Toward Understanding Post-Structuralism and Curriculum.

Wen-song Hwu

Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation

https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/5516

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI
University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeib Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600
Toward understanding post-structuralism and curriculum

Hwu, Wen-Song, Ph.D.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1993
TOWARD UNDERSTANDING POST-STRUCTURALISM AND CURRICULUM

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Curriculum and Instruction

by

Wen-Song Hwu
B.Ed., National Taiwan Normal University, 1981
M.S., University of Wisconsin-Stout, 1986
May 1993
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my most sincere gratitude to Dr. William Pinar, my mentor, for his unforgettable support, guidance and loving friendship. I would also like to thank Dr. Jacques Daignault for his understanding and help in transforming me into a person whom I would like to be.

Dr. William Doll has significantly influenced my thought during this study. His constant encouragement, probing questions and father-like advice have helped me focus my study; he has shown me a direction for my career. Dr. Ted Aoki is a "true" teacher, who has helped me to "remember" who I really am in this study. I also thank Dr. Spencer Maxcy for his intellectually stimulating coffee-conversations with me. Dr. William Reynolds is appreciated for his help and encouragement throughout these years.

I would also like to thank Drs. Frances Beck, William Beck, Marie Weiss, and Bernard Weiss for their constant emotional support during this study.

Finally, I thank my parents and I dedicate this study to them. I hope someday they will be proud of me.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** .......................................................................................................................... ii

**TABLE OF CONTENTS** ............................................................................................................................ iii

**ABSTRACT** ................................................................................................................................................... vii

**INTRODUCTION** ........................................................................................................................................ 1

  - Background ........................................................................................................................................ 1
  - Journey ............................................................................................................................................... 5
  - Personal Experience ......................................................................................................................... 7

**CHAPTER ONE:**

**HISTORICAL FORMATION OF POST-STRUCTURALIST THOUGHT** ............... 9

  - Scenario ............................................................................................................................................... 9
  - Abbreviated History of Structuralism ............................................................................................... 12
  - Important Structuralists .................................................................................................................... 19
    - Ferdinand de Saussure ..................................................................................................................... 19
    - Claude Lévi-Strauss ......................................................................................................................... 22
    - Jacques Lacan .................................................................................................................................. 24
    - Roland Barthes (early) .................................................................................................................... 26
  - Limits or Problems of Structuralism ............................................................................................ 27
  - Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 37

**CHAPTER TWO:**

**REVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY POST-STRUCTURALISM** ............................................ 39

  - Critique of Reason or Enlightenment Rationality ........................................................................... 39
  - Rationality after the Enlightenment ............................................................................................... 43
  - Phenomenology and the Rise of Post-structuralism .................................................................... 45
  - What is Post-structuralism? ............................................................................................................. 50
  - Post-structuralist Orientations ....................................................................................................... 55
    - Subjectivity ..................................................................................................................................... 55
    - Identity and Self ............................................................................................................................... 57
    - Totalization and Structure ............................................................................................................. 59
  - Prominent Post-structuralists .......................................................................................................... 62
    - Michel Foucault:
      - Discourse and the Power/Knowledge Relation ........................................................................... 62
Jacques Derrida:
Text, Differance and Deconstruction.................................68
Gilles Deleuze:
Difference and Sense.................................................................72
Jean-François Lyotard:
Differend, Metanarrative and the Post-modern..........................................................78
Michel Serres:
Science, Literature and Philosophy..........................................................80
Post-structuralism and Controversy..........................................................84
Remarks................................................................................................................86

CHAPTER THREE:
POST-STRUCTURALISM IN CURRICULUM STUDIES:
BEGINNINGS....................................................................................................89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Curriculum Discourse</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-structuralism and Curriculum</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge and Curriculum</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum Praxis</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading and Curriculum</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problematics</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deconstructive Pedagogy</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Contemporary Curriculum Theorists</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Taubman:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-gendered Curriculum and Student/Teacher Relation</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleo Cherryholmes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-structural Investigation</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Wexler:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the New Sociology of Education</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca Martusewicz:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-modern Feminist Critique</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Doll:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Post-Modern Perspective</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Pinar:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autobiography and the Architecture of Self</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ted Aoki:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound of Pedagogical Calling</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After-thoughts</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER FOUR:
THE WORK OF JACQUES DAIGNAULT ...................................................126

Post-structuralism Encountered .........................................................126
Daignault's Staging-Thinking .............................................................128
Post-structuralism "as" Pedagogy .........................................................129
The Indecent Curriculum Machine:
Who's Afraid of Sisyphus? (1982a) .............................................130
To Make Someone Know as We Make Someone Laugh:
A Perverse Analysis of Promise and Desire in Curriculum (1982b) ....136
Analogy in Education: An Archaeology without Subsoil (1983) .......140
Curriculum Beyond Words, With Words (1984a) .........................143
Curriculum and Action-Research:
An Artistic Activity in a Perverse Way (1984b) .........................148
Semiotics of Educational Expression (1986) ..............................153
Autobiography of a Style (1988a) ....................................................158
. . .Yn X Cursus [. . .] TIA2 Arts aRe. . . (1988b) .........................162
The Language of Research and the Language of Practice:
Neither One nor the Other Pedagogy (1988c) ...............................164
Where Did the Subject Go? (1989a) ..............................................168
Curriculum as Composition:
Who is the Composer? (1989b) .....................................................169
Education, Poststructuralism and Local Emancipation (1990) .......173
Commentary ..................................................................................175

CHAPTER FIVE:
TOWARD A POST-STRUCTURALIST CURRICULUM AND PEDAGOGY: A TAOIST CONNECTION ..................181

Taoism and Zen Philosophy .............................................................182
Connections Between Taoism and Post-structuralism ..................185
Displacement of the Self .................................................................190
Language as Paradox ....................................................................192
Curriculum and the Aesthetics of Existence .................................194
Body-effect and Self-stylization .....................................................198
ABSTRACT

This dissertation describes extensions of post-structuralism in contemporary curriculum discourses. Post-structuralist thought is mainly associated with the seminal work of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Jean-François Lyotard, and Michel Serres.

Post-structural criticism and analysis challenge prevailing structuralist approaches and question the fundamental assumptions upon which these approaches rest. A key assumption of structural approaches is that all phenomena are constituted by an underlying structure. In curriculum, these structural assumptions (often scientific) remain unacknowledged and thus are immunized against criticism; rather, they are incorporated into the preferred structural analyses, interpretations, and organizations promoted by the promise of order and rationality. The notion of "rationality"—scientific in essence—has been the dominating force of curricular "planning." The problem is not that reason has turned into domination, but that we do not fully recognize its domination. Chapter One and Chapter Two portray historical formations of post-structuralism in order to identify specific threads or themes which lay a basis for understanding post-structuralist elements of contemporary curriculum theory.

The author investigates the extensions (in Chapters Three and Four) of post-structuralism in contemporary curriculum theorizing. Working from concepts of "subject," "history," and "differences" identified in major works by Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, and
Serres, this study identifies those concepts of these scholars that surface in contemporary curriculum discourses.

This study explores the works of eight curriculum theorists now drawing on contemporary post-structuralist thought. This focus will not only give rise to reexamining the questions and problematics of curriculum, but will also put forward a post-structural framework for curriculum inquiry, which might provide a rethinking and reexamining of curriculum discourses.

A final purpose of this study is to link aspects of Eastern Taoism and Zen philosophy with post-structuralist thought which will provide curriculum theorists with an intercultural understanding of "the play of unrecuperable differences" and irresolvable paradoxes. The notion of Tao and Zen may provide a useful counterweight to Western logocentric thought and the metaphysics of presence. In addition, the connection (passage) between Taoist and post-structuralist thought may serve to illuminate the questioning post-structuralism posits. Curriculum as post-structuralist text may vitalize the curriculum field itself.
INTRODUCTION

However far man may extend himself with his knowledge, however objective he may appear to himself—ultimately he reaps nothing but his own biography. (Nietzsche, 1984, p. 23)

From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art. (Foucault, 1977, p. 237)

Background

In this passage Foucault expresses what has become one of the central issues of curriculum studies in the 1990s: The problematic of the formation and technology of the self and the problematic of theory and practice in curriculum. There have been many emerging theoretical approaches and practical implications in curriculum reform movements since the launching of Sputnik in 1957 (Jackson, 1992). Beginning in the 1960s, discontent with dominant positivist orientations, critical analyses and theoretical understanding of curriculum were introduced to the curriculum studies, including work associated with neo-Marxism, critical theory, hermeneutics, feminism, semiotics, psychoanalysis, phenomenology, postmodernism. These diverse traditions have been extensively employed in curriculum research (Pinar, 1988b, 1992; Jackson, 1992).

Throughout my graduate studies, I have been intrigued by post-structuralists' thinking and their arguments. When I read post-structuralists' works, there is a sense that what I read I have thought before, albeit not realized or articulated. Post-structuralists raise
radically different questions (than the ones posed by their predecessors, the structuralists and phenomenologists) concerning the problematics of knowledge, language and subjectivity that are fundamental to human understanding and existence. The curriculum question, and my question as well, is no longer the Kantian question of "what can we know?", but rather "how has the path of my knowing been determined?" and "how have I been situated to experience the real, which is a product of that knowing?" (Foucault, 1970, p. 229) The whole idea of language as a sign system has been displaced from questioning its intrinsic nature to problematizing its exterior field, that space of distribution within which signs function as signs, as elements deployed and activated through a network of relations. This is the result of relations established among institutions, economic and social processes, systems of norms, etc.—in short, in "a field of exteriority that is not contained in the object," (Foucault, 1972, p. 45), nor can be formalized as grammar, logic or speech-act conventions. The dichotomy of subject and object, fundamental to the project of modernity, entails the search for certainty and the effort to use reason to establish absolute and universal truth. In this view, the knowing subject is the self-conscious guarantor of all knowledge. Humankind is the source of all truth. The post-structuralists' diagnostic problematization of the "death of man" or the "disappearance of subject" is neither abstract nor subjectless; rather, it is an exploration of concrete bodies and their circumstances in order to open new possibilities. How do knowledge discourses create subject and deploy power? "Since man was constituted at a time when language was doomed to dispersion,
will he not be dispersed when language regains its unity?” (Foucault, 1970, p. 386) What is the linkage between the universal "I" and the individual "me"? What is the relationship among power, knowledge and the self and how does it function? These problematics do not replace a discredited epistéme. Rather, they create an epistemological space through the displacement of old one; it is for us to realize our position vis-à-vis that displacement ceaselessly postpones and defers, and thus to make connections with ourselves. These displacements or dislocations of problematization open up a gap that can be extended close to another "functions of singularization"--new variables of space and time--so as to obtain a connection, a relational complexity (Deleuze, 1991, p. 94). The connections among post-structuralism, curriculum and myself seem to be enmeshed, and therefore the purpose of this study is to untangle post-structuralism and its meanings, curriculum implications, including efforts at self-understanding.

The ideas of difference, multiplicity, transgression, non-hierarchical and non-monolithic discourses challenge educators (curriculum scholars in particular) to re-think their theoretical understandings and daily practices. One central tenet of these post-structuralist notions is to argue that any approach which claims to be a universal or totalizing realization and transcendental justification is doomed to self-exhaustion. Today the objective or aim of developing general theories or universal claims is vulnerable to self-deconstruction, or is regarded simply as "anachronistic" (Burbules and Rice, 1991). The merging of contemporary debates has occurred to the extent that it is difficult to identify what distinguishes a
"curriculum theory" from social-historical-political-cultural critique concerning the discourse of curriculum in general. These merging and diverse themes have been at the core of contemporary curriculum discourses.

Many curriculum scholars have claimed that we seem to be on the verge of a major "paradigm shift" (Kuhn, 1970; Brown 1988) or an "epistemological break" (Althusser, 1970); or rather as Jean-François Lyotard (1984b) has termed it, the "post-modern condition." As Lyotard says, any theory that looks to a metadiscourse of emancipation in order to legitimate itself should be described as "modern" and therefore as irredeemably inappropriate to contemporary conditions (Lyotard, 1984b). It is in a space of "heterogeneity" (Pefanis, 1991) or a state of "heteroglossia" (Bakhtin, 1981; Whitson, 1988) that we find ourselves in the midst of a site among diverging discourses. While in the celebration of "difference," we are urged to make connections, not to adopt a merely pluralistic approach, but to unravel the nexus of power, knowledge and self among difference, to "translate" one from another (Serres, 1983).

Deleuze (1991) also notes:

[Concept does not die simply when one wants it to, but only when new functions in new fields discharge it. This is also why it is never very interesting to criticize a concept: It is better to build the new functions and discover the new fields that makes it useless or inadequate. (p. 94)]

This study is also an attempt to suggest connections between post-structuralism and curriculum. It will also suggest that the Eastern Taoist thought and Zen philosophy may shed light on
understanding these connections. The implications of these connections for an emerging curriculum theory represent one focal point of this study.

Journey

Since I was in the elementary school, I have been fascinated with the teaching profession. It is, in part, due to the Confucian tradition that teaching is a divine profession—to be a teacher, is to live meaningfully, to study, to be a *literatus* (wen). "Wen," my first name (middle name in Chinese), can also be translated as literature, writing or to write; somehow I always feel connected to that idea. The Confucian idea of being a teacher is to decipher the "Tao," to pass on knowledge, and to enlighten pupils. After I entered the Normal University to study to be a teacher, I began to study Taoism and Zen philosophy which pushed me further toward understanding my own situatedness in the world. Zen stories are always refreshing to remember. One story points to my current thought:

One day when Ma-tsu was walking with Po-Chang, a flock of wild geese flew overhead. Ma-tsu asked Po-chang, "What is there?" "Wild geese, master." "Where are they now?" "They have flown away." Ma-tsu seized Po-chang's nose and gave it a violent twist, so that Po-chang cried out in pain. The master said, "How could you say that the wild geese have flown away? They have been here from the very beginning." Po-chang was immediately awakened. (Cheng, 1991, p. 65)

While I was teaching, there were certain dilemmas I faced everyday. I tried to resolve them, but to no avail. Questions surrounded me constantly. Is there another alternative to the
In 1985, I came to the United States to pursue these questions. It was at the University of Wisconsin-Stout where I first encountered hermeneutics and critical theory; I was immersed in understanding the relation between the individual and the world. Through Gadamer and the Frankfurt school I realized that notions of meaning, interpretation and understanding are central to curriculum studies. I had been studying the work of curricular scholars such as Michael Apple, Eliot Eisner, Paulo Freire, Maxine Greene, Henry Giroux, Madeleine Grumet, Dwayne Huebner, Herbert Kliebard, James MacDonald, William Pinar, and Philip Wexler since William Reynolds introduced me to the curriculum field. In studying curriculum and pedagogy, I found those dilemmas I had previously encountered reemerging into my thought. Then I decided to work with William Pinar whom I thought would be helpful to my study.

At LSU I studied postmodernism with William Doll, semiotics with Tony Whitson, curriculum theory with William Pinar, and phenomenology with Ted Aoki. Most importantly I was reawakened by French post-structuralism through studying with Jacques Daignault. Each of these teachers and traditions opened up new possibilities for me to deal with curriculum theory and self-understanding. These individuals allowed me to trace my personal journey from the East to the West, then back to the East. My Eastern
heritage has enabled me to recognize the constitution and significance of Western arguments and their Eurocentric assumptions. Through study of post-structuralism, I have attempted to discover a space in order to think "difference" and to transgress "the order of things" (Foucault, 1970).

**Personal Experience**

As a Chinese student, mainly influenced by Confucius, I have come to understand that each tradition in philosophy has its origin in the unity of human experience and in human reason or thinking. In the sense, life refers to an attitude, a way of being in the world. The idea that anyone can be whatever one wants to be as long as one keeps working hard is engrained in many students' minds; everything is possible if only one works hard enough. I am no exception.

The problematic of language is the cornerstone of understanding human existence. Language is not only a mimetic conception of reality, but also a deictic one. Its purpose is to "point" to reality, not merely to "represent" or "mirror." Post-structural thinking is to show an attitude, an ethics that traverses the "in-between" among discourses. It is an attitude of "detachment," of conceptual configuration which determines whether an action--its probable or actual consequence--is good or evil. It is the effect produced through discursive practices which conditions the possibilities of discursive formation. Another Zen story illustrates this point:

Liang-chieh who forded a river with Master Mi. Liang-chieh was said to have asked Mi: "What kind of
Post-structuralism is like the art of fording a river without wetting the feet. It teaches one to be moral without being bound to or having to hold onto a set of rules and thus to sever that attachment. Post-structuralism is not opposed to morality, yet it is an ethics without morals. In this regard, teaching is like an art; it is an "artless art," and perhaps unteachable. It is achieved by each individual deploying a network of historical power/knowledge relationships. Teaching is not what one does; it happens. This study attempts to make these and other connections between post-structuralism and curriculum, and in elaborating them, suggests a new stage of curriculum theory forthcoming. To elucidate in detail the elements of this new theory is outside the scope of this study, which is transitional in character. In the last chapter, however, I will draw a path from the East (Taoism and Zen philosophy) to the West (post-structuralism) back to the East (a Taoist post-structuralism), which represents not just one path of one person, but perhaps a possibility for a new intercultural field of curriculum theory.
CHAPTER ONE
HISTORICAL FORMATION OF POST-STRUCTURALIST
THOUGHT

Life reiterating itself in order to recover its hold on itself during its fall—as if holding its breath in an instantaneous apprehension of its origin; but the reiteration of life by itself would be hopeless without the simulacrum of the artist who, by reproducing its spectacle, succeeds in delivering himself from reiteration. (Klossowski, 1970, p. 15)

Scenario

In the beginning, I would like to clarify the term "post-" which was, and has been, a trendy one used by many scholars in various disciplines (post-Kantian, post-Marxism, post-industrial, post-liberal, post-modern, etc.). For some, post- means something that is "after," "beyond," "above" or "transcending"; for others, it means virtually "anti-" or "neo-"; for still others, it means simply to "stop" (an anagram for "post"), or rather to step behind or beneath, to subvert, to deconstruct. In this last sense post-structuralism is a way to the opening of ambivalence between "oppositions" proposed by structuralists through the "play of differences" or "double science," those oppositions which essentially constitute binary logics in metaphysical thinking, such as subject/object, presence/absence, speech/writing, signified/signifier, truth/error, and the like. In these oppositions, a hierarchy is established by privileging one side of each binary opposition (for example, presence has come to be valued over absence). Post-structuralism attempts to overturn and dismantle this hierarchical formation. This interpretation of post will
be the one employed in this study. As Michel Serres suggests, we need to consider beings rather than names, relations rather than beings, and movements rather than slogans, paths rather than movements (Serres, 1989b). Serres (1989b) notes: "The slave and the master are kneeling together; they both venerate the relation which binds them. . . . Their place changes, the spot of relation remains" (p. 92). Gilles Deleuze also argues that even if there are only two terms, there is an "AND" between the two, which is neither the one nor the other, nor the one which becomes the other, but which constitutes the "multiplicity" from within. Deleuze (1987b) remarks:

It is always possible to undo dualism from the inside, by tracing the line of flight which passes between the two terms or the two sets, the narrow stream which belongs neither to the one nor the other, but draws both into a non-parallel evolution, into a heterochronous becoming. (p. 35)

Structuralism in France has two different traditions. The one I will study is derived from the social sciences, and was mainly developed by Ferdinand de Saussure (linguistics, semiology—the theory of the sign), Claude Lévi-Strauss (anthropology), early Roland Barthes (literary criticism), and Jacques Lacan (psychoanalysis). The other is derived from a tradition in the natural sciences—mathematics, the leading exponents of which are the Nicolas Bourbaki group (mathematics) and Jean Piaget (biology, mathematics and psychology). While remaining committed to its major tenets, both groups provide their own alternatives to those problems embedded in humanism's fundamental assumptions. The main
problem with humanism is the prioritization of the subject in a mythologized fashion; the belief that "man" has a special kind of being; that "he" and his thought have a privileged status in the world; that the subject is at the center of the signification it generates.

Structuralism seems convinced that there is an elementary and underlying "structure" or "system" which can be systematized and used as a method of scientific knowledge. Structural analysis is to reveal the underlying fundamental structure which is common to all human activities, and to make it intelligible. Such a fundamental structure becomes an essence without which no one could be a one. According to Josué Harari, in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-structuralist Criticism (1979), structuralism or a structuralist "tendency of thought" can be summarized as follows:

The rejection of the concept of the 'full subject' to the benefit of that of structure; (2) the loss of pertinence of the traditional "form/content" division insofar as for all structuralist theories content derives its reality from its structure; and (3) at the methodological level, a stress on codification and systematization. (1979, p. 27)

Philip Lewis examined Vincent Descombes' Modern French Philosophy (1986) and remarked that Descombes had characterized three primary themes of semiological structuralism: (a) "The signifier precedes the signified"; (b) "Meaning arises out of non-meaning"; (c) "The subject submits to the law of the signifier" (1986, pp. 95-97). Then he concluded that the structures, in structuralism, emerge in large scale social and cultural contexts, "make themselves" independently of subjects. "Myths think themselves through us," says Lévi-Strauss (Caws, 1988, p. 29).
These characteristics give rise to the following questions raised by post-structuralists: What is the relation between subject and structure? How does this relationship become interdependent? Why is there a notion of an overall pattern in history? In all these questions, the isomorphic idea between propositions and reality, in terms of the signifier and the signified, comes under suspicion. Also the hierarchical relation is denied; the notion of stability in either structural linguistics by Saussure or cultural anthropology by Lévi-Strauss is brought into question (Derrida, 1976, 1978). In short, post-structuralism involves a critique of metaphysics, of reason, of the concepts of history, of identity, of the subject, and of truth.

Abbreviated History of Structuralism

It can be said that structuralism was inaugurated in linguistics and anthropology, particularly in the works of Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss. Each tried to explain human reality, one through literary and linguistic theory and the other through anthropology (Scholes, 1974; Culler, 1975; Clarke, 1981; Rex, 1984; Sturrock, 1982, 1986; Caws, 1988). Structuralist theory arrived in the United States during the early 1970s, founded, in part, on a model of language proposed by Saussure. Language, in Saussure's mind, is a system, a whole, a body of rules, independent of any speaker, historically given, on which speakers are forced to draw; it also is purely "relational." The "sign," Saussure states, is comprised of "langue" (language) and "parole" (speech) (Saussure, 1959). He asserts that the supremacy of the totality is langue over parole; in other words, langue is primary, parole is secondary. Another key
idea of Saussure's is the distinction between "signifier" and "signified" which may be regarded as the central tenet in the structuralist approach. According to Saussure, "signifier" can be said to be a sound-image, or its graphic equivalent; on the other hand, "signified" is considered as the concept or meaning. The relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary--Saussure calls this relation "sign" (Saussure, 1959). Signification is the process or activity of relating the signifier to the signified within a system of differences between signs; in other words, speech precedes writing. As Terry Eagleton (1983) remarks "there is no inherent reason why these three marks (c-a-t) should mean 'cat,' other than cultural and historical convention" (p. 97). Saussure (1959) states:

Language is a system that has its own arrangement. Comparison with chess will bring out the point. In chess, what is external can be separated relatively easily from what is internal. The fact that the game passed from Persia to Europe is external: against that, everything having to do with its system and rules is internal. If I use ivory chessmen instead of wooden ones, the change has no effect on the system; but if I decrease or increase the number of chessmen, this change has a profound effect on the 'grammar' of the game. One must always distinguish between what is internal and what is external. In such instance one can determine the nature of the phenomenon by applying this rule: everything that changes the system in any way is internal. (p. 22)

Besides linguistic structural analysis, there are anthropological approaches, scientific in nature, toward understanding human relation and existence. Lévi-Strauss is a cultural anthropologist. He insists that he fully recognizes the "autonomy" of society. For him, the individual can exist only in society, but society has effective
reality only in the individual psyche. It is no longer possible to see reality as something out there, a fixed order of things which language merely reflects. On this assumption, there is a natural connection between word and thing. In his long study of relations of kinship and systems of myth, he not only attempts to develop an objective scientific analysis of meaningful cultural phenomena, but he also gives his structural analysis a psychological foundation and insists that this foundation is provided by a rational unconscious.

Simon Clarke argues that Lévi-Strauss goes on to specify the "fundamental structures of the mind" which underlie "reciprocity"--a spontaneous response to the experience of opposition between self and other. These structures which, Lévi-Strauss (1969) insists are "universal," are three:

1. The exigency of the rule as a rule;  
2. The notion of reciprocity as the most immediate form of integrating the opposition between self and the others; and finally,  
3. The synthetic nature of the gift, i.e., that the agreed transfer of a valuable from one individual to another makes these individuals into partners, and adds a new quality to the valuable transferred. (pp. 75, 84)

It is in this sense that modern French structuralists reasoned that if we know the word is formed by language—in Saussure's view, language as a system of signs—then language may be said to constitute our knowledge of the world; in other words, language is the only reality since knowledge can be represented or communicated only through and in linguistic form. Terry Eagleton (1983), commenting on structuralism, says that "reality is not reflected by language but produced by it" (p. 108). It is assumed by structuralists that the system of language, its construction, is
explicable without reference to the intentions of the user: the structure of mentality is derived from the observable structure of language, rather than presumed to be knowable as itself a cause of language. Structure can be analyzed as if it existed autonomously (Megill, 1985; Descombes, 1986). Structures define practices that themselves change the structures. We can conclude that the structural analysis assumes that through language the world can be described, actions appropriately identified, events truthfully depicted.

What is structuralism? The answer to this question may be different to different people. Some identify structuralism and semiotics as the sciences of the sign, as systems of signs (Saussure, 1959). Others see it as a sort of scientific methodology to various inquiries (Sturrock, 1981, 1986). Still others regard structuralism as "a movement of mind" (Scholes, 1974, p. 1). These different emphases concerning structures are difficult to isolate from one another for they are interrelated. As Jonathan Culler (1975) notes: "One cannot define structuralism by examining how the word has been used; that would lead only to despair" (p. 3). A number of participants, including Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes (in his early works), Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, have devoted much of their efforts to discussion (if not definition) of this mode of thought; each has done so in a different and ambiguous way based on the author's own interpretations and suited to his own purposes.

According to J. G. Merquior (1986), structuralism can be summarized as follows: A "style of thought" in the humanist wing of
knowledge, a result of disappointment with so-called humanism, an "anti-humanism" or an "anti-historicism" (pp. 2-3). Structuralism was born out of a "revulsion against the existentialist cast of mind" (Merquior, 1986, p. 6). Because existential humanism asserted the primacy of consciousness, or of the subject which has been rejected by most structuralists, the "death of the subject" and "the assault on realism" have been two provocative slogans for many structuralists. Eagleton (1983) remarks that the subject, for structuralists, was effectively "reduced" to the function of an impersonal structure. In his view, the new subject is really the "system" or structure itself. Structuralism is, according to Eagleton (1983), an attempt to apply linguistic theory to objects and activities other than language itself.

Eve Tavor Bannet, in Structuralism and the Logic of Dissent (1989), argues that the label of structuralism is problematical if it is regarded as a description of method. Conversely, she insists that we may begin to think of it ideologically. The ideological implications of structuralism in France are made clear, for instance, in Descombes' Modern French Philosophy (1986) and Rabinow's French Modern (1989). Here the assertion is made that structuralism was looking for a base on which to build a rationalist human philosophy, while rejecting phenomenology and existentialism. The central ideological tenet of structuralism, remarks Bannet (1989), is "language as a system defines society as a system and also the forms of thought," that "it brings into accord, because it engenders, mental structure and social structures" (p. 3). It can also be said that structuralism wants to preserve the principles of the Enlightenment in the face of the onslaught of irrationalism. As Clarke (1981) puts it,
Structuralism therefore sought to integrate the whole of human existence in a rational synthesis rooted in the individual mind: to restore the unity of reason and emotion, intellect and experience as the basis of human existence. (p. 32)

More fundamentally, its central notion is that certain basic structures or systems govern and explain any object of study. The notion or problematic of "structure" is the central element in any structuralist's or its counterpart's mind; it is not on the basis of human existence, but as the basis. For some, the structures of structuralism are "generally subsumed under a model, a master structure explicated by analysis as the basic 'mechanics of meaning' obtaining in any given area of social life" (Merquior, 1986, p. 7). For others, a structure should be understood as a set of "relations" among entities that form the elements of a system; "the structure will be said to be 'concrete' if the relations are actually embodied in some system, 'abstract' if they are merely specified but not so embodied" (Caws, 1988, p. 13). For still others, structural analysis begins with the structure--relations that, defined in a purely formal way by certain properties, characterize a set of elements, the nature of which is not specified. This analysis demonstrates that a certain cultural content (kinship system, or myth) is a "model" of that structure, or a "representation" of it (Descombes, 1986, pp. 83-85). Descombes (1986) remarks:

Neither more nor less than this content is "isomorphic" to a number of other contents. Structure is precisely that which holds good in an isomorphism between two sets of contents. (p. 86)
Other characteristic ideas and practices, important to structuralists, are the notions of wholeness, self-regulation, and transformation. Rex Gibson (1984) remarks that one of the key assumptions structuralists hold is that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Reality lies not in things but in the relationships between and among them. This is often expressed as "decentering the subject"; in other words, the human loses his or her place at the center of things. Gibson (1984) says "no longer is man the proper study of mankind, but the whole that is mankind itself" (p. 9). Human beings become the object and subject of study at the same time. The relation between structure and meaning becomes the central focus of structuralist approaches.

Another key idea of structuralism is transformation. Such an idea appears to contrast strangely with the preceding characteristics which suggest that structuralism is essentially static in its preference for "synchronic" analysis and self-regulation. But this idea does not conflict with the notion of transformation, for the latter draws attention to those laws of wholes that themselves constitute the origin and direct the flow of change. Such laws are both structured and structuring. As Piaget (1970) puts it: "[A]ll known structures... are, without exception, systems of transformation" (p. 11). Therefore structures are subject to change, but according to the laws of system. The notion of transformation, for Lévi-Strauss, is that cultural objects are never given singly, but always in groups whose members prove to be transforms of one another; the object of knowledge in human sciences is therefore not the particular case but the group of transformations to which it belongs.
For Piaget (1970), structuralism is concerned with structure, and a structure is a "system of transformation" (p. 5). Allan Megill (1985) summarizes Piaget's theses on the definitions of structure succinctly. It is worth quoting here:

In the first place, for Piaget a structure is not a mere aggregate; it is not an accidental collection of elements and their properties. Rather, it is a whole whose elements are subordinate to laws, in terms of which the structure qua whole or system is defined. In the second place, a structure is subject to transformations, brought about by the play of its governing laws. And finally, a structure is self-regulating—that is, the transformational laws of the structure "never yield results external to the system nor employ elements that are external to it." (p. 212)

In short, as Megill (1985) sees it, a structure necessarily "entails self-maintenance and closure." He continues to argue that "it operates according to its own inner system of laws, a system of laws that never transforms the system into something other than what it is" (p. 212). The structure is beyond the reach of each element within that structure. One element can not be modified without entailing a modification of all the others.

Important Structuralists

Ferdinand de Saussure

Structuralism starts in linguistics, particularly in the work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. He can be considered as the founding father of structuralism. Some aspects of his main ideas were mentioned in the preceding discussion. Saussure emphasized
the distinction between the signifier and the signified. Such a
distinction is pertinent in structuralist approaches, for example, the
sound image made by the word "dog" is the signifier, and the concept
of a dog is the signified. The structural relationship between the
signifier and the signified constitutes a linguistic sign, and language
is made up of these signs. The linguistic sign is arbitrary; this means
it stands for something by convention and common usage, not by
necessity. Saussure also stressed the point that each signifier
acquired its semantic value only by virtue of its differential position
within the structure of language. In this conception of the sign there
is a precarious balance between signifier and signified. There can be
no signifier without a signified and vice versa. He also argues that
there is no intrinsic relationship between signifier and signified.

Meaning, for Saussure, derives from the system of langue, from
its formal relationships and rules, and not from its relationship to an
outside, independent world. In other words, meaning arises not from
objects, but from the relationships of signs. Saussure (1959) insists
on the arbitrariness of the sign and remarks that "in language there
are only differences without positive terms" (p. 119). In brief, for
Saussure (1959), meaning arises out of "oppositions" (p. 119). For
example, the color of yellow is what is not red or blue, it is defined
by its relationship within the color system. Therefore, it can be
concluded that meaning, in Saussure's view, is derived from the
differences arising from the relational qualities of language, not in
the isolated words themselves; there are no positive properties in
words themselves. This differentiation, in Saussure's words, is "their
most precise characteristic that they are what the others are not" (Saussure, 1959, p. 59). It gives meaning:

Signs define one another neutrally by means of their differences from one another. . . . "The" and "this" are meaningful only in so far as they are implicitly distinct from "a" and "that." (Saussure, 1959, p. 59)

While he argues that language has no positive characters, what Saussure calls its "value," he is saying that it is constituted by internal "oppositions," the differences. In short, there can be no meaning without difference. Identity is entirely a function of differences within a system. As Jonathan Culler puts it, in On Deconstruction (1982), "meaning is the product of a linguistic system, the effect of a system of differences" (p. 110). This is the "chain of signifiers," which means exactly that a signifier is always dependent upon, and thus elucidated by another signifier, since no one has a "positive" property (Culler, 1975, p. 11).

The problem of language has been a central focal issue for most philosophers since antiquity. Traditionally, language is conceived as a mere carrier or medium of information and meaning. For some, language is not only the fundamental element of thought, the condition of knowledge, rather it co-exists with knowledge. As Lev Semenovich Vygotsky contended, in Thought and Language (1962), the development of thought is "determined by language, i.e., by the linguistic tools of thought and by the sociocultural experiences of the child" (p. 51). He also believed that "a word without meaning is an empty sound, no longer a part of human speech. Since word meaning is both thought and speech, we find in it the unit of verbal thought
we are looking for" (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 5). In short, there are intrinsic relations between language and thought.

Saussure (1959) says that "language is necessary for speech to be intelligible and to produce all its effects; but speech is necessary for language to be established; historically, the fact of speech always comes first" (p. 134). At the same time, it is no longer to see reality as something "out there," a fixed order of things which language merely reflects. On this (false) essentialist assumption, there is a natural connection between word and thing; for the structuralists this connection is arbitrary, historical, social.

Claude Lévi-Strauss

Simon Clarke states, in his The Foundations of Structuralism (1981), that "for Lévi-Strauss knowledge can never be based on subjective experience, it must have an objective foundation" (p. 31); this foundation is exactly what Lévi-Strauss sought to achieve an "objective synthesis of experience and reality" (Clarke, 1981, p. 31). The foundation of this objective synthesis is the unconscious. Lévi-Strauss called the human subject--the center of being--the "spoilt brat of philosophy" (Clarke, 1981, p. 12). He stated, like other structuralists, that the ultimate goal of the human sciences is not to constitute man but to dissolve him (Lévi-Strauss, 1963). For he claims that the isolated symbolic orders as a privileged reality of which we can have direct knowledge depends on its ability to identify the meanings constituted by such orders independently of any particular subjective interpretation of these meanings. In other
words, he seeks to discover the objective residue of meaning that remains when rational abstraction has been made from all such subjective interpretations. Clarke (1981) lists the main themes of Lévi-Strauss' structuralism:

The attempt to discover an objective meaning immanent in the object defined without reference to anything outside the object; the structuralist reduction of that meaning to the formal relations between the parts of the object and so the reduction of the content to form; and the theory of the unconscious. (p. 186)

The supposed opposition between nature and culture dominates the thought of Lévi-Strauss. For him, we have lost our respect for nature, have cut ourselves off from it, and are not prepared to live under its rule. He insists that the only solution is a reduction of culture to nature. In looking at Lévi-Strauss' structural analysis of "myth" one can reach the same conclusion found in looking at Chomsky's structural linguistics. In the relation between language and reality, Lévi-Strauss sees that the objective unconscious meaning of particular symbolic systems is to give access to a privileged order of reality.

In Lévi-Strauss' The Elementary Structures of Kinship (1969), the discovery of a theory of unconscious provides the foundation for a rationalist, human philosophy displacing the concept of "reciprocity" from the center of structure. The symbolic is itself underlain by the formal structuring capacity of the unconscious, supposedly revealed by structural linguistics. This formal unconscious is universal and atemporal, prior to subjective experience and to the temporal modality of that experience. For
Lévi-Strauss (1966), a proper structural analysis of a myth will decompose the story into component parts which will reveal the "unconscious infrastructure" that underlies textual surface manifestations (p. 40). He is searching for an universal underlying system which constitutes segmented parts and their rules of combination. Lévi-Strauss puts it, there are "those universal laws which are the substance of the human unconscious" (Perpich, 1984, p. 37).

Jacques Lacan

Lacan's theory, a reformulation of Freud's psychoanalytic theory, is partly founded on the discoveries of structural anthropology (Lévi-Strauss) and linguistics (Saussure). One of his main arguments is that the unconscious, as a hidden structure, resembles language. The unconscious is comparable in structure to language. In fact, Lacan argues that language is the condition for the unconscious, that it creates and gives rise to the unconscious. For Lacan, following Lévi-Strauss, the individual psyche is created in the process of socialization in which the individual is assimilated into symbolic orders, while at the same time being individuated within them (Lacan, 1977). The subject is created by a language which pre-exists the individual. Lacan's conception of the "subject" is regarded as constituted in language which can interpellate the subject and put it in its place. The system of language preexists the individual. Thus, anything said about the world should be placed in quotations; "the subject is spoken rather than speaks" (Lacan, 1977, p. 71). As Clarke
(1981) remarks: "It is simply a way of living out a particular mode of integration into the symbolic orders of society" (p. 215). The order of language then constitutes both the subject and the knowledge of the subject.

The notion of "I" is first articulated in what Lacan calls the "mirror stage." The mirror stage, Lacan argues, is a moment of alienation, since to know oneself through an external image is to be defined through self-alienation (Lacan, 1977). The subject, then, has a profoundly ambivalent relationship to that reflection. It loves the coherent identity which the mirror provides. However, because the image remains external to it, it also hates that image. The subject experiences many radical oscillations among contrary emotions (Lemaire, 1977; Said, 1985).

Saussure regarded the relationship between signifiers and signified as stable and predictable. Lacan insists that we are all immersed in everyday language and cannot elude it (Lacan, 1977). In a Lacanian view of language a signifier always signifies another signifier; no word is free from "metaphority" (one signifier in the place of another). Since any signifier can receive signification retrospectively, after the fact, no signification is ever closed, ever satisfied. There is no natural link between signifier and signified. In repression, Lacan sees one signifier coming to substitute for another. The old signifier and what it signifies are "pushed down" to the unconscious.

Lacan believes that the discourse within which the subject finds its identity is always the discourse of the Other--of a symbolic order which transcends the subject and which composes its entire history.
Lacan, following Freud, stresses that the real can not be apprehended or investigated except through the intermediary of the symbolic. One Lacanian tenet is that subjectivity is completely relational; it comes into play only through the principle of difference, by the opposition of the "other" or the "you" to the "I." In other words, subjectivity is not an essence but a set of relationships. It can only be induced by the activation of a signifying system which exists before the individual and which determines his or her cultural identity. This approach is quite similar to the development of the Saussurean notion of sign (Ulmer, 1985).

Roland Barthes (early)

Barthes started as a structuralist, with his later work moving toward post-structuralist approaches (Sturrock, 1986; Harland, 1987). He once defined structuralism as a mode of analysis of cultural artifacts which originates in the methods of contemporary linguistics (Barthes, 1977). He has contributed the notion of writing and reading, in its playfulness and pleasure, to demystify those apparent, natural, familiar and "self-evident" elements of literary texts. In doing so, he opens the text to multiple possibilities of meaning, not simply residing in and of a literary critic's self-consciousness. Barthes focuses on the "self-reflexivity" of text itself in order to demonstrate the text's plurality through a "decomposition" of the forces—in terms of "codes" in his famous S/Z (1974)—within the texts.
Barthes has proclaimed the death of the author in order to question the humanist assumption that subjectivity, the individual mind, is the source of meaning and action. He defines structuralism as a method of analyzing cultural works, whose aim is not to discover the meaning of a work, but to reconstitute the rules governing the production of meaning. He further insists on "the freedom of the reader"; however, this freedom is not a mere return to individualism, nor the free will of transcendental consciousness, nor the coherent subject of a self or an "I." For Barthes, it is a "divided subject, even a pluralized subject, that occupies, not a place of enunciation, but permutable, multiple, and mobile places" (Kristeva, 1980, p. 111). As Barthes (1977) puts it, "the text only exists in the movement of discourse. . . the text is experienced only in an activity of production" (p. 157). In other words, it is a "demystification" of literature.

Limits or Problems of Structuralism

Since structuralism arrived in the United States in the 1970s, literary studies have undergone a radical revision, namely the New Criticism movement (Berman, 1988). Structuralism challenges the role of the literary critic in reading the text. Interpretation of literary text is what readers bring to literary works--a whole bank of tacit assumptions and anticipations. Language is thus viewed as a structure of phonetic differences, rather than an aggregation of terms (words), each corresponding to a component of objective reality (things).

Structuralism is based upon the assumption that only on the ground of a structure of networks, in relations to one another, do
elements of a system function or exist meaningfully. Culler (1975) points out that "if human actions and productions have a meaning there must be an underlying structure or system of traditions and conventions which makes this meaning possible" (pp. 21-22). William Ray, in his *Literary Meaning: From Phenomenology to Deconstruction* (1984), makes clear the implicit assumption of the structuralists:

Events, phenomena, and objects are culturally functional only to the extent that they have meanings, and objects that have meaning are by definition social phenomena best understood in terms of the shared structures through which that meaning constitutes itself. (p. 110)

This underlying "shared" structure is, for Saussure, the system of sign; for Lévi-Strauss, the idea of symbolic order; for Lacan, the notion of the unconscious; for Barthes, the multiplicity of "text"; all of which are derived from a kind of anti-existential humanism which claims that we can know a world independently of its symbolic representation and that we can know ourselves independently of the symbolism that constitutes a particular conception of ourselves.

This Saussurean based language system implies a kind of "idealism," which asserts that language does not create meanings but reveals them, in other words, meanings pre-exist their expressions. This is exactly what Derrida strives to deconstruct; for Derrida, there can be no meaning which is not formulated, in brief, we can not reach "outside" language (Derrida, 1976).

Through analyzing structuralists' historical and philosophical horizons, there are basic assertions in their notions of identity,
meaning, subjectivity and history—though all interrelated— which appear to be somehow problematic. In its confidence and all-embracingness, structuralism seems to answer a fundamental human need for order and coherence. I will address briefly these issues implicit in structuralist analysis.

The main problems of structuralism include the concept of subject, the notion of identity and meaning, the idea of history and the over reliance on reason. The philosophy of the subject is and has been the focus of modern philosophers. Structuralism is a consequential development of disappointment with that branch of humanism which asserts the primacy of the human subject—existential humanism. Structuralists' claim the relationship between the individual and society, the term "I," is to be understood only in terms of the social whole. Therefore, the subject "I" is decentered or dispersed. Thus, subjectivity is to be thought of in relation to the individual and structures; in terms of the Saussurean model, this is the embeddedness of "the sign in the language" (Saussure, 1959, p. 67). Saussure insists that a word has meaning only in the context of totality—langue (Saussure, 1959). Therefore, the centered subject—which is self-conscious, self-aware, self-determining—is displaced by a structural system; human beings, for structuralists, are carriers or "bearers" of structures and those structures determine their individuality. The eradication of subjectivity is a rebellion of subjects against a system that negated them as such. Jürgen Habermas, for instance, raises interesting questions about the problem of the structuralists' treatment of subjective intentionality (Habermas, 1990). He argues that "subjectivity and intentionality
are not prior to, but a function of, forms of life and systems of language; they do not 'constitute' the world but are themselves elements of a linguistically disclosed world" (Habermas, 1990, p. ix).

The concept of subjectivity was first decentered by the structuralists, mainly Lévi-Strauss and Saussure, who reversed the traditional perception of subjectivity residing with consciousness or inner mental images. The structuralists regarded the subject as the function of the whole structure whose relation to each individual is where meaning is founded. Continuing this tradition, the post-structuralists distrust the idea that structure has its center and origin beyond each individual's reach. Their concept of relation becomes more central and problematic. Furthermore, Foucault argues that the question of the status of the subject is dismissed by structuralists. The dissolution of subject appeals to the question of "origin," foundation, and the problem of "representation" which post-structuralists seek to reexamine. The question of the subject, for Foucault, has been intimately linked with the related questions of subjection, domination and exclusion (Foucault, 1970, 1972).

The question of identity is interwoven with the notion of difference. For structuralists, Saussure in particular, the meaning of a word is constituted by its differences or oppositions within a language system. Saussure defines language as a system of signs. What gives a sign its identity? Saussure argues that signs are arbitrary and that each sign is defined not by some essential property but by the differences which distinguish it from other signs. This notion of difference or differentiation implies the "metaphysics of presence" or "logocentrism," deconstructed by Derrida, which will
be discussed later (Derrida, 1976, 1981a). Structuralism maintains, on the one hand, that no terms of the system are ever simply and completely present, for differences can never be present. And on the other hand, it defines identity in terms of common absence rather than presence. Identity, the central element of metaphysical thinking, is made purely relational. The question of presence and absence also gives way to the problematic of writing and speech that Derrida strives to deconstruct. There is also the involvement of the hierarchization of identity and difference.

The difference, in terms of structuralist's binary oppositions—signified/signifier, speech/writing, subject/object, nature/culture, presence/absence, intelligible/sensible, etc., entails the question of "supplement," which undermines Western logocentric and metaphysical thinking. Logocentrism assumes the priority of the first term in the bifurcation just given, and regards the second in relation to it, as a "complication," a negation, a supplement (Derrida, 1978). The notion of supplement, insisted Derrida, is "always already" present and, in fact, functions to constitute the privileged term; in other words, it implies that there is no origin and nothing exists until it is supplemented (Crowley, 1989; Hayles, 1990).

The notion of 'history" is quite different for structuralism and post-structuralism; for structuralism, history is to be seen as a series of shifting configuratives opaque with the passage of time. The notion of history, in a structuralist sense, is synchronic or ahistorical. Structuralism attempts to investigate any structure from a more "impersonal" or "scientific" perspective than that of the intending subject. Derek Attridge, Geoff Bennington and Robert Young (1987),
commenting on structuralist notions of history, state that "structuralism addressed questions to history even as it tended to repress the question of history" (p. 3). Saussure's synchronic mode of analysis seems to ignore the existence of history. It is a concern with structures rather than with chronologies. Structuralists' claim, according to Norris (1982), that "historical understanding is only possible in so far as it adopts a synchronic standpoint, 'classes of dates each furnishing an autonomous system of reference'" (p. 78).

The central issue, according to Michel Foucault, is that of the denial of the singularity of events, of the discredited, of the neglected, and of a whole range of phenomena (Foucault, 1970, 1972). These phenomena, known as "naive knowledges," the structuralists located low down on the hierarchy, beneath their required level of scientificity. Through Foucault's genealogical analysis, to be discussed later, we see the problematic as the insurrection of subjugated knowledge which runs through the whole of Western historical analysis. In the post-structuralists' view of history, mainly that of Foucault, there can be no constraints, no essences, no mobile forms of uninterrupted continuities structuring the past (Foucault, 1972).

For some writers, history is always realized as "ex post facto" or, as Hegel declared, consequent on Minerva's flight. All the social actor can do is to survey a world that can only be characterized as an impregnable efface, which is the traditional facade associated with all forms or realism. Structuralism as a whole is necessarily "synchronic"; it is to investigate particular systems or structures under artificial and ahistorical conditions, dismissing the systems or
structures out of which they have emerged in the hope of explaining their present functioning. Some find the threatening of "historicity of history" proposed by post-structuralists to be unbearable. Perry Anderson (1984) for example, in the name of Marxism and its concept of history, has dismissed all post-structuralism on the grounds that it represents "the randomization of history" (p. 114).

Nevertheless, history is traditionally thought of as grand explanatory systems and as linear processes constituted by discrete events and uninterrupted continuities. Post-structuralism not only "reintroduces" history into structuralism or "shows that effects of history have been reduced," but also questions the traditional concept of history itself. Derrida (1973) remarks:

If the word "history" did not carry with it the theme of a final repression of différance, we could say that differences alone could be 'historical' through and through and from the start. (p. 141)

Furthermore, Foucault's genealogical analysis, following Nietzsche, questions the legitimacy of the present by separating it from the past (Foucault, 1977, 1979). The role of cause or explanation is thus rejected. The gap between the past and the present underlines Foucault's historiography. He claims that when the technology of power of the past is exercised, the present assumptions which posit the past as "irrational" are undermined. Those notions of discontinuities, ruptures, gaps, lacunae, and thresholds, argues Foucault, have been excluded throughout Western thought since Plato.
Another problem of structuralism is its over-reliance on reason. Structuralism, in general, seeks a universal foundation in order to secure logical consequence. The question of how the human sciences are historically possible and what the consequences of their existence are have not been fully answered. According to Foucault, madness, chance, and discontinuity have been excluded by reason. The "otherness" of reason allows the transgression which makes all possible become possible, all differences become "differentiated" (Foucault, 1973). In curriculum practices, mainly in bureaucratic organizations, the notion of reason is transformed into scientific rationality (Schön, 1983). The objective of scientific rationality is to gain control and mastery over the physical and social environment. Following Nietzsche, Max Weber argues that scientific rationality focuses on means but not on ends, such instrumental reason can be but of limited help to us as we live our lives.

Foucault reiterates and criticizes this scientific rationality by arguing that science uncovers the mythology in the world, but science itself is a myth which has to be superseded. Madan Sarup (1989) observes, following Foucault, that "scientific knowledge has brought about a disenchantment with the world" (p. 76). He continues to argue that means can be calculated with efficiency--i.e., technical rationality--but ends and values become increasingly problematic to determine. One effect of the rise of instrumental or technical rationality is the process of reification which has produced disenchantment.

Structuralist approaches decenter the subject by emphasizing relationships and not individuals. Meaning is rooted and fixed in
structures, not in individuals; but the displacement of the individual from the center of meaning is questionable. As we have seen, in *From Prague to Paris* (1986), Merquior argues that structuralism has been "vocal in asserting the centrality of culture (and suggesting its autonomy) and so reluctant to accept any talk of 'hard' infrastructural determination of the cultural realm" (p. 115).

Meaning, for the structuralists, is fixed or rooted within the structure of language. But meaning, argue post-structuralists, is interminable or always already indeterminate.

In *Structuralist Poetics* (1975), Culler asserts that to debunk structuralism, it is best to approach it through its linguistic foundations. He insists that "linguistics is not simply a stimulus and source of inspiration but a methodological model which unifies the otherwise diverse projects of structuralists" (Culler, 1975, p. 4).

Derrida is in the forefront of those questioning the structuralists' assumption. In his view of language, the signifier is not subordinated to the signified, as an image to a mirror. There is no isomorphic correspondence between the level of signifieds in language. There is no fixed distinction between signifiers and signifieds. Derrida argues that meaning is not retrieved from apparent unmeaning, but rather consists in the repression of unmeaning. For him, any specification of meaning can only function as a self-defeating attempt to stabilize and restrain what he terms the "dissemination" of the text (Derrida, 1981b). To know the meaning of a signifier leads to a process which is not only infinite but also circular. Signifiers constantly transform into signifieds, and vice versa, and it is impossible to reach a final signified which is not a
signifier itself. Meaning is dispersed along the whole chain of
signifiers; it is an endless interplay of presence and absence. In
short, the meaning of a sign, of what is present, depends on what the
sign is not, on what is absent.

Meaning, then, is not immediately present in a sign. Since the
meaning of a sign is a matter of what the sign is not, this meaning is
always absent from it. This notion of the unstable overturns
structuralists' conception of definable and stable structural analyses.
The stability of structure, according to structuralists' thought, is
questionable. No element is absolutely definable within the
structure or system. Furthermore, Derrida's concept of writing and
"différance" is a challenge to the idea of structure; for a structure
always presumes a center, a fixed principle, a hierarchy of meaning
and a solid foundation. It is exactly these notions which the endless
differing and deferring of writing puts into question. For curriculum
practices, this means that the projected "end" of knowledge could
ever coincide with its "means" is an impossible dream. Sarup (1989)
puts it well by saying that "no one can make the 'means' (the sign)
and the 'end' (meaning) become identical. . . . The sign must be
studied 'under erasure,' always already inhabited by the trace of
another sign which never appears as such" (p. 36). Deleuze (1988)
remarks:

Truth offers itself to knowledge only through a series
of "problematizations" and that these
problematizations are created only on the basis of
"practices," practices of seeing and speaking. These
practices, the process and the method, constitute the
procedures for truth, "a history of truth." But these
two halves of truth must enter into a relation,
problematically, at the very moment when the problem of truth denies any possible correspondence or conformity between them. (p. 64)

Conclusion

In this chapter I have outlined major tenets of the structuralists' enterprise along with several important and fundamental limitations or problems within structuralism. As we have seen, in Saussurean perspectives, language is conceived as a system of signs whose relations and differences within a system make meaning intelligible and independent of an external world (Saussure, 1959). Structuralism can be summarized, according to Sarup (1989), as performing four basic operations:

First, it shifts from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena to the study of their unconscious infrastructure; second, it does not treat term independent entities, taking instead as its basis of analysis the relations between terms; third, it introduces the concept of system or structure; finally, it aims at discovering hidden general laws. (p. 43; underlining added)

Having outlined several limitations and problems of structuralism—the conceptions of identity, subjectivity, meaning and history, through contrasts between structuralism and post-structuralism—we will see in the next sections that the structuralist-minded movements in curriculum studies have faced the same problems. I will now explicate post-structuralism in relation to these questions and point to their implications for curriculum theory and
practice. In doing so, I will also lay out the problem concerning "rationality"—reason itself—which reverberates through the field of curriculum in general.
CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY POST-STRUCTURALISM

Knowledge without illusion is an illusion through and through, in which everything is lost, including knowledge. A theorem of it might be sketched like this: *There is no myth more innocent than that of a knowledge innocent of myth.* (La Traduction, cited in Descombes, 1986, pp. 91-92)

Critique of Reason or Enlightenment Rationality

The Western philosophical paradigm was built upon a "reasoning" process that involved no interventions in the phenomenal world. To reason, Maxine Greene (1984) remarks, was to "take the stance of the contemplative spectator and 'see' with the eyes of mind" (p. 547). Starting from Plato, the philosopher detached himself as a temporal being from the material world. The objective patternings and the meanings of appearance, Plato believed, could be achieved only through rational faculty. For Aristotle, human rationality entailed the ability to grasp the design or the "telos" of reality; he stated, that "to know what excellence is, is not enough; we must endeavor to acquire it and to act accordingly" (*The Nichomachean Ethics*, 1920, p. 1179b).

Following this ancient tradition, Francis Bacon stressed that if reason could be freed from error then the notion that reason unassisted could come to know the truth could be retained. Thus he introduced an "inductive logic" to replace Aristotle's "deductive logic." We all remember and are haunted by one of Francis Bacon's well-known dicta: "knowledge is power." For Nietzsche, knowledge is "the
will to Truth," and is manifested in "the will to power" (Nietzsche,
1966). Nietzsche replaces reason with the will to power.

Baruch Spinoza (Benedict de Spinoza) insisted "clear and distinct
ideas" are true when compared with confused ideas. For him,
reasoning occurs through sequences of propositions; and the highest
certainty is found in intuition. He called reason and knowledge of
the second kind (distinct from opinion or imagination) as that
emanating "from our possessing common notions and adequate ideas
of the properties of things" (Spinoza, 1949, pp. 107-112). John Locke
believed all knowledge to be founded in experience. He was
convinced that external objects were presented in experience by
ideas, which might or might not resemble what actually existed
outside (Locke, 1924).

In the early seventeenth century, René Descartes invented his
great "dualism"—idea and matter, mind and body—that we have
been haunted by from its inauguration. The dualism that Descartes
constructed worked steadily through the decades to clear the path
for a more careful study of the world of things. Outside the human
head was the world of objects and things. Descartes was concerned
to relate these two worlds, the world of time and space and the
world of mental activity. It laid the way for the development of the
so-called hard sciences such as physics, chemistry, and biology. It
also conceived the subjective world as independent from the
objective world.

Descartes' predication of existence upon cognition—"I think,
therefore I am; I am a thing that thinks"—has been questioned
throughout the last century (Descartes, 1968). Many contest the
dualism that the relation between "I think" and "I am" proposes (Heidegger, 1962; Silverman, 1987; Soloman, 1988; Prigogine, 1989). For Descartes, "I think" precedes "I am." On the contrary, argues Merleau-Ponty (1961), really "the 'I think' . . . is re-integrated into the transcending process of the 'I am', and consciousness into existence" (p. 439). In short, the notion of a priori status assigned to "reason"--the "I think"--is rejected. Lacan (1977) argues in his discussion of the "gaze of the other," it is the gaze of the other which makes the "I" possible. He insists that "I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think" (p. 166). Lacan believes that how we present ourselves--the "I" of the "I think"--is always subject to the interpretation of others. I do not exist alone.

As Lacan has reversed Descartes so Derrida (1982) has deconstructed Roger Bacon. Roger Bacon's view of the place of experimental philosophy is the focal point of his empiricism. He differentiates the relationship between "speculative knowledge" (scientia speculativa) and "simple empiricism (scientia operativa)" (Fr. Rogeri Bacon quaedam hactenus ineditis, 1859). The purpose of experimental science, he says, is to confirm the understanding of the natural and man-made things. He insists that experimental science is the "mistress" of all previous knowledge and the end of deductive reasoning. Derrida (1978) characterizes this claim as "thinking by metaphor without thinking the metaphor as such" (p. 139).

David Hume concluded that we can not "really know" the world at all. He believes in reason and the empirical appeal to the senses, and he detested obedience to authority on such non-rational or nonsensical matters as metaphysics. His skepticism centers upon his
denial that we ever actually experience the necessary connections--"causes"--between events; no such world exists outside our experience, insists Hume (Hume, 1951).

Immanuel Kant in his "critical" philosophy (see his three Critiques of Reason, 1952, 1956, 1958), attempted to reconcile the seventeenth century's scientific world view with a conception of human freedom, and he undertook, following Jean-Jacques Rousseau, to redefine reason from the standpoint of a moral account of its end. He devoted much of his career to articulating "the limits of reason." His proposed solution for resolving this crisis in the modern world is illustrated in his doctrine of the "crisis of reason." At the heart of his works is an expansion of the concept of self, the "transcendental" self or ego, suitable for all people at all times and under all conditions. Knowledge of the world, for Kant, is possible because the self determines the structure of our experience. Contrary to the Cartesian solitary ego and Kant's transcendental subject, argues John Dewey, reason is social rather than solitary, historically rooted rather than timeless, pragmatic rather than theoretical (Dewey, 1929).

Dewey's reconstructive aim was to undermine the authority of the inherited theories of reason and to legitimate the pragmatic, experimental reason already at work in modern science. Despite his differences with Kant, Dewey could agree with the Kantian maxim: "They learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own" (Kant, 1958, p. 20).
Rationality after the Enlightenment

The rationality of the Enlightenment includes both rationalism and empiricism. Human rationality has been critiqued by Nietzsche and his followers as the dialectic of reason itself. In defending Enlightenment ideas, preserving the legacy of Western rationality, the contemporary critical theorist Jürgen Habermas attempts to work out the concept of "communicative rationality," quite different from instrumental-technical rationality, in order to restore the Enlightenment project and to revitalize modernity—still "an incomplete project" (Foster, 1983, p. 3). In his books, The Theory of Communicative Action (Vol I, 1984; Vol II, 1987), Habermas contends that "universal pragmatics" enables us to understand the foundation for emancipatory self-reflection, grounded in intersubjective communicative competences. While rejecting Enlightenment's solitary or "subject-centered" reason, he does defend reason through "consensus." Communicative reason is universal consensus without constraint. Consequently, Richard Bernstein (1985) calls Habermas the "guardian of reason" (p. 25). In his recent book, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1990), Habermas continues to argue that the philosophical discourse initiated by Kant has shown the notion of subjectivity to be the principle of modernity. In contrast to modern French philosophies, Habermas insists that "the basic conceptual aporias of the philosophy of consciousness, so acutely diagnosed by Foucault in the final chapter of The Order of Things, were already analyzed by Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in a similar fashion" (1990, p. 295). As Richard Bernstein
portrays it, the project of Habermas has been the search for reason as a central theme in the western tradition, in hope of its revitalization (Bernstein, 1985).

Habermas raises the interesting point that reasons are of a special nature. These reasons, he sees, can always be expanded into arguments which we then understand only when we "recapitulate" (nachvollziehen) them in light of some "standards" of rationality. This "recapitulation," for Habermas, requires a reconstructive activity in which we bring into play "our" own standards of rationality, at least intuitively (Habermas, 1984, 1987). He continues to say, according to Bernstein (1985), that "the interpretative reconstruction of reasons makes it necessary for us to place 'their' standards in relation to 'ours,' so that in the case of a contradiction we either revise our preconceptions or relativize 'their' standards of rationality against 'ours'" (p. 204). In other words, we can not understand reasons without at least implicitly evaluating them.

Conversely, Richard Rorty raises questions about the contingency of language (Rorty, 1986a, 1989). After the collapse of analytical philosophy, he sees that there is opposition to foundational thinking or the view that there exist representations privileged by the fact that they mirror some independent empirical reality (Rorty, 1979, 1989). He insists that language foregrounds human existence and understanding by contrasting "metaphysicians" (Plato-Kant tradition) with "ironists" (Derrida), and he illustrates the distinction between reality being "discovered" and "invented" or created. Rorty (1989) remarks:
Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. (p. 5)

Rorty thus focuses on the problematic of "representation"; he insists that reality is created, rather than out there waiting to be discovered. He strives to work on the nature and the status of philosophic discipline. Rorty warns us that the temptation to look for criteria (in terms of Habermas' "standards") is part of the temptation to think of the world as possessing an intrinsic nature, an essence.

Rorty also argues that the human self is created by the use of a vocabulary rather than expressed in a vocabulary. He remarks (1986a) that "what is true about this claim is just that languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a property of linguistic entities, of sentences" (p.3). After announcing the demise of all foundational thought, he claims that the desire for "vocabularies-as-wholes" or "final vocabulary" is to keep the conversation going, on which a sense of "solidarity" or "community" can be built (Rorty, 1982, pp. 376-377; 1989). The claim to reason always entails a "transcending power," remarks Bernstein. For it is renewed with "each act of unconstrained understanding," and with "each moment of living together in solidarity" (Bernstein, 1985, p. 32).

**Phenomenology and the Rise of Post-structuralism**

Modern French philosophers, post-structuralists in particular, insist that the main problem of Western philosophical thought is exactly, in various disciplines, the hegemony of language and the
death of subjectivity (Descombes, 1986; Champagne, 1990). The "disappearance" or "death" of man is one of the most important claims laid out by post-structuralists. It is a critique of humanism as the metaphysics of subjectivity, a break with the indissolubly humanist and dialectical philosophy of Hegel and Marx. Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, in their French Philosophies of The Sixties (1990), remark that this non-humanistic and non-dialectical culture had appeared in Nietzsche and Heidegger, long before it is echoed in the structuralist enterprises (as in Lévi-Strauss, who practiced the death of the subject in the birth of structures).

Phenomenology, as an investigative method, proposed by Edmund Husserl, marks the starting point for contemporary critical philosophy. The task of phenomenology is to minimize deception, to see things as they really are. It starts with the return of philosophy to scientific status, because scientists and empiricists simply rejected philosophy and its foundation without any attempt to demonstrate its validity. For Husserl, it is the "Absolute," though degraded by the historicist and relativist (mainly Nietzsche), where the truth is to be found (Husserl, 1962); in short, truth is to be found in transcendental consciousness. According to Robert Solomon (1988), Husserl's phenomenology is "the close examination of the essential structures of [transcendental] consciousness, with an eye to deriving [describing] necessary and universal truths of experience" (p. 130). It is Husserl, according to Foucault (1989a), who defined "the horizon of reflection" for generations to come (p. 41).

Martin Heidegger, a student of Husserl, rejects his teacher's "reactionary Cartesianism." Heidegger insists, in Being and Time
(1962), that we have lost our understanding of true "Being," for the very language we use blocks understanding. He sees that Husserl's phenomenology is the means to undermine Descartes' dualism--mind and body--and the mechanistic view of the world and the self-enclosed illusion of self that it fosters. Heidegger's theory of interpretation and understanding aspires to reach the authenticity of Being itself. Phenomenological approaches provide the most powerful principle for sorting through the many issues of meaning that have emerged. We all remember his famous dictum: "Thing [shows itself] in itself" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 54). Further, his phenomenology is elaborated by Merleau-Ponty (1964): "Back to the things themselves" (p. 25).

Post-structuralists owe much to Nietzsche and Heidegger, for both can implicitly be found in most post-structuralists' works (Silverman, 1987). Following Nietzsche and Heidegger, against those who characterize post-structuralism as a repudiation of phenomenology (Descombes, 1986; Brodribb, 1992), I would argue, though not at all in a chronological sense, that there are three "opening" dimensions of phenomenological thought. One is the phenomenological "existentialism" advocated by Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; a second is the phenomenological "hermeneutics" put forward by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur; a third is the "reiterative," "transgressive" post-structuralism, proposed mainly by Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida. I will focus this study on the latter.

Focusing on language as the starting-point for a new mode of thought on politics and the subject, post-structuralists base their
work on a new understanding of history as "discursive formations" and "text," and of writing (écriture) as production and invention, not merely representation. They regard language as the scene of our finitude, the place where we confront with the limits or boundaries of our subjectivity (Moi, 1986; Michelfelder and Palmer, 1989). Through these boundaries or limits where the condition of possibility or the transcendental of discourse is eluded the transgression of meaning can account for a unique relation. This relation, according to Derrida (1978), "is not an access to the immediate and indeterminate identity of a nonmeaning, nor is it an access to the possibility of maintaining nonmeaning" (p. 268). It is a transformation of the relationship between difference and opposition such that, if it is true that "thinking" and "placing" the object in a system of oppositions are the same thing, there is "the possibility of thinking a relationship without thinking it" (Lyotard, 1984a, p. 139). Furthermore, argues Deleuze (1986b), this relation no longer concerns "the reproduction of figures but the production of a continuum of intensities in a nonparallel and asymmetrical evolution" (p. 13). This notion of serial discourses, proposed by Deleuze, can account for heterogeneity, the differences that "disappeared" as structures linked similarities.

Like structuralists, post-structuralists present the practices of language as the bedrock for human sciences. However, Foucault employs the relation of power and knowledge to shed light on Saussure's language system; the system itself is contaminated with hidden structures and thus reveals what has been excluded and how it happened. It is Foucault's (1972) contention that discovering the margins of history and its discontinuities makes human
representation of existence possible--"a theory of discontinuous systematization" (p. 231). In brief, an "epistéme" of the modern era is formed. For Derrida, language is a structure of material marks or sounds which are in themselves "undecidable" and upon which meaning has to be imposed (Derrida, 1978). Following this line of thought and in contrast to Hegel's idea that there is no thought outside of language, Rorty (1989) has warned us--by asking the question: "What is the relation of language to thought?"--that we will fall into the trap of either "the evident failures of reductionism" or "the short-lived successes of expansionism" (p. 12). Relatedly, Rorty urges us to conceive of efficiency in our usage of words, instead of questioning whether our beliefs are contradictory. Rorty's notion of edification can be characterized as an attitude interested not in what is out there in the world, or in what happened, but in what we can get out of the world for our own uses.

Coinciding with Habermas and Rorty's critiques of Enlightenment rationality and their questions regarding the nature of philosophy, post-structuralists recognize that there is a sense of "crisis" in philosophical thought. They offer a different "diagnosis" of contemporary philosophical discourses. These post-structuralists reject Habermas' preoccupation with "tradition" whose different "interests" of Reason would lead to universal communication through his "universal pragmatics" or "inter-subjective reason." Lyotard argues that such a consensus implies the elimination of differential intensity by legitimation and "performative criteria" (Lyotard, 1984b). Rather, he urges us to search for "dissension," which is differential, imaginative and "paralogical," thus destabilizing and
disturbing closures generated by self-regulated systems. This amounts to the continual openings transgression brings out, constantly deferring any possible closure or totality (Lyotard, 1984b, pp. 60-67). Although different from Habermas' understanding of "tradition," Rorty seems to want to have a master who says there is no master, solidarity with what holds solidarity to be only a contingent affair. He then wants the lack of philosophical mastery to be itself a tradition on which we can all come to agree. Foucault argues that the "we" is not, as for Habermas, the consensual "we" of practical reason, nor as for Rorty, the ironical one of liberal solidarity. John Rajchman (1991), following Foucault, points out that it is the question of the "we" of the anonymity. Succinctly he notes that:

It is rather a community of those who would constantly expose their own thought to an experience of de-naturalization. And it is perhaps precisely the possibility of this anonymity and this de-naturalization that lie at the heart of fears and the anxieties we so often encounter when the purity of a nation or of its traditions is asserted or assumed. (pp. 18-19)

**What is Post-structuralism?**

Answering this question is not an easy task, even though many have devoted extensive studies of these modes of thought (Culler, 1975; Harari, 1979; Megill, 1985; Poster, 1989, 1990; Sarup, 1989; Champagne, 1990). Pecora notes that post-structuralism is, though a quarter century has passed, still difficult to interpret and represent in America. It is partly assimilated into "deconstruction" and is
largely adopted, says Pecora (1986), as "a style of literary criticism" (p. 34). In the context of American pluralism or "America the scrivener," noted by Gregory Jay (Jay, 1990, p. ix), post-structuralism has no single unified meaning. Some (e.g., Berman, 1988; Rorty, 1982) have identified "deconstruction," "textualism," or "genealogical analysis" with post-structuralism. Others (e.g., Harari, 1979; Merquior, 1986; Harland, 1987; Frank, 1989; May, 1989; Callinicos, 1990) have deployed or appropriated post-structuralism as "arch- or hyper-structuralism," "anti-structuralism," "superstructuralism," "antirationalism," "neostructuralism," a "contemporary form of anarchism," or the "successor of modernism." Even among post-structuralists, namely Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze and Michel Serres, there is no unified theme. Josué V. Harari has explicitly raised this question, in his Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-structuralist Criticism (1979), and provides this answer:

The question is less ambitious than it might appear; it does not seek a clear or unified answer, but only tentative answers that may perhaps be reduced, in the end, to nothing more than a panorama only slightly different from that offered by structuralism. For this reason, among others, post-structuralism--like structuralism--invites a plural spelling. (p. 27)

Post-structuralists reject the question "what is?," in order to understand what is embodied in the search for origin, essence or foundation. Thus, questioning is exactly the problematic in the first place. From this, we can understand why neither/nor logic runs through most post-structuralists' works. Simply, to define is to distort. Post-structuralism is paradoxical in nature. In another
sense, as soon as we "name" or "designate" something or someone, on the condition that this be done with necessary precision and above all the necessary style, we "denounce" as well (Deleuze, 1990, p. 284). We can recall that Nietzsche's answer to the question "What is?" would be "Which one?" and thus invites a "plural spelling." In the same manner, while defining the notion of "phrase," Lyotard (1984a) points out:

There is no definition of a phrase because every attempt of this sort leads to the concept of a "well-formed totality." On the contrary, we must say rather that "definition" is a family of phrases, and its demand for the "well-formed" corresponds to the universe it presents and varies according to whether the definition is logical, grammatical, linguistic or analytical. (p. 314)

Another concern, the ethical aspects of post-structuralism, as Martin Jay (1989) points out, is related to the question of moral imperatives proposed and praised by Kant. Jay claims that post-structuralism is "often taken to mean a valorization of impulse, desire, and transgression, which sanctions an ethical 'anything goes'" (p. 70). David Carroll, in Paraesthetics (1987), remarks that post-structuralists' projects are to attest to the multiplicity underlying any totality and to the possibility of alternatives to any totality. Jacques Daignault (1990) proposes an "ethics without morals" which, he insists, means that globalized understanding is not opposed to localized interpretation and knowledge; on the contrary, it is the "diagonal" sense between the global and the local, the universal and the particular which makes human existence meaningful.
In discussing post-structuralist thought, it is my intention to single out some important post-structuralists' arguments or problematics, particularly those that can inform contemporary curriculum studies. Post-structuralist approaches begin with the recognition that the epistemological consequences of structuralism lead to an unraveling of the empiricist presuppositions of the Saussurean-based model—particularly because the original notion of the "signified" reflects a commitment to a form of empiricist "knowledge" that evaporates under scrutiny. What any signifier signifies can not be divulged except by using more words, more signifiers. This is regarded as the chain of signifiers or, as Nietzsche observes, interpretation of interpretations.

For structuralists, language points to itself: What exist are "texts." However, the idea of a "knowable" reality is rejected by post-structuralists. In post-structuralism, knowledge of the world derives from the interaction between a primary subjectivity and a language that pre-exists the user, which generates the "self." The concept of self should not be confused with consciousness, ego or id. The self is, Foucault (1988a) explains, following Alcibiades, "to be found in the principle which uses these tools, a principle not of the body but of the soul... that is the principal activity of caring for yourself, not of 'knowing' yourself... and not the care of the soul-as-substance" (p. 25; emphasis added). In brief, post-structuralist strategies and forms of analysis focus on the philosophical issues of language, interpretation and "renunciation" of self; furthermore, they attempt to dismantle or to "shake up" the conventional and stable conceptions of meaning, subjectivity, identity and history.
Mark Poster describes post-structuralist strategies succinctly in *The Mode of Information* (1990). He says that post-structuralists seek to abandon all forms of reductionism, of totalizing interpretations of texts. He summarizes as follows: "For them [post-structuralists] texts are not homogeneous, linear bodies of meaning; they are not expressions of authorial intention or reflections of class position" (Poster, 1990, p. 115). Rather, texts separate the author from the reader and insert an important space that allows "acts of meaning" (Bruner, 1990) or "festivals of interpretation" (Wright, 1990) to set aside the author-ity of the writer and permit one to read the text as it is in writing. Foucault (1984) succinctly makes this point in his "What is an Author?"

For Derrida, meaning is inexhaustible (Derrida, 1978, 1981b). Derrida insists that any specification of meaning can function only as a self-defeating attempt to stabilize and restrain what he terms the "dissemination" of the text. The notion of subjectivity, for post-structuralists, tends to be not only the structuralist sense of "displacement," but also to be completely localized and desubjectivized. The idea of identity is not merely identity between identity and difference, in terms of the Hegelian dialectic, but is questioned further as the difference between identity and difference, through difference itself (Derrida, 1978). It is through post-structuralism that the negative power of the dialectic is called so radically into question. Deleuze (1983a) remarks, in the subversion of dialectical tradition in contemporary critical thinking:

Difference reflects itself and repeats or reproduces itself. The eternal return is this highest power, the
synthesis of affirmation which finds its principle in the will. The lightness of that which affirms against the weight of the negative; the game of the will to power against the labor of the dialectic; the affirmation of affirmation against that famous negation of negation. (p. 197)

Post-structuralist Orientations

As we have discussed in chapter one, the limits and problems embedded in structuralism are illuminated by post-structuralism. While raising questions about structuralist approaches, post-structuralists provide insightful critiques and shed new light on the way we understand those issues.

Subjectivity

Through Descartes' reflection, modern philosophy has become a philosophy of the subject. The locus of certainty and truth, subjectivity is the first principle from which everything arises and to which all must be reduced or returned. The primacy of subjectivity or consciousness is an explicit assumption. The concept of subjectivity is first questioned and decentered by the structuralists, mainly Lévi-Strauss and Ferdinand de Saussure, who reverse the traditional perception of subjectivity residing within consciousness or inner mental images. They regard the subject as the function of the whole structure, on which the relation to each individual meaning is founded. Althusserian ideology of self, derived from Marxism, is that the sense of oneself is not individual but is, rather, the ideal image of oneself that ideology has influenced to accept as oneself. Post-structuralists distrust the idea that structure has its center and origin
beyond each individual's reach. They emphasize that the movement made by each individual, therefore the subject, is not only decentered but rather "displaced" or "disappeared"; furthermore, argues Foucault, the subject is not one but "split," not an absolute origin but a "function ceaselessly modified" (Foucault, 1989, p. 61).

Lacan stresses the point that there is no subject except in representation, but that no representation captures us completely. Lacan believes that how we present ourselves is always subject to interpretation by others. The Chinese philosopher, Chuang-tze, points out:

> There is nothing that cannot be seen from the standpoint of the "Not-I." And there is nothing which cannot be seen from the standpoint of the "I." If I begin by looking at anything from the viewpoint of the "Not-I," then I do not really see it, since it is "not I" that sees it. If I begin from where I am and see it as I see it, then it may also become possible for me to see it as another see it. Hence the theory of reversal that opposites produce each other, depend on each other, and complement each other. (Merton, 1965, p. 42).

There is no possible concept of subjectivity, insists Derrida. For deconstruction should be subjectless and through which it can be proclaimed "the death of subject" (Derrida, 1978). Derrida (1978) insists that "the concept of a (conscious or unconscious) subject necessarily refers to the concept of substance--and thus of presence-out of which it is born" (p. 229). Discussing deconstruction, Paul Smith states, in Discerning the Subject (1988), that for Derrida, "there can be no concept at all of subjectivity without a partaking in the metaphysics of presence and all its critical and decisive moves of interpretation" (p. 46). However, Smith argues that there is
inevitable existence of the agent or operator of that processes of interpretation through whom it passes. Smith (1988) remarks:

What is established in this absence of the “subject” and its identity, and through the erasure of its desire, is then a machinery of language which more or less goes on without us. In other words, if it is not “I” who chooses, the machinery of language and thought chooses “me,” and any “I” exist only as the passive construct of a system of forces. (p. 48)

Similarly, Alex Callinicos (1990) argues from a Marxist point of view that the central project of post-structuralists is the demotion of the subject from "constitutive" to "constituted" status. Derrida insists that the state or status of the complement will always be denied to the interminable of the "supplement." Deleuze claims that an "intellectual theorist has ceased to be a subject, a representing and representative consciousness. . . . there is no longer any representation, there is only action, theory's action, the action of practice in the relationships of networks" (Foucault, 1977, pp. 206-7).

One of the main themes of Foucault, found in Madness and Civilization (1973), is how external imposition or control has been replaced by internalization. The birth of the asylum can be seen as an allegory regarding the constitution of subjectivity. Madness and Civilization is an indictment of modern consciousness.

**Identity and Self**

From the Aristotelian view, the law of identity serves as a foundation of categorization and exclusive definition; in other words, an entity is what it is precisely because it is not anything else.

Vincent Descombes (1986) remarks that "identity cannot be thought
except as differing from the different. Difference is what enables identity to be itself" (p. 40). Eagleton (1990) also remarks that the notion of identity is "coercive." It is the "ideological element of pure thought" and was "installed at the heart of Enlightenment reason" (pp. 45-54).

The problematic of the constitution of "self" is one of the central themes in post-structuralism, and we shall see later, of prominent post-structuralists. Michel Foucault, in his three (the announced fourth volume in the history of sexuality: Confessions of the Flesh is unfinished) volumes of The History of Sexuality (1978, 1985, 1986), developed a theoretical strategy to investigate the self in early centuries as an alternative to the phenomenological notion of self as consciousness and to the structuralist notion of self as an object of analysis. His project would be a genealogy of how the self constituted itself as subject. In other words, Foucault (1988a) focuses rather on "technologies of the self."

In his Critical Theory and Poststructuralism (1989), Mark Posterexamines post-structuralism, mainly Foucault's thought, in contrast with critical theory as developed by the Frankfurt School, and establishes a set of "rapprochements" in order to show convergences between the two and to consolidate post-structuralist themes. His intention is to incorporate post-structuralist interpretive strategy into a social context, in terms of contextualizing its own position and in beginning a critique of the present. He then tries to integrate it into critical theory and to offer an autocritique of its inscription of reason for critical theory. Poster (1989) summarizes Foucault's developmental characterization of the self as follows:
A critique of the self as rationalist by a strategy of reversal through madness vs. reason; (2) a critique of the self as centered consciousness by a strategy of displacement. The locus of intelligibility shifted from subject to structure; (3) a hermeneutics of the self using a strategy of historicism. The emphasis fell to the activity of self-constitution in discursive practices. (p. 54)

The concept of self is contingent upon language. The self is a matter of the continuity of one's self-understanding, but this continuity consists in constantly putting oneself into question and a constant being-other. We can see that the concept of self, as Rorty (1986b, 1989) insists, is contingent upon conversation within community. The conversation he argues for is that we as community members constantly work through dialogue or the mediation of language and thus keep the conversation going.

**Totalization and Structure**

The notion of "totalization" in structuralism is another important problematic for Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault. It is defined by structuralists on the one hand as useless, on the other as impossible. Sartre's idea of "totalization" is related to his notion of history. He emphasizes that history unfolds its significance through a sweep of interpretive hindsight; conversely, history is dismissed by structuralists as a wishful belief in the wholeness and continuity of human experience. Christopher Norris (1982) argues that the socialization of cogito in Sartre's fashion is to "fall into the twin Hegelian traps of 'individualism and empiricism'" (p. 78). Eagleton (1990) reasons that many of the concepts of totality are
"objectionably homogenizing and essentialistic, superiorly excluding a range of crucial political struggles which they have decided, for one reason or another, can hardly be regarded as 'central'" (p. 381).

The concept of structure is another problematic raised by post-structuralists. It is, for structuralists, regarded as a complete, closed system which encloses everything. Structuralism decentered the sovereign subject or cogito, which remained unacknowledged since Descartes, and it recognized that the subject as a function of structures—social, mythical, linguistic, and so on—was not as a ground or source of knowledge. Post-structuralists argue that structuralism failed to escape the logocentric tradition that meaning is determined and fixed within and by the system. For Deleuze, it is the epistemological status of those impersonal structures that regulate that subjectivity is in question. Like Derrida (1978, 1981b), Deleuze (1987a, 1990) recognizes those structures and then incorporates them into his philosophy of difference, or a theory of "singular points," to decenter the very notion of structure. Deleuze (1990) insists that "there is no structure without series (signified series and signifying series), without relations between terms of each series, or without singular points corresponding to these relations. . . . without the empty square—place without an occupant, which makes everything function" (p. 51; emphasis added). In addition, argues Derrida, the very idea of structure always presumes a center, a fixed principle, a hierarchy of meanings and a solid foundation, and it is just these notions which the endless differing and deferring of writing puts into question.
In his first essay of *Writing and Difference* (1978), Derrida asserts that structuralism, in the biological and linguistic fields, above all insists on preserving the coherence and completion of each totality at its own level. To be a structuralist, Derrida (1978) notes, is to concentrate on the organization of meaning, on the autonomy and idiosyncratic balance, the completion of each moment, each form; and it is to refuse to relegate everything that is not comprehensible as an ideal type to the status of aberrational accident. (p. 26)

The problem of structure, Derrida (1978) sees, is from within: namely, "the possibility of concealing meaning through the very act of uncovering it. To comprehend the structure of a becoming, the form of force, is to lose meaning by finding it" (p. 26).

Texts by post-structuralists have become common in a variety of disciplines--philosophy, linguistics and literature in particular--in which they question the notion of the "foundation" of a theoretical framework by interjecting concepts of "discontinuity", "limit" or "boundary", "difference or différance", "rupture", "threshold" and "series" (Foucault, 1972). The Western tradition of the history of thought has been thoroughly examined by Hegel, Heidegger and Nietzsche. However, according to Derrida, these philosophers are all entrapped by the self-presence (self-assurance) of a "metaphysics of presence" which stabilizes the "origin" of their critiques and secures their transcendental metaphysical operation of exclusion. Derrida (1978) argues that there is no original text: "everything begins with reproduction" (p. 211). Foucault (1970) stresses, in a different yet related way, that the history of thought has been an exercise of
exclusion and a structure of domination. Here, he provokes a theoretical reorientation of historical investigation, which calls for a thematic of "discontinuity" in the present social formation.

Post-structuralists raise the question that the problem of "limit" or "boundary" of totalization has been excluded during the totalizing processes. They challenge the metaphysical presuppositions of traditional philosophy and the representational mode of thought, found in difference or "différance," that undermines the certainties of Western rationality. Derrida (1978) argues, from the standpoint of the concept of "play," that "if totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field—that is, language and a finite language—excludes totalization" (p. 289). It is the interplay of presence and absence in the language or utterance that makes discursive practices possible. This movement of play, conditioned by the lack or absence of a center or origin, is the movement of "supplementarity"—which, Derrida emphasizes, is the function of "différance" in play.

**Prominent Post-structuralists**

**Michel Foucault: Discourse and the Power/Knowledge Relation**

Michel Foucault has been studied by many scholars in all human sciences. Foucault's sudden death and the incompleteness of his projects have provoked innumerable studies of his illuminating thinking and elusive strategies dealing with the social sciences (Rajchman, 1985 & 1991). Studies are entitled even under his name,
Michel Foucault, such as those by Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton et al.'s (1979); Alan Sheridan (1980); Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan (1982); Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1983); Mark Cousins and Athar Hussain (1984); J. G. Merquior (1985); Gilles Deleuze (1988); David Shumway (1989), and Didier Eribon (1991); others are James Bernauer and David Rasmussen et al.'s The Final Foucault (1988); Jean Baudrillard's Forget Foucault (1987); Jonathan Arac et al.'s After Foucault (1988), and Foucault Live (1989). He can be characterized as one of the most influential philosophers in contemporary thought.

Michel Foucault was a student of Louis Althusser whose "historical materialism" is considered a revision of Marxist economic determinism. Foucault not only recognizes Althusser's notion of an "epistemological break" to develop his own historical understanding of discontinuities within history, but he goes further to argue that the silencing of the "marginal" in history makes history itself possible through demonstrating the relations between power and knowledge (e.g., Foucault, 1972; Althusser, 1970). Foucault's style and position are most influenced by Nietzsche, whom he acknowledges; his "archaeological" and "geneaological" analyses resemble Nietzsche's pessimistic notions regarding the status of man in the human sciences (e.g., Foucault, 1970, 1972). Edward Said (1988) identifies Foucault as "the greatest of Nietzsche's modern disciples" (p. 1).

The notion of "discourse" is exemplified in Foucault's (1972) own writing. He states that discourse is, first of all, "a possible line of attack for the analysis of verbal performances" (p. 121). It refers to any language system in which consistent patterns of usage create communities of discontinuities or pariahs. Discursive formation
means to refer "neither to an individual subject, nor to some kind of consciousness, nor to a transcendental subjectivity" (pp. 122-123). Rather, discourse is conceived as "a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined" (p. 55). Discourse is made of a group of "statements." Statements are not constituted by a formalization of what is possible based on another possible as propositions; nor by a dialectic of oppositions which makes phrases possible. According to Deleuze's Foucault (1988), statements are "necessarily tied to a law and an effect of rarity" (p. 2). Deleuze observes that it is the case of de facto and de jure, a logocentric order of argument, from local observations to universal truth-claims. These type of statements making up any given discourse do not cohere around unique empirical or transcendental subjects. Rather they are united by a set of rules or relations which provide a variety of subjective positions in relation to a specific referential. It is in this sense that the subject is dissolved in discourse.

Foucault's goal is to establish a fundamental level of description at which thought can be seen to be organized in that formation which he calls a "discourse." As Alan Megill (1985) remarks, discourse for Foucault, is "language from which all self-reference, all inner play, all metaphysical distortion are eliminated" (p. 208). And the function of discourse is to serve as a transparent representation of things and ideas standing outside it. Whatever Foucault means by "discourse," it arises out of a reconstruction--archaeology--of the analysis of theoretical formation undertaken by his philosophical forbearers. He proceeds from making no promise about the continuity or mutual
meaningfulness of the layers of meaning it excavates. His main themes include the centrality of language in understanding social practices, the "illusion of autonomous discourse," the discontinuity of history, and the central place of political power in what the authorities prefer to present as scientific knowledge.

Discourse, in general, is understood as a "systematic set of relations," as the embodiment of power/relations within a system of statements, which is constitutive of a group of discursive practices (Foucault, 1972). Foucault (1972) describes discursive practices as:

A body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative function. (p. 117)

From this perspective, we can consider what "discursive practices" are implicated in curriculum as a function to construct its own "regimes of truth." These discursive practices are, according to Foucault (1977), "characterized by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories" (p. 199). These ensembles of constitutive knowledge, statements, and practices attribute to the formation of particular discourse at a historically specific moment, which Foucault terms as an "epistéme" of the modern era. He proposes the self-constitution of the critical theorist through a practice of opposition to the dominant discourses of the present conjuncture. Those dominant discourses can be conceived as "regimes of truth," as general economies of power/knowledge, or as multiple forms of constraint.
Power does not represent the ideas of the founding subject. Foucault rejects the tendency to recover a continuity of the past, a totalization of subject or any form of global theorizing. Foucault insists, in the *Foucault Reader* (1984), that we need an "attitude" as a mode of relating to contemporary reality which is both reflexive and transgressive, a way of thinking from within or without; in short, a relation of belonging and presenting itself as its task, which he in turn calls "the critical ontology of ourselves" (Foucault, 1984, pp. 47-49). Jacques Daignault (1990) argues that "local emancipation," as in Foucault's localized truth, or in Serres' and Lyotard's "local knowledge," or in Deleuze's "minor knowledge," is not opposed to a or *the* universal truth, nor to claims of a global, uniform and central effort of mankind, but attempts to reveal the multiplicity of forces behind a localized power regime and the fragmentary nature of historical forms (e.g., Foucault, 1972; Serres, 1983; Lyotard, 1984b; Deleuze, 1986b). These relationships, or rather passages, between local and global, particular and universal, marginal and central are intertwined in a disorderly fashion among statements. Deleuze (1990) remarks:

Comparison between statements are therefore linked to a mobile diagonal line that allows us, within this space, to make a direct study of the same set at different levels, as well as to choose some sets on the same level while disregarding others. (p. 3)

Discourse signifies a set of relations that gather as "events" not as "pure meanings." Foucault (1977) held to a "principle of singularity," which simply says "there are events in thought" (pp. 21-30). He wanted to open the space of a critical questioning that would
be prior to who, at a time and place, we think we are. This means that he proposes to regard the discourses through which we think and act as events of a particular kind; starting up, again, the history of our own self-conceptions, to "eventualize" that history and to ask again, "who are we today?" (Foucault, 1985) Foucault tries to "dehistoricize" history and points to his development of a discontinuous historiography, what John Rajchman (1985) calls "historical nominalism."

The concept of knowledge, for Foucault, is intertwined with the power relations. The knowledge that interests Foucault is information imposed by a privileged few to exclude certain groups of people. The tradition assumes that knowledge is logically independent of power, since to be known seems to mean to be acquired in conditions free from distortion and coercion. However, Foucault thinks that the interconnection among social institutions and the growth of certain forms of knowledge becomes apparent, rendering the idea of interest-free knowledge appear as the anomaly instead of the rule. The unthought behind the acquisition and communication of knowledge is not some a priori of communication, such as Habermas' "ideal speech situation" as the counterfactual condition of truth assumed in any discourse (Habermas, 1987). Rather, Foucault insists that the unthought that conditions knowledge is power. In brief, the dilemma of the educational enterprise, observes Foucault, is intertwined with power/knowledge relation and the constitution of self.
Jacques Derrida: Text, Différence and Deconstruction

Derrida is probably the most renowned French thinker in recent literary theory and criticism in the United States. He was first introduced to the United States by the Yale Critics. One of his main projects or strategies—deconstruction—has been widely received and discussed in different disciplines (e.g., Jencks, 1987; Norris, 1988). Books exclusively focusing on Derrida's deconstruction include Jonathan Culler's On Deconstruction (1975), Christopher Norris' Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (1982) and What is Deconstruction? (1988), John Sallis et al.'s Deconstruction and Philosophy (1987), and Hugh Silverman et al's Derrida and Deconstruction (1989). Derrida proposes an interminable deconstruction of the Western philosophical tradition, interminable because the internal structure of writing is trapped in an abyss of Cartesian binary oppositions. Deconstruction functions to dissolve the unitary meaning of texts.

Deconstruction, according to Derrida, targets an array of representatives of traditional metaphysical systems: phonocentrism, logocentrism (mainly Heidegger's "metaphysics of presence"), phallocentrism and mimetologism. Deconstruction is not, Derrida (1978) insists, either a "method," a "technique" or a species of "critique" (p. 24). Christopher Norris (1987) characterizes deconstruction as "the dismantling of conceptual oppositions, the taking apart of hierarchical systems of thought which can be reinscribed within a different order of textual signification" (p. 19).
To deconstruct is to play the "reversal of hierarchies" in the texts; it is ever incomplete. There is a double movement--"overturning" and "metaphorization"--involved with deconstruction (Derrida, 1981a, pp. 6-10). Deconstruction, on the one hand, is to overturn hierarchical binary oppositions within texts, as Derrida (1981a) remarks:

We are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand. To deconstruct the oppositions, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment (p. 41).

On the other hand, deconstruction immediately proceeds to the next step to avoid the trap; warns Derrida (1981a), "the hierarchy of dual oppositions always reestablishes itself" (p. 42). The point of the second stage is to keep process from degrading into structure. This process is involved with "reinscription" of writing. Derrida reminds us that there is a "perpetual double movement within the oppositions so that the positively-valued term (e.g., 'civilization') is defined only by contrast to the negatively-valued term (e.g., 'barbarism') which continually threatens the former's sovereignty" (Norris, 1987, p. 34). In other words, separate, individual terms give way to "a process where opposites merge in a constant undecidable exchanges of attributes" (Norris, 1987, p. 35). It is this process of undecidability that underlies the movement of metaphorization with its mutual crossings and implications, making it a means of textual "transportation" by which the writer is carried along. For Derrida, any attempt to reduce deconstruction to "a concept in terms of
method or technique," which is precisely deconstruction at work, represents an arrest of deconstruction (Norris, 1987, pp. 18-27).

Derrida insists that it is necessary to dismantle systems, to analyze structures in order to view their processes, both when systems work and when they do not, why structures do not manage to close themselves off, and so forth. He starts from the position that our traditional ways of thinking are structure-based and are therefore incapable of revealing the nomadic and often paradoxical character of movement or process. Derrida's project in deconstruction is to reveal the ambivalences, self-contradictions and "double binds" that lie latent in any text. The text is the field of operation of deconstruction. For him, "deconstruction" is not at all the first or the last word, and certainly not a password or slogan for everything that is to follow (Derrida, 1981a, 1985). This double bind movement within the text, insists Derrida, is necessarily inevitable. What is included and what is excluded are not only chosen by chance. Deconstruction is an event that does not await the deliberation, or organization of a subject. "It deconstructs it-self. It can be deconstructed. [Ça se déconstruit.] The 'it' [Ça] is not here an impersonal thing that is opposed to some egological subjectivity" (Derrida, 1988, p. 4). Furthermore, deconstruction is in deconstruction, is to lose its construction, is to deconstruct itself.

The difference, we recall from chapter one, in terms of structuralist's binary oppositions--signified/signifier, speech/writing, subject/object, nature/culture, presence/absence, intelligible/sensible, etc.--entails the question of "supplement," which undermines the Western logocentric and metaphysical thinking.
Logocentrism assumes the priority of the first term and regards the second in relation to it, as a "complication," a negation, a supplement. The notion of supplement, insisted Derrida (1978, 1981a), is "always already" present and, in fact, allows the privileged term to be constituted; in other words, it implies that there is no origin and nothing exists until it is supplemented (Crowley, 1989; Hayles, 1990).

In order to demonstrate the notion of difference, undecidable, and double-bind, Derrida uses "différence" to illustrate what the interplay or "trace" of presence and absence is and what those "differing" and "deferring" traces are. In short, "différence" suggests a displacement without reversal. Derrida (1976) notes:

There is no essence of différencé; it is that which not only could never be appropriated in the as such of its name or its appearing, but also that which threatens the authority of the as such in general, of the presence of the thing itself in its essence. That there is not a proper essence of différencé at this point, implies that there is neither a Being nor truth of the play of writing such as it engages différence. (pp. 25-26)

Derrida's main goal is to deconstruct the metaphysics of presence, mainly Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger's the truth of Being. In doing so, he calls for a "writing," a new concept of writing which he terms "grammatology" (theory of writing), which would undo its heretofore silent role in history. Furthermore, to give a voice to writing, as it were, would be to undo history itself. Such a move cannot (yet) be thought. Derrida insists that:
A science of writing runs the risk of never being established as such and with that name. Of never being able to define the unity of its project or its object. Of not being able either to write its discourse on method or to describe the limits of its field. (cited in Crowley, 1989, p. 17)

The concept or "non-concept" of "différance" is the main theme of Derrida's entire project. In Margins of Philosophy (1982), Derrida devotes one chapter to explicate "différance" through Freud's analogy of the unconscious with "Mystic Pad"; it can be said as erasure of erasures, trace of traces. The notion of "always already" is Derrida's sort of methodological strategy to imply, then to undermine, the notion that meaning is fixed; or, in other words, that there is an origin. In fact, Derrida argues, the very idea of origin is an illusion. As Kathleen Hayles (1990) has shown us, différance:

[A]cknowledges a before and after—that is, a constituting difference—but defers indefinitely the moment when the split occurred. No matter how far back we go into signification, we never come upon the originary difference that could act as ground for the chain of signifiers. (p. 179)

Gilles Deleuze: Difference and Sense

The concept of "difference" has been interpreted and reinterpreted by many scholars, post-structuralists in particular. Post-structuralists' contention is to denounce the Platonistic concept of presupposed resemblance, similitude and identity. Rather, they advocate a celebration of "difference" and "aconceptual concept" or "non-concept" that undermines the certainties of Western rationality (Deleuze, 1990). In Deleuze's view, it is through the play of
"difference"—as the only alternative to a deadlocked dialectical tradition (to reason itself) as reason tries in vain to overcome its oppositional nature—at the origin of values—that new light can be cast on a way of life. Pecora (1982), commenting on Deleuze, states that "the history of reason in the West becomes, not the dialectic of pure conception, or pure representation, with an objective 'reality,' but instead the dialectic of reason as power" (p. 46).

Deleuze's (1983a) philosophy of difference is interrelated to Nietzsche's notion of an "affirmation of affirmation" and can be briefly put as "only difference(s) can resemble each other." It is contrasted to "only that which resembles differs" (p. 74). There are two ways of making difference: says Deleuze, affirmative and negative. He insists that it is not the reproduction of the same, but rather the repetition of the different which is important. Deleuze (1988) succinctly puts it: "Resemblance then can only be thought as the product of this internal difference" (pp. 262-263). This internal difference is exactly where the world of simulacra are built. The simulacrum is regarded as the copy of a copy, in terms of Rousseau's model and copy (see Derrida, 1981a, p. 86; 1981b, pp. 206-207).

Deleuze's philosophical thought adopts Nietzsche's notion of relation between knowledge and life. In Nietzsche and Philosophy (1983a), Deleuze insists that Nietzsche puts knowledge into action, not as itself an end, but as a simple means of serving life. And he warns us that "the opposition between knowledge and life and the operation which knowledge makes itself judge of life are symptoms, only symptoms" (p. 96). Furthermore, he avers that "knowledge is opposed to life, but because it expresses a life which contradicts life,
a reactive life which finds in knowledge a means of preserving and glorifying its type" (p. 100). When thought is subjected to knowledge, knowledge becoming the legislator, Deleuze remarks that "knowledge is thought itself, but thought subject to reason and to all that is expressed in reason" (p. 101).

In his interpretation of reason, Deleuze (1983a) depicts "reason," following Kant's definition, as "the faculty of organizing indirect, oblique means," contrary to culture (p. 99); doubtless the original means react on the ends and transform them, but in the last analysis the ends are always those of nature. Reason, states Deleuze, sometimes dissuades and sometimes forbids us to cross a certain limit or boundary. Because to do so is useless, would be evil, and is impossible--there is nothing to see or think behind the truth. He questions the notion by asking, "Does not critique, understood as critique of knowledge itself, express new forces capable of giving thought another sense? A thought that would go to the limit of what life can do, a thought that would lead life to the limit of what it can do?" (Deleuze, 1983a, p. 101). Deleuze agrees with the Stoic saying that reason is a body which enters, and spreads itself over, an animal body.

While welcoming structuralist's dethroning the subject or attacking on the cogito, Deleuze questions the status of impersonal structures that confine subjectivity. He thoroughly problematizes the structural model--Saussurean analysis of linguistic structure--through a theory which emphasizes "singular points," "planes of consistence," "nomadic distributions," and his philosophy of difference. Deleuze (1990) argues that structuralist approaches may
have no essential point in common other than "sense," regarded not at all as appearance but as "surface effect" and "position effect," and produced by the circulation of the "empty square" in the structural series (the place of the dummy, the place of the king, the blind spot, the floating signifier, the value degree zero, the absent cause, etc.).

Deleuze (1990) remarks:

Structure is in fact a machine for the production of incorporeal sense (Skindapsos). But when structuralism shows in this manner that sense is produced by nonsense and its perpetual displacement, and that it is born of the respective position of elements which are not themselves "signifying," we should not at all compare it with what was called the philosophy of the absurd, nonsense is what is opposed to sense in a simple relation with it, so that the absurd is always defined by a deficiency of sense and a lack [there is not enough of it]. (p. 71)

Following Deleuze, we can see not only that nonsense "makes" sense, this sense being precisely that it has none, but more importantly that the relation between sense and nonsense should not be based on a relation of exclusion. Rather, suggests Deleuze (1990), it should be considered "an original type of intrinsic relation, a mode of co-presence" (p. 68). It is an orientation that is not simply an alternative but a possible complement, conjugation or coexistent interaction.

Unlike many deconstructionists, Deleuze's notion of meaning (sense) can be expressed in a sentence, but that meaning can only be designated in a second sentence, whose meaning must be designated in a third, and so on. This paradox of indefinite regression attests to the weakness of the speaker, but "the impotence of the empirical
consciousness is here like the 'nth' power of language, and its transcendental repetition, the infinite power of language to speaks of words themselves" (Bogue, 1989, p. 64). In Deleuze's views, meaning is a simulacrum, a paradoxical, contradictory entity that defines common sense. Roland Bogue (1989) elaborates on it as following:

It is always expressed in language, but it can only be designated by initiating a process of infinite regression. It seems to inhere [subsist] in language, but to appear in things. (p. 73)

The understanding of "sense," Deleuze emphasizes, in Logic of Sense (1990), is that words express things, but that which is expressed is an attribute of things (i.e. an event). Meaning and events form a single surface with two sides, events only emerge within words, but that which emerges pertains to things. This surface of meaning/events forms the surface between words and things and functions as "the articulation of their difference" (p. 37).

In another book, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1986b), Deleuze regards Kafka as important because he invented a mode of writing--minor literature--that allow us to account for the different "machines" that condition our actual relation to the world, to the body, to desire, and to the economy of life and death. This can be portrayed through their understanding of art. Art, in modern sense, Deleuze and Guattari (1987a) perceive, is no longer an art that proposes to "express" (a meaning), to "represent" (a thing, a being), or to "imitate" (a nature). Réda Bensmaïa (1986) notes:

It is rather a method (of writing)--of picking up, even of stealing: Of "double stealing" as Deleuze sometimes says, which is both "stealing" and "stealing away"--that
consists in propelling the most diverse contents on the basis of (nonsignifying) ruptures and intertwinings of the most heterogeneous orders of signs and powers. (p. xvii)

The notion of "becoming" is a pivotal point for Deleuze's (1987b) philosophical thinking; for him, in becoming there is no past nor future—no even present, there is no history. This means that it is a matter of "involuting" (p. 29). It is neither progression nor regression; to become is to become more and more restrained, more and more simple, more and more deserted and for that very reason populated. Deleuze (1987b) explains:

This is what's difficult to explain: to what extent one should involute. It is obviously the opposite of evolution, but it is also the opposite of regression, returning to a childhood or to a primitive world. To involute is to have an increasingly simple, economical, restrained step. (p. 29)

To become is to reach a process whose synthetic principle is "complication," which "designates both the presence of the multiple in the One and of the One in the multiple" (Deleuze, 1972, p. 44). To complicate the sign and the meaning is revealed in essence, not created by essence. Deleuze (1987a) remarks: Multiplicities are made up of "becomings" without history, of "individuation without subject" (pp. 239-254). Deleuze thus embraces Nietzschean perspectivism and aestheticism, arguing that all thought presupposes evaluation and interpretation, and that truth is created rather than discovered.
Jean-François Lyotard: Differend, Metanarrative and the Postmodern

Jean-François Lyotard is the most obvious advocate of postmodernity among post-structuralists. His *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1984b) is one of the best representatives of the literature about the postmodern condition. He defines, in a simple term, the condition of postmodern as distrust toward "meta-narrative." According to Lyotard, the postmodern condition is characterized by the multiplicity of "little narratives." He argues that the master narrative (meta-narrative) has lost its credibility, regardless of whether it is a scientific or a non-scientific narrative. He sees that the decline of the unifying and legitimating power of the grand narratives of speculation and emancipation as an effect of the advancement of technologies, which has changed emphasis from the ends of action to its means. Madan Sarup (1989) asserts, following Lyotard's argument, that the attention from ends of action to its means, from truth to "perfomativity," is reflected in contemporary educational policy (p. 124).

Modernity, writes Lyotard (1988), is "not an era in thought, but rather a mode of thought, of utterance, of sensibility" (p. 314). The challenge of postmodernity to the modern one lies precisely in its power to upset the form, content, and cultural representation of knowledge. Not only are the distribution, organization, and the presentation of knowledge reified and naturalized, but knowledge itself is prescribed as something that exists transhistorically and outside of human praxis. Fredric Jameson (1981) has observed that
the great meta-narratives may have passed underground, and still
be affecting us unconsciously. He insists that "the political
unconscious" expresses itself in the persistence to undermine master
narratives.

Lyotard (1988) has remarked that "to judge is to open an abyss
between parts by analyzing their différend" (p. 326). The
différends--phrases in dispute, proclaims Lyotard, are not like
litigations which are "disputes where all of the conflicting parties
recognize that certain criteria obtain which allow for the adjudication
of their disputes," rather différends are "disputes where such criteria
do not exist" (Fritzman, 1990, p. 376). Lyotard (1988) suggests that
a reality would be describable as "the consensus of all the libidinal
regions about an intensity" (p. 62); but precisely this (the operation
of an equilibration of charges and investment) is the object of
Lyotard's consistent suspicion. Such a consensus implies the
elimination of differential intensity on the libidinal band, and a
necessary concealment of the event in the construction of a reality.

Lyotard's argument, in The Postmodern Condition (1984b), is
that a discourse bound to the truth of its referent cannot presuppose
the validity of its own access to that truth (which would amount to
not respecting, "in dispute," the referent at all, but merely its own
internal discursive formation). It needs to have a recourse to a
different type of discourse to provide it with a grounding. As
Lyotard (1984b) sees the problem:

Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known
that it is the true knowledge without resorting to the
other, narrative, kind of knowledge, which from its
point of view is no knowledge at all. Without such recourse it would be in the position of presupposing its own validity and would be stooping to what it condemns: begging the question, proceeding on prejudice. (p. 29)

In analyzing the conditions of the legitimation of knowledge in contemporary science, Lyotard (1984b) defines postmodernism as "incredulity toward metanarratives" (p. xxiv). He argues that we do not establish stable language elements, the relation between narrative and knowledge, and there are many different language games, "a heterogeneity of elements," which only give rise to institutions in patches, i.e. "localized knowledge" (Lyotard, 1984b, pp. 61-66; Geertz, 1992). Lyotard (1984b) remarks:

Consensus does violence to the heterogeneity of language games. And invention is always born of dissension; it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy. (p. xxv)

In other words, Lyotard's paralogy focuses on constantly introducing new perspectives into the discourse that disagree with the existing ones, producing a focus upon "dissensus" rather than consensus.

**Michel Serres: Science, Literature and Philosophy**

Michel Serres is perhaps the least known post-structuralist to readers in American institutional academic circles (Daignault, 1989). Serres' connection of science and literature, and his description of the parallel development of scientific, philosophical, and literary trends, in my view, foresees the future direction for both the natural and
social sciences. He succinctly "translates" the passages between exact science on the one hand and the human sciences on the other. He identifies the "evolution" of modern knowledge through the "points of exchange" and the "conditions of passage" that separate scientific knowledge and humanistic cultivation (Serres, 1983, 1989a).

Serres' provocative thinking, especially regarding the "parasite" or "the excluded third," is most important to rethinking our living and lived world. Serres' work challenges us to think otherwise. The parasite violates the system of exchange by taking without returning; it introduces an element of irreversibility and thus marks the commencement of duration, history, and social organization. Serres (1982) states:

The parasite invents something new. It intercepts energy and pays for it with transformation. It intercepts roast beef and pays for it with stories. These would be two ways of writing the new contract. The parasite establishes an agreement that is unfair, at least in terms of previous accounting methods; it constructs a new balance sheet. It expresses a logic that was considered irrational until now, it expresses a new epistemology, another theory of equilibrium. (p. 51)

The appearance of parasite elicits a strategy of exclusion. In the beginning, the parasite enters as an irritable addition that it would be best to expel. However, it is the fact that the parasite is an integral part of the system. By exercising a perturbation and subsequently integrating it, the system passes from a simple to a more complex stage. Harari and Bell, in their introduction to Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy (1983), note:
By virtue of its power to perturb, the parasite ultimately constitutes, like the clinamen and the demon, the condition of possibility of the system. In this way the parasite attests from within order the primacy of disorder; it produces by way of disorder a more complex order. (pp. xxvi-xxvii)

Serres (1982) promotes a new communication as an intersection of social forms, and it is at those intersections of communication, individuals realize that "order is not the norm, but the exception" (p. 85). Such a conception of edge-breaking with conventional transitive communication does shed light on the dynamics of classrooms. Enacted in every pedagogy is the tension between the unified and systematic knowledge as well as the comparative and pluralistic epistemology of the journey. Such transportation of relationship entails multiplicity of local fragments in the space of knowledge.

Serres also introduces a new mode of thought—"dialogue" or "translation"—to the effort to understand literature and science. The notion of dialogue, in Serres' (1983) mind, does not establish a dialogue between two symmetrical ontologies but rather functions "to rethink the relations between order and disorder in such a way as to show how everything begins, ends, and begins again according to a universal principle of disorder" (p. 100). To hold a dialogue is, Serres (1983) emphasizes:

To suppose a third man and to seek to exclude him; a successful communication is the exclusion of the third man. The most profound dialectical problem is not the problem of the Other, who is only a variety of—or a variation—of the Same, it is the problem of the third man. (p. 67)
The notions of passage and noise have significant implications for curriculum studies and practices, as we shall see in the next chapter. They are entangled with the processes of translation or dialogue. On the one hand, the meaning of a passage takes shape only against a background noise. On the other hand, it needs to exclude completely what needs to be included—background noise. Often, teachers try to convey a message or transmit knowledge to students; inevitably, there are interruptions, extractions or something out of the conditions of the process, even in Lyotard's sense of *différend* (irresolvable contradictions), which are, perhaps, felt and not known. These gaps or ruptures, where no one "can speak any longer, and we have the irrational or the unspeakable—the incommunicable, to be very precise" (Serres, 1983, p. 50), need to be connected, linked, or "dialogued" by teacher and students together. These processes of linkage are where pedagogy is at work, as Daignault for instance, insists.

In Serres' (1983) view, it is necessary for us to bring out the real world in its multiple forms, uneven structures, and fluctuating organizations. He warns us:

No, the real is not cut up into regular patterns, it is sporadic, spaces and times with straits and passes . . . Therefore I assume there are fluctuating tatters; I am looking for the passage among these complicated cuttings. I believe, I see that the state of things consists of islands sown in archipelagoes on the noisy, poorly-understood disorder of the sea, . . . the emergence of sporadic rationalities that are not evidently nor easily linked. Passage exist, I know, I have drawn some of them in certain works using certain operators. . . . But I cannot generalize,
obstructions are manifest and counter-examples abound. (pp. 23-24)

Post-structuralism and Controversy

Many debates about and around "post-structuralism" have occurred since it was introduced into various disciplines. (Graff, 1984; Dews, 1987; Jay, 1989; May, 1989; Habermas, 1990; Watts, 1991) Even among those people who are claimed to be "representatives" of this mode of thought (post-structuralists never claim themselves as representatives), stresses and tensions are evident. I do not wish to minimize these substantial differences; however, the differences among them while serious are much interrelated.

Basically, debates about post-structuralism or critiques of post-structuralist thought are abhorred by critical theorists, some feminists, and neo-Marxists, for post-structuralists want to extol everything that has been left out in the totalizing theories and processes these groups expound. In so doing, post-structuralists focus on the marginal, the excluded, on the boundary or limit itself which thus makes totalization possible. The question raised is how long can a group or movement stress the marginal without becoming marginal itself? Can the theoretical subject generate a discourse that represents the real, unmasks domination in the real, without itself introducing new forms of domination? Peter Dews (1987) states that the post-structuralist assumption that "the concept of the subject implies an immobile, self-identical, and constitutive center of experience seriously underplays the complexities and subtlety of the ways in which subjectivity has been explored within the Western
philosophical tradition" (p. xv). In short, he questions the dissolution of the subject, as well as the post-structuralist suspicion of the concept of truth.

Manfred Frank argues, in his book entitled *What is Neostructuralism?* (1989), that neither hermeneutics nor "neostructuralism" (his replacement for post-structuralism) come to grips with the claims of individuality. He claims that human agency, individuality, is the central issue for human conceptualization. He insists on the notion of "the constitutive role of subjectivity as the primary factor in meaning" and of history by asking the question: "How can one redeem the fundamental idea of modern humanism which links the dignity of the human being with his use of freedom" and "do justice to the fundamental fact that subjects can only form themselves, in linguistic, social, cultural, and historical orders?" (Frank, 1989, p. x) Locating knowledge, meaning, or understanding of self and the world in a utopian project of the ultimate individual is exactly what the post-structuralists are trying to undermine.

Post-structuralism has been criticized or charged as "nihilistic," "morally deficient" or "politically bankrupted" (e.g., Merquior, 1986; Jay, 1989; Crowley, 1989). Some (Giddens, 1987; Dews, 1987; Habermas, 1990) view post-structuralism, particularly deconstruction, as a reanimation of self-defeating relativism in the late twentieth century. As Martin Jay (1989) remarks, "post-structuralism is often taken to mean a valorization of impulse, desire, and transgression, which sanctions an ethical 'anything goes'" (p. 70). Its political implications or ethics without morals make many people uncomfortable. Anthony Giddens (1987), among others, claims that
structuralism and post-structuralism have failed to fulfill their proclamations, and warns us that they are "dead traditions of thought" (p. 75). Alex Callinicos (1990) embraces, from a Marxist standpoint, Andreas Huyssen's claim that "poststructuralism is primarily a discourse of and about modernism" (p. 69). Not surprisingly, Giddens and others find post-structuralism threatening, not because it lays a claim to authority--claiming to know what the text means in a direct challenge to established understanding--but because it denies the fundamental convention of meaning as property.

Post-structuralism introduces unconventional yet critical thought into philosophical thinking by challenging the questionable tradition of metaphysics of presence and the age of Logocentrism in the West. Furthermore, as an attack on metaphysical thought, post-structuralism has firmly and consistently recognized the importance of representations and the mediation of discourse in building the social and in the formation of subjectivity. Paul Smith (1990) remarks that "arch-poststructuralist" discourse, namely deconstruction, has led to a number of severe critiques of idealism and metaphysics in all their dispositions (p. 43).

Remarks
This chapter has attempted to introduce post-structuralism, which in the next chapter I will connect with curriculum discourses, to shed light on a new direction for curriculum studies. Curriculum theory and practice have been dominated by structure-minded or modernist approaches since World War II. The central concerns
have been predictability, order and systematic control, all operating to achieve predefined goals. Such a scheme of curriculum development brought forward massive productivity, as well as savage inequality, to the educational enterprise. Structuralist analyses and applications supported many administrative educators view of schooling as a factory. However, educational reform reports during the 1980s echoed the ongoing discontentment of students' educational performance and achievement. These proposals for reform argued that present schooling is failing to provide essential knowledge needed for understanding of the problems we face (A Nation At Risk, 1982; Paideia Proposal, 1982; A Place Called School, 1984; Cultural Literacy, 1987; The Closing of American Mind, 1988). The problem is not the insufficient effort put into reform, nor the direction toward educational "excellence" those reports advocate; rather what is at stake is what we want to do as students, teachers, administrators and parents, what kind of "educated" citizens we expect pupils to be, and what kind of curriculum should be communicated to each student. An advance in intellectuality is not a fulfillment of the wish to know but of the wish to think. Post-structuralist thought may help us rethink the conventional categories regarding education and provide us with a critical perspective uncovering the underlying "structure" of educational reality. Lyotard (1990) describes "the desire of the West as a wish to know, and the wish to know as an avoidance of responsibility, as a flirtation with the known in which the knowing subject 'never gets his fingers burned'" (p. 99). In a world of pluralistic perspectives, traditional Western standards are deplorable from certain vantage points and
parochial from others; the need to include or explore the silenced voices—in terms of class, gender, and race/ethnicity issues in curriculum—is inevitable toward understanding the world we all live in and the ways we are.

Post-structuralism declares meaning to be the property of one and each one, it restores to the text its own authority as an endless system and event; textuality constitutes texts in the form of history. Post-structuralism continues to be reexamined and debated; at the same time, it challenges us to rethink our present condition. Our sense of past and future must necessarily be constructions of present discursive formation and the epistéme of modern era. The conditions of possibility and impossibility are illuminated.

Chapter three will focus on contemporary curriculum discourses. We will explore the possibility that post-structuralism can shed light on curriculum studies, in part by an analysis of the prevailing structuralism in present curriculum studies.
CHAPTER THREE
POST-STRUCTURALISM IN CURRICULUM STUDIES: BEGINNINGS

The embodiment of knowledge and knowing in the human self led—for some—to autobiography, an interest in telling stories of life history in order to reconceive the relation of self to knowing, a relation at the center of curriculum understood as 'currere,' the running of the course. (Pinar and Grumet, 1976, p. 53)

To be sure, children don't live as our adult memories would have us believe, nor as their own memories, which are almost simultaneous with their actions, would have them believe. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986c, p. 79)

Contemporary Curriculum Discourse

The historical development of the field of curriculum studies has been ideological and full of conflict (e.g., Franklin, 1986; Kliebard, 1986; Kridel, 1989; Tanner and Tanner, 1990). Many stories have been told, stories of and about developing and organizing the curriculum field, by various scholars from their own interests and ideologies (Pinar, 1988b, 1992). Cleo Cherryholmes (1988) asserts that curriculum history is:

marked by repeated turmoil and conflict, because it is always possible to question its purposes, beliefs, values, assumptions, metaphors, and orientations that fix its purpose and meaning. (p. 131)

Curriculum discourses have emerged from various and diverse disciplinary approaches and methodological orientations. Historical
awareness might release us from the prisons of our current conventions of understanding.

At present, traditionally, the problems of curriculum have been uneasy and complex ones, their conceptualization has been based upon scientific efficiency, technical rationality, predictability, order and control (e.g., Cherryholmes, 1988; Lather, 1991; Doll, in press). The issue at stake is that the concepts of predictability and control are enhanced by a deterministic, technocratic and scientific "structural" approach--implying *procedural neutrality*. The closedness of this approach deprives pedagogy of meaning and fragments the processes of teaching and learning. The concept of knowledge has been limited to certain discrete information-givens and memorizations; it is based upon complementary conceptual models, such as Tyler's rationale and Bloom's taxonomy advocate. Since 1969, when Schwab announced that the curriculum field was "moribund," there have been diverse yet significant shifts and movements towards the rethinking of curriculum (Huebner, 1976). Many curricularists, such as Michael Apple (1979, 1986), Elliot Eisner (1979, 1991), William Pinar (1975, 1988b), Henry Giroux (1981, 1989), Herbert Kliebard (1986, 1992), Jacques Daignault (1984, 1992), Ted Aoki (1983, 1990a), to list but a few, continuously strive to reconceptualize curriculum field. These scholars contribute intriguing theses to the curriculum field and provide new "meaning," substantial arguments, and different approaches to the field. As William Pinar remarks, in *Contemporary Curriculum Discourses* (1988b), the "reconceptualization" of the curriculum field has occurred and continues to proceed. It is on the shifting grounds of
transforming knowledge that curriculum undergoes dramatic alterations in its representations of socio/historical production.

New possibilities in curriculum thought, such as post-structuralism, implicitly suggest even deeper senses of what the nature of curriculum might be, and provide us with ways of asking pertinent questions about the very purpose of curriculum studies. In education, particularly curriculum, post-structural criticism and analysis challenge the prevailing structuralist approaches and question the fundamental assumptions upon which these approaches rest (e.g., Daignault, 1984; Wexler, 1987; Cherryholmes, 1988; Pinar, 1988a, 1992; Doll, 1991; Whitson, 1991). A key assumption of structural approaches is that all phenomena are constituted by an underlying, organizing and originating structure, an assumption of the Tyler rationale and Bloom's taxonomy (Daignault, 1986; Cherryholmes, 1988; Pinar, 1988a; Lather, 1991). To understand this underlying structure is to understand the scientific-technocratic tradition. These structural assumptions, often scientific in principle, remain unproblematical and thus immunized against criticism; rather, they are incorporated into preferred structural analyses, interpretations, and organizations promoted by the promise of order and rationality. The notion of "rationality"--scientific or instrumental in essence--has been the dominating force of curricular planning and development for several decades. The problem is not only that reason (or scientific observation) has turned into domination, but that we do not fully recognize its domination and exclusion. Not only has post-structuralism given us a new theoretical approach for
transforming curriculum phenomena, it also shows us new ways of being, thinking and doing.

**Post-structuralism and Curriculum**

Post-structuralism has had a growing impact on critical curriculum studies (e.g., Wexler, 1987; Cherryholmes, 1988; Lather, 1991; Pinar and Reynolds, 1992). Post-structuralism provides curricularists with new modes of thinking. Foucault offers a kind of thinking of "threshold," "boundary," "transgression," or "rupture," which means to think the conditions of the possibility which are unrepresentable; in other words, to think through the unthinkable or what is unthought. Derrida (1976) challenges us to subvert and destabilize where we are and what we do. This attitude can be described and comprehended as deconstruction of texts, implied in his well-known phrase: "There is nothing outside the text" (p. 227). The separation of "world" and "consciousness," embodied in the form of hermeneutics, leads to the crippling dehistoricization of both the subject and the world. This leads to the destabilization of structures and subjects. The process of destabilization is crucial to the post-structuralist project. In curriculum, the destabilization is characterized by provocative questions—raised by the students and the teacher—that move from exhausted predestinations to the unanticipated. It is opened during times of spontaneity, improvisation, interpretive risks, crises, when one reflects upon taken-for-granted ways of knowing. Contrary to totalizing critical theory, it moves away from the grand dream of interpretive mastery, the desire to gain control and to stabilize. Instead, it leads
to localization, particularity, and non-discursive formation. Therefore, any "meta-narrative" is under suspicion and thus rejected (Lyotard, 1984b, p. xxiv).

Let us recall related post-structuralist analysis and criticism. Foucault attempts to discern how the paradoxes of "excess" and "lack" presented in exegetical hermeneutics follows from a notion of signification still linked to the dialectical play of "signifier" and "signified"--such as structural binary oppositions. The "commentator" is unable to move out of this space of signification into the exterior fact of the "historical appearances of discourses," because his/her own humanism is caught up in the autonomy of this mode of signification. This sense of autonomy has been already produced, sanctioned and valorized by the humanism that gives status as "meaning-maker." In moving away from such a critical posture, Foucault identifies his mode of analysis as directed to the discovery of "discursive structures," and in identifying the rules of objectification that make these structures possible.

Derrida presents us a shifting and, at times, distorted image of the world, and thus breaks the molds, conventions, and routine patterns which fossilize both our world and ourselves. It is up to us, the reader, to decipher what he tells us about our world; what he brings to light through metaphors and similes, or through contradictions and absurdities; and what he tells us about the possibilities of changing our world as well as changing ourselves. He makes it inevitable for us to question our own assumptions, and thus come to a better understanding of our own beliefs. However, this is but one approach to Derrida's text, one among many, for there are
"as many images of the object as eyes to contemplate it, as many images of essence as minds to understand it" (Herbert, 1964, p. 13). As beliefs in long-standing traditions of understanding and objective knowledge fall apart, the critical issues of curriculum stand to be transformed.

Derrida also begins his "Exergue," in Of Grammatology (1976), by focusing the reader's attention on the "ethnocentrism which, everywhere and always, has controlled the concept of writing" (p. 64). Although the Newtonian positivist theories and traditional science, mostly concerned with closed systems and linear relationships, were challenged by developments in areas such as relativity, non-Euclidian geometry or quantum theory, the domain of the humanities appeared much slower in accepting "those aspects of reality which seem to characterize today's social changes: Disorder, instability, disequilibrium, nonlinear relationships . . . and temporality" (Prigogine, 1984, pp. xiv-xv). If we accept instability, if we seek to remain "[open] to surprise, puzzlement, confusion," in order to function efficiently in "chaos," a whole new set of skills is needed, based as much on the non-rational as on the rational (Schön, 1983, p. 66).

Like post-structuralists' attention to "difference," critical curriculum scholars and educators raise the issues of diversity, exclusion, and marginalization. Differences are not merely a matter of what each person wants to believe. Furthermore, meaning is a social construction. Not only is each individual's perspective informed by interaction with others, but such also reflects the perspectives of an individual's broader historical and sociocultural
understandings. In such a way each person constructs one's being-in-the-world. Hence, finding many voices and creating more spaces within curriculum understandings, in terms of Bakhtin's "heteroglossia," is crucial to curriculum discourse (Whitson, 1988; Miller, 1990). Therefore, curricular meanings are embodied in the complexity of classroom life and the multiplicity of identities elicited by the discourses.

However, the goal is not just to silence another voice and replace it, nor to integrate it into a "universal" voice. Instead every voice stands on its own and speaks for itself; more importantly, it is to "translate" voices into one another. Here is pedagogy at work. Pedagogy refuses to achieve the sublimation of oppositions, but instead exhibits the process and thereby makes sense, or "translates," as Michel Serres (1983) would say. Harari and Bell (1983) explain Serres' project as the following:

To translate the several voices of the "language" of the world's disorder into different languages, to translate one language into another, to pass from one vocabulary to another, and thus to establish a world-encompassing network of communication. (p. xxiv)

And, as the teacher is asked for answers to educational problems, teaching is pressed into developing a more differentiated and expanded vocabulary. A plurality of voices searches for the right to reality--to be accepted as legitimate expressions of the true and the good. The point is not how to keep up with an incessant flow of passing voices, but rather how to sustain a valued heritage--understanding of difference itself.
Knowledge and Curriculum

This shift away from the traditional use of writing and books has strong implications for instructional methods, especially if we consider the particular status and function within which language has been vested throughout the history of formal schooling. Education has often appeared as a powerful device for control. Its aim has traditionally been to "reproduce the dominant values of society and to legitimize the authority of the State" and the class structure. It has been accused of being an "instrument of class power" (Anyon, 1979, pp. 317, 341). Derrida's "step beyond" may be applied to curriculum, encouraging educators to go "beneath" conventional pedagogy and to devise new approaches better fit for an era of informationalism (Poster, 1990). The responsibility is the teacher's to understand the system of transmission of ideas between and among students and teachers. At issue here are the modes of transmission of ideas, of instructional modes in post-structuralist epistemology, and of the teacher as model and authority keeper and perpetrator of the "truth." Our educational curricula are mostly controlled by those who know; the educational system operates to sustain the existing structure of power.

In Applied Grammatology (1985), Ulmer suggests that "the problem of the 'preface', discussed by Derrida in 'Outworks,' is identical with the problem of pedagogy in general" (p. 161). It is a problem of communication between the supposed keeper of knowledge (teacher) and those who believe they are to learn from him/her (students), thus becoming the teacher's "disciples." Ulmer
draws a parallel between the position of the teacher as a text's preface, each of whom "knows" the text, and of the students and readers, who depend on the former to be introduced to that knowledge. Derrida's (1982) comments apply the preface directly to the relation between students and teacher: "To seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholastics, not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim" (p. 47). It also underlines the roles of dialectic and rhetoric, and the fact that pedagogical exposition, just like every reading, adds something to what it transmits, a "supplement." Derrida (1981a) notes:

Grammatology must deconstruct everything that ties the concept and norms of scientificity to ontological, logocentrism, phonologism. This is an immense and interminable work that must ceaselessly avoid letting the transgression of the classical project of science fall back into a prescientific empiricism. This presupposes a kind of double register in grammatological practice: [I]t must simultaneously go beyond metaphysical positivism and scientism, and accentuate whatever in the effective work of science contributes to freeing it of the metaphysical bounds that have borne on its definition and its movement since its beginnings. (pp. 35-36)

Knowledge, Sharon Crowley insists in her A Teacher's Introduction to Deconstruction (1989), is necessarily contextualized: that is, "no object of perception can be altogether known when it is studied in isolation from the system that gives its meaning, from other objects that are both related to it and different from it, both in space and time" (p. 11). Knowledge is also interrelated with the constitution of power relations. Power and knowledge, according to Foucault (1980), are fused in the education practices that comprise
history and that discourses partake of power, not knowledge alone. The issue is the relationship between claims to truth and the distribution of power in discourse. Foucault (1980) insists that "we are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth" (p. 93). Cherryholmes (1988) argues, from Foucault, that knowledge exists in relation to the constitutive interests that lead to its production. Knowledge, Wexler (1987) remarks, which is "elusive, associational, and complexly connotative enables the fragmented decentered subject to push forward, interiority, toward realizing a residual desire for integration" (p. 103). Objective knowledge, accumulated throughout a given time, is dependent upon a particular perspective, in terms of Kuhn's (1970) "paradigm." What counts as objective truth is not the result of rationally subjecting hypotheses to empirical test, but emerges from a network of social agreements, a network of power relations.

Compounding the problem of delay between emergence of knowledge and access to that knowledge in a pedagogical setting are the traditionally conservative characteristics of the educational system. Derrida (1978) believes that the practice of education should catch up with contemporary epistemology, and that the epistemic breaks of grammatology aim to help pedagogy do just that. These breaks challenge the dominant epistème and offer the possibility of displacing that epistème. One of post-structuralism's central subjects is an interrogation of the production of knowledge as a complex contextual activity. Curriculum should not be a matter of replacing one "poor" with another "superior" knowledge. Curriculum
should be a dialogue, in which all sub-discourses may benefit from the discourses of their neighbors. As Grisoni (1976) remarks: "Every university puts language in this position of delay or derivation in relation to meaning or truth" (P. 62). In other words, knowledge is contextual and relational.

Curriculum Praxis

Tony Whitson, in "Post-structuralist Pedagogy as Counter-hegemonic Praxis" (1991), insists that "post-structuralist principles are needed now for an effective counter-hegemonic praxis" (p. 78). However, warns Whitson (1991), there is a danger of being simply an oppositional discourse, therefore, reintegrated into a hegemonically dominated social order. He explains:

The distinctive character of hegemony as a mode of domination achieved precisely through the structural articulation of diverse interests, which functions partly by incorporating oppositional interests into articulated structuring (or meaningful "jointing together") of disparate elements within hegemonic order itself. (pp. 79-80)

Thus hegemony, argues Whitson (1991), can be seen to "operate through articulation of conflicting elements by putting opposition into a supportive place within the structure" (p. 80). This can be achieved through deconstruction to shake up or dismantle the structure. However, the reversal of the hierarchy (dominant/marginal or oppressor/oppressed) is neither an exchange of position, nor a sublation of contradiction into some superior entity. It is in the ways in which teachers and students interact with
knowledge and the meanings produced by such interactions which reveal something about what actually happens to school knowledge when it is acted upon. Traditional (the Enlightenment) epistemology which defines knowledge in terms of absolute truths that are acquired by individual autonomous subjects recedes from view.

Foucault situates all discourse on the surface of a power/knowledge relation and treats discourse as a form of action, as a movement within a field of forces. The question of the origin or foundation (or lack of) of discourse seems to have little relevance when the principal questions being asked of discourse are how it performs and what its effects are. Instead Foucault is interested in exploring the different discursive formations of knowledge and how these discourses have been deployed at different historical periods. Each discourse represents a different deployment of knowledge and power.

**Reading and Curriculum**

Reading is always involved with interpretation and rereading. In deconstructive terms, reading is "rewriting" the text and of ourselves (Lyotard, 1987; Crowley, 1988; Scholes, 1990). Roland Barthes' definition of reading is suggested:

> We never stop adding to the "Search," we never stop writing it. And no doubt that is what reading is: rewriting the text of the work within the text of our lives. (cited in Scholes, 1990, p. 10)

Here, we can understand that reading is rewriting. Reading means not simply literal translation of symbols, nor the destructive.
On the contrary, it is through such a reading, as Sharon Crowley (1989) puts it, looking for "places in the text where a writer's language mis-speaks her, where she loses control of her intention, where she says what she did not 'mean' to say" (p. 7). What is present (said) is always "implied" in what is absent (not said). As Paul Ricoeur (1974) remarks, "what is gain from one point of view is loss from the other" (p. 291). Also reading in such a way is neither "author-centered" nor "reader-centered," but centered in terms of hermeneutic understanding and Derrida's "protocols of reading" (Derrida, 1981a, p. 63; Scholes, 1990). Rewriting means to write what we have read, in a sense of "creativity," not simply text upon text or going back to the origin. Rewriting is also a "working through," argues Lyotard (1987), "a task of thinking the meanings or events that are hidden not only in prejudices, but also projects, programs, prospects and the like, that are concealed even in the propositions or purposes of a psychoanalysis" (p. 4). Deleuze (1983b) insists:

Reading a text is never a scholarly exercise in search of what is signified, still less a highly textual exercise in search of a signifier. Rather, it is a productive use of the literary machine, a montage of desiring machines, a schizoid exercise that extracts from the text its revolutionary force. (p. 47)

Reading curriculum can be understood as working through its interweaving "textuality" (Scholes, 1985; Whitson, 1991). Curriculum practices, mainly in bureaucratic organizations, were organized and structured via scientific rationality. The objective of scientific rationality is to gain control and mastery over the physical and social
environment. Scientific rationality focuses on means but not on ends. Instrumental reason can not help us to live our lives. Foucault (1989) reiterates this by saying that science uncovers the mythology in the world; but science itself is a myth which has to be superseded. As noted earlier, "scientific knowledge has brought about a disenchantment with the world" (Sarup, 1989, p. 76). What is important about this one-dimensionalizing, or desocializing of knowledge--instrumental/technical rationality--is that it displays how the redefinition of knowledge is mediated institutionally between micro-classroom production and macro-integration of social regulation and interlocking networks of discipline and control.

Philip Wexler (1987) points out that structuralism views the curriculum as a set of rules or symbolic practices, and structuralism avoids "reducing knowledge to a static representation of social process" (p. 108). However, he argues that the centering of the sign of structuralism "returns language to being rather than signifying. Centering stabilizes the structure, allowing its predictive generalizability" (Wexler, 1987, p. 137). In view of school knowledge and its meaning, Wexler sees that the presence of some foundational essence becomes the target of deconstruction. Deconstruction is not a theory of meaning. Nevertheless, Derrida is much concerned about meaning; his claim about meaning is to present a conception of meaning where the conditions of possibility for meaning are to be found in iteration rather than contextualization. Deconstruction always involves both a reversal and an intervention. It does so not by passing from one concept to another, but by overturning the conceptual and nonconceptual order which is undecidable. The
undecidability of a word or utterance has a twofold meaning of presence and absence always at play within any specific determinate signification.

Problematics

In the structural analysis of curriculum, questions often come in pairs, implying binary opposition, contradiction, and tension. Examples of binary distinctions that structure curriculum include theory/practice, fact/value, cognitive/affective, teaching/learning, method/manner, prescription/description, action/thinking, subject-centered learning/learner-centered learning, etc. Sometimes, these distinctions are either dismissed as unproblematical or simply taken-for-granted. In addition, they are individualized into a problem of ambivalence, not regarded as a structurally induced dilemma. As Foucault (1986b) remarks "perhaps our life is still governed by a certain number of oppositions that remain inviolable, that our institutions and practices have not yet dared to break down. These are oppositions that we regard as simple givens" (p. 23). All of which are, according to Daignault (1984), necessarily embedded in the problematical relation between "what is"--what is described and "what ought to be"--what is prescribed (pp. 6-14). Daignault (1982a) elsewhere remarks:

The curriculum field is full of many competing definitions or ideas, each one proclaiming to be the best one (what ought to be). . . and finally it decided to look for consensus or to accept relativism because no agreement seems possible. (p. 178)
However, to address these problematics is not to achieve the sublimation or Hegelian "aufhebung" of these oppositions; instead it is to identify and to create (in terms of transgression) rather than to resolve. Cherryholmes (1988) claims that the strategic approach of critical discourse is not "turning the search for truth into a conflict or competition. . . . The pursuit of the best argument is what is sought" (p. 89). An example of the subversion of structural dichotomies within curriculum is the work of Madeleine Grumet (1988), Philip Wexler (1987), and James A. Whitson (1991). Grumet studies extensively the relation and constitution of private and public knowledge; Wexler (1987) analyzes the polemics between technological knowledge and cultural formation; Whitson (1991) argues for truly "counter-hegemonic" pedagogy to enable us to disrupt the structure --"hegemonic order" itself (p. 80). My intention here is to engage in problematization itself and to make connections, in order to create more senses. I also hope to make sense myself. A Zen master once said:

How to overcome the "dualist" world, in terms of subject-phenomena? The answer is to forget the question. For example, I am doing what I am doing, nothing else. (personal translation of Understanding Zen in Yuanwu, 1969, p. 26)

The above passage at first may seem to be nihilistic or relativistic. The issue concerns, I would argue, one's "forgetting" and "doing." It can be argued that this is not simply believing in nothing, nor an overture to conformism; rather, adopting Nietzsche's perspective of "active nihilism" or "cheerful nihilism," it implies a challenge to the causes and effects of disintegration by speeding up
the process (Pefanis, 1991, p. 91). This also can be understood through Derrida's concept of desire. Derrida (1985) remarks:

The desire for the intact kernel is desire itself, which is to say that it is irreducible. There is a prehistoric, preoriginary relation to the intact kernel, and it is only beginning with this relation that any desire whatsoever can constitute itself. Thus, the desire for the phantasm of the intact kernel is irreducible—despite the fact that there is no intact kernel. (p. 115)

Here, Derrida opposes desire to necessity, to "ananke" (p. 116). The ananke is that there is no intact kernel and there never has been one. That is what one wants to forget, and to forget that one has forgotten it. It is not absence instead of presence, but a trace which replaces a presence which has never been present, an origin by means of which nothing has begun. Derrida means to define trace as that which always escapes, is deferred in the attempt to define absolute knowledge as presence. The thought of the trace is the radical other within the structure of "différance," always escapes the binary system that is the hallmark of the being of presence.

**Deconstructive Pedagogy**

As noted in chapter two, "deconstruction" has been a fashionable word in various disciplines and studies. As a leading figure in this movement, Derrida and his deconstructive strategies have been fully recognized and abruptly applied in educational discourses. Several have paid extensive attention to the concept of deconstructive teaching (e.g., *Yale French Studies*, 1982; Scholes, 1985; Crowley, 1989). Some curricularists embrace Derrida's concept of deconstruction in part, in order to question and then to undermine
our deeply embedded normative assumptions in curriculum (Ulmer, 1985; Wexler, 1987; Cherryholmes, 1988; Crowley, 1989; Pinar, 1988a).

Derrida's involvement with the Group for Research on Philosphic Teaching (GREPH) has been the best exemplar of deconstructive pedagogy. In his essay "Deconstruction and Pedagogy" (1985) Vincent Leitch cites deconstructive thinking for suggesting a certain strategic stance and practice for pedagogy. He remarks that the process of "depropriation" in deconstructive teaching would be necessary to suspend our ordained and naturalized belief and its own critiques. In order to succeed in this teaching, Leitch (1985) insists, the notions of "suspicious, critical, discriminating and optimistic" must be passed on to students. He points out that the classroom is always a problematic field, and he proposes ways of achieving a pedagogical project:

Uproot the frozen text; break down stereotypes and opinions; suspend or baffle the violence and authority of language; pacify or lighten oppressive paternal powers; disorient the law; let classroom discourse float, fragment, digress; seek ascetic or libidinal abandonment of the teaching body-self. (p. 21)

Further, a deconstructive pedagogy treats the "writing" process as it occurs always and everywhere. The writing process is not repetition, but differentiation. The notion of writing, in deconstructive terms, Leitch (1985) claims, implies that everything that we know is written; or, in other words, "Writing produces all our knowledge" (p. 23). As Silverman (1987) noted, following Sartre's ideas, to write is to be free, to be "engaged"; he remarks that
"being is acting and writing (to write, écrire) is to act" (p. 238).

"Writing" for Derrida, according to Gregory Ulmer in *Applied Grammatology* (1985), is the "inventio" of a new rhetoric, with "invention"--creativity--being the "mana" word of the new pedagogy associated with writing. The function of notion, like "mana," is to be opposed to the absence of signification, without entailing by itself any particular signification (pp. 163-165; see also Derrida, 1978). In other words, pedagogy is based upon a notion of invention or creativity. Thus pedagogy should be committed to change rather than to reproduction, and the classroom should become "a place of invention rather than of reproduction" (Ulmer, 1985, p. 162). We, students and teachers exist in a state of continuous construction and reconstruction; it is a world where anything that can be negotiated can occur.

The obstacle, Ulmer (1985) observes, that Derrida wishes to remove, is the conception of the "exteriority" of writing to speech and speech to thought--the view that language is an instrument of thought, and writing only "the extension of an instrument (supplement)" (p. 79). As signs come into existence, independent of the intentions and temporality of the founding consciousness, and exterior to self-contained systems posited by structuralism, the event is always on the "exterior." Derrida wants to illustrate his own "grammatology," the practice of a mode of writing which is no longer subordinated to speech and thought, a writing no longer functioning as a representation of speech, a practice in which the hierarchy of thought, speech, and writing is collapsed. In this sense, there is
neither inside nor outside, neither originary nor supplement, but "différance" itself (Derrida, 1976, 1978).

Grammatology, applied by Ulmer (1985), cuts across the old divisions of knowledge, being concerned with all manners of inscription, with the question of how any form of knowledge or mode of knowing relates to writing. Through deconstructive criticism of a structural view of meaning, Cherryholmes (1988) focuses on written text, and demonstrates that text speaks with many voices; he insists that "the meaning of what is present depends upon what is absent" (p. 61). In other words, texts include traces of words and concepts not present, and that which is not present makes possible that which is present. Meaning, according to Derrida (1978), is in a legal sense subjectless, yet a conceptual necessity.

Meaning is determined by a system of forces which is not personal. It does not depend on the subjective identity but on the field of different forces . . . . No one is free to read as he or she wants. (p. 22)

Robert Scholes (1985) suggests that teachers need to bring to students knowledge and skills that "will enable them to make sense of their worlds, to determine their own interests" (p. 15). The pedagogy which Scholes envisages seems to consist in a conscious attempt to empower students by letting them bring their own values and experience to bear on a text, and by illuminating the social and historical components of the text. Similarly, Ulmer relates Derrida's notions of deconstruction and writing to provoke a pedagogy, which recognizes that knowledge in and of humanities is precisely a knowledge of "enframing," of "media and mise en scène" (Ulmer,
In such way, stresses Ulmer, knowledge is understood not as a representation of something else but as itself a mode of action in the cultural world.

**Selected Contemporary Curriculum Theorists**

**Peter Taubman: De-gendered Curriculum and the Student/Teacher Relation**

In his 1979 doctoral dissertation, entitled *Gender and Curriculum: Discourse and the Politics of Sexuality* (published in 1982), Peter Taubman employed Foucault's methodology to illuminate gender and feminist issues in curriculum studies. Taubman (1979) observes and analyzes the shifting movements of "sexual politics" through their discursive constitution within our daily lives. He proposes a "de-gendered" society as necessary to the transformation of curriculum (pp. 162-176). The underlying politics of selection (or exclusion) are typically obscured through the ways knowledge and curriculum are presented and organized. Curriculum, as a consequence of selection, distribution, and interpretation, symbolizes not only what is privileged as "formal" or real knowledge, but conditions the discursive practices that infuse this knowledge with power.

A decade later, he remarks, in "Achieving the Right Distance" (1990), that it is significant to develop a psychoanalysis of relationship between student and teacher, more importantly, a relationship between the teacher and his or her self-identification. Many believe anyone can teach, for it is easy to be the teacher and
anticipate her or his practices. We teach the way we are taught. The issue at stake here is the taking up of an identity (public image) which requires suppressing aspects of the self. To become a teacher thus means to become someone you are not. Taubman explicates the experience of coming to teach himself autobiographically. There is a contradiction involving in the distance between student and teacher. On the one hand, Taubman (1990) notes:

To compensate for the unconscious and forever unsatisfied need, the student, knowledge and the privileged position as the one who knows are substituted. . . . The desire to be, to know, to have is an unending desire that works in the direction of increasing distance between teacher and student. (p. 121)

On the other hand, reiterates Pinar (1988a), "intimacy with students would require [a teacher's] dissolution of identity" (p. 127). The "right" distance between student and teacher, suggests Taubman (1990), lies "in the middle, at the midpoint" (p. 131). This midpoint can be related to the paradoxical instance found in post-structuralism.

This process of "achieving" the right distance, I think, is the focus to which pedagogical meaning aspires. In discussing this process, it should address the discursive formations of producing knowledge and the ways for interpreting the knowledge that can and cannot be produced. Taubman rightly notes that the assumption of particular forms of cultural authority has been mystified, in the realm of Lacan's the "imaginary." He remarks: knowledge is instructive in and of itself (Taubman, 1990).
Cleo Cherryholmes: Post-structural Investigations

Cherryholmes, in his Power and Criticism (1988), took the task as "an interpreter of post-structuralism" (J. F. Soltis in Foreword) to demonstrate contemporary post-structuralist thought and its application to curriculum. He provides a clear and convincing introduction to post-structural approaches to the curriculum field; he asserts that the analytic tradition has influenced many educators, preventing them from accepting a less orderly, less controllable, less accountable framework. Cherryholmes (1988) offers his own view of "critical pragmatism" which incorporates post-structuralism into traditional American analytic philosophy (pp. 141-149).

Cherryholmes (1988) invites readers to "rethink" present structural educational discourse-practices (pp. 1-13). Through post-structural analysis and criticism, mainly Foucault's "discourse" (which he terms "interpretive analytics") and "power arrangement," Derrida's "text" (which he terms "deconstruction") and "meaning in play," coupled with speech-act theory, Cherryholmes (1988) insightfully criticizes structuralist analyses that have been deterministic and uncritical (pp. 33-40). He outlines and questions three influential structuralist-minded approaches in education: Tyler's (1949) rationale, Schwab's "The Practical 4" (1969) as an extension and application of Tylerian rationale, and Bloom's taxonomy. He asks of Tyler's rationale--under what conditions can it be operative? He questions how we can make decisions about curriculum and instruction when these are socially embedded and determined by political, historical, cultural, economic, and linguistic
settings. He regards the most troublesome characteristic of the structuralist approach as "value neutrality."

To the question of meaning, Cherryholmes (1988) draws on John Austin and John Searle's speech act theory to show that meaning is socially constructed and context dependent. At Derrida's insistence, writing makes speech possible. Cherryholmes then explicates this notion of absence of textual formation into the school's "hidden curriculum," arguing that the awareness of critical thinking needs to be raised. He points out: "Deconstructive analysis suggests that texts are never what they seem" (p. 61). This absence parallels the "noise," in Serres' (1982) "the parasite," as background signifying the presence and the message.

Cherryholmes (1988) recognizes that critical discourse or "pragmatism" is necessarily paradoxical in nature itself. He states that it "cannot eliminate structural conditions necessary for its own constitution. . . the desire to eliminate distortions is also a normative commitment" (p. 92). In addition, Cherryholmes suggests an attitude of playfulness to approach deconstruction. It is in this notion of playfulness that one can seek beyond what is in the text, that one can connect between words, utterance, or discourses and what is not there.

Cherryholmes basically demonstrates a circular triplet--construction, deconstruction, subsequent criticism--in his analyses of curriculum. In these analyses inheres a radical definition of the self, which in Europe has Marxist underpinnings, that Cherryholmes and others, who seek to "liberate" the self, find unappealing. He attempts to incorporate speech-act theory into post-structuralism, as if this
might remedy the post-structuralism with which, in fact, speech-act theory is incompatible. He, and other deconstructionists, customarily ignore post-structuralist epistemology and focus on the analysis and interpretation of literary work. Such analysis is a project of description of the content of a poetry not subordinated to propositional truth.

Philip Wexler: After the New Sociology of Education

Philip Wexler, in his Social Analysis of Education (1987), reapproaches the social analysis of education through a postmodern lens. He focuses not only on historical analyses of educational change, but also reconceives education by viewing school knowledge as "processes of decomposition and dereification" (p. 83). He asserts critically that knowledge has been simply regarded as "skill and information," that a culture of scientism, heroic, self-centered and psychological, has been expressed through contemporary schooling. He also rejects the concepts of "reproduction" and "resistance," adopted by the so-called new sociology of education, as able to account for the social function of schools and society. He then introduces a synthesis of post-industrialism and post-structuralism into his "social analysis" of education. He claims that education has been distorted, that the contradiction of education (like that of the sociology of education) is that "it is at once a discursive blockage against realizing and articulating knowledge," which "'contains'--both includes and constrains--the most powerful, though diffused and fragmented, cultural resources of historical knowledge" (Wexler,
Wexler claims that representation is already an "audacious act against the autonomy of the subject" (p. 101).

Wexler (1987) stresses that the conceptual formation from ideology to reproduction/resistance has functioned in a binary fashion--"individual-society," "structure-agency," that it presumably has a cultural autonomy similar to what it is criticizing. This cultural autonomy, Wexler observes, that is "linked to obscure the possibility of a collective historical understanding of social life" (p. 43). Wexler still believes the dialectic of the "commodity" is where the disruptive diffusion and decentering current at play in social and literary modernism. He argues that those abstract cultural mystifying processes which once were hidden, congealed by post-industrialism, are now unravelled in the ordinary practices of social production. He remarks that "the deconstructive decomposition of the sociocultural relations of production is now both a requirement of advanced production, and secondarily, in the capitalization of information, an additional means of profit" (p. 14). For Wexler, the "subject" is sometimes assumed by the term "socialization" and it "ruptures the apparent naturalness of the systematic objectifying pacification of self-conscious subjective identity and intentional action" (p. 115). Also she/he is a "self-parody," "multidimensional, decentered, and decentering" subject (p. 115).

Wexler (1987) further remarks that the centering of structure "not only regresses toward essentialism, toward the view of symbols as 'expressing' some prior unitary being or thing, but also stops the movement that inheres in language" (p. 137). The relational system of signs limits structuralism itself. He further explains that "the aim
of decentering is to release the refined energy of textuality, and to offer an enlightenment not of reason, but of movement" (p. 139). He is proposing that the free energy, informal culture of social interaction, performance-oriented rationality, emitted from textuality is also what conditions knowledge production taking place in the schools.

The discourse is secondary to the centered metaphysics of structuralism. The power of discourse, claims Wexler (1987), is not "an expression or representation of anterior objects" (p. 141). On the contrary, it is discourse, the socially constructed and regulating practices of that "dispersed plane of knowledge, the epistémé, that forms the object, referent, and being of last appeal, the subject, 'man'" (p. 141). Wexler stresses that the production of knowledge is not only the object of practice but also the social relationships it inscribes. As Foucault (1972) puts it: "Every educational system is a political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it" (p. 227). The point is not to dissolve relations of power in the utopia of a transparent communication, but to give one's self the rules of law, the techniques of management, and the ethics--the ethos--the practice of self, which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination.

However, Wexler (1987) is skeptical of post-structuralism and regards it as "a form of cultural life as internal exile" (p. 15). In an essay "Curriculum in the Closed Society" (1989), he notes that post-structuralism is a "literary face" of postmodernism (p. 10).
Rebecca Martusewicz: Post-modern Feminist Critique

Those of us stand outside the circle of this society's definition of acceptable women; those of us who have been forged in the crucibles of differences... know that survival is not an academic skill. It is learning how to stand alone, unpopular and sometimes reviled, and how to make common cause with those others identified as outside the structures in order to define and seek a world in which we can all flourish. It is learning how to take our differences and make them strengths. For the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. (Audre Lorde, *Sister Outsider* in Barbara Johnson, 1987, pp. 1-2)

The feminist movement has had enormous influence on curriculum since the late 1970s. Feminist criticism, according to Vincent Leitch (1988), started along with hermeneutics, literary criticism and semiotics and post-structuralism to "expose patriarchal premises and prejudices; to promote the discovery and revaluation of literature by women; and to scrutinize the social and cultural contexts of literature and criticism" (p. 307). Gender in education has always been an important issue in all levels of policy-making and everyday practices, especially since the women's movement in the 1960s.

Martusewicz details a post-modern or post-structural feminist perspective of curriculum field in her Ph.D. dissertation, *The Will to Reason: An Archaeology of Womanhood and Education, 1880-1920* (1988). She attempts to lay bare the claim of "the reason of the other" to account for the dismissal or "neutralization" of women's discourse by patriarchal domination (Martusewicz, 1988, p. 46). This word "Other," insists Derrida (1978), is "circumscribed in silence by
the capital letter which ever increases the neutrality of the other, and which we use so familiarly, even though it is the very disorder of our conceptuality" (p. 105). Also reason is, in the Deleuzean notion of "a priori other," the idea of neither presence nor absence, of other defining initially a certain way of treating the concepts of understanding--"a concept being given, reason seeks another which, taken in the totality of its extension, conditions the attribution of the first to the object to which it refers" (Deleuze, 1990, p. 294).

Woman's acquisition of power of voice thus grows not out of her identity but out of her division into the inside and outside of reason.

Martusewicz (1988) depicts the discourses of women during the period from 1880 to 1920, which had tremendous impact on feminist theory to date. For instance, she argues that "the female body became the object of scientific gaze and the 'truth' of woman's nature was asserted, backed up with hard evidence" (p. 48). Woman's relation to knowledge is that the place of the "facilitator" of knowledge as mother and as teacher, servicing the knower but distant from and incapable of becoming the knower herself. Drawing on Foucault, she challenges dualistic, male-dominated ways of thinking, reproducing androcentric bias at the groundwork, not merely presupposing them. She questions the relation between the historical production of knowledge and woman as a social form and subjective position. For the subject is not the source of meaning; rather, Foucault (1980) asserts meaning and subjectivity are produced through a complex system of differences, through language and the wider symbolic system that we understand to be culture.
Regarding the question of knowledge production and of identity, Martusewicz (1988) raises the following:

First, many are interested in what women should be learning, what forms of organized knowledge would be beneficial to a woman's life. But, in order to come to a decision about such curricular matters, there would first have to be agreement about what constitutes true womanhood. (p. 4)

Martusewicz (1988) argues that the discourse on the body was "articulated within a broader discourse on reason. . . women strategically emulated to justify their positions in the male-dominated world of knowledge production" (p. 144). She claims that reason legitimates women's exit from the private while ensuing the reproduction of woman as inferior "Other," as woman struggles to have what man has. She then asks the question, raised first by Adrienne Rich (1976), of "whether women cannot begin, at last, to think through the body, to connect what has been cruelly disorganized" (p. 284). "Thinking" is an active and expanding process; "knowing" are recapitulations of past processes. Our thinking bodies are intertwined with our lives and our deaths. In doing so, women "produced knowledge about their body, in particular about the female body and its regulation, about the female mind, and about the educated woman" (Martusewicz, 1988, p. 144). She is suggesting a deeper understanding that reconceptualizes educational history and has the potential to problematize the taken-for-granted categories which produce knowledge and identity.
Notions of postmodernity or postmodernism have stimulated vigorous debate for two decades (Arac, 1986). Nietzsche, Heidegger, Habermas, Foucault, Lyotard, Rorty, and Jameson, among others, have variously discussed the project of modernity in detail. Each has followed the tradition of Enlightenment and moved in his own direction. Postmodernism, started in Art and Architecture, has become a self-evident historical "category," an interdisciplinary specialization (Rajchman, 1991). It is generally accepted as an umbrella term for referring to the processes, changes and transformations that "come after" what before were generally homogenized, reducible, controllable, or predictable discourses.

In curriculum, postmodern approaches and analyses start to emerge following different traditions. Burbules and Rice (1991) characterize three ideas of postmodernism in educational studies. They are "the rejection of absolutes," "the perceived saturation of all social and political discourses with power or dominance," and "the celebration of difference" (pp. 395-396).

Stanley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux (1991) approach the postmodern from a critical--neo-Marxist, Gramscian, Weberian--philosophical orientation; and they observe that what is at issue in education is the legitimacy claims of marginal discourses, the diversity of producing knowledge and its validity. Carol Nicholson (1989) points out that a postmodern feminist pedagogy is not to "destroy tradition but to give students the opportunity to reinterpret it for themselves in the light of new problems and perspectives" (p.
Fritzman (1990) advocates a postmodern pedagogy, embracing Lyotard's paralogy, which instead of constructing a curriculum based on the ideal of a social consensus, teaches students "to be sensitive to the inevitable presence of differends" (p. 379). In other words, the emphasis is on "dissensus" rather than consensus.

William Doll (1989, 1991) sets forth a "post-modern" view of curriculum, drawing heavily on post-quantum science and post-positivist philosophy as a way to reinterpret Piaget, Bruner and Dewey, and as an alternative to the present prevailing modernist paradigm. He proposes a four R's curriculum inquiry, which are "richness, relation, rigor, and recursion" (Doll, in press). This approach suggests a different realm of pedagogy and practice.

Doll (1989) approaches the problematic--deterministic orientation--of curriculum through a post-modern perspective, which he contrasts with modern Newtonian paradigms, and he outlines a possible post-modern view of curriculum. He then suggests that notions of "instability," "chaos," "self-organization," "complexity," and "recursion" should be considered in concerning the interactions between teacher and student in the classroom. Utilizing Piaget, Bruner and Dewey, he exemplifies "equilibrium," "disequilibrium" and "reequilibration" at various stages of self-generative development in order to achieve the process pedagogy in schooling (Doll, in press).

Doll acknowledges the hermeneutics of understanding and of self to embrace a notion of "community" which includes Rorty's notion of "conversation." He strives to introduce a post-modern view of curriculum through a "new" epistemology which is hermeneutically
oriented. This alternative to a traditional, systematic and linear
Tylerian rationale proposed by Doll (in press) would help to vitalize
curriculum.

William Pinar: Autobiography and the Architecture of Self

The notion of "currere," inaugurated and emphasized by Pinar
and Grumet (1976), is the keystone of the "reconceptualist"
movement of the 1970s. Currere stems from its Latin root, Pinar
(1976) notes, suggesting that curriculum focus not on the external,
the objective, the public, but rather to involve the search for the
nature of the individual experience of the public--the existential
experience of the educational journey. Recently, Pinar (1991) insists
that "the significance of place" brings "the particularistic into focus";
it also "sharpens our understanding of the individual and the psychic
and social forces that direct him or her" (p. 4). To the contrary,
Foucault (1986b) remarks:

We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of
the world is less that of a long life developing through
time, than that of a network that connects points and
intersects with its own skein. (p. 22)

Pinar (1988a) questions the concept of "authentic self" through
autobiography which would enable students and teachers to
understand themselves and the world itself. The concept of an
"authentic self" with knowable characteristics, such as rationality,
emotion, and will, is dismantled. For Pinar (1988b), understanding of
self is not narcissism, rather it is a "precondition and a concomitant
condition" to the understanding of others (p. 150).
Pinar asserts that the construction of self requires certain exclusions which, in terms of curriculum, as "enculturation," as political socialization (Pinar, 1988a). He is suggesting the construction of an inclusive architecture of self through autobiographical reflection. He insists that a self committed to education might well redistribute resources from the dominant self to those elements of the self that have been—via conditioning and choice—marginalized. He argues that "the self is fictive; it is an aesthetic creation, and the means by which the self is planned and 'built' are story-telling and myth-making" (Pinar, 1988a, p. 18). He proposes using autobiography as a means for self-reflection and self-understanding in relation to the self, curriculum studies, and the world. This orientation, Merleau-Ponty (1961) suggests:

> produces a table of diverse, complex probabilities, always bound to local circumstances, weighted with a coefficient of facticity. (p. 44)

Each reality of self gives way to reflexive questioning, irony, and ultimately the playful probing of yet another reality. The center fails to hold; it is deconstructed through increasingly awareness that the objects of which we speak are not so much in the world as they are products of perspective. The very concept of personal essences is thrown into doubt.

Pinar (1992) points out that post-structuralism has been rapidly recognized throughout the last decade and provokes certain controversies and debates among curriculum studies. Nevertheless, he embraces such a challenge for curricular scholars, through which educators may respond reflexively. As well, he recognizes that
notions of "narrating" or "to narrate" in writing are highly suggestive for curriculum theory and practice. As Robert Scholes (1990) remarks, narrative is a central armature of human thought.

Ted Aoki: Sound of Pedagogical Calling

Ted Aoki proposes a kind of embodying of teaching. It is not simply representational reflective understanding, nor merely critical praxis, understood as critical theory searching underlying ideology which conditions our existence. This reflective "storying" and "theming," in Aoki's view, is concerned more about what we already are while we are existing in the world. Curriculum, insists Aoki, is regarded as the movement of lived-experience, relations between man and the world. Pedagogy for him can be considered as play which is purposeful without a purpose. Play is not random but coherent and meaningful, yet without a purpose in a conventional sense, because it is not for anything but just for fun, for self-enjoyment, for "being-in-the-world." Such a view has great practical significance. Free association is not just everything goes; free association still makes connections, because free association brings us back home to our self—in terms of Heidegger's "dwelling-in-the-world." Pertinent here is a Zen story:

A blind man went to visit his friend far away. When he was ready to leave, the sky was very dark. His friend advised him to take a lamp to light the way, he answered that "I do not need a lamp, bright and dark are the same to me." His friend said: "I know you do not need a lamp, but if you do not hold a lamp, maybe someone will come across you." He then held a lamp and walked home. On the way home, one person knocked on him at his face. He yelled to that person:
"Hey! watch your way, don't you see the lamp! Are you blind!" That person replied: "Hey sir, your candle was not lit." (personal translation)

This story implies that holding other people's ideas in order to understand others is like the blind man holding the lamp; he would never know whether the candle was lit or not.

Aoki (1990a) believes that students' and teachers' work and their self-reflexivities are central to the understanding of pedagogy. Stories are told, in terms of Heidegger's "telling," in their own voices, by students and teachers and they share with one another--"listening to pedagogical being" (pp. 2-10). This pedagogy signifies an attempt to create spaces for expressions of their concerns and thus brings us a sense of "belonging together" (pp. 12-16).

Afterthoughts

The implications of post-structuralist perspectives for curriculum are numerous. Post-structuralism invites us to rethink, to question the way we used to think. Curriculum as post-structuralism is an intriguing reminder of the provisionality of knowledge. In this chapter, I have considered the initial examples of post-structuralist scholarship. Taubman and Martusewicz incorporate Foucault's methodology into gender-difference and identity-formation. Cherryholmes and Wexler employ post-structuralist approaches to focus their critical theory perspectives. Pinar and Aoki extend phenomenological aspects of curriculum theory and practice toward post-structuralism. Doll argues for a post-modern vision in curriculum. These scholars can be viewed as transitional as they point toward a post-structuralist "view" in
curriculum, a view currently most completely developed by Jacques Daignault.

In the next chapter, I will explicate Jacques Daignault's post-structuralist curriculum thought. Daignault articulates post-structuralism extensively, demonstrating curriculum studies and pedagogy post-structurally. In the "deconstruction" of curriculum many problematics start to emerge as post-structuralists' notions of the "condition of possibility," the "undecidable," the "trace," or the "events" are employed. These problematics as discursive formations point to curriculum understood post-structurally.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE WORK OF JACQUES DAIGNAULT

Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; also that the moral (and immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown. (Nietzsche, 1966, p. 13)

I can talk of Foucault, tell you that he has said this or that to me, set it out as I see it. This is nothing as long as I have not been able really to encounter this set of sounds *hammered* out, of decisive gestures, of *ideas* all made of tinder and fire, of deep *attention* and sudden closure, of *laughter* and smiles which one feels to be "dangerous" at the very moment when one feels tenderness--this set as a unique combination whose proper name would be Foucault. (Deleuze, 1987b, p. 11)

Post-structuralism Encountered

This chapter discusses the major works of a major post-structural curriculum theorist--Jacques Daignault. It provides an overview of his thought and of its bearing on the central issues of contemporary curriculum theory. Since the influence of Gilles Deleuze on Daignault is enormous, a "reading" of Deleuze presented alongside a reading of Daignault will be presented as an intersecting "event." I would agree with what Foucault (1977) says when he writes: "... perhaps one day, this century will be known as Deleuzean" (p. 165).
Thinking of Jacques Daignault, whose complex and elusive style strikes me most, I am reminded of Deleuze's encounter with Foucault. The "deep attention" and "sudden closure" revealed in Daignault's rigorous efforts suggest the metaphysical questioning of essence—"what is the problematics?" to which I have no fixed answer. If I supplied an answer, then Daignault would ask: "Which one?" The concept of "multiplicity" comes into play here.

The post-structuralist curriculum, Daignault (1983) conceives, is not simply the transmission of knowledge, or the transmission of values, nor the mastery of method—"know-how" or "know-how-to-be"—but rather is a "manner" to "stage" knowledge through a "passage-way" (pp. 7-13). This passage-way is to think otherwise, as in Nietzsche's "will to" (as resentment), Heidegger's notion of "thinking" (thought-provoking) and Foucault's history of thought (as unthought), especially in the Deleuzean "sense" (French sens)—surface and event (as the fourth dimension of language or fourth person singular). Daignault is suggesting such a notion of thinking or sense in which to think oneself as self-educative, means "to experiment and to problematize"; to make sense which by itself is a problematic and problematizing. Influenced by Kant and Deleuze, Daignault asserts that the separation of universality and particularity, subject and object, one's work and play, one's intellectual activities and everyday life, teaching and learning is all but unattainable. Binary oppositions are denied. Daignault thinks of the "excluded middle" (in Deleuze's term "sense-event") being given ready-made unproblematically in curriculum studies. The excluded middle is the interest of determinations of signification. He argues
that sense (event) is presented both as that which happens to bodies and that which insists in propositions. As Ulmer (1985) points out, classroom is a place for teacher and students' inventions, not simply reproduction; he insists that "pedagogy is (a) theater that is not representation but 'life itself'" (p. 174). Lives become texts. Texts require interpretations and reinterpretations.

**Daignault's Staging-Thinking**

Jacques Daignault started his career in music. He was fascinated by the works of John Cage, Philip Glass and Steve Reich whose work resembles a musical version of post-structuralist thought. Daignault studied education at University of Laval, where he finished the Ph.D. in 1982. He has studied post-structuralism, mainly the works of Deleuze, Serres and Lyotard since 1976 in Quebec and in France. The influence of Deleuze on Daignault is obvious; he employs the Deleuzean notion of "sense," "expressible and expressed," "surface-skin" and "paradoxes" in his own teaching and writing. He writes on post-structuralism and curriculum theory in a "unique" (there is no organizing principle) yet consistent way, and he has developed a "staging" (mise en scène) or "performative speech act" in his own educational pursuits (1986, p. 3).

In reflecting upon Daignault's writing, I hope to lay out an interpretation of his "ideas" without losing the diagonal senses of his writing. These diagonal senses are "unsayable" (Foucault, 1972, 1977), akin to Derrida's "undecidable," or "trace," and Deleuze's "non-parallel" revolution—which is a "heterochronous becoming" (Derrida, 1978; Deleuze, 1987b). Language has invented the dualism, says
Deleuze (1987b); therefore we must pass through dualism because it is in language. In other words, to pass through dualisms is not to get rid of them, but to fight against language, to invent "stammering"—AND, AND, AND. . . (1987b, p. 17). For instance, in Platonic dualism, we recognize that it is not at all the dualism of the intelligible and the sensible, of Idea and matter. It is not the distinction between the model and the copy, but rather between good copies and simulacra—false copies (Deleuze, 1990). Deleuze states that "it is a subterranean dualism between that which receives the action of the Idea and that which eludes this action" (1987a, p. 3). However, I hope, this study can be grasped in a conventional as well as post-structuralist way to cast light on the connection between Deleuze and Daignault's thought.

In a series of essays written during the last decade, Daignault analyzed and demonstrated pedagogical implications of post-structuralism through his encounter with Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Serres and Deleuze. He has staged the questions of future possibilities in curriculum theory and practice.

Post-structuralism "as" Pedagogy

For Daignault, the truth is not merely the subject of enunciation nor the subject of statements, but the "event" itself—the boundary of two sides. In a Derridean fashion, Daignault sees the concept of truth, as implied by harmonious agreement and that which defines the "true" opinion of what something means, as itself a naive notion.

Why study Daignault's essays historically? Because essays interweave with one another; there is no organizing principle. This
"staging" is a stage itself. Daignault deals with problematics in curriculum (his usage of education and curriculum is somehow interchangeable) post-structurally. For instance, Daignault remarks in his essay, "Curriculum as composition: who is the composer?" (1989)

Education is the process through which the subject resists determinations. That is to say the subject is not the self-consciousness; actually, the subject is the subject of education. Thinking is the bridge between the expressing's self-consciousness and the subject of education. Thinking is the incarnation of curriculum as composition; it is what gives birth to an assemblage of notes. (p. 4)

His "translation" of post-structuralism into curriculum is insightful. Thinking means to "problematize," to go beyond subject-identity toward "the thought of difference" and "the production of sense" (Daignault, 1991, p. 376). This leads to an aesthetics of problematization that neither excludes the subject nor centers it. Daignault insists: This problematization does not exclude feeling or emotion without reducing everything to it either.

**The Indecent Curriculum Machine: Who's Afraid of Sisyphus?**

(1982a)

One day Sisyphus brought an indecent curriculum machine that functioned (got out of order) only if it got out of order (worked). Immediately Sisyphus hastened to start the machine and since it worked very well (got out of order), it got out of order (began to work) at once. Happy was he to see that his machine worked (got out of order) but sad was he also to see that it was out of order (worked). (p. 194)
In the beginning of his first (in English) article, with Clermont Gauthier, entitled "The indecent curriculum machine: Who's afraid of Sisyphus?" published in The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing (1982), Jacques Daignault claims that the fundamental problem of the curriculum field has been the search for identity; in other words, its definition. Here, we can connect this quoted passage with Deleuze's (1990) comments on Mallarmé, dialogue from Zen master, he states: '

"If you have a cane', says the Zen master, 'I am giving you one; if you do not have one, I am taking it away.' (or, Chrysippus said, 'If you never lost something, you have it still; but you never lost horns, ergo you have horns") (p. 136). The point is not to repudiate any identity nor to embrace every possibility whatsoever. There is a paradoxical element implicitly being connected with the question of "What is curriculum?" raised by Daignault. This curriculum question and answer parallels the questions raised in post-structuralism. This paradoxical instance, therefore, has the property of always being displaced in relation to itself, of "being absent from its own place," its own identity, its own resemblance, and its own equilibrium. It is the question of "in-between" or "boundary" which runs into all possible directions at one and the same time.

Since its identity, the curriculum field, Daignault argues, was a "step-child" or "sub-discipline" to other disciplines. It was always associated with or derived from other disciplines and subject matters, such as psychology, political science, history, sociology, educational administration. Daignault contends that curriculum has been developed and became recognizable during the last two decades.
Daignault (1982a) does not define what curriculum is, rather, "how it functions-how to be" (pp. 182-183). We can understand his intention via Deleuze's (1986b) statement that "it is absolutely useless to look for a theme in a writer if one hasn't asked exactly what its importance is in the work--that is, how it functions (and not what its 'sense' is)" (p. 45). This also parallels the "technologies of self" in Foucault's dealing with self-formation (Foucault, 1988).

Daignault, then, approaches this problematic of identity through the concept of paradox, adopted from Gregory Bateson (1972) and Deleuze's (1990) series of paradoxes. Daignault argues that identity is inherited from difference, and he remarks that the concept of identity presupposes the concept of "sameness." Two items have to be the same in order to be identical. Such a view has been explained in Hegel's dialectical thinking; it is the identity, both between the identity of identity and identity and between the identity of difference and difference (Descombes, 1986), that constitutes the "difference" between identity and difference. However, Daignault goes further to argue that the problematic of identity is focusing on the paradoxical instance of the "difference" itself, not yet differentiated. Paradox, says Deleuze, is at first that which destroys good sense as the only direction, but paradox is also that which destroys common sense as the assignation of fixed identities. Deleuze (1990) asserts that the function of the paradoxical instance is to "ensure the relative displacement of the two series, the excess of the one over the other, without being reducible to any of the terms of the series or to any relation between these terms" (p. 40). In other
words, paradoxical instance functions to condition the possibilities of being related or divergent.

In this Deleuzean way, then, Daignault (1982a) insists that curriculum is a paradoxical and nomadic object, which is always transient (moving). In short, curriculum is "thought without image, object following an always moving empty space" (p. 182). Here we should not confuse the acts of thought with the image of thought; for him, the curriculum does not exist, but it happens. As Deleuze (1990) points out, the idea of "a place without occupant" and "an occupant having no place" are not to be fixed or to be filled up in a place, which would simply stop the game (an "ideal game" in his mind); to the contrary, he insists, the point is to keep on playing. The empty place and perpetual displacement of a piece in a game is a double sliding in a "perpetual disequilibrium vis-a-vis each other" (p. 40). However, Deleuze (1990) remarks that "the paradoxical entity is never where we look for it, and conversely that we never find it where it is. As Lacan says, 'it fails to observe its place' (elle manque à sa place)" (p. 41).

Daignault does not propose that we should stop defining but, on the contrary, to multiply the definitions, to invite a plural spelling. To define is to distort. His intention here, with which Deleuze would agree, is that to define is not a question of probabilities, combining the heterogeneous elements, simply putting them together. Rather, to define is to portray that there are varied lines, in the Deleuzean (1990) term "series ," made by people (or things) that do not know necessarily which line they are on or where they should make the line which they are tracing pass. The serial form is "realized in the
simultaneity [of] at least two series" (p. 36). In short, there is a whole "geography" in people—with lines of flight, series of event. The notion of time-spatial can be found in Deleuze's (1986a, 1989) "movement-image" and "time-image."

Another notion of "machine" that is articulated in this essay, related to Deleuze's (1987a) idea of "desiring-machine," is that of assemblage, an assemblage of enunciation, an activity of prolific writing. Thus the curriculum machine is in this sense of a writing produced wherever the curriculum is placed. The indecent machine, in Daignault's (1982a) eyes, is exactly that this prolific writing is "contingent to the fantasies of the unconscious and inscribes itself literally in the tempo of the poetical involvement at the risk of engendering delight" (p. 188).

The problematic of theory and practice also interests Daignault significantly; it has been one of the major issues of curriculum. Daignault approaches the problematic by using Deleuze's series of paradoxes to demonstrate the present dilemma within the curriculum field. For example, regarding the problematics of teaching and learning, Daignault claims that there are many differences among theoretical practices, yet theoretical practices cannot be confused with the application of theories. Both Foucault and Deleuze recognize this point and reiterate that "theory does not express, translates, or serve to apply practice: it is practice" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 13).

Therefore the problematic involves, observes Daignault, adopting Deleuze's third and eighth series of the proposition in Logic of Sense (1990), i.e. that the issue at stake is the distinction or gap between
theory and practice. Daignault found this can be understood as the "gap" between "signans"—as signifying— and "signatum," as the signified, which is called Lévi-Strauss' paradox by Deleuze (1990):

The Universe signified long before we began to know what it was signifying. . . . Man, since his origin, has had at his disposal a completeness of signifier which he is obstructed from allocating to a signified, given as such without being any better known. There is always an inadequacy between the two. (cited in Daignault, 1982a, p. 187)

What is in excess in the signifying is a place without an occupant. What is lacking in the signified series is a "supernumerary"—an unknown, an occupant without a place. Daignault asserts that two conditions are present: "First, the elements of each series have to be determined by differential relations as in the case for phonemes and morphemes in the language" and second, there must exist a paradoxical instance which pervades both series without belonging to neither a place without an occupant nor an occupant without a place" (p. 189). This instance has the function of articulating the two series to one another, of making them communicate, coexist, and ramify.

Daignault (1982a) insists that the filling-up or abandonment of the gap or empty space between two series becomes "terrorism" or "nihilism." In terms of terrorism, Daignault argues that the filling-up of empty places requires (1) "all radical transformation of what exists in conformity with what we believe it ought to be"; (2) "each one (competitive doctrines or ideologies) tries to convince the other that his is the true one," and consequently calls for violence (p. 192). In terms of nihilism, he observes that the abandonment of empty space becomes nihilistic in the sense that "our acts instead of being
asserted for what they are reactive to something which does not exist, or becomes a "patched-up activity" (p. 193). Here, he is elucidating the "sense" that not only the gap between the two series is irreducible, but also that the paradoxical instance of the pedagogical complexity maintains and keeps two series (theory and practice) meeting each other constantly. He says: Curriculum can be defined as "a prolonged hesitation between sense and sense" (p. 193).

Daignault (1982a) concludes:

One day Sisyphus bought an indecent curriculum machine that functioned only if it got out of order and that got out of order only if it functioned. Immediately he hastened to start the machine and since it worked very well, it got out of order at once but also since it got out of order quite well, it began to function.
... this prolonged hesitation defined the curriculum.
(p. 194)

To Make Someone Know as We Make Someone Laugh: A Perverse Analysis of Promise and Desire in Curriculum (1982b)

In this amusing and provocative essay, Daignault succinctly illustrates the fundamental paradox of the pedagogical relation through the intriguing conversation between Don Juan and Don Quixote. The paradox, Daignault (1982b) sees, is exactly the link between desire and promise, teaching and learning; in other words, "the promise of the other's desire" (p. 18). As Lacan (1977) would say "the subject of a teaching is a learning" (p. 20). Along with these lines, he ironically parodies Marxist approaches which are succinct (sufficient) but too dogmatic. He writes wittily, "I would become sad as a Marxist should Don Quixote become a Roller Derby player!" (p. 3)
In other words, Marxist approaches function to kidnap the readers to make them happy.

The notion of desire is the central point of this essay. We can recall the concept of desire, explicated by Derrida (1985). He states:

The desire for the intact kernel is desire itself, which is to say that it is irreducible. There is a prehistoric, preoriginary relation to the intact kernel, and it is only beginning with this relation that any desire whatsoever can constitute itself. Thus, the desire for the *phantasm* of the intact kernel is irreducible—despite the fact that there is no intact kernel. (p. 115)

The notion of desire is not the absence instead of the presence, but a trace which replaces a presence which has never been present, an origin by means of which nothing has begun. The opposite of desire, in terms of "ananke," makes possible the kernel desires itself--the intact desire for intactness. (Derrida, 1987)

Daignault (1982b) reiterates the relation between "what is" and "what ought to be." The gap between what is and what ought to be has been one of Daignault's on-going interests. Here he confronts it with the notion of desire. Girard, Rosset, Lacan and Deleuze are the background figures. Now he is introducing a notion of desire as seduction which can be discovered in pedagogical situations. The notion of seduction means the interplay, dialogue and encounters between teachers and students. The object of desire is to know and thus be seduced; it is unreachable or unattainable. We can never know absolutely and yet our quest to know never stops. Once the object of desire has been appropriated, it loses its status as desirable; possession means death. Incidentally, in this regard Taubman (1990) points out that pedagogy is the question of achieving the
"right" distance between teachers and students in complicity with the Lacanian notion of "desire."

Desire cannot be a question of "interior drives," or Girard's "lack of being," for to think of it in those ways is to reestablish the realm of interiority common to Man, even if one is Woman. Daignault (1982b) insists that "such is the romantic lie to which is opposed the 'romanesque' truth" (p. 5). According to Deleuze (1987b) and Daignault (1982b), the misconceptions of desire may be summarized as following three:

First, it can be put in relationship with lack or the law; second, with a natural or spontaneous reality; third, with pleasure or, above all, the festival, celebration (i.e., reversal). (Deleuze, 1987b, p. 103)

We can see here desire represented as a lack, a function not of the presence of a desirable object, but of its actual absence and thus of its sole imaginary and symbolic presence. On the contrary, Daignault (1982b) asserts, desire is not "the inaccessibility of the object of Desire," but also the assumption that it comes from "an excessive appreciation of reality is rejected" (p. 6). Thus he argues that it is rather from "a radical 'différance' coming from the pure fabrication of a double" (p. 7). This is an undifferentiated whole. This also can be interpreted in light of Deleuze's contention that desire is production, or "desiring-production," not acquisition or lack. Ronald Bogue (1989), commenting on Deleuze and Guattari, remarks:

Desire is essentially unconscious, and hence unrelated to negation (there is no "no" in the unconscious), indifferent to personal identities or body images (central to Lacan's imaginary order) and independent
of linguistic expression or interpretation (the core of Lacan's Symbolic order). (p. 89)

In other words, desire is "not internal to a subject, any more than it tends toward an object" (Deleuze, 1987a, p. 89).

The notion of Other is much related to desire. Deleuze (1987a) defines: "The Other, as structure, is the expression of a possible world" (p. 134). This means that it is the structure of the possible; that the expressed possible world exists, but it does not exist (actually) outside of that which expresses it. Deleuze (1990) argues that "the error of philosophical theories is to reduce the Other sometimes to a particular object, and sometimes to another subject" (p. 307). The Other is the subject. Without the other there is no subject.

In Daignault's staged conversation between Don Juan and Don Quixote, he sheds light on the nature of "dialogue" in its process. To dialogue, as Serres (1983) asserts, is to require a third party and to exclude him/her at the same time. To make someone know as to make someone laugh is exemplified best by an excluded third within a dialogue through Socratic irony. Daignault (1982b) describes:

Protagoras knows that brings him equally to know, but of a knowledge which brings one to think it is futile to know anything whatsoever that is true, not even to know that to really know consists in knowing that we know nothing. Socrates asserts that his conviction of being the wisest, which in fact consists in mere ignorance, comes to him mainly through the contacts he has with the sophists. It is by questioning them, that this game brought him to know, but of knowledge of mere ignorance. (p. 18)
To make someone know is to dialogue and to make someone believe that the third party is excluded, "in pretending to say the truth" (p. 17). It is in such a way that to make someone know, not saying the truth, is like making someone laugh. The excluded third is in a paradoxical position. The paradoxical situations within all pedagogical relations, identifies Daignault (1982b), is "the promise of the Other's Desire" (p. 19).

**Analogy in Education: An Archaeology without Subsoil (1983)**

In this long essay Daignault explicates analogy in education through "common sense" and "good sense." He employs his understanding of Deleuzean "sense" to inquire into curriculum problematics, such as theory and practice, teaching and learning. Analogy, commonly understood, is a nonconclusive reasoning that proceeds through a fourth proportional term (A is to B as C is to D). For instance, a pen to a writer is as a gun to a soldier.

Analogy, in Greek term "analogia or analogos," (from *ana*, "up," "upon," "throughout," and "continuous," and *logos*, "ratio," "reasoned") means the comparison of similarities in concepts or things. (Angeles, 1981) For Daignault (1983), analogy can be shown as proportional identity by the means of analog communication. He proposes four categories of analogy in education and further to fill a gap of "rigorous analogies" in education:

The analogies of good sense and common sense; (2) the scientific analogies (or theoretical models); (3) the artistic analogies (or poetical metaphor); and (4) the pedagogical analogies. (p. 20)
Here, Daignault (1983) again connects these analogies with Deleuze's notion of sense, repetition and difference, and paradoxical instance between signifiers and signifieds to deal with the problematics between teaching and learning. Teaching and learning represent two series which meet in pedagogy. There is necessarily a gap between these two. One knows and the other does not. Let us recall that the notion of sense, Deleuze (1990) writes, is the fourth dimension of a proposition: It is

\[
\text{[N]either the designation (objective signification), nor the manifestation (subjective signification), nor signification (systematic signification). Sense does not ex-ist but sub-sists in the world and in-sists in language. (p. 38)}
\]

Daignault elaborates Deleuze's "sense" that it is expressed as an event of an entirely different nature. Deleuze (1990) asserts that "it emanates from nonsense as from the always displaced paradoxical instance and from the eternally decentered ex-centric center" (p. 176). In short, sense is produced by nonsense--"a donation of sense" (Deleuze, 1990, p. 69). Daignault (1983) also uses Steve Reich's repetitive music to demonstrate that while "the shifting of the repetition [is being] accelerated at a constant speed," the differential value will be the same as the repetition itself to a certain extent; "repetition generates the difference"--interpreting the composition (p. 26). On the other hand, in the learning process, the difference needs to be annulled in order to repeat the same passage rigorously. This means that "the repetition increases toward identity and the difference decreases to zero"; in other words, "difference gives birth to the repetition"--learning the composition (p. 27). We can see
there is a paradoxical instance which circulates in the difference of teaching-learning process: "the 'non-sense' of the differential repetition of analogies analogous to themselves. And this sui-reference of the analogies is itself a function of the difference put forth for the joy of teaching" (p. 27).

In this article Daignault (1983) deals with the notion of common sense and good sense again, but related directly to curriculum.

Common sense is a mechanism by which is conferred an identity to things--identity by virtue of which things may be known--and, good sense, a mechanism by which is imposed a direction, a good order in virtue of which a moral--which gives sense to life--may be founded. (p. 4)

Daignault (1983) uses the analogy of common sense by reducing the teaching-learning processes as the transmission of informations--what he terms "the problematics of instruction." In the commonsensical processes of teaching and learning, there is an analogy of "going from the known to the unknown." The analogy of good sense as transmission of values is as "the problematics of education." It is a "mediation of relevance" (pp. 3-4). Here, as we can see, he protests these two notions of "intellectual" space--common sense and good sense; he warns us that we must not take the explanation of a fact for granted, but rather the birth or the suspicion of the existence of this fact--a preconceived opinion depending upon good sense and common sense. Rather, he encourages us to "wage a battle against the truisms and prejudices of [our] times" (p. 5). He is deconstructing the notion of common sense and the good sense of "complex prejudices."
Daignault (1983) proposes that curriculum is in a twofold paradoxical position, which is a "complex" prejudice. On the one hand, education transmits the cultural heritage of the past; on the other, it stimulates the youth to bring forth an improvement of present conditions—an example of an apparently contradictory prejudice as a paradoxical instance. We need not confuse contradiction with paradox, for the principle of contradiction points to the real and the possible, not to the impossible. The force of paradoxes is that they are not contradictory, but that they allow us be present at the genesis of contradictions.

_ Curriculum Beyond Words, With Words (1984a)_

While this paper focuses on the issue of curricular language, it also sheds light on the repudiation of an "overabundance of signifiers" proposed by many structuralists, by Lévi-Strauss in particular. Daignault (1984a) says: "Curriculum is beyond words, that is what I say; with words, that's what I do" (p. 1). This gives rise to the problematic between the notion of "concept" or signification and "word," in the sense of Austin's dictum "to do things with words" (p. 1). However, the idea of speech-act theory is insufficient for Daignault to deal with curriculum. Daignault (1984a) is looking for the "performative" speech act, and he argues that "to be meaningful is not to say the truth, but to succeed in the 'performance'" (p. 1). This approach implicates Lyotard's (1984b) paralogy—a principle of performance—understood as the primary differences ("the heterogeneity of the rules" and "the search for dissent") for a model of legitimation. This legitimation has nothing to
do with maximized performance. Paralogy is a move played in the pragmatics of knowledge.

The gap between philosophy as the content (the scientific) and literature as the form (the poetic) is applicable to curriculum. Among the debates between science and art, he sees: There is a double bind where curriculum stands. There is an excluded third—pedagogy—in teaching philosophy and literature. Daignault (1984a) refuses to exclude. He states:

When I teach philosophy of education, the temptation is there, very often, to stop the teaching/learning process (that is: concrete explanations, examples, analogies, etc.), to jump into the philosophical work stricto sensu. . . . So when I teach, I partly do philosophy. But that is not philosophy teaching (I mean common sense teaching), that is the practice of my second field of study as a third which I refuse to exclude; that is a third use of my second field of study: neither scientific, nor poetic. (pp. 4-5).

This issue can be related to the problematic of the identity of curriculum discussed previously (Daignault, 1982a). He considers curriculum as the excluded third in the debate between art (the poetic) and science (the scientific). He remarks:

Remember that the chemist who teaches chemistry does not accomplish the same thing in research as he does while teaching. . . . Why is it so? Because chemistry is not beyond words while education and curriculum are. Moreover, chemistry is a real first field of study while education is a second field of study. . . .While it is universal in science, it is local in education. (pp. 9-10)

Daignault (1984a) uses Lyotard's the "narrator," the "narrated" and the "narratee" to explain the relation between research and
teaching (research and teaching in science and art). He argues that "teaching is the genesis of the research and creative process itself" (p. 11). In both science and art, the narratee is a virtual narrator and vice versa in the teaching process, for competition and selection will determine who will be the next master-narrators. However, there is the situation of the narratee becoming spectator (in the case of art and education). In curriculum, Daignault insists that there is a gap between what the narratees (students) are and what narrators (teachers) think they should be as narrators. This gap resembles the gap between theory and practice, and there arises a paradoxical instance between teachers and students. There are also dangers of being terrorist (dogmatic) or nihilist (doing nothing).

Curriculum, says Daignault, is the excluded third in the debate between art and science. Daignault also uses Serres' "dialogue" to explicate the excluded third in the communication process, which is the finding of "idealities" for science, the aesthetic piece for art. The question, he asks, is: What is the excluded third in education? Daignault (1984a) answers: "The history of arts and the history of sciences are a struggle against prejudices and cliches of an age, while the history of education is an incredible struggle to find the best prejudices and cliches" (p. 15). He then proposes to employ pedagogical analogy which can perform something meaningful even with scraps--this is the what is for curriculum.

Daignault (1984a) explicates the analogy (or metaphor) of Lacan's interpretation of definition of the metaphor to demonstrate pedagogical performance of analogous communication. He explains:
A metaphor is a mathematical function such as the signifier to signify $[S]$ is replaced by a prime signifier $[S']$ above the division's bar $[/]$. That is the condition $ [=] $ for the signifier $[S]$ to reach $[(+)]$ a signified $[s]$. (p. 17)

In the formula, any signifier to signify which belongs to a metaphor (in that case the word "metaphor") must be replaced by another signifier (in that case the formula itself). What is the signified of the signifier of "metaphor"? There is no answer; there is only "infinite regression" from signifiers to signifiers. Daignault (1984a) sees that "the chain of signifiers is Desire in Lacan's theory. And Desire is unattainable. So the definition of a metaphor is beyond words, with words" (p. 18). The concept of "word" can be explained through an analogy, according to Derrida (1978), to the notion of "exergue" in the values of money as "usure." Curriculum is analogous to the definition of the metaphor, asserts Daignault. Daignault (1984a) believes that "curriculum is a metaphor the signification of which is unattainable. The best we can do is to talk about it with analogies" (pp. 20-21). One of his hypothesis is the following:

We could learn to practice education as the third excluded (from the debate between art and science); we would refuse to be excluded from the so-called rigorous (scientific and poetic) debates. What I believe is that common sense and good sense opinions are the third excluded by art and science. (Daignault, 1984a, p. 6)

Daignault wrote this paper in English; his native language is French. Thus he is doing something now with words, something which is beyond words. He also develops a "second order rhetoric--a process in which someone acts like... like... the first 'like' is an
analogy, the second 'like' is an analog communication" (pp. 23-24).

Deleuze (1986b) states that "writing has a double function: to translate everything into assemblages and to dismantle the assemblage. The two are the same thing" (p. 47). The dismantling of the assemblages, observes Deleuze (1987a), makes the social representation take flight in a much more effective way than a critique would have done and brings about a "determinorization" of the world that is itself political and that has nothing to do with an activity of intimacy.

The problem again, Daignault sees, is that we confuse education with good sense and common sense. Paradox is opposed to doxa, in both aspects of doxa, namely, good sense and common sense. Deleuze (1990) explains as follow:

Good sense is said of one direction only: it is the unique sense and expresses the demand of an order according to which is necessary to choose one direction and to hold onto it. Good sense therefore is given the condition under which it fulfills its function, which is essentially to foresee. . . . In common sense, "sense" is no longer said of a direction, but of an organ. It is called "common," because it is an organ, a function, a faculty of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same. Common sense identifies and recognizes, no less than good sense foresees. (pp. 75-78)

Good sense and common sense are therefore undermined by the principle of their production, and are overthrown from within by paradox. This paradoxical instance is linked to Derrida's insistence that we must first try to conceive of the common ground, and the "différance" of this irreducible difference. For instance, Zen appears
to be anti-metaphysical, and yet Zen masters often make statements which are quite metaphysical. Zen masters seem to be fond of ordinary language, and yet their use of language is often extraordinary. This "paradoxical instance," for Zen masters, is the original teaching of Zen.


This essay Daignault (1984b) returns to the relationship between theory and practice, or between research and practice. Daignault (1984b) is suggesting a particular "geography" of pedagogical thought to inform curriculum theorists and teachers. He distinguishes two kinds of "rapport" between theory and practice. The first corresponds to "technological space" or Platonistic geography, and the second to "political space" or Nietzschean geography (p. 5). The first kind of rapport is considered as "an activity describing and explaining objectively a certain portion of reality, and the diverse possible applications which enable this reality to be transformed"; the second aims at "the practice itself of the setting up of a relation between two opposite conceptions of theory: objective and normative" (Daignault, 1984b, p. 5).

This is a point where Daignault goes back to the concept of Nietzschean "geography" of thought and Deleuzean "nomadic movement" and "lines of flight," in order to demonstrate the "spaces" of knowledge. There are "technological," "political" and "pedagogical" spaces, suggests Daignault (1984b). According to Deleuze (1986c), the nomads have no history; they only have geography. "It is false to
define the nomad by movement. Rather he is who does not move... and he is only seated while moving" (p. 51). Daignault argues that the notion of space, in a different epistéme which represents modes of thought, is the constituting force of knowledge and its background. The space is the "gaps" or "rapports," he sees, between theory and practice, teaching and learning signifying the problematics of curriculum theorizing.

Daignault illustrates the significant difference between "de facto" (by fact) and "de jure" (by right), a posterori and a priori, a distinction also made by Kant and favored by Derrida, which identifies the difference between pure reason and practical reason. This difference among the spaces of knowledge and the problematic between theory and practice are reapproached. Knowledge, for Kant, is a synthesis of representations, "we think we can find a predicate B outside the concept A, a predicate which is foreign to this concept, but which we think we ought to attach to it" (Deleuze, 1983a, p. 97). When it depends on experience it is a posterori; on the contrary, it is the a priori synthesis which attributes a property to the object which was not contained in the representation, "rational knowledge and a priori knowledge are identical" (Kant, 1966, Preface). Daignault is questioning whether de jure and de facto are reducible to political space or technological space.

Daignault (1984b) connects the differences and gaps with his proposed concept of "pedagogical city" to describe the circulation of places and occupants in the middle, or in-between technological space and political space. Daignault (1984b) states:
One of the main traits of the technological space and of the Platonistic geography of thought consists in setting as a strict problem of competence (knowledge, know-how-to-be and know-how), the passage from theory to practice. "Being" always assumes that somewhere exists a passage altogether possible and desirable. (p. 8)

He demonstrates that in three historical stages (antiquity to the Enlightenment, Middle Age, Renaissance onwards) of pedagogical knowledge production there have also been corresponding changes between the gap of "what exist" and "what should be." Daignault (1984b) claims:

Education, no matter how it is perceived, has never been, at least until recently, indifferent toward the great dreams of humankind. For Plato, education is seen as a process leading, ultimately at least, to the realization of certain ideals. . . . We will in succession come upon three kinds of knowledge: knowledge, the "know-how-to-be" and the "know-how," and the three corresponding educational institutions: society, school, and the individual. To each of these three moments of a dual evolution correspond three great conceptions of Evil. (pp. 6-7)

First, technological space is evil as "ignorance, knowledge and the educational city": The gap between "what is" and "what ought to be" is constituted by the only thing "that is" (Daignault, 1984b, p. 11). Knowledge is implied by the passage from the sensible world to the world of ideas. The obstacle to the passage from one world to another world is "ignorance." Second, it is "radical evil, the know-how-to-be and the school": The passage from "what exists" to "what should be" is no longer justified by knowledge as the guarantor (Daignault, 1984b, p. 12). A new conception of the educational process is required to deal with adopting moral behavior. The
process of conversion guarantees the passage from one state to another. School becomes "a place in relation to the City of Men" (Daignault, 1984b, p. 13). Third, it is evil as "an obstacle, the know-how, and the individual": The emergence of the Subject transforms all knowledge. Reason substitutes for the laws of the nature and those of God in constituting knowledge (Daignault, 1984b, p. 14). The gap between what is and what ought to be points to the realization of possibilities inscribed in our world: an authentic know-how. The pedagogy of the space of know-how presupposes an individual force which is education's role to develop and guide.

Each of these three technological spaces in curriculum is involved with the possible application of these knowledges; these prescriptions of the possibilities are chosen and regarded as the guarantors of later success. The question of the prescription of objectives calls for a political decision treated as question of fact, as the prescription of means. Daignault (1984b) remarks that "the Platonistic geography in constantly folding down the technological space upon the political spaces treats the prescription of ends as a simple prescription of means" (p. 15). In other words, technological decisions underlie political considerations.

The question of "folding down" is related to the concept of a Nietzschean geography of thought. This can be explained through Deleuze's notions regarding "perspectivism" in Nietzsche, analogous to Daignault's notion of "pedagogical city." For both Deleuze and Daignault, the pedagogical city is not the questioning of divergence nor disjunction, because divergence is no longer a principle of exclusion, and disjunction no longer a means of separation. Rather,
"incompossibility" becomes now a means of communication. In Deleuze's terms, each vantage point of the city points to a city which corresponds to each different vantage point, always a different city within the city.

This rapport between theory and practice in political space has a paradoxical nature. Daignault continues to explicate the rapport or gap through the paradox of signification and sense. The interest of the determinations of signification lies in the fact that they engender the principles of non-contradiction and the excluded middle, instead of these principles being given ready-made. The paradoxes themselves enact the genesis of contradiction and inclusion in the propositions stripped of signification. This can be recalled as Stoics display so much interest in the connection of propositions—things and words (Daignault, 1984b).

Action-research focuses on the investigation political space and on a question of de jure. As Serres (1983) says:

To think the concept of disorder does not mean to establish a dialogue between two symmetrical ontologies but rather to rethink the relations between order and disorder in such a way as to show how everything begins, ends, and begins again according to a universal principle of disorder. (p. xxvii)

It is, then, necessary to rethink the world not in terms of its "laws" and its regularities, but rather in terms of perturbations and turbulences, in order to bring out its multiple forms, uneven structures, and fluctuating organizations. Foucault links discontinuity and power relation to the laws, ethics, and social formation in France at the time (Daignault, 1983).
Deleuze (1988) remarks that "the unthought is therefore not external to thought but lies at its very heart, as that impossibility of thinking which doubles or hollows out the outside" (p. 97). The theme, which has always intrigued Foucault, is that of the "double," but the double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, it is an interiorization of the outside. Deleuze (1988) asserts that "it is not a doubling of the One, but a redoubling of the Other. It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a repetition of the Different" (p. 98). For Deleuze, a problematization of thought has triple roots which are knowledge, power and self.

Daignault (1984b) concludes:

The type of authorized prescriptions by action-research would never be derived from the "having to be" but from the interdiction to desire it really: to never prescribe, to never proscribe and never abstain oneself. (p. 26)

_Daignault (1984b)_ concludes:

_Semiotics of Educational Expression (1986)_

This essay deals with the problematics between text and knowledge in order to illustrate a "genre" of teaching. Daignault observes (1986) the preponderance of signifiers over signifieds has been the cornerstone for modern French philosophy and literature. For instance, Derrida points out that writing (in the sense of trace) is the logical prerequisite for speech. Daignault (1986) asserts that "we do not write with ideas, but with words" (p. 1). More emphasis upon signifiers instead of signifieds is employed. The style, rhythm, and opacity of writing constitute aspects of the work's meaning.
Daignault (1986) explains: "Hidden into the text, under [a] word's thickness, concepts become almost undiscoverable" (p. 2).

Many would object to this kind of playing on words or pun, for it creates unnecessary difficulties for the reader to understand the work. Daignault insists this is a misunderstanding of the notion of the text. He continues to argue the preponderance of text over signification lies in the gap between science and literature. Many scientists and logicians would consider writing as a transcription--written words of their thoughts. For them, thinking is a mental activity. In positive sciences and scientific communications, the *sine qua non* condition is the preponderance of signifieds over signifiers. Knowledge is made of concepts, not of words. The representations of the world is constituted by concepts as their boundaries or limits. Such representations are called theories. Word's opacity, cacography and noise make the understanding or usage of theories difficult.

Daignault (1986) believes we need a bridge between words and concepts; the bridge is a new genre--"textual staging of knowledge" for education (p. 5). The linguistic expressions of this genre are reducible neither to words nor concepts. Daignault (1986) insists:

This is not to say that I do not want any more to use words to write and to use concepts to think! When I say words I mean the matter of text, that in which signifiers have a preponderance over signifieds. And when I say concepts, I mean the matter of knowledge, that in which the preponderance is inverted. (p. 5)

To speak a language is to use linguistic signs which are necessarily made of signifiers and signifieds. Daignault (1986) says: "A word is a sign, not a signifier; a concept is a signification, not a
The instrumental use of language is to mean something with words. There are rules for using language both in science and literature. In science, we need to create concepts; in literature, we need to give form to the text. We can understand these rules are limits or thresholds. These limits in science and literature entail a gap or "road" between signifiers and signifieds. The gap is constituted by the boundaries--"the no concept's locus in signifieds" and "the no word's locus in signifiers" (Daignault, 1986, pp. 5-6). The former is called "expressible," the latter "expressed." Both are the third excluded.

The boundary itself is what conditions the existence of creating concepts in science and of giving form to text in literature. For example, in science, one must build a boundary between what is and what is not the concept. The boundary functions as a condition that "the identity of a concept is warranted and at the same time what is not the concept can be declared different" (Daignault, 1986, p. 6). Here, the difference is regarded as negation. The boundary itself is neither a part of the concept nor a part of the difference. The boundary itself is a Derridean "différance." Daignault (1986) remarks: "The expressible sub-sists between the world and the language" (p. 7). This can be also applied in literature. The "expressed" itself as boundary is a condition that a "tightness" between signifiers is required to produce rhythms; at the same time, the boundary gives forms to the opacity of language. Therefore, the expressed "in-sists" between the language and the world (pp. 8-9).

In filling the gap between science and literature, in which text and knowledge defend obstinately their boundaries, there is a
boundary itself where pedagogy is said to be at work. Daignault believes our first intellectual activity in teaching as well as in writing about curriculum consists in textual staging of knowledge. In this regards, Serres (1989a) remarks:

We must imagine a way in which to teach, with the same genre, both the poem and the theorem, without wrongdoing either and with mutual enrichment: experimentation and experience, the new world of scientists and the storytelling of time immemorial, the immortal world of scientific laws and the new age of the arts. (p. 34)

Daignault (1986) believes:

Education is the undying trace of the text of our day-to-day life, and such a text, which I call an expression, is nothing but the boundary itself. Writing about curriculum, in regards to the problematics of curriculum, is neither on the road or in the field but subsists in the no man's land. (p. 8)

Daignault thinks that the bridge between words and concepts is exactly the text of our day-to-day lives. Curriculum is the ever-ending trace of the text of everyday life. The trace, in disciplinary terms, is the boundary itself between literature and science. This trace is unnameable for it sub-sists in the world and in-sists in the language. What it "represents" cannot be represented. Or, as Derrida (1973) remarks:

The trace is not a presence but is rather the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, displaces, and refers beyond itself. The trace has, properly speaking, no place, for effacement belongs to the very structure of the trace. Effacement must always be able to overtake the trace; otherwise it would not be a trace but an indestructible and monumental substance. (p. 156)
The boundary Daignault (1986) refers to is that "the no concept's locus in signifieds--expressible, no word's locus in signifiers--expressed" (p. 5). In Derrida's terms, this boundary itself is exactly a "différence"--a undifferentiated whole: a difference which makes the difference between identity and difference. The "différence" undermines the metaphysical hope of finding a "transcendental signified," a concept independent of language. The metaphysics of presence, which is self-presence, has been to find a stable place to stand outside, or above it. Derrida (1976) says "originary différence is supplementarity as structure" (p. 167). Here structure means that irreducible complexity within which one can only shape or shift the play of presence or absence: that within which metaphysics can be produced but which metaphysics cannot think.

The "textual staging of knowledge," I believe, can be understood through Derrida's notion of silence. For Derrida (1978), silence plays the irreducible role of that which bears and haunts language, outside and against which alone language can emerge. Ulmer (1985) puts the matter well:

The risk in talking about silence (as many teachers must do, and for which the operations of the Mime are an analogy) is that a meaning might be given to that which does not have one (and this fall back into discourse is also a return to Hegelianism). To control this risk, sovereignty (a precursor of deconstruction) betrays meaning within meaning, betrays discourse within discourse, by choosing words, like "silence" itself, that "make us slide." (pp. 184-185)

Although silence can save one from conceptualization, one should not be attached to and be bound by it, according to Zen. Thus the
master Chap-chou was striking a flint for a light. He asked a monk, "I call this a light. What do you call it?" The monk did not say a word. Thereupon the master said, "If you do not grasp the meaning of Ch'an (Zen), it is useless to remain silent" (Chang, 1959, p. 156). The important point is not whether one should speak or should be silent, but non-attachment. It is an extreme to keep silent. Te-shan told his disciples, "If you say a word, you will get thirty blows. If you do not say a word, you will get the same thirty blows across the top of your head" (Chang, 1959, p. 133). One should allow the mind to operate freely, naturally and spontaneously.

**Autobiography of a Style (1988a)**

The subject is this free, anonymous, and nomadic singularity which traverses men as well as plants and animals independently of the matter of their individuation and the forms of their personality. "Overman" means nothing other than this—the superior type of *everything that is*. This is a strange discourse, which ought to have renewed philosophy, and which finally deals with sense not as a *predicate* or a property but as an *event*. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 107)

It is my hope that after reading the above passage we can better understand Daignault's performance. In this stylistic essay, Daignault (1988a) continues to evoke the Kantian idea of style and manner in problematic of teaching and learning. Daignault (1988a) states:

Style is the most expensive form of writing. Style is always autobiographic and self-educative. I can not imagine working on style—even in a very intellectual activity—without becoming someone else: myself different; and without feeling the work of thinking on my skin and in my stomach. What we call inspiration
is only a somatic writing process. We need epistomachology. (p. 36)

According to Deleuze (1987b), a style is managing to "stammer" in one's own language, but he asserts, not "being a stammer in one's speech, but being stammer of language itself" (p. 4). Being like a foreigner in one's own language, it can be a gesture of the body which prompts an understanding contrary to what language indicate. In language, the equivalent of such gesture are called "sense" or "solecism," remarks Deleuze. The following passages from Daignault (1988a) portrays his illustration of "sense":

Plan of the Essay
Pedagogy and style:
orchestring at tempo
chorus and writing.

Practice of the Epoch
Presence to sense:
archaeology of a script
short in my life

Process of the Epigraph
Pause
prompt
chorus (p. 22)

This passage is anagrammatically meaningful. It is in a "diagonal" sense inherited in language that Daignault strives to get across the normative meaning embodied in common sense and good sense. We can see Prometheus and Epimetheus are implicated in these lines. Daignault (1988a) explains: "Scientific knowledge and technical craft are gifts from Prometheus. But thinking is a gift from Epimetheus. The guardian of hope has modeled human time in his own image; he has created humanism" (p. 34). It needs to be understood, I think, through his performance--style--of presenting
this study. What I am doing here, I think, is in a paradoxical position. As Samuel Beckett (1976) has done: to name the unnameable. However, I am "making" sense.

Daignault also exemplifies a difference between French language and English language. In some ways he masters both, in order to point out that not only being a stranger in Others is a very efficient way to be "outside," as he subsists in that of Others, but also as William Pinar's conviction, cited by Daignault, that "the comprehension of the relations among one's life history, biographic present and one's intellectual works surmounts one's engaging in educational work" (Daignault, 1988a, p. 9). So this neither means that speaking (mastery of a) different language is superior to those who only speak one language, nor simply to translate or to copy one into the other; but in the sense of Deleuze's "becoming," it is not phenomenon of imitation or assimilation, but of a "double capture, of a non-parallel evolution, of nuptials between two reigns" (1987b, p. 10). To become is a matter of "involuting"; it is neither regression nor progression. Deleuze admits that it is difficult to explain, yet he states:

[T]o what extent one should involute. 'I' is obviously the opposite of evolution, but it is also the opposite of regression, returning to a childhood or to a primitive world. To involute is to have an increasingly simple, economical, restrained step. (1987, p. 29)

Deleuze praises the following as to what the definition of "style" is, as Marcel Proust remarks, "great literature is written in a sort of foreign language within our own language" (Deleuze, 1987b, p. 54). In other words, we might be better to speak a kind of "foreign"
language within our own language. In *A Theory of Semiotics* (1976), Umberto Eco insists that "to re-write in another language means to re-think" (pp. vii-viii). We can clearly see the Daignault's endeavors present a re-thinking in English language of French, a re-thinking of what curriculum means.

To think over something is to think oneself: That is in this view, what thinking means. To know is not the same as to think. We can know many things, while not knowing ourselves: that is a matter of thinking. In regard to this matter, Michel Serres (1983) has pointedly made a simple yet comprehensive comment. Serres states: "For Plato and a tradition which lasted throughout the classical age, *knowledge is a hunt*. To know is to put to death--to kill the lamb, deep in the woods, in order to eat it" (1983, p. 28). In brief, to know is to kill, to rely on death. Embracing a Deleuzean notion of thinking, Daignault insists that to think is to experiment and to problematize. Deleuze (1988) puts it: "Knowledge, power and the self are the triple root of a problematization of thought" (p. 116).

In examining Rousseau's writings, *Essay*, Derrida explicates the problematics of the relationship between speech and writing (Derrida, 1978). Derrida insists:

The difficulty of the pedagogy of language and of the teaching of foreign language is, *Emile* will say, that one cannot separate the signifier from the signified, and changing words, one changes ideas in such a way that the teaching of a language transmits at the same time an entire national culture over which the pedagogue has no control, which resists him like the already-there preceding the formation, the institution preceding instruction. (1978, p. 170)
In his article, "The Professor of Desire," Steven Ungar (1982) argues that the impact of the importation and exportation of foreign discourse is not simply the abstract translation from one language or culture to another, but rather to heighten "our awareness of the social factors affecting the distribution of French ideas as something other than duty-free import" (p. 85).

This essay can be interpreted in its title itself, Daignault (1988b) explains, that the title is a "transliteration" of the following three paragraphs:

Why an excursus, [now? To deal with the form. Is it possible to change the field without moving the comma? Anything goes in curriculum? To answer those questions, I propose an y-x dictionary of n elements instead of a function. A contribution to curriculum staging.] The above is an abstract the title of which is not yet known; only thought. The abstract is not an abstract of this paper but a transcription of an <<x>>, teasing [a <<t>> signé] here and there, in the cursus of this paper. (p.1)

Once again, Daignault (1988b) discusses the difference between Kant's concept of "method" and "manner." The former, Daignault notes, stricto sensu, is the notion of structure. Derrida notes: This structure refers only to space, geometric or morphological space, the order of forms and sites (Derrida, 1978); the latter "manner", refers to Deleuzean "becomings", is style, morality of existence (Deleuze, 1987a). For Daignault (1988b), method is "singular and definite, which means that it is THE way; manner is singular but indefinite, which means it is A way; then he focuses on curriculum study and
insists that it is always plural—**WAYs**, which means it is neither
definite nor indefinite" (p. 14). Daignault interprets the difference
between transliteration and translation, which is "iter," as "way" (in
Greek) or "repetition" (I=re[t]). He (1988b) notes:

In Latin, *iter* means "way" [hodos in Greek; as a prefix, it
also means "repetition." I say it again: "I" = re-"t."
In the work of Roussel, anagrams (anaphones, actually, as in the work of Saussure) were only A way: *iter* or*hodos*; a manner. Saussure maybe tried to embed anagrams in THE way of semiotics: trans-*iter* or meta-*hodos* [to go across the way]; a method. I am trying to conceive of passages in many ways: *iter-iter* [way & repetition]; **WAYS**. Not all the ways--only some--but always plural. I try to transcribe flashes that emerge from the play of transliteration; that makes perhaps a translation. (p. 16)

Daignault is trying to show the passage between answer and
answer, question and question which means not the passage from a question to an answer, but their absolute difference--in the
Deleuzean term "unilateral distinction." The event, being itself impassive, involves the transformation of relationship between
difference and opposition. The absolute difference allows both active and passive to be interchanged more easily, since it is neither the one nor the other, but rather the effect of their common result.

Daignault is writing the text anagrammatically to connect what we normally acquire intellectually. He is building bridges to show other ways of writing and thinking. The connection he makes is not anything counts. Rather, Daignault (1988b) insists that "everything is in everything: in many ways only" (p. 7). The bridge is paradoxical, for Serres; it connects the disconnected. Daignault
emphasizes that such a question "always implies an answer the
destiny of which is to close space; that kind of space the opening of
which is called problem" (1988b, p. 6). This can not be confused with
the relation of cause and effect; rather, says Deleuze (1990), "[events]
being always only effects, are better to form among themselves
functions of quasi-causes or quasi-causality which are always
reversible [the wound and the scar]" (p. 8). It is to think the
possibility of thinking a relationship without thinking it.

Daignault strives to think of curriculum as a non-complete
relative difference—unilateral distinction. Curriculum is, says
Daignault, an intransitive verb—to pass, only to pass, in terms of
Joycean "riverrun." He also insists that curriculum is regarded as an
"event," which subsists or inheres in language. Curriculum, like an
event, simply happens.

The Language of Research and the Language of Practice: Neither
One nor the Other: Pedagogy (1988c)

This paper deals with that language, used by researchers and
practitioners, that is caught up within the "intellectual" space which
everything is reducible to either propositions or things. Daignault
(1988c) states:

To worry about differences between the language of
research and practice is to be concerned about the lack
of a common language, then of a dialogue, of a
collaboration, of an involvement, and finally of any
real improvement in education. (p. 46)

Here, on the basis of the difference between research and
practice, Daignault raises the question: Is a dialogue possible between
researchers and practitioners in curriculum without any common language? The answer, insists Daignault, is "yes." The lack of a common language is a false problem to which no resolution can be reached if it is seen as a real problem. The real problem is a twofold reductionism, argues Daignault. On the one hand, a reduction to what is common to both languages of research and practice—a weak than common sense—is a kind of nihilism. One the other hand, a reduction to knowledge—the absolute domination of research language—is a kind of terrorism.

Daignault (1988c) uses a Frank O'Hara poem to explicate differences between theory and practice, which is analogous to painting and poetry for him. He reiterates, cited from The Selected Poems of Frank O'Hara (1974), which is appropriate here:

I am not a painter. I am a poet. Why? I think I would rather be a painter, but I am not. Well, for instance, Mike Goldberg is starting a painting, I drop in. "Sit down and have a drink" he says. I drink; we drink. I look up. "You have SARDINES in it." "Yes, it is indeed something there." "Oh." I go and the days go by and I drop in again. The painting is going on, and I go, and the days go by. I drop in. The painting is finished. "Where's SARDINES?" All that's left is just letters, "It was too much," Mike says. But me? One day I am thinking of a color: orange. I write a line about orange. Pretty soon it is a whole page of words, not lines. Then another page. There should be so much more, not of orange, of words, of how terrible orange is and life. Days go by. It is even in prose, I am a real poet. My poem is finished and I haven't mentioned orange yet. It's twelve poems, I call it ORANGES. And one day in a gallery I see Mike's painting, called SARDINES. (p. 47)
Daignault views this poem as an analogy to teachers and teaching. Daignault proposes that we can write something about teachers, entitled Teacher, while doing so without saying a word on teaching. This something he calls pedagogy. Daignault (1988c) argues:

Differences between the language of practice and the language of research are not reducible at the surface level. . . . Nevertheless, language is language. At some level, there are no differences between languages. . . . Knowledge could be defined as the linguistic articulation of a symbolic exchange. . . . The world is not reducible to a general semiotics. (pp. 49-50)

The surface level is the one of vocabulary, the syntax and the style. Both languages "deserve" more than any reduction to what they have in common. According to the semiotics definition of language, anything could be seen as a sign to be exchanged against another sign. Within the limits of language, one could argue that there are similar structures between research and action, theory and practice. The one of knowledge is an example. However, the collaboration between researchers and practitioners at the language level must be encouraged, but not at the cost of reducing everything to fragmented knowledge or common language. For example, Foucault (1973) argues that there is no such thing--common language--any longer; he demonstrates the relationship between madness and reason:

The constitution of madness as a mental illness. . . affords the evidence of a broken dialogue [between reason and madness], posits the separation as already affected, and thrusts into oblivion all those stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax in
which the exchange between madness and reason was made. (p. x)

Daignault (1988c) again raises the question of boundary concerning the complexity of the world—what is "general text" in Derrida—to argue that "there is no possible knowledge of the world" (p. 50). Knowledge represents a focus on signs. The world is a complex interweaving of signs and "notes." The notion of note, claims Daignault (1988c), can be defined as "a force (a kind of differential) and a difference of intensity insisting on the fuzzy border of any sign" (p. 50). For instance, culture can be defined as "any plane of the world, any particular focus or folding of a given assemblage of signs and/or notes" (Daignault, 1988c, p. 51). A culture or a plane is a partition of three discourses: "text," "score," and "versification."

Daignault (1988c) asserts:

A discourse made of signs only is a text. A discourse made of notes only is a score. A discourse made of both signs and notes is a versification. . . . A partition made of texts only is a semiosis. A partition made of scores only is a notation. A partition made of verses only or any combination is a composition. The same partition can be seen at the same time as a semiosis, a notation and a composition; that is what composition means. (pp. 51-52)

Daignault proposes to define research and practice in curriculum as "compositions"; in short, curriculum as composition. Therefore, the pedagogy he perceives is a composition of texts and notes. Pedagogy is operating on the boundary between a simulacrum of prescription: a what ought to be curriculum and a simulacrum of description: a what is curriculum.
Where Did the Subject Go? (1989a)

This essay is based upon Derrida's deconstruction--"différance" and Deleuze's concept of "different-ziation" to claim that the subject is not dead, but "resisting with its skin" (p. 2). The resistance, Daignault (1989a) remarks:

Against a structural reversal, with its pure and simple liquidation of subjectivity; against the return of self-consciousness as the center of the world; and finally against the sublation (aufhebung) of the individual subject into the collective subject as a broader center of the world. (p. 1)

The concept of differance has been discussed previously (see Daignault, 1986; also chapter two). The concept of skin, adopted from Deleuze, is that of the "surface" of events, things and states of affairs. The skin or surface is where our senses are working. Deleuze insists, cited from Paul Valéry, "what is most deep is the skin" (1990, p. 10). Everything happens at the boundary or limit between things and propositions. Everything returns to the surface, this is the result of the Stoic operation--the unlimited return. Becoming-mad or becoming unlimited is no longer a ground which rumbles.

Daignault (1989a) argues that the irreducibility in discursive analysis is one of the major contributions of post-structuralist thought. He says:

It denotes "today's unthinkable" in the midst of structuralism, in the possibly hegemonic situation of language, because language today has also become a problem: [T]here is no way out of it; but not everything can be reduced to it. (p. 8)
The concept of "flash" in the lightning of darkness, explained by Daignault, is exactly the sense of "différance" in relation to itself in which differentiation is realized; this also can suggest Derrida's "trace" which involves leaving a trace and erasing itself at the same time. As Lyotard's (1987) concept of difference within identity, passion within reason, in light lies our darkness. Also in Deleuze's notion of "between," a passage from Virginia Woolf cited by Deleuze, can be used to explain (which he recorded) that "I spread myself out like fog BETWEEN the people that I know the best" (1987b, p. 27).

Deleuze (1987b) remarks:

The middle has nothing to do with an average, it is not a centrism or a form of moderation. On the contrary, it's a matter of absolute speed. Whatever grows from the middle is endowed with such a speed. We must distinguish not relative and absolute movement, but the relative and absolute speed of any movement. (p. 27)

Daignault insists that the global text--what Kristeva (1980) calls "general text"--is not reducible to the language, or symbolic order, or semiosis, but that it does not elude these things either. He is suggesting everything can be distinct from the global text, yet the global text can never be distinct from all those things--what Kristeva (1980) calls "particular text"--that are distinct from it--Deleuze terms "unilateral distinction."

Curriculum as Composition: Who is the Composer? (1989b)

In staging his own writing and teaching, Daignault starts this essay to deal with the problematics of the notion of subject or subjectivity found in many post-structuralists' works and his
proposed "composition" (This essay was later published in 1991). Many critical theorists, Marxists in particular, have been dissatisfied with and detested by the privileged "apparatus" of the notion of "general text"--textuality. Paul Smith (1989) argues that not only such a notion as textuality is questionable as that to which all conceptual phenomena must be submitted, but also problematic is the impotence to which the notion leads us, unless it leaves room for mediation by active subject/individuals. Daignault (1989b) emphasizes that the subject is neither a person, nor any form of individual, collective or transcendental consciousness; rather, the subject is comprised of the "dynamics of an analyzer and of a synthesizer both dealing with expressions I call notes" (p. 1), or as impersonal plural agency. In part this parallels the notion of "agency without agents" in Foucault's "subject-positions." Foucault (1972) has said that a subject is not a "speaking consciousness," but rather "a position that may be filled in certain conditions by various individuals" (p. 115). Moreover, this echoes Deleuze's (1987a) "individuation with subject." Daignault (1989b) remarks that the subject of education is the locus of the composition of a subjectivity in curriculum which makes sense. To describe a pedagogy qua the subject of education does not consist in analyzing the relations between the teacher and what he says, the students and what they say (or wanted to say); but in determining what position can be occupied by any individual if he/she is to be the subject of education.

Daignault emphasizes the composition of expressing that is "a process through which his self-consciousness offers less and less resistance to the reality of transcendental expressibles and to the
emergence of new empirical *expresseds*" (1989b, p. 1). In Daignault's notion of "composer," we can clearly see that "expressing" is a present on-going process, the concept of "expressibles" is a transcendental, ideal concept of "what ought to be"; the concept of "expresseds" is simply the emergence of new empirical presence. He remarks that the composer is constituted in the "dynamics" of both "synthesizer" and "analyzer" in the work or play (pp. 3-4). This dynamic process produces the expressed as the doubling of the expressible, the doubling of a double. For the expresses has already incorporated the expressible as interiorized double.

The issue of "sense," "expression," "expressible" and "expressed" can be found in Deleuze's (1990) "logic of sense," which dealt with the distinction between things and propositions, expressible and expressed. The concept of "notation," adopted from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, according to Daignault, has much to say about Derrida's critique of Rousseauistic phonocentrism. Notation is not simply a supplement of speech, rather it precedes speech and it does not exist without writing. It is unforgettable; it is to be rearranged, no longer to be spoken about, but to be written on as composition of the subject (Daignault, 1989b).

The mastery of the individual's survival is one of the most significant successes of science and rationality. The faculty of reason is the major player in the Enlightenment. Yet we found in contemporary discourses that if one has multiple goals, and many ways to evaluate them, the concept of rational decision making is threatened. If everything is reasonable, then nothing is reasonable. Daignault's concept of "composition" and "decomposition" are
somehow perceptible in a sense of the notion of "event" in Foucault's project, it suffices to say the concept of "multiplicity." We can understand the problematic in terms of the multiplication in voices. The breakdown of rational standards has led to an "anything-goes" or nihilistic attitude, as Feyerabend (1975) terms it. All competing voices have been silenced, causing society to become stagnant and stultifying. We need to discover by what forces problems transform themselves and to demand the constitution of new ways of thinking. We have other problems to discover; we need to create a new series of events.

The no concept's locus is called "expressible" and the no word's locus, an "expressed." Both are not something. Both are not nothing. The expressible "sub-sists" between the world and the language. Difference is identical to negation in defining a concept by scientific usage. Deleuze (1990) says that "they are not things or facts, but events. We can not say that they exist, but rather that they subsist or inhere" (p. 5). The subject can be reinterpreted, restored, and reinscribed. In conclusion, Daignault (1989b) remarks that "the subject of education [the frontier, once again, between an expressing and a composer] grows, through such a process of composition, towards a continuing problematization of the ego" (p.15). Such an event, composition and decomposition, functioning against all personalism, psychological or linguistic, promotes a third person, and even a "fourth person singular," the non-person or "It" in which we recognize ourselves and our community better than in the exchanges between an I and a You.
Education, Poststructuralism and Local Emancipation (1990)

This essay, comprised of 111 passages quoted from post-structuralist texts (most are his own translation from the French), contrasts Foucault's notion of truth with Habermas' idea of emancipation. The debates (e.g., Graff, 1984; Dews, 1986; Ray, 1988; Poster, 1989; Habermas, 1990) between critical theory and post-structuralism has occupied the center stage of disputes regarding social theory in various disciplines. Daignault attempts to localize those arguments and to shed light on curriculum discourses. The major issue here is the difference between concepts of "progress" or human emancipation in post-structuralism and critical theory. The notion of progress for critical theorists, Daignault argues, is synonymous with "universal emancipation." Daignault (1990) also reminds us that the Enlightenment (Aufklärung) is the "foundation of the very idea of progress in modern and contemporary education" (p. 1).

Daignault reviews several problematics, "local" rather than "global," of those debates and their consequences for contemporary curriculum theory. These problematics include the old Enlightenment meta-narratives, the notion of progress, the concept of truth, and universal foundation of reason. He then proposes an ethics (new ethics) without moral, power and interpretation, and "local emancipation." This new ethics, following Foucault's conception, is conceived as a very strong structure of existence, without any relation with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983).
Traditional notions about our morality has been articulated in the idea of analytical or necessary link between ethics and other social or economic or political structures (Foucault, 1983). The challenge is to problematize prevailing practices and to interrogate power relations inherent in all social existence. It is to support local and minor forms of knowledge and a dislocation of commonly held conceptions about experiences, practices, and events.

It is not only the truth is what enables the mind to think; it is also the truth that enables us is to care for oneself and others. Foucault (1988a) insists that to know oneself is to care for oneself. Daignault (1990) notes that "any pretention to reach the Absolute is a movement through which something is excluded; there is no absolute truth" (p. 3). The project of Foucault is to particularize the universal, not to deny it. The way of telling the truth is an endless interpretation, and to tell the truth is independent of a political regime which tends to be indifferent to truth and while prescribing the truth.

Daignault (1990) notes we move toward a relativism, to a thought which is independent of any system of thought. Daignault's thinking here refers to Serres' (1989b) notion to understand without a concept. Serres proposes to search for a new knowledge-- "knowledge without death" (p. 110). Serres (1989b) notes:

Alexander [the concept] reigns over all, including his opponents. His power is so great that none remains who can object. To contradict the king is to belong to the king, to oppose power is to enter into the logic of the powerful. (p. 142)
Daignault insists that post-structuralism does not criticize the universal, but does criticize the juncture between the global and the universal. This juncture is what produces dogmatism. Dogmatism is conceived as any local victory which tries to impose itself as a norm. However, this local victory is simply a universal effect. Daignault proposes to avoid dogmatism by thinking of this effect locally, not globally. This "localism" may be regarded as "relativism," not a global philosophy, a "local effect of their [post-structuralists] commitment to reach the universal" (Daignault, 1990, p. 36). Post-structuralism requires one to assume responsibility for truth. To champion localism without committing to truth is what produces nihilism. Daignault (1990) concludes: "Local emancipation is not nihilistic" (p. 36).

Commentary

Daignault's work revives the question of the construction of the subject. Structuralism is correct when it throws back into question the central position of the subject in humanism; it is by insisting on the fact that the subject is symbolically determined that it succeeds in decentering it, indeed even dissolving it. But structuralism leaves intact the question of the sensible and not merely symbolic relationship of the subject to the body. From my view, one merit of Deleuze's work is that it has completely revived this question. Daignault (1989a) notes: "It is not a matter of going back to the romantic or phenomenological subject, but of showing that the real fissure of the "I" comes into being also through difféance-making
and not just through becoming-différance" (p. 37). It is important to note that the articulation of understanding and speaking of the self are subjected to a different kind of reading. It is the novelty of shifting perspectives. The key concept, explained by Deleuze (1990), is consequently that of individuation. He states:

The essential process of intensive quantities is individuation. Intensity is individualizing; intensive quantities are individualizing. Individuals are signal-sign systems. (p. 47)

The question of signals is taken up again in A Thousand Plateaus (1987a) in reference to the synthesizer: the synthesis of continuous variation; it is precisely at that point that the sensuality of sense is to be found. Not that sense is sensible, but its synthesis is. Furthermore, a synthesis implies a surface for recording differences in intensity, a sort of skin of differentiating sense; the condition without which the subject would never be anything more than a sign in a differentiating structure, or a differentiation subordinated to the identity of the plenitude of consciousness. Deleuze (1987a) remarks:

The individual is in no way indivisible, but never stops dividing as he changes his nature. There is no me in what he expresses; because he expresses [I]deas as internal multiplicities made up of differential relations and points that stand out, of pre-individual singularities. And there is no I expresses there either; because there again he is forming a multiplicity of actualization, like a condensation of points that stand out, an open collection of intensities. (p. 143)

Jacques Daignault's curriculum theory draws upon French philosophers Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Jean-
François Lyotard and Michel Serres. In these essays reviewed here, Daignault analyzes and demonstrates pedagogical implications of post-structuralism and stages questions regarding future possibilities for curriculum. In my view, Daignault's major contribution to the curriculum field is to challenge us to rethink curriculum and ourselves as educators. He exhibits how we can understand and do curriculum *post-structurally*. More importantly, to understand Daignault's work is to "listen" to his performative staging and to encounter. These essays hint at the minimum effect he has produced. Another summarized version of Daignault's work, "Traces at Work from Different Places," can be found in William Pinar's book, *Understanding Curriculum as Phenomenological and Deconstructed Text* (1992).

Daignault is provoking a new way of thinking in a complex way and in an elusive manner. This new way of thinking, he insists, is not analytical thinking, which is in terms of "either/or"; nor is it dialectical thinking which is "both/and" (Wilden, 1972). He provokes a notion of thinking or sense that to think oneself as self-educative means "to experiment and to problematize" (Deleuze, 1988; Foucault, 1989) and to think otherwise; to make sense which by itself is a problematic and problematizing. Fundamentally Daignault's works can be grasped through the concept of paradox, the paradoxical instance and nomadic movement. The notion of paradoxical instance is the movement of forces which circulates between two series of oppositions and moves both directions at the same time. It is the moment of the simultaneity of coincidence when an occupant without a place is the same as a place without an occupant. As Deleuze
(1990) remarks, "the younger becoming older than the older, the older becoming younger than the younger--but they can never finally become so; if they did they would no longer be becoming, but would be so" (p. 136).

Daignault reiterates the relations between nihilism and terrorism in pedagogy. Following Deleuze, he states that "there exist two great illness of structure. The filling-up of the empty case by its accompanying subject and the empty case left alone without accompaniment. The consequences in education are terrorism and nihilism" (Daignault, 1982a, p. 192). Such a twofold reductionist's tendency in curriculum theory and practice is evident in the gap between what is and what ought to be. In the play between what is and what ought to be one creates pedagogical meaning. Daignault remarks that this idea can also be related to the concept of structure which encapsulates what is and what ought to be and forms a closed system. He argues that the demotion of the paradoxical and endless movement within the structure is in question. Daignault rejects the presumption of a fixed principle, a center and a solid foundation which regulates structure, and thereby forecloses the system.

These essays exhibit the movement of his thought and style. They "stage" the problematic between theory and practice. Problematics of binary oppositions (description and prescription, teaching and learning, thinking and action, method and manner, etc.) are presented as irreducible to either one. Daignault insists that they are inseparable from the movement of paradoxical instances. In short, sense as nonsense produces meaning (sens).
Daignault's thought is derived from understanding paradox. He offers us first, a definition of curriculum as paradoxical. He approaches curriculum through Deleuze's notion of "sense," "occupant without place" and "place without occupants." To define is to distort, but Daignault does not propose that we should stop the project of definition; on the contrary, one works "to multiply the definitions." Second, he explicates the notion of desire, arguing that desire as seduction can be implicated in the pedagogical situation. Paradox is exactly the link between desire and promise, teaching and learning; in other words, it is "the promise of the other's desire" (Daignault, 1982b, p. 22). To teach, for him, is to promise the other's desire: to seduce through knowledge. Third, Daignault presents an analogy of common sense and good sense, in Greek, as doxa. Common sense is a mechanism by which identity is conferred to things and is an analogy of the known to the unknown. Good sense is a mechanism by which a direction is imposed, a good order and is an analogy of the moral to be founded. Through contrasting with analogy, para-dox is opposed to both aspects of doxa, paradox would provide us with pedagogical meaning. Fourth, he explores political space and technological space in curricular thought, questioning the "excluded third" between these two spaces. Whether "de jure" and "de facto" are reducible to political space or technological space is questionable. Fifth, regarding thinking, knowing and feeling, Daignault insists that thinking is different from knowing, but knowledge and feeling are not opposed to thinking. As Serres (1983) remarks: "To know is to kill, to rely on death" (p. 28). Sixth, regarding différence and unilateral distinction, he explicates the notion of "text" and problem of language. He
reexamines Derrida's readings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau to demonstrate the unilateral distinction to shed light on différance. Seventh, regarding style, manner and method, he challenges us to think ourselves in provocative ways as self-educative. He elaborates Deleuze's (1987b) definition of style, i.e., "great literature is written in a sort of foreign language within our own language" (p. 57). Eighth, regarding dialogue and translation, the questions of curriculum planning and implementation, research and practice are raised to reinscribe the excluded third. He insists that curriculum is a non-complete relative difference, an intransitive verb--to pass--or in the Joycean sense, "riverrun." Ninth, regarding the subject of curriculum, he questions and claims that it does not exist, but subsists in things and insists in language; this questioning of curriculum as "event" gives us new understanding of curriculum and curriculum discourse.
CHAPTER FIVE
TOWARD A POST-STRUCTURALIST CURRICULUM AND PEDAGOGY: A TAOIST CONNECTION

Authentic teaching is watchfulness, a mindful watching flowing from the heeding of the call in the pedagogical situation that the good teacher hears. Indeed, teachers are more than they do; they belong to that which is beyond their doing; they are the teaching. (Aoki, 1988, p. 16)

Starlight asked Non-Being: "Master, are you? or are you not?" Since he received no answer whatever, Starlight set himself to watch for Non-Being. He waited to see if Non-Being would put in an appearance. He kept his gaze fixed on the deep void, hoping to catch a glimpse of Non-Being. All day long he looked, and he saw nothing. He reached out to grasp, and grasped nothing.
Then Starlight exclaimed at last: "That is IT."
This is the furthest yet! Who can reach it?
I can comprehend the absence of Being
But who can comprehend the absence of Nothing (Void)?
If now, on top of all this, Non-Being IS,
Who can comprehend it?
(The Way of Chuang Tzu, 1965, p. 125)

This study concludes by linking post-structuralist thinking with the Chinese Taoist and Zen perspectives, a linking that may suggest a next step for curriculum theory development. To begin this process of linking, I will review aspects of Taoism, Zen philosophy, and post-structuralism as they speak to important concepts in contemporary curriculum discourse. We begin by examining briefly Taoism and Zen, then moving to commenting on certain connections among
Taoism, Zen, and post-structuralism. From possibilities created by these connections, I will briefly reflect on the following curriculum concepts: the self and its displacement, language as paradox, aesthetics, and listening. This reflection represents the end of the beginning.

**Taoism and Zen Philosophy**

Chinese Taoist philosophy, namely Lao-tze (Lao-tzu) and Chuang-tze (Chuang-tzu), is embodied in everyday life and seems to be more attractive to many Chinese than Confucian philosophy. Lao-tze's *The Tao Te Ching* (1989) is comprised of approximately five thousand words. In Chinese culture, many people would contend that the less is said, the more is meant; it is understood as saying more by saying less. To many Chinese, Tao can not be known but felt. Some people combine *The Tao Te Ching* with the *Book of Changes* (known as *I-Ching*) to explain the mystery and beauty of the universe, the meaning of life and death, the secret passage beyond the world of positive knowledge where there is a realm of forces unseen. Zen philosophy, mainly influenced by Taoist thought, has been always associated with the Buddhist school of thought, known as Zen Buddhism. Zen has been regarded by some as a "psychological leaping of the unconscious" or a "metaphysical awareness of transcendental reality." Zen is often said to be "illogical" and "anti-intellectual" in nature (Suzuki, 1949, 1963; Dumoulin, 1979).

Taoism and Zen philosophy are paradoxical in nature. Lao-tze says that "one who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know" (Lin, 1948, p. 257). In the Taoist view, language can be
regarded as a paradox. In the opening of *The Tao Te Ching*, Lao-tze claims that "the Tao that can be spoken of is not the everlasting Tao. The Name that can be named is not the everlasting name" (Chen, 1989, p. 51). Chuang-tze not only developed a complete theory of knowledge, but also felt and expressed more poignantly the pathos of human life. Chuang-tze states that "those who dream of the banquet wake to lamentation and sorrow. Those who dream of lamentation and sorrow wake to join the hunt" (Merton, 1965, p. 64). He continues: "What we love is the mystery of life. What we hate is corruption in death. But the corruptible in its turn becomes mysterious life, and this mysterious life once more becomes corruptible" (Merton, 1965, p. 64). Zen, as noted earlier, appears to be anti-metaphysical, and yet Zen masters often make statements which are quite metaphysical. From the perspective of Zen, there is neither a fixed meaning nor a fixed referent for each term in language. Taoist and Zen master often employ multiple usages and meanings, and their meanings are not determined by extra-linguistic referents but rather depend on internal linguistic conditions.

In Taoism, the true character of "wu-wei" (literally translated as non-doing or doing nothing)---"do not act" is not mere inactivity but "perfect action"---because it is an act without activity (Chen, 1989, p. 81). In other words, it is action not carried out independently of "Tien" (heaven) and "Di" (earth) and in conflict with the dynamism of the whole, but in perfect harmony with the whole--Tao. However, we must not confuse "Tao" with "the sublation of 'aufubeng' of Hegelian thought" (Daignault, 1989a, p. 3) or the structuralist's "transcendental signified." Tao is everywhere and nowhere at the
same time. Wang Pi (1979), commenting on Lao-tze, argues that the relationship between Tao and Te (Lao-Tze is The Tao Te Ching) is a paradox. Tao is considered as substance and Te as function. In other words, with non-being as substance, all things will function well. At the same time, insists Wang (1979), "although it is valuable to have non-being as function, nevertheless there cannot be substance without non-being" (p. 67). The concept of "wu" (having not), or non-being, nothingness (or void) is the most important element in Taoist thinking. If being is to be understood or to be useful, it has to function through non-being. Lao-tze remarks:

Thirty spokes unite around the nave;
From their non-being (loss of their individuality)
Arises the utility of the wheel.
Mold clay into a vessel;
From its not-being (in the vessel's hollow)
Arises the utility of the vessel.
Therefore by the existence of things we profit.
And by the non-existence of things we are served. (Lin, 1948, p. 87)

He continues to say:

Tao produced the One.
The One produced the two (Ying and Yang)
The two produced the three.
And the three produced the ten thousand things (all things-creative universe).
The ten thousand things carry the Ying and embrace the Yang, and through the blending of the material force they achieve harmony. (Lin, 1948, p. 214)

Here Ying and Yang are introduced to implicitly invoke the "yu" (having) and "wu" (having not), ultimately to reach the One out of Tao. In a "Tai-Chi" symbol, we see a white dot within the black portion, a black dot within the white portion. Both complementary
and contrasting features are present at the same time. Zen and Tao as the middle way would be committed to neither, in terms of any dualism; for instance, idealism is as untenable as realism.

Contrasting with Taoist and Zen philosophy, according to James Liu (1988), Confucius is the "one who knows it cannot be done but does it" (p. 25). In other words, Confucius had to use words to explain that words are unnecessary. It is this idea of "words do not exhaust meaning" that suggests more meaning than what is explicitly expressed--"you know what I mean" (Liu, 1988, pp. 1-37). This problematic of language is central to post-structuralism, as well as to Taoism and Zen philosophy. Reflections on language and discourse led to Foucault's connections among language, knowledge and power, to Derrida's attack on dualism and his critique of logocentrism, to Deleuze's fourth dimension of language, to Lyotard's comments of "language game," and to Serres' dialogue in an information society. The intellectual is no longer commissioned to play the role of advisor to the masses and critic of ideological content, but rather to become one capable of providing instruments of analysis. Foucault (1986a) notes:

[W]hat is philosophy today--philosophical activity, I mean--if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead legitimating what is already known? (pp. 8-9)
Connections Between Taoism and Post-structuralism

Heideggerian thought (later Heidegger) has much in common with Taoist thinking (Parkes, 1987). The influence of Heideggerian thought on structuralists and post-structuralists is quite significant; several structuralists (Barthes and Lévi-Strauss) are fascinated by the influence of Zen philosophy in Japan and are interested in China. Barthes (1982) explicitly states that writing is in its own way a "satori"--a Zen event--defined as "a loss of meaning," "a seismism" which perturbs the thinking subject (p. 10). This event produces a speech-void. At the same time, this void makes writing possible. Post-structuralists are also intrigued by what has happened philosophically in the East; sometimes they explicitly acknowledge the difference between the West and the East (Foucault, 1970; Derrida, 1982; Deleuze, 1987a; Serres, 1989b). Several elaborate the influence of Eastern thought in their writings (Deleuze, 1987a; Eribon, 1991). Deleuze explicitly states that the notion of "Body without Organ" is much related to "Tao." Foucault is interested in the practice of Zen. China, Serres (1989b) notes, is the last "universalizing ideology" in the world. The implicit connection, I am suggesting here, is a first step toward the dialogue between the West and the East in contemporary curriculum theory.

The connection between Western and Eastern thought has been elusive and not evident; from different interpretations of each tradition no consensual understanding could emerge. Gadamer writes, in *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (1987), that "the generation. . . would be very reluctant to say anything in print about a philosophy if he/she were him/herself unable to read and understand the
relevant texts in the original language" (p. 7). Having written on Japan and China, Barthes (1982) seems to confront an unknown that is neither about Japan nor about China. This unknown refers back to his own language, and through his language, that of all the West. I wish to suggest certain passages between the West and the East tradition in light of Post-structuralism, Taoism and Zen philosophy. This passage-way may help Westerners to understand post-structuralist curriculum from a different, non-Western perspective.

For the purpose of linking the characteristic features of the post-structuralist curriculum to Taoism or Zen philosophy, I would propose at this point to review several important concepts in post-structuralism: "paradoxical instance--the excluded middle," "preponderance of signifiers over signifieds," "deconstruction," and the postmodern turn. Some (Cohen and Goldman, 1990) characterize the philosophy of Chuang-tze as a Taoist deconstructionism. For Taoism and deconstructionism, a text does not fix a state of affairs; nothing is fixed and every interpretation transforms the reading perspective. Both deconstruction and Taoism reject any philosophical system that accommodates Western metaphysics and the notion of a transcendental and personal Being. Taoism provides a useful counterweight to Western logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence at the same time. One can quote from Taoist texts to support Derrida's deconstruction of Western philosophy, or alternatively, one can say that, from a Taoist perspective, such deconstruction is unnecessary. In deconstructive context, the attempt is not to ascertain the underlying wisdom of the texts, or to locate their internal coherence, but to explore the texts as
expressions of ideology, culturally dominant values, and popular culture. This attempt tends to focus on differentiation rather than consolidation of the marginal, on the rise of new loci of local struggle, and on the appearance of new technological communication media.

In post-structuralism, Foucault and Deleuze argue that things (meaning, history, etc.; contrary to propositions) are not joined together by a process of continuity or interiorization, but instead they rejoin above and beyond ruptures and discontinuities (Foucault, 1970, 1972; Deleuze, 1987a, 1988). The notion of discontinuity is neither the "arrow," nor the "cycle," nor the "pyramid." The point is not that there are no continuity and hierarchy in history, but rather that we treat any assumed continuity and hierarchy with suspicion. This attitude moves out of the confines of history into the preconditions of the possible as possible. Foucault articulates an unquestionable suspicion toward any order through which knowledge is transformed into power and vice versa. In sum, Foucault (1979) insists that there is "no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations" (p. 27). In Discipline and Punish (1979), Foucault also demonstrates that dualisms are molar or massive effects occurring within multiplicities. Deleuze (1988) emphasizes that "Body without Organ" is "a problem not of the One and the multiple but of a fusional multiplicity that effectively goes beyond any opposition between the One and the Multiple" (p. 137). The multiplicity of forces, the multiple being of force, Taoist observes, is "wu-wei"—an act without
activity. These forces are unfolded on the surface of internal depth and then folded under the surface; any given perspective can only be validated by reverting to still other perspectives. Serres (1982) explicates the notion of "noise" (La Belle Noiseuse) to implicate or "indicate" that the birth of order comes from the chaos or disorder, the functions of Hermes and the "parasite" points to undermining the certainty of being, expressions of indeterminacy, and any binary system. This thinking parallels Lao-tze's concept of "wu," the fathomless form, the formless foundation of all forms; all forms are derived from it.

Looking beyond a "hermeneutical circle" of the exchange between sense and utterance (or signifier and signified), Derrida intends a revolutionary thesis: le double dédouble ce qu'il redouble. Dédoubleur means "to split," to "cut in two," so that signifier can rebound and make "half" of the signified into signifier. The signified itself is thus distributed into two functions, signified and signifier, which it can perform in turn or simultaneously (Derrida, 1978). This "differentialism" of Derrida, characterized by Robert Magliola (1984), is "between the Tao" (pp. 2-11).

Let us read a poem by Tao Yuanming:

In this there is true meaning;
I wished to wax eloquent, but have forgotten words.
(Liu, 1988, p. 43)

Post-structuralists are particularly concerned with the foundations and limits of theory. The lesson they learn from Nietzsche is that truth is not "a transcendent unity." They replace mind with "text" (as the locus of enunciation of meaning), and replace
identity with "difference" (as the strategy of reading). They argue that the subject is the point of origin of meaning and the world consists of actions amenable to the understanding of the subject--and yet the "subject" is displaced. Derrida (1978) notes:

Nothing within this language (the language of everything that has participated, from near or far, in the adventure of Western reason), and no one among those who speak it, can escape the historical guilt. . . which Foucault apparently wishes to put on trial. (pp. 35, 58)

Displacement of the Self

The notion of self has been central in curriculum studies. The traditional recognition of the individual self in the West seems to be the center of society; relationships are considered by-products of interacting individuals. In the East, matters of self seem trivial compared to concern for family and community. The sense of self is stronger in the West than in the East. This attitude results in detailed study of human nature in the West; one is always in search of further individualization. One is attempting to grasp what is at the basis of the individual soul. On the other hand, the East tends to focus upon Nature and in so doing to obliterate the individual; there is often no sense of self.

One can not care for self without knowledge. Knowledge of self is also the knowledge of a certain number of rules and conduct or of principles which at the same time function as truths and regulations. The care of self therefore is to employ and to explore these rules--the game of truth. The relations of power, according to Foucault,
constitute a field of knowledge and operate between individuals. Power and knowledge directly imply one another. Foucault exposes how the subject of knowledge and the subject of power together compose the regime of truth in modern society along these lines. However, the aim is not to free truth from power but to open up the possibility of the constitution of a new politics of truth.

The subject is to be understood as a "form" that "is not above all or always identical to itself" (Foucault, 1987, p. 121). This means that subjects are constituted differently in different discursive situations; and different forms of relationships with the self are established through these different modalities of subjectivity. The practices of self are, Foucault (1986a) insists, "not something that the individual invents by him/herself. They are patterns he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society and his social group" (p. 122). These processes of self-formation are not "natural" but are something done to the self, performed on the self. The "technologies" of the self also suggest the body as a set of relations for experimentation and invention that may be exercised for the purpose of constituting the self. This eroding of the identifiable self is manifest in a wide range of practices of self. The disappearance of the subject from the center gives way to reflexive questioning, irony, and ultimately the playful probing of yet another reality. Our ways of understanding the self are thus displaced. Foucault (1977) also warns us an attempt "to capture the exact essence of things, their purist possibilities, and their carefully protected identities," is necessarily an essentialism. He explains:
This search [for the origin] assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession. This search is directed to "that which was already there," the image of a primordial truth fully adequate to its nature, and it necessitates the removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity. (p. 142)

**Language as Paradox**

Tao [Yuanming], one of the greatest Chinese poets, has expressed reality as an undifferentiated whole, the same as that expressed by Chuang-tze. For Tao [Yuanming] to convey, in poetry, a sense of the undifferentiated state of reality, there is no medium other than words, which involves the making of distinctions. Tao [Yuanming] resolves the dilemma by accepting Chuang-tze's advice to "forget words" after getting the "meaning" as well as the latter's paradox, "great eloquence does not speak" (Merton, 1965, p. 27). The paradox is, of course, that Tao [Yuanming] has to use words to tell us that he has forgotten words, and since he is writing about his own act of writing this poem. His words may be taken as an example of Deleuze's "hammering" or Daignault's writing about curriculum as with words and beyond words. As noted earlier, Zen Buddhists seem to be fond of ordinary language, and yet their use of language is often extraordinary. This paradoxical nature, for Zen Buddhists, is the original teaching of the Buddha. This paradoxical instance is embedded within the undifferentiated state of reality, which sheds light on Daignault's (1989a) "curriculum as composition." Language
does not simply represent or mirror the reality; instead it is part of reality and reflects upon itself. Foucault (1970) notes:

Though language can be spread them [things] before us, it can do so only in an unthinkable space. . . we shall never succeed in defining a stable relation of contained to container between each of these categories and that which includes them all. (p. xvii)

This unthinkable space is similar to Daignault's (1988c) gap between "signs" and "notes," the relation between power and forces. Forces constitute power; forms constitutes knowledge. Power does not pass through forms but forces. To affect is a function of force, to be affected is like a matter of force. Force as an exercise of power shows up as an affect, since force defines itself by its very power to affect other forces. This space is the condition of possibility of the undifferentiated state of reality. In this way the gap, detached from any specific use and any substance, attests to the sublimation from within the primacy of paradox; it produces by way of paradox a more complex or bifurcated paradoxical instance.

In curriculum, the notion of paradox (para-doxa, doxa as the dogmas of the times) might be brought into everyday classroom and practice. We need to attend a new sense of order--paradoxical order or chaotic order, by continuously questioning taken-for-granted assumptions. Since there is no resolution that can be reached, no possible choice that can be made, this disorder of order, adding new dimensions to the discourse, may be imperative for curriculum theory. To identify the paradox, however, is not to resolve it. Daignault (1989b) insists: "The translation of a 't' too many is . . . passages between answers and questions, not the [or even a] passage
from a question to an answer, but their absolute difference [différance]" (p. 361). The absolute difference is the paradoxical instance, the condition of possibilities of undifferentiated whole. The strategy is not to produce answers or solutions to problems or to assist in the development of new social intervention. Rather, it is to make us experience that period's discourse as a specific self-sufficient web that can account for the whole of its own world.

As noted earlier, Foucault (1973) insists that

[A]s for a common language, there is no such thing; or rather, there is no such thing any longer; the constitution of madness as a mental illness, at the end of the eighteenth century, affords the evidence of a broken dialogue, posits the separation as already effected, and thrusts into oblivion all those stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax in which the exchange between madness and reason was made. (p. x)

This attitude locates madness in an area of unforeseeable freedom where frenzy is uncharted; if determinism can have any effect, it is in the form of constraint, punishment, or discipline.

Curriculum and the Aesthetics of Existence

One day, Chuang-tze was dreaming about becoming a butterfly; it is so alive and flies wherever it wants happily. He forgets himself so it does not notice his existence. Suddenly, he wakes up and feels himself lively. He can not tell whether he, Chuang-tze, was dreaming as a butterfly or being a butterfly he was dreaming about himself. There must be a distinction between Chuang-tze and butterfly. It is called wu-hua. (personal translation of Chuang-tze Dreams Butterfly in Wang, 1909, p. 12)
This story is about the "fluttering" between Chuang-tze and the butterfly. It can also be said to be about reality and illusion, knowledge and ignorance, even about the reality of uncertainty. This notion of fluttering parallels Deleuze's (1987a) notion of "perpetual disequilibrium," or Daignault's (1984a) "passage-way" (pp. 3-7). There may be some questions about this story's verifiability or experience of a dream. Asking questions like these is like asking what shapes the clouds have. The clouds are neither square nor round, any more than dreaming or waking. A story is a story. Whether or not I am Chuang-tze or a butterfly may be an interesting question, but that uncertainty does not detract from the story. The aesthetics of the story have to do with the "effect" of meaning rather than with its content per se. Story-telling may be another passage to understand curriculum. This approach has been implied by other traditions in critical pedagogy and teacher development: curriculum as "story-telling" (Aoki, 1983; Egan, 1986; Elbaz, 1991), "collaborative teacher's autobiography" (Raymond, Butt & Townsend, 1992) or curriculum as "autobiographical text" (Pinar, forthcoming). Another example is Graham's Reading and Writing the Self (1991). He employs autobiography in English teacher education and curriculum through "reading and writing" the self. His work suggests it may be possible to open the way to achieve authentic self understanding via curriculum. However, Deleuze (1987a) sees that:

No longer are there acts to explain, dreams or fantasies to interpret, childhood memories to recall, words to make signify; instead, there are colors and sounds, becomings and intensities [and when you are becoming-dog, do not ask if the dog you are playing
with is a dream or reality, if it is "your goddam mother" or something else entirely]. There is no longer Self that feels, acts, and recalls; there is a "glowing fog, a dark yellow mist" that has effects and experiences movements and speeds. (p. 162)

We live our lives as a story we are telling, reminds Jean-Paul Sartre (1969); "a man is always a teller of tales, he lives surrounded by his stories and the stories of others, he sees everything that happens to him through them; and he tries to live his own life as if he were telling a story" (Sartre, 1969, p. 39). Story-telling is a way of life. For instance, science is a "story" in the language of a logico-mathematical system, as inductively and deductively tight as we can make it.

Telling stories can be playful. Gadamer (1988) argues that "play is really limited to representing itself. Thus its mode of being is self-representation" (p. 97). Play must be purposeless and have no purpose outside itself. Inconclusiveness is conclusive after all, once it becomes an identifiable consciousness. Lyotard (1984b) describes this purposeless "space" or "scene" as that "which in the modern poses the unpresentable in the presentation itself. . . that which is concerned with new presentations, not purely for the pleasure of it, but the better to insist that the unpresentable exists" (p. 89). We write to be other than what we are. The purpose of writing is to "know to what extent the exercise of thinking one's own history can free thought from what it thinks silently and to allow it to think otherwise" (Racevskis, 1987, p. 133). One tells a story in a voice that mingles with the voices of the other storytellers. We tell stories
together. To tell a story about curriculum is to tell a story about stories and ourselves.

Another story is pertinent here. "The joy of fishes" (1965) is about Chuang-tze:

Chuang-tze and Hui-tze were crossing Hao river by the dam.

Chuang said: "See how free fishes leap and dart: That is their happiness."

Hui replied: "Since you are not a fish, how do you know what makes fishes happy?"

Chuang said: "Since you are not I, how can you possible know that I do not know what makes fishes happy?"

Hui argued: "If I, not being you, cannot know what you know, it follows that you, not being a fish, cannot know what they know."

Chuang said: "Wait a minute! Let us get back to the original question. What you asked me was how do you know what makes fishes happy? From the terms of your question, you evidently know I know what makes fishes happy."

Chuang continues: "I know the joy of fishes in the river, through my own journey, as I go walking along the same river." (Merton, 1965, pp. 97-98)

This story implies playfulness. Chuang-tze and Hui-tze were together for a long time; they were playing with each other. Pedagogy and curriculum are enriched by constantly questioning assumptions among students and teacher. Clem Adelman (1992) suggests that play can be regarded as "a quest for vocation" and best be understood as an intermingling between the "imagination" and the "feedback from attempts to test the consequences on others and things of 'what if' questions" (p. 139). Such a questioning entails an "opening" of perspectives, a multiplicity of voices. In curriculum,
many are looking for correct answers to universalize, normalize and standardize their so-called "objective" agendas (Phillips, 1987; Jackson, 1992); only a few are asking important questions to localize alternatives, to de-objectify objectivity.

Therefore, the role of curriculum theorizing is not to formulate a global analysis of the ideologically coded, but rather to analyze the specificity of the mechanisms of power and to construct, little by little, strategic knowledge. Curriculum functions to displace discursive practices, such as self-formation, sense-making, historical awareness, rather than merely transform particular discourses. As noted earlier, these strategies are less interested in achieving a unified whole, either within collaborative communities (Miller, 1990) or within individuals, and more on exploring the possible connections among those fragmentations and differences. Derived from the analysis of the discursive formation of schooling, curriculum theory becomes practice. Theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: It is practice.

**Body-effect and Self-stylization**

Another implication of post-structuralism and Eastern thought in curriculum can be considered as a kind of body teaching and displacement of the self. Traditionally, teaching is merely connected to words or representation. Students not only acquire knowledge through "the movement of signifiers," (Derrida, 1978) but they also think knowledge by "thinking through their body" (Gallop, 1988) or by feeling (not merely knowing) the knowledge they explore. Students are practicing "body reading" in the texts and everyday
experience (Grumet, 1988). These ideas call us back to the body, back to the primordial experience of childhood, and back to the "skin" of a new body; these are problematics best raised by Lyotard (1988-1989): "Can thought go on without a body?" For thought without a body is the prerequisite for thinking of the death of all bodies, and of the death of thought that is inseparable from those bodies. Foucault (1986a) suggests that "it is physical pleasure [effects of body] that will have the last word and dismiss the prudish speeches [thought] with a peal of laughter" (p. 213).

One of the differences between the West and the East concerns the notion of "individuality"--including the notion of self. The construction of self, in the East, is thought as that there is lack of a adequate basis for individuality. One reason is that many see such a basis as requiring not only moral autonomy but also what Max Weber (1951) called a "unified personality" (p. 235). Modern Western tradition has constructed the self through the emphasis on privacy; Cartesian skepticism regarding the problem of knowledge, facilitating criticism of authority figures; "romantic" approaches to the emotions, including the profound ways in which the relations among emotional, sexual, moral, and religious tendencies that were explored by Rousseau, Dostoyevsky, and Freud; an emphasis on economic and political rights; and even on philosophies defining the individual as the ontologically formed human subject. The notion of self has been explicated by post-structuralism through the scrutiny of power/knowledge relation and sexuality, the function of desire, the method of autobiography, the languages games, and the communication and relationships to others in information society
(Foucault, 1978, 1985, 1986a, 1989; Deleuze and Guattari, 1983b, 1987a; Derrida, 1985; Lyotard, 1985; Serres, 1982, 1983). The "Otherness" is recognized and is essential to understanding the self. Awareness of the Other and of the technologies of self-formation permit individuals to be affected by their own means—a certain number of operations—on their bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves to attain the order of things.

However, it is difficult to discern any trans-cultural standards by which they necessarily amount to the "best" or the most "authentic" construction of the self. An advance in intellectuality is not a fulfillment of the wish to know. Lyotard (1990) describes knowledge as "the desire of the West as a wish to know, and the wish to know as an avoidance of responsibility, as a flirtation with the known in which the knowing subject 'never gets his fingers burned'" (p. 99). In addition, Chuang-tze tells us: "When knowledge went north" to search for truth, knowledge failed (Merton, 1965, pp. 118-120). This understanding of reality echoes Serres' (1983) "to know is to kill" (p. 28). It is not a question of discovering truth in the subject but of remembering truth, recovering a truth which has been forgotten. Chuang-tze says: "We come nowhere being right, since we have the answers. 'For he who knows does not speak, he who speaks does not know.' And 'the wise man gives instruction without the use of speech'" (Merton, 1965, p. 120). The subject does not forget her/himself, her/his nature, origin, or her/his supernatural affinity, but she or he forgets the rules of conduct and what she or he ought to have done. The use of language is necessary, yet problematical, in
all communications. Wittgenstein (1922) once remarked: "The limits of language. . . mean the limits of my world" (p. 34). J. Hillis Miller (1977) also argues that "language is not an instrument or tool in man's hands, a submissive means of thinking. Language rather thinks man and his 'world'" (p. 444). As the vocabulary of expression is expanded (forcibly), so is the potential repertoire of relationships among human communication and understanding. Foucault explicates the identification and construction of self through the nexus of power and knowledge relation. Individuals are effects of power, the tools of power, the elements of its articulation, not its points of application.

**Pedagogical Listening**

The philosophy of listening has been suppressed by a dominating culture of "talking" or "speaking" in the West. The mechanism of "saying without listening" has been regarded as constituting itself a generalized form of domination and control. Listening is not passive but active. Aoki (1989) explains "listening" through etymology ("Listening" in Chinese): Listening involves ears, eyes, mind and undivided attention altogether in order "to listen." He remarks that "listening to the foregoing carefully allows us to become thoughtful of how we may have become beholden to the metaphor of the I-eye--the I that sees" (Aoki, 1989, p. 5). We need to listen to the living speech of the Other. We must not merely listen to one's words but to one. After all, "what would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it is resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent
possible, in the knower's straying afield of himself?" (Foucault, 1986a, p. 8) Jo Anne Pagano (1990) insists that "to engage in conversation is to inflict oneself toward the Other. Conversation is made up of gesture and posture as well as of word" (p. 133). We need to listen to "voices" or the "tone" of teaching (Aoki, 1990a; van Manen, 1986, 1991). It is in the teaching of the teachers that students can acquire, assimilate, and transform a set of practices into a permanent principle of action and to get prepared.

Gemma Fiumara (1990) also suggests that the strength of contemporary thinking lies "less in the creation of new basic concepts than in the new messages of past thoughts that enable us to rediscover and 'hear'" (p. 76). This pluralism of expressions opens the way to full expression of all discourses, to a free play of discourses. The challenge to curriculum is thus to facilitate renegotiation of the meaning systems within which "the problem" exists, to open the way to new solutions. We can see that Foucault's (1970, 1972) project functioned as one of problematizing the presuppositions of utopian dreams by liberating the power of truth from the forms of hegemony that imprison it. As Serres (1982) would say: "To invent, is not to produce, it is to translate" (p. 65). Listening, however, is not to be envisaged as yet another position so much as a path of a coexistential nature aimed at an understanding of the message or theory. This understanding will extend listening to develop in the direction of further conjunctions and cross-fertilization. This understanding also opens the door to multiple realities.
Eric Chappell, in his Ph.D. dissertation entitled *The Azimuth of Language: Explorations of the Limits of Expression* (1985), attempts to articulate the meaning-of-the-whole, which he terms "calling," in the texts and everyday life. This approach intersects with Aoki's notion of pedagogical belonging and Heidegger's "dwelling." This calling also involves pedagogical listening which means that not only should we listen to the message carefully, but more importantly, we should listen to the unsaid or the silent--saying what it does not speak. The realization of the silent implies the intervention of the "I." To break the bonds of any "given" has tremendous implications. Listening to the calling is authentic and is an embodiment of the undifferentiated whole of reality.

Ted Aoki (1989) pursues a bridge over the West and the East through phenomenological belonging and grounding (Heideggerian "dwelling"). He proposes an attitude of "belonging" and "dwelling" in curriculum and pedagogy. He reiterates Heidegger's "dwelling":

> To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature. Everything that already belongs to the gathering nature of this thing, appears as something that afterward read into it. . . . To be a human being means to be on the earth as mortal. (Heidegger, 1971, pp. 147, 149)

The notion of "bridging" and "belonging" in Aoki represents the key point of his phenomenological curriculum theory. He constantly evokes the notion of "calling" of teachers and students in pedagogical situation. We as educators, he insists, should practice and be able to acquire a sort of pedagogical "listening," whose meaning is two-fold; first of all, the teacher needs to be attuned to pedagogical living with
students that their voices can be heard. Moreover, the teacher needs to be so attuned to allow a listening to the voice—the "calling"—of the good in the lived pedagogical situation with students (Aoki, 1989, 1990b). Teachers would invite students into modes of dialogue as participants rather than pawns, as collaborative interlocutors instead of slates to be filled. A student is a teacher and vice versa. They speak and listen together. They are different; they are connected.

The End of The Beginning

Post-structuralism is an on-going discourse, or a "subject-in-process." Since curriculum scholarship is focused on knowledge production and self-formation within our culture, a more in-depth analysis of socio/historical and self-reflective discourse is needed to answer questions regarding the mobilization of meaning embedded within cultural formation, of organizing forces of the state in assuring a decentered yet unified future. In other words, contemporary curriculum theories must be analyzed in terms of the relations among self, power and knowledge.

We must be willing to confront and to transgress the limits of our discourse, to understand the conditions of possibility for entrapment in historical categories in order to move beyond those categories. This approach opens up the question of the relationship of theory to practice, a phenomenon from which a new ethics—an aesthetics of existence—can be advanced, one based not on the lifting of censorship and prohibition but rather on a more limited ethic that invents new forms of life independent from reified political and social structures. The call for "dialogue at the margins" (Schultz,
1990) or "local emancipation" (Daignault, 1990) is needed to examine how the relations of boundaries of our discourse and our subjective constitution as the paradoxical social dynamism are being realized.

Dialogue between Eastern and Western philosophy is worth continuing. Derrida (1976) says:

> We must begin wherever we are and the thought of the trace which cannot take the scent into account, has already taught us that it was impossible to justify a point of departure absolutely. Wherever we are: in a text where we already believe ourselves to be. (p. 162)

To develop further a dialogue between Eastern and Western philosophy, it is evident that one has to understand first the languages of both traditions, and to be able to "translate" one language into the other. A concern with the dialogic allows us to move beyond the conversation itself to attend to the conditions of its production. One has to "read" the philosophical problems and solutions presented in different traditions and be able to conceptualize in one's native system so as to create passages. Perhaps one beneficial consequence would be a better understanding of one's own cultural position. No improvement in self-understanding is possible without such discovery and exploration. Foucault (1985) reminds us:

> There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks and perceive differently than one sees is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all. People will say, perhaps, that these games with oneself would better be left backstage; or, at best, that they might properly form part of those preliminary
exercises that are forgotten once they have served their purpose. (p. 8)

Michel Serres (1989b) remarks:

A touch of irrationality is a saving grace for us, a stroke of luck which gives us some breathing space, a loose fit in the machine which makes us alive. Life, intelligence, goodness probably came out of this free play and this lack of restraint. Leave some ears of wheat in the field for the gleaners, he [the farmer] said. Perhaps we shall learn one day that the most reliable machines leave room for the unexpected. (p. 11)
REFERENCES


Whitson, J. A. (1991). Post-structuralist pedagogy as counter-hegemonic praxis (can we find the baby in the bathwater?). *Education and Society, 9*(1), 73-86.


VITA

Wen-Song Hwu received a Bachelor of Education degree from National Taiwan Normal University in July, 1981. He then taught high school for four years in Taiwan. In 1985, he came to the United States to pursue graduate study. He received the M.A. degree in Industrial Education from the University of Wisconsin-Stout in 1986. Before he came to Louisiana State University to complete his doctoral degree, he spent one year of doctoral study at the University of Minnesota.

At the University of Wisconsin-Stout, Mr. Hwu studied with Dr. William Reynolds who introduced him to the field of curriculum studies. Dr. Reynolds recommended Mr. Hwu to study with Dr. William Pinar at Louisiana State University. Mr. Hwu applied and was accepted into the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at Louisiana State University, studying under the advisement of Dr. William Pinar. At LSU he was awarded graduate assistantships for four consecutive years. His dissertation, under the guidance of Dr. William Pinar, Dr. Ted Aoki, Dr. Jacques Daignault, Dr. William Doll, and Dr. Spencer Maxcy, is concerned with the relationships between post-structuralism and curriculum.
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: Wen-Song Hwu

Major Field: Education

Title of Dissertation: Toward Understanding Post-structuralism and Curriculum

Approved:

[Signatures]

Major Professor and Chairman
Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signatures]

Date of Examination: June 21, 1991