Politics, the Nationality Problem, and the Habsburg Army, 1848-1914. (Volumes I and II).

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Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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Politics, the nationality problem, and the Habsburg army, 1848–1914. (Volumes I and II)

Miller, Lohr Eugene, Jr., Ph.D.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1992

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POLITICS, THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM, AND
THE HABSBURG ARMY 1848 - 1914

Volume I

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of History

by

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May 1992
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................... ii

ABBREVIATIONS ............................................. v

ABSTRACT ...................................................... vi

INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1

CHAPTER

Volume I

1 Army and Dynasty: *Vormärz* and Revolution .. 3

2 Army and Dynasty: Decay and Dualism. . . . . 68

3 Army and Nationalities:
   Russian Threat, Territorial Reform. . . . . 136

Volume II

4 Army and Nationalities:
   Crisis in Bohemia and Hungary . . . . . . . 196

5 Army and Nationalities:
   The Counsels of Despair . . . . . . . . . . 280

CONCLUSION .................................................. 381

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................386

VITA .........................................................401
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FML</td>
<td>Feldmarschalleutnant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FZM</td>
<td>Feldzeugmeister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Stab Op.-Büro</td>
<td>General Stab Operations-Büro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHSA</td>
<td>Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KA</td>
<td>Kriegsarchiv, Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KM</td>
<td>Kriegsministerium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKFF</td>
<td>Militärkanzlei Franz Ferdinand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKSM</td>
<td>Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MÖStA</td>
<td>Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Nachlass Auffenberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖMZ</td>
<td>Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift</td>
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ABSTRACT

The army of the Habsburg Monarchy was the central institution of the Habsburg state, and it embodied the ideal of non-national, dynastic rule. The army leadership was aware of the dangers of nationalism, but in the period between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the revolutions of 1848, no attempt was made to overcome the danger of national disaffection. The revolutions of 1848 caused the army to remove Hungarian and Italian units from their homelands, but, despite the suspicion in which they were held, these troops fought well in the wars of 1859 and 1866.

The financial weakness of the Monarchy and the coming of home rule to Hungary caused this policy of garrisoning Hungarian units outside of Hungary to be gradually abandoned after 1867. The worsening of relations with Russia after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 led the Monarchy's army to undertake a series of reforms designed to reduce the time needed for mobilization. Central to rapid mobilization was a "territorial" system wherein most of the Monarchy's soldiers were garrisoned in their recruiting districts. Despite the growth of nationalist agitation, the army leadership expressed no fears for the loyalty of the troops. Nonetheless, the army became deeply involved in suppressing nationalist unrest, especially in Bohemia and Hungary. This process
culminated in 1905 with proposals for full-scale military intervention in Hungary.

In the last decade before the outbreak of the First World War the army leadership, aware of the growing of nationalist feeling and the growing social isolation of the officer corps, sought to develop its own plans for a renewal of the Monarchy. These various plans, which became increasingly pessimistic, involved proposed wars with Italy or Serbia or support for the plans of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Monarchy's heir-apparent, who intended to begin his reign with a military coup in Hungary that would enable him to reconstruct the Monarchy as a centralized state. By 1914 the army leadership, though not the soldiers in the ranks, had come to despair of the Monarchy's future.
INTRODUCTION

Between 1848 and 1914 the Habsburg state changed its boundaries, its name, and the designation of its armed forces. In 1848 the state was known as the Austrian Empire, and its armed forces were the kaiserlich-königlich (imperial-royal) Armee. In 1914 the subjects of a state known variously as Austria-Hungary, the Habsburg Monarchy, or the Dual Monarchy, marched off to war in three different formations—the imperial-and-royal (kaiserlich-und-königlich) joint army, the imperial-royal Landwehr of Austria, and the royal Honvéd of Hungary. The changes in designation, both for the state itself and for its army, reflected the attempts of the Monarchy’s rulers to deal with the effects of nationalism—particularly of Hungarian separatism—on a multinational state.

Both the supporters and opponents of the Habsburg state regarded the army as the special servant of the dynasty. It was the army that held the Monarchy together during the revolutions of 1848/49, putting down revolts in Italy, Prague, and Vienna and fighting a bitter civil war to keep Hungary from asserting its independence. The events of 1848 made both the friends and opponents of the dynasty acutely aware of the multinational composition of the army—and of the role of the army in supporting a political order which was explicitly opposed to the idea
of nationalism. Throughout the half-century between the coming of Hungarian home rule in 1867 and the outbreak of the First World War, political debates on the size and structure of the Habsburg army were defined by the army's presumed role in creating and maintaining a unified, non-national, dynastic state.

This study deals with the effects of the nationality problem on the Habsburg army between 1848 and 1914. It treats the Habsburg army both as an object in the political debates within the Monarchy and as an institution trying to preserve its own particular ethos in the face of political and social changes it only dimly understood.

The Habsburg armies held the Habsburg state together in 1848/49 and, despite the growth of nationalist sentiment within the Monarchy, fought throughout the First World War with both loyalty and tenacity. In an era which has seen the dissolution of both state and army in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the army of the Habsburg Monarchy provides yet another example of an institution attempting to reconcile its own belief in state service with the conflicting demands of nationalism and a supranational ideology.
The army of the Habsburgs survived the Napoleonic wars with its prestige intact and its role in European policy enhanced. The soldiers of the dynasty had fought the French danger for a generation, and though repeatedly savaged, had avoided the sudden catastrophe that had overtaken their Prussian rivals. The officers of the Austrian army held fast to the memory of Aspern and were quick to point out that in 264 engagements in the French wars, Austrian arms had carried the day in 168. The Habsburgs had fielded the largest of the allied armies in the campaigns of 1813-14, and an Austrian field marshal had been supreme commander at Leipzig. The army of the dynasty had outlasted the ambitions of General Bonaparte, and Prince Metternich and his emperor expected it to be the main support of legitimacy and stability in the postwar age. Twenty years after the end of the French wars, Austrian generals could still note with pride that, in the fight against liberalism and subversion, "even today the legitimate part of Europe can look with full confidence only towards the Austrian army." The army with which Prince Metternich proposed to defend legitimate interests in central Europe consisted
in 1847 of 294 battalions of infantry, 268 squadrons of cavalry, 56 dispersed batteries and 121 companies of artillery, and some units of technical troops and frontier guards. The army was organized by branch as

**Infantry**
- 58 line infantry regiments
- 20 grenadier battalions
- 18 Military Border regiments
- 1 Tirol Jäger regiments
- 12 Jäger battalions
- 6 garrison battalions

**Cavalry**
- 8 cuirassier regiments
- 6 dragoon regiments
- 7 chevaux-leger regiments
- 12 hussar regiments
- 4 uhlans regiments

**Artillery**
- 5 field artillery regiments
- Various garrison units

Metternich boasted that the peacetime strength of the army was 400,000 men—315,000 infantry, 49,000 cavalry, 24,000 artillery, and 9400 technical troops. In theory, another 400,000 could be raised by summoning the Hungarian Insurrectio and mobilizing the seventy battalions of the Austrian Landwehr. The Insurrectio, however, had last been called out in 1809, when the Magyar lords had ridden out to do their feudal duty in their ermine cloaks and egret plumes and were slaughtered
by the French at Raab. The affair had been a set-piece on the theme of chivalry against metallurgy, and the Insurrecto—as demands in the Hungarian Diets of 1832, 1836, and 1840 for its revival seem to indicate—had been allowed to fall dormant. The Landwehr—which had done fairly well in 1809—led a shadowy existence throughout the Vormärz. Gunther Rothenberg declared that the emperor had decided to abolish the militia in 1827 and that the Landwehr was "completely shelved" in 1831. However, Wrede's Geschichte der k.-u.-k. Wehrmacht as well as reports from contemporary British observers grant the Landwehr a continued existence.

In any case, the wartime strength of the Habsburg army in Metternich's day was far below the 800,000 men of the chancellor's calculations. The peacetime estimate of 400,000 was itself more than wishful thinking. Army expenditures were fixed at 40-44 million florins a year, and military expenditures fell as a percent of the budget from 50% to 20% between 1815 and 1848. The military coped with an inflationary era by keeping essential cadres on active duty and sending the rest of the men on leave. Perhaps a third of the army was permanently on leave, and in the latter half of the 1820s the figure may have climbed to one-half. Alan Sked calculated that in the Vormärz years the chancellor "could count on only
270,000-300,000 troops, and he preferred not to rely on them at all."

Sked's remark bears further consideration. Metternich's policies abroad were predicated on diplomacy rather than force, and the defense of the Rhenish frontier was by and large simply handed to the Prussians. Yet the Austrian army was regularly employed throughout the Vormärz. Austrian units did garrison duty in the federal fortresses of southern and western Germany, and in 1832 Metternich assembled a brigade for a proposed intervention against radical elements in the principedoms of the southwest. The army intervened in Naples and Piedmont in 1820/21, in central Italy in 1831, and in Parma and Modena in 1847. The Grenzer units on the Military Border fought regimental-sized campaigns against brigands, Bosnian rebels, and Turkish irregulars in 1819, 1831, 1834, and 1845/46. Metternich's diplomacy, the saying went, was all done with mirrors. The same was true of his military policy. Neither Metternich, the Archduke Charles, still the Monarchy's most prestigious soldier, nor Count Kolowrat, Metternich's rival and architect of the Monarchy's financial policies, considered the army ready for foreign war. It was the state of the army that kept the Austrian government from going to war over the Eastern crisis of 1829 or against
France in 1840, despite favourable diplomatic conditions. The Monarchy was prepared to intervene in Italy in defense of "order" throughout the Vormärz, since Austrian policy held that the road from Paris to Vienna ran through Milan, but the role of the army there, as in the Monarchy as a whole, was largely one of security. Critics of Feldmarschall Count Radetzky, the commander of Austrian forces in Lombardy-Venetia, were unimpressed with the training given the Austrian armies in Italy, and Radetzky's famed field maneuvers may have been more shadow than substance, exercises in propaganda designed to convince the population of Lombardy that, whatever the temptations of nationalism and French doctrines, the double-headed eagle still flew in Milan.

The armies of the dynasty were intended to support stability and legitimacy in Europe and within the Monarchy itself. The image of an army of 800,000 led by the heirs of Schwarzenberg and Archduke Charles served that role abroad, while at home the army fulfilled its mission by suppressing brigandage on the Turkish frontiers, protecting Austrian rule in Lombardy and Venetia, and putting down political disturbances. In 1845 Illyrian rioters were put down by force in Agram, and the next year the army and a loyal peasantry crushed a rising of Galician nobles and occupied the free city-
state of Cracow. Strikes that took on a political color could be dealt with by the military, and Prince Alfred Windisch-Graetz first made his name in Prague by putting down a strike of textile and handicraft workers in 1844. No provincial gendarmerie existed outside Lombardy-Venetia until 1849, and the army provided police service in the Austrian countryside. The urban criminal police forces of the Monarchy were pitifully small, and in major cities grenadier and pioneer troops from local garrisons did duty as supplemental police. An army designed to fight abroad or on the frontiers generates much of its own cohesion; the urge to defend one's home, the glories of empire and conquest, and the sense of being with one's own kind in an alien land are all powerful bonds. An army whose role is largely internal must possess far stronger inner strength, and that point was not missed in Vienna. After 1848 the dynasty was well aware that only its generals had saved the Monarchy, and in the continuing Hungarian crises at the end of the century Archduke Albrecht was quick to point out that only the army linked the lands of the Monarchy together; if the army's spirit failed, then the dynasty was lost and Austria would exist no more.

The Austrian army of the Vormärz, Rudolf Kiszling maintained, was "an absolutely reliable instrument of
power in the hand of the monarch." Yet in 1848/49 the army experienced a mutiny unequalled in its history. Thousands of Italian regulars deserted the colors, nearly the whole of the Austrian fleet offered its services to Daniele Manin's reborn Venetian Republic, and thousands of Hungarian regulars took up arms against their sovereign. The events of 1848/49 within the army are made even more difficult to understand by the lack of any official inquiry into their causes. The question remained: how reliable was the army of the dynasty, and what measures were taken to ensure its loyalty?

Francis I is supposed to have observed of his empire that

"My peoples are strange to one another and that is all right. They do not get the same sickness at the same time. In France if the fever comes you are caught by it at the same time. I send the Hungarians into Italy, the Italians into Hungary. Every people watches its neighbor. The one does not understand the other, and one hates the other...From their antipathy will be born order and from the mutual hatred general peace..."

The peoples of the Monarchy were strange to one another, and the soldiers of its army hardly less so. Perhaps two-thirds of the officers were German, a figure which one contemporary observer put at eleven in twelve for some Slav regiments, and the old Habsburg tradition of accepting the swords of foreign officers lingered on:
Englishmen, Danes, French, Russians, and Swiss were to be found serving the dynasty.\textsuperscript{18} Englishmen (including Richard Guyon, who became one of Kossuth's generals in 1848) fought as hussar officers on both sides in the Hungarian war, exiled Legitimist Frenchmen commanded Austrian troops in Italy, a Cavanagh of Ballyane fell leading Hungarian infantry at Vincenza, and in a celebrated remark Heinrich Hentzi, the imperial commander at Budapest in May 1849, explained to his besiegers that, though born in Debrecen, he was no Hungarian but a Swiss loyal only to the emperor. Officers in 1848 were in any case under no obligation to learn their soldiers' languages and, as in Wellington's army, they could not really be expected to talk to the men. Ethnic and linguistic purity were rare in any province and especially so in Bohemia and Hungary. There were, Istvan Deak points out, Hungarian regiments where hardly anyone spoke Hungarian, and while a regiment from Transylvanian Siebenburgen might be German enough to understand a Salzburg unit, it would remain wholly alien to a Szekler unit raised a few days' ride away.\textsuperscript{19}

The dynasty's armies had always been multinational, and as early as 1715 Prince Eugene had wished to exclude Poles, French, Italians, Hungarians, and Croats from line regiments. A Hofkriegsrat ordinance of 1722 warned
against those nationalities who were "great slackers and braggarts" and who would "debauch and lead astray" their German comrades. Yet the army had never been a merely German institution, and in the Vormärz the provinces of the Monarchy provided regiments as follows (exclusive of the Military Border):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Cavalry</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohemia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombardy-Venetia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moravia-Silesia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transylvania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the last year before the revolution the strength of the peacetime army (including Jäger and Grenzer units but excluding technical branches) was rated at 339,574 officers and other ranks. This number could be broken down by province of origin as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria (Upper, Lower, Inner)</td>
<td>55,546</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohemia</td>
<td>47,544</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>55,540</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>76,179</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombardy-Venetia</td>
<td>30,100</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These numbers must be treated with some caution, since the Hungarian figures would include large numbers of non-Magyars, and large numbers of Germans would be included in the figures for Bohemia and Moravia. Yet the army can be seen with fair accuracy as being very likely half Slav and only about a sixth German. Hungary, where regular line regiments had been raised only since Theresian times, provided the single largest "national" contingent.

The loyalty of multinational armies and imperial populations has been a problem since antiquity. Athens used citizen-soldiers and sailors to police its Aegean empire but kept order in Athens itself with Thracian slave-soldiers; Rome kept its native auxiliaries away from their recruiting areas. The heterogeneity of the Habsburg army was obvious, and the problem of nationalism did not escape the dynasty and the Hofkriegsrat, the Monarchy's central military administrative council. The imperial authorities, the American consul in Hungary reported, devoted "millions of money and the highest orders of intellect" so that the "enormous mass of machinery which pervaded the empire, and held in
subjection the heterogeneous and discordant nations of which it was composed" would be an effective internal force. Key to this was a military system of divide-and-rule. The standard English-language work on the Habsburg army, Rothenberg's *The Army of Francis Joseph*, points out that at the end of 1847, six of fifteen Hungarian infantry regiments were stationed in Italy, four more were in the Austrian crownlands, and only five remained inside Hungary. Four of the eight Italian infantry regiments were stationed outside Italy, while six regiments from the Austrian crownlands had been sent to Lombardy-Venetia and four more to Hungary. Thirteen of twenty-five non-Hungarian cavalry regiments were garrisoned in Hungary, and six of the twelve regiments of Hungarian hussars had been sent outside Hungary. Rothenberg insists that these figures show that

To counteract nationalist influences, Vienna adopted a policy of distributing troops outside their ethnic areas, and in addition troops were transferred frequently to avoid their becoming too friendly with the local inhabitants.

Some current scholarship agrees with this view. Alan Sked has translated from the Magyar parts of an article on "The Austrian Military Organization in Hungary and the Troops Stationed in Our Country in April 1848" by Aladar
Urban of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Urban explains that

The Hungarian cavalry and infantry regiments...were dislocated, naturally mainly in foreign provinces, far from their homeland. Thus at the beginning of 1848 out of 45 battalions of the 15 Hungarian and Transylvanian infantry regiments, only 24 were garrisoned inside the country; of the five Grenadier battalions...only two were stationed at home. The position of the Hussar regiments was similar; of the 12 regiments, only 4 were in Hungary and the annexed lands or were in Transylvanian territory. On the other hand, 16 battalions of seven foreign infantry regiments, besides 12 cavalry regiments, were stationed in Hungary and Croatia and Transylvania. That is, nearly half of the foreign cavalry regiments were stationed in our homeland and the number of foreign infantry was comparatively large.2 4

The image of a deliberate policy of divide-and-rule is firmly established in Habsburg historiography. The classic view is exemplified by the American diplomat W. H. Stiles, who in explaining the events of 1848/49 to Americans, wrote that

A body of troops, in ordinary times, is quartered in every capital and every town in the empire, the number in each being regulated by the size and character of the population. Infinite care, too, is taken in the disposition of these troops, which is always made with reference to the different nationalities. Agreeably to the "divide and conquer" principles of Metternich, no troops were permitted to remain at home, or in those provinces where they were enlisted and belonged, but invariably transferred to another and more distant
nation, where they could not speak the language, had no sympathy with the people, and where they were ready, at any moment, to shoot them down with as little compunction as they would a foreign enemy whom they had never before seen. Bohemians, for instance, were quartered upon the Hungarians; Hungarians upon the Austrians; Austrians upon the Poles; Poles upon the Italians; and Italians upon the Croatians, &c.3

Sixty years after the events of 1848 it was firmly believed by Franz Ferdinand and his circle that prior to the 1880s an extra-territorial garrison system had been applied to dampen national enthusiasms in the army and such a system should be immediately re-established.3 Yet official references to any such system are remarkably absent. Certainly there was concern about nationalism. Count Frimont, commander of Austrian forces in Italy in the 1820s, had argued against using Lombard or Venetian units to suppress revolutions in the Italian states and refused to allow Italian officers to serve in the Austrian military mission sent to rebuild the army of the duchy of Parma in 1834.7 Radetzky himself wrote in 1834 that Italy and Poland would never be properly loyal "military countries," and there had been arrests of a handful of disaffected junior officers in Galician regiments in 1840.9 Yet there was no official policy of relocating regiments away from their homelands. Istvan Deak claimed that army policy was to send the two
line battalions of each regiment to distant areas inhabited by different nationalities while leaving the third battalion and the recruiting and training machinery of the regiment in its home district. But he went on to admit that such a system was "never consistently pursued." Any presumed policy of divide-et-impera must be examined in light of the histories of the individual regiments, Sked's, *Survival*, analysis of Radetzky's order of battle, and the state of imperial finances.

The army was the property of the emperor, the supreme warlord. Its soldiers were bound by their oath to fight "wherever the imperial will of His Majesty may command, on land and water, by day and by night, in fights, battles, skirmishes and enterprises of any kind" and from the time of Montecuccoli and Eugene the Hofkriegsrat had attempted to run the army as an imperial institution and not as a collection of provincial militias. There was no standard method of training officers or levying recruits in the Vormärz and no standard term of service. Until the 1840s Cisleithanian recruits served for fourteen years, Italians for eight. In Hungary, where the county authorities used the army as a dumping ground for undesirables, service was for life. Only in 1845 was a standard eight-year term introduced.
There was concern that Cisleithanian provinces were bearing a disproportionately heavy burden—Radetzky pointed out that between a fourteen-year active term and a thirteen-year Landwehr commitment, a Cisleithanian recruit had a military liability up to age 45— and a continuing unhappiness with the quality and number of recruits provided by the Hungarian counties. Nonetheless, the regiments were, within the limits imposed by linguistic diversity, regarded as all of a kind. Regiments could not be built up from a common draft of recruits—Galicians brigaded with Lombards and Voralbergers—but all were soldiers of the emperor, and the Habsburg army appears to have taken seriously Article 1 of Archduke Charles's service regulations: nationality and religion were of no significance next to a soldier's oath of loyalty.

The army was a long-service institution, and a recruit whose life revolved around his regiment for eight or fourteen years would presumably be insulated from many of the political fevers of the civilian population. Yet the Habsburg army was hardly unique in setting long terms of service. Contemporary military thought still held that only long-service troops could be properly and economically trained. In any case, even long-service troops would be exposed to local agitation if left in one
garrison long enough, and the accepted image of Habsburg policy is that regiments were deliberately and frequently shuffled about:

Vienna adopted a policy of distributing troops outside their ethnic areas, and in addition troops were transferred frequently to avoid their becoming too friendly with the local inhabitants. One regiment...Infantry Regiment "Hoch-und-Deutschmeister" Nr. 4, was stationed in Milan in 1815, posted to St.-Pölten the next year, switched to Bergamo in 1820, to Naples in 1822, to Capua in 1830, to Görz in 1831, to Verona in 1833, to Kaisers-Ebersdorf in 1836, to Vienna in 1840, and finally to Tarnow and Lemberg in 1846.34

Rothenberg’s example is somewhat flawed. The Hoch-und-Deutschmeister was a Viennese regiment, and the memorial raised by the Viennese to "our Deutschmeister" on the regiment’s second centenary still stands in the little Deutschmeisterplatz before the Rossauer Kaserne. The list of regimental movements is impressive, yet in the thirty years Rotheberg considers, one might note that Deutschmeister spent four years at St.-Pölten, only a day’s march to the west of the capital, four years at suburban Kaisers-Ebersdorf, and six years in Vienna itself. It was presumably at Naples and Capua on active service, and was part of the forces sent to police Galicia in 1846. In other words, between 1815 and 1846 the regiment was in or near its home for fourteen years.
A look at Wrede's listings of regimental stations suggests that regiments, on the whole, moved every four to six years. Yet exceptions abound: the Hungarian 2. Infantry was at Pressburg from 1830 to 1848; the Bohemian 1. Cuirassiers at Brandeis from 1819 to 1848; the 37. Infantry (Grosswardein) at Lemberg throughout the Vormärz; the 4. Cuirassiers (Lower Austria) at Pressburg from 1817 to 1847 and the 8. Cuirassiers (Bohemia) at Podiebrad from 1836 to 1848. Two of the Italian regiments which remained loyal to Radetzky in 1848—the 38. (Brescia) and 45. (Verona) Infantry—spent 1830–48 in narrow orbits around their recruiting areas in northern Italy, rarely more than a few days' march from home. When the Richter Grenadiers were ordered to Hungary in October 1848, they had been in Vienna for more than fourteen years.

A purely tactical view favored exposing regiments to more than one locale and not allowing a unit to go to seed in one garrison, since as imperial property all regiments existed to defend the Monarchy as a whole. A garrison post requiring one battalion of infantry could be manned equally well by Galicians or Veronese. In March 1830 directives were issued for large-scale transfers designed to stir the army from its "peacetime slumber." Yet by the mid-1830s there were budgetary
pressures against moving regiments across the Monarchy. More regiments were garrisoned in their home districts, large numbers of men were simply sent home on unpaid leave, and, when regiments were moved, it was to posts in nearby areas. Italian units on the move were more likely to march to Croatia or the Dalmatian coast than Hungary or Bohemia. Between 1835 and 1837 the percentage of Italian infantry in Radetzky's forces rose from thirty to forty-five percent. Count Franz Hartig, the former governor of Lombardy protested to Vienna that prudence dictated that Italian soldiers be kept out of Lombardy-Venetia, but as the army's budget stagnated in the decade before 1848 the Hofkriegsrat could not afford to pay for constant relocations.

Regimental histories also suggest that the picture of a deliberate policy of divide-and-rule is suspect. The Berkeleys give Radetzky's order of battle in January 1848 as containing 70-75,000 men deployed in sixty-one battalions, thirty-six squadrons, and 108 batteries. They go on to note that "the greatest mistake made by Radetzky was to have left so many Italian regiments...in Italy." The Verona general command had no Italian gunners or troopers, but twenty-four battalions—about forty percent of the infantry and a third of the total force—were made up of Italians, a figure twice the size
of the twelve battalions of Austrians who made up the next largest ethnic unit. The remaining twenty-five battalions can be broken down as ten Croat, nine Hungarian, and six Bohemian-Moravian. Even if the Hungarian and Bohemian units contained large numbers of Germans, the infantry at Radetzky's disposal had a solid Italian core. These troops were exposed to considerable propaganda bombardment in Lombardy, but Alan Sked's search of Metternich's files turned up only a single case of Italian soldiers being successfully suborned by nationalist sects before 1848. In 1833 the governor of Lombardy reported to Metternich that, while his Italian troops were subject to constant attempts by nationalists to subvert their loyalty "as far as the military is concerned, the conduct of the Lombard troops up till now can in no way be reproached. With regard to both discipline and loyalty to their oaths, no blame whatsoever can be attached to them." Radetzky was more than satisfied with the morale of his Italians into March 1848, and it is worth noting that three Italian regiments remained loyal throughout 1848/49, and the 38. Infantry (Brescia) distinguished itself against the Piedmontese and against rebels in Milan and the Veneto.

Rothenberg maintains that at the end of 1847 ten of the fifteen Hungarian infantry regiments were stationed
outside Hungary. His figures, which apparently derive from Rudolf Kiszling’s work, are not as reliable as Aladar Urban’s, which are drawn from the Hungarian archives. However, Urban’s contention that at the beginning of 1848 twenty-four of forty-five Hungarian battalions were at home does not bear out his point that the Hungarian regiments were largely relegated to garrisons "far from their homeland." If indeed sixteen non-Hungarian battalions were stationed in Hungary, Transylvania, and Croatia, Urban does not indicate how many were in Croatia, where in view of the large-scale fighting that broke out on the Military Border in 1845/46, one might see them as reinforcements for the Grenzer and not (as Urban does) as foreign occupation troops. Sked also notes that in Urban’s view a non-Hungarian unit at, say, Agram would count as a "foreign" unit in Hungary; a Hungarian regiment sent to Croatia would count as being away from "our homeland."

In April 1848 Count Latour, the new Austrian war minister, reported that imperial troop strength in Hungary was twenty-four battalions, sixty-two squadrons, and eleven companies of artillery. The figure cannot be taken as definitive. Troop levels in Hungary were extremely fluid throughout the spring of 1848. Hungarian units returned from other parts of the Monarchy, some
Cisleithanian units were, at the behest of the Hungarian war ministry, sent out of Hungary, and still other Hungarian units were sent from Hungary to reinforce garrisons in Italy or the Border. Nonetheless, Latour’s report indicates that while surprisingly little of the cavalry (eight of sixty-two squadrons) was Hungarian, sixteen battalions were from Hungarian regiments. While much of the artillery was Bohemian (Bohemia and Moravia supplied three of the army’s five artillery regiments), two-thirds of the infantry garrisoned in Hungary was, if not solidly Magyar, at least from regiments raised in the Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. The imperial garrison in Hungary was officially rated at 32,000 men; some 14,000 of them (forty-three percent) were Hungarian. Latour’s report makes only an eighth of the cavalry Hungarian—as compared to a third (six of nineteen regiments) for Rothenberg and Kiszling and a quarter (four of sixteen regiments) for Urban. Nonetheless, the number of Hungarian soldiers in Hungary in early 1848—two-thirds of the infantry, forty-three percent of the total, including the garrisons of the major fortresses of Komorn and Peterwardein—is too large to fit easily into a policy of divide-and-rule.

Even if no deliberate policy of moving regiments outside their national areas can be demonstrated, other
policies could be used to guard against any potential disloyalty. The post-Mutiny Indian Army restricted access to combat branches to those northern "martial races" who had been loyal in 1857. The Soviet army tried to confine its Central Asian conscripts to labor and service units. Unsupported infantry are a manageable threat, and one might cripple any chance of a rising by denying suspect nationalities access to heavy weapons. Stiles certainly felt that the Austrian army employed such devices:

Another most admirable arrangement for... strengthening the empire at the expense of the provinces, consisted in the arrangement of the army, and by which each nation of the empire was instructed in only a single arm. The Bohemians, for example, were mostly infantry; the Hungarians, cavalry; the Austrians, artillery; the Tyrolese, riflemen; the Poles, lancers. The whole, therefore, when united under imperial command, constituted a powerful and efficient force; but divided, no province, in case of revolt, was possessed of a complete and formidable army."

And in point of fact neither Hungary nor Galicia provided any artillery. The reason, though, seems less one of deliberation than tradition. Artillery was by tradition a bourgeois branch of service, and the skills required of an artillery officer were not really compatible with being a gentleman—a situation not unknown in the English
and Prussian armies. Artillery was largely a Bohemian—Bohemian German but more often Czech—arm. Was there ever, Archduke Albrecht would ask, a better or more cold-blooded gunner than a Czech? Artillery was a field for the urban bourgeoisie and skilled workers, and those classes were notably absent in East Galicia or trans-Danubian Hungary. There was no attempt to deny cannon to the Italians; Venetians with a taste for military trigonometry could become naval gunners. Other Italian officers dominated the army’s technical branches—fortification, engineering, cartography. The same sort of logic applied to the cavalry as well. Lombardy provided only a single regiment of chevaux-leger (one which would remain conspicuously loyal in 1848/49), but northern Italy, like Transylvania and the Tirol, was not horse country. Steppe lands—Galicia and Hungary—were cavalry country by tradition, and those two provinces provided twenty regiments of cavalry between them.

The simplest means of controlling suspect populations is to station overwhelming force at the source of disaffection. English liberals like the Berkeleys or Priscilla Robertson certainly believed that the Austrian army was deployed to overawe the population; Cecil Woodham-Smith once cast a glance at 1820s Austria, "ruled by an army, where even to speak of liberty was a
crime."49 Urban suggests that, since in February 1848 the imperial garrison in Hungary—twelve grenadier companies, 130 companies of line infantry, seventy-two squadrons of cavalry, eleven companies of artillery, plus technical and fortress units—amounted to about one-tenth of total imperial strength, Hungary was under military occupation.50 The same image—which perhaps owes more to Browning's poetry than to political observers—is applied to Lombardy and Venetia. The Hofkriegsrat, well aware of Napoleon's maxim that the road from Paris to Vienna ran through Milan—and of revolutionary currents inside Italy—kept the Verona general command on a wartime footing. Yet the garrison levels in such a sensitive area remained low. In 1833 Radetzky's army was made up of 75,000 men, but by early 1846 the marshal disposed of only 49,000—15,000 of whom were fortress garrisons in the Quadrilateral. In point of fact, as Sked noted, there seemed to be no relation in the Vormärz between garrison strengths and the presumed political reliability of the various provinces. Sked's chart of 1846 garrison levels shows little evidence of quartering troops on the disaffected:51
Table 1.1. Civil and Populations, Habsburg Monarchy 1846

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Civil Population</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Ratio Civil/Military</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Austria</td>
<td>1,375,400</td>
<td>34,226</td>
<td>40.19</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper Austria</td>
<td>844,914</td>
<td>12,652</td>
<td>66.78</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steiermark</td>
<td>966,863</td>
<td>18,466</td>
<td>54.72</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kärnten-Krain</td>
<td>757,355</td>
<td>2,146</td>
<td>352.93</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Küstenland</td>
<td>477,702</td>
<td>3,487</td>
<td>137.00</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tirol</td>
<td>830,948</td>
<td>8,807</td>
<td>94.36</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bohemia</td>
<td>4,112,085</td>
<td>62,083</td>
<td>66.24</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moravia-Silesia</td>
<td>2,162,086</td>
<td>4,552</td>
<td>474.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>4,718,991</td>
<td>78,252</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dalmatia</td>
<td>384,572</td>
<td>9,456</td>
<td>40.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lombardy</td>
<td>2,516,420</td>
<td>31,556</td>
<td>79.74</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venetia</td>
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<td>30,945</td>
<td>69.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>12,039,400</td>
<td>56,802</td>
<td>211.96</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transylvania</td>
<td>2,069,600</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>220.17</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>1,147,283</td>
<td>56,322</td>
<td>20.37</td>
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</tbody>
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Some 34,000 soldiers were stationed in Lower Austria, but the capital itself was lightly garrisoned. When revolution broke out in March 1848, the young Archduke Albrecht, commanding the city garrison, had only 14,000 men of all branches to control a city of more than 400,000. Albrecht was able to restore order in the Inner City after a day of street fighting, but his men were unable to control the suburbs. The authorities in Vienna, like their counterparts throughout Europe, were paralyzed by the sudden onset of the revolution that Metternich had long predicted, and their lack of resolution contributed much to the springtime triumph of the revolutionaries. As R. J. Rath's account of the
revolution in Vienna makes clear, the authorities had
given little or no thought to planning for the
maintenance of order. The March Days in Pressburg and
Budapest met no military opposition; neither the court
nor its palatine in Hungary suggested resorting to arms
to block the designs of Kossuth and Batthyany. The
Venetian command abandoned the city after a Grenzer
battalion, sent in only after all authority had
collapsed, had failed to reclaim the Arsenal from armed
workers and Manin's National Guard. Radetzky's army had
been brought back to strength by the beginning of 1848,
but the Milan garrison was only 10,000 strong and the
available field forces had been distributed in small
units all across the countryside on the orders of
Archduke Rainer, viceroy of Lombardy-Venetia. Despite
years of telling one another that the day of revolution
was at hand, the imperial authorities had never
considered the problems of dealing with a widespread
revolt.

During the crisis of 1848-49 the imperial army and
its generals held the empire together against Piedmontese
invaders, Hungarian rebels, and domestic revolutionaries.
"Grapeshot and bayonet," wrote Rothenberg, "preserved the
Habsburg dynasty and its empire." Yet in the course
of 1848 thousands of Italian soldiers deserted the
colors, more thousands of Hungarian regulars joined Kossuth's rebel armies, and imperial regulars under the command of the new Hungarian war ministry fought against Croat troops who claimed to be defending the imperial regime which had proclaimed them outlaws. The irony is of course that the initial rebel successes in Italy and the ability of the Hungarians to secede depended on the presence of large numbers of native troops. There had been no system of assuring national reliability employed before March 1848; the defections of the spring and fall would not be forgotten after the restoration of order.

About a third of Radetzky's men were Italian-born, and while the marshal had consistently regarded political suspicion of his men as malicious and ignorant civilian attacks on military honor, he had admitted in a report of December 1847 to the Hofkriegsrat that one could not expect of the Italian troops "more than is . . . reasonable . . . There can be no doubt that these troops will be subject to all kinds of influences and will be enticed to desert; if the luck of war goes against us in the first battle, then I shall not answer for their loyalty; such an experience would not even be surprising; it is as old as history itself."5

The Austrian army in Lombardy-Venetia had been highly regarded by the populace in the first half of the
Vormärz; they had lived in the glow of being the conquerors of the French. But the Italian regiments had been subject to popular abuse and enticements to disloyalty throughout the 1830s and 1840s; their loyalty was keyed to their membership in a solid and successful organization. The sudden onset of revolt and the collapse of Austrian authority left the Italian troops scrambling out of the wreckage. By the last week of March 1848 reports of large-scale desertions were being sent to Vienna from the Verona command. Venetia was struck first—a battalion of the 13. Infantry and the Angelmayer battalion of grenadiers had deserted in Venice itself, joined by a battalion of the 16. at Udine and four companies of the 8. Feldjäger at Padua. The losses in Venice—where 2460 of a city garrison of 8370 were Italian—included much of the imperial fleet as well. Three corvettes, two steamers, and three frigates escaped to Trieste with depleted crews, but the bulk of the fleet—including six brigantines, three corvettes, and perhaps 100 patrol and supply ships—and the whole of the naval infantry went over to the rebels. The fleet had been inherited wholesale from the moribund Venetian Republic at the end of the French wars, and its traditions and outlook were wholly Venetian. But the desertions ashore were consequent upon a total failure of
will on the part of the army commanders in the city, who had given in to the demands of Manin and his supporters before any major violence had broken out. The pattern was much the same in Lombardy; the initial successes of the revolutionaries in mid-March gave rise to an air of panic and despair on the part of the authorities. On 5 April Radetzky reported that he had lost seventeen battalions, two squadrons, and one battery—units that had deserted, been evacuated from Venice to Trieste, or been cut off in the countryside. Two weeks later he reported that his losses were little more than a thousand dead and wounded, but that 10,860 had deserted and 13,000 had been cut off.60

The Berkeleys claimed that a quarter of all Austrian casualties were "willful missing"—Italians who had deserted rather than fight the rebels of Piedmontese—and that four-fifths of Radetzky’s Italian troops deserted or went over to the enemy.61 The latter figure would mean that more than 16,000 Italian soldiers deserted. Lawrence Sondhaus put the number of deserters at about 15,000 but argued that, despite the Berkeleys’ claims, between one-half and two-thirds of all troops raised in Lombardy and Venetia remained loyal and that very few Lombard troops ever took up arms against their old service.62 The dispersal of small units across the
countryside prior to the outbreak of the revolts guaranteed a high number of men who would be quite simply missing. The experience of being one of a dozen or two soldiers stationed in the midst of an armed and hostile countryside, abused by the population and clergy, out of touch with any higher authority would be more than a little unnerving. And communications in Lombardy-Venetia still moved at the same speed—a man on horseback—as in Roman times. The report of 5 April indicates the fragmented state of the army: a battalion of Warasdiner Kreuzer Grenzers was "supposed to be fighting its way to the Tirol from Como;" the whereabouts of three companies of the 43. Infantry, the garrisons of Lecco, Marbegno, and Sondrio were completely unknown; the 2. battalion of the Banat Grenzers was presumably somewhere behind the Isonzo. How many of those listed as "missing," "cut off," or "deserted" were ultimately moved from one category to the other remains unclear, although large numbers of deserters returned to the colors after the initial shocks of March. Once his forces had consolidated their position in the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, Radetzky issued a series of amnesty decrees that attracted men back into service "by the thousands."
Disaffection in the imperial ranks came suddenly, and events seem to have borne out Radetzky's belief that any initial reverse would shake the loyalty of troops who had resisted nationalist blandishments in peacetime. Troops faced with revolt in March 1848 found themselves—as in Milan, where events paralleled those in Vienna—facing in inadequate numbers a large and well-armed population, or—as in Venice—commanded by officers who had given themselves over to panic. Small local detachments were abandoned in a hostile countryside, subject to the counsel of nationalists and their own fears. The nature of recruiting took its own toll. Sked's account of the 26. Archduke Ferdinand d'Este (Udine) Infantry makes it clear that the Este, securing communications between Lombardy and the Tirol, had long been used as a dumping ground for undesireables and petty criminals. The imperial commander in the Tirol complained on the eve of the revolts that the 26. had twenty to twenty-five convicts dumped in each of its twelve companies, and that the Este had already established a reputation for rioting and brawling in Innsbruck. By April the Este had become unmanageable. The 400 Hungarian troops in the area had no supplies, and, with only two rounds available per man, could not be relied upon to quell any serious unrest in the Este. The
26. was subject to overt bribery in both cash and wine by local revolutionaries, and it was isolated by the collapse of political authority. Nearly 400 men of a suspect and ill-regarded regiment had been sent with only two officers into a zone filled with unrest and stripped of local officials. There are no exact figures for the return of deserters after Radetzky had begun to reassert imperial authority, but desertion itself seems to have ceased by the early summer of 1848. The Italian troops that remained loyal during the retreat to the Quadrilateral stayed loyal afterwards. Radetzky himself appears to have understood the nature of much of what had happened to his Italians. His own policies toward deserters— at least for private soldiers— were quite mild, and in February 1849 the marshal reported that "the greater part" of the deserters had returned to their regiments.

The ultimate cohesion of Radetzky's army is borne out by events that did not happen. In early 1848 Radetzky's armies contained ten battalions of Grenzers along with eight line battalions from Hungarian regiments, a Hungarian grenadier battalion, and sixteen squadrons of hussars—10,000 South Slavs and 10-12,000 Hungarians. By mid-June Magyars and Serbs were slaughtering one another in the Voivodina; in early
September a Croat army invaded Hungary proper. As early as May the Vienna authorities had reported that Grenzer units on their way to Italy were deeply worried about leaving their homes and families to the mercies of the Magyars. The Hungarian press was solidly in favor of Italian independence, and its editorials called for the withdrawal of all Hungarian units serving in Italy. The imperial authorities were able to exercise some control over communications with Lombardy-Venetia, but the outbreak of war in Hungary was no secret, and the treatment dealt Magyars and South Slavs by one another was no secret either. Yet while the numbers of Hungarians and Grenzers on service in Italy rose to about 30,000 each, there were no internecine outbreaks. Neither were there any significant desertions. The Italian press assumed that all Hungarians in Italy were fighting only under the knout and were straining at the leash to desert in support of Italian ambitions, but even after revolutionary Hungary proclaimed its intent to seek a Piedmontese alliance, "hardly a Hungarian soldier from the 30,000 stationed [in Italy] defected." Radetzky strictly enforced a policy of even-handed treatment of his troops, and the circumstances of war against a foreign enemy worked to promote cohesion in the ranks, as did reports of Italian atrocities at Brescia. Despite
the early desertion of half the Italians, the imperial armies in Italy, made up in large part of men whose families were killing one another along the Drave, held together on a core of corporate loyalty.

The cohesion of the army was unshaken throughout most of the empire. Only in a single instance— the mutiny of the Richter Grenadiers on the Taborbrücke in October 1848— did the rank-and-file of imperial units fire on one another without orders from their officers. Even in the case of the Richters, it might be noted that the Bezirkschef urging the grenadiers to refuse to leave Vienna was a former captain in the unit. In Prague, where the military under Windisch-Graetz applied a policy of calculated provocation, troops from the Bohemian Infantry (Theresienstadt) and the 8. Curassiers (Prague) fought with some relish against Czech students and workers. Prague has often been taken as the first great victory of the counterrevolution: imperial troops commanded by resolute officers stayed true to their oaths and fought energetically against the designs of civilian rebels. A quiescent Bohemia then supplied the imperial armies with a steady stream of loyal recruits throughout the Italian and Hungarian wars. In March-April 1848 more than 100,000 reservists and soldiers on extended leave were recalled to their regiments without incident.
Recruiting continued—even across the Leitha—without serious disruption, and the Hungarian regiments continued both recruiting (which served both Vienna and Budapest) and, more to the point, providing reinforcements for Italy into the summer.\textsuperscript{70}

The proclamation of constitutional government in Hungary had been made with imperial assent, and imperial troops in Hungary came under the administration of the Hungarian Ministry for War, a situation confirmed in May by royal decree. While Kossuth and Batthyany temporized on the question of recalling Hungarian troops from Italy, some Hungarian units were returned from Cisleithania. As of May 1848 the Hungarian ministry controlled twenty-five battalions of line infantry from Hungarian regiments, two battalions of grenadiers, and four complete hussar regiments; four more line battalions and four more hussar regiments were returned in the early days of summer.\textsuperscript{71}

Kossuth appealed in the summer for all other Hungarian units to return from Cisleithania, and some units of hussars responded. Units of the 8. and 12. Hussars under junior officers attempted to fight their way home from Galicia and Bohemia. Most of the deserters from the 12. were cut up or driven into Prussian internment by Bohemian cuirassiers, but a few hundred men from the two regiments did arrive in Hungary, where they faced the
wrath of Kossuth's War Minister, the hussar colonel Lazar Meszaros, who threatened to have them tried and hanged for desertion and insubordination.

The troops available to the Hungarian ministry in early summer formed no negligible force. However, some units of the twenty-nine available battalions were sent out to Italy, and the state of the regular army in the Vormärz Monarchy told against the Hungarians. György Klapka, the deputy war minister, claimed that all units, and especially the cavalry, were understrength. Hungarian forces in mid-summer were carried as twenty-one battalions of infantry, seventy squadrons of hussars, and two regiments of Szekler Grenzers—a regular force supplemented by ten fairly inchoate battalions of national guard (Honvéd) volunteers. At 15,000 foot and 7000 horse, the regular units were seriously undermanned. Regulars, on Meszaros's instance, were kept separate from the Honvéd. In later and more desperate times, regulars might be put in the same tactical formation as the militia, but even so radical a general as Arthur Görgey was still enough of an imperial-royal officer to disdain the Honvéd. Görgey acidly described his northern corps of 20,000 men as being "two-thirds useless volunteers" and, like Meszaros, put his faith in regulars. Troop returns for May 1849—the high
tide of Hungarian defiance—still carry nineteen regular battalions and ten regular hussar regiments as the core of the Hungarian armies, separate from and prized above 106 Honvéd battalions, four rifle battalions, and six regiments of Honvéd hussars.75

Throughout the Austrian half of the Monarchy there were units that remained loyal to their oaths in the face of revolutionary appeals. Czech troops fought loyally in Prague, and Czech recruits and reservists continued to report to their depots. In Italy there were Italian units that fought against Piedmont and against rebels in Lombardy and Venice. Two battalions of the 45. (Verona) Infantry and two of the 38. (Brescia) Infantry distinguished themselves against the Piedmontese. Units of the 38. held the fortress of Mantua for Radetzsky throughout the early weeks of revolt and war, and a battalion of the 45. took part in the siege of Venice. The first two battalions of the 44. (Milan) Infantry deserted in the spring of 1848, but the third battalion remained loyal and was singled out for special praise at the battles of Santa Lucia and Custozza.76 After 1849 some Hungarian exiles made great play of the fact that soldiers of two Italian regiments in Hungary, the 16. Zanini (Treviso) and the 23. Ceccopieri (Lodi) took service with Kossuth.77 Some units of the 16. at Essegg
attempted to remain neutral in the ethnic warfare that flared across Slavonia in the autumn of 1848, but Hungarian units secured the fortress until loyalist officers surrendered it to Baron Jellacic in February 1849. Yet four companies of the 16. took part in the defense of Temesvar. One battalion of the 23. was at both Temesvar and the siege of Komorn. Another battalion fought under Hentzi at Budapest and was taken prisoner in May 1849; the battalion commander and a party of officers and senior enlisted men were killed in a failed attempt to blow up the Chain Bridge over the Danube at Buda. The 7. Chevaux-leger, the only cavalry unit raised in Lombardy-Venetia, had been in Hungary almost continuously since 1815; it went over to Jellacic in the autumn of 1848 and fought with great ferocity throughout the campaigns of 1848-49. Hungarian units in Italy fought loyally, despite the efforts of the revolutionary government in Hungary to seek an Italian alliance. The 33. (Altsohl), 52. (Fünfkirchen) and 61. (Temesvar) Infantry and the 5. and 7. Hussars distinguished themselves in the field; much of the credit for the victories at Mortara and Novara went to two battalions of the 33. Gyulai (Arad) Infantry.

Many of Radetzky's Italian soldiers melted away in confusion in the spring of 1848. Men leaving Lombard
regiments sought to desert, not to defect. Only in Venice itself, where the third battalion of the 13. (Padua) Infantry and a grenadier battalion stationed in Venice since 1837 and made up of men from the 16. (Treviso) and 26. (Udine) Infantry joined sailors and naval infantry in manning the walls, did they fight against the imperial standards. Hungarian units in Italy remained loyal. The Hungarian units in Hungary joined Kossuth's forces en masse.

There were a few conspicuous foreign names among the Hungarian commanders—the Pole Józef Bem, the Hessian Count Karl Leiningen, the English hussar officer Richard Guyon—and into the autumn of 1848 some non-Hungarian units stationed in Hungary continued to take orders from the Hungarian government. The first encounter between Jellacic and the Hungarians at Pakozd was decided by batteries of the 5. (Prague) Artillery, firing against units of the same regiment serving in the Croat ranks. In the course of the autumn, though, the Czech gunners returned to imperial service, and their places were filled by miners hastily recruited in Upper Hungary. The armies of Kossuth were almost wholly Magyar and Szekler. The military forces of the Hungarian revolution—a core of regular infantry and hussars and a Honvéd force that
eventually reached 140 battalions and eighteen regiments of hussars--were a "national" army.

The 15,000 regular infantry that made up the spine of the Hungarian armies in the late summer of 1848 and which bore the brunt of the fighting against Jellacic stayed loyal to Kossuth and Görgey throughout the war, and the local authorities in the counties of Hungary continued to forward conscripts to the training depots of the regular Hungarian regiments. Imperial courts-martial did not attempt to delve into the causes of their defection, and the motives of many officers and enlisted men alike can only be guessed at. A sense of Magyar nationalism certainly existed, although for the rank-and-file the meaning of nationalism is likely to have reduced itself to a reaction against attacks on Magyardom and Magyar dominance in Hungary by Serbs, Croats, and Romanians in the summer’s fighting in the south and east. More important, in all likelihood, was the habit of discipline. Conscripts continued to arrive at the drill square or the riding school, orders continued to be passed on from officers and non-commissioned officers to ordinary soldiers, and orders continued to be obeyed. Certainly this was the view of the imperial authorities: a decree of 20 August 1849 granted amnesty to all private soldiers and non-commissioned officers of regular
battalions or cavalry squadrons in the rebel armies, provided that they had been born in the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. At Peterwardein and in the Szekler Grenzer battalions the enlisted men had thrown out their loyalist officers to fight for Kossuth's commissioners, but in general the command structure remained intact. The officers, especially the junior officers of a regiment provided leadership for loyalty or rebellion.

Perhaps 200,000 Hungarians—50,000 regulars of all branches, including about 1500 officers—saw service in the rebel armies in 1848/49. Many of the 50,000 were "blissfully ignorant of their new status as rebels: in the first months of the war, and many officers continued to believe that in taking orders from the Hungarian government— from Batthyany and Meszaros as royal ministers—they were bring true to their oaths." To march out as a regular against the Serbs or Jellacic in the summer of 1848 was to obey the orders of regular officers responsible to a legally-constituted war ministry sanctioned in turn by the king-emperor. The commander of the 2. Schwarzenberg Uhlans at Alt-Arad found himself fighting on royal orders against Serbian volunteers raised on "imperial" authority by the Austrian consul in Belgrade, who was busy earning his general's rank by persuading Serb Grenzers to fight Hungarian
regulars. Baron Blomberg of the Schwarzenberg Uhlans pleaded desperately with Vienna for either clarification or recall.\footnote{65} Latour's war ministry in Vienna alternated between ordering imperial generals in Hungary to obey Meszaros's War Ministry in Budapest and telling them to follow their own consciences—"an inhuman task," Deak commented, "for men who had been taught never to think independently."\footnote{86}

The Swabian and Romanian burghers of Weisskirchen in southern Hungary petitioned the court to explain the new state of affairs: "What in one place is good and legal, in another place appears as a betrayal of the good cause, and no matter what one does, one is bound to violate Your Majesty's laws in the very act of obeying them."\footnote{87} The officers of imperial regiments were no less caught among interpretations of their oaths. Meszaros at the Hungarian war ministry continued to style himself a royal minister and annotate promotions and transfers with "pending the gracious approval of His Majesty."\footnote{88} Imperial officers fighting in the Voivodina knew themselves to be acting under legal and proper orders; it was only in the autumn of 1848 that the lines of rebellion and loyalty began to harden. An imperial rescript of 3 October 1848 defined disloyalty as obedience to the Hungarian authorities after that date.
That date was too late for many officers who wished to return to imperial service. Feldmarschalleutnant Janos Moga, who had fought Jellacic's army at Pakozd, resigned from Hungarian service on 1 November 1848 and departed for the imperial camp; a court-martial sentenced him to five years' fortress detention. Feldmarschalleutnant Baron Janos Hrabovszky, one of the Monarchy's most decorated and distinguished officers, spent too long fighting the Serbs. He left Hungary only at the end of 1848; his sentence was ten years in a fortress dungeon. The change of rulers in December 1848 blurred lines of loyalty for others. Many Hungarian officers consoled themselves with the thought that they were fighting for the good Ferdinand and his constitution against the "usurper" Franz Josef, creature of the court camarilla. Many officers sought service on the Italian front, where no questions of honor applied; not a few rebel officers told their judges they would have been utterly loyal if only they could have gone to Lombardy to serve their monarch. Others followed Görgey out of desperation; at least the chill punctilio of the subaltern-turned-field marshal gave off the impression of military rectitude divorced from the grey fog of politics.
The uniforms of regulars on both sides remained the same, and trumpet-signals and German commands were not changed until late in the affair. Only when Windisch-Graetz's men put white ribbons on their shakos—the standard sign for "enemy" troops on maneuvers—did the number of tragic and comic mistakes fall off. Meszaros fought long and hard against Kossuth's plans to magyarize the Hungarian armies, and Hungarian forces were commanded in German throughout the early days of the war. The commanders on both sides treasured the common bond of their uniforms and hesitated to shatter the unity of the army. "I shudder," wrote Jellacic in September 1848, "at the thought of training my cannon on hussars. If this happens, a chasm will open, perhaps forever, in the ranks of the army." Count Adam Teleki, commanding the Hungarian regulars blocking Jellacic's path to Budapest, ordered his men to stand neutral and attempt negotiations; Teleki's predecessor Ottinger had decided to treat the whole affair as a sort of maneuver and ordered a quiet withdrawal while forbidding his men to use their weapons. On 28 December 1848, Ottinger, now a major general commanding cavalry for Windisch-Graetz, encountered the 2. battalion of the 34. (Kaschau) Infantry at Babolna near Raab. Ottinger, with the Wallmoden Curassiers and the Civilart Uhlans, stood off
from the 2/34, hesitant to engage old comrades of the observation corps deployed against the Croats in August. Only when the infantry fired upon his horsemen did Ottinger sound the charge, and 300-400 of the 2/34 fell to the lances and swords of the cavalry.9

The Hungarian rebel armies enlisted 200,000 men in the course of the war; perhaps 10,000 of that number were officers, 1500 of those professionals. Under the terms of the amnesty decree of 20 August 1849 junior Honvéd officers were subject to service in the ranks as private soldiers, but few ex-lieutenants and captains had to endure more than brief periods of service in the ranks. The imperial armies had grown to 648,000 men by October 1849, and the strains on budget and staff were heavy. The military did not wish to accommodate an influx of disaffected ex-officers, and most were shortly discharged. The full weight of military displeasure fell on outsiders: members of the Viennese Academic Legion who had left Vienna to serve in the Hungarian armies found themselves marched off in chains to penal detachments. Military courts tried 498 officers above the rank of captain: 231 were sentenced to death and forty were actually executed; most of the dead were junior officers in the regular army who had attained high rank in the Honvéd.9 A special Militär-Zentraluntersuchungs-
Kommission, which sat from 1 November 1849 to 31 December 1850 heard 4628 cases—twenty-four generals, seventy-one staff officers, 376 line officers, thirty-nine military bureaucrats, twenty-nine military doctors and technical personnel, 354 other ranks, 1448 civilians, and thirty-nine civil servants. The commission was less sanguinary than Haynau's courts-martial: of the seventy-one staff officers, two were cashiered and imprisoned, four lost rank and pension rights, fifty-three were "purified" and rehabilitated, two cases were simply dismissed, and nine were still awaiting a hearing when the commission was adjourned. Generations of Hungarians were raised to revere the thirteen Hungarian generals executed at Arad, and the 120 soldiers, civilians, and peasant partisans executed immediately during and after the war. By the standards of the twentieth century the number of executions was almost trivial; to Hungarians of the post-revolt generation the number was proof of Austrian ruthlessness and cruelty.

The treatment of regulars who had fought on the rebel side was, at least by twentieth-century standards, quite lenient. The Austrian Verzeichniss der wegen Hochverrates durch Teilnahme an der ungarischen Revolution gefällten kriegsgerichtlichen Urtheile lists 759 condemned rebels, two-thirds of them soldiers. One
need only count up the number of dead and look at the dates of amnesty for those imprisoned to understand the changes in the treatment of armed rebellion since 1850.9 The composite regular officer on Kossuth's side, Deak noted, was a subaltern who "grabbed the opportunity for promotion, adventure, the chance to command army corps instead of platoons [and] when in doubt consoled [himself] with patriotic sentiments and progressive slogans." (Klapka, one might note in passing, had been so bored as a junior officer that he had thought seriously of going off to Bengal to buy a place in the East India Company's army).9 Those officers who were "purified" by imperial tribunals returned to their old service, apparently without official prejudice, although suspicion persisted in officers' messes for years.9 The rank-and-file were luckier. They had after all only done what they were told by their superiors and betters. They were subject to discrimination neither from their commanders nor their comrades.100

The regiments that had fought on the rebel side could not be simply dissolved and their names stricken from the army list, as the East India Company had done with Madras regiments after the mutinies of 1806 or the Bengal regiments after the mutiny of 1857. They were
however "reorganized"—sent out of Hungarian territory and provided with new officers; NCOs and enlisted men who had been conspicuously pro-Kossuth were quietly discharged. The 62. (Maros-Vasarhely) Infantry, from which only the officers and fifty men had remained loyal, was sent off to Leoben and Trentino to be rebuilt. The 60. (Eperjes), which had distinguished itself in street fighting in Vienna before its return to Hungary and subsequent disloyalty, was shipped back to Lower Austria and totally rebuilt, since all three battalions and their officers had gone into revolt.101 There had been three Italian regiments in Hungary in 1848, the 16. and 23. Infantry and the 7. Chevaux-leger. The light horse had stayed with Jellacic and had been notably loyal; the infantry presented a problem. Four companies of the 2/16 had fought at Temesvar, but the rest of the two battalions in Hungary had tried to stay neutral. The 3/16 at Treviso and the regiment's grenadiers in Venice had been disloyal. The line infantry of the 16. were sent off to Olmütz to be re-trained; after the fall of Venice the grenadiers were shipped to the imperial siege lines around Komorn to redeem themselves. The 23. Ceccopieri was treated with more leniency. The 1/23 and 2/23 had won acclaim at Komorn, and only the 3/23 in the regiment's home district at Lodi was purged.102
The army had held the Monarchy together, and if the Hungarian and Italian regiments were suspect, the civil population was subject to the full weight of military and imperial displeasure. Martial law lasted in Vienna and Prague until mid-1853 and in Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia until mid-1854. Vienna itself, where the population had defied regulars and murdered an imperial war minister, was treated to special consideration. The Vormärz garrison of 14,000—made up largely of pioneer and grenadier units—had been inadequate to subdue an armed populace of 400,000, and after the restoration of order the army returned in force, trebling its garrison strength. In 1850-56 the new Arsenal was built on the high ground near the Südbahnhof as a home for three regiments of infantry and supporting artillery units. An American military observer pronounced the new Arsenal to be "doubtless perfect in all respects" and within its walls were sufficient ammunition and materiel to give the army's gunners fire superiority over the whole of the city for an extended siege. A new Franz-Josefs-Kaserne was built near the Dominikanerbastei at the eastern edge of the Innere Stadt, providing control over the Danube bridges and the city's other railway station. Temporary strongpoints were set up and linked by heliograph, and continuous patrols—which clashed with
angry civilians on more than a few occasions—were run between the Arsenal and scattered firebases. On any night in the early 1850s, as many as 100 patrols might leave the Arsenal gates for the streets of the Innere Stadt.\textsuperscript{104}

In October 1848 loyal regulars had taken five days to blast and batter their way inside the city walls. The army and the court were convinced that new outbreaks were imminent—in 1850 the young emperor wrote his mother that "here...the spirit grows worse day by day, but the people are too cunning to let it come to an armed showdown...On Sunday, a great church parade on the Glacis, to show our dear Viennese that troops and guns still exist."\textsuperscript{105} The army's engineers drew up plans for a chain of fortifications all around the walls, for adding a 30-ft. scarp onto the exiting walls, and for demolishing all houses along the curtain. The system was laid out so that the "Inner City as well as the Glacis might be effectively controlled, the swarming out of the suburbs by the rabble into the Inner City, where the most valuable citizens are gouped, be hindered, plundering might be prevented, and effective bombardment allowed."\textsuperscript{106} Vienna's commercial and industrial leaders protested that any extension of trade and industry required the demolition of the old walls so that the suburbs might be annexed and the city's
chronic housing shortage alleviated, but the Archduke Maximilian d'Este, something of an expert for the court on social unrest, noted that the proletariat had already tasted the blood of its betters, that it was daily swelled by an influx of foreign outcasts and transients, and that only the walls stood between the Hofburg and the rabble. Special instructions were drawn up for the garrison in 1853 and renewed in 1857: the army had no intention of being left surprised and helpless before a new rising. On the eve of the Italian war of 1859 the city garrison was given notice that large-scale reinforcements were available; Archduke Wilhelm had arranged for an additional fifteen thousand men to be on hand within 72 hours.

The heightened requirements in both Vienna and the Monarchy as a whole were also met by the creation of a new force of gendarmerie, established throughout the various crownlands in the autumn of 1849. Thirteen battalions of gendarmes, trained and outfitted on military lines, were set up under Feldmarschalleutein Johann Baron Kempen von Fichtenstamm, then governor-general of Budapest. Kempen saw his new command as an elite force. His men received better pay and quarters than line soldiers (as well as cash bonuses for each arrested criminal actually convicted, with a sliding
scale for severity of the crime), and their authority extended to both civilians and soldiers, including officers.

By early 1850 the new gendarmerie was co-opting the best of the army's NCOs directly from their regiments. The thirteen battalions expanded to sixteen within a year, and finally to nineteen. Three were employed in Hungary proper, and one each in Siebenburgen, Croatia, and the Voivodina. Their authority replaced that of the old patrimonial courts and the Pandurs employed by the Hungarian counties, and their presence had long been wished for in parts of Hungary where the usual procedure had been to wait until highway robbery became epidemic before sending for the army to hunt down highwaymen. The gendarmerie provided quiet and effective police functions throughout the crownlands—reformers had been advocating the creation of a rural police force throughout the 1840s—and it served increasingly to take over the task of dispersing strikers and demonstrators.

If such a role made the gendarmes less than popular with the civilians, neither were they admired by the army. The gendarmerie was generally recognized as honest and highly disciplined, but in 1852 it was placed under the ministry of interior, and feelings in the army turned
against what it saw as a rival institution. It was an open question, one military observer noted, whether the army or the civilians hated the gendarmerie more.\textsuperscript{112} Kempen had envisioned the gendarmerie as a force whose mission was one of providing public security, but he had not seen himself as head of a political police. Yet after mid-1852 Kempen found his new command assigned the functions of the secret police formerly run directly by the minister of the interior.\textsuperscript{113} By the middle of the 1850s both Kempen and the emperor were uneasy about the use of the gendarmerie for covert political surveillance.\textsuperscript{114} The military function of the gendarmes, though, should not be overlooked. The battalions serving in the Hungarian east were faced with bands of nationalist partisans who had gradually taken up the more traditional trade of simple banditry, and who could rely on at least the passive support of much of the peasantry. Campaigns against brigandage by both gendarmes and regulars became routine. The line between partisan and bandit was hard to draw, and the imperial authorities remained on edge and continued to reinforce their garrisons.\textsuperscript{115}

The enemies of the empire were by no means all defeated. Radetzky's armies had smashed the Piedmontese, and the marshal and his advisors had attempted to win the
Lombard peasants for the empire by ruining the local nobles, but the 130,000 imperial soldiers now stationed in Lombardy-Venetia were more than ever garrisoned in a hostile land. The Piedmontese had not been made to feel the full consequences of defeat, and Count Cavour, the Piedmontese chief minister, was harboring exiles and partisans from both Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia. On 6 February 1853 a series of attacks on Austrian guardposts in Milan began, and on 26 February there was an attempt to seize the head quarters of the city garrison. Ten imperial officers and other ranks were killed; fifty-five more were wounded. Seventy-nine Italians captured in the raids were hanged on Radetzky's order. The British ambassador in Turin primly noted that "the difficulties of administering the Lombardo-Veneto would appear . . . to be rather increased." Radetzky immediately set about confiscating the estates of those Lombards who had gone into emigration, imprisoning all those suspected of radical views, and demanding authority to pursue terrorists into Switzerland and Piedmont.

The army had learned what observers had said that it knew all along from the war in Hungary. No system of non-national garrisoning had been operated in the Vormärz, but there was now an overriding need to keep watch on the Hungarian regiments. They had proven
themselves unreliable at home, and the authorities were aware of the presence of ex-Honvéds, both officers and private soldiers, in the ranks. Special attention was paid to reintegrating regular officers, and various orders of the day reminded officers of their duty toward amnestied comrades. In some cases recruiting districts were shifted to break continuity with the army of 1848. The 2. Infantry, a Pressburg regiment since 1781, had its recruiting area shifted to Brasso in the Siebenburgen area of Transylvania. The 60. was moved from Eperjes to Erlau; the 19. had its recruiting district shifted from Szolnok to Raab. The district of the 33. (Altsohl) was given to the Bohemian 25. Infantry; the Galician 12. was recruited in Zips from 1853 to 1857. The Hungarian regiments were moved out of St. Stephen’s Lands and the Italian regiments were moved out of Lombardy-Venetia. Each of the Hungarian regiments had left one battalion in its recruiting district before 1848; the third battalions were now moved about as well. Supply, mobilization, and training were made vastly more difficult, but the army was now afraid of the Hungarians. In other crownlands, regiments like the 15.(Tarnopol), the 4.(Vienna), the 57.(Tarnow), or the 18.(Königgrätz) might remain at home, but not the Hungarians. As of 1858, only a single Hungarian regiment, the 62.(Maros-
Vasarhely) was anywhere in territory (in Agram, in this case) belonging to the Crown of St. Stephen.119

The treatment of the Hungarian regiments affected their morale. There was increasingly little chance that Hungarian soldiers would receive any real sympathy or understanding from their officers. There had been, not surprisingly, a shortage of Hungarian officers joining the colors after 1849. Given both the unwillingness of Hungarians to seek commissions on political grounds and the declining status of a junior officer (pay scales were fixed at 1818 levels of a florin a day for a lieutenant, despite the inflation of the 1850s), the number of Hungarian (and Cisleithanian) officers declined. By 1859 fifty-two percent of the imperial-royal officer corps was made up of men born outside the Monarchy.120 Fewer officers in the non-German regiments had any grasp of their men's language or problems than before 1848, when even if a subaltern of the Hungarian nobility might speak French far better than he spoke Magyar, he had at least some traditional sympathy with his men and some place in their accepted scheme of things. Resentments grew inside Hungarian regiments throughout the 1850s. Friedrich Engels looked at the Austrian army in 1855 and judged that its survival was problematical; any shock might
dissolve it, and many regiments were only waiting for a chance to desert.121

The soldiers and line officers of the imperial-royal forces, as distinct from the high command, fought well in Lombardy in 1859, living up to the old description of the Austrian army as "lions led by asses." Yet two complete army corps could not be sent to the Italian front at all; they were required in Hungary to guard against any possible rising.122 One author noted tartly about the Italian debacle that conquered peoples rarely make enthusiastic soldiers,123 but the point is less that the Hungarians were a conquered nation than that the soldiers of Hungarian regiments had been made to feel that they were potential rebels and not trusted soldiers of the dynasty. Those who had fought with great bravery under Radetzky were treated no better than those who had fought as rebels under Görgey and Klapka. The creation of a deliberate system of non-national garrisoning told Hungarian soldiers that they were now seen as traitors merely awaiting their chance to desert or revolt. An extra-territorial system had not existed before 1848, and its implementation afterward did not insulate suspect nationalities from politics. It introduced instead national disaffection as a source of military demoralization and only made soldiers of the Hungarian
regiments aware of their own identity as members of a suspect nation.
Notes to Chapter One


9. Sked, Survival, p. 44.


11. See the arguments by the Archduke Maximilian d'Este in his situation reports from Lombardy, Kriegsarchiv (hereinafter cited as KA), Feldakten 1848, Krieg im Italien-Hauptarmee, Fasz. 214.


13. On the police, see Anton Sassmann, Die Gendarmerie Österreichs (Leipzig, 1926).


18. Kiszling, "Wehrmacht" p. 240; See also Daniel Fenner von Fenneberg, Oesterreich und seine Armee (Leipzig, 1847), pp. 76-106.

19. Deak, Lawful Revolution, p. 188.


26. KA, MKFF 1913 33-12, #113 ex 1913, Bardolff to Franz Ferdinand.


30. Deak, *Lawful Revolution*, p. 188.


40. Berkeley, *Italy in the Making*, pp. 6-9, 11.


44. Sked, *Survival*, p. 49.


54. Ibid., p. 38.


61. Ibid., pp. 11, 102.


64. Sondhaus, *In the Service of the Emperor*, p. 42.


73. Ibid., 2: 175.
74. Kiszling, Revolution, 2: 3.
76. Sondhaus, In the Service of the Emperor, pp. 36-39.
80. Sondhaus, In the Service of the Emperor, p. 41.
81. Ibid., p. 39.
82. Deak, Lawful Revolution, p. 195.
84. Deak, Lawful Revolution, p. 194.
85. Deak, "Army Divided," p. 229
86. Deak, Lawful Revolution, p. 146.
87. Ibid., p. 141.
88. Ibid., p. 192.
89. Ibid., p. 331.
92. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, p. 29.
95. Deak, Lawful Revolution, p. 331.
96. Kiszling, Revolution, 2: 293.
98. Ibid., p. 333.
100. Kiszling, "Wehrmacht," p. 244.
102. Ibid., 1: 229, 279.
103. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, p. 45.
108. KA, KM Präs-Büro 1857/460, 28 February 1857.
109. KA, KM Präs-Büro 1859/7615, 7 November 1859.


118. Wrede, *Geschichte*, I, Beilage VII.

119. See the official *Militär-Schematismus des österreichischen Kaiserthums 1858*.


Late in the evening of 3 July 1866 the remnants of the Austrian Northern Army streamed away from the field at Königgrätz. A handful of units, most notably those of Austria's Saxon allies, made the retreat in good order. The bulk of the Austrian forces, perhaps 100,000 men, pressed toward the fortress of Königgrätz in deepening panic. The city commandant feared that the mob swarming through the dusk toward his walls was Prussian, and the city gates remained barred. The sluices of the Elbe had been opened, and as night fell some 60,000 men were trapped on a handful of narrow causeways. Theodor Fontane could find only one image to rival the chaos outside the town of Königgrätz: the shattered Grande Armée pouring back across the Berezina. \(^1\) In the aftermath of the battle perhaps 180,000 men were moved back across the Elbe to regroup north of Vienna— an impressive, if belated, show of competence by the defeated Austrian commanders. \(^2\)

Yet the army itself was near to collapse, far closer than it had been after any of the defeats of the French wars. Major Geza Fejervary, sent up from the emperor's military chancellery to view the damage, found entire
battalions coming apart; in many units officers could enforce discipline only at swordpoint. Count Karl Coudenhove wrote home in despair that his men were, in point of fact, no longer willing or able to fight.3 Only the cavalry, where the spoiling charges of the Alexander Uhlans and the Wrangel Cuirassiers had broken the ability of the Prussian horse to mount a pursuit to the Elbe, and the artillery, which kept up a successful covering fire late into the night, emerged from the wreck of Benedek’s Northern Army with any martial reputation left intact.4 On the morning of 4 July drowned soldiers floated on the Elbe in sodden clumps, and the hills north of Königgrätz were strewn with white-coated dead, the victims of superior staffwork and the firepower of the needle gun. The survivors of the Northern Army staggered on toward Vienna, the political influence of the army lost along with all the other wreckage abandoned on the field.

The ruin of the Austrian army had been seventeen years in coming. Contemporary observers, Friedrich Engels among them, had expected the imperial forces to make short work of a Prussian army which had seen no real action since 1815. The Austrians were, after all, the heirs of Radetzky, and Feldzeugmeister Ludwig Benedek, commanding the Northern Army, was the hero of San Martino
and the darling of the Liberal press. In defeat the
court and the army scrambled to find a scapegoat, and the
anguished Franz Josef spoke bitterly of betrayal. Yet
little had happened in Bohemia that had not gone wrong in
Lombardy in 1859. The lethargy and indecisiveness of the
generals, the blithe reliance on the bayonet, the
restiveness of Hungarian troops, all had been present at
Magenta and Solferino. The army's effectiveness in the
field had deteriorated steadily since 1849, and
Rothenberg's list of its technical deficiencies in 1859
is exhaustive:

[The high command] repeatedly warned that the
army was not prepared to undertake a campaign,
although it is doubtful that they realized the
extent of the damage done to the army since
1849...Logistic and supply services were
insufficient and corrupt and the troops lacked
engineering stores, rations, and clothing. Infantry
weapons were adequate, but the artillery was much
inferior to that of the French. Above all, command
was in the hands of [generals] who failed to see the
need for seizing the initiative.

The brilliant performance of the imperial light cavalry
against the French and the stubborn resistance put up by
Benedek's wing at Solferino masked the cold facts of
1859: the imperial forces had been poorly trained,
indifferently led, and had contained large numbers of men
whose loyalty was questionable. The decay of the army
was a function of the victory of 1849, and it paralleled
the overall failure of Austrian policy in the 1850s.
Later in the century Count Taaffe would explain that the secret of governing the Monarchy was to find a way to keep everyone only mildly unhappy. The regime of the 1850s pleased no one, and it left everyone dissatisfied without creating the spirit of resignation that was Taaffe's goal. The governments headed by Prince Felix Schwarzenberg (1849-1852) and interior minister Alexander Bach (1852 - 59) offered something to offend all the political factions of the Monarchy, and while it introduced a number of liberal reforms--municipal autonomy, trial by jury, uniform tariff and taxation, an independent judiciary, a reformed civil service--the emigres of 1849 still regarded Austria as "a ship loaded with slaves...who could be freed only after a shipwreck."

The imperial authorities tried within the limits of a non-national state to recognize national and linguistic equality. Schwarzenberg and Bach did not aim at Germanizing the Monarchy, and laws were gazetted and trials held in ten languages. The expansion of the bureaucracy, where German was the internal language, meant that more German was heard, but of course not all the bureaucrats were German, and the schools of Bohemia turned out sufficient numbers of Czech officials to infuriate Bohemian Germans who found "German civilization
served up to them by Czech officials on a platter of state of siege." The administrators of the 1850s were, however much they might be mocked in Hungary as "Bach's hussars" in their cloaked and gold-frogged pseudo-Magyar uniforms, by and large efficient and honest. Yet imperial policy neither conciliated the Hungarians nor won the support of the nationalities who had fought against the Magyars in 1848/49:

The [Hungarian] peasants appreciated their liberation but persisted in attributing it not to Vienna but to Kossuth, and there is little evidence that they preferred the relatively efficient but alien Bach Hussars to their own traditional masters....

The Slovak nationalists found that they had got, after all, very little more out of Vienna than they had out of Pest...The Serbs fretted against the ill-faith which had given them, instead of their own self-governing province, an absolutely-ruled Department full of Germans and Roumanians.... In Transylvania both the Saxons and the Roumanians were solid in opposing reunion with Hungary, but both were bitterly disappointed with the new absolutism... The Croats brooded over Dalmatia, and found the yoke of imported foreign officials as heavy as the Hungarians did; all the books quote a remark made by a Croat to a Hungarian friend: "We have got as a reward what you got as a punishment."

The failure of the imperial government to build a centralized non-national state was mirrored in the decay of the army. The 1850s had begun with great promise. As Novara, at Temesvar, and on the Jaegerzeile the army had held the Monarchy together. The dull Biedermeier court
of the Emperor Ferdinand had been replaced by one that glittered with uniforms. The young emperor, so lately a junior staff officer, surrounded himself with soldiers and habitually appeared in uniform. There was military rule in Verona, Budapest and Vienna itself. Baron Kübeck, late president of the Hofkammer and now the Monarchy's financial expert, attended a dinner at Schönbrunn in the autumn of 1849 and found himself adrift in a sea of generals. He confided to his diary that Austria was now a military state and that at Schönbrunn he had seen the "apotheosis of the army."12 Victory had given the army a pre-eminent voice in the councils of state, and when the war ministry, a legacy of the failed liberalizing of 1848, was dismantled in 1853, the army was freed from the last traces of civilian control. In the autumn of 1850 the massed battalions of imperial—royal whitecoats—a quarter of a million men, commanded by the now-legendary Radetzky—helped ensure Austria's diplomatic triumph over Prussia at Olmütz.13 The triumph at Olmütz, followed in 1853 by a successful show of force against the Turks over Ottoman threats to Montenegro and then by the occupation of the Danubian Principalities during the Crimean War, gave the imperial army a series of empty victories. The Prussians, humiliated at Olmütz, undertook to reform
their armies in order to oppose Austrian "arrogance" in the Germanies. The mobilization against Russia had been fearfully expensive—sixty million florins overall, the whole of the 1854 military budget swallowed up by March 1854—and the consequences crippled the Monarchy's finances for years afterward.\footnote{The Russians were outraged at Austria's actions in the Danubian Principalities. The newly-crowned Tsar Alexander blamed his humiliation at the hands of Britain and France on the lack of support—the "armed neutrality"—shown by Franz Joseph, and the Monarchy lost any hope of support from the Russia that had sent 150,000 men into Hungary to aid the Habsburgs in 1849.}

The 1850s gave the army its paper triumphs. The mobilization of the autumn of 1850 had even made the imperial armies seem both powerful and modern. The imperial quartermasters had moved 75,000 men, 8000 horses, and 1800 wagons and artillery pieces to the Bohemian front by rail\footnote{The Prussian army, which had seen no serious fighting since 1815, allowed itself to be cowed by an Austrian army so recently victorious on two fronts. In point of fact, though, the imperial forces had learned little in 1848/49. The transport system decayed all through the 1850s, victim of unbalanced budgets, the sale of rail}—a dazzling display of skill. The Prussian army, which had seen no serious fighting since 1815, allowed itself to be cowed by an Austrian army so recently victorious on two fronts. In point of fact, though, the imperial forces had learned little in 1848/49. The transport system decayed all through the 1850s, victim of unbalanced budgets, the sale of rail
lines to private concessions, and the rampant corruption which culminated in 1859 with the suicide of the army's chief of procurement. The tactics that had won the day at Novara and Komorn had been wholly orthodox, and there was no incentive to change. Victory can ruin an army just as surely as defeat, and the imperial commanders locked themselves into obsolescent doctrines. Perhaps the major change in the structure of the army was the dissolution of the light cavalry. Uhlans had been of use in Hungary, and the cavalry's seven regiments of chevaux-legers were converted to uhlans and given lances, creating shock troops at the expense of reconnaissance, a move exactly opposite to the evolution of military theory elsewhere.

The reasoning behind the expansion of the uhlans affected the infantry as well. Maria Theresa's Austria had been famed for its use of light infantry and skirmishing tactics, but nineteenth-century doctrine stressed close formations and the bayonet. The victories of 1848/49 were won with methods commonplace in Archduke Charles's day, and Austrian military doctrine centered on close columns charging home with cold steel. The military leadership of the Monarchy was not given to intellectual pursuits, and legend held that the Austrian staff could not be interested in the Prussian Kriegspiel.
because one could not properly place bets--and the young emperor insisted that "loyal and chivalrous" officers rather than learned ones were the guarantors of the army's success. Nothing is quite so conducive to lethargy as success, and there was no love of military learning in the upper reaches of the army. Count Karl Grünne, the emperor's adjutant and the most influential military voice in the Monarchy, was scathing in his contempt for "military pedants," a reflection of both his conservatism and his own lack of military talent. Benedek, lionized for his exploits in 1848 and 1859, insisted that he could conduct a campaign according to simple principles; he was, he said, not impressed by complex maneuvers. Archduke Albrecht, who did keep up with the theory of his profession, distrusted innovation on political grounds; any major innovation in the army ultimately implied social change, and the spirit of the army had to remain true to the Dynasty alone.

The army approached 1866 with a tactical doctrine that took no account of the introduction of the breechloading rifle or the open-order tactics developed by the French in Algeria. In part this was sheer conservatism, a refusal to meddle with past success. It was also a misreading of the lessons of 1859. At Solferino the French, whose infantry had been largely
armed with smoothbores, had used the superior accuracy and firepower of their artillery to allow fast-moving French columns to press home bayonet charges into the close-packed Austrian formations. The Austrian high command had viewed the French success as proof of the ability of the bayonet to overcome firepower and had neglected the role of the French artillery in enabling the infantry to overcome the superior range of the rifled Lorenz musket used by the Austrians. The imperial-royal service regulations of 1862 designated the bayonet as the supreme weapon on the battlefield and abandoned maneuver and aimed fire for the cold steel and élan of pure Stosstaktik. The results, even in the Danish campaign of 1864, were bloody enough. In 1866 the whitecoated Austrian battalions charged the Prussian needle-guns and died in waves. The Austrian victory at Trautenau (27 June 1866) cost the Habsburg forces 17.8% casualties against 4.2% for the Prussians. The 23.Infantry (a former Lombard regiment, recruited at Zombor in Hungary since 1860) suffered losses of thirty-one percent. For every Prussian soldier killed in 1866, 2.3 Austrian soldiers died, and total casualties amounted to 4.5 Austrians killed, wounded, and missing for every Prussian.
Conservatism and a misreading of the events at Solferino explained part of the reliance on Stosstaktik, but some historians, Hans Delbrück chief among them, saw the preference for close formations as being grounded in the fear of desertion by various national groups—Italians, Hungarians and Croats. Delbrück's assertion was sharply attacked by Heinrich von Srbik, who denied outright that the imperial-royal army was devoted to close formations out of fear of national disaffection and pointed out that the Habsburg armies had a long tradition of favoring cold steel and mass. The Vormärz army, like so many continental forces, lacked the financial resources to sustain an interest in Feuertaktik. With line infantry limited to twenty training rounds per man annually, a reliance on the bayonet was unavoidable. Furthermore, only about ten percent of the infantry conscripts of the 1850s were literate, and the quality of imperial-royal NCOs was generally regarded as low. It was easier to supervise men in close formations where attacks could simply be made en masse with the drums beating out the *pas de charge*.

There had of course been concern among the Austrian high command in 1859 that disaffection among Italian and Hungarian units would lead to large-scale desertions or outright mutiny. Count Grünne, the emperor's adjutant—
general, argued that the reserve battalions of all the Lombard and Venetian regiments should be sent out of Italy immediately upon mobilization. Archduke Albrecht, commanding general in Hungary, wanted all mobilised Hungarian reservists sent out of Hungary, though not to Italy, where they were likely to desert or defect. Nor did he wish to see any suspect Italian troops posted to Hungary. And the initial battles of the war seemed to bear out fears of desertion. The 45. (Verona) Infantry distinguished itself at Magenta, winning 32 silver medals and losing 45 killed and 287 wounded, but also listing 742 men as missing. The 13. (Padua) Infantry, being shipped from Hungary to reinforce the Italian front, lost 110 men to desertion en route and was abruptly shifted to Innsbruck. News of the defeat at Magenta and the evacuation of Milan precipitated large-scale desertions in the 23.(Lodi) and 43.(Bergamo) Infantry. Croatian Grenzer units sent to Lombardy had displayed a distinct lack of discipline and a tendency to go off in search of loot, leading Gunther Rothenberg to agree with Delbrück. It was long believed that there had been large numbers of deserters in 1859 from Hungarian units. C.A. Macartney believed that 15,000 Hungarian troops, six percent of the Austrian forces in Italy, deserted during the war of 1859. The 19.(Raab)
and the 34.(Kaschau) Infantry are supposed to have had 1200 missing at Solferino—\(a\) level of desertion tantamount to outright dissolution.\(^{32}\)

Yet, as Istvan Deak demonstrated, the actual statistics for the campaign of 1859 tell a much different story. Casualty returns from Solferino for the 19. listed 32 killed, 183 wounded, and 64 missing. The 34., all three of whose battalions fought for Kossuth in 1848/49, fought with enthusiasm at Solferino; the regiment suffered 703 casualties, of which 271 were missing—"a low figure, considering that the battle was lost and that the Austrians listed as missing everyone who could not be positively identified as dead."\(^{33}\) In other Hungarian units, such as the 48.(Nagykanizsa) and the 60.(Eger), there were high figures for all types of losses. The 48. lost 62 killed, 347 wounded, 235 captured, and 161 missing at Solferino, where it held its position in the center of the fighting. With two gold and seventy-nine silver medals awarded to its soldiers, it was one of the most highly decorated units of the war. The 60., badly mauled at Magenta, was driven from the field by the French at Solferino, losing fifty-six killed, 249 wounded, and 548 missing. Many of the losses occurred when elements of the regiment fired on one another in darkness and confusion during the general
The imperial-royal army's Hungarian units, Deak noted, did not desert en masse in northern Italy; they were killed en masse.35

Desertions in large numbers had certainly taken place from the Monarchy's Italian regiments, though few of these occurred at or near the front. The 13.(Padua) lost its deserters on the march west out of Hungary; the 23. (Lodi) and 43.(Bergamo) were stationed on the Dalmation coast when problems began. The 55.(Monza) lost forty-two men when its reserve battalion was sent from Lower Austria to Hungary in midsummer, after fighting had ended in Lombardy.36 The Hungarian regiments had shown no special tendency to desert despite the assertions of some historians.37 Yet it was the perception of desertion rather than the reality that seems to have affected Austrian decisions about the need for close supervision of the troops, and by 1866 there was a deep concern for using close formations to monitor suspect nationalities.38 The three Italian regiments that fought in Bohemia in 1866--the 13.(Padua), 38.(Brescia), and 26.(Udine)--distinguished themselves despite heavy casualties,39 but when Magyar battalions of the 67.(Eperjes) and 68.(Szolnok) Infantry were unable to advance against Prussian fire at Nachod, it was taken as self-evident that Hungarian troops were attempting to
abandon the field. The imperial-royal command was more than willing to treat its Hungarian soldiers as potential traitors.

Imperial policy demanded an army loyal only to the dynasty, but the regiments could not be separated from their national groups. Both Friedjung and Prince Schwarzenberg's biographer claimed that in the years between 1848 and 1866 "an Austrian regiment was a melting pot of various nationalities" and that "after 1849 a system was introduced whereby each regiment consisted of soldiers of different nationalities." Both writers seem to have confused the regiment, drawn from a local recruiting district, with the brigade—the basic imperial tactical grouping during the 1850s—made up of six battalions of infantry. The battalions of a brigade might be of various nationalities, but each battalion came from its own regiment, its own recruiting ground. The brigade allowed the military authorities to keep large tactical units together while still allowing them to monitor suspect units. And imperial suspicion fell impartially as rain. Of the nine regiments recruited in Italy in the 1850s only two saw any service in Lombardy-Venetia during those years: the 13. (Padua) was at Udine for the first few months of 1854 and the 44. (Milan) arrived in Padua at the beginning of 1860—although
the 45. (Verona) saw services at Magenta in 1859 and won thirty two silver medals for bravery, a performance it would repeat at Königgrätz. The German regiments were not exempt. The 4. Hoch-und-Deutschmeister had distinguished itself in Hungary, but a detachment of grenadiers of the 4. had deserted to the mob attacking the war ministry buildings in October 1848, and the regiment was considered prone to sympathize with the Viennese and shipped out to the Tisza in the early 1850s to hunt bandits. 4 3

The Hungarians were of course kept out of Hungary. Of twenty-one Hungarian regiments in 1858, only one was serving inside the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen; in 1862 the number was three of forty-one regiments. 4 4 Suspicion fell on the Grenzers, the units of the Monarchy’s Military Border, as well. The Transylvanian Grenzer regiments had fought for Kossuth and had been "re-organized" in 1849, but in early 1851 they were dissolved altogether and their soldiers parcelled out to other regiments. 4 5 Szekler cadres of the old 1. Szekler Grenzers were moved to Czernowitz and, along with two companies of the 31. (Hermannstadt) and three companies of the 51. (Klausenburg), converted to a new 5. (Munkacs) Infantry. The new regiment received an auxiliary recruiting area at Maros-Vasarhely and was further
diluted in 1852 with 2800 recruits from the zones of the 32. (Budapest) and the 34. (Kaschau).46

The Croatian Grenzers had been conspicuously loyal in 1848, but the Habsburgs had never been disposed to shows of gratitude. Loyalty to the dynasty was simply assumed; rewards were rarely handed out for mere performance of duty. An autonomous Croatian kingdom of Illyria was no more desirable than an autonomous Hungary. Fiume and bits of eastern Slavonia were added to Croatian territory, and the Grenzers were given actual title to the land they farmed in their regimental areas,47 but Dalmatia was kept separate from Croatia and the major demand of the Croats, the union of the Border with civil Croatia, was denied.48 The male population of the Border was still subject to military justice and permanent military service, and the Border and its inhabitants were proclaimed an "integral part" of the imperial army.49 The economy of the Border was in a dismal state, and all observers agreed that improvement was possible only if the Border could be integrated into Croatia proper.50 The Border was producing only half as much grain as civil Croatia in the early 1860s, and a deepening poverty in the regimental areas was easily transmuted into political discontent.51
The Croats had very little with which to bargain. Jellacic had passed from the scene in the early 1850s, and the spirochetes that ate away at his spinal cord destroyed the major living link between the Croats and the Dynasty. It had also become open knowledge that the military efforts of the Grenzers in 1848/49 were notable more for loyalty than success. The failure of Jellacic's offensive against Budapest had dispelled a number of illusions about the fighting ability of the Grenzers. The Croats had carried the day in the Prater and down the Landstrasse during the recapture of Vienna, but they had displayed a distressing tendency to break away in search of plunder. A decade later, Grenzer regiments sent to Lombardy impressed Austrian officers as being chiefly concerned with "stealing chickens, and exhibited an extraordinary concern for their safety during battle." The Grenzers no longer had a place on the modern battlefield; the soldier-farmer had been made obsolete and was now failing at both professions. The regiments of the Border performed their traditional tasks of hunting down bandits and facing down local Ottoman garrisons, but they could no longer command any special mystique. Their major active function was maintenance of the Pest-Cordon against a Turkey supposedly infested with plague and cholera, so that
if you dare to break the laws of the quarantine, you will be tried with military haste; the court will scream out your sentence to you from a tribunal some fifty yards off; the priest, instead of gently whispering to you the sweet hopes of religion, will console you at duelling distance, and after that you will find yourself carefully shot and carelessly buried in the ground of the Lazaretto.94

The military authorities did not wish to give up their control over the Border, since military control provided, at least in theory, a base for future operations against Hungary. Yet attempts to isolate the Border from the political life of civil Croatia and the wider economy of the Monarchy produced nothing but deepening dissatisfaction and poverty.55 By the end of the 1850s the Croats, so highly praised for the loyalty and devotion they had shown a decade before,56 were considered unreliable. Large numbers of Croats had deserted in Lombardy in 1859, and the French had hoped to induce them to rise in support of a French landing in Dalmatia.97 In 1850 an Austrian observer had warned the command in Hungary that "South Slav nationalism hides dangerous tendencies behind a mask of outward loyalty;"58 by 1859 it was necessary to shift Czech and German regulars in large numbers to the Border. The English traveller George Spottiswoode found that "the mountains swarmed with soldiers," and the army was
interning in Josephstadt fortress as many nationalist
suspects as it could find.\textsuperscript{59}

The new attitude of the Croats found political
expression in the aftermath of the war. The imperial
government, beset by military disaster and financial
collapse, harassed by a well-organized and well-financed
press campaign mounted by the German Liberals and the
financial community,\textsuperscript{60} began its retreat from the
programs of Schwarzenberg and Bach, from a unitary state
and absolute imperial authority. The October Diploma of
1860, the first constitutional experiment of Franz
Joseph's reign, promised an enlarged crown council drawn
from the monarchy as a whole. Pressure from the German
Liberals and the Hungarians, both of whom sought more
from a constitution than a council with no control over
defense or foreign affairs and with only limited control
of taxation, forced its withdrawal within a few
months.\textsuperscript{61} Its successor, the Silvester Patent of 1861,
made the diets of the crownlands electoral colleges for a
central Reichsrat in Vienna. Nine Croatian-Slavonian
delegates were to be sent to the Reichsrat, and the
Croatian Grenzers, though under military orders to
discuss nothing but the election of delegates to the
central Reichsrat, were allowed to participate in the
deliberations of the Croatian Sabor. The Grenzers,
rebuffed in their attempts to petition the emperor over the status of the Border, sided with the Sabor's block of Croatian nationalists, and Grenzer votes gave the nationalists in the Sabor a majority against participation in the Reichsrat. The imperial authorities were outraged by the open defiance of the Grenzers, and the Border delegates were immediately shipped back to their regiments and kept under open arrest. All Grenzer officers suspected of nationalist sentiments were to be transferred out of Croatia—a decision that applied even to Colonel Petar Preradovic, the celebrated author of German romances of the Border: the author of Das Uskoken Mädchen was declared too nationalist to serve in Croatia and Slavonia. The decision to post suspect Grenzer officers to regiments elsewhere in the Monarchy gave a number of nationalist officers incentive to resign; the most radical took service in Serbia, which had attracted the sympathies of South Slav nationalists both Orthodox and Catholic. The group of ex-Habsburg officers in Belgrade devoted themselves to organizing intelligence networks along the Border and promoting insurrection in Bosnia in the hope of using a Turkish war as the catalyst for the creation of a South Slav state.
The Monarchy's Italian provinces were under constant strain from a nationalism that was, despite Radetzky's efforts to separate the peasants of Lombardy and Venetia from their politically-active betters, deeply rooted. Yet the population was sufficiently quiet in the late 1850s for a ninth Italian regiment—the 55.(Como)—to be raised. Italian units were posted abroad, most often to Bohemia and Hungary. Yet the Italians, as exemplified by the performance of the 45.(Verona) at Magenta and Königgrätz, continued to give good service. The fleet, whose sailors and marines had mutinied in 1848, continued to be drawn from Dalmatia and the Veneto. The political reliability of the fleet seems to have improved during the 1850s—a function perhaps of the ongoing shift of naval forces away from Venice to Pola and almost certainly of the new life brought to the fleet by the Archduke Maximilian, named to the admiralty in 1854. The young archduke's influence in improving the training and outfitting of the neglected fleet went far towards dissolving nationalism into professionalism. The crews of the outgunned Austrian fleet that devastated their Italian opponents at Lissa were, after all, largely Italian-speaking.

The loss of Lombardy left the imperial administration in the Veneto thoroughly demoralized. The
fortress towns of the Quadrilateral, Mantua, Legnano, Peschiera, and Verona, remained in imperial hands, and the ambitions of the Piedmontese were held at the line of the Po and the Mincio. The guns of the Quadrilateral and the rail net centered on Mantua gave the imperial defenses an overwhelming advantage on the frontiers of the new Italian kingdom. There were still seven Italian regiments after 1859/60, including a new 79. raised at Pordenone and an 80. raised at Vicenza in 1860.

Table 2.1
Italian Infantry Regiments 1848-60

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<th>Year</th>
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Yet Benedek, arriving in Italy in 1861, found the administration of Venetia, both civil and military, in a state of "uncertainty, passivity, and impotence."  

Little enough had changed in Venice itself. The imperial fleet was slowly shifting to Pola, but the city's status as a free port brought in sufficient merchantmen to fill the docks. Austrian officers and their friends still drank at Quadri's, staring across San Marco at the partisans of a united Italy drinking at Florian's. The imperial administration and the populace both spent the 1860s in lethargic anticipation. Benedek found the population "hardly conscious" of any connection with the Monarchy, ruled "in greater part" by nationalist ideas, but simply cultivating their own material interests in disregard of the Austrians, in expectation of change. Such expectations were not merely rumor or nationalist propaganda: the Austrian cabinet had informed Prince Richard Metternich in Paris in March 1863 that any "policy of sacrifices" for Venetia would involve reviving "dangerous tendencies among the nationalities at home" and was too risky to consider. Both the Prussians and the Italians believed that a diplomatic arrangement which would cede Venice to Italy in return for their support for Austrian occupation of Bosnia and the Danubian Principalities was possible. At the beginning of 1866
circles around General La Marmora, the Italian war minister, were using the Vienna Rothschilds to convey hints to the imperial government that Venice in return for supporting Austria’s acquisition of Bosnia, Wallachia, and parts of Serbia would be an acceptable trade.68

Austrian fears in Italy in the early 1860s were less of war or revolution than of terrorist attacks by Garibaldist irregulars. The imperial ministry of finance had informed the Archduke Wilhelm that for fiscal 1860 the army could get funds only after all the other expenses of the state had been met—thus exercising a veto on any Austrian action against Garibaldi’s coup in the Two Sicilies or Garibaldist movements in Umbria and the Emilian Marches.69 The 2. Army, the imperial garrison in Italy and once the centerpiece of the Monarchy’s defenses, dwindled from 150,000 men and 5500 horses in 1861 to 55,000 men and 3000 horses in 1863; by 1863 the Verona general command was reporting that some regiments were down to a bare dozen men in a company.70 When in 1864 it was feared that 4000-5000 Garibaldisti were readying a coup in Friulia, only fifty understrength companies could be found for its defense.71 The Polish revolt of 1863 revived revolutionary hopes throughout Europe, and reports of Italian projects frightened
Benedek into proclaiming martial law in early 1864 and threatening to shoot any captured irregulars out of hand. Troops were alerted in Carinthia and the Tirol, and the outcome was determined as much by the hesitation of the Italian government in supporting Garibaldi as by the imperial troops who spent endless weeks chasing down partisans' lairs in the hills around Udine and Belluno. Reports in 1865 of projects against Fiume and Cattaro and of increased activity against Venetia being planned by revolutionaries in Bologna led to increased patrol and counter-intelligence activity, but concrete proposals to reinforce the police led to an impasse over the legal status of imperial and Lombard-Venetian gendarmerie forces.72

The heart of the Monarchy’s problem was of course Hungary. The Hungarian constitution had been suppressed in 1849, and the old Kingdom of Hungary had been dismembered. Transylvania was carved away into a separate unit, as was Croatia. Hungary proper was divided into six military districts based at Sopron, Pressburg, Kaschau, Budapest, Nagyvarad, and Temesvar. The Temesvar military region was joined to the Voivodina in November 1849 and transformed into a new crownland with Franz Joseph as Grand Voivode, leaving Hungary in five parts, each ruled by a military governor and his
civilian advisor. The punitive regime of Feldmarschall-
leutnant Baron Haynau, whose armies had broken the
Hungarian forces in 1849, had served its purpose by mid-
1850, and the marshal was retired to his newly-acquired
Hungarian estates, where he spent his last years
wondering why his gentry neighbors refused to invite him
to their parties.73 His replacement was Archduke
Albrecht, who made his formal appearance as governor-
general at Pressburg in mid-October 1851.74 The new
regime moved to hand over as much authority as possible
to the civilian specialists in charge of integrating
Hungary and its laws into the Monarchy as a whole, but
martial law officially remained in effect until May 1854,
and the new gendarmerie was backed by twenty-two
battalions of infantry designated for internal-security
duties.75

Albrecht's arrival gave no joy to those Hungarians
not attached to the court. The Archduke's ten years in
office saw the creation of much of the economic
infrastructure essential to the country's later
development, and the new regime supervised the abolition
of feudal dues and the transfer of urbarial lands to
their new peasant owners.76 Nonetheless, the reforms of
the early 1850s were carried out by the bureaucrats, many
of them Czechs and Germans imported by Bach's ministry,
and the decrees of January 1853 converting the "provisional" decrees of 1849 into a permanent system reiterated Bach's Verwirkungstheorie, under which Hungary, by its treason and rebellion, had forfeited its constitution and its right to exist as a separate kingdom."

The Archduke, whose rank was first seen as a concession to Hungarian sentiments after the rule of Haynau and his bourgeois civilian advisor Heinrich Gehringer, was "an austere military figure to whom every Hungarian was a rebel, actual or potential." And Albrecht made no secret of his belief that he was ruling over conquered territory. The suspension of the customs barrier between Hungary and the Austrian provinces gave the hard-pressed Magyar gentry access to the German demand for grain, but credit for expansion and mechanization on gentry holdings was available only to friends of the dynasty. The integration of Hungary into the Austrian tax structure meant that Hungary was now paying its share of expenses for the whole Monarchy, and taxes increased tenfold as Hungary's privileged position vanished: the 1847 figures for taxes were 4.3 million florins in direct taxes and 5.3 million florins in indirect taxes; the figures for 1857 were 41.5 million and 65.6 million florins respectively. The bulk of the
direct taxes fell on the nobility; the peasantry found itself bearing the cost of new taxes on food and tobacco. 80

There were of course real enemies of the state for the governor-general to contend with. In the autumn of 1851 the gendarmerie uncovered a conspiracy in the Szekler towns of Transylvania, organized by an ex-Honvéd colonel named Joszef Mack, who billed himself as Kossuth’s chosen agent and who had established a fairly extensive network of terrorist cells across the country. The affair was dealt with swiftly, as was a second, more comic-opera, attempt at revolt by a radical named Oszlopy the following June. 81 The executions following the suppression of Mack’s conspiracy prompted the exiled Kossuth to urge his followers to wait for a more favorable international alignment, and the skill of the authorities in intercepting radical communications dampened conspiratorial enthusiasms at home.

Nonetheless, the imperial visit of 1852 was attended by a massive military escort, as was the visit of both emperor and empress in 1856. In both cases the emperor refused to wear the uniform of any of his Hungarian regiments; security units enforced a ban on the red-white-green national colors while the imperial procession, decked in the black-and-yellow of the
dynasty, passed by. Physical opposition to the new order was confined to the hinterlands of the east and south, where a tradition of banditry kept alive bands who fancied themselves as partisans. The 4. Hoch-und-Deutschmeister, sent out beyond the Tisza to hunt bandits, killed or captured 122 brigands in the last two weeks of September 1850 alone, and the dreary work of ferreting out brigands and self-proclaimed partisans from among a sullen population went on throughout the decade.

The nature of Hungarian resistance had been defined by Ferenc Deak as early as 1850. Asked to serve on an imperial commission on integrating Austrian and Hungarian judicial procedures, he informed Vienna that "it is not possible to cooperate actively in public affairs." Deak's attitude was shared by the majority of his class, and the Magyar gentry withdrew to their estates. The imperial authorities were hardly anxious to recruit from among a suspect people, but there were few enough volunteers for imperial service in any case: when in June 1850 the authorities began recruiting civilian administrators, only nine of 117 applicants were Magyar.

The ruling class of Hungary withdrew from public life, leaving the collection of taxes and the levying of recruits to the "Bach hussars" and the army. Cynics
claimed that the majority of the 156,000-man imperial garrison in the late 1850s was there to collect taxes, and the army and the finance ministry fought a savage paper war over who would bear the costs of the endless expeditions to collect taxes. Thirty-two million gulden were in arrears in Hungary in 1859, a figure raised to forty-five million three years later by an exhausted and exasperated army command. Those Hungarians possessing sufficient influence, respectability, or wealth to defy the bureaucrats openly did so, confident that a platoon of soldiers would be helpless against local passivity and obstinance. When the Hungarian Diet assembled in 1861, every single deputy was deeply in arrears with his taxes. The habit of non-payment became entrenched in the countryside. Despite the coming of home rule and Dualism, sweeps across the countryside by the (now Hungarian) gendarmerie and army to collect taxes were commonplace throughout the last thirty years of the century.

The suppression of county authorities and the enactment of uniform conscription throughout the Monarchy in 1852 put the Hungarian conscript pool in direct contact with the imperial authorities. The law of 1852, amended again in late 1858, set eight years as the standard term of service throughout the Monarchy,
followed by a two-year reserve liability. The emperor proclaimed that a state "which can raise two hundred thousand men without trouble...is not sickening for revolution," but the annual intake never reached half that figure. Hungarian recruits had been provided by the counties, and the local high sheriffs and lords-lieutenant had used the army as a dumping ground for vagrants, insolent peasants, and petty criminals. The conscription laws of the 1850s and early 1860s still exempted the Monarchy's propertied classes, but the transfer of conscription power from local notables to professional administrators meant that more Hungarians faced the prospect of military service. The quality of Hungarian recruits may well have improved, but the conscripts of the Bach era were levied by an authority perceived as foreign, and they included men far more disposed to protest both their own conscription and the imperial regime in Hungary than their Vormärz counterparts. The army's methods for dealing with recalcitrant private soldiers dated back to Eugene's day, and the lash was applied with mechanical indifference. Resistance to conscription became endemic in Hungary, and the imperial authorities became convinced that, given any opportunity, there would be widespread desertion from the Hungarian regiments.
 Nonetheless, outright insubordination remained rare. Magyar conscripts were difficult to catch, and the army believed that Magyar troops could not be stationed in Hungary. Yet in 1859 and 1866, when chances for open defiance appeared, surprisingly few Hungarian soldiers availed themselves of the opportunity to fight against the Habsburgs. In 1859 Kossuth obliged Louis Napoleon and Cavour by forming a Hungarian Legion to fight against the Austrians in Lombardy. The Hungarian Legion, built around a cadre of about 300 long-time emigres, despite appeals by Kossuth to the Hungarian soldiers of the imperial-royal forces in Italy, attracted few recruits. By early July 1859 the Hungarian Legion numbered 4000 men, but the majority of those were something less than volunteers. The French command in Lombardy had simply transferred all Hungarian prisoners to the control of the Legion. The new legionnaires found themselves given the choice of the Legion or French prison camps. The Hungarian leadership extolled the "volunteers" in the foreign press, but in private they were angry at French ignorance. "Hungarian" regiments were by no means all Magyar, and the Legion found itself filled with Croatian, Swabian, Slovak, Serbian, or Romanian soldiers who had no wish to fight for a Magyar vision of Hungary. In any event, the Legion saw no combat and most of its members
were only too happy to accept the Austrian offer of amnesty after the end of the war.

A number of Hungarians took service with Piedmont, and five years after Solferino many were languishing at Ancona, sick of being used to fight in Piedmont's internal quarrels and busy petitioning Benedek in Venice for amnesty and the chance to return home. Another Legion was raised in 1866 to fight alongside the Prussians but met with even less success. Commanded by György Klapka, the defender of Komorn fortress, it never exceeded battalion strength and was made up of emigres long exiled from Hungary. When Klapka attempted to move into northern Hungary he found the local Magyar population apathetic and the Slovak peasantry openly hostile. Harassed by the locals and given no support by the Prussians, Klapka and his few hundred men fell back across Moravia into Prussia. Their sole achievement may have been to raise Czech support for the Habsburgs. Frantisek Rieger, leader of the Czech deputies in the Reichsrat, pointed out that a Magyar radical victory was a threat to the Czechs and offered Czech support to the imperial government.

There had been no revolts in either Lombardy-Venetia or Hungary in 1859, despite the fears of many Austrian commanders (such as Archduke Albrecht) and the hopes of
Kossuth and his fellow emigres. Yet when the army began to rebuild itself, to think of revenge in Italy or the growing possibility of war with Prussia, its leaders were faced with a long list of suspect nationalities and an eroding financial base. The loss of Lombardy left the Monarchy in possession of a Veneto whose population expected to be joined to Italy within a few years. The Croats were openly suspect, the Magyars sullenly obstinate. The Hungarian Diet had been suspended in August 1861; by November the country was once again under martial law, and the military engaged in a grinding, often futile, series of tax-collection campaigns. Faced with discontent at home, the need to defend the Monarchy's remaining Italian possessions, and the possibility of a war over leadership in the Germanies, the army found itself woefully short of manpower either to fight abroad or to maintain order at home.

On paper, the imperial-royal army could field a half million men upon mobilization. The strength of the infantry had been augmented in the summer of 1848 by activating each regiment's first Landwehr battalion as a fourth regular battalion, and the fourth battalions had never been retired. In mid-1852 the infantry had been officially declared to consist of sixty-two line regiments of four field battalions and a depot battalion.
each.96 This gave the army a mobilized strength of half a million,97 but the actual number was far less. The Monarchy's financial straits and the difficulty of extracting recruits from Hungary made a system of five battalions too expensive to operate. In 1855 the depot battalions were dissolved and the fourth line battalions thinned and returned to the regimental recruiting districts to serve as training cadres.98 When in September 1859 the decision was taken to enlarge the infantry by eighteen regiments, there was a marked shortage of soldiers.

The planned expansion envisaged transforming sixty-two regiments of four battalions to eighty regiments of three battalions and a depot cadre. Each old regiment would give up two battalions to the new regiments, and units would be shuffled between older regiments to make up for the loss of Lombard troops. The 4. Hoch-und-Deutschmeister gave up its 2. and 3. battalions to the new 72. (Pressburg) and received the 3. battalion of the 14.(Linz). The 48.(Nagy-Kanisza) took in the 3/52.(Funfkirchen) but sent out its own 2. and 3. battalions to the 44., late of Milan, now re-forming in Kaposvar. The 44. in turn sent a cadre of officers and NCOs from the 2/44. to the 6.(Neusatz). The 20.(Neu-Sandec) sent its 2. and 3. battalions to the 67.(Eperjes)
and took in the 3.56(Wadowice)." The Lombard regiments were given new recruiting grounds, often in Hungary, where Italian troops had long been commonplace. The 23.(Lodi) was shifted to Maria-Theresiopel, the 43.(Bergamo) to Versec in the Banat, the 44.(Milan) to Kaposvar, the 55.(Como) to Brzezany in Galicia, and the 11. Uhlans, the only cavalry regiment raised in Habsburg Italy, were sent to Przemysl. Most of the Lombard soldiers were simply released from service in 1860, although some (especially the cavalrymen of the 11.Uhlans) seem to have served out their terms. The expansion could only take place by thinning already understrength regiments. The 4.Hoch-und-Deutschmeister, brought home to Vienna in triumph in 1854, paraded on the Glacis for the emperor and his new bride with a strength of eighty men per company. When in 1860 the 2/4. and the 3/4. were transferred to the new 72., company strength fell to sixty.  

The 1860s opened badly for the army. The expansion of the infantry meant in concrete terms only a thinning of existing resources: eighteen new regimental banners implied the costs of eighteen new recruiting districts and training depots and competition for a fixed (and inadequate) number of warm bodies. The demands of the Lombard war had meant an early levying of recruits, and
the class of 1860 could not be raised. There was little help to be had from outside sources. Revived parliamentary life in Austria was controlled by the German Liberals, and memories of October 1848 died hard: Liberal hatred of the army was exceeded only by Liberal distaste for the Church. The Reichsrat had a willingness to pay for a gendarmerie that would keep the mob and the Magyars in their places but no sympathy for enlarged military budgets. The military budget fell from 179 million florins in 1861 to 118 million in 1863/64; after the Danish campaign of 1864 it was cut again to 96 million.

In theory, 310-320,000 men reached the age of twenty every year in the Monarchy, of which 85,000 would be recruited for eight years in the line and two years in the reserves. Allowing for a 2000-man naval levy, the imperial army at full mobilization could draw on ten classes of 83,000 men and a force of 50,000 Grenzers. In practice, only those recruits destined for the cavalry saw eight years of service. Artillery and engineering troops generally served four to six years, and infantry only one and one half to three. After 1855, most of the infantry were furloughed after eighteen months and did (at most) an eight-week autumn drill for the rest of their line obligation. Austrian military authorities
continued to insist that long-service troops alone could be properly trained and shielded from outside influences. The latter belief was universal, though its empirical accuracy has been questioned. The eight-year term of service and the pressure of finances meant that the imperial army would be only minimally trained and woefully short of reserves. Indeed, Benedek complained from Italy in 1862 that the regiments of the 2. Army were "wholly disorganized" and that, with only fifty men to a company, no real tactical training was possible. Some of his battalions were down to a mere twelve men per company, a state of only ghostly existence.

It was nonetheless true that the Northern Army of 1866 was fully imperial-royal, drawn from all the crownlands of the Monarchy, with Venetian infantry alongside Hungarian, Bohemian, and Lower Austrian soldiers. Benedek's army was poorly trained and equipped and led by men who had learned nothing in 1859, but there was little open resistance to the war. Mobilization on the Border, where South Slav conspiracies had been festering, was "orderly, if unenthusiastic." Italian attempts to promote an insurrection on the Monarchy's flank were of no significance, and Garibaldi spent much of August 1866 in a fit of rage and despair over the "shameful apathy" of the peasants of the Veneto,
who gave aid and comfort to the "foreign mercenaries" of the Habsburgs. A contemporary observer gave a rough national breakdown of the imperial army as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Cavalry</th>
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<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siebenburgen</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Borderlands</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>41</td>
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Helmert's detailed analysis for the end of 1865 gives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Infantry</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>126,300</td>
<td>26  %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech-Slovak</td>
<td>96,300</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>52,700</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthene</td>
<td>50,100</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>37,700</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magyar</td>
<td>32,500</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>27,600</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovene</td>
<td>22,700</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>20,700</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>492,700</td>
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</tbody>
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The Northern Army was woefully understrength. The Monarchy could raise only 528,000 men in 1866—of which 463,000 (400,000 infantry, 29,000 cavalry, 24,000 artillery, 10,000 engineers) were combat troops. Ninety-four thousand men were needed to man the fortresses of the Monarchy, thirty battalions of regulars (25,000 men)
were designated for internal security in Hungary and Vienna; 20,000 more were kept in recruiting areas as training cadres. Only 310,320,000 men remained available for a two-front war. Friedjung estimated that Benedek began his campaign with 238,000 men, and the 210,000 imperial-royal soldiers he commanded at Königgrätz were roughly equal to the Prussian forces opposing him.

Archduke Albrecht, commanding in Italy, had only 74,000 men available at the outbreak of hostilities and only 110,000 available at Custozza to oppose a total Italian force of 260,000 under La Marmora. Plaschka noted that the Northern Army, fighting for hegemony in Germany, had two regiments each from lower Austria and Styria and one from Upper Austria; the bulk of the infantry was drawn from Bohemia, Galicia, Venetia, and Hungary. The bulk of the Feldjägers were Bohemian, as were both dragoon regiments and a majority of the heavy cavalry. Plaschka believed that 1866 was the last truly heartfelt merging of peoples for Kaiser and Reich.

The debacle at Königgrätz was the product of years of decay and neglect. The army forfeited the remnants of the prestige it had won in 1848, but it is important to note that the imperial army was by no means finished as a fighting force. Albrecht, named to the disgraced Benedek's command, hurried up to Vienna from his victory.
at Custozza, followed by 70,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry.\textsuperscript{114} Albrecht mobilized all available units, called up another 83,000 recruits, and with 334,000 men and 533 guns under his command was prepared to fight on.\textsuperscript{115} The summer of 1866 was not so black as 1740, and the archduke was ready to fight on the Danube and raise the loyal populations of Bohemia and Moravia.\textsuperscript{116} Even with the conclusion of an armistice with the Prussians, the war went on in the south, and 20,000 imperial troops a day poured back into Venetia, shattering the morale of an Italian army just then rejoicing over small successes near Trient. French observers with the Italians, expecting a temporary French stewardship over Venetia before the Italians took possession, were furious that the archduke's men were deploying on "their" railroads.\textsuperscript{117} Albrecht's performance in Italy and the crushing victory of the imperial fleet at Lissa saved the Monarchy's position as a great power; the unitary structure created in 1849 could not be saved.

The failure of the Silvesterpatent of 1861 had been manifest in Hungary from the outset, and in 1863 the Czechs and Poles had withdrawn from the Reichsrat as well. As early as the winter of 1863 groups of Hungarian conservatives had presented the emperor with petitions calling for "dualism in equality" under which an
indivisible Monarchy would support two parliaments and a joint ministry for war and foreign affairs. The ideas were Count György Apponyi's, and if they failed to impress the imperial cabinet, they did impress Ferenc Deak, leader of the moderates in the Hungarian Diet, who appropriated them for his own. Deak's luck, which had saved him from Haynau's courts-martial and from political obscurity, gave him credit for the ideas behind the Ausgleich, the future Compromise of 1867 between Hungary and dynasty. As opinion in Hungary turned against the exiles of '48 after Kossuth proposed that Hungary be joined to Serbia, Croatia, and the Principalities in a Balkan federation, Deak's voice became the dominant one on the Hungarian scene. By the beginning of 1866 the police reported to the interior ministry in Vienna that the magnates of Hungary were of no consequence; no voice other than Deak's counted. Certainly by December 1864 the emperor, at the urging of Albrecht, whose tactical eye was always acute, was secretly in touch with Deak. In April 1865 Deak published an unsigned "Easter Article" in his party's paper. German translations appeared almost simultaneously. No one on either side of the Leitha, the little river which served as the nominal boundary between Hungary and the Austrian lands, doubted that the article
was Deak's; few people knew that the imperial court had 
had advance knowledge of its contents. 122

Deak's proposals, generally known as the May 
Program, were a decided retreat from the long-held 
Hungarian insistence on a return to the constitutional 
structure of April 1848. "We stand ready," Deak wrote, 
"to concert our laws with the continued existence of the 
empire." 123 A constitutional Hungary would admit that 
it shared a common ruler and army with a constitutional 
Austria and could accept the fiscal machinery needed to 
fund a common defense and foreign policy. The proposals 
produced immediate imperial responses. At the end of 
April the emperor arrived at Pressburg without his usual 
military escort to present gifts to the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences. On 6 June he appeared without notice in 
Budapest to announce the suspension of the military 
courts that had governed since the uproar of October 
1860. On 20 September 1865 the Silvesterpatent was 
suspended pending full conciliation with Hungary, and 
elections for a new Diet were set for November. On 14 
December Franz Joseph opened the new Hungarian Diet; the 
sole item on the agenda was the "revision," by which the 
Magyars meant the re-enactment, of the constitution of 
April 1848.
Deak and his followers, firmly in control of the Diet, elected a committee of sixty-seven to conduct negotiations. The committee in turn elected a select committee of fifteen, headed by Deak and his deputy and heir-apparent, Count Gyula Andrassy, to act as its executive body. The Deak team was completely in control: Andrassy chaired both committees and Deak's draft proposals met no challenges. The committee of fifteen pressed on with its work despite the Diet recess proclaimed at the outbreak of war. Deak's famous moderation—his celebrated remark to the emperor that Hungary asked for nothing more after Königgrätz than before—was a desire to present the Austrians with a fait accompli. Win or lose in Bohemia (and Deak was unsure which would be better for Hungary\textsuperscript{124}) the Hungarian position would be clear. The committee's draft was published the same day, 25 June 1866, as the announcement of Albrecht's triumph in Italy.

Deak and Andrassy had succeeded in controlling events thus far; it was only on the question of the future of the army that their hold was not secure. It was obvious that the dynasty regarded the army as its ultimate guarantor, a point continually reiterated by Albrecht, and the Hungarians found it self-evident that Hungary could not truly be a nation without an army of
its own. Demands for a separate Hungarian army went back at least to the beginning of the century, and the Diet of 1839 had called for a force officered by Hungarians and commanded in Magyar. A minority of Deak's committee of fifteen, led by Kalman Tisza, insisted that in the aftermath of Königgrätz the moment had come to create an Hungarian army. The Pragmatic Sanction, Tisza claimed, required that Hungary and the Austrian lands have only a common defense and not a common army. Deak and Andrassy, with greater realism, argued that the imperial authorities would never accept a division of the army; such a demand would be an open provocation. If the Committee made such a demand, Deak warned, they would bring ruin to both themselves and the nation. There was no way around the right of the monarch to an army with a unified leadership, and Deak had no desire to test the limits of imperial patience. The majority of the committee of fifteen voted to wait on the army issue pending the outcome of the political settlement.

The decision to wait did not mean that Deak and Andrassy had decided to make any concessions to Vienna. In late July Deak informed the emperor that, while Königgrätz had not changed his demands, neither would he support a second recruit levy in Hungary for the continuance of the war. The introduction of
universal service in December found no support in Hungary, and Andrassy made violent statements against such a "violation" of the "rights of the nation."

Imperial circles knew their limits as well: conscription had been an attempt to circumvent Hungarian demands, and shortly after the turn of the year it was quietly suspended.  

Deak was willing to admit that a unified army was the only practical form of military organization in the modern world and that a concrete division of the army would have a "crippling influence" on any effective command in wartime. The imperial government issued a royal rescript on 17 November 1866 reaffirming the unity of the army and the imperial prerogatives of command, but indicating a willingness to compromise over recruitment and supply. On 9 January 1867 the committee of fifteen assembled under Count Ferdinand Beust, the Saxon exile now serving as Franz Joseph's foreign minister, to present its final report. The final version accepted a traditional reading of the Pragmatic Sanction. The monarch would have exclusive rights of command over the army; the Hungarian parliament would be responsible for conscription, quartering, and supply within the borders of the Kingdom of Hungary.
Thus far control of the army was restored to the status of 1722/23. Article 12 of the finished Ausgleich document reserved to the Diet control over recruiting, length of service, quartering, and supply. The Consilium Locumentale Hungaricum had had as much authority in the eighteenth century. Article 13 gave the Hungarian ministry veto power over any basic structural alteration in the military system that would affect Hungary, thus giving the Hungarians power to block any real change in the role of the army or its place in the Monarchy.132 Article 11 of the Ausgleich expressed the committee of fifteen's compromise; its language was sufficiently obscure to give hope to those who still wished for a Hungarian army:

In accordance with the constitutional sovereign rights of His Majesty in regard to the area of military affairs, all matters relating to the unified leadership, command, and internal organization of the army as a whole, and thus also of the Hungarian Army as an integral part of the common army, are recognized as being reserved to His Majesty.133

The acceptance of the report was followed on 18 February by the appointment of an autonomous ministry in Hungary. Two days later the high command spoke out. On 20 February 1867 the Archduke Albrecht issued an order of the day acknowledging the existence of a Hungarian war ministry, but insisting that the army was still a unified
force and inveighing against any expression of separatism. The language of Article 11—"Befehligung und innere Organisation des ganzen Heeres und so auch des ungarischen Heeres, als integrierenden Teiles des gesamten Heeres"—was vague enough to mean anything from Hungarian regiments within the army to national guard units to regiments of a wholly autonomous force, and Albrecht understood enough about Hungarian aspirations to realize that such language would be an opening wedge in a campaign to divide the army. Over the next two years Albrecht devoted himself to arguing at court against any concessions to the Hungarians, and he finally took a step unheard of for an archduke, publishing a nominally-anonymous pamphlet entitled Wie soll Oesterreichs Heer Organisiert sein? (How Should Austria's Army Be Organized?) in which he violently attacked the Hungarian leadership for undermining the unified spirit of the army.

The Hungarian radicals were quick to use Albrecht's opposition to attack Deak and Andrassy for their failure to restore a national army. No Hungarian politician could afford to seem too accommodating toward Vienna, and any concrete work on reform, and restoration of full recruiting, stalled. By autumn patience was wearing thin in both capitals; another serious confrontation seemed
In November the emperor intervened personally. Colonel Friedrich Beck of the imperial military chancellery was sent to deal with Andrassy, and the leading generals of the Monarchy were assembled and ordered to map out a plan for army reform that would maintain the unity of the army without violating the new constitutional structure. The emperor was a man of limited range, but he was rigidly consistent once committed. He had accepted Dualism; he was now determined to have both the Ausgleich and a unified army.

Andrassy was under sharp pressure to extract concessions from Vienna. Yet Beck, beginning a brilliant career as the emperor's confidant, was able to present a compelling case. A national Hungarian army would have its own Slav and Romanian regiments, and the anger of even Palacky's Austro-Slavs over the Ausgleich opened the way to demands for Slavic armies within the Monarchy. In any case—how long could Hungary stand alone? The spectre of Russian armies and Slavic insurrections hovered over any vision of a separate Hungary. Andrassy was willing to yield on the question of using German as the language of service (Dienstsprache) for the joint army and went on to promise that he would not press for the dissolution of the Border, a zone that the
Hungarians saw as both infected with Slav nationalism and a potential base for intervention in Hungary. He could not forego the creation of some kind of Hungarian force, and he proposed that under a joint, imperial-royal (Kaiserlich-königlich—k.-k.) regular army there would exist "national" forces—an Austrian Landwehr and an Hungarian Honvedseg—controlled by the two ministries. Beck reported to his master that Andrassy's position, given the state of affairs in Budapest, was reasonable and perhaps even courageous. Beck did, however, see the national guards as a militia on a Tirol model: men over thirty already done with reserve service, used for internal security duties, and likely to see action only as auxiliaries in times of emergency. Andrassy's own view was obscure, but the Diet was unlikely to accept so minor a role for a revived Honvéd.

Albrecht was less easily convinced than Colonel Beck. A restored Honved would only glorify the traitors of 1848/49, and it would give unreliable elements and potential rebels access to training and weapons. More to the point, local politicians would feel free to lavish funds on the national guards in the name of national pride and patronage while stinting the real army, the joint imperial forces. The generals, convened in conference in late February 1868, were in a dangerously
restive mood. FML Karl Moering argued that the moment had come to force a break with Hungary; FML Count Bigot de St. Quentin argued that the army, as final guarantor of the Monarchy and the dynasty, must act to preserve the emperor's role, even against the emperor's wishes. Nonetheless, habits of obedience were deeply ingrained, and Cromwell's disease had never infected the Monarchy. On 23 March the army command reported their acceptance of Andrassy's proposals.

The Hungarians' appetite only grew with eating, and throughout the balance of the year they made additional demands. Affairs had now come down to matters made all the more virulent for their symbolic nature. The Hungarians sought to re-create the Honvéd of 1849 in matters of uniform and organization; Albrecht and the military would not countenance serving soldiers wearing the costume of traitors. Only in early June, again through the efforts of Colonel Beck, was a settlement reached. Honvéd organization and uniform would follow k.-k. patterns, but its units would be allowed distinctive flashes, buttons, and banners. Magyar would be the language of command, and soldiers of the Honvéd would swear an oath to both king and constitution. By mid-June the emperor was able to write Andrassy and
congratulate him on his willingness to join in solving the army question.

A final issue remained. The Honvéd of course contained hussars to support its infantry, but it had not been given artillery. The imperial command had followed the example of the British after the Sepoy Mutiny: the Indian Army, for all its excellent qualities, was not allowed artillery. The Hungarians saw the Honvéd as their national army, and the opposition in the Diet attacked Andrassy for allowing the Honvéd to be treated as a second-rate force over the question of artillery. Yet there would be no concessions here. The imperial command was absolutely unwilling to concede cannon to the Hungarians. In August 1868 Albrecht took time during a tour of Croatia to pray at Jellacic's grave and reiterate his views on unity and rebellion. The emperor and his high command remained firm: under no circumstances would the Honvéd be given artillery.142 Andrassy backed down, placating his vocal opposition with a pledge to strive in the future for an increased role for the Honvéd.143 Those Hungarians who sought heavy weapons for their army had to content themselves with the twenty batteries of gatling guns the Diet provided its army. The gatling guns were the subject of a heated debate in military circles that finally reached the emperor, who declared
them to be infantry weapons and not artillery. The victory was more than a little hollow. The guns proved unreliable and unwieldy, and by the mid-1870s they had been withdrawn from service. The Honvéd would have to wait another forty years before it had a second chance at artillery.

On 5 December 1868 an imperial order of the day announced the arrival of the new state of affairs:

Today a new formation, the Landwehr (Honvedseg) joins the army as a valuable addition to the common defense...[This formation] serves the same end as the Army...and I expect that all officers...and the generals in particular will do their utmost to strengthen the bonds between all the units of My Army and that they will strengthen the spirit of discipline and order and combat any divisive and dangerous influences from the outset.144

Beck had drafted the order with an eye to both Albrecht and Budapest. The Honvéd was accepted into the army, but it was an "addition" to the defenses of the Monarchy and not a separate force. Nominal command was given to the Archduke Joseph, one of the members of the dynasty least objectionable to the Hungarians, but actual control rested with the defense ministry in Budapest. The other peoples of the Monarchy, and the Slav subjects of Hungary in particular, saw the new arrangement as a threat: the Magyar lords now possessed an army. The fathers of
Dualism, warned the Czech writer Frantisek Palacky, would end by being the godfathers of Pan-Slavism "in its least desirable form."  

The arrangements negotiated by Beck and Andrassy led to a resumption of conscription and the extension of universal service. Subjects of the Monarchy were liable for twelve years of service, although the annual intake was limited by law to 95,000 men--55,000 from the Austrian lands and 40,000 from Hungary. Yet the Monarchy lacked the funds to absorb and train so many conscripts as first-line troops, and the intake was broken down by lot. The unlucky were sent to do three years' service with the joint army, then seven years with the reserves, and finally two years with either the Landwehr or the Honvéd. A middle group did two years on cadre duty with the Landwehr or Honvéd, and a lucky third group went straight into an Ersatz-Reserve where they would receive training only in time of war. The joint army's active forces numbered 255,000 in peacetime; wartime strength, excluding the Grenzer regiments but including the Landwehr and the Honvéd, stood at 800,000--half a million men fewer than France, six hundred thousand fewer than Russia.  

Dualism and universal service were not popular everywhere. The mountain population of Cattaro on the
Dalmatian littoral had traditionally been exempt from conscription, and the loss of that exemption provoked a revolt in 1869. A badly-managed punitive expedition of eighteen battalions found itself unable to cope with mountain warfare, and in 1870 conscription was temporarily suspended throughout the Krivosije. The Czechs were furious that the Magyars had achieved autonomy and an army, and nationalist riots and refusals to take the military oath took place across Bohemia. The military, however, had long known how to subdue unruly Czechs. Prague was under martial law from November 1868 to April 1869, and six battalions of infantry and a squadron of cavalry were brought in to overawe the Czechs.  

Albrecht had worried from the beginning that Dualism would give the two parliaments an excuse to starve the army, and in fact the army budget fell from eighty-five million florins in 1868 to seventy-five million in 1869. The war scare of 1870 brought it up to eighty million again, but thereafter, and especially in the depression years after 1873, the army found its budget slashed. On a percentage basis, the Monarchy spent less on its army than any other major power. The same was not true of the Hungarian Diet. While the Austrian Landwehr remained a cadre force, the Honvéd, which was training almost twice
as many men, was a favored child. In its first years the Honvéd was getting nine million florins a year. Depression cut the figures to seven million for 1874-76, but after 1877 the Honvéd budget soared past the nine million level again.  

The organizational capabilities of the Honvéd grew apace. By 1870 Honvéd units were participating in joint army maneuvers, and after 1873 the Honvéd possessed its own divisional and territorial commands. The credit went to Baron Fejervary, late of the emperor's military chancellery. Archduke Joseph was titular commander of the Honvéd, but actual control lay with Bela Szende, the longtime Hungarian war minister. In 1872 Fejervary had been promoted to Generalmajor and transferred from command of the 72. (Pressburg) Infantry to Budapest, where he was named Szende's military secretary. Fejervary rapidly and effectively integrated ninety-two battalions of Honvéd infantry and forty squadrons of cavalry into twenty-eight infantry regiments and ten regiments of hussars drawn from seven military districts which, unlike those of the Landwehr, were not congruent with joint-army corps areas. In 1873 Fejervary was responsible for just under 160,000 men; by 1876 he could report that 200,000 men were combat-ready and deployed in brigade and divisional frameworks. Their training was up
to k.-k. standards, and done from Magyar and Croat manuals Fejervary had had translated.\textsuperscript{150} Five years later the imperial command concluded that, in sharp contrast to the Landwehr, the Honvéd was a highly-capable force\textsuperscript{151}, lacking only artillery to be as good as any k.-k. troops. The irony here was that Fejervary was an imperial loyalist to the core. His appointment had provoked sharp attacks in the Hungarian Diet, where some deputies took note of his loyalty to the dynasty and declared him unfit to command a Honvéd which represented the Hungarian spirit and nation.\textsuperscript{152} The emperor had accepted Dualism and intended to support it; Fejervary's own attitude was the same. The loyalist technician presided over the creation of a Hungarian national force.

The Habsburgs had long devoted themselves to the special skill of conservatives: salvaging what could be salvaged from the corrosion of change. Albrecht had been gifted with a full measure of his family's talent, and, although he had not been able to block the formation of the Honvéd, he was able to hold the line around the joint army. Allmayer-Beck claimed that after 1867 the army was a pawn in factional and national maneuverings--an object, not an actor.\textsuperscript{153} Albrecht's achievement was to keep the outside world beyond the doors of the officers' mess. The archduke's deepest belief was that the officers must
be kaisertreu alone—that in the end only the loyalty of the imperial officers held the Monarchy together.

Albrecht devoted himself to championing the alt-österreichisch virtues in the army. There were, though, far too few regular officers and NCOs. Even with the introduction of reserve commissions for men of education who volunteered for a year of training, the ranks of the Monarchy’s defenders were thin indeed. At the end of the 1870s there were only 12,055 regular and 5143 reserve officers on the army list. The einjährige provided some relief, but also, as the story of the army after August-September 1914 showed, brought the world of partisan politics and partisan nationalism one step closer to the army. The post-1867 army saw itself as the emperor’s army. Yet it found itself increasingly beleaguered. The Hungarians had achieved home rule and were building their own army; the Czechs would demand the same. The army was now subject to the whims of parliamentary control; its foreign horizons dimmed year by year. The army had now to deal with the nationalities as well as render service to the dynasty. Yet it still had its strengths; the measure of its vitality is that it was able in the latter half of the 1870s to support one more wave of reforms.
Notes to Chapter Two


16. See Walter Rogge, Österreich von Vilagos zur Gegenwart, 3 vols. (Leipzig-Vienna, 1873), II: 36-37; Macartney, Habsburg Monarchy, p. 485, 509N.


34. Ibid., pp. 499-500.

35. Ibid., p. 501.

36. Sondhaus, p. 52.


42. See the Italian regimental histories in Wrede, *Geschichte*, vol. I.


44. *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch*; 1858, 1862.


46. Ibid. 1:20, 50, 148.


59. George Spottiswode, "A Tour in Military and Civil Croatia" in Francis Galton, ed., *Vacation Tourists and Notes in 1860* (London, 1861); troop movements listed in KA, KM Präs-Büro 1859 #1841, 1845, 1900, 2199.


66. In Regele, Benedek, p. 207.

67. Ibid., p. 208.


70. Regele, Benedek, p. 225.

71. Ibid., p. 205.


74. Carl von Duncker, *Feldmarschall Erzherzog Albrecht* (Vienna-Prague, 1897), p. 188.


82. Redlich, Emperor Francis Joseph, p. 197.


84. Kiraly, Ferenc Deak, p. 139.


86. Regele, Benedek, p. 318; Macartney, Habsburg Monarchy, p. 487.


89. Wrede, Geschichte 1: 108-09.


91. Redlich, Emperor Francis Joseph, p. 228.


94. Richard Plaschka, "Zwei" Niederlagen um Königgrätz," Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 74 (1966): 410; on Klapka, see H. L. Kilpatrick, Bismarck's Insurrectionary Projects during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1966); also A. Kienast, Das Legion Klapka (Vienna, 1900).


97. KA, 60 Jahre Wehrmacht, pp. 41-42.

99. See Wrede, Geschichte, 1: Beilage IV for Table of Transfers.

100. Finke, Deutschmeister, p. 192, 201.


103. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, p. 58.

104. Friedjung, Kampf, 1: 348.


107. Kienast, Das Legion Klapka, pp. 84-86.


111. Helmert, Militärystem, p. 41.

112. Friedjung, Kampf, 1: 350.


116. KA, Feldakten 1866 F.7/42-7, "Operierende Armee unter Erzherzog Albrecht."


118. Király, Deak, p. 166.


130. KA, MKSM 1867 82-1/2; KA, MKSM 1867 82-5/1; Eduard von Wertheimer, *Graf Julius Andrássy*, 3 vols (Stuttgart, 1910-13), 1: 250.


134. KA, KM Präs-Büro 1867 44/46.

135. [Archduke Albrecht], *Wie Soll Österreichs Heer organisiert sein?* (Vienna, 1868).


138. KA, MSKM Sonderreihe F. 76.

139. KA, MKSM 1868 82-3/20.

140. Albrecht to Kriegsminister Baron John, December 1867, KA, Nachlass John, B.138-22.


144. KA, MKSM 1868 82/3-14 in various drafts.


150. Ibid., pp. 88-89.


On 30 July 1878 four divisions of the Austrian army advanced out of Croatia and southern Dalmatia and entered the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The imperial-royal forces, numbering some 72,000 men, had been sent to occupy the two provinces under the just-concluded terms of the Treaty of Berlin. In early summer, Count Gyula Andrássy, now the Monarchy’s foreign minister, had proclaimed that the whole operation could be carried out by a couple of squadrons of hussars and a regimental band.¹ His remark was one of those unfortunate statements that return with depressing regularity to haunt bellicose politicians. The initial force of four divisions proved woefully inadequate, and five additional divisions plus various specialist units had to be sent as reinforcements. In the two-and-a-half months before the occupation of the two provinces was officially declared to be complete (19 October 1878), nearly a quarter of a million of the Monarchy’s soldiers had been mobilized for service in Bosnia. In early October 1878 imperial-royal forces in the field numbered 159,000 men; total Austrian casualties for the campaign came to 5198 men killed, wounded, and missing.²
The campaign in Bosnia and the Herzegovina was the first war of the Dualist age, and the Monarchy had mobilized nearly a third of its wartime strength. The imperial-royal forces faced opponents of all kinds, from battalions of Turkish regulars to bands of native partisans, whose total strength was estimated at 93,000 - 95,000.3 The Bosnian terrain was inhospitable and the local population largely hostile. Yet the imperial-royal forces performed quite creditably. Indeed, as Gunther Rothenberg pointed out, the Austrian performance in 1878 compares favorably with that of the German army in the same countryside in the 1940s.4 The occupation campaign was the Monarchy's major military effort in the half-century between the Ausgleich and the First World War, and for the Monarchy's military leadership it ended twenty years of military humiliation. The successful occupation of Bosnia in the face of determined opposition helped erase the memory of those disasters, of defeat in the field in Lombardy and Moravia, of the fiasco over the introduction of conscription in the Krisvosije in 1869.

The post-Ausgleich army had fought and won its first battles. Yet the Monarchy's Balkan entanglements meant a continuing threat of hostilities with Russia. Throughout the 1880s the army had not only to face the political consequences of the Ausgleich and growing nationalist
sentiment at home but to plan for a major war in Galicia against an enemy vastly superior in numbers.

Relations between Russia and the Monarchy had been strained since the Crimean War. The Monarchy might have been expected to repay Russian aid in Hungary in 1849 with military support, but the Monarchy had instead declared its armed neutrality and temporarily occupied the Danubian Principalities. The decay of Ottoman power in the Balkans highlighted the potential for conflict between the two states. The Monarchy preferred that the Turks remain in control of their European possessions, but should Turkish rule collapse, its diplomats feared either a Russian policy of outright territorial expansion or the creation of independent Balkan states under Russian protection and control, states which would also exert a destabilizing influence on the Monarchy’s South Slav populations.5

Yet hostility had not yet seemed inevitable at the end of the 1860s. Russian foreign policy under Prince Alexander Gorchakov had sought in many ways to accommodate the Monarchy. Early in 1867 Gorchakov approached Count Revertera, the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg, with the offer of an agreement that would give the Russians the right to occupy Ottoman-ruled Bessarabia in exchange for Austrian control of either Albania or the Herzegovina.6 The idea of coordinating the Balkan policies of the two states found a ready audience among the military circle
around Archduke Albrecht, where this was seen as a gesture of amity that might lead to an alliance directed against Prussia.

The aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War put a halt to any entente between Russia and the Monarchy. On 31 October 1870 the Russians, taking advantage of Prussian involvement in France, announced their decision to remilitarize the Black Sea, closed to Russian warships since 1856. Fifteen years after their humiliation in the Crimean War, the Russians had contrived to return to the Balkan scene with a unilateral flourish. There was an immediate flurry of panicky talk in both Vienna and Budapest. Some Hungarian circles, led by Count Gyula Andrassy, argued for immediate military action against the Russians.7 Franz Baron Kuhn, the Monarchy’s war minister, saw the Russian actions in the Black Sea as a prelude to a Russian march into the Balkans and sought unsuccessfully to convince the emperor to order an immediate attack into Russian Poland to seize Warsaw.8 Even Albrecht, a proponent of a Russian alliance, was worried enough by the Russians’ unilateral action to order staff studies done for a war against Russia.9

Albrecht was nonetheless unwilling to give his support to Kuhn’s and Andrassy’s desire for a confrontation with the Russians. He remained convinced that a Russian alliance was both possible and desirable,
and as late as 1875 he would visit St. Petersburg in an attempt to interest the Russians in an alliance directed against the Germans.\textsuperscript{10} Albrecht's position was seen as a personal affront by Andrassy, who had been named foreign minister in the autumn of 1871, and early in 1872 Andrassy had begun to complain to the emperor that Albrecht was attempting to make foreign policy on his own. Albrecht and his supporters responded by pointing out that, with its huge and restive Slav population, the Monarchy needed the friendship of the Russians and that Andrassy's policies were based on Magyar bitterness over Russian intervention in Hungary in 1849 and not on any concern for the interests of the Monarchy.\textsuperscript{11}

Beyond any considerations of foreign policy, much of the military leadership believed that the Monarchy's army was completely unready for war with the Russians. There had been doubts about the army's readiness for war in the summer of 1870, and, after the decision had been made to remain neutral in the Franco-Prussian War, Franz Joseph had ordered a special investigation into the combat-readiness of the army. The problem, the report indicated, was not manpower. In six weeks the Monarchy could have put 600,000 men into the field. The problem, as in 1859 and 1866, was logistics. The imperial-royal forces would have been hard-put to feed, clothe, and provide transport for themselves. Albrecht, attacking the unwillingness of
the Reichsrat to fund the army, claimed that any reserve units mobilized in 1870 would have been untrained and without arms.\textsuperscript{12} Despite the eagerness of Andrássy and Kuhn for a confrontation with the Russians, Albrecht contended that the army could not fight a major war.

Albrecht's views, published as an anonymous pamphlet on "Das Jahr 1870 und die Wehrkraft der Monarchie" in the late autumn of 1870, were of course politically motivated. The archduke attacked the Hungarians and the German Liberals of the Reichsrat for allowing the combat-readiness of the army to decay, and he was wholly opposed to Hungarian desires for a war with Russia. Yet, despite his position that the army was unready for a major war, he was more than willing to mobilize against Bismarck's Prussia. Albrecht's desire to fight a war of revenge in Germany did not wane until late in the 1870s, though his views, especially after the appointment of Andrássy as foreign minister, represented an ever-smaller minority among the emperor's advisors.\textsuperscript{13} The archduke did not wish to give up his cherished vision of Austro-Russian forces driving to the gates of Berlin, of the black-and-yellow standards of the Monarchy going up over the ruins of Potsdam. Nonetheless, Albrecht was well aware that the army had its own Balkan policy, one which, while differing sharply from the official foreign policy of Andrássy and
the diplomats at the Ballhausplatz, was likely to lead to conflict with Russia.

The army’s interest in the Balkans had initially centered on the problem of defending the Küstenland, the Monarchy’s long, narrow strip of littoral that ran down the eastern shore of the Adriatic from Istria through Dalmatia. The terrain was mountainous and desolate, and much of the population had little use for any governmental authority. There were few roads, and the Küstenland lacked any strategic depth. As long ago as the mid-1850s the aged Radetzky had argued that the Monarchy would need Bosnia to make Dalmatia secure—a point of view that Baron Beck, the head of the emperor’s military chancellery, had been arguing since the mid-1860s. The loss of Venice in 1866 had left Trieste and Fiume as the Monarchy’s only seaports, making the acquisition of a defensive hinterland for the Küstenland imperative.14

The military were well aware of the decay of Ottoman power in the Balkans. The last Turkish garrisons had left Serbia in the early 1860s, and local revolt had become endemic throughout the western Balkans. By the beginning of the 1870s the collapse of Turkish authority seemed all too likely. During his tenure as Hungarian premier, Andrassy had argued that the Monarchy should work for the cession of Bosnia to Serbia, a move that would separate a grateful Serbia from Russian influence.15 The military,
more concerned than Andrassy with defending the Dalmatian provinces, was unwilling to see an enlarged Serbia, since it would serve as a focus for South Slav nationalism. By extending the Monarchy’s sway inland the military hoped to channel Slav nationalism into acceptably pro-Austrian sentiments.

Throughout the Ausgleich negotiations Albrecht had supported the creation of an autonomous South Slav province based on the lands of the Military Border, and in reaction Andrassy and the Hungarian leadership had feared that the military’s interest in the South Slavs was part of a plan to use the Grenzers of the Border and the Slav populations of Turkish Croatia to put political and military pressure on Hungary. The Magyar leadership had refused to ratify the military budget in 1869 unless the Military Border was dissolved, but even after the incorporation of the Border into civil Croatia in 1871 Andrassy and his fellow Magyar lords believed that the army, led by Albrecht, was carrying out its own policy in the Balkans in an effort to use the South Slavs against Hungary.

Andrassy and the Hungarian leadership wanted no more Slavs in the Monarchy, no increase in the Monarchy’s Slavic population that might upset the political balance of Dualism. Andrassy’s preference as foreign minister was to support continued Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The
policies of Feldzeugmeister Baron Franz Rodich, the
governor of Dalmatia, were designed to undermine Turkish
authority in Bosnia. Rodich, acting with the support of
Beck and Albrecht, devoted himself to establishing contact
with Croatian nationalists in Bosnia and offering
financial support and protection to Catholic missionaries
preaching pro-Habsburg doctrines among the Croats across
the Turkish border.19 When Beck persuaded the emperor to
tour Dalmatia in the spring of 1875, Rodich arranged to
have Franz Joseph greeted by hand-picked deputations of
both locals and Bosnian refugees who petitioned for
Austrian protection. Feldmarschalleutnant Baron Anton
Mollinary, the imperial-royal corps commander in Zagreb,
was convinced that Rodich was actively encouraging revolt
in Bosnia.20 The Monarchy’s military leadership had
serious reservations about a direct conflict with Russia,
but it was prepared to carry on an active policy of
destabilization in the Balkans despite the risk of Russian
involvement that an Ottoman collapse would bring.

Andrassy’s own position in the mid-1870s was
considerably less confrontational than it had been during
the Black Sea crisis. He had been unable to interest the
British in cooperating with the Monarchy against the
Russians,21 and by 1873 he had yielded to Bismarck’s
pressure for a rapprochment with Russia. Andrassy saw
Germany as both the Monarchy’s natural ally and as
supporter of Hungary’s special position within the Monarchy, and, despite his personal misgivings, he had joined Bismarck in agreeing to a show of amity in the Dreikaiserbund of 1873. The Dreikaiserbund itself provided for little more than consultations among the three signatories in the event of threats to the peace, but it had created a channel for Austro-Russian discussions on the future of the Balkans. When rebellion erupted in the Herzegovina in the summer of 1875, both Andrassy and Gorchakov sought to localize its effects and induce the Ottoman authorities to reform their administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The revolt itself was the product of local conditions, not foreign intrigues. There had been widespread crop failure in 1874, and the Turkish authorities in the Herzegovina had called in troops to collect delinquent taxes, provoking an uprising that spread across both provinces. Andrassy’s policy of maintaining Ottoman authority was rapidly overtaken by events as the Turks were unable to put down the revolt. Nor was the Dalmatian military command disposed to help the situation. Andrassy had secured imperial authorization for the Turks to use the Monarchy’s Adriatic ports to move both troops and supplies into Bosnia, but all through the summer of 1875 Rodich was allowing chartered steamers to put in at Cattaro and unload
shipments of rifles and ammunition for the rebels across the border.\footnote{Andrassy complained to the emperor about "this enterprise of the military" and attempted to have all imperial-royal units made up of South Slav soldiers transferred out of Dalmatia.} Nonetheless Rodich, well aware that Andrassy would not consider any direct Austrian intervention so long as the Turks had any control over the situation,\footnote{Rodich, well aware that Andrassy would not consider any direct Austrian intervention so long as the Turks had any control over the situation} continued to aid the rebels. Supported by Beck and Albrecht, he allowed the rebels to use his territory as a haven safe from Turkish pursuit and established caches of arms and supplies for the Bosnians.\footnote{Rodich, well aware that Andrassy would not consider any direct Austrian intervention so long as the Turks had any control over the situation}

The success of the Bosnian rebels, and the uprisings that broke out in Bulgaria in the spring of 1876, made the collapse of Turkish authority seem ominously near. The governments of Serbia and Montenegro, prompted by domestic pressures, began to move toward war with the Turks. Belgrade and Cetinje seemed, much to the disquiet of the Monarchy's diplomats and soldiers, to be filled with pan-Slav journalists, streams of Russian envoys, and representatives of Russian "relief organizations" who were busily dispensing funds to the Bosnian rebels.\footnote{More disturbing still was the arrival in Belgrade of Russian volunteers and adventurers, many of them army officers, for service with the Serbian army against the Turks. By the beginning of summer it was clear that the Serbs and}
Montenegrins were about to go to war with the Turks, and Gorchakov and Andrassy met to confer on Balkan policy. In July 1876, just after Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Turks, the two foreign ministers met at Reichstadt and reached agreement. In the event of a Turkish defeat—something both men expected—the Monarchy would occupy parts of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; Russia would obtain Bessarabia and Batum on the Black Sea. In any case, neither party would intervene directly in the fighting. The agreements—the Reichstadt Accords—were primarily verbal and quite vague; neither minister had a clear understanding of exactly how much of Bosnia and the Herzegovina had been promised to the Monarchy. Nonetheless, both states were now deeply involved in the fate of European Turkey; neither could permit the other to be the sole beneficiary of an Ottoman collapse.29

The Serbian and Montenegrin armies had been expected to win an easy victory over the Turks. By September 1876, though, the Ottoman forces had managed to inflict a series of sharp defeats on the Serbs, forcing them to ask for an armistice guaranteed by the European powers.30 There suddenly existed the possibility that the Turks, already victorious over the rebellion in Bulgaria, might be able to reassert full control over Serbia and Montenegro. The Russians were unwilling to tolerate the loss of prestige involved in having two states which had been the object of
much diplomatic and financial patronage crushed, and they were equally unwilling to give up their promised territorial gains. By the end of 1876 they were preparing for a war with the Turks. Bolstered by further agreements with the Monarchy in January and March 1877 over the disposition of Bessarabia and Bosnia, the Russians declared war on 24 April 1877.

By early summer the Russian armies were on the Danube. Yet at the Ballhausplatz suspicion was growing that the Russians were likely to ignore their agreements with the Monarchy and impose a victor’s peace. At the end of July 1877 Andrassy, though sharply opposed by Albrecht and Beck, was arguing in favor of using the army to threaten Russian supply lines in Romania. He was willing to accept the military’s view that a Russian war would be long and bitter and would in all likelihood end in the destruction of at least one combatant, yet for the four months that the Russian armies were stalled before the Turkish citadel of Plevna, Andrassy continued to urge the military to support at least the threat of action against Russia.

On 15 January 1878 Franz Joseph presided over a ministerial council with Beck and Albrecht in attendance. The Russians had taken Sofia on 4 January and were moving across Rumelia toward the western approaches to Constantinople. Russian peace terms, first announced in
December, included the creation of a large Bulgarian client state and contained no mention of the cession of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to the Monarchy. Andrassy was convinced that war was at hand and he wanted only technical advice from the military.3

The military offered Andrassy two plans, offensives launched from either Transylvania or Galicia. The plans did not derive from the study prepared by Albrecht during the Black Sea crisis of 1870, but from staff exercises done in 1874 for Feldzeugmeister Baron Franz John, the chief of the general staff.34 Albrecht and Feldmarschallieutenant Baron Anton Schönfeld, the new chief of the general staff, supported the idea of an offensive from Galicia or the Bukovina as the more technically sound of the two options, but their advice came hedged with warnings: the Monarchy could not support a long war, and a second front was likely to erupt if the Italians scented blood. Furthermore, a war against Russia would leave the Monarchy vulnerable to any demands Germany, as a potential partner for either side, might choose to make. A protracted war would also lead to domestic difficulties, to unrest among the Monarchy's Czech and South Slav subjects.35 Albrecht's position was supported by Count Bylandt-Rheidt, war minister since 1876, who argued that mobilization alone would cost 310 million florins for the
first ninety days. The Monarchy could not afford that, let alone bear the costs of a major war.\textsuperscript{36}

Andrassy continued to press for action throughout February, but on 24 February he was informed by the emperor that there would be no mobilization. The Monarchy would accept the German call for a conference on the Balkans at Berlin. Andrassy was authorized to seek parliamentary approval for sixty million florins for "special military requirements," a euphemism for the costs of occupying Bosnia and the Herzegovina, but there would be no war. Franz Joseph was prepared to enforce the Monarchy's claim to Bosnia, but not to risk a major war. The Congress of Berlin fulfilled the Monarchy's hopes. The Russians were forced to abandon their designs for a greater Bulgaria powerful enough to dominate the Balkans, and on 13 July 1878 the Monarchy, supported by both Bismarck and Britain, received a European mandate for the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

The army was able to complete the occupation of the two provinces in just over ten weeks. However, any satisfaction over the actual occupation was short-lived. The flow of Russian aid to Serbia and Montenegro in 1875-76 and the Russian designs reflected in their demands on the Turks at the end of 1877--a greater Bulgaria garrisoned by Russian troops, Bosnia and the Herzegovina under Ottoman control, Serbia and Montenegro given a
common border—had given the military a disheartening vision of the future. Despite Bismarck’s efforts to link Russia and the Monarchy with Germany in at least nominal friendship and despite Albrecht’s desire for a Russian alliance, the army was now aware that its next major opponent would in all likelihood be Russia, and the army was far from convinced that it could sustain a war with a major power.

Discussion of the imperial-royal forces’ combat-readiness had begun as long ago as the late summer of 1870, in the aftermath of the Monarchy’s decision not to intervene in the Franco-Prussian war. The weaknesses in the army’s supply and transport systems and the unreadiness of the reserves discovered by the investigating committee established to look into the state of the army had served as a basis for Albrecht’s polemics against the unwillingness of the Reichsrat to support the army, and those discoveries had led to the establishment of a special commission on mobilization for various wartime scenarios. The commission’s work was slowed by the bureaucratic fights between the war ministry and the general staff that plagued the army throughout the early 1870s, and it was not until 1874 that recommendations for mobilization were ready in preliminary form and not until 1876 that new mobilization instructions were fully ready. By that time, however, Serbia and Montenegro
were at war with the Turks, the Monarchy was preparing to occupy Bosnia, and the possibility of conflict with Russia had become clear. In mid-1876 Count Arthur Bylandt-Rheidt, the Monarchy’s war minister, began talks with Baron Schönfeld, the chief of the general staff, on implementing measures for more rapid mobilization, and in November 1876 Schönfeld established a special department under Feldmarschalleutnant Baron Anton Vlasits of the general staff’s planning section to develop mobilization plans for concrete situations, meaning plans for a war against Russia.40

Staff studies developed in 1874—the studies which formed the basis for the plans offered to Andrassy in January 1878—suggested that war with Russia would begin with a clash in Galicia.41 The Monarchy’s forces would be hopelessly outnumbered in the field, and the solution first suggested in 1874—a quick spoiling attack into Russian Poland—became the foundation of Austrian war plans for the next forty years. The war plans finalized in 1880 assumed that the initial level of enemy forces would be thirty-four Russian divisions—twenty-two on the Galician front, twelve in the south. They would be opposed by twenty-five and a half imperial-royal divisions—twenty in Galicia, five and a half in the south.42 The initial disparity of forces would be worsened if troops had to be kept on alert against the
Italians. Schönfeld warned that even an ostensibly neutral Italy would have to be watched if war came in the east. In the event of serious tensions or open hostilities, anything up to a third of the Monarchy’s forces could be tied down on the Italian front. The Monarchy, if it fought alone, would be fighting against vastly superior numbers.

The only solution seemed to depend upon speed of mobilization. The imperial-royal forces would have to depend on an aggressive defense, on exploiting interior lines of communication. Yet in the mid-1870s the Monarchy’s railway net, at just under ten thousand kilometres of track, was barely sufficient for such a role. The rail lines had only come under government control after the financial crisis of 1873, although Beck and the war ministry had long argued for nationalization. The military did manage to have two new lines built into Galicia and to have the five existing lines double-tracked, but it was obvious that, given the limitations of the rail net, any attempt to reinforce rapidly the Galician front, especially if the order of battle had to be shifted and secondary fronts opened, would lead to chaos. Too many units were stationed too far from their recruiting zones and home depots.

There was no deliberate policy of non-national stationing of units. By the late 1870s half of the
Hungarian infantry regiments were on Hungarian territory. Yet the Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen were extensive; to be "at home" for an Hungarian regiment did not necessarily mean being near the regiment's recruiting district. The 2.(Fogaras) was at Kronstadt, the 51.(Klausenberg) at Peterwardein, the 33.(Arad) at Karlstadt, the 60.(Erlau) at Budapest. The same pattern was true all across the Monarchy. Being in its own crownland did not mean a regiment was in or near its recruiting district. A Bohemian regiment such as the 73.(Eger) might be stationed at Theresienstadt, or the Galician 55.(Brzezany) at Lemberg. Of the eighty imperial-royal infantry regiments, only ten were stationed in their respective recruiting districts in 1877. Early in 1881 Schönfeld presented Albrecht with a "Memoir on the Revision of New Scenarios Respective to a Russian War" that listed the hindrances that this kind of stationing presented to "a more rapid and effective opening of the campaign and thus to an energetic conduct of the war." There was, Schönfeld pointed out, no relationship between the corps commands and their component regiments. For XIII.Korps (Zagreb) or III.Korps (Graz) to be brought up to wartime strength, their designated regiments would have to be assembled from all across the Monarchy. This would be a transport nightmare, and with the post-1878 necessity for keeping a large occupation force in Bosnia, the order
of battle was permanently distorted. Only a territorial reorganization of the army, Schönfeld argued, would allow for an effective mobilization and rapid reinforcement of the Galician front.

Albrecht's own views were rather complex. The Archduke agreed with Schönfeld on the need to restructure the army. Schönfeld's "On the Combat-Readiness of the Various Armies: Parallels Between a Territorial System and Our Own" had argued that the Monarchy had chosen to rely on a small field army to buy time while it mobilized, yet nonetheless failed to provide trained reserves or cadres for corps or division-level mobilization. Albrecht agreed that there were far too few first-line battalions, and the Monarchy, unlike any of the other great powers, was counting its second-line formations, its reserves, as part of its operational army. At the beginning of hostilities, only thirty-two of the forty divisions existing on paper could actually take the field. Yet he was hesitant about a full program of territorialization. Albrecht distrusted the Hungarians on principle. Nothing had happened in thirty years to give him faith in the Magyars, and the archduke had no wish to see the Magyar lords with their own independent army. Throughout his tenure as inspector-general, Albrecht had concerned himself with the education and training of the army and its soldiers, and he was not at all sure Schönfeld or the more "modern"
generals understood just how heterogeneous the Monarchy and its army really were.

In April 1881 Albrecht presented the emperor with a memorandum on his own views. A greater "stabilization" of the army and its garrisons was needed, Albrecht argued, but a fully territorial organization was not possible. The army, Albrecht stressed, was, except for the dynasty itself, the only unifying element of the Monarchy ("ausser der Dynastie, das einzige Band der Reichszusammengehörigkeit"). An army where regiments were raised and garrisoned permanently in their recruiting districts would degenerate sooner or later into a collection of provincial militias (Provinzialmilizen) with no sense of the Monarchy as a whole. Albrecht had a sharp awareness of the dangers of exposing the army to local politics, and he found nationalism to be a "dangerous tendency growing day by day." But his concern was less with the possibility of subversion and revolt than with the slow decay and spiritual dissolution of the army.

Albrecht accepted Schönfeld's view that the complex linguistic map of the Monarchy gave a certain safety to territorialization: no territorial corps would be all of one language, and no single corps could form an independent army. The Archduke's own point was that the Monarchy was divided into cultural as well as linguistic zones. The backlands of Ruthenia or Transylvania were
separated from Bohemia or Lower Austria not only by language but by decades, if not centuries, of cultural development.

Albrecht's own conservatism was a kind that freed him from the prejudices of the bourgeois age: he believed unquestioningly in the superiority of the Dynasty and the aristocracy which served it, and from his eminence as a Habsburg and an archduke national prejudices and national claims to superiority were utterly irrelevant. The Magyar lords were all rebels at heart, he believed, but unlike Franz Ferdinand a generation later he never extended that belief to a hatred of Hungarians. He was very much his father's son and very much a man of the first years of the nineteenth century, if not the eighteenth. Every people had its special qualities, and the strength of the Monarchy derived from knowing how to recognize and combine those qualities inside the army. The "polyglot composition of the army" was its strength, Albrecht declared. One could find nowhere else in Europe "a better Jäger than the Tiroler or Inner-Austrian, a finer light cavalryman than the hussars of Hungary, a more cold-blooded cannoneer than the Bohemian, a more fearless sailor than the Dalmatian."³³

Nonetheless, whole provinces and peoples were intelligenzlos, lacking educated classes. The Monarchy was not so badly off as Russia, where seven conscripts in
ten were illiterate, but neither was it France, where even with the presence of recruits from Brittany and Guyenne, illiteracy was at only 5.5%—nor was it Germany, where only 0.2% of new conscripts could not read and write.\textsuperscript{54}

Twenty-two percent of all conscripts in the Monarchy were illiterate in the 1880s. At the end of the decade forty-two percent of all Hungarian recruits were illiterate, and as late as 1900 so were nineteen percent of the recruits from Lower Austria itself. The state of affairs worsened mile by mile in the eastern provinces. In Galicia only thirty percent of all adults were literate. In the Bukovina literacy was at twenty-nine percent; in Dalmatia it was twenty-two percent.\textsuperscript{55} For all Albrecht's faith in the courage of the ordinary infantryman and his bayonet, he was not fool enough to believe that one could do without technical specialists. The "rawest peoples" (rohesten Volkstännmen) of the Monarchy could provide no technical NCOs. If the mountains of the Monarchy provided no cavalry, that could be remedied. The cavalry had always been concentrated where it was most needed. But there would be no engineers or gunnery NCOs from Ruthenia or the depths of the Alfold. The poverty of the east was hideous enough. A Galician, social reformers pointed out, could do only a quarter of the work of an average European worker, and had access to less than half of what his counterparts in the West ate.\textsuperscript{56} The lack of education
meant that any units recruited and garrisoned on a purely
local basis would suffer from a critical lack of
engineers, gunners, and logistics staff.

The army of the Monarchy, like all others, depended
on the quality of its officers. The officers of an army
set its tone, imparted its spirit, and gave it its sense
of purpose. The occupation of Bosnia, Albrecht wrote, had
been a good thing for the spirit of the army: the
officers and men had experienced an arduous but successful
campaign against an elusive and tenacious foe together.
The officers of the Monarchy, whatever their nationality,
had fought for a common purpose. The Monarchy’s officers
had of necessity to be above nationality, to be
professionals committed only to the Dynasty; there was no
other course open to a multinational state, or
"formation," as Albrecht put it in one insightful
moment.57

Albrecht feared that territorialisation would reduce
the officer corps to a kind of epauletted proletariat.
The officers of a regiment would be permanently on
station, and Albrecht foresaw the stagnation of morale and
skill. A young lieutenant posted to a regiment would in
all likelihood remain there for the greater part of his
career. A Hungarian, Polish, or Croatian officer posted
to Budapest, Lemberg, or Zagreb would be subject to
national agitation, yes, but an officer posted to a
garrison in the Carpathians or deep in the Hungarian steppe would be cut off from the world. What professional skills, what breadth of outlook would survive a decade of isolated parade squares and empty horizons?

Territorialisation, Albrecht continued, was no panacea for the army’s difficulties. It could not be complete—and was indeed complete nowhere in Europe. The regiments had been drifting homeward ever since the Ausgleich, but fifty-one regiments and eighteen battalions of Jägers, 169 of 450 battalions, or about two-fifths of the army, were outside their recruiting districts. Some areas were too unsettled for the use of purely local troops. Just then a sharp little campaign was being fought to introduce conscription in the Bosnian hills, and such areas would require a leavening of soldiers from elsewhere. Other areas could not support the number of troops needed for garrisons. After all, Vienna supported the 4. and Budapest the 32. Infantry, but in 1881 the infantry complement of the Budapest garrison was drawn from six line regiments (IR 6, 32, 33, 67, 68, 70) and the 40. Feldjäger battalion. Vienna’s garrison was drawn from seven infantry regiments (IR 17, 34, 38, 47, 52, 58, 63) and the Tirol Jägers.38 Still other places, Bosnia, the Tirol, Dalmatia, would need extraterritorial units to maintain any balanced corps composition. The Archduke
estimated that at least a quarter of the army, and perhaps more than a third, would continue to be extraterritorial.

Albrecht was not opposed to territorial garrisoning on principle. He recognized that speed of mobilization was critical, and he was not averse toward moves to bring the regiments closer to their reserves and depots. Nor did he believe that the army had to be stationed according to some policy of *divide et impera*. National tensions needed to be recognized, but stagnation was a more pressing danger. Of all imperial institutions, he thought, the army alone was concerned with the Monarchy as a whole. The most important of all questions was the unity of the army, its sense of being the defender of an empire and not a province. It was not enough to be simply loyal; the army had to transcend national and local feeling altogether. The Bosnian campaign had, he believed, given the army a sense of common purpose, a feeling too valuable to be thrown away in dozens of isolated garrisons. Psychological and spiritual unity was, in the end, far more valuable than the gain of a few days in mobilization.

Albrecht concluded with his own set of proposals for territorial reform in an appendix on "The Weaknesses of the Infantry and their Remedies." Each recruiting district would provide two regiments of three battalions each. One regiment would remain at home and the second
would be employed elsewhere; every three to four years the regiments would alternate. Reservists of both would do their training and annual maneuvers at home, under the supervision of a joint recruiting staff. The army, with close attention to population changes, should then be able to field fifteen corps of two divisions each.

The Archduke's proposals were immediately countered by Beck, who, as Schönfeld's health failed, was emerging as his successor as chief of the general staff. Late in April 1881 he produced a "Study on the Means of Removing the Defects in Garrisoning and Order of Battle which Hinder the Rapid Mobilization and Strategic Concentration of the Army." Like Albrecht, Beck recognized the problems posed by the heterogeneity of the Monarchy and its peoples. He also raised the issue of how much reform would cost. The army had initially asked for sixty million florins to cover the costs of the Bosnian campaign and had then asked for fifteen million more. The Reichsrat, angered by what it saw as the army's endless need for money, had tried to slash both the military's budget and peacetime strength. Count Eduard Taaffe, the emperor's chosen Kaiserminister, had been hard-pressed in 1879 to secure a defense bill that maintained the army at its current levels of manpower and spending. Total reform might be too expensive to be politically possible.
Beck accepted the need for rapid mobilization as the basis for all discussion. In the 1870s he had argued that a Russian war would be long and bitter, and his assessment had not changed. Yet he did believe that any future war would have to be brought to a rapid conclusion. Win or lose, the finances and internal political and national structure of the Monarchy could only support a swift war. Territorial garrisoning was the only way to ensure a swift mobilization. Yet, like Albrecht, he saw the limits of territorialization. No troops were raised in Bosnia yet, and a large extra-territorial garrison would be needed there. Vienna, with its status as Haupt-und-Rezidenz Stadt and its growing socialist movement, required six more regiments than could be locally raised.

Beck also stressed the incoherence of the army's order of battle. Peacetime military districts did not correspond to wartime commands. Two corps commands were based in Prague and would compete for staff during wartime. The staffs assigned to Krakow, Trieste, and Innsbruck were no more than skeletons. Administrative and wartime command functions overlapped everywhere. If peacetime commands were assimilated with wartime zones, substantial savings could be made in both time and money. Such consolidations could be carried out without appealing to the politicians for more funding. In point of fact, the order of battle could then be expanded. With total
mobilization, the Monarchy could field 1.1 million men, but these would face 2.6 million Russians and quite possibly 900,000 Italians as well. Any expansion of the order of battle was valuable."

There were, Beck pointed out, eighty line infantry regiments. With the consolidation of administrative units and a territorial basing, these could be converted to 132 regiments of three battalions each, yielding thirty-two divisions of four regiments, or sixteen corps of two divisions. Beck followed Albrecht's idea of having two regiments per recruiting district, one of which would be extraterritorial. Transfers between home and abroad would prevent stagnation. Each existing field artillery regiment would give up a battery to serve as cadres for artillery to support the newly enlarged infantry, and here Beck saw the only problem: given the widely varying cultural levels of the Monarchy's provinces, there would be a shortage of technically-competent troops. It would be some time before the territorialised army could have sufficient artillery support.

Both Beck's and Albrecht's views had been made known to the general staff in the early spring of 1881. In the first week of March Bylandt-Rheidt had ordered staff studies done on various reform proposals." The only proviso handed down by the minister was that nothing be done that would entail altering the basic system of
conscription; the basic Wehrgesetz had been put through after hard fights in 1867/68, and those parliamentary battles had been too vicious to begin again. The general staff planners produced their own views within a few weeks of Beck’s and Albrecht’s. Their "On the Introduction of a Territorial Organisation of the Army," like Beck’s memorandum, sought to combine territorialisation with expansion."

The staff proposal began by assuming that the purpose of territorialisation was to hold the movement of men and supplies to a minimum. The major assumption was that recruiting would become possible in Bosnia in the very near future. The staff, like Beck, saw no point to the current chaos of military and general (administrative) commands but saw "fatal political consequences" in trying to adapt areas of unequal size and composition into territorial units. The solution seemed to be a decentralised system of independent corps commands each responsible for its own recruiting.

The staff paper envisioned fifteen corps areas that would support two divisions each. The units within each zone would be permanently integrated into higher tactical formations. The regiments would be kept permanently as part of active divisions, thus enhancing their ability to be mobilized rapidly and sent to the front. The territorial zones would be supplemented by sixty newly
raised over-strength mobile battalions which would serve in those areas where extraterritorial units would be required. Thirty one mobile battalions would be assigned to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the adjacent Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, and Dalmatia; twenty-nine would be used in Vienna, Budapest, Trieste, and the South Tirol. The mobile forces would be attached to local divisions for tactical and training purposes, but their officers would be rotated rapidly through the new battalions—a move the staff hoped would help prevent stagnation among the officer corps.

The reorganized army would contain 119 regiments of three battalions each, the sixty mobile battalions, fourteen Jäger battalions raised in the corps zones, and ten battalions of Kaiserjägers from the Tirol. An additional field artillery regiment would be formed by separating one battery from each of the thirteen existing regiments. The staff hoped for further expansion of the rail net, and railway service units, recruited throughout the Monarchy, would be expanded and placed directly under the control of the general staff. Other independent technical units, such as the fifteen battalions of pioneers and engineering specialist units for mountain service in Tirol and Dalmatia, would be under local control. Recruiting and administration would be decentralised, and each corps command would be responsible for raising and training troops in its own area.
The staff proposal did not mention the costs involved in setting up the new system. For example, the costs of repatriating regiments to their home districts were never mentioned. The staff was aware of the confines of the defense budget and had chosen to ignore them. Even one-time expenditures such as transport costs in returning units to their recruiting districts, costs that could quite clearly be justified, were seen at a ministerial level as an open challenge to the politicians. No reform could be undertaken that would alter the arrangements of 1867/68, and no reform would be acceptable that would require increased expenditures. The war ministry thanked the staff for its work, but Bylandt-Rheidt informed the planners that, alas, "on political grounds" their designs had to be rejected."

Late in May a series of conferences on reform were held at the war ministry with the emperor as chairman. Beck and Albrecht were present as were Bylandt-Rheidt, Feldzeugmeister Baron Johann Philippovic, who had commanded XIII. Korps in the Bosnian campaign and was now commander of the Vienna garrison, and Generalmajor Count Franz Welserheimb, the Landwehr minister. No Hungarian representatives were present. The agenda of the meetings covered the proposals of Beck, Albrecht, and the general staff as well as a list of issues drawn up by the emperor: the permanent maintenance of corps formations, territorial
and administrative boundaries, the number and strengths of divisions and corps, command relationships in the major provinces, numbers of regiments per recruiting district, location of regimental districts, garrisoning of Jäger battalions, recruitment for the artillery, and assignment of technical and specialist units.68

Albrecht, pointing to the experiences of 1866 and the difficulties encountered in 1878, argued that the peacetime army had to be divided into established corps. Philippovic answered by drawing on the findings of the commission of inquiry into the occupation campaign.69 The current division of the army into line regiments and reserve commands was, he argued, the only "wholly sound basis" for army organization. While some reorganization was desirable, any radical restructuring would entail, if nothing else, assuming European peace in the next two years, an assumption Philippovic was not prepared to make.

Beck objected to Philippovic's assertions. He repeated the arguments made in his earlier memoranda and pointed to the experiences of foreign armies. Germany, France, Russia, Italy, and even Turkey had found territorial organization to be the most effective form of military administration. Beck's arguments were based on Schönfeld's work of late 1880 and early 1881 on a Maximalfall, a worst-case scenario for a Russian war. The key to Austria's war-fighting capability would be a quick
combination of forces in Galicia. That much was basic. And at present a quick combination could not be achieved.

In case of war there would have to be a massive reshuffling of regiments before the army was ever ready to take the field. Eleven regiments would have to be brought from Bosnia and the Herzegovina, refitted, and shipped to the front. A whole list of dismal examples could be cited: the 24.Division, based at Przemysl, would have its technical staff and supply depot at Brünn in Moravia; the artillery assigned to VI.Korps (Kaschau) was at Wiener-Neustadt. All the Jäger battalions designated for the Bohemian commands were in the Bosnian mountains. In fact, only twenty percent of the infantry and sixteen percent of the Jägers would be available upon the outbreak of war. The numerical situation vis-à-vis Russia would only worsen with mobilisation.

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**Russia**

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**Austria-Hungary**

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On the fortieth day of mobilisation Russian superiority on the Galician front would amount to nearly a quarter-million infantry, 40,000 cavalry, and over 900 guns. Welserheimb, the Landwehr minister, indicated that all this was obvious. A system of territorial corps was the quickest, most efficient mobilisation scheme. So much went without saying. What was not obvious was how such a system could be reconciled with or adapted to political realities. Above all, how could the transition to such a system be paid for? The Monarchy’s forces were still using the time-honored expedient of saving money by keeping large numbers of men on furlough. The Monarchy had already been subjected to the contempt of its German ally for this and other military economies. When the Austrians proposed to save money in 1879 by sending 18,000 men on extended leave, Bismarck pointed out that they could save still more money by sending 100,000 home, or, better yet, achieve real economies by disbanding the army altogether. The Monarchy had only one ally, and, as Albrecht insisted, one could not rely on that ally’s promises. There was no point in drawing up reform plans that could not be funded. Welserheimb’s point was that an abortive reform, or a half-done one, would be worse than simply learning to live with the present system. And it took no imagination to envision the Germans’ contempt for their ally if the Reichsrat rejected as too expensive a
plan to make the Monarchy's forces ready for a major conflict.

Bylandt-Rheidt was inclined to support the staff's call for mobile units separate from the territorialized corps formations. A corps system, he pointed out, would facilitate the attachment of Landwehr units to the line army. Welserheimb had estimated that 80,000 Landwehr/Honved troops could be integrated into the line, providing the equivalent of three new divisions. The mobile battalions would give the army more flexibility in dealing with contingencies while the bulk of the Landwehr and the Honved could be assembled in brigades and trained alongside the regulars for their wartime duties of manning garrison depots and guarding lines of communication, thus releasing more regulars for the Galician front.

Territorialization would make it easier to integrate the Landwehr into line formations; there was no disagreement on that point. In reality, though, the Landwehr was made up of two very different components, the Landwehr of the Austrian crownlands, the Hungarian Honved, and could not be treated as simply part of the regular army. Welserheimb saw his own task as overseeing the integration of the Austrian Landwehr into regular formations, but his counterpart in Budapest took a very different view. Bela Szende, the Honved minister, spent much of his time protesting to the imperial-royal war
ministry that the Honved was not part of the regular order of battle and should never be considered as such. Treating it as such implied that it could be used outside Hungarian territory without the assent of the Hungarian Diet, a clear violation of the terms of the Ausgleich. Szende's latest protests had inspired Bylandt-Rheidt to retort that the role of the Diet was to provide the necessary laws for the use of the army as determined by the emperor and his war minister. At the moment, though, neither the emperor nor Bylandt-Rheidt was prepared to argue the terms of the Ausgleich with the Hungarians. The emperor informed Phillipovic and Welserheimb that one could not treat the Landwehr and Honved—especially the Honved—merely as reserves. The "national" formations were not an integral part of the field army, and, despite the military difficulties raised, their special constitutional position had to be recognized.

Albrecht brought the conference back to technical issues by calling for discussion on the number of territorial corps to be formed. The archduke now took territorialization for granted; one simply had to make it work. The obvious thing was to match the corps boundaries with the crownlands, to structure the army to avoid conflict and duplication of effort with civil authorities. To that end he proposed a structure of thirteen corps,
nine of two divisions each and four "front-line" corps
zones of three divisions each, plus an independent corps
in the Tirol and a joint army-navy command in Dalmatia.
His change of heart was part of a shift on Albrecht's part
toward a belief in the need for a decisive encounter early
on in any new war. Like Beck, Albrecht had come to
believe that the Monarchy could not survive an extended
war. He did, however, sound a note of caution. The
Monarchy was unlike any other state in Europe, and even
with territorial reform no one at the conference table
should be so naive as to believe that it would ever be
able to mobilize as fast as the Germans.74

The archduke's views were shared by, and to some
extent created by, Beck, who, as the archduke aged and his
eyesight failed, had become Albrecht's advisor and
confidant. Beck himself had already moved to a belief in
the primacy of rapid mobilization and a decisive initial
encounter. In part this was simply acceptance of
conventional strategic wisdom in Europe, of beliefs drawn
from studies of 1859 and 1866, from a partial
understanding of the Franco-Prussian War, and an absence
of any understanding of the American Civil War. The
conventional wisdom was that the coming of the railroad
meant that, since troops could be assembled and moved to
the front at speed, war itself would be no less rapid.

The doctrine of rapid decision highlighted the
weaknesses of the Monarchy's army, and it ran counter to the intuitions of both Albrecht and Beck. Yet its corollaries had a definite appeal for Beck and the staff. The reforms necessary for rapid mobilisation were logical enough, since the imperial order of battle was totally chaotic. More importantly, a rapid decision in the field would place few strains on the political structure of the Monarchy. The Monarchy had been capable of fighting on after Königgrätz, and Albrecht for one had been willing to fight the Prussians on the Danube or in the streets of Vienna. Yet the attitude of the Hungarians had been the key in forcing the emperor to make peace. The Monarchy might survive a defeat: in Napoleon's day Francis I had become rather skilled at salvaging the Monarchy after military disaster. But the Monarchy would not survive a protracted agony.

Beck, officially chief of the general staff since early June 1881, was aware as well that any corps system would benefit the military to the exclusion of the war ministry. The corps would absorb the ministerially controlled reserves administration, and the decentralized corps would be responsible to the staff. For Beck, given the long fights over the powers of staff chief and war minister in the early 1870s and his own efforts to be directly subordinate to the emperor, territorialisation was a personal victory. Beck, always the consummate
military courtier, seems to have won the archduke over to his views.

Bylandt-Rheidt had received an imperial order to set up a ministerial committee to work out the details of territorialisation. He had informed the emperor at the outset that there was no way to hold the line on costs. The staff proposals on new troop formations alone would cost at least 900,000 florins. Thus the key instruction relayed by Beck from the emperor, that any new system be no more expensive that the old, was immediately void. The committee was ordered to observe the present limits on recruit contingents, to match military and political boundaries, and to make only the absolute minimum number of changes in the cavalry and the specialist units.

The committee had been chaired by FML Baron Vlasits, chief of the general staff’s planning section, and Vlasits had assembled the chiefs of the railway, topographic, and recruitment sections of the staff into a working group that was overseen on occasion by Beck himself. The ministerial committee began its work in late July 1881 and issued its report in mid-April 1882. The committee also met, with Beck presiding, to consider the lessons of the latest (November 1881-late May 1882) rising in southern Dalmatia and Bosnia itself. Three divisions and naval support had been required to put down the revolt and begin to enforce conscription, and Beck impressed on the
committee the need for substantial mobile forces which
could be kept on extra-territorial duty in Bosnia."

The ministerial committee's final report was based on
the two goals of rapid mobilization and maintenance of a
strong extra-territorial force in Bosnia and the
Herzegovina, though it also set out two variants by
Albrecht and Beck (Projects A and B) that called for an
expansion of the number of infantry regiments in the order
of battle. These projects called for an infantry
establishment of 120-132 regiments organised half as cadre
units with a minimal peacetime strength and half as
reinforced mobile units, though in March 1882 Albrecht
also suggested a structure of three cadre battalions and
one overstrength mobile battalion per regiment."
Requirements for Bosnia, Dalmatia, and the South Tirol
would take eight to nine battalions from each corps, which
meant that most regiments would field one extra-
territorial battalion at any given time."

Project A called for fifteen corps commands of two
divisions each; each division would be made up of fifteen
battalions. Project B called for sixteen corps commands
of two divisions each; the battalion strengths of the
corps would vary from twenty-seven to thirty. There was
also a less ambitious Project C, a proposal which had
Bylandt-Rheidt's personal support. Project C called for
fifteen corps of two divisions, with Trieste as a special
separate region. The thirty infantry and eight cavalry divisions of the army would be territorial so far as possible, even for units designated for other corps in wartime. There would also be ten Landwehr divisions, three from Cisleithanian lands and seven from Hungary. Each of the existing eighty line regiments would give up one battalion to form twenty new regiments. The reformed army would consist of one hundred regiments, each of four battalions plus a small recruiting depot cadre. Project C had the advantage of being less expensive than the other proposals, and on 11 May 1882 Bylandt-Rheidt formally gave Project C his endorsement with only one change—the total number of reformed regiments was raised to 102.

On 22 May 1882 copies of the ministerial committee's draft report on Project C were circulated to all section chiefs of the general staff, and on 3 June the work was declared complete. Bylandt-Rheidt estimated that, if implementation of the reforms began in September 1882, the army would be ready for a trial mobilization under the new system by March 1883 and full mobilization by May 1883. On 10 June Bylandt-Rheidt presented the committee's report to the emperor, and two days later imperial sanction was given to reforms based on Project C. On 17 June Bylandt-Rheidt officially informed the Landwehr and Honved ministers; on 28 June the Hungarian government was presented with the details of the army reforms. Final
authorization was given by Franz Joseph on 30 June. The changes were slated to begin on 9 September, two weeks after the end of the annual summer maneuvers.82

The garrison changes entailed by the reforms were not inexpensive. The staff estimated that changes within the Monarchy proper would cost 280,700 gulden and that transport in and out of South Tirol, Dalmatia, and the occupation zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina would cost a further 294,300 gulden, a total of 475,000 gulden for transport costs alone.83 Thirteen regiments would be sending battalions to the occupation zone. Two battalions each from twenty-one line regiments and four Jäger battalions would be coming home. The least expensive change would be in moving the 9. Jägers from Brück-an-der-Mur to Judenburg in Styria—a mere 200 gulden. Moving three battalions of the 21. (Ceslau) from Prague to Riva in the South Tirol would be the most expensive—11,000 gulden. The total costs of the changes—transport, relocation, and the establishment of twenty-two new line regiments—came to over 700,000 gulden, which had to be met from the mere 78,000 gulden in the 1883 army budget for "orderly development of the army" plus an extraordinary grant of 650,000 gulden.

The Monarchy was now divided into fifteen corps commands, each responsible for conscription and training within its zone.84 The corps commands were established as
I.Korps had originally been headquartered at Sarajevo; the title was soon shifted over to the Krakow region, perhaps in symbolic recognition of the primacy of the Galician front. Each corps contained two divisions of two territorialised regiments each. The 2.Division, at II.Korps (Vienna), was made up of the 3. (Kremsier) and 4. (Vienna) Infantry. The 29.Division, with IX Korps at Josefstadt, was made up of the 42. (Theresienstadt) and the 36. (Jungbunzlau).

Imperial-royal regiments had long since borne honorific titles, the most famous being the 4. Hoch-und-Deutschmeister. They now joined, at Albrecht's suggestion, their recruiting district names to the honorifics in an effort to harness local patriotism to regimental spirit. Thus the 1.Infantry was now the Kaiser
Franz Joseph Infanterie-Regiment Troppau Nr.1; the 4. was now the Hoch-und-Deutschmeister Infanterie-Regiment Vienna Nr. 4. Territorial titles were also an effort to emphasize unity in the twenty-two new regiments. Battalions separated from older regiments or Jägers converted to line infantry were not always in "national" units. Seven battalions of Jägers were attached to other-language regiments. Seventeen Hungarian battalions found themselves in Austrian units; one Moravian and one Bohemian battalion found themselves in Galician regiments; a Carniolan battalion was attached to a Croat regiment; a single forlorn battalion from Lower Austria was sent off to Hungary. But territorial titles were a way of instilling unit pride; the new regiments had no battle honors or famous honorary colonels-in-chief yet, and a territorial title was a substitute for a regimental history or a famous patron.

The actual transfers and reorganisation went smoothly. By mid-1883 the Monarchy's infantry had been territorialized. Extra-territorial units were still stationed in Dalmatia, Bosnia and the Herzegovina, South Tirol, and in Vienna itself. At the end of 1883, though, almost nine soldiers in ten of the imperial infantry—eighty-nine of 102 regiments—were serving in their recruiting districts. The new system kept reservists with their regiments. Regiments could alternate one battalion
at home with three detached, or three at home with one detached; reservists would always train with their designated regiments. Only the cavalry, grouped permanently in wartime formations on the frontier to face any surprise descent by Russian forces, were expected to do long extra-territorial service, and even here, two-thirds of the Monarchy's mounted troops were, given the nature of cavalry recruiting, in or near home.

The changes did accomplish one desired end: mobilisation time against Russia fell from forty-five days in 1881 to thirty-five in 1883. By the end of the decade, the new system, coupled with expansion of the railway net, brought the time down to just over three weeks. It was a change from the plans of 1881, when the staff had had to admit that the infantry would not have its logistics train or full artillery support until day seventeen of mobilization, while the Russians would have nineteen infantry divisions and twenty cavalry divisions fully ready in Galicia by day fourteen.

Yet the reforms did not alter the basic weaknesses of the army. The number of regiments had been raised, but not the number of recruits. The census of 1880 had provided figures showing that a larger army could certainly be raised, but there was no political will to change the annual conscript quotas. The imperial authorities had fought hard for the defense bill of 1879,
which had done little more than maintain existing levels of financial support, despite the increased involvement of the Monarchy in the Balkans.92 The next proposed expansion of the army, a decade later, provoked a major crisis with the Hungarians. Nor was there more money for the army. In 1892 a study by the general staff put the Monarchy fourth among the five great powers in total defense spending since 1867.93

Total Defense Spending 1867-1892 (in French francs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>23.15 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>22.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6.82</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Monarchy, one English historian noted, spent the equivalent of 13.2 million pounds on its military establishment in 1880, and 13.6 million in 1900. In the same period Germany's defense budget grew from 20.4 million English pounds to 41 million. Russia, the Monarchy's planned principal adversary, enlarged its military spending from 29.6 million pounds to 40.8 million.94 One British officer, writing at the height of the Balkan crisis, believed the imperial-royal forces to be "very formidable" and led by a competent and highly-motivated officers corps.95 Yet though the army of the Monarchy was capable of fighting well, its weaknesses in
manpower, logistics, and funding had not been remedied by territorial reform. The army was better sited to mobilize after 1883, but it was no more capable of fighting an extended war than it had been in 1876.

In the event of war with Russia, the army would find itself confronted with a vastly superior adversary. Despite the territorial reforms, the army was well aware that it could not fight such a war alone. By the mid-1880s the Monarchy was nominally allied with Romania and Italy, but the alliances existed only on paper, an affair of German sponsorship. It was quite clear that neither was reliable, and that the "allies" still coveted Transylvania and the South Tirol. The army had come to be dependent on the German connection to hold off the Russians. The war plan of 1881 counted on forty German divisions of infantry and nine of cavalry to move against the Russians. Yet despite talks between Beck and his opposite number Count Helmuth von Moltke, there were no binding plans for joint operations. Albrecht of course was not surprised: he suspected the Germans of, in true Prussian fashion, plotting some treachery that would abandon the Monarchy to the Russians. Beck spent much of the 1880s trying to extract definite promises from the Germans, and in 1887/88 the Germans finally let it be known that they would engage only seven corps and four reserve divisions against the Russians--a cut of about forty percent from earlier
expected levels. The problem had not been wholly unforeseen. The war plan of 1881 had noted that even with French neutrality, Germany would need fifteen divisions of infantry and three of cavalry to cover the French frontier. The French, if they chose to fight, could bring forty line and twenty-four reserve infantry divisions into quick service against Germany.97

The conclusions were not hard to draw. In any two-front war the Monarchy would have to rely on its own resources, and those were few indeed. In December 1886 Albrecht wrote the emperor that, in truth, little could be done to make the army ready for a major war. Existing resources could be more efficiently utilized, but without radical changes in the political sphere, few real improvements could be made. Such changes were highly unlikely—and, ultimately, undesirable for their internal consequences.98

Abroad, the Monarchy faced superior Russian armies. At home, the army was now explicitly territorialized, the troops in daily contact with their neighbors from civilian life. As Albrecht had predicted, the cultural disparities within the Monarchy became increasingly visible. At a period when other European powers were shortening terms of service for their conscripts in order to maximize the number of trained reservists, the general staff emphatically rejected any such scheme for the Monarchy.
The period of active service, the staff insisted, was short enough as it was. Any effort to lower it to two years would keep the military from having time to train the less-developed nationalities in basic technical skills."

The quality of the Monarchy's officer corps remained generally high. The Monarchy did not produce any stellar names--any Moltkes or Roons--but its officers, especially in the artillery, had been solid and competent. Yet there was a shortage of regular officers. The limited budget kept pay low, and the imperial-royal officer, while held in some regard in social circles, could command nothing like the prestige of his German counterpart. The Monarchy commanded the services of some 17,000 regular officers in the 1880s, and with its low pay and slow promotion attracted few more. The regulars were in great measure what the Habsburg ideal called for: non-national professionals serving their emperor with a loyalty that mirrored that of a Catholic order. "The word service," wrote one army commentator, "has a magical power in our Army...[and] the Army, animated by the dynastic idea, alone represents unity in our state, and is the rock upon which the whole edifice of the State rests." But in the last half of the 1880s the Monarchy came more and more to rely on reserve officers, whose numbers grew from 5840 in 1885 to 12,171 in 1892. Reserve officers, drawn in
large part from the one-year volunteer cadets, lacked the purely dynastic and professional allegiances of the regulars. They were not subject to the language requirements imposed on the regular officers, and by the end of the century there were regiments where the reserve officers were wholly unable to speak with their men. A hundred years before, officers, as Wellington said about the British army, could not be expected to speak with their men; in an age of nationalism they had to for their own purposes and welfare. The military authorities tried to avoid the demoralisation that Albrecht had feared by shifting its regular officers around the Monarchy with some frequency. The reserve regiments fell to reserve officers drawn from the universities and not the military academies, and it was these officers who began to insist upon an increasingly "national" tone in the attitudes of both Landwehr and Honved units.

There had been a homeward drift of the Monarchy's regiments throughout the 1870s, and after 1883 almost nine in ten of the Monarchy's infantrymen were based in their own recruiting districts. During the arguments over territorial reform the problems of national tension and nationalist agitation had been largely brushed aside. All the authors of territorial schemes, from Albrecht and Beck down, had admitted that national problems would affect a territorialized army. Yet the issue had received no real
attention. The Russian danger was of prime concern, and rapid mobilization was the order of the day. There seemed in fact to be no immediate nationalist threat. The Hungarian leadership, uneasy about Russian involvement in the Balkans, had backed the army bill of 1879, while Count Taaffe’s ministry, with the Czechs and Poles in the Reichsrat gathered into the conservative "Iron Ring" coalition, had temporarily quieted the Slavs. In 1882/83 the national horizon had been, if not clear, at least a lighter shade of grey.

The calm would last only a few more years. The army bill of 1889 would call forth a resurgence of Magyar obstructionism and separatism, and Taaffe’s proposed language ordinances of 1890 set off violence in the streets of Prague between Czechs and Germans. The Magyar oligarchs might hope the joint army could keep the Cossacks from the streets of Budapest, but they also saw it as an obstacle in the way of a separate Hungarian national army. In Bohemia the army was increasingly seen as an instrument to keep peace in the streets, and the idea that one had to be German or Czech, that one could not be Bohemian, was shouted at the conscripts with disturbing frequency by civilian crowds. The army had been reorganised to face the Russian foe with greater speed. That much had been achieved, but Albrecht and Beck had had to admit that all such reforms were limited: there
were sharp limits on what could be achieved with the resources at hand. The emperor's soldiers, officers and men, regulars and reservists, were chief among those resources. One could expect professionalism and loyalty, and the Monarchy's armies gave that to the end. But the army was now subject quite overtly to national demands. As national peace broke down in the 1890s, it would be the territorialised army that would feel the sharpest strains.
Notes to Chapter Three


7. Ibid., p. 27; see also a full treatment of the crisis in Heinrich Hertz, *Die Schwarze-Meer Konferenz von 1871* (Stuttgart, 1927).


9. KA, MKSM 69-1/3 ex. 1871.


12. KA, *Kriegsministerium Präsidend-Büro* (hereafter cited as KM Präs-Büro) 16-13/3 ex 1870; see also [Archduke Albrecht], *Das Jahr 1870 und die Wehrkraft der Monarchie* (Vienna, 1870), pp. 70-73.


15. Dioszégi, Aussenpolitik, p. 75.


22. Rupp, p. 74.


26. Dioszégi, Aussenpolitik, p. 84.

27. See Rodich's reports to Beck, KA, MKSM Sonderreihe F. 73/20.


37. KA, KM Präb-Büro 16-3/1 ex. 1870.
40. KA, MKSM 69-2/6 ex 1876; KA, KM Präs 75-34/5.
41. KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro F. 1, "Zur Lage," 14 February 1874.
42. KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro F.1, "Bemerkungen über die russischen und österreichischen Streitkräfte."
43. KA, Gen Stab Op-Büro F. 1, report of 20 November 1876.
46. KA, KM Präs 75-5/11 ex 1880.
49. KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro F. 2, Res. Nr. 311/1881.

50. KA, KM Präs-Büro 45-16/1 ex 1882, "Memorandum über die Formation der größeren Heereskörper in der k.-k. Armee," 1 February 1881.

51. KA, KM Präs 45-16/1 ex 1882. "Über Verbesserung unserer Heeresorganisation."

52. KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro F. 2. Res Nr. 311/1881.

53. KA, KM Präs-Büro 45-16/1 ex 1882.


59. KA, KM Präs 45-16/1 ex 1882, "Die Gebrechen der Infanterie und ihre Behebung."


61. KA, MKSM 65-2/7 ex 1881. "Studie über die Mittel zur Beseitigung jener Übelstände in der Dislokation und Orde de bataille der Armee..."


64. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

65. KA, KM Präs 76-12/4, Nr. 1342.

66. KA, MKSM Sep. Fasz. 30, "Entwurf einer territorialen Organisierung des Heeres."

67. KA, KM Präs-Büro 45-16/2 ex 1882, Beilage B.
68. Protocol in KA, MKSM 20-1/5-2 ex 1881.

69. KA, KM Präs-Büro 45-1/1 ex 1881, Enquetekommission, 2 May 1879.

70. KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro F.2, "Allgemeine Bermerkungen über unsere Mobilisierungs-und Aufmarschverhältnisse"; KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro F.4, "Memoire über die Revision respektive Neuarbeitung des Kriegsfalles mit Russland (Maximalfall)."

71. KA, Gen Stab. Op.-Büro F.4, "Bermerkungen zur Memoire über die Revision des Kriegsfalles mit Russland (Maximalfall)," December 1880,

72. Jenks, Austria Under the Iron Ring, p. 43-44.

73. KA, KM Präs-Büro 33-1/6 ex 1881, notes of 25 November 1881 and 18 December 1881.

74. KA, MKSM 70-1/41 ex 1881.

75. Glaise-Horstenau, Weggefährte, p. 253-54; KA, MKSM 1-33/2 ex 1881.

76. KA, KM Präs-Büro 45-16/2 ex 1882, Beilage A, Beilage B, Konvolut F.


78. KA, MKSM F.30, "Studie über die Armee-Reorganisierungs-Frage."

79. KA, KM Präs-Büro 45-16/2. Nr. 2708.

80. KA, KM Präs-Büro 45-16/2 ex 1882, Beilage A.

81. KA, KM Präs-Büro 45-16/1 ex 1882, "Konzept"; KA, KM Präs 45-16/2 ex 1882, Nr. 2708, "Comité-Bericht."

82. KA, MKSM 38-3/2 ex 1882; KM, Präs 45-16/10 ex 1882, Nr. 4281.

83. KM, Präs-Büro 45-16/2, Beilage I-5, "Übersicht des Dislokations-Wechsels."

84. KA, KM Präs-Büro 45-16/2, Beilage L. "Umwandlung der Militär-Territorial Bereiche in Korps-Bezirke."
85. KA, KM Präs-Büro 45-11/1 ex 1882, "Studie über die Armee-Reorganisierungsfrage."

86. KA, KM Präs-Büro 45-16/2 ex 1882.

87. Reports in KA, MKSM 38-3/5 ex 1882; KA, MKSM 38-3/29 ex 1882.

88. KA, KM Präs-Büro 45-16/2 ex 1882, Beilage G.

89. KA, MKSM Sonderreihe 70/40, "Kavallerie in Galizien," Albrecht to war minister, July 1886.


91. KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro F.3, Beilage 26, "Übersicht der Schlagfertigkeit."


93. KA, MKSM Sonderreihe 90/3, "Denkschrift über die allgemeinen militärischen Verhältnisse im Jahr 1892."


96. KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro F.3, Beilage 25, "Übersicht der Streitkräfte."


98. KA, MKSM Sonderreihe 70/38, "Die Vermehrung der Wehrkraft der Monarchie."


102. KA, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 1: 51.
POLITICS, THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM, AND
THE HABSBURG ARMY 1848 - 1914

Volume II

A Dissertation
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in
The Department of History

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CHAPTER 4
ARMY AND NATIONALITIES: CRISIS IN BOHEMIA AND HUNGARY

As the army of the Monarchy looked back from the years just before 1914, the 1870s would take on a golden tinge in its collective memory. It was true that the army had acquired a new enemy in the east, and the growth of Russian power could be neither minimized nor ignored. Yet the army had fought a successful campaign in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and a generation of the Monarchy's officers would look back on the Bosnian campaign as a time of shared purpose and positive achievement. The Balkan crisis had even prompted the Hungarian leadership to offer its public support to the army during the negotiations over the army bill of 1879. The territorial reforms of 1881-83 had given the army extra time to mobilize against a foreign threat, and the army's professionalism and loyalty were taken for granted. Throughout the arguments over territorial reform there had been no doubt cast on the loyalty of the multinational army.

The army had devoted itself during the 1870s to technical concerns that had culminated in the reforms of 1881-83. Those reforms were in part a reflection of domestic stability. There had been no systematic separation of regiments and homelands before 1848, and
after 1867 the regiments had slowly begun to return to their home areas. The territorial reforms overseen by Bylandt-Rheidt had given official sanction to territorialization, and official complacency mirrored domestic peace. Yet from the mid-1880s on, the army was increasingly involved in suppressing domestic unrest in the Cisleithanian lands. The end of the 1880s saw the beginnings of a twenty-year struggle between the imperial government and the Hungarian leadership over the nature of the army. The 1880s began with Czechs and Germans rioting against one another in the streets of Prague with new and bitter intensity, and with troops and workers facing one another in the streets of Vienna. The era would reach its climax twenty years later in a constitutional crisis that saw the army preparing to endure another round of civil war in Hungary.

Count Taaffe, named Austrian minister-president in 1879, once observed that his government would keep peace by keeping all the nationalities a little bit unhappy. Like so many policies pursued in the Monarchy, this was at best a short-term expedient. Yet Taaffe’s maneuvering kept Cisleithanian politics in precarious stability for fourteen years. The emperor’s chosen Kaiserminister was adept at juggling liberals and conservatives, Poles, Czechs and Germans. The chambers of the Reichsrat, though, were not the streets of the Monarchy. Taaffe, who
served as his own interior minister, received daily reports from all the cities of the Monarchy on the growth of nationalism, socialism, anarchism, and anti-semitism. There were riots in Prague in 1881 over the creation of separate German and Czech universities, and the gendarmerie had to make armed forays to rescue German students from Czech lynch mobs.\(^1\) The government's language ordinances of 1880 mandating linguistic equality for German and Czech in public affairs provoked violence between Bohemian Germans, who were outraged at the thought of losing civil service jobs to bilingual Czechs and Bohemian Czechs who sought to have Czech declared the official language of the province. In a very few years governments in the Cisleithanian lands would fall over the issue of how many courses in German and Slovene would be offered in an obscure provincial high school, but for now Taaffe was convinced that the nationalities could be managed. In the early years of Taaffe's regime the threat of social radicalism rather than the threat of nationalism kept lights burning deep into the night in offices in the Innere Stadt.

The army saw itself as the shield of the dynasty, and it remained available to the government as the ultimate guarantor of the social order. In the autumn of 1882 the Vienna garrison was called out when the police failed to quell large-scale riots in the working-class areas in the
west of the city. Ten months later troops of the city garrison were sent into Alsergrund, Vienna's Ninth District, to put down widespread riots and arson; fighting went on for several nights while soldiers cleared the streets at bayonet point. Yet the military leadership of the Monarchy exhibited remarkably little enthusiasm for armed repression.

The military leadership relied on loyalty to the dynasty and to superior officers, on devotion to the ideals of hierarchy and obedience, to hold its polyglot army together. It saw socialism, for all its ability to transcend national lines, as ultimately promoting national division within the Monarchy by undermining faith in dynastic loyalty and the traditions of deference. The army had little sympathy for socialism or social protest. No imperial-royal officer would have considered, as Boulanger did in France, ordering his troops to share their rations with striking workers. Yet the army was not willing to impose order with the mailed fist alone. The troops of the Vienna garrison were called out to disperse crowds by force throughout the 1880s and 1890s, but the "assistances" given the civil authorities were restricted in scope. Army regulations specified that the use of force beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense required the joint authorization of both the local commander and the ranking civil authority. Troops were
given no special training in dealing with civil disorders, and in fact service regulations called for the concentration of troops in defensive positions in the event of outbreaks and regarded patrols by small units as unduly provocative.4

Internal security is a job rarely popular with regular officers. British officers in Georgian times hated having their men called for riot duty as much as they hated having their units sent to build roads in Scotland.5 The officers of the Third Republic saw riot and strike duty as one more trick devised by the politicians to ruin the status of the army; the army had to play "the role of workingman's villain [thus] shattering the image of a body above class and political faction."6 American officers in the 1870s and 1880s expressed the same fears; they had no wish to be seen as the hirelings of mine and rail owners, and they loathed the thought of being used not to defend the nation but to do a policeman's job.7 The feeling was common among contemporary Russian officers as well. A soldier's job was something more than that of a policeman, and for all the legendary willingness of the Cossacks to charge into crowds with sabres bared, few of the tsar's officers relished the thought of giving up the relative certainties of warfare for the uncertainties of crowd control.8
The army of the Monarchy was called upon to render numerous "assistances" in the final decades of the nineteenth century, but it should be noted that the military moved with some circumspection. Rothenberg claimed that the Monarchy and its army "maintained internal security by means no more ruthless than in other states of the day." One might argue that the Monarchy was actually far more reserved in its use of armed force than some other states. There was violence between troops and crowds, and bayonets were bloodied and rifles sometimes fired, but the Monarchy had no Bloody Sunday, no Pullman Strike, no Fourmies Massacre.

Whether from unwillingness to use indiscriminate force, scrupulous obedience to regulations, or a distaste for an "unprofessional" and morale-sapping role, the regulars of the Monarchy did not provide a mailed fist at the ready disposal of Taaffe and his successors. The force immediately available to the authorities, and most amenable to use, was provided by the gendarmerie. A call to the local garrison for "assistance" presented the local authorities with the problem of dealing with the military and its own ethos and command structure, as well as providing an admission that the civil authorities were no longer able to cope on their own. The local gendarmerie detachment, however, came directly under civil control and could be deployed immediately.
At its foundation in 1849 the gendarmerie had consisted of one thousand men organized into sixteen detachments. During the 1850s it served both as a rural guard and a political police in Venetia, Vienna, and conquered Hungary, and it grew to four thousand men in 1854 and finally to nineteen thousand by 1859. After the loss of Lombardy and Venetia it had been reduced to 7900 men, and in 1867 it was divided into separate Austrian and Hungarian services. Early in 1870 the Landwehr and Honvéd ministries relinquished control of the gendarmerie to the interior ministries of the two halves of the Monarchy.

Baron Kempen, the first commander of the gendarmerie, had tried to build an elite force on military lines, and his cadres had been trained by NCOs hand-picked from the ranks of distinguished regiments. Kempen organized the gendarmerie battalions on an army model and subjected them to military discipline. Even after their transfer to the control of the interior ministries, the gendarmerie regiments maintained their military appearance and training. Ministerial ordinances stressed that, while the gendarmerie was under the supervision of the ministry of the interior in all service and financial affairs, its organization, discipline, and equipment remained military. The Austrian gendarmerie in the 1880s was made up of 133 officers and 8120 men divided among fourteen local commands:
Unlike the Royal Hungarian gendarmerie, which rapidly became the agent of local landlords and the ruling party in Budapest, the Cisleithanian service retained the high reputation Kempen had sought to create, and its capabilities were regarded as close to those of regular army units. The Austrian gendarmerie was indeed able to undertake purely military missions: in 1880-82 it saw combat service in Istria and Dalmatia against the revolts in the Krisvosije.¹³

The Cisleithanian gendarmerie continued to grow throughout the remaining years of the century—146 line officers, 21 staff officers, and 9300 men in 1895 rose to 181 line officers, 25 staff officers, and 11,900 men in 1904.¹⁴ The growth reflected the rise of social and national unrest in the 1890s; the addition of a staff section for planning suggests both the increasing importance of the gendarmerie as a security force and the need to plan for the careful deployment of units that,
while self-consciously elite, by no means possessed overwhelming force. The list of major gendarmerie deployments against labor unrest is indicative of the decline of Taaffe’s era of carefully-balanced peace:
Leoben, Donawitz, Seegraben (1889); the Vöcklabrucker coal fields throughout 1889-91; Gablenz, Reichenberg, and Teplitz (1890); Ebenfurt, Hochwolkersdorf, Zückmantel, and Prossiwitz (1890); Mährisch-Schöberg (1893); Polnisch-Ostrau and Falkenau (1894); and defense of the Brürer coal fields and local government buildings and major firefights with anarchist groups (1896). By the end of the century the gendarmerie also served to hold the line against nationalist disorders.

The gendarmerie was more responsive to governmental desires than the army and, as an arm of the police, it was a less provocative symbol than the army, whose open dynastic orientation evoked memories of 1848/49. The gendarmerie was the major element in restoring order in Vienna and northern Bohemia in 1897, in Prague, Lau, Prerau, Holleschau, and Mährisch-Weisskirchen in 1899, and in riots by Italian and German student groups in Innsbruck in 1901 and 1904.

The frequency of calls on both the gendarmerie and the army increased sharply in the early 1890s, largely because of growing violence between Czechs and Germans. Count Taaffe had been adept at balancing the demands of
political parties, but the conflicting demands of Czech and German nationalists in Bohemia did not allow for an equilibrium constructed from the dissatisfaction of all parties. Taaffe’s government had tried since 1880 to reach a permanent accord with the Czechs, but by refusing to declare German as the "official language" of the Cisleithanian half of the Monarchy and by ordering that all verdicts handed down in the provincial courts of Bohemia and Moravia be given in the language of the parties involved, the government had deeply angered the Bohemian Germans. The dispute over the language of judicial opinions in Prague and Brünn drove the German deputies into a boycott of the Reichsrat. The Czechs were unwilling to make any gestures of conciliation, and the radical Young Czechs insisted on both a special constitutional status for Bohemia and full linguistic equality, which the rise in Czech population relative to the Germans would soon convert into dominance. The arguments went on in the streets as well. Insults and ink-wells were hurled in the Reichsrat and the Bohemian Diet; paving-stones were thrown in the streets of Prague and Brünn. The years immediately before 1890 saw the growing presence of gendarmes and soldiers on Bohemian streets as civil government became even weaker.

William Jenks noted that in the 1880s "no serious student of the Habsburg sickness looked beyond Bohemia for
signs either of possible improvement or of the. . .
agonies of dissolution. . . An unresolved war between
Germans and Czechs was a malignancy that threatened the
very essence of the Austrian state." It was Taaffe's
attempt to work out a compromise settlement in Bohemia
that brought down the Iron Ring in the end. Agreements
reached between Czechs and Germans in January 1890 under
government sponsorship were put before the Bohemian Diet
the following May. The German deputies had ended a four-
year walkout to attend. The Young Czechs, whose radical
stance had excluded them from the negotiations for a
Bohemian settlement, attended with every intention of
provoking violence. The Bohemian Diet collapsed into
chaos and fistfights; the session was prorogued and the
chamber cleared by the police.

Prague then erupted into demonstrations far more
violent than those seen in 1868. Czech mobs attacked
German shops and passers-by, imperial eagles were pulled
down from public buildings, and statues of the emperor
were defaced. Count Thun, the imperial governor, found the
civil police wholly overwhelmed and called out the
gendarmerie and the garrison. Prague and much of the rest
of Bohemia came under a state of siege. The Prague
garrison, its infantry component made up of elements of
five line regiments and a Feldjäger battalion, all
Bohemian, was able to clear the streets and restore
order at bayonet point, but the city would remain under a state of emergency throughout most of the decade. Count Thun, who had been cheered on his appointment as the Staathalter destined to preside over the arrival of Bohemian autonomy, found his name a byword for rule by military force. The mood in Bohemia, symbolized by a German boycott of the Bohemian Exhibition of 1891 and by a bomb attack on the emperor's rail coach outside Reichenberg, continued to deteriorate.

The Reichsrat elections of 1891 devastated the ranks of the conservative Old Czechs, destroying one of the main supports of Taaffe's coalition. The victorious Young Czechs, the new victors in Bohemia, were of no mind to cooperate with the government, and both Taaffe and the emperor thought the Young Czechs too radical to be part of a government coalition. Taaffe carried on for another year, trying to keep the system in balance, but by the autumn of 1893 his final attempt at conciliation, an effort to expand the franchise in the Cisleithanian lands, collapsed. The Iron Ring was replaced by a stopgap ministry of technicians, and its achievements would be largely forgotten in the furor of the 1890s. Taaffe had held his coalition together by an elaborate game of keeping all his plates in the air. His fall left both his successors and the commanders of the security forces only the fragments of political peace.
The deepening German-Czech conflict also encouraged national unrest elsewhere in the Monarchy. The negotiations for the army bill of 1889 had brought forth a new flowering of Magyar nationalism. Magyar nationalism both provided an example for the Young Czechs and derived part of its intransigence from Magyar fears that the Czechs might achieve their own Ausgleich. In Carinthia and Styria there emerged Slovene pressure on the provinces' Italians and Germans. The Alpine Germans, the backbone of the Monarchy, began to be restive, and Pan-German sympathies were violently expressed in Linz, Graz, and Vienna. The crowds cheering the Pan-German leader Georg von Schönerer down Vienna's Landesgerichtstrasse to his imprisonment for destroying the offices of Neues Wiener Tageblatt marred the celebration of the emperor's birthday and offered the unpleasant and distasteful spectacle of a Viennese crowd cheering for a Prussian king. The possibility that the Germans of the Monarchy could become disaffected was a disheartening omen for peace in the Cisleithanian lands.

Taaffe's immediate successor lasted a little less than two years in office. Prince Windischgrätz, grandson of the hero of 1848, attempted to deal with the Bohemian problem by maintaining the state of siege in Prague and extending the Landwehr term of service. Yet it was not the unrest in Bohemia that brought down his ministry.
The Windischgrätz ministry fell over an utter triviality, a symbol of the decay of affairs in Cisleithania. Funds had been earmarked for the construction of a Slovene Untergymnasium in the village of Cilli in southern Styria. German Liberals, aghast at the thought of allowing Slovene-language classes in a town thought to be a German stronghold, withdrew their support from the government. The emperor and his advisors determined to have no more governments dependent on parliamentary whims and declared that Austria would be governed by extra-party technicians. The Slovenes of Cilli got their Untergymnasium in the next year's budget; the town itself remained a German enclave until its remaining inhabitants were driven out or slaughtered by the advancing Red Army in the spring of 1945.

The state of secondary education in a provincial town of south Styria was an issue of the greatest triviality, but it proved that government in the Cisleithanian lands was no longer able to function on a parliamentary level. The Austrian half of the Monarchy would be largely governed in the future by bureaucrats. The dynasty had always leaned heavily on its non-national administrators and its army; in the mid-1890s these seemed to be its only sustaining forces.

The ill-fated Windischgrätz was replaced by Count Casimir Badeni, the long-time imperial governor of
Galicia. Badeni had earned a reputation for efficiency and a strong hand. He had kept the Ruthenes in line, kept Russian terrorists from using Galicia as a sanctuary, and championed the fortification of the Russian frontier. Moreover, he had the support of the bureaucrats and the army. The Badeni ministry was charged with rebuilding Taaffe's coalition of Slavs and conservatives in order to maintain social peace and to reach an equitable and workable truce in Bohemia. Badeni was first able to force through an extension of the franchise in an attempt to reach those peasants as yet uncorrupted by nationalism. Like the emperor, Badeni believed that the nationalism of the middle and lower-middle classes was the force that could wreck the Monarchy.

In the early spring of 1897 Badeni set out to conciliate the Czechs. The Reichsrat elections of March 1897 had been another resounding success for the Young Czechs, and Badeni hoped to win the more moderate of them to the side of the government. The state of siege was lifted in Prague, press censorship was curtailed, pardons were granted to a number of convicted radicals, and Count Thun was removed as governor. In April new language ordinances were issued for the civil service in Bohemia and Moravia. Effective 1 July 1901 all imperial civil servants in the two provinces would be required to know both Czech and German; local courts would be obliged to
hear cases in the language of the plaintiff; and internal administrative correspondence would be conducted in whichever language the original paperwork concerning an issue had used. Badeni defended his decrees as being vital to the welfare of the Monarchy, and he joined Czech spokesmen in pointing out that no more was being required of German bureaucrats than Bohemian landowners required of their gamekeepers.\textsuperscript{23}

The German parties, almost to a man, refused to accept decrees handed down by a cabinet dominated by Poles. Five of the key ministries, including Interior, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, were held by Poles\textsuperscript{24}---and that allowed Czechs to displace Germans. One of Taaffe's Polish ministers had long ago warned the recalcitrant German Liberals that the Monarchy could be governed "without the Germans;" the German parties believed the Monarchy was now being governed "against the Germans."\textsuperscript{25}

Violence erupted throughout Bohemia and spread to the alpine provinces. The Reichsrat, its sessions disrupted by the increasingly violent actions of German deputies, was yet again cleared by the police. The gendarmerie had to be called in to clear mobs off the Ringstrasse in Vienna. The city garrison was called out, and troops were in the streets in Salzburg, Graz, Linz, and Prague as well. The level of violence rose all through the summer, and later writers described the temper in the Austrian
lands as "revolutionary" and reminiscent of 1848. By late summer, with the army in the streets and the decennial negotiations with Hungary impending, the idea of declaring martial law throughout Cisleithania and ruling through military governors-general was in the air.

The Vienna garrison, drawn from the 4.(Vienna), 61. (Temesvar), 64.(Broos), 66.(Ungvar), 68.(Budapest), 71. (Trencsin), 84.(Vienna), and 1. and 4. Bosnians, was able to clear the capital's streets with well-timed appearances and the application of rifle butts. Other garrisons were less fortunate. Riot duty is always wearing, and few things erode morale more rapidly. The Prague garrison had been on constant call since Taaffe's day, and the demands had taken a toll. The 28.(Prague) Infantry was moved out of the city in 1893 and sent to Linz and then on to Trient in 1895. Rothenberg claimed that the 28. had become "unreliable," though he did not cite any specific instances of disaffection, and some units of the 28. remained in the city. The 28., an almost wholly Czech regiment, may have shown nationalist tendencies or it may have been simply exhausted by riot duty. Constrained to use minimum force, it may have been battered by the crowds and sent away to recover its morale. After all, there could be nothing pleasant about living in daily contact with a population that might be hurling brickbats at soldiers or attacking patrols. In any case, the transfer
of the 28. was not a harbinger of military unreliability.

In 1897 the Prague command was faced by outbreaks of rioting on a scale unknown since 1848. Czech mobs took to the street to attack Germans and destroy property owned by Germans and Jews. Count Coudenhove, the new governor, called out the city garrison. The troops were from the 28., as well as the 73.(Eger), 88.(Beraun), 91.(Budweis), and 102.(Beneschau) as well as the 7.Dragoons and 22. Feldjägers. All were Bohemian units, and most were largely Czech. Although I Korps (Krakow) and II Korps (Vienna) had been alerted in case reinforcements were required, the local forces served quite admirably.

While the Prague garrison was able to maintain order in the city, its counterpart at Graz was far less fortunate. Styrian Germans had never forgotten the Cilli affair, and the riots against the Badeni Ordinances gave German nationalists a chance to settle scores not just with the Slovenes but with political rivals as well. On 20 November 1897 violence broke out between rival crowds of Social Democrats and Christian Socialists, the latter made up largely of students. A full third of the city's 195 policemen were sent to disperse the crowds, but the police were driven off by rioters armed with paving-stones and clubs. Socialist leaders were unable to calm their followers, and the Christian Socials had no wish to calm
theirs. The city authorities then requested aid from the Graz garrison.

The garrison was not a large one. Graz was the headquarters of III Korps, but its barracks were occupied only by the 7.(Klagenfurt), 27.(Graz), and 2.Bosnian infantry and the 5.Dragoons (Marburg). 31 All were Styrian or Carinthian units except the Bosnians, and the Bosnians would take the blame for all future events. The Bosnian regiments had been raised in the mid-1880s after the suppression of the conscription revolts in the Occupied Provinces and the Krisvosije. 32 Conscription had been exceedingly unpopular, and attempts to levy troops had sparked a year-long revolt. 33 Nonetheless, Bosnian units were soon raised, and Bosniaken were considered to be fine military material, a reputation they would maintain and enlarge after 1914. For the moment, however, they could not be kept in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was unwise to keep armed natives in a newly conquered zone with a centuries-long history of violence and instability, and they had been moved into the Monarchy proper to relieve line regiments with battalions detached to the Okkupationsgebiet. Rothenberg believed they had been brought in as outsiders to quell urban riots, 34 but their appearance in Vienna (1892) and Budapest (1891) probably reflected convenience as much as anything else. The two capitals, with garrisons of half-a-dozen infantry
regiments and assorted cavalry, artillery, and support units, were convenient places to park new regiments. The capitals' garrisons required more men than could be raised locally, and Bosnians in fezzes seemed no more unusual than swaggering mustachioed hussars on the cosmopolitan streets of Vienna. The 2. Bosnians had arrived in Graz in 1896. They were a long way from their depot at Banjaluka, and the good people of Graz were violent nationalists.

On the night of 20 November 1897 two companies of Bosniaks were sent into Graz to restore order. Repeated appeals by local Social Democratic officials for the crowd to disperse failed to produce any result, and toward midnight the Bosniaks made a bayonet charge to clear the streets. By 2 a.m. order was restored, but one rioter was dead and four badly wounded. The violence ended for the moment, but the Bosniaks had become an immediate target for popular hatred. They were reviled as outlanders and "Muslim mercenaries". The latter term was particularly galling to the army, since it was usually prefaced with *schwarzgelb*, black-and-yellow, the dynasty's colors. The students and burghers of Graz began to sport blue carnations, the symbol of German nationalism, and attack the black-and-yellow of the dynasty.

On 26 November a socialist crowd attacked the offices of the city's Christian Social newspaper. The Bosniaks were called out again, supported by the 5. Dragoons and
the 27.(Graz) Infantry. Bosnian troops dispersed the crowd, but it soon reformed, counterattacked behind a barrage of paving stones, and was only then driven off at bayonet point. A half-squadron of dragoons, penned in the Auerspergplatz by a hostile mob, battered their way out with the flat of the sword. FML Anton Succovary, commanding III Korps, had to deny publicly press reports spreading throughout Cisleithania that his cavalry had made repeated sabre charges into the crowds. The edge of the sword, Succovary insisted, could only be used in self-defense or upon his direct, and as yet ungiven, order.35

On 27 November the Christian Socials came out to seek revenge, and fighting erupted in the city's Hauptplatz. A socialist group, fleeing from patrols of the 7.(Klagenfurt) Infantry, was stopped from looting wine shops by the arrival of more of the 7. On their return to the Hauptplatz they were confronted by a company of Bosniaks. Paving stones began to fly, and the Bosniaks fixed bayonets and charged. One platoon, clearing out side streets, was cut off in the Murgasse and beset by stones and roof-tiles hurled from surrounding buildings. The battered Bosniaks gave ground down the alleyway. When the situation became dangerous, their lieutenant ordered a volley. The rioters scattered, leaving one man dead, another dying, and twenty wounded. The arrival of cavalry reinforcements drove off the rest of the crowd. The men
of the 7. gave chase to the edge of the Stadtpark, but the officers of the regiment chose to forego entanglements in the unlighted park. Bayonet fights in a darkened wood hardly seemed worthwhile.

The official report from Succovary to the war ministry was succinct enough:

On the night of the 26/27th as well as the 27/28th assistances were rendered against street demonstrations caused by students and workers. On the first night no major clashes took place. Last night four companies of one hundred men each and one squadron were employed. A group of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Infantry Regiment Nr. 2, belabored by stones in the Murgasse, opened fire, killing one civilian and wounding others; order was restored thereafter. Assistances were concluded between 0100 and 0300 hours. At 1600 hours today, upon request of the governor, six battalions and one squadron under Generalmajor Sglitz were held ready on the Hauptplatz and in barracks. Reports to follow after full investigation.36

The Bosniaks were of course absolved from any wrongdoing. The official report37 made clear that the officers of the garrison had used force quite cautiously. Given the level of threat, Succovary and his junior officers had not even taken advantage of moments when army regulations38 would have permitted sabre charges and aimed fire. Nonetheless, the Bosniaks became the object of virulent local hatred. At a Sunday concert in early December crowds greeted the men of the 7. as "German brothers" and offered them beer and cigarettes. The Bosnians, on the other hand, were subject to both verbal and physical abuse, and the regiment was marched back to
barracks by officers unwilling to order a charge with bayonets and rifle butts into well-dressed Sunday promenaders. The mayor of Graz was informed that the Bosniaks would be kept out of sight as much as possible and, most humiliating to Succovary and the garrison command, sent out only in tandem with German units.39

The garrison officers, from German and Bosnian regiments alike, were excluded from Graz society; shops and restaurants became unwilling to serve officers. All over Graz the Styrian equivalent of the "no redcoats wanted here" that faced Kipling's Tommy Atkins began to appear in shop windows.40 The local press attacked the "provocative presence" of "foreigners"—off-duty Bosniaks—in the town. Any brawl between a Bosniak and a local in a tavern became an unprovoked attack by bayonet-wielding "Turks" on peaceful German citizens.41 German nationalists spoke of events in Graz as a "neu Türkenkrieg" and promised more violence.42

The furor over the Bosniaks in Graz reached the floor of the Reichsrat in early December. The government had suffered the humiliation of Badeni's fall in November; the Polish strongman had become, after Ficquelmont and Metternich, the third Austrian minister in history to be driven from office by public clamor.43 The attempt to govern "against the Germans" had failed, and once more an interim bureaucratic cabinet was appointed to pick up the
pieces. On 7 December the imperial war minister, the delightfully named Krieghammer, rose to defend the honor of the army and the competence of III Korps' commanders:

Insofar as the polyglot composition of the Austrian army is concerned, I can assure you that every regiment, wherever its men are recruited, will carry out its duty against the internal and external enemies of the Monarchy, and in this regard it makes no difference whether a regiment comes from the north or the south or what tongue it speaks. In the army every nationality is held in equal value and equal regard. No officer recognises any differences among the nationalities.  

Krieghammer's assurances were both heartfelt and true. The army remained loyal and supranational; its ability to cobbled together a functioning system out of disparate nationalities was a model for the Monarchy's ruling class, men like Badeni or Taaffe or Krieghammer, who saw themselves as servants of the dynasty and not a nation. Yet the limitations of the army were also evident. The army had performed with discretion and loyalty throughout the 1880s and 1890s. But it could only restore order, not create the conditions for peace. It could clear the streets and keep hostile nationalities apart, but it could not be used to govern. The Budapest oligarchy could solve its problems with recalcitrant peasants or insolent Croats and Romanians by ordering the Honved to fire on a crowd, but Cisleithania could not be governed by ordering the army to fire on the Czech or German middle classes. In the autumn of 1898 crowds of
burgers pelted the unlucky Graz garrison with rocks and garbage, and the emperor, in an uncharacteristic display of truculence, demanded to know how the troops had allowed themselves to be humiliated and why their officers had failed to order the use of firearms.45 It was, however, politically impossible to fire on the middle classes, on well-dressed crowds of property-owners, students, and professionals. In a parliamentary era, one could not shoot down the people who made up the backbone of the state. So long as no political solution could be reached, the army would remain a useful instrument, but one fated to be abused by the crowd and battered by both parliamentary deputies and paving stones.

Political problems do not exist in isolation; they feed off one other. German and Czech intransigence fueled each other, and by the end of the 1890s disquieting linkages were forming all across the Monarchy. Magyar successes in 1867 had inspired Czech nationalists to demand autonomy for Bohemia. Every Czech success threatened the privileged, not to say dominant, position of the Magyars in the Monarchy, and every Czech demand provoked the Magyar oligarchs to pre-empt any hope of Czech victories over Vienna by making their own demands. The successes of the Magyars in acquiring the Honved provoked Young Czechs to demand their own autonomous units. The Hungarians, agitated by the success of Czech
linguistic demands, moved to defend themselves from Slavdom by increasing their campaign to Magyarise the minorities. Demands that Magyar be accorded greater use in Hungarian regiments were met with a Czech campaign calling on Czech recruits to respond in Czech instead of army German on the parade ground."

Hungary had been quiet during the 1880s; the Russian threat had been a powerful impetus to cooperate with the imperial authorities in strengthening the army. The increased Russian troop strength in Poland was just as menacing at the end of the 1880s, and there was little outright hostility to the army. Nonetheless, the Hungarian leadership used the debates over the army bill of 1889 to pressure the imperial government for concessions. The initial demands were largely symbolic, a matter of Count Kalman Tisza, the Hungarian premier, covering his left flank against his more vocal opposition. Yet they became the opening moves in a game that very nearly brought down the Ausgleich.

In the midst of the 1889 debates Hungarian deputies began to demand that Hungarian regiments be commanded in Magyar and that Hungarian regiments be granted the right to carry Hungarian flags and bear Hungarian emblems on their uniforms. Such demands had an obvious emotional appeal, and Tisza's opposition used them as a stick to beat the premier and his more moderate Liberals. Tisza
had devoted no little time and effort to building a working relationship with his counterparts in Vienna, and he had no wish to provoke a crisis. He was nonetheless all too aware that he was constrained to exact concessions from the imperial authorities. In any case, he agreed with his opponents that a greater role for Magyar in the Hungarian regiments would aid the ongoing effort to force Hungary's Slovaks, Romanians, and Serbs to adopt the language of their masters, and so Tisza brought up his own series of linguistic demands during the army bill negotiations.

The imperial government was vulnerable to Hungarian pressure in 1889. That spring saw a sharp increase in Russian troop movements in Poland, and the army wanted its annual intake of conscripts raised above the levels negotiated in 1879. The army requested an enlargement in joint (imperial-royal) army conscription from 89,000 men to 103,100. The number itself was not large, but the army, which had been unable to win parliamentary approval for adjusting recruiting quotas according to population growth, was desperate for manpower, and it was willing to bargain for even a few thousand extra recruits. The general staff and the war ministry were aware that Hungarian rapacity, fed by nationalism and the imperial weakness revealed by the Czech-German conflict, was
growing, but there was no alternative to negotiating with
the Magyar leadership.

Tisza arrived in Vienna in the fall of 1889 with his
hand strengthened by the increasing level of furor in the
Hungarian Diet and by riots in the streets of Budapest
demanding greater "equality" in military affairs for
Magyardom. He was not prepared to advance the demands of
the more vocal members of the Diet for full use of Magyar
as the language of command in the Hungarian regiments, let
alone the demands of opposition leaders like Count Albert
Apponyi and Ferenc Kossuth for expansion of the Honved
into a national Hungarian army. Tisza had called out
aging survivors of the Ausgleich negotiations to argue
against the demands of Apponyi and the younger Kossuth.
Andrassy himself was brought into the Diet to proclaim
that the demands for a Hungarian national army were
dangerous not only to the Monarchy but, in the face of
Russian sabre-rattling in Poland and Bulgaria, dangerous
to Hungary as well. The architects of the Ausgleich,
Andrassy said, had not pressed for military separatism,
and such a course was doubly dangerous now.47

Tisza did not find the negotiations with the imperial
government very difficult. In return for his support for
the army bill he was able to return to Budapest with what
he felt was an appropriate number of concessions. Magyar
one-year volunteers were no longer required to be fluent
in German, and, symbolically, the title of the joint army was to be altered to show Hungary’s status. The army was now designated k.-und-k., kaiserlich-und-königlich, imperial - and - royal. The added article represented the self-governing status of the Kingdom of Hungary within the Monarchy. The Hungarians had asked for the change as long ago as 1875: Bela Szende, then Honvéd minister, had petitioned Vienna to adopt k.-u.-k. gemeinsames Heer or simply das Heer for the army’s title. In any case the und had been creeping in. The imperial war ministry had protested in 1873 that k.-u.-k. was being "smuggled in" by the Hungarians and the popular press, and the common usage of the term both within and without the army subverted its joint and dynastic status. The concessions, like so many arguments based on symbols, left no one happy in the end. The army disliked any concession to Hungarian demands for separatism, and the Hungarians resented still being linked in an imperial designation.

The position of the military on both symbolic and linguistic concessions was straightforward. The army was the single major joint institution in the Monarchy. Division of the army seemed tantamount to division of the Monarchy. At best, the Monarchy would be a mere personal union, the Austrian lands and the Kingdom of Hungary held together only by the person of Franz Joseph. At worst, as the Archduke Albrecht had predicted, the Monarchy would
dissolve into a welter of fissioning parts. Linguistic parity for Magyar was a first and fatal step toward separatism. The "independence" parties in Hungary did not, the army believed, seek merely to protect the national identity of Hungarian troops, but to enforce Magyar domination within Hungary.

There were in any case purely military objections to any Hungarian demands for language concessions. Only thirty-six of the Monarchy's 102 regular infantry regiments spoke one tongue, and of the forty-one regiments raised in Hungary only seven were purely Magyar-speaking.\(^5\) The military consequences of linguistic parity were quite obviously unfortunate: increased difficulty of communication within the army and decreased speed of mobilisation. There were already Honvéd staff officers who spoke no German.\(^5\) There was simply no way to reconcile military necessity with two official languages of command.\(^5\)

The Magyar position was not quite so simple. Tisza was a firm supporter of the terms of the Ausgleich as they stood. He had been Andrassy's chosen successor, and he had inherited a healthy fear of the Russians. He had become skilled at using the Honvéd to keep the minorities in line at bayonet point, and he had no wish to force issues in the joint army. Yet the army bill debates of 1889/90 had been Tisza's swan song. He had made himself
seem insufficiently radical to the followers of Apponyi and Ferenc Kossuth, and, by the spring of 1890, he found himself vilified in the Diet and by the opposition press and resigned the premiership in disgust after fifteen years in power.

His Liberals remained in control of the government, but there was no firm leadership to defend the Ausgleich arrangements. The opposition held the high ground of political symbolism, exploiting Magyar fears of the nationalities, emotional bonds with the revolution of 1848, hatred and fear of Slavic (i.e., Czech) successes, and pride in Hungarian sovereignty. All factions agreed that the use of Magyar in Hungarian regiments was vital to Magyarising the nationalities, and Apponyi's faction disdained the joint army as a foreign occupation force and hoped to see the Honved and the Hungarian joint regiments merged into a national army. Ferenc Kossuth added antidynastic sentiment to a disdain for the army as an institution.54

The early 1890s saw a rapid growth of opposition sentiment in Hungary. Opposition to the Liberals, to the party which had supported the Ausgleich, grew as memories of 1849 faded. The joint structure of the Monarchy came to seem, as Norman Stone had it, a "luxury".55 The Czechs were forcing the Germans from dominance in Bohemia, and the Magyars could hardly do less. The arrival on the
political scene of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who had become Franz Joseph's heir-apparent following the suicide of Crown Prince Rudolf, did little to inspire confidence in the future of Dualism. Other members of the dynasty, notably Albrecht, had been hostile to Hungary in the past, but the new imperial successor manifested an open and total hatred for all things Magyar. Albrecht had despised the Hungarian political leadership but believed that the ordinary Hungarian soldier, if properly led and fairly treated, would be loyal to the Monarchy and the emperor. Franz Ferdinand openly doubted the loyalty of all Hungarian officers and proclaimed that all Hungarians, cabinet minister, prince, cardinal, burgher, peasant, hussar, servant, were each and every one revolutionaries and potential traitors. The Liberals depended on the Ausgleich; Dualism seemed likely to pass away with the old emperor.

The final Ausgleich negotiations of the century arrived in the wake of the Badeni riots in the Austrian lands. The opposition parties had taken advantage of Hungary's celebration of one thousand years of nationhood to proclaim 1896 a year of political truce, and it was only to be expected that, after such a well-publicized display of graciousness, 1897 would be a bitter year for both the ruling Liberals and the imperial government. There was growing sentiment on the part of the
professionals and small businessmen who made up the backbone of the opposition parties in favor of a separate Hungarian customs area, and the long-playing crisis across the Leitha had its repercussions in Hungary. Bohemian "state rights" were seen by the opposition as a prelude to a tripartite Monarchy, and there was an impetus to extract concessions from Vienna before Prague could win any victories that would incite the nationalities in Hungary or diminish Hungary's role in the Monarchy. There was no hope of unseating the Liberals in any sort of ordinary election; Tisza had built up a party structure that gave them an unassailable edge even without himself as premier. In any case government controlled both the location of polling places and the counting of ballots. The "electoral geometry" designed to keep the nationalities in their place kept the Magyar opposition in its place as well. Yet there was capital to be made. The imperial government had shown its weakness in Bohemia, and the opposition stood to gain support by scourging the Liberals for their failure to take full advantage of imperial disarray.

The demands made in the Hungarian parliament after 1896 reflected a deep strain of national arrogance as well. In the late spring of 1897 the Young Czech press began to demand that Czech recruits called up for service but not yet in uniform, conscripts in limbo between
arrival at a barracks and the issue of the blue-grey soldier's plumage, be allowed to respond to commands in Czech. The harried imperial authorities were having none of it, however. Conscripts who chose to answer zde instead of hier at roll call were threatened with martial law and military courts, as were those politicians and journalists who egged them on. The Young Czechs retreated before a display of imperial determination, and the Czech failure, well-publicized in Budapest, was a goad to Hungarian nationalists: the Magyars would be able to win the sort of symbolic victory that had eluded the Czechs.

The first demands of the opposition parties, the so-called '48 parties, concerned the economic provisions of the Ausgleich. The economic treaties between Hungary and the Austrian lands expired at midnight on 31 December 1897. The '48 parties had devoted themselves to a policy of obstructing the renewal of the Ausgleich treaties throughout the year, and their demands on the government had driven the Liberals away from any productive negotiations. On New Year's Day 1898 the opposition parties announced that Hungary was no longer integrated with the rest of the Monarchy's economy; Hungary was free to establish its own customs zone and erect protective tariffs. The government, however, managed to force a one-year "temporary" renewal through the Diet, and early in the year the Austrian and Hungarian premiers signed a
memorandum of understanding which extended the economic clauses of the 1887 agreements pending some definitive action on the part of the Hungarians. The opposition's position was that the agreement was totally illegal and that the country was being governed ex lege, outside the law. The opposition managed to block the 1899 budget and recruiting authorizations and announced that, should the imperial authorities attempt to collect taxes or levy recruits, the king would be in violation of the constitution and his coronation oath.

The imperial government now found its ability to maintain the army under attack. Recruiting in Hungary was a problem under the best of circumstances. Hungarian poverty kept the physical quality of conscripts below that of their Cisleithanian counterparts, and the army had to take an older age group in order to find a sufficient number of physically acceptable men. Opposition successes in 1898 meant that the recruit levies for 1899, 1900, and 1901 had to be met by a painfully hammered-out set of emergency measures and annual bills. Time-expired men were retained in service, and men from the Ersatzreserve were called up to active service.

Hungarian obstruction also came at a time when the army, dissatisfied with the recruit quotas of 1889, was preparing to plead for more men. War minister Krieghammer had hoped to use 1899 to ask for more recruits; he was now
forced to try emergency measures to keep the army manned at all, even at the level of 1889. In the autumn of 1902 Krieghammer, despairing in an attempt to gain formal approval for using the *Ersatzreserve* as a permanent source of peacetime manpower for the joint army, finally asked for an increase in the recruiting quotas. The joint army would receive annual levies of 125,000 men—71,562 from the Austrian lands and 53,438 from Hungary. The proposal was the spark that ignited five years of crisis in Hungary.

The upheaval in Hungary is conventionally known as the crisis of 1905, the year of greatest drama. Its origins may have been in the demands of the opposition, of the professional classes and small businessmen, for a protective customs zone and a separate national bank, but by the end of 1902 it had evolved into a fight over the nature of the army. Contemporary observers understood that the army was at the center of opposition demands but were unaware of the depth of the crisis or its severity. In 1902 the army attempted to expand its recruit quotas to keep itself effective against the numerically superior Russians and found itself under attack at every turn by Magyar nationalists.

In October 1902 the war ministry presented the Hungarian Diet with a request for a substantial increase in recruiting; Hungary’s share would be 16,292 more men—
10,727 for the joint army, 3000 for the Honved, and 2565 for the supplementary reserve. No one doubted that Hungary's population could support the increase. There were even inducements—new NCO schools and military hospitals for the Honved—designed to win favor among the nationalists. Yet the '48 parties had been battered by Liberal electoral chicanery in 1901, and the army bill seemed to be the perfect emotional issue on which to build popularity and recoup their fortunes. And, as one opposition spokesman pointed out, "Our king is well along in years, and we must use these few [remaining] years to take advantage of his attention to the law and his oath. Every Hungarian knows that dark days are coming for our country. . ."  

The opposition was prepared to seize the moment, and on 27 January 1903 the Party of Independence presented the government and the imperial authorities with a list of military demands: Hungarian officers to serve only in Hungarian regiments; all officers in Hungarian regiments to be fluent in Magyar; Magyar to be the language of command and service in Hungarian regiments; Hungarian regiments to bear Hungarian national crests and flags; regiments raised on Hungarian soil to swear allegiance to the Hungarian Constitution; active service to be reduced from three years to two; and Hungarian regiments to be stationed only in Hungary in time of peace."
The military and the imperial government found the demands totally unacceptable, but they were frighteningly popular in Hungary. They had an immediate appeal to national emotion, and, by asking for a reduction in the terms of active service, the opposition parties stood to gain a major body of support on purely practical lines. The military could see only disaster ahead. Taken as a body, the opposition demands called for the creation de facto of a separate Hungarian army, stationed only in Hungary and commanded in Magyar, loyal to the Hungarian constitution—meaning loyal to the Magyar oligarchy and not to the dynasty, flying national red-white-green flags instead of Habsburg black-and-gold. The opposition demands called for a return to the state of affairs of the spring of 1848 and the first heady days of "reforms." The end, the military leadership believed, would be the summer and autumn of 1848 again: reform would be followed by an attempt to assert Hungarian independence, and civil war would follow.

The opposition demands had seized the emotional high ground in Hungarian politics, and there was a steady flow of Liberal politicians away from government positions and toward more strident nationalism. Obstruction in the Diet prevented a succession of short-lived ministries from doing anything to reach a lasting agreement with Vienna. A four-month bill allowing the government to levy recruits
expired in April 1903 and, without any renewal possible over opposition obstruction, Hungary was once again ex lex as of 1 May 1903. By June the emperor was ready to go outside the halls of the Diet to find a premier, and in late June Count Karoly Khuen-Hedervary, the long-time Ban of Croatia, was named premier. Khuen-Hedervary had made a name for himself as an iron-fisted viceroy in Zagreb, but his tenure as premier was no happier than that of Badeni, another viceroy who found the capital more troublesome than the provinces. The Magyarone aristocracy of Croatia were no more than kept puppets, and the Honved was always at hand to deal with Croats who took to the streets. The politicians of the Diet were arrogant, anarchic, and free from the threat of viceregal police. Khuen-Hedervary, used to issuing orders, was unable to reach any compromises and unwilling to yield on any point because of personal pride. By mid-August 1903 he found himself increasingly isolated and powerless, and he handed in his resignation.

There was now no chance of securing a recruit bill in 1903, let alone securing Hungarian agreement to any expansion of the army. Hungarian conscripts of 1900 due for discharge on 1 October 1903 were informed that they would be retained indefinitely. In mid-August the emperor visited Budapest but found no one willing to form a
ministry. By September he took the occasion of cavalry maneuvers at the Galician village of Chlopy to speak out:

I have determined to satisfy myself once more concerning the instructional establishments, leadership, and conduct—as well as the overall constitution and readiness—of all my troops... I must and will maintain their existing and proven arrangements. My Army in particular—whose solid framework is being threatened by one-sided ambitions wholly ignorant of the noble ambitions it has to fulfill for the welfare of both state-regions of the Monarchy—must know that I will never relinquish the rights and powers which are granted its Supreme Warlord. Joint and unified as it now is shall my Army remain—the strong power for defense of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy against every foe.68

On 22 September the emperor informed Khuen-Hedervary and, through him, the entire Hungarian leadership, that his position was inflexible. He did, however, hint that there existed the possibility of some negotiated changes in the administration of the k.-u.-k. army. The emperor pointed out that, while he had always defended the Ausgleich and the rights of the Hungarian nation, he could not diminish his sovereign rights under the Ausgleich, nor would he agree to any measure that would weaken the army and thus be detrimental to both partners in the Monarchy.69

The Liberal leadership met in Budapest a week later to work out a compromise on the army question. A working group of nine, headed by ex-premier Kalman Szell and Count Istvan Tisza, son of Kalman Tisza, was formed, and on 18 October the committee issued its recommendations:
Hungarian emblems should be given greater prominence; the Hungarian military commands should correspond with local civil authorities only in Magyar; Magyar should be used in all military courts convened in Hungarian regiments; Hungarian troops should, insofar as military necessity and administrative requirements allowed, be commanded by Hungarian officers; all Hungarian officers should be transferred to Hungarian regiments; and Hungarian cadet schools should be expanded. The committee went on to recognize that the language of service and command was a prerogative of the crown and "for grave political reasons affecting the larger interests of the nation" refrained from seeking changes. Within a week, the emperor accepted the proposals as a basis for negotiation and authorized Count Istvan Tisza to form a cabinet. The rights of the crown had been recognised; Franz Joseph felt the rest of the proposals to be purely administrative matters open to discussion.

Tisza was not a popular man in Vienna. He was no less a nationalist than his fellow Magyar lords, and he had once dismissed a report on Hungarian affairs by an Austrian minister-president as "the dilettante opinion of a distinguished foreigner." He was nonetheless the only Hungarian leader not afflicted by the chronic shortsightedness of his class, and he had no patience with the anarchic grandstanding that party politics had become
since his father's death. Tisza was willing to accept the personal costs of the premiership—accusations in the Diet and the opposition press that he was a traitor to Hungary and no more than the bought agent of the court—and his high-handed methods had some success at checking the chaos beginning to permeate political life. In March 1904 Tisza bludgeoned through temporary recruit and budget bills, allowing the army to release some reservists and time-expired men and finally permitting the government to pay some of its bills. He was adept and ruthless in shutting off political opponents, and he was no less hard-fisted in dealing with disorder beyond the Diet. The Honved was called out in early 1904 to break a major rail strike, and on Tisza's orders recalcitrant strikers found themselves forcibly enlisted in the Honved and subjected to military law.

Nonetheless, the situation in Hungary continued to deteriorate. Tisza's insistence on parliamentary order provoked greater discontent within Liberal ranks and drove once-loyal deputies deprived of their time-honored rights to filibuster and shout imprecations closer to Apponyi and Ferenc Kossuth. Violence had begun in the streets as well. In October 1903 a wreath commemorating the rebel generals executed at Arad in 1849 appeared on the Kossuth monument at Szeged, supposedly delivered in the name of the third-year men of the local garrison. Military police
of the 46. (Szeged) sent to remove the wreath found themselves opposed by civil police sent by the county authorities to defend it. In the ensuing fight two civilians were seriously wounded. Fights between soldiers and civilians, or duels between officers and satisfaktionsfähig Magyars, had never been uncommon in Hungary; they now became epidemic. Violence in the streets was reflected in the Diet, and Magyar deputies proved no less fond of smashing furniture than their Czech counterparts. When Tisza proclaimed to his constituents that a joint army was required for Hungary’s security and that order in parliament was vital if Hungary was not to go the way of the disintegrating Cisleithanian lands, the opposition leadership arranged a display of violent physical displeasure. The proud opposition leaders, including an ex-premier, had themselves photographed smiling proudly in the ruins of the Diet chamber, pieces of shattered benches and desks clutched in their hands like swords of honour.  

In mid-December 1904 Tisza dissolved the Diet and announced new elections for January. He seems to have hoped that the electorate would reject the irresponsibility of the opposition or, alternatively, that the opposition, if confronted with a serious chance of power, would moderate their demands. In either case, Tisza seriously miscalculated. The opposition had long
since captured the emotional issues of the campaign, and Tisza’s role in breaking parliamentary "freedom" to obstruct business had driven a large number of local notables, the men who ran the county administrations, into the opposition camp. The election campaign was marked by serious outbursts of violence, and Cisleithanian troops, as opposed to the Honved, which usually enforced the government’s will at the polls, had to be called in.74 The election itself was held four days after "Bloody Sunday" in St. Petersburg, and the massacre of Russian workers, graphically and widely reported in the Hungarian press, was linked to reports in Independence Party papers that the emperor had offered k.-u.-k. troops to help the tsar shoot down the workers of St. Petersburg.75 Tisza himself remained oddly passive throughout the campaign, and for the first time in living memory the considerable repressive apparatus of the Hungarian government was not brought to bear on voters.76 The combined opposition parties won 231 seats to the Liberals’ 159, a massive repudiation of the policies of Tisza and the supporters of the Ausgleich.

The victors assumed that, having broken the dominance of the Liberals, they could dictate terms at the Hofburg. Ferenc Kossuth was granted an audience (in Magyar) with the emperor, who indicated his willingness to go forward with the proposals drawn up by the Committee of Nine
headed by Tisza and Kalman Szell in October 1904. The younger Kossuth showed some personal tact before the man who had been his father's arch enemy, but the younger Andrassy announced that there could be no hope of an increase in the recruit quota, and that he, Andrassy, would join a new government only on the basis of an independent customs zone and a full implementation of Magyar language of command. Gyula Justh, one of the younger leaders of the Party of Independence and newly-appointed speaker of the Diet, informed the emperor that, even if Magyar became the language of command in Hungarian regiments, Hungary still demanded an independent national army, a point of view expressed again by the Diet in an address to the throne offered that spring.

Late in March Feldmarschalleutnant Heinrich von Pitreich, the imperial war minister, and Admiral Count Rudolf Montecuccoli, the chief of the naval staff, arrived in Budapest to meet with the new majority leadership on military questions. Montecuccoli was the architect of the remarkable growth of the k.-u.-k. fleet, and he hoped to avoid any crisis that would slacken the flow of funds and men for his new and cherished navy. Pitreich was known as a moderate on "superficial" issues such as flags and emblems, and was ready to compromise. His own view was that externals were of limited importance. Hungarian troops had sported distinctive dress since Theresian
times, and they would be no less brave or loyal for having St. Stephen’s crown on their uniform buttons in place of the double eagle. A willingness to compromise on small things, Pitreich held, was the key to saving the larger goal of a unified and enlarged army. Pitreich’s willingness to be flexible was unable to win over the parties of the victorious coalition. The new majority rejected any growth in the military budget and insisted on Magyar as the language of command in all Hungarian units. By May it was obvious that the new Diet was firm in its position and that no government could be formed that would be acceptable to the crown. The flow of emissaries from Vienna to Budapest, and from government offices to those of Ferenc Kossuth and Count Apponyi, came to an abrupt halt. Late in May Franz Joseph decided upon a new expedient: a non-parliamentary ministry.

Non-parliamentary ministries were nothing new west of the Leitha; the Austrian lands had long been governed by cabinets of technicians. In Hungary, though, a cabinet could not be purely "colorless" politically; it had also to be identifiably Hungarian. The choice of premier, announced on 28 May, was Feldzeugmeister Baron Fejervary, commander of the Royal Hungarian Life Guards. Fejervary was 72, with a long and honorable history of service to the dynasty. He had been decorated for bravery under fire at Solferino and had gone to service both in the emperor’s
military chancellery and as commander of line regiments. He was a loyalist to the core, but his "Hungarian" credentials were no less impressive. In 1872 he had served as deputy to Bela Szende, the first Honved minister, and from 1884 to 1904 had been Honved minister himself. The Honved existed as a fighting force largely due to Fejervary’s untiring efforts. The old general was not averse to a separate Hungarian customs area, nor was he a friend of the nationalities or the lower classes. Even at the nadir of its popularity, the Fejervary government was willing to send the gendarmerie and the Honved out to the Dunatul to smash harvesters’ strikes at the behest of many of those same magnates (including Apponyi) who branded Fejervary a traitor and to use regular cavalry against striking miners at Fünfkirchen. Hungary, Fejervary said, could be governed only with a club, but it had to be painted the national red-white-green.

Initial reaction to his appointment justified Henry Wickham Steed’s report in the London Times that, in leaving retirement to take up the premiership, Fejervary was "sacrificing his brilliant past and comfortable present, and. . . condemning himself to spend the remaining years of his life as an object of hatred." The Budapest press announced his arrival by headlining "The Bodyguards Are Coming!" and by treating his
appointment as a kind of royal coup. The Fejervary
government never shook off its military stigma. To its
enemies it remained the Trabantenregierung (Magyar:
Darabont-kormany), the Life Guards' Regime. On 20 June,
the day before Fejervary was to be presented to the Diet,
the coalition leaders issued a statement terming the new
government illegal and unacceptable. The next day
Fejervary faced the Diet, read out the proposed program of
his ministry in the face of mounting unrest and abuse from
the deputies, and then produced a royal rescript
proroguing the Diet. Legally, the Diet had now forfeited
its place as a legislative body; any enactments it might
make were invalid, illegal, and could be treated as acts
of rebellion. The cabinet members left the platform for
their offices. The deputies, left alone, raised a cheer
for Norway, which had declared itself independent of
Sweden two weeks before. The deputies went on to vote a
resolution of "national resistance" calling on all county
and local governments to refuse to collect taxes or to
call up recruits. The coalition ordered the proclamation
printed and sent out to all local officials, and a
"steering committee"—in effect, a government-in-exile—
was set up to make policy. The '48 parties, in refusing
to govern or to allow the functions of government to
proceed, had finally emulated their fathers and
grandfathers: they were, not to put too fine a point on it, in rebellion against their king.92

The melodrama in the Diet was great fun for observers from the Viennese popular press; it was less amusing for observers in the k.-u.-k. army. The generals knew rebellion when they saw it, and they had no intention of being caught off-guard as their counterparts had been in 1848. The army was the ultimate guarantor of the Monarchy, and by midsummer 1905 the operational planning bureaus had begun to draw up contingency plans for a military solution to the crisis in Hungary.

In four decades of Dualism there had been any number of imperial officers who wished to repay Magyar insolence with a march on Budapest. Such was the stuff of talk over the late-night brandy in the officers' mess. Yet the emperor had firmly defended the Ausgleich settlement, and there was no desire at the top to replace the Dualist structure by force, to give choleric colonels and majors their chance to cross the Leitha and "sort the bastards out." When Crown Prince Rudolf suggested in 1886 that anti-military and anti-Dynastic riots in Budapest be put down by a military government, Archduke Albrecht rebuked him for showing such immaturity.93 Baron Max-Vladimir Beck, Austrian minister-president from 1906 to 1908 and cousin of the chief of the general staff, bluntly told his old pupil Franz Ferdinand to give over his dreams of
shattering the Magyar oligarchy by force: it was no longer 1849, and no conquest of Hungary was conceivable.94

The plans that emerged in the summer of 1905 were put together by the Operations Bureau of the general staff and later collected in the Kriegsarchiv as Fall U. (Fasz. 182). Glaise-Horstenau's biography of Beck claimed that in case of major disturbances in Hungary, the 4. Infantry Division (Brünn) and cavalry from the 15. Dragoons would occupy Budapest, while the 25. Division, based on Vienna, would join the Styrian 5. Dragoons to secure the connections between the two capitals.95 Yet until Rothenberg and Peball published a précis of the Fall U. documents in 1969, the level of force expected had not been analyzed by historians of the Monarchy. The description given by Glaise-Horstenau implied an occupation, an extension of the "assistances" rendered the civil power. The documents in Fall U. bear out Baron Beck's point that Hungary could only be pacified with shattering levels of force. Fall U. is a plan for a full-scale civil war.

Fall U. is not a single coherent plan, but rather a collection of plans. And it lacks the appended information that such a plan would generate later in the century—consideration of casualties, of foreign political ramifications, and, most importantly, how it would be funded. The basis of Fall U. is a study of "A Military
Solution of the Hungarian Question" dated Raab, February 1904 and signed by Generalmajor Moritz von Auffenberg, commanding the 65. Infantry Brigade. Building upon this is a longer "Study U.," dated Vienna, 13 August 1905, undersigned by Colonel Heinrich Krauss-Elislago, chief of the Operations Bureau, and annotated by FML Oskar Potiorek, deputy chief of the general staff. There is also a manuscript on "Solution of the Hungarian Crisis by Force of Arms," signed by Oberstleutnant Artur von Mecenseffy of the Operations Bureau and dated Vienna, 19 July 1905. The Mecenseffy study has various appendices containing drafts of imperial proclamations on public order to be issued in both Hungary and Cisleithania and orders for the commanders of IV., V., VI., XII., and XIII. Korps in case the staff plans became operational.

Auffenberg’s work, the basis of the other two proposals, is dated February 1904. The other two studies are dated July-August 1905, though the Mecenseffy manuscript has an undated appendix on "Kriegsfall U.--General Mobilisation. Appendix to the Wartime Order of Battle Effective 1 April 1905." Rothenberg and Pehall could not determine an exact date for the start of staff planning, but the addition of an Hungarian appendix to mobilisation orders effective in April and the completion of Mecenseffy’s work in mid-July suggest that work began before the presentation of the Fejervary government to the
Diet and may have begun as a staff question not long after Pitreich and Admiral Montecuccoli returned from Budapest at the end of March.

Auffenberg's work was in any case a "private" matter. Sometime in late 1902 Auffenberg had surveyed the Hungarian situation and begun to draw up plans for an armed intervention. His work was something more than a pipe-dream of "sorting the bastards out". Auffenberg claimed later that he had resolved to look at the state of affairs in Hungary "with the conscientiousness of an historian and with the care of an imperial soldier fearful for the future of the Dual Monarchy." But this is quite disingenuous. Auffenberg had been made Generalmajor in 1900, and he was very much the ambitious officer. He was courting Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his party, and Auffenberg was sending along lengthy observations on the state of the army and the situation in Hungary to the Archduke's retinue at the Belvedere in Vienna. He hoped to use Franz Ferdinand's patronage to win his marshal's baton, and indeed by 1911 he would be the Belvedere's choice for war minister. The Archduke found in Auffenberg's reports exactly what he wanted to hear: reports from an officer with both line and staff experience that argued for shattering the Magyars by force.
Auffenberg's goal was the "complete and fundamental reduction of Hungary and the permanent establishment of a promised new order;" his means were speed and force: "offensive à outrance, an offensive carried out to the final consequences of the opportunity." Auffenberg proposed to mobilise the Cisleithanian troops of the Monarchy plus Romanian and Croat troops of the Hungarian regiments against the Honvéd, unreliable Hungarian units, and elements of the civil population armed and led by nationalist radicals. His own figures, inconsistent both within the plan and arithmetically, give totals of 371 battalions, 198 squadrons, and 150 batteries/1202 guns (Appendix II: Order of Battle) or 399 battalions, 212 squadrons, and 144 batteries/1136 guns (Part IV: Operations Plan) available for disposition in three armies. A main force (Danube Army) of 194 battalions, 102 squadrons, and 80 batteries drawn from II., III., VIII., IX., and XIV. Korps would move out in two columns, Vienna-Pressburg-Esztergom and Graz-Szombathely, to link up on the Danube at Budapest. A northern army (144 battalions, 84 squadrons, 54 batteries) would move Przemyśl-Eperjes-Kassa, split through Eger and the line Ungvar-Munkacs and reunite on the Tisza. A small southern army (33 battalions, 12 squadrons, 16 batteries) would leave the line Belovar-Esseg, move to Pecs and then divide, one column occupying Kecskemét while the bulk of the southern
forces would reach the Danube and move north to join the Danube Army.\textsuperscript{101}

The key to the problem was Budapest itself, and Auffenberg proposed to strike hard for the capital. Auffenberg saw concentrations of "reliable" artillery at Pressburg, Ödenburg, and Komorn (although supported only by five "reliable" battalions of infantry) and groupings of loyal units around the capital--two battalions of the 23. (Sombor) and three battalions of the 3. Bosniacs in Budapest, plus two battalions of the 76. (Ödenburg) at Gran and one battalion of the 69. (Stuhlweissenburg) plus one squadron of the 12. Uhlans at Stuhlweissenburg.\textsuperscript{102}

The western approaches to the capital were vulnerable, and Auffenberg proposed to strike at the heart of national resistance before forces in eastern Hungary, with its heavy concentration of "unreliable" troops along the line Kaschau-Miskolcz-Debreczin-Grosswardein, could be raised and Honvéd units moved west or the loyal garrisons overwhelmed.

Initial Hungarian opposition would, Auffenberg estimated, come from 170 battalions, 150 squadrons, and 200 guns. He assumed from the outset that the Honvéd would be openly hostile, and that, if given time, the Magyar political leadership would attempt to arm the populace and set inactive or reserve officers at their head. He did not expect whole Honvéd regiments to mutiny
instantly but foresaw instead an ongoing flow of Honvéd troops to the enemy. The same would be true of regular Hungarian regiments. Auffenberg counted ninety-two battalions of twenty-three regiments as unreliable, and to those he added one hundred squadrons of hussars. Fifty-four squadrons of Honvéd hussars, about eighty battalions of Honvéd infantry, and 150 to 200 guns, or about 1/4 of the Hungarian artillery, to make up his total. 103

Auffenberg was not concerned with the political consequences of his plan. He regarded the Slovaks as broken by the Magyars and thus likely to follow their masters' lead. 104 Beyond that, Auffenberg's concerns were purely technical. The Russians were distracted in Manchuria, the Magyars were moving toward rebellion, and, looking out from brigade headquarters at Raab, Auffenberg saw the time at hand for a final settling of accounts with Budapest. In any case, Auffenberg could not afford to dwell on political matters. Even had they been within his competence, he could not afford to bring them to the attention of the patron he was courting. The archduke was always ready to have his prejudices confirmed, but he was known to dislike meddlers.

The general staff could afford no such inhibitions. Any military settlement in Hungary involved more than sending in troops. Disturbances in Hungary covered a range of possibilities, from passive resistance by local
authorities to widespread rioting to outright rebellion. Suppression of disturbances by military force would have effects not only on the local population but on the regiments of the k.-u.-k. army drawn from Hungary as well. The "Solution of the Hungarian Crisis by Force of Arms" drawn up by Mecenseffy was concerned in large part with the problem of isolating the army from the political effects of an intervention. Mecenseffy's introduction pointed out:

We are concerned with, to face facts, the suppression of the revolutionary attempts, and also with the suppression of possible risings which might spread to part of the Army. In order to prevent the latter, the most important task of the army leadership lies in... the management and maintenance of discipline in the army. Whether this can succeed, since the uninterrupted subversive activity of the Party of Independence has been indecisively and passively regarded for months, is another question.  

The operational possibilities envisioned by Mecenseffy and the staff were not terribly different from those seen by Auffenberg. All five corps bordering Hungary (I, II, X, XI, and XIII) would be mobilised, with VIII. and IX. Korps acting as a strategic reserve. There would follow a concentric advance into Hungary proper. Units from I. Korps would advance to Turocz-Szt. Marton, Sillein, and the valley of the Waag; X. Korps would move via Ungvar-Nagy Mihaly and Kaschau; XI. Korps would move troops to Maramores-Sziget, Huszt, and Munkacs; XIII. Korps would move troops up to Nagykanisza and Pecs; II.
Korps at Vienna would send out eight to ten battalions with a strong artillery component by ship to Pressburg and Komorn. Cavalry would move to Komorn by land, screened by the guns of the Danube Flotilla. The western lines of the Hungarian rail net would be seized by advance units. Troops designated for occupation duties would be mobilised behind the forces making the initial move into Hungary and could be rapidly fed into areas secured in the initial coup de main.\(^{106}\) Transport capability at the Vienna docks (Donaukanal, Winterhafen, Brigittenauer Lände, Donau-Ufer, Kaisermühlen), estimated for early September would be 2320 men (or 1890 men plus 130 horses, or 1890 men and 60 guns)—or 2650 men if the ships of the Pressburg-Vienna local run were taken from trade.\(^{107}\)

Mecenseffy divided the Hungarian units of the joint army into "reliable" and "unreliable" categories on a simple basis: units with more than fifty percent Magyar personnel were automatically regarded as unreliable. Joint army units plus the inherently unreliable Honvéd forces in the five Hungarian corps area included 150 battalions, 120 squadrons, and forty-four batteries with fifty percent plus Magyars, and sixty-three battalions, five squadrons and forty-four batteries of "loyal" troops.\(^{108}\) Even if one assumed that some Magyars in unreliable units would simply desert rather than go into open rebellion and that not all units were at full
strength, a rebel command would have fifty-one regiments of infantry and seventy-seven squadrons of hussars immediately available at full combat strength. The non-Magyar population at large could be expected to be passive. They had been "made cunning through experience and bitter disappointment," a reference to the treatment of the Croats in 1849 and the events on the Border in 1868, and they had no reason to trust the imperial government to protect them against Magyar revenge. As much as the Croats, Romanians, Serbs, and Saxons hated the Magyar oligarchs, in a separate Magyar state their sheer mass might provide them with political weight. The imperial military could expect no help from the non-Magyars this time, and it would have to contend alone with treason in the Honvéd and unreliability in the ranks of the joint army.

The Operations Bureau of the general staff received Mecenseffy's work in mid-July. Through July the Coalition parties had devoted themselves to promoting a policy of total non-cooperation with the Fejervary government by the country and municipal authorities. In mid-July the city of Budapest announced that not even voluntary recruits would be accepted for the joint army and that the city would not accept any tax payments. Within a few days the interior ministry had set about annulling such local ordinances and using the gendarmerie
to deliver and enforce conscription orders. The Fejervary cabinet had begun to consider the idea of using the gendarmerie and the military simply to replace the county administrations, local bodies whose impotence had been emphasized by their willingness to beg the "illegal" Fejervary government for aid when farm-labor and miners' strikes broke out all through the Dunatul. The Operations Bureau, considering the decay of affairs in Hungary, decided that "under the present circumstances in Hungary, military measures for the restoration of the legal order could be especially urgent around the time of the 15th of September." In mid-September, then, the 4. Infantry Division (Brünn) would enter Budapest to secure the government offices and the royal arsenals.

"Studie U," the most elaborate of the staff designs, is based both on Mecenseffy's plan and the results of a meeting of the operational and transport staffs (a meeting attended by naval delegates and a deputy of Beck's from the emperor's military chancellery as well) held at the war ministry in Vienna on 3 August. The final draft, undersigned by Krauss-Elislago, had two variants. The first, "Suppression of Localized Unrest in the Streets," was straightforward enough. The twelve battalions of the 4. Infantry Division, joined by the 11. Dragoons, slated to be transferred to Slavonia after 7 September, and thus immediately available, would occupy Budapest in support of
the civil authority. Krauss-Elislago did not, however, wish to repeat Windisch-Grätz’s error of 1848. Budapest was the economic and political center of Hungary, but it was not the whole of the country. A second variant, sketching out requirements for subduing widening unrest and outright rebellion, was also presented.

The second plan called for the immediate appointment of FML Prince Lobkowitz, commanding IV. Korps, as supreme commander and military governor in Hungary. Budapest would be immediately occupied, and the rail centers at Bruck-an-der-Leitha, Raab, and Komorn would be seized. Budapest could be reinforced by joining the 15. Dragoons to the 11. Dragoons already in place. The 25. Infantry Division, with twenty-six battalions, would then move into IV Korps. The 12. Infantry Division and six squadrons of the 5. Dragoons would move from X. Korps (Krakow) to V. Korps. Thirteen battalions of the 2. Infantry Division and the 6. Uhlans would move into VI. Korps. VII. Korps would get six battalions of the 14. Infantry Division (XIII. Korps), and XII. Korps would get six squadrons of the 14. Dragoons and ten battalions from the 11. Infantry Division (Lemberg). Full mobilization would proceed in the Cisleithanian lands and Bosnia-Herzegovina along the lines already laid down in Kriegsfall I--mobilization against Italy. At full strength, 406 battalions, 197 squadrons, and 123 batteries of regular troops and 300
battalions, 186 squadrons, and 112 batteries of the Landwehr would be available for operations against Hungary.\textsuperscript{117} Krauss-Elislago calculated that rebel forces would at most come to 282 battalions, 146 squadrons and 78 batteries, drawn from the following sources:\textsuperscript{118}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalions</th>
<th>Squadrions</th>
<th>Batteries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honvéd</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Landsturm</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreliable k.-u.-k.</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questionable k.-u.-k.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures for the Hungarian Landsturm reflected staff estimates of the civil population likely to join an open revolt. Krauss-Elislago, though, was more cautious than Mecenseffy or Auffenberg in labelling k.-u.-k. units as unreliable. Units with less than twenty percent Magyar personnel were believed inherently reliable; units above seventy percent Magyar were written off as unreliable. Units at twenty to seventy percent--fifteen infantry regiments--were "questionable" and slated for special treatment: removal from areas of disaffection and indoctrination by their officers on the topic of loyalty under trying circumstances. Krauss noted a special problem here. Three battalions of the 60. (Eger), a
regiment ninety-eight percent Magyar, were in Vienna, along with six squadrons of the 4. Hussars and three battalions of the "questionable" 101. (Beckescaba). Special attention would have to be paid to such potentially hazardous situations outside Hungary.119

The staff plans were presented to a full crown council held at Bad Ischl on 22 August 1905. There was no effort to present a military solution as the sole or even leading option open to the imperial authorities. Count Goluchowski, the foreign minister, and War Minister Pitreich favored discussing the military option, but Goluchowski, along with Baron Gautsch, the Austrian minister-president, also favored continuing negotiations with the coalition in Budapest. Fejervary was against any attempt to install a military government in Hungary. He would, he claimed, be unable to find sufficient administrators willing to serve a military regime. The time when a few score "Bach hussars" could govern Hungary was gone; Fejervary was convinced that the administration would collapse from desertions by bureaucrats if the army moved in. In any case, Fejervary said, he could not support leading the Monarchy into civil war.120

On 24 August the Operations Bureau took note of how far preparations for Fall U. were to go.121 The staff was told to count on the Diet being prorogued between 15 September and 10 December. Ersatzreserve troops would be
called up in September to keep the infantry up to strength; the cavalry and artillery would continue to be kept at full strength with time-expired men. Should a military government be installed, the Budapest command would be in charge of full implementation of recruiting. The Danube Monitor-Gruppe and its patrol boat escorts would come under IV. Korps command effective 1 September. The naval units would then go on exercises at Dunafoldvar while the sympathies of their Croat and Magyar crews were determined. Two monitors, staffed with hand-picked crews, would be kept on alert at Budapest. Fejervary had insisted that joint rather than purely Cisleithanian units be used for the occupation of Budapest by 4. and 25. Divisions; the action, he maintained, would be in defense of state order and not a war against Hungary. Prince Lobkowitz would be given twenty-two battalions at his immediate disposal in case of disturbances—ten battalions of Bosniaks and Bosnian Feldjägers and twelve battalions of Hungarian troops from 6. (Ujvidek), 51. (Kolozsvár), 72. (Pressburg), and 61. (Temesvár) Infantry, all from regiments with less than fifty percent Magyar personnel. The 6. (forty-one percent German, thirty-two percent Croat), which had served in Budapest from 1890 to 1902, would be moved from Vienna back to Budapest at the end of August in order to relieve
local garrison units for maneuvers and move them out of the city.124

In August and September the operations planners could look at Fall U. with some certainty that the first option, the occupation of Budapest, would be set in motion. Fejervary's government had been able to break a number of county assemblies, but resistance continued throughout most of the country, and government officials were subject to social ostracism and threats of mob violence. Reports in the press that the government was considering the proclamation of universal suffrage, joined with reports of revolutionary upheavals in Russia, led to increasing unrest on the left in both Hungary and the Cisleithanian lands. On 23 September, in an audience of less than five minutes, the emperor and the leadership of the coalition reached an impasse: the coalition leaders refused to make any concessions on their military demands.125 On 8 October the war ministry despatched sealed letters to each of the corps commanders. Enclosed was the proclamation of martial law in Hungary and an appendix placing the Honvéd under the direct command of Prince Lobkowitz, the new military governor of Hungary.126

The army was ready to move at the beginning of October. It was, however, increasingly obvious that a military solution was losing favor among the emperor and his advisory. Fejervary had never been enthusiastic about
the use of armed force, and neither had his imperial master. Franz Joseph at seventy-five still retained vivid memories of 1848, and as he aged his taste for "rigorous measures" declined. In the summer of 1905 he had gone to Prince Alfred Windischgrätz’s castle at Stekna with the generals gathered for the year’s Kaisermanöver. He had told his generals that he was deeply moved to be there, in this last citadel of unswerving loyalty. Yet he had no wish to draw the sword again. At dinner one night he had asked FZM Alexander von Krobatin what would happen if Hungarian affairs continued to deteriorate. Krobatin’s reply was hearty and straightforward: "Why, shooting, Majesty!" The emperor strode off in indignant silence. Imperial assent would be required for the order to execute Fall U.; short of an actual armed rising by Magyar nationalists, there was little imperial will to send in the army.

In any case, Fejervary and his interior minister had decided on an attempt to break the Magyar leadership—"insolent oligarchs" (Übermütige Oligarchen) Fejervary called them—by purely political means. Kristoffy and Fejervary had been dropping hints that the government might favor universal suffrage throughout the summer, and Kristoffy had begun to court Hungary’s small socialist party. Fejervary found the social democrats to be "ganz traitable" and began to hint that the Hungarian socialists
might be acceptable as full partners in the political process and that no real danger might arise to Hungary and the Monarchy from a thorough-going reform of the Diet. Fejervary and the emperor were both confident that the threat of universal suffrage by decree would ultimately break the resistance of the coalition. When in mid-September a mass demonstration in Budapest put 100,000 workers in the streets to demand electoral reform, the government refused to send for troops and contented itself with cordonning off the plaza before the Parliament building. The Budapest garrison had been reinforced with two detachments of Honvéd from Ödenburg, and, while on alert, was nonetheless ordered to keep out of sight until sent for. When the agitated deputies demanded that the government protect them from the workers, Kristoffy’s chief of police informed them that they would have to look after themselves.

The coalition leadership, headed by Ferenc Kossuth, attempted to counter Fejervary and Kristoffy’s appeal to the workers and the nationalities by flirting with the South Slavs. On 4 October a conference of Croatian political leaders issued the Fiume Resolutions, offering political support to the coalition. The Fiume Resolutions were matched on 17 October by a similar Serbian resolution at Zara, thus presenting the imperial government with the spectre of the South Slavs allied with the Magyars. The
Fiume Resolutions raised the possibility of unrest in Croatia and Slavonia, unrest that would prevent the military from using all its southern forces in Hungary proper and from drawing replacements out of the south to reinforce garrisons in occupied Hungary. Yet Croat support was an ambiguous weapon, and Kossuth's moves were disavowed by many of his fellow leaders. Croat support for the coalition had been conditional on a revision of the Croat-Hungarian agreements of 1868, and the Croats demanded greater local autonomy, economic concessions, incorporation of Dalmatia into an enlarged Croatia-Slavonia, and a widened role for the Croatian language in Honvéd units. The language of military regiments, the coalition leaders suddenly discovered, was not just a Magyar issue. The South Slavs presented problems for any imperial military moves in Hungary, but they offered problems to the coalition as well. The Party of Independence and its allies were brought face to face with the spectre of an enlarged and autonomous South Slav bloc.

On 4 October Kristoffy met with Franz Joseph. The interior minister offered the emperor two alternatives: universal suffrage or civil war. Two days later the Reichsrat issued a call for universal suffrage in Cisleithania. There was unrest growing in the Austrian lands as well, demands for electoral reform based both on rumors from Hungary and press reports of the revolution in
Russia. From 4 to 6 October the emperor weighed the costs of a military solution. Croatia could not be stripped of garrisons, order could not be guaranteed in the Austrian lands, and full-scale civil war seemed unavoidable. Yet on 6 October Franz Joseph finally decided against military intervention. The general staff was still preparing the corps commands for Fall U., and transport officers were preparing to take over the Vienna docks to embark troops. But by 12 October, four days after the corps commanders had been sent their sealed orders, the political decision had been communicated to the military. Cipher telegrams were sent out to the commanders of IV., V., VII., XII., and XIII. Korps, ordering the immediate return of the sealed packets. On 7 November staff officers of the war ministry's Präsidal-Büro burned the packets in the courtyard of the ministry, their seals still unbroken. The text of Fall U., although not its reputation, vanished into the depths of the Kriegsarchiv.

Kristoffy's plan for using universal suffrage as a political weapon was less dramatic and less thorough than Auffenberg's or Mecenseffy's, but it had the advantage of not making Hungary into a battlefield. A purely political program undercut national resistance in a way that the bayonets of the army could not. The administrators who ran the counties of Hungary were not, as they had been in 1848, gentlemen doing a part-time job out of noblesse
oblige; they were professional bureaucrats who owed their jobs to the lords-lieutenant appointed by Fejervary. The bulk of Hungarian officialdom might have resisted Austrian troops; they would not hazard their jobs in a fight between Fejervary and the coalition. Resistance in theatrical forms continued—the prefect of police in Budapest found his office looted, supporters of the government were snubbed in the street and expelled from gentlemen’s clubs, the prefect of Debrecen was mobbed by students, metal tulips (made, in the finest comic-opera tradition, in Austria) appeared on Magyar labels as a sign of a boycott of Austrian goods, and the county lord-lieutenant at Ungvar found his inaugural ceremony marred by a mob carrying his effigy to a newly dug grave. Kristoffy and Fejervary, using Honvéd forces and a sprinkling of k.-u.-k. units, sent troops to Debrecen and Ungvar, and those guilty of interfering with the government found themselves marched off in handcuffs by imperial infantry or Honvéd hussars. Roving royal commissioners began to tour the counties with escorts of gendarmes and infantry, making the point that the government would physically support loyal officials, and, pour encourager les autres, summarily sacking and arresting any officials implicated in disorders, too conciliatory toward the coalition, or known to frequent
political meetings without the express consent of a lord-lieutenant.138

By the end of the year the situation in Hungary’s countryside had stabilized. The government and its commissioners had achieved a rough measure of control. Reliable men were sent down from Budapest to fill vacant posts, and outright defiance was at an end. The joint army, the gendarmerie, and the Honvéd had acted with despatch and discretion to maintain order without resort to extreme measures. The role of the Honvéd was a personal triumph for Fejervary. In mid-summer the Honvéd had been written off as a nest of traitors, real or potential; yet all through the autumn it had been a loyal instrument of order and royal authority. Fejervary’s years as Honvéd minister had not been in vain. Whatever the officers and enlisted men of the Honvéd might think of the Dual Monarchy and dynasty, they had been taught to be loyal servants of state order.

There was, however, one center of disaffection still to be dealt with, and one more role for the Honvéd to play. The Diet was still sitting, though its sessions had degenerated into a mocking of a parliament. The Diet had been a forum for coalition pleas for funds—Kristoffy had stopped government payments to all areas of "national resistance"—and exhortations to defy the government. By January the Diet knew that it would be dissolved by royal
order, and the coalition was seriously considering refusing to accept a rescript of dissolution. The Viennese press had reported as early as 18 December that a mobile force of k.-u.-k. troops was being readied in case the Diet refused to disperse.

Fejervary approached the emperor at the beginning of February 1906 to urge that the Diet be dissolved by force, an act of force majeure designed to resolve the impossible political situation once and for all. A show of force, Fejervary insisted, was the key to Sanierung, a clearing of the air. Such an act, however, could not be entrusted to joint army troops. Fejervary had once said that the club he would need to beat his fellow countrymen into submission had to be painted in national colors. Therefore, there could be no doubt in any observer's mind that it was the king of Hungary and not the emperor of Austria who had acted.

On 19 February the assembled Diet discovered the huge neo-Gothic Parliament House cordoned off by police and several squadrons of Honvéd hussars backed by a strong force of Honvéd infantry. The operation had been entrusted to GM Sandor Nyiri, who had been appointed royal commissioner in Hungary. Nyiri at fifty-two was one of the Monarchy's youngest generals, and he had been Honvéd minister under Tisza in 1903. He was talented, energetic, and proudly Magyar—the proper colors to be Fejervary's
cudgel. The emperor had expressed his fear that things might become "a bit lively" in Budapest, and he was convinced that trouble lay ahead. Nyiri, however, was firmly convinced that rapid and self-confident action would carry the day. He had already obtained royal assent for removing the lord mayor of Budapest and appointing Kristoffy's hand-picked prefect of police as acting major with full local powers. It remained only to deal with the deputies.

Late in the morning of 19 February a group of Honvéd military police escorted Colonel Viktor Fabrizius into the Diet chambers. The Speaker refused outright to read a royal rescript of dissolution, and Fabrizius mounted the podium and began to read. A substantial bloc of deputies, joined by coalition supporters in the galleries, attempted to shout him down. At that point Fabrizius ordered in his men, and Honvéd infantry with fixed bayonets cleared the chamber. Later historians—among them A. J. May and Norman Stone—claimed that Romanian troops had been employed, and that "foreign" troops had been sent to crush parliamentary freedom in Hungary. The story seems to go back no farther than 1910, to a Pan-Germanic polemic against the supranational position of the dynasty. The troops involved were Fabrizius's own regiment, the 1. Honvéd Infantry, raised in Budapest. In the end, the Honvéd had simply obeyed orders. Its men acted
unquestioningly against the pretensions of the coalition politicians. The coup of 19 February generated no popular outrage on any scale. There were demonstrations in Budapest for the next few nights, but Kristoffy's police contained them with a minimum of violence. A call by coalition leaders for a nationwide protest on 25 February failed utterly. Kristoffy banned all outdoor political meetings, and the day passed without incident. The Hungarian military had been loyal to the king, and

in the weeks following the dissolution of Parliament on February 19, national resistance ground to a halt. . . . By the first of April the government was in control of local organs of administration almost everywhere. What is perhaps more important . . . the Hungarian people took the authoritarian actions of the government calmly. . . . The spirit of revolution . . . had burned itself out by spring.

There was a final anticlimactic act. In mid-March Fejervary summoned the coalition leadership to his offices and laid down an ultimatum: they had brought Hungary to the edge of civil war, and, since they were likely to win any new elections, they were now required to accept responsibility. They had to decide between cooperation with the crown and accepting ministerial posts or arrest and imprisonment for sedition. The coalition, outplayed and outfought, collapsed. Its leaders repaired to the Hotel Bristol in Vienna to receive terms from the crown. The coalition leaders could administer the coming of universal suffrage to suit themselves—Fejervary was in
the end no real friend of the nationalities—but demands for a separate army and for Magyar Kommandosprache had to be abandoned, retroactive conscription had to be enacted, enlarged recruit quotas had to be accepted, and economic unity maintained. On 8 April a coalition cabinet was officially named. The moderate Sandor Wekerle was named premier, Andrassy minister of interior, Apponyi minister of education, and Ferenc Kossuth minister for commerce. The nationalities were left to the mercies of the Magyars, but the coalition leadership had assumed power with the offhand contempt of the crown and the knowledge of their own humiliation.

On 23 April, in the immediate aftermath of elections which confirmed the coalition in power, annual maneuvers were held in Hungary. Reservists reported to their units without incident. The men standing in line on Honvéd barracks squares never knew that they had been considered potential traitors and rebels by the Operations-Büro of the general staff. In almost thirty years of crisis on both sides of the Leitha the army command had learned to distrust the peoples of the Monarchy and to distrust openly the Hungarian units. Yet the Honvéd had been Kaisertreu after all. The army could have relied on its own. In later days, Franz Joseph told Conrad von Hötzendorf that whatever others, including many of his own advisors and generals, might say, his Magyar soldiers had
been, after all, a reliable element in defense of the Monarchy.152

Three years later to the day, Fejervary rode at the head of the Royal Hungarian Life Guard at the Solferino memorial and received the Knight’s Cross of Maria Theresa with Brilliant from his emperor.153 The old general was resplendent in his uniform and awards, and he was still straight-backed and thick-chested in his 70s, with a full hussar’s moustache. The day was a triumph for him, a capstone to fifty-eight years of service to the dynasty. He had fought for his sovereign in war and served him in peace. His government had restored order in Hungary and presided over an arrangement between the crown and the Magyar oligarchy that kept the army unified and gave the high command its enlarged troop quotas.

The habitually dour face of the emperor, however, told the other side of the story. Like all victories in Hungary, this one was inconclusive and at best only tactical. The humiliated coalition was free to avenge itself on the nationalities and the workers, and the army had suffered from year after year of budgetary neglect and a dearth of Hungarian recruits. Fejervary was there to receive the rewards due a loyal and faithful servant, but the fatalism of the emperor told the larger story. The Monarchy and its army had gone through thirty years of crisis. Some threats, such as anarchists in the Austrian
lands, had been easily contained, but in Bohemia and Hungary rebellion had come very near. There had been victories at the brink, but they had bought only a little time. The army was no longer sure of the peoples of the Monarchy, even the Alpine Germans, and it was beginning to doubt itself.
Notes to Chapter Four


11. Ibid., p. 83.

12. Ibid., p. 89.


15. Ibid., pp. 76-77, 438-443.

16. Ibid., pp. 96-97.


25. Ibid., p. 664.


32. KA, Abt. für Kriegsgeschichte, *Der Aufstand in der Herzegovina*.. .

33. Ibid., p. 13-19.


36. KA, KM Präs-Büro 52-26/2 ex 1897.

38. A. Wimpfling, *Der administrative Waffengebrauch der öffentliche und des Heeres* (Vienna, 1898), pp. 863-68.


40. KA, KM Präs-Büro 52-26/5 ex 1897.


42. See the thinly-fictionalized autobiography of the nationalist Eduard Hoffer, *Der blaue General* (Graz, 1921).


45. KA, KM Präs-Büro 52-5/9 ex 1878.

46. Kolmer, 4: 81, 489-90.

47. Speech reprinted as Julius Andrassy, *Die Einheit der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee* (Vienna, 1889).


49. KA, KM Präs-Büro 75-4/7 ex 1875.


51. A. L. Hickmann, *Die Nationalität-Verhältnisse im Mannschaft der k.-u.-k. Armee* (Vienna, 1902), Fig. 1.


53. KA, Nachlass Beck-Rzikowsky, B/2 Fasz. VIII, Nr. 301, "Die Ungarische Dienstsprache".


55. Ibid., p. 167.


66. In Kiszling, *Franz Ferdinand*, p. 82.


75. See Neue Freie Presse (Vienna) 26 January 1905. Morgenblatt (cited hereafter as NFP); also Peter Hanak, "L'influence de la revolution russe de 1905 en Hongrie," Acta Historica, IV (1956).


77. Sosnosky, Politik, 2: 140-41; NFP, 13 February 1905, Abendblatt.

78. NFP, 25 February 1905, Morgenblatt.


82. Kiszling, Fejervary, p. 90-95.


85. NFP, 11 July 1905, Morgenblatt.

86. In May, Monarchy, p. 357.

87. (London) Times, 22 May 1905.

88. Lanyi, Regierung, p. 22.

89. Lanyi, p. 32.

90. NFP, 21 June 1905 Abendblatt.

91. Lanyi, Regierung, pp. 30-41.
92. Paine, "Crisis of 1905-06," p. 84. The phrase was used by Joszef Kristoffy, Fejervary's minister of the interior.


96. Rothenberg-Pebell, "Der Fall U.," p. 94.


100. Ibid.

101. Ibid. "Geografisch-Strategisch Übersicht."

102. Ibid., "Beilage A (Dislokationskarte)."

103. Ibid., "Operations-Plan."

104. Ibid., "Auszug."

105. Ibid., "Lösung der ungarischen Krise mit Waffengewalt."

106. Ibid.


109. Ibid., Beilage 9, 10.

110. Ibid., "Lösung."


113. KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro Fasz. 182, "Konzept: Auszug der Studie U."

114. Ibid., Präs Nr. 5040 (duplicate), Nr. 2018 (1 August 1905).

115. Ibid., "Studie U."


117. Ibid., "Bekämpfung einer grossen und organisierten ungarischen Revolution--Beiderseitige Kräfte."

118. Ibid., Beilage 12.

119. Ibid., Beilage 1.


121. KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro, Fasz. 182. Nr. 10, "Ergebnis der Beratungen in Ischl und der Kommissionellen Beratung im Kriegsministerium."

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid., Nr. 2-A.

124. Ibid.

125. Sosnosky, 2: 192-93; Lanyi, Regierung, pp. 85-86.

126. KA, KM Präs-Büro 1905, Nr. 6552.


131. Ibid., p. 176.


135. KA, KM Präs-Büro 1905 Nr. 6579/2, 5233/2.
136. KA, KM Präs-Büro 1905 52-33/2.
140. NFP, 18 December 1905, Abendblatt.
141. Kiszling, Fejervary, p. 96.
142. Lanyi, Regierung, pp. 203-05.
144. NFP, 20 February 1906, Morgenblatt.
145. Lanyi, p. 207-10; NFP, 19 February 1906, Abendblatt; 20 February 1906, Abendblatt
146. May, Monarchy, p. 359-60; Stone, p. 180.
151. See Lanyi, pp. 190-92.
On an August afternoon in 1900 Franz Joseph and his entourage rode up Mariahilferstrasse from the Hofburg toward Schloss Schönbrunn through crowds of Viennese assembled to celebrate the emperor's birthday. Franz Joseph was still a magnificent horseman, and he rode with the straight-backed classic form he had learned in the vanished age of Metternich. The old emperor possessed an effortless majesty, and to the young soldiers mounting guard at the imperial residences—the grandsons and great-grandsons of the sentries standing watch in the year of his accession—he had become a figure of legend. To the crowds assembled outside the Michaelertor on that day in 1900 he was the embodiment of the Monarchy itself, and by 1900 it required a serious act of will to imagine the Monarchy without him. The birthday procession of 1900 could not match the Jubilee celebrations of 1888, when the emperor had been trailed by sixty-seven archdukes, but in a Catholic state the afternoon's cavalcade was bound to make a deep and disquieting impression. Today was the emperor's seventieth birthday, and the Biblical span was threescore and ten.

No one in Vienna—not the crowds on the Ring or the emperor's ministers in their offices—could doubt that the
new century brought with it the waning days of Franz Joseph's reign. Each Austrian minister-president in his turn—Ernst von Koerber, Karl von Gautsch, Max-Vladimir von Beck, Karl von Stürgkh—knew that he might well be the emperor's last chief minister, and each saw it as a point of honor not to give Franz Joseph any political disaster to blight his last years. The emperor's age was known in Budapest, too, and there it was an incentive to extract a maximum of advantage from the ruler who had signed the Ausgleich. Franz Joseph's reign had been characterized by a rigid adherence to form and to the letter of constitutional law, along with a pragmatic flexibility in daily politics. He had been both emperor and king, insisting on the unity of the Monarchy and yet still standing by Hungarian interpretations of the Ausgleich. In both Vienna and Budapest political observers predicted that such an attitude, such a sense of equipoise and attention to constitutional obligation, would not survive the passing of the old emperor. The Viennese literati assembled at the Cafe Central might listen to what Hugo von Hofmannsthal called "distant planets falling" in expectation of an age of new forms of painting and poetry, but in the ministerial offices throughout the Innere Stadt, fin-de-siècle had a concrete and ominous meaning.

The age of the emperor provided a focus for the problems facing the Monarchy in the decade and a half
between the imperial birthday that opened the new century and the outbreak of the Great War. The protracted constitutional struggle with the Hungarian Diet, the growth of virulent nationalism in Hungary and Bohemia, the annexation of Bosnia and the growing menace of Russia and Serbia—all the crises of the pre-war years—pointed to a reckoning facing any new regime. The Monarchy had to be remade; the days of Fortwürstein were drawing to a close. That much was clear in both Vienna and Budapest. It was clear, too, that the army—the symbol of the joint Monarchy, of the dynastic ideal—would bear the shock of the new age, the pressures from both within and without the Monarchy. One chief of the general staff put it simply enough: the Monarchy was like no other state, and all other questions were dissolved in the question of the army.²

The army had its own fears for the new century. The emperor's soldiers had last gone to war in 1878, but as the new century began, it seemed all too likely that the long years of peace were drawing to an end. The Monarchy appeared to be surrounded by waiting predators, and the Monarchy's military planners came to believe that war with Russia, Serbia, and Italy—singly or in combination—was inevitable.³ The Monarchy's military spending had not kept pace with its rivals, and A.J.P. Taylor's judgment that the Monarchy "found it difficult to be even in the second
rank" of European powers had been shared by the Monarchy's military leadership since the mid-1880's.
Table 5.1
Defense Budgets: European Powers 1890 - 1914

<table>
<thead>
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<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1914</th>
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<td>41.0</td>
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<td>40.8</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>88.2</td>
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The Monarchy's defense budget rose by seventeen percent—from 262 million crowns to 306 million—between 1895 and 1906, but much of the increase had been devoured by hasty attempts to strengthen fortifications on the Italian frontier and to replace the grossly obsolete guns.
of the field artillery. The size of the army had been fixed in 1889, and the Hungarian crisis had been sparked by attempts to increase its size. The gains finally won in 1906—an increase of 22,000 men, from 103,000 to 125,000, in the joint army’s annual intake—were modest enough, and Hungarian intransigence prevented any actual growth, any rise in the number of conscripts actually processed, until 1912. Yet in the last decade of the nineteenth century, the forces raised in European Russia had grown from 639,000 men to 1,000,000, and the Italian army—a particular fixation of Conrad von Hötzendorf, Beck’s successor as chief of the general staff—had grown from 190,000 to 266,000 men.
Table 5.2

Defense Budgets and Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Defense as % budget</th>
<th>Recruit % pop.</th>
<th>Peacetime Army as % pop.</th>
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<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
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Table 5.3

Wartime Field Formations 1906

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<th>Squadrons</th>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>144</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>England</td>
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<td>111</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>57</td>
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The enemies of the Monarchy were able to outspend it, to recruit and to train more of their young men, and to
maintain a greater percentage of the population as soldiers. The slide into second-rank status had been obvious to Albrecht and Beck by the end of the 1880s, and in the new century it would seem to much of the Monarchy's military leadership to lead downward into the abyss.

The Monarchy's military leadership, distracted by events in Budapest, had been taken unaware by the 1903 military coup that had transformed a docile Obrenović Serbia into the aggressive and militarized Karadjordjević Serbia of the Balkan Wars. As late as the Second Balkan War, k.-u.-k. military intelligence believed that the Serbs were still lacking in discipline and were not yet fully trained with their new Russian and French weapons, but there was no doubt that the 450,000 men Serbia could field were both physically hard and highly motivated. By August 1914 the Serbian field armies were fully the equal of the southeastern k.-u.-k. forces in both numbers and equipment, and far superior in combat experience and leadership.

To the 450,000 Serbs the Monarchy would face had to be added the Italian army. Whatever its adventures (or misadventures) in Libya and Abyssinia, whatever facile assurances the diplomats at the Ballhausplatz might extract from their opposite numbers in Rome, the planners of the k.-u.-k. general staff held fast to the belief that Italy would take the opportunity of an Austro-Serbian or Austro-Russian war to fall upon Dalmatia and the
And behind Italy and Serbia was the spectre of Russian might, of limitless reserves of manpower—the nightmare of Cossack hordes swarming across Galicia into Moravia or pouring out of the Carpathian passes onto the Hungarian plain. When plans for a multifront war—Kriegsfall R + I + B(S)—were drawn up in 1907/08, the underlying assumption had to be, as the Archduke Albrecht had noted in despair twenty years before, that the Monarchy had to rely on German support, that it could no longer fight a major war on its own. The alternative to a hopeless war against overwhelming odds seemed to be increasing reliance on, and subordination to, German strength. The military security of the Monarchy could not be tied to German promises, but the concrete steps the k.-u.-k. high command could take were limited. No additional conscripts arrived at recruit depots until 1912, and the demands of pursuing a policy of maritime dominance in the Adriatic put additional strains on an already limited manpower pool. The k.-u.-k. fleet, headed by the aggressive and highly competent admirals Anton Haus and Rudolf Montecuccoli, grew into a compact but technically excellent fighting force. Nonetheless, the growth of the fleet meant a diversion of funds from rifles and field artillery to dreadnoughts, from the instruments of survival to the instruments of prestige. By 1912 the fleet had more warships than it could find
crews for, and the army was called upon to provide an additional 3000 men a year for the fleet. The army cut back individual battalion strength to create new formations—a purely phantom force increase—and stripped men from service units, replacing soldiers with civilian contract workers wherever possible, and incurring the wrath of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand by pulling musicians from military bands and returning them to line duty. Yet there were only so many flautists to be made into riflemen. Any concerted attempt to improve the condition of the army ran headlong into Magyar obstructionism and, behind that, the question of nationalism throughout the Monarchy.

The number of new conscripts entering the army from the Hungarian lands showed no growth until 1912 despite the promises made in 1906. The "Hungarian crisis" had been resolved, but the problem of Hungary remained. Franz Joseph had refused to sanction a violent solution to the Hungarian crisis of 1905, but the possibility of violence, of a new deadlock at the next Ausgleich negotiations, of a nationalist outbreak in Hungary remained. Fall U. remained on file at the war ministry. The military leadership could not believe it would never be needed, and the plans were updated at least once. In the spring of 1907, FML Conrad von Hőtzendorf, successor to the aged Beck as chief of the general staff, had the plan reviewed
and ordered changes drawn up in the order of battle, shifting larger cavalry contingents to the northern front. There would be other crises, other deadlocks. The generals knew that Hungarian intransigence had not ended and that the demands of the Magyar oligarchy would continue to call for a separate Hungarian army and perhaps for Hungarian secession. Fall U. remained in the vaults of the war ministry, a temptation to believe that the army must one day save the unity of the Monarchy and a reminder that, however loyal and professional the performance of Honvéd units in dispersing the Hungarian Diet had been, there were still lists of "questionable" and "unreliable" units that had to be borne in mind.

Fall U. remained as the sole fully-elaborated plan for a military solution to the Monarchy's internal problems. Yet, if the Hungarian crisis had dominated political life in the Monarchy in the first years of the century, Hungary was not the only locus of nationalist discontent, nor was the "Hungarian problem" the most intractable of the Monarchy's problems—or even the only one with a potential for violence. The command at VIII. Korps in Prague had been sufficiently disturbed by nationalist sentiments in Bohemia—and inside some of its own regiments—to begin discussing plans for dealing with a nationalist revolt. In 1908 the garrison command at Trieste warned III. Korps HQ in Graz that it feared that
the Italians of the Küstenland would take advantage of any war with Serbia to revolt against the Monarchy and requested that plans for occupying the Littoral with loyal troops be drawn up. \textsuperscript{19} Neither plan found its Auffenberg, and no sealed folders for a "Fall Böhmen" or "Fall Küstenland" found their way into the war ministry archives. But the war ministry could not ignore the potential for violent upheavals in those regions, nor could it ignore the fact that, using the criteria Auffenberg had applied to Magyar regiments, eleven Bohemian regiments could be defined as potentially unreliable (70+% Czech) and ten more could be defined as "questionable" (20-70% Czech). \textsuperscript{20}

The list of potential catastrophes—a multi-front war, the festering German-Czech quarrel in Bohemia, fear of Hungarian secession, and the hovering question of what would happen when Franz Joseph died—continued to grow. Yet the amount of actual disloyalty simmering within the Monarchy should not be overdrawn. Joachim Remak once pointed out that, while "happy cooperation" might not have been the mood of many of the nationalities, there were few who did not feel at least "passive acceptance." \textsuperscript{21} It was after all a Budapest Honved unit that dispersed the Hungarian Diet in 1906. In July and August 1914 the nationalities—even the Czechs—responded loyally to the declarations of war against Serbia and Russia. There
existed in the Monarchy in the last years before the Great War far deeper reserves of popular loyalty than many postwar historians, knowing the events of October/November 1918 (and, in some cases, seeking to construct nationalist hagiographies) were willing to see. The political aims of the nationalities—Czech, Croat, Magyar, Serb—in the last decade before the war were still based on demands for national privilege and not the destruction of the state that could ensure those privileges. Only the Italian unrest in the Littoral and the Südtirol was insoluble as an internal problem—only the Italians sought an outright departure from the Monarchy.\footnote{23}

The amount of actual disloyalty within the Monarchy was not a question that seemed to interest the k.-u.-k. military leadership. By 1914 much of the imperial-and-royal high command saw itself as beset by impending doom. Conrad expected that war with Russia would be "a hopeless struggle," one which, though fatal, could not be avoided if the Monarchy was to be true to its sense of honour.\footnote{22} Their predecessors had been blithely complacent before 1848 and 1866; the officers of Conrad's generation wrote and spoke in an atmosphere of near-hysteria. In some measure this was only a pessimism born of professionalism. They had been taught to judge the capabilities of an enemy rather than his intentions, and the k.-u.-k. generals were well aware of the Monarchy's weaknesses in the face of a
seemingly inevitable war on multiple fronts, and they were no less aware of the truism (so recently borne out in Russia) that external defeat breeds internal discontent. On a deeper level, their unease ("needless panic" in Norman Stone's phrase) was a response driven by frustration, by the inability of an increasingly isolated military class to obtain the reforms--financial and structural--that might give the Monarchy the strength to survive in a world of predatory neighbors and national discontents.

Corelli Barnett put forth the formula that "military disaster is...national decline exposed by violence." Conrad or Auffenberg would have agreed absolutely. And the military leadership, so painfully aware of the costs of years of struggle over the military provisions of the Ausgleich, saw in the weaknesses of the k.-u.-k. army the decay of the Monarchy itself. The officers of the Monarchy had always been certain that theirs was an honorable and honored calling. Even in the years of defeat, of Solferino and Königgrätz, it had been no mean thing to wear the emperor's coat and serve the dynasty. Yet in the new century the officer corps, trained to an ethic of service and dynastic loyalty, saw itself as increasingly isolated and unheeded, its ideals held to be irrelevant if not faintly laughable. Its claim to be the key unifying element in the Monarchy was highlighted by
nationalist and socialist attacks on the army, but there was little solace to be had in a pose of beleaguered nobility. An old world was ending, a new reign was looming, and the ability of the army to defend the Monarchy it claimed to hold together was withering away.

That professional soldiers should feel alienated from their nation’s political leadership is perhaps not surprising; in the latter half of the twentieth century such alienation has become a given in Western journalism. The k.-u.-k. military leadership was not alone in its feelings of isolation. The French army had been swept by politically directed purges in the last two decades of the century; each change in parliamentary complexion had swept a new class of officers into forced retirement or professional oblivion. The Russian army had undergone disaster in Manchuria and revolution at home in 1904-07; throughout the first months of 1906 mutinous units had exchanged artillery and gunfire with loyal troops in a series of bitter firefights. By 1912 the tsarist police were convinced that the Russian army was riddled with networks of officers whose zeal for military professionalism and modernization was only a mask for radicalism and—with an eye on the officers’ coups in Lisbon and Constantinople—seditious views on the role of the army in leading the state into modernity.26 The tsarist police had already aroused the wrath of the army
by openly questioning the loyalty of Polish officers (and Russian officers with Polish wives) serving in the tsar's forces. Nor was the k.-u.-k. leadership alone in its pessimism. The staff planners of the British army spent the last years before the Great War preparing for an inevitable and savage civil war in Ireland. The last week of July 1914 saw an ironic coup de théâtre at Whitehall: the British leadership, poring over maps of Ireland, convinced that the fate of Britain hinged on a handful of parishes in county Fermanagh and county Tyrone, was suddenly confronted with an ultimatum in Belgrade and panicky calls for maps of Flanders and France.

Yet the Austrian case remained unique. Conrad's insistence that in the Monarchy all other questions were dissolved in the question of the army had a subtle edge to it. The joint army, the imperial-and-royal as opposed to the Royal Hungarian units, was based on a denial of national feeling. The k.-u.-k. army was required not simply to repress nationalism but to resolve it, to create a loyalty not based on race or language. The civil administration had no such sense of mission, and the military grew increasingly disenchanted with the bureaucracy. In Bohemia the civil service had become a prize to be captured and wielded for national aims by Germans or Czechs. In Hungary the administration was openly a tool of Magyarisation. In Galicia the army was
treated by the administration as vaguely irrelevant.
Auffenberg claimed that the governors from Goluchowski on
had seen themselves as "more imperial satrap than
governor--more an assistant king than a high official" and
simply excluded anyone not of the Polish nobility from
influence.\footnote{An officer of \textit{k.-u.-k.} military intelligence
complained that in Lemberg}

the Commanding General tried to eliminate the
latent tension between civil and military authority.
He found no support from the Governor... who as
direct representative of the Monarch believed himself
superior to everyone, and this conceit carried over
to his exclusively Polish staff... [The] off-duty
activities of officers were confined solely to
military circles, especially since the Polish
nobility would not on principle speak German and
visibly exerted themselves to have no contact with
the Officer Corps. One had the feeling of being not
in Austria, but in some enemy land.\footnote{The generals could find no allies in the chanceries.}

Conrad pointed out that, while the army was starved for
manpower, the civil service held 150,000 more men--a dozen
divisions' worth--than served in the peacetime army.\footnote{The upper ranks of the \textit{k.-u.-k.} army saw themselves
as very nearly alone--alone in understanding the threat of
a multi-front war with Russia, Serbia, and Italy and alone
in offering unconditional loyalty to the dynasty. "We
cannot count," Conrad wrote, "on our populace expressing a
unified patriotic desire to improve the conditions of our
armed forces."\footnote{What applied to the "public" applied no}
less to the civil administration. The civil service, wrote General Alfred Krauss,

stood in utter opposition to the army. Austria was a Beamtenstaat. Every fifth or sixth man was a civil servant. Half the revenues of Austria went for the support of the civil service. The bureaucrats saw in the army the most dangerous opponent of their dominance...Although the army cost not a third of the army of bureaucrats, all the bureaucracy clamoured about the unbearable costs of the army.  

Worse yet, Krauss insisted that the access of seasoned soldiers to the emperor and his ministers was thwarted by the host of young, often aristocratic, bureaucrats that filled the Hofburg and, jealous of their own dominance and ignorant of the condition and role of the army, kept the emperor's soldiers at arm's length. Krauss wrote with a great dose of professional envy and postwar bitterness, and his descriptions must be treated with caution. Yet he expressed the attitudes of many officers in the last years of peace. Fearful of the nationalities, utterly cynical about the "public," disenchanted with their civilian counterparts, the military leadership of the Monarchy grew increasingly pessimistic about the future of the Monarchy itself.

For five days in October 1905 it had been possible that the Hungarian crisis would be resolved by force. The corps commanders of the Monarchy had been in possession of sealed warning orders for Fall U.--for military intervention in Hungary. Officers of the k.-u.-k. general
staff had been on hand at the docks in Vienna and Pressburg to note how much shipping could be requisitioned to move troops downriver to Budapest. Civil war, the staff planners at the Reichskriegsministerium knew, was only a telegram away. By 12 October, though, the moment had passed. Special couriers retrieved the sealed orders, and the plans for Fall U. were locked away in the staff archives. The moment for civil war had passed in secret, but its first anniversary produced an unsettling literary echo—a vision of what might have been, and what many k.-u.-k. officers feared might still come to pass.

In late October 1906 copies of a small, anonymous novel called Unser Letzter Kampf were presented to the Kriegersarchiv-Bibliothek in Vienna. The book was subtitled "The Testament of an Old Imperial Soldier" and, while its title page announced that it had been printed in Vienna and Leipzig in 1907, the Kriegersarchiv staff noted on the introductory page of copy #3 that it had been checked into the library holdings on 25 October 1906. The anonymous author, the "old imperial soldier" of the title, was no stranger to either the Kriegersarchiv-Bibliothek or the halls of the Reichskriegsministerium. He was in fact a general staff officer named Hugo Kerchnawe, a future k.-u.-k. general and, after the war, the author of numerous German-nationalist and stridently right-wing histories of Europe since 1789.
The book itself was a Zukunftroman, a genre falling somewhere between the political tract and what a later age would call "speculative fiction." Despite the promise inherent in its title—a military history of the Monarchy's next and final war—Unser Letzter Kampf is neither scholarly analysis nor a fleshed-out wargame scenario. It has nothing in common with the theoretical exploration of future conflicts found in works such as Bernhardi's Germany and the Next War or the work of Feldmarschalleutnant Adolf von Sacken of the Vienna Kriegaarchiv," and it should not be taken as a forerunner of the "techno-thriller" genre pioneered by Sir John Hackett and Tom Clancy in the 1970s and 1980s. Unser Letzter Kampf has more in common with the spate of call-to-arms novels that appeared in the United States in the years before 1917, warning of the evil intentions of Europeans (usually Germans, but occasionally British) and urging an aroused populace to arm for war. Yet Kerchnawe's work is less a clarion call than a nightmare. Its English-language equivalent might be Thomas Dixon's The Fall of a Nation (1916), in which the Pope incites Imperial Germany to invade an America weakened by Jews, immigrants, and suffragettes. The mood here is not one of military plausibility; it is one of manic despair, where disaster is absolute and ineluctable.
The book was, Gunther Rothenberg claims, "widely read" in military circles, and, given its author—a general staff officer with aspirations to historical scholarship—its readers would have found it disquietingly plausible. Kerchnawe would certainly have been familiar with the overall state of the k.-u.-k. army, with the desperate improvisations by which the army sought to maintain itself during the long Hungarian crisis, and with the political furor of 1905/06. He may even have been aware of the existence of Fall I. That secret, as the Auffenberg scandal of 1912 will show, was never airtight. In any case, Kerchnawe's military audience, well aware of how the army had suffered since 1900, of how dangerous a year 1905 had been, and of how bleak the future seemed, would have come to the story all-too-ready to believe.

The novel opens in a windswept Viennese February on a scene any k.-u.-k. officer would have found familiar in 1906. The imperial capital is paralyzed by strikes and mobs demanding universal suffrage and socialism; the Monarchy itself is paralyzed by Magyar obstructionism and separatist demands. The government vacillates; the ministers cannot bring themselves to order the streets cleared with deadly force. There could be no doubt in a military reader's mind that Kerchnawe was drawing on memories of 1905, of the huge Vienna demonstrations attendant upon the revolution in St. Petersburg.
The novel’s heroes are gathered in the Arsenal, where the Vienna city garrison has been withdrawn in the face of the mobs. As they lament the state of affairs inside the Monarchy, a young captain of artillery sums up the condition of the k. - u. - k. army:

Ancient cannon, no men, no horses, no recruits for half the army, no maneuvers, badly-trained reservists, everything you see just patched together, no ships—nothing. If the Prince of Monaco declared war on us we’d have to pack it in. Tough luck for him, that his princedom doesn’t border on us.40

And behind the weakness of the army Kerchnawe placed not just the "hypertrophied" bureaucracy and the "decayed men of 'culture'"41 who filled the Reichsrat, but specific political figures as well—"[Viktor] Adler, [Heinrich] Ellenbogen, [Engelbert] Pernerstorfer and company" of the Social Democrats, the traitorous "[Count Albert] Apponyi and consorts" in Budapest. Kerchnawe expected nothing but sedition in the Hungarian Diet, where only the most blindly naive could fail to see that government and opposition were both part of the same Magyar oligarchy and sought the same ultimate ends.42 In Vienna he found sure signs of degeneracy inside the Greek temples on the Burgring: "Speeches, speeches, speeches, and rabble-rousing, but never deeds."43

The late winter of Kerchnawe’s mythical 1908 sees disaster piled upon disaster. While riots rage in Vienna and the major provincial cities of the Monarchy, a secret
coalition of Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro launches a sudden attack across the Monarchy's southern borders. The k.-u.-k. army, weakened by years of neglect and by the long Hungarian crisis, its ranks already stretched thin to contain internal disorder, is hard-pressed to deal with the invaders, and Serbs and Montenegrins stream into Bosnia-Herzegovina. Count Apponyi, speaking at a plenary session of the Hungarian Diet, announces that the Magyar leadership will not vote for the mobilization of Hungarian units. Troops are sent in to clear the Diet, but unlike the straightforward mission carried out by Colonel Fabrizius and the Honvéd military police in the real world, the attempt miscarries. The doors of the great parliament building are closed and barricaded, and the Diet is defended by an armed mob. The troops—unsure of themselves, without orders to open fire—are driven off by the crowd. Hungarian reservists, corrupted by nationalist emissaries, begin to melt away from their depots. The Kingdom of Hungary begins a headlong descent into revolution and chaos.

Kerchnawe's account of events in Budapest is in sharp and strident counterpoint to the real events of February 1906. In reality, the Diet had been cleared by a detachment of local troops who had obeyed orders without question. Protestors had filled the boulevards of Budapest for the next few nights, but there had been no
attempt to defend the Diet or defy the military. A show of force had not defused nationalist sentiment, but it had trumped the Magyar oligarchy. No one had been willing to raise the stakes once force had been admitted as an overt factor. Still, for any k.-u.-k. officer who followed the events in Budapest, for anyone aware of the existence—even if not the substance—of a Fall U., there would have been a terrible kind of plausibility in Kerchnawe's depiction. Fabrizius's brief Sanierung of February 1906 might all-too-easily have turned into insurrection.

*Unser Letzer Kampf* moves forward at a nightmarish pace. The k.-u.-k. fleet is annihilated by the Italians in a savage battle off Pola. The Russians descend upon Galicia and, fittingly enough, Hungary. The perfidious German Reich offers no aid to its sometime ally and instead moves its own forces into Bohemia and the Alpine provinces to "protect" the German population and complete the work of 1866. The story ends in midsummer, with the last k.-u.-k. forces drawn up on the plains of Lower Austria, facing a final battle against overwhelming Italian forces.

The book is a strident and hysterical little tract, and it outruns the avowed intentions of its author. Kerchnawe took as the text for his sermon a saying of Prince Eugene's: "An army of 300,000 men is worth more than any treaty of alliance." The novel was intended to
be a call for rearmament, but Kerchnawe seemed unable to decide whether the destruction of the Monarchy was due to the superior firepower and numbers of the Italians, Serbs, and Russians or to disaffection and treason within. The Monarchy’s final defeat in the field was made possible by its internal enemies—by Social Democrats and Magyar oligarchs; by the mobs in Vienna, Prague, Zagreb, and Lemberg who choose chaos over loyalty; by the weakness and indecision of the Monarchy’s political leadership, who will not face the need for strong measures. In the face of all this, Kerchnawe’s (or, on another level, Conrad’s) call for a strong army has a hollow ring. The extent of disaffection portrayed in the novel renders its author’s call for rearmament irrelevant. Empires are won by armies; they are maintained by faith. An army can take and hold territory, it can control lines of communication, it can confront an enemy army in the field. It cannot provide a basis of belief for a society. It can make men obey, but it cannot make them believe. That fact underlies the whole of Unser Letzter Kampf and gives it its air of hysteria and despair. In the aftermath of 1905/06, that fear would have intruded upon any military reader. A weapon, whether an army in the hands of a state or a rifle in the hands of a soldier, is worse than useless if there is no belief in its use.
The fears expressed in *Unser Letzter Kampf* did not fade away after 1907, and other Zukunftromanen emerged from within the k.-u.-k. world to capitalize on them. In 1909 Kerchnawe published a second, and more widely distributed, anonymous work, *Die Vorgeschichte von 1866 und 19-?.* This second work showed off Kerchnawe's academic bent in a first half devoted to a history of the catastrophe of 1866, an historical exposition that attacked Prussian perfidy and Hungarian disloyalty with equal venom. The second half reworked the ground of his earlier book: no loyalty could be expected from the Magyars or Czechs, the Monarchy was surrounded by jackals waiting to spring, and only within the shrinking circle of the k.-u.-k. ranks could loyalty be found. Kerchnawe stressed that the Magyar oligarchy's obstructionism had prevented Albrecht from fighting on against the Prussians in 1866; he was equally certain that Germany would abandon the Monarchy to its enemies in any future war. Kerchnawe could find hope only in the vision of a strongly-centralized and re-armed Monarchy with German as the language of state—since presumably only by re-Germanizing the state apparatus could cultural fragmentation be halted and the loyalty of the Monarchy's German subjects be protected from pan-German sentiment.

Lass strident, but perhaps more distressing, was a small novel called *Quo vadis Austria?*, published in Berlin
late in 1913. The novel lacks the fevered violence of Kerchnawe’s books, and its depiction of the ruin of the Monarchy is distinctly low-key, a matter more of belief than of Russian or Italian bayonets. The disturbing feature of the novel was its subtitle: "A Novel of Resignation." *Resignieren* carries the same possibility for wordplay in both English and German, and the book was at once a yielding to History and Fate and an act of renunciation by the "Austrian Officer" who had anonymously published it. Its author was Gustav Sieber, late of the 54.(Olmütz) k.-u.-k. Infantry. Sieber had been born in Moravia in 1885, the son of a k.-k. major, and commissioned into k.-u.-k. service in 1908. He served with line infantry companies in Bosnia at Plevlje and Sarajevo before being posted back to the regimental depot at Olmütz. His resignation from active service in December 1913 had not been caused by the publication of *Quo vadis Austria?*; the novel had given concrete form to his decision to leave k.-u.-k. service.

*Quo vadis Austria?* raises quite pointedly the issue of faith: who still believes in Austria? Sieber was not concerned with battle fleets clashing in the Adriatic or fortresses in the Alps or even sedition in Budapest or Prague. His concern was with how many people in and out of k.-u.-k. service still found the Monarchy worth devoting their lives to. His answer was simple enough:
too few. If general war loomed, there would be Germans or
Magyars or Czechs, but too few Austrians. Sieber had no
animus against the dynasty and no belief in the need for
any sort of Pan-German solution to the Monarchy's future.
His concern was that the Monarchy could offer its soldiers
a sense of professionalism and duty, but nothing else.
There was, Sieber insisted, no underpinning of faith left,
no overriding belief that the Monarchy was not merely
convenient, but necessary. How many men would offer up
their lives or their devotion for something that was
simply faute de mieux? That question—that sense of
aimlessness—carried beyond Sieber's novel to even the
most Monarchietreu of Vienna's intellectuals, to those not
given to assuming despair as a fashionable pose. In 1912
Hoffmansthal wrote a friend:

And the domestic scene? Half indolence, half
heedlessness. The problems too intricate, too
Gordian-entwined. Decency, courage here and there--
as in Conrad's case--but these men, too, without any
real faith."

The generals in the ministerial complex on the
Dominikanerbastei and in the high command offices at
Wiener Neustadt were no less attuned than the literati at
the Cafe Central to the sound of "distant planets
falling." The fears articulated by Kerchnawe and Sieber--
the decay of the Monarchy's military standing, separatist
movements in Budapest and Prague, the unwillingness of the
Reichsrat to take remedial action and the failure of
society to demand action—were echoed from the Reichskriegsministerium to the corps headquarters in Budapest and Prague and Lemberg and on to the garrison commands in Trieste and Sarajevo. Yet Conrad and his colleagues on the general staff were also aware that the army was in danger of losing both the political standing and physical means to act even if the moment for action arrived.49

It was still possible for the army to present itself as the beloved servant of the dynasty and for its officers to tell one another that they belonged to an honoured and honourable estate. If one looked at the works of the army's favoured painters, such as Ludwig Koch, one could see the army's official and desperately-held view of itself. Koch's "Gala-Dinner der Angehörigen der Arcieren Leibgarde in Schönbrunn" (1913)50, with its glittering array of officers dining with their sovereign, might have come from the days of Grünne and Hess, the days when liberal critics and conservative officials alike had declared that the Monarchy was being run by the army. Yet all the vast watercolour portrayals of court balls (Balls bei Hof) could not hide the fact that since the death of the Archduke Albrecht no military figure been able to make policy. The reality of military life was less the Balls bei Hof than Franz von Myrbach's "Auf Vergessenem Posten"51—the forlorn officer riding across a desolate
Ruthenian landscape on his way to a forgotten little fortress.

The k.-u.-k. army over which Conrad assumed operational command in 1906 found itself increasingly isolated within society. In part this was the army's own doing: a narrowly professional education and a belief in the officer's direct loyalty to the dynasty left little room for interest in those social or historical questions derided at the military schools as *reflektierende*—"thought-provoking." But it was also an isolation that the outside world inflicted on the Monarchy's affairs. In areas where 'national' feeling ran high, officers found the homes and company of the local elites increasingly closed to them. Outside Budapest itself, Hungarian traditions of hospitality often overcame separatist distaste for the joint army, but in Prague both Czech and German nationalists openly despised the army, leaving its officers only the company of the local Jews, who were equally disdained by the two factions. Galicia, where the bulk of the cavalry and an increasing percentage of the infantry were stationed, was seen by the officers posted there as a kind of minor hell: alongside the legendary physical discomforts, the Polish nobility behaved as if the garrison officers were simply not there. It was a rare thing in a Galician town for a Habsburg officer to be asked to a Polish gentleman's home, even, some officers
said, if the officer were a general and the Pole the province's viceroy. Vienna of course never lacked in social calls, but the Haupt-und-Residenz-Stadt itself had its dangers. In the German cities of the Monarchy including Vienna, Graz, and Innsbruck, the student duelling societies had so made a sport of insulting officers in cafes or on the street that the army found it necessary to set up special courses in the sabre in order to give its officers any chance at all of remaining, if not unscarred, then at least free of public humiliation. The problem was only solved by a decree from the war ministry authorising challenged officers to use the pistol rather than the sabre.

The officer's uniform guaranteed him special seating at a purely nominal cost to the Hofoper or the Burgtheater and gave him the right to attend the annual Hofball. It did not, however, guarantee his economic security. The officers of the dynasty had long been given only minimal salaries. In the 1850s a junior officer was paid no more and often less than a senior journeyman in a craft guild. Sixty years later in an age when he would be far less likely to have a private income, an officer in k.-u.-k. service would still be paid on average two-thirds of what his French or German counterpart would make. A more bitter comparison would be with the members of the Monarchy's civil service, where the same ratios applied.
Chronic underpayment might have been acceptable if one fully subscribed to the vision of the officer corps as a special caste of vassals bound directly to their prince, but by the last decade before the War, such a vision was eroded by the growing economic differences between officers and civil servants. Not the least of Conrad's achievements in the eyes of his contemporaries was the supplementary pay for k.-u.-k. officers that he extracted from the Reichsrat at the height of the Bosnian crisis of 1908.

Yet it was still true that civil servants enjoyed higher pensions than officers, higher per diem allowances, more extensive subsidies for moving between assigned posts, and higher tuition subsidies for their children. A district judge could afford to send his sons to a "good" Gymnasium, but an infantry captain—his equivalent in rank—could not. An officer's son had first claim on admission to military schools, where tuition costs would be borne by the state. The military academy at Wiener-Neustadt noted in its annual report for 1912/13 that 67.1% of its students (294 of 438 total) had come up from military preparatory or cadet schools. The Theresianum itself was largely tuition-free; over ninety percent of its students paid nothing at all, and many of its future officers were there for exactly that reason, just as their fathers had placed them in state-subsidized military
312

schools as boys.57 Behind Alfred Krauss's disdain for the bureaucrats who allegedly monopolised influence at court58 was a hostility based on very real economic pressures that drove the officer corps in upon itself.

Cartoons in the military press had long played on the theme of the enclosed military family--types satirized in such pieces as Franz Schönflug's "An Army Family Idyll"59: the choleric colonel, the massive and poker-faced Frau Oberst, the dandified older son in his uhlan's helmet, the rowdy younger son in cadet's uniform, all peering through monocles around the breakfast table. It was still possible for k.-u.-k. officers to laugh at themselves, but such cartoons made a point: the number of "outside" applicants to the regular officer corps was declining; reasons both economic and ideological had begun to keep the middle and upper classes of the Monarchy from aspiring to wear the emperor's coat.

Gunther Rothenberg noted that after 1905 in the officer corps of the Monarchy, "a strong hereditary element of sons following in their fathers' footsteps became evident."60 Rothenberg saw this as a positive factor, but this attitude, based on the images of Prussian or British "regimental families," neglects the other side of the coin: a growing separation between a world of professional officers and the larger world of the Monarchy as a whole. The military itself was not unaware that it
was losing its appeal for officers from the upper classes and that its own social and political horizons were narrowing. One internal study of 757 junior officers showed that seventy-one percent came from the families of officers (fifteen percent), NCOs or provosts (ten percent), higher civil or military officials (twelve percent) or the lower ranks of state service (thirty-four percent).
Table 5.4
757 Junior Officers (1908): Fathers' Professions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Higher civil or military official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Free professions (academics, physicians, advocates)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Landowners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Higher trades (apothecaries, book dealers, wholesalers, businessmen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Lower civil or military official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Private income (rentier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Farmer (small holder or tenant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lower trades (salesman, clerk, craftsman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Underofficer or provost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;Non-independent&quot; professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>757</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Istvan Deak pointed out that the Theresianum's class of 1913, with 99 of 133 graduates drawn from military or state service families (74.4%) was "clearly...less representative of the officer corps and of state service" than the class of 1874, when ninety percent of the graduates had come from families who wore the dynasty's colours. Yet the one-quarter of the class not from state- or military-service families was almost wholly drawn from the lower middle classes, from families which had "lost" a son in offering him the chance of social advancement. Indeed, by 1913 the representatives of the nobility at the Monarchy's premier military academy—one Baron, two Ritters, and twenty-nine lesser nobles—were almost completely drawn from the service nobility, from families newly ennobled by personal distinction in the service of the monarch.

By the end of the first decade of the new century, a pattern was evident: the officer corps replenished itself from its own sons and the sons of k.u.k. officials plus a growing number of young men from the lower middle classes who had separated themselves from their families and class background in taking the emperor's commission. The army's efforts to extend itself into the Monarchy's educated classes by offering reserve commissions after a single year of service to conscripts who had completed their secondary education were largely unsuccessful. The
reserve officers were suspected by their career counterparts of harbouring nationalist sentiments, and far too few "one-year" men availed themselves of the opportunity to turn the privileged status of their conscript days into an officer's career. Of 16,000 career infantry and Jäger lieutenants commissioned into k.-u.-k. service between 1883 and mid-1914, only 2300 (14.4%) came from the ranks of the reserve. 64

As the officers' world narrowed, the military authorities tried to come to grips with the idea of an officer corps cut off from the nobility and the educated middle classes. The officer corps had long envisioned itself as the "mute instrument" of the dynasty, but there now occurred a shift of emphasis in the meaning of the phrase, from implying a non-national, non-political professionalism to implying a beleaguered, anti-political caste sealed off from society. 65 The ubiquitous Auffenberg was once more at hand to explain the problems facing the officer corps. Early in May 1908 he submitted to the war ministry, and to his patron, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, a memorandum "On the Composition of the Officer Corps" wherein he lamented that the k.-u.-k. professional officer of the future would be drawn (at best) from the lower middle classes and that historical experience in "all eras and all lands" showed that
extraordinary losses in battle were, throughout history, accepted only by those military units led by a homogeneous and socially well-established officer corps with an especially well-developed sense of honour... One must therefore realise that... our officer corps and, quite probably the army as a whole cannot be expected to offer a better-than-average performance...

The social background of the officers would make them unlikely to produce any automatic deference or admiration on the part of society as a whole. The solution, Auffenberg believed, was to "educate, educate, educate"—though what he had in mind was not at all an education in the liberal spirit which the reserve officers were supposed by the Liberal politicians of the 1870s to provide to the army, but a kind of indoctrination in deracination.

Education, Auffenberg proclaimed, gave its recipients both self-confidence and a sense of self-worth. More to the point, education would raise a young officer candidate out of the social milieu of his birth. The "bonds of heart and family" which might become a hindrance to an officer confronted with upheavals in the larger world of the Monarchy would doubtless weaken. Auffenberg was willing to concede that, in separating k.-u.-k. officers from the worlds into which they had been born, there was the risk of the officer corps becoming an exclusive caste. Yet while such exclusivity was "no advantage in the cultural and intellectual development of an officer, it
is, in a strictly military sense, no disadvantage either..."67

Auffenberg’s second point is of course arguable. One analyst has claimed that the greatest source of instability in the k.-u.-k. army was a lack of "basic trust" between private soldiers and officers, a lack based on a mutual incomprehension that was far more a product of the officers’ isolated social caste than of language or rank.68 Exclusivity severed the army leadership from a sense of the political and social life of the Monarchy. There was no k.-u.-k. equivalent of the Victorian officer who could expect as a matter of course to be a local magistrate or member of Parliament once he had left active service. Imperial-and-royal officers, both in Auffenberg’s prescription and in fact, formed a caste whose education was narrowly technical, who were trained to believe absolutely in the Monarchy and the dynasty, and who were shielded from any discussion of the political and social factors shaping the military and its future.69 The "mute instrument" of the dynasty was also deaf, and Auffenberg’s vision of its leaders’ education was intended to keep it so.

In the long-ago world of Franz Joseph’s youth, in the days before Solferino, the young emperor’s adjutant had declared that "the Army does not discuss. The Army does not reason." Yet of course it did both. The k.-u.-k.
army was expected to be a world unto itself, to be the silent instrument of the dynasty’s will. Nonetheless, however mute the army was expected to be in the face of the outside world, however deaf to external voices its officers were trained to be, it possessed its own inner, institutionalised voice. At the end of each year, the chief of the general staff was expected to produce a *Militär-Politische Denkschrift*, an overview of the state of both the army and the Monarchy as a whole for the eyes of the emperor and the war minister. Conrad’s annual reports had been the work of a mind focused on quantitative matters; his view of the Monarchy’s condition had been embodied in his constant pleas for more recruits, for the Hungarian agreements of 1906/07 to be implemented at long last, for money to repair the "desolate condition" of the army. Conrad’s reports had been pessimistic enough, but they had been relentlessly technical. It was only in 1912, when Conrad’s incessant quarrels with the foreign ministry had briefly driven him from favour, that the army’s views were given a more emotional expression.

The author of the *Militär-Politische Denkschrift* for 1912 was General der Infanterie Blasius von Schemua, who temporarily replaced Conrad as chief of the general staff at the end of 1911. Schemua’s appointment seems never to have been intended as permanent. Schemua was a man of some personal charm and he was well-regarded at court; his
appointment served to provide a respite after Conrad's long-standing quarrels with Count Aerenthal, the Monarchy's foreign minister, over Balkan policy. Schemua's term in office served to allow the temporarily-disgraced Conrad time to reflect that the chief of the general staff did not make diplomatic policy as well as run the army. Gerhard Ritter was correct in describing Schemua as "evidently no more than a caretaker." Schemua lacked Conrad's drive, ambitions, and technical expertise; he devoted his free time to theosophical and occult societies. Yet, ouija boards aside, he was a competent administrator who ably handled the large-scale mobilisation of k.-u.-k. forces in late 1912, when it appeared that the Balkan crisis might lead to war against Serbia and Russia. Schemua was a solid and steady, if obscure, officer, and his 1912 surveys spoke for the mass of k.-u.-k. officers who lacked the aggressive visibility of Conrad or Auffenberg, but who nonetheless shared their fears.

The characteristics of the modern age, wrote Schemua, were "dissolution and disintegration." One had only to look around oneself to see "ferment, flux, unrest..." Society had lost any sense of its aims, of its goals. Yet "social, economic, and political" tensions demanded solutions.
Such solutions could not come from the civil administration. The civil service of the Monarchy no longer served the needs of the population. It had become bloated and ineffective. Unable to recruit conscientious staff, it relied on no more than appearances and capricious authority. In consequence, internal policy was shaped not by the plans of the government, but by "impulses from below," and internal policy was increasingly marked by corruption, weakness, and impotence.

Schemua, like Conrad and Albrecht before him, recognized that the Monarchy’s peoples had been brought together by force of circumstance. "Austria-Hungary," he wrote, "is not a temporary assemblage of states, no, the peoples have grown together because they, whether they wish to see it or not, are joined by common interests." Yet it was only the Monarchy’s soldiers who were willing to serve and defend those common interests: "The soldier will soon be the only one who does not make a business of his profession, who serves selflessly the common idea, and for whom there exists a common fatherland."

Schemua was as well aware as Conrad of the material failings of the army--the lack of recruits, of artillery, of funding. Yet underlying all that was a far graver lack, a lack of belief. The two parliaments, he told Franz Ferdinand, were corrupt in the most basic sense:
They lacked the will to act for the good of the Monarchy as a whole, they lacked any sense of the Monarchy as a whole. Istvan Deak, titled his study of the Habsburg officer corps Beyond Nationalism, but as R.J.W. Evans pointed out, the k.-u.-k. officer corps in the last years before 1914 was not so much "beyond" nationalism as "still on the threshold" of a "largely uncomprehending Austrian patriotism." Penned within narrowing horizons, the k.-u.-k. officer corps sought some sign that the Monarchy possessed a belief in itself, in its own future. The increasing air of desperation and hopelessness seen in the memoranda of Conrad, of Schemua and of Auffenberg was based on the need to believe, to see a belief in the Monarchy held by groups outside the tight circle of those who wore the emperor's coat. Increasingly desperate to see concrete signs of belief, the military leadership of the Monarchy began to cast about for the possibilities of action.

Action did not necessarily mean a demand for military action. Conrad's much-heralded and obsessive demands for war with Italy and Serbia were not shared by the foreign ministry, by the heir-apparent, by the emperor, or by many, perhaps most, of his colleagues. Military intelligence was well aware of the strength of the Serbian forces and understood that a war against even Serbia alone would absorb all the Monarchy's energy. Schemua's
Denkschrift for the beginning of 1912 had emphasized the danger of any multi-front war and called for circumspection in the Balkans and improved relations with Russia. Schemua and his staff were under no illusions about the costs of military action. The next war, he wrote in February 1912:

will be in the fullest sense of the word a people’s war, in which armies will battle until annihilation, until the enemy army is powerless the national strength of the enemy is broken, his centres of industry, trade and commerce overrun and occupied... As Bismarck said: seigner à blanc.

Action need not have meant a call for war. Yet a call for action, action for its own sake, marked a total failure of political thinking.

The historian Josef Redlich once described Conrad as "exclusively a technician. In politics he recognises only quantifiable and measurable factors, corps, guns, fortresses, etc... He lacks the ability and understanding, in short, everything essential for the great concept of a state based on the nationalities." Conrad’s limitations were those of his profession and class; as Rothenberg pointed out, "Conrad’s sentiments were shared by the vast majority of senior soldiers and by the regular officer corps." The "mute instrument" of the dynasty had been rendered unable to comprehend the political life of the Monarchy or envision any real changes in either the composition of the Monarchy or the role and place of the
army. Conrad himself was able to entertain briefly visions of some form of tripartite structure, of playing a South Slav card against the Magyars," but in the end he, like his colleagues, was unable to accept the "chaos," the loss of control, both political and psychological, implicit in politics. The officers of the Monarchy knew that for a unit under fire only discipline and a firm hand would permit survival, and what was true for a regiment was true for the Monarchy as a whole.

In the last decade before 1914, there was no doubt in staff circles that the Monarchy's next war would be a multi-front struggle against enemies possessed of superior numbers and equipment. That catastrophe—embodied in a Kriegsfall R + I + B(S) (1908)—weighed with increasing urgency on the k.-u.-k. leadership. The weakness of the army was no secret. The army, lamented Baron Franz von Schönaich, the Monarchy's war minister, was "withering away." Yet nothing could be done to rebuild the military until the internal situation was resolved, and the military leadership could think of no solution other than the traditional evocations of dynastic loyalty and a call for a firm hand.

Conrad had come to office in 1907 convinced that "all our preparations and planning for external war are useless so long as our internal situation is not resolved." But the consummate technician could find no solutions.
Unable, as he later admitted, to accept a "policy of patience" he began to demand "energetic"—violent—measures: abrogation of the Ausgleich, suspension of the constitution.

Conrad's obsession with finding a war, with war as a "magic potion to master a situation which was really without remedy" might have been predicted from his technical works. His 1903 survey of the Boer War concluded that the new age of firepower had completely altered the face of warfare. Yet the Monarchy lacked the financial base and the trained reserves of manpower necessary to exploit the technology and tactics of modern war, and Conrad lacked the vision to imagine a thoroughgoing reconstruction of the Monarchy and its army. Josef Redlich found him to be "a true Austrian of our time: full of doubts concerning everything Austrian." Convinced that the army could not take advantage of the new techniques of warfare, unable to imagine political changes that might lessen the danger of a major war, Conrad yielded to his own sense of despair. The army would have to rely on offensive spirit, to charge on and hope that determination alone might overcome the inevitable losses.

Conrad's insistence on a war with Italy or Serbia was not finally based on a linkage between success abroad and an end to the stalemate at home. Unlike key members of
Louis Napoleon's regime before the Franco-Prussian War or the Argentine junta in 1982, Conrad offered no promises of domestic renewal as the fruits of victory. He could not, by 1912, offer more than even odds that any war would be successful, nor did he have any clear sense of what further complications--foreign or domestic--such a war might entail.91

By 1914 Conrad had reached a state of complete intellectual bankruptcy. All he could offer was action for its own sake--a demonstration that the Monarchy and its army could still act. When in the summer of 1914 he finally got his war, no one could have been more pessimistic about what he lamented would be "a hopeless struggle" made inevitable by the Monarchy's need to save its last asset, its honour.92 Yet while Conrad in his office on the Stubenring was spinning out ever more desperate and desperately pessimistic fantasies, south and east across Vienna in the Belvedere were men who understood exactly what the army could do to save itself and the Monarchy.

The Belvedere--the twin palace complex built for Prince Eugene--had been Archduke Franz Ferdinand's official residence since 1898. It had been given him along with a roving commission zur Disposition, at the pleasure of the emperor, as inspector-general of the armed forces. The Belvedere had been a symbol that the
archduke, so recently seriously ill with tuberculosis and usually regarded with little interest or favour by the emperor, had at long last—a decade after the suicide of Crown Prince Rudolf, three years after the death of his father, the emperor's younger brother Karl Ludwig—been acknowledged as heir-apparent. By the time of the Hungarian crisis of 1905, the Belvedere had become a symbol of Franz Ferdinand's opposition to the whole political atmosphere of the Monarchy. The Belvedere had become what its occupant saw as the seat of a shadow government, and the archduke's military chancellery had become the center of planning for the role of the army in Franz Ferdinand's reign and his proposed new order.

Franz Ferdinand had been commissioned at fourteen; he had been made a colonel at twenty-seven and a general at thirty-one. By 1905 he had worn the Monarchy's uniform for twenty-eight years and had been expecting for over a decade to be named titular commander in chief in case of war. His promotions were of course dynastic; it was considered essential that a Habsburg archduke be a soldier and equally essential that an archduke have sufficient military rank to be presentable at court and diplomatic functions. Franz Ferdinand had never received formal staff training or attended any of the higher military schools, and he lacked the consuming military interests of the late Archduke Albrecht or his own brother Otto. Yet
the army was the focus of much of his attention, and it was the army that he planned to use to save the Monarchy he would inherit.

Franz Ferdinand had been known to disparage publicly the Ausgleich arrangements as a "typical product" of Franz Joseph's "love of compromise." His own opinions had formed early in life, and he saw no reason to change them. In 1896 he wrote Feldzeugmeister Beck that

in the difficult times which face the Monarchy, one must ask, who and what supports the Throne and the Dynasty? To this question there is only one answer—the Army. The Army does not serve only to defend the fatherland against foreign foes; its chief role is the defense and maintenance of the throne and the struggle against the enemies within.

The enemies within were easily identified. In 1908 he wrote Conrad that the Monarchy was "totally in the hands of Jews, Freemasons, Socialists, and Hungary," and "those elements" sought to ruin the army and the officer corps so that "when the time comes that I need it, I can no longer rely on the army!"

Frederic Morton has recently pictured Franz Ferdinand as the leader of a "peace" faction—a "dove," and one "all the more ferocious because there was hardly any other in the Empire's highest council." And the archduke indeed had no use for Conrad's war plans and argued in favour of conciliating Russia and moving with caution in the Balkans. Yet if he had no wish to march on Belgrade or Cetinje or Milan it was not out of any attachment to peace
as an ideal. What drove the archduke apart from his erstwhile protege Conrad was that Franz Ferdinand needed the army for something other than wars in the Balkans or Italy. Franz Ferdinand needed the army to establish his new reign by marching on Budapest.

Conrad wrote that the future of the Monarchy required "a strong central state administration supported by a unified Army, with a centralized parliament... If the nationalities cannot fit themselves into this order of things, then catastrophe is unavoidable." If in the end Conrad came to believe that catastrophe could not be avoided, it was because he saw no way to force the nationalities to believe in the Monarchy. Like Beck before him, he realised that 1849 could not be repeated, that Hungarian obstructionism could not be solved by force. Conrad was prepared to rage against concessions to the Magyars on military questions, but though at the beginning of his tenure as chief of staff he had had Fall U. updated, he was never prepared to urge its implementation. It seemed far easier to dream of conquests in Serbia or the Veneto than to risk civil war. Conrad may indeed have found, as Redlich said, "all the non-material problems of modern politics--public opinion, national ideas" to be unknown territory, but he was well able to weigh up the risks of an internal solution by force. There would be at least "honour" and
"prestige" to be gained abroad; there would be nothing to be won by an attempted conquest of Hungary. Franz Ferdinand, like his seventeenth-century Styrian namesake, knew that his future subjects could--should--be forced to believe.

Franz Ferdinand was far closer in temperament to the second of his namesakes than the first, and contemporary observers continually described him as a figure of the High Baroque. An Italian journalist envisioned him "among the grey granite of the Escorial," but there was more of Ferdinand II than of Philip II in him. He lacked Philip's concept of prudence, of endlessly weighing alternatives. His two deepest beliefs--in dynastic absolutism and in the presumed treason of all the Magyar oligarchy--were openly and energetically held. He wrote to Kaiser Wilhelm that "the so-called noble, knightly Magyar is the most infamous, anti-dynastic, unreliable and lying wretch, and all the difficulties which we have in the Monarchy have their ultimate source in Hungary." During his unhappy tenure as colonel of the 25. (Ödenburg) Hussars he had had no qualms about expressing the same views to his Magyar officers; as inspector-general he refused outright to review any Hungarian unit.

The key to all of Franz Ferdinand's ideas was the destruction of the Magyar oligarchy and its dominance in Hungary. As early as 1895 he had shown interest in an
"American" federalism—a strong central regime that would permit domestic autonomy in a new set of crownlands, where Slovak and Croat autonomy would undercut Magyar strength. By 1903 he had moved to consider trialist ideas, adding a Kingdom of Croatia as a third unit of the Monarchy, and in 1906 he expressed great interest in the federal plans of Aurel Popovic, whose *Die Vereinigten Staaten Grossösterreichs* called for twenty ethnically-based crownlands with their own courts and internal administrations. But by 1907 he had abandoned trialist and federal ideas. The willingness of Serbs and Croats to combine in the Fiume Resolutions convinced the archduke that any Slav bloc would be as dangerous to the unity of the Monarchy as a Magyar one. In the end, trialism would only give the South Slavs and the Czechs a chance to copy the Magyars. The only hope of maintaining order in the Monarchy was "To break this preponderance of Hungary! Otherwise we will with absolute certainty become a Slavic empire, and trialism, which would be a disaster, is inevitable."

The mechanism through which the archduke developed his plans for his new regime and the breaking of Magyar dominance was the military staff granted him by the emperor in 1898. As part of the archduke's position as inspector-general he was entitled to copies of all major papers from the *Reichskriegsministerium* and the Austrian
and Hungarian defense ministries, and a staff of two military aides was assigned to deal with the documents. Its initial head was Heinrich von Krauss-Elislago, later chief of the Operations-Büro and one of the architects of Fall U. The role of the archduke’s staff had at first been largely limited to preparing digests of ministerial reports. After 1906, with the arrival of a new adjutant, Captain Alexander von Brosch of the Kaiserjägers, the staff became the centre of the archduke’s plans and, in the eyes of many observers, something of a shadow cabinet.

Allmayer-Beck described Brosch rather disingenuously as an "outspokenly political but not politicised officer." He was a fine staff officer and a fine light infantry officer as well. He had attracted the archduke’s attention while commanding a Kaiserjäger unit on maneuvers in the Tirol in the late summer of 1905; he was appointed the archduke’s adjutant in February 1906 and promoted to major three months later. Brosch’s portrait in the Kriegsmuseum shows him as a combat soldier, leading his encircled Jägers in a last, doomed charge in August 1914, but he was a born courtier, a political soldier who very deftly interpreted his master’s wishes and who expanded the small staff he inherited—formally designated the archduke’s military chancellery in November 1909—into an intelligence and advisory body only
marginally smaller than the emperor's own military staff.\textsuperscript{109}

Franz Ferdinand had long felt himself blocked from any access to real authority in the Monarchy, from the co-regency (\textit{Mitregentschaft}) he felt was his due from the old emperor, and he was given to saying that he knew less about policy than the lowest servant at Schönbrunn.\textsuperscript{110}

Brosch saw his job as establishing the role of the Belvedere in all affairs of state. To that end he expanded the Belvedere's intake of ministerial documents and began to submit questions to local commands. The story ran in the army that if a rifle fell from its rack in some forgotten Galician garrison, the archduke—always fascinated with military detail—would know its serial number the next day.\textsuperscript{111} Behind the joke lay the information net that Brosch spread throughout the army, seeking details about events and, more importantly, personnel changes and appointments.\textsuperscript{112} It became the business of Brosch's staff to know when any officer suspected of being "soft" on Hungarian matters or not sufficiently in tune with the archduke's views or, as in the case of Baron Holzhausen, head of the Theresianum and later commander of the 4.(\textit{Hoch-und-Deutschmeister}) Infantry, too Protestant for the archduke's taste, received a new posting.\textsuperscript{113}
At the very beginning of his tenure as adjutant, Brosch had established contacts between the Belvedere and the Christian Social journal *Reichspost*, which had been strongly critical of any concessions to Hungary in military affairs. In short order *Reichspost* became the "official", and financially-supported, newspaper of the Belvedere. Friedrich Funder, *From Empire to Republic*, the young editor of *Reichspost*, was summoned to the Belvedere several times a week and given direct telephone access to Brosch, who also provided him with copies of confidential documents that Brosch or the archduke wished to have publicised. It was through Funder that Brosch began to assemble a group of intellectuals—Aurel Popovici, the Croat Ivo Frank, the Slovak Milan Hodza, the Romanians Iuliu Maniu and Alexander Vajda—who, along with the "renegade" Magyar Jozsef Kristoffy, minister of the interior in Fejervary's government, would begin to formulate plans to use universal suffrage and the nationality question to attack the dominance of the Magyar oligarchy in Hungary.

Brosch's own views on concessions to Hungary—uniforms, flags or language of command—was as hard-line as the archduke's. Brosch knew only too well that the unity of an army was not only in its arms and equipment, but more especially in its spirit... [which is the] prerequisite for successful leadership, Every concession to Hungary, be it over flags or insignia or the language
question, was in regards to constitutional and also military affairs a mistake, against which Major von Brosch immediately opened a front.\textsuperscript{116}

Brosch was willing to go public with attacks on any concessions to Hungarian aspirations. Articles, first using Brosch as deep background, then signed by "a highly-placed military personality," and finally under Brosch's own name, began to appear in \textit{Reichspost} and \textit{Österreichische Rundschau} opposing any and all of the compromises offered by war ministers Pitreich and Schönaich. "Der Militärische Ausgleich," which ran in \textit{Österreichische Rundschau} for 13 March 1908 and was later reprinted as a pamphlet under Brosch's name, made the Belvedere's position clear: the future of the Monarchy depended on a unitary, non-national army, commanded in German, loyal only to the dynasty.\textsuperscript{117}

The position papers issuing from the Belvedere were quite openly designed to let the army and the public know that the heir-apparent planned to open his reign by sweeping aside decades of temporizing and drift. The current staff at Schönbrunn was well aware of its symbolic role in the archduke's eyes and had given Count Montenuovo, the emperor's chamberlain, signed, undated resignations as a hedge for their pension rights against the mass dismissals Franz Ferdinand was known to be preparing for the first day of his reign.\textsuperscript{118}
archduke's plans included sacking the old emperor's retinue; they included abandoning the Ausgleich as well.

By mid-1911 Brosch had prepared a complete program for Franz Ferdinand's accession. The Thronwechselprogramm, including updated lists of appointments to be made to the new emperor's government and army, was complete by September 1911, two months before Brosch's term as adjutant expired. Friedrich Funder and Joszef Kristoffy believed that the archduke "entertained no thoughts of revolutionary plans of action against Hungary" and planned to proclaim his plans for a renewed Monarchy during the coronations in Budapest and Prague. Brosch's plans for the change of reigns make clear that Franz Ferdinand intended from the first to undertake "revolutionary plans."

Franz Ferdinand intended to reign as Franz II of Austria, not of Austria-Hungary. A manifesto "An unsere Völker" would be issued in three versions—one for the Cisleithanian lands, one for Hungary, and one for Bosnia-Herzegovina—proclaiming the new reign and explaining that the time had come for a firm hand to restore unity. The vision of the new regime was not unlike that found in the October Diploma of 1860—the crownlands to be given local administrative autonomy, the imperial government above them absolute control of army and finances. The Dual Monarchy would be at an end; Franz II would refuse to
swear a coronation oath to the Crown of St. Stephen, and the Hungarian constitution could be immediately abolished. All concessions on issues of military insignia or language of service and command would be immediately retracted. The new emperor's first general order to the soldiers of the imperial (no longer imperial-and-royal) army proclaimed that

under old and honourable banners and insignia, hallowed by the centuries, should the Army and Navy--when God so wills--fight for Emperor and Fatherland and, undisturbed by any and all social and national tensions under unified leadership and command, be but an instrument of its supreme commander for the welfare of Our fatherland.122

There would immediately be a new and enlarged military budget and on expanded intake of conscripts. Those sections of the Ausgleich (sec. 11, 12: 1867) dealing with military affairs would be revoked. All rights of command and organisation would be absolutely reserved to the Crown; there would be no more control of the army by "parliamentary clique." The army's needs would be supplied without reference to the Reichsrat or the Hungarian Diet--perhaps on the model of Bismarck's handling of the Prussian military budget in the 1860s. There could be no more pressing task, the archduke told Joszef Kristoffy, than removing the army from the whims of parliamentary control.123

The program drafted by Brosch fit perfectly with the archduke's personality. Franz Ferdinand thrived on the
thought of "decisive" action. In 1908 he had told Conrad that if he were emperor he would summon the two prime ministers and the war minister for an ultimatum:

    do you know what I would do if I were the emperor? I'd summon Wekerle, Beck...and Schönai
    ch and I'd say to them: "I'll send you all to the Devil if I don't get more recruits and higher
    officers' pay for my army in eight days," and I'll tell you right now, in 24 hours I'd have it all!124

Franz Ferdinand was fond of proclaiming that "When I become supreme commander, then I'll do what I want. Woe, if anyone does anything else! I'll have them all shot!"125 The bellicose rhetoric, though, masked the fact that the archduke had no long-term view of how to handle a defiant Hungary, and that the needs of the army itself, the need to mount a credible force against foreign threats, made the army less likely to be a mute instrument to be used against the Magyars.

The archduke himself believed that there would be little resistance to the new regime. He counted on support in Hungary from the nationalities—especially the Romanians, whose cause he publicly championed—and indeed from the "ever-loyal" Hungarian peasantry, on whom he counted for support against not just the gentry but against all his other enemies—"the dominance of Freemasons, Socialists, Anarchists, Jews, radical Slavs, irredentists"126—as well. The archduke seems to have assumed that the proclamation of a new order would rally
the bulk of the Monarchy's population behind him. Brosch had held discussions in the summer of 1910 with the jurist Heinrich Lammasch on revising Hungarian constitutional law, but he had done nothing to build political support for the archduke in Hungary, and neither Brosch nor Franz Ferdinand had been able to attract German support for the proposed new order. By 1911 the German government had in fact made it clear to both the archduke and to the diplomats at the Ballhausplatz that no German support would be offered for any kind of coup in Hungary.

The initial assumption about a coup de main in Budapest seems to have been that no real resistance would be offered. Fall U. was still on file with the Operations-Büro of the general staff and remained available to the new Franz II. Yet Brosch showed no interest in any detailed plans for military intervention—neither in presenting them to the archduke nor even in obtaining information for his own files. Action against the Hungarian parliament was seen as being much along the lines of the Sanierung undertaken by Fejervary and Fabrizius—a limited number of troops deployed to occupy the Diet and disperse the deputies. Brosch did, however, propose to garrison key points on the Hungarian rail and telegraph nets with "reliable" detachments of infantry and engineering units. Hungary would then receive a military governor, whose role would be modeled on that of
Archduke Albrecht in the 1850s. Franz Ferdinand, in what Norman Stone described as a gesture of "characteristic futility"\textsuperscript{130}, planned to give that post to a suitably-promoted Brosch.

It was only with the approach of the 1912 army bill negotiations that Brosch and the Militärkanzlei staff began to consider the larger problems of a coup in Budapest. Brosch had long since prepared lists of civil officials to be dismissed and replaced with "loyal" Magyars; by 1910 he had begun to consider military changes as well. Lines of communication would have to be secured; that much had been obvious from the beginning. Should any real resistance develop, Budapest would have to be held, as would key towns and fortresses in the countryside. The archduke remained convinced that "neither the Jewish businessman, nor the peasant in the Hungarian plains, nor finally the worker in the industrial centers" would "risk his own skin" for the likes of the Magyar oligarchy\textsuperscript{131}, but his staff had to consider the possibility of real resistance from Hungarian troops. Brosch began to plan for strengthening key Hungarian points with Cisleithanian troops and transferring heavily Magyar regiments out of Hungary.\textsuperscript{132}

The k.-u.-k. army had been garrisoned on a territorial basis since the 1880s. With the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was garrisoned by units drawn
from the Monarchy as a whole, regiments were ordinarily stationed in their recruiting districts. The system had been designed to permit rapid mobilization against an enemy—Russia—possessed of a superior initial strength. It was of course possible for units to be moved away from politically sensitive areas. In 1911 troops of the 70.(Peterwardein) Infantry, a regiment eighty percent of whose men were Serbs, were withdrawn from the garrison at Semlin following unrest in Slavonia and replaced by the all-Magyar 68.(Szolnok) Infantry. Nonetheless, the army had long since set rapid mobilization as a top priority. The growth in Russian strength since the 1880s, along with the inability of the k.-u.-k. forces to substantially increase their manpower levels, made rapid mobilization all the more vital.

Rothenberg argued that Conrad was prepared by 1911 to subordinate speed of mobilization to questions of political loyalty, but this seems a misreading of Conrad’s views. Conrad’s concern was, as always, numbers. He never ceased to press home the fact that a peacetime k.-u.-k. infantry company contained ninety-three men and its Russian counterpart held 167, or that by 1913 the Russian army would have thirty-eight reserve divisions while the k.-u.-k. forces would have none at all. Conrad’s plans called for the wartime k.-u.-k. army to field forty-eight first-line divisions, a number that
could be reached only be re-assigning the Landwehr and Honvéd as first-line units.\textsuperscript{136} Conrad's projections could offer no hope of creating substantial reserve forces in less than a decade.\textsuperscript{137} Only by speed of mobilization and use of the Landwehr and Honvéd as first-line units could the Monarchy hope to stop any initial Russian onslaught. Conrad might sanction special instances of moving units for political reasons, but he would not support any large-scale dismantling of the territorial system.

Conrad was preparing for war in Galicia; Franz Ferdinand's plans did not depend on speed of mobilization. By 1911, at the end of his appointment as adjutant, Brosch had drafted plans for large-scale garrison transfers to safeguard the accession of Franz II. His successor, Colonel Karl von Bardolff, devoted the first part of his tenure to drawing up plans for altering the whole territorial system and ensuring the loyalty of the army in the face of any political upheavals brought on by the new regime. By the spring of 1913 Bardolff's designs had been submitted to the archduke.\textsuperscript{138} Territorial garrisoning, Bardolff wrote, was no longer effective. In view of nationalist propaganda and the intensification of national unrest, one could no longer assume that the army was unaffected by national tensions. It was therefore vital
to "return, at least in part, to the principles which regulated garrisoning before the '80s."

Bardolff proposed giving special attention to the twenty-four infantry regiments with sixty percent or more Magyar personnel. Five would be left in their home districts; eight more could be kept inside their corps areas, but moved outside their home districts; eleven would be shifted completely away, thus giving an increase of five regiments with completely "extra-territorial" stations. Thirteen regiments of sixty percent plus Magyar troops would remain inside the lands of the Hungarian crown. They would be balanced by sixteen "nationality regiments," all presumably reliable for use against the Magyar oligarchy, as well as two Bohemian infantry regiments and one regiment of Bosniaks. Five of sixteen hussar regiments were already serving with the expanded cavalry forces facing the Russians in Galicia; two more would be transferred to the Polish frontier. Of the nine remaining hussar regiments, five would be at their home depots and four stationed elsewhere inside Hungary, possibly as small units of border patrol horse. The new governor-general's cavalry forces would be augmented by two Bohemian dragoon regiments and the Croatian 5. Uhlans.

The same criteria were applied to the Czechs, who during the crises over the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 and the Balkan War in 1912 had showed
disturbing pro-Serb sympathies. Of fifteen infantry regiments with sixty percent or more Czech troops, four would remain in their home districts, three in their present corps commands, and eight would be extra-territorial—an increase of four extra-territorial regiments. Of ten Bohemian cavalry regiments with fifty percent or more Czech troops, eight (an increase of two) would be extra-territorial. Six largely Czech infantry regiments would remain in Bohemia—the seventh would be in its home corps area, but outside Bohemia proper. The Magyar 1. Hussars, the Ruthene 7. Uhlans, the German 4. Dragoons, and the German-Bohemian 14. Dragoons would be used to augment cavalry forces.

Bardolff also planned to shift garrisons in the South Slav provinces of the Monarchy. Of seven Serbo-Croat regiments in XIII. Korps (Zagreb) and the Dalmatian command (site of the planned XVI. Korps at Ragusa), one would be left in its home district, three more would be in the corps area, and three (an increase of two) would be extra-territorial. Of fifteen battalions raised in Dalmatia, ten—an increase of five—would be extra-territorial. Only a single k.-u.-k. battalion, drawn from the 22.(Sinj) Infantry, one battalion of the 37.(Laibach) Honvéd, and two battalions of the 23.(Zara) Landwehr Infantry would remain territorialized.
Bardolff was prepared at least to nod in Conrad's direction by acknowledging that, bearing in mind the "gravest misgivings" (schwerwiegendsten Bedenken) of the chief of the general staff, he had maintained the territorial system intact in the Galician corps commands (I. X., XI., Korps) as well as in III Korps (Graz) and XIV Korps (Innsbruck) covering the Italian frontier. But he insisted that any successful overhauling of the garrisons required that five Magyar infantry and two hussar regiments, four Czech infantry regiments and two Czech cavalry regiments, one Croat infantry regiment, and two Dalmatian regiments be moved out of their present stations and replaced by "foreign" (fremdnationale) units—in addition to those units already posted to duty in Bosnia or Galicia. Some transfers, Bardolff argued, could not wait for a general change. Units thought especially susceptible to bad influences—such as the 18.(Königgrätz) and 102.(Beneschau), eighty percent and one-hundred percent Czech respectively—needed to be moved "This year and as soon as possible."

All the plans drawn up at the Belvedere by both Brosch and Bardolff turned on the question of succession. Franz Ferdinand's authority as inspector-general had been expanded by 1913, and he had been formally given the role of commander-in-chief in wartime. But he lacked authority to order any major changes in the territorial system on
his own, and there was no chance that Franz Joseph and Conrad would support his plans. Each month that the old emperor remained on the throne—and Franz Joseph would suffer no serious illness until the spring of 1914, when he contracted pneumonia shortly after Easter—made the plans drawn up at the Belvedere more difficult to implement.

Franz Ferdinand hoped to base his foreign policy on caution in the Balkans and conciliation with Russia. Yet the k.-u.-k. military had to face the spectres of Russian power and the near-certainty of fighting a multi-front war. The point of the protracted Hungarian crisis had after all been an expansion of the army. The Army Bill of 1912, enacted amidst impending war in the Balkans, gave the army 42,000 more men annually—136,000 for k.-u.-k. forces, 20,175 for the Landwehr, and 17,500 for the Honvéd—a total of 181,000 men, which would rise to 236,300 (170,000 k.-u.-k., 35,300 Landwehr, 31,000 Honvéd) over the next six years. The two second-line forces would henceforth be treated as first-line units, and both Landwehr and Honvéd would receive not just more men but organic artillery and technical units as well.

Honvéd units had been organized at regimental level since 1890; by 1913 the Honvéd consisted of thirty-two infantry regiments organised into seven divisions. Its ten hussar regiments were at full strength, and plans were
underway to double the cavalry establishment. The Army Bill of 1912 gave both the Landwehr and the Honvéd their own artillery. Artillery units were of course vital in moving the Landwehr and Honvéd to first-line status; artillery also gave the Honvéd the ability to undertake its own combined-arms operations and resist any k.-u.-k. coercion with heavy weapons.

The Hungarian Diet was quite willing to vote funds for its "national" forces, an attitude that meshed exactly with Conrad's desperate attempts to rebuild the Monarchy's military strength. By mid-1913 each of the Honvéd hussar regiments had been given reinforced machine-gun detachments. A field artillery regiment had been formed at Budapest, and a horse artillery regiment was being raised. By 1917 the Honvéd would possess eight field artillery regiments, all integrated into brigade formations. Heavy artillery units, including howitzers, would be based at major strongholds in Budapest, Zagreb, and along the Szekesfehervar--Pressburg line. By 1920 Honvéd artillery strength would consist of eight field artillery regiments, two horse artillery regiments, and eight heavy artillery regiments based at Budapest, Debreczen, Lugos, Marosvasarhely, Nyitra, Szekesfehervar, Zagreb, and Pressburg. Had Franz Ferdinand succeeded to the throne in 1916--in the year of Franz Joseph's actual death--his plans for a coup in Budapest would have
had to take into account an expanded, well-armed Honvéd equipped with heavy artillery.

The Magyar leadership was certainly aware of Franz Ferdinand's intentions in outline if not full detail. They were certainly aware of the existence of Fall U., and of the plan's original author. By mid-1911 Auffenberg had become the Belvedere's choice for war minister—a post now, in deference to Hungarian demands, styled k.-u.-k. Kriegsminister rather than Reichskriegsminister. Auffenberg had long identified himself as the archduke's man. His "The Role and Mission of the Next War Minister," sent to the Belvedere from Sarajevo in November 1910, was fully in accord with the Belvedere's insistence on revoking all concessions to Hungary. He had even written Bardolff assuring him of his personal loyalty to the archduke: "His Highness's intentions are the only guiding-light which I will follow while I am in this post and while I am capable of doing my duty." However, in mid-1912 the Hungarian press began reporting that Auffenberg had prepared plans for military intervention in Hungary and implied that the new war minister still had those plans in mind. The war minister, already in a politically exposed position over budgetary debates, was suddenly seen as a liability in securing the support of Count Istvan Tisza, the Hungarian premier. Auffenberg appealed in panic to his patron for support, but his
political usefulness was clearly at an end. His career was saved—his old classmate Conrad secured an army inspector's post for him—但是 by the end of the year he had been dismissed by the emperor.

The Magyar leadership had seen Auffenberg as an obvious stand-in for the archduke and as an easy target. Count Istvan Tisza, head of Hungary's ruling party, had been willing to drive the 1912 Army Bill through the Diet—at one point, in an ironic replay of the days of Fejervary and Fabrizius, he had had armed guards physically remove recalcitrant deputies—but, while he was willing to expand the army to meet the Russian danger, he was under no circumstances ready to yield on any questions of Hungary's rights within the Ausgleich structure, and his object at all times was to maximise Hungarian influence. "I would," Tisza said in rejecting offers to mediate between himself and the archduke, "fight even my king if he would violate the Hungarian constitution." Franz Ferdinand regarded Tisza as the archvillain of all Magyarmom and, on Bardolff's advice, refused to receive him. Tisza was secure in his convictions and his dominance of Hungarian political life, and he was no less secure in his belief that Franz Ferdinand's plans would never be realized. When, over Easter 1914, the emperor's illness raised the possibility of a change of reigns, Tisza let it be known in both
Vienna and Budapest that, should Franz Ferdinand attempt to use the military against Hungary, it would be Tisza who would have the last laugh. It was widely believed in Vienna that Tisza intended to call out the Honvéd to thwart the heir-presumptive.153

In the last months before the assassination at Sarajevo rendered all the plans drafted at the Belvedere meaningless, it became increasingly obvious that any new reign was likely to begin with violence. The archduke still envisioned a new Monarchy, unified and centralised. Colonel Brosch, who had remained in close touch with Franz Ferdinand and was still his confidant, was slated to be at the new emperor's side as military governor of Hungary and, as the archduke told Frau Brosch, as future imperial chancellor.154 The new commander of IV. Korps in Budapest, General der Kavallerie Karl von Tersztyansky, was the archduke's personal choice, and Tersztyansky was known to be a frequent visitor to the Belvedere. It was widely believed in Vienna that he had been put in place to act against the Hungarian Diet and to remove Tisza from power by force.155

Norman Stone argued that the military leadership of the Monarchy, closed in upon itself and increasingly aware of its inability to effect real policy changes, now "required" a "policy of violent conservatism" which would "restore a Greater Austria where some form of national
justice might be achieved through a policy of even-handed repression." Yet there was no agreement on exactly what should—or could—be done. Conrad believed no less than the archduke in a unified, centralized Monarchy free of Magyar obstruction, but he was unwilling to embark upon civil war or abandon the territorial system. He preferred to flee from domestic entanglements to scenarios for war abroad where, although his estimates of the probability of success became increasingly pessimistic after 1908, there was still hope that a show of force could give the peoples of the Monarchy some reason to believe in the k.-u.-k. ideal. The archduke and his circle sought to go to the heart of the problem, to remove any Magyar interference with army and state by destroying Hungary's special position. Conrad had originally attracted the archduke's patronage because of his reputation for energetic measures, but by 1913 his obsession with war against Italy and Serbia and his failure to view the army as purely an imperial guard had cost him the Belvedere's confidence. Franz Ferdinand used his role as inspector-general to harass Conrad throughout the autumn maneuvers of 1913 in an attempt to badger him into resigning as chief of the general staff. His successor would likely be Tersztyansky, Conrad's rival for the post in 1906, and now a firm believer in the archduke's views.
There did exist some sympathy for a third possibility, one that required neither war abroad nor a coup in Budapest. Auffenberg had caught Franz Ferdinand’s eye by proposing armed intervention in Hungary, and he remained outspoken in his opposition to any concessions to Hungarian demands. Yet after 1906 he began to take an interest in conditions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and during his tenure as corps commander at XV. Korps in Sarajevo, he had come to consider trialism, the creation of a south Slav crownland built around Bosnia-Herzegovina, a serious and perhaps necessary possibility. Brosch and the archduke viewed trialism with no small amount of mistrust, but Auffenberg continued to argue in its favor. A South Slav crownland offered the possibility of forming a counterweight to Hungary, foiling the attraction of Belgrade on the Monarchy’s Serb population, and ensuring the continued loyalty of the Monarchy’s Croats. Auffenberg’s views on the situation in the southeast of the Monarchy may not have conformed to the Belvedere’s line, but they did find an echo in the military’s Bosnian policy after 1908.

Bosnia-Herzegovina had been governed through the k.-u.-k. finance ministry during the years (1878-1908) when it had been an occupied territory still belonging in theory to the Ottoman Empire. A civil administration had been granted the newly-annexed province in 1910, but the
The real authority in the area remained with the military. The area had traditionally been the haunt of komitadji, brigands whose depredations were often intertwined with nationalist beliefs, and XV.Korps had long since been supplying "order." Fifteen extra battalions were sent in during the annexation crisis of late 1908 and fifteen more in early 19091 During the Balkan Wars XV. Korps, the newly formed XVI. Korps (Ragusa), as well as the Dalmatian Landwehr were mobilised. The military held extraordinary authority throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the military looked to Bosnia as a province where, free of parliamentary obstruction, a policy of "even-handed repression" could be employed to win the population away from nationalism.162

The arrival in 1911 of Feldmarschalleutnant Oskar Potiorek as governor-general was widely hailed by the military as a first step in overcoming pro-Serbian enthusiasm. Potiorek had come to demonstrate that the Monarchy was still capable of determined action, that a policy of strength and fairness carried out by an administration whose chief was himself a Slovene would convince the population of the desirability of Habsburg rule, and that incipient disloyalty could be overcome by a firm hand in Bosnia—as it could be in Prague or Budapest as well. Potiorek's authority was far-reaching, and the powers granted him would later be used as a basis for the
extensive control over civil and economic life the k.-u.-
k. military would acquire during the First World War.

Potiorek came to Bosnia with the intention of making it a "model" province. Yet his view of his role—as being a much needed strongman—suffered from the narrowness of the officer's conception of the world. A firm, fair hand on the parade ground might produce a cohesive and obedient infantry company, but "discipline" alone could not reach the causes of dissatisfaction in Bosnia. Potiorek, one historian noted, "was basically a gendarme, and not a very good one at that." 163

The imperial authorities had attempted to make the initial occupation more palatable by leaving the local social structures alone, and this meant leaving 900,000 largely Orthodox and Serbian peasants enserfed to a largely Muslim landowning class. The population of Bosnia-Herzegovina remained, outside of a few mining districts, desperately poor and illiterate. 164 Military policy could make no headway against rural poverty, nor could it implement land reform. By mid-1914 the impoverished population of eastern Bosnia, an area long regarded as bandit country, had become so entangled with smuggling and Serbian komitadjis that the military had simply written off the population of the province east of the Bosna River as hopelessly disloyal. 165 Potiorek's "firm hand" was no more successful. All Serbian
organizations were dissolved, the Serb press was regularly confiscated and the province's schools—regarded as nurseries of radicalism—were put under strict police control. Potiorek himself remained cloistered in his headquarters, unwilling to admit that his policies had failed to attract the population to k.-u.-k. rule and might indeed be counterproductive, yet convinced that he was surrounded by disloyalty.

Auffenberg had at least been willing to understand the political implications of constructing a South Slav crownland, a move certain to provoke forceful opposition from Budapest, especially since it would entail the loss of Croatia. Potiorek in Sarajevo had attempted to order loyalty into being "by mere administrative routine," in Stone's phrase. Potoriek's failure and his attempt to overcome political frustration by violent rhetoric filled folder after folder sent to the war ministry. His situation on a hostile frontier might be extreme, but his tone was shared by his colleagues in Prague, Budapest, and the Belvedere. By 1912/13, the military leadership of the Monarchy could not contemplate the future without overtones of desperation and panic.

Brosch had used his office to establish contacts with potential allies of the archduke. Bardolff seems to have seen himself as a collector of information, and he devoted himself to informing the archduke of any instance of
perceived disloyalty by the populace or weakness on the part of the government. Franz Ferdinand was given copies of all editorials in the Hungarian press attacking the army or the archduke, though this was very much preaching to the choir. When the Balkan Wars and k.-u.-k. mobilization led to unrest in Bohemia, Bardolff was there to pass on stacks of memoranda and telegrams. The tone of his commentary was unrelentingly shrill: there was disloyalty and anti-military sentiment everywhere, and the administration was absolutely passive in the face of subversion—"totally without initiative" in Bardolff's underlined phrase. The information only fed the belief of the archduke and his supporters that the Monarchy must be fundamentally restructured and given a new, firm regime with the army serving as the chief instrument of the Crown.

There had indeed been unrest in Bohemia. Demonstrations supporting Serbia's war against the Ottomans had taken place throughout the autumn of 1912. In two towns--Prerau and Prossnitz--these had dovetailed with local arguments to produce clashes between Czech and German mobs, a pattern that was repeated in Pilsen and Königgrätz in early December. A student mob at Königgrätz had tried to prevent a column of reservists of IR 18 (Königgrätz) from boarding troop trains, and a final total of seventy-eight gendarmes and military police was
required to disperse the crowd. The 8. Dragoons at
Pardubitz and IR 35 (Pilsen) had shown symptoms of
disquiet.\textsuperscript{171}

Yet Bardolff's comments portrayed each incident in
the most hysterical light possible. In July 1913 a
lieutenant Johann Ovcicka of the 11. Uhlans was given a
commendation by the local command for quelling unrest
among a transport of reservists from the 8. Dragoons--
restoring order at the point of a drawn pistol after a
party of reservists had attempted to settle an argument
with the military police by using their sabres.\textsuperscript{172} None
of the reports in Bardolff's files indicated that there
had been any political overtones or that the unrest had
been likely to spread to the rest of the regiment. A
similar incident—a fight between mobilized reservists and
military police—on the quay at Portsmouth or Marseilles
would have been treated as a localized (and likely
drunken) quarrel, the young lieutenant who stopped it
praised, and the officers and NCOs of the offending unit
called on the carpet. Guardhouse time, extra drill, and
company officers packed off to other assignments would
have been the result. Bardolff, and indeed the archduke
and much of the war ministry treated the incident as a
serious mutiny, an incipient rebellion.

The same panic set in when the archduke's staff was
informed by the interior ministry that a planned exchange
of reserve units slated for Bosnia and Dalmatia—an exchange of older for younger reservists—would likely produce demonstrations in I. (Krakow), II. (Vienna), VIII. (Prague), and IX. (Leitmeritz) Korps. The mobilization of older classes, of men with jobs and families, in peacetime, even if during a time of diplomatic crisis, would seem certain to generate unpopularity. The immediate response at the Belvedere was a denunciation of the "passivity" and cowardice of the political authorities in the affected areas. By the end of August 1913 Bardolff was conveying the archduke's demands that local officials be transferred or sacked for lack of firmness and replaced with men of more "energy" or by the military. When in October 1912 an Oberleutnant Ban of IR 53 (Zagreb) joined a group of two dozen local civilians crossing over from the Foca region to join the Montenegrins against the Turks, this became not only a matter of local legend--of Serb k.-u.-k. officers deserting still in uniform to fight at the siege of Scutari--but a matter for enciphered telegrams between XV.Korps command and the Belvedere, where the incident was taken as a harbinger of large-scale desertions.

The spring of 1914 saw the military leadership of the Monarchy trapped inside an increasingly desperate sense of pessimism. Conrad and his operational staff were convinced of the inevitability of a multifront war against
Russia, Serbia, and Italy (and possibly Romania as well), and even with German and Bulgarian aid they did not believe that the Monarchy had any real hope of success in such a war.\textsuperscript{176} Should the old emperor die before war came, Franz Ferdinand's plans were almost certain to result in civil war against Hungary. The failure of military authorities in Sarajevo and Ragusa to hold on to the loyalty of the South Slav population underlined the cost of trying to maintain the status quo. The army itself was only slowly being fleshed out after the passage of the 1912 Army Bill—after more than a decade of Magyar obstruction. The battalions and squadrons were still in a skeletal state, and the costs of the long periods of alarm and mobilization in 1912/13 during the Balkan Wars and the crisis over Albania had cut hard into the army's budget. The disruptions of personal and economic life had seriously sapped the morale of many units, reserve and regular alike. Conrad was terrified that the army—its combat ability, its morale, its stability—was withering away before his eyes.\textsuperscript{177} By mid-1914 Conrad had come to believe that even a catastrophic war was preferable to death by a kind of spiritual and economic evaporation. When war finally came, he wrote that it would be "a hopeless struggle, but it nevertheless must be, for such an ancient monarchy and its army cannot just perish ingloriously."\textsuperscript{178}
The ultimate question for the k.-u.-k. leadership was one of belief. The men of the k.-u.-k. officer corps had devoted themselves to the dynasty and the Monarchy since cadet school and the Theresianum. Their devotion to the dynasty and to the ideal of service was in Istvan Deak’s phrase, "near-religious," and was taken as given, and no more than a handful ever wavered in that devotion. Two-thirds of them were children of public-service families—sons of fathers who were themselves officers or NCOs, or who served in the gendarmerie, the bureaucracy, the state railways, the customs service—which might be transferred throughout the Cisleithanian lands (the whole of the Monarchy, in the case of k.-u.-k. families) and had as Deak says "for all intents and purposes, no nationality." They believed absolutely in the Monarchy, and they identified the army with the Monarchy as a whole. Conrad, Brosch, Auffenberg, Schemua, and Potiorek all believed in a unified, centralized Monarchy imbued with a common will and a common vision of loyalty. A company, a battalion, a regiment, or a division—their success required a strong authority, clear-cut lines of command, and an overarching sense of loyalty to and belief in the group. The model of the nation for the k.-u.-k. officer corps was in the end regimental. The required virtues of the k.-u.-k. officer were the virtues of the military vassal: personal bravery, loyalty to the person
of the liege, devotion to a cause beyond the self. By
1912 the army leadership, as Schemua said, believed itself
alone in society in possessing or admiring those virtues.

When the army leadership looked out at the larger
world, what it saw was a Reichsrat dominated by "anti-
politics," by the eagerness of political factions to
forego any positive gains in order to block the plans of
rivals, a system based on pure defensiveness and abetted
by an administration whose taste for "stability" meant an
avoidance of all conflict and change. In Budapest the
Magyar oligarchy sought either independence or Hungarian
dominance within the Monarchy. Hungarian obstruction had
blocked any reconstruction of the army between 1889 and
1912, and the price of Hungarian assent was that the
Magyars were able to use the army as an instrument of
Magyarization—to force Slovak or Romanian or
Transylvanian Saxon recruits to speak Magyar, to obey the
king, represented by a Diet controlled by the Magyar
oligarchy, and not the emperor, to look to the Hungarian
flag rather than the double eagles of the dynasty. The
army alone stood as the support of the dynasty and the
Monarchy. In 1911 Brosch lamented that

every year in October we conscript men who have,
as often as not, undergone a preliminary training in
nationalist, anti-Austrian atmospheres and have been
educated as irredentists or anti-militarists, or who,
being illiterate, know less than nothing of the
world; and out of such material we have to fashion
intelligent, responsible individuals and enthusiastic, patriotic citizens.\textsuperscript{182}

In the years after the Hungarian crisis, in the last decade before the war, the k.-u.-k. leadership had come to feel that the future offered only a choice of nightmares. Kriegsfall R+I+B(S)—a multifront war where the depleted k.-u.-k. forces faced overwhelming odds—seemed all too likely to occur. Or the vision of Kerchnawe’s \textit{Unser Letzter Kampf} could materialize: predatory neighbors taking advantage of internal conflict to dismember the Monarchy. Or the scenario advanced by Gustav Sieber—a grey, whimpering end where the Monarchy would collapse with slow agony because no one could be bothered to believe. The Monarchy’s military leadership saw themselves as the only force that stood for the unity and future of the realm, and their perceived helplessness drove them deeper into despair, desperation, and a corrosive distrust of the society around them. In the end Conrad contrived to call his own nightmares into being, to involve the Monarchy in a fatal Balkan policy and, finally, in the multifront war he had feared for so long.

The army bill of 1912 had contained a War Services Act that granted the military extraordinary civil and economic authority in time of war\textsuperscript{183} and after 1914 the army would assume control over large areas of the Monarchy, including regions (Bohemia and Croatia) far from
the actual fighting. The policies of the Kriegsüberwachungsamt, the War Supervisory Office, were little different from those tried by Potiorek—a drill-square view of instilling loyalty. The army engaged in bitter political conflicts with the civil administration, which it regarded as flaccid and indulgent, and its policies far too often deepened any existing disaffection.\textsuperscript{184}

In its panic the military wildly overreacted to any incident that might show disaffection. When in the most famous incident of 1914 troops of the 9. Landwehr Infantry and IR 28.(Prague) went off to the front drunk and chanting that they were going to fight the Russians and didn’t know why, the military ignored the fact that both units came from heavily socialist working-class districts and had a long-standing distaste for "being ordered about by the military or any other organ of state"\textsuperscript{185} and the more salient fact that, drunk and unhappy or not, both regiments went off to fight. The military chose to regard all Czechs as suspect even when the all-Czech IR 102 (Beneschau) became one of the first wartime units to be mentioned in despatches.\textsuperscript{186} Any incidents became proof of widespread underlying disaffection and thus proof of the need for stronger and more wide-ranging military control.
Suspicion was not confined to the Czechs. In 1914 both the Italian 97.(Trieste) Infantry and its reserve component, the 5. Landwehr Infantry, went off willingly to war; the 97. saw especially hard fighting in Galicia. Units of LIR 5. and Italian units of the 20. Feldjägers as well as some Italian units of Kaiserjägers, fought with determination against the Italians in 1915/16. This did not prevent the military from evacuating much of the Italian populations of the Tirol to internment camps and brigading Italian troops into special "southwest" units (Südwestbataillone)—less tactfully known as Italienerbataillone or PU (politische—unzuverlässig, "politically-unreliable")-Einheiten.197 The Serb troops of BHIR 1. and 2. were taken from combat formations, disarmed, and sent off to labour battalions. The Serbs, treated nearly as convicts and affronted in martial pride, became ready targets for seditious propaganda and, when combat losses required their return to their units, carriers of disaffection. In contrast, the commander of BHIR 4. retained his Serbs, announced his confidence in his men, and was rewarded with loyal and outstanding service.198

The open unrest that appeared in the Monarchy after 1917 was predicated upon privation and exhaustion, but the policies of the military—panicky, desperate suspicion and heavy-handedness—drove local populations into
disaffection. The irony here is that the k.-u.-k. leadership, convinced that they alone believed in the Monarchy, by treating the administration and the populace as suspect, ended by eroding loyalty. All the plans drawn up to stave off the dissolution conjured up by Kerchnawe only helped bring on the nightmare.

The k.-u.-k. army of 1918 bore little resemblance to the force Conrad led to war in 1914. Norman Stone estimated that of the 900,000 men who had been in uniform at the beginning of August 1914, 845,000 were lost—killed, wounded, captured or invalided home due to disease—by the end of the year. Of fewer than 60,000 officers—career and reserve k.-u.-k., Landwehr, Honvéd, and those who had left the army and were now reactivated—available at the start of the war, 22,310 would become casualties during the final four months of 1914. One-third of the professional officers serving at the outbreak of the war would die—in action, in captivity, or of wounds—during its course. The expansion of the army further diluted the k.-u.-k. officer corps. By October 1918 there were 188,000 serving officers, of whom only 35,000 were career soldiers. The war diluted the ranks of professionals in all the armies—one might consider the change from the small, long-service British army of 1914 to the huge citizen's army that fought for Britain in 1916—but in the Monarchy the change had a
special significance. The officers commissioned to replace the losses of 1914 lacked the k.-u.-k. indoctrination and linguistic skills of the pre-war officer corps, and many brought "national" sentiments to the front with them. Since no reservist was promoted beyond the rank of captain,¹⁹² it would be the "new" officers who were in close daily contact with their troops, who would have to deal with language barriers and national tensions. Such problems were made more complex by losses among the enlisted ranks as well. The losses sustained during the war put an end to the territorial basis of the army; conscripts were brigaded into units without regard for territorial usage. By 1918 Vienna's all-German 4.(Hoch-und-Deutschmeister) Infantry contained 18.5% Italians. Vienna's other regiment, the equally all-German IR 84, would be twenty percent Italian and five Czech. The all-Czech 102.(Beneschau) Infantry would be fourteen percent German; the 55.(Brzezany) Infantry, once ninety-five percent Ruthene, would be twenty-five percent Polish and twelve percent German.¹⁹³

Yet the wartime army held together and fought on, and in the late summer of 1918 the army's standards flew far beyond the Monarchy's borders. The army of the Monarchy outlasted its Russian opponent and very nearly outlasted its German ally. The k.-u.-k. army experienced no disaffection on the scale of the mutinies experienced by
the French army in 1917, nor was the Monarchy faced with nationalist revolts such as the British faced in Ireland in 1916. The army remained loyal during the general strike of January 1918, and seven divisions returned from the front to maintain order in Bohemia and Upper and Lower Austria. The k.-u.-k. leadership only began to employ organized propaganda techniques among the troops during the last six months of the war; the soldiers of the Monarchy had fought for four years on previously unsuspected reserves of loyalty to the emperor-king and to the idea of a fatherland. In the end it was the high command, with its willingness to see disaffection everywhere, that failed to believe, that failed to see that loyalty could exist outside the ranks of k.-u.-k. professionals.

Conrad wrote once that in the Monarchy all other questions were dissolved in the question of the army; by 1914 the military leadership sought to dissolve all other questions by applying the methods of the barracks square. Had Franz Ferdinand survived to become Franz II those methods would have had full reign inside the Monarchy. One can only note that such methods failed in the "model" province of Bosnia in peacetime, and they failed throughout the Monarchy in wartime. Conrad's own sense of desperation led him to advocate bellicose and increasingly fantastic policies which finally involved the Monarchy in
a war Conrad himself believed would only lead to disaster. The conscripts who went off to war in 1914 still possessed strong reserves of loyalty. It was the military leadership and not the rank-and-file which no longer believed in the future of the Monarchy.
Notes to Chapter Five


2. KA, Conrad Archiv, Aphorismen I.


5. Figures in Ibid., xxvii.


9. Ibid., p. 218.


11. KA, Chef der Gen Stab, Evidenz-Büro #N1274/1913. "Resume über die Serbische Armee in Feldzug 1912/13."


18. KA, KM Präs-Büro 1905-7003. Kommandant VII. Korps to RKM.


22. Ibid., 137.


27. Ibid., p. 214.


32. In Regele, Conrad, p. 177.


34. Ibid., p. 76.
35. [Hugo Kerchnawe], Unser Letzter Kampf: Der Vermächtnis eines alten kaiserlichen Soldaten (Vienna-Leipzig, 1907). Photocopy of Kopie Nr. 3 in possession of author.


37. Friedrich von Bernhardi, Deutschland und der Nächste Krieg (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1912); Adolf von Sacken, "Der Zukunftskrieg und die Staatswehr," ÖMZ 38 (1897).


40. Kerchnawe, Unser Letzter Kampf, p. 5.

41. Ibid., p. 1.

42. Ibid., p. 58.

43. Ibid., p. 1.

44. Ibid., p. ii.

45. [Hugo Kerchnawe], Die Vorgeschichte von 1866 und 19-?. Von einem alten kaiserlichen Soldaten. (Vienna-Leipzig, 1909).

46. [Gustav Sieber], Quo vadis Austria? Ein Roman der Resignation. (Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1913).


48. Quoted in Remak, "Invalid," p. 133.


51. Ibid., p. 139.

52. See the official Lehrplan der k.-u.-k. Militär-Akademie (Vienna, 1898); also Istvan Deak, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1990), pp. 87-88.

54. Auffenberg, Aus Österreichs Höhe, p. 39; see also the remarks of Urbanski quoted in Asprey, The Panther's Feast, p. 49.


56. Deak, Beyond Nationalism, pp. 115, 121-23.

57. Ibid., pp. 92-94.


60. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, p. 151.


62. KA, Nachlass Auffenberg B/677, "Herkunft der Offiziere (Beruf der Vater)."

63. Deak, Beyond Nationalism, p. 87.


66. KA, Nachlass Auffenberg B/677, "Uber die Verfassung des Offizierskorps und die Stimmung in demselben," May 1908.

67. Ibid.


70. KA, Gen Stab Op-Büro Fasz. 95, "Denkschrift Ende 1906" and "Denkschrift Ende 1907"; also Denkschrift November 1911/Beilage 2".


73. KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro Fasz. 95, "Militär-Politische Denkschrift Anfangs 1912" pp. 1-3.

74. Ibid., p. 7.

75. Ibid., p. 9.

76. KA, Militärkanzlei Franz Ferdinands (hereafter cited as MKFF) 34/128, "Denkschrift 1912," Schemua to Franz Ferdinand.


78. KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro, F. 5506, 5516, 5581, Jahresberichte über die serbische und montenegrische Armee, annual 1911, 1912, 1913; KA, Gen Stab Op.-Büro F. 5532, "Evidenztableau der Wehrmacht Serbiens."


81. Quoted in Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, p. 144.

82. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, p. 145.

83. See Wank, "Political vs. Military Thinking in Austria-Hungary 1908-1912," p. 3.


85. In Regele, Feldmarschall Conrad, p. 81.


91. See the discussion in Hans-Jürgen Pontenius, Der Angriffsgedanke gegen Italien bei Conrad von Hötzendorf (Cologne-Vienna, 1984).


99. Conrad’s war plans of November 1911 in KA, Akten der MKFF, 1911/81.

100. Quoted in Peball, "Um Das Erbe," 30; Wank, "Conrad von Hötzendorf and his Memoirs," 86.


103. Ibid., p. 65; Conrad Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, 3: 81-82.


106. In Kiszling, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, p. 149.


111. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, p. 142.


117. KA, Nachlass Brosch, B.232/F.1; Sitte, "Alexander von Brosch," pp. 62-64; Funder, From Empire to Republic, p. 101.

118. Morton, Thunder at Twilight, p. 181.


120. Funder, From Empire to Republic, pp. 160-61.

121. Reprinted in Franz, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, pp. 146-47.

123. "Vorschläge für den Fall eines Thronwechsels," reprinted in Ibid., p. 158.


134. Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, p. 162.


137. KA, Gen Stab. Op.-Büro Fasz. 95, Denkschrift Jämmer 1914 (Konzept)" "Operative Divisionen," "Die Reserve-Armee."

138. KA, MKFF 1913 33-12. "Referat über die Prinzipien des nächsten Garnisonwechsels."

139. KA, MKFF 1913 #113 ex. 1913, "Resume" 5/1 1913.
140. See text in Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, 100 Jahre Allgemeine Wehrpflicht in Österreich (Vienna, 1968), pp. 60-62.


143. Lucas, Fighting Troops, p. 140.


145. KA, Nachlass Auffenberg B/677, "Stellung und Aufgaben der Nächsten Kriegsministers."


151. Ibid., p. 65.

152. Ibid.


154. Franz, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, p. 27.


158. KA, Nachlass Auffenberg B/677 Res. Nr. 117, "Die Frage der Konzessionen an der Magyarismus." 1 July 1908.

159. KA, Nachlass Auffenberg B/677, K. I. "Politische Situationen in Annexionsgebiet (Ende 1909)"; "Unsere militär-politischen Situation August 1908 und die bosnische Frage"; "Über die Angliederung der 3 Slavonischen Komitate an Ungarn."


168. See KA, Gen Stab, Akten der Chef des Generalstabes, F. 89/A, Politische Korrespondenz.

169. KA, MKFF 14-1/6-5, Nr. 1627-1913, 1 March 1913.

170. KA, MKFF 14-1/6-5, Nr. 1627, "Information."

171. KA, MKFF 14-1/6-5. Nr. 4951-1.

172. KA, MKSM 1913 57-3/1, Auszug: Präs 1.868-1913.

173. KA, MKFF, 14-1/6-5, Nr. 4951-1913, 15 May 1913.

174. KA, MKFF, 14-1/6-5. Nr. 6922-1913, 29 August 1913.


179. Deak, Beyond Nationalism, p. 91.

180. Ibid., p. 184.


185. Ibid., p. 52.

186. KA, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 1: 46.


189. Deak, Beyond Nationalism, p. 194.

190. KA, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 1: 57; see also KA, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 2: Appendix 3.

191. Deak, Beyond Nationalism, p. 194.

192. Ibid.


In 1848/49 it had been the imperial-royal army that had held the Monarchy together, and throughout the seventy years between the revolutions of 1848 and the dissolution of the Monarchy the army had seen itself as a special institution, one above nationality and loyal to the dynasty and the emperor. Since the days of Prince Eugene, the Monarchy's generals had been well aware of the polyglot nature of the regiments they commanded, but up to 1848 the military leadership paid remarkably little attention to the question of nationality. The Archduke Charles had insisted that there could be no privileged nationalities in the ranks of the army, and in fact the various nationalities were looked on with neither fear nor favor. Regiments were garrisoned throughout the Monarchy with little regard for national origin; the imperial-royal army lacked both the inclination and the resources to operate any coherent system of garrisoning troops away from their homelands.

The events of 1848 made the army's leadership aware of the possibility of national revolt, and throughout the 1850s and 1860s Hungarian units were deliberately kept away from Hungary. Yet Magyar officers continued to be commissioned into imperial-royal service, and there were Magyar officers commanding Magyar troops.
Italian units fought in the campaigns of 1859 and 1866, and their performance, despite later legends of mass disaffection, was by and large loyal. The imperial government was unable to overcome Hungarian political and fiscal obstruction in the 1850s and 1860s, but the imperial-royal army was able to integrate Hungarian recruits and Hungarian regiments into its ranks and instill a sense of common purpose.

The army leadership—exemplified by the Archduke Albrecht—had been unwilling to station Hungarian regiments inside Hungary, but after 1867 both the changed political climate of the Monarchy and its straitened finances meant that such a policy could not be maintained. Throughout the late 1860s and 1870s there was a slow movement of Hungarian regiments back to Hungary. The fears raised by the revolution of 1848 had largely evaporated. No voices were raised in warning, and the creation of the Honvéd, of a "national" Hungarian force provoked little opposition from the military. By 1883, when the army was re-organized on a territorial basis, the loyalty of the army—of regiments of all nationalities—was taken for granted. Opposition to territorialization was based on fears for the army's combat efficiency, not for its political reliability.

Territorialization put the army in direct contact with the nationalities on a daily basis. Yet in the
political unrest that began in the 1890s, the army remained a reliable instrument for maintaining order. It was after all a Honvéd unit that dispersed the Hungarian Diet in 1906. It was not the rank-and-file, but the officer corps itself that began to show signs of disaffection.

The world of the k.-u.-k officer corps became increasingly narrow as the nineteenth century ended. Its members still saw themselves as direct vassals of the emperor, and many of them had no nationality outside the concept of army and regiment. The economic and social position of the officer corps declined relative to both the bureaucracy and the civilian middle classes, and its narrowly technical education meant that the officer corps was increasingly cut off from political and intellectual currents in the Monarchy. They had been trained to be loyal and to be above nationality, and in holding fast to those ideas they came to doubt that any other group in the Monarchy was prepared to be self-sacrificingly loyal.

The k.-u.-k. leadership was all too aware of the army’s material weakness, and they blamed it on political weakness, on a lack of will on the part of the imperial government. In the last years before the war, the army’s leadership began to gravitate to figures who offered the promise of "decisive" action—toward Conrad’s dreams of a war with Italy or Serbia, or toward Franz Ferdinand, who
offered no less unrealistic plans for re-making the Monarchy by a coup in Budapest. In both cases these were the counsels of futility and despair, and Conrad for one was intermittently aware of the lack of realism in his designs. The Monarchy's generals were aware that their special sense of loyalty was not shared outside the ranks of the military, and they could not believe that there was any alternative source of loyalty other than military values. "Action" would, they hoped, force others to once again believe in the Monarchy; the irony is that a policy of the "firm hand"—in Bosnia or in wartime Bohemia—only drove much of the population away from any hope of loyalty.

Archduke Albrecht wrote in the 1880s that the army was the single great link holding the Monarchy together, and that the Monarchy could not survive the break-up of the army. The peoples of the Monarchy surprised the military leadership with their willingness to fight in 1914, with the unexpected depth of their loyalty. Yet the military leadership no longer trusted them, or even trusted its own ability to defend the Monarchy. Albrecht, preparing for the territorial reforms of the 1880s, had said that the strength of the army lay in its ability to use the special characteristics of each nationality to make a greater whole. The men of Conrad's generation were no longer able to envision an army—or a Monarchy—built
along those lines. The demand for an enforced unity had failed for both Ferdinand II and Joseph II; it was no less untenable for Franz Ferdinand and Conrad. The nationalities still had faith in the Monarchy in 1914. It was the k.-u.-k. leadership and not the nationalities that first despaired of the future.
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