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A Policy Approach to Educational Leadership in the State Legislature.

Sue Wells Weaver
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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A policy approach to educational leadership in the state legislature

Weaver, Sue Wells, Ph.D.

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A POLICY APPROACH TO EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP
IN THE STATE LEGISLATURE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Administrative and Foundational Services

by
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ABSTRACT

This study investigated legislative expert influence in the context of educational policy decisions. Institutional and behavioral approaches to legislative study were compared. In a chi square analysis of all legislative education enrollments in the 1993 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, legislation introduction success was positively associated with author's level of credential and reputation expertise. Relative importance of type of expertise was indeterminable and some influence was unaccountable in the analysis.

The policy approach, based on Theodore Lowi's theory that policy predicts politics, integrated the prior approaches. Lowi's distributive-regulatory-redistributive schema informed the independent policy variables, while influence, role, and subsystem theories were bases for the independent information source and legislator expertise variables. The political phenomenon was the dependent measure of legislative educational expert influence.

A legislative simulation was conducted in the 1993 Regular Session with two groups of 24 legislators, who were comparable on social-demographic background but contrasted on membership on the education policy committees. Interviews included administration of the Legislative Reference and Resource Survey, in which three types of
educational policy and five categories of information sources were manipulated, producing influence assessments on a 0-3 scale, specific named information sources, and other data concerning the internal flow of information.

In a three-factor analysis of variance performed on scale scores, distributive policy produced overall (high) potential for influence, significantly different from that produced in regulatory (moderate) and redistributive policy (low). Legislature and constituency were most influential, differing significantly from staff and agencies and also from interest groups. Legislators with expertise valued agencies more than did their non-expert peers, who depended upon constituency more.

In qualitative data analysis, distributive policy produced high diversity and many experts. Redistributive and regulatory policies produced succeeding lower diversity scores and fewer and different experts, suggesting greater potential influence for any one expert. Redistributive and regulatory issues were more salient for legislators than distributive issues, and a pattern of situational leadership prevailed. Legislative educational leadership was concluded as the premiere source of policy information, its influence relative to the policy context.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

State legislatures have increased their role in educational policy-making over the past two decades, and they are now the new context for educational governance (Fuhrman, 1987). Key legislators have taken on new roles in formulation and oversight of educational priorities. Shifts to the state level context have changed not only the identity of key actors but also the nature of the decisions being made. Now more than ever, political leadership is a role that must be successfully performed if educators are to achieve the goals of education.

One of the major factors for enhanced state activity in education was the decline in the federal role during the Reagan administration. Decreased federal resources meant that states had to assume the financial burden, regardless of their economic capacity. Partly in response to the 1983 National Commission on Excellence report, A Nation at Risk, states passed a voluminous amount of educational reform legislation and spent by mid-decade an additional $6 billion, a 2 percent increase in education expenditures (Inman, 1987).

Correspondingly, the local role in financing education has diminished over time. Some governors and legislators felt that local school systems' unwillingness or inability
to improve schools forced state government to initiate change. Decreased federal resources and decreased local autonomy were reasons for the first major change in the context of governance—a shift in the level of decision-making.

Another important factor was the increased capacity of state government to make decisions about education. Governors had been involved in school finance reforms in the 1970s and teaching and learning reforms in the 1980s, and had developed a set of national educational goals for implementation in the 1990s. State legislatures had become more professionalized, with increased technology and staff resources, and had become less dependent on state departments of education for information. The second major change in governance context was a shift in power among the actors involved in education (Fuhrman, 1987).

These shifts over the past two decades served to thrust the state legislature into the forefront of educational policy-making. The state level had grown more prominent, its patterns for determining education policy had continued to change, and political leadership for education had become even more important.

Background and Setting

During the decade of the 1960s, there was a relatively stable pattern of interaction among policy actors and groups. School lobbies, state agency bureaucrats, and
political leaders controlled decisions about education, and coalitions among these persons and groups sought to influence state-level policy-making. The patterns of structural interaction between association networks and the legislature were described in a typology of the progressive stages of state-level politics of education (Iannaccone, 1967). A more open system emerged in the 1970s. New forces for change--school finance reforms, collective bargaining, taxpayer revolts, and increased party competition (Usdan, Minar & Hurwitz, 1969)--brought additional actors into the political arena. The varying influence of governors, state boards and department chiefs, organized educators and coalitions, key legislators and staff became the subject of much research (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976; Masters, Salisbury & Eliot, 1964; Milstein & Jennings, 1973).

By the 1980s state educational policy-making had become a kaleidoscopic pattern of fragmented power (Jackson, 1987). State legislatures assumed a leadership role as numbers and types of policy decisions coming before the legislature expanded. The various change factors described by Rosenthal and Fuhrman (1981) were as follows: more organized efforts of environmental groups, greater diffusion of support of citizens and communities, growth in bureaucratic government and policy, and development of the legislature as an institution. State legislatures
continued in the 1990s to dominate education, consolidating
and digesting the innovations of the previous decade (Wirt
& Kirst, 1982). Though the pace of educational innovation
slackened, a lasting consequence was the full-fledged
emergence of state educational leadership, principally the
governors and individual legislators (Fuhrman, 1987).

The enhanced state leadership role has created new
problems. Time and information resources available in
legislatures have not been adequate to meet increased
responsibilities, even with more professionalized staff and
with upgraded information services. The role of expert
legislators and their staffs has become extremely valuable
in this context.

The policy specialist has been a subject of research
at several levels of decision-making, including the United
States Congress (Kingdon, 1977; Zwier, 1979) and the states
(Porter, 1974; Sabatier & Whiteman, 1985). State level
research has focused on the role of specialists at several
decision levels. One role was that of specialists inside
the institution. Legislative structures and individual
specialists were identified in a national study of
leadership and influence inside the legislature conducted

Another broader role was that of specialists in
political linkage between forces outside and inside the
legislature. The role of representation of the
constituency was fulfilled in shared goals and values leading to decision-making choices (Hedlund, 1975). Mitchell (1981) said that experts emerge as a critical link between citizens and public officials. Expertise is developed when key leaders, in response to external pressures on the legislative system, become more involved in the substantive content of issues. A third role of elite actor and policy innovator was described by Mazzoni (1991) as located within a "leadership arena," where top legislators and the governor formulate broader, less popular policies or engineer structural policy breakthroughs. In all these roles and decision levels, the educational policy specialist emerged in research as a primary factor in patterns of state-level decision-making about education.

Problem Statement

Not enough is known about the influence of educational policy specialists in the legislative decision-making process. The literature on state legislative influences has generally focused on the large cast of political actors who provide information and seek input into policy decisions, resulting in declaration of one or another actor as "winner" in the influence contest. Recently, more research attention has been paid to the individual legislator's role orientation (Mitchell, 1981), and to the legislators' involvement in policy subgovernments and issue
networks (Kirst & Meister, 1983). More studies are needed regarding the structures of leadership and the behaviors of individual leaders, either with colleagues, staff or other experts in the policy field (Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1981).

In addition, there is a missing link in explaining the context of political interactions leading to legislative decisions about education. Much of the research in legislative influence has acknowledged that different policy issues create different power and influence relationships; policy implies politics (Lowi, 1964; Ripley & Franklin, 1980). There has been more speculation than evidence of a significant policy effect in the area of legislative education (Mitchell, 1981). Analysis of different factors in the context of educational decision-making may help to supply the missing link.

Limitations are imposed by traditional and behavioral approaches to legislative study. No one theory about legislative decision-making has emerged (Mitchell, 1981; Stout, 1975; Wahlke, 1975). Easton (1969) said that the methodologies of the standard approaches are too narrow in scope and too conservative, and that future research products should be action-oriented and relevant to society’s problems. New information from new approaches is needed for better legislative study and improved educational decisions.
Research Questions

The primary purpose of the present study was to explore influence of the educational leadership in legislative policy decisions. The following descriptive and analytic questions were addressed with Louisiana legislators:

1. How is influence for educational decisions associated with structural and individual leadership roles in the legislature?
2. How is influence of the legislature and its leaders affected by differences in the context of educational decisions, including type of policy and sources of policy information?
3. How is influence of information sources different for legislators with different leadership roles in education?

Theoretical Perspectives

The policy approach to legislative study was the design framework for this study. Institutional and individual approaches were compared and contrasted with the policy approach to determine utility for understanding the role of legislative leadership. Mitchell's (1981) study of legislator role orientation provided a behavioral model for studying influence. Parent's (1983) study of the legislator specialist was the research model for examining the education leadership. A general interpretative schema
developed by Lowi (1964) provided the organizing concept of the policy variables. Lowi theorized that different amounts of governmental coercion were needed to pass certain policies, because of the perceived economic impact on persons or groups. His three-dimensional frame of reference regarding policy type provided the substantive content of the policies in this study.

Three policy arenas were distinguished as follows. "Distributive" policy arena is an area of noncoercive policies. The policies are patronage decisions in which benefits are dispensed to individual citizens, not groups, in nonadversarial and disaggregated decisions.

"Regulatory" policy arena is an area of coercive, or mandated, policies. The regulations are laws or rules which impact groups of individuals along sector lines in the economy by raising costs and/or reducing or expanding their alternatives. "Redistributive" policy arena is an area of highly coercive governmental policies. These policies threaten property or other goods, and impact broad categories of private individuals (social classes).

Definitions

Following are some terms relevant to this study of education leadership in the legislature.

**Decisional referents**—criteria that may guide legislators in their decision-making about education. Hedlund (1975) defined decisional referents as decision-making criteria
that are the operational translations of the decision-maker's goals and values. This study operationalizes referents as individual and group sources of information, and also as legislator's orientation to the policy-making role.

Educational policy actor--a participant in the educational policy-making process in Louisiana. Actors in this study included the following cue sources for policy decisions: legislators, legislative and agency staffers, interest group representatives, individual constituents, and other individuals.

Expertise--"knowledge of the content and implications of specific proposals" (Bryant, 1985). Legislative experts were defined as the "differentiated informed aristocracy" forming the leadership of the policy subgovernments within the legislature (Parent, 1983). In this study, expertise was two functions of legislative leadership, indicated as credential expertise and reputation expertise.

Influence--"an effect on the condition or development of something" (Jackson, 1987). The American Heritage Dictionary defined influence as:

A power indirectly or intangibly affecting a person or a course of events. Power to sway or affect based on prestige, wealth, ability, or position. A person or thing exercising such power. An effect or change produced by such power (p. 674).
It is also "the extent to which a legislator is perceived by other legislators as having the strongest influence in the policy issue under consideration" (Bryant, 1985, p. 6).

**Institutional role**--role in which expertise is conferred by position as education policy committee member. In this study, institutional role is also referred to as credential expertise.

**Leadership arena**--a decision locus for a narrow range of policy, described by Mazzoni (1991) as "a tiny, institutionalized set of the state's top-level executive and legislative office holders (and, perhaps, behind-the-scenes private influentials)" (p. 129). Leadership arena was not congruent with policy arenas tested in the study; however, it is most likely the arena where redistributive policy is developed and decided.

**Legislation**--any policy which has been before the state legislature either in committee or on the floor. Enrolled legislation is the set of bills passed by both chambers and submitted to the governor for signature, but not necessarily enacted.

**Legislative educational leadership**--the legislature in its informational role in educational policy; those legislators who play key roles as a function of position on policy committee or individual characteristics and behavior.

Rosenthal and Fuhrman (1981) defined leadership as follows:

as a set of characteristics focusing on skills and competencies; as a set of behaviors in which one
individual affects what other individuals do; as specific processes involving those who lead and those who are led; and as the activities of persons in positions of authority (p. 5).

**Policy arena**--a framework for governmental decisions of the same type. In this study, distinctions in arenas relate to the amount of governmental coercion needed for passage and the impact or expected impact on the society. Policy types are functional categories, not subject matter categories.

**Policy information**--the type of information shared in the decision-making process. Sabatier and Whiteman (1985) distinguished policy information from political information, as follows:

"Political information" will refer to information about the positions of other political actors on pending legislation and about the likely impact of the legislation on reelection or career prospects. "Policy information"...will include information on the actual content of proposed legislative alternatives, the magnitude and causes of the problems they are designed to address, and their probable effects on society (p. 397).

**Power**--"a social phenomenon associated with some individual or group of individuals" (Jackson, 1987). Political power is "the ability to make decisions in a political system or to overtly influence the decision-making process" (Titus, 1986).

**Limitations of the Study**

The study investigated the influence of the educational leadership in a single state legislative session. Leadership was examined under various conditions
through the design of the legislative simulation. The following limitations and delimitations were acknowledged:

1. Limitations associated with experimental realism in the legislative setting and with experimental manipulation of the study variables were recognized.

2. Attitude data regarding influence were measures of perception of influence, not facts or demonstrated behavioral phenomena. The study was intended as exploratory research in policy theory.

3. Constraints on legislative decision-making such as environmental and political factors were not presented in this research. Bias relative to budgetary constraints during the present session was recognized.

4. The processes of educational policy development and other decision-making functions within the legislature were not analyzed, nor was policy activity in other decision-making bodies analyzed.

5. The policy leadership roles of individuals other than legislators were not analyzed, and legislators' roles in the policy subgovernment were not analyzed.

6. Information concerning the legislators, policies, and information sources was relative to the educational and political context of the 1993 Louisiana Legislature, and was therefore not generalizable to other policy domains, other state settings or other sessions.
Significance of the Study

The study of legislative leadership for educational decisions is a relatively new area of social science research. Early on, Bailey and his colleagues described state-level political leadership as one of "four leadership roles [that] must be successfully performed if schoolmen are to realize their goals" (cited in Stout, 1985, p. 1). More recently, scholars have appreciated the importance of state legislatures in educational policy-making and the role of individual legislators in shaping those decisions. The legislative educational leadership study was an empirical test of the concept and its place in educational policy theory.

The design of the study represented a new approach. Literature from psychology, education, and political science was combined to increase the validity and reliability of the legislative simulation research. Policy specialist was specified to the domain of education policy, and education policy was assigned according to a typology. The research attempted to extend empirical traditions of legislative research in general and educational leadership research in particular.

Policy research in education has implications for educational administration. New information about policy leadership and potential for legislative influence has utility for policy-makers in the subgovernment, educators
at all levels, and citizens in general. Understanding the role of leadership in specific educational policies can help to bring about improvements in legislation and better attainment of educational goals.

Summary of Chapters

Chapter II presents the literature bases for the study, including the following: 1) the conceptual basis of the legislative educational leadership study, 2) the policy approach to legislative study, 3) the theoretical base for policy arenas, and 4) the political influences on legislative decision-making. The research design is presented in Chapter III. Methods and procedures are described for collection and analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data regarding influence.

Chapter IV presents the findings of the research in three sections, as follows: 1) association between expertise and influence, 2) policy, information source, and legislator expertise effects on influence, and 3) patterns of leadership and influence in legislators' communications regarding educational decisions. Chapter V includes a summary and discussion of the major findings of the research, and suggestions for future educational policy research.
CHAPTER II
RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter presents the literature bases in four sections. The first section summarizes descriptive and empirical study regarding the legislative expert. Four approaches to legislative study are described in the second section. Policy arenas in empirical literature and in this study are described in the third section. In the fourth section, the literature on various influences for legislative decisions is summarized.

Legislative Educational Leadership

Historically, leadership for educational policy was the preserve of the established education community--state departments of education, teacher associations, local school boards, colleges and universities, and other professional educators. There was little appreciation in research of the political nature of education (Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1981). As research interest in state-level activity increased, scholars began to investigate influence in some of the following areas: politics of educational finance (Bailey, Frost, Marsh & Wood, 1962), educational interest groups and group coalitions (Iannaccone, 1967; Masters et al., 1980) and programmatic decisions of state agency officials (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976; Campbell, Cunningham, Usdan & Nystrand, 1980). State legislatures
were mentioned peripherally in some research (Garms, Guthrie & Pierce, 1978; Wirt & Kirst, 1982), but legislative leadership for educational policy was not researched at all.

Legislators themselves placed much emphasis in the area of education. In 1963 and 1974 surveys in the 50 states, legislators ranked education as the third most important issue, close behind taxation and finance (Francis & Weber, 1980). The legislature and governor’s office, rather than state boards and departments of education, provided impetus for school finance reforms of the 1970s and emerged as the state-level leadership for education. Following their leadership for academic excellence reforms of the 1980s, "legislators and governors...eclipsed state boards and education experts in formulating policies related to teaching and learning" (Fuhrman, 1987, p. 131). According to Mazzoni (1992), "governors, legislators, their staffs, and reform allies--not public school groups--have become the directive element in the policy system" (p. 9).

Legislatures took the leadership role in educational policy partly because of their skeptical view of the education bureaucracy. The state department’s standing depended on the standing of the chief state school officer (Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1981), and the state board had a moderate amount of influence with a few key lawmakers (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976). Legislators were also coming
to depend more on the legislature itself for informational resources. Reasons for the legislature’s increased self-reliance were increased fiscal and institutional capacity, increased representativeness of the legislature, and greater professionalization and staff resources (Fuhrman, 1987).

The individual legislator’s attitudes and perceptions became important in research. New York state legislators reported that experts in the legislature and the views of the people back home were the most relevant sources of influence on education (Milstein & Jennings, 1973). In a nationwide study, legislators’ second most important influence was the colleague who was a policy specialist (Uslaner & Weber, 1979). The importance of the specialist, however, was not pursued in early research, perhaps because the research focus from mid-century on was political representation. Representation focuses on legislator responsiveness to constituent demands, rather than on individual responsibility regarding policy.

The role of the legislator as policy expert emerged as a principal focus of study. Seminal role theory (Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan & Ferguson, 1962) explained influence as a function of individual expertise and personal knowledge, engendering a long line of research (Bryant, 1985; Jewell, 1970; Mitchell, 1981). According to Mitchell, specific decision-making behaviors are associated with the role
orientations of key policy factors, a linkage which is manifest in their legislative workroles and in their basic role-taking choices relative to policy decisions.

One role of policy leadership described by Lindblom (1968) was the role of reconstructive leader, in which the leader alters the policy decisions of others in the following manner:

He takes the middle course of shifting others' preferences so that the policies he desires fall within (whereas they formerly fell outside) the constraints imposed by the preferences of other participants in policy making. And he then uses what power or influence he has to get the policy he wants (p. 105).

Other leadership roles were setting the policy agenda, influencing the process, and determining educational outcomes (Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1981).

Formal and informal roles of expertise were described. Top officials operated in a leadership arena of policy, according to Mazzoni (1991), where "lawmakers function as switchers in the legislative system, channeling issues to arenas" (p. 131). Major, high profile influences were the official leaders, caucuses and committees, and expert staff; more subtle influences were trusted friends and perceived policy experts (Patterson, 1976). Trusted colleagues with formal legislative position and those with policy specialization were found to be important cue-givers on complex issues for members of the United States Congress (Matthews & Stimson, 1970).
Structural and individual roles of legislative leadership were investigated in a national study by Rosenthal and Fuhrman (1981). Subsequent to interviews with reputational leaders in education in the state legislatures, an intensive educational leadership study ensued in six states. Two specific factors of leadership were found to be institutional factors of party leadership or committee position, and individual factors of legislator and staff attributes, including friendship and policy expertise.

The multi-state study showed that relationships with colleagues and staff were the most important influences for legislators, for the following reasons:

The legislative education leaders interact primarily with colleagues on the committees on which they serve, the houses in which they are members, and the party caucuses with which they have an affiliation. These are their principal relationships when it comes to legislation and to specific matters of education policy. Also important are the relationships a legislator has with staff who work directly, or even less directly, for him (p. 57).

To meet informational needs, legislators and staff keep up contacts with agencies and groups; thus, experts serve as access points for policy information.

The role of the specialist in controlling the flow of information has been of keen interest in research. Mitchell (1981) said that a small group of active decision-makers "control legislative policy by deciding which information is important and which interest groups are
legitimate. It is they who must be persuaded if one hopes to significantly influence the content of a policy" (p. 144). This path of influence was described as the two-step model of communication by Kovenock, who said that outsiders "wholesaled" information to experts inside the legislature, who in turn "retailed" it to other legislators (cited in Porter, 1974).

Porter (1974) applied the model in a study of legislator reliance on colleagues for information. Experts were known and influential because of their command of policy knowledge. They and committee chairs were found to be more successful at transmitting information than self-nominated experts and non-experts, in policy fields where acknowledged experts were common. Their absence from other policy fields resulted in disruption of the flow of communication and possible impairment of quality of the legislative product.

Zwier (1979) compared U. S. Representatives' information sources using the two-step model. Specialists on the subcommittees had more varied sources of information such as the executive branch and interest groups, while nonspecialists' sources were more likely to be colleagues and constituents. Staff members' role proved so important that Sabatier and Whiteman (1985) developed a three-stage model that included staff, specialist legislators, and their linkages to external sources of information. The
role of specialist in the policy subsystem has been fruitful for legislative research.

One condition for influence of policy specialists was type of expertise. Reputational experts were found to be more successful in getting legislation passed than formal chamber leaders, committee chairs, and self-nominated expert legislators (Porter, 1974). Formal position held, background as educator, prominence of policy or fiscal committee, and extent of linkage with state department of education, constituents or locals were several types of structural and behavioral expertise (Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1981).

Another condition for influence was type of policy decision. Many studies stated that issues differences affect relationship differences, but few tested the hypothesis empirically. Rosenthal and Fuhrman (1981) did not address policy outputs. Mitchell (1981) anticipated a policy effect but found that "legislative orientations are not significantly affected by the nature of the issues under consideration" (p. 77). Parent (1983) found that specialist’s influence was better explained by policy complexity than by policy type. According to the scholars, the findings may have been the result of methodological limitations of the studies.
Approaches to Legislative Study

State politics research has been somewhat hampered by the scarcity of theory. "No theory, even of the midrange, has been offered" (Stout, 1985, p. 1). Mitchell (1981) said that a general theory of legislative behavior was needed to comprehend influences in broad (macro) as well as narrow (micro) legislative settings.

Wahlke (1975) summarized three decision-making theories and the accompanying stages of legislative study as follows: influence theory (structural approach), constraint theory (process approach), and role orientation theory (behavioral approach). Stages were distinguished by different research questions, key concepts and variables, evidence and reasoning, and research design and materials. Research in these veins, according to Wahlke, was merely additive and incremental, descriptive but not comprehensive or complete, lacking of comparative analysis and whole categories of information, and as a result, limited in the production of political knowledge.

Easton (1969) foretold a fourth stage--the "postbehavioral" revolution--to replace traditional and behavioral models with a more policy-centered, value-premised, relevant and active approach. Policy leadership was its moral imperative. The fourth paradigm, however, has not been much evident in legislative study (Wahlke, 1975).
Figure 2.1 diagrams three traditions that are relevant in this study—structural, behavioral, and policy approaches. Lowi (1964) began the policy tradition because existing pluralist and elite models of power in America could not explain political associations. He argued that political relationships were based on people’s expectations of governmental outputs, "so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship. ...or, over time, a power structure" (p. 688). Lowi "broke the rules of rigorous description and empirical theory by beginning with a policy problem (as he perceived it) and seeking to explain it" (Parent, 1983, p. 25).

Scholars have continued to build toward policy theory based upon Lowi’s argument that policy begets politics. Structural or behavioral techniques, which alone were inadequate to explain patterns of influence for legislative policy-making, were combined in integrative models of legislative decision-making. The policy approach and techniques were needed to address the role of the legislator policy expert.

**Structural Approach**

Structural research models, which were primarily historical and descriptive, dominated the first half century of legislative research. The unit of analysis was
### RESEARCH TRADITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL</th>
<th>BEHAVIORAL</th>
<th>POLICY (INTER-INSTITUTIONAL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theories</td>
<td>Legalistic, Descriptive, Structural Organization Theory</td>
<td>Cue Theory, Rational Choice Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the Policy Expert</td>
<td>Committee Member</td>
<td>Cue-Giver in Legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Expert</td>
<td>Credential Expert</td>
<td>Colleague Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operationalization Committee Membership</td>
<td>Colleague Reputation</td>
<td>Policy Reputation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.1. Legislative Research Traditions and the Legislative Educational Leadership**

the legislative institution. The shape and character of the legislative arena itself, rather than the activity taking place (processes and behaviors) within the framework, were the research focus.

Structure in a legislature exists as a vehicle for conversion of preferences into policy. Structural elements in the intra-institution include rules and regulations that force groups to be interdependent (Milstein & Jennings, 1973); other elements in the extra-institution are the policy-making resources that organization groups and individuals bring to the policy decision. Influence theory often guided the institutional tradition of research in such examples as educators' influence for finance decisions (Bailey et al., 1962) and professional educators' and interest groups' influence for policy decisions (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976; Iannaccone, 1967).

Internal sources of power are leadership structures and functions. Party affiliation is an intra-institutional source of power and influence which cues legislators relative to party positions. The expertise of formal chamber leaders relates to political information which is concerned with meeting the goals of reelection, rather than to policy information which is concerned with achieving the substantive aims of policy. Party has not been a direct influence in single-state educational decisions, but it has
indirect influence through committee chair assignment or through constituent influence.

Committee leadership is another intra-institutional influence which cues legislators on pre-floor negotiated policy decisions. In structural theory, formal position of committee chair or member confers policy expertise. The legislative committee has been an important explanatory variable in decision-making studies (Hamm, 1980, 1983). Staff expertise contributes to committee influence and accrues to expert legislators with whom staff are symbiotically related. Committee leaders and members represented institutional structures in the integrative research model in this study.

Extra-institutional power sources are the governor and constituent group representatives. The policy subsystem is an inter-institutional phenomena which may be operational in the state legislature but may be more characteristic of the congressional system (Francis & Weber, 1980). Such sources are in formal and informal relationships with legislative system members.

Easton (1969) criticized traditional approaches as being too dependent on prescription, ethical inquiry and action. The patterns of decision-making which emerged in research resulted from both formal prescriptions and informal rules about appropriate behavior in the legislative institution. According to Wahlke (1975),
the "structure" of a legislature effectively inheres not in the verbal abstractions of analysts or in the formal rules enacted to govern the behavior of the group’s members, but in the dependably repetitive patterns of behavior displayed by almost every legislator involved (p. 4).

In observation of these patterns of legislative behavior, scholars began to focus on the individual legislator to explain decision-making outputs.

**Process Approach**

Process research models, developed just prior to behavioral models, concentrated on activity within the legislative framework as the unit of analysis. Legislative behavior was passive reaction to pressures and demands outside the legislative system (Wahlke, 1975). Systems theory (Easton, 1965) and constraint theory guided the models; in the system, demands were inputs and legislative decisions were outputs.

Process models presupposed "that 'policy output' is not determined by 'legislative decisions' at all, but is predictable from key features of the socioeconomic environment of legislatures" (Wahlke, 1970, pp. 79-80). Character of legislative policy-making is governed by a state's economic structure and its social [political] organization (Patterson, 1976). External and internal constraints on the legislator's decision-making include socioeconomic, political, structural and demographic limitations.
Process theories were applied extensively in education (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976; Usdan et al., 1969; Wirt, 1976; Wirt & Kirst, 1982; Zeigler & Johnson, 1972). A study of New York legislators' attitudes and perceptions done by Milstein and Jennings (1973) utilized the process model and influence theory. Omnibus education reform legislation in Texas was explained using systems theory (Jackson, 1987). The model, however, failed to account for the fact that not all actors are affected by systemic factors in the same way. Because of its inadequacy to comprehend individual decision-making, it was not integrated in this research design.

Behavioral Approach

Behavioral research approaches, with the individual legislator as the unit of analysis, emerged around mid-century. These models focused on the individual actor's perceptions of, and responses to, factors in the policy-making context, and the stable, observable patterns of response in the context. Cue theory was the major theoretical base for behavioral models. The cue-taking model assumes that legislators take short-cuts in getting information for policy decisions by taking cues from fellow legislators, or groups of them, or even the whole body (Kingdon, 1977). Cue sources of individual legislators were examined to assess the relative impact of all possible influences, or a few key influences (Uslaner & Weber,
1977), or the influence of one actor such as the constituency (Miller & Stokes, 1963).

Rational choice theory assumes that reelection is a primary goal for legislators. The expert provides useful political information to other legislators. The rational-activist model of decision-making (Luttbeg, 1968) suggests more voter awareness of legislator performance than has been found in empirical study (Hedlund, 1975).

Mitchell (1981) conducted a behaviorally oriented three-state study of legislative policy decision-making which focused on legislator role concepts, or expectations about job performance that impact decisions. The research base was role orientation theory developed by Wahlke and his colleagues (1962). Mitchell concluded that:

> legislative policy formation can be adequately interpreted only if we understand the particular role orientations adopted by the key actors involved in each policy decision [and that orientations are linked to behavior through] first, the structure of typical legislative work roles, and second, certain basic role-taking choices made by each policy actor (pp. 139-140).

Key legislators choose to initiate policy rather than just to respond to others' initiatives. Those who assume key roles at multiple stages within the legislative workflow have greater impact than others on the formation of state legislative policy.

Bryant (1985) replicated Mitchell's model in a study of the decision orientations of Minnesota state legislators relative to the issue of educational quality and
excellence. She concluded the following: that legislators adhere more to a values system and to policy expertise, particularly staff expertise, than to charismatic or collegial relationships or legal factors; that legislators look to inside reference groups for educational policy leadership; and that power is concentrated in a few sources, including specialist committees and persons. These conclusions support the behavioralists' argument that leadership individuals in the legislature have the greatest influence on education policy.

Easton (1969) criticized behavioral approaches as being inordinately concerned with description, explanation, and verification. Wahlke (1975) also presented the following limitations of the approach:

behavioral legislative research has not made a substantial theoretical leap forward over the conceptualization and design of nonbehavioral research....[Although] the conceptual span of behavioral research covers a much wider territory than either institutional or process-oriented conceptions or both of them together...[it] is rarely much more theoretical in the proper sense of that word than most other legislative research (p. 8).

Reexamining the behavioral revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, Lowi (1970) realized that:

what was neglected, albeit not entirely abandoned, were those more macroscopic things within which individual behavior takes place. This includes rules and norms, institutions and other social structures that any individual or interpersonal behavior must presuppose. This context is the public and formal, which is distinct from, yet the correlative to, the private and informal or behavioral (p. 314).
Lowi was referring to the policy context of legislative decision-making behavior. His theoretical perspectives informed the development of the policy approach to influence in the legislature.

**Policy Approach**

Policy research models, emerging in the late 1960s, were consistent with the extra-institutional focus of some earlier models. The policy approach, according to Parent (1983),

> takes the policy as the unit of analysis and follows the decision-making relevant to that policy whatever direction it might take, regardless of institution. The assumption that specialization occurs within fairly distinct policy defined areas is the core of these works (p. 18).

Policy specialization is the key to understanding the role of educational leadership.

In policy dimensional research models, actors’ influence varies across rather than within policy areas. In Clausen’s (1973) policy dimension (partial) theory of voting decisions, a common policy concept underlies a subset of roll call votes. Legislators save time and money by applying the policy-content decision rule, as follows: they first sort policy proposals into general content categories (the subset) and then establish a policy position for each category of policy content. The policy dimension enters the research model through legislators’ attitudes and behaviors; policy attitudes affect choice of cues. Policy dimension has remained an important variable

Renewed interest in policy content has emerged with the body of literature on political representation. According to Jewel (1982), legislators represent their constituency in several ways, including making public policy and expressing views and attitudes regarding legislation. They are cued by certain constituent groups on certain types of issues, initiating the process by "examining major categories of issues because the ingredients of policy responsiveness differ from one policy to another" (p. 78).

Ingram, Laney and McCain (1980) used the policy approach to study representation for environmental and developmental issues in the four-corner states. Issue clusters were an important variable, activating certain cues and influences on legislators in direct relation to interests and concerns of the persons and groups involved. The research demonstrated that legislator responsiveness cues were related to the nature of the policies in question.

Parent (1983) used typologies of policy type and complexity to study the role of legislative policy specialist. He aggregated issues at committee levels (subject matter divisions), and assigned education policy as one broad area of regulatory policy. Specification to
committee issue domains was probably the reason that policy complexity rather than type better explained the specialist's influence. In early policy study, subject matter classification schemata have been problematic; moreover, "the subject matter of legislative decisions probably is a very inadequate guide to the legislature's functioning" (Wahlke, 1970, p. 98).

Coercion Typology

American public policy research falls generally into the following three types of studies: single-case studies, cross-state comparisons of variables impacting policy outcomes, and essays synthesizing knowledge into classification schemata such as models, theories, or typologies (Chandler, Chandler & Vogler, 1974). Typologies were devised to capture the dynamics of policy--change implicit in the models, and shifts in decision arenas--and to point toward theory development. The adequate policy taxonomy connotes real features of real government that have political significance (Lowi, 1964).

Figure 2.2 presents a diagrammatic summary of the arenas and political relationships described by Lowi. This seminal typology was based on coercion and power, coercion being to the macrosocial level what power is to the microscopic or behavioral level (Lowi, 1970). Government uses policy deliberately, to coerce in order to control
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARENA</th>
<th>PRIMARY POLITICAL UNIT</th>
<th>RELATION AMONG UNITS</th>
<th>POWER STRUCTURE</th>
<th>STABILITY OF STRUCTURE</th>
<th>PRIMARY DECISIONAL LOCUS</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>Individual, firm, corporation</td>
<td>Log-rolling mutual non-interference, uncommon interests</td>
<td>Non-conflictual elite with support groups</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Congressional committee and/or agency</td>
<td>Agency centralized to primary functional unit (&quot;bureau&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>&quot;The coalition,&quot; shared subject-matter interest, bargaining</td>
<td>Pluralistic, multi-centered &quot;theory of balance&quot;</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>Congress in classic role</td>
<td>Agency decentralized from center by &quot;delegation,&quot; mixed control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Association</td>
<td>The &quot;peak association,&quot; class, ideology</td>
<td>Conflictual elite, i.e., elite and counter-elite</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Executive and peak associations</td>
<td>Agency centralized toward top (above &quot;bureau&quot;) elaborate standards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.2. Arenas and Political Relationships: A Diagrammatic Summary

society and individual conduct. A group or individual uses what power is available to it in order to shape policy, the instruments of government. 

Policy arenas represent categories of coercion that are functionally as well as historically distinct. According to Lowi (1964), "these areas of policy or government activity constitute real arenas of power...[each with] its own characteristic political structure, political process, elites, and group relations" (pp. 689-690). Lowi (1970) described the political process which "for distributive bills is almost entirely committee centered...for regulative bills is very strongly parliamentary...[and] for redistributive bills is also strongly parliamentary but...strongly executive centered (pp. 321-322).

Distributive Policy

The distributive policy arena is the locus of non-coercive decisions which are not policies at all, but by accumulation are called policy. These highly individualized decisions are closest to being privatization of the public, and are aptly called "patronage" or subsidy policies. In this arena, resources are not limited, and no social group is deprived in the distribution of benefits. Distributive policies provide a situation where everybody wins, or at least no group loses.
Distributive politics are highly stable; there are many political players with unrelated interests, little confrontation, and balanced power relationships. They are subsystem politics, dominated by bargaining and logrolling tactics. A pluralist/elite, or situational, model of power is prevalent.

In education, distributive issues have been the preserve of established education groups, representing their individualized interests (Mazzoni, 1992). Distributive policy examples in literature have included such issues as placement and development of vocational education programs, state high school for the arts, and class size. According to Mazzoni, the K-3 class size issue in Minnesota was a distributive issue until decreasing scarce resources gave it a more redistributioinal aspect.

Regulatory Policy

The regulatory arena is the milieu of coercive governmental choices which impact groups of individuals generally along economic sector lines. Since money and power resources are limited, direct choices have to be made as to which groups will be benefited and which deprived. Regulatory policy provides a situation in which some groups win and some groups lose.

The politics are less stable in this arena; there are shifting coalitions of shared interests and conflict between the majority and minority. Pressure group or
pluralist power politics are the norm. Political interactions are characterized by deliberation, association and expertise (Mazzoni, 1992).

In education, regulatory issues are those that concern standards for programs, teachers, and students. Some examples of these gate-keeping policies (Wirt & Kirst, 1982) are curriculum and program regulations, higher education standards, and mandates such as certification, accreditation and attendance. Mazzoni (1992) provided Minnesota examples such as competency-based graduation requirements and a teacher standards and certification commission.

Parent (1983) classified all education policy as regulatory, even though assignment of education to a single policy category was problematic. Education committees consider all types of issues, such as the following:

- distributive issues, e.g., placement and upgrading of public libraries, and schools for the handicapped.
- ...redistributive issues, e.g., the educational opportunities of blacks and whites, and rich and poor.
- ...regulatory issues that concern the rules concerning teacher certification and higher education standards and programs (p. 77).

Since the major thrust in Louisiana legislation in recent years has been professional improvement of school teachers, education was cautiously assigned in the specialist study as regulatory policy, because it involves bargaining between teacher groups and the education agency.
Redistributive Policy

The redistributive arena is the locus of coercive decisions where "the categories of impact are much broader, approaching social classes. ...haves and have nots, bigness and smallness, bourgeoisie and proletariat" (Lowi, 1964, p. 691). When resources are limited, broad associations of people (based on ideology or class) become activated by shared self-interest and struggle for economic benefits provided by government policies.

The politics are highly unstable; there is cohesion within the associations but institutionalized conflict between the coalitions. Many actors are brought into the arena, forming very broad-based coalitions and engaging in a highly confrontational style of policy-making (Mazzoni, 1992). The conflict over redistributonal policy is two-sided: one side wins and the other loses. The elite model of power is prevalent.

In redistributive education issues, the stakes are both material and symbolic. Mazzoni's (1992) Minnesota examples were decisions about tax and school finance reform, education vouchers and open enrollment policies. Louisiana legislation examples have included revision of the Minimum Foundation Program formula (1991, 1992), nonpublic school funding (1990), and vouchers (1990) and charter schools (1993). Education has most often been classified as redistributional policy. In recent years
especially, resources for education have grown more scarce and demands for them have become more urgent.

All governmental policy is in the long run redistributional (Lowi, 1964). Policy arenas and their participants in them shift over time. "What makes an issue fall within a given arena at some point in time is its demand and supply pattern and not any idiosyncratic characteristics of the policy" (Hayes, 1978, p. 160). Added or deleted features can cause a shift in perception about policy, and a corresponding shift in policy actors. More often it is that redistributive issues are presented as distributive issues to secure support. In a study of the national educational policy system by Bresnick (cited in Hamm, 1983), a different set of influences were produced when the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 was revised. The executive agencies and interest groups were relatively uninvolved the second time around and House committees dominated the policy process because the issues of formula allocation had changed.

Shifts in distributive and regulatory education issues toward more redistributive issues were observed in Mazzoni's (1992) longitudinal study. Minnesota distributive school funding issues ordinarily were resolved in subsystem politics; however, increased funding for the governor's favored initiative, K-3 class size reduction, made the issue redistributional and controversial.
Regulatory issues also became conflict-laden "when widely perceived as redistributing salient stakes--such as power, status, and opportunity" (p. 16). Outcome-based education was regulatory policy until conflict over its ultimate restructuring of Minnesota's K-12 system caused it to take on a redistributon aspect.

Louisiana policies have also demonstrated policy arena migration. The revision of the Minimum Foundation Program (MFP) formula, a redistributive policy issue, has a "hold harmless" provision for wealthier districts that couches it as more acceptable distributive policy. The Louisiana Teacher Evaluation Program (LaTEP), ordinarily a regulatory initiative, became more redistributive when its decertification component created bitter conflict between teacher unions and education and business interests that approached class war and ultimately forced its retrenchment.

Categorization of policy initiatives according to the coercion typology has been a subject of research for 30 years. Lowi himself subjectively assigned roll call voting decisions to the three predefined policy categories in order to test the theory, using floor creativity on policy decisions in the 87th Congress (1970) and an expanded base of decisions (1971). Others have tested the typology extensively in empirical research in Congress (Dodd & Schott, 1979; Ripley & Franklin, 1980) and in state
government (Parent, 1983); some scholars have altered it (Hayes, 1978; Lowi, 1970; Ripley & Franklin, 1980), or applied it in other venues (Peterson, 1981).

The typology has remained appealing to scholars because it captures much detailed complexity of legislation and presents a persuasive perspective (Francis & Weber, 1980). It has been of lasting value because its "classification categories...are simultaneously exhaustive (covering all elements) and mutually exclusive (allowing particular policies to be classified as belonging to one and only one category)" (Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1985, p. 59). Even so, category assignment has remained problematic for researchers.

Policy context was for Lowi and other scholars the starting point for investigation into individual legislator attitudes and behavior. Mazzoni’s (1992) 20-year retrospective on education legislation in Minnesota similarly concluded: "as is clear from the case studies, the number, type, alignment, and activity of participants vary by issue as well as across time" (p. 15). Policy research models have produced additional knowledge beyond that provided by behavioral models, building toward new perspectives in policy theory.

Influences

A major task of political analysis, according to Patterson (1976), has been "to investigate more
thoroughly...the structure of influences and the causes for variations in the relative influence of constituents, the governor, interest groups, party leaders, representatives of state executive agencies, legislative leaders and committees" (p. 187). These influences are the reference groups and individuals that are salient for legislators in educational decisions. Their importance was examined here as functions of institutional structure and individual behavior. Theoretical underpinnings of these decision-making referents were useful in understanding the concept of relative influence.

Influence theory assumes that policy outcomes are the result of the interactions of influential persons and groups, such as the governor, the legislature and lobby groups, in direct and indirect communications. Influence theory alone is inadequate because it neglects the influence of the individual--the legislator's knowledge, beliefs and interests--on the policy-making process.

Role theory asserts that legislative decisions are controlled by the specific role orientations of legislators, causing them to focus on some central features in the decision more than others. Role orientation is useful for explaining how an individual legislator interacts in ways and forums that determine the course of decisions (Mitchell, 1981). Legislator orientation, however, has not been found to be sensitive to issue
differences, nor has it been able to explain roll call behavior (Hedlund, 1975).

Subgovernment "theory" is actually an institutional concept borrowed from Congress to explain decision-making at the committee level or other sub-floor decision loci. It presupposes that legislative decisions are influenced by key legislators who are members of a policy subsystem (Thurber, 1991). Importance of information sources for a legislator may depend upon whether or not the legislator is a member of the policy subgovernment. In studies in Congress and state legislatures, influences on policy specialists were different from those of non-specialists (Sabatier & Whiteman, 1985; Zwier, 1979). Specialists looked to the administration, the department agency and program people for policy information, whereas nonspecialists relied on legislative sources. Subgovernment theory provides a basis for appreciating the role of the policy leadership in shaping education legislation.

Who has influence with legislators? What criteria are guiding the direction of decisions being made by individual legislators? Hedlund (1975) said their choices are derived from broadly shared beliefs and values, which have become operationalized as referents for decision-making. For legislators, decisional referents are the structures or individuals that occupy roles that are counter to the
legislator's role and that have salience for decision-making.

Importance of a group is relative because it can change with a change in stimuli. The causes for these variations have been the major focus of research. One cause is the proximity of a referent to legislators. Much of the research refers to insiders and outsiders, or the inside structures and individuals and outside agents (Milstein & Jennings, 1972; Wirt, 1976). These divisions were also referred to as insiders, near circles and far circles of influence (Marshall et al., 1985) and proximate and non-proximate influences (Patterson, 1976). Webber (1987) found that external rather than internal sources of policy information were more important for legislators with a favorable orientation toward policy information.

Another cause for variation in influence is the policy decision in question. Mazzoni (1992) described various kinds of policies decided in four decision loci, or state-level policy-making arenas. Beyond that, not much research on the importance of policy context for understanding legislative decisions about education has been done. The policy focus has been important in political science literature (Clausen, 1973; Ingram et al., 1980). In this study, it was used to analyze the influence of the legislative leadership and four additional legislator decisional referents.
Legislature

The legislature as a whole is influential for decisions. It has been perceived as a cluster of insiders within an inner core of ever widening circles of influence (Marshall et al., 1985). Its influence depends partly upon the effect that the legislative norms, rules and regulations, and structures provided in party, caucuses and committees have on the individual legislator’s patterns of decision-making. Chamber leaders, party and caucus leaders, and trusted colleagues may be influential for legislators. Leadership structures and leadership individuals are the principal sources of information for policy.

The committee role provides institutional influence. Legislators in a 50-state study most frequently mentioned regular committee meetings as the most significant decision-making point (Uslaner & Weber, 1977). Committee hearings scored highest in legislators’ regard, closely followed by legislative staff, in a survey of members of the Nevada legislature (Bradley, 1980). Their influence was as general source of information, best when complemented with other sources of more factual information. Committee influence was more closely tied with party influence in the U. S. House of Representatives, because of the committee assignment process (Born, 1976).
Committee influence and staff influence are closely tied to each other.

Hamm (1983) said that the committee's role in the policy subgovernment relationship is the strength of committee influence on legislative decisions. He discussed variation in the patterns of influence among legislative committees, executive agencies, and interest groups, owing to differences in distributive and regulatory policy types. He found that committee and subsystem influence, however, were minimal in redistributive issues. Committee influence may operate as individual influence when it is provided by committee leaders and members; then it becomes a type of policy expertise.

Education specialists provide individual influence. These individuals are influential because they are sources of policy information for legislation. Their power depends on several factors. One factor is the individual's expertise and whether it leads to success in the legislature. Another factor is relative influence among other referents that influence legislators. Yet another factor is differences in the dimensions of legislation which affect the leadership's ability to influence decisions.

State Governmental Agencies

The education agency is a structural source of influence whose legislative policy-making role has
undergone change in recent years. State agencies are extra-institutional sources of influence whose prime leadership task, according to Campbell and his colleagues (1980), is to marshall the positive public opinion necessary to legislative action. State departments of education are now required by legislatures to perform more service functions than policy functions (Loewenberg, Patterson, & Jewell, 1985).

The education agency has lost some of its policy-making influence over the years. Its role has been downplayed at the legislative floor level, but agencies have influence within the "hidden cluster" of the policy subgovernment (Mazzoni, 1992) and thus with the educational leadership. For leaders in the Rosenthal and Fuhrman (1981) study, the major outside relationship was with the state department of education. State agencies should play a major part in policy-making for education, not only to make better policy but also to assist in the selection of which policy options to pursue (Campbell et al., 1980).

The state agency still has influence on some issues such as desegregation, graduation competency, and educational outcomes (Mazzoni, 1992). Parent (1983) hypothesized that agency role is most important in distributive policy and least important in redistributive policy.
The governor's office is another extra-institutional source of influence. Milstein and Jennings (1972) said that the governor's office is a critical access point to the policy-making process for education interest group leaders. The governor does not control the education agency, but according to the scholars, the influence the governor has over these agencies, through his appointive powers and budgetary control, makes for a strong and direct relationship between them. Many legislators note that they consider these agencies to be extensions of the governor's office (p. 64).

Executive influence has not been much researched, even though an index of gubernatorial involvement in education was developed in early research (Hines, 1976). There has been almost no research into the relationship between the governor's political efforts and state public policy variations (Morehouse, 1976). The governor's power and influence is often applied through the legislative party leadership (Patterson, 1976). According to Mazzoni (1991), this is the leadership arena of state policy-making, a micro-level arena where the governor and top legislative officials or other policy elites decide more controversial issues. The leadership arena is extremely powerful and influential.

Executive influence is the most important influence for redistributive education policy. Governors, working through the leadership, have been effective at pushing forward programs that meet long-range statewide needs. Two
important education policy movements made possible because of the governors' thrust were the state school finance reforms of the 1970s (Geske, 1975) and the teaching and learning policies of the 1980s (Fuhrman, 1987).

The ability of the executive to have influence may depend on legislator role orientation. According to Jewell (1970), "a knowledge of the legislator's role with respect to the governor's expectations should be valuable in predicting his vote on [the governor's] bills" (p. 490).

**Legislative Staff**

Staff are policy committee and sometimes fiscal committee personnel who play a large role in the subgovernment. They influence policy largely as a function of support for the activities of committee chairpersons and other specialist legislators (Sabatier & Whiteman, 1985). In the national educational leadership study, three-fourths of the leaders said that staff reports were very useful (Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1981). In Nevada, the sources most heavily relied upon were committee hearings and the staff (Bradley, 1980).

Staff influence has not been much studied, despite a generally upgraded role of staff during the legislative reforms of recent years. Their importance to specialist legislators was found by Sabatier and Whiteman (1985); they added a third stage including staff in Porter's (1974) model of information flow. They found that specialists and
other legislators in California relied primarily on committee staff in their areas of specialization, personal staff of specialists, and central staff.

Staff have influence at the floor level as a principal inside source of information for legislators. They have even more influence at the sub-floor level, in setting the agenda and specifying the alternatives to policy at the committee level. According to Hamm (1983), their principal relationship is with committee chairs and policy experts, but they also have relationships with other members of the subgovernment, varying with the characteristics of the policy at hand. They are particularly influential in distributive policy, where the agency-committee relationship is one of cooperation, and are less influential in policy areas at higher levels in the system.

**Interest Groups**

Pressure groups were the major focus in early studies of power and influence for state education policy formation (Milstein & Jennings, 1972). They are a structural, or extra-institutional source of influence. Structure of the legislature, such as committees and rules and regulations, is a vehicle for conversion of the policy demands of groups. Its structure forces groups to become interdependent.

A typology of the influence patterns linking the professional education organizations to the state
legislature was developed by Iannaccone (1967) and has been much tested in empirical study (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976; Karper & Boyd, 1988; Zeigler & van Dalen, 1976). Its four classes of statewide structures—disparate, monolithic, fragmented and syndical—represent developmental stages in the progression of interest group influence in a state political system.

The typology has been useful in recent research in coalition-building in response to executive pressure regarding school funding in Pennsylvania (Karper & Boyd, 1988) and in the emergence of education entrepreneurs in Minnesota (Mazzoni, 1992). It has some descriptive power (Stout, 1985), but focuses too much on organization professionals and may not be complex enough as the legislature grows in sophistication (Aufderheide, 1976). Its utility for the present study was limited, but it provided a foundation for understanding the fragmented pattern of group influence in Louisiana.

Education lobby influence has been divided by issues—collective bargaining, tenure, salaries, school finance, certification—that generally represent labor and management conflict. Aufderheide (1976) found that teacher association influence was greater on education policy, but on finance issues non-education groups such as business, labor and agriculture groups had the greater impact. Teacher groups have power on issues such as collective
bargaining and national board of standards, but public school groups in general have less relative influence than before (Mazzoni, 1992). The basis of teacher group influence is political clout rather than information supplied to the legislature (Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1981).

Educational associations have become fragmented by militancy, by special need interest groups, and by particularized needs of the district (Fuhrman, 1987). They have failed to represent the preferences of their members, and they have also failed to advance or protect many legitimate constituent concerns (Hedlund, 1975). Unless their group membership is large, they are less effective in low party conflict states and in more professionalized legislatures (Patterson, 1976).

Business interests have had influence, particularly for educational reform policy, and their importance has been a subject of empirical debate. Regarding state legislators’ perceptions of business and labor interests, Ambrosius and Welch (1988) said that "the views of business are more important than those of the governor, other legislators, ethnic groups, parties, or other state officials" (p. 208). Business groups, not the state education agencies, provided the impetus and support of the legislature and governor for the academic excellence reforms of the 1980s (Fuhrman, Clune, & Elmore, 1988).
Business and citizens' groups are expected to become more influential in the future (Mazzoni, 1992).

The effectiveness potential of state-level interest groups may be limited by several factors. One factor is that other influences may be greater. For instance, the influence of educators and non-educators in the legislators' districts may be more important than that of the formal state organization representatives (Milstein & Jennings, 1972). The individual legislator's role orientation toward each group and closeness to the group may determine the effectiveness of a group (Jewell, 1970). According to Wahlke and colleagues (1962), legislators may be expected to facilitate or to resist group demands according to their friendliness or hostility to pressure group activity, and their knowledge or awareness of pressure group activity in their own legislative situation. Legislators who are uninformed or neutral about a group are likely to exhibit inconsistent behavior regarding the group.

Another factor is the general trend away from group and coalition influence, partly attributable to the enhanced role and greater specialization of the state legislature. Even some very large state coalitions have dissolved over high conflict issues, such as collective bargaining. The literature supports the notion that
interest group influence is likely to be strongest in regulatory policies.

Constituency

Constituents are people in the district represented by a legislator. Constituency is an influence in the individual tradition of research. Much research done on the representational relationship of a legislator and constituency has centered on the trustee-delegate dichotomy described by Wahlke and others (1962), a typology of legislative response patterns to the constituency. Legislators who depend on constituency input for decisions are delegates. The delegate model was confirmed by McCrone and Kuklinski (1979), under the conditions that legislators perceive themselves as delegates and that constituents provide consistent cues regarding their preferences to legislators. Legislators who make decisions according to conscience, conviction, and principles are trustees. The dichotomy has not been very useful in predicting roll call voting behavior; however, the trustee model could be useful for understanding leadership behavior.

Congruence between the views of constituency and the views and voting behavior of legislators has been used to measure degree of representation. Congruence was first examined to determine the extent to which constituency controlled the voting of members of the U. S. Congress (Miller & Stokes, 1963). A 50-state study of congruence
found that state legislators often misread the public regarding its preferences for public policy (Uslaner & Weber, 1979). Wahlke (1975) argued that citizens lack enough information to communicate their preferences, even if they wanted to do so.

The concept of policy leadership is somewhat antithetical to the notion of policy responsiveness. According to Eulau and Karps (1977), "in the participatory theory of democracy the leader--insofar as the model admits of leadership at all--is largely a reactive agent guided by the collective wisdom of the group" (p. 250). Leadership as it is conceptualized in this study is more connotative of policy responsibility.

Issue differences affect representation. According to Jewell (1982), the legislator first examines the major category of issues, because policy responsiveness differs from one kind of policy to another. He or she then seeks cues from certain constituent groups on certain types of issues. Jewell found that legislators in nine states could determine the major issues for districts, or those which aroused the most interest and generated the most response, and could determine the different groups of influence for those issues. In practice, he said, the representational style of an effective legislator must contain elements of both the delegate and the trustee roles.
The constituency as a whole is not expected to have a great deal of influence on distributive policy. On redistributive policy, however, the literature suggest that legislators concerned with reelection will pay close attention to constituency wishes and will reject redistributive policies which are unfavorable with large, identified constituencies.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

This chapter provides the research design for the study of leadership and influence. In the first section, a conceptual framework is presented to clarify the different components of the research process. The second section of this chapter describes the methodology used for the analysis of the expertise-influence association. The third section describes the methods and techniques used to develop the survey instrument, and also describes the procedures used for analyzing the influence data. In the concluding section of the chapter, the analysis of the qualitative interview information is discussed.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework for the study of legislative influence in education is presented in Figure 3.1. The Louisiana Legislature was used as "an arena for legislator interaction and decision-making (an influence system)" (Bryant, 1985, p. 156). Influence was approached first as legislative success in a comparison of institutional and behavioral approaches and the multiple and competing theories of decision-making guiding the approaches. Leadership was conceptualized as two functions of legislator expertise. The first expertise function was institutional workrole or position, with a theoretical
<table>
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<tr>
<th>LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT</th>
<th>PRIMARY UNIT OF ANALYSIS</th>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
<th>ANALYSIS OF DATA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An arena for legis­lator interaction and decision making (an influence system:</td>
<td>Legislators as individuals or members of committee</td>
<td>Legislator Expertise</td>
<td>Influence (Introduction Success)</td>
<td>Chi square - 1993 Enroll­ments</td>
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Figure 3.1. Design of the Study of Legislative Educational Leadership
foundation in structural and influence theory. The second expertise function was individual role and reputation, with a foundation in rational choice theory, cue theory, and role orientation theory. The influence analysis compared these leadership functions and provided a prelude to the policy approach in the remainder of the study.

Influence was approached next as the potential for influence in a policy context. The policy framework integrated the two prior approaches and added dimensions of the policy context. This approach had its theoretical and empirical foundation in the policy typology of Lowi (1964), which described three separate arenas of policy based on the amount of governmental coercion necessary for passage and the perceived economic impact of the policy on society. The first dimension of policy context was policy content, and three arenas of policy were outlined in the study---distributive, regulatory, and redistributive arenas.

The approach also incorporated the behavioralist tradition of explaining influence in terms of legislators' goals and values operationalized as decisional referent choices (Hedlund, 1975). The second dimension of context was provided in legislator decisional referents, or the sources of information for policy decisions. The study focused on influence of the legislature, and its reputational leaders, and influence of four additional categories of informational source. The approach combined
structural and behavioral traditions in the concept of policy leadership role as inter-institutional influence in the system. This third dimension of context was legislator expertise leading to differential influence of the external referents for policy decisions.

Leadership and Influence

The first analysis of influence concerned the association between specialization in education and legislative policy outputs. This analysis was conducted to answer the first research question: How is influence for educational decisions associated with structural and individual leadership roles in the legislature?

Expertise

Figure 3.1 lists the independent expertise variables constructed for the study. Legislative leadership was conceptualized in this study as two functions—committee position and reputation. In the national study of state educational leadership, formal structural authority as committee chair or top chamber leader was described as a priority basis of leadership, but personal characteristics such as dedication, prior occupation as educator and legislative seniority also accounted for influence (Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1981). Leadership workroles of importance were party leadership, membership on policy or fiscal committees, and workroles within various organizations and agencies (Mitchell, 1981). Empirical
comparisons sometimes found individual reputation to be more important (Buchanan et al., 1960; Porter, 1974; Uslaner & Weber, 1979) and sometimes committee membership was more important (Sabatier & Whiteman, 1985; Zwier, 1979).

Credential expertise was developed as a variable for the purpose of defining structures of influence. Legislator's role as a committee leader or member is the relevant concept in structural theory; the credential of membership on the education policy committee confers expertise. In both a theoretical and practical sense, legislators who are committee members are more likely than non-committee members to be influential in educational decisions. Credential experts were indicated in the study as legislators with committee position and were operationally defined as the chairpersons and members of the education policy committees of the House and Senate during the 1993 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature.

Reputation expertise was developed for the purpose of identifying individuals with influence. A legislator's behavior among peers is the relevant concept of expertise in role theory, cue theory, and most of behavioral study. Individual expertise is that conferred by reputation as expert for reasons of policy specialization or personal characteristics. Hypothetically, reputational expertise is
likely to be more influential than non-expertise in education legislation. Several scholars have found that reputation as expert or specialist is more effective than chairmanship of the pertinent committee in passage of legislation (Parent, 1983; Porter, 1974). Parent explained the reason for this finding as "the ability of the expert to initiate and successfully guide...legislation through the chamber; [whereas] the committee chairman as expert exerts influence in a variety of ways (p. 58).

Reputation expertise was indicated in the study as the specific individuals who consistently served as information cue sources for their colleagues. The operationalization of reputation expertise for this first analysis depended on data "borrowed" from the second analysis. In the Legislative Reference and Resource Survey (LRRS) instrument, open-ended response items produced legislator nominations of influential colleagues. From the set of data collected in this instrument, colleague reputation experts were identified as those colleagues receiving nomination as an influential by five or more peers across all policies in the survey. The instrument is presented in greater detail in the following section.

Overlapping of reputational expertise and credential expertise was expected from reading the literature. Therefore, four levels of expertise were identified for the analysis as follows: reputation experts with committee
membership, reputation experts without committee membership, non-experts who were committee members, and non-expert non-member legislators. Cross-comparisons at these four levels produced more precise measures of expertise and more accurate associations with influence. In addition, the measures and associations could be interpreted in terms of the comparative utility of institutional and behavioral approaches for study of legislative influence.

**Legislative Success**

Figure 3.1 presents influence as the dependent variable, indicated as introduction success in the expertise-influence analysis. This standard empirical indicator of influence was a measure of the extent to which a legislator was successful in passing education legislation which he or she initiated. Introduction success was operationally defined in this study as frequencies of enrolled (i.e., passed, not necessarily enacted) 1993 education legislation which was authored by variously expert legislators. Enrollment frequencies were recorded by author's level of expertise. Calculations performed on the frequencies produced average number of successful bills for each expertise level.

A one-sample chi square analysis was conducted on the frequency data. Chi square analysis was used in a study of influence of several decisional referents for Texas
legislators relative to 1984 omnibus educational reform legislation (Jackson, 1987). In this legislative study, the analysis was used to determine whether there were statistically significant differences in influence in the expertise levels. The calculations produced a value of $X^2$ for all levels of expertise associated with influence.

If significant differences were found, each association was examined to determine where the differences were. Very large differences between observed and expected enrollments and the amount of over- or under-estimation were noted. Comparisons of the levels were interpreted in terms of relative influence of the expertise variations and in terms of the corresponding approaches to legislative study.

Legislative Simulation

A legislative policy simulation was developed for answering the second and third research questions, as follows: How is influence of the legislature and its leaders affected by differences in the context of educational decisions, including type of policy and sources of policy information? How is influence of information sources different for legislators with different leadership roles in education?

Policy context was the primary unit of analysis in the analysis of variance in influence for the legislative sample. Legislators as groups was the unit of analysis in
the analysis of variance in influence for two differentially expert groups of legislators. Contextual variables, group variables, and the influence measure—potential for influence—were constructed for the research in the processes described in this section.

Development of Survey Instrument

In developing the Legislative Reference and Resource Survey (LRRS), educational policy simulations were constructed in a several stage process. The first stage was conceptualization. Initial screening of policies for inclusion in the study was based on whether policies provided insight into the contextual factors affecting the policy-making behavior of political actors, had some effect on all educational and legislative districts and the state, and were salient in the current or recent legislative session (Bryant, 1985). In addition, policies to be included would have features that displayed the dynamics of policy leadership in the state legislature, that is, represented a policy type in the study typology. Policies would be categorized as members of the policy arena types, depending upon the extent to which the policy's features were shared with other members in the arena and the extent to which those features could be recognized by subjects.

Fifteen policy issues were selected subjectively from legislative education bills in the 1992 session. The legislative items were taken from summary reports for the
Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary Education and Louisiana Board of Regents. These fifteen issues were those which, in the researcher's judgment, and in the informal assessments of education policy knowledgeable, best represented the relevant features of distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policy.

Second, a process was developed for categorization and quantitative measurement of the educational policy items. An instrument was designed that included instructions, an abstract of the coercion typology, the list of 15 issues with simulated 1992 bills, and a rating sheet for categorizing the best-case exemplars of policy. This policy categorization instrument was submitted to 20 university professors and doctoral students in educational administration and political science who were known to be knowledgeable about educational policy issues in Louisiana. Eighteen subjects responded to the instrument.

For the twelve issues which were addressed by at least one-half of the raters, percentage scores were developed which represented a value across the raters for the policy. Six policies had an inter-rater correspondence of 70 percent of the academic raters and were equally distributed among policy categories as follows: distributive issues--student transportation and curriculum priorities; regulatory issues--teacher certification and high school graduation exit examination; and redistributive issues--
Minimum Foundation Program (MFP) formula revision and governance/management of post high school education. This process of screening to determine best-case simulations served to increase internal validity of the independent measure.

Third, a pilot study of the LRRS instrument and survey administration procedures was done. For the pilot instrument, academic subjects' categorizations were developed as policy scenarios in the following manner. Each policy scenario (i.e., category) included two issues and accompanying simulated bills of 1992; the scenario represented either the distributive, regulatory, or redistributive policy category. Instructions were to select in each scenario the more important policy issue in the 1992 legislative session. A different policy scenario was presented in each manipulation.

Included also for each category was a response set containing five generic sources of information for policy decisions--state governmental agencies, legislature, legislative staff, interest groups, and constituents. Instructions were to rank each source in order of its importance for providing information for respondents, relative to the policy issue selected as salient in its category. Additional instructions were to write in, where possible, those specific persons or groups of importance.
The same response set was replicated for each of the different policy scenario manipulations.

A group of 24 legislators (7 Senators, 17 Representatives) was selected in a random process for participation in the pilot survey. These persons were hand-delivered the instrument, along with letters of endorsement of the study from top officials in the Senate and House of Representatives. To facilitate rate and timing of response, a self-addressed stamped return envelope was provided, and follow-up telephone calls and personal contacts were made. Seventeen legislators responded to the pilot study.

Based on the results of the pilot study, the number of policy issues was reduced to the three that were most salient for the large majority of pilot subjects. These issues were curriculum priorities in distributive policy, teacher certification in regulatory policy, and MFP formula revision in redistributive policy. The final instrument included these issues and provided updated simulations using 1993 bills. Additional refinements suggested in the pilot study were a standard rating scale for measuring influence (Jackson, 1987; Uslaner & Weber, 1977) and the interview process of instrument administration. The pilot process served to clarify the policy scenarios, increase salience for legislators, produce more precise results, and increase validity in the study.
Legislative Reference and Resource Survey (LRRS)

The refined Legislative Reference and Resource Survey (LRRS) (see Appendix A) was administered in the legislative simulation. Its features were manipulated policy scenarios, replicated decisional referents, scalar items representing degrees of influence for each referent, and open-ended items for nomination of important referents relative to policies. Following is a discussion of each feature of the instrument and the list of questions accompanying the instrument.

Each policy scenario manipulated in the legislative survey included an educational issue and five simulated 1993 bills. Distributive policy arena consisted of new programs and curricula. This family of simulated program proposals included AIDS education, multicultural education, parenthood education and pilot program, health clinics for Orleans schools, and environmental education. Regulatory policy was typified by the teacher certification issue. Simulated proposals included changing the present requirements as follows: student teaching exemption for aides and paraprofessionals, mathematics competence and human relations skills training for teacher education programs and in-service programs, and establishment of teacher evaluation or continuous service and professional development as the basis for certification. Redistributive policy was represented by issues of educational equity and
accountability. Simulations included proposals for the continuation of 1992 MFP formula and approval of 1993 formula; empowerment (by Constitutional Amendment) of legislative amendment of formula and reduction in appropriation; and addition of a percentage adjustment factor for inflation.

Each response set replicated in the survey included five manipulated sources of information. The set of generic cue sources, also called legislator decisional referents in this study, included state education agencies, legislature, legislative staff, interest groups, constituents, and "other" sources. Open-ended response items were supplied for collection of legislators' named specific sources such as staffers, legislators, group representatives, constituents, or other individuals of importance in their decision-making about education.

A set of attitudinal items was replicated for each source of information. Each item in the set represented a value placed on an informational source by a legislator. These attitudinal items were ratings on a Likert-type ordinal scale of influence, with the following categories and assigned values of influence: no (0), a little (1), some (2), and much (3) influence.

The legislative simulation was conducted in a standard interview format. The researcher manipulated the independent policy and source variables, replicated the
attitude items for each policy, and recorded legislators' spoken responses. This format ensured that all key items on the attitude scales were completed by all subjects, that responses to open-ended items and questions were specific and informative, and that could be done if necessary on scale items and nomination items.

In addition to the LRRS instrument, several open-ended questions were developed to explore in depth the aspects of legislators' communications relative to education committee and to individual legislators. The questions were as follows:

1. Have you ever been involved in education in a professional capacity?
2. For specialists. How did you come to be a member of the education committee? For non-specialists. Have you ever been a member of the education committee?
3. How frequently do you discuss education issues with colleagues who are (are not) on the education committee?
4. What are some of the issues you discuss with them?
5. Can you describe any situations in which another legislator has come to you for advice about an educational decision?
6. Can you describe any situations where you’ve gone to other legislators for information about decisions?
7. For insight into the legislator's workrole in education, would you tell me a bit about your experiences with staff, the education agencies, interest groups or constituents?

Validity

The experimental nature of the study and the variables required addressing validity and reliability at several stages. One experimental validity issue was dependence on the experimental legislative setting. Validity problems persisted in counseling psychology experiments concerning the differential effects of self-disclosing versus self-involving counselor statements on clients (Williams, Mathews & Teddlie, 1988; McCarthy, 1979, 1982; McCarthy & Betz, 1978), because "studies of self-referent responses by counselors of varying status need to be studied in naturalistic settings" (McCarthy & Betz, 1978, p. 131). To address the issue, the legislative simulation used data from both experimental and real life situations (Crano & Brewer, 1986; Greenwood, 1983); it isolated the phenomena of interest (e.g., policy and decisional referents) while preserving the natural contextual meaning of the policy decision.

The second issue of validity and reliability was subject selection. Legislators were familiar with education proposals, experienced in policy interrelationships, and able to role-play their own
referent behavior successfully, unlike volunteer student subjects in role-playing experiments. They were experienced in recalling past situations and applying the appropriate "decision rules" and "rules of the game" to the current policy situation (Clausen, 1973). Legislators were assumed to be "committed actors sensitive to norms and ideological goals relative to the processing of issues" (Bryant, 1985, p. 156), to have minimal evaluation apprehension (Greenwood, 1983), and to give honest and accurate responses. Nevertheless, subjects' attitude structures presented in an experiment may not correspond directly with that presented in real-life individuals' cognitive structures (Kerlinger, 1984).

A third issue addressed in this study was validity of the variables. The purpose was "not to determine how people would actually behave in specific situations...but to identify the critical variables that generate different interpretations of social [political] situations" (Greenwood, 1983, p. 236). Kerlinger (1984) presented the following argument for validity of the variables:

- The evidence for validity of a variable and for its place in a theory is greatly strengthened when the variable can be both measured and manipulated...with verbal materials, as in vignettes of 'characters' presented to subjects to study and react to in prescribed ways (p. 238).

The purpose of the two-stage pilot research process and further development of the manipulations was to create in legislator-subjects the intended definitions of the policy
content situation, but not necessarily appreciation of the underlying typology.

**Policies**

The policies forming the base of the education policy typology were selected in the described screening process. The independent policy variables were indicated as qualitative, nominal variables of distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policy, and were operationally defined by the amount of inter-rater agreement regarding categorical placement of policies. Scenarios for each policy measure were developed using imaginative elements corresponding to the theoretically relevant features of the external policy situation and using a problem-solving orientation, the two criteria of experimental adequacy (Brewer, 1985). Specific 1993 legislative bills were added based on their identity as "similars" within a category. Haskell (1987) said a category was defined,

by the members of exemplars that belong to it.... The more similar the exemplars, the tighter the category.... The tacit goal of categorization is to maximize within-category similarity while minimizing between-category similarity" (p. 107).

The survey manipulations isolated and varied the policies and policy information sources. The utility of the simulation was "the potential ability to vary systematically (across different 'runs,' or replications, of the simulated system) conditions that would be confounded with other factors in the real political system"
(Crano & Brewer, 1986, p. 101). Each scenario was a manipulated educational problem or issue to be decided (i.e., new programs and curriculum, standards and requirements, equity) using various 1993 legislative proposals (e.g., multicultural education, teacher evaluation, MFP formula), and each included a response set for scale and nomination assessments of the decisional referents.

**Decisional Referents**

The criteria guiding legislators in their decision-making have been defined empirically as psychological frames of reference such as legislator's conscience and state or district interests (Hedlund, 1975), and as institutional references such as legislature, interest group, and executive cue sources (Bryant, 1985). In this study, institutional and individual criteria were indicated in the sources of policy information for legislators. Source was a qualitative, nominal, independent variable, operationalized and manipulated as the following categories: legislature, the principal source variation of interest; state governmental agencies; legislative staff; interest groups; and constituency.

A behavioral criterion in this study was legislator's orientation to policy role, conceptually either policy responsibility (leadership) or policy responsiveness (followership). Leadership was operationalized as
expertise and used as a qualitative, dichotomous, independent blocking variable in the study. Expertise was defined as membership or non-membership in the educational policy committee.

**Attitude Items**

Potential for influence was the dependent measure of influence in this analysis. A common measure of influence has been retrospective assessments about referents for specific legislation or general policy decisions (Jackson, 1987; Uslaner & Weber, 1977). In this study, Louisiana legislators evaluated multiple decisional referents on a scale of influence. The indirect dependent measure—potential for influence—represented a composite of the dynamics of legislator-source interaction in a type of policy. The legislative simulation manipulated conditions in the policy environment in order to examine the potential influence of the legislative leadership. One condition was the importance placed on legislature as a categorical source of influence for each policy decision; the other was value of a legislator as a specific source for a policy. The indications and operationalizations of potential for influence were analyzed separately.

The first indication of potential for influence in this study was legislator ratings of five decisional referents in three types of policy on the LRRS. It was operationally defined as a score representing a value on a
0-3 scale of influence (i.e., no influence, 0; a little influence, 1; some influence, 2; and much influence, 3). Scores were recorded for each legislator and were aggregated at the levels of policy and expertise groups for the analyses. Results were interpreted in terms of the influence value for all legislator referents in general and the legislative educational leadership in particular, and in terms of the implications for the policy approach to study of leadership and influence.

Sample

Louisiana was selected in this study for reasons similar to those of Parent (1983). One reason for its selection was access to research materials and research subjects, facilitated by personal contacts with top officials in the Senate and House of Representatives. The second reason was contextual factors in this legislature that encourage policy expertise--the short legislative session (60 days) and its one-party character. According to Parent,

the factions where policy expert relationships are formed are likely to reflect policy preferences rather than party loyalty. If relationship between expertise and legislative outcome does indeed occur...those links should manifest themselves in Louisiana (p. 54).

Biographic and demographic data concerning legislator attributes were gathered outside the interview to the extent possible. Information was used to select subjects for two groups of legislators and to provide a description
of the context for study results. Descriptive attribute variables were indicated and operationalized as the following dichotomies.

--institutional role, membership or non-membership on education policy committee;
--political party, affiliation as Democrat or Republican;
--institutional base, membership in the House or Senate;
--race, white or black;
--legislative seniority, senior (4 or more years) or junior (0-3 years).

Table 3.1 presents the sample of legislative respondents. A sample of 48 members of the 1993 Louisiana Legislature was selected for their positional and purposive value in the study. The following two groups of legislators were selected: (1) all 24 members of the education policy committees of the Louisiana Legislature, and (2) a comparison group of 24 non-education committee member legislators. Groups were comparable on several demographic and biographic attributes, including political party, institutional base, race, and legislative seniority. Groups were contrasted by legislative workrole in education, when workrole was defined as committee membership or non-membership.
Table 3.1. Demographic Characteristics of Two Groups of Respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>EDUCATION COMMITTEE MEMBERS (n=24)</th>
<th>NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS (n=24)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Party</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Base</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
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<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative Seniority</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The timing of interviews coincided with the 1993 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature. As in the pilot, letters of endorsement from the Speaker of the House and Senate President were presented to respondents. Interviews were conducted on the chamber floor and in the halls and offices of the legislature, each lasting from 15 minutes to an hour and 15 minutes, with most interviewees being very cooperative and responsive. The timing and location of the interviews, along with the selection of contemporaneous legislative issues and bills, enhanced experimental realism in the research. The legislative simulation and interview format provided a set of scale data for analysis at multiple levels, including the individual legislator, legislators as members of groups, and the legislative body in the context of policy.

Scale Analysis

The LRRS instrument was designed to produce a profile of each legislator’s views regarding the degree of influence an information source was likely to have in each of the three educational policy arenas of the study. The scoring procedure resulted in scores for each legislator on each of the referent attitude items on a Likert-type ordinal scale measuring potential for influence. At the level of individual legislator, a set of 15 decisional referent scores was produced representing the value for each of the five referents across three types of policy.
Aggregation of individual responses at the levels of policy produced 720 total influence scores for statistical analysis. Aggregation of responses at the levels of committee membership and non-membership produced 360 scores per group for statistical analysis.

Mean scores for the attitude referents were calculated for each scenario of policy and for all policies. Comparisons of the means revealed the extent of respondent agreement on the degree of influence of a decisional referent with regard to the policy decision. Means were also calculated for each level of respondent expertise and were compared for extent of respondent agreement on decisional referent influence with regard to the respondents' expertise (i.e., committee position). Means were displayed in tables by levels of policy and by levels of respondent expertise.

A standard univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) for this type of sample data was performed. When independent variables are qualitative and nominal, "the data analysis is limited to testing the overall null hypothesis of ANOVA and subsequent post hoc comparisons" (Hinkle, Weisman, & Jurs, 1979, p. 285). The dependent measures were on an ordinal scale, violating an assumption underlying the analysis of variance; however, "when measurement of the dependent variable is dichotomous or on an ordinal scale,
the effect on the probability statement is not serious" (Hinkle et al., 1979, p. 262).

A three-factor ANOVA with repeated measures on two factors and with subjects as blocks was performed. Variation in respondent attitude scores was observed as effects of policy manipulation, information source differentiation, and differential legislator expertise. The analyses concerned whether differences in referent scores within each policy category were relatively larger or smaller compared to the between-policy differences; whether differences in referent scores were larger or smaller for the two expertise groups; and whether there were differences resulting from interactions among the independent variables.

Tests of statistical significance were conducted for all sub-categories to determine main and interaction effects. If significant differences were found, post-hoc analyses were conducted on the mean scores to analyze the differences. Observed main and interaction effects and significant sub-category differences were reported in the ANOVA source table.

Findings were interpreted in terms of how overall influence was affected by differences in policy and source sub-categories and expertise levels. Results were interpreted in terms of the extent to which the legislature as a categorical referent was significantly different from
other referents for the policies. These interpretations addressed the second research question regarding the implications of policy differences for educational leadership, and the third research question concerning the importance of referents for differentially expert legislators. In addition, results of the analysis were interpreted in terms of the utility of the policy approach and the applicability of the coercion typology for study of legislative influence in general and educational leadership in particular.

Information Patterns

The second and third research questions were also concerned with influence in the context of individual leadership for specific policy decisions. This part of the study explored information patterns that were defined by the legislators themselves in their responses to LRRS items and the interview questions. Separate analyses of cue behavior in the external and internal environments of the legislature provided "the relevant, personal context, the idiosyncratic associations, beliefs, and ideas" (Bryant, 1985, p. 63), and created descriptive pictures of the external and internal dynamics of legislative information flow.

Diversity and Expertise

The first investigation of information patterns was relative to influence of the legislative leaders in the
three policy arenas. Qualitative LRRS source item information was analyzed to develop for each policy arena the patterns of information source diversity and number and identity of individual sources of information. As in the previous analysis, influence was defined as potential influence of the legislative leaders, and was operationalized in two ways.

The first operationalization of influence of the leaders was the degree to which they operated in a policy arena where legislative colleagues were important. This degree of influence was determined as a score representing overall potential for influence within each policy category—the information pattern diversity score. The concept of information pattern diversity was based on the concept of density in network theory, as described by Parent (1983):

Source diversity refers to ties involved in the actions of the group: many ties among few people is low diversity; few ties among many people is high diversity. .... In a highly diverse information source pattern, most legislators would name different sources of information as important. .... In a highly concentrated information source pattern, all of the legislators who name sources would name the same single source, or only a few sources (pp. 84-85).

Information pattern diversity scores for each policy arena were calculated as follows:

\[
\text{information pattern diversity score} = \frac{\text{number of actual sources}}{\text{number of potential sources}}
\]
The number of actual sources in each pattern was the number of unique individuals named by the respondents. A source was unique only the first time he or she was named; thereafter, repeated nominations of these sources served to decrease diversity. The number of potential sources in each pattern was the number of legislators participating in the information pattern, that is respondents who named one or more specific sources of information. Respondents who did not name specific sources did not participate in the pattern.

Calculations on the total nomination frequencies in a policy arena produced scores which were values of information pattern diversity. Many different nominated sources produced a highly diverse information source pattern for the policy arena, which meant a low potential for influence of experts. The same few nominated sources yielded a highly concentrated pattern, which meant a high potential for influence. Scores were reported in an index representing high to low potential for expert influence in the policy arena. Calculated results were expected to be different from but complementary to results of the statistical analysis of overall influence for the policy arenas. The results were also interpreted in terms of the utility of the policy approach for understanding the inter- and extra-legislative contexts of influence.
The second operationalization was the extent to which the leaders were among a very few reputation experts (legislator or non-legislator) operating in the policy arena. This extent was determined by counting nomination frequencies of specific individual sources of information, and determining which individuals met the criterion for reputation expertise. Whereas reputation expertise was determined in the first analysis in this study as acknowledgement by five or more colleagues in all policies in the survey, in this analysis of influence it was defined as legislators or other individuals who were so acknowledged within each policy arena.

Calculations on the nomination frequencies produced the number and identities of legislator and non-legislator reputation experts. These numbers were reported in the table containing the diversity index and were interpreted as the extent of leader's potential influence, relative to additional inside and outside reputation experts operating in the pattern. Results of the reputation expertise analysis were also interpreted in terms of the intra-legislative and behavioral approaches to understanding influence for educational policy decisions.

**Salience and Expertise**

Interview questions accompanying the survey administration were presented in the section on survey instrumentation. These questions sought to gather
legislators' personal reflections and recalled interactions with colleagues in general and specific cue-giving and cue-seeking experiences. Data recorded by the researcher were organized in a computer file. The analysis of the data produced patterns of communication with colleagues regarding educational decisions.

First, responses concerning differences in the two groups relative to experience as educator and frequency of cue sharing were reported. Next, descriptive information regarding contemporary policy issues was reported in terms of frequencies, percentages, and rank order of importance, and was interpreted as salience of issues for legislators. Finally, descriptions regarding critical cue incidents and situations were reported as patterns of policy differentiation and leadership attributes emerging from the responses. The patterns of leadership were interpreted as credential expertise, personal reputation expertise, and policy reputation expertise.

The informational flow patterns were also used to facilitate the interpretation of the leadership and influence associations, correspondence with the institutional, behavioral and policy approaches to study of legislative educational leadership, and utility of the policy typology. Additional comments relative to perceptions about outside referents for educational policy
decisions were presented in text where they related to the discussions of policy, leadership and influence.
CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH RESULTS

This chapter presents the results of the investigation of influence and educational leadership in the Louisiana Legislature in three sections. The first section presents the findings regarding the association between influence and two types of legislator expertise. The second section presents the results of the statistical analysis of influence in association with three factors in the policy-making context--policy context, categorical sources of information, and legislator expertise. In the third section, the results of the analysis of influence in association with policy context and the individual sources of information are described. The section also describes the patterns of communication among legislative colleagues regarding educational policy decisions.

Expertise and Influence

Influence was measured as introduction success, a standard measure of influence in cue theory (Buchanan, Eulau, Ferguson & Wahlke, 1960; Parent, 1983; Porter, 1974) which is important also in structural theory and policy theory. Success was defined as number of 1993 legislative enrollments in education that were sponsored by legislators at four levels of expertise. Enrollment data were gathered
from staff reports to the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education and the Board of Regents of Louisiana.

Legislator expertise was specified as credential and reputation expertise, corresponding to institutional and behavioral approaches to legislative study. Credential expertise was defined as role as member of the education policy committee. Behavioral expertise was defined as role as expert by reputation (Mitchell, 1981; Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1981) and defined as nomination by five or more colleagues in responses across policies in the Legislator Reference and Resource Survey (LRRS). Relative importance of these two conceptualizations of expertise was the object of this association analysis.

Results of the nomination analysis were that, in all cases except one, the experts by reputation were experts also by virtue of formal position as education policy committee chairs and members. Therefore, the following four variations of expertise were developed for the influence analysis: reputation experts who were committee members, reputation experts who were non-members, non-experts who were committee members, and non-expert non-member legislators.

The nomination information was combined with the 1993 legislative enrollment data to produce frequencies of the population of 121 bills and resolutions for author’s level of expertise. Frequencies for 49 authors were recorded for
four expertise levels, as follows: reputation and
credential experts (7), 29 bills; reputation and non-
credential experts (1), 4 bills; non-reputation and
credential experts (6), 19 bills; and non-reputation non-
credential legislators (35), 69 bills. The following were
average number of bills and percentage of bills passed by a
level: expert committee members, 4.1 (24.0 percent);
expert non-members, 4.0 (33.0 percent); non-expert
committee members, 3.2 (15.7 percent); and non-expert non-
member legislators, 2.0 (57.0 percent).

Table 4.1 presents the observed and expected
frequencies of legislative enrollments for legislators at
four levels of expertise. A one-sample chi square test was
used to determine whether the proportion of successful
bills at each level of expertise was equal to the
proportion of bill authors at that level. Since the
expected frequency in one level was less than five, the
Yates correction for continuity was used to prevent the chi
square test from being too literal (Huck, Cormier & Bounds,
1974). The "goodness of fit" test resulted in the obtained
\( \chi^2 = 11.95, \) \( df = 3, \) and was significant at the .01 level.
Collective differences between observed and expected
frequencies of legislation in each expertise level were too
great to be attributed to sampling fluctuation.
Table 4.1. Observed and Expected Frequencies of 1993 Legislative Enrollments Falling in Each of Four Levels of Legislator Expertise.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVELS OF LEGISLATOR EXPERTISE</th>
<th>Reputation with Membership</th>
<th>Reputation with Non-Membership</th>
<th>Non-Reputation with Membership</th>
<th>Non-Reputation with Non-Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction Success (n=121)</td>
<td>29 (17.28)</td>
<td>4 (2.47)</td>
<td>19 (14.81)</td>
<td>69 (86.42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi square=11.95*

*Statistically significant at the .01 level.
Expertise and influence were positively associated. Reputation expertise in combination with committee position produced the greatest success. Under-estimated success at this level contributed the greatest value of difference between observed and expected frequencies (7.95) of all levels. The opposite level of non-reputation without committee position experienced the least success. Success for this level was over-estimated, producing the second highest value of difference in frequencies (3.60). Clearly, legislators with high expertise were more influential than their peers with no expertise in education.

Greater success of reputation expertise or credential expertise, however, could not be concluded from the results. Institutional and behavioral measures did not account for subtle differences in influence. These results were slightly different from those obtained in California (Buchanan et al., 1960), Michigan (Porter, 1974), and Louisiana (Parent, 1983): where different operationalizations of committee position (as chair, not member) resulted in findings that the expert individual was more effective.

Success in passing one's legislation was a limited aspect of influence. The legislative success measure could not account for influence contributed by two reputation experts, who passed no legislation in 1993 but obviously
were influential in terms of colleague interaction leading to successful decisions. Thus, leadership in terms of provision of policy information became the focus of study. Influence within this larger context of policy decision-making was the object of the next investigation of legislative educational leadership.

Policy, Source, and Expertise

Influence was indicated in this analysis as potential for influence, an hypothetical construct partially replicated from Parent's (1983) study of specialist in the policy tradition. Potential for influence was operationally defined as legislators' assessments regarding decisional referent influence on the 0-3 LRRS scale. For each legislator, the attitude item responses were replicated for each of five manipulated sources of information for education policy (state agencies, legislature, staff, interest groups, constituency). The items and sources were repeated within each of three manipulated policy scenarios (distributive, regulatory, redistributive), generating a set of 15 responses for each legislator. The set of response items per subject provided a profile of each legislator's views regarding the degree of influence a source was likely to have in each of the three educational policy arenas of the study. Response sets were recorded for 48 legislators at 2 levels of expertise.
Table 4.2 presents the results of the three-factor analysis of variance using repeated measures on two factors and subjects as blocks. Significant main effects were found for policy at the 0.05 level (p-value=0.028) and source at the 0.01 level (p-value=0.0001). A significant effect was found for the source-expertise interaction at the .01 level (p-value=0.0005). These main and interaction effects were reported in terms of significantly different means for legislator decisional referents.

**Policy Effect**

Table 4.3 presents the levels of policy and respective sample means. Overall means for policies were as follows: distributive (µ=1.89), regulatory (µ=1.70), and redistributive (µ=1.65). Post hoc analysis showed that distributive policy was significantly different from regulatory policy (p-value=0.048) and also from redistributive policy (p-value=0.013). Regulatory policy was not significantly different from redistributive policy. Separate comparisons on the policies were conducted using Duncan’s multiple range method.

The findings regarding policies in this study were that distributive policies produced highest overall potential for influence of the sources, with regulatory and redistributive policy yielding generally lower and lowest overall potential for influence. The results of this
Table 4.2. Analysis of Variance of Influence for Policies, Sources, and Expertise Groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MEAN SQUARE</th>
<th>F-VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Ss</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise (B)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error between</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Ss</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy (A)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>3.59*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source (C)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.71</td>
<td>13.51***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x C</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x C</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>5.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B x C</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error within</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>719</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .0005 level; ***at the .0001 level.
Table 4.3. Influence Mean Scores for Categorical Information Sources by Policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY</th>
<th>DISTRIBUTIVE</th>
<th>REGULATORY</th>
<th>REDISTRIBUTIVE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>legislature</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>constituency</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constituency</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>legislature</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staff</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>interest</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agency</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>staff</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest groups</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>agency</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=48)</td>
<td>1.89*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at the .05 level.
analysis of variance were interpreted as support for the argument that influence is associated with policy differentiation, and as support for the policy approach to research.

Source Effect

Table 4.3 also presents the overall means of categorical information sources, as follows: constituency ($\mu=2.13$), legislature ($\mu=1.99$), staff ($\mu=1.72$), agency ($\mu=1.60$), and interest groups ($\mu=1.31$). Post hoc analysis showed that constituency was not significantly different from legislature, and staff was not significantly different from agency. All other pairs of the levels of source were significantly different. Separate comparisons on the sources were conducted using Duncan’s multiple range method.

The findings regarding cue sources in this study were that constituency and legislature were the most influential sources in all the policies, followed by legislative staff and state agencies, with interest groups being least influential. The finding that legislature was either the first or second most influential source across policies was evidence that the legislature’s leadership was highly influential in all policies, and especially influential in distributive policies.
Source-Expertise Interaction

Table 4.4 presents the respective sample means for two levels of legislator expertise. Post hoc analysis was conducted to investigate contrasts in influence of sources for the two respondent groups. Legislators with expertise depended on agencies for their information more than did legislators without expertise (1.754 v. 1.316). This difference was statistically significant as a least squares difference (LSD) test at the 0.05 level (p-value=0.047). Legislators with expertise depended on constituency less than did their peers without expertise (1.782 v. 2.343). This difference was also statistically significant as a LSD test at the 0.05 level (p-value=0.011). Separate pairwise comparisons on source-expertise interaction were conducted with an overall Type I error of 0.05, using Bonferroni methods. Probability levels are also reported in the table. The remaining contrasts were not statistically significant.

The range of the groups’ mean scores was examined. Expert legislators scores had a narrow range (1.213-1.782); means were about equal except for the low interest group mean. The narrow range suggested balanced opportunity for many sources to influence the expert group. Non-experts’ range in means was wider (1.288-2.343); means were high for constituency and legislature, and low for all other
Table 4.4. Influence Mean Scores for Categorical Information Sources by Expertise Groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREDENTIAL EXPERTS (n=24)</th>
<th>NON-EXPERT LEGISLATORS (n=24)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>constituency</td>
<td>1.78*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legislature</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staff</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agency</td>
<td>1.75**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest groups</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant as a LSD test at the .01 level; **at the .05 level.
sources. The wider range suggested greater opportunity for legislature and constituency to influence the non-expert group.

With regard to the finding of source-expertise interaction, legislators with expertise differed from non-expert committee counterparts in the following ways: higher state governmental agency influence and lower constituency influence; tendency to seek outside policy experts more and likelihood of being sought more by non-expert peers. Groups did not differ on influence of the legislature, which was high for both groups; however, the groups' slightly different ranges in source means was interpreted as slightly higher opportunity for the legislature to influence non-experts.

The remaining effects and interaction effects were not statistically significant. Legislators with expertise (committee members) and those without expertise (non-members) did not differ in decisional referent attitudes. Legislators' inclinations toward different categorical referents were not associated with policy differences. Legislators with expertise were not distinguished on attitudes associated with policy context differences. Contrasts in legislators' preferred references were not relevant to policy differentiation.

The results of the ANOVA relative to policy arenas were that distributive policy produced highest potential
for influence, and regulatory and redistributive policy produced lower potential for influence. Influence of an information source was associated with variation in policy and source factors and with variation in legislator expertise.

The results relative to influence of the legislature were that legislature was highly influential in all educational policies, and more so in distributive policy. Constituency was slightly more important overall, and legislature was slightly more important for non-expert legislators, but neither difference was significant. As an entity of leadership for education policy, legislature was very important.

The results relative to influence of information sources associated with variation in legislator expertise were that legislators with expertise depended on state agency sources to a greater extent and on constituency to a lesser extent than their non-expertise peers. These results were interpreted as evidence of a policy subgovernment effect and suggested support for the two-step flow of information (Porter, 1974; Sabatier & Whiteman, 1985).

The ANOVA results were interpreted as evidence of the utility of the policy approach for understanding influence for educational decisions in general, and influence of the legislature in particular. Influence in association with
the individual context of policy leadership was the subject of the next investigation.

Information Patterns

The second research question concerned influence of the legislature and also concerned influence of legislative leaders as specific individual sources of information. In the next analysis of potential for influence, information pattern diversity was derived for the policy arenas from individual nomination data in the LRRS. Number and identity of reputation experts operating in the patterns were also produced. In addition, patterns of colleague interactions concerning salient educational issues and situations were extracted from responses to open-ended interview questions. These analyses yielded, in legislators' own words, specific experts in the external and internal environments and the policy issues for which they supplied information. Results of these separate analyses are reported in this section.

Diversity and Expertise

Nomination data were collected by means of open-ended responses on the LRRS instrument. Frequencies of named individual cue sources were recorded for each policy arena. Table 4.5 presents the list of categorical sources with the total number of unique individuals named by legislators specific to policies. It also presents the total number of
legislators participating in each policy information pattern.

Table 4.6 presents the information pattern diversity by policy. The index of diversity was developed as follows. Frequency of unique sources in all source categories were aggregated at the level of policy. A source was unique the first time he or she was named and thereafter was not a unique source. The number of total unique sources was divided by the number of legislators naming sources in the pattern. Values on the index of cue source diversity were as follows: distributive policy (1.67), regulatory (1.31) and redistributive (1.49).

Table 4.6 also presents the number of experts for policy arenas. The number of nominated influentials meeting the expertise criterion within each policy arena was calculated and reported as legislator and non-legislator reputation experts. In the respective policy categories, the following specific individuals were acknowledged as influential: distributive--6 reputed experts (who were also committee members), 2 legislative staffers, and 1 Department of Education senior official; regulatory--3 experts (who were also committee members), 2 staffers, and 1 Governor’s Office of Education official; redistributive--3 experts (2 committee members and 1 non-member), 2 staffers and 1 (different) State Department senior official.
### Table 4.5. Specific Information Sources by Policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY</th>
<th>DISTRIBUTIVE</th>
<th>REGULATORY</th>
<th>REDISTRIBUTIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency Staffers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Staffers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL SPECIFIC SOURCES</strong>*</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL LEGISLATORS SPECIFYING SOURCES</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Actual number of unique named individual sources; **Number of legislators naming sources in an information pattern.*
Table 4.6. Information Pattern Diversity and Reputation Experts by Policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DISTRIBUTIVE</th>
<th>REGULATORY</th>
<th>REDISTRIBUTIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information Pattern Diversity</strong></td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reputation Experts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislator</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Legislator</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Low Diversity = High Potential for Influence
The ideal situation in which legislative leadership could flourish was a policy arena with a high potential influence pattern and a highly concentrated expertise pattern. High potential influence was interpreted from a low diversity pattern, where influence was concentrated among fewer persons; low influence potential was construed from a pattern of high diversity, where a wide range of individuals operated as cue-givers in the arena.

The findings of the analysis of unique cue-givers and legislator cue-seekers were interpreted as follows. For distributive policy, the high diversity pattern and the high number of experts suggested the lessened importance of any one expert. Redistributive and regulatory policies yielded lower diversity patterns and a fewer number of experts, implying greater potential influence of the few leaders. Redistributive legislation produced a finance expert who was not a policy committee member. Clearly, distributive policy influence patterns were different from regulatory and redistributive influence patterns. These results were slightly different but complementary to the results of the statistical analysis of variance, reinforcing the utility of the policy research approach.

Salience and Expertise

The responses regarding involvement in education in a professional capacity and length of committee service produced background information on the two groups of
legislators. Nearly twice as many members as non-members were experienced educators. Thirteen of the committee members had current or former positions in professional education, at different levels of education from kindergarten to university levels. Frequently, the committee members cited "experience as an educator" and "request" for assignment as factors responsible for their placement on education committee. These "experienced educators," "long-time educators," and "the university professors" were cited as important cue sources by colleagues on the survey. Committee members averaged about seven years of experience on the committee, while only two of the comparison groups had prior brief service on the policy committee.

Responses relative to frequency of interaction with colleagues about educational legislation revealed that more committee members had high frequency of contact (11, or 45 percent of total) than moderate (6, 25 percent) or low (7, 29.2 percent) contact. More non-committee legislators had low frequency of contact (12, 50 percent) than moderate (6, 25 percent) or high (6, 25 percent) contact. Legislators with a committee position were more likely than those without a formal position to play a leadership role in exchanging policy information. These results were understood as support for the institutional component of the policy approach to legislative study.
Table 4.7 presents observations about important legislative issues as incidence, percentages, and rank orders of issues communicated among legislators. There was little difference between the two-groups’ responses. The table reports issues which were of high salience (i.e., 5 or more mentions) or moderate salience (3-4 mentions). The issue with highest salience for legislators was the MFP formula (26.3 percent of all specified issues), followed by teacher evaluation (11.3 percent). Other issues with high salience were higher education funding, teacher certification and graduation exit examination (6.3 percent each). Nine additional issues were mentioned once.

The policy perspectives of the study led to concluding that issues with high to moderate salience tended to be redistributive (i.e., MFP) and regulatory (i.e., teacher certification and evaluation) policies; low salience issues were generally distributive policies (i.e., health care, AIDS education, and Tech Prep programs). Legislators understood how policy content differences impacted the political relationships at several levels, as the following comments attest:

(Redistributive policy)

Charter schools [will be on the] agenda for the next few years. Coalition is possible because we’re not taking away from one group and giving to another. The present proposals offer public school choice within districts.
Table 4.7. Salient Educational Issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK ORDER</th>
<th>EDUCATIONAL ISSUES</th>
<th>INCIDENTS (n=80)</th>
<th>PERCENT*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minimum Foundation Program Formula (MFP)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Teacher Evaluation Program</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Higher Education Funding</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Teacher Certification</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Graduation Exit Examination</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Teacher Retirement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Sex Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Collective Bargaining</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Restructuring, Choice</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Higher Education Single Board</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Academic Standards for Athletics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Alternative Education Program</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Drop-Out Prevention Programs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentages total less than 100 percent because the table does not include nine issues mentioned once. The base for calculations was total incidents (80) rather than legislators mentioning incidents.
I'd be a fool not to consider the local superintendent [on MFP].

Making the local district whole or [keeping the] same dollars as in the past is highly important.

(Regulatory policy)

Teacher certification is a national [regulatory issue]. Certification requirements are good for breadth [of teacher competence] but not for course competence.

I listen to the testimony; [a source's importance] depends on the issue. The first thing I look at is the origin of the bill: whose bill is it; who asked for it to be introduced; why? Within the committee we have some members on labor and on conservative [sides] and in the middle. I don't believe in tearing up quality legislation [i.e., The Children First Act] in the interest of these individuals.

(Distributive policy)

Because we're short of funds, the question is not which programs to have, but whether to add dollars to the state general fund [for new programs].

Differences in policy characteristics but not in expertise groups produced different patterns of issue salience.

Summaries of the critical incidents of policy information exchange recalled by legislators provided detailed descriptive information about the role of leadership structures, leadership individuals and policy leadership. The first pattern was leadership structure provided in committee position. A pattern of diffuse rather than specific expertise suggested that membership in committee was the relevant authority base. Credentialed group legislators were approached more often on multiple
issues (8 cue-givers, 22 issues) than non-credentialed legislators (3 cue-givers, 8 issues) were approached.

Another contrast was the patterns of leadership and followership roles. Committee members were more proactive in dispensing information on multiple issues, as this committee member and educator attested:

I keep files at my desk [on such issues as gun control, safety, day care programs, alternative education, multicultural education] to share with other legislators on the floor.

Non-committee members were more likely to be passive cue-takers, as was evident in the following comments:

[Colleagues] come for support on an education bill, and to ask how I feel [about it].

I am lobbied.

I rely on others to educate me.

Sometimes non-experts were more active in cue-seeking roles, however, as were these respondents:

I seek others on a daily basis, as a short cut and time saver.

I go to other legislators for advice if they’re on a committee I’m not on, to see what things were hashed out in committee. I respect their ability to synthesize information.

Respect for committee decision and committee chairmanship was common to both groups. The experts’ duties were to supply "information about a committee decision" in education, and to "check with others on other committee decisions," such as "retirement committee about a bill’s effect on teachers," "agriculture committee on rural
affairs," and "transportation committee on bond issues."

One non-expert took a more passive approach, saying:

I know committeemen [colleagues] but am generally not involved in detailed workings of the committee. I wait to see [committee decision] on the floor.

Chairman was mentioned by name and in specific policy areas more often among fellow committee members, but by office more often among comparison legislators.

Camaraderie and trust among peers was a basis of committee influence for both groups. Committee members said:

I trust [a committee leader]; he and I agree on educational issues, though not on politics.

[Colleague X] is an educator and friend and would give his sincere opinion and the right response.

A non-committee legislator also sought "friends on the committee regarding broad policy areas."

Influence was shared in the legislature by formal and informal means. One committee official tended to "take the mike on the floor" to share views; another long-time expert advocated a more subtle approach, saying:

You lose your effect if you speak on every issue.

All the comments and consistencies regarding committee role were understood as support for the institutional component of the policy approach to legislative study.

The second pattern was individual leadership relative to personal characteristics. Authority bases included social-demographic and behavioral characteristics such as
party affiliation, racial reference groups, institutional base, legislative seniority, educator experience and district representation. Other bases were relative to philosophy or ideology, friendship and other personal attributes.

Expertise in this pattern was related more to individual traits rather than to committee role or policy role. One-half the credentialed legislators referenced committee colleagues or other legislators by name, attributing influence to personal or policy position reasons. One consulted with "other legislators on budget and capital outlay," and these two approached colleagues for policy and personal purposes:

I seek other legislators, relative to bills [for example, the Agriculture Committee regarding Wildlife and Fisheries issues, such as trespassing].

[Two colleagues and I] have similar philosophies regarding good government and reform issues.

Some diffuse individual expertise was observed. A few comparison-group legislators were sought on multiple issues having to do with experience or education in their respective professions. One legislator reported seeking various experts "all the time," saying:

I consult with people versed in the matter (for example, attorneys on trial lawyer issues, or insurance matters) and with those I trust.

Educator experience was respected by members in both groups. Several persons on the committee referenced former and current school administrators as leaders on whom they
depended for information about "classroom application of policy," its "effect on the system," and "district issues."

Former school system administrators on the committee appreciated their leadership role within the committee as being "a mentor for others," including "[four other educators], who come to me for information."

Committee members were likely to seek any legislator who "is an educator or has tried to influence a bill or has expertise," or who "has highly specialized information in education." Committee professionals who were non-educators were likely to be special interest area leaders, including one who was a "'bell cow' for colleagues, especially on higher education," and another who was "a self-appointed expert for budget discussions."

Non-committee members were prone to refer to specific legislators with educator experience for their general policy expertise. These sources were committee members or other legislators with experience at several levels of education.

Party affiliation and district representation were barely in evidence as authority bases. A committee member and a non-member expressed the following similar thoughts:

I contact other Republicans with fiscal conservative leanings and experience.

I’ll often go to an ideologically alike (Republican or East Jefferson Parish) committee member who has heard the bill discussed.
District was a slightly more important cue for some legislators but was tempered in one case by a larger consideration, as these comments show:

I respect counterparts from my area. I request their opinions because of their familiarity and experience.

New Orleans legislators will ask for information specific to New Orleans public schools.

[Rural groups versus New Orleans groups] come for advice regarding mandates.

I was contacted by parish superintendents, to leave the MFP as is.

I'd be a fool not to consider the local superintendent.

Making the local district whole or [keeping] the same dollars as in the past is highly important.

I seek information aggressively for my constituents, but not to the detriment of others in the state. How a program affects my district [matters, but] an adverse effect brings [my decision] to the state level.

Legislative seniority as an authority base was mentioned indirectly in the following two committee members' responses:

Freshmen legislators ask me what to do with [MFP] and for an explanation of the dedicated funds issue.

Over the years I have become somewhat knowledgeable. Some legislators have the pattern of talking to me, but the new people have not sought us [old-timers, experts] out so much.

Legislative base was alluded to in the remark about being a "bell cow" for other Senators on higher education.

Some individuals referred to themselves as an "other" source in the LRRS instrument. Various allusions were made
to the following: "my gut instincts and values," "my belief in the fundamentals of education," "church groups’ influence on curriculum and programs," "influence of God and values," and "common sense." Personal values in one’s colleagues and oneself was an important base of authority for several legislators. All these comments and patterns of response regarding individual attributes were understood as the individual component of the policy approach to legislative research.

The third pattern was individual leadership specific to dimensions of policy. Legislators in the credentialed group provided information on specific issues more often than their counterparts. Individual policy experts were named by this group in association with the following issues: higher education (including single board issue), MFP (dedicated funds and weighting in formula), teacher evaluation, multicultural education (including textbook issues), and seat belts on school buses. Some issues were considered "pet projects" of legislators.

Legislators with greater responsibility in education were also more eager for specific policy information from named experts within the committee on issues such as the community college system, the MFP and collective bargaining, and outside the committee on the "pass to play" issue in athletics. They also consulted experts outside the legislature (policy subgovernment experts) such as a
legislative education staff expert, State Department of Education personnel, and other resources in other states (issue network experts), including national sources such as Education Commission of the States and regional sources such as Southern Regional Education Board.

Legislators in the non-credentialed group provided some information internally in regard to the following policy issues: single board for higher education, vocational-technical institute funding, MFP, dual curriculum and multicultural education. One legislator, a known medical expert, provided information on "health issues, sex education, and school health clinics."

Comparison group members sought information from specific committee experts on higher education funding and a pilot Saturday Academy program, and from other colleagues on MFP, teacher retirement and alternative education.

Legislators in the non-expert group were not likely to utilize outsiders in the policy subgovernment, although one had consulted "a BESE member who [was] a neighbor." One legislator used national and state issue networks for information on minor sports in higher education:

I got staff to call the NCAA. I went primarily to the professionals and then to fellow legislators with universities in their districts.

All these communication patterns specific to policy context and content were taken as support for the policy approach to legislative study.
In concluding the interview, legislators were given the opportunity to express inclinations toward any of the outside decisional referents in policy-making. Only comments that were germane to policy characteristics or legislative educational leadership were included in the foregoing discussion.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents an overview of the design of the legislative study and a summary of the principal findings. Conclusions about the results and recommendations for future educational leadership and policy research are also presented.

Study Overview

This study focused on influence of educational leadership in the Louisiana Legislature, exploring leadership in the legislative body, its structures, and individual legislators. Specifically, the study investigated variation in influence of the leadership as associated with different types of educational policy. It also investigated variation in influence of other decisional referents as associated with different legislator leadership roles.

Analyses and descriptions were done to answer the following research questions:

1. How is influence for educational decisions associated with structural and individual leadership roles in the legislature?
2. How is influence of the legislature and its leaders affected by differences in the context of
education decisions, including type of policy and sources of policy information?

3. How is influence of information sources different for legislators with different leadership roles in education?

Research foundations in educational administration, political science, and psychology contributed to various aspects of the study. Three research paradigms for legislative study--the institutional, behavioral, and policy approaches--guided the development of the independent leadership and policy variables.

The conceptual base for the educational leadership construct was literature specific to legislative leadership roles, legislator role orientation, and roles within state-level policy arenas. Construction of the expertise variables was informed by the legislative specialist literature at state and congressional levels of study. Educational leadership variables were presented as functional roles of the legislature as a whole, legislators as committee members, and legislators as expert individuals.

The theoretical base for the educational policy variables was the coercion policy theory, outlining distributive, regulatory, and redistributive arenas of policy. These arenas were the organizing principle of the policy context variables constructed for the analysis of
influence. Experimental research in counseling and social psychology provided models for design of the legislative simulation.

The study sample was a purposive sample of 48 legislators, with two groups of 24 legislators compared on personal and background characteristics, and contrasted on institutional workrole in education (i.e., membership or non-membership in the policy committee). Interview methodology included the Legislative Reference and Resource Survey (LRRS) developed for the study, and a schedule of interview questions regarding relevant policy issues and colleague informants.

Principal Findings

A variety of data was produced in the instrument items and responses to questions which led to answering the three main research questions in the study. The principal descriptive and analytic findings were summarized in terms of influence of leadership structures and individuals, influence effects of policy and source manipulations and legislator attributes, and leadership’s pivotal role in flow of policy information. Answers to the research questions were derived in four data analyses.

Leadership Structures and Individuals

A positive association was found between influence and leadership, specified as credential or reputation expertise, in the chi square analysis of enrolled
legislation for 1993. Leaders with both types of expertise were much more successful than expected in bill passage. Leaders with one or the other type of expertise were similarly and expectedly effective. Legislators with no expertise were less successful than expected. Greater success of credential or reputation expertise could not be concluded using these measures in this analysis.

Other reasons for success variation could not be extracted from data in this analysis. Even though average passed bills for the high-level experts was twice that for non-experts, the single author falling in the reputation-only level restricted a conclusion about the greater success of reputation experts. The relative utility of institutional and behavioral approaches could not be concluded using these measures and data. In order to understand influence, more contextual information was needed.

Policy, Source, and Expertise

The second analysis demonstrated that influence was associated with types of educational policy, different categorical sources of information, and legislator expertise groups. In the analysis of variance on LRRS scale data, where influence was potential for influence of legislator decisional referents, policy type manipulations produced the expected associations with influence of the educational leadership. Leadership was specified as the
categorical variable of legislature and as a level of the respondent expertise variable.

Distributive policy differed significantly from regulatory and redistributive policies on potential for overall influence; the latter policies did not differ on total influence. Decisional referent influence was produced for each policy type by aggregation of sample scores. Legislature and constituents, respectively the second and first high influences in distributive policy, differed from other sources in importance for the policy decisions. Staff and state agency also differed from other sources, and interest groups differed from all others.

The leadership group differed significantly on outside sources of information, depending more on state agencies and less on constituency than their comparison group peers. Legislature as a cue source was slightly more important for non-experts.

**Information Patterns**

The third analysis demonstrated slight differences in information pattern diversity. Distributive policy differed slightly from redistributive policy, and differed to a greater extent from regulatory policy. Higher diversity and many experts in curriculum decisions meant lower potential influence for any one individual expert in distributive policy. Moderate and low diversity in school finance and teacher certification decisions, respectively,
and fewer experts, meant higher potential influence for the redistributive or regulatory specialist. In this analysis, slightly different influence potential of the two coercive policy arenas was attributed to salience of finance issues in 1993. For Louisiana legislators in this session, the important policy distinction was that between distributive and non-distributive education legislation.

Specific legislator leaders were potentially very influential. Influence was concentrated in a few expert legislators along with even fewer staff and agency experts, and no constituent or interest group experts. Legislator experts were more numerous in distributive than in non-distributive policies, with influentials' identities changing across policies. The legislative policy leadership was potentially influential in all types of policy, and individual leaders had more potential for influence in regulatory and redistributive policies.

The fourth analysis relative to educational information flow among legislators revealed salient educational issues and leadership patterns. Redistributive legislation (e.g., MFP policy, higher education funding) and regulatory legislation (e.g., teacher evaluation program, graduation exit examination) had high and next high salience for legislators. Distributive legislation (e.g., proprietary schools, health care issues) was more salient for the individual legislator.
Committee influence, as described by respondents, was relative to diffuse expertise, proactivity, and formal role. Individual influence was observed as personal and background characteristics such as district base, personal ideology, and general educator experience. Policy expert influence was specified in policy information exchanges and frequent consultation with non-committee colleagues and subgovernment influentials.

Conclusions and Discussion

1. The policy approach produced a more comprehensive account for influence than was possible using previous approaches to legislative study.

Institutional and behavioral approaches were inadequate for comprehension of the dynamics of legislative educational leadership. A higher level of legislator expertise was associated with a greater proportion of legislation success, but reputation and credential expertise were not distinguished in the study. The policy approach used derivatives of these concepts (i.e., legislator reputation expertise, committee membership) and was able to account for some of the variation in influence.

When policies varied, so too did the decisional referent choices of legislators. Overall influence for distributive policy was greater than influence for other policies; moreover, as policy changed and need for policy information changed, importance of information sources
altered accordingly. Policy differences also produced changes in numbers and identities of reputation experts inside and outside the legislature.

The coercion typology as the basis of educational policy variables was accountable for variation in influence. Manipulated curriculum, teacher certification, and Minimum Foundation Program (MFP) formula policies produced the effects expected for distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policy, respectively. Policy manipulations produced slight differences in diversity scores, and also produced the anticipated decrease in number of experts and changes in identity of experts in the expected direction.

In analyses using the policy approach, leadership emerged as important, with complementary results at different levels of analysis. Across policies, legislature and constituency were the most influential of all sources. Distributive policy produced more individual legislators who were experts. Policy committee membership produced more policy subgovernment reliance, and non-membership produced higher dependence on constituency. Variation in the context of education legislation provided the broad perspective for a narrow picture of educational leadership and influence in the legislature.

2. The legislature was the chief source of educational policy information for legislators.
The high influence of legislature in distributive policy helped to distinguish distributive policy from other policies. In all policy arenas, legislature and constituency were principal providers of information for legislators, but the nature of information provided by legislative colleagues and constituents was different. Concentration of power among a few legislators and staff suggested their function was to produce policy information, whereas diversified influence of many constituents suggested their role was to produce political information. This latter role was perhaps concerned more with implications for reelection. This conclusion was supported in several respondents' comments regarding the limited informational value of constituents.

Legislature was second in importance and almost equally influential for differentially expert respondent groups. The leadership group had a balanced reference pattern, depended more on state agencies for information than did their peers, and were more likely to use "other" sources such as regional or national educational institutions and issue networks. It was logical that leaders sought cues externally from policy knowledgeable and shared them internally with peers. By contrast, their peers had a wider range of influences and sought outside cues from district educators or voters to a greater extent. This logic suggested support for the two-stage model of informational flow.
3. Roles of other information sources varied according to informational needs of legislators.

Constituency was highly influential as a categorical source of information, produced a diverse pattern of nominees and no experts, and was more relevant for non-expert legislators. The "educators back home" provided information about district impact of policy decisions. Their information was needed less by expert legislators for the following two reasons: first, the experts tended more to have experience as an educator; and second, their greater responsibility in educational policy matters required more substantive policy information.

Legislative staff and state governmental agencies were moderately influential across policies and groups. The emergence of two reputation expert staffers in all policies and three agency reputation experts (one per policy) was evidence of subgovernment influence in the study. The importance of these subsystem sources suggested that experts had the greater propensity to solicit information and to seek it from knowledgeable and expert professionals.

Interest group influence presented a caveat in interpreting study results. There were consistently low ratings for interest groups in all but one policy and in both expertise groups, and no acknowledged experts were produced. In absolute terms, interest group influence was under-represented in all but three policy arenas in the
study, possibly because of some fragmentation of groups' power but more likely the result of legislators' perception of the negative social acceptability of lobby influence. Nevertheless, relative influence of this source changed across policy arenas in the expected direction and in the policy arena (regulatory) that would have been predicted. This finding did not confound the policy effect, and did not alter conclusions regarding leadership and influence.

4. Policy expertise formed the basis of individual legislators' major role in providing policy information for colleagues.

The policy approach was superior to institutional and behavioral approaches for understanding dynamics of policy relationships. The standard influence measure, authorship of successful legislation, presented one aspect of expertise; the policy approach used measures of expertise which better represented the multi-dimensional context of policy responsiveness.

Redistributive policy arenas had lower potential for individual influence and fewer experts than distributive policy. Emergence in this arena of one non-member reputation expert reinforced the importance of policy expertise in the Louisiana Legislature.

Individual legislator experts were highly influential in all policies; legislator concentration was second only to staff member concentration. The concentration of power
in a few legislators and two staffers implied the presence of micro-system and subsystem arenas of policy as described by (Mazzoni, 1991).

Both expertise groups acknowledged policy reputation expertise as important and identified similar reputation experts. Respondent comments suggested confirmation of the pivotal role of experts in the flow of information. Some effect of educator experience was indirectly accounted for in the reputation and credential expertise measures.

Recommendations for Further Study

1. The policy approach should inform additional studies of influence for educational policy.

Several suggestions for use of the policy approach emerged in the study. First, future legislative educational leadership study should use the policy research model to extend the boundaries of the behavioral research paradigm, and to attempt a larger theoretical statement about policy and implications for leadership. Legislators' individual attitudes and role orientation, and group dynamics, should be viewed through the policy lens. The value-based mode of authority examined in role orientation study should be expanded in future micro-level decision-making study. Naturalistic inquiry using the policy approach would incorporate values, friendship, and policy-related bases of authority in study of leadership roles inside and outside the legislature.
Second, influence provided by other state-level decision-making referents should be studied to complete the picture of state-level educational policy-making. Constituent representation, an important concern in political science literature in all areas, should be examined in the area of education. Policy responsiveness studies would address how policy content is cued and activated by constituent groups, and how policy positions of representatives and the represented reflect ideology, partisan concerns, and attitudes about spending. Responsiveness study in specific policy issues may suggest additional incentives for legislators to assume policy leadership roles.

The state-level referent influence of subsystem sources should be evaluated. Whether or not legislators' dependence for policy information has shifted away from state agencies and toward legislative staff, the finding of a subsystem effect suggests mutuality of these sources' roles in education. Moreover, subgovernment leadership is a multi-dimensional concept: the roles of legislator experts and additional reputation experts need to be studied within the policy subsystem and the policy sector.

Interest group influence, whether in decline or not, has been a research focus since the development of the statewide model of educational interest group influence by Iannaccone (1967). The obvious problems in the study of
interest group influence flow from its having been under-studied, under-tested, and under-measured. The policy approach used in this study provides a framework for measurement of the influence of interest groups that could produce breakthroughs in this area of politics of education.

Third, the policy approach should be used for studying policy decision-making in other educational institutions, such as state and local boards of education, and other settings of time and place. Policy typologies following Lowi have successfully explained urban policy decisions (Peterson, 1981) and local school tax elections (Weaver & Parent, in press). Evidence in this study of legislators' seeking policy information from regional and national institutions suggests that policy issue networks (Kirst & Meister, 1983) are a future influence on decisions. Multi-state studies in education (Mitchell, 1981; Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1981) should be replicated and extended through the policy model to produce new information about policy decision-making. Single state longitudinal study in Minnesota (Mazzoni, 1992) should be replicated in other states in order to apprehend the effects of shifts over time in policy context and influence.

2. Policy analysis studies are needed for advancements in educational policy theory and practice.
Policy context, the external environment of policy, needs better explication in research. Contextual variables tested in this study and others relative to decision locus (Mazzoni, 1991; Uslaner & Weber, 1977) should be constructed using various techniques. Nontraditional forms of instrumentation are needed to increase sensitivity to changes in policy context and changes in political interaction surrounding policy.

Content, the inner environment of a policy decision, also needs more study. Policy information should be distinguished in research from political information, the type needed for reelection purposes, in order to untangle some of the problematic aspects of constituent and interest group influence. Advancement in policy theory will require more effort in the following areas: empirical testing using nontraditional techniques and methodologies, replacements for subject matter distinctions and better assignment of policy typologies, and new approaches to measurement and manipulation of policy concepts.

Policy analysis foundations and research should receive more emphasis in the educational administration curriculum in universities. Regardless of continued or expanded state legislative involvement in educational governance, policy-makers and their advisers at all levels of education from schools to district and state levels, need a better understanding of theories, methodologies, and
utilization of policy research. Educational decisions guided by social science research can lead to better implementation, more realization of shared goals, and improvement of education for young citizens.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX A

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE AND RESOURCE SURVEY
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE AND RESOURCE SURVEY

Instructions: In the following three types of education legislation, rate the sources of information for the issues according to the amount of influence each would be able to have. List specific persons or groups wherever possible.
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE AND RESOURCE SURVEY

TYPE 1
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM AND CURRICULUM

The following are a group of individual bills providing for the development of new educational programs and curricula. Each is an example of distributive education policy. These decisions impact the distribution of benefits and costs of education among groups and individuals.

NEW PROGRAMS AND CURRICULA

The 1993 legislative bills provide for study and/or implementation of the following programs and courses:

- AIDS education and community-based grant programs;
- Multicultural education;
- Parenthood education and pilot on-site day care programs;
- School-based health clinics in Orleans Parish;
- State environmental education program and studies.

Where would you go to obtain information about any one of these educational program and curriculum decisions?

Rate the following information sources according to the amount of influence each would be able to have, from no influence to much influence on the issue. Specify persons or groups where possible.

State Education Agencies (Specify agency or individuals)

( ) No Influence ( ) A Little Influence ( ) Some Influence ( ) Much Influence

Legislature (Specify individual legislators)

( ) No Influence ( ) A Little Influence ( ) Some Influence ( ) Much Influence

Legislative Staff (Specify person[s])

( ) No Influence ( ) A Little Influence ( ) Some Influence ( ) Much Influence

Interest Groups (Specify group[s] or person[s])

( ) No Influence ( ) A Little Influence ( ) Some Influence ( ) Much Influence

Constituents (Specify if possible)

( ) No Influence ( ) A Little Influence ( ) Some Influence ( ) Much Influence

Other (Specify)

( ) No Influence ( ) A Little Influence ( ) Some Influence ( ) Much Influence
TYPE II

EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS AND REQUIREMENTS

The following are decisions which set educational standards and requirements for the certification of teachers. They are examples of regulatory education policy. These decisions place regulations and controls upon the performance of teachers, universities, schools and districts.

CERTIFICATION OF TEACHERS

The 1993 legislation includes the following mandates:

- Establishes continuous teaching service and professional development as basis for teacher certification;
- Eliminates classes of teacher certificates and certificate renewals based on teacher evaluations;
- Exempts student teaching requirement for certain teacher aides or paraprofessionals;
- Requires human relations skills training in teacher education and in-service programs;
- Requires mathematics competence as standards in teacher education programs;

Where would you go to obtain information about these or other educational standards and requirements decisions?

Rate the following information sources according to the amount of influence each would be able to have, from no influence to much influence on the issue. Specify persons or groups where possible.

| State Education Agencies (Specify agency or individuals) | ( ) No Influence ( ) A Little Influence ( ) Some Influence ( ) Much Influence |
|--------------------------------------------------------|

| Legislature (Specify individual legislators) | ( ) No Influence ( ) A Little Influence ( ) Some Influence ( ) Much Influence |
|---------------------------------------------|

| Legislative Staff (Specify person[s]) | ( ) No Influence ( ) A Little Influence ( ) Some Influence ( ) Much Influence |
|--------------------------------------|

| Interest Groups (Specify group[s] or person[s]) | ( ) No Influence ( ) A Little Influence ( ) Some Influence ( ) Much Influence |
|------------------------------------------------|

| Constituents (Specify if possible) | ( ) No Influence ( ) A Little Influence ( ) Some Influence ( ) Much Influence |
|------------------------------------|

| Other (Specify) | ( ) No Influence ( ) A Little Influence ( ) Some Influence ( ) Much Influence |
|-----------------|


The following decisions concern resource reallocation for the purpose of student equity. The revised Minimum Foundation Program (MFP) formula is an example of redistributive education policy. These decisions provide for a more equitable distribution of the economic costs and benefits of education among school districts.

IMPLEMENTATION OF MFP FORMULA
The 1993 legislation makes the following provisions:

Approval of the MFP formula as adopted by BESE on April 22, 1993;
Continuation of the MFP formula adopted and approved in 1992;
Authorization of legislative amendment of the MFP formula proposed by BESE (Constitutional Amendment);
Reduction of appropriation to not less than 98% of the amount required to fully fund the MFP (Constitutional Amendment);
Requirement that MFP formula include a percentage adjustment factor for inflation.

Where would you go to obtain information about this or another educational equity decision?

Rate the following information sources according to the amount of influence each would be able to have, from no influence to much influence on the issue. Specify persons or groups where possible.

State Education Agencies (Specify agency or individuals) _______________

(   ) No Influence (   ) A Little Influence (   ) Some Influence (   ) Much Influence

Legislature (Specify individual legislators) _____________________________

(   ) No Influence (   ) A Little Influence (   ) Some Influence (   ) Much Influence

Legislative Staff (Specify person[s]) _________________________________

(   ) No Influence (   ) A Little Influence (   ) Some Influence (   ) Much Influence

Interest Groups (Specify group[s] or person[s]) _________________________

(   ) No Influence (   ) A Little Influence (   ) Some Influence (   ) Much Influence

Constituents (Specify if possible) _________________________________

(   ) No Influence (   ) A Little Influence (   ) Some Influence (   ) Much Influence

Other (Specify) ____________________________________________________

(   ) No Influence (   ) A Little Influence (   ) Some Influence (   ) Much Influence
APPENDIX B

LOUISIANA LEGISLATORS' SPECIFIC SOURCES OF INFORMATION
LOUISIANA LEGISLATORS’ SPECIFIC SOURCES OF INFORMATION

AGENCY
Department of Education
Board of Elementary and Secondary Education
Governor’s Education Office
Board of Regents
Department of Health and Hospitals

LEGISLATURE
Education Policy Committee
Black Caucus
Rural Caucus
Budget Reduction Committee
Audit Council

LEGISLATIVE STAFF
Education Committee Staff
Fiscal Committee Staff
Legislative Fiscal Office
Legislative Auditor
Legislative Library

INTEREST GROUPS
Louisiana Association of Educators (LAE)
Louisiana Federation of Teachers (LFT)
Associated Professional Educators of Louisiana (APEL)
Louisiana School Boards Association (LSBA)
Louisiana Association of School Superintendents (LASS)
Louisiana Association of School Executives (LASE)
Louisiana Association of School Business Managers (LASBM)
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI)
Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana (PAR)
Parent Teacher Association (PTA)
Citizens for Educational Freedom (CEF)
League of Women Voters
Junior League
New Orleans Public Schools
New Orleans Metropolitan Area Council
Special education interests
Vocational education interests

CONSTITUENCY
School Board/System
Parish Superintendent(s), Staff
School Principal(s)
Teachers
Parents
Business Community
Local Library Research Staff
Self
OTHER
Southern Regional Education Board (SREB)
Education Commission of the States (ECS)
Southwest Educational Development Laboratory (SEDL)
National School Boards Association (NSBA)
National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL)
University College of Education
University President
VITA

Sue Wells Weaver was raised and educated in DeSoto Parish in northern Louisiana. She received the B.A., M.A., and M.A. in Education degrees from Northwestern State University. Weaver is a former Assistant to the State Superintendent of Education and a former member of the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board. She is an experienced secondary teacher and university instructor in English, and is certified as principal, supervisor of instruction, and program evaluator. Her professional affiliations include the American Educational Research Association, Phi Delta Kappa, and Delta Kappa Gamma. Her article on voter support in school tax elections, co-authored with Dr. T. Wayne Parent, appears in a 1994 issue of Urban Education. She and her husband, Burton, have seven children.
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: Sue Wells Weaver

Major Field: Education

Title of Dissertation: A Policy Approach to Educational Leadership in the State Legislature

Approved:

[Signatures]

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signatures]

Date of Examination:

October 26, 1993