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Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans and Military Reform in the Progressive Era: 1898-1912.

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**Neo-Hamiltonian republicans and military reform in the
Progressive Era: 1898–1912**

Barr, Ronald James, Ph.D.

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NEO-HAMILTONIAN REPUBLICANS AND MILITARY
REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: 1898-1912

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
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in partial fulfilment of the
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in

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by

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ABSTRACT

The Spanish-American War changed the course of American history. In a few months the United States acquired a colonial empire and adopted a policy of overseas involvement that greatly altered future world events. The political victory of a few military reformers and politicians, who endorsed Social Darwinism, over those who upheld the ideas of Jefferson and Jackson, destroyed the international isolation of the American republic. No matter what successive political administrations claimed, they inherited substantial overseas commitments.

The group that engineered this profound change in American foreign and defence policy were led by Elihu Root, John Hay, Leonard Wood, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt. These men were convinced that American economic prosperity and political independence depended upon exerting influence overseas. The creation of English-speaking democracies world-wide, which endorsed free trade, would guarantee American prosperity and peace. Josiah Strong's evangelism, which claimed advanced nations had a duty to help the less fortunate, provided American imperialists with moral legitimacy. American expansion required both allies and an efficient military. During the late nineteenth century top-ranking British officials decided that Britain could not maintain its industrial and

naval preeminence. An informal alliance between the United States and Great Britain became increasingly attractive to key decision-makers in both countries. This decision led to poorer relations with Germany and Japan because these states resented Anglo-American imperialism and its industrial power.

The American army highlighted these changes. The Spanish-American War had displayed deficiencies of command, training, and equipment that proved unacceptable to politicians wishing to influence the world. Army reform provoked political debate. Supporters of local control, volunteerism, and the ideologies of Jefferson and Jackson opposed military reform. Led by William Jennings Bryan, they challenged the view that national efficiency required a professional civil service, army, and navy responsible to federal authority. Ideas from Germany, Britain, France, and Switzerland were used to construct the new army. American business organisation, partly responsible for unparalleled economic growth, influenced the rhetoric of reform and new command structure of the army. The reforms included a General Staff structure, War College, and closer national guard-regular army cooperation; creating the basis for today's American army.

CHAPTER ONE TOWARDS A NEW CENTURY

In 1883 the novelist Henry James left America for Europe. He left a country of thirty-nine states and fifty million people living in a largely rural environment. Chester A. Arthur was president. He presided over a country with rural values, with government that was primarily local, controlled by amateurs. The political economist William Graham Sumner had published a book entitled, What the Social Classes Owe to Each Other, which upheld class distinctions, upper-class superiority, and rural stability. On August 30, 1904 James returned to America on the S.S. Kaiser Wilhelm II. His native land had greatly changed. The population was now seventy-six million and over percent of people lived in towns of 2,500 people or more. Theodore Roosevelt was president. He led a country transformed. The rural Republic was now an industrial and colonial world power. James quickly discovered a preeminence of business ideas and values in America which deeply depressed him. A year later, thoroughly sickened by the dominance of commercialism in his own land, he returned to Europe.¹

James could not adapt to the momentous social and economic change in America. Railroads had destroyed the old frontier and allowed substantial urbanisation. Big

business advocated professionalism and efficiency as essential to develop new markets at home and abroad. These ideas challenged the old Jacksonian and Jeffersonian notions of local political control, relative international isolation, agrarian economy, and individual amateurism. Alexander Hamilton's concept of a strong centralised state, expanded federal agencies, and a professionally advised executive dominated American politics. Economic necessity and moral obligation had created an American Empire. The essence of government was strong central authority advised by professionals. Supporters of this philosophy were frequently referred to as "Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans." Concerned at the increasing complexity of society, they argued that government must place authority in the hands of a body which had the confidence of the majority: professionals who could ensure efficiency in an age of increasing complexity. Such government was essential to ensure continued economic growth and political independence in a competitive international world. American success in a such a world depended not only on efficient government but also on a strong military. The debate over military reform reflected these national political and economic changes. Military efficiency required a new command system and a professional officer corps. The struggle over army reform highlighted the political divide within America between

Neo-Hamiltonian Federalists and Jacksonian-Jeffersonian localists.

Between 1870 and 1900, the United States enjoyed both remarkable economic expansion and considerable Federal government growth. National income increased from \$7 billion in 1870 to \$17 billion by 1900. Foreign investment, only \$684 million in 1897, reached \$2 billion by the early twentieth century. Economic development created new economic trusts and corporations with an annual 300 corporate mergers between 1895-1914 creating American Tobacco, U.S. Steel, DuPont, and other corporate empires.² The Federal Government underwent profound change. In 1871 the civilian pay-roll of Federal employees numbered only 53,000; yet by 1901 there were 256,000 employees. The federal budget, set at \$292 million in 1871, increased to \$1 billion by 1891. Thomas Jenckes advocated civil service reform in the 1860's based on the principle of merit. He attacked provincial patronage and helped promote the professionalism in government established in 1883 with the Pendleton Civil Service Act. In 1895, the Dockery-Cockrell Congressional Commission undertook one of several comprehensive reviews of government administration. The apparent successes of commerce and industry led to interviews with business managers on the latest management techniques.³

Unlike industry and the Federal Government, the American army was in decline in the late nineteenth century. The effective army created during the Civil War was rapidly disbanded at its end. By July, 1868 the army's strength was set at 54,302 officers and men, an enormous reduction from Civil War enrollment.⁴ Peacetime limited the army's role to pacifying fewer than 100,000 hostile Indians in the West and to upholding Reconstruction in the South.⁵ Further reductions in army enrollment took place on March 3, 1869 and July 15, 1870, when Congress reduced the army to 30,000 officers and men and the number of regiments from forty-five to twenty-five.⁶ By March, 1898 the army numbered fewer than 25,000 men in a country with a population of over 73 million people. Throughout the nineteenth century, with the exception of the Civil War, the United States had a lower ratio of military personnel to population than Japan or any European power.⁷

At the same time as the army grew smaller, business, particularly railroads were developing new management techniques that would soon have an impact on the army. The completion of the great East-West rail lines created the largest companies of the mid-nineteenth century. The Illinois Central, Baltimore and Ohio, Michigan Central, and other railroads, undermined provincial economics and politics in America. As David C. McCallum, General Superintendent of the Erie Railroad pointed out in 1855:

A Superintendent of a road fifty miles in length can give his personal attention in the direction of details; each person is personally known to him, and all questions in relation to its business are at once presented and acted upon.⁸

This economic system preserved the local control so important to Jefferson and Jackson. The emergence of larger railroads, however, overturned local control and produced regional, divisional, and finally national management. In the 1860s and 1870s managers in the Pennsylvania Railroad pioneered a new departmental system reporting to a divisional and headquarters structure. The new central office consisted of departmental heads who worked with the president to coordinate, assess, and plan the goals of each department in relation to the company's interests.

Throughout the 1880s and particularly during the depression of the 1890s the consolidation and amalgamation of American business was promoted by ideas for national management. Business expanded, and by 1900 agricultural income was estimated at only \$3 billion out of a total production income of over \$14 billion.⁹ Between 1888 and 1892 Gustavus and Edwin Swift created a national distribution, marketing, and processing company for beef products. In 1895, James B. Duke created American Tobacco for purchasing, manufacturing, and marketing tobacco world-wide. By 1900 similar organisational advances were made by U.S. Steel, U.S. Rubber, National Biscuit, and DuPont. No longer local in character, these new companies

gave America the largest industrial capacity in the world.¹⁰ The economy was increasingly based upon business technology, business management, and science. Philosopher John Dewey, supported by Henry James, criticised nineteenth-century individualism. Americans were encouraged to support government bureaucracy and business based upon administrative efficiency and scientific management.¹¹

Jacksonian and Jeffersonian supporters were not the only Americans alarmed by the emergence of big business and urbanisation. In 1883, John Hay, later secretary of state, published a novel entitled The Bread Winners. He attacked the rural egalitarian society upheld by Jeffersonians and created heroes who accepted their social position in life. He portrayed industrialists as philistines.¹² Elihu Root, later secretary of war, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and author Henry Adams shared this ambivalence to the impact of business on society; they saw in Britain an ideal alliance between corporate wealth and social position which maintained stability.

Business expansion encouraged urbanisation. Between 1880 and 1900 the number of Americans living in towns more than doubled. Urbanisation threatened rural American values and alarmed even active supporters of industrial expansion. Hamlin Garland and later Henry Nash Smith continued to chronicle the homestead and rugged

individualism. William Graham Sumner, Theodore Roosevelt, and Leonard Wood all endorsed the "strenuous life concept" of intense physical activity as an antidote to industrial and urban weakness.¹³

Despite the reduction in the size of the American army, its officer corps maintained its continuity. Between 1871 and 1898 the corps varied little more than 100 from a figure of 2,100 officers;¹⁴ the highest number of resignations was just twenty-eight in 1889.¹⁵ This continuity within the officer corps was reinforced by the continuity of ethnic origin and education within this relatively small body of men. The majority of senior officers were Protestant and came from North-eastern states. Such ethnic, regional, and religious cohesion within the officer corps was reinforced by a common educational experience: between 1898 and 1940, over sixty-eight percent of top military men graduated from West Point while many of the remainder had some college education.¹⁶ The social profiles of army officers were similar to those of the new business leaders. The demands of army life, however, removed most officers from the influence of corporate ideals of efficiency, organisation, and specialisation emerging in business and the civil service. Most officers lived on the frontier far from cities, industry, and the new commercial ideas of the North-east. Colonel Stephen C. Mills summed up the life of

most when he wrote:

You were wet, and cold, and hungry; or dry, and hot, and thirsty, according to your geographical location. You chased elusive Indians over routes of alkali, rock and sage, they usually got away from you and all you got in return were the jeers of the fellows who didn't happen to be out that trip.... You were always behind on your paper work, and when you got the chance to make papers, it was usually done with the paucity of detail only equalled by Mark Twain's boyhood diary. A months hard scouting was dismissed by the entry "Distance marched during month, 360 miles.".... These were the good old days when one drill a day, five days in a week, comprised military training. Target practice was practically unknown. I think the allowance of ammunition was twenty rounds a year, and by custom of the service it went in hunting.¹⁷

During the Indian wars some seventy-five military posts were operational in prairie and mountain states alone, often located in rugged and inhospitable terrain.¹⁸

Despite the reduction in the number of posts by the 1890s only sixteen of eighty posts were occupied by a regiment or more in 1894.¹⁹ Small military commands occupied the largely undeveloped West far from North-eastern corporate expansion and its new ideas. The lack of recreational, or educational facilities encouraged boredom not military reform.

The declining size of the army and promotion based upon seniority created few promotion opportunities which in turn discouraged interest in new ideas. By the 1890s many officers were often too old for the promotions they held. (see Table 1).

TABLE 1
THE AVERAGE AGE OF BOTH STAFF AND LINE OFFICERS WHEN THEY
RECEIVED PROMOTION TO A SPECIFIC GRADE.

RANK		AGE	RANK		AGE
Lieutenant	at	31.1	Lieut. Colonel	at	60.9
Captain	at	43.5	Colonel	at	62.25
Major	at	57.1	General	at	58.25

Source: Captain, later Brigd. General Wm. Crozier's report on the 1901 Peking Relief Expedition to China. The North American Review, (Boston, Feb., 1901).

Major General Johnson Hagood described the army as an aging, well-trained fire department with no fires, and the firemen sitting around playing chequers. Promotion among army officers had practically stopped. Generals of the Civil War, demoted to captain and major, remained common.²⁰ According to General Nelson A. Miles, in 1889 110 officers in 1889 had not received a promotion for two decades, while even in 1895, 279 officers were still Civil War veterans.²¹ In 1890, the senior lieutenant of artillery had twenty-eight years of service, with twenty-three years as a lieutenant, while the senior infantry subaltern had yet to be promoted after nineteen years of experience at the same grade.²² Slow promotion discouraged interest in military innovations. An officer gained no advantage by studying new military methods, since all officers were promoted solely on the basis of seniority. Recognising the problems caused by long-delayed promotion, Congress passed a law in June, 1882 requiring mandatory retirement at sixty-four years of age, or after forty

years of service. This failed to alleviate the problem, with most officers between forty-one and fifty-one years of age, and only fifty-two officers sixty-one years old or over by 1885.²³ The problem remained throughout the 1890s and early 1900s. Disenchanted and time-worn, most officers cared little for civil service, business, or military reform. The scattered army provided little opportunity to practice handling larger numbers of troops at divisional, brigade, or even regimental levels. Confronted with slow promotion and tedious assignments to small Western outposts, many line officers sought staff bureau assignments, which, when made were permanent, usually involved promotion by one grade and allowed an officer to work regular office hours in one of the larger American cities. Senator Redfield Proctor graphically outlined the scramble to get a staff position while debating a bill to increase the size of the army in 1900:

Permit me to state the common method, when there is a vacancy, or is to be one in the Quartermaster's Department. The scramble for the place commences months before it actually occurs. There are about six hundred first lieutenants in the line ... sometimes three hundred I am informed are applicants for the place The applicants file briefs giving their records, with letters from military officers, personal and political friends. These briefs are often printed pamphlets of many pages. The wives, mothers, and sisters of the applicants in personal interviews appeal to the President and the Secretary. The scramble to get out of the fighting branch of the army is at least unseemly. Of course but little consideration is given to most applicants, Senator A or Representative B has a relative or a constituent with powerful influence behind him and he demands it.

Such a system of political patronage, combined with poor prospects for promotion and the dispersed state of the army, led Senator Proctor to conclude that: "No system could be better calculated to kill ambition."²⁴ The lack of opportunity, however, was not the only problem which confronted army officers in the late nineteenth century.

The end of Reconstruction in 1877 and the decline in Indian hostilities gave the army only a ceremonial and police role in a society safe from European imperial encroachments. A cultured Eastern woman underlined the apparent irrelevance of the army when, surprised by the appearance of an army colonel, she exclaimed: "What a colonel of the army ? Why I supposed the army was all disbanded at the close of the War!"²⁵ Industrial unrest including the strikes of 1877 and the Pullman Strike of May 1894, which involved more than 16,000 troops, briefly gave the army a new role in society. This role, however, hardly justified the army's existence to Congressional critics keen to cut expenditure. William T. Sherman, commanding general of the army from 1869 to 1883, unconvincingly concluded that the army's peacetime role was to prepare for war.²⁶ In the late nineteenth century a new justification for maintaining a standing army emerged, based upon international economic competition and the intellectual ideas of Social Darwinism.

In 1870, Britain dominated the industrial world. This position of preeminence was rapidly undermined by Germany, America, France and Japan. America exceeded British steel production in 1890, and by 1905 America produced four times and Germany twice the steel produced in Britain. American coal production exceeded that of Britain in 1900.²⁷ The industrial dominance of Britain was replaced by commercial competition among several powers (see Table 2).

TABLE 2
WORLD PERCENTAGE OF INDUSTRIAL AND
FOREIGN TRADE 1870-1910.

YEAR COUNTRY	1870	1885	1900	1910
Great Britain	31.8	26.6	19.5	14.7
United States	23.3	28.6	30.1	35.5
Germany	13.2	13.9	16.6	15.9
France	10.3	8.6	7.1	6.4
Russia	3.7	3.4	5.0	5.0

League of Nations Report, Industrialization and Foreign Trade, cited in Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan, p.26.

The emergence of new economic powers caused an undignified scramble for world-wide colonial Empire as Britain, Germany, France, and Belgium attempted to secure sole access to raw materials and new markets at the expense of competitors. The creation of formal empire alarmed American businessmen convinced that prosperity depended on free trade and expanding markets. The interrelationship between continued economic growth and overseas trade

interested politicians. Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, Theodore Roosevelt, Whitelaw Reid and other prominent North-eastern Republicans, reasoned that American wealth and continued economic growth required an assertive American foreign policy.

International relations between Great Britain and the United States in the mid-nineteenth century were poor. The location of the Alaskan-Canadian boundary, fishing rights, and claims for damages inflicted by British-built Confederate ships in the Civil War contributed to strained relations. Initially British economic superiority produced little inclination to settle such matters, but the disintegration of British economic superiority led to a friendlier attitude towards America among members of the British establishment. In the 1880s prominent Members of Parliament Joseph Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilk widened their definition of upright Anglo-Saxon powers to include America.²⁸ British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring-Rice emphasised increasingly cordial Anglo-American relations when he wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge in July 1890, expressing delight at the U.S. decision to annex Hawaii:

I can't tell you with what a pleasure I see that Hawaii is at length to be annexed. The pleasure is selfish and has nothing to do with the real or permanent advantages to America which I believe will result from the step. I think there can be no doubt that there is an intention, (and a natural one), to depose English civilization, (I mean yours as much as mine) from the Pacific I need not say how excited we all are at the very

welcome proof that you have given that people who talk English can still fight²⁹

The effects of industrialisation which threatened to undermine American social status by creating a new wider middle class alarmed John Hay, Henry Adams, and Henry Cabot Lodge. Increasingly they sought to emulate British aristocrats, who had successfully preserved class distinction despite industrialisation and emerging middle class democracy. These Neo-Hamiltonian or Federalist Republicans enjoyed cordial links with British imperialists such as Rudyard Kipling, James Bryce, General Sir Andrew Clark, and Arthur Balfour. A typical week for Hay in Britain often included dinner with Lady Metcalf on Monday, dinner with the Gladstones and John Morley on Tuesday, Wednesday dinner at the Foreign Office with Sir John Pauleston, Thursday dinner with Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, and a weekend at the Joseph Chamberlains with Mrs Robert Peel and Sir Henry Drummond.³⁰ These extensive social contacts with British society imbued Hay, Whitelaw Reid and other Republican supporters, with ideas of empire and Social Darwinism.

In America, British author Herbert Spencer, outlined a human hierarchy dominated by Anglo-Saxon Protestants, to accompany the publication of Charles Darwin's, Origin of the Species. He argued that advanced and progressive society was based upon technology and science. Since Britain and America were the most technologically

advanced, their societies were obviously superior to all others. Spencer's work sold over 350,000 copies in America and popularised Social Darwinism. William Graham Sumner, an influential Yale Professor, became a leading disciple of Social Darwinism in America.³¹ In the 1890s, Hay was appointed ambassador to Great Britain. He regularly forwarded to Washington D.C. material describing the advantages of imperial rule. In July 1898 he forwarded a pamphlet by General Clarke on the experiences of the pioneering British Imperialist Sir Stamford Raffles in the Malay peninsula. Hay drew attention to the expansion of trade in the region, to new civil administration, and to civil works implemented by British imperialists.³²

Hamiltonian Republicans readily accepted the argument that colonial rule benefited both the natives and the colonial power.

In America important religious leaders and influential economists also began to conclude American involvement overseas would be beneficial. Josiah Strong, a Protestant minister and reformer, published Our Country, which challenged the church to concern itself with social problems. In 1893 he published The New Era, which aroused spiritual idealism among American Protestants and encouraged support for social reform and paternalism abroad by describing disease, illiteracy, and poverty in foreign lands as an unacceptable evil. In economics the

ideas of Brooks Adams and other Neo-Hamiltonians attracted considerable attention during the American economic slump of the 1890s. Startled businessmen believed that the American home market was saturated and that expansion overseas was required for economic recovery. Lodge and other Neo-Hamiltonian Imperialists supported the evangelical and economic call for a policy of "wise aggressiveness," which had allowed Britain to secure raw materials and new markets.³³ As Roosevelt wrote to an agreeing Lodge:

The useful member of the brotherhood of nations is that nation which is most thoroughly saturated with the national idea, and which realizes most fully its rights as a nation and its duties to its own citizens As yet no nation can hold its place in the world or can do any work really worth doing unless it stands ready to guard its rights with an armed hand.³⁴

Increasingly the Neo-Hamiltonians envisaged an army that was not merely useful but essential in a competitive world.

Traditional U.S. foreign policy based upon the tenets of avoiding alliances, maintaining freedom of the seas, and upholding an open door policy on trade (all endorsed by Britain, the premier naval power in the world) did little to encourage the demand for a strong military. However, military and foreign policy was refashioned by the Monroe Doctrine, which opposed European encroachment upon the Americas; American territorial expansion into

Hawaii, Midway, Johnson Island, and Samoa by the 1890s, and the development of formal European colonial empires. In the 1880s the navy began a limited building program. A naval war college was established, and William C. Endicott chaired a board which considered coastal defence. In the army, Adjutant General Richard C. Drum ordered Major William J. Volkmar to organise a Division of Military Information, which established a military attache service. Congress authorised money for the appointment of officers overseas in 1888 and in 1889, military attaches were assigned to Berlin, London, Paris, St Petersburg, and Vienna. By the early 1890s most European capitals had an American military attache. These officers forwarded large numbers of pamphlets, articles, and other material on military systems. Many officers later influential in modifying the American army served as attaches including; Major William Ludlow, Captain Tasker H. Bliss, Captain John J. Pershing, and Captain Peyton C. March.³⁵ Technological breakthroughs in steam power, electricity, and the telegraph, coupled with American imperial expansion, reduced the effectiveness of America's barriers for isolationism: the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. These changes further convinced Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans of the need for military reform. Most Americans, however, rejected the Federalist view of the world and endorsed the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideals of strong state

politics, provincial economic control, and national defence based upon a locally organised, amateur National Guard.³⁶

A four-year economic depression beginning in 1893 undermined the position of the incumbent President, Grover Cleveland. The following year the Republican Party gained 117 seats in the House of Representatives, which created a Republican majority lasting until 1910.³⁷ In 1896 at the Republican Party Convention in St. Louis, William McKinley was selected to run for president. Born in Ohio in 1843, he was a Civil War veteran, a lawyer, a former Republican congressman, and a former governor of Ohio. McKinley supported big business and the gold standard. He was cautious about further expansion overseas. Nominated with the help of Senator Mark Hanna, McKinley was not from the Neo-Hamiltonian wing of the Republican Party.³⁸

McKinley was opposed by Democrat William Jennings Bryan. Bryan was of English and Irish descent and was the second of six children born on a 500-acre farm in Salem, Illinois. He grew up in the rural Midwest, where he led a tough farming life. He was profoundly influenced by the moral evangelism in the speeches and writings of Wendell Phillips.³⁹ Phillips assailed the "money power" in America as a menace to republican government and freedom. Like his father and like Phillips, Bryan endorsed Jeffersonian and Jacksonian opposition to policies supporting corporate

power, a unified banking system, centralised government, and a larger professional military. A gifted orator, he was elected to Congress in 1891. He led the Democratic Party and Populists against big business and Neo-Hamiltonians.⁴⁰ The depression helped McKinley to victory in the Presidential election; he polled over 7,000,000 votes and carried twenty-three states, against 6,500,000 votes and twenty-two states for Bryan. Electoral chicanery deprived Bryan of precious votes in West Virginia, Ohio, and Kentucky which might have altered the election result.⁴¹ The close election, despite a depression, both underscored the appeal of democratic ideals among the electorate, and emphasised the relative weakness of business and Social Darwinian theories, which promoted overseas expansion and strong central government.

McKinley attached little importance to the army and appointed Russell A. Alger as secretary of war. Alger, born in 1836, was the son of a pioneer couple both of whom died when he was 11 years old. He raised two younger children, put himself through the local academy, and passed the Ohio Bar in 1857. In 1859 he moved to Grand Rapids, Michigan and married into a prominent local family. He served throughout the Civil War in the volunteer cavalry and saw action at Gettysburg, the Wilderness, and in the Shenandoah Valley. After the Civil War he became a timber millionaire with interests in

Canada, California, and Michigan. He was ambitious but politically naive.⁴²

Alger encountered an army frustrated and divided. These problems were exacerbated by a command system which promoted bitterness between staff and line officers. The administrative system also created resentment between the top ranking soldier in the army, the commanding general, and the secretary of war and staff officers. Army management departed from planned organisation through the Revolutionary and Jacksonian Periods and had been finalised by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, and the U.S. Senate in March 1821. The structure upheld the president's role as commander-in-chief but did not clarify the limits of command assigned to the commanding general of the army. The commanding general was allotted control over military discipline and military operations with all orders relating to these issues transmitted through his office. The secretary of war retained financial control over the army, under the president, and was directly in charge of the staff bureaus. (see Appendix 1).⁴³ Such a system appalled Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, who endorsed the idea of a strong central government, served by professionals, with clear lines of communication to the executive.

Staff bureaus were composed of officers with permanent appointments, responsible directly to the

secretary of war. These officers paid scant attention to requests from officers in the field or orders issued by the commanding general of the army. Such a confused system, with no clear delineation of control led to constant friction between the commanding general and secretary of war. Prussian military success increased the frustration felt by the few officers interested in reforming the ineffective American system. Prussia had created a highly successful army, while the American army suffered dismal promotion prospects, divided command, and congressional enmity.

Defeated at Jena in 1806 by Napoleonic France, Prussia soon set about rebuilding its military reputation. Gerhard Scharnhorst, Karl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke, Albrecht von Roon and others produced a military system that was, in terms of organisation, the most advanced in the world.⁴⁴ These reformers established a war college for advanced education and a general staff to command the army. By 1821 Prussia possessed all the basic elements of a modern command structure.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, political upheaval in Europe in the 1820s, which caused fear of revolution, led the King of Prussia to rely on his army officers for political support. This decision by the king undermined civilian control of the army. The powers of the elected war minister were reduced and the organisational structure envisaged by Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, and other army reformers was overturned.

In America the frustration and competition between the secretary of war and commanding general over who controlled the army led Winfield Scott to write to the secretary of war in 1849: "It is in my opinion, indispensable that the movements of all staff officers immediately connected with the troops, as well as the number required at particular stations should be regulated by my orders."⁴⁶ This friction continued throughout the early years of the Civil War, with poor command relations between General George B. McClellan and Secretaries of War Edwin Staunton and Simon Cameron, symptomatic of the poor command structure of the army. President Lincoln eventually solved this problem by promoting his most successful general, Ulysess S. Grant, to general-in-chief and giving him complete control of the army. In 1865, however, the Civil War ended, and control of the army reverted to the secretary of war. Grant found his authority undercut as staff bureaus re-asserted their independence from the commanding general, and re-established their allegiance to the secretary of war.

The politics of President Andrew Johnson's administration, and Grant's own presidential plans prevented any concerted attempt to stop this erosion of power. In 1868 Grant was elected president and General William T. Sherman became the new commanding general of

the army. Grant attempted to solve command problems in the army by ordering the secretary of war and staff bureaus to transmit orders through the offices of the commanding general.⁴⁷ Grant and Sherman's reforms were attacked by important members of the Republican Party, including Secretary of War John A. Rawlins. Opposition to placing considerable military power in the hands of a military man could not be overcome. Grant revoked the proposed reforms, and the role of the commanding general returned to that of military figurehead. The divided army command structure remained.⁴⁸ Sherman continued to advocate reform despite this set-back, and bitter exchanges with Secretary of War William Worth Belknap ultimately induced Sherman to move his headquarters out of Washington to St. Louis.

Traditionally, American soldiers had regarded the French army as a model worthy of emulation. Sylvanus Thayer and Dennis Hart Mahan used French military ideas when they reformed West Point, while the strategic and tactical concepts of Jomini were used in American military manuals.⁴⁹ The quick military victories by Prussia over Denmark, Austria, and France in successive wars alerted those few officers interested in reform to the potential of the new German military structure. General Philip H. Sheridan who replaced Sherman on November 1, 1883, observed the rapid Prussian victory over France while on a seven-month trip to Europe. The mobilisation plans of

Prussian Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke impressed Sheridan, who concluded that the American army required a war planning agency. Sheridan missed the bitter struggle between Chancellor Bismarck and von Moltke over political objectives in the Franco-Prussian War, which highlighted the increasing power of the German General Staff.

Impressed with Prussian military success, most nineteenth-century American military reformers failed to realise that the political freedom given to the Prussian army was unacceptable in the American democratic political tradition. Sheridan was accompanied by Colonel William B. Hazen, a former Civil War major general, who investigated the Franco-German military education systems. In his report published in 1872, he praised the German system while criticising the American army for its arrogant staff departments and confused command structure. Returning to America, both officers gave enthusiastic reports to General Sherman, with Sheridan declaring that the Germans had built a "perfect military system."⁵⁰ Sherman spent several months observing European armies and continued to promote military reform. In June 1870 he appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Emory Upton commandant of cadets at West Point.

Upton, from Batavia, New York, was the tenth child of a zealous Methodist family that embraced temperance and abolitionism. He entered West Point in 1856, studied

science and mathematics, and developed a professional contempt for civilian soldiers. A successful cadet, he had his choice of appointments and joined the 5th U.S. Artillery on May 14, 1861.⁵¹ Upton served with all three arms during the Civil War, was wounded twice, and was promoted rapidly from 1st lieutenant in 1861 to brigadier general United States army and major general of volunteers by 1865. His views on an army necessary for the republic were profoundly influenced by his participation in some of the most ferocious fighting of the war at Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and the Bloody Angle at Spotsylvania Court House. He had seen militiamen run at Bull Run, had seen volunteers refuse to fight because their contracts had been violated, and had seen state governors who manipulate promotions, including his own, for personal political gain.⁵² Upton was reduced in rank to lieutenant-colonel with the rapid demobilisation at the end of the war. After the war he served in the West. In 1870 his wife died, and he turned his full attention to military reform.⁵³ By 1875 he had established himself as a prominent military theorist. Sherman convinced Secretary of War Belknap to give Upton and two other officers - cavalryman Brigadier General "Sandy" Forsyth and artilleryman Major Joseph P. Sanger - permission to tour the world to analyse military systems.

The three officers sailed from San Francisco in late 1875, returning to New York in 1876, having visited Japan, China, India, The Ottoman Empire, Russia and the Western European States.⁵⁴ On his return Upton recommended that a war school be established at Fort Leavenworth and began work on his report entitled, The Armies of Asia and Europe, published in 1878.

Upton's ideas quickly became popular in reformist circles in the army. He proposed a new three-battalion structure for regiments, staff appointments for fixed terms, promotion based on merit, a system of advanced military education including a war college, and a general staff system created by the amalgamation of the Adjutant General's Office and Inspector General's Department.⁵⁵ Upton did not outline the powers of the commanding general or those of the secretary of war in his new system. His praise for the Prussian system implied the commanding general would be chief of the general staff with considerable independence from civilian control. In Prussia von Moltke operated increasingly without civilian control, despite the presence of the able Chancellor Bismarck. The inability of Upton and other nineteenth-century reformers to define the relationship of the secretary of war to the commanding general within the army command structure and their failure to recognise that the freedom given to the Prussian army would be unacceptable in America limited their contribution to later reforms.

In 1865 the only national institutions for military education were the military and naval academies at West Point and Annapolis. Under the command of the chief of engineers, West Point was largely a technical school. In 1866, however, it was given independent status and a broader curriculum was implemented. General Sherman encouraged educational reform while commanding general. In 1868 an artillery school was established at Fort Monroe to give the first post-graduate training for West Point officers. In 1881 similar advanced schools for the other two branches of the army were established with the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth.⁵⁶ This school attempted to provide some form of post-commission training for isolated field officers accustomed to commanding small garrisons. Though only partially successful, the school became influential through two of its instructors; Captain Arthur Wagner and Captain Eben Swift.

Wagner was an influential reform-minded officer. Born in Chicago on March 16, 1853, he graduated from West Point in 1875. He spent his early years in the army fighting Indians in the Dakota Territory. In 1881 he became professor of military science at Louisiana State University, later moving to the Florida Seminary in Gainesville to hold a similar post. In the late 1880s he was appointed lecturer in military art at Fort Leavenworth

and was soon promoted to head of department. In 1888 he visited Europe, on leave of absence, to study the organisation and methods of the German army. He visited the war college in Berlin and war schools at Potsdam and Metz. Wagner toured European battlefields and studied the Austro-Prussian conflict in the light of the Civil War; the published result was the highly acclaimed Campaign for Koniggratz. In 1893 he published The Service of Security and Information, which became the textbook at the three service schools, and in 1895 he published Organisation and Tactics, which was authorised as the standard text for all officer examinations.⁵⁷ In 1893 Eben Swift joined Wagner on the faculty at Fort Leavenworth. Unlike Wagner, he was concerned with the methods of teaching military instruction, and both men complemented each other.⁵⁸

In 1878 the military reform proposals advocated by Upton were introduced to the House of Representatives. Sherman, Hazen, and Upton prevailed upon House minority leader James A. Garfield and Senate Military Affairs Chairman Ambrose E. Burnside to support reform. A product of German military thinking the bill was defeated in Congress, by those opposed to political freedom for the army.⁵⁹ Sherman, Sheridan, Upton and Hazen were influenced both by the military success of Grant when freed from political control and the easy victories achieved by Prussia in Europe. These men wanted the general-in-chief

to have absolute authority over the army. The belief that Grant and von Moltke succeeded due to freedom from political constraints challenged the deeply held Anglo-American distrust of autonomous standing armies at a time when the need for an army was not apparent. Not surprisingly, proposals for reform under these conditions invariably failed.⁶⁰

The emerging concept of professionalism affected the army with the creation of new expert associations. In 1885, the U.S. Cavalry Association was established, followed by an Infantry Association in 1892 and an Artillery Association in 1893. All three associations produced their own journals.⁶¹

On August 14, 1888 Lieutenant General John McAllister Schofield replaced Philip Sheridan as commanding general of the army. Schofield, like Sherman and Sheridan, promoted military reform, but, unlike the previous commanding generals, he understood the limitations of his office. Born in New York in 1831, he graduated from the military academy in 1853 and was appointed assistant professor of natural philosophy at West Point in 1856. In 1861 he was appointed a major of volunteers and served on the staff of General Lyon. In November 1861 he rose to brigadier general of volunteers. A divisional commander in the western theatre during the Civil War, he later commanded the Army of the Ohio under General Sherman. On

November 30, 1864 he was promoted to brigadier general in the regular army. After the war he served as secretary of war in Andrew Johnson's administration, held various departmental commands, and commanded West Point between 1876 and 1881. In 1866 and 1881 he toured Europe to evaluate various military systems. During his tenure at West Point and throughout his military life, Schofield took an interest in military reform and in young, reform-minded officers.

Tasker H. Bliss, William H. Carter, and William M. Wherry all served under Schofield.⁶² Bliss in particular served extensively as his aide and secretary. In 1879 Colonel Wherry, while serving on Schofield's staff, published an article entitled "The Command of the Army," which explained the problems of a divided military command and advocated a new centralised command structure.⁶³ Unlike previous commanding generals, Schofield in particular stressed that any military reform that threatened civilian political control would always be unacceptable in America. Schofield proposed a centralised command structure which retained the political control so badly undermined in Germany. On February 23, 1889 he outlined his ideas in a memo to President Grover Cleveland:

In time of peace it is neither necessary, nor proper, that the commanding generals be clothed with the supreme authority of the Commander-in-

Chief, nor that the staff be exempted from the responsibility to their staff superiors. But the commanding generals are, no less in peace than in war, the representatives of the Commander-in-Chief, and delegated in part by him to his subordinates All this does not involve any possible distinction between the President's authority and that of the Secretary of War. So far as concerns or is known to the Army, of the line, staff, and generals, alike. He is responsible alike for the military and fiscal affairs of his department. He is an impartial judge between those of his subordinates, who are charged with different often conflicting interests The function of the staff in this regard, is to watch, to inspect, to inquire, to investigate and to report to their chief, all the things that require correction; but not to decide nor command except their own subordinates it would be destructive to the efficiency of any military system ... to permit a staff officer to overrule the decision of his superior in rank. If there were a "Chief of Staff," superior in rank to all, that difficulty would be overcome by his action in cases of contest.

Schofield continued his discussion by describing the limited functions of the commanding general while the secretary of war was so over-worked that he required an assistant. The commanding general was virtually isolated. Schofield revealed he only saw orders issued in his name if they were submitted to him. Frequently he only knew of orders when they appeared in the morning papers. The General concluded:

....The solution to all these difficulties seems to lie in the simple recognition of the principle that the General Commanding the Army is subordinate, in all things to the Secretary of War, no less than the President, and that he and his subordinate commanders of divisions and departments are the assistants of the Secretary and President in the military administration, no less than in the command. In accordance with this principle, the General-in-Chief would be in effect, though not in name, the Chief of Staff of the Army.⁶⁴

Schofield deplored the lack of further education and planning in the army. As commanding general, he acted as a de facto chief of staff, sparing the War Department the bitter squabbling which had plagued it throughout the century.⁶⁵ Schofield also encouraged younger officers interested in reform, including Tasker Bliss.

Bliss was not a typical army officer. His father was an eminent language professor at Lewisburg College, the forerunner to Bucknell University, while his mother was the daughter of the dean of Vassar College. He spoke six languages, including French, German, and Spanish, and enjoyed translating Latin during his time off. One of thirteen children, he tried to enter the navy after two years at Bucknell. He failed to gain a place, and entered West Point in 1871. Graduating near the top of his class in 1875, he had the choice of any arm of the army. Initially he elected to join the cavalry, but a classmate named Sturgis persuaded him to select the artillery. The following summer, Sturgis died while serving with General George A. Custer's 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn. Bliss was one of a small group of reform-minded officers at West Point, all of whom graduated in either 1875 or 1876. The group included William H. Carter, William Crozier, Arthur L. Wagner, J. Franklin Bell and William Wotherspoon. These officers were influenced by the reform

proposals of Upton, Hazen, Sherman and Schofield.⁶⁶ Bliss served for one year with his regiment, then was posted to the Military Academy, as assistant professor of modern languages. Schofield was school commandant. In the early 1880s he was posted to the Artillery School, where he graduated at the top of his class and was appointed adjutant at the school. In 1885 he worked on the Endicott Board for coastal defence, and then was assigned to the new Naval War College.⁶⁷

On October 6, 1884 William E. Chandler, secretary of the navy, approved the creation of the Naval War College under the command of Commodore Stephen B. Luce. Luce became convinced of the value of staff work while commanding the monitor Pontiac, which supported Sherman's army crossing the Savannah River in early 1865. The briefing by Sherman before the attack convinced Luce that staff work and planning were invaluable. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan became the college's first historian, and Lieutenant Bliss the first lecturer in military science.⁶⁸ In 1885 Bliss visited Europe to study teaching methods in military science. He visited France, Great Britain and Germany, but like Upton was most impressed with the war college in Berlin. On his return from Europe Bliss was appointed aide-de-camp and then private secretary to General Schofield. Bliss was distinct from most army officers, who were ageing Civil War veterans, and like

most reformers he was regarded as an outsider by the officer corps.⁶⁹

On October 5, 1895 Major General Nelson A. Miles replaced Schofield as commanding general. Born in Westminster, Massachusetts in 1839, he volunteered for Civil War service in 1861. Appointed first as captain he rose in rank to major general by 1865 and received the Congressional Medal of Honour for bravery in action at Chancellorsville. After the war he remained in the army, and became a colonel in the infantry in July 1866. Miles spent the next fifteen years in the West, acquiring a reputation as an Indian fighter. In 1880 he was promoted to brigadier general and ten years later became once more Major General Miles. Unlike Bliss and other army reformers, Miles was a decorated Civil War veteran and Indian fighter and was not viewed as an "academic" who merely wrote books about others' exploits.⁷⁰ An exceptionally fine regimental commander, Miles had no respect for civilians, was brave, ambitious, vain, and blunt. He never attended West Point or any service school and had no interest in the military ideas of Germany or France which he regarded as irrelevant to the unique American experience. Intensely proud of his promotion to commanding general - a post held by George Washington, Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman and others - he had no intention of supporting any military reform which

placed the commanding general under the secretary of war.⁷¹ Relations between the commanding general and the secretary of war and staff bureaus returned to acrimonious bickering and divisiveness.

Unlike Miles, many army officers had no faith in the state militias or hastily organised volunteers as effective fighting forces. Schofield, Hazen, and Upton remembered the combat failures of such forces in the Civil War. Younger officers such as Carter, Bliss, and Wagner, graduates of West Point, increasingly regarded the army as a "profession" and opposed "volunteerism." The National Guard, however, remained fundamental to Democrats faithful to the ideas of Jefferson and Jackson. The Guard represented provincial volunteerism as opposed to central control and professionalism. It also provided state political officials, who often appointed senior officers, with powers of patronage. In 1879 the National Guard Association was created; throughout the 1880s and 1890s it portrayed the militia as a popular West Point, able to counter professional regulars who might usurp the government. The argument proved popular and found sympathy in Congress, which doubled Federal appropriations for the Guard while questioning the very need for a standing army.⁷²

Regular army officers were appalled at the support given to the Guard, which they regarded as an

unprofessional and inefficient organisation. Colonel J. P. Sanger, who had accompanied Upton on his world tour, summed up the condition of the militia when he wrote:

.... In none of the states are there schools for officers and non-commissioned officers In forty-two states, the company officers are elected by the men; in Connecticut, "on the recommendation of the company," in West Virginia, Montana, and Wisconsin, the second lieutenants are elected by the men; in New Hampshire, company officers are nominated by field officers; in Washington, upon petition of the majority. In thirty-five states, company officers were examined for appointment; in ten, they are not

Sanger continued: "cognizant of the practice of electing militia officers ... then it is not worth while to expect good discipline, or instruction, in the National Guard." He further criticised the lack of drill, target practice, and standardised equipment, concluding that the volunteer system was a "broken reed."⁷³ Despite these failings the National Guard, and the concept of a volunteer army in times of national emergency, retained the powerful ideological and political backing of the Democratic Party and state politicians.

By 1898 most officers still failed to recognise the significance of the technological, professional and managerial revolutions at home or the importance of the new commercial competition abroad. The creation of professional associations, new service schools and a Military Information Division with military attaches around the world, had little effect on aging Civil War

veterans in far-flung Western outposts. Younger officers, imbued with new ideas of professionalism had no authority to reform the army. The efforts of Sherman, Sheridan, Schofield, and Upton had failed; as the Spring of 1898 arrived, with the possibility of war, the army remained weak and divided.

CHAPTER ONE - END NOTES

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CHAPTER TWO
"NO END OF A LESSON:" AMERICA AND THE
SPANISH - AMERICAN WAR

On April 25, 1898 the United States declared war on Spain. By the end of August, America had defeated Spain and acquired Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, and Manila in the Philippines. Despite the previous expansion of American commercial interests into Hawaii and some enthusiasm for acquiring Samoa, these overseas acquisitions marked a radical departure from the American past. The United States was transformed from a continental state, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, into a country with new responsibilities far overseas.

President McKinley only reluctantly agreed to war. The civil war in Cuba, which provoked an inept Spanish reaction, compelled the President to demand that Spain vacate the island.¹ Unsuccessful rebellions against Spanish rule had occurred in 1868, 1878, and again on February 24, 1895. The underlying cause remained the same: poverty created by Spanish corruption and mismanagement. Throughout the late 1890s Cuban rebels like Thomas Estrada visited America to raise money and support for the insurgents. These men claimed the war as their American revolution and struggle for freedom.² Spain responded by mobilising several hundred thousand troops, who failed to defeat Cuban forces, and suffered 100,000 casualties.

Dysentery, typhoid, and malaria incapacitated 50,000 men, while 50,000 more were battlefield casualties.³ In January 1896, General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, was appointed as the new Spanish commander.

The policies implemented by Weyler prevented McKinley from following the policy of strict neutrality adopted by his predecessor Grover Cleveland.⁴ General Weyler ordered the construction of elaborate lines of barbed wire and guard houses across Cuba to prevent rebel movement. His most controversial policy, however, was "Reconcentration," which involved the forced removal of rural populations into armed camps. Weyler ordered anyone found outside the camps to be considered hostile and shot. Weyler's troops systematically destroyed Cuban agriculture and village life. The overcrowded camps housing the displaced population lacked food and water. Extensively reported in America, Weyler's exploits earned him the titles, "Human Hyena" and "The Butcher," in the national and local press.⁵ Thousands died in General Weyler's camps; his policy created famine, yet failed to break the rebels or produce peace. In sparsely populated, mountainous eastern Cuba, guerrilla forces moved freely in substantial numbers. Only around Havana did Spanish troops exert any control. Weyler's strategy scattered his forces throughout Cuba, destroyed local agriculture, and made his forces dependent upon supplies from Spain and alienated American public opinion.⁶

In America, despite the deterioration in U.S.-Spanish relations, the army failed to plan for any conflict. The army remained at its lowest numerical level since before the Civil War and Secretary of War Russell Alger and Commanding General Nelson Miles paralysed army command with their struggle over its control. In 1897 Alger, thoroughly sick of Miles, ordered him to observe the Greco-Turkish War and attend Queen Victoria's Jubilee just to get him out of Washington.⁷ In contrast, the Naval War College planned for war with Spain in 1895, encouraged by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt. By 1898 the navy, unlike the army, had detailed plans for operations against Spain in the Pacific, Atlantic and Caribbean.⁸ Under increasing domestic pressure to respond to events in Cuba, McKinley demanded that Spain enter into negotiations with the guerrillas and create a time-table for Cuban independence.

Germany was irritated by this new American interest in the Caribbean. Already at odds with the Anglo-Americans over control of Samoa in the Pacific, Kaiser Wilhelm II threatened:

It is high time that we other monarchies ... agree jointly to offer help to the Queen, [of Spain], in case the American-British Society for International Theft and Warmongering looks as if it seriously intends to snatch Cuba from Spain.⁹

In November, 1897 British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring-Rice,

warned Theodore Roosevelt of the German wish to expand commercially in the Caribbean and the unenthusiastic response in Berlin to any suggested American involvement in Cuba.¹⁰ In the spring of 1898, civil war broke out in Samoa, between the Anglo-American and German backed natives, which underlined an increasing Anglo-American understanding. The tripartite agreement over the islands, established in the Berlin Act of 1889, was broken. A new agreement was proposed: Germany gained Samoa, America received the islands of Pago Pago, and the British took Tonga and the Solomon Islands.¹¹

In mid-January 1898, supporters of Spanish colonial rule and General Weyler rioted in Havana, wrecking Cuban newspapers and businesses that supported the American reform process. The incident angered McKinley and Congress, with the result that the battleship U.S.S. Maine was dispatched to Havana on January 25, 1898 to prevent further lawlessness. On February 9, the New York Journal published a personal letter intercepted by Cuban rebels from the Spanish premiere, Dupuy de Lome, to a friend in Cuba. The letter criticised American interference in Cuba, and described McKinley as "weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd, besides being a would be politician who tries to leave the door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoes."¹² Many Americans, furious at this insult to the President,

demanded an immediate apology. The late and half-hearted nature of the Spanish response only caused more resentment towards Spain. The U.S.S. Maine arrived in Havana and anchored inside the harbour. On the night of February 16, 1898, the Maine blew up; 262 officers and men were killed. American public opinion was shocked, while American newspapers speculated the U.S.S. Maine had been deliberately sunk.¹³ Congress, infuriated by the "McKinley letter" and the destruction of the Maine, listened angrily to Senator Redfield Proctor denounce Spanish tyranny on his return from a visit to Cuba. In a moving speech, Proctor described the conditions in Cuba and the shame inflicted on American people for permitting such atrocities so close to home.¹⁴

Congress unanimously increased defence expenditure by \$50 million and called on McKinley to take stronger action against Spain.¹⁵ Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans who endorsed a Darwinian model - of inevitable world competition and conflict over limited resources - joined those imbued with Josiah Strong's missionary zeal in sweeping aside McKinley's caution. Even William Jennings Bryan approved the Congressional defence appropriation on the basis of protecting American honour and Cuban welfare.¹⁶ Bryan claimed that America was helping a friend in need, but he warned Republicans, who favoured overseas expansion, that history would only vindicate America if it upheld the

principles of freedom and self-determination. It would be hypocritical and greedy if a war justified on the basis of humanity became a war of conquest. In a clear warning to Neo-Hamiltonian supporters such as Hay and Lodge, he attacked those who dreamed of empire around the globe and claimed enduring happiness was based upon a homogeneous people with free and democratic government.¹⁷

On April 22, 1898, the United States implemented a naval blockade on Cuba and two days later formally declared war on Spain. The demand for war swept aside any protest. In the House of Representatives Speaker Thomas B. Reed, who opposed war, summed up the feelings among congressmen, when asked by Vice-President Hobart why he had not dissuaded his colleagues. He responded, "Dissuade them! He might as well ask me to stand out in a Kansas waste and dissuade a cyclone." Such was the desire for war.¹⁸ The United States army of 24,000 regulars confronted a Spanish army in Cuba of 150,000 men supported by 80,000 Cuban loyalists. The Spanish forces, however, were demoralised by three years of guerrilla warfare and tropical disease. In these years 13,000 troops died from yellow fever, and by 1898 one quarter of all troops were hospitalised with dysentery, typhoid, and yellow fever. Despite these problems, Spanish forces in Cuba heavily outnumbered American land forces.¹⁹

The navy, unlike the army, had planned for war. On April 30, 1898, Commodore Dewey, commander of the American Asiatic Squadron, entered Manila Bay and sank the entire Spanish pacific fleet. Theodore Roosevelt, the assistant secretary of the navy, encouraged this prompt action. Sympathetic to Neo-Hamiltonian ideas, he supported the view that American victory in the Philippines would encourage U.S.-Asiatic trade. American control of the archipelago would provide new markets, raw materials, and a base to exploit the increasing weakness of China regarded as an important future market. In the late 1890s large areas of China had been seized by foreign powers: Japan acquired Formosa; Russia seized the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur; France took Kwangchow Bay; Germany occupied Kiaochow; and Great Britain seized Weihai-wei.²⁰ America, through Roosevelt's action, now claimed the Philippines. The rapid action in the Philippines circumvented the Teller Amendment, designed by Bryan and other anti-imperialists to prevent America claiming sovereignty overseas. Added to an army appropriation bill, the Teller Amendment applied only to Cuba, not to the Philippines, which now could be legally seized by American forces.

Initially, the army expected the war to be a naval contest, with only small invasions to aid rebel forces in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. However, even this limited role exposed the complacency and inefficiency of

the post-Civil War army. Despite the naval victory by Dewey, many Americans in coastal cities feared Spanish naval shelling of their homes. Congressmen demanding protection for their constituents discovered that the recommendations of the Endicott Board, and young reform-minded officers like Bliss had been largely ignored. According to one artillery officer, only 151 heavy guns and mortars were mounted and ready for action, out of the 2,000 recommended by Endicott, Bliss and others. General Miles, an early critic of the war, proclaimed Washington D.C. defenceless, while the Ordnance Department informed Congress that each coastal gun had only twenty rounds of ammunition.²¹ Congress responded quickly to public pressure from coastal communities and approved an ambitious coastal defence scheme.

The proposal by McKinley for a larger standing army, received less support in Congress. The National Guard, state politicians, and congressional Democrats combined to defeat plans for a larger professional army. The traditions of volunteerism, provincial political control and local identity remained strong. Representative George B. McClellan and General Miles both introduced plans to expand the professional army. McKinley's administration, however, supported legislation proposed by House Military Affairs Committee Chairman, John A.T. Hull.

Hull, a Republican from Iowa, was a powerful member of the House of Representatives who chaired the military affairs committee for ten years.²² The "Hull Bill" proposed an army of 27,000 men, arranged to expand quickly to a force of 104,000 regulars, organised in three-battalion regiments as recommended by Emory Upton. The bill ignored controversial organisational reforms and was supported by all segments of the professional army including Secretary of War Alger, Commanding General Miles, and Adjutant General Henry Corbin. Despite this rare unanimity in the professional army, Hull's legislation was defeated in the House by 155 votes to 61.²³ The National Guard, state politicians, and most of Congress, continued to support the locally controlled volunteer against the federal professional. The principle of a volunteer army was reaffirmed and in the words of Representative Hull:

The opinions of Grant, Sherman, Schofield and Miles did not have the slightest weight when put in the balance against an officer in the state militia. The great generals had no votes, the militia officers had votes back of him with which to enforce his demands.²⁴

The failure of the bill reflected the antipathy of many Americans to a standing army. Indeed the minority report by the House Military Affairs Committee, which represented the views of Democratic members, bluntly asserted:

Such an army is not necessary to be maintained in the country now, neither because of our relations

to the islands [Cuba and Puerto Rico] nor because of any necessity which has arisen in the country itself.

The report reminded Americans that "the dangers and evils of a standing army are many and well recognised" and that "the one proposed in the Hull Bill would in time of peace be a menace to the liberty of the citizen." The hostility to a professional army even produced claims that it would "desecrate the ballot box." The report by four Democrats concluded by recommending a standing army of under 30,000 men.²⁵

On April 22, 1898 a compromise bill was signed into law. The President was authorised to raise an army of 120,000 men. In a major concession to the National Guard half of the newly created force would be local militia.²⁶ The legislation endorsed none of the changes suggested by nineteenth-century army reformers, and Congress limited the duration of the proposed increase by requiring all volunteers to be released in 1899. Ideas of provincial independence had defeated the attempt to create a professional army controlled by a central authority. National Guard units continued to elect junior officers while state governors asserted their patronage by appointing middle-ranking and senior militia officers. Many Civil War veterans, including Schofield, pressed McKinley not to repeat Abraham Lincoln's mistake of mobilising too few men early in the war. National Guard

officers warned the President that they would not act unless all units were mobilised in any state called for volunteers. On April 23, McKinley yielded to this advice and, ignoring the terms of the Hull Bill, called for 60,000 regulars and 125,000 volunteers.²⁷

Many army officers became increasingly hostile to the assertive and politically powerful National Guard, a body they regarded as unprofessional and ineffective. Comments made by Captain R.K. Evans reflected the antagonism in the regular army towards the militia. In a prize-winning essay, he described the Battle of Bladensburg in the Revolutionary War, when a small British force of regulars routed a large American volunteer force in good defensive positions. He brusquely concluded: "this incident shows that no reliance can be placed on raw levies, hastily assembled, without time to acquire discipline or learn their duties as soldiers."²⁸ The conflict with Spain fully justified such concerns.

In the army, relations between Miles and Alger continued to deteriorate. Miles was appalled at the rapid increase in the size of the army and continued to voice opposition to the war. Alger was increasingly confident in the army's ability to succeed and so enthusiastically endorsed proposed invasion plans. In the tradition of von Moltke in Germany and of Grant in the Civil War, Miles asserted his right to unrestricted army command free from

political control, a demand dismissed by McKinley. His abrasive manner and ambition for high political office increasingly isolated him in the War Department. As early as 1895, the then secretary of war Daniel Lamont was obliged to remind Miles of his position in the administration:

To the many newspaper correspondents who have called on me today to inquire concerning a reported interview with you which appears in the Tribune of today and a statement printed in the Mail and Express each evening I have been obliged to decline to make any expression and I write to suggest you follow the same course.

I think I explained to you that no order can be made until I hear further from the President and it has not been his habit to announce his purpose to the press in advance of action itself....²⁹

The ambitions of the commanding general and his opposition to the war left him isolated and frustrated within the administration. In April 1898 he issued sound military advice on the problems of invading Cuba: the dangers of disease, the task of maintaining naval supremacy around Cuba, and the difficulties in supplying the army overseas.³⁰ McKinley was greatly disappointed in Miles. Under domestic political pressure to act decisively and aware of the possibility of European intervention, he wanted a plan of action, not reasons for inaction. The administration ignored Miles and his advice. Neither "Major" McKinley nor Alger knew enough about the army to direct it without advice. Increasingly, they relied on Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin, who controlled the

bureau which issued army orders. The Adjutant General became a de facto chief of staff.

Corbin was born in Ohio in 1842. He volunteered for combat in the Civil War and fought with the Army of the Cumberland in Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama. By 1866 he was a colonel of volunteers and regular army captain. Appointed a company commander he spent the next ten years on garrison duty in the South-West. In 1880 he was promoted to major in the adjutant general's office in Washington D.C.³¹ In Washington he soon became friends with the influential Ohio lobby and profited from its political connections, which included President Rutherford B. Hayes, future President James A. Garfield, and McKinley. All three men liked Corbin, relied upon his advice, and took an active interest in his military career.³² In February 1898 after serving eighteen years in the adjutant general's office he was appointed adjutant general. A domineering figure, six feet two in height, solidly built, with a full moustache, he was an impeccable professional, who detested the amateur soldier and political opportunist. He faced an arduous task in mobilising the army for war.

In the words of Alger: "After 33 years of peace, during the greater part of which the army did not exceed 26,000 men, it suddenly became necessary to arm, feed, and equip more than a quarter of a million men."³³ The demands

of war quickly overwhelmed the War Department and its bureaus, and exposed the lack of Army intelligence, or staff system. The army had no pre-planned campaign of military action, and little intelligence on the Spanish army.

Major General Arthur MacArthur, a divisional commander in Major General Wesley Merritt's force to invade the Philippines, described the woeful intelligence:

It was my privilege to join Eighth Corps at San Francisco in June 1898, and on the 27th of that month I started for Manila in command of the third detachment of the Corps, consisting of five ships and approximately 5,000 men. Aside from the high spirits and feelings of self-confidence which actuated all concerned, the distinctive characteristic of the command was the absolute ignorance of the Philippine Archipelago, in respect of geography, climate, people and the general aspects of nature.

There was little or no literature aboard from which instructive information could be obtained. One writer to whom we had access advised all travellers to carry coffins, as few returned alive from Manila. Another and more optimistic writer cited an Eastern epigram to the effect that for romance and adventure the entire Eastern world relied upon Manila. These two facts constituted about all we could learn by investigation³⁴

In addition to this lack of basic information, other problems in Washington seriously impeded efficient planning for war. The War Department was besieged by office seekers and reporters, who quickly relayed every detail of American war plans to the outside world.³⁵ In order to expedite interviews with office seekers, Corbin withdrew all chairs from his office, save his own, and

kept all those seeking patronage standing in front of his desk. The Adjutant General frequently called meetings at three in the morning to avoid the crowded War Department hall-ways the crush of reporters those wishing to promote themselves and interfering congressmen. William Jennings Bryan was among those who offered his services and McKinley reluctantly approved his commission. He was appointed colonel of a regiment of Nebraska volunteer infantry. Corbin made sure that the leading Democratic politician was given no opportunity to become a war hero, and his regiment was assigned to a mosquito-filled camp on the St. John's River in Florida.³⁶

The mobilisation of the National Guard was a calamity. Almost half the guardsmen refused to leave home for an extended length of time and were replaced with hastily assembled volunteers. Most state troops were equipped with Springfield rifles, a single-shot, breech-loader, using charcoal powder, which created a large cloud of dust when fired, revealing one's position to the enemy. These Springfield rifles were poorly maintained, old, and often exploded in the user's face when fired. Less than half of National Guard officers had attended an instructional course, and even fewer had passed a formal command examination.³⁷ Training for the enlisted men consisted of weekly company drills, supplemented by regimental drills during the week, or ten days of summer

camp. Little time was devoted to target practice since ammunition was in short supply. This inadequate training, however, was more than the replacement volunteers received.

While the National Guard struggled with mobilisation, Alger and Miles continued to argue. Alger openly resented Miles and dismissed his abilities asserting that, "many of the General's proposals were obviously impracticable, and not infrequently impossible."³⁸ The lack of planning and proper command procedures promoted inter-service rivalry between Admiral William T. Sampson and General William R. Shafter, the commanders for an invasion of Cuba.³⁹ Shafter, a friend of both McKinley and Alger, was appointed to command the army attacking Cuba after Miles refused to go. A grossly fat, short-legged man, he displayed all the faults of a late nineteenth-century career officer. An aging Civil War veteran, promoted through the seniority system, he had spent the years since the Civil War in sedentary garrison posts. Shafter was neither physically nor mentally equipped to command the expedition to Cuba. In describing his physical condition, the chief commissary officer stated: "he couldn't walk two miles in an hour, just beastly obese."⁴⁰ The lack of further educational facilities in the military had prevented Shafter from acquiring the necessary theoretical knowledge to command an army. The dispersed state of the

army since the Civil War prevented any practical training with units larger than a regiment. Shafter, like many of his senior colleagues, was the product of a neglected system.

The army was further handicapped by the choice of Tampa Bay, Florida as the main embarkation port for the invasion of Cuba. Although closer to Cuba than any other U.S. port, Tampa had several fundamental flaws. Unlike New York, Charleston, Mobile, or New Orleans, Tampa was not a deep water port and relied on a single mile-long pier to service ocean-going shipping. Florida was largely an undeveloped land of swamp and pine forests, filled with snakes, insects, and disease throughout much of the state. Significantly, Tampa was served by only one rail link. Galveston, Savannah, Mobile, Wilmington N.C., and Charleston all had more than four rail links. New Orleans had eighteen rail links, which provided extensive access to the northeast and midwest.⁴¹ The choice of Tampa was made by Alger, after conversations with both General Miles and Morton F. Plant. Plant owned the main railroad from South Carolina to Florida and the only railroad which served Tampa. Corbin, who recommended the use of New York, was overruled, and wrote sadly of the decision:

Mr. Plant, of the railroad system bearing his name persuaded the Secretary of War that Tampa was the place and his railroad was competent to handle the army and all its supplies. It proved that neither was true The moving of a large army only

meant plenty of traffic to him. His ability to do it he did not doubt, only he did not realize what he was undertaking. That was not all. Secretary Alger had all the confidence in his judgement and ability, and that was a misplaced confidence, one that I never shared with him He believed in Mr. Plant, no one could move him from his confidence in his judgement. I shall always think that all in all Tampa was the very worst place one could have assembled this force.⁴²

General Miles added to administration problems by a series of ill-timed press leaks and the use of his office to augment his income. In April, 1898 Dr. W.H. Daly, a member of General Miles's staff and close personal friend, wrote to several companies in Pennsylvania that Miles was in financial difficulties. Six companies each advanced \$5000 to the General, and, in return, he recommended them for War Department contracts.⁴³ Miles received money from Mr. Plant in Florida, in return for which the General made seven requests to Secretary Alger to establish a camp for 10,000 soldiers near Miami, Florida, a camp supplied by the Plant railroad. Alger relied on the recommendation from Miles and no survey of the camp was carried out. It was later discovered that the camp was situated on a coral reef, only two feet above sea-level and was surrounded by thick forest with no clearings for drill. In July 1898 the camp was closed.⁴⁴

The full extent of corruption in the office of the commanding general was outlined a year later by a report compiled by Colonel Wm. H. Carter who estimated probable corruption in purchases worth over \$1 million. He wrote:

Incredible as it may seem these official reports show among other things, that General Miles recommended the purchase of one type of gun, which had been tried by the Board of which he was President, had exploded with disastrous results and that not with standing this fact, he officially informed the Secretary ... that the trial demonstrated high explosives could be thrown by them with perfect safety.

Carter criticised the attempt by Miles to replace the standard issue Krag-Jorgensen rifle with a Winchester rifle of inferior quality and concluded:

The reports of the Chiefs of Ordnance upon General Mile's various positions will make it clear, why, at a very early stage in the war, it became absolutely necessary to question General Miles in matters he should have known all about.⁴⁵

Despite these problems, army camps were established across America, and an invasion force began to assemble at Tampa. On April 29 General Shafter arrived in Tampa with the first 6,000 troops and after a further evaluation of the probable dangers, McKinley authorised a force of 40,000 troops, to be sent to Tampa in early May.⁴⁶

The argument for an active life demanded physical activity to counter weakness in martial spirit caused by urbanisation. Roosevelt, eager to follow this idea, resigned as assistant secretary of the navy to become a lieutenant-colonel in the first volunteer cavalry. Deeply involved in strategic naval planning Roosevelt was appalled at the confusion he experienced while in the army. Neither the army nor the navy had the shipping to conduct an invasion. The Quartermaster's Department


struggled just to assemble thirty-eight chartered vessels at Tampa, a motley fleet of steam lighters, a collier, barges, a tug and two hastily converted hospital ships: the "John Englis" and the "Olivette." The whole fleet could carry only 16,000 men and a limited amount of equipment, well below the force of 40,000 authorised by the President.⁴⁷ The immediate problems of training and supply increased with embarkation, which underlined both the lack of staff planning and inadequate resources available to the army. Roosevelt was disgusted and wrote to his friend, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, describing the shambles in Tampa:

There are hundreds of freight cars containing stores of all kinds which nobody knows anything about, and the line is so jammed that it is impossible to move as fast as the muletrains go alongside On the wharf not one shadow of preparation had been made to receive any regiment, no transportation had been assigned in advance, and there was actually no office for either the Commissary or Quartermaster⁴⁸

By May 8, 1898, over 1,000 freight cars were stranded between Charleston and Tampa, while on the pier only two or three freight cars could be unloaded each day. The army and Mr. Plant had not agreed on any specific loading schedule, and there were frequently no invoices for the railroad wagons. Nobody had any idea what was on each train or what had priority. The hot and humid weather added to everybody's discomfort. When troops discovered that less than half the force could be carried on waiting

FIGURE 1

The Philippines in 1902



ships, they illegally seized ships to ensure their participation in the invasion. These men were crowded aboard ill-designed transports for eight days in hot, humid weather, before they eventually set sail.⁴⁹

The preparations for the invasion of the Philippines, under the command of Major General Wesley Merritt, were much more successful. He organised an effective expeditionary force despite having to sail 7,000 miles from California to a land defended by 20,000 Spanish soldiers. Unlike Shafter, Merritt had experience commanding divisional forces in the Civil War, was physically fitter than Shafter, and enjoyed the benefits of San Francisco's deep-water harbour and rail links. Despite this successful organisation of forces the attempt to invade and hold the Philippines proved disastrous. The islands occupied 114,000 square miles and were larger than all U.S. states and territories except Alaska, Texas, California, Montana, and New Mexico. There were over 7,000 islands in the archipelago with over 1,000 were inhabited. (see Figure 1). Encountering nearly seven million people and seven main language groups, Merritt's force of 10,000 men would prove wholly inadequate.⁵⁰ On May 3, 1898, Neo-Hamiltonian Republican John Hay, U.S. ambassador to Great Britain, strongly recommended McKinley approve the annexation of Hawaii. Such a move would prevent Germany from linking Hawaii with either Samoa or the Philippines

in any future negotiations. The American ambassador indicated tacit British support for such a measure, through his contacts with the Foreign Office.⁵¹ On June 15, 1898 Hawaii was formally annexed by Meritt's force en route to Manila. Hawaii would provide a secure forward base for the invasion of the Philippines.⁵²

On June 22, 1898, American forces landed at Daiquiri, a small village harbour in Cuba, and quickly seized the neighbouring harbour of Siboney. Both villages were merely breaks in the steep shoreline cliffs and offered neither piers nor wharfs to the invaders. Fortunately, the landing encountered no Spanish resistance, as the American forces had no landing craft: troops swam and waded half a mile through heavy surf to get ashore. Even more fortunately the Spanish commander, General Arsenio Linares, insisted on scattering his troops throughout Cuba, a policy which gave the American forces local superiority despite their overall numerical inferiority.⁵³ The supply bureaus, confronted with the shambles in Tampa, a shortage of shipping, and the non-existent harbour facilities in Cuba, struggled to provide even basic necessities to the army in the field. These supply problems were compounded by the Cuban rainy season, which started just days after the invasion and which turned dirt roads into thick mud virtually stopping all supplies to front line troops. Roosevelt bitterly described these staff and supply

failures, while besieging Santiago in July, 1898:

The mismanagement has been beyond belief We are half starved; and our men are sickening daily. The lack of transportation, food, and artillery has brought us to the very edge of disaster; but above all the lack of any leadership, of any system or executive capacity.⁵⁴

Three weeks into the campaign, men still had no shelter tents and were soaked by the daily rains.⁵⁵ In Washington D.C., Miles and Alger continued to bicker, diverting attention from the chronic problems in Cuba. The Commanding General insisted that the steel shields he had devised, which weighed over a 1000 pounds and moved on long steel axles, should be shipped to Cuba. Over 200 of the shields had been manufactured, and several were shipped to Cuba, taking valuable space on troop transports. They proved to be utterly useless on mud-filled Cuban trails.⁵⁶

The army had twelve staff bureaus, all accountable to the secretary of war, who invariably had no knowledge of army organisation. The bureaus normally handled the administration of an army of 25,000 men, not the 250,000 mobilised for war with Spain. Army supply was controlled by three bureaus with no overall coordination. The largest staff bureau was the Quartermaster's Department, responsible for clothing, tentage, wagons, horses and transportation for troops. The Commissary Department provided food for the troops, while the Subsistence

Department delivered accessories such as candles, oil and salt. The Signal Bureau managed army communications, and the Medical Bureau oversaw all aspects of health, including the supply of medicines. The Pay Department paid the troops. The Engineer Corps controlled civil and military construction projects. The Judge-Advocate's Office was the legal office for the army and secretary of war. The Inspector General's Office conducted examinations into all aspects of army operations. Lastly, the Adjutant General's Office, commanded by Corbin, issued all army orders and held many army records. Alger and Miles proved incapable of exercising authority over this complex system. Corbin, was left the impossible task of coordinating army staff functions, performing as a one-man general staff. The result was independent action by staff bureaus, which created considerable chaos. Captain Edmund Rice, a member of Shafter's Staff, summed up the confusion in a telegram to the War Department: "Expected 275 reserve troops for Shafter in Cuba. Commissary Department mistakes led to 23,000 lbs. of potatoes instead."⁵⁷

The Inspector General's Office provided little information on staff failures. Inspector General Joseph C. Breckinridge, the senior officer, disliked Corbin and supported Miles. He left his bureau with no orders when he took a field command in Cuba.⁵⁸ His actions deprived McKinley's administration of crucial information on the poor state of army training, supply and shelter.

Despite these problems, by early July, American forces had laid siege to Santiago. Admiral Cervera, commander of the Spanish Caribbean Fleet, was forced to sail and was convincingly defeated by the U.S. navy. This second decisive victory over Spanish naval power doomed Spanish forces in Cuba and Puerto Rico, who were dependent upon supplies from Spain. General Miles, having been largely ignored in Washington, accepted the chance to command the invasion of Puerto Rico. Miles organised an effective invasion force that left from Charleston and New York and met with little Spanish resistance. On July 17, 1898 the large Spanish garrison in Santiago surrendered to American forces, while in the Pacific General Merritt seized the island of Guam, as his forces headed towards Manila in the Philippines.⁵⁹

By mid-August all Spanish forces had surrendered in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and Manila. American battlefield casualties were relatively light: 294 servicemen killed and 121 wounded. A further seventy-three died in various accidents, including forty-eight who drowned struggling ashore through the surf in Cuba.⁶⁰ More servicemen drowned than were killed by Spanish fire during the landings in Cuba. These unnecessary deaths due to the lack of proper shipping were, however, secondary to the 2565 deaths caused by disease. Death through illness was five times more common than battlefield fatalities.⁶¹

Brigadier General George Miller Sternberg commanded the Medical Bureau. A kind, German Lutheran he had attended Columbia Medical School and joined the regular army medical department in 1861. He served extensively as a field surgeon, became a pioneer in public health, and conducted research into the causes of yellow fever. His work was admired by Louis Pasteur and Joseph Lister. He founded the Army Medical School to improve training of surgeons established new schools for the Hospital Corps and introduced biological laboratories to hospitals.⁶² Yet, despite Sternberg, army health care collapsed during the war. There was no General Staff to direct the allocation of resources to the greatest need, while medical supply faced the same chaotic system as other stores. Roosevelt outlined the problem to Lodge:

Even now with Santiago taken and our ships in the bay and with a month in which to have gotten ample transportation, food, and medical supplies our condition is horrible in every respect. I have over one hundred men down with fever in my own camp out of my regiment of four hundred, two hundred having previously died or having been sent to rear hospitals. The mismanagement of the hospital service in the rear has been such that my men will not leave the regiment if they can possibly help it; yet here we have nothing for them but hardtack, bacon and generally coffee without sugar. I cannot get even oatmeal without paying for it myself The engineers and artillery have done poorly and the hospital division even worse. But the prime difficulty has been the lack of transportation, including the means to land from ships.⁶³

Shafter wrote to the War Department, describing the condition of thousands of troops who needed medicine,

while all the field hospitals could provide for eleven days was a supply of quinine.⁶⁴ Thankfully, victory was close at hand.

In Washington, the disgruntled Miles believed a conspiracy had denied him the credit for victory and thus began collecting details of army failures. Shafter warned Corbin that Miles and his friends, Inspector General Breckinridge and Colonel Waughner, were gathering information to discredit the army's performance in Cuba.⁶⁵ Army surgeon W.H. Daly, a member of Miles's staff, began collecting information on the unpopular and frequently inedible, tinned beef ration.⁶⁶

In the Philippines, while Spanish forces vacated the islands, the alliance between Filipino nationalists and the U.S. army remained intact. On August 12, 1898 America and Spain signed a peace protocol in Paris. The American negotiating team consisted of two Neo-Hamiltonian imperialists, Senator William Frye and the diplomat Whitelaw Reid; two limited imperialists, Senator Cushman Davis and former Secretary of State William Day; and anti-imperialist Democratic Senator George Gray. McKinley, at best a reluctant expansionist, hoped this negotiating team could ensure tangible territorial gains to offset any criticism of war management. The American representatives were instructed to press for recognition of U.S. claims to Guam, Puerto Rico, a coaling station in Cuba, and

occupation of strategic points in the Philippines. In the early Autumn of 1898 the commander of U.S. forces in the Philippines, General Merritt, arrived in Paris to convince the American negotiating team to demand the annexation of all the Philippines. The conference remained deadlocked on this new demand until December 10, 1898, when Spain agreed to accept \$20 million for the islands.⁶⁷

Anti-imperialists were concerned by the American decision to seize the Philippines. William Jennings Bryan left his volunteer regiment, still bivouacked in Florida, to visit McKinley in Washington. He challenged the President to disband all volunteer regiments and attacked expansionism saying: "They volunteered to break the yoke of Spain in Cuba, and for nothing else. They did not volunteer to ... subjugate other peoples or establish United States sovereignty elsewhere."⁶⁸

However, the ideas of William Graham Sumner, Herbert Spencer, and Herbert Croly had grown in popularity in America. Many people were now willing to endorse limited imperialist goals. A Literary Digest poll of 192 editors discovered that half favoured annexation of the Philippines and that a further third supported U.S. coaling rights in the islands.⁶⁹ Within the Republican Party, president McKinley and future president William Howard Taft emphasised the new willingness to accept some form of imperialism. Unlike true imperialists, these

limited imperialists, believed that a limited period of Western guidance would benefit other countries by allowing them to achieve multi-party democracy and free market capitalism. Such figures relied on the teachings of Josiah Strong and stressed the moral duty to help those who were less fortunate. True imperialists, such as Hay, Lodge, and future army chief Leonard Wood, endorsed the racial stereotyping of Social Darwinism, and believed certain peoples would always be incapable of self-government. These views reflected the conclusions of Dewey, Sumner, and Croly, who believed that technology and business expansion were the basis of all progress.⁷⁰ Many important people, however, including Andrew Carnegie, Mark Twain, and William Jennings Bryan all remained opposed to any overseas expansion.

Britain urged Ambassador Hay to insist that McKinley retain the Philippines or give Britain first option in any future sale.⁷¹ Popular British author Rudyard Kipling also encouraged American expansion and wrote to Roosevelt, the Republican nominee for governor of New York:

I can't tell you how pleased I was to get your letter or how sorry to see that you are nominated for Governor this fall. Why not leave that sort of skittles to Bryan and Co. and go in for being a colonial administrator. God knows your country will need'em pretty bad in a few years Now go in and put all the weight of your influence into hanging on permanently to the whole of the Philippines. America has gone and stuck a pick-axe into the foundations of a rotten house and she is morally bound to build the house over again from the foundations⁷²

To examine all the issues related to the war McKinley established the Dodge Commission under Civil War veteran and railroad executive Grenville M. Dodge. The commission convened on September 24, 1898 and consisted of twelve Civil War veterans, many of whom were also successful businessmen. The commission conducted five months of hearings, which for a while, were followed closely by the press. The testimony of General Miles, which attacked the canned beef ration, caused the greatest public interest.⁷³ Miles cited evidence surreptitiously gathered by his friends, surgeon Major Daly and Lieut. Colonel M.P. Maus, at Camp Thomas, that the tinned beef ration was treated with boric acid, making it unhealthy for human consumption.⁷⁴ The allegations led to a separate inquiry into the beef ration, publicity in the newspapers for Miles, and the eventual court-martial of Commissary General Patrick Eagen. Eagen, a hot-tempered Irish immigrant, was enraged at the accusations levelled against his department. He was charged with conduct unbecoming of an officer before the Dodge Commission when he threatened to pour the contents of the camp latrine down Miles's throat. Corbin quietly recommended clemency for the Commissary General to McKinley, and Eagen was retired on full pay.⁷⁵ The claims made by Miles, later found to be untrue, were typical of the stratagems used by the Commanding General to promote himself as a presidential

candidate.⁷⁶ Miles emphasised other issues in later years to embarrass the incumbent administration and to promote his own political goals, which only complicated relations in the army high command.

In February, 1899 the Dodge Commission published its findings. It concluded that the failures in the staff system were caused by an inept management structure, which failed to provide contingency planning for future conflict. The Inspector General's Office was criticised for ignoring orders from the Secretary of War. Committee members were particularly concerned by one event on May 17, 1898, when in response to public pressure over the condition of army camps, Alger authorised an inspection. The order was ignored when Miles claimed the right to command inspections and countermanded the order by the Secretary. The resulting squabble over jurisdiction of command prevented the poor condition of many army camps from being reported.⁷⁷ Many Americans were most annoyed by the poor medical treatment given to wounded soldiers. The commission recommended the Medical Bureau be enlarged to deal with an army four times its regular peacetime strength.⁷⁸ Army supply bureaus were criticised for being unprepared and for failing to stockpile enough food, wagons, or money for soldier's pay.⁷⁹ The divided command structure of the army was noted by the committee, and the comments of General Schofield were published in the

report. The former Commanding General testified effective army command depended on his willingness to act as chief of staff to the secretary of war and president.⁸⁰

Many staff officers believed that the application of business values to the army would produce greater efficiency and this idea proved popular with a committee dominated by businessmen. The army signals chief, Brigadier General Adolphus Greely, recommended the amalgamation of the Inspector General's Department and Adjutant General's Office to promote efficiency and a centralised command. Greely further suggested the unification of all supply bureaus under business management principles.⁸¹ This suggestion which combined the Quartermaster's Department, Subsistence Department, Commissary Department and Pay Bureau was not surprisingly opposed by the members of those staff departments, but they also expressed their views in business terms. Commissary General Eagen cited a current industrial debate which highlighted the problems of placing too many functions in one department.⁸²

The eight-volume report of the Dodge Commission produced little immediate impact when published. Elihu Root, however, was a close friend of commission chairman Grenville Dodge. He later read the report, during his first year as secretary of war and used its conclusions when formulating his ideas on military reform.⁸³

The victory over Spain increased the army's military commitments. In Cuba and Puerto Rico the army was responsible for establishing civil administration including sanitation, education, and commerce. In the Philippines, the alliance between Filipino nationalists and the American army ended, when the Paris conference approved the American purchase of the islands. Fifty thousand Filipino nationalists began hostilities against the occupying American forces. The war quickly developed into a nasty guerrilla war that lasted over three years and caused more casualties than the Spanish-American War.⁸⁴ The Hull Bill, passed in 1898, established a larger army based on volunteers who were entitled to go home when peace was concluded with Spain. The new demands of civil administration in Cuba and Puerto Rico, emerging conflict in the Philippines, and manning of newly built coastal batteries all required a larger permanent army.

A bitter debate began in Congress on the need for creating such an army. The argument focused on those who favoured the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian principles of a locally controlled, volunteer force and those who proposed a professional force under central command, as championed by Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. Bryan in a speech to an enthusiastic crowd in Nebraska, took up the Democratic challenge:

Our People defended Cuba against foreign arms, now they must defend themselves and their country

against foreign ideas - the colonial idea of European nations. Heretofore greed has perverted the government and used its instrumental interference for private gain; but now the very fundamental principle of our government is being assaulted. The Imperialist idea was antagonistic to ideas and ideals cherished since the writing of the Declaration of Independence. We must refrain from entering a colonial policy or abandon the doctrine that governments receive their just powers from the consent of the governed. A house divided against itself cannot stand, this nation cannot endure half-republic and half-colony - half-free and half-vassal.⁸⁵

Lodge, Hay, Roosevelt and other Neo-Hamiltonian disciples utterly rejected these ideas. Influenced by Spencer's Social Darwinism, and Brooks Adams's economics, they demanded an efficient military to protect American overseas expansion. Colonial expansion was essential for continued economic growth and American prosperity.

Congress started prolonged hearings on the need for a larger army. These congressional hearings, and the wider political debate, focussed on the centralisation of political power. The argument highlighted the influence of business and the concepts of "professionalism" and "efficiency," in military reform. Quartermaster General M.I. Luddington testified that he opposed the unification of staff bureaus since, "this was an age of specialities," while Dr. Thomas N. Jamieson argued that a new Army Bureau of Pharmacy was required to recognise pharmaceutical expertise.⁸⁶ Commissary General Eagen underlined the influence of business analogies when, commenting on the amalgamation of supply bureaus, he stated: "Any

businessman if he stops to consider what ... the departments do will reach the same conclusion I have - that each has enough to do."⁸⁷

Adjutant General Corbin attacked amateur idealism and stressed the importance of professional training in the modern army.⁸⁸ Schofield again called for a general-in-chief appointed by the president to control staff bureaus and the army line. Such an officer, would act as chief adviser to the secretary of war and the president and would be politically accountable.⁸⁹ General Miles claiming Corbin and Alger planned to "Imperialise" the army, continued to defend the office of commanding general by citing the common belief that the military success of von Moltke, Grant, and others was due to their military autonomy from political constraints. Miles argued that a civilian secretary of war who held the post for an average of two years was incapable of grasping the intricacies of military management. The solution was to place all military administration under the commanding general.⁹⁰

McKinley despaired of getting any sweeping army reform accepted and eventually approved a measure calling for a larger army and ignoring the other problems. On March 2, 1899 an act entitled "Increasing the Efficiency of the Army" was passed by a partisan vote in Congress. The act authorised an army of 65,000 men and allowed the President to raise a further 35,000 volunteers, who would

remain in service until July, 1901. A few minor reforms were accepted as amendments to the act. An examination was established for new second lieutenants, and the number of major generals in the regular army was increased to three. The most significant reform was an extension of presidential power: the appointment of volunteer officers by the president, not the states.⁹¹

Increasingly concerned about public criticism of war management, McKinley was, however, reluctant to force either Miles or Alger to resign. He feared that any prominent resignation would implicate his administration in the military failures. Both men were also extremely influential. Miles had many friends in Congress, was related to the powerful Cameron family in Pennsylvania, and was a senior member in the important Civil War veterans association, The Grand Army of the Republic. Alger, the former governor of Michigan and business millionaire, enjoyed the friendship of many business leaders including Cornelius Vanderbilt.

In June 1899 however, Alger's senatorial ambitions became known. He allied himself with Michigan governor Hazen Pingree, a man openly critical of McKinley's policy in the Philippines. Unimpressed with Alger's war management, McKinley decided to ask for his resignation. On Sunday July 8, 1899 Vice President Garret A. Hobart visited Alger and delivered the President's decision. The

following day Alger resigned.⁹² He was at best only a passable administrator unable to handle the ambitious General Miles. Over-confident of the army's abilities, and unwilling to listen to professional advice, he was at least partly responsible for the military shambles in the war with Spain.

The army was now vastly different from when he took office. The regular army had increased three fold; senior officers John M. Wilson and Elwell S. Otis were proconsuls in Cuba and the Philippines; and the army was engaged in a large-scale guerrilla war in the Philippines. America had acquired an empire that included Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, and Pago Pago. In the army many fundamental flaws remained: the divided command structure, ineffective military education, promotion by strict seniority, poor inter-service cooperation, and a badly trained National Guard. In the words of Rudyard Kipling, however, some at least had learned a lesson:

Let us admit it fairly, as a business people
should,
We have had no end of a lesson: it will do us no end
of good.
It was our fault, and our very great fault - and now
we must turn it to use.
We have forty million reasons for failure, but not
a single excuse.
So the more we work and the less we talk the
better the results we shall get.
We have had an Imperial lesson. It may make us an
Empire yet!⁹³

CHAPTER TWO - END NOTES

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CHAPTER THREE
EARLY ARMY REFORM AND THE
ELECTION OF 1900

Debate on army reform was encouraged, both by the weaknesses that appeared in the American army in the Spanish-American War and by the new colonial responsibilities created by that war. Traditional American political philosophy promoted trust in a volunteer army with local political control and rejected the idea of military preparedness. Military reform, which proposed a strong central executive and large standing army, challenged these assumptions. Neo-Hamiltonian politicians endorsed this challenge, encouraged by their belief that increasing global competition for limited resources was inevitable. Abroad, the on-going guerrilla war in the Philippines and the Boxer Rebellion in China kept army reform at the centre of political debate. At home the enduring admiration for business and its organisational achievements ensured that corporate ideals would continue to influence the debate on military reform.

The new secretary of war, Elihu Root, faced a considerable challenge. Born in 1845, he had grown up in a world far removed from military service or its values. His grandfather, father, and brother were all teachers. Root taught briefly at two girls' schools after graduating from Hamilton College.¹ Root's only previous encounter with the

military came during the Civil War, when the army rejected him due to frail health. After raising some money from teaching, Root studied law and received a B.L. and M.A. from New York University Law School in 1867.² By the late 1890s Root had established himself both as a prominent New York lawyer and as a staunch Republican. His clients included New York City, the Sugar Trust, Consolidated Gas, six railroads and William M. Tweed, the important political boss of New York City. In 1879 he was defeated as the GOP candidate for judge on the court of common pleas, but in 1886 he was elected leader in his assembly district. A year later President Arthur appointed him U.S. district attorney for the Southern District of New York City. In this capacity he met Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. He was a member of the Bar Association and was President of both the Republican Club and the Union League Club in New York. In early 1899 he successfully defended Roosevelt in a tax fraud case.³ McKinley then offered Root the U.S. ambassadorship to Spain, which he refused, having no knowledge of Spanish.⁴

Some months later, the president decided to replace Alger as secretary of war. The new secretary was to be an experienced administrator and lawyer, able to deal with the legal problems involved in creating colonial government. The list of qualified candidates was soon reduced to three names.⁵ McKinley canvassed Adjutant

General Corbin, the new secretary of state John Hay, governor Roosevelt, and Root's friend, secretary of the interior Cornelius Bliss for their opinions. Corbin, Bliss, and Hay endorsed Root. Roosevelt supported the candidacy of General Francis V. Greene and privately wished himself to be considered.⁶ Despite the reservations of Roosevelt, McKinley offered the job to Root. Root at first refused saying: "Thank the President for me, but say it is quite absurd I know nothing about war, I know nothing about the army."⁷ The caller insisted Root reconsider because McKinley required a lawyer to handle colonial administration, not a military expert. The President called Root and appealed to his sense of duty and honour, ideals of great importance to a nineteenth-century professional gentleman, and convinced Root to accept.⁸ The choice of Root emphasised the low priority McKinley attached to military reform, and his unwillingness to accept the Neo-Hamiltonian vision of the world, which demanded an efficient military. Roosevelt, Lodge, and others were surprised by McKinley's choice and believed the appointment was designed to prevent military reform.⁹

Summoned by the President, Root arrived in Washington on the Congressional Limited from New York at 10.30 pm, Monday July 24, 1899. He went straight to the White House where McKinley and Corbin met him for the first time.¹⁰ As

he entered McKinley's office, Corbin saw a small trim man, with dark eyes, a wide forehead and small iron-grey moustache. He was wearing a light summer suit and a jaunty straw hat. McKinley greeted him as secretary of war.¹¹ A week later, on August 1, 1899 he was officially sworn in and spent that night in the Arlington Hotel with General Corbin.¹² Root was immediately confronted with problems both in colonial administration, and military organisation. The general public had a lively interest in military reform, encouraged by newspaper reports of military mistakes, the return of volunteer officers to politics at home, and the conclusions of the Dodge Commission. Root, accompanied by Corbin, set about familiarising himself with the War Department and its staff.

The War Department was in the executive building beside the White House. It was a large multi-storey, Victorian, grey stone building, which occupied a whole block. Corbin and the Secretary had connecting offices, while those of the commanding general and his staff were at the other end of the building. Initially Root tried to elicit the cooperation of General Miles, and the bureau chiefs, but only Corbin proved helpful.¹³ Corbin and Root quickly became friends, and the connecting door between their two offices was soon swinging constantly. Both men joined the active life fad, promoted by Roosevelt, Sumner,

and others, and they rode together each week-day evening and Sunday.¹⁴ Corbin introduced Root to Assistant Adjutant General Lieut. Colonel William H. Carter, who soon became Root's chief military adviser and friend.

Carter was a slight dapper man, with brown hair and a full moustache. He had a great interest in American military reform. Born in December 1850 in Brooklyn, he entered West Point in the early 1870's. The noted reformer Emory Upton was the school commandant. In the college he studied the ideas of Sherman, Schofield, Upton, and Hazen. His classmates included Arthur Wagner, Tasker Bliss, and Thomas H. Barry, officers later influential in army reform. After graduation Carter remained at West Point as a teacher in the department of tactics and joined Bliss who was assigned to teach languages. The new commandant was General Schofield. Throughout the 1880s Carter served with the 6th cavalry fighting Indians in Arizona, the Dakotas, and Wyoming. On Aug. 30, 1881 he won the Congressional Medal of Honour for retrieving the bodies of Captain E.C. Hentig and Private Bird while under heavy fire from Apache Indians. In the 1890s Carter was appointed an instructor at The Infantry and Cavalry School Fort Leavenworth, where Wagner and Swift were also teaching. In 1897 he was appointed major and assistant adjutant general on the recommendations of noted military reformer Brigadier General Theodore Schwan and Brigadier

General George Crook.¹⁵ Schwan, Wagner, and Carter drew up the legislation for the Act of March 2, 1899 which increased the regular army to 65,000 men, and mobilised 35,000 volunteers for two years. Carter was to become a valuable adviser to a secretary of war ignorant of army matters.¹⁶

Root's immediate problem was colonial administration. Major General John R. Brook, Brigadier General Leonard Wood, and Brigadier General William Ludlow were the leaders of colonial government in Cuba. Major General Elwell S. Otis was acting governor in the Philippines. In Cuba and Puerto Rico the army handled domestic government, overseas trade, and security. The Teller Amendment provided for Cuban independence, while Puerto Rico was to become an American colony. Cuban independence required the creation of tariff agreements on U.S.- Cuban trade and a legal agreement for a U.S. naval base at Guantanamo. While these issues involved Root, help from Charles Magoon, a legal expert appointed to the law offices in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, allowed Root time to study some of the problems of military administration.¹⁷

The efficiency of the army once more took on sudden urgency with the escalation of the conflict in the Philippines. On December 10, 1898 Spain had agreed to sell the islands to America. This was followed eleven days later by McKinley's speech calling for "benevolent

American assimilation" of the islands."¹⁸ Throughout January 1899, the Filipino leaders Emilio Aguinaldo, Pedro Paterno, and Apolinario Mabini protested against the American decision.¹⁹ Many Americans were appalled by this overt attempt to acquire empire, but the champions of anti-imperialism refused to act. William Jennings Bryan, the leading Democrat, allowed his obsession with reforming the Gold Standard, to distract him and his party from attacking this widely unpopular move to American imperialism. He wanted foreign policy matters settled quickly, so he could concentrate on domestic economics and the increasing power of business.²⁰ Anti-imperialists such as Andrew Carnegie and Mark Twain tried repeatedly to get Bryan to speak out against the Senate treaty which approved the annexation of the Philippines, but he ignored their requests, and the treaty passed the Senate on February 6, 1899 fifty-seven votes to twenty-seven: only one vote more than the necessary two-thirds majority.²¹

Two days before this vote, Major General Otis authorised an assault on the Filipino army outside Manila. Otis, who had replaced Merritt in August 1898 as commander of U.S. forces in the Philippines, regarded Filipinos as "rag-tag" inferiors and was determined to crush them before any political directive could stop him. A pompous, fussy, career soldier, he resented political interference from Washington. Archbishop Chapelle, the papal legate in

the Philippines, described him "as of about the right mental calibre to command a one-company post in Arizona."²² Throughout the spring of 1899, U.S. forces skirmished with the Filipino army. Even in January 1899, Private William Christner wrote home: "We killed a few to learn them a lesson and you bet they learned it."²³

In May 1899, Brigadier General Henry W. Lawton arrived with more troops to conduct an offensive in the Philippines. Lawton was a brave, eccentric individual. A Civil War veteran, and holder of the Congressional Medal of Honour, he had also captured the Indian leader Geronimo in 1886. In Cuba, he had served as a brigade commander and led the important attack on El Caney. Rewarded for his leadership in the Spanish-American War, he was made Governor of Santiago, only to be sent home in disgrace after a six-day drinking spree. He arrived in Manila wearing a British pith helmet and a bright yellow scarf, which he wore on all subsequent campaigns.²⁴

When Root took office Otis, Lawton, and Major General Arthur MacArthur had apparently routed the Filipino army; killing over 3,000 Filipino soldiers at a cost of only sixty American lives.²⁵ Aguinaldo, the main Filipino leader, however, instructed his forces to disperse and begin guerrilla warfare against the American forces. In Washington D.C., Root supported the acquisition of the islands and was confident of quick success. Throughout the

autumn he read widely on British colonial policy as he considered how best to govern the new colonies. Root, like Hay, Lodge, and Wood, regarded British imperial ideas as successful and worth copying.²⁶ Secretary Root encouraged Otis to give selected journalists greater access to military information, especially those from Hearst's papers, as they supported annexation of the Philippines.²⁷

Root and his expansionist colleagues enjoyed good relations with British officials and were increasingly suspicious of Germany. On September 2, 1899 Roosevelt introduced Root to the British military attache Colonel Arthur Lee, who accompanied Roosevelt during his time in Cuba. Lee and Roosevelt were good friends and remained so throughout their future careers. Root dined frequently with Lee and the British Ambassador Lord Pauncefoot.²⁸ The secretary of war read and appreciated Kipling, and, in a memo to the secretary of state, indicated his support for British intervention in Egypt.²⁹ In contrast, he and other senior Republicans were alarmed by any rumoured German expansion in the Caribbean or Pacific. This unease over German intentions was encouraged both by British and by German actions. In 1898 Count Hatzfeldt the German ambassador in London, approached the then American ambassador John Hay and demanded German coaling stations in the Pacific in return for German recognition of the American annexation of Hawaii. This action encouraged

Hay's suspicion of German intentions, already cultivated by the British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring-Rice.³⁰ In late 1899, a memo on the Philippines authorised by the president, discussed the problems caused by guerrilla warfare and possible German intervention. The report circulated among senior members of the cabinet and concluded that control of the islands was being contested by Spain, Filipino nationalists, Germany, and the United States. Summing up the international situation it stated:

.... The situation is further complicated by the semi-hostile attitude of Germany, which has maintained an unnecessarily large naval force in front of Manila for the last five months, the officers of which have on many occasions shown their disposition to embarrass and thwart the United States It is not probable that Britain will permit the Philippines to go to any of her rivals except ourselves. She has her own reasons, looking to the future, for allowing us to keep without objection, what our own arms and resources have won. (Hence the U.S., in the face of guerrilla opposition, has to hold the islands itself).³¹

The delicate diplomatic situation was underlined by the actions of Captain Chichester R.N. He placed his three ships between Manila and a German squadron commanded by Vice Admiral von Diederichs, which seemed determined to seize an island for Germany.³²

The international situation encouraged Lodge, Hay, Root, and other Neo-Hamiltonians to press for further colonial expansion and military reform. American victory over Spain had made isolationism irrelevant. For expansionist Republicans the issue was: would America play

its new international role well, or badly? Neo-Hamiltonian supporters argued that industrial growth and overseas expansion were evidence of American ingenuity and superiority.

Root was a notable corporate lawyer and participant in the remarkable success of American business. During his early life, the value of internal American commerce increased from \$2 billion, in 1850, to \$18 billion by 1900; exports rose from \$17 million to \$435 million; railroad mileage, just 9,000 miles in 1850, reached 194,000 miles in 1900; and coal production increased from three million tons to 240 million tons over the same period.³³ Root defended corporate amalgamation and believed in it explicitly. In an address by Mr. F.B. Thurber he underlined the following passage:

Not less foolish is our attitude towards the organization of industry known as "trusts." With the advent of the powers which now control the world, steam, electricity and machinery, came the organization of industry, because these great forces could only be economically handled in large units and so "corporations" These to promote economy and efficiency have been consolidated into larger organizations known as "Trusts." It has been popular to oppose and denounce these organizations, but it is safe to say that corporations and "trusts" have been an important element in the rapid development of our country, and to them we must look for the continuance of progress.³⁴

These ideas were an anathema to followers of Bryan and challenged Jeffersonian-Jacksonian ideals of an agrarian democracy. Root, Hay, Roosevelt, and others

regarded business boards served by professional advice as the appropriate blueprint for efficient government. In foreign policy and defence this system was essential to defend both the United States and its overseas interests against European and Japanese competition. Senator Lodge, in a speech before Congress, pledged his support for a policy of creating American economic superiority to preserve political independence. He warned of the competition America faced in implementing such a policy: "But does anyone suppose they like it? They are gasping for breath in all parts of Europe we occupy a great position economically. We are marching to a still greater one ... but, dazzled by its splendour, do not forget its perils."³⁵

Commercial expansion encouraged the development of professionalism, the ideal of efficiency, and overseas expansion. Middle-ranking officers interested in military reform were inspired by the apparent success of business organisation and sought to achieve the same efficiency in the army. Lieut. Colonel Carter outlined the analogy between successful business and hoped-for army reforms when he wrote:

In our early history, when railroads were constructed with a view to uniting adjacent towns, they needed honest management and technical skill; but when they were merged into great systems controlling thousands of miles of track, and dependent upon the freights from distant territory ... it was no longer enough that they should

posses skilled engineers and accountants, but it became necessary that they be controlled by directors - groups of men whose principal work was to observe rival lines, to consider state and local laws and to prepare the system to derive all possible advantage from future growth of contiguous territory. The duties of these vast corporations are very nearly akin to those of the proposed General Staff of the Army The business of the War Department, which in proportion exceeds that of many of the largest trusts or corporations of the world combined, is managed upon an entirely different plan from that pursued in any private concern.³⁶

Within the army there were many people who opposed military reform. The National Guard, based on volunteerism and provincial command, and middle-ranking regular army officers, who had waited years for promotion by strict rules of seniority, opposed most reforms. In service journals militia officers stoutly defended the locally recruited volunteer and warned darkly against the military professionalism of "Hessian and other continental monarchies" and the army of the, "hired assassin stamp," which would destroy American liberty.³⁷ Few National Guard officers supported the opinions of Iowa National Guard Colonel, J.G. Gilchrist, who described the Guard as having weak staff organisation, poor commanding officers, meagre training, and piteous equipment.³⁸

The controversy over military reform and the new colonial problems of America gave the new secretary of war much to do. Root gained a further problem when he fell out with General Miles. In mid-August 1899 operations against guerrillas in the Philippines required the construction

and manning of many posts.³⁹ To provide officers for these new commands, Root wrote to retired General Francis Greene, Governor Roosevelt, Corbin, and Miles asking them to recommend able officers for the new positions available.⁴⁰ Miles recommended promotion by strict seniority. The following day the whole story of officer selection appeared in national papers. Root believed Miles leaked the story to the press. He never trusted Miles again and attempted to isolate him from the army.⁴¹

The failure of the army to secure a quick victory in the Philippines worried Root and the administration. The American commanders of the campaign, Otis and MacArthur, consistently denied they needed more troops, despite inquiries from Root and the War Department. MacArthur, frustrated by the lack of success against poorly equipped natives, turned to technology for a solution. Armoured trains, naval artillery, Gatling guns, and a fire engine, adapted to spray petroleum on villages, were all introduced with little effect.⁴² The war became increasingly vicious, and one private wrote home describing retribution inflicted on one area after an American soldier was killed and disembowelled:

"Immediately orders were received from General Wheaton [Maj. Gen. Lloyd Wheaton] to burn and kill every native in sight; which was done to the finish. About 1,000 men, women, and children were reported killed."⁴³ Each side

ruthlessly retaliated to each new atrocity. American troops were buried alive in ant-hills, decapitated, and castrated, while Filipino nationalists lost their lives, homes, and livestock in ever increasing numbers.

In America, Senator Carl Schurz, appalled at the continued violence, established an Anti-Imperial League. Mark Twain, William Dean Howells, Illinois Governor John Altgeld, William Jennings Bryan, and Andrew Carnegie all became prominent members. In response to one reported set of casualty figures, Carnegie wrote caustically to Republican Whitelaw Reid: "... it is a matter of congratulations, however, that you seem to have about finished your work civilising the Filipinos. It is thought that about 8,000 of them have been completely civilised and sent to heaven. I hope you like it."⁴⁴ McKinley and his administration were increasingly worried both by the failure to end the war and the increased public support for anti-Imperialism. The President, disillusioned with Otis, decided to send more troops to the Philippines. By the end of October 1899 U.S. forces occupied only 117 square miles on the main island of Luzon. Hundreds of islands, encompassing 115,000 square miles of land remained unconquered.⁴⁵

Throughout October Root worked long hours to complete his first report as secretary of war. Published in November, it recommended systematic military planning for

any eventuality, promotion by merit, posting of line officers to all staff bureaus except the Medical Department for five year periods, inter-service cooperation, and creation of a war college to educate bright officers.⁴⁶ The war college would be governed by a board of senior officers appointed for fixed terms by the president. Military information division records, and reports by military attaches, would be placed at the disposal of the college. The college would supervise the other army service colleges, coordinate all army education, and educate the brightest service school graduates. Root urged Congress to set aside \$20,000 to fund work on the new college.⁴⁷

Predictably Democratic congressmen, national guardsmen, state politicians, and middle-ranking officers, opposed Root's program. The Secretary, however, remained determined to centralise army command and place the state militias firmly under federal control.

Root realised any interference with the National Guard would be unpopular, and he astutely left plans to federalise the militia to a separate committee. Roosevelt, always willing to promote military reform, suggested that "General" Daniel Butterfield of the New York National Guard to chair the contentious committee on militia reform. A nine-man committee was established including six National Guard officers. Army Colonel A.L. Mills and legal

adviser, deputy Judge-Advocate General Lieutenant-colonel George B. Davis joined Butterfield as committee members.

The committee legislation provided for 100,000 locally trained militia under federal command in time of war.⁴⁸ Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans remained unhappy with this compromise. They wanted complete central government control over the militia. Root's proposals received support from governor Roosevelt, secretary of state Hay, and the few professional officers interested in reform. In the Senate, Lodge, Proctor, Beveridge, and Military Affairs Committee Chairman Joseph B. Hawley congratulated Root on a great report.⁴⁹ Proctor, a former secretary of war, and currently the senior senator from Vermont was most enthusiastic. Root, aware of Proctor's strong business connections in Vermont, qualified his praise stating: "The only trouble with Proctor was that he wanted everything built out of Vermont marble."⁵⁰ Hawley, the senior senator from Connecticut, was a close friend to Root. He supported the creation of a strong central government and, like Root, had attended Hamilton College.⁵¹

Despite powerful support, Root faced considerable opposition as well. Many congressmen were annoyed at Neo-Hamiltonian support for the British position in the Boer War and the failure to end the conflict in the Philippines. They attacked ideas of colonial expansion and

military reform as un-American. With an election due in 1900, many Republican congressmen remained reluctant to support contentious proposals for military reform. Nonetheless Root pressed on. He instructed Brigadier General Theodore Schwan and Carter to draft legislation for an army bill to be presented in 1900. Carter, ever enthusiastic, proposed legislation to create a general staff structure. Root, aware of congressional opposition, remained more cautious. A novice on ideas of military organisation, he wished to study Carter's plans in detail. Distracted by the need to address the problems of colonial administration in Cuba and Puerto Rico and the on-going war in the Philippines, he lacked the time and political will to endorse fully Carter's ideas.⁵²

In Cuba the military leadership was influenced by the evangelical ideas of Josiah Strong and Kipling's concept of the "White Man's Burden." A program of social improvements was initiated. The overall commander in Cuba, Major General John R. Brook, was less enthusiastic in implementing social reforms than his two deputies Leonard Wood and William Ludlow. Root invited all three to Washington D.C. to discuss social and political reform in Cuba. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans expected to transform their new colonial empire into a set of states which endorsed multi-party democracy and free trade. These two reforms they believed were essential to provide the

political stability and expanding markets to benefit U.S. business.

Root was impressed with the enthusiasm which Wood and Ludlow had for their task. He was less impressed with Brooke. The old major general refused to mingle with "inferior" natives and displayed no interest in social or industrial reform. In contrast, Ludlow as governor of Havana had established food centres to avert famine, which fed 20,000 people daily. Streets were cleaned regularly to prevent disease, a new sewage plant was planned, street lighting was installed and a new bacteriological laboratory was created to study tropical disease.⁵³ Wood, as governor of Santiago, promoted sanitation projects, education, and extensive harbour improvements to improve trade. Wood summed up their achievement: "The stagnant pools and dirt in streets had disappeared. Houses no longer discharged effluent onto the streets and disease such as yellow fever declined dramatically."⁵⁴ The decline in yellow fever was used as further evidence to support American involvement overseas. The gulf coast of America was frequently infected with the disease from Cuba. A reduction in the incidence of the disease in Cuba reduced the chance of infection in America.

Disappointed by Brooke's attitude, Root recommended that he be replaced. McKinley favoured Ludlow, but Roosevelt intervened and in early December Wood was

promoted to major general of volunteers and governor of Cuba. Root, toasting Wood's promotion, underlined the importance of civic and economic reform to Neo-Hamiltonians stating:

I am prouder of Wood in Santiago and Wilson in Mantanzas and Ludlow in Havana, cleaning the streets and disinfecting the pestholes and teaching the elements of civic government; teaching them how to go back to work, to earn their living; teaching them to become self-governing citizens of a free state, than I ever could be of a hero on the ramparts amid the hail of shot⁵⁵

Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans agreed with Josiah Strong that America had a moral duty to help those states less fortunate than the Republic. Of greater importance, however, was the establishment of an American claim to the limited natural resources and economic markets provided by the world. Military success in the Philippines was essential to secure a share in the important Pacific market.

In the Philippines Brigadier General Samuel Young and Brigadier General Lawton almost captured the guerrilla leader Aguinaldo. Otis disliked both Young and Lawton, and, before his rivals returned, he claimed all the credit for their mission. He announced that Aguinaldo's family had been seized and that the war was over. Unfortunately for Otis the war continued and his premature announcement, which had raised hopes in Washington, became another source of irritation between the administration and the

General. On December 18 Lawton died while helping wounded men to escape enemy fire. The hero who had captured Geronimo was shot by a Filipino rifleman named Lucerio Geronimo. Much to the annoyance of Root, the end of the war seemed no closer.⁵⁶

In South Africa war broke out between the British and Boer farmers. The British were confident of success, a view shared by pro-British Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. Unfortunately the Boer War, which lasted for over three years, exposed the same organisational problems in the British army as existed in the American army. The political support provided by Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans to the British in South Africa increased the opposition in Congress to military reform and overseas expansion. Root, Hay, and others hoped for a swift British victory, but, as in the Philippines, they were to be disappointed. The inefficient British staff system and poor training caused initial disaster and defeat.⁵⁷ At Magersfontein on December 1, 1899 poor staff work was responsible for 968 casualties in the Highland Brigade, when they were shelled by their own artillery.⁵⁸ The weaknesses exposed in Anglo-American armies in the Spanish-American War and Boer War, produced closer collaboration between the two states on military reform.

Military difficulties in the Philippines and South Africa provided opponents of Anglo-American imperialism in

America with evidence that it was a failure, un-American and pro British. Irish and German political lobbies attacked McKinley's tacit support for Britain. Bryan denounced Anglo-American imperialism and upheld the virtue of the democratic, Jeffersonian, republic. In a speech to Congress he explained the dangers of imperialism:

.... After a century and a half of English domination in India, less than one twentieth of one per cent of the people of India are of English birth, and it requires an army of seventy thousand British soldiers to take care of the tax collectors.... A colonial policy means that we shall send to the Philippine Islands a few traders, a few taskmasters and a few office-holders and an army large enough to support the authority of a small fraction of the people while they rule the natives....⁵⁹

Roosevelt, Root, and Hay were furious at criticism of what they regarded as the essential expansion of commerce. Hay angrily wrote to Whitelaw Reid that Bryan was "a halfbacked glib little briefless jack-leg lawyer," grasping for power.⁶⁰ Lodge reminded the Senate that Britain supported the American desire for free trade in China and the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt vilified Bryan and dismissed his ideas claiming that those who opposed British imperialism invariably disputed the American right to intervene in the Caribbean and Pacific.⁶¹ Secretary of State Hay attempted to prevent South African President Kruger from visiting America. Commenting on the request to Lodge he wrote: "The Boer women and children are in the concentration camps simply because their husbands and

brothers want them there, and as to the war ... it will stop the instant Botha and deWet wish it to stop."⁶²

Despite British set-backs in South Africa, Republican desires for free trade and overseas expansion encouraged the adoption of a pro-British stance. Increasingly many Republicans recognised that the two countries had common interests.

Root entered the new year determined to get some army reforms approved. His main goals, however, were to learn more about army organisation and gain greater support for the concept of military reform. During the autumn, Carter had provided Root with a copy of Upton's book, The Armies of Asia and Europe. The text gave Root a survey of foreign military organisations and exposed him to the ideas of Upton, one of the most influential late nineteenth-century army thinkers. When he discovered the book was out of print he ordered a new edition. To promote awareness of the need for military reform, he had it distributed to all army posts and major newspapers. Root found the book invaluable stating: "it gave me the detail on which I could base my recommendations and overcome my ignorance as a civilian."⁶³ The secretary of war gained further insight from the eight-volume Dodge Commission Report on the Spanish-American War. Root was friends with the chief author of the report, and to gather even more information on military reform Root authorised the creation of a board

to study army reform.⁶⁴ The chairman was Brigadier General William Ludlow. Ludlow had impressed Root with his program of civil works in Cuba. Unfortunately, the governor of Havana had closed two anti-American newspapers in the city: La Lucha and El Cubano. This act angered local people and involved Ludlow in an unseemly argument over press censorship. Root recalled the Governor to Washington D.C. and offered him the opportunity to chair the board on army reform.⁶⁵ Ludlow accepted the appointment.

Ludlow graduated from West Point in 1864. A qualified engineer, he served with distinction as chief engineer in 20th corps of the Army of the Cumberland and later as chief engineer for General Sherman. In one twenty-six day period, his command built thirty-seven trestle and pontoon bridges and mapped over 1,700 miles of road.⁶⁶ After the Civil War he spent the next three decades working on army civil engineering projects. He worked on harbour improvements in New York and Baltimore, constructed sea-coast defences at Staten Island and Charleston S.C., and built new water and sewage works in Washington D.C. and Philadelphia.⁶⁷ He fought hard against machine politics and was well liked by social reformers. Arriving in Philadelphia in February 1883, he confronted scheming speculators, hoping to benefit from the new water works contract. One contractor entered Ludlow's office and quietly laid a \$50 bill upon his desk. The general slowly

picked it up, rolled it like a reefer, held it to a gas jet and lit his cigar.⁶⁸ In 1894 he was posted to Great Britain as the U.S. military attache where he served for two years. While in London he came into contact with the British military reformer Spencer Wilkinson, the first Chichele Professor of War, at Oxford University. Ludlow forwarded a considerable number of newspaper cuttings, articles, and books on military affairs to the Military Information Division in Washington. On April 18, 1896 he forwarded Wilkinson's work, The Brain of the Army, which provided new insight into how to create an efficient, German-style army, while maintaining democratic control.⁶⁹ The text would become highly influential both among British and American military reformers.

The other members of the Ludlow Board were Joseph P. Sanger and Henry C. Hasbrouck. Colonel Sanger was well acquainted with military reformers and their ideas. He was a Civil War veteran, honour graduate of the artillery school in 1868 and former professor of military science at Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine. He had accompanied Upton on his world tour, when they inspected the armies of the world, and was an aide and military secretary to Lieutenant General Schofield for fourteen years.⁷⁰ The other committee member was Colonel Henry C. Hasbrouck. A graduate of West Point, he served as assistant professor of natural and experimental philosophy at West Point

between 1863-1865. He spent the 1870s fighting Indians in the West. In the 1880s he was appointed commandant of West Point and in 1892 became the director of the artillery school at Fort Monroe.⁷¹ All three officers, like most army reformers, enjoyed a military career of education and travel, unlike most of their colleagues. The three officers were instructed by Root and Corbin to make preliminary recommendations on the creation of a war college. Lieutenant Colonel Carter, Root's chief military adviser, was appointed secretary to the board.⁷²

Congressional debate on the army bill proposed by Root began in February 1900. The legislation recommended interchangeable staff and field appointments for army officers. Permanent staff appointments, except in the Medical Bureau, were to be abolished. In an attempt to extend executive authority over the army, all bureau chiefs would be appointed for fixed terms determined by the president. A \$20,000 appropriation for a new war college was proposed. Carter, despite his duties with the Ludlow Board, attended all the hearings with Root. Corbin testified supporting the suggested reforms. The other bureau chiefs mostly opposed reform. Paymaster-General Alfred E. Bates supported the removal of permanent staff appointments but opposed other reforms.⁷³ Chief of Engineers John M. Wilson, Chief of the Records and Pensions Department Fred C. Ainsworth, Judge-Advocate

General G. Norman Lieber, and Inspector General John C. Breckinridge opposed all army reform.⁷⁴ In the Senate, Redfield Proctor and Francis Cockrell introduced amendments to support Root. They cited the success of the American navy in the Spanish-American War, which already had staff-line interchange, a war college, and amalgamated staff departments.⁷⁵ The amendments were voted down. General Nelson Miles, the commanding general of the army, testified in favour of many of the reforms. As he pointed out that he had recommended staff-line interchange and an expansion in formal army education when he became commanding general in 1895. Miles warned Congress that the increase in the regular army, from 24,000 to 65,000 men approved until July 1901, would have to be extended. Garrison forces were required in Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines. Miles reminded Congress that it had increased the demands upon army manpower through its coastal defence policy.⁷⁶ Carter reported that only forty-three out of seventy-five new coastal forts were even partially manned. The installations, built due to public pressure in the Spanish-American War, had cost over \$100 million dollars. Without 18,000 new troops to maintain these defences, Carter predicted they would rapidly deteriorate and be useless in any future conflict.⁷⁷

The proposed military reforms and congressional debate were influenced both by British military thinking and American business principles. German military ideas played only a minor role; only the proposed war college owed its existence to German military thinking. The two most contentious issues, the abolition of permanent staff appointments and promotion by merit, were inspired by the example of the British army. Upton in his influential The Armies of Asia and Europe described how British staff officers were required to serve in the field after a five-year appointment in the staff.⁷⁸ Root and Carter, familiar with Upton's work, recommended a four-year detail to coincide with the American electoral process. Brigadier General Theodore Schwan, a recognised expert on the German army, denied Germany had any meaningful staff-line interchange. Once admitted to the army staff, only extremely incompetent officers were removed. There was no institutionalised length of staff service followed by a period of service in the field. Schwan also wrote that most regular army appointments were by seniority.⁷⁹ These ideas influenced Root and Carter and their proposed bill. Relying on the work of Upton and Schwan, they used the British example in planning staff-line interchange.

The language of those who opposed and endorsed military reform regularly included references to American business. General Greely, chief of army signals, argued against the proposed detail system and cited the views of

the American Institute of Electrical Engineers to support his position:

Certainly no man can become an electrical expert by the simple detail of four years. The present system embodies the principle that has enabled American corporations such as the Pennsylvania Railway, New York Central Railway, the Westinghouse, the General Electric and other companies to train bodies of scientific experts who have placed national interests in the van.⁸⁰

Ideas of "professionalism" and "efficiency" dominated the debate on military reform. Both concepts were strongly associated with corporate success. Unfortunately, supporters and opponents of army reform sought to apply professionalism in different ways. Bureau chiefs regarded professionalism as a vindication of their autonomous position within the army, while supporters of reform thought professionalism required improved military training for the whole army. This debate on how to achieve professionalism in the army hindered progress on military reform. The drive for professionalism had inspired new military associations. In the late nineteenth century the cavalry, artillery, and infantry, all established associations with their own membership standards and journals. The proposal to establish a war college, which promised tougher educational standards, appealed to those determined to encourage professionalism in the whole army. Professionalism created efficiency according to army reformers, both by providing a trained army, and supplying educated advice to government.

The professional idea, however, hindered army reform by encouraging further fragmentation in the army staff. Bureau chiefs, opposed to reform, stressed that staff specialisation required knowledge achieved only by continued staff service. The creation of further staff bureaus was promoted by veterinarians and pharmacists who demanded professional recognition.⁸¹ Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans rejected these views, which threatened greater autonomous specialisation, and undermined their desire for greater central planning and control. In a rare victory for army reform, Root was able to block the creation of two new staff bureaus for veterinarians and pharmacists. Record and Pension Chief Fred C. Ainsworth demonstrated the manipulation of the professional idea by staff officers when he spoke before congress:

This is an age of specialities in all professions, the military as well as the legal and the medical, and that there is no man who can hope to be proficient in all branches of any profession; that it takes a lifetime of devotion to any one branch to make a man master of all its details; and that no good would come of half educating a comparatively small number of the line officers of the Army by detailing them ... for four years and then sending them back to the line.

In response to further questioning he bluntly concluded:

"It would mean incomplete education of a small portion of officers of the line and utter demoralisation of staff departments."⁸²

The congressional argument on military reform continued unabated. Republican party managers became increasingly concerned that the party was promoting unpopular military reform. The presidential election was only five months away. McKinley, under pressure to act, instructed House Speaker David B. Henderson to limit debate on military reform. Henderson agreed and promised to re-introduce personally an army reform bill in the new congress.⁸³ The continued inability of the army to end the war in the Philippines and Republican support for the British in the Boer War worried Republican Party supporters.

The Democrats decided to make the American annexation of the Philippines a major election issue. Encouraged by Bryan, German-Americans opposed to militarism and Irish-Americans opposed to Britain announced their overwhelming support for the Democratic Party. In a speech at the New York Academy of Music, the "Irish Joan of Arc," Maude Conne, denounced Britain as "the robber nation of the world. Hence it matters not what nation England is at war with, right or wrong, it is Ireland's duty to oppose."⁸⁴ Confronted with growing public annoyance over American foreign and defence policy, both McKinley and Root were desperate for victory in the Philippines. The President decided to relieve General Otis and appoint a civilian governor-general in the Philippines. In late April 1900,

it was announced that, after twenty-one months in command, Otis had "earned a rest."⁸⁵ Major General Arthur MacArthur replaced Otis, and William Howard Taft became the new civilian governor.

Taft, a graduate of Yale and Cincinnati Law School, was reluctant to accept the appointment. A former solicitor-general of the United States and federal circuit court judge, he really wanted an appointment to the Supreme Court.⁸⁶ A stout fellow who had never served in the army, he hated killing things and was at best a reluctant imperialist. Surprisingly, Root thought him the ideal choice.⁸⁷ Taft hesitated but accepted, when McKinley promised him a future appointment to the Supreme Court. Root appealed to his sense of honour and duty ideas of importance to upper-middle-class gentlemen.⁸⁸ In May 1900 Taft accepted and set sail for the Philippines with the new civil commission.

Despite the public opposition to military reform and imperialism, Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans persisted in supporting these ideas. Roosevelt, Hay, Root, Croly, Henry Adams, and others were convinced that international politics and trade were dominated by national self-interest. In such a world conflict over limited markets and resources made war certain. The most efficient response was "military preparedness." Popular among Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, this philosophy gained increasing

support within the entire party. Events abroad seemed to provide overwhelming evidence to support this view. In the Philippines the continued presence of a German fleet provoked concerns over both a possible German invasion and possible aid for the Filipino rebels.⁸⁹ In May 1900, The New York Times worried over the future of the relatively unimportant Danish West Indies. The paper caused considerable alarm among Republicans when it speculated the islands might be purchased by Germany.⁹⁰ The Commercial Bulletin of Boston, summarised the fears of Root and others in a May editorial:

Now nobody desires or is seeking war with Germany. At the same time it is silly to close our eyes to the fact that we are rivals. If any person doubts what German feeling for this country is, he has only to look at German caricatures and editorial articles, which though not insulting to the United States ... are nevertheless hostile For a quarter of a century Germany has tabooed our provisions, made war on our trade, counterfeited our goods in foreign markets, and furnished guns and cartridges to our enemies. She has not threatened war, but she has been a strong and active commercial rival.

The performances of the German vessels in Manila Bay are one evidence of her attitude. Over her great marine exhibit in Paris is the motto, "Our future lies on the sea." Everywhere in Samoa, among the Cameroons, Germany is seeking expansion.

The article concluded with a call to arm: "We certainly do not want war with Germany or any foreign power. We as certainly cannot prevent encroachment by stripping ourselves of defence."⁹¹

Events in China added to Neo-Hamiltonian concern. In the summer of 1900 two German missionaries were killed in Shandang. The German authorities retaliated by burning two Chinese villages, an act that provoked the Boxer Rebellion by northern Chinese against foreign intervention in their country. The Boxers besieged the American and various European legations in Beijing.⁹² In early July Brigadier General Adna Chaffee and a U.S. force dispatched from the Philippines joined the Western relief efforts of Russia, Japan, France, Britain, and Germany under Count von Waldersee, the German commander.⁹³ For the Neo-Hamiltonians the international events of 1900 only confirmed the need for military reform.

Despite the coming election, Root continued to encourage military reform. In late July he instructed Corbin to send letters to all general officers and regimental colonels for their views.⁹⁴ The replies arrived throughout the autumn of 1900. Of the eight regular army general officers only Major General Miles and Brigadier General Joseph Wheeler did not reply. Ten of the eighteen volunteer general officers replied, but only fourteen of forty-two regimental colonels forwarded their opinions. The views expressed did little to encourage the supporters of reform. The only point of consensus was the need for a larger army. Bureau chiefs remained implacably opposed to all reform and the replies from line officers only confirmed the widespread ignorance and apathy.⁹⁵ The

secretary of war was thoroughly discouraged, and his misery increased when in September he contracted influenza and colic.⁹⁶

A month later the Ludlow Board presented its report. Ludlow spent considerable time in Britain and Germany studying the military command structures there. Sanger, another member of the board, visited Switzerland to observe the mobilisation of its reserves.⁹⁷ In London Ludlow contacted the noted military thinker Spencer Wilkinson and picked up a copy of Wilkinson's most recent work, the Brain of the Army. Ludlow took the book to Germany, read it, and on his return to Britain, eagerly sought out Wilkinson again, and discussed military reform well into the night. Finally, Ludlow asked Wilkinson why he did not awaken Britain to its own military realities. Wilkinson replied that citizens in a democracy were more interested in domestic politics. Ludlow agreed but added, "We also have a democracy in America, but you have something here we haven't got," "What's that?" Wilkinson asked. "Stupidity at the top, all the way around," came the reply.⁹⁸ Wilkinson's work described how an efficient German military structure could be established without threatening democratic political control. He recognised that Germany had the most effective army but, with the death of Bismarck, was now operating without civilian political control. In a democracy such military freedom remained unacceptable.⁹⁹

While Ludlow went to Germany, Sanger went to Switzerland. Switzerland attracted attention because it was a republic with locally organised reserves. The reserve forces were better trained and equipped than the National Guard. The Swiss government could mobilise several hundred thousand militia in twenty-four hours, an impossible task for the American army.¹⁰⁰

In October 1900 the Ludlow Board reconvened in Washington D.C. to present a memorandum to Root that suggested executive action. The board proposed an army war college headed by a general officer, with the necessary assistants, all with four-year, fixed-term appointments. The war college would coordinate and provide a unified army education system and provide advanced learning for selected officers. Fort Leavenworth, the Cavalry and Infantry School would provide all practical training with large military formations. The board warned Root that a war college was no substitute for a general staff. Both institutions were required for an efficient military.¹⁰¹ In a separate meeting Ludlow presented his ideas and a copy of Wilkinson's Brain of the Army to the Secretary of War. Root read Wilkinson's book and was greatly influenced by it, but for now no action was taken on the recommendations of the Ludlow Board with the presidential election only weeks away.¹⁰²

The ongoing war in the Philippines and British blunders in South Africa continued to give Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans domestic political problems. In the Philippines they awaited the arrival of Taft and his fellow commissioners. Taft was joined by Henry C. Ide, a New England lawyer and former Chief Justice of Samoa; Professor Dean C. Worcester, a zoologist from the University of Michigan; and historian Bernard Moses from the University of California. This eminent group sailed first to Japan where it had an audience with the emperor and left convinced of Japanese friendship towards America. The party enjoyed several days of sightseeing and visited the temples at Nikko, high in the mountains. Taft described the trip to his brother, made more difficult by his weight, now close to 300 pounds:¹⁰³

.... The road was steep and got steeper. I had one pusher in addition to the jinrikisha man, [jinrikisha a small light weight two wheeled passenger vehicle], when I began, another joined when we were halfway up, and it seemed to me that [when] we struck the last hill the whole village was engaged in the push. The Japanese seemed to look upon me with great amusement; at the various places we changed cars there were a great number of people clattering along on their wooden platforms which they used as shoes, and they gathered about me, smiling and enjoying the prospect of so much flesh and size....¹⁰⁴

When the Commission finally arrived in Manila, they received a cool reception from the army high command. MacArthur, the military commander, resented civilian interference in the islands and so failed to greet them at

the pier and assigned the commission only one room for an office. Relations did not improve when Taft criticised heavy-handed military operations and suggested cooperation with the natives.

In America McKinley and Root were further discouraged as the anti-imperialist movement gained support in the South. Senator Daniels from Virginia and E.L. Godkin attacked imperial expansion which threatened a "witches' cauldron of inter racial friction between Blacks, Asians, and Anglo-Saxons."¹⁰⁵ The increasing political opposition to imperialism among previously sympathetic groups increased the pressure on MacArthur to achieve victory. The army was angry at Taft's conversations with "the little brown brothers" and pressed Root to approve more vigorous measures. MacArthur, without waiting for approval from Washington, ordered the execution of Filipino prisoners in retaliation for atrocities committed against U.S. forces. Taft was furious, and his anger reached a new level when MacArthur gave the former judge, who prided himself on his legal knowledge, a lecture on the constitution. Taft wrote caustically to Root that it was not often the constitution was used to maintain the absolute power of a subordinate military commander against presidential orders.¹⁰⁶ The administration angered by this civil-military bickering ordered MacArthur to cooperate with Taft.

At home the Republican Party reaffirmed support for overseas expansion, despite increased support for Bryan among Southern Democrats, Irish-Americans, and German-Americans. Secretary of State James Hay sought advice from British imperialist James Bryce on how to govern the Philippines.¹⁰⁷ Hay was convinced that a Franco-German plot existed to undermine the Anglo-Saxon desire for free trade.¹⁰⁸ Root, Lodge, and other Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans continued to endorse a philosophy of competitive natural selection, evangelical good works, and free trade. In Chicago, Bishop Bowler, summed up the pre-election mood of these expansionist Republicans:

Expansion is the law of Saxon life. When he accepted individual accountability directly to God without intervention of any man, then God gave him self-reliance and sent him about the job of saving the world. Mrs Partington with her broom trying to sweep back the tide of the ocean is more certain to win than the men who stake their success fighting expansion; for they are fighting not merely McKinley, and the Rough Rider and the American People, but they are also fighting the restless force ... of natural selection - and they are also fighting God's external purpose to elevate the races.

Expansion is in our blood, in our history, and in our destiny If McKinley is elected he will hold the United States up to the front as a world power, secure the open door for trade and the gospel, and help perpetuate civilization. Thus hastening the end of heathenism and the Christianization of the world.¹⁰⁹

Roosevelt, nominated as McKinley's running mate, underlined the belief in American moral rectitude based upon Anglo-Saxon superiority. He described expansion by a "masterful people" as a source of pride and not regret.¹¹⁰

Bryan travelled the country attacking militarism and imperialism. He proposed public ownership of municipal franchises, greater regulation of big business and Filipino independence he also and sympathised with the Boers in South Africa. The democratic leader warned audiences repeatedly that an imperial policy must lead to a larger standing army which would threaten American liberty.¹¹¹ Root responded with a widely reported speech from Canton, Ohio in which he criticised anti-imperialists for encouraging Filipinos to continue the war and praised American forces for their successes in the Philippines and China. The Secretary of War attacked proposals to regulate efficient business organisations and the claim that a larger army would be used to suppress labour. In an attack on Bryan's use of Jefferson to justify anti-imperialism, Root reminded his audience that Jefferson had not implemented democracy in the territories acquired in the Louisiana Purchase. The speech angered Bryan, but was one of the most effective of the campaign.¹¹²

Appreciative of the good coverage he had received, Root thanked sympathetic journalist William Laffan of the New York Sun. In his letter he again lambasted Bryan, describing him as "a disgusting, dishonest fakir" and concluded: "When I see so many Americans running after him, I feel very much as I do when a really lovely woman falls in love with a cad."¹¹³

On November 7, 1900 the election took place, and the Republican Party won in New England, the mid-Atlantic States, and upper mid-West. Bryan carried the old

Confederacy and Colorado, Montana, Idaho, and Nevada. It was a convincing Republican victory. McKinley polled over 7.2 million votes, against 6.3 million for Bryan. In the Senate the Republican Party took a fifty-five to thirty-one majority with four seats held by minority parties. Nine of the fourteen senators who opposed Anglo-American imperialism were defeated.¹¹⁴ The election vindicated the policies of the Republican Party and strengthened the position of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas in American politics. Attention turned once again to military reform and winning the war in the Philippines.

CHAPTER THREE - END NOTES

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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Republican victory in the election of 1900 allowed Neo-Hamiltonian ideas to flourish. Hay and Root continued to control the State and War Departments. Theodore Roosevelt, a supporter of strong central government and overseas expansion, was the new vice-president. In the Senate, Lodge, Proctor, Joseph R. Hawley, Albert J. Beveridge, and Joseph B. Foraker ensured staunch support for imperialism and military reform. These men were determined to expand American trade, promote military reform, and strengthen central government and dismissed the idea of the locally controlled agrarian republic as irrelevant in the modern world. In his early speeches Roosevelt demanded larger armed forces, a subsidised merchant navy, increased American exports, and the application of business methods to government to ensure efficiency. To the new vice-president, Jefferson was simply "the most incompetent chief executive we ever had."¹

The rapprochement between the Republican Party and Great Britain continued. American neutrality in the Boer War was at best ambiguous. Secretary of State John Hay instructed Stanford Newell, the U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands, to discourage Boer President Kruger of the

Transvaal Republic from visiting America. McKinley recalled the letter, but Kruger decided against coming to America anyway.² Throughout the Boer War American businessmen provided the hard-pressed British army with thousands of horses, hundreds of tons of animal feed, and considerable amounts of foodstuffs. The New York Times reminded those who were pro-Boer that thirty-eight percent of all American exports went directly to Britain and that over half of all American trade was with the British Empire.³ Root, like Hay, supported British intervention in Africa and praised the new Anglo-Egyptian government of Lord Cromer.⁴

In America, despite the convincing Republican election victory, many people remained sceptical about the value of imperial expansion or military reform. President Charles Eliot of Harvard, Lincoln Steffens, Mark Twain, and William Dean Howells all joined Bryan in attacking American involvement overseas.⁵ Bryan defended the ideals of Jefferson and was furious with Root, who compared the annexation of the Louisiana territories in 1803 to the annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines. In a direct attack on imperialism, Bryan quoted Jefferson: "conquest is not in our principles; it is inconsistent with our government."⁶ Mark Twain sent an "updated" version of the Battle Hymn of the Republic to his friend Hay:

I have read his bandit gospel writ in burnished
rows of steel,
As ye deal with my pretensions, so with you my
wrath shall deal,
Let the faithless sons of freedom, crush the
patriot with his heel,
Lo, greed is marching on.⁷

In the Philippines the American military position deteriorated further. Mutual brutality encouraged greater violence. The army resented both civilian criticism and Taft's attempted policy of local reconciliation. Generals MacArthur, Young, and Bell ignored Taft's advice and adopted more vigorous tactics to end the war.⁸ Root defended the army from charges of harsh conduct, both in America and from the Philippine Civil Commission. Taft found his ideas of reconciliation rejected, as the government sought to end the war through military means.

In Washington, the administration was under pressure to pass a new army bill before February 2, 1901 when the temporary approval of a larger standing army ended. If no new legislation was approved, the army would return to its pre-Spanish-American War level of 24,000 men. This force was inadequate to meet the new defence commitments at home, in the Pacific, and in the Caribbean. Root instructed Carter to present a new army bill for consideration by Congress.⁹ No longer inhibited by election concerns, Root approved the inclusion of several reform ideas in the new bill, including creation of an army war college, a new corps structure for the artillery, the amalgamation of the three bureaus concerned with army

supply into one department, fixed four-year appointments to most staff bureaus, promotion by merit, and a permanent increase in the size of the regular army.¹⁰ Root refused to approve Carter's request to include general staff legislation in the new bill. The Secretary of War remained concerned that opposition to centralised army command among staff officers, National Guard officers, and congressmen would threaten the possibility of any change being approved. This cautious approach by Root was vindicated when the measures provoked considerable protest.

Middle-ranking officers, who had waited for years for promotion by seniority, condemned promotion by merit. In an anonymous letter one major expressed the majority view:

I entered the army from West Point nearly 30 years ago. I have never ceased to be a student; have been faithful in the school of application, lyceums, in the execution of the problems of minor tactics, as subaltern, captain, squadron commander, in garrison and field, in all which I have won the praise of my superiors. The Spanish war, with its fine opportunities came I never worked so hard before ... worn out with work I became the victim of malaria Is there anything in this record of 30 years, or in the labours of the past 33 months, to be ashamed of? Is there anything worthy of punishment? If not, why should I be deprived of the long delayed advancement given by law? I should be glad to see merit suitably rewarded but on behalf of myself and hundreds of others do earnestly pray that Congress may never approve so unjust a measure.¹¹

Staff officers joined middle-ranking colleagues in lobbying Congress to oppose army reform. The objections raised by these officers received considerable support

among those in Congress who feared any extension of executive authority through the introduction of promotion by merit or fixed-term staff appointments. Representative John Hull, the House Military Affairs Committee chairman, expressly informed Root that the majority of congressmen opposed fixed four-year term staff appointments and promotion by merit for these reasons.¹² Root introduced a compromise suggesting that only one-third of all promotions be decided on merit. The president would select one officer for promotion from a choice of three recommended by an army promotion board.¹³ Congress remained skeptical of this attempt to strengthen executive authority over military appointments, because the idea of trained professionals advising a strong central authority was not recognised by most Americans as an appropriate way to achieve effective government.¹⁴

General Miles, the commanding general of the army, announced his support for fixed-term staff appointments, a larger army, and more artillery, but he opposed the other suggested reforms.¹⁵ Most bureau chiefs resisted reform except the proposal to increase the size of the regular army; all wanted more men for their particular departments. Brigadier General A.R. Buffington the Ordnance Chief, Inspector General J.C. Breckinridge, Quartermaster General M.I. Luddington, and Judge Advocate General G. Norman Lieber rejected all suggested reforms.¹⁶

Paymaster General Alfred Bates, Signals Chief Horace Greely, and many artillery officers supported most of the recommendations by Root. The inability of the army officer corps to present a coherent program of reform aided those opposed to any change in the traditional reliance on the hastily mobilised volunteer.

Industrial analogies and the twin concepts of "efficiency" and "professionalism" once more dominated the debates on military reform. The issue of a separate bureau for veterinarians was again advanced on the basis of emerging professionalism.¹⁷ Root forcefully opposed further fragmentation of command and lobbied hard against such ideas. He wrote to Senate Military Affairs chairman, Joseph Hawley, that the creation of any further staff bureaus only enhanced the disintegration of army command, which in turn promoted inefficiency.¹⁸ Carter, the author of the proposed reforms, was impressed with the ability of modern business organisations to control diverse specialisations and markets. For military reformers there were clear analogies between the success of American business and organisational failure in the army. Carter and Root believed that centralised control and clear lines of command in any system created efficiency. Alexander Hamilton had advocated such ideas in government, and American business success seemed to prove him right.

The expansion of the regular army had required the

selection of 298 new staff officers and 837 new first and second lieutenants so that the need for new officers added impetus to recommendations for army education reform.¹⁹

Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans regarded education as essential to creating an efficient military profession and Root was aware the current system was wholly inadequate.

In September, 1900 Colonel Joseph P. Sanger issued a scathing attack on army education. He reported a lack of standardised training in the National Guard, poor educational facilities, and the general ridicule of formal education as a means of training in the army. No state had classes for National Guard officers or non-commissioned officers. In the regular army, most officers received no training after leaving West Point, and only three percent of enlisted men attended post schools.²⁰ Military training at universities was mostly symbolic and was ineffective for current defence needs. All of the 104 university and college courses were regarded as inadequate: target practice, sanitation procedures, and army administration were omitted from the syllabus in many cases.²¹

In his annual report Root attempted to tackle these problems. A new system of continuous education for army officers was recommended. Each army post would educate junior military officers who had not attended West Point, and a national system of certificates would document the courses completed by junior officers. Five service schools

would provide specialist training for certain officers: artillery training at Fort Monroe; engineering at Washington Barracks; submarine defence at Fort Totten; army medicine at Washington Barracks; and staff work at Fort Leavenworth.²² The last would give officers experience with large military forces in order to prevent repetition of Spanish-American War command failures. A permanent garrison of several thousand men would be stationed at Fort Leavenworth to provide officers with practical experience in handling brigade-size units.²³

The final element of Root's proposed reforms was an army war college. The college would supervise and inspect all other schools and oversee all aspects of military education. The brightest officers would receive advanced training in command and organisation at the college. Strategic planning would be conducted on the basis of military information gathered from abroad. A general officer would head a five-man committee in charge of the college. The chief of artillery, chief of engineers, superintendent of West Point, and the commander of Fort Leavenworth would attend committee meetings as *ex officio* members.²⁴ Root hoped these officers would act as an informal general staff by acting as the centre of education and information gathering. Six months previously, Root had expressed the reasons for these changes before the Senate:

Instead of having nothing but a poor, weak, simple-minded civilian secretary of war who is the only person to bring the strings together of all this multitudinous activity you have a board of the leading officers of the army, including the heads of all the staff departments whose business it is to advise on all the great questions of military preparation.²⁵

Despite this testimony, many remained skeptical of Root's proposals.

The proposed artillery reform abolished the regimental system and created a new corps system, subdivided into coastal defence and field sections. The new coastal fortifications, built to defend communities from naval assault in the Spanish-American War, were undermanned so an increase of 7,000 artillerymen was unanimously recommended by army officers as the solution to the problem.²⁶

These proposed organisational changes caused great division of opinion in the army. Nelson Miles, army traditionalists, and most bureau chiefs opposed any change to the regimental system.²⁷ Typical opposition was expressed by Inspector General Breckinridge who pronounced: "As a soldier I believe in regiments. This section abolishes them. It would disband admirable regiments that have a history running back a hundred years and an esprit de corps which might be the envy of the world."²⁸ Supporters of reform argued that the corps system produced a more flexible organisation with a

general officer providing a unified authoritative voice on the needs of the artillery. Army artillery previously struggled under the divided authority of regimental colonels. The recommendation underlined Neo-Hamiltonian desires for centralised army command which enhanced political control over the army. The United States did not rely exclusively on Germany for ideas on military reform, for the suggested change in artillery organisation was borrowed from the corps structure used in the British army.

The proposed introduction of fixed term assignments for army officers proved controversial. The staff system, already outlined, gave permanent tenure to officers transferred to staff bureaus, which made them unaccountable to the commanding general. (see Appendix 1). It created envy between staff and line officers as staff officers enjoyed city life and influential political friends. The introduction of fixed four-year staff appointments, followed by an automatic appointment for at least two years to a field command, attempted to solve these problems. Only the president could re-appoint any officer to the staff without an automatic re-detail to the field.²⁹ The recommendation applied to only six of the twelve staff bureaus: the Adjutant General's Office, Inspector General's Office, Quartermaster's Department, Commissary General's Office, Ordnance Department, and

Signal Corps. Specialist technical or professional knowledge, excluded the other bureaus, such as the Engineers or Medical Corps. The reform was further limited when Root agreed to apply the new measure to only the 155 new staff positions, created by the expansion in the army.³⁰ The 185 current members of the army staff were, both excluded from re-detail and guaranteed promotion by seniority.³¹ These concessions underlined the significant opposition to this reform by Congress and staff officers.

Throughout the nineteenth century the issue of staff-line interchange had provoked endless controversy, highlighted by the failed attempts to limit staff appointments by the Banning, Coburn, and Garfield committees on military reform.³² The bitter fight in Congress to pass even a limited rotation of staff and line officers confirmed the political acumen of Root, who rejected any attempt to move quickly on radical reforms. The measure endorsed by Congress limited staff experience to only ten percent of all army officers in their first twenty years of service. The majority of senior officers would continue to have no staff experience. A full detail system was only envisaged after twenty, or thirty years, when the last of the current staff officers had retired. (see Table 3).

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF ALL ARMY OFFICERS AT
EACH GRADE LIKELY TO SERVE IN THE STAFF.

RANK	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OFFICERS
Generals/Colonels	34.2
Lieut. Colonels	35.6
Majors	23.4
Captains	30.6
First Lieutenants	9.6
Second Lieutenants	None

Presented in hearings on the Army Bill before the Senate Military Affairs Committee, 56th Cong. 2nd sess., Dec. 11, 1900, p.63.

The Senate altered the final reading of the bill by promoting Commanding General Miles and Adjutant General Corbin. The top rank in the American army after the retirement Sherman in 1883 was only major general, two full ranks lower than most other armies. After years of protest by senior officers, Congress agreed to restore the rank of lieutenant general.³³ Miles was promoted to lieutenant general and Corbin to major general, restoring the original rank distinction between the commanding general, adjutant general, and the bureau chiefs.

On February 2, 1901 the new army bill was finally passed by Congress. Root had achieved only a partial victory. The expansion of the army was approved. The regular army increased from 24,000 to 60,000 regulars. This force could be further raised, at the discretion of the president, to 88,000 in times of national emergency.³⁴ Such a flexible system reflected both congressional desires to keep the army small, and the Neo-Hamiltonian wish for greater control by the executive. The president, not Congress, determined the size of the army.

The focus of army expansion emphasised the view of military reformers that "military preparedness" was the best response to inevitable future conflict. Since the training required for artillery and cavalry service took longer than for the infantry, they received a larger proportional increase in numbers. The number of infantry regiments jumped from twenty five to thirty while the number of cavalry regiments increased by fifty percent and the new artillery force almost doubled in size.³⁵ The new artillery corps and the refusal to create any further staff bureaus were victories for the supporters of centralised command. Congress, however, refused to approve the amalgamation of the three supply bureaus and severely curtailed the implementation of staff-line interchange. These failures and the decision by Root to tackle National Guard reform in a separate bill underlined the political strength of Democrats, bureau chiefs, and National Guard officers and the Jeffersonian ideology of states rights, volunteerism, and local control.

The creation of the war college was the most significant change agreed to by Congress. This institution was a major step towards the general staff system, the ultimate aim of the reformers. Carter, Bliss, and Schofield all pressed Root to continue the reform process. All three hoped the secretary of war would introduce a

general staff bill to Congress. Root, backed by a politically secure executive, was more sympathetic than previously to such requests. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans hoped the new general staff would rectify previously confused army management, and strengthen executive authority over the National Guard.

The idea of a staff for generals was many centuries old. Originally they consisted of aides who relayed messages throughout the army and clerks who copied and kept orders. Larger armies required more efficient administration and a new centralised body, the general staff, emerged. It administered, maintained, and directed the army.³⁶ The first effective general staff system appeared in early nineteenth-century Prussia. Prussia had three powerful states on its borders: France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. National independence required an efficient army. France's defeat of Prussia at Jena in 1806 underlined the importance of the army in preserving national sovereignty. Military defeat forced Prussia to reform its army and in 1807 a commission was established to recommend a new military organisation. This commission included the most significant military thinkers of the nineteenth century. Gerhard Scharnhorst, Neithardt von Gneisenau, Karl von Stein, Karl von Grolman, and Herman von Boyen as commission members and Count Goetzen and Karl von Clausewitz, an important military theorist, as associate members.³⁷

These men hoped that military reform would serve as a means to transform a monarchical absolutist state, with its strict caste system, into a liberal democratic state. Prussia required an army for its existence, and, if the army recruited from all able-bodied male citizens, it should give these citizens access to government.³⁸

Scharnhorst emphasised military education and promotion based upon merit. He laid the foundation for an effective military education system open to nobles and commoners, with new war schools at Berlin, Königsberg, and Breslau, and a new war academy in Berlin.³⁹

It was this war academy that had impressed successive generations of American military reformers. Sheridan, Upton, Schofield, Bliss, and Ludlow all reported favourably on the institution. In 1821, the general staff was established in Prussia as a separate department, which reported through the war department to the King. This new department had periodic staff-line officer reassignment. Gneisenau developed the great general staff which remained in Berlin, while other general staff officers, were assigned to field commands to ensure the implementation of staff planning.⁴⁰ The Prussian nobility rejected liberal reforms and convinced successive Prussian monarchs to oppose democratic accountability over the military. Liberal reformers had succeeded in creating an efficient

military structure, which in the end became a bulwark against liberalism and democracy.⁴¹

The Prussian General Staff expanded throughout the nineteenth century. In 1866, during the war against Austria, the king subordinated all units of the army to the Chief of Staff von Moltke. This remarkable order allowed Moltke to command the entire army, without reference to either the king, or war minister.⁴² Militarily successful, this degree of autonomy further undermined civilian control over the military. Although the order was rescinded between the armistice with Austria in 1866 and war with France in 1870, a dangerous precedent was established. The rapid defeat of France in 1870 further weakened civilian political control over the army. Military victories made the army popular. The General Staff was rewarded for its success with complete control over all military decision-making. The new German system rejected the teachings of Clausewitz who warned that military planning must always be subordinate to civilian political policy. In America, only General U.S. Grant enjoyed such freedom of command during the last year of the Civil War. Moltke ignored the assertions of Clausewitz, Scharnhorst, and Bismarck that military policy must always implement civilian political goals. Supported by military victories, he easily resisted civilian attempts to regain some control over the army.⁴³ Without

the influence of wider political concerns, the German army conducted its strategic planning in a political vacuum, the fatal consequences of which were exposed in World War One. The system, with its reputation for efficiency, impressed Upton, Hazen, Sherman, and Grant. Only Schofield, among nineteenth-century American military reformers, realised that the autonomy given to the German army was politically unacceptable in America.⁴⁴

The German military system was unattractive to Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans who wanted stronger, not weaker, political control over the army. Spencer Wilkinson's Brain of the Army presented the Secretary of War with a solution to this problem.⁴⁵ Wilkinson argued that the essence of government was a single strong authority and that the object of representative government was to put authority into the hands of a body which had the confidence of the majority. The problem with the British and American armies was that government could not get professional advice because they had failed as professional bodies. Anglo-American armies lacked proper educational standards, failed to plan for future conflicts, and were unable to present government with efficient prepared alternatives in time of national emergency.⁴⁶ The divided U.S. army command structure only aggravated these failings. (see Appendix 1). The problem was how to reconcile a civilian president who was commander-in-chief, with the Commanding

General of the army, who presumably was an expert.

Wilkinson presented the solution:

What we want for the defence of Great Britain is in each of the two services, the navy and the army, a department for campaigns and battles, for preparing as Moltke prepared, for the next war, for the directing it when it comes, and all the time training and testing the admirals and generals. As the heads of these two departments we want the best naval strategist and the best military strategist in the service; and we want no one whatever to stand between either of these men and the Cabinet. Of course, when I say Cabinet, I mean for this purpose the First Lord of the Admiralty [Secretary of the Navy] and the Secretary of State for War. Each of these Ministers is the Cabinet to the service over which he presides; when he says "yea" or "nay" it is the Cabinet [President] that speaks through him."⁴⁷

Wilkinson's solution was close to the original idea of Prussian military reformers who advocated a Prussian general staff reporting to an elected civilian war minister, who represented a politically accountable government. Root instructed Carter to prepare a general staff bill on the Wilkinson model.

American foreign policy was dominated by policy of "benevolent assimilation" in new colonies and the war in the Philippines. The ideas of Josiah Strong, who believed America had a moral duty to improve the lives of less fortunate foreigners, were partially implemented. General Young informed Army Headquarters in Manila that 203 schools teaching 10,714 children had been established and he hoped enrollment would rise to 25,000 in a few months. The general requested over 30,000 textbooks, 15,000

slates, 30,000 slate pencils, seventy-five teachers of English, and building materials for 150 school buildings.⁴⁸ In Washington, Root received reports from High School Superintendent Eduardo Diaz and Morgan T. Scudder, principal of New York State Normal School, on education in Cuba. The reports emphasised the need to teach civics, especially American democratic ideals, and business methods to high school students.⁴⁹ These social reforms underlined the determination of Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans to combine Strong's claim of moral responsibility with the extension of U.S. trading opportunities.

The creation of politically stable, English-speaking democracies that endorsed free trade, would benefit American exports. In the competitive world market, Republicans sought to support actively American business. Root, a corporate lawyer, retained many business contacts and staunchly supported attempts to increase U.S. exports. The Secretary of War endorsed free trade and regarded the Pacific as "the Ocean of the future." America could dominate this new market through its control of more than half the North American Pacific coastline, Hawaii, and the Philippines.⁵⁰ Root sent maps of Asia to prominent industrialists to encourage trade with the east, regularly requested information on foreign trade from his colonial legal adviser Charles Magoon, and defended the industrial

trusts as elements of progress essential for foreign trade.⁵¹ He agreed with Hay that Anglo-American friendship was bound by many ties and that Japan and Germany were America's main commercial rivals.⁵² Only fishing rights off the coast of Canada and right of free passage in any proposed Panama Canal remained as difficult issues between Britain and the United States.

The large increase in the regular army allowed Root to recommend promotion for several officers. Adna Romanza Chaffee, who commanded U.S. forces during the Boxer rebellion in China, was promoted to major general. Five other officers were promoted to brigadier general, including Leonard Wood and J. Franklin Bell, men sympathetic to army reform and to the ideas of Neo-Hamiltonianism.⁵³ The promotion of Wood from surgeon captain to brigadier general was the most contentious. Wood joined the army as a contract surgeon on June 9, 1885 having graduated from Harvard in 1884. His military career, like that of most army reformers, was unrepresentative of the standard army career. He was not a Civil War veteran but had served extensively in the Southwest in the campaigns against the Apache Indian. After the capture of Geronimo, he was appointed surgeon at Fort McPherson, Georgia. In the early 1890s he became attending surgeon to Presidents Cleveland and McKinley. In May 1898, he organised the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, "The Rough

Riders," with his good friend Theodore Roosevelt. Upon the surrender of Spanish forces in Cuba, he was appointed governor of Santiago.

His attempts to implement sanitary and educational reforms gained favourable recognition from Root. Wood was a staunch imperialist who admired the British Empire. He supported military reform both to sustain American expansion overseas and because he believed international conflict was unavoidable. A close friend of Roosevelt, his outspoken defence of American imperialism and support for army reform made him a staunch supporter of Neo-Hamiltonian Republicanism. In December, 1899, he was appointed governor of Cuba and promoted to major general of volunteers.⁵⁴ His regular army rank remained captain and surgeon. The promotion of "Doctor" Wood over hundreds of colleagues caused the first of many controversies which occurred throughout Wood's career. Corbin, Shafter, and other senior officers resented the promotion, but Wood proved an able officer who encouraged army reform and American imperialism.⁵⁵ Wood and Corbin soon became firm friends. The Adjutant General quickly recognised his abilities and stated: "I have never ceased to say that it is utterly wrong in principle, but I also say that ... the man is eminently worthy ... Wood is a soldier and a scholar."⁵⁶

The promotion of James Franklin Bell created further resentment among many regular army officers. Bell had

graduated from the U.S. Army Military Academy in 1874. Wagner, Bliss, and Carter were all his classmates. After graduation he served extensively in the West. A captain in the 7th Cavalry in 1898, he served in the Philippines and was rapidly promoted to volunteer major, lieutenant colonel, and brigadier general. On Sept. 9, 1899, he won the Congressional Medal of Honour during fighting against Filipino forces near Porcia Luzon.⁵⁷ An advocate of tough reprisals against Filipino guerrillas, he attracted favourable attention from army superiors, Root, and Roosevelt. Governor Taft, attempting a policy of reconciliation in the islands, was less impressed. Bell was promoted over 1036 more senior colleagues and, with Wood, represented a major assault on promotion by seniority. Both officers were to have a significant role in future army reform.⁵⁸

The poor performance of the American army in China increased pressure on Root to implement further army reforms. In the early spring, William Crozier, the ordnance chief for American forces in China identified the poor training of officers, ignorance about the country, lack of forward planning, and supply failures as major problems affecting the army.⁵⁹ The world-wide commercial expansion of Germany and uncertainty over the intentions of Japan added impetus to demands for army reform.

The improvement in Anglo-American relations continued with sympathetic reaction to British imperial development, while Japanese and German expansion was severely criticised. Secretary of State John Hay wrote to his friend Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, hoping for a speedy end to the Boer War and the creation of a "new English-speaking commonwealth South of the Zambesi" and in Eastern Asia.⁶⁰ While Hay encouraged British imperialism, Roosevelt railed at German belligerence:

Some friends of mine who have been at the German field manoeuvres last year were greatly impressed with the evident intention of the German military classes to take a fall out of us when the opportunity arises. I find that the Germans regard our failure to go forward ... as a sign that our spasm of preparation, as they think has come to an end; that we shall sink back, so that in a few years they will be in a position to take some steps in the West Indies or South America which will make us put up or shut up on the Monroe Doctrine I wish to see us act upon the old frontier principle, Don't bluster, don't flourish your revolver and never draw unless you intend to shoot.⁶¹

The opinions of both the secretary of state and the vice-president emphasised a new Anglo-American understanding. Throughout the spring of 1901, relations between America and both Japan, and Germany, continued to deteriorate. In April it was discovered that Mr. Taiyo Hojo, a Japanese consular official in Manila, was acting as a spy for Filipino guerrillas. He accompanied U.S. missions against Filipino forces and passed information on

American troop dispositions to the guerrillas. He was arrested and deported to Japan.⁶² Root reported this action by the military to secretary of state John Hay. Later the same day, Root reported further evidence of Japanese treachery to the State Department. The U.S. military attache in Beijing reported certain steamers smuggling arms from Japan, via Hong Kong, to Manila. The secretary of war asked the British government in London to tighten customs procedures in the colony.⁶³

Despite these developments, the American army seemed close to victory in the Philippines. On March 23, 1901 Brigadier General Frederick Funston, in a daring undercover raid, captured the guerrilla leader Aguinaldo. Funston intercepted a courier carrying a message from Aguinaldo to his brother requesting reinforcements. The general organised 81 Tagalog-speaking Macebe scouts who, with Funston and three others disguised as captured American officers, entered Aguinaldo's camp and captured the elusive guerrilla leader. Funston rushed his prisoner to the coast where they boarded the U.S.S. Vicksburg. This daring raid made Funston the hero of the hour and depressed many of his contemporaries, who regarded him an irksome blowhard.⁶⁴ Aguinaldo ordered a cease-fire and much of the fighting on Luzon stopped. In outlying islands, however, the war continued with various tribal groups.

In Washington, Assistant Secretary of War George D. Meiklejohn was replaced by William C. Sanger. Sanger, from New York State, was Roosevelt's friend, attended Root's alma mater, Hamilton College, and was an expert on the militia. The appointment signalled Root's determination to reform the National Guard and demonstrated Roosevelt's influence over appointments.⁶⁵ The vice-president was responsible for advancing the careers of Wood, Bell, Crozier, Sanger, and others who contributed greatly to military reform. The appointment of Sanger, a Neo-Hamiltonian Republican, indicated McKinley's willingness to endorse further military reform. While Sanger familiarised himself with his office, Root was compelled to review colonial, not military problems.

In the early summer a constitutional convention established a new American-Cuban relationship. The agreement featured many of the imperialist goals of Neo-Hamiltonians. Cuba was forbidden from concluding treaties with any foreign power or allowing the construction of military bases by foreign powers. The United States reserved the right to intervene in Cuba, to protect life or property, and demanded a naval station on the island at Guantanamo. Wood, as governor of the island, presented the American terms to the islanders. The agreement ensured a virtual American protectorate over the island.⁶⁶

In the Philippines the capture of Aguinaldo reduced the level of fighting. Root took the opportunity to remove MacArthur and replace him with Chaffee, the successful commander in the Boxer Rebellion. The Secretary of War hoped this change would improve the poor relations between Governor Taft and the army in the Philippines. On July 4, 1901, the formal transfer from MacArthur to Chaffee took place. MacArthur headed home to a hero's welcome in California, despite allegations of corruption among his staff, which included giving favoured status to certain companies in return for a percentage of the profits.⁶⁷

The appointment of Chaffee failed to heal the rift between the army and civilian authority. Otis, MacArthur, Chaffee, and Young believed the Filipinos to be untrustworthy heathens who required enlightened American leadership so the duty of the army was to restore order and introduce democracy and capitalism to an inferior people. Taft rejected this indictment and criticised the draconian measures imposed on local people. He infuriated the army by inviting Filipino leaders to dinner and consulting them on government reform.⁶⁸

Chaffee, a career soldier who felt more comfortable on a horse than behind a desk, soon fell out with Taft. He informed the Governor that he distrusted native government and that he intended to give the Filipino "bayonet rule" for years to come. Later he informed a journalist, "if you should hear of a few Filipinos more or less being put

away, don't grow too sentimental over it." Chaffee brought in his fellow cavalrymen, J. Franklin Bell and Jacob Smith, officers who believed in a thorough prosecution of the war to deal with rebellions in Batangus and Samar.⁶⁹ (see map, p.60 Chpt. 2). The methods employed by these officers later caused a major political scandal.

The continued failure of the British to secure victory in South Africa annoyed those Neo-Hamiltonians attempting to convince the American public of the benefits of imperialism. The Army and Navy Journal, impatient with British failure, sought to explain what had happened. The British lacked business efficiency. Piecemeal organisation and divided command created unpreparedness and gross inefficiency. The Journal continued: "if a railroad, after being reorganised, were placed entirely under the control of the engineers and traffic superintendents, it would not be long before it came to grief again. It must have business managers." The solution for the British was to put the army staff "upon a business footing" and have as head a man, "thoroughly versed in business methods."⁷⁰ Later that month, Root received from Paymaster General Alfred Bates a letter advocating the amalgamation of staff bureaus on the basis of business efficiency.⁷¹ Despite this enthusiasm for applying business methods to the army, opposition to reform remained widespread. The New York Evening Post described Root's reforms as "An Act

to Make the President of the United States a Military Dictator" and attacked the extension of federal powers.⁷² McKinley's administration ignored these criticisms, implemented the reforms already approved, and planned further changes.

In the summer of 1901, the War Department selected Washington Barracks as the site of the new war college. Major General S.B.M. Young was appointed college president. Young and the other officers appointed had no training in the role of a war college. Root hoped the war college could act as a de facto general staff, until Congress approved the creation of a new staff system. The decision overburdened an inexperienced War College Board with administrative, planning, and educational functions. The early development and success of the college was severely curtailed by this decision.⁷³

Military reform was only one important proposal, among several, suggested by Neo-Hamiltonians to strengthen federal government. The consular service, local government, and federal civil service, also required reform. To create a strong centralised government, advised by professionals, required that provincial amateurs be replaced throughout government.⁷⁴ Business ideas of organisation influenced reform in each of these areas. In 1900, the first municipality was established in Galveston, Texas. The municipality was designed to operate as a

business corporation, which applied business methods to public service. Municipal commissioners were regarded as a board of directors. By 1907 the corporate idea in local government was common in Texas, and by 1913 over 300 cities adopted such an organisation. Municipal commissioners planned for the future, adjudicated between competing interest groups, and coordinated city government, much like the functions of an army general staff.⁷⁵

In August 1901 Brigadier General William Ludlow died. An efficient colonial administrator and enthusiastic supporter of military reform, his death was a set-back for supporters of military reorganisation. Having completed the recommendations of the Ludlow Board, which he presented to Root, he was posted to the Philippines. On the outward passage he contracted bronchial problems diagnosed in Manila as tuberculosis. He returned home immediately and died two months later, at Convent, New Jersey; he was fifty-seven.⁷⁶ William H. Carter made extensive use of Ludlow's ideas as plans for a general staff slowly developed. The ill-health of both the Secretary of War and Senator Hawley, chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, hindered progress on introducing further military reform for much of the year. Root was ill throughout most of the early spring and much of the autumn of 1901 with influenza, colic and a series

of painful boils.⁷⁷ In early September, despite continued ill-health, Root announced his intention to introduce a general staff bill that year.⁷⁸

Unfortunately, two disasters halted all progress on military reorganisation. On September 6, while attending the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, president William McKinley was shot. He died six days later. The sudden death of McKinley temporarily paralysed government with a period of mourning and the arrival of a new president.⁷⁹

The second tragedy occurred three weeks later. Company C, 9th U.S. Infantry, camped at Balangiga, Samar, was almost all massacred in a native attack. (see map, p.60 Chpt. 2). The unit was commanded by Captain Thomas Connell, a devout Catholic, who decided that on Sundays only camp sentries were to carry arms. Native forces surprised the unarmed soldiers at breakfast on Sunday, September 27. Armed with only tent poles, hot water, and shovels, a few men made it to boats on the coast. The following day six survivors, out of a total of eighty-eight men and three officers, reported the tragedy to the regiment. The relief column discovered terrible savagery in the camp; Connell's body was found decapitated and on fire, other bodies were burnt or slit open and stuffed with camp stores.⁸⁰

The massacre was reported extensively in America, and Roosevelt, the new president, quickly endorsed the army's

demand for harsh retaliation. Chaffee, the army commander in the Philippines, was furious at the death of colleagues who had served with him in China. The general attacked Taft's policy of friendship and promised tough reprisals. Roosevelt and Root supported Chaffee, and Taft was left isolated in his role as civilian governor. In vain Taft announced his sympathy with civilian, not military, methods and insisted that "justice requires that both sides should be heard before judgement is given." Neither the army nor Roosevelt was prepared to be so reasonable. The President wrote to Taft instructing the Governor to come to terms with Chaffee.⁸¹ To compound a miserable October for Taft, he contracted Dengue fever, and was forced to return to America for treatment.

The departure of Taft removed the only voice of restraint and compromise on the islands and left Chaffee and the army free to deal with the natives. Taft, the reluctant imperialist, read Kipling to his staff before he departed for San Francisco:

Now it is not good for the Christian
To hustle the Aryan brown.
For the Christian riles and the Aryan smiles,
And he weareth the Christian down;
And the end of the fight is a toombstone white,
And the name of the late deceased,
And the epitaph dear, "A fool lies here,
Who tried to hustle the East."⁸²

Chaffee met his colleagues, J. Franklin Bell and Jacob Smith, and instructed both to show no mercy against

suspected guerrillas. Bell ordered a Filipino prisoner shot every time an American soldier died. Both Bell and Smith ordered field commanders not to discourage junior officers who were "over enthusiastic" in carrying out their orders. Bell described the new policy as a short aggressive war, where the innocent and guilty suffered to produce a quick conclusion. The example of William T. Sherman in the Civil War justified the army's actions.⁸³

In contrast to events in the Philippines, the attempt to establish American primacy in the Caribbean proceeded smoothly. In Cuba, Wood reported local approval for the American conditions for independence, increased trade with America, a drop in yellow fever and continued progress in educational reform.⁸⁴ In November 1901, Lord Landsdowne signed the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, which established conditions for a Panama canal.⁸⁵ The agreement abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which stipulated any canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans must never be fortified or controlled by either Great Britain or the United States. The new treaty allowed America to construct, control, and fortify any isthmian canal. The agreement concluded by Lord Pauncefote, the British ambassador who was an expert on international canal legislation, and John Hay, the secretary of state, emphasised increasing Anglo-American cooperation.⁸⁶

For many senior British officials the Spanish-American War had been a decisive event. The brief war both

stimulated American naval construction and showed the ability of the U.S. navy in battle.

TABLE 4
BATTLESHIP NUMBERS 1896-1906; BUILT AND UNDER
CONSTRUCTION.

Year/Country	G.B.	GER.	FR.	U.S.	JAP.
1896	57	24	35	12	-
1898	63	22	36	13	6
1901	66	36	33	18	7
1904	68	38	42	25	9
1906	67	39	41	28	17

From the Accounts and Papers in the Parliamentary Records cited by Aaron L. Freidberg, The Weary Titan, p.153.

Great Britain, confronted by German, Russian, Japanese, and American industrial and military growth, could no longer expect to dominate world trade. The solution was a new mutual understanding between the two "Anglo-Saxon" powers and in 1902 an alliance with Japan against Russia. The weakened British position was emphasised by the deterioration in British naval superiority (see table 4). Britain regarded Russia and Germany as the greatest military threats to its world position. To defend the empire against the challenge, required compromise with other powers. In a letter to the prime minister's private secretary, George Clarke, secretary of the Committee on Imperial Defence, summed up the British position:

What is best not to say is that we believe that the idea of opposing the navy of the United States ... close to its bases must be abandoned. This naturally altered some strategic aspects of this

part of the world. In years not far distant, we shall be quite unable to oppose the navy of Japan in its own waters. It is best to recognise facts, but not always proclaim them from the housetop.⁸⁷

In America Neo-Hamiltonians happily endorsed this new reapproachment with Great Britain.

On October 23, 1901, Root returned to reforming the War Department after a three-month absence due to McKinley's death, ill-health, and the distractions of events in the Philippines. The new President and Root were concerned by the level of army staff opposition to reform. They decided to weaken this opposition through the promotion of younger officers to senior positions. Judge-Advocate General G. Norman Lieber, as the army's senior legal officer, advised Congress and the War Department on the constitutionality of reform. His opposition to military reorganisation seriously hampered the progress of reform legislation.⁸⁸ Root wanted a chief legal officer who actively supported change: particularly contentious militia reform which involved increasing presidential authority. He selected Deputy Judge Advocate Lieutenant Colonel George B. Davis. Davis served on General Butterfield's Committee on Militia Reform in late 1899. He was familiar with the arguments and indicated his support for greater federal control over local reserves.⁸⁹

Root also wanted to replace ordnance chief Brigadier General A.R. Buffington. The Ordnance Department performed poorly in the Spanish-American War and had been criticised

by Congress and the army line. The bureau had refused to cooperate with the artillery service or Board of Ordnance and Fortification.⁹⁰ Roosevelt and Root wanted to abolish the overlapping functions of these organisations, to produce a simplified, "business organisation." Captain William Crozier, the ordnance chief with American forces in China, impressed the President with his enthusiasm for army reorganisation.⁹¹ Crozier was only forty-seven years old. A senior captain, he had served in the army for twenty-six years in both the artillery and Ordnance Department at home and abroad. He was an expert on small ship design and European Ordnance and had travelled widely in Europe. At West Point he attended classes with Carter, Bliss, Wagner, and Bell, all prominent supporters of military change.⁹² These two nominations, which ignored promotion by seniority, provoked immediate opposition in the Senate. Roosevelt and Root again confronted the opposition in a protracted fight.⁹³

In late November 1901, Root released his annual report as secretary of war. It contained an outline of proposed military reorganisation. The main recommendations included an expansion in military education; the integration of the National Guard with the regular army, common training, and standardised equipment; amalgamation of supply bureaus and the creation of a general staff.⁹⁴ Root argued strongly for all the reforms and wrote of the

general staff proposal:

No one can doubt the general and field officers of our army have been too exclusively occupied in the details of administration, with inadequate opportunity and provision for the study of great questions, the consideration and formulation of plans, comprehensive forethought against future contingencies, and coordination of the various branches of the service with a view to harmonious action I strongly urge the establishment by law of a general staff, of which the war college board shall form a part.⁹⁵

The report praised American expansion overseas and the social reforms implemented in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Root argued for new low tariffs in the Pacific and Caribbean to encourage American exports. Support for a subsidised merchant navy was encouraged. Lastly, the continued guerrilla war in the Philippines was dismissed as "minor in character."⁹⁶

Root's report outlined an agenda of reform which stressed the dominant Neo-Hamiltonian, imperial, and business influences within the Republican Party. The general staff and National Guard reform proposals weakened state control and promoted presidential power. Staff bureau amalgamation produced simplified, centralised command, apparently similar to successful American business enterprises. The suggested promotions of Crozier and Davis indicated a commitment to merit-based professionalism and not amateur volunteerism. Root's attempts to belittle continued problems in the Philippines and his praise for Wood's colonial reforms emphasised the

continued importance of imperialism to the Republican Party. Local political control and a volunteer army, however, remained popular ideas nationally. Many people were still unwilling to trust a system of limited professional military freedom under a strong federal government, far removed from local control. The attempt to turn Root's proposals into law emphasised these ideological divisions.

CHAPTER IV - END NOTES

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CHAPTER FIVE
ROOT'S ARMY REFORMS

On December 7, 1901 Roosevelt delivered a presidential message arguing that America needed a more efficient, better educated army. The United States did not need a larger army but ought to have professional armed forces selected by merit to achieve military efficiency. A general staff, with a chief of staff at its head, ought to plan and coordinate army actions. The militia law was obsolete. Roosevelt recommended a major extension of executive authority. The training, equipment, and organisation, of the National Guard was to be placed under federal control. The President concluded by supporting Root's reforms passed in 1901: the substitution of four-year details from the line for permanent appointments in staff divisions, the creation of a unified command for the artillery, and the ability of the executive to determine the size of the army. The implementation of general staff and militia reform, would complete the successful transformation of the army into a professional body responsive to central government.¹

The suggested reforms were opposed by the established alliance of senior staff bureau members, congressional Democrats, state governors, many militia officers, and Commanding General of the army Nelson Miles. Miles

resented the creation of an army war college, which placed military education under the control of the adjutant general not his office. He thought further training of army officers unnecessary and was appalled at the prospect of joint training with "certain classes of men" principally the National Guard. Miles claimed that the suggested reforms were more appropriate to a "military aristocracy" or "monarchical Germany," than to the American Republic.²

Root decided to challenge his opposition. Carter, Young, Bliss, and Ludlow convinced the Secretary of War that the war college could not perform as a general staff.³ This decision caused great animosity between Miles and Root. In early December Miles got into further trouble when, as chairman of a board on post closures, he reviewed political and military considerations. The General was reminded that political considerations were the domain of Congress and the executive.⁴ Miles persisted in commenting upon issues unconnected with his office, and in late December, he was again disciplined by Root when he supported Admiral Dewey in his claim for credit in the naval victory over Spain.⁵ Angry at Miles's disobedience, Root announced the new chairman of the War College Board would be Major General S.B.M. Young. The Board, approved by Roosevelt, was the first step towards a general staff. The other members of the Board remained unannounced and six months passed before its first meeting.⁶

Events in the Philippines repeatedly prevented Roosevelt and Root from introducing further military reform. Major General Chaffee appointed his friend Brigadier General Jacob Smith to command the district where the Balangiga massacre had occurred. A veteran of the Indian wars, he regarded all non-whites as savages and was nicknamed "Hell-Raising Jack." Smith informed reporters that he intended to burn all of Samar and inflict heavy casualties on the natives. This report and orders by Bell and Chaffee to shoot civilians and prisoners were reported extensively in the American press.⁷

The army supported the new tough measures. Major General Young summed up army feelings on the Philippines War, civilian interference, and Japanese involvement in a highly publicised speech delivered in Washington:

War does not usually come before full scope has been given to forensic display, and diplomacy has exhausted itself. When war does come, the humanity talked of in times of peace has no place. To carry on war, disguise it as we may, is to be cruel; it is to kill and burn, burn and kill, and again kill and burn.... I feel confident our little Jap friends would have stopped the pattering of the bare feet of our "little brown brothers" through the jungle in a very short time, and that the aggressive Army of our German friends would not have viewed with equanimity the burying alive of their friends as did our soldiers in obedience to home sentiment....

Young finished by stressing the views of Sumner, Croly, and Strong and the importance of Social Darwinism and

evangelical-inspired reform. He concluded:

God is good and He is forgiving, but He is also just, and I believe, when the day of judgement comes He will surely award the proper punishment to the malicious slanderers of His Army.

That the American Army was His Army in Cuba and the Philippines, I believe, admits no doubt. No army that had been neglected for so many years by its government and was so ill prepared for war could have achieved such remarkable success, unless He took it in His special care.⁸

Many newspaper editors and congressmen were appalled at the flagrant disregard for human rights by the army. Senator Lodge was forced to establish a congressional committee on the Philippines to review army actions. Supporters of imperialism were appointed to fill Republican vacancies on the committee. Senators Lodge, Beveridge, Proctor, and William Allison sought to reduce harmful testimony by the various witnesses. Anti-imperialist Democrats Thomas Patterson, Charles Culbertson, and Joseph L. Rawlins, however, secured injurious admissions from Brigadier General R.R. Hughes, and Governor William H. Taft. Taft specifically condemned the indiscriminate attacks on the native population in retaliation for acts of violence.⁹ The Anti-Imperialist League gained more public support. Samuel Gompers, the American Federation of Labor President, Edwin Lawrence Godkin and Horace White, editors of the New York Post, and Professor Henry Van Dyck joined Carl Schurz, Carnegie, Howells, and others in denouncing imperialism.¹⁰

Despite these difficulties, Root continued to develop his program of military reform. In early January 1902 Carter, and William Cary Sanger, the new assistant secretary of war, drafted the new militia legislation.¹¹ Root outlined the proposals to sympathetic newspaper editors in late January.¹² In the Senate, the bill was introduced by Senator Hawley, chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and in the House by Charles Dick, who had access both to the recommendations of the unofficial Butterfield Committee and to the views of Carter and Sanger. A Republican from Ohio and secretary of the Republican National Committee, he supported militia reorganisation. As a major general in the Ohio National Guard, however, he understood that most of the militia opposed any federal interference.¹³ The bill entitled "To Increase the Efficiency of the Militia and for Other Purposes" was the first attempt to modernise the militia since 1792. The bill re-defined the duties of the National Guard: equipment and training would be standardised to match that in the regular army and in times of national emergency the militia would operate under federal control as a national reserve.¹⁴

Root hoped to introduce general staff legislation in tandem with militia reform. The legislation was delayed, however, by Carter, who sought a compromise with bureau chiefs. Carter was convinced that the proposed

amalgamation of supply bureaus threatened the passage of general staff legislation. Root rejected this advice as Roosevelt pressed for a comprehensive reform bill. On February 14, 1902 the army reorganisation measures were placed before Congress.¹⁵ The bill created a new department of supply, commanded by a major general, with four sub departments responsible for army pay, all aspects of supply, and transportation. The amalgamation of supply bureaus was justified on the basis of centralisation in business, which apparently had created greater efficiency. Colonel Carter reaffirmed this when he informed Congress that departmental consolidation was in vogue with the great corporations. The second item suggested was a general staff. The Office of the Commanding General, Adjutant General's Department, and Inspector General's Office would be amalgamated to create this new body. Headed by a lieutenant general, it would include thirty-six officers who held the rank of lieutenant or above in the regular army. The lowest staff grade was captain, and each officer detailed for four years could only be re-appointed after having served two years in the field.¹⁶

Presidential selection of staff officers and control over re-appointment underlined the continued attempt to increase executive authority at the expense of Congress. The reforms were justified on the basis of certain future conflict which required an efficient military. The success

of American industry suggested organisational competence was possible by applying the methods of business organisation. In the North American Review, Carter compared the structure of a general staff to the management board of a vast railroad which manipulated international markets, carried diverse freight over vast distances, and maintained thousands of miles of track.¹⁷ Root outlined the relevance of business principles in defending the amalgamation of supply bureaus before the Senate Military Affairs Committee.¹⁸ Even those opposed to reform used business organisation examples to support their position.

Progress on the General Staff Bill was disrupted by the need for Root and Roosevelt to justify army actions in the Philippines. The poor health of Republican J.A.T. Hull, chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, also delayed the passage of army reform.¹⁹ The harsh measures used in the Philippines increased opposition both to American expansion overseas and to the military reform which proposed a stronger federal army. Roosevelt and Root were alarmed by increasing opposition to their policies. Root published a document entitled Charges of Cruelty, etc., To the Natives of the Philippines 1902 to answer opponents of imperialism. The document claimed cruelty by the army against civilians was rare but, unfortunately, highlighted light sentences given to offending soldiers.

Newspaper editors seized on one case, in which an army lieutenant killed a prisoner and was sentenced to five years hard labour. Roosevelt commuted the sentence to half pay for nine months and forfeiture of thirty-five places on the promotion lists.²⁰ The story created an uproar in the country and provided opponents of military reform and imperialism with more support.

The Commanding General sensed an opportunity to embarrass Root and supporters of army reform. He asked the President for permission to visit the Philippines because the large forces committed, the considerable expenditure involved, and the severity under which the war was being conducted made a visit necessary.²¹ Roosevelt determined to prevent unwanted interference by the ambitious Miles, denied the request. Several days later, Miles leaked his request to visit the islands to the press. Roosevelt was incensed and publicly rebuked Miles, reminding him that he was in overall command at Wounded Knee, when the army shelled helpless Indian women and children. Undaunted, Miles suggested he be appointed military governor of the islands an idea the President and Root quickly rejected.²²

In Congress opposition to the army reforms increased. The new staff legislation was attacked by bureau chiefs who saw their autonomy threatened. The Inspector General, Quartermaster General, and Paymaster General all opposed the new staff structure.²³ Commanding General Miles

produced the most hostile testimony to the bill. Relations between Miles and the administration, always difficult, degenerated to a new low. Roosevelt detested the Commanding General, and even in 1899 he had warned Lodge of Miles's obsessive desire to be president and the difficulties Root faced in dealing with Miles.²⁴ Miles was determined to remain commanding general and rejected the post of chief of staff, a position he regarded as inferior to his own.

Root and Carter were surprised by Miles's powerful testimony against all the suggested reforms.²⁵ He denounced the consolidation of the three supply bureaus and the recommendation for a general staff, which disbanded his office of commanding general. Miles argued that the creation of an army transport division only added another bureau to the three already responsible for army supply. In an appeal to past glories, he staunchly defended the current structure:

More than 100 years ago our Army was organized by the genius of Washington, Steuben, Hamilton, and others. In all wars in which we have been engaged it has in the end been victorious In my judgement, a system that is the fruit of the best thought of the most eminent and ablest military men that this country has produced should not be destroyed by substituting one that is more adopted to the monarchies of the Old World Unlike our Presidents, the sovereigns of Spain, Italy, Turkey, Austria, Germany, and Russia, are trained from their earliest boyhood with a view to commanding armies ... such as suggested might be better adopted for those countries than our Republic.

Miles warned of the dangers in military centralisation which a General Staff created. He appealed to the committee, dominated by Civil War veterans, not to abolish the office of commanding general held with distinction by Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan. He concluded by declaring: "It seems to me you are throwing the door wide open for a future autocrat or a military despot."²⁶ Miles's position as the top ranking soldier in the country and as a noted Civil War veteran increased the effect of his testimony with many senators who had themselves served in the Civil War. The Grand Army of the Republic the powerful congressional lobby group which represented Civil War veterans, endorsed Miles's views. At the conclusion of his testimony, Carter, who had been present throughout, was informed by Senator Hawley that no favourable action on the bill was likely. Hawley, impressed by Miles's testimony, joined Democrats in opposing the bill.

Root reported the effect of Miles's testimony to the President and the cabinet. After a prolonged debate, they unanimously decided to continue with the army reform proposals.²⁷ Determined to encourage further American expansion overseas, Roosevelt, Hay, Root, and others knew that future conflict was certain future American greatness depended on the ability to hold possessions in the Pacific, control Asian trade, and defend American interests in the Caribbean and Americas. Root openly

admitted to Carnegie, a staunch anti-imperialist, the desire of Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans to control the Caribbean from the, "point of Florida to the gateway of the proposed Isthmian canal."²⁸ The continued attempts to buy the Danish West Indies and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty on the isthmian canal underlined this statement. In late January 1902, the Senate supported Neo-Hamiltonian policies and approved the purchase of the Danish West Indies, but the Danish Rigsdag rejected the offer. The Danish government only agreed to a sale in 1917 and after a national plebiscite, the islands of St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. Martin were purchased for \$25 million.

Certain of full cabinet support for military reform, Root and Carter planned the counter attack against their opponents. Root arranged for retired generals Schofield, and Merritt to testify before Congress. Both men were famous Civil War veterans with distinguished military careers. Root hoped their testimony would negate that of Miles, who claimed to represent the army past and present.²⁹ Carter was assigned to advise both Schofield and Merritt, while Root approached Senator Francis M. Cockrell for his support in putting helpful questions to both witnesses during their testimony before Congress.³⁰ The Secretary of War attempted to enlist supportive testimony from other retired and serving officers. Apathy, and a reluctance to testify against colleagues and

superiors, led to a poor response. Among senior officers, only Brigadier General George W. Davis in the Philippines and retired General Grenville Dodge agreed to testify.³¹

Throughout the spring the Senate Military Affairs Committee remained hostile to all of Root's reforms. In early April 1902, the committee rejected the proposed nomination of Captain William Crozier to replace Brigadier General Buffington as ordnance chief.³² Root continued to stress the need for a general staff and circulated favourable information including his report as secretary of war for 1902 to twelve leading newspapers.³³ General Corbin coordinated the publicity campaign and used his knowledge of the press, army, and government to maximise the impact of documents supporting military reorganisation. Roosevelt gave Root his full support, despite opposition from Congress, staff bureaus, and General Miles. The President regarded the general staff as an important policy to strengthen federal government and to equip America for further expansion overseas.³⁴

Miles and his supporters threatened the implementation of reform. Roosevelt was bitter at the Commanding General's failure to serve the administration and its policies. The President was further angered when Miles cast doubt on whether Roosevelt participated in the famous charge up San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American War.³⁵ Roosevelt responded to these attacks in a letter to

Root, bitterly denouncing the Commanding General:

During the six months that I have been President, General Miles has made it abundantly evident by his actions that he has not the slightest desire to improve or benefit the Army, and to my mind his actions can bear only the construction that his desire is purely to gratify his selfish ambition, his vanity, or his spite. His conduct is certainly incompatible, not merely with the intelligent devotion to the interests of the country, but even with intelligent devotion to the interests of the service.³⁶

The poor relations between the Senate Military Affairs Committee and the administration, caused by Miles's testimony, made future reform seem doubtful. The Commanding General sought to embarrass the government further when in early April 1902, he again raised the issue of atrocities in the Philippines. Miles passed confidential information on several incidents to members of the Senate.³⁷ The General again requested permission to visit the army fighting in the Philippines. Root agreed and encouraged Miles to also tour Europe and Russia. This apparent defeat for the Secretary of War was actually a clever ploy to isolate the most persistent critic of military reform by sending him abroad. Miles sailed from San Francisco in the late spring on a trip that would take several months.

On April 9 Schofield and Merritt appeared before the Senate. Schofield, a long-time supporter of military reorganisation, proceeded to counter effectively the testimony of General Miles. He recalled the chaos in the

army created by a divided command structure. The past highlighted only the frustration produced by divided command. General Winfield Scott left Washington in disgust for New York; General Sherman moved to St. Louis frustrated and angry; and General Sheridan, who remained in Washington, became ill. Schofield argued that all the great generals of the past, including Washington, advocated centralised command. He admitted German influence in the general staff idea but denied the system proposed would lead to military autocracy. The general praised the benefits of army education, the suggested amalgamation of bureaus, and emphasised the benefits of "efficiency," "professionalism," and stronger federal control over the army.³⁸ Merritt seconded Schofield's arguments and stressed how consolidation of staff bureaus would reduce friction and increase efficiency.³⁹

The testimony of these two senior army officers and respected Civil War veterans rallied Republican support for military reform. The testimony of Brigadier General Davis, a commander in the Philippines, added further support to military reform, when he claimed a general staff would have prevented the organisational disasters of the Spanish-American War.⁴⁰ In late May the Senate reconsidered military reform and signaled a change of heart by confirming the appointment of two reforming officers, Crozier and Davis, as ordnance chief and judge

advocate general respectively.⁴¹ Root had succeeded in reopening the debate on army reorganisation.

Abroad, Cuba was granted independence on May 20, 1902. America retained military bases in the island and kept control of Cuban foreign policy. The intentions of Germany and Japan continued to concern Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. In Cuba, Wood reported "official coolness" between American officials and German seamen during the independence celebrations.⁴² In the Philippines, suspicion over Japanese expansion in the Pacific increased. Chaffee and Davis warned Root of substantial Japanese forces moving into Formosa and Java. The army command in the Philippines recommended a permanent garrison of 35,000 men both as evidence of American commitment to the islands and as a warning to Japan.⁴³ The future defence of the Philippines and guerrilla war on outlying islands continued to distract Root from military reform.

Throughout the summer, the "Waller trial," covered extensively by the press, added to political scandal over army actions in the Philippines. Major Littleton Waller, a marine, was under the command of Jacob Smith in Samar. "Hell-Roaring Jack" ordered Waller and his command to kill all natives over ten years of age. Waller ignored the order and attempted to traverse the unknown mountainous jungle of Samar to find the main rebel camp. The expedition failed and over half the company was taken

sick. Waller, ill with a fever, ordered twelve local guides shot when it was discovered that they planned to lead the weakened force into a trap. The incident was reported to Root.⁴⁴ The Secretary of War, aware of criticism over light sentences for officers who killed indiscriminately, had Waller brought to trial. Root hoped the trial of a marine officer would redirect criticism from his department to the navy. Unfortunately, Waller still had a copy of Smith's orders, which he read to the court. Waller was acquitted and Jacob Smith arrested. Root and the army command in the Philippines were shocked by these events. The Secretary of War sought to have Smith pronounced insane, but not enough doctors would confirm the diagnosis.⁴⁵ Smith was found guilty and was retired from active service. Roosevelt was appalled at Smith's "loose talk" during the trial and his defence of various arbitrary killings.⁴⁶ The army supported Smith throughout the trial, and Chaffee, Young, and Bell all pressed unsuccessfully for an acquittal.

The slow progress of general staff reform, militia reorganisation, and the Waller trial, all depressed Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. As the spring session of Congress came to an end, however, two important Neo-Hamiltonian measures were approved by Congress. On June 28 the Senate passed the Isthmian Canal Act, authorising the financing and building of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. In

the event the President could not obtain a concession from the Panama Canal Company of France - which he eventually did for forty million dollars - he was to negotiate a treaty with Columbia. A few days later, the Philippine Government Act was approved declaring the Philippine Islands an unorganised territory and all inhabitants territorial citizens of the United States. A presidential commission was authorised to govern the new territory. On July 4 Roosevelt granted amnesty to all political prisoners in the Philippines in an attempt to end the war. No agreement was reached on militia reform or general staff legislation, and they remained to be re-introduced in the autumn session of Congress.

On July 14, 1902 Root promoted his military adviser William H. Carter to brigadier general. Three days later Tasker Bliss, another strong supporter of military reform and Wood's deputy in Cuba, also received his promotion to brigadier general.⁴⁷ Major General Arthur MacArthur retired, and Brigadier General John C. Bates gained his second star in the reorganisation of army command. Wood and Bliss returned to America immediately after the implementation of Cuban independence. Wood stayed in the White House with his friend the President while he waited for re-assignment.⁴⁸ Bliss was appointed to the War College Board which, with the failure to pass general staff legislation, continued to operate as a de facto

general staff.⁴⁹ Major General Young chaired the Board, and the other members were: Brigadier General Carter, Chief of the Artillery Wallace Randolph, Chief of Engineers George Gillespie, Major W.B. Beach, and Major H.A. Greene.⁵⁰ Root encouraged these men to discuss planning and preparation for future conflicts. The Secretary of War also directed the Board to recommend a system of continuing officer education for the 1,500 new lieutenants commissioned due to army expansion. To deal with the training of these officers, J. Franklin Bell was reassigned from the Philippines to command the Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Colonel A.L. Mills was appointed superintendent of the Military Academy. Both were appointed ex officio members of the War College Board and were instructed to follow its directives.⁵¹

In June Germany invited three senior American army officers to attend their summer military manoeuvres. Root and Roosevelt decided to send Corbin, Young, and Wood.⁵² Young and Corbin left early in July, while Wood left later with Root, who was a member of the commission to decide the U.S.-Canadian border in London. Root's associates on the commission were Senator Lodge and former Senator George Turner. The President instructed Root to secure as much of the Pacific coastline as possible, advice unpopular with Secretary of State Hay, who sought better Anglo-American relations.⁵³ Roosevelt, however, was

determined to control the North American Pacific coast and to ensure American domination of Asian trade. On July 24 Root and Wood set sail from New York on the S.S. Savoie, to London and Le Havre respectively. Corbin, Young, and Wood were not to return to America until early October. While Root was away, Sanger was appointed acting secretary of war, and Carter was adjutant general, deputising for Corbin.⁵⁴

Wood arrived in Le Havre on July 24 and was greeted by prominent French officials. After a night in France he left for a holiday in Spain. A week later Wood joined his colleagues in Berlin. The three officers spent two weeks in Germany, as guests of the Kaiser, visiting military schools and observing the army manoeuvres.⁵⁵ The visit was covered extensively by the press in America. Corbin's comment that the German army was the best in the world was widely quoted. In the New York Sun, a paper supportive of military reform, Miles's contention before Congress that a system good enough for Grant and Sherman was good enough for today was dismissed by Corbin as "oratorical rot." The three officers enjoyed the publicity, national attention, and their frequent dinner engagements with the Kaiser. The officers described the German leader as similar to an enterprising president of an American railroad. Such business analogies revealed the high reputation American business organisation enjoyed among senior officers.⁵⁶

Not all the press comment on the trip was favourable. Democrats and anti-imperialist opponents of a large professional army criticised the visit. One paper characterised it as "The Terrible Spectacle in Berlin" while others variously reported the visit as "repugnant to Quaker blood" and "whetting the American appetite for bloodshed."⁵⁷ These emotive headlines underlined the deep divisions in America over policies advocating imperialism, a stronger executive, and a professional military. After two weeks in Germany, Corbin, Young, and Wood left for Paris having been invited to the French manoeuvres.

France had attempted to reform its army after the disastrous defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. To solve its problems, the army attempted to use German military ideas. The decision to introduce German military institutions also presented France with the problem of maintaining democratic control over its army.⁵⁸ Unable to resolve this dilemma the army produced an ineffective command structure. The chief of staff, a junior brigadier general, acted as secretary to the war minister. This general had no control over staff bureaus, and often more than twenty officers outranked him.⁵⁹ Military reform suffered in a political process which produced thirty-two governments, and twenty-six ministers of war between 1870 and 1900. Political instability was compounded by the Dreyfus affair in which a Jewish army captain was wrongly

convicted for treason. The Dreyfus controversy divided the army and created public suspicion of the military.⁶⁰

France had little to offer America on the subject of military reorganisation. Young and Wood spent their time at dinner parties, visited Switzerland, and toured Monaco. Wood was irritated at the lack of time spent observing the French army. He dismissed Monaco as thoroughly rotten with its dependence upon gambling and high suicide rate.⁶¹

In early October Corbin, Young, and Wood left France for Great Britain. Root, having completed his work on the U.S.-Canadian Boundary Commission, had already left for New York. The Secretary of War contacted military theorist Spencer Wilkinson during his visit, and the two men discussed in London how to create an effective military system in a democracy.⁶² These discussions between Wilkinson and the Secretary of War were to prove invaluable in helping Root formulate ideas for American military reform.

The reception given to Root, Corbin, Young, and Wood in Britain emphasised the developing relationship between the two powers. All four men were deluged with requests to attend dinner parties and various social functions. The date of Wood, Corbin, and Young's departure was postponed from October 18 until November 1, 1902 to accommodate new engagements. All three dined with King Edward, Lord Roberts, Kitchener, Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain,

James Bryce, and Roosevelt's mess mate in the Spanish-American War, First Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Lee. The cordial welcome and willingness of the American party to enjoy British hospitality to the full contrasted sharply with the formal two-week stay in Berlin. Root, Wood, Corbin, and Young all visited British military establishments and discussed military reform and colonial government in detail with their hosts. On October 30 Wood, Young, and Corbin left London and the following day boarded the St. Louis, bound for New York.⁶³

The informal Anglo-American alliance grew stronger while suspicion of Germany increased. Corbin, Young, and Wood were sent to Germany not only to view the German general staff and war college but also to assess the abilities of a potential enemy. In America, the war college emphasised increasing suspicion of Germany, with its first special study of future conflict. The college produced a planned response to a German attempt to prevent America from seizing Santo Domingo and Haiti.⁶⁴ On his return to America, Wood produced a detailed analysis of the German army for Root and Roosevelt. He discussed potential weakness in the use of cavalry, ineffective company level command, and the strength of their artillery.⁶⁵

Root returned home and decided to resign as secretary of war. Happiest in New York with his lucrative corporate

law practice, he disliked public speaking and faced pressure from his shy wife to leave public office. In late September he informed Roosevelt of his decision. He agreed to remain in the cabinet until March 1903, allowing one last attempt to get militia reform and general staff legislation through Congress.⁶⁶ On October 4, 1902, Root wrote to the Army and Navy Journal reaffirming the influence of business organisation on military reform proposals:

The trust is an evolution rather than a survival, and it represents the furthest advance of the process of concentration in the business world. Its development has been harmonious and logical Improved machinery, better methods of distribution and stricter attention to small details of management have resulted in enormous reductions in operating expenses The trust ... has placed the United States foremost among the industrial nations. We take it therefore, that if the trust per se is a menace to American industry then the Army per se is a menace to American liberty. The trust is a highly organized kind of energy of one kind and the Army a highly organised kind of energy of another kind. In both power is supplemented by responsibility. The preciseness, simplicity, economy, and thoroughness of the methods of military establishment are clearly reflected in the conduct of the successful trust. The analogy between the two is unmistakable.⁶⁷

No legislative reform could be implemented until after the mid-term congressional elections in early November, 1902. Supporters of army reform remained confident that the militia bill would pass and pressed Root to continue with all his proposed reforms.⁶⁸ The Secretary of War avoided most requests to speak before the election and spent his time gathering information on

military matters. He instructed the War College Board to prepare a detailed analysis of the supplies needed to equip a force of 50,000 men to fight either in the Atlantic or Pacific.⁶⁹ These requirements were presented to Congress. On November 4, the results of the election were announced. Both major parties gained seats from minor parties or vacant seats. The Republicans however, maintained a fifty-seven to thirty-three majority in the Senate. In the House of Representatives the total number of seats rose from 357 to 386, and the Republicans kept their majority over the Democrats, 208 to 178. On November 9 Young, Corbin, and Wood arrived in New York.⁷⁰ The end of the election and return of important senior officers were quickly followed by the re-introduction to Congress of militia reform and general staff legislation.

Root implemented a propaganda campaign endorsing military reorganisation. In late November, copies of Root's annual report as secretary of war for 1902 were distributed to sympathetic newspapers and businessmen, including Paul Danna of the New York Sun, R.L. Fern of the New York Tribune, J.P. Morgan, and Richard McCurdy, President of Mutual Life Insurance.⁷¹ The normally reticent chairman of the War College Board, Major General Young, joined in enlisting commercial support for army reform. In a speech to businessmen in Cleveland, he argued that any increase in American exports depended upon the

creation of an efficient army. The General defended American policy in the new territories as humane and civilised and warned of the dangers posed by European competition. Young continued: "If we wish to gain the supremacy in commerce in the East, we must maintain a military force in the Philippine Islands that can act instantly ... at any point in the East and that fact must ... be understood by all Oriental people." He finished by promoting military preparedness as the best guarantee of peace stating: "The larger and more efficient the force, the more widely its strength of arms be delayed."⁷² The speech was well received and emphasised the alliance between many business leaders and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans.

In early December congressional hearings on the various military reforms resumed. Root was confident of success with General Miles, a main opponent of reform, still abroad. Many military reformers thought future conflict would involve mass armies under central control. The professional army was only the basic structure for this larger military force.⁷³ Trained reserves were vital to provide the manpower for armies in excess of 100,000 men. To achieve this goal, militia reform was of great importance. Military reformers proposed a voluntary national reserve force to consist of 100,000 veterans under federal control. In an attempt to weaken state and

local power, the National Guard would be relegated to a position as second volunteer reserve.

The National Guard Association was appalled at these proposals, and proud of its role in national defence it quickly mobilised opposition to the proposal. Congressmen were lobbied by state politicians and National Guard officers to change the bill. Confronted with such opposition, the War Department was forced to compromise.⁷⁴ National Guard officers recognised the need for reform and suggested mandatory summer training camps, inspections by the regular army, and an end to political appointment or election of officers. The Guard rejected plans to replace them with a national reserve and upheld the importance of local identity and organisation.⁷⁵ In a compromise, the War Department reluctantly agreed to accept the National Guard as the first reserve.

On December 4 Root introduced the compromise militia reform bill. In his speech announcing the legislation, he attacked the obsolete basis on which the National Guard operated. Organised without standardised education, equipment, and training, the Guard failed in the Spanish-American War to provide an effective reserve.⁷⁶ The new militia bill recognised the National Guard as the first volunteer force, while the remainder of the male population between the ages of eighteen and forty-five was termed the unorganised reserve.⁷⁷ The bill extended

federal power. The Guard accepted federal funding; joint army-National Guard exercises were introduced; militia officers were to attend war college courses; and all equipment was standardised regular army issue. This compromise legislation made rapid progress through Congress and was passed as the Dick Act on January 21, 1903. The new act preserved the state organisation of the National Guard but established greater federal control over the reserve. The issue of deploying the Guard abroad remained politically contentious. The Attorney General, encouraged by Roosevelt and Root, announced that the legislation clearly permitted the president to deploy the Guard abroad.⁷⁸ Opposition to the deployment of the militia in foreign wars, however, refused to disappear. Over ten years later, in 1917, Congress challenged the right of president Woodrow Wilson to send the National Guard to Europe during World War One.

One week after the militia bill was introduced to Congress, the equally contentious army reform bill was tabled before the relevant committees. The bill proposed a general staff and chief of staff to replace the divided army command structure (see Appendix 1). The office of commanding general was replaced by a chief of staff. The Inspector General's Department and Adjutant General's Office were abolished to create the general staff. The Pay Department, Quartermaster Corps, and Commissary Department were amalgamated into one division of supply.

The general staff could consist of three general officers, detailed for four years by the president from serving general officers. Four colonels, six lieutenant colonels, and twelve majors were detailed from the army, under rules of selection determined by the president. All officers appointed to the general staff served four-year appointments and, upon completion of their tour of duty, returned for at least two years to a field command. Root and other army reformers hoped fixed-term appointments would end animosity and jealousy between staff and line officers. All operational planning would be controlled by the general staff. Unlike the old system, there would be no division of responsibility between the top general of the army and secretary of war. (see Appendix 2).

Root used business analogies to explain the reforms to Congress. In response to a question from Senator Foraker, he explained the need for improvement:

You are in the position of a railroad company without a railroad manager as if the president of a railroad company who is not a railroad man were to undertake to run the railroad by dealing directly with the general passenger agent and the chief of motive power and the heads of the different departments of the railroad. It is impossible for any civilian secretary to perform this duty.⁷⁹

Despite support from powerful men in Congress, the proposed legislation was soon in trouble. The supply bureau chiefs and Inspector General Breckinridge opposed

the amalgamation of their departments. Congress attacked the presidential appointment of general staff officers as an unnecessary extension of executive authority. Promotion by merit was criticised both by middle-ranking officers as a threat to their rightful promotion and by Congress as a dangerous expansion of presidential authority.⁸⁰ In response to this opposition, Carter and Root introduced a modified general staff bill. The proposed merger of the supply bureaus was dropped, and the Inspector General's Office was retained. Vacancies created by general staff detail would not be filled until the general staff proved its use.⁸¹ This compromise removed opposition from powerful bureau chiefs to reform. Opposition in Congress, however remained high, despite favourable testimony from Root, Schofield, Young, Carter, and others.⁸² Root enlisted Roosevelt's help to convince Congress to pass the bill. In early January, Roosevelt met Richardson, the House minority leader, in an attempt to prevent further Democratic opposition.⁸³

In the Philippines, General Miles still attempted from far away to discredit the administration during the delicate negotiations on military reform. He forwarded a report to the War Department and president which supported claims of army brutality in the islands. The report charged the army with torture, unnecessary death, corruption, and abuses of civil rights. Roosevelt and Root

prevented publication of the information gathered by Miles, because the President was determined to give Congress no further excuse for postponing military reform.⁸⁴

Corbin continued the public relations offensive. In a speech before businessmen, he stressed the Neo-Hamiltonian belief that international conflict was certain and that the prudent response was military preparedness.⁸⁵ The Neo-Hamiltonian view of the world was given credence by the widespread reporting of international commercial competition. Many leading articles warned of German expansion in Latin America, European encroachment in Central America, and the danger of losing the "vital" Asian market to Europe or Japan. Newspapers compared American and European industrial performance and criticised neglect of the merchant navy, as Britain and Germany expanded their fleets. These press stories were taken seriously by business leaders and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans who were convinced American greatness depended on overseas markets.⁸⁶ The battle to implement the general staff reforms continued.

Root was determined to provide the army with the same centralised departmental system that existed in large business concerns.⁸⁷ The scale of War Department operations made reliance on talented individuals for effective command inefficient and dangerous. American

business and the German general staff system provided the answer. Industrial vice presidents, like a general staff, concentrated on long-term planning. General managers, in charge of daily operations, were similar to staff officers with field commands. Root, who had worked extensively as a corporate lawyer, frequently made this analogy in explaining how a general staff would work.⁸⁸

Throughout January, 1903 hearings on military reorganisation continued in Congress. Generals Young, Carter, and Corbin all testified for a second time.⁸⁹ Brigadier General Crozier, the new ordnance chief, and Davis the judge advocate general, broke ranks with other bureau chiefs and endorsed change.⁹⁰ On January 7, 1903 the general staff bill achieved unexpected success in the House of Representatives. Root's compromise, which kept the supply bureaus and Inspector General's Office, passed by 154 votes to fifty-two.⁹¹ General Miles, who was on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, heard the news weeks later when he reached Paris.⁹² In early February the bill was approved by the Senate. Brigadier General Fred C. Ainsworth, head of the Army Records and Pensions Department, succeeded in getting one last amendment accepted. In a subtle, but significant change to the wording of the bill, the chief of staff would supervise but not command the staff bureaus.⁹³ Carter hoped bureau chiefs would accept the chief of staff's authority, and

would ignore any ambiguity in the legislation.

Unfortunately bureau chiefs frequently challenged general staff authority in later years.⁹⁴ Roosevelt and Root agreed to introduce the staff system, which abolished the rank of commanding general, one week after General Miles retired on August 8, 1903.⁹⁵ These final concessions ensured the passage of the general staff bill. On February 14, 1903 Roosevelt signed the bill into law.⁹⁶

The General Staff Act was a triumph for Root and his adviser Carter. Carter wrote the legislation which Root requested and provided important testimony before Congress. Other officers knowledgeable on military reform, particularly Brigadier Generals Theodore Schwan and Tasker Bliss, did little to help Carter or Root.⁹⁷ Schwan wrote the most influential pamphlet published on the German army. Bliss taught at the Naval War College and was an aide to Schofield for many years. Neither officer testified before Congress, despite their long interest in military reorganisation. The Secretary of War acknowledged Carter's central role in both drafting and fighting for military reform legislation:

Special credit is due to Brigadier General William H. Carter for the exceptional ability, and military industry which he has contributed to the work of devising, bringing about, and putting into operation the General Staff Law. He brought thorough patient historical research and wide experience, both in the line and staff, to the aid of long-continued, anxious and concentrated thought upon the problem of improving military administration, and if the new

system shall prove to be an improvement the gain in the country will be largely due to him.⁹⁸

The act was a major success for Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, despite the failure to amalgamate the supply bureaus, the Ainsworth amendment, and the delay in implementation until Miles retired. The Dick Act and General Staff Act strengthened executive control over the army and promoted greater professionalism. Individualism and localism no longer dominated army command or training.

On January 22, Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans achieved another important legislative victory. The Hay-Herran Treaty, which guaranteed a ninety-nine year lease and U.S. sovereignty over a Panama canal zone, was signed with Columbia. The treaty was ratified by the Senate on March 17, 1903. The Senate also approved nine new ocean-going warships for the navy.⁹⁹ Roosevelt and his Neo-Hamiltonian supporters were delighted. On April 3, in a speech in Chicago, Roosevelt praised the new legislation that strengthened the military and approved a canal to link the American Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The speech, influenced by the Social Darwinism of Croly, Sumner, and Spencer, and the evangelicalism of Strong, praised American achievements in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Roosevelt warned, however, of the dangers of international competition and expansion and reminded his audience of recent attempts by Britain, Germany, and Italy to blockade Venezuela to collect over-due debts. America

needed to be prepared to protect and advance its position in the world. The President concluded:

I believe in the Monroe Doctrine with all my heart and soul; I am convinced that the immense majority of our fellow countrymen so believe in it; but, I would infinitely prefer to see us abandon it than to see us put forward and bluster about it, and yet fail to build up the efficient strength which in the last resort can alone make it respected by any strong foreign power whose interest it may ever happen to be to violate it There is a homely old adage which runs, "Speak softly and carry a big stick: you will go far." If the American Nation will speak softly and yet build and keep at a pitch of the highest training ... the Monroe Doctrine will go far.¹⁰⁰

Notwithstanding these legislative victories, Roosevelt and his Neo-Hamiltonian allies realised that continued American success required further policies to support the navy, foreign investment, and exports.

CHAPTER V - END NOTES

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CHAPTER SIX:
AMERICA AND THE CONTINUED EXTENSION
OF THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN

In America, the years 1903 and 1904 were a triumph for the aspirations of Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. In international relations Anglo-American friendship continued to develop, while suspicion of Japan and Germany intensified. The implementation of Root's military reforms suffered from over-confident reformers, continued staff bureau and congressional hostility, and ignorance of how to use a war college and general staff. General Miles persisted in criticising administration policies in the Philippines and even his retirement proved controversial. In 1904 Brigadier General Fred C. Ainsworth emerged as the new arch critic of Root's army reforms. Root retired as secretary of war. Roosevelt won a full term as president, despite Democratic charges of imperialism and militarism.

Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were confident of their ability and right to govern at home and abroad. The success of democratic capitalism in the Anglo-Saxon state epitomised progress and justified American imperialism. Speeches and articles reaffirmed these values.¹ Military preparedness remained the key policy to defend American progressive, democratic, and commercial ideas.² The passage of the Dick Act on militia reform and the General Staff Act were only part of the Neo-Hamiltonian

legislative program. Roosevelt and his allies remained determined to further American trade by investment abroad, civil reform in U.S. colonies and protectorates, government subsidies to the merchant marine, and support for free trade and democracy abroad.

In January 1903 Secretary of State Hay concluded the details of the Hay-Herran Treaty with the Columbian Ambassador. The agreement ceded a ten mile canal zone across the Panamanian Isthmus to the United States. America agreed to pay Columbia \$10 million dollars and an annual rent of \$250,000 for the proposed canal. When built, the canal would encourage American trade in the Pacific and give the U.S. navy greater flexibility in any future conflict, especially in any war with Japan. On February 14, 1903 Congress passed both the general staff bill and the bill creating the Department of Commerce and Labour. These two pieces of legislation underlined the Republican commitment to overseas exports and a strong federal government. The new Commerce and Labour Department was designed both to promote business exports and inform government of industrial competition at home and abroad.³ Root, like many of his colleagues, promoted American overseas trade and was concerned by foreign competition, particularly from Germany, in Central and Latin America.⁴ These measures, implemented by successive Republican administrations, greatly encouraged overseas trade. In

1900 investment abroad was less than \$1 billion dollars: by 1908, it reached \$2.5 billion dollars.⁵

The military reforms, passed in 1903, attempted to prepare America for conflict. The regular army was much larger, the general staff promised efficient management, and the militia was under greater federal control. A new scheme of military education would establish better professional standards in the army. On February 21, 1903, in an elaborate ceremony, the Secretary of War laid the cornerstone of the new Army War College.⁶ This act emphasised the lack of general staff training in the army. Despite this problem, Root remained confident the army's problems had been resolved. In his final report as secretary of war, he ignored the inexperience of those posted to the general staff and congressional opposition to change. He confidently asserted: "I do not think that any important legislation regarding the army will be advisable for some time to come."⁷ The Secretary of War underestimated the confusion which existed in the army, even among supporters of change, over the function of the war college and the general staff. Ignorance hindered the effectiveness of army reform. Root remained convinced the worst problems in the army were settled. General Carter, increasingly apprehensive about the ambiguous wording of the General Staff Act, was less certain. The General encouraged Root to promote public support for military reform, by publishing the works of Emory Upton.⁸

The improvement in Anglo-American relations continued. In late 1902 the British government responded to the military inadequacies revealed in the Boer War. Two royal commissions studied the militia and regular army. The flaws uncovered were similar to those reported in the American army at the end of the Spanish-American War. The Esher Commission reported on regular army failures in planning, logistics, training and even marksmanship. It was revealed to the King that the best twelve shots in the army, fired over 1,200 rounds, at targets from as close as 210 yards, and only scored ten hits. Lord Esher commented drily to the King, "It was not thought desirable that this record should appear in the printed evidence."⁹ As in America, British military reformers concluded that individual gallantry was no substitute for training and staff planning. Supporters of reform in both countries advocated a modern army with a staff to coordinate its actions, a reserve linked closely to the regular army, and the ability to increase greatly reserve and regular forces through volunteers.¹⁰ The debate on British military reform emphasised the new Anglo-American relationship with information on military reform freely passed between prominent American and British officials. Root was in frequent contact with his British counterpart H.O. Arnold Forster and First Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Lee.¹¹ Root

underlined the links between American and British military reformers when he wrote some years later to Spencer Wilkinson:

I do not forget, although I dare say many people do, what a great part your little book, The Brain of the Army, played in bringing to pass that both countries had some sort of an institution of that kind [general staff] in existence when the sudden emergency came.¹²

In February 1903 war broke out between Japan and Russia over control of Korea and its strategic ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. Initially one assumed Russia, a European power with superior forces, would easily defeat the oriental Japanese. The war was ignored by most Anglo-American officials. Early Japanese success due to inept Russian military leadership, however, attracted the attention of many foreign observers.¹³

In the Philippines American army commanders were increasingly uneasy after Japan easily defeated the Russian pacific fleet. In Washington, the attention of Roosevelt and Root again turned to the islands, provoked not by the emergence of Japan, but by General Miles. The Commanding General, demanded publication of his report on the Philippines, suppressed during the legislative battle over the General Staff Act. Miles accused Brigadier General Funston of ordering prisoners shot; Generals Chaffee, Hughes, and Smith, of authorising unnecessary torture; and various junior officers of abusing prisoners.¹⁴ The charges of maltreatment included the

water cure inflicted upon three priests who subsequently died. This torture involved shoving a hose down an individual's throat and repeatedly filling their bodies with water. Roosevelt and Root attempted to delay the publication by ordering Miles to provide copies for the War Department and army headquarters in Manila. The General had to comply and publication of the report was further delayed.¹⁵

On March 17, 1903 the Senate had ratified the Hay-Herran Treaty, but the Columbian government in the meantime had begun to procrastinate over the agreement. This delay to the Panama Canal irritated Roosevelt and his Neo-Hamiltonian allies. Congress alleviated this disappointment with continued support for Neo-Hamiltonian legislation. The army and the navy both secured large budget appropriations.¹⁶ In the War Department, Root continued the preparations for implementation of the General Staff Act. A review board was established to select candidates for the forty-two staff positions available, chaired by Major General Young with Chaffee, Bates, Randolph, Carter, and Bliss committee members and Major H.A. Greene as committee recorder. Any officer who was a service school graduate, who displayed administrative ability, or who held the Medal of Honor was considered for General Staff duty.¹⁷ The quality of officers selected among the lower grades was remarkably

high: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Barry, Major George Goethals, Captain John J. Pershing, Captain Peyton C. March, and Captain Joseph T. Dickman - all appointed to the staff - later became successful general officers.¹⁸

Major General Young was selected as the first chief of staff with Corbin as his deputy. Carter and Randolph, the chief of the artillery, were selected as assistants. The choice of Young was a political compromise. Roosevelt and Root were aware that many opposed promotion by merit and the general staff. By appointing a career officer, Roosevelt and Root hoped to diffuse criticism of reform. The reformers were bitterly resented throughout the army. None had served in the Civil War, all had powerful political friends, and all had served longer in staff or army schools than in operational commands. Carter and Wagner were derided for having "written books about conflict" rather than serving in the field; Wood was dismissed as "that doctor," and Bliss was widely regarded as a "pussy-footing academic."¹⁹

In contrast General Young had been promoted through the ranks. Born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1840, Young had joined the army as a private at the start of the Civil War. In September 1861 he transferred to the cavalry. During the Civil War he was promoted four times and fought in most of the big battles in the East. At Gettysburg he was wounded by a musket ball, which left his left elbow

permanently crooked. He successfully hid the injury from the army for thirty years. Appointed captain in the cavalry in 1866, he served throughout the West for the next thirty years. In 1897 he was appointed colonel of the 3rd Cavalry. He served as Roosevelt's brigade commander during the Spanish-American War. Roosevelt liked Young and thereafter took an active interest in his career. Young attended the German manoeuvres in 1902, was the first president of the war college, and chaired the selection panel for the general staff.²⁰ Roosevelt and Root hoped these appointments would prepare Young for his new role as chief of staff. Young never attended West Point or any of the service schools during his army career. A good soldier, he was to prove an inadequate chief of staff. This attempt to make Root's army reforms more palatable to many career soldiers weakened the effectiveness of the general staff and war college.

Root remained confident the army reforms would ensure an effective military system. The decision by Inspector General Breckinridge, a strong opponent of reform, to retire early, was taken as evidence that the reorganisation would work. Officers supportive of the changes already commanded the Artillery, Signal Corps, Ordnance Department, and Judge Advocate General's Office. Breckinridge's retirement gave Root a further opportunity to strengthen support for the new system.²¹ On March 17

the Secretary of War wrote a long letter to the Washington Times outlining the various changes in army organisation. He attacked critics of reform claiming the changes were a natural extension of those begun by Generals Scott, Grant, and Sherman. He again stressed preparedness, as the prudent and efficient response to future conflict, and concluded the war college and general staff would soon prove to be indispensable.²²

Confident the army reorganisation would prove successful, Root pressed Roosevelt to let him return to his law practice in New York. The President was reluctant to let the most successful member of his cabinet leave and tried to persuade Root to remain in office until the presidential election the following year. The Secretary of War insisted he be allowed to leave as soon as possible. Roosevelt wrote to Taft, governor of the Philippines, asking him to return home and replace Root.²³ Taft consulted his family and then wrote to the President that he had "no knowledge of army matters and no taste for or experience in politics."²⁴ Roosevelt continued to press Taft to take the post. On April 18, 1903 another staunch opponent of reform, Quartermaster General M.I. Luddington, announced his retirement. Root, regarded this as further evidence that army reorganisation was gaining wider acceptance.²⁵ Confident of success he pressed Roosevelt to announce a new secretary of war.

The Secretary of War ignored continued confusion among officers over the role of the general staff and war college. Bliss, a noted supporter of reform, struggled to define the purpose of the Army War College and contacted his old colleagues at the Naval War College for advice.²⁶ Carter and Wood, important champions of reform, sought field commands in the Philippines to improve future promotion chances. Root convinced Carter to remain as assistant chief of staff for six months. Carter's professional rival, Leonard Wood, was assigned to the Philippines. Wood left for Manila via Europe, North Africa, and India.²⁷ In May 1903 Wood arrived in Egypt, where he spent two weeks with Lord Cromer who headed the British protectorate. Wood sought to learn from him and from other British colonial officials in Aden and India, all he could about colonial government. The General was well received by British officials throughout his trip, which emphasised the cordial relations between Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans and the British establishment.²⁸

In Washington Roosevelt's administration continued to defend American expansion abroad by announcing plans to fortify Hawaii against attack. The attention of the Secretary of War and President remained focused on the Pacific as General Miles returned from his world tour and published his report on atrocities in the Philippines. Published first in the Army and Navy Journal on May 2, the

report soon appeared in the national press.²⁹ The General accused the army of illegally occupying church property, inflicting water torture on prisoners, and having indiscriminately killed innocent civilians. He was particularly critical of the actions of Generals Chaffee, Bell, and Smith after the Balangiga Massacre. Miles denounced General Bell for implementing a policy of concentration, which placed villagers in crowded camps with little food, while those outside the camps were killed. Taft supported these claims and estimated 75,000 people had died of disease and that ninety percent of livestock had been slaughtered due to indiscriminate army policies.³⁰

Roosevelt, Root, and many army officers were furious at these attempts to re-open charges of army atrocities in the islands. The President wrote angrily to Root: "I think that Miles must be given more credit for more low cunning than we thought. What an irredeemable blackguard and scoundrel he is, and how the jacks and fools do take to him!" He continued attacking Miles's character and demanded he be clearly vilified for challenging American imperial aspirations. The President concluded: "He has played the part of traitor to the army and therefore to the nation. His intriguing disloyalty should be manifest so that there can be no mistake about it in the future."³¹ Chaffee refused to comment on the allegations, but, at a

banquet in his honour he described Moro tribesmen as "150,000 Muslim agricultural savages," and taunted Taft's policy of local consultation saying: "They do not wish us to come into contact with them, but we love them and are going to tell them so."³²

Even bureau chiefs, who normally supported Miles, refused to endorse his criticism of the army in the Philippines. Many appointed by Root had no sympathy for the Commanding General, but even among long-serving staff officers, his comments provoked anger. Commissary General Frank Weston was furious at claims his department supplied sub-standard rice to concentration camps in the Philippines. Judge Advocate General Davis announced there was no basis for charges against the army, and other Root appointees such as Crozier and Gillespie rebuked Miles in the press.³³ Neo-Hamiltonian concern that the charges by Miles would increase opposition to U.S. imperialism proved unfounded. Many papers, aware of Miles's self-centred manipulation of information in his quest to become president, dropped the story. As early as April 1902, the New York Times had dubbed him "Miles Gloriosus" in an article attacking his self-centred promotion of his own affairs. The legitimacy of many charges he made were dismissed by an apathetic public as the desperate attempts of a man trying secure a presidential nomination.³⁴

Progress continued on implementing Root's army reforms. In June the first joint army-navy manoeuvres took place. Bliss produced a report on the functions of a general staff to help Young understand his new role. Root was concerned at the inability of army officers to understand the application of the new institutions. He directed Bliss to send his report on the general staff to all bureau chiefs.³⁵ The Secretary of War asked Bliss to prepare a further report on the use of the army war college. Root hoped these reports would eliminate uncertainty surrounding the use of his reforms.³⁶ In mid-June Roosevelt approved the assignment of all general staff officers. Young was confirmed as chief of staff, Corbin as his deputy, Carter as assistant chief of staff, and Bliss as head of the army war college. Root realised that Corbin was better qualified to be chief of staff, but the Adjutant General was not popular in the army, or with the president. A strict disciplinarian who believed in professional soldiers, he upset Roosevelt with comments denigrating the contribution made by volunteer forces during the Spanish-American War.³⁷ Root hoped Corbin and Carter would be future leaders of the general staff, once Young and Chaffee had their chance.³⁸ In late June, Root announced he would leave Washington in August to attend another session of the U.S.-Canadian Boundary Commission in London.

In the new American colonies, Taft and other reformers continued to create American institutions to promote democracy and capitalism. In the Philippines, Taft encouraged the construction of schools and the teaching of English. In Puerto Rico, on June 17, 1903 a university was established. The administration encouraged free trade with Cuba, while discouraging trade between the new protectorate and Europe.³⁹ Columbia continued to hesitate in ratifying of the Hay-Herran Treaty, which infuriated Roosevelt. He wrote to Hay: "I do not think the Bogota lot of obstructionists should be allowed permanently to bar one of the future highways of civilisation."⁴⁰ In July 1903 at an informal meeting of Panamanian businessmen in New York, agents of the Panama Canal Company and army officers, agreed on a way out: the secession of Panama from the Republic of Columbia. The solution was "unofficially" accepted by Roosevelt and Hay, and plans were laid to start a revolution in Panama.

The continued extension of U.S. trade in the Americas, determination to construct a Panama Canal, and development of colonies, underlined the dominance of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas in American foreign policy. Almost two years earlier, Root had outlined these goals, which stressed the continuity in Neo-Hamiltonian foreign policy, to Charles Gardiner. The Secretary of War supported Gardiner when he asserted:

The Americas and the Pacific will be the future trade battle ground of the world. Our advantages for the trade of the Orient are already greater than any European power, because of our long Pacific coastline, our possession of Hawaii, the Philippines, the Aleutian islands and our foothold in Samoa. The isthmian canal will still further strengthen our natural advantages so that our holding the leading place in the trade of the Orient, as we have recently attained to that of the Western world is inevitable.⁴¹

In the Philippines, Taft, having sought the advice of his family, accepted the appointment as secretary of war. He wrote to Root, however, asking him to delay his resignation until the spring of 1904 to which the Secretary of War reluctantly agreed. Taft explained that his determination to implement reform was the reason for delay. As governor of the Philippines, Taft was involved in implementing a new criminal code, an internal revenue act, districting of the islands for legislative seats, and creating a land regulation act for settlement and sale of lands. Taft hoped to have these measures in place before he returned home.⁴²

In the War Department changes in personnel and confusion over the exact role of the general staff continued to cause problems. Assistant Secretary of War William Cary Sanger, who had worked on the Dick Act, decided to retire. An expert on militia organisation and staunch supporter of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas, he was hard to replace. Retired General Robert S. Oliver was appointed as the new assistant secretary. Oliver, like Sanger, was from New York State. He was a Republican with strong Neo-

Hamiltonian links, which included his brother-in-law Joseph Choate, the American ambassador to France and later to Britain.⁴³ The inexperienced Oliver was almost immediately appointed acting secretary of war, due to Root's imminent departure for London. The first operational months of the general staff were overseen by an inexperienced acting secretary of war. Root did not return from the meetings on the Alaskan Boundary Commission until late October 1903.⁴⁴ The confusion over the role of the general staff intensified. Bureau chiefs, including Paymaster General Bates, the new Inspector General Brigadier General G.H. Burton, and the Chief of Engineers Brigadier General Gillespie, complained about poor representation on the general staff. No constructive relationship developed between the staff bureaus and the general staff. Bureau chiefs demanded more men, money, and resources. Only Chaffee, Corbin, Carter, and Crozier openly supported the general staff. Corbin and Chaffee advocated promotion for general staff officers to increase their authority, while Crozier and Carter suggested clearer wording of legislation to stress general staff preeminence.⁴⁵ The President added to confusion over general staff functions by failing to give clear direction and blandly called for practical efficiency, and not theory, to be the goal of the War Department.⁴⁶ Inexperienced in staff work, most of the officers assigned to the general staff remained uncertain of their new role

within the army. The War Department attempted to explain new duties, by providing each officer with a copy of Brigadier General Theodore Schwan's report on the German army. Published in 1894 and entitled "The Organisation of the German Army," this inadequate guide was all that was available to new staff officers.⁴⁷

Outside the War Department criticism of Root's army reforms continued among congressmen, local politicians, and some newspapers. The New Orleans Times-Picayune summed up the fears a strong federal army still caused among many people:

It is already clear that the people behind the General Staff idea are preparing to create a military oligarchy within the army that will override all the various bureaus of the War Department and dominate everything within the army that is worth dominating. In a word, the Chief of Staff will be practically the Commanding General of the Army - not nominally as General Miles has been, but actually. The Chief of Staff should have no such extensive powers as the new regulations propose to give him, particularly over troops actually on the scene. It is entirely unsafe to give a chief of staff resident in Washington the power to negate movements of generals commanding in the field.⁴⁸

Despite these problems implementation of Root's army reforms continued. A joint army-navy board was created to promote greater inter-service cooperation which was a major problem in the Spanish-American War.⁴⁹ Root and Roosevelt agreed on a program of army promotions over the next two years to advance officers supportive of army reform including Corbin, Wood, and Carter.⁵⁰

On August 8, 1903 Lieutenant General Miles retired from the War Department. Roosevelt, who loathed Miles for his opposition to army reform, criticism of imperial expansion, and personal attacks on his war record refused to publish the normal glowing retirement tribute of service. Many Congressmen and Civil War veterans were angered by the failure to acknowledge Miles's retiral and demanded a proper tribute. None was forthcoming. Root wrote to the President in support of his stand:

.... If he had been a good officer in that position (Commanding General) faithful, loyal, useful, the holding of the position would have entitled him to higher consideration, but he has been a bad officer, unfaithful, disloyal, injurious to the service, worthy of blame rather than praise, it seemed to me the mere holding of the office entitled him to no more favourable treatment....

These sentiments were endorsed by Roosevelt, and Miles's last communication was dismissed by Root, when he stated bluntly:

.... You will see that he proposes to abandon five regiments of cavalry and turn them into bicycle, motor cycle, and automobile regiments. Colonel A.A. Pope, one of the General's closest friends ... who has just written a very violent letter regarding the retirement order, is one of the leading bicycle and automobile manufacturers of the country⁵¹

In retirement, Miles continued to oppose reform and acted as an adviser to congressmen resisting army reorganisation plans.

On August 15, 1903, the official transition from commanding general, to chief of staff took place. Young

became the first American chief of staff. A few days later Root publicly announced his intention to resign from the War Department on January 31, 1904.⁵² On August 21 Root left New York with his family, bound for London and his work on the Alaskan Boundary Commission.⁵³ Before he left, he addressed the new general staff at a dinner held in his honour. In a typical Neo-Hamiltonian speech he attacked those who wished to rely on individualism, volunteerism, and localism. Progress was defined in terms of organisation - such as business trusts or the new general staff - which allowed professional individuals to advise government which ruled the masses. The war college provided the means to educate a new professional officer corps. The general staff allowed professional officers to direct the army under the secretary of war and president (see Appendix 2). Root concluded by praising Young and Corbin for the sacrifices they had made to help reorganise the army.⁵⁴ Corbin was unhappy at not being promoted to chief of staff. As deputy to Young he had lost much of his old power. Secretary of State Hay, Lieutenant General Schofield, and Root pressed Roosevelt for assurances that Corbin would be appointed chief of staff in the future. The President, despite his own dislike of Corbin, agreed to consider his appointment after the retirement of Young and Chaffee.⁵⁵

Section two of the General Staff Act defined the four main goals of the general staff as: planning for national defence, issuing reports on military readiness for operations, providing expert advice to the secretary of war and field commanders while coordinating all action in the field, and performing any other military duties assigned to it by the president.⁵⁶ This broad definition of general staff activities and ignorance of staff officers produced an ineffective general staff. Captain, later General, Peyton March, a member of the first general staff, later claimed no one knew what to do. Numerous committees studied all aspects of the army without any guiding principle (see Appendix 3). March only discovered how a general staff actually worked when, as military attache in Japan, he was able to observe it work in the Russo-Japanese War.⁵⁷ The new General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, also had an inauspicious start. Bell, the commandant designate, was delayed in the Philippine Islands and only arrived in July 1903. He discovered officers attending the college had spent the year drinking, gambling, and hunting. Half the class had failed over half the college exams. Annoyed by this failure to take education seriously the war department disciplined the worst offenders. Bell a strong supporter of a professional officer corps finally forced army officers to apply themselves.⁵⁸

The general staff continued its struggle to define its purpose. Information was collected from the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications, and the Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry Boards, in an attempt to define General Staff duties. Young left Washington for Newport, Rhode Island to visit the Naval War College and discover how it operated.⁵⁹ On his return to Washington he discovered Corbin had issued orders without his approval. Young rebuked Corbin, the only senior officer with practical knowledge of army administration, who then requested a transfer.⁶⁰ In October 1903 Corbin was appointed Commander of the Department of the East and Chaffee became Deputy Chief of Staff.⁶¹ The failure of Corbin to accept his demotion further reduced the effectiveness of the general staff. Chaffee an aging Civil War veteran was untrained in army planning or administration. Roosevelt underlined his great influence on army reform by transferring Corbin and promoting Chaffee while Root was in London. The President was impressed with Chaffee, especially his distinguished service in the Civil War, Cuba, the Boxer Rebellion, and the Philippines. He hoped this appointment would end suspicion and jealousy directed at the general staff by many career army officers.⁶²

In late October Root left London to return home. The negotiations on the Canadian-Alaskan Boundary had been concluded. The American negotiating team got nearly all

the territory they demanded. The Canadian government was furious, but the treaty was further evidence of the British desire - even if it annoyed an important Dominion - to improve relations with America. Root met H.O Arnold Forster and Spencer Wilkinson during his visit as the exchange of information on military reform continued.⁶³ The Secretary of War was disappointed at the performance of the general staff during his absence. He remained confident, however, that it would, "find itself," and all would be well. In a letter to Schofield, he claimed that the major defects had been corrected, and that the army was no longer, "like a railroad without a general manager."⁶⁴ Root enjoyed the lavish praise he recieved for the successful passage of army reform. He was described as a "Hamiltonian genius" by supporters and was widely regarded as the ablest member of the President's cabinet. The Secretary of War remained determined to leave public life, however, and refused to continue as head of the War Department or to stand as the Republican candidate for governor of New York.⁶⁵

Convinced the army had the necessary institutions to perform effectively, Root focused during his remaining weeks in office on the problems of America's merchant marine. He supported criticism by businessmen of government decisions which failed to develop the merchant navy. American shipping was essential to commercial

supremacy in the Pacific and Caribbean. Root joined Senator Marcus Hanna, William Henry Vanderbilt, and others in demanding government support for this strategically important industry. These men criticised the decline in American merchant shipping from 2.5 million tons in 1865 to under 1 million tons in 1902; the high running costs faced by ship owners; and evidence that sixty-five percent of all American exports were carried by foreign ships. Politicians and businessmen determined to promote American expansion overseas found such figures unacceptable.⁶⁶

Roosevelt's administration received more bad news from the Philippines but better news from Panama. In the Philippines, Wood reported renewed fighting against Islamic Moro tribesmen in response to piracy and theft. The offensive on the islands of Mindanao and Jolo was conducted with advice from Governor Birch, the senior British official in North Borneo, which again underlined the development of Anglo-American cooperation.⁶⁷ The administration received happier news from Panama. On November 4, 1903 General Huertas, leading a force of firemen and railroad workers, declared Panamanian independent from Colombia. The American navy stood by to prevent any Colombian intervention. Two days later, Secretary of State Hay announced American diplomatic recognition of the new state. A new Panama Canal treaty was quickly concluded. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty

guaranteed the United States a hundred year lease of a ten mile canal zone, for a lump sum of \$10 million and an annual rent of \$250,000. Colonel, later Major General, George Goethals was appointed chief engineer of the new canal project, due to be completed in 1914.

In America, Young and Bliss endeavoured to clarify the functions of the war college and general staff. Bliss published a further report on the war college. The report was influenced, both by his own service in the Naval War College and his knowledge of American railroad organisations which he greatly admired.⁶⁸ The Chief of Staff devoted his time to replacing the old departmental army commands with a new divisional structure. This was the last attempt by Young to reorganise the army as he keenly awaited his retirement.⁶⁹ In late November, Root and Young published their last annual reports. Both men remained confident the army reorganisation would prove successful. Root, delighted with the passage of the General Staff Act and Dick Act, continued to underestimate the animosity this legislation provoked among congressmen, middle-ranking officers, and many staff officers.⁷⁰ In December, Carter, Root's military adviser and author of reform legislation, was posted to the Philippines. The General was keen for a field command to ensure future promotion, but his untimely departure caused more upheaval in a general staff unsure of its purpose.⁷¹ Root's

attention was diverted both by events abroad and by domestic politics, and he failed to realise the general staff needed further guidance.

The surprise success of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War and the American acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone forced Root to concentrate on events abroad and not on defining clear general staff objectives. In response to the expansion of Japanese power in the Pacific, American forces established garrison forts at Yavisa and Santa Maria in Panama. Congress recieved plans for harbour defences in Manila and a new naval station at Subic Bay in the Philippines from Secretary of the Navy Moody and Secretary of War Root.⁷² Roosevelt also pressed Congress to promote his friend Leonard Wood to major general. The attempt to promote Wood was unpopular with many army officers and congressmen, due to his rapid promotion from captain to brigadier general. Congressmen hostile to Wood accused him of corruption in Cuba and attempted to misrepresent testimony in his favour. Defending Wood and arguing for his promotion involved Root in many time-consuming visits to Congress.⁷³ The inability of the general staff to perform as expected finally attracted Root's attention, as pressure to provide an accurate assessment of American defence needs in the Pacific increased. In late November 1903, Root authorised the creation of a new three-man board to consider army

administration made up of Brigadier General Fred C. Ainsworth, Bliss, and new Adjutant General Colonel Hall.

Fred Crayton Ainsworth was popular with many Republican and Democratic politicians. Born in Woodstock, Vermont in 1852, Ainsworth joined the army as a contract surgeon in 1874. He was appointed to the Surgeon General's Office in 1886 after service in Alaska, Oregon, and Arizona. In July 1889, he was placed in charge of the Record and Pension Division of the Surgeon General's Office and Volunteer Enlistment Branch of the Adjutant General's Office. In 1892 he was promoted to colonel and head of the new Record and Pension Office.⁷⁴ This bureau was responsible for individual Civil War records and approved all war pensions. Thousands of pension claims were made each week during the 1870s, and 1880s, and the bureau failed to keep pace with demand. Ainsworth introduced a new system of record keeping which reduced the backlog of claims. Congressmen were delighted that they could quickly secure pensions for prominent constituents and praised the "business methods" of Ainsworth.⁷⁵ In 1898, all military service records for all American wars were transferred to Ainsworth's department. The Record and Pensions Office took on these extra duties, yet under Ainsworth's leadership, reduced its staff from 300 in 1894, to just forty-two in 1902. In recognition for his service he was promoted to brigadier general in March, 1899.⁷⁶

Ainsworth wanted to extend his authority to control all army records, many of which were held by the Adjutant General's Office. Corbin, while adjutant general, resisted any attempt to weaken the power of his department. As a member of Root's committee on army administration, Ainsworth again suggested all records be placed under his control. He argued the general staff reduced the role of the adjutant general's office, since many of its command functions were now performed by the general staff. Only its role as keeper of army records, such as orders issued, remained intact. Colonel Hall, unlike Corbin, was not disposed to challenge these assertions or Ainsworth's proposal that all records be placed under his control. Ainsworth cleverly manipulated Roosevelt and Root's admiration of business methods by suggesting that his ideas matched those occurring in business organisation. Root encouraged Hall to accept the offer and promised him a promotion to brigadier general if he accepted. The merger centralised army records, and rewarded Ainsworth, a man who apparently represented professionalism and business efficiency. Root hoped this amalgamation would provide the general staff with a secretary who would act like the secretary to a company board of directors.⁷⁷ In early January 1904, Congress confirmed the abolition of the office of adjutant general and the appointment of

Ainsworth as military secretary. Carter, already on his way to the Philippines, wrote to the Secretary of War in alarm at this extension of staff bureau power. Root dismissed this warning, confident this measure would relieve the general staff of administrative detail and allow it to function as he envisaged.⁷⁸

On January 9, 1904 Lieutenant General Young retired as chief of staff. A distinguished Civil War and Spanish-American War veteran, he struggled for six months both to defend the general staff from its detractors and to define its function.⁷⁹ At the end of his career, with no staff training, he found it impossible to create an effective general staff. Major General Adna Chaffee, another career soldier equally ill-equipped to be chief of staff, replaced Young. Carter, Wood, Bliss, Wagner, and other knowledgeable officers were still too junior in rank to be appointed chief of staff. Congress, under pressure from those who opposed promotion by merit, continued to reject the promotion of Wood and other army reformers.⁸⁰ Chaffee, like Young, was a strong character, able to assert his authority and defend the general staff from its critics. Untrained in staff work, however, he was unable to provide the general staff with the necessary guidance as to its role within the army.

The new Chief of Staff enjoyed close links with senior British officials, including First Lord of the

Admiralty Arthur Lee and Field Marshal Earl Roberts of Khandahar. Chaffee had first met Lee in Cuba in 1898 and met Roberts, Lee, and other senior British officials many times during the next few years.⁸¹ As commander of American forces during the Boxer Rebellion, he enjoyed prolonged celebrations with British officers, when his promotion to major general was announced during the march to Beijing.⁸² Chaffee replaced MacArthur as commander of U.S. forces in the Philippines immediately after the liberation of Beijing. A staunch imperialist, he ruthlessly crushed opposition in the islands, and encouraged American citizens to settle in the archipelago. Roosevelt and Root approved of such policies, and Chaffee was rewarded with promotion to chief of staff.

Chaffee, while commander in the Philippines, had learned to distrust the Japanese. The General was aware of Japanese attempts to aid the rebel forces in the Philippines and as chief of staff, remained deeply suspicious of their future intentions. In one letter he wrote:

....The Asiatic will never love the European or American. He may be, perhaps, put in a situation which will force him to say he does, but you may be certain he does not. The Japanese are very friendly, but they do not like Europeans or Americans when it comes to a matter of like or dislike; they tolerate us, so to speak, but the feeling is different from the feelings existing between Europeans and other Europeans, Americans and Europeans, and vice versa. The Japanese smile when we tell them our affairs in the Philippines will soon be settled to our

satisfaction; they do not believe us for the reason that they think they know the islanders better than we do. They talk of a time when it may be necessary to put a hundred thousand men in Formosa. They do not adopt a humane policy, but crush resistance....⁸³

The success of Japan against Russia in Korea and Manchuria reinforced fears of Japanese intentions among senior American officials. As relations with Japan deteriorated, those with Britain continued to improve. Root continued his exchange of information on army reform with British officials.⁸⁴ In the Philippines, Wood, commander of the province of Southern Luzon, reaffirmed his friendship with British colonial officials in a letter to his friend, J. St. Loe Strachey.⁸⁵

In early 1904, Lincoln Steffens, a powerful critic of those using business as a model of efficiency, published The Shame of the Cities. The book advocated civic reform to challenge graft, privilege, and corporate corruption. Although the book did not directly attack free market big business, Steffens and other "muckracking journalists" soon specifically identified the deficiencies of business management in other works.⁸⁶ In 1906 William Hard reported in Making Steel and Killing Men that forty-six men were killed in one year at a Chicago-based U.S. Steel Plant. The American railroad industry, often the focus of great praise among army reformers, was criticised for poor safety standards that killed 328 workers each year.⁸⁷ This criticism of American business, and by implication

its management record, attracted the attention of Roosevelt. Increasingly the President was less willing to accept the glowing praise which business management received from Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. Roosevelt considered federal regulation of business to promote efficient use of resources, and tighter laws on safety at work. The willingness of the President to consider greater government regulation of business, increasingly disrupted relations with his Neo-Hamiltonian allies. Root, Lodge, Wood, and others wanted defence and foreign policy controlled by strong central government but were less enthusiastic over proposed government regulation of American business. Over the next few years these differing views increasingly divided Roosevelt and his followers from Neo-Hamiltonian and more conservative Republicans.

On February 7 Root gave his last interview as secretary of war. He recommended the continuation of the staff-line detail system, more promotion by merit, joint army-militia manoeuvres, a larger war college, and further increases in the artillery. He praised the civic reforms in Cuba and staunchly defended the acquisition of the Philippines, asserting that:

... our trade will increase as the processes of civilization go on in the islands, and particularly if the tariff on Philippine goods is reduced. The Filipinos are now acquiring wants. You cannot sell hats to bareheaded people any more than you can sell trousers to people who wear breechclouts. As the people become more advanced their wants will become

even greater and more varied. Civilization and trade move together serving them and ourselves.

He continued in words that echoed the views of the social reformer and evangelist Josiah Strong:

....But there are profits which cannot be cast up at once in dollars and cents. Our future relation with the Philippines will give us an immense advantage in the vast Pacific trade which must come into being. That fact is inevitable. But we have planted our civilization in the Philippines; we are teaching the people to love our institutions, and wherever we lift up the weak and ignorant people and teach them our ways we are serving ourselves
...⁸⁸

A few days before he left office, Root received a final letter from Carter, still enroute to the Philippines. The letter repeated the warning that the Military Secretary's Department threatened army reform. Military Secretary Ainsworth opposed promotion by merit and staff-line interchange, and he sought to limit the powers of the general staff. Ainsworth was a close friend of the new Commissary General and other staff chiefs, and Carter feared a new alliance of bureau chiefs against army reorganisation.⁸⁹ Root ignored these warnings and remained confident of success.

In mid-February Taft replaced Root as secretary of war. Taft was a civilian ignorant of both army matters and the procedures of the War Department. His nomination took place in a presidential election year, and, unlike Root, he found little time to familiarise himself with the problems and responsibilities of his new post. Confronted

with the demands of the presidential nomination and electoral process, he was happy to rely on the able administrative abilities of Ainsworth, who made himself readily available to the beleaguered secretary of war.⁹⁰ In Congress, Roosevelt found his authority weakened as the election approached. The promotion of Wood was further delayed by jealous middle-ranking officers. In a harsh attack on promotion by merit, an anonymous letter to Senator Proctor summed up the feelings of many officers:

Among recent nominations, I will mention those of General Wood to be major general; Generals Carter, Bliss, Barry and Mills to be brigadier generals. Each one of them, except Mills, was a staff officer and non-combatant when appointed general, and have not risked their skins to bullets, nor the health of their bodies by work in the field in Cuba or the Philippines Ninety-nine per cent of the army ... know there are far better and more efficient general officers than General Wood.

The officer continued his attack on promotion by merit, claiming combat veterans were ignored. He concluded with a specific attack on Wood:

But for the extraordinary promotion General Wood has already received, he would be a doctor in the Medical Department of the army, along with his classmates If Doctor Wood should receive an appointment of major general in ten years, he will then have received a greater reward than any officer of the United States Army⁹¹

The frustration felt by middle-ranking officers at their own slow promotion hampered the advancement of Wood, Carter, Bliss, and other able officers for some time to come. The close association between reform-minded officers

and Neo-Hamiltonian politicians made these officers unpopular in the army, and politicised their promotions in Congress. Despite these problems, Wood was promoted to major general on March 14, 1904. Republicans staged a surprise vote in Congress, which caught opponents unaware, and his promotion was easily confirmed.⁹²

By the spring of 1904, the Russo-Japanese War concerned both London and Washington. The comprehensive destruction of the Russian Asiatic Fleet at Port Arthur by an oriental power was greeted with alarm. In Britain the Admiralty announced the Royal Navy would match Franco-German naval forces in the Pacific. Significantly, no mention was made of any British response to American naval forces in the region.⁹³ Britain remained ambivalent over the surprising success of Japan against Russia. In 1902 the British government signed an Anglo-Japanese Treaty to undermine any Russian threat to India. Japanese intentions to control Manchuria and Korea, however, increasingly alarmed the British Foreign Office and the American army in the Philippines.⁹⁴ In London political pressure to achieve military preparedness increased. Lord Esher proposed his new plan to reform the British army. A general staff, chief of staff and increased authority for the Committee for Imperial Defence were recommended.⁹⁵ Root congratulated his British colleagues in adopting the military organisation best suited to Anglo-American

democracy. He reminded his British friends that neither the United States nor Great Britain could adopt continental European ideas of military ascendancy over the political process.⁹⁶

In America Ainsworth continued to strengthen his position as military secretary. Taft and Roosevelt accepted Ainsworth's contention that the military secretary should be one rank above other bureau chiefs. Despite objections from Root, Congress approved the promotion of Ainsworth, who became military secretary and major general. Carter, now commander of American forces in the Department of Visayas in the Philippines, pressed Root to oppose Ainsworth's increasing authority. The former Secretary of War, however, was confident Ainsworth would relieve the general staff of administrative duties, allowing it to concentrate on strategic planning and other more worthy goals.⁹⁷ Chaffee, the new chief of staff, was suspicious of Ainsworth and sought to limit his power within the army.⁹⁸ The Military Secretary responded by enhancing his reputation through referring all matters likely to cause difficulty to the assistant secretary of war. In this way he promoted the belief both in the War Department and in Congress that he was a man who got things done since he was never associated with failure. Ainsworth manipulated Army pension awards, which his office controlled, to promote himself in Congress.⁹⁹

Ainsworth's reputation continued to prosper. Taft, hard-pressed by Roosevelt's re-election campaign, increasingly delegated decisions to the Military Secretary. Chaffee, the chief of staff, and Commandant Bell at Fort Leavenworth, now paid for undermining Taft's efforts in the Philippines.

In the Pacific, concern over Japanese expansion continued to increase. In May 1904 Japan scored a second convincing victory over the Russian navy. The Russian Baltic Fleet sailed around the world to avenge the destruction of their Asiatic fleet. The fleet was intercepted and destroyed in the strait of Tsushima.¹⁰⁰ In the Philippines, Wood supported Rear Admiral William M. Folger, who responded to news of the Japanese victory by recommending a permanent naval base be established at Subic Bay. It was hoped that this new naval facility would protect U.S.- Asiatic trade, underline the American commitment to the islands, and serve as a warning to Japan.¹⁰¹ Wood warned that America was threatened if Japan dominated Korea and Manchuria and suggested international action to limit Japanese expansion. In an oblique reference to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, he dismissed the prospect of British support for Japan:


Whatever be the results of the fighting or the length of the war, the principal nations of the world cannot remain indifferent to the arrangements that must finally be concluded. The same reasons that would influence the powers in restraining Russian

aggrandizements at the cost of Chinese dismemberment and Korean vassalage in case of unqualified success of Russia, would cause them to take action to limit Japan's aspirations were her successes unqualified and her desires excessive.¹⁰²

In the Caribbean, the Japanese success led Roosevelt to press for an early completion date for the Panama Canal. On May 9 the Isthmian Canal Commission was placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel George Goethals, who was responsible directly to the Secretary of War.¹⁰³

FIGURE 2

American Expansion in the Caribbean 1898 to 1916



In the Caribbean, America continued to strengthen its control over the sea lanes between America and Panama, as the British decided to withdraw. (see Figure 2). In London, Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher replaced Walter Kerr as first sea lord at the Admiralty. Fisher, as Britain's senior admiral, recommended that British forces be withdrawn from the Caribbean and North America for service at home or in the Mediterranean. By the winter of 1904 the Royal Navy base at St. Lucia was under orders to close, and most of the ground and naval forces in Halifax, Nova Scotia and Bermuda had been withdrawn.¹⁰⁴ The new supremacy of the United States in the region was emphasised by American intervention in Santo Domingo and the subsequent "Roosevelt Corollary." In the summer of 1904, Santo Domingo faced demands for debt repayment from Germany, Italy, and Spain. The island's president, Carlos F. Morales, offered to turn all custom houses and forty-five percent of all excise duties over to America, if Roosevelt would save the island from its creditors. The President agreed in order to obstruct European powers from interfering in the island. Roosevelt justified American intervention through the "Roosevelt corollary," which he attached to the Monroe Doctrine. The amendment authorised American intervention in any state in the Western Hemisphere, which failed to meet international obligations. The President agreed in order to obstruct

European powers from interfering in the continent.¹⁰⁵ This arbitrary act emphasised the determination of Roosevelt and his Neo-Hamiltonian allies to secure American preeminence in the Caribbean, Latin America, and, with the opening of the Panama Canal, the Pacific.

In Washington the army continued its struggle to define the functions of the general staff and war college. In May 1904 Colonel Arthur Wagner and Brigadier General Bell planned to reorganise the General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. A new syllabus was introduced based upon the "applicatory method" favoured by Wagner and his teaching colleague Eben Swift. Classroom teaching was combined with practical map problems, tactical rides, and campaign planning. Swift, head of the Department of Military Art, emphasised grand tactics, general staff duties, original research in strategy and military history, logistics, and military geography.¹⁰⁶ In June Bliss unsuccessfully attempted to define the relationship between the new military secretary, chief of staff, and secretary of war. Congress added to the administrative confusion by announcing that the military secretary could report directly to the secretary of war on questions originating in his office, without informing the chief of staff.¹⁰⁷ Taft, confronted with the demands of electioneering, overall responsibility for the army, colonial administration and civil reform, and command of

the Panama Canal project, delegated more work to the efficient Ainsworth.¹⁰⁸ The general staff found its authority slowly eroded both by Ainsworth and Taft's poor regard for Chaffee and Bell.

In late June 1904, the Republican National Convention selected Roosevelt as its presidential nominee with Charles W. Fairbanks as the vice-presidential candidate. Two weeks later, the Democratic party met to finalise their party manifesto and select a presidential candidate. William Jennings Bryan, the party's candidate in 1896 and 1900, did not seek the nomination and supported the candidacy of publisher Randolph Hearst. Instead of Hearst, Alton B. Parker from New York was nominated, with Henry G. Davis from West Virginia as his running mate. The convention did adopt Bryan's policies on anti-imperialism, anti-trust measures, and direct election of senators. In his speech to the conference Bryan attacked Roosevelt as a dangerous militarist and imperialist. He pleaded with the conference to nominate "a pilot," who would lead the party "away from the Scylla of Militarism without wrecking her upon the Charybdis of Commercialism."¹⁰⁹

The presidential campaign got off to a slow start. In October, however, Miles denounced Roosevelt as a militarist. Parker, the Democratic nominee, demanded independence for the Philippines and condemned the acquisition of the Panama Canal strip. In spite of these

charges, Roosevelt he was easily re-elected.¹¹⁰ The electoral vote gave Roosevelt over 7.5 million votes; Parker nearly 6 million votes; and Eugene V. Debs, a Socialist candidate, over 4,000,000 votes. It was the largest margin of victory since 1872. In Congress the Republican Party maintained its fifty-seven to thirty-three majority in the Senate and picked up forty-three seats in the House for a 250 to 136 majority. The policy of American expansion overseas was again vindicated. Roosevelt, who had replaced the assassinated McKinley, had won a presidential election in his own right. Flushed with victory, Roosevelt announced that under no circumstances would he be a future candidate for president. The President later bitterly regretted this categorical statement.¹¹¹

In the winter of 1904 the Committee for Imperial Defence in London approved Admiral Fisher's proposals for a complete British withdrawal from the Caribbean and Canada. The decision reflected concern over German military expansion in Europe and increasing Anglo-American cooperation. In America Bliss, the head of the army war college, emphasised increasing Anglo-American friendship with a report to the Joint Army-Navy Board which identified Japan, Germany, and Russia, as likely future enemies.¹¹² In December 1904 Admiral Fisher summed up the new international order when he wrote in a confidential memo:

A new and definite stage has been reached in that evolution of the modern steam navy which has been going on for the last thirty years, and that stage is marked not only by the changes in the material of the British Navy itself, but also by changes in the strategic position all over the world arising out of the development of foreign navies. To the west, the United States are forming a navy the power and size of which will be limited only by the account of money that the American people choose to spend on it. To the east, the smaller but modern navy of Japan has been put to the test and has not been found wanting ... and a new German navy has come into existence.¹¹³

By the end of 1904 the United States and Great Britain had an informal alliance based upon a recognition of the limits of British power and a common concern over German, Japanese, and Russian territorial and military expansion. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans had achieved many of their original policy goals. The American people had repudiated anti-imperialism in the election; the United States had extended its influence in the Caribbean and Pacific; and American investment and trade overseas continued to increase rapidly. Neo-Hamiltonians were confident that their policies would continue to prosper for another four years under President Roosevelt.

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CHAPTER SEVEN
INTERNATIONAL SUSPICION AND
FEAR OF JAPAN

American military and foreign policy in the period 1905 to 1908 was dominated by concern over the intentions of Japan in the Pacific. America was determined to assert control over that ocean, and the actions of the Republican administration in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Philippines reaffirmed the importance of this goal. The failure of Root's army reforms to deliver promised military efficiency made certain that army reorganisation remained an important political issue. Conservative and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans continued to believe business organisation represented efficiency and progress. Roosevelt and others, however, were less impressed with business organisation as reports of industrial incompetence, dangerous working practices, and threats to public health by the drive for short term profit appeared with alarming regularity. In 1905 Charles Evans Hughes uncovered serious mismanagement in the three largest insurance companies in America. The companies used money to purchase political favours and to deal illicitly with financial houses on Wall Street. This scandal was followed by reports exposing flagrant abuses of public health by several food and pharmaceutical companies.¹

The President reacted by supporting greater government regulation of business and the economy. The willingness of Roosevelt to sanction government regulation of business alienated Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, who only supported strong government for defence and foreign policy. This philosophical division on the role of government ultimately divided the Republican Party and weakened the influence of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas in American politics. Taft, the new secretary of war, struggling under a large and diverse workload, was unable to resolve the continued organisational problems in the army. An influential member of Roosevelt's cabinet, his presence weakened the influence of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas, which he had always supported only with reluctance.

American foreign policy in the spring of 1905 was dominated by worries about Japanese expansion, concern over events in Morocco, and the continued attempt to strengthen American influence in the Caribbean. In late January a protocol was signed with the Dominican Republic in the Caribbean. The agreement gave America control over Dominican custom houses, foreign affairs, and defence policy ensuring that the United States had effectively acquired another Caribbean protectorate.

In Washington the German Ambassador Speck von Sternberg sought to involve America in the Moroccan Crisis. The ambassador claimed Germany wished free trade in the region and was being excluded by an Anglo-French

agreement. He challenged America to support free trade in this part of North Africa. The President instructed Taft to contact the British ambassador and explain German concerns, but he refused to support the German demand for free trade. The event underlined both Roosevelt's willingness to overburden Taft with affairs unconnected with his office and continued Anglo-American friendship. The American government happily endorsed the British demand for free trade in China yet rejected the German request for free trade in Morocco.²

Throughout the late spring and early summer, Roosevelt and his advisers worried about Japanese expansion in the Pacific. This concern was provoked by the comprehensive defeat of Russian naval and ground forces by Japan. The President and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were concerned that Japan would challenge America's attempt to secure commercial domination in the region. In Roosevelt's cabinet suspicion of Japan was common. On July 1, 1905 Secretary of State John Hay died. Anti-Japanese feeling in the cabinet, however, increased when Elihu Root replaced him. Despite opposition from his wife and a reluctance to return to public office, Root agreed to become secretary of state. As secretary of war, Root knew of Japanese attempts to undermine American influence in the Philippines, and thereafter he always distrusted Japan. Philander C. Knox, the attorney general, and all senior

generals in the army, shared Root's suspicion of Japanese intentions. Only Taft, the Secretary of War, remained convinced that Japan posed no threat to American expansion in the Far East.³

In the Philippines the policy of benevolent assimilation continued. Public education enrolled less than 100,000 in 1898 but reached 521,000 in August 1905. The teaching of English and civics received priority in the new system. Roosevelt ordered the colonial government to encourage business as much as possible.⁴ New taxation and fiscal policies were introduced to encourage local business and investment from America. Wood left the Philippines in June 1905, for minor surgery in Boston and a holiday with his friend, the President.⁵ Bliss, head of the war college, asked for a transfer to the Philippines to enhance his promotion prospects and was placed in charge of the Department of Mindanao.⁶ He arrived to find Corbin, the army commander in the islands, deeply unhappy. The former Adjutant General, ordered to the Philippines after relinquishing command of the Department of the East in New York, disliked the humid and isolated Manila. He and his wife missed Washington and New York. The announcement that Major General John C. Bates would replace Chaffee as chief of staff in January 1906 further depressed the isolated Corbin.

Bates, like Young and Chaffee, was a career soldier and Civil War veteran with no staff experience or training in military schools.⁷ The decision to promote Bates reflected the attempt by Roosevelt to negate criticism of the general staff by appointing a senior combat veteran chief of staff. This policy encumbered the general staff with a commander who was invariably at the end of his career. Young, Chaffee, and Bates were all too old to serve a full four-year term as chief of staff, and their combined service as head of the general staff covered only twenty-seven months (see Appendix 4). On June 24 at Asheville, North Carolina, Colonel Arthur Wagner died of tuberculosis. The untimely death of Wagner, a staunch supporter of military reform, and promotion of Bates, were serious set-backs to army reform.⁸

On June 30, 1905 Taft published his first report as secretary of war. He recommended tighter educational testing for junior and field grade officers and dismissal from the service for lieutenants who failed basic course work. Captains and majors who failed to apply themselves at service schools should be retired to speed up middle-ranking promotions. The Medical Bureau gained one hundred and thirty new medical officers to end the army practice of relying on civilian contract surgeons. The Artillery Corps was to be increased by 6,500 men. Taft noted twenty-nine National Guard officers attended regular army service schools for the first time. The Secretary praised the work

of the Army War College, which produced a full study of the recent Russo-Japanese War including lectures on the Japanese army and its general staff.⁹ These studies emphasised concern in the army over Japanese intentions, while the events of both the recent Boer War and Greco-Turkish War were largely ignored.

The possibility of Japan gaining complete control of Korea and Manchuria worried Roosevelt. The President offered to hold the peace conference between the two powers. Both states accepted the American offer, and the peace conference convened in late August at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The Russian negotiator was Foreign Minister Sergei Iulevich Witte, while the victors were represented by Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō. At the conference Japan failed to obtain either an indemnity from Russia or any territory apart from Karafuto, a paramount position in Korea. Japan was granted the South Manchurian Railway concession. Komura returned to Japan to discover the premier, Taro Katsura, ready to sell the railroad to American millionaire E.H. Harriman. The negotiated sale only failed when Komura threatened to resign, and the railroad remained under Japanese control. When the contents of the treaty became known in Japan, anti-treaty demonstrations erupted into rioting, which included an assault on Komura's home. The dominant figures in the Japanese army, including senior General Yamagata Aritomo

and his aide Colonel Tanaka Giichi - later war minister and prime minister of Japan in the 1920's - were furious that Japanese treaty gains had not been greater. Senior officers in the Japanese army general staff urged the premier to approve a policy of expansion on the Asian continent, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.¹⁰ These plans placed Japan in direct conflict with Neo-Hamiltonian wishes that America dominate the commerce of Latin America and the Pacific. Roosevelt was delighted with the outcome of the peace treaty - that saw him awarded the Nobel Peace Prize - for limiting Japanese territorial gains in a region where America wished to expand.

In America the leading Democrat, William Jennings Bryan, announced his intention to go on a world tour. He left San Francisco in early September for his first stop, Japan. Unlike most Republican politicians and business leaders, Bryan maintained his faith in international reasonableness and cooperation. In Japan he received a warm welcome and was assured that the Japanese felt nothing but good will towards America.¹¹ The perception Bryan and many Democrats had of Japan highlighted fundamental differences between Republicans and Democrats. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, had no faith in international agreements and firmly believed that power and wealth depended upon securing overseas markets from hostile foreign powers. In such a world, military preparedness was

essential. Democrats, who endorsed international cooperation and relative isolation, rejected this view and continued to support volunteerism and local control within the army.

In the summer of 1905 Roosevelt instructed Taft to review American coastal defences. The last comprehensive report had been by the Endicott Board commissioned by President Grover Cleveland in the 1880s. The Taft Board issued its report in the Autumn of 1905. Boston, New York, and San Francisco were categorised as of primary importance. The committee recommended Guantanamo in Cuba, and Subic Bay in the Philippines, be added to this list. The second recommendation categorised Panama and Alaska as important as continental America for defence purposes. Pearl Harbour, Manila Bay, Guam, and the Aleutian Islands were important but less so than those in the other two categories. Roosevelt used events in the Russo-Japanese War to justify this reappraisal of coastal defence. The President argued that the Japanese surprise attack on Port Arthur underlined the need for secure fleet bases while Russian defeat required a greater American presence in the Pacific to counter Japan.¹²

In the Philippines, Corbin's misery was compounded by the discovery of a heart condition, which required him to take several month's leave in Australia.¹³ Roosevelt offered Wood, now fully recovered from his operation, the

chance to replace Corbin as head of the Philippine Division. Wood accepted and sailed from New York on August 23, 1905. As with his previous trip to the Philippines, Wood elected to go via Europe, the Suez Canal, and India. The General again spent considerable time with British colonial administrators, including the governors of Gibraltar, Egypt, Australia, and Hong Kong.¹⁴ Roosevelt also decided to recall Brigadier General Carter from the Philippines for a new posting in America.¹⁵

In Washington concern over German intentions world-wide abated as attention focussed on Japan. Root, however, like his predecessor John Hay, remained suspicious of German attempts to expand trade in Latin America. As secretary of state, he instructed the American ambassador in Berlin to be uncompromising in the negotiations over the commercial treaty between the two nations.¹⁶ In Europe relations between Britain and Germany continued to deteriorate. Secretary of State for War R.B. Haldane, who replaced H.O. Arnold Forster in the spring of 1905, responded by implementing British army reforms. The planned general staff was created, the Committee for Imperial Defence gained greater authority over colonial defence, and a British Expeditionary Force was established for rapid deployment in Europe.¹⁷ Haldane noted the influence of Root on these British reforms:

Really you know I do not need to know anything about armies and their organization for the five

reports of Elihu Root, made as Secretary of War in the United States are the very last word concerning the organisational place of an Army in a democracy.¹⁸

In America the struggle to apply Root's army reforms continued within the army. The first extensive joint army-navy exercises took place in the Chesapeake Bay in the autumn of 1905. These joint manoeuvres were designed to encourage inter-service cooperation which had failed so badly in the Spanish-American War. Unfortunately this first exercise provoked such fierce inter-service argument over who won the various engagements that Taft felt compelled to ban any further joint manoeuvres.¹⁹ Throughout the winter of 1905 the general staff continued its struggle to assert its authority over staff bureaus. Taft, swamped with work, was unable to provide the necessary political support the general staff required. In 1905 the secretary of war had been secretary of state for one month, was placed in overall command of the Panama Canal project, and was pro-tem president of the senate whenever Roosevelt was away. Overworked, Taft rarely mentioned the War Department in his correspondence.²⁰ Root relieved Taft of most foreign policy concerns. In late November the Secretary of State wrote to Ambassador Henry White in Italy, outlining the American position in the continuing Moroccan Crisis. Root instructed White to support broadly free trade in North Africa, but under no circumstances was he to jeopardize the growing alliance

between Great Britain and France. The Republican administration valued the "Entente Cordial" as a useful counter to the emerging industrial and military power of Germany.²¹

On October 24, 1905 Major General Wood arrived in Manila and assumed command of all American forces in the islands. Corbin, who was still unwell, remained in Australia.²² In early December Wood sent his assessment of the international situation in the Pacific to Roosevelt. The General indicated his great concern over Japanese expansion. Wood pressed the President to authorise more fortifications for the Philippines and for the Sandwich Islands, which he claimed Japan was ready to seize. He continued:

The Japanese are very rapidly refitting captured Russian battleships, which appear, in many instances, to have been only moderately injured, and they will soon have a large fleet here We should concentrate our defensive work at Manila, and put the immense fund we intended to spend, not into works spread over the islands, but into a fleet of battleships, especially designed for duty in this part of the Pacific. If we control the sea, no one can bother us here, once we lose it, the islands are gone with the exception of Manila, which we could hold for a while if well prepared. I believe in a good army, but we must have a strong Pacific Fleet if we are to hold these islands, maintain prestige in the Orient, and develop our trade. Very few people who have lived in the East ... take any stock in the idea that we shall be left free to work our will here. Japan is very anxious to be the new England of the East. She has unlimited cheap coal and cheap labour, and will soon be able to manufacture goods as well as we can

Wood concluded by warning Roosevelt of the security dangers and racial problems posed by admitting Japanese workers to America. He strongly recommended tougher immigration controls.²³ A month later Wood received the President's reply. Roosevelt endorsed the proposals to fortify the Sandwich Islands, increase the Pacific Fleet, and tighten immigration controls over Japanese and Chinese labour. The President, however, thought Japan's attention would be directed towards Korea and Manchuria for some time to come, and he dismissed claims that the Philippines were in imminent danger.²⁴

On January 16, 1906 Lieutenant General Adna Chaffee retired as chief of staff. A tough career soldier, he had kept control of the staff bureaus through his strong character. Chaffee retired a few weeks early to allow his friend, Major General John C. Bates, the chance to serve briefly as chief of staff before he too retired. Roosevelt announced that Corbin would replace Bates and serve the first full four-year term as chief of staff.²⁵ Unfortunately, Corbin was unable to accept the appointment due to his deteriorating heart condition. At the end of January, Corbin returned to Manila from Australia. In Manila he formally handed command of the islands over to Wood.²⁶ The former Adjutant General set sail for home. On his return home, he suffered partial paralysis of his left arm and was offered command of the Northern Division in St. Louis, Missouri. A few months later Corbin retired

from the army and in 1909, he died while undergoing heart surgery in Baltimore.²⁷

The inability of Corbin to accept the appointment as chief of staff was a set-back to the implementation of army reform. Corbin was de facto chief of staff during the Spanish-American War, was an able Adjutant General, and supported Root's army reforms from the beginning. He was the only senior officer with the necessary practical experience both to successfully serve as chief of staff and to guide the General Staff towards its proper function. His ill-health deprived the army of crucial experience when it was most needed. Major General Bates, a company commander in the Civil War, regimental commander in the Indian Wars, and brigade commander in the Philippines, readily admitted his lack of professional training, business experience, and education.²⁸ The final act of a distinguished service career his appointment allowed Ainsworth to enhance his authority.

On March 23 Congressman Frederick Gillette wrote to Secretary of War Taft with a common complaint about Ainsworth's misuse of power. He described how the Military Secretary rejected a requested army discharge for the son of an influential member of his constituency. Three weeks later, the Congressman discovered Ainsworth authorised the army discharge at the request of Senator Crane.²⁹ These arbitrary decisions, based upon Ainsworth's personal

whims, became increasingly common over the next few years. Taft, confronted by a large and diverse workload ignored others' criticism of the Military Secretary and continued to give him greater responsibility. The Secretary of War undermined Root's general staff reforms by putting Ainsworth in charge of the War Department during his frequent absences. This decision made the chief of staff responsible to a bureau chief: the exact opposite of what Root had intended in the General Staff Act.³⁰

Roosevelt was entrusting Taft with too many diverse functions, which prevented the Secretary of War from gaining necessary experience to control the War Department. Taft found himself constantly harried by a president worried over Japanese intentions in the Pacific, the construction problems created by the Panama Canal, and the problems of colonial administration.³¹ In early 1906 Taft's problems increased when rioting broke out during mid-term elections in Cuba. President Estrada Palma requested American troops to restore order in the island. The War Department was considering this request when, on April 16, the San Francisco earthquake presented further problems.³² Taft was also concerned about his weight; which had reached 326 pounds during his time as governor of the Philippines. Advised to lose weight, Taft spent several hours each day doing physical exercise, which further reduced time spent in the War Department. The

diverse problems confronting the Secretary of War prevented his considering why Root's army reforms had failed.³³

The President was also distracted from the continued problems in the army by new domestic concerns. Upton Sinclair in The Jungle publicised tainted meat sales by Chicago meat-packing companies. The book added to mounting evidence which revealed a complete disregard for public health by American companies. Army reform was no longer a central priority of the administration. Roosevelt focussed increasingly on the creation of stronger federal agencies to deal with commercial greed. The passage of a Pure Food and Drug Act, which tightened government controls over American companies, emphasised the new priorities of Roosevelt's administration. Increasingly Roosevelt regarded the construction of a strong Pacific Fleet and completion of the Panama Canal as the only important defence priorities of the administration.³⁴ In late spring Corbin wrote to his friend Wood of the organisational problems still confronting the army. He concluded that Secretary of State Root knew more about the continued problems in the army than either Roosevelt or the overworked Taft.³⁵

In April 1906 Roosevelt decided to appoint J. Franklin Bell to replace Bates as the first four-year appointee as chief of staff. Bell had impressed the

President with his service in the Philippines, which included a Congressional Medal of Honour for distinguished gallantry in action near Porao, Luzon. In 1902 he returned from the Philippines to command the staff college at Fort Leavenworth. He successfully introduced Root's educational reforms and received great praise from the Inspector General's Office for his role in promoting army education. Born in 1856, he was the first soldier who had not served in the Civil War and the first graduate of West Point to be appointed chief of staff.³⁶ Supporters of army reform were delighted that a younger, professionally trained soldier was to be chief of staff. The decision, however, promoted an officer who had been openly critical of Taft's policies in the Philippines, which strengthened Ainsworth's position within the War Department. Root pressed Roosevelt to appoint Carter assistant chief of staff, commandant of the war college, or Superintendent of West Point. These requests were rejected by the President. Carter, the architect of general staff legislation and critic of Ainsworth's increasing power, was appointed commander of the Department of the Lakes in Chicago.³⁷

Roosevelt and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans continued to promote American control over Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. The President sent Secretary of State Root on a prolonged tour of Latin America to encourage closer relations with the United States. In

Cuba, protests against President Palma erupted into open warfare in August 1906. Roosevelt, keen to intervene, waited until President Palma asked for help. The General Staff proved its value when it responded quickly to a request from Taft for a plan to send American troops to the island. In contrast to the haphazard American invasion of Cuba, Bell announced 6,000 troops could be sent to Havana in one week, and over 24,000 men could be in Cuba in one month.³⁸ The willingness to consider military intervention in Cuba, combined with American control of Panama and the Dominican Republic, underlined the commitment to extend American influence in the Caribbean. In the Philippines Wood asserted American authority both by attacking rebel natives and preparing for war with Japan. Wood and his deputy Bliss organised 8,000 American troops to end the piracy and jungle raids conducted by Moro tribesmen in Mindanao.³⁹ As commander in the islands he expressed concern at expanding Japanese and German influence world-wide. In a letter to Major Higginson, he endorsed British concerns over German industrial production and the possible threat Japan posed to Anglo-American Pacific trade.⁴⁰

The new Chief of Staff, Bell was determined to implement Root's vision of army reform. He initiated several new ideas which included a departmental structure of army command to replace the divisional structure, the

abandonment of fixed-term appointments in the Ordnance Bureau, and the creation of seven new manoeuvre camps for joint army-National Guard exercises.⁴¹ Bell's confidence quickly evaporated, however, when confronted by the intriguing bureau chiefs and the indifference of Taft. Increasingly, Bell relied on the devious Ainsworth, who became his chief adviser on the political intricacies of the War Department.⁴²

In September 1906 Roosevelt approved the deployment of American troops in Cuba. The President appointed Taft the new governor of the island to replace the beleaguered Palma. The Secretary of War snubbed Bell and appointed Ainsworth acting head of the War Department during his absence. Bell, began to lose confidence in his ability as chief of staff as he realised he faced a secretary of war and staff bureau chiefs hostile to him and his office.⁴³ Root was increasingly concerned at the growing power of Ainsworth in the War Department. He suggested Carter be appointed head of the Army War College to provide help for Bell and support for the General Staff. Taft and Roosevelt ignored this request and appointed Brigadier General William Wotherspoon head of the War College.⁴⁴ Carter remained in Chicago, isolated from the army command in Washington.

In the Philippines the arch-imperialist Wood received a visit from Bryan and his wife as part of their world

tour. The couple had visited Korea and China after their stop in Japan and were keen to see America's new colony in the East.⁴⁵ In Manila Bryan reaffirmed his opposition to imperial expansion and military preparedness. Wood recorded the speech in his diary and, with some satisfaction, the reaction of Mrs. Bryan: "Mrs Bryan ... said that whatever his views were in regard to the Philippines it was evident the people of the Moro Province were not yet ready for self-government." The General was happy to agree with Mrs. Bryan and noted: "Mrs. Bryan is a sensible, level-headed appearing woman and I have no doubt has a restraining influence on her husband."⁴⁶ In late autumn, Bryan and his party left the Philippines for India, the next stop on their world tour. Unimpressed by Bryan's arguments, Wood continued to press for new defences in the islands, including a new fort to be called Fort McKinley in Manila.

In Washington Roosevelt struggled to gain Congressional approval for Wood's new fort, and a bigger Pacific Fleet. On December 20 he notified Wood that he hoped to have the measures approved in the defence appropriations for the spring of 1907.⁴⁷ Root returned from his tour of Latin America, and in a speech in mid-December, before the Pennsylvania Society of New York, he reaffirmed the Neo-Hamiltonian goal of overseas expansion. He robustly defended the creation of strong central

government in defence and foreign policy, achieved through professionals who advised the political executive. Only this system could guarantee the efficiency required to succeed in a highly competitive world. Root defended attempts to professionalise the army and the State Department. He denounced those who supported political power at the local level, endorsed volunteerism over professionalism, and opposed American expansion overseas. Neo-Hamiltonian ideas must succeed to insure American independence, economic growth, and freedom.⁴⁸ From India Bryan rejected Root's ideas. The Democratic leader, speaking in Bombay, criticised both the morality of Anglo-American imperialism and refuted its claimed economic benefits.⁴⁹

In the spring of 1907, the new congressional session approved several policies regarded as vital by Roosevelt and his Neo-Hamiltonian allies. It ratified Roosevelt's agreement with the Dominican Republic, approved funds for new fortifications in the Philippines, and authorised a larger navy. Responding to pressure from Wood, Roosevelt's proposal to limit Japanese immigration was also accepted. War with Japan seemed imminent, and a classified memorandum circulating among senior officials, emphasised this view:

.... Japan's ambition, to accomplish which she is doing everything possible, is to be the sole lord and owner of the Orient, and this is the reason why

she formerly subjugated Korea and in our days dominates China. Russia proposed and tried to conquer a dominion in the Orient and we have already seen what Japan did to stop her. The United States desired to mix up the Philippines, and, as the Philippine Islands are on the map of the Orient where Japan has harboured resentment against the United States - resentment that is constantly intensified on account of the question aroused by the intervention of the Americans in Manchuria and the new restrictive measures adopted against Japan in America.

We must therefore confess that war will come without fail Japan will not wait for the opening of the Panama Canal, which would make the Americas powerful in the Orient Whether we desire it or not, we shall see ourselves involved in the struggle ... we must think what to do.⁵⁰

In early April, Wood wrote to Colonel Hugh Scott, a future chief of staff, claiming Japan was ready to attack the Philippines.⁵¹ A few days later, he wrote to Secretary Taft, demanding greater preparation for war. The General denounced the anti-imperial lobby in America for encouraging Japan to believe that the U.S. would relinquish the islands without a fight. Wood dismissed the idea that Great Britain would aid Japan under the terms of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Treaty. He assured Taft that the treaty applied only to Russia and that America would fight an internationally isolated Japan.⁵²

Roosevelt and his administration were determined to defend American overseas interests in the Pacific, Caribbean, and Latin America. On March 17 the President underlined this commitment to protect American influence abroad when he ordered U.S. Marines to intervene in Honduras to restore political stability.

The prospect of imminent war with Japan forced Roosevelt to reconsider the failure of the General Staff to perform as expected. Root and other army reformers gained the attention of the President for the first time in many months. Ainsworth was criticised for wielding too much power in the War Department and undermining the role of the General Staff. The President agreed to abolish the post of military secretary and to re-appoint Ainsworth adjutant general. In an attempt to increase the authority of the chief of staff, Bell was promoted to Major General, the same rank as held by Ainsworth.⁵³ A planned reorganisation of the artillery was approved. The Artillery Corps, created by Root's Army reforms of 1901, was split into a new two-part structure based around coast and field artillery. The sudden flurry of military reform, however, soon ended as Roosevelt's attention again focussed on domestic regulation of big business.⁵⁴

Roosevelt joined an increasing number of people unwilling to accept that business had proven a leader in organisation and efficiency. Henry James, who had returned to America after a twenty year absence in Europe, criticised his homeland in The American Scene. He attacked modern America as a nation based upon violence, plunder, and commerce. Science and technology had been made subservient to a short-term profit motive which destroyed human values.⁵⁵ The attacks on business greed and

inefficiency by James, Upton Sinclair, and others challenged the Neo-Hamiltonian view that business organisation represented the pinnacle of progress. Nonetheless, Root reaffirmed his support for strong central government served by professionals with control over defence and foreign policy but limited intervention in the economy. Increasing international competition required a strong, well-briefed government, while big business a symbol of efficiency needed little government interference.⁵⁶ These Neo-Hamiltonian views clashed with Roosevelt's wish to introduce government regulation of business. The use of business organisational ideas continued to flourish, however, and in the summer of 1907, Des Moines Iowa introduced corporate, planned city government. Based upon an idea first implemented in Galveston, Texas in 1900, the development of corporate city government was regarded as an efficient response to both local corruption and the increasing functions of city government.⁵⁷

In late June Roosevelt invited senior army and navy officers to Oyster Bay for discussions on the measures to be taken if Japan launched a sudden attack. The conference decided to fortify Oahu in the Hawaii Islands and establish a naval base at Pearl Harbour.⁵⁸ In an attempt to convince Japan of American military power, it was also decided to send an American fleet on a world cruise. The

President ordered sixteen battleships and cruisers accompanied by four destroyers to assemble for the cruise. The whole fleet was painted white to attract publicity and soon became known as the "Great White Fleet." The ships visited Hawaii, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia to emphasise the American commitment to the Pacific.⁵⁹ Bell, the chief of staff, was not invited to these discussions, which undermined his authority and that of the General Staff. In the War Department Taft continued to appoint Ainsworth in charge during his long absences, leaving Bell anxious over his inability to establish his command authority. Bell, unlike Chaffee, lacked confidence in his ability and was unable to break with Ainsworth, who continued to increase his authority and reputation at Bells expense.⁶⁰

The Japanese war scare continued throughout the autumn of 1907. Brigadier General Pershing, regarded as one of the army's finer commanders, was posted to the completed Fort McKinley in Manila. Wood criticised the new naval base at Subic Bay and wanted American resources concentrated in Manila and at Pearl Harbour. In an angry comment in his diary, he predicted that scattered American forces would easily be defeated and that the Philippines would fall within seven days of a Japanese assault.⁶¹ On October 11, 1907, Captain James H. Reeves, the military attache in Beijing, warned of continued Japanese

commercial and military expansion in the region. He reported the arrival of 15,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria and claimed it was effectively a Japanese province.⁶² By the Winter of 1907, no Japanese invasion had materialised, but concern over Japanese intentions remained high.

The prospect of war emphasised the poor performance of the general staff. Root, Wood, and Carter were concerned at the inability of Bell or Taft to control Ainsworth and to assert the primacy of the General Staff.⁶³ Captain Frank R. McCoy, the President's military aide, claimed Bell was most garrulous, which irritated the impatient Roosevelt who stated: "He talks too much and would stay all day, I never can get rid of him." The Chief of Staff was increasingly unhappy and unwell. He felt isolated as the President avoided him by sending instructions through either McCoy or Army War College President Wotherspoon. Bell never understood this conflict of character and was further handicapped by bureau chiefs who, inspired by Ainsworth's example, ignored his authority.⁶⁴ The Chief of Staff and Taft did implement one major reform, when they established brigade posts, regimental - and brigade - sized units, which allowed army officers to train with large forces.⁶⁵

In the spring of 1908, evidence of Japanese treachery encouraged the belief that war with Japan was inevitable.

In early February, a confidential memorandum compiled by Lieutenant Colonel Jones, chief of military intelligence within the General Staff, was circulated among very senior officials. The report detailed Japanese attempts to destabilise American influence in the Pacific over a ten-year period. Roosevelt, Root, Taft, Bell, Wotherspoon, and Secretary of the Navy Victor H. Metcalf all received copies. The report claimed Japan aided Filipino forces in their war against America. In 1896 Filipino nationalist Jose Ramos, who fled the Philippines to escape the Spanish authorities, was given political asylum in Japan. Ramos encouraged Aguinaldo, the main nationalist leader, to forge links with Japan. In June 1898 Aguinaldo sent two trusted advisers, Nariano Ponce and Faustino Lichauco, to Japan for a series of meetings with senior officials. Foreign Minister Mr. Askai, Assistant Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fukushima, and several members of the Japanese general staff promised to help the nationalists against America. Throughout the autumn of 1898, Captain Y. Tukizawa, the Japanese military attache in Manila, accompanied American forces in the Philippines and passed information to Filipino nationalists. Other Japanese officers acted as military advisers to Filipino forces.

In October 1900, General Trias, Aguinaldo's deputy, approached the Japanese consul in Manila in an attempt to secure arms shipments from Japan. The report claimed Japan

complied with the request. Ships in Shanghai and Hong Kong were used to disguise arms shipments from Japan to Filipino nationalists. Colonel Jones reported substantial Japanese espionage at American bases and alleged that Japan had topographical data and other information on the new military installations at Manila Bay, Subic Bay, Pearl Harbour, Puget Sound, and Monterey, California. The report concluded by warning that American security was threatened by Japanese military expansion, its large merchant navy, immigration to America, and control of Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands.⁶⁶

This report greatly influenced the President and his senior advisers. It highlighted knowledge of Japanese activities in the Philippines and explained the hostility of the army command towards Japan. All senior officers who commanded American forces in the Philippines knew of Japan's aid to the enemy. The claims of Japanese espionage were supported by an incident in India which occurred only weeks after this report had been read in Washington. The British authorities in Calcutta intercepted a package bound for Japan. The parcel contained complete engineering drawings of the fortifications of Corregidor, the island fortress which guarded the entrance to Manila Bay. The plans revealed the exact height above sea-level of all gun emplacements, location of searchlights, position of fire control stations, and extent of mine fields guarding the

harbour entrance. British intelligence delivered the plans to the American consul, which both underlined Anglo-American cooperation, and the limited nature of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902.⁶⁷ Wood summed up to Roosevelt the anger directed at Japan and the determination to defend Anglo-American interests in the Pacific:

.... There is a rapidly growing feeling among the whites here that a definite issue with Japan is not far off. She seems to be without any sense of commercial honour, and her recent fortunate outcome in her struggle with Russia has served to upset the brown people throughout the East and bring a general feeling of unrest, and I should not be at all surprised to see the British-Japanese Alliance broken off for good and sufficient reasons in the very near future. Discrimination against British merchandise and British merchants in the transport, etc., is causing much discontent. It seems to me that the best outcome for us would be an understanding with England which would result in the maintenance in the Pacific of fleets by each which united would always be superior to the Japanese fleet. Japan must be smashed at sea before long or white influence in the East will be ended, and with it, to a large extent trade. The Japanese are not friendly to any white people and are looking forward to the establishment of a policy on the coast of Asia that will correspond very closely to our Monroe Doctrine⁶⁸

The increasing tension between Japan and America alarmed the cautious Japanese Premier Taro Katsura. He convinced the cabinet, despite army protests, to pursue a policy of international cooperation with Europe and America. Japan was not ready for war against an America supported by Russia and other European powers. In such a war, Britain would not support Japan, which reaffirmed the limited nature of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. By pursuing a

policy of expansion as recommended by the army Katsura emphasised Japan faced defeat and international isolation. Katsura convinced a majority of his government to embark on a new policy of international agreement. The army opposed this policy. On February 18, 1908 a note was sent to the American ambassador in Tokyo acknowledging American immigration controls and agreeing to uphold them by not issuing any more visas to Japanese labourers. The Japanese government also initiated a series of diplomatic treaties with the United States, Great Britain, and France. In return for recognition of Japanese control of Korea and Manchuria, Japan offered to accept American ownership of the Philippines, French control of Indo-China, and British ownership of India. In the autumn of 1908, a U.S.-Japanese treaty was formally concluded in the Root-Takahira Agreement.⁶⁹

The improvement in great power relations in the Pacific convinced Roosevelt that Wood could be recalled. In mid-February he announced that Wood would take command of the Department of the East, after a six-month trip through Europe including visits to the military manoeuvres in Germany and France. Major General Frank C. Weston, the former commissary general, became the new commander in the Philippines.⁷⁰ In a final letter to Root from Manila, Wood reaffirmed his belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority, the benefits of controlling the Philippines, and advantages provided by American rule to the islanders.⁷¹

In America, Taft began his campaign to secure the Republican presidential nomination. Roosevelt initially supported Root and hoped he could be convinced to run for president. Root still determined to return to his law practice in New York, was reluctant to accept. The Secretary of War was viewed with suspicion by Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. As governor of the Philippines, and head of the War Department, he had often questioned ideas of American racial superiority, the need for military expansion, and the long-term benefits of colonialism. In an effort to secure Neo-Hamiltonian Republican support in the Republican primaries, Taft made several "Neo-Hamiltonian speeches." In business clubs in Chicago, Cleveland, Tacoma, and Augusta, Georgia, Taft gave the strongest endorsements of his career to colonialism and military expansion. He attacked ideas of "non entanglement" as outdated, enthusiastically endorsed the policy of a big navy, reaffirmed the importance of the Monroe Doctrine and Panama Canal to America's defence, and promised merchant marine ship subsidies and support for free trade in the Pacific.⁷² In domestic politics Taft rejected further progressive reforms and pledged to "perfect the now adequate machinery" of controls over interstate labour and commerce. These views were endorsed by Root, Wood, Lodge, and other conservative and Neo-

Hamiltonian Republicans.⁷³ As Taft and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans moved to a closer understanding, Roosevelt increasingly alienated such party members with support for Bryanite policies on the environment and further business regulation.⁷⁴ Increasingly, Roosevelt identified with Republicans unwilling to accept business corruption, poor safety standards, and destruction of the environment. This group of Republicans included Charles Evans Hughes, Louis D. Brandeis, and Albert J. Beveridge, who rejected Taft as too conservative.⁷⁵

The organisational problems of the army continued. Secretary of War Taft was distracted by his election campaign, while improved relations with Japan removed any urgency to solve the army's problems. Root continued to press for Carter's appointment to the General Staff. Taft, who disliked Carter, rejected the request, and Carter remained commander of the Department of the Lakes in Chicago. The author of the General Staff Act was deeply unhappy, and, despite support from Root and Young, he became depressed by the failure of army reform and his own career prospects.⁷⁶

Wood, Carter's great professional rival, left the Philippines in late February 1908. The former commander of the Philippines made use of his return to America to visit British colonial officials. These visits emphasised the agreement between Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans and the

British colonial establishment to defend Anglo-Saxon rule and free trade. He took tea in the Raffles Hotel Singapore with the British high commissioner, stayed with British colonial officials in Ceylon, and spent time sightseeing in Egypt with his friend Lord Cromer, the de facto ruler of Egypt.⁷⁷ In Gibraltar he was welcomed by the British governor, and, after touring Spain for two weeks, he arrived in Britain. In London he spent nearly eight weeks with senior British military and government officials, visited and dined with Lytton Strachey, Lord Curzon, Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Howe, and the Colonial Secretary the Earl of Crewe.⁷⁸ With all of these men he discussed the future security and trade of the Far East.

Wood sought backing for an unofficial Anglo-American alliance against Japan.⁷⁹ The strong association between Wood and British imperialists highlighted Wood's personal commitment to Anglo-American friendship, based upon free trade and Anglo-American imperialism. It also emphasised the support such ideas enjoyed among Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. The willingness of American envoys to extend their visits in Britain, which rarely occurred on trips to Germany or France, underlined the mutual advantages many felt could be achieved through closer ties.

While Wood promoted Anglo-American friendship, the presidential election continued in America. Roosevelt already privately regretted his public pledge that under

no circumstances would he be a candidate in 1908.⁸⁰ The President continued to hope Root would stand in the election, but Root firmly rejected Roosevelt's proposal, and the President reluctantly accepted that even "wild horses wouldn't drag him into making a public campaign."⁸¹ The other Republican candidates, apart from Taft, were Speaker of the House "Uncle Joe" Cannon and Charles Evans Hughes. Roosevelt regarded Hughes and Cannon as too independent from him and announced his support for Taft. On June 16 the Republican Party Convention elected Taft as its presidential candidate with conservative Jim Sherman from New York as his running mate.⁸² Roosevelt received the longest outburst of support at the convention, provoked by a speech given by Henry Cabot Lodge praising his presidency. Two weeks later the Democratic Party selected William Jennings Bryan, giving him a third attempt to win the presidency.

In the War Department, the presidential election deprived the General Staff of strong political leadership and encouraged independent action among staff bureau chiefs. In July Taft resigned as secretary of war to concentrate on his election campaign.⁸³ On July 23, 1908 Roosevelt appointed Luke E. Wright, a lawyer from Tennessee, to the post. Wright strongly supported Neo-Hamiltonian policies of overseas expansion. The new Secretary had three sons who volunteered for service in

the Spanish-American War, was a member of the U.S.-Philippine Commission between 1900-1904, and replaced Taft as governor-general of the Islands in 1904, serving until 1906. A committed imperialist, he received an honorary doctorate in law from Root's alma mater Hamilton College in 1904. In 1906-1907 he served as American ambassador to Japan during the "war scare" and advocated a tough line against Japanese expansion in the Far East. Despite his staunch support for American Imperialism, which made him politically acceptable to Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, he had no knowledge of military affairs.⁸⁴

Wright discovered a War Department unofficially run by Ainsworth, while the chief of staff was ignored and bureau chiefs did as they pleased. Bell had failed utterly to assert his authority as chief of staff and, to compound his misery, it was discovered he had diabetes. His medical condition accounted for much of his depressed state, tiredness, and wild swings of mood. Unfortunately this diagnosis did not improve his character, which continued to make him an ineffective chief of staff. Major Archie Butt, the President's military aide, summed up the problem in a letter to his mother:

.... General Bell talks so much that he gets on peoples nerves. He always seems to be talking for the benefit of someone in the adjoining room. I do not see how he is going to last much longer. He has crossed swords too, with General Ainsworth, a fatal thing for anyone to do, especially one who does not handle a rapier. Ainsworth attends to his duties so

perfectly that it is a relief for anyone to approach his office. He is deep and wise and kind, except when he is crossed, and then the Assyrian could not come down more swiftly, or more deadly⁸⁵

Supporters of army reform were encouraged, however, when orders announced the return of Bliss from the Philippines for reassignment in America.⁸⁶ More good news followed when the new Militia Act which had limited the President's mobilisation of the National Guard to unit call ups during war was offset by an unchallenged ruling by the attorney general which reaffirmed the president's right to use the Guard abroad. Carter continued to be ignored by the administration and, with the sudden death of his son, lapsed into a deep depression over the prospects of achieving military efficiency, continuing American colonial expansion, or advancing his own career.⁸⁷

In London Wood left his British colleagues and travelled to France. Over the next four weeks he observed French and German military manoeuvres. He renewed his acquaintance with the Kaiser, whom he had met on a previous visit in 1902, and dined with both the French president and the German emperor. Wood made several reports on the French and German armies, which concentrated on their abilities in the field and not on their general staff structures. The General, like many Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, was concerned about German economic expansion, and the Kaiser's attempts to secure a formal overseas empire. Germany was viewed as a commercial

rival and potential enemy, and Wood welcomed the chance to observe any weaknesses in the German army.⁸⁸ On completion of the German manoeuvres, Wood returned to London for further meetings with British officials before setting sail for New York in early September.

In September the election campaign had begun in earnest. Bryan embarked on an extensive national tour describing big business as "industrial despotism" and attacking American imperialism for undermining individual liberty. He denounced army reforms as militarism and, citing his hero Jefferson, warned of the dangers to the Republic posed by materialism and industrialisation.⁸⁹ The Jeffersonian ideology of local political control, a volunteer army, and an internationally isolated agrarian republic, continued to have wide public support. In the election of November 3, 1908 Taft won 321 electoral votes, to Bryan's 162. In the popular vote, Taft won over 7,500,000 votes, while Bryan polled nearly 6,500,000. In the Congressional elections the Republicans maintained their sixty-one to twenty-three Senate majority and 219-172 House majority. The victory, however, was less convincing than previous Republican triumphs. Taft's lead over Bryan was only 1,200,000 million votes, less than half the margin Roosevelt achieved over Parker in 1904. Colorado, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oklahoma all rejected Taft, when they had accepted Roosevelt. The new President

led an increasingly divided party, emphasised by telegrams of congratulations from Progressive Republicans, which demanded constructive but not conservative leadership.⁹⁰

On November 9, less than one week after the election, the new Army War College opened. The opening address was given by Root to an audience that included Roosevelt, Taft, Wright, and Bell. In his speech, Root attempted to define the functions of the War College, War Department, and General Staff. The former Secretary of War, however, produced only a vague definition which only emphasised the confusion which existed over army administration. The War College was "to do the thinking for the army" while the General Staff did the "studying of military science" and the War Department handled administration.⁹¹ The speech only emphasised Root's failure to communicate how he had intended army organisation to perform. In a major omission, he also failed to stress the importance of having General Staff officers in the field to ensure the implementation of war plans.

Later that same day, Wood arrived in New York. He travelled to Washington and spent the next week briefing Roosevelt on his travels. The two men discussed Japanese expansion and possible American responses, the continued superiority of the German army, a closer alliance with Britain, and Wood's proposal to popularise the idea of military preparedness.⁹² Wood was appalled by the failure

of Bell as chief of staff, the power wielded by Ainsworth in the War Department, and the failure to implement Root's army reforms as envisaged. To strengthen the General Staff, he convinced Roosevelt to appoint Bliss as president of the new War College. As the year ended, Wood delivered his first public speech on military preparedness to the New England Society of New York. The speech warned of the dangers to American overseas trade if Japan continued to expand its colonial empire and industrial capacity. Wood regarded the world as having limited resources and too many competitive empires, making certain future world conflict. To protect American liberty and economic growth, Wood recommended that the New England Society endorse his proposal to train 50,000 volunteer officers for service in a national emergency.⁹³

The year closed with both Progressive Republicans and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans uncertain what policies the new President would adopt. Neo-Hamiltonians remained convinced war was inevitable, with Japan the most likely enemy. In response Wood, Root, Wright, and others were determined to ensure that Taft supported a larger navy and greater army efficiency. The new President must defend United States territorial and commercial interests in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Pacific.

CHAPTER SEVEN - END NOTES

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CHAPTER EIGHT
MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AND
THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW CITIZEN ARMY 1909-1912

American politics between 1909 and 1912 were dominated by increasing division between Progressive and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. The philosophical and policy differences between these two groups temporarily disrupted the Republican electoral pre-eminence over the Democratic Party. Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, many personally friendly to Roosevelt, rejected his domestic reform program and sided with the conservative Taft. In military and foreign affairs, Neo-Hamiltonian ideas, which had profoundly changed the agenda on these issues, retained their dominant influence. Intervention in China and Central America underlined the commitment to asserting American influence in the world.

In the army the concept of a broad-based citizen force re-emerged. The small professional army of 100,000 regulars was regarded as inadequate. European and Japanese forces had millions of trained troops and America needed to respond to armies of this size. Neo-Hamiltonians suggested short-term enlistments to create a trained federal reserve, increased money for the armed forces, greater standardisation of National Guard and regular army equipment, and more joint training exercises. The policy proposed a trained professional elite which would command

a large citizen army with basic military knowledge. General Wood described the new policy as "military preparedness," which encouraged mass mobilisation around a professional core.

On January 28, 1909 Cuba once again achieved limited self-government when American troops left after three years of occupation. Root, writing to the sympathetic newspaper The Outlook, reaffirmed his commitment to American intervention anywhere in the Caribbean or Latin America to defend American interests.¹ Taft, the president-elect, asked Root to remain secretary of state, despite his strong views on asserting American economic and military power abroad. The New York lawyer refused, although as a favour to his party he agreed to his appointment as the junior senator from New York. Root's refusal to continue in the cabinet left James Wilson, the secretary of agriculture, as the only member of Roosevelt's cabinet reappointed by Taft. General Wood noted in his diary both the disappointment among the "Roosevelt men" and the sudden realisation that Taft was determined to assert his independence.²

In the War Department, staunch imperialist and supporter of military reform Luke Wright was replaced by Jacob McGavock Dickinson. The new secretary was from Columbus, Mississippi and was a graduate of universities in Leipzig, Paris, and New York. A corporate lawyer with a

practice in Chicago, his only previous experience of government office was two years as an assistant attorney general, and two years as a federal solicitor. Unlike Wright, he had no commitment to American imperialism. His appointment emphasised Taft's reluctance to accept the Neo-Hamiltonian view of international relations, that war was inevitable and military preparedness essential.³ Taft selected six other corporate lawyers for senior cabinet positions including: Philander C. Knox as secretary of state, Franklin MacVeagh as secretary of the treasury, and George Wickersham as attorney general. These appointments created a conservative administration, impressed by the achievement of American business and unsympathetic to further domestic reform.⁴ On March 4, 1909 Taft was inaugurated as president, and his new administration formally took power.

In the Philippines, concern about Japanese intentions continued among American officials, especially when Japanese espionage was again discovered on the islands. A soldier, on duty as a photographer with the engineers, was offered \$25,000 by Japanese army officers for complete photographs of the defences on Corregidor. The soldier agreed, but then took fright and reported the matter to the authorities. A trap was set by the army, and two Japanese officers were caught accepting photographs from the soldier. The two Japanese officers were arrested, but,

having diplomatic immunity, they were later released.⁵ In Washington Taft chose to ignore the incident, a decision that angered senior army officers and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. The incident also revealed the inability of the Japanese government, led by Taro Katsura, to control the Japanese army and its continued wish to create a Japanese empire in the Pacific.

Major General Leonard Wood, now commander of the Department of the East, was concerned at Taft's willingness to compromise with Japan. He spent the summer of 1909 in New York establishing himself as the leading spokesman for Neo-Hamiltonian ideas. In June he held meetings with Root, Bliss, and Wotherspoon, where he outlined his proposals for military preparedness and asked for their support. Wood argued that the development of a mass army, with a professional core, was essential to defend American interests abroad. In letters to army colleagues, he denounced the failure to make the chief of staff paramount in the army, and reaffirmed his belief in the importance of American colonial possessions.⁶ Roosevelt announced his support for Wood's ideas, before he left for a prolonged hunting trip in Africa.⁷

In late June Wood led the fight to continue the labour exclusion laws affecting Japanese immigration and again criticised Taft for his willingness to compromise with Japan.⁸ Wood was utterly convinced his policies were

correct, and he personally attacked all those who hindered their implementation. He joined the criticism of Bliss, his deputy in Cuba and the Philippines, for his failure to end the periodic rebellions by Moro tribesmen in the Philippines. Wood disliked any action which encouraged anti-imperialist sentiment and he lectured Bliss for being, "unable to act decisively," and loving too much "academic discussion."⁹ To strengthen the General Staff, Wood suggested Bliss head the Army War College and that Wotherspoon be appointed assistant chief of staff to help Bell.¹⁰ The acceptance of both appointments by Taft strengthened Neo-Hamiltonian ideas in the War Department and underlined the influence Root, Lodge, and Wood, still wielded over promotions.

In mid-August Wood implemented joint manoeuvres with regular army troops and National Guard forces from Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Washington D.C. The plan was to defend Boston from attack. Over 15,000 troops were involved with Bliss the main commander and Wood chief umpire. The exercise cost \$500,000, and indicated Taft's willingness to support some Neo-Hamiltonian ideas.¹¹

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1909, relations between Wood and Adjutant General Ainsworth remained cordial. Wood's own command headquarters was Governor's Island in New York, but frequent meetings brought him to

Washington. Ainsworth often met Wood at the station, and Wood regularly stayed at Ainsworth's home. The Adjutant General suspected Wood would replace Bell as chief of staff, and sought to ingratiate himself, to a possible superior and rival.¹² In early November Wood was appointed deputy chairman on the selection board for general staff officers, with Major General Bell presiding.¹³ The appointment increased the suspicion that Wood was to replace Bell.

On December 7 Taft, in an address to the nation, announced stringent fiscal measures to promote government economy. The announcement highlighted the views of a president and cabinet that believed in the efficiency of big business and distrusted big government. All federal departments were required to cut expenditure, the War Department from \$210 million to \$165 million.¹⁴ Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were appalled at the proposed defence cuts. A week later, however, Taft silenced some of the criticism from Root and others when he announced Wood to be appointed chief of staff. The appointment was a major victory for supporters of military reform and imperialism.¹⁵

Ainsworth was one of the first people to congratulate Wood, and he took the opportunity of their first meeting in the War Department, to present his ideas on Army reorganisation. The Adjutant General, suggested great

savings could be made in the army budget by placing the Inspector General's Office under his control. He reminded Wood of his abilities as an administrator, and his reputation for providing a better service at a lower cost.¹⁶ Roosevelt, Taft, and Root all originally impressed by the apparent organisational efficiency of big business, found many of Ainsworth's ideas attractive. His proposal to amalgamate the Adjutant General's Office and Inspector General's Office typically mirrored the latest ideas in business of amalgamating departments to cut costs. In late 1909, however, Roosevelt no longer viewed big business organisation as an unqualified success, while Root concluded Ainsworth's organisational brilliance did not outweigh his misuse of power. Both men warned Wood to treat any ideas from Ainsworth with caution. Taft, and many in his cabinet, however, still held both business organisation and Ainsworth's ability to implement business measures in high esteem.

Wood refused to accept Ainsworth's ideas, and after gaining support from Root and attorney general Wickersham, he announced his determination to oppose the planned cuts in the defence budget. Senator Root pressed Wood to accept Carter as his deputy, but Wood was reluctant to accept Carter and indicated his preference for Bliss.¹⁷ Carter supported the concept of a professional army, but rejected the reliance on militia forces, which Wood's proposal for

military preparedness required.¹⁸ In a letter to his British friend, John St. Loe Strachey, Wood reaffirmed his belief in volunteer forces:

I want to congratulate you on your new book: "A New Way of Life." I have read it with the greatest amount of interest We, like yourselves, are much dependent on volunteers, and anything which serves to arouse the interest of the people in the necessity for a reasonable amount of preparedness for trouble is doing work in the right direction. I am anxious to see your Territorial Forces and hope I shall have time to drop in at some time at some of your manoeuvres¹⁹

Despite Wood's preference for Bliss, Taft announced in late December that Carter was promoted to major general and assistant chief of staff. Wotherspoon was appointed head of the Army War College. Bliss, furious at being passed over, was sent to command the Department of California.²⁰ Wood was disappointed by these decisions but was soon occupied with mobilising opposition to Taft's defence cuts. On New Year's Eve Wood dined with Root and Admiral Mahan and all three agreed to oppose Taft's policies of defence cuts and appeasement towards Japan. A strong American military presence must be maintained in the Pacific to deter Japan. They remained certain of future military conflict and that military preparedness was essential.²¹

In early January, Bell the chief of staff, was hospitalised due to complications caused by his diabetes.²² Although not due to take office until April,

Wood became acting chief of staff. In his new office he continued to warn colleagues of the danger posed by Japan, criticised Taft's determination to improve relations with Japan, and claimed the Japanese had sponsored an anti-American movement in the Philippines. He pressed the President to give greater priority to the Panama Canal, which he claimed would provide America with flexibility in deploying its naval forces. In a typically forthright interview with George Eriswold Hill, he summed up his distrust of international agreements:

.... Until international law and justice have advanced far beyond their present state of progress, a purely neutral [Panama] canal, in the sense of an unfortified waterway, must remain a utopian dream. The body of international law on which even the leading powers of the world are agreed is extremely limited and as for a means of enforcing it, it does not exist. When two nations have exhausted the resources of diplomacy ... treaty obligations are as ropes of sand and there has never been a time when non-belligerents, unless impelled by self-interest, have been willing to interfere to enforce the provisions of even the most important international conventions....

He reminded his readers that, without the Canal, 13,000 miles separated the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States. The General outlined the dangers to American defence posed by modern technology. Advances in shipbuilding techniques, steam power, and electrical equipment had ended American immunity to foreign invasion. Wood warned of the dangers of surprise attack, noting the Japanese assault on Port Arthur, which had destroyed the

Russian Pacific Fleet in one shock attack. A small professional army provided no defence against these threats. Only his policy of military preparedness, which created a European-style citizen army, provided adequate security.²³

A few days after this extensive interview, the new Chief of Staff, again emphasised his opposition to Taft's policies: ".... Japan is going ahead in a perfectly methodical way to dominate the Far East and as much of the Pacific and its trade as we and the rest of the world will permit. When she has a good excuse she will absorb the Philippines"²⁴ The President, who placed great faith in the rule of law and international cooperation, rejected Wood's views. Wood had no more success in his attempt to convince Taft not to appoint Carter as his deputy. Senator Root and Secretary of War Dickinson were both friendly towards Carter and convinced Taft to ignore Wood's request.²⁵ Regarded as an author with powerful political friends, Carter remained an unpopular figure within the army earning the nickname, "fire side willie."

On April 21, 1910 Bell officially retired as chief of staff. He had tried his best to implement Root's army reforms, but was undermined by Ainsworth and an unsympathetic Taft, who remembered Bell's opposition to his reform program in the Philippines. Isolated and in ill-health, he was delighted to leave Washington D.C. and

its scheming War Department for a new posting as army commander in the Philippines.²⁶ The new Chief of Staff left Washington almost immediately for a tour of Latin America. Taft appointed Wood and Bliss as presidential envoys and instructed them to encourage closer U.S.-Latin American relations. At the end of this six-week tour, Wood went to London and spent a week discussing Japanese and German expansion in the Pacific and Latin America with his British colleagues: Lord Cromer, J. St.Loe Strachey, Arthur Lee, and others.²⁷

While Wood was abroad the philosophy of Taylorism was popularised in America. Championed by Frederick W. Taylor, who claimed scientific management would increase business efficiency, it was popular among people who believed business organisation could provide government with the example of how to achieve maximum efficiency. Taft's administration, dominated by corporate lawyers, responded favourably to "Taylorism" and considered implementing its ideas in government departments. The new ideas promised to save money and challenged those who rejected business organisation as inefficient. Taft considered creating an efficiency commission to review federal government departments.

After an absence of almost two months, Wood returned to Washington. He remained opposed to Taft's attempt to gain greater government efficiency, which he feared might

lead to even greater defence cuts. The policies of the President were temporarily forgotten, however, when he discovered Carter had authorised staff appointments during his absence. He informed Carter bluntly that he had not wished him to be his deputy, and that he, not Carter, was chief of staff. The two men continued to work together but Carter, once the leading army reformer, discovered that his opposition to any reliance on volunteer forces set him against Wood's policy of "military preparedness."²⁸

Throughout August, Wood, Carter, and Captains Hagood and Hanna worked on a new general staff structure.²⁹ They presented it to the President in early September, he approved it within a few days. The reform eliminated general staff sections. Four new organisational divisions were created: a Mobile Army Division in charge of rapid mobilisation, a Coastal Artillery Division, a Division of Militia Affairs responsible for joint reserve-regular army actions, and the War College Division responsible for strategic planning.³⁰

Wood and his colleagues also sought to improve the militia system. The Swiss militia system attracted the most attention, since Switzerland was a republic with a locally organised militia and small professional army capable of mobilising 240,000 trained volunteers in less than twenty-four hours.³¹ Wood ordered several reports to be commissioned on the Swiss system and its relevance to

America.³² By late autumn of 1910, these measures had become the foundations of Wood's new military system.

The policy of reconciliation with Japan continued to be unpopular in the army. Wood, Root, and other senior figures remained convinced American economic growth depended upon controlling Far Eastern trade. Taft's faith in international agreement was ridiculed by Wood, and he ordered all military attaches in Latin America and the Pacific to report on any Japanese economic or military activity.³³ The President, worried over internal party division, was aware of Wood's opposition to his foreign and defence policies.

Internal Republican party division between progressives and conservatives increased with Roosevelt's return from Africa. In May the former President told his friend Lodge that his support for Taft had been a mistake.³⁴ A few weeks later he delivered his own policy speech at Ossawatimie, Kansas. The "Square Deal," speech did not criticise Taft by name, but it challenged the President to support a graduated income tax, government control over big business, stronger labour protection laws, and a larger defence budget. The promise of more defence expenditure did not impress Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans, because they feared Roosevelt was splitting the party. The mid-term congressional results confirmed their apprehension. On November 8, 1908 the Democrats had

gained control of Congress for the first time since 1894. The Republican Party theoretically still held a comfortable majority in both houses, but Progressive Republicans, disillusioned by Taft's policies, voted with the Democrats to give them a majority. In the House James Hay, Democrat, became chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. A staunch supporter of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian principles, Hay distrusted strong centralised government, opposed Root's army reforms, supported locally controlled volunteer forces, and was a close friend of General Ainsworth.³⁵ This appointment did not endear Roosevelt to Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans who blamed the former president for the division within their party.

Wood was annoyed by the election results and by Taft's decision to create a War Department Board on Business Methods. Ainsworth had convinced the President to create this board as the military review body for the new Efficiency Commission on Government Performance. The Adjutant General was appointed chairman. Wood, like his predecessors, found his authority undercut by Taft's faith in Ainsworth.³⁶ The Chief of Staff's difficulties increased with a revolution in Mexico. The dictator Porfirio Diaz was challenged by the liberal reformer Francisco I. Madero. In Washington, Taft worried over the threat to 40,000 U.S. citizens and over \$100,000,000 of investment in Mexico.³⁷ The President feared Diaz's fall

might cause political chaos. Wood was ordered to prepare contingency plans for military action.³⁸

Relations between the President and the Chief of Staff remained difficult, despite their close working relationship on the Mexican crisis. In Congress, Democrats had passed the McLachlan Resolution, instructing the secretary of war to report to Congress on national defence. Democrats hoped to use the opportunity to discredit ideas of military preparedness and demand defence cuts. Ainsworth, advising important congressmen, hoped to reduce general staff authority over staff bureaus. Dickinson allied with Wood, allowed the chief of staff to appear before Congress. In an effective speech, Wood claimed the army suffered from badly organised supply departments, insufficient artillery, ineffective reserve forces and too few personnel for current defence needs.³⁹ The speech annoyed Taft, since he had not authorised it and because it discredited Taft's attempt to reduce military expenditure. To avoid causing a scandal, which would add to internal party division, Taft decided to discipline neither Wood nor Dickinson.

In January 1911 the War Department introduced Wood's plan to achieve military preparedness by increasing the efficiency of the militia. Wood advocated a new two-year enlistment period in the army to replace the current five-year term. Under the new scheme, after two years service

men would be liable for call-up for the next eight years. The Chief of Staff hoped this would provide a large trained reserve. The bill re-asserted the right of the President to use the National Guard abroad.⁴⁰ A separate measure, introduced days later, suggested commissioning 500 new regular army officers to allow the professional army to expand rapidly in time of war.⁴¹ Both measures were opposed by Democrats and Progressive Republicans. In the War Department Wood discovered Ainsworth had passed information on to opponents of the new measures, and a serious row erupted over the powers of the adjutant general.⁴² Thereafter the two men were bitter enemies. Ainsworth continued to provide information to opponents of military reform, especially to his friend, House Military Affairs Chairman Hay.⁴³

The Mexican crisis distracted Wood from his attempt to pass new army legislation. A border incursion from Mexico left two U.S. citizens dead and eleven injured in Douglas, Arizona. The President was reluctant to act, preferring to trust international agreement rather than any hasty use of force.⁴⁴ The demands for action from worried businessmen, Roosevelt, and from the army increased. In early March public pressure forced Taft to order an army mobilisation in Texas, with Major General Carter in command. The plan was to rapidly deploy 20,000 troops on the border.⁴⁵ The troops were not to enter

Mexico. The mobilisation was a failure. By the end of March, the U.S. force numbered less than 20,000 and was critically short of supplies. The struggle to assemble 20,000 troops in America gave credence to Wood's comments on the continued inadequacies of the army.

The political fight to achieve army reform took on a new urgency in the wake of the Mexican trouble. In Washington, Wood was frustrated at opposition to his reforms and openly described his opponents as "stupid fools."⁴⁶ In the Senate, Root and Lodge announced their support for Wood's plans although it did not weaken Taft's continued refusal to support Wood. The Chief of Staff's reforms, like those of Root, required strong support from the executive if they were to succeed. Wood and Taft continued to disagree on the benefits of international law and better relations with Japan with the Chief of Staff persisting in encouraging the army to ignore Taft's policies. He ordered Bell, commander in the Philippines, to plan U.S. defensive strategies in response to a Japanese attack. Bell happily complied. He disliked Taft, and, like most senior officers, he scorned any willingness to trust in international agreements.⁴⁷ Aware of increasing party division, his declining stature in the army, and increasing opposition in Congress the President decided to replace Secretary of War Dickinson. He offered Henry Lewis Stimson the post. Stimson was regarded as a

Progressive Republican and one of Roosevelt's closest friends, so Taft hoped that this appointment might reunite an increasingly divided Republican Party.⁴⁸

Henry Lewis Stimson was born in New York on September 21, 1867. A graduate of Yale and Harvard Law School, he was admitted to the New York Bar in 1891. In 1893 he became a member of Root's law firm in New York where he soon became a close friend of Root and full partner in the firm in 1897. Over the next few years, Stimson became friendly with Roosevelt, Wickersham, Gifford Pinchot and other leading Republicans. Between 1906 and 1909 he served as U.S. Southern District Attorney for New York.⁴⁹

Roosevelt and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were delighted by Stimson's appointment as secretary of war. On May 12, 1911 Dickinson retired as secretary of war and Stimson formally took charge. The new Secretary, like most of his predecessors, was ignorant of army matters and War Department personalities. In a series of meetings, dinners, and a week-long fishing trip, Wood, Root, and Roosevelt sought to educate Stimson. Their plans for military preparedness and the likely opposition in the War Department and in Congress were discussed with the new Secretary.⁵⁰ On his return from his fishing trip, Stimson immediately faced various demands from opponents of army reform.

In Congress, Hay introduced a bill inspired by Ainsworth. The bill revived Ainsworth's suggestion to consolidate the Adjutant General's Office and Inspector General's Office, proposed to cut the number of General Staff officers, and suggested promoting all members of the Adjutant General's Office one grade upon retirement.⁵¹ The last measure ensured Ainsworth would retire as a Lieutenant General. Wood opposed all the measures suggested. He approached the President and demanded that he denounce the bill and reassign Ainsworth to a departmental command. Although Taft agreed to consider these matters, he decided to leave Ainsworth as adjutant general and ignore the implications of the Hay Bill.⁵² Ainsworth submitted his views to Stimson, reminding the new Secretary that the Record and Pension Office was exempt from General Staff control under the original act of Feb. 14, 1903. He claimed that Taft, as secretary of war, had supported this interpretation of the Act when he wrote: "The Chief of Staff is charged ... by law with the duty of supervising, under the direction of the Secretary of War, all troops of the line and various staff bureaus." On the basis of these claims, Ainsworth asserted Wood had no legitimate control over his office.⁵³ Stimson rejected these assertions. He indicated to Ainsworth his support both for the authority of the General Staff over all staff bureaus, and for Wood's policy of military preparedness.

Throughout the autumn of 1911 the War Department suffered continual bickering among leading officers. Wood, Carter, and Ainsworth all sought to influence War Department policy in different ways.⁵⁴ Wood and Carter challenged Ainsworth's right to reassign officers to new posts. The issue caused such acrimony between the Adjutant General and the Chief of Staff that communication between the two men could only be conducted through notes passed by third parties.⁵⁵ The President tried to avoid becoming embroiled in these arguments among senior Army officers, but his decision not to support Wood only encouraged further adverse comment upon his leadership, abilities and policies. Colonel John G. Harbord summarised this anti-Taft feeling in the Army when he wrote:

.... I have heard no good words out here for the President's peace-at-any-price policy If Mr. Taft and Carnegie succeed in abolishing war, my father-in-law says he supposes all the army we need will be Archie Butt [the President's Military Aide] and an attending surgeon or two. Bishop Brent in his sermon this morning referred to the President as an Idealist whose dreams might many of them not come true in our day, but might become the platforms of practical politicians in another day. You can never expect any initiative from Congress unless pushed from behind. To tell the honest American voter that he is worthless as a soldier without training does not win him votes like letting him know that the citizen soldier of America can win over the brutal hirelings of any other land with or without training....

Harbord continued, suggesting Wood establish an army league to promote public interest in military preparedness.⁵⁶ The Chief of Staff required no prompting

on this issue. In Great Britain he had discussed such a planned organisation with his British friends.

Senator Root did all he could to get Wood and Stimson to become firm friends. The new Secretary of War proved eager to learn. He agreed that international conflict was inevitable and that Wood's proposal to ensure military preparedness was the best guarantee for future security. Stimson supported American expansion overseas, believing colonial possessions were vital for American business and defence. In October he rejected a proposal for Puerto Rican statehood and suggested that American colonies should aspire to British-style Dominion status with the United States.⁵⁷

Taft's attempt to placate Roosevelt by appointing Stimson secretary of war failed. On December 23, 1911 Roosevelt wrote to William B. Howland announcing his intention to challenge Taft for the Republican presidential nomination. In late February 1912 Roosevelt publicly declared his intention to recapture the White House.⁵⁸ Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans were dismayed by Roosevelt's action. Root, Wood, Stimson, and others were sure he would split the party and thus allow a Democratic victory.⁵⁹ Such a victory would endanger Root's military reforms and prevent the implementation of Wood's plans for military preparedness. They regarded Roosevelt as unelectable and rejected much of his domestic platform as too radical. Supporters of Taft and military reform,

continued to believe in the efficiency of big business and free market capitalism. Roosevelt's policies threatened judicial freedom, private property, military reform, and business interests.⁶⁰ Stimson, the most progressive member of Taft's cabinet, rejected Roosevelt's "progressive policies" outright and endorsed Taft. In a letter to Otto T. Banard he summarised the faith many Republicans still had in business organisation as an example of efficiency:

.... We have reached the stage of big business, but not of monopoly, but that which exists for the economic purpose of saving the wastes of production and lowering its costs have come to stay and should not be interfered with. Possibly sometime in the dim future we may in some industries as we have already in railroads, reach the stage of regulated monopoly, but we have not done so yet and it is not a practical question.

He further claimed that market competition was an effective regulator which guaranteed efficiency and confidently concluded: "under normal conditions our big corporations will be regulated and controlled as to their prices by potential competition."⁶¹

Unlike Roosevelt, Taft's cabinet refused to accept that business organisation was inefficient and required government regulation. The former President was increasingly regarded as a dangerous interloper with a shallow commitment to true Republican Progressivism.⁶² Roosevelt's plans placed Root, Lodge, Stimson, and Wood in an awkward position. They did not wish to speak against him, yet his actions threatened the Republican Party,

military reform, and big business. None of these leading Neo-Hamiltonians believed Roosevelt could be elected; his actions only seemed to guarantee a Democratic victory in November.⁶³

Throughout the spring, Wood continued to promote his military reforms. The Chief of Staff confronted growing opposition in Congress, both to further army reform and to measures already enacted. Congressional Democrats, encouraged by a divided Republican Party, introduced their own bill to challenge Wood's ideas for military preparedness. The legislation recommended longer army enlistments, the disbandment of the Militia Division responsible for army-militia cooperation, the end of line officer appointments in the General Staff, the return of coastal artillery to local regiments, and Adjutant General Ainsworth's right to control the Inspector General's Office.⁶⁴ These proposals reflected the continued appeal of local control, volunteerism, and international isolation to many Americans. The fear remained that a centralised professional army, and colonial expansion, threatened the American republic.

In Congress, Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans attacked the changes proposed by Democratic legislation, but many of Roosevelt's progressive supporters endorsed the attempt to weaken American military power. Taft joined those opposing the bill. Wood and Stimson confronted further difficulties

when Major General Carter testified before Congress. Wood's deputy defended the General Staff, attacked Wood's planned national reserve, and supported the creation of a large professional army. A staunch advocate of military professionalism, he refused to accept that a large volunteer reserve could be reliable in battle.⁶⁵

Wood and Stimson challenged these assertions. The Chief of Staff cited the views of economist Brooks Adams to highlight the link between conflict and trade. An efficient military was essential to guarantee overseas trade and ensure American prosperity. Wood released a general staff report on the deficiencies that remained in the army and the ease with which America could be invaded. He argued that the United States confronted industrial competitors with large citizen armies and that American security depended upon military preparedness.⁶⁶ In April 1912 Wood, supported by Root and Stimson, decided to establish an Army League to publicise the reasons for military preparedness. The League quickly denounced the Democrats and Taft for pursuing policies of "retrenchment and economy," which threatened national security and prosperity.⁶⁷

Events abroad provoked alarm from Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans as they considered the Democratic Army Bill. Political instability in many places seemed to threaten American trade and investment. In Mexico virtual civil war

continued to threaten American citizens and investment. The Panama Canal was nearing completion and would require a military garrison to defend it. American forces occupied Tien tsin in China, as revolution inspired by provincial army units threatened American nationals, property, and trade. Japan continued to expand its military forces and to extend territorial control over Manchuria, Korea, and Formosa. Many in the army believed the Philippines remained in danger and that American trade in the Pacific was under threat from Japan. Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic all required American troops and custom officials to maintain economic and political stability. In Europe, the naval arms race between Germany and Britain intensified after the British launched the first modern battleship, H.M.S. Dreadnought in 1906. For Neo-Hamiltonians the international scene in the spring of 1912 provided proof of political instability abroad, accompanying threats to American investment and exports, and thus the necessity for American military preparedness.

In Washington the army remained under pressure from Taft to produce defence cuts. Stimson and Wood commissioned a report on closing posts as a way to cut costs, organise larger army units, and reassign their limited forces to more strategically important areas. Many of the fifty-two military installations in America had been built in response to the Indian Wars and were no

longer required in the twentieth century. The report recommended closing eighteen forts and provoked outrage in Congress from representatives of the states affected. The majority of the closures were in Texas, Wyoming, Michigan, and New York.⁶⁸ Congress rejected the post closure plan, and relations between supporters of military reform and Congress reached a low-point. This failure to close posts encouraged Stimson to introduce the ideas of Taylorism and scientific management into the army to reduce costs. The introduction of Taylor's ideas emphasised the continued confidence many Republicans had in business organisation to achieve efficiency. Stimson, like Root, believed army and business organisations were similar in structure and problems faced. The introduction of Taylorism did produce considerable savings but was dropped after strikes occurred at army arsenals in protest against the rigorously enforced time allotment for each task.⁶⁹

The failure of plans to reduce expenditure discouraged the already reluctant Stimson and Wood from pursuing Taft's defence cuts. In the early spring, however, the General Staff recommended abolishing the muster rolls held by the Adjutant General's Office. The muster rolls, which listed individual members of a unit, could be replaced by a descriptive list which would save money. Wood wrote to Ainsworth for his opinion. After three weeks Wood still had received no reply from the

Adjutant General. The Chief of Staff sent a further querie to Ainsworth, asking for his comments on the suggestion by the General Staff. Four days later the Adjutant General sent a reply. He accused Wood of arrogance, questioned the objectivity of the proposal, and criticised the Secretary of War for bias against his office.⁷⁰ A further inquiry from Wood demanding an opinion elicited a sarcastic reply to Stimson:

.... Life is too short to permit of wasting any portion of it in discussion with, or for the benefit of, any one whose conception of the underlying principles of military administration is so hazy that he can advocate such a proposition seriously.... A proposition of this kind would be remarkable if advanced by a state militiaman and it is simply amazing when put forward by an officer in the regular army, even though his connection with the military side of that establishment be so remote as to be merely nominal⁷¹

On February 10, Wood met Judge Advocate General Crowder, War College President Crozier, and his assistant Carter. These senior officers unanimously recommended disciplinary action against Ainsworth for insubordination.⁷² Five days later Stimson relieved the Adjutant General of his command. The following day, faced with a possible court martial and public disgrace, Ainsworth announced his retirement.⁷³ Colonel Hall, the deputy adjutant general, replaced Ainsworth. James Hay and other prominent Democrats were indignant that their friend had been forced to retire. The attempt to close army posts, continued assertion of presidential authority over

the National Guard, and the Ainsworth affair created a new determination in Congress to remove the Chief of Staff and rescind the General Staff Act of 1903.

Wood and his Neo-Hamiltonian supporters needed allies. President Taft, confronted by a strong presidential challenge by Roosevelt, also needed support. The result was a new alliance between conservative Taft Republicans and Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. The President, previously reluctant to support American intervention overseas, began to solicit Neo-Hamiltonian support. In early June the President authorised the use of American Marines in Cuba to maintain the pro-American administration. A few weeks later Marines landed at Managua, capital of Nicaragua, to help the pro-American president remain in power. In August Taft signed the Panama Canal Act and indicated his willingness to consider fortifying the canal, as Wood, Root, and others wished.

In Congress the Democrats, advised by Ainsworth, introduced an amended Army Bill. The Bill proposed a forty percent cut in the number of General Staff officers, disbanded five regiments of cavalry, limited the role of the secretary of war on post closures, and narrowed the choice of chief of staff open to the president in an attempt to exclude Wood.⁷⁴ These measures, supported by progressive Republicans and Democrats, easily gained a majority in the House of Representatives. In the Senate,

Root and Lodge worried that Taft might not veto the bill. Both senators worked with Stimson to prevent its passage. In the Senate Francis E. Warren of Wyoming, Chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee, led the fight to pass the bill.⁷⁵ Wood and Stimson had recommended Wyoming lose four posts in their report on post closure. On June 11 the bill passed the Senate by one vote.⁷⁶

Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans remained unsure whether Taft, a man who opposed military preparedness, would veto the bill.⁷⁷ The President, however, required support at the forthcoming Republican National Convention. Roosevelt had compiled impressive victories in many Republican primaries including the important states of Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Taft's home state of Ohio. The President had won only Massachusetts, where the party organisation was controlled by Senator Lodge. At the convention Roosevelt needed only eighty more votes to defeat Taft.⁷⁸ To win the nomination, the President required the support of Lodge, Stimson, Root, and other Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans. On June 18 Taft vetoed the Army Bill. The presidential veto included the annual army budget and, in a rare display of support for the army, Taft defied Congress to leave the army unfunded.⁷⁹ That same day the Republican National Convention began in Chicago.

The Republican convention lasted four days. Root was appointed chairman of the convention, and Neo-Hamiltonian

support gave Taft majorities on the Republican National Committee, the platform committee, and the credentials committee. These committees and Root's chairmanship ensured Taft controlled who spoke to the convention, what policies were adopted, and which Roosevelt delegates were accredited to replace Taft delegates. Roosevelt and his supporters found the convention determined to nominate Taft, who secured the nomination with 561 votes to 107 for Roosevelt. Over 300 delegates refused to vote in protest at Taft's managing the convention.⁸⁰ Roosevelt was furious and never forgave Taft, Root, and Lodge for denying him the Republican nomination. Root, once a close friend, was singled out for particular vilification by Roosevelt and his supporters.⁸¹ In a letter to his uncle, Stimson stressed his disappointment at Roosevelt's actions and underlined how meaningless the term "Progressive" had become:

.... I am much disheartened over the performance in Chicago. But I place the original responsibility for it upon Mr. Roosevelt and his advisers. You remember I prophesied at Chicago that his entrance into the contest would disrupt the real progressive party and probably throw the election into the hands of the reactionary Democratic Party. Events have moved exactly along these lines. His efforts have thrown Taft who is not a reactionary, apparently into the hands of the reactionaries ... at the same time, defeating himself T.R. and crippling his efforts toward good. He is the last man in America to lead a progressive party as a candidate for president, because he inevitably brings with in with his personality the third term issue⁸²

Roosevelt ignored pleas not to further split the

Republican Party and in August at an alternative convention, the Bull Moose Party nominated Roosevelt and Hiram Johnson as its candidates. The split in Republican ranks was complete. Confident of victory in November, the Democrats nominated Woodrow Wilson the governor of New Jersey and Thomas R. Marshall from Indiana as their presidential ticket.

In Washington Stimson attended a conference with leading Democrats to design a new army bill. The conference reported its findings to Taft in August. Democrats agreed to remove the provisions from the bill which disqualified Wood from office and prevented the secretary of war from recommending post closures. A new suggestion to amalgamate the three supply bureaus into one department was accepted.⁸³ Wood and Stimson reluctantly accepted a cut of one third in General Staff officers and abandoned Wood's planned shorter enlistment periods. Ainsworth advised Democratic congressmen to denounce Wood's plans for national preparedness during the compromise debate, and many did.⁸⁴ At the end of August, the compromise bill was presented to Taft, who quickly signed it into law.

The debate on army reform again emphasised the influence and respect which business organisation still commanded among army reformers. Throughout the spring and summer of 1912, Wood and Stimson held a series of

conferences on the future organisation of the American army.⁸⁵ A feature of these meetings were large tables, which compared the organisational structure of two principal railroads, the Pennsylvania and New York Central, with the command system operating in the American army. Extensive use was made of these diagrams during discussions on how to achieve coordination among staff bureaus; army-National Guard cooperation; and supervision of strategic planning in the field.⁸⁶ The use of these diagrams demonstrated that the business analogies used during debates on military reform amounted to more than rhetoric designed to impress Congress or the newspapers.

Wood continued to persevere with his policy of national preparedness. In early September he sent copies of the War Department's conclusions on how to achieve efficiency to Taft, Mahan, Choate, Root, and other prominent public figures.⁸⁷ Increasingly, however, the upcoming presidential election distracted attention from Wood's proposals.⁸⁸ Stimson advised the Chief of Staff to concentrate his attentions on preserving the General Staff and army educational reforms already in place. The Secretary of War, warned Wood that Taft's administration would not tolerate another Ainsworth controversy before the election. In September, despite opposition from Wood, Ainsworth's friend James Buchanan Aleshire was appointed head of the new consolidated Supply Department. Stimson

advised Wood to cultivate good relations with this new bureau chief.⁸⁹ The approaching election deeply depressed Root, Stimson, and other Republicans as most senior Republicans were reluctant to speak for a divided party apparently bound for defeat. Root, who hated speech-making, confided to a friend that he pleaded illness to avoid Taft's requests.⁹⁰ Taft was bitterly disappointed and angry at the lack of support from Root, Wickersham, Knox, Stimson, and many other senior party members.

Wood continued to worry about American military failings. The international situation seemed highly unstable. Japan was exploiting the Chinese civil war to improve its Pacific trade and to gain more territorial concessions in China. In Mexico political instability continued to threaten American lives and investment. German arms sales and exports to Argentina and Brazil challenged the American determination to uphold the Monroe Doctrine.⁹¹ The Chief of Staff was concerned by the threat these problems presented to the American attempt to achieve economic supremacy in the Pacific and Latin America. Wood kept Roosevelt fully informed, as the former president seemed more likely to be elected than Taft.⁹² On November 5, 1912 the election result was announced: The electoral vote gave Wilson 435 votes, Roosevelt eighty-eight votes and Taft eight votes. Roosevelt and Taft split the Republican popular vote. Wilson received over

6,000,000 votes, against over 4,000,000 for Roosevelt, and nearly 3,500,000 for Taft. In Congress the Democrats achieved a fifty-one to forty-four majority in the Senate and a 291-127 majority in the House.

Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans responded quickly to the defeat. They were determined both to protect Root's General Staff Act and to ensure that Wood's ideas on national preparedness received consideration from the new administration. In Cambridge, Massachusetts, just six days after the election, Wood again outlined his ideas:

.... Every man of ordinary common sense knows that wars, however much we strive to avoid them, will come and only those who have failed to gather anything of wisdom from the past can object to reasonable preparation for the future. If we wish to avoid war against this country, it will be necessary to be reasonably prepared to meet them. A simple declaration that wars are not coming, and a failure to make reasonable preparation for possible difficulty, is distinctly an ostrich policy, and those who preach it are responsible for disaster and bloodshed than any other class of men

....⁹³

In the War Department Stimson attempted to rush through several administrative reforms before the new administration took office in March 1913. Suggestions made by the Cleveland Commission on Economy and Efficiency were rapidly implemented. The new measures reduced army paper work by one third and produced annual savings of \$300,000.⁹⁴ Stimson also sought to convince Wilson, the incoming president, of the value of army reforms already in place. He used his friend, New Jersey lawyer William

Osborn, to present his views to Wilson. Osborn was a friend of Wilson's, and the President-elect listened to his advice on matters of defence policy.⁹⁵

Wilson appointed Lindley Miller Garrison secretary of war. Garrison, a native of New Jersey, was a lawyer and former vice-chancellor of New Jersey and would serve as secretary of war from March 7, 1913 until February 10, 1916.⁹⁶ In the weeks before he took office, Wood and Stimson sought to influence Garrison.⁹⁷ The new Secretary became increasingly sympathetic to Neo-Hamiltonian ideas and ultimately left office convinced that Wilson's opposition to military preparedness was wrong.

In February 1913, violence in Mexico required the mobilisation of American troops and in the process vindicated the Stimson-Wood reforms which consolidated army command. In one short telegram, Stimson mobilized 20,000 fully equipped soldiers, who were quickly deployed along the Texas-Mexico border. Garrison observed the success of this operation and realised that the mobilisation had succeeded because of forward planning by the War College and the organisational skills of the General Staff. The new Secretary was suitably impressed.⁹⁸ Garrison agreed to continue Wood-Stimson policies of closing small western outposts, defending army reform, and consolidating scattered army units through creating brigade and divisional commands.⁹⁹ Stimson was delighted

with Garrison's promised support for the army. Wilson provided further good news to supporters of military reform when he announced that Wood would serve out his term as chief of staff. This decision allowed Wood to remain chief of staff until April 20, 1914. The continued influence of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas on defence policy was assured.

The struggle to preserve the professional army led by a general staff and presidential control over the National Guard continued for many years. The passage of National Defence Acts in 1916 and 1920 rekindled debate on the army best suited to the American republic. The experiences of World War One convinced all but a small minority in Congress to accept Neo-Hamiltonian ideas. The ideas of Root, Stimson, Wood, and others radically altered American defence and foreign policy. These men, confronted by the depression of the 1890s, large European colonial Empires, and expanding industrial capacity, were convinced American freedom and security depended upon economic expansion abroad. To encourage American exports, the acquisition of colonies and a strong military were essential. War with Spain provided the opportunity to extend American influence in the Caribbean and Pacific.

An agrarian, demilitarized state was transformed into an interventionist world power. American relations with Japan and Germany increasingly deteriorated. A new

informal Anglo-American alliance, based on free trade and a belief in Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, emerged. Neo-Hamiltonian policies ensured all future American governments faced large overseas commitments. This Neo-Hamiltonian victory over the ideals of Jefferson and Jackson had fundamentally altered American foreign and defence policy for the rest of the century.

CHAPTER EIGHT - END NOTES

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
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APPENDIX ONE


The Army Command Structure in the 1890's



Derived from Otto, L. Nelson National Security and the General Staff Washington, Infantry Journal Press: 1946, p. 21

APPENDIX TWO

The Army Command Structure in the Autumn of 1903



APPENDIX THREE
SOME SUBJECTS CONSIDERED BY THE FIRST
GENERAL STAFF.

Purchase of land for new forts.

Prevention of cruelty to animals in time of war.

Revision of infantry drill regulations.

Supply of travel rations for the militia.

Detail of student officers at the General service and Staff College.

Pensions for Macabebe Scouts.

Water system for Fort McKinley, Manila.

Compostion and pay of army bands.

Preparation of various maps.

Inspection of seacoast defences.

Reorganisation of field batteries.

Militia organisation in Alaksa and Puerto Rico.

Appointment of a board to consider fire control and searchlights.

Instruction of Cuban artillery corps.

Railroad through the Vancouver military reservation.

Information compiled from the Annual Report of the Secretary of War June 30, 1903 H.Doc. 58th Cong., 2nd sess. Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1903), p.69.

APPENDIX FOUR

COMMANDING GENERALS AND CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE ARMY 1864-1918

NAME		FROM	TO
<u>Commanding General</u>			
Grant U.S.,	Gen. .	March 9, 1864	March 4, 1869
Sherman W.T.,	Gen. .	March 8, 1869	Nov. 1, 1883
Sheridan, W.T.,	Gen. .	Nov. 1, 1883	Aug. 5, 1888
Schofield, J.,	Lieu. Gen. .	Aug. 14, 1888	Sept. 29, 1895
Miles, N.A.,	Lieu. Gen. ..	Oct. 5, 1895	Aug. 5, 1903
<u>Chiefs of Staff</u>			
Young, S.B.M.,	Lieu. Gen.	Aug. 15, 1903	Jan. 8, 1904
Chafee, A.R.,	Lieu. Gen.	Jan. 9, 1904	Jan. 14, 1906
Bates, J.C.,	Maj. Gen.	Jan. 15, 1906	April 13, 1906
Bell, J.F.,	Maj. Gen.	April 14, 1906	April 21, 1910
Wood, L,	Maj. Gen.	April 22, 1910	April 20, 1914
Wotherspoon, W.,	Maj. Gen.	April 21, 1914	Nov. 15, 1914
Scott, H.L.,	Maj. Gen.	Nov. 16, 1914	Sept. 21, 1917
Bliss, T.H.,	Maj. Gen.	Sept. 22, 1917	May 19, 1918
March, P.C.	Gen.	May 19, 1918	June 30, 1921

Derived from William Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United States Army (New York: D.Appelton-Century, 1924), p.532.

VITA

Ronald James Barr was born in Paisley Scotland. He grew up in the Shetland Islands and after finishing High School in Lerwick Shetland he entered Glasgow University. In 1985 he gained an honours M.A. in modern history and politics. He then entered Aberdeen College of Education where he qualified as a high school teacher. In 1986 he entered the graduate program in history at Louisiana State University. In May 1989 he was awarded a thesis M.A. and in May 1993 he completed his doctorate. He is currently the U.S. historian at Chester College in England.

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Major Field: History

Title of Dissertation: Neo-Hamiltonian Republicans and Military Reform in the Progressive Era: 1898-1912

Approved:

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Major Professor and Chairman

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Date of Examination:

September 2, 1992