defeat, continuing to keep tabs on the behavior and location of Soviet citizens abroad. SMERSH (“Death to Spies”), the main counter-intelligence agency in the Red Army also secured help from Soviet DPs themselves through bribery, blackmail, and repeated threats.\textsuperscript{25} According to a former defected member of SMERSH who worked with the repatriation mission and was tasked with recruiting DP agents:

\textsuperscript{21} “Ukrainian Displaced Persons,” October 15, 1946, UNRRA Austrian Mission fonds, S-1492-0000-0172, UNA.
\textsuperscript{22} Basansky, \textit{Escape from Terror}, 122; Kotyeva, \textit{Three Worlds of Larissa}, 164.
\textsuperscript{23} For Soviet propaganda posters see Wyman, \textit{DPs}, 76-77; For film screenings see Dyczok, \textit{The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees}, 54.
\textsuperscript{24} Letter from General Deputy of Control for UNRAA Germany and Austria to Deputy Military Government [British Element], May 27, 1946, UNRRA, S-1492-0000-0172, UNA; Basansky, \textit{Escape from Terror}, 124.
\textsuperscript{25} Elliot, “The Soviet Repatriation Campaign,” 346.
Some agents were bought for money...[others] might be promised complete forgiveness for all past sins and an honorable homecoming to their Motherland. They might also be threatened with reprisals and of course threats would be made against their families, if they happened to be in Soviet hands.  

As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union began to deteriorate, the secret police played an increasingly large role in identifying and investigating Soviet citizens refusing to return home, while also providing cover for Moscow’s espionage activities in the West.

When propaganda and intimidation failed to persuade Ukrainians to return home, Soviet officials turned to threats, kidnappings, and manhunts. Throughout the fall of 1945, the U.S., Britain, and France allowed Soviet repatriation personnel to “travel freely about the western zone, [at times] without even being accompanied by allied representatives.” For example, in Flensburg, Russian liaison officers convinced the British officers of the camp that all DPs were Russians, including 250 Ukrainians who held Polish citizenship prior to the outbreak of war.

According to Bohdan Panchuk, head of the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB), “in many places they [Soviet repatriation officers] were free to roam; they would stop a civilian in the street, and if they found a Ukrainian, they would very often load him into a vehicle and that was it.” Inside the DP camp at Mainz-Kastel “manhandling people into trucks at gunpoint” was a common occurrence while outside the camp, Soviet trucks cruised the streets to find any Slavs they happened to come across. In one instance, during a screening interview a Soviet interpreter told British and American officials that a family of Ukrainians wished to go home, despite the fact that they repeatedly pleaded to stay in Germany.  

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28 Ibid., 509.
29 Letter by Canadian Occupation Forces Officer in Germany, August 23, 1945, in *Plight of Ukrainian DPs*, 22-23.
30 Panchuk, *Heroes of Their Day*, 69; According to Mark Wyman the French Army was much less cooperative with Soviet repatriation officers compared to the British and U.S. occupation authorities. See Wyman, *DPs*, 64.
illegal seizures of Ukrainians DPs occurred in Germany and Austria, APRA and SMERSH also operated in Belgium, Norway, Italy, and France.\(^{33}\)

The unrelenting force used by Soviet authorities to repatriate DPs terrorized Ukrainians who did not wish to return home, and led to physical assaults on Soviet repatriation representatives and suicides among some Ukrainians. Violent attacks against Soviet authorities occurred repeatedly throughout the summer and fall of 1945 as Moscow increased its use of force in repatriation efforts. The historian Mark Elliott estimates that several thousand USSR citizens killed themselves rather than return home. UNRRA reports also cite several instances in which Ukrainians were asked to appear in front of a screening committee located within Soviet DPs camps but resorted to suicide, fearing they would be forcefully repatriated after they met with screening officials.\(^{34}\) Memoirs written by former Ukrainian forced laborers also describe suicides during the summer of 1945 in great detail. For example, one Ukrainian DP, who was kidnapped and placed in a Soviet repatriation center but managed to escape, described a man who “slit the throats of his family members and then his own with a razor,” leaving a note that read “I choose to die on freedom’s doorstep [rather] than be sent back to be tortured to death in Russia.”\(^{35}\) In another incident, when Soviet repatriation officers raided a Ukrainian church service in Kempton, Germany in August 1945, Ukrainians threw themselves out second and third story windows of the building.\(^{36}\) Violence against Soviet officials and self-harm provides a graphic illustration of the extent to which fear of repatriation existed in many Eastern European

\(^{33}\) For example, in Brussels, Soviet representatives broke into private homes without search warrants and in DP camps outside of Paris Soviet representatives abducted DPs without interference from the French police. Letter from Charge’ d’ Affairs to Secretary of the State, March 8, 1946 in Plight of Ukrainian DPs, 8; Elliot, “The Soviet Repatriation Campaign,” 349; and Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta, 373-377.

\(^{34}\) Elliott, Pawns of Yalta, 174. For an example of an UNRRA report citing violence and suicides see Letter from Central Representation of Ukrainian Emigration/Ukrainian Central Relief Committee in Germany to UNRRA Headquarters at Arolsen, June 16, 1946, UNRRA, S-0437-0022-25, UNA.

\(^{35}\) Basansky, Escape from Terror, 128.

\(^{36}\) Olexa Woropay, On the Road to the West: Diary of a Ukrainian Refugee (London, 1982), 33.
DP camps and was one of the ways in which Ukrainians asserted their agency in the repatriation process.

Desperate attempts to avoid repatriation concerned some U.S. soldiers, prompting a shift in the United States’ acceptance of the use of force by repatriation officers. Following reports of violent protests and deaths among Ukrainian DPs by American soldiers, General Eisenhower submitted a report to President Truman at the end of September 1945 describing the situation. The fact that Soviet citizens were choosing death over returning to the USSR caused Truman to ban the use of force in repatriation efforts in the American zone in October 1945. Subsequently, on December 21, 1945 the American State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee prohibited forceful repatriation unless displaced persons were either captured in German uniform, members of the Soviet armed forces after June 22, 1941 and not later discharged, or the Soviet Union could prove they had voluntarily aided the enemy.

However, the new order did not deter Soviet repatriation officials as the definition of “collaboration” was used loosely by the APRA and, as a result, forced repatriation, often with Allied support, continued under the pretense that Ukrainian DPs were either war criminals or had aided the enemy by working for Nazi Germany. For example, in March 1946 the UNRRA allowed Soviet representatives into the Bad Hersfeld DP camp, where they registered 120 Ukrainians for forced repatriation citing collaboration with Nazi Germany. Despite the fact that all residents of the camp disputed these claims, U.S. officers of the 7th Regiment of the 7th Army

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37 As some historians have pointed out, several different factors contributed to the U.S. refusal to allow forcible repatriation including an urging from U.S. commanders to put an end to Soviet repatriation efforts, increasing knowledge that many displace persons did not want to return home, and deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. See Tolstoy, Victims, chapter 18; Elliot Pawns of Yalta; and Nicholas Bethell, The Last Secret.

38 Proudfoot, European Refugees, 238-239; Elliot, Pawns of Yalta, 121-122; Dyczok, The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees, 51.

39 Policy reprinted in U.S. Forces European Theater (Main) APO 757, “Repatriation of Soviet Citizens Subject to Repatriation Under the Yalta Agreement,” January 4, 1946, UNRRA, S-0437-0022-25, UNA.
arrested those on the Soviet repatriation list, transported them to an isolation camp and, following an investigation, convicted and deported 75 of the 120 Ukrainians to the Soviet Union. A similar situation occurred in the DP camp in Ingolstadt, in which the UNRRA Director allowed 93 former Ukrainian forced laborers from the Soviet Union to be turned over to Soviet officials despite the fact that many were married to Polish citizens and did not wish to return home. In another incident, Soviet authorities arrested and repatriated 405 Ukrainians in a DP camp in Füssen for holding Nazi identification papers. The Ukrainian Central Relief Committee reported similar occurrences in DP camps located in Günzburg, Schwabmünchen, Ravensburg, Mainz-Kastel, and Hanau in the summer and fall of 1946.

Repatriation was a disorganized, chaotic, and distressing episode in the immediate postwar period, one which created an atmosphere of fear among Ukrainian DPs as Soviet officials resorted to a variety of violent means to return as many Ukrainians to the Soviet Union as possible. Fear of returning home stemmed from the fact that Ukrainians suffered tremendously under Soviet occupation, witnessing mass starvation following forced collectivization and mass murder during Stalin’s purges in the 1930s. As one Ukrainian DP explained, “I am only 24 years old, but have known much woe…such big nations like America and England have no real idea what communism stands for…and under no circumstance do we wish to return to the Soviets.” It was also widely known among Ukrainian DPs that Soviet

40 Mykola Bahnyniwskyk, “Forcible Repatriation of Ukrainian DPs in Hersfeld Camp.” UNRRA, S-0437-0022-25, UNA.
41 Letter from 3rd U.S. Army Headquarters to UNRRA District Office in Munich, Subject: Screening of Ukrainian DPs, October 18, 1946, UNRRA, S-0437-0022-25, UNA.
42 Letter from Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration/Ukrainian Central Relief Committee in Germany to UNRRA Headquarters in Arolsen, June 16, 1946, UNRRA, S-0437-0022-25, UNA; Letter from C.J. Williams, Deputy Director of UNRRA to U.S. Zone Headquarters, Subject “Forceful Repatriation of Ukrainians, August 13, 1946, UNRRA, S-0437-0022-25, UNA.
43 “From a letter signed by four young Ukrainians, formerly of Eastern Ukraine and now in the American Zone of occupation in Germany, sent to a Ukrainian American here whose soldier son became acquainted with them over there,” July 7, 1945 in Plight of the Ukrainian DPs, 19-20.
authorities were prosecuting Ukrainians for working for the Nazi regime as forced laborers, often sentencing them to years of hard labor in Siberia. A letter from a Ukrainian-American soldier described a harrowing scene of Ukrainians in DPs camps “breathlessly waiting with what seems to be hopeless hopefulness” for a miracle to end repatriation to the Soviet Union.

While large-scale forcible repatriation missions dwindled by the spring of 1946, APRA continued efforts to capture and transport Ukrainian DPs back to the Soviet Union until 1948, ultimately retrieving two million displaced persons from Western occupation zones. The constant fear of forced repatriation, uncertainty about the future, and the psychological trauma resulting from total war and dislocation terrified the estimated 200,000-250,000 Ukrainians DPs who could not be persuaded to return home. Like Ukrainians who experienced horrific conditions and collective suffering in forced labor camps, the endless threats of forced repatriation affected all Ukrainian DPs and, as a result, despite their different backgrounds, produced a high degree of national solidarity as Ukrainians faced a shared and immediate goal of protecting their safety and avoiding repatriation.

Methods of Resistance

Once the UNRRA became the official international organization responsible for repatriation in October 1945, it operated in accordance with its stated goal of returning all displaced persons residing in German and Austrian DP camps to their homelands. However, problems stemmed from the fact that the UNRRA did not understand the political and economic realities facing Ukrainian DPs if they returned home. Despite repeated appeals from Ukrainian DPs and Ukrainian volunteer organizations, the UNRRA were bound by several treaties signed

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Ibid.  
45 “From a personal letter addressed to Chancellor of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Diocese of the USA, Philadelphia, PA, Diehl Germany, September 11, 1945 in Plight of the Ukrainian DPs, 15-16.
with the USSR, maintaining Ukrainians were defined as either Polish or Soviet nationals. Consequently, Ukrainian DPs resorted to a variety of methods to resist repatriation including organizing their own camps and welfare committees; working with Ukrainian organizations in the United States, Canada, and Britain; claiming refugee status based on the political circumstances in the Soviet Union, and actively fighting to be classified as either Ukrainian or stateless citizens. The process of resisting voluntary and involuntary repatriation consolidated nationalism among different groups of Ukrainian DPs as they increasingly defined themselves in opposition to the Soviet Union and portrayed themselves as victims of foreign occupation. Moreover, as Ukrainian DPs worked with Ukrainian transnational organizations, they united with Ukrainian diaspora communities in Europe and North America over the issues of forced repatriation, opposition to Soviet control of Ukraine, and anti-communism.

According to a December 1945 report by the UNRRA, Ukrainians were “reluctant to uproot themselves from the relative security and comfort of camp life” due to the uncertainty surrounding the postwar conditions in their home countries in terms of welfare, housing, food, and employment. Other explanations for failure to comply with repatriation listed in the report included an unwillingness to lose employment within camps; refusal to leave another person who was non-repatriable; bad health or illness; and “the desire to maintain lucrative illegal activities such as black-market operations.”

However, most memoirs, testimonies, and interviews reveal that Ukrainians who wanted to avoid repatriation were motivated by one or more of the following considerations: fear of punishment for suspected collaboration with the Nazis, resistance against communism and the Soviet political system, opposition to the incorporation of

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46 UNRRA Austrian Mission, “Repatriation of Allied Displaced Persons in Allied Camps in Austria,” December 10, 1945, UNRRA, S-1492-0000-0173, UNA.
Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union, and in some cases the desire for religious freedom.\textsuperscript{47} As one Ukrainian DP rationalized:

We’ll be going back to the same things. Leather will be shipped to Russia to make shoes, while we bind our feet in rags; we’ll grow things in the collectives so Russians can eat while we struggle to get enough to survive…I have never seen a German barefooted, and [they] have food. I have eaten from their garbage cans. They throw out things that would have been gratefully eaten at home.\textsuperscript{48}

Although UNRRA officials probably understood why Ukrainians did not want to return home, the disparity between the December 1945 UNRRA report and explanations cited by Ukrainian displaced persons reveals a lack of will or ability to do anything about Soviet demands, which when combined with the vague regulations outlined at Yalta and Halle, created conflict and misunderstandings among Western Allied officials and the UNRRA on the one hand and Ukrainian DPs on the other.

By the beginning of 1946 UNRRA Repatriation Officers recognized that Ukrainians represented a group of DPs who were “stolidly and fanatically determined to resist returning to their former countries,” but, nonetheless, continued to encourage repatriation in a variety of ways, which continued to threaten and terrify Ukrainian DPs. Until June 1947 the UNRRA allowed Soviet authorities, with assistance from local German or Austrian police to raid displaced persons camps under the pretense of uncovering illegal black-market activities, leading to the arrest of Ukrainian DPs, often without uncovering any incriminating evidence. Moreover, during the summer of 1946 the UNRRA worked with Soviet repatriation officers who alleged that Ukrainian self-help organizations were impeding repatriation by spreading fascist, anti-repatriation propaganda. As a result, the UNRRA, with assistance from the U.S. military, conducted a series of investigations into pro-fascist activity in Ukrainian organizations and,

\textsuperscript{47} See for example Kotveya, \textit{Three Worlds of Larissa}, 165-166; Markovna, \textit{Nina’s Journey}, page number 356-357.  
\textsuperscript{48} Julia Alexandrow, \textit{Flight from Novaa Salow}, 114.
although the investigation found no evidence of anti-repatriation or anti-Soviet propaganda in Ukrainian DP camps, the UNRRA reiterated orders denying recognition to Ukrainians as a separate nationality, banned Ukrainian organizations from operating in DP camps, and denied Ukrainian émigré welfare agencies permission to directly assist Ukrainian DPs.\footnote{Letter from U.S. Army Zone Director to UNRRA Central Headquarters, Subject: Alleged Pro-Fascist Ukrainian Organizations in UNRRA Assembly Center, August 14, 1946, UNRRA German Mission fonds, S-0437-0022-25, UNA; Letter from UNRRA Pasing-Munich to Mr. J.H. Whiting, Director U.S. Zone, Subject: Alleged Pro-Fascist Ukrainian Organizations in Assembly Centers, August 13, 1946, UNRRA, in file Field Operations- DPs- Racial- Ukrainians, S-0437-0022-25, UNA; Margaret Bond, Chief Repatriation Officer, “Transfer and Repatriation of DPs in UNRRA Camps in Austria,” January 10, 1946, UNRRA, S-0402-0003-01, UNA.}

Recognizing that some Eastern European DPs refusing repatriation were only doing so to receive free access to care and material aid, the General Council of the UNRRA also passed Resolution no. 52 on June 24, 1946, which announced that only those individuals who accepted repatriation were entitled to UNRRA care.\footnote{UNRRA Administrative Order no. 52, UNRRA, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:5, UNA.} The General Council also passed Resolution 71, which declared that all displaced persons must return home or become subjects of either Germany or Austria.\footnote{“Repatriation, 7 June-28 June 1946,” UNRRA, S-0399/S-0400-14, UNA; “Directives on DP Operations, No. 2,” in file Displaced Persons- Directives on Eligibility for UNRRA Assistance, UNRRA, S-0399/S-0400-14, UNA.} Both resolutions were repealed months later since neither were successful in encouraging repatriation, which caused the UNRRA to adopt subsequent measures such as placing Ukrainian DPs into Polish and Soviet DP camps to facilitate repatriation, adding Soviet interpreters to screening panels to reduce language difficulties, restricting cultural activities within DP camps, suppressing anti-repatriation activities, and threatening reductions in material aid and food rations.\footnote{Memorandum, “Nationality Camps,” May 6, 1946, UNRRA, S-1492-0000-0173, UNA.}

In response to continued pressure to return home, Ukrainian DPs actively resisted repatriation in several ways. Prior to the end of the war Ukrainians began assembling displaced persons camps and organizing mutual assistance, which turned into a concerted campaign against
repatriation during the summer and fall of 1945. Before SHAESF and the UNRRA became involved in creating displaced persons camps, Ukrainians had established their own makeshift camps, which were generally located near or around mutations factories, military bases, or centers where forced laborers had worked during the war. 53 Other times Ukrainian DP camps, which were made up of Ukrainians from Eastern and Western Ukraine, started out as a sub-camp or “suburb” of a Polish or Baltic camp, but as the number of Ukrainians quickly grew from dozens of people to thousands, Ukrainian DPs began to create their own camps. 54

UNRRA reports in 1946 repeatedly cite Ukrainians establishing their own camps without UNRRA approval such as the DP camp “Hindenburgkaserne” in the city of Würzburg. 55 According to the Ukrainian National Committee, Ukrainians created the Hindenburgkaserne camp in former military barracks in three months by renewing the kitchen, renovating living and sleep accommodations, bringing electricity into the camp, and creating a theater room without any outside assistance. By June 1946, the camp housed 972 persons. Using their own means,” Ukrainians organized a primary school for children, created youth groups, formed workshops and workers associations, held driving and English courses for adults, and assisted 401 people with finding jobs outside of the camp. 56 By organizing their own camps Ukrainians resisted repatriation by grouping themselves together, uniting around a common goal, and creating schools and workers associations aimed at preparing Ukrainian DPs to become productive and active citizens either in Germany or abroad.

53 Panchuk, Heroes of Their Day, 85; Kotyeva, Three Worlds of Larissa, 182.
54 Ibid.
55 Letter from Ukrainian National Committee to 3rd U.S. Army Headquarters, Subject Ukrainian Camp Hindenburg-Kaserne, September 16, 1946, UNRRA, S-0437-0022-25, UNA.
56 Letter from Ukrainian National Committee to 3rd U.S. Army Headquarters, Subject “Ukrainian Camp Hindenburg-Kaserne,” September 16, 1946, UNRRA, S-0437-0022-25, UNA.
During the height of forced repatriation, Ukrainian DPs also worked together to falsify identification papers, change their names, or obtain new documentation. Prior to the end of the war, Ukrainian émigrés living in Geneva and Paris printed Ukrainian Red Cross identity cards and sent emissaries into Germany and Austria to distribute them to Ukrainian forced laborers who either needed documentation or wanted new identity cards. Jerry Burianyk, an engineering officer working with the Ukrainian Red Cross, stated, “We organized meetings in forests, bushes, and camps. I had a portable typewriter…and the refugees would line up and we issued these Red Cross cards to them. I’d sign my own name as authorization.” The Ukrainian Red Cross issued about four thousand Red Cross identity cards before the authorities recognized that the documentation was not legitimate.

Others destroyed their German work documents or identification papers from home, claimed to have lost IDs, changed their names, or bribed officials for new papers so as not to be turned over to the Soviet authorities. According to one former Ukrainian forced laborer, “Countless former citizens of the Soviet Union falsified their documents to state that before 1939 they had lived in Poland, Yugoslavia, Italy or any other place, except the Soviet Union. Most everyone was desperate not to be sent back to Stalin and no risk was too great to avoid this.” In one instance an entire family went to great lengths to have their identities changed:

We had new papers made out giving our birthplace and residence before 1941 as Myrohosha near Dubno, in the Polish section of western Ukraine. The priest in our church at Hiedenau made out a new marriage license for Dad and Mother…Also in order to answer questions correctly and intelligently when they went to apply for new papers from the authorities in Hiedenau, Mother and Dad

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
had to study and learn about the conditions around Myrohosha before the war; crops, prices, local events, and etc.\textsuperscript{62}

Ukrainian DPs from Western Ukraine often helped Eastern Ukrainians in changing their identity by providing them with valuable information as to particular events, conditions, and geographical markers in specific prewar Polish towns. While some Ukrainians were successful in passing themselves off as Polish citizens, other times “the geographical naïveté of many UNRRA officers did not permit them to believe that Ukrainians could claim Polish citizenship and not be called Poles.”\textsuperscript{63}

The number of Ukrainians who chose to falsify or change their “official” identity, i.e., citizenship in order to avoid being captured by Soviet officials demonstrates the real fear Ukrainian DPs experienced as they faced the potential of forced repatriation and desired a better life. Furthermore, shedding an old identity that Ukrainians did not feel allegiance to allowed Ukrainians to adopt a new national identity as a Ukrainian displaced person. It also suggests that “Ukrainian” may not have been meaningful to some DPs since there are cases where “being Polish” was a more useful tool for resisting repatriation. The malleability associated with the ways Ukrainian DPs utilized their national identity in the postwar period demonstrates that Ukrainian national identity was “instrumental” in nature.\textsuperscript{64} In other words, Ukrainian DPs rationally used their national identity for practical and tangible means.

The landscape of national DP camps facilitated the rise of national self-help committees to appeal to Western military authorities for assistance, bring the issue of forcible repatriation to Western authorities, and represent the collective aspirations of Ukrainians, which had some

\textsuperscript{62} Siegmund, \textit{My Ukrainian Footprints}, 174.
\textsuperscript{63} Wyman, \textit{DPs}, 80.
success. Despite the fact that UNRRA banned national welfare agencies from working with Ukrainian DPs, Ukrainians created their own committees, which in an official capacity focused on concerns related to camp life and the everyday welfare of individuals; however, these committees also frequently petitioned the UNRRA, U.S. army, and political figures in North America. For example, on May 2, 1945, an Ukrainian initiative committee in Munich appealed to the local US commander seeking legal protection and, as a result, by the end of May 1945 an unofficial liaison was created with the western authorities, “thus ensuring at least a hearing for Ukrainian DP concerns.” Throughout 1946 Ukrainian self-help committees appealed to the UNRAA asking for an end to forced repatriation and the Ukrainian committee in Neubeuern wrote several letters to President Truman, the head of the UNRRA, the president of the International Red Cross in Geneva, and General Eisenhower, although most of the letters went unanswered or did not reach their intended recipient. For instance, the Ukrainian self-help committee in Aschaffenburg wrote several letters to Eleanor Roosevelt and the United Nations in May 1946 in an effort to secure democratic protections for Ukrainian DPs, but all correspondences were intercepted by the UNRRA and not forwarded due to the fact that “the petitions pray for relief of a nature beyond the competence of this Administration.”

Most petitions advocated for help in ending forced repatriation by explaining the political and economic realities facing Ukrainian DPs when they returned home, specifically the fear of

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67 Panchuk, Heroes of Their Day, 67; Margaret Bond, Chief Repatriation Officer, “Transfer and Repatriation of DPs in UNRRA Camps in Austria,” January 10, 1946, UNRRA, German Mission, Repatriation, S-0402-0003-01, UNA.

68 UNRRA Response to Petitions sent by the Ukrainian Group in Aschaffenburg, May 1946, UNRRA, in file Field Operations- DPs- Racial- Ukrainians, S-0437-0022-25, UNA.
being mislabeled as a collaborator and Soviet retribution. Testimonies and interviews with former forced laborers who returned to Ukraine after the war prove that repatriation fears were valid as several describe filtration camps, NKVD interrogations, imprisonment, and sentences in forced labor camps in Siberia.69 Although most were pardoned after Stalin’s death in 1953, former Ukrainian forced laborers remained subject to social discrimination and suspicion until the 1990s. Appeals sent by Ukrainian DPs explaining the kind of life that awaited them upon returning home focused on highlighting opposition to the Soviet Union and communist rule. Descriptions of Soviet atrocities including mass starvation during forced collectivization, mass murder during Stalin’s purges in the later 1930s, the destruction of the Ukrainian clergy, banishing former forced laborers to Siberia were prominent examples used in appeals to Western Allies.70 Retelling past suffering under Soviet rule not only united different groups of Ukrainians, but also reinforced a sense of collective victimhood among Ukrainian DPs, which became a common characteristic of national identity in Ukrainian diaspora communities.

Even though the UNRRA banned international welfare and volunteer agencies from working with Ukrainian DPs, North American and European Ukrainian communities and organizations also lobbied the UNRRA and Western governments for an end to repatriation, which created networks between Ukrainian DPs and established Ukrainian diaspora communities. The Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB), created in September 1945 by Bodhan Panchuk was one of the first transnational organizations to assist Ukrainian DPs in their fight against repatriation. CURB, which worked closely with both the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF) and the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARCC),

70 Letter signed by four young Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine to American-Ukrainian Committee, July 7, 1945 in Plight of Ukrainian DPs, 19-20.
established contacts with Ukrainian DPs and organized Ukrainian committees and sub-branches in Belgium, Austria, and the British, American, and French zones in Germany by either mailing out instructions or physically bringing Ukrainians together. These committees exchanged information regarding repatriation, the status of refugees in various locations, and immigration. For example, CURB insisted DPs receive Ukrainian newspapers from Canada and the United States so they could obtain accurate information about repatriation and immigration. Although the occupation forces worried about the content of the newspapers and banned them for some time fearing anti-Soviet and anti-repatriation propaganda, CURB officials delivered and circulated the newspapers regularly anyway.\footnote{Ibid., 63.} Due to CURB’s influence, new Ukrainian relief efforts sprang up such as the Philadelphia Ukrainian Relief Committee and the Detroit Ukrainian Relief Committee.\footnote{Panchuk, Heroes of their Day, 72.}

The Catholic Church also played an important role as a welfare agency since, as a religious institution, it had free access to both POW camps and DP camps. The Vatican assisted all Catholic refugees in Germany and Austria after the war, but Ukrainians also succeeded in creating two Catholic relief committees designed specifically to provide assistance and information to Ukrainian DPs. Funds collected by Ukrainian diaspora churches and Ukrainian volunteer agencies in the United States and Canada were channeled through these two Catholic relief committees, one of which was located in Rome by the initiative of Bishop Ivan Buchko, and the other was located in Paris and headed by Father Perridon. Catholic churches in particular worked closely with the International Red Cross and the Cooperative for American Remittance to Europe (CARE), donating money earmarked for material aid for Ukrainian DPs.\footnote{Plight of the Ukrainian DPs, 30-31; Dyczok, The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees, 88-89.}
By putting Ukrainian DPs in contact with Ukrainians in the United States, Canada, and throughout Europe, Ukrainian transnational organizations such as CURB and the Catholic Church effectively created a transnational Ukrainian communication network, which expanded the boundaries of the Ukrainian nation as Ukrainian DPs united with other Ukrainian diaspora communities over the issue of forced repatriation and anti-communism.

However, one of the most important ways Ukrainian DPs resisted repatriation was by claiming refugee status, statelessness, or insisting that they were Ukrainian citizens instead of Polish or Soviet citizens. However, in all three instances Ukrainian DPs faced challenges and pushback since the UNRRA and Allied forces refused to classify Ukrainians as a separate national group between 1945 and 1948. Acceptable nationalities included UN countries, neutral nations, political entities, ex-enemy nations, and non-repatriatable or stateless individuals whereas Ukrainians, along with Croats and Armenians, were considered national subdivisions. Since Ukrainians were not listed as a recognized national group, their claim to international protection and material assistance was constantly in question.

In December 1945 the U.S. Army distributed a memorandum, which the UNRRA circulated to all its branches, listing two categories of non-repatriable persons: “persecutees,” or political refugees and stateless persons. Political refugees were defined as “persons who on account of political conviction or for racial reasons are non-repatriatable” and “stateless persons,” were those holding Nansen passports or those who “cannot establish claim to citizenship in any country.” However, regarding Ukrainians, the memorandum also explicitly stated, “this group is not recognized as a nationality and will be dealt with according to

74 United States Forces APO 777 U.S. Army, AG 383-PAACA, “Determination and Reporting of Nationalities,” December 21, 1945, UNRRA, S-1492-0000-0173, UNA.
determined nationality status as Soviet Nationals, of other countries of which they may be citizens, or as stateless. A follow-up memorandum regarding the status of Ukrainians reiterated:

People claiming to be Ukrainians are either Soviet, Polish, a National of another country of which they are citizens, or stateless. This headquarters will not recognize the claim of any individual that does not fall into one of the above four categories; they are either one or the other but not Ukrainian.75

In some cases, orders were issued specifically forbidding the use of the label “Ukrainian.”76

Since the UNRRA used the U.S. definitions of “persecutees” and stateless persons for repatriation purposes and access to UNRRA care, Ukrainians actively fought to be categorized in either group, based on the fact that their homeland had been occupied by hostile foreign powers which prevented them from enjoying political, religious, cultural, and individual liberties. Their Ukrainian identity was a key aspect in defending claims for refugee status as DPs argued that in order to retain their national identity and secure individual freedom they needed to live in democratic states. For example, after a violent clash between Soviet repatriation officials and Ukrainians DPs in the Hersfeld Camp, Mykola Bahyniwnskyk adamantly maintained:

Ukrainians cannot return to their homeland for political reasons, as enemies of the present political regime in the Ukraine. It is for this reason that the Soviet representatives treat all such people as their political opponents and traitors. Yet, a political refugee, according to international law is never a traitor.77

Moreover, another Ukrainian DP argued, the Western Allies say they fought in World War II “for the benefit of democracy, and to free oppressed people, yet here we have people who have been oppressed, made slaves, serfs or servants, and their culture and language under steady bombardment.”78

75 U.S Army APO 411, AG383.7 (GNMHX), “Non-Recognition of Ukrainian as a Nationality,” February 25, 1946, UNRRA, S-1492-0000-0172, UNA.
76 “Report by Miss Lerigo, Historian of the UNRRA Austrian Mission,” undated. UNRRA, Austrian Mission fonds, PAG 4/3.02.2.2.2, UNA.
78 “Summary of Arguments Against Forcible Repatriation of Ukrainians, UNRRA, S-1492-0000-0172, UNA.
Ukrainian relief agencies also lobbied on behalf of Ukrainian DPs for refugee status. For example, CURB sent letters and reports on the state of Ukrainian DPs to local and federal Ukrainian agencies and governments in United States and Canada in an attempt to persuade officials to help Ukrainian DPs resist repatriation on the grounds that they were a separate national group and should be considered political refugees based on the history of oppression by the Soviet Union. In a letter to the U.S. State Department Bodhan Panchuk argued that Ukrainians should be classified as their own separate national group, “segregated from all other nationals of like status and be placed in exclusively Ukrainian camps.” Another letter maintained, “The Ukrainian peoples are in the same position as were the Czechs and Poles in 1914, a conquered and oppressed people, having no recognized government, but possessing their own customs, traditions, and language.” While the UNRRA acknowledged that Ukrainians were eligible for UNRRA care since they had been subjected to “Nazi persecution and discriminatory legislation,” such “persecution” did not qualify them as political refugees for purposes of repatriation and, therefore, Ukrainians remained classified as repatriable.

Ukrainian DPs also resisted repatriation by rejecting their Soviet or Polish citizenship and insisting they were either stateless or Ukrainian citizens. According to several UNRRA reports conducted in the spring of 1946, Ukrainian DPs constantly argued that they “were not citizens of the U.S.S.R” and “in effect had no fatherland to which to return.” As the Ukrainian Central Relief Committee in Germany stated:

79 Ibid., 64; “D.C. Poole, Associate Public Liaison Officer, United States Delegation to the San Francisco Conference Regarding Conversation with Representatives of the Ukrainian Congress Committee on the Ukrainian Situation in Europe,” May 14, 1945, in Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian Question, 159-160.
81 “Summary of Arguments Against Forcible Repatriation of Ukrainians, UNRRA, S-1492-0000-0172, UNA.
82 UNRRA Central Headquarters Austrian Mission, Admin Order No. 44, Subject: DPs with whom the UNRRA may Deal, February 1, 1946, UNRRA, Austrian Mission, S-1492-0000-0173, UNA.
83 “Results of Repatriation Poll,” file 014.1/A, UNRRA Germany Mission fonds, S-039/S0400-6, UNA.
The merely formal classification of Ukrainian DPs as Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovakian, or any other citizens and not recognizing them as a separate national group can neither abolish their feelings of the racial unity nor solve the problem as to their state as a whole. This problem arises from the fact that despite their not being recognized as an independent group, all the Ukrainians form a separate national body which has its peculiar character and its particular requirements.84

Other Ukrainian DPs expressed the same sentiment in their memoirs such as Julia Alexandrow who, when expressing her frustration at the lack of sympathy from Western officials and the UNRRA concerning the plight of Ukrainian DPs, lamented, “Ukrainians were never really part of Russia; we were like slaves to the Russians.”85 Another Ukrainian DP protested the distinction between Polish Ukrainians and Soviet Ukrainians, exclaiming, “We are both Ukrainians!” when he was separated from his wife.86

One way that Ukrainian DPs shed their previous citizenship was by listing themselves as “Ukrainian” under both citizenship and nationality sections in their UNRRA registration papers.87 For example, in May 1946 the UNRRA conducted a poll in the U.S. zone of occupation in an attempt to determine which DPs would still accept repatriation and a significant number of Ukrainians insisted that they be classified as “stateless Ukrainians,” despite the fact that UNRRA personnel informed them that that was not a choice, per U.S. military instructions.88 Nevertheless, in the May 1946 poll close to 1,700 DPs still listed themselves as “stateless Ukrainians,” which UNRRA officials later changed to “undetermined nationality,” rationalizing that “some are in doubt as to their nationality in view of territorial changes that have taken place

and thus are not in a position to assert or claim a particular nationality." In the same poll, approximately Ukrainians described the absence of political, cultural, religious, and personal freedom at home; a desire for a better life; and fear of Soviet retribution at home as reasons for resisting repatriation. As the very existence of Ukrainian national identity was being questioned between 1945 and 1948, defining citizenship and belonging based on nationality rather than place of birth or past residence provided Ukrainian DP's with a sense of belonging even if they could not identify with an existing state.

Legal representatives for the TsPUE also argued for the existence of Ukrainian citizenship given the fact that the Ukrainian SSR became a member of the United Nations and a Ukrainian delegate sat on the UN Special Committee on Refugees. Under the U.N. Charter, signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, “Russian dominated states” were given four votes divided among the USSR, the Union of Baltic states, the White Russian Republic, and the Republic of Ukraine. Since the Ukrainian SSR signed the U.N. charter as a member of the United Nations as well as the articles of the UNRRA, Ukrainian lawyers argued that it must be considered a nation, “having as a minimum requirement similar governmental and foreign connections to those of the members of the British Commonwealth.” As a result, the citizens who had resided in the areas encompassing the new Ukrainian SSR became “Ukrainians, and not Russian as surely as citizens of Australia are Australians, of South Africa are South African, as Canada are Canadian and not British.” Legal representatives also argued that since Poland and the Ukrainian SSR did not exist as states during the war, they could not be bound by the Yalta

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89 Numbers come from Team No. 15, Hersfeld, Team No. 517, Wiesbaden-Kastel, Team No. 518, Cornberg in “UNRRA Tabulation of Questionnaires on Repatriation,” UNRRA Germany Mission fonds, S-0425-14, UNA.
90 “Results of Repatriation Poll,” file 014.1/A, UNRRA Germany Mission fonds, S-039/S0400-6, UNA.
91 “Summary of Arguments Against Forcible Repatriation of Ukrainians, UNRRA, S-1492-0000-0172, UNA.
92 Ibid.
agreement, and therefore citizens of the two states were not bound by it. However, the notion of Ukrainian citizenship was extremely challenging for Western Allies to accept since the Ukrainian SSR was part of the Soviet Union despite the fact that it was a member of the United Nations.

The rejection of Soviet citizenship, and in some cases Polish citizenship, based on political, historical, and cultural differences caused problems and considerable confusion for Western authorities and the UNRRA as it challenged Western notions of democratic citizenship and raised questions as to what distinguished nationality from citizenship. Moreover, envisioning a Ukrainian nation without its own nation-state was, as Laura Hilton argues in her study on Latvian DPs, was “particularly troubling” since “statelessness was characterized as repugnant to the desired principle that every person ‘belong’ as a citizen to one of the family of nations [nation-states],” which may explain why Western Allied and UNRRA officials had trouble recognizing Ukrainian nationhood.

Letters exchanged between the UNRRA, the U.S. Army, and British Forces reveal the confusion among Western authorities as Ukrainian DPs made a distinction between citizenship, defined as a political relationship between individual and state, and nationality, or a sense of cultural identification, whereas Western authorities used the two terms interchangeably. For example, British officials complained to the UNRRA Headquarters that, “there is, so far as we are aware, no definition of what constitutes a ‘Ukrainian.’ We are instructed to carry out a segregation and report of the details and breakdown of ‘Ukrainians,’ but we are given no

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93 Ibid.
95 See for example, “Attachment to Memorandum,” from Director General to the Central Committee, Subject: Report to Central Committee on the ‘Undetermined Nationality,’ Category, October 24, 1946, UNRRA, S-1536-0000-0257, UNA.
guidelines as to who are in fact to be considered Ukrainians.” In reference to the change in Polish-Ukrainian borders, the Acting Director in Chief of the UNRRA in January 1946 noted that some DPs were not currently repatriable because “it is not at present possible to determine their nationality” [i.e. citizenship status]. For clarification as to the “nationality” of Ukrainians, the UNRRA appealed to the Polish government, but remained perplexed as to the answer given as evidenced by a letter from Louis C. Stephens to Miss Radin, Chief of Repatriation and Care Division, stating “by ‘citizenship’ the Polish Government seems to mean the formal political relationship between the person and the Government; and by ‘nationality,’ the ethnic and cultural affinity of persons so designated.” The lack of protocols and uniform classification procedures regarding Ukrainians was further complicated by the fact that UNRRA officials and Western occupation authorities referred to Ukrainians as such in field reports, correspondences, and memorandums as early as 1945, yet for official purposes continued to prohibit the use of “Ukrainian” for identification purposes on official documents and statistical reports.

According to Rogers Brubaker, “certain dramatic events, in particular, can galvanize group feeling, and ratchet up pre-existing levels of groupness.” Ukrainians living in DP camps in Germany and Austria in the postwar period exhibited a high level of groupness, national cohesion, and collective solidarity as Ukrainians from Western and Eastern Ukraine interacted, communicated, and worked together to protect their safety and avoid repatriation.

96 Letter from R. W. Dawson, Assistant Director Field Operations for Zone Director to UNRRA Headquarters Arsolon, Subject- Segregation-Ukrainians, January 13, 1947, UNRRA, PAG-4/3.0.11.01.0: 1, UNA.
97 “Directives on Displaced Persons Operations No. 4,” Admin. Order No. 22, January 3, 1946, UNRRA, Austrian Mission, S- 1492-0000-0173, UNA.
98 Letter from Louis C. Stephens to Miss Radin, Chief of Repatriation and Care Division, Subject- Repatriation of Polish-Ukrainians, May 2, 1947, UNRRA, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:6, UNA.
99 See for example Letter from Charlotte T. Lloyd to Mr. Myer Cohen, Subject “Policy on Unsuccessful Repatriates,” November 1, 1946, UNRRA, S-1536-0000-0258, UNA; Letter from Allied Commission for Austria [British Element] to UNRRA Zone Headquarters, Subject “Classification of Displaced Persons, October 17, 1947, UNRRA, S-1492-0000-0173, UNA.
forming their own camps, organizing welfare committees, working with Ukrainian organizations abroad, claiming refugee status based on the political circumstances in the Soviet Union, and actively fighting to be classified as either Ukrainian or stateless citizens, Ukrainians, “strove to create a mental realm in which its citizen-members, divided in status and interests, can unite in common identity and common will.”¹⁰¹

The heightening of tensions between the West and the Soviet Union, coupled with the lack of consideration for a separate Ukrainian nationality among the Western Allies and international relief agencies, also led Ukrainian DPs to adopt anti-communism as a crucial element of their self-identification. This was a rational and pragmatic choice, though historically motivated, designed as a tool to resist repatriation. Ukrainian DPs made every effort to be recognized as a separate nation outside of Soviet control, but this proved to be impossible. It was obvious, however, that anti-communism and opposition to the Soviet political system was becoming an increasingly important characteristic defining the West. Ukrainian DPs utilized this sentiment and their historical experience under Stalin to present themselves as ideal candidates that could easily assimilate into Western European or North American society.

**Changes in International Perception**

Between 1945 and 1948, as a result of Ukrainian insistence on their national identity and transformations occurring in the international community, attitudes and policies towards Ukrainians gradually shifted from a complete denial of Ukrainian nationhood to a growing acknowledgement of Ukrainian DP interests as diplomatic and political changes between the United States and Soviet Union became more pronounced. Shifts in the Cold War led to

adjustments in UNRRA classification procedures, an increase in the number of Ukrainians
classified as such in UNRRA reports between 1945 and 1948, and transformations in the United
States immigration polices demonstrate the degree to which Ukrainians united to prove the
existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity.

In second half of 1946, the UNRRA amended their protocols for classifying Ukrainians
for registration purposes. For example, an April 1946 report on population breakdown in the
U.S. zone of Germany listed Ukrainians as the second largest nationality, stating Ukrainians
constituted “a cultural unit with a strong sense of national unity…most have lost their nationality
(citizenship) without becoming legally stateless.”102 In August 1946, Ukrainians living in
displaced persons camps in Heidelberg were told they did not have to register as Soviet citizens
and could claim themselves stateless. Moreover, in order to “make nationality classifications as
complete and reliable as possible,” Ukrainians could officially identify themselves as Ukrainians
if a team of directors verified their prewar place of residence and language spoken.103

However, these policy changes seem to have only applied to Ukrainians from former
Polish territories as a subsequent cablegrams sent to all UNRRA district offices stated that
persons claiming no state, “who are clearly of Ukrainian extraction (that is to speak Ukrainian
rather than Polish and belonging to the Greek Catholic Church and who came from former Polish
territory now party of the Ukrainian SSR should be shown as Ukrainian under the classification
of Nationality.”104 A further modification in November 1946 instructed UNRRA officials to list
the “previous residence” of Ukrainians from former Polish territories as “Ukraine,” and classify

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102 Population Breakdown, UNRRA Administered DP Centers, US Zone Germany, April 10, 1946, UNRRA, PAG
4/3.0.11.3.0:9, UNA.
103 Attachment to Memorandum from Director General to the Central Committee, Subject- Report to Central
Committee on the ‘Undetermined Nationality’ Category, October 24, 1946, UNRRA, in file Displaced Persons-
Undetermined Nationality of DPs, S-1536-0000-0257, UNA.
104 UNRRA Cablegram, no. 13052, November 14, 1946, UNRRA, in file Displaced Persons- Undetermined
Nationality of DPs, UNRRA, S-1536-0000-0257, UNA.
them as “stateless” in terms of citizenship. Although these changes only applied to Ukrainians from Western Ukraine, accepting language, geography, and religion as markers of national belonging indicated a significant change in UNRRA classification procedures. Moreover, despite the fact that the UNRRA repeatedly stated that they had no legal basis to make claims regarding citizenship, the organization began to distinguish between citizenship, or the “formal belonging to a state with possession of passport issued by authorities of the state concerned” and nationality, which was defined as “belonging to a national group, based primarily on national feeling, by allowing Ukrainians to claim Ukrainian nationality and “undetermined” citizenship.

Part of the change in classification procedures stems from the fact that in December 1946 the Polish government refused to accept Ukrainian DPs as Polish citizens even if they held Polish citizenship prior to the war. Following conclusions of Russian-Polish border agreement in August 1945, former inhabitants of the eastern territories of Poland had the right to choose between Polish and Soviet Ukrainian citizenship, but this only applied to persons living within the Polish state when the treaty was signed. Therefore, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians living outside the Polish state had no such option based on the notion that since they “never had Polish nationality, they were not being deprived of it,” and were, therefore, not considered acceptable for repatriation to Poland. As one Ukrainian DP explained to UNRRA officials:

It is to be pointed out that to ‘repatriate’ Ukrainians to Poland means practically to repatriate them to the Soviet Union, because according to the agreement existing

105 UNRRA Cablegram no. 17337, November 22, 1946, UNRRA in file Displaced Persons- Undetermined Nationality of DPs, UNRRA, S-1536-0000-0257, UNA.
107 UNRRA Memorandum to Files, Subject- Citizenship of Former Inhabitants of Territory East of Curzon Line ceded to Russia, December 2, 1946, UNRRA, in file Displaced Persons- Undetermined Nationality of DPs, S-1536-0000-0257, UNA.
between Poland and the Soviets all the Ukrainians living westward of the present Soviet-Polish border are to be displaced to the Soviet Union...And the delivery of Ukrainian DPs to Soviets...would be equal to extermination.\(^{108}\)

Although Ukrainian displaced persons refusing repatriation did not want to return to either Poland or the Soviet Union, after the release of the Polish government’s refusal to accept Ukrainians who had lived in Poland prior to 1939 as Polish citizens, the UNRRA increasingly began to accept Ukrainian claims to statelessness.

In the aftermath of the Russian-Polish border agreement, Ukrainians DPs originating from Western Ukraine increased their claims for statelessness, which produced a new understanding of the realities facing Ukrainian DPs if they returned home and a new understanding that citizenship and nationality were not always exclusive. While UNRRA officials originally dismissed political reasons for not wanting to return home as masked economic motivations and the product of fascist organizations within Ukrainian DP camps, a letter written in 1946 by one official shows that this perspective was changing:

A review of the reasons expressed against repatriation would indicate in the final analysis that the anti-Soviet convictions of these people are deep-rooted and by no means passive. It is highly doubtful if these fears of persecution, loss of life, etc. which they believe would become a reality if repatriated, could be eradicated by counter-propaganda or other educational activity aimed at obtaining voluntary repatriation.\(^{109}\)

Consequently, throughout 1947 and 1948 Ukrainians were increasingly accepted as a separate national group, in both UNRRA statistics, albeit unevenly, and largely dependent on Cold War tensions.

\(^{108}\) Letter from Central Representation of Ukrainian Emigration/ Ukrainian Central Relief Committee in Germany to Headquarters of 3\(^{rd}\)U.S. Army June 25, 1946, UNRRA, in file Field Operations- DPs- Racial-Ukrainians, S-0437-0022-25, UNA.

One of the first official records that listed Ukrainian displaced persons was the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees (IGCR), which conducted a preparatory registration of DPs in August 1946, listing 1,500 Ukrainians desiring resettlement in the Hannover region.\textsuperscript{110} In December 1946 the UNRRA conducted a preliminary registration of Ukrainians in the three Western occupied zones in Germany and Austria, the results of which were published in a final report dated May 31, 1947, which identified 101,836 Ukrainians receiving assistance in Germany and 8,064 in Austria.\textsuperscript{111} However, the report noted that the number of Ukrainians was probably higher as DPs in each occupation zone had its own methods for classification and Ukrainians labeled themselves based on conditions in each zone. For example, UNRRA officials believed that in the British zone it was likely that 88 percent of those classified as “undetermined” were Ukrainian and between seven and eight percent of the total Polish population living in the French Zone were Ukrainians. In contrast, the U.S. Zone specifically distinguished between “Polish-Ukrainians” (51,155), “Russian Ukrainians” (2,398), and “undetermined Ukrainians” (12,021).\textsuperscript{112} As the December 1946 report illustrates, even though Western occupation authorities increasingly allowed Ukrainians to classify themselves as such, the process occurred unevenly. It was not until the IRO submitted Administrative Order no. 152, which stated, “in addition to country of citizenship or country of last habitual residence write in the ethnic or nationality group for any of the following: Jews, Ukrainians, Volksdeutsche,” that

\textsuperscript{110} Letter from E.A. Reich to Morgan, August 7, 1946, Subject-1500 Ukrainians Reported Registered in the Hannover region, UNRRA, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2, UNA.

\textsuperscript{111} UNRRA Central Committee, Seventh (Final) Report on Displaced Persons Operations under Resolution 92, May 31, 1947, UNRRA, PAG-4/3.0.1.02.0.

\textsuperscript{112} Report from Ivan Hasslocher, Chief, Reports and Analysis Division to Martini, December 9, 1946, Subject-Situation of Ukrainians in Three Zones, UNRRA, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.0:1, UNA.
Ukrainian nationality was officially accepted. As a result, while only 9,190 DPs were listed as Ukrainian in December 1945, this number drastically increased to 106,549 by June 1947.

There was also a shift in thinking regarding Ukrainian nationality in the United States which can be seen by changes that occurred in the U.S.’s immigration policies in 1948. The Cold War heavily influenced this change in perspective as the ideological conflict between East and West demanded that Western governments demonstrate a respect for basic democratic rights. The ideological differences between the Soviet Union and Western powers had become politically sharp with the onset of the Cold War and the decent of the iron curtain over Eastern Europe, the Berlin airlift, series of show trials, and the communist takeover of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Anti-Sovietism and opposition to communist rule in Ukraine had previously been perceived as economic in nature now came to be regarded as political-ideological. As tensions escalated, the United States in particular not only increasingly accepted the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity that proved to be staunchly anti-Communist, but also began to support Ukrainian immigration.

In July 1948 President Truman sent a message to Congress emphasizing the need for legislation allowing DPs to enter the United States, arguing that they were “hardy and resourceful otherwise they would not have survived the war; they were opposed to totalitarianism; and because of their burning faith in the principles of freedom and democracy they had suffered privation and hardship.” During the fall of 1948 a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee visited over 150 DPs camps in Germany and Austria and in their report members

113 Administrative Order no. 152, Appendix II, “Instructions For Completing Form CM/1” (Revised), December 11, 1948, IRO Archives, AJ 43/1038.
114 Wyman, DPs, 80.
“rejected the forced repatriation of persons who have a legitimate fear of political or religious persecution in their homelands” as morally unacceptable, urging western nations to allow DP immigration. The Citizens Committee for Displaced Persons (CCDP) and the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC) worked closely with Congressional committees to portray Ukrainian DPs as determinedly anti-communist, hardworking, strong, God-fearing, and lovers of democracy.\textsuperscript{117}

As a result, in the 1948 Displaced Persons act, 40 percent of the granted visas went to those whose place of origin had been annexed by a foreign power and a further 30 percent were allocated to those who had experience in farming. Ukrainians accounted for 70,000 or 18 percent of all DPs who came to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act.\textsuperscript{118} In 1953 the Refugee Relief Act was signed into law, allowing an additional 35,000 DPs still living in Western Europe to immigrate the U.S., permitting 5,000 more Ukrainians from Germany to resettle in the U.S.\textsuperscript{119} Canada also passed similar legislation, but Ukrainian DPs appealed to Canada’s labor shortage instead of anti-communist sentiments to initiate immigration legislation, linking Ukrainian national identity to a hardworking peasant culture.\textsuperscript{120}

In the months following the conclusion of the war international perspectives regarding Ukrainian DPs and Ukrainian national identity closely aligned with the repatriation agreements signed at Yalta, which did not recognize Ukrainians as a nationality.\textsuperscript{121} Documents also reveal that British, American, and Canadian officials did not understand the complexity of Ukrainian

\begin{itemize}
\item 116 Ibid., 18.
\item 118 Kuropas, “Ukrainian-American Resettlement Efforts,” 399.
\item 119 Ibid.
\item 121 “What is our Policy? British Zone- Displaced Persons, Subject- Ukrainians,” document reprinted in \textit{Panchuk, Heroes of Their Day}, 133-134.
\end{itemize}
national identification, viewing Ukrainians simply as an ethnic sub-group of Russians.\textsuperscript{122}

However, as hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians fervently resisted repatriation and the activities of organizations such as CURB spread information regarding the situation of Ukrainian DPs in Canada and the United States, western Allied views shifted and there was a push in both the U.S to allow large number of Ukrainian DPs to immigrate.

**Conclusion**

Having already experienced traumatic situations during the war, whether in the form of violent occupation policies or through forced labor, many of the Ukrainian DPs who did not wish to return home were frustrated with Allied involuntary and voluntary repatriation policies. Episodes of suicide, violence against Soviet repatriation officers, and assuming new identities demonstrate the real fear many displaced persons felt from the constant worry of being forcibly sent to the Soviet Union. Moreover, Western Allied military officials and the UNRRA continuously questioned the existence of a Ukrainian national identity, making displacement another painful event that Ukrainians collectively suffered through. However, displacement and the fear of forced repatriation consolidated Ukrainian nationalism as Ukrainian DPs united to resist repatriation, shed their previous identities, define themselves in contrast to Russia and the Soviet political system, and connect with Ukrainians living in Europe and North America.

While the experience of displacement in the face of forced repatriation created a high level of national coherence among Ukrainian DPs, it also heightened the notion of victimhood in Ukrainian national consciousness. According to Peter Gatrell, mass displacement in the modern world can become a source of trauma rather than dynamic cultural expression which can be seen in “the importance that refugees attached to ideas of struggle, suffering and loss, as well as

\textsuperscript{122}“Determination and Reporting of Nationalities,” from Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, November 16, 1945, UNRRA Germany mission fonds, S-16517, UNA
heroism, inner strength, and self-realization…bravery might include taking up arms against oppressors, but it was just as likely to entail less dramatic tactics designed to outwit officials.”123 The emphasis on a history of foreign occupation that limited democratic liberties coupled with the constant fear of forced repatriation heightened the victimhood mentality among Ukrainian DPs while emphasis on the distinctive and repressive history of Ukrainians under foreign occupation illustrated their deep antipathy for the Soviet political system. Furthermore, as Ukrainian DPs and Ukrainian transnational organizations claimed that Ukrainians should receive refugee status based on hostile foreign takeover and lack of freedom in their home states, Ukrainian DPs increasingly defined themselves in contrast to Russians and the Soviet Union.

In the immediate postwar period, “refugees could receive international protection only after a thorough investigation of their background, personal documents, and claims” whereas in the interwar period, “the League of Nations collectively awarded legal protection to designated groups of stateless people, Russians and Armenians in particular.”124 As a result, the reasons why Ukrainian DPs did not wish to return home became vital aspects of Ukrainian national identity in the postwar period, namely, a history and fear of Soviet occupation of their homeland, anti-communism, and no protection guarantying the right to national recognition or cultural expression. Fear of Soviet retribution, perpetual screenings, the prospect of being labeled as a collaborator, and forced repatriation in the form of kidnappings and manhunts produced “a real terror” among displaced persons and within DP camps.125

National identity was also reinforced by the UNRRA classification methods and the transnational Ukrainian relief agencies. In 1946, rising importance was given to the question of which displaced groups should be given international recognition and entitled to material aid. According to G. Woodbridge, the UNRRA Council defined “two classes of Slavic displaced persons: good and bad. The good should be helped, the bad not. The test of whether an individual was good or bad was whether they wanted, actively and quickly, to return to his area of origin.”

Ultimately, the Western Allies and the UNRRA divided DPs into three categories: “good” DPs who accepted repatriation; “good” DPs who did not want to return home for legitimate reasons; and “bad” DPs such as collaborators and criminals. As a result, in order to present a positive, unified image of themselves as “good” or “true” refugees, Ukrainian DPs emphasized their strong commitment to democracy and Christianity, and their rejection of Communism, hoping it would firmly established them as ideal potential immigrants.

The recreation of Ukrainian national identity in postwar displaced persons camps demonstrates the flexibility of national identity. Even though Ukrainians hailed from different ideological, socioeconomic, and religious backgrounds, cultural elements, shared traumatic experiences, and a need to present themselves as a unified group to avoid repatriation bound them together. The malleability of national identity also allowed Ukrainian DPs to expand the borders of Ukrainian nationhood to include Ukrainian diaspora communities abroad. According to Robin Cohen, “bonds of language, religion, culture, and a sense of common history and perhaps a common fate impregnate a transnational relationship and give to it an affective,

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intimate quality that formal citizenship or even long settlement frequently lacks.” As Ukrainian DPs were fighting against repatriation, they were also constructing diaspora communities in Germany and Austria based on these common bonds. In doing so, they increasingly united with Ukrainian diasporas in Western Europe and North America, which influenced the ways in which Ukrainians used their cultural nationalism to increase their chances for immigration, particularly to the United States and Canada.

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128 Robin Cohen, “Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers,” *International Affairs* 72 no. 3 Ethnicity and International Relations (1996); 518.
The role of Ukrainian immigrants is to be a voice for the Ukrainian people and the defender of their political and national human rights.\(^1\)

--G. Denisenko

“Peredden’ Novoho roku”

The fight for international recognition of a separate Ukrainian identity was part of a larger process of fostering cultural nationalism among Ukrainian displaced persons in the postwar period. Given that the liberation of Ukraine from Communist control was not feasible, and many Ukrainians displaced in Germany feared returning home or wanted to pursue better economic opportunities, Ukrainian DPs drew upon elements of cultural nationalism to construct a common, unifying identity. They also used their migration experience. According to Robin Cohen, “a member’s adherence to a diasporic community is demonstrated by the acceptance of an inescapable link with their past migration history and sense of co-ethnicity with others of a similar background.”\(^2\) In other words, diasporas are constructed and cemented by cultural bonds of language, religious convictions, and/or political ideas as much as they are by the experience of migration. For Ukrainians living in displaced persons camps between 1945 and 1951, the migration experience, whether the result of forced labor or fleeing communist rule, served as a means to unify a fairly diverse group of Ukrainians. As a result, the making of cultural nationalism in the Ukrainian postwar diaspora was heavily influenced by recent migration experiences and future plans to immigrate abroad.

\(^1\) Quote from a speech given by G. Denisenko on the anniversary of the proclamation of Ukrainian Independence reprinted in “Peredden’ Novoho roku (New Year’s Eve),” Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald), no. 1, February 9, 1947, 3, AUPO. Denisenko was a professor at the Ukrainian Technical and Economic Institute who often spoke out against communism and the Soviet Union.

Using Ukrainian DP newspapers and archival material from Harvard’s Ukrainian Research Institute, this chapter will look specifically at how the migration experience affected the type of cultural nationalism that Ukrainian DPs cultivated between 1945 and 1951. On the one hand, the isolated environment of DP provided a unique opportunity to foster cultural nationalism in ways that had not been possible in the past. Ukrainian DPs often constructed cultural nationalism through the cultural artifacts such as education, history, religion, art, language, and folk traditions with scarce resources in war-torn Western Germany and Austria, which demonstrates the importance of maintaining their Ukrainianness outside of the homeland. As Walter Clemens explains, these cultural artifacts are “symbols that help individuals to image they belong to a larger, defined community” which “deepen communal ties and help individuals appreciate this community. In this way, by drawing upon traditional cultural artifacts such as education, history, religion, art, language, and folk traditions Ukrainian DPs built a unified community despite varied social, economic, educational and political backgrounds.

On the other hand, Ukrainians used cultural nationalism as a mechanism of self-portrayal to the Western countries to which Ukrainian DPs hope to immigrate. It allowed DPs to present a positive, unified image of themselves, or as “good Ukrainians” as opposed to those still living under communist rule in Soviet Ukraine. It was not uncommon for ambassadors and representatives from the U.S. and Canada to visit larger camps and both camp officials and Ukrainian DPs made sure that Ukrainians were presented in the best light. As a result, between 1945 and 1951 Ukrainian DPs used Ukrainian cultural nationalism to prove they were ideal candidates for immigration to North America by emphasizing a commitment to democracy and Christianity, highlighting how Ukrainians were victims of foreign occupation, and to verify their feelings of anti-communism and Soviet domination of Ukrainian lands. This was done by
establishing a series of pluralistic, democratic political organizations and administrative structures to govern camp life; constructing an intricate education system for children and adults that prepared DPs to be skilled workers and, therefore, active members of society; the use of religion as a means to prove that Ukrainians were God-fearing Christians; and the creation of social organizations that allowed Ukrainians to practice their own cultural tradition as a way to distance themselves from their Soviet past.

**Ukrainian Politics in DP Camps**

Politics play an important role in the construction of diaspora organizations and range from overt participation in the politics, to day-to-day negotiations of power relations concerning communal organization, or how the diaspora represents itself to outside groups.³ The occupations by Nazi and Soviet forces in addition to the partial changes in rhetoric by the OUN over the course of the war influenced the formation of political organizations in postwar Ukrainian diaspora communities in Germany and Austria. The fact that many Ukrainian DPs had hopes of immigrating abroad (particularly after the United States and Canada amended their immigration laws beginning in 1948) also impacted the creation and construction of political structures. Although many Ukrainian DP camps had been organizing their own administration organizations since the end of the war, once the UNRRA officially allowed all DPs to govern their own camps in 1946, local governing bodies expanded and Ukrainians established regional governments, created nationally based court systems, and political parties expanded their involvement in camp affairs. Ukrainians used these political structures not only to effectively govern DP camps, but also to politically distance themselves from Ukrainians living in Soviet

Ukraine by demonstrating a commitment to a pluralistic, multi-party system; holding democratic elections; and outwardly denouncing communism.

The postwar environment in the Western occupation zones in Germany and Austria influenced the formation of political life in Ukrainian DP camps. According to David E. Apter, a political scientist who stresses the importance of environment as the determinant of party organization and party politics, an essential feature of political parties is that their form is determined by the “socio-political ensemble of their society.” Between 1945 and 1951, one of the main elements of Ukrainian political organization and party formation was the insular environment of DP society, which was largely isolated from the mainstream larger society, albeit temporarily. In the past, Ukrainians had been geopolitically separated from each other and experienced a wide range of repressive measures aimed at limiting national expression, which hindered the creation and development of a united Ukrainian society. However, within the DP camp organizational structure, the immediate postwar period provided a limited time and space for a united Ukrainian society to materialize, a society that overcame differences in the composition of the Ukrainian DP community. This Ukrainian “mini-society” represented a “state within a state,” and when combined with the fact that majority of Ukrainian DPs were young and at least initially unemployed, the social conditions of camp life increased the appeal of political participation.

As part of the effort to resist repatriation and establish themselves as a separate national group, Ukrainians organized democratic forms of self-government in DP camps through camp committees and councils as well as elected, representative administrative bodies. In the fall of

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1945 SHAEF suggested that DPs “should be encouraged to organize themselves as much as administratively possible” and beginning in 1946, the UNRRA allowed DPs to form their own democratic governments “as a very practical modus operandi.” Soon thereafter, Ukrainian camps were largely run by democratically elected camp councils, whose primary function was to serve as a go-between for dealings with DPs and the UNRRA or Allied officials.

The end of UNRRA administration in DP camps and the creation of camp administrative governments led to the restructuring of camps along national lines as displaced persons moved to camps that represented their nationality. For example, after camps were allowed to form their own national governments, Ukrainians from ten smaller camps came to the Oselia camp in Regensburg and many residents of other nationalities moved to other camps. After this restructuring the Oselia camp held a total of 6,053 DPs, 4,665 of which were Ukrainian, 930 claiming statelessness, 287 Poles, 89 Yugoslavians, 46 Lithuanians, and 36 Byelorussians. This phenomenon was repeated throughout Germany and Austria, which effectively created nationally homogenous camps.

Although camp councils held a variety of responsibilities, self-government in Ukrainian DP camps allowed Ukrainians to govern their own social, cultural, and communal life in ways that had not been possible before. For example, during the 11th meeting of the Council of Oselia, the council passed a cultural and education referendum that expanded the youth scouting group called “Plast,” established a literary circle, maintained that all schools were to teach in Ukrainian, and promised further discussion on efforts to create a commercial and music school. The Council of Oselia also regulated rules regarding the sale of Ukrainian crafts and handiworks,

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7 “Z ofisu Oseliyi (From the Office of Oselia),” Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald), no. 5, February 9, 1947, 1, AUPO.
stating that prices must match those put forth by the IRO and German prices. As part of the camp council administration in Regensburg, Ukrainian DPs had their own police units, sanitation organizations, and a Central Election Commission to oversee and guarantee free and fair elections since, at least initially, some elections to DP camp councils were accompanied by political infighting for control of camp supplies.

Eventually several camp councils worked together to create an overarching administrative council, the Ukrainian National Rada, which served as a system of governance to conduct business with nation-states and international bodies, facilitate communication and organization among Ukrainian DP camps throughout Germany and Austria, and provide a common, democratic voice. As part of the process of creating a central governmental body, potential candidates were selected based on their potential to lead such an organization and successfully unite many different groups of Ukrainians. During a regional conference of all Ukrainian committees in Germany in October 1945, Vasyl’ Mudryi, a politician from Western Ukraine who had served as a member of the Polish Sejm, was chosen as the candidate who possessed the necessary experience and diplomatic skills for the job. Shortly thereafter, delegates from thirty-three Ukrainian committees created the Central Representation of Ukrainian Emigration (TsPUE) and elected Vasyl’ Mudryi as president of the new organization and Myhailo Vetukhi, from Eastern Ukraine, as vice president. The TsPUE Department of Culture and Education specifically functioned as a policy making body, providing ideological, curricular, and administrative guidance. Although TsPUE was not officially recognized until 1947, it

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8 “11- e zasidannya rady Oseliyi (11th Meeting of the Council of Oselia),” Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald), no. 4, February 1, 1947, 2, AUPO.
9 Most accusations of political infighting and violence occurred between rival political party and printed in party newspapers. See for example Zenon Pelensky, “Teor treba poborivaty! (Terror Must be Fought!),” Ukrainska trybuna (Ukrainian Tribune), May 22, 1947, 2, AUPO.
10 Dyczok, The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees, 78.
11 Ibid.
operated outside of the law, organizing Ukrainians along national lines in camps, delivering aid to Ukrainian DPs, and providing a coordinating commission that represented the interests of both Western and Eastern Ukrainians.

As part of the self-government of camps, Ukrainian DPs also established a court system and elected their own judges. The “Provisional Statue of the Court of Justice,” which was handed out to all national DP camps, stated that “individual national groups shall be organized by the Court of Justice and the courts divided into sections according to the national populations of each camp.”

Court procedures and the assignment of judges were to be conducted according to nationality and national minorities in Ukrainian DP camps were to have their own judge. Crimes overseen by camp court systems included acts against “public, peace, honor, and freedom,” acts against the property of public and private individuals, acts against security, and participation in the black market. Penalties varied from a public reprimand, the removal of additional food and tobacco products for a set time period, public labor, and arrest for up to 14 days. More severe crimes were sent to an Allied Military court. Although the UNRAA admitted that “the legality of this court was questionable,” it did not raise questions or make a concerted effort to disband the court system since the court systems demonstrated an acceptance of due process.

Due to favorable conditions in Germany and within DP Camps, a pluralistic, multiparty political system developed, which produced a dozen Ukrainian political parties between 1945 and 1951 covering a wide spectrum of ideological orientations. The Ukrainian political right included the External Division of the OUN-B, the OUN Solidarists or the former OUN-M, and

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12 “Provisional Statue of the Court of Justice for Regensburg,” *Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald)*, no. 1, February 9, 1947, 3, AUPO.
13 Ibid.
14 Woodbridge, *UNRRA*, vol. 2, 523.
the Alliance of Hetmanities (SHD). The political left included parties such as the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP), the Ukrainian Socialist Party (USP), and the so-called democratic faction of the OUN Abroad (OUNz). Additionally, there were a handful of center-leaning parties such as the National-Democratic Alliance (UNDO), National State Union (UNDS), Alliance of United Ukraine-Peasant Union (SSZU-SP), and the Constructive Creative Forces (SKTS). The OUN-B and OUN-M were the largest political parties and had the most members, followed closely by the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{15} According to the political scientist Vasyl Markus, the rest of the parties should be seen as “mini-parties” since they often had defective structure-function properties and owed their origin to purely opportunist reasons, namely, to gain representation in the newly established National Rada. Nonetheless, Markus also notes that smaller parties worked with larger parties to create coalition blocs within the National Rada, had their own newspapers and propaganda mechanisms, and participated in democratic procedures in the National Rada.\textsuperscript{16}

Since the OUN-B and OUN-M made up two of the largest political parties, those who had been leading cadres and rank-and-file members in both organizations in Ukraine during the war had to confront their collaboration with Nazi Germany, integral nationalist rhetoric, and actions against Poles during the war. This was mainly accomplished by downplaying fascist rhetoric, expressing hatred of Soviet occupation and communism, and nourishing the idea of the “innocent victim.” Expressing hatred for the Soviet Union and communism was a common theme in speeches made during national holidays and editorials printed in Ukrainian DP

\textsuperscript{15} Vasyl Markus, “Political Parties in the DP Camps,” 113.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 114. For example, Ukrainian newspapers writers created professional journalist associations, the two most notable being the Union of Ukrainian Journalists (SUZh) and the National Democratic Association of Ukrainian Journalists (NDOUZh). Each group reflected the political and ideological views of its members, with SUZh supporting the Ukrainian National Council (UNR) and NDOUZh supporting the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR) and the OUN foreign units.
newspapers. For instance, in a speech celebrating the anniversary of the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1919, G. Denisenko, a professor at the Ukrainian Technical and Economic Institute, spoke on the historical and political relationship between Russia and Ukraine. He argued, that “the separation of Ukraine from Russia means the complete rupture of political ties with Russia” and an “outright campaign against the hostile Kremlin” exerting power over Ukraine.17

Collaborators also used the “innocent victim” mentality to explain their actions during the war. This idea was sustained by the belief that Ukrainians were the victims of historical circumstances and that sympathizing with fascism and collaborating with the Nazis was justifiable as it was the only way to protect Ukrainian national interests. Detailed descriptions of Ukrainian collective trauma during the interwar period under Stalin appeared in many Ukrainian newspapers to articulate the collective trauma Ukrainians faced at the hands of foreign occupiers during the war.18 Interestingly, despite the actions taken by the OUN and UPA during the war, the idea that Ukrainians were more anti-Communist rather than pro-Nazi was largely accepted by U.S. military authorities as tensions with the Soviet Union ramped up and the Cold War took precedence in U.S. international politics.19 The fact that, on the whole, the United States favored any articulation of anti-communism over past and blatant infringements to democratic liberties due to the emerging Cold War gave Ukrainian DPs hope that it was possible to construct a new non-Soviet identity. It also projected the idea that if Ukrainian DPs presented themselves in a certain light, it would increase their chances to immigrate to the United States.

17 “Peredden’ Novoho roku (New Year’s Eve),” Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald), no. 1, February 9, 1947, 3, AUPO.
18 See for example Zenon Pelensky, “Teor treba poborivaty! (Terror Must be Fought!),” Ukrainska trybuna (Ukrainian Tribune), May 22, 1947, 2, AUPO.
19 Vasyl Markus, “Political Partis in the DP Camps,” 114.
Due to the experience Ukrainians had under Stalin, whether in Soviet Ukraine or the interwar occupation of eastern Poland, most Ukrainians supported a democratic, multi-party type of government and wanted to immigrate to democratic countries. However, some members of OUN affiliated parties had trouble accepting the new commitment to democratic liberties. For example, the exiled émigré society that had established itself in Central Europe after the failure to establish an independent Ukrainian state in 1917-1920 was highly critical of a multi-party system and hesitant to embrace democratic positions such as freedom of elections. However, within Western occupied zones, the totalitarian Russian Communist Party and National-Socialist German Workers’ Party were two strong deterrents to single-party politics and a one-party system contradicted the purpose of striving for a liberated Ukraine, which was the overall goal of the exiled émigré society. As a result, despite their critiques of pluralism, they adhered to the democratic governmental structure in DPs camps in order to garner support among the Western Allies for an independent Ukrainian nation-state.

While members of the OUN-B and OUN-M parties remained intent on working towards the ultimate goal of establishing an independent Ukrainian nation-state, other Ukrainian organizations constructed and nurtured the notion of a borderless Ukraine to promote their ideological strategies for Ukrainian independence while sustaining Ukrainian culture. For instance, Ukrainian women created an all-encompassing women’s society, known as The Women’s Union, that spanned political borders and formally included Ukrainian women’s organizations in the United States and Canada. The union “combined the rhetoric of patriotism with democracy and stressed the expanded community responsibility of a mother who recognized the importance and impact of the world outside her four walls.”

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20 Ibid.
conferences such as the Ukrainian Pan-American Conference and the World Congress of Ukrainians, which Ukrainian DP sent elected representatives to, promised to consolidate “an all-Ukrainian unity” among Ukrainian diasporas throughout the world.22

Transnational connections with Ukrainians living throughout the world became particularly useful in 1948 and 1949 when the majority of Ukrainian DPs immigrated abroad. Prior to the mass exodus, Ukrainian DP camps in and around Munich and Frankfort welcomed representatives from the U.S. and Canada in an attempt to visually demonstrate how well Ukrainians would fit in North American society. These meetings often facilitated connections with Ukrainian diaspora communities in the United States and Canada as Ukrainian Americans and Ukrainian Canadian regularly assisted Ukrainian immigration to North America.23

The organization of political life in the form of camp committees, councils, and elected administrative bodies on the local and regional level, the creation of camp court systems, and the existence of a pluralistic, multi-party system in Ukrainian DP camps provided a way for Ukrainians to reject their communist past and more firmly align themselves to the West. While the brutal experiences Ukrainians faced under foreign occupation during WWII facilitated the adoption of democratic forms of self-government, participating in democratic processes also provided Ukrainian DPs a way to demonstrate their anti-communist sentiments. After new immigration legislation was passed by the U.S. and Canada in 1948, participating in politics became a way for Ukrainians to present themselves as democratically minded potential immigrants, ready to break with their Soviet past. While not everyone embraced the new commitment to democratic principles and many Ukrainian DPs had to confront collaboration

22 “Svitlo I temryava (Light and Darkness),” Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald), no. 1, February 1, 1947, 3, AUPO.
23 The Ukrainian-American Aid Committee was one group that frequently visited Ukrainian DP camps in Germany. Woodbridge, UNRRA, vol. 2, 546.
with Nazi Germany, the overall goal of contrasting Ukrainian DPs from Ukrainians living in the
Soviet Union was an effective way to increase chances for immigration.

**Preserving Ukrainianness through Education**

Following the construction of political structures, Ukrainian DPs turned to their attention
to constructing a coherent cultural identity and establishing mechanisms by which it could be
spread based through several key elements of national culture: education, history, religion, art,
folk traditions, and literature. The central theme of the process was the preservation of what it
meant to be Ukrainian as a way to claim moral victory over communism by continuing their own
unique traditions even though Ukrainian DPs did not possess their own nation-state. For
example, one Ukrainian DP publication proclaimed “to preserve and nurture love for our native
land [we must] adhere to our customs and traditions, sing our native songs, wear traditional
[Ukrainian] clothes, and show the beauty of our native art.”24 Another reminded the Ukrainian
DP population that educating the youth in Ukrainian and teaching the history and geography of
Ukraine was one essential factor in ensuring that Ukrainianness was preserved through
successive generations.25 In both of these instances, DP posited themselves as the future of their
people and established clear boundaries between themselves and Ukrainians living Soviet
Ukraine.

One of the most important ways Ukrainians sought to persevere Ukrainian national
identity was by creating school systems to educated both youth and adults. The construction and
organization of schools was a “spontaneous, extensive, local initiative from teachers and parents
that occurred as early as the summer of 1945.”26 For example, the Ukrainian DP camps in

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24 M.U., “Molod’ v emihratsiyi (Youth in Exile),” *Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald)*, no. 3, February 23, 1947, 1, AUPO.
25 K.I.M., “Plast: Hasha hordist’ i mriya (Plast: Our Pride and Joy),” *Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald)*, no. 3, February
23, 1947, 3, AUPO.
26 Daria Markus, “Education in the DP Camps,” 185.
Regensburg constructed a kindergarten, which in 1947 had 150 students and four teachers as well as a gymnasium with 289 students and 19 teachers.\(^{27}\) Initial Ukrainians schools were located in in warehouses or bombed out buildings and lacked blackboards, chalk, books, paper, and writing materials; however, by 1947 an extensive Ukrainian-language educational system existed throughout Western Germany.\(^{28}\) Through schools, Ukrainian DPs sought to provide Ukrainian DPs an education that would help them become active and productive members of society. Schools were also a means in which to preserve Ukrainian national identity within DP camps. In addition to providing language courses and skilled labor courses, the curriculum for Ukrainian schools also included courses on Ukrainian geography, literature, and art. Moreover, in elementary and secondary schools, teachers spoke in Ukrainian and taught an idealized, and often mythical, version of Ukrainian history while heavily promoting participation in Ukrainian youth groups.\(^{29}\)

The elementary and secondary school system was structured around the interwar system of schools in Western Ukraine, which was based on a “two-track system:” one for the future elite and another for the rest of the children. Children started in kindergarten and the first four years of elementary education were common to all. After the fourth years, students who passed an examination could enter an eight-year secondary school—the gymnasium. Those who did not pass proceeded to other types of secondary schools based on specific professions: teaching, commercial or trade, or a number of short-term vocational courses.\(^{30}\) Since schools in DP camps provided some children and young adults with access to education for the first time, education

\(^{27}\) “11\(^{\text{e}}\) zasidannya rady Oseliyi (11\(^{\text{th}}\) Meeting of the Council of Oselia,” *Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald)*, no. 4, February 1, 1947, 2, AUPO.

\(^{28}\) “Schools in ‘Displaced Persons Centers’ in Germany,” *School and Society* (December 1945): 384.

\(^{29}\) “School Committee Minutes,” September 19, 1945, Berchtesgaden (Orlyk) DP Camp Records, UI0070, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (hereafter HURI).

\(^{30}\) Ibid.
was not only focused on academic skills such as reading and writing, but was also centered on Ukrainian national traditions, customs, and history, with all instruction conducted in the Ukrainian language.\(^{31}\)

The war experience left its mark on both young people and adults. Forced to use their survival instincts for many years, many Ukrainian DPs drank, smoked, or demonstrated a disregard for authority to combat feelings of anxiety, nervousness, and frustration of the uneasy DP existence and apprehension and worry about the future.\(^{32}\) Ukrainian teachers and leaders in the camps saw this as a problem that could block relief aid and impede chances of immigration. Moreover, according to school committee minutes in the Berchtesgaden camp, many adults feared that children would not get a proper national education due to the fact that they were being educated outside the homeland.\(^{33}\) Newspaper editorials echoed these concerns, stating that in order to “encourage admiration for our customs, traditions, songs, and beauty of native art” and “create an unlimited love for the Motherland,” elementary education should focus on the preservation of Ukrainian national identity and remembrance of the homeland.\(^{34}\)

For Ukrainian DPs the homeland was, by choice, not physically accessible and, therefore, represented an imagined space that connected them to their ethnic past. According to Zlatko Skrbis, who studies Croatian and Slovenian diasporas in the twentieth century, a main characteristic of all diaspora communities is a specific focus on the homeland since imagined constructions of the homeland allow diasporas “to retain a rootedness in the past” while successfully integrating into a new society.\(^{35}\) Imagined constructions of the homeland are often

\(^{31}\) Daria Markus, “Education in the DP Camps,” 188.


\(^{33}\) “School Committee Minutes,” September 19, 1945, Berchtesgaden (Orlyk) DP Camp Records, UI0070, HURI.

\(^{34}\) M.U. “Vykhovannya molodi (Youth Education),” Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald), no. 3, March 23, 1947, 4, AUPO.

\(^{35}\) Skrbis, Long Distance Nationalism, 41.
buried deep in language, religion, and culture and while the “old country” always has some claim to a community or individuals’ loyalty and emotions, that claim may be strong or weak, or boldly or meekly articulated in a given circumstance or historical period.” Nevertheless, as Robin Cohen argues, “a member’s adherence to a diasporic community is demonstrated by the acceptance of an inescapable link with their past migration history and sense of co-ethnicity with others of a similar background.”

As a result, elementary and secondary school curriculum paid specific attention to the idea of the homeland, which was portrayed in a romantic fashion, abstracted from contemporary political and economic realities. For example, elementary reading books were published focusing on national heroes such as the ABC Book (Bukvar) written by L.P. Depoloy, which uses the life of Taras Shevchenko, to teach children the Ukrainian alphabet. Other children’s books used in elementary schools emphasized Ukrainian history and geography, with sections dedicated to mythic stories of Cossacks, lessons and legends about the Dnieper River, the location of important Ukrainian cities, traditional Ukrainian poems and songs, the history of Ukrainian national symbols, and the importance of religion in Ukraine. This way of teaching represented a conscious attempt by educators to eradicate differences among Ukrainian students in terms of regional and denominational lines by developing a “mutual understand and a feeling that we are all of the same nation.”

Education in DP schools was not solely confined to learning subject matter in classrooms. As part of the goal to promote a unified Ukrainian culture many schools required

36 Cohen, Global Diasporas, ix.
37 Ibid.
38 L.P. Depoloy, Bukvar, 3rd ed., (n.p. 1951), Berchtesgaden (Orlyk) DP Camp Records, UI0070, HURI.
39 School Committee Minutes,” September 19, 1945, Berchtesgaden (Orlyk) DP Camp Records, UI0070, HURI.
extracurricular activities. For example, every Sunday and during designated religious holidays students had to attend church services together with their classmates under a teacher’s supervision. Students also participated in celebrations for nine national holidays including November First, the Battle of Bazar, Independence Day, Kruty, Shevchenko, Independence of Carpathian Ukraine, Day of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, Symon Petliura, and Ivan Franko Day. Such national holidays were commemorated with concerts, church services, dances, and feasts and students’ participation was obligatory. For instance, students from the Ukrainian National School in Regensburg arranged a Christmas celebration in 1947 that included singing traditional Ukrainian Christmas songs and poems, as well as traditional Christmas readings from the Bible. On “Whitsun Day,” in the Delmenhorst camp in the British Zone students and teachers dressed in traditional Ukrainian clothing commemorated national heroes by visiting a symbolic tomb decorated with flower wreaths, the Ukrainian national trident, and banners.

Youth organizations such as Plast, CYM, and Sich meet regularly at schools and provided a variety of sporting and cultural activities for children and adolescences. While joining sports teams, drama groups, or choirs was optional, it was highly encouraged that students participate in one youth organization. The principals of Plast, CYM, and Sich all maintained a deep commitment to scouting that focused on character development, mental and emotional intelligence, physical endurance, and skills for practice life—all characteristics Ukrainian leaders believed “good Ukrainians” needed to have successful immigration applications. The largest youth organization, Plast, which had been a prominent Ukrainian

41 “School Committee Minutes,” September 19, 1945, Berchtesgaden (Orlyk) DP Camp Records, UI0070, HURI.
42 For an example of a celebration held for Ivan Franko see “V rokovynyi smerty Franka, (On the anniversary of Franko’s death), Newspaper clipping, Volodymyr Nestorovych Papers, UI0091, HURI.
43 “Rizdvo (Christmas), Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald),” no. 6, March 18, 1947, 4, AUPO.
44 Y.U., “Plast, (Plast),” Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald), no. 6, March 18, 1947, 4, AUPO.
youth group for thirty-five years, had over 6,000 members in all three Western occupation zones and its basic values included the following: 1. Be faithful to God and the Motherland 2. Help others 3. Obey the organization’s leaders and rules. Plast, as well as CYM and Sich, met with other Ukrainian camp youth branches for assemblies on leadership, participation in religious and national holidays. Similar to combining cultural education with academic learning, youth organizations linked scouting activities with a particular national form by creating and centering activities aimed at retaining traditional Ukrainian culture outside of the homeland.

In addition to elementary and secondary education, Ukrainian DP camps also provided adult education courses in a variety of forms, which were created to teach adults English or German and educate them in skilled trades. The “People’s Universities” had eleven branches in the American Zone and two branches in the British Zone. The Regensburg branch employed sixteen teachers and had 287 students enrolled. This educational institution sponsored a number of popular lectures on Ukrainian subjects and provided short-term courses for adults including the following: literacy courses, language courses in English, French, and German, music courses, history, economics, geography, and physical education. Commercial courses, designed to teach adults a specialized skill such as carpentry, sewing, shoemaking, radio repair, driving, shorthand, and typing. These courses were highly popular and in 1948, in the camps in the American Zone of Germany 89 courses were being held, attended by 2,039 persons. As one DP newspaper editorial stated, the main goal of the adult education system was to produce a

47 Ibid.
48 “11- e zasidannya rady Oseliyi (11th Meeting of the Council of Oselia,” Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald), no. 4, February 1, 1947, 2, AUPO.
49 Korol, “Torhovelnii shkoly na emigatsii,” Ukrainska trybuna (Ukraine Tribune), July 3, 1947, 5, AUPO.
50 M.M., “Suchasna ukrainska emigratsiia v Nimechchyni (Contemporary Ukrainian Immigration in Germany),” Kalendar-Almankh na Iuvileinyi 1948 rik (Calendar-Almanac for the year 1948), (Augsburg-Munich 1948), 186.
wide range of graduates with sufficient knowledge for which to thrive abroad and not to have Ukrainians seen “in an unfavorable position in the eyes of foreigners.”

Institutions of higher learning in Munich including the Ukrainian Free University, the Ukrainian Higher School of Economics, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Theological Academy as well as a Ukrainian Catholic Theological Seminary in Hirschberg, Bavaria were another element of the education system in DP camps. Professors for newly established universities came from the interwar exiled community in Prague as well as professors from universities in Kharkiv, L’viv, and Kyiv whose areas of expertise included Ukrainian history, literature, archeology, and ethnography. These universities and institutions of higher learning in combination with scholarly associations including UVAN, Ukrainian History and Philosophy Association, and Shevchenko Scientific Society, represented the scholarship of Ukrainian emigres and focused on creating the next generation of Ukrainian scholars. Some of these universities stressed the need for states to open their borders for Ukrainian immigrants. The 11th Science Conference of the Physical-Mathematical Group of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences is one prime example. The main goal of the conference was to stress to Western European and North American scholars that it is impossible to have a free exploration of science under in Ukraine under communism as researchers were constantly forced to justify and defend communist methods and aspirations. As one speaker stressed, “the development of free science behind the Iron Curtain will only come when the modern totalitarian regime is demolished.”

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51 M.P. “Shkilnyi rik rozpochavysia (The School Year Has Begun),” *Ukrainska tybuna (Ukrainian Tribune)*, September 18, 1947, 2, AUPO.
52 “Programm: Der Tutigkeit des Ukrainischen Wissenschaftlichen Institutes in Berlin,” Volodymyr Nestorovych Papers, UI0090, HURI.
53 Ukarayins’ka nauka ta immihratsiya (Ukrainian Science and Immigration),” *Visnyk oseli (Oselia Herald)*, no. 3, February 18, 1947, 2, AUPO.
DP camps gave Ukrainians a sense of self-sufficiency, which gave Ukrainians an unprecedented opportunity for self-administration and a free hand in cultural and educational activities. Like the establishment of a pluralist democratic form of self-government, the establishment of schools in DP camps served two purposes. The schools created in DP camps prepared children and adults for a new life by providing a solid education through a formidable curriculum, but schools also served as a medium for the transmission of national values. They rebuilt and strengthened ties to Ukrainian history, national patriotic tradition and heritage, religion, and language. The national elements in the curriculum as well as extra-curricular activities sponsored by schools left a mark on the DP generation and contributed to the transformation of war refugees in a diaspora, as Ukrainians planned for immigration.

**Religion**

Historically, there has been a strong relationship between Ukrainian national identity and devotion to Christian religions. The church in postwar Germany had a “much greater significance for the Ukrainian refugees and for displaced persons generally than any ordinary spiritual organization that simply took care of the religious needs of its faithful.”\(^{54}\) According to the ancient “orthodox” tradition, “there was always some kind of interdependence and co-operation—symphony—between spiritual and secular powers in the Christian East.”\(^{55}\) This interdependence excluded the possibility of a single, international authority for Eastern Christendom and, instead, it created many state or national churches.\(^{56}\) This is why Ukrainians were so anxious to found churches in DP camps—the church had always been a traditional

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\(^{54}\) Alexander Baran, “The Ukrainian Catholic Church,” in the *Refugee Experience*, 147.

\(^{55}\) Ibid.

\(^{56}\) According to Alexander Baran, Eastern Europe had just one Orthodox faith, but many “orthodox” churches. “This national concept of the church remained in Ukraine even after the Union of Brest (1595). Consequently, the Uniate Metropolitanate of Kyiv became a “Particular Catholic Church,” based on its tradition (Ruthenian rite). Later the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church under Austro-Hungarian rule became not only a particular church, but a national institution of Western Ukraine.” Alexander Baran, “The Ukrainian Catholic Church,” 148.
institution that represented the whole Ukrainian national, cultural, and religious heritage. The churches founded in DP camps were the same as the ones that they had left in their homeland and both the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in postwar Germany and Austria were not simply spiritual organizations that simply provided religious needs and moral authority to the faithful but were instead important national institutions that constantly influenced the political, social, and cultural existence of Ukrainian DPs.\textsuperscript{57}

Most Ukrainian spiritual leaders were either exiled clergy from the interwar period, had undergone forced labor deportation, or fled the Soviets in 1944. During the interwar period, many Ukrainian religious leaders were exiled since Soviet communism did not provide a space for religious activity and, consequently, Soviet Ukrainians lost their churches and religious institutions. Along with exiled religious leaders from the interwar period, a significant number of both Catholic and Orthodox clergy found themselves displaced after the war. Nearly 80 percent of Ukrainian Catholic priests, many of whom had served alongside their countrymen in forced labor camps in Germany, were displaced persons after the war. Moreover, before the Red Army recaptured Ukraine, both Catholic and Orthodox clergy fled west along with large numbers of their episcopate, clergy, and followers.\textsuperscript{58} As a result, at the beginning of 1946, according to one report, there were 177,630 Ukrainian refugees residing in Germany and 29,241 in Austria. Of those, 65 percent were Catholic and 33 percent Orthodox, with three-fourths of Ukrainian DPs regularly attending mass on Sundays.\textsuperscript{59} The number of Ukrainian Christians coupled with the fact that the Ukrainian clergy had shared wartime experiences with its flock

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 147.

\textsuperscript{58} V. Mudry, “Nova ukrainska emigratsiia ta orhanizatsiia taborovoho zhyttia, (New Ukrainian Emigration and Organization of Camp Life” Siohochasne i mynule (Present and Past), nos. 1-2 (1949): 9-10, AUPO.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
caused churches to become centers for national, social, and cultural activities as much as they were ecclesiastical institutions.

Anticipating a need for ecclesiastical organization, five members of the Orthodox hierarchy—Metropolitan Polikarp, Archbishop Mykhail and Bishops Mstyslav, Platon, and Viacheslav—held a conference in Bad Kissingen on July 16, 1945, which set into motion the canonical organization of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Germany and Austria. The conference decided “to convene a sobor of bishops to examine the new conditions of the church’s activities in exile and to adapt its organizational structure to the postwar situation of Ukrainian refugees.” A year later, the Second Sobor of Bishops met in Esslingen, officially creating a set organizational structure for Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in each occupation zone. The Sobor assigned jurisdiction of the British Zone to Metropolitain Polikarp, while the American zone was divided into several episcopal regions: Southern Bavaria (headed by Archbishop Mykhail), northern Bavaria (Bishop Volodymyr Malets), Schwaben (Archbishop Ihor), Wurttemberg-Baden (Bishop Platon), and Gross Hessen (Bishop Mstyslav). Archbishop Sylvestr was assigned the Ellwangen DP camp and Archbishops Hennadii to Austria. The meeting also organized a higher theological school and pastoral courses, committed to operating a periodical press to publish standard Ukrainian translations of liturgical and other religious texts, and to pursue unification with the Ukrainian Orthodox churches in North America.

Similarly, in 1946-1947, the Ukrainian Catholic Visitature Church set out to organize a stable structure for its own religious activities. The American, British, and French zones of occupation each had their own archpresbyteries, or districts, and each archpresbytery was

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61 Ibid.
subdivided into deaneries. The deaneries contained 120 parishes and smaller missions with 182 priests and 58,278 registered faithful. Moreover, the parishes and smaller missions also contained 71 specific church organizations in the form of brotherhoods and sisterhoods. Like the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Catholic Church also focused its efforts on education, establishing a theological seminary with 52 students and 14 professors in the castle of Hirschberg, Bavaria.62

Church organization and the construction of churches happen simultaneously. Almost immediately, with the help of exiled religious leaders, Ukrainian DPs built churches from scraps. For example, Ukrainian Orthodox DPs in Hersfeld, Germany created a chapel in an abandoned barn in one week by cleaning, painting, and decorating it. A nineteen-year-old artist did the paintings; scrap material and tin cans provided materials for the candelabra, table, and alter, while the candles were dipped by hand. The church also had “stained glass windows” depicting Christ behind the alter made by painting the window a frosty white and stretching a painted piece of gauze over the frame.63 In other instances Ukrainian DPs utilized large meeting halls, old barns, barracks, and schoolhouses for mass and religious activities. In the DP camps of Oker, Hallendorf, Korigen, Windischbergerdorf, Oberplatz, and Kornberg DP built Ukrainian-style wooden churches. Every church had vestments and embroidered clothes for covering the alter in an effort to preserve everything as it was from the religious tradition of their homeland.64

Religious holidays provided one link with tradition for uprooted people, as church services and celebrations adhered to traditional Ukrainian religious ceremonies as much as

possible. One Ukrainian woman remembered Easter in her DP camp near Hamburg where the traditional *paska* bread was made and “people gathered at midnight in the Eastern Rite Catholic Church for the priest’s blessing. Then there was the walk home before sunrise and the return to church for the 9:00am service, followed by a large family dinner extending through the afternoon and evening.”

In some instances relief agencies helped provide food for bigger religious holidays like when 400 individual CARE packages arrived to help Ukrainians celebrate Easter in the Austrian DP camps in 1948. Ukrainians tried as best they could to carry on traditional religious celebrations, but there were limits. According to Gina Wasyll, in her Ukrainian village, on the Sunday following Easter, “everyone would walk to the cemetery, carrying a lunch of sweet wine, eggs, and cake, where they would spend the rest of the afternoon among the graves of the ancestors, but this portion of the Easter tradition could not be followed in the camp.”

While some Ukrainian DPs made the traditional cake on the Sunday after Easter and gave out decorated eggs, Wasyll was disappointed because “it was not the same.” Nevertheless, religious services and holidays provided a piece of home for Ukrainian DPs.

One religious rite that clergy was desperately needed for was marriages. Since the Third Reich had forbidden weddings in forced labor camps, there was an abundance of group wedding celebrations in 1945 and 1946, often with the couple’s children standing by. The Belsen DP camp recorded twenty weddings on one day in the summer of 1945. Most Ukrainian DPs were young and had either fallen in love during the war in forced labor camps or met someone in DP camps as many were often lonely, torn from their family members, and felt isolated. According

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65 Quote reprinted in Wyman, *DPs*, 112.
67 Ibid.
to one DP, people would meet and five minutes later would ask if you were married.\footnote{Quote reprinted in Wyman, \textit{DPs}, 111.}

Additionally, leaders of Ukrainian DP camps encouraged marriage whenever possible as it gave Ukrainians a better chance of immigrating as married couples or families were more often accepted over single DPs. Weddings incorporated traditional singing, music, and dancing. Ceremonies, held outside, followed Ukrainian tradition as much as possible. Ben Kaplan, an American who attended several “wholesale” weddings reported he was surprised that even under austere camp conditions traditional rites were “followed faithfully.”\footnote{Ibid. 112. The adherence to traditional rites is also discussed in E. Skorodynsky, “Relihiine zhyttia v taborakh (Religion in the Camps),” \textit{Sichochasne i mynule (Past and Present)}, no. 1 (1949): 46-47.}

In DP camps, Ukrainian churches not only provided religious services, but served as a societal organization that became a rallying point for practicing cultural nationalism and fostering national identity. Since Ukrainians considered the church a national organization, or at least part of their national heritage, all political and national commemorations, manifestations, and demonstrations were always connected with some kind of religious service.\footnote{The Catholic Church in in Galicia had historically been a semi-political or national institution and in the interwar period, due to the Concordat between Poland and the Vatican, the Ukrainian Catholic church in Galicia acquired some immunity and freedom in which it protested against the abuses of the Polish government. See Alexander Baran, “The Ukrainian Catholic Church,” 153.} As a result, social gatherings in churches often revolved around the celebration of national holidays, such as the annual Unity Day celebration in January, which celebrates the unification of eastern and western Ukraine through the “Treaty of Unity” in 1919. Commemorations such as these often included celebratory feasts, song and dance, and stories that mixed religion and folklore.

Additionally, the Ukrainian Catholic Church, in particular, served as the main facilitator of immigration overseas, especially to the United States. Catholic churches throughout Western Europe also provided thousands of affidavits for Ukrainians who did not have any relatives or sponsors in the United States. One of the most important actors to help assist overseas
immigration was Bishop Ivan Buchko, appointed General Apostolic Visitator of all Ukrainian Catholics in Western Ukraine on November 21, 1946, by Pope Pius XII. After he was appointed Visitator, Bishop Buchko visited most DP camps and private Ukrainian communities in Germany and, with authority from the Vatican, he asked the Western Allies and local German governments to support Ukrainian refugees and expedite their immigration overseas. Bishop Buchko also published a pastoral letter to Ukrainian refugees in November 1948 in which he described the persecutions in Ukraine and expressed his hope that the church would be victorious and religious freedom would be restored to the Ukrainian homeland. The letter also emphasized the necessity for Ukrainian DPs to remain faithful Christians and to reject “damaging influence of atheistic, anti-Catholic, and sectarian literature” as this would hinder their chances of immigrating abroad. 71 The need to present Ukrainians as God-loving Christians to aid in the immigration process, was echoed in conferences between Bishop Buchko and the American National Catholic Welfare Conference. 72

Religion served as one of the main mechanisms in which Ukrainian DPs fostered cultural nationalism since the church has historically been tied to Ukrainian identity. Not only did the clergy provide spiritual guidance and assist in traditional rites such as baptism, weddings, and funerals, the church celebrated religious as well as national holidays. The combination of religious and national celebrations provided one way that Ukrainians were able to overcome their Soviet legacy and construct a new identity outside of the homeland. Since, for the most part, Soviet occupation had deprived Ukrainians from practicing religion, the DP camp environment allowed for a religious rebirth that unified Ukrainians and was a way for them to demonstrate their anti-communist feelings. Moreover, specific clergy members such as Ivan Buchko aided

71 Alexander Baran, “The Ukrainian Catholic Church,” 152.
72 Ibid.
significantly in overseas immigration by providing advice, establishing connections with
transnational relief organizations, and giving affidavits. In this way, the church is one example
of how the construction of cultural nationalism in the DP era was simultaneously a process of
creating a national identity that would help Ukrainians immigrate abroad.

**Literature, Art, and Social Organizations**

Social organizations that operated on a larger scale by connecting Ukrainian DP camps
throughout the Western Zone of occupation in Germany were another means of fashioning
cultural nationalism. Many of these social organizations revolved around artistic traditions
including choir and theater groups, literary societies, and physical culture since the conditions in
DP camps allowed for a more public airing of the community’s distinct culture and history. As
H. Shevchuk wrote, “Only the representatives of a free Ukrainian literature, that is, of the émigré
literature, who base themselves on the holy feelings of patriotism of the Ukrainian people and on
its experiences of superhuman sufferings and uneven struggle, can show they are ethically
superior [to Soviets].” To encourage artistic expression and maintain cultural times to the
homeland camp committees, religious leaders, and teachers set up and organized choirs, folk
dances, and drama series. Maintaining cultural ties to their homeland was a way to normalize
conditions, relieve DPs from monotonous daily life, and assuage feelings of homesickness, but
cultural traditions also provided an opportunity for Ukrainian DPs to express their anti-Soviet
sentiments, collective trauma, and prove they were different from Ukrainians living in the Soviet
Union.

Writers were the first group of the Ukrainian DPs to organize. Only four and a half
months after the war ended in Europe (and before the UNRRA took official control over DP

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73 H. Shevchuk, “Voroh’ Luriia Kosacha v teatri pid mystetskym provodom Volodymyra Blavatskoho” (Iurii
Kosach’s play “Voroh” under the direction of Volodymyr Blavatsk), *Chas*, December 15, 1946, 2, AUPO.
camps), the Union of Ukrainian Writers (Мистецький український рух or MUR) was founded. Unlike the dozens of local literary organizations that produced short-lived journals, magazines, and almanacs, MUR’s aim was to lead the development of Ukrainian literature in the postwar period as a means to present Ukrainian culture to the rest of the world. MUR based itself on a long-held tradition of the reliance on literary societies to help marshal, lead, and foster the development of Ukrainian culture through literature. These societies typically comprised a group of authors or elite leaders who aspired to manage the cultural development of a society, which according to Danylo Husar Struk was “a uniquely, or more precisely, Russian-Ukrainian phenomenon, where so much social and political thought entered into the consciousness of society through literature.”74

During its three-year existence (from September 23, 1945 to November 2, 1948), the MUR’s stated mission was to organize Ukrainian writers, establish a publishing house, and aid in the development of publishing activities in the form of collections, newspapers, and books by individual authors. However, MUR’s first declaration, also demonstrates a motive to shape Ukrainian culture in the postwar period:

The times have placed and place before Ukrainian art that task to which it has been called: to serve its nation by its highly artistic and superb form and in such a way as to establish for itself a voice and an authority in the art of the world. Discarding all that is artistically imperfect and ideologically hostile to the Ukrainian nation, Ukrainian artists are uniting in order to strive in friendly cooperation toward the summit of real and serious art.75

MUR’s declaration demonstrates a conscious effort among some Ukrainian writers to eliminate certain aspects of Ukrainian history, culture, or identity, that contradicted the way they thought

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75 Deklaratsiia Obiednania Ukrainskykh Pysmennykh ta Mystiv (Declaration of the Union of Ukrainian Writers), reprinted in Struk, “Organizational Aspects of DP Literary Activity,” 224.
Ukrainian DPs should be portrayed in the postwar period. It seems logical that discarding “imperfect and ideologically hostile” elements would refer to pro-Soviet attitudes or collaboration with the Nazi regime. Again, this was accomplished by denouncing fascism and communism while portraying the Ukrainian people as “innocent victims” of historical circumstance. In other words, the activities of MUR, which in addition to the publishing imitative also held congresses, conferences, and literary readings, attempted to influence how Ukrainian culture was fashioned and portrayed.

In addition to organized literary societies, Ukrainian DPs also focused attention on the publication of newspapers, magazines, journals, and individual works on both the local and regional level. For almost two years, Ukrainian DPs lived outside local laws, meaning their presses had no legal status. Despite this, and the fact that Allied military authorities and the UNRRA were not given any indication of how to treat DP publications, Ukrainian publications began appearing as early as fall of 1945. Vasyl Chaplenko, the first editor of the newspaper *Nashe Zhytтя* (Our Life) explains how this often happened:

A group of writers who happened to end up together in the camp began to make attempts to publish a newspaper or journal. It turned out that for publication one had to have permission, but nobody knew exactly from whom. After some consultation, representatives of the group turned for permission to the American duty officer; he forbade all publication, even a wall bulletin. A few days later, however, permission was granted by the persons in charge of the local UNRRA organization. The first issue of *Nashe zhyttia* came out on September 5, 1945. Technically it was of low quality and in content too, not very abundant. As the of the second issue, content became even more limited, for the censor forbade the inclusion of any political article.76

76 Vasyl Chaplenko, “*Lyst vid redaktsiyi* (Letter from the Editor),” *Nashe zhyttia (Our Life)*, September 5, 1946, 4, AUPO.
Many of the larger, and longer running, newspapers provided information on day-to-day life in the camps, addressed the question of Ukrainian-German relations, and offered articles on the work of Ukrainian artists, sculptors, singers, writers, scholars, sportsmen, teachers, and priests.  

However, one of the most prevalent topics in Ukrainian DP newspapers was immigration. On the one hand, newspapers printed practical immigration such as providing lists of countries that were accepting displaced persons, giving up to date regional statistics on the number of Ukrainians who immigrated abroad and to where, and the steps to successfully fill out immigration paperwork or find a sponsor. On the other hand, newspapers were also filled with editorials expressing a desire for Ukrainians to present themselves in a certain way in order to increase their immigration chances. For example, on Ukrainian DPs moving to England stated:

> The issue of resettlement of Ukrainians to England is interesting for our community from many points of view. The fact that her government and the public have taken an interest in Ukrainian migrants as a creative, hard-working and morally honest, enduring, and trustworthy proves that our people are welcome in England. The British still knew little about us as a separate national community, we are often confused with Russians and Poles.

Memoirs depict similar sentiments, suggesting that appearing as “backward,” uneducated, or not productive members of society, was a common concern for Ukrainian DPs.

Since immigration was a common goal among the majority of Ukrainian DPs, many themes of editorials focused on disassociating Ukrainian DPs with communism. One of the ways they did this was to use a mythized version of Ukrainian history to argue that Ukrainians had always been “a freedom loving people” and describing the atrocities committed by the

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78 LAUPO; Anhliya vidkryla dveri nachym skital'tsyam (England Opens its Doors to our Migrants),” Nedilya (Sunday), May 4, 1947, 5, AUPO; Omelyan Vitkovsky, “Pro sylu voli ta kharakter (Concerning Willpower and Character),” Holos (Voice), no. 4, January 22, 1947, AUPO.  
79 “Anhliya vidkryla dveri nachym skital’tsyam (England Opens its Doors to our Migrants),” Nedilya (Sunday), May 4, 1947, 5, AUPO.  
80 Ibid.
Soviet Union. Particular attention was also given to Ukrainian resistance movements during the war as a way to counter narratives that highlighted Ukrainian collaboration. One way this was done was to argue that the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC), which continued its operations after the war ended, was the only Ukrainian nationalist group that cooperated with Nazi Germany. Of course, this was entirely false. Nevertheless, countless articles appeared championing the democratic nature of resistance groups as well as the actions of the OUN, UPA, and Supreme Liberation Council against Nazi occupation without addressing the well-documented collaboration between these groups and Nazi Germany in the first years of the war.

The plethora of newspapers, journals, and magazine led to the creation of journalist associations and conventions. The First Ukrainian journalist convention took place on March 2-4, 1946, in Schweinfurt, Bavaria in an attempt to bring journalists together on a professional basis. On April 7, 1946, the editors of five newspapers including *Ukrainski vistii*, *Nashe zhyttia*, *Nedilia*, *Slovo*, and *Ukrainsky tyzhevyk* established the Association of the Ukrainian Democratic Press with the goal of “countering the attempts of some émigré groups [Zch OUN and the Foreign Representation of the UHVR] to foster exclusivity and intolerance of other Ukrainian groups.” After this association was created, other groups of journalists formed their own organizations throughout Germany and Austria, both locally and regionally. The largest was the Association of the DP Press in the American Zone (later changed to Association of the Free Press of Eastern and Central Europe, Balkan, and Baltic States), founded in February 1947 in the Ukrainian camp Somme-Kaserne in Augsburg. The association encouraged journalists of different nationalities to seek out more opportunities for wider cooperation and at its height in

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81 “Demokratiya lyshe odna (There is only one Democracy),” *Nashe zhytya (Our Life)*, no. 16 September 12, 1946, 1, AUPO.
82 “A United Front of Editors,” *Ukrainski vistii*, no. 14, April 21, 1946, 1, AUPO.
1948 had 45 representatives of 83 Ukrainian, Polish, Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Serbian newspapers.\textsuperscript{83} The success of the Association of the DP Press lead to the creation of the Federation of Free Journalists of the Captive Nations, which was based in London and connected Ukrainian journalists (and other nationalities) to émigré groups throughout Western Europe, creating a transnational network of Ukrainian writers whose aim was to keep Ukrainian culture and history alive in the minds of DPs once they moved out of the camps.

In DP camps, the creativity of Ukrainian theater was able to develop to its fullest. The moral oppression, ceaseless terror, and harsh censorship it had known during the interwar period prevented any free thought or independent existence. According to Iosyp Hirniak, a founder of the Theater Studio (TS), which organized performances in Austrian DP camps, “the aim of all the work of our collective in emigration was to make the theater an inextricable part of the spiritual and cultural life of our Ukrainian community.”\textsuperscript{84} Theatrical performances were influenced by Western European drama and covered a variety of topics from everyday camp life to complex tragedies.\textsuperscript{85} Although plays were originally held in empty garages with no decorations, costumes, or props, by the summer of 1946, many larger Ukrainian DP camps had formed their own theatrical troupes, some of which traveled and performed at smaller camps.\textsuperscript{86} For example, the theatrical troupe in Neu-Ulm, called Rozvaha, put on over 200 performances, including traditional Ukrainian plays such as Lesia Ukrainka’s \emph{Lisova pisnia} (The Song of the Forest).\textsuperscript{87}

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\textsuperscript{83} Roman Ilnytzkyj, “Zhurnalisty Polonenykh natsiy stvoryly Vsesvitnyu orhanizatsiyu (Journalists of the Captive Nations have Created a World Organization),” \textit{Chas}, December 19, 1947, 1, AUPO.
\textsuperscript{84} Iosyp Hirniak, “Kilka dumok i refleksii pro studiiu i pro nashi teatralni i bilia teatralni spravy, (A Few Thoughts and Reflections about our Theater and Theatrical Affairs),” reprinted in Valerian Revutsky, “Theater in the Camps,” 300.
\textsuperscript{86} Ukrainian Council for Physical Culture Photo Album, UI0091, HURI.
\textsuperscript{87} Valerian Revutsky, “Theater in the Camps,” in \textit{The Refugee Experience}, 293.
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Ukrainian playwriters often wrote plays about day-to-day life in the camps as well as old Ukrainian folktales and legends, but more contemporary themes such as foreign occupation, with heavily anti-fascist or anti-communist tropes, were also popular. For instance, the Ukrainian newspaper, Chas, held annual literary competitions and during the 1946-1947 season the theme of the competition was armed struggle of the Ukrainian people against German occupying forces. Although many of the submissions focused on the struggle of the Ukrainian underground against the Nazis, the winning play, entitled Voroh (Enemy) by Iurii Kosach, emphasized the role played by ordinary Ukrainians in resisting Nazi tyranny.\(^{88}\) According to one review, printed in Chas, the play’s greatest achievement was the “realistic portrayal of Nazism” and successfully showed that Ukrainian resistance to Nazi occupation was not solely the work of the Ukrainian underground, but “something shared by all Ukrainians.”\(^{89}\) Despite factual errors, like the fact that many Ukrainians initially welcomed the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the play sought to distance ordinary Ukrainian DPs from OUN and UPA activities.\(^{90}\) Moreover, like editorials in newspapers, plays such as these served as a way for Ukrainians to shape and shift the narrative of the Ukrainian experienced during WWII.

The conditions in DP camps also allowed social organization to flourish. People had time, if not always money, to organize, plan, and create. Although communication was sometimes a problem in postwar Germany, the distances between camps were relatively small. The World YMCA/YMCA activities in Ukrainian DP camps provide a perfect example of Ukrainian DP’s taking advantage of organizational opportunities since the association was one of the main organizations that brought Ukrainians from different camps together through summer

\(^{88}\) I. Korybut, “Demon v odnostroiu,” Ukrainska trybuna (Ukrainian Tribune), October 31, 1948, AUPO.  
\(^{89}\) H. Shevchuk, “Voroh’ Luriia Kosacha v teatri pid mystetskym provodom Volodymyra Blavatskoho” (Review of “Enemy” by Iurii Kosach under the direction of Volodymyr Blavatsk) , Chas, December 15, 1946, AUPO.  
\(^{90}\) Valerian Revutsky, “Theater in the Camps,” 300.
camps, leaders conferences, training centers, sports competitions, and art exhibitions. For example, the 1948 and 1949 Ukrainian Joint YMCA/YWCA Chairman’s conference brought Ukrainian’s from all over the American and British Zones to Regensburg.\textsuperscript{91} In one instance, the YMCA held “live” chess tournament in which the pieces were played by people dressed in their own national costumes.\textsuperscript{92} Additionally, the Council for Physical Culture held sporting competitions throughout the year and sponsored annual events such as the 1947 Day for Physical Culture in which Ukrainian DP camps competed in a variety of sports, performed songs and plays, and dressed in traditional folk costumes.\textsuperscript{93} The 1947 event brought Ukrainians from DP camps in Mittenwald, Augsburg, Neu-Ulm, Nuremberg, Regensburg, Bayreuth, Berchtesgaden, Aschaffenburg, Ettlingen, Bamberg, Wurzburg, Rottenburg, and Munich.\textsuperscript{94}

In DP camps, the period between 1945 and 1951 represented “an intense period of social activity, harnessing all the available creative forces after the destructive interruption of the war.”\textsuperscript{95} Many of the literature, art, and social organizations created in DP camps between 1945 and 1951 not only played a role in the construction of cultural nationalism within DP camps, but also provided a template for community organization in diaspora communities in North America.

**Conclusion**

Most Ukrainians lived in DP camps for less than five years, but despite this relatively short period of time, the camps became centers of political, social, and cultural activity. Camps placed people in a “controlled proximity without the threat of punishment” and provided “an opportunity to exchange feelings and ideas about the world and thus to restructure their shattered

\textsuperscript{91} YMCA Scrapbook, Volodymyr Nestorovych Papers, UI0091, HURI.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Photo Album, Ukrainian Council for Physical Culture, UI0069, HURI.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
First the first time, an idea of a united Ukrainian society, in a limited time and space materialized. Self-government and self-administration in Ukrainian DP camps also gave Ukrainians a sense of self-sufficiency and, for the first time in Ukrainian history, Ukrainian history could be taught in schools, religion could be practiced with persecution, and literature could be published without censorship or fear of political repercussions.

Cultural nationalism began to unify Ukrainians in forced labor camps during the war, but expanded tremendously in the postwar period, which can be seen in political organization, education curriculum, the role of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Ukrainian language publications, and social activities in DP camps. Ukrainian DPs drew upon positive and shared elements of their national memory as they successfully organized and shaped a coherent national identity. In this way Ukrainians overcame differences through a common cultural heritage while presenting themselves as “good Ukrainians,” to the United States, Canada, and other countries accepting displaced persons. DPs from Soviet occupied regions, according to Lauren Hilton, “believed they could claim moral victory over the Communists by continuing their cultural traditions and by refusing to return, which drew international attention to their anti-Communist stance.”

The central theme of this process was the preservation of what it meant to be [Ukrainian], posited as both a duty and an ongoing mission.

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97 Lauren Hilton argues this point for Latvian and Polish DP in Hilton, “Cultural Nationalism in Exile,” 301.
98 Ibid., 289.
Conclusion

In the spring of 2014 Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea and backed civil unrest in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, two industrial-rich regions in the easternmost part of Ukraine. Part of Putin’s justification for these actions included an assertion of his right to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in those areas. In a speech on March 18, 2014, to both houses of the Kremlin following the annexation of Crimea, he claimed that the residents of Crimea “turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives” because “time and time again attempts were made to deprive Russians of their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them to forced assimilation.”¹ This statement raised, and continues to precipitate, questions concerning the historical relationship between Russians and Ukrainians as well as questions regarding Ukrainian and Russian ethnicity, language, culture, and nationalism. With Ukrainian diaspora communities around the world condemning Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty, understanding Ukrainian nationalism in Ukraine and within Ukrainian communities around the globe is crucial for comprehending the crisis in Ukraine as well as international responses.

Ukrainian nationalism developed differently and more slowly than in other Central and Eastern European countries. Prior to WWII, Ukrainian lands remained geopolitically divided and the few nationalist organizations that existed believed that the Ukrainian speaking population could only become nationalized by the formation of an independent Ukrainian nation-state. Ukrainian nationalist in the early twentieth century, however, remained divided over how to achieve Ukrainian independence and failed to reach the majority of the Ukrainian speaking

population, the majority of which belonged to illiterate, lower classes. This was partially due to the fact that Ukrainian nationalists borrowed preconstructed models of nationalism from Central European countries, where nationalist movements developed from the bottom up. Moreover, the interwar period saw the brutal repression of Ukrainian nationalism in Soviet Ukraine by Stalin and government sanctioned restrictions against the expression of Ukrainian nationalism in Poland. The lack of available mechanisms for mass communication, widespread illiteracy, and policies aimed at suppressing Ukrainian nationalism inhibited the success of nationalizing efforts prior to World War II.

The Second World War marked an important turning point in the consolidation of Ukrainian nationalism since it united Ukrainian lands that had been historically separated by empires. Between 1939 and 1941 Ukrainians in prewar Poland became united under Soviet rule and between 1941 and 1944 under Nazi occupation. Fluid borders allowed nationalist groups such as the OUN access to Ukrainian speaking people living in Soviet Ukraine. This led to a mass nationalizing campaign involving the spread of propaganda and the establishment of nationalist newspapers, which emphasized the presence of a common language, culture, religion, and historical experience among ethnic Ukrainians. Many ethnic Ukrainians also united against the brutal policies forced onto them by both Stalin and Hitler.

While it is clear that Ukrainians exhibited a cultural nationalism that connected them during occupation, in forced labor camps, and in displaced persons camps, that bond meant different things to different groups of Ukrainians. It was also used for a variety of aims during the war and in the postwar period. Consequently, it is not only important to understand the processes of Ukrainian national development during World War II, but also the ways in which that nationalism was used during this time. During occupation, the OUN, UCC, and UPA
initially supported the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union since they hoped it would lead to the creation of a Nazi-allied independent Ukrainian state. When it became clear that Hitler would not support an autonomous Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalists made a drastic reversal of their nationalist rhetoric. Instead of focusing on authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and violent animosity towards national rivals, Ukrainian nationalists emphasized anti-imperialism, freedom of speech, as well as religious and economic freedom. This shift in rhetoric was merely a pragmatic and opportunistic attempt to gain support from Western Allies for an independent Ukraine after the war ended.

Ukrainians in forced labor and displaced persons camps also utilized common bonds associated with cultural nationalism for rational means. The conditions in forced labor camps led to overcrowding, poor housing conditions, inadequate food rations, and, at times, physical and emotional abuse. Nazi racial ideology also ensured discrimination against Ukrainians, as well as other Eastern European workers. As a means of exerting their agency, resisting Nazi oppression, and coping with suffering, Ukrainian forced laborers held feasts on national holidays, wrote letters to family and friends, sang national songs, and held dances when possible.

The bonds created during forced labor camps continued in displaced persons camps after the war ended. Between 1945 and 1951 Ukrainians utilized their cultural nationalism to resist repatriation, claim refugee status, and insist that they be classified based on their nationality instead of prewar citizenship. As Ukrainians actively constructed their own camps, committees, and national organizations in the postwar period, they emphasized their Christian faith, anti-communism, and opposition to Soviet rule in Ukraine. Although historically motivated, these characteristics which came to define postwar Ukrainian diasporic nationalism, were also used in
rational ways to ensure that had the best chance to immigrate to Western Europe or North America.

Although the DP era only lasted six years, it marked a period in which Ukrainians from many different geographical regions, political orientations, and socioeconomic backgrounds united around cultural nationalism for a variety of different reasons, which has important consequence for understanding cultural nationalism. First, cultural nationalism offered Ukrainians a sense of community and belonging when they could not identify with an existing nation state, which gave them a space to practice cultural traditions, air past grievances, and process the effects of the war. Secondly, cultural nationalism allowed Ukrainians to redefine the boundaries of the Ukrainian nation in more flexible terms. Ukrainian DPs still possessed a strong cultural attachment to the homeland, but whereas Ukrainian nationalism during the interwar period placed strict limits and definitions as to who was a member of the Ukrainian nation, Ukrainian DPs expanded these boundaries to include Ukrainians living outside of the nation-state. Moreover, through interactions with Ukrainians living in the United States and Canada and the creation of international Ukrainian social organizations, Ukrainian nationalism took on a more transnational character, a process which continued after immigration abroad. Finally, cultural nationalism provided Ukrainians with a sense of agency as they posited themselves as an autonomous, unified nation when confronting repatriation, access to humanitarian aid, and to increase their chances of immigrating to the United States. During the postwar period Ukrainians used cultural nationalism to demonstrate to the Western Allies and the UNRRA that they constituted a separate nation, uniquely distinct from Russians and Poles, despite not having their own nation-state, in order to resist Soviet repatriation campaigns and gain access to humanitarian aid.
The DP era ended in 1951 when the majority of displaced persons had immigrated to other parts of Europe, North America, South America, and Australia. Those who remained in Germany were officially reclassified as “homeless foreigners.” The year 1951 also marked the beginning of the dismantling of administrations created by the Allies. As hundreds of thousands of DPs immigrated abroad, the IRO (International Refugee Organization), which had taken over the administration of DP camps from the UNRRA closed nationally homogenous camps, consolidating them into “foreigner camps” designed to accommodate all types of refugees. The consolidation of Ukrainian cultural nationalism during WWII and the postwar period demonstrates the malleably and flexibility of nationalism, as Ukrainians remade nationalism between 1939 and 1951 and used it for their own aims. It also provides insight into the type of nationalism present in Ukrainian diaspora communities today.

In his book, *Global Diasporas*, Robin Cohen argues that the definition and idea of diasporas varies greatly, but there are a common set of characteristics common to all diasporic communities including the following:

1. Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, or the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or further colonial ambitions
2. A collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history, and achievements
3. An idealization of the punitive ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety, and prosperity, even to its creation, which could lead to the development of a return movement that gains collective approbation
4. A strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history, and the belief in a common fate
5. A troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance at the least, or the possibility that another calamity might befall the group
6. A sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement
7. The possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance of pluralism.²

The postwar Ukrainian diaspora between 1945 and 1951 and those that exist today fit almost all the characteristics outlined by Cohen.

Cohen goes on to distinguish between different types of diaspora communities including victim, trade, imperial, and cultural diasporas, but notes that some diaspora communities take dual or multiple forms while others change over time. Ukrainian diaspora communities today are both victim and cultural diasporas. Victim diasporas, according to Cohen, represent communities that have had a “decisive break event” in their histories that caused homelessness, placelessness, or statelessness, yet the group clings to a collective memory and myth about the homeland. The traumatic dispersal from the homeland, which is usually defined by enslavement, exile, displacement, discrimination, or religious intolerance, also tends to provide a common memory of historic injustice that binds the group together. For many of today’s Ukrainian diaspora communities, WWII constituted the primary “traumatic event” that unified displaced and exiled Ukrainians and, as a result, victimhood and anti-Sovietism still remain prominent defining characteristics of Ukrainian nationalism in Ukrainian diasporas.

Ukrainian diasporas are also cultural diasporas. Cultural diasporas, according to Cohen, are cemented not only by bonds of language, religious convictions, and/or political ideas, but also by the experience of migration. Moreover, all acknowledge the presence of an “old country,” which is “buried deep in language, religion, custom, or folklore” and “always has some claim on their loyalty and emotions. That claim may be strong or weak, or boldly or meekly articulated in a given circumstance or historical period, but a member’s adherence to a diasporic community is demonstrated by the acceptance of an inescapable link with their past migration.

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3 Ibid., 3.
4 Ibid., 3-6.
5 Ibid., 23.
6 Ibid., xii.
Beginning in forced labor and DP camps, Ukrainian identity was rooted in traditional cultural artifacts such as language, education, literature, and folklore, which served as a means to preserve their Ukrainianness. In this way, fostering cultural nationalism was also a way to eliminate geographical, political, and socio-economic differences between Western and Eastern Ukrainians.

Cultural nationalism as means of self-identification continued after Ukrainian DPs immigrated abroad. Language, religion, folklore, art, and historical experience are characteristics that unite Ukrainians across all diaspora communities. As Putin continues to threaten the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine the legacy of foreign oppression, including the brutal occupations under Stalin and Hitler during World War II, endures in the minds of many Ukrainians and has become a transnational rallying point for those who identify as Ukrainian around the globe.

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7 Cohen, *Global Diasporas*, ix.
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According to the website, this online archive is a project of Archival Information Systems (AIS), carried out in cooperation with libraries, archives, and research institutions in Ukraine and abroad to digitize Ukrainian newspapers from the twentieth century. The project began in 2012 and holds more than 400 publications. The collections used in my dissertation include the following:

- Propahandyst-s’ka presa okupovanykh ukrayins’kykh terytoriy 1941-44 (Interwar Press of Galicia and Volhynia)
- Mizhvoynenna presa halychyny ta volyni (Propaganda Press on the Occupied Ukrainian Territories 1941-44)
- Periodyka taboriv diya peremishchenykh osib ta presa ukrayins’koyi emihratsiyi (Displaced Persons Camps and Ukrainian Emigration Periodicals)

HURI- Harvard University Research Institute Archival Collections
Berchtesgaden (Orlyk) DP Camp Records
- Records of Berchtesgaden (Orlyk) DP Camp and documents from the "Zaporizzhia" sports club in the Aschaffenburg DP Camp

Volodymyr Nestorovych Collection
- Includes a scrapbook he kept during his years as bookkeeper for the World’s YMCA-YWCA for displaced persons in the British zone of Germany and photographs of joint conferences of Ukrainian YMCA-YWCA leaders from the American and British zones.

Ukrainian Council for Physical Culture (RFK)
- Photo albums containing images of various Ukrainian DP sports clubs in Germany

Ukrainian student movement in the United States
- Records of the Central Union of Ukrainian Students, the Union of Ukrainian Student Associations of Germany, and the Federation of Ukrainian Student Organizations of America

UNA- United Nations Archives
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Folder: Reports to Repatriation Missions, 1946-1947

USHMM- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Contains a collection of Arbeiter Bücher and other identification papers from forced laborers working in Vienna, Austria

This online archive contains 590 interviews with former forced laborers in 25 different languages. The interviews were conducted in 2005-2006 and the archive contains 32 subsets compiled from various interview projects in 26 countries under the direction of the University of Hagen. The Ukrainian interview project was carried out by the Eastern Ukrainian Institute of Kharkiv University and headed by Gelinada Grinchenko. The Ukrainian interviews were conducted in 2005 by Tatiana Pastuschenko, Gelinada Grinchenko, Irina Rebrowa, and Oleksij Musiesdow and German translations were provided by Lina Majewskaja, Nataliia Patiaka, Olga Welte.
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Vita

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