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The Rhetoric of Synnationalism: A Model of Foreign Policy Discourse.

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The rhetoric of synnationalism: A model of foreign policy discourse

Hamlett, Ralph A., Ph.D.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1992

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THE RHETORIC OF SYNNATIONALISM:
A MODEL OF FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE

A DISSERTATION

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Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Speech Communication

by

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ABSTRACT

The United States, as other nation-states, claims legitimacy as an agency for the expression of the aspirations of its people. This political structure appeared as part of a historical process that implied a transfer of authority from ruling elite(s) to the public.

However, U.S. foreign policy discourse evidences an incomplete relocation of authority. In matters of sovereignty and national interests, the policy establishment considers itself more capable of decisions than ordinary people. The establishment tends to view citizens as masses disinterested in and incapable of understanding vital decisions of the state. The policy establishment assumes the public's role is best limited to a general endorsement of expert opinion.

This study proposes a model for the analysis of U.S. foreign policy discourse to explain how popular opinion is constructed in that arena. 'Synnationalistic discourse' is used to name this rhetorical genre. This term is used because of a tendency of the discourse to produce mass confidence in and acceptance of foreign policy items as these are discursively situated in the nation state vision.
This model of discourse analysis is used to discover how popular support was gained by the Reagan Administration for a particularly controversial agenda item, the Strategic Defense Initiative. This study suggests the Administration used synnationalistic discourse to recontextualize the Strategic Defense Initiative as the American mission. The result was that S.D.I. became a commanding persuasive symbol, a rhetorical icon, within the sphere of popular opinion.

The benefits of this model are two-fold. Because the model proposed by this study does not presume rational standards embraced by the classical tradition, it should be more useful for the analysis of U.S. foreign policy discourse. Second, the model may have a restorative function, showing how the discourse subverts the rhetorical tradition by being an instrument for hegemonic control. By showing how this speech is constructed, it may suggest a site from which a citizen voice could enter foreign policy debate.
CHAPTER I
Introduction

American foreign policy must operate within the parameters of popular opinion. Governmental and non-governmental actors, therefore, have to secure the broadest range of support for their agenda items. This study proposes a model for analyzing discourse that the foreign policy establishment uses to achieve that objective.

This chapter lays the groundwork for the study of American foreign policy discourse. The question that the study addresses is outlined in the first section. The second section examines the nature of American popular opinion, which will lead to a discussion of two rhetorical works contributing to the model proposed in this study. The third section suggests the justifications for this undertaking. In the fourth section, materials used for this study and the method of analysis are discussed.

I
Statement of the Problem

Two problems exist for the U.S. foreign policy establishment as it attempts to gain popular approval for its items. First, while the foreign policy establishment seems immersed in discussion about strategy and tactics, its
central terms and foundational policies are seldom reviewed. Second, citizens, apart from university based elites and certain high profile members of the press, are presumed to be uninformed and apathetic and more interested in private pursuits rather than the international workings of their nation-state.

This study attempts to answer the following question: Why is this arena of discourse closed? By answering this question, the study may assist individuals to become active participants in the American foreign policy process and to view examination of the loci communes of policy rhetoric as necessary and proper.

Given the present monopoly by experts, this study argues that traditional models of discourse analysis are inadequate. Most of them are based on a nineteenth century image of an idealized America: an informed electorate applying rational analysis to extended discourse. At present, foreign policy discourse envisions a mass public that does not possess essential background knowledge and will not invest the time to acquire such information. Despite its image of a passive public, the discourse is crafted to delimit debate and, in some cases, to promote secrecy. Accordingly, foreign policy discourse does not lend itself to the analysis of logic, evidence, and cognition mandated by traditional rational models.
This study proposes a model for the analysis of U.S. foreign policy discourse that is not rationally based. This model is predicated on mass confidence in and acceptance of the nation-state vision. First, this study argues that policy advocates construct popular opinion for their agenda items by drawing from a reservoir of collective thought that forms the American vision. This vision presents the United States as the paradigm and exemplar of an emerging world society.

Second, this study uses the term 'synnationalistic discourse,' to name the genre of rhetoric that is employed in the agenda-setting process of American foreign policy. By using this rhetoric, foreign policy advocates legitimize particular agenda items by situating them in the American vision. The rhetoric functions to recontextualize policies within the central terms of the national state. Thus their enactment is placed beyond criticism as being necessary for the survival and fruition of the United States. Items become functions of a larger international American mission. Particular agenda items, operating as rhetorical icons, take on the power of Foucault's central terms: nation, people, God, state, destiny, father and center.

Further, this study argues that synnationalistic linkage makes rhetorical icons effective in molding popular opinion. These links work to produce collective commitment, serving to construct popular opinion.
II
Contributory Studies

Underlying any rhetorical approach to the study of American foreign policy is the recognition that governments must depend on popular consensus in order to operate the nation-state domestically and internationally. Henry Kissinger observes that twentieth century governments are the "culmination of a process started by the French Revolution: the basing of governmental legitimacy on popular support." Kissinger asserts that, "Even totalitarian regimes are aberrations of a democratic legitimacy: they depend on popular consensus even when they manufacture it through propaganda and pressure."

Public opinion, as an influential component in the U.S. foreign policy process, is problematic. The political establishment holds the assumption that the people are incapable of participating in the process due to lack of concern. Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder observe that the majority of Americans demonstrate limited interest and are reluctant to participate in matters of public affairs. The conclusion derived from a review of data concerning public political apathy over a twenty-four year period (1960-84) seemingly supports this claim:

[For almost a quarter of a century, and almost regardless of changes in political seasons and/or questionnaire construction, the typical American has maintained a lukewarm involvement in public affairs. Indeed, in light of the great changes]
that characterized American political life between the election of John F. Kennedy and the re-election of Ronald Reagan, this constancy in overall levels of citizen political interest is truly remarkable.

The public's apathetic tendency is also reflected in a public opinion survey and analysis sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. The findings reveal that in the area where citizens "probably" have their greatest impact on public policy, national elections, participation is low. For instance, from the years 1975 to 1979, 69% of the public claimed to have voted in a presidential election. While this figure might suggest the majority of the populace voted, the editor contends that this figure "overstates" the actual turnout. Likewise, 63% of the respondents reported that they voted in a local or state election; 27% to have asked someone to vote for their party or candidate; 23% to have written or spoken to a public official about some political issue; 22% to have gone to a political meeting to hear a candidate speak; and 14% to have worked for a political party or candidate.

Several reasons for the causes of apathy have been advanced. First, Harry Holloway and John George attribute the public's political detachment to a conflict within the psyche of the American individual of private versus public concerns. Holloway and George argue that the apolitical behavior of much of the population is the result of the individual being concerned with his/her well-being and
personal advancement. These concerns include employment, health and prospects for their children. Political involvement--actual participation and gaining information concerning political issues--is viewed in terms of cost and benefits. Political activity is often viewed as unnecessary or even "counterproductive." Time spent in politics is an interference to time "that might be otherwise devoted to work or personal life and leisure." Holloway and George contend that these attitudes lead to "privatism, . . . a self-centered individualism which tends to distinguish the personal from the social or public sector of national life."11

A second cause for apathy may be the 'distance' and abstractness of many foreign policy concerns. The citizenry is thought to be little concerned about U.S. foreign policy because, as Thomas Graham observes, it is "more remote from most people's lives" than public policy.16 Citizens' lack of concern has been documented by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. During the period of the study, only four percent of the general public surveyed contacted public officials about a foreign policy issue. Even more important, a declining interest was registered for information relating to international issues.19

Policy makers' acceptance of the general population's lack of relevant foreign policy information is a major problem for the survival of a healthy civic culture. The
decision makers assume citizens do not possess the information to form rational judgments in matters of foreign policy and thus do not invite their participation in public dialogue. The position taken by policy formulators is comparable to the one suggested by Jacque Ellul that government "cannot follow opinion; opinion must follow the government." On the other hand, a 'manufactured' legitimacy does not reflect a genuine loyalty or commitment to our public institutions.

While decision makers minimize the role of the public in the states's international operations, they also are cognizant of the public's potential. McGeorge Bundy asserts that U.S. policy formulators accept that "for many Americans, foreign policy doesn't really matter, except when it does." The result is what Ellul states to be the greatest danger facing the foreign policy establishment—"public opinion manifesting itself in the shape of crisis" and overturning previous decisions. This damburst is the result of a public denied access to decision making; it can only enter the process in a catastrophic way.

This public 'threat' manifests in its ability to deny elected policy formulators with the loss of legitimacy. 'Legitimacy' is defined here as the belief of the people that individuals responsible for proposing and implementing policy, both domestic and foreign, are operating in their perceived interests.
States when a majority of voters demonstrate through the electoral process that the 'best' leaders or representatives have been selected.

Elected individuals by the public demonstration have valid affirmations of what Max Weber calls "charisma" or special abilities "not accessible to everybody" to carry out a mission—in this case, policy formulation and/or implementation." Authority is maintained until such time that tenure duly expires or when officials no longer prove themselves to be the best persons for the position—"the master sent by the gods." The latter occurs when the officials fail to communicate to the people that they are operating in the interests of the state. "It is then that his mission is extinguished, and hope waits and searches for a new holder of charisma."

Breakdowns of legitimacy have been serious in the foreign policy arena. The defeat of Jimmy Carter in 1980 is primarily attributed to the Administration's rhetorical failure. The Administration failed to convince a questioning public that its handling of the Iranian Crisis was correct. In Congress, adverse public reaction registered over the Panama Canal Treaties in 1976. Members backing the treaties were accused of 'giving away' the canal. An inadequate response to that charge is credited in part for the defeat of half the senators who supported the treaties and who were up for re-election in 1978.
Even the fear that legitimacy is crumbling can result in elected individuals surrendering their entire political agendas. Lyndon Johnson's decision not to seek re-election exemplifies a surrender due to the inability of the Administration's discourse to convince the public of the legitimacy of its actions in Vietnam.

The switch of legitimacy from one elected official to another threatens the agendas of the predecessor with reversal or abandonment. Therefore, advocates of particular foreign policy objectives are faced with a paradox. They believe the mass populace is uninformed. But concurrently, they accept that the populace has the potential to "converge on one point ... to become excited and assert" itself—to become a public—producing 'undesired' changes and risking the continuity of foreign policy agendas.\textsuperscript{8}

To mollify this potential, policy advocates construct popular opinion favorable for their propositions. The discursive construction of popular opinion has been an area of continuous inquiry. In his sixteenth century political treatise, Machiavelli advised that leaders should depend on image to lead the masses since knowledge was not possible for the general populace.\textsuperscript{8} The application of the Machiavellian philosophy was discernable in the use of 'cant' in the conduct of internal and international relations prior to the twentieth century. Grant Hugo defines 'cant' much as modern political speakers define
'code,' an "esoteric language intended to confuse the vulgar while conveying a specific meaning to initiates."

The basing of government on popular support during the twentieth century has mandated that the citizens possess a "relatively stable set of predispositions that are manifested in the form of emotive attachments and sentimental identifications with the symbols of the political system." While 'deliberate deception' may not be a necessary characteristic of today's political discourse, Murray Edelman observes it functions as a "systematic though unplanned dissemination of illusion" which creates meaning "not based upon observation or empirical evidence."

The ambiguity and complexity of international issues are provided meaning by interfacing the citizens' extant beliefs and attitudes with current international issues--by identifying the unknown with the known. The interface occurs because the language of political advocates perform as 'cuings' for the general public. Citizens, in turn, construct meaning from their collective past.

Philip Wander offers important insights about argumentative modes of political discourse and how they function in defining American foreign policy. Wander suggests that foreign policy discourse takes two forms: "prophetic dualism" and "technocratic realism." First, prophetic dualism is a Manichean dualism of good versus
evil. It resonates with the world view of Christian Fundamentalism. Prophetic dualism is a non-comprising argumentative form which "divides the world into two camps."\(^{30}\)

The second mode, technocratic realism places efficiency over morality. The tone is more "secular, humanistic, scientific, and negotiable."\(^{31}\) According to Wander, this is the argument of the expert--the "pragmatic government bureaucrats and skilled professionals."\(^{32}\)

Prophetic dualism is suggested by Wander to be rhetorically effective for an audience which abides by a "religious faith, the faith of our fathers, the ideals of freedom, individuality, a militant God, and the existence of evil in the world."\(^{33}\) On the other hand, technocratic realism promotes the view of a "managerial humanist elite."\(^{34}\) This form is commanding rhetorically to labor, racial and ethnic minorities, middle-class professionals, and the intelligentsia.\(^{35}\)

Wander observes that since one form may have stronger appeal than another depending on the constituency, one mode can predominate over the other during different periods. For instance, Wander argues that prophetic dualism was used by the Eisenhower-Dulles Administration to attract the "Protestant Establishment" which dominated the Republican Party during the nineteen-fifties.\(^{36}\) When the American people became "scornful of an America shaped along lines
laid down by a Republican God and Protestant Fundamentalists," policy advocates turned to the argumentative mode of technocratic realism." The rhetorical change was made to attract the scholars, government bureaucrats, and skilled professionals "who formed part of the coalition which brought the Kennedy Administration into power." Wander writes that these seemingly diametrically opposed modes of foreign policy discourse "can co-exist," and "elements of each may appear in the same speech" due to a "deeper level"—a ground:

Beneath isolated and abstracted form of argument and the demands of political pluralism is the realization that arguments over foreign policy share a world, literally "the world," so deep and fundamental as to be called the "ground on which foreign policy is debated in this country. It is ground shared by various administrations, Republican and Democrat." Wander argues this teleological axiom of foreign policy discourse is nationalism.

The "ideological context wherein this ground is defined and made to appear natural" is the persona of the United States." The discourse of political advocates that personifies the United States cues popular perceptions of its supreme "mission in a world of nations" with a "moral and spiritual center raising it above all other nations" in the international community." It is that collective perception which dictates that the "United States is the
manifestation of Truth, Justice, and Freedom placed on this earth by a God whose purpose it is to make of it an instrument for extending His spiritual and material blessings to the rest of humanity.** When interfaced successfully with the collective perception, foreign policy arguments become "pervasive," "obvious," and "free of challenge" for the populace.**

Foreign policy discourse is viewed as secular speech with religious dimensions. Wander implies this religiosity in his description of the "United States" as ground for American foreign policy rhetoric: "Its personification as an Actor with . . . a moral and spiritual center."* This study suggests that foreign policy discourse produces a vision of the United States for the mass public that has religious rhetoricity.

The persuasive effect on popular opinion is in keeping with that of traditional religion as assessed by Edward W. Said: furnishing the mass population "with systems of authority and with canons of order whose regular effect is either to compel subservience or to gain adherence."* Thus, the study may suggest that the apathetic characteristic of American citizens is discourse related.

This study builds from Wander's perspective. The model of foreign policy discourse proposed in this study attempts to show systematically how the interface occurs between foreign policy items and the collective confidence in the
mission of the United States. The model incorporates and expands a framework of foreign policy that accounts for ideology and myth. This study accepts the basic premise posited by Michael Calvin McGee that "[h]uman beings in collectivity behave and think differently than human beings in isolation. . . . The collectivity is said to 'have a mind of its own' distinct from the individual qua individual."

Collective commitment in matters of foreign policy is identified in this study as synnationalism. This study argues that collective support is more extensive than nationalism. This tendency is constructed by recontextualizing agenda items as the American mission. The argument is made that when specific agenda items are joined by discourse with the mission, these become comparable to what McGee defines as an "ideograph, . . . a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal."

This study, following McGee's lead, argues that these abstractions operate at different levels. McGee suggests two ideographic tiers. One group functions internationally while the other performs domestically. This work contends the domestic ideographic strata is further divided in terms of foreign policy and partisan political applications. The rhetorical device in discourse primarily intended for a partisan effect serves to gather "subgroup" support for a
particular party." In foreign policy, citizens are "united" by synnationalistic recontextualizations "that represent the political entity 'United States.'"

To distinguish between the two, this study provides a different nomenclature than that offered by McGee. The term 'ideograph' is used for partisan applications. When the device constructs popular opinion supporting foreign policy items, the term 'icon' is applied. This refinement of terms is used to avoid confusion.

The integration of McGee's contributions with those of Wander should result in a more functional model for the understanding of American foreign policy discourse. This goal is in keeping with McGee's assertion that "structures must be understood and described before one can claim to have constructed a theoretically precise explanation of a society's ideology." Hopefully this research will move rhetoricians closer to that precision and continue the progression of knowledge concerning foreign policy discourse and its construction of popular opinion. The importance of such an undertaking is addressed in the following section.

III
Significance of Study

The significance of the rhetorical model of U.S. foreign policy proposed in this study is its pluralistic perspective. This perspective attempts to combine and extend the strategic, metaphoric, and ideological approaches
that have been used to analyze American foreign policy discourse. While other scholars have analyzed foreign policy discourse from these singular perspectives, this study suggests a holistic model to explain the construction of popular opinion in the foreign policy arena. Singularity, this provides justification as well as suggests the significance for the study. However, this construct's perspective makes the study meaningful for two other reasons.

First, the model does not assume the rhetoricity of rational discourse for the construction of popular opinion, a position held by the more traditional models. From the classical perspective, citizens are conceived to be responsive to logical arguments and proofs as well as to emotional appeals. Furthermore, the traditional approach assumes that the populace will be actively attentive. Individuals will possess an educational background equipping them with a framework including a vocabulary that will enable them to comprehend and judge logical discourse. Constructing popular opinion does not lend itself to this classical tradition of deliberative discourse. The rational model's shortcomings are nowhere more apparent than in presidential debates. According to Jamieson and Birsdell, this discourse is a unique form of modern political communication and "has become the buzz word for 'serious politics.'"
Not only do debates invite a focused attention uncharacteristic of ads but they also create a climate in which even those otherwise disposed to shun political messaging are expected to be able to converse about political data. . . ."

In a campaign season chock full of spot ads and news snippets, viewers turn to debates to provide sustained analysis of issues and close comparisons of candidates."

One would expect that because of their atypicality presidential debates would command rationality. However, Jamieson and Birdsell lament this is not the case:

Those who have been ill disposed to concentrate on politics are unlikely suddenly to devote all their energy to a ninety-minute learning experience. And even when motivation spikes attention, new vocabulary needs time to sink in. Definitions must be embedded. Time is required to get past surface meanings to substance."

So even in the context of the perceived politically notable event of presidential debates, the classical model of discourse has limited applications. Arguably, that model would even be less beneficial for determining how advocates construct favorable popular opinion for more obscure foreign policy. Because the model proposed by this study does not presume rational standards embraced by the classical tradition, it should be more expedient for the analysis of U.S. foreign policy discourse.

A model that does not privilege rationality suggests a second justification for the study. The study may have a restorative function, showing how the discourse subverts the rhetorical tradition by being an instrument for hegemonic
control. By showing how this speech is constructed, it may suggest a site from which a citizen voice could enter the debate.

Insights generated from the study may serve as a means of eventually restoring authentic legitimacy to the process of foreign policy. This form of 'legitimacy,' unlike the Weberian use of the term, would be as Jurgen Habermas argues "an accord or agreement among free and equals." Instead of a structure of domination and acquiescence, it would be one of participation. The materials and method for achieving these objectives are presented in the following section.

IV
Materials and the Method of Inquiry

A variety of materials were used to develop the model of discourse analysis. These materials included scholarly works primarily from communication, political science, and sociology. Principally, discourse broadcast by the television medium was used to operationalize the model. Artifacts were taken mainly from this medium, because it is the source "relied" upon by citizens to form their political views. Additional materials consisted of other speech texts, historical works, magazine and newspaper articles, and governmental and political documents. The latter served to exemplify certain points made by the study as well as to describe the situational context of the model.
Speech and interview transcriptions used in this study were carefully prepared from video and audio recordings. These were rechecked for accuracy. Whenever possible, written transcripts of the discourse appearing in another source or provided by the medium broadcasting the material were compared with the recorded broadcasts and the personally prepared transcripts to further ensure reliability.

This study is arranged in the following format. Chapter Two proposes a model for the analysis of U.S. foreign policy discourse. The chapter answers the following questions. What part does the nation-state vision play in American foreign policy? Why does a foreign policy establishment continue to dominate decisions in U.S. international operations? How does this establishment use the vision in the construction of popular opinion?

The model is operationalized in Chapter Three. Some of the questions addressed in this chapter are: What are the constraints facing foreign policy items? What means are available for advocates to address them? How did the Reagan Administration apply these means to redefine an event the citizens could have perceived as an Administration failure. How did the Strategic Defense Initiative become an icon in the process?

Chapter Four concludes the study. The questions asked in this chapter are: Why does American foreign policy
discourse harm the rhetorical and nation-state ideals? How might future research improve the applicability of this model of discourse analysis? What are the potential benefits of this study?

Summary

One of the more fundamental problems facing policy formulators in the American nation-state is the construction of popular opinion. American foreign policy is determined and put into place by a foreign policy establishment. Its actions must be approved by the mass citizenry. Advocates must convince its citizens that the proposed actions for the United States in the international community are correct. If unable to do so, they risk losing support for policy and with it the ability to rule.

To show how these advocates cope with this potentially destabilizing situation, this study proposes a model of foreign policy discourse that does not assume rational discourse to be effective for the mass public. Instead, it suggests that the rhetoricity of foreign policy discourse is grounded in collective thought constructing the American vision. This model is presented in Chapter Two.
Notes


7Rielly, p. 30.


9Holloway and George, p. 165.

10Holloway and George, p. 165.

Rielly, p. 4; p. 30.


Ellul, pp. 125-6.


Ellul, p. 125. For instance, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro argue that a substantial congruence exists between public opinion and policy on highly visible issues. The authors suggest that opinion changes on these issues are important causes of policy change. See: Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," American Political Science Review (March 1983), pp. 175-96.


Edelman, p. 32.

Wander, 342.
Wander, 347.
Wander, 349.
Wander, 344.
Wander, 352.
Wander, 347.
Wander, 343; 352.
Wander, 347.
Wander, 349.
Wander, 352.
Wander, 352-3.
Wander, 337; 353.
Wander, 353.
Wander, 353.
Wander, 353.
Wander, 353.


"McGee, 2.
"McGee, 15.
"McGee, 8.
"McGee, 8.
"McGee, 8.
"McGee, 14.


Jamieson and Birdsell, p. 5.

Jamieson and Birdsell, p. 199.

See: Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology, p. 82; and Habermas, p. 200.

For instance, a survey conducted in 1980 by the Center for Political Studies found that 'among the very apathetic citizenry,' 74.8% said "TV was the medium used most" for information about politics and current events. 8.4% said newspapers, 1.7% said magazines, and 15.1% said radio." Furthermore, 58.9% of the people who "were very involved" said TV was the "most used medium." See: Bennett, p. 135.
CHAPTER II
A SYNATIONALISTIC MODEL OF FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE

The last chapter suggested that U.S. foreign policy discourse contained an inventional element that constrained public discussion of certain issues. This chapter will attempt to reconstruct salient features of the inventional process in order to understand why this is so. As the last chapter made plain, it is not enough to 'read' the message in the traditional sense. A kind of deconstruction must be employed in order to understand how the message arose and what bases of appeal were used in its construction.

Accordingly, the chapter is divided into two parts: The first part of the chapter discusses the site of all foreign policy discourse: the nation-state. The second part discusses a significant feature of that discourse, the inventional process by which debatable politicies are placed in contexts in which debate is adjourned. This process is a kind of iconization.

The site of policy discourse is the nation-state. Sites of discourse determine who can speak, what rules are applicable, what can be said on a subject. They are arenas of constraint and possibility, and those who control the site of discourse control the content, form, and extent
of public debate. In a large sense, the nation-state functions as a site, just as a courtroom, a public building, a convention, or a university does. Thus, a discussion of the nation-state—its origins, special history, and particular ethos—is relevant here.

The nation-state claims legitimacy as an instrument for the expression of the aspirations of its people. It appeared as a historical successor to kingship, and it implied a progressive, internationally pervasive, transfer of authority from ruling elite(s) to the public.

However, nation-states evidence an incomplete relocation of authority. Because of their transcendent identities extending back into history and forward into the future, in matters of sovereignty and national interests, foreign policy custodians consider themselves more capable of decisions than ordinary people whose horizons are bound by day to day affairs. Therefore, they tend to view citizens as masses incapable of understanding fundamental decisions of the state. This seems to be the case of U.S. foreign policy. The policy establishment assumes the public's role is best limited to a general endorsement of expert opinion. A participating public might interfere with the policy's efficacy. U.S. foreign policy discourse is articulated, therefore, to provide the illusion of citizen participation by constructing popular support.
In the second section, the model is described. This is a process of message construction in which policy objectives are linked to the centering terms of the national vision. Effective American foreign policy discourse is one that successfully recontextualizes items with this vision. The result is a mythic identity for the item. This recontextualization, a rhetorical icon, has synnationalistic tendencies that unify individuals and construct favorable popular opinion. In this light, metaphoric similarities seem to exist between the Christian icon and the rhetorical icon in the sense that both make use of abstract universal terms that bind individuals to ideas beyond their mortal existence and human limits.

I
The Nature of U.S. Foreign Policy

The vesting of sovereignty in the nation-state and the importance of popular consent for the structure's international recognition represent a fundamental visionary shift of the system from that of its immediate political precursor, dynastic orders. This earlier political formation had gained prominence by the nineteenth century in "most of the important states in international politics." The structure's political principle was the dynastic centralization of political authority. This principle affirmed that within their "defined territories," dynasts were the "only rule-making and rule-applying bodies."
location of authority was characteristic of the legal doctrine of sovereignty described by French political theorist, Jean Bodin in his 1576 work, *De La Republique*, that the ruler "cannot in anyway be subject to the commands of another, for it is he who makes the law for the subject, abrogates law already made, and amends absolute law."³

Dynastic sovereignty was functional because of the existing vision. This vision was constructed from the "consensus of political values that prevailed in Europe, the cosmopolitanism of the upper classes, the regard for principles of royal authority and Christianity."⁴

People still thought in terms of a hierarchy of social classes, each with its special rights, privileges, and obligations, rather than in terms of natural rights and natural laws that applied equally to all persons. Their loyalties were to their towns, provinces, and ruling dynasties rather than to nation-states or their fellow citizens.⁵

The "age of egalitarian revolutions" beginning during the latter seventeenth century and continuing until the middle of the nineteenth century challenged this philosophic underpinning of dynastic sovereignty—the divine right of kings and principles of royal succession as well as the stability inherent within the system.⁶ The result was emerging visions for social advancements and change through competing political institutions. These ideas were incorporated from the Enlightenment and the economic revival of the eighteenth century:
The growing belief that the mind of man was devoid of ideas at birth gave rise to the theory that all men were created equal and were capable of being molded by their environment. The hierarchical conception of society was discredited, and the idea that social and moral progress could be achieved by creating the proper environment gradually replaced the older desire for stability and order. At first, the proper environment was thought to be one in which everyone could exercise his natural rights and obey governmental regulations that were made in accordance with natural law. Gradually, the concept was expanded to include democracy and the right of each nationality to govern itself.

The period that has been termed a "middle-class revolutionary movement" and from which the French Revolution arose initiated the new visions and with it the gradual sovereign shift from dynasts to the mass public. The people became more active participants with the visions in that they shared their destinies with the state. The movement's effects on the mass public were the "development of strong emotional attachments to the central state (adding to the traditional loyalties to provinces or towns) and involvement of the average citizen or subject in his government's political life." These centering words—State, Citizen, Nation, People—became the sacred terms of a secular religion.

The movement's visions produced a reformation of political structures extending from western society where the thought was ascendant to all areas of the globe. Instead of the government creating the state, in the last two centuries, the vision of social improvement
institutionalized by political environments and supported by popular opinion has "preceded, and in many cases created, the state." This reformation is reflected in the fact that internal popular consent, real or manufactured, is considered a necessary condition for official modern nation-state sovereignty. The status empowers the United States and other polities to join the international community as "legal persons" and provides for autonomy in their internal operations.

Established nation-states confer the internationally recognized legal status in accordance with a state's capabilities for meeting certain preconditions. These provisions include the state's "stability of organization and administration," the "ability to regulate its internal affairs without outside interference or control," and "specific international capacities."

Ultimately, internal popular consent is deemed instrumental in the satisfaction of these requirements. Without a consenting plurality, coerced or democratically induced, multiple factions might disrupt any potential for a state's operational continuity domestically or internationally. This perhaps would result in an opportunity for external interventions or subjugation.

Since changes in the form of government or in the personnel who operate the government do not necessarily affect political stability, sovereignty, unlike the previous
political thought, resides in the nation-state itself and not in one person whether dictator, monarch, or elected official. The government, presiding either as a group or an individual, is granted transitory sovereign attributes when, and only as long as, it is recognized to have tenable authority based on the assent or acquiescence of its population empowering it to act.  

The involvement of the citizenry in the operations of the nation-state allows for popular influence in what had been once the private domain of the dynasts. For instance, in foreign affairs, the "greater involvement of the average citizen or subject . . . imposes restrictions on the policy makers' freedom of action." An example is Quebec, where a provincial mobilization of voters has resulted in a partial withdrawal of support for the central government at Ottawa.

While the latitude of government actions has been narrowed by popular influence, at the same time, the policy process of nation-states clearly shows that the decentering of authority is only partial. Autocratic structures, for example, contemplate public reaction and its ramifications, but authority comparable to the dynasts remains centralized. Ithiel De Sola Pool attested to this fact in a 1960 description of how the Kremlin elites' handled the "force" of Soviet public opinion by "brutal suppression," and "by creating diversions and camouflage."
The United States policy process because of and in spite of its representative arrangement and a vast commercial press also evidences a relative passivity and even disinterest of the people in decision making. This is so even though the U.S. structural and cultural orientations provide for potentially powerful popular participation:

Some form of pluralism is more plausible than the single elite model of power structure but it still leaves us with a most imperfect democracy. . . . Elites, whether political, corporate, professional, or whatever, have far more influence than the bulk of the population. For good or ill a relatively small number have much more to say about policy matters than the people at large. The results are at odds with the equality implied by classic democratic theory. To reject the single elite theory is not to ignore the substantial inequalities present.

Domestic structures juxtaposed with the nature of states' policies may suggest why the foci of power are more centralized in some nation-states than in others. The overriding purpose for nation-state operations is survival of its vision. When domestic and foreign policies interlock for national security interests as in ideological or revolutionary regimes, popular participation may seem disruptive to the vision. For instance, in an ideological nation-state, doctrine provides the vision of the state. As long as the doctrinal vision remains operational, it motivates both domestic and foreign policy under its rubric.
Similarly, the warrant for the revolutionary nation-state, the vision of self-determination, effectively combines both elements of policy. The revolutionary nation-state must secure for itself political and economic stability that may be impossible through domestic policies alone. Therefore, "foreign policy is domestic policy pursued by other means; it is domestic policy carried beyond the boundaries of the state." John Spanier addresses the importance of this association in his discussion of foreign policy benefits to governments of revolutionary nation-states. He writes that in these states the "only way of arousing the people and keeping them united is to continue the struggle" against a perceived external threat. The governments "preserve their power by externalizing domestic dissatisfaction" by finding "foreign scapegoats . . . to relieve internal stresses and strains."

In both of these regimes, domestic and foreign policy are inseparable from the guiding state visions. They are united in ideological polities because the pervasive "analytical framework" makes them heuristically interdependent. While in revolutionary states, unification of policy is functionally vital.

These domestic structures centralize authority and limit citizen participation. In the former, participation is not needed because "ideology is official, and its interpretation [its implementation domestically and
internationally is the task of the Party leaders, who regard their reading of the ideology as embodying the only true view of society and history; as 'true believers.' In the latter, a single leader or one party symbolizes the state vision of nation-building and use domestic and foreign policy concurrently as the means for its consummation. Citizen input in the policy process is suppressed because it imposes threats to the government's personification as the vision.

State structures that allow for greater separation between policies and state vision enhance the opportunity for public participation, exhibiting a more decentralized location of authority. Such is the case of the United States. First, U.S. domestic and foreign policies are separated by different operating presumptions. Domestic policy is not guided by a singular vision and its protection. Its quintessence is a multiplicity of public interests. The policy may assume threats to the structure of the internal organization, but these are generally situational, perhaps brought about by failed policy or natural catastrophe.

U.S. foreign policy, on the other hand, is directly linked to sovereignty and the state vision. Its supposition is maintenance of self-determination for the nation-state and from that the international advancement of its vision. The assumption exists that the state must
compete globally for the satisfaction of its interests against rational adversaries. These adversaries vie in the international arena for their own objectives which are perceived more often than not as mutually exclusive and frequently detrimental to U.S. interests. With security resulting from successful rivalry, the state is able to further its vision.

Second, these distinctions produce different attitudes concerning citizen input in U.S. policy processes. Unless faced with a perceived catastrophic upheaval, domestic policy operates within the established structure for internal policy. The orientation is grounded within the advocacy tradition of a representative democracy. This allows for mediated citizen influence through prolonged debate. Morton A. Kaplan notes that "majorities should not work their will immediately but only after delay . . . ." The "underlying consensus is that the majorities, if they can sustain themselves, ultimately should have their way . . . ." The domestic advocacy process allowing for citizen input is judged less suitable for foreign policy. The inclination of that policy establishment is to equate American foreign policy with the solution of immediate issues necessary for the success of the long-term vision. Public participation through extended debate is deemed counterproductive in this atmosphere often characterized by
a sense of urgency resulting in a need for secrecy and "combative solidarity." George H. Questor details these two postures inherent in U.S. policy processes:

In the domestic sector, we do not find ourselves adopting the working assumption of having an adversary, a rational antagonist against whom we must close ranks. In the prevention of floods or epidemics, or the avoidance of unemployment, we do not steel ourselves to worry that "the enemy might be listening."

One can think of relatively few issues on the domestic side which impose a continuing need for secrecy. Advance information on the next location of new highways or the timing of currency devaluations must be held closely, of course, but these are the exceptions, rather than the rule. By contrast, secrecy is almost the rule in foreign policy, with openness the exception, because the foreign ministry of another state might exploit our openness. But the secrecy is indeed merely the symptom of a broader form of institutionalized hostility toward foreign governments, and institutionalized expectations of loyalty among one's own citizens. While American Congressmen on domestic issues are urged to have split loyalties, taking their constituents' wishes and needs into account, but also paying attention to national needs, no such diversity of goals is advocated for the foreign policy practitioner. As a working myth, foreign service academies still use something like "my country above all" as their first approximation of a goal."

The U.S. structural orientation and its juxtaposition with policy may explain the nature of its foreign policy discourse. On one hand, the U.S. structure promotes decentralized power. But the perceptual contrasts between purposes of policy makes decentralization, while not complete, more apparent and desired at the domestic rather than at the foreign policy level. U.S. foreign policy
discourse may have a similar objective for its citizens as the effects attempted by regimes whose structural orientations are less democratic and both domestic and foreign policies are joined. This objective would be the acquiescence of the majority of citizens.

The objective may be similar because all nation-state policy formulators are faced with a comparable problem: How to join its people with the state in matters considered to be or presented as vital for the nation-state vision? This is the utmost challenge for advocates because of the myriad of nations as people--their "ethnicities" as well as interests--residing within the boundaries of the nation-state--the "formal political organization which grants citizenship."

Without uniting the majority of its people behind its proposed actions, the advocates would have to compete with others for the position best enunciating and/or advancing a majority vision. While this might be structurally desirable in domestic policy of democratic societies such as the United States, internal competition would defeat the immediacy and secrecy perceived necessary for foreign policy. Advocacy in the policy process of autocratic regimes would or could be seen as a challenge to either the ideologies or the governments' symbolic role as the nation-state. In any case, policy formulators in these structures might risk losing the prerogative to speak for the people.
To gain mass support for their foreign policy agendas, advocates must construct effectively a perception within the majority of people, while their interests may be domestically diverse, that they share a common vision, a destiny, with the nation-state. Advocates, operating on the peoples' behalf, speaking with a single voice, protect and promote this destiny where it might be threatened.

Arguably, policy formulators attempt to meet this demand by drawing from and/or recycling a reservoir of collective thought producing what Karl Deutsch addresses as a higher order of nationalism. The term, synnationalism is used here to suggest such a cumulative nationalism that reflects more support than nationalism. Synnationalism would result in the nation-state as a "terminal community"—"the largest community that, when the chips are down, effectively commands men's loyalty, overriding the claims of both the lesser communities within it and those that cut across it within a still greater society."

Synnationalism is seemingly possible because of a metaphoric affinity of nation-state vision to religious vision. The correlation is suggested in Emile Durkheim's theoretical discussion of the religiosity of society. The parallel occurs because both thoughts, religious and societal, share a "heterogeneity" that "characterizes the sacred from the profane"—the ideal vision and experienced reality.
Society, which Durkheim argues is the source of all religious thought, participates in the real world and at the same time imports an "ideal." Even though individuals cope with the imperfections of society, Durkheim contends that they strive and hope for a "perfect society, where justice and truth would be sovereign and from which evil in all its forms" is "banished forever." Durkheim concludes that this thought "is in close relations with the religious sentiment. . . . [I]t is towards the realization of this that all religions strive."

Durkheim posits that this analogous relationship of societal and religious vision provides the basis for a collective inventional framework. From Durkheim's perspective, the purposiveness of societal religiosity for individuals within the collective is that society's vision tends to be hermeneutically more authoritative for an individual than an interpretive framework she/he would have in isolation. This became the basis for the Durkheimian idea of society as transcendence, an entity that justified and sometimes encouraged individual sacrifice. Even the secular person retain a God: society.

This position is in keeping with the "essential character of the religious spirit" as postulated by Alfred North Whitehead. Society would supply the "vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real,
and yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes." The effect would be an optimism enriching what otherwise might be a "basatelle of transient experience." This, Durkheim argues, has the potency to unite individuals into "one single moral community"—society. Durkheim found similarities between the secular organizations (Military) and religious organizations (Catholicism). Despite a wide difference in goals, tactics, and values, the organizations inspired an abstract and idealized mode of commitment.

If Durkheim's thesis is correct, the nation-state vision, an agent of the largest and more pervasive unit of society, would be commanding due to its purport. This has been conceptualized as "the absolute solution to history and life"—a kind of immortality. For instance, Carlton J. H. Hayes makes the following observation that "[t]o national state as to Universal Church, is attributable a mission of salvation and an ideal of immortality. The nation is conceived of as eternal, and the deaths of its loyal sons only add to its undying glory." This optimistic assurance arguably has the potential to elicit a similar response from members of nation-states as that of "human nature to religious vision,"—a "surrender to the claim for assimilation." For the individual, this would be a synnationalistic tendency, a submission to the
nation-state vision that when invoked overrides other factional loyalties.

Plausibly, popular support for nation-state foreign policy can be explained in terms of advocates' abilities to effectively produce synnationalistic attachments for policy items. From this standpoint, policy formulators establish or maintain necessary mass support for their agenda by constructing a popular opinion that foreign policy items are fundamental and consonant with the nation-state vision. This is achieved in autocratic regimes through force or pressure because internal advocacy, for the most part, is structurally excluded. In such regimes, supportive mass opinion in the policy process ostensibly is little more than coerced acquiescence orchestrated by governmental mechanisms.  

U.S. policy formulators, as other nation-states with democratic structures must construct supporting opinion through rhetorical discourse. This discourse allows for but delimits debate by interfacing policy items with the nation-state vision. The framework for a model to analyze this discourse is discussed in the next section.

II
A Rhetoric of Synnationalism

To construct popular opinion, the U.S. foreign policy establishment frames its policy language and imagery that maximizes synnationalistic tendencies in its citizens. This
discourse resonates with the individuals' identity with the American vision. The majority of U.S. citizens assimilate their national identity through early socialization and day to day life in a environment rich with nationalistic messages. This usually is a cradle to grave discursive process, as Harold Lasswell asserts, beginning with citizenship, the "national rite of baptism," and continuing through social discourse, in which "the state solicitously follows him through life, tutoring him in a national catechism, teaching him by pious schooling and precept the beauties of national holiness." The icon is essentially epideictic rather than analytical. It functions as a reminder, a 'presentness' of the state in remote places. Lasswell argues that these interactions exist at all levels within the American system. They manifest in nation-state rituals as standing, hand-over-heart, while reciting the "Pledge of Allegiance" or singing the "Star Spangled Banner"; in myths of heroism told and retold in homes, schools, churches, and other social groups or dramatized by the media; in national celebrations, e.g., July 4th observances; and in physical artifacts such as coins and memorials that surround individuals in everyday life.

Individuals collaborate with this discourse, resulting for many, in acceptance of and loyalty to the construct of the United States' vision. This construct presumes that the
environment institutionalized by the American system best serves the humanitarian interests domestically and internationally and, therefore, is superior to other systems. The vision exemplifies a Manicheanism predicated on a heterogeneity between the United States and other polities. The United States polity is the ideal. That ideal is correct—good and moral—while the non-ideal (polities outside the American sphere) is wrong—evil or immoral. The ideal functions as a sacred.

As stated in the previous section, the construct is directly linked to foreign policy, whose accepted ends are its protection and promotion internationally leading to a more perfect world community. This goal, described as the "American mission," seeks to re-shape the world polities in the U.S. image. The thought embedded in the visionary fabric is that if others could choose, the choice would be the American way; if people could experience the American system or a facsimile thereof, they would opt for that system.

The vision has its resonance in discourse used to construct the American identity. Kissinger asserts, "A sense of mission is clearly a legacy of American history; to most Americans, America has always stood for something other than its own grandeur." For instance, Thomas Jefferson stated in 1801, "A just and republican government maintained here will be a standing monument and example for the aim of
the people of other countries." Although Jefferson's example was an internal rather than a world mission, it continues to resonate in our foreign policy. The thought has been recycled by discourse throughout U.S. history as evidenced by President Carter's statement in 1977 that: "We are confident that democracy's example will be compelling, and so we seek to bring that example closer to those . . . who are not yet convinced about the advantages of our kind of life."

Arguably, a hermeneutic framework for U.S. foreign policy emerges from the collective ideas expressed by discourse that forms this vision. Individuals do not share one commonly held view of the American mission anymore than they do of 'liberty' or 'democracy.' But as Durkheim writes, "in incarnating themselves in individuals, collective ideas tend to individualize themselves. Each understands them after his own fashion and marks them with his own stamp; he suppresses certain elements and adds others." The American vision, as Hans Morgenthau argues of ideology, grows "out organically from the very conception Americans have formed of who they are and what they are all about in their relation with other nations."

Arguably, the conceptualization of the American vision is constructed from individually assimilated discourse, historic and recycled, that professes United States' international interests necessary for survival and fruition
of the U.S. nation-state. Although widespread, these interests can be delimited to three dimensions: defense, economic, and world order. First is defense or protection of American people, territory and institutions against any potential foreign dangers. Through discourse, the historic dicta are internalized that enemies "are real," and "external vigilance is the price of freedom." The economic interest results from the interplay of individuals with the U.S. capitalist praxis. The sentiment embedded, though amorphous, presumes a common locus similar to that professed by Benjamin Franklin that "[i]ndustry and constant employment are preservations of the morals and virtue of a nation." The economic interest is juxtaposed to the vision because of the ideal that the U.S. economic system is necessary for the "social destination to take care of itself" that "allows the social universe to unfold . . . beyond human interference." Finally, the world order interest takes the form of an American responsibility to all nations of the world. Henry Kissinger writes that this obligation "is part of American folklore that, while other nations have interests, we have responsibilities; while other nations are concerned with equilibrium, we are concerned with the legal requirements of peace." This area of interest dictates that American foreign policy should be directed for the establishment of a peaceful international environment in which disputes between
nations can be resolved without resort to war. The assumption exists that the natural order is one of peace. Problems produce conflict and war. If problems exist, "plans can be made for meeting them."74

These sentiments are continually born anew in the affirmations of particular individuals. For instance, the defense interest is recycled through discourse as when Jimmy Carter stated in his Farewell Address that: "National weakness, real or perceived, can tempt aggression and thus cause war. That's why the United States can never neglect its military strength. We must and we will remain strong."75 The interest was reaffirmed in Ronald Reagan's observation that: "We . . . live in a world that's torn by a great moral struggle—between democracy and its enemies, between the spirits of freedom and those who fear freedom."76 The economic interest is renewed through statements comparable to President Reagan's summons to "reawaken" the American "industrial giant" in order for the United States to be once again the "exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom."77 As with defense and economic interests, a distinctly American version of world order is constructed through discourse. John Kennedy affirmed this version in the following words:

To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the
instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of support--to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective--to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak--and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run.  

The discourse expressing these interests is generated from hermeneutic bases for U.S. foreign policy, loci communes or shared perceptual commonalities. The importance of these archetypes is that they are traces of contexts that individuals have experienced by participating with societal discourse that bespeak the essentials of the United States vision.

These archetypes, while they lie latent in the individual's subconscious, can be activated by fresh discourse, making interpretation possible. One way of understanding the process is in terms of Ogden and Richard's theory of signs:

... when a context has affected us in the past, the recurrence of merely a part of the context will cause us to react in the way in which we reacted before. A sign is always a stimulus similar to some part of an original stimulus and sufficient to call up the engram formed by the stimulus.

The effect of calling up the archetype expands the contextual trace to a position of referent signified by the sign.

The theory can be applied in the following situation. An American citizen is told that nonvalue-assigned Country 'X' has adopted a socialistic government. In this instance,
the sign is 'socialism.' Archetypes exist with abstract emotional attachments to capitalism and opposition to socialism. The archetypes are the product of numerous accounts, richer contexts, of the virtues of the former and the abomination of the latter. Perhaps these have been told in stories of socialistic countries 'Y' and 'Z.' For example, the individual has been told how the peoples of 'Y' and 'Z' are automatons controlled by the state with little or no hope for their future. These thoughts are associated with the people of country 'X.' In the process, 'X' loses its value anonymity.

While the theory of signs may demonstrate the importance of the archetype, it fails to show how synnationalistic attachments can be constructed for foreign policy items. A more accurate description that accounts for the unifying tendencies of foreign policy discourse seemingly would be one that attempts, as Michael Calvin McGee suggests, "to see a legitimate social reality in a vocabulary of complex high-order abstractions that refer to and invoke a sense of 'the people.'" The approach ostensibly would be one that provides for an expansion of a referential archetype to a level rhetorically effective for the majority of citizens.

Mythology may indicate such an expansion. 'Mythology' is intended here, as Roland Barthes writes in his methodical description, as the "study of a type of speech." This
type of speech, myth, Barthes asserts, is a language whose message constructs a reality by drawing from historic meaning. Barthes' approach for the analysis of this language is the study of "ideas-in-form"—"part both of semiology inasmuch as it is a formal science, and of ideology inasmuch as it is an historical science."

According to Barthes, myth is a second order semiological system "constructed from a semiological chain which existed before it." The originating system similar to that discussed above consists of a signifier (an image), a signified (a concept), and a sign (the relationship between concept and image).

This tripartite schema can be demonstrated using the previous example of country 'X.' The 'capitalism good-socialism bad' archetype is an image existing suspended as a mental state. In suspension, the image exists as a preconceived attitude, a predisposition that readily attaches itself to an unknown substance when stimulated. The concept, the second term of the system, supplies the trigger in that it confronts the individual with country 'X,' which lacks a contextual definition and results from the 'telling about' of that country to the individual. The 'telling' process works in conjunction with secondary conditions, non-contextual thoughts of Country 'X' that existed prior to or derived from the process. The third term in the semiological chain, the sign, is the
relationship of signified to signifier being the "associative total" of the archetype and country 'X.' The sign ultimately is the contextualization of 'X' for the individual.

The second order system, myth, begins with this product of the first system. But whereas sign is contextualization in the first order, at the mythic level, it becomes form. Form unites with concept resulting in recontextualization. The process, as described here, transforms meaning derived from the first semiological system that might be limited to the individual into a more pervasive universal, "an opinion molecule," that registers in the foreign policy process.

Myth according to Barthes is predicated on the second term of the system, the concept. Concept is what Barthes asserts to be the "motivation . . . which causes myth to be uttered." In foreign policy discourse, the concept of myth would be the assimilated expressions of United States' interests held by individuals—defense, economic, and world order. The concept in this discourse would not be the "purified essence" of one interest but would exist as a "formless, unstable, nebulous condensation"—the construct of the American vision.

The signifier, the form, would crystalize specific interests. For example, the economic interest is contextualized by the 'capitalism good-socialism bad' Country 'X.' The stories of 'Y' and 'Z,' embroiled in the
archetype of socialism, are personified in the existence of 'X.' If 'Y' and 'Z' were blamed for previous wars, 'X' predictably would be seen as a potential threat not only to the U.S. nation-state but to a peaceful world climate.

For the concept to function as a unifier of American interests, the verifiable record of the form by design would be exploited. Mythic form differs from the image of the first order semiological system in that the latter is archetypal. That image is non-entity-specific. Form of the second order can not exist comparably since it originates as the sign of the first system. In the orbit of meaning, both sign and its derivative embrace an archetypal charged entity. This entity is specified in that the emotional charge unites with an object and its material record. In the example of Country 'X,' meaning includes the archetype along with the country's geo-political and cultural histories.

The peculiar system of myth, its ability to unite individual interests, demands manipulation of these qualities. If the form appears as a unique isolated symbol, the concept would be obscured. The economic interest as well as defense and world order become of no concern. Country 'X' may have had a past history of being ruled by dictators operating under the guise of capitalism. The populace perhaps had suffered seeing their nation's wealth, their potential, being robbed by a handful of elites. If
this were the case and had existed over decades, a citizens' revolt against those who had oppressed them to replace that rule with a more distributive economic system—socialism—might seem justifiable.

With a potential for awareness of that record, the U.S. populace, while they might accept the 'capitalism good—socialism bad' charged entity, perhaps would question or even deny a concept which no longer could be supported by the Country 'X' form. By drawing attention away from the record, the concept signified by the form, in this instance, 'X,' is recontextualized and becomes more compelling.

Recontextualization arguably is the defining feature of myth.90 The meaning of the form is only obscured, not destroyed. The "indisputable" image in Barthes words "is tamed, put at a distance, made almost transparent; it recedes a little, it becomes the accomplice of a concept which comes to it fully armed."91 Once subdued, the meaning serves as a "reserve" for the form which "must constantly be able to be rooted again in the meaning and to get there what nature it needs for its nutriment; above all it must be able to hide there."92

With Barthes semiological explanation, the reason for the revolution in 'X' may be lost, but form taps into the atrocities of the revolt, violence and killings; into ties that might have existed between the deposed 'capitalists' and U.S. administrations and those that might exist now
between 'X' and other socialist countries. These bring a richness to the form of a government which is bent on destruction of fundamental human rights as well as a government which is against the U.S. society demonstrated by the harm it imposed on its former leadership, friends of the United States. These meanings are absorbed within the concept which replaces the distorted history with other situations.

These situations are the "unlimited mass of signifiers" that are available to the concept." Countries 'Y' and 'Z,' although ingrained in the archetype of 'socialism,' stand alone or together as signifiers of the concept. Other revolutions, potential or actual, that are asserted to be socialist inspired become signifiers--forms--within the concept as well. Likewise, stories once learned during socialization, when recalled, add to the existing concept.

The result of meaning which is at once specified--atrocities committed by socialist 'X'--and general--socialism inspires revolution as in 'X,' 'Y,' and 'Z'--provides for the unification of the form with the conceptual motivation producing "myth itself"--recontextualization." This occurs for two reasons. First, literal meaning is always present (the entity--socialist 'X') causing the concept (defense, economic, and world peace) to be established by an "eternal reference." Thus socialist 'X,' although highlighted as a revolutionary society that
does harm to friends of the U.S., remains a physical polity indicating a need for the United States to be aware of its goals and to defend them. The inclination will remain as long as 'X' exists. If in the case the country alters its government to capitalism or is conquered, the polity's past will exist as a historical example supporting the national interests in perpetuity.

Second, American interests, the motivation for the concept, are "frozen, purified, eternalized, made absent." Form exists as if it "naturally conjured up the concept" of myth, "as if the signifier gave a foundation to the signified." To paraphrase Barthes: U.S. defense interests? It's just a fact: look at 'X' which is just like countries 'Y' and 'Z' who have threatened us in the past! The specific intention is lost, and the recontextualization takes on the quality of a mythic generality, a unification of political form with the American vision.

If the preceding description is accurate, it may serve to explain why national myths historically as well as currently have been and are credited with creating and maintaining collective state belief, or consciousness. For instance, David Bidney writes that Neo-Platonic and Stoic philosophers of the Hellenistic period "saw in it [myth] a method of preserving the authority of tradition as well as religious prerogatives of the state." Gilbert Morris
Cuthbertson echoes Bidney's suggestion in his statement that "Myths evoke the shared emotions of nationalism. Myths . . . create social cohesion and stimulate the social consciousness of group politics."[100]

The unifying effect of myth perhaps can be attributed to its commanding nature, which Barthes states "has an imperative, buttonholing character:

stemming from an historical concept, directly springing from contingency . . . , it is I whom it has come to seek. It is turned toward me, I am subjected to its intentional force, it summons me to receive its expansive ambiguity. . . . I feel as if I were personally receiving an imperious injunction. . . . This is because the concept appears to me in all its appropriative nature: it is a real call . . . ."[101]

Lasswell seemingly attests to this feature in his observation that the "political myth which is accepted with such confidence, is a configuration of assumptions (either true or false) that they hardly appear to bear the character of assumption."[102]

Besides functioning as a means of state support, mythic recontextualization suggestibly could provide a description of a United States' rhetoric of synnationalism and ultimately may provide a clearer understanding of the state vision. Murray Edelman notes that people in collectives have a propensity to "respond chiefly to symbols that oversimplify and distort."[103] A political recontextualization operates as a symbol in that meaning is
attached to a referential unit. The recontextualization of the referent makes this symbol comparable to what is termed 'key symbols' or 'condensation symbols.' No matter the terminology, a political recontextualization functions to unite the populace by promoting synnationalistic allegiance to that symbol as long as the specificity of meaning is not questioned. The rhetorically commanding effect of the item for the mass public as Lasswell states "is that of providing a common experience for everyone in the state":

Indeed, one of the few experiences that bind human beings together, irrespective of race, region, occupation, party, or religion, is exposure to the same set of key words. Sentiments of loyalty cluster around these terms, and contribute to the unity of the commonwealth.

Because of this impact and in light of the argument that the United States vision shares similarities to religious vision, a political recontextualization perhaps could be explicated metaphorically. More specifically, foreign policy items with synnationalistic tendencies may have the essence of a secular political icon, a rhetorical icon, much like that of a religious icon of the Church. George Galavaris posits the existence of secular icons that personify the traditions of the state and have strong moralizing characteristics. Furthermore, Herbert Read, argues that icons, images projected through discourse, are instrumental for the "development of human consciousness,
and therefore in the development of the aptitudes and skills
dependent on consciousness. These analogous attributes
seemingly are present in political recontextualizations and
in their synnationalistic tendencies.

Aesthetic theory, while it is intended for and applies
directly to visual artifacts such as the religious icon,
may, as Edelman suggests, give insights into these
"expressive political symbols" of recontextualization. As
Edelman states, both forms exist as a hermeneutic in which
"[p]sychological distance from symbols that evoke perception
and emotions heightens their potency rather than reducing it
... bring[ing] out in concentrated form those particular
meanings and emotions which the members of a group create
and reinforce in each other."

Aesthetic theory in general encompasses two
psychological functions of art: vitalism and elevation.
The former stresses what is important while the latter lifts
art out of its "intentional purposiveness." Art
originates with vitalism. As an instrument of discourse,
art has never attempted to portray the entirety of the world
but only what is significant as a "life force." For
instance, during the Paleolithic Period typified by nomadic
tribes in which wild animals were important for survival,
the art form registered as animalism or animal art. The
ancient tribal art found in caves of Southern France and
Northern Spain demonstrates significant patterns of animals'
essential character. As Read suggests, "the prehistoric artist automatically emphasized what was most important in the animal's form"—an enlarged head of a bull showing the locale of the concentration of its power, for example." Likewise, a child's art exemplifies a vitalism. Again, Read states that a child "first scribbles aimlessly and then out of the graphic chaos, begins to select and isolate significant signs—signs for the objects nearest to his vital needs." In this case, the artistic function manifests in representations of the mother, father, siblings, self, and home.

Similarly, Christian art initially evidenced a vitalism. Unlike prehistoric and child's art, the function of Christian art had a rhetorical function. The motivation was to provide the uninitiated as well as the illiterate with pictorial narratives which could bring these individuals to a state of grace important for the ultimate survival of the individual—immortality. The purpose of early Christian art is observed by Ernst Kitzinger:

The artist's main interest is his story, he is anxious to convey a definite message, and he invites us to concentrate on this rather than on details of form. In classical [pagan] works of art, we always find a perfect balance between content and form. The loss of this balance marks a new stage in art-history, a stage in which art becomes the vehicle for the propagation of certain doctrines."
Whereas vitalism suggests the purposiveness of form to Christian art, the elevative function indicates a reason for the overshadowing of intent by the form. With elevation, the motivation of form is displaced in that form in actuality becomes simultaneously the thing signified. Form motivates form.

This phenomenon is seen in the iconizing of religious art, which was more pronounced during the Byzantine Period. Religious paintings during that era came to be regarded not simply as illustrations for those who could not read or as augmentations of the text for the literate few but as actual truths within themselves. The devotion attached to these icons compelled the collective belief that these were "such perfect symbols of the Holy Truth that there appeared to be no need to ever depart from them."

A political recontextualization experiences a similar evolution from a position of vitalism to one of elevation. Political form arguably has its origins in a sort of vitalism. Undoubtedly, the motivations for the form were or were perceived to be real. For example, the United States was born in a threatening environment. It emerged from revolution. Later, continent-wide trade had to be instituted for economic solvency and survival. A new order was deemed essential to give stability to the system which had experienced near disaster with the Articles of Confederation.
The unifying rubric of these motivations was the immortality of the nation-state as was the narrative motivation of Christian icons to the individual. This superlative force, therefore, would seemingly determine the essential characteristics of United States political forms as was the case in prehistoric and early Christian art. As in the latter, the motivation served as the guiding principle behind form which educated and united the masses within a collective consciousness.

But as Edelman observes of any symbolic form that becomes a vehicle for expressing a group interest, political form once descriptive becomes evocative. This transformation can be explained potentially in terms of aesthetic theory. Vitalism expressed by an image is by nature a recontextualization—significant features are highlighted while others are omitted. This phenomena registered in Byzantine art when, as noted in Kitzinger's description, "all signs of individual life have been suppressed, and faces and attitudes have become stereotyped." Likewise, political form used to express American foreign policy move from a position of vitalism to one of elevation or evocation. Kissinger apparently describes this rhetorical feature of U.S. foreign policy discourse when he states that issues are stated "in black and white terms. . . . Nations are treated as similar phenomena, and those states presenting immediate problem are
treated similarly. Additionally, the incentive is extant according to Kissinger to state "cases in its most extreme form."

The rationale for the evolution of political form to a recontextualization is that this form, as Christian art, provide the prerequisite to myth--abstracted meaning. Both, motivated by hidden concepts, become enduring, commanding a type of encompassing piety, always ready to establish mythical recontextualizations of a generalized immortality.

U.S. foreign policy discourse that is effective in constructing popular opinion comparable to the artifact of the Byzantine artist is a hermeneutic for a perceived reality. The Byzantine artist provided the populace with works, that rhetorically provided answers and means of instruction and allowed a sense of participation in divine life. These symbols, when venerated, brought about unification of the populace within a collective which was administered by the Church.

American political forms when metaphorically iconized, the tendencies suggested by synnationalistic discourse, also provides answers and directions and suggest citizen participation in the actions of the nation-state. These tendencies are achieved by advocates recontextualizing foreign policy items as the nation-state vision. With these forms, the foreign policy establishment is able to convince the populace that proposed actions are in keeping with the
interests of the nation-state vision. The result is the promise of a sort of immortality for the citizenry. Thus, in much the same way the Christian icon united the terrestrial and celestial Church; a political recontextualization can be viewed as a rhetorical icon that persuades the populace to support the actions of its foreign policy establish.

Of course, this analogy between the Christian icon and what has been suggested as a rhetorical icon is deliberately constructed for insights that it may give and is intended only as a perspective from which to analyze foreign policy discourse. The Christian and rhetorical icons as abstract ideal forms arguably have similar persuasive effects which may be understood in their comparable designs. However, in practical applications, differences do exist which may cause this analogy to break down.

While these may be numerous, two striking dissimilarities should be noted. First, an individual interacts differently with the Christian icon than with the rhetorical icon. Christian icons were and are actual artistic manifestations of religious belief. The religious icon seemingly is approached naturally by the faithful as a sacred object because of its explicit, more permanent, visual religious context corresponding to the one already internalized. The rhetorical icon is more implicit. This political form, though artistic in nature, is a construct of
discourse that assumes a type of religiosity. The sentimental attachments to the form are only as strong as the temporal context its producing discourse constructs within the psyche of the individual.

Second, the Christian icon, in its ideal state, had an imperative nature while the same may not be always true of the rhetorical icon. The lack of technology during the Byzantine era in which the religious form was conceived, prevented alternate messages and channels of information. The modern multiplicity of messages and channels, however, may preclude the permanency of confidence placed in the rhetorical icon. Issues have the potential for creating an awareness in the individual or groups of individuals that due to their factional importance may challenge mass confidence in the political form. But not withstanding these differences, this analogy may serve to explain why the rhetorical icon, either in isolation or in their configuration can serve to construct popular opinion.

Summary

This chapter proposes an analytic model for understanding and evaluating foreign policy discourse. It posits the following stages in the construction of popular opinion in terms of synnationalism. First, the foreign policy establishment constructs popular opinion through discourse that has synnationalistic features. These
features can unify people because the nation-state vision shares the abstract universal appeals of religious discourse. Second, the nation-state vision is constructed from historically recycled discourse suggesting interests important to the vision. Finally, effective foreign policy discourse recontextualizes policy items with those interests. Recontextualizing discourse constructs a political form producing synnationalistic tendencies and in so doing has the potential for constructing favorable popular opinion. In the next chapter, this model of discourse analysis is expanded further and applied to the Reagan Administration's handling of the 1986 Reykjavik Meetings.
Notes


*Holsti, p. 84.

*Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, M. J. Tooley, trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), p. 25; and p. 28. It should be noted that Bodin had two exceptions to absolute immunity for the sovereign. These included areas of divine and natural law which were in God's domain. See: Bodin, p. 29.

*Holsti, p. 65.


*Major, p. 373.

*Major, p. 373.

*Major, p. 456.

*Holsti, p. 67.

*Holsti, pp. 66-7.

*Holsti, p. 70; Major, p. 456.

*Holsti, p. 64.

*Once the international community provides de facto as well as de jure recognition to a state, the tradition of sovereignty generally applies. I use the words 'generally applies' due to the fact that absolute sovereignty for the

17 von Glahn, pp. 56-8.
18 von Glahn, pp. 89-90.
19 Holsti, p. 68.
22 Holloway and George, p. 211.

24 This discussion is addressing ideal types. Spanier notes that while no one system can be completely categorized, "ideal-types help us understand the actual concrete configurations." See: Spanier, p. 264.
Donald E. Nuechterlein differentiates public interests from national interests by suggesting the former is concerned with the "well-being of the American people and American enterprise within the territorial boundaries of the United States." The latter involves those interests outside U.S. boundaries. See: Donald E. Nuechterlein, United States National Interests in a Changing World (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973), p. 6.


See: Kissinger, pp. 91-2.

Kissinger, p. 30.

Questor, p. 394.


Rupert Emerson, quoted by Glazer, p. 60.


Durkheim, p. 72.

Durkheim, p. 76.

Durkheim, p. 77.

Durkheim, p. 77.

Durkheim, pp. 78-9.


Whitehead, p. 192.


See Lasswell, p. 59; p. 168; and p. 172.
Although major Western polities—England, France, etc.—have different political structures than that of the United States, their membership in the NATO Alliance and/or their Western tradition implant the notion that these polities are comparable and, for the most part, are not in conflict with the American ideal.


Kissinger, p. 94.


Durkheim, p. 80.

Neuchterlein, p. 8.

Voices of the American Revolution, p. 113.

Benjamin Franklin, quoted in Voices of the American Revolution, p. 152.


Kissinger, pp. 91-2.

Steele and Redding, p. 57.


Barthes, p. 11. Barthes notes that mythic speech is by "no means confined to oral speech. It can consist of modes of writing or of representations; not only written discourse, but also photography, cinema, reporting, sport, shows, publicity. Therefore, mythic speech would also include social practices including the acts of voting, protesting, or supporting. These, in turn, would serve to strengthen the construct in that it would have a participatory existence. See: Barthes, p. 110.

Barthes, p. 112.

Barthes, p. 114.

Barthes, p. 114.

Barthes observes that this third term, recontextualization [signification], is in fact myth because, as in any semiological system, it is the association of the first two terms (form and concept). In Barthes words, "It is the only one which is consumed in actual fact." See: Barthes, p. 121.


Barthes, pp. 124-5.

Harold D. Lasswell, "The Language of Power," in Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics,

10Edelman p. 31. For a brief summary of significant literature dealing with this phenomenon, see: Edelman, p. 31, "note 16."

10Lasswell writes that the "key symbol" is the basic term of the political myth." "Condensation symbols" according to Edelman is potentially any "political act that is controversial or regarded as really important . . . which evoke the emotions shared with the situation." It should be pointed out that Edelman also suggests the existence of referential symbols which "are economic ways of referring to the objective elements in objects or situations." However, since 'objectivity' is merely meaning, and it too is manipulated to induce an emotional response, his discrimination between the two seems at best arbitrary (at least for purposes of this discussion). See: Lasswell, Language, p. 13; and Edelman, pp. 6-7.

10For instance, see: Elder and Cobb, p. 121; and p. 134.


10George Galvaris, The Icon in the Life of the Church: Doctrine, Liturgy, Devotion (Leiden: B. J. Brill, 1981), pp. 21-2. Lester C. Olson notes that iconology signifies "speaking pictures or images." While he limits his discussion to visual images, seemingly the definition of
icon can include verbal images of the sort mythical form entails. See: Lester C. Olson, "Benjamin Franklin's Pictorial Representation of the British Colonies in America: A Study in Iconology," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 73 (February 1987), pp. 18-42.


11^Edelman, p. 11.

13^Edelman, p. 11.

11^Read, pp. 17-52.

12^Read, p. 33. Edelman also argues that "[m]any artists have recognized that the expressive power of their works is dependent upon their creating a world set apart from the one in which the audience lives and breathes, so that the spectators may find it easier to engage themselves with the artistic symbols." See: Edelman p. 11.

13^Read, p. 36.

14^Read, p. 22.

15^For instance, see: Ernst Kitzinger, Early Medieval Art (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), pp. 36-79.


16^Gombrich, p. 98.
114 Edelman, p. 125.
115 Kitzinger, p. 57.
116 Kissinger, p. 33.
117 Kissinger, p. 31.
118 Kissinger, pp. 46-7.
120 See: Galvaris, pp. 1-5.
CHAPTER III
AN APPLICATION OF THE SYNNATIONALISTIC MODEL
OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Although foreign policy may be guided by large visionary goals, its day to day implementation occurs through a concrete agenda of specific acts and policies. It is a rhetorical truism that abstract goals often enjoy far broader support than the specific measures that are employed to implement them. This is because specific policies engage real world constraints. They may run up against the claims of rival groups, the brute fact of limited resources, or the tug of competing loyalties.

The United States foreign policy vision is implemented through a finite set of agenda items. This chapter examines a central agenda item, the Strategic Defense Initiative. The rhetorical trajectory by which public support was constructed and mobilized in favor of this program is a paradigm case of the foreign policy success formula.

Accordingly, in the first section of the chapter, the agenda building process is analyzed. Section two deals with the ways in which constraints against public acceptance of foreign policy are overcome. The third section examines a case history to discover how popular support was gained for
a particularly controversial agenda item. The final section
deals with the process of iconization as an ultimate aim of
agenda building. This section includes an assessment of the
success of White House strategies in the construction of
popular opinion. This occurred because the Administration
used synnationalistic discourse to recontextualize the
Strategic Defense Initiative as the American mission. The
result was that S.D.I. became a commanding persuasive
symbol, a rhetorical icon, within the sphere of popular
opinion. With this item, I will contend that the
Administration was able to redefine the Reykjavik meetings
from a conference on disarmament to an exemplum of the
'Peace Through Strength' doctrine.

I
The Agenda-Building Process of American Foreign Policy

The analysis of foreign policy discourse in this
chapter approaches American foreign policy from a systems
perspective. This systems context is consistent with what
is generally referred to as the 'policy' process. Based on
their research, Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin make the
following three observations regarding policy: "1) Policy is
what the government says and does about perceived problems;
2) Policy making is how the government decides what will be
done about perceived problems; and 3) Policy making is a
process of interaction among governmental actors; policy is
the outcome of that interaction."
The systems perspective used for this analysis does not view the United States as having multiple foreign policies. Instead, U.S. foreign policy is considered to be one body composed of many agenda items or issues. These items are implemented to advance the national interest in the international arena. Thus 'policy' in the context of this discussion is considered to be the outcome of an agenda-building process. The sum-total of these varying issues make-up U.S. foreign policy.

The process of agenda-building begins when a perceived international exigence is brought to the national agenda. While 'agenda' is often used to denote a prioritizing of items, its application here, although it may include this function, is intended as Roger Cobb and Charles Elder use the term: "a general set of political controversies that will be viewed at any point in time as falling within the range of legitimate concerns meriting the attention of the polity."3

This sphere of political concerns is divided into two types, systemic and institutional. The first type of agenda "consists of all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority." The second type, institutional or 'formal' agenda, is the "set
of items explicitly up for the active and serious consideration of authoritative decision makers."

Cobb and Elder argue that the "natures of the two agendas are substantially different." The systemic agenda is "composed of fairly abstract and general items." These items "do little more than identify a problem area" and will "not necessarily suggest either the alternatives available or the means of coping with the problem." The institutional agenda is "more specific, concrete and limited in the number of items." This agenda identifies, "at least implicitly, those facets of a problem that are to be seriously considered by a decision-making body."

In the agenda-building process, an 'issue' moves from the systemic to the institutional agenda. As Cobb and Elder suggest, "It is unlikely that any issue involving substantial social consequences will gain standing on a governmental agenda unless it has first attained systemic agenda status."

For the issue to achieve recognition on the systemic agenda, two factors must be present: "initiator and the event, or triggering mechanism, that transform the problem into an issue." First, four classifications of initiators are common in the agenda-setting process: "readjusters," "exploiters," "circumstantial reactors," and "humanitarians."
The first type of initiator "perceive[s] an unfavorable bias in the distribution of positions or resources" and constructs an issue to "redress this imbalance." The World Zionist Organization, which was founded in 1897 and coordinated programs to establish a national Jewish homeland, might be seen as representative of this category.

The second type of initiator, 'exploiters,' includes individuals or groups "who manufacture an issue for their own gain." If the invasion of Grenada by the United States in 1983 had been designed to foster favorable popular opinion for Ronald Reagan a year before the presidential election, the Administration arguably would be representative of this classification.

'Circumstantial reactors,' the third type of initiator, create issues in response to an unanticipated event. The freezing of Iranian assets by the Carter Administration in response to the 1979 Hostage Crisis as well as the Bush Administration's 1990-91 "Operation Desert Shield/Storm" in reaction to the Iraqi take over of Kuwait are examples of this type of initiator.

A final division is the 'humanitarian.' This classification of initiator includes persons or groups who bring an issue to the agenda to "acquire a psychological sense of well-being for doing what they believe is in the public interest." This type of initiator is primarily limited to domestic policy. However an example of the
humanitarian initiator in foreign policy includes musicians under the leadership of Bob Geldof who with 'Live Aid' raised money and created national awareness for the people of drought-stricken Ethiopia during 1986.

The second factor that must be present for an issue to achieve systemic agenda status is a triggering device. Cobb and Elder argue in foreign policy these triggering devices are primarily external and include four types:

The first is an act of war or military violence involving the United States as a direct combatant. Examples include the Vietnam war, the Pueblo seizure, and the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima. The second category includes innovations in weapons technology involving such things as arms control, the Hotline between the Kremlin and the White House, and the deployment of an anti-ballistic system. The third type is an international conflict in which the United States is not a direct combatant, such as the conflicts in the Middle East and the Congo. The final category involves changing world alignment patterns that may affect American membership in the United Nations, troop commitments in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the American role in the Organization of American States. 13

Effective resolution of an exigence occurs when an item is moved from recognition on the systemic agenda to popular approval on the formal agenda. This flight-path necessitates a "dynamic interplay" between the initiator and the trigger device. 14 This interplay must overcome three popular opinion constraints. These constraints include:

1) Widespread attention or at least awareness; 2) Shared concern of a sizeable portion of the population that some
type of action is required; and 3) A shared perception that
the matter is an appropriate concern of some governmental
unit and falls within the bounds of its authority.15 The
focus of this chapter now turns to the rhetorical means
utilized by the initiators to meet these constraints.

II
Rhetorical Means of the Systemic Agenda

Constraints facing an issue or item slated for the
systemic agenda arise through the situation consisting of
problem definition and efficacy of the solution.16 Problem
definition is fundamental due to the fact that societal
events are "interpreted in different ways by different
people at different times."17 The exigence must be
construed within limits that identify and specify interests
that induce majority agreement.

The second constraint, efficacy, exists due to the
abstract nature of policy and the operating presumptions of
foreign policy. First, to gain support for an agenda item,
advocates should provide "good reasons" that an item will
effectively resolve the exigence and produce desireable
consequences.18 Meeting this aspect of the constraint is
problematic since systemic agenda items will have never been
tried and tested. Thus, evidence given for the adoption of
an item will be tentative. As many reasons for rejecting
the issue as those offered for its acceptance can be expected.
The policy establishment's belief that foreign policy should be a 'closed' enterprise poses a second problem in meeting this constraint. Even if 'good reasons' were available to argue the effectiveness of an item, foreign policy practitioners hold to the tenet that secrecy should be maintained, and the public should not be actively involved. Openly addressing this constraint would violate this precept.

Because of the problems associated with the definitional and efficacy constraints, specialized, or technical, discourse in addressing them is not viable for the construction of popular opinion. Foreign policy advocates meet the constraints facing an item on the systemic agenda primarily by means of the special resources of metaphoric discourse. The utility of metaphoric foreign policy discourse is threefold. It addresses the abstract situational constraints that otherwise might be lost by the specialized language. Second, it serves as a device for explaining sensitive issues without revealing particular details, thus maintaining secrecy. Finally, it subdues active involvement by the citizens in the process.

These functions are possible because of the metaphoric tendencies of the discourse. Ogden and Richards suggest this discourse provides "context through other words." Furthermore, metaphoric discourse, as Murray Edelman argues, allows the populace to "live in a world in which causes are
simple and neat and remedies are apparent." The strength of the device, according to Edelman, is that it "can vividly, potently, pervasively evoke changed worlds in which the remedies for anxieties are clearly perceived and self serving causes of action are sanctified." The metaphor, as "an instrument for shaping political support and opposition and premises upon which decisions are made," is considered effective because it makes an image of the "unclear and the remote."

The effectiveness of the metaphoric language is enhanced by the perceived role and situation of the governmental and non-governmental actors bringing the item to the attention of the general public. The primary governmental actor is historically and traditionally the Office of the President. The office entails a variety of advisory and administrative agencies—the National Security Council, the Cabinet, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and agencies comprising the 'Intelligence Community' as well as other sources—that assist agenda-setting. Non-governmental policy advocates are generally special interest groups comprised of economic interest groups, the 'military-industrial complex' and ethnic minorities.

The administration capitalizes on the public's perception of the constitutional roles inter alia of the office as well as the situation. Constitutional roles
include Chief of State, Chief Executive, Chief Diplomat, Commander in Chief and Chief Legislator. Extra constitutional roles encompass Chief of Party, Protector of the Peace, Manager of Prosperity, World Leader, Voice of the People, and Leader of the Rituals of American Democracy. These roles augment the persuasibility of the metaphoric discourse by bringing a historic tradition of credibility to it.

For the most part, special interest groups do not have the benefit of pre-legitimized roles. Therefore, these groups primarily use the situation of the exigence. An example of such an agenda-setting effort was that of the American Jewish Conference, which existed from 1942-48. During its six year existence, the lobby brought to the U.S. agenda the need for a Jewish Homeland, the State of Israel. The group was effectively able to use the situation of the Jewish Holocaust to support one truism of their campaign that: "Israel is historic justice and serves as just compensation for innumeral massacres."

Role and situation are not only important in terms of providing plausibility. These create another indispensable asset to the advocates—power to gain access to the media in order to voice their cause. Presumably, advocates can hold three classes of power that are influential in gaining access to the media. First is what Dan Nimmo and James Combs define as a sort of 'celebrity' power. This power
can be described as a presumed noteworthiness of individuals because of wealth, occupation, or prestige that draws attention of the media. Elected officials, particularly the President, would best exemplify advocates possessing this faculty. Because of the actual and perceived roles of office, elected officials are able to direct media attention to an issue. For instance, Robert MacNeil of the nationally acclaimed PBS MacNeil/Lehrer News Hours admitted a "certain amount of truth" in the proposition that the media is "slavish to the [presidential] administration." MacNeil stated "where the administration turns its searchlight or its spotlight, we [the media] tend to follow more than we do other things. We follow the lead of the administration first."

A second class of media related power held by advocates can be identified as 'melodramatic.' Melodramatic power is the capability to influence the media due to a heightened piteousness or compassionate emotionalism in response to circumstance. As Nimmo and Combs argue, "Occasionally things happen that are so fantastic, involve remarkable characters, are vastly panoramic in scope, and prove so interesting to the audience" that the media construct a melodrama. This melodrama "typically involves a moral tale of the struggle of morality versus immorality and satisfies mass-audience desire for both thrilling and sensational fare combined with some sort of affirmation that
evil is punished and that morality is vindicated." As an actor in the melodrama, an advocate, either in the role of hero or victim, is able to express the issue that caused or might prevent the evil.

Again, the American Jewish Conference may typify such an advocate. Immediately before and after the surrender of Nazi Germany, accounts surfaced concerning the atrocities committed against individuals of Jewish descent. Those reports placed the Jewish Conference in the position of victim in the melodrama covered by the media. Arguably, by using that media position, the Conference became instrumental in having the State of Israel formalized on the U.S. agenda immediately following the creation of the state.

A final classification of power providing accessibility to the media could be considered a combination of both celebrity and melodramatic power. This power is derived from the identification of primary advocates with others whom Cobb and Elder delineate as "specific publics" including "identification" and "attention" groups.

Identification groups are those individuals who would identify "generally" their interests or have a "persistent sympathy with . . . [the] generic interests of another group." An example of such a group is the 'Christian Right,' which has strong emotional attachments to the issues of pro-Israeli advocates. The religious collective is
characterized by its profound belief in the inerrancy of biblical scriptures. According to their interpretations, the State of Israel is mandatory. For the 'Second Coming' to occur, the Jews must be gathered in the Holy Land—a State of Israel."

Pro-Israel advocates nurture the support of the Christian Right which has an estimated membership between thirty to fifty million people. These advocates stress biblical morality as a "valid basis" for the "utmost in financial and military support to Israel." Any agenda item unfavorable to Israel threatens its security, and as one member of this identification group is reported to have observed, "If Israel does not survive, there is no place for Jesus to come back to."

Attention groups are a second classification for individuals comprising specific publics. Although these individuals are "disinterested in most issues, . . . they are informed about and interested in certain specific issues. . . . [O]nce an issue is raised in their sphere of concern, they become readily mobilizable." Again, an example of these groups can be seen in the context of the Israeli issue. To maintain a favorable U.S. position, pro-Israel advocates promote a bond between the State of Israel and its citizens and the American Jewish community. They appeal to the belief that Jews "denote a transnational,
multilingual, historical and religious group which professes a oneness, a unity, a whole, a solidarity."

Advocates attempt to convince the American Jewish community of a 'partnership' among all Jews. The American Jew has an obligation to support pro-Israeli issues. This tendency constructed from the alliance is discernable in a statement attributed to a U.S. Jewish theologian and political activist that: "We [members of the American Jewish community] have as much interest in fostering Israel as do Blacks in eliminating the ghettos or union members in maintaining the integrity of the unions."

These groups gain access to the media because many individuals within the specific publics have celebrity status such as television evangelists. But more important, they gain the attention of the media due to their potential impact on U.S. decision-making and the electoral process. As Gerard A. Hauser contends, they "may vote and shout . . . they shove and claim." In Hauser's words, they "ejaculate." Thus their access to the media would fulfill the melodramatic interest of the media.

Cobb and Elder point out "for an item or an issue to acquire popular recognition, its supporters must have either access to the mass media or the resources necessary to reach people." Role and situation serve to accomplish both functions. By using role and situation, the advocates reinforce the metaphoric discourse with credibility allowing
for the personification and mandate of the issues that they support.

This description suggests the limitations of public participation in foreign policy. The discourse of that policy, because of its metaphoric nature, provides only an illusionary understanding of items. In this platonic process, citizens respond to "objects of belief and not of knowledge." Foreign policy decisions are limited to a foreign policy establishment similar to what Plato described as 'guardians' or 'oligarchs.' The result is what Kenneth Zagacki and Andrew King describe as a "further fragmentation" of a "delegitimizing tendency" in American political discourse." The people "become little more than spectators." By analyzing U.S. foreign policy discourse, the possibility exists that public participation in decision-making may be eventually enhanced. Findings from these analyses, as Habermas suggests, perhaps may "make it possible to distinguish an accord or agreement among free and equals from a contingent or forced consensus." In the next two sections of this chapter such an analysis is attempted. The undertaking, hopefully, will show in a specific case, the aftermath of the Reagan-Gorbachev Reykjavik Meetings, the operation of the rhetorical means of the systemic agenda and particularly how advocates constructed popular opinion through the use of
synnationalistic rhetoric. In the first section, the background of the event is discussed.

III
A Case Study in Systemic Agenda Access

At meetings held in Reykjavik, Iceland, October 11-12, 1986, President Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev worked out a "series of accords in principle that surprised the negotiators themselves."33 The tentative agreements included: 1) the banning of all medium-range missiles from Europe; 2) the initiation of a phased accord beginning with verification of existing treaties with the ultimate goal of the cessation of nuclear testing; 3) a limitation of nuclear launchers, missiles and bombers, and the abolition of all ballistic missiles over ten years; and 4) "an agreed statement" concerning separated families, emigration and possible areas of cooperation.34

The series of talks, which might have produced "'historic gains'. . . founndered on" President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative.35 During the meetings' final day, Mikhail Gorbachev linked all agreements to an "'integral part' of the package—that the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty be made binding for ten more years and that this be understood to restrict research and testing on new missile defense to the laboratory."36 Reagan's rejection of the linkage not to curb the initiative led to the culmination of the two day meetings with a failure to reach agreement.
The outcome of the Reykjavik meetings created a threefold domestic problem for the Reagan Administration including: 1) negative impacts on upcoming congressional elections; 2) a questionable future for the Strategic Defense Initiative as a viable policy item; and 3) a possible deterioration of the Reagan Administration legacy. First, the Reykjavik meetings had the potential to result in Republican losses in the November congressional elections. Holloway and George assert political activity of citizens cluster around several concerns that focus "on standards of living, health, and the prospects for their children, including their education and opportunity of advancement."87 Voting can be affected by threats to these factors. If emotional arguments were constructed by the Democratic party that Reagan had created an unstable environment, and if these were accepted by the majority of citizens, Republicans, in general, could have been held accountable for a "major conflict" that could jeopardize everything that the people "might hope for."88

The situation was ripe for such a charge. The Soviet Union's arrest of U.S. journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, as well as the U.S. expulsion of Soviet diplomatic personnel during September and October of 1986 suggested a growing conflict between the two superpowers.89 In light of this situation, the Administration faced a recycled Democratic
accusation that the Reagan Administration was responsible for tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Although defeated earlier, this allegation would be harder to overcome in the wake of Reykjavik. Reagan initially began his term in office with what some experts had called a "benign neglect" toward arms control in which American-Soviet relations were allowed "to reach a twenty-year low." The Administration in its first four years advocated containment of the 'Evil Empire' through U.S. rearmament with an average defense budget increase of eight point three percent leading to a proposed three hundred thirteen billion dollar defense budget for the first year of the second term.* This militarization posture kept alive the charge first levied in 1980 by the Democrats that Reagan was "trigger happy" and citizens' anxieties concerning Reagan's "warmonger image."  

The Administration dispelled that accusation and relieved public fear by advancing the posture as 'Peace Through Strength.' The goal of rearmament was justified as a "bargaining chip" to secure negotiations with the Soviet Union for arms reductions. For instance, this justification, as Andrew King and Kenneth Petress write, was used by the Reagan White House to defuse the U.S. Nuclear Freeze Movement of 1981-82. King and Petress argue that Reagan was able to defeat the movement in part by convincing the American people that it was not a "universal movement,
but a unilateral Western Movement with no counterpart in the Soviet Union."^66

By rejecting Gorbachev's overtures, Reagan potentially threatened his justification for the U.S. build-up of conventional and nuclear weapons. Gorbachev's proposals could have been interpreted as the beginning of Soviet attempts at arms reductions countering the unilateral argument. If Reagan's justification were lost, popular opinion might have been convinced by arguments similar to that of Tom Wicker who alleged that the President "missed the best chance any President has had in the last two decades to eliminate the central security concern" of the United States.^67 But even more detrimental, the Administration could have been labeled as the aggressor in the American-Soviet conflict by Reagan's refusal to negotiate. The President could have been perceived as escalating existing tensions between the United States and the Soviets. The perception persisting from October until November had the potential to result in the loss of critical Republican House and Senate seats.

Second, the failed Reykjavik meetings threatened the Administration with the possible rejection of the Strategic Defense Initiative as a viable policy instrument or with a reduction of funding. The initiative received sharp criticisms following the meetings. Although the Administration described S.D.I. from its inception as the
solution to the Soviet problem, critics charged that the instrument, dubbed 'Star Wars' by the media, was little more than a whim. For instance, nuclear physicist, I. A. Robbie, who worked on the Manhattan Project during World War II, argued that S.D.I. was a "foolish" project "of an old man." As Robbie stated, "Think about the arrogance ... he [Reagan] knows nothing about this" but announces the project to the world "before he consults the scientists." Others argued even if deployment were feasible, the project would cost a "trillion or more dollars," would take a decade to deploy and ultimately would lead to the militarization of space by the superpowers.

Reagan's failure to negotiate the reduction of existing military technology due to Soviet demands placed on the non-existing weapons system resulted in other charges. For instance, Reagan was accused of "protect[ing] a research program in which some of the most distinguished American scientists have no faith, and for which the necessary computers and software do not and may never exist." Furthermore, critics challenged the effects to the program resulting from limitations demanded by the Soviets in exchange for the arms reduction agreement. Opponents argued that the condition of confining S.D.I. research to the laboratory, "would have no significant effect" on the project. Some critics even alleged that the limitation "might speed technical progress if showy demonstrations in
orbit were foregone for more exacting ones on earth." If a convincing case had been made from these arguments, popular opinion could have rejected the initiative or supported a reduction of its funding."

More important than loss of S.D.I.'s funding were the long term impacts that arguments arising from Reykjavik might have on the Reagan legacy. Reagan could be faulted as a dogmatic President who refused to sacrifice a "dubious vision" for the security of the United States. If this occurred, future attempts to block the Administration agenda would be supported by popular opinion. In such a case, the Executive would become ineffectual as an agenda-setter for both foreign and domestic policy. The Reagan White House would risk being regarded as extremist and as impotent in policy matters. Conceivably, the Republican Party could receive the blunt from this negative legacy of its standard bearer. The party could be linked to the Administration's negative record, losing policy decisions and other elections.

Three days following the meetings, however, the Reagan Administration was able to effectively construct popular opinion that supported its actions at Reykjavik. In so doing, the Administration resolved the potential tripartite domestic problem created by the meetings. For instance, despite the rhetoric of the questions, a White House poll conducted on October 14th, two days following the meetings,
gave an indication that "overall [popular] approval of . . . Reagan's handling of his job had jumped from sixty-four percent among one thousand people interviewed October ninth and tenth, to seventy-three percent among five hundred interviewed.""75

Findings from the White House poll were supported by a Times/CBS News Poll taken on October 14th and 15th. The survey suggested that in "almost all population groups" questioned, including Democrat as well as Republican respondents, "more than twice as many blamed Mr. Gorbachev as blamed the President for the lack of agreement in Reykjavik.""76

This positive perception occurred because the White House met the rhetorical problem created by the Reykjavik meetings. The rhetorical problem facing the Administration was the "initial assessment that the meetings had broken down in anger, that arms control prospects had dimmed and that United States-Soviet relations were off-course.""77

When the meetings stalemated, Reagan was described as "grim-faced, even angry.""78 A key official in the Administration was quoted as saying: "The President was just furious. He was steaming angry when he came out of that door with Gorbachev. We all felt that we had come so close to pulling this off, and yet we couldn't.""79

One official described Secretary of State George Shultz "as looking haggard and drained" when he delivered a
nationally televised press conference the day the meeting ended. In that description, the official is reported to have said that he had "never seen Shultz exude through his word, the pace of his comments, his facial expressions, such disappointment and defeat." The Administration's frustration registered in Shultz's conclusion to his opening remarks when he told the American people that the White House was "deeply disappointed at this outcome."

The change in perception occurred because the Administration was able to redefine the Reykjavik meetings. That redefinition hinged on the White House's ability to market an agenda item. While the rhetorical problem arose from the collapse of the Reykjavik meetings, the breakdown producing the problem was attributed to a Reagan agenda instrument. The President had refused to consider limitations on his Strategic Defense Initiative, which was a component of 'Peace Through Strength.' Therefore the sine qua non of a Reykjavik redefinition depended on constructing popular support for the agenda item.

The Administration accomplished this by: 1) using rhetorical strategies to construct popular support for the 'Peace Through Strength' posture, particularly the Strategic Defense Initiative on the systemic agenda; and 2) using that endorsement to change the image of the meetings. The suggestion that popular opinion construction occurred at the systemic level of the agenda process is based on Cobb and
Elder's argument that formalized issues take a long time in achieving that status.\textsuperscript{83} If Cobb and Elder are correct, a reasonable assumption is that 'Peace Through Strength' and S.D.I. had never reached the formal agenda.

The Reagan Administration began its first term with expressed concern over domestic spending with defense receiving little emphasis. The White House began to set a defense agenda for increased spending by the 1982 mid-term elections. However, in March of 1983, Administration defense spending requests were being seriously questioned by both Democrats and Republicans.\textsuperscript{84} The 'bargaining chip' basis for the expenditures additionally raised doubt in November of that year when the Soviets walked out of medium range nuclear missile negotiating sessions over the issue of U.S. deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{85}

By the beginning of the second Reagan term in 1985, the defense budget was coming under "especially close scrutiny."\textsuperscript{86} Foreign policy instruments, including both the MX missile and the Strategic Defense Initiative, the latter being in the planning stage, were threatened with budgetary extinction. Even though the White House had pushed for approval of the defense agenda as part of the formal agenda as early as 1982, popular support for the items was not strong enough in 1986 for necessary institutional status.
The potential for a negative popular opinion created by Reykjavik further impacted the status of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative. For instance, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Clairborne Pell was quoted as saying:

"This is a sad day for mankind. I deeply regret the failure to achieve an agreement when we were virtually on its brink. As I said a year ago, the obvious compromise was, is and will be, a deep reduction in strategic offensive weapons in exchange for an equivalent limitation on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

In essence we have given up a bird in the hand, for two in the bush, S.D.I."  

The Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee asserted that Congress "would put Star Wars under more scrutiny and fire than ever before."  

Subsequently, at the time of the Reykjavik meetings, the three constraints necessary for formal agenda status of Reagan's defense agenda had never been met. The White House had not effectively acquired a mass public acceptance of 'Peace Through Strength' and S.D.I. as being needed and appropriate. The concern triggered by Reykjavik over Reagan's policy issues demanded a re-emergence and/or renewal of these items at the systemic level. 

Based on this assumption, the Reagan Administration can be viewed as 'circumstantial reactor' as well as 'exploiter' initiators for revitalizing its defense agenda. The unexpected Reykjavik situation necessitated the first
initiator role. The belief reportedly held by the Administration prior to the meetings was that Reykjavik would serve only as a preliminary for scheduling a 1987 summit in the United States between Gorbachev and Reagan. The meetings were not for purposes of actual proposal negotiations.

Since the meetings were considered of limited consequence, the talks were hastily planned. White House Chief of Staff, Donald T. Regan recalled that on September 19, 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze delivered a letter to President Reagan from Gorbachev proposing a meeting "as soon as possible" between the two leaders for purposes of discussing the complete elimination of Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe. This itinerary was expanded to include discussions pertaining to human rights violations, regional conflicts, and bilateral relations.\(^9\) On September 30, Reagan publicly announced the Iceland meetings slated to begin eleven days later. Because of Administration skepticism concerning the meetings' outcome, the President concentrated on other governmental matters during that time. His Reykjavik preparations were limited to briefings by advisors and to carrying "homework" to the presidential quarters of the White House.\(^9\)

Reports from Iceland indicated the Administration was surprised by the proposals Gorbachev brought to the series
of talks." According to one official, Reagan at one point told his U.S. delegation: "This wasn't supposed to be a summit. We aren't supposed to be in these negotiations.*

In the aftermath of Reykjavik, the Administration had to address charges that the meetings' failure was due to the White House's extreme haste and poor preparedness. Former Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Robert McNamara, assessed the meetings as "ill-planned." Although McNamara gave the President "tremendous credit for the imagination and courage with which he presented his ideas," he argued the "matter had not been thought through by our government. It hadn't been discussed with our Joint Chiefs. It hadn't been discussed with our allies." The situation mandated that the Administration dodge any indication the "American side got into areas that had not been thoroughly prepared for beforehand." The Administration performed the second role, exploiter, due to the possibility of Reykjavik's political ramifications. Political fall-out from the meetings apparently seemed real for the Administration as well as others vying internally and externally for political gain. Within the U.S. campaign arena, reports being circulated suggested that Democratic hopes of a November victory had been heightened, and Republican expectations had been "dashed" by the meetings' lack of positive closure."
The Soviet Union stood to profit politically from the meetings' collapse, as well. Senior Soviet officials, "including advisers to Mr. Gorbachev from the Government and Party, several of them members of the Central Committee," reportedly claimed that if "a convincing case" could be made that "Reagan blocked a chance to curtail the arms race by insisting on continued development of a space-based missile defense system," the USSR could achieve a two-fold public relations victory. According to the officials, the Soviet Union could influence the outcome of critical November elections and, more importantly, could make "inroads in Western Europe," weakening the NATO Alliance. Both of these public relation attempts were apparent at a press conference held by Soviet Leader Gorbachev on his departure from Reykjavik:

I think you are here representing the people of the world and you know that the world is in turmoil. The world is concerned. The world demands leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States display political will, display determination to stop the trends that are leading towards dangerous and unpredictable consequences. . . . I feel the President probably would have to seek the advice of Congress, of American political leaders, of the American Public. Let America think. We are waiting. We are not withdrawing the proposals that we have put forward and I would say the proposals on which, substantially, we have agreed.

Now secondly, I think that all realistically minded forces in the world should now begin to act."
Unless the perception were changed, the failed Reykjavik meetings would represent a potential political weapon against the Administration and the Republican Party. The Administration was placed therefore in a position of having to exploit rhetorically for its advantage the unexpected events of Reykjavik brought on by its agenda item.

Aboard Air Force One from Iceland to Andrews Air Force Base, hours following Shultz's press conference and a nationally televised departure address by Reagan, the White House developed a two part strategy for addressing the rhetorical problem of Reykjavik. The program reportedly was described by Patrick J. Buchanan, Director of White House Communications, as "the most extensive and intensive communications plan" that he had "ever been associated with in the White House." The campaign's purpose was to deliver to the American people a message concerning Reykjavik favorable to the Administration.

The first part of the campaign was to capitalize on the melodrama of the Reykjavik meetings to gain access for spokespersons approved by the Administration. By doing this, the Administration attempted what U.P.I. Bureau Chief, Helen Thomas, noted 'dean' of the White House Press Corp alleges is the aim of all administrations--to provide "snap shots" of information that administrations treat as "their private preserve." According to Thomas, "The White House
doesn't want us to ask questions. They want us to see only what they want us to see."\textsuperscript{103}

Donald T. Regan, the White House Chief of Staff, in his decision "to place major Administration officials on the record before virtually any television, newspaper, magazine or radio outlet that asked for them" could provide its version of Reykjavik as the authoritative one and perhaps keep the drama of Reykjavik alive until a favorable popular opinion could be constructed.\textsuperscript{104} All White House officials involved in the campaign were to speak "on the record and by name attached to the individual talking."\textsuperscript{105} Larry Speaks, White House spokesman, told reporters, "If you receive information on a background basis from a senior Administration official, from here on out that senior Administration official may not be plugged into what's going on."\textsuperscript{106}

The public relations campaign began on October 13th, the day following the close of the meetings with NATO members being briefed by Secretary of State Shultz and a nationally televised address by Ronald Reagan.\textsuperscript{107} By October 14th, the public relations campaign had been transformed into a "full-blown publicity blitz."\textsuperscript{108} For instance, President Reagan "spent almost" the entire day of October 14th discussing the Iceland meetings with congressional leaders, newspaper columnists and television news anchors, and foreign policy and national security officials. On
October 13th and 14th, the schedules of the Secretary of State and John T. Poindexter, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "focused on the summit." Their coast-to-coast activities included appearances on televised news programs, meetings with newspaper editors and reporters, and news conferences.  

The second component of the White House strategy was to provide the American public with a consistent persuasive message that the Strategic Defense Initiative was a necessary agenda item. In light of this assessment, Reagan's refusal to sacrifice S.D.I. would be a fitting response. Reykjavik would be a success. Buchanan was quoted as saying:

> From the early instant analysis, all you got was that the summit collapsed because the President was intransigent on S.D.I. That's simplistic and false. We have the whole story. So Regan, Shultz, Poindexter, and the President are going on the record in as many forums as we can to tell the story.  

The message constructed by the Administration followed the positive thematic parameter used by Shultz in his Reykjavik press conference and Reagan's nationally televised departure address delivered at Keflavik, Iceland. This theme arguably was followed because it was already in the public domain, but more importantly, the theme assimilated the events of Reykjavik into Reagan's established persona.
Supporters and even more objective political analysts suggest that the popular appeal of Reagan resided in his image. For instance, James Brady, Reagan's White House Press Secretary, writes that Reagan was able to "flourish" as the "Great Communicator" because the "man and the President" were "inseparable." He conducted "his presidency based on the same fundamental principles that . . . guided his life." Likewise, Hedrick Smith argues Reagan's appeal "had ridden on image: his image of steadfastness, his image as a man of principle, his image of uncompromising refusal to deal with the devil."

By recycling this theme in the redefinition of Reykjavik, the Administration provided narrative rationality to its message. According to Walter Fisher, this quality can determine "whether or not one 'should' accept a story, whether or not a story is indeed trustworthy and reliable." The resulting appeal of the Administration’s message, therefore, can be credited to the Reagan persona, "his character, his commitment to his philosophy . . ., and the coherence of his position," much as Fisher explains the allure of Socrates' story told in the Gorgias.

In their statements, Reagan and Shultz embraced the President's persona suggesting the noble resolve of the Administration as opposed to the ignoble motive of the Soviets. Reagan was portrayed as a hard working negotiator who went to Iceland "to advance the cause of peace" and who
"put on the table the most far-reaching arms-control proposals in history." As Shultz described, Reagan "was constructive in reaching out and using his creativity and ingenuity." Further, Shultz argued the President was willing to make concessions. But at the same time, he "would not turn away from the basic security interests of the United States, or allies and the free world."

This motive was contrasted with the negative Soviet intent that "rejected" the noble cause. The difference manifested by Soviet limitations on S.D.I. Shultz described the Strategic Defense Initiative as having "the nature of an insurance policy—insurance against cheating, insurance against somebody getting hold of these weapons." S.D.I. would "maintain an effective shield for the United States, for our allies, for the free world." Soviet attempts to link the proposals to the initiative, which Reagan professed as a "defensive shield," were described by Shultz as "perhaps a indication of where they're headed."

White House officials built upon this theme during the massive public relations campaign constructing a three part scenario of Reykjavik that: 1) contraposed the American with the Soviet motive; 2) suggested how the American motive overcame the U.S.S.R's; and 3) proposed the benefits of Reykjavik. First, the Soviet Union was represented as having initiated the Reykjavik meetings with a "letter from the General Secretary saying, "Please come meet me in
Iceland."  Even though most of his advisors saw the risks involved, Reagan, "felt it was important to try." At the talks, Reagan was willing to negotiate and to make concessions in areas "important to the United States and our allies." The Soviet motive for instigating the negotiating process was an attempt to accomplish what its 1983 walk-out of the Geneva negotiations sessions had failed to do, to weaken support for Reagan's defense agenda. The Administration argued that from the time the Soviet delegation had walked out of the Geneva arms reduction talks until Gorbachev contacted Reagan, the U.S.S.R. had been testing American determination and challenging NATO's accord. But during the course of the "year and a half when they walked out of the talks," IMf missiles were deployed in Europe with the approval of European allies as the North Atlantic Alliance had became more united. Soviet participation in the Reykjavik meetings ultimately was designed to bring about reductions in 'Peace Through Strength' and "kill" S.D.I. If and when that plan failed and the meetings deadlocked, the Soviets would then use propaganda that would eventually force American arms reduction. Paul Nitze, Special Presidential Advisor on Arms Control, argued that the Soviets intended to use the lack of final conclusion at the summit as a means for "creating divisions between the
United States and . . . [its] various allies around the world and within the various countries including the United States as well."

Second, according to the Administration's scenario, Reagan's resolve halted this Soviet attempt. Reagan stated that he entered into the negotiations with "no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions. We were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy." Reagan observed, "the principal objective of American foreign policy" is "not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom" and a "commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world." These two goals were protected by Reagan.

Reagan argued that during the meetings he proposed "the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. . . . [He] offered the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles--Soviet and American--from the face of the earth by 1996." Furthermore, Reagan "didn't limit [the negotiations] to just arms reductions. . . . [He] discussed . . . violation of human rights on the part of the Soviets."

The perseverance of the presidency was tested by unfair Soviet demands placed on the American proposals:

This may have been the most sweeping and important arms reduction proposal in the history of the world. But it wasn't good enough for Mr.
Gorbachev. He wanted more. He wanted us to accept even tighter limits on S.D.I. than the ABM treaty now requires. That is to stop all but laboratory research. He knew this meant killing the Strategic Defense Initiative entirely, which has been the Soviet goal from the start.

Of course, the Soviet Union has long been engaged in extensive strategic defense programs of its own. And unlike ours, the Soviet program goes well beyond research—even to deployment. The Soviet proposal would have given them an immediate one-sided advantage and a dangerous one. I could not and would not agree to that. I won't settle for anything unless it's in the interest of American Security.\[164\]

Reagan, who professed that he preferred "no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States," rejected the linkage alleging that "[w]hat Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a new version of a fourteen year-old ABM treaty that the Soviet Union has already violated. . . . [He] told him we don't make those kinds of deals in the United States:

I told him I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away S.D.I.—there was no way I could tell our people their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things our freedom and our future.\[165\]

By constructing this narrative of the President standing up to the Soviet Union, the Administration drew from the consistency of a forty year Cold War consensus that a strong U.S. diplomacy is the best defense against Communism. This Kennan philosophy demands a pragmatic and "hardheaded handling of a rigorously appraised situation
... not to make the world wonderful but to save it from the worst consequences of its follies: 

Russians will pursue a flexible policy of piecemeal presumption and encroachment of other people's interest, hoping that no single action will appear important enough to produce a strong reaction on the part of their opponents, and that in this way they may gradually bring about a major improvement in their position before the other fellow knows what's up... Whoever deals with them must therefore be sure to maintain at all times an attitude of decisiveness and alertness in the defense of his own interests.

In keeping with this philosophy, the Secretary of State observed that he thought "it was good for the Soviets to see that in Ronald Reagan they are up against somebody who is capable of saying 'no' as well as capable of saying 'yes,' who will judge the interests of the United States and hold firm for them." Buchanan echoed this popular sentiment that "[w]hen the President of the United States stands up for the national security of this country and takes that kind of firestorm, I think that the average American will say, 'I trust Ronald Reagan. He did the right thing in the national security interest.'

The final component of the White House scenario was Reykjavik's impact on the substance and direction of future negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the aftermath of the meetings. This element of the scenario attempted to dispel the image constructed by the media that the negotiations had failed. The Administration attempted
to construct a rival narrative that the meetings had laid the foundation for future meetings.

Again, this strategy followed the Kennan thought. The narrative suggested by the Administration assumes the U.S.S.R. will negotiate when "they themselves want something and feel themselves in a dependent position." For instance, Buchanan challenged the media's report by arguing that they "went into something . . . of a collective panic in their descriptions" of a "collapse." Although, he admitted that Gorbachev "was very tough in his statement," Buchanan stressed that Gorbachev "didn't say 'I'm never going to the United States to a summit.'"

This observation augmented Reagan's position that: "The United States put good, fair ideas out on the table . . . [that] won't go away. Good ideas . . . have a life of their own." This contention was supported by other White House officials who argued that the importance of the meetings was "the substance of what is possible."

The outcome of this scenario was a redefinition of the Reykjavik meetings. Secretary of State Shultz appraised the meetings as "not a question of how it appears, it's a matter of what happened:

Now the strategic nuclear weapons are more numerous and more deadly and of course they're pointed at the United States so we went to Reykjavik very much in mind willing to engage on that subject. And as it turned out, we were able to. And we were able to bring off an agreement with Mr. Gorbachev contingent, to be sure, but,
nevertheless, to nail down a cutting in half of those weapons and to do it in a manner that makes sense from our standpoint. That is category by category. . . . And so as we have assessed it, and others have. We have said, "Now look at these accomplishments."\textsuperscript{13a}

For this assessment of Reykjavik to 'work,' popular opinion had to find Administration statements credible that the United States needed the Strategic Defense Initiative. After all, the failure to reach positive closure making the 'possibilities' of Reykjavik 'contingent' rather than a reality resulted from Reagan's refusal to sacrifice his 'vision.'

The White House seemed to be facing a rhetorical dilemma. On one hand, the Administration was publicly advocating that the "supreme need . . . is for man to learn to live together in peace and harmony . . . where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined."\textsuperscript{13a} But at the same time, the Administration was advocating its defense agenda that entailed the rebuilding of the U.S. military.\textsuperscript{13a} Without an element bolstering these agenda items, particularly S.D.I., the resolve of the President and his commitment to the nonexistent weapons system, might have appeared absurd. Soviet demands could have seemed reasonable. Ultimately, a redefinition of Reykjavik would be more difficult if not impossible.

To persuade the American people of S.D.I.'s viability, the Administration used arguments that previously had been
used to gain support for the agenda item and buttressed these with new arguments derived from the situation. First, the White House followed a similar strategy for the Strategic Defense Initiative as the one used by the Administration for its defense agenda when it first emerged systemically. The Administration argued that "above all, beginning to work on the Strategic Defense Initiative . . . spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously."137 Reagan maintained that the existence of this agenda item and its popular support, both domestically and internationally, and the awareness of this fact by the U.S.S.R. left them with no choice but to bargain.138 The Administration also argued that S.D.I.'s intent was one of peace, replacing the "insanity" of the Mutual Assured Destruction defense posture.139

Along with these premises, the White House offered new arguments for the Strategic Defense Initiative in the context of Reykjavik. The White House used questions concerning the Soviet motive for the meetings as proof for the necessity of the agenda item. Reagan stated that he made proposals that "could satisfy" Soviet "concern while protecting" U.S. "principles and security."140 The rejection of those proposals raised several "critical" questions on which Reagan said the "American people should reflect:

How does the defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever
vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today, all free nations are utterly defenseless against Soviet missiles, fired either by accident or design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so—forever?\textsuperscript{1}

The one answer to these questions was the ignoble motive of the Soviet Union that sought to gain an advantage over the U.S. and its allies. As Buchanan reasoned, "If the Soviets were genuinely sincere in arms control and wanted to get rid of nuclear weapons, they would have . . . [negotiated] in a second."\textsuperscript{2} But according to Buchanan, the U.S.S.R. refused to give up, in anyway, its military power, because their power is the "one thing that makes them feared, respected, enables them to terrify and intimidate people," and "that almost separates them from being a third-world country."\textsuperscript{3}

In addition to, and not mutually exclusive from the Soviet motive, the agenda item was identified with a presidency defending American interests. In his address to members of the Arms Control Staff, using a device that Kenneth Burke describes as a "representative anecdote\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{4}" that provided in itself a summation of the public relations campaign, Reagan claimed, "The Soviet proposal would have given them an immediate one-sided advantage and a dangerous one. I could not and would not agree to that."\textsuperscript{5} While Reagan was "willing to go the extra mile," to offer proposals, "when he saw something that he felt was not in
the interest of the United States, he had the courage to say 'No.' It was time to walk away from it."

Finally, S.D.I. was linked to positive repercussions of Reykjavik. First, by standing up for U.S. interests, Reagan had taught the Soviets a "lesson": America could not be tricked."
Second, the agenda item was asserted to be "paying dividends" evidenced by the "progress on the issue of arms control" at Reykjavik."
"For the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions" were "moving and moving in the right direction—not just toward arms control, but toward arms reductions."

Reagan, in another representative anecdote, observed that "if there is one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we are dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets toward even more breakthroughs."
In keeping with this final argument, the White House asserted that the Strategic Defense Initiative guaranteed future negotiations that would benefit from the Reykjavik meetings. As Shultz surmised, Reykjavik was only one stage of many in a natural bargaining process.

The arguments the White House used to support S.D.I. is exemplified in the justification Reagan offered concerning his actions at Reykjavik that protected the Initiative:
I realize some Americans may be asking tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's demand? Why not give up S.D.I. for this agreement?

The answer, my friends, is simple. S.D.I. is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the commitments made at Reykjavik.

S.D.I. is America's security guarantee—if the Soviets should—as they have done too often in the past—fail to comply with their solemn commitments.

S.D.I. is what brought the Soviets back to arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland.

S.D.I. is the key to a world without nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{131}

The rhetorical bonding of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative with national security interests [opposite those of the Soviet's] and the strength of the President allowed for the redefinition of the failed Iceland meetings. As the opinion polls taken October 14th and 15th seemed to suggest, popular opinion was constructed that seemed favorable to Administration actions. From these aggregate measures, the majority of Americans passively seemed to accept Administration charges that: the Soviets were responsible for the failure to reach accord; the President should not have given up S.D.I.; and the talks even though not successful would lead to other more profitable negotiating sessions.

The Strategic Defense Initiative became a rhetorical instrument to persuade the people that Reykjavik was successful. The Administration's unwillingness to make concessions concerning this item that resulted in the stalemated meetings, in effect, produced the positive image
for Reykjavik. Reagan stated, "The American people don't mistake the absence of a final agreement for the absence of progress."152 "So you can see, we made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and above all, realistic approach with the Soviets."153

Not only did the White House public relations campaign accomplish its primary objective of overcoming the rhetorical problem created by Reykjavik, it perhaps fulfilled a second function of more enduring effects. By adapting the Strategic Defense Initiative to a position of a rhetorical device, they moved the item from the systemic to the institutional agenda.

Particularly, to construct S.D.I. as an effective instrument of persuasion, the Administration had to, and did in fact, make the 'vision' of S.D.I seem real for the majority of the populace. This was done by the Administration using the popular attention that S.D.I. had attracted to its advantage to construct a symbolic identity for the initiative. For instance, Buchanan was quoted as saying "Gorbachev has done more for S.D.I. in one week than we've been able to do in a year."154

As a symbolic entity, S.D.I arguably enjoyed an existence analogous to that of other phenomena having their "bases in symbolism and not in fact," a "comparatively unflexible, rigid form of adaptation."155 The possible
result was that S.D.I became interwoven with the American vision, and as posited by Sam Donaldson, White House Correspondent for ABC News, comparable to "something that goes along with the founding principles of this country, as a bedrock which we won't give up." Although the statement is hyperbolic, Donaldson's opinion may be reflective of the popular attitude concerning S.D.I in the context of redefining Reykjavik.

Recontextualized, S.D.I tended to "reflect structural and institutional biases found within the system," which, according to Cobb and Elder, is the nature of items having formal agenda status. The rhetorical means used by the Administration and opinion leaders for persuading the populace that the Strategic Defense Initiative was a necessary agenda item perhaps would result in this quality. This possibility is considered in the next section.

IV
S.D.I. As a Rhetorical Icon

The foreign policy process by its nature attempts to limit domestic advocacy. The foreign policy establishment, during negotiations of the type that occurred at Reykjavik, would perceive itself at a disadvantage if the foreign participant knew the U.S. bargaining position that had already been debated or was being debated domestically while negotiations were on going. In the case of Reykjavik, the establishment would probably feel that General Secretary
Gorbachev would have had only to wait for American public opinion to register unfavorably toward the Reagan White House. The President might feel more compelled to accept the U.S.S.R.'s proposals because of the impacts facing the Reagan White House. Therefore the foreign policy establishment attempts to prevent public participation in the process.

The advocacy process is delimited by constructing popular opinion. The establishment constructs majority opinion supporting U.S. agenda items by using discourse that produces synnationalistic tendencies. The argument proposed in this section is that the Administration used the discourse to recontextualize the Strategic Defense Initiative on the systemic agenda to construct popular opinion supporting its actions at Reykjavik.

The discourse used during the White House public relations campaign recontextualized the defensive 'vision' of the Strategic Defense into a broader vision. S.D.I.'s recontextualization made the initiative seem more viable for the American people. For instance, following Ronald Reagan's national broadcast concerning Reykjavik, Tom Foley, then Democratic Whip in the U.S. House of Representatives, complained that the President "treats and has always treated S.D.I. as if it were an existing technology that we're prepared to put into space to protect us against nuclear
attack. It's only the possibility." General Daniel Graham, U.S. Army, Ret., reiterated Foley's observation:

... I thought that when the President said for the first time that he didn't want his own options cut down, not some future President, that finally the President has been convinced that we have readily deployable S.D.I. systems right now. That a decision to deploy at least three layers of defense is available to the President, now. So I don't think that it's something way off in the future.

The Time/CBS News Poll, which showed a marked increase in the number of people who believed S.D.I would work, indicated that apparently the majority of American citizens trusted the President.

At the time of Reykjavik, S.D.I. resided only on the systemic agenda, existing in the laboratory or on blueprint. The systemic agenda, according to Cobb and Elder, is "composed of fairly abstract and general items that do little more than identify a problem area. It will not necessarily suggest either the alternatives available or the means of coping with the problem."

When Ronald Reagan introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative during a speech in 1983, the intent of the address was not designed specifically for advancement of the proposal. Instead, the speech was intended to gain an advantage in a debate over defense spending. In the speech Reagan discussed numerous areas of Soviet military build-up. At the conclusion of the address, he suggested a potential
for overcoming the threat of Soviet strategic nuclear missiles. This proposal was not a concretized plan but only an "effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve . . . [the] ultimate goal of eliminating the threat." But until such a program could be conceived, which he argued might not occur "before the end of the century," Reagan argued for increasing existing armaments. These increases, including "modernizing . . . strategic forces" and "improving . . . non-nuclear capabilities," would enable the U.S. to "pursue real reductions in nuclear arms . . . from a position of strength" and "reduce the risk of a conventional military conflict."

When the Reykjavik meetings occurred, the Reagan Administration still described the Strategic Defense Initiative as an item for the prevention of an attack by incoming strategic Soviet missiles. This description provided by the Administration did not tell how the initiative would work. For example, Secretary of State Shultz described S.D.I. immediately following the meetings as a "vigorous presence . . . in the nature of an insurance policy . . . [that] would maintain an effective shield for the United States, for our allies, for the free world." But three days later he stated, "I don't know who knows what S.D.I. is." The Strategic Defense Initiative in this
state was only an abstraction that had been contextualized as an defensive item.

Popular support was constructed for Administration actions at Reykjavik S.D.I. because the public relations campaign was able to recontextualize S.D.I. This recontextualization was a product of the discourse of the public relations campaign. The Administration, as initiators of the systemic agenda item, wittingly or not, was able to attach existing political archetypes that construct the American vision to S.D.I. This recontextualization was accepted by popular opinion.

The Administration drew primarily from the extant heterogeneity between the United States and the Soviet Union as its reservoir for the recontextualization of S.D.I. As argued, historic and recycled discourse is assimilated by individuals producing positive and negative archetypes. Negative archetypal images of the U.S.S.R. have been derived as the result of originating discourse from the "Red Scare" period (1945-1950's) and discursively recycled during the Cold War era. Writing during the earlier period, FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, argued that the Soviet attempt was to subvert the United States making it a part of their system. This intention was in keeping with Winston Churchill's conviction that the U.S.S.R. "desire[d] the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines." Hoover later described that doctrine, as
a "brutal, godless, materialistic way of life which would ruthlessly destroy . . . [American] values and ideals" and as a "deadly menace; a scourge which threatens the very existence of Western civilization."\textsuperscript{171}

These sentiments are kept alive through contemporary political discourse. For instance, Reagan's presidency was characterized by anti-Soviet discourse in which he professed that: "All the moral values this country cherishes . . . are fundamentally challenged by a powerful adversary which does not wish these values to survive."\textsuperscript{178} Individuals assimilate this discourse producing an archetypal reserve of predispositions contrasting the United States persona [good] with the Soviet persona [bad].

The public relations campaign recontextualized the Strategic Defense Initiative by drawing from this reservoir of predispositions. The campaign triggered existing archetypal predispositions and attached them to the Strategic Defense Initiative by the descriptions of Reykjavik. The White House portrayal was of a menacing Soviet Union: They "worship at the altar of power," have "got nine thousand ballistic missile warheads that can strike the United States," have a "record of playing fast and loose with past agreements," "want to see how much farther they can push us in public," and had the intent of "killing S.D.I."\textsuperscript{179}
The negative Soviet image was contrasted to the positive United States position. The initiative "would protect against cheating or the possibility of a madman sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles. After all, the world now knows how to make them."174

The Administration discourse suggested that S.D.I. must be 'good' since it was a creation of the U.S. Likewise the Soviet Union attempted to "kill" the initiative. The Soviet Union, "which is out to destroy the United States," would do all in its power to harm a policy instrument that is in the interest of the U.S., defense, and goes against the ostensible best interests of the U.S.S.R., world domination.

The White House's public relations campaign intensified faith in these archetypal predispositions attached to the S.D.I. abstraction with other persuasive arguments stemming from the meetings. As stated earlier, the White House argued the Soviet intent for Reykjavik included propaganda purposes if their "design" to "kill S.D.I." failed. These allegations were in keeping with anti-Soviet predispositions. Assimilated discourse arguably has produced a popular sentiment that "[p]ropaganda has become the most powerful single weapon in the communist arsenal. . . . It is utilized both to supplement military, conspiratorial, political, diplomatic, or economic measures. . . . It is the object of these schemers to raise doubt in the minds of our misinformed citizens."175
White House arguments were consistent with this instilled anti-Soviet predisposition. The public relations campaign presented its accounts as "true statements which are not very friendly to the U.S.S.R." Contradictory Soviet versions were suggested to be attempts to distort.¹⁷⁶

Also, accounts stressing presidential actions during the negotiating process strengthened the U.S. vs. Soviet archetypes. As noted above, the Office of the President has the benefit of non-constitutional roles. As Clinton Rossiter writes, the President is "the one-man distillation" of America.¹⁷⁷ In the aftermath of Reykjavik, Reagan was portrayed as protector of the people. The Soviets were pitted against someone "who would judge the interests of the United States and hold firm for them" and was "capable of saying 'no.'"¹⁷⁸ Revered qualities of the President—'constructive,' 'creative,' 'amenable yet resolved,' and 'pragmatic'—espoused during the campaign were American attributes.¹⁷⁹ Reagan's negotiation stance and his refusal to give up the Strategic Defense Initiative made it synonymous with a determined American objective of national defense.

The result of this discourse supported the initial contextualization of S.D.I. This contextualization was a first order semiological relationship of signifier--Soviet vs. American intent--to signified--the S.D.I. abstraction. In the aftermath of Reykjavik, S.D.I became a more value-
weighted abstraction, a defensive instrument of a 'good' country, protecting itself from the aggressions of a 'bad' country.

The worth of this contextualization was its ideographic rhetoricity as a coalition formulation device. S.D.I. had the potential for persuading individuals to affiliate with groups that believe defense to be an overriding U.S. interest. The initiative was used by the Administration in such a way to benefit the Republicans in the 1986 November congressional elections. The White House discursively used the item to revive the charge that Democrats critical of the initiative were "soft on defense."  

This contextualization, however, had limited applications for convincing the majority of citizens that the outcome of Reykjavik was successful. The efficacy of the initiative was restricted to its being a defensive instrument. S.D.I was in the development phase. The initiative was only practical "for long-run insurance"—a future defense system with no utility for the present.

A convincing argument still could have been made that the Administration sacrificed a 'bird in the hand for one in the bush.' Perceived Soviet-American tensions had not been abated, and concrete proposals that could have eased them had been rejected. Such objections had the potential of adversely impacting S.D.I. and the perception of Reykjavik
because no mutual collective agreement exists concerning U.S. foreign policy.

Citizens have only a framework of appropriate U.S. actions based on their perceptions of interests fundamental for the survival of the American vision. Individuals are socialized into a tripartite intuition of American interests which includes economic, defense and world order dimensions. These 'feelings' are vague conceptualizations of what is important to foreign policy. Unless a 'real' crisis occurs that immediately impacts on one certain dimension [an Oil embargo (economic) or a hostile attack or takeover of a U.S. installation (defense)], American citizens presumably will direct their attention arbitrarily toward one of the three interests.

In the case of Reykjavik and S.D.I., no actual crisis had taken place. Opponents could have aroused a majority of citizens with their arguments concerning the economic (astronomical cost), world order (destabilizing factor), as well as defense (deployment feasibility) ramifications over-shadowing White House arguments. If S.D.I had remained solely contextualized as a futuristic defense agenda item, these opposing arguments could have thwarted Administration attempts at redefining Reykjavik and retaining the Strategic Defense Initiative.

For S.D.I. to be useful as more than an ideograph but as a suasory device for constructing popular opinion, it had
to take on a more extensive metaphorical meaning for American foreign policy. The image of S.D.I had to be moved from a position having bearing only on a future defense interest with no real immediate persuasive worth to one encompassing all three goal areas. In this state, S.D.I would be vindicated as a vision essential for the present and would have a suasive impact on popular opinion against potential arguments leveled against White House actions at Reykjavik.

The Administration's public relations campaign was able to construct popular opinion by using synnationalistic rhetoric. This discourse was effective because: 1) it united the economic, world order, and defense interests in the context of Reykjavik to construct the concept of the American mission; and 2) it used the archetypal fueled form of S.D.I. to signify this concept. The result was a recontextualization of S.D.I. to a second semiological level. The initiative, recontextualized, signified what the mass holds to be important for U.S. foreign policy.

First, the three interests were combined constructing the American mission as the underlying concept for the Iceland meetings. The American mission, as discussed in Chapter II, is a hermeneutic that serves as a basis for convincing citizens the appropriateness of U.S. foreign policy actions. This framework dictates that the United States should protect and promote the U.S. vision by seeking to convert other nation-states from their doctrines to that
of a constitutional federal republic modeled after the American system.

The Administration successfully employed this concept throughout the Reagan era to defend its foreign policy. For instance, in his 1983 "State of the Union Address," Reagan argued that the U.S. "leadership role in the world came to us because of . . . the values which guide us as a free society." Reagan professed that this "bedrock" provided the "cornerstone of a comprehensive strategy" that his Administration "intend[ed] to pursue . . . vigorously." This international "stewardship of peace and freedom" combined the three interests in that the Administration argued its "strategy for peace with freedom [world order]" had to be "based on strength--economic and military strength."

As in the 1983 address, the White House public relations campaign used the American mission to explain the Reykjavik meetings. The campaign explicated the meetings as necessary for "pursuit of . . . [the] ideal toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined." This objective according to Reagan was one that America had been "honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity"--the dream of lasting peace and human freedom." Seemingly, Reagan was not solely advocating the absence of war and extolling the merit of human autonomy. Instead, he was connoting what U.S. citizens apparently
consider to be the foreign policy goal of the United States—the "extension of freedom . . . [a] commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world."186

Second, the campaign recontextualized S.D.I. with the concept. Reagan argued that the pursuit of the mission had led to the initiative that had "most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously" at Reykjavik.187 In this synnationalistic context, S.D.I. with its archetypal charge suggestibly became a "literalization" of the American mission.188

The White House recontextualized S.D.I. as a literalization of the American mission by using metaphoric discourse to identify S.D.I. to the three U.S. interests. For instance, the Administration's campaign joined S.D.I. and the economic interest through its discourse used in the portrayal of presidential actions at the meetings. The Reagan persona took on that of a shrewd 'capitalist' against the Soviets who were diametrically opposed to that principle.

The descriptions of Reagan conceivably had semblance to the average citizen's conception of the U.S. economic system. The simplest form of this system according to Milton Friedman is "freedom of exchange."189 This system ingrained within American folklore rests on the principles of "law and order"190 that "gives people what they want
instead of what a particular group thinks they ought to want."

The public relations campaign suggested that Reagan was skillfully using this most basic meaning of capitalism. According to Shultz, Reagan was willing to negotiate for those "things that were potentially important to the United States and our allies," but he refused to "give the store [S.D.I.] away. . . . [W]hen he saw something that he felt was not in the interest of the United States, he had the courage to say 'No.' "It was time to walk away from it." Through the Administration's use of this discourse, the Strategic Defense Initiative was recontextualized as a metaphor for combined United States interests, a literalization of the American mission. As in the above example, S.D.I. was a non-negotiable commodity that Reagan was justified in refusing to give up because of its defensive and world order benefits. As Reagan explained, "There was no way I could tell our people their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things our freedom and our future." Without the benefit of metaphoric discourse, S.D.I.'s recontextualization, as Robert L. Ivie argues, would be difficult or impossible. The discourse provided S.D.I. with the "appearance of sheer rationality" that "compensated for lingering doubts over any such ambiguities" as the
initiative's cost or even its existence. The initiative "emerged as a rigid, probative line of reasoning which presumed to test independently the very metaphor from which its own premises were drawn." On one hand, S.D.I. did exist since the Soviets rejected Reagan's proposals due to the Strategic Defense Initiative. The device was viable, or why would a militaristic government place demands on it? Why would they enter into negotiations in which historic breakthroughs became a possibility, if S.D.I. were not crucial? And yet, the form of S.D.I. did not demand substance. Shultz stated that the potential agreements that defined success for Reykjavik were possible "no doubt in large part because the President has insisted on learning about strategic defense."

The campaign enhanced the rhetoricity of the S.D.I. recontextualization by drawing from other situations. In one case, a "goading symbol of American failure dealing with Russians" was coupled with the more recent Administration examples of Soviet actions to justify S.D.I. White House Communications Director Buchanan constructed an argument suggesting that if Franklin Roosevelt had "been as tough at Yalta as Ronald Reagan was at Reykjavik," the United States "might not have had some of the problems that we've got today." By referring to Yalta, the Administration drew from a historic American experience of a negotiating session that, unlike Reykjavik, had been "greeted with almost
unanimous praise." However, the Soviets made "flagrant violations" of the Yalta provisions and "seemed to speak contempt for the whole idea of world peace." The initial hope that the Yalta Conference would bring better Soviet-American relations and understanding decayed.

The campaign recycled the meaning internalized from this historic example. The Administration alleged the Soviets had violated the existing 1972 ABM Treaty and the 1975 Helsinki Accords and had been involved in world-wide regional conflicts. These professed situations reinforced the Soviet vs. American archetypal predisposition that the U.S.S.R. had not changed drastically from their 1945 posture, fortifying a long held U.S. attitude that the Soviet "talk much about peace but feverishly prepare for war." As Buchanan asserted: "This gets down to the question. Do you feel that Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet Union are more interested in genuine peace and getting rid of weapons than Ronald Reagan?"

In this context, S.D.I literalized a determined moral America fighting for its vision against an equally determined morally corrupt Soviet Union. Upholding S.D.I. made the initiative symbolic of a U.S. triumph or as Buchanan argued, "Reagan's 'finest hour.'"

Besides using situations to intensify the rhetoricity of S.D.I., the White House campaign used the symbolic power of the presidency to generate additional credibility. The
Administration argued that the office placed Reagan's judgments beyond reproach. As Buchanan maintained, "even if the American people disagree with the President, he was elected to do what's right." Campaign spokespersons argued that S.D.I. was an extension of the presidency whose "function is to defend the national security interest."

By recontextualizing S.D.I. as a literalization of the American mission and enhancing the metaphor through situation and presidential role, the initiative became more effective for constructing a favorable popular opinion than its 'defense' rhetoricity. Without verifiable substance to its form, arguments against the initiative lost their force. Three such arguments were: 1) The initiative demonstrated a U.S. aggressive intent; 2) S.D.I. demanded a huge projected cost; and 3) S.D.I. was not technologically plausible.

First, opponents argued that the Strategic Defense Initiative was a destabilizing device. Robert McNamara observed this tendency occurred because "[t]here is deep mistrust on each side [American and Soviet]. Each side . . . fears the other side is seeking to achieve a first strike capability. . . . [T]he steps we take--the actions we engage in--lead the Soviets to that belief."

The public relations campaign overcame this argument by pointing out the Soviet Union had "devoted far more resources, for a lot longer time than we, to their own 'S.D.I.'" The United States "had not bothered" with an
anti-ballistic missile system since "the threat of nationwide annihilation made such limited defense seem useless." The Administration incorporated S.D.I within its agenda only after it determined the program of "mutual destruction and slaughter" of Soviet and American citizens "uncivilized." From the White House's perspective, having no shield meant the "slaughter of a bunch of Russians."

The difference between the two systems was that the Soviet vs. American archetypes attached to S.D.I. made the perception of the 'operational' Soviet system militaristic and the envisioned U.S. plan altruistic. S.D.I.'s form allowed one state's proven offense to become another nation's defense.

Reagan manifested the disparate intents. He told the American people "if and when we reached the stage of testing we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet observation of such tests. And if the program was practical we would both eliminate our offensive missiles, and then we would share the benefits of advanced defenses."

S.D.I.'s rhetoricity became more compelling in the context of Reykjavik. A Pentagon spokesman contrasted the importance of the U.S. system with the Soviet program at the meetings in which the Soviets attempted to maintain a "balance in the balance of terror" while S.D.I. offered "protection" for both countries "instead of blowing each other up." The Soviet refusal of U.S. proposals because
of linkage to S.D.I. tended to confirm the White House's argument of a "critical moral distinction between totalitarianism and democracy."²¹³

A second objection raised against the Strategic Defense Initiative was the enormous cost of the program that was estimated in the trillions of dollars. The White House campaign used the synnationalistic recontextualization of S.D.I. to shift the focus of the argument from cost to benefits. As a literalization of the American mission, S.D.I.'s objective was to protect the futuristic projection of the U.S. vision on the international community.

By transferring the locus of the argument, financing for the program seemed reasonable. The answer to the charge of S.D.I.'s high cost was not in terms of dollar amounts. Instead, the Administration argued, "America can't afford to take a chance."²¹⁴ Reagan contended that "America and the West need S.D.I. for long-run insurance. It protects against the possibility that at some point when the elimination of ballistic missiles is not yet complete the Soviets may change their mind. We know the Soviet record of playing fast and loose with past agreements."²¹⁵

S.D.I.'s recontextualization suggested a more noble purpose than solely a U.S. defense interest. The policy item limited to an instrument of defense could be challenged because of massive funding. Likewise, Administration actions at Iceland could be disputed due to these cost and
the viability of the item at that time. But the campaign's recontextualization of S.D.I. as integral to the American mission justified spending for a future world interest, an 'insurance policy' for the world.

Comparably, justification for the initiative's feasibility was constructed by the recontextualized meaning of S.D.I that broadened its definitional base beyond that of a defensive weapon. The Administration recycled what Zagacki and King contend were S.D.I.'s originating "romantic themes" of American culture, preservations of American traditions. By directing definitional focus away from weapons technology, the Strategic Defense Initiative became a sign for American beneficence and "material prosperity."

Furthermore, S.D.I. stood for the benefits of American ingenuity. The campaign recycled the Reagan argument, suggested by Janice Hocker Rushing, the possibility of an "Edenic past" derived from a "scientific future." This recontextualized meaning of S.D.I., however, did not limit the initiative's advantages to the United States polity but suggested world progress through S.D.I. The initiative would not destroy, but American technological supremacy and creativity would be a vehicle for fulfilling the American mission. Questions concerning its viability as those opposing Kennedy's challenge of "going to the moon," would prevent the U.S. from "getting there."
S.D.I.'s recontextualization worked effectively, outweighing any likely opposition because the campaign suggested a sense of participation on the part of the American people. Administration strategies for recontextualizing S.D.I. recycled the myth that people are collaborators in the nation-state vision. The U.S. citizens were ultimately responsible for the success of the American mission under the guidance of the President. Reagan told the American people, "... I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy—world peace and freedom—be pursued:

Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might; your support has restored our military strength. Your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.880

The concept of Reykjavik, the American mission, was fundamental to this strategy. As argued by the Administration, S.D.I., as a recontextualization, was necessary for the eventual fruition of the mission. According to the Administration, the only way that the
"dream" could be realized was for American popular opinion to "maintain . . . determination and . . . direction"—to continue to support the Strategic Defense Initiative.881

The democratizing of the world would take time. Of course, America had to survive for the future democratizing process. But in the meantime, popular support would demonstrate through example to the existing democracies and other nations the virtues of the American form of government.

Furthermore, American popular opinion would bring the Soviets back to negotiations because at Reykjavik, as Reagan contended, "it was this strength and unity that brought the Soviets to the bargaining table. And particularly important was America's support for the Strategic Defense Initiative."882 Eventually Soviet conversion might occur for as General Graham posited, "[I]t's already got the Soviets realizing that if these defenses go in masses of nuclear weapons are not the answer to their problems."883 Thus as long as S.D.I. was accepted by the American people, the concept would be attainable.

Arguably, the result of the White House public relations campaign was the creation of a rhetorical icon from the Strategic Defense Initiative. As the New York Times/CBS News Poll indicated the campaign produced "perhaps stronger, confidence in the . . . plan."884 The reason for this increased popular confidence in the initiative was that
its meaning became central to American myths. Primarily, the initiative was envisioned as a defensive system, however, the campaign recontextualized S.D.I. to embrace other interests constructing the American mission. Popular acceptance of those interests demanded devotion to the recontextualization. In effect, the initiative provided an immortality symbol for the people. With its existence came a promise that the U.S. nation-state could continue to prosper unthreatened, eventually leading to a world politic commensurate with the American ideal.

Summary

This analysis of Reagan Administration discourse may provide insights into the workings of U.S. foreign policy legitimation. The popular verdict for the failed Reykjavik meetings was a measure of the Administration's success in recontextualizing the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Reagan Administration's rejection of Soviet proposals had come to be seen as saving S.D.I.

The Administration was able to construct popular opinion by recontextualizing S.D.I. as a guardian and guarentor of the American mission. Thus, when demands were placed on the initiative at Reykjavik, citizens were persuaded to support the Administration's rejection of those demands.
By supporting S.D.I.'s recontextualization, the citizens were provided with a sense that they were active participants in the destiny of the American nation-state. The sense of 'participation' strengthened the legitimacy of the foreign policy establishment. Governmental actions at Reykjavik were sanctified and the governmental agenda was strengthened. The ramifications of this analysis are discussed in the concluding chapter.
Notes


Cobb and Elder, p. 85.

Cobb and Elder, p. 85.

Cobb and Elder, p. 87.

Cobb and Elder, p. 87.

Cobb and Elder, p. 85.

Cobb and Elder, pp. 82-4.

Cobb and Elder, pp. 82-3.

Cobb and Elder, p. 83.

Cobb and Elder refer to this type of initiator as the "do-gooder." See: Cobb and Elder, pp. 83-4.

Cobb and Elder, p. 84.

Cobb and Elder, p. 85.

Cobb and Elder, p. 86.

Ripley and Franklin, p. 7.

Ripley and Franklin, p. 7.


Cobb and Elder, pp. 107-8.


Edelman, p. 71.

Edelman, p. 68.

Edelman, p. 67.

Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, 4th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), p. 60. It should be noted that in recent years a goal has been pursued by legislators to "make Congress an 'equal partner' with the President in the formulation and administration of American foreign policy--thereby reversing the long period of Executive dominance in the diplomatic field." For the most part, however, congressional influence on foreign policy is limited primarily to Congress monitoring the actions of the Executive through activities collectively
known as "legislative oversight." See: Crabb, p. 188; and Ripley and Franklin, pp. 19-21.

""Crabb, pp. 239-51.


An exception is the "Military Industrial Complex" which includes "agencies of the American government--chiefly the Department of Defense and influential legislative bodies such as the House and Senate Armed Services committees--that often express the view that national defense spending must be increased" as well as business corporations, labor unions, American Agriculture producing commodities, and individual members of Congress. An example of the "Military Industrial Complex" using its role in the agenda-setting process was the Pentagon's efforts to prevent the release of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study which argued against the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Pentagon successfully prevented the study from being released for seven months arguing that "it contained sensitive information" and thus endangered national security. See:
R. Jeffrey Smith, "SDI Faulted in 2-Year Hill Study," 


32 Cobb and Elder, p. 91-2.


35 "Violence in a Tube."

36 Nimmo and Combs, pp. 84-5.

37 Nimmo and Combs, p. 87.


39 Cobb and Elder pp. 105-7.

40 Cobb and Elder, p. 106.


42 Marly, 6.

"Cobb and Elder, p. 106.


Hauser, p. 327.

Cobb and Elder, p. 86.


Holloway and George, p. 166.


Thomas, p. 22; and Ronald Reagan, "Address to Evangelical Christians, "Orlando, Florida: 8 March 1983.


"Nuclear Freeze Debate," Donahue Show, 31 March 1983.

"Debate." See also: Talbott, pp. 588-9.


King and Petress, p. 169.


The cost estimate was stated by Sen. San Nunn, D-Ga., member of the Senate Arms Committee. See: "The Reagan--Gorbachev Summit," ABC News, 12 October 1986. Tom Wicker also echoed Nunn's observation when he wrote that the U.S. "at best cannot produce a deployed weapons system for more than 10 years or for less than perhaps three trillion dollars." See also: Wicker, p. 5, col. 5.

Wicker, p. 5, col. 5.


7Clymer, p. 9, cols. 3-4. These findings were significant in that "[i]n theory, in nineteen cases out of twenty, the results based on such samples will differ by no more than four percentage points in either direction from what would have been obtained by interviewing all adult Americans registered to vote. The error for smaller subgroups is larger. For example for men or women, the margin of sampling error is plus or minus five percentage points. In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error into the poll. See: "How the Poll Was Conducted," *New York Times*, National Ed., 16 October 1986. p. 9, cols. 1-2."


Weinraub, "As Reagan Triumphs," p. 10, col. 5;


Weinraub, "As Reagan Triumphs," p. 10, col. 5.; See also: Regan, p. 394.


Cobb and Elder, p. 93.


Thomas, p. 22.


Herbers, p. 7, col. 4.
Some NATO members were voicing dismay over Reagan's handling of the meetings and seemingly were accepting Gorbachev's assertion that Reagan turned "his back on Soviet proposals that could have led to 'historic' arms control accords."
In some countries, particularly France, more approval was voiced for Gorbachev's actions at the meetings than were Reagan's. Favorable news accounts and editorials from the foreign press applauded Gorbachev for breaking the news blackout the White House requested and briefing the press first. See: "Disappointment is Expressed in World Capitals Over Iceland Talks, But Also Hope," New York Times, National Ed., 14 October 1986, p. 6, cols. 1-5.


113Shultz was described after a three-hour briefing of NATO members in Brussels as "smiling and optimistic," a drastic change from the "dejected and depressed" appearance he possessed at the end of the talks in Iceland a day earlier. At one point, the meetings, which Shultz
previously had termed a 'disappointment' were described by
the Secretary of State to be in some ways, "a tremendous
success." See: Frank J. Prial, "Shultz Briefs NATO Allies
6, cols. 4-6.


3-7.

7, col. 2.

111See: Shultz; and Ronald Reagan, "Departure
Address from Reykjavik Summit," Keflavik, Iceland: 12
October 1986.

112Regan, p. 395.

113James S. Brady, *Ronald Reagan: A Man True To His
Word* (Washington: The National Federation of Republican

114Smith, p. 449.

115Walter R. Fisher, "The Narrative Paradigm: An
Elaboration," in *Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A
Twentieth-Century Perspective*, 3rd ed., revised, Bernard L.
Brock, Robert L. Scott, and James W. Chesebro, eds.

116Fisher, p. 246.

117"Interview with Pat Buchanan, Dir. of White House
"Interview with George Shultz," ABC News Nightline, 15 October 1986.


Interview with Pat Buchanan.


Reagan, "National Broadcast on the Reykjavik Meetings."


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"Interview with George Shultz."

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Kennan, p. 563.

"Interview with Pat Buchanan."

Reagan, "Talk to Arms Control Staff Members."

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Reagan, "National Broadcast on the Reykjavik Meetings."

Weinraub, "As Reagan Triumphs," p. 10, col. 6. Britt Hume, Capitol Hill Correspondent for ABC News, stated after the October 13 presidential broadcast that there "is a feeling on Capitol Hill among those who would be critical of the President that he might just be able to swing public opinion in his favor and turn this apparent failure into a kind of triumph in the sense he's got public attention on S.D.I. as never before, and he might be able to swing it in his favor . . . ." See: "Analysis of the Presidential Address Concerning Reykjavik Meetings."


"Analysis of the Presidential Address Concerning Reykjavik Meetings."

Cobb and Elder, p. 89.

"Analysis of the Presidential Address Concerning Reykjavik Meetings."


Clymer, p. 9, cols.1-6.

See: Cobb and Elder, p. 87.

Janice Hocker Rushing writes that Reagan in this address had the "rhetorical advantage over many rhetoricians in that his ultimate purpose of avoiding nuclear annihilation is one of the few in modern social life which is virtually uncontested; thus, he does not have to create a consensus on ends. . . . [T]he public is reassured even though it is not enlightened. As long as action is taken, it is not necessary to comprehend its complexities." See: Janice Hocker Rushing, "Ronald Reagan's 'Star Wars' Address: Mythic Containment of Technical Reasoning," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* (November 1986), 427-8.

While the predominant archetypes of the Soviet and American system were produced in large part after WWII the communist fear had existed within the United States as early as 1919 when the first Communist Party and Communist Labor Party were formed in the United States.

The formation of the post WWII anti-Soviet archetypes occurred when Soviet Party Leader Joseph Stalin broke away from the allies and lost his 'Uncle Joe' status. As Eric F. Goldman notes, the "situation" was ripe to the "American mind" for belief in an East-West Clash:
Yet the reports kept coming and they helped to insinuate into the national mind deeply worrisome questions: Could the United States pull off the new world role it was assuming? Wasn't it especially likely to fail in view of the way the Soviet was acting?

In the UN, the Russian representatives were incessantly vetoing, staging story walkouts, presenting their arguments in a shrieking billingsgate. On the most critical issue of all, international control of atomic energy, the Russians conducted themselves in a way which seemed to most Americans categorical proof that the Soviet wanted no genuine international control.

The news from around the world was of continuing gains by Communist parties. In France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia, the Red groups emerged from the war the strongest single political units and their growth was rushing ahead. Aid from the Soviet was helping Red Armies bring one region of China after another under the control of Communists. Even from the Latin countries to the south, which Americans had long considered a region of amenable rumba-dancers, the news was portentous. Communist parties, reliable estimates ran at the end of 1946, would poll a million to a million-and-a-half votes if free elections were held, and their support was mounting with the steadiness of a Cugar beat.


Hear Hoover, p. vii.


177See: "Interview with Pat Buchanan," and Reagan, "Talk to Arms Control Staff Members."
178Reagan, "National Broadcast on the Reykjavik Meetings."
179Hoover, On Communism, p. 114.
180Interview with Paul Nitze."
181Rossiter, p. 4.
182Interview with George Shultz."
184Gailey, p. 10, col. 3.
185Reagan, "Talk to Arms Control Staff Members."
187Reagan, "State of the Union."
188Reagan, "National Broadcast on Reykjavik Meetings."
189Reagan, "National Broadcast on the Reykjavik Meetings."
190Reagan, "National Broadcast on the Reykjavik Meetings."
165

Reagan, "National Broadcast on the Reykjavik Meetings."


Friedman, p. 14.

Friedman, p. 15.

"Interview with George Shultz."

Reagan, "National Broadcast on the Reykjavik Meetings."

Ivie, 250-53.

Ivie, 246.

"Interview with George Shultz."

Goldman, p. 34.

"Interview with Pat Buchanan."

Goldman, p. 10. See also: Goldman, p. 11; and pp. 34-7.

See: Reagan, "Broadcast Address on Reykjavik."

Hoover, Masters of Deceit, p. 350.

"Interview with Pat Buchanan."

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Zagacki and King, pp. 6-7.

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Rushing, p. 420.

"Interview with Pat Buchanan."

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Clymer, p. 9, col. 4.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION

This study concludes with a summary and discussion of the implications, and suggestions for future research. In the first section, the findings of the study are summarized to show how U.S. foreign policy discourse restricts debate and limits participation of the citizens. The argument is made that this discourse subverts both traditional American ideals and the deepest rhetorical traditions of civic humanism. In the final section, the limitations of the study are suggested. Potential areas of research are outlined that could strengthen the value and test the usefulness of the model this study proposes.

I
Summary and Implications

Authority in U.S. foreign policy tends to be centralized within a foreign policy establishment. Several assumptions support this arrangement. First, debate is assumed to be detrimental to U.S international operations. Foreign policy operates under the assumption that the policy is linked to the state's sovereignty and its vision. Foreign policy is the expression of United States
competition with other nation-states for the advancement of its national security interests. In this environment, often characterized as a situation demanding secrecy and urgency, debate is deemed counterproductive.

Second, citizens are thought to be incapable of participating in the decision making process. Although majority support is required for foreign policy, individuals within the United States are regarded as being wedded to 'privatism,' an orientation "toward personal concerns, including the desire to improve material well-being." This assumed orientation suggests that citizens are unwilling to spend the time to gain information by which to determine appropriate policy actions. Finally, it is assumed that foreign policy is best left to experts who can mediate its complexity in terms that ordinary people can grasp.

This study argues that policy advocates use synnationalistic discourse to overcome these presumptions. Such discourse is used to solidify majority approval for foreign policy actions. Synnationalistic discourse recontextualizes agenda items as literalizations of the more pervasive goal of U.S. interests assimilated by citizens, the American mission. This mission holds the U.S. vision as the paragon for the international community. The items, synnationalistically contextualized, evoke an image of an omnipotent United States from the citizens.
With synnationalistic meaning, foreign policy items take on a rhetoricity similar to that of 'condensation' or 'key terms.' The foreign policy items become recontextualized symbols of the enduring American mission — rhetorical icons. These items are effective in constructing popular opinion and serve as a means for decisions to remain centralized and for defusing potential debate.

The primary implication of this study is that the discursive process of American foreign policy impairs the rhetorical tradition and a U.S. axiom. First, the traditional foundation of rhetoric has been the rejection of an absolute truth and a reliance on probability in decision making. George Kennedy asserts, rhetoric is only "useful and legitimate" when two sides are presented and "the choice between them can be clearly perceived and intelligently made."

Second, the United States as a nation-state system has as a founding principle that people have a stake in their political destinies. The U.S. is an institution created by and for its people. It does not vest permanent authority in 'great men' or in special groups of persons. Ultimately, the citizens are responsible for its operations.

Synnationalistic discourse harms both ideals. First, this discourse removes choice, the "contestable validity claims," from agenda items. Support for foreign policy
items are not determined by "good arguments"—"a worthiness to be recognized." Instead, advocates interface items with the American vision to construct popular confidence in their foreign policy items.

The rhetorical potency for these agenda items, such as S.D.I., is grounded in their tendency to be immune from counter-arguments. To deny these instruments means that citizens, in effect, deny the U.S. vision. Conversely, if supportive, the people, as Representative Jack Kemp said of those who favored S.D.I., are on "high moral and political ground."

Second, the discourse tends to diminish citizen input to the foreign policy process. The discourse creates a "bridge" that suggests to the citizen that his/her interests are identical with those of the state. Over time, mere passive assent becomes an acceptable substitute for active participation.

The outcome, as Havel argues, is an "illusion" that conceals citizens "adaptation to the status quo." The people acquiesce to the foreign policy establishment reacting to its decisions rather than actively engaging in decision making. The individual is freed to pursue his/her private ventures knowing that the establishment's decisions are the 'right' ones. Instead of having the potential for being an actor, though minor, in the process, the citizen is relegated to being an observer.
For the discursive process to be consistent with the ideals of rhetoric and the U.S. nation-state, foreign policy discourse should induce 'true' public participation in the decision making of the state. The public, as Gerald A. Hauser describes, is "participating, judging--in a dynamic sense--persons who are actively involved in shaping the ways social wheels turn." The public "is active and creative" that "weighs and exchanges."

To achieve this aim, discourse would not be designed for popular acquiescence. Instead, the discourse would be a means of advocacy presenting one view while allowing for alternatives. The excusatory function would be removed, reminding citizens of their participatory responsibilities in U.S. decisions. This goal may be impossible to accomplish. But, the insights from this and other studies describing U.S. foreign policy discourse as it is currently used may move discourse in that direction.

Current changes in the international community may challenge the specific dimensions of this model since societal institutions and their presumptions are fragile and are in constant flux. However, the broader assumption on which this model is based, the synnationalistic tendency of foreign policy discourse, should have continued applicability. For this model to be comprehensive as a means for analyzing foreign policy discourse, certain
limitations need to be addressed. These limitations are suggested in the next section.

II
Suggestions for Future Research

This approach for the analysis of U.S. foreign policy discourse is admittedly incomplete for three reasons. These limitations need to be addressed to improve the model as well as to test its usefulness. First, this study is based on a single extended example. The model is operationalized using the Strategic Defense Initiative in conjunction with the 1986 Reykjavik meetings. This model of synnationalistic discourse needs to be tested in the contexts of other foreign policy items. These applications could include not only items that the United States proposes in its relationship with the U.S.S.R. but for its dealings with allies and nonaligned third world countries.

Second, this study assumes the primacy of discourse. For purposes of scope, this study does not address the influence of media on the passivity of the U.S. citizenry. Also, the study does not analyze the impacts of the media on popular opinion.

Future research could explore these areas. Studies might investigate the media's pacifying effects on U.S. citizens by their coverage of U.S. foreign policy. Another area of inquiry could focus on roles of various media in the construction of popular opinion. Finally, research might
extend the exploration of the extent to which the foreign policy establishment controls the media. These studies may make this model of discourse analysis more comprehensive by expanding it to a mass mediated construct.

A final limitation of this study is the perspective from which it is written. This study analyzes U.S. foreign policy discourse in the context of a bipolar world. The model focuses on the U.S. foreign policy establishment's continued reliance on the nation-state vision as it is constructed in an environment of competition between two world 'powers,' the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Future studies could apply this model to what is perhaps an evolving multipolar international community. These studies could explore what changes might occur in foreign policy discourse if the basic assumptions that undergird its rhetoric change. For instance, studies might address the potential importance that economics may come to have on foreign policy discourse. These studies could examine competing discourse between multinational corporations, regional, and ethnic groups pursing their interests and the foreign policy establishment holding to the existing nation-state vision as each attempts to construct popular opinion.

Besides these suggestions for future research, an additional area of potential investigation exists. Attempts could be made to isolate existing icons within U.S. foreign
policy. Studies of this nature might lead to a hierarchical inventory of icons.

The research might explore the possibility that some icons are peripheral while others are pivotal. Some icons may be minor recontextualizations that can be broken without any lasting impacts on popular opinion. Others may be crucial literalizations of American values, leaving little room for modification.

These studies may show how the foreign policy establishment is able, at times, to violate the rhetoricity of existing icons. Also, the studies might explain why foreign policy establishments may become victims to their own rhetorical creations. The result of these studies may eventually lead to foreign policy discourse that is designed to increase citizen participation in the process.

This chapter has argued that U.S. foreign discourse should encourage public participation in the decision making of the state. This ideal is opposed to the discourse as it is currently practiced. Toward that end, the model of discourse this project proposes attempts to show how the foreign policy establishment is able to centralize authority and limit participation.

This chapter also has suggested areas of research that may strengthen and test the applications of this model. These descriptive investigations may reveal the imperfections of foreign policy discourse. These analyses
might enable the rhetorical scholar to prescribe improvements. Through continuing research of this nature, legitimate foreign policy discourse eventually may emerge that directly involves citizens in the decision making process of the state.
Notes


4Habermas, p. 5.


7Haval, p. 43.

8Haval, p. 43.


10Hauser, p. 327.
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