4-11-2020

The Differences between Political Islam and the Hizmet Movement in Turkey

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THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POLITICAL ISLAM AND
THE HIZMET MOVEMENT IN TURKEY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by
Fevzi Sarac
B.S., Istanbul University, 2007
M.A., Long Island University, 2015
May 2020
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank everyone who played a role in my academic accomplishments. Especially;

To my lovely wife, Derya, and wonderful daughters, Fatma and Zeynep, who supported me with their love and understanding.

To my parents, Selahaddin and Remziye, for your prayers that I always feel with me.

To my major professor, Dr. Leonard Ray, for your continuous guidance and support during my PhD studies.

To my committee members, Dr. David Sobek, Dr. Daniel Tirone, Dr. Christopher Sullivan, and Dr. Kristin Gansle, for guidance throughout the research process.

Thank you all for your unwavering support.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................. II

LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................... V

LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................... VI

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................... VII

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .................................................. 4
  THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY ................................................................. 4
  THE NUR MOVEMENT ........................................................................... 6
  THE HIZMET MOVEMENT ................................................................. 8
  POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY ............................................................ 11
  THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN TURKEY SINCE 2001 ..................... 14

CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENT ATTITUDES ................................................................. 26
  POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY THEORY ............................................... 26
  RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORIES ........................................ 29
  COMPETITION BASED BUSINESS THEORIES ................................ 31

CHAPTER 4. MAIN ORIENTATIONS OF THE MOVEMENTS ................. 32
  HYPOTHESIS ....................................................................................... 32
  CASE STUDIES .................................................................................... 35
  QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS ............................................. 53
  CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 69

CHAPTER 5. SOCIAL CAPITALS AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF ASSOCIATIONS THAT THE MOVEMENTS PRODUCE ............................................................... 71
  HYPOTHESIS ....................................................................................... 71
  SURVEY ANALYSIS ........................................................................... 76
  CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 96

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 99

APPENDIX A. TIMELINE .......................................................................... 102

APPENDIX B. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS OF TURKEY ...... 104
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. THE ROOT WORDS IN THE DICTIONARY .............................................. 56
TABLE 2. ORIENTATION SCORE BY AFFILIATION ............................................. 59
TABLE 3. REGRESSION MODEL – THE RELATION BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF WORDS IN ENGLISH ARTICLES AND IN TURKISH ARTICLES ..................... 61
TABLE 4. ORIENTATION SCORE BY AFFILIATION, WITH STANDARDIZED LANGUAGE ............................................................................................................ 62
TABLE 5. ORIENTATION SCORES BY CATEGORIES .............................................. 66
TABLE 6. ORIENTATION SCORES BY CATEGORIES WITH STANDARDIZED LANGUAGE ............................................................................................................ 68
TABLE 7. IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION AND POLITICS IN LIFE....................... 78
TABLE 8. THE TRUST LEVELS IN RELATION TO CERTAIN GROUPS............... 82
TABLE 9. MOST PEOPLE CAN BE TRUSTED .................................................... 84
TABLE 10. DO YOU THINK MOST PEOPLE WOULD TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU IF THEY GOT A CHANCE, OR WOULD THEY TRY TO BE FAIR? ................................................................. 84
TABLE 11. NEIGHBORHOOD QUESTIONS ANALYSIS ........................................ 90
TABLE 12. THE OUTCOMES OF THE BELONGING QUESTIONS ANALYSIS..... 94
TABLE 13. HOW PROUD OF NATIONALITY .................................................... 95
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1. ORIENTATION SCORE ................................................................. 58

FIGURE 2. ORIENTATION SCORE BY AFFILIATION ................................. 60

FIGURE 3. REGRESSION MODEL – THE RELATION BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF WORDS IN ENGLISH ARTICLES AND IN TURKISH ARTICLES ............ 61

FIGURE 4. ORIENTATION SCORE BY AFFILIATION, WITH STANDARDIZED LANGUAGE ...................................................................................................................... 62

FIGURE 5. ORIENTATION SCORE BY AFFILIATION, LANGUAGE EFFECT ..... 63

FIGURE 6. ORIENTATION SCORES BY CATEGORIES ................................. 65

FIGURE 7. ORIENTATION SCORES BY CATEGORIES WITH STANDARDIZED LANGUAGE .................................................................................................................. 67
ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the attitudes of two influential social movements in Turkey: the Hizmet movement and political Islam. Historical overview demonstrates that there are continuous and deep attitudinal differences between the movements. I aimed to see the effects of the different attitudes. First, I look how affiliation to a specific movement shape their solution-orientation. Qualitative and quantitative analysis in this research shows that the Hizmet movement follow culture-based solutions while political Islam follows institution-based solutions. Second, I delve into the relationship between affiliation and social capital. The outcomes imply that the Hizmet movement produces bridging social capital whereas political Islam produces bonding social capital.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Social movements are gaining strength and influence in the current globalized environment. In Turkey, two movements have had a substantial effect, becoming increasingly influential segments of the country especially after the 1980s. The idea of political Islam, driven by the National Outlook (Milli Gorus) movement, is now one of the central elements of Turkish politics, and since Turkey is a secular and democratic country, political Islam in Turkey is followed closely by the rest of the world. The Hizmet movement has engaged in educational and non-educational activities in more than 100 countries around the world. As a religion-based transnational movement originating in Turkey, it is also closely globally followed. However, the two groups often strongly criticize one another. These critiques have increased in number in recent years, after confrontations in Turkey resulted in accusations and outrage. Even excluding the contemporary situation, philosophical and strategical differences between these two movements were visible. In this research, I will delve into the attitudes of the movements to see the effects of these differences.

I will first examine the history of the Republic of Turkey, the Nur movement, the Hizmet movement, and political Islam in Turkey. This review will constitute a base for my research because I will glance through the historical background related to the general attitudes of the Hizmet movement and the political Islam to observe how different they are. Then, I will inquire about the possible theoretical explanations on the attitudes of the movements. In this regard, I will go through political opportunities theory, resource mobilization theory, and competition-based business theories. Afterward, I will present my hypothesis.
I will have two hypotheses in regard to the different attitudes of the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey. The first one is about their orientations when they are seeking a social or political change. Two main orientations - cultural and institutional - are salient in political science literature. I argue that the Hizmet movement looked for cultural solutions while the political Islam looked for institutional ones. I will use both a qualitative research method and a quantitative research method to test my argument. I will apply case studies as the qualitative research, and survey analysis as the quantitative research, in this paper.

The second hypothesis explores the relationship between movement affiliation and social capital. I will hypothesize that the movements produced dissimilar social capitals for their followers. The Hizmet movement developed bridging social capital, whereas political Islam in Turkey generated bonding social capital. I will use a quantitative survey analysis to test the hypothesis. The survey analysis includes three categories of questions - trust questions, neighborhood questions, and belonging questions. I will use all three categories to measure social capital in multiple ways. I expect to find similar outcomes though I measure social capital in multiple ways, so my conclusions stand on a strong foundation.

This study will reveal a good amount of knowledge about the different attitudes of the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey. Although the movements are well known globally, their attitudes are not well analyzed in academics. An academic aspect related to their attitudes and a comparison of their attitudes are a need in the literature. Additionally, this study will help to understand the weak points of well-known social movement theories such as political opportunity theory and resource mobilization theory.
Both theories explain some portions of the movement’s attitudes, but fail to give inclusive information to disclose the substantial parts explaining the different attitudes of the movements.
CHAPTER 2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

To understand the two movements and their philosophies and strategies, we must understand their history, as well as the environment in which they developed. For this reason, I provide a short historical background of the Republic of Turkey, as well as the history of the Nur movement, the Hizmet movement, and political Islam in Turkey. I will also highlight the political situation in Turkey since 2001 because the last twenty years, first enhanced the image of alliance between the Hizmet movement and the political Islam, then made the movements each other’s enemy. These years gave us a good amount of historical background about their different attitudes in different situations.1

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

The Republic of Turkey was founded by an Ottoman General, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in 1923, to serve as the successor to the Ottoman Empire. The philosophical direction of the country was moving towards the West, and the new nation followed the theories of modernization in an effort to create a future for its people. Even at the beginning the change was direct and significant; and the Republic of Turkey broke all possible ties with the old regime and traditions (Ozman 2010). The elements of modernization and reform process include abolition of the sultanate (1922), foundation of the republic (1923), elimination of the caliphate (1924), changes in headgear and dress (1925), closure of religious convents and dervish lodges (1925), introduction of the new penal law (1926) and civil code (1926), adoption of the Latin alphabet (1928), presentation of new family law and abolition of titles and by-names (1934), full political

1 See Appendix A for the timeline
rights for women (1934), and inclusion of the principle of laicite in the constitution (1937).

Despite these efforts, the reforms barely infiltrated Turkish society at large. Westernization was embraced by the military, the bureaucracy, and the urban bourgeoisie. The pious masses in rural Anatolia, however, were generally opposed the social and cultural reengineering coming from the top (Taspinar 2012). Nevertheless, civil society’s critique of the reforms was not tolerated and most involved severe state response. Religious groups criticizing the rapid reform process, especially regarding the role of religion in society and the state, and those with different notions of reform also faced an unforgiving state response (Brockett 2006). The Turkish republic hoped to separate religion and state via the unforgiving state responses. Ideologically, the new republic followed a hardcore French style of laicism ("assertive secularism") instead of the American style of secularism ("passive secularism").² The application of aggressive French style laicism in the new republic required limiting the visibility of religion in public life (Kuru 2007). Due to this fact, confrontations between the laicist reformers and different civil society groups has been apparent in the Republic of Turkey since the nation’s very beginning.

In 1946, the single-party regime was ending; the Turkish republic had introduced a multi-party system. This system created opportunities for opposition groups to voice their critiques and offer their own reform ideas. However, the country's democratization

² Kuru (2007) drew a the distinction between “passive secularism” and “assertive secularism,” arguing that assertive secularists are dominant in France and Turkey whereas they are marginal in the United States. He defined two characteristics of assertive secularism. First, “the state excludes religion from the public sphere,” and second it “plays an assertive role as the agent of a social engineering project that confines religion to the private domain.” Conversely, passive secular states like the United States allow religion to be publicly visible, but avoid the official establishment of any religion by playing a passive role.
process was interrupted by military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980, as well as a military memorandum in 1997.\(^3\) The Turkish military is seen as the protector of the constituent formation of the Republic and the representative of secular establishment. Therefore, it has been at the center of Turkish politics by “setting balances,” as needed.

**THE NUR MOVEMENT**

The Nur movement blazed the trail for the Hizmet movement. Thus, I discuss the Nur movement as a means of better understanding the main philosophical and strategic attitudes of the Hizmet movement.

Said Nursi was the pioneer behind the Nur movement. He was an influential Muslim scholar who supported the republicanism and constitutionalism during the Ottoman era. He was active in politics at the end of the Ottoman Empire. His political opinions and activities grew more visible after he came from the East to Istanbul, the capital of the Empire. He presented some projects to Sultan Abdulhamid the Second, but was not successful in convincing him to adopt them. Instead, Nursi was alienated by the Sultan’s inner circle. Later, he was put on trial after the Ottoman countercoup of 1909 against the liberal reform movement. Afterward, he fought against the Russian army and became a prisoner of war in Russia for over two years, during World War I between 1916 and 1918 (Sahiner 2016).

At the end of the Empire, Turkey was at the risk of becoming a sort of a Western colony. Nursi was one of the Muslim scholars who stood against the British occupation

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\(^3\) Candar (1999, 1997) called the memorandum a “postmodern coup.” The memorandum refers to the National Security Council meeting’s decisions on 28 February 1997 that initiated the resignation of the prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, and ended his coalition. Because Turkish military leadership upended the government without dissolving the parliament or suspending the constitution, it has been called a “postmodern coup.”
of Istanbul and supported Mustafa Kemal’s efforts to mobilize the people for the war of independence. When certain Muslim scholars issued a statement criticizing Mustafa Kemal’s efforts to redirect the sympathies of the Turkish people toward the new mobilization effort, Nursi advocated for Turkish deployment against foreign powers (Celik 2000). The Turkish Parliament (majlis) was founded in 1920, and Nursi was among the people who had been invited to the new majlis in Ankara.

He subsequently became critical of the direction the new country was taking, but his method of objection changed in these years. He explained his change by identifying the past as the “old Said era,” and stated that the “new Said” followed a faith and Quran service without being in politics (Nursi 2011, 436-651).

The old Said was both an Islamic scholar and a political activist who had ideas about how best to reform his country. He defined Muslim majority countries as backward, and described three main problems - ignorance, poverty, and disunity - in Muslim society (Nursi 1996a, 102; 1996b, 69; 2019, 74). One of his major projects was opening a university in the Kurdish region of the Empire. The university would offer both spiritual and scientific educations. Kurdish, Turkish, and Arabic would all be languages of education at the university (Nursi 2019, 173-175). The school would strive for a peace between science and religion, as well as promote a peace between Turks, Kurds, and Arabs. To achieve his goals, he met with politicians and influential leaders, delivered sermons, wrote articles in newspapers, and mobilized the people. His influence as a political activist was apparent, and an effective part of his life and methodology.

Nursi gave up political activism in the new Said era. Even during World War II, he refused to read newspapers or follow current events (Nursi 2011, 250-253). In this era,
he focused on writing and praying, and he rarely met with the masses.\(^4\) He encouraged his followers not just to read his writings but also to write and distribute them to others. His methodology changed from political activism to creating a consciousness via his writings. His followers were eager to read, write, and share his works to help him create this new consciousness. He was willing do this to initiate a more conscious and deliberative generation.

Despite Nursi giving up active politics, he was held in compulsory exiles or imprisoned between 1924 and 1956, due to his ideas and/or activities that were interpreted as against the secular Turkish republic. Even though he was either in exile or in prison, he continued to mobilize the community into what is called the Nur movement. This movement focused on faith and social issues and was very careful not to be a direct part of politics. Nursi stated that he took “refuge in Allah from the Satan and politics”(Nursi 2011). The methodology of the movement was to create a consciousness of values, as well as religious and social issues, without being active in politics.

According to a New York Times article on Nursi’s death in 1960, the number of his followers were estimated at one million (Saritoprak 2008). This mobilization reached all the way to Fethullah Gulen, who would one day be a pioneer of the Hizmet movement, when he resided in a small city named Erzurum in the eastern part of Anatolia.

**THE HIZMET MOVEMENT**

Fethullah Gulen encountered the Nur movement in the 1950s when he was a student in a religious school in Erzurum, Turkey. He was impressed by its philosophy and

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\(^4\) The Turkish state had a role on this. The Turkish regime put limitations on Nursi not to meet with people (Nursi 2019, 822-824).
the structure, so he became a follower. During the following years, the influence of Said Nursi has continued to become one of the main sources behind Fethullah Gulen’s philosophy, though the Hizmet movement eventually departed from the Nur movement, and became its own distinct entity (Yavuz 2013). The Hizmet movement attempted to initiate social change without directly taking part into politics, much like the Nur movement.

Gulen moved from Erzurum to Edirne when he was twenty. He became an official imam in Edirne and Kirsehir before he was appointed to preach in Izmir, a major city in the western part of Turkey known for its strong secular identity. In Izmir, he sowed the seeds of the Hizmet movement. His influence increased as he preached regularly in different cities around western Turkey (Mercan 2019; Pahl 2019).

After the 1971 coup, Gulen was imprisoned because of his increasing influence, which had come to the attention of the young country’s establishment skeptical of any non-state organization. He was released after several months because the state decided that he wouldn’t use his influence against it. However, we will see that both Gulen and his followers have always been considered suspicious by the hardcore secular establishment.

The 1970s were chaotic years in Turkey. Students on the left and right clashed with one another regularly. In this atmosphere, the Hizmet movement highlighted how unnecessary the chaos was, and how it was creating a disastrous road map for the young. The movement organized seminars, conferences, and reading clubs, opened student houses and dormitories, and strongly reacted against violent student confrontations and protests during those years. These were all part of the movement’s non-political
approach. Gulen described the same problems of ignorance, poverty, and disunity that Nursi did, and following Nursi’s methodology, raised consciousness and emphasized values that fought against these conflicts. However, there is a major difference between the Nur movement and the Hizmet movement. Nursi did not have the opportunity to create foundations and institutions when laicist Turkey was being established. On the other hand, Gulen would have some limited opportunities to do so in the following years. Thus, he would encourage people to open schools and educational institutions to fight ignorance, found charity organizations to combat poverty, and create spaces for open dialogue to battle disunity and polarization. The Hizmet movement pursued this kind of activities in times of opportunities during the chaotic 1970s. Though the movement was against any form of violence (and even non-violent protests) due to its philosophy and methodology, an arrest warrant was issued for Gulen after the 1980 coup and he had to go into hiding for six years, until the coup had lost its impact.

After the coup lost its influence on Turkish politics, a new era started for Turkey. The political and economic liberalization at the end of the 1980s created opportunities for social movements. The Hizmet group increased its influence by opening schools and dormitories in different parts of the country, becoming more and more influential in those years, especially among young people. By the beginning of the 1990s, the movement could encourage hundreds of devoted young people to open new schools in central Asia after the USSR collapsed. The Hizmet movement has had a transnational influence after these years, while also increasing its impact on a national level.

As the number of schools, university preparation centers, and dormitories increased, the movement also organized events to promote dialogue in Turkey in the
1990s. The first dialogue dinner was organized by Journalists and Writers Foundation\(^5\) in 1994. There were people of different ideologies, religions, and backgrounds in the audience, and Gulen underscored the importance of a secular state respectful of religion. He also highlighted the importance of democracy by stating that “there is no return from democracy.” This speech was received negatively by political Islamists. However, Gulen repeatedly restated his position in the following years (Mercan 2017, 1-56).

Turkey faced another military intervention in 1997, while the movement was increasing its influence via these dialogue-promoting events. Gulen’s ideas about democracy and secularism were not enough for the secular state-formation. After the 1997 military intervention, oppression toward the Hizmet movement increased. In 1999, Gulen came to the United States for a heart operation. While there, a court case was opened against him by an Ankara Security Court Prosecutor. Thus, he decided to remain in the United States and not return to Turkey. Though the Ankara High Criminal Court acquitted him in 2006 and this decision was approved by the Supreme Court of Appeals in 2008, Gulen never returned to Turkey and has lived in Pennsylvania since 1999 (Harrington 2011).

**POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY**

Turkey introduced the multiparty system in 1946. This system created avenues for political participation. Even though it was only in a limited sense, the role of religion in politics and society began to be discussed more openly. Political Islam in Turkey established its roots in these years.

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\(^5\) Gazateciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı (GYV) in Turkish
Between 1946 and 1961, there were only two major political parties in Turkey. One presented itself as the representative of the establishment and the state ideology, the Republican People Party, and the other was the opposition party, the Democrat Party. All opposition groups came together under the same party name, despite individual differences. After the 1961 coup, the Democrat Party was banned, and a new party, the Justice Party, was established. However, this new party was not an umbrella party like the Democrat Party. Different political orientations tended to establish their own parties in these years, so political Islam in Turkey found its institutional grounds.

Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of political Islam in Turkey, was a successful engineer who took an interest in politics. He first founded the National Outlook movement in 1969, and then the National Order Party in 1970. The party was looking for support especially from religious groups that had been oppressed by and objected to the laicist formation of Turkey. While founding his party, he visited Fethullah Gulen to ask for support from the Nur (or the Hizmet) movement. Erbakan visited Gulen in 1969, when he was staying with some of his students at a retreat camp. He argued that politics was the best way to serve the people, so groups like Gulen’s should support him in his political endeavors. Erbakan’s effort was unsuccessful. Gulen rejected his request for support of political Islam and clearly restated his nonpartisan approach to politics and the antipolitical strategy embraced by the movement (Mercan 2019, 82-86).

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6 Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)  
7 Demokrat Parti (DP)  
8 Adalet Partisi (AP)  
9 Milli Görus Hareketi  
10 Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP)  
11 I use the name “Nur” for this movement because the distinction between the Hizmet and Nur movements was unclear in these years.
The party changed its name to the National Salvation Party (NSP) after the 1971 coup.\textsuperscript{12} During the 1970s, political Islam became an influential player in Turkish politics. The party was a coalition member during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. First student protests, then political violence and ideological confrontations were a part of the politics of the late 1970s. These chaotic years resulted in a coup in 1980. A meeting organized by the NSP six days before that coup was believed to be one of the events that triggered the coup.\textsuperscript{13}

After the 1980 coup, all political parties (including the NSP) and all political party leaders (including Necmettin Erbakan) were banned from politics. When the smoke from the coup had cleared, a new party called the Welfare Party\textsuperscript{14} (WP) was established; Erbakan became the leader in 1987.

A new political leader, Turgut Ozal, arose in the post-coup era. He came to power after the military regime, championing economic and political liberalization programs from the end of the 1980s to the beginning of 1990s. The WP took advantage of new political opportunities brought about by the liberalization process. In 1994, the WP achieved substantial successes in local (municipal) elections. It won elections in the most populous city, Istanbul, and the capital city, Ankara. This success continued through the 1995 national elections. The WP took 21\% of all votes in this election, more than any other party. They led the coalition that ran Turkey until 1997. However, Erbakan was forced to resign after months of oppression brought about by the 1997 military memorandum (i.e., the February 28 post-modern coup) and the coalition dispersed in

\textsuperscript{12} Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP) in Turkish
\textsuperscript{13} The name of the meeting was the “Saving Jerusalem and National Youth Walk and Meeting.” Israel announced Jerusalem as the capital of Israel on July 23, 1980. The National Salvation Party protested Israel’s action from Konya, Turkey.
\textsuperscript{14} Refah Partisi (RP) in Turkish
June of 1997. The WP was shut down by the Constitutional Court and Erbakan was banned from politics in 1998.

The political Islamists in Turkey were ready for the negative Constitutional Court decision. A new party, the Virtue Party (VP), appeared immediately in the political arena. Nevertheless, the Turkish military was continuing to control Turkish politics. In this environment, tensions among political Islamists became more visible. Both conservatives and progressives in the party were trying to structure the future of political Islam in Turkey. Though both were banned from politics, the conservatives were led by Erbakan, whereas the progressives were led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After the Constitutional Court shut down the VP in 2001, the conservatives and progressives started two separate parties. While the conservatives founded the Felicity Party, the progressives organized the Justice and Development Party (JDP).

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN TURKEY SINCE 2001

The JDP was founded as an umbrella party and rejected being called an Islamist party. “We took off our National View movement’s shirts” was the new motto of the JDP’s Islamist leaders (Haber7.com 2007; Milliyet 2003). In addition to politicians representing the progressive wing of the political Islam (such as Erdogan, Abdullah Gul, and Bulen Arinc in the VP), some politicians at the center-right (such as Cemil Cicek, Abdulkadir Aksu, Huseyin Celik, Koksal Toptan, and Kursat Tuzmen) and center-left (such as Ertugrul Gunay and Reha Camuroglu) were among the founders of the new party. The JDP defined itself as a “conservative democratic party” (Taspinar 2012). It supported democratic reforms, accession to the European Union, and a liberal economic

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15 Fazilet Partisi (FP) in Turkish
16 Saadet Partisi (SP) in Turkish
17 Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP or AK Parti) in Turkish
agenda. After the 2001 economic crisis\textsuperscript{18} and political emergencies of the coup era, the JDP presented a new road map to Turkish society. This road map was highly recognized among liberals, the business community, and the middle class. The Hizmet movement was among the groups valuing this road map though its support was not explicit due to the movement’s non-partisan political strategy. The JDP won the election in 2002 with 34.28\% of the votes, and has ruled the country ever since. While the JDP was becoming an influential player in Turkish politics, the Felicity Party received only 2.49\% of the votes and no seats in the parliament.

During the first term of the JDP government, the political and economic reforms bore fruit. Both political and economic indicators were positive during these years, and Turkey progressed through the steps for EU accession.\textsuperscript{19} Despite these positive indicators, both the Hizmet movement and the political Islam were facing difficulties. Gulen was dealing with political trials (Harrington 2011), and the JDP was struggling to prove itself as a non-Islamic party. In 2007, the shadow of hardcore secular establishment on Turkish politics was once again becoming apparent. When parliamentarians decided to select the new president of the country, Abdullah Gul’s wife was critiqued for wearing a headscarf. Gul was the JDP presidential candidate, and his Islamic background touched a nerve regarding the constitutive state’s formation and triggering secular fears throughout the country.

\textsuperscript{18} The economic downturn in Turkey resulted in a historical crisis in 2001. In that year, GDP growth fell to -5.7\%, down from 3.8\% the previous year (2000). The Consumer Price Index increased by 54.9\% year-to-year. The Turkish lira was devalued, depreciating 51\%. Real wages were reduced by 20\%, and unemployment rates increased significantly (Uckun and Doerr 2010).

\textsuperscript{19} See Appendix B for “freedom rating,” and “aggregate freedom score” of Freedom House in addition to GDP per capita between 1998 and 2019 in Turkey to have a sense about the general trend.
At this time, the Turkish Army released an e-memorandum and intervened in the political process one more time. The JDP deputies had an absolute majority (more than half of the deputies were JDP members), so they were sufficient in number to elect the new president in the second round. However, the Constitutional Court decided to cancel the first-round parliamentary election because the number of deputies in the election was lower than the qualified majority (two thirds of the deputies). The Republican People Party (RPP) boycotted the parliamentary vote to ensure that the number would not be sufficient to have a qualified majority. Thus, the election process was deadlocked.

The country went to a national election in this situation. The debate around the parliamentary voting for the presidency and the protests (i.e., the Republic Meetings) organized by the RPP to defend the secular formation of the country framed the main political discussions during the campaign period. The JDP got 46.58% of the votes perceived an electoral win against the secular establishment. However, the number of JDP deputies decreased from 351 to 341, despite the percentage of votes increasing, because of the Turkish election system. Now, there were three parties in addition to 22 independent deputies in Turkish Parliamentary. This new distribution gave the JDP the

20 The Turkish constitution required a qualified majority (367 of the 550 votes) to elect the president in the first round. If no one was elected, a simple majority (275 of the 550 votes) would be sufficient to elect the president in the second round.

Sabih Kanadoglu, once the attorney general of Turkey’s High Court of Appeals, argued that a qualified majority is also needed as a meeting requirement in the first round. It means that 367 representatives had to be in the parliament to have a meeting for the first round. Abdullah Gul’s presidency was questioned by secular groups because of his political background. Sabih Kanadoglu’s argument became an unprocurable option for the opposition to deadlock the process.

The date of the first round was April 27, 2007. The RPP did not participate in the voting. Gul received 352 of the 357 votes. After the election, the RPP objected to the results, and the Supreme Court canceled the first round. Because the first round was canceled, there was no second round. Thus, the election process was deadlocked.

21 The threshold in Turkey is 10%. This high threshold is the reason for the substantial change in seats. In the 2002 national elections, just two parties succeeded to receiving more than 10%. There
ability to maneuver. Gül was elected as the president of Turkey in the third round by the new parliament. Then, the JDP offered a constitutional change to prevent the problem of deadlock in future presidential elections. After this constitutional change, not the parliament but rather the people would directly elect the president. In these tense days, the Hizmet movement supported the JDP against the secular establishment. Though their support was not explicitly declared, Hizmet-affiliated media outlets and individuals explicitly showed their reactions against the status quo and stood by the JDP.

The 2007 election was not the end of the tension, but rather the beginning of more salient ones. The JDP faced a closure case in 2008. The closure request was made by Turkey’s chief prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, and failed by only one vote in the Constitutional Court. The accusation was violating the separation of religion and state in Turkey by lifting the headscarf ban at universities. To ban a party, seven of the 11 judges were required to vote in favor of closure. In this case, six of the 11 voted in favor of the JDP’s closure. In addition, 10 of the 11 agreed that the JDP had become “a center of anti-secular activities.” Therefore, the decision was made not to shut down the party, but to reduce state funds being distributed to the party rather. This incident underscored how weak the JDP’s position was in the upper tiers of the bureaucracy. Secular establishment was holding on to the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy, controlling the political arena even though they’d lost some political power via elections.

At this point, the Hizmet movement was becoming more important for JDP. Though it had not declared a party identity or political ideology, there had been Hizmet-

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were five parties that received between 5% and 10%. In the 2007 national elections, three parties received more than 10%. Additionally, Kurdish nationalist and socialist parties contested the elections as independents, in order to bypass the 10% threshold. They received 22 deputies. Hence, the number of JDP deputies decreased though the percentage of JDP votes increased in the 2007 national elections comparing to the previous national election.
inspired bureaucrats, and their numbers were on the rise because of the movement’s ongoing educational efforts for years. More importantly, they were prone to act in favor of any political party without looking at the name or ideology. Additionally, their conservative identity eased their support of these bureaucrats for the JDP’s policies. The JDP put these bureaucrats on the friend list, but they did not become the fully trusted ones due to their non-political visions. Because political Islamists had not yet had the opportunity to develop a bureaucratic power, Hizmet-inspired bureaucrats got the political support and became influential in the years. On the other side of the story, the Hizmet movement was generally positioned next to the JDP in the same years because of the EU accession process, decisions in favor of democratic rights (especially for Kurds and religious groups), and the ongoing tensions between the hardcore secular establishment (which the movement defines as status quo) and conservative segments of the Turkish society.

After 2008, the political tension in the country changed its direction. At this time, we started seeing court cases against military officers. Even high ranking generals were standing trial for plotting against the Turkish government and creating a “deep state” clandestine network (Unver 2009). The Ergenekon trials began in 2008.22 In subsequent years, new cases were opened, and all of the cases were merged in 2012. The trials were at the center of Turkish politics, and increased the level of polarization in the country. On

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22 The Ergenekon trials were high-profile trials. 275 suspects, including military generals, journalists, academics, and politicians, were accused of forming an organization called Ergenekon and plotting against Turkish government. The trials started in 2008, and 23 indictments were revealed between 2008 and 2013. The verdict was declared on August 5, 2013, and most of the suspects were convicted to lengthy imprisonments including lifetime ones. After 2013 corruption investigations, many of the convicts were released. A retrial were declared in 2016 after the verdict in the trials were annulled. In 2019, the court stated that “no such organization had existed” and the suspects were acquitted (Ahvalnews 2019; Al Jazeera 2013).
July 4, 2008, Deniz Baykal, the leader of the RPP, responded to rumors that he was acting like the defendants’ attorney, stating:

I am honored to be the advocate of the victims, the oppressed, all the people whose rights have been violated and whose human rights have been abused. Seem like the prosecutor in this case [Ergenekon] is the Prime Minister. If the prosecutor in this case is the Prime Minister, the attorney will be Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition party (T24 2016).

Twelve days later the leader of the JDP, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated in a public meeting:

While the legal process is still ongoing, to be an attorney for illegal structures that have been investigated for allegedly plotting against the democratic political process is just an ovation of a political philosophy that has a weak belief in a democratic state of law. … Our nation follows this closely and evaluates accordingly. Because, it is important to see that who is the attorney of whom. While we have not assigned any positions to ourselves, thankfully they give us the duty of prosecution. That's a good thing. Why? Prosecutors work on behalf of the nation. The prosecution is there on behalf of the nation. … We also strive to defend and seek the truth and justice on behalf of the nation. If the prosecutor is defined in this sense, yes, I'm the prosecutor” (T24 2016).

As it is seen in these speeches, both sides created strong positions and consolidated their bases that relied on these positions, so political and ideological polarization became a side of Ergenekon cases. In 2010, while these trials were going on and the polarization was increasing, a number of constitutional changes were at the center of Turkish politics. The changes included several amendments regarding economic and social rights, individual freedoms, judicial reforms, coup leaders, and investigation of military officers. In April and May of 2010, the Turkish parliament voted for these constitutional reforms, which passed because the JDP had a sufficient majority. However, the RPP applied to the Constitutional Court to review these reforms. The court partially accepted the RPP’s concerns and subjected them to a public referendum on September 12, 2010. The reforms passed by 58% of the votes in September of 2010.
During the referendum, the Hizmet movement explicitly demonstrated that it was pro-reform. Hizmet volunteers had become active supporters of the constitutional changes during the campaign. Fethullah Gulen himself also encouraged people to support the changes and vote “yes” in the referendum. Some Hizmet volunteers even came to Turkey from other countries just to vote. The movement played an active role during the campaign (which was an unusual strategy for the movement). On August 2, Gulen communicated a clear message of support for the constitutional reforms and the movement’s ideas about politics. In a video sermon, Gulen stated:

Unfortunately, the constitutional amendment could not be prepared to satisfy the needs of our country, which is a European Union candidate and has made new initiatives in the Middle East. However, even if we say 'unfortunately' in terms of not being able to do what needs to be done, even one or two article changes aimed at preventing some executioners and different status quos is very important. You should make not just women, men, and … people who live all over the world with their families, but also, if it is possible, the people in their graves vote ‘yes’ in the referendum, because it is a very important step in the name of democracy.

Some politicians may be considering taking advantage of the referendum on their own account. However, I evaluate the issue by looking at whether it's useful to the nation or not. In this respect, it is necessary not to see the referendum politically and to approach it from the perspective of what the nation will gain. To portray the referendum only as an occasion to clean up the dirt of the 1980 coup and to settle with the coup plotters is not true. It is wrong to think that revenge will be taken from the putschists in this way. Believers cannot seek revenge. In this package, there are very important items for the future of our nation. In this respect, the amendment package should be supported in this aspect and 'yes' votes should be given with such intention.

We still stand at the same distance from every party. We did not say to anybody to ‘join a specific party, show up at rallies, be the applause of a party in the streets.’ Standing at a distance does not prevent us from voting on some issues that we find appropriate for the fate of our nation. This nation has supported whoever exhibited good things and who did good works. Actually, the supported one is not a person or a party, it is actions. Said Nursi, who was far away from worldly things and stayed distant from politics as much as saying ‘I take refuge in Allah from Satan and politics,’ voted when it was appropriate, and even said ‘I used … that party.’ Yes, we stand distant from all parties. However, to use our votes in a place that we believe will do good things for the future of Turkey is different from standing distant. (M. F. Gulen 2010)
The effect of the referendum continued through Turkey’s national election in 2011. While the influence of the Hizmet movement was visible (despite not being explicitly declared), the JDP received 49.83% of the votes in the national election. These two years enhanced the image of an alliance between the JDP and the Hizmet movement. However, the differences between these two would become visible soon, and by 2012 would continue to increase until both groups drew clear lines to separate themselves from one another.

On February 7, 2012, the head of the Turkish Intelligence Agency (MIT), Hakan Fidan, and two chief MIT administrators were called by a prosecutor to testify. Erdogan stepped in and did not allow Fidan and other MIT personnel to bear testimony. Ten days after the testimony crisis, the Turkish parliament passed a law requiring that the permission of the Prime Minister be given before an investigation of MIT personnel could be initiated. Though Erdogan did not state this in public, he and the party held the movement responsible for the crisis, accusing the prosecutors of Hizmet connections. Hizmet’s discourse against this kind of accusation was limited to reminding the public of their principles, and that this discourse would continue in the future. These principles underscore the right of Hizmet-inspired people to be a part of the bureaucracy, hold influential positions, and be protected by the rule of law. The principles also assert that bureaucrats should not be judged by their identity or lifestyle.

Beyond these principles, the movement did not declare an explicit position. However, Hizmet-affiliated writers and media outlets argued that no one, including the head of MIT, is above the law, and therefore anyone can be investigated. They asserted that the prosecutors are also not above the law, so they should also be judged if their
accusations are false or has a political motivation. However, none of the actions were related to the Hizmet movement, even if a bureaucrat privately followed a Hizmet lifestyle according to them (Ukraynahaber.com 2012). The philosophical differences were becoming more visible in these days, and Hizmet-connected bureaucrats were already beginning to lose their positions in state institutions. They began appearing on blacklists even as Erdogan invited Gulen to the country on June 16, 2012 during a Turkish Olympiad organized by the movement. Erdogan demonstrated a welcoming attitude in front of 100,000 people in a stadium in Istanbul (Mercan 2019, 266-267). The welcoming invitation at the time of publicly-unknown conflict may be interpreted in two ways. First, Erdogan tried to bury the conflict between his party and the Hizmet movement in public sphere not to lose any level of support. Second, Erdogan invited Gulen in order to get him under control in Turkey. As a former speechwriter of Erdogan states, the invitation was apparently a political maneuver rather than a sincere message (Aydin Unal 2016). Hence, the welcoming attitude does not mean that there were not apparent philosophical differences in these days between the movements.

About a year later, Erdogan and his government faced big protests (i.e. Gezi Park protests). Erdogan’s reaction was hard. He discredited the protestors by his actions like calling them “a handful marauders” and “drunkards,” accusing them of drinking alcohol in a mosque and attacking a woman in a head scarf and her child on the street. At the same time, police officers began using excessive force against protesters (Gurcan and Peker 2014; Orucoglu 2015). Despite the protests beginning as peaceful demonstrations, in time they became marginalized. In the course of a few weeks, there were demonstrations in 80 out of 81 cities, with 3,611,208 people participating in 5,532
protests. More than 7,500 protestors were injured, five protestors lost their lives, three remained in critical condition, 63 were severely injured, 106 suffered from severe head trauma, and 11 lost their sight. The police used 3,000 tons of water and 150,000 gas bombs against protestors (Gurcan and Peker 2014; Onbasi 2016). In these days, the movement did not take a clear side but in a video sermon Gulen stated “don’t say marauders to them,” criticizing Erdogan’s wordings and strategy of polarization.

Before the heavy smoke of the Gezi protest had subsided, a new crisis appeared in Turkish politics at the end of 2013. This new conflict was directly between the Hizmet movement and the JDP; it has since been called “the prep school crisis.” The JDP was preparing an education bill that would shut down all prep schools. Hizmet volunteers were very active in education, and the movement was responsible for around 1,000 prep schools in operation. The movement leaders interpreted the bill as an action against its active role in education, and explicitly reacted against it. As the debates on the bill were at their most intense, the 2013 corruption investigations erupted. Erdogan’s son and the sons of four Turkish ministers became suspects in investigations dated on December 17 and December 25, 2013. Erdogan blamed the Hizmet network for these investigations, and called such inquiries “a coup against its government.” He referred to the movement as “a parallel state.” The positions of the judges, prosecutors, and police officers related to these investigations changed immediately. Erdogan targeted the movement in public, when the movements criticized the Erdogan regime and supported the corruption investigations explicitly.

23 In 2012-2013 educational year, there was 3858 prep schools in total in Turkey. 51,522 teachers were working in prep schools, and they have 1,280,297 students (Gumus 2014).
In this environment, the local elections held on March 30, 2014 became a clear indicator to see the people’s reaction for the corruption investigations. After the Turkish people showed their support for Erdogan and his party in the election, oppression of the Hizmet movement increased. The Erdogan regime openly used state power against the movement in a variety of ways. Until July 2016, the Erdogan regime conducted irregular but frequent administrative audits of Hizmet-affiliated and connected schools, foundations, and businesses. After a period of terror and accusations of a parallel state, new anti-Hizmet boards were appointed to many institutions, including the Zaman newspaper, Samanyolu broadcasting group, and Ipek media group. Additionally, during this period, people influential in the movement were investigated and some of them even imprisoned. Other than holding several non-violent protests, the movement’s reaction was limited in following judicial processes, using the power of the media, and writing letters and articles. Even these actions lost their influence when the regime appointed new boards to Hizmet-affiliated media groups, eliminating the effect of the media and regularly intervening in the judicial processes.

As July 2016 drew to a close, the Erdogan regime was in full control of his fight against the movement. However, the regime’s actions were limited because the movement was protected by law. On July 15, 2016, Turkey experienced one of its most catastrophic nights in the form of a coup attempt. Erdogan blamed the Hizmet movement and called the coup attempt “a gift from God” at the early times, and asked the people to take to the streets. More than two hundred people lost their lives that terrible night. Beginning the next day, hundreds of thousands of alleged Hizmet-affiliated people were purged from state institutions. Thousands of schools, media outlets, and foundations were
shut down due to their connection to the Hizmet movement.\textsuperscript{24} State of emergency was declared after the coup attempt, and the rule of law faded. Therefore, these purges and further oppressions could be done without due processes and procedural guarantees (Asylum Research Consultancy 2017, 66-74).

\textsuperscript{24} Between July 15, 2016 and March 4, 2019, 150,348 people were dismissed, 500,654 were investigated, and 96,885 were arrested. In the same time period, 3,003 schools, dormitories, and universities were shut down. Additionally, 6,021 academics lost their jobs, 4,463 judges and prosecutors were dismissed, 189 media outlets were closed, and 319 journalists arrested due to their Hizmet affiliation. In addition, kidnapping, torture, and other mistreatment became prevalent in Turkey (turkeypurge.com 2019).
CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENT ATTITUDES

The historical review revealed different attitudes between the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey in various eras and under multiple conditions. Two major theoretical perspectives, political opportunity and resource mobilization, are widely used in the literature to explain the attitudes of social movements. In this section, I first introduce political opportunity theory and then discuss resource mobilization theory. However, both perspectives are inadequate to describe the variance between the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey. In addition to these two well-known social movement theories, I explore competition-based business theories to determine if they can be used as a theoretical base for this research. Competition-based theories would be a good explanation if the differences were temporary and were not deep philosophically. However, the differences in various era and under multiple conditions demonstrated that they are neither temporary nor artificial. Thus, I conclude that a wider theoretical perspective is necessary for this study.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY THEORY

Political opportunity theory prioritizes the role of political opportunities and constraints for social movements. Eisinger (1973) first used political opportunity theory to explain the increasing rate of riots in the 1960s in the United States (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). He claimed that increased acceptance of participation during the era created political opportunities in the US, so some American cities experienced increased rates of riots at that time.
Then, McAdam's (1982) study of civil rights movements suggested that political opportunities increased after changes in demographics, levels of repression, migration, and the American political economy, and these improved political opportunities which resulted in a more active African American society.

Tarrow (1998) also emphasized the importance of political opportunities, arguing that contention was more closely related to political opportunities and constraints than social and economic factors because the opportunities and constraints produced crucial information for movement formation by revealing allies and exposing enemy weaknesses.

The history of the Republic of Turkey presents a good amount of political opportunities and constraints for the social movements based on circumstances. The restrictions in the coup eras created difficulties as a constraint, and also created a demand coming from the society. Social movements that fulfilled the demand also used the demand as an opportunity. However, both the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey have experienced similar constraints and opportunities in the same eras. Both groups took advantage of the opportunities and managed to eliminate the repercussions of the constraints, so they could increase their influence in years.

To look at the environment after the 1980 coup era will present a good example. During the coup era both groups had limited ability (close to none) to mobilize people or to play an active role in the society. In this era both groups managed to keep their social base from diffusion. After the coup era the demand for political liberalization and Ozal reforms created opportunities for the social movements. The movements took advantage of these opportunities and became one of the most prominent elements in Turkish society.
in the second half of the decade. These prominent elements became one of the most influential segments of the society in the 1990s. The effect of Ozal reforms on these two social movements is analyzed by several scholars including Kilinc (2013) and Rabasa and Larrabee (2008). Kilinc (2013) highlighted that the economic and political liberalization occurring in Turkey in the 1980s created opportunities for the Hizmet movement, and the movement took advantage of these opportunities. Rabasa and Larrabee (2008), on the other hand, prioritized the role of Ozal’s reforms as a political opportunity that caused the rise of political Islam in Turkey. In short, scholars have used political opportunity theory to explain the rise of both the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey. However, political opportunities cannot account for the differences between the Hizmet movement and political Islam, basically because the movements share the same opportunities at the same time.

1997 postmodern coup era provides also a good example to analyze the reliability of the political opportunity theory for this research. This period of time created similar political constraints for both movements. I will delve into the strategies and philosophies of the movements in these years on their educational activities in the following pages, but it is beneficial to see that both groups faced oppression directly in the second half of the 1990s. Both groups experienced attrition in the era, whereas they could manage to go forward and being an influential part of the Turkish history in the first decade of the twenty first century despite their different attitudes.

These two examples show that though the political opportunity theory explains a lot for the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey, it is not an influential theoretical perspective for analyzing the different attitudes between these two movements.
because the movements took advantage of similar political opportunities in the same eras, and suffered because of similar political constraints during the same years.

**RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORIES**

In the resource mobilization school of thought, scholars rely on the effects of both entrepreneurial and political mobilization to understand social movements. McCarthy and Zald (1973) argue that a movement’s ability to access and control resources is the main factor in social movement mobilization. Additionally, Tilly (1978) and McAdam (1982) focus on the role of political struggle and a movement’s ability to mobilize people across the political spectrum.

This theoretical perspective, however, does not present us a good base to get into the differences between the two movements because of two reasons. First, both the Hizmet movement and political Islam used the same grounds for their mobilization strategies. They were mostly influential on the middle class and conservative members of Turkish society. These people were becoming urbanized, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, and both movements fed upon this newly urbanized middle class. This means that the human and financial resources for both movements were similar, as the opportunities and constraints were. In addition to the similar resources, both of the movements used religion (Islam) as the main motivation source for the purpose of mobilization. It is apparent that the people resource and the main resource for their mobilization strategies are same. The theory focuses on resource and mobilization, it enhances the role of similar human and financial resources (middle class, conservative segment of the Turkish society), as well motivational resources (Islam) of the movements. Due to these two reasons, resource mobilization theory, like the political opportunity theory, is not an
adequate theoretical base for understanding the different attitudes between the Hizmet movement and the political Islam.

In sum, the theoretical perspectives of the political opportunity theory and resource mobilization theory overrate the three main similarities between the Hizmet movement and the political Islam. First, the groups faced similar political opportunities and constraints (e.g., economic and political liberalization in some eras, and the oppressive power of secular establishment especially during coup years). Second, their human and financial resources were similar, and both movements used these resources effectively, especially after the 1980s (e.g., resurgence of the middle class, conservatism, similar cultural references, etc.). Third, they used religion (Islam) as the main motivational source for their mobilization strategies, so their mobilization tools are also similar. These overrated similarities block the wider vision to see the effects of the different attitudes. All theoretical bases work on behalf of simplification and generalization, but the simplification and generalization should not miss substantial part of the knowledge on an issue (Shively 2013). On the issue of the movement’s comparison, the theoretical perspectives miss a substantial part of the knowledge, so they are inadequate to explain the different attitudes. In fact, these perspectives create confusion because of the blockage they put on the wider vision.

At this point, I may have two options. (1) I may argue that the different attitudes are temporary and artificial, hence the theoretical perspectives, indeed, don’t miss any substantial information. They are just missing some knowledge in specific conditions for the sake of simplification and generalization. In that case, I should offer a theoretical perspective to explain the artificial differences, and then can rely on the widely-used
theoretical perspectives for general conditions. (2) I may assess the differences are deep and permanent as historical review compels, so look for a wider theoretical perspective and analyze it to better explain the different attitudes.

**COMPETITION BASED BUSINESS THEORIES**

Competition-based business theories are a good solution on behalf of the first option. These theories explain the attitudes of firms that do business in the same field. According to the theories, the firms look for a solution to improve their competitive outlook. They may do that via manipulating the market environment (Shapiro 1989) or via differentiating themselves in some strategic products and service (Smith, Ferrier, and Ndofor 2001).

For this research, it is apparent that political Islam and the Hizmet movement try to influence the same segments of the society, and use the same religion as the main mobilization source. Additionally, the movements have to deal with similar political constraints and opportunities. Thus, I can look at them as two firms that do business in the same field, so they use competition-based strategies to improve their competitive outlook, and focus on different attitudes. However, these theories require that the differences are artificial, mostly temporary for the sake of competition, and limited with strategic maneuvers. The historical review demonstrated that the attitudinal differences between the movements are observable in various eras and under multiple condition for a long time, so they are far away to be temporary and artificial. Hence, I delved into the second option, and offered a theoretical perspective to explain the situation.
CHAPTER 4. MAIN ORIENTATIONS OF THE MOVEMENTS

If political opportunity theory, resource mobilization theory, and competition-based business theories do not present a prominent knowledge about the deep and long-term differences between the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey, what are the main factors that explain the differences? I have two explanations. First, the movements shared different philosophical attitudes to leading social and political change, and that creates different orientations while they propose a solution for a change. Second, the philosophies and strategies of the movements resulted in variations in their social capital. In this chapter I will delve into the first explanation. After I explain my hypothesis, I will put a light on the movements’ orientations while they are looking for a change in the field of education and economy. Then, I will apply a content analysis to determine the strength of my hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS

Two general orientations, cultural and institutional, shape explanations in comparative politics. After the 1970s, the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey were excellent at defining the problems of the conservative, urbanized middle class. Thus, both groups became influential in society. However, they offered different explanations and solutions, based on the two general orientations in the field for solving these problems. The Hizmet movement followed a cultural approach. In contrast, political Islam offered strategies based on institutional solutions. In this chapter, I first explain these tendencies in comparative politics. Then, I delve into the case of Turkey to determine the effects these tendencies had on the two social movements.
General orientations in comparative politics shape world views not just in Turkey, but also around the world. A contrast is often drawn between cultural and institutional explanations in political science. On one hand, cultural explanations prioritize the role of history (Putnam 1993), childhood socialization (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1971), ethics (Weber n.d.), and education (Dee 2004). On the other hand, institutional explanations focus on the role of economic conditions (Lewis-Beck 1990), regime characteristics (Kitschelt 1986), institutions (Jackman 1987; Powell 1986), and rational choice (Stokes 1963). To understand the two blocks better, I will present an example in each side. As an example of a culture-oriented explanation, I will discuss Putnam’s (1993) thesis. I will also introduce Powell’s (1986) ideas as an example of an explanation that is more institution-based.

In his book “Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy,” Putnam (1993) explained why certain communities enjoy a more vital civic life than others, specifically examining Italy in the 1970s. Despite different parts of Italy sharing the same institutions, they functioned differently depending on their geographical location. In some regions, the institutions created a working democracy, while in others they failed. Putnam (1993) stated that:

In [the] 1970, Italians laid the groundwork for precisely this experiment by creating a new set of regional governments all along the Italian peninsula. All had the same formal structural organization, and all had important powers and much money to spend. But the soils in which these identical organizations were implanted were very different. Some regions in Italy were economically backward, while others were as economically advanced as anywhere in the world. Some regions were traditionally Catholic, some deeply Communist, some essentially feudal, and so on. For nearly a quarter century my colleagues and I have closely observed this experiment in democratic regional governance. It soon became clear that despite their identical form, these various regional governments worked very differently. As we had expected, some of them proved to be utter failures - inefficient, slothful, corrupt. Others, however, were very effective -
creating innovative day care centers, industrial parks, jobs programs, family clinics, environmental programs, and the like. (Putnam 1993, 101)

To explain why different parts of Italy had different levels of democratic and civic standards though they shared the same institutional base, Putnam (1993) went back to 1000 AD, arguing that the culture that had been established for hundreds of years was the central force affecting the development levels of various sectors of Italy in the 1970s. His research is a good example of a culture-oriented explanation.

On the other hand, Powell (1986) looked for the cause of low voter turnout in the United States as compared to other mutual democracies in his 1986 article “American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective.” There, he argued that despite attitudinal advantages, voter turnouts were low due to the American institutional setting, particularly the party system and registration laws. He stated:

Using a combination of aggregate and comparative survey data, the present analysis suggests that [from a] comparative perspective, turnout in the United States is advantaged about 5% by political attitudes, but disadvantaged 13% by the party system and institutional factors, and up to 14% by the registration laws. (Powell 1986, 17)

In short, Powell (1986) argues that institutional settings such as American registration rules and the electoral and party systems decreased voter participation. Though there were some cultural advantages such as political awareness and a democratic civic culture, the institutional disadvantages substantially outweighed them. His research prioritized the effects of institutional disadvantages over cultural advantages, so it is a good example for an institutional-based explanation.

When we look at Putnam (1993) and Powell (1986), the two different orientations are clear. Putnam (1993) emphasized the importance of culture by tracing back hundreds of years, while Powell (1986) prioritized the effect of the American institutional setting to
answer his research question. Indeed, these general orientations can also be checked to analyze the attitudes of social movements because the characters of social movements make the movements follow one of the orientations for their solution offers. Due to the fact that, I will look at the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey from that perspective, examine the movements and determine whether their characteristics (such as philosophies) lead to different orientations while they are looking for a change in society.

If we look closely at these two social movements, we see that both groups sought social/political changes in Turkey. I argue that their solution offers can be identified by the two different orientations in comparative politics. There are philosophical and strategic dissimilarities between movements. These dissimilarities are deep enough to characterize the movements, so they lead different orientations (institution-based and culture-based orientations) for their solution offers.

_Hypothesis 1: While the Hizmet movement looked for cultural solutions, political Islam in Turkey looked for institutional solutions._

**CASE STUDIES**

Before describing my quantitative analysis, I have defined two areas these movements used to solve problems and achieve social and political change: education and the economy, whereas they follow different philosophical and strategical orientations. A discussion of these two aspects will provide a qualitative base before exploring my quantitative data, underscoring the dynamics of my hypothesis. I chose these two areas because cultural solutions are generally widely used for educational change, whereas institutional solutions are more often employed in the field of
A systematic variance between the movements even in these two areas fortify my hypothesis.

**Education**

Political Islam and the Hizmet movement are the major sources that are seeking a social change through education in Turkey. I will first look at how political Islam is seeking for a change, then I will dig into the case of the Hizmet movement. I will, especially, go over the attitudes of the movements in their educational activities during post-1997 coup era. Additionally, I will delve into the attitudes of the Hizmet movement in the field of education during 2013 corruption investigations via analyzing the speeches of Fethullah Gulen to determine whether the attitudes of the Hizmet movement were consistent in time. The attitudes of the movements in the educational arena present a good example to analyze if there is a difference in their main orientations while they are seeking a change.

Historically, Turkey has employed an ideology-based education system. The National Education Ministry has served as a tool for achieving ideological and political goals at least since the beginning of the Republic (Kaplan 1999, Akyuz 2001). In his broad study of the Turkish educational system, Kazamias (1996) argued that school systems in Turkey are associated with the political system in several ways, claiming that the education system was not neutral, but rather existed in a political context. Tanor (1997) also highlighted the prominent role of education to create a new model of Turkish community and citizenry after the establishment of the republic.

Political Islam in Turkey looks to achieve social change in an institutional way through education. The movement aims to capture this already ideological landscape and
change the ideology of the system. Curricula and school types are their central elements of change. Aksoy (1991) argued that political Islam seeks to make religious lessons compulsory for students, as well as to create more religious schools and encourage the appointment of teachers who share the Islamic ideology to positions of principal and director. Due to the fact that imam-Hatip schools (i.e., cleric-preacher schools) have been a primary focus since the 1990s, and secularists see such schools as a threat to Turkish secularism. It became one of the conflict zones between political Islamists, who seek a social and political change via educational institutions, and secularists, who try to keep current status-quo and strongly against this type of change.

Let me briefly explain Imam-Hatip schools and their role in Turkey. Imam-Hatip schools are public vocational secondary educational institutions. They were first founded in 1951 to offer religious education to raise religious leaders such as imams, preachers, and teachers of the Quran (YongPak, 2000). Their curricula feature courses like Islamic justifications, the sayings of Muhammad (hadiths), the Quran, commentary on the Quran (tafsir), and recitations from the Quran (tajweed). Between 1983 and 1997, the number of these schools grew from 374 to 604, and the number of enrolled students increased from 220,911 to 511,502 (Yavuz 2003:127). Student enrollment in these schools reached its peak in the 1990s when political Islam was in power. These numbers created tension in this era between the WP, who were increasing their political power, and the Turkish military, who serve as it was to represent the country’s secular establishment. Necmettin Erbakan, the head of WP, increased this tension by allegedly claiming that “Imam-Hatip schools are our back yard” in 1997 (Erkan and Akcayoz 2003). Then, a controversial education reform bill supported by the Turkish military required eight years of
compulsory education and forced the closure of middle schools (grades 6 to 8) and all vocational secondary schools, including Imam-Hatip institutions’s middle school parts. Thus, Imam-Hatip schools lost the chance to educate students for a long time such as six years and when they are young enough for (open to) deep influence. Before the bill passed, there were 609 Imam-Hatip schools, and another 250 were awaiting approval from the Ministry of National Education, controlled by the WP (Akugur1997:30). The strategy of political Islam in these years was to push for institutional formation which contradicted with the previously secular organization of the Turkish educational system. The struggle resulted in the downfall of the Reform Party coalition, of which the WP was an effective member in 1997. The intervention of the secularist Turkish military into the political arena was the apparent cause of this downfall. Part of the military’s political strategy at that time was to dismantle the Imam-Hatip schools, so they tried to succeed by the educational bill (Rutz 1999).

The educational system in Turkey and the role of Imam-Hatip schools discussions in it give a good representation of Political Islam’s solution orientation on education. Political Islam in Turkey perceived a deficiency in Turkey’s educational system, and supported an alternative institutional model to solve the problem. In spite of confrontations, political Islam did not give up their links with the institutions because the movement attempted to create institutional change in favor of their ideology and the institutions were central elements of these attempts.

Education is also an area in which the Hizmet movement is very active (Ebaugh 2010). However, the Hizmet movement did not force any institutional change such as political Islam did. Agai (2002) explained that Hizmet-inspired schools do not teach
religion, though they are motivated primarily by religious faith. This shows that the priority for the movement is not the curriculum. He added that these schools “stress the teaching of ethics (ahla\’k), which is seen as a unifying factor between different religious, ethnic, and political orientations.” The Hizmet movement considers education to be an essential area of focus; it values education as more than just an institutional prerequisite. The movement offers a value and culture based educational method apart from an institutional base. Therefore, Hizmet-inspired schools are active in many countries that have a variety of institutional prerequisites. Faruk Mercan (2019) visited Hizmet-affiliated schools in South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan for his book *M. Fethullah Gulen: A Life in the Way of Allah* (*M. Fethullah Gulen: Allah yolunda bir omur*). Hizmet schools have been providing educational services in most of these countries for more than twenty years. They follow different curricula depending on the countries’ institutional settings. There have even been several institutional changes in such countries in these twenty years, but because the schools prioritize more cultural rather than institutional framework, they were able to use different forms and techniques, so they could keep on and could raise a generation with values for social changes through education.

For a better comparison between the Hizmet movement and political Islam, I will examine the attitudes of the Hizmet movement during 1997 post-modern coup era as I also analyzed the same era in terms of the political Islam’s attitudes. The post-modern coup era is an interesting time to examine when analyzing different approaches of the two social movements in Turkey. In 1997, the Hizmet movement was facing oppression by
the Turkish military, as were members of political Islam in Turkey. Concurrent with the closing of the Imam-Hatip schools, Hizmet-affiliated schools were also targeted. However, the strategy employed by the Hizmet movement was different from that of the political Islam.

Before digging into Hizmet movement’s strategy during the era, it is important to highlight three main differences between Imam-Hatip schools and the Hizmet-affiliated schools. First, Hizmet schools were private institutions, not public ones. Second, some were located outside of Turkey. Third, Hizmet schools followed the same curriculum as that of other secular private and public schools, and did not teach religious courses such as commentary on the Quran (tafsir), recitations from the Quran (tajweed), and the sayings of Muhammad (hadiths). All three of these differences could serve to eliminate some of the institutional pressure for the Hizmet schools. However, the Hizmet movement did not try to stand against institutional pressure. It is because their main goal was to protect the cultural framework that had been established through decades. The movement believed that they could protect this cultural framework in another institutional form, even if they lost certain advantages. Additionally, the Hizmet movement saw the problem with trying to force institutional change because such actions would create a rational basis of fear among the secularists in the country. Due to the fact that the strategy of the movement was to focus on eliminating this fear and being ready to give up their institutional rights rather than pushing for institutional change.

On December 23, 1997, the headline of the Hurriyet newspaper read: “Fethullah Gulen is transferring the schools” (Fethullah hoca okulları devrediyor) (Hurriyet Newspaper 1997). The article stated that there were more than 1,000 schools,
dormitories, prep schools, and student houses that were affiliated with the Hizmet movement, both inside and outside of Turkey. The movement was prepared to transfer the Turkish schools (around 300) to the care of the Turkish government, if they so desired.

If a conclusion is necessary to be drawn in terms of comparison, it is apparent that political Islam, in response to the same type of pressure, followed a totally different strategy in 1997. Political Islam acted as if they owned the Imam-Hatip schools because their main philosophy urged institutional change; the Hizmet movement was even ready to give up their rights of ownership of private schools affiliated with the movement because these intuitions, philosophically speaking, were not the movement’s primary goal. This illustrates the deep philosophical and strategical differences that define the main solution-orientations of these two movements.

Another point of interest is the strategies followed by the Hizmet movement after 2013. In 2013, the Hizmet movement faced a similar level of oppression. At this time, the Turkish government, led by the JDP, attempted to shut down prep schools. These prep schools were seen the main institutions supporting the human capacity of the movement. The Hizmet movement was very active in opening prep schools in Turkey, and the action to close down these schools was interpreted as a move against the Hizmet’s. This time, the movement tried to combat this closure because it was perceived as an attack on the cultural framework of their educational activities. The Zaman newspaper, which was affiliated with the movement, started a campaign of protest. People were informed about the attempt via a headline that appeared on November 14 in the Zaman newspaper, reading: “A huge hit against education” (Egitime buyuk darbe) (T24 2013). For the next
four days, the headlines all related to this issue. Additionally, 1.5 million copies of a special edition issued on November 15 were published and distributed to incite a reaction against the attempt.

The attempt to close prep schools in Turkey was interpreted as a move not just against the institutional but also the cultural base of the Hizmet movement. I looked at the speeches and writings of Fethullah Gulen between November 14 and December 17, available from www.herkul.org. I selected this time period because November 14, 2013 was the starting point of the prep-school confrontation. Then, a corruption investigation was erupted in Turkey on December 17 and the prep-school discussion was no longer a primary issue because the tensions had escalated to a higher level via the investigation. I reviewed twelve videos and four written works. In these materials, Gulen defined the era as one of persecution. He did not see this as just a prep school issue. He envisioned a wider spectrum of assault, the goal of which was to demolish the movement (or at least change its main values). In these materials, I noted his advice to the community, words that shaped the movement’s general tendencies during these days. He underscored four key points in these speeches and writings. I will generally use direct quotations from Gulen in order to present first-hand guidance from him in this time period without a salient interpretation.

(1) *Don’t step back if you believe that you are right, and test yourself and your values. Test yourself regularly.*

He regularly reminded the people to follow their beliefs, though this might cause them to experience hardship. He also regularly reminded them of the movement’s main

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25 Herkul.org is a website that has broadcasted Fethullah Gulen’s weekly sermons and has published written versions of his communes since 2001.
values, and advised that they make sure that they adhered to this code. In these days, the Hizmet group had begun explaining their motives and the negative effects of the prep school closures for the country. With the effect of media and as a result of this strategic vision, the prep-school issue became one of the main points of discussion for the country for at least two months. Let me demonstrate how Fethullah Gulen emphasized the importance of not standing back when things needed to be changed, and how he reminded his people of their key value system in his articles several times in these two months.

I took four materials that appeared on www.herkul.org in these two months as examples to represent Gulen’s guidance for the Hizmet followers. The first example is an article appeared on December 15, 2013. In his article “Temporary Storms and Permanent Breezes,” Gulen stated that:

Thanks to the light emitted by faith and by the confidence toward the Right, we are not shaken by the noise and fuss that is wanted to be created around us, nor do we panic in the face of the dust and smoke that surrounds us, nor do we submit to the oppressor, cruelty and oppression that come upon us. We trust in Allah; we are equipped with wisdom, and try to breathe religiosity, piety, consent of the Right, and our own cultural values in every region. (Gulen 2016)

As a second example, I used a video sermon. In his statement that appeared on a video entitled You Will Walk Without Stop, which appeared on November 24, 2013, Gulen said:

If you have set out with this intention and persevered in some services, you should continue on your way, after looking at whether the issue is appropriate to the Qur'an and Sunnah, regardless of who [it] is against or for. (Gulen 2013e)

Gulen was regularly seemed to show similar reactions highlighting the main values, and standing strong for these values in other opportunities. In another video entitled Storms, Swings and Persistence on the Right that was released on November 27, 2013, he stated that:
It is necessary to insist on what is right and reasonable. Not to insist on the truth means leaning towards invalids. ‘Let's destroy these schools.’ This is invalid! ‘Let's stop the development.’ This is invalid! It is not your own thing. It is entrusted! … You cannot remain irreverent to this; this means being irreverent to the Right. You will defend it. You will surely defend it without compromising your style. (Gulen 2013b)

Two days later, on November 29, 2013, he gave another video sermon. The name of the video was *My Positive Presumption (Optimism): Arms and Wings were Broken about the 2004 Decision of the National Security Council*. In that video, he underscored the main values and the importance of protecting these values in any condition one more time. He stated that:

As it is mentioned in the previous sermon, if you see the developments that have been done by opening education slots, by serving your community, and by introducing your basic values to the whole world, falsely [accused] after you tested yourself with the Quran and Sunnah as a requirement of intelligence, logic, and reasoning, to walk on this way is disrespectful toward the Right. However, if you walk on this path by taking the [Quran], Sunnah, [general decision by the Muslim nation], [reasoning of Muslim scholars], and the exegesis of time behind you, it means that the path is right. This time, if you turn away from this right path [and] face someone or somebody blocking you, or coming upon you in some way, you will be disrespectful to the truth. Therefore, you will be disrespectful to Allah, the [Quran], and the Sunnah. What is wrong with the things you do that Allah does not love, that the Prophet did not/does not accept, and that is against your national values? Are drugs, cigarettes, alcohol used in university preparation courses? Is there insusceptibility? If these are being done, I would say to lock their doors, withdraw, you do evil instead of goodness! … If they do not exist, and if there is a march toward your own community values, this is the right; to return from this becomes a not-right thing. If so, [to] become silent while defending such a subject is a mute devilry. (Gulen 2013a)

These statements indicate that between October and December 2013, Gulen reminded his followers to test themselves based on their main values, and stand strong behind these values if they believe the values. His consistent statements in different opportunities show how stable his opinions and guidance are on this issue. This focus on values and value-based reactions presents his main philosophy. This philosophy and
guidance created a value and culture based orientation when the Hizmet movement was seeking a solution in different times including 2013.

(2) Be legitimate.

Gulen’s second concern was legitimacy. He highlighted the importance of legitimacy while standing against oppression by focusing on reactions. For example, in one of his video speeches entitled Black Propaganda and Self Accounting that appeared on December 6, 2013, he stated that “illegitimacy is always illegitimacy. Legitimacy is always legitimacy. It is necessary to test your attitudes and behaviors, and to stand by the legitimacy” (Gulen 2013g). In Gulen’s dictionary, legitimacy is used to emphasize the importance of rules and laws. Gulen constantly encouraged his followers to obey the rules, and limit themselves with these rules in any case. It is a strong position against institution-based orientations, because the encouragement does not give a prominent role to rules, laws, or the institutional frameworks that these rules and laws create. Fethullah Gulen and the Hizmet movement, which Gulen’s ideas have an important role to shape, believe that they can create some level of value-based good in any types of institutional framework. Thus, legitimacy became one of Gulen’s visible focus-points in times of the 2013 confrontations.

(3) Do not act with animosity, act with kindness. Use positive actions.

Besides legitimacy, Gulen highlighted other values while staying strong and advised his people not to lose their value-based foundation when reacting against oppression. He advised people not respond harshly, and instead adopt a kind manner. I exhibit three examples from Gulen’s video-sermons. On November 16, 2019, in a video entitled Direction, Patience and Prayer During Stormy Periods, he said:
We should decide not to use needles not just against pack threads, but also against spears. We must be determined not to use a needle. Even if we hurt, we shouldn't hurt. Even if we break, we shouldn't break. Although our roads are narrowed, we should not try to narrow the road against others. (Gulen 2013c)

His value-based reaction advice also appeared in another speech entitled *You Will Walk Without Stop* that was released on November 24 of that same year. He stated:

> You should not be shaken neither by the disloyalty of your friends nor the rigor of enemies. You should also not confront anybody personally, shouldn’t act with malice; the actions you are doing shouldn’t be reactionary. These are the things that take away and break … sincerity. However, at the same time, you should not step back from defending what you know to be true. Otherwise, it would be disrespectful to the truth. (Gulen 2013e)

My third example is from another video appearance. He gave a statement to this effect during his October 12 video appearance entitled *Always on the Peace Pathway*.

> Especially in these days, though dissension and disunity are bubbling, it is preferable to have some positive attitudes and behaviors as the type of medication that is modifying and decreasing tension. In order to not accelerate rupture and disintegration, some must take it on the chin and must hold their position because of their character. (Gulen 2013d)

These examples indicate that Gulen advises some values even in times of oppression and when he looks for a strong reaction. His stable position in different times in a short time period such as 2 months points out the importance of value-based approaches for Gulen and the Hizmet movements.

(4) Break the sense of belonging, and reach a wider spectrum. Focus on the reasonability of the issue, and get outside the limits of identity.

The last point he highlighted was about reaching out to more people by not focusing on belonging. To accomplish this, he again underscored the rationality and credibility of this type of action according to religious, national, and universal values. Let
me reveal three more passages to project Gulen’s fourth focus point in 2013. On December 12, 2019, in a video entitled *Always on the Peace Pathway*, he said:

While mentioning the activities and institutions of dedicated souls, different names such as service, movement, communion and community were used. In fact, there are people of every kind, understanding, color, and pattern in these things. It's like an embroidered and brocaded tambour. These can be compared to people who come together and pray together in a mosque. Most of them may not even know each other, but they come together with a sense of rationale and logic. (Gulen 2013d)

In another part of the video, he said:

Yes, black-spirited people are trying to scribble positive things. In these days, they call it organization … it is a community that consists of various types of people who come together at the reasonability of the activities. To open a school, open a cultural center, open reading rooms and give free lessons to poor people are charitable and good works! Some people are coming and asking if I can open one too. The community also has this kind of people. It is impossible to define this kind of community as [an] organization. Furthermore, the term organization also has a very different meaning in terminology. Obviously, they say this word with a deliberate negative connotation.26 (Gulen 2013d)

Gulen rejects strong organizational structures and strong belongings that creates a base for a strong structure. Because of this reason the Hizmet movement does not have tools (such as flags, anthems, official website, headquarter, membership, or central institutions) that is used for belonging-creation and for organizational formations. Gulen, himself, emphasized that people come together on a rational base such as charitable works and with loose networks. His focus is on the values that attract people, not on the institutional tools related to sense of belongings. On December 13, 2019, in another video entitled *Don’t Look Despicable, Don’t Break Heart*, Gulen continues to clearly express his opinions one more time:

26 In media and politics, the word of “organization” is used to emphasize the strong structure of the movement. And, mostly it is used to present the Hizmet movement as a “crime organization” or a “lodge.”
All kinds of considerations of belonging, including -isms should be removed and discarded. The successful things happening should be seen just as extra graces of Allah Almighty to the people who come together at the rationality of the Quran and the reasonability of the Quran. (Gulen 2013f)

Gulen followed up his value-based strategy by regularly highlighting these four focus-points in his speeches and articles released in times of the prep-school conflict. His regular and stable emphasis on value-based actions resulted in a culture-based orientation when the Hizmet movement was seeking for a solution or position.

The reactions of the Hizmet movement in 1997 and 2013 demonstrate its focus on a cultural base rather than institutional advantages or disadvantages. The movement could even give up prominent institutions to protect the group, depending on how the oppression affected the main cultural framework of the movement. Anwar Alam (2019) supported this argument, stating that “for Gulen, serving the cause of God, Islam, or humanity does not require establishment of any formal organization or direct preaching (dava) about Islam.” Additionally, the movement tries to create a culture base reaction against oppressions. It is also important to see this fact because the movement prioritized and tried to create a culture-based philosophy not just in terms of actions but also in terms of reactions.

In brief, both political Islam in Turkey and the Hizmet movement believed in the importance of education, and offered solutions for improving the education system. However, their separate philosophies created different orientations for pursuing this goal. An examination of the strategies and philosophies of political Islam and the Hizmet movement during post 1997 coup era, and the Hizmet movement during the 2013 prep-school confrontation era present good cases to depict the main solution orientations of the movements. The case studies exhibit that political Islam in Turkey hoped to create
institutional structures, while the Hizmet movement focused on value-based education and followed a culture-based methodology.

**The Economy**

The economy is another area that both political Islam in Turkey and the Hizmet movement consider for social change and through which they attempted to offer solutions. In this section, I first look into political Islam’s approaches; then I explore the Hizmet movement’s vision when they are dealing with the economy in the contemporary Turkey.

To envision political Islam’s approach on the economy better, I will examine the economic concepts of political Islam in Turkey and their practical usage. Later, I will look at the economic environment in Turkey and try to figure out what kind of perspective the political Islam followed in this environment especially after 1980.

Political Islam in Turkey used two main conceptual designations – the Just Order and Real Economy – in the area of economics. The social system in its entirety was perceived as non-Islamic by political Islamists because of high usage of usury, high interest rates and unfair money distribution. Therefore, the contemporary institutional framework, especially the banking system, was considered suspect. To overcome this issue, political Islam in Turkey put forth a model called “the Just Order” (*adil düzên*). This model required both social responsibility and state power. The model includes anti-imperialist ideas, and promotes state-supported cooperation and tax regulations in order to create a fair and secure economic environment (Erbakan 1996). With some nuances, the Just Order structured the base for the economy policies of Turkey’s 54th government, in which Welfare Party was a coalition member between June 1996 and June 1997. This
economy policy is called “Real Economy” by the government (Ersin 2015). The concept of Real Economy relied on the strengthening of multi-partner structures based on production in addition to advocating the allocation of interest-free government loans to all such enterprises. Though the economic models of the political Islam – the Just Order and Real Economy – include some cultural elements, it is apparent that the orientation of the models is toward forcing institutional changes such as tax regulations, banking regulations, and using state power to promote cooperation-led businesses.

The economic environment of Turkey and political Islam’s attitudes in this environment also give us some clues about the orientation of political Islam while they are seeking solutions. Political Islam aimed to exert the power of the state to create a new wealthy class who would establish the sustainability of political Islam itself. The Turkish Republic did not have a bourgeois class at the beginning, so the state created its own bourgeois class (Keyder 1987). In addition, the country followed import-substitutionist industrialization (ISI) strategies for its economic development from 1930 till 1980. Intense government intervention was part of the economic development strategies of Turkey in these years (Wagstaff 1989). Because of these two reasons the dominant role of the state for a prosperous business was salient in Turkey. For a business success, interaction between bureaucrats and policymakers was a more important element than the market opportunities (Onis 1998). Thus, the line between wealthy economic classes and the state was blurred since the beginning of the Republic in Turkey.

After 1980, small-scale enterprises advanced their role in the economy with the effect of the economic liberalization efforts and globalization. But the state did not give up playing a dominant role via clientelistic relations, and the central position of the state
for the business class remained influential. Additionally, the newly emerging small-scale firms mostly depended on domestic, artisanal, patriarchal, and paternalistic labor systems (Gulalp 2001). In this type of economic environment, “it is hard to tell where society (in the form of family and school ties or community celebrations of ethnic and political identity) ends, and where economic organization begins” (Piorre and Sabel 1984). The labor system created a working class that relies on society rather than professional networks.

Political Islam in Turkey offered a win-win style formation in this situation. It supported institutional frameworks that mix society and economic organizations. The movement used the “language of social disadvantage” effectively to reach out to different segments of the society and establish interdependence between them (Bugra 2002). MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association) is a good example to look into the perspective of political Islam on this issue. The Association created a society for small-scale businesses, and let them support each other in solidarity. The businesses were highly supported by political Islamist policy makers and bureaucrats. When political Islam had the opportunity – when it had enough power to implement, – the MUSIAD members became the ones that took advantage of state contracts and support. In return for this, the businesses constituted the main financial lockbox of political Islam. The society also helped low-income supporters find jobs in these businesses, or get financial assistance and charitable aids from these businesses. The financial flexibility of political Islam in Turkey created an advantage in the political race. On the one hand political Islam could gain financial and social support and more power; on the other hand the newly emerging small-scale businesses could get state contracts,
reach state opportunities, and support their community and ideology. It is not hidden now that there are unwritten rules to regulate this win-win circle that requires pushing any business that takes advantage of a state contract via the society to give a set amount of financial support for the dawa (the cause) meaning the ideology of political Islam. Though the values are mentioned in political Islam supported institutions such as MUSIAD, the main frame is far from being value-based, rather it is apparent that the frame is more institution-based.

Conversely, the Hizmet movement offered a new business culture for its supporters. Gülen, himself, gathered his ideas about the economy in a book named “Our World with Its Vastness: Economic Considerations” (Gulen 2009). It shows the importance of economic solutions for the Hizmet movement. In this book, Gulen largely talks about the value of social life and its principals such as equality before the law, family life, the importance of human being, conscientiousness etc. He also talks about economic systems, production, property, source of incomes, but the book is more culture-oriented rather than institution-oriented. At this point, it is important to inquire how his ideas guided the Hizmet movement in general on this issue.

For the Hizmet-inspired businessmen, the concept of trustee (mutevelli) was prioritized since the beginning. Trustees would come together once a week for consultation meetings (istişare). Gulen organized first trustee meetings in the 1960s when he resided in Izmir, and he encouraged his followers to organize and enlarge this kind of meetings in many opportunities afterward. In these meetings, local issues were discussed, and solutions proposed. In this way, business people became accustomed to voluntarily being a part of the action on a regular basis (Ebaugh and Koc 2007). The business culture
included a business ethic in addition to voluntary action, which emphasized discipline and quality work motivated by religious values. In this regard, it was comparable to the Protestant movement of the sixteenth century (Aras and Caha 2000). Weber (n.d.) argued that the religious values of the Protestant movement motivated hard work and the accumulation of wealth. In sum, the Hizmet movement attempted to encourage wealthy businessmen to see themselves as responsible for volunteer projects and to become more successful to maintain these projects, through the creation of a trustee culture.

In brief, both political Islam in Turkey and the Hizmet movement consider the role of economy important. Political Islam offers some institutional solutions (such as tax regulations, regulation of banking system, and state-supported cooperation) and a win-win systemic approach, whereas the Hizmet movement suggests a business culture as a solution. In other words, political Islam in Turkey follows institution-oriented solutions, on the contrary, the Hizmet movement follows culture-oriented solutions.

The attitudes of political Islam in Turkey and the Hizmet movement in these two areas, education and the economy, highlights how the movements offered different solutions (institution-oriented or culture-oriented) to the problems of the country based on their different world views and philosophies.

**QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS**

The attitudes of political Islam and the Hizmet movement when they are seeking social change in education and the economy revealed significant information on behalf of my first hypothesis. In this section, I will test the hypothesis using a quantitative research method. I will use content analysis as a quantitative method. I will first furnish brief information about my dataset. Then, I will provide the details about the dictionary that is
crucial for the analysis. At the end, I will delve into the outcomes after I inform you about how I operationalized the data analysis.

**Articles and Dataset**

I selected 130 articles on political Islam and 126 articles on the Hizmet movement. The total number of articles was 256. They were written in one of two languages, either English or Turkish. In my analysis, I attempted to eliminate the language effect. You will find the original results without elimination of the language effect, and also the results from that language effect were eliminated. The time frame was from 1990 to 2016. I did not select the most recent articles, which would likely have been affected by the ongoing turbulence in Turkey. Especially after 2016, pieces written from both sides of the situation have tended to focus on the current conflict, and may skew my analysis. In the future, it may be useful to review articles from this time period to see whether the movements would stay true to their main philosophical orientations, even in times of a hard confrontation and conflict, or, if the confrontation and conflict would change their worldview and solution-orientation when they are seeking a social change after the confrontation.

Let me also share information on how I gathered the articles and how I categorized them. The articles analyzed here were obtained from conference papers, book chapters, journals, and webpages affiliated with each movement. I decided on the affiliation of each article based on two determinants. (1) The resource from which the article was obtained may have indicated the affiliation, for instance if the article was obtained from a journal affiliated with one of the movements or presented at a conference organized by one of the groups. (2) The writer’s background and present connections
may also have indicated the proper affiliation. If the writer was openly a member of one group, I attributed the article to that movement. In each article, the author, resource, or both were clearly affiliated with one of the movements, so I was able to attribute each appropriately.

Creating the Dictionary

A dictionary is a central element for my research because I am looking for how institutional and cultural orientations appear in articles by looking at how frequently cultural and institutional words are used in these articles. To accomplish having a useful dictionary for my analysis, I determined some words to represent institutional orientation and cultural orientation. To avoid selection bias, five random articles representing the institutional side and another five indicating the cultural side were selected for the creation of this dictionary. After reviewing the words, I chose those that best seemed to indicate an institutional or cultural orientation.

I avoided words such as “party” or “dialogue” that may have ability to manipulate the analysis. For example, “party” was used frequently by the articles affiliated with the political Islam; each time they referenced a party by name, the word “party” appeared. Likewise, the term “dialogue” was used more often than usual in Hizmet-affiliated articles because of dialogue institutions. I didn’t want these kinds of words to skew my dataset, so I eliminated them. Additionally, I also avoided words such as “state” that could have different meanings in either English or Turkish. “State”, it can be used as a verb meaning “declare,” it can be used as a noun meaning “condition,” or it can be used as a noun meaning “the commonwealths that make up a country.” The third meaning represents an institutional orientation, but I avoided putting the word and such the words...
in my dictionary because it is impossible to eliminate the different meaning without a contextual information and the computer-based content analysis does not give me any contextual information.

After the eliminations, I had 20 institutional and 20 cultural words, 40 root words in total. I included both English and Turkish translations of these words to the dictionary. I also added all possible versions (e.g., with suffixes and prefixes) that appeared in the articles. In the end, I had 1,167 words in two languages, including all versions of the original forty words. You can find out the 40 root words by looking at table 1.

Table 1. The root words in the dictionary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Words</th>
<th>Cultural Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Anayasa Constitution</td>
<td>Baris Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Cumhuriyet Republic</td>
<td>Kimlik Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Diyanet Diyanet28</td>
<td>Modern Modern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Düzen Order</td>
<td>Kultur Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Düzenleme Regulation</td>
<td>Sorumluluk Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Halife Khalifa</td>
<td>Gelenek Tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 İdare Management</td>
<td>Erdem Virtue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 İktidar Government</td>
<td>Hosgoru Tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Kanun Law</td>
<td>Deger Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Kural Rule</td>
<td>Ahlak Moral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Kuruluş Organization</td>
<td>Etik Ethic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Kurum Institution</td>
<td>Saygi Respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Müessese Establishment</td>
<td>Uyum Harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Nizam Arrangement</td>
<td>Hikmet Wisdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Politika Policy</td>
<td>Fedekarlik Altruism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Rejim Regime</td>
<td>Esitlik Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Şistem System</td>
<td>Durustluk Honesty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Şeriat Sharia</td>
<td>Cogulculuk Pluralism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Appendix C for the whole 1167 words.

28 Diyanet is the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey. It is an official state institution.
Institutional Words

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yapı</td>
<td>Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yönetim</td>
<td>Administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cultural Words

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medeni</td>
<td>Civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medeniyet</td>
<td>Civilization²⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prensi</td>
<td>Principal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operationalization

I counted the institutional and cultural words appearing in each article.³⁰ Then, I calculated the difference between them (difference = institutional – cultural). After this calculation, I obtained the ratio via dividing the difference by the total number of the words in the article (difference_per_word = difference / total words). Then, I multiplied the ratio by 1,000 to obtain an easily interpretable number (orientation_score = difference_per_word * 1000). I called this the “orientation score.” The orientation score is the number showing the difference between the numbers of institutional and cultural words if the article has 1,000 words.

\[
Orientation \ Score = \frac{I - C}{T} \times 1000
\]

\(I = The \ number \ of \ institutional \ words, \ C = The \ number \ of \ cultural \ words, \ T = The \ total \ number \ of \ words\)

Higher scores refer that the piece is more institutional. If the article is more culturally oriented, the difference is negative. The highest orientation score (i.e., the most institutional piece) in my dataset is 60.53, whereas the lowest orientation score (i.e., the most cultural piece) is -49.15.

²⁹ Because civic (medeni), civil, and civilization (medeniyet) come from the same root in Turkish, I put these words in the same category.

³⁰ For word count, I used a software program called Antconc. This software allows the user to create their own dictionary. The program gives the user the total number of words of their dictionary in each article. I also used TextWrangler to standardize some of the Turkish letters (such as ç, ş, ğ, ö, and ü). In addition to these software programs, I created and used a Mac Automator to convert all kind of documents to a plain text format. Moreover, STATA is used for statistical analysis.
While designing quantitative content analysis, some scholars such as Laver and Garry (2000) use a ratio between the number of text units representing a positional difference and the total number of text units representing a position. If I follow up this design, my formula would be $\text{orientation} = \frac{l-c}{l+c}$. I did not use this design because of some deficiencies that the formula creates for my research. Some of the articles, especially short articles, have small numbers of institutional or cultural words. These small numbers result in stronger or weaker position than it should be, and influence the reliability of the analysis. The ratio that includes the length of the article solves this problem. Thus, I used the ratio of the number of text units representing a positional difference to the number of text units representing the length of the article. For instance, let’s assume that I analyze two papers, both have 10 institutional and 5 cultural words, but one of them has 100 total words while the other has 200 total words. The orientation score for the first paper will be 50, and the score for the second paper will be 25. If I use the design of Laver and Garry (2000), both of the papers will have the same level of orientation (0.66) because the length of the paper is not considered as a parameter in this design. For my research, it is more effective to look into how much positional difference is observed in a specific length of paper, so I used the orientation score for my research design.
Analysis Outcomes

I used a difference of means test (t-test) to determine if political Islam in Turkey and the Hizmet movement create significant difference in terms of orientation score. Table 2 shows the STATA outcomes for the analysis. The test outcome indicates that the political Islam articles are more institutionally oriented as compared to the Hizmet articles, and the results are highly significant. The mean orientation score for political Islam articles is 9.47, while the mean orientation score for Hizmet articles is -10.70. The probability of the movements having no difference in their orientation score is even less than 0.001 (the t score is -11.97). The box plot in figure 2 offers a visual presentation of these outcomes. You can also check the histogram presented in figure 2 as a visual record. The histogram shows that most of the Hizmet articles have negative orientation score meaning they are mainly culture oriented. Conversely, most of the political Islam articles have orientation scores bigger than zero, but they are more distributed compared to the Hizmet articles.

Table 2. Orientation Score by Affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Islam in Turkey</th>
<th>The Hizmet Movement</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>9.47</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>16.54</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>16.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
<td>-11.97***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2. Orientation score by Affiliation

*Language Effect*

In the dataset most of the political Islam articles are in Turkish, while most of the Hizmet articles are in English. Therefore, I attempted to eliminate the language effect in my next step. To standardize the language, I used Google Translator because a computer based translator would eliminate human interference to the analysis. I randomly selected five Turkish and five English articles from my dataset. From these articles, I randomly selected portions. I translated Turkish portions to English and English portions to Turkish using Google Translator, so I have ten pieces that were translated to the other language. I then ran a regression test to assess the relationship between the languages. The relationship between the number of words in English and Turkish is:

\[
Y = 8.75 + 1.28X
\]

*Y* = The number of words in an English piece  
*X* = The number of words in the Turkish piece translated from English

You can find the outcomes of the regression analysis in table 3. The R-square is very high (0.97) showing that the model works well to presents the relationship between the languages. Additionally, the outcomes are highly significant (t score is 16.04) showing that the analysis provides an effective model to standardize the language. Figure 3
demonstrates the regression line and the distribution of data points around this line, so we can observe the effect visually. Closely distributed points around the regression line demonstrates the strength of the regression model.

Table 3. Regression Model – The Relation Between the Number of Words in English Articles and in Turkish Articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Constant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( F ) Score</td>
<td>257.25***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R)-square</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. ( R)-square</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( T ) score</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.04***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Regression Model – The Relation Between the Number of Words in English Articles and in Turkish Articles

\[ Y = 8.75 + 1.28X \]
Based on this model, I standardized the language. I then ran the difference of means test one more time using the standardized language. After standardization, the \( t \)-test outcomes retained to showing that the political Islam articles result in more institution-based orientations comparing to Hizmet articles, and the outcomes are highly significant (t score is -12.85). Table 4 and figure 4 presents the outcomes or the analysis done with the standardized language.

Table 4. Orientation Score by Affiliation, With Standardized Language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Islam</th>
<th>The Hizmet Movement</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
<td>-1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>12.79</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>14.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( t \) -12.85***

Figure 4. Orientation Score by Affiliation, With Standardized Language

Then, I compared the analysis done with the original languages and the analysis done with the standardized language. Figure 5 provides a box plot as a visual record to observe the outcomes related to the comparison. The outcomes express that the mean score of the political Islam articles decreases from 9.47 to 7.32 when we apply the
standardized language. Additionally, the standard deviation decreases from 1.45 to 1.12. These changes did not substantially affect the significance rates. The t-score increases from -11.97 to -12.85, but both outcomes are highly significant and support the hypothesis. This unchanging finding indicates that the hypothesis remained strong after the language was standardized too.

![Box Plot - Orientation Score by Affiliation](image)

**Figure 5. Orientation Score by Affiliation, Language Effect**

*Analysis based on categories*

In this section, I provide an analysis based on four categories: the economy, education, religion, and renewal. Through this categorical analysis, I investigate whether the difference is limited to one category or remains stable across a number of different categories. This analysis also helps reveal the level of effect in each category. The analysis was conducted with both the original languages and the standardized language in order to determine the significance rate of any limitation, based on the language.

The categories define prominent aspects of the articles. Since the articles were not chosen according to their categories at the beginning, the number of articles in each
group was different. For instance, there were two Hizmet articles related to the economy, while there were 59 Hizmet articles discussing renewal. Additionally, some of the articles didn’t address one category alone. For these articles, I chose the most prominent category appearing in the article.

The analysis using the original languages demonstrates that the difference in orientation score is stable across all categories. Education has the lowest significance rate, with a t-score of -2.07. For education, the p-value is 0.046, and it’s significant in the 0.95 confidence level. All of the other three categories has p-values lower than 0.001. This shows the stability of my hypothesis through different categories. However, it is important to mention that the number of observations was limited for drawing conclusions, especially in some categories such as economy.

At this point, I want to highlight two facts that the outcomes revealed. First, both the Hizmet articles and the political Islam articles on education have negative mean orientation scores. This demonstrates that even political Islam used a culture-oriented language when it comes to education. Second, political Islam’s mean orientation score changed more substantially than did the Hizmet movement’s mean orientation score throughout the categories. The Hizmet articles’ mean orientation score for education is -10.13, religion is -9.24, renewal is -11.49, and the economy is -24.71. It is important to remember that there were just two Hizmet-affiliated articles on the economy. Once I exclude those two articles, the Hizmet articles’ mean orientation score changes by around -10 in certain categories. The political Islam articles, on the other hand, have a mean orientation scores of -3.03 for education, 7.21 for religion, 13.58 for renewal, and 8.42 for the economy. It demonstrates that the political Islam’s language changed more
depending on the categories. You can find the details of the analysis in Table 5 and Figure 6.

Figure 6. Orientation Scores by Categories
Table 5. Orientation Scores by Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RELIGION</th>
<th></th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>The Hizmet Movement</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>-9.24</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>3.26</td>
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<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>17.84</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>15.25</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>-5.11***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RENEWAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>ECONOMY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>The Hizmet Movement</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>13.58</td>
<td>-11.49</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>8.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>17.18</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>18.85</td>
<td>11.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>-9.85***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis by Categories based on standardized language

When the previous analysis was revisited using the standardized language, the results showed that the language effect does not play an influential role in the findings. Three main findings did not change whether looking at the outcome using the original languages or the standardized language. First, the orientation-score difference again is significant in all of four categories. Second, the lowest significance rate is in education as it was in the previous analysis. And third, the orientation scores related to the Hizmet articles are more stable across the various categories comparing to the political Islam articles. These three findings remained the same regardless of the language effect. Table 6 and Figure 7 present the information about the categorical analysis with the standardized language.

Figure 7. Orientation Scores by Categories with Standardized Language
Table 6. Orientation Scores by Categories with Standardized Language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELIGION</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Political</td>
<td>The Hizmet</td>
<td>Combined</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Movement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Movement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>-9.24</td>
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<td>-7.18</td>
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<td>1.57</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.58</td>
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<td>-2.57***</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>ECONOMY</th>
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<td>Combined</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>The Hizmet</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Movement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Movement</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>59</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>10.51</td>
<td>-11.49</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>-24.71</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>9.79</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>16.05</td>
<td>Deviation</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>13.84</td>
<td>12.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>-10.41***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>t</td>
<td>-4.74***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68
CHAPTER CONCLUSION

There are two general orientations -institutional and cultural- in comparative politics forming different perspectives. My first hypothesis argues that the political Islam and the Hizmet movement lead to different orientations while they are seeking social change in Turkey because they share dissimilar philosophies. To test my hypothesis, I used both qualitative and quantitative research methods. I applied case studies as a qualitative research, and content analysis as a quantitative research.

For case studies, I selected two areas – education and the economy – and tried to figure out the movement’s attitudes in these two areas. The analysis demonstrated that despite political Islam’s prioritization of institutional structures in education, the Hizmet movement followed culture-based solutions. Especially the 1997 post-modern coup era and 2013 prep-school crisis era revealed significant information for my study. In the category of the economy, the findings continue to show the differences in terms of orientations. On the one hand, the political Islam offered an order called “the Just Order,” a policy perspective called “Real Economy, and a win-win structural formation for small and emerging businesses. On the other hand, the Hizmet movement focused on creating a business culture among its followers. These findings well support my hypothesis. Future researchers looking for the stability of these findings in the other areas may help to increase the knowledge on this issue.

Additionally, I used content analysis to test my hypothesis in another way. I analyzed articles affiliated to each movement, and compared their orientation scores. The outcomes demonstrated a strong support for my hypothesis. Highly significant results were stable when we apply the tests using the original languages and a standardized
language. The analysis based on categories also contributed the stability of the results in different categories. In four categories – economy, education, religion and renewal – the outcomes were significant and supported my hypothesis. It would, however, be better to have a larger number of observations in specific categories such as economy.

In sum, both case studies and content analysis supported my hypothesis arguing that political Islam looks for institutional solutions while the Hizmet movement looks for cultural solutions.
CHAPTER 5. SOCIAL CAPITALS AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF ASSOCIATIONS THAT THE MOVEMENTS PRODUCE

In addition to my first hypothesis, there is another element on which the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey create vary. Both movements have produced different types of social capital. The Hizmet movement followed a philosophy and strategy that resulted in bridging social capital, whereas political Islam’s philosophy and strategy produced bonding social capital. In this section, I will first delve into the foundation of my hypothesis. Then, I will test my hypothesis using a quantitative survey analysis.

HYPOTHESIS

The foundation of my hypothesis relies on the concept of “social capital.” The concept of “capital” can be traced back to Marx (1995) in the 19th century. Capital is defined as an accumulation of money, including money itself, surplus value, and investment. After Marx, the concept has evolved over the years. Scholars have defined multiple types of capital, some quite different from Marx’s original concept. The meaning has evolved to cover all kind of elements that can buy goods and create profits. Bourdieu (1986) defined three types of capital – economic, cultural, and social – while Coleman (1988) described four: financial, physical, human, and social. As one of these capital types, social capital became an influential parameter in sociology studies in the 1980s. Lin (1999) defined social capital as “investments in social relations with expected returns,” arguing that social capital: (1) facilitates the flow of information, (2) represents its influence on an agent, (3) underscores the certification of an agent’s social credentials, and (4) reinforces identity and recognition. Then, Putnam (1993) analyzed the concept in
order to explain the democratic tendencies of North Italy as compared to those of the south. With his studies, Putnam (1993; 2000) popularized the concept of social capital in political science.

Putnam (1993) presented two forms of social capital creating different democratic tendencies in North and South Italy. The different forms were the results of dissimilar associations among people. He defined two types of association, bonding and bridging, that result in dissimilar forms of social capital. According to him, bonding associations reinforce exclusive identities within homogenous groups, whereas bridging associations enable social interactions between people across diverse cleavages. In another word, bonding social capital requires “homophilic ties” between individuals who are similar, whereas bridging social capital requires “heterophilic ties” between people who are different (Nichols, Tacon, and Muir 2012).

These two association types build up the base for my argument in this paper. My argument depends on the dissimilar social capital that the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey created for their followers. I argue that on the one hand the Hizmet movement creates more bridging associations for its followers, while on the other hand political Islam in Turkey creates more bonding association among its supporters. This hypothetical argument is based on four theoretical assumptions.

First, the nature of politics in emerging democracies pushed political Islam in Turkey to create more bonding social capital for the sake of political competition. Ward and Gleditsch (1998) argue that democracies require popular support, and popular support means strong in-group associations and polarization in young democracies. Thus, emergent democracies are more conflict prone. Mansfield and Synder (1995) also
underscore the effect of competition between old and new elites in emerging
democracies, asserting that the nature of political competition affects the democratization
process and makes countries more aggressive during the process. Old and new elites
compete with one another in times of transition. For the sake of competition, they
mobilize the masses but in the end they can’t control them due to weak institutions. Not
just weak democratic institutions, but also tenuous democratic norms may result in
conflicts in emerging democracies (Maov and Russett 1993). It concludes that it is not
easy to carry out the competition in balance in this type of democracies, and this
conclusion is not changing regardless of the causes of the conflicts.

Turkey is an emerging democracy that experienced two military coups in 1960
and 1980, as well as two military interventions in 1971 and 1997 that forced the
government out of power (Gursoy 2015). In addition to these unstable transitions, there
was visible rivalry between secular modernist and Islamist elites (Gole 1997). After
giving background information about these confrontations, Hermann (2011, 170-185)
delves into the rivalry between old elites and new elites in his book originally published
in German in 2008. He named old elites as “white Turks,” while he called new elites
“black Turks.” He argues that the polarization that is occurred in Turkey when the old
elites and new elites came across made some problems such as headscarf issue difficult to
solve. The unstable democratic transition and polarization between old and new elites
motivated the political parties to focus more on in-group associations to consolidate
popular support because in times of polarization and conflict “social cohesion” becomes a
more effective political tool rather than “social harmony.” It resulted in more bonding
than bridging social capital for the political groups in Turkey. Political Islam in Turkey is
one such political group. Contrary to these groups in direct politics, though the Hizmet movement shares the same environment with political Islam in Turkey, its non-political philosophy and strategy eliminated some effects of political polarization during the democratization process.

The second theoretical base depends on motivational resources and environmental factors that Hizmet-inspired people faced. The Hizmet movement prioritized dialogue with other religions, nations, and ideas. Additionally, the movement created an environment of dialogue for its followers. This prioritization and environment led to bridging associations. Fethullah Gulen, the leader of the movement, profoundly promoted interfaith and intercultural dialogue (F. Gulen 2000; Ali Unal and Williams 2000). Gulen saw dialogue and coexistence as one of the irrevocable values (Mercan 2017, 133-156). He motivated his sympathizers to create dialogue with others in many opportunities. It is obvious that his ideas and motivation influenced the movement’s attitudes strongly in many ways. Additionally, Hizmet-inspired foundations and people organized numerous activities that stressed interfaith and intercultural dialogue (Paul and Becker 2015). These activities led the people in the Hizmet movement not just come together with the people in different religions, nations or ideologies, but also made the Hizmet affiliated institutions and people to become the prominent figures in interfaith and intercultural dialogue (Lacey 2010). This dialogue atmosphere also made the Hizmet people create more bridging associations. Thus, I argue that the ideological (philosophical) motivations and environmental factors that the Hizmet movement created for dialogue result in more bridging associations for its followers, and produce bridging social capital.

Third, the Hizmet movement’s activities in different countries around the world
pushed Hizmet-people to create more bridging associations. Passive tolerance theories claim that people who live in diverse neighborhoods are more tolerant compared to people living in highly segregated areas; hence they initiate more associations in different communities. We can conclude that diverse living areas produce bridging social capital. Ebaugh (2010) stated that there were more than 1,000 Hizmet-inspired schools in over 100 countries on five continents when she wrote her book about the movement in 2010. In addition to these schools, there were Hizmet inspired universities, hospitals, media organizations, cultural centers, and charity organizations both inside and outside of Turkey. These wide-ranging activities in different regions and cultures required Hizmet-inspired people to live in different cultures and resulted in more bridging social capital.

Finally, the reactionary confrontation with the West and Western culture resulted in bonding social capital for political Islam in Turkey. Even if this was not the case for all Muslim-majority countries, most were introduced to the modern Western ideas through colonization and oppression. Modern political Islam ideologues such as Mawlana Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shariati, and Ayatollah Khomeini were raised in the era of colonization, and thus their ideas developed from that experience. Thus, one of the main frames of their ideas became anti-colonization, and anti-westernization. Political Islam in Turkey shares similar philosophies because of its ideological connection to the other political Islamist groups even though Turkey was not directly colonized in its history. Therefore, confrontations with the West and Western culture became the source of political Islam in Turkey too (Dagi 2005). This confrontation and reactionary attitude

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31 The institutions in Turkey was shut down by Turkish government after July 2016.
obstructed political Islam from creating bridging social capital with others because those others were mostly defined as Westerners or the puppets of Westerners.

*Hypothesis 2: The Hizmet movement created more bridging social capital.*

*Conversely, political Islam in Turkey created more bonding social capital.*

**SURVEY ANALYSIS**

I will use survey analysis to test my second hypothesis. In this section, you will first find the information about the dataset. Then, you will find out how I measured social capital using three categories of questions – trust questions, neighborhood questions, and belonging questions. You will also see the analysis outcomes based on the people’s answers to the survey questions.

**Dataset**

For my analysis, I used two sources. The main source is World Value Survey (WVS). WVS includes questions about changing values and their impact on social and political life. Nationally representative surveys from almost 100 countries formed WVS. The surveys are conducted in every five years. The last WVS, the 7th wave, was conducted between 2017 and 2020 and will be published in 2020. I used the WVS’s 6th wave conducted in 2012 in Turkey. There are 1605 survey responders from Turkey in the dataset. I assumed that political Islamists prioritize religion and politics in their life. Based on this assumption, I defined the people who declared “very important” to the importance of religion and politics in their life as political Islamists. Relying on this definition, I got 201 respondents as political Islamists in the dataset.
The second source is a survey questionnaire that was conducted by me. I prepared the questionnaire using 26 questions from WVS.\textsuperscript{32} For the survey, I communicated 63 people who declared that he/she was a Hizmet movement volunteer and were in Turkey in 2012. I asked them to answer all of the questions as they are in 2012 in Turkey\textsuperscript{33}. At the end, I got a dataset that has 264 respondents (201 political Islamists and 63 Hizmet volunteers). These respondents were asked the same 26 questions that appeared in WVS’s 6\textsuperscript{th} wave.

It is important to note that the category of “political Islamist” was created based on the assumption, however the category of “Hizmet volunteer” was created by self-declaration. Before doing my research, I looked into the applicability of this method. Table 7 shows the answers of the Hizmet volunteers if they are asked about the importance of politics and religions in their lives. The outcomes indicate that the Hizmet volunteers prioritize religion but not politics in their life. The results fortified my assessment that caused me to code the people who highly prioritize the role of both religion and politics in their life as political Islamists. All of the Hizmet volunteers who answered the question see religion “very important” or “rather important” in their life (93.65\% of them see it “very important,” 3.17\% of them see it “rather important”). Conversely, 27.57\% of the Hizmet volunteers see politics “very important” or “rather important” in their life, and just 4.76\% of them gave the answer of “very important” to the question. Almost 70\% of the Hizmet respondents see politics as “not very important,”

\textsuperscript{32} See Appendix D for the questionnaire.
\textsuperscript{33} All of the survey respondents were out of Turkey at the time of survey. It is very to difficult for a person to declare himself/herself as a Hizmet volunteer in Turkey in these days because the Turkish government called the movement a terrorist organization and its volunteers terrorists.
or “not at all important.” These outcomes demonstrate the applicability of my assessment and the method for this research.

Table 7. Importance of Religion and Politics in Life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Important in Life</th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Rather important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.17%</td>
<td>39.68%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>23.81%</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.17%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
<td>93.65%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operationalization and Analysis Outcomes**

I will use three categories of questions to measure social capital and different types of associations in multiple ways. The first category to measure social capital is “trust questions.” This type of question generally related to attitudinal and cognitive aspects of social capital. They can be measured by asking trust level in relation to certain groups or by asking general trust level questions (Aldrich and Meyer 2015). The second category is related to the acceptance of another people in your own environment. Because I used neighborhood as the environment, I called this type of questions “neighborhood questions.” Another measurement approach is finding out how strong belonging was created toward local or global structures. This category of questions is called “belonging questions.” In the upcoming pages, you will find analysis outcomes using all three categories of questions to measure social capital and different types of associations. In
this way, I will be more comfortable to draw a conclusion after looking at the outcomes analyzing social capital by using multiple ways of measurement methods.

**Trust Questions**

The first way of measuring social capital and association types is using “trust questions.” Levels of trust in relation to certain groups such as family, neighbors, and relatives can be used as a parameter of social capital via questions such as “what level of trust do you have in those who live near you?” (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004). The general level of trust is also used as a parameter of social capital via questions such as “can most people be trusted?” or “are most people honest?” (Putnam 2000, 91). High level of trust in homogenous groups require strong homophilic ties, so resulting in more bonding social capital. Conversely, high level of trust in diverse groups require heterophilic ties, so yielding more bridging social capital. This information builds the foundation of my analysis in this section.

In terms of the trust level in relation to certain groups, I used a block of questions in the World Value Survey. The block consists of six questions. The questions represent how much the survey responders trust their families, neighborhoods, the people whom they know, the people they meet for the first time, people of another religion, and people of another nation. Because my main hypothesis claims that political Islamists create more bonding associations, I expect that they trust more in homogenous (local) communities. Conversely, my main hypothesis requires that people in the Hizmet movement trust more in diverse communities. In short, I assert that the people in the Hizmet movement have more trust toward the groups that have members of dissimilar backgrounds, whereas political Islamists trust the groups that have members who share similarities. Based on
this, I have five hypotheses. I don’t have any expectation for the “how much you trust people you know personally?” question. For the other five questions, I have these hypotheses:

H2a: The people in the Hizmet movement have less trust in their families comparing to political Islamists.

H2b: The people in the Hizmet movement have less trust in their neighbors comparing to political Islamists.

H2c: The people in the Hizmet movement have more trust in the people they meet first time comparing to political Islamists.

H2d: The people in the Hizmet movement have more trust in people of another religion comparing to political Islamists.

H2e: The people in the Hizmet movement have more trust in people of another nation comparing to political Islamists.

Trust questions presenting general trust levels also can be used as a parameter to measure social capital. Thus, in addition to the previous ones, I used two more questions asking whether most of the people are trusted, and if the survey respondents think that “most people would try to take advantage of [them] if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair.” The first question is a yes/no question, and the second question has a scale from 0 to 10 to show the levels of trust. This study requires to figure out whom you trust rather than how much you trust because my main hypothesis is more related to the different association types. Trust can be created by bonding associations or by bridging associations. Therefore, these two questions do not initiate clear hypotheses. The outcomes will be more related to the interpretation of the questions by the survey
responders. The main hypothesis imposes an argument that the political Islamists have more trust in local communities, whereas the Hizmet volunteers have more trust in more diverse communities. Because the general trust questions may be interpreted in both directions, the outcomes are not clear to interpret. However, I don’t assume that there will be a significant difference among the movements’ followers because both groups are effective in creating social capital – bonding or bridging – for their followers, and it is one of the reasons behind their successes. Thus, I hypothesized that:

H2f: There won’t be significant difference between the people in the Hizmet movement and political Islamists when they are asked if most people can be trusted.

H2g: There won’t be significant difference between the people in the Hizmet movement and political Islamists when they are asked that “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?”
Table 8. The Trust Levels in Relation to Certain Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much you trust:</th>
<th>Do not trust at all</th>
<th>Do not trust very much</th>
<th>Trust somewhat</th>
<th>Trust completely</th>
<th>Tau-b</th>
<th>Pr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your family</td>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td>88.89%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>3.52%</td>
<td>95.48%</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your neighborhood</td>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>17.46%</td>
<td>34.92%</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>1.52%</td>
<td>10.61%</td>
<td>38.38%</td>
<td>49.49%</td>
<td>0.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People you know personally</td>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.92%</td>
<td>59.02%</td>
<td>36.07%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>4.04%</td>
<td>17.17%</td>
<td>41.92%</td>
<td>36.87%</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People you meet for the first time</td>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>15.87%</td>
<td>50.79%</td>
<td>31.75%</td>
<td>1.59%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>31.16%</td>
<td>44.72%</td>
<td>19.60%</td>
<td>4.52%</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of another religion</td>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>64.91%</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>23.20%</td>
<td>38.14%</td>
<td>29.90%</td>
<td>8.76%</td>
<td>-0.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of another nation</td>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>3.45%</td>
<td>32.76%</td>
<td>60.34%</td>
<td>3.45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>22.28%</td>
<td>34.72%</td>
<td>34.20%</td>
<td>8.81%</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8 depicts the outcomes related to the trust levels in relation to certain groups. The outcomes show that political Islamists have more trust in their families and neighborhood. Especially when it comes to the trust level toward neighborhood, the difference is highly significant (the p value is even less than 0.001). In terms of family, the difference is not significant in 0.95 confidence level, but it is significant in 0.90 confidence level. At this point, it is good to remember that the family structure in Turkish society is taken more than a group that includes similar members. You can find out that both groups highly respond “trust completely” when it comes to family. If we go back to interpret our outcomes after this small explanation, we see that these outcomes show a slight support for H2a and very strong support for H2b.

The outcomes also significantly support the hypothesis that the people in the Hizmet movement have more trust in the people they meet first time compared to political Islamists as indicated in H2c (p value= 0.031). Additionally, the people in the Hizmet movement have more trust in people of other religion and nation. The outcomes are very significant in these two cases (the p values are less than 0.001), and thus H2d and H2e are supported by the outcomes in addition to H2c.

These outcomes demonstrate a strong quantitative support to the first group of hypotheses. I had five hypotheses related to the trust levels in relation to certain groups. The outcomes indicated strong significant supports for four of them (the hypothesis related to “neighborhood,” “people who you meet first time,” “people of another religion,” “people of another nation”), and a slight support for the other one (the hypothesis related to “family”). Therefore, I conclude these outcomes support my main hypothesis arguing that political Islam results in more bonding social capital, thus leading
to more trust toward local communities. However, the Hizmet movement creates more bridging social capital, hence leading to more trust toward diverse communities.

Table 9. Most people can be trusted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Need to be very careful</th>
<th>Most people can be trusted</th>
<th>Chi (2)</th>
<th>Pr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>6.5138</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>11.58%</td>
<td>85.20%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>t value</th>
<th>Pr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>-0.5959</td>
<td>0.5518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let me also share the outcomes related to the general trust questions. Table 9 and Table 10 demonstrate the details of the outcomes. The interpretations related to the general trust questions are not as clear as the previous outcome-interpretations. For the question “Can most people be trusted,” the outcomes show that political Islamists carry more trust, and it is significant. It does not support hypothesis 2f. For the question “do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?”, we don’t see any significant difference, and it suits with H2g. As previously indicated, these outcomes mostly rely on respondent’s apprehension when he/she is asked the general trust questions. He/she can see the questions reflecting a trust toward local groups, or diverse groups. The general level of trust among the movements’ supporters as well as the causes and consequences of the general level of trust among
them can be a good area of research in the future though it is not in the scope of this study.

In short, the analysis of trust questions gave a good amount of information for this research. Though we don’t get a clear conclusion after having the outcomes related to the general trust questions, the trust questions in relation to certain groups reveal that political Islam in Turkey leads to more bonding social capital, whereas the Hizmet movement results in more bridging social capital.

**Neighborhood Questions**

The second way of measuring social capital and association types is by assessing the acceptance rate of sharing same environment with other people. Putnam (1993, 92 and 201-202) uses this way of measurement and argue that people become more satisfied if the regional or local government enable community activity facilities and opportunities. He claims that communal gatherings create an opportunity to share the same environment with others and thereby result in more bridging associations and vibrant associational life. Based on my main hypothesis, I expect that the people in the Hizmet movement are more tolerant to have neighbors with whom they are not emotionally or ideologically close because the movement creates more bridging social capital compared to the political Islam in Turkey.

In the WVS questionnaire there is a block of questions asking if the survey respondents mention a specific group of people they “would not like to have as neighbors.” There are nine questions in this regard. The questions ask if the survey respondents “would not like to have” (1) drug addicts, (2) heavy drinkers, (3) homosexuals, (4) unmarried couples living together, (5) people who have AIDS, (6)
immigrants/foreign workers, (7) people of a different religion, (8) people who speaks different languages, and (9) people of a different race as their neighbors. My main hypothesis is that the people in the Hizmet movement create more bridging associations compared to the political Islamists. Thus, they should be more supportive of sharing the same environment with the people from different backgrounds and people of different lifestyles. However, because Hizmet people share a conservative lifestyle as much as political Islamists, I also argue that Hizmet people are not supportive of actions which harm the community life and tolerant of the people who act like that. In sum, I have two expectations. First, I expect no significant difference between the Hizmet movement and political Islam in terms of sharing the same neighborhood with the people who harm the community life. Second, I expect a significant difference between the movements in terms of sharing the same neighborhood with the people from different backgrounds and people of different lifestyles. In this regard, I have nine specific hypotheses relying on to these two expectations.

H2h: There is not a significant difference between Hizmet people and political Islamists in mentioning that they would not like to have “drug addicts” as neighbor.

H2i: There is not a significant difference between Hizmet people and political Islamists in mentioning that they would not like to have “heavy drinkers” as neighbor.

H2j: The people in Hizmet movement are less likely to mention that they would not like to have “homosexuals” as neighbor compared to political Islamists.
H2k: The people in Hizmet movement are less likely to mention that they would not like to have “unmarried couples living together” as neighbor compared to political Islamists.

H2l: The people in Hizmet movement are less likely to mention that they would not like to have “people who have AIDS” as neighbor compared to political Islamists.

H2m: The people in Hizmet movement are less likely to mention that they would not like to have “immigrants/foreign Workers” as neighbor compared to political Islamists.

H2n: The people in Hizmet movement are less likely to mention that they would not like to have “people of a different religion” as neighbor compared to political Islamists.

H2o: The people in Hizmet movement are less likely to mention that they would not like to have “people who speak a different language” as neighbor compared to political Islamists.

H2p: The people in Hizmet movement are less likely to mention that they would not like to have “people of a different race” as neighbor compared to political Islamists.

In this part, we observe two groups of people whom survey respondents are asked whether they would not like to have in their neighborhood. The first group of people is more related to the bad habits that collide with conservative lifestyle. I count “drug addicts” and “heavy drinkers” in the first group. My hypotheses, H2h and H2i, indicate that both groups should equally react against to having a neighbor who has habitual
problems in terms of their conservative lifestyle. Table 11 demonstrates the outcomes related to the neighborhood questions analysis. The outcomes, as is seen in the table, show that Hizmet-people are even less tolerant to having this type of neighbors compared to the political Islamists. Both results are highly significant (p values are less than 0.01). These results partially support my hypothesis because the Hizmet movement did not create better tolerance to the first group of people because of the conservative lifestyle as I expected. However, the results indicate that political Islamists created more tolerance toward the groups. These results are statistically significant. It seems that people in the Hizmet movement have more conservative reaction comparing to the political Islam. It is not in the scope of this study, but it may be a good area of study for future researchers.

The second group of people are more related to the different backgrounds and different lifestyles. I count the rest of the categories – “homosexuals,” “unmarried couples living together,” people who have AIDS,” “immigrants/foreign workers,” “people of a different religion,” “people who speaks a different language,” and “people of a different race” – among these groups. The outcomes related to these groups show that people in the Hizmet movement are more tolerant as indicated in the other hypotheses in this section (H2j, H2k, H2l, H2m, H2n, H2o, H2p). The outcomes besides the outcomes for “homosexuals” are significant. The image of homosexuality between the movements in Turkey and also between Hizmet volunteers in different countries are another area of study. However, it is good to interpret our outcomes in terms of homosexuality at this point. It seems that the Hizmet volunteers in Turkey don’t see homosexuality as much as a different background or a different lifestyle like immigrants or people of a different religion, so the outcome did not create a significant difference in favor of the Hizmet
movement. On the other hand, they also don’t see homosexuality as much as a habitual deficiency colliding with their conservative lifestyle like drug addiction, so the outcome did not create a significant difference in favor of the political Islam. The outcomes show that the ideas of the Hizmet volunteers and political Islamists are closer to each other compared to the other groups of people. As I indicated previously there are several research questions to study related to this specific outcome, so it is a good area of study for future researches. Beside this point, the outcomes present a significant support for rest of the hypotheses, 2k, 2l, 2m, 2n, 2o, and 2p, and indicate that the people in Hizmet movement are more tolerant to different lifestyles, religion, languages, and races.
Table 11. Neighborhood Questions Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would not like to have as neighbors</th>
<th>Mentioned</th>
<th>Not Mentioned</th>
<th>Pearson chi(2)</th>
<th>Pr</th>
<th>Cramer's V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug addicts</td>
<td>The Hizmet Political Islam</td>
<td>98.41%</td>
<td>1.59%</td>
<td>7.0987</td>
<td>Pr = 0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>86.57%</td>
<td>13.43%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy drinkers</td>
<td>The Hizmet Political Islam</td>
<td>93.65%</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
<td>9.7167</td>
<td>Pr = 0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75.62%</td>
<td>24.38%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>The Hizmet PoliticalIslam</td>
<td>76.19%</td>
<td>23.81%</td>
<td>0.4444</td>
<td>Pr = 0.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80.10%</td>
<td>19.90%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried couples living together</td>
<td>The Hizmet Political Islam</td>
<td>49.21%</td>
<td>50.79%</td>
<td>6.627</td>
<td>Pr = 0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>67.16%</td>
<td>32.84%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who have AIDS</td>
<td>The Hizmet Political Islam</td>
<td>57.14%</td>
<td>42.86%</td>
<td>5.0045</td>
<td>Pr = 0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>72.14%</td>
<td>27.86%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants/foreign workers</td>
<td>The Hizmet Political Islam</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
<td>90.48%</td>
<td>4.4704</td>
<td>Pr = 0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.39%</td>
<td>78.61%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of a different religion</td>
<td>The Hizmet Political Islam</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
<td>96.83%</td>
<td>13.8359</td>
<td>Pr = 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.38%</td>
<td>75.62%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who speak a different language</td>
<td>The Hizmet Political Islam</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>95.24%</td>
<td>8.4435</td>
<td>Pr = 0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.40%</td>
<td>79.60%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of a different race</td>
<td>The Hizmet Political Islam</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
<td>96.83%</td>
<td>14.7309</td>
<td>Pr = 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25.37%</td>
<td>74.63%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In sum, the outcomes present two findings. First, the Hizmet movement results in more intolerance compared to the political Islam toward having the people who have habitual deficiencies in terms of their conservative lifestyle as their neighbors. Second, the Hizmet movement leads to more tolerance comparing to the political Islam toward having the people from different background and the people of different lifestyle as their neighbors. The first finding partially supports my two hypotheses, H2h and H2i. The second finding strongly supports six of my hypotheses, H2k, H2l, H2m, H2n, H2o, and H2p. In addition to these findings, the outcome related to homosexuals did not present a support for my hypothesis, H2j.

**Belonging Questions**

The third way of measuring the association types is using belonging questions. Putnam (2000) defines bonding associations as “super glue.” It is a super glue that reinforces identities within a homogenous group. Additionally, Vermeulen and Verweel (2009) state that bonding process is “identity works.” Nichols, Tacon, and Muir (2012) also focus on the relationship between bonding associations and sense of belonging when they highlight that people who have sport-club membership identify themselves as “we,” and the other group members as “like us.” The bonding association among them and the identity that sport-clubs created for them result in these self-identifications. These scholars prioritize the major role of bonding associations on collective identity formation because bonding associations lead to social cohesion and so sense of belonging. Relying on this theoretical base, I will use belonging questions to assess bonding social capital.

My main hypothesis states that the political Islam creates more bonding social capital compared to the Hizmet movement. Thus, I expect to see that the political
Islamists create stronger belongings especially in homogenous groups, and I hypothesize that political Islamists see themselves more as part of homogenous groups. Additionally, the effect of bonding association diminishes, and bridging association becomes more salient in diverse groups. Therefore, I also expect that the effect of bonding association to establish the sense of belonging decreases in diverse communities, and I hypothesize that the relationship between political Islamists and group identity does not continue to be seen in diverse communities.

To test my hypotheses, I used a block of questions in WVS, and called them belonging questions. I have five questions related to belonging. In the survey, respondents were asked how much they see themselves as “part of local community,” “part of the nation,” “citizen of the European Union,” “a world citizen,” and “an autonomous individual.” I have three hypotheses based on these questions. I did not use EU referring a group belonging for the Turkish people because the EU ascension process became a complicated process for Turkey and Turkish citizens. The EU was too far away to create a sense of belonging in 2012 for Turkish citizens, so the analysis of the question may misguide my studies. I also did not have a hypothesis about how people see themselves as an autonomous individual because it does not refer any group belonging. I categorized “local communities” and “the nation” as homogenous groups, so belongings related to them should be more associated with bonding social capital. On the other hand, I categorized “world citizens” as a diverse community, so the effect of bonding association and the sense of belonging should decrease in this category.

In addition to this block of questions, the WVS includes a question asking how much a person proud of his/her nationality. I also used this question for my analysis. In
this question, I expect that political Islamists become more proud of their nationalities comparing to Hizmet people because they create a group-identity in their nation due to bonding social capital.

H2r: Political islamists see themselves more as part of a local community compared to people in the Hizmet movement.

H2s: Political islamists see themselves more as part of their nation compared to people in the Hizmet movement.

H2t: Political Islam in Turkey does not create more sense of belongings toward world citizenry compared to the Hizmet movement.

H2u: Political islamists are more proud of their nations compared to people in the Hizmet movement.
Table 12. The Outcomes of the Belonging Questions Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I see myself as</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Kendall's Tau-b</th>
<th>Pr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>part of my local community</td>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>12.70%</td>
<td>52.38%</td>
<td>30.16%</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>part of my (country) nation</td>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
<td>49.21%</td>
<td>34.92%</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>2.51%</td>
<td>5.03%</td>
<td>36.68%</td>
<td>55.785</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizen of the European Union</td>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>26.67%</td>
<td>36.67%</td>
<td>28.33%</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>23.47%</td>
<td>27.55%</td>
<td>34.18%</td>
<td>14.80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a world citizen</td>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14.75%</td>
<td>34.43%</td>
<td>50.82%</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>2.04%</td>
<td>8.16%</td>
<td>31.63%</td>
<td>58.16%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>an autonomous individual</td>
<td>Hizmet</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
<td>19.05%</td>
<td>26.98%</td>
<td>47.62%</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Islam</td>
<td>4.04%</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
<td>42.42%</td>
<td>36.87%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The outcomes present that the political Islamists compared to Hizmet-people create more sense of belonging in all categories. The outcomes related to the “local communities” and “the nation” are statistically significant. They mean that political Islamists see themselves more as part of local communities and the nation, so these outcomes support two of my hypotheses (H2r and H2s). The outcomes related to world citizenship are not statistically significant. They show that the effect of bonding social capital reduced and lost its ability to create a significant difference between political Islamists and Hizmet volunteers in terms of creating identity toward world citizenship. However, it is interesting to see that even in this group, political Islamists feel more like world citizens. I cannot build a solid interpretation based on this result because the result is not significant, but future researchers might delve into the outcome to have more detail on the sense of belongings in diverse groups. Though it creates some more questions, the outcome supports my hypothesis related to the world citizenship (H2t). Although it is not related to any of my hypothesis, it is good to note that the outcomes also show that the people in the Hizmet movement see themselves more as autonomous individuals, but the outcome is not statistically significant.

Table 13. How proud of nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all proud</th>
<th>Not very proud</th>
<th>Quite proud</th>
<th>Very proud</th>
<th>Tau-b</th>
<th>Pr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hizmet</strong></td>
<td>17.86%</td>
<td>32.14%</td>
<td>26.79%</td>
<td>23.21%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Islam</strong></td>
<td>0.52%</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
<td>12.04%</td>
<td>84.29%</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to these questions, I had one more question that was for assessing pride in nationality. The outcome presents that political Islamists have more proud of their nationality, and it is highly significant clearly supports my last hypothesis (H2u).
In conclusion, all four of the hypotheses were supported by the analysis outcomes. Therefore, I can confidently conclude that political Islam in Turkey leads to more bonding association, and so creates more sense of belongings especially in homogenous groups.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I tried to figure out what kind of social capital the Hizmet movement and political Islam in Turkey produce for their followers. Social capital is a widely used concept in social sciences, and different types of associations provide different social capitals. Two types of associations – bonding and bridging – are defined in the literature. Bonding social capital is the expression of in-group associations, whereas bridging social capital is the expression of the associations between the people who don’t think like each other.

Relying on this terminology, my main hypothesis in this chapter is that the Hizmet movement produces more bridging social capital, while on the contrary the political Islam creates more bonding social capital.

My hypothesis relied on four theoretical bases;

(1) The nature of politics in emerging democracies pushed political Islam in Turkey to create bonding social capital.

(2) The Hizmet movement prioritized the idea of dialogue, and established dialogue atmosphere for its followers. This motivation and environment produced bridging social capital.

(3) The activities of the Hizmet movement in different countries around the world led to bridging social capital.
(4) The reactionary confrontation with the West and Western culture limited bridging association opportunities and resulted in bonding social capital for political Islam in Turkey.

To analyze the hypotheses that rely on the four theoretical bases, I used a quantitative survey analysis. I formed three categories of questions for my analysis. The first category was trust questions. The outcomes after analyzing trust questions revealed that political Islamists have more trust in homogenous groups such as families and neighborhood. However, the Hizmet volunteers carry more trust in diverse communities such as the people whom they met for the first time, people of other religions, and people of other nations. I also asked general trust questions in the survey. These questions demonstrated that the general trust level is more related to the respondent’s perception of trust. The perception may work in favor of homogenous communities or diverse communities.

The second category of questions was neighborhood questions. I hypothesized that the Hizmet volunteers are more tolerant to share their own environment with people whom they don’t think like because the Hizmet movement produced bridging social capital for its volunteers. The analysis related to this category of questions presented that Hizmet people are more intolerant of drug addicts and heavy drinkers as neighbors, while political Islamists are more intolerant of unmarried couples living together, people who have AIDS, immigrants/foreign workers, people of a different religion, people who speak a different language, and people of a different race as neighbors. All these results are statistically significant, channeling me toward two conclusions. First, the Hizmet movement carry concerns neighbors who have habitual deficiency in terms of their
conservative lifestyle in their neighborhood. Second, they have more tolerance to accept others in their neighborhood because the Hizmet movement produced bridging social capital for them.

The last category of questions was belonging questions. My hypothesis indicates two arguments. First, political Islamists have more sense of belonging compared to Hizmet-people because of bonding social capital. Second, the sense of belonging diminishes in diverse communities because bridging social capital, instead of bonding social capital, is salient in diverse communities. The outcomes after analyzing the questions in this category showed that political Islamists see themselves more as part of their local community, part of the nation, and a world citizenship. The outcomes for the first two questions are significant and show that political Islamists have more sense of belonging because the movement produced bonding social capital for its supporters. The third outcome related to the world citizenry is not significant showing that the impact of bonding social capital decreases in diverse communities.

In sum, the statistically significant results after analyzing three categories of questions fortified my main hypothesis arguing that the Hizmet movement produced bridging social capital, whereas political Islam in Turkey created bonding social capital for their followers.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

This study compared two influential social movements in Turkey: the Hizmet movement and political Islam. Historical review demonstrates that there are continuous and deep attitudinal differences between the movements. I aimed to see the effects of the different attitudes between the movements.

The widely-used social movement theories – political opportunity theory and resource mobilization theory – overrate the similarities and create an obstacle to clearly see the effects of the different attitudes. Additionally, competition-based business theories are used to explain artificial differences. Two competitors may differentiate themselves from each other strategically for the sake of competition. These theories also do not present a good explanation to understand the deep attitudinal differences between the movements. Thus, this study was needed to establish an additional theoretical perspective for an explanation about the attitudinal differences between the movements. It also builds up an alternative base for explanations on attitudinal characteristics among social movement theories.

I first looked into the relationship between movement affiliations and solution-orientations. I hypothesized that political Islam in Turkey looked for institutional solutions while the Hizmet movement looked for cultural solutions. Both case studies and quantitative content analysis supported the hypothesis. Though I applied the relationship in different categories such as education, economy, renewal, and religion; a better design – especially more data gatherings in some specific categories – is necessary in the future to observe the relationship in different categories. Additionally, my time frame doesn’t cover post-2016 era. The sharp confrontation and conflict in the post-2016 era among the
movements seems to influence their attitudes. Future research would be beneficial to investigate how this era influenced the movements’ orientations in general.

Second, I delved into the relationship between affiliation and social capital. I hypothesized that political Islam in Turkey produced more bonding social capital while the Hizmet movement produced more bridging social capital. To test my hypothesis, I used a quantitative survey analysis including three categories of questions – trust questions, neighborhood questions and belonging questions. The analysis outcomes demonstrated that:

(1) Political Islamists have more trust in homogenous groups, whereas hizmet volunteers have more trust in diverse groups compared to each other.

(2) Compared to political Islamists, Hizmet volunteers are more tolerant of different people as their neighbor, but they are more intolerant of the people who have habitual deficiencies in term of their conservative definition as their neighbor.

(3) Compared to the Hizmet movement, political Islam in Turkey creates more sense of belongings in homogenous groups, but the relationship loses its strength in diverse communities.

These findings support my hypothesis. In addition to these findings, the analysis revealed five areas that need attention for a better understanding in the future. The first one is related to the general trust level. This type of trust can be produced by bridging or bonding social capital depending on the direction of the trust, whether it is toward homogenous groups or diverse groups. Causes and consequences of the trust level regardless of the direction is an area of study that I did not delve into in this study.
Second, conservative reactions of the Hizmet movements compared to the political Islam is higher according to the outcomes. The definition and perception of conservatism and its effects on the movements are other areas of research that should be considered more intense. The third area is about the perception of homosexuality. Does it perceive as a lifestyle or as a habitual deficiency in the minds of Hizmet people? It is an additional research question needed a close attention. Besides that, there can be different perception specifically on this issue, and generally on some other issues between the Hizmet communities in different countries. I believe that the perceptual and attitudinal differences between the Hizmet communities in different cultures is necessary to understand the movement better. Moreover, the last area is related to sense of belonging in diverse groups. We observed that bonding social capital is influential to create the sense, but it loses its effects in diverse communities. It is important to study how sense of belonging is created in diverse communities.

In sum, this research reveals the limited utility of resource mobilization, political opportunity, and competition-based business theories. Additionally, it finds out the usefulness of a focus on movement philosophy and ideology as it impacts their solution-orientations and social capital. These findings lead to a new perspective to evaluate social movements and their attitudinal characteristics.
APPENDIX A. TIMELINE
APPENDIX B. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS OF TURKEY

The “Freedom Rating” and “Aggregate Freedom Score” between 1999 and 2019 in Turkey. Source: www.freedomhouse.org

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Freedom Rating</th>
<th>Aggregate Freedom Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GDP per capital between 1998 and 2018 in Turkey. Source: www.ceicdata.com

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$4,496</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>$4,108</td>
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<td>$4,317</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>$9,311</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C. THE WORDS IN THE DICTIONARY

Cultural Words in the Dictionary:

barış, barışa, barışacak, barışacaksa, barışıları, barışmadığı, barışmak, barışmalıdır,
barışmanın, barışması, barışmasını, barışmasının, barışmaya, barışmaz, barıştıran,
barıştırmak, barıştırmaya, barıştırmamasıyla, barışıç, barışıçil, barışı, barışık, barışıklığın,
barışın, barışıp, kimlik, kimlikle, kimlikler, kimliklerin, kimliklerinden, kimliklerine,
kimliklerini, kimlikleriyle, kimliksizliğidir, kimliksizliğine, kimlikte, kimliğe, kimliği,
kimliğim, kimliğiniz, kimliğimize, kimliğimize, kimliğinizin, kimliğinin, kimliğinden,
kimliğine, kimliğimi, modern, moderncesinden, modernist, modernistler,
modernistlerle, modernistik, modernizasyonlar, modernize, modernizm, modernizme,
modernizm, modernizme, modernleşme, modernleşme, modernleşmek, modernleşmekte,
modernleşme, modernleşmeye, modernleştirebilir, modernliği, kültür, kültürce,
kültürde, kültürden, kültürde, kültür, kültür, kültürler, kültürlerle, kültürleri,
kültürlere, kültürleri, kültürlerin, kültürlerin, kültürlerin, kültürleryle, kültürlerle,
kültürlerle, kültürlerle, kültürlerle, kültürlerle, kültürlerle, kültürlerle,
kültürlüğünü, kültürümüz, kültürümüzde, kültürümüzden, kültürümüzde,
kültürlüğünü, kültürümüz, kültüründe, kültüründen, kültürün, kültüründe,
kültürlüğü, kültürümüz, kültürümüz, kültürümüz, kültürümüz, kültürümüz,
kültürlüğü, kültürümüz, kültürümüz, kültürümüz, kültürümüz, kültürümüz,
kültürlüğü, kültürümüz, kültürümüz, kültürümüz, kültürümüz, kültürümüz,
çoşulcu, çoğulculuk, çoğulculuğu, etik, medeni, medenileşme, medenileştirmek, medenilik, medeniliği, medeniliğin, medeninin, medeniyet, medeniyeti, medeniyetle, medeniyetleri, medeniyetlerdir, medeniyetlerin, medeniyette, medeniyetten, medeniyettir, medeniyi, prensibe, prensibi, prensibidir, prensibin, prensibine, prensibini, prensibinin, prensibiyle, prensip, prensipler, prensiplerden, prensiplere, prensipleri, prensipleridir, prensiplerini, prensiplerinin, prensipleryle, prensiplerle, prensipte, prensiptir, peace, peaceable, peaceably, peacebuilders, peacebuilding, peaceful, peacefully, peacefulness, peaceislands, peacemaker, peacemakers, peacemaking, identities, identity, identités, modernday, modernen, modernes, modernisation, modernise, modernised, modernising, modernism, modernist, modernistic, modernists, modernities, modernity, modernization, modernize, modernized, modernizers, modernizing, modern, cultural, culturalised, culturalism, culturalist, culture, cultured, cultures, culturl, responsibilities, responsibility, responsibly, traditie, tradities, tradition, traditional, traditionalism, traditionalist, traditionalists, traditionally, traditionist, traditionists, traditions, traditon, virtue, virtues, virtuous, virtuousness, tolerance, tolerancebased, tolerans, toleration, tolerances, tolerance, valuable, value, valuelessness, values, valuing, moral, morale, moral, moralism, moralist, moralities, morality, moralization, moralizes, moralizing, morally, morals, respect, respectable, respected, respectful, respectfully, respecting, respective, respectively, respects, harmonic, harmonies, harmonious, harmoniously, harmonisation, harmonise, harmonization, harmonize, harmonized, harmonizes, harmonizing, harmony, wisdimization, wisdom, wisdomization, wisdoms, altruism, altruist, altruistic, altruistically, equality, equalization, equalize, equalizer, equally, honest, honestly, honesty, pluralism, pluralisms, pluralist, pluralistic, plurality, pluralité, pluralizing, ethic, ethical, ethically, ethicalreligious, ethicists, ethics, ethik, ethnic, ethiopia, civic, civicism, civics, civil, civilian, civilians, civilisation, civilisation, civilisations, civilised, civilta, civility, civiliza, civilization, civilizational, civilizations, civilized, civilizing, civiltta, civilization, principally, principals, principe, principle, principled, principles

Institutional Words in the Dictionary:

anayasa, anayasada, anayasadır, anayasalar, anayasalardır, anayasalarımız, anayasalarımızın, anayasalarını, anayasamızdaki, anayasamızın, anayasa, anayasanın, anayasasına, anayasasında, anayasasındaki, anayasasinın, anayasaya, anayasayı, cumhuriyet, cumhuriyete, cumhuriyeti, cumhuriyetin, cumhuriyetinde, cumhuriyetine, cumhuriyetinin, cumhuriyetle, cumhuriyetler, cumhuriyetlerde, cumhuriyetleri, cumhuriyetlerin, cumhuriyetlerindeki, cumhuriyetlerinden, cumhuriyetlerine, cumhuriyetlerinin, cumhuriyetlerle, cumhuriyetten, cumhuriyettiir, diyane, diyanete, diyaneti, diyanetin, diyanetten, düzen, düzenlerde, düzenler, düzendir, düzeni, düzenler, düzeninde, düzenimiz, düzenin, düzeninde, düzenine, düzenini, düzeninin, düzeniyle, düzenle, düzenler, düzenlerde, düzenlerine, düzenleri, düzenlerin, düzenlerini, düzenlerinin, düzenlemeye, düzenlemeler, düzenlemelerde, düzenlemelerdir, düzenlemelerere, düzenlemeleri, düzenlemelerin, düzenlemelerine, düzenlemelerini,
APPENDIX D. THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire was prepared by Fevzi Saraç, a PhD candidate at Louisiana State University for an academic study. Survey data will not be shared with any other persons, institutions or organizations. The personal information of the respondents is not asked. Even if this information is known, it will not be noted and used.

Note: The abbreviation NI in the questionnaire means I have no idea, and the abbreviation NA means no answer.

What is your gender?
1 Male
2 Female

Where were you living in 2012?
1 In Turkey
2 Outside of Turkey

The people who indicated that they were living in 2012 in Turkey will continue to do the rest of the survey.

34 The Turkish version of this questionnaire were used. The format of the Turkish version is the same as the questionnaire published here.
Answer the following questions by centering your thoughts on 2012. Answer the question anticipating that you are in Turkey in the year of 2012.

1- Do you define yourself as a Hizmet movement volunteer?
   1. Yes, I am a Hizmet movement volunteer
   2. No, I am not a Hizmet movement volunteer

2- For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is Very important, important Not very important, Not at all important

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Not Very Important</th>
<th>Not at All Important</th>
<th>NI</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3- I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust Completely</th>
<th>Trust Somewhat</th>
<th>Do not Trust Very Much</th>
<th>Do not Trust at All</th>
<th>NI</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your family</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your neighborhood</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People you know personally</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People you meet for the first time</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of another religion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of another nationality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4- Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?
   1. Most people can be trusted
   2. Need to be very careful
   ..............................................
   -1 NI -2 NA

5- On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mentioned</th>
<th>Not Mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug addicts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of a different race</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who have AIDS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants/foreign workers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of a different religion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy drinkers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried couples living together</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who speak a different language</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6- Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? Please show your response on this card, where 1 means that “people would try to take advantage of you,” and 10 means that “people would try to be fair”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People would try to take advantage of you</td>
<td>People would try to be fair</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7- People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Using this card, would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>NI</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I see myself as a world citizen.</td>
<td>I see myself as part of my local community.</td>
<td>I see myself as part of the Turkish nation.</td>
<td>I see myself as part of the European Union</td>
<td>I see myself as an autonomous individual.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8- How proud are you to be Turkish? Choose one of these options.

1 Very proud
2 Quite proud
3 Not very proud
4 Not at all proud

5 I am not Turkish

-1 NI -2 NA
APPENDIX E. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (IRB) NOTIFICATION

Date: April 13, 2020
To: Malcolm Richardson
   Interim Dean, Graduate School
Through: Stephen Beck
       Associate Vice President, ORED
Re: Unapproved Project

The IRB office was notified by a PhD candidate (Fevzi Sarac, Political Science, major professor Leonard Ray) that his dissertation research, which involved human subjects was not properly submitted to the IRB for review. The use of human subjects in this project involved surveying people in Turkey about their experiences in 2012 regarding the Hizmet movement and political Islam. Generally, surveys-based projects qualify for approval through the exemption process since the risk level is minimal. However, a risk level determination is not possible at this point for this dissertation. Therefore, this project will be recorded in IRB files as unapproved with a non-determined risk level.

Thank you,

Dennis Landin
Professor Emeritus, Kinesiology
Chair, Institutional Review Board
dlandin@lsu.edu

cc: Elizabeth Cadarette
Leonard Ray
Fevzi Sarac
REFERENCES


Ahvalnews. 2019. “Turkish Court Acquits All Suspects in Ergenekon Trial.”
eryenekon-trial (February 5, 2020).


Ebaugh, Helen Rose, and Dogan Koc. 2007. “Funding Gulen-Inspired Good Works: Demonstrating and Generating Commitment to the Movement.” In Muslim World in


———. 2013f. “Hor Bakma, Gönül Yıkma (Don’t Look Despicable, Don’t Break Heart).” herkul.org.


Journal of Political Science 16: 57–86.


VITA

Fevzi Sarac was born in a small city named Elazig in Turkey. He went to Istanbul University for BS in Electric-electronic engineering. After graduation, he moved to New York, and earned his MA degree in Political Science in Long Island University. The he moved to Louisiana to pursue his PhD in Louisiana State University. He is married and has two daughters.